1974 NASA AUTHORIZATION B 693,508 HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT OF THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTIOS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ON H.R. 4567 (Superseded by H.R. 7528) FEBRUARY 27, 28; MARCH 1, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 23, 26, 1973 [No. 1] Part 2 Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Astronautics § ** DEPost-reb Ex T}_i > fºr TED STAT * * : * ~. c -- , ES OF A ñº ſº (v2. - * ... ." 1974 NASA AUTHORIZATION HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT OF THE COMMITTEE ON - SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ON H.R. 4567 (Superseded by H.R. 7528) FEBRUARY 27, 28; MARCH 1, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 23, 26, 1973 [No. 1] Part 2 Printed for the use of the Committee On Science and Astronautics § U.S. GOVERNMENT, PRINTING OFFICE 93–466 O WASHINGTON : 1973 COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICs OLIN E. TEAGUE, Texas, Chairman KEN HECHLER, West Virginia JOHN W. DAVIS, Georgia THOMAS N. DOWNING, Virginia DON FUQUA, Florida JAMES W. SYMINGTON, Missouri RICHARD T. HANNA, California WALTER FLOWERS, Alabama ROBERT A. ROE, New Jersey WILLIAM R. COTTER, Connecticut MIKE McCORMACK, Washington BOB BER GLAND, Minnesota J. J. PICKLE, Texas GEORGE E. BROWN, JR., California DALE MILFORD, Texas RAY THORNTON, Arkansas BILL GTJNTER, Florida CHARLES A. MOSHER, Ohio ALPHONZO BELL, California JOHN W. WYDLER, New York LARRY WINN, JR., Kansas LOUIS FREY, JR., Florida BARRY M. GOLDWATER, JR., California MARVIN L. ESCH, Michigan JOHN N. HAPPY CAMP, Oklahoma JOHN B. CONLAN, Arizona STANFORD E. PARRIS, Virginia PAUL W. CRONIN, Massachusetts JAMES G. MARTIN, North Carolina *-** *-** John L. SWIGERT, JR., Executive Director JAMES E. WILSON, Deputy Director JOHN A. CARSTARPHEN, Jr., Chief Clerk and Counsel PHILIP B. YEAGER, Counsel FRANK R. HAMMILL, Jr., Counsel HARold A. GóULD, Technical Consultant J. THOMAS RATCHFORD, Science Consultant WILLIAM G. WELLs, Jr., Technical Consultant JOHN D. HOLMFELD, Science Policy Consultant THOMAS N. TATE, Technical Consultant and Counsel CARL SWARTZ, Minority Staff Jose PH DEL RIEGO, Minority Staff FRANK J. GIRoux, Clerk DENIS C. QUIGLEY, Publications Clerk SUBCOMMITTEE on MANNED SPACE FLIGHT DON FUQUA, Florida, Chairman WALTER FLOWERS, Alabama ROBERT A. ROE, New Jersey WILLIAM R. COTTER, Connecticut BOB BER GLAND, Minnesota BILL GUNTER, Florida LARRY WINN, JR., Kansas ALPHONZO BELL, California JOHN W. WYDLER, New York LOUIS FREY, JR., Florida JOHN N. HAPPY CAMP, Oklahoma (II) C O N T E N T S WITNESSES February 27, 1973: Dale D. Myers, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, National Aeronautics and Space Administration; accompanied by: Harry H. Gorman, Deputy for Management to the Associate Ad- ministrator for Manned Space Flight, NASA, and William C. Schneider, Director, Skylab Program, NASA-------------------- February 28, 1973: William C. Schneider, Director, Skylab Program, NASA____________ Harry H. Gorman, Deputy Associate Administrator, Management, Office of Manned Space Flight, NASA_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ! March 1, 1973: -- *ś Myers, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, Douglas R. Lord, Director, Sortie Lab Task Force, NASA__________ March 6, 1973: Pº, Myers, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, Maj. Gen. R. H. Curtin, USAF (Ret.), Director, Facilities Office, Office of Administration, NASA------------------------------. Philip E. Culbertson, Director, Mission and Payload Integration, Office of Manned Space Flight, NASA_ _ _ _ _-------------------- March 7, 1973: William D. Bergen, President, North American Aerospace Group, Rockwell International--------------------------------------- Chester, M. Lee, Program Director, Apollo/Soyuz Test Project, March 8, 1973: Prof. Maurice Levy, Chairman, European Space Research Organiza- tion Council----------------- – “ — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —---- Charles R. Able, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company; accompanied by: Charles W. Hutton, Vice President (Marketing), George Butler, Skylab Pro- gram Manager, McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company, and John Disher, Skylab Program Manager, NASA_____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ March 13, 1973: - Col. Henry B. Stelling, Jr., Director of Space Headquarters, USAF---- James J. Harford, Executive Secretary, American Institute of Aero- nautics and Astronautics; accompanied by: Dr. Jerry Grey, Admin- istrator, Technical Activities, AIAA, and J. Preston Layton, Senior Research Engineer and Lecturer, Princeton University----------- March 14, 1973: Dr. Harrison H. Schmitt, Astronaut (Apollo 17)------------------- Dr. Rocco A. Petrone, Director, Marshall Space Flight Center and Apollo Program Director------------------------------------- Philip E. Culbertson, Director, Mission and Payload Integration, Office of Manned Space Flight, NASA_ _ _ _--------------------- Dr. Charles A. Berry, NASA, Director for Life Sciences_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ March 15, 1973: David Fradin, Chairman of the Federation of Americans Supporting Science and Technology-------------------------------------- Thomas Brownell, FASST Executive Director--------------------- Dr. T. A. Heppenheimer, FASST Vice Chairman/Technical--------- W. Craig Howell, Universe Astronautics Foundation, Inc.; accom- panied by: William P. O'Neill, Vice President, Research and De- velopment, and Peter J. Luciano, Director, Economic Research and Analysis---------------------------------------------------- March 23, 1973: North American Space Division, and the Rocketdyne Division, Rock- Well International------------------------------------------- March 26, 1973: Briefings by Lockheed Missiles and Space Company_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Page 45 122 149 221 237 241 260 291 380 395 403 473 484 501 533 276 572 765 783 787 814 831 989 (III) APPENDIXES Appº. A: Field hearings: ohn F. Kennedy Space Center: (Summary of current status and Page future plans) - * - * * * * * * * * *m mº sº * * * * * * * * * - smºs º-º º ºsmº - - -- *sº º sº * * *-* * * * * * * * * * * * * 1010 Johnson Space Center: (Briefings)------------------------------- 1038 Marshall Space Flight Center: (Statement by Dr. Rocco Petrone, Director)--------------------------------------------------- 1075 Chrysler Corporation Space Division (Furnished for the Record)— — — — 1206 Appendix B: Questions and answers for the Record-------------------- 1247 (IV) 1974 NASA AUTHORIZATION TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1973 Hous E OF REPRESENTATIVES, CoMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS, SUBCOMMITTEE on MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, . Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, in room 2325, Rayburn House Office Building, at 10 a.m., Hon. Don Fuqua (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. FUQUA. The subcommittee will be in order. First, I would like to welcome the new members of our subcom- mittee to our first hearing on NASA authorization for fiscal year 1974. I would like also to welcome back to the subcommittee all of the mem- bers on both sides of the aisle who served so faithfully on this subcom- mittee during the past years. - We have with us Dale Myers, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight. It is good to welcome Mr. Myers and his staff back. I would like to offer several comments before we proceed. It is my intention, having conferred with Chairman Teague, to hold hearings in the field at the Manned Space Flight NASA centers, also with several of the key contractors, during the same time as we hold hearings here in Washington. I would like to urge all the sub- committee members to take part in these hearings. As you all know, our space program has been continuously declin- ing for the past 7 years and a number of key questions need resolution during these hearings this year. Among those are such questions as: Can the Space Shuttle be developed in an orderly manner with the funds currently projected for research and development? - Another question is: Should we consider the flight of the second Skylab after the completion of the currently planned Skylab in 1973? Are we doing enough in such areas as the development of the space tug, a sortie laboratory, and the development of international coopera- tion in manned space flight? I am confident that we can count on you, Dale Myers, and your associates in the Office of Manned Space Flight, to provide us with adequate answers to these and other questions during the hearings. Following the authorization hearings, I fully expect that the Manned Space Flight Subcommittee, in exercising its oversight function will be looking into a number of other issues associated within its jurisdiction. I know we can count on the cooperation of NASA, where appro- priate, in dealing with these activities, and I look forward to an active year for the Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight. (1). 2 I also would note you are accompanied by William C. Schneider, Director of the Skylab program, and Mr. Harry Gorman, Deputy for Management, to the Associate Administrator, M.S.F. I would like to ask the ranking minority member, Mr. Winn, if he has any opening comments as we begin these hearings this year. Mr. WINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We do welcome you, Dale, and your staff, to these hearings. We have a long, involved schedule. I am sure we will be seeing you not only at the hearings up here but on at least several of the trips where the committee will be inspecting NASA facilities. It is nice to welcome you this morning. Mr. Fuqua. Please proceed. - [Biographical sketch of Mr. Myers follows: DALE D. MYERS Associate ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, NASA Dale D. Myers is Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, National Aeronautics and Space Administration. He assumed direction of NASA’s manned space flight program on January 12, 1970. In this capacity he is responsible for the planning, direction, execution, and evaluation of NASA’s overall manned Space flight program. These functions include management authority over the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, Manned Spacecraft Center, and John F. Kennedy Space Center. - Myers was born in Kansas City, Mo., on January 8, 1922. He was graduated from the University of Washington, Seattle, Wash., in 1943 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He received an honorary Ph. D. from Whitworth College in 1970. He joined North American Aviation in June 1943, as an aeronautical engineer. In 1946 he joined the Aerophysics Department of North American, which was engaged in research and development of long-range supersonic guided missiles. He progressed through aerodynamics and flight test to Assistant Director of the Aerophysics Department in 1954. In 1956 he was named Chief Engineer of the newly formed Missile Division, and in 1957 became Piogram Manager for the Air Force Hound Dog missile. He was appointed Vice President and Program Manager of the Hound Dog program in 1960. In April 1964, after a short period of advanced design, he became Vice President and Program Manager of the Apollo Command and Service Modules activities at North American Rockwell Corp., the company’s present name. Myers is a Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and a Fellow of the American Astronautical Society. In February 1969, he was awarded the NASA Certificate of Appreciation for his contributions to the Apollo 8 moon-orbiting flight, and in September 1969, he received the NASA Public Service Award for his contributions to the success of the Apollo 11 lunar landing mission. In February 1971, he received the NASA Distinguished Service Medal for his contributions to the continuing success of the Apollo program. Myers is married to the former Marjorie Williams of Seattle, and has two daughters. STATEMENT OF DALE D. MYERS, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, NASA; ACCOMPANIED BY HARRY H. GORMAN, DEPUTY FOR MANAGEMENT TO THE ASSOCIATE ADMIN- ISTRATOR FOR MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, NASA; AND WILLIAM C. SCHNEIDER, DIRECTOR, SKYLAB PROGRAM, NASA Mr. MYERs. I want to thank you for the opportunity to present the Manned Space Flight budget request for fiscal year 1974. I would like to discuss the highlights of our request and have my program directors discuss the details. 3 I strongly believe that the terms “accomplishment,” “transition” and “commitment to the future” best signify the present state of manned space flight. All of us can be justly proud of this Nation’s accomplishments in space, which could never have been realized without the strong support of this committee. The Nation has come a long way since the early days of the Mercury Program. We have mastered the technology to reach out beyond our planet and to view the Earth in an entirely new perspective. The historic accomplishments of the Apollo Program are an open record and an enduring tribute to a basic belief in human progress. The Apollo flights, in 3 short years, gave us an order of mangitude increase in our knowledge of the solar system. Although the epic Apollo voyages have ended, the results of these missions will provide the scientific, the technical, and medical, and the managerial com- munities with a rich store of data that will be studied and analyzed for many years to come. I purposely included, in addition to the much heralded scientific treasure of the Apollo Program, the technical, the medical, and the management fields since so much of what we have learned falls in these categories and is of direct and practical benefit. Your committee recognized this in your excellent report on “The Practical Returns From Space Investment” issued last October. Having completed the Apollo Program, we have now completed a transition. We have moved from the era of learning how to live and work in space to a new plateau, where this Nation can utilize space and its unique capabilities for expanding its horizons in science and in applications, in defense, commercial activities and in inter- national cooperation at reduced costs. The challenge facing us now is to consolidate, to refine and to apply what we learned as we move into the era of space utilization for man’s benefit. Skylab, with its first launch only a few weeks away, is the first post- Apollo step into the extensive utilization of space. Much of what we will learn in Skylab will be based on our experiences in the past, while at the same time, will be absolutely essential to chart the future. The Apollo Soyuz Test Project—we refer to it as ASTP-is also a part of our new plateau in the use of space. Here we are taking a major step forward in meaningful and beneficial international coopera- tion in manned space flight. A thrust of this magnitude implies a commitment to the future. We are committed to international cooperation. There has been a steady increase of international interest and participation in our manned space flight programs. There are 48 international investigations in the Skylab Program, for example. - I would like to interject here that these investigations do not involve our funds. The foreign participants are using their own money. The ASTP mission itself will also be an undertaking of unique inter- national character. Later, the Space Shuttle, now being developed, will provide ample additional opportunities for meaningful technical and economic cooperation in space. One of its many new opportunities will be to carry the Sortie Lab, now being developed by a group of European nations, again using their own funds. 4. We are also committed to the use of space at the lowest possible cost. This commitment is based on the knowledge gained from over a decade of successful space flight, and the capability to apply that knowledge to reducing the cost of producing space results. #: me now continue with the specifics of my presentation to you today. - Since my testimony on the fiscal year 1973 budget last year, we completed the Apollo Program with the successful launches of Apollo 16 and 17. We are not requesting any funds for Apollo in fiscal year 1974. - The Apollo accomplishments are well known. Each successive mis- sion resulted in incremental and systematic expansion of our knowledge of the Moon, of the universe and the Earth, itself. The last mission, Apollo 17, was perhaps the most successful of the entire program. It had fewer anomalies than any other flight and set ten records during its 12% days in space. Apollo 17 was the first mission in which results from previous missions played a key role in the selection of the landing site. It was also the first mission on which a number of new and second generation experiments were available, based on past lunar experience. The crew included the first scientist (geologist) astronaut and the flight carried more experiments than any previous Apollo mission. Starting with Apollo 15, experimentation took the lead role over exploration. Apollo 17 culminated this transition and, as a result, a wealth of new information was gained from this most scientifically rewarding mission. - The Apollo 17 astronauts left a plaque on the lunar surface before lift-off for their homebound journey. The plaque commemorates the completion of man's first exploration of the Moon. The term “first exploration” is significant because it carries the promise that some- day man will return to the Moon to continue this great achievement of the century. Later in your hearings, Astronaut Jack Schmitt will discuss what we have learned about the Moon. - As I reported to this committee in January, part of closing out the Apollo activity is a very careful screening of available production tooling for applicability to future shuttle or other NASA requirements. As far as the flight articles are concerned, assuming no need for the use of backup hardware in the Skylab or ASTP missions, we will have two Saturn V and two Saturn IB launch vehicles available. We will also have one completed CSM and two partially assembled CSMs in addition to the backup Skylab cluster. This hardware will be placed in storage for potential use. We will continue to inform this committee of any changes in their status. - 5 AVAILABLE APOLL0 / SATURN / SKYLAB HARDWARE ASSUMING NO FAILURES IN SKYLAB AND ASTP LAUNCH WEHICLE |-SATURN V– SPACECRAFT ſº ſº-º: COMPLETE -ſº | | || I —l - NASA HQ MT73-5088 CSM BACK UP SKYLAB CLUSTER REV. 2-13–73 As important as the hardware is to the success of space missions, one should not ignore the continuing essential role of man in space. The versatile nature of man, time and again, proved itself in space. From the first suborbital flight in the Mercury program through the epic announcement of the Eagle's landing; during the near disaster on Apollo 13, and through the final Apollo missions with their history- making extravehicular activities, it was man who made the difference. In the Skylab program, which is my next subject, we are going to evaluate further the unique capabilities of man as a participant in space flight activities. • º, SKYLAB As I pointed out earlier, Skylab (ML 70–6618) is the first new step into the extended utilization of space. It is also the first step toward reorienting manned space activities to Earth orbit, which is going to be the arena of operations for quite a long time. Obviously, Skylab is a logical extension of manned space flight, capitalizing on both Apollo hardware and on the hard-won operational experience we have developed in areas such as docking, crew transfer, and working in space. In this transition from lunar to Earth orbital activities, Sky- lab will extend man’s previous experiences related to long duration space flight. “Utilization” is an important aspect of the program. From a hard- ware standpoint, we minimized program costs by extensive use of existing Apollo hardware. The launch vehicles, the command and service modules and even the shell of the orbital workshop are Apollo derivatives. Operationally, we utilize near Earth-orbit to perform experiments in life sciences, solar astronomy, Earth observations, material processing, astrophysics and man/systems integration. Over half of the Skylab experiments are in the areas of life sciences, astron- omy and Earth resources. For medical experimentation, Skylab offers a unique laboratory with features unattainable on Earth. The zero gravity environment will be sustained two to four times longer than for experiments on previous missions. This long duration will afford a much needed investigation of human physiological processes. Once the medical data from prolonged wieghtless environment are compared to those obtained on Earth, our basic understanding of these processes will be greatly extended. 7 Solar astronomy and astrophysical science experiments, above the filtering effect of the Earth's atmosphere, constitute a large part of the Skylab experiment program. The Sun and its influence on the Earth’s environment will be studied extensively. A better understand- ing of four basic types of solar emissions, that is the white light corona, the H-alpha rays, the X-rays and ultraviolet rays may enable us someday to harness this apparently limitless source of energy as the energy sources here on Earth diminish. Earth resources experiments, as a complementary program to the now famous Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS) program, is the third main group of Skylab expermients. It promises significant benefits for both developing and technologically advanced nations. The basic objectives of these experiments are to investigate water, land, and atmospheric phenomena. Earth resources investigations will include a number of specific tasks in nine major groups ranging from agriculture to cartography. Variations in conditions will be observed with significant accuracy because during the 8-month mission period Skylab will cover about 75 percent of the Earth's surface, passing over each point once every 5 days. In general, Skylab sensors are more advanced than ERTS and will form the basis—with ERTS data—for the time when these sensors will be in operational use like the weather satellites. Whether we consider the Earth resources experiments or the po- tentialities of solar energy, the processing of material in zero gravity, composite casting or crystal growth, the Skylab missions are empha- sizing practical benefits from space. The pattern of manned space activities is clear: We went to space, we learned about the new environment, men and machines, and now we are beginning to utilize the new opportunities for the benefit of mankind. This unique space investigation opportunity has stirred a great deal of international interest. About 200 scientists from 20 different countries will participate in a worldwide ground-based solar observa- tion program which will be correlated with the Skylab observation results. The Earth resources experiments also have their share of international participation. Of the 146 investigations selected by NASA, 45 are from foreign countries. - Closer to home, the enthusiastic response of our young people to the Skylab Student Project was most gratifying. High school students from all 50 States proposed over 3,400 experiments, of which 19 were selected for flight on the Skylab missions. As far as program status is concerned, Skylab had a very busy year. Since my last testimony before this committee a series of design certi- fication reviews took place covering flight hardware, ground support equipment, and the mission plans. The successful completion of these reviews in January of this year gave us the assurance that the basic design of the equipment, the experiments and plans were ready for the job. The flight articles, built or modified in various plants and facilities throughout the Nation, have been delivered to the Kennedy Space Center and are now undergoing final checkout for flight readiness. We are planning to launch the Skylab workshop in the month of May, just a few weeks from now. The first 3-man crew, consisting of 8 Pete Conrad, Joe Kerwin, and Paul Weitz, will be launched 1 day later. The May launch date is a recent change from our previous date of April 30 which we had held for about 2 years, and results from a series of small problems related to checkout at Kennedy. The problems are not serious and are the kind that always come up when you are working with a new piece of hardware. I am very pleased that these problems have been contained so well. We are requesting $233.8 million for fiscal year 1974 to complete the Skylab program. In addition, these funds will cover the rescue capa- bility and all the necessary flight support from our contractors as well as program integration activities and expenses related to experiment data reduction and analysis. I am convinced that Skylab is one of the most significant programs of the space age. The months ahead will be truly exciting and reward- 3. - - - I would like to discuss now our most ambitious binational space project so far, one that has many significant implications; that is the Apollo–Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) (MA 72–6906). Briefly, the mission Asa-s-22-22ss-x Tºo wº-ºo: RE- 2-20-7- will have the primary objective of verifying the techniques and hard- ware for rendezvous and docking of American and Soviet Union manned spacecraft. The two spacecraft will remain in the docked ºration for about 2 days—with the entire mission lasting 6 to 12 ayS. In April of 1970 the NASA Administrator initiated discussions with members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences concerning cooperation in 9 the area of astronaut safety. Several meetings with Russian officials during the following 2 years laid the technical and management groundwork for the historic agreement signed by President Nixon and Chairman Kosygin in May of last year. - - Article III of the agreement calls for the development of compatible rendezvous and docking systems for the spacecraft of both countries “to enhance the safety of manned flights in space and to provide the opportunity for conducting joint scientific experiments in the future.” Since the President's visit, the project has moved steadily ahead. In July of last year the Project Technical Proposal, the Organization Plan and a general project schedule were established. In October 1972, the launch date was set as July 15, 1975. This, by the way, is the first time the Russians have ever announced, in ad- vance, a launch date for one of their space missions. The U.S.S.R. also agreed to operate the Soyuz Spacecraft at 10 lb/in” instead of their normal 14.7 lb/in” atmospheric pressure while in a docked configuration with our spacecraft. This will shorten signifi- cantly the time involved in transfer between spacecraft because it will eliminate prebreathing of oxygen for 2 hours. - These were but two of several operational and management agree- ments reached at the October meeting. The next full-scale meeting of all five U.S.-U.S.S.R. working groups will take place next month here in the United States. I might point out that throughout these meetings our relationship with the Russians is based on mutual and equal exchange of infor- mation. With this brief history, I intend to highlight the increasing tempo of ASTP activities. Chet Lee, who is the ASTP Program Director, will later describe the program and its status in detail. I have here the 2 to 5 scale model of the ASTP docking mechanism which was built by North American Rockwell, transported to Moscow and used in fit and functional test with the Russian equivalent. It has been tested successfully with the Russian half. Mr. Bob White of our Johnson Space Center will be here after the testimony today to demonstrate how this universal docking system works. It is unique in our history of items of this nature. It allows any spacecraft to dock with any other spacecraft because the mechanisms are identical, as opposed to the present system, which produces a probe and drogue. Turning to our ASTP funding requirements, we are asking for $90 million in fiscal year 1974. This amount will provide for spacecraft modification and related requirements. It will also fund the manu- facturing, checkout and testing of the docking module. In fiscal year 1974 we will also begin the design, development and testing of experiments for the ASTP mission. An important task during this timeframe will be the refurbishment of the Saturn IB launch vehicle which is now in storage and the updating of its ground support equipment. In the area of launch operations, funds will pro- vide for the modification, test, and operation of the launch facilities and associated equipment. Funds will also be used for crew training, as well as for equipment needed in the flight support and operations 8.T08,. - - The ASTP has many significant implications. There are the prac- tical, operational considerations, such as astronaut and cosmonaut safety. With a universal docking system, both nations will be able to fly space rescue missions. 10 There is also the possibility of reduced costs through mutual coop- eration in space. We have been able to keep down ASTP costs by relying on residual Apollo hardware. This advantage resulted in sig- nificant economies. Because of the Saturn IB payload capacity for this mission, we were also able to reduce costs by utilizing heavier and less sophisticated structures, that is, the docking . and its oxygen and nitrogen tanks. The long range implications of the ASTP mission are just as im- portant as the more immediate and more concrete considerations. Apart from contacts in technical areas, the management interface itself may also contribute to better understanding and, therefore, to the establishment of a pattern for joint effort in other areas. The resulting cooperation and strengthened institutional ties will, as President Nixon said upon his return from Moscow, “create on both sides a steadily growing vested interest in the maintenance of good relations between our two countries.” With the Space Shuttle, the thrust of manned space flight programs will have reached its new plateau. We now look at the commitment to the future. The new era will be dramatically supported by the Shuttle (MH 73–5111) with its rapid and easy access to space at much lower cost. NASA Ho MH73-511 1-23-73 Our major challenge was to drive down the cost of space hardware, experiments and operations. The Shuttle concept that evolved after 3 years of extensive analytical studies filled this need, and represented a major stepping stone to radically reduced costs in space transporta- tion and payloads. 11 During the past year after the March 1972 decision to proceed with the parallel burn, solid rocket booster approach, we did additional work with North American Rockwell and our Johnson Space Center people to refine the configuration, run wind tunnel tests and develop the beginning of the system shown here. • This is the way the Shuttle system operates. After we have mounted the Shuttle vertically, with the payload installed in the payload compartment, we ignite the three high pressure liquid hydrogen- oxygen main engines in the orbiter. The two solid propellant boosters are ignited at the same time. With all of the engines burning, we lift off vertically at about half a G acceleration, with a thrust-to-weight ratio of about 1.5. All the engines burn up to about 150,000 feet, about 30 miles altitude. At this time, the solids are ejected from the system. They come back into the atmosphere, descent into the ocean by means of a parachute system, and are towed back to land for refurbishment and reuse. The orbiter, with its three main engines and external hydrogen oxygen tank system operating, goes into low earth orbit. Once in orbit, the orbiter separates from the tank. The tank is retrofired—just a burn of a small rocket engine on the external tank, which slows it down for re-entry. We can choose the re-entry area. The tank essentially disintegrates during the reentry process. Once the orbiter is in low earth orbit, the payload compartment doors can be opened. As we go through these hearings, we are going to find that the orbiter system has great versatility and is used for may purposes. I will discuss these broad uses further in my testimony. We will be describing to you the various and versatile capabilities of the Shuttle. After the Shuttle orbiter's mission is complete, whether it involves the placing of a satellite in space, recovery of a satellite, use of experi- ments in the payload compartment, or other activities, the payload doors are closed and the system uses its retrorockets to slow down and reenter the atmosphere. The thermal protection system absorbs the energy during re-entry. - The chart at the back of the room shows some of the temperatures we will experience in re-entry. The high temperatures involved are about the same as those of blast furnaces—2,500 to 3,000 degrees Fahrenheit. e Mr. FUQUA. How does this compare with the command module? Mr. MYERs. The command module has re-entry surface tempera- tures of about 5,000 degrees. That material is destroyed, it has to be ablated. The orbiter's thermal protection material is reusable. The orbiter comes back into the atmosphere and lands, like a regular air- plane, on a runway. It is brought back to its hangar, refurbished and set up for the next flight. - - Mr. WINN. There is no propulsion in the big tank? Mr. MYERs. None at all. - We are finding that the contractors who are getting ready to bid on this external tank are using outstanding techniques and efforts to reduce the cost. - Mr. FLOWERs. What are you shooting at? 12 Mr. MYERS. I would personally rather not discuss the kind of cost estimates we have within NASA. We find tremendous competition developing in the country. Although we have estimated that the tank’s cost, as it applies to the cost per flight, is about 20 percent of the total cost per flight, we would like to hold the details because we are going to have this terrific competition coming up in industry. I would prefer not to telegraph my punch on those costs. Mr. WINN. Is there a guidance system in the tank? Mr. MYERs. None at all. Mr. WINN. After it separates what does it do? Mr. MYERs. The inertia of the tank is so great that we can set up the angle so that when it separates, it holds that angle. The retro- rocket slows it down very sharply, and puts it on the path to re-entry. Potential dispersion of the tank parts in the worst case, is about 600 by 200 miles. We want to be in a large, untraveled water area, which is easy to find. The solid rocket boosters, which have the more expensive parts, are dropped at about Mach 5, at a low enough speed that they re-enter without excessive heat. We use parachutes to bring them back to an ocean landing. They are recovered, refurbished, and refilled with solid propellants and reused. The orbiter’s external tank is expendable. Our aim is to develop the manufacturing techniques to reduce the initial cost to an absolute DOll][] II.O.UIſl. - Mr. GUNTER. How much in the way of refurbishing is necessary for the items that come back, the solids? Mr. MYERs. A lot of work has been done on that. In previous solid programs there have been cases where the solids got so old that there was a lack of confidence in the solids. As a result, they have gone through the process of washing out the remaining solid and refilling the tanks. The process would involve towing the solid back to a port, washing out the remaining fuel—the oxidizer, residuals still on the inside of the tank, pressure-testing the tank to be sure it has not been damaged, refilling, and putting it back in operation. We have driven very hard to keep the complex pieces of equipment in the orbiter itself, because the orbiter will be used over and over again. - Mr. GUNTER. Is much refurbishing necessary for the orbiter? Mr. MYERs. I think that the orbiter will be developed, over a period of time, to be much like commercial transport. We have the opportunity to use transport-type replacement and overhaul tech- niques in the avionics equipment carried aboard the vehicle. We will have continued work in developing the external insulation to keep that refurbishment to a minimum. We are pleased with the progress in that technology program, and have in fact met every one of our milestones in the technology program for external insulation. We will discuss that further in the Shuttle portion of our testimony. Mr. CAMP. Did the original plan call for all the hardware to be recovered? - Mr. MYERs. Yes, sir. - Mr. CAMP. Can you tell us why this has not been done? Mr. MYERs. Earlier, our concepts were looking to a fully reusable two-stage system, where the first stage would have wings and the second stage would have wings. 13 During our studies, we found that the development of a fully reusable two-stage system would be extremely expensive, with a cost estimate of about $10 billion for research, development, test, and engineering. The economic studies we went through showed that to get a high return on investment we were getting too deeply committed into the development dollars involved in the program, and that for the level of space activity we saw ahead, we would be much better off choosing a system with a much lower research and development bill, although it increased the cost per flight somewhat, we found in our studies that the real savings in the Shuttle will be in the way it is used and its effect on the payloads, even more than in the launch costs themselves. In the tradeoff studies it became clear that the orbiter and its capability to carry payloads up to earth orbit and back down to earth represented the real key to the Shuttle's viability and versatility. The tradeoffs of development costs versus cost per flight were clearly pressing in the direction of reducing the development costs. We are going to show the configurations of those two-stage vehicles and those tradeoff studies in a later portion of our testimony. But the pressures to drive down the development cost is the basic answer. We were driven in the direction of reducing development costs, even though the cost per flight increased somewhat. The economic studies indicated that. And, of course, our budget pressures also indicated that we should wait as far as a fully reusable recoverable booster. We want to continue to study recovery system technology in NASA, at a very low level. I believe eventually we will want to bring in such a system, but it appears to be a later evolutionary process. Mr. CAMP. Thank you. Mr. MYERS. I am going to repeat some of my testimony. I will try to avoid it as much as I can. This committee is well aware of the long, intensive process of evaluating the alternatives that led to the selection of the final Shuttle design. We are continuing that step-by-step process, entering into contracts for hardware when the hardware is well enough defined to bring in the next system. To emphasize, there has been substantial progress in the Shuttle program during fiscal year 1973 (MB 73–5455). 93-466 O - 73 - 2 14 SPACE SHUTTLE CONTRACTING CY 1972 CY 1973 J|A|s|0|N|D|I|f|M|A|M||1|A|s|0|N|D CONTRACT | ORBITER A AWARDED | | C0NTRACT | MAIN ENGINE A FINALIZED | lissue - | |REQUEST - | #posal; CONTRACT EXTERNAL TANK i A AAWARD C0NTRACT | AWARD SOLID ROCKET | A B00STER | is Proposals SUBCONTRACTS MHT 3-5455 2-22-13 As this chart indicates, in August of last year the space division of North American Rockwell was awarded the prime contract for orbiter development and overall integration. In the same month, the main engine contract was finalized with Rocketdyne. The request for proposals will be issued for the external tank in April and start of contract work is targeted for August. That is the next major contract we will be placing. -- The solid rocket booster request for proposals is scheduled for July with a contract award date of November. The orbiter and engine contractors are already well along in those activities necessary during the system definition, design, and early development phases of a program. Subcontracting is also progressing smoothly. In addition to contractor activities, there was forward movement in other areas as well. In April of last year, after consideration of about 150 potential sites, NASA, together with the Department of Defense, selected the Kennedy Space Center in Florida and Vander- berg Air Force Base in California as the Shuttle launch and landing sites. g- . We also established the “Lead Center” management concept for the Shuttle Program. Under the general direction of headquarters, the program manager at the Johnson Space Center, formerly the Manned Spacecraft Center, is responsible for the day-to-day management of the overall program. This permits us to reduce manpower requirements in NASA Headquarters, and in the Centers. The Lead Center concept also provides for quick and responsive access to the scientific and technical expertise located at the Center. The Johnson Space Center is responsible for the orbiter and integra- tion of the Shuttle effort. The Marshall Space Flight Center manages 15 the external tank, the main engine, and the solid boosters; while the Kennedy Space Center conducts launch and landing operations. At each level of program management, we coordinate with the Air Force. Interagency policy and program requirements are reviewed by a joint NASA/USAF Space Transportation System Committee chaired by Assistant Secretary Hansen of the Air Force and myself. Over the past year we have made significant strides in establishing an orderly development effort for the Nation's Space Shuttle. However, the manpower buildup has been suppressed as a result of our adjustments to Federal spending cuts in fiscal years 1973 and 1974 time frame. This slowdown in the rate of our Shuttle manpower buildup has resulted in a delay in our first manned orbital flight until December 1978, a 9-month delay. Let me now turn to our plans for fiscal year 1974. With the external tank and solid rocket booster contractors selected, the prime con- tractor team will have been assembled. Our request of $475 million will assure another year of continued progress, although at a somewhat slower pace than previously planned. Specific tasks we intend to accomplish include test facility activa- tion, wind tunnel testing, building of an avionics breadbroad for the main engine and initiating fabrication of a structural test article for the Orbiter. We will also design tools, develop test hardware, and procure components. To sum up, the progress achieved thus far and our projected plans for fiscal year 1974 will assure continued advances toward an opera- tional space transportation system which by its unique and versatile nature will provide us with the tools required to realize the promise of Space. The Shuttle is an Earth-to-orbit transportation system. As with any transportation system, to be effective it must meet the needs of the user. Therefore, payload and mission planning constitute an essential part of our future planning if we are to take advantage of the unique features and operational characteristics of the Shuttle. The capabilities and versatility inherent in the Shuttle's design features will vastly increase the opportunity for space activities and at the same time dramatically decrease the cost of payloads and mis- sion operations. This will be accomplished through realization of weight and volume constraints, by providing a more benign environment, through payload retrieval and reuse; on-orbit checkout and mainte- nance as well as intact abort. Recognizing the pivotal role of these areas, last November we es- tablished a separate Mission and Payload Integration Office within the Office of Manned Space Flight. The new office is responsible for planning and coordinating payload activities for missions beyond Skylab including: e Payload analysis and requirements activities directed toward the development of payload characteristics and requirements to establish §. design and operational parameters of the Space Transportation System. - - e Mission analysis and requirements activities including the development and maintenance of the NASA Mission Model; payload capture analysis; interface requirements and trades; and operation approaches. I6 e Advanced payload analysis. I might interject that this Office is, in some respects, like a cargo airline operator office. We are looking for the Shuttle Office to develop the transport and we are looking for this Office to be the group that develops the best way to fit payloads into the system and the most economical use of the Shuttle itself. We are requesting $5.5 million for this effort in fiscal year 1974. The Sortie Lab, or as the Europeans have named it, the Spacelab SORT | E LAB —MF 73–5731A— is a very good example of a concept that evolved from our payload planning activities associated with shuttle. The Sortie Lab will consist of two major elements, a pressurized manned laboratory module and an external unpressurized platform or pallet to mount large instruments and sensors. The Sortie Lab elements may be used together or separately. The Sortie Lab will be transported to orbit inside the Shuttle's cargo bay and remain attached to it throughout the mission. Within the pres- surized laboratory module, experimenters will be able to operate their instruments. When the pallet is used without the laboratory module, the instruments can be operated from the orbiter cabin, from the ground or can be fully automated. Upon completion of the mission, the Sortie Lab will be returned to Earth, refitted with new equipment and reused. The Sortie Lab has presented a major opportunity for international participation in the post-Apollo era. In December 1972, the Science Ministers of the European Space Conference, responding to our initiative, endorsed the study and 17 development, by the European Space Research Organization (ESRO), of a Sortie Lab. Four nations (Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Spain) made a commitment to develop and finance a Sortie Lab to meet both U.S. and European specifications, contingent upon cost studies to be completed in August 1973 confirming the general validity of the cur- rent cost estimate—$250–$300 million. The European group is spend- ing about $10 million for their phase B study now underway, and would be expected to fund completely the development of the Sortie Lab. Concurrently with the Europeans, we are conducting an in-house definition study at the Marshall Space Flight Center to define re- quirements, and to examine the operational aspects of the Sortie Lab. Following the final European commitment next summer, we will continue and expand our studies of Sortie Lab operations to maintain a sound technical basis for U.S. participation in this important project. In addition, Marshall is doing a ground-based testing and simula- tion program to test experiment and subsystem hardware for the Sortie Lab. By simulating various possible interfaces between typical experiment hardware, the onboard principal investigators and the Sortie Lab itself, criteria will be defined for low-cost approaches to ex- periment design and operations. We are asking for $2.5 million in fiscal years 1974 to support the parallel U.S. Sortie Lab effort. Supporting all our mission system and integration efforts are a broad range of technology investigations which may involve a com- ponent or a system or even the whole concept. By early fabrication and testing of selected items of advanced technology, we are able to mini- mize technical risk and cost uncertainty as we move forward into pro- gram commitment. We call this effort advanced development. SPACE Tuc º º NASA Ho Mºgº REV. 2-20-73 - 18 For instance, as part of advanced development we will continue feasibility studies related to a Space Tug (MTZ1–7367). The Shuttle will operate in low Earth orbit but for payloads designed for higher orbits it will be necessary to utilize a vehicle that can operate in this interorbit environment. We call this vehicle the Space Tug. This re- usable propulsive stage would be carried into low Earth orbit inside the Shuttle cargo bay. Once released, it may be used to transport payloads to and from these higher orbits or in some cases propel them to Earth escape velocity. In cooperation with DOD we are also evaluating alternative vehicles and development approaches which could provide this capability. This evaluation will lead to a joint DOD/NASA decision this fall with respect to which agency will plan to conduct the de- velopment of this very important propulsive stage. Other work commitments within advanced development are related to such tasks as the evaluation of pyrotechnic systems, internal insulation materials, and avionics for onboard checkout. We are requesting $7.5 million to carry on the Advanced Develop- ment effort in fiscal year 1974. - I emphasized earlier the essential role of man in space. The pro- gram which focuses on man’s capabilities and limitations in the space environment is Life Sciences. As part of this effort, we have been studying man’s physiological and behavioral responses to weightless- ness during progressively longer missions. A thorough understanding of this aspect of space flight is very important if we are to take full advantage of a more routine access to and longer stay in space. Until now, manned space flight was the exclusive realm of astronauts, who are conditioned and trained for years to endure the challenges of an inhospitable environment. - In the Shuttle era, however, we are going to see many ordinary passengers commuting to and from space. The passengers of the Shuttle—those who will be operating the scientific amd applications experiments, will be subjected to only about 25 percent of the G to which the Apollo astronauts were exposed. Our life scientists are preparing for this new requirement by studying man as a living organism in space, interpreting the results into the development and testing of new life support and protective devices that will make the space environment more habitable and safe for these scientists and engineers. All this requires a variety of new medical instrumentation, meas- uring equipment and technology for man-machine interfaces. Our fiscal year 1974 Life Sciences program of $21 million will continue medical investigation of the adaptive changes of body organs, nervous system, muscles and skeleton as they adjust to weightlessness. Studies will be initiated in the behavioral area also which will deter- mine the optimum performance capabilities of men in space. The environmental systems effort will concentrate on the develop- ment and testing of experimental life support and protective devices which suppress contamination on extravehicular activities, instru- mentation technology will work on integration of medical measuring instruments and on the development of remotely controlled manipu- lator and sensor systems. 19 Many medical benefits have been derived from our work. Several hospitals are using a cap with sponge electrodes originally developed to obtain brain wave tracings from astronauts under stress. Another example is a mass spectrometer developed for NASA to control atmospheric gases. This is now available commercially and is used by several hospitals, universities, and research institutes for respiratory and blood gas analysis. It will measure eight gases simul- taneously. In another application of this technology, the entire series of pulmonary function tests can now be administered in 10 minutes. For over a decade, ultraclean environments have been used in conjunction with fabrication of aerospace components. Clean rooms using these techniques provide a near particle free environment and can reduce the incidence of the postoperative infection in major surgeries. The use of this technology has been adopted by more than 25 hospitals. These are just a few of the many medical applications derived from space research. The programs which I have just discussed—ASTP, Skylab, and Shuttle—all had their beginnings in what we refer to as Advanced Missions Studies. This modest activity concentrates on potential new program and system concepts. The main thrust of this type of investigation is to identify future tasks in space, to determine the types of missions that would be most likely to accomplish these tasks, and to assess the technological advances and total resources required to conduct the missions. In addition to investigating future programs, advanced studies are also conducted in support of integrated program planning which includes both current and future programs. The fiscal year 1974 effort for which we are requesting $1.5 million will examine potential new programs for the 1980's that can utilize the Shuttle capability. We will also conduct studies looking into the feasibility of uprating the Shuttle's performance and reducing its operational cost. Other activities will investigate the safety aspects of future manned missions and conduct cost analyses which will improve our ability to estimate future program costs. The last item in our R & D budget is development, test, and mission operations. This support consists of basic engineering and test opera- tions together with crew training, launch, and flight support required at our field installations for space flight missions. The four major categories of effort are research and test operations, crew and flight operations, operations support, and launch systems operations. These functions are performed by highly skilled support contractors. - We have been progressively reducing the cost of this effort as Apollo phased out. Additional reductions will be made upon completion of Skylab (MB 73–5230). 20 MANNED SPACE FLIGHT DTMO MANPOWER FY 1971-74 13 I- 12,800 12 H. MANYEARS IN n | THOUSANDS 10 H 9,500 9 H. * – 1971 1972 1973 1974 FISCAL YEARS NASA HQ MB73-5230 REV. 2–20–73 As this chart indicates, between fiscal years 1971 and 1974 we will have eliminated over 3000 support contract employee positions at our centers. The total R & D support contractor effort in fiscal year 1974 will be about 9,500 man-years, an approximately 15-percent reduction from this fiscal year, made possible because of the comple- tion of Skylab with its heavy demands generated by a high density launch rate. During fiscal year 1974, in-house activity will support Skylab launches, Shuttle and ASTP development preparations, payload planning, crew training and mission planning. My next topic is research and program management. However, before I start this subject I would like to dwell a few moments on organizational changes in Manned Space Flight. Upon the completion of the flight phase of Apollo, the program director, whom you all know, Dr. Rocco Petrone, was appointed as Director of the Marshall Space Flight Center replacing Dr. Eberhard Rees, who has retired after a distinguished career in space activities. Dr. Rees will never, I am sure, receive the accolades which he so richly deserves for his many years of service to his adopted country. His untiring dedication and technical capability has led his Govern- ment/industry team to the incredible record of achievement of the Saturn V program. We will miss him. We have also recently announced the appointment of Chester M. Lee as program director of the Apollo Soyuz Test Project. Chet Lee was formerly the mission director for Apollo. I discussed previously the establishment of a mission payloads and integration office in Manned Space Flight. This important function 21 is headed by Mr. Philip E. Culbertson, who is also my acting director for advanced missions. - For research and program management, we are requesting $332.5 º As last year, this figure represents reduced funding. (MB 5306). - MANNED SPACE FLIGHT RESEARCH AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT NUMBER OF PERMANENT POSITIONS FY 1974 BUDGET ESTIMATES FY 1972 FY 1973 || FY 1974 TOTAL PERMANENT POSITIONS 11,625 || 11,350 || 10,525 KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 2,467 2,409 || 2,309 JOHNSON SPACE CENTER 3,817 3,727 || 3,652 MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER 5,341 5,214 4,564 NASA HQ MB73-5306 2–12–73 In terms of civil service manpower, this means a reduction of 825 positions during fiscal year 1974. The manpower loss at our centers since fiscal year 1972 is about 10 percent. These reductions are con- sistent with the reduction of activities caused by the phaseout of the Skylab program, the suspension of HEAO, and the cutback in communications activities. In fiscal year 1974 our civil service team will support the remaining Skylab launches and prepare for the ASTP mission. Significant effort will also be applied to the Shuttle development activities which will begin to accelerate. 22 MANNED SPACE FLIGHT FY 1974 CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES PROGRAM SHUTTLE COST ($MILLIONS) MODIFICATIONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FACILITIES.. . $19,490 MANUFACTURING AND FINAL ASSEMBLY FAC. LITIES.............................. $19.510 - • $39,000+ NEW LANDING FACILITIES - $28, 200 INSTITUTIONAL MODIFICATION OF POWER SYSTEM $ 1.085 TOTAL................$68. 285 * "BOOK VALUE" OF EXISTING FACILITIES BEING MODIFIED IN FY 1974 |S APPROX IMATELY $300 MILLION. NASA HQ MB73–5418 2-21-73 My next subject is construction of facilities (MB 73–5418). I would like to emphasize that in the Shuttle facilities area, for which we are requesting $67.2 million, we are making maximum utilization of the great capability we built for Apollo. Of the nine projects requested in fiscal year 1974, eight projects provide for only modifications and adaptation of existing capability to support Shuttle. By the way, the basic cost of the facilities we are modifying, as you see in the footnote of the chart, was about $300 million. An example of modifying Apollo facilities for the Shuttle is the use of the S-IC test stand at the Mississippi test facility for orbiter propulsion testing. The only new construction project requested this year is to provide for the orbiter landing facilities at KSC. For institutional facilities, we are asking for one project only, at a cost of slightly over $1 million [$1.08 million]. The purpose of this funding is to modify the electric power system at the Slidell Computer Complex. The modified system will supplement the commercial power supply which experienced frequent interruptions in the past. This facility, incidentally, has broadened its support role to include Govern- ment agencies other than NASA, such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the U.S. Geological Survey, the Mari- time Commission, and the U.S. Forestry Service. 23 MANNED SPACE FLIGHT FY 1974 BUDGET ESTIMATES | MILLIONS OF DOLLARS ) FY 1974 RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT $1,057.0 AP0LL0 -0- SPACE FLIGHT OPERATIONS 580.5 SHUTTLE 475.0 ADVANCED PROGRAMS 1.5 C0NSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES 68.3 RESEARCH & PR06 RAM MANAGEMENT 332.5 TOTAL $1,457.8 NASA HQ MB73-5307 2-12-73 This chart shows a summary of the Manned Space Flight funding request for fiscal year 1974; for Research and Development we are asking $1,057,000,000. The $580.5 million for Space Flight Operations includes, in round figures, $234 million for Skylab; $90 million for ASTP; $220 million for Development, Test and Mission Operations; $21 million for Space Life Sciences; and $15.5 for Mission Systems and Integration. For the Shuttle, we are requesting $475 million; for Advanced Pro- grams we ask $1.5 million. - Our Construction of Facilities request is slightly over $68 million, while in the Research and Program Management area we are asking i$332.5 million. The Manned Space Flight total request is $1,457.8 Iſll LI101). 24 MANNED SPACE FLIGHT FLIGHT ACTIVITY PROGRAMS 1973 |1974 |1975|1976|1977 |1978 |1979| 1980 | SKYLAB WORKSHOP MANNED ASTP SHUTTLE HORIZONTAL TEST FLIGHTS [ ] FIRST MANNED ORBITAL FLIGHT -º- OPERATIONAL - 4th- SORTIE LAB A * = -- *= -s º ºs º- *-* =s* * * = * mºns ºr sºme mºms wºm, sº sºme mºs = sºme sºme m sºme sm ammº sºme m ms sm as mºm mºm * sº * * * * *- FUTURE PLANNING - TUG | * NASA HQ MB73–5180 REV. 2–20–73 My final chart shows the total manned space flight schedule activity. As I indicated earlier, Skylab operations will begin in May of this year. In July 1975, we will launch the ASTP mission. The Shuttle horizontal test flights will start in 1977, leading to the first manned orbital flight in December 1978. Operational missions will begin a year later. The European Spacelab will start flying. Our future planning includes the Tug in the same timeframe. - The year 1974 is going to be one of significant accomplishment and real challenge in space as well as here on Earth. We are entering many new and challenging management and technological areas, all with the promise of tremendous payoff. We are moving rapidly toward exciting and challenging space flights, with opportunities to reduce dramatically the cost of space operations, while opening up whole new opportunities in space. We believe the manned space flight program is worth every dollar we have requested. I solicit your support. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. This concludes my summary of the manned space flight program for 1974. Mr. FUQUA. Thank you very much, Mr. Myers, for that fine up-to- date status report on the operations and plans of the Office of Manned Space Flight. Without objection I would like to insert in the record some informa- tion I requested of you, that is, the amount of money NASA requested from OMB, and the budget request as submitted to Congress, with the reductions made at the OMB. We will make that part of the record at this point. 25 [The document “FY 1974 Budget” follows: NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, FISCAL YEAR 1974 BUDGET [In millions of dollars) (a) The NASA request to the Office of Management and Budget. (b) The budget request to the Congress. º Request Congressiona Manned space flight program to OMB Difference udge & D.: Space flight Operations----------------------------------- 642. 3 –61.8 580. 5 Skylab--------------------------------------------- 258.4 —24.6 233. 8 ASTP--------------------- 95.0 —5.0 90.0 PTM9--------------------------------------------- 240.2 —20.0 220. 2 Space life Sciences---------------------------------- 26.0 —5. 0 21.0 Missions systems and integration--------------------- 22.7 —7.2 15.5 Space Shuttle------------------------------------------- 560. 0 –85. 0 475. 0 Advanced missions-------------------------------------- 1.5 ---------------- 1.5 Total R. & D------------------------------------------ 1,203.8 –146.8 1,057.0 C Of F: Space shuttle--- * * * 67.0 +.2 67.2 odernization of power system—Slidell computer facility---- 1.7 —. 6 1.1 68.7 —. 4 68.3 Rehabilitations and modernizations, minor construction at MSF centers------------------------------------------ 4. 6 —. 1 4.5 Total 9 off------------------------------------------ 73. 3 —.5 72.8 P.M.--------------------------------------------------- 340.6 —8.1 332.5 Total manned space flight------------------------------ 1,617.7 —155.4 1, 462. 3 MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, FISCAL YEAR 1974 C OF F AND R. & P.M. BUDGET |In thousands] Request to Congressional OMB Difference budget C of F: Shuttle projects----------------------------------------- $67,000 +$200 $67,200 Kennedy Space Center------------------------------- 28, 200 0 28, 200 Johnson Space Center------------------------------- 1, 200 +1, 300 2,500 Marshall Space Flight Center------------------------- 4, 400 0 4, 400 Michoud assembly facility---------------------------- 9,600 –90 9, 510 Mississippi test facility------------------------------ 12, 200 –900 11,300 White Sands Test Range----------------------------- 1, 400 —110 1,290 Downey-------------------------------------------- 2, 600 +50 2, 650 Palmdale------------------------------------------ 7, 400 —50 7, 350 Institutional project: Slidell Computer facility--------------- 1,680 –595 1,085 Total 9 of F------------------------------------------ 68,680 –395 68,285 R. & P.M.: Johnson Space Center----------------------------------- 111,018 –1, 768 109,250 Marshall Space Flight Center----------------------------- 137, 723 –4, 866 132,857 Kennedy Space Center----------------------------------- 91, 853 –1, 492 90, 361 Total R. & P.M.--------------------------------------- 340,594 –8, 126 332, 468 26 NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, FISCAL YEAR 1973 OPERATING PLAN [In millions of dollars) (c) The initial and final budget operating plan. Current . Initial Operating plan Operating plan (fiscal year 1973 e (fiscal year 1973 Col. 1974 Manned space flight program authorization) Difference budget) R. & D.: Apollo------------------------------------------------- 128.7 –52.0 76.7 Space flight Operations----------------------------------- 894. 2 —15.2 879. 0 Skylab--------------------------------------------- 540. 5 –38.5 502. 0 ASTP-------------------------------------------------------------- +38.5 38.5 DTM0--------------------------------------------- 305. 2 —11.2 294. 0 Space life sciences---------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 25.5 —2.0 23.5 issions systems and integration--------------------- 23.0 —2.0 21.0 Space Shuttle------------------------------------------- 200.0 ---------------- 200. 0 Advanced missions-------------------------------------- 1.5 ---------------- 1.5 Total R. & D------------------------------------------ 1, 224.4 –67. 2 1, 157.2 C of F: Space Shuttle----- .* = * * * = * * = * = * * * * * = a- - - - - - - - - - - * = * = ** = = ~ * = 27.9 ---------------- 27. 9 Modernization of fire protection system-------------------- 6 ---------------- ... 6 Total------------------------------------------------ 28.5 ---------------- 28.5 Rehabilitations and modernizations, minor construction at MSF Centers---------------------------------------- 4.1 ---------------- 4. 1 Total C of F------------------------------------------ 32.6 ---------------- 32. 6 & P.M.--------------------------------------------------- 340. 6 —3.9 336.7 Total manned space flight------------------------------ 1,597.6 –71. 1 1,526.5 Mr. FUQUA. Recently in a news article there appeared a story that Skylab costs had exceeded the planned amount by $400 million. Was that an accurate assessment? Have we gotten into an overrun situa- tion, or what caused this, if there was additional cost involved? Mr. MYERs. The numbers are right, Mr. Chairman. The state- ments, we believe, are in error. Let me go into the history. Since 1970 we have had an increase in the Skylab cost estimate of about $400 million. But the basic reason for that increase was that in September 1970, NASA reluctantly canceled Apollo 18 and 19. At that time, we had planned to carry out Apollo 17, then Skylab, and then Apollo 18 and 19. Consistent with our policy on the Apollo program content and budgeting, the support activities from the contractors across that time period were funded within the Apollo line item. When Apollo 18 and 19 were dropped from the NASA program, the flight support from the contractors, and the development, test and mission operation support had to be carried elsewhere. In terms of Skylab, the cost in the line item went up dramatically because of the cancellation of Apollo 18 and 19. The flight support previously carried for Apollo 18 and 19 had to be shifted to Skylab. The fact is that the Manned Space Flight budget was reduced by almost $900 million for the fiscal year 1971 through fiscal year 1974 period in the process of cancellation of Apollo 18 and 19 and the readjustment of costs to Skylab. Mr. FUQUA. But you could attribute a large portion of the $400 million to the cancellation of Apollo 18 and 19? 27 Mr. MYERs. Yes. Mr. FUQUA. And transfer into Skylab, because you had to keep lºº crews, facilities, others, other related items, on a readiness basis? Mr. MYERs. Exactly correct. Mr. FUQUA. This was, then, a transfer cost, an accounting pro- cedure of whether you charged it to Apollo or to Skylab. Mr. MYERs. Yes. Mr. Fuqua. So the figures on Skylab, construction of the labora- tory, the tests, so forth, those are as have been projected. Is that correct? - Mr. MYERs. That is correct. Other than these transfers of the costs to provide for the contractor flight support the basic Skylab program cost is essentially as we predicted in 1971. In this year's request, in fact, the cost of the Skylab program is $69 million below the estimate provided to the Subcommittee last year. Mr. WINN. Would the gentleman yield? Mr. FUQUA. Yes. - Mr. WINN. Thank you. I want to clarify the record for the new members of the committee, that Congress never did approve Apollo 18 and 19. Am I not right? Mr. MYERs. I believe that is correct. As part of the adjustments lº in its fiscal year 1971 operating plan, NASA canceled Apollo 18 and 19. - We had it in our future planning, and had our budget projections, based on the flight of 18 and 19 after Skylab. Mr. Fuqua. This was the long leadtime item. Mr. WINN. Yes. I just wanted it clear so some of us would not think $º actually authorized and approved that money—because we ad not. Mr. MYERs. The funding had been in our long-range forecasts. Mr. WINN. We talked about it frequently for years. Mr. MYERs. Yes, sir. The Congressional Committees were kept informed about the methods of costing Apollo and Skylab. When we dropped 18 and 19, which is a better way to put it, transferred costs had to go into Skylab to sustain the contractor capability across that time period. Mr. WINN. In retrospect, if we had funded for that $400 million we probably could have had Apollo 18, couldn’t we? - Mr. MYERs. Let me work the arithmetic out. By dropping Apollo 18 and 19, the NASA Manned Space Flight budget for fiscal year 1971 through fiscal year 1974 was reduced by almost $900 million. The Skylab runout cost increased by about $400 million when Skylab had to absorb the flight support activities after Apollo 17. - I can only answer that for $900 million we could have flown the Apollo 18 and 19 missions. Mr. WINN. Apollo 19 was not as far along as the extend towers for Mr. MYERS. Yes. - Mr. WINN. Thank you. - Mr. Fuqua. But there has not been any excess cost that was not projected with respect to Skylab, as far as R. & D., or development, or fabrication, so forth, for Skylab? 18 28 Mr. MYERs. That is correct. Mr. FUQUA. Your estimates hit on the head what you asked us for, and now it is even less, if put on a scale? Mr. MYERS. Yes, if we look at what we are doing this year. In fact, the constancy of the Skylab schedule has been very gratifying. The contractors and our people have done an outstanding job in qualifying the hardware for Skylab. The current Skylab cost estimate is $2.529 #. which is $69 million below last year's estimate of $2.598 1||10Il. Mr. Fuqua. Then to say a “cost overrun” of $400 million, that is not an accurate statement? - : Mr. MYERs. It is not. Mr. Fuqua. It is a result of other factors that were not necessarily related to Skylab? - Mr. MYERs. That is correct. Mr. WINN. If I may interrupt again, the $400 million, does need clarification. Possibly one of the problems might be that when you come before the committee, Mr. Myers, and you present your budget through the years we have not had the long-range forecasts of planning or the expenditures for Skylab. As I recall, in 1971, 1972, and 1973 the committee had to ask NASA to put into the record at a later time in the year how much additional money you were going to have. I think that is one of the problems that confuses this issue and makes it look like an after- thought, or overrun. Mr. MYERS. Yes. Mr. WINN. Let me ask this: In your budget why can’t you put the total program costs? Mr. MYERS. For the Shuttle we are doing that, giving you our estimates for the full development program for the Shuttle. Mr. WINN. I am talking about Skylab. Mr. MYERs. NASA has provided the Skylab cost estimate to the committees each year during the hearings. - That's correct, isn’t it, Harry? Mr. GoRMAN. Yes. We have responded to the committee's requests for this information in the past. Mr. Fu QUA. Yes. - -- . Mr. WINN. As I recall, they came from questions asked by members; of the committee, and then you put that in later. Since we know it is going to be an on-going program why can’t it be included in the total program cost in advance, in your budget? Mr. Fuqua. Do you anticipate asking for money for Skylab next year, in your next budget? - Mr, MYERs. No, sir. Fiscal year 1974 funding will complete the Skylab program, assuming there is one Skylab. Mr. FUQUA. Right. Mr. WINN. How are you going to carry the additional cost of the reserve Skylab, the part you referred to as, the Skylab Cluster? How are you going to show those costs? Or are you going to be accused of an overrun again? Mr. MYERs. Those costs would be carried in our institutional base as part of an on-going capability for the future. It is a relativel Small number of dollars. It is a mothball situation, where we will put them in storage. 29 Mr. WINN. Couldn’t you submit it as soon as possible, while these hearings are going on? If you have it today, fine. But I was going to give you the option of submitting it within the next few days rather than later in the year when it might go unnoticed by many. Mr. MYERs. I would like to put in the record a summary of the changes in the program, and how that affected the cost of the run-out Skylab program, if that is acceptable, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Fuqua. Yes. (Material requested for the record follows:) Skylab total project cost history Million 8 of dollars Fiscal year 1971 budget testimony (November 1972 launch) - - - - - - - - - - - - 2, 100 January 1971 Apollo 17 delayed to December 1972 to enhance scientific payload (Skylab launch date March/April 1972)--------------------- + 105 Fiscal year 1973 budget estimate------------------------------------ 2, 205 Rescue capability added in Spring/early summer 1971----------------- +45 Runout of President's fiscal year 1972 budget------------------------- 2, 250 Impact on Skylab of canceling Apollo 18 and 19, flight support previously in Apollo 18 and 19 shifted to Skylab------------------------------ +348 Runout in President's fiscal year 1973 budget (April launch)------------ 2,598 Successful qualification testing and integration, reduced contractor flight support manpower levels----------------------------------------- — 69 Runout in President's fiscal year 1974 budget_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2, 529 Mr. MYERs. Also the cost of the storage of the hardware that would be associated with it. (Information requested for the record follows:) Cost of placing left-over Apollo-Saturn/Skylab hardware into storage is about $400,000. The annual maintenance is then about $100,000 per year. Mr. Fu QUA. I was going to ask what would be the closeout cost following the third Skylab mission. Could you include that? (Further information for the record follows:) Costs associated with program closeout, plant clearance, contractor phaseover and program termination will be approximately $54 million. - Mr. MYERs. Yes. It is included in the cost estimates we have for the complete runout of the Skylab program, that we are requesting this year; but we will break out the costs associated with closeout. Mr. Fuqua. Do you have the estimated cost of completion of the Skylab program? That is what you are asking for this year? Mr. MYERs. Yes. This will complete it. º estimated cost to completion of the Skylab program is $2.529 OIl. Mr. Fuqua. How does the overrun figure compare with your estimated costs in 1971 and 1972? Mr. MYERs. In 1970 during our fiscal year 1971 budget testimony, we estimated the Skylab cost to completion at $2.1 billion. In January 1971, Apollo 17 was delayed until December 1972 to increase the scientific capability for that mission and to minimize our fiscal year 1972 funding requirements. That moved the Skylab 93-466 O – 73 – 3 30 launch date to April 1973. When we moved Skylab from November 1972 to that April 1973 time period, the schedule adjustment increased i. Skylab cost by $105 million—from $2.1 billion to a cost of $2.205 11110Il. We added the Skylab rescue capability in the spring and summer of 1971, which added $45 million, giving a total of $2.250 billion. The impact on Skylab of canceling Apollo 18 and 19 and shifting those common support, costs to Skylab increased the Skylab costs by an additional $348 million to the cost we quoted last year in the fiscal 1973 budget of $2.598 billion. This year because of timely completion of qualification, we are able to reduce our Skylab runout cost by $69 million. The final Skylab runout cost would be $2.529 billion. This will be the information we will submit for the record. Mr. FUQUA. Now, what effect will the total cost of slipping of the launch date to May have? Mr. MYERS. We have estimated that impact at about $15 to $20 million for the slide from the end of April to the May time period. Mr. FUQUA. Have you set a launch date? Mr. MYERs. We have a working date of May 14. We want to con- firm our total systems testing and final testing of the hardware before V. ºlize that date. We plan to finalize the date about the end of 8.TCſ). Mr. Fuqua. You mean it costs $1 million a day to slip it? Mr. MYERS. It is an expensive thing to slip. Mr. Fuqua. What was the cause of the slip? Mr. MYERS. The slip was the overall effect of first time joint testing at KSC. A series of small things that added up. One of the areas, for example, we have worked very, very hard on is stowage of equipment. The Skylab will have about 10 times as many stowage items as the command and service module had in the Apollo flights. We early recognized that as a serious and major problem in our own manage- ment and technical development. I believe we did put the proper emphasis in that area, and our people worked on it as hard as humanly possible. But it was a little º than we could take, and was one of the factors that caused a Slip. But remember that the $15 to $20 million increase is within our fiscal year 1973 funding plan, and if we had not slipped, our Skylab run out cost would have been perhaps $85 to $90 million less than last year's estimate. I think we have done an outstanding job in tight control of our Skylab activities and in planning the highly complex activities leading to this launch. And as I mentioned, our current Skylab runout is $69 million below last year's estimate. If you recall our early problems with Apollo, we had some very major slips because of major technical problems that showed up. We have not had those major technical problems in the Skylab program except in this area of fit and function of this major element of stowage, and in some experiments where we have had special efforts to complete the qualification—for example, some of our Earth resources experi- ments. I would say that the management team has done an out- standing job and if we launch Skylab in May, that will probably be the most stable launch schedule for the longest period of time of any of our manned space flight programs so far. 31 Mr. Fuqua. What would be the cost of the second Skylab, the backup lab, to launch? Mr. MYERs. We have reviewed our cost estimates for a second Skylab program, in response to your request, and our projections of the additional funding which would be required to support such a program are set forth below. We have included estimates of the additional funding required both for a Skylab B program in which the experiments would be identical to those flown on Skylab, and for an upgraded Skylab B in which new and improved experiments would be introduced. FUNDING REQUIREMENTS [Dollars in millions; Fiscal year 1974 1975 1976 1977 Total Skylab B----------------------------- $105 $150 $275 $135 $665 Upgraded Skylab B-------------------- 115 175 320 205 815 These cost estimates take into account the impact that a “Skylab B’’ would have on the ASTP and Shuttle programs and are based upon a launch of the “Skylab B’’ workshop in July of 1976. The first manned mission would occur in September 1976 to permit launch of the Saturn V and Saturn IB’s from a single pad (39B) at KSC, thus allow- ing work to proceed on modifying Pad 39A for Shuttle operations. The second crew would be launched 3 months after the first, in December. Baseline mission duration would be 56 days. No rescue capability for the second mission would be included in the program, as noted above, since we would have used all the launch vehicles and spacecraft that could economically be brought to flight readiness. Mr. FUQUA. Including related support? Mr. MYERs. The estimate excludes certain related support and experiment changes. The hardware we have remaining, that I showed you we are planning to store, would support the launch of the backup workshop, and two visits by command and service modules. Mr. FUQUA. When? - Mr. MYERs. In the 1976 time period, which we used for estimating cost of such a launch. Mr. FREY. Would the Chairman yield? Mr. Fuqua. Yes. Mr. FREY. Could you repeat the cost of the equipment we are going to store? Mr. MYERs. About $600 million in Apollo hardware. Mr. FREY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [Further information on the cost to mount a second Skylab mission was submitted for the record as follows: 32 NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTATION, Washington, D.C., March 26, 1973. HoN. Don FUQUA, Chairman, Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, Committee on Science and Astro- nautics, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: During the hearings before the Committee on Aero- nautical and Space Sciences, United States Senate; and the Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, Committee on Science and Astronautics, House of Repre- sentatives; NASA was asked for its views on the feasibility and desirability of a second set of Skylab missions in the period between the Apollo–Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) in 1975 and the start of Shuttle operations in 1979. The attached paper summarizes NASA’s views on Skylab B and presents cost estimates of the funding requirements for such missions. Sincerely, H. DALE GRUBB, Assistant Administrator for Legislative Affairs. Attachment. SKYLAB B Following the Skylab and ASTP missions, assuming no need for the use of back-up hardware in these missions, we will have two Saturn V’s and two Saturn IB’s in the NASA inventory. We will also have one completed CSM and two partially assembled CSM's in addition to the back-up Skylab cluster. Thus, there is sufficient hardware available for a “Skylab B” program, although signifi- cant new funding would be required to bring this hardware to flight readiness and to launch and support the missions. Such a program would include the launch of a Skylab cluster and two manned visits, the second of which would be with- out rescue capability. In this sense, a “Skylab B” program would be possible. Dr. Fletcher has testified to the fact that there would be significant value from a scientific point of view in a second Skylab, particularly if NASA were to introduce new or improved scientific experiments. On the other hand, the workload and cost of a second Skylab would be signi- ficant, as pointed out below. Within the resources we can reasonably foresee during the next several years, we simply do not see the possibility of a “Skylab B’’ program if we are to carry out during these years a balanced and productive program which includes the development of the Space Shuttle. And in terms of the benefits to be realized, a second Skylab would not approach the Shuttle in value. Thus, although we recognize the inherent worth of a second Skylab, we have not recommended it. We have reviewed our cost estimates for a second Skylab program and our projections of the additional funding which would be required to support such a program are set forth below. We have included estimates of the additional funding required both for a “Skylab B’’ program in which the experiments would be identical to those flown on Skylab, and for an “Upgraded Skylab B’’ in which new and improved experiments would be introduced. FUNDING REQUIREMENTS [Dollars in millions) Fiscal year 1974 1975 1976 1977 Total Skylab B----------------------------- $105 $150 $275 $135 $665 Upgraded Skylab B-------------------- 115 175 320 205 815 These cost estimates take into account the impact that a “Skylab B” would have on the ASTP and Shuttle programs and are based upon a launch of the “Skylab B” workshop in July of 1976. The first manned mission would occur in September 1976 to permit launch of the Saturn V and Saturn IB's from a single pad (39B) at KSC, thus allowing work to proceed on modifying Pad 39A for Shuttle operations. The second crew would be launched three months after the first, in December. Baseline mission duration would be 56 days. No rescue capa- bility for the second mission would be included in the program, as noted above, since we would have used all the launch vehicles and spacecraft that could eco- nomically be brought to flight readiness. 33 The funding estimates for the “Upgraded Skylab B’” would provide for the Selective introduction of new or improved experiments to enhance significantly the return that could be expected. Because the details of these improvements would depend on what we learn in Skylab we cannot predict precisely what new experiments would be flown. We have included a total of $150 million in our estimates for this purpose, however, and we believe that this amount would be reasonable to provide for such improvements as the electronic transmission of data from the earth resources multispectral scanner to permit real-time mission replanning; the incorporation of a higher resolution microwave antenna; ex- periments for studies concerning the remote monitoring of pollution, particu- larly in the upper atmosphere; and the addition of an ultraviolet telescope to Study Solar flares during what would be an approaching peak of solar activity. We would also undoubtedly want to conduct new experiments in life sciences, depending upon what we learn in Skylab. Present funding provides for storage of the hardware mentioned above, but does not provide for refurbishment at a later time. The above estimates are based upon a timetable which assumes a decision by this summer to at least maintain the option of proceeding with a second Skylab. We estimate that a six-month delay in go-ahead (resulting in an end-of-1976 launch date) would increase the total funding requirements by about $100 million. In summary, in spite of the benefits and values of a second Skylab in 1976, Our considered judgment remains that it would be most unwise to allow it to displace or delay the development of the Shuttle or any of the other programs included in Our FY 1974 budget submission. Mr. FUQUA. What is the total estimated cost of the ASTP program? Mr. MYERS. The total ASTP runout cost was estimated originally at $250 million. We feel quite confident about that estimate. Mr. Fuqua. The figures still look good? Mr. MYERs. Yes, sir. Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Winn. Mr. WINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to compliment NASA for their looking down the road enough. On page 7 you talk of a better understanding of the four basic types of solar emissions—the white light Corona, the H–Alpha rays, and the rest of them you mentioned. Can you tell us, or can any of your staff, a little more about how those experiments will be conducted, and what the working relation- ship is between the Skylab and the ground, how that works? And, is the public going to be able to participate in it? Are they going to realize how important some of these energy experiments really are? Mr. MYERS. Let me answer the second question first, then ask Mr. Schneider to cover the first. We are putting a lot of energy into the question of how do we involve high school students and the general public in the tremendous output of the Skylab program. With 70 different experiments, 280 different investigative scientists on the ground all over the world, we know the scientific community is very heavily involved. And in their papers and reports there will be a great community discussion. But we have tried through the student experiment to involve the high school people of the country, and we think we have done a rea- sonably good job. We have some very exciting relatively simple ex- periments that high school students have submitted, and with, ob- viously, very bright young people involved in that activity. We are going to try to keep them involved in the Skylab program through distribution of information concerning those experiments back to the schools, and through the National Science Teachers Association, distribute information about those flights. 34 Mr. WINN. I hope we don’t have the delay in processing we have had in the past. At the same time, I want to congratulate you on this, because on several trips to my district, in talking with high school students in science meetings and in the entire conferences, I found that they are much more aware of pre-Skylab experiments than they ever were on Apollo. In Apollo they found out after the experiments were publicized. - But I was mainly interested in the energy crisis that we face, and if there is a significant experiment that you are doing with energy. Mr. MYERs. Let me have Bill Schneider, Director of the Skylab program, discuss use of that. Mr. WINN. Were you going to cover that anyway, Mr. Schneider? Mr. ScHNEIDER. I will be pleased to cover it in more detail than I cover it in my testimony, if you would like. Mr. FUQUA. Let me say, Mr. Schneider will be here tomorrow, and at this time we might discuss the questions we have for Mr. Myers. Mr. WINN. Fine. Let's skip that and cover it tomorrow with Mr. Schneider. Mr. Fu QUA. Fine. Mr. Gunter? - Mr. GUNTER. No questions, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FUQUA. We want to welcome Congressman Gunter to the committee, who comes from one of the great States in the country, and got his start in one of the greatest congressional districts—mine. Mr. FREY. I would like to agree in part. It seems to me it was my part of the State the legislature carved up! [Laughter.] I have some questions. - Mr. FUQUA. Certainly. Mr. FREY. If OMB had released the $85 million you requested, in what way would it have been used? - Mr. MYERs. We would have moved out much more strongly with our shuttle contractors and their subcontractors. Now our plan is to continue essentially on the same schedule in bringing on board these contractors and subcontractors but not to build up their manpower as rapidly as previously planned. We will do the same thorough job in systems engineering as we planned previously, by getting these people on board at the right time to work with us in putting together the whole system, but we cannot get out into the hardware as rapidly. That has caused a delay in the Shuttle horizontal and vertical flight tests. Mr. FREY. I notice in your estimates you hold firm to the total costs. Even with the delay can you still hold firm with the costs? Mr. MYERs. We hope we can. Mr. FREY. So do I. Mr. MYERs. We are in the process of working this out with the contractors. I just cannot say yet. We are early in the program, not in a position of having a large base affected by this. So we have a good chance of keeping the slip to a minimum. Mr. FREY. We have been in this position before in the past 3 or 4 years. Where do you reach the point in the shuttle that the delay becomes too much? Mr. MYERs. We faced that in the discussions this year. With our fund limitations in fiscal years 1973 and 1974, one of the major ques- tions we all faced was the question of the point where the system will 35 move out from under you in technology until it is no longer a proper program. We don’t think we are there. We think we have a shuttle program which, by being operational by the end of 1979 or early 1980, still has the possibility of a dramatic change in capability in space. Although perhaps we think the time is not optimum any more, it is hard to say what is optimum, at this point in the program. We know we have a major systems integration activity in the shuttle, and we are working very hard to be sure we have everything in place before we move out in hardware. Mr. FREY. What if we go through another 9-month or year delay? Are we at the point now where you are going to either do it or not? Mr. MYERs. That is my feeling. I think we are at the place where the kind of funding we have worked out in this budget squeeze is still a proper kind of a funding versus years ahead of us, but it is one where any further slips will really jeopardize the program. Mr. FREY. I know you have been concerned, as has the committee, with this gap in the program. Except for the US/USSR project to pick up three or four years, there is nothing else in the program. It is a problem not just of hardware but of people. Year after year we have destroyed teams of engineers. I don’t have to tell you about the problem of getting people in engineering. I don’t see many en- gineers around the country asking their children to go into it, and I cannot blame them. Is there anything we can do about this situation? Mr. MYERs. I think the problem is the general limitation involved in technology in the country; and I think that is a very bad situation. But to answer specifically your question, we are dealing with a NASA budget which last year was hoped to have been stabilized, but because of the budget crunch, we even took a cut from that level. We look ahead to the time period when we will be back on a higher budget than we are requesting this year, but not a very dramatic increase. When I look forward to the kind of commitments I have in the Shuttle Program I would have to see an increase in the NASA budget, to be able to bring on, say, another ASTP flight or Skylab flight, or any of these other obviously capable programs that could be carried out in this time period. When I was faced with the issue of should I fly a second Skylab or put that money into the Shuttle I could only conclude we must Sup- port the Shuttle, because of its long-term implications in the total space program and the national interest. Mr. FREY. That holds true even with the 9-month delay? Mr. MYERs. Even with the 9-months delay. The dollars now are even more important to put into the Shuttle, to hold that schedule. Mr. FREY. Mr. Chairman, I have a couple other questions, one being about people, which I think is really a key thing. We saw your chart of man-hours, and 15-percent reduction. I know you have the figures for the NASA employees, but do you have them for the contractors around the country, breakdowns on what this new budget will mean vis-a-vis the contractor personnel at the different installations around the country? 36 Mr. MYERs. We have them for those which are under contract. We have subcontracting activity yet to be established on which we can only sort of statistically say where things of this nature might show up. We can certainly give you that information on those contractors that are now under contract. - Mr. FREY. Obviously we are interested in KSC, along with the other installations. What do we have stored? In California, we saw much equipment that had been mothballed. What do we have in our total inventory? Mr. MYERs. Including the $600 million of hardware we are storing, how much more? Mr. GoRMAN. Stored? Mr. FREY. Maybe “stored” isn’t the correct term . . . throwing a cloth over it, or something to that effect Mr. Myers. We have about $1.8 billion worth of the facilities built for the Apollo Program, many of which are being modified for the Shuttle Program. We are capitalizing on this basic investment. Mr. FREY. Would you provide that? Mr. Myers. We will provide that, yes. [Information requested for the record follows: For available industrial assets, which would include plant equipment, and special test equipment as well as special tooling, the acquisition value is as follows: Millions Saturn IB and V--------------------------------------------- $530 Apollo Spacecraft--------------------------------------------- 1, 330 Launch Support Equipment----------------------------------- 680 The total acquisition cost of uncommitted completed flight hardware, assuming Skylab and ASTP are conducted as planned is approximately $950M. Mr. FUQUA. You are planning to store this at much reduced cost from what you have in the past, because it will not have to be flight- ready, is that correct? Mr. MYERs. That is correct. We are moving it into a mothball status still in the position that it could be withdrawn from storage and flown within a period of 18 months. That basically gives the guys the ground rules to use in the process of St0rage. § FREY. How long is it before the people who manufacture re- placement parts lose the practicability to start production again? Mr. MYERs. We are gradually eroding that as we move through the Skylab launch. On through the CSM flights we will erode it further. Manufacturing capability for Apollo hardware will in a practical sense be disappearing about 2 years from now. Mr. FREY. Then you are saying that if we do anything on this we will have to do it in the next budget or not at all. One last general statement for the record. What is your personal opinion of future need for increases in the budget vis-a-vis effects of manpower, aging of NASA, and other factors we have talked about? I think it would be important to get that in the record. Mr. Fuqua. If you can do it in 30 words or less, it would be great Seriously, I would like it in the record. - Mr. MYERs. It is a continuing management problem. Each year we have struggled with the problem. Each year we have been successful in keeping the kind of skill and capability we need. 37 We are to bare rock bottom, I think. We see it in many cases, where now the next man laid off is a skill you no longer have. I think these are the problems we face as the major management challenge in the manned space flight program. Mr. FREY. I think the people involved in the Apollo program, knowing what has happened, and who still performed the way they did, were outstanding. It is hard to believe they did such a great job. To all of them, the contractor, NASA, we say, “thank you for a great job under pressure.” Mr. MYERs. I think you are aware the last lunar module to fly had one-fifth the anomalies of any other LM that flew, even with the men checking it out knowing it was the end of their jobs. I think it is an incredible indication of the capability and dedication of the people of this country who worked on the Apollo program. Mr. Fuqua. I think I can speak for the entire committee and, I am sure, the Chairman of the full committee, in saying if there is any way you can express it on behalf of the committee to these people, we -certainly appreciate the firm dedication—and it was dedication— when the last screw you may tighten may indeed be the last one, and it is the best one. Mr. MYERs. The best one. Mr. Fuqua. There is a great dedication, and we pay tribute to these outstanding people. Mr. MYERs. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Fuqua. Is the European investment in the Sortie Lab, between $250 to $300 million, their money or ours? Mr. MYERs. That is their money. Mr. Fuqua. The contribution they are making? Mr. MYERs. All through our work in the international scene we have always worked out our programs on a non-exchange-of-funds basis. When the Europeans commit to build the Sortie Lab they build it with their money. Mr. FUQUA. And that is progressing well? Mr. MYERs. Yes, sir. Mr. FUQUA. Could you supply for the record—not necessarily now— in the $146.8 million reduction in your budget you had a breakdown of $24.6 million out of Skylab, $85 million out of shuttle. Can you provide for the record what you would have done with this money, had you received it, in the various categories? Mr. MYERs. Yes, sir. [Information requested for the record follows: The $146.8 million would be utilized in the following manner: Skylab–The Skylab project could have used the deleted $24.6 million for more thorough testing of backup hardware. The reduced testing extends, from ten . to about fifteen months our ability to put backup hardware into use if Iłee CiêCI. Apollo Soyuz Test Project.—This additional $5.0 million of obligation authority would haye been used to provide flexibility to cover potential design changes to the program hardware now in manufacture. - Development, Test and Mission Operations.—Of the $20 million, $7 million would be utilized by the Marshall Space Flight Center and $13 million by the Johnson Space Center. At Marshall, the $7 million would have increased the Center's ability to plan for and respond to the needs of Skylab, ASTP and Shuttle programs by permitting additional procurement of equipment, supplies and services that would have increased the Center’s capabilities across-the-board. 38 The $13 million of Development, Test and Mission Operations funds at Johnson Space Center would allow the performance of Shuttle related analyses and tests which would contribute to the program design decision process and would provide an additional degree of program schedule assurance. The balance of the funds would be utilized to restore delated Earth Resources and Lunar Science activities. Space Life Sciences.—Deleted Space Life Science funds ($5.0 million) would have been used to support selected efforts at universities, to complete the ground testing of advanced integrated life support systems, and to continue the develop- ment of a wide range of advanced bioinstrumentation. Mission Systems and Integration.—If the funds originally requested for Mission Systems and Integration had been received, the following additional work would be accomplished with the deleted $7.2 million. Phase B level Tug System Studies would be conducted in support of the MSFC in-house Tug program definition effort. Supporting engine system and launch site operations studies would also be conducted as required to support the Tug program definition effort. Additional advanced development technology tasks would be conducted in the following areas: Orbital Debris Environmental Effects Environmental Quality Information Management Systems Heat Pipe Applications Management Techniques Thermal/Structural Analysis Interface Low Cost Launch Techniques Solar Array Stack Development Shuttle/Tug Checkout Interface Improved Command Channel Encoding Crew Procedures Tug Hydrogen Turbopump Technology Flameproof Materials Launch Facilities and Equipment The level of effort to develop payload requirements data, payload operational approaches, and the development of Space Shuttle, Sortie Lab, and Space Tug interface requirements and trades would be restored to the original planned level. In addition the effort to develop low cost payload concepts and payload design criteria for the Space Shuttle, Space Tug and Sortia Lab would be accelerated to the original schedule. Shuttle.—Increasing the Shuttle FY 1974 fund request by $85 million could result in pulling back the first manned orbital flight two to three months from December 1978 to September/October 1978. The additional funds would be distributed as follows: Orbiter $–H 60 million Main Engine + 15 mllion External Tank +5 million Solid Rocket Booster +5 million Mr. Fu QUA. Mr. Winn? Mr. WINN. Two short questions. You talk about international interest, the scientists from different countries participating in the solar observation program to be corre- lated with the Skylab observation results. Where are they going to be located? Mr. MYERs. Located in their own countries, all over the world. Mr. WINN. They are not together? s Mr. MYERs. Oh, no. These are a whole series of astronomers with their own astronomy laboratories, working through correspondence with our Marshall people, and through them with our principal inves- tigators, in exchanging information about the sun, in this program. Mr. WINN. You talk about requesting $233.8 million for 1974 to complete the Skylab program, “In addition, these funds will cover the rescue capability. * * *” + What, basically, are you doing on the rescue capability? Mr. MYERs. We are building a kit of seats that can go under the couches of the command module and would allow us to launch a CSM on a Saturn IB with a capability to carry five men down. We would 39 launch with two astronauts, we would dock to the alternate port on the Skylab, and we would be able then to rescue the three men from the workshop and bring them home. That activity puts us in a position where that kit is available, and would be used only as needed, of course. Mr. WINN. Has it progressed well? Mr. MYERs. It has progressed well. We have it available for rescue, even on the first Skylab. Mr. WINN. Do you have any way to try that? Mr. MYERs. No. But we are sure if we have a water landing we have no problem. The only thing the space below the couches was for was for land landing, and that was a more serious problem during launch, where we might get blown with parachutes back on the land. Mr. FREY. Would you yield? Mr. WINN. Gladly. Mr. FREY. How long would it take to make a rescue, if you encounter a problem? Mr. MYERs. We are in a position where we are using the next vehicle in line in the checkout phase to be the vehicle to rescue. In the first mission we would be in a position where if we needed rescue immediately after launch of the first man visit it would be about 4- to 8-days to rescue. Mr. FREY. That wouldn’t be much of an emergency. Mr. MYERs. We went through a very complete analysis. It turns out we can have the man in the command module, and rescue them in that, or leave them in the pressurized compartment if there is a pressure problem with the command module. The probability was higher that we would have rescue requirements due to a module failure at the end of a mission than would exist in a situation with both the pressurized compartment and the command module. So we were getting into a double-failure situation, to have instant response. And it appears—at least our studies concluded—that the proba- bility of having to suddenly rescue from the pressurized working com- partment and from a failed command module were almost non- existent. So we found we could leave them in the pressurized com- partment and take the time to go ahead and check out and launch, and it was a much less expensive operation by that means. While we are on this subject, you may recall that in the period after the AS204 accident, Dr. George Mueller testified that: “We did learn one other thing which is in a later finding of the Board from the accident itself, and that is, we learned that we should have carried out full scale mockup tests of fire replicas, mockups of the spacecraft in such a fashion that we could carry out in replica the burning that would take place inside a space- craft. The boiler plate testing, so-called, to do this was developed down at MSC. It was suggested to the Board and supported the Board in reproducing the details of the accident. We plan to make full scale mockup fire tests of every spacecraft cabin in the future. We believe that we can be sure that the changes we introduce then in materials, and their location, can be verified that they will be safe from fire. We are sure, as sure as we can be, that this particular fire hazard will not continue to be a problem in the space. program.” 40 The large efforts that NASA has since directed toward fire safety have produced an improved alternate approach to such full scale test. This approach is a rigid materials selection and control program based primarily on elimination of flammable materials and substitu- ting new nonflammable or self-extinguishing materials wherever possible. Where this cannot be done, flame propagation paths are eliminated by barrier layers of protective materials, stowage in closed metal containers, isolation from ignition sources and utilizing the physical separation made possible by larger spacecraft with less dense packaging of equipment. This improved alternate approach is of particular importance now when we consider the large costs that would have been involved were we to go through a full scale flam- mability test program on space station type of hardware. This new approach has been fully utilized on Skylab. We have in lace a rigid material selection and control program. We have utilized arge amounts of new nonflammable or self-extinguishing materials in its design. All residual flammables are minutely scrutinized in terms of stowage as well as end usage and possible restowage or disposal. We have isolated flammables in metal containers away from ignition SOUITC6S. - In addition to the material control program, we are using a two-gas system which reduces the partial pressure of oxygen below Apollo levels. We have added fire sensors to our caution and warning system and fire extinguishers in all elements of the cluster for the remote possibility that a fire might still occur. We are convinced, however, that such fires would be both contained and extinguishable. We are training our crews in firefighting and evacuation procedures. We are protecting them from combustion products with portable breathing bottles. Finally, we have run selected flammability tests on com- ponents of the program (for example, electrical panels, tape recorders, and so forth) to essentially meet the mockup fire tests referred to by Dr. Mueller, where density of internal packaging is great and ignition Sources necessarily present, to demonstrate that such fires will not propagate beyond the component. This alternative has prevented the unnecessary expenditure of several hundred million dollars for a full- Scale flammability test of the immensely complicated and large Skylab modules. - This improved approach has been documented as policy to be followed on future programs in NHB 8060.1. “Flammability, Odor and Offgassing Requirements and Test Procedures for Materials in En- vironments that Support Combustion.” It is believed by the group of experts who developed these current requirements, that we have significantly exceeded the intent of performing the critical review and verification tests expressed by Dr. Mueller. Mr. WINN. Are you through? Mr. FREY. Yes; thank you. Mr. WINN. $90 million for fiscal 1974, was included for spacecraft modification dealing with our joint docking, rendezvous and docking with the Russians. When Mr. Teague and I were there in August and met with the Russian scientists we could not—maybe you have done a better job of communicating than we did—get any commitment from them for anything but the first joint docking. We asked them in several different ways would this be an ongoing program. 41 I wonder, without a commitment from the Russians, at least as far as I know, are we spending to modify our spacecraft in the future, for something that might not actually happen. Mr. MYERS. In our present budget planning we are not planning for a second ASTP. We have had no firm indications from the Russians on this. We are in a position, perhaps, to easily move to a second flight, because they have, in working with us, stated that they will have a second vehicle ready to go on 2 weeks’ notice. Mr. WINN. I knew they had a backup vehicle. That is why we asked if they considered this part of an ongoing program. And they would not commit themselves to that. The $90 million is for the first joint docking, and has nothing to do with the possibility of a second program, or mission, right? Mr. MYERs. That is right. Mr. WINN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Fuqu A. Thank you, Mr. Myers. We will proceed now with William C. Schneider, Director of the Skylab program. We will go as far as we can. You will be back tomorrow? Mr. SchNEIDER. Yes, sir. Mr. MYERs. Bob White from our Johnson Space Center is one of the men working with the Russians, and has been involved in developing this two-fifth scale mechanism. Perhaps the best way, Mr. White, is to describe what we did in Russia, then describe how the mechanisms work. - Mr. WHITE. Basically, we have the two-fifths scale model. This is the result of an agreement about a year ago between the two countries to build compatible systems. The hardware is designed specifically in our interface agreements with the Russians; we have a basic drawing, described as the interface drawing. The Russians took their drawing, we took ours, that we came up with together, and we built this hard- ware to scale. It demonstrated at our Moscow meeting last December the capa- bility of both countries to take a drawing and from the engineering standpoint and manufacturing standpoint accomplish campatibility. We have demonstrated the fact that we have compatibility. We have used the models and engineering analyses, both with their modifica- tions and with ours—it would be a United States-to-U.S.S.R. type of situation—to demonstrate where we have engineering problems we have to solve, or have to understand the inner workings of the hardware. - This is a passive system, where the guide ring assembly has been retracted. - This is the active system, with the guide ring extended. We have attenuators used for the extension, and to absorb energy, so you can fly in at any number of different parameters, miss aline- ment up to a 1-foot-miss distance. With the active system extended it has compliance, it can comply with the passive system until the energy can be absorbed in the attenuators, and the vehicles self-aline from the realinement mechanism we have here. We have basically the docking, where we have capture, and, if I may, the capture latches are shown, and I will separate them so you 42 can see them better. We have the capture latches here [indicating], which make contact with the body-mounted latches, the receptacle on the passive system. Once that is achieved the alinement takes place, stabilization, and we bring the two systems together and the structural ring is brought in direct contact with the mating vehicle structural ring, and you pick up pressure seals, and the crew initiates a preload, or locking, of these structural rings by engaging these latches to the mating vehicle. After that is done you can pressurize the tunnel and come through in a shirt sleeve environment. I will demonstrate retraction here, if I may. You have the capture, and then we have retracted. With the command to engage the structural latches you have a structural tie and integrity across the interface, to carry on space dynamics, pressurize environment, or transfer. Mr. MYERS. Remember, this side was a Russian two-fifths scale model designed and built in Russia. We took the other half over to Russia and demonstrated that we could do this. This interface drawing is on the metric system, and our drawings have metric and inches. Also, the interface drawing has Russian and English written on the drawing. I am sorry we did not bring one for you to see. Mr. WHITE. I think it is safe to say we all started from scratch, from the concept of what we call the androgenous systems, or identical systems. The only thing salvaged from the Soyuz side would be the fact they are using the structural latches, and the peripheral ring, they look just like the Soyuz and and Soyuz II latch, as well as the struc- tural ring itself. We are using essentially the same type of attenuators as we have on Apollo; they use a system which is electromechanical, the same as they use on the Soyuz. ººm the standpoint of hardware it is a new concept from both SIOleS. Mr. MYERs. In the first meeting with them we had the idea of the finger system. Apparently they had been working with one similar to that, and in the discussions that went on we all agreed to drop to the three-finger system that is involved there, the three paddles, which is really, our people think, proper and simpler than what we had been working on. There has been a give-and-take in the whole technical group. Thank you, Mr. White, very much. I think, Mr. Schneider, maybe you could describe the vehicle. Mr. FUQUA. Yes, please. Mr. SchNEIDER. [Describing a Skylab model]. As you know, the Skylab starts with an unmanned launch of the workshop cluster on top of a Saturn V. In the launch configuration the telescope mount is not deployed at this point. The command and service module, of course, it is not there. It is launched on a Saturn IB. The solar arrays on the telescope mount are folded along its sides and the solar wings of the workshop fold down along the sides of the spacecraft. It is launched on top of a Saturn V, placed into a 235-nautical- mile orbit inclined 50 degrees to the Equator, completely automat- ically under the guidance of the instrument unit, the same as that on the Apollo. 43 First, the shroud, which covers the entire top of the payload, to protect it from the launch environment, is separated and discarded. The vehicle is then prepared for the men to come up the next day. The telescope mount is deployed and the duster rolls over so that the solar telescopes face the sun. The solar arrays on the workshop are deployed and the solar arrays on the telescope mount are extended. The large control moment gyros are turned on, which are the mech- anisms which control the attitude of the vehicle. The various systems are automatically turned on, under the command of the instrument unit. The telescope mount is kept facing the Sun. This face [indicating] is facing the Sun constantly throughout the entire Skylab mission except when we will be conducting Earth Resources Experiments. The next day, the three crewmen will be put in rendezvous orbit, launched on top of the Saturn IB, using the command and service module, which is fundamentally the same as that of Apollo. There were some changes because of the Earth orbit considerations but fundamentally it is the same vehicle. They will get into a temporary orbit, and then go through a rendez- vous procedure which is almost identical to the procedures we de- veloped in the Gemini program. They will then rendezvous with the workshop, maneuver around the workshop, dock to the workshop, then transfer into the living quarters, and will remain in those quarters for the remainder of the mission. That sequence will be repeated two more times so that three dif- ferent crews will visit the workshop during the course of the Skylab program. The crewmen have as their living quarters the first floor of the work- shop [indicating], where we have three bedrooms, a bathroom, and a wardroom, and then this large experiment area. This area here is also a large experimental area, where we conduct many of the corollary experiments. The engine room where the controls are located, is in the airlock, which also controls all the oxygen and nitrogen. This multiple docking adapter contains the controls for the Earth resources experiments and for the solar observatory experiments. One crewman will be in this module almost all the time during waking hours, working on using either the solar observatory experiments or the Earth resources experiments. The other two crewmen will be conduct- ing other experiments throughout the workshop. The fundamental day of the astronauts is based on Houston time. We will get them up at about 6 a.m. Houston time, they will eat breakfast and prepare for the day, then spend the day conducting the experiments as required. At the end of their normal 8-hour day, two of the crewmen will debrief, while the third crewman will remain working on solar astron- omy, and they will continue this for the remainder of the mission, get to the end of the mission, secure the vehicle, reenter the command module, and reenter the Earth’s atmosphere. About 2 months later the second manned mission will start. It will be 56 days long. About a month after they return the third 56-day mission will be on. That will complete the Skylab program. All the consumables should be about used up by that time. We expect about a month's worth of food and oxygen to be still on board at that time. 44 In order to retrieve the high-resolution data from the solar observa- tory we are required to go out EVA and open up the cameras and bring back the film. The data on six of the seven solar instruments are recorded on film, very high-resolution data. They must go out and retrieve that film, by EVA, once on the first mission, twice on the second mission, and once on the third mission. ‘We have four loads of film for the telescope mount on board Skylab. I think this is probably a good place to pause now, and I can begin my testimony again tomorrow, if you desire. º Mr. WINN. I have two questions on this. Is the model coming back? Mr. ScHNEIDER. No, we are losing the model today. We will have a smaller model. Mr. WINN. On the multiple docking adapter, is that similar to what we have used in the past, or does it incorporate any of these new ideas? Mr. ScHNEIDER. The docking ports are identical to those of Apollo. We have not been able to include any of that new ASTP technology here. There is one axial port we will normally use, and a second port here, an emergency port which we can use if we have to do a rescue mission; we have the capability to come up and dock at this port ſindicating]. - - Mr. MYERS. The part number is identical to those of Apollo. Mr. SchNEIDER. They are Apollo parts. Mr. WINN. When the astronauts leave, how long does it take to secure the craft? - - Mr. ScHNEIDER. About a day and a half for them to put the house in order, get all things back in lockers and get ready for the next crew to come up. It takes about 3 days to activate the spacecraft the first time, about a day or a day and a half each subsequent visit. Mr. WINN. What if they couldn’t do it in a day and a half? Mr. ScHNEIDER. We have set up a very extensive and comprehen- sive method of flight planning. We do not plan on lifting off with a flight plan for the full 28 days. We will send up a flight plan every 2 days with what we expect people to do the next day. So if the activa- tion sequence took a day longer it would cause us no trouble. We would have to decide which experiments we could not do, but we have a mechanism set up so we can accommodate it. Mr. WINN. Thank you. Mr. FUQUA. What could be the problem of docking, with regard to the solar panels? Will they be rotating? Mr. ScHNEIDER. No, sir. It faces the Sun constantly, in this direction indicating], at all times. Mr. Fuqua. There is no danger of bumping into them as you are trying to dock? Mr. ScHNEIDER. No, sir, the astronauts have practiced that repeatedly; there is plenty of clearance here, and they have no problem in getting in for docking. Mr. Fuqua. Thank you. - If there are no further questions we will adjourn, to resume at 10 o'clock tomorrow. We will again have Mr. Schneider, and also Mr. Gorman as witnesses. Thank you. [Whereupon, the subcommittee adjourned at 12 noon, to reconvene on Tuesday, February 28, 1973.] 1974 NASA AUTHORIZATION WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1973 HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CoMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICs, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in room 2325, Rayburn House Office Building, the Hon. Don Fuqua (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. Fuqua. The subcommittee will be in order. When the meeting adjourned yesterday, Mr. William C. Schneider, Director of the Skylab Program, had started to explain the Skylab, and will present his formal presentation this morning. Mr. Harry Gorman, Deputy Associate Administrator, Management, Office of Manned Space Flight, is also present. We will proceed with you, Mr. Schneider. Mr. ScHNEIDER. Thank you. STATEMENT OF WILLIAM C. SCHNEIDER, DIRECTOR, SKYLAB PROGRAM, NASA Mr. ScHNEIDER. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: I welcome this opportunity to appear before you once again, to provide you with a progress report on Skylab–ML70–6618—and to highlight for you what lies ahead. 93-466 O - 73 – 4 (45) º, _SKYLAB 46 In previous statements to this committee, we have provided much background material on the development and manufacturing aspects of the program. As you know, Skylab is a 3-mission program— ML71–7503-consisting of one 28-day and two 56-day manned flights spanning an 8-month time period. 47 LAUNCH SCHEDULE ºt- i 1973 May UN | Ul Aue sep oci now bec T T s k . . . . . . . . . . . . . º ---- ------------- ºf-Gaºlo I -------------- ----------- En-u or q-La-este. 5T-Foºd------ --- P-L- -----ou--a -or u- -RT-DATE------- P---------- ------- -------- ---------- --------- ------------- PLACE-pºwer-cº En-sº-tº-E usness Bºat ------------ ---E-T-P-L- Edward Gibson | Bºth pare 11----- | PLace-au-Faun - ED-u of Roc-Estºn ------------ ------ --- ----a-Pogue. LT co-usa= Bºth date-1------ PLace-axe-a-oº: --------------- ---------- To man our missions, the Skylab flight crews–ML72–5652—have been selected, including two additional backup crews–ML72–5651– to assure an adequate roster. I propose that this statement focus on what we plan to accomplish now that we are approaching the opera- tional phase. 49 SKYLAB ASTRONAUT BACKUP CREWS 2-------------- -------- 1st Mission -------- ---------- ------------- ------------- tº u ºr -- a----------- Russe-tº-tº-aºl -------------- PLace weatu-E-- - tº------- ------------ ------------- ------------- ----------- ------------- ------------ ------------- ------------------ wa-E-Ba-coluwe-a-º. -------- ---------- E------------- ----- ------- ---------- ------------- --------------------- --- Bºuc------------------ ------------- ------------- -------------------- But first let me take a moment to set the stage. Through the summer and fall of last year, flight hardware—ML72–7317—for the Skylab-1/ Skylab–2 launch was delivered to the Kennedy Space Center. From California, Alabama, Texas, we delivered all of our flight hardware primarily by aircraft, but also by barge. 50 FLIGHT HARDWARE ARRIVAL AT KSC Aurºlock Mudu LE Multiple docking ADAPTER onental workshop. PayLoad SHRDud. Aft intenst AGE command AND SERVICE MODULES NASA Ho Mºz-73-17 REv. 2-22-73 This delivery was contingent on the completion of exhaustive integration and systems testing prior to acceptance by NASA. Exten- sive use of altitude and thermal/vacuum chambers to simulate flight conditions was an important test requirement. Below this level of testing and even more basic was the qualification test program, now virtually complete. 51 ------> - - --- -- - Tºº 20 fºr chamber --> s - MEDICAL ExPERTMENTALTTTUDE TEST ------------070 -º-º-º: One test program of special significance should be mentioned. Last summer the Skylab medical experiment altitude test of 56-day duration—ML 73–5070—was conducted in an altitude chamber at the Johnson Space Center, in a simulated orbital workshop environ- ment. This test was designed to obtain baseline medical data, to determine the physiological effect of the environment on the three crewmen, and to insure the operational readiness of the integrated medical experiment system. HARDWARE CHECKOUT AT KSC º-EL-º-º-º: Fº |--|-- I- - º, º # , i.e. NASA HC ML72-73-15 i. | *. 12-22-72 ATM. Going in To clean-Room in - ºc Bibgº º TIE Tºuring EockING TE: Having arrived at KSC, the flight hardware has undergone intensive checkout at the module level—ML 72–7315—including docking tests to verify the critical interface between the multiple docking adapter and the command and service module. Stacking of the Saturn V and Saturn IB launch vehicles—ML 72–7316—has proceeded apace and end-to-end integrated systems tests of the orbital assembly have been completed. 53 That test was successfully completed last Saturday, and I am pleased to report we had very few problems. All the activities to date support a mid-May dual launch. Major activities which remain to be accomplished prior to rollout of the Saturn V/Skylab-1 to the launch pad include the stowage and service- ing of consumables like food and water, and the final flight stowage of experiment and operational equipment. Rollout to PAD 39A is scheduled for mid-April. We are presently conducting a bench review on all of the stowage equipment. The work remaining on the Saturn IB/Skylab-2 manned vehicle, which was transferred to PAD 39B the day before yesterday, comprises the now standard launch preparations for manned space flight. The overall philosophy has been to conduct all possible testing and servicing within the protected environment of the vehicle assembly building and to move the space vehicles to the launch pad only when they are virtually ready for flight. However, the flight readiness reviews and countdown demonstration tests remain to be accomplished prior to launch. In this brief status report, I have stressed the comprehensive nature of the test program. Our test pyramid, starting at the com- ponent qualification level and building up through the levels of subsystem and module testing, through acceptance reviews and checkouts, to the countdown demonstration, provides us with the confidence we need to launch and operate America's first space station. By this time next year, Mr. Chairman, the Skylab flights will be history, and we will be well into the initial assessment of the practical benefits and value of a manned research facility in Earth orbit. 54 The Skylab program is predominantly utilitarian in nature, putting the space vehicles and operating knowhow developed by Apollo in the service of a wide range of scientific and technological disciplines while increasing enormously the opportunities for man to perform useful tasks in space. SKYL AB SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATIONS - The scientific investigations—ML 72–5744—to be conducted on the Skylab mission embrace almost every discipline that can take advantage of the unique properties of the orbital environment— the broad view of Earth and the biosphere, the availability of the entire electromagnetic spectrum for celestial observation, and the virtual elimination of the effects of gravity. 55 SCOPE OF SKYLAB COMMITMENT TO SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY sº----- $/ Sº Z & /& sº §§§º/#/.3% Skyº &S/3/$/º/sº.3% &/S $/ $% $/$/S/SS/SS/S INVESTIGATIONS 44 || 146 24 26 || 9 || 17 || 4 || 270 INSTRUMENTS 7 || 6 || 12 18 || 8 || 2 || 4 || 57 PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS 5 || 140 || 11 || 19 || 7 || 17 | 3 || 202 C0-INVESTIGATORS | 11 || 388 || 6 || 13 || 4 || 2 || 0 || 424 ASS00 IATED PROFESSIONALS 75 || 5 || 10 || 3 || 0 || 12 || 8 || 113 FOREIGN PROFESSIONALS (23) GIS) (5) (4)|(0) (2)|(0)|(253) STUDENT INVESTIGATORS 0 || 2 || 7 || 6 || 1 || 0 || 3 || 19 NASA HQ M 173-5056 REV 2-21-73 About 270—ML 73–5056—separate scientific and technological investigations have been identified. These investigations are being pursued by over 600 principal investigators and coinvestigators, of which some 250 are for foreign professionals. Over 100 additional senior scientists are formally associated with the program, most of these through written agreement with the principal investigators. Beyond this, many principal investigators have informal arrangements with other scientists for assistance in analysis or in assessing the sig- nificance of the results. Overall, it is expected that more than 700 senior scientists and engineers outside of NASA will have a direct function in the analysis and reporting of Skylab experiment data. Over 2,500 astronaut hours will be allocated to the performance of these investigations, which is more than three times the total amount available in all prior United States Earth orbit missions. The crew will operate more than 50 different assemblies of sophisticated equipment to acquire an extraordinary amount and variety of data. 56 SKYLAB SOLAR AS T R O NO MY EXPERI MENTS OBJECTIVES • LEARN MORE ABOUT THE UNIVERSE SPACE ENVIRONMENT A tº D I HE SOLAR S. Y S I E M A ND I HEIR ºff E CI O N E A R T H AND ** * * * *-D - A --L--R E D A A On 5 OLAR P. H. E. N. O. M. ENA w H. N. C. R. E. A ºf D -- I - A - D - PA I. A. L. R. E. S. O. Lulu I O tº tº H C S = - A -- -- *-C A - A - A B L * * G R O U - D. B. A. St D C B ºf R ------ ------------ And now let me address each of these disciplines in turn. The study of the Sun—ML 72–5742—goes back to the beginnings of civilization, when prehistoric astronomers used its motion to predict the seasons and tell the best times for planting and harvesting. Their successors, modern solar astronomers, seek to understand and explain the remarkable phenomena within and around the Sun itself. In part, this is scientific research in its purest form, but there is also a strong awareness that better knowledge of solar processes may lead the way to new means for generating and controlling energy for use on Earth. Yesterday, Mr. Winn, you asked what solar astronomy may con- tribute to the solution of the energy crisis we face here on Earth. The Sun is the only known working thermonuclear reactor that is accessible for scientific study. Although scientists generally agree that the Sun's energy is derived from thermonuclear reactions, the details of this process are not well understood. Observations by the Skylab solar-instruments will bring a major increase in new data, particularly in the X-ray and short ultraviolet wavelengths which do not penetrate the Earth’s atmosphere, with a resolution of pattern detail and spectral structure that will surpass anything previously available. Now, this is scientific research in its purest form. No one can predict the new knowledge that may result from this, but it must surely bring scientists closer to a full understanding of the Sun as a reactor. This in turn should yield insights into the fundamental energy processes which would eventually lead to engineers harnessing them for controlled energy generation to meet man’s growing demands. For example, I am told that if there were a way to harness the . from just one solar flare, which I do not propose you can, it would provide enough energy for 1 million years at the current rate 57 we consume it here on Earth. So you can see that understanding of the thermonuclear processes could lead eventually to great reactors, which may solve our problems. Mr. WINN. I would like to ask a question. Are you cooperating with any of the Government agencies who are looking into the energy crisis? Mr. ScHNEIDER. Solar astronomy is far more purely scientific in nature, and not what I would call an applications program. So in that respect, no, we are not. However, closer at hand is all of our knowledge in the development of the solar arrays. These solar arrays are the largest that have ever been assembled, and this is an entirely different process from the thermonuclear reactor. These solar arrays will produce 7% or 8 kilo- watts of power for Skylab, and do represent the largest collection, I believe, of solar energy for utilization. I am not an expert in this, but I understand the University of Arizona has been looking into setting up similar arrays on the desert to collect solar energy for more near-term use on Earth. In that respect the technology may have a very practical benefit. Additionally, there is the problem of understanding the mechanisms by which solar events affect the Earth. For example, it is known that solar flares are associated with the auroras and with the disruption of ionospheric radio transmission. Since these same flares correlate with variations in the profiles of temperature and density in the upper atmosphere, it is probable that they may trigger worldwide weather phenomena as well. Better understanding of the solar flare phenomena may therefore eventually contribute to improved worldwide weather prediction. AIMUSHERE ABSURPION OF SOLAR EMISSIONS 2- º - - * * ------- --AR lºw- --- i. ººº------ ------ ~~~~ ------ RADAR UHF (MICROWAVE) RADIO LF AUDIO AC TTTTTTTTTTTT GAMMA - RAY TTTTT TTI "--, ATMOSPHERIC TRANSMISSION 58 The Solar instruments on Skylab will assist in understanding these phenomena by affording an unmatched opportunity to gain new knowledge of the sun. Operating beyond the limitations of the atmos- phere—ML 73–5458—these solar º: will make observations of the sun not accessible from ground observatories, particularly in the ultraviolet and X-ray regions. Their size and sensitivity make it possible to observe details of form and spectral composition not attain- able by the satellite solar observatories orbited to date, and their operation under the direct control of an astronomer-astronaut allows them to be aimed selectively at specific details on the solar disc. The observing program to be carried out on Skylab embodies coordinated attacks on specific problems of solar physics, such as: magnetic fields and circulation in the solar atmosphere; solar flares; pºnenºs and filaments; and expulsions of solar matter toward the arth. In planning a thorough and worldwide program in solar physics, the principal investigators have established agreements for joint investigations with over 50 astronomers and physicists in the United States and abroad. Concurrent ground-based observations in ac- cessible wavelength regions, and X-ray and Gamma-ray observations from sounding rockets and balloons will provide needed supporting data to the spaceborne programs, and will multiply the solar physics return from both activities. To allow other interested scientists to coordinate their own observa- tions with the solar astronomy program without a formalized agree- ment, the principal investigators also established procedures for worldwide communications. These will inform interested ground- based observers on scheduled solar astronomy observing activities on a daily basis. We are broadcasting these activities daily on WWV, so they may be listened to by anyone in the world. It is expected that over 200 observatories and scientists will take advantage of this opportunity. 59 SKYLAB EARTH RESOURCES EXPERI MENTS -i- -Ps ------ º º - waits rºtºnon- ------- 2. -NERAL RESOURCE* > - --- Lu-O- OBJECTIVES ------- ºr of oc R A P Hºc A NALY SIS OF CROPS FORES I R Y Lº Dºº- -- - - - - -o- E - G- E O LOGY - nº. D F - A LUATE AIR AND w a ER POLLU 10 tº -- or nº ºur a cºs of a tº not out. For tº n -- ~~~ ---------- Lo a D tº wºn 1 ºr ºf R - D - - - ------ it ºr ºut a ºº º A - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Now let's look down from Skylab. The use of spacecraft as a plat- form for observing the earth—ML–72–5845—has been amply demon- strated by the photography returned by Gemini and Apollo flights and the weather information provided routinely by automated satel- lites for many years. The Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS) launched last July and the Skylab Earth Resources Experiment Package (EREP) are experimental efforts directed towards demonstrating the feasi- bility of using space to gather more detailed information and applying it to the problems of the environment, our diminishing resources, and the rapidly growing world population. The data provided by ERTS and E.REP are to be used, for example, to study crop and forest inventory, crop health, oceans, mineral resources, water resources, and air and water pollution. 60 EREP PROGRAM STRUCTURE AgriculſURE/RANGE/FORESTRY CROP INVENTORY |NSECT INFESTATION SOIL TYPE SOIL MOISTURE RANGE invenTORY FOREST INVENTORY FOREST INSECT DAMAGE GEOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS MAPPING - METALS EXPLORATION HYDRO CARBON EXPLORATION ROCK TYPES VOLCANOS EARTH MOVEMENTS CONTINENTAL WATER RESOURCES GROUND WATER SNOW MAPPING D RANAGE BASINS WATER OUALITY 00:EAN INVESTIGATIONS SEA STATE SEA/LAKE ICE CURRENTS TEMPERATURE GEODESY LIVING MARINE RESOURCES ATMOSPHERIC INVESTIGATIONS STORMS, FRONTS, AND CLOUDS RADIANT ENERGY BALANCE AiR OUALITY ATMOSPHERiC EFFECTS COASTAL ZONES, SHOALS, AND BAYS CIRCULATION AND POLLUTION IN BAYS UNDERWATER TOPOGRAPHY AND SEDIMENTATION BATHYMETRY COASTAL CiRCULATION WETLANDS ECOLOGY REMOTE SENSING TECHNIQUES DEVELOPMENT PATTERN RECOGNITION MICROWAVE SIGNATURES DATA PROCESSING SENSOR PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REGIONAL PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT LAND USE CLASSIFICATION TECHNHOUES ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS – SPECIAL TOPICS STATE AND FOREIGN RESOURCES URBAN APPLICATIONS COASTAL/PLAINS APPLICATIONS MOUNTAIN/DESERT APPLICATIONS CART06RAPHY PHOTOMAPPING MAP REVISION MAP ACCURACY THEMATIC MAPPING NASA HQ ML72-6399 A REV. 2/21/73 More specifically, EREP will be used to acquire selective data— ML–72–6399A—for 146 investigations in 46 task areas which can use remotely sensed data from space. For instance, the tasks under “crop inventory” in the agriculture/range/forestry discipline include studies in Arizona, California, Colorado, Michigan, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas; and in Iran, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, the Sudan, and Colombia. - Mr. FREY. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt? Mr. Fuqua. Surely. : Mr. FREY. I understand the delay in the launch of Skylab is going to hinder the EREP crop study, because the growing season will have begun. Is that correct? Mr. SCHNEIDER. No, sir. That was an erroneous report in some of the Houston newspapers, I believe. It has caused us to reshuffle some test sites, but has not destroyed any usefulness of the data. We do want to get off in the spring, so we can get the spring growing cycle. Mr. CAMP. How come you are not paying any attention to Oklahoma? Mr. SchNEIDER. Only in the particular area I selected there, sir. We have EREP investigations in many, many places. Whether or not Oklahoma is included, I will have to research. Mr. CAMP. I think we should have Oklahoma included. Mr. SCHNEIDER. Sir, we will provide you with information on what we are doing for Oklahoma. 61. [Information requested for the record follows: A. EREP TASKS PLANNED TO USE OKLAHOMA AREA TEST SITES Subject Task No. Investigator Moisture in soil--------------------- 146 Dr. J. R. Eagleman, University of Kansas. Hydrocarbon exploration------------- 241 Dr. Robert J. Collins, Eason Oil Co., Oklahoma City, Okla. Atmospheric investigation------------ 502 Dr. D. E. Pitts, NASA, Johnson Space Center, Texas. Mr. WINN. It might not show a lot of crops, but it will sure show a lot of big football players. Mr. BERGLAND. Will the postponing of the flight until May mean the southern latitudes of the United States will not be photographed at the time of the planting? Do you intend to move the belt north? - Mr. SCHNEIDER. No, sir. We use ground truth sites, and we have just selected a set of those which will be in the area from which we want to get data. . It has no fundamental effect on the effectiveness of the experiments. Mr. BERGLAND. Thank you. Mr. CAMP. Mr. Chairman. Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Camp. Mr. CAMP. In your testimony it says “crop health, and oceans.” Can you see under the water? Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes. Many of these instruments, by proper interpretation of the data, tell you what is beneath the surface. In Skylab, we have two microwave experiments which I will explain later, designed specifically for oceanography, and looking at ocean areas. The infrared experiments will give us a great deal of information about the temperature of the water, temperature below the water surface level and give us a great deal of information as to what types of contaminants may be included in this water. Each element radiates differently. By having a 14-channel infrared sensor record the data in each of the 14 channels, and by proper interleafing the data and referring back to the bank of reference data, we can tell a great deal about an ocean and what is beneath it. 93-466 O – 73 - 5 62 SPECTRAL COVERAGE ERTS/EREP ERTS MSS DIT] RBW [T] \ VISIBLE AND NEAR INFRARED Wºry MI CROWAVE y 4 6 8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 22.2%) 6 8 10 12 14 16)) 5 10 15 20 25 MICROMETERS CM EREP S190 (a) [] S190 (b) [T] S191 || || T S192 [T] [I] [I] [T] [T] S193 * - - X S194 X NASA HQ ML72- 6814 REV 2–21–73 The Skylab instruments generally provide higher spectral and spatial resolution—ML 72–6814—than is available with ERTS. In the lower regions of the spectrum—blue, green, and red—some of the EREP bands have been selected to be comparable to those available with the ERTS Multispectral Scanner (MSS) and Return Beam Vidicon (RBV). However, the EREP coverage has been expanded to the infrared, to include a thermal channel, and measurements in the microwave region. We have two experiments that work in the microwave region. The microwave portion of the spectrum is important because of its ability to penetrate clouds and because it is of primary interest to oceanographers. The techniques for using microwave sensors, however, are not as well-developed as for optical sensors. Hence, the sensors to be flown on Skylab are unique advance developments. The EREP investigators will use the data acquired with these instruments, as well as data obtained with high altitude aircraft, and sample measurements at actual test sites to interpret and apply the space data. The 146 EREP investigations are to be carried out by people affiliated with other Government agencies, with State and local governments, universities, industry, and foreign countries and groups The data acquired will also be made available to other users through Federal outlets established by the Departments of Interior and Commerce. Mr. WINN. May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman? Mr. FUQUA. Yes, sir. Mr. WINN. Before we get away from the agricultural field, again, a major constraint on the amount of time that can be spent on Skylab Earth resources experiments, is the requirement, as I understand it, to keep the ATM pointed at the Sun. 63 How were the relative amounts of time to be spent on solar observa- tions and Earth resources determined? Mr. SCHNEIDER. We have been trying to optimize the return from both of these experiments. We currently have 65 EREP passes scheduled during the Skylab mission, which should accomplish all objectives of those 146 investiga- tions. Mr. WINN. By keeping the ATM pointed at the Sun, though, you are limited, are you not? How much percentage of your total time do you lose because it is not directed towards the Earth? hº SCHNEIDER. The majority of the time we will be pointed towards the Sun. For example, there are on the order of 15 revolutions per day, out of which we would normally plan for one revolution of Earth observa- #: The most we plan on any one day is two observations of the arth. Mr. FREY. May I ask one question? Mr. FUQUA. Certainly. Mr. FREY. One of the things we have promised the public for a long period of time is that there will be a payoff from this project. To date, although we have done much, I don’t think we have had enough benefits to point out. One of the problems I find, for instance in the Florida citrus in- dustry, is what we call “young tree decline.” We have been working with people from the Cape area to try to come up with a space tech- nique to deal with this, and they are doing a great job. But one of the problems we run into is the data base. I would like to know, in your opinion, when we finish with this program, will we have the data base we need, which we don’t have now? Or are we going to be telling people from the agricultural communities, like Mr. Camp, that we can not tell them anything yet, it will be another 4 or 5 years? Mr. ScHNEIDER. We are trying to get the data base. The EREP investigations are combination of observations from space, on the ground, and from aircraft, to get just this data base that is so needed in order to interpret and understand the data. We have a coordinated program. ERTS and E.REP are coordinated, not two separate programs, to get that data base so we can do what we all hope to do. Mr. FREY. If we do not have what we need, where do we get it? Do we have to put up another Skylab? Mr. ScHNEIDER. The Skylab instruments are as advanced instru- ments as we know how to build today. Mr. FREY. By the time we finish with this program, hopefully there will be new and different ones. The state of the art will not remain where it is, will it? Mr. ScHNEIDER. No. But these are the best ones we know how to build today. Mr. FREY. To put up Skylab this May means you had to start 2 or 3 years ago, basically you are using a great deal of technology that is old right now. Mr. SchNEIDER. That is right. 64 Mr. FREY. What I am trying to do very delicately, is to lay the base for a need for a further Skylab, because without the data base every- thing we do is absolutely useless. Mr. ScHNEIDER. Correct. The whole Earth Resources Program, of course, calls for a further continuing effort to expand in these areas. Mr. FREY. Thank you. Mr. CAMP. Will it be possible to tell what the crop conditions are throughout the whole world, as well as in North and South America? Mr. SCHNEIDER. Wherever you have photographs taken, and providing you have the data base to let you interpret the photographs; that is correct. Mr. CAMP. But I understand that this information will be sensitive, it won’t be so everyone can use it because of the situation between the different countries. - In other words, like the Russian crop failure, we will know it, but we cannot talk about it? Mr. ScHNEIDER. No, sir. It is our plan to make every bit of data available through the Department of Interior and Department of Commerce. All photographs will be available to anyone who wants to buy them at about $1.50 a print. Mr. WINN. Are you restricted by some countries on photographing? Mr. ScHNEIDER. No one has restricted us. *; WINN. As far as you know you can photograph everything in sight': Mr. SCHNEIDER. We are photographing all the test sites that have been proposed for the EREP investigations. We are not indiscrimi- nately photographing the whole world. Mr. BERGLAND. Are those States and foreign countries listed in your testimony the only places involved? Mr. SchNEIDER. Oh, no. That is just under one category. There are 19 different foreign countries and the U.N. involved in EREP. I can submit for the record the States involved, as well. Mr. Fuqua. It would be well to submit that for the record. Mr. SchNEIDER. Certainly. [Information requested for the record follows: A. E.REP observations have been planned on the basis of test site areas pro- posed by principal investigators. For the continental United States, these sites vary from small areas within a State to multi-State groupings and encompass portions of virtually all States. Other observations planned include Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the 36 foreign countries listed: Iran, Brazil, Argentina, Sudan, Colombia, Philippines, Israel, Mexico, Spain, Australia, France, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Venezuela, Italy, Switzerland, Niger, Japan, Canada, Chile, Indonesia, Thailand, India, Mali, Paraguay, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Nepal, Germany, Malaysia, Bolivia, Honduras, Peru, El Salvador, and Ecuador. Mr. FUQUA. Please proceed. 65 ASTROPHYSICAL SCIENCES IHE UPPER AIMUSPHERE - - "Gººs - - - - - - - - ULTRA TOLE AIR GLOW Mr. SchNEIDER. Having looked up and down, we should now look into deep space. Astrophysics—ML71-5596—has traditionally sought answers to fundamental questions regarding the nature of the physical universe, leading to the discovery of important concepts—the passage and measurement of time, the seasons, the size and shape of the Earth, its place in the solar system and relationship with the rest of the observable universe. In addition, the study of matter in previously unknown states and of processes too exotic to occur naturally in our own environment—the generation of thermonuclear energy in the center of stars, for example—has had a great influence on the growth of other physical sciences. The increase in available information brought about by access to space and the opening up of the entire spectrum from gamma rays to new regions of radio waves holds out the promise of discoveries of new phenomena, such as pulsars, previously hidden from our view, and new insights into basic scientific questions. The Skylab facility will provide an opportunity to perform a variety of investigations relating to cosmic rays, measurements of radiation reflected by dust particles in interstellar space, and ultraviolet and X-ray observation of visible and invisible stellar sources. Less strin- gent weight limitations on Skylab permit larger instruments to be flown, and film and sample return will provide better resolution of data than has been obtained from an unmanned satellite. While all the solar, Earth, and astrophysical observations are going on, other important investigations taking place will be those relating to life sciences, that is to man himself. Biomedical monitoring of the crewmen was an important operational element in previous 66 manned space programs, but the limitations of weight, space, and crew time did not permit detailed scientific investigation of the physi- ological effects that took place. In Skylab, systematic and detailed studies will be made of the effects of prolonged weightlessness on the major body functions—ML 72–5743. º SKYLAB MEDICAL EXPERIMENTS - | . - - | | OBJECTIVES ** - DETERMINE EFFECT OF LONG DURATION SPACE FLIGHT ON MAN: PERFORM INVESTIGA- TIONS OF: • CARD10WASCULAR ADAPTATION • BONE MINERAL CHANGES • GAIN/LOSSES OF BODY B10-0HEMICALS • HEMATOLOGY, IMMUNOLOGY, NEUROPHYSIOLOGY PULM0NARY AND ENERGY METABOLISM Comprehensive experiments have been designed to investigate the extent of skeletal and muscular alterations and to evaluate biochemical changes and nutritive requirements. These investigations will meas- ure input and output of fluid and biochemical constituents, make X-ray estimates of bone demineralization and assess hormones and electrolytes in body fluids. A detail cardiovascular study will test the reflexes which regulate the regional distribution of blood throughout the body. This important measurement will help to determine the nature and time course of changes in these reflexes. The cardiovascular investigation also in- cludes vectorcardiograms during calibrated exercises, in order to evaluate the response of the heart to a provocative stress in weight- lessness. Investigations in hematology and immunology deal with the effects of space flight on the blood cells, body fluid compartments, the clotting mechanism, body immunity, and chromosomal aberrations. For the first time we will be collecting blood samples in flight. These samples will be separated into plasma and cells and returned for postflight analysis. 67 Neurophysiology investigations will evaluate several nervous sys- tem responses to determine effects of weightlessness on the otoliths which contribute to man's perception of body orientation in space and will test for changes in sensitivity and susceptibility of the semicircular canals to rotation in weightlessness. A sleep monitoring experiment yºgate the effects of space flight on the quality and quantity OI Sleep. Energy expenditures will be measured by comparing the metabolic rate observed during rest with that found during prescribed calibrated workloads and with similar data taken before and after the mission. These extensive medical studies will provide a base of knowledge so that future decisions on the use of men in space can be made with confidence. It is also expected that the response to weightlessness will add sig- nificantly to the basic understanding of man's various physiological processes in his normal environment. In addition, some of the advances in medical instrumentation developed for Skylab will find important application in hospitals and doctors’ offices. Related to the life sciences investigations are the man/systems integration experiments, focused on space flight itself, to improve future space systems and operations. By producing an integrated body of knowledge based on empirical observations of how man function in space, these investigations will make possible more effec- tive space operations. ORBITAL WORKSHOP 0NE G TRAINER - - º - - & ---O-------------> -º-º-ºxº-R-E-ºx anta NASAT tº º Future decisions on what functions should be allocated to men in space and which should be automated—ML 72–5059—how to 68 design support systems, living accommodations, work stations, controls and displays—ML 72–5740—what kind of provisions are best for servicing and maintaining space equipment, the desirability of artificial gravity—all need a body of solid facts which define man's capabilities and support needs in weightless flight. INTERIOR - MULTIPLE D0CKING ADAPTER solar ASTRONOM CONTROL & DISPLAY Thus we expect from Skylab a many-fold increase in the body of factual knowledge available to the designers and operations planners of the space shuttle and the scientific and applications payloads that it will carry into space. The last of the investigations are those relating to the discipline of materials science. As we well know, the Earth environment not only determines, but also limits many materials processes, especially through its ever-present, large gravitational force. The space en- vironment offers virtual elimination of gravity. Melting and mixing without the contaminating effects of containers, the suppression of convection and buoyancy in liquids and molten materials, control of voids, and the ability to use electrostatic and magnetic forces otherwise masked by gravitational forces open the way to new knowl- edge of material properties and processes. 69 MATERIALS PROCESSING IN SPACE SKYLAB EXPERI MENT M 512 WTERTISTROTºº Exºtº HEATING *º-2- - - - wº- - SPHERE FORMING Skylab investigations in this area—ML 71–5028—will range from the examination of composite structural materials with highly spe- cialized physical properties, such as solidification of lamellar structures in an eutectic alloy, to large highly perfect crystals with valuable electrical and optical properties, grown from solution or by vapor transport, all associated with materials systems which cannot now be produced on Earth. The Skylab materials processing facility represents the first step in a program of space research in the materials science and manu- facturing in space area. Seventeen separate investigators, including two from foreign countries, will be associated with this research. Ultimately, the knowl- edge to be gained will result in improved materials and processes for use on Earth. Before leaving the experimental disciplines, I would like to cover one special area of investigation. Last year, when I was before this committee, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, I advised you of the unique Skylab student project, cosponsored by the National Science Teachers Association and NASA, to provide high school students with an opportunity to submit experiment proposals for use on Skylab. The response from our young scientific community was beyond anything we had anticipated. Applications were requested from every State and in excess of 3,400 proposals were received. Of these, 301 regional winners and 25 national winners—ML 73–5040—were selected by the NSTA. 70 SKYLAB STUDENT PROJECT REGIONS H O RC-A-M-E-R-S-MST-REGI-s anaeic wu-Ena-s-wo, or Paoposal-a-ceived º Regional centess * --------E-F-G-C-E-TERS - Natio-a-ERs - PLus Puerto Rico, Cana-zone - viacºm Islands -- PLus ---- --- --> ---------- I am pleased to say that we have been able to accommodate 19 of the 25 national winners on Skylab, using either specially designed hardware, which we built in-house, or by providing data from existing Skylab equipment. All winners, including those that we could not accommodate for reasons of hardware complexity and cost or time for performance, have been assigned to work with NASA scientists or principal investi- gators either in their specific experiment area or in related areas. Every submittal has received suitable acknowledgement, and special awards have been made to regional and national winners. In years to come these young people will be filling our shoes, and I must say that after meeting them I have a feeling of confidence in the future. Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to address the area of opera- tions in somewhat more detail than we have done in previous state- ments. Operations is concerned with the planning and conduct of launch and flight activities. The planning required for the long- duration Skylab missions, with the myriad of activities to be accom- plished, has been an undertaking of considerable magnitude. The preparation of two complex space vehicles in parallel creates a major increase in coordination and planning requirements. Other factors adding to the operations challenge of Skylab are the number and complexity of the Skylab systems, and of course the number of experiments and experimenters involved. 71 --------GE-5 SKYLAB FLIGHT CONTROLLER TRAINING ºssion … CºntroL - CONSOLES sºon - a . - CREM station CREW station La. TRAINER TRAINER - - - -º-º-º: - - - Cº. CREW STATION TRAIMER - º, Tºº-soº 1-8-73 Because of these complexities great emphasis has been placed on training and simulation—ML 73–5013. Simulations have covered all segments of the mission, including launch, workshop activation, typical in-orbit days, deactivation and reentry. Further simulations will be conducted to evaluate flight readiness to assure that the operations team and space vehicles are ready to go. Indeed, we are now in a 3-day simulation, which started yesterday, and is going on today and tomorrow, involving the crew, the ground crews, the ground controllers, people at Houston, Marshall and º in a completely integrated simulation of 3 days of orbital ight. When I left my office it was going well. As in past space missions, we again expect outstanding per- formance from our flight crews. Skylab flight crews have been under- going vigorous training ever since selection, covering a multitude of subjects and skills from astronomy and medicine to simulated rendez- vous and docking maneuvers. By the time our crews are ready for flight, they will have received over 2,000 hours of training, most of it devoted to experiment operations. - No report to this committee would be complete without advising you of the status of our rescue capability, which we touched on a little bit yesterday. Last year I told you that our rescue capability was under develop- ment. Now I can report that a rescue kit to convert Skylab command modules to rescue vehicles has been manufactured and qualified, and will be delivered to KSC next month. 72 Basically, the kit consists of two additional couches and life support equipment. The rescue mode envisages launch of the next mission spacecraft, with the kit installed, but with only two astronauts on board, thereby providing accommodation for the three astronauts awaiting rescue. Thus Skylab–3 is potentially the rescue vehicle for Skylab–2, and Skylab–4 for Skylab–3. To provide rescue capability for Skylab–4, the Skylab backup spacecraft will be used. If I may give an analogy here, the command and service module is normally our lifeboat, and we would expect if we have any problem in the workshop, that the crew would retreat to the command and service module and detach and come back to Earth. The Skylab rescue kit envisions that there is a problem in the life- boat that would prevent you from coming back. That means then you stay in the workshop until the rescue lifeboat comes up to get you. In closing, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I feel that through the extensive nature of our test programs and the careful planning of operational activities we are ready to embark on a truly significant mission, and with your permission, I would like to show a short film in summation of my statement. (Film shown, with accompanying commentary.) Mr. ScHNEIDER. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared testimony. Mr. Fuqua. Thank you, Mr. Schneider. One matter you mentioned in the latter part of your formal testi- mony was the rescue capability. During the 28 days, and later the 56-day missions, will there be #.' forces deployed for rescue operations in both the Atlantic and 8,OITIC ( Mr. ScHNEIDER. No, sir. We have very minimal deployment of forces around the world for recovery. If rescue were necessary it would be our plan to return to the eastern portion of the Pacific Ocean. Mr. Fuqua. There would be a minimum crew stationed in that area at all times? Mr. ScHNEIDER. Yes, sir. Not a full-up capability at all times, but adequate for emergency purposes. Mr. FUQUA. And others would be on call to augment the effort? Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes. Mr. Fuqua. Yesterday we discussed the cost of launching of an additional Skylab with Dale Myers. There was discussion of the assessment of data that you would get, say next year when you are testifying you will have had 8 months of lapse time. What leadtime do you need, if a decision is made to go with a second Skylab? Was there some talk of 1975 or 1976? Mr. ScHNEIDER. We quoted the financial requirements to launch in 1976. A decision would probably have to be made before the end of the Skylab program, because we will be placing some of the equipment in storage before the end of the program. Mr. Fu QUA. When would that be? Mr. ScHNEIDER. We tentatively plan at the end of the second manned mission to deactivate the backup hardware and place that in storage. - 73. Mr. FUQUA. When is that scheduled? During the second or third mission? Mr. ScHNEIDER. The second is scheduled for August, and should be completed in October. At that time, we would begin to place the backup equipment in storage for eventual disposition. Mr. FUQUA. What could be gained by another Skylab? Mr. SCHNEIDER. That depends on the kind of instruments we would carry. Some of the instruments on Skylab, as they are now, would benefit from additional use. Others we anticipate we will get as much information as is necessary, from the present program. Mr. FUQUA. Going back to the questions asked by Mr. Frey and Mr. Camp in trying to develop this data bank do you think you would acquire enough information during these three missions to fully supply that bank? Or would it be necessary to go back to more sophisticated and updated equipment? You have to draw the line someplace to cut off on new improvements, or updating, or more sophisticated equipment. Mr. ScHNEIDER. What I believe is missing in the Earth resources package on Skylab is the ability to transmit the data back to Earth as you acquire it. Currently all the data is recorded on film or magnetic tape and brought back at the end of each manned mission, and if you were going to add to the EREP experiments that would be the most profitable addition, I believe. Mr. Fuqua. Would there be any other instrument or scientific packages required? Mr. ScHNEIDER. Each sponsoring office has been asked what it would like to do if they had all the resources available, and everybody would like to update their instruments. There are solar instruments the Office of Space Sciences would prefer on board if a second Skylab program were flown, for instance. Mr. FUQUA. In your opinion, would a second Skylab be worthwhile, or would it just fill a gap in manned space? Would it provide useful information that would justify the additional cost and risk involved? Mr. ScHNEIDER. It is that term “justify additional cost”; of a second Skylab that has to be weighed against the totality of the budget. Without budgetary restraints, I have no doubt that a second Skylab would be a useful tool. How useful it would be must be weighed against other requirements of the Agency and of the Nation. Mr. Fuqua. I am thinking about our responsibility, and that of the Agency. We have a gap where we don’t have any manned flights of any kind, until the Shuttle flies, probably in 1978 or 1979. Mr. SchNEIDER. Yes. Mr. FUQUA. I don’t think you can iustify it just to have somebody fly. But can enough useful information be derived from the total package of Earth resources that would justify a serious look at another Skylab? Yesterday you indicated it would justify that. I am not asking you to advocate something that is against policy, apparently the decision has been made not to do that, or not make that decision yet. Mr. ScHNEIDER. Yes, sir. Mr. FUQUA. But I am asking you to let us know if you think the scientific information we would receive from an additional Skylab would be justifiable? Would it be borderline? Or would it be well worth the expenditure? 74 Mr. ScHNEIDER. Almost every investigation on Skylab would benefit from a better statistical base for the data. Many of the ex- periments are being conducted with minimal data return, because of the time. So I would have to say a repeat of the Skylab investigations would be beneficial to nearly all of the principal investigators. Mr. FLOWERS. Would the chairman yield? Mr. Fuqua. Yes. Mr. FLOWERS. I think the chairman is also getting at possibly other experiments. When you chose what to put on Skylab-A, did you leave out a great body of experiments because you had only one to fly? Mr. ScHNEIDER. Yes, sir. That is what I meant when I said before that in discussions as to whether or not we should fly a second Skylab program, we queried the sponsoring offices, such as NASA’s. They came back with experiments they would like to add in. If you totaled up everything it would have added another $100 million to the Skylab estimate. Everybody has ideas, but they would all be expensive. - Mr. FUQUA. After the first crew returns in early June or mid-June, and you have had a chance to evaluate the data received, would you then be in a much better position to advise the committee on this matter? Mr. ScHNEIDER. I am sure we would be. Because we believe the first acquisition of data from Skylab will whet the appetite of a lot of people. Mr. FUQUA. Maybe we can look at this more realistically at that time. We have the equipment, provided we have no emergencies. Is that correct? Mr. ScHNEIDER. Yes. There would be a requirement to finish one of the command and service modules. Yesterday Mr. Myers showed two partially completed command and service modules. One of those would have to be completed. We are deficient in that respect. It is partially assembled. Mr. Fuqua. That would be included in the $500 million figure he gave? Mr. SchNEIDER. Yes, sir. Mr. Fuqua. And as I recall that included a possibility of three more 56-day flights. Mr. SchNEIDER. That price was on the basis of two command and service modules. To complete the other command and service module the price would go up somewhat. The planning there envisioned two 90-day missions. Mr. Fuqua. Thank you. Mr. Frey. Mr. FREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You touched on the power problem. We know we have an energy problem in this country. We know that no matter what we do we have problems with the environment. Mr. Winn mentioned the solar and steam questions. Mr. SchNEIDER. Yes, sir. Mr. FREY. What data are we going to get regarding the potential of steam, using the inner Earth for power? How much will we know from the first Skylab about this? 75 Mr. SchNEIDER. From the first Skylab we will know which of the sensors will give us the best information for finding these thermal sources. We expect we will find some of the thermal sources using these instruments, but they are not designed primarily for that. Mr. FREY. In other words, the second Skylab would really be hºl in this area, which is one of the great national problems we 8,Veſ Mr. ScHNEIDER. Provided it was set up to be an Earth resources mission, concentrating on mapping the Nation to find those thermal TeSOUITC0S. Mr. FREY. Have we gone to other agencies that are interested in energy and said, “Look, we have something here. We have a power problem. How about you financially contributing to this thing?”? Have we looked at this well enough to see if there are other sources of funding? Mr. SCHNEIDER. No. I think, personally, we would be overselling what we will get out of the EREP package. Perhaps after we get back the first set of data we might be able to say for sure we could find these thermal sources with this kind of efficiency. I can not promise that right now. Mr. FREY. If you are going to do all these things and get nothing out of it, it is all worthless. Mr. SchNEIDER. Of the 146 investigations, some of them are close to operational and are expected to bring back data that will find immediate use. Some of the other investigations are more exploratory, to tell us what to do next. Mr. FREY. But of the 146 investigations, obviously some will di- rectly affect and relate to other activities of the Government in other areas. Now, has there been discussion about going to these other people and saying, “Look, we think this could be a joint venture.” On funding that might make sense. - Mr. ScHNEIDER. To my knowledge that hasn’t been done, although other Government agencies are fully aware of what we are doing with Skylab, and the other agencies are members of the Interagency Coordinating Committee. - Mr. FREY. If it is going to help the Department of Agriculture in a certain area, and there are real benefits from it, it seems to me that should be one source of funds, as an example. Secondly, why can’t we use, with the Skylab–and I know there are weight limitations—but even in a few key areas, is there any hope of taking along a few boxes you might plug in as you go? Mr. SchNEIDER. We think there is a limited capacity for doing that on later missions. About 80 percent of the storage is available for limited reallocation. Mr. FREY. If we took this approach would it cut down on the $500 million cost you are talking about? Mr. ScHNEIDER. I am not sure I follow the question. I thought you were referring to Skylab–3 and Skylab —4, could we bring up new experiments? --- 76 Mr. FREY. I was talking about that. By doing it that way is there any way you could limit the cost? Mr. SCHNEIDER. No; I am sorry, I do not quite follow you. Skylab B would be completely independent of Skylab A. Mr. FREy. But, is there any way you could refurbish, and save costs, on Skylab A, instead of going to Skylab B? Mr. ScHNEIDER. Oh, I understand. No; it takes about 1,000 pounds perman, per month, of consumables. Mr. FREY. Is there any way of going up for, say 56 days, and per- haps flying one more short mission, maybe only go for 3 weeks? .. Mr. SCHNEIDER. We have that option. It is not in current funding. If the use of consumables were below what we expect, there would be oxygen, water, things like that, on board, so we could either extend the last mission beyond the 56 days, or fly the rescue vehicle e - & Mr. FREY. With new experiments on it? © Mr. ScHNEIDER. Probably fly it with new film, new tape, to utilize the experiments that were on board. Mr. FREY. Would that cost be less? & Mr. ScHNEIDER. Yes; a lot less. I would have to provide that. [Information requested for the record follows: The cost of a fourth manned mission in Skylab using the rescue hardware is estimated in the range of $95–$105 million. This estimate includes the effort to prepare an alternate vehicle as a backup for the Apollo Soyuz Test Project since the Skylab rescue hardware is also planned as the ASTP backup. The additional manned mission would extend the existing program by two months assuming a 28 day manned mission launched in February 1974. This estimate is also based on the assumption that there would be sufficient consumables to sustain the workshop in an active status throughout this program extension. There are no provisions in this estimate for a rescue capability for the added mission. Mr. FREY. I think it would be useful for members of this committee, and other Members of Congress, to have the names of the people in their districts who have participated in the student program. I think it would be very useful. Mr. Fu QUA. Can & provide that for the record? Mr. ScHNEIDER. Gladly, [Information requested for the record follows:] A. The regions are delineated in the attached map (Attachment A). The Regional Chairmen are shown in Attachment B. The students who were selected as National Winners are listed in Attachment C. Those students whose experi- ments are to be flown in Skylab are listed in Attachment D. The students who were Regional Winners (excluding National Winners) are shown in Attachment E. 77 ATTACHMENT A SKYLAB STUDENT PROJECT REGIONS. Region Aſº, REGioiºſ IX - ~41% 22E2:2: ſº-H º • f f - º . . . i \, REGłonxi - § gº proposals -------. - * e º º 2:7 205 proposals º º, sº 3-ºx city) ... . . *_k-xº~~~ . .”). REGION Iv -zz--~~ § º º #. .3 KY 600 proposals - 4. - º **t ºw.” - º - tºvº §: **k *3. 237 crocºa" Fº i - REGION XI) | 322 proposals' - ſ REGion x' 350 proposals ! ~~ M - sº º RCMAN NUMERALS--NSTA REGIONS & ARA8}C N{}MERALS--NUMBER OF PROPOSALS RECEIVED () REGIONAL CENTERS - NASA CENTE * PLUS PUERTO RICO, CANAi ZONE & VIRG}N ISLANDS >kNASA CENTERs * + plus AlaskA" ' O NATIONAL WłNNERS * * * PLUS GUAM & HAWA; ATTACHMENT B REGIONAL CHAIRMEN P. J. Cowan, P.O. Box 5873, North Texas State University, Denton, Tex. Home telephone: A.C. 817-382–2259—Office: A.C. 817–788–2231 Ext. 238. Dr. Kenneth W. Fast, 222 Plant, Webster Groves, Mo. 63119. Home telephone: A.C. 314—962–9543—Office: A.C. 314—966–5710. Dr. Julius Golobow, Department of Biological Sciences, Herbert H. Lehman Col- 'º gº; Park Boulevard, West Bronx, New York, N.Y. 10468 A.C. Dr. John A. Maccini, 5706 Harland Street, New Carrollton, Md. 20784, A.C. 301–345–5134. Dr. Wendell F. McBurney, 103 Morrison Hall, Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind. 47401, A.C. 812–337–9785. Miss Nancy Noeske, Science Supervisor, Milwaukee Public Schools, P.O. Drawer 10K, Milwaukee, Wis. 53201, A.C. 414–475–8093. Pº,* # Schaff, College of Education, The University of Toledo, Toledo, io 06. Hºtelephone A.C. 419–882–4862—Office: A.C. 419–531-5711 Ext. 2465 or Dr. Seymour Stein, 13080 Lorene Court, Mountain View, Calif. 94040, A.C. 415–967–0362. * Dr. Lee R. Summerlin, 1786 Cornwall Road, Birmingham, Ala. 35226. Home telephone: A.C. 205–823–5190—Office: A.C. 205–934–2312. Mr. C. G. Wasselaros, 302 Murrysville Road, Trafford, Pa. 15085, A.C. 412– 372—0868. Dr. James R. Wailes, Hellems 311, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colo. 80302. Home telephone: A.C. 303–494–7729—Office: A.C. 303–443–2211 Ext, 8468. Mr. Harold Wiper, 25 Lynne Road, Sudbury, Mass. 01776. - Home telephone: A.C. 617–443–9327—Office: A.C. 617–969–9810 Ext. 256. Palmer House, Newton H. S., Newtonville, Mass. 02160. 93 - 466 O - 73 - 6 78 ATTACHMENT C NATIONAL WINNERs Pººl C. Bochsler, Route No. 2, Box 75, Silverton, Oreg. 97381. A.C. 503–873– Kºº* Hºndt, 11380 Grand Oak Drive, Grand Blanc, Mich. 48439. A.C. 313– Viº. Converse, 1704 Roosevelt Road, Rockford, Ill. 61111. A.C. 815– At School, 427 Stanford Hall, Notre Dame, Ind. 46556. A.C. 219–283–8761. Troy A. Crites, 736 Wynwood Drive, Kent, Wash. 98031. A.C. 206–UL 2–2499. Wºº, punlap, 6695 Abbot Avenue, Youngstown, Ohio 44515. A.C. 216– 2–8160. John C. Hamilton, 98–1054 Palula Way, Aiea, Hawaii 96701. A.C. 808–488–4315. º § jealy, 84 South Gillette Avenue, Bayport, N.Y. 11705. A.C. 516– 2–1092. At School, Box 489, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pa. 18015. A.C. 215–691–9213. Alison Hopfield, 183 Hartley Avenue, Princeton, N.J. 08540. A.C. 609–924–6553. Kathy L. Jackson, 18618 Capetown, Houston, Tex. 77058. A.C. 713–333–4542. Roger G. Johnston, 1833 Draper Drive, St. Paul, Minn. 55113. A.;hool Carleton College, Northfield, Minn. 55057. A.C. 507–645–4431, Ext. Jeanne L. Leventhal, 1511 Arch Street, Berkeley, Calif. 94708. A.C. 415–848–1511. Keith D. McGee, 122 Sunflower, Garland, Tex. 75041. A.C. 214–278–3979. At School, Box 3312, Rice University, Will Rice College, Houston, Tex. 77001. A.C. 713–528–4943. Tº *; Meister, 33–04 93rd Street, Jackson Heights, N.Y. 11372. A.C. 212– —4521. At School, 113 Nason Hall, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy N.Y. 12181. A.C. 518–270–7485. *śs; Merkel, 153 Ashland Avenue, Springfield, Mass. 01119. A.C. 413– 82—4323. Judith Miles, 3 Dewey Road, Lexington, Mass. 02173. A.C. 617–862–7170. Cheryl Peltz, 717 South Windermere, Littleton, Colo. 80120. A.C. 303–794–0402. Terry Quist, 3818 Longridge Drive, San Antonio, Tex. 78228. A.C. 512–732–1750. Joe Reihs, 12824 Wallis Street, Baton Rouge, La. 70815. A.C. 504–275–0845. Pº, W. Schlack, 92.17 Appleby Street, Downey, Calif. 90240. A.C. 213–869– 92. N º W. Shannon, 2849 Foster Ridge Road, Atlanta, Ga. 30345. A.C. 404–938– 429. Rirk Sherhart, 2144 Earlmont, Berkley, Mich. 48072. A.C. 313–544–2568. At School, University of Michigan, A.C. 313–764—0878. Rººt #jaehle, Huntington Hills-North, Rochester, N.Y. 14622. A.C. 716– 67–8177. Kºstein, 2167 Regent Court South, Westbury, N.Y. 11590. A.C. 516–333– 2927. Joel G. Wordekemper, 810 East Sherman Street, West Point, Nebr. 68788. A.C. 402–372—3576. Joe B. Zmolek, 1914 Hazel Street, Oshkosh, Wis. 54901. A.C. 414–235–4024. ATTACHMENT D STUDENT ExPERIMENTS TO BE FLOWN IN SKYLAB EARTH's ABSORPTION OF RADIANT HEAT Joe B. Zmolek, 1914 Hazel Street, Oshkosh, Wis. 54901. SPACE OBSERVATION AND PREDICTION OF WOLCANIC ERUPTIONS Troy A. Crites, 736 Wynwood Drive, Kent, Wash. 98031. PHOTOGRAPHY OF LIBRATION CLOUDS Alison Hopfield, 183 Hartley Avenue, Princeton, N.J. O8540 possible confirmation of objects witHIN MERCURY's orbit Daniel C. Bochsler, Route 2, Box 75, Silverton, Oreg. 97381. 79 SPECTROGRAPHY OF SELECTED QUASARS John C. Hamilton, 12 Honu Street, Aiea, Hawaii 96701. X-RAY CONTENT IN ASSOCIATION WITH STELLAR SPECTRAL CLASSES Joe W. Reihs, 12824 Wallis Street, Baton Rouge, La. 70815. X-RAY EMISSION FROM THE PLANET JUPITER Jeanne L. Leventhal, 1511 Arch Street, Berkeley, Calif. 94708. A SEARCH FOR PULSARS IN ULTRAVIOLET WAVELENGTH Neal W. Shannon, 2849 Foster Ridge Road, Atlanta, Ga. 30345. BEHAVIOR OF BACTERIA AND BACTERIAL SPORES IN THE SEYLAB AND SPACE ENVIRONMENTS Robert L. Staehle, Huntington Hills-North, Rochester, N.Y. 14622. AN IN WITFO STUDY OF SELECTED ISOLATED IMMUNE PHENOMENA Todd A. Meister, 33–04 93rd Street, Jackson Heights, N.Y. 11372. A QUANTITATIVE MEASURE OF MOTOR SENSORY PERFORMANCE DURING PROLONGED INFLIGHT ZERO “G” Kathy L. Jackson, 18618 Capetown Drive, Houston, Tex. 77058. WEB FORMATION IN ZERO GRAVITY Judith S. Miles, 3 Dewey Road, Lexington, Mass. 02173. PLANT GROWTH IN ZERO GRAVITY Joel G. Wordekemper, 810 East Sherman Street, West Point, Nebr. 68788. PHOTOTROPIC ORIENTATION OF AN EMERYO PLANT IN ZERO GRAVITY Donald W. Schlack, 92.17 Appleby Street, Downey, Calif. 90240. CYTO PLASMIC STREAMING IN ZERO GERAVITY Cheryl A. Peltz, 7117 S. Windermere, Littleton, Colo. 80120. C APILLARY ACTION STUDIES IN A STATE OF FEEE FAILL Roger G. Johnston, 1833 Draper Drive, St. Paul, Minn. 55113. ZERO GRAVITY MASS MEASUREMENT Vincent W. Converse, 1704 Roosevelt Road, Rockford, Ill. 61111. EARTH OF BITAL NEUTRON AN ALYSIS Terry C. Quist, 3818 Longridge Drive, San Antonio, Tex. 78228. WAVE MOTION THRU A LIQUID IN ZERO GRAVITY W. Brian Dunlap, 6695 Abbot Avenue, Youngstown, Ohio 44515. SKYLAB STUDENT PROJECT-STUDENT ADDRESS LIST REGIONAL WINNERS Region I Special Mention Mark W. Rattan, 11468th Place, Kenosha, Wis. 53140. (School in Massachusetts) Title of Proposal: Zero Gravity and Electroencephalography. Regional Winners Kevin G. Coulombe, 1816 Jennings Road, Fairfield, Conn. 06430. Title of Proposal: Growing Crystals in a Solution in an Environment of Zero Gravity and Extreme Radiation. 80 Janice E. Voss, 6 Eastwood Drive, Wilbraham, Mass. 01095 Title of Proposal: The Structure of Liquid Crystals. Richard R. Paradis, 172 Purchase Street, Milford, Mass. 01757 Title of Proposal: Zero Gravity Space Boilers. Thomas G. Gill, 95 Knollton Road, Allendale, N.J. 07401 Title of Proposal: Standing Sound Wave Experiment. Dean F. Redfern, Bailey Lane, Somers, Conn. 06071 Title of Proposal: Capillary Action in Zero Gravity. William P. Negiolo, 204 Stone Gate Road, Southington, Conn. 06489. Title of Proposal: Experiments in Varying Attractive Magnetic Forces. John P. Lincavicks, 891 Meriden Avenue, Southington, Conn. 06789. Title of Proposal: A Mass Accelerated in Zero Gravity. Walter C. Milliken, 8 Evans Drive, Dover, N.H. 03820. Title of Proposal: Simulation of Satellite Orbits. Richard J. O’Keefe, 104 Kane Street, Springfield, Mass. 01119. Title of Proposal: Time Dilation—A Proof for Relativity. Cº.; D. Abrams, Tremont Street, Box 288, R.F.D. No. 3, Rehoboth, Mass. 02769. Title of Proposal: Radioactive Decay Without Gravity. David M. Stubbs, 51 Beverly Road, Wellesley, Mass. 02181. Title of Proposal: The Sloshing Properties of Fluids in Zero Gravity. Christopher W. Kirk, 40 Westwood Road, Shrewsbury, Mass. 01545. Title of Proposal: Zero Gravity Auxin Distribution in Bean Seedlings. Kathleen A. Fitzgerald, 28 Hobbs Road, North Hampton, N.H. 03862. Title of Proposal: Zero Gravity Seed Development of Phaseolus Lunatus. John M. Krajnak, 202 Silver Street, Dover, N.H. 03820. Title of Proposal: Study of Germination and Plant Growth in Zero Gravity. Steven H. Holt, 25 Freedom Drive, P.O. Box 115, Collinsville, Conn. 06022. Title of Proposal: Hydroponics in Zero Gravity. Lynn M. Melchiori, 317 Cheshire Road, Pittsfield, Mass. 01201. Title of Proposal: The Effects of Zero-Gravity On Plant Life. Debbie Ann Koama, 64 Cloverdale Road, Southington, Conn. 06489. Title of Proposal: Effects of Weightlessness Upon Mice. - Sunny Wong, 924 State Road, North Dartmouth, Mass. 02747. Title of Proposal: Zero Gravity Influence on the Regeneration Rates of Planaria. Marsha F. Goldberg, 77 Park Avenue, Bloomfield, Conn. 06002. Title of Proposal: Cell Growth and Mutations Experiment. John R. Storella, 22 Metcalf Street, Medford, Mass. 02155. Title of Proposal: Effect of Zero Gravity on Ant Behavior. Kim A. Mayyasi, 292 Elizabeth Avenue, Ramsey, N.J. 07446. Title of Proposal: Zero Gravity Growth of Epidermal Cells in Vitro. Robert L. Epps, Father Panik Village, Building 4, Apartment 807, Drive 192, Bridgeport, Conn. 06608. Title of Proposal: Physiological Effects on a Moth During the Process of Metamor- phosis in Zero Gravity. Clifford A. Brass, 2 Bruce Circle, Randolph, Mass. 02368. Title of Proposal: Protein Synthesis in a Zero Gravity Environment. Elizabeth K. Tanner, 129 Cat Mousam Road, Kennebunk, Maine 04043. Title of Proposal: Feasibility of Earth/Space Telepathic Communication. . Region II Regional Winners-(New York) Jonathan P. Schneck, 2 Sylvan Road, White Plains, N.Y. 10605. Title of Proposal: Calcium Content of the Bone After Subjected to Different Conditions in Zero-Gravity. Peter L. Gabel, 279 Getzville Road, Snyder, N.Y. 14226. & Title of Proposal: The Effects of Zero Gravity on Bioelectric Equilibrium. Larry P. Frohman, 715 Willow Road, Franklin Square, N.Y. 11010. Title of Proposal: Gravity as a Limiting Factor in Regeneration in Lower Forms. James V. Noto, 152 Emily Avenue, Elmont, N.Y. 11003. Title of Proposal: The Effects on the Circadian Rhythm of Gonyaulax Polyedra from the Loss of the Geomagnetic Field. John Vendetti, Bridgehampton-Sag Harbor Turnpike, Bridgehampton, N.Y. 11932. Title of Proposal: How Will Plant Growth Be Effected by Gibberelic Acid, in a Zero Gravity System? 81 Jeffrey R. Fine, 7 Clay Pitts Road, Greenlawn, N.Y. 11740. Titº of Proposal: The effects of Zero Gravity on Geotropic Activity in Tagetes inuta. Thomas R. Majewski, 259 Beale Avenue, Cheektowaga, N.Y. 14225. Title of Proposal: The Affects of Zero Gravity on Plant Function. Evan J. Morris, 353 Longmeadow, Buffalo, N.Y. 14226. Title of Proposal: Ultraviolet Observations of Meteor Showers. Thomas H. Colligan, 81 Soundview Drive, Port Washington, N.Y. 11050. Title of Proposal: Extra-Galactic X-Ray Sources. - Michael D. Oltz, P.O. Box 51, Willseyville, N.Y. 13864. Title of Proposal: Coordination-Testing Activity. Michael Sciascia, 147 Potomac Avenue, Buffalo, N.Y. 14213. Title of Proposal: The Effect of Prolonged Exposure in an Alien Environment to Mental Efficiency and Eye-Hand Coordination of Man. Andy L. Chaikin, 12 Cow Lane, Great Neck, N.Y. 11024. Title of Proposal: Visual Perception and Motor Coordination Experiment. John Tylko, Jr., R.D. No. 5, Binghamton, N.Y. 13905. Title of Proposal: Simple Electrophoretic Separation. Region III Regional Winners (New York) Yoe Itokawa, 4256 Kessena Boulevard, Flushing, N.Y. 11355. Title of Proposal: The Effect of Zero Gravity on the Aging of Human Non- Specialized Blast Cells. Luis A. DeLaVega, 1161 Stratford Avenue, Bronx, New York, N.Y. 10472. Tº of Proposal: The Affect of 0-Gravity on the Differentiation of the Chick mbryo. Joseph W. Giebfried, 9008 216 Street, Queens Village, N.Y. 11428. Title of Proposal: The Effect of a Low Gravity Field on a Natural Rhythmic Cycle of a Living Organism. - Sanford R. Climan, 3335 Gunther Avenue, Bronx, New York, N.Y. 10469. Title of Proposal: The Effect of Zero Gravity on the Nerve Impulse and the Neuro-muscular Junction. Bruce P. Gelman, 2430 E. 63 Street, Brooklyn, New York, N.Y. 11234. Title of Proposal: On the Effect of Weightlessness in Space. Philip L. Redo, 435 East 70 Street, New York, N.Y. 10021. Title of Proposal: Effect of Extended Weightlessness on Reproduction, Growth and Development of Mice. Edward L. Plotnik, 27 West 96 Street, New York, N.Y. 10025. Title of Proposal: The Effects of Zero Gravity on Regeneration. Lloyd D. Stahl, 18519 64th Avenue, Flushing, New York, N.Y. 11365. Title of Proposal: The Effect of Zero Gravity on the Minimal Aversion Threshold of the Human Ear. Gary P. Goldenberg, 801 East 48 Street, Apartment 200, New York, N.Y. 10017 Title of Proposal: The Determination of the Composition of Gum Nebula. Barbara A. Kelley, 325 Beverly Road, Douglaston, N.Y. 11363. Title of Proposal: Detection of a Planetoid through the use of the ATM White Light Coronagraph. Stanley Weber, 2403 Brigham Street, Brooklyn, N.Y. 11235. Title of Proposal: Spaceborne Particle Intensity Scanning Device. Jon P. Zyzyck, 86 Seminary Avenue, Yonkers, N.Y. 10704. Title of Proposal: Zero Gravity Effect on Air Bubble Formation in Water. James McAllister, 4 Lewis Avenue, Apartment 7D, Brooklyn, N.Y. 11206. Title of Proposal: Locomotion of Zero Gravity. Patrick M. Crean, Quaker Bridge Road, Ossining, N.Y. 10562. Title of Proposal: Mixture of Fluids of Different Density in Zero Gravity. Edward R. Helder, 389 Sheffield Street, Staten Island, N.Y. 10210. - Title of Proposal: Refraction in Zero Gravity. Francis Barany, 370 East 76th, Street, No. A–301 New York, N.Y. 10021. Title of Proposal: Phase Equilibria at Zero Gravity. Jonathan Andrew Hochber, 460 Riverside Drive, New York City, N.Y. 10027. Title of Proposal: The Effects of Field-Independency in Inter-Planetary Space. Antonio F. Perez-Infante, 613 East 16th Street, Apartment 4B, Brooklyn, N.Y. 11226. Title of Proposal: Effect of Zero-Gravity on Several Phenomena. Gary G. Rickershauser, 61–13 Palmetto Street, Ridgewood, N.Y. 11227. Title of Proposal: Affect of Zero Gravity on Charles Law. 82 Region IV Honorable Mention (Pennsylvania) Robert M. Hersh, 212 Springer Drive, Coraopolis, Pennsylvania 15108. Title of Proposal: Zero Gravity Electroencephalography. Regional Winners (New Jersey) Richard A. Nygaard, 9 Drumlin Drive, Morris Plains, N.J. 07950. Title of Proposal: Measurement of Astronaut Coordination. Probyn Thompson III, 19 Indiana Road, Somerset, N.J. 08873. Title of Proposal: Timed Visual Responses in a Gravity and Weightless Environment. Judy Hill, 1318 Spruce Avenue, Wanamassa, N.J. 07712. Title of Proposal: Levitation Melting in Zero Gravity. Alan R. Silberman, 22 Stephen Drive, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 07632. Title of Proposal: The Effect of Zero Gravity on Rates of Diffusion. Christopher K. Gilbert, 4 Fieldcrest Drive, Westfield, N.J. 07090. Title of Proposal: Impact Energy Absorption of Materials in Zero Gravity. Rºº. Pierrehumbert, 351 North Drive, Apartment 74, North Plainfield, Tige of Proposal: Free Liquid Surface Transverse Waves in a Zero Gravity ystem. Stephen A. Savitt, 80 Mahar Avenue, Clifton, N.J. 07011. Title of Proposal: The Use of I.R. Photography in the Detection of Marine Flora Degradation. David Olmstead, 2411 S. Cuthbert Drive, Lindenwold, N.J. 08021. Title of Proposal: Plant Tropism Reactions in Zero Gravity. Frank A. Hill, 173 Pine Street, Pompton Lakes, N.J. 07442. Title of Proposal: Effects of Zero Gravity on Fish Behavior. Regional Winners (Pennsylvania) George M. Butchko III, 706 Linden Street, Clarks Summit, Pa. 18411. Title of Proposal: Investigation of Visual Perceptions in Space. Jordin T. Kare, 215 Fairview Road, Narberth, Pa. 19072. Title of Proposal: Zero Gravity Testing of Surface Tension Films. John K. Peterson 413 13th Street, Huntington, Pa. 16652. Title of Proposal: Weightless Crystal Growth. Raymond Aldridge, 1444 Beers School Road, Coraopolis, Pa. 15108. Title of Proposal: The Pressure of Light. Don H. Gilmore, 528 Fourth Street, Chester, Pa. 19013. Title of Proposal: Molecular Separation of Substances. William E. Wren, 85 High Street, Susquehanna, Pa. 18847. Tige of Proposal: The Effect of Zero Gravity on the Radical and Plumule of a eed. Steven Chalfin, 447 Hendrix, Street, Philadelphia, Pa. Title of Proposal: Geotropic Response in a Zero Gravity Environment. Robert E. Adler, 14 Buttonwood Circle, Lafayette Hill, Pa. 19444. Title of Proposal: The Effect of Zero Gravity on Germinating Seeds. David Charles Dobson, 158 N. Jamestown Drive, Coraopolis, Pa. 15108. Title of Proposal: The Effect of Radiation on Bacterial Growth. Thomas J. Greco, E-Z Acres R.D. No. 1, Drums, Pa. 18222. Title of Proposal: The Affect of Zero Gravity on Cancer Cells. Joseph W. Caparosa, 123 W. Mentz Avenue, Butler, Pa. 16001. Title of Proposal: Fly Equilibrium in Zero Gravity. James D. Hann, 5086 Raintree Drive, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15236. Title of Proposal: Zero Gravity Effects of Mammalian Reproduction. John W. Anderson, 554 East Main Street, Uniontown, Pa. 15401. Title of Proposal: Regenerative Ability of Planaria in Zero Gravity. Terence S. Hawkins, 75 Highland Avenue, Uniontown, Pa. 15401. Title of Proposal: Development of Chicken Embryos in Non-Gravity. Theodore J. Babin, 435 Herbst Manor Road, Coraopolis, Pa. 15108. Title of Proposal: Effects of Zero Gravity and Radiation on the Rate and Types of Mutations in Drosophila. Ira W. Freilich, 607 Brighton Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 19111. . . . & e Title of Proposal: Gravitational and Solar Effects on Common Pisces Orientation. 83 Region V Special Mention (South Carolina) Julian (Denny) H. Morgan III, 607 Maple Street, Spartanburg, S.C. 29302. Title of Proposal: Mitotic Development of Cancer Cells in Zero Gravity. (Virginia) Jeffery Dale Sargent, 107 Eagle Street, Richlands, Va. 24641 Title of Proposal: Effects of Bioisolation on Intestinal Micro Flora. (Maryland) Richard E. Hoye, 7819 English Way, Bethesda, Md. 20034. Title of Proposal: Laser Communications Experiment. Regional Winners (Virginia) William A. Eastham, Route 3, Box 236, Front Royal, Va. 22630. Title of Proposal: The Effects of Outer Space on Green Plant Life. John R. Ross, 6417 Floridon Court, Springfield, Va. 22.150. Title of Proposal: The Growth Rate of Human Hair. Mark D. Dion, 1607 Wrightson Drive, McLean, Va. 22101. Title of Proposal: The effects of Airborn Ion Flux Densities on Human Perform- ance Factors. Willoughby S. Hundley, III, P.O. Box 182, Boydton, Va. 23917. Title of Proposal: Exercising in Zero Gravity. Eugene A. Kelly, 3034 Cannady Road N.E., Roanoke, Va. 24012. Title of Proposal: The Effects of Weightlessness and Artificial Gravity in Space on the Chromosomes of Drosophilia Melangaster. John G. Sotos, 3105 Wessynton Way, Alexandria, Va. 22309. Title of Proposal: Effects of Zero Gravity Environment on the Development of Acute Leukemia. - Gregory Fabian, 7207 Galgate Drive, Springfield, Wa. 22153. Title of Proposal: Collection of Particles Emitting from the Sun. Frank F. Warren, Jr., 3124 Inlet Road, Virginia Beach, Va. 23454. Title of Proposal: Evaluation of Relative Time. Kenneth P. Severin, R.R. No. 1, Gainesville, Wa. 22065. - Title of Proposal: Observing the Green Flash from above the Atmosphere. Marty I. Thomas, 415 Edmond Street, Bristol, Va. 24.201. Title of Proposal: Aerobatic Cereal. Frederick I. Maish, 1411 South 21st Street, Arlington, Va. 22202. Title of Proposal: Infrared Detection of Water Pollution. John S. Fornaro, 886 N. Kensington Street, Arlington, Va. 22705. Title of Proposal: Zero Gravity Gyroscope Accuracy. Roger Eckert, 2701 South Inge Street, Arlington, Va. 22204. Title of proposal: Coordination in Zero Gravity. Regional Winners (South Carolina) Walter H. Johnson, Jr., 104 Emory Road, Spartanburg, S.C. 29.302. Title of Proposal: Zero Gravity Tissue Culture of Clonal Plant Cell Colonies. Candace K. Crenshaw, Box 465, Lancaster, S.C. 29720. Title of Proposal: Zero Gravity Affect on Germination of Avena Sativa. Claude D. Bryan, 223 Woodlawn Street, Greenwood, S.C. 29646. Tºº of Proposal: Bryan’s Hypothesis: The Alpha and Omega of the Savage eucocyte. (North Carolina) Julia E. Kamienski, 516 Eastwood Drive, Gastonia, N.C. 28052. Title of Proposal: The Effects of Zero Gravity on the Formation Absorption and Circulation of Ceredro Spinal Fluid. Jeff L. Hodges, P.O. Box 312, Boone, N.C. 28607. Title of Proposal: Long-term Effects of Zero-Gravity on the Muscles of the Arms and Legs. Fred William Hengeveld, 405 Lakeshore Lane, Chapel Hill, N.C. 27514. Title of Proposal: Egg Development and Hatching of Rana Pipiens. Paula J. Teague, Route No. 1, Box 515, Snow Camp, N.C. 27349. Title of Proposal: Mendelian Law of Dominance as Observed in Drosophilia Within a Zero Gravity Environment. Robert G. Eure, P.O. Box 175, Gates, N.C. 27939. 84 Title of Proposal: Zero Gravity Photon Efficiency Experiment. Lyndon D. Long, Route 1, Box 430, Graham, N.C. 27253. Title of Proposal: Artificial Gravitation Experiment. (Maryland) Doug S. McFarland, Box 519, Route 4, Sykesville, Md. 21784. Title of Proposal: Geotropism Investigation in a Zero Gravity Environment. John F. Galvardi, Jr., 11505 Bedfordshire Avenue, Potomac, Md. 20854. Title of Proposal: Study of Maneuverability in a Weightless State. James T. Tarrants, 12134 Long Ridge Lane, Bowie, Md. 20715. Title of Proposal: Adaptability of Argiopidae Spider in Web Construction. Geoffrey E. Forden, 7402 Glenside Drive, Takoma Park, Md. 20012. Title of Proposal: Zero Gravity and the Behavior of Hydra. Wayne D. Robinson, 9505 Powderhorn Lane, Baltimore, Md. 21234. Title of Proposal: General Relativity Environment. Philip C. Pritchard, 105 Albert Drive, Glen Burnie, Md. 21061. Title of Proposal: Measurement of Time Dilation. Eric H. Radany, 11905 Devilwood Drive, Rockville, Md. 20854. Title of Proposal: An Investigation of Intermolecular Forces in a Non-polar Gas Under Weightless Conditions. - Ray P. McCawley, 13009 Blairmore Street, Beltsville, Md. 20705. Title of Proposal: Effects of Mass Movements Within a Rotating Space Station and How to Correct Them. David P. Farmer, 703 Lawrence Drive, Rockville, Md. 20850. Title of Proposal: Zero Gravity Settlementation. (West Virginia) Reva C. Holliday, 806 Edgar Avenue, Ronceverte, W. Va. 24970. Title of Proposal: Circadian Rhythms in Plants. Frances (Renie) I. Stewart, 3309 Noyes Avenue SE., Charleston, W. Va. 25304. Title of Proposal: The Effects of a Zero Gravity Environment on Seeds of Sweet Corn, Soybeans, garden beans, and Pumpkins. Richard D. Layne, 406 Dickinson Street, Williamson, W. Va. 25661. Title of Proposal: The Effects of Zero-Gravity on a Spider. Kepler W. Night, 602 Walnut Avenue, Fairmont, W. Va. 26554. Title of Proposal: Time Dilation Experiment. Region VI Special Mention (Florida) John W. Olsen, 2301 Don Andres Avenue, Tallahassee, Fla. 32304. Title of Proposal: Infrared Photography as an Aid to Determine Archaeological Sites on Cozumel Island, Mexico. Regional Winners (Tennessee) Gene L. Hahn, Route No. 4 Clearview Drive, Mt. Juliet, Tenn. 37122. Title of Proposal: Zero-Gravity Effects Upon Cancer Cells Al S. Lovvorn, 402 Woodlawn Drive, Mt. Juliet, Tenn. 37122. Title of Proposal: Reaction Time Studies of the Human Body When Subjected to Prolonged Stays in Space Lee A. Solomon, 4119 Ealy Road, Chattanooga, Tenn. 37412. - Title of Proposal: Affect of Thermally Abnormal Microclimates on Ecological Balance David R. Brittain, 1624 Madrid Drive, Largo, Fla. 33540 Title of Proposal: Effect of Zero Gravity on Fluid Flow in Vascular Plants. Norma J. Ayres, Route 2, Box 79, Waverly, Tenn. 37.185. Title of Proposal: Influence of Zero Gravity on Growth and Development of the Garden Pea. - (Alabama) Charles J. Benson, 9 Buckner Circle, Fort McClellan, Ala. 36.201. Title of Proposal: Effects of G-Forces and Zero-Gravity on Bone Ossification in Chicken Embryo. James O. Beasley II, 1431 Magnolia. Curve, Montgomery, Ala. 36106. Title of Proposal: Effects of Zero Gravity on the Ameba. 85 (Georgia) Tony J. Boatright, Route No. 2, Box 345, Douglasville, Ga. 30134. Title of Proposal: Gym. In Zero-Gravity. Jack B. Straus, Jr., 3109 Clubview Drive, Columbus, Ga. 31906. Title of Proposal: Determination of Coordination and Skill Changes in the Weightless Environment. Wendall W. Sheffield, Jr., 12 Dogwood Road, Route 6, Newnan, Ga. 30263. Title of Proposal: Effects of Zero Gravity on Dreams. Larry W. Loggins, Box 22, Nicholson, Ga. 30565. Title of Proposal: Space Particle Collection Box. Paul B. Dill, 745 East Wesley Road, N.E. Apt 4, Atlanta, Ga. 30324. Title of Proposal: A search for Black Holes. Renneth E. Nash, Route 3, Clarksville, Ga. 30523. Title of Proposal: Galactic Gamma Ray Mapping. Regional Winners (Mississippi) Alan G. Crudden, 511 Waveland Avenue, Waveland, Miss. 39576. Title of Proposal: Measuring Body Adaption to O-G in the Rec Room. Phillip M. Smith, Route 3, Box 362A, Philadelphia, Miss. 39350. Title of Proposal: Hydroponic Plant Growth. (Florida) Steven A. Burton, 1208 New Hampshire Avenue, Tavares, Fla. 32778. Title of Proposal: Mental/Dexterity Kit. Horton C. Cockburn, 2451 Brickell Avenue, Miami, Fla. 33129. Title of Proposal: Prolong Zero Gravity Reflex-Experiment. Karin A. Hokkanen, 2140 Thunderbird Trail, Maitland, Fla. 32751. Title of Proposal: Copper Sulfate Crystal Zero Gravity Development. William T. Bridgman, 430 N.E. 15th Street, Homestead, Fla. 33030. Title of Proposal: Metal Deterioration in Outer Space. David R. Brittain, 1624 Madrid Drive, Largo, Fla. 33540. Title of Proposal Effect of Zero Gravity on Fluid Flow in Vascular Plants. William W. Gross, 7001 Jackson Spring Road, Tampa, Fla. 33614. Title of Proposal: Investigation into Systemic Transfer & Physiology (Growth & Change) of Vascular Plants. Mark Minie, 1918 Byrum Drive, Clearwater, Fla. 33515. Title of Proposal: The Effects of Zero Gravity on the Growth Rate of Chlorella. Region VII Special Mention (Indiana) Robert E. Downey, 208 East 6th Street, Alexandria, Ind. 46001. Title of Proposal: The Effects of Zero Gravity on the Number and Effectiveness of White Blood Cells. Jerry B. Franklin, R.R. No 1, Box 386, Spencer, Ind. 47460. Title of Proposal: Forms of Liquids in Zero Gravity. (Ohio) Randall L. Grimm, 708 Wilbur Avenue, Youngstown, Ohio 44502. Title of Proposal: Crew Efficiency Deterioration Measurement. Anthony N. Lewis, 6780 Abbot Place, Worthington, Ohio 43085. Title of Proposal: Separation of Liquids in Zero Gravity. Regional Winners (Ohio) Jerry Konyk, 3321 Scranton Road, Cleveland, Ohio 44,109. Title of Proposal: Weightlessness: A Possible Way to Combat Cancer. Patricia M. Buckley, 3085 Mayfield Road, Cayahaga Falls, Ohio 44224. Title of Proposal: The Effects of a Weightless, Confined Environment on Learning. Ronald C. Coursen, 5812 Natham Avenue, Ashtabula, Ohio 44004. Title of Proposal: Weightless Effects on Tadpoles. - (Indiana) Michael K. Kroeger, 801 Hoosier Avenue, Evansville, Ind. 47715. Title of Proposal: The Effect of Zero Gravity. Upon Goldfish Equilibrium. Mary F. Spalding, 4516 Stratford Avenue, Indianapolis, Ind. 46.201. Title of Proposal: The Effects of Reduced Gravity on the Aging of Cells. 86 (Kentucky) Randy E. Williams, Route 5, Murray, Ky. 42071. Title of Proposal: Regeneration in Planaria at Zero Gravity. Stuart R. Ferguson, Hathaway Road, Union, Ky. 41091. “Zero Gravity Alloys” Region VIII Special Mention (Illinois) Daniel J. Williams, 9130 Lowell, Skokie, Ill. 60076. Title of Proposal: Investigations of the Chemical Composition of Two Near- Earth Points of Dynamic Equilibrium. (Missouri) William D. Snow, 1111 East Ninth Street, Rolla, Mo. 65401. Title of Proposal: Dislocations of Silicon Crystals Grown in a Zero-Gravity Vacuum. Mark A. Barteau, 832 Ariege Drive, Creve Coeur, Mo. 63.141. Title of Proposal: The Nature, Origin and Potential Applications of “Slow Particles.” Regional Winners (Illinois) Steven H. Williams, 639 Bel Aire Terrace, Palatine, Ill. 60067. Title of Proposal: Scientific Experiment. Paul W. Tuinenga, 18136 Dolphin Lake Drive, Homewood, Ill. 60430. Title of Proposal: The Effect of Color and Prolonged Zero-G on Distance Estimation. Anthony L. Moretti, 50 Oak Avenue, Highwood, Ill. 60040. Title of Proposal: Test of the Special Theory of Relativity. Peter B. Letarte, 268 Laurel Avenue, Highland Park, Ill. 60035. Title of Proposal: Zero-Gravity Behavior of an Insulated Colloidal Suspension. Lawrence B. Jankowski, 5627 N. Melvina Avenue, Chicago, Ill. 60646. Title of Proposal: Actual Effect of Relative Speed Upon Time. E. Jay Gamze, 1077 Ridgewood Drive, Highland Park, Ill. 60035. Title of Proposal: A Test of the Kinetic Theory of Matter and Heat. Brich B. Weinfurter, 136 Harbor Drive, Barrington Harbor Estates, Barrington, Ill. Title of Proposal: Wireless Pulse Monitor. Michael M. Micci, 1308 Texas Avenue, Joliet, Ill. 60435. Title of Proposal: Free Flight Analysis of Gliders and Ball. Stephen A. Wilus, 326 North Orchard, Park Forest, Ill. 60466. Title of Proposal: Cosmic Ray Origina Experiment. Michael A. Krause, 6712 N. Maplewood, Chicago, Ill. 60645. Title of Proposal: Analysis of Relativistic Effects on Metabolism. IRonald L. Carter, 408 So. Second Avenue, Hoopeston, Ill. 60942. Title of Proposal: Development of Frog Eggs (Rana Pipiens) in Different Gravity/ Zero Gravity Combinations. Mark B. DuBois, 116 Burton Street, Washington, Ill. 61571. Title of Proposal: The Effect of Zero Gravity on Instincts. Henry Sifuentes, 1457 W. 47th, Chicago, Ill. 60609. Title of Proposal: The Effect of a Spaceship Environment on Turtle Develop- ment and Behavior. Ann M. Korosec, 2243 So. Damen Avenue, Chicago, Ill. 60608. Title of Proposal: Zero Gravity Tilipia Mossanbia Development. Howard H. Prager, 513 Ridge Avenue, Evanston, Ill. 60202. Title of Proposal: The Effects of Geotropism on Plants. Jeffrey M. Brown, 7934 Wilson Terrace, Morton Grove, Ill. 60053. Title of Proposal: Effects of Plant Growth Hormones on Plant Development in a Zero Gravity Environment. - Craig W. Gustafson, 2915 36th Street, Moline, Ill. 61265. Title of Proposal: Mini-Table Tennis. Michael J. Frankenberger, 8.158 Root Court, Niles, Ill. 60648. Title of Proposal: Refraction of Light Through the Earth's Atmosphere. 87 (Missouri) James L. Nouss, Sr., Route 2, Box 420 Schoettler Road, Chesterfield, Mo. 63017. Title of Proposal: Experimental Investigation of the Field Theories Concerning the Effect of Gravity on Time. Frank A. Erickson, 25 Francisca Drive, Florissant, Mo. 63031. Title of Proposal: Observation of Zero-Gravity Effect on Candle Flame. David A. Wilkins, 805 Davis Dr. Box 181, Cabool, Mo. 65689. Title of Proposal; The Effects of Zero Gravity on Mycetophilidae Development. Edwin M. Kyriakos, 217 Huntleigh Drive, Kirkwood, Mo. 63122. Title of Proposal: Effect of Zero Gravity on the Instinctive Behavior of Animals. Kathy D. Hall, Brown Branch R. Station, Ava, Mo. 65608. Title of Proposal: The Effect of Zero Gravitation and Cosmic Radiation on Antibody Production in Pocket Mice. Rhoda L. Barnes, Star Route, Ava, Mo. 65608. Title of Proposal: The Effect of Zero Gravity and Cosmic Radiation on the Mutability, Specificity and Transduction of Bacteria and T. Phage. Mark A. Doernhoefer, 8875 Rusdon, St. Louis, Mo. 63126. Title of Proposal: Cell Growth in Zero-Gravity. Region, IX Special Mention Jeff L. Gray, Rural Route 2, River Falls, Wis. 54022. Title of Proposal: Effects of Prolonged Weightlessness on Delicate Motor Co- ordination of Crew. Jeffrey V. Fox, 12090 Francesca, Grand Blanc, Mich. 48439. Title of Proposal: Effects of Zero Gravity on Escherichin Coli. Regional Winners Leonard K. Runck, Rural Route 3, Lamberton, Minn. 56152. Title of Proposal: Ant Farm in Zero Gravity. Kathryn J. Nelson, S. W. Exp. Station, Lamberton, Minn. 56152. Title of Proposal: The Ability of the Common Orange Garden Spider to Build a Web at Zero Gravity. Meridith A. Gould, 6 Krahmer Drive, Fairmont, Minn. 56031. Title of Proposal: Effects of Stimulants and Depressants in Zero Gravity. Knut E. LaVine, Shingwauk Village, Route 2, Aitkin, Minn. 56431. Tº of Proposal: A Comparative Study of Spacial Radio Signals in Time and a,C62. Rifat Pamukou, 7741 Fifth Avenue, Kenosha, Wis. 53140. Title of Proposal: Does Long Term Weightlessness Effect The Human Intestine? Herman Amos, Jr., 2855 North 21st, Milwaukee, Wis. 53206. Title of Proposal: Circadial Effects of Prolonged Weightlessness. Frank H. Zeller, Route 2, Box 257, Cambridge, Wis. 53523. Title of Proposal: Zero Gravity Capillary Action. Terry M. Kleiber, 4055 N. 62 Street, Milwaukee, Wis. 53216. Title of Proposal: Cosmic Ray Flash Experiment. Brian J. Awe, 14610 W. Rogers Drive, New Berlin, Wis. 53151. Title of Proposal: Project Mercury. - Grant F. Schwartz, 17290 Twenty-Two Mile Road, Utica, Mich. 48087. Title of Proposal: Effects of Zero Gravity on the Metamorphic Cycles on the “Hyalophora Cecropia.” Michael G. McManus, 23612 Coach Light Drive, Southfield, Mich. 48075. Title of Proposal: Investigation of Radio Sources Absorbed by the Ionosphere. Richard A. Ottolini, 31792 Gilbert, Warren, Mich. 48093. Title of Proposal: Gravity Telescope. Timothy J. DiLaura, 27921 Ruehle Street, St. Clair Shores, Mich. 48081. Title of Proposal: Project Inquirer: Auxiliary Scientific Satellite. Timothy L. Gaynor, 1730 Linwood, Ann Arbor, Mich. 48103. Title of Proposal: Ionic Propulsion by Means of Cosmic Rays. Jeffrey F. Bell, 415 South Union Street, Tecumseh, Mich. 49286. Title of Proposal: Zero-Gravity Bubble Behavior Experiment. Steven R. Kleen, 2312 48th Place, Des Moines, Iowa 50310. Title of Proposal: Time Dilation. Audrey L. Schwartz, 1210 38th Street, Sioux City, Iowa, 51104. Title of Proposal: Zero Gravity Cancer Growth Rates. 88 Region, X Special Mention Joanna I. Smith, Box 337, Shiprock, N. Mex. 87420. Title of Proposal: Frustrations in Zero Gravity. Vince K. Crow, 3108 Idylwild, Midwest City, Okla. 73110. Title of Proposal: Zero Gravity Tennis. Richard B. Boyd, Jr., 2108 North Palm, Pasedena, Tex. 77502. Title of Proposal: Gaseous Diffusion in a Zero Gravity Environment. Regional Winners Rie L. Soo Hoo, 918 East Hill Avenue, Gallup, N. Mex. 87301. Title of Proposal: Zero Gravity on the Properties of a Gas and Liquids. Kenneth C. Chambers, 336 Andanada, Los Alamos, N. Mex. 87544. Title of Proposal: Gravitational Radiation. Frederick D. Yarger, P.O. Box 875, Las Vegas, N. Mex. 87701. Title of Proposal: Comparisons of NA and Nitric Oxide Airglow Emissions to the Ionospheric Density and Na, OI and N2 Airglow Emissions. Todd R. Morgan, 3315 West Seventh Terrace, Prairie Village, Kans. 66208. Title of Proposal: Infrared Galactic Mapping Survey. Revin L. Chestnut, 5217 West 71st Street, Prairie Village, Kans. 66208. Title of Proposal: Web Building in Zero Gravity. Daniel L. Sheley, 1209 Court Street, Scott City, Kans. 67871. Title of Proposal: “Statocysts” Behavior in Simulated Gravity. Joni L. Baeke, 9817 Lee Circle, Leawood, Kans. 66206. Title of Proposal: The Effects of “Orbital Photoperiodism” and Weightlessness on the Circadian Rhythms and Basal Metabolic Rate of Mus Musculus. John R. Joyce, 1825 South 71st East Avenue, Tulsa, Okla. 74112. Title of Proposal: Gravitational Wave Detector. Earl L. Saffell, 111 North Coo-y-yah, Pryor, Okla. 74361. Title of Proposal: Effects of Zero Gravity on Crystals. T. Patrick Clement, II, 413 Bel Aire, Blackwell, Okla. 74631. Title of Proposal: Surface Tension, Adhesive and Cohesive Properties of Liquids. Dan J. Hawkins, 301 South Oak, Harrison, Ark. 72601. Title of Proposal: The Effects of Calcitonin and Pyrophosphate on Bone Resorption Induced by Weightlessness. Peter M. Spinella, 715 Omstead Street, Morgan City, La. 70380. Title of Proposal: Geotropism. With Respect to Space. Patrick A. Teffiemire, 103 Washington Street, New Boston, Tex. 75570. Title 8. Proposal: The Effects of a Spacelike Environment on Bacterial Spores or Cysts. Richard Scott Kucel, 318 Tealwood, Houston, Tex. 77024. Title of Proposal: Zero Gravity Root Pressure. Nick C. Bellos, 431 Cosgrove Avenue, San Antonio, Tex. 78210. Title of Proposal: Zero Gravity Effects on Lipid Composition in the Blood Plasma of Rabbits. - - - - Joseph P. Dugan, Jr., 3833 Stanford, Dallas, Tex. 75225. Title of Proposal: Green Flash Phenomenon. Gary D. Teeter, Box 368, Hale Center, Tex. 79041. Title of Proposal: Effect of Weightlessness on Chlorella. Raren R. Stengel, 15515 St. Cloud, Houston, Tex. 77058. Title of Proposal: Sub-Sound Effects. - Region XI Special Mention - Thomas W. Trent, 1401 Fifth Avenue SE., Jamestown, N. Dak. 58401. Title of Proposal: Reaction Time in Zero Gravity Regional Winners Joel P. Busby, 113 South Ninth Street Circle, Chickasha, Okla. 73018. Title of Proposal: Space Poll David B. Aster, South 3019 Tekoa Street, Spokane, Wash. 99.203. Title of Proposal: Time Dilatation Aboard Skylab William R. Smith, 3330 East 19th Avenue, Spokane, Wash. 99203. Title of Proposal: Simulated Gravity for Plant Growth Tony M. Peterson, 52 158th Place NE., Bellevue, Wash. 98008. Title of Proposal: Reaction Timing Suzanne D. Shepard, 13123 East 24 Avenue, Opportunity, Wash. 992.16. 89 Title of Proposal: An In Space Bathing Bag David P. Fyhrie, South 1427 Cook Street, Spokane, Wash. 99.203. Title of Proposal: Low Interference Study of the Telekinetic Power. Don R. Beckman, East 1217 56th, Spokane, Wash. 99203. Title of Proposal: The Effect of Zero Gravity on Simple Chromatographic Substances. Stephen G. Tenge, 17214 Palatine Avenue North, Seattle, Wash. 98.133. Title of Proposal: Suspension of Precipitates in Liquids in Zero Gravity Robert E. Bellem, Route 1 749–8 N.W., Ephrata, Wash. 98823 Title of Proposal: Gyroscopic Stability in Zero Gravity Richard T. Kennedy, 22819 17th Avenue South, Des Moines, Wash. 98.188. Tº of Proposal: The Effect of Gravity on Molecular Effusion and Diffusion ates George W. Keilman, Star Route Box 17, Quinay, Wash. 98848. Title of Proposal: Gravitational Wave Detection Tºy M. Chestnut, East 2443 North Altamont Boulevard, Spokane, Wash. 99202. Title of Proposal: The Observation of the Circulation of Atmospheric Pollutants Einar O. J. Nyhus, 6726 Northwest Drive, Ferndale, Wash. 98248. Title of Proposal: Capillarity in a Weightless Environment. Roberta L. Montgomery, Rural Route 2, Neligh, Nebr. 68756. Title of Proposal: Regeneration in Zero Gravity. David E. Moeller, 2517 South 40th, Lincoln, Nebr. 68506. Title of Proposal: General Theory Experiment. Gabriel G. Vita, 7338 E. Princeton Avenue, Denver, Colo. 80237. Title of Proposal: The Sensations of Pressure in Zero Gravity. E. Steven Hill, 831 South Raritan Street, Denver, Colo. 80223. Title of Proposal: A space Experiment to Study Earth's Absorption Band. Karl O. Shipps, P.O. Box 1652, Durango, Colo. 81301. Title of Proposal: Effects of Long-Duration Space Flight on Vision. Bernhart J. Lisatz, 470 Eaton Place, Lakewood, Colo. 80226. Title of Proposal: Reproduction of White Mice in Space. Patrick T. O’Brien, 1280 South Eaton Court, Lakewood, Colo. 80226. Title of Proposal: The Effects of Cosmic Rays on Various Substances in Space. Douglas M. Dowis, Route 3, Sterling, Colo. 80751. Title of Proposal: Charting Ocean Currents by Infrared Pictures. Richard J. Liles, P.O. Box 1181, Steamboat Springs, Colo. 80477. Title of Proposal: Molecular Forces in Zero Gravity. Earl B. Shafer, 2918 Third Avenue, Pueblo, Colo. 81008. Title of Proposal: Space Optics Contamination Monitor. Mark H. Megahan, 1909 Tendoy Drive, Boise, Idaho 83705. Title of Proposal: Energy Loss Due to Convection in a Fluid. Richard L. Cunningham, P.O. Box 17, Cave Junction, Oreg. 97.523. Title of Proposal: Zero Gravity Exercise Bar. Don R. Pettit, Route 3, Box 183, Silverton, Oreg. 97381. Title of Proposal: Effects of Zero Gravity on Non Vascular Plants. Harvey C. Scott, 15666 S.E. Holly Court, Milwaukie, Oreg. 97222. Title of Proposal: The Effect of Filtered and Unfiltered Solar Radiation on a Colony of Bacteria. Region, XII Special Mention Tony A. Aldous, 20719 New Hampshire Avenue, Torrance, Calif. 90502. Title of Proposal: Rhizopus Nigricans (Black Bread Mold) Development in a Zero Gravity Environment. Scott A. Rubin, 5002 Chaparral Way, San Diego, Calif. 92.115. Title of Proposal: Biorhythms—Changes in the Rhythm of Some Metabolic Parameters Under the Influence of Zero Gravity and the Absence of 24-Hour Geophysical Rhythms. Richard S. From, 8745 South Fowler, Fowler, Calif. 93625. Title of Proposal: Possible Effects of Weightlessness on Internal Organs. Regional Winners Peter S. Jordan, 15251 Dickens Avenue, San Jose, Calif. 95124. Title of Proposal: A Test for the Effect of Weightlessness on Color Vision. David C. Wetlesen, 768 Remington Drive, Sunnyvale, Calif. 94087. 90 Title of Proposal: Maintaining Physical Fitness in a Weightless Environment. Edward Meyer, 20836 Halldale Avenue, Torrance, Calif. 90501. Title of Proposal: The Effect of Zero-Gravity on Human Reaction Time. Richard L. Ferranti, 1234 Santa Cruz Avenue, Meno Park, Calif. 94025. Tºº Proposal: Transmission of High Frequency Radio Waves by the Iono- spnere. Charles L. Raison, 712 McKinley, Dinuha, Calif. 93618. Title of Proposal: Test of Einstein's Theory of Relativity with the Use of the Apollo Telescope. Mr. Carl William Weber III, 1644 La Corta Street, Lemon Grove, Calif. 92045. Title of Proposal: Solar Observing With a Broad-Band Filter. David R. Merritt, 1211 Becket Drive, San Jose, Calif. 95121. Title of Proposal: Photographic Search for Nearby Galaxies. Robert P. Zager 4.133 Mattos Drive, Fremont, Calif. 94536. Title of Proposal: Time Passage Equipment. Rirk D. Robinson, 274 North Magnolia Street, Orange, Calif. 92666. Title of Proposal: The Effect of Gravity on Light. Alan L. Sailer, 2190 Mandrill, Ventura, Calif. 93003. Title of Proposal: Zero-Gravity Heat Transfer & Convection; Multi-Density Liquid Migration. Ralph W. Caldwell, 13842 Valerie Street, Van Nuys, Calif. 9.1405. Title of Proposal: Was Einstein Really Right? |Michael P. Moody, Orthello Way, Santa Clara, Calif. 95051. Title of Proposal: Rate of Diffusion Experiment. Alice F. Schreiman, 5805 Harold Way, Hollywood, Calif. 90028. Title of Proposal: Zero Gravity Recuperation. Carin E. Crichton, 350 Marcella Way, Millbrae, Calif. 94030. Title of Proposal: Zero Gravity Web Building Experiment. Barbara A. Boggan, 1803 Spt. Sq. Box 1607 (School in Japan), A.P.O. San Francisco, Calif. 96525. Title of Proposal: The Effect of Weightlessness on Ants. Mark E. Gurney, 3040 Roxanne, Long Beach, Calif. 90808. . Title of Proposal: The Effects of an Orbital Environment on the Circadian Rhythm of Cell Division in a Mutant of Euglena Gracilis. Michael P. Hamilton, 19543 Bluffwood Street, Rowland Heights, Calif. 91748. Title of Proposal: Effect of Zero Gravity on Ion Exchange in Plants and the Superficial Effects upon the Plants General Metabolism. James D. Green, 1536 Harriet Lane, Anaheim, Calif. 92802. Title of Proposal: Endogenous Circadian Rhythm of Phaseolus Vulgaris L. and Biloxi Soybean. Jeremy B. Rubin, 1915 Carla Ridge Drive, Beverly Hills, Calif. 90210. Title of Proposal: Effect of Gravity on Bacterial Sensitivity to Antibiotics. Steven A. Morley, 3224 Wall Avenue, San Bernardino, Calif. 92404. Title of Proposal: Zero Gravity Effects on Early Plant Growth and Seeds. Paul A. Mori, 1469 Crestline Drive, Santa Barbara, Calif. Title of Proposal: The Effects of Gravity on Climbing Plants. Reid L. Miller, 40 North Second West, Farmington, Utah 84025. Title of Proposal: Effect of Zero Gravity on Plant Directional Growth. Becky L. Bequette 7260 Jill Place, Tucson, Ariz. 85706. & Title of Proposal: The Effect of Zero Gravity on the Function of Plant Auxins. David M. Bissegger, 4233 East Desert Cove Avenue, Phoenix, Ariz. 85028. Title of Proposal: Growth and Response of Plants to Various Stimuli in a Zero Gravity Environment. Phillip D. K. Lee, 5654 Pia Street, Honolulu, Hawaii 96821. Title of Proposal: Zero-Gravity Muscular Development in Mus Musculus. Mr. SchNEIDER [continued]. The NASA Office of Education has a very extensive follow-up to the student program. We have sent to every teacher who requested an application blank a series of booklets OIl ºsted classroom experiements to be conducted while Skylab is in orbit. [Information for the record follows.] (NotE.-In addition to the normal news media distribution of the following NASA news release, each Member of Congress from whose district a student's experiment was selected, was individually notified by NASA.) 91 NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, Washington, D.C., July 20, 1972. STUDENT ExPERIMENTS SELECTED FOR SKYLAB Experiments proposed by 19 high school students from 16 states have been approved for the Earth-orbiting manned Skylab space station in 1973. Selection of the young experimenters was announced today by the National Science Teachers Association (NSTA) and NASA as part of the Skylab Student Project. The nationwide project directly involves secondary school students in space research. The 19 experimenters are from the 25 national winners selected by NSTA and announced in April. The 25 proposals had been selected for detailed review from 3,409 submitted by U.S. secondary school students. The NASA review determined that because of Skylab performance requirements and schedule constraints the six other proposals could not be accommodated. Skylab is an experimental space laboratory that will be orbited next year to conduct scientific, technological, and biomedical investigations from the vantage point of space. The first manned mission, with three astronauts, will last up to 28 days, the second and third 3-man missions are planned to last up to 56 days. The Skylab space station will test equipment and techniques for gathering in- formation on Earth’s ecology, oceanography, water mangement, agriculture, forestry, geology, and geography. Astronomy experiments will substantially in- crease knowledge of the Sun which sustains life on Earth. Habitability, biomedical, behavioral, and work effectiveness experiments will further evaluate man’s capabilities in space flight. The 25 finalists and their teacher-sponsors have been invited by NSTA and NASA to attend the Skylab Educational Conference at the Kennedy Space Cen- ter, Fla., at the time the Skylab is launched. The finalists, sponsors and schools received special medallions. The experiment evaluation and flight selection process involved NASA Skylab Program personnel from the Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Ala.; the Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston; and the Kennedy Space Center, Fla. Preliminary designs were developed for experiments requiring flight hardware. Other experiment proposals can be satisfied by using data from existing experi- ments of Skylab principal investigators. The student finalists participated in a week of preliminary design reviews at the Marshall center where they and their teacher sponsors and parents were joined by Skylab scientists, engineers, technicians and project officials. The 19 students will remain closely involved in the development of experiment equipment (where hardware is required) and in the planning of how their investi- gations (including data retrieval and processing, flight planning and crew training) will be conducted. The student experiments are being handled in a manner very similar to the mainline Skylab experiments. Some students will work very closely with teams of Skylab investigators. WILLIAM W. POMEROY. The students and experiments selected for participation in Skylab are: Daniel C. Bochsler, Route 2, Box 75, Silverton, Oregon, 97381. “Possible Con- firmation of Objects within Mercury’s Orbit.” Silverton Union High School, Mr. John P. Daily, Teacher/Sponsor. This experiment will attempt to identify a planetary body which may orbit the Sun at a distance approximately 0.1 the distance from Earth to the Sun (Mercury’s orbit is 0.3 to 0.4 the distance to Earth's orbit). The experiment is to be performed by examining about 30,000 Skylab solar telescope photographs. Vincent W. Converse, 1704 Roosevelt Road, Rockford, Illinois, 61111. “Zero Gravity Mass Measurement.” Harlem High School, Miss Mary J. Trumbauer, Teacher/Sponsor. This experiment complements the existing Skylab specimen mass and body mass measurement devices. The equipment consists of a simple leaf Spring an- chored at one end with a container at the other end into which is placed the mass to be measured. The experiment operates on the same principle as the baseline Skylab mass measurement devices and can therefore be used as an excellent demonstration of these. 92 Troy A. Crites, 736 Wynwood Drive, Kent, Washington, 98031. “Space Ob- servation and Prediction of Volcanic Eruptions.” Kent Junior High, Mr. Richard C. Putnam, Teacher/Sponsor. The aim of this experiment is to analyze infrared surveys of known volcanoes obtained by baseline Skylab earth resources experiment equipment. The data will be compared to ground-based data to determine whether remote sensing can detect increased thermal radiation which may precede an imminent eruption. W. Brian Dunlap, 6695 Abbot Avenue, Youngstown, Ohio, 44515. “Wave Motion Thru a Liquid in Zero Gravity.” Austintown Fitch High School, Mr. Paul J. Pallanta, Teacher/Sponsor. The aim of this experiment is to observe the motion of a gas bubble surrounded by a fluid when excited by a calibrated oscillator. Two liquids of different vis- cosity will be used. Provisions will be made for varying the size of the bubble. John C. Hamilton, 12 Honu Street, Aiea, Hawaii, 96701. “Spectrography of s: Quasars.” Aiea High School, Mr. James A. Fuchigami, Teacher/ ponsor. - In this experiment, selected photographs obtained by the ultraviolet stellar astronomy equipment will be analyzed. Photographs of target areas in which quasars have been identified will be studied to obtain spectral data in the ultra- violet region to augment existing data in the radio and visible ranges. Alison Hopfield, 183 Hartley Avenue, Princeton, New Jersey, 08540. “Photography of Libration Clouds.” Princeton Day School, Mr. Norman Sperling, Director, Duncan Planetarium. This experiment will use the Skylab solar telescope cameras to obtain informa- tion on two regions in the Moon's orbit. At two points in the orbit of the Moon, ahead of and following the Moon in its path, a condition of gravitational equi- librium is conducive to the collection of space particles. When each of these regions comes within sight of the Skylab solar telescopes the brightness and polarization of the reflected light will be measured. Kathy L. Jackson, 18718 Capetown Drive, Houston, Teacas, 77058. “A Quantita- tive Measure of Motor Sensory Performance During Prolonged Inflight Zero “g”. Clear Creek High School, Mrs. Mary K. Kimzey, Teacher/Sponsor. This experiment uses a standard eye-hand coordination test apparatus to meas- ure changes in motor sensory skill of crew members. Roger G. Johnston, 1833 Draper Drive, St. Paul, Minnesota, 55113. “Capillary Action Studies in a State of Free Fall.” Alexander Ramsey High School, Mr. Theodore E. Molitor, Teacher/Sponsor. . The aim of this experiment is to determine if the zero gravity environment induces changes in the characteristics of capillary and wicking action from the familiar Earth gravity characteristics. *Jeanne L. Leventhal, 1511 Arch Street, Berkeley, California, 94708. “X-Ray Emmission from the Planet Jupiter.” Berkeley High School, Mr. Harry E. Choulett, Teacher/Sponsor. The aim of this experiment is to detect X-rays emitting from Jupiter. The X-ray Emission detected by Skylab will be compared with solar activity and Jupiter's radio emission to derive more information on the mechanisms of that great planet. - Todd A. Meister, 33–04 93 Street, Jackson Heights, New York, 11372. “An In Vitro Study of Selected Isolated Immune Phenomena.” Bronx High School of Science, Mr. Vincent G. Galasso, Teacher/Sponsor. This experiment aims to determine if the absence of gravity affects representative life processes. - Part A–(Chemotaxis) utilizes guinea pig macrophage under the influence of casein and incorporates a filter to trap migrating cells. Part B–(Antigenicity) measures concentrations of antigen/antibody. Part C–(Mobility) demonstrates the mobility of a ciliated cell by microscopic observation and by photomicroscopy. Judith S. Miles, 3 Dewey Road, Lexington, Massachusetts, 02173. “Web Formation in Zero Gravity,” Lexington High School, Mr. J. Michael Conley, Teacher/Sponsor. - 93 f This experiment will observe the web building process and the detailed structure of the web of the common cross spider (arenus diadematus) in a normal environ- ment and in a Skylab environment. Analysis of experiment results will be similar to analysis of similar experiments, without the Skylab environment, performed by the Research Division of the North Carolina Department of Mental Health, Raleigh, N.C. Cheryl A. Peltz, 7117 S. Windermere, Littleton, Colorado, 80.120. “Cytoplasmic Streaming in Zero Gravity.” Arapahoe High School, Mr. Gordon B. Scheels, Teacher/Sponsor. The aim of this experiment is to perform microscopic observation of leaf cells of elodea plants in zero gravity to determine if there is any difference between the intracellular cytoplasm compared with cytoplasmic motion of similar leaf cells on Earth. Terry C. Quist, 3818 Longridge Drive, San Antonio, Teacas, 78228. “Earth Orbi- tal Neutron Analysis.” Thomas Jefferson High School, Mr. Michael Stewart, Teacher/Sponsor. In this experiment, detectors inside Skylab record impacts of high energy neutrons. The detectors mounted on the inboard faces of water tanks, will be able to discriminate between neutrons in four energy spectra. The neutrons, which have been moderate by their passage through the water in the tanks, impact the detectors and produce fission particles which in turn interact with º; material. Chemical treatment of the interaction reveals readily identifi- able trackS. *Joe W. Reihs, 12824 Wallis Street, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 70815. “X-Ray Content in Association with Stellar Spectral Classes.” Tara High School, Mr. Helen W. Boyd, Teacher/Sponsor. The primary aim of this experiment is to make observations Cf celestial regions in X-ray wavelengths in an attempt to relate X-ray emissions to other spectral characteristics of stars observed. In addition, observations of the Sun in X-ray and other spectral regions will be studied to reevaluate the Sun and its relation to other stellar classes. Donald W. Schlack, 92.17 Appleby Street, Downey, California, 90240. “Phototropic Orientation of an Embryo Plant in Zero Gravity.” Downey High School, Miss Jean C. Beaton, Teacher/Sponsor. Joel G. Wordekemper, 810 East Sherman Street, West Point, Nebraska, 68788. “Plant Growth in Zero Gravity.” Central Catholic High School, Mrs. Lois M. Schaaf, Teacher/Sponsor. These two experiments have been combined into a single joint experiment whose objectives are: 1. To determine the differences in root and stem growth and Orientation of radish seeds in specimens grown in zero gravity and on Earth under similar environmental conditions. 2. To determine whether light can be used as a substitute for gravity in causing the roots and stems of radish seeds to grow in the appropriate direction in Zero gravity, and to determine the minimum light level required. Neal W. Shannon, 2849 Foster Ridge Road, Atlanta, Georgia, 30345. “A Search for Pulsars in Ultraviolet Wavelengths.” Fernbank Science Center, Dr. Paul H. Rnappenberger, Teacher/Sponsor. Objective of this experiment is to make ultraviolet observations of selected celestial regions in an attempt to relate ultraviolet emissions with known radio- emitting pulsars and with the pulsar in the Crab Nebula which is known to emit in- visible light and radio spectra. Robert L. Staehle, Huntington Hills-North, Rochester, New York, 14622. “Be- havior of Bacteria and Bacterial Spores in the Skylab and Space Environments.” Harley School, Mr. Alan H. Soanes, Teacher/Sponsor. In this experiment colonies of various species of bacteria will be studied in the Skylab zero gravity environment to determine if this environment induces variations in survival, growth and mutations of the spores which are different from those observed in identical colonies on Earth. *The approved experiment, relies, on the use and availability of the ATM equipment. Actual conduct of the experiment is contingent upon the resolution of . Operational and tehnical uncertainties that influence whether or not this type of observation can be made. 93—466 O—73—pt. 2 7 94 Joe B. Zmolek, 1914 Hazel Street, Oshkosh, Wisconsin, 54901. “Earth’s Absorp- §. of Radiant Heat.” Lourdes High School, Mr. William L. Behring, Teacher/ ponsor. Objective of this experiment is to derive information on the attenuation of heat energy in Earth's Atmosphere. Measurements are to be made simultaneously i. * ºth's Surface and at Skylab altitude to determine differences in radiant eat levels. Mr. FREY. One last thing. On the camera resolution, you were talking about the ERTS pro- gram and Skylab, and the difference in resolution. Could you explain that a little more? Is there a great deal of overlap? Obviously there is a small amount. Mr. SCHNEIDER. We cover the same identical bands as does ERTS, and then go way beyond. Can we have that Vugraph again? With respect to physical resolution on the ground, I believe ERTS has a resolution power of about 200 feet. We expect to be in the order of 20 meters. You can see the two ERTS instruments show on the top there, as being in the visible light spectrum. You can see that the Skylab photographic experiments, S190A and S190B are in the same general region. The telescope 191, aimed by the astronaut, covers a wide range, out to the thermal infrared; 192, which brings back 14 pictures, each in a different specific wavelength, covers, again, the same ERTS bands. then goes beyond into the near infrared and into the thermal infrared, The two microwave experiments are way out here in the microwave region. So we do overlap deliberately the ERTS capabilities, then go beyond. Here is what I meant when I say I can not promise exactly what we will get in these regions, because it has never been done before. But that thermal infrared channel there is the one that holds the greatest interest as far as finding these “hot spots.” Mr. FREY. We have already collected so much data along the line that we will never even get to look at. One of the tremendous problems we have is that we have a mass of information, and it will take the next 100 years to look at it. What provisions are being made to handle this data? Will we handle it differently, or have more information that we will not be able to thoroughly review? Mr. SCHNEIDER. This has been given a great deal of our attention. There will be more data coming down in Skylab than have come down in the entire Apollo program. So from a data-handling standpoint it has received a great deal of our attention, we must be sure the prin- cipal investigator on any one of these investigations will get his data. How he will interpret it, of course, will be a function of how good a scientist he is. Mr. FREY. How much more efficiently would he be able to operate, would you guess, if he could have a continuous flow of information from the Skylab on a daily basis instead of the retrieval of film and magnetic tape? - Mr. SCHNEIDER. It makes it much closer to an operational system, because the principal investigators could look then at the thermal channel. Mr. FREY. How much more efficiency are we gaining? Mr. SchNEIDER. At least an order of magnitude, if not two. 95 Mr. FREY. Which is a very important reason to do something like that. Thank you. Mr. Fuqua. Mr. Flowers. Mr. FLOWERS. I am interested in this line of questioning, too. I would like to feel that the wealth of information that could be obtained from a second Skylab, say, would fully justify the expense, but from the testimony I have heard, if I have a criticism it is of the scientific community, not of information, and there just isn’t any way, and I think OMB is right. If there is a problem in communicating with the general public, I think it has been on the part of the scientific community. People remember Apollo 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and each time they were told there was more information collected in this one than in the last. But it really just amounted to more Moon rocks, as far as the general public was concerned. - I think there is a crying need for better communication from the scientific community to the general public. I hope we can achieve that, and better and more efficient handling of the data, as Mr. Frey suggests, I think is an absolute prerequisite. If spending more money would help that, I think Congress would be willing to appropriate it. But to continue on exploration just to have more canned data out of it is not justified. Mr. ScHNEIDER. Yes; I was saying to the Chairman, perhaps after the first mission when there is a wealth of data down and we can look at it and see what it really means, it might have great significance and be exactly the time you would want to reexamine the question. Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Bergland. Mr. BERGLAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Pursuing the point raised by Mr. Flowers—is every one of these experiments on board contracted out with a private investigator— better to say, a non-NASA source of expertise? Mr. ScHNEIDER. I cannot say “every.” The method by which we get experiments on board is that an in- vestigator, whether NASA, outside, university, other Government agency, what-have—you, submits his experiment proposal to a spon- soring office, such as Dr. Naugle's Office of Space Science, in NASA. They evaluate and say whether it is a good scientific investigation. That is submitted to the Manned Space Flight Experiments Board, chaired by Mr. Myers. They evaluate it and decide whether or not to assign it to a program. If they would decide to assign it to Skylab we decide whether we can get it on board the spacecraft physically. If the answer is “yes” we tell the board, and it is committed to us. We have a French experiment, where the experiment has been built, provided for and developed by the French Government, and has a French principal investigator. Experiments have been proposed by NASA principal investigators, as well as others proposed by universities. Mr. BERGLAND. Take the medical experiments on board, will the evidence and data collected on this mission be made available to the entire medical, scientific communities? Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes, sir, each principal investigator has a contract with NASA where he has exclusive publication rights to his data for 1 year. At the end of 1 year he is required to write a report which then is put out through the normal scientific channels. At the end of 96 the 1 year all of his fundamental data, basic data out of the instru- ments, is available to anyone who wants it. So the analysis and con- clusions are available at a maximum of 1 year, and then the data from which he acquired those is available to anybody who wishes to request it after a year. That is on all experiments. Mr. BERGLAND. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Fuqua. Mr. Gunter. Mr. GUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Schneider, I wonder if you can expand a little beyond your earlier testimony with regard to the difference in resolution between ERTS and Skylab, as to the significance there? Obviously there is an importance or significance. Mr. ScHNEIDER. There are two kinds of resolutions we are talking about. One is physical resolution, where the ERTS pictures have a specification requirement of about 200 feet, and are actually down to about 150 feet. The Skylab specification on the photographic equipment, the S190—A, the big camera you saw in the movie, is 100 feet, and we expect a little better than that. g We have a high resolution camera that looks out through the scientific air lock and its resolution by specification is 20 meters. Again, we expect a little better than that. That is physical size. In spectral resolution the Skylab instruments are—the S192, multispectral scanner, which will give us 14 pictures in each of 14 infrared wavelengths, covering that wide band I showed there, its resolution goes from visible, right on through thermal. There are no other instruments that will give us thermal channel information available for space flight today. This will be the first one. - Mr. GUNTER. Did NASA actually ask OMB for the money for Skylab B? - - Mr. ScHNEIDER. I don’t know the answer to that question. Mr. GoRMAN. The Agency did not ask OMB for this in its formal budget submission. The subject was discussed a few years ago. Mr. GUNTER. Yes. Mr. GoRMAN. A second Skylab was not in the formal NASA fiscal year 1974 budget submission to OMB. Mr. GUNTER. What is the basis of your policy not to request it? Mr. GoRMAN. Because of the overall budget constraints and priorities within NASA, that we had to deal with. Mr. FUQUA. I believe Mr. Myers answered that yesterday. Based on this they felt the money with the limitations they had could be better spent in Shuttle than in Skylab. Mr. GoRMAN. Yes, sir. That is what I meant by priorities. Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Wydler. Mr. WYDLER. Can you give me an idea of the experiments going on Skylab, what percentage are pointed toward the stars, what percentage to Earth? Mr. SchNEIDER. There are seven instruments pointed toward the Sun, six pointed toward the Earth. In the scientific area there are two pointing toward the stars, another eight or nine pointed toward the biosphere around us. 97 Mr. WYDLER. Biosphere, you mean the atmosphere, and so on? Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes. Mr. WYDLER. That relates to the Earth? Mr. SCHNEIDER. Some of them do, yes. Mr. Fuqua. Mr. Bergland. Mr. BERGLAND. What do you regard as the three most important experiments on this mission? Mr. SCHNEIDER. I have been trying valiantly for 4 years not to show any preference for any of the experiments, so I do not get any principal investigators angry with me. On a near-term basis, from a practical viewpoint, obviously the earth resources experiments will be the most useful. I believe the S192 experiment, 14-channel multispectral scanner, is by far the most exciting instrument in the Earth resources. From a further-out standpoint I have a minority opinion that the materials processing experiment has in it a great deal that we are going to learn. Mr. Braguano. Would materials processing include the medical aspect' Mr. SCHNEIDER. No. On Skylab we have a vacuum chamber with a heat source. We have a number of experiments that will look at materials processes. We have a capsule of aluminum copper, for example, which we will melt and reform. If it reforms the way the theory says it reforms, we will have a material that will have great advantages in the Superconductor area. I am by no means proposing we end up with a Willow Run in space, and produce superconducting materials in space, but I think it has great promise in bringing back substantial knowledge of materials processes to be used here on Earth. Another experiment is forming pure crystals which can be formed without any convection, because there is no gravity. Theorists say when we get the crystal back, they will have a purity unattainable on Earth, and that they would have great potential benefits in the semi- conductor field and might lead to new knowledge and uses of semi- conductors. That is my personal feeling about that experiment. Mr. BERGLAND. What would be the third category? Mr. ScHNEIDER. I will have to stick, for that, with my solar physicist friends. The NRL experiment, the SO–82, will give us the first long- term look at the sun in very great detail. That is far-out science, not near-term science. I think it will give us a far more fundamental understanding of the Sun and of thermonuclear processes than we have today. In that order I think those three are the most exciting, and I have probably offended 264 scientists. Mr. FUQUA. Thank you very much. [The balance of William C. Schneider's statement reads as follows: - *- 98 º- SKYLAB INTRODUCTION In previous statements to this committee, the NASA has provided much background material on the development and manufacturing aspects of the Skylab program. Since Skylab (ML70–6618) is now approaching the operational phase, this statement briefly focuses on the accomplishments of the recent past and directs considerable attention to the planned accomplishments of the near future. As the committee knows, Skylab is a three mission program (ML71– 7503) consisting of one 28-day and two 56-day manned flights spanning an 8-month period. One day prior to the launch of the first manned mission, the Skylab itself will be launched and placed in orbit to await the arrival of the first crew. 99 --- S y LAUNCH SCHEDULE 1973 May ſun ſul Aug sº oc | Now || Dec sº . . . . . . ºt first manned wission - º | seconº MANNED Mission* | ! SAT i - W i - | | i | - crew." º º * º - º a - s sat #1 ſ t 1B || l - 7. t nº-1- - - l The launch of Skylab, SL-1, followed the next day by the launch of the first manned mission, SL-2, in mid-May, constitutes in effect a dual launch and marks the start of Skylab flight operations. 100 AIRLuck Mºdule Multiple uncºnt-Aunºrth - - - - º onental-woºkshop. Pavload shadud-ar-intenstage cºmmand and stºvicº Munults ------------- RE-2-22-7- Through the summer and fall of last year, Skylab flight hardware (ML72–7317) for the SL-1/SL-2 mission was delivered to Kennedy Space Center (KSC). This delivery was contingent on the completion of exhaustive integration and systems testing prior to acceptance by NASA. Extensive use of altitude and thermal/vacuum chambers to simulate flight conditions was an important test requirement. Below this level of testing and even more basic was the qualification test program now virtually complete. Out of the many hundreds of items to be qualified for flight, only eight remain to be completed. 101 º º - MEDICAL EXPERIMENT ** NASA HQ - 73-5070 1-15-73 One test program of special significance should be mentioned. Last summer the Skylab Medical Experiment Altitude Test (SMEAT) (ML73–5070), of 56-day duration, was conducted in an altitude chamber at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) in a simulated orbital workshop environment. This test was designed to obtain baseline medical data, to determine the physiological effect of the environ- ment on the three crewmen, and to insure the operational readiness of the integrated medical experiment system. The atmospheric constituents, pressures, food, water, waste management facilities, and experiment hardware were similar to those which will be used during the Skylab mission. It was a highly successful test and all objectives were satisfied. Hardware problems uncovered have been corrected in the flight units. HARDWARE CHECKOUT AT KSC * - - - --- - - - - - - - - - - - - F. - - ------ — - I-in- - --- º -- º: *- MDA & cºm DuBING Docking TEST Having arrived at KSC, the flight hardware has undergone intensive checkout at the module level (ML72–7315), including docking tests to verify the critical interface between the multiple docking adapter and the command and service module. Stacking of the SL-1/SL-2 space vehicles (ML72–7316) has proceeded apace and end-to-end integrated systems tests of the orbital assembly have been completed. - - - ...º. º- - - NASA Hº-M172-7315 i’ i. 12-22-72 ATM Going No clean Room ºl- osc Blogwº º Lº "- 103 KSC STACKING OPERATIONS All the activities to date support a mid-May launch. Major activi- ties which remain to be accomplished on SL-1 prior to rollout to the launch pad include the stowage and servicing of consumables like food and water, and the final flight stowage of experiment and operational equipment which is scheduled for early March. The readiness and operational compatibility of the space tracking data network with Skylab will be checked later this month, to assure that the communica- tion systems will have the capability to provide for the high data rate the experiments will produce. The payload shroud nosecone, which provides boost protection for the airlock module/multiple docking adapter and telescope mount will be installed next month and rollout to pad 39A is scheduled for April. Work remaining on SL-2, which was transferred to pad 39B earlier this month, only involves the standard launch preparations for manned space flight. Launch pad operations have been minimized to the greatest possible extent. The overall philosophy has been to conduct all possible testing and serv- icing within the protected environment of the vehicle assembly building and move the space vehicles to the launch pad only when they are virtually ready for flight. However, the flight readiness reviews and ºwn demonstration tests remain to be accomplished prior to all Il CIl. This brief status report has stressed the comprehensive nature of the test program. The test pyramid, starting at the component qualification level and building up through the levels of subsystem and module testing, through acceptance reviews and checkouts, to the countdown demonstration, provides the confidence needed to launch and operate America's first space station. 104 By this time next year the Skylab flights will be history, and initial assessment of the practical benefits and value of a manned research facility in Earth orbit will be well underway. The Skylab program is predominantly utilitarian in nature, putting the space vehicles and operating know-how developed by * in the service of a wide range of scientific and technological disciplines. In most of these, the use of a space platform is essential to the advancement of knowledge beyond that already acquired independent of space flight. In others, the advancement of space flight itself is the main purpose. -ASA Hº-Lº-5- --0-2 SKYL AB SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATIONS Earlin ºur CEE -º-º-º-º-º-º: The scientific investigations to be conducted on the Skylab mission (ML72–5744) embrace almost every discipline that can take advantage of the unique properties of the orbital environment—the broad view of Earth and the biosphere, the availability of the entire electro- magnetic spectrum for celestial observations, and the elimination of the effects of gravity. 105 SCOPE OF SKYLAB COMMITMENT TO SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY - sº- S /& sº § § § C2 sº, §§23S $/sº / & /&/$3. . Sº º §§ § 'º .# sº & § & INVESTIGATIONS 44 || 146 24 26 || 9 || 17 || 4 || 270 INSTRUMENTS 7 || 6 || 12 | 18 || 8 || 2 || 4 || 57 PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS 5 || 140 || 11 || 19 || 7 || 17 || 3 || 202 C0-INVESTIGATORS | 11 || 388 || 6 || 13 || 4 || 2 || 0 || 424 ASS00IATED PROFESSIONALS 75 || 5 || 10 || 3 || 0 || 12 || 8 || 113 FOREIGN PROFESSIONALS (23) (219) (5) (4)|(0) (2) (0) (253) STUDENT INVESTIGATORS 0 || 2 || 7 || 6 || 1 || 0 || 3 || 19 NASA HQ ML73-5056 REV 2-21-73 About 270 (ML73–5056) separate scientific and technological investigations have been identified and validated for applicability to the disciplines involved. These investigations are being pursued by some 600 principal investigators and coinvestigators. Nearly 100 additional senior scientists are formally associated with the program, most of these through written agreement with the principal investi- gators. Beyond this, many principal investigators have informal arrangements with other scientists for assistance in analysis or in assessing the significance of the results. Overall, it is expected that more than 1,000 senior scientists and engineers will have a direct function in the analysis and reporting of Skylab data. Over 3,500 astronaut hours will be allocated to the performance of these investigations, more than three times the total amount available in all prior U.S. Earth orbit missions. The crew will operate more than 50 different assemblies of sophisticated equipment to acquire an unprecedented amount and variety of data from a single scientific facility. This magnitude of participation and scientific interest empha- sizes the importance of the Skylab experiments and investigations. Attention is now focused on each of the more significant disciplinary 8.T08,S. - 106 SKYLAB SOLAR ASTRONOMY EXPERI MENTS OBJECTIVES - E - R - * or E A B O U 1 I HE UN v FRSE SPACE ENVIRONMENT * - D - so a R S Y S I tºº. A ND THE R F fºr E CI O N E A R H AND ------D - * -- Dº I A or so A R P ++ tº O - tº a w- H -- C - E A St D - ºn a -- ~p a a ºf solulu l-O tº tº HO sº wºn tº - - -- a-- * * * * * G -O--D E A ºf D C B sº º a ". --- SOLAR ASTRONOMY The study of the Sun (ML72–5742) goes back to the beginnings of civilization, when prehistoric astronomers first used its motion to pre- dict the seasons and tell the best times for planting and harvesting. Their successors, modern solar astronomers, seek to understand and explain the remarkable phenomena within and around the Sun itself. In part, this is scientific research in its purest form, but there is also a strong awareness that better knowledge of solar processes may lead the way to new means for generating and controlling energy for use on Earth. There is also the problem of explaining mechanisms by which solar events affect the Earth (ML68–5072), particularly in the streams of high energy particles associated with solar flares. 107 ATMUSPHERIC ABSORPTION OF SOLAR EMISSIONS - --> lºw----- -------- - -º ºc - ºn º - - *** - *** - I - - --- --------- -------- º º --- - -------- --~~~~ ------- Courtesy of national GEOGRAPric society. Davis MELTLER, ARTIST º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º: 1-2-3- For example, it is assumed that these flares are responsible for the auroras and the associated disruption of ionospheric radio transmis- sion. Since it is known that sunspot activity correlates with variations in the profiles of temperature and density in the upper atmosphere, it is conceivable that the injection of energy in the upper atmosphere by solar particles may trigger worldwide weather phenomena as well. The solar instruments on Skylab afford an unmatched opportunity to gain new knowledge of the Sun. Operating beyond the limitations of the atmosphere, these solar telescopes will make observations of the Sun not accessible from ground observations, particularly in the ultra- violet and X-ray regions. Their size and sensitivity make it possible to observe details of form and spectral composition not attainable by the satellite solar observatories orbited to date, and their operation under the direct control of an astronomer-astronaut allows them to be aimed selectively at specific details on the solar disc. The observing program to be carried out on Skylab embodies co- ordinated attacks on specific problems of solar physics, such as: magnetic fields and circulation in the solar atmosphere; active regions, analogous to storm centers, associated with sunspots; solar flares, giant eruptions associated with active regions; prominences and fila- ments, hundreds of tons of matter suspended in the solar atmosphere; and expulsion of solar matter toward the Earth. In addition, the properties of the Earth's atmosphere will be probed by observing the extinction of solar radiation as the spacecraft passes from night to day. The series of three Skylab missions will provide over 500 hours of astronaut controlled solar observations. While the first solar astronomy 108 mission can be considered exploratory in nature, to separate the ordinary from the extraordinary and to refine the skills of the inte- grated astronaut/ground support team, the second and third missions will make it possible to close the cycle of observation, interpretation, and new observation, and to follow up on the new discoveries that are anticipated. - In planning a thorough and worldwide attack on solar physics, the principal investigators have established agreements for joint investi- gations with over 50 astronomers and physicists in the United States and abroad. Concurrent ground-based observations in accessible wavelength regions, and X-ray and gamma-ray spectroscopy from sounding rockets and balloons will provide needed supporting data to the spaceborne observing programs and will multiply the solar physics return from both activities. To allow other interested scientists to co- ordinate their own observations with the solar astronomy program without a formalized agreement, the principal investigators also established procedures for worldwide communications which will in- form interested ground-based observers what the scheduled solar astronomy observing activities are to be, on a daily basis. It is expected that over 200 observatories and scientists will take advantage of this opportunity. The unique combination of a manned solar observatory and simul- taneous worldwide ground observations provides a powerful tool for obtaining new knowledge of the Sun that will benefit many areas of study. - EARTH RESOURCES Space as a vantage point for observing the Earth (ML72–5845) has been amply demonstrated by the photography returned by Gemini and Apollo flights and the weather information provided routinely by automated satellites for many years. 109 NASA HQ ML72-584.5 SKYLAB 4-26-72 EARTH RESOURCES EXPERI MENTS EARTH OBSERVATION STUDIES ------------ - 2. - ----- - --> --- S. OBJECTIVES PER FOR M P HOTOGRAPHIC A.N.A.L. Y SIS OF CR OPS FORESTRY UNDERGROUND w A LE R S NO w Co v ER GEO LOGY O CALE AND EVALUATE AIR AND w AI ER POLLUTION -- a---E OCEAN SURFACES ICE AND cloud for M AT LONS AND SE A - R - A C E L E M-PERATURE. To A D LN w E AT H E R P RED CT LON AND O N T R Ol ---> t a RI H St N sun G. It c HN QUES A ORBIT AL A-L || UDES COMP A R tº --out-D B as E. D. D. A A N AN AL Y 7 ||NG E A R T H RE SOUR C tº D-º-º-º-º- The Earth resources technology satellite (ERTS) launched last July and the Skylab Earth resources experiments package (EREP) are experimental efforts directed toward demonstrating the feasibility of using space to gather more detailed information and apply it to the problems of the environment, our diminishing resources, and the rap- pidly growing world population. The data provided by ERTS and EREP are to be used, for example, to study crop and forest inventory, crop health, oceans, mineral resources, water resources, and air and water pollution. More specifically, EREP will be used to acquire selective data for 146 investigations in 46 task areas (ML72–6399) which can use remotely sensed data from space. For instance, the tasks under “Crop Inventory” in the “Agriculture/Range/Forestry” discipline include studies in Arizona, California, Colorado, Michigan, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas; and in Iran, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, the Sudan, and Colombia. These studies should provide the basis for evaluating the feasibility of routine assessment of the major food crops of the world. 93—466 0–73—pt. 2–8 110 EREP PROGRAM STRUCTURE AGRICULTURE/RANGE/FORESTRY CROP |NVENTORY |NSECT INFESTATION SOIL TYPE SOIL MO STURE RANGE | NVENTORY FOREST INVENTORY FOREST INSECT DAMAGE GE010;ICAL APPLICATHONS MAPPING METALS EXPLORATION HYDRO CARBON EXPLORATION ROCK TYPES VOLCANOS EARTH MOVEMENTS CONTINENTAL WATER RESOURCES GROUND WATER SNOW MAPPING DRAINAGE BASINS WATER OUALITY 00EAN INVESTIGATIONS TEMPERATURE GEODESY LIVING MARINE RESOURCES ATMOSPHERIC INVESTIGATIONS STORMS, FRONTS, AND CLOUDS RADIANT ENERGY BALANCE AIR OUALITY ATMOSPHERIC EFFECTS COASTAL ZONES, SHOALS, AND BAYS CiRCULATION AND POLLUTION IN BAYS UNDERWATER TOPOGRAPHY AND SEDIMENTATION BATHYMETRY COASTAL CHRCULATION WETLANDS ECOLOGY REMOTE SENSING TECHNIQUES DEVELOPMENT PATTERN RECOGNITION MICROWAVE SIGNATURES DATA PROCESSING SENSOR PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REGIONAL PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT LAND USE CLASSIFICATION TECHNIOUES ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS – SPECIAL TOPICS STATE AND FOREIGN RESOURCES URBAN APPLICATIONS COASTAL/PLAINS APPLICATIONS MOUNTAIN/DESERT APPLICATIONS CART06RAPHY PHOTOMAPPING MAP REVISION MAP ACCURACY THEMATIC MAPPING NASA HQ ML72-6399 A REV. 2/21/73 The Skylab instruments generally provide higher spectral and spatial resolution (ML72–6814) than is available with ERTS. In the lower regions of the spectrum (blue, green, and red) some of the EREP bands have been selected to be comparable to those available with the ERTS multispectral scanner (MSS) and return beam vidicon (RBV). However, the EREP coverage has been expanded to the infrared, to include a thermal channel and measurements in the microwave region. 111 SPECTRAL COWERAGE ERTS/EREP ERTS MSS [T] RBW [T] \ VISIBLE AND NEAR INFRARED yº), MICROWAVE y .4 .6 8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4\\6 8 10 12 14 16)) 5 10 15 20 25 MICROMETERS CM EREP S190 [a] [I] S190 (b) [] S191 T | | || | S192 [I] [T] [I] [I] L] - S193 X S194 X NASA HQ ML72- 6814 REV 2-21-73 While the microwave portion of the spectrum is important because of its ability to penetrate clouds, the techniques for using microwave sensors are not as well developed as for optical sensors. Hence, the sensors to be flown on Skylab are advance developments which could lead eventually to an all weather remote sensing system. 112 ASTROPHYSICS THE UPPER . ºr " ATMOSPHERE RAYS - | º º - S. - º DLET - - - Hºº Aºsº Astrophysics (ML71-5596) has traditionally sought answers to fundamental questions regarding the nature of the physical universe, leading to the discovery of important concepts—the passage and measurement of time, the seasons, the size and shape of the Earth, its place in the solar system and relationship with the rest of the observable universe. In addition, the study of matter in previously unknown states and of processes too exotic to occur naturally in our own environment—the generation of thermonuclear energy in the center of stars, for º had a great influence on the growth of other physical sciences. The increase in available information brought about by access to space and the opening up of the entire spectrum from gamma rays to new regions of radio waves holds out the promise of discoveries of new phenomena, such as pulsars, previously hidden from our view, and new insights into basic scientific questions. The Skylab facility will provide an opportunity to perform a variety of investigations relating to cosmic rays, measurements of radiation reflected by dust particles in interstellar space, and untra- violet and X-ray observation of visible and invisible stellar sources. Less stringent weight limitations on Skylab permit larger instruments to be flown, and film and sample return will provide better resolution of data than could be obtained from an unmanned satellite. 113 LIFE SCIENCES While all the solar, Earth, and astrophysical observations are going on, other important investigations taking place will be those relating to life sciences, that is to man himself. Biomedical monitoring of the crewmen was an important operational element in previous manned space programs, but the limitations of weight, space, and crew time did not permit detailed scientific investigation of the physiological effects that took place. In Skylab, systematic and detailed studies will be made of the effects of prolonged weightlessness on the major body functions—ML72–5743. SKYLAB MEDICAL EXPERIMENTS - - º I OBJECTIVES º-ºº. DETERMINE EFFECT OF LONG DURATION SPACE FLIGHT ON MAN: PERFORM INVESTIGA- TIONS OF: • CARDIOWASCULAR ADAPTATION • BONE MINERAL CHANGES • GAIN/LOSSES OF BODY Bio-CHEMICALS • HEMATOLOGY: IMMUNOLOGY, NEUROPHYSIOLOGY PULM0NARY AND ENERGY METABOLISM ------ -- Nutrition and musculoskeletal experiments have been designed to investigate the extent of skeletal muscular alterations and to evaluate biochemical changes and nutritive requirements. These investigations will measure input and output of fluid and biochemical constituents, make X-ray estimates of bone demineralization and assess hormones and electrolytes in body fluids. A cardiovascular study will test the reflexes which regulate the regional distribution of blood throughout the body. This important measurement will help to determine the nature of time course of changes in these reflexes. The cardiovascular investigation also includes vectorcardiograms during calibrated exercises, in order to evaluate the response of the heart to a provocative stress in weightlessness. Investigations in hematology and immunology deal with the effects of space flight on the blood cells, body fluid compartments, the clotting 114 mechanism, body immunity, and chromosomal abberations. For the first time blood samples will be collected in flight. These samples will be separated into plasma and cells and returned for postflight analysis. Neurophysiology investigations will evaluate several nervous system responses to determine effects of weightlessness on the otoliths which contribute to man's perception of body orientation in space and will test for changes in sensitivity and susceptibility of the semicircular canals to rotation in weightlessness. A sleep monitoring experiment . investigate the effects of space flight on the quality and quantity of sleep. Energy expenditures will be measured by comparing the metabolic rate observed during rest with that found during prescribed calibrated workloads and with similar data taken before and after the mission. Circadian rhythm studies are concerned with the physiological periodicity of many body functions about the 24-hour terrestrial day and night cycle. In addition to obvious rhythms such as sleep and wakefulness, the endocrine cardiovascular, nervous, and other systems and biomedical processes are influenced by this cyclic phenomena. A more fundamental investigation of the function of the biological clock, which is believed to be responsible for the timing of these rhythms in man and other animals, will be conducted by experiments using pocket mice and vinegar gnats. These experiments will test the stability of the clock mechanism under zero gravity conditions. These comprehensive medical studies will provide a base of knowl- edge so that future decisions on the use of men in space can be made with confidence. It is also expected that the response to weightlessness will add significantly to the basic understanding of man’s various physiological processes in his normal environment. In addition, Some of the advances in medical instrumentation developed for Skylab will find important application in hospitals and doctors’ offices. MAN/SYSTEMS INTEGRATION Related to the life sciences investigations are the man/systems integration experiments which focus on the improvement of future space systems and operations. These investigations are directed towards more effective space operations through the development of an integrated body of knowledge resulting from observations of how men function in space. 115 º ORBITAL WORKSHOP S ONE G TRAINER Future decisions on what functions should be allocated to men in space and which should be automated, how to design support systems, living accommodations—ML72–5059—work stations, controls and displays—ML72–5740—what kind of provisions are best for servicing and maintaining space equipment, the desirability of artificial grav- ity—all need a body of solid facts which define men's capabilities and support needs in weightless flight. 116 sº INTERIOR - MULTIPLE DOCKING ADAPTER - SOLAR ASTRONOMY CONTROL & DISPLAY In Skylab, much of this information will be derived from opera- tions reports and from the postmission evaluation of the performance of the Skylab spacecraft and its subsystems. In addition, there are seven separate investigations aimed at specific aspects of the subject. Two are directed toward the architectural and functional design of spacecraft and equipment for living and working in space. Another investigation will develop detailed information on the modes by which the crew perform various functions and the time and effort it takes to do them. Others investigate the disturbing effects that crew motion inside the spacecraft may have on the fine pointing performance of high resolution telescopes. Additionally, two investigations are concerned with techniques for astronaut maneuvering outside the spacecraft on future missions. The main body of the life sciences investigations will document the physiological response of the crews to prolonged weightlessness; the man/systems integration investigations will show how men operate in orbital flight. Thus it is anticipated that Skylab will provide a many- fold increase in the body of factual knowledge available to the de- signers and operations planners of the space shuttle and the scientific and applications payloads that it will carry into space. Of equalim- portance will be the validation of the techniques of zero gravity anal- ysis and simulation, which will allow future engineers to evaluate specific design concepts under controlled conditions, on the ground, with confidence that the results are valid representations of what will happen in space. 117 MATERIALS SCIENCE Last of the investigations are those relating to the discipline of materials science. As is well known, the Earth environment not only determines, but also limits many materials processes, especially through its ever present, large gravitational force. The space environ- ment offers virtual elimination of gravity. Melting and mixing with- out the contaminating effects of containers, the suppression of con- vection and buoyancy in liquids and molten materials, control of voids, and the ability to use electrostatic and magnetic forces otherwise masked by gravitational forces open the way to new knowledge of material properties and processes. Skylab investigations in this area will range from the examination of composite structural materials with highly specialized physical properties, to large highly perfect crystals with valuable electrical and optical properties, all associated with materials systems which cannot now be produced on Earth. MATERIALS PRocessing IN SPACE SKYLAB EXPER MENT M 512 METAL's MELTING -\ ExOTHERM HEATING º - - - ------------- - SPHERE FORMING º *-T- RE-2-a- ºſ-Ting The Skylab materials processing facility—ML71–5208—represents the first step in a program of space research in the materials science and manufacturing in space area. Examples of the experiments to be performed include: behavior of molten metals in free fall and the structures formed when they are resolidified; sphere forming to determine sphericity, hardness, surface smoothness, and internal microstructure; growth of single crystals from a solution and by chemical vapor transport; microsegregation of doping impurities in germanium; silver reinforced with oriented silicon carbon whiskers; pore sizes and shapes in sintered grids of fine silver wire; solidifica- tion of lamellar structures in an eutectic alloy. 118 Seventeen separate investigations including two from foreign countries will be associated with this research. Ultimately, the knowl- edge to be gained will result in improved materials and processes for use on Earth. SKYLAB STUDENT PROJECT The discussion of the experiment disciplines would not be complete without covering one unique area of investigation, the Skylab student project. This project is cosponsored by the National Science Teachers Association (NSTA) and NASA, and was formulated to provide high school students with an opportunity to submit experiment proposals for use in Skylab. The response from the young scientific community was beyond anything anticipated. Applications were º from every State and in excess of 3,400 proposals were Ireceived. SKYLAB STUDENT PROJECT REGIONS H. O Roman nu-ERALs -ºsta REGºons ARABC numenalis - No. of PROPosals neceived REG-c-e-r-as * Masa-manned FuGºt centens - National-winners - PLus Puento alco, canal-zone & wing-sl-ands -- PLUS Al-As-A - PLus----------- Of these, 301 regional winners and 25 national winners (ML73– 5040) were selected by NSTA. The Skylab program has been able to accommodate 19 of the 25 national winners by using either specially designed hardware, which will be built in-house, or providing data from existing Skylab equipment. All winners, including those that could not be accommodated due to hardware complexity, cost, or time for performance, have been assigned to work with NASA scientists or principal investigators either in their specific experiment area or in related areas. Every submittal has received suitable acknowledge- ment, and special awards have been made to regional and national Winners. 1.19 OPERATIONS As the initial launch time draws near, program emphasis is shifting to the operations area. Basically, operations is concerned with the plan- ning and conduct of launch and flight activities. The planning required for the long duration Skylab missions, with the myriad of activities to be accomplished, has been an undertaking of considerable magnitude. A significant new challenge for our operations teams is the dual launch of the SL-1/SL-2 mission. The preparation of two complex space vehicles in parallel creates a major increase in coordination and planning requirements. Other factors adding to the operations chal- lenge of Skylab are the number and complexity of the Skylab systems, and the number of experiments and experimenters involved. The following reviews some of the highlights of the operations activities with primary emphasis on the execution of experiments. The basic operational plans for the first Skylab manned mission are the flight plan and the mission rules. These plans are virtually complete and will be published in the next few weeks. The flight plan defines the in-flight tasks to be performed from launch through recovery. Its development is a complex process in which competing and conflicting mission and experiment requirements must be identified and resolved, astronaut procedures identified and associated performance times allocated, and operational constraints considered. Developing and producing the flight plan helps to build the coordination and team work among the various elements so necessary for mission conduct. The mission rules provide the preplanned actions necessary to insure crew safety and to maximize the probability of mission success by guiding operational decisions during the launch and flight phases of the mission. In addition to the development of operations plans, the organiza- tional elements involved in the Skylab missions have participated, and will continue to participate, up until launch, in training and simulations. A simulation (ML73–5013) is a mission rehearsal in which one or more elements of the mission team perform the activities they will be responsible for during the actual mission. Elements in- clude flight crews, launch crews, flight control specialists, flight plan- ners, program management personnel and experiment principal investigators. Simulations to date have covered evaluation of flight planning, and crew activities during launch, workshop activation, typical in-orbit days, deactivation, and reentry. In addition, we have recently con- ducted our first integrated simulation in which all mission elements interact with each other. Further simulations will be conducted to evaluate flight readiness and launch countdown to assure that the launch team and space vehicle are ready to go. * As in the past space missions, outstanding performance is anticipated from our flight crews. Skylab flight crews (ML72–5652) were selected last year and have been undergoing vigorous training ever since, covering a multitude of subjects and skills from astronomy and medi- cine to simulated rendezvous and docking maneuvers. To assure an adequate crew roster, two additional crews (ML72–5651) have been selected for backup. By the time our crews are ready for flight, they will have received over 2,000 hours of training, much of it devoted to experiment operations. - 120 KYLAB FLIGHT CONTROLLER TRAINING SIMULATION MISSION CONSOLES CONTROL simulation - a . A-M ºš - BARTH RESOURCES CREW station - - CREW statiºn TRAINER - -RAINER mºnºs CONSOLE SKYLAB ASTRONAUT PRIME CREWS ------- --------- --------- ------- -------- -------- ---------- ------- ---------- ------- ------- --------- ------------- ------------ --------- --------- ------------ -------------- ------------- ----------> --- ---------- --- ------------- -- ------------ ------------ ** ann-n ----------- Enºn Gibsºn ----------- ------------- ºn tº Gaºlº --------------- ----------- -D-u-o-o-º-º-º-º- -a-rown -st- --- ------------ ------ ----------- PLACE-da-Park- ------------- ------------- -º-º-º-º-º: PLac-au--a-- ED-L or Roc---tº- B-E.---------- ------ P-Lºt P-O- ---Louis-a- -or us wº Bºth dart 2-2+--- PLACE cº-a-d PLACE-D-E----- Rapids--- Eu-o-º-º-T-S-E-ED- ED-u-oº-º-c-esat- - - or sºu-ºº-º- P--- Paul--tº- cº-ºw B-R-bar-------- - P---------- ----------- Bº-usnºw-wºº. ---a-Pogue. - - Co-usa- B1*T* Date-----ºu 121 SKYLAB ASTRONAUT BACKUP CREWS ºn------------ -------- -----sºn -------- ---------- enera date - ------------ to u or to es asa-u----- º' 2-, Russº-L-º-º-Eur-war. -------------- PLACE-NEPTUNE - ------- -------------- -------------- -------------- ------------- *------------ En svaacuse as ucua wea *** ** **-tº-coluwe-a--- -------- ------------- ------------- ---------- tº ----------- P- ------ - ------------ ------------- E-u-nº-ut-------------- ----- ----------------------- - ------------- P----------- -------------------- The Program Director is responsible for assuring that the program mission requirements are met, for reviewing experiment priorities, and for approving major flight plan changes. A newly created group for the Skylab missions is the Skylab Advisory Group for Experiments (SAGE). SAGE will advise the Program Director on long-range experiment replanning for an ongoing mission and for subsequent º SAGE is composed of directors of the experiment-sponsoring OITICeS. The Flight Management Team (FMT), is another group that has been created for the Skylab missions. This team, chaired by the Program Director, is composed of program and operational personnel and will provide guidance to the Flight Control Team and coordinate mission activities with NASA management. The Skylab program intends to maximize the scientific and tech- nical return from its experiments. To assist in this effort, the experi- ment principal investigators have participated in the flight planning process and will also participate in real time mission operations. Any flight planning changes that affect experiment performance will be reviewed with the principal investigators. Additionally, they will have channels of communication, for discussion of major experiment policy changes, to SAGE. RESCUE CAPABILITY A rescue kit to convert Skylab Command Modules to rescue ve- hicles has been manufactured and qualified, and will be delivered to KSC next month. Very basically, the kit consists of two additional 122 couches and life support equipment. The rescue mode envisages launch of the next mission spacecraft, with the kit installed, but with only two astronauts on board, thereby providing accommodation for the three astronauts awaiting rescue. Thus SL-3 is potentially the rescue vehicle for SL–2, and SL–4 for SL–3. To provide rescue capability for SL-4, the Skylab backup spacecraft will be used. With the successful culmination of the extensive test programs and the intensification of the planning of operational activities, the Skylab program is rapidly approaching mission readiness. The number and variety of investigations in solar atronomy, Earth observations, astrophysics, life sciences, man/systems integration, and materials sciences, and the broad involvement of the scientific community, both nationally and internationally, signify a worldwide interest in Skylab. The NASA now looks to the culmination of its efforts, adding to the knowledge of manned space flights, while focusing attention on its usefulness to manned Earth life. Mr. FUQUA.. Our schedule is slipping a little. We will now hear from Mr. Harry Gorman, the Deputy Associate Administrator, Management, Office of Manned Space Flight, NASA. Will you proceed, Mr. Gorman? STATEMENT OF HARRY H. GORMAN, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ADMINIS- TRATOR (MANAGEMENT), MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, NASA Mr. GoRMAN. Thank you. . Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before the committee this morning. By way of introduction, I have two separate budget requests to present. The first request is the manned space flight part of the research and program management budget and the Second request is the development, test and mission operations item of the research and development appropriation for manned space flight. The Research and Program Management budget pays for the civil service salaries and related costs, including travel of civil service personnel. It also pays for what we call installation Services. Instal- lation services can be defined as those services required to maintain the buildings and grounds and to operate the centers on a day-to-day basis. All three of the Manned Space Flight Centers contract out much of the installation services to the industry, which traditionally provides such services for other Government agencies as well as for the private sector. They include custodial, security, groundskeeping, building maintenance and repair, administrative automatic data processing, occupational medicine, graphics and reproduction. The balance of installation services are generally purchased locally and include utilities, supplies, materials, and equipment used in the administration of the Centers’ activities. The civil service complement and the installation support contractor work force at the three Manned Space Flight Centers reached a com- bined peak strength of approximately 21,400 in fiscal year 1967. This budget request will provide for this combined work force at about 14,000—a 30-percent reduction. 123 The Second budget request is the development, test, and mission operations item of the research and development appropriation for manned space flight. Development, test, and mission operations pays for contractor support to the Centers' research, development, and operational activities. Today there are 31 companies under contract ranging from very large aerospace companies to relatively small firms providing specialized technical services. Prior to fiscal year 1973, the efforts provided by these contractors were performed primarily in support of the Apollo program. With the completion of Apollo in fiscal year 1973, it was important to separately identify and manage this part of the Manned Space Flight Centers' in-house capability. This is the 2d year it is presented as a separate item in the R. & D. budget request. The civil service complement at each of the Centers is consciously limited in size. We look to industry to balance and supplement the civil service technical disciplines and to provide unique skills in the operation of laboratory, test, launch, and mission facilities. This capability has been adjusted from its Apollo support role to that currently required for Skylab. Additional adjustments are being made to provide the support necessary to meet the requirement of the Apollo–Soyuz Test Project, Space Shuttle, and other NASA programs. The research, development and operations contractor support effort during the Apollo program peaked in fiscal year 1968 at about 17,500 people. Our fiscal year 1974 request will provide employment at approximately a 9,500 level—a 45 percent reduction. RESEARCH AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT This part of my statement contains the budget request for the manned space flight portion of the research and program management appropriation. In fiscal year 1974, this totals $332.5 million. The research and program management budget pays for the civil Service salaries and related costs—representing about 72 percent of the total request—for travel of civil service personnel, and for the installation services that I described earlier. Civil service personnel provide the program management and technical expertise needed to effectively carryout assigned programs and related activities. They also perform such vital functions as pro- curement, budgeting, finance, supervision, and contract administration. The civil service staff will decrease by 825 positions in fiscal year 1974 to a total strength of 10,525. This reduction is related to the completion of the Skylab mission, the termination of communications lead center activity, and the suspension of high energy astronomy observatory. In the past year, we have made extensive changes to the organiza- tional structure of the office of Manned Space Flight Field Centers. These changes are the result of a reassessment of manned space flight's current responsibilities, the projected roles and missions, and the resources to accomplish them. wº In order to perform planned work at lower cost, we started this year to broaden the scope of in-house capabilities and through manage- ment improvements achieve a phasedown of civil service and contractor support manpower. This will continue in fiscal year 1974. 124 Each of the Centers’ budgets has already been provided to you in great detail. I do not plan to augment that detail, but will provide you an explanation of the activities performed at our Centers to achieve the objectives of NASA's programs. GEORGE C. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER The fiscal year 1974 research and program management budget request for the Marshall Space Flight Center is $132.9 million (MD73–5412). The Marshall Center at Huntsville, Ala. became a part of NASA in July 1960 and serves as NASA's primary Center for the engineering and development of large launch vehicle and propulsion systems. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER The Center is probably best known and recognized for the highly successful Saturn launch vehicle program. In recent years, however, the Center has applied this same management and technical competence to even more challenging program activity. For instance, Marshall has a major role in Skylab which is now being readied for launch at the Kennedy Space Center. The Skylab is a manned space laboratory with an extensive program of scientific, medical, and engineering experimentations requiring a broad spectrum of engineering, scientific, and management skills. I believe a question was raised as to whether we had principal investigators in civil service. We do, indeed. Mr. James E. Milligan, located at the Marshall Space Flight Center, has one of the major experiments in the Skylab telescope mount—the dual X-ray telescope. 125 The Skylab program responsibilities at Marshall include engineer- ing, test, and integration of the total systems as well as the major hardware items for the total Skylab cluster. Marshall's major hard- ware development responsibilities include the orbital workshop, the airlock module, the multiple docking adapter, the payload shroud, the telescope mount, and certain scientific, biomedical and technology experiments. The telescope mount, engineered and built in-house, is a good example of Marshall’s technical capability. In addition to being an advanced solar observatory, the telescope mount provides attitude control for the Skylab cluster. To develop and verify this critical control system Marshall had to first develop a total system simulator for the telescope mount which will continue to be used for real time support during the Skylab mission. In connection with their total Telescope Mount responsibilities, Marshall Civil Service personnel monitored the altitude tests con- ducted in the Thermal Vacuum facilities at the Johnson Space Center and are now involved in prelaunch activities at the Kennedy Space Center. Here we see the Apollo 17 crew, with the famous Lunar Roving Vehicle and the powerful Saturn V launch vehicle just before the Apollo 17 launch. (MA 73–5210) APOLLO 17 PRIME CREW LEFT TO RIGHT HARRISON H. SCHMITT RONALD E. EVANS EUGENE A. CERNAN - º - - - Nasa Hºzº-sºlo - 2-5-73 - - -- T. -- º º The highly successful and versatile Lunar Rover, which served so well on the lunar surface and greatly expanded our range of explora- tion, was also under the management and technical direction of the Marshall Center. 93—466 O—73—pt. 2–9 126 Marshall is the responsible Center for the Saturn launch vehicles for Skylab, and the Apollo Soyuz Test Project including engineering and post-flight analysis. The Center's role in the shuttle is a major one of project manage- ment and technical direction of the booster systems, which includes the solid rocket booster, the external tank and the main engines for the orbiter. Marshall will perform structural analysis, define entry controls, thermal requirements, recovery systems, and verify aerodynamic design for the shuttle solid rocket booster. It is planned to perform these tests at Marshall using modified existing facilities. The preliminary design of the external tank was performed by Marshall. A prime hardware contractor will produce the external tank at the Michoud Assembly Facility, and the selection is scheduled for some time this summer. Marshall has program management and technical direction of the design, development and production of the shuttle main engine, which is under contract with the Rocketdyne Division of Rockwell International. Optimum use of the unique laboratories and test ca- Pºiº at Marshall is planned in support of the prime contractors’ effort. In fiscal year 1974, Marshall will also be developing, investigating, and testing structures, hardware, and environmental sensitive mate- rials for the Shuttle Tug, and Sortie Lab. In addition to the activities in Huntsville, the Center is responsible for the management of three offsite facilities: The Michoud Assembly Facility in New Orleans, La., where the Saturn S-IB and S-IC booster stages were built and where the external tanks for the Space Shuttle orbiter will be built; the Slidell Computer Complex in Slidell, La., which provides computer services for NASA and a variety of Govern- ment customers; and the Mississippi Test Facility in Bay St. Louis, Miss., where development testing of the shuttle main engines will be carried out by Rocketdyne. The existing Saturn engine test stands are being modified to accommodate the new high pressure design. Other Federal and State agencies engaged in earth environmental research are also located there. The Marshall Space Flight Center is expected to reduce 650 Civil Service positions by the end of Fiscal Year 1974. This reduction re- sults from the completion of Skylab, the termination of the com- munication lead center activity at Marshall and the cutback of the High Energy Astronomy Observatory. Although this is a major reduction in terms of numbers of people, we are confident that the Center will retain its overall technical competence and versatility. LYNDON B. JoHNson SPACE CENTER For fiscal year 1974, the Research and Program Management Budget request for the Johnson Space Center is $109.2 million. (MD73–5414) Established in 1961 as the Manned Spacecraft Center, the primary mission of the Center located in Houston, Tex., is the design and development of manned spacecraft, the selection and training of astronaut crews and the conduct of space flight missions. 127 The Center mission further embraces an engineering, development, science, and operations capability to support and to generate the knowledge required to advance the technology of manned space flight and related disciplines. 10HNSON SPACE CENTER – º In addition to being the lead center in the management and in- tegration of the Space Shuttle System, as described earlier by Mr. Dale Myers, the Center has been assigned the management and technical direction of the Orbiter Project. This involves utilization of the Center's laboratory and technical capability. For example, an Orbiter project activity is underway at the Center to develop and evaluate Shuttle avionics subsystem concepts to provide primary technical guidance in flight hardware development. Specifically, “breadboards” of avionics subsystems are being produced and evalu- ated. These breadboards are now being installed into an integrated system that will provide a test capability for testing integrated avionics investigations. This, in turn, will produce specific inputs to both system and subsystem design by the prime contractor. In ad- dition, this system's effort will provide the initial phase for develop- ment of the in line Shuttle avionics systems integrated testing. Each activity and product is required for adequate conduct of the Shuttle development and test program. Johnson Space Center is responsible for all crew and manned space flight operations, which include activities associated with astronaut training and proficiency, preflight, and postflight support. 128 The Skylab astronauts are in training now and the Apollo Soyuz Test Project crews have been selected. Astronaut training equipment includes proficiency aircraft, spacecraft mockups, procedures simula- tors, and mission simulators. (MD 73–5493) tº-º-º: Mr. WYDLER. Is this picture on the slide one that was taken at the Johnson Space Center? Mr. GoRMAN. Yes, sir. The current priority in the crew and flight operations area is the simulation of the Skylab mission. Skylab flight controller and crew training simulations and pad test support began during Apollo 17 and have now reached a plateau which will continue through the Skylab mission. This involves around-the-clock monitoring for a period of 8 months. The Center is pioneering in the field of remote sensing of the Earth's resources and environment and has been designated as the lead NASA center for Earth Observations, a major part of the Agency’s applications program. They are also engaged with the Department of Housing and Urban Development in applying space technology techniques and capabilities to urban problems. The scope and significance of the scientific effort at the Center is well recognized and the participation of the scientific community in the activities there is most beneficial. One of the leading lunar scien- tists at the Center is Dr. Paul W. Gast, formerly a professor of chem- istry at Columbia University, who is now chief of the Planetary and Earth Sciences Division. He has made many contributions to theories 129 of the origin and history of the moon, including the now accepted fact that the lunar highlands represent the ancient crust of the moon. Inhouse research is supplemented by other principal investigators around the world, such as Dr. Gerald T. Wasserburg of California Institute of Technology, who is well-known in his field for his excellent geochemical rock dating work; and Dr. Gary Latham of the Uni- versity of Texas, using data from lunar surface seismometers, is dis- covering unexpected facts about the lunar interior. In Life Sciences, the Center has expanded its focus from man’s ability to endure in space to include the aspects of long duration manned space flights. Laboratory research and mission monitoring is planned for each of the Skylab missions to assess human adaptation to longer manned space flight. For Skylab, this involves around-the- clock monitoring for the 26-day and the two 56-day flights. Life Sciences activities include experiments in flight, flight crew operations monitoring and development of physiological requirements for future spacecraft systems. Examples are the early detection of disease pro- gram; biomedical research on the effects of weightlessness on life process assessment of spacecraft toxicology; and, working in conjunc- tion with the Ames Research Center, development of a new cooling technique for the astronaut during extravehicular activity. This tech- nique eliminates the residual contamination caused by water evapora- tion associated with methods used previously. The Center is also responsible for operations at the White Sands Test Facility, located at Las Cruces, N. Mex., and the Earth Resources Laboratory located at the Mississippi Test Facility. The White Sands Test Facility will be used to test the Shuttle Orbital Maneuvering System, Reaction Control System, and shuttle materials. The Earth Resources Laboratory is an important element of the Johnson Space Center and is engaged in the application of remote sensing techniques to land use mapping and Ocean and atmos- pheric observations, which represent an important support element of the NASA applications program. - There is a planned reduction at the Johnson Space Center of 75 civil service positions by the end of fiscal year 1974. This reduction is part of the general Agency reduction in civil service personnel. JoHN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER In fiscal year 1974, the Research and Program Management budget request for the Kennedy Space Center is $90.4 million. The Kennedy Space Center was established at Cape Kennedy, Fla., as a separate Center within NASA in July 1962. (MD 73–5415.) It serves as the primary NASA Center for the test, checkout, and launch of space vehicles, both manned and unmanned. The Center launches the Delta, Centaur, and Atlas-Centaur vehicles for NASA-sponsored unmanned missions and for non-NASA “customer” payloads; 16 of these missions are scheduled in fiscal year 1974. A Titan Centaur capability will be established to launch the Viking at the eastern test range in fiscal year 1974. The Kennedy Center has cognizance of NASA unmanned launches from both the eastern and western test ranges. 130 KENNEDY SPACE CENTER Apollo 17 was successfully launched in fiscal year 1973, and shortly a dual launch will take place—the Skylab Orbital Workshop and the first manned visit to the workshop on the following day. In fiscal year 1974, Kennedy Space Center will be processing the launch vehicles and spacecraft for the two Skylab 56-day revisit missions as well as integrating the astronaut rescue vehicle. Concur- rently, the Center will continue maintaining backup Skylab workshop processing capability during the first several months of the fiscal year. Saturn IB launch capability will be maintained through completion of the Apollo Soyuz Test Project in mid-1975. Skylab launch capabili- ties initially involve Launch Complex 39, pads A and B, together with direct launch related supporting facilities and ground systems. As the Skylab mission progresses, however, facilities and ground support systems no longer needed will be downmoded. Mr. FREY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question? What are you talking about, in terms of which facilities? Mr. GoRMAN. In the latter part of this fiscal year there will be a total reduction in people at KSC on the order of 5,000. Mr. FREY. The latter part of this fiscal year? Mr. GoRMAN. By the end of fiscal year 1974. Mr. FREY. Before June? Mr. GoRMAN. Yes, sir. By the end of June 1974. Mr. FREY. Where are we now? About 14,250 personnel? Mr. GoRMAN. Approximately. Mr. FREY. That is contingent on nothing happening such as an additional Skylab? 131 Mr. GoRMAN. The figures I quoted are based on the currently approved program. Mr. FREY. How much in essence would it differ if we had, say, a Skylab B? Mr. GoRMAN. In fiscal 1974 I don’t think it would make too much difference, sir. The potential impact of that would be later. Mr. FREY. How many people would you be talking about? Mr. GoRMAN. With respect to a second Skylab? Mr. FREY. Yes. Mr. GORMAN. We would have to come pretty close to where we are today, I think, for that kind of activity, which is around 14,000 people at KSC. Mr. FREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. GoRMAN. During the period after Skylab, the Center will maintain and preserve those facilities and systems needed for the Apollo Soyuz Test Project. The Kennedy Space Center will perform the normal integration, test and checkout of the Apollo Soyuz Test Project prime vehicle, with its special docking module and system for connecting to the Soviet spacecraft. The vehicle integrated for a possible Skylab rescue mission will serve as the backup vehicle for the mid-1975 Apollo Soyuz Test Project mission. This vehicle will be maintained at a readiness level that will permit bringing it into launch-ready condition in minimum time. Kennedy Space Center was selected as the initial launch and landing site for the Space Shuttle. This will require planning and construction of a runway and supporting facilities. Planning has already started and in fiscal year 1974 these efforts will increase greatly. The Center will continue to sustain and use its specialized capability for launching unmanned payloads. The Kennedy Space Center plans to reduce 100 civil service positions by the end of fiscal year 1974. This reduction is part of the general Agency reduction in civil service personnel. That completes my testimony regarding the civil service activities at the Manned Space Flight Centers. In closing, I will make a few remarks regarding the overall budget request. This chart (MR 73–5466) shows our total fiscal year 1974 dollar requirements to be $332.5 million. $239.5 million is for personnel compensation and related costs of our civil service work force. $6.8 million is for civil service travel, which includes the cost of transpor- tation, per diem, and related expenses required to direct, coordinate, and manage our widespread program activities. $86.2 million is for in- stallation services, which includes the activities I described previously. The next chart (MB 73–5306) shows that to perform Manned Space Flight's activities in fiscal year 1974, the civil service strength will be 10,525. This represents a continuing reduction from previous years. 132 MANNED SPACE FLIGHT RESEARCH AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS BY FUNCTION FY 1974 BUDGET ESTIMATES (; MILLIONS FY 1972 FY 1973 FY 1974 PERSONNEL & RELATED 247.4 244.2 239.5 TRAVEL 6.9 7.0 6.8 INST ALLATION SERVICES 98.3 85.5 86.2 MANNED SPACE FLIGHT NASA HQ MR73–5466 2–23–73 RESEARCH AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT NUMBER OF PERMANENT POSITION FY 1974 BUDGET ESTIMATES S FY 1972 FY 1973 || FY 1974 TOTAL PERMANENT POSITIONS 11,625 || 11,350 || 10,525 KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 2,467 2,409 || 2,309 JOHNSON SPACE CENTER 3,817 3,727 3,652 MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTERI 5,341 5,214 || 4,564 NASA HQ MB73-5306 2-12–73 133 R & PM FY 1974 BUDGET MSF AUTHORIZED CEILINGS (CIVIL SERVICE) 15,000 12,000 0 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 FISCAL YEARS NASA HQ MR73–5468 2–23–73 You will note on this chart (MR 73–5468) that there has been a reduction of 4,072 civil service positions at the Manned Space Flight Centers since our peak of fiscal year 1966. The planned reduction of 825 positions in fiscal year 1974 will have to be achieved by further use of reduction-in-force procedures. This chart (MR 73–5469) reflects the strong technical orientation of our civil service personnel, which has resulted in a skill composition where 52 percent of the work force are scientists and engineers, 17 per- cent are technicians, 16 percent are professional administrative, and 15 percent are clerical. I might say here that in spite of the reductions I referred to on the previous chart we have been able to retain, and in Some cases increase, our technical strength at all of the Centers. Most of our reductions have been made in the overhead and administrative area. This summarizes our budget request, and I would like to con- clude the research and program management explanation with this observation. The Manned Space Flight Centers have met the steady decline in their personnel strengths by consolidating and simplifying their organization, and have reduced the cost of operations even though confronted with additional payraise costs. Reductions reflect downward adjustments as major programs are completed, and the new program activity does not require the available manpower. 134 MANNED SPACE FLIGHT 000UPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION FISCAL YEAR 1974 SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS 52% PROFESSIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE 16% TECHNICANS 17% CLERICAL 15% NASA HQ MR73–5469 2–23–73 Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee for your attention to the Research and Program Management budget presentation. Now, I would like to move to the second budget request. Mr. Fuqua. Since we are running short of time, could we insert the second part into the record as it is? Mr. GoRMAN. Yes, sir. Mr. Fuqua. If there are any summary remarks you would like to make about it, certainly you may. I know we will have questions about all of it. We will mark it part of the record at this point. [The balance of Harry H. Gorman's statement reads as follows: DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND MISSION OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT This part of my statement contains the Development, Test, and Mission Operations portion of the Manned Space Flight Research and Development Budget for Fiscal Year 1974. We are requesting $220 million to support this effort at the three Manned Space Flight Centers—Johnson Space Center, Marshall Space Flight Center, and Kennedy Space Center, and at the four offsite facilities, White Sands Test Facility, Mississippi Test Facility, Slidell Computer Complex, and the Michoud Assembly Facility. This request of $220 million is a reduction of 25 percent from fiscal year 1973. 135 As I explained in my opening remarks, we looked to industry to balance and supplement the Civil Service technical disciplines and to provide unique skills and know-how to operate and maintain the research, development, and test facilities located at the manned Centers. The flexibility inherent in this capability to ongoing as well as future programs permits the continuing use of the large and extensive facilities built for the Apollo program. By selectively bringing in con- tractor support, we have been able to retain maximum flexibility in shifting work assignments and priorities to accommodate changes and unanticipated problems as the programs proceed. Over the past decade, industry know-how and expertise has been used extensively in support of highly technical operations such as those in Mission Control Center at the Johnson Center, the Launch Complex at Rennedy and the Structural and Dynamic Test facilities at the Mar- shall Center. In fiscal year 1974, this funding will provide the con- tractor support portion of our in-house capability which is necessary for the accomplishment of the present Skylab program and Apollo Soyuz Test Project; for the spacecraft and ground support equipment and launch vehicle engineering required for these projects and; for the design, development, and subsystem testing activities associated with the Space Shuttle and for predefinition of future programs. The effort covers a wide spectrum of technical, engineering, scientific, and medical disciplines supporting not only Manned Space Flight pro- grams, but also activities such as unmanned launches, Earth obser- vations, and continuing effort in lunar science. The work covered by the contracts is generally competed every 3 to 5 years. We have had very keen competitive interest in all areas and are satisfied that competition has been a very positive factor in getting appropriate talent at reasonal costs. DEVELOPMENT, TEST & MISSION OPERATIONS MANNED SPACE FLIGHT REQUIREMENTS ($ MILLIONS) FY 1973 FY 1974 RESEARCH AND TEST OPERATIONS 80.2 49.7 CREW AND FLIGHT OPERATIONS 74.9 61.7 OPERATIONS SUPPORT - 68.6 58.4 LAUNCH SUPPORT OPERATIONS 70.3 50.4 TOTAL 294.0 220.2 NASA HO MD73–5400 2–20–73 136 This request of $220 million, which is divided into four project categories, reflects the overall 25 percent reduction from fiscal year 1973, which I mentioned earlier. The reduction is primarily due to the completion and delivery of Skylab flight hardware to the Kennedy Center in Fiscal Year 1973 and the completion, of the second 56-day mission in mid Fiscal Year 1974. (MD 73–5400) By the end of Fiscal Year 1974, it is planned to reduce the contractor support in the order of 2,700 positions, the equivalent of 1,500 man-years. The budget before you provides considerable detail; therefore, the remainder of my statement will describe some of the facilities and activities requiring contractor support at each of the three Centers. The support is provided and managed by industry. GEORGE C. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER In Fiscal Year 1974, the Development, Test, and Mission Opera- tions budget request for the Marshall Center is $37 million, which is a 47 percent reduction from fiscal year, 1973. The contractor support for engineering and technical services and operation of facilities required at the Center will be performed by 12 companies. - Engineering services in the areas of electronics, electrical systems, and guidance and control is provided by contract with the Sperry Rand Corp. This activity is directed to conducting mathematical and engineering analysis of flight hardware. This includes stress, vibration, thermal, and reliability analysis. Engineering services are provided in specialties such as laser techniques, electronics systems, optical components, advanced guidance, tracking and communications, microelectronics failure analysis, and large-scale integrated circuits. Engineering services and research and development in materials, propulsion, and thermodynamics are provided under contract with the Teledyne Brown Engineering Co. They operate and maintain the component and systems test facilities including electronic, electrical, and electro-mechanical equipment used in test operations. The con- tractor provides technical operation and maintenance of high-pressure gas and propellant facilities and equipment; and design and structural development of special projects such as solar arrays, radiators, de- ployable meteoroid protection, high performance cryogenic protec- tion, and heat shielding. Other areas of engineering services are structures, fluid mechanics, vibration, and acoustics. Engineering and technical services in the areas of quality, reliability, and safety are under contract with the Federal Electric Co. The contractor performs a comprehensive space hardware test and check- out function at Marshall. The company designs and develops test and checkout equipment, develops procedures, and conducts test and checkout operations. The contractor also maintains test and check- out documentation, analyses test and checkout results, and develops techniques and concepts for current and future use. 137 Engineering services in the area of aerodynamics; space environ- ment and space trajectory are provided under contract with the Northrop Corp. The Contractor investigates and evaluates aerospace natural environment, analyzes vehicle design considering aerody- namics, thermodynamics, fluid dynamics and control, and analyzes mission and orbital mechanics for assigned programs. The company also establishes communication and tracking requirements, final pre-flight trajectories and range safety, and dynamic stability through booster and spacecraft structural dynamic analysis. In the operational area, Northrop operates and maintains the aerodynamics facilities and the atmospheric research facility. (MD 73–5410) - _º ---. º- tº ASSEMBLY FACILITY- - - Plantwide services at the Michoud Assembly Facility located at New Orleans, are provided under contract with the Mason-Rust Co. These services are those associated with a large industrial plant and range from general housekeeping to maintenance of complex plant and operational equipment. In addition to providing services to NASA prime contractors located at the plant, Mason-Rust also provides services to other tenants including the U.S. Department of Agriculture and Navy. (MD 72–5448) Operation and maintenance of the third generation computer system at the Slidell complex is under contract with the Computing and Software Co. This includes the preparation of computer programs and optimum design layout of the complex. Also included is the requisitioning, stocking, and issuance of administrative supplies, spare parts, and subassemblies. The Slidell computers provide services for the contractors and agencies located at the Michoud Assembly Facility and the Mississippi Test Facility at Bay St. Louis, Miss. In addition, the National Weather Service located at the Slidell complex is supported by this contractor. The installation services at the Mississippi Test Facility are provided under contract with Global Associates. In addition to the support furnished the NASA program activity at the Mississippi Test Facility, Global provides services to other Government agencies doing environ- mental research there. Laboratory and technical services at the Mississippi Test Facility are provided under contract with the General Electric Company. These services include standards and calibration, material analysis, chemical and biological analysis, meteorological services and instrumentation evaluation, for NASA and other Government agencies at the facility. LYNDoN B. Johnson SPACE CENTER In fiscal year 1974, the Development, Test and Mission Operations budget request for the Johnson Center is $112.2 million, which is an 11% reduction from fiscal year 1973. 139 |AERIAL VIEW-MT MISSISSIPPI TEST FACILITY - - º || || --- º - º - - - - - º -º- - º º º - (MD 74–5411) The contractor support for engineering and technical services and operation of facilities required at the Center will be performed by 16 companies. Operation and maintenance of the Mission Control Center is carried out under contract with the Philco-Ford Corporation. The company also provides developmental effort for the reconfiguration of the Mission Control Center on a mission-by-mission basis to support training simulations and flight missions. They provide post-flight mission analysis of system performance which results in the develop- ment of modified procedures and system improvements. These efforts require the contractor to perform theoretical analyses, investigations, studies, and experiments leading to design and development in space flight mission control. Operational support of laboratories and test facilities is carried out under contract with the Northrop Corporation. Major areas include preparation of test facilities and systems for laboratory testing, preparation of test articles and test set-ups, maintaining facilities in operational mode, and preparation of test planning and test pro- cedures. Test areas supported include large vacuum chamber testing, vibration and acoustic testing, thermochemical tests, structural and dynamics testing, experimental mechanics, facility logistical support, crew performance training, fluid chemistry, and toxicology support. The computer operations and maintenance, general electronic, instrumentation, and engineering services are carried out under con- tract with the Lockheed Electronics Company. The contractor operates 140 ſº computational facilities, provides operational support to the ata Reduction Complex, performs systems technology and scien- tific/engineering applications support. The general electronic, instru- mentation, and engineering services performed by the contractor are associated with electronic, electro-mechanical, experimental and developmental space flight hardware, optical instrumentation/com- munications systems and subsystems. In addition, Lockheed provides engineering and instrumentation services to support tests in the infor- mation systems and guidance and control laboratories and facilities, and in the areas of space physics, lunar and earth sciences, mapping sciences, and earth observation operations. Operational maintenance and modification of the simulator com- plex is provided by contract with the Singer Corporation. This in- cludes software development, programing, component redesign, mock-up design and testing, routine and reparative maintenance, and installation of modification kits into the existing SIMCOM which consists of 14 major simulator systems and extensive associated subsystems and equipment. The design, development and implementation of the computer complex in the Mission Control Center is carried out by the IBM Corporation. This includes system studies, mission and mathematical analysis, programing, equipment engineering, equipment and com- puter program testing, maintenance, and documentation. The con- tractor is required to provide mission and simulation computer program packages for each mission. (MD 73–5413) JSC – WHITE SANDS TEST FACILITY 141 The White Sands test facility in New Mexico, a component facility of the Johnson Space Center, will be used in fiscal year 1974 for testing shuttle materials, components, and propulsion systems. Dyna- lectron operates and maintains the temperature and atmospheric en- vironmental chambers and other complex laboratory test equipment. In support of the manned flights, the Department of Defense pro- vides for world-wide recovery capability and is reimbursed for each mission supported, based on the number of ships, aircraft, com- munications facilities and training personnel deployed, and on the number of days these resources are used. JoHN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER In fiscal year 1974, the development, test and mission operations budget request for the Kennedy Center is $71.0 million, which is a 28 percent reduction from fiscal year 1973. The contractor support for engineering and technical services and operation of facilities required at the Center will be performed by six companies. Operation and maintenance of launch complex facilities and re- lated equipment such as crawler-transporters, the converter com- pressor facility, mobile service structure, and the altitude chambers for pre-launch checkout of spacecraft is provided by the Bendix Company. Additionally, launch related services such as propellant handling, life support, technical shops, chemical cleaning and decon- tamination and systems safety are provided. Operation and maintenance of mechanical ground support systems, including the umbilical tower, propellant loading, ground power, and various pneumatic systems, is provided under contract with the Boeing Company. They also provide selected services in support of mission activities. Specific examples include such efforts as opera- tion of critical power systems; post-launch refurbishment; structural painting, cleaning and scaffolding; operation of clean rooms; and provision of logistics services. Operating and maintaining the central nerve system of Kennedy Space Center is provided under contract with the Federal Electric Company. This comprises the telemetry data core, basic computer facility, and the communications center. Federal Electric's tasks in- clude operation and maintenance of the launch-related environmental measuring equipment, electrical and mechanical measuring instru- ments and timing and distribution equipment. In connection with automatic data processing, Federal Electric validates data and computer operations, distributes data and operates retransmission equipment to transmit large volumes of data in real- time to other locations, including the Johnson Space Center and the Marshall Space Flight Center. In addition, Federal Electric carries out communications planning and special studies and analysis of existing and planned Center communications systems. The operation and maintenance of the acceptance checkout equipment is provided by the General Electric Company. The company also provides services and support for electrical and elec- tronics systems. 93—466 O—73—pt. 2—10 142 The operation and maintenance of the computers located in the Mobile Launcher and Launch Control Center is obtained under contract with the IBM Corporation. The company also provides systems engineering and is responsible for the operation and main- tenance of the digital events evaluators. Detailed engineering and drafting services are provided for by Pan American World Airways. Such services include preparing detail designs, performing field engineering and field liaison engineering, preparing the Center's specifications and standards, maintaining and updating operations and maintenance manuals and operating the Engineering Documentation Center. The Air Force Systems Command, Eastern Test Range, provides selected services to the Kennedy Center in support of both manned and unmanned missions. The technical range support provided includes down range telemetry, communications, optical tracking, command control and precision timing. Launch support services include operation and maintenance and propellant handling for the unmanned launch complex. Meteorological services, photographic services, and barge services are also provided. - Mr. Chairman, I have a listing of the support contractors for each of the Manned Space Centers indicating the type of work they perform which, with your permission, I will submit for the record. (MD 73– 5406, MD 73–5407, MD 73–5408) DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND MISSION OPERATIONS INDUSTRIAL CONTRACTs KENNEDY SPACE CENTER CONTRACTOR HOME OFFICE ACTIVITY BENDIX CORP. SOUTHFIELD, MICH! GAN LAUNCH operaTIONS SERVICES BOEl NG CO. - SEATTLE, WASHINGTON INSTALLATION SUPPORT & GSC OPERATIONS FEDERAL ELECTRIC CORP. PARAMUS, NEW JERSEY INSTRUMENTATION & comMUNICATIONS GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. NEW YORK, NEW York CHECKOUT EOUIPMENT operations |BM coºp. * - ARMONK. NEW YORK CHECKOUT COMPUTER OPERATIONS PAN AMERICAN AIRWAYS NEW YORK, NEW YORK DESIGN ENGINEERİNG NASA HO MD73-5406 2–20–73 143 DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND MISSION OPERATIONS CONTRACTOR COMPUTER SC} ENCES CORP. COMPUTING & SOFTWARE, INC. FEDERAL ELECTRIC CORP. GENERAL electric CO. GLOBAL ASSOCIATES HAYES INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. MASON-RUST (J/V) NORTHROP CORP. PLANN: NG RESEARCH CORP. SPERRY-RAND CORP. TELEDYNE BROWN ENGINEER!NG HOME OFFICE LOS ANGELES, CAL FORNIA LOS ANGELES, CAL FORNIA PARAMUS, NEW JERSEY NEW YORK, NEW YORK OAKLAND, CAL FORNIA BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA OAK RIDGE, TENNESSEE LEXINGTON, KENTUCKY LOS ANGELES, CAL FORNIA LOS ANGELES, CAL FORNIA NEW YORK, NEW YORK LOS ANGELES, CALI FORNIA INDUSTRIAL CONTRACTS MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER ACTIVITY COMPUTER OPERATIONS (HUNTSVILLE) COMPUTER OPERATIONS (SLIDELL) RELIABILITY ENGINEERING TECHNICAL SERVICES MTF SITE OPERATION & MAINTENANCE MANUFACTURING ENG. 8, TELECOMMUN iCATIONS TECHNICAL Facilities OPERATHON MAF SITE OPERATION AERONAUTICAL ENGINEERING SYSTEMS INTEGRATION ELECTRONICS SYSTEMS ENGINEERİNG TECHNICAL FAC1LITY OPERATION NASA HO W. C. 73-5407 2–20–73 DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND MISSION OPERATIONS CONTRACTOR BOEl NG CO. e DYNAELECTRON CORP. IBM CORP. KELSEY SEYBOLD KENTRON HAWAII, LTD, Łl NEAR STANDARDS LOCKHEED ELECTRONICS CO. NORTHROP CORP. PHILCO-FORD CORP. SINGER (LINK) SPERRY-RAND CORP. TAFT BROADCASTING CO. TECHNICOLOR. INC. TECHNOLOGY INC. WACKENHUT SERVICES, INC. WESTHE}MER REGGING 8, HEAVY HAULING CO. INDUSTRIAL CONTRACTS JOHNSON SPACE CENTER HOME OFFICE SEATTLE, WASHINGTON D!STRICT OF COLUMBIA ARMONK, NEW YORK HOUSTON, TEXAS HONOLULU, HAWAII HOUSTON, TEXAS BURBANK, CAL FORNIA LOS ANGELES, CALIF. DEARBORN, MICHIGAN NEW YORK, NEW YORK NEW YORK, NEW YORK HOUSTON, TEXAS HOLLYWOOD, CAL FORNIA DAYTON, OHIO CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA HOUSTON, TEXAS ACTIVITY RELIABILITY, OUALITY & SAFETY WSTF OPERATIONS AND AIRCRAFT SERVICING MISSION CONTROL COMPUTING MEDICAL RESEARCH OPERATIONS OPER. & MAINT. OF TECH. FAC) LITIES ELECTRONIC COMPONENT FABRICATION ELECTRONIC INSTRUMENTATION & COMPUTERS LABORATORY & TEST FACT LITY OPERATIONS CONTROL CENTER ENGINEERİNG SIMULATOR OPERATION COMPUTER PROGRAMMING TEST MONITORING HIGH-PRECISION PHOTOGRAPHY L! FE SCIENCE LABORATORIES OPERATIONS SAFETY ENGINEERING TEST EOUIPMENT SERVICES ... --> → 144 In summary (MD 73–5400) this portion of the budget provides for participation by industry in support of the in-house management of the Manned Space Flight program and a number of other important activities being carried out at the Manned Space Flight installations. In this way, we are able to fulfill the responsibilities of the Government with a stable and much smaller civil service work force than would otherwise be the case. DEVELOPMENT, TEST & MISSION OPERATIO D SPACE FLIGHT REQUIREMENTS ($ MILLIONS) NS FY 1973 FY 1974 RESEARCH AND TEST OPERATIONS 80.2 49.7 CREW AND FLIGHT OPERATIONS 74.9 61.7 OPERATIONS SUPPORT 68.6 58.4 LAUNCH SUPPORT OPERATIONS 70.3 50.4 TOTAL 2940 202 NASA HO MD73-5400 2–20–73 Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to present this statement. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. GORMAN. We do depend very heavily on the industry support we get in the area of development, test operations, and mission opera- tions. This is particularly true in the operational activity at the Johnson Space Center and at Kennedy. - The technical and engineering support that we get from industry at Marshall is an important part of that in-house capability, although we do not have a great deal of actual operational activity there. Overall, I would like to say again that this support is very important. Industry has been extremely responsive to our needs over the past years. They have also been undergoing substantial reductions and have done a great job in retaining their quality and competence in spite of those reductions. Mr. FUQUA. I see that you have a reduction of 47 percent at Marshall, 11 at Johnson, a 28 percent reduction in the budget re- quest at Kennedy. Also, you mentioned earlier the reduction in civil employees. Do have a figure on contractor employees? Mr. GoRMAN. The overall? Mr. Fuqua. Yes, sir. 145 Mr. C ORMAN. You mean, Mr. Chairman, as part of this work force here? . Mr. FUQUA. Well, the total at three centers. Mr. GoRMAN. Yes, sir; I do have that. It is a little complicated. I can go through it for you. Mr. FUQUA. Why don’t you just supply that for the record? Mr. GoRMAN. I will be glad to, Mr. Chairman. [Information requested for the record follows: The following summarizes the NASA contractor employment at manned space flight centers Fiscal year Difference Fiscal year Difference Fiscal year 1972 1973 1974 Kennedy (KSC)------------- 11,060 —395 10,665 — 4,977 5,688 On-site----------------- 10,885 —397 10,488 —4,977 5, 511 Off-site *--------------- 175 —H·2 177 -------- 177 Johnson (JSC) -------------- 7,577 – 1, 148 6,429 —979 5,450 On-site----------------- 7,323 — 1,119 6,204 — 1,084 5, 120 Off-site *--------------- 254 — 29 225 + 105 330 Marshall (MSFC) - - - - - - - - - - - 7,772 — 84.5 6,927 – 2,029 4,898 On-site----------------- 5, 120 — 850 4,270 — 1,088 3, 182 Off-site *--------------- 2,652 +5 2,657 –941 1,716 Total---------------- 26,409 – 2,388 24,021 —7,985 16,036 1 Western test range. . & & 2 White Sands test facility and the Earth Resources Laboratory at the Mississippi test facility. 3 Mississippi test facility, Michoud assembly facility, and the Slidell computer complex. Mr. Fuqua. Reviewing the testimony of last year, you anticipated, or NASA anticipated, with approval of the Space Shuttle this would create a stable employment situation and halt the downward reduc- tions that had been going on for the last 3 or 4 years. What is your reassessment of that, in light of the further planned reductions in the fiscal year 1974 budget? Mr. GoRMAN. Mr. Chairman, the current scope of the Shuttle pro- gram, as it has evolved in the past year, has required less in-house activity than we anticipated last year. The buildup of the Shuttle contractor and subcontractor manpower will be at a slower rate than we anticipated when the fiscal year 1973 budget was submitted last year. Even so, the overall downward trend has been attenuated and we hope to stabilize the employment situation is fiscal year 1974. Mr. FUQUA. Was this because of more economies or efficiencies, or was it just a law laid down by OMB that you must reduce even further than you anticipated last year? Mr. GoRMAN. Since last year, we have selected the prime contractor for the Orbiter, we have the prime contractor for the engine. The work of the prime contractor has now been defined. The prime con- tractor's relationships with the in-house activity and the way the whole Shuttle activity will be integrated is better understood. I believe we have a fairly accurate projection of the requirements. 146 Mr. FUQUA. As you have further proceeded into the program you have been better able to define your manpower needs than you could last year when it was more on the drawing board? Mr. GoRMAN. Yes, sir. Mr. Fuqua. The reductions in these positions at the various Cen- ters, will that be by attrition, or by RIF? Mr. GoRMAN. We hope that the reductions at the Johnson and Kennedy Centers can be essentially done by attrition. On the other hand, we have to retain a good skill mix, and it is not always the case that attrition gives us the best skill mix. As a result, at both of those Centers we may have to do a limited reduction in force in order to maintain the necessary skill balance. At Marshall, the attrition will not take care of the reduction, which is 650 people in fiscal year 1974. We will have to have a reduction in force at Marshall. Mr. Fuqua. Last year, when Dr. Kraft, Director of the Johnson Space Center, was before the committee, he mentioned the fact that they had not been able to hire any new graduate engineers in the past year. I assume that is true at Marshall and at Kennedy. Mr. GoRMAN. Yes, sir. Mr. FUQUA. So we find ourselves with our talent growing older each year, with no really new ideas being pumped into the lifestream of our capabilities. Is that still happening? Mr. GoRMAN. I believe that is true, sir. I believe we are getting a year older every year at our three Centers. Mr. Fuqua. This is not a very good situation. Mr. GoRMAN. It is not. Mr. Fuqua. Mr. Bergland. Mr. BERGLAND. How will the reduction affect the headquarters at Washington? Mr. Fuqua. We will get into that in another briefing later, for the whole NASA Headquarters. Mr. BERGLAND. Fine. I withdraw the question, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. l Mr. FUQUA. It is perfectly all right to ask. But we will cover that ater. Mr. BERGLAND.. I will wait. Mr. Fuqua. Mr. Gunter. Mr. GUNTER. When you speak of reduction in force, you are speaking primarily about across-the-board reductions, or are you talking about civil service people, or about contractor employees and civil service? Mr. GoRMAN. We have a term called reduction in force, RIF. We usually refer to civil service when applying that term. But the overall reduction at all three Centers will not only include civil service but will include support contractors, as well, in fiscal 1974. Mr. GUNTER. A similar percentage reduction? Or do you find the contractor employees being reduced in greater percentage? Mr. GoRMAN. The contractor employees will be reduced by a greater percentage in fiscal year 1974. Mr. GUNTER. I am sure had I had the opportunity to serve on this committee previously I would have known some of these answers, and I apologize for asking. 147 What is the reason briefly for the disparity between the percentages in cuts in personnel in comparison, say the Johnson Center, Kennedy Center, and Marshall? Mr. GoRMAN. The reductions at Marshall were greater because of the programs that had been instituted at Marshall and the effect of the fiscal year 1974 budget on those programs. We had, for example, Marshall designated as the communication lead center just last year. That activity of Marshall was discontinued. The High-Energy Astronomy Observatory, which is a Space Sciences project, about which Dr. Naugle will talk to the other subcommittee, has been suspended. Marshall has had a major role in that program, and it has been stretched out and is at a much lower level in fiscal year 1974 than anticipated. - In addition to that there were other activities that were not as great as they anticipated earlier. There has been no substantial reduction, I should add, in the scope of the activities of the Kennedy Space Center or the Johnson Space Center. The reductions there are part of the general Agency reductions in civil service. Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Gorman, would the buildup of the Apollo Soyuz test project necessitate an increase in personnel in, say, fiscal year 1975? Mr. GoRMAN. Yes, it will, sir. Mr. Fuqua. I am speaking of probably the three Centers, par- ticularly perhaps Johnson and Kennedy. Mr. GoRMAN. The buildup at Johnson and Marshall will precede that at Kennedy. There will be a sustaining level at both the Marshall and the Johnson Centers. The activity at Kennedy will increase, we anticipate at least, in fiscal year 1975, by about 1,500 or 2,000 people. Mr. FUQUA. Both contractor and civil service? - Mr. GoRMAN. The buildup will be in contractor personnel. Mr. FUQUA. Of the $90.4 million requested for KSC how much of that is for the Western Test Range? Mr. GoRMAN. We have about 70 people in residence there. The budget provided about $1.5 million for that effort in fiscal year 1974. Mr. FUQUA. The remainder would be at the KSC2 Mr. GoRMAN. Yes. - Mr. Fuqua. At Johnson how much of that is for the White Sands Test Facility? Mr. GoRMAN. On the order of $3 million in fiscal year 1974. Mr. FUQUA. Do you have any long-term plans for the continued use of the White Sands installation? Mr. GoRMAN. Yes, sir. The White Sands location has been desig- nated as the test site for the orbital maneuvering system for the Shuttle, which is the relatively small propulsion system for maneuver- ing the orbiter in space, and the reaction control system. Mr. FUQUA. According to last year's data you have increased the number of acres that you have at White Sands about 12,000 acres. What was the reason for this expansion? - Mr. GoRMAN. There is no change from last year's data. The budget narrative should read that NASA has the use of 54,080 acres under a use agreement with the Army. Mr. Fuqua. Fine. [Information requested for the record follows:] 148 The NASA Fiscal Year 1973 budget request indicated that the Johnson Space Center White Sands Test Facility occupied 54,080 acres at the U.S. Army’s White Sands Missile Range. The NASA Fiscal Year 1974 budget request showed the occupation of 66,861 acres at White Sands Test Facility. This figure of 66,861 acres was an error; the correct figure is 54,080 acres, the same as in Fiscal Year 1973. There has been no expansion at the White Sands Test Facility. Mr. Fu QUA. How many people do you have being used at Ellington Air Force Base that would be assigned to the Johnson Center? Mr. GoRMAN. The majority of the people at Ellington Air Force Base are support contractor people who provide maintenance and operation of the aircraft activity there. The employment is on the order of 300 or 350 people. Mr. Fuqua. In the fiscal year 1974 budget now under considera- tion the overtime pay remains about the same as it was in 1973. It looks like with a reduction in force that would decline. Can you clarify that for us? Mr. GoRMAN. At all of our Centers, we are maintaining a signifi- cant amount of necessary overtime. And I think Mr. Schneider can address the reasons better than I can. Mr. ScHNEIDER. As far as fiscal 1974 is concerned, most of that overtime is associated with running the Skylab flights, which are on a 24-hour-a-day operation, which continue through the missions. Mr. GoRMAN. All three Centers are involved. Mr. Fuqua. Do you know how your reduction in personnel com- pares to other Federal Programs, other agencies? Mr. GoRMAN. No, I do not have the precise information with me today. However, sir, that there have been reductions in other Govern- ment agencies. Mr. FUQUA. I think that is all I have. We may have further questions to submit to you for the record. Mr. GoRMAN. We will be happy to provide the answers, sir. Mr. FUQUA. The subcommittee will stand adjourned until tomorrow morning at 10 o’clock, when Mr. Myers and Mr. Lord will discuss the Space Shuttle. The subcommittee stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, March 1, 1973.] 1974 NASA AUTHORIZATION THURSDAY, MARCH 1, 1973 Hous E OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICs, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in room 2325, Rayburn House Office Building, the Hon. Don Fuqua (chairman of the subcommittee), presiding. Mr. Fuqua. The subcommittee will be in order. We continue the authorization hearings this morning with, Dale Myers, Associate Administrator of Manned Space Flight, accompanied by Mr. Charles Donlan, the acting director of the shuttle program; ºr. Douglas Lord, the Director of the Sortie Lab Task Force in Dale, with that, will you proceed? Mr. MYERs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. STATEMENT OF DALE D. MYERS, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, NASA, ACCOMPANIED BY DOUGLAS R. LORD, DIRECTOR, SORTIE LAB TASK FORCE, NASA, AND CHARLES J. D0NLAN, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR MANNED SPACE FLIGHT (TECHNICAL) AND ACTING DIRECTOR, SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM Mr. MYERS. It is almost 1 year ago that I described to this sub- committee the Space Shuttle system the President proposed and the Congress approved. The President stated that, and I quote, It will go a long way towards delivering the rich benefits of practical space utilization and the valuable spinoffs from space efforts . . . because the Space Shuttle will give us routine access to space by sharply reducing costs in dollars and preparation time. Today’s boosters, manned spacecraft, and automated satellites are not reusable and, once expended, a replacement booster and the Spacecraft must be manufactured at a great expense [MH73–5111]. The Space Shuttle will replace all but the smallest U.S. space vehicles. It will significantly reduce the cost of space operations because it will combine the advantages of airplanes and spacecraft, and will fly repeatedly to space and back to Earth. The NASA contracted design studies by American industry and the economic analysis by Mathematica Inc. were probably the most thorough analyses ever performed on any proposed scientific pro- gram. Since these analyses indicated that payload benefits were the (149) 150 SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM NASA HQ MH73-5 111 1-23-73 major area for cost savings, NASA has continued to conduct payload studies in the areas of payload reuse and refurbishment costs, and design of payload subsystems. The additional benefits identified in LAUNCH WEHICLE REPLACEMENT FEET | 300 N. A C 200H | 100 ſ A 0 | º . #AA SCOUT THOR ATLAS TITAN º SAT. SAT. III I W NASA HQ MH73-5465 2-26-73 151 COMPARATIVE LAUNCH C0STS 60ſ & 50H 3 SATURN IB £ 40H = - PAYLDADS DUE EAST £ T. AT 100 MILES ALTITUDE 3 : 30H ; : TITAN III C - tº fº s G 20 H Cº. - ATLAS CENTAUR & º ºs º º tº ſº tº ſº tº gº tº ſº tº gº tº gº gº ºn tº º º ſº gº tº º ºs ºs 1. Sú SPACE SHUTTLE THOR DELTA ($10.5M) —1 –1– 1 1 1– | 20 30 40 50 60 70 CAPACITY - THOUSAND'S OF POUNDS NA3A HO MºH72-69.91 REV. 2-2-73 these payload subsystems studies provide increased confidence that the shuttle will bring about the savings predicted in the economic analysis. Another benefit to be derived from the shuttle is its capability to replace most of the present nonreusable launch vehicles (MH73– 5465). Rather than maintain a variety of different nonreusable boosters for specific weight ranges, the shuttle provides the flexibility to place in orbit a range of payload weights. My next chart (MH72–6991) is a comparison of launch costs of some current nonreusable launch vehicles and the Space Shuttle. Mr. FUQUA. Dale, how much would you save by not having to maintain this stable of other vehicles for launch? Mr. MYERS. Mr. Chairman, the economics studies we did included the maintenance costs of those many different configurations of launch vehicles we have in the country. Mr. Fuqua. Could you provide for the record a breakout of that? Mr. MYERs. Yes, sir. We will do that. Mr. Fuqua. Thank you. [Information requested for the record follows: Based on the economic studies that have been made comparing the Shuttle with the current expendable launch system, e.g., the 581 shuttle flight mission model, the average annual recurring cost of the current expendable system for performing the missions totals about $950 million, compared with $670 million for shuttle operations. This analysis results in a cost savings of $280 million per year in favor of the shuttle launch system. Mr. MYERs. As you can see the shuttle cost per flight is constant. I think that is a fundamental point about the shuttle. It can orbit payloads, of course, anywhere in the range from very little up to greater than capability of the Saturn 1B. 152 The estimated cost per flight for the shuttle is $10,500,000 in 1971 dollars while a Saturn 1B launch is considerably more expensive. In addition, because of the multiple payload carrying capability of the shuttle, the shuttle costs will be apportioned to the user in accord- ance with the particular service provided to each user on the mission. The Mathematica study clearly showed the economic advantages of the shuttle system we have proceeded to develop. My next chart (MH73–5463) compares the selected shuttle system with two of the primary alternate systems which we evaluated in the economic analysis last year. The selected configuration provided the best balance between development cost and cost per flight to yield the greatest return for the investment. SPACE SHUTTLE COST COMPARISON (1971 DOLLARS) #1 (3 FULLY REUSABLE 10 I- 9 – }* & EXTERNAL LIQUID 8 & HYDROGEN TANKS 7 ºm- wºn $ 5.150 BILLION ~ PARALLEL SOLID BILLIONS Ps - y ROCKET BOOSTER SELECTED 4 H. CONFIGURATION 3 -* $ 10.5 MILLION 2 — 1 }* 0 l l | | | | 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 C0ST PER FLIGHT IN MILLIONS NASA HQ MH73-5463 2-26-73 The cost of payloads and their characteristics have by far the great- est influence on the overall cost of the space transportation system. We have been forced to develop longer life satellites through design sophistication and redundancy. But satellites can be less expensive if resupply in orbit, maintenance, recovery, and reuse were practical (MH72–7106). That is exactly what the Shuttle will do. For less transportation cost, it will place, service, and retrieve, where profitable, automated satellites, and because it will do this with a reusable orbiter with a large cargo space, the satellites them- selves can be built for a lower price. This is where the shuttle's greatest economic benefit lies. The Space Shuttle concept for developing a new, low-cost transpor- tation system has been supported by both the legislative and executive branches of the Government. This position has won the endorsement of many scientific advisory groups and both Houses of Congress have given substantial support. 153 NASA HC MHzz-710s Il-27-72 The shuttle is not just a continuation of the manned space flight program as we have known it in the past. Manned space flight has matured to the point where we now know how to involve many users in the space transportation system so that the cost of space operations of all kinds can be reduced. In one typical mission model, 73 percent (MH72–7063) of the pay- loads planned for the shuttle are unmanned automated satellites. Twenty-seven percent will utilize the skills and services of attending scientists, engineers, and technicians. Millions of dollars will be saved by using satellite equipment over and over again, and by using low- cost standard components that can be replaced when they wear out. The shuttle will be utilized by many Government agencies and commercial interests. The Department of Defense will use the shuttle and provide and operate a west coast facility at Vandenberg Air Force Base. They have indicated that they plan to use the shuttle for essentially all their missions when it becomes operationally available. Present forecasts provided by the Air Force indicate a spacecraft flight rate of about 20 per year during the decade of the 1980's. My next chart (MH73–5461) summarizes the overall Space Shuttle development schedule. This chart identifies the development activities already underway on the Space Shuttle Main Engine and Orbiter. External tank and solid rocket booster development will be started this year. The overall development program has been structured to support the first horizontal flight of the orbiter in early 1977, and the first manned orbital flight in December of 1978, which will be from Kennedy. 154 MISSION MODEL [12 YEARS - 1979-1990) • AUTOMATED 73% • APPLICATIONS ............................ 29% * SCIENCE ........................................ 10% • MILITARY . 34% • MANNED 0R MAN-TENDED .................................. 27% * TOTAL “… 100% NASA H0 MH 72-7063 REW 2.21 - 73 SPACE SHUTTLE DEVELOPMENT SCHEDULE FY 13 74 | 75 | 76 | 77 | 78 79 80 || 81 CY | 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL A START MAIN ENGINE DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT & MANUFACTURING `s- : –J START ORBITER DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT & MANUFACTURING `s START DEVELOPMENT OF EXTERNAL |- ExtERNAL TANKDEVELOPMENT & MANUFACTURINGTS, TANK & SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER, SOLID ROCKET B00STER DEVELOPMENT & MANUFACTURING > FIRST HORIZONTAL 4 H0RIZONTAL FLIGHT TEST PROGRAM FLIGHT FLIGHT TESTS FIRST MANNED 0RBITAL FLIGHT WERTICAL FLIGHT TEST PROGRAM OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY NASA HQ MH73–546] . As required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and in accordance with guidelines established by the Council on Environ- mental Quality, a thorough analysis of the possible environmental effects of the Space. Shuttle was made in 1972, in conjunction with other Federal agencies having responsibility in this area. A detailed 155 report was filed with the Environmental Protection Agency and sub- mitted to Congress. In every case these detailed studies into the effects on the atmosphere, water, and noise by the Space Shuttle System showed that they are minimal and below allowable limits. Even though anticipated effects are below allowable limits, safeguards will be instituted to further minimize any potential environmental impact. Before I proceed to describe in detail the progress that has been made in the past year and our plans for the coming year on the Various shuttle projects, I would like to emphasize the benefits I feel the shuttle will bring to space operations. We are continuing to study the ways in which the shuttle can reduce the overall cost of space operations. Today on a national average, the cost of space operations is divided about 20 percent for launch costs and about 80 percent for payload costs. Thus, it is impor- tant to reduce the payload costs as well as the launch costs. The $10,500,000 cost per flight for the shuttle is an important step in reducing the transportation portion of space operations. In fact, the launch cost to individual users will be less than $10,500,000 because the shuttle will carry more than one payload on many of its flights. The reduction in the cost of payloads is even more promising than the launch cost reduction. For example, NASA and DOD have conducted studies with several space-experienced companies to determine the reduction in satellite costs where the shuttle is used for launch and retrieval. These detailed studies consistently show payload cost reduction of 40 to 50 percent compared to present-day payload costs. Now, these studies were for satellites. We will discuss later the Sortie Lab, where we believe cost reductions even greater than 40 to 50 percent are easily obtainable. While these studies focus primarily on the cost reductions possible with automated satellites, we see great possibilities for low-cost space operations in the sortie mode of the shuttle. In the sortie mode, the payload—Scientific, applications, defense, commercial—remains attached to the shuttle for the duration of the shuttle flight. This mode of operation can take advantage of men on board the shuttle; it can be automated; or it can be a combination of both, automated and manned. The payload equipment may be used over and over again, thus reducing costs. We can see how the Space Shuttle by influencing both the launch and payload costs will reduce significantly the overall costs of space operations. At your March 6 hearing, Mr. Philip E. Culbertson, Director of Mission and Payload Integration, will further review how the Space Shuttle will reduce the cost of space operations. I would now like to describe to you the system and hardware we are developing. (MH73–5421) Our basic shuttle system has not changed since the Agency commitment of March 1972. The configuration on the left of this chart identifies the system I described to you last year. The shuttle system shown on the right reflects our current baseline. The present configuration incorporates system design changes that have occurred in the past year. One of these which I can bring to your attention is a noticeable difference in the shape of the orbiter wing. This change will provide greater lift at landing and less aerodynamic drag. 156 SHUTTLE SYSTEMS DESIGN EVOLUTION sRB 13 FT. Dia-tiss-in- -130 FT-Lo-G E1.29 F.T. dia º --50 Ft-Low G x 144.3 FT-Lo- - SRB 11.8 FT. Dia-iiaz in.) ong ET-155.7 FT-Long 27 FT-dia. - -67 To give you a better understanding of the relative size of the shuttle orbiter, my next chart (MB72–5191) shows a comparison with exist- ing aircraft. As you can see, the length of the orbiter is comparable to the DC-9 jetliner, the smallest of the jet transports used by our major airlines 80 ºr AGENCY COMMITMENT MARCH 1972 NASA HQ MHZ3-5421 REv. 2-26-73 193-ft r 125 FT : , . - * - |E 78 FT CURRENT BASELINE FEBRUARY 1973 ORBITER COMPARISON WITH EXISTING AIRCRAFT SHUTTLE 707 ORBITER DC-9 WINGSPAN 142 FT (43.4 M) 78 FT (23.8M) 94.3 FT (28.7 Ml LENGTH 153 FT (46.5 M) 125.0 FT (38.1M) 119.3 FT (36.4M) DPER. W.T. EMPTY 135,000 LBS 150,000 LBS 57,210 LBS [61,236 kg) (68,040 KG) (26,000 KG) LANDING SPEED 140 KNOTS 175 KNOTS 112 KNOTS Nas, moº-ºº: REv. 2-8-73 157 I wanted to just describe very briefly how the shuttle worked. But since I did that in the hearings last week, let me only emphasize here the payload aspects of the system. We talked about how the Space Shuttle will be launched vertically, with the twin solid rocket boosters plus the three main liquid hydro- gen-oxygen engines operating simultaneously. These orbiter engines are fed from the hydrogen-oxygen tank. After we reach about 30 miles altitude, the solids are ejected from the system and recovered by º in the ocean. The mission profile is shown here. (MH72– 7098 SPACE SHUTTLE IMSSION PROFILE NASA HQ. Mºz-7098 11-27-72 We will show you a film of some tests we have been doing on that system a little later. Then, the main engines are continually fed by the external hydro- gen-oxygen tank, and the whole system then continues into orbit. Finally, the external tank is dropped and the orbiter is then left in flight to continue on its mission. In the satellite placement mode the payload compartment doors are opened and the satellite is placed in orbit. Another advantage of the shuttle, by the way, is that it provides an improved launch environment. Also, the payload can be checked out after we have reached orbit. This means that the satellite has sur- vived the most difficult of all the environment requirements of a satel- lite being placed in orbit—that is the launch environment. There is another advantage of the shuttle. The payload can be placed in orbit, and, through communication with the ground, be checked to be sure it is operating properly before the shuttle reenters the atmosphere and returns to the base. Those flights to place a satellite in orbit will be very short. 93-466 O - 73 - 11 158 For Sortie Lab flights, where we carry an instrument package aboard the system and do not place that system in space, we require the shuttle to stay in orbit for the duration of the activity. We have esti- mated 7 to 30 days as the length of stay-times there. In those instances, the Sortie Laboratory will be brought back to earth in the shuttle. The reusable shuttle offers all kinds of advantages for new, low-cost opportunities in space that we have not had with expendable systems. Mr. WYDLER. Dale, did you say the booster will go into space? Mr. MYERS. The external tank is carried into orbit because it still feeds fuel to the orbiter main engines through connecting pipes. Mr. WYDLER. That tank is going to burn up? Mr. MYERs. After it is released from the orbiter. We time the release of the orbiter from the external tank so that when we operate a retrorocket on the tank, the tank is deorbited, slowed down, and burns up on reentry. One of the advantages of this type of design is that we place the expensive reusable equipment in the orbiter, including the engines. The external tank is generally of material we believe will burn up during reentry. But we have one additional safeguard. If any pieces were to survive the tremendous heat of reentry, we would be in a position to choose where they land. We have looked at the South Indian Ocean and near the Atlantic, where there is just no ship travel at all and the area is completely uninhabited. We can select the landing area. Mr. WYDLER. Have you given thought to possibly using that tank again? Mr. MYERs. Yes. We looked at it, Congressman Wydler. And we felt that the protection of that tank at orbital reentry velocities would cost more than the tank is worth. Mr. WYDLER. I am thinking in terms of leaving it in orbit. Mr. MYERs. No, we had not considered that approach. We want to avoid pollution of space as much as possible. And the tank’s orbit would eventually decay. Almost all of the low-orbit devices that we put in orbit will eventually decay into the atmosphere. Mr. WYDLER. How does this vehicle, the Orbiter, land? I under- stand it comes down on the Earth. But what has it on the bottom? Mr. MYERS. Regular landing gear. We are going to show a film today on some of the work we have done on these high-angle entry landing technologies that NASA has been developing. At one time, for example, we expected to have turbojets aboard the device, to be used to change the glide angle as we come in to land. We found that out guidance accuracy is so good and our technology results in the landing approach activity so rewarding that we have not needed to space-rate these turbojets. Mr. WYDLER. Do I understand the landings will occur at Kennedy? Mr. MYERs. Yes. The initial launch and landing site for the Space Shuttle is the Kennedy Space Center. Mr. WYDLER, What is the situation there? What would happen if you were trying to come in and had bad weather conditions? Can the vehicle land at sea? - Mr. MYERs. We can land at alternate fields. We also will have a category 3 automatic landing system aboard. There has been quite a bit of work in the country on these completely automatic, no-visibility landing systems. •. 1.59 Mr. WYDLER. I am very interested in that. Because the airlines claim they cannot do that. Mr. MYERS. We will be in a position where our space technology will be very applicable to future commercial transport operations. We will show you a short filmstrip later of some of our work in this 8,I’68,. My next chart (MH72–6843) identifies the four major Space Shuttle development projects currently underway, in more detail. The facility modifications related to these projects I will describe in a later session. This subject will also be discussed with General Curtin, the Director of the NASA Facilities Office. SPACE SHUTTLE SCHEDULE FY 1974 CY 1972 CY 1973 CY 1974 J |A|S| 0 |N|D J F |M|A |M| J J |A|S| 0 |N|D J| F |M|A|M| J J|A |S| 0 |N| D - | SYSTEM START | ORBITER DEVEL. 9 AND SYSTEM INTEG. DESIGN / DEVELOPMENT DESIGN AND FAB. TOOLING DEV. TEST / FAB. STRUCT. TEST ACT. START PDR TURBO – A D TS MAIN ENGINE TES (SSME) DESIGN / DEVELOPMENT FAB. TEST ENG START EXTERNAL TANK (ET) DESIGN / DEVELOPMENT |SSU START RFP SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DESIGN / DEVELOPMENT (SRB) NASA HQ MB72–6843 PDR – PRELIMINARY DESIGN REVIEW REV. 2–14-73 The Space Division of the Rockwell International Corporation— formerly North American Rockwell—was selected by NASA as the Orbiter contractor and Orbiter development began in August of 1972. The Rocketdyne Division of Rockwell International, the main engine contractor, started engine development in April of 1972. A prelimi- nary design review was held last September and detailed design is proceeding. External tank requirements have been defined to support release of a request for proposal for the external tank development this coming April. Similar efforts have continued on the solid rocket booster to support issuing a request for proposal this July. I would like now to describe in detail, in the order shown, the progress that has been made in the past year and our planned efforts in the coming year. In describing the projects, I will highlight the two areas of activity that have supported key decisions made during the past months. I will also discuss solid rocket booster development activity that is helping us to understand the problems associated with Solid rocket booster recovery. - 160 Design and development of the Orbiter (MH73–5110) was initiated early in fiscal year 1973. The prime contractor, the Space Division of Rockwell International Corp., is responsible for design, development, manufacturing, test and evaluation of two Orbiter vehicles and support for the initial orbital flights. In addition, the prime contractor has been assigned the task of supporting the Shuttle Program Office at the Johnson Space Center in integrating all elements of the Space Shuttle system. SPACE SHUTTLE ORBITER NASA Hº-Hºº-º-10 1-2-3 During the past year efforts were devoted primarily to initial Orbiter vehicle design, development, test, and engineering activities. We are preparing the specifications for the avionics system configuration; completing basic wind tunnel tests and testing structural components for the complete forward fuselage model. Wind tunnel studies were used extensively to determine the pat- tern of complicated flow fields that exist about the Space Shuttle during ascent flight (MH73–5125). The flow patterns you see in the chart are invisible in flight but are revealed in these wind tunnel tests by special techniques. Knowledge of such flow fields is important in resolving the structural and thermal details of the design. Orbiter subsystems contractors are being selected by the orbiter prime contractor, subject to approval by NASA. The subsystem items being subcontracted (MH73–5332) are shown on this chart. By the end of fiscal 1974, we expect all major subcontracts to be awarded. Subcontractors already selected include the Minneapolis Honeywell Corp. for the Digital Flight Control System; the Inter- national Business Machines Corp. to supply data processing and 161 SPACE SHUTTLE VEHICLE FLOW WISUALIZATION SHADOW GRAPH ~ stock wave SEPARATED E-L-L----------------- º 2-> ---L-CIED --Oc-wave-Bour-DARY ---------------------- L_- -------------- ----- MAJOR ORBITER SUBCONTRACTING y CATEGORY Y 72 CY 4 FIM A M J J A LSO NL D. J. F. M. A. M. J J A LS PRIMARY STRUCTURE THERMAL Hi-TEMP Low ER SURFACE PROTECTION Power FUEL CELLS PROPULSion RCS Engines AW10NICS ENVIRONMENT ENVIRONMENTAL control control AND LIFE SUPPORT MECH SYS REMOTE MANIPULATOR ARM ſo 2 15 A 5 75 LAUNCH & LAND I GR00ND MAINT & OPER SUP |AMERICAN AIRLINES o REDUEST FOR PROPOSAL PLANNED a CONTRACT AWARD PLANNED • REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL issued A cont. RACT AWARDED NASA HD MH13-5332 REw 2-20-73 162 Software requirements; and American Airlines for ground maintenance and operations support. One of our key management principles in the Shuttle Program is to reduce technical requirements wherever possible and to build the shuttle to “hard” requirements. We have already been successful in revealing several important ways in which this can be accomplished. For example, after it was determined that airbreathing engines would be necessary only for ground ferrying operations and early horizontal test missions, they were deleted from the orbital missions, thus saving space qualification of the turbojets. . I would like to take a moment here to show you a film of one of the test aircraft we have used to demonstrate the capability to make the unpowered landings we envision for the Shuttle Orbiter. Here the pilot is inserting digital information into a digital flight control and automatic landing system. We also wanted to evaluate a hand controller of the type developed during the Apollo program, which we will probably use for the shuttle. These are some of the instruments and the flight attitude indicator for approach to landing. Now they have gone into an automatic system, the airplane is pitching to a 10-degree approach angle to the runway at Edwards, and 10 degrees is steep. This is a view from the pilot's cockpit as he approaches the runway. This particular technology program involved a two-segment approach, where the airplane first comes down at 10 degrees angle, then goes to a 2% degree angle of approach for the final approach to the runway. The engines here are at zero thrust so we can simulate the conditions of the shuttle, which will be at zero thrust at landing. Here is the flare to 2% degrees approach, and this is called an “energy conversion-type of landing.” The airplane is slowing down all the time as it approaches the runway, and touches down here at about 175 knots, then comes on in. You can see this completely automatic landing system is used for the approach. - d The pilot actually takes over here at just the last second on touch- OWIl. They have made about 50 landings with the system, successfully, and have had touchdown at about 2% feet per-second. We are moving in the direction of a completely automatic landing system for all- weather operation. Mr. WYDLER. That will be the normal mode of landing? Mr. MYERs. Yes, all the way from orbit to landing. Mr. FUQUA. Will it be noisy? Mr. MYERS. It will be whistling as it comes down to land. We are now in the orbiter design phase—including structural dia- grams and substructure layouts, materials selection, and cost optimi- zation of fabrication. - Mr. WYDLER. Excuse me. That landed at 175 knots? Mr. MYERs. Yes. Almost 200 miles per hour. That will be about the speed it will have. Mr. WYDLER. How many feet does that take to land? Mr. MYERS. Later we will discuss our facilities for the runway. And the area that you deal with most in a touchdown of this nature is just where do you touch down on the runway? Headwinds and tail- 163 winds tend to give you a spread, although they are compensated for in the equipment. We are aiming for a 15,000-foot runway at KSC. We will use braking parachutes and brakes for slowdown and stop- ping, because we won’t have turbojets for reverse thrust. Mr. WYDLER. I suppose the obvious question is: What happens if something goes wrong on that approach, in the sense that you are not going to hit that runway at all for some reason? Mr. MYERs. If you really have run out of energy, and have no opportunity to use energy trim to come into the runway, you would have an off-runway landing, which would be a catastrophe. Mr. WYDLER. You would have a crash. Mr. MYERs. Yes. Mr. FLow ERs. You would have an off-runway landing? Mr. MYERs. You have other things, such as water ditching, that you have to start looking at as part of the development of the program. It is our view that our history with the system has been such that we are confident we can retain our energy management for successful landings, to contain the risk level. Mr. WYDLER. On the chart you show all the major primary struc- ture subcontracts being awarded in March. Is that going to happen? Mr. MYERs. The first three will be awarded in March—the mid- fuselage, wing, and vertical stabilizer. We plan to award those sub- contracts in March. Mr. Fuqua. Please proceed, Dale. Mr. MYERs. We are also defining the thermal protection system requirements to overcome the temperatures shown in this chart. (MH73–5341.) PROJECTED PEAK EQUILIBRIUM TEMPERATURE DISTRIBUTION 15OK LB ORBITER NDERSIDE - 25oos F - BLAST FURNACE WHITE HEAT) > 2000 ° F STEEL MELTS º IET ENGINE NOZZLE O09 F BRASS MELTS ("RED" GLOWING HEAT) topside 50° F SELF-CLEANING 0VEN > - 65 ºffins Iron NASA HQ M H 73-534 [T] * 65 ºr ſºnmes 2-1 6-73 164 To give you a feeling for the kind of temperatures we are dealing with, I thought we would relate them to things we are familiar with on earth. The large areas on the top of the fuselage and wing are about 650 degrees Fahrenheit. At the bottom of the screen, we show the upper surface temperatures, and in the upper half of the screen we show the underside of the fuselage. For example, the areas around the tailpipe and lower back part of the wing are the temperatures of the jet engine turbine. - -- Moving forward on the lower surface of the wing, most of the energy is absorbed, and we get up to temperatures where steel melts, and on the leading edge the temperature is like a blast furnace. So we are moving into an insulation area that will be not only, of course, vitally important and necessary to the shuttle but will also clearly give us new technologies in insulation. The type of insulation we are dealing with here is to be used over and over again. These are the types of insulation that will be important to other applications as we move forward. The materials investigation to develop, test, and choose the best materials to withstand these temperatures repeatedly has been an ongoing technology effort for several years. This low cost technology work has provided a large payoff relative to the thermal protection system. It included a thorough test program carried out with many candidate materials. (MH 73–5340.) I would like to pass this specimen of the material around. It is lightweight, reusable, and has given us great confidence in this external insulation and let us use today's metals and just protect them with that type of material. ORBITER THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM tº sº: º sizé ºn 10W TEMPERATURE ::::: HIGH TEMPERATURE Wºº # REUSABLE SURFACE & * * * RElisabič surface JºWºº) INSULATION cºs sº-º-º-º: tº: ::sº § §§ rººs iº §§§ sº §§§ ºº's *::::::: REINFORCED CARBON-CARBON NASA HO MH 73-5340 2-1 6-73 165 That particular sample is a silica sample. Mr. FUQUA. Where was this made? - Mr. MYERS. Lockheed, which is one of the companies doing this type of work. We have been making comparative tests and supporting technology programs on this for about 3 years now. This is the position that we are in todav. We think that reusable external insulation is the way to go. Mr. Wydler, what you have is an indication of the external tempera- ture during the test. We went to 2,000 degrees external temperature during a 50-minute simulated reentry test, and the structure at the bottom only reached 300 degrees Fahrenheit. It is a terrific insulator that doesn’t let the heat soak through to destroy the underlying metal strength. Mr. WYDLER. How much temperature can this withstand, outside? Mr. MYERs. We have reached about 2,500 degrees—the leading edges go past 2,500 degrees. On those, we will use a different, heavier material. It will be used only where necessary for the very high temperatures. It is called a “carbon-carbon” composite material, and will withstand temperatures up to 3,000 degrees. Mr. WYDLER. This strikes me as something with a tremendous number of potential civilian uses. Insulation of this type could be a very valuable thing in the commercial market. - Mr. MYERs. We believe it will have that type of application. Just as our spray-on foam from the Apollo program has reached so many different applications, we think this is the next step in the insulation technology from the space program. Mr. WYDLER. It is remarkably light. Mr. MYERs. Yes. On this film, this is a 120-inch diameter solid rocket booster case, empty, simulating conditions of reentry. It is being dropped at an angle of 20° at a velocity of 40 feet per second. We will show it to you first in slow motion so you can get a feeling for the dynamic action of entry into the water. Then we will show it in real time. We will aim the rocket at an angle for reentry and, in this case, it penetrates about half way into the water before it levels off. Of course, the case itself deflects but does not exceed its yield limits, So it can be used again. We are doing this test, by the way, to verify a whole series of model test programs where we have dynamically scaled the vehicle, and, with these relatively small models, are investigating the whole spec- trum of drop conditions we might be subjected to. This is using a very large crane in Long Beach Harbor, operated by the Navy. The Navy has been extremely cooperative in this test activity. - Now, the water, of course, rushes up inside that case when it hits the water, then when it lays back on its side it is expelled by the pres- i.i.built up inside the case, and gives a little propulsion to the case itself. Mr. Fuqua. Some of the water will remain in it? Mr. MYERs. Yes, and it will sink to where the nozzle is at the water level and the nose will project out of the water. Mr. FUQUA. This will make it tow better. Mr. MYERs. That is correct. It will make it tow better. Now we will show you the film in real time, which is pretty fast. 166 The second bounce, of course, has to be considered in the structural dynamics of the system. This is the towcraft going to recover it for the next drop. This is an inside view of installing the instrumentation to measure the deflection of the case itself when it hits the water. We are going to show you a picture from inside the system. You can see the water beginning to approach the nozzle, then you See the water gushing inside of the system. Actually what you see is the solid rocket booster model itself rolling as it stabilizes in the water. These water impact tests have been ex- tremely useful and tow tests are planned. Fiscal year 1974 funding will provide for the continuation of Orbiter design, development, test, and engineering activities. Specific tasks will include: initiation of Orbiter structural components, release of hardware specifications, procurement of structural members and initiation of tool fabrication. Testing and preparation of specifications for avionics subsystems will be started, including work with the fuel cells used in the electrical power system. We will start fabrication of mockups to evaluate crew systems and cabin arrangements. Fabrication of ground support equipment and of development test hardware for the external tank separation system will also be initiated. We plan to begin development testing of the orbital maneuvering system. In addition, the definition of the integrated ground test plan for the Orbiter and Shuttle vehicle models wind tunnel testing will be completed. MAIN PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM |NSTALLATION ORBITER/EXT TANK LH2 DISCONNECT L02 SUPPLY MANIFOLD MAIN ENGINES (3) 470K UB VACUUM THRUST N ORBITER/ExT TANK LO2 DISCONNECT L02 VENT VALVES s L02 ENGINE NLET LINE LH2 – Louid HYDROGEN Lo2 – Louid oxygen • NASA HD MH72-5597 REV. 2–1–73 167 As I stated earlier, the Space Shuttle Orbiter vehicle will be boosted into low Earth orbit by the Space Shuttle main engines, operating simultaneously with the twin solid rocket boosters (MH72–6597). The three main engines are located in the tail section of the Orbiter in a triangular arrangement as shown on the chart. NASA HC MHz.2-7310 12-22-72 The engines, (MH72–7310) which operate at a rated vacuum thrust level of 470,000 pounds each, are designed to use a staged combustion cycle in which propellants entering the engine are raised to high pres– sure by turbo-pumps powered by preburners. This engine cross-section shows that the exhaust from the preburners is supplemented by the fuel used for cooling the engine and additional oxidizer; this mixture is then burned in the main combustion chamber and flows through the nozzle with an expansion ratio of 80:1. As my next chart (MH73–5162) shows, fiscal year 1973 Space Shuttle main engine effort has been devoted primarily to engine design and the start of component tests. Fiscal year 1973 tasks included laboratory and bench tests involving major components. We have also started fabrication of components and subsystems for test programs. For example, engine components developed by the engine contractor are currently being tested as shown on the next chart (MH73–5116). The liquid hydrogen used to cool the nozzle of the engine is mixed with the liquid hydrogen that bypasses the cooling circuit before entering the preburner injector. These tests are designed to evaluate the mixer performance and operating characteristics. Other tests are used to determine the effectiveness of liquid hydrogen in cooling the combustion chamber. 168 SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE DEVELOPMENT SCHEDULE FY > || 1973 || 1974 Lºs Lºis I ºf 1978 Dº DºD L 1981 B2 CY > 1972 || 1973 |1974 I-1975 I 1976 | 1977 I 1978 1979 T-1980 1981 PROGRAM SRR SYSTEM PDR *}} º lºsſ Maº MILESTONES & =sz =F700° füğı {}º FLIGHT ENGINE ENGINE FLIGHT PROJECT º º ſº ~7 l MILESTONES DETAL DES AND DEVELOPMENT Z CERTIEST ićNITION PRE-BURNERITURBO-PUMPTESTs + §sity jº ºxº |-SUBSYSTEM INTEG. TESTS T- TESTING |-T—T- *- ENGINE FIRST ENG. Aſmuſ FIRING FIRING SYSTEM - (SEA LEVEL TEST FIRINGS *~ (3) PROPULSION DEL TO TESTING TEST ENG. FAB AND ASSY__MTF_1 ||LPROPU, Isis’s DEL. FLT ENG [3] DEVELOPMENT to KSC FOR FMor FLIGHT - A. DEL. [4] FLT ENGINES ENGINES ZTAT:..." PDR - PRELIMINARY DESIGN REVIEW CDR - CRITICAL DESIGN REVIEW NASA HD MH73-5162 2, 1/73 LIQUID HYDROGEN - MIXER E- TEST HARDWARE - -- LIQUID HYDROGEN C00LING TEST The next chart (MH73–5115) shows ignition system tests being conducted to evaluate preburner performance and the effect of the design and fabrication process on the flow characteristics. 169 SSME IGNITION SYSTEM TEST HARDWARE PREBURNER ELEMENT TEST ------------- ------- Two major subcontracts were awarded in fiscal year 1973 by Rocketdyne, one to Minneapolis-Honeywell, Inc., of Minneapolis, Minn., for the controller and the other to Hydraulic Research, Inc., of Los Angeles, Calif., for the hydraulic actuator and filter assembly. Fiscal year 1974 funding will provide for the continuation of engine design and test activities now underway and the initiation of others. Engine assembly drawings will be released and long lead hard- ware for deliverable test engines will be ordered. Fabrication of the engine controller subsystem and hydraulic servoactuator mechanisms will start, as will fabrication of the engine test units for the first hot firing in early 1975. We will also procure the components to support engine testing at the Mississippi Test Facility and the construction and operation of the engine avionics. The first complete test engine will be delivered to support the engine test firing scheduled for 1975. The external tank supplies liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen pro- pellants for the Orbiter main engines from lift-off to Earth orbit insertion. After shutdown of the main engines the external tank is separated from the Orbiter vehicle (MH73–5164). As here shown in the next chart (MH72–7015), the external tank is a single assembly, approximately 166 feet long and 27 feet in diam- eter, with separate liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen tankage. It is mounted below the Orbiter and between the solid rocket boosters. Major systems include pressurization, feed, separation, and retro- rocket reentry subsystem. 170 SPACE SHUTTLE WITH EXTERNAL TANK an ºn ----- EXTERNAL TANK SYSTEMS SUBsystem UMBILICAL PLATES LIQUID HYDROGEN FEED LINE EXTERNAL HYDROGEN PRESSURIZATION/ VENT LINE - LIOUID OXYGEN - FEED LINE RANGE SAFETY Avionics Cº-DEORBIT Avionics EXTERNAL OxYGEN PRESSURIZATION VENT LINE HYDROGEN LOADING SENSORS TANK/BOOSTER UMBILICAL PLATE OxYGEN LOADING SENSORS GAS DIFFUSER DEORBIT MOTOR NASA Ho MHz.2-7015 Rev 2-16-73 171 The present design reflects the results of extensive studies and tests conducted over the past year by NASA and industry involving aerodynamics, load distribution, fabrication, materials, and tank proof-testing. These efforts are being used to develop requirements and specifications for selection of a contractor on a competitive basis, for design, development and manufacturing of the external tanks. The request for proposal is to be issued in April 1973 with contractor Selection and contract start expected in August 1973. At this time we are aware of at least four major aerospace companies who have expressed an interest in developing the external tank. They are: the Boeing Co., Chrysler, Martin-Marietta, and McDonnell Douglas. As you probably know, the Orbiter prime contractor, Rock- well International, is precluded from participating in this procurement. Industrial firms, as well as the Marshall Space Flight Center, are currently examining external tank alternate subsystems, including low-cost thermal protection materials such as spray-on foam insulation and ablatives. Low-cost manufacturing techniques in the areas of advanced welding and single piece bulkheads and nondestructive testing are also proceeding. Results of Marshall Space Flight Center tests are made available to prospective external tank contractors through periodic NASA briefings. External tank design will emphasize location of interface hardware on the reusable Orbiters and solid rocket boosters in order to keep expendable hardware systems to a minimum. Fiscal year 1974 funding will be required for design and develop- ment of the tank. The design of the tank and major subsystems will progress to the point where it will be possible to begin fabrication of the structural and propellant flow test articles in the first quarter of fiscal year 1975. solid ROCKET B00sIER DIMENSIONS THRUST: LENGTH 144.3 FT. SEA LEVEL = 2.76M LBS DIA 11.8 FT. VACUUM = 3.23M LBS SEPARATION MOTORS (6)–23 THRUST TERMINATION NOZZLE & THRUST PORT (2) VECTOR CONTROL SEPARATION MOTORs (6) £ºonſ FWD SKIRT FWD SEPARATION SYSTEM RECOVERY SUBSYSTEM : PARACHUTE PACKS (3), LOC/NAV AIDS NOSE FAI RíNG NASA HQ MH72–7014 REV. 2-16-73 172 The shuttle booster (MH72–7014) consists of two solid rocket boosters, approximately 11.8 feet in diameter and 144 feet long. They are attached to the orbiter external tank and burn in parallel with the orbiter main engines, providing propulsive thrust up to staging al- titude. After separation, they are parachuted to the ocean as shown on the next chart (MH72–7022). Each solid rocket booster will carry about 970,000 pounds of solid propellant and will provide a thrust at sea level of 2.76 million pounds for approximately iOO seconds. SOLID ROCKET B00STER(SRB)RECOVERY APOGEE 250,000 FT – e. *}; *:::: 4 º º SHROUD RELEASE lº 25,000 FT DROGUE | NFLATION f 22,000 FT }{<\ .29 STAG|NG 2 REEFING LINES º 162,000 FT | RELEASE DROGUE EXTRACT MAINS 6,000 FT FULL | NFLATION .. 2,600 FT | `--> ſ {! *. 7 m r i t F - - *— 㺠; Lºs - Pº. - - --->|-> - y- * * *. º: *- &º. SPLASHDOWN > 160 N.M. NASA HQ MH72–7022 | | –30-72 Thrust vector control and thrust termination capability will be provided. Other subsystems include attachment structures for the external tank and orbiter interfaces, recovery system, separation rocket motors, electrical power and distribution system, and a mal- function detection system for self-checkout during the preflight phase as well as during launch. - - A current industry capability exists for fabricating booster cases of this size and some companies have built and fired even larger boosters. Both a monolithic structure and a segmented case design are being examined as candidates. Trade studies are being conducted by NASA to develop low-cost recovery systems and to make maximum use of off-the-shelf equipment in order to reduce the cost per flight. Other cost reduction areas being examined are: utilization of more efficient solid propellant materials, improved fabrication methods, utilization of existing solid rocket technology, and decreasing the cost of the solid rocket boosters. We are planning to issue a request for proposal in July 1973 and expect to have a contractor on board by November of 1973. Four major aerospace companies with experience in this field have expressed an interest in developing the solid rocket booster. They are: the 173 Aerojet General Division of General Tire, the Lockheed Propulsion Division of Lockheed, Thiokol, and the United Technology Center Division of the United Aircraft Corp. As in the case of the external tank, the orbiter prime contractor is precluded from participating in this procurement. One of the critical considerations in solid rocket recovery is the corrosion of the rocket case material. We are evaluating the effects of sea water on candidate materials for the solid rocket booster motor (MHZ3–5124) to develop suitable protective coatings. A number of metal alloys and protective coatings were exposed for various periods up to seven days in the Gulf of Mexico. After exposure, all surfaces were evaluated for general corrosion and biological growth. EFECTS OF SEA WATER 0N SRB CANDIDATE MATERIALS ------------ ----- Water impact tests of solid rocket booster models are being con- ducted in test tanks and in a natural water environment. Valuable data were obtained on entry position, velocities and the resultant impact forces on the solid rocket boosters. I showed you a short film of one of these booster drop tests conducted by the Marshall Space Flight Center with the cooperation of the United States Navy at Long Beach, Calif. this month. Fiscal year 1974 funding will provide for: initiation of design and development of the solid rocket booster; start of fabrication and assembly of the structural and propulsion test articles; and modi- fication of booster handling and ground test equipment. The present development plan provides for the first development firing in 1975 and the preliminary flight readiness test in mid-1977. I would like to discuss the management plan we have developed for the Space Shuttle program. This plan makes use of the capabilities 93-466 O - 73 - 12 174 and resources developed for previous manned space flight programs, but modifies them to accommodate the systems integration aspects of the shuttle configuration, while at the same time minimizing cost. At the beginning of previous manned space flight programs, only a small cadre of skilled manpower was available. It was, therefore, necessary to develop teams of technical and management experts in Government, as well as in industry. The staff at our three centers provided the Government with a strong nucleus of managerial and technical skills. The Apollo configuration, with separate launch ve- hicles and spacecraft, led naturally to systems engineering and deeper management involvement from NASA headquarters during the development period. With the Apollo program completed, these centers, together with NASA headquarters, can furnish the man- agerial and technical skills needed to develop the Space Shuttle program in addition to completing ongoing programs such as Skylab and the Apollo Soyuz Test Project. The configuration of the Shuttle, with booster, tank, and orbiter clustered together, results in the lowest cost per flight consistent with R. & D. dollar constraints. This approach, however, calls for the highest order of systems integration and systems engineering. To capitalize on existing strengths and to minimize the number of personnel required, NASA has developed a “lead Center” management plan (MH73–5470) for the Space Shuttle program. Basically the plan utilizes the program office and a multicenter systems integration group located at the Johnson Space Center as an arm of NASA headquarters in carrying out the program. LEAD CENTER MANAGEMENT PLAN cºeºes- º SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM OFFICE NASA H0. SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM OFFICE J. S. C. SYSTEM / NGINEERING MSFC | JSC KSC | PROJECTS OFFICE MAIN ENGINE LAUNCH & LANDING solip RockFT 800STER | |0RBITER PROJECT OFFICE EXTERNAL TANK V V V CONTRACTORS CONTRACTOR CONTRACTORS NASA HC MH73-54/0 2-26-73 PROJECT OFFICE 175 The Space Shuttle program office here in Washington is responsible to me for generating the overall systems performance, schedules, and resource control. (MH72–6783.) SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM ORGANIZATION SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM DIRECTOR EEE TUSAF ] SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM MGR - JSC H. — — — — USAF | - l T sº SYSTEMS *ś." |MANAGEMENT B0ARD INTEGRATION INTEGRATION | | INTEGRATION I | T SPACE SHUTTLE PROJ - ORBITER PROJECT º SHUTTLE PROJ º == | USAF MGR |sº OFFICE KSC | | | | I | l_[USAF F-H | EXTERNAL SPACE SOLID OPERAT- LAUNCH & TANK SHUTTLE ROCKET PROJECT ENGINEER- MANUF IONAL LANDING PROJECT MAIN ENG §§ CONTROL |NG & TEST MGR PROJ MGR REQMTS 0PS MGR NASA HQ NAH72-6783 REV. 2-1 6-73 We delegate to the shuttle program office at the Johnson Space Center the authority to manage the program on a day-to-day basis, to carry out the integration studies previously done in headquarters for the Apollo program, and to contract with industry teams that will produce the shuttle. The Program Manager at the Johnson Space Center, in turn, utilizes the technical and managerial skills of each Manned Space Flight Center to carry out those functions and activities in their special areas of expertise. The Orbiter itself, for example, is the responsibility of the Johnson Space Center, while the solid rocket booster, the shuttle main engine and the external tanks are managed by a team at the Marshall Space Flight Center. Similarly, the Space Shuttle project office located at the Kennedy Space Center is responsible for the launch and landing operations, which will take place first at that location. Regularly scheduled meetings, attended by all responsible elements of the management teams, including the participating contractors, are arranged to identify interface issues and programmatic problems. Periodic reviews with top NASA management are also an important aspect of the lead Center plan. This management plan has been in effect since July 1971. It is working very well. It has, in fact, eliminated the need for a large group of integrating contractor personnel at NASA headquarters as was required during the Apollo program. We believe it will prove to be a very cost-effective way of managing the program. 176 To assure that program objectives are achieved on schedule and within authorized funding, particular attention is being paid to measuring contractor schedule, cost and technical performance and to control program changes which could have an impact on program costs and schedules. This is being accomplished by establishing cost targets as part of the design requirements at all work levels, instilling extreme cost consciousness in all participants by holding them re- sponsible for adhering to cost targets, making maximum use of ex- isting facilities and capabilities, controlling manpower buildup both at the contractors' plants and at NASA installations, and by making use of the contractor's own management and information systems without compromising safety. SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM C0ST GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT PHASE USE EXIST|NG TECHNOLOGY AND OFF-THE-SHELF HARDWARE EMPHASIZE HARDWARE COMMONALITY DESIGN FOR LOW COST PRODUCIBILITY MINIMIZE TESTING AND PAPERWORK REQUIRED UNDERSTAND AND ACCEPT DIFFERENT DEGREES OF RISK TRADE-OFF DES |RED FEATURES FOR COST FOCUS ATTENTION ON FEW VERY HIGH COST TEMS NASA HQ MH72-6926 REV. 2-14-73 (MH72–6926) NASA top management, being fully cognizant of the need to achieve a low-cost program, is making all levels of man- agement aware of the need to implement the guidelines on this chart. Effective day-to-day implementation of these principles will con- tribute to attaining our cost targets for the shuttle. Another important consideration is the reduction of costs per flight. A management plan has been instituted which makes cost per flight an engineering design characteristic, to be considered a measurable performance parameter. Such factors as turnaround time, maintenance manpower and spares requirements are under continuous review. In addition, each technical tradeoff study is ana- lyzed for its effect on costs per flight. Cost per flight receives atten- tion during the decisionmaking process at all levels and is used as a means of measuring program performance. Recent vehicle design 177 decisions have provided some margin relative to the $10.5 million estimated cost per flight. From its inception, the Space Shuttle was intended to provide maximum benefit to a variety of users, including the Department of Defense. A joint NASA/Air Force Space Transportation System Com- mittee was established in 1970. This committee, chaired jointly by Grant Hansen, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development, and myself, is responsible for a continuing review of space transportation requirements and for making recommendations as to how best to meet these requirements. A close working relationship has also been established at the operational level. If I may, I would like to skip the balance of that paragraph. Mr. Fuqua. Go ahead, and we will make the entire statement part of the record. Mr. MYERs. Thank you. Let me now summarize our status and plans for the Space Shuttle. In 1972 solid progress was made in the shuttle program. With the final Space Shuttle system configuration selected on the basis of firm tech- nical and economic considerations, the President proposed, and Con- gress approved the development of a low cost space transportation system using the Space Shuttle concept. A contractor was selected for development of the Orbiter vehicle and systems integration and the contract for development of the Space Shuttle main engine was imple- mented. System requirements were defined and a firm program baseline was established, shuttle hardware development and testing were initiated, and launch and landing sites were selected. The shuttle program organization was established and a manage- ment plan established which would keep program costs to a minimum by taking full advantage of available capabilities and resources. Plans for fiscal year 1974 call for an orderly buildup in prime and Subcontractor manpower for the Orbiter and Space Shuttle main engine development and award of contracts for all remaining major elements of the shuttle, including the external tank and the solid rocket booster. Fiscal year 1974 funds, although less than we had requested, will provide for an expanded scope of design, development, and testing activities and for continuation of subsystems and com- ponent development. As I stated in my testimony earlier, the combined impact of fiscal year 1973 and fiscal year 1974 outlay limitations slowed down the shuttle contractor and subcontractor buildup and resulted in a 9– month slip in our first manned orbital flight. Any further cuts will cause major increases in program costs and could, in my mind, jeopardize the whole program. With the hardware development phase of the Space Shuttle pro- gram underway, program schedules and funding projections are based on the momentum established during the past year. As I have already emphasized, today's biggest challenge is to reduce the cost of operating in space. We are confident of increased benefits, new discoveries, and new applications. These prospects will be realized by the Space Shuttle. The operational Space Shuttle of the 1980's will bring into existence a new economical era in space operations. The shuttle will allow us to continue surveys on monitoring and managing vitally important 178 Earth resources, to improve worldwide communications and education, to expand international cooperation, and to enhance economic progress and national security. The shuttle will make it possible to take ad- Vantage of vast new opportunites in space. This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Fuqua. Thank you, Dale. We appreciate your fine and clear statement regarding the shuttle. Last year and the year before there was a great deal of discussion about the Mathematica report, which you mentioned, in your state- ment. In that report, the economists made calculations as to the cost of the program and the economic benefits. Based on 1973 dollars, which we are in now, how does that report look? It was based, as I understand it, on 1971 dollars. Mr. MYERs. Yes. Mr. Fuqua. Are the projections in that report still in the ball park? What is the status now? Mr. MYERs. The Mathematica report was based on 1971 dollars. We were not allowed to account for inflation. We have had a year of inflation since then, and I can say only that inflation generally tends, in the complicated mathematics of that study, to improve the return on investment. So in fact, with the year going by, the inflation would result in an even better economic benefit from the shuttle. Mission models do not stay constant. A mission model is a plan for understanding basically how to use the shuttle. None of the activities in the last year have indicated any lessening of the cost-effectiveness of the shuttle. In fact, some of the indications are that we will even show a better return on investment. Mr. FUQUA. Based on the contracts awarded to date, which include the engines for the orbiter, and the orbiter itself, how do those con- tracts compare with your projections made when you first came to Congress and gave us an overall figure for the shuttle? Mr. MYERS. They are very consistent with those estimates, Mr. Chairman. The numbers quoted and negotiated for those programs are actually lower than the estimate we have within our total estimate for the shuttle development, the $5.15 billion, in 1971 dollars. But we expect, as the development effort proceeds, to have some necessary changes to that contract. We do have some reserve to cover changes that occur in the future. We are taking every possible management action to maintain that $5.15 billion (1971 dollars) shuttle develop- ment cost estimate. Mr. Fuqua. This would not be overrun, but it would be upgrading equipment, or a new series of Mr. MYERS. It would involve new changes in requirements, addi- tions, or contingencies that occur during a development program. It would not be overruns. It would be changes to the contract, directed by the Government, for developments as they occur. We are quite confident about the $5.15 billion estimate for the shuttle development program, provided that this year's budget request and future year funding requirements are approved. Mr. FUQUA. This year you asked OMB for $560 million; that was reduced by $85 million. What did that do to you? Mr. MYERS. That reduction, coupled with the impact of 1973 outlay constraints, resulted in the 9 months slip in the first manned 179 orbital flight for the shuttle program. The program was otherwise on schedule. Mr. Fuqua. What did you have to reduce? Mr. MYERs. Manpower buildup at the prime contractºr and subcontractor levels. It just presses down the rate of buildup of the program. That causes milestones to slip. It finally meant that we would have to delay our development milestones and that adjustment impacted the first manned orbital flight. Mr. FUQUA. Suppose there were an additional cut of say $50 to $75 million, what would that do to you? You talk about you are ready to go to contract with your booster engines and booster tanks and the orbital tank. - Mr. MYERs. Yes. We have gone to rock bottom, in our view on, the shuttle program in our internal dealings within NASA in trying to balance this overall reduction. I believe further reductions in the shut- tle would have an even greater effect on the schedule, another delay. It would probably mean that we would delay the implementation of our contracts on the tank and the solids, and certainly would mean a reduction in the buildup of our manpower in the critical subcon- tractor area. Mr. Fuqua. From a management point of view, from the overall program view, so that everything comes together at the end when you get ready to fly, how critical is it that you let those contracts this year—this calendar year—that you are asking money for in this budget? - Mr. MYERs. We think it is vital to get the main contractors on board to develop the system integration of this complex interacting system that we have. As opposed to what we call a “series booster,” this interacting set of tanks and orbiter to us means we have to get the teams together, working together, to get the answers on that inte- gration activity. Delays in that vital effort could mean a day-for-day delay in the overall program. I am very worried about major delays in the shuttle because my experience with R. & D. programs has been that if they do not have continuous good funding support, they tend to erode in support to the point that they are very subject to cancellation. Mr. FUQUA. In stretchout what would happen to your cost projections? Mr. MYERS. Costs would go up. Mr. Fuqua. Do you have any idea how much? Mr. MYERs. We are not able to answer that. We are working with the contractor on the impact of the fiscal year 1974 budget, such as the effects we have had in the 9-month stretch in the shuttle's first manned orbital flight. We are going to do all we can to keep that cost to a minimum, of course. And it will be our goal to keep growth at Zero, if we can. But we do know that as programs stretch, the delay is reflected in overhead at the contractor's plant, inflationary effects, many things that could drive all program costs up. When you have a program that is balanced in terms of total content, milestones, and progress, slippage causes increases in the total cost of the program and is a very inefficient way to run a program. It impacts overall cost. We would be in a position where large funding cuts would adversely affect the whole system and increase costs. 180 Mr. FUQUA.. Any stretchout will in the end cost more and delay the time the shuttle will be available? Mr. MYERs. Yes, sir. . Mr. FUQUA. And also it would affect the continuation of other boosters that would not be needed at that time? So we are really getting into an inefficient situation if we stretch out and have a period of uncertainty as to what the funding level is going to be? Mr. MYERs. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Wydler. . Mr. WYDLER. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Flowers? Mr. FLOWERs. No questions, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Frey? Mr. FREY. I would like to pursue your line of reasoning. . In the long run, with the stretchouts, we will pay for the costs anyway, won’t we, down the line? Mr. MYERS. Yes. Mr. FREY. Regarding the contractor personnel, how about the human equation, people, keeping teams together, what is left of the teams? Are we reaching a point in terms of manpower where for some reason we won’t have the right people available if delays keep occurring? Mr. MYERs. That has been a continuous worry, about the phase- down of the total manpower that was trained in the Nation’s Apollo program. We are now down below 100,000 people in the industry supporting us. We hope that is rock bottom, because below that point you beging to lose not only the special skills and craftsmanship, but also the tremendous team spirit we built in Apollo, which set unsurpassed standards for dedicated performance and high-quality programs. We see that facet as another serious problem if we can not build and continue the momentum of the shuttle program. Mr. FREY. Somehow, we always find money down the line, but is is a question of what you do with it, and with whom. I think this is a serious problem on which not enough emphasis has been placed. Mr. MYERs. Cuts in dollars will not save money, it will cost money. Mr. FREY. The chairman touched briefly on our other booster. The whole concept of the shuttle, of course, is to handle a great deal of both manned and unmanned launches; 73 percent of the payloads will be automated satellites. Now, about planning and funding for phasing out our other boost- ers? Is there not a crossover point where you have to make that deter- mination, and could we get in a situation where we wouldn’t have boosters to launch with? Mr. MYERs. We have not reached that point. We will eventually. We have done studies in the area of the transition period. Work is going on within NASA to look at the overall transition period. We are going to discuss that later. - This year we can only say that a delay in the shuttle will delay the ability of this nation to take advantage of the vast opportunities of the shuttle with respect to sharply reducing the cost of launches, operations, and payloads and gaining the advantages from the pay- 181 loads standpoint. Later, serious problems could be caused in the transi- tion period in terms of how many more expendable boosters you buy and other significant considerations. Mr. FREY. Each year I ask the question of the Department of Defense as to their participation in this program: How about dollars? Mr. MYERs. We have in fiscal year 1973 about $4 million to $5 mil- lion from the Air Force involved in various studies in support of our efforts. We have a joint NASA-Air Force effort underway in studying the Tug, which is the upper stage for the shuttle. We are going to º #. fall which agency should manage and fund development of the Tug. - At the present time I feel, as I did when we first made the agree- ments with DOD, that NASA should be responsible for the develop- ment of the shuttle. The Air Force should do timely studies that lead to an early understanding of their particular requirements so that we can influence much more easily modifications, if necessary, to meet their requirements. That work has been funded by the Air Force, and is continuing. The NASA-Air Force Space Transportation System Committee is a mechanism for coordinating the requirements. The major shuttle funding that the Air Force is involved in would be their Wandenberg–Western Test Range—facilities modifications, and procurement of the orbiters, engines, boosters, and tanks for their missions. That is the agreement we had made previously with the Air Force. I think the reason that this approach makes sense is that a single development agency is, in my mind, an absolute necessity for the most efficient development of the national capability. The Space Shuttle will be used for NASA missions, Air Force missions, commer- cial operations and for international flights. We believe that the shuttle needs one single point of management. Just as in the case of the Tug, it could be a reasonable and proper management system, perhaps for the Air Force to be the single agency responsible for development of the Tug. But I don’t think we should have joint devel- opment and management of the shuttle. Mr. FREY. One last question: In the last couple of years in the Senate you had some people who hadn’t really looked into it, who got a lot of headlines about this being a $100 billion project, and I don’t think they really looked at the facts. One of the things the chairman mentioned was the mathematical studies that had been conducted. I have not seen anything recently from NASA on any further updates on the cost and cost-effectiveness. f{ shºuld we expect a fairly detailed summary before we go to the OOI’ſ - Mr. MYERs. We have not continued those studies. We had not considered those studies as a continuing activity. A mission model was used at that time, and we are continuing to update that model, but Mathematica has not made additional studies. We are now in the process of updating one of the cost-effectiveness studies. The trends, as I mentioned earlier, say that we are going to either meet or beat the same kind of return on investment we had last time. But this study effort, from the standpoint of a formal report, will not be completed until April or May. 182 Mr. FREY. With the chairman’s permission, I would like to have this in the record, whatever there is. Last year statements were made that these estimates were way low, that you would be $95 billion over, and a lot of other nonsense. To have documentation would be helpful, a comparison of last year and this year. Mr. FUQUA. I agree. If you could provide that for us we will make it part of the record. [Information not available at this printing.] Mr. MYERs. We will provide it to the committee when it is available. Mr. Fuqua. What is the last possible date contracts can be let for the solid rocket boosters and the external hydrogen-oxygen tanks and still maintain your projected schedule? Mr. MYERs. The reviews we made as part of the budget crunch included that area. The dates we have now are August of this year for start of the external tank contract and November for start of the solid rocket booster contract. Those are the latest dates we can have and maintain good systems integration and balance in the program. l ºr. FUQUA. You don’t feel that you have any cushion of time eft'. Mr. MYERS. No. Mr. Fuqua. What is the total in fiscal year 1974 funding for long-leadtime components for the shuttle main engine? Mr. MYERs. In fiscal year 1974, we are going to provide long-lead components for the main engines that will be used for development tests and for the first flight orbiters. Mr. Fuqua. None for production of engines? Mr. MYERs. Not in fiscal year 1974. Mr. Fuqua. The long lead time is only for the test articles? Mr. MYERs. Only for the test articles. Mr. FUQUA. Do you have any figures on the current target goals for recurring costs on the external tanks? Mr. MYERs. Yes, we have our internal assessment. We will be entering a terrific competition with industry. Mr. FUQUA. If this is part of the competition we will defer that. Mr. MYERs. To give you a feeling, we think the tanks will cost about 20 percent of the total cost per flight, something on that order. I would like to keep our estimates under our hat until we have this competition. Mr. FUQUA. Certainly. Mr. MYERs. The industry is very seriously looking at ways to get that cost down. We are appreciative of that effort, and we want to have good solid competition. I think we will get good responses from industry to meet NASA's requirements. º Mr. Fuqua. How about environmental studies? Is it conclusively proven that with the shuttle flying we will not get cancer if we walk out in the atmosphere or if we walk outside? tº e - © Mr. MYERs. I an an engineer and not an atmospheric scientists. But we have had people do an environmental study for us, and the environmental impact study we have submitted indicates that the 183 effects of the shuttle are extremely minimal as far as the overall atmospheric effects are concerned. f \; FUQUA. How about pollution from the engine, motors, so Orth'. Mr. MYERs. Of course, we will have a big cloud of smoke from the Solids, just as we have had with the Apollo and the Titan III missions. We have studied very carefully the exhaust products at the launch sites both in California and in Florida. And they are completely ºd within the limits set by the Environmental Protection gency. Mr. FUQUA. Is there any danger of bringing back radioactive materials from orbit by the shuttle to Earth and contaminate an area or those who came in contact with the orbiter? Mr. MYERs. No. The radiation we pick up in space flights, even out to the Moon, is so small that it has no effect on the people working around and operating the vehicle. I remember someone saying there is less radiation involved than you have from the dial of a watch. Mr. Fuqua. None of the astronauts have suffered any ill effects from this? Mr. MYERs. None at all. Mr. Fuqua. You do not anticipate adverse effects on the environ- ment at all? Mr. MYERS. No. Mr. Fuqua. This has been thoroughly studied in depth? Mr. MYERs. Very thoroughly. Mr. FREY. After last year and the year before I have not heard much more about any environmental people raising any questions on this point. My first question: Have you met with anybody who has raised these questions in the past? Mr. Don LAN. We have had no objections to our Shuttle Environ- mental Impact statement from any source. Mr. MYERs. I think there was some discussion before we made the study and completed and submitted it. Since the environmental study was submitted and reviewed, there have been no objections or questions concerning it. Mr. FREY. You have had no objections from anybody who is interested environmentally? Mr. MYERs. None. Mr. FREY. Thank you. Mr. Fuqua. Thank you very much. [The complete formal statement of Mr. Myers follows: SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM STATEMENT OF DALE D. MYERs, Associate ADMINISTRATOR FOR MANNED SPACE FLIGHT NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION CoNGRESSIONAL HEARING STATEMENT SPACE SHUTTLE Introduction The Space Shuttle represents a “second generation” space transportation system which takes full advantage of advanced technologies developed during earlier manned space flight programs. Several years of intensive study by NASA, the scientific community and the aerospace industry proved conclusively that the availability of this technology made the development of a low-cost transportation 184 system based on a reusable vehicle technically and economically feasible. In view of this conclusion and in the conviction that such a transportation system would serve an important national need, the President authorized NASA in January 1972 to proceed with development of the Space Shuttle. After extensive hearings con- ducted in the Spring of 1972, both by the House and the Senate, Congress appro- priated FY 73 funds for the development phase of the Space Shuttle Program. When the Space Shuttle becomes fully operational in the 1980's, it will mark the dawn of a new era in space operations. The Shuttle will make it possible to take advantage of many new opportunities in space, including scientific explora- tion, exploitation of the earth's resources, improvement of communications, better international understanding, and enhancement of national security. (MH72–5017–1–9–73) SHUTILE WILL HAVE MANY USES - ---------- cºuncanons º ---. º - - - - -- º cºcº º - - º º Accomplishments With the firm decision to proceed in hand and the conceptual design phase virtu- ally completed, the Space Shuttle Program has made solid progress since our last report to Congress. A number of key milestones were accomplished during 1972 (MH73–5461–2–22–73). After congressional approval had been obtained the Shuttle Program organization was established and a management concept selected which is best suited to achieving Shuttle Program objectives on schedule, and within authorized funding limits. Major program milestones were defined, master schedules prepared and procedures developed to assure integration of the entire program. With the final Space Shuttle system configuration established (MH73– 5111–1–23–73) the contract for development of the orbiter high pressure engines 185 ... …, SPACE SHUTTLE DEVELOPMENT SCHEDULE fºLº Dº TETTTTTTTTT - In cy iſ 72 73 74 75 70 T Tº 79 - Co-GRESSIONAL APPROVIAL A stant -an ENGINE DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT --ANUFACTURING > i - stant Dººner DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT --AMUFACTURING stant DEVELOPMENT OF ExtERNAL I ExtERNAL TAMM DEVELOPMENT --AMUFACTURING tank a solid rocket Boosteº, A. SOLIDROCKETECOSTEDEVELOPMETETTIFACTURIGº- | First Horizontal 4 MORIZONTAL FLIGHT TEST PROGRAM Flºr FuGMT. Tests First ---MED onental FLIGHT wentical. Flºn TEST PROGR- OPERATIONAL CAPA-ILITY - -- SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM NASA HC MHZ3–5 || || 1-23-73 - NASA HQ MHZ3-5461 2-26-73 186 was finalized, a, Contractor selected for orbiter vehicle development and systems integration, and requirements for selection of Government-furnished equipment (GFE) Contractors were defined. Launch and landing sites were selected, the en- Vironmental impact of the Shuttle was assessed and detailed cost analyses were completed to insure that development costs and costs per flight would not exceed the values calculated during the program study phase. Program Schedules and Integration On the basis of detailed work statements prepared during the proposal stage, master schedules were developed which serve as the principal guides for program managers and contractors. They are used to plan the program in an orderly manner; to establish priorities for resources allócation and to measure progress. Key milestones have been defined which serve as program “sign posts,” to advise management as to when Specific program decisions have to be made. These master Schedules delineate milestones and activities in detail for the next, two fiscal years, both for the overall Shuttle Program (MH72–6843, Rev. 2:14–73) and SPACE SHUTTLE SCHEDULE FY 1974 CY 1972 CY CY J |A|S| 0 |N|D J F |M|A |M| J J |A|S| 0 |N|D J| F |M|A |M| J J A S 0 |N| D ORBITER DEVEL. AND DESIGN / DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM INTEG. DESIGN AND FAB. TOOLING DEV. TEST . STRUCT. TEST ACT. START PDR TESTS MAIN ENGINE (SSME) DESIGN / DEVELOPMENT FAB. TEST EXTERNAL TANK (ET) DESIGN / DEVELOPMENT SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DESIGN./ DEVELOPMENT (SRB) NASA HQ MB72-6843 PDR - PRELIMINARY DESIGN REVIEW REV. 2-14–73 for all major program elements. To insure that the many complex tasks being carried out simultaneously in widely separated locations are accomplished in accordance with systems requirements, and that all elements of the program are geared to achieving Space Shuttle operational status by the end of this decade, detailed operating procedures for systems integration have been developed and are being implemented. Space Shuttle Main Engine The Rocketdyne Division of Rockwell International which had been selected as the prime contractor for development of the Space Shuttle main engine, was awarded a definitive contract in April 1972. A “Preliminary Design Review”. Space Shuttle Management Plan For the Space Shuttle Program a management plan was selected which makes use of the institutional capabilities and resources developed for previous manned space flight programs. The Shuttle Program office, which is a part of the Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF) located at NASA Headquarters in Washington, D.C. is responsible for overall systems performance, schedules and resources control. The Johnson Space Center at Houston, Texas serves as an extension of the HQ program office and has been assigned responsibility for day-to-day pro- 187 gram management. In this capacity it develops project plans and schedules, performs system integration, recommends allocation of resources to individual projects, and exercises change control with respect to technical details, schedules and resources. JSC is assisted in these tasks by the prime (orbiter) contractor, Rockwell International Corp., which has been assigned responsibility for systems engineering and integration. Contractors are being encouraged to make maximum use of their own management systems to control program costs, schedules and technical performance, in order to keep program management costs to a minimum. (PDR) was held in September 1972 and component development was initiated. Engineering effort is continuing to verify and improve engine performance. Orbiter/Integration Contractor Selection After an exhaustive review of all technical and cost considerations involved, the Space Division of Rockwell International was selected in July 1972 as the prime contractor for orbiter development and systems integration and contract was signed in August 1972. During FY 1973 considerable progress was made in initial orbiter design and subsystem definition. The contractor is well on the way toward initiating hardware development, including definition of tooling and testing requirements with the orbiter structures Preliminary Design Review (PDR) expected about the middle of FY 1974. In addition, studies to verify new technological concepts continued and work was begun to establish operational requirements, such as simulation, training and other engineering support. Program Requirements for External Tank (ET) and Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) Definition of program requirements and specifications has progressed suffi- ciently to make it possible to issue “Requests for Proposals” for the External Tank and the Solid Rocket Booster in the near future. It is planned to select the ET contractor by August 1973 and the SRB contractor in November 1973. In selecting these contractors, emphasis will be placed on the use of low-cost manufacturing techniques and tooling in order to reduce to a minimum the con- tribution of these systems elements to costs per flight. To assist in this endeavor, it is planned to fabricate and assemble external tanks at the U.S. Government- owned Michoud Assembly Plant in New Orleans, Louisiana. Launch and Landing Site Selection A key decision made in 1972 was the selection of the Shuttle launch and landing sites. On April 4, 1972, Dr. James C. Fletcher, the NASA Administrator, announced that the Shuttle would operate from the Kennedy Space Center in Florida and Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. It was determined, after a thorough review of potential launch sites that those two existing facilities offered major advantages with respect to cost, safety, operational requirements and environmental impact. Operational requirements taken into consideration were booster recovery, launch azimuth limitations, latitude and altitude effects on launch and landing performance and abort constraints. Environmental Impact Assessment As required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, and in accord- ance with guidelines established by the Council on Enironmental Quality, a thorough analysis of the possible environmental effects of the Space Shuttle was made in 1972, in conjunction with other federal agencies having responsibility in this area. Potential adverse consequences of Shuttle operations on the atmos- phere and the oceans, as well as social effects were assessed and a detailed report was filed with the Environmental Protection Agency and submitted to Congress. In every case, these detailed studies of the effects on the atmosphere, water and noise by the Space Shuttle system showed that they were minimal and below allowable limits. Regardless of the fact that anticipated effects are below allow- able limits, safeguards will be instituted to further minimize any potential environ- mental impact. Cost Analysis Detailed cost analyses undertaken during the past year by NASA and several contractors indicate that the target costs of 5.39 billion in 1972 dollars (5.15 billion in 1971 dollars) for Shuttle development, and 10.5 million per flight (1971 dollars) are indeed realistic and can be achieved. These studies also showed that, given the present mission and payload requirements, the configuration Selected represents the best compromise between development and launch costs (MH73– 5463/2–21–73). Other studies revealed that the use of the Shuttle as the principal 188 SPACE SHUTTLE COST COMPARISON (1971 DOLLARS) 10 T- |FULLY REUSABLE 9 H. f A EXTERNAL LIQUID 8 H O HYDROGEN TANKS 7 H. * * $ 5.150 BILLION as PARALLEl SOLID 5 F 3) R00KET B00STER BILLIONS SELECTED 4 C0NF1GURATION *H $ 10.5 MILLION 2 H 1 H 0 L l l | –! 0 2 4 6 8. 10 12 C0ST PER FLIGHT IN MILLIONS - NASA HQ MH73–5463 2-26-73 - means of transportation and deployment could result in payload cost reductions by as much as 50%. Based on the currently anticipated utilization of the Space Shuttle, the reductions in payload costs, coupled with the low cost of transpor- tation would insure that the investment in Shuttle development could easily be returned over a ten-to-twelve year flight program. If, as is likely, new, useful and economically beneficial mission possibilities open up during the 1980's because of the routine and quick access to space made possible by the Shuttle, the investment will be returned even more rapidly. Plans for fiscal year 1974 During the past years, a solid foundation was laid for the significant progress made in FY 1973. Plans for next fiscal year call for a build-up in prime and sub- contractor manpower and the award of contracts for major elements of the Shuttle, notably the External Tank and the Solid Rocket Booster. FY 1974 funds will provide for an expanded scope of design, development and testing activities and for initiation of manufacturing of structural components and sub- systems. Existing facilities for fabrication and testing will be modified to meet Shuttle program requirements. In FY 1974 design and fabrication of tooling will begin and plans will be firmed up for system operations, training and support operations requirements. A more detailed discussion of accomplishments and future Shuttle program activities is contained in the following section of this Statement. System description The Space Shuttle system consists of an orbiter vehicle, an external hydrogen/ oxygen tank and twin solid rocket boosters (MH73–5343/Rev. 2–16–73). The orbiter will look like a delta winged airplane, about the size of a DC-9 jet liner. It will have a payload bay that can accommodate payloads up to 4.5 meters (15 feet) in diameter and 18 meters (60 feet) in length and weighing up to 29,500 kilograms (65,000 pounds). Doors on top of the compartment will open in orbit to permit deployment or recovery of spacecraft. 189 SPACE SHUTTLE VEHICLE [2] SOLID ROCKET 7 FT DIA B00STERS (SRB) XTERNAL 11.8 FT DIA \ • ^\ºn - - - - - - - – --- ~ VA-a- sº 78FT Q-T-- - - 4–20.25 FT 144.3 FT 193.2 FT -—165.75 FT NASA HO ".' H 73-5343 5 E. 3-13 - 73 The orbiter will normally carry a crew of four, including the pilot, a co-pilot, a systems monitor, and a payload specialist who will check out the payloads and deploy them in space. The Shuttle will accommodate up to ten persons including the crew. All will travel in shirtsleeve comfort without space suits and undergo acceleration forces during launch and re-entry which are considerably less than those experienced during previous manned space flights. The Shuttle will permit scientists for the first time to accompany their experiments into space. The orbiter will be boosted into space through the simultaneous operation of two solid propellant booster rockets and three high pressure liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen main engines. The booster rockets will detach at an altitude of about 48 kilometers (30 miles) and descend into the ocean by parachute, to be recovered, refurbished, and reused. The orbiter, with its three main engines and hydrogen/ oxygen propellant tank will proceed into orbit. The tank, which is expendable, will then be deorbited to a predetermined remote ocean site (MH72–7098/11– 27–72). Upon completion of the mission, the orbiter will reenter the atmosphere and land like a conventional airplane. Progress made during FY 1973 on all elements of the system provides a solid base for continued development in FY 1974 (MH72–6843/2–14–73). Several years of feasibility and definition studies and a comprehensive technology program have resulted in the determination of system sizing and weights, selection of thermal covering for each area requiring heat protection, basic structural materials, and mission operations which would obtain the lowest practical cost-per-flight. Analyses and tests proceeded to investigate the design of the External Tank and the size of the Solid Rocket Boosters. Extensive testing, design, and hardware development efforts heve led to a baseline configuration which gives assurance of meeting Shuttle cost and performance goals. - Upon completion of program plans, vehicle sizing and critical trade studies, system baseline specifications were established in 1972 at the Preliminary Re- quirements Review (PRR). This review resulted in the definition of data needed for procurement of the External Tank (ET), the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), and orbiter subsystem requirements. Vehicle requirements will be reviewed at the Systems Requirements Review (SRR) scheduled for early FY 1974. The SRR will be followed by the award of contracts for the design and production of the External Tanks and Solid Rocket 93-466 O - 73 - 13 190 GPAGE GEUTE MSSION PROFILE - º- - - Asa HQ -72-7058 1-27-72 Boosters. In addition, the fabrication and assembly of the orbiter will be started, leading to the scheduled First Horizontal Flight in early 1977 and to the First Manned Orbital Flight by the end of 1978 (MH73–5461/2–22–73). Contracting and hardware design is proceeding rapidly due to the availability of a sound technology base. The successful research, manufacturing, and opera- tional experience with the 120 and 156 inch solid rocket programs is directly applicable to the technology required for the Shuttle solid rocket boosters; Saturn V technology and tooling will be used for ET development and production; and, the use of a basic aluminum structure for the orbiter eliminates the need for an extensive and potentially expensive metalurgical development program for improved structural materials. Another key low-cost characteristic is the reduction of technical requirements wherever possible. Trade-off studies have already been successful in revealing several important ways in which this can be accomplished. For example, after it was determined that airbreathing engines would be necessary only for ground ferry operations and early test missions, they were deleted from the orbital missions. Such technical decisions to produce the least cost development and operational program is in agreement with the management principle to maxi- mize the use of existing technology and to build the shuttle to “hard” require- ments. This resulted in cost consciousness permeating all trade studies and technical decisions. Orbiter/Integration Design and development of the orbiter (MH73–5110/1–23–73) was initiated early in FY 1973. During the development phase of the program the prime contractor, the Space Division of the Rockwell International Corporation, is responsible for design, development, production, test and evaluation (DDT&E) of two orbiter vehicles and support for the initial orbital flights. In addition the prime contractor has been assigned the task of supporting the Shuttle Program Office at JSC in integrating all elements of the Space Shuttle system. During the past year efforts were devoted primarily to initial orbiter vehicle design, (MH73–5342/2–16–73) development, test, and engineering activities. Major orbiter vehicle efforts in FY 1973 include: award of the contract for orbiter development and system integration, which includes completion of technical trade studies and the establishment of a baseline configuration; establishment NASA HC MHºº-º-10 ORBITER WEHICLE --- NASA HQ MH73-5342 2-1 6-73 of program requirements (plans, schedules, funding, manpower, facilities); preparation of systems specifications for government-furnished equipment (Solid Rocket Booster, External Tank, airbreathing engines); initiation of pre- liminary design—including structural diagrams, and substructure layouts, materials selection, and cost optimization of fabrication; definition of thermal protection system interface requirements and initiation of procurement of reusable surface insulation materials; definition of subcontractor responsibilities; prep- 192 aration of specifications for the avionics system configuration; completion of basic wind tunnel tests to support the systems requirements review; testing of structural components; initiation of vibration interaction tests and completion of forward fuselage model tests. Wind tunnel studies were used extensively to determine the pattern of com- plicated flow fields that exist about the Space Shuttle during ascent flight (MH73– 5125/1–23–73). From such data, analytical estimates of aerodynamic pressure SPACE SHUTTLE VEHICLE FLOW VISUALIZATION SHADOW GRAPH - --- º- SHOCK wave SEPARAIED s BOUNDARY LAYER NIERACTION º º ºxº - - --> SS SIDE VIEW Turbulent Boundary LA-ER ------------ SHOCK wave MPINGEMENT - ºf Borrow view. --- - -- --> -- NASA HQ MHZ3-5 125 -º-º-7- levels were made and applied to the structural design requirements and to the placement of components. Orbiter subsystems contractors are being selected by the orbiter prime con- tractor, subject to approval by NASA. Subsystems being subcontracted include: the vertical stabilizer; wing, mid-fuselage; orbital maneuvering pod and engine; thermal protection insulation materials; digital flight control system; data proc- essing and software; guidance and navigation; environmental control system; space radiator; fuel cell power plant; nacelle and pylon for airbreathing engines; reaction control module tank and engines; cryogenic storage system; the auxiliary power unit; and ground maintenance and operations support. The orbiter schedule (MH73–5161/2–1–73) details the NASA and prime con- tractor efforts currently under way and the considerable design, test and produc- tion required in the future to meet the First Manned Orbital Flight in CY 1978. 193 ORBITER PROJECT DEVELOPMENT SCHEDULE FY > || 1973 |1974 || 1975 [1976 || 1977 1978 || 1979 || 1980 cy 1972 |1973 |1974 |1975 1976 1977 || 1978 |1979 | - A A CDRA * - MILESTONES ORB 0RB —H — ORBITER H. V CDR " | PREL DES DFTAI DESIGN \ | DEVELOPMENT º 0RB |N0 | FAB AND ASSY WEHICLES H}R FL || | EST 0RE NO 2 FA8 AND ASSY • º {RTICAL - t |HFI b 0 || fºLIGHT IESIS FAB 180 Assy - SIRUC GROUND * / struct ſesſing \ TEST PROPULS10M FAB his | | ARTICLES º: / PROpulºsing N HYDiaulic ful COM | lºst allºtrºl IES ARI AB AND Assy AOR Fli SUPPI in a ISI SUPI SHUTTLE AWINICS INT tº 1AB AOR FLI IESI SUPI i– THERMAL VACUUW TEST Articlf / A / THER waſ It'sſing —l —l-l | NASA H0 MH73 516. 2 13 FY 1974 funding will provide for the continuation of orbiter design, develop- ment, test, and engineering activities. Specific tasks will include: initiation of orbiter structural test article fabrication and related testing of structural components, release of hardware specifications, procurement of structural members, initiation of tool fabrication, and the start of fabrication of the forward and aft fuselage, crew module, and atomspheric flight controls; testing of docking mechanisms, including tooling and fabrication of the interface connecting hardware with the main propulsion system; procurement of electronic components, initiation of breadboard testing and preparation of specifications for avionics subsystems including electrical power (fuel cells), guidance and navigation, communication and tracking, displays and controls, operational instrumentation, and auxiliary propulsion units; start of fabrication of mockups to evaluate crew provisions and cabin arrangement; fabrication of development test hardware for the External Tank separation system; initiation of ground support equipment manufacture; definition of the integrated ground test plan for the orbiter and Shuttle system; and orbiter and Shuttle vehicle models wind tunnel testing. In addition to specific hardware design by the orbiter prime contractor, tasks will also proceed in the following areas of activity: avionics design effort will include atmospheric flight control, guidance and navigation, crew displays and controls, instrumentation, communications and checkout, and improvements in fuel cells, cryogenic storage, and related power systems; thermal protection system (TPS) tests will continue on the candidate materials for reusable non- metallic surface insulation, reinforced pyrolyzed plastics, and lightweight ablators. These TPS tasks are concerned with final testing of selected materials, production processes and characterization of the development thermal insulation elements in simulated reentry conditions. NASA is planning to perform Reaction Control System (RCS) level development testing at the White Sands Test Facility. In addition NASA is reviewing the need to perform RCS subsystem testing to com- plement the subcontractor's preliminary design. This work may be performed at JSC to determine off-limit operating values, anomalies, and other critical par rameters to allow NASA to accurately specify the mission characteristics and to fully understand the RCS system as it is developed. 194 Orbiter subsystems Major orbiter subsystems (MH73–5175/2–1–73) have been defined and pre- liminary designs are well advanced, with preliminary design reviews (PDR) scheduled during FY 1974. Avionics—Recent evaluations of alternative con- figurations to accomplish the avionics functions have resulted in the evolution of a baseline avionics system which is expected to be a highly cost-effective set of electronics hardware for the orbiter vehicle. The major subsystems are: guidance and navigation for both atmospheric and space flight; displays and controls for all systems status data and the payload during atmospheric and space flight; electrical power distribution and control; instrumentation for checkout during the development and the operational phases: and the communications links such as voice, telemetry, command, tracking and television. A preliminary space utili- zation analysis of the Shuttle has already resulted in the location of several avionics subsystems and components aboard the orbiter. ORBITER WEHICLE SUB-SYSTEMS (*NSTALL IN CARGO BAY) |MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM (MPS) ORBITAL MANEUVERİNG SYSTEM (OMS) NASA HO M. H.73-51.75 2-1-73 A simplified block diagram of the avionics system has been prepared (MH72– 7059/12–22–73). This represents a relatively simple but efficient design without sacrificing either quality or safety. This baseline minimizes the number of black boxes, electrical wires and electrical connectors. The avionics will be fault tolerant, that is, redundancy will be designed in so that two major subsystems failures can occur without degrading the capability to return to base. This is commonly called the fail-operational, fail-safe requirement. - Development risk and cost will be reduced by using off-the-shelf hardware wherever it is cost effective. The avionics hardware will consist of: gimbaled inertial measurement systems, computers, communication receivers and trans- mitters, standard cockpit displays and cathode ray tube (CRT) displays which have been developed, produced and demonstrated to be operable. Existing off- the-shelf electronic hardware will be used extensively in the avionics subsystems. In some cases these will be modified to meet Shuttle requirements but this is expected to cost less than designing new hardware. A mockup of part of the Orbiter avionics equipment bay has been constructed to test installation techniques and wiring methods (MH73–5163/2–1–73). 195 CURRENT AVIONICS BASELINE Naw AIDS AND SENSORS comMANDER + HAN NTR + D CONTROL SPACE CONTROL's PILOT GN & C + computer HAND CONTROL MULTIPLExER + + MULTIPLExEr + E subsystems - AERO SURFACE Nºt GN & C + CONTROLS LIFE Sup COMPUTER + - systEM + THERM-PROT.sys. *ARDENED Power STRUCTURE PERFORMANCE COMMANDER N - #Taº Monitorinc DISPLAY'S AND PAYLOADs computer PILOT CONTROL | + CREw STATIONS PAYLOAD MANIPULATOR + REDUNDANI Note: communication AND ELECTRICAL POWER Distribution subsystems NOT SHOwn Nasa HC--H72-7--> Rev. 2-1-73 MOCKUP OF ORBITER AMONICS EQUIPMENT BAY NASA ºn Mºº --- Electrical power will be generated from three hydrogen/oxygen fuel cells, each capable of providing seven kilowatts continuously or 10KW peak at a nominal 30 volts DC to the Shuttle system. Each one of the fuel cells can supply the nominal on-orbit electrical power required. They will be maintenance-free for 2000 operating hours with a useful life of 5000 hours with maintenance. Three 10 amp-hour Nickel Cadmium batteries will be used for orbiter entry and post 196 landing operations. The electrical power system also includes cryogenic storage vessels (dewars) for storing hydrogen and oxygen for the fuel cells (MH73–5119/1- 23–73). ORBITER ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION FUEL CELL POWERPLANTS -3 LIQUID 0XYGEN |Wººs; E. % || |º Ø à lº % º jº % A-º à-1 : /º *TA HYDROGEN SYO à 2. Sº “ Baments 4– \) º ºf was &C. & W - º ºf º 5\%. 3. Wºº {\ §º FUEL CELL REPLACEMENT sº Yº W ŠKV3 ACCESS D00RS \SN LIQUID HYDROGEN (RH & LH SIDES) SERVICE UMBILICALYSTLIQUID 0xYGEN NASA HQ MH73-5] 19 1–23-73 Subcontractor contributions are already a significant part of the avionics work. The Massachusetts Institue of Technology is under a NASA contract for guidance, navigation and control performance analyses; Intermetrics has a subcontract for complier software development; the International Business Machines Corporation will define the data processing and software requirements; Minneapolis Honeywell will develop the Digital Flight Control System; and the McDonnell Douglas and Grumman Aircraft Companies are performing inte- gration support for the prime orbiter contractor. In addition, the contract for the development of the guidance and navigation hardware will be awarded in FY 1974. A Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory (SAIL) is planned for JSC to provide the necessary test area for integrated electronic hardware and software Operation to prove or recommend design changes for the avionics equipment. This will allow verification and necessary revisions to occur in adequate time for final development. This laboratory will also be available to support flight crew procedures development. - Propulsion.—In order to satisfy the requirements of its assigned missions and associated operational modes, the Space Shuttle employs primary and second- ary propulsion systems (MH73–5175/2–1–73). The primary propulsion system, which provides the thrust necessary to send the vehicle from lift-off to staging and then into earth orbit, consists of the three reusable liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen rocket engines and the twin recoverable solid rocket boosters (SRB). These pro- pulsion systems will be discussed in detail later. The secondary propulsion system of the orbiter consists of Reaction Control (RCS), Orbital Maneuvering (OMS), and Airbreathing propulsion (ABPS) subsystems. The RCS provides the thrust necessary for on-orbit attitude control and minor maneuvering for braking actions and docking maneuvers. The OMS furnishes the propulsive thrust for major on-orbit maneuvers including cir- 197 cularization of orbit, orbital transfer, rendezvous and deorbit. The airbreathing engines are used for horizontal flight test in the atmosphere and for ferry Operations. The Reaction Control Subsystem (RCS) consists of three self-contained and independent propulsion modules: one is located in the orbiter nose section and the other two in each of the aft (Orbital Maneuvering System) pods (MH73– 5123/1–23–73). Each module contains a helium pressurant storage and distri- ORBITER REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM (RCS) [2] RCS PROPELLANT TANKS [BOTH SIDES) 1100 LB THRUSTERs (3) RCS PROPELLANT | TANKS FWD MODULE REAR MODULE-2 REDD. NASA HQ MH73-5 123 1–23–73 bution system for forcing the propellant through the engines; a monopropellant (Hydrazine) storage and distribution system; and multiple thrusters, each op- erating at a rated vacuum thrust of 4900 newtons (1100 pounds). The forward module contains 16 thrusters and each aft module in the OMS pod contains 12 thrusters. All thrusters, tanks and components are disigned to be interchange- able in all modules. Functionally, the RCS provides attitude control and three-axis translational capability during both orbital and entry phases of the mission. During the orbital phase, the RCS provides precise attitude and translational control capability required for rendezvous and docking and orbiter stabilization. The RCS can also act as a backup in case of OMS subsystem failure by providing roll control, steering and a deorbit capability. - Following an in-depth study effort directed toward evaluation of alternate RCS concepts with low development risk and cost, the monopropellant, easily storable hydrazine was selected. Additional advantages offered by this selection are exhaust cleanliness, and ease of checkout and maintainability, which are important characteristics in meeting the design goal of two-week, turnaround for all systems. The Space Division of Rockwell International (RI) conducted a trade study on the RCS to optimize engine thrust level vs. number of engines, to assure the best match of performance parameters prior to procurement of this subsystem scheduled for the fourth quarter of CY 1973. RI intends to subcontract the RCS module detailed design, development and production. The RCS thrusters and propellant tanks will also be subcontracted by NR and furnished to the RCS module subcontractor for installation and integration. The Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem (OMS) when used sequentially or in combination with the RCS provides the orbiter vehicle its maneuvering capabili- ties to perform designated missions ranging from on-orbit docking maneuvers for 198 satellite recovery or repair to space rescue. Specifically, the OMS is designed to provide the thrust for orbit circularization, orbit transfer, rendezvous and deorbit. - The current engine design and placement for the OMS (MH73–5122/1–23–73) calls for two reusable, pressure-fed rocket engines to provide 26,700 newtons (6000 pounds) of thrust each. Propellant for each engine is stored in tankage located in each pod. When additional orbital maneuvering capability is required OMS “kits” may be mounted in the cargo bay. ORBITAL MANEUWERING SUBSYSTEM (OMS) OMS ENGINE PITCH & YAW ELECTR0- MECHANICAL G|MBAL OMS PROPELLANT TANKS OMS HELIUM TANK NASA HQ MH73–5122 I-23-73 As with the RCS, both cryogenic and storable propellants have been examined to select the propellant which would provide the least development risk and offer the best compromise between system weight, volume, and program cost. A storable bipropellant mixture was chosen that consists of nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4) as the oxidizer and monomethyl hydrazine (MMH) as the fuel. A proto- type orbital maneuvering engine injector is being evaluated for performance, heat distribution and stability (MH73–5113/1–23–73). - * . " The broad technology base available from development of the Apollo CSM service propulsion subsystem minimizes the development risk associated with the concept proposed by NR, which plans to subcontract the OMS pod assembly on a competitive bid basis. The Request for Proposals (RFP) for design of the OMS pod was released in November 1972 and selection of a subcontractor and authority to proceed is expected before the end of FY 1973. The Airbreathing Propulsion Subsystem (ABPS) will be needed only for the horizontal flight test program and ferry operations. Elimination of airbreathing engines from orbital flight simplifies the overall orbiter design while increasing the amount of payload that could be transported to and returned from Orbit. Program costs are kept low by reducing the number of engines required and eliminating the need for qualifying these engines for orbital flight. The airbreathing engine configuration on the orbiter vehicle is the subject of ongoing technical trade studies. A number of engines either currently in produc- tion or under development are being considered for use on the Space Shuttle. Selection of a candidate engine is scheduled for CY 1973. Thermal protection.—To meet thermal protection requirements for the Space Shuttle, a NASA funded technology program in support of materials develop- ment has been underway for several years. This effort involved a spectrum of materials to provide a data base for comparing candidates for the very high temperatures and high heat loads (MH73–5341/2–16–73) expected in areas such 199 PROTOTYPE ORBITAL MANEUWERING ENGINE NIECTOR TEST PROJECTED PEAK EQUILIBRIUM TEMPERATURE DISTRIBUTION 15OK LB *"º > 2000° F > 1750° F 1sooº F > 850° F > 650° F NASA Ho M.H.73-534) [ ] < 65.0° F - 2-16-7 3 as the nose and wing leading edges (temperatures from 2100°F to 3000°F) and different materials in the other areas where temperatures are lower than 2100°F Great progress was made in these investigations and in general nonmetallics were developed to provide excellent protection against the high temperatures. Test evaluations are being conducted in arc-jet tunnels, radiant heating ovens, and on vibration, acoustic and strength testing machinery (MH73–5114/1–23–73). 200 Baseline materials are currently being selected for the orbiter vehicle (MH73– 5340/2–16–73). For the lower temperature areas an elastic reusable surface insula- tion (RSI) will be used. This will be applied to the lower temperature areas on the top side of the Orbiter. A silica based RSI will be used on the underside, front, rudder, and certain high temperature areas of the orbiter. Sample non- metallic tiles are being mounted on the underside of an actual aircraft wing to test application to a typical airframe surface (MH72–7075/11–22–72). A rein- Rºman meaning test of SºuTTLE THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM LOW TEMPERATURE HIGH TEMPERATURE RSI RSI REINFORCED CARBON-CARBON nasa Ho MH-3-5340 2-5-7- 201 APPLICATION OF TPS TILES IU - * Typical Air FRAE surface Nº-ºoºº ------- --- forced carbon-carbon material will be used to protect the highest temperature areas at the nose and leading edges of the wings. The prime contractor will soon select subcontractors to develop the actual components for the orbiter thermal protection system. During FY 1974, it is planned to complete material development to insure proper temperature control while in orbit, to develop a compatible coating for water proofing and in the case of the leading edge, to protect against oxidation. Other development effort will provide materials for penetrations such as the landing gear doors, sliding seals for the aerodynamic control surfaces and antenna windows. Verification of analytical predictions through large scale tests will be needed for flight certification. Crew systems and life support.—Crew and passenger compartments are located at the forward end of the orbiter (MH72–7045/Rev. 2–1–73). In addition to the life support and environmental control equipment, the cockpit and passenger areas contain the avionics equipment, airlock entrance to the payload bay docking module and basic living equipment and furnishings. The Environmental É. and Life Support System (ECLSS) currently being designed includes eight basic subsystems (MH73–5120/1–23–73). The ECLSS requirements for the orbiter have been timed so that all the life support subsystems of the shuttle can take advantage of the practical experience and possible improve- ments to come from other manned space programs such as Skylab. ECLSS pri- mary features as currently baselined, are as follows: Dietary systems.-The type and amount of food selected for the orbiter crew diet is based on personal preference and physiological (dietary) considerations. Crew desires, physical requirements, and psychological test results will be analyzed to determine the final provisions to be included on board the shuttle for crew and passengers. These will include combination frozen and freeze-dried foods. Ozygen storage.—A vehicle fuel cell oxygen storage system has been selected for providing the primary oxygen requirements. Pressure and composition control.—A pressure-regulated nitrogen and oxygen two-gas control is being designed for maintaining the proper pressure and atmos- pheric composition in the cabin. 202 ORBITER CREW/PASSENGER PROVISIONS D0CKING MODULE PAYLOAD MONITOR STATION UPPER SECTION ACCESS T0 MID-SECTION 23 MID-SECTION AVIONICS Ø 22' PILOT ORBIT STATION | N. STATION * | Missiºn [] . COMMANDER j|DP’ jºr O .* - t STATION E_\- \ FLIGHT SECTION LOWER SECTION AHRLOCK EASILY REMOVABLE FL00R FOR EDUIP. ACCESS (3 PLACES) AVIONICS WASTE WATER TANKS WASTE MGMT SYS EQUIP. AVIONICS EDUIP. C00LING PACKAGE AVIONICS WASTE MGMT GALLEY ACCESS HATCH SIDE HATCH MID-SECTION LOWER SECTION - NASA HQ MH72-7045 REV. 2–1–73 ORBITER ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL & LIFE SUPPORT (ECLSS.) ATMOSPHERE REWITALIZATION UNIT AVIONICS RAM AIR/FAN COOLING CABIN TEMP CONTROL DUCTING F00D MANAGEMENT SPACE RADIATOR WAPOR-CYCLE UNITS ECLSS CONTROL PANEL 2 PANELS DEPLOYED (ATMOSPHERE HEAT SINKS) AVIONICS BAY DUCTING gº/ - HYDRAULIC HEATERS AVIONICS FANS/HEAT EXCHANGER WASTE MANAGEMENT NITR06EN STORAGE FUEL CELL HEAT EXCHANGERS -- 0XYGEN STORAGE NASA HQ MH73–5120 |-23-73 203 Atmosphere controls.--Carbon Dioxide, humidity and temperature controls will be required to assure good performance during all mission phases, including reentry and atmospheric flight. Heat exchangers and water separators will be required for the cabin temperature and humidity control functions. Atmospheric contaminant control.—Conventional methods using charcoal, metal- lic adsorbents, particle and bacteria filters will be used. Heat rejection.—Space radiator panels required for avionics cooling (MH73– 5120/1–23–73) will also be used as the main heat sink for the crew and passenger compartments during the on-orbit mission phase. An evaporator with either water or ammonia will be used for transient periods of high heat load, to supple- ment the radiator heat sink. Thermal control (air conditioning) consists of two coolant loops—a non-toxic (water) circuit inside the cabin and a coolant circuit external to the cabin. Water management.—Bladderless tanks will be used for potable water storage for increased reliability and to greatly reduce maintenance problems. Pasteuriz- ation and/or sterilization will be used to control microbiological problems. Waste Management.—The waste management system will be designed to accommodate both male and female crew membcrs. It will employ vacuum drying components, which make it unnecessary to jettison waste products. Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) The Space Shuttle orbiter vehicle will be boosted into low earth orbit by the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) operating in parallel with twin solid rocket boosters (SRB). Simultaneous operation of the two solid propellant booster rockets and the three high pressure liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen orbiter main engines will provide the thrust necessary to insert the orbiter into the desired º earth orbit. Main engines continue to burn until the desired orbit is 3,0016 WeCl. - The main engines are located in the orbiter aft fuselage in a triangular pattern (MH72–6597/Rev 2–1–73). The engine spacing allows adequate clearance for maximum gimbal deflection for thrust vector control during the launch phase. . . s. v.-- *MAIN PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM INSTALLATION LH2 VENT VALVES LH2 ENGINE INLET LINE LH2 SUPPLY MANIFOLD of BITERIEXT TANK LH2 DISCONNECT - L02 suPPLY MANIFOLD MAIN ENGINES (3) * 470K L8 VACUUM THRUST of BITER/Ext TANKL02 DiscONNECT . . * K ë. w $ . . . \ L07 VENT VALVES :, , \ . : . . L02 ENGINE NLET LINE LH, - Louid HYDRogen - * , - Loz – Liquid oxygen - NASA Hu MH72-5597 f : • " - . . - REV. 2-1-73 204 The engines, which operate at a rated thrust level of two million newtons (470,000 pounds), are designed to use a staged combustion cycle in which pro- pellants entering the engine are raised to high pressure by turbo-pumps powered by preburners. The exhaust from the preburners is supplemented by the fuel used for cooling the engine and additional oxidizer; this mixture is then burned in the main combustion chamber and flows through the nozzle with an expansion ratio of 80:1 (MH72–7310/12–22–72). Design and development of the SSME has been underway at Rocketdyne, a Division of Rockwell International, since Spring 1972. This contract provides for delivery of three propulsion test engines and 24 flight engines. During the DDT&E phase of the orbiter, seven engines will be delivered, the first three of which are scheduled for installation in the orbiter to be used in the First Manned Orbital Flight in CY 1978 (MH73–5162/Rev. 2–1–73). The Critical Design Review (CDR) scheduled for CY 1976 will insure that design has progressed sufficiently to permit release of engine design drawings to manufacturing. Flight engines will be approved for manned flight prior to First Manned Orbital Flight (FMOF) by means of Flight Certification reviews. This will insure that deliverable engines conform to contract end item specifications. FY 1973 effort was devoted primarily to engine design and the start of com- ponent tests. The overall engine Preliminary Design Review (PDR) was held in September 1972. Specific FY 1973 tasks included: release of component and subsystem design drawings for major test items; preparation of design drawings for fabrication of hydraulic servoactuator mechanisms; laboratory and bench tests involving the preburner oxidizer system, oxidizer turbomachinery, thrust chamber, hot gas manifold, heat exchanger, and interconnect devices; and start of fabrication of components and subsystems for test programs including the ignition system, preburners, injection system, combustion chamber and nozzle assembly, oxidizer turbopump, fuel turbopump, and controller assembly. - NASA HQ MH72-7310 12-22-72 205 SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE DEVELOPMENT SCHEDULE FY > | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 | 1916 | 1977 L 1978 || 1979 L 1980 || 1981 |82 CY P. l 1912 || 1913 | 1914 L 1915 1915 1977 1978 || 1919 | 1980 || 1981 SRR SYSTEMPOR systemſa FIRST FIRST MANNED §ts . § H=sz. R7 ### - {}º nºt PROJEEI. 'º' "º ſº. MILESTONES | DEEinſLESTEDEVEIHEif —º-HHS ENGINE Iénition PRE-BURNERJTURBO-PUMPTESTS I SUBSYSTEM | #. TESTAYvºl. SUBSYSTEM INTEG. TESTS T-L TESTING I | I tº the A Allmuſ fring ; - - ge tºva, #sſiſſiss-->ls . - [3] Pºpulsion| * DEL T0 TESTING TEST ENG. FAB AND ASSY | MTF I • , |PRUPUl IESIS DEL. FLT ENG (3 ºwn | ####, Engines . - ZTIFF/HF *::: * * PDR - PRELIMINARY DESIGN review CDR - CRITICAL DESIGN REVIEW NASA H0 MH73-5162 2/1/73 Engine components developed by the engine contractor, as for example the hydrogen mixer hardware, are currently being tested. The liquid hydrogen used to cool the nozzle of the SSME is mixed through this hardware with the liquid hydrogen that bypasses the cooling circuit before entering the preburner injector. Those tests are designed to evaluate the mixer performance and operating characteristics. Other tests are used to determine the effectiveness of liquid hydrogen in cooling the combustion chamber. Temperature rise is measured along the chamber walls having contours similar to the SSME combustion chamber (MH73–5116/1–23–73). Ignition systems tests are being conducted to evaluate preburner performance and the effect of the design and fabrication process on the flow characteristics (MH73–5115/1–23–73). Two major subcontracts were awarded in FY 1973 by Rocketdyne, one to Minneapolis-Honeywell, Inc. of Minneapolis, Minnesota, for the controller and the other to Hydraulic Research Inc. of Los Angeles, California, for the hydraulic actuator and filter assembly. - FY 1974 funding will provide for the continuation of engine design and test activities now underway and the initiation of others. Specific areas of effort will include: installation and checkout of component and subsystem test equipment; assembly and delivery of components and subsystems, including the liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen turbines, inducers, ignition system, bearings, preburner assembly, combustion chamber and nozzle assembly, fuel turbopump, and the controller assembly; ignition system tests; initiation of preburner, turbopump, and thrust chamber subsystems testing; release of engine assembly drawings; procurement of long-lead hardware for deliverable test engines; start of fabrication of the engine controller subsystem and hydraulic servoactuator mechanism; start of fabrication of the engine test units for the first hot firing in early CY 1975; design and procurement of servoactuators to support engine contractor testing at the Mississippi Test Facility; and the construction and operation of the engine avionics breadboard. The first test engine will be delivered to the Mississippi Test Facility in preparation for the first engine test firing in 1975. Other development tasks will be directed toward extending engine life and reusability. Additionally, fiscal year 1974 funding will provide for propellants to Support development and component testing. 93-466 O - 73 - 14 LIQUID HYDROGEN MIXER TEST HARDWARE LIQUID HYDROGEN C00LING TEST ----------- ------ External tank The External Tank (ET) supplies liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen pro- pellants for the orbiter main engines from lift-off to earth orbit insertion. After shut down of the main engine, the External Tank is separated from the orbiter vehicle (MH73–5164/2–1–73) and deorbited toward a predetermined, remote ocean area. Detailed design studies and computer simulations indicate that the tank will break up during atmospheric reentry. The External Tank is a single assembly, approximately 50.5m (165.8 feet) long and 8.2m (27 feet) in diameter, with separate liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen tankage, mounted below the orbiter and between the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB). Major elements include pressurization, feed separation, and retro-rocket reentry subsystems. The present design (MH72–7015/1–23–73) reflects the results of extensive trade studies conducted over the past year by NASA and industry involving aerodynamics, load distribution, fabrication, material, and tank proof testing. These studies are being used to develop requirements and specifications for selection, on a competitive basis of a contractor for design, development and production of external tanks. The Request for Proposal (RFP) is to be issued in #" 1973 with contractor selection and contract start expected in August 1973. The present development plan provides for delivery of the initial test articles in late 1975 and delivery of the first flight tank in early 1978. Activities are presently being conducted at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) to examine alternate subsystems, including low cost thermal protection materials such as cork, spray-on foam insulation and ablatives; low cost man- ufacturing techniques in the areas of advanced welding studies and single piece bulkheads; and non-destructive testing. Results of these studies are made available to prospective Extenal Tank contractors through periodic briefings at MSFC. External Tank design will emphasize location of expensive interface hardware SSME IGNITION SYSTEM TEST HARDWARE PREBURNER ELEMENT TEST ºn HQ -73-5- -º-º-º- on the reusable orbiters and SRB, in order to keep expendable hardware systems to a minimum. MSFC is currently investigating new production methods for welding large curved structures such as the External Tank. One method available for considera- tion by potential External Tank contractors is the Seam Tracking Television method (MH73–5117/1–2–73). It involves a TV camera and lighting systems which are used to control a welding head mounted on a movable track. This has produced uniformity and quality which may help reduce production cost. To further minimize costs it is planned to fabricate the External Tank at the NASA- owned Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF). NASA is also investigating a procedure to eliminate excessive machining and to develop a lightweight, relatively inexpensive ET structure. This involves welding of “T” stiffeners to plate stock to produce inexpensive stiffened panels and fabrication of cryogenic tank bulkheads from single pieces of sheet stock by means of a bulge forming die which results in a single piece hemispherical bulk- head (MH73–5127/1–23–73). This process is being extrapolated to the full size required for External Tank bulkheads. Activities of this type are constantly being studied and evaluated by NASA and Industry to determine the best methods to pursue in the development of a low-cost External Tank which will keep shuttle costs per flight as low as possible. FY 1974 funding will be required for design and development of the tank, leading to a preliminary design review {p}; late in FY 1974. The design of the tank and major subsystems will progress to the point where it will be possible to begin fabrication of the structural and propellant flow test articles in the first quarter of FY 1975. SPACE SHUTTLE WITH º EXTERNAL TANK - nºsº RE------- EXTERNAL TANK SYSTEMS SUBSYSTEM UMBILical PLATES Llould HYDROGEN FEED Line EXTERNAL HYDRogen PRESSURIZATION/ VENT LINE LIOUID OxYGEN FEED Line RANGE SAFETY Avionics FºldFORBIT AVIONICS 27- - EXTERNAL oxygen Sºs - PRESSURIZATION vent Line HYDROGEN LOADING SENSORs TANK/BOOSTER UMBILICAL PLATE OxYGEN LOADING SENSORs GAS DIFFUSER DEORBIT MoToR NASA Ho MHT2-7015 Rev 2-16-73 209 ºnal suppºrt structure CONTOUR Backup RAR 2-8-01-ETER TELEVISION ADAPTER WELDING ExTERNAL TANK NOSE CONE weld statDN ------TURE -Lusº cºncun TV -º-º-º: - REDUCTION STUDES ºulº sº was ºn Mººl - ºn 210 SOLID ROCKET B00STER DIMENSIONS - THRUST: LENGTH 1443 FI. SEA LEVEL = 2.76M LBS D1A li. 8 FT. VACUUM = 3.23M LBS SEPARATION MOTORS (6) NOZZLE & THRUST VECTOR CONTROL SEPARATION MoToRs (6) Leº £ºo RT THRUST TERMINATION PORT (2) FWD SEPARATION SYSTEM RECOVERY SUBSYSTEM : PARACHUTE PACKS (3), Loc/NAV AIDS NOSE FAIRING NASA HQ MH72-7014 REV. 2-16-73 Solid rocket booster The booster elements of the vehicle system consists of two Solid Rocket Boosters, approximately 3.6m (11.8 feet) in diameter and 44.5m (144.3 feet) long. They will be attached to the Orbiter External Tank and will burn in parallel with the orbiter main engines, providing propulsive thrust up to staging altitude (MH72–7014/Rev. 2–16–73). At this point, the SRB's are separated from the External Tank and parachuted into the ocean from where they are retrieved and returned to the launch site for refurbishment and reuse on later flights (MH72–7022/11–30–72). Each SRB will carry 435,000 kg (969,222 pounds) of solid propellant and will provide a thrust at sea-level of 12.4 million newtons (2.75 million pounds) for *Pg. 100 seconds. - olid propellant candidate materials are being examined to increase efficiency, decrease costs and take advantage of experience derived from past programs. Thrust Vector Control (TWC) of plus or minus 5° and thrust termination capa- bility will be provided. Other subsystems include attachment structures for the ET and obriter interfaces, recovery system, separation rocket motors, electrical power and distribution system, and a malfunction detection system for self- checkout during the pre-flight phase as well as during launch. A current industry capability exists for fabricating booster cases of this size and some companies have built and fired even larger boosters. Both a monolithic structure and a segmented case design (MH72–6024/5–16–72) are being examined as candidates. . Extensive in-house trade studies are being conducted by NASA to improve the reliability of recovery and reuse of the boosters, and to make maximum use of off-the-shelf equipment in order to reduce the cost per flight. Other cost reduction areas being examined are: utilization of less expensive materials, improved fabri- cation methods, simplicity of design, utilization of state-of-the-art technology and increasing reuse of the SRB. * * - One of the critical considerations in solid rocket recovery is the corrosion of the rocket case material. NASA is evaluating the effects of sea water on candidate materials for the Solid Rocket Booster motor to develop suitable protective coatings. A number of metal alloys and protective coatings were exposed for various periods up to 7 days in the Gulf of Mexico. After. exposure all surfaces were evaluated for general corrosion and biological growth (MH73–5124/1–23–73). 211 SOLID ROCKET B00STER(SRB)RECOVERY APOGEE 250,000 FT —º: º SHROUD RELEASE º 25,000 FT DROGUE in FLATION 22,000 FT STAGING 2. REEFING LINES ...” Z 162,000 FT | RELEASE DROGUE ExTRACT MAINS 6,000 FT FULL INFLATION 2,600 FT -- º T- [. ** -------- --- ----- ----------— - - - -- _- -- - - - - IOv/ TO LAUNCH site SPLASHDown - 150 N.M. ãº: NASA HQ MHZ2-7022 11-30-72 155 nº. SEGMENTED SRM 212 EFECTS OF SEA WATER 0N SRB CANDIDATE MATERIALS NASA HQ --------- -23-7- Water impacts tests of SRB models have been run in closed tanks : natural water environment using parachutes. Valuable data were obtain these tests on entry position, (MH73–5128/1–23–73) velocities and the forces on the SRB. The SRB program will include design, development and qualificatio booster and subsystems, including the recovery system, the thrust vectoi system and the thrust termination system. The present development plan for the first development firing in November 1975 and the prelimina readiness test (PFRT) in mid 1977. The first set of flight hardware is st # gºvery in late CY 1977 and will support the First Manned Orbital 1978. FY 1974 funding will provide for: initiation of design and developmer SRB and initiation of the preliminary design reviews for the major subs start of fabrication and assembly of the structural and propulsion test and modification of propellant processing and ground test equipment. Management plan The management plan selected for the Space Shuttle Program makes us capabilities and resources developed for previous manned space flight pr but modifies the plan to accommodate the intimate systems integration as the Shuttle configuration, while at the same time minimizing cost. At the beginning of previous manned space flight programs only a sma of skilled manpower was available. It was, therefore, necessary to develop technical and management experts in government, as well as in indust staff at our three centers provided the government with a strong nu managerial and technical skills. The Apollo configuration, with a separate and spacecraft, led naturally to system engineering and deeper man: involvement from NASA Headquarters during the development perio the Apollo Program completed, these centers, together with NASA Headq can furnish the managerial and technical skills needed to develop th Shuttle Program in addition to completing on-going programs such as and the Apollo Soyuz Test Project. The configuration of the Shuttle, with tank and orbiter clustered together, results in the lowest cost per flight co with R&D dollar constraints. This approach, however, calls for the highest systems integration and systems engineering. 213 4% SRB MODEL DROP TEST SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM OFFICE NASA Hø. | SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM OFFICE J. S. C. systEM NGINEERING MSFC KSC PROJECTS OFFICE MAIN ENGINE LAUNCH & LANDING SOLID ROCKET 800STER ExTERNAL TANK ORBITER PROJECT OFFICE PROJECT OFFICE ! CONTRACTORS ! CONTRACTOR V CONTRACTORS NASA HC MH73-54/0 2-26-73 214 To capitalize on existing strengths and to minimize the number of personnel required, NASA has developed a “lead center” managment plan (MH73–5470) for the Space Shuttle Program. Basically, the plan utilizes the program office and a multicenter Systems integration group located at the Johnson Space Center as an arm of NASA Headquarters in carrying out the program. The Space Shuttle Program Office in Washington is responsible to The Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight for generating the overall systems performance, schedules, and resource control. We delegate to the Shuttle Program Office at the Johnson Space Center the authority to manage the program on a day-to-day basis, to carry out the integration studies previously done in Headquarters for the Apollo Program, and to contract with industry teams that will produce the Shuttle. The Program Manager at the Johnson Space Center, in turn, utilizes the tech- nical and managerial skills of each Manned Space Flight Field Center to carry out those functions and activities in their special areas of expertise. The Orbiter itself, for example, is the responsibility of the Johnson Space Center while the Solid Rocket Booster, the Shuttle Main Engine and the External Tanks are managed by a team at the Marshall Space Flight Center. Similarly, the Space Shuttle Project Office located at the Kennedy Space Center is responsible for the launch and landing operations, which will take place at that location. Regularly scheduled meetings, attended by all responsible elements of the management teams, includ- ing the participating contractors, are arranged to identify interface issues and programmatic problems. Periodic reviews with top NASA management are also an important aspect of the lead center plan. This management plan has been in effect since July 1971. It is working very well. It has, in fact, eliminated the need for a large group of integrating contractor personnel at NASA Headquarters as will prove to be a very cost effective way of managing the program. NASA/USAF cooperation From its early inception, the Space Shuttle was intended to provide maximum benefit to a variety of users, including the Department of Defense. A joint NASA/ Air Force Space Transportation System Committee (STS) was established in 1970. This committee, chaired jointly by the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for R&D and by the NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, is responsible for a continuing review of space transportation requirements and for making recommendations as to how best to meet these requirements. In addition to this high level group concerned primarily with policy making, a close working relationship has been established at the operations level. USAF personnel are assigned to the various Space Shuttle program offices (MH72– 6783/Rev 2–16–73) while NASA personnel serve in a liaison capacity at HQ SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM ORGANIZATION SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM DIRECTOR E—ſ USAF ] SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM MGR - JSC — — — — — USAF SOFTWARE | | RESOURCEST? I Control || º §fts" |MANAGEMEN BOARD N] | Liſičğāīn) | NiêRATION T I - I SPACE SHUTTLE PROJ ORBITER PROJECT SPACE SHUTTLE PROJ OFFICE MSFC MGR (JSC) OFFICE KSC #==}_ſuSAF) I - - -l I I T sº 0PERAT- || || LAUNCH & PROJECT || |ENGINEER MANUF IONAL LANDING CONTROL |NG *TFS" || Rººms || Ops wer NASA HQ WH72-6783 REV. 2-1 6-73 215 SAMSO. In addition to these full-time personnel who participate in program planning and management activities at all levels, civilian and military representa- tives of DOD serve on source evaluation boards and working groups concerned with aerodynamics, structures, propulsion, crew systems, electronics and opera- tions. DOD further supports the Space Shuttle Program by sponsoring special industry and in-house studies of particular interest to DOD, such as payload requirements, security, crew safety, etc. DOD also provides results of research in the area of solid rocket technology, lifting bodies, thermal protection and similar topics. Management for cost effectiveness To assure that program objectives are achieved on schedule and within author- ized funding limitations, particular attention is being paid to measuring contractor schedule, cost and technical performance and to control program changes which tºld have an impact on program costs and schedules. This is being accomplished y: - Establishing cost targets as part of the design requirements at all work levels. Instilling extreme cost consciousness in all participants by holding them responsible for adhering to cost targets, - Making maximum use of existing facilities and capabilities, Controlling manpower build-up both at the contractors' plants and at NASA installations, - Making use of the contractors’ own management and information systems. NASA top management, being fully cognizant of the need to achieve a low cost program, is making all levels of management aware of the need to implement cost guidelines (MH72–6926&6928). Effective day-to-day implementation of these principles will contribute to attaining our cost targets for the Shuttle. Cost per flight management Another important consideration is the reduction of costs per flight (CPF). A cost per flight management plan has been instituted which makes CPF an engineering design characteristic, to be considered a measurable performance parameter. Such factors as turnaround time, maintenance manpower and spares requirements are under continuous review. In addition, each technical trade-off study is analyzed for its effect on costs per flight. CPF receives top management attention during the decision making process and is used as a means of measuring program performance. Recent vehicle design decisions have provided some margin relative to the ten million, five hundred thousand dollars ($10.5M). SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM C0ST GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT PHASE • USE EXISTING TECHNOLOGY AND OFF-THE-SHELF HARDWARE EMPHASIZE HARDWARE COMMONALITY DESIGN FOR LOW COST PRODUCI BILITY • MINIMIZE TESTING AND PAPERWORK REQUIRED UNDERSTAND AND ACCEPT DIFFERENT DEGREES OF RISK TRADE-OFF DESIRED FEATURES FOR COST • FOCUS ATIENTION ON FEW VERY HIGH COST ITEMS NASA HQ MH72-6926 REV. 2-14-73 216 SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM C0ST GUIDELINES PRODUCTION PHASE • DEFINE COSTS ACCURATELY PRIOR TO START OF PRODUCTION • ESTABLISH FIRM COST CEILING FOR EACH JOB • MEETESTABLISHED COST TARGETS NASA HQ MH72-6928 REV. 2-14-73 Management systems While the size and complexity of the Space Shuttle Program requires a degree of uniformity, this does not mean that each program element should be structured to conform to a common set of management systems and procedures. The Shuttle management approach is based on the conviction that each industry participant in the program has a background of development experience and capability to develop space systems. To utilize each contributor’s resources most effectively, management system objectives and general criteria are specified to be used as a reference by all program participants. At the same time, it is left up to the discre- tion of the major participants to utilize systems and techniques best suited to their Specific Organizational structure, capability and management methods. This balanced approach makes it possible to have available all the necessary tools for decision making, without burdening either the contractors or NASA with costly management systems which place heavy demands on the time and energies of personnel and increase program costs. . To assure that program objectives are achieved on schedule and within authorized funding, particular attention is being paid to measuring contractor Schedule, cost and technical performance and to control program changes which could have an impact on program costs and schedules. This is being accomplished by; establishing cost targets as part of the design requirements at all work levels; instilling extreme cost consciousness in all participants by holding them responsible for adhering to cost targets; making maximum use of existing facilities and Capabilities; controlling manpower build-up both at the contractors’ plants and at NASA installations; and by making use of the contractor's own management and information systems without compromising safety. Performance management system (PMS) A major problem confronting management in programs of the magnitude and complexity of the Space Shuttle is how to measure progress, and how to gauge the ; of Schedule or performance slippages on the achievement of program objectives. 217 A key prerequisite for effective program management is a thorough under- standing of program content and structure. The Work Breakdown Structure (WBS), which defines all program effort required to achieve program objectives is the principal element of the Statement of Work (SOW) given to the Shuttle Program prime contractors. The Statement of Work clearly defines each contractor's tasks, while the WBS divides them into logical and manageable elements, each representing an item of hardware, a service or a function to be performed (MH72–6778/10–1–72). For each element of the WBS, discrete SAMPLE CONTRACT WORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE Masa-ºn- ------ schedules, cost targets and organizational responsibilities are assigned and the contractor held accountable for their accomplishment. The Work Breakdown Structure, detailed functional program plans and design specifications are used by the individual contractors to prepare “logic networks” which are time-phased diagrams detailing the sequence and interrelationship of all program activities, resulting events or milestones and identifying all program interfaces and significant constraints. The work breakdown structure, program plans and logic diagrams provide the principal input to the “Performance Management System” (PMS), a management technique designed to permit project managers to evaluate schedule and cost performance simultaneously in order to predict successful accomplish- ment of assigned tasks. Corrective action is taken in those cases where serious schedule or cost slip- pages are indicated. This system supplies not only information required by management to make intelligent decisions, but it also provides visibility to techni- cal personnel engaged in carrying out these tasks and are held directly accountable for their performance. While the measurement of cost and schedule performance is a key element of successful program management, the tracking of technical accomplishments is no less vital if performance objectives are to be achieved. Technical Performance Measurement (TPM) provides this capability by comparing predicted with actual technical performance. TPM defines data requirements; establishes a technical evaluation performance profile for each selected parameter and for associated critical design factors; establishes milestones and plots actual versus planned values for each factor; assesses the impact on systems performance when trends develop; and, finally, provides a technical evaluation profile, which is reported to NASA program management. TPM tracks performance during the entire hardware development cycle, including simulation, ground and flight tests. 21.8 Configuration management - In highly complex research and development programs, schedule and cost over- runs are frequently caused by design changes made in response to technical problems, or on the basis of changed mission requirements. Unless such changes are properly controlled, and their impact on schedules and cost evaluated before they are implemented, they can seriously affect program cost and schedule objectives. - - For this reason, a balanced Configuration Change Control Management System is being implemented in the Space Shuttle Program which is designed to establish effective controls and to preclude any unauthorized changes to the base-line program, while at the same time permitting the contractor sufficient flexibility to exercise design options when necessary. Actual control is exercised through Program Requirement Control Boards (PRCB) composed of key technical and management personnel who review all change proposals and recommend approval or disapproval to the chairman of the PRCB. Space Shuttle PRCB's are associated with appropriate program levels in accordance with the shuttle program structure (MH72-6767/2–13–73). PRCB’s also perform a program integration function by CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | EVEL 1 - PROGRAM DIRECTOR NASA HOS CONTROLLED REOUIREMENTS (PROGRAM DIRECTION) 8, DIRECTION LEVEL II - PROGRAM MGR CONTROLLED REOUIREMENTS MSC, PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 8, DIRECTION THAT NORMALLY AFFECTS MORE THAN ONE PROJECT OFFICE LEVEL || || - PROJECT MGR CON- MSC MSFC KSC TROLLED REOUIREMENTS & - DIRECTION THAT CLEARLY PROJECT MANAGEMENT AFFECTS A SINGLE PROJECT - OFFICE LEVEL IV — DESIGN ACTIVITY/ CONTRACTOR CONTROLLED REOU! REMENTS IMPLEMENTATION 8, DIRECTION THAT CLEARLY AFFECTS ONLY THE RESPECTIVE PROJECT MANAGEMENT - ELEMENT FOR WHICH THE - DESIGN ACTIVITY/CONTRACTOR HAS RESPONSIBILITY AND THEN . WITH IN THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE NASA PROJECT MANAGER DESIGN ACTIVITY/contRAcroRS NASA HO MAH72-6767 REV 2–13–73 exercising interface control and by determining the effect of changes on other elements of the program. PRCB board procedures insure that each proposed change to the baseline is completely described (including impacts); is thoroughly coordinated, reviewed, and evaluated; is authorized and implemented in an approved manner; and that the contractor properly implements changes processed in this manner. - The activities of the PRCB’s are closely tied to key decision points of the hardware development cycle to insure, both at the systems and the major con- tractor end-item level, adequacy of systems design, and compatibility of the hardware, software and systems design with program baseline requirements. These four critical “decision points” are the Program Requirements Reviews (PRR), the System Requirements Reviews (SRR), the Preliminary Design Reviews (PDR) and the Critical Design Review (CDR) (MH72–6771/2–13–73). These reviews, supported by the program requirements Control Board System allow program management to maintain control over hardware configuration and insure that contractors comply with program requirements in terms of technical performance, in cost and schedules. 219 SPACE SHUTTLE REVIEW SYSTEM REVIEW . LEVEL PROGRAM REOUIREMENTS REVIEW (PRR) || SYSTEM REOUIREMENTS REVIEW (SRR) || CONTRACT PRELIMINARY DESIGN REVIEW (PDR) ||| CONTRACT CRITICAL DESIGN REVIEW (CDR) ||| MONTHLY PROGRAM REVIEWS II/III OUARTERLY PROGRAM REVIEWS II/III SYSTEM PRELIMINARY DESIGN REVIEW (PDR) || SYSTEM CRITICAL DESIGN REVIEW (CDR) || NASA Ho MH72-6771 REV 2–13–73 Information management One of the principal cost drivers in complex R&D programs is the requirement for generation of vast amounts of data and documentation. In past programs, as much as 25% of total costs represented the cost of reports and other documenta- tion. The Space Shuttle Program is making a calculated effort to reduce data costs by exercising control over data generation and distribution. At the same time, care will be taken to insure thalt all information necessary to assure program success is prepared, is compatible with program requirements and available to users. For this purpose, a Space Shuttle “Information Management” activity has been established which is responsible for controlling, monitoring and directing all activities pertaining to information requirements. To asisst in the orderly flow of information from the contractor's plants to NASA management, a docu- mentation tree has been developed which clearly identifies all major data require- ments for the Space Shuttle Program. The content of each report and the basic approach to the data generation is described leaving details to the internal Operat- ing procedures of the performing activities. Contractors must provide assurance that their proposed approaches and techniques are sound and when implemented, will provide the information required to accomplish program objectives. In all information activities advanced communications and display techniques are being employed to further reduce the need for written documentation and reports. Management information centers For day-to-day management of the Shuttle Program, Management Information Centers (MIC) are being installed at NASA facilities and contractors' plants which provide continuing program visibility for shuttle management and Operating personnel (MH72–6780/Rev. 2-16-73). MIC's serve as focal points for planning and status data and display integrated techincal and programmatic data for use by all levels of management. MIC data is closely tied to the Shuttle Work Breakdown Structure used throughout the program. Each MIC contains a common data base and detailed information geared to center and project requirements. This permits management at different locations to communicate easily and aids in program decision making. The information displayed at MIC's and selectively presented to any level of NASA management constitutes data already available from the contractor's own management systems. It does not involve generation of new data either in content or format. Utilization of the contractor's displays reduces data require- ments and minimizes the costs involved. MIC's are linked by a high-fidelity con- 220 SPACE SHUTTLE – MANAGEMENT INFORMATION CENTER NETWORK NASA HO PROG.0FF. MIC f ſiscss. gº MIC A | | -] MSFC : JSC KSC SHUTTLE PROJ. ORBITER PROJ. l_AUNCH & LAND MIC - - MIC PROJ. MIC - A. | -I- | 1– system || S.S.M.E. E.T. sºlº ORBITER CONTRACTOR CONTRACTOR CONTRACTOR CONTRACTOR MIC MIC MIC - MIC T TT | is = = m = = m = ** = = m = = m = ** = m = = m = m = = ** => INFORMATION FLOW FOR CONTROL NASA HQ MHZ2-6780 ==== INFORMATION FLOW FOR LIAISON & INTEGRATION 9-25-72 ference telephone system which, coupled with a facsimile data transmission capability, permits display of data at a high rate for teleconferences. All govern- ment MIC's are being equipped with hardware available from previous programs, making it unnecessary to purchase or lease new equipment. The Shuttle MIC system represents an important management tool designed to complement the Shuttle management concept and intended to provide a low- cost management capability. Summary In 1972 solid progress was made in the Space Shuttle Program. With the final Space Shuttle system configuration selected on the basis of firm technical and economic considerations, the President proposed and congress approved the development of a low cost space transportation system using the space shuttle concept. A contractor was selected for development of the orbiter vehicle and for systems integration and the contract for development of the orbiter main engine was finalized. Systems requirements were defined and a firm program baseline was established, shuttle hardware development and testing, were initiated and launch and landing sites were selected. The Shuttle Program organization was established and a management plan selected which would keep management costs to a minimum by taking full advantage of available capabilities and resources Major program milestones were defined, master schedules prepared and proce- dures developed to assure that program objectives are achieved on schedule and within authorized funding limits. Plans for the next fiscal year call for a build-up in prime and subcontractor manpower for orbiter and Space Shuttle Main Engine development and the award of contracts for all major elements of the shuttle, including the External Tank and the Solid Rocket Booster. Fiscal 1974 funds will provide for an expanded scope of design, development and testing activities and for continuation of subsystems and component development. With the hardware development phase of the Space Shuttle Program well underway, program Schedules and funding projections are based on momentum gained during the past year. - 221 Today’s biggest challenge is to reduce the cost of operating in space. We are confident of increased benefits, new discoveries, and new applications. These prospects will be realized by the Space Shuttle. The operational Space Shuttle of the 1980's will bring into existence a new economical era in space operations. It will allow us to continue the profitable exploration of earth resources, improvement of worldwide communications and education, development of international understanding, and enhancement of national security, and make it possible to take advantage of many new opportuni- ties in space. We will now hear from Douglas R. Lord, Director of the Sortie Lab Task Force. STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS R. LORD, DIRECTOR, SORTIE LAB TASK FORCE, NASA Mr. LoRD. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I am here as the Director of the Sortie Lab Task Force to describe for you two significant activities, the first aimed at defining and developing a Sortie Lab to use in conjunction with the Shuttle, and the second, a laboratory evaluation and simulation program which will test breadboard experiments and subsystems. We have grouped º* activities under the title of Concept Verification Testing ). The Sortie Lab concept as shown in the first chart (MF72–7007) will be designed to be installed in the Space Shuttle cargo bay and to allow nonastronaut scientists to use nearly conventional laboratory equipment at orbital altitudes. The Sortie Lab concept originated in early studies of Shuttle usage which identified unique opportunities that could be derived in shuttle missions of short duration by adding a simple laboratory within the payload bay. The laboratory is made SHUTTLE ORBITER relescopes SORTHE LAB CONCEPT NASA HC MAF72-7007 REV. 2-26-73 93-466 O - 73 - 15 222 up of two main sections. The first is a closed, pressurized module in which experimenters and their laboratory subsystems and experiment apparatus could be located. The second section, called the pallet is exposed to space when the payload bay doors are opened. This struc- ture would support large sensors requiring space exposure, such as the telescopes shown in this drawing. The pallet can be used either in conjunction with the pressurized module and supported by it, or separately mounted in the payload bay and supported directly by the Shuttle Orbiter. - The goals that have been set for the Sortie Lab are many, and varied. (MF 73–5425) First, as a laboratory it must provide the kind of capabilities in space that an experimenter expects to find in a research facility on the ground. Such fundamental characteristics as a shirtsleeve atmosphere, adequate electrical power, instrument pointing capability, data recording equipment, and communications with the ground, will be essential. SORTIE LAB GOALS CAPABILITIES SORTIE LAB RESPONSIVENESS |NTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION NASA HO MF73-5425 2-26-73 Second, since we are planning for a system which will operate over a decade or more, beginning near the end of this decade, we must provide the versatility to meet a variety of as yet undefined uses in all possible scientific and space applications disciplines. . Third, the Sortie Lab must be responsive to the changing needs of the experimenters as they discover and explore new techniques of space-based research. Whereas in the early phases of its use the Sortie Lab will probably contain a variety of simple experiments and sensors, later missions may sometimes be dedicated to a single large and more sophisticated facility, capable of achieving many scientific objectives. The Sortie Lab will be responsive not only in this manner but also 223 by using the quick turnaround capability of the shuttle it will permit early utilization and exploration of new-found techniques and dis- COVeT16S. - - Next, one of the most important goals set for the Sortie Lab is low cost. We believe this can be achieved through judicious use on orbit of the shuttle capabilities, by reuse of the Sortie Lab systems and experimental payloads, and also by employing ground-laboratory support equipment, by simplifying the integration of experiments, and by reducing the leadtime required by the experimenter for ap- proval and documentation. Finally, the Sortie Lab gives us an opportunity for international participation, not only in the planning for and eventual utilization of the system, but now, for the first time in the manned program, in the initial development of a completely new capability. The desire to go forward in space exploration on an international basis has been expressed throughout the world. In the course of our discussions with representatives of the European space community it became evident that the Sortie Lab was ideally suited to the monetary and technological level Europe could commit to this effort during the next decade. Studies conducted by European industrial teams have reinforced this conclusion and it now appears the Sortie Lab will be funded, designed, and fabricated in Europe. My next slide (MF72–5731) expands upon the characteristics we have found desirable in the Sortie Lab design. Of particular signifi- cance is the crew makeup. While two or three members of the crew will be trained astronauts responsible for the shuttle operation and piloting, a minimum of two passengers, requiring only minimal flight qualification, will be available to conduct experimentation. We are considering in our present design efforts the feasibility of increasing that number of passenger-experimenters to five or six. The availa- bility of such a crew of experiment operators would allow continuous 24-hour operations. - Over the past decade the United States has increasingly recog- nized the need for international space exploration. Scientific data has been freely exchanged since the first satellites were launched. Coop- erative programs in the past have built and launched a series of un- manned satellites. Now, with the advent of the Apollo Soyuz Test Project and the decision by the European governments to build the Sortie Lab, international cooperation is reaching a higher and more potentially rewarding phase of cooperation. My next slide (MF73–5428) outlines our present plan for Sortie Lab cooperation. As is recognized, the United States will build and operate the Space Shuttle. It will be available to Europe or other in- terested users on a cooperative or cost-reimbursable basis. The Sortie Lab, however, will be funded, designed, and built by Europe to meet mutually developed requirements. Professor Levy, the chair- man of the European Space Research Organization Council, will discuss in greater depth during later hearings how Europe foresees its role in this program, which the Europeans refer to as Spacelab. Finally, to fill out the program, experimental and application- oriented payloads will be originated and developed by all participants and flights will be cooperatively scheduled. SORT | E LAB Jºliº SERVICES MISSION FEATURES PDWER 2 DR MDRE "MISSION PALUAL SPECIALIS is CUDLINE DFERABLE IN BAY Dº ATTACHED CUSIDE Data management Cºlº-ALMS | Lºſ Dºº-Dº. STANDARD LAB INSTRUMENTS Duº NDBPENDENT OF Jº SLABLE PLATEDRMS wº- NWT TV - PRESSURIZED MODULE ºDO CL FILAE sº slºº Bºlºº Dººl wºulºws EºPººl ºs º-E-Nº-Hº ACCESS TO EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT animºs Dººl. EDTMS *ALLEL Our program of Sortie Lab cooperation with Europe has passed several significant milestones (MF73–5424). In 1972 European Space Research Organization (ESRO) contractors completed three concept definition studies. A joint NASA–ESRO review of these studies was followed by the European decision to commit some $7.5 million to preliminary design activities and to initiate independent science and applications payload planning groups. arly this year the Sortie Lab concept was introduced to potential users in Europe at a symposium attended by some 250 European scientists. Since then preliminary design contracts have been initiated with two European prime contractors selected from the earlier three study teams. We understand that seven nations have listed themselves to participate in the present definition effort: Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Spain. Still other European countries are considering joining this effort. In the meantime, as Europe mobilizes its resources to undertake this program. NASA is continuing at its research and development centers a number of supporting activities (MF73–5423). At the Marshall Space Flight Center we are continuing a parallel º design of the Sortie Lab to firm up the design requirements or Europe. This effort is being concentrated on the experimental and operational aspects of the Sortie Lab, since that is expected to be NASA’s primary responsibility in the program. We will draw on these efforts to provide technical assistance to ESRO and will be establishing a technical liaison office at the European Space Tech- nology Center, a field center of ESRO in Noordwijk, the Netherlands. 225 SORTIE LAB C00PERATION E w ºw s § Ö§ - $Y) § 3. ëstº, Yºº UROPE DESIGN & BUILD U.S. PROVIDE TECHNICAL SUPPORT & OPERATE BOTH U.S. AND EUROPE \\ y § £º; º º - º ;j -& K º º º Q {} USE AS PAYLOAD B0TH EUROPE AND U.S. S. DEVELOP & OPERATE CARRIER DEFINE AND DEVELOP 0PE USE ON COOPERATIVE coopFRATIVE PLANNING R COST REIMBURSABLE BASIS & SCHEDULING NASA HO MF73-5428 2-26-73 EUROPEAN SORTHE LAB B ACTIVITIES 1972 • COMPLETED THREE CONCEPT DEFINITION STUDIES • COMMITTED TO $7.5 MILLION PRELIMINARY DESIGN EFFORT e INITIATED PAYL0AD PLANNING GROUPS IN SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 1973 e INTRODUCED SORTIE LAB CONCEPT TO EUROPEAN USERS e INITIATED PRELIMINARY DESIGN EFFORT WITH TWO PRIME CONTRACTORS e SEVEN NATIONS PARTICIPATING IN THE PROGRAM T0 DATE GERMANY NETHERLANDS |TALY BELGIUM UNITED KINGDOM SPAIN FRANCE MASA HO MF73-5424 2-26-73 In addition to these direct support efforts, at the Ames Research Center we are examining how actual infrared astronomy observations are being made from the Lear jet aircraft and how similar scientific experiments are conducted in the Convair 990 flying laboratory. 226 NASA SORTIE LAB ACTIVITIES 1. PROGRAM DEFINITION STUDIES e PARALLEL DESIGN EFFORT TO DEFINE REQUIREMENTS • SYSTEMS ANALYSES OF OPERATIONS AND EXPERIMENT INTEGRATION e SUPPORT TO ESR0 DEFINITION ACTIVITIES II. ASSESS (AIRBORNE SCIENCE SHUTTLE EXPERIMENT SYSTEMS SIMULATION] e LEAR JET AND CONWAIR 990 FLIGHTS TO SIMULATE SORTIE LAB • CONDUCTING REAL SCIENCE (IR ASTRONOMY) • DEVELOPING SORTIE MISSION PROCEDURES AND TRAINING III. CVT (CONCEPT VERIFICATION TESTING) • FACILITY FOR STUDYING EXPERIMENT INTERFACE PROBLEMS • BREADBOARD EXPERIMENTS AND SUBSYSTEMS • SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS TO REDUCE EXPERIMENT COST NASA HO M F73-5423 2.26.73 This activity, given the acronym of ASSESS, is providing insight into how research is carried out onboard an airplane at very low cost compared to space research. From this we hope to develop and verify low-cost, simple procedures and training requirements for use with the Sortie Lab missions. A third type of program being conducted in support of Sortie Lab is the Concept Verification Testing (CVT) being conducted at the Marshall Space Flight Center. This activity is directed toward bread- board hardware tests of critical subsystems and developing simple, low-cost interface sytems for experiment integration. Experience on earlier programs has shown that integration cost frequently exceeds experiment cost, hence simplified methods may lead to large savings. Probably the most important activity in support of the Sortie Lab program is the continuing dialog which has been initiated on both sides of the Atlantic between potential users of the system and the Sortie Lab designers (MF72–6946). This activity has three important facets. First, potential users define experiments which they envision as being necessary to carry out their observations, and are made aware of how the Sortie Lab can further their programs of scientific and applications-oriented activities. Then payloads are defined by grouping together suitable packages of such equipment. Finally, these payloads are used in further definition of the Sortie Lab concept. Thus a continuing cycle of activities assures us of the most effective marriage of users with their supporting system. These studies have already taught us many things. A common thread is the desire for more man-days of experimentation per flight. **º- *... 227 This has led to consideration of larger, multishift crews aboard and to investigations of missions up to 30 days in duration. We have found that some uses, such as materials and life sciences, require a larger pressurized volume than do such uses as Earth observations and astronomy. The latter activities pose more stringent requirements for large telescopes and antennas precisely stabilized and exposed to space vacuum. These and other requirements are being used to establish new and more realistic design constraints for the Sortie Lab. We have found in our studies that the closer we can come to meeting the requirements of real potential missions having both technical feasibility and scientific merit, the more specific are the emerging design requirements for the Sortie Lab. With this in mind, I would like to show and briefly discuss some artist concepts of three missions we are examining. SORTIE LAB DEFINITION APPROACH TO USER RE0UIREMENTS SHUTTLE SORTIE WORKING GROUPS |REQUIREMENTS/ SORTIE LAB DEFINITION [PAYLOADS DEFINITION STUDIES NASA HO MF72-6946 REV 2-26-73 The first of these is an astronomy mission (MF73–5457), a mission of up to 30 days in duration and requiring a crew of six men. Of the six, four would be dedicated to the multishift operation of the pay- load. In this case, the scientific instruments aboard consist of two telescopes. The instrument in the aft portion of the payload bay is a 1.5-meter aperture infrared telescope designed for remote operation. The instrument adjacent to the pressurized module is a 1-meter aperture diffraction limited telescope configured to bring the focal point into the laboratory where crewmen can examine the image quality prior to taking photographs or spectrographic readings. SORTHE LAB ASTRONOMY nasa Hº Mºſs-5.57 2-23-73 Within the pressurized laboratory are located recording equipments and control instrumentation. The laboratory module is of minimum size, reflecting minimal need for instrumentation, whereas the pallet is quite long, reflecting the requirements for large instruments to be space-exposed. The cylindrical structure located between the Sortie Lab and the Shuttle Orbiter cabin is a docking adapter for possible docking to a free-flying satellite or to another shuttle. Through this module a space-suited crewman could gain access to the externally mounted instruments. The second mission which I would like to describe for the Sortie Lab is a pallet-only mission (MF73–5461). Many potential users of the shuttle are enthusiastic about this mode of operations, since it provides a standard mounting system with the shuttle to which remotely operated or automated payloads can be attached. The pallet and Shuttle Orbiter can provide support such as coarse pointing, electrical power, data handling, communications or control to the payload, which, in the case illustrated, is for Earth observations. The cylindrical instrument on the forward part of the pallet is an optical telescope to view selected areas on the ground with a gimballed scanning mirror to compensate for image motion. The parabolic antenna at the rear of the pallet is a microwave receiver which can penetrate cloud cover to determine the temperature and roughness of º sea. Other cameras and radar imagers are mounted on the pallet to complete the specific payload complement of Earth sensors. Control of these instruments can be provided, when necessary, from two stations in the cabin area. Within the Orbiter cabin the primary control consoles and recording equipment are shown, while the crewman at the window can observe the functioning of the instruments and use the remote manipulators of the shuttle to make simple adjustments. 229 SORTHE LAB PALLET ONLY EARTH OBSERVATION The pallet-only mode of operation is particularly appealing in such scientific disciplines as solar physics or high energy astrophysics where techniques which have been so effectively utilized in balloon flights, sounding rockets, and automated satellites can be adapted to the sortie mode. In some cases the shuttle will serve these experiments for ºins purposes only, with the equipment being nearly self- sufficient. SORTHE LAB LIFE SCIENCES NASA Hº Mº - º - º 55 230 The third mission illustrated (MF73–5456) shows the sortie lab configured to accomplish experiments in life sciences. Since life sciences concentrate on the effect of weightlessness on living organisms and no known need exists to expose specimens to space, no provisions are made for external access or experiments. Instead, the maximum pressurized volume is provided for the housing of living specimens, for specimen examination, and for the conduct of experiments on man, himself. Our present design studies are examining various ways for modifying the size of the pressurized module, as well as the pallet length, by the employment of modular structural techniques. The sortie lab will also have the capability to accommodate multi-disci- pline payloads as well as the single-discipline payloads such as have been described here. - In addition to these design considerations, we foresee the need of a simple procedure to allow a user to participate in a Sortie Lab mission with a minimum of redtape and delay. We are considering ways by which experiment apparatus would be developed by a university, industrial firm or government laboratory and physically integrated into the Sortie Lab racks at the developer's facility. Higher level integration of the racks into the Sortie Lab or large instruments onto the pallet would occur at a central facility, perhaps at the launch site. The experimenters would be given minimal training by NASA, and the orbital mission then flown. The data, experiment apparatus and on-board experimenters would be returned to their sponsoring group for analysis of the flight results. I hope that this brief description of the Sortie Lab program has given you a clear understanding of this unique opportunity to bring together numerous sources of strength, both technical and financial, into a single effort to apply the future international space capabilities to the increase of knowledge and the benefit of the citizen. The financially and tech- nically strong countries which make up the European space community will become full partners in the manned space program. The experience gained by both ESRO and NASA in 15 years of the design of auto- mated spacecraft will be combined with the presence in space of skilled investigators to carry out a more flexible and responsive program of experimentation and development. The Space Shuttle will be augmented by the Sortie Lab to become a more useful space facility without penalizing its role as a low-cost space transportation system. Thank you. . - Mr. FUQUA. Thank you very much, Mr. Lord. You are asking, as I recall, $2% million for the Sortie Lab. Mr. LORD. That is correct. Mr. Fuqua. Is there anything else related to the Sortie Lab, in the budget? Mr. LoRD. Some of the in-house manpower is supported through the development, test, and mission operations funding. Mr. Fuqua. Do you have any idea how much that is? Mr. LORD. Can we supply it for the record please? [Information requested for the record follows: Some support contractor manpower involvement in Sortie Lab definition efforts at Marshall Space Flight Center is funded from Development, Test and Mission Operations (DTMO) in Fiscal Year 1974. DTMO provides for a variety of com- mon technical and disciplinary capabilities necessary to support any program con- 231 ducted at a Manned Space Flight Center. The planning and budgeting for activi- ties like the Sortie Lab assume that the Manned Space Flight Centers will be able to provide the support necessary to meet program requirements on a timely basis. Since this capability is not funded or directed by any specific program and yet is available to all programs, the only practical method of determining the funding related to a specific program is to estimate the extent to which the program will receive support from the DTMO capability. The estimate of the support to be provided by DTMO to Sortie Lab in Fiscal Year 1974 is calculated at approxi- mately $1.0 million. Mr. Fuqua. Certainly. Mr. LORD. The other costs will be taken care of by Europe, at the present time. Mr. Fuqua. Is there a duplication of the work you are doing ; compared with the European, if they are going to build the ab? Mr. LoRD. There is a very clear understanding that NASA and the United States will be the operators of the system when it is developed and supplied by Europe. Therefore, to be prepared to handle the integration of the experimental payloads and all the operational facets of the missions we feel we have to do at least a minimal definition, design-type work, or effort, and provide technical support to ESRO in their design studies. We feel we must have a small cadre of people fully knowledgeable about these kinds of problems. Mr. FUQUA. How many of our people are involved? Mr. LoRD. At the Marshall Space Flight Center, at the present time we have approximately 90 civil service and 55 support contractor personnel involved. Mr. FUQUA. Will that increase or decrease? Mr. LoRD. The design effort will decrease when the definition effort terminates this fall. The operational effort will gradually increase as we get closer to the time of use of the system. Mr. FUQUA. From an operational standpoint if the lab is developed by the European nations—and let me say, I think it is good to get this participation in our space effort, not only for our benefit but for the scientific benefit of the other nations involved—you men- tioned one of the labs that could do something similar to ERTS and some of the others, Earth resources, and if we had a project we wanted to run, would we have to lease the lab on a time basis from ESRO2 Mr. LoRD. No. - Mr. Fuqu A. I know we would have the Orbiter. How would it be accomplished? Mr. LoRD. The laboratories Europe will provide to us will be part of the shuttle system, and be at our disposal and for our use. Mr. FUQUA. Will NASA buy it? Mr. LoRD. No. We will buy a second unit, or any succeeding ones we decide are needed. Mr. MYERs. They will supply the first unit to us, and it will be ours to use on a free and unrestricted basis. Mr. FUQUA. Then suppose they have missions they have a require- ment for? Would they pay their portion of the cost? 232 Mr. LoRD. If they decided to buy additional units for their own use i. ºuld do so and then reimburse us for the cost of the shuttle 8,UI) Cºl. In the areas of cooperative desires there is no reason some of their payloads couldn’t be accommodated as part of some of the missions we would fly, as we have participated in the past in automated satellites. - The third possibility would be for them to lease space on one of our labs, if they had something they wanted specifically that we felt was not up to our standards from a scientific or technical standpoint. Mr. FUQUA. Having in mind the discussion we had yesterday about Skylab–assuming we do not fly Skylab B, and we gathered the data we received from Skylab A and determined that this is a very worth- while area to review for the United States, or the world, for that matter, cooperating with other countries, do you think this would be more exotic experiments than you could fly on Skylab A, say? Mr. LoRD. I think there would be a gradual evolution of this capability through the years. Mr. FUQUA. Would this be technology that we could benefit from? Mr. LoRD. Yes. I think the Sortie Lab will be a powerful develop- ment tool to develop equipments, experiments and techniques which can then be applied to operational systems which would probably be automated. Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Frey. Mr. FREY. In the original shuttle studies, if I recall correctly, the sºrtie Lab may have been a concept, but certainly not much more, was it? Mr. LORD. The concept is a little more than a year old. Mr. FREY. It wasn’t even thought of originally. The Sortie Lab is obviously more utilization of the shuttle, when we look at the total mission profile we have talked about. It will b an economical use for this country, will it not? - Mr. LorD. Yes, sir. Mr. FREY. So what I guess we can say is that in the last year we have been able to find even more economic utilization of the shuttle than 3 years ago, when we started this whole thing. Mr. LoRD. It is a unique opportunity which the shuttle offers us. Mr. FREY. It sure is. I point this out because I think, as many have said, when you get into it you are not sure what you are going to end up with. But our track record is good, and here is another specific example of we didn’t know about that is going to pay off. Will the participation of these European nations in the cost some- how or another reduce the overall cost? Mr. LORD. Yes. Mr. MYERs. Yes. Very definitely. Mr. FREY. I think that is important, too. The fact that somebody else will be paying for something. That is very important. I feel that this is just the tip of the iceberg; this type of cooperation is wonderful, and it is just the beginning, as the chairman said. Mr. LoRD. You will hear, I think, from Professor Levy that the Europeans are very firmly committed to this program, that it is essential for their well being in space, as well as for our own. Mr. Fuqua. Mr. Flowers. Mr. FLow ERs. No question, Mr. Chairman. 233 Mr. Fuqua. Suppose for some unforeseen reason the Europeans decided they did not want to proceed with the Sortie Lab, that funding was too high, or they ran into technical difficulties. What would then be the position of NASA? Mr. LORD. All indications are that they are firmly committed to the program. We do have an escape clause in our discussions with them, that if the cost exceeds to a very large degree the early estimate of around $300 million they can back out as of August 15 of this year. If that did happen I think we would probably come to this body with a proposal that the United States should develop the system on its own. - Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Frey. Mr. FREY. In whatever estimates you are going to come up with, Dale, by the end of March, will you include the estimates of potential returns from this type of mission to the United States? Mr. MYERs. We are going to try. The problem is, it is a unique activity, and these cost-effectiveness studies have been based on com- paring the shuttle with another way to do it. We have here something unique, brand-new, a new opportunity in space, and we are having a difficult time finding a way to compare it with some other way to do that activity. We are going to try very hard to include this new opportunity, new system, in that cost-effectiveness study. Mr. FREY. Are you at all concerned about the fact Skylab A will be completed, in essence, within the next year or year and a half, and ºth, Resources vis-a-vis the shuttle, wouldn’t be for another 6 or 7 years! Mr. MYERs. Yes. We are very worried about that. But it is part of the problem that we ran into in overall funding for the manned space flight programs. Mr. FREY. We are writing off at least 6 years. We are developing knowledge, then stopping at a point where in terms of magnitude, we could be developing two, three, or four times the amount we have, and we are just stopping for 6 years. Mr. MYERs. As far as the opportunities involved with both Skylab and the Sortie Lab are concerned, there is no question that we are going to have a large hiatus in that type of activity. In other areas of Earth resources, the ERTS program will continue development of some of those aspects of the Earth resources program. Mr. FLOWERs. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Fuqua. Mr. Flowers. Mr. FLOWERs. I notice only four European nations are involved in the Sortie Lab. Is that correct? Mr. LORD. No, sir. As my statement indicated, seven have indicated a desire to participate at this time. Mr. FLOWERs. Who put up money? Mr. LORD. All of the seven, with the exception of France. Mr. FLOWERs. I did not realize France was involved at all, except by word-of-mouth. Mr. LoRD. The French reached agreement with the Europeans, and the agreement involved that French industry will receive 10 percent of the design definition effort this year, with the indication that they will be reimbursed for that. Mr. FLow ERs. What sort of group is this? Is it one with any official function or is it an informal group? 234 Mr. LoRD. It is done through the European Space Research Organization, which has been established for some time and has a long history of launching international satellites. Perhaps Mr. Frutkin would care to expand on that. Mr. FLOWERS. The various nations are coming into this in the percentages they have indicated, independent of any previous com- mitment in the organization, is that correct? Mr. LoRD. That is correct. This has been authorized as an ESRO special project, authorized within their charter of existence, whereby a project can be undertaken not necessarily involving all of the member nations. - There are 10 member nations. All 10 are at this time participating in the Space Lab Program Board which is guiding this effort, and 7 have indicated an immediate desire to participate in the definition effort activities underway. Mr. FLow ERs. How much of it is in actuality West German money? Mr. LORD. At the present time approximately 50 percent. Mr. Fuqua. I see Mr. Frutkin here. Would you identify yourself for the reporter, please? You might give us a thumbnail description of ESRO, in about 1 minute. Mr. FRUTKIN. I am Arnold Frutkin, Assistant Administrator for International Affairs, NASA. & Everything Mr. Lord has said is correct. ESRO is a treaty organi- zation, a governmental instrumentality brought into being by agree- ment in 1964 between 10 European countries. Within their charter they have established a special project for the purpose of carrying on the space laboratory development program. There is a legal instrument which these seven governments are enter- ing into with ESRO for that special project. That instrument is open for signature beginning today. We expect there will be some signatures within the next week. It will take only the signatures of Germany and Italy to make it effective. Meanwhile the phase B design studies to which Mr. Lord has referred are in progress, and the contracts are in force, and so on. Mr. FUQUA. I might add, we invited ESRO to participate in the shuttle, some years ago. Mr. FRUTKIN. Yes, sir. Mr. Fuqua. In its early design concepts. Mr. FRUTKIN. Yes, sir. Their participation is the result of 3 years of effort by this group. Mr. Fuqua. And by our invitation. Mr. Winn? Mr. WINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don’t have any questions. I just wanted to say that Chairman Teague and I had the opportunity of meeting with some of the representatives of ESRO in Paris last August on our way back from Russia. I was very impressed with not only the knowledge and type of men that we met there, in this case from Germany, the United Kingdom, France, several from France, and, I believe, Belgium. I was very impressed with their dedication to these projects, to the Sortie Laboratory idea. 235 Now, we did have what I felt was an extremely interesting con- versation, a very thorough briefing. Mr. Wilson of the staff was with us, and we think we asked at that time some very pertinent questions and got very pertinent answers. I believe Mr. Frutkin will agree that part of the problem, at least at that stage of the game—and I think some of the problems have been ironed out now—is the way they want to operate through ESRO and in which direction they can best serve their own interests and the interests of the organization. That was the impression I got. Of course they have political problems, too, like everybody else, and that stems from one word, called “money.” But I was extremely impressed, as I know Chairman Teague was, with these men, with their sincerity and dedication. And certainly they are extremely knowledgeable men. Some are scientists, some are engineers, some are ex-military. It was quite an interesting combina- tion. I think we are on the right path in working through international organizations of this type. Mr. Fuqua and I were on the international committee working for space cooperation, and I felt that was really, Mr. Chairman, one of the first times I had seen truly sound evidence, in person, anyway, of international cooperation. I am extremely enthusiastic about it myself. I think we can open a lot of doors and make a lot of friends. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FUQUA. Thank you, Mr. Winn, for a very fine statement. If there are no further questions, the subcommittee will stand adjourned until Tuesday, March 6, at 9:30 a.m., in room 1302 of the Longworth Building, at which time Mr. Myers will be back with us to discuss shuttle payloads, General Curtin to discuss construction of facilities, and Mr. Culbertson to discuss advanced studies. The subcommittee stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m. the subcommittee adjourned, to recon- vene at 9:30 a.m., on Tuesday, March 6, 1973.] 1974 NASA AUTHORIZATION TUESDAY, MARCH 6, 1973 Hous E of REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICs, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, Washington, D.C. The Subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:30 a.m. in room 1302, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Don Fuqua (chairman of the subcommittee), presiding. Mr. Fuqua. The subcommittee will be in order. We are happy this morning to have as witnesses Mr. Dale Myers, Mr. Philip Culbert- son, and General Curtin. We will discuss a series of items relating to facilities, payloads, and other matters. Please proceed, Mr. Myers. Mr. MYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for the opportunity to comment on manned space flight facilities for fiscal year 1974. General Curtin is with me. Also with me this morning is Phil Culbertson, Director, Mission and Payload Integration, Office of Manned Space Flight, NASA. STATEMENT OF DALE D. MYERS, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, NASA Mr. MYERS. A number of facilities are required to accomplish the shuttle program. However, all fiscal 1974 requests, except the orbiter landing facilities project at Kennedy Space Center, consist of modi- fication or adaptations of existing capabilities to shuttle requirements. In comparison to the Apollo program, the total cost for shuttle facil- ities is lower by almost an order of magnitude because maximum use is being made of the capability that already exists. The first major facility modifications for the Space Shuttle were programed in fiscal years 1972 and 1973. With the selections of: (1) Kennedy Space Center, Fla., and Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., as the shuttle launch and landing sites, (2) the NASA Michoud Assembly Facility, Louisiana, for the external tank production, and (3) Rockwell International as the orbiter and systems integration contractor in calendar year 1972, the locations at which the majority of shuttle functions will be performed have been identified. The major unknown, at the moment, is where the solid rocket boosters will be produced and tested. We expect that this location will be identified when the solid rocket booster contract is awarded this November. The Space Shuttle facilities approved in prior years are all underway to meet critical program schedule requirements. 93-466 O - 73 - 16 (237) 238 As in all prior facilities budget proposals, the fiscal year 1974 re- quest for Space Shuttle facilities has been formulated to meet specific program requirements. The projects included in this year's program (MH73–5490) have been reviewed in detail, to ascertain that they can meet the shuttle program technical and schedule requirements at the lowest cost possible. SPACE SHUTTLE-Construction of FACILITIES-FISCAL YEAR 1974 ESTIMATES Dollars in thousands Research and Development Facilities------------------------------ $19,490 Modifications for Auxiliary Propulsion and Power Systems Test Facilities, White Sands Test Facility, New Mexico.------------- 1, 290 Modifications for Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory, Johnson Space Center, Texas--------------------------------------- 1, 240 Modifications for Radiant Heating Verification Facility, Johnson Space Center, Texas--------------------------------------- 1, 260 Modifications for the Orbiter Propulsion System Test Facilities, Mississippi Test Facility, Mississippi------------------------- 11, 300 Modifications for External Tank Structural Test Facilities, Marshall Space Flight Center, Alabama------------------------------- 4, 400 Manufacturing and Final Assembly Facilities----------------------- 19, 510 Modification of Manufacturing and Subassembly Facilities for the Orbiter, NASA Industrial Plant, Downey, California----------- 2, 650 Modification of and Addition to Final Assembly and Checkout Facilities for the Orbiter, Air Force Plant #42, Palmdale, Cali- Oriºla---------------------------------------------------- 7, 350 Modification of Manufacturing and Final Assembly Facilities for External Tanks, Michoud Assembly Facility, Louisiana_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 9, 510 Launch and Landing Facilities------------------------------------ 28, 200 Construction of Orbiter Landing Facilities, John F. Kennedy Space Center, Florida-------------------------------------- 28, 200 Total.-------------------------------------------------- 67, 200 As indicated, the nine (9) projects are grouped into three categories: (1) Research and development, (2) manufacturing and final assembly, and (3) launch and landing. All are time urgent to meet program schedule requirements as indicated on this chart (BX73–15564(1)). The auxiliary propulsion system, consisting of the orbital maneuver- ing and reaction control systems, must undergo extensive development and qualification tests, including hot firings, under simulated space altitude conditions. The auxiliary power system is to be operated from sea level to space altitude conditions, and must provide hydraulic and electric power, both as an independent source and when integrated with the primary fuel cell electrical power system. The requested modi- fications to the existing Apollo Command and Service and Lunar Module test stands and support systems at the White Sands Test Facility are based on these development and qualification requirements and their continued availability for mission support during the de- velopment flight program. As indicated by this schedule, go-ahead in fiscal year 1974 is required to meet system level tests by the end of calendar year 1975. 23.9 SPACE SHUTTLE FACILITIES C Of F SUMMARY OF NEED DATES FISCAL YEAR 1974 CY 1973 || CY 1974 CY 1975 CY 1976 CY 1977 CY 1978 1 2 3 4 || 1 || 2 || 3 || 4 || 1 || 2 || 3 || 4 || 1 , 2 3 4 || 1 2 3 4 || 1 , 2 3 4 F TA P R O G R A M MIL E S TO N E S Lºs FHF FMOF PROPULSION ANi) POWER SYSTEMS AVIONICS INTEGRATION LABORATORY HEATING VERIFICATION FACILITY PROPULSION SYSTEM TEST FACILITIES STRUCTURAL TEST FACILITIES -- MSFC AND SUBASSEMBLY FACILITIES FOR ORBITER - – DOWNEY FINAL ASSEMBLY AND CHECKOUT FACI - FOR ORBITER -- [DT) FINAL ASSEMBLY FACILITIES FOR TANKS -- MAF CONSTRUCTION OF ORBITER LANDING FACILITIES -- KSC NASA HQ BX 73-15564(1) 10–11-72, REV. 2–28-73 The shuttle avionics subsystems must function together reliably during launch, space flight, reentry, and return aerodynamic condi- tions. The capability to develop, integrate and to verify the overall flight avionics systems is to be provided by the modifications in Building 16 at the Johnson Space Center for the Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory (SAIL). At this location, the shuttle flight avionics can be integrated with mission control, the worldwide communications net- work, software development and crew training facilities already in place at Houston and will continue to be available for support during development and operational flights. The combined orbiter structure and overlaying thermal protection system (TPS) materials must be verified for proper performance prior to committing to production and manned flight. To accomplish this verification, full-scale, flight configured test articles, such as wing tips, fillets, wing leading edges, and so forth; must be subjected to reentry atmospheric pressure and temperature rises and structural loadings caused by aerodynamic flight. The modifications for the radiant heating verification facility at Houston are to meet this re- quirement. * The main propulsion system of the orbiter, consisting of the three main rocket engines, associated feed lines and controls and the large external tank must be qualified for proper performance under various flight conditions prior to commitment to launch and flight into orbit. This system requirement is separate and distinct from the capability to develop and to qualify the single main rocket engine that was provided for at the Mississippi Test Facility in the fiscal year 1972 and fiscal 240 year 1973 programs. Full duration, approximately 500 seconds, pro- pulsion system test firings are required to develop confidence in system flight performance and thermal control; to develop and validate ground launch operations; to evaluate off-nominal system operation; and to provide data to support system dynamics analyses such as the “POGO’’ effect experienced with large, liquid rocket systems. The external tank, a major structural element of the Space Shuttle vehicle, requires verification of its structural integrity prior to com- mitment to production and luanch. The tank, which provides the propellants to the orbiter main engines, must withstand the static and dynamic loadings of the solid rocket boosters and the orbiter as well as the stresses of varying propellant levels during launch into orbit. In addition, the tank must be fabricated of lightweight structure to conserve overall Shuttle payload performance, thereby requiring detailed knowledge of its structural performance at cryo- genic temperatures. The modifications to the existing S-IC Static Test Facility at Marshall Space Flight Center, to test the liquid hydrogen tank, are based on these requirements. The modifications for manufacturing and final assembly facilities are required to provide the capability at existing government plants to perform the many tasks of component fabrication, Subassembly, development and test, and systems assembly. The reusable, man- rated orbiter subassembly work will be accomplished at the NASA Plant, Downey, Calif., and final assembly and checkout at Air Force Plant 42, Palmdale, Calif. Manufacturing and final assembly of the external propellant tank will be accomplished at the Michoud Assembly Facility, New Orleans, La. It was selected for this work because of the basic capability for fabrication, assembly and testing of large structures, such as the external tank, and the availability of water transportation for the completed tanks to the launch and landing sites at Kennedy Space Center, Fla. and Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif. With the selection of the external tank contractor expected in August 1973, the design of the tank and major subsystems will progress to the point that fabrication of the structural test article will be required to start in calendar year 1974 to support testing in calendar year 1975. The Orbiter Landing Facility at Kennedy Space Center is the first of a series of projects to provide the capability to launch and land the Space Shuttle from the Kennedy Space Center. A runway adjacent to the launch areas is required to provide safe landing and ready transfer of the orbiter to safing and deservicing areas and subsequent refurbishment and preparation for launch. In addition, the runway is located to provide for recovery of the orbiter in the event of an abort during launch and ascent to orbit. The location, width, and length of the runway were established after careful con- sideration of the conditions under which the orbiter may be landing º the rapid turnaround operations to be implemented after landing roll Out. These projects comprise the currently foreseen fiscal year 1974 facilities needs. Mr. Fuqua. Now, Major General Curtin will comment, further. 241 STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. R. H. CURTIN, USAF (RET), DIRECTOR, FACILITIES OFFICE, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION, NASA General CURTIN. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: The fiscal year 1974 budget request for construction of facilities totals $112 million, of which $67.2 million relates to facility projects directly in support of the Space Shuttle. An additional $8.9 million is also requested for Space Shuttle facility planning and design activities. This makes a total of $76.1 million, or almost 70 percent of this total request, which is Space Shuttle-related. This amount for Shuttle facilities activities compares to $31.7 mil- lion in fiscal year 1973, for these same purposes. I will first cover the Space Shuttle requirements recognizing that there is also included one additional manned space flight facility project which is not Shuttle-related and which will be covered later. This indicates that the additional amounts required in fiscal year 1974 for Shuttle facilities and related facility planning, in a major way, account for the increase in our total estimates for construction of facilities this year, as compared to the $77.3 million in fiscal year 1973. This fiscal year 1974 request for Space Shuttle facilities is a phased extension and continuation of the fiscal years 1972 and 1973 programs for this purpose, as well as providing for the first phase of launch and landing facilities at Kennedy Space Center, Fla. These earlier construction of facilities resources provided a total of $47.9 million and, as now allocated, include $17.2 million for facilities for the testing of the Space Shuttle main engine (SSME), $21.4 mil- lion for direct Shuttle research and development-type facilities, and $9.3 million for the initial phases of modifications required at selected Government-owned plants to provide for orbiter and external tank manufacturing capabilities. Attachment 1 to this statement shows the details of this allocation, as well as for other resources applied to Shuttle facilities. For ease of reference, attachment 2 is a map which indicates the specific major locations thus far selected for Space Shuttle activities, which involve facility work. This specific fiscal year 1974 request for Shuttle facilities, which consists of 9 projects, totals $67.2 million, as previously mentioned. Of this total, $19.5 million is for research and development facility work at four locations, as follows: a. White Sands Test Facility, N. Mex- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - $1,290,000 This project provides for the modification of three existing altitude test stands at this location to provide capability for the development and qualification of three orbiter systems. These are: (1) the Reaction Control System (RCS) consisting of several small engines, each to have a thrust in the range of some 800 to 1,200 pounds; (2) the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) consisting of two rocket engines, each to have a thrust in the range of about 5,000 to 10,000 pounds; and (3) the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU). These modifications are mostly mechanical in nature, in- volving thrust mounts, liquid nitrogen capabilities and an exhaust gas pumping system and related work to increase the reliability and safety of the existing test stands, as well as to reduce the operational costs of these test activities. b. Johnson Space Center, Tex---------------------------------- $2,500, 000 242 There are two projects involved at this location. The first of these provides for modifications to the existing Spacecraft Research Office and Laboratory. This work is necessary to accommodate flight guidance, navigational and control equipment; flight crew station mockup; and simulators related to the space shuttle program. The modified facility is necessary to support the development and verification of flight avionics hardware and the integration of this hardware with the shuttle orbiter flight software. These modifications are estimated to cost $1,240,000 and mainly involve equipment. The second project is for modifications to an existing building, the Translation and Docking Simulation Facility. This work is needed to provide a high temperature, low pressure capability for verifica- tion testing of full-scale flight-configured thermal protection system test articles. This capability is necessary to test and verify the behavior of the structure and materials proposed for use in the construction of the thermal protection system prior to committing it to production and subsequent manned space flight. The work primarily consists of the installation of an existing altitude chamber; pro- curement and installation of radiant heaters; and the installation of an associated heat exchanger and related pumping equipment. c. Mississippi Test Facility, Miss------------------------------ $11,300,000 This project is required to modify the existing Saturn V First Stage (S-IC) Test Stand, Position B–2, and related test control center and supporting systems at this test site. It is needed to provide capability for developmental and qualifica- tion testing of the orbiter's main propulsion system. This is a distinct and separate requirement from that for the testing of single engines to be accomplished on the A-1 and A-2 test stands and previously provided for. They system to be tested on this facility will consist of a “cluster” of three of the planned liquid hydrogen/ liquid oxygen main orbiter engines with the external propellant tank. The entire propulsion system to be tested will consist not only of the engine “cluster” and tank, but will also reflect the geometry of the “feed line” system and other neces- sary connections to the external propellant tank. It will thus reflect the perform- ance of the propulsion system as a whole. The work includes: the addition of a liquid hydrogen transfer, distribution and disposal system; related extension of the gaseous hydrogen system; provision for a liquid hydrogen dock at the test stand; modifications to the structural system, such as load frame and access plat- forms, rehabilitation and modification to the stand's mechanical and electrical systems; and modifications and additions to the instrumentation and control systems. d. Marshall Space Flight Center, Ala- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - $4,400, 000 This work is required to modify an existing test facility at the Marshall Space Flight Center to provide capability for structural testing of the liquid hydrogen tank portion of the shuttle external tank. The liquid oxygen tank and the inter- tank components, that comprise the remainder of the external tank, will be tested in other existing MSFC facilities that do not require facility modifications for this purpose. The work involved in this project mainly consists of the removal and relocation of the existing flame deflectors; the augmentation of the adjacent liquid hydrogen storage, transfer and disposal systems; and the modification of the service platforms and structural members, as well as modifications and extension of the electrical and mechanical utilities. The second increment, $19.5 million, of the $67.2 million shuttle facility total is for the modification of Government-owned manufacturing plants at three locations. These are as follows: a. Downey Industrial Plant, Calif------------------------------- $2,650, 000 This request is to continue and extend the FY 1973 increment which provided for modifications and alterations on those elements of work required to Support program management and the initiation of fabrication at this exsting government facility. This initial fabrication involves the crew compartment and forward and aft fuselage air frames for early structural testing. This FY 1974 increment pro- vides the additional modifications necessary for complete manufacturing, System development and test capabilities for the crew module, and forward and aft fuse- lage sections of the orbiter vehicle. The main facilities to be modified in this proj- ect are the Manufacturing Building, which is needed to provide adequate tube 243 forming and the structural subassembly work stations, and an engineering area; and the Chemical Processing Facility for orbiter components processing. In addi- tion to the work in these two facilities, work will also be done on the Space System Development Laboratory to provide an upgraded thermal vacuum test and a mechanical and fluid component testing capability for the orbiter components and systems; on the Crew Module Testing Building to provide the capability to con- duct pneumatic testing of the crew module; and on the Systems Installation and Checkout Building for the installation and checkout of electrical, electronic and fluid systems in the orbiter crew module, aft and forward fuselage. While addi- tional rehabilitation work on this large facility will be required in the future, this increment, as requested in FY 1974, will complete all initial programmatic facility needs, recognizing that some modifications may be required by future production, manufacturing or like programmatic changes. b. Air Force Plant No. 42, Palmdale, Calif.---------------------- $7, 350, 000 This project provides for the modifications and additions to an existing facility to accommodate the subassembly of major sections and final assembly and checkout of the space shuttle orbiter. This site was selected for these purposes because of its proximity to the prime contractor's main operations at Downey, Calif., and its accessibility to the existing long runway system at Palmdale. The high bay and mezzanine areas, as well as a utility annex of this existing large hangar-type structure, must be extended to meet shuttle needs. Modifications to the existing facility will also provide required areas for such purposes as auto- matic checkout equipment control and computer rooms, telemetry ground station, Shops, clean rooms, laboratories, preassembly, final assembly checkout stations, and administrative space. A nitrogen and helium gaseous storage and transfer System and appropriate supporting utilities will also be provided. These are all detailed in the project documentation contained in the budget estimates. Again, except for any follow-on rehabilitation and modification work, this request pro- vides for all of the currently foreseen facility work needed for initial operations. c. Michoud Assembly Facility, La------------------------------ $9,510, 000 This project is necessary to provide for modifications and additions to the existing government-owned facility at this location. It is needed to provide space for the manufacture, final assembly and checkout of the space shuttle liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen external tanks. The work generally includes modifica- tions of and a high bay addition to the main Manufacturing Building, modifica- tions to the Vertical Assembly Building, a high bay addition to the Booster Hangar Facility, and the construction of a heat-treatment facility. This project, which is an extension of the FY 1973 increment, is required to provide for fully Operable major and final assembly as well as for test and checkout facilities. This will complete the requirements necessary to provide a capability to produce complete external tanks at the rate of approximately 24–28 per year. This rate is required to support the early phases of the shuttle development and opera- tional programs. This increment will provide a surface treatment facility for the treatment of the external tank skin sections; major and final assembly positions for the liquid oxygen and hydrogen tanks, as well as for the complete external tank; operable stations for the application of insulation to the tanks; and a heat treatment facility to strengthen the welding joints and properly condition the tank material. Additional work will be required in the future if it becomes neces- Sary to increase the external tank production rate above the quantities indicated. The third and final increment of this year’s total Space Shuttle facili- ties request is the largest. It involves: Kennedy Space Center, Fla------------------------------------ $28,200,000 This Florida location and Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., have previously been selected as the sites for the launch and landing of the space shuttle. The se- lection of Kennedy Space Center, of course, will permit us to make maximum use of the extensive and unique Apollo facilities which exist, many of which can be adapted for shuttle use. The total range of shuttle facilities needed at Kennedy Space Center will include: Launch facilities; launch support facilities; orbiter landing facilities; maintenance facilities; and logistics facilities. This year's project, “Construction of Orbiter Landing Facilities”, provides the first increment but, nontheless, a major portion of the landing facilities necessary for the return of the orbiter from space, as well as for orbiter horizontal flights. The project includes 244 | * a 15,000-foot-long by 300-foot-wide runway, an aircraft parking apron, a 10,600- foot-long “towaway”, airfield lighting and related area utilities. The “towaway” is required to connect the landing facility with the existing Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) area where the orbiter will be maintained and checked out. This project is essential to the launch and landing of the space shuttle at Kennedy Space Center and, as included in this request reflects that work which must get under way during this time period. The actual paving and related site preparation and earthwork by far constitute the major elements of this request. It is also estimated that approximately $10 million will be required in future CoE programs to complete the landing facilities by providing such items as a flight operations building with control tower, an orbiter “safing” facility, emergency mechanical arresting gear and the completion of the related utilities and site work. This added work just mentioned relates only to the landing facility itself and does not reflect the additional work needed in subsequent years to provide the total range of º in other categories needed at Kennedy Space Center and outlined €3.TIlêT. These space shuttle facilities projects are very much “time sensi- tive”—that is, each is specifically related to some established pro- grammatic “milestone” or need-date. Not only has the time required for design and construction been considered, but also, as appropriate that needed for checkout and activation. On this basis, then, it can be said that all of these fiscal year 1974 shuttle facility projects are clearly geared to the overall shuttle master schedules and are essential to the support of such schedules. In fiscal year 1973 we first began, in a substantial way, to become involved in the planning and design work for the then emerging space shuttle facilities program. This program is of such a magnitude and nature as to justify separate consideration and for that reason its planning needs are reflected as special requirements under facility planning and design. There is a total of $8.9 million included in this year's request for space shuttle facility planning activities. This includes studies, en- gineering support, and the preparation of preliminary engineering reports for upcoming projects, and the final design for the pending fiscal year 1975 facility needs. This specific design, when accom- plished, will essentially complete facility design for the shuttle ground test program, the early and initial phase of Solid Rocket Booster ºproduction and test facilities, and the pads and mobile launchers at More specifically, preliminary engineering work to be carried out under this request relates to the need to provide facilities with capa- bilities to receive, service and recover the SRBs, and other activities concerned with the recovery of this flight hardware. Comparable pre- Jiminary work will also be done with regard to the facilities needed for the production and testing of these boosters. In the same way and the same manner, final design efforts to be provided for by this request will relate to the facility needs for dynamic testing, thermal vacuum and materials testing, and crew training facilities, as well as the early phase of the production and test requirements for the solid rocket boosters and the modification of launch pads, mobile launchers and such follow-on launch and Janding needs at Kennedy Space Center. This completes the review of the major aspects of the fiscal year 1974 request for Space Shuttle facilities for a total of $67.2 million, and for shuttle planning activities which require $8.9 million. This total of $76.1 million, which has just been covered, is presented in considerably more detail in the documentation of the budget esti- mates. 245 This program certainly is solid evidence of our intent to make maximum use of the existing facilities available to us. The full range of modifications to, rehabilitation of, and additions to such existing facilities as contained in these estimates is evidence of this fact. In addition to the Space Shuttle facility needs just reviewed, there gºhº additional Manned Space Flight project which is at 1Clell, Là. Slidell Computer Complex, La--------------------------------- $1,085, 000 This nonshuttle project is for the modification of the power system at the Slidell Computer Complex. This large computer complex mainly provides support to NASA activities at Marshall Space Flight Center, Mississippi Test Facility, and Michoud Assembly Facility. This project will provide static uninterruptible power capability as a modification to the existing system. This is necessary to minimize electrical power irregularities impacting critical computer equipment and thus assure the effectiveness and reliability of these operaticns. This requirement has been generated by the installation of larger, more complex and more sensitive equipment, as well as the larger volume output now required of this complex. Mr. Chairman, this completes my statement with regard to space shuttle facilities, as well as to the single nonshuttle project. I will now be pleased to furnish any additional information needed, or to respond to any questions you may have. Mr. FUQUA. Thank you for your presentation. We are happy to have you here. Congressman Mosher, ranking minority member of the Committee on Science and Astronautics is here this morning and would like to ask some questions. Mr. MOSHER. Frankly, I am not sure that this is the right place to ask this question, but I am aware that your jurisdiction has to do with all NASA facilities. General CURTIN. Yes, that is right. Mr. MOSHER. I note on page 13 of the testimony that you presented, your reference to NASA’s intent to make maximum use of the existing facilities available. General CURTIN. Yes. Mr. MosBER. It is in that regard, and because it is in my district, ; I have to be terribly concerned about NASA's Plum Brook acility. * Now, let me just say that I think it is a supurb facility but that is to be closed. I have no idea whether Plum Brook would make any sense for some use in your manned space program, on which you are testifying here. And I am not asking at this time necessarily for an off-the-cuff answer, but I would like to have a really carefully consid- ered answer to this, a statement in this regard for the committee as to what the potential in NASA's plans is for this facility [Plum Brook]. As you know, it is being phased out and it will be put in mothballs, so to speak. Nobody seems at this time to know when it might be used. I would therefore like a better idea of this from you. Its resources are unique in many ways, for example, there is the tremendous environmental tank there; also the reactor is located there and many test stands. More than $120 million has been invested in that that facility in the last few years by the Government. A wonderful team of competent scientists and engineers and tech- nicians exist there. Now, all of a sudden we are breaking it up. We are doing away with it. I cannot help but look upon this as a very serious 246 waste of Federal funding and Federal competence. Certainly, General, there must be alternatives for the use of that facility. Now, not at this moment, but after you have seriously considered this, will you please respond to this as to what the potential is? [Information requested for the record follows: The availability and capability of the Plum Brook facilities (and personnel) are being made known to all potential user agencies. Some of the specific actions in this regard that are presently underway, near implementation, or in the planning Stages, are: 1. The Lewis Research Center is preparing a “package of materials” which describes the capabilities of Plum Brook Station in detail. This package, or brochure, will be used as the reference base for discussions with prospective user agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Transportation, the Department of the Interior, the Department of Commerce and others. This brochure should be available in the near future. 2. The Director of the Lewis Research Center has been in contact with a number of prospective users, including, for example, the Electric Research Council. We understand that this Council plans to establish, in the near future, an Electric Power Research Institute funded at a substantial level by a charge on all privately owned participating utilities. Mr. William Meese, Detroit Edison, has been named to be the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the new Institute and Dr. Chaun- cey Starr, UCLA, the Director. Both these gentlemen have been contacted with regard to the feasibility of establishing the Institute at either the Cleveland or Plum Brook site. 3. The Lewis Research Center, through the Greater Cleveland Growth Asso- ciation, has been in touch with the Business and Employment Council of the Governor of Ohio regarding a council recommendation to establish a state funded Ohio Development Center. It is the understanding of Lewis that this proposed Center may be funded at a $5M level over the next two years. Conceivably, the Plum Brook Station might be the location for such a Center. 4. With regard to the Reactor Facility at Plum Brook, the Station is presently making a cost study to determine if the reactor might be efficiently utilized for environmental research. In this proposed application, the reactor would be operated at power levels below 10 megawatts for the purpose of irradiating various types of environmental samples (biological, atmospheric, fuels, etc.) for the purpose of determining trace elements contained therein. This work, if performed, would be done for the Environmental Protection Agency. Small scale efforts of this nature have been conducted previously in the reactor. The reactor has also been used for performing various irradiation programs for the Atomic Energy Com- mission. This work involved the irradiation of uranium carbide fuel samples for possible use in land-based power generation plants. 5. The Space Power Facility at the Plum Brook Station consists of a 100' diameter x 120' high vacuum chamber. In it, it is possible to conduct a wide variety of experimental programs requiring a high vacuum environment. For example, the spacecraft shroud to be used in connection with NASA's Skylab Program was recently tested in this facility. Presently, the facility is being prepared for extensive testing of the shroud that will be used in NASA’s Viking Project. That work is expected to continue into early calendar year 1974. However, under NASA’s presently restructured program, there are no additional programmatic needs for the use of this facility and it is anticipated that it will be placed in standby mode by the end of Fiscal Year 1974. Inquiries are received from time to time concerning possible use of this very large vacuum facility by other federal agencies or depart- ments and, when possible, Lewis has accommodated these requests. For example, in December, 1972, a short duration project was completed for the Air Force. Investigations are presently underway on the feasibility of the use of the facility again for a short term project some time within the next several months. We will continue to seek means of accommodating possible uses for the facility by other agencies. The brochure in preparation, which was referred to in item 1, will include a complete description of the capabilities of this facility. 6. The previous items, for the most part, cover actions which are in preparation or contemplated. In addition, there are a number of activities with other depart- ments presently in effect. Among these are: a. The Wild Life Research Unit of the Department of Interior presently has a Use Agreement with the Station for office and laboratory facilities. This agreement has been in effect for several years and present plans are to continue it as long as the facilities can be made available. 247 b. A Use Agreement is presently being negotiated with the Department of Interior, Population Management Branch, for office space and equipment storage Space. - c. A Use Agreement has also been executed with the Department of the Army for the use of approximately 10 acres of land located in the Plum Brook Station buffer zone. The Army plans to build a Training Center on this plot to conduct Army Reserve meetings. d. A Use Agreement is being negotiated with the Ohio Air National Guard for an area of approximately 370 acres which will be used as a training site by the 200th Civil Engineering Squadron, Camp Perry, Port Clinton, Ohio, for the purpose of training Air National Guard personnel in deployment exercises for establishing temporary airfield bases. e. Use Agreements exist with 34 different parties for the farming of approxi- mately 2500 acres of the Plum Brook Station (nearly one-third the total Station acreage) in the buffer zone area outside the perimeter fence. General CURTIN. Yes. The director of Lewis Research Center has undertaken a rather comprehensive plan on that phase down. We do not have his detailed plans yet. I do know that the potential uses by NASA and other Government agencies are some of the considerations in the planning. I will undertake to see that the committee is advised as to the latest status of this matter. . Mr. MosHER. Thank you. Mr. FUQUA. Yes, thank you. Mr. MosBER. I appreciate your doing this and the opportunity of having this on the record. Mr. Fuqua. We are glad to do this. As you recall, last year the sub- committee on NASA oversight went into the activities of GSA regard- ing surveys of facilities that were not in use. One included land at Langley and also at Lewis. General CURTIN. Yes. Mr. MYERS. Yes. Mr. Fuqua. Do you know at this time what the present status of these surveys are, that is the land that is considered excess by GSA? General CURTIN. The land at Lewis was, in our judgment, closely related to potential impacts from the planned expansion of the adjoining airport. The present status is that it will be held in abeyance. Further action on this matter will be held in abeyance by GSA for the developments on the airport expansion there. We are reporting these particular developments every 6 months to GSA. We assume that they will take the issue up in about 2 years. - e Mr. FUQUA. Have you updated these data since we had the meetings in August? General CURTIN. Yes. We are also keeping them advised of our evaluations as to the impact of the airport expansion, and as to how it may affect this matter. They agreed to a deferral on this. We assume that it will be raised again in 2 years and we will evaluate it then, Now, as to the land at Langley. They have pretty well accepted our position that it should now not be excessed but will be studied again in the years. The only pending action at this time involving GSA is the 2,600 acres at the Wallops Station. That requirement was reduced to under 400 acres by GSA. They propose to take and transfer that amount of land to the Department of the Interior for fish and for wildlife subject, of course, to certain restrictions for NASA use. We have no objection to that and we are awaiting the action. ... Mr. FUQUA. Has any land been declared excess since the time of the hearings last August, General? 248 General CURTIN. There were some minor ones, but they were not necessarily the result of the GSA survey. Mr. Fuqua, Could you provide us with that list of those proper- ties that you have declared excess? General CURTIN. Yes. [The information to be supplied follows: Since August 1972 NASA has reported to GSA, as being excess to NASA needs, the following land: 52 acres comprising the Eastville Camera Site, Eastville, Va., 110 acres comprising the Space Radiation Effects Laboratory, Newport News, Va. Mr. Fuqua. It was my understanding that some years ago the White Sands test facility was to be phased down to a minimal stand- by status. What is going on there now, General Curtin? General CURTIN. I think that Mr. Myers could cover that subject better than I. However, there are components and materials testing underway and there are support activities for the Skylab and the Apollo–Soyuz Test Project. A Japanese engine development program is also being worked there. Mr. Fuqua. You are asking for money in the budget for modifica- tions to the test facilities. Can’t this be accomplished at the Arnold Engineering Development Center? - Mr. MYERs. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Fu QUA. Yes? Mr. MYERs. We made a complete survey of the use of the facilities for both the main engine and the reaction control system. Now, at the time that we were considering a two-stage fully reusable booster con- cept, we needed help regarding the engine testing. We had planned to use the AEDC to test the engine under altitude conditions. When we made the decision to do this testing at sea level, we no longer needed the altitude test operation. In our final studies, we found a major advantage to using the facili- ties at MTF for the Space Shuttle main engine. It has been agreed to by the Air Force and AEDC. Since that time we have had the use of AEDC for testing of the reaction control system and the orbital maneuvering system. Now, in this case, we found a distinct advantage from a cost view- point or standpoint to use the White Sands facility. We need major system testing. We have just reviewed in the last month the trade study with AEDC. They agreed that there is no duplication in this White Sands facility. Mr. FUQUA. You mentioned the Japanese engine testing program a moment ago. Mr. MYERs. Yes. Mr. Fu QUA. What is this? Mr. MYERs. The Japanese have arranged with the United States º, ſº transfer of technology for a license to build the Thor launch VēIllCle. Now, the testing of that activity is located at White Sands. There are Japanese test activities there. They have support from us. Mr. Fuqua. I heard on the news this morning of the McDonnell- Douglas joint venture with the Japanese to launch a vehicle satellite using an American launch. e Mr. MYERs. Yes. That is right. That is the Thor launch vehicle. They are using the international rocket engine on this. The training of 249 the Japanese engineers and technicians is being handled in this coun- try. Part of it is done at White Sands. S Mºvova. What is the leadtime for the construction at White 8.D.OlS General CURTIN. Just a moment. Mr. Fuqua. Yes. General CURTIN. The design effort will take 9 to 12 months, March of 1973 to early 1974. The construction will start in December of 1973 to January of 1974, with a target date of completion of April of 1975. Following that, there will be 3 to 4 months of checkout. We plan to start testing around the first of October, 1975. Mr. FUQUA. Then the stretchout of the Shuttle program has been taken into account? Do these leadtimes reflect that? General CURTIN. Yes. They are the Space Shuttle program mile- stones that are shown on the chart. (BX73–15564(1)) This is correct. Mr. FUQUA. Now the Marshall Center, you are asking for $4.4 million. There is a $17.4 million shown as expended from prior years funds as far as the book value of the existing stand. General CURTIN. Yes. Of the $17.4 million, $12.6 million relates to the static test stand and $4.8 million to the control center there. This was finished in 1964. The “book value” of the actual facility is what is referred to. Mr. FUQUA. Regarding the modifications at Downey. I refer to Air Force Plant 42. How far is Palmdale from Downey? General CURTIN. About 40 to 50 miles as the “crow flies,” Mr. Chairman. Mr. FUQUA. How do you plan to get the orbiter from Downey to Palmdale? - General CURTIN. It will arrive in Palmdale for final assembly of major components. It will be transported by air or by road. Mr. FUQUA. Final assembly will be at Palmdale rather than Downey? General CURTIN. Yes. Mr. FUQUA. How many additional facilities are required for final assembly work? General CURTIN. For the final assembly at Palmdale, we are asking for $7,350,000. This is Air Force Plant No. 42. At Palmdale, we are taking over a large building which is Building No. 294—a large hangar type of facility. We have to enlarge that facility and expand it for the assembly operations. The major portion of this would be an extension on one end of it. We will provide a ramp and other exten- sions and a lot of additional internal mechanical and electrical work to make the area fully usable for the Shuttle final assembly. Mr. FUQUA. What other modifications do you plan at Palmdale? General CURTIN. At the present time there are none that are planned, except for possible additional rehabilitation and modification of the facility, as well as any work required by subsequent adjustments that may come along in the manufacturing and production planning. The requirement that we have shown, except for normal rehabilita- tion, covers all of the presently foreseen requirements. We would also like to report that we have had additional contacts with the Air 250 Force to see what other support for our requirements might be available to be met from the available assets at Palmdale. Now, Mr. Chairman, at the moment, Building 294 is the only one that appears to be available for our purposes. Mr. FUQUA. Did the Air Force use this facility for high-performance jet aircraft development? General CURTIN. Yes; that is right. Mr. FUQUA. It is not suitable as is for what you are planning to do? General CURTIN. It was more of a flight checkout facility as opposed to a manufacturing facility. Mr. Fuqu A. How many people would be employed at Palmdale, General, as far as the final assembly work is concerned? General CURTIN. About 850, as currently estimated. Mr. Fuqu A. 850? General CURTIN. Yes. Mr. Fuqua. What about Michoud? You are asking now for $9,510,- 000. What is the relationship between this project and the project for modification of the external tank structure test facility at Marshall? General CURTIN. This project provides for, among other things, the construction of the test articles that will go to Marshall for testing. This is a production facility basically, while the Marshall facility is basically for the structural testing of the first test article that will be produced. Mr. Fuqu A. It is the committee's understanding that a high bay extension would be required only if the orbiter was to be assembled at Michoud. General CURTIN. This is not quite correct. In last year's program, we presented Michoud as a possible site for orbiter manufacturer. We had a statement in the documentation, indicating that a high bay extension might be required. The high bay extension in this project involves 30,000 square feet and is 95 feet high. This is now related to external tank manufacture, so that the tanks can be manufactured and welded in a vertical position. It is for a different purpose. Now, at that earlier point in time, we did not know the mode for the external tanks. We did not have the planning point indicating that this would be a requirement. Mr. FUQUA. You said that the production plan is to make 24 to 28 external tanks per year. Is this based on an around-the-clock operation? General CURTIN. It would be basically one shift. This is why the requirement here for future extension is so small. Mr. Fuqua. Do you have an estimate how much of the Apollo tooling will be used? Mr. MYERs. What we are looking for is real ingenuity by the con- #". responding to the request for proposal, which will be issued in April. Mr. FUQUA. You are encouraging contractors to adapt the tooling rather than having to manufacture and develop new tools. Mr. MYERs. Yes, that is right. Mr. Fuqua. What percent of the main manufacturing plant will be used for the manufacture and assembly of tanks? General CURTIN. About 60 percent or say about two-thirds. 251 Mr. Fuqua. Now, as to the construction of the orbiter landing facil- ties at the Kennedy Space Center. You are talking about a 1,000 overrun at each end of the runway. What if somebody comes in there with a crosswind? Is there then something that is needed on the sides of the runway? General CURTIN. The runway will have shoulders. That can be used in emergencies under crosswind conditions. Mr. Fuqua. You have heard of WIC'? General CURTIN. Yes. Mr. MYERS. Yes. ºr. FREY. I am glad to hear that the construction is going well on this. General CURTIN. Thank you. Mr. FREY. Let us see at this time if we can get something for the record. First, I believe that there are some NASA letters to the committee. They are dated March 6, 1972, October 30, 1972, and {ºny 26, 1972. I would like to get these into the record regarding Mr. FUQUA. That will be made part of the record. [The letters for the record follow: NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, Washington, D.C., March 6, 1974. Hon. GEORGE P. MILLER, Chairman, Committee on Science and Astronautics, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: As you know, the NASA Authorization Act, 1972, (P.L. 92-68) contained in subsection 1(b) (8) a project line item “Expansion of Visitors Information Center, John F. Kennedy Space Center, $2,100,000.” Funds for this project had been included in the Senate-passed verion of the 1972 Appro- priations Act, but not in the House-passed bill, and such funds were not included in the final Appropriations Act, P.L. 92–78, pursuant to the agreement of the Committee of Conference. As we testified last year, although NASA’s FY 1972 budget request to Congress did not include funds for an expansion of the WIC, we had for some time been concerned with the fact that the present VIC facilities, which reasonably will accommodate no more than 4,000 to 5,000 visitors a day, are inadequate to Satisfy the increasing number of visitors. Now that Disney World in Orlando, Florida, has opened, we have a positive indication of the impact of this near-by attraction on the number of visitors to KSC. For example, from October 1, 1971, the day Disney World opened, through December 3, 1971, the visitor attendance at the WIC was about 40% higher than for the same period in 1970. The December 1971 peak was, as usual, between Christmas and New Year's when 12,000 to 14,000 per day took the bus tour, and we estimate that this corresponds to 14,000 to 17,000 total visitors to the WIC on each of these days. We believe that facilities such as the WIC, which provide a means of informing the public of NASA missions, objectives, projects and the results of our aero- nautical and space programs, are quite valuable. But we believe also that this is true so long as the public is not greatly inconvenienced by long waiting lines, crowded facilities, etc. Hence, in preparation for an expansion of these facilities, we have authorized Dr. Debus, the Director of KSC, to proceed with the final design of the facilities authorized by the Congress under the guidelines included in the enclosed project documentation. We believe that we have identified Construction of Facilities funds appropriated for the Kennedy Space Center which could be applied to the existing $2.1 million authorization, if a decision is reached at a later date to proceed with the project. The funds which we believe could be used were those previously directed to Skylab facilities at KSC, the full amount of which is not now needed for that purpose. We had initially allocated a total of $12.1 million for Skylab launch facilities, including an FY 1968 increment, but it now appears that we may be able to meet the requirements for about $10.0 million. 252 We, of course, recognize that this is a unique situation and a unique proposal to Solve what has become a serious problem. For this reason, we are bringing this matter specifically to your attention and if you have any questions concerning it, we will be pleased to discuss them with you at your convenience. Meanwhile, if I can provide additional information, please let me know. Sincerely, --- JAMES C. FLETCHER, Administrator. CoNSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES FISCAL YEAR, 1972 ESTIMATES Project title.—Expansion of the Visitors Information Center. Installation line item.—John F. Kennedy Space Center, NASA. Cognizant installation.—Office of Manned Space Flight. Cognizant installation.—John F. Kennedy Space Center, NASA. Location of project.—Merritt Island, Brevard County, Fla. Type of project.–New Construction. Funding: Fiscal year 1971 and prior years------------------------ $2,004, 438 Fiscal year 1972 estimate--------------- — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 2, 100,000 Total funding through fiscal year 1972._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ $4, 104,438 Estimated Future Year Cof Funding Dependent on future firm requirements. Project purpose and scope— To provide additional reception, exhibit and other related space in the Visitors Information Center (VIC) area at Kennedy Space Center to meet the urgent and immediate needs of the general public by providing adequate facilities so that the required information and education programs may be conducted. These urgent needs represent facilities which are in consonance with a new total con- ceptual master plan and are contiguous with and complement existing WIC facilities. This is a self-sufficient increment as proposed and when completed along with existing facilities the total complex will be capable of accommodating an average of some 10,000 visitors a day. Project description— This project provides for construction that will complement the existing fa- cilities, is a completely usable entity and is compatible with any further project elements which may be needed in the long term as set out in the conceptual master plan for visitor facilities at the Kennedy Space Center. The construction proposed comprises a new Reception and Exhibit Building and a new Hall of History. The specific elements of these facilities are as follows: Reception and eachibit building.—This building will have a gross area of ap- proximately 23,700 square feet with a minimum ceiling height of 25 feet in order to accommodate exhibits. Space for future administrative offices will be located on the mezzanine. - Hall of history.—This building will have a gross area of approximately 13,000 square feet. It will have a minimum ceiling height of 25 feet to accommodate exhibits. - Supporting facilities.—This work consists of constructing two canopies and connecting all facilities by extending the existing sidewalk system. PROJECT COST EST MATE Unit of IT183SU Te Quantity Unit cost Total cost Land acquisition-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Construction: Reception and exhibit building------------------------ SF 23,700 47. 25 $1,120,000 Hall of History-------------------------------------- SF 13,000 41. 53 540, 000 Canopies------------------------------------------- LS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 210,000 Site preparation, utilities----------------------------- LS ---------------------------- 230,000 Total---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2, 100,000 Equipment----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- None Note: All exhibits, artifacts, etc., will be provided separate from this project. 253 Project justification— NASA concern and Congressional interest in the proper and effective handling of the general public visiting the Kennedy Space Center was first evidenced in 1964. In a partial response to this need, tours of KSC were initiated in 1966 and a Visitors Information Center opened in 1967. The site of the WIC is adjacent to NASA Parkway on Merritt Island to the west of the KSC Industrial Area. This VIC facility has some 31,500 SF of enclosed space. The existing facility can reasonably accommodate some 3,000 visitors per day. Since visitor demands have grown extensively, certain “stop gap” type minor construction efforts have been necessary in the past but these have not been anywhere near adequate to meet the real current needs and those of the immediate future. In CY 1971 some 1.2 million visitors came to the WIC. These visits are reflected in peak demands, both within a given day and on certain days. For example, on a given day some 80% of the visitors arriving do so between the hours of 11:00 AM and 3:00 PM. To date, based on actual count, the KSC VIC has experienced at least 188 days of over 6,000 visitors and has had several peak days in the 15–18,000 per day range. This project is therefore required in order to provide adequate facilities to receive, manage, and inform up to ten thousand visitors per day at the Kennedy Space Center. Disney World, located 50 miles west of KSC opened in October 1971 and is expected to attract 10–12 million people in their first year of operation. During the period October 1, 1971 through December 31, 1971, KSC experienced a 42% increase in tour patrons over the same period in 1970. If the anticipated growth rate continues in 1972, the tours will reach the 1.5 million rate. This has had a considerable impact on the KSC facility loading. During these periods, when the number of visitors exceed facility design capacities, the visitors suffer discomfort because of a lack of space and service facilities. This results in NASA presenting a poor image to the visiting public. The existing visitor facility has approximately 31,500 square feet of enclosed area but can satisfactorily accommodate only 3,000 visitors per day. This project will ºmmodate an average of 10,000 with peak loadings up to 15,000 visitors per day. This project is urgent and essential, and if not provided NASA must face the alternative of reducing/curtailing visitors at KSC. Such action is not believed to be in the best interests of the government or NASA and certainly not respon- sive to the needs of the general public as these needs have been expressed by the public interest. NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, Washington, D.C., October 30, 1972. Hon. GEORGE P. MILLER, Chairman, Committee on Science and Astronautics, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On March 6 of this year I advised you that we had authorized Dr. Kurt Debus, Director of the Kennedy Space Center (KSC), to proceed with the final design for an expansion of the Visitors Information Center (WIC) at KSC. That design effort is now complete and this letter is to advise you that we now plan to proceed with this project. As pointed out in my March 6 letter, the expansion of the present WIC is urgently needed to accommodate the rapidly increasing number of visitors to KSC. Our experience continues to verify our predictions on the impact of Disney World in Orlando, Florida, on the number of visitors to KSC. For example, from October 1, 1971, the day Disney World opened, through October 1, 1972, the visitor attendance at the WIC was about 40 percent higher than for the same period a year prior. We estimate that between Christmas and New Year's there were 14,000 to 17,000 visitors to the WIC each day. The Easter 1972 peak was slightly over 12,000 compared to the Easter 1971 peak of approximately 9,000. It is estimated that the total project will cost $2,100,000, which will be provided from prior years Construction of Facilities resources available at KSC. The project description is enclosed for your information. º would be pleased to discuss this matter in greater detail with you, if you WISI). Sincerely, .* JAMES C. FLETCHER, Administrator. 93-466 O - 73 - 17 254 CONSTRUCTION of FACILITIES FISCAL YEAR 1972 ESTIMATES Project title.—Expansion of the Visitors Information Center. Installation line item.—John F. Kennedy Space Center, NASA. Cognizant program offices.—Office of Manned Space Flight. Cognizant installation.—John F. Kennedy Space Center, NASA. Location of project.—Merritt Island, Brevard County, Fla. Type of project.–New Construction. Funding: Fiscal year 1971 and prior years------------------------ $1,955, 140 Fiscal year 1972 Estimate----------------------------- 2, 100, 000 Total funding through fiscal year 1972-------------- $4,055, 140 Estimated future year Cof funding dependent on future firm requirements. Project purpose and scope— To provide additional reception, exhibit and other related space in the Visitors Information Center (WIC) area at Kennedy Space Center to meet the urgent and immediate needs of the general public by providing adequate facilities so that the required informaton and education programs may be conducted. These urgent needs represent facilities which are in consonance with a new total con- ceptual master plan and are contiguous with and complement existing WIC facilities. This is a self sufficient increment as proposed and when completed along with existing facilities the total complex will be capable of accommodating an average of some 10,000 visitors a day. Project description— This project provides for construction that will complement the existing facil- ities, is a completely usable entity and is compatible with any further project elements which may be needed in the long term as set out in the conceptual master plan for visitor facilities at the Kennedy Space Center. The construction proposed comprises a new Reception and Exhibit Building and a new Hall of History. Both of these facilities, in the early phases of use, will primarily be used for exhibit displays. The specific elements of these facilities are as follows: Reception and eachibit building.—This building will have a gross area of approxi- mately 26,400 square feet with a varying ceiling height of approximately 24 to 40 feet. Space for future administrative offices will be located on the mezzanine. Hall of history.—This building will have a gross area of approximately 12,200 square feet. It will have a ceiling height of approximately 24 feet. Supporting facilities.—This work consists of constructing canopies and connect- ing all facilities by a sidewalk system and necessary utilities. PROJECT COST ESTIMATE Unit of we Iſlē3Sūſe Quantity Unit cost Total cost Land acquisition-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Construction: Reception and exhibit building------------------------ SF 26, 400 43.75 $1,155,000 Hall of History-------------------------------------- SF 12, 200 41. 40 y Canopies and utilities-------------------------------- |LS - - - - 440,000 Total---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2, 100,000 Equipment----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- None Note: All required exhibits, artifacts, etc., will be provided separate from this project. Project justification— NASA concern and Congressional interest in the proper and effective handling of the general public visiting the Kennedy Space Center was first evidenced in 1964. In a partial response to this need, tours of KSC were initiated in 1966 and a Visitors Information Center opened in 1967. The site of the WIC is adjacent to NASA Parkway on Merritt Island to the west of the KSC Industrial Area. This VIC facility has some 36,500 SF of enclosed space. The existing facility can 255 reasonably accommodate no more than 4,000 to 5,000 visitors per day. Since visitor demands have grown extensively, certain “stop gap” type minor Con- struction efforts have been necessary in the past. These have been inadequate to meet the real current needs and those of the immediate future. In CY 1971 some 1.2 million visitors came to the WIC. These visits are reflected in peak demands, both within a given day and on certain days. For example, on a given day some 80% of the visitors arriving do so between the hours of 11:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. To date, based on actual count, the KSC WIC has experienced at º 300 days of over 6,000 visitors and has had several peak days in the 14– 3 * ~ * * This project is therefore required in order to provide adequate facilities to receive, manage, and inform up to ten thousand visitors per day at the Kennedy Space Center, Disney World, located 50 miles west of KSC, opened in October 1971 and attracted 10.7 million people in their first year of operation. During the period October 1, 1971 through October 1, 1972, KSC experienced a 40% increase in tour patrons over the same prior 12-month period. If the anticipated growth rate continues, attendance will exceed the 1.5 million rate. This has had a con- siderable impact on the KSC facility peak loading. During these periods of peak loadings, when the number of visitors exceed facility design capacities, the visitors suffer frustration and discomfort because of a lack of space and service facilities. This results in NASA presenting a poor image to the visiting public. This project is urgent and essential, and if not provided NASA must face the alternative of reducing/curtailing visitors at KSC. Such action is not believed to be in the best interests of the government or NASA and certainly not re- sponsive to the needs of the general public as these needs have been expressed by the public interest. NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, Washington, January 26, 1973. Hon. OLIN E. TEAGUE, Howse of Representatives, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On October 30, 1972, we advised you that we planned at that time to proceed with a $2,100,000 project to expand the Visitor Information Center (VIC) at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). This letter is to inform you that in reviewing our entire progrem in the light of the reduced expenditure level and the consequent program reductions we announced on January 5, we have reluctantly reached the decision that we are unable to proceed with the expansion of the WIC as we had planned. This has been a difficult decision for us to make since, as we have pointed out, the existing WIC facilities are unadequate to accommodate the ever increasing number of visitors to KSC. Nevertheless, in order to continue the essential elements for a balanced and productive space and aeronautics program. Within the tight fiscal constraints we are under, we believe that the decision is a realistic and proper One. Since the need for an expansion of the WIC is immediate, however, we have begun to explore ways in which the present facilities can be expanded without the ex- penditure of appropriated funds. We will soon request legislative authority to permit NASA cr a concessioner to use revenues generated by sales of Services and goods to visitors for this purpose. Also we have initiated discussions with the Department of the Interior to explore the possibility of entering into an inter- agency agreement under which Interior would undertake to conduct the visitor information function for NASA using the rather comprehensive authority available to that Department. This approach also would envision an expansion of the existing VIC facilities using revenues resulting from the sale of services or goods to visitors. Since the present facilities are already overburdened by the number of visitors, the ultimate decision on the approach we will recommend will depend on which will be the most expeditious and efficient in satisfying our obligation to inform the public about NASA’s programs and activities. We would be pleased to discuss this matter further with you, if you wish, and we will keep you informed of our progress in this matter. Sincerely, JAMES C. FLETCHER, Administrator. 256 Mr. FREY. Thank you. Now, you are aware of Public Law 9268 authorizing the construction of the first extension of the WIC. The committee is advised March 6 and October 30 of the plans to proceed with this. Now, after October, we were notified that because of certain limitations, you could not proceed. Where are we today as to the status of the funding of the program? - General CURTIN. The decision has been made that we cannot, at least at the present time, fund the WIC from the appropriated funds. We cannot do it under the constraints that exist now. Now, recognizing the need for something to be done to respond to the needs of the many visitors at this location, the Agency has been conducting additional analyses and looking at modes of meeting these needs without using appropriated funds. Mr. FREY. We talked about the trend as to the visitors. Do you have the trends in visitors and the projections for the center? General CURTIN. I could generalize on that. At the moment, the visitors at KSC have been running between 1.5 to 1.8 million people each year. We feel that if there are no additional accommodations provided because of the limitations, this level might stabilize in the 1.5 million range. If additional accommodations were provided, KSC could accommo- date about 2.5 to 3 million visitors per year. There seems to be a very definite tie between the visitor growth at KSC's WIC and the upward trend in the State of Florida. There have been some rather well done studies in this regard to support the position that I have given you. Mr. Fuqua. Last year there was a big increase in visitors, but this was because of the opening of Disney World, but has it continued to go up this year or has it leveled off? General CURTIN. This is hard to predict. You are right. Last year was our largest year by far. Also a very good year was 1969. This January there were 72,000 visitors. I don’t have the information for last January. M; FUQUA. You don’t have that information with you at this time? - General CURTIN. No. - Mr. FUQUA. Could you provide it for the record? - General CURTIN. Yes; from my experience with the visitors at the Kennedy visitor information center, it appears that the peak periods are during the times that children are out of school. These peaks seem to be growing. The overall numbers of visitors also appear to be growing. Mr. FREY. General. General CURTIN. Yes. Mr. FREY. You think at this time that one of the limiting factors as to visitors is that there is no way to accommodate more people? General CURTIN. Correct. The present visitor information center is quite limited, particularly in inclement weather when the people can- not get out. The facilities there are relatively restricted. The capacity would be something in the order of 4,000 to 5,000 a day. Once you exceed that number, you are in trouble. 257 Mr. FREY. I think that one of the best ways that we have to show the space program to people and to show them the benefits of it is this. I don’t think that we are doing as good a job as we could. This is not because of the people not being interested, but due to limited physical facilities. We should look to some other way to do this. Would you care to comment on that now? General CURTIN. Yes. There has been a proposal made. This was to permit an entrepreneur to come onto the site and to develop the necessary facilities and run the facilities for NASA on the basis of income from the sales and the other activities relating to the opera- tion. This income would be available to capitalize or offset the cost of establishing and operating his activities. Now, this proposed approach would require a change in our NASA Space Act. This is now being considered within the executive department. Mr. FREY. What change would it require? General CURTIN. Basically, legislation would be needed to permit the retention of the income from the activities to be diverted to supporting the activities. I now have the visitor figures for 1972. The comparable figure was 86,600 people in January of 1972 as compared to 90,000 of this year. Mr. FREY. Would the profit be taken out of the concession revenues that would normally go back to the Government? Is that what you are talking about? General CURTIN. I am not as yet fully informed as to how this would operate. As I understand this, it would mean a man coming there under a concession or contract arrangement with NASA. He would provide the capital on a secured or mortgage loan from a bank. He would then build the facility and amortize it from the profits derived from the operation. - Now, all the revenues so derived would revert profit or capitaliza- tion as well as to covering the operating costs. Mr. FREY. I assume that the committee will see the proposal in detail at an early date? - General CURTIN. I cannot answer that. I am not current now as to where it now stands. Mr. FREY. I would like to see a copy of the proposal that they are talking about. Mr. FUQUA. Is there any indication at this time when that would be available to the committee? General CURTIN. The only information that I have, and it may not be complete, is that the proposal has been circulated to other agencies for comment. I do not know at this time if we know of a date when it will be available. Mr. FREY. You said that several means were being considered here. Is there another way at this time that you are trying to do this? General CURTIN. Not at the moment. This seems to be the one that is considered best. One of the elements that is attractive is that if this can be done it will provide the resources whereby the facility could be realized in the shortest possible time as opposed to other approaches. Mr. FREY. How much have we realized on the operations of WIC as far as revenues are concerned? - General CURTIN. We have to get this. 258 . FUQUA. If you don’t have it now, please provide it later for the I'êCOTOl. General CURTIN. The service improvement account, which is one available from this operation to provide for minor improvements to the tour and related activities, since the inception of this activity in 1968 and through 1972, has accumulated to $1,427,000. Mr. FREY. In how many years? General CURTIN. That would be 4 complete years and 1 partial year. Some $248,000 has been returned to the Treasury. Of the $1.4 million in the account, $870,000 has been spent on minor improvements, leaving a balance of about $560,000 in the particular account as of December 1972. Mr. FREY. General, has that amount been increasing as the people do? How Jong would it take to pay off the facility? Do you have an estimate? General CURTIN. I cannot say, because looking back, it has been in the $300,000 to $400,000 range in the last several years. There could be a different rate structure in a new proposal from that we have under the current one. Mr. FREY. The orbital landing facility at Kennedy is the $28.2 million. For the start of the shuttle facilities, 1 year ago, we estimated $300 million for the total facilities. Is that estimate still good? General CURTIN. Yes. It is the best figure that we have today. There have been some revisions as to the internal composition but the total is still good. Mr. FREY. The 9-month delay, this will not add any cost to the estimate? General CURTIN. Not to the $300 million estimate. It reflects 1971 dollars. That was the only way that we could express it then because of the scheduling and the other considerations. Any additional con- struction of facilities costs will go back to that “benchmark” date. Mr. FREY. Has the Air Force made any estimates as to Vandenberg Air Force Base? General CURTIN. They actually made one study about a year ago. They have done some updating of this. They now have a study with the Johnson Space Center to get more details on the ground and launch processing. Presumably, this is to be a basis for new studies. Mr. FREY. They don’t have a cost figure? General CURTIN. No. Mr. FREY. In their initial studies is there anything else to be pro- vided for? General CURTIN. The only thing that we are providing at the mo- ment is our technical backup as a basis for the further study in the processing and the flow of the vehicle landing to orbit and return, as such, and the concept of operations involved. Mr. FREY. In terms of construction, are there any estimates of the ºple that will be there to perform the work and what types they will € General CURTIN. No. I don’t have that particular information right at the moment. Mr. FREY. I would like to have that provided later. I would like that for the record. General CURTIN. Yes, all right. Mr. Fuqua. We would like that. 259 General CURTIN. I will try to get this information for you. [The information to be provided by General Curtin follows: The construction of the orbiter facilities will initially employ about 500 con- Struction personnel. At the peak of construction in support of the shuttle about 1,500 workers will be employed. Mr. FREY. What is the completion date on the runway? General CURTIN. It is targeted for the third quarter of the calendar year of 1976. This would allow for the time for the additional facilities required and installation of the barrier and ILS, the lighting and checkout of the total operation involved. Now, at this time we are looking for an operational date of about 1 year later. Mr. FREY. What is the total amount out of the $300 million that will go to Kennedy for construction? General CURTIN. Our current estimate is $150 million, about half º ſº total of the $300 million. That is our present estimate in 1971 Olla,I’S. Mr. FREY. For the record with respect to the construction of facilities, if there is some money cut along the line, what is going to be the result of this regarding the date that you have set for the testing and flying of the shuttle? Mr. MYERS. Any delay would be a very serious problem. In all of our shuttle planning, we have timed the facilities to come into the design, construction and checkout phase to meet the milestone dates of the overall program. Each of these facilities has critical need dates. Mr. FREY. Is it fair to say that any slippage in the construction of ſºil;ies would require an equal amount of time, plus money in this 8,I’68, Mr. MYERS. Yes. My experience in overall program management is that the facilities are really the most critical pacing item. They must be ready to meet the program requirements. Mr. Fuqua. You mentioned Vandenberg. Are you putting any money in Vandenberg or is the Air Force supporting that completely? General CURTIN. Not at the moment. There could be some NASA facilities identified later. Mr. MYERs. We have made an agreement with the Air Force that they would fund their facilities modifications at Vandenberg. We have also stated that if there are special, unique NASA facilities required, NASA would fund them. tº Mr. FREY. That would be over and above the $300 million men- tioned for 1971? Mr. MYERs. Yes. The $300 million estimate (in 1971 dollars) covers the NASA facilities for development of the shuttle, including the facilites at KSC. It covers those facilities that would be required for development of the orbiter that will be used operationally at KSC. The Air Force would fund, over and above that cost estimate, for their Vandenberg facilities requirements. Mr. FREY. What are we talking about here as to the construction of facilities? Give us an estimate during the time period, considering inflation. Where has this figure gone—the $300 million? General CURTIN. Our projections indicate that we are talking some- where in the range of $375 to $410 million as the actual ultimate buy cost. This depends, of course, on the currently unknown factors that may come up as the shuttle development program moves forward. 260 Mr. FREY. When we come back to the Congress and talk in dollars today and in the future, are you going to be able to show directly the increase in cost due to inflation and the increase in construction? Is this going to be documented? General CURTIN. Yes. We maintain an estimate on the runout cost, based on the best projection as to what the cost might be in subsequent years. p Mr. MYERs. We have done this as far as certain costs are concerned. The estimated cost of the shuttle development in 1971 dollars, is $5.15 billion. From 1971 to 1972, a 5 percent inflation occurred. If one applied only this 5 percent inflation factor to the runout cost estimate and assumed no more inflation, the figure would be $5.39 billion. I think that this is a very important point to make clear in understanding the cost estimate. Mr. FUQUA. Several years ago we talked about the Shuttle and the committee was very insistent, and it still is, that maximum utilization of the present facilities be made to meet the shuttle requirements. N.ow, can you give us some assurance that this is still being carried Out: Mr. MYERs. Yes. On every one of our facility requirements, we have carefully reviewed existing NASA and DOD facilities before we moved on to any new facilities. I can assure you that we are using existing capability to the maximum extent possible. This approach is to our interest to keep the cost of the program down. General CURTIN. It is not only the facilities. If you notice in the projects to date, particularly those that we are implementing now, we want to point out the amount of material and equipment that has been salvaged from other locations and incorporated into these jobs. We show vacuum tanks being moved and the piping being salvaged. These will be reused to the extent possible. Mr. Fuqua. Let me commend you for doing that. Mr. Bell? Mr. BELL. I have no questions at this time. Mr. Fuqua. We will move on to Mr. Philip E. Culbertson, director of mission and payload integregation. STATEMENT OF PHILIP E. CULBERTSON, DIRECTOR, MISSION AND PAYLOAD INTEGRATION, OFFICE OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, NASA - Mr. CULBERTSON. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, last week, Mr. Myers reviewed for you the considerable progress which we have made during the past year on the Shuttle configura- tion, on the critical technology areas, on the development of the º program plan and of the organization which will carry out that plan. #. I would like to review some of the mission and payload activities which we have undertaken which have served to strengthen our confidence that the Shuttle will accomplish its primary objective, of providing “routine” access to space, by sharply reducing costs in dollars and preparation time. 261 You may recall that last year that we spoke of a set of investiga- tions which led to economic comparisons between a number of alter- native systems for boosting payloads into orbit. These studies pointed out that the principal factors which govern overall space program costs are the launch hardware and operations costs, the cost of the spacecraft and their associated instrumentation and the level of space activity itself. Earlier testimony has dealt in some detail on the reasons for Our growing confidence in projections of Shuttle development and launch COSt. My remarks will, therefore, be focused on the level and character of Shuttle utilization and upon the impact which the Shuttle will make on payload development concepts and costs. The projection of Shuttle utilization, that is the type and frequency of missions it will fly and the way that it will fly them, is of importance in two respects: - First, it is used to develop and organize an understanding of the requirements to which the Shuttle should conform. Its second, and equally important use, is in providing a basis for decisions related to the fulfillment of those requirements. The operational lifetime of the Shuttle, however, extends well beyond the time for which it is possible to make quantitative state- ments about all of the anticipated specific missions. Our model for system utilization must therefore be a projection from past and present experience. It is not a static forecast, but has changed and will continue to change as national priorities and objec- tives are modified and as our understanding of the opportunities provided by space evolve. It is, therefore, incumbent on us to structure decisions based on the Shuttle utilization model that are as insensitive as possible to varia- tions in that model. In this way, the Nation will acquire a space trans- portation system that will have universal utility. Our present view of the space station illustrates this evolving process of program projection. Although we have not abandoned the option for eventually developing a space station, it is not in our present planning. On the other hand, we are finding a considerable increase of interest in short duration missions in which instruments and lab- oratory-like equipment are carried into orbit attached to a rack or contained within a pressurized compartment carried in the Shuttle cargo bay and returned to earth with the Shuttle when the mission objectives are completed. We have characterized these missions as Sortie missions, with the principal payload carriers, about which you heard last week, being the pressurized module and the pallet. Neither the projected elimination of space station missions nor the possible increase in Sortie missions during the 1980's appear to have invalidated the conclusions reached in last year's comparative analy- SIS. Our projection of missions in which the Shuttle will be employed also forms the basis for establishment of system requirements. As is the case in economic analysis, it is necessary, to base those requirements on our best understanding of future missions, but in full recognition of the high probability that those missions will change as we move forward during the years ahead. v 262 Although the fundamental Shuttle characteristics are based upon requirements imposed by extrapolations of present missions, the Shuttle is, by its nature, a very versatile machine; so that to a sig- nificant extent, it is not highly sensitive to a reasonably wide range of System requirements. In this respect, I would like to attempt to clarify one misconception about the capability of the Shuttle and the cost of utilizing that capability which has been expressed a number of times. The Shuttle, as you are aware, is being designed to carry a 65,000- pound payload into orbit. A number of Shuttle analysts have ob- served that the Nation cannot afford to develop and build all of the satellites that are implied by 65,000 pounds times a national launch rate of 40 to 60 missions per year. They fail to point out that the 65,000-pound capability is achieved in a due east launch to an altitude of approximately 100 nautical miles: a mission in which the beneficial effect of the Earth’s rotation is maximized and requirements for on-orbit propulsion are minimized. All launch systems, however, experience an inescapable reduction in system performance as launch azimuth deviates from due east and as orbital altitude increases. As a matter of fact, the Shuttle, like all hybrid two-stage launch vehicles, reaches its operational altitude limit at somewhat less than 100 miles—far beneath the desired orbits of many of its anticipated missions. For these higher energy missions another propulsive stage such as Centaur, Agena, or a new reusable stage designated the Space Tug, will be carried in the Shuttle cargo bay as part of the payload, to provide the final increment of velocity after separation from the Shuttle, just as the third stage of an expendable booster does. In the case of the Shuttle/Tug combination, however, the total system performance will allow the Tug to deliver the satellite and return to the Shuttle for return to Earth and preparation for a sub- sequent mission. The combined propulsive stage and satellite weight must, of course, conform to the total low orbit payload capability of the Shuttle. This chart, MK73–5482, shows that when these factors of altitude and launch azimuth are appropriately taken into account, and a reasonable load factor is included, our current projection of the aver- age weight to be carried within the cargo bay on automated satellite delivery missions is about 40,000 pounds, and the associated average weight of instruments and supporting equipment is approximately 6,000 pounds. The remaining 34,000 pounds consists of a propulsive stage, which in most cases is reusable, and its very inexpensive liquid propellant. The average shuttle payload on automated satellite delivery missions will therefore consist of approximately 6,000 pounds of instruments and equipment which may range in price from several hundred to several thousand dollars per pound and approximately 34,000 pounds of reusable propulsive stage which will, in part, because of its reusa- bility, cost less than $20 per pound. This payload breakdown is compatible with a reasonable projection of national space activity, whereas, of course, the implication that each mission will include 65,000 pounds of satellite leads to a budgetary implication that is clearly unreasonable. 263 AVERAGE SHUTTLE PAYL0AD WEIGHT DISTRIBUTION AUTOMATED SPACECRAFT DELIVERY MISSIONS 34,000; TUG 6,000 # SATELLITE 13,000 # 0RBITAL 12,000; REDUCTION OFF-L0AD NASA HQ MK73-5482 3–1–73 These factors of what appears to be performance degradation, incidentally, being derived from the mathematics of flight mechanics, are similarly applicable to all other launch vehicle systems. I would like now to turn to our views about payloads and the way in which they will be affected by the shuttle. At the time of our discussions with you a year ago we had performed several analyses which indicated that the use of the shuttle would permit an overall reduction in payload costs of approximately 40 percent. This reduction came from relaxation of design constraints, from the standpoints of weight, volume; and launch environment; from the opportunity provided by the shuttle for payload on-orbit tending or retrieval, refurbishment, and reuse; from the intact abort feature which is a shuttle design objective; and from the ability, when using the shuttle, to return payloads which encounter failure during initial activation. Studies during this past year have served to both strengthen and broaden our conviction that these savings are not only possible but are probably conservative. Our search for a more explicit understanding of the cost of satellites and space operations has included an examination of the costs, and the reasons for those costs, of a considerable range of systems. As an illustration, for example, we talked to the manufacturers of consumer electronics where completed articles such as television sets can be sold for less than $5 per pound. Although there are, of course, tre- mendous differences between a TV receiver and a spacecraft, the TV does contain a reasonably complex electronic circuit, a structural frame, a power supply, and some sort of an external packaging. 264 So, although cost per pound is not a precise measure of the cost of space, the fact that satellites cost from 400 to 4,000 times more per pound than television receivers made us decide to determine a few of the reasons why. Let me illustrate, in the next chart, MK73–5484, a few of the factors which influence the difference in cost between television and satellite production: SYSTEM C0ST DRIVERS TELEVISION SATELLITE VERY LIMITED PRODUCTION MASS PRODUCED LIMITED NEW DESIGN PREDOMINANTLY NEW DESIGN UNRESTRICTED WOLUME DENSE PACKAGING LIBERAL MARGINS NARROW MARGINS LIBERAL WEIGHT CONTROL TIGHT WEIGHT CONTROL LIBERAL SPECIFICATIONS TIGHT SPECIFICATIONS L0W "C0ST OF SYSTEM HIGH ''COST OF SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS''' MALFUNCTIONS''. NASA HQ MK73–5484 3-I-73 1. The television is mass produced. 2. Most of the design of this year's television is usually the same as lº year’s. Only a limited portion of it can really be considered to €. In eV. 3. The designers are able to arrange the components within the set in a manner which makes them reasonably open and accessible, so that thermal dissipation is not too great a problem and so that relatively few special tools are required during fabrication. 4. Liberal design factors are used because weight is not a major problem; therefore test programs during development are relatively simple and do not result in major redesign. 5. No weight reduction programs are initiated late in development. 6. The designer is not subjected to an overpowering accumulation of directives and specifications. 7. Since the cost of system malfunction in the final product is gen- erally measured by the cost of a service call and a few parts, the level of inspection and of quality itself are generally established by the need to maintain satisfactory customer relations. 265 ºntrast our spacecraft production experience has been one in WI11CI] . 1. Production is extremely limited. 2. Weight limitations and performance demands force us toward design optimization which, in general, is manifest in new design. 3. Volume and moment of inertia considerations have normally led to dense packaging arrangements. 4. Weight limitations have led to narrow factors of conservatism which have resulted in the need for extensive testing. 5. Weight growth has led to costly weight reduction programs. 6. The need for very high reliability and the complex set of interfaces which normally have to be met, have led to extensive management control practices and to very rigid quality control, inspection, and integrated testing. 7. The high cost of system malfunction adds to the requirement for extensive control and testing. These spacecraft design and fabrication practices have been adopted largely because of three factors which have characterized the overall Space program: First, the drive to maximize the performance of each spacecraft within the capability provided by each launch opportunity has forced the designer to work within progressively narrowing limits of weight, volume, and factors of conservatism. Second, when the cost of system malfunction is measured in loss of a multimillion-dollar spacecraft, a delay of months or perhaps years in the accomplishment of a space program objective, or a major reduc- tion of system effectiveness, it becomes cost effective to institute tight and extensive specifications and a high level of inspection and control. And third, as our space program has matured and our objectives have become more complex, we tend to increase the sophistication and complexity of the spacecraft which we develop. Our experience in experimentation utilizing laboratory instruments, aircraft instruments, balloon, and sounding rocket instrumentation and finally in satellites, has strongly indicated that as these factors increase in dominance over design and fabrication processes, it becomes increasingly difficult to hold costs down. In our study of the use of the shuttle, we have, therefore, concen- trated on the three factors which are illustrated on figure MK73–5483: relaxation of system constraints, reduction of the impact of system malfunction, and reduction of system sophistication and complexity. Last year, we discussed a study performed by Lockheed in which they had conducted the preliminary design of three shuttle-oriented spacecraft to establish an understanding of the relationships between the spacecraft designed by today’s practice and those which took advantage of the characteristics of the shuttle. Obviously, different types of spacecraft are affected in different ways, but when applied to our total projection of shuttle utilization we concluded that it should be possible to reduce spacecraft costs § º percent or more when they are designed specifically for the Shuttle. In the past year, both NASA and the Department of Defense have continued these studies. We have also begun to explore a number of additional areas, made possible by the characteristics of the shuttle, which show promise of further cost reductions. 266 SHUTTLE PAYLOAD DESIGN EMPHAsis • RELAXED SYSTEM CONSTRAINTS • REDUCTION OF THE IMPACT OF SYSTEM MALFUNCTION • REDUCTION OF SYSTEM sophistiCATION AND COMPLEXITY NASA HQ MK73–5483 3-1–73 The first of these is the increased use of standard components and subsystems. It has been our practice to virtually “tailor-make” each spacecraft because of the premium placed on system performance. As long as spacecraft weight is at a premium it does not necessarily pay to utilize a component which overperforms just because it has already been developed, if it weighs twice as much as one which could be developed to do the job. But as the weight premium is reduced, the balance can be tipped in favor of the already developed or standard component, with a possible increase in weight, but with the promise of cost and schedule leadtime reduction. This concept has now been tried with results which are very encour- aging. We are, therefore, pursuing our investigation of the possibilities for considerably increased standardization. Incidentally, although the full benefits of standardization will have to await the introduction of the shuttle, our early work in this field indicates that some of the concepts may be applied to spacecraft which are flown before the shuttle. A second concept which we are examining, but which has not yet been applied to our overall analysis of Shuttle economics, is that of remote on-orbit spacecraft repair and refurbishment. This possibility is characterized by the use of spacecraft in which major components are attached and arranged to facilitate removal and replacement. In practice, one can conceive of a spacecraft with a geometric arrangement of integrated subsystems attached to the spacecraft 267 structure by a few fasteners and functionally tied into the rest of the operating systems by separable connectors. In the event of system malfunction or of the need for a component update, a payload servicing unit is sent to rendezvous and dock with the spacecraft, and, using techniques similar to those developed for other remote operations, removes the desired subsystem and inserts the replacement. We have not yet proceeded with the study of the implications of this mode of operation sufficiently to establish its complete viability. Both NASA and the DOD, however, view it with sufficient interest to be pursuing it in some detail. Finally, I would like to comment on an area which may prove to be the most beneficial of all of those which we have considered but which may also be the most difficult to quantify. It has to do with the re- lationship between system design, development, fabrication, and test and the cost of system malfunction. Briefly stated, if the adverse effects of system malfunctions can be adequately reduced, then the money and effort directed toward pre- vention of malfuncation can be similarly reduced. The Shuttle, with its reduced operational costs, its provision for Spacecraft retrieval or on-orbit repair, its Sortie missions in which experimental equipment will be routinely returned to Earth, and its great flexibility in missions scheduling, should significantly reduce the impact of spacecraft malfunction, and therefore permit a corresponding reduction in the resources directed toward prevention of malfunction. This certainly will not apply to all spacecraft, but it does appear to apply in many cases. At our Ames Center near San Francisco, we have for several years used a converted commercial transport, a Convair 990, as a flying laboratory for a broad range of scientific and engineering studies. Scientists, operating with very few constraints, install instruments and equipment, frequently directly from their laboratories, and partic- ipate in airborne missions often thousands of miles from their homes. The aircraft has had missions over the Atlantic, Alaska, and South America, as well as over many areas of the continental United States. It has been used for missions conducted for solar eclipse pho- tography, ocean studies, and land surveys. A distinguishing feature has been that it has been accomplished at very low cost for instruments and equipment. We are quite aware that we will not, for many reasons, achieve equivalent costs for space experimentation. But, we are closely examining our 990 operations to draw from it those characteristics which can be beneficially applied to Space operations. One of those characteristics which is of particular interest is the way we are able to take beneficial advantage of the low cost, compared to current space operations, of system malfunction. We have stated that it will take time before the full benefits of payload effects can be realized. We recognize that this can happen, particularly with spacecraft launched or expendable launch vehicles late in the 1970's and requiring a transition to the Shuttle. TRW has provided data on this possibility. Under a USAF con- tract, TRW analyzed a spacecraft currently launched on a Titan launch vehicle. They reviewed the spacecraft design from the point of 268 view that they would fly it first on an expendable booster, then make only the minimum mandatory modifications required to assure that the spacecraft was compatible with the Space Shuttle when it made the transition. The result was a gross spacecraft program savings of 38 percent. It cost an additional 8 percent for the required mandatory changes, and the net benefits gained by the total program were 30 percent through 1990. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to depart from my printed statement at this point to illustrate a number of the pay- load and Shuttle characteristics about which I have spoken by de- scribing a specific operational communications satellite program and the contrasting ways that it would be accomplished with the use of expendable launch vehicles and with the use of the Shuttle/Tug system. The mission objective of the program would be to provide highly reliable operational communications services. Launched on an expend- able Titan IIIB/Centaur launch vehicle, each spacecraft has been estimated to weigh 1,030 pounds. In order to meet the mission requirements the spacecraft would be deployed in synchronous orbit (19,323 nmi altitude) and in clusters at the desired locations around Earth, for example, over the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. A total of 26 spacecraft would be required to fulfill the communications requirements from 1979 to 1990. Conducting this program using the Titan IIIB/Centaur would re- quire 26 new spacecraft and 26 launch vehicles because the space- craft and the launch vehicles are expended. The average spacecraft and launch cost for each flight is estimated to be $25.8 million. ‘. If the same program is carried out using the Shuttle and Tug, the cost changes significantly. First, with the Shuttle we can apply the low cost approaches to payload design. We are no longer constrained by weight limitations; therefore, we can ruggedize the spacecraft structure, simplify the design and veri- fication test program, and thus reduce both development and unit spacecraft cost. We can make these changes, and others that I men- tioned earlier, because the capability of the Shuttle and Tug will allow an increase in spacecraft weight and will provide the capability for the satellite to be retrieved, returned to Earth for repair and refur- bishment, and for redeployment. The Shuttle/Tug combination can deploy and retrieve two of these satellites on a single flight. Operating in this way, the Shuttle and Tug will make 13 flights to deploy 26 spacecraft of which 10 are new and 16 are refurbished. On eight of these flights two spacecraft are deployed and two are retrieved. tº * : * : ſº The total cost for conducting the program would be $14.9 million per spacecraft flight, compared to the $25.8 million for the expendable approach—a savings of 42 percent. * When the program of the 1980's is analyzed for each mission in the way that I have summarized by this example, we are able to develop specific system requirements and to make direct cost comparisons of the Shuttle and expendable launch vehicle programs. We are engaged in a number of activities which will lead to a better understanding of the effective use of the shuttle to perform those 269 missions which have resulted from an extrapolation of our present projects. We have been consistently encouraged by the results of these activities. . During the coming year, we will pursue these promising concepts in greater depth, and, in all probability, uncover additional ideas worthy of study and analysis. We shall, in addition, begin an examination of our spacecraft management and control structure with an objective of developing major simplifications where they are indicated to be appropriate. We recognize, however, that the achievement of these efficiencies will not be a simple task but will require a major effort by both customer and contractor. By moving forward now, significantly in advance of most detailed shuttle-oriented spacecraft design, we can assure that the 1980's will, in fact, be a period of easy access into space with sharply reduced Costs. i appreciate the opportunity to discuss these activities with you today. Mr. Fuqua. Mr. Culbertson, thank you. This is a very important part of the development of the Shuttle and the utilization. We appreciate your remarks. You mentioned 40 to 60 missions per year. Is this the same figure that you realized to us last year, as such, of the projected mission re- Quirements for the Air Force, as well as NASA? Mr. CULBERTSON. The Air Force has not specifically changed with regard to its mission level. The projection of NASA missions was re- duced somewhat last year because of the budgetary limitations. Very recently, however, we have been seeing a considerable increase in sortie missions. It looks like the number of NASA missions will therefore rise and will be at about the same level as we had last year, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FUQUA. You don’t anticipate the reduction would be of a permanent nature? Mr. CULBERTson. That is correct. The reason that we can do this within the budgetary limitations is because of the low cost that we expect on sortie missions in terms of the experiments and the equip- ment, thanks to the Shuttle's capabilities. Mr. FUQUA. The reduction in missions, is called RIM. Mr. MYERs. We think that the overall rate will stay at the level you mentioned. - Mr. Fu QUA. You mentioned the reduction in payload costs of approximately 40 percent. What causes this particular reduction? Mr. MYERs. I can give examples. Now, in the Skylab program, using the first and the second stages of the Santurn V, there was an excess weight capacity. We took advantage of that by designing the shroud that covers the payload with no constraints on weight. We increased the weight of the shroud by 50 percent over normal weight. The cost savings for that specific design was $35 million. We also increased the safety factor. We eliminated much of our check out activity and decreased the inspections. We had a major saving in cost. In the docking module for the Apollo–Soyuz Test Project we found that the Saturn IB had more launch weight capacity than we needed for that specific mission. We applied the same approach to that, as 93-466 O - 73 - 18 270 such, where we had been expecting to design the docking module with the same honeycomb and aluminum bonded structure that we used for the service module. We changed to five eights of an inch aluminum plate. We had the proper thermal and structural characteristics, but of course, there was an increase in weight. . The design approach resulted in a 40 percent cost savings in the structure of the docking module. These are examples of cost savings by eliminating the weight constraints which allow us to increase the safety factors and save money. Mr. Fuqua. How about the size and diminsions of the payload? You have a cargo bay that is large and you will not have a size problem that you have now in the more sophisticated satellites that are presently being launched? Mr. CULBERTSON. Let me answer your question by using a solar array as an example. Our normal practice has been to be very careful in our selection of the individual solar cells to put on the solar array. We select a low percentage of those within a production lot. We took only those that had the maximum output. Therefore, when we make one of these up we may utilize 15 percent of the total production quantity that had been examined. We want the maximum output per square foot of the solar arrays. If we are not limited in volume and weight, we can take 95 or 100 percent of a run of the solar cells and utilize them and increase the weight to 15 or 20 percent and obtain the same power level. We could do it then without the costly selection process required today. Mr. Fu QUA. How about the redundancy in systems? Could you realize a cost reduction in this area? Mr. CULBERTSON. There actually has been a lot of debate as to whether we should reduce redundancy. But the basic point is that the reusable shuttle—its characteristics and capabilities will result in lower payload costs. We will not require extensive testing to assure the level of redundancy or reliability. Most of the cost of reliability comes from today’s requirements to test and to verify that we have that level of the actual reliability. The shuttle will significantly reduce these expensive requirements. . If we can drastically cut down on the testing program, there would be fewer test articles and tests involved. Mr. Fuqua. In the design of the new types of payload adaptable to the shuttle—if something happened to the shuttle program, could they be used in the conventional launch vehicles that we have now? Mr. MYERs. There will be a transition where the payloads will be º for existing expendable large vehicles and then carried on the Shuttle. Now, in response to your question, which is a very good question, we must have a transition period in the payloads area. If we were to design right away only for the shuttle, and for some reason, if it did not come through, we would have to have a redesign to put the pay- load back on the expendable launch vehicle. There will be a transition period during which we will design for the expendable vehicle and also be able to carry those payloads on the shuttle. When the shuttle is fully operational and the expendable vehicles are phased down, we will design for the shuttle specifically to take advantage of the reduced launch and entry acceleration. 271 Mr. FUQUA. You are not going to cut off the present conventional launch vehicle stable. You will gradually phase into the shuttle adap- tation. Mr. MYERS. In some cases, this is a time-phased situation; 5 years from now, we may begin to design for both capabilities so that we will be in a position to phase down the expendables; 10 years from now we may design only for the shuttle, which will drive down the payload COStS. Mr. CULBERTSON. In last year's analysis, there was a gradual in- crease of shuttle use per year. We assumed, in our program analysis for the first full year of operation, that we would fly 12 productive missions outside of the actual test program. The next year it would be 36 and the next year it would be 50. Then after 4 years, we would reach a steady condition. We are taking another look at this. We will do the same kind of evaluation this year, Mr. Chairman; missions will be gradually built up. Many of the payloads won’t even be de- veloped before the first shuttle flight takes place. - Mr. FUQUA. If you design a payload for the shuttle, and with the weight considerations and the other factors mentioned, including size, it would not be possible to fly them on a conventional vehicle would it? Mr. MYERS. It would be more expensive to do that, Mr. Chaiman. If you had a satellite that weighed 1,000 pounds and was designed for an expendable vehicle, it may weigh 1,500 if it is designed for the Shuttle. If the Shuttle does not come along and if you want to launch it on an expendable vehicle, you may have to get a larger size vehicle. That is one of the factors in the transition period. - As the weight increases, so does the expendable system's launch cost. The Shuttle which can be used over and over again, is different. The ºutle launch cost is, within limits, insensitive to payload weight. Mr. FUQUA. As to the total cost, for example, take the earth satellite, §" know what the cost of that is, the one we presently have in Orbit? . Mr. MYERs. I do not. I am sorry. We could provide that informa- tion. Mr. FUQUA. Please provide it. Give us the estimate of the cost as to the 40-percent reduction. - [The information to be provided by Mr. Myers follows: The Earth Resources Satellite—I (ERTS-I), now in orbit, and the Earth Resources Satellite—B (ERTS-B), to be launched in the first quarter of 1976, are estimated to cost approximately $195-$205 million. ERTS-I and ERTS-B have been procured as a single package. - No studies have been focused on determining specifically what reductions would accrue to ERTS if the Shuttle's services were available. The Lockheed Missile and Space Company Payload Effects Analysis, dated June 30, 1971, did however analyze in detail the effect of the Shuttle on a Synchronous Equatorial Orbiter (SEO). The SEO program as flown on an expendable launch vehicle was $209 million. Using the low cost design approach, the SEO program flown on the Space Shuttle would be $125 million. This represents a 40% savings. Mr. FUQUA. What launch vehicle was used for the Earth Resources Satellite? Mr. CULBERTSON. It was a Thor Delta. The cost is $8 million per launch. 272 sº FUQUA. You are talking about $10.5 million per launch for the uttle. Mr. MYERs. We estimate, $10.5 million for the Shuttle cost per flight. In direct competition, the Thor would be less expensive than the Shuttle launch. However, the Shuttle can carry multiple payloads whereas the Thor is definitely limited in terms of payload capability. Mr. FUQUA. Excuse me. How many could you carry on the Shuttle similar to what we have now? Mr. CULBERTSON. The Thor Delta only has the capability of 4,800 pounds. Any time that you want to compare the performance you have to consider the altitude also. It is not just as simple as saying that the Shuttle has 14 times the capability of Thor Delta. Mr. MYERs. The capability of the Thor Delta at 100 miles due i. is 4,800 pounds. The capability of the Shuttle far exceeds that eVel. . - Mr. Fuqua. I am trying to compare apples and apples. I am looking for some comparisons of the cost of satellites that we will use in the future and how much you think that you could save by using the Shuttle system, compared to the present conventional launch vehicle COSts. Mr. MYERs. We expect to save enough on the satellites and experi- ments to more than offset the cost of the Shuttle launch. Mr. FUQUA. I believe we need this information. Mr. MYERs. We will provide this information for the record. Mr. Fuqua. Yes; I think that the Committee should have this before we mark up the bill. Mr. FREY. Yes; that would be helpful. Mr. MYERs. We will provide that later. Mr. FREY. Thank you. Mr. FUQUA. We would appreciate that. [The information to be provided by Mr. Myers is as follows:] The following analysis has been given to each payload in the Mission Model. The payloads used for this example are elements of a specific operational com- munication satellite program. The analysis demonstrates the contrasting ways that the program would be accomplished with the use of expendable launch ve- hicles and with the use of the Shuttle/Tug system. All figures are in 1971 dollars. The mission objective of the program would be to provide highly reliable oper- ational communications services. Launched on an expendable Titan IIIB/Centaur launch vehicle, each spacecraft has been estimated to weigh 1,030 pounds. In order to meet the mission requirements the spacecraft would be deployed in synchronous Orbit (19,323 m.mi. altitude) and in clusters at the desired locations around earth, for example, over the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. A total of 26 spacecraft would be required to fulfill the communications requirements from 1979 to 1990. Titan IIIB/Centaur is a derivative of the Titan IIIE/Centaur and was selected because it represented the lowest cost expendable launch vehicle capable of launch- ing the spacecraft into synchronous orbit. Conducting this program using the Tital IIIB/Centaur would require 26 new spacecraft and 26 launch vehicles be- cause the spacecraft and the launch vehicles are expended. The average spacecraft and launch cost for each flight is estimated to be $25.8 million. - * If the same program is carried out using the Shuttle and Tug, the cost changes significantly. First, with the Shuttle we can apply the low cost approaches to pay- load design. We are no longer constrained by weight limitations; therefore, we can ruggedize the spacecraft structure, simplify the design and verification test program, and thus reduce both development and unit spacecraft cost. These changes can be made because the capability of the Shuttle and Tug will allow an increase in spacecraft weight and will provide the capability for the satellite to be retrieved, returned to earth for repair and refurbishment, and for redeploy- ment. The Shuttle/Tug combination can deploy and retrieve two of these satel- 273 lites on a single flight. Operating in this way the Shuttle and Tug will make 13 flights to deploy 26 spacecraft of which 10 are new and 16 are refurbished. On eight of these flights two spacecraft are deployed and two are retrieved. The total cost for conducting, the program would be $14.9 million per spacecraft flight, com- pared to the $25.8 million for the expendable approach—a saving of 42%. The attached table shows a detailed cost breakdown for conducting the program utilizing the Shuttle at $14.9 million per spacecraft flight as compared to the $25.8 million for the expendable launch vehicle case. THE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE EXAMPLE, 26 SPACECRAFT LAUNCHED BETWEEN 1979–90 [In millions of 1971 dollars Expendable launch vehicle Shuttle case, 10 new space- C2S8 Cr3 (26 new spacecraft, (16 refurbished, 26 launches) 13 launches) Spacecraft R.D.T. & E------------------------------------ 64 56 Spacecraft investment----------------------------------- 271 (26×10.42) 109 (10X10.90) Spacecraft refurbishment-------------------------------- 0 - 39 (16X2.44) Spacecraft Operations------------------------------------ 22 (26X0.85) 22 (26X0.85) launch cost-------------------------------------------- 315 (26×12.12)1 162 (13×12.46) 1 Total-------------------------------------------- 672 388 Recurring cost/spacecraft launch (excludes R.D.T. & E. and Spacecraft operations)---------------------------- _---- 10.42+12.12=22.54 109–H39-H12.46=11.92 - 26 2 Program cost/spacecraft-------------------------------...-- 25.8 14.9 1 The launch costs are computed on the basis of the actual launch cost of the launch vehicles plus allowances for a launched spacecraft that malfunctions (infant mortality) and launch vehicle failure (abort reflight in the shuttle case). These allowances are spread across all space programs equally. Shown below is the calculation of these effects for the Space Shuttle. A similar calculation also applies to the expendable launch vehicle case. Space Shuttle launch cost------------------------------------------------------------------------ 10.50 Space Tug launch cost--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1.00 Infant mortality effect (6 percent)----------------------------------------------------------------- . 69 Abort Reflight Effect (2.3 percent)----------------------------------------------------------------- . 27 Total------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 12.46 Mr. FUQUA. For what portion of the Shuttle payload model will you need a space tug? Mr. CULBERTSON. We will need a third stage of some sort to supplement the Shuttle. - Mr. MYERs. Yes; a modification of an existing stage or a third stage, which we can recover and reuse. Mr. CULBERTSON. I will break that down when I talk about the Space Tug. - - Mr. FUQUA. Have you an idea as to the percentage? Mr. CULBERTSON. That is covered in the testimony. - Mr. FUQUA. Very well. Is there any duplication between the advanced missions that you will discuss and the payload and the advanced development? Mr. MYERs. Mr. Culbertson is in charge of this area and he can tell you that it is very carefully controlled as far as the budget is concerned. - As to the payload integration activities, this activity is in one sense like the operator of a cargo airline. It is a group of people who are looking at the types of missions that will be carried by the Shuttle in the most efficient way to operate them and studying cases where two satellites might logically go to the same orbit so that they could be carried on one Shuttle mission. Further, this group is looking at the opportunities to get the most out of the Shuttle. The Shuttle Director is responsible for developing the Shuttle. Mr. Culbertson would be 274 the operator of the cargo line, for example, and that would be the cargo air operation. He will describe the Advanced Missions area in his testimony. Mr. WINN. On page 15 in the last closing paragraph, you say you are engaged in a number of other activities. What are they? Mr. CULBERTSON. This was more or less of a closing statement. I referred to those particular activities that we had done relative to the way of designing space craft and flying them; also using the Shuttle. Mr. WINN. It sounds like a pep talk. Now, the question about the space station. For several years we have been talking about a space station. We had been briefed on the west coast on some of the mock ups and the plans. Now, as to what could be accomplished by a space station, was the space station not practical or was it just too expensive, or could you give us some of the various reasons why you ruled it out? Mr. MYERS. The basic reason is that the initial investment was too high, given our budgetary limitations. Mr. WINN. The initial investment? Mr. MYERs. Yes; we had a critical decision as to whether or not we should go toward a space station or go toward a Shuttle, which offered the opportunity to decrease the cost of space operations. It was clear at the time that we could not fund both programs under our budget constraints. We have since found that of the experiments and the types of activities that we expected to carry out in a space station, over 90 percent can be done with the Shuttle. Mr. WINN. Ninety percent can be done by the shuttle and sorties. Mr. MEYERs. Yes; except for the long-duration type activity requiring more than 30 days. We can carry out a sortie mission, using the shuttle, of up to 30 days, whereas the space station could stay permenently in orbit. - Mr. WINN. For those remaining missions or experiments would there be any way that they can be incorporated here? Mr. MYERS. There is always the opportunity that we could go into a space station as a result of the Sortie Lab experiments. The Sortie Lab offers an opportunity to conduct the manufacturing, material processing, and other activities that we are just beginning to understand. The potential is vast. Now, as the returns mount, the next step would be modular space stations. I see the opportunity at this time to learn through our programs, such as Skylab and shuttle, to reduce the actual experi- mental cost. This will get us closer to the idea of profitable manu- facturing in space activity. When we have proven those capabilities, we will move on to the space station type of operations. Mr. WINN. You have not completely given up on the space station? It is somewhere in the back of your mind? Mr. MYERs. I have not given up on any of the exciting possibilities of the space station and other areas of potential return. Mr. WINN. Since these hearings started I have had several people ask me what the Space Shuttle is. Some people don’t believe that it would be a new mode of transportation. Are we kidding ourselves that this is a method and mode of transportation? Are we misleading the public into thinking it is like getting on the Metrobus? Mr. MYERs. The shuttle is new and has the potential for even a bus approach. It has every opportunity of growing toward commercial 275 transport capabilities. Because the shuttle system can be used over and over again, we will be in the mode of maintenance rather than using a brand new vehicle every time we fly. The maintenance gives you the opportunity to build great reliability and to reduce the cost of launch and payload operations. If you have an airliner with many hours of operation on each system and, over a period of time, an accumulation of reliability and data on the systems, you can reduce the cost of manpower required to check * * operation. That is the key element of the low cost, reusable Shuttle. Mr. WINN. I want to look at some of the press releases we have sent out and see if we are misleading people in assuming this is a new means of transportation. I think that we all better do that. I think that we have done a good job of confusing people. - Mr. BELL. My question is very close to what Mr. Winn asked. It goes to the future of the Space Shuttle. Where do the hypersonic ram- j º fit into the picture and where should their development be phased IIlſ Mr. CULBERTson. If I can broaden the context here, I’d say that I think there are three areas of possible ultimate change to the shuttle. There is the normal possibility of changes which the contractor recognizes as minor changes or improvements. The next level of change that we will study within the next couple of years is the possibility of a shuttle modification in the late 1980's that could lower the cost of operating the shuttle by a change in the booster. Now, the hypersonic ramjet might enter into this in a new first stage. I think that most of us that have looked at this problem think that the ramjet may be a propulsion system consideration for a second generation shuttle. This might be introduced at the turn of the century. This depends on how we are able to uttilize the present capabilities of the systems we are developing today. Mr. BELL. You are saying that this program is quite a way off. You are saying that we are not really very close to the aircraft or the space- craft combination? Mr. CULBERTSON. I referred to applicability. I was not referring to the possibility of an ultimate transport-type aircraft for regular pas- senger service. Mr. BELL. It is a logical conclusion if you develop a spacecraft of the ramjet type. Mr. CULBERTSON. But any of these advanced systems are going to be a fairly long time away. M; BELL. You have not done a great deal of advanced work in this 8.I'ê8, Mr. CULBERTSON. This type of work has been on a low level. If we continue this low level program, it will be at least 10 years before we can see how we might tie this to a specific configuration. Mr. MYERs. We think there is a need to have a low level of effort looking at ways to improve the shuttle. We don’t need a big program now, but it is necessary to continue a low level of study in looking to the day that will come when we want to advance. One of the methods of propulsion of the fully reusable booster would be the hypersonic ram- jet. - Mr. FUQUA. Please present your other statement at this time. 276 STATEMENT OF PHILIP E. CULBERTSON, DIRECTOR, MISSION AND PAYLOAD INTEGRATION, OFFICE OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, NASA - Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: My testimony this afternoon will cover the Mission Systems and Integration area and the Advanced Missions Program. Mission Systems and Integration is now comprised of three separate line items, all of which, at least in part, support preparations for utilization of the Space Shuttle system when it becomes operational. On March 1, Mr. Lord described the Sortie Laboratory and concept verification testing activity. Today I plan to cover the two other areas; namely, Advanced Development and Mission and Payload Integration. First, let me give you an introductory overview. INTRODUCTION In reviewing accomplishments from the first decade of space and projecting our plans toward the needs of the future, one dominant aspect of space rose above all other considerations—the cost of space activity must be reduced if full advantage is to be taken of the Op- portunity which space provides. We have reviewed for you the manner in which this consideration led to the Shuttle as the principal element of the new Space Trans- portation System. Our analysis of the Mission Model indicated, however, that about half of all payloads that will need to be taken into space by the shuttle will be destined for orbits beyond those which can be reached by the Shuttle alone. Flights to geosynchronous orbit, that unique orbit in which space- craft appear to be stationary when viewed form Earth, comprise a major part of these. Flights into higher altitude polar orbit and orbits beyond the reach of the Earth’s gravitational pull make up the re- mainder. The second component of the Space Transportation System is therefore to be a Space Tug. MT73–5046 shows a typical Tug engaged in the operations of pay- load deployment, recovery and on-orbit servicing. The Space Tug was first conceived as a reusable propulsion system sized for a variety of missions from moving satellites from one Earth orbit to another, to carrying payloads from lunar orbit down to the lunar surface. Studies of this requirement indicated that the resulting concepts were too ambitious, that such a vehicle would cost too much to develop and would therefore not effectively fit into our overall budgetary planning. - When the various vehicle concepts were matched with the evolving payload model, a Space Tug configuration emerged which could accomplish all of the known payload delivery requirements at a cost that was acceptable in the tightening budgetary environment. 277 REPRESENTATIVE MISSION MODEL DISTRIBUTION swww.º S. SS &S Q 0 se ~ 15% ARE &S PLANETARY ſ' AND WARIOUS ~ 25% ARE ORBITS GEOSYNCHONOUS ~ 10% ARE POLAR ~ 50% SHUTTLE ONLY NASA H0 MT 72-6642-A REW 2-26-73 TUG PAYLOAD SUPPORT & PAYLOAD RECOVERY NASA H0 MT73-5046 - 1-11-73 wºr- ################## : “: “ . .'; . . ... ...~~, rººf（ sº tºº... ...H.' * * ... is hºr #:s..….… . . PAYLOAD DEPLOYMENT 278 CURRENT STATUs The configuration that has emerged is one that can be carried into space in the cargo bay of the Space Shuttle—see MTV2–6495. The Tug will be carried into a low Earth orbit either separately, or already attached to its payload. After checkout in orbit it will be launched in separate flight until it reaches the prescribed orbit. After detaching the payload it will then be commanded to return to the Shuttle orbit where it will await another payload, or will be returned to the Earth in the Shuttle Bay for refurbishment and reuse. NASA Ho MTV2-8495 RE- 3-5-73 º - This mode of operation was selected as a result of a broad range of studies of candidate configurations and operational modes, conducted by NASA and DOD. E.L.DO also conducted feasibility studies for geosynchronous missions of interest. These studies established the feasibility and desirability of high performance, low operating cost, cryogenic or storable upper stages. In recognition of current funding constraints, NASA initiated a significant effort to generate planning data for alternative programs and vehicle configurations. This spring, NASA and DOD have undertaken this cooperative project to evaluate likely alternatives for providing desired upper stage capability, to analyze system and technology requirements, and to establish programatic and configuration data packages. This set of studies will establish alternative concepts for achieving the required system characteristics within projected schedule and budgetary constraints. 279 Possible system development by either NASA or DOD is being fººd in this upper stage assessment effort. Alternatives of interest OCUIS OIl 1. Use of existing expendable stages modified for operational use with the Shuttle, to be followed by a Space Tug developed for a later operational date; 2. Use of existing stages, modified to provide for increased pro- pellants and limited reuse capability, to be followed by a Space Tug * the desired capability, developed for a later operational date; 8.Il 3. Development and use of a low development cost, reusable, interim Space Tug, available for Shuttle initial operations that could evolve to a system with greater capabilities at a later date. (Phased development as available resources permit.) Contractors have now been selected to undertake major tasks in this effort including: Analyses of mission characteristics and require- ments; subsystem, configuration and operational analyses; develop- ment plans; technology implications; interface ground, and flight support systems requirements; cost relationships; and identification of Space Tug development program definition options. A significant in-house effort (that is, engineering systems analyses, development program planning and supporting technology studies) is also underway at the Marshall Space Flight Center. Fiscal year 1974 funds will be required to extend these studies in areas where additional data are needed. Program schedule and cost data will be generated on the various alternative systems and on the engines for these systems. Also, in fiscal year 1974, Tug engine studies will be conducted to support the system studies. Major areas to be considered include performance improvements to existing engines and an understanding of the implications of refurbishment and reusability. . User requirements analyses will continue to support the generation of vehicle systems requirements and technology information. This effort will directly support the MSFC in-house Tug effort. This fall, as these studies near completion, NASA and DOD will determine which of the program options is the proper course of action to follow and which of the two agencies will plan to proceed into de- tailed design and development. SUMMARY Current study efforts will serve to refine our understanding and evaluation of the development options and technology requirements for the interim and the later, greater capability, Space Tug systems. The feasibility of achieving, at low cost, an acceptable interim Tug system that could evolve to a system with the desired capabilities at a later date is the principal object of these study efforts. ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT The overall direction and coordination of advanced development activity for manned space flight programs is centralized within the OMSF Advanced Programs organization at NASA headquarters. 280 This provides assurance that the advanced development of component hardware and subsystems properly supports the planning of new mis- sions and programs. It also provides an effective focus for the selection of technical areas in which development effort will result in more ef- fective program decisions. - The output from the Advanced Development program is manifest not only in the foundation provided for hardware design decisions, but also in the development of procedures and operational techniques. The data developed are applied to the process of component se- lection, to the understanding of increased performance potential, to the reduction of cost, and problem solving for on-going programs. The work is an essential bridge between research and technology results on the one side and the incorporation of new concepts in system hardware and operations on the other. MT73–5419 shows a list of current advanced development areas which have been undertaken in support of the Space Shuttle where we have been making substantial progress and where results will con- tribute through improvement of performance, reliability, or cost reduction. CURRENT ADVANCED DEVELOPMENTS FOR SPACE SHUTTLE APPLICATIONS • WACUUM IACKETED DUCTING FOR CRYOGENIC FLUIDs • HEAT PIPES FOR THERMAL CONTROL • PYROTECHNIC SYSTEMS FOR STAGING OPERATIONS • AUXILLIARY PROPULSION FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL • MATERIALS FOR THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS • ADVANCED TRACKING TECHNIQUES FOR RENDEzvous • STABILIZATION CONTROL FOR LOAD RELIEF OF STRUCTURES • AEROTHERMODYNAMIC TESTS FOR SEPARATION, INTERFERENCE, PLUME IMPINGMENT, AND WATER IMPACT • ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF EXHAUST PRODUCTS, SONIC B00M, ETC. NASA HQ MT 73–5419 2–28-73 At the completion of fiscal 1973, responsibility for these areas will be phased into the Space Shuttle program. 281 SPACE TUG THIN METAL SIRUCTURE AUXLIARY NSULATION PROPULSION - |MAIN - _`PROPULSION COMPOSITE 2^ SIRUCTURE IHERMAL CONTR01 MEEDROld SHIELD T ADVANCED * º - NASA HQ waſ 73-549; 3-lºº - - - - - - - - MT73–5489 lists several advanced development areas for Space Tug application. Most of these areas are aimed at reduction of the Tug's weight since a 1-pound reduction in empty weight means a pound increase in round trip payload capability each time the Tug is used to deliver a payload to geosynchronous orbit. Later discussion .# the Space Tug will mention its extensive use as a high energy stage for operation between Earth orbit, where it is delivered by the shuttle, and geosynchronous positions of payload destination. - Typical of work for Tug application in the first item, propulsion .." is our work toward possible use of a modified RL-10 engine shown in MT73–5290. This engine is currently being used for the Centaur stage of Atlas/Centaur and Titan III/Centaur but, with further performance improvement through modification, could pos- sibly become a viable candidate for early Tug capability at low development cost. For a full capability Tug we are also supporting high speed bearing and seal development technology to ...; OAST activity in more advanced propulsion systems. In addition to the foregoing activity for the space tug, we plan to study the advanced concept .# using the Earth's atmosphere for brak- ing deceleration during return from synchronous orbit. This study and other advanced development activity for the Space Tug will be coordinated closely with DOD as alternative vehicle development approaches are evaluated. 282 RL-10 ENGINE NASA HQ MT73-5290 2-9-73 In other systems areas, efforts in fiscal year 1973 are being devoted to radiator developments, autonomous navigation systems, energy storage systems, flame resistant fibrous materials, and flat conductor cable connectors. The latter work is particularly attractive because electrical cabling in spacecraft and launch vehicles represents a significant segment of the system weight. Past effort within the advanced development program has made much progress toward development of these new cables. However, more work is needed on connectors. Investigations will continue for the flat conductor cable connector bodies and connector spring contacts. Efforts will include development of corona-proof connectors, dis- tribution boxes and aluminum conductors. We anticipate that this development of lightweight highly reliable electrical cabling will soon be sufficiently advanced that it can be routinely employed in many space applications. 283 ADVANCED STUDIES The next area that I will discuss is the advanced mission studies program. The funds requested for advanced studies are used to probe into the future, to seek out new projects which should be considered by NASA and to study them to sufficient depth to see whether they are feasible and properly related to national objectives. The Space Tug program, which I have just discussed, has now been identified as a needed project. It was considered to be an advanced study project until this year and was in the fiscal year 1973 advanced studies program. This is consistent with the pattern that has developed over the past several years, where the promising projects among those studies are turned into flight development projects. The shuttle evolved from the advanced space transportation studies conducted in the advanced studies program; the Sortie Lab program evolved from the shuttle utilization studies conducted over the past 2 years. - During fiscal year 1973 the advanced studies program is focusing on continued studies of the Space Tug element of the space trans- portation system and tug applications. - In fiscal year 1974 we plan to concentrate our study effort in the following technical areas. SPACE SHUTTLE Once Space Shuttle operational experience has been gained and its economic and operational characteristics are demonstrated, considera- tion will be given to making improvements that will further decrease the operational cost; for example, a less expensive or more readily refurbishable first stage will be considered. The advanced studies program will include the analysis of a number of concepts for evolutionary changes to the shuttle which hold promise of a favorable effect on operational cost. LARGE LIFT LAUNCH WEHICLE ConCEPT Payload and traffic projections through the 1980's indicate that the preponderance of Earth to orbit traffic can be accommodated by the Space Shuttle. It is not prudent at this time, however, to close the door to a possible requirement for a launch capability for payloads in the 100 to 200 thousand pound class. MT73–5048A shows a concept of a large lift vehicle based on shuttle technology and certain shuttle components. Study effort is needed not only to further define the large lift ve- hicle concept but to evaluate compatibility with Space Shuttle proc- essing at the launch site. 284 REPRESENTATIVE LARGE LIFT VEHICLE CONCEPT SHUTTLE DROP | TANK — PAYLOAD SHUTTLE B00STER SRM AWIONICS PROPULSION NASA H0 MT13. 5048A 1-11-73 NASA-HQ ADVANCED MANNED MISSION CoNCEPTS Approximately one-third of the total number of payloads to be carried to low Earth orbit by the shuttle will be carried on to geo- synchronous orbit by the Space Tug. With this number of payloads in geosynchronous orbit, it may some day become economically attractive to have men there for ex- tended periods of time to service and maintain the payloads on-orbit. Studies of system possibilities for synchronous operations, and what relationship they might have with the Space Shuttle and Space Tug, need further examination. Over the next several years, lunar studies will be conducted to de- velop needed information for a possible future resumption of manned lunar exploration. 285 The objective of this study effort is to stay abreast of the continuing analysis of the completed lunar missions, to define engineering and scientific objectives of possible future manned lunar missions, and to investigate the impact of such missions on the Space Transportation System, including the large lift vehicle. The final area of consideration will be: . ADVANCED PROGRAM Changing national needs and priorities require a continuing assess- ment of the capabilities and directions of space activities as they relate to satisfaction of national objectives. ANALYSIs Of FUTURE PROGRAM OBJECTIVES INPUTS FROM INDUSTRY SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITIES INTEREST GROUPS SURWEY _| SYNTHESIZE *| ANALYSIS OF T REQUIREMENTS - OF NATIONAL SPACE NEEDS LT CAPABILITIES | DEFINITION H EVALUATION 0F SYSTEM WHO BENEFITS? AND PROGRAM WHEN7 ALTERNATIVES WHAT Is THE cost VERsus BENEFITs? NASA HQ MTZ3–5247 —FEED BACK - 2–7–73 MT73–5247 indicates one way of looking at these relationships. National needs may be defined by the public, by industry, by the scientific community, by the priorities established by the Congress, or by various interest groups. The analysis of the capabilities of space activities to meet these needs consists of matching specific needs to specific space functions. Finally, in those cases where a space capability appears to have a potential for contributing to a national need, program and system concepts must be developed in order to make a proper evaluation of technical feasibility, costs, and benefits. & * We plan to undertake an integrated analysis of these relationships in the coming months. 93-466 O - 73 - 19 286 From these fiscal year 1974 studies, we expect to: 1. Identify areas which may later result in cost reduction improve- ments to the Shuttle. 2. To acquire data upon which to establish the feasibility of a large lift vehicle based on the Shuttle. 3. To investigate the impact of Advanced Manned Mission concepts on the Space Transportation System. 4. To obtain data about national needs and aspirations, upon which we can base our planning for the future. In today's labor market, the funds being requested for the fiscal year 1974 advanced studies support only about 30 to 40 engineers in contractor plants. The benefits that are derived from these funds are, however, far in excess of this rather token contractor representation. These studies provide the means for active exchange of ideas, con- cepts, and plans between the agency planners and their counterparts in industry. This benefits industry, in that it allows them to direct their in- ternally controlled planning and research funds toward those goals that the agency has determined as most advantageous. At the same time, agency planners get the benefit of diverse opin- ions of the proper goals, programs, or systems, as seen from the various economic and geographical vantage points represented by the contractors. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FUQUA. Thank you, Mr. Culbertson. Thank you again for your remarks. What amounts were appro- priated in fiscal 1973, for advanced studies? Mr. CULBERTSON. $1.5 million, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FUQUA. Do you plan to spend all of it in this fiscal year? Mr. CULBERTSON. It is committed at this time. Mr. Fuqua. Is there any in the pipeline from previous years that has not been expended? Mr. CULBERTson. There was at the beginning of this year, but we are using it all. Mr. FUQUA. If you use the $1.5 million, how much additional money is involved? Mr. CULBERTson. We expect to spend a total of approximately $2.4 million this fiscal year, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FUQUA. How much did you ask for? - Mr. CULBERTson. In our fiscal year 1973 budget, we asked for $1.5 million. Mr. FUQUA. On the first chart that you have I am somewhat confused. This refers to the Tug. Mr. CULBERTSON. Chart No. 4. Mr. Fuqua. You say 50 percent of the payload would be required for the Tug. Mr. CULBERTson. Those are the missions which may be polar or due east or where the altitude is such that the Shuttle can reach. It will either deposit a satellite at that point or it will conduct some other type of mission that does not require additional propulsion. Mr. FUQUA. The 10-percent polar orbit, what about that? 287 Mr. CULBERTSON. That would be where the desired altitude exceeds that which the Shuttle can reach. Therefore, an upper stage capability is provided to supplement the Shuttle's capabilities. Mr. Fuqua. What is the next one? . Mr. CULBERTSON. About 15 percent of this total projection involves other various missions, where an upper stage is needed. There is an infinite variety of orbits depending on the characteristics of the pay- load and missions. A large block of those requiring the Shuttle and a third stage are geosynchronous orbits. Mr. Fuqua. After 1980 you will need the Tug for about 50 percent of your launches. - Mr. CULBERTSON. Yes. - Mr. Fuqua. Have you made any studies as to the possible reuse of the Tug? I understand you sent out invitations to bid on the Tug sº ut you have not made any firm decisions, have you? r. CULBERTSON. In order to achieve the type of overall system efficiency desired, we need a reusable Tug—an element that can get a payload and bring it back to the Shuttle. Because of funding limita- tions, we may not be able to have this capability when the Shuttle first becomes operational. We are studying all the possible candidates, such as existing stages that might be modified to provide an interim capability. Some of these would be expended when they are used for the mission. They would not have the capability to retrieve a payload. They would be used to support the requirements imposed by the mis- sion, but would not allow us to get the full economic benefit from the system. We want to initiate the development of a Tug by NASA or by the Department of Defense, as early as budgetary limitations permit. Mr. Fuqua. In your preliminary study with the Department of Defense, have you any figure as to what the reusable Tug might cost? Mr. CULBERTSON. You are talking about the development of it or the individual use? Mr. FUQUA. The development part of it prior to the time you will have an operational vehicle. Mr. CULBERTSON. The development cost has been estimated and ranges from $500 to $750 million. Studies are just getting underway today, and they will add much detail to our understanding. These are preliminary figures. Since the Tug is to be reused, we will not have to invest in a large fleet. We expect a reasonable turnaround time with a couple of weeks on the ground. It currently looks as though we would º between six and eight Tugs, on the order of $15 to $20 million €8,0ſ). We think that each mission would cost about $1 million. In addition, we would need spares. However, we could prolong the life of the Tug with planned maintenance. The reliability of the system would be an economic and operational advantage. Mr. WINN. You answered a question about how much money you had asked for in the past, but going to page 3, sir, you are talking about the cost, to service and maintain the payload, and I have been of the opinion that when you are putting men up there and have a manned space flight that it is more expensive. Mr. CULBERTSON. It depends on the job and where it may be. This is similar to our reasons for not discarding our work on the station. Within the study area, we are looking to the future as far as reasonably 288 possible. We want to see what kind of a system might need support and its specific requirements. There are thoughts as to what we might do, but the process of our advanced studies is to try to get to a point where we can match possible system capabilities with possible requirements at the time. Mr. WINN. I wanted that clarified as you were talking about the study in order to stay abreast of the continuing analysis. You talk about defining the engineering and the scientific objectives. This is as a possible manned lunar mission. Mr. CULBERTSON. We were referring to the engineering objectives. That is what we are talking about. Mr. WINN. The manned space flights are more expensive, as a rule are they not? Mr. MYERs. In looking at the cost of the vehicles, you find that the cost per launch of an Apollo is very expensive. It also requires a very high level of systems performance. Now, when we look at the type of varied and complex experiments that we placed on the surface of the Moon and used in the service module's scientific instrument module, and when we looked at the vast pioneering geological survey that was carried out by men on the surface of the Moon during Apollo, there is no way, in my opinion, that you can make a unmanned machine do that job. Man’s judgment makes the difference. You start with a set of Apollo requirements. You say to meet these requirements, it took a man to do the job. For example, during the Apollo 17 mission, Commander Cernan and Dr. Schmitt covered 35 kilometers in their lunar roving vehicle, conducting significant ex- ploration of the Moon. In addition to conducting a wide variety of experiments, they returned about 250 pounds—115 kilograms—of lunar samples to Earth. Now, the Russians sent a machine to the Moon. In 10 months it covered about 10 kilometers and it carried nothing back to the surface of the earth. It transmitted information, but in no way could this com- pare with what the astronauts did. There are proper places for men and there are also proper places for machines. In the Shuttle, we will have the capability for man to ac- complish activities that man should actually do and for machines to do what they do best. The reusable Shuttle, as the cornerstone of an economical versatile space transportation system, will open up the avenues of opportunity in both areas. Mr. WINN. I think there are those who would disagree that we need a man to do all the things that were done on the Moon. In some cases the men did nothing but take a package out and place it there. Some said a machine could actually have done that as well. However, I agree that most of the experiments were important and you have to consider what they brought back. The success has to be considered. It is questionable whether some of the experiments could have been one by machine and been handled as successfully as it was done by the men. You are talking about advance program objective analysis. This is always good for controversy; also the national objectives and needs, they are referred to. You say by priorities established by the Congress. I doubt that. You also mentioned the various interest groups. I know 289 you have to take all these into consideration. I am glad since we also hear about making work for the agencies to keep jobs open. You have to analyze and look a long way down the road to figure out what our needs might actually be and what experiments and payloads might be put on the various crafts at the time. I don’t think that we do a very good job of telling the public as to what they need in certain fields. The committee does not ask the public or poll them as to what we ought to do in space. The scientific community comes forward very strongly and makes recommendations. I don’t mean to editorialize but do you have anything to add at this time to what I have said? Mr. MYERs. It is a very difficult subject to convey. We do our best to analyze the returns of the space program as to what they can do, for our country and for the world. I am sure that we don’t do well enough to do justice to the returns from one program. Mr. WINN. Thank you very much. Mr. FUQUA. You may want to supply this for the record. Getting back to the Shuttle payloads. How do the economic factors look now as compared to last year? We were given some figures on the economics based on the vehicle costs and the stretch out of the Shuttle particularly concerning Shuttle payloads. If you have any specific figures, I would like to get them. Are the economics we found last year looking better or less favorable at this time? Mr. MYERs. There was a major payload effects study done by Lock- heed last year. We have not carried out another study of that nature. We have looked at the kinds of trends that have occurred as to the missions and, from what we have seen, Mr. Chairman, it looks like we are as cost effective as we were last year, possibly we are even a little better. Mr. FUQUA. If you have any figures you can put them in the record later. Please do this for us. Mr. MEYERS. Yes. [This information requested is not available at this time; however, it will be submitted to the committee on or after May 1, 1973.] Mr. Fuqua. We want to thank you and General Curtin; also Mr. Culbertson for your interesting testimony this morning. We have a considerable number of additional questions we would appreciate receiving answers to for the record (see appendix B). Tomorrow we will meet in Room 2212. We will have Robert Anderson of Rockwell International and Mr. Lee. We will adjourn at this time. [Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to recon- vene at 9:30 a.m., on Wednesday, March 7, 1973.] 1974 NASA AUTHORIZATION WEDNESDAY, MARCH 7, 1973 Hous E of REPRESENTATIVES, CoMMITTEE on SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICs, SUBCOMMITTEE on MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:30 a.m., in room 1302, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Don Fuqua (chair- man of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. Fuqua. The subcommittee will be in order. We are happy to have with us this morning Mr. William B. Bergen, president of North American Aerospace Group of Rockwell Inter- national. Mr. Bergen, we are happy to have you with us. STATEMENT OF WILLIAM B. BERGEN, PRESIDENT, NORTH AMER- ICAN AEROSPACE GROUP, ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL Mr. BERGEN. I am president of the North American Aerospace Group of Rockwell International. The group includes the space division in Downey, Calif., prime contractor for design, development, and production of spacecraft for the Skylab and ASTP programs, the Space Shuttle Orbiter, and for integration of all elements of the shuttle system. The group also includes the Rocketdyne Division in Canoga Park, Calif., contractor for the Space Shuttle main engine. On behalf of the company I would like to express our appreciation for the opportunity to again appear before this subcommittee. It has been an eventful year in space since our last appearance. We have seen the completion of man’s most memorable technological achieve- ment—the Apollo lunar landing program, and we have taken the first steps toward routine utilization of space by going forward with the Space Shuttle. We have submitted a formal statement to the committee and, after making a few brief remarks, we will be pleased to answer any questions you or the members of the committee might have, Mr. Chairman. With me today are the key individuals directly responsible for the conduct of the Space Shuttle programs at Rockwell Inter- national. I should like to introduce Mr. Joseph McNamara, president of the space division; Mr. William Brennan, president of the Rocket- dyne Division; Mr. George Jeffs, executive vice president, space division; Mr. Bastian Hello, vice president and Space Shuttle program manager; and Mr. Paul Castenholz, Rocketdyne vice president and Space Shuttle main engine program manager. All have been directly concerned with the U.S. space program for many years. (291) 292 Since our last appearance our company has changed its name as you implied and we have merged with Rockwell Manufacturing Corp. The new name better reflects the continued growth and new dimen- sions of the company. And, the merger with Rockwell Manufacturing gives the corporation a larger, broader base of activity. The Aerospace Group was redesignated the North American Aero- space Group at the same time, and will continue to function just as it has in the past. As the group president I continue to report to Mr. Robert Anderson, president of Rockwell International. I can assure you that both Mr. Anderson, and Mr. Al Rockwell, chairman of the board, will continue to give the Space Shuttle programs their complete support and attention. Our entire management team is well aware of the immense responsi– bility that comes with our involvement with NASA in developing the Space Shuttle for this Nation. The program is fundamentally sound. It is technically feasible and we believe it will be cost-effective. The system surely will be the strong backbone of the forthcoming era of space operations. Before commenting in more detail on the Space Shuttle program I should like to briefly discuss our company’s responsibilities in connec- tion with the Skylab and the Apollo–Soyuz Test Project. These pro- grams represent the only remaining U.S. manned space flights before Shuttle. They are essential in maintaining an effective government- industry team as we transition into the Space Shuttle program. The Skylab should clearly demonstrate how closely related are space experimentation and man’s earthbound problems. We believe the scheduled experiments in the areas of solar physics, earth resources analysis, and biomedical and behavioral experiments will make major contributions to our better understanding of man and of the Universe in which we live. Our company is now in the sixth year of contractual activity for Apollo command and service modules required for the Skylab program. I would like to note that we presently estimate and have so reported a $5 million underrun in costs on our portion of the program. Mr. FUQUA. Let me commend you on this; we hear the opposite so often. Mr. BERGEN. I hope we can have similar reports on the Shuttle in the future. Mr. Fuqua. We look forward to it. Is that a commitment? Mr. BERGEN. No, sir. Rocketdyne, of course, has built the engines for both the Saturn V and Saturn 1B vehicles which will be used for back-to-back launches scheduled for May. Later this morning in another session you will hear in detail about the Apollo–Soyuz test project planned for 1975. For this historic joint U.S.-Russian mission in space our company will provide an Apollo command and service module and a new docking module compatible with both Russian and U.S. hardware. As on all U.S. manned space flights the American astronauts will be launched by Rocketdyne engines. Your committee already has heard extensive testimony on the per- formance, mission operations, and technical characteristics of the 2.93 Space Shuttle program. I would like to concentrate the remainder of my remarks this morning on work already under way at the Space and Rocketdyne divisions to meet those goals as stated by NASA. The Space Shuttle main engine program is proceeding on schedule and within cost. A cost-plus-award fee contract was negotiated with NASA's George C. Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Ala., last August following a favorable decision by the General Accounting Office in April, 1972, concerning a protest by another contractor. º was originally selected to build the engines by NASA in uly, 1971. The most significant event of the 47-month development phase will be the critical design review in March, 1976. This is the controlled milestone when NASA reviews and approves the engine system design and releases it for production of flight engines. Up to the present time we have released 55 percent of the detailed engineering drawings, placed over 1500 purchase orders with outside companies—of these 65 percent were with small business and minority- owned firms—and we have been modifying manufacturing and test facilities required for the program. Design verification testing of the key component of the engine, the ignition system, has been under way for several weeks. This component paces the development program since it is the ignition source for all combustion within the engine. Tests of materials and processes also have been accomplished during this 12-month period. The Space division entered discussions with NASA’s Johnson Space Center, Houston, Tex., immediately following the announcement of contract award on July 26, 1972, and continued to refine the Shuttle System configuration prior to authority to proceed on August 9, 1972. These efforts resulted in a well-defined system and configuration, and 5 days later, Space division cooperated with NASA in conducting intensive factfinding and program orientation meetings which provided the initial system configuration baseline, a refined statement of work and program schedule, and a clear definition of areas requiring primary emphasis. - The output of these discussions formed the basis for systematic and productive system and subsystem studies conducted during the initial contract period. The long-range importance of the work performed during this formative stage of the program should not be minimized. We have paid special attention to five basic parameters: cost per flight, the rate of program buildup, peak funding requirements, total program funding requirement, and mission capture. To accomplish these aims, the Space division has used the finest talent available within the corporation and elsewhere in the aerospace industry to ensure efficient and thorough investigation of all alternate approaches to the achievement of program objectives. During this period, several key design decisions were made. I would like to emphasize each decision hinged on not just technical merit but also cost merit. - It was decided to incorporate thrust vector control on the solid rocket booster, delete the abort solid rocket motors and the air- breathing propulsion system from orbital missions. These decisions resulted in either reduced per flight cost or increased orbital payload capability for several missions. . ' 294 A successful program requirements review was held in November 1972, which enabled Space Division subsequently to respond with a rapid system-resizing effort for NASA of a lightweight orbiter con- figuration concept on December 15. NASA subsequently directed that we proceed with further system development based on a 150,000- pound orbiter dry weight baseline. Simultaneously, wind tunnel testing has proceeded at 10 aero- dynamic test facilities throughout the country. We have verified the fundamental stability and aerodynamic characteristics of the configuration. º We have conducted hundreds of mission simulation runs at our Space Division flight simulator. This system is tied through a com- puter to provide simulations of ascent, in-orbit, reentry, and touch- down flight modes. This simulation has allowed test pilots from NASA and Rockwell International to assure the soundness of the Zero thrust landing concept. Concurrent with the establishment of the system configuration, preliminary planning has gone forward for the accomplishment of the total program. This planning insures the early assessment of the effects of current design and program decisions on future activities. It also established the requirements for and scheduling of resources, and provides good management visibility of total program needs and potential problem areas. Preliminary plans have been formulated based on the availability, utilization, and cost of alternate facilities. Quality assurance inspection plans, interfacing of government furnished equipment schedules and technical requirements, integrated logistics plans, and the placement of major subcontracts have been formulated. Methods have been established with NASA concurrence for the continuous assessment and tracking of cost per flight. The Space Shuttle subcontracting program is structured toward achievement of maximum technological, economical and schedule benefits through effective distribution of work between company and outside sources. Our proposal called for subcontracting 53 percent of the Shuttle Orbiter work throughout the country, and if this occurs it is expected to have a widespread, positive impact on the entire aerospace industry. Several major subcontract proposals are now being evaluated on the orbiter wing, the vertical tail, the midfuselage, and the orbital maneuvering system. We expect award of these contracts within the next 30 to 60 days. You have heard previous testimony identifying two major elements of the program—solid rocket boosters and the external tank, which will be contracted directly by NASA. These team members are expect- ed to be on board by November of this year. At Space Division, we have been working directly with NASA to develop the required technical definition of those elements of the configuration. Let me now mention the impact of the Shuttle program on our North American Aerospace Group employment. The employment level at Rocketdyne in April, 1972, was 2,684. Present employment is 3,033, an increase of 12 percent and we expect the employment level will continue to climb and peak at approximately 3,800 people in 1978. 295 At Space Division employment is beginning to turn around also. As you know, we have been reducing our work force for several years. In September, employment at Space Division bottomed out at 6,213, and this has since increased to 6,875. We expect to continue the buildup to approximately 15,000 working on the Shuttle program in 1976. You can well imagine how difficult this past massive employment reduction has been. We have lost hundreds of dedicated, highly qualified individuals despite our efforts to transfer as many as possible to other divisions of the company. NASA has estimated that a peak employment of some 50,000 can be expected on Shuttle throughout the country. And, of course, these primary jobs generate added thousands in secondary employ- ment. In this decade alone this combined total is expected to exceed 750,000 man-years. - The direct benefits of the Space Shuttle Program are well known to this committee. Routine, economical access to space makes possible a unique way of solving national and worldwide needs of all mankind. Space Shuttle missions include a wide range of activity that will bring specific and long-range benefits to all of us on earth. Equally important perhaps are the ancillary benefits of space research and development spending. Some of these benefits are little understood and, therefore unappreciated. We recognize our responsi- bility to help communicate them to the American public. The key to increased productivity and economic growth is techno- logical progress. One recent study performed by the Midwest Re- search Institute concluded that some 60 percent of the economic gains through technological progress in the 1949–1968 time period was attributable to R. & D. activity. The same study said that high technology undertakings such as the space program are particularly rewarding national investments because they exert a disproportionately high weight toward increased national productivity. Other studies support these conclusions. For example, one by Chase Econometric Associates concluded that, even in the short term, a spending mix within a fixed overall budget ceiling only slightly favoring high technology will have a highly favorable effect on economic growth, Federal tax receipts, and total employment. This occurs here as in the previous example because the technology- intensive industries are most significantly impacted. - We are convinced the Space Shuttle will favorably affect this Nation's balance of trade posture. In saying this, I am not suggesting that we will be exporting Space Shuttles like we do commercial aircraft—nor that the solution to our current trade dilemma will be found in the Shuttle. But I do suggest that the stimulative economic effects of the Space Shuttle will impact most fully the high technology industries. And these are the ones upon which we heavily depend as a primary Source of exports to offset increasing imports of commodities with low-technology content. But the Shuttle will help our trade picture in another way. It will, in effect, export services by launching and providing in-orbit maintenance to the satellites of other nations. This may not be 296 significant in the context of the total magnitude of our foreign trade flow, but it will help while at the same time contributing to inter- national cooperation and goodwill. For technology to be a truly effective economic stimulant it must get out into the economy. Never before in history has there been a more dedicated effort by government and industry to insure the flow and diffusion of technology throughout all of the industry. The very fine publication of the Science and Astronautics Com- mittee last October, and, from your hearings in several prior years on the practical returns from space, offers ample evidence of the success of this endeavor. But much—and perhaps most—of the technology which has been transferred is difficult to document and is not well known. One objective in the 1967 merger of North American Aviation and Rockwell-Standard was the application of technology developed in aerospace to our commercial activities. Although difficult at first, we persevered and succeeded—to the point where it is a well-established corporate practice. Our activities in general aviation aircraft, knitting machines, printing presses and in many other areas have benefited. We have proven that technology transfer can and does take place—and our company is not alone in this. - We think our success in the endeavor and the success of other com- panies is healthy and in keeping with the national need to stimulate the economy through the advancement and diffusion of technology. The real beneficiaries are the American people. The past several years have witnessed a reordering of national priorities. Increased emphasis has been placed on social programs. We understand this—and indeed support much of it. But we think the Space program has taken more than its share of reductions. Since 1969 space spending has been reduced by 25 percent com- pared to vast increases in most other areas of Federal spending. We think its current level of support is marginal at best. Further reduc- tions may cause program stretchout and increased cost in the total program and will surely cause irreparable harm to our goal of a bal- anced, viable space program geared to serve our needs on Earth. In summary, Mr. Chairman, we believe the Shuttle Program is moving very well. The concept is fundamentally sound, the new op- erations that it allows will significantly enhance our space capability; it has realistic time and cost schedules; the system will provide bene- fits to earthbound problems; it will spawn significant ancillary bene- fits and employment; it is the right system at the right time. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and now if you have any questions, I or my colleagues will try to answer them for you. Mr. Fuqua. I think Mr. Bell would like to ask you a few questions. Mr. BELL. Yes. I didn’t have any questions, Mr. Chairman, I wanted to welcome Mr. Bergen, president of the North American Aerospace Group of Rockwell International. It’s a real pleasure to welcome you before the committee. I want to state that this organi- zation is one of the best in the Nation, and has been doing a great job. It is a real honor to have you before this committee. Mr. BERGEN. Thank you very much. Mr. Fuqua. Thank you, Mr. Bergen, for a very fine statement and as I said earlier, certainly your company should be commended for the 297 efficient job that it did in the Apollo program and we hope that the same efficiency can prevail in this program. You mentioned at the end of your statement about the possibility of shortage of funds and stretchout costs that could develop. If the Congress decides, or the administration, or whomever, that there should be a further stretchout, we already have had one of 8 or 9 months in this year's budget. What is that going to do to our overall projected cost of $5.15 billion to produce the Shuttle? Mr. BERGEN. In my opinion, a stretchout automatically means increased cost. There is one alleviating factor. A stretchout in the early portion of a program is not as critical as when the program matures. Mr. FUQUA. Where do we reach that point—now, this year, next year? Mr. BERGEN. I believe we are just about there. It will certainly be a lot more critical next year. A stretchout of the same proportion next year will be much more critical. • - * Mr. Fuqua. Your company has had experience in the manufacture and development of aircraft for military services. In the experience you have had, have you had stretchouts in funding? Do you have any handle that we can put on stretchout cost? Mr. BERGEN. I will give you some recent experience. For the major aircraft program, we received that contract a little over 2 years ago. The funding so far has been exactly what it was planned at the initia- tion of the contract, to the dollar. Mr. FUQUA. How is your cost running? Mr. BERGEN. We are running just on cost. Mr. FUQUA. So if you had had a stretchout you would start exceed- ing cost projections? Mr. BERGEN. Yes, indeed. We plan our first flight April of next year; we are on schedule. Should we miss, we know the costs will increase. ū Mr. FUQUA. Hasn’t this been historically true throughout the space program, when you have an R. & D. program, if you get off schedule, your costs start accelerating? tº Mr. BERGEN. Yes; an example is the MOL program, which was stretched and stretched until cancellation. e Mr. Fuqua. Rocketdyne has engine development. How far along is that development so if a stretchout comes in engine development or in the orbiter that you have reached that point, that it would start really accelerating? We are at the beginning of the program but we are getting ready to produce hardware. Mr. BERGEN. Your question is in two parts, the first part deals with the status of the engine and I would like to defer to Mr. Brennan, Mr. BRENNAN. Our negotiated contract already has been stretched 6 months. It was delayed initially as mentioned by Mr. Bergen, and with the stretch we will be able to meet all the requirements and dates of the shuttle. The present schedule and funding should meet all the requirements. Mr. FUQUA. Now, the other part of the question, Mr. Bergen? Mr. BERGEN. Yes, sir, I think a further stretch could add to the orbiter contract costs. Mr. FUQUA. We were talking earlier about where in time do we reach the point that a streatch is really going to accelerate in cost. You said we are about there now. In fact, aren’t we there now? 298 Mr. BERGEN. Yes, I believe so. I just want to say as a matter of degree— - Mr. Fu QUA. It’s getting more progressive, accelerating more. Mr. BERGEN. The cost accelerates as time increases. Mr. FUQUA. You mentioned also that—and we are aware that there has been a number of design features that have changed since your contracts with NASA. How is this going to affect the program and also the cost to the program from the original estimates that were made? Mr. BERGEN. I would like to ask Mr. Hello. Mr. HELLO. Yes, Mr. Chairman, there have been some design changes. Instead of describing them let me talk about the net effect of them. The effects, particularly since our last major milestone on the program in November, have been to reduce the gross liftoff weight by over a million pounds and they have resulted in a reduction of the cost per flight of more than a million and a half dollars, and the net effects of those then have been in the right direction, reduced weight, reduced cost per flight. Mr. FUQUA. You mentioned about the number of subcontractors, 53 percent was going to be subcontracted out. Sometime within the next few weeks could you supply us for the record, if it is not con- fidential company information, the names of those subcontractors, where they are located, and the approximate number of employees they have. Mr. BERGEN. Yes, we will do that. You might want to know the major ones. Mr. FUQUA. We have looked at some economic effects through- out the country and not just California. I think it woudl be very interesting and many of the members would like to know what part of the work their area is getting and if this is affecting the entire economy of the United States. When we visit your facility we may want to go into more detail on some of these economic studies. Mr. BERGEN. There are three subcontract awards that are in final processing right now. Mr. McNamara might want to review what they are and who the competition is. Mr. BELL. Mr. Chairman, as I understand, Mr. Bergen said 53 percent outside of California. - Mr. BERGEN. Fifty-three percent outside of Rockwell International. Mr. McNAMARA. If I might add to Mr. Bergen’s statement, Mr. Chairman, we have taken bids as noted in his verbal testimony for the tail section, the midbody, and the wing, and also the OMS pod, and we have completed our evaluation of the wing, the tail, and the midbody. These evaluations have been submitted to NASA for concurrence and should be announced shortly. These represent subcontracts in excess of $100 million. They are substantial. There are others to follow. It appears that there should be a fairly good distribution across the country based on our assess- ment of potential subcontracts. - - - Now, in our written testimony we have a schedule of our make or buy distribution. By make we mean those things we do in-house and the buy distribution is those that we contract for. We also have shown the approximate times that these procurements will occur. We can 299 get a great deal more information for you. We can tell you the po- tential subcontractors and where they are located, and certainly we can give you some background on the companies and we will supply that to your committee. Mr. FUQUA. I would certainly appreciate that, Mr. McNamara. Mr. BERGEN. On the same subject, we have placed major con- tracts on the engine. - Mr. BRENNAN. Mr. Chairman, we have placed a contract with Minneapolis Honeywell in Minneapolis and in Florida for the engine control system and that will be in the range of $35 to $40 million. Another major subcontract, insofar as the engine is concerned, is the hydraulic control system contract with Hydraulic Research in Cali- fornia, valued at approximately $7 million. The number of people associated with the Minneapolis Honeywell operation is approximately 200 and Hydraulic Research, approx- imately 100 people. - Mr. FUQUA. You mentioned about 750,000 man-years in your statement. This is direct man-years in the shuttle program? Mr. BERGEN. This includes the people working directly on the Shuttle plus the secondary jobs generated. Mr. Fuqua. It does include the secondary? Mr. BERGEN. Yes, sir. Mr. FUQUA. Could you put a value on those man-years? Mr. BERGEN. Yes, we will submit that to you. Mr. CAMP. Mr. Chairman, before we get too far away from the previous statement, or this last one, do you also have the contract for the tanks? Mr. BERGEN. No; we are assisting NASA in developing the specifi- cations for the tanks. We are ineligible to bid for those tanks. They will be procured directly by NASA. We anticipate those will be awarded later this year. Mr. CAMP. Do you have any satellite companies that still belong to the new name of Rockwell now that could bid on these tanks? Mr. BERGEN. No. Mr. CAMP. None of your group of any kind? Mr. BERGEN. Under the ground rules, no part of Rockwell Inter- national is eligible to bid on the tanks or the booster. Mr. CAMP. In other words, your plant in Tulsa, Okla., couldn’t bid on the tanks. Mr. BERGEN. Not as a prime. Mr. CAMP. Could they be, what do you call it, the secondary? Mr. BERGEN. I believe they can. Mr. CAMP. Isn’t it the policy of NASA now to place this work all over the whole country so it does have the effect on the economy that the chairman just mentioned a minute ago? Isn’t this their policy now? Mr. BERGEN. I am really not in a position to speak for NASA on what their policy is. My understanding is, and the way we are pro- ceeding, is we are evaluating these contracts on their own merits and they will be awarded on their own merits. We do appear to be getting a good geographical distribution. 300 Mr. CAMP. When the Shuttle is completed and is doing the job it was meant for, as a vehicle back and forth to the satellite, do you anticipate we could use the Shuttle in the commercial world of flight? Mr. BERGEN. I will ask the man who is going to build it, Mr. McNamara. * Mr. McNAMARA. We believe there are many things that can be done in the commercial world and I will take an example of a geo- physical company. I think a geophysical company is going to find this a very valuable tool in analyzing the substructure of our earth for oil deposits, mineral deposits, and that type of thing. I think that the farm community is going to be involved, is going to be deeply involved with the use of the Shuttle program in analyzing their crops, their growth, their rotation, and so forth. I can see a whole team of agri- culturists or a whole team of geologists working with data from the Shuttle, and analyzing and predicting what is down there and where they should move next. - Mr. CAMP. How about the area of commercial transportation? I Mr. BERGEN. I am glad to see you are more of a far-out man than 8, Iſl. Mr. CAMP. Can we visualize flying this vehicle from New York to Tokyo in an hour or less? Mr. BERGEN. We can visualize it certainly. I am afraid it is beyond my time. - Mr. Fuqua. There are going to be some high ticket prices at $10% million a flight. I agree with the gentleman from Oklahoma and I hope I live to see it, as a young man, that it will have that potential later. I don’t know.' Mr. BERGEN. There is no question about it that many of the- technical features of the Shuttle have application short of your ulti- mate goal. For example, when the next generation SST comes along what we have learned about Shuttle thermal protection systems will be directly applicable to new aircraft design. Mr. Fu QUA. Mr. Winn? Mr. WINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On page 8, Mr. Bergen, you referred to five basic parameters: Cost per flight, the rate of program buildup, peak funding requirements, total program funding require- ments, and the mission capture. I wonder if you could enlarge on what you lºan by the mission capture. Are you talking about the end resultſ: Mr. BERGEN. That simply means that of all the missions that have to be performed in space, how many of them can be performed by the Shuttle? For example, our payload size is based upon the payload requirements and if we reduced our payload capability there would be a number of missions we could not perform with the Shuttle. Mr. WINN. Do you want to enlarge on that, Mr. McNamara? Mr. McNAMARA. I think the intent is that we have to maximize the use of the Shuttle for all space missions. .* Mr. WINN. You are still experimenting with payloads, aren’t you? Mr. MCNAMARA. We are still analyzing payloads and we still be- 301 `-- lieve the Shuttle will be able to do every known mission with this full- size payload bay and this lift capability. Certainly there are new things going to be developed but as we foresee it the Shuttle should be able to do all the civil and military missions that are now known. Mr. WINN. There is a cooperative effort between NASA and DOD on the Space Shuttle, isn’t there? Mr. McNAMARA. That is right. I am really not in a position to tell you the depth of that cooperation, but it's very apparent to us that DOD is getting more and more involved with NASA and with our- selves in following the progress of the work, defining their requirements and making sure that the requirements of the orbiter and the system fits their requirements. Mr. WINN. I don’t believe anyone on this committee wants to divulge what the experiments might be on the Space Shuttle. I am sure the committee will be briefed by the military later and the infor- mation made available to the members of the committee. A great deal has been mentioned about employment figures. You stated the employment level at Rocketdyne in April of 1972 was 2,684, and present employment was 3,033, an increase of 12 percent. Do you expect this to climb and peak at approximetely 3,800 in 1978? I may be reading between the lines but I am one who advocates a consistent hiring or employment policy rather than trying to attain something you might have had in the middle days of Apollo. In other words, I’m not sure you would want the 3,800 or 3,000 or 5,000. I don’t remember the exact figures that you had back in the mid-Apollo program. I would rather see you have a consistency of, say, 3,500 or 3,600, so you don’t have to let your crews and teams go, and then try to run them down and bring them back every 2 or 3 years. I know that the committee is interested in the percentage of employ- ment. We are glad to see that many of those fine people, most of them from the west coast, have remained there and are available to the program. Maybe I am reading you wrong. I hope you aren’t shooting for some high-employment figure at some time just to say, “Look how many we are hiring.” Mr. BERGEN. I am glad you brought that up. I would like to point out in the case of Rocketdyne and space division the manpower re- quirements were generated based on the job itself and the time required to do it. They bore no relationship to what we had in the past. As a matter of fact, I would like to add for the record it is my understanding that in the proposal submitted we had the most modest buildup of manpower. You must recall that the Apollo program was, in effect, a crash program and to give you some feel for the 15,000 I quoted in space division on shuttle, this division had a peak on the Apollo program of 35,000. So we will not return to anywhere near that level. Mr. BRENNAN. The peak employment at Rocketdyne for all opera- tions was approximately 20,000. 93-466 O - 73 - 20 302 Mr. WINN. I had forgotten the figures but my own opinion, and there are many on the subcommittee who agree, is that whatever administration we have now and in the future would have a consistent space technology and science research program rather than peaks and valleys as in the past. It is my belief that many Members of Congress feel this way. The ones I have talked to said if they knew we had a $3 billion or $3% billion program consistently then they knew about what we were going to spend, rather than go over 5 and then maybe under 10. Mr. BERGEN. If we could operate at a pretty much fixed level of employment, our management job would be infinitely more simple. We recognize that is a utopia no one to date has been able to reach. Mr. WINN. It’s pretty hard because you have to bid these programs. The encouraging thing is, as we have seen on our many trips to the coast, that the various companies do work together and if one of them becomes prime then the other ones that sometimes bid and don’t get to be the prime contractor, do a very important part as a subcon- tractor on the program. Mr. BERGEN. I might add this, that merger with Rockwell-Standard and now Rockwell Manufacturing, we have been able to somewhat attenuate these peaks and valleys by transferring people, and inci- dentally, the transfer so far has been pretty much one way from aero- space to commercial, and in the high level management technical levels as I recall we transferred better than 200-odd people from our aero- space group into our commercial activities. Mr. WINN. I have taken almost my 5 minutes. When, in your view, is it necessary for the development of the space tug to be phased into the Shuttle program? What is the timing on that? Mr. BERGEN. Let Mr. Jeffs answer that. Mr. JEFFs. As you well know, in addition to military payloads, there are many other payloads that require high altitude earth orbit. Weather observation is an example, and it does require this orbit transfer capability. I think to take the maximum advantage of the capabilities that will be provided putting the big payloads in orbit with the Shuttle, we should have a Tug as soon as practical, dollarwise and otherwise. It would appear to be able to take the maximum ad- vantage of it that the Tug program should begin in the early part of 1975 and should be operational in the early part of the 1980's. Mr. WINN. I was going to ask how critical is the space Tug develop- ment? You said very critical, almost immediate, right? Mr. JEFFs. As early as possible. Mr. WINN. What are the greatest technological hurdles as you see the Space Shuttle program? Mr. HELLO. The major technical hurdles we have to overcome are primarily in one area, perhaps two areas, as I see them. The thermal protection system development, that we have not yet com- pleted, is perhaps our single greatest technical hurdle. Mr. WINN. You have done a lot of work on that. Mr. HELLO. Yes, and we have representative materials which if further testing is favorable will work just fine for our vehicle. The other one I think is just the normal problem of building an aerospace Vehicle, of making sure that we keep under control the structure and the weight. That is a straightforward problem. It is not a develop- mental problem, but nevertheless one of the things we have to do. 303 Mr. WINN. Did you say one of the problems is aerodynamics? Mr. HELLO. No. Mr. WINN. Is it? Mr. HELLO. No. Mr. WINN. I thought they worked that out in their preliminary observations. They changed that somewhat, didn’t they? Mr. HELLO. A little bit and the little bit we changed was done because of improvements we saw in the wind tunnel work. Mr. WINN. Somewhere I think Mr. Bergen referred to the fact we * didn’t say wind tunnels, but tests of that type. Why do we need 10? Mr. BERGEN. In spite of everything you may read about the advance of technology, wind tunnels are somewhat of a black art. There are such things as scale effects, wind tunnel wall effects, and it is very important to get corroboration between different wind tunnels. Some wind tunnels are specialized. For example, on our engine inlet duct work they are practically all run in Tullahoma. So a wind tunnel is not just a wind tunnel; there are different sizes and designs. Mr. WINN. So the reason you run, say, 10 different tests is because of the different types of wind tunnels. Many Members of this com- mittee, and I am one, were not aware of this. I appreciate this infor- mation. Thank you. - - Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Bell. - - Mr. BELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to correct one inad- vertent comment that was made about the NASA policy of selecting locations for aerospace operations. That comment might suggest they are made according to what could be politic in the Nation. I think what Mr. Camp meant to say is the policy of NASA has been and still is to choose the areas of most efficiency and the plants that have the most effective operation. I want to make it clear that I still think this is NASA's policy. One thing I would like to ask of Mr. Bergen. Would you tell us a little bit more about the employment problem in your area in Los Angeles, Calif.? Mr. BERGEN. Well, that is quite a subject. Let me speak of the aerospace industry as a whole. I think it adequately mirrors the un- employment problem in our area. © There are 37 percent fewer engineers and scientists employed in the aerospace industry now as compared to 1967. These people are either unemployed or underemployed. The impact on employees in manufacturing and such operations is even greater. In 1967 there were over 400,000 persons employed in the space program—today there are less than 200,000. In Southern California, aerospace has dropped from a point of em- ploying 9 percent of the work force in 1967 to less than 6 percent today. e ran an interesting survey at Space Division recently and I would like to ask Mr. McNamara to tell you about it. Mr. McNAMARA. We sent out over 5,000 questionnaires to people that were on layoff and we asked, “If there was a job here, would you come back to Space Division, or to some part of Rockwell Inter- national?” The answers were surprising. Over 90 percent said, “If you call me back I will come to work.” 304 Some of them had gone into other businesses. Some reported that they were having trouble getting employment in other industries because potential employers believed they would return to aerospace if called back. Mr. BELL. Would you say that aerospace and aeronautics have brought many people to the area and that as a result of the cutbacks these people are now out of work, some of whom are turning to other industries? Mr. McNAMARA. That is true. Mr. BELL. And the point that should be of concern is we are losing a lot of the technical know-how generated in the early days that may never be recaptured. Mr. BERGEN. There is also another point to make here. The very fact that this condition exists today is discouraging college students from taking engineering courses and I predict that within the next 5 or 6 years there is going to be a very serious scarcity of good, quali- fied engineers. + Mr. BELL. As a matter of fact, I understand from college and uni- versity officials I have talked with in California, there is a big shift over to law and other types of activities away from the aerospace and technical and engineering areas. Thank you very much for your testimony. I want to commend all the other members of Rockwell International, which I think is one of the finest organizations in the Nation. Mr. FUQUA. Is it because of where they are located? Mr. BELL. Would you like me to elaborate, Mr. Chairman? Mr. FUQUA. Let me agree with you. * On the buildup of employment, how many of your old employees came back? You were talking about 85 percent indicated they would desire to come back? - Mr. McNAMARA. If I may take a cut at that, we have not called very many people back. We have had a very slow buildup and it’s been very controlled and rightly so. Very few people that are on lay- off have said “I don’t want to come back.” They have come back, almost without exception they have come back. I might just add one thing. In our total growth our plan was, and I think its still sound, that 75 percent of all the people that will be at Space Division at peak will be people that were transferred from other programs within Space Division that were on callback, were transferred from other Rockwell International Divisions, and only 25 percent of them will be new hires and I think that was our prediction and I think it’s still holding true. Mr. BRENNAN. From Rocketdyne's standpoint, the data are pretty much the same as Mr. McNamara’s; of the 350 people who have re- turned, approximately 80 percent are recalls. Mr. BELL. Mr. Chairman, so I won’t sound too localized, we must remember this team we are talking about had a major role in putting the first man on the Moon. Mr. Fu QUA. And they certainly did a fine job. Mr. Gunter. - Mr. GUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s nice to see you gentlemen again. 305 I wonder if you would like to expand on earlier testimony with regard to the goal of reaching $10.5 million in cost per flight. I know you indicated you might be able to cut back some on that because of some improvements in design. Also, I am really interested in this goal of achieving an average annual expenditure of less than a billion dollars per year in development. Is that realistic? hi. BERGEN. I will defer that to the man responsible for it, Mr. €11O. Mr. HELLO. Let's talk about the two parts if I might. The cost per flight part first. One of the specific things that happened is to reduce the solid rocket motor size, which represents about 40 percent of the cost per flight itself. The size of the solid rocket motor has gone down from 156 inches in diameter to 142 inches, significantly affecting its cost per flight. The impact of the solid rocket motor then on the total cost per flight has gone from in the order of $5.2 million per flight down to something in the order of $4.5 million per flight for just a solid rocket motor alone, and those are the kinds of things that give us confidence that we can meet the goal we have of $10.5 million. As a matter of fact, we are just about on that goal right now. Mr. GUNTER. You really don’t expect a reduction there, you just expect to meet that goal? Mr. HELLO. What I said earlier in response to the question of technical challenges, meeting the weight, has a direct effect on the question. If we can meet the weight of the orbiter, of the tank, and of the components of the solid rocket motor itself, we can keep the size of the solid rocket motor down and therefore its costs down. Now, I don’t see any great further reductions that we can make in the cost per flight. We are about there right now, although we are going to continue to try. And the other part of your question had to do with maintaining the peak annual funding. Mr. GUNTER. Right; I guess that was an administration goal. Mr. HELLO. I have to beg off from some of it. I don’t have com- plete figures at my fingertips of what make up a billion dollars a year. Let me talk in terms of the orbiter integrator program which we are responsible for. The goal that we are trying to stay within is $600 million, which, of course, is a major part of the billion dollars a year, and so far we haven’t been able to reach that goal. For instance, our proposal had numbers in it on the order of $750 million for a peak year. Now, we are working on that problem and ...' right at this moment we have people working with the ohnson Space Center to see if we can ameliorate that problem. We have not yet done it but we are working on it. Mr. GUNTER. But it looks like it is going to be difficult, realistically, to come in under the billion dollars per year on development cost? Mr. HELLO. Let me talk about the $600 million again, not the billion. It looks like it will be difficult to meet exactly $600 million. Mr. GUNTER. Mr. Chairman, if I could also ask the gentlemen, what is your current schedule for final contract definition for the Shuttle Program? Mr. McNAMARA. Well, as you can well understand, I have been following that one very, very closely and we have been in negotiations for Some time with NASA, and I am sure you can appreciate it, this is a complex program. 306 It’s over a very long period of time and we and the Government are trying to find the best combination for both of us. I would say that the negotiations have gone well to date. I think we are almost there and I believe in the very near future we will consummate those negotiations. Mr. GUNTER. Can you give us any indication what the very near future means? Mr. McNAMARA. Well, I expect before this week is out we will be back together; we have a few open items. I think we have worked very hard. I think we have some answers for some of these items and NASA has been working these open items. I would suggest within the next 3 or 4 weeks we ought to have negotiated this thing, at least at the Johnson Space Center. Of course, then it goes through the NASA cycle and it may be a while before the final contract is approved, but I think our basic negotiations should be completed. Mr. GUNTER. Do you see any major problems? Mr. McNAMARA. Not at this time. Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Frey. Mr. FREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You commented, Mr. Bergen on the Skylab, and we have talked about the problems of filling the gap in manned space flight with Russian-United States rendezvous and docking. What are your general thoughts on the Skylab B? What are your feelings about it in terms of the practicality or the possibilities of it? Mr. BERGEN. The present activities, flying activities, take us up through 1975 so you face a potential gap of 3 years. This brings up some practical problems of what do you do with your people at Kennedy Space Center, and it is a problem. In all candidness, I would have to say I would like to see some activity going on there. I don’t believe you do things just to fill a gap, I think you have to have a worthwhile objective. I think it is a mistake if you have a Skylab B at the expense of Shuttle. º Mr. FREY. They say in the practice of law you never ask a question you don’t know the answer to. I violated that rule, but I think the decision has pretty well been made. When do you lose the capacity to launch a Skylab B as far as your part of it goes? Mr. BERGEN. About right now our command modules are all finished. We are fortunate, I may say, and those people are not leaving the company; they are going over on the Shuttle, so if the problem should develop they are immediately available. Mr. FREY. One of the things we have been trying to document for the record is the effect of any further delay in the Shuttle program. For instance, we have had a 9-month delay. So far the testimony has indicated this is a critical point. What would be the effect as far as your participation goes if we have a delay of an additional 9 months or a year? Mr. BERGEN. As I said previously, it would result in increased cost. You brought up a very interesting point. I would like to have Mr. Brennan comment on the engines on the Saturn I–B–when were those built? Mr. BRENNAN. These engines were built in 1968, so they are 5 years of age now. The H-1 engines are for Skylab and ASTP and in addition 307 to that some of the spare hardware is also being used for other programs. These engines are rather old engines but they have been check fired in the last year; one engine was taken out of stock, and successfully checked out. Now, peoplewise, on the program, from Rocketdyne's standpoint, the º: will fall off critically in the flight support the middle of this year. That will be a problem at Rocketdyne. Mr. FREY. How about the safety factor in using older equipment? Mr. BRENNAN. I don’t feel there is a real critical point; the hardware is well protected. The soft goods are of some concern but the hardware is protected from a corrosion standpoint. We have tested engines that are 10 years’ vintage and have fired successfully. Mr. CASTENHOLZ. We have used engines over a period of 10 or 15 years and we don’t see any wearout by storage. We do replace seals as required, but as far as using engines, we see no problem. Mr. FREY. In the work you have done on the Shuttle have you dis- covered anything unexpected as far as the end result, the missions, or anything out of the ordinary, as far as reduction in cost or what you can do with the Shuttle that wasn’t discussed last year? Mr. HELLO. No, Congressman, I don’t believe we have. I think the 2% years of studying we did were very, very productive and there ave been no surprises in the last 8 months. Mr. FREY. I would just like to conclude, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bell, we enjoy what is left of the company in Florida. We just wish there were a little more. Mr. Fuqu A. Mr. Flowers. Mr. FLow ERs. Mr. Chairman, it amazes me that my colleagues from California and Florida are so conversant with Rockwell Inter- national and these gentlemen, I hardly know them. I would like to welcome them to come down to my district in Alabama if they are looking for a place to locate some of this industry, to manufacture any aspect of the Space Shuttle at all and perhaps then when they come back next year I could have some nice things to say. You know it is amazing to me, you comment about how many of your engineers and I guess mainly working people that come back after a period of layoff. They are obviously dedicated people and I think that is a wonderful thing that we can get them back, but they must exist in an up-and-down industry. I think somewhere, somehow there has got to be a leveling out process where there will be steady employment because we can’t continue to keep these people on a yo-yo basis. Do you feel that way? Mr. McNAMARA. Yes; we discussed that earlier, Congressman. We made a conscious decision when we made our proposal and made our make-and-buy structure that we were not going to let the shuttle growth get too big, just for this very reason. That was one of the factors in deciding how much you buy. We think that this is a very proper thing and simultaneously with this we are working very dili- gently on other programs that would come in on the back side of that curve so we don’t have any large reductions. There will be some—you just can’t get away from it. There is also a change in mix, but we have been through some very serious and sad traumas, laying off 20,000 people and we don’t want to repeat it. 308 Mr. BERGEN. I might add to that in the aerospace group we have something like 9,000 engineers total. On the B-1 program which I mentioned previously, we have just come over the engineering peak and we are coming down. Most of those people are going over to the . Shuttle, so company wide we at least in this case are maintaining pretty much a level of employment. Mr. FLow ERs. Thank you. Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Wydler? Mr. WYDLER. Gentlemen, I am from a different State, New York, and in my area we have the Grumman Corp. who was one of your competitors for this Shuttle contract. They came in second, which is nothing like a horse race, it doesn’t pay at all. So I am most interested in the possibility and hope that they may become a participant in some fashion in this program. In your statement your proposal called for subcontracting 53 percent of the shuttle orbiter work throughout the country. Is that still the percentage that we are dealing with at the present time? Mr. BERGEN. Yes. - Mr. WYDLER. You haven’t changed anything from the time of your proposal? Mr. McNAMARA. It is approximately correct and I would like to clear that one up. There has been a change as a result of our fact finding and working the whole program plan with NASA—where NASA is doing more of the work then we had originally planned. What that really means, that 53 percent is more like 51 percent. That is a minor change, but I just-want to make sure that we all understand. Mr. WYDLER. When you use the expression you wish to do this 53 or 51 percent throughout the country, does that include California? Mr. BERGEN. The point came up before. I want to emphasize all of these proposals are being evaluated on their own merits, of which geographical location is not one. We have been through three of the major subcontracts and of the potential winners there, it looks as if a good geographical distribution is being attained. I am emphasizing again that they are not being evaluated on the basis of geographical location. Mr. WYDLER. I know on the whole history of this contract one of its purposes obviously has to be and had to be no matter who was going to win the contract to try to hold our aerospace industry, to get it with this contract because we don’t have much to go with and if we don’t do it with this contract we are not going to do it at all. Timewise, are your contracts pretty much on schedule? Mr. BERGEN. Yes, sir; of the four we just mentioned, the wing, the tail, and the orbiting maneuvering system, and the midbody, three of those are within 30 to 60 days. Mr. WYDLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FUQUA. Thank you very much, Mr. Bergen, we appreciate you coming and also Mr. McNamara and Mr. Brennan. We appreciate Rºi. contributions and look forward to visiting you within a few WeekS. [The formal statement of the Space Division, Rockwell International follows: SD 73-CE-0002 PRESENTATION TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 7 March 1973 (9 Space Division Rockwell International (309) É FOREWORD This document is submitted in response to an invitation issued February 21, 1973 by the Chairman, Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, U.S. House of Representatives. It discusses the manned space flight program and Rockwell International’s participation in that program. Scheduled to appear for Rockwell International at the oral presentation on 7 March 1973 are: W.B. Bergen, Corporate Vice President and North American Aerospace Group President J.P. McNamara, Space Division President W.J. Brennan, Rocketdyne President G.W. Jeffs, Space Division Executive Vice President B. Hello, Space Division Vice President and Space Shuttle Program Manager P.D. Castenholz, Rocketdyne Vice President and Space Shuttle Main Engine Program Manager iii SD 73-CE-0002 # CONTENTS Section - Page 1 INTRODUCTION • * * * * * * * * * * * * 1-1 A New Corporate Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 End of Employment Decline • . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 Reorganization for Shuttle . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2 Apollo 16 and 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 Skylab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1–5 ASTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6 Space Shuttle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6 2 ‘SKYLAB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1 Rockwell International’s Role . . . . . . . . . . 2-1 Hardware Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2 Quality Trends tº gº º * e e tº 2-2 Spacecraft Crew Compartment Stowage Planning . . . . . 2-3 Program Economies * * * * * * * * * * * * 2-3 3 ASTP & º is is tº $ tº e s tº it tº a tº & 3–1 Background * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 3-1 Objectives' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 Hardware tº t t t t t t tº tº tº e is tº tº e 3-1 Mission Profile tº º 'º e º 'º º 'º tº a tº º º 3-2 U.S.A.-USSR Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3 Paris Air Show tº is # 8 tº e º is g º º is is 3–4 . Design Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4 Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5 International Implications . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5 U.S.A. Space Program Implications . . . . . . . . 3-5. V SD 73-CE-0002 É. Rocketdyne SSME Program Highlights . . . . . . . . . 4-25 Orbiter Subcontracting Approach . . . . . . . . . . 4-27 Benefits to the Nation—Goal-Oriented . . . . . . . . 4-29 Benefits to the Nation—Ancillary . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-36 Section - - Page 4 SPACE SHUTTLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1 Objectives . . . . . . . . . º 4-1 Program Elements and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . 4-1 Program Plan and Major Milestones . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2 Performance Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4 Accomplishments to Date . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8 Shuttle Configuration and Key Features . . . . . . . . 4-14 Mission Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-20 Major Technical Issues * * 4-21 vi SD 73–CE-0002 É Figure 1-1 1-2 1–3 2-1 2–2 2-3 2-4 3-1 3-2 3-3 3-4 3–5 3-6 3-7 3-8 3-9 3-10 3-11 4-1 4-2 4-3 4-4 4-6 4-7 ILLUSTRATIONS Space Division Head Count Space Division Organization Space Shuttle Concept Skylab Missions 1 and 2 Skylab Mission Profile Rescue Concept tº § { … tº CSM Skylab Program Events . . . . . . Apollo-Soyuz Rendezvous and Docking Test Project Androgynous System tº e º 'º ſº tº gº ASTP CSM 111 Modifications ASTP Docking System ASTP Docking Module g Docking Module Mounted in Truss Mission Profile tº ſº tº $ tº e & ASTP Master Program Schedule No. 2 & © tº tº tº º ASTP Master Program Schedule No. 2 Ground Tests, Mockups, Trainers, and Simulators e sº tº e º 'º º º Hardware and Effort Comparison Between U.S. and USSR ASTP Technology Transfer * & ſº e º 'º & Program Level Work Breakdown Structure Space Shuttle Schedule . . . . . . . . . . Correlated WBS and Performing Organization Cost Planning Problem Assignment and Tracking Accomplishments and Performance Shuttle System Design Evolution Parametric Sizing Data vii SD 73-CE-0002 Page 1-2 1-3 1-4 2-1 2-1 2-2 3-1 3-2 3-2 3-2 3-3 3-3 3-4 3-6 3-6 4-1 4-3 4-5 4-7 4-8 4-11 4-12 É Figure Delta Cost/Flight Data Relative to PRR Baseline Integrated Vehicle Gimbal Considerations Integrated Vehicle Selection Space Shuttle Vehicle Space Shuttle Size Comparison Cost-Per-Flight Drivers External Tank Systems Solid Rocket Booster Orbiter Vehicle tº e º e & Space Shuttle Liquid Propulsion Systems Orbiter Electrical Power System Orbiter Hydraulic System Space Shuttle Mission Profile - External Tank/SRB Arrangement Constraint Thermal Protection System . . . . . High-Temperature Reusable Surface Insulation Weight Margin Development—Structures a & Weight Margin Development Candidates—Propulsio and Power Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . Weight Margin Development Candidates—Mechanical, Hydraulic, Environmental, and Thermal Protection Systems . . . Space Shuttle Main Engine is a tº SSME Program Schedule . . . . Ignition System Design Verification Test Rocketdyne SSME Test Facility . . . . . Rocketdyne Combustion Chamber Fabrication Facility Potential Major Orbiter Subcontract Elements Broad Mission Capabilities tº - Placement and Recovery of Satellites Shuttle Laboratory e e º 'º e Shuttle as a Short-Duration Space Station viii SD 73-CE-0002 Page 4-13 4-13 4-14 4-14 4-15 4-15 4-16 4-17 4-17 4-18 4-19 4-20 4-20 4-21 4-22 4-23 4-23 4-24 4–25 4-26 4-26 4-26 4-27 4-27 4–28 4–30 4-31 4-32 4–33 É Figure 4-37 4–38 4-39 4-40 4-41 4-42 4–43 4-44 Table 4-1 4-3 44 Space Tug Mission Profile Payload Delivery Comparison • * * Cost Benefits From Payload Recovery • * * * * * Gain in Private Non-Farm GNP From Post-1949 Technology Impact on Technology-Intensive Areas • ... • * * NASA Technology Utilization Programs, 1964 to 1972 U.S. Trade Balance Trends & - * e - Selected Cumulative Statistics on NASA International Space Activities TABLES Sizing Guidelines . . . . Orbiter Make-or-Buy Distribution Subcontract Award Plan Growth in Output per Man-Hour ix SD73-CE.0002 Page 4-34 4-35 4-35 4–37 4–39 4-40 4-41 4–43 Page 4-12 4–28 . 4-29 4-36 É I. INTRODUCTION Rockwell International welcomes this opportunity to present its views on aspects of the national space program to the Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics. - Significant space flight accomplishments have been made since our presentation here in March, 1972. We share with NASA the sense of pride afforded by our contributions, as well as the satisfaction in knowing that the benefits to our nation and mankind will continue to multiply in the years ahead from these early efforts. In addition, we share the excitement engendered by the start of space programs that will open new horizons for international cooperation in the mid-1970's and routine access to space in the decades beyond. After a brief review of this past year's highlights, this statement is divided into three major sections. They discuss our involvement in Skylab, the Apollo Soyuz Test Project (ASTP), and the Space Shuttle. Since completion of the Apollo lunar landing program last December, these programs are the only remaining U.S. efforts devoted to manned space flight. There is a real challenge before the Congress and this nation to sustain these critical programs. They provide the major cutting edge for technological advancement—a vital concern to assure sound economic growth while providing the knowhow for solving many of mankinds ills. We therefore respect- fully urge full support for the NASA space program proposed by the Administration. A NEW CORPORATE IDENTITY In mid-February, the shareowners of North American Rockwell approved a new corporate name, Rockwell International. The new name better reflects the continued growth and new dimensions of the company. Simultaneously, a merger with Rockwell Manufactur- ing took place, creating a larger, broader-base organization. The company now comprises five major groups: Automotive, Electronics, Industrial Products, Utility and Consumer Products, plus the renamed North American Aerospace Group. Space Division continues as an integral element of the Aerospace Group, which is headed by William B. Bergen, President. END OF EMPLOYMENT DECLINE In early September 1972, Space Division achieved a noteworthy milestone with the end of a long decline in employment. This turnaround was made possible by award of the Space Shuttle prime contract. As shown in Figure 1-1, Space Division's manpower peaked at almost 30,000 in 1966, primarily because of our major role in the Apollo CSM and Saturn S-II programs. After six years of business contraction, resulting from a phasing down of these activities, employment was slightly greater than 6000. - The Space Division head count is expected to continue its present upward trend as the Shuttle program matures, reaching a peak of about 19,000 in 1975 and 1976. Our personnel buildup plan includes interdivisional transfers, recalls from layoff, and new hires, with emphasis on meeting goals for placing minorities and women in all classifications. Space Division is implementing a detailed manpower acquisition plan to facilitate achievement of revised Shuttle cost, technical, and schedule performance goals. The current year's (1973) plan is a SD 73-CE-0002 ë Cºu,w orHER 25,000 Kºź \ | / * : ºº LAUNCH OPERATIONS ". - 20,000 - SATURN LAUNCH VEH N S 15,000 & Sºx Astp 10,000 \ SPACE SHUTHEN S N 5,000 * §ºš ** & Sºś 0. - >> Rºs 1933 1985 1966 1967 1868 || 1969 | 1970 1971 || 1972 || 1973 || 1974 || 1975 1978 KH-Actual—-tº-roascast Figure 1-1. Space Division Head Count refinement of our long-range Manpower Acquisition and Develop- ment Plan, which contains 5-year, time-phased, program-functional requirements; skill mix forecasts correlated to program milestones; identification of manpower sources; and minority and female utilization goals. - Current period manpower plans reflect a more controlled Shuttle program buildup inasmuch as they are (1) closely keyed to the overall Space Division financial planning and budgeting cycle and (2) reflect monthly personnel additions by department down to the job classification level. The result of such detailed staffing plans has been a well-modulated, selective, manpower buildup constantly sensitive to program changes. - REORGANIZATION FOR SHUTTLE As noted, the Space Shuttle program will dominate Space Division's business and requirements for technical, management, and 1-2 production resources through the remainder of the 1970's. However, the division planned a rigidly controlled and gradual initial buildup of resources applied to Shuttle closely conforming to published NASA planning while recognizing that ongoing Apollo program commitments must also be considered. Consequently, the division organization was restructured in May, 1972, for the most effective use of its capabilities on all programs while facilitating a cost- effective and efficient transition to a Shuttle-dominated posture as the Shuttle program develops and the Apollo program phases out. The principal features of the new organization (Figure 1-2) as they affect Shuttle are: 1. The Shuttle program has been projectized. It has its own dedicated line and staff, reporting both administratively and functionally to the program manager. 2. The CSM and S-II program organizations will continue to function as in the past, reporting directly to the Space Division president. As these programs decline, they will provide a source of experienced personnel to the Shuttle program. 3. An executive vice presidency was established to assist President J.P. McNamara in the overall management of the division. 4. The division's Launch Operations organization at Kennedy Space Center will continue its support to NASA. The CSM and S-II ground/launch operations support teams, at the conclusion of their activities, will be reassigned within the Launch Operations Shuttle project, making available an ongoing team with both spacecraft and booster experience. 5. All programs draw division policy definition and admini- strative and specialty services from the Space Division management staff (i.e., Engineering, Personnel, Safety, and Finance and Administration). SD 73-CE-0002 # & tº-ºººººº-ºº-ºº: EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT W. JEFFS - $AFETY MANAGER J. GERA Public RELArions Division DIRECTOR R. E. BART C޺ Plºog º Aºs VICE PRESIDENT & PROGRAM MANAGER G. B. MERRICK LAUNCH QPºlº VICE PRESIDENT & GENERAL MANAGER T. J. O’MA. Lºy (KENNEDY $PACE CENTER, FL) Space 5HUTTLE PROGRAM VICE PRESIDENT & PROGRAM MANAGE & PROGRAM VICE PRESIDENT & ASST. PROGRAM MANAGER 1-3 $ATURN LAUNCH Wºłł|CLES PROGRAM vſ CE PRESIDENT R. SCHWARTZ Figure 1-2. Space Division Organization FUNCTIONAL SUPPORT $PACE DIVISION PRESIDENT J. P. McNAMARA FitELD, OPERATION3 VICE PRESIDENT W. T. SHORT PRODUCTION OPERATIONS VICE PRESIDEN r J. W. CUZZUPOLI fHous Ton. Tx, (PROGRAMS ( PROGRAM ºf Vºl.O.Płºſtºn FINANCE & ADºlnišTRATION VICE PRESHOENT A$5uº ANCE MANAGEMENT PER30Nitºl. Vic E PRESIDENT DIVISION DIRECTOR R. F. L.ARSON A. F. URBI t}}V/STON DIRECTOR $ON C. H. FELT2 SD 73-CE-0002 $PACE SYSTEM3 & APPLICATIONS PRESIDENT & VICE PROGRAMS MANAGER G. W. JEFFS f ACTG. J É APOLLO 16 AND 17 The Apollo 16 and Apollo 17 J-series lunar landing missions in April and December, 1972, respectively, achieved a sharply increased scientific data return. This reflects the continued effectiveness of the NASA/Rockwell International technical/management team and is representative of the favorable results that have been demonstrated in virtually every segment of the program. Essentially the experiment instruments used during the Apollo 16 mission to acquire inflight photography and scientific data were the same complement used on the Apollo 15 mission. However, Apollo 16 greatly expanded the coverage of the lunar surface. It provided more comprehensive deep space measurements, providing scientific data useful in validating findings from Apollo 15 as well as adding to the total knowledge of the moon and its atmosphere, the solar system, and galactic space. Apollo 17 was the longest total mission of any of the Apollo flights, and the spacecraft's system performance was closer to perfect than any previous spacecraft. Apollo 17 was the third lunar mission to carry a large set of orbital sensors and cameras in the service module. The performance of these instruments and three new scientific experiments, including the technically advanced lunar sounder, was successful in all respects. An ultraviolet spectrometer measured lunar atmospheric density and composition, an infrared radiometer mapped the thermal characteristics of the moon, and the lunar sounder acquired exceptional data on subsurface features. Moreover, the lunar sounder's performance verified its potential for use in earth orbit. The Saturn S-II stages S-II-11 and S-II-12 performed virtually flawlessly during the launches of Apollo 16 and Apollo 17. All values attained in the critical flight parameters were within allowable deviations. Particularly significant was Rockwell International’s 1-4 detailed contingency planning. It enabled the S-II-12 to accom- modate the exceptionally long hold period in the Apollo 17 launch countdown without affecting the launch or subsequent flight performance. SKYLAB Shipment to Kennedy Space Center (KSC) of the first Skylab spacecraft, CSM 116, on July 18, 1972, represented a two-week schedule acceleration to facilitate Skylab workshop interface testing. This demonstrated Rockwell International’s ability for rapid integra- tion of revised program requirements into its activities and vehicle flow with minimum impact. The CSM was initially mated with the Skylab multiple docking adapter and the airlock module for interface testing in December, 1972. On February 21, 1973, CSM 116 was transferred to the Vehicle Assembly Building for mating with the S-IB booster. Also in the past year, technical and management effort has supported all requirements for converting the S-II-13 stage to serve as the terminal stage for injecting the workshop into orbit. Modification of the S-II stage for this mission, which has significant differences from prior lunar mission launches, required numerous changes to the configuration of the S-II-14 stage. These have all been accomplished, and the stage is on schedule to support the Skylab launch. The remaining S-II flight stages, S-II-14 and S-II-15, are at KSC but have had no specific missions assigned. S-II-15 is undergoing installation of kits as a potential Skylab launch vehicle similar to S-II-13 but on a non-interference schedule. No effort is being expended on S-II-14. In support of the Skylab CSM booster program, an H-1 engine built in 1966 was returned to Rocketdyne for test firing in November, 1972 and achieved all test objectives, proving that seven years of storage had not impaired the engine's ability to perform its SD 73-CE-0002 § Skylab mission. H-1's were last flown on Apollo 7 in October, 1968. Those not used for Apollo missions were placed in storage at NASA's Michoud Assembly facility. * ASTP Rockwell International's support to NASA's program baseline for the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) initially entailed the progressive development of parametric performance, pricing, and schedule studies based on design recommendations and spacecraft requirements as the mission definition evolved. With our strong technology base, timely program support enabled NASA to issue a leter contract on June 30, 1972, authorizing Rockwell International to proceed toward an ASTP mission in mid-1975. Integration of the added ASTP tasks with its difficult phasing requirements into CSM Programs has been achieved during the past year. Rockwell International's support in conjunction with NASA to the U.S.A.-USSR technical working groups, coupled with the timely initiation of engineering for CSM 111 and the docking module and docking system, were achieved simultaneously with, in fact, a cost reduction to the on-going Apollo and Skylab programs through most efficient use of personnel. A two-fifths-scale model of the ASTP docking system was accepted by NASA on June 30 and airlifted to Johnson Space Center (JSC) in support of U.S.A.-USSR ASTP reviews in July, 1972. Progress at these meetings was significant. Decisions were reached between the two countries that permitted clear and positive operational and subsystem definition, enabling Rockwell Inter- national to proceed rapidly with hardware development and fabrication. SPACE SHUTTLE When the reusable Shuttle vehicle (Figure 1-3) enters service in the late 1970's, space flight will have begun the age of maturity. The 1-5 Figure 1-3. Space Shuttle Concept availability of economical transportation to orbit, combined with the unique return-to-earth capability, will benefit all Shuttle users: NASA, DOD, other U.S. government agencies, commercial organiza- tions, international consortiums, and foreign governments. On July 26, 1972, NASA announced the selection of Rockwell International's Space Division as the prime contractor to develop the Space Shuttle. A letter contract, NAS9-14000, was executed on August 9, marking the official authority to proceed (ATP). This followed award of the Shuttle main engine program to the Rocketdyne Division, in April, 1972. Space Division entered discussions with NASA immediately after announcement of contract award and continued to refine the Shuttle system configuration prior to ATP. These efforts resulted in a well-defined system and configuration at ATP; and commencing five days after ATP, Space Division cooperated with NASA in conducting intensive fact-finding and program orientation meetings. These meetings provided the initial system configuration baseline, a SD 73-CE-0002 § refined statement of work and program schedule, and a clear definition of areas requiring emphasis. Recognizing the long-range importance of the work performed during this formative stage of the program, Shuttle management has concentrated on reducing cost per flight, limiting the rate of program buildup, reducing peak and total program funding requirements, and maximizing mission flexibility. Our highly skilled work force has rapidly performed extensive trade studies and candidate preliminary designs and has provided analyses of technical, cost, and schedule effects of the total program in support of the program decision-making process. Examples of early decisions are to incorporate thrust vector control on the solid rocket boosters, to delete abort solid rocket motors, and to eliminate the air-breathing propulsion system from orbital missions. A successful program requirements review (PRR) was held in November, 1972. The thorough technical preparation for PRR and its efficient conduct enabled Space Division to respond quickly with a system resizing effort that culminated in the presentation to NASA of a lightweight orbiter configuration concept on December 15. NASA subsequently directed Space Division to proceed with further system development and cost-per-flight reduction efforts based on a 150,000-pound, dry-weight baseline orbiter. Concurrent with establishment of the system configuration, Space Division has been planning accomplishment of the total program. This planning ensures early assessment of how current design and program decisions will affect future activities, establishes the requirements for and scheduling of resources, and provides good management visibility of total program needs and potential prob- lems. Preliminary plans have been based on the availability, use, and costs of candidate facilities, manufacturing build-and-flow plans, quality assurance inspection plans, interfacing of government fur- nished equipment schedules and technical requirements, integrated logistics plans, and the placement of major subcontracts. Methods have been established and agreed to with NASA for the continuous assessment and tracking of cost per flight. In addition, a number of top-level funding analyses have been conducted to evaluate the effects of potential program funding levels available to NASA, which assisted NASA in its resource planning. Analysis of the initial phases of previous programs indicates that firm and systematic management control from inception avoids false starts, excessively rapid manpower buildup, and the proliferation of ill-defined and nonessential activities. In recognition of these potential savings, Space Division reviewed and refined its manage- ment systems during the proposal and pre-award periods and developed new system concepts where required. Since ATP, these systems, tailored to Shuttle program needs, have been progressively implemented for firm control of cost, schedule, and technical performance and to provide NASA with the visibility required to achieve program goals. Of interest is implementation of a work authorization and program directive system; an automated cost, schedule, and performance status system; a change control system; and the status visibility systems that provide data to Space Division and NASA management information centers. Use of these systems by Space Division management, together with the continued application of Rockwell International manpower acquisition and control methods and plans, has resulted in a controlled, economical, and orderly achievement of initial program objectives closely conforming to our letter contract commitments. SD 73-CE-0002 § 2, SKYLAB ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL’S ROLE The Skylab program, which will become the nation's first step. toward a permanent space laboratory, will use four command and service modules (CSM's) built by Space Division. Three are scheduled for flight, with the fourth for backup and rescue. Skyhab mission plans are depicted in Figures 2-1 and 2-2. The rescue concept is displayed in Figure 2-3. A modified Saturn V launch vehicle boosted by five Rocketdyne-built F-1 engines will launch the unmanned Skylab workshop from Kennedy Space Center (KSC). A Space-Division-built S-II stage, powered by five Rocketdyne J-2 engines, will place the workshop into earth orbit. (5) skytals in orºtat. $70RAGE FOR REVişır G) iºn *} Ç A iºno. ©iºn, º @* 67 tº: G) iºn - •, (3) º \ (Đntºniny K9– * #3° - smashdown MAY 28, 1973 launch su I FROM PAD 33A (2) § G) cºm Renoizvous MAMEUVERS APAll 30, 1973 - FREPANE 0p AMEWORKSH - !" 235 N M 00017 1AUMCHSL-2 FROM PAD 733 FOR storage, - C MAY!. I CREW TRANSFER TO WN \\ tººl 913 _* >\ . ſnºw-º-º: Š - OEPLOY WORKSHOP : • * * Oſſiºn to soian (2) * N tº *m-. Cz “sº *= @º amºunt arm Pointing ** S. complete 2s DAY Místigº toNTROL $Ygntm 0MERT TO 2.4×13 LOCAL 0RIENT 1050LAn INERTIAL 0Riºt to z-axis LOCAL $MNUPCMG Verificat. Anirudë ATTYuDE, ACTIVATE wonksHoº, VERTICAL Antrudë. F0R Cº. RENDERWOut computy Exp:RIMENT: CONDUCT EANTH RE30Uacº Figure 2-1. Skylab Missions 1 and 2 LONG DURATION EXPERTMENTS (52) 19 SCIENT ific 13 ENGINEERING 6 TECHNOLOGY 9 EARTH RESOURCES s 4. - UP TO 6 28 DAYS UP TO LAUNCH ORBITAL Q & º § 3. wº- Żºłe 2. \ 6 UP TO 56 DAYS 58 DAYS . . . . |Y = ? S.18 S 18 {CSM 11 (CSM 17 (CSM 118 §ºol MANNED} MANNED) MANNED) CŞM 137 Rescue CŞil 110 Re$CUE C޺ 110 MEscut: TIME I L L 1 | | (MONTHS) 0 t 2 3 4 6 7 Figure 2-2. Skylab Mission Profile DAYS . SkyLAB FROM ALARM MISSION 50 r- TIME TO RESCUE (DAY3) (ALARM TO LIFTOFF! -T ––– - 23 * - MIM --- 3 MO i0 BAYS VEHICLE' H.--Hº-adays soays-- —ssoays-- — PAp 118 tº tle REFURBISH MCH LAUNCH LAUNCH TIME REscue [T] [III] [III] ..its Figure 2-3. Rescue Concept SD 73-CE-0002 :: --MAX 45 DAYS days § The next day, a Saturn IB vehicle—powered by eight Rocket- dyne H-1 engines in the first stage and one Rocketdyne J-2 engine in the second stage—will launch three astronauts in the first Skylab CSM to rendezvous and dock with the workshop. Skylab program elements have benefited from the consistently thorough preparation at all levels of management and throughout the work force. Attention to detail is a key to Skylab's superior hardware quality, attainment of accelerated schedules, and excep- tional cost effectiveness. HARDWARE STATUS Skylab program milestones have been achieved on schedule, as indicated in Figure 2-4. The three spacecraft, CSM's 116, 117, and tº - -º-, CSM MISSION MANNED ALT Runs | !st INTEGRAYED L8 GEND CSM-MDA DOCKING TEST § [T] ĐOWN E Y ""; "W" kº. 1 16 St. 2 [I] KSC H DK, STORAGE st ºwessie's lesſ-li V DELive RY v º - «S LAUNCH i 17 SL 3 sºm STATUS * 23 canR * | C | F A FRR | | F v; go! A DCR $18 SL 4 - ! - C { F ſ |V RESCUE STANOBY 119 SL BACKUP - c; F J | lºſi Figure 2-4. CSM Skylab Program Events 118, have been delivered on or ahead of schedule to KSC. Downey test and checkout are complete with CSM 119, the Skylab backup, in preparation for shipment to KSC in May. Also, the rescue kit has been completely fit-checked in CSM 118, has completed the NASA acceptance readiness review, and has been shipped to KSC. At KSC, CSM 116 has completed combined systems testing, multiple docking adapter and airlock module interfacing testing, and manned altitude runs. The spacecraft was transferred to the Vehicle Assembly Building on February 21, and the total S-IB stack was moved to the pad on February 26 in preparation for launch in May. CSM 117, delivered to KSC on December 1, 1972, was the first CSM to be received and stacked in the altitude chamber without any noted discrepancies before or during stacking. This spacecraft has completed combined systems testing, and altitude testing will start after the launch of Skylab -1 and Skylab -2. CSM 118 was shipped to KSC on February 8. The command and service modules have been mated, and the spacecraft is through receiving inspection. OUALITY TRENDS Skylab spacecraft quality trends have continued to be favorable, with the number of nonconformances diminishing for each successive Skylab end item. The reduced number of CSM 116 discrepancies in relative comparison to previous end items during the Downey systems installations, checkout, and preshipment phases and KSC receiving inspection was significant. Likewise, CSM's 117, 118, and 119 demonstarted a progressive quality improvement. CSM 117 recorded the lowest number of discrepancies and test variances of any previous spacecraft during the checkout phase, and CSM 119 had the lowest number of system installation discrepancies. SD 73-CE-0002 § SPACECRAFT CREW COMPARTMENT STOWAGE PLANNING The Skylab program is benefiting from Apollo's spacecraft command module crew compartment stowage planning experience. The capability of evaluating such factors as vibration, shock, acoustics, environment, and cushioning makes possible timely solu- tions to the increased stowage requirements for scientific experi- ments and film packages. Rockwell International has regularly supported Skylab stowage coordination group meetings at JSC and MSFC to assist NASA in defining specific stowage configurations and to minimize the impact of potential changes to the CSM stowage configuration. Rockwell International further assisted NASA at 2-3 MSFC in evaluating film container stowage for the Apollo telescope II1OUIIlt. PROGRAM ECONOMIES The pursuit of economies linked to an aggressive cost and budget control policy has resulted in a progressively favorable impact to Skylab expenditures. Based upon an evaluation of the current status of the Skylab program and a projection of the tasks remaining to be completed, it was determined that the estimate at completion for authorized Skylab contract work will underrun the contract value by $5.0 million, which was reported in a special NASA 533 financial report in December, 1972. SD 73-CE-0002 § 3. ASTP BACKGROUND The Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) mission is a highly technical and meaningful cooperative U.S.A.-USSR space effort. It will entail astronauts and cosmonauts working together on a complex mission highly visible to the world via television. Important basic bilateral agreements with the USSR have been reached in a conciliatory environment. And they have set the stage for joint operating and control procedures pertaining to the details of technical working groups, communications, exchanging information and maintenance of interface documentation, and joint tests, design reviews, flight operations preparation, and training of flight crew and flight operations personnel. OBJECTIVES The ASTP mission will test the technical requirements and solutions for compatibility of systems for rendezvous and docking of future manned spacecraft and stations. Program plans call for a U.S.A. Apollo CSM and a USSR Soyuz spacecraft to link up (Figure 3-1) in an earth orbit mission in July, 1975. Crew transfer and the performance of scientific tasks are especially significant to the mission plan during two days of docked operations. The Soviet decision to operate the Soyuz spacecraft at 10 psi instead of the normal 14.7 sea level pressure has made four crew transfers possible because less time will be required in the transfer tunnel before crewmen enter the CSM's 5-psi pure oxygen environment. This change also significantly reduced docking module system com- plexity. - NEW, COMPATIBLE DOCKING ASSEMBLY Hºbſki CU3MECTW biºſ Aſ PETAT CTblkDBHA DOCKING MODULE CTbilºbCºb|M OTCEH . Figure 3-1. Apollo-Soyuz Rendezvous and Docking Test Project In addition the mission will test the androgynous docking assemblies (Figure 3-2) with the docking mechanism and targetſ alignment systems. It will also derive experience for the conduct of flights by U.S. and USSR spacecraft, including rendering aid in emergencies. HARDWARE Rockwell International’s ASTP contract, which was negotiated and definitized October 6, 1972, encompasses modifications to CSM 111 as the primary spacecraft (Figure 3-3), the development of a modification kit to update CSM 119 as a backup spacecraft, the SD 73-CE-0002 Figure 3-2. Androgynous System design and development of a docking system common to the USSR docking system (Figure 3-4), and a docking module (Figure 3-5) to serve as an airlock between the Soyuz and Apollo spacecraft. A truss (Figure 3-6) will be designed to support the docking module in the spacecraft lunar module adapter (SLA). Ground support and other ancillary equipment are also being designed, modified, and fabricated. MISSION PROFILE Under the planned ASTP mission profile (Figure 3-7), the CSM will be equipped for up to 12 days in space, depending on the experiments carried. The Soyuz spacecraft will be launched first. Then the Apollo spacecraft will have five launch-window opportuni- ties to join it in orbit. 3-2 rapped. ADDED- -video recorder to Art BulkHEAD -ELE-TR-HARNES5 to DOCKING Module --speaker box --propellant storage ODULE --Ros-Quad HEATERs Modifications: •oza Hashelves MODIFICATIONs: DELETE- - Main display console --2 sps tanks a -stowage 1 HELIUM tank --High Gain antenna --RENDEzvous RADAR TRANSPONDER *-ando, tank *-Return enhancement -attery *same as cºm skylab Modifications Figure 3-3. ASTPCSM 111 Modifications Pass---o-c-s-s-tº- active docking system micrº-rººf ºur ºwn clºwn ºil. -ºptiºn Boo---TE-----Es autº--ºntº attenuators structural RING trunded-mun uniºront -- structurta-Ring Interface surfaces mºnºxº~1---- Guidº Ring tExtended Base and tunnel. asse-e- ºr cº-ºrd upttu- -----------Es -tº-wº ºntº Figure 3-4, ASTP Docking System SD 73-CE-0002 § § ECLSS TANKS SYSTEM MODULE. • ECLSS EQUIPMENT • COMMUNICATION • DISPLAY & CONTROLS • STOWAGE | vhf/EMANT—- LAUNCH POSITION D0CKING MODULE IN SLA Figure 3-6. Docking Module Mounted in Truss 3-3 A º Eliº- Hº-00CKED OPERATION: 2 DAYS UP TO 8 DAYS APGito DE0%tiºn 30°uz RECOVERY US$R APOLLD RECOVERY PACIFIC 06:EAN SOYUz APGLLO LAUNCH LAUMCH Figure 3-7. Mission Profile U.S.A.-USSR MEETINGS U.S.A. and USSR meetings are fundamentally organized into five technical working groups, with Rockwell International personnel being identified as official members of these groups. The meetings have proceeded smoothly. Soviet and U.S. engineers have worked side by side in both countries, and good progress is being made in the hardware development. A meeting at Houston this month with the USSR will include discussions of experiment candidates and further talks on how the U.S. and Soviet control centers will be linked during the mission. Evaluation of several ASTP experiment candi- dates has been initiated at Rockwell International in support of NASA, considering such factors as cost, volume, weight, power, Russian participation, and probability of success. SD 73-CE-0002 § PARIS AIR SHOW Fabrication is in process of a full-size (exterior) mockup of the ASTP docking module and docking mechanism for the forthcoming Paris Air Show. This mockup will be used with a ground test spacecraft, CSM 105, for external viewing with a full-scale Soyuz model. The display will be available for review when the Soviets visit Rockwell International's Downey plant on March 17 and 18 in conjunction with the U.S.A.-USSR ASTP meetings. DESIGN EFFORT The ASTP's complex and difficult performance requirements are being implemented by the same team of key designers, engineers, and technicians who built and operated the Apollo and Skylab spacecraft. A solid foundation of spacecraft system knowledge, coupled with demonstrated program management performance, is paying dividends in technical excellence and reduced program expenditures. Actions taken on docking module design decisions typify Rockwell International’s cost consciousness. For example, the docking module has been designed with a constant-thickness aluminum shell with high factors of safety. This has greatly simplified design and fabrication and has eliminated need for a structural test vehicle. Also, a greatly simplified design has been adopted for the truss structure, which retains the docking module in the SLA until completion of the transposition maneuver. In addition, a significant amount of previously flown Apollo hardware is being used, eliminating the development and qualification of new equipment. Rockwell International is providing a VHF/FM/transceiver- antenna system to be used on the ASTP vehicles, transmitting on the Soviet radio frequency. Commercial hardware is being procured for this system with screening by test of the actual flight hardware to ensure adequate performance and reliability. This approach signifi- cantly reduces design, development, and testing costs. 3-4 Close surveillance of the ASTP design activities has been maintained through comprehensive design reviews conducted by JSC. The preliminary design review was conducted in November, 1972, and the docking module has passed its critical design review. The first complete docking system has been completed and is in test. CSM 111 is scheduled to have modifications complete and be in systems test on March 15. All other program milestones also are being met on schedule, as depicted in Figure 3-8. thruscazoo), band 1-º-n DES ºf VIEW DES 2.ÉVIEW SYSTEM 0%; GA = Gºíº.Viºls; (33- A & Kºuaijbolº tº . At &timº Gs', º "t iſłićHi} D$ ttºck!!!” TRUSS ! iſ Głºgi 2 tº Atikuſº +. : *** * |MODÚl E .*. A999 y tº -i tº tºu. yacı G.W. Jºſ", Ixituſ IV: Witt PRI $46,"." OM-2 ſºlicº CSM Ill CŞM 119 & Siſa's Figure 3-8. ASTP Master Program Schedule No. 2 TESTING Figure 3-9 is a schedule of the U.S. and USSR subsystem docking module and docking system tests and mockup activities. The ASTP test program has been carefully defined to assure that the SD 73-CE-0002 § SUBSYST TEST$ ECLSs antAoûOARD comm a RANGING CA8LE COMM & TV DM rests [THERMAL VAC, olºfsoºf Uz TÉst USA UPoſafe DSTESTs (2/5 SCALE DS) USSR-USA ºxº DEVELOPMENT ony rest ITIMscºsſº exeº oualification &H USSR-USA Lo-Fi Port CDR-3 - MOCK UP - . HY-Fi UPDATE TO MSC MSC 2 (CSM 111] A MOD kit TO MSc CMS-1 (CSM 111] A MOD KIT To ksc Jºiºſolſ|D|IFMIAIMEDIATSIOUNDUEFIMIATMJIJASONDITIFMIATITITIATS, lºnz lº ºld 1975 Figure 3-9. ASTP Master Program Schedule No. 2 Ground Tests, Mockups, Trainers, and Simulators flight hardware is capable of performing the ASTP mission and to take maximum advantage of cost-saving opportunities. Program economies are being achieved by appropriate analysis in lieu of ground testing of Apollo and Skylab hardware that has previously been qualified. ExPENDITURES GFY 1973 funding expenditure projections and the ASTP contract estimate at completion have been reduced by $3 million, as reported in the February, 1973 NASA 533 Financial Management Report. This condition early in the program provides an optimistic basis for a potential contract underrun. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS The ASTP program is recognized for its implications inherent to international collaboration in the study of outer space. The program 3–5 represents a strategic element within a broad base of many cooperative U.S.A.-USSR efforts and will be accompanied by a high degree of understandable worldwide visibility over an extended time period. As a pilot program, ASTP represents a technical venture with the USSR that is laying the ground work and may serve as a model: for further cooperative efforts in other fields. The expectations of success are high. The Soviet Union's high priority for the venture and her cooperative response have been gauged by the State Department as unprecendented. The program benefits from current publicity throughout all elements of Soviet society, creating an ASTP awareness across the general Soviet population. Also, it has received an enthusiastic reaction from the influential Intercosmos Group. Equally encouraging are the reasonably balanced contributions from both countries. USSR commitments in manpower and hard- ware are significant, as indicated by the completion of the two-fifths scale-model testing (with units from both sides) in December. (Figure 3-10 compares the hardware and effort of the two nations.) In addition, there are significant technology transfer benefits being derived from the ASTP program (Figure 3-11). U.S.A, SPACE PROGRAM IMPLICATIONS From the standpoint of the United States’ manned space program, it should be recognized that ASTP is currently the only mission to allow earliest exploitation and followup of knowledge gained in the Skylab program's manned earth orbit operation. Moreover, the ASTP mission in 1975 partially fills the manpower continuity gap between the Skylab and Space Shuttle programs during the period 1973 to 1978. Usable spacecraft and experiment flight hardware that now exist provide unique options for potential missions in the post- SD 73-CE-0002 § Skylab period. For relatively small additional costs, large benefits in areas such as earth resources and continued international cooperation USSR PROVIDING * e SOYUZ + LAUNCH WEHICLE e BACKUP SOYUZ + LAUNCH VEHICLE AT PAD • REDUCED SOYUZ OPERATING PRESSURE PSIA) Figure 3-10. Hardware and Effort Comparison Between U.S. and USSR 3-6 with the Soviets are available from further Skylab and USSR docking missions. U.S. BENEFITING USSR BENEFITING e SPACE RESCUE TECHNOLOGY • DUAL PRESSURE ENVIRONMENT EXPERIENCE • K02 OXYGEN GENERATION SYSTEM • SPACE RESCUE TECHNOLOGY • U.S. MATERIALS FLAMMABILITY, TOXICITY & VOLATILE CONDENSABLE MATER ALS DATA BANK •DUAL PRESSURE ENVIRONMENT ExPERIENCE U.S. PROVIDING • CSM ill 4 LAUNCH WEHICLE • DOCKING MODULE e DOCKING MODULE PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM • DOCKING SYSTEM - U.S. SIDE • DOCKING TARGET ALIGNMENT AiDS • 215 SCALE MODEL OF DOCKING SYSTEM • FULL SCALE DOCKING SYSTEM TEST FACILITY e LM VHF IAM TRANSCEIVER & RANGING UNIT FOR USE IN SOYUZ • EMERGENCY PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM • DOCKING SYSTEM - USSR SIDE e2/5 SCALE MODEL OF DOCKING SYSTEM • CONDUCT OF SCALE MODEL TESTING •ELECTROMECHANICAL SCREW JACK ATTENUATORS • SłLICONE RUBBER SEAL MATER}Al e GN&C MODEL •GROUND CONTROL TECHNOLOGY e METRIC SYSTEM CONVERSION INCENTIVE e SILICONE RUBBER SEAL MATERIAL e GN&C MODEL e GROUND CONTROL TECHNOLOGY Figure 3-11. ASTP Technology Transfer SD 73-CE-0002 § 4. SPACE SHUTTLE OBJECTIVES The Space Shuttle program will provide a transportation capability that will substantially reduce the cost of space operations and support a wide range of scientific, defense, and commercial uses. As a space transportation system to earth orbit, it will provide work horse capabilities similar to the ships, trucks, and airliners so vital to our economic life and well being. The Space Shuttle, however, is more than a work horse transport. It is designed with the flexibility to carry out many kinds of earth orbital missions in different modes of operation—delivering or retrieving satellites and propulsion stages; on-orbit servicing of satellites; and delivery, operation, and return of space laboratories. But, like earthbound carriers, it is designed with operational economy as the key driver. PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES The basic Space Shuttle vehicle concept, established about a year ago, consists of a reusable orbiter vehicle, reusable solid rocket boosters that burn in parallel with the orbiter main engines, and an external main propellant tank. The program consists of two phases: (1) system development and production and (2) Shuttle operations. The basic elements of the first phase are shown in the program-level work breakdown structure (WBS) of Figure 4-1. For the develop- ment and production phase, the solid rocket boosters, main engines, external tank, and air-breathing engines (for test and ferry flights) are identified as government-furnished equipment (GFE). The system management, system engineering and integration, orbiter vehicle, and system support are identified as system contractor tasks. SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM (NASA) I I SHUTTLE SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION PHASE | I II Ti Q ^ system - SYSTEM ORBITER SOL ID MANAGEMENT egºing VEHICLE §§ §: INTEGRATION FLIGHT TEST SYSTEM EXTERNAL ăţiing SUPPORT SUPPORT TANK *:::::: GOVERNMENT FURNISHED SYSTEM CONTRACTOR N. SYSTEM CONTRACTOR [T] EQUIPMENT § PºſME TASKS SUPPORT TASKS Figure 4-1. Program Level Work Breakdown Structure The NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight has assigned the Johnson Space Center (JSC) as the Shuttle program lead center. In this capacity, JSC has management responsibility for program control, overall system engineering, and integration of the flight and ground elements. JSC also is responsible for the design and development of the Shuttle orbiter vehicle. The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) is responsible for design and development of the solid rocket booster, Space Shuttle main engine, and the external tank elements of the Shuttle system. The project managers for each of these system elements report on program matters directly to the JSC Space Shuttle program manager. The Kennedy Space Center SD 73-CE-0002 § (KSC) is responsible for design and development of launch, landing, and refurbishment operations and attendant facilities. Rockwell International's Space Division (SD) has been selected as the Space Shuttle system contractor for the design, development, and production of the orbiter vehicle elements. Rockwell's Rocket- dyne Division is under contract to NASA MSFC for the Space Shuttle main engines. The Space Division program includes the orbiter airframe, all subsystems, and the physical integration and installation of government furnished equipment. This responsibility covers all design, development, manufacturing, quality control, test, tooling, assembly, installation, checkout, and procurement required to produce complete units. In addition, the Space Division role in system engineering and integration of the Space Shuttle system is to develop those products that define the requirements and preliminary design for the system configuration, development, and operation. To date, a large portion of the engineering effort has been devoted to analyses that address requirements of the total system. Space Division integration responsibilities are to assist NASA in the total program and system by: 1. Supporting NASA in integrated program management. 2. Integrating the solid rocket booster (SRB's), main engine (SSME’s), external tank (ET), and airbreathing engines (ABE’s) with the orbiter vehicle. 3. Defining and supporting the control of the integrated flight and ground system and verifying that the system meets requirements. 4. Supporting NASA in the horizontal and vertical flight test programs. 5. Supporting NASA in Shuttle operations. Contractors for the SRB's, ET’s, and ABE’s have not been selected yet by NASA. Space Division is assisting NASA by defining technical requirements which NASA will incorporate into procure- ment packages to be sent to prospective bidders. The present Space Division contract is in the first increment of four planned by NASA. These increments, which cover specific time spans and/or phases of procurement, are discussed further in the next section. PROGRAM PLAN AND MAJOR MILESTONES Space Shuttle program planning spans a 17-year period through 1988. The design, development, test, and evaluation (DDT&E) phase is conducted during the first seven years, leading to the first vertical flight (FVF) in December, 1978. The phase concludes with the completion of five additional orbital test flights by October, 1979. Included in the phase are the fabrication and test of major ground test articles, the first two orbiters, Space Shuttle main engines (SSME's), air-breathing engine (ABE) sets, external tanks (ET’s), and solid rocket boosters (SRB's) for the atmospheric and orbital flight test programs, as well as the ground and range support systems. The production phase covers fabrication of three additional orbiters and the ET’s, SRB’s, SSME's, and ABE’s required to complete the operational fleet. The current operations phase model begins with the acceptance/ferry flight of orbiter No. 3 and concludes with the completion of 445 flights by the end of CY 1988. As seen in Figure 4-2, Space Division is currently working to a program schedule that oversupports the NASA Headquarters schedule; i.e., we are working with an FVF of March rather than December, 1978. In conjunction with NASA, however, we are conducting a series of program evaluation studies to develop schedules that reflect the effects of recently announced funding constraints, yet continue to support the headquarters schedule requirements. SD 73-CE-0002 § . C Y 1972 || 1973 1974 || 1975 1976 1977 | 1978 || 1979 1900 1981 1982 | 1993 PROGRAM MALESTONES ©2 & 3) & © 6 © ATP Pºn ºn Pºſt ºf Any CBR FMF FvF Iºn AL Cººl tº PRød f iſiºnal FLIGHT WYEAR DDT&E DDTAE | | MAJOR GROUND TESTS {NCREMENT 1 tº CREMENT 2 | grºuºruſtAt Test Artrict E tsf A, | MAIM PºtoPUtslow rest ARTICLE tº Al Mºtºoºº. OPERATIONS HYoºnAulicſ: LtGHT CONTROL ARTICLE support INCREMENT 4 vtºRøAcoust lºft HERMAt , VACUUº ARTICLE ºf Attºut Anticit - Avionics integration tacosaroº Y t GFE (SSME) v Arp finº ºustº V w #ºnd t arr (ass, ºr tons?) ſºftg y tººlſ GFE (ABE, ET, SRB) Sºfts (ET.SWD) º ORBATER 1 Lºsſ ºften ºn R *, ſº ORBITER 2 | fºL ºf | 1 | | Futgiſts § TU-TETTE ORBITER 3 FAS º Aºy Flººrs ORBITER 4 PRODUCTION INCREMENT 3. ORBITER 5 | Figure 4-2. Space Shuttle Schedule Space Division's current and planned participation in the Space Shuttle program is in four increments. Increment 1—the first two years—includes all effort leading to preliminary design review of the Shuttle. As the Space Shuttle system contractor, we have assisted NASA in refining Shuttle program technical requirements and finalizing the management techniques, procedures, agreements, etc. to be used by all Shuttle program participants. This refined baseline was established shortly after the program requirements review (PRR), in November, 1972. In this role, Space Division is assisting NASA in defining requirements for the elements to be developed under associate contract arrangement with NASA–SSME's, ET’s, SRB's, and ABE’s. Preliminary data, interface control data, plans, and schedules are being prepared for use by NASA in its procure- ments and are to be incrementally submitted to them between March and July, 1973. In parallel with these activities, preliminary design of the orbiter and its subsystems is well underway, and long-lead facility design has been initiated. 4-3 The next major Shuttle program milestone is the system requirements review (SRR) scheduled for mid-1973. Space Division will complete, and submit for NASA approval at that time, the final Shuttle system requirements specification and top level plans to be. implemented by all NASA centers and their contractors, including Space Division. These Level II. requirements will be placed under strict configuration and program management control for the duration of the program. Individual program element (project) designs will evolve from the baseline requirements, and a phased series of design reviews will be conducted to ensure that system requirements are being complied with and that integrated designs and plans exist. Increment 1 will end after completion of the Shuttle prelimi- nary design review (PDR) in July, 1974, when all system elements will have been authorized to proceed with detailed designs. During the second DDT&E period of five years—Increment 2– we will fabricate six major orbiter ground test articles and two orbiters for flight test, conduct orbiter-unique ground test programs, and assist NASA in conducting integrated ground and flight test programs. The early portion of Increment 2 will also involve continuous reviews of the detail designs culminating with the final Shuttle critical design review (CDR), in April, 1976. Completion of this review will signify that the detail designs and selected test evaluations of Shuttle program hardware elements have been approved. Rollout of orbiter No. 1 will occur at the Palmdale facility in July, 1976. Final preflight operations will be complete, and the first horizontal flight (FHF) to Edwards Air Force Base conducted in December, 1976. Horizontal (atmospheric) flight tests will be conducted for approximately 14 months. During this period, orbiter No. 2 will be produced, horizontally flight-tested, and flown to KSC. SD 73-CE-0002 § There it will undergo critical flight readiness static firing (FRF) tests and in March, 1978, begin the orbital flight test program. The flight test program will be completed by the end of CY 1978; however, Increment 2 will extend into 1979 to cover the final five orbital flight tests, test analysis and reporting requirements, and modifica- tion of orbiter No. 1 to the orbital flight configuration. Before completion of Increment 2, we will have delivered to KSC orbiter No. 3—the initial Increment 3 production vehicle. This vehicle will make the first operational flight, in January 1979. The production increment will be completed with delivery (to Vandenberg AFB) of the fifth orbiter to join the operational fleet, in June, 1982. Concurrent with delivery of orbiter No. 3, in 1978, Space Division will initiate support to NASA and to the Air Force during the operations phase-Increment 4 of the program. Achieve- ment of the required 160-hour ground turnaround capability, with five operational vehicles, will be the major goal during this phase. We are planning the detail steps and design requirements necessary to meet this objective so that a maximum rate of 60 flights per year will be possible beginning in 1983. Continued support will be provided through 1988, when the total traffic model of 445 flights is scheduled for completion. PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT Continued improvement in performance by Space Division on CSM and S-II has resulted from development and use of improved systems for control of costs and schedules and the increased maturity of an already experienced results-oriented organization. These capabilities are being applied to Shuttle. WORK ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING The first step in work planning was to develop the Shuttle program logic network and master program schedule (MPS) covering all elements of the Space Shuttle program, from initiation of 4-4 Increment 1 through completion of Increment 4. The MPS depicts the major program milestones, NASA reviews, and GFE element delivery requirements to support system test and flight hardware schedules, as well as the activities and products of the system contract described by the work breakdown structure (WBS) and WBS. dictionary. The Space Division elements of the program-level WBS have been expanded as a planning base for development of supporting schedules, task descriptions, financial planning, and identification of organization assignments. A cost accumulation structure was devel- oped to establish accounting codes for WBS elements and performing organizations. - From the baseline provided by the WBS, MPS, and logic network, the performing organizations have developed detailed cost, schedule, and technical performance plans. These plans will be updated whenever NASA-directed changes occur. Cost and schedule status reports are available by levels of the WBS and by the performing organization's management structure, with the cost account manager's report being the common data element for summarization. Figure 4-3 illustrates how WBS product costs and the performing organization costs are linked together. MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF COSTS PER FLIGHT Operational costs are receiving more attention in the Shuttle program than in previous manned space programs. These are expressed in terms of cost per flight. Space Division's overall process for controlling cost per flight and design development, test, and engineering (DDT&E) and produc- tion costs is closely linked to the definition and control of program baselines. Internal baselines are developed from division proposals and NASA direction. They consist of cost per flight, DDT&E and production cost, schedule, and technical performance requirements. SD 73-CE-0002 335 |-№-hſºk Z000-EIO-£ 1. CIS Œ# yºuºuºrº, ！oa， ºn， NØISHQ WELSÅS TvOINVHOEW AJOIV!}O{J\fn 3T:nqÓW AA380 NØISĖJO ASSW \ł33|N|9|NE WV8908€ ±3łHO 9 Nſ&#EENĖ9Nº S38:nl:Of（\\$1$ į“º” į S8AA 3DVX， JUN， WEIÐVIN， !！!9！/Nww. W\/85) Obe § Major trades are assigned to a trade study manager, who directs the activities of a multifunctional team. He presents the integrated results and recommendations, including cost-per-flight effects, to management for decision. A joint system engineering and business management team integrates the cost data and maintains the cost models required for these trade studies and for integrated cost-per- flight and total program cost reporting. - Trade study results are evaluated in accordance with program change control procedures and changes approved by the program manager or chief engineer. This control process gives program management the visibility to assess the potential effects on schedule, cost per flight, total program costs, and annual funding before a decision is made. If a decision affects an associate contractor or the NASA baseline, it requires NASA approval. The resulting decisions and their incremental effects are recorded, and action is initiated to change applicable controlled documentation. The accountability of cost per flight and the visibility of change impacts are provided to NASA and Space Division program management. CORRECTIVE ACTION AND FOLLOWUP Another source of management visibility is the identification of problems. Corrective action for problems is the responsibility of the operating manager. When the problem cannot be solved at his level, it is elevated to the next appropriate management level for resolution. Problem identification and corrective actions are not restricted by the formal system. Management at all levels acts when variant conditions are observed. Program problems are reported in the performance management system as cost, schedule, or technical performance variances. Formal corrective action is initiated for problems with potential program impact. Causes are determined and work-around plans, tradeoff alternatives, and other problem-solving approaches are documented. Once an item is identified by the program manager as a 4-6 critical problem, a manager is assigned and a critical problem report (CPR) is prepared and statused weekly. The CPR states the problem, indicates the major program effects, and provides a brief analysis of the problem. It also contains a plan of action that lists items, due dates, and personal responsibility. This system has been in use for many years at Space Division, as illustrated in Figure 4-4. To date, no critical problems have been identified on the Shuttle program. INDIRECT COST MANAGEMENT The control of DDT&E, production, and operational costs and correction of problems involve prior planning. In the implementation of the plans, program management carefully controls direct head count and direct labor costs. In addition, indirect costs constitute a significant element of total program cost. Their effective control is a prime objective of both program and executive management. Space Division's Indirect Cost Management System (ICMS) has clearly demonstrated its ability to meet this objective for the Shuttle program. The best test of the effectiveness of a cost management system is the results it produces. During the period 1967 to 1971, despite a major decline in division work loads and severe inflationary pressures, the ratio of overhead costs to direct labor actually declined as a result of diligent management attention. The Space Division's performance in indirect cost control has been specifically recognized in various NASA performance evalua- tions under the incentive fee award provisions of the CSM and S-II contracts. Under the Apollo contract (NAS9-150) for the period July 1, 1971, through December 31,1971, the NASA JSC Award Fee Evaluation Board observed: “The board was gratified with your continued achieve- ments in the areas of personnel reduction, control of indirect costs . . .” SD 73-CE-0002 § a ºf .sº w = 1 . . . . ; ~ tº ºt tº i t . . . ºf s- a . . # * * º •-º-º: batt des. 30, 1 § : ||||||| FROGRAM Fºrtú ºff 㺠L-l * * * - * G R C. At P R O B | [ MA R & P C R To: R. K. Field rººt M. A. Perkiºs Dy3% ty rººt 㺠wºrdſ: critics: freels asport ag, v-zs, Osaltfitsties Yesting ef $25 Fl.; Cº-Propellent talve ºut gºal Actuatºr tºº $ehºw!e : i i { { | | |{, Al (, Rſiſt. At weet tº a reas awartes iss sº a sº gº ºvº (.ki: it at ( * iſ iſºl ºf ; ; ; tº PROGRAM - G R T C A l P R O B & NA ſº B P C R W i - Mºvies the tetal dieck 11 eval tasting of the iP3 engine and its t t tº tº ºf twº tº turrent plans are fºssibly sad wiy; i.º. łº sº: s? 3-2-37. It areas saist ºers current Plºt de net nwevert tals schedule, *releſ, ºr plans which will assure arºslation ºn sºis. • Sºlºs: tº• *sloºst are relithins of plans for the lastalwatts, st bi-prºpellent valve med bits reºired º: for $C 10}, § eaſt º i 3. t tº is sº . Review plens replanning s. º ( ; [...? I liſ. Al CR ſtºl (, tº it ºl * I ſº. At * Aºi Kº W. C. § ſet 6 will 4%rectly tº 0. 0 in &e we later * * *** **-prºvellest valve lessess was esseriences ºries cºvement wall fleetles testing. Festing has been suspeated weadiº sedificatiºn and further devoterºnt testian ºn welve seals. # Bistrtiºtſ tº: ſº. Cathers J. Łęstrº Palbºvº lº, fººts , W. Jeff, , ſº g ſº M i ** *** westºs tº 11) actuater preeless were delayed actuater wal test lap in twº pert af $t 017, Bºſlºvº tº tººl ºf ºf i : Prºtº with the clutth and slip ring of the $PS unine actuatºr have resulted tº redesign and the requirement to suspend ºual testing until test hardwere cºuld be updated. - : i !, West cºstſea sey be slayed beyond ſtock 11 awal test schedule sº deliver stºulist ef $6. ºff. $ć 192, and $º 10) may not be ºut. y 1. 3C 617 sinaten may be estsycé. ºDºº ºl: lºgº ºuring cºmponent ºval testing ºf the bi-propellaat valve has resulted in tº suspension of sus! tenting wattl sºditiºnal set ſpa and l ºt tº ºt tº tall valve seals are tº , it is ent tasted that this stattiewal test lay w!?! tº coºlets on 1-80-47, efter sºics the suei testing ºf be resumed. Rºt cºoley Won and ºf Itation of ºpines for $6 Wol, 182 and 103 must be subsequeatly accomplished, y 2. f* , tº iſ & # ; diſºriº ºftcrº #Flº: B lºg.º.B “*” gºtta º f : 1ſ' ºt * { | | || $4 || || ſº tº 1 bººk Figure 4-4. Program Assignment and Tracking The NASA MSFC Performance Evaluation Board findings for the period January 1, 1971; through January 31, 1972, under the S-II contract (NAS7-200) stated: “. . . The board specifically expressed appreciation of the contractor's control procedures which were so effective in reducing indirect cost. The expenditure (indirect cost as a percentage of total cost) was considered outstanding, and represents a reduction in NR FY 1971 in comparison with NR FY 1970. This reduction was achieved by aggressive attention to cost . . .” PROVEN EXPERIENCE—CSM AND S-II Space Division's potential performance on the Shuttle contract may best be gauged by looking at actual performance on contracts for the design, development, and operational launch of the CSM and S-II. These reflect the division's ability to perform successfully on large, complex, aerospace programs that are similar to Shuttle in scope and technology. On the CSM program, including Skylab, a cost overrun of less than 2 percent of a 3.6 billion dollar contract value is projected. For S-II, an underrun of 10.7 percent is projected for the period from contract redefinition, in June, 1967, to contract completion. Schedule control has been equally effective. For both the CSM and S-II programs, all NASA flight schedules have been met by Space Division. The lessons learned during the CSM and S-II programs were applied to our KSC Launch Operations contracts. These contracts, as a result, have had a history of outstanding schedule and cost performance. The CSM Launch Operations contract, since its inception in 1968, has continually underrun its costs. Current estimates project an underrun of approximately 5 percent. This SD 73-CE-0002 : i H ź underrun was achieved by (1) a reduction in total manpower requirements, (2) use of less overtime, and (3) improved indirect- direct manpower ratios. It is significant that the reduced indirect-to- direct manpower ratios were made during a period of significant reduction of the direct head count base. Scheduling on this program is considered by NASA KSC to be the most effective at the center and is used as a model for other contractors. S-II Launch Operations has met all NASA launch schedules and has underrun cost objectives since its inception in 1966. An underrun of approximately 8 percent is projected for the S-II launch program. NASA has recognized the excellence of Space Division perform- ance on the CSM and S-II programs as reflected in the award fees earned by Space Division. The award fee evaluations are based on the degree of attainment of the following management objectives: 1. Timely management visibility into problems to enable contractor and NASA management to achieve Apollo program goals in an economical and efficient manner. 2. Application of effective problem-solving techniques. 3. Operational, technical, and general management practices conducive to timely delivery of quality spacecraft at a reasonable cost. The recent launch and recovery of Apollo 17 and achievement of substantially all mission objectives reflects the ongoing perform- ance capability of the Space Division. ACCOMPLISHMENTS TO DATE During the initial phase of the Shuttle program, the primary responsibilities of the Space Division, in support of NASA objectives, were to establish Space Shuttle configuration baselines, help plan the total program, and implement management control systems and techniques. The following paragraphs summarize the accomplish- ments to date from both the programmatic and technical viewpoints. The most significant programmatic events from initiation of activity through January are discussed chronologically. The technical accom- plishments discussed summarize the design evolution with respect to the current baseline. - PROGRAMMATIC Figure 4-5 summarizes the most significant events during the period and the products that demonstrate the progress achieved. It also shows the division's performance in operating within dollar expenditure plans. -a, Pnn PRELIMINARY PROGRAM 3ASEL!NE PROGRAM REOMTs PRELIMINARY system CONFIGURATIONS • SYSTEM SPECIFICATIONg pt-ANs & ºftoGRAM PLANs ExPENDITURE Pt.ANs * TOTAL PROGRAM SCHEDULt schedults . e INCREMENT 1 PlaNS AND SCHEOULE BASELIME: FACT Finding Pippº INITIA - PROGRAM BASELINE e WING * PROGRAM scH:DULE e MID Füşºl AG: LighTWEIGHT system e INTEGRA rºD ve * ALTERNATE t{GHTWEIGHT of BITER tº 120. DaY. Sow & 120-DAY 800GETs * 1zo-day study Plan e Oſºs * EMPHASIS of FINITIołº CONFIGURATIONS O'MR No. 2 • PARAMETRIC - tº DEltiſe ASRM FFECrs OMR NO. 5 Oºliº No. 1 c incorporarE • POTENTIAL WEIGHT e e SR8 TVc MEDUCTIONs lightwelčHT ORDITER s of LETE ABPS * INCORPORATE “ºff” | Renodynamicumes e INCORPORATE Avionics Revised saseline $CH&D'ULL; & SCHEDUt-e ſsRºtºrs cantilevereo systºl BASER-INE * Rºsk ANALYseº *: AUG I sep .* 20 - .." ,” ,” ,” $5 - ~~~ cost PERFORMANCE ... •º 2 : • * - o tº sº º •e: - sº 3 to H actual- --~2. : ; sº : . --~~~T. ? _---" 5 sh– -** PLAM $º.zºº * --~~ AC "UAt. tº 10.7m 8 ----- UNOERPLAN $ 2.5id () AUG, sep #: _NOV ote *— Gry t Figure 4-5. Accomplishments and Performance SD 73-CE-0002 § Under Letter Contract NAS9-14000 to NASA's Johnson Space Center (JSC), Space Division assumed the development and produc- tion design responsibility for the reusable payload carrier, known as the orbiter vehicle, and for integration of the Space Shuttle system. Starting on August 14 and continuing through August 28, NASA conducted a series of fact finding meetings at Space Division for redefining initial program tasks in the light of anticipated restraints in NASA funding and planned expenditures during government fiscal years 1973 and 1974, but without delaying the first vertical flight (FVF). This redefinition was accomplished by task deletions and/or task deferments to future times, by task scope reductions, and by NASA assumption of performance responsibility for certain tasks. Space Division made recommendations for the redefined tasks at JSC on September 11 and 12. Acceptance of some of these changes led to subsequent revisions to NASA's statement of work and master program schedule. The success of the entire program hinges upon defining a configuration that supports an optimum balance among design, development, and operational costs and recognizes the reality of constrained budgets and government guidelines on peak annual funding. In its approach to achieving this objective, Space Division management has concentrated on communicating with NASA day by day, continuously analyzing the effects of configuration options on schedules and costs of all program phases and hardware system elements, and providing the most competent and effective team of personnel to perform the work involved. The initial program baseline established by the fact finding sessions was developed through control of program decisions and complementary contractor and NASA actions at regular orbiter management reviews (OMR's) held each month. The first OMR, in September, resulted in deletion of the air-breathing propulsion system except for ferry missions and incorporation of a cantilevered cabin design. The next OMR, in 4-9 October, deleted the abort solid rocket motors from the design, incorporated thrust vector control into the solid rocket boosters, and incorporated a modified avionics baseline as a result of the recommendations of an ad hoc avionics review team. A preliminary evaluation of the lightweight system concept and its cost and . schedule was conducted in December, 1972. As a result, JSC provided Space Division with new requirements for the Space Shuttle – i.e., for a lighter-weight (150,000-pound dry weight) orbiter vehicle — to reduce the cost per flight. Presently, total program requirements are being tailored to accommodate the lightweight orbiter. The GFY 1973 and 1974 funding constraints recently announced by NASA are being evaluated jointly with JSC to determine the rephasing of program schedules that best meets NASA schedule and funding constraints. Preliminary program and system requirements for the Space Shuttle were developed jointly by Space Division and JSC. These requirements were predicated on preliminary configuration data as provided and modified by NASA and Space Division studies. Shuttle requirements were evaluated by seven joint SD/JSC teams at the mid-November, 1972 program requirements review (PRR). The review assessed the adequacy and compatibility of baseline require- ment documents of the Shuttle program and the management techniques, procedures, and systems to be used by all Shuttle participants. It also considered and updated program technical requirements — some, or all, of which could be incorporated into NASA contracts with various contractors on the Space Shuttle program. The specific, major documents reviewed by the seven joint teams during PRR were: - 1. The System Specification for the total Shuttle program 2. Master Verification Plan defining the approach to confirm- ing the Shuttle system for operational use SD 73-CE-0002 § 3. Interface control documentation needs for the orbiter vehicle and the main engines to be used by Space Division and Rocketdyne 4. NASA Level II System Requirements for controlling program parameters; NASA Master Program Plan for definition of management tasks and responsibilities; the Management Plans of Space Division and Rocketdyne reflecting management techniques for cost, schedule, and technical reporting; and a work breakdown structure identifying the work to be performed by Shuttle program participants 5. All schedules — from NASA system level to contractor and element contractor levels - 6. NASA Level II Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality provisions to be applied to the Space Shuttle 7. NASA Level II Integrated Logistics requirements for the program. - - As of February 8, 1973, more than 80 percent of the open item dispositions were completed. Currently, Space Division is seeking NASA concurrence for closure of the completed review items. The balance of the review items are under study and evaluation for final resolution by April, 1973. The Space Division provides system integration support to the JSC program office as part of its Space Shuttlé effort. These activities cover many areas, both technical and management. They include establishing and maintaining effective working relationships with the NASA project offices at JSC, MSFC, and KSC. In addition, the Space Division, in cooperation with NASA, has conducted an active technical and coordination data exchange program with other major candidate prime contractors (for the external tank and solid rocket booster) to assure cost-effective and realistic definition of requirements for each of the GFE elements. From contract inception, the concept of exchanging manage- ment information has included specially dedicated centers at Space Division and NASA that would mirror one another. These rooms and their visual and audio equipment are called management information centers (MIC's) and are important in facilitating the communications. so necessary in managing such a program. Advanced techniques giving total program visibility were imple- mented at the Space Division MIC. After evaluation of the MIC, NASA directed Space Division in October to assist in development and implementation of NASA MIC's. Senior program control personnel dispatched by Space Division to Houston worked directly with NASA personnel and brought the first JSC MIC on line on October 31, 1972. Space Division personnel are now permanently stationed at JSC to assist in the MIC operation. In mid-November, at JSC request, Space Division helped establish improved Shuttle program visibility at NASA headquarters. Existing facilities were analyzed, and display formats and reprographic techniques were chosen. Photographic support, reproduction, accumulation, and sequencing of charts were coordinated, and material was delivered to Washington, D.C., in ten days. Space Division also supported the ensuing physical layout of the information and establishment of procedures for weekly update of data. TECHNICAL The current Shuttle system configuration baseline was derived from an evaluation of a lightweight system concept and its costs and schedules. This was done to reduce the cost per flight. The current baseline (January, 1973) with a lighter-weight orbiter vehicle and an earlier (November, 1972) configuration concept are shown in Figure 4-6. The integrated vehicle, sized to preliminary system require- ments and optimized to keep program costs and cost per flight at a minimum is shown on the left in the figure. The gross liftoff weight for this configuration was 5.2 million pounds. The orbiter vehicle in SD 73-CE-0002 š SRB 13.5 FT DIA X 175.1 FT LONG —l—- ET 25.3 FT DIA | X 189.8 FT LONG — |- 212 FT 125.8 - FT. º ! | {H} ! {\{\} : H ! | H–84.0 FT-- SRB 11.8 FT DIA , X 144.3 FT LONG ET 27 FT DIA PRR NOVEMBER 1972 BASELINE JANUARY 1973 Figure 4-6. Shuttle System Design Evolution this configuration had a dry weight of 170,000 pounds, including a potential weight growth. The external tank (ET) was designed to contain 1.65 million pounds of usable liquid oxygen and hydrogen propellants, and the solid rocket boosters (SRB's) to contain 2.8 million pounds of propellants. The integrated vehicle shown on the right hand side of the figure was sized to revised requirements and was optimized to minimize costs for those requirements. The gross liftoff weight for this configuration is 4.1 million pounds. The ET contains 1.55 million pounds of usable liquid oxygen and hydrogen propellants, and there are 1.9 million pounds of propellant in the SRB's. The orbiter vehicle in this configuration has a dry weight of 150,000 pounds. The orbiter wing shape is different and provides a greater lift at landing and less aerodynamic drag. The sizing guidelines employed during this phase of design must be realistic if the final product is to fulfill its mission. These guidelines are in constant review and are modified and updated whenever substantiating data are available. Table 4-1 itemizes the guidelines used to size the Shuttle vehicle at the preliminary requirements review (PRR) and the subsequent parameters now used for the lightweight vehicle. For example, the specific impulses (Isp) of the SSME and SRB have been increased 1 percent from PRR based on additional data and improved confidence. Ascent power level of the main engines has been raised to the emergency power level (EPL) of 109 percent to improve launch performance efficiency. - - A primary parameter in the gross vehicle sizing is orbiter dry weight. By sizing the orbiter to a new set of ground rules, and using a more efficient wing configuration, we reduced orbiter dry weight by SD73 CE.0002 § Table 4-1. Sizing Guidelines PRR 150% LB ORBITER SSME ISP 450.7 SEC, 1% LOW 455.2 SEC, NOM VAC SRB isp 273.2 SEC, 1% LOW 276.0 SEC, NOM VAC SRB OVERSIZE FOR GROWTH 10K L8 iſ NJECTED WT NONE EPL 10.9% ON ABORT- 10.9% ON BOTH ABORT – ONCE – AROUND & NOMINAL ASCENT (FULL PAYLOAD) *A*SSION AS RECUREO (STAGING TO RTLS) ONCE–AROUND FLIGHT PERFORMANCE RESERVE $.25% AV 0.85% Av ORBITER CONTROL WTS DRY WT 170,000 LB 150,000 LB ĐOWN PAYLOAD 40,000 LB 25,000 LB EQUIL LANDING SPEED (VD) 150 KT AT 189 165 KTAT a = 15° OMS - POLAR 500 FPS 250 FPS DUE EAST 950 FPS 850 FPS POLAR 150 FPS AV EOU}\/ 100 FPS AV EOUIV DUE EAST 150 FPS AV EOU}V 100 FPS AV EOUIV 20,000 pounds. These changes included a reduction in the maximum payload returned from orbit (40,000 to 25,000 pounds) and the noted OMS and reaction control system delta V reductions. An orbiter weight margin development program was introduced to lower the risk of an unacceptable weight growth in the system. The Space Shuttle system resizing resulting from these changes may save approximately one million dollars every flight. In synthesizing the integrated vehicle configuration and devel- oping the top-level system requirements, we considered the variation of vehicle cost as a function of external propellant tank and the SRB characteristics. Other considerations in establishing the vehicle configuration center on the major propulsion system requirements; namely, the gimbal angle requirements for the Space Shuttle main engines (SSME’s) and the length-to-diameter ratio (L/D) of the SRB's. The SSME gimbal requirements must not exceed #11 degrees and it is desirable that the L/D of the SRB's not exceed a value of 10 in order to minimize development risk. In Figure 4-7, parametric data are shown wherein external tank dry weight and diameter are 4-12 ET DRY WI (K LB) $3 tº . - WEIGHT – (M LB) - 86 - 4.3 r- 304 IN - 318 (N. 34 — 4.2 -- 324 IN. * 336 IN. 0.2 – - 4. I E=-T - * .80 - 30 — 4.0 k- 78 H. “f- blow - 76 k- . 1.65 2.3 H. s—tº a thl. t See 318 N. 74 H. 2.2 H. § { 1.55 ºmº- 2. \ }- - + $.5M LB PROP 300 350 320 330 340 1.50 1.55 1.60 1.65 1.70 £7 biasatyer (N.) ET PROP (M LB) Figure 4-7. Parametric Sizing Data related as a function of propellant load. With these data and following the sizing ground rules, we developed parametric data for gross liftoff weight (GLOW) and booster liftoff weight (BLOW). They are shown as a function of external tank propellant load and diameter. It can be seen that regardless of diameter, the minimum GLOW occurs at approximately 1.55 million pounds of external tank propellant weight. It can also be seen that reducing the BLOW results in an increase in the overall system or GLOW. A major consideration in selecting is the effect on cost per flight. These data have been converted to cost per flight (compared to the PRR baseline) and are shown in Figure 4-8 as a function of external tank propellant weight and diameter. It can be seen that the system cost per flight decreases as the external tank propellant weight is reduced and as the diameter is increased. In Figure 4-9, the considerations regarding SSME gimbal angle are illustrated. The SSME gimbal angle requirements are established by vehicle trim and control following SRB burnout. SRB thrust vector control (TVC) SD 73-CE-0002 § A COST/FLIGHT (W '7, 5) ET DIA -0.6 F- 304 IN. 318 IN. 324 IN. -0.8 H. 336 (N. -1.0 H. -1.2 —V-1– | | 1.5 1.6 1.7 ET PROPELLANT wr (M LB) Figure 4-8. Delta Cost/Flight Data Relative to PRR Baseline provides the trim control during its thrust period, with the orbiter providing high response control and stabilization. When SRB thrust tails off, the SSME must provide total control. The vehicle flight condition that determines the gimbal angle requirements for the orbiter SSME are (1) the SRB burnout center of gravity and (2) the external tank burnout center of gravity. Figure 4-9 shows the results of a detailed analysis of gimbal travel required for an external tank diameter of 324 inches. The gimbal travel is derived from four sources of requirements and results in a total range of 21.9 degrees (+10.9-degree gimbal angle). Positive deflection is required at SRB burnout to trim and control the center of gravity location of the entire vehicle in that condition. Negative deflection is required to trim and control at the external tank burnout center of gravity location. The relative position of these centers of gravity is influenced by the external tank configuration. Effects of configuration changes are illustrated graphically, showing 4-13 -ºš onemen REFERence plane ºšº NULIANGE ºS*=tº ::$ºryarb G|MBAl- $SME GIMBAL ANAi Ysts: 324 N. Er * Glººſal. A DEG º ~ 1.56M LD PROP REQUIREMENT | SRs 80 (1} | ET so (2) --~~~~ TRIM + FAIL + 4.0 - 7.2 ºsmºs |LEC - 0.7 1,000 LE PROP SNU + ALIGN. + 1.0 – W.0 38 F- TOTAL + 9.4 -$1.2 * _l | | | RANGE 20.8 (+10.3) º 310 320 330 340 (1) PRESTAGE: SRB PROPELLANT EXHAUSTED, ZERO PAYLOAD EXTERNAL TANK OſaſſBTER (INCHES; {2} NJECTION: 65K LB PAYLOAD Figure 4-9. Integrated Vehicle Gimbal Considerations that decreased propellant loads require increased gimbal travel. The influence of tank diameter indicates preference in the range of 320 inches. The 324-inch-diameter, 1.55-million-pounds-of-propellant configuration requires a +11-degree gimbal travel. The effects of the foregoing data are further shown in Figure 4-10. Lines of constant external tank propellant load are plotted as a function of external tank length and diameter. Superimposed on these data are boundaries illustrating where an SRB L/D of 10 will be exceeded and where an SSME gimbal angle of +11 degrees also will be exceeded. The general area between the boundaries, shows where low cost per flight will be achieved. Systems within the area illustrated will have the desired characteristics of low cost per flight, adequate control capability, and a reasonable SRB L/D. The sig- nificant parameters of the selected system are given in the figure and result of the integrated baseline configuration of Figure 4-11. SD 73-CE.0002 § SELECTED SYSTEM alſº ET: 324 N. D.A . 2800 1.55M LB PROP º - SRB: L/D = 8.2 2600|- SSME 23 = + 119 2400|- 2200– 2000H COST /FLIGHT l 1600H #: SSME-3 = +110 i. ºf .50 260 280 300 320 340 - 360 380 ET DIAMETER Figure 4-10. Integrated Vehicle Selection SHUTTLE CONFIGURATION AND KEY FEATURES The integrated Space Shuttle vehicle (Figure 4-11) consists of the orbiter, the external tank (ET), and the solid rocket boosters (SRB's). The orbiter carries the 4-man crew and payload and is equipped with three 470,000-pound vacuum thrust rocket engines. The external tank contains propellants for the main engines. The SRB's provide thrust augmentation during the initial phases of launch, up to a velocity of about 4470 feet per second. Combined sea level thrust of the main engines and the SRB's is 6.86 million pounds. - The Shuttle has been designed to minimize SRB weight, which is important in reducing cost per flight and overall program cost. The 4-14 SR6 324 (N, DIA 142 HN. DIA EXTERNAL \ /T TANK __ ºf Z 4- -t-ºf-- == __^ Ass] GLOW . . . . . 410.1% L., ‘. . * l . 3& --------- 7. Fr ,' * * - - QRSITER, 15.0% Łº DRY *. >tº: 8 . . . . . . 22.59% LL; __º ." S. ... • EW . . . . . . tº U. X— X-----F—fts. SRE THRUST N. FT Figure 4-11. Space Shuttle Vehicle SRB's will be recovered and refurbished, and the main engines will be retained aboard the orbiter for reuse. In Figure 4-12, the Shuttle launch configuration is compared with that of the Saturn V/Apollo and two commercial jet aircraft. The complete Shuttle vehicle (193.2 feet long) is smaller than the largest commercial airliner. The orbiter length is about the size of a DC-9, 125 feet as compared to 119 feet. The complete Space Shuttle vehicle is considerably shorter (by over 150 feet) than the expend- able Saturn V launch vehicle. COST CHALLENGES Economics is paramount in all Shuttle program decisions. The current configuration represents a realistic compromise among factors that influence development and operational costs. For example, Dr. Fletcher has stated that the decision to employ an external tank was made primarily to reduce substantially develop- ment cost and risk with only a moderate increase in operational cost. SD 73-CE-0002 § 193.2 FT F. Tº FT SHUTTLE SATURN Figure 4-12. Space Shuttle Size Comparison Controlling of total program expenditures depends strongly on actions taken during the first few years of development. These include assigning and controlling cost per flight and development cost targets to individual WBS elements, performing major trade and optimization studies (complemented by wind tunnel and laboratory tests) to develop high confidence in design decisions, and pacing the work force buildup commensurate with phased development require- ments and peak funding constraints. Shuttle is intended to substantially reduce the cost of trans- porting payloads and personnel to orbit through the principle of reusability. The expendable external tank and the reusable SRB's account for 68 percent of operational cost (Figure 4-13). Although all hardware elements are receiving thorough examination in our effort to reduce cost per flight, attention is being concentrated on the external tank and SRB's. Substantial size and weight reductions 4-15 EXTERNAL TANKS 25.8% SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER 41.9% 2.5% || GROUND ORBITEFT OPERATIONS SPARES PROGRAM 8.3% SUPPORT 2.3% \ 17.0% 2.2%YMAIN ENGINE SPARES * FUELS & PROPELLANTS (LESS SOLID PROPELLANTS) Figure 4-13. Cost-Per-Flight Drivers already have contributed to lower cost for these items. In addition, the external tank is being designed for simplicity and ease of fabrication, with higher cost components being located on the reusable orbiter. Deletion of abort solid rockets, in conjunction with addition of thrust vector control to the SRB's, also has contributed to lower operating costs. EXTERNAL TANK The external tank (Figure 4-14), contains all the propellants supplied to the orbiter main engines. These propellants consist of liquid hydrogen (LH2) fuel and liquid oxygen (LO2) oxidizer. All fluid controls and valves for main propulsion system (MPS) operation are located in the orbiter to reduce recurring costs. Anti-vortex and SD 73-CE-0002 § SUBSYSTEM UMBLICAL PLATES LH2 FEED LiNE CAVITY PURGE LINE L02 ANTI.GEYSERING LINE £XTERNAL LH2 TH PRESSUR}ZATION/ º . . . º VENT LINE - * * - L02 FEED LINE 102 ANTI-VORTEX BAFFLE AVIGNICS LH2 TANK 53,800 CU FT EXTERNAL L02 PRESSURIZATION LWNE LH2 L0ADING SENSORS OEDRBT TANK/800STER UMBILICAL PLATE MOTOR INTER TANK SEPIDEORBIT MOTORS L02 TANK 19,500 CU FT GAS L02 LOADING DIFFUSER SENSORS Figure 4-14. External Tank Systems slosh baffles are mounted in the oxidizer tank to minimize liquid residuals and damp fluid motion. Five lines (three fuel and two oxidizer) interface between the external tank and the orbiter. All interface lines except the oxidizer vent line are insulated with spray-on foam developed by the Saturn S-II program and protected with a fiberglass fairing. An uninsulated antigeyser line on the external tank provides LO2 geyser suppression. Liquid-level point sensors are used in both tanks for loading control. The external tank contains 1.55 million pounds of usable propellant at liftoff. The liquid hydrogen tank volume is 53,800 cubic feet, and the liquid oxygen tank volume is 19,500 cubic feet. These volumes include a 3-percent ullage provision. The hydrogen and oxygen tanks are pressurized to respective ranges of 32 to 34 psia and 20 to 22 psia. 4-16 Both tanks will be constructed of aluminum alloy skins with support or stability frames as required. The sidewalls and end bulkheads use the largest available width of plate stock. The skins are butt-fusion-welded together to provide reliable sealed joints. The aluminum skirt structures use integral machine-milled skin-stringers with stabilizing frames. The primary structural attachment to the orbiter consists of one forward and two rear connections. Spray-on foam insulation (SOFI) is applied to the complete outer surface of the LH2 tank, including the sidewalls and the end bulkheads. An ablator of sheet cork is bonded directly to the outer surface of the LO2 tank nose cone and areas of the intertank skirt structure adjacent to the SRB's. Sheet cork ablator is also bonded to a sandwich substructure that is supported from the LH2 tank and skirt. The thermal protection system (TPS) coverage is minimized by using the heat sink approach provided by the sidewalls, SOFI, and propellants. SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS Two solid rocket boosters (SRB's), as illustrated in Figure 4-15, are attached to the external tank and burn in parallel with the main propulsion system, providing ascent propulsive thrust up to staging. The primary elements of the motors are the case, nozzle and thrust vector control (TVC), propellant system, igniter with safe and arm provisions, and thrust termination and malfunction detection instrumentation subsystems. Each SRB weighs approximately 1.1 million pounds and produces 2.87 million pounds of thrust at sea level. The propellant grain is shaped to reduce thrust and prevent overstressing the vehicle after liftoff. The grain is of conventional design, employing a star perforation in the forward motor closure and a truncated cone perforation in each of the segments and aft closure. The contoured nozzle expansion ratio (area of exit to area of throat) is 11 to 1. The SRB TVC gimbals the nozzle +5 degrees, with a 1-degree override capability. That in conjunction with the orbiter SD 73-CE-0002 š DiMENSIONS LENGTH . . . 144.3 FT DIA . . . . . . *42 IN. THRUST TERMINATION NOZZLE & TVC AFT Ski RT & LAUNCH support FWD SKIRT conrhol weight Y. 1.129,390 POUNDS RECOVERY waſ . . . THRUST (SL) . . . . 160,000 LB 2.87m LB RECOVERY SUBSYSTEM PARACHUTE PACKS LOC/NAV AIDS MOSE FARING Figure 4-15. Solid Rocket Booster main propulsion, provides the flight control vector for the Shuttle boost phase. A segmented case design affords maximum flexibility in fabrication site selection and ease of transportation and handling. Thrust termination is provided for abort modes by means of two symmetrical ports formed in each forward motor dome by the ignition of redundant linear shape charges. The SRB's are released by pyrotechnic separation devices. Thrusters on each SRB, at the aft and forward ends, provide separation from the orbiterſtank. - The forward section provides installation volume for the SRB electronics recovery gear, batteries, and forward thrusters. The parachute recovery system is envisioned to include a mortar-fired, ribbon pilot chute; a drogue chute; and ribbon main chutes. 4-17 ORBITER VEHICLE The orbiter (Figure 4-16), comparable in size and weight to modern transport aircraft, contains the crew and payload for the Space Shuttle system. The orbiter can deliver single or multiple payloads of up to 65,000 pounds; the payloads can have a length of up to 60 feet and a diameter of up to 15 feet. The orbiter crew compartment can accommodate up to ten persons, including the Crew. Aerodynamic control surfaces augment control of the inte- grated Space Shuttle vehicle provided by the gimbaled main engines during boost and provide control of the orbiter below Mach 2. The orbiter exhibits good aerodynamic flight control characterisitcs during approach and landing. Design touchdown speed is 165 knots, consistent with current high-performance aircraft. WiNG | VERT TAlt. AR (So FT} 2000 473.25 78 FT AR 2.285 | 1.675 0.20 0.404 ALE 450 4.59 N, oºts/RCs Poos e oºts THRUst ºn 6 ºtA •ſacs thaust = 0.96%:/EA CONTROL weight 150,000 POUNDS Figure 4-16. Orbiter Vehicle SD 73-CE-0002 # The orbiter vehicle is trimmed to provide a hypersonic lift-to-drag ratio of approximately 1.4 during entry. At subsonic speeds, the maximum trimmed lift-to-drag ratio is about 6. Liquid Propulsion Systems The main propulsion system (MPS) provides the velocity increment for inserting the orbiter into an orbit of 60 by 100 nautical miles by operating in parallel with the SRB's during the initial ascent phase and continuing to burn to injection after SRB separation. The main propulsion rocket engine subsystem is shown in Figure 4-17. Each of the three Rocketdyne GFE rocket engines operates at a mixture ratio (LO2/LH2) of 6:1 and a chamber pressure of approximately 3000 psia to produce a nominal sea level thrust of HEiſlſºl iſ AWKS : ºś » * * \\ - /~gº / Nº. DR51ſt RIEx 7 ſank lo, Disconnecy 0RBITER1Ex! YANK LH, Disconnect &AAt N PROPULSION SYSTEM | NST ALLATION MAIN thghts (3) RCS PROPELLANT TANKS : -º-º: s f/ODULE 350 LE THRUSſt Rs M294.2 glid “. ^ *RCS PROPELLAM! WAM{S * ~~ * 2 - **, * HELAUíl 22 -0us - 's Nº PROPELLANT TANK * TANKS Hºlluº OMS TAHK MODULE RCS LEFT REAR MODijt E Figure 4-17. Space Shuttle Liquid Propulsion Systems 4-18 375,000 pounds and a vacuum thrust of 470,000 pounds, with a fixed nozzle area ratio of 77.5:1. The engines are throttleable over a thrust range of 50 to 109 percent of the design thrust level. This allows limiting orbiter acceleration to 3g's and provides a higher. emergency thrust level for use during aborted flights. The engines are gimbaled to deflect +11 degrees for pitch and +9 degrees for both yaw and roll control during the orbiter boost phase. - The orbital maneuvering subsystem (OMS) provides the propul- sive thrust to perform orbit circularization, orbit transfer, rendez- vous, and deorbit. The OMS tankage is sized to provide propellant capacity for an on-orbit delta V of 1000 feet per second with a vehicle payload of 65,000 pounds. This propellant quantity (23,880 pounds) is provided in two pods, one located on each side of the aft fuselage. Each pod contains a high pressure helium storage bottle, tank pressurization regulators and controls, a fuel tank, an oxidizer tank, and a pressure-fed, regeneratively cooled, rocket engine. Each engine produces a vacuum thrust of 6000 pounds and uses nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4) as the oxidizer and monomethylhydrazine (MMH) as the fuel. Provisions are included for up to three sets of auxiliary tanks, each providing an additional delta V capability of 500 feet per second to achieve an overall delta V capability of 2500 feet per second. The auxiliary tankage, located in the cargo bay, uses the same propellant tanks, helium bottles and pressurization system components as the pods. The orbiter reaction control subsystem (RCS) will provide vehicle attitude control in space and translation capability for small velocity increments. These functions will be provided from just prior to separation from the external main propellant tank through the on-orbit maneuvers and during certain phases of entry. The monopropellant RCS has a forward and aft set of 950-pound thrusters to provide fail operational/fail safe attitude control and translation capability. Each module contains several identical monopropellant hydrazine tanks, which use a positive SD 73-CE-0002 # | expulsion device to ensure propellant feed under all operating conditions. The proposed configuration is sized to meet the propellant requirements of a polar mission. Electrical Power Electrical power for operation of most orbiter equipment (Figure 4-18) is by fuel cell power plants. Three hydrogen/oxygen fuel cell systems provide power for all normal and emergency mission phases from prelaunch through orbiter landing. This power is supplemented by three 20/30 kva, 400-Hz generators powered by turbine-driven auxiliary power units (APU's) during ascent, entry, and landing to accommodate the large electrical loads unique to these mission phases. Fuel cell reactants and oxygen for the environmental control and life support system (ECLSS) are supplied from supercritical cryegenic storage Dewars. Fuel cell heat is rejected, and product water is delivered to the ECLSS. Three ten-ampere-hour, nickel-cadmium batteries provide power for firing pyrotechnic devices and emergency reset of the power generation OXYG8 N DEWAR APU DRIVEN AC GENERATORS .3 20130 kVA. 120/208 VAC,400 H, I (10.4 FT3 CAPACITY S 1050 PS1A MAX. PRESSURE) HYDROGEN DEWAR g (19.5 FT3 capacity, 335 PSIA MAX, PRESSURE) FUEL CELL POWERPLANTS (FCP).3 7 KW CONTINUOUS/10 KW PEAK Wºº- DEWAR REPLACEMENT &\\ 6\ {HORIZONLY) . - *W. º § 4. º \O ; sº - § º W - & § & t0 AMP-HOURS Ş Sūſī § ŽSW2 Wººs ºf * *. W ſ . º wº - FCP REPLACEMENT § N. §§ ſ PºW (HORIZ & VERTICAL) ſº-ſº | | FUEL CELL POWER SUBSYSTEM ACCESS DOORS S S • 14 KW CONTINUDUS/20 KW PEAK (RH & LH SiOES) • 27.5 TO 31.0 VDC • 305 KWH MISSION ENERGY EPS/ECLSS • $96 KWH ABORT ISURVIVAL SERVICE UMBILICAL ENERGY HYDROGEN DEWAR OXYGEN DEWAR Figure 4-18. Orbiter Electrical Power Systems and distribution equipment. During the horizontal flight test program and ferry flights, the air-breathing engines drive three ac generators to satisfy all electrical demands. The supercritical cryogenic storage Dewars consist of two concentric spherical shells. The stored hydrogen and oxygen reactants are maintained above the fluid critical pressure. Therefore, reactants are supplied in a single fluid state by simple pressure feed. The nominal operating pressure for both hydrogen and oxygen is maintained by supplying heat to the fluid when the pressure in the Dewars drops to the minimum allowed. Hydraulic System The 3000-psi hydraulic system (Figure 4-19) provides power to actuate the aerodynamic flight control surfaces, main engine gimbals and engine controls, main and nose landing gear, main landing gear brakes, and steering. Hydraulic power is provided by four independent systems that offer a high degree of redundancy. This approach minimizes weight, power extraction, and system complexity and emphasizes a balanced design among systems. Many components are standardized, thus minimizing cost, development time, and logistics support. Each hydraulic system is powered by a variable displacement pump (60 gpm) powered from separate APU's, a feature that contributes to the redundancy of hydraulic power sources. The four independent, 150-horsepower, monopropellant, hydra- zine APU's provide shaft power to the hydraulic pumps and ac generators for approximately 90 minutes during prelaunch, ascent, entry, and landing. A separate positive expulsion fuel tank and pressurization assembly supplies the hydrazine fuel to each APU. Interconnections between assemblies are avoided to preserve independence and simplify checkout. The systems provide mission capability after a single failure and for safe flight and landing in the event of a second failure. SD 73-CE-0002 § S8 SERVO MöTOR TANGEM RUſ)0ER SPEE0 BRAKE SINGLE CHANNEL SERVO ACTUATORS \ 8ACKUP ELECTRG COMMANb HYD SERV0 ::::::::::::::. 0 & Gº SPEED BRAKE THREE CHANNEL HYD SERV0 ELECTRU COMMAND HYD SERV0 #99988 THREE CHANNEl \ MAth POWER-Pumps, RESERVOIRS ElBCTR0 COMMAND HYD SERV0 H20 80188 & MISC valves TVC three-thanNEL sERvo ACTUATORs CŞ *ALGST Run ACTUATOR ELEV0M SINGLE CHANNEL 6Ackup ELECTR0 COMMAND HYD SERV0 § º ÚPt.gck Ét.8VGN THREE CHANNE1. " ELECTRD COMMAND Hypse Rvo TANDEM ELEVON SERVO ACTUATORS 3006 ACTUATORs 1 º * * NLG STRUT º * * *- ACTUATOR <> º y anr ( BRAKE WALVES QD BRAKE Q £MERGENCY ACCUMULATOR UPLOCK V At WES N SERVICE PANE\. 00WN to CK ACTUATDR MLG & NLG VALVE - ſ Nose wheelsmething ºss º ACTUATOR ** * N * . Figure 4-19. Orbiter Hydraulic System MISSION PROFILE Major elements of a typical Space Shuttle mission are depicted in Figure 4-20. During launch, hold-down is provided until the main engines and the solid rocket boosters (SRB's) provide a thrust equal to the weight. Pitch and roll into the preferred attitude for the selected launch azimuth are initiated after the vehicle clears the launch tower approximately five seconds after liftoff. Maximum loads normal to the flight path can be expected about 60 seconds after liftoff for the due-east mission illustrated. Maximum dynamic pressure of approximately 650 pounds per square foot occurs at 39,400 feet. Values in Figure 4-20 change slightly as the mission changes. r- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - oweſt cºarxºg ^ ongºr Tººl Sºº- EARTH ORBIT OPERATIONS w ptonstr * * * * **, * * * * * * * * *A* PARMºunts * wn aſſoo ºt \ S. • *fe ºr 2. ſºooºtºn . ...,x* *-a- $ºtºxxºt Octºº ºf Yoº cutawatºr w = go ºut of taigº swarafº Roki. C. <2\,- 1 * ºn Miaº switHart pitch - * * *o ºdo Nº. • ?: 3rtº --- cacºgramºf a taº & dº toowººnangº • 4xxx ºf - * - $occo fºr arrºw to LAuºcº sitt - ={\, * . ‘’-> . . “2, tºtal. Uaº . . - ogºtów, woºtiºn vºtiocº • tº gºrg , ,” Max & 16 otg Rºcº >. ... ºn ~ . . . . Sº *. <2– Figure 4-20. Space Shuttle Mission Profile Upon burnout, the SRB's are separated, small solid rocket motors forcing the empty cases away from the orbiter and external tank (ET), which continue toward orbit. The SRB's fall in an arc and are decelerated by drogue parachutes deployed at about a 25,000- foot altitude. The main parachutes are deployed at 16,000 feet. The SRB cases and recovery system are retrieved from the ocean and towed back to land for refurbishment and reuse. The orbiter and ET are inserted into an elliptical orbit at a nominal perigee of 60 nautical miles altitude. Shortly after injection, the ET is separated from the orbiter. A retrorocket decelerates the ET, resulting in atmospheric entry and impact in a preselected ren Ote OCean area. - - - At apogee, 100 nautical miles altitude, the orbit is modified to the one desired by using the orbital maneuvering subsystem (OMS). 4-20 SD 73-CE-0002 •l § Orbital operations involving payload deployment, observation, exper- iments, or other activities are then performed. After orbital operations have been completed, the OMS provides the velocity change necessary to perform the deorbit maneuver. The orbiter enters the atmosphere at a flight path angle of approximately one degree with an angle of attack of 34 degrees. A deceleration glide is then performed to reach the desired landing site. The orbiter can reach landing sites as far as 1085 nautical miles on either side of its initial flight path. After the orbiter glides into position, an unpowered landing is made. The feasibility of un- powered landing has been verified by NASA with many flights of . The orbiter and its ground support system have been designed to permit turnaround of the vehicle for the next flight within 14 days after touchdown. This includes refurbishment, maintenance, assembly, and checkout prior to launch. A comprehensive response to the key technical issues in the current phase of the Space Shuttle program was demonstrated by Space Division through progressive definition and evaluation of optimization parameters and tradeoff studies. Systematic identifica- tion of interrelated functional criteria of all structures and propul- sion and power systems, as well as of other functional elements, facilitated isolation of design features that influence system perform- ance and cost and contribute to a decrease of integrated risk factors different aircraft (including F-111, CV-990, and B-52) simulating orbiter approach and landing profile. - MAJOR TECHNICAL ISSUES for all phases of the program. ET AND SRB SIZES AND ARRANGEMENTS It is essential to size and locate the propellant tanks in a way to achieve minimal effect on center of gravity displacement of the 4-21 Space Shuttle system. This is because of the consumption of propellants during ascent flights. The effects of solid propellant consumption in the SRB's on the mass and loads distribution must be integrated with those of the external tank propellants to assure adequate control during powered flight and acceptable distribution of all critical design loads. The magnitude and displacement of forces constitute a technical issue that postulates definition of constraints for the design geometry arrangement of the ET and the SRB's. Figure 4-21 illustrates the relative location of the ET and SRB's in the Space Shuttle system, together with qualitative identifications of the principal design criteria affecting distribution of design loads and the magnitude of aerodynamic drag. These design criteria form a basis for parametric analysis to develop acceptable aerodynamic and thrust vector control allowances and concepts. Interrelationship of these items also has been used for assessment of the performance factors in cases of propulsion performance degradation and/or asymmetric thrust perturbations. £XTERNAL TANK & SRB SizBD TO MINIMIZE COST/FLIGHT MASS FRACTIONS ET/ORB AFT ATTACH *mºs-ºs-º-º: |PROPELLANT DISTRIBUTION e OR8 AFT PAYLOAD tº A BULKHEAD SRB/ET THRUST ATTACH e i NTERTANK AREA TO MINIMHz: WT * = 2* ExTERNAL TANK • MASS FRACTION - • COsºr ,” SRB MOZ2t-E PLANE e NOSE SHAPE *|<- OVERHANG ... • MINIMIZE ACCUSTICS & e “ PLUME/AERO EFFECrs -- . . . . ; #3– | &S \ • CONSTRAINED BY sº r x-I º ORB ME PLUME NLºy N \ *s IMPINGEMENT SR3 RADIAL LOCATION N SRB • ET Wr RELATIVE LOCATIQNS Ł.O. §T 8 O ºw. SS FR • PERFORMANCE e LOCATE TO CENTER OF GRAVITY ...; ACTJºn • CONTROt. MINIMHzÉ • MINIMIZE GIM8AL ANGLE s SEPARATION AERO SHOCK FOR PERFORMANCE • LD $10 DRAG EFFECTS & ACTUATOR WT Figure 4-21. External Tank/SRB Arrangement Constraints SD 73-CE-0002 § ET/SRB arrangement constraints have been evaluated in terms of (1) subsonic and supersonic aerodynamic characteristics and derivation of compatible flight control criteria; (2) liftoff and flight-to-orbit performance, with the associated reliability and safety considerations; and (3) the acoustic effects propagated from the nozzles of the solid propellant motors. These arrangement con- straints have been evaluated during sizing and optimization trades and in establishing the integrated system characteristics leading to baseline configuration definition. ORBITER THERMAL PROTECTION The thermal protection system (TPS) is on the outside of the primary structural shell of the vehicle (Figure 4-22). It maintains the airframe outer skin within acceptable limits during ascent to orbit and entry. Temperatures encountered range from somewhat below 650°F to nearly 29009F. The structure must be protected against NOSE SECTION LEADING EDGE TYPICAL Hi-TEMP RSI & Low TEMP RSI Access PANEL AERO MOLD LINE INSULATION V" HU("t URE ALUMINUM STRUCTURE MOt-d LINE FILLER BAR GEND RCC REINFORCE j VIII. Low-reme as tissu [T]hremp as thfish & Insulation IFigure 4-22. Orbiter Thermal Protection System 4-22 these temperature extremes, not to exceed 350°F. Selection of the best materials over such a wide temperature range presents the foremost technical challenge in the design of the TPS. Criteria to be met include reuse, weight, cost, and design and development confidence to mention just a few of the more critical items. The design established for the TPS meets these challenging goals by selectively using materials that exhibit good properties over the required temperature ranges. The orbiter can be divided roughly into three temperature regions: areas below 650°F; areas between 650°F and 23000F; and areas over 2300°F. To protect areas below 6500F, about 25 percent of the orbiter vehicle surface, a low-temperature, reusable, surface insulation has been selected. It is reusable as a noncharring insulator at maximum temperatures below 650°F and has overtemperature tolerance as a result of its ablator characteristics at higher temperatures. Approximately 65 percent of the vehicle surface is subjected to temperatures ranging from 650°F to 2300°F, and those areas are protected by high-temperature, reusable, surface insulation that is directly bonded to the vehicle airframe and that uses a foamed pad and rigid backing. Its maximum design temper- ature is 2300°F, but it has proved able to withstand temperatures of 3000°F under emergency conditions. The areas experiencing temper- atures exceeding 2300°F include the lower forward fuselage and along the wing leading edge. These areas are fabricated of reinforced carbon-carbon capable of withstanding temperatures well in excess of the maximum they will be subjected to (approximately 2900°F). Silica was recently selected as the material for the high- temperature, reusable insulation. Both mullite and silica were candidate materials (Figure 4-23). Each has been tested extensively under technology development activities conducted by NASA. The preliminary choice of mullite was based upon early results of this technology development. They showed mullite to have a high potential for best overall design characteristics. It was believed that the side-wall cracking experienced under simulated reentry cycling was outweighed by its higher potential for reuse capability, cold soak SD 73-CE-0002 § TYPICAL MULLITE MATERIAL Mulli TE R 7 ILE VENT TO Ut. Litt: RSL ideat PREssure AERO Mold t_the 8s. ADHEsive Foamº PAd ALUMINUM STRUCTURE Moid Line TYPICAL SILICA MATERIAL SIL!CA RSI coAT ING RS, At RO MOUD LINE • MULLITE TO SHLiCA A HRS | A WT = -2369 LB - (NO ATT|TUDE CONSTRAINTS & DIRECT ENTRY) . RocKEINFORCED - CARBON CARBON [T] High TEMPRS, Ø lowTEMPRs Figure 4-23. High-Temperature Reusable Surface Insulation characteristics, and optical properties. However, subsequent NASA testing and evaluation concluded that the side-wall cracking tendency could not be overcome without extensive development. With the selection of silica over mullite, a weight growth margin improvement of approximately 2370 pounds was realized because of the lower density of the silica. WEIGHT MARGIN DEVELOPMENT Design weight margins are determined by the amount of weight growth allowance that, from statistical and historical data, is estimated to be required early in a program to assure the final product does not exceed a specified weight. Space Division, with close support from JSC, is currently investigating several promising areas for improving the Shuttle weight margin. 4-23 Structures Figure 4-24 illustrates several available structural weight margin candidates now in evaluation. The application of boron-epoxy stiffened titanium structural materials in the thrust structure and the mid-body frames and longerons is based on its use in high- performance aircraft and promises to provide a significant increment to weight margin. - Another application of advanced materials and manufacturing technology is the hybrid cabin. The design uses the low conductivity supports from the aluminum cabin structure to support large panels of glass laminate outer structure. - Other cabin studies in progress involve replacing the integral bond ALUMINUM St. RA in ARREsityR sy RUCTURE PLAIt Möld lint' FILLER BAR SYRAIN |SOLATOR pAO cabin airlock with a redesigned airlock/docking module carried in the cargo bay and redesign of the orbit station visibility provisions. LONGERON.D’ETAll- * - - - botton/EPOxY REINFORCING TITANIUM Boſton/EPOxY qBINFORCING TIt ANIUM LoNGERONS THRUST STRUCTURE Borton/EPOxY REINForced INNER CAP ALUM WEB r; CAPs FRAME.OETAll- THRUST STRUCTURE.DETAll. Figure 4-24. Weight Margin Development—Structures SD 73-CE-0002 ; Incorporation of such design changes and application of advanced materials and technology not only will produce a signifi- cant weight margin, but also may produce a substantial overall program cost saving. Propulsion and Power The orbital maneuvering system (OMS) and the reaction control system (RCS), together with the auxiliary power units (APU's) and other components of the electrical power system (EPS), were identified as candidates for a substantial part of the weight margin development. Figure 4-25 presents the outline and installation location of these systems and subsystems and their relative size. FuÉL cell Power PLANTs (3) yiew Loºking two and neoand OMS ENGINE & . Yº (D PORTSIDE REAR RCS MODULE FORWARD RCS MODULE 2^ AUXI LiARY POWER SYSTEM VHEW LOORING FWD AND INBOARD Figure 4-25. Weight Margin Development Candidates—Propulsion and Power Systems The reduction of basic OMS tankage size to meet nominal mission maneuvering requirements is being evaluated. OMS tank kits would be provided to meet higher maneuvering requirements which might be needed for special missions. Replacement of the monopropellant RCS by a bipropellant system is being evaluated as is the reduction of the number of RCS thrusters used in the orbiter from 40 to 32. Analysis of the EPS, including the auxiliary power system and the fuel cell power plants, yielded similarly promising weight margin increments. Final selection of these weight margin development items will be based on refined evaluations considering impact on cost, reliability, safety, and system flexibility. Other Subsystems Weight margin candidates for other orbiter subsystems are illustrated in Figure 4-26. A potential weight margin improvement in the thermal protection and control system can be gained through selective on-orbit attitude orientation management and through ground-supported active cooling after landing. Examination of Shuttle missions has shown that, of all currently identified missions, conditions in less than 5 percent may be such that temperatures could exceed nominal single orbit conditions or be so low as to cause cold soak problems with the high-temperature, reusable surface insulation. For these rare conditions, rather than penalize orbiter design and, hence, weight, restrictions on attitude orientation can be made. With alternating periods of attitude hold for experiment performance, followed by selective attitude orientation for thermally conditioning the hot and cold regions of the orbiter, significant weight growth margins can be provided. A cycle of six hours of attitude hold and three hours of thermal conditioning (seven hours for the last cycle prior to deorbit and reentry) is under consideration. The ram air/vapor cycle cooling system for ECLSS and hydraulic equipment may be eliminated by extending the capabilities SD 73-CE-0002 § RAM AIR/vapon cycle DELETION MANIPULATOR ARM DELETiON SIMPLIFIED HYDRAULIC SYSTEM THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM CONDITIONING Figure 4-26. Weight Margin Development Candidates—Mechanical, Hydraulic, Environmental, and Thermal Protection Systems of the on-board water boiling system to include the first 23 minutes after entry and by adding a lightweight ammonia boiler system and a fuel heat sink unit. - e To save weight, the orbiter hydraulic system may be simplified by replacing the eight dual-tandem, balanced, elevon actuators with four single-balanced, dual-switching, servo actuators. One servo actuator may also replace two rudder actuators. These modifications would provide additional weight margin and simplify flight and ground operations while reducing some system redundancy. Examination of several proposed Space Shuttle traffic models indicated that the maximum weight of payload was carried aloft in missions requiring the deployment of a large satellite or a satellite and a propulsive stage. Analysis of the deployment sequence showed that deployment required only one manipulator arm. The second arm may be deleted as a standard item of orbiter equipment. With the installation provisions and controls for the second arm retained, a second arm can be added as part of the payload for rescue, retrieval, sortie, and servicing missions where two arms are desirable and the weight of payload carried is less than the maximum. Revisions may also be made to the avionics bay fire detection and suppression system and to the landing gear extension modes to reduce the weight of these systems. ROCKETDYNE SSME PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS The Space Shuttle Main Engine Program (Figure 4-27) received a go-ahead at Rocketdyne in April, 1972. We are now in the 12th month of a 47-month development phase (Period “A”) culminating with the critical design review (Figure 4-28). Critical design review (CDR) is the control milestone when NASA reviews and approves the engine system design and releases it for production of flight engines. The 47-month development phase is followed by 21 months of production and verification testing to certify that the engine is safe, reliable, and ready for manned flight. An additional 17 months are needed to demonstrate compliance with all required specifications and to complete the development program. The 27 flight engines will be produced between March 1976 and December 1979, the end of COntract. In the 11-month period since go-ahead, the major engineering task has been completion of detail engineering drawings for release to manufacturing. The release initiates the material procurement pro- cess and establishes the schedule for buildup of manufacturing services. We have released more than 55 percent of the drawings, placed more than 1500 purchase orders with outside businesses to buy materials and parts (of these 65 percent were with small business and minority-owned firms), and have been modifying manufacturing and test facilities to requirements of the main-engine program. SD 73-CE-0002 O & FS SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE ------- --------- ------- --- ---------------- ---------- ------------------ --------- ------- ------------- ------- --------- ---------- ---------- --- - - - - - - - - - - - - ---- --- --- ------ --- ---- --- -- --- --- -- ----- ------- ----- ------ Figure 4-27. Space Shuttle Main Engine PROGRAM schedul-E DEVEL PROD - - - - - - - M i i i | i. i. I GO AHEAD CDR PEc v |ric w I L- -. - I - E– 47 Mo-E-2TMO-E-17MO- I | ! 1st Phorſes set FLIGHTSETEqc - 27 ENGINES PERIOD “A” I . . . . . Tº | | | | | | | | | | | | - l I H–l-PERod "e"— t | | | | | | | 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 Figure 4-28. SSME Program Schedule 80 4-26 In support of the engineering design team, many tests of models, components, materials, and fabrication processes have been completed. Design verification testing (Figure 4-29) has been underway for weeks on one critical component of the engine, the ignition system. This component paces the development program since it is the ignition source for all combustion within the engine. A major activity has been completion of the design by the architectural and engineering contractor and start of construction on the modification in the Cocoa area (Figure 4-30) of Rocketdyne's Santa Susana test complex. This facility was built for the Saturnſ Apollo program and is being modified to make use of existing equipment and facilities. A search of all government-owned equip- ment throughout the country has resulted in moving valves and ducts, lines, propellant tanks, pressurization system, and other components from their location to Cocoa. Figure 4-29. Ignition System Design Verification Test SD 73-CE-0002 § § Figure 4-30. Rocketdyne SSME Test Facility The next major milestone is activation of the combustion chamber fabrication center (Figure 4-31). Construction was com- pleted in late February on this electroforming facility. It provides the capability to manufacture the main engine combustion chambers by electrodeposition of layers of copper and nickel over a slotted liner made from copper alloy. The number of people working on the main engine program has risen to more than 600 since contract go-ahead. The buildup was achieved primarily by transfer of personnel from programs that are being completed, e.g., Saturn/Apollo, and by recalls of former employees. This is about one-third of the manpower buildup that will be required during the peak year (1977) of the program. The main engine program is on schedule and within cost. The schedule is tight, but if program funding continues as planned, the engines required in just over three years from now (June 1976) to support the vehicle development program will be delivered on time. 4-27 Fºº-AAA- --- ºmni * 'º - - .." º ſ/m ºr " , | º - º *"… Figure 4-31. Rocketdyne Combustion Chamber Fabrication Facility ORBITER SUBCONTRACTING APPROACH The Shuttle orbiter make-or-buy program (Figure 4-32) was developed during the prime contract proposal period and maintained after contract award. It is structured to yield maximum technologi- cal, economical, and schedule benefits by distributing contract requirements between company and outside sources. The make-or- buy program is the basis for a potentially wide geographical distribution of Shuttle program dollars. Table 4-2 reflects the established Shuttle orbiter make-or-buy program items and illustrates the division of Rockwell International effort versus the potential major subcontracts. The Space Division procurement plan gives prime consideration to scheduling subcontracts to meet orbiter assembly and test requirements, but at the same time allows for constraints on program SD 73-CE-0002 § ECLSS / * REMO 2” ARMS N --~ - | & sº \– L 2 Figure 4-32. Potential Major Orbiter Subcontract Elements annual funding. Where major subcontractors must participate in early Space Division engineering design activities, procurements are phased for careful control of initial engineering support levels and for the start of full hardware activities. Table 4-3 shows the subcontract award plan, which is in accordance with current program milestones and the subcontracts Space Division has issued to date. Major procurements represent over a billion dollars of subcontracting planned for the early phase of the Shuttle program. Subcontracts were awarded to McDonnell Douglas and Grumman Aerospace for engineering level-of-effort support to minimize an early buildup and temporary peaking of Space Division engineering personnel and to optimize use of knowledgeable tech- nical personnel from Shuttle program competitors. Table 4-2. Orbiter Make-or-Buy Distribution Make Buy : : Structural Subsystems 1. High-temperature reusable surface insulation (RSI)— thermal protection system (TPS) Low-temperature RSl—TPS Leading edge structural subsystem/reinforced carbon carbon–TPS - . Manipulator subsystem : 4 :: Mechanical and Electrical Power 1. Fuel cells 2. Cryogenic storage subsystem 3. Auxiliary power unit : : X Avionics 1. Flight control system 2. Guidance and navigation integration system 3. Software and data processing peripheral equipment 4. Computer : Environmental Life Support 1. Environmental control subsystem 2. Food management subsystem 3. Waste management subsystem 4. Space radiator subsystem : / N \ VERTICAL STABILIZER Z MD Fujśćt. Agº /. $3EMBLY CARGO BAY RCS/OMS fºo()RS & SPACE RADHATOR PANEis Element Structures 1. Mid-fuselage 2. Wing 3. Vertical stabilizer 4. Forward fuselage 5. Aft fuselage 6. Final assembly, installation, and checkout Propulsion 1. Reaction control subsystem (RCS) engines 2. RCS modules 3. RCS tanks 4. Orbiter maneuvering subsystem (OMS) engines 5. OMS pod 6. Air-breathing engine structural module 7. Air-breathing engine nacelle and pylon SD 73-CE-0002 # Table 4-3. Subcontract Award Plan Dates Level of - Subcontractor ſtem Effort” Hardware and Remarks Engineering support 9-16.72(A) McDonnell Douglas, St. Louis, Missouri Engineering support 9-16.72(A) Grumman Aerospace, Bethpage, New York Ground maintenance and 10.9.72(A) American Airlines, operations suppbrt Tulsa, Oklahoma High order language and 10-26-72(A) intermetrics, Boston, compiler Mass. Flight control system 2.5-73(A) 10.1.73 Honeywell, Inc., St. Petersburg, Fla. Software and data processing 3.12.73 7.1.73 IBM, Owego, New York peripheral equipment Vertical stabilizer 3.20.73 10.1.73 Proposals received’ Wing 3.20.73 10.1.73 Proposals received Mid-fuselage 3.20.73 10.1.73 Proposals received Orbiter maneuvering 3.30.73 10.1.73 Proposals received subsystem (OMS) pod High-temperature reusable 5.1.73 Proposals requested surface insulation (RSÍ)— thermal protection system (TPS) Leading edge structural sub- 5.21.73 Proposals requested system/reinforced carbon carbon-TPS Computer 7.1.73 Environmental control 7.2.73 subsystem Low-temperature RS!—TPS 7.25.73 Fuel cells 9. 1.73 Payload bay doors 10.1.73 OMS engines 10.1.73 Cryogenic storage subsystem 11.1.73 Reaction control subsystem 11.1.73 (RCS) thrusters RCS modules (aſt and forward) 11.1.73 RCS tanks 11.1.73 Food management subsystem 12.1.73 Waste management subsystem 12.1.73 Auxiliary power units 1.2.74 Space radiator subsystem 1.2.74 Air-breathing engine subsystem 2.1.74 nacelle and pylon Manipulator subsystem 5, 1.75 Authority to Procesd *A = actual dates, others are estimated. 4-29 Proposals have been requested and received and are being evaluated for the vertical stabilizer, wing, mid-fuselage, and orbiter maneuvering subsystem (OMS) pod. Proposals for high-temperature reusable-surface-insulation (RSI) are due for receipt on March 21, 1973. Proposals for the leading edge structural subsystem are due for receipt on March 30, 1973. Space Division is working closely with NASA in planning and maintaining visibility on the geographic distribution of Shuttle program funds, including offsite work. We have made a concerted effort to identify aerospace capabilities related to Shuttle require- ments in all regions. Extensive bidder development efforts have resulted in a wide potential geographic participation as well as a competitive environment for major and significant Shuttle procure- Inent.S. Procurement planning for the Shuttle program has considered small and minority-owned businesses. Our Small Business Adminis- tration program has been approved, and a minority-business enter- prise plan we developed for the Shuttle program has been approved by NASA. In the last six months, the Space Division has placed 185 orders with minority business enterprises for a total of $334,618, and 142 minority suppliers have been identified in the supplier library. BENEFITS TO THE NATION-GOAL-ORIENTED The world's requirements for improvements in meeting human needs are expanding at an ever-increasing rate. In the coming 10 to 20 years, the world will be facing a number of problems affecting the quality of life that will challenge the scientific, technological, management, and leadership skills of mankind. Modern civilization consumes energy and resources at a tremendous rate—perhaps more in the past three decades than since the beginning of civilization. A new view of earth is required to cope with the problems posed by the dissipation of land, mineral, and water resources; a deteriorating environment; and an expanding population. SD 73-CE-0002 Space can be used in many ways to directly assist in solving these problems. Space systems have already been utilized to improve weather forecasting, communications, and our physical knowledge of our earth. Space systems can provide information about the earth that cannot be duplicated and information not practical to obtain by current techniques. The new view of earth must provide information on a regional, national, and worldwide basis and must be updated at frequent intervals. Space platforms can obtain unique information about the features, processes, and resources of the earth for scientists to investigate the complex interrelations of man and the natural environment; to search for new understanding of the features and phenomena governing changes in the air, water, and land; and to discover new resources and means to preserve those we have. Space platforms can repeatedly monitor and inventory the environmental conditions, changes, quantity, quality, and distribution of water, land, air, and vegetation resources information so vital to manage- ment agencies. Access to space makes possible a unique way to solve problems of mankind. Economical access to space through development of the Space Shuttle—the direct goal of this program—can make new, less costly ways to satisfy national and worldwide needs practical. Although many direct applications of space to human needs can be and have been described, many others cannot be foreseen today. These other applications will be derived and defined from the discoveries of precursor systems and from further study of the problems and how they can best be solved. However, achieving more than a few of the many potential benefits offered mankind by space systems requires low-cost transportation to and from space. SPACE APPLICATIONS The Space Shuttle has the capability to perform missions in response to current projected applications to national and worldwide needs and the flexibility to respond to policy, discovery, and innovation. A primary mission is the delivery of payloads to earth 4–30 orbit. As shown in Figure 4-33, the system can place payloads of 40,000 pounds into a 100-nautical-mile-altitude polar orbit and 65,000 pounds into a 28.5-degree inclined orbit. The orbiter contains propellant for orbital maneuvering and tank kits are available for additional propellant, giving capability to increase operating altitude. The payload return capability of the Space Shuttle system is a unique feature that can lead to substantially lower cost operations. Nominal design conditions of the orbiter are 165 knots landing speed with a 25,000-pound payload return. Landing speed increases with heavier payloads but only reaches about 183 knots with 65,000 pounds. With proper selection of design margins and braking design, capability will be available to land with heavier than nominal payloads as may be needed in such cases as abort. The Space Shuttle is more than a transport vehicle; it has capability to carry out missions unique to the space program— retrieval of payloads from orbit for reuse; service or refurbish - PayLoad-DELivery -RETRIEval- LARGE sizes, Multiple -BENIGN EnvironMENT TEMP, contamination, Loads -util-it-support comM. Guid&nav, Power, stae -ouick tunnaround ADAPTABLE ACCOMMODATIONS Payload-ºn. ºw DELIVERY TO orbit - structure Design of payload-a- | | H.-Era ---—wth-i- | ------alt -- 40 º -- 100 on-Ti-climatio-toes) payload return -PEED (knots) u-Eatine Limit º 2- 40 so -- Pavload-wn tº Le) Figure 4-33. Broad Mission Capabilities SD 73-CE-0002 É š The Space Shuttle will have countless uses during its operational life, which will extend beyond the 1990's. Missions include a wide range of applications of space and of space platforms, which can be achieved through operation of satellites, satellites with propulsive stages, space laboratories, or combinations as appropriate to the specific objectives and requirements. The space laboratory provides capability to do research and to develop techniques and equipment. The use of the Space Shuttle will not be limited to the missions that can be forecast today. The reduction in the cost of earth orbital operations and new operational techniques will enable new and unforeseen solutions of problems to be made. For example, disposal of nuclear waste into deep space or the sun may allow vastly expanded use of earth-bound nuclear power plants thereby helping to resolve the world's energy crisis. This was the subject of a study, Concepts for Space Disposal of Nuclear Waste, performed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology during the spring of 1972. Placement and Recovery of Satellites One important Space Shuttle mission class will be the place- ment of satellites in earth orbit as illustrated in Figure 4-34. On many of these placement missions, a satellite launched on a previous mission will be retrieved and returned to earth for refurbishment and reuse. º --~~~ Figure 4-34. Placement and Recovery of Satellites The satellite, or satellites (up to five individual satellites may be delivered on a single mission) are serviced, checked out, and loaded into the Shuttle. The crew that boards the Shuttle on the launch platform will consist of Shuttle pilots and payload specialists. Upon arrival at the desired orbit, the payload specialist will conduct predeployment checks and operations. After assuring that the satellite is ready for deployment, the crew will operate the payload-handling system, which lifts the satellite from the cargo bay retention structure, extends it about 50 feet from the orbiter, and releases it. The final activation of the satellite will be by radio command. The Shuttle will stand by until assured that the satellite is performing satisfactorily before proceeding with the remainder of its mission. In recovering a satellite, the orbiter will rendezvous with it, maneuver close, and attach the payload handling or manipulator arm(s) to the satellite. After deactivating the satellite by radio satellites in space; and transport to orbit, operate, and return space laboratories. This capability results in a net savings in the cost of space operations while greatly enhancing the flexibility and produc- tivity of the missions by the presence of man. The Shuttle's safe, comfortable transportation allows almost any physically fit person to go into space. This can include the world's most outstanding men and women in any technological field. Their participation in experiments or observations can make exponential increases in the effective application of space techniques to solution of pressing human needs. 4-31 SD 73-CE-0002 § command, it will be lowered into the cargo bay and locked in place. The orbiter will perform deorbit maneuvers, enter the atmosphere, and land, returning the satellite for reuse. This operating mode can be cost-effective through repairing malfunctions or modernizing expensive satellites to extend their useful life. Another unique Shuttle operational capability is on-orbit satellite servicing or refurbishment. This capability, combined with the large weight and volume capacity of the Shuttle, provides the payload designer with new freedom in developing and operating satellites that can reduce payload costs as well as improve performance. Shuttle Laboratory Capability for man's participation in space operations provided by the Space Shuttle will increase the effectiveness as well as reduce the costs of the application of space techniques. As illustrated in Figure 4-35, university as well as industrial and governmental research scientists from all parts of the world, can carry their laboratories into space. Manned operation of Shuttle-borne laboratories will provide an entirely new capability for investigating, developing, evaluating, and applying space techniques and equipment to key objectives. Furthermore, the availability of uncommitted or “excess” payload space aboard some Shuttle flights may permit the participation of graduate students at little or no charge. They may install laboratory equipment for space experiments to be conducted in fulfillment of their thesis requirements. The large volume of the Shuttle cargo bay can accommodate a manned laboratory with a comfortable “shirtsleeve” environment for research investigations, technology development, or specific applica- tions. This capability has uses in areas of life sciences, including medical and biological research; material sciences, including manu- facturing processes for vaccines, semiconductors, and other materials; and technology development and applications in physics, communi- cations, weather and pollution monitoring, and earth resources surveying. 4-32 -------------a-taaa- ºf La-ºr-t-t-to-ºnent Figure 4-35. Shuttle Laboratory The research investigators in universities and industry can carry their laboratories into space in terms of both equipment and techniques. With the Shuttle, discipline-oriented scientists, engineers, and technicians who are not trained astronauts can use their skills directly in space operations. Through use of the available technical skills for equipment calibration, service, and operations, payload equipment can be simplified, as proven by NASA aircraft programs, reducing payload costs substantially. Also, because of the crewmen's technical knowledge, minor repairs and equipment modifications can be made in-flight in the same manner they are done in earth-based laboratories. This direct application of already trained technologists without special astronaut skills will open wide the opportunities for participation. SD 73-CE-0002 § Much of the commercial laboratory equipment used by the research investigator can be brought aboard the space laboratory, if it is not already a part of the basic laboratory facilities. The investigator's familiarity with the equipment will enhance mission results and the application of developed equipment will reduce costs. The discipline-oriented, specialized knowledge of the investi- gators when applied in direct conduct of an investigation in space can, as in earth-based labs, accelerate the advancement of knowledge. Interpretation, evaluation, and redirection can take place during a single mission. New investigations and applications of the technology to evaluate different techniques in situ can accelerate the evolution of optimal application systems. Shuttle as a Short-Duration Space Station The Shuttle, when equipped with selected mission kits, will be able to operate up to as much as 30 days in orbit as well as performing short-duration missions. As such, it can act as a short-duration space station. This type of Shuttle flight as illustrated in Figure 4-36, is often referred to as a space lab mission and the payloads as space lab payloads. The Shuttle can carry many different space laboratory payloads with varying instruments to observe the earth, sun, planets, and stars, or payloads that require operation in the zero-gravity or vacuum of space. Shuttle laboratories of a number of varieties, with foreign government or United Nations participation, will use a combination of standardized pressurized volumes, airlocks, and equipment-mounting platforms to carry out missions for research or application of space techniques. In the artist's concept, a laboratory module and many instru- ments are shown installed in the cargo bay. The Shuttle can be flown in an inverted flight attitude to orient the instruments toward earth for a survey of earth resources and to investigate geophysical and environmental parameters. Certain instruments require mounting external to the pressurized volume, and require monitoring and 4–33 Figure 4-36. Shuttle as a Short-Duration Space Station control by the crew. Pressure-suit operations in the payload bay are practical when instrument service is required. Instruments needing manned operation such as high-resolution, multispectral cameras with film are directly accessible to the crew. The Shuttle, carrying attached payloads consisting of laboratory modules and instruments, provides an entirely new capability for manned participation, which will increase the effectiveness as well as reduce the costs of the application of space technology. Delivery and Return of Propulsive Stages/Satellites In placement of satellites in very high-altitude orbits or on trajectories to the planets or outer space, a space tug (recoverable SD 73-CE-0002 # propulsion stage) or expendable stage (such as Agena or Centaur) will be utilized. Both the satellite and the propulsion stage will be delivered to orbit and deployed with manipulators, as shown in Figure 4-37. Prior to release, the combined stage/satellite system is checked and readied for launch, including updating guidance information. The Shuttle orbiter moves a safe distance away before the radio command signals are given to fire the propulsion stage engines. Visual as well as remote monitoring can be accomplished by the Shuttle payload crew. In the event of a malfunction, the stage and satellite can be retrieved for inspection and repair. Should it be determined that repair is beyond the on-board capability, the stage propellants would be dumped, and the entire payload returned to earth for refurbishment. ^ kº § 3, REMDEZVDUS WITH 000K with PAYLOAD OEPLOYMENT PAYLOAD PAYLOAD • RECOVERABLE SPINNERS • VISUAL ſºv) TUG USESSPFM.TABLE • LASER RADAR ORBITER/TUG 000 (ING • utiliz: MANIPULATORS TUG DEPLOYMENT to 68RTH IUG • INITIALizE TUG DATA FROM ORBITE • ROTATE TUG FROM BAY AND DEPLOY WITH MANIPULATORS Figure 4-37. Space Tug Mission Profile After the propulsion stage is activated, the Shuttle stays in orbit while the stage delivers the satellite to the higher-altitude orbit. Missions delivering and retrieving satellites from a geosynchronous orbit (altitude of about 22,300 statute miles) will encompass from three to six days of orbital operations. A space tug will perform the propulsive maneuvers under control of its own guidance system. Monitoring and command can be done from the Shuttle or from the ground. The tug will be returned to a low-altitude earth orbit where the Shuttle will rendezvous with it and retrieve it for reuse. The space tug will introduce a new mode of operation for high-energy missions. The Space Shuttle/tug system is capable of delivering a 3000-pound payload to a geosynchronous orbit (19,323-nmi altitude) and returning to earth with an equal-weight payload plus the empty tug. A payload of nearly 8000 pounds can be delivered and the tug returned when no payload is recovered from geosynchronous orbit. This unique capability, as with the recovery of satellites, offers a new dimension to satellite designers that will substantially reduce space payload development and operational costs. • EXPENDABLE SPINNER ONLY PROGRAM IT * * * ORBITER/TUG RENDEAVOLS • ORBITERACTIVE • VISUAL ſº V) • GROUND RADAR • TRANSPONDER • LASER RADAR • TUG USESAPSTO BACK OFF AFTER SPIN CAPABILITY ON PAYLOAD UNLATCHING PRiMARY TUG Active AS BACKUP • TUG 11.5 M Mi (32 tº M! 8th IND 8, 10 N. Mi (13 km) A30VE SHUT LE PAYLOAD DELIVERY COSTS Figure 4-38 compares Space Shuttle capabilities with two current expendable launch vehicles. The comparison shows that Shuttle will place payloads in space at a lower recurring cost than existing systems, can deliver larger and heavier payloads, and has the unique capability of returning payloads to earth for refurbishment and reuse or inspection and analysis. The cost per flight and cost per pound values shown for the existing launch vehicles, obtained from the Aerospace Corp. refer- ence, are conservative since they are not believed to contain program support costs. Program support costs however, are included in the values shown for Space Shuttle. SD 73-CE-0002 à Figure 4-38, Payload Delivery Comparison COST BENEFITS FROM PAYLOAD RECOVERY The costs of payloads will be less for the payloads used with Space Shuttle compared to the equivalent-function payloads used with existing expendable launch vehicles. This cost benefit will result from the differences in capability of the Space Shuttle, which are: 1. Relaxation of the payload density requirement (65,000 pounds maximum, 15 feet diameter, and 60 feet length). These capabilities can allow a reduction of DDT&E and production costs of the payloads. The capability of recovery and return-to-earth means that payloads can be designed and developed less expensively, and that a smaller production quantity will satisfy the payload mission require- ments, since the recovered payloads can be refurbished and replaced in space. The residual value of a payload returned to earth varies as a function of factors such as need, age and state of the art. Figure 4-39 parametrically displays payload weight, residual value in dollars per pound (thus the residual value), and, finally, the net savings or cost of transportation. During the Apollo program, several studies were conducted to define the cost of refurbishing an Apollo command module for possible reuse. Those studies showed that the residual value was on the order of 50 percent of original cost. Unmanned satellites are expected to have a higher percentage residual value and therefore an even greater net savings in payload costs. PAYLOAD VALUE -- - Slo)0, LB $2000/18 40M BREAK-EVEN S10, 4M REC COST, FLT S750 LB - 30M — — —- # RESIDUAL $500 ‘L8 VALUE OF PAYLOAD zow SAVED — ($) $250 LB 10M | _l 50 4G 30 20 10 0 10M G 10M 20M 30N 40M P L v. T (KLB, fººt COST NET SAVED S MISSION Figure 4-39. Cost Benefits From Payload Recovery - $10.33M - $10.6M PER LAUNCH PER LAUNCH tº 15S/LB) Sº-a stº (6308/LB) t se: PER LAUNCH Sº- Se: (815&s/L8) E iſ PAYLOAD PAYLOAD HEIGHT JEL!VER $5.000 UB in sºciº FT | (METERS) (FEET) 29,000 LB = 260 AYLOAD 3,000 CU FT RECOVER FOR REUSE 25,000 LB sº N |- 100 § t 25 - B-mo §§ º STAGE S$ SHUTTLE S$ • LOWEST COST/L8 OF - 50 * STAGE 0 N$ 0Eil WERED PAYLOAD 5.StGMENT SSS • HEAVIER PAYLOADS SRM'S (2} UEt!VERE0 ſ • PAYLOAD RECOVERED l s—— 3 SRM’s ºl FOR REUSE 0- 0 * = . * * ſº- THOR | TITAN liſt) | | SHUTTLE | *Atmospace heront No.aſp. 12023m. 1", inſeGRATED OPERATIONS PAYL0ADS/FLEET ANALYSIS FINAL REPORT 2. Relaxation of the transportation accelerations (3 g’s maximum). 3. Recovery and return of payloads to earth (25,000 pounds nominal). 4-35 RESIDUAL SD 73-CE-0002 § BENEFITS TO THE NATION – ANCILLARY Evidence that the nation is benefitting directly from the space program is impressive, and the Space Shuttle program will enhance those benefits and bring others in the future. By reducing the costs of placing payloads into orbit and lowering the costs of the payloads themselves, the Shuttle program will allow a larger proportion of the space dollar to be applied to a greater variety of payloads and more challenging missions. This surely portends an even higher return on the nation's future investment in space. But stemming from the space program is a whole class of less tangible benefits whose potential importance is significant even when compared to the direct contributions. These ancillary or indirect benefits, which do not pertain directly to the stated intent and purposes of the space program, are little understood and their importance frequently is unappreciated. Yet they contribute greatly to the nation's social and economic fabric and should be fully communicated to the American people. SPACE TECHNOLOGY IMPACT ON PRODUCTIVITY AND GROWTH Productivity increase and economic growth are vital in meeting the future socio-economic needs of our nation. The reason for this is self-evident. Growth of total output relative to population means a higher standard of living, a greater national abundance. From a different perspective, a growing economy is in a superior position to meet new needs and to solve socio-economic problems. This has been demonstrated in recent years as the real gross national product (GNP) in the United States has been expanding. This extra output provides the means by which we have been able to undertake space exploration, wage a domestic war on poverty, and begin an attack on pollution without dramatically impairing domestic consumption and investment. In a static economy with a constant real GNP, these programs would entail cutting back some other areas of production. There are obvious advantages to further growth in the United States. The increment in real output each year can be used to satisfy existing needs more effectively, to undertake new projects, or both. In this way, we can increase our public wealth in such forms as schools, public transportation facilities, and hospitals without extraordinary sacrifices of private wealth. With a growing economy, resources for social capital can be drawn from incremental production with little disruption to established patterns of consumption. Economic growth minimizes social and political conflicts by making it possible to assign a higher priority to some goals without diminishing the resources available for others. The Role of Productivity The GNP and its rate of growth fundamentally depend on two factors: the number of man-hours of labor worked and productivity. The shorter work week and the increase in vacation time have sharply reduced the number of hours the average member of the labor force works each year and tend to counter increases in the labor force. As a nation, therefore, we have chosen to rely primarily on our rising productivity as a source of economic growth. Labor productivity in the United States has risen steadily, with few interruptions, over the period for which records exist. This is demonstrated in Table 4-4. Table 4-4. Growth in Output per Man-Hour Period Avg.9% Change per Year 1889 to 1919 1.7 1919 to 1947 2.2 1947 to 1965 3.3 1966 to 1970 1.7 SD 73-CE-0002 # It can be seen, however, that the rate of growth slowed noticeably in the period 1966 to 1970. This reduced rate inhibited the economy from achieving its full potential. Indirectly, it promoted inflation by being insufficient to offset rising costs. The figures for 1966 to 1970 seem somewhat less distressing in light of a productivity recovery in 1971 and 1972 to about 3.5 percent. But the disturbing thought lingers that perhaps certain noncyclical factors—suspicion of technology as an example—are restricting the rise of productivity, and the productivity picture in the United States assumes an even darker cast when compared to trends in other industrialized nations. The average yearly gain in output per man-hour in the period 1965 to 1970 in Japan, for example, was 14.2 percent. It was 8.5 percent in The Netherlands, 6.6 percent in France, 5.3 percent in West Germany, and 3.6 percent in the United Kingdom. The erosion of our balance of trade posture is partly attributable to our sluggish productivity rates. The Role of Technology and R&D The single most important key to increasing productivity and economic growth is the stimulative effects of technology. Some studies have concluded that, over relatively long periods, as much as 90 percent of the increase in output per man-hour is a result of technological progress. A study by the Midwest Research Institute! (MRI) of the period 1949 to 1968 concluded that 20 percent more total output was realized as a result of technology introduced after 1949 than might otherwise have been achieved. By 1968, the compounding growth of technology had reached a point at which technological improvements beyond 1949 levels were accounting for 37 percent of the output. This can be seen in Figure 4-40, which also shows that research and development (R&D) accounted for 60 percent of the technology-induced gain in national output during the period. *Economic Impact of Stimulated Technological Activity, Part I, Midwest Research Institute (November 1971) p. 4. *A Review of the Relationship Between Research and Development and Economic Growth/Productivity, National Science Foundation (February 1971). 4-37 BiLLIONS OF 1953 DOLLARS 650 600 550 F- 500 H. 450 H. 400 H. 350 H. - F- 300 OUTPUT AT 1949 TECHNOLOGY LEVEL o | ----|--|-- | 1–1 – | 1 || 1950 1955 1960 1965 Figure 4-40. Gain in Private Non-Farm GNP From Post-1949 Technology This strong relationship between R&D investment and productivity improvement is abundantly documented and widely acknowledged. For example, in four papers commissioned by the National Science Foundation to review the relationship between R&D and economic growth and productivity, the contributors’ views were summarized as follows: “Although what we know about the relationship between R&D and economic growth/productivity is limited, all available evidence indicates that R&D is an important contributor to economic growth and productivity. Research to date seeking to measure this relationship (at the level of the firm, the industry, and the whole economy) points in a single direction—the contribution of R&D to economic growth/productivity is positive, significant and high.” 2 SD 73-CE-0002 § The Impact of Space Technology Several recent studies of the economic leverage of space research and development have determined that, as an economic stimulant, this particular type of high technology activity has a far greater than average impact. The most comprehensive of these is the MRI study. In evaluating the effects of NASA's research and development spending during the period 1959 to 1969, it found that the $25 billion (in 1958 dollars) spent on civilian space R&D during the period had returned $52 billion through 1970 and will continue to pay off through 1987, at which time the total payoff will have been $181 billion in 1958 dollars. The discounted rate of return for this investment will have been 33 percent per annum. This is thought by MRI to be a conservative estimate because it is based on the assumption that NASA's R&D has an average payoff effect. There is strong evidence, however, that NASA's R&D spending has disproportionately high economic effects because of the increased technological leverage produced through the exacting demands of the space program. Because technological multiplier: vary widely among industries, it is evident that resources allocated to one industry can have a significantly different leverage than in another industry. The high economic effects of the space program come about because NASA allocates its R&D dollars to the more technologically-intensive industrial sectors—i.e., those with the higher technological multipliers. The MRI study noted that the weighted average technological index of the industries that perform research for NASA is 2.1, while the multiplier for all manufacturing is 14. This leads to the conclusion that the pattern in which NASA's resources are distributed generates higher growth than the average spending pattern and, as the MRI study concluded, “Highly technological undertakings, such as the space program, do exert disproportionate weight toward increased national productivity.” “Impact of the Space Shuttle Program on the National Economy,” The Engineering Economist, (1973 Winter Issue) Volume 18-2. • ‘The Economic Impact of Alternative Federal Government Programs Chase Econometric Associates (December 1972). 4.38 Corroboration of this conclusion is found in two econometric studies of the effects of spending for high technology programs. In a study using the University of Maryland's 185 producing sector input-output model, the economic effects of NASA's spending for the Space Shuttle program were compared with equivalent outlays for two low-technology programs—residential construction and increased consumer spending." The study concluded that the Space Shuttle program would have a comparatively high stimulative effect on the national economy. It would generate more total output than the other two programs because of its higher multiplier effects; it would have a more favorable impact on the U.S. balance of trade position; and it would create more jobs in the high-technology industries. The reason for this is the same reason cited in the MRI study: industries with higher technological multipliers are stimulated by the Shuttle spending. As seen in Figure 4-41, nearly 70 percent of the total production (direct and indirect) generated by the Shuttle program would be in high technology industries, compared to 6 percent for residential construction and 10 percent for consumer spending. Similar ratios apply to employment—68 percent of the total employment created by the Shuttle would be in technology-intensive industries, compared to only about five percent for the other two programs. - In another study, Chase Econometric Associates investigated the short-term effects of alternate government spending mixes within a fixed budget level.” The study concluded that a given level of federal expenditures that even slightly favors the higher technology programs, such as space, will tend to increase tax revenues and reduce the budget deficit, increase employment levels, and increase output. These results would even begin to show in the short run—i.e., in the same time frame in which the federal expenditures were made. For example, it was assumed that a change in the federal spending mix within a fixed budget ceiling occurred such that in GFY 1974 $3.7 billion more was spent on high technology programs and the same amount was reduced from low technology activities. The results showed that in FY 1974 alone the GNP could increase by $9 billion, 130,000 more jobs would be created, and federal tax receipts would increase by $1.5 billion. The reason is that this type of budget policy SD 73-CE-0002 § PERCENT 80 "TECHNOLOGY-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES: } = e CHEMICALS F- e ELECTRICAL AND NONELECTRICAL MACHINERY e TRANSPORTATION EOUIPMENT 60 H. (AIRCRAFT, AUTOS, ETC.) e SCIENTIFIC INSTRUMENTS AND CONTROLS 3. PRODUCTION 40 H. [T] EMPLOYMENT 20 }= H. 3. SHUTTLE CONSTRUCTION CONSUMPTION Figure 4-41. Impact on Technology-Intensive Areas particularly benefits the cyclically sensitive, high-productivity manufacturing sector, where impact of government policy is most quickly felt and wherein exists the high-technology industries. Management Methods The scientific and technological developments resulting from space research and development expenditures are not the only contributors to growth. Also contributing to the productivity increase in both the private and public sectors are the newly developed management techniques and methods. An entirely new order of management capability has been developed to meet the 4-39 stringent requirements of the space program. The need to coordinate and manage the effort of tens of thousands of private and government entities made it necessary to create advanced management systems capable of assuring the success of missions requiring high levels of hardware reliability. This was done despite the limited budgets and tight schedules. Now this management capability is finding its way into the private sector as well as in state and local governments. An example is the highly efficient integrated regional and national commodity distribution system recently developed by a large, diversified, manufacturing company. This system had its genesis in logistics supply systems developed to support Air Force missiles. Later it was modified to meet space program needs. Another example is the widespread use of manage- ment systems based on system engineering techniques first developed and used in military and space programs. Planning and budgeting based on this approach, for example, is widespread, ranging from the unified school district of Torrance, California, to the government of the State of New York. Large complex programs like the Shuttle push out the frontiers of management techniques just as they extend the frontiers of science. And just like science and technology, these management techniques are transferred to other uses and contribute to productivity and growth. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER The MRI study provided an undergirding to its findings on the economic effects of NASA's research and development by describing the extremely complex process whereby space technology is developed and commercially applied. It demonstrated that such a process indeed exists and that NASA, as a mission-oriented research and development agency, plays a key role in the application. Unlike many military and industrial research activities where secrecy is paramount, NASA has made the developments achieved during the space program a part of the public domain. One effective technique for this has been the Technology Utilization (TU) program. The SD 73-CE-0002 § program has established a network of regional dissemination centers staffed with specialists to assist small business without large engineering staffs. Development details and extensive supporting information have been published in the form of thousands of Tech Briefs, hundreds of Technical Support Packages, and numerous compilations, Special publications have been prepared and published concerning surveys, handbooks, and the use of NASA technology in areas such as fire safety, biomedical instrumentation, and cryogenics. Figure 4-42 summarizes some of the TU activity for the period 1964 to 1972. Note the almost exponential increase in the number of requests for information on new technology from the public. Perhaps of more lasting and fundamental overall benefit to society from technology transfer will be what might be termed the second-generation developments. Second-generation developments bear little relationship to the technology that spawned them. They are accomplished by industry using space-developed technology to modify old products, create new products, and even develop entirely new industries. That this fundamental transfer process works has been demonstrated time and again within the industry. One of the chief reasons for the 1967 merger of North American Aviation, Inc., and the Rockwell Standard Corporation to form Rockwell International Corporation was to take advantage of the potential aerospace technology applications to the non-aerospace markets served by Rockwell Standard. This required developing an effective technology transfer mechanism. Proof that such a mechanism exists, and indeed, that technology transfer works, lies in the hundreds of recorded intra-corporate interactions that have taken place in materials and processes, electronics, and other disciplines. Electronically controlled knitting machines, an electronic brake control system, high- temperature lubricants, welding and nondestructive test equipment, earth resource measurement and evaluation techniques—all were developed from our aerospace activities and are now being applied commercially. And these are but a few examples. Our management never wavered from the belief that the advanced technology inherent 4-40 5000ſ 100,000T 4500 H. 90,000 H. 4000H. 80,000H- 3500- 70,000 3000 H. 60,000 2500 H. 50,000 2000H. 40,000 15ook 30,000 1000H 20,000 500 d 10,000 O oº:::::::::::::::::::: 71 72 REOUESTS FOR TU INFORMATION FROM THE PUBLIC 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 REPORTS OF NEW TECHNOLOGY FROM CONTRACTORS AND NASA CENTERS Figure 4-42. NASA Technology Utilization Programs, 1964 to 1972 in the aerospace industry can be successfully transferred to organiza- tions serving the commercial market place. After more than five years of concerted effort, we have learned many lessons. We have recognized that commercialization of advanced technology does not occur overnight or without some re-education of both the technology-conscious engineer and the market-oriented commercial product manager. Most important, however, we have learned that technology transfer will work. SD 73-CE-0002 § In one sense, Rockwell International serves as a microcosm of the economy—developing an effective transfer mechanism and using the mechanism to feed technologies from its aerospace activities to the industrial elements of the corporation. This is a process taking place more and more as the nation's scientific and technical knowledge reservoir is fed from the space undertakings of NASA. The large body of knowledge accumulated in the process of satisfying mission-oriented program requirements is retained for use by others for nonspace applications. Just as NASA has developed procedures to ensure that this knowledge is added to the nation's knowledge bank for withdrawal when the technology can be applied, so have mechanisms been built within companies and between companies to aid and foster the transfer process. We believe the Shuttle program will provide a technology base that will permit the continued operation of this process to the ultimate benefit of society as a whole. FOREIGN TRADE IMPACT In 1971, the United States experienced a negative balance of trade for the first time in this century. The deficit was even greater in 1972, approximating $6 billion. In recent years there has been a general deterioration of the trade balance as the growth of imports has exceeded the rate at which exports have grown. The current deficits are a result. A disturbing aspect of this trend is the softening of our position with respect to technology-intensive products where, in the past, the U.S. succeeded in maintaining a favorable balance large enough to offset deficits in other categories. Imports of high- technology products now are about two-thirds of U.S. exports of this commodity class, compared to only one-fourth in 1960. And the softening is occurring in nearly all of the specific commodities making up the technology-intensive category. It can be seen from Figure 4-43 that although both the agricultural and the technology-intensive balances are traditionally positive, the latter plays the major role in offsetting the negative 4–41 Billion US $ 1 O - - ~555- M- $8.3 s W 7 "Technology-Intensive" Manufactured Products s — J. H.- 2 - d Agricultural Products $1.9 $ 1 1 - $1.5 O $1 6 Minerals, Unprocessed Fuels, - 2 and other Raw Materials - 4 -$4.1 - 6 "Nontechnology-intensive' Manufactured Products • 8 – -$8.3 1 O l | | l | l | | 1962 64 . 66 68 7O SOURCES: The U.S. in the Changing World Economy, Volume I December 27, 1971, U.S. Government Printing Office U.S. Department of Commerce Figure 4-43. U.S. Trade Balance Trends balances in the other two categories. It so happened that in 1971 we sustained a downturn in our balance of high-technology commodities while at the same time experiencing significant $2.1 billion and $1.6 billion increases, respectively, in the negative balances of low- technology manufactured goods and raw materials. Deficits in these categories were even greater in 1972. To offset these trends, we must widen the gap between the exports and imports of technology-intensive products. SD 73–CE-0002 QN) ~I bº) The causes of our current trade balance problem are complex. They include rising costs and lagging productivity rates vis-a-vis competing nations. But the fundamental cause focuses on the role of technology. The ability of the United States to maintain a favorable trade balance depends largely on the pace of technological development. There is a high correlation between an industry’s research and development spending and its trade position. Our trade patterns show that new industries, or highly innovative older industries that constantly generate new products, are net exporters; whereas older industries, or those with few new products to offer, suffer from growing import competition. The solutions to the problem of negative trade balances are, like its causes, many and complex. But fundamentally they must include the strengthening of our domestic economy through measures that encourage stability and improved productivity and the enlarging of the areas of our comparative advantage in trade with the rest of the world by concentrating on the things we do best. The key is technology. Improvement in our international competitiveness requires that we encourage technology advancement, for technology fosters innovation and constitutes the major single source of increased productivity rates. It was previously stressed that space research and development is an exceptionally stimulative economic activity because of its technology leverage. The higher economic effects of space R&D come about because NASA allocates its resources to the more technologically-intensive industrial sectors. The high technology industries upon which we depend for a favorable trade balance are the very ones that are the primary recipients of space R&D spending and the leading contributors to the space program. The Space Shuttle program is unique in that it will contribute to our foreign trade posture and help solve our adverse balance of payments problems in two ways. As discussed, one method is by stimulating the high-technology producers. In the long run, this is 4-42 probably the most important way. But there is a second method. This is by affording the United States the opportunity to become the world space launch and service center, providing launching and in-orbit maintenance of spacecraft owned and operate; by other Iſlation.S. / - -- In anticipation of the major international role to be played by the Space Shuttle, on October 9, 1972, the President enunciated a specific policy for space launchings whereby the United States will provide launch assistance to other countries and international organizations for peaceful satellite projects. The policy stresses that launches will be provided on a nondiscriminatory, reimbursable basis. With the ability of the Shuttle to provide launch services at lower costs and, indeed, to offer orbital maintenance services never before available, the already large participation of foreign countries with the United States in space exploration should markedly increase. It is likely that some of the European nations will have the most extensive involvement in the Shuttle program. Evidence of this is an announcement in January, 1973, by the European Space Research Organization (ESRO) that it had agreed to establish a special project to develop a sortie laboratory to fly with the Space Shuttle in the 1980's. The sortie laboratory will be carried into orbit in the payload bay of the Shuttle orbiter and will remain attached to the Shuttle throughout the mission. Assuming that detail cost studies confirm the general validity of current cost estimates, it can be expected that ESRO will continue through final design and development of the sortie laboratory. Certainly, this activity foretells major involvement in the Shuttle program by several European nations, including use of the Shuttle for launch and maintenance services. It can be seen from the foregoing that both policy and precedent exist for use of American launch systems in placing foreign satellites into orbit. With the advent of less expensive launch services to be offered by the Space Shuttle, it is reasonable to expect other nations to increase their use of U.S. launch services, especially if the SD 73-CE-0002 § European space community decides against development of EUROPA III or a similar launch system. Revenues derived from these launch services and those from orbital maintenance services will be positive factors in our balance of payments picture. Similarly, one should recognize that by offering reduced transportation costs, i.e., lower costs per pound of payload in orbit, the Space Shuttle will permit a higher percentage of the space R&D dollar to be used for scientific and earth applications payloads. Development of these payloads can, in their own right, positively influence the balance of payments—indirectly by stimulating high technology industries and directly by the sale of the payload hardware, or the services of the hardware, to foreign countries. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION Over the past decade the United States has made significant strides in international space cooperation. The National Aeronautics and Space Act of July 29, 1958, charges NASA with conducting its aeronautical and space activities so as to contribute materially to “cooperation...with other nations and groups of nations in work done pursuant to this act and in the peaceful application of the results thereof....” Implementation of this act has resulted in a wide number of cooperative projects and associations with other nations. Figure 4-44 shows that as of January 1, 1972, there were 87 countries of the world already cooperating with the U.S. in some form with respect to space activities. This included 20 countries involved with us in flight projects and 80 countries involved in ground-based projects. The total was maintained in 1972, and it may be expanded by Soviet-bloc nations as a result of the joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP). The Space Shuttle program will provide a bridge for even greater international cooperation, particularly in development of major hardware and in cooperation during the operational phase. One of the aims of the Shuttle program is to encourage international participation in space. As the President said in his January 5, 1972, statement on Shuttle: 4–43 To January 1, 1972 Iotal Countries which Hove Entered into AGREEMENTS] 39* • Cooperative Project Agreemert. 28 Countries** • Irocking ond Doto Acquisition Agreements ----------------------------- 22 Countries |ſolo Countries in which Scientists Participate in Cooperative ASSOCATIONS --------------------- 87° 84 Countries** • Ground-Based Programs • Personnel Exchanges 40 Countries** |Total Countries” COOPERATING IN SOME FORM with U.S. (NASA) --------------------------- 87° * Duplications Eliminated ** includes European Space Research Organization (ESRO) (SOURCE: Office of laternational Affairs, National Aeronovtics and Space Administration) Figure 4-44. Selected Cumulative Statistics on NASA International Space Activities “Views of the earth from space have shown us how small and fragile our home planet truly is. We are learning the imperative of universal brotherhood and global ecology—learning to think and act as guardians of one tiny blue and green island in the trackless oceans of the universe. This new program will give more people more access to the liberating perspectives of space, even as it extends our ability to cope with physical challenges of earth and broadens our opportunities for international cooperation in low-cost, multipurpose space missions.” In addition to the cooperation involved in providing launch assistance to other countries and international organizations, cooperative programs in development of Shuttle payloads and participation in Shuttle missions can be realized. The interest expressed by ESRO in developing a sortie laboratory to fly with the Space Shuttle in the 1980's is an excellent example. Other likely cooperative projects are earth resource surveys, aircraft and shipping navigation, communications, weather watch and forecasts, and space exploration. SD 73-CE-0002 § In our testimony before this subcommittee last year we pointed out that the United States certainly will be one of the chief beneficiaries of these cooperative activities. We continue to hold that belief. The potential benefits to this nation fall into three main areas. First are the economic benefits from such things as an improved balance of payments as we “export” Shuttle services; an expanded mission base as a result of foreign missions and payloads; and cheaper world communications. Second are benefits in the technological and scientific areas from technology exchanges between the United States and foreign engineers and scientists and new technology and scientific findings resulting from foreign missions and payloads. Such technical exchanges will in many instances eliminate duplication of projects between nations and thus provide for a more efficient use of TeSOUllſ CeS. - The third main area is political benefits derived from various nations working together for a common goal. The continued open and peaceful nature of the United States space program will enhance the United States' role of world leadership for peace. The Space Shuttle will afford this country unique opportunities to expand international cooperation. By spreading the benefits of space technology and space capability and by employing the talent and skills of many countries, we will surely contribute to a more stable world order. Vital to meeting the future socio-economic needs of our nation is an increase in the rate of productivity and economic growth. Technology is the single most important key to achieving this growth, and the rate of technology advance depends largely on the level of R&D activity. The exceptionally high economic effects produced by space R&D should, therefore, be of particular interest to the American people. In the United States, the advance of technology has been slowing, and we have already felt the deleterious effects. Last year we quoted the words of Peter G. Peterson in our testimony before SUMMARY *Peterson, Peter G. The U.S. in a Changing World Economy (December 1971). 4-44 this subcommittee because we felt they eloquently captured the essence of the problem and outlined a logical approach toward its solution. We feel they bear repeating: - “In seeking a new, more open and fair environment for American exports...our preferred alternative is to meet head on the essential—if demanding—task of improving our productivity and our competitiveness in an increasingly competitive world, to seize the initiative in designing a new, comprehensive program designed to build on America's strengths and to encourage a competitive world trading system with the confidence that comes from having a sense of our future. “The basis for this confidence must be a strong domestic economy, characterized by increased investment in our economic future—particularly in new plant and equipment—and stimulated by new programs directed toward drawing forth the technological advances which will both increase our international competitiveness and help our society fulfill its promise of a better life and productive work for its citizens.” A viable space program is an excellent means of advancing technological progress and favorably impacting the American economy. We particularly urge continued support of the Space Shuttle program. The Shuttle's contributions will be multi-faceted. As a cost-effective, reusable transportation system, it will reduce the costs of transporting payloads into space and free more funds to improve the numbers and capabilities of these payloads to serve the needs of mankind. It will also contribute to the advancement of technology and thereby stimulate economic activity, and it will directly and indirectly contribute favorably to our balance of payments position. Finally, the Space Shuttle is uniquely suited to play an important role in promoting international cooperation and good will. In short, as we stated in our testimony last year, “we think it (the Space Shuttle program) is a good and sound—indeed, an excellent investment—which is in the best interests of all the American people.” - SD 73-CE-0002 375 [Amplification of testimony by Rockwell International officials to Manned Space Flight Subcommittee on March 7 and 23, 1973:] APRIL 9, 1973. Hon. Don FUQUA, Chairman, Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, Committee on Science and Astro- nautics, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The enclosed data is submitted in response to questions raised during the hearings of your subcommittee with Rockwell International. Some of the questions were raised on March 7, 1973 in Washington D.C. and others on March 23, 1973 while your subcommittee was at Downey. The principle points dealt with the details of the Shuttle Orbiter and Shuttle main engine sub- contracting plan and anticipated Shuttle-related employment. If we can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to call upon us. Yours truly, * JAMES F. MADEw ELL, Director, Shuttle Applications. SHUTTLE ORBITER SUBCONTRACTING The Shuttle orbiter make-or-buy program was developed during the prime contract proposal period and maintained after contract award. It is structured to yield maximim technological, economical, and schedule benefits through opti- mum distribution of hardware requirements between company make and outside Sources. The Shuttle make-or-buy program provides the basis for a potentially wide geographical distribution of Shuttle program dollars. Table 1 reflects the established Shuttle make-or-buy program elements and shows the Space Division of Rockwell International effort versus the potential major subcontracts. TABLE 1.-ORBITER MAKE-OR-BUY DISTRIBUTION Element Make Buy Structures: Mid-fuselage--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X ing---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X Vertical stabilizer----------------------------------------------------------------------------- X Forward fuselage------------------------------------------------------------------- X At fuselage------------------------------------------------------------------------ X Final assembly, installation, and checkout---------------------------------------------- X Structural subsystems: * reusable surface insulation (RSÍ)—thermal protection system-------------------- X S). Low-temperature RSl—TPS-------------------------------------------------------------------- X Leading edge structural subsystem/reinforced carbon/carbon—TPS---------------------------------- X Manipulator subsystem------------------------------------------------------------------------ X Mechanical and electrical power: fuel cells------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ X Cryogenic storage subsystem------------------------------------------------------------------- X Auxiliary power unit-------------------------------------------------------------------------- X Propulsion: Reaction control subsystem (RCS) engines------------------------------------------------------- X RCS modulºs--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X R98 tanks------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ X Orbiter maneuvering subsystem (OMS) engines--------------------------------------------------- X OMS pod and tank assembly------------------------------------------------------------------- X Air-breathing engine structural module.------------------------------------------------ X Air-breathing engine macelle and pylon---------------------------------------------------------- X Avionics: Flight control system-------------------------------------------------------------------------- X Software add data processing peripheral equipment------------------------------------------------ X Computer------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ X Environmental life support: Environmental control subsystem--------------------------------------------------------------- X Food management subsystem------------------------------------------------------------------- X Waste management subsystem------------------------------------------------------------------ X Space radiator subsystem---------------------------------------------------------------------- X Ground maintenance and operations support: Ground maintenance and operations support----------------- X 376 Since the award of the Shuttle orbiter prime contract, the Space Division has awarded subcontracts currently amounting to $14,379,891. Table 2 represents the subcontractors (ordered chronologically), the dollar value, and a description of the work being performed. Subcontracts were awarded to McDonnell Douglas and Grumman Aerospace for engineering level-of-effort support to minimize an early buildup and temporary peaking of Space Division engineering personnel and to optimize use of knowledgeable technical personnel from Shuttle program competitors. - TABLE 2.--SHUTTLE ORBITER SUBCONTRACTS AWARDED Supplier/location Current value Description Intermetrics: Cambridge, Mass--- $1,147,012 Develop and generate high order language and associated compiler. McDonnell Douglas: St. Louis, Mo- 3,520,000 Perform aeroflight simulation studies and provide on-call engineering services to support shuttle design. - - Grumman Aerospace: Bethpage, 5,557, 825 Design and fabricate wind tunnel models and provide On-Call engineer- - - - ing services to support shuttle design and RSI study. - Honeywell, Inc.: St. Petersburg, 1,974,920 Establish flight control system, requirements to be converted into Fia. procurement specification and perform studies of alternate ascent Control concepts. | BM: Oswego, N.Y ------------- 923, 214 Define system requirements in data processing and software for vehicle and overall system analysis. * - - - - - American Airlines: Tulsa, Okla - - - 873,066 Support SD engineering in areas of vehicle maintainability, main- tenance engineering, and planning. TRW: Redondo Beach, Calif______ 95,000 Perform radiation survivability study. . . wº º º Associates: Long 5,760 5,000 kwa power distribution system—Building 288. each, Calif. R. &#. Associates: Long Beach, 17, 350 Equipment cooling and structural testing lab–Building 288. 3||ſ. Deardorff, Babayan & Pappas: 1,730 Sheet metal fabrication shop—Building 001. San Marino, Calif. A. C. Martin & Associates: Los 250,714 Final assembly, Palmdale—Building 294. Angeles, Calif. º & Helin, Inc.: Burbank, 13, 300 HVAC Phase III—Building 001. alif. In addition, on 29 March 1973, source selections were announced totaling more than $140 million for the design and fabrication of major orbiter structural com- ponents (see attached news release, Enclosure 2). Detailed subcontractor terms are being negotiated with four firms with awards scheduled for 20 April 1973. Currently, the Space Division is engaged in selecting sources for major and other significand procurements. Proposals have been requested, received, and are being evaluated for the high-temperature reusable surface insulation (HRSI). Proposals for the leading edge structural subsystem are due for receipt April 20, 1973. Table 3 recaps the solicited sources by major subsystem, the source selection, and the status of the source selections in process. The Space Division procurement plan for the remaining major and other signif- icant procurements gives prime consideration to scheduling subcontracts to meet Orbiter assembly and test requirements, but at the same time allows for constraints On program annual funding. Where major subcontractors must participate in early Space Division engineering design activities, procurements are phased for careful control of initial engineering support levels and for the start of full hardware activities. Table 4 shows the subcontract award plan, which is in accordance with current program milestones and the subcontracts Space Division has issued to date. Major procurements represent over a billion dollars of subcontracting planned for the early phase of the Shuttle program. Space Division is working closely with NASA in planning and maintaining visibility on the geographic distribution of Shuttle program funds, including offsite work. We have made a concerted effort to identify aerospace capabilities related to Shuttle requirements in all regions. Extensive bidder development efforts have resulted in a wide potential geographic participation as well as a competitive environment for major and significant Shuttle procurement. Procurement planning for the Shuttle program has considered small and minor- ity-owned businesses. Our Small Business Administration program has been approved, and a minority-business enterprise plan we developed for the Shuttle program has been approved by NASA. In the last six months, the Space Division has placed 185 orders with minority business enterprises for a total of $334,618, and 142 minority suppliers have been identified in the supplier library. 377 TABLE 3.−SHUTTLE ORBITER SOURCE SELECTIONS IN PROCESS Subsystem Solicited sources Status Wing-------------------- Boeing, Seattle, Wash., Grumman, Bethpage, Source selection presentation to NASA N.Y., McDonnell Douglas, St. Louis, Mo., Fair- on Mar. 6, 1973. Source selection child Industries, Farmingdale, N.Y., General announced Mar. 29, 1973. Authority Dynamics, Fort Worth, Tex., Lockheed, Bur- to proceed planned Apr. 20, 1973. bank, Calif., Northrop, Hawthorne, Calif., Mar- tin Marietta, Denver, Colo., and Avco Aero- & structures, Nashville, Tenn. Mid fuselage------------- Boeing, Seattle, Wash., Fairchild, Industries, D0. Farmingdale, N.Y., Lockheed, Burbank, Calif., McDonnell, Douglas, St. Louis, Mo., Vought Aero., Dallas, Tex., General Dynamics, San Diego, Calif., Grumman, Bethpage, L.I., N.Y., Martin Marietta, Denver, Colo., Northrop, Haw- thorne, Calif., and Avco Aerostructures, Nash- - * ville, Tenn. Vertical stabilizer--------- Beech Aircraft, Wichita, Kans., Vought Aero., D0. Dallas, Tex., Martin Marietta, Denver, Colo., Cessna Aircraft, Wichita, Kans., Fairchild in- dustries, Farmingdale, N.Y., Lockheed, Bur- bank, Calif., Kaman Aerospace, Bloomfield, Conn., Boeing, Seattle, Wash., McDonnell Douglas, St. Louis, Mo., Rohr Corp., Chula Vista, Calif., General Dynamics, San Diego, Calif., Grumman, Bethpage, N.Y., Aeronca, Middle- town, Ohio, and Avco Aerostructures, Nash- e º ville, Tenn. - Orbiter maneuvering sub- Aerojet General, Sacramento, Calif., Boeing, Seat- Source selection presentation to NASA system pod and tank as- tie, Wash., Grumman, Bethpage, N.Y., McDonnell on Mar. 12, 1973. Source selection sembly. Douglas, St. Louis, Mo., Aeronutronics Division, announced Mar. 29, 1973. Authority Newport Beach, Calif., Rohr, Chula Vista, Calif., to proceed planned Apr. 20, 1973. Bell Aerosystems, Buffalo, N.Y., General º, namics, San Diego, Calif., Lockheed Missile, Sunnyvale, Calif., Martin Marietta, Denver, Colo., TRW Systems, Redondo Beach, Calif., g and Teledyne-Neosho, Neosho, Mo. & High-temperature reusable General Electric, Philadelphia, Pa., Lockheed- Source selection presentation to NASA surface insulation. Calif., Sunnyvale, Calif., AWC0, Lowell, Mass., planned May 2, 1973. Authority to and Martin Marietta, Denver, Colo. proceed planned May 17, 1973. Leading edge structural AVCO, Lowell, Mass., LTV Aerospace, Dallas, Tex., Source selection presentation to NASA subsystem. and McDonnell Douglas, St. Louis, Mo. planned June 6, 1973. Authority to * proceed planned June 19, 1973. Windows----------------- Actron Industries, Monrovia, Calif., Goodyear Authority to proceed planned May 4, Aerospace, Litchfield, Ariz., PPG Industries, 1973. Huntsville, Ala., Corning Glass Works, Corning, Y., Libby Owens, Brackenridge, Pa., and Teledyne Camera, Arcadia, Calif. Atmospheric revitalization AiResearch, Torrance, Calif., Hamilton-Standard, Source selection presentation to NASA and orbiter freon coolant Windsor Locks, Conn., General Electric, King of planned June 15, 1973. Authority to loop. Prussia, Pa., Fairchild Stratos, Manhattan proceed planned July 2, 1973. Beach, Calif., and Vought Systems, Grand Prairie, Tex. (freon coolant loop only). e Computer---------------- IBM, Owego, N.Y., RCA, Burlington, Mass., CDC, Source selection presentation to NASA Minneapolis, Minn., Singer Kearfott, Little planned June 27, 1973. Authority to Falls, N.J., Raytheon, Sudbury, Mass., and proceed planned Aug. 1, 1973. General Electric, Lynn, Mass. 1 Selected source. TABLE 4.—SHUTTLE ORBITER SUBCONTRACT PLANNING Authority to proceed dates 1 Major subcontract items ($10,000,000 or more) Level of effort Hardware LOW temperature reusable surface insulation____ * * * * * * * * * * * * * = ma º mº º m s as * = * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * July 25, 1973 Manipulator subsystem------------------------------------------------------------------------- May 1, 1975 f**------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Sept. 1, 1973 Cryogenic storage subsystem-------------------------------------------------------------------- Nov. 1, 1973 Auxiliary Power unit---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Jan. 2, 1974 Reaction control subsystem (RCS) engines--------------------------------------------------------- Nov. 1, 1973 RCS modules (aft and forward)------------------------------------------------------------------ D0, **------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- D0. Orbiter maneuvering subsystem engines---------------------------------------------------------- Oct. 1, 1973 Air breathing engine nacelle and pylon----------------------------------------------------------- Feb. 1, 1974 Flight control System—Honeywell-------- -------------------------------------- Feb. 5, 1973 (A)--- Oct. 1, 1973 Software and data processing peripheral equipment—IBM ------------------------ Mar. 5, 1973 (A)--- July 1, 1973 Atmospheric supply and pressure control-l-l----------------------------------------------------- Oct. 1, 1973 Footnotes at end of table. 378 TABLE 4.—SHUTTLE ORBITER SUBCONTRACT PLANNING—Continued Authority to proceed dates 1 Major subcontract items ($10,000,000 or more) Level of effort Hardware Food management subsystem-------------------------------------------------------------------- Dec. 1, 1973 Waste management subsystem------------------------------------------------------------------- DO. Space radiator subsystem----------------------------------------------------------------------- Jan. 2, 1974 Main propulsion components (feed lines, disconnects, prevalves)------------------------------------- Sept. 1, 1973 Pressure relief module (Type 1 02 and H2)-------------------------------------------------------- Nov. 1, 1973 Hydrazine tank-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- D0. Communication and tracking (TACAN, antennas, CCTV, transceiver)---------------------------------- Jan. 1, 1974 Displays and controls--------------------------------------------------------------------------- D0. Operational instrumentation--------------------------------------------------------------------- Nov. 1, 1973 Development flight instrumentation (transducer and PCM)------------------------------------------ Aug. 1, 1973 Inverters (electrical power distribution and control)------------------------------------------------ Feb. 1, 1975 Crew seats and harness (crew provisions and accommodations)-------------------------------------- Sept. 1, 1974 Ejection Seats and harness (crew provisions and accommodations)----------------------------------- Apr. 1, 1974 Main and nose gear strut------------------------------------------------------------------------ Oct. 1, 1973 Deceleration system (jettison actuator)----------------------------------------------------------- Apr. 1, 1974 Docking mechanism (seals)---------------------------------------------------------------------- Jan. 2, 1975 Payload bay door actuation system--------------------------------------------------------------- Mar. 1, 1974 Space radiator panel deploy and latch system------------------------------------------------------ D0. Main engine TVC gimbal actuator---------------------------------------------------------------- Nov. 1, 1973 Subsystem sequence controller------------------------------------------------------------------ July 1, 1974 Electrical power distribution control (MPS engine interface unit) ------------------------------------- May 3, 1974 1 Scheduled ATP dates are based on Orbiter Master program schedule 01, rev. 5, and are currently being replanned in º: yº program schedule option Mar. 3, 1973. = ACIII.3}. SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE PROCUREMENTS The Rocketdyne Division of Rockwell International Corporation has made purchases for the Space Shuttle main engine program in 29 states (Table 5). Rocketdyne's purchases of more than $100,000 for the Shuttle engine program are listed in Table 6. TABLE 5.—Rocketdyne SSME Procurements (April 1, 1972 through March 1, 1978) DISTRIBUTION BY STATE More than $1,000,000: Indiana. California. Iowa. Florida. Kansas. Minnesota. Louisiana. More than $100,000: Maryland. Massachusetts. Michigan. Oregon. Missouri. Pennsylvania. Nevada. Texas. New Jersey. Wisconsin. New York. Less than $100,000: North Carolina. Arizona. Ohio. Colorado. Rhode Island. Connecticut. Vermont. Delaware. Washington. Illinois. West Virginia. TABLE 6.-Individual purchase orders of more than $100,000 Supplier: P. O. value S & Q Construction Co., San Francisco, Calif- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - $245, 833 Sechrist & Kelly Construction Co., Paramount, Calif____ _ _ _ _ _ _ 464, 560 Narco Steel Corp., Paramount, Calif.------------------------ 586, 436 S & Q Construction Co., San Francisco, Calif- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 107,926 Westmont Industries, Santa Fe Springs, Calif.---------------- 129,471 Gray Tool Co., Houston, Tex------------------------------ 154, 547 Bovee & Crail Construction Co., Paramount, Calif.------------ 2, 577, 351 Bechtel Corp., Norwalk, Calif.------------------------------ 1,300. 135 379 TABLE 6.-Individual purchase orders of more than $100,000—Continued Supplier—Continued P. O. value Honeywell, Inc., Minneapolis, Minn., and St. Petersburg, Fla-___$10,000, 000 Hydraulic Research & Manufacturers Co., Valencia, Calif.------- 1, 799, 574 Arcturus Manufacturer Corp., Oxnard, Calif.----------------- 223, 053 Industrial Tectonics, Inc., Compton, Calif.------------------- 138,472 Masoneilan International, Inc., Montebello, Calif____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 185, 267 Masoneilan International, Inc., Montebello, Calif._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 144, 546 Masoneilan International, Inc., Montebello, Calif._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 270, 710 Masoneilan International, Inc., Montebello, Calif-___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 326,084 Wyman-Gordon Co., Sherman Oaks, Calif-__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 118, 194 Grove Valve and Regulator Co., Oakland, Calif.-------------- 172, 200 Statham Instruments, Inc., Oxnard, Calif- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 103, 326 Wyman-Gordon Co., Sherman Oaks, Calif__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 107, 550 Gray Tool Co., Houston, Tex.----------------------------- 104, 262 Statham Instruments, Inc., Oxnard, Calif- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 128,430 Hoefner Corp., South El Monte, Calif.----------------------- 125, 206 Paragon Precision Products, Pacoima, Calif.------------------ 333, 792 Wisconsin Centrifugal, Inc., Waukesha, Wis_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 350, 219 Excel Pattern Works, Los Angeles, Calif.--------------------- 118, 500 Lox Equipment Co., Livermore, Calif.----------------------- 232, 388 EFCO Systems, Inc., Canoga Park, Calif.-------------------- 153, 197 Smith Crane & Rigging Co., Los Angeles, Calif.--------------- 284, 669 Luscombe Electric, Thousand Oaks, Calif.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 244, 200 Scott Company of California, Compton, Calif.---------------- 121, 646 SPACE SHUTTLE EMPLOYMENT In Mr. Bergen’s testimony of March 7, 1973, he stated that during the 1970's the combined total of primary and secondary employment created by the Space Shuttle is expected to exceed 750,000 man-years. This translates into an average of slightly more than 90,000 jobs in the 1974–1980 period, and approximately 126,000 jobs in the peak year. More than 50,000 of the 126,000 jobs in the peak year will be directly related to the program, i.e., the aerospace jobs resulting from the prime and major subcontract awards. When these contractors spend their contract dollars for materials, plants, and equipment—and their employees spend their wages and salaries on consumer goods and services—additional jobs are created. Our studies show that for every direct Shuttle job, about 1.5 additional jobs are created. These are primarily the jobs created in the community as a result of increased demand resulting from the multiplier effects of the direct Shuttle expenditures. Thus, there will be more than 75,000 secondary or indirect jobs in the peak year in addition to the direct jobs. The value that can be placed on the total number of direct and indirect jobs is difficult to ascertain because of the variety of jobs in the overall job mix and the unknown wage and salary levels during the rest of the decade. But assuming the average annual income of the job holder is $10,000, the 750,000 man-years of ºnent will generate $7.5 billion in personal income in the form of wages and Sala,T16S. Four FIRMs Aw ARDED SUBCONTRACTS FOR SPACE SHUTTLE WORK Down Ey, CALIF., March 29, 1973.−Four subcontracts totaling more than $140 million for the design and fabrication of major structural components for the Space Shuttle orbiter were awarded today by Rockwell International Corpora- tion’s Space Division. Selected to do the work and approximate dollar values of the seven-year sub- COntracts were: - Fairchild Republic Division of Fairchild Industries, Inc., Farmingdale, Long Island, N.Y., $13 million, vertical tail; Grumman Aerospace Corp., Bethpage, Long Island, N.Y., $40 million, wing; Convair Aerospace Division of General Dynamics, San Diego, Calif., $40 million, mid-fuselage; and McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company-East, St. Louis, Mo., $50 million, orbital manuevering system. 380 Detailed terms of the agreements are being negotiated with the four firms. Rockwell International’s Space Division is prime contractor for the develop- ment of the shuttle orbiter to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. In addition, the division is responsible for integrating the complete system. Work on the components will be done in two phases. Initially, the four companies will support Space Division in the preliminary design and preparation of defini- tive specifications, while the second phase includes design and fabrication of hardware. The orbiter's vertical tail, awarded to Fairchild, will be conventional aircraft structure and will include a rudder speed brake assembly. It will have a modified, swept triangle shape, and will be about 26 feet high and 22 feet long at its base. The orbiter wing, to be developed by Grumman, will have a “double delta” design—an intial 75-degree sweep from the fuselage and then a 45-degree sweep leading to the tip. The wing will be made in two panels having a total of approxi- mately 2,100 square feet of surface and a combined weight of about 14,000 pounds. Each wing panel will measure some 34 feet from tip to fuselage, and will be about 62 feet wide where it joings the fuselage. Weighing about 12,400 pounds, the orbiter mid-fuselage section will be approxi- mately 62 feet long, 17 feet wide, and 13 feet high. Awarded to Convair, it forms the payload bay section of the orbiter, which will be 60 feet long and 15 feet in diameter. The orbital maneuvering system, awarded to McDonnell Douglas, aids the shuttle’s payload-carrying orbiter in performing orbital circularization and change, rendezvous and deorbit maneuvers in space. The system has two 6,000-pound thrust engines and is housed in two pods—or covers located one on each side of the Orbiter’s aft fuselage section. The work includes the propellant gauging, pressuri- zation and distribution subsystems, and the pods which will house the system. The Space Shuttle will be the nation’s first reusable space vehicle. Goal of the program is to develop a workhorse system that will meet the space needs of the nation over the coming decades at a considerable savings over today’s costs. Rockwell International’s Space Division expects to have as many as 10,000 Subcontractor and supplier firms across the nation participating with it on the shuttle program. Potential companies have been identified in almost every state. Rockwell International, a major multi-industry company, is a leading manu- facturer in five principal market areas: automotive, aerospace, electronics, in- dustrial products, and utility and consumer products. It has strengths in research, development and systems engineering, and a growing position in a number of emerging industries. Mr. Fuqua. We will now hear from Mr. Chester Lee, program director of the Apollo Soyuz Test. Mr. Lee, we are happy to have you and will you now proceed. STATEMENT OF CHESTER M. LEE, PROGRAM DIRECTOR, APOLLO SOYUZ TEST PROJECT, OFFICE OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, NASA Mr. LEE. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the Apollo Soyuz Test Project with you today. As Dale Myers said in his opening statement to this committee, “The ASTP Mission will be an undertaking of unique character . . . and is the most ambitious bi-national space project so far.” The primary objective of the Apollo Soyuz Test Project is to conduct a joint U.S.–U.S.S.R. earth orbital mission to test technical solutions for creating compatible docking systems, which can be used inter- nationally for docking future manned spacecraft and stations. . A way of placing the objective of this project into perspective is to look at it in the context of cooperative activities with the U.S.S.R. Future manned vehicles of both countries will be designed with com- patible equipment for rendezvous and docking. This enhances the 381 safety of astronauts and cosmonauts of both countries in earth orbit flight, and also permits the consideration of planned cooperative exercises in space. In this context, the Apollo Soyuz Test Project is an early test of designs of the equipment needed to achieve this goal. It will include testing a rendezvous system in orbit, testing of universal docking assemblies, verifying techniques for transfer of astronauts and cos- monauts, performing experiments and other appropriate joint crew activities while in docked flight. An important achievement will be the gaining of experience in conducting joint flights by U.S. and U.S.S.R. spacecraft, including the ability to render aid in emergency situations. Thus, I view ASTP as an important step toward future cooperation in space between nations of the world. The planned mission profile as shown on this viewgraph begins with the launch of the Soyuz. The Soyuz spacecraft has been the primary manned vehicle for the U.S.S.R. space program since it was introduced in 1967. It consists of an orbital module, a descent module, and an instrument unit. (MA72–6820) APOLL0/SOYUZ TEST PROJECT MISSION PROFILE ~ BEGOA. HA OPEMTy • COOSA" 5|{OBO'. A BtºBOA. HA º: SOYUI OPEMTy CTb3+OBHA ORBIT *An Oſlſolº A* Docking Docking SEPARATION INSERTIOR TESTS APOLLO G#. D.Cºe APOLLO OTſle ſle HVAR – ºr —º. DEORBIT cxon c OPEMTH HOPAE na "And Juſ CH* SOYUZ DEORBIT pocked operations 2 DAYS PASOT A B COCTbºob Dºłh DPſ COCTORHWVA APOLL0 ACTIVE | RE:{DEZWOUS - s 1 DAY CB ſyſkEHME h AHI ABHOTO Gº • And ſindh A" - - Laue– _T SOYUZ RECOVERY _T USSR Cſia CEHME ºem • And nſloh" t MISSION PROFILE CnACEHWE ãº, ºft nPoewne noneta Kºłº TMxMW OHEAH C'ſ APT LAUNCH • CORG3 APOLLO RECOVERY º CTAPT * CCCP PACIFIC OCEAN CD:03 HOPAE J18 *And nnDH" NASA HQ MA72–6820 ] 0-2-72 The configuration to be used in the test mission will be a modifica- tion of the basic Soyuz design to include the compatible rendezvous and docking equipment. 93-466 O - 73 - 25 382 The new, universal docking system will be located on the orbital module. After launch, the Soyuz will be inserted into an Earth orbit of approximately 188 by 228 kilometers (101 by 123 nautical miles) then maneuvered to circularize the orbit in preparation for rendezvous at a nominal altitude of 225 kilometers (121 nautical miles). The plane of the orbit will be inclined 51.6° to the equator. The first Apollo launch opportunity will occur about 7% hours after the Soyuz liftoff. Four additional opportunities or launch windows of approximately 15 minutes in length exist, spaced about 24 hours apart. The fourth and fifth opportunities necessitate a reduction of the time in docked configuration from approximately 48 hours to approximately 24 and 9 hours respectively. After insertion into an Earth orbit of 150 by 167 kilometers (81 by 90 nautical miles) by the Saturn IB launch vehicle, the command and service module will separate from the SIVB stage then it will turn around, dock and extract the docking module. As noted on the viewgraph the docking module will be internally mounted in the adapter area in essentially the same position that the lunar module was mounted during the Apollo Lunar missions. (MA 73–5471) APOLL0/soyuz TEST PROJECT LAUNCH CONFIGURATION FOR APOLL0 CSM AND D00KING MODULE | • * 6 LAUNCH ESCAPE SYSTEM #. § LAUNCH ESCAPE SYSTEM LAUNCH THERMAL -Y COMMAND MODULE (CM) PROTECTIVE COWER z - - º :*: ; SERVICE MODULE (SM) 'ſ Jº || DOCKING MODULE (DM) SPACECRAFT LAUNCH ADAPTER (SLA) DM LAUNCH tº SUPPORT STRUCTURE SATURN IB LAUNCH WEHICLE NASA HQ MA73–5471 2-26-73 383 The Apollo command and service module with the docking module will then perform the maneuvers necessary for rendezvous and then dock with the Soyuz using the universal docking system. For about 2 days, the astronauts and cosmonauts will exchange visits between vehicles carrying out joint activities. During transfer operations the buddy system will be used when in the docking module and at all times there will be at least one astronaut in the Apollo and one cosmonaut in the Soyuz. Additional tests of the docking mechanism are planned, and after final separation, the two spacecraft will conduct independent activities before reentry. The Apollo mission will have a duration of up to 12 days. During the docked and undocked phases of the mission the crew will conduct experiments, some of which may be performed jointly. It is our understanding that the Soyuz mission will have a duration of 6 days. I have a brief film clip, Mr. Chairman, I would now like to show the illustrations that I have just discussed. The ground rules for management of the real time operation have been established. Each spacecraft will be controlled by its respective control center. Consultations between control centers will be held for decisions affecting joint activities. These joint activities will normally be conducted according to mission documentation, which include contingency plans. We are currently discussing the exchange of personnel between countries for mission control center support. It is proposed that each country would provide a team of technical specialists whose primary role would be to provide technical informa- tion to the host country flight director upon his request. One of the ground rules agreed to early in our negotiations was that flight crews would be trained in the other's language to facilitate communication with each other and the control centers. The host country will have primary responsibility for deciding appropriate action for a given situation in the host vehicle. Any television will be immediately transmitted to the other control center. I would now like to discuss the hardware we are preparing to carry out this mission. The Apollo spacecraft for ASTP will be a modified version of the command and service module flown during the early lunar landings. The spacecraft was manufactured and checked out for the Apollo program and had been in storage. Initial modification design, develop- ment, test, and engineering work being performed by Rockwell International at their Downey plant in California is underway and proceeding on schedule. Because the Apollo command module and the Soyuz operate at different pressures and mixtures of oxygen and nitrogen, an airlock is required to allow the crew to transfer between the two spacecraft. The upper hatch and docking mechanism of the Apollo command module is very difficult and expensive to modify because of its close integration with the forward heat shield and earth landing system including parachutes, separation charges and flotation gear. Therefore, the decision was made to provide a docking module to serve as an airlock and also incorporate the new universal docking system capable of functioning with identical components of the Soyuz spacecraft. 384 The docking module is a cylindrical structure about 1.5 meters (5 feet) in diameter and 3 meters (10 feet) in length. The aft end of the docking module incorporates a lunar module type drogue and hatch so that it can be mated with the docking probe on the forward end of the command and service module. The docking module provides tankage and control systems for oxygen and nitrogen to allow adjusting the pressure and oxygen con- centration of the atmosphere to match that of either spacecraft. It also contains electrical power, TV connections, and communication cabling which allows operation of either spacecraft communication system from within the module. Most of these controls and electrical systems are located within an equipment pallet that is installed on the wall of the module and forms a platform or floor. The forward end of the docking module incorporates the new universal docking system. This docking system consists of two main elements: (1) The structural assembly, which is rigidly attached to the ve- hicle and provides the base to which the structural ring assembly is mounted containing the eight structural ring latches. (2) The guide ring assembly with the guide paddles and capture latches is attached to the structural ring assembly by attenuators or shock struts and is capable of being extended or retracted. That ring is depicted here. I might add at this point that interface, the commonality between the two countries' designs rests primarily in the guide and structural rings. After the guide rings, it is each country’s own design. In fact the United States’ design is somewhat different from that of the U.S.S.R. Ours is primarily hydraulic and theirs is electromechanical. In operation, the active vehicle extends its guide ring assembly while the guide ring of the passive vehicle remains retracted. Either of the two docking vehicles can be the active member. Capture is made by the capture latches on the guide paddles of the active ve- hicle engaging the body mounted latches on the passive vehicle. The guide ring assembly on the active vehicle is then retracted thereby pulling the two spacecraft together until the structural ring faces meet and the structural ring latches engage to provide a hard dock and seal. Either vehicle can perform undocking in an emergency. A successful demonstration of this system was conducted on a two-fifth scale model during joint tests in Moscow last December. The first full-scale docking system, a development unit for testing, will be delivered to the Johnson Space Center this spring. Qualifica- tion testing of the flight design is scheduled to begin early next year. Later on I plan to discuss in some detail our working relationships with the Soviets and their cooperation in jointly solving our mutual problems. However, because one of the most significant examples of this cooperation involved the present design of the docking module, I think it is appropriate to mention it at this point. It concerns the agreement reached to reduce the Soyuz spacecraft operating pressure during docked operations. The change is significant in that it eliminated the need for the astronauts and cosmonauts to remain in the docking module and prebreathe pure oxygen for approximately two and a half hours whenever they were transferring from the 760 385 millimeters of Mercury (14.7 lb/inºa) atmosphere of Soyuz to the 260 millimeters of Mercury (5 lb/inºa) atmosphere of Apollo. This prebreathing in the docking module was required to remove nitrogen dissolved in the blood at the high Soyuz atmospheric pressure, thus preventing the bends from nitrogen bubbles formed during the transfer to the lower Apollo pressure. - In October of last year, at a joint meeting in Moscow, the Soviets agreed to lower their Soyuz spacecraft pressure from 760 millimeters of Mercury (14.7 lbſinºa) to 520 millimeters of Mercury (10 lb/inºa). With this lower pressure differential, nitrogen bubbles will not form when the crew transfers to Apollo. - This then eliminated the need for prebreathing and thus for long stays in the docking module, and has made both the design of the docking module and the mission profile much simpler. For example, the reduced stay time eliminated the need for astro- naut and cosmonaut liquid cooled garments, the need for an environ- mental cooling system, and greatly simplified the gas management system. Because of this reduction in transfer time, we have also been able to plan an additional crew transfer, which will enable all members of both crews to visit the other spacecraft. This is an additional point I would like to make concerning the technology we are using in the design of the docking module. Because the Saturn IB will carry a payload substantially larger than the command and service module into orbit, the docking module design is not required to strive for extremely low weight. This has permitted relatively simple design and reliability solutions. As a result, we have been able to achieve significant cost benefits. For example, the initial docking module proposal which suggested a lightweight, milled, integrally stiffened, rolled and welded aluminum structure with a minimum wall thickness of .065 inches was replaced by a simplified, minimally machined, rolled and welded structure of about five-eighth inch wall thickness. Two lightweight, highly stressed, 2,700 lb/in” pressure tanks designed for the Apollo lunar module and proposed for the docking module were replaced with four 900 lb/in” tanks of higher safety factor and less exotic material. Since the higher pressure tanks required pressure regulation in two steps, redundant 2700 lb/in” regulator packages were also elimi- nated. Two sets of essentially off-the-shelf communication equip- ment will be used to provide reliability instead of a new single high reliability unit which would require development, and space environ- ment qualification. We believe these are also excellent examples of the kind of cost savings we can expect to see in the shuttle era because of the shuttle payload capability. As mentioned previously, ASTP will carry experiments. At the present time our activities are directed to the identification and definition of candidate ASTP experiments. A preliminary list is being developed. We are now, in the selection process for ASTP. We are striving to have some experiments which will: (1) Provide data which can be furnished to scientists in each country; (2) provide for co- investigators located in both countries; (3) require active cooperation of U.S.S.R. cosmonauts; and (4) use existing hardware where possible. It is planned to discuss U.S. and U.S.S.R. proposed experiments during the joint meeting scheduled for the middle of this month. 386 Subsequent to this meeting, final plans for implementation will be prepared. ASTP will utilize residual Apollo-Skylab Saturn IB launch vehicle hardware. While no launch vehicle work specifically for ASTP has begun to date, modification, testing and checkout of the launch vehicle will begin during the coming year in time to support our launch date. At Kennedy Space Center kaunch complex 39, as well as other required launch facilities and ground-support equipment, will begin preparation and test during the coming year. To summarize where we are today, I am glad to be able to report to you that the program is on schedule and moving well toward our current mission date of mid-July 1975. - General STAFFORD. Dr. Slayton, and Mr. Brand have been selected for our prime crew and are beginning to work toward proficiency in the Russian language. Joint crew training with the cosmonauts is planned this summer in the United States, to be followed by joint training in Russia this fall. Our joint working groups will continue to meet on a regular basis are and, in fact; meeting next week in Houston. As I indicated previously, effort on the ASTP spacecraft is proceed- ing on schedule. - - Modifications are currently being made to the ASTP prime com- mand and service module, and the spacecraft will begin initial check- out in April. The initial docking module structure is in fabrication and will begin installation of systems this winter. The initial full-scale docking System, a development unit for testing, will be delivering to Johnson Space Center this summer. In addition, the experiments will be chosen and work initiated to have them available to support the launch date. Next year the launch vehicle will go through poststorage and lºcations checkout, and launch complex 39 preparations will egin. - As you can see, we are well underway and progressing smoothly toward our joint meeting in space. At this point I would like to discuss futher our working relationships with the Soviets and the agreements we have reached as a result of these meetings. It was apparent at the outset that it would be necessary to provide a means for engineers and scientists from the United States and U.S.S.R. to discuss the technical details of their various disciplines with their counterparts. To accomplish this end, five joint working groups were established in the following categories: Mission model and operations plans; guidance and control; mechani- cal design; communications and tracking; and life support and crew transfer. The basic approach adopted has been to minimize and simplify the interface between spacecraft, and then to define the details of that interface so that it can be understood and controlled by each country. This provides maximum flexibility, once you leave that interface, for each country to utilize its own design and approach to engineering problems. 387 As early as 1970, agreement was reached on the placement of structural elements and equipment, optical and radio beacon charac- teristics, communications requirements, spacecraft atmospheres and spacecraft coordinate systems. In the meetings just around the time of the agreement reached last May between President Nixon and Chairman Kosygin, we agreed on such essentials as a schedule for regular and direct contact between project teams, detailed formal documentation, joint reviews and joint tests, and development of crew training plans, the level of reciprocal language familiarity, and the need to develop public information plans taking into account the obligations and practices of both countries. I have already discussed the sugnificant effect of the agreement by the U.S.S.R. to reduce the Soyuz operating pressure during joint docked operations on the simplification of the docking module design. Other significant agreements have also been made. The mission profile I have discussed was established based on Soyuz launching first. At the same time, the Russians agreed to provide a complete backup vehicle to maximize the number of launch opportunities for both nations. Mr. WYDLER. Is this something we requested of them? Mr. LEE. No. They volunteered to provide a backup vehicle to help maximize the launch opportunities. Mr. Wydler. I am just trying to make sure I understand the meaning of the word “agreements.” * You say they agreed to launch Soyuz first. Is that something we wanted them to do? * * & Mr. LEE. Yes. It ended up that that approach maximizes the opportunities for us to have a completely successful mission. By their agreeing to go first and to provide a backup vehicle, we have more launch windows. Let me try to explain that just a little more, if I may, sir. & c The Soyuz launch vehicle is constrained for what I believe is a “soft goods” life problem once the propellants have been loaded. Once they start loading the spacecraft or the launch vehicle, with propellants, they are limited in lifetime of the vehicle. I think the first such limitation arises 10 to 6 days before the agreed to launch date. From that time on, anytime up to “T” minus 6 hours in the final count, they can slip another 6 days and still launch that vehicle. Once we go past “T” minus 6 hours, they are limited to just a 1-day slip. If they can’t launch on the 16th of July, say, that entire vehicle is scrubbed. They are going to prepare a backup vehicle, ready to go, that we could then recycle and launch probably 10 days later. - - Mr. Fuqu A. Please proceed. e - e & Mr. LEE. Primary factors considered were the limited mission duration capability and the launch vehicle constraints of the Soyuz once their launch vehicle and spacecraft fueling has commenced. The United States has agreed that the Apollo will perform altitude control during most of the docked phase of the mission because it has a larger load of reaction control propellants than the Soyuz. 388 Further, it was agreed that the United States would supply existing VHF radar ranging equipment used in the Apollo program between the command and service module and lunar module to simplify the ASTP rendezvous problem. The Soviets, in addition to agreeing to prepare a second launch vehicle and spacecraft that could be launched within 1 or 2 weeks, have also agreed that all Soviet equipment which is brought into the docking module or command module will conform to the flammabil- ity requirements which have been established for the Apollo program. These agreements are representative examples of the willingness we are experiencing in this project to jointly solve our mutual prob- lems and share in the total effort. It illustrates how two highly tech- nological programs in the two countries are being brought together and are establishing and building upon mutual confidence and trust to achieve our mutual goals. It is important to note that, although many constraints exist in the hardware and the mission, both nations have discovered as we work together that the engineering needs to accomplish the mission must rule. These needs have ruled and this is why we have made what I consider tremendous progress in the short time since formal approval of the program. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. This concludes my discussion of the Apollo–Soyuz test project. Mr. Fuqua. Thank you very much, Mr. Lee, and we appreciate your comments about what appears to be a rather forward looking program for this Nation in space and particularly in international cooperation. - You mention on the first page of your statement about the objective of the Apollo–Soyuz test project was to conduct a joint mission to test technical solutions for creating compatible docking systems which can be used internationally for docking future manned spacecraft and ºne. Do we have any further plans beyond this one mission for this? Mr. LEE. No, sir; there is no funding for missions beyond the one scheduled for July 1975 Mr. FUQUA. Is there any discussion going on with the Russians about future joint ventures later? Mr. LEE. Up until this time, no, sir. There have been no discussions about a followon to this one mission. Mr. FUQUA. Do you think there might be after you get further into those possibilities? Mr. LEE. I would not be surprised at discussions when we talk about what we are doing in the experiments. The natural lead-in question would be, “This might be a better experiment for a later mission.” An introduction of that sort, sir, could lead to further discussions. Mr. FUQUA, You also mentioned about the additional experiments that might be conducted by the Apollo crew after the joint docking is completed. - Have you specified those yet or are those still in the planning stages? Mr. LEE, No, sir; they have not been specifically identified at this time. We have just gone through a preliminary review of a number of proposed experiments in terms of their scientific merit, cost, and feasi- bility. I might emphasize that we are limited in both cost and weight. 389 We have established a limit of 200 pounds on total weight and a $10 million cost ceiling level for experiments. One other limitation is the required volume or space to stow the experiments. These limitations— cost, weight, and feasibility—have made us possibly eliminate some experiments that would be very good to conduct during the ASTP mission. - - - - Because of economic and scientific reasons, we are trying to use experiments that have been assembled as backup for Skylab and other NASA programs. Results of the experiments already flown may make the acquisition of additional data very desirable. We might get such data with slight modification of the backup equipment. I might add that although it would be extremely disappointing if we were unable to achieve an actual docking, we would still accomplish many objec- tives of the joint mission and gain valuable experience and information on conducting joint international missions. We are also looking at experiments we could mount on the exterior of the docking module but, again, we are limited by overall payload weight. We are very interested in looking at some experiments in Earth resources. We are pursuing a sound plan for Earth observations. . Mr. Fuqua. What backup missions or plans do you have in case something should happen that the docking would have to be scrubbed so that our flight would not be completely wasted? - - Mr. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I think that would depend a great deal on just what occurs that limits rendezvous. For example, perhaps we could rendezvous and stationkeep but not dock. They use different tracking stations than we do and we are very interested to see how accurate the state vectors are, how they agree and how accurately we could come in and actually rendezvous with the Soviets. If we were able to maneuver and yet not dock, we would hope to continue several additional days of the mission, with the Apollo alone, to conduct various experiments, such as Earth resources. If we were able to station- keep, there are also some experiments that we might conduct jointly with the Russians and we are looking into these possibilities. If we had to eliminate the dock phase, we would continue provided that it was worthwhile for us to stay in Earth orbit getting data on our experi- ments. The Russians, we understand, are limited to approximately 6 days and would reenter at that time. . Mr. FUQUA. This may be more appropriate to address to the State Department but I will ask you anyhow and you can defer if you are not in a position to answer. . . . - Suppose in late June of 1975 we are getting ready to launch and Some international incident happens that severely strains relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. - What would happen to our launch at that point? Have those con- tingencies been looked at? - Mr. LEE. I will defer to Mr. Frutkin on that. - Mr. FRUTKIN. Mr. Chairman, we would really be guided by the Department of State and the White House in a matter like that. I think the disposition that has been shown by them in the past would be to attempt to hold to normal relationships and we would certainly hope to carry on our project. - Mr. FUQUA. And we certainly hope that that situation does not develop. * 390 Mr. WINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry that I wasn’t here for the first part of your testimony, Mr. Lee, but I did read the advance copy that was sent to our office and we appreciate that if we can get it in advance because we are having so many hearings these days and different committees. Following the line of thought, Mr. Fuqua started there, since the Russians have already committed themselves to a backup Soyuz, if there was a postponement not for political reasons, but something wrong with the first one of theirs, how long would it take to get their second one ready to go? Mr. LEE. Approximately 10 days. Mr. Winn. They are that close on the second one. Mr. LEE. It is essentially committed, except for loading the propellants. Mr. WINN. That is incredible. We don’t have such a backup, do we? Mr. LEE. No, sir. Mr. WINN. So if we blow it somewhere Mr. LEE. We will have a backup vehicle, recognizing that it is the same vehicle that Skylab has as a backup, but it would not be in a readiness posture for launching in 10 days. Mr. WINN. How long would it take? Mr. LEE. We have studied this problem in some detail. Based on the planned resources at KSC for test and preparation of the space vehicle during the 1975 time period, the preparation of the backup vehicle would require a minimum of 4 to 5 months. In addition, the Soviets have indicated that their launch window for this mission will close in October. Therefore, a requirement and decision to use the backup vehicle would have to occur no later than about May for us to possibly launch the backup vehicle in 1975. Mr. WINN. What are the main experiments to be considered in your meetings with the Russians? I accompanied Chairman Teague to Russia and met with the Soviet Academy scientists this summer. Would the Russians like to incorporate experiments in the joint docking that couldn’t be incorporated because of the weight problems? Mr. LEE. Sir, I can’t answer that question at this time. We know they are coming to the meetings in March prepared to discuss experi- ments but we do not know at this time what those experiments will be. I will be able to furnish that after the March meeting. Mr. WINN. Has there been communication back and forth on any- thing they would like to do? I know as much as possible you are trying to work it on a joint basis of who wants what and try to get the priorities ironed out with the limitations you have on weight. That question, I guess, was a little premature because you haven’t talked about it. Mr. LEE. I would like to ask Mr. Frutkin to reply. Dr. Naugle, NASA Associate Administrator for Space Science has had some dis- cussions concerning the cooperative scientists’ effort. But with regard to the ASTP we are not knowledgeable at this time of any particular experiments. We hope to be after the March joint meeting. Mr. FRUTKIN. I think Mr. Lee is absolutely correct. This meeting that begins later this month will be the first one in which the two sides will be unveiling their ideas about experiments for this ASTP program. 391 Mr. WINN. What is the weight limitation? Mr. LEE. On the Russians or the United States? Mr. WINN. The combination package, or are there any combina- tion weight limits? - In other words, we are putting basically what we want on ours within limits and they are doing the same to theirs. Mr. LEE. Yes, sir. Mr. WINN. And then we exchange the data? Mr. LEE. Yes, sir. Mr. WINN. Do we exchange it with anybody else besides the Russians? - Mr. LEE. I am sure we will be prepared to. Mr. WINN. Have you made any commitments? Mr. LEE. No, sir, we haven’t proceeded that far. Mr. FRUTKIN. It would be our standard procedure to open up the results. Mr. WINN. I wonder if the Russians objected to this sharing of information? Mr. FRUTKIN. We made very clear we intended no compromise of our normal approach to the openness of our program. Mr. WINN. Well, I am very intrigued by this, of course, by having been there and discussed it with their men. I think both Chairman Teague and I are proceeding with caution on some things because we are of the opinion that it may be a one-sided deal where they are basically picking our brains but the more of the hearings I read and also some of the earlier comments by Dale Meyers, I am beginning to alter my thinking in that field. I think maybe we are benefiting in more ways than I thought we were going to. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Fuqu A. Mr. Gunther. - Mr. GUNTER. Mr. Chairman, back on the experiment area again, I believe your testimony on page 10 and what you have said sub- sequently indicates that you have not decided specifically on the experiments that will be conducted. How did you come to the figure in the budget of $4.6 million for experiments for fiscal 1974, if you didn’t know what experiments— Mr. LEE. Based on our Apollo experience we knew we would have to start defining an initial procurement of our hardware at this time in order to be ready for the July launch. Mr. GUNTER. You have started defining experiments but you don’t know what the experiments are? - . . Mr. LEE. Generally. You cannot say we are specifically defining them, sir. We know essentially the type of experiments we are capable of carrying, the approximate sizes, and this is money for getting started— for the preliminary definition. It is an estimate, of course, on the fabrication of some of the hardware we know will have to start in that time frame in order to meet our tests and checkout time and be ready for launch in July. - • * Mr. GUNTER. Did I hear you mention a figure of $10 million? Mr. LEE. Yes, sir, as a limitation for what we would devote to experiments. - Mr. GUNTER. During fiscal 1974? Mr. LEE. No, sir, throughout the entire program. 392 Mr. GUNTER. How do you view that particular figure? Is that being foolish on our part with regard to the ultimate yield this entire project might bring? Mr. LEE. I don’t believe it is based on our preliminary review of the type of experiments we believe are feasible. We allowed for some growth in size and cost based on Apollo ex- perience and we are trying to get them to define these experiments, or at least bring them to a breadboard stage, so we will have some confidence that they will not go into cost overruns. We do have weight and volume limitations. The tentative list we selected exceeds the 200-pound limitation. I allowed it to go over the limitation because I do have some weight margin in reserve. Based on what we have seen to date, we have some very interesting possibilities that will be within the $10 million limit. The primary objective of this mission, of course, is the rendezvous and docking and learning to work with the Russians. When we estimated the total ASTP cost, we still had a number of unknowns and we felt it prudent not to target the experiment funds too high. Our current knowledge supports this decision. I feel quite confident, if we find a real fine experiment and are close to the $10 million dollar limit, that I will be able to discuss this with Dale Myers and get permission, if we are still within our funding limits, to pursue that experiment. Mr. GUNTER. Do you see us being able to accomplish a great deal more from a technological standpoint by working with the Russians or could we in fact really do better through our own program and with our own dollars without having to go through the negotiations and all of the effort toward cooperation. - In other words, could we accomplish more technologically by pad- dling our own canoe, in your judgment? Mr. LEE. I think not, sir. Certainly there are areas we could pursue On our own, but I think we have much to gain by this cooperation exchange with the Russians. - Mr. GUNTER. Is it a greater gain in the international relations field rather than in the technical field? Mr. LEE. I think we know so little about their technical field that it would be wrong for me to suggest that we can’t learn anything from them in the technological field. - They do things different. As a matter of fact, the design of the eight-structural ring latches and peripheral ring we are using on the docking system is basically the Russians, and I think we will all agree that this is better for this purpose than the probe and drogue we had in the Appollo. I don’t think we should say we don’t stand to gain, technologically. I do feel we will gain much internationally. Mr. FRUTKIN. I might add just a note to that, sir. The nature of the program objective here requires our cooperating with them. The fundamental objective is to develop compatible docking systems which will be used by all our spacecraft and theirs, so you will have this standby rescue capability. Mr. GUNTER. In working with the Russians in this way, do we share and share alike in technology? In other words, do they learn everything we know and we learn everything they know or are there limits to that type of approach? 393 Mr. LEE. There is a limit in that we only go beyond the interface, which is common to both countries, as necessary to make the overall systems work. - - Now, we will go beyond the interface to a degree in our training. We will train the cosmonauts in the subsystems that we have, but only to the degree required for operation, such as switching procedures. This is necessary in a contingency situation where an astronaut or cosmonaut might have to return to Earth in the other vehicle. They would have to know how to operate the spacecraft. But we are not getting into the principles, tolerances, and manufacturing techniques. I might add we are not disclosing proprietary information or any of our manufacturing processes. I am sure they know some of the things such as crimping wires but we are not disclosing our tools or techniques. - Mr. FRUTKIN. We have been terribly careful. What we do is talk about what is being done and not how we do it in any structural sense. We have agreed on what the design of the rings would be but not how we build the rings. Mr. GUNTER. Isn’t it true the ultimate end of cooperation, and I am not against cooperation, Mr. Chairman, is that if we are yards ahead of them, they and their technology are going to benefit more than we. Isn’t that basically true? - Mr. FRUTKIN. If there were an exchange of technology it would be true, but we are avoiding an exchange of technology. Mr. GUNTER. In this particular effort, but perhaps on down the road. It seems ultimately that the sharing of technology can’t be avoided. Mr. FRUTKIN. If our experience with them continues to be as satisfactory as it is in this particular project, which is extraordinary, people at the Soviet Embassy, our Embassy, and the Soviet Union, tell us there is no parallel with the experience we are having with these people. If that experience continues successfully, we would certainly be encouraged to try something more, but in every step we ever took we would have to be certain there was a complete quid pro quo and we are getting as much as we were giving. We are very sensitive of that and want to make sure not only is there no substantive imbalance but also that there is not even an appearance of an imbalance. We are sensitive to this. Mr. FUQUA. We thank you very much, Mr. Lee, for being here. The subcommittee will resume hearings tomorrow in room 2212 at 10 o’clock. Our first witness will be Prof. Maurice Levy, chairman, European Space Research Organization Council, to discuss Space Lab, and Mr. Charles Able, chairman, McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co., to discuss Skylab. [Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the subcommittee recessed to reconvene Thursday, March 8, 1973, at 10 a.m.] 1974 NASA AUTHORIZATION THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 1973 Hous E OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICs, SUBCOMMITTEE on MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Don Fuqua (chairman of the subcommittee), presiding. Mr. Fuqua. The subcommittee will be in order. We are happy to have with us this morning a distinguished visitor to our country who has played an outstanding role in furthering international cooperation in space. He is chairman of the European Space and Research Organization Council, who have been working on the Spacelab. We are happy to welcome you here, Prof. Maurice Levy. I believe Mr. Winn, the ranking minority member of the subcom- mittee, would also like to welcome you, too, to the committee. Mr. WINN. I want to greet you. I have not had the privilege of meeting you in several trips to Europe. I want to apologize, but I am on the Foreign Affairs Committee, and they have just called an execu- tive committee meeting to explain some of the problems in Khartoum, and I am going to have to excuse myself for about 10 or 15 minutes. I will be back as soon as I can. Professor LEvy. Thank you very much. Mr. Fuqua. Please proceed, Professor Levy. STATEMENT OF PROF. MAURIGE LEVY, CHAIRMAN, EUROPEAN SPACE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION COUNCIL Professor LEvy. Yes. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I would like first to say how happy I am and honored to come and talk in front of you. I have been on the Washington scene for a few years, and therefore º the important role which your committee plays in space 8.I:851]?S. I also would like to apologize on the fact that I have no prepared text at the moment, but it will be ready this afternoon for distribution. Now, Mr. Chairman, I appear before you as chairman of the Council of ESRO, the European Space Research Organization, which includes 10 European countries, namely: Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, in order to (395) 396 describe briefly fo, you the present plans of our organization for par- ticipating in the development and use of what is called in the United States the “sortie lab,” which we prefer to think of as the space laboratory, or space lab. This, as you know, is part of a more complex program, the space shuttle and orbital systems program which Europe also plans to use in cooperation with the United States. Before speaking about the present situation and the way we see the future, I would like first to recall the historical background. It was in the autumn of 1969 that the Europeans were given a briefing of what was then called the post-Apollo program, and invited to par- ticipate in it. At that time the NASA budget amounted to nearly $5 billion per year. The first landing on the Moon had just taken place. The technological progress achieved was undisputed, and the post- Apollo program comprised not only the shuttle system, but also a reusable tug as well as a space station and a nuclear-powered rocket. During 1970, while the American authorities were studying this program, the Europeans reflected on the implications of participating in it. It was during this same year that they decided to embark on application satellites in the fields of communications, air traffic control, and meteorology. It was at the ministerial meeting of the European Space Conference held in Brussels in July 1970 that it was decided to finance studies both on application programs and in the post- Apollo area. The discussions on participation in the space shuttle program were lengthy on account of the following factors. The size and scope of the program in relation to the sum of European space budgets. The difficulty of deciding on participation when the content of the program as a whole had not yet been fixed. The absence until January 1972 of an American decision to embark on a definite program; and, finally, the lack of clear and precise information on the conditions under which the cooperation would take place. Notwithstanding these uncertainties, Europe was greatly interested on account mainly of the important prospects offered by manned flights and the hope that participation in the program would lead to the resolution of the problem of launchers which has always given rise to many difficulties in Europe. When the program was finally approved and defined by the American authorities in January 1972, the Europeans largely centered their discussions on participation in the space tug. It was in this context that a delegation of the European Space Conference went to the United States at the beginning of June of last year in the hope that a decision on participation could be taken at the ministerial meeting of the conference which was then scheduled for July 1972. The particular attraction of the tug as far as Europe was concerned was that it would have to some extent helped to resolve the problem of the construction of European launchers. I might perhaps here open a parenthesis on this question of launchers which has been at the center of European discussions on cooperation with the United States. Most European countries believe that in the long run it is essential for Europe to have its own launching capability if it wants to play an active and continuing role in space research and applications. How- ever, there exist differences among them on the procedures to reach this goal. 397 Some countries would like, in spite of past setbacks, to embark immediately on the development of a conventional launcher adapted to the operational application satellites of the 1980's. Others, pointing out the fact that the whole space concepts are going to be deeply modified by the advent of the space shuttle, would prefer to rely on a close cooperation with the United States, hoping that near the end of this decade Europe will have reached a sufficient technological capability to acquire its own launching system. Since it was difficult, because of limited financial resources, to pursue both courses simultane- ously, the development of s apace tug appeared as a good compromise, as it would have meant continuing activity in the propulsion area, thus conserving the possibility of the subsequent development of launchers in Europe. Unfortunately, during the June 1972 meeting, the American author- ities indicated that they did not wish the Europeans to undertake the development of a space tug. This American position, which came as a surprise to us, led to further delay in reaching a decision on our participation in another sector of the program since this meant re- opening the question of launchers. It was then becoming clear that a space lab was the only part of the remaining program suited for European cooperation. Consequently, ESRO, on commission from the European Space Conference, completed three different concept studies of the space lab with three different contractors. At the Ministerial Meeting of the European Space Conference in Brussels on the 20th of December, 1972—that is about 2 months ago—the European ministers of science and technology reached an agreement in principle on both the problem of launchers and the participation in the space shuttle program on the basis that these projects would be carried out and managed within a common European framework, and that the question of participation and financial contributions would be decided later by each country. ESRO was entrusted with the task of implementing the space lab program as a special project, which means that not all the member states of the organization are required to participate in it financially. The financing of the phase B studies, which amount to about $8.5 million, has been approved by the organization, and six states have already decided to contribute to it. The aim of these studies is to obtain before December of 1973 a more precise knowledge of the costs of carrying out the program. And as of now a number of European states have indicated their intention of financing its subsequent devel- opment provided that the cost does not substantially exceed the estimates made so far; that is, approximately $300 million. Europe will make a final decision on this program not later than the 15th of August, 1973. Mr. Fuqua. What was the date? Professor LEvy. 15th of August. Since I understand that you have already had a technical presenta- tion of the space lab, I shall limit myself now to the description of the organization which ESRO is setting up to carry out the program and to our plans for future uses of the system. e The project will be managed at ESTEC, one of the technical centers of the organization situated in Holland. The project team will be located there. However, we shall have in the headquarters in 93-466 O - 73 – 26 398 Paris a special division dealing with the whole program; that is, not only the space lab development, but also the planning of future missions, the coordination of efforts with those of NASA on the com- plete system, and so forth. Since this is not done usually for the programs of ESRO, which are normally entirely managed in ESTEC, it shows.the importance we attach to a program which in our mind goes much beyond the development of the space lab. The latter will, of course, be carried out by European industry. - At the moment the phase B studies are conducted in competition by two separate groups of contractors under the direction of two prime contractors. Near the end of this year a unique prime contractor will be selected for the development phase. It will have to award subcontracts in such a way that a fair geographical distribution of work is achieved among the participating countries but keeping, nevertheless, a strong element of competition in order to maintain the cost at a reasonable minimum. Coordination with NASA will be insured at all levels by the setting up of working groups, by the establishment of an enlarged representa- tion of ESRO in Washington, and of similar offices of NASA, both in Paris and at ESTEC. As far as the future uses of the system are concerned, a presentation of the space lab to approximately 250 scientists was made in Frascati in Italy on last January. Groups are now working actively to define future missions in areas such as astronomy, life sciences, earth re- sources detection and so on. We fortunately have ahready had a long experience of working with NASA in this area since many European science experiments have been flown on American satellites in the last 10 years. Others will be carried in the Skylab. - Furthermore, as you probably know, more than a dozen of purely European satellites have been launched in cooperation with NASA. The relations of our scientists with their counterparts in the United States are excellent. We anticipate that cooperation for the uses of the space lab, which will greatly enlarge the potentialities of special research for our scientists, will go very smoothly since the channels and working habits already exist in this area. - - - * I might perhaps, before closing, explain what are the remaining steps to be taken in 1973 in order to finalize European participation in the space shuttle program. The ESRO Council has already ap- proved the text of an agreement laying down the arrangements under which the space lab would be developed first in ESRO and subse- Quently within the European Space Agency which in conformity with the decisions taken in Brussels is expected to be set up in 1974. This agreement is open for signature between March 1, and the end of July. It will probably be implemented very shortly as the minimum ... of signatures required for this is expected to be gathered rapidly. . - - Next, two types of agreements will have to be negotiated with the United States. First, a technical NASA–ESRO agreement relating to the procurement of the space lab and its future uses as well as its integration in the Space Shuttle. Second, a government-to-govern- ment agreement covering a certain number of problems more political in nature. These are related, for example, with commitments for nonduplication of efforts, with the possibility of transferring tech- 399 nology to other European programs, with the access to the whole shuttle system, with the availability of conventional launchers, et cetera. Since these problems were discussed already in detail in June of 1972, we do not anticipate major difficulties there, although Some hard negotiations will undoubtedly take place. I might perhaps mention here another problem. The space lab is very much dependent for its development and uses on the definition of the shuttle itself and on the date of its availability for orbital flights. We have seen before how a lack of definition of the American program and delays in its basic decisions led to further complications in Europe. A similar situation could arise if the concept of the shuttle were to be changed greatly in the next few months, or if further delay in its orbital flights were foreseen. This would probably lead Some of the European countries who are at present involved in the phase B part of the program to reconsider their position. To conclude, I would say that all the member states of ESRO recognize the interest of European participation in the American shuttle and orbital systems program. Only problems of priorities stemming from the limited resources available are likely to prevent a few of the ESRO countries from participating in this program. Most of them attach to this participation an importance that is not limited to the technological aspects. They see it as a prototype of future collaboration between the United States and Europe in many other areas. However, to go beyond the stage which we have now reached, one must realize what is at stake and the difficulties which remain. We believe, as you do, that a certain degree of specialization in the technological field is necessary on a worldwide scale if we want to avoid duplication and waste of resources. Such a policy cannot but be approved on the European side where more than anywhere else the drawbacks of duplication of effort and lack of harmonization of programs has been experienced and recognized. However, techno- logical specialization among independent and sovereign countries must imply a direct and unconditional access to the equipment supplied by the other partners. Otherwise, specialization leads to subordination. At a time when advanced technology moves in the area of strong commercial competition, this difficulty must be faced and solved. The problem of launchers, for example, shows that we have not yet found a satisfactory solution. However, it is clear that only by in- creasing the areas of cooperation can we put ourselves in a situation where the number of common interests will become large enough to overbalance rivalries and distrusts. In this light, the cooperation between Europe and the United States on the space shuttle program can be seen, therefore, as a major step forward. Thank you. Mr. FUQUA. Thank you very much, Professor Levy. We appreciate your statement and the interest of the European nations participating in this part of the shuttle program effort. Do you think that by the time the phase B studies are completed that there will be more countries participating in the space lab? Professor LEvy. Well, we believe that by the time the present agree- ment is closed to signature, namely at the end of July, we will prob- ably have about seven countries participating. 400 Mr. Fuqua. How many do you have now? Professor LEvy. Six. Mr. Fu QUA. Six. Who would be the other one? - Professor LEvy. Probably France. Then we expect—we can, of course, not foresee what will happen later, but it could very well be that one more country would join the arrangement after it is colsed to signature. There is a procedure by which a country can later on join in the agreement, and we expect that probably one more country will do so. - So altogether, I think we could possibly have 8 out of the 10 ESRO member states in the program by the end of the year. That is, if everything goes well. In other words, if we solve all the problems which I have already mentioned. - Mr. Fuqu A. Under the terms of the agreement among the par- ticipating countries, is there any provision which would permit a nation to withdraw if they wished to? - Professor LEvy. Well, by the 15th of August we should have a pre- cise knowledge of the overall cost of the program. And if the complete cost of the spacelab does not exceed in a significant way the existing figure, then at that time the countries will embark on a commitment which will then be firm. In other words, they will no longer have the possibility to withdraw after that. - Mr. Fu QUA. What would be the minimum number of countries that would be required to proceed with the actual development of the space lab? - - Professor LEVY. Well, it is not so much the minimum number of countries as the percentage of the existing financement which is im- portant. And you see, for the space lab, which is a special project, we have a system of financing which is not exactly the same as for the other projects. These other projects are financed proportionately to the GNP of each country, whereas in the space lab the financing is decided more or less through an agreement among the participat- ing countries. And if one or two countries, as it seems to be the case at the moment, are ready to pay a large fraction of the cost, then I I think we do not need more than a few others to embark on the development. Mr. FUQUA. Do you have any idea what the expected fund con- tribution of the currently participating countries is? Professor LEvy. Pardon me? Mr. Fu QUA. The expected contribution of those countries presently participating. What commitments have they made? Or will that com- mitment be determined after August 15? - - Professor LEVY. For the moment they are committed to this amount I mentioned, which is about $8.5 million. You see, we have an account- ing system which is not exactly the dollar. The commitment is to 7.5 million accounting units, which means about $8.5 million. That is their commitment at the moment. But after August 15 they will be committed to the total amount, which we expect to be in the neighbor- hood of $300 million. Mr. FUQUA. Have you arrived at any conclusions, as to the number of space labs that will probably be needed in the first few years? I would say the first generation of space labs? - 401 Professor LEvy. Well, this, of course, would follow from the present studies on the future missions of the space lab. There are several groups at work both in Europe and the United States. We expect that at least a prototype and another one will be needed, and we do hope that more will be necessary, which of course is in the interest of Euro- pean industry. We are actively at the moment trying to define all the interesting missions to see how far these can be funded in the existing budgets. But we do hope that more space labs will be needed subsequently. Mr. Fuqua. In the first generation of the space lab, are you going to develop a design that can be modified and upgraded without having to build a complete new lab? Professor LEvy. We very much hope to do this. This will be part of the phase B studies, but we very much hope to do it, to have a system which can evolve without having to completely rebuild it entirely, yes. Mr. FUQUA. Are the agreements between ESRO and NASA, sufficiently defined so as to permit the initiation of development? Professor LEVY. Well, they are at the moment negotiating and we will also start very soon to negotiate a government-to-government agreement on the political level. But our plans are to have completed the negotiations by the month of July so that when a commitment is made for the full program all the rules of the agreements will be laid down so that everybody knows what it is all about. Mr. FUQUA. Do you think there would need to be any further under- standings, particularly between NASA and ESRO, with regard to the technical requirements? Professor LEvy. I think not. I think most of the problems have been recognized, and I think the discussions so far have gone very well. I don’t anticipate any major problem. Mr. Fuqua. You mentioned this in your statement, but possibly further amplification would be helpful. In the development of the space lab will any of the items be procured on an international basis or will they come directly from those countries that are participating? Professor LEvy. Yes. They would come mainly from the countries who are participating. However, it is clear that because of the inter- face between the space lab and the rest of the shuttle, some of the elements will have to be procured in the United States also. Mr. FUQUA.. I want to commend you for it. The decision to take on the space lab, does that fill in your ongoing ELDO and ESRO programs? © Professor LEvy. Well, part of the difficulty was to try to fit in the space lab program with the ongoing programs. We have in Europe a rather ambitious program of application satellites which we have embarked on, and for us it is very important because we anticipate many operational missions in this area in the eighties. On the other hand, we have, as I mentioned in my statement, the problem of launchers, and the whole difficulty of the last 2 years has been to find a way to fit everything in. My understanding of the Brussels decisions of last December is that we finally have found a way to do so. Mr. FUQUA. Do you anticipate that after the development of the space lab that other European countries will possibly buy additional space labs for specſic missions that they may have a requirement for? 402 Professor LEvy. They may not buy other space labs, but I am sure that many more countries will use the space lab, in addition to those who will develop and construct it. In fact, our understanding is that there won’t be much difference between those who have developed the space lab and those who have not, as far as using the system is concerned. And we anticipate that everybody who has an idea, who has an interesting experiment to propose, any really in- terested scientist will be able to participate. Mr. Fuqu A. I want to apologize to you for the poor attendance this morning. It is not the quantity that we have but rather the quality that we have here this morning. But we have four subcommittees of this committee meeting this morning. Professor LEvy. Yes, I understand. Mr. FUQUA. The entire Congress is almost like a big rocket taking off. Our thrust is at the beginning when we are trying to get legisla- tion to go to the floor for action later on in the year. Our emphasis will shift from committee to floor action later. So most of the committees of Congress are meeting every morning now. Everybody has more than one meeting to attend. So I apologize. But we are happy to have another great Floridian here, Mr. Frey. He may have some comments. - Mr. FREY. I am glad you used the word “another,” too. One of the things I think most of us are interested in, and the chair- man might have covered it, but do you see any problems down the line? We met with some of your people over a period of time on what you have been doing. Do you see any roadblocks in the finalization of what you have been working on? Professor LEvy. Well, from now to August 15 we have a certain number of problems to solve. First of all, we have to finalize the cost which will come out of the phase B studies, to see if it is in harmony with what we expect. Then we have to work on the NASA–ESRO agreement and the government-to-government agreement which will cover a certain number of ticklish problems which I mentioned in my statement. These are, for example, the commitment for nonduplica- tion of efforts, the possibility of transferring the technology to other programs, the access to the whole system, and so on. But these were actually discussed in depth already last year. So I do not expect that anything really new will come up. And we have already gone as far as we have gone with the knowledge of the difficulties and of the posi- tion which both the United States and Europe have taken. Conse- quently, although I do not minimize the work to be done, I don’t think there will be any major roadblock. - Mr. FREY. I can say for myself, and I think the people on the com- mittee, that we are delighted with your activity we are delighted with what you are doing, and it looks to us like this has great potential. There appear to be tremendous benefits for all of us down the line. And I am sure we are going to get into many areas that we never thought of as we continue to work in this. We are encouraged by it. I think it is one of the real bright spots in the total space program. Professor LEvy. Yes, Mr. Congressman, we also have exactly the º feeling. I think it is a major step. And this is just the beginning Of it. 403 Mr. FREY. And it seems for once we are using some commonsense. We might get our money's worth out of it for everybody, you know. Like the missionaries who do well while doing good. If you can work that out, it is delightful. - Thank you. - Mr. FUQUA. Thank you. We appreciate your coming, and we look forward to working with you in the future. We hope that this is a very bright and shiny road down for the future in terms of inter- national cooperation. We are sure that it will be that way. We hope SO on Our part, anyway. - Professor Levy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Fuqu A. Thank you very much. We will now hear from Mr. Charles Able, the chairman and chief executive officer of the McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co., the prime contractor on the Skylab program. Mr. ABLE. Mr. Chairman. - Mr. FUQUA. Charlie, you might want to identify your associates for the record before you start. - Mr. ABLE. Yes. I would like to introduce Mr. Charles Hutton, a vice president of McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co., and Mr. George Butler, here behind me on the left, who is our program manager on Advanced Skylab Applications. - STATEMENT OF CHARLES R. ABLE, CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EX- ECUTIVE OFFICER, McDONNELL DOUGLAS ASTRONAUTICS CO., ACCOMPANIED BY CHARLES W. HUTTON, WICE PRESIDENT (MARKETING), GEORGE BUTLER, SKYLAB PROGRAM MANAGER, McDONNELL DOUGLAS ASTRONAUTICS CO., AND JOHN DISHER, SKYLAB PROGRAM MANAGER, NASA Mr. ABLE. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to appear before this committee. I had the pleasure of appearing before this same com- mittee last year. As you know, I am here representing the McDonnell Douglas Co. The Astronautics Co. is a division of the McDonnell Douglas Corp. Our corporate management activities are centered in St. Louis. Our Astronautics Co.'s activities are headquartered in Huntington Beach, Calif. We also have major facilities in St. Louis, Mo., and Titusville, Fla. We have substantial testing activities at Vandenberg, White Sands, Cape Kennedy, and the Kwajalein Islands. My testimony today will cover the Skylab Program, the major Manned Space program in which the Astronautics Co. is involved. Accompanying my testimony for inclusion in the record are detailed Statements on the Skylab program, as well as two other programs in which we have a major interest; the Space Shuttle program which we believe is one of the most important programs in the country, where we are one of the competitors for the HO tanks to be developed in Michoud, La., and the space tug, a component part of the future manned space operational system. - Before I discuss the Skylab program I would like to discuss some personal views. When the engineering community tries to optimize a 404 certain function with regard to how each contributes to the overall solution of a problem, we attempt to analyze those individual parts and put them together in their relationship to the whole, in what we call systems analysis. The space program is a component part of the national equation. I strongly believe that the space contribution in this equation has not been fully appreciated or understood by the American people. The current national economic planning is based upon the concept of full employment. Full employment, or anything close to it in an industrial society, can only be accomplished by continual upgrading of individual skills so that the opportunities always exist for those with lower skills to upgrade themselves. The space program challenged the American worker with the highest skill levels ever attained in the his– tory of man. Those workers with advanced capabilities were trained and educated in the most advanced technologies and manufacturing techniques. They utilized innovation and pushed the frontiers of knowledge and production. Their demand for more information and techniques stimulated the growth of educational institutions, and their movement into highly skilled jobs created the opportunity for those in lower skilled jobs. Critics of the space program seldom see it as a people industry. Yet, I know this committee is fully aware, 72 percent of the space dollar finds its way into the payrolls. Space is not a limited program for scientists and engineers, who represent only 13 percent of the space program dollars. We all know it provides employment for machinists, truckers, construction workers, manufacturing job shops, accountants, maintenance personnel, and almost any tradesman in the Nation. The Nation’s entire work force was upgraded by the challenge of space. And yet, as the Nation seeks “full employment” and maximum use of the talents of each individual, the number of people employed on NASA programs has declined to approximately 127,000 from a peak of 420,000. The majority of the former space employees have reentered the work force with jobs in which they are technologically underemployed, and by doing so have bumped less qualified employees in other in- dustries, or in some cases are unable to obtain a job because the employer in outside activities has a degree of suspicion that if this worker has an opportunity to go back to the space industry he will leave him. The net effect is like falling dominoes, with those having lower skill levels losing the most. In the aerospace industry alone we estimate we have lost the equivalent of 2 million years of formal technological training and 6 million years of technological experience. I would hesitate to estimate the underutilization of the entire domestic work force from this lack of emphasis on a national technological challenge. I would seriously question whether the United States or any nation can afford this incredible waste of human resources. It is of interest to note that the lowest unemployment rate in the decade occurred during NASA’s peak expenditure year. - One of the principal goals of this Nation is economic growth. We are faced with increasing foreign competition in both our overseas and domestic marketplaces. Technology not only stimulates the economic growth by creating new products and new industries, but increases the productivity of our work force so that they can meet the challenges of low-cost foreign labor markets. . 405 Space-developed technologies and materials have been applied to every aspect of our lives and economic products from the medical sciences, surgery techniques, to transportation, and on and on, the fallouts from the space program. Very seldom do you associate NASA research in optically ground plastics with contact lenses, heat shield reentry materials with dental fillings, space suit design with perma- press, or microelectronic wristwatches that will not only revolutionize the watch manufacturing industry but have the potential to move that industry back to the United States where it started. The simple fact is that applications of space technology and manufacturing techniques to commercial products have been consistent contributors to the economic health of the Nation. In the early sixties, just prior to the Nation's setting the manned lunar landing goal, the state of the economy was described as “gallop- ing sluggishness.” In just 5 years after the lunar goal was set, when NASA was in its peak funding year, the economy was experiencing its fastest growth in the decade. The space industry has contributed advanced production training devices that improved the learning curves, automated devices that increased the productivity of labor, new processing techniques that have decreased the time in manufacture, and new product develop- ment that provided a cheaper way to accomplish the same task. I would like to divert from my prepared testimony, a moment here and illustrate just one example. As we all know, the common discussion today is the so-called energy crisis, and in looking for new fuels and fuel supplies, many of the major oil companies have made associations with the natural gas fields in the Middle East and else- where. The most economic and productivitywise way to transport that is by liquefying natural gas. About 5 years ago one of the major oil companies, American Oil Co., went to NASA and asked what had been developed in the way of insulating materials that would be of use to them, and they were referred to us in connection with the foam fiberglass material that we developed for the Saturn TVB tank, which is an internal installation technique. We could not find it available anywhere in the synthetic materials area; we had to develop it ourselves. And we have been working with American Oil for the past 4 years in developing cryo- genic insulation to go in these big natural gas tankers that would increase its operating efficiency by almost 50 percent over the existing insulation system. Mr. Fuqu A. And make it less expensive to the consumer? Mr. ABLE. And make it less expensive. They estimate we can save about $5 million per tanker, while increasing its productivity. Mr. Fuqu A. Per tank load? Mr. ABLE. The cost per tanker would be 5 million less than the present technique, which is only 5 percent; those tankers are about 100 million. But the important thing, it increases the amount of cargo that they can carry, because it has less boil-off and a lighter weight material. This came directly from the space program. You don’t have to look further, really than the electronics industry to see the transistorized, color, 90-channel, large screen TV sets that cost the same a sthe large black-and-white set that you bought 15 years ago, or that nine-band transistorized portable radio you bought --> * \ \ ſº 406 that, if it was hand-wired and contained vacuum tubes, would be too large, too heavy, and too expensive. On the international scene, the space program has contributed to the solution of the balance-of-payments problem. Three of our major foreign trade surplus industries are aircraft, computers, and synthetic materials. Each of these business sectors has received extensive stimulation from the space program when space funding was at its peak. The foreign demand for our high technology products created the most positive balance of trade that we have had in the decade. Again I would like to divert for a minute. I was very pleased and interested in hearing Professor Levy talk about the ESRO operation and the sortie space laboratory. We are fortunate to be a member of one of the teams on that sortie lab, and we have engineering people presently today working with ERNO in Germany. In the field of foreign affairs, the space program has not only given the Nation a method of worldwide communication where various cultures have had a chance to examine and understand each other, but has provided a common challenge of space exploration for the world scientific community. We have all been concerned with moti- vating America and installing again in this country our intense pride and direction. I would suggest that on July 20, 1969, when Neil Armstrong first set foot on the Moon every American, regardless of his economic status or political belief, was proud, and those in other countries took pride in man’s conquest and for the moment stood in awe of the American accomplishment. I hope that these examples of the many contributions of the space program to the overall national goals will be totally recognized by those people in positions of influence and authority. I am personally proud to be a part of the space program. Now I would like to focus specifically on the Skylab program. We at the McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co. are highly enthusi- astic about the value of Skylab. It is more than a link in man’s search for more knowledge about his total environment. It is part of a new decade in which we begin to focus on cost-effective programs to make use of space for direct practical benefits on Earth for the good of all mankind. Before this committee last year I discussed some of the aspects of the Skylab–the number of missions, the crew members and the hardware involvement of the McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co. This information is in submission for the record. Today, I would like to touch on the Skylab highlights as well as reiterate our participation. McDonnell Douglas is responsible for pro- viding the orbital workshop and the air lock module, as well as the payload shroud for the Skylab vehicle. The flight articles for each of these units were shipped to Kennedy Space Center in Florida in the fall of last year. They have now been stacked with the other modules in the vertical assembly building and are currently undergoing inte- gration, testing, and check-out operations. Our astronautics company also designed and developed the Saturn S-IVB which is the second stage of the Saturn 1B launch vehicle that is used to boost the command service module into orbit with the three ºut crew members for rendezvous and docking to the Skylab Cluster. 407 We currently have approximately 2,700 employees working on Skylab with about 52 percent of that population in southern Califor- ; 30 percent in St. Louis, Mo., and 18 percent at the Kennedy Space enter. The launch date for the Skylab has been maintained essentially the same since the last time I was before this committee. A year ago the launch date was April 30, 1973, and currently it is May 14, 1973. As you will recall, there are three separate missions, each involving three astronauts for one 28-day stay in orbit, and two 56-day periods in orbit for a total of 8 months. Skylab will be operational on the cur- rent plan from mid-May of this year to mid-January of next year. Skylab will provide individual rooms for eating, sleeping, personal hygiene, and recreation, enabling members of the crew to work and relax without spacesuits in a weightless environment. During the 8- month mission, there will be three periods of manned operation spearated by two periods of unmanned operation. The Earth Resources Experiments portion of Skylab has continued to receive enthusiasm and interest from engineers, scientists, and colleges throughout the world. During the 8-month mission period, Skylab will fly over 75 percent of the Earth's surface, including the entire United States, except Alaska, all of Africa, Australia, China, most of Europe and South America, and the oceans between these areas. Skylab will pass over each point every 5 days so that time-based variations on Earth can be observed and information gathered relative to agriculture, forestry, geology, geography, air and water pollution, and weather forecasting. - In an effort to make space research results and on-board experiments available to our younger scientific minds, NASA in cooperation with the National Science Teachers Association, developed a program where high School students, grades 9 through 12, competed in a national contest to have their experiments included in the Skylab program. Over 3,600 students submitted experiments, demonstrating their in- terest in space. These were first reduced to 301 regional winners and then 25 national winners were selected. Of these 25 experiments, 11 required onboard flight hardware and the remaining experiments will be carried out with instruments that were previously designed for the Skylab. The scientific data developed from the student experiments and other experiments on Skylab will be available to all of the high school scientific departments. In addition to the student experiments, the Skylab will conduct 290 investigations in 60 experiment areas. Accompanying the earth resources experiments and student ex- periments, Skylab will perform extended biomedical investigations adding to man's knowledge of his adaptability to space, solar ex- periments utilizing the solar telescopes and material processing ex- periments to provide information on manufacturing techniques unique to space which may develop new or greatly improved materials and processes for use on Earth. It is a tribute to NASA and this committee that the residual hard- ware from the Apollo program has been retained so that manned Space options could be preserved in the time between the last flight of Skylab and the first flight of the shuttle. When the results of Skylab are known, and the value of operational space has been established, 408 additional funding could be directed at a second Skylab mission utilizing unassigned Apollo hardware. After the basic Skylab program, NASA will have available three unassigned Saturn 1B vehicles, three Apollo command and service modules, and a complete set of Skylab hardware with a Saturn V booster. NASA is presently conducting a detailed study for long- term, low-cost storage of this hardware providing a capability to launch this hardware within two years after authority if it is so desired. • We have conducted extensive studies utilizing this man-rated, paid- for hardware for a second Skylab mission. The most favorable mission appears to be one that could accommodate experiments and crews from any nation interested in participating. A mission of this type might be funded by a consortium of nations, which could provide opportunities for important international scientific research in col- laboration with other countries, thus expanding international co- operation and contributing to the building of a network of shared Self-interests in international stability and peace among nations. Deviating and departing from my testimony, I had the opportunity several months ago to have a discussion with the British Minister of Aerospace, Hazeltine, a very distinguished, relatively young man, conservative Member of Parliament, Great Britain. He was over in this country, and his interest lay in discussing international coopera- tion in space. He expressed considerable interest in a second Skylab. We have made it very clear that the shuttle priority and the funding on shuttle is a necessity for this country and that we cannot do anything that will detract from that. So to make a long story short, if they bring money, the European consortium, it would be an awfully good invest- ment for them. - We intend to have further discussions with the European consortium in this area. That concludes my testimony, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FUQUA. Thank you, Mr. Able. I appreciate your very fine statement. Let me say that the first part of your statement is very excellent and certainly sums up, I think, the feelings of many Members of Congress on the value of our space program. As you mentioned, 72 percent of the space dollar goes into payrolls. When we fly Skylab or when we go to the Moon it is not a balance-of- payments deficit. No money is spent on the Moon. Mr. ABLE. That is right. Mr. Fuqua. It is all spent right here on the good Earth. Some people have some confusion about that we are probably spending a lot of money out of the country or out of the world. Mr. ABLE. That is right. Mr. FUQUA. I think you make a very good point about the tech- nology that we have gained from it, and certainly your company has been on the forefront of those in the program. I think your comments are very interesting, too, about what is happening to our labor force and the skills that we are not utilizing to their maximum. It is some- thing I think that we need to be aware of, and I hope we can do more about it. On the Skylab B, I was interested in your comments, too, about this, that this would be an opportunity to utilize some equipment, 409 and research and development that we have already put together and at least get some returns on our investments that we have made. And certainly for the international community it would be an excellent source in addition to their space lab, to do something in this second Skylab. I think certainly we should look at that. We have urged NASA very strongly not to dispose of this equipment, and if we can find a less costly method of storing it, which I think we are accomplishing, that we could keep it for future missions, it may have some requirement down the line. When do you think is the last date that we could make a decision on the second Skylab? Mr. ABLE. I think it could be stored for a number of years without any concern as to the quality and reliability of the hardware. One little-known fact, but some of our Saturn TVB's that flew on the Apollo lunar landing mission were built and stored for almost 3 years. And they went through a standard checkout with no problem. So you could well determine—well afford to go through the complete Skylab program itself, evaluate the results and see how you might want to do certain minimum modifications to the experiments based on the data you have already collected. Now, we have been around ourselves and talked to all 78 of the principal scientific investigators who came up with these various experiment packages. Each one of them has expressed that in many cases, without any modification to the experiment, the data bank that we get from the first flight would enable them to set it up in a little º different time schedule to obtain further data which would be of Y8,11162. So I would say, No. 1, we could launch on a normal schedule within 2 years of authorization. It is a little bit of a selling tool, but we always refer to the second Skylab as the Spirit of '76. That would be a nice name. I am not sure that that would be very salable to European countries. Maybe the British. But that is another matter. Mr. Fuqua. How much modification would it take to have more storable there so that the Skylab could be manned for a longer period of time? Possibly more visits. I am not talking about any missions longer than a 56-day period, but the possibility of more visits. Would it take a great deal of modifications? Mr. ABLE. Let me refer to my expert witness, Mr. Butler. Mr. BUTLER. It would depend on many visits. Mr. Fuqua. Certainly. Mr. BUTLER. For additional visits it would require a fair-size modification. There would also be a weight problem. Mr. FUQUA. That is what I was getting at. Are we at the outer limits of our permissible weight? Mr. BUTLER. We are pretty close. We have a very small margin left on weight. I don’t think you could add more than perhaps 5,000 pounds more of storables, and that is not very much. Everything that they use the entire time they are up there has to be carried up when the Skylab is initially launched. The Apollo command module has a very small carrying capability. They now plan to take up film and magnetic tape and bring back film and magnetic tape and urine and feces samples. But that is just about all they are º of carrying both space and weightwise with the command module. 410 Mr. FUQUA. There is not any way they could carry up more storable life support materials? Mr. BUTLER. Sandwiches, maybe, but no big thing. Mr. Fu QUA. Mr. Winn? Mr. WINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Able, I wasn’t here for all your testimony, but I was able to go over it this morning before I left my office. I too, agree with the chairman, that you have hit the nail on the head on a great many of our problems. I wish, if you would, or someone that might be accompanying you, if you could give the committee a little more information about the extended biomedical investigations that you referred to on page 11. I think possibly that this may be one of the first places that we can really make a dent in identifying with the public, because practically everybody is concerned with either their own health or someone in their family. - Mr. ABLE. I will again refer to Mr. Butler. Mr. BUTLER. Well, right now the first flight, the principal thing that people are after is just to find out what the gross effects are of living in the space environment. The principal things that they are doing in space are checking the respiratory system, the cardiovascular system, the blood flow. They have a few tests that will determine if there is any problem in bone marrow—any problem concerned with that. But there are a lot of things that we aren’t doing that the medical people do to people on Earth that I think in any program follow-on we would want to do to a greater degree. Mr. WINN. Other than the length of time, are we doing much differently in the biomedical field than we have done in the reports from the command modules back to the ground? Mr. ABLE. Yes. We do have exercise machines onboard and certain exercise schedules that there was not weigh and volume capability. Mr. WINN. That is because they have more room to move around? Mr. ABLE. More room. Mr. WINN. They are moving around, too, without space suits, which would be different. Mr. ABLE. Exactly. Mr. WINN. I am trying to think of some of the other things that I know about Skylab that would be completely different as far as testing and reporting and monitoring with the ground. Mr. ABLE. Basically they have more medical monitoring equipment to be able to do right on the Skylab cardiograms as a result of exercise. Mr. WINN. That is right, they are doing some of that themselves. Mr. ABLE. They can do that themselves. Mr. WINN. And do it to each other, I presume. Mr. ABLE. Right. . . - - Mr. WINN. So I think there will be some differences. I don’t know whether they will be earth shattering or not at this stage, but it will maybe put us on the track of some improvements in the medical field. - - Mr. BUTLER. I would like to add just a little bit. On the Apollo flights we did urine and feces sampling prior to takeoff and then after the astronauts got back down again. We will be sampling every day. They are going to collect all the feces and ice-cube size 411 samples of urine each day from each astronaut which they will bring back from orbit. So we will have a daily indication of a lot of their body functions. Mr. WINN. Bring back each day? What you mean is they are putting it in storage? Mr. BUTLER. We freeze the urine and we dry the feces, and they will be carried back when the command module comes back. But postanalysis on the ground then would give you a day-by-day track on what their physical condition was. - Mr. WINN. Right. As the time expands. Yes. Many members of the committee have visited the Skylab mockup and we were shown those storage lockers. I think most of us pretty well understand it. You are talking about the new types of material processing experi- ments. Can you enlarge on that a little bit? What types of materials are we talking about? Are we talking about space materials, or the common everyday material? Mr. BUTLER. There are new materials that we are trying to develop. They are trying to grow some fibers, they are trying to weld some materials in a particular environment that we can’t duplicate on Earth. And I don’t know whether we are going to—I will ask John Disher here if we are going to get that experiment on electrophoresis. Mr. DISHER. There is not an electrophoresis experiment specifically. There are several experiments on high purity crystal growth, potential new alloys which could be solified in the zero gravity environment which is nonmiscible here on Earth. There are experiments regarding matrix materials which have the potential for very high strength formation of materials, again which can’t be formed in the one-gravity field here on Earth. - Those are several examples of the manufacturing in the Space experiments. Mr. WINN. After the basic Skylab program—and I am quoting from your page 11—NASA will have available three unassigned Saturn 1B vehicles, three Apollo command and service modules, and a com- plete set of Skylab hardware with a Saturn V booster. And you say NASA is making a detailed study for long term, low-cost storage of this hardware. Has McDonnell Douglas made any studies? Mr. ABLE. Yes. Mr. WINN. What would it cost to put this in mothballs? Mr. ABLE. We have been participating actively with NASA and the other Saturn-Apollo contractors. Mr. WINN. That study is still in process? Mr. ABLE. It is in process, but it is pretty well finalized. Mr. WINN. Without any commitment on the part of your company or NASA, can you give us an idea what we are talking about? I think the committee would like to know. Because a lot of us are interested in a second Skylab. Mr. ABLE. The figures we have been looking at, that I believe represents a reasonable estimate, is in the order of $20 million per year. And that assumes that you do encapsulate the hardware and keep it in an air-conditioned container and periodically check it out— not check out the whole system; just make sure that there is no moisture or damage. 412 Now, you can get many estimates higher than that, but those are associated with maintaining a technical capability. And I don’t think we can afford that. I think we can rebuild it very quickly. Mr. WINN. That is what I was going to ask. Also, have you undertaken any studies as to possible redesign of backup Skylab hardware for other space purposes? Mr. ABLE. Yes. We have looked at a whole series of changes in experimentation. The figures that are roughly Mr. WINN Using this equipment that you have in storage? Mr. ABLE. Using the hardware we have in storage, but substituting new experiments or additional experiments. And that, again, is a question of funding availability. Mr. WINN. Yes. Mr. ABLE. I believe the figures that have been generally accepted by everybody are that it would cost about $500 million of new money to launch the existing Skylab backup hardware with the present experiments with certain minor modifications. Mr. WINN. $500 million? Mr. ABLE. $500 million. - Mr. FREY. Would you yield, Mr. Winn, just a second? Mr. WINN. I would be glad to yield. Mr. FREY. I understand too the value of the equipment we presently have is well over $600 million. Mr. ABLE. Yes, sir. Mr. FREY. Excuse me. - Mr. WINN. No, I think that is a good point. In trying to analyze what time gap we would want there, and if we put this equipment in mothballs and at the cost that you referred to, how long a period of time might we want to do that and how much is it going to cost us? I think a lot of us have been looking at these possibili- ties. The reason I asked the question about redesigning is that I don’t really think that we are going to scratch the surface of the possible experiments that we can conduct from Skylab. Mr. ABLE. Yes. We do have a complete list from minor modifica- tions to experiments to major changes, to new ones; and pay your money and take your choice is pretty much the way it stands. Mr. WINN. I think you have to crawl before you can walk. Mr. ABLE. Right. Mr. WINN. And that is obvious. But I, for one, am very excited about a second Skylab without even improving the first experiments. Weight, of course, is always a problem. What about the weight of the experiments? - Mr. ABLE. I think the experiments that have demonstrated interest we don’t have a problem at this present time. Mr. BUTLER. Theat is true. Mr. ABLE. The real problem, of course, is extended duration. Mr. FREY. Will you yield just 1 second on that point? Mr. WINN. Yes. Mr. FREY. If we didn’t stay up for the whole 56-day period and have three visits of maybe 36 days, could we cut the cost down under the $500 million? Would that have anything to do with it? Would that affect it very much? 413 Mr. ABLE. No. The effect is your number of visits, because you are using a Saturn 1B launch vehicle each time. Mr. FREY. If we just had two visits, what would it do? Mr. ABLE. If we had two visits, Mr. Butler, would you care to guess what that could cost per launch of the Saturn 1B Apollo module? Mr. BUTLER. I don’t know. Let me confer quickly with Mr. Disher here. Mr. DISHER. Those answers are provided for the record in the NASA testimony. º; FREY. Could you give us any estimate, just a rough estimate of it? Mr. DISHER. We will address that in our answer for the record, if we may, sir. I can’t cite an answer. Mr. FREY. Let me just ask you this: Is the launch cost, the $500 million, going to be over $1 hundred million for all three launches? Mr. FLow ERs. Mr. Frey, counsel tells me that we are going to have a hearing that deals with this subject. Mr. FREY. I will wait. Mr. ABLE. I would like to add that McDonnell Douglas feels very strongly the importance of the shuttle program. And with the present problem of funding for the NASA budget, there is just no room at all to take any money away from the shuttle, and it shouldn’t be taken away from the shuttle. I think the second Skylab is only going to make sense if new money can be brought in with no detriment to the shuttle. And hopefully there could be significant European interest. Mr. WINN. Well, I am glad you made that point, because I don’t believe that members of this committee believe in the juggling philos- ophy of let's take money from this program and slip it over into that deal. I think we are trying to figure out where we can have a con- sistency in our space programs. I may sound like a broken record but we are attempting to eliminate the ups and downs and the peaks and valleys that you have been going through for years. For your further information, many of the Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle would support a consistent program if we really could tell what it was going to cost and where it was going to be in 5 or 10 years in the various program areas. I don’t know if that is always possible, because new experiments and new equipment and updating equip- ment, mothballing equipment, all those things cost a lot of money. And I don’t blame the gentleman from Florida for showing concern. We are trying to analyze what the best thing is that we can possibly do. As far as your own company is concerned, what would you say is the effect of the completion of the Skylab program on space-related activities of your own company? Mr. ABLE. We presently have 2,700 people, work force, on the Skylab. Mr. WINN. How is their morale? Mr. ABLE. Good at the moment, because they are so busy getting ready for the launch they haven’t had time to worry about the future. Now, those people are very skilled people. The majority of those will replace and bump other people on our roster because of their skill level. They will come out of other programs. But 2,700 people in the present environment will go out of the door. 93-466 O - 73 - 27 414 Mr. WINN. I was amazed when we visited out there before that even when the programs were being cut back the morale was still pretty good. Mr. ABLE. Morale has been pretty good. Mr. WINN. You all do a fine job. I don’t know how you do it. They don’t know whether they are going to be working in the plant or selling hamburgers somewhere. Mr. ABLE. It is a very difficult thing to do. My timetable, I always recall the end of 1968 in my astronautic company I had 30,000 em- ployees, of which approximately 40 percent were engineers. Today I have 17,000. And I have to go down another 3,000 this year. So it has been a pretty shattering business. - A few years ago when a program we had called Skybolt was can- celed, we dropped from 25,000 people down to 18,000, and let me tell you that that was far easier from a management point of view than dropping from 13,000 down to 10,000, because now we are getting to critical masses. X- I am engaged in a daily exercise of restructuring the organization. We just can’t afford to do some of the things that we have done in the past, consolidating departments. And you can’t lay off from the bottom and keep the top management structure. I had the unfortu- nate experience of having to retire early a year-and-a-half ago three of my considerably experienced vice presidents. They were friends of mine. I don’t know if they still are today. But it is a fact of life. Mr. WINN. In your closing paragraph you talk about opportunities for international cooperation and collaboration and particularly in a second Skylab mission. And as I understood it, you said you had talked to some countries. Thirty-one, or representatives of 31 countries? • Mr. ABLE. No. I believe that was Professor Levy that was referring to those. - Mr. WINN. OK. Mr. ABLE. We ourselves have had considerable discussions with the European consortium, the ESRO and ELDO. We do have an association with ERNO on Germany on the space lab. We are a member of their phase B team. In the pre-shuttle award days we had associations with and support from Aerospacial, Hawker Sidley, and ERNO. We have actively followed this. As I mentioned, the British Minister of Aerospace, Mr. Hazeltine, is specifically greatly interested in this. We have had an informal request come through from Great Britain which we believe came from Mr. Hazeltine, as to the possibility of licensing Delta to be used as the launch vehicle for unmanned space applications. Mr. WINN. Is there any other such interest and inquiries that you can tell the committee? . Mr. ABLE. Well, as this committee may know, I think there was a little uproar here in Washington the other day, but we were accused of selling ICBMs to Japan in one committee the other day. We actually have and have had a United States Government-Japanese Government agreement, and we have licensed the first stage of the Delta, called the Thor, to Japan. They will build it. We are helping them design their upper stages and helping them design their launch 415 º for satellite programs. We have in residence engineers in apan. That has been the extent of our activities in the space field at the present time. Of course we have been involved along with NASA and launched many international unmanned satellites. The British Skynet, which is the military communications systems. The Canadian scientific satellite—we launched two of those, I believe. There is continuing interest in that area. As you may have observed, the European consortium and Euro- pean Space Council feel very strongly that they have to have the ability to launch themselves and push the button. It was expressed to me by Mr. Hazeltine that the next President of the United States might not be willing to provide those launch services and they could not totally depend on that possible change of posture. Mr. WINN. Well, when Chairman Teague and I met with ESRO officials we were not in doubt at all that they wanted that capability. But you are firmly convinced that there is a great opportunity for more and more cooperation. Mr. ABLE. Yes, sir. Mr. WINN. Of course, the problem remains the same, priorities and money. Mr. ABLE. That is right. Mr. WINN. And in my meetings with them I found out that their money problems were just as severe as ours. Mr. ABLE. Right. Mr. WINN. And how they are going to use the money that they have set aside for space research. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FLow ERs. Mr. Frey, do you have any questions, sir? Mr. FREY. Mr. Chairman, I do have a few questions, if I may. First let me say that I think one of the things I have been most proud of and I think this is reflected in this Committee, since it has been stated before by the Chairman and other members, is the tre- mendous job that everybody has performed. Apollo has been amazing to me; with all the cutbacks and people knowing they are losing their job, and yet the last mission had less defects and less problems than any before. It is a real tribute to the work force and I hope that the people who have done the work understand this. Because as you well know, if we had had some problems it would have given the opponents a great chance to destroy what we are trying to do. I hope our words of appreciation get out. We have been looking at the question of a second Skylab. One of the areas that I don’t think has been explored sufficiently is that much of the work on the Skylab relates to areas of critical concern to the entire Congress. For instance, the questions of power and environment which other agencies have responsibility for... I really haven’t seen any pushing by NASA or by the industry, for instance, to go to these other agencies and such and at least start talking about some money. I am talking now of the Department of Commerce and the Department of Transportation as examples. Have you done anything on this? Mr. ABLE. We believe we have done a fair amuont, but. George, may I ask you to comment on that, who you have been visiting? 416 Mr. BUTLER. We have talked to Interior and Commerce on the subject. But not at any great length. We want to put up Skylab A and have it working and have some real proof of the things that we can do for them before we go out in any really agressive manner and talk to these people. Mr. FREY. Do you think after the initial mission but before we send up the second, are we going to have enough of the facts to know whether we have something that is salable? M.Burtºn Yes, I think we will. After the first mission I think We º * Mr. FREY. So at that point we wouldn’t have to wait until Skylab A is completed to make a decision? Mr. BUTLER. No. Mr. FREY. One other thing. You mentioned the fact we can store the residual equipment. But one thing I don’t think you mentioned is about the human resources. Mr. ABLE. Well, it is a cold hard fact of life, we cannot afford to retain people sitting around twiddling their thumbs, neither the Government nor ourselves. And we just have to say that the key Skylab people, most of them, the large majority of them will be retained in other positions. Mr. FREY. But they will be doing other things? Mr. ABLE. They will be doing other things. And we would shift them back over. We have done that before. - - Mr. FREY. But it would cost more money in terms of what we are doing if we put off a decision on Skylab B for, say, a couple years? Mr. ABLE. Yes. As you transfer them over to the other programs and as a new program starts, let’s say a second Skylab, you can’t take all of those people because they are on other important Govern- ment contracts. You have to work a mix. And we have to be sure we don’t dilute the activity of the programs they are on. So you are going to lose some. Mr. FREY. Another question on your statement. You are talking about the loss of skills. Of course one of the favorable items in our balance of trade has been our high technology products. However, one of the reasons that we are down now is that even the export of high technology items is decreasing. Šir ABLE. Right. Mr. FREY. And the way we are going, at least in my opinion, I would like to know yours, it looks as if this is going to continue, and it is going to have a tremendous negative effect on our balance of payments. - Mr. ABLE. Exactly. The amount of competition we are facing from the lower-cost labor market countries, to let our technology slide too is to me a disaster. Mr. FREY. On the basis of that, would you comment on the watch illustration you gave, about moving the industry back here? Would you expand on that for the record? Mr. ABLE. Well, there have been quite a few developments. I think you have seen a lot of the advertisements on little electronic watches that have been developed and are now competing with foreign watches. I don’t want to quote any specific brand. I have seen several of them. They appear to be selling. Mr. FREY. Do you have anything on the percentage of the market that they are starting to recapture? 417 Mr. ABLE. Two basic U.S.-developed technologies are competing for the displays of electronic watches: Light emitting diodes and liquid crystals. Their output is transmitted in seven-bar displays to form alpha numerics. The displays, basic counter circuitry, micro- electronics, power devices, and manufacturing techniques were developed as byproducts of the space/defense electronics industry. The displays which are used in many applications are expected to be a $100 million market by 1976. The electronic watch in the United States is expected to have a 35 percent penetration by the end of the decade. Due to cost breakthroughs, this will represent over a $2 billion market over the next 7 years. There is another significant thing too. I was quite surprised. I don’t know if you gentlemen have noticed, and I don’t have the figures, but the Hewlett-Packard little electronic computer, various versions, has taken away a substantial part of the market from Japan. And it is a very, very efficient little machine. I happen to know one of the directors real well of Hewlett-Packard. He is a semiretired man, Mr. Thomas Pike. He used to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense under Eisenhower. And he arranged for them to send us a demonstration model of one that you—it is very straight- forward for bankers and you can work on bond rates, interest rates, and do it all versus time and the tradeoffs right on your own desk. It is strictly a financial machine. And they have engineering machines, business machines. And they have really penetrated where these Japanese machines had made a big gain. That came out of the Space program. Mr. FREY. What are we going to do with the Skylab A when we are finished? Is there any thoughts at all of putting it in a higher orbit or doing something with it with future use in mind? Mr. ABLE. I believe we estimate—Mr. Butler is it about 3 years before the orbit decays from date of launch? Mr. BUTLER, Those were the original estimates. The later estimates show it is going to stay up longer than that. I don’t know of any plans. You might defer that question to NASA. Mr. FREY. How long do the figures show it will stay up now? Mr. BUTLER. I think it is in the order of 5 or 6 years now. It would be tumbling, and not in a stable flight attitude probably after, oh, maybe a year and a half, though. Mr. FREY. Basically unusable? Mr. BUTLER. Yes. It would be very risky to go up and try to jump on while it was going around. Mr. FREY. I would as soon not, myself. Mr. FLOWERs. Thank you, Mr. Frey. I was going to ask about the possibility of achieving a higher earth orbit, and it seems that that possibility is pretty much foreclosed, then, unless we had a tug or something to haul it up there quickly. Mr. Able and others representing your company, thank you for being with us. We will reconvene on March 13th in room 2318, with Colonel Stelling of the Air Force and the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Mr. Hartford, Executive Secretary, Mr. Gray, Administrator, and Mr. Leighton, the Senior Research Engineer. [The formal presentation of McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co. follows: 418 PRESENTED TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE FOR MANNED SPACE FLIGHT CHAIRMAN: CONGRESSMAN DON M. FUQUA MARCH 8, 1973 419 SKYLAB IS THE NATION'S FIRST LONG TERM MANNED EARTH ORBITAL FACILITY. IT IS AN EXPERIMENTAL SPACE STATION, DESIGNED TO PROVIDE A COMFORTABLE SHIRTSLEEWE ENVIRONMENT FOR A THREE-MAN CREW FOR PERIODS OF UP TO 56 DAYS IN EARTH ORBIT. THE PROGRAM HAS TWO MAJOR OBJECTIVES. THE FIRST IS TO ExTEND MAN'S SPACE FLIGHT CAPABILITIES. THIS WILL INVOLVED AN ASSESSMENT OF MAN'S OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES AS WELL AS EXTENSIVE BIO-MEDICAL ExPERIMENTS TO DETERMINE THE EFFECT OF LONG TERM SPACE ACTIVITIES ON THE HUMAN BODY. THE SECOND MAJOR OBJECTIVE IS TO CONDUCT SCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENTS IN WHICH THE SUN, EARTH, AND CELESTIAL SPACE WILL BE STUDIED. THE SKYLAB "CLUSTER" IS SHOWN AS IT WILL APPEAR IN ORBIT. THE MAJOR LIVING QUARTERS AND EXPERIMENT AREAS ARE CONTAINED IN THE LARGEST SECTION OF THE SKYLAB, THE ORBITAL WORKSHOP, DEVELOPED BY THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS ASTRONAUTICS COMPANY IN HUNTINGTON BEACH. THE CONTROL CENTER IS LOCATED IN THE CENTER SECTION, THE AIRLOCK MODULE, DEVELOPED BY THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS ASTRONAUTICS COMPANY IN ST. LOUIS. THE SKYLAB WILL BE LAUNCHED UNMANNED ON A TWO STAGE SATURN W. THE CREW WILL RIDE INTO SPACE ABOARD AN APOLLO COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE LAUNCHED BY THE SMALLER SATURN IB WEHICLE. 420 THERE ARE SEVERAL KEY FEATURES OF SKYLAB THAT SET IT APART AS A UNIQUE, ONE OF A KIND SPACECRAFT. fºcºPowavel.a. Mool/GLAs ASTRORMALyrics Corvº PARMY KEY FEATURES OF SKYLAB SA-5660 BIOMEDICAL, SOLAR, EARTH RESOURCES EXPERIMENTS TWO GAS, 5 PSI ATMOSPHERE ATTITUDE CONTROL BY CMG'S WITH COLD GAS SUPPORT ELECTRICAL POWER FROM TWO SETS OF SOLAR ARRAYS REAL TIME AND RECORDED TM AND TV ACTIVE COOLING OF ATMOSPHERE AND EQUIPMENT C02 REMOVAL BY MOLECULAR SIEVE EXPENDABLES FULLY STOCKED AT LAUNCH 421 THE SKYLAB WILL OPERATE IN SPACE FOR APPROXIMATELY EIGHT MONTHS, DURING WHICH TIME THERE WILL BE THREE MANNED MISSIONS AND TWO PERIODS OF UNMANNED OPERATION. IN ALL, THERE WILL BE A TOTAL OF 140 MANNED DAYS OF OCCUPANCY DURING THE EIGHT MONTH PERIOD. MISSION PROFILE WORKSHOP ACTIVATION & OPERATION C 3i ętº Qºrº ſ O Šà | | [\ | SL1 S - sº SATURN CSM CSM CSM WORKSHOP (MANNED) [MANNED) [MANNED) (UNMANNED] | A | | i l | I O 1 * 3 4 5 6 7 8 TIME (MONTHS) 422 THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS ASTRONAUTICS COMPANY IS HEAVILY INVOLVED IN THE SKYLAB PROGRAM AND IS COMMITTED TO ITS SUCCESS AS AMERICA'S FIRST SPACE STATION. IN ADDITION TO FURNISHING TWO SETS OF HARDWARE FOR THE SKYLAB CORE WEHICLE (ORBITAL WORKSHOP, AIRLOCK MODULE, AND PAYLOAD SHROUD), THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS ASTRONAUTICS COMPANY ALSO PROVIDES THE S-IVB, SECOND STAGE OF THE CREW WEHICLES. MCDONNELL DOUGLAS INVOLVEMENT IN SKYLAB 423 THE ORBITAL WORKSHOP CONTRACT RESPONSIBILITIES INCLUDE TWO SETS OF FLIGHT HARDWARE AND WARIOUS NONFLIGHT EQUIPMENT. THE AIRLOCK MODULE CONTRACT RESPONSIBILITIES ARE SIMILAR. *:::::::: SKYLAB-ORBITAL WORKSHOP SA-2702 *::::::::::c- CONTRACT RESPONSIBILITIES • TWO SETS OF FLIGHT HARDWARE • ORBITAL WORKSHOP - FLIGHT • ORBITAL WORKSHOP - BACKUP • NONFLIGHT HARDWARE • MOCKUP - HIGH FIDELITY • 1-G TRAINER * e CREW SYSTEMS EVALUATION LABORATORY - LOW FIDELITY * ZERO-G TEST HARDWARE e NEUTRAL BUOYANCY TEST HARDWARE e DYNAMICS TEST ARTICLE • DEVELOPMENT FIXTURE • GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT • DEVELOPMENT AND QUALIFICATION TEST ITEMS • ‘INTERFACE MANAGEMENT OF DESIGNATED EXPERIMENTS 424 THE MDAC HARDWARE HAS MET THE SCHEDULED PROGRAM MILESTONES. *:::::::: SKYLAB PROGRAM SA-6061 “…-- MDAC MILESTONES 3–7–73 1970 1971 1972 1973 1 || 2 || 3 || 4 || 1 || 2 | 3 2 || 3 || 4 || 1 || 2 || 3 CRITICAL DESIGN REVIEWS |. DELIVER DYNAMIC TEST 12–4 || 4-1 5-15 ARTICLES Al A. A OWS, AMPS PAYLOAD SHROUD (PS) 9-22 ACCEPTED BY NASA A ORBITAL WORKSHOP (OWS) 9-8 TO KSC A AIRLOCK MODULE (AM) b. TO KSC A LAUNCH SKYLAB NO. 1 º BACKUPS READY FOR MISSION SUPPORT 4-30 OF SKYLAB NO. 1 |A | 425 THE ORBITAL WORKSHOP (OMS) SERVES AS THE LIVING QUARTERS AND EXPERIMENT OPERATIONS AREA FOR SKYLAB. INDIVIDUAL ROOMS FOR EATING, WASTE MANAGEMENT, AND SLEEPING ARE PROVIDED. A LARGE VOLUME OF STOWAGE CAPACITY IS PROVIDED FOR FOOD, WATER, CLOTHING, TRASH BAGS, AND EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT. THE ONS FLIGHT UNIT IS SHOWN AS IT APPEARED FOLLOWING FINAL ASSEMBLY. ORBITAL WORKSHOP N. OWS AFTER º - º FNAL ASSEMBLY Z * 426 THE AIRLOCK MODULE (AM) IS THE CONTROL CENTER FOR THE SKYLAB POWER, ENVIRONMENTAL, LIFE SUPPORT, INSTRUMENTATION, AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM. THE AIRLOCK GETS ITS NAME FROM THE FEATURE WHICH PERMITS THE CREWMEN TO GO OUTSIDE THE WEHICLE FOR EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY WITHOUT DEPRESSURIZING THE ENTIRE SKYLAB. THE FLIGHT VEHICLE WAS MATED WITH THE MULTIPLE DOCKING ADAPTER AT THE MDAC ST. LOUIS FACILITY AND IS SHOWN AS IT APPEARED PRIOR TO ALTITUDE CHAMBER TEST.S. - alſº ºf º 427 THE SKYLAB PAYLOAD SHROUD WAS DEVELOPED AT MCDONNELL DOUGLAS ASTRONAUTICS COMPANY., HUNTINGTON BEACH TO PROVIDE LAUNCH PROTECTION AND SUPPORT FOR THE APOLL0 TELESCOPE MOUNT (ATM) AND TO SERVE AS AN AERODYNAMIC FAIRING OWER THE MULTIPLE DOCKING ADAPTER (MDA) AND AIRLOCK MODULE. THE TECHNIQUE USED TO SEPARATE AND JETTISON THE PAYLOAD SHROUD AWOIDS CONTAMINATION OF THE PAYLOAD THROUGH USE OF AN EXPANDING BELLOWS WHICH PROVIDES THE REQUIRED THRUST. THE FLIGHT UNIT SHROUD IS IN THE FOREGROUND AND THE SHROUD BACKUP UNIT CAN BE SEEN IN THE BACKGROUND. 428 THE INTERIOR OF THE ORBITAL WORKSHOP FLIGHT UNIT IS HIGHLIGHTED IN THE FOLLOWING SERIES OF PHOTOGRAPHS. 30-MED EXPERMENT ACCOMMDATIONS JRBIAL WORKSHOP Mºst cºlº ºn Pºssºs 93-466 O - 73 - 28 ºn wº SLEEP COMPARTMENT 431 ºRBIAL WORKSHOP ENERTAINMENT ： ~ [−] №. |- […] №. WORKSHOP º CREW SHOWER 432 ORBA WORKSHOP º'ELS AND WIPES 433 ASTRONAUTS ROBERT L. CRIPPER, KARL J. BOBK0 AND DR. WILLIAM E. THORNTON ARE SHOWN AS THEY EMERGED FROM THE 56 DAY SKYLAB MEDICAL EVALUATION AND ALTITUDE TEST (SMEAT) AT THE MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER IN HOUSTON, TEXAS. THE EQUIPMENT AND WORK PROCEDURES TO BE USED DURING THE ACTUAL SKYLAB MISSIONS WERE SIMULATED. 20 F00T CHAMBER - 434 THE KSC SCHEDULE FOR THE ORBITAL WORKSHOP AND AIRLOCK MODULE ARE AS SHOWN. fºLºcºfºº & E- ººgººsº. As & S A-6064 Assyrºorºgatyrics KSC FLOW 3–7–73 1972 1973 SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR OWS 9/25 1-29 MECHANICAL TESTS-1 L 7 POWER-ON TESTS_ 13 STOWAGE & ACCFF_ [T] PAD | AMIMDA I0/9 29 MSOB [ r T 13 VAB | | | 435 THE MANUFACTURING WORK PLAN FOR THE OWS-BACKUP UNIT HAS AN ASSEMBLY COMPLETION DATE OF MARCH 30, 1973. THE EFFORT IS ON SCHEDULE. ORBITAL WORKSHOP ;: MANUFACTURING WORK PLAN - BACKUP UNIT 1972 1973 J|F |M|A |M|J|J|A |S| 0 |N|D|J|F|M|A | M|J|J |A|S| 0 |N|D |-- FUNCTIONAL ſ VERIFICATION H MISSION SUPPORT INSTALLATIONS SKYLAB NO. 1 N N N N TIN 436 THE STATUS OF THE OWS-BACKUP UNIT CAN BE SEEN IN THE FOLLOWING SERIES OF PHOTOGRAPHS. ºf - a sº **s ºr " Cºl. WORKSHOP Backup -- - º - - 437 JRBIAL WORKSHOP - BACKUP NSILLATIONS FORWARD SKR ORBITAL WORKSHOP BACKUP INSTALLATIONS UPPER LEVEL ORBITAL WORKSHOP BACKUP INSTALLATIONS L0WER LEVEL ORBITAL WORKSHOP BACKUP INSTALLATIONS LOWER LEVEL - - - - * , º - - º tº - -- - - | - º 439 AM tº sºººººººº-º- ºfºº Ats Astrºon/A&/7 fes convºatavy THE AIRLOCK/MULTIPLE DOCKING ADAPTER BACKUP UNIT WORK PLAN IS AS SHOWN. SCHEDULED TO BE ASSEMBLED AND CHECKED OUT BY APRIL 30, 1973 TO BE USED FOR MISSION SUPPORT DURING THE SKYLAB FLIGHTS. THE EFFORT IS ON SCHEDULE. *:::::::: AIRLOCK/MULTIPLE DOCKING ADAPTER “.…-- WORK TEST PLAN – BACKUP UNIT 1972 SEPT | OCT | NOW | DEC | JAN FEB THE BACKUP IS SA-6063 3–7–73 1973 | MAR APR 8 152229 5 13.20.273 10 1725 1 8 15 22:29 5 12 1926 2 9 1623 2 9 1623.30 5 13.2027 4 L I i Ll l l l l l l I 1–1–1–1–1–1- 1 I L I L | | | | | | | | | | | MATE AM/MDA [] (11-7) AM INSTALLATIONS H (12–17) SYSTEM ASSURANCE TESTS EREP INSTALLATIONS & CHECKOUT (1–30) SlMULATED FLIGHT TESTS (3–9) (4-14) 440 THE AIRLOCK MODULE BACKUP UNIT IS SHOWN AS IT APPEARED AFTER FINAL ASSEMBLY. º Bºº Sºº sººn 441 THE AIRLOCK MODULE AND MULTIPLE DOCKING ADAPTER BACKUP UNITS ARE SHOWN AS THEY APPEARED PRIOR TO BEING MATED. ſae º |- |---- ： （~~~~ № |- ， º º ： W. |- ſ. | ſ. 442 THE AUTHORIZED EXPENDITURES FOR THE ORBITAL WORKSHOP, AIRLOCK MODULE, AND KSC LAUNCH ACTIVITY IS AS SHOWN. DEVELOPMENT, FABRICATION, ASSEMBLY AND CHECKOUT. THIS REPRESENTS OVER FIVE YEARS OF EFFORT, INCLUDING DESIGN, ALL EFFORT IS WITHIN CURRENT BUDGETS. *:::::: SKYLAB PROGRAM SA-1691 ...” ExPEN DITURES PLUS FEE (AUTHORIZED) CUM （ºſ) LARS 1970 | 1971 | 1972 |→ | 1974 """ºf MAM,Asſon ºf MAM, Jason duFM/AM Jason plufmams. Aslon duFM/AMJ isiºns ~~£; $744.0 Awar."r" & ,” 22. ºvar- ~~ $710. 9 2r 600! AM 400 Ez--- *}=4|1$413.2- OWS 200 443 THE HISTORY AND FUTURE PREDICTION OF MDAC MANPOWER FOR SKYLAB SHOWS THE MANPOWER LEVELS ACTUALLY PEAKED IN MAY, 1972. Zº N. ^\ SA-1371 SKYLAB PROGRAM MDAC MANPOWER SUMMARY 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 A 2–18–72 /...A ACTUALS Neº- \\ OPERATIONS \\ T.e.” _T NS 2 lºcal - 444 THE MDAC SKYLAB PERSONNEL ARE DISTRIBUTED THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES AS SHOWN. SKYLAB PROGRAM - O/W-3592A ACTIVE MDAC LOCATIONS TOTAL MANPOWER ST. LOUIS N} O O HUNTSVILLE l,606 -—ſ - .NKSC 24OUSION 445 THE HISTORY AND FUTURE PREDICTION OF TOTAL MDAC EMPLOYMENT ARE AS SHOWN. *::::::: SA-6076 l 1972 1973 1974 50,000 1969 1970 197 97 9 40,000 30,000; 20,000 - - All 9THER -u ENGINEERING - 10,000 MANUFACTURING 0. |TOTAL | 26025 TT 20850TT5450TT3750T BOOOTB270 T. (AVERAGES PER YEAR) 93-466 O – 73 – 29 446 MANY OF THE REQUIREMENTS PLACED UPON THE SKYLAB/ORBITAL WORKSHOP ARE UNIQUE. THE WEHICLE IS LARGER, MORE SOPHISTICATED, AND MUST PERFORM WELL FOR A GREATLY EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME, COMPARED TO PREVIOUS MANNED SPACECRAFT. *:::::::: - SKYLAB SA-6065 “…-- UNIQUE ASPECTS e LARGEST VOLUMESPACECRAFT EVER PLACED IN EARTH ORBIT e EXCEEDS PREVIOUS MANNED DURATION BY A FACTOR OF TEN • CAPABILITY FOR ON ORBIT UNMANNED STORAGE, REACTIVATION AND REUSE e SYSTEMS ACTIVE FOR 8 MONTHS e SPECIFIC FEATURES PROVIDED FOR HABITABILITY e OWS LOADED AND SECURED SEVERAL WEEKS PRIOR TO LAUNCH e SMALL NUMBER OF PRODUCTION VEHICLES 447 SECOND SKYLAB Atºcºonººſell-ſi. Lºgougiº. As Astrºorº/ALWTTC's © ºaf MY MAN-RATED HARDWARE IS CURRENTLY AWAILABLE TO SUPPORT A SECOND SKYLAB MISSION. HOWEVER, IF IT IS TO BE AVAILABLE FOR MID-1970 FLIGHT, THIS HARDWARE MUST BE PROPERLY STORED AND MAINTAINED THE LAST SATURN W LAUNCH, APOLLO 17, IS SCHEDULED FOR DECEMBER 6, 1972. EARLY DISMANTLING OF THE SATURN W LAUNCH FACILITY AT KSC WOULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE SECOND SKYLAB PLAN. THE SATURN IB CAPABILITY IS MAINTAINED WITH THE LAUNCH OF THE APOLLO SOYUZ TEST PROJECT IN 1975. PRECURSOR DISCUSSIONS WITH WARIOUS SCIENTISTS, ENGINEERS, AND SPACE ENTHUSIASTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD HAS RESULTED IN A STRONG DESIRE TO PARTICIPATE IN A SECOND SKYLAB MISSION. IT IS BELIEVED THAT AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF FLIGHT OPPORTUNITY CALLING FOR WORLD-WIDE PARTICIPATION IN A SECOND SKYLAB WOULD RESULT IN AN OVERWHELMING RESPONSE OF TECHNICAL EXPERIMENTS WHICH BENEFIT MANKIND. SINCE THE BACKUP AND UNASSIGNED SATURN/APOLLO HARDWARE IS MAN-RATED AND PAID FOR, THE SECOND SKYLAB CAN BE FLOWN FOR APPROXIMATELY 20 PERCENT THE COST OF SKYLAB-A. AND SINCE THE SECOND SKYLAB OFFERS THE OPPORTUNITY FOR INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION AND HAS THE CAPABILITY TO MORE THAN DOUBLE THE RESEARCH OBTAINED FROM SKYLAB-A, IT REPRESENTS A HIGHLY COST-EFFECTIVE MANNED SPACE PROGRAM. AMſcLºonºº. . a-ºe- SECOND SKYLAB gºoftºnwy FOR A SECOND SKYLAB - WE MUST HAVE: • A COMPLETE AND AVAILABLE SET OF FLIGHT HARDWARE • A LOGISTICS SYSTEM - CSM * A LAUNCH CAPABILITY - SATURN WAND S-IB / CSM * A STRONG POLITICAL JUSTIFICATION WITH SOUND TECHNICAL OBJECTIVES A REASONABLE COST S/L-47] 448 AMycodofºrºsiº.L. tº Cººl fºsſº. As AstrºCA/AGL/Tiſcs corºa Rººf CONDUCTING A SECOND SKYLAB MISSION IN CONSONANCE WITH THE APOLLO SOYUZ TEST PROJECT REPRESENTS AN IDEAL COST-EFFECTIVE METHOD OF CONDUCTING TWO PROGRAMS AT A VALUE SIGNIFICANTLY LESS THAN TWO INDEPENDENT MISSIONS. AFTER COMPLETING THE APOLLO SOYUZ TEST PROJECT MISSION, THE CSM COULD RENDEZVOUS AND DOCK WITH SKYLAB FOR AN EXTENDED MANNED MISSION. THE ASTRONAUTS COULD CONDUCT WARIOUS EXPERIMENTS, BOTH UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONALLY ORIENTED. THIS MISSION MAY ALSO BE LOOKED AT AS AN INSURANCE POLICY TO INSURE THAT A CSM LAUNCH IS NOT WASTED IN THE EVENT THE APOLLO SOYUZ TEST PROJECT MISSION IS NOT SUCCESSFUL. *:::::::: INTERNATIONAL SKYLAB MISSION ~~~~ WITH USSR Soyuz (ASTRONAUTS) —- ſ t A t jº" | | W º | | | ſ : | * SOYUZ - CSM | | SKYLAB CSM SUYUZ S/L-552 449 fy coorv RJEE R. poºfesù. As AstrºroRMAUrics corºlºarº Y WITH THE UTILIZATION OF UNASSIGNED SATURN/APOLLO AND SKYLAB HARDWARE, THE UNITED STATES HAS THE CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE A SPACE STATION FOR WORLD-WIDE PARTICIPATION. THIS FACILITY CAN DEVOTE A MAJOR PORTION OF ITS RESEARCH CAPABILITY TO INTERNATIONAL EXPERIMENTS DEDICATED TO EARTH RESOURCES, COMMUNICATIONS, NAVIGATION, WEATHER FORECASTING, EDUCATION, ETC. WHAT BETTER WAY TO CELEBRATE THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 200TH ANNIVERSARY THAN BY GIVING TO ALL THE EARTH'S PEOPLE A MULTI-NATIONAL SPACE STATION, DEDICATED TO THE PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF PRESSING WORLD PROBLEMS. e rºcºorºº Rºſie LL Jºoſ ſcº. As INTERNATIONAL SKYLAB OBJECTIVES AstrºporºſalſTV.cs cofºafºy • PROVIDE AN EARTH ORBITING FACILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE RESEARCH e CAPITALIZE ON THE USE OF AVAILABLE AND PAID-FOR HARDWARE e PROVIDE MEANINGFUL MANNED RESEARCH OPERATIONS WHILE SHUTTLE IS BEING DEVELOPED e PROVIDE FLIGHT DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED SUBSYSTEMS e SPACE SPECTACULAR TO FOCUS ON BICENTENNIAL CELEBRATION S/L-545 450 McDoRMNELL aéoùugº As As7 tºon/A&AETºcs conymparvy THE CURRENT NASA PLAN FOR MANNED SPACE FLIGHTS SHOWS A SIGNIFICANT GAP IN MID-TO-LATE 1970' S. THIS WILL BE DETRIMENTAL TO MAINTAINING LAUNCH CAPABILITY, ASTRONAUT EXPERTISE, AND NATIONAL INTEREST IN OUR SPACE PROGRAM. A SECOND SKYLAB REPRESENTS A COST-EFFECTIVE PROGRAM TO FILL THIS GAP AND MAINTAIN OUR MANNED SPACE FLIGHT EXPERTISE AND NATIONAL INTEREST. sº Cº Lºs Las MANNED SPACE PROGRAMS As Tº OA/A ºf rºcs coaº Paav ºf * SKYLAB |NTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION APOLL0 S0YUZ TEST PROGRAM SKYLAB-A APOLL0 1968-72 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 SHUTTLE 1978 1979 S/L-57. 451 AM/coºrºº Elº. L fººt LIGILAS AsTrººſ/A&Jºcs * conyſiºlºgy THE SKYLAB BACKUP HARDWARE HAS A CAPABILITY OF PERFORMING A SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL SKYLAB MISSION BY ACCOMMODATING A SOYUZ SPACECRAFT FOR A PERIOD OF 28 DAYS OR LONGER (TIME CONTINGENT ON SOYUZ CAPABILITY). SKYLAB'S CURRENT ORBIT INCLINATION OF 50 DEGREES IS COMPATIBLE WITH SOYUZ LAUNCHES OF 51.6 DEGREES. A 1.6 DEGREE CHANGE IN ORBIT INCLINATION FOR SKYLAB AND CSM WOULD RESULT IN ONLY SLIGHT DECREASES IN PAYLOAD CAPABILITY. IN ADDITION, IT APPEARS THAT SOYUZ HAS THE CAPABILITY TO RENDEZVOUS AND DOCK AT AN ORBIT ALTITUDE OF 235 NAUTICAL MILES. THIS ORBIT PROVIDES SUFFICIENT LIFETIME FOR TWO CSM AND SOYUZ VISITS. *:::::::: - SEC0ND SKYLAB “…-- CSM DUAL RENDEZVOUS MISSION 235 N.R.M. –- e- - - -> tº-º-e ––7--------> flºw ºf 3 125N.M. —- 2- - --> * * = (ASTP) :4.+ſ %22zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz SKYLAB SOYUZ CSM S/L-404A 452 rwcoorvivºs-L. Logouºlº. As Aş’ rººftº fºr ſcs convºarvy THE INCREASING INTEREST IN WORLD-WIDE COOPERATION IN SPACE IS IDEALLY COMPATIBLE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL SKYLAB ROLE. SKYLAB's 12,000 CU/FT OF LIVING AND WORKING SPA MULTI-NATIONAL CREWS FOR EXTENDED PERIODS. ... ...— NASA'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PARTICIPATION BY UNITED STATES HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS IN THE SKYLAB PROGRAM RECEIVED ENTHUSIASTIC RESPONSE FROM ALL ENGLISH SPEAKING COUNTRIES. ALTHOUGH FOREIGN COUNTRIES WERE NOT OFFERED THE CHANCE TO PARTICIPATE, THEIR EXPRESSION OF INTEREST TO DO SO WAS OVERWHELMING. --ºe- . INTERNATIONAL SKYLAB MISSION POLITICAL JUSTIFICATION: | • OFFER JOINT USA/USSR DOCKING AND SHARED OCCUPANCY FOR EXTENDED PERIODS e OFFER MULTI-NATIONAL CREW PARTICIPATION • OFFER WORLDWIDE AVAILABILITY OF DATA FROM SKYLAB EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT - • OFFER TO INSTALL AND OPERATE SELECTED EXPERIMENTS PROVIDED BY WORLDWIDE SOURCES e SELECT STUDENT SCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENTS ON WORLDWIDE BASIS S/L-548 453 McDCPAMAMELL. fºot-ſºº Ais AstrºonſalſTiſcs corºatºry THE NATION HAS INVESTED MILLIONS OF DOLLARS FOR EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT CURRENTLY INSTALLED ON SKYLAB-A. THE FULL CAPABILITY OF THIS EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT WILL NOT BE FULLY REALIZED ON SKYLAB-A DUE TO MISSION TIME RESTRICTIONS. ALTERNATE USES OR OBJECTIVES WHICH PROVIDE BENEFITS TO THE MAN-0N-THE-STREET COULD BE EMPHASIZED ON A SECOND MISSION. THE UNITED STATES HAS DEDICATED ITSELF TO THE CONTINUATION OF SPACE OPERATIONS. A SECOND SKYLAB OFFERS A PERFECT MULTI-NATIONAL FACILITY TO DEVELOP ADVANCED SYSTEMS AND EXPERIMENTS THAT WILL BE USED ON SPACECRAFT IN THE 1980'S TO CONTINUE THE UNITED STATES LEAD IN MANNED SPACE FLIGHT EXPLORATIONS. AMºtºººº. E. L. L. Jºº LVGº As Akş’ rºoftºyºſcs INTERNATIONAL SKYLAB MISSION corºlºgy TECHNICAL JUSTIFICATION: e CONDUCT MULTI-NATIONAL EXPERIMENTS • PROVIDE UNIQUE DEMONSTRATIONS THAT SHOW WORLD WIDE BENEFITS TO THE MAN-ON-THE-STREET e PROVIDE ALTERNATE USES FOR MAJOR SKYLAB EXPERIMENT HARDWARE (I.E., ATM CELESTIAL) e DEMONSTRATE ADVANCED PROTOTYPE SPACE SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT HARDWARE IN ZERO G • ACCOMMODATE SIMPLE ZERO G CONCEPT VERIFICATION EXPERIMENTS S/L–549 454 AMºcſ dººrºººº-º- fºot ſº. As Asºr RORMALVTECS coºa Rºy HUNDREDS OF LOW-COST EXPERIMENTS WITH SCIENTIFIC RELEWANCE CAN BE IDENTIFIED FOR FLIGHT ON THE SKYLAB MISSIONS. THE FEW LISTED ON THE FACING PAGE ARE TYPICAL EXAMPLES OF EXPERIMENTS WHICH WOULD BE INTERESTING TO THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY. Mycoonſ fºeſ—ſſ. - INTERNATIONAL SKYLAB --...-- CONCEPT VERIFICATION OF SIMPLE ZERO-G EXPERIMENTS CRITERIA • RESULTS OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST • SIMPLE EXPERIMENT HARDWARE • ADAPTABLE TO CARRY-ON SUITCASE TYPE INSTALLATION * SIMPLEOPERATING TEST PROCEDURES - MIN. CREW TIME CANDIDATE ZERO GRAVITY SUITCASE EXPERIMENTS • LOW-G BOILING, FLUID TRANSFER, GAS PHASE MIXING • PHASE SEPARATION, LIQUID IWAPOR, CAVITATION IN BOILING • EMULS10NS AND COLLOIDS, BROWNIAN MOTION • COALESCENCE, EVAPORATION, SPLINTERING, SUPERCOOLED WAPOR PHYSICAL SIMULATION OF ATMOSPHERIC CIRCULATION • WELDING, ELECTROPHORETIC SEPARATION, MATERIAL DEPOSITION SOLIDIFICATION, CRYSTAL GROWTH, El ECTROHYDRODYNAMICS • BACTERIAL GROWTH AND MO, NPHOLOGY * FERTILIZATION, MORPHOGENESIS, LIFE CYCLE AND BEHAVIOR * PLANT LIGNIFICATION AND GROWTH S/L-550 455 fºcíºofſ ºf EELL. DC (UGLAS As Trºof fairy Tºcs corººfy'Y EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT TIME AND MONEY CAN BE SAVED BY EVALUATING PROTOTYPE SUBSYSTEMS IN THE ACTUAL ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH THEY ARE DESIGNED TO FUNCTION. A SECOND SKYLAB REPRESENTS AN IDEAL DEVELOPMENT FACILITY FOR CONDUCTING SUCH EVALUATIONS IN SUPPORT OF FUTURE MANNED AND UNMANNED MISSIONS. THE FACING CHART LISTS A FEW EXAMPLES OF CANDIDATE SYSTEMS THAT COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR FLIGHT IN THE MID-1970'S. - AMC Cocº RNRWELL lºo& JGLAs INTERNATIONAL SKYLAB conſººfyy FLIGHT DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED SYSTEMS CRITERIA • IDENTIFY SHUTTLE | SORTIE LAB - SYSTEMS ADAPTABLE TO SKYLAB • CORRELATE CANDIDATE SYSTEMS WITH GROUND TESTS (E.G., MSFC CONCEPT VERIFICATION TESTS) - * SELECT CAND IDATE SYSTEMS BASED ON AVAILABLE PROTOTYPE HARDWARE - O # ADVANCED SYSTEMS SUITABLE FOR SUITCASE OR SIMPLEMODIFICATION CANDIDATE SYSTEM KITS • WATER RECLAMATION • WASTE CONTROL • TRASH COMPACTION • CARBON MONOX IDE CONTROL • RESISTOJET THRUSTER • ZERO-G PROPELLANT TRANSFER • COMMUNICATIONS e DATA COLLECTION AND TRANSMISSION - S/L-55] 456 -: INTERNATIONAL SKYLAB MISSION --...-- WITH USSR SOYUZ ORBITAL WORKSHOP £yºr CSM RESCUE % CSM DOCKING PORT S/L-542-2 SKYLAB HAS SUFFICIENT FACILITIES TO ACCOMMODATE SIX CREW MEN. HOWEVER, IT MAY BE MORE PRODUCTIVE TO ACCOMMODATE ONLY FOUR MEN AT ONE TIME TO EXTEND THE LIFE TIME OF THE CONSUMABLES IN THE EVENT MULTIPLE WISITS ARE DESIRED. SKYLAB COULD ACCOMMODATE 4 MEN FOR 140 DAYS OR SIX MEN FOR 95 DAYS. IT WOULD BE A SIMPLE PROCEDURE TO STOCK SKYLAB WITH USSR FOOD PRIOR TO LAUNCH TO SATISFY SOVIET DIET REQUIREMENTS. 457 *:::::::: INTERNATIONAL SKYLAB MISSION ...-- SKYLAB | SOYUZ MODIFICATIONS ORBIT PARAMETERS – COMPATIBLE • ALTITUDE 235 NM CIRCULAR • INCLINATION 51.6 DEGREES CREW SIZE – 6 MAN * ALL ASTRONAUTS | COSMONAUTS LIVE IN SKYLAB ADDITIONAL CREW SLEEP QUARTERS ON SECOND FLOOR * USA |USSR FOOD STORED IN SKYLAB CONTAINERS BEFORE LAUNCH 95 MANNED DAYS AVAILABLE WITHOUT MAJOR CHANGES S/L-529-l THE MAJOR M0DIFICATION TO THE SKYLAB CLUSTER IS THE ADDITION OF A DOCKING ADAPTER COMPATIBLE WITH SOYUZ SPACECRAFT. * THE SOYUZ NORMAL OPERATING PRESSURE IS 15 PSIA. THE MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED TO SKYLAB TO BE COMPATIBLE WITH THIS RELATIVELY HIGH PRESSURE COULD RESULT IN A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN COST. THIS PROBLEM IS ALLEWIATED SINCE SOYUZ HAS ITS OWN AIRLOCK SYSTEM, PERMITTING CLOSIRG OFF SOYUZ FROM SKYLAB TO ALLOW OPERATION IN THE SKYLAB CLUSTER AT 5 PSIA WITH NO DAMAGE TO THE SOYUZ SPACECRAFT. OPERATION AT 5 PSIA WOULD REQUIRE PRE-BREATHING OF OXYGEN BY THE COSMONAUTS FOR A COUPLE OF HOURS PRIOR TO TRANSFER FROM THE SOYUZ T0 SKYLAB. MODIFICATIONS TO BOTH THE SOYUZ AND SKYLAB TO AID IN DOCKING THE TWO SPACECRAFT AND FOR GROUND . COMMUNICATION IS REQUIRED BUT ARE MINOR IN NATURE. 458 nºwcºcºorwalie LL ſºot ſºil. As INTERNATIONAL SKYLAB MISSION comeavy SKYLAB | SOYUZ MODIFICATIONS GENERAL e CABIN PRESSURE • SKYLAB 5 PS IA e SOYUZ 15 PSIA • DOCKING ADAPTER PROVIDES PRESSURE CONTROL FOR CREW TRANSFER SKYLAB. • PROVIDE NEW DOCKING ADAPTER e ADD COMPATIBLE RENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING AIDS e RELOCATE MULTIPLE DOCKING ADAPTER RAD IATOR TO FIXED AIRLOCK SHROUD • PROVIDE SLEEPING QUARTERS AND FOOD FOR THREEMORE CREWMEN SOYUZ e ADD DOCKING MECHANISM • PROVIDE COMPATIBLE RENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING AIDS \- S/L-538–1 fºcºonººſier-L- apougº. As As rºorºalſTMcS cofºrºa Aſ ºf \ DURING WISITS TO THE UNITED STATES, AND AT WARIOUS SYMPOSIUMS, FOREIGN NATIONALS HAVE EXPRESSED HIGH INTEREST IN FLYING BENEFICIAL MANNED EXPERIMENTS ON A SECOND SKYLAB. THE CURRENT SKYLAB-A EXPERIMENT HARDWARE IS NOT DIRECTLY AWAILABLE TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN THEIR PURSUIT OF SPECIFIC RESEARCH OBJECTIVES. HOWEVER, IN MANY CASES, BACKUP EXPERIMENT HARDWARE IS AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT A SECOND SKYLAB MISSION. AN INTERNATIONAL SKYLAB COULD MAKE THIS HARDWARE AWAILABLE AT A MINIMAL COST TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES. IN ADDITION, THE SKYLAB-A PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS WOULD BE EXTREMELY PLEASED TO EXPAND THEIR INVESTIGATIONS AND DATA COVERAGE FOR EARTH RESOURCES, SOLAR CYCLES, AND MEDICAL EXPERIMENT AREAS SINCE SKYLAB-A WILL NOT COMPLETELY FULFILL ALL DATA REQUIREMENTS. 459 Avºc ºf Eß-L Loºſdºs Lºs - INTERNATIONAL SKYLAB MISSION AgºsºrºfºalſTV.cs ~~ EXPERIMENT PROGRAM BENEFITS COORD INATED INTERNATIONAL EXPERIMENT PROGRAM IN SKYLAB BASED LABORATORY OFFERS MUTUAL WORLDWIDE BENEFITS: e MULTI-NATIONAL CREW CAN BE CONSIDERED e USA AND INTERNATIONAL NEW CARRY-ON EXPERIMENTS • JoſNTUTILIZATION OF USA/USSR SENSORS FOR WORLDWIDEEARTH RESOURCE SURVEY e MULTI-NATIONAL EXPERIMENTS UTILIZING "PAID FOR" SKYLAB BACKUP EXPERIMENT SENSORS AND EQUIPMENT • EXTENDS SKYLAB-A EXPERIMENT PROGRAM e ADDITIONAL SEASONAL COVERAGE FOR EARTH RESOURCES e LEARNING CURVE BENEFITS e ADD SOLAR CYCLE COVERAGE AND ASTRONOMICAL OBSERVATION OPPORTUNITIES • CREW TEME AVAILABLE FOR EXPERIMENT OPERATIONS INCREASED • EACHADDITIONAL CREWMAN PROVIDES 250MAN-HOURSMONTHTO CONDUCT EXPERIMENTS ~ S/L-536 a-rºes INTERNATIONAL SKYLAB MISSION CONCLUSIONS A SECOND SKYLAB PROVIDES THE MOST POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT SPACE EVENT POSSIBLE IN THE SEVENTIES THAT OFFERS FOR REASONABLE COST: . e MEANINGFUL MULTI-NATIONAL PARTIC|PATION e A BROAD SPECTRUM OF EARTH ORIENTED BENEFITS • THE BEST ZERO"G" FLIGHT DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITY DURING THE NEXT 5 TO 10 YEARS • A SHOWCASE FORCELEBRATING USA's 200TH ANNIVERSARY • PRUDENT USE OF "PAID-FOR" BACKUP SKYLAB HARDWARE S/L-546 460 ADVANCED SKYLAB CONCEPT (SHUTTLE LOGISTICS) THE EXISTENCE OF AN ADVANCED SKYLAB IN EARTH ORBIT DURING THE EARLY PHASES OF SHUTTLE DEVELOPMENT PROVIDES A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO USE ITS CAPABILITIES TO AUGMENT THE OVERALL SHUTTLE PROGRAM. THE FACING CHART PROVIDES EXAMPLES OF WHERE AN ADVANCED SKYLAB COULD SUPPORT SHUTTLE DEVELOPMENT/OPERATIONS. IT IS PARTICULARLY NOTE-WORTHY THAT THE EARLY SHUTTLE EXPERIMENT PACKAGES CAN, IN MANY CASES, PROVIDE . GREATER RETURN THROUGH LONGER ORBITAL STAY TIMES ASSOCIATED WITH THE SUPPORT CAPABILITY OF THE ADVANCED SKYLAB. Wºº-ºººººººº... . º: ADVANCED SKYLAB ©ººrly SHUTTLE FLIGHT SUPPORT • PROVIDE MAINTENANCE/SERVICING BASE • EMERGENCY CREW SURVIVAL – EXTENSIVE LIFE SUPPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS • IN ORBITDATA ANALYsis FACILITY • RENDEZVOUS I DOCKING TEST e SHUTTLE PAYLOAD DEPLOYMENT TESTING O stabilization AND RESOURCES SUPPORT FOR PAYLOADS • LOGISTICS/SPARES STOWAGE (PROPELLANT |CARGO TRANSFER) • RESOURCES FOR EXPERIMENT EXPANSION | EXTENSION • EVALUATION OF SHUTTLE ACTIVATION OPERATIONS AND CHECKOUT S/L-572 461 AM/CAE ORMAME.I. fºLºgº. As AşTºrofºasunriſcs CCAMLEARMY THE ADVANCED SKYLAB EMBODIES CERTAIN SYSTEM CAPABILITY INCREASES ABOVE SKYLAB-A WHICH ALLOW ACCOMMODATION OF LARGER CREWS, LONGER MISSIONS, AND ENLARGED EXPERIMENT CAPABILITY. THESE INCREASES ARE PROVIDED PRIMARILY BY MODIFICATIONS TO SKYLAB-A SYSTEMS WITH SOME LIMITED ADDITIONS OF SYSTEMS WHICH ARE CURRENTLY UNDER DEVELOPMENT FOR FUTURE SPACE APPLICATIONS. SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY REFLECTS AN EVOLUTIONARY STAGE BETWEEN THE CURRENT SKYLAB PROGRAM AND THE EVENTUAL SPACE STATION. - --ºe- ADVANCED SkyLAB FEATURES BEYOND SKYLAB-A • ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENT CAPACITY (VOLUME) FOR EXPANDED EARTH RESOURCES, COMM/NAV, SCIENCE, ETC. • CLOSED LOOP WATER RECOVERY SYSTEM e IMPROVED THERMAL CONTROL CAPABILITY e INCREASED ELECTRICAL POWER • LONG LIFE, HIGHLY RELIABLE AND MAINTAINABLE COMPONENIS (3 YEAR GOAL) - • EFFICIENT ON-BOARD REAL TIME DATA MANAGEMENT WITH HIGH TRANSMISSION RATES INCLUDING ELECTRONIC IMAGERY • NEW DOCKING ADAPTER FOR SHUTTLE COMPATIBILITY S/L-69A 93-466 O - 73 – 30 462 FººdPAMAMER.L \ fºot/G. LAS As rººftºtyTics cºrºntſ ºf THE ADVANCED SKYLAB USES THE SKYLAB-A BACKUP WEHICLE AND A SECOND OWS MODULE FABRICATED FROM A MODIFIED SATURN S-IVB TANK STRUCTURE. THIS TANK REPLACES THE SKYLAB-A MULTIPLE DOCKING ADAPTER AND PAYLOAD SHROUD. THIS ADDITION, IN CONJUNCTION WITH MODIFICATION TO THE AIRLOCK, PROVIDES A VEHICLE WITH THE SAME EXTERNAL LAUNCH PROFILE AS SKYLAB-A, BUT WITH APPROXIMATELY TWICE THE PRESSURIZED WOLUME. SYSTEMS SUCH AS SOLAR ARRAYS AND CREW ACCOMMODATIONS ARE ALSO DUPLICATED, PROVIDING SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY. DOCKING ACCOMMODATIONS ARE PROVIDED AMIDSHIPS FOR CSM'S, AND ON THE FORWARD END FOR SHUTTLE-DELIVERED PAYLOADS. AMſcºof wººle. Lº- Hºº & JGº-As As ºf JAL rººs SELECTED ADVANCED SKYLAB CONFIGURATION cºRMJPARMY CSM D0CKHNG PORTS D0CKING PORT FOR VIEW A-A SHUTTLE-DELIVERED. LOGISTICS MODULE B F- BACKUP |- AIRLOCK (MODIFIED) * tº ſº 㺠* e ;: § a II ..~ * * Af $ ! I 14 ! I t ii / ZT ..., : ; }; N 7. : {\ 2% * Z - |-- i i kº BACKUP NOSE FAIR ING A jº |- -vº OWS (MODIFIED) * * B S/L-250A 463 ----------- ----- ----------- -------- LOGISTICS IS PROVIDED TO THE SKYLAB BY THE SHUTTLE WITH DELIVERY OF PAYLOADS TO THE FORWARD DOCKING INTERFACE. IN THIS MODE THE FORWARD SOLAR ARRAY IS DEPLOYED AFT ALONG THE BODY FOR GREATER DOCKING CLEARANCE. THIS ILLUSTRATION DEPICTS A LOGISTICS MODULE DOCKED DIRECTLY TO THE SKYLAB. THIS MODE OF OPERATION WOULD ALLOW MANNED MISSIONS UP TO 90 DAYS. CONTINU0US MANNING CAN BE ACCOMMODATED BY THE USE OF A MULTIPLE DOCKING MODULE, ALLOWING-OVERLAPPING PERIODS FOR TWO LOGISTICS MODULES. 464 SPACE TUG PROGRAM Nº. -------------- ----------- SPACE TUG PROGRAM ------------ -------- PROGRAM OBJECTIVE: THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE SPACE TUG PROGRAM ISTO PROVIDE AN ECONOMIC SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM (TOGETHER WITH THE SPACE SHUTTLE)THAT WILL SUPPORTA WIDE RANGE OF SCIENTIFIC, DEFENSE AND COMMERCIAL APPLICATIONS IN EARTH ORBIT AND OUTER SPACE. S/L-612 465 28233 SPACE TUG* l e is THE REUSABLE UPPER STAGE OF THE SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM e IS CARRIED IN THE CARGO BAY OF THE SHUTTLE ORBITER © INITIATES AND COMPLETES ITS MISSIONS IN LOW EARTH ORBIT SPACE TUG” PLUS SPACE SHUTTLE Y SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM (STS) + US AIR FORCE DESIGNATION IS ORBIT-TO-ORBIT SHUTTLE REPRESENTATIVE SHUTTLE MISSION DISTRIBUTION ~15% PLANETARY AND VARIOUS ORBITS 60% REQUIRE THIRD STAGE (SPACE TUG) NON-NASA 18% ~15% NEAR POLAR ~30% GEOSYNCHRONOUS ~ 40% SHUTTLE ONLY 466 31396 SPACE TUG FOR PLANETARY MISSIONS REUSABLE TUGS ExPENDED SPACE TUG AND PAYLOAD cº 467 fºrcºcººfayeº-º- Doºjºsº. As THE ISSUE OF PAYLOAD RETRIEVAL Astrºrońſau rºics coaºarvy THERE ARE CURRENTLY NO SPECIFIC MISSION REQUIREMENTS FOR SATELLITE RETRIEVAL HOWEVER: THE COSTS TO DEVELOP A SATELLITE RETRIEVAL CAPABILITY ARE LOW A RETR |EVAL CAPABILITY CAN PROVIDE A USEFUL ADJUNCT TO ORBIT READ INESS TESTS THROUGH RETURN OF PREMATURELY FAILED SATELLITES RETURN OF EXPENDED SATELLITES FOR LITTLE OR NO ADD |T|ONAL COST (WHEN RETRIEVAL |S COMBINED WITH OTHER MISSIONS) ON ORBIT SERVICING AND SATELLITE REPOSITION ING SIGNIFICANT COST SAVINGS THROUGH PAYLOAD REUSE S/L-6l3 3400] BENEFITS TO PAYLOADS FROM TUG e REDUCED WEIGHT RESTRICTIONS YIELD LOW COST DESIGN, E. G. MODULARIZATION, EXISTING HARDWARE, OVERDESIGN, GREATER REDUNDANCY FOR IMPROVED RELIABILITY © LARGE DIAMETER AND VOLUME YELDS SIMPLER PACKAG|NG e SUPPORT SERVICES SUCH AS POWER, COMMUNI- CATIONS, CHECKOUT, THERMALTOASTING, REDUCE SUBSYSTEM DESIGN REQUIREMENTS G PLACEMENT ACCURACY AND MULTIPLE DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCES SPACECRAFT PROPULSIVE AND GROUND SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS Gº STATUS CHECK AND RETRIEVAL CAPABILITY ALLOWS RETURN OF SPACECRAFT AFTER FAILURE (PRE-DEPLOYMENT AND DURING OPERATION) 468 ſ ---------- ----------- ----------- ------ ALTERNATIVES FOR PROVIDING A THIRD STAGE FOR THE SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM EXISTING EXPENDABLE STAGES (DELTA, AGENA, OR CENTAUR) FLOWN ExPENDABLE OUT OF SHUTTLE MODIFIED EXISTING STAGES (INCREASED PROPELLANT, RESUSE, ETC.) REUSABLE FULL CAPABILITY TUG LATER PHASE DEVELOPED SPACE TUG (INTERIM + EVOLUTION) AVAILABLE AT SHUTTLE IOC DIRECT DEVELOPEDTUG TO SATISFY SPECIFIC MISSION REQUIREMENTS AVAILABLE AT 2.T04 YEARS AFTER SHUTTLE IOC S/L-614 469 36347 TUG DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM SCHEDULE 1972 | 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 T T I I I T I I I I I I I I TI SYSTEM STUDIES | | ASSESSMENT AND DECISION F- ~ phoonam Definition loºr | DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT IOC/OI * CENTAUR [T]GRowth stages INTERIM TUG CRYO INTERIM Tug stonABLE SOAR | SUPPORTING | STUDIES TOPSS | | |LAUNCH site SERVICES REF: AIAA PAPER NO. 73-74; W. G. HUBER, TUG/PAYLOAD INTERFACES NASA MSFC | fºr ºf MAMEſ ſº- Jºſé Gº. As SUMMARY As rºoftſ.ºrºcs coyºgº ºf THE SPACE TUG IS A NECESSARY, INTEGRAL PART OF THE SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM TO MEET THE NATIONS LONG RANGE NEEDS THE PROGRAM IS STRUCTURED FOR JOINT PARTICIPATION BY NASA AND DOD NEAR-TERM NEEDS OF GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY ARE TO EVALUATE ALTERNATIVE TUG PROGRAM CONCEPTS IN CONSIDERATION OF: • SHUTTLE FUNDING AND SCHEDULE REQUIREMENTS • SPACE TUG TOTAL PROGRAM COSTS • ANTICIPATED NASA BUDGETARY ALLOWANCES S/L-615 470. SPACE SHUTTLE ExtERNAL TANK PRogRAM The Space Shuttle is a space transportation system which has been designed to reduce the cost of future space operations. The use of this system can materially improve the quality of human life on earth in the areas of earth resources, com- munications, weather observation, and crop monitoring. º sº FIGURE 1 Major elements of the Space Shuttle System are a manned reusable orbiter vehicle designed to carry payloads into earth orbit and return, the Space Shuttle main engines, twin solid-rocket boosters, and a large external tank to carry the hydrogen and oxygen fuel supplies for the main engines. The external-tank program calls for design, development, and production of 445 flight tanks. 471 FIGURE 2 McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company has been working in support of North American Rockwell Company the Shuttle Prime Contractor and is direct- ing a major proposal effort toward winning the development and production contract for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Space Shuttle external tanks. We have named Mr. Theodore D. Smith as Vice President, External Tank General Manager to head our team. Mr. Smith headed our Shuttle Booster work during the Shuttle Phase B studies and before that managed our Saturn S-IV and S-IVB stage programs. He has assembled a team of experts, drawing heavily upon our past hydrogen fueled launch vehicle programs and our commercial aircraft manufacturing programs. The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company will propose to conduct the design, development, and production phases of the external-tank program in Louisiana at the NASA Michoud installation. The NASA Mississippi Test Facility and the Slidell, Louisiana, computer complex will also be used in support of the external-tank program. 472 Initially, in support of the MDAC program to win the production contract, the company has formed a resident engineering-technical work team at the Michoud facility. Based on preliminary estimates, manpower requirements for the external-tank contract will reach 750 by the end of 1974, with more than 50 percent (approximately 400 employees) to be hired locally in Louisiana and Mississippi. By 1976, at the peak of the external-tank development phase, local employ– ment in the same areas will more than double to approximately 850 out of a total of 1200. With production running through 1988, peak employment on the program (approximately 2000 employees) will be reached in 1981; some 85 percent of this manpower (approximately 1700 employees) will be hired locally in Louisiana and Mississippi. - The best information that we and NASA have today is that the funding for the external-tank program is expected to be $12 million a year in 1974 and to reach a peak of $140 million yearly by 1981, leveling off to an annual rate of $100 million through 1988. - That concludes the hearing. [Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday, March 13, 1973.] 1974 NASA AUTHORIZATION TUESDAY, MARCH 13, 1973 Hous E OF REPRESENTATIVES, CoMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICs, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in .* Rayburn House Office Building, the Hon. Walter Flowers presiding. Mr. FLOWERS. We will begin our hearings this morning. I would like to welcome Colonel Stelling and Lieutenant Colonel Steelman here to the Manned Space Flight Subcommittee. We will be delighted to hear from you on the Space Shuttle this morning. STATEMENT OF COL, HENRY B, STELLING, JR., DIRECTOR OF SPACE HEADQUARTERS, USAF Colonel STELLING. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am certainly pleased to appear this morning as the representative of Secretary Hansen for the purpose of describing Department of Defense participation in joint activities with NASA in support of the Space Shuttle development program. The Air Force has been designated as the executive agent for the DOD on this program. Secretary Hansen is the senior DOD representative and cochairman with Dale Myers on the Joint Space Transportation System Committee. He very much wanted to appear before this subcommittee but was unable to do so today because of a long-standing commitment to participate in a NATO meeting. As you are aware, the DOD places heavy reliance on space systems to support its global military mission. Space, however, represents but one of the military operational environments and space systems must complete with other more conventional approaches in determining the most cost-effective means of accomplishing the defense mission. In a very broad sense the DOD therefore does not have a space mission comparable to the NASA mission in space even though both agencies share the space environment. This common interest has led to a number of joint space activities which have been of benefit to both agencies. Both agencies have a con- tinuing need, because of limited resources, to review and improve the effectiveness of space operations. The development of the Space Shuttle is a logical step in providing a space system which will not only satisfy future needs of NASA and the DOD but also the needs of potential domestic and international users. The President has given NASA the job of developing and testing the shuttle system including the Kennedy (473) 474 Space Center launch and supporting control facilities. The President’s goal of enhancing access to space requires considerable effort on the part of the DOD in exploring the unique features of the shuttle sys- tem to determine how its use can lead to better and more effective utilization of space for military operations. The DOD strongly supports the Space Shuttle development pro- gram and plans to use the shuttle when it becomes operational and as it meets the performance and cost targets. Air Force efforts which are funded in the fiscal year 1973 budget for $4 million are directed at assuring that military space mission needs are identified and pre- sented to NASA for incorporation in the shuttle design, providing essential data and integrated planning to support future DOD shuttle- related decisions, and exploring shuttle capabilities for more effective, lower cost military space operations. The Air Force Systems Com- mand, space and missile systems organization maintains a shuttle program office at Los Angeles with detachments at the NASA centers. This shuttle office is responsible for continuous coordination and planning with NASA, including jointly funded contractor studies, and for directing the activities of the Aerospace Corporation and Air Force contracted studies with industry. A number of recent actions have been taken which will help to strengthen our planning in support of the shuttle activities. A DOD Space Shuttle User Committee was established in the Pentagon to provide a focus for the broad user interest of the DOD and to com- plement the activities of the Air Force Shuttle Program Office. Mem- bership includes representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and all the military departments. NASA will send representatives to the Committee meet- ings. The Committee is chaired by the Air Force and reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development, Mr. Hansen. The Chairman is the Air Staff Director of Space, the position which I now hold. With full use of the Space Transportation System, military Space operations can be improved and individual space program costs can be reduced by a combination of the following factors: Reduction of launch failures and loss of expensive payloads; Payload retrieval and reuse; Payload on-orbit maintenance and servicing; On-orbit testing of critical payload subsystems; Reduced payload weight and volume constraints; Widespread use of standardized payload subsystem modules and less costly qualification and acceptance testing, and finally; Reduced launch costs for many space activities. Faster response to new mission requirements is possible by flying engineering test subsystems utilizing the orbiter for concept verifica- tion testing as described to you by Dr. Lord on March 2. In addition to increased operational flexibility, reduced development risk for new payloads, and potential lower life-cycle costs, the shuttle offers an unexplored potential for the accomplishment of military as well as space activities on a more routine basis. At the very minimum, it will provide a single, modern launch system replacing the many types of launch vehicles and launch complexes currently employed. However, if the shuttle is to have the dramatic impact on space operation 475 possible, it will happen because it stimulates extraordinary new approaches to developing and operating space systems. The Department of Defense concurred last April in the selection of the Kennedy Space Center and Vandenberg Air Force Base as the launch and recovery sites for the Space Shuttle. The DOD will develop the shuttle facilities at Vandenberg on a schedule which is compatible with the NASA progress in developing the shuttle and the Kennedy Space Center facilities. In the absence of specific DOD mission requirements which could conceivably require the launch of an Air Force shuttle at the Kennedy Space Center, present plans call for NASA to be responsible for shuttle system facilities and launch and recovery operations at Kennedy for all civilian and military users. The Air Force will have like responsibility at Vandenberg Air Force Base. Command and control of satellites will be accomplished by either the Air Force Satellite Control Facility (AFSCF) or the NASA Tracking Station Network with the exception that DOD operational space programs will be handled by the Air Force network regardless of the launch site utilized. Shuttle hardware, software, operating procedures, and ground equipment will be common and interchangeable between NASA and the Air Force to the maximum extent possible. Considering the NASA position that an orbit-to-orbit stage or space tug is required for the initial operational capability of the shuttle, two remaining major issues confront the DOD: 1. How soon should the DOD plan for the Vandenberg facility and the use of the shuttle for essentially all DOD payloads? 2. What agency should develop the space tug and what configura- tion should be selected? The Air Force is preparing a program memorandum which addresses the first question. As part of this exercise, the DOD Space Shuttle User Committee has asked the DOD program offices responsible for current space activities to formulate plans for rapid and economical transition to the shuttle as development progress permits. In addition the Air Force Shuttle Program Office is continuing studies which ex- plore how best to exploit the versatility and flexibility offered by the shuttle for a large spectrum of new space activities. This information will be used to update the present DOD mission model which has been provided to NASA for their planning purposes. The updated mission model will provide the basis for establishing revised launch projec- tions as a basis for developing vehicle procurement and replenishment strategies. The program memorandum will provide plans and options for con- tinued DOD participation in the shuttle program. One alternative will concentrate on launching DOD payloads from Kennedy as soon as NASA is ready, with acquisition of an Air Force capability at at Vandenberg to be phased in later. A second alternative will empha- size early acquisition of Vandenberg and a third alternative will show earliest practicable DOD use of the shuttle at both Kennedy and Wandenberg. In regard to the space tug issue, over half of the DOD payloads projected for the future require high-energy orbits which require an orbit-to-orbit stage in addition to the shuttle orbiter. NASA has simi- lar needs for high-energy missions. Just as a standard orbiter con- figuration is a design goal, it is intended that a standard space tug 476 / \ will meet the needs of both agencies as well as civil and international users. A joint DOD/NASA decision on which agency will develop the space tug is anticipated this fall. The Air Force is presently partici- pating with NASA in the funding of contractor studies of three tug configurations, expendable, interim, reusable, and full capability reusable. These studies range from simple, low-risk modifications of existing stages which would be expendable to high technology, new stage developments providing both stage and payload recovery and reuse. The Air Force will continue to work with NASA to obtain better cost estimates for the variety of technical options under definition. The fiscal year 1974 Air Force budget request for shuttle calls for the expenditure of $5.5 million to permit continued definition of: Shuttle trade studies and design evaluation; Space tug definition and selection activities; DOD operational and support system concepts; Mission planning and advanced payload studies; and, System integration planning and update of the DOD shuttle utility assessment. I have emphasized that DOD planning for utilization of the shuttle is closely keyed to the NASA development of the shuttle. Most of the DOD space programs must provide continuous and uninterrupted service. Schedule uncertainties associated with the new shuttle devel- opment will necessitate some overlap in the planned availability of the shuttle and termination of launches on expendable boosters. If on top of technical uncertainties, NASA is confronted with further reduction in the shuttle budget the resulting schedule slips can have a very adverse effect on the ability of the DOD to plan for early use of the shuttle. Uncertainties which increase the transition period when both the shuttle and expendable boosters will be required can only increase the overall cost of space activities. With performance and cost as planned, the Space Shuttle can be an effective instrument of military capability and preparedness in support of our national security and peace. As a spokesman for the Department of Defense, I am pleased to express the support of DOD for the NASA shuttle development program. Thank you. I will be pleased to respond to your questions. Mr. FLOWERs. Thank you very much, Colonel. The gist to what you are saying, would it be that the Air Force and NASA are working very close together on all aspects of the development of the shuttle and the launch facilities and all other parts of the shuttle program? Colonel STELLING. Yes, sir, that is correct. Mr. FLOWERs. Do you feel there are any areas from the Air Force point of view that are not fully coordinated or any areas that need particular attention at this time? Colonel STELLING. No, sir. We have a program office of approxi- mately 29 people working in Los Angeles with detachments from that office located at the operating centers. This assures a close day-to-day working relationship between NASA and the Air Force as the execu- tive agent for DOD for Space Shuttle activities. In Washington we have the Space Transportation System Committee that meets period- ically to review matters of joint interest. We have the DOD User Committee, with NASA participation, which is looking into the appli- 477 cation of the shuttle to a wide variety of DOD space applications. We are talking about setting up an ad hoc working group to work with NASA to assure that all of the information is developed and explored prior to this fall, when NASA and DOD will be faced with a decision on who should develop the space tug. So I think, con- sidering the state of the development on the shuttle program, that coordination between the two agencies is very good. Mr. FLOWERs. You all are well together on that. What sort of planning has gone into the prospective training of, I guess you call them pilots of the shuttle, or will we continue to regard them as astronauts? What are we going to do in that regard? Colonel STELLING. We are talking about first flights in 1979 and 1980. I haven’t participated in many detailed discussions that would help answer this particular question. The general approach seems to be one similar to the one that was used on the Apollo program. Mr. FLOWERs. Thank you. - º Colonel STELLING. If I may add, we would certainly anticipate using NASA systems facilities for training and all. Mr. FLOWERs. The training aspect would be under NASA? Colonel STEELMAN. Under NASA and Air Force, that is right. Mr. FLOWERs. Thank you very much, Colonel. I will call on Mr. Winn, first. Mr. WINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Do I gather that there is a possibility that DOD might be more in- terested in taking over the main operation of the space tug? Colonel STELLING. Sir, the interest the DOD has in the space tug revolves around the fact that over 50 percent of our missions require the space tug to achieve high energy orbits. We are planning to meet the possibility of a decision being made where the DOD, the Air Force, would develop the tug in the same fashion that NASA is de- veloping the orbiter. Procurement of the tug, just as the question of the procurement of the orbiter for operations at either Vandenberg or Kennedy, and the details of the procurement strategies associated with those procure- ments have not yet been worked out. We are in the process of dis- cussing these issues with NASA. Mr. WINN. I believe this is the first time that this committee has heard that much enthusiasm, or even that much information in regard to Air Force interest in the space tug. Most of us have been of the opinion that it was pretty much cut and dried, that it would be a NASA project. I am not expressing my opinion. I just was a little surprised to hear your statement. I wanted to ask about your budget figures. On page 8 you say for the year 1974, Air Force budget requests for shuttle call for the expendi- ture of $5.5 million to permit the continued study of the effectiveness of, and then you list five items. This, as you say, is the Air Force budget. This would be over and above the budget that is requested for space shuttle from NASA. Colonel STELLING. Yes, sir. Mr. WINN. In other words, this is the Air Force version of what they will have to spend to be a cooperative part of the team; right? Colonel STELLING. Yes, sir. - 93–466 O—73—pt. 2 31 478 Mr. WINN. We have had quite a few changes in design of the Spac Shuttle, as you well know, and still part of your $5.5 million relates t the shuttle trade studies and design evaluation. It seems to me lik there may be some overlapping there between that and what NASA has already done. Maybe I don’t understand it. I will guarantee don’t understand all the technicalities of it as you gentlemen do. But am wondering if there is a possibility that there might be some over lapping in the request for funds for work that NASA has already completed, because we have sat here for almost 3 weeks now looking a all the possible configurations. At least we thought that is what they Were. Can you enlighten the committee a little bit on that? Colonel STELLING. We worry about the same thing, Mr. Winn. In order to avoid duplication, we have a joint working agreement or the space tug. The DOD has provided money for tug studies to NASA and is participating with NASA on the tug studies, so the tug studies in the main are joint studies to avoid duplication. Mr. WINN. I don’t think NASA shows any credits to the Ail Force or DOD for your contribution in their budget request. Colonel STELLING. Our contribution is somewhat more modest than theirs. | Mr. WINN. On page 7 you make a statement in your first ful paragraph there, the last few words. I think I know what you mean but it is a little vague when you say a third alternative will show earliest practicable DOD use of the shuttle at both Kennedy and Vandenberg. - Is this a third alternative, as you describe it, or are you working in this direction at the present time as a third part of the total program? Colonel STELLING. Perhaps I can best explain that by referring to the Air Force concept of “fly before you buy.” I believe Dr. Seamans described this to the subcommittee last year where it is desirable to complete the development and complete the testing of that develop- ment before you proceed to acquire either additional vehicles or additional facilities, so our planning has been directed at phasing in the acquisition of the Vandenberg facility at such a time when we could exploit the lessons learned by NASA in developing the Kennedy Space Center. If there were some overriding reason for parallel acquisition of both bases which might arise for a number of reasons—one could be a wish to get out of the expendable booster business as soon as possible— then you would be faced with the situation where you won’t be able to exploit as well the lessons learned by the initial development. You would also be faced with the problem where the number of dollars spent in a given fiscal year would be increased. Mr. WINN. Let me change the subject a little bit. ... • Are all of the technical requirements of the Space Shuttle that we have been hearing about in these hearings in conformance with projected Air Force needs? Colonel STELLING. Yes, sir. We spent a lot of time on defining what we consider to be minimum Air Force requirements. I am in the proc- ess now of getting the position that I am going to describe validated It seems to me that the position today with respect to the two agencies is that there are no overriding requirements that affect the shuttle 479 design and that the shuttle design contemplated today satisfies the mission requirements of both agencies, with no overriding DOD peculiar requirements affecting the NASA design. Mr. WINN. Then your main area would be what is in the experi- mental package, what is in the payload; is that right? Colonel STELLING. Yes, sir. That was the reason for the formation of the DOD User Committee. It was to get the operational programs to do the long-range planning that is necessary to look into the future and º the steps that will make effective exploitation of the shuttle possiple. It is difficult, with an ongoing program, to look much further than 4 or 5 years into the future, so it was necessary for us to place special emphasis on looking into the period starting with the 1980's. Mr. WINN. At this stage of the game, and it is probably way too early according to NASA witnesses, what percentage of the payload would you say would be strictly Air Force or DOD, what percentage would be strictly NASA or scientific? Colonel STELLING. Colonel Stellman, do you have that figure? Mr. WINN. In the shuttle. Colonel STEELMAN. It is rather difficult. It is a little early at the present time. Our mission model which we have developed reflects those missions that we have forecasted for the time period between 1980 and 1990, and indicates approximately 20 launches per year on an average. As to the NASA model, they are reworking their model at the present time and it will fluctuate. It is a dynamic process, so it is really difficult at this time to say what the percentage will be. Mr. WINN. It is an ongoing package that you would develop together? Colonel STEELMAN. Yes, sir, we develop the DOD mission require- ment, as best we can for that time period. NASA does the same thing. We continually update ours. They do the same. Mr. WINN. From the configurations that were shown to members of this subcommittee, we understood that the weight of the payload was one of the problems. Colonel STEELMAN. In what? Mr. WINN. The weight of the various experiments might well be a problem; the weight and design of course. How many experiments they will be able to get into the shuttle will be determined by their size and shape. Colonel STEELMAN. The 15 by 60 foot payload bay and 65,000– pound payload weight, can satisfy all of the projected DOD require- ments as we now see them. It is my understanding Mr. WINN. True of the ones you want in 1990? Colonel STEELMAN. Yes, sir; it is my understanding that this is also true of NASA. Mr. WINN. Does the Air Force anticipate operating the Space Shuttle after its development, exclusively from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, or would it use the NASA Merritt Island facilities? - Colonel STELLING. There are two approaches. One approach that has been looked at would have Air Force shuttles procured by the Department of Defense operating out of both Vandenberg and Ken- nedy. The other approach, which is similar to the approach that the 480 Air Force uses on the Titan 3–C launch facility at Kennedy, would be a clean way to handle operations. This approach would be to have NASA responsible for all of the operations at Kennedy; that is they would be responsible to put into orbit payloads for all users, whether they were NASA, military, civil, or international. The same would be true for the Air Force at Vandenberg. This would allow us to simplify the organizational interfaces and equipment and facility interfaces at the two launch bases. This is the approach. The latter course of action which I described, both NASA and the Air Force have elected. There is a possibility as we further define DOD missions that we may want to fly a DOD peculiar shuttle, one that was modified for a DOD mission, utilizing a DOD crew out of Kennedy, for example. We have not defined those missions to date. Therefore, we will continue with the basic plan, which says the Kennedy operation will be a NASA operation. The Vandenberg operation will be an Air Force operation. We would expect that, with common procedures and common equipment, we would still retain the possibility that if peak loading was such at Kennedy, that an additional orbiter was required, that an orbiter from Vandenberg could be supplied for this purpose. Mr. WINN. You really are saying that Vandenberg is sort of your home court and Kennedy is sort of NASA’s home court, and that you really feel that you should have, or would want to operate from there, if at all possible. But since this is a joint mission, and probably will be for quite some time, it is going to be a cooperative effort. Colonel STELLING. Yes, sir. Mr. WINN. Thank you, Colonel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Frey? Mr. FREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Colonel, congratulations. Colonel STELLING. Thank you. Mr. FREY. One thing I was interested in Mr. Fuqua. You can call him General if you want to. Colonel STELLING. May I make a point at this point, Colonel Steelman appeared on the new General’s list so congratulations are in order for him also. Mr. FREY. Congratulations also. Colonel STELLING. Colonel Steelman has been what we call the program element monitor on the shuttle for the last 4 years and provides continuity on this program, along with Secretary Hansen who has also been involved with the shuttle since its inception. Mr. FREy. I hope the Congress can continue to provide some continuity. I am interested in the space tug and your assessment of it. Ob- viously from your statement, it is pretty much essential to the future of Air Force missions, is that so? Colonel STELLING. The Air Force missions can be met with either a shuttle system or continuation of expendable boosters. The selection of the shuttle is in recognition that this approach will satisfy the needs of both the DOD and NASA. # Mr. FREY. And also I assume the overall view, one of economy, is also important? 481 Colonel STELLING. Yes, sir. Mr. FREY. The tug and the work that you are doing in it as such; :an you just give us a few ideas about the cost factors you have igured in it, whatever you have come up with generally? Colonel STELLING. The purpose of the four contractor studies, which | believe Mr. Myers mentioned earlier, looking at cryogenic approaches jo the tug and storeable propellants are the studies which are going to give us the information that we need to come up with cost figures. I guess an answer is that we are working that pretty hard right now and f I give you a figure it would have to be a ball park figure. Mr. FREY. What about a ball park figure, just generally? Colonel STELLING. Approximately $900 million for development, hat is, for a fully reusable tug, along with an interim step, which would Contemplate either the use of an interim reusable or the use of an ºble upper stage, with some modifications to adapt it to the Orbiter. Mr. FREY. When will the study be complete? Colonel STELLING. The study will be completed in February of next year. However, we are planning on, call it a data dump, from the studies prior to September so that information can be used in a review of all of the information available at that time, leading to a decision as to whether DOD or NASA will develop the tug. Mr. FREY. I assume as part of the study you are looking into an interim tug, using expendable boosters to get from low Earth orbit to higher orbit? Colonel STELLING. Yes, sir. Mr. FREY. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Camp. Mr. CAMP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I am a little late. We had another meeting. I hope that I won’t ask you something that you have already answered, but if I understand it rightly, in the colloquy that I have heard here, your operation will be at Vandenberg and NASA will be down at the Cape? Colonel STELLING. Yes, sir. - Mr. CAMP. Tell me, what do you do that NASA doesn’t do? Colonel STELLING. We hope we will both be doing the same thing. Mr. CAMP. This is the point. Why? Why should you both be doing the same thing? Colonel STELLING. Let me qualify when I say the same thing. I am talking about the launch operations associated with putting payloads into orbit. I am not saying that the payloads that we put into orbit will be doing the same thing. I am only speaking of the launch activities associated with the orbiter itself. Mr. CAMP. Will DOD then have an operation that will be the same as NASA as far as the shuttle is concerned and its use and operation? Colonel STELLING. It will be very close. NASA is going to make modifications to the Kennedy Space Center facilities that they have there now. The DOD has some facilities that could be modified. How- ever, we are looking at the acquisition of new launch facilities at Vandenberg. It certainly would be our concept, however, to not develop peculiar requirements that would require duplication of effort that had already been done by NASA in the acquisition of the Kennedy facility. Mr. CAMP. Thank you. 482 Mr. FUQUA. I think, in further clarification of the gentleman's question that your primary mission at Vandenberg will be pola. Orbits where Kennedy will be easterly orbits. Colonel STELLING.' Yes, sir. Mr. FUQUA. There are different missions that the Air Force has for particular polar orbit. Colonel STELLING. That is correct. Mr. FUQUA. General, the cross-range capability of the shuttle, does this meet the Air Force requirements or do you think you will be satisfied with the cross-range effects? Do you want something like 1,500 miles? Colonel STELLING. The 1,100 nautical miles, which is the plan today, is acceptable to the DOD. It will allow the orbiter to make one revolution of the Earth and return to the launch base. Mr. FUQUA. Are all of the technical requirements of the shuttle in conformance with your projected needs? Colonel STELLING. Yes, sir. Mr. FUQUA. You are satisfied with that? Colonel STELLING. Yes, sir. - Mr. FUQUA. Are the Air Force performance requirements for a space tug more or less demanding than those of NASA? Would a relatively low performance satisfy Air Force requirements or is a high per- formance system essential? Colonel STELLING. The Department of Defense performance re- quirements for the space tug (orbit-to-orbit stage) are no more or less demanding than those of NASA. A high-performance system is the ultimate goal of both agencies. Mr. FUQUA. Then you partially have answered this but I want to clarify it for the record. You anticipate that this has not been finally concluded, that your operational requirements will be completely separate from those of NASA and NASA completely separate from Air Force? Colonel STELLING.. I would like to expand. Mr. FUQUA. As far as management, logistics and the entire opera- tion of the shuttle, as far as your requirements and as far as NASA requirements. Colonel STELLING. What I was referring fo earlier was the launch operations at the two bases. When it comes to questions of logistics and procurement, I would not say that our present plans call for auton- omous operations. In fact we are very actively exploring ways of utilizing common sources, common spares, common logistic support, in order to avoid duplications in the efforts of the two agencies. I was going to say, this question that you asked now is one that we are spending a lot of effort on. It is one that I think both agencies recog- nize that by doing a good job now and working together well, we can avoid duplication of efforts. Mr. FUQUA. Then your current thinking is that this would be joint working together as far as operation, management, logistics after the development of the shuttle? Colonel STELLING. Yes, sir. The desire is Mr. FUQUA. This gets back on the question Mr. Camp asked, there is not going to be a duplication of effort down the road. 483 Colonel STELLING. That is right. The question of development is One where it has been the desire of both agencies to maintain separate agency responsibilities. This approach, however, does not necessarily apply to the operations and acquisition phase of the shuttle program. Mr. Fuqua. What is your view? Have you formulated any views on the possible manufacture or purchase of the shuttle after the develop- ment? Would you buy through NASA or would you buy direct from the contractor? You mentioned briefly about fly before you buy. Let's hope you can buy and that it will fly. Colonel STELLING. Yes, sir. This, again, is something which both NASA and the DOD aer developing at the present time. Utilizing the updated mission model, One comes up with a projection of launch requirements. Using these projected launches, we can establish the need for orbiters themselves. With this information, you can develop a procurement strategy that takes into account not only the requirement for launches, but the re- quirement for spares which may be needed to back up operations at either site. We have not reached the point where any decision has been made on how to purchase the orbiters, nor have we come up with any agree- ment on how the DOD would pay NASA for a shuttle ride at Kennedy Space Center. However, we do have the model today where the Air Force provides NASA with the rides on Titan 3–C's, which is a good model to utilize for operations of a shuttle at either base. Mr. Fuqua. Haye you made any preliminary estimates,on the cost of construction at Vandenberg and when do you plan to ask for money for that? I am talking about shuttle-related now. Colonel STELLING.' Yes, sir. We have. Again they are ball park figures. The budget impact depends upon the date selected for the initial capability at Vandenberg. If we establish a date of 1983, for example, which would allow us to profit from the development ex- perience of NASA, we would not have significant funding required for the Vandenberg facility until fiscal year 1979. Mr. FUQUA. So you are not asking for any additional this year? Colonel STELLING. No, sir. Colonel STEELMAN. This is one of the purposes of the program memorandum that we are working now, is to define these options, lay out a plan and better understand these costs and when they should be applied. Mr. FUQUA. You have given a figure of how much you have in- vested in the shuttle to date? Colonel STELLING. No, sir, I have not. Mr. Fuqua. Do you have a figure? - Colonel STELLING. Yes, sir, we do. I think it is approximately $8 million through fiscal year 1972. I will give it to you by fiscal year. In fiscal year 1970, it was $2.4 million, in fiscal year 1971, it was $2.5 million, in fiscal year 1972, $3 million, and 1973, the current fiscal year it is $4 million, and for fiscal year 1974, we have $5.5 million in the President’s budget. Mr. Fuqua. Most all of this has been for design and studies as to mission requirements, configuration? - Colonel STELLING. It has all been for studies, with the idea that we have the resources which allow us to work jointly with NASA in the development of concepts and preliminary designs. 484 Mr. Fuqua. That is about $17 million that you have put in so far. General, thank you very much. - Mr. Winn has a question. Mr. WINN. Mainly you are here to second the nomination of NASA for the Space Shuttle; aren’t you? It is pretty hard at this stage of the game for you to tell us what is in the payload, what º you have settled on and all the various things that you are OIng. . Colonel STELLING. Yes, sir, it is. The leadtime is such that if we are talking about Shuttle flights beginning in 1980, we don’t need to make configuration decisions this early. Mr. WINN. The thing I was thinking about is that probably not this year, but in the next couple of years, this committee may be hard pressed by Members of Congress to give them some of the answers that we have gotten not only from NASA but from you today. I think they are going to want more detailed information. Now we can explain to them that you are not that far along. You are still in the planning stage. A little bit later when you are requesting more money, your second nomination is going to have to be a little stronger. Colonel STELLING. We will be in a position to provide that infor- mation. - Mr. WINN. My other question is this: Are there any employees of NASA at Vandenberg at the present time, full time? Colonel STEELMAN. I think to support some of the other NASA programs I believe there are some, yes, sir. I think the NASA ERTS program flies out of Vandenberg for example. Mr. WINN. Working on shuttle? Colonel STEELMAN. To my knowledge there are not any there. I am sure the NASA representatives that are there are closely co- Ordinating in the Vandenberg area, but specifically, for the single purpose of shuttle alone I don’t believe there are any. * WINN. It is probably still premature to have personnel out there. - Colonel STEELMAN. Yes, sir. Mr. WINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FUQUA. Thank you, Mr. Winn. Thank you very much, General Stelling, and Colonel Steelman. Colonel STELLING. Thank you. Mr. FUQUA. We will now hear from Mr. James J. Harford, executive secretary, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. I believe he is accompanied by Mr. Jerry Grey, administrator and J. Preston Layton, senior research engineer and lecturer. STATEMENT OF JAMES J. HARFORD, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF AERONAUTICS AND ASTRONAUTICS; ACCOMPANIED BY DR. JERRY GREY, ADMINISTRATOR, TECH- NICAL ACTIVITIES, AIAA, AND J. PRESTON LAYTON, SENIOR RE- SEARCH ENGINEER AND LECTURER, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY Mr. HARFORD. I hope you all have copies of the “Green Book, the AIAA Assessment of New Space Transportation.” Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: I’d like to introduce Mr. J. Preston Layton of Princeton University, who's been 485 involved in rockets and space research and development for more than 30 years in the Navy, industry, and university and Dr. Jerry Grey, the AIAA technical administrator and a longtime consultant to industry and Government—particularly in fluid dynamics, rocket, and nuclear propulsion. Mr. Layton and Dr. Grey have directed an AIAA assessment of new space transportation systems including the NASA Shuttle, and we’re going to review the conclusions of that assessment in a few minutes. Let me say first, though, that we’re honored to be here but not very proud to say that this is the first time that AIAA has ever presented testimony before a congressional committee. We are, after all, a professional society of some 24,000 engineers and scientists whose careers are dedicated to the very programs on which this committee and others are called to make regular judgments. We’ve not always felt that those programs have received the treatment they deserve and yet we’ve been, by and large, quiet about it. But that’s in the past. I think you’ll find that from now on AIAA— like many of our sister professional societies—will want to make our views known to you who have the responsibility of deciding how to allocate an always-limited amount of Federal support. We realize that we’re not without bias—that we tend to look opti- mistically on ways in which aerospace science and technology can better the human condition. But what we’ve failed to realize, until recently, is that if we don’t tell our fellow citizens about those ways— doing our best to be as objective as we can—then it’s not likely that anyone else will. So I thank you for the invitation, and I hope you’ll invite us back. Let me begin by giving you some rather painful indicators that our country's capability to apply aerospace technology to the common good has been seriously eroded in the last few years. Now this is damage that is not readily apparent to the editorial writers, many citizens, even some Congressmen who seem to have been saying: enough in space, let's take care of Earth. First of all, the aerospace profession had been greatly depleted. AIAA's membership—aeronautical, mechanical, chemical, electronic engineers, mathematicians, physicists, astronomers, chemists, and students is down over 38 percent in the last 3 years—from 39,000 to 24,000. Second—and perhaps even more devastating—the current college enrollment in aerospace engineering is off 63 percent from its 1968 peak. If this continues—and the decision on a new space transporta- tion system is at least one important factor in determining whether it will continue—we will hamper greatly—maybe disastrously—our ability to get from our hard-earned national investment in Space capability the payoffs that we’ve all been working toward for so long. Maybe the biggest sin on the soul of the aerospace professional is that he permitted the public to think of the Apollo program as pri- marily a noble adventure for astronauts—as something which took place only in space. If, instead, we had promoted an awareness that by far the most important objective of operating in space is to enable all of us to live better on Earth—now and in the future—we wouldn’t be in the trouble we’re in. But we are in trouble and the supreme irony is that it happens just as we’ve begun to get visible earthly payoffs and have established an 486 ability to gain further benefits by operating in space on a large scale And, of course, it is the potential appearance of the reusable launc vehicle which offers that ability. - I want to interject, Mr. Chairman, that we all hear a great dea these days about the problems of low productivity and trade deficit in the country. I think we had better remind ourselves that what gav us high productivity and a trade surplus, the major source of our na tional wealth in fact, is our science and technology. Let's remin those who felt that Apollo was “an irrelevant space spectacular” that for example, it virtually created the solid state electronics field, i brought computers into wide use, it practically invented inertia guidance and fuel cells, taught us how to use liquid hydrogen as fuel, and developed systems management. The only areas in which w have a positive trade balance are in technology—intensive product like these. The new space transportation system is one of the nex horizons for high technology. If you read nothing else in this book, I hope you will read th chapter starting on page 46 called Available and Projected Technology Although it won’t require breakthroughs, the new space transporta tion system will be one of the best tests that we could have for emerg ing technology. For instance, the new space transportation system is not only a space system but it serves as a national test bed for al future modes of flight within the atmosphere, in all speed regimes That is a very important point. There is no way, Mr. Chairman, for us to continue to develop out science and technology in an optimum fashion unless we engage to the fullest the country’s scientists and engineers. A new space transporta- tion system is one of a limited number of high technology programs that has reached maturity. It is ready to go. Now it is because we feel the space transportation system is SC important that AIAA put a very big effort into that green book, “New Space Transportation Systems: An AIAA Assessment.” It took over a year to complete and required several tens of thou- sands of man-hours of volunteer time of engineers and scientists from throughout the United States. Mr. Layton and Dr. Grey headed this project and some 22 members of AIAA technical committees were directly involved in it. Their job was “to undertake the assessment of technological prospects, overall characteristics, and broad desirability of a new space trans- portation system to serve the needs of space activities in the 1980's and beyond, with consideration of available funding and social and political aspects from the viewpoint of the aerospace professional and his professional society, the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics.” As the foreword, written by AIAA President Holt Ashley states: “It is our intention that this knowledge be utilized as effectively as possible in providing accurate and objective information on space transportation and related programs to whoever needs or wants it.” Two weeks ago Dr. Grey and I were in Moscow. We gave several copies of this document to several leaders of the Soviet space program, who, as you may know, are developing their own shuttle studies. Dr. Ashley added that “many shades of viewpoint exist among the contributors to the assessment, the elected officers, and the member- ship of the AIAA. Accordingly, we cannot expect universal agreement 487 with every statement and conclusion. The broad comprehensive support it has received during the review process indicates, however, that the final product constitutes a fair consensus from a group of informed professionals. Mr. Chairman, I hope that you and the members of your com- mittee will take the opportunity to read the full report, but for now I’d like to review with you the main conclusions: - (1) The development of a new, versatile and cost-effective space transportation system is an essential element in a national policy that would enable the United States to derive optimum benefit from its investment in space technology and maintain its world leadership in Space. There will be an increasing impact of space activities on life in the |United States and in the world. These activities include improving global communications, reducing the likelihood of military conflict, stimulating commerce and industry, monitoring the environment, increasing the efficient use of earth resources, and exploring the universe. (2) The anticipated space program of the 1980's and 1990's warrants a new space transportation system which can offer substantially im- proved versatility, flexibility, and possible cost advantages. Such a space transportation system is technologically feasible and can be de- ployed without undue risk. The current NASA Space Shuttle is a logical and workable compro- mise between a system which would meet currently projected needs and one which anticipates the increased demand for space transpor- tation in the 1980's, considering the probable funding available for Space. (3) A reusable space transportation system based on the current space shuttle, an interorbital transfer stage or tug and other essential operational elements will offer the following capabilities: (a) It will meet the total demand for commercial, environmental, scientific, international, and national security missions with few exceptions. - (b) It will save payload costs for both unmanned and manned missions. Improvements in civil and military spacecraft will result from (i) use of standardized and modularized components and sub- systems, (ii) ability to carry large payloads under conditions much less severe than those of current launch vehicles, (iii) capability to revisit satellites for maintenance, repairs, parts and propellant replacement, or retrieval, and (iv) reduction in reliability and testing requirements. (c) It will take scientists and other experts without astronaut training into space, along with their equipment, in a “shirtsleeve” environment. This ability will broaden our scientific and technological opportunities significantly. (d) It will provide a convenient environment for laboratory studies, space manufacturing, system tests, medical experiments and other l'ISéS. (e) It will provide a space rescue capability. Although many of these capabilities could be realized by modifi- cations of existing expendable launch vehicles, the versatility offered by a reusable space transportation system is expected to lead to more effective use of space in all the areasidentified, and in future activities not yet recognized clearly. 488 (4) The number and importance of Earth orbiting missions having higher energy orbits, especially at the geosynchronous altitude— 35,800 kilometers or 22,300 statute miles—needed for communica. tions, and other applications, satellites, require that an interorbita transfer stage be developed for use with the Space Shuttle system Conceivably, this requirement could be met in the early 1980's by Some modification of existing expendable stages—for example, Agena, Centaur, or Transtage—or the use of stages with interim capabilities. Eventually a reusable space “tug” designed specifically to meet mission requirements will be needed. - The current NASA Space Shuttle system permits not only the launching of all prospective payloads into low Earth orbit, but also provides room in its payload bay for the interorbital transfer stage needed to place spacecraft into higher orbits, to maneuver them extensively in Earth-centered space, or to launch them onto trajec- tories in interplanetary space. (5) There have been no adverse environmental effects of significance caused by space operations to date, and there is currently no expec- tation of future impact. (6) Should the demand for space activity in the 1980's substantially exceed the present predictions, it will be necessary to reevaluate the desirability of developing alternative space transportation systems. The present Space Shuttle concept, therefore, should be kept flexible and should be subjected to continuing critical scrutiny in the areas of mission requirements, technology, and economics. The leadtimes and other factors needed for efficient and effective development of such alternative systems, however, must be fully considered. Mr. Chairman, I want to make it clear that those conclusions are the conclusions of the individuals who created this assessment, that is Mr. Layton, Dr. Grey, and their 22 colleagues, not necessarily the AIAA as an organization. We are a big eclectic organization. In endorsing this document for distribution, the AIAA Board considered those conclusions worth the attention of the American public. However, it is not only the conclusions, but the body of the document which we hope will be studied carefully. The program for the new Space Transportation System is a very complex one and of course very important. We feel our role in AIAA is to inform, rather than to persuade the public and the decision- makers about the program. With that objective this document is being distributed to those AIAA members who ask for it, and through 68 sections and 115 student branches all over the country to interested citizens. We hope it fulfills a useful function and I thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to make the statement. We will be happy to answer whatever questions you may have. [The biography briefs of James J. Harford, J. Preston Layton, and Dr. Jerry Grey are as follows: - JAMEs J. HARFORD James J. Harford was awarded a degree in Mechanical Engineering from Yale University in 1945. He served as an engineering officer aboard Navy transport vessels in the Pacific during World War II. He has worked as an estimating engineering for Worthington Corporation and was an Associate Editor of Modern Industry Magazine (now Dum’s Review). He spent two years in Europe in 1952–53 writing articles under contract to the U.S. Mutual Security Agency on French, 489 British and Italian industries. He became Executive Secretary of the American łocket Society in 1953 and from 1953 to 1963 ARS grew from a membership of ,500 to 21,000. When ARS merged with the Institute of Aerospace Sciences in 963 to become the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Mr. Harford became Deputy Executive Secretary of the new organization. He was Ippointed to his current position of Executive Secretary in 1964. In addition to being a fellow of AIAA, he is a fellow of the British Interplanetary Society, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and he is an sociate fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society. He is a member of the AIAA Dommittee on International Cooperation in Space and has represented AIAA at many International Astronautical Congresses. He is listed in Who's Who in America, American Men of Science, and Engineers of Distinction. J. PRESTON LAYTON - J. Preston Layton received a B.S. in Aeronautical Engineering at NYU in 1941 and an M.S. in Aeronautical Engineering at Purdue in 1951. From 1941–45 while serving as a U.S. Naval Reserve Officer on active duty, he was engaged in ſet propulsion research and development, especially JATO. He was a research 2ngineer and field project engineer with The Martin Company (1946–50), most #. as Field Project Engineer on the VIRING High Altitude Sounding Ocket. Since 1951 he has been Senior Research Engineer and Lecturer at the Aero- space Systems Laboratory of Princeton University, where he has been responsi– ble for directing the research efforts of the Nuclear Propulsion Systems and Mission Analysis Research Group in studies of advanced space propulsion systems and their application to future space missions. While on leave from Princeton in 1958– 59, Mr. Layton served as Research Engineer, Nuclear Propulsion Division, of the University of California Lawrence Livermore Laboratory where he was engaged on the Pluto (Nuclear Ramjet) Project and Advanced Space Nuclear Power Program. - Over the years he has served as a consultant on numerous projects to Aerojet- General Corporation; The Martin Company; University of California Lawrence Livermore Laboratory; RCA; Thiokol Chemical Corporation; United Nations; Mathematica, and others. - Mr. Layton, an AIAA Associate Fellow, is Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Assessment of New Space Transportation Systems and a past member of both AIAA predecessor societies, the Institute of Aerospace Sciences and the American Rocket Society. He is a member of the American Management Associ- §: American Society for Engineering Education, Combustion Institute, and 1gma, Al. DR. JERRY GREY Dr. Jerry Grey received his Bachelor's degree in Mechanical Engineering and his Master's in Engineering Physics from Cornell University; his Ph. D. in Aeronautical Engineering from the California. Institute of Technology. His early career included stints as a full-time Instructor of Thermodynamics at Cornell, an engine development engineer at Fairchild, a Senior Engineer at Marquardt, and a hypersonic aerodynamicist at the GALCIT 5’’ Hypersonic Wind Tunnel. He was a professor in Princeton University’s Department of Aerospace and Mechanical Sciences for 15 years, where he taught courses in fluid mechanics and propulsion and served as Director of the Nuclear Propulsion Research Laboratory. He formed the Greyrad Corporation, a supplier of high- temperature instrumentation, in 1959 and was its full-time President from 1967 to 1971. He is now Administrator of Technical Activities for the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, where he spends half his time; the other half is devoted to consulting practice, writing, and lecturing. Dr. Grey is the author of two books and over a hundred technical papers in the fields of fluid dynamics, heat transfer, rocket and aircraft propulsion, nuclear propulsion and power, plasma diagnostics, instrumentation, and the applications of technology. He has served as consultant to the U.S. Air Force, NASA, and the AEC, as well as over twenty industrial organizations and laboratories. He was Vice-President, Publications of the AIAA for five years, and is listed in Who’s Who in America, American Men of Science, Engineers of Distinction, and the United Kingdom's Blue Book and Dictionary of International Biography. 490 Mr. FUQUA. Thank you very much, Mr. Harford. We appreciate you and your colleagues coming here this morning and providing us with this very helpful and supportive testimony of our space program and Our goals and particularly the Space Shuttle. I am very appreci. ative of the booklet, Space Transportation Systems. I am looking forward to reviewing it. I am sure, as you have already reviewed for us, it does contain important information helpful to us. I think you may be talking to the wrong group, trying to convince this group to support the space program, but we hope that we as well as the AIAA and other groups who recognize and see the need and the importance of a space transportation system, the value of it in the coming decades, that we can persuade those who have, I think, a more shortsighted view of the long-range implications of this. I want to commend you for a very excellent statement. I recognize that the AIAA is more of a scientific group, engineers and scientists, but in looking at the economic aspects of the shuttle as they have been reported to this committee and by NASA and the Air Force, do you think that we need an updated economic evaluation of the cost benefits of the shuttle? Mr. HARFORD. Very much so, and a constantly updated evaluation. I am going to ask my colleagues to respond in more detail to that. It is, of course, one of the major questions that is before us. There are a lot of unknowns. Among them, for example, if you really are going to establish a cost justification argument, are how many missions there are going to be for this system, what the mission definition will be, what the actual systems operations costs are, whether the pay- loads are designed for the shuttle's unique capability and, of course, how soon we are going to arrive at a high level of use. That is perhaps one of the big questions too, how steep is that use curve going to get and until we are able to establish answers to all of that, we are in a fairly broad range of speculation on costs. I think we have got to have some faith here. We are all convinced that there is eventually going to be an enormous amount of traffic carried on the shuttle and on the total space transportation system. But how soon? It is hard to resist using the analogy of the telephone system. If soon after Mr. Bell invented the telephone, people who had never seen a telephone were asked how they would use it, their answers would probably be not very articulate or compelling, and another analogy which we have to keep reminding ourselves of is air transportation. If one of the millions of transatlantic business passengers today were to say what he thought his grandfather might have said in 1903 about the need for air travel, it would really make an interesting comparison, to the stage that we are in, what we regard as the opening up of a vast new frontier. Mr. FUQUA. Or even when Lindbergh first flew to Paris. Mr. HARFORD. Yes. Those parallels are with us. We ought to keep reminding ourselves of them because this Nation was built on guts and courage to go ahead in areas where there seem to be a reasonably good risk of producing something that would pay off in great terms for the country, and I am afraid that in some respects we have begun at least to show signs of losing our nerve in those areas. I hope we won’t here. I think we have to be careful also, as we look at the economic argument for the shuttle, to be concerned about preserving our other 491 capabilities, our other programs in space. This program could threaten to hog the budget—the NASA budget—and there have already been Some casualties, programs that we think are very worthy. It is im– portant for this committee, for us to constantly be watchdogging that, to try to continue what we regard as a fairly minimum shuttle design, nurture it, make sure that it continues to have the necessary critical mass to keep going, but try also to keep other programs alive. Now Mr. Layton may have some comments to make on that too or Dr. Grey. Mr. LAYTON. I would like to review the economic aspects and the costs briefly. Even though the studies and analyses of the need for new space transportation systems to date, primarily by NASA and its contractors, have been more extensive than were those for any previous large public undertaking and they are the first in the aerospace field to include the combination of mission models, projected technology, innovative design concepts for the vehicles and spacecraft and their operations, and the methodologies of modern economic analysis, and although they employed the best available cost estimating capabilities in the aerospace field, we in the Assessment Committee felt that even better mission projections and cost estimates, based on still more refined economic methodologies, would be needed. However, it would be difficult to make these analyses at the present moment in any better fashion. The primary contribution of the Mathematica analysis—where I was the leading technical consult- ant—which has been so widely discussed, was in assisting NASA to turn away from the fully reusable, two-stage shuttle system and to select the partially reusable system that is now being developed. Mathematica also showed how modern economic analysis methodol- ogies can be applied to the consideration not only of space trans- portation systems but other large governmental undertakings. I believe that is an important aspect. Dr. Morgenstern, who is chairman of the board of Mathematica and who directed their analysis, insisted throughout that the ultimate decision on the shuttle should rest finally on the level of demand for space activity in the 1980's, and we believe that is true. The fact that the United States will surely support a level of space activity in the 1980’s of more than $50 billion is sufficient reason to determine at a reasonable cost how that activity can be conducted most efficiently while still carrying on a balanced program in the 1970's. To date less than 1 percent of the total cost of those space activities has been invested in that direction. We think that develop- mental activity should continue on the system until we can get firmer numbers and have the opportunity to understand the payload effects in more detail on a mission-by-mission basis, and then, to carry out. further analyses. It is a fact that the United States does not have an overall national plan for space activity in the 1980's that represents a concensus of all vitally involved parties and I believe that is something we ought to work toward. It is hoped that Congress will assist in the formulation of such long range plan that is of great moment to the future of the country and of mankind. Mr. FUQUA. Since the completion of the Mathematica report that you referred to and the other economic studies that went into that, 492 do you think that we have even made a more sound case for the shuttle than appeared at that time or is it less economical? Mr. LAYTON. I believe we are in the process of making such a case, or at least in getting a better basis for analysis of that case. With the activities of the contractors that have been selected so far, the cost numbers on the development of the shuttle system are getting firmer. Also, additional payload studies, and the other efforts of NASA to identify the unique capabilities that the shuttle offers, working them into the mission models, plus a better definition of just how the space program will develop within the available funding, indicate that we are making progress toward getting things on a better planning basis. Mr. FUQUA. Of course one of the intangible benefits that we find, as you mentioned, is recouping our earlier investments in space, which is very difficult to put a handle on or cost figures or value on. That is a very substantial figure, I am sure. Mr. HARFORD. Indeed it is. Mr. LAYTON. I believe that the development of the Space Shuttle system has to be based on analysis but over the year's study I became convinced—although I had early reservations—that the United States simply had to develop the shuttle as an essential to the mainte- nance of its place in space and the further purposes of mankind. I think that we can show the benefits analytically, and I am devoted to that prospect, but I think to some extent it is a question of being willing to see what space can mean and will mean and to base our faith on that prospect. Mr. Fuqua. I don’t think we have based, or are as near as we want to basing our faith on this as we were when we committed ourself to land a man on the Moon. Mr. LAYTON. That is right. One point that needs be made is that the Space Shuttle development is very straightforward. Apollo was sort of a gold-plated crash program with some high risks in it. This program has been analyzed in considerable extent, and technologically we are in much better condition to undertake it. NASA has the organization, the experience and the facilities, very largely, and we are in much better condition to undertake this program, I believe, than we were the Apollo program and we succeeded very well with that, both performancewise and financially. Mr. Fu QUA. Mr. Winn? Mr. WINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. - I too want to commend you, Mr. Harford, for a fine statement and a very fine presentation of this so-called green book. We have got 10 copies of it. We received some copies of it at our office a couple of days ago. I had a chance to thumb through it. You were very thorough. I was afraid maybe you gentlemen would come up here and tell us everything that was in the green book. I would like to ask you a couple of questions. One, do you think that we are misleading the public by continued reference to space transportation systems? Mr. HARFoRD. I don’t think so. We define the space transportation system carefully in the introduction to this book as including a launch vehicle and an upper stage to establish a payload in orbit and a transfer stage. We are very careful to do that in order to make it clear that we are in fact talking about a system and a system of which the shuttle includes only two elements, the launch vehicle 493 and the upper stage. That is the purpose of the use of the expression, space transportation system. I think it is not misleading because it is an appropriate word. It is a word which means space commerce. There is going to be a great deal of traffic in space which is not specialized astronautically if you will. It is going to have to do with performing very pragmatic missions that enable us to know more about Earth, enable us to do things in space, such as manufacture, that have bearing on the commerce of this country. Transportation is a very fine word and I think that is what we are looking for. Mr. WINN. The last time I was home I met with some of my colleagues, some high school students. The high school students, through NASA, of course have had a part by submitting their ideas on Space Shuttle. I was asked the question about transportation. I am afraid that some of the young people figure this is a new method of a metro system. I can understand their concern. I agree that your definition of a transportation system, from a scientific standpoint, is very good but I don’t believe that the average man on the street understands what a transportation system is, except that that is where he catches the subway, or he catches the bus, or even on airplanes. Mr. HARFORD. That is a problem. I think the layman has a psychological barrier which simply associates space with venturesome exploration. We are talking about a way to get many people and many activities up into space and down again and I hope we are successful, all of us, in communication of that to the broad citizenry. 1Dr. GREY. Mr. Chairman, the concept of a space transportation system, in the way you state it, is quite correct, although we are still very much in the early stages of such a system. We might compare this new space transportation system to one of the first airplanes which might have been called an air transportation system at the time it was first instituted: the DC-3. Space commerce in the future will probably be heralded by the space transportation system we are now discussing just as air transportation and air commerce were heralded by the DC-3. Mr. WINN. You talked about working and meeting with the Rus- sians and presenting them with this book. I had the privilege, along with Chairman Teague, of meeting with the Russian scientists in the early part of September. I just wondered, because it has come up at our hearings, particularly when we had Dale Myers here. I think Dr. Low was in the room at the time. We had the question come up of whether we seem to be so eager to cooperate with the Russians that we might be giving them some of our secrets that they are not aware of yet. I am also wondering about the green book, because I see Some things in here, and again I am not an engineer and I am not a scien- tist, but some things that I thought that were specially reserved for our own eyes. I am not accusing you of giving away secrets, I am just trying to find out whether this new group of whoever it might be, Congressmen, scientists, whoever might be next going to Russia and the Russians coming over here this week; whether we are so willing to cooperate that we are going to start giving away everything that we have achieved in the last 20 years. Are we going to close the gap, which at least I think is there, and maybe you will, too, after meeting with them. 93—466 O—73—pt. 2—32 494 Mr. HARTFORD. They are trying very hard. I think we all have to remind ourselves that we are in an open society. This book contains nothing but unclassified material. There is no doubt that the American system of open information in journals has been helpful to the Soviets through the years, and surely has had some effect on enabling them to do what they did in space and in other areas, like aeronautics. We have always prided ourselves in this country that we are able to do that and run faster than everyone else and I hope that we are able to continue to do that. In practical terms, we don’t think that the Soviets have got any- where near the technology which is going to permit them to move as rapidly as we are in a space transportation system. This is speculation, but rather we think they are putting the emphasis on a space station, and it is not inconceivable in fact that our own space transportation system might be purchased by the Soviets one day to feed that space station of theirs, if we in fact are able to achieve international coopera- tion to the level which I hope we can achieve. We are ahead of them here. They don’t have the technology to develop the rocket engines, the thermal protection systems, at least we don’t think they do, and I am not speaking from any privileged or classified information by the way. We in the institute are very carefully in the public domain. I believe we are pushing much faster than they are right now in this area. We know that they are doing shuttle studies. Mr. Myers, at the last International Astronautical Congress in Vienna was approached by one of the Soviets and we mentioned that in this book. I introduced them in fact because one of the Russian engineers wanted to meet Mr. Myers and get some clarification on the approaches to the shuttle. Mr. Myers was very open in showing him, of course that information which has already been brought up and disseminated here. Mr. WINN. There is this concern and I agree, I think we are way ahead of them after being over there and seeing the little that they wanted to show us. I think we are pretty far ahead of them, but I am not particularly anxious to help them close the gap. Though I think through our philosophy of continuing to go ahead, we are going to keep running ahead. But they are going to continue to try to catch up. It may not be a good comparison, but their 100-yard- dash man won the gold medal in the Olympics too. Mr. HARFORD. He was on the airplane with us going over. I would remind you also that they are in motion to become cus- tomers of ours in aeronautical technology. A group of eight of them attended the AIAA annual meeting in January with the express purpose of shopping for air traffic control systems and we hope that they will be buyers as well as rivals. Mr. WINN. I agree with the possibility of them being buyers because I feel this is one way they feel they catch up. They don’t have the knowhow. At the same time if we continue the open book policy that we have, invite them down to Houston, invite them down to the Cape as our guests and have them meet with our scientists, they are going to have to do the same thing. I think at the right stage and the right time, not only from the scientific standpoint but from a political standpoint, we are going to have to say, look, this is a two-sided game. 495 Now, we talk, or you mentioned, losing our nerves. I don’t know that that is too good a description, losing our nerves. I don’t think most of us in Congress feel that we are losing our nerves as far as continually funding the science program and the space program. Right now I suppose we could drive by the White House and see a group of people down there—I don’t know what is going on down there now but usually there are a group of people demonstrating for whatever they think their priorities might be, disagreeing with the President. Or there may be some on the steps of the Congress when we go over at 12 o'clock. I think the problem is that most of us would agree, that the tax- payer is just up to about here with how much he is going to pay in Federal income tax, plus the other taxes that he has in various States and various cities. How much more are we going to be able to take out of that total package and put into science research? This is really more the problem, I believe, than losing our nerve. There are some of us that are a lot more gung-ho about scientific exploration and our desire to continue the lead in technology in the entire world. Since I came on this committee 7 years ago, I am more convinced that that is why we are such a great country. But it takes a while, and many of the other Members of Congress have had this experience, and certainly the public has had nothing but a darned good TV show of our men landing on the moon. Even then they don’t watch that too much any more. The most recent flights, according to surveys that I have seen indicated they do not. How we can make it clear to the public, as you have tried to in this book in several places, I am glad to see that you are sending it out, and I hope you will swamp, if you can the high schools and the colleges, at least their science classes, because they are the ones that are going to be running the ball game here very shortly; but how we can keep them looking ahead and thinking ahead and not get discouraged? I represent the University of Kansas. They have been very active in a cooperative effort with NASA. I know too that they are having a hard time now that they are understanding that scientists and engi- neers are being laid off on both coasts and as Mr. Frey will acknowl- edge, the future doesn’t look good for them, at least in that field. They are going to try to head in some other direction. These are some of the facts that you brought out today. I agree with your facts. It is discouraging and there is no one believe me, unless it is other members of this committee that could agree more with Mr. Layton's statement, that we have got to have long-range planning. I sound like I am giving a lecture here but all I am doing gentlemen is agreeing with practically everything you say. If we could have a constant budget of $3 to $3% billion in the scientific community, and the scientific community knew that we were going to have that funding without having to fight all the time, that may sound low to you but it sounds high to some other Members of Congress that want practically none, or for it to go to welfare or whatever top priority might be. This is one of our problems. I think the AIAA can do a great job in furthering this belief and in doing even a better public relations job than you have in the past. I think you are aware of that by your opening statement. 496 Mr. HARFORD. Congressman Winn, I think you will be glad to know we have just established a high school grade of membership in AIAA. We feel it is very important to begin to rebuild the interest in science and engineering on the part of our young people. Mr. WINN. I think that is very good, very commendable. Let me ask you one kind of jolting question, because it is something that we had better face. What would happen if Congress did not fund the Space Shuttle? Mr. HARFORD. We think it would be a very very grave mistake. I mentioned critical mass before. It is important that we have the space program, a very energetic one. I think if we didn’t have a space trans- portation system development, not only that program, but many of . other space efforts would crumble, and we would be in very bad Snape. - Mr. WINN. Right along that line, we hear, and I have seen a couple of articles recently, not directly aimed at space, but indirectly, saying what happened to the good old days when the Government didn’t fund practically all science research. Of course this would cover a lot of fields. I suppose it is based on the high percentage of the total numbers, total amount of money that goes to colleges for scientific studies, medical schools, whatever it might be. The question of whatever happened to the good old days when people had it within their own minds to try to discover something new without being prodded or paid for by the Government comes up from time to time and it seems like more frequently in cartoons than any other time. What is your thinking on that?' Mr. HARFORD. I think I have to disagree with you. The good old days when the Government didn’t fund research meant that there wasn’t really much research being done. With a few notable exceptions, Some very farsighted companies, but in fact, research really didn’t get going in this country until the Government funded it. Early of course it was for defense reasons. Certainly in our field, in aeronautics and Space, and particularly in aeronautics, the development of aircraft was the product of the development of military aircraft and the technology associated with it to a great extent. - Those who yearn for those good old days are being unrealistic. Mr. WINN. For clarification, I am not proposing that philosophy. I just Say I read more about it and see more in cartoons. It is not my philosophy. - Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Frey. Mr. FREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First let me say I think one of the most important things is the fact that you people have gotten off your chairs, and are finally about to do Something. I think part of the reason we are in this mess is that people like yourself who have been involved in it over a period of time, thought being food for thought was enough. Unfortunately it isn’t enough. You have got to be good, let somebody know you are good and what you are doing. I am just delighted that you are doing this now and delighted to see the extent of your remarks. - I also had a chance to look at your book and skim it over. I would hope that in the dissemination of this you might come up with a little simpler version, too, depending on what your market is. You know we 497 have been great in technical magazines, writing to each other. We get about 1 percent of the population. We are not getting a great many of the people that we have to convince, so I just would like this paper to go to the kids. My kids get the Weekly Reader, things like that. I hope in your market and what your group looks at that you look at the various levels, the market that you have to sell. I am sure something from you, for instance to the Weekly Reader, in that type of form, would also sell, would also be published and I think would do a great deal of good. Mr. HARFORD. That is a very good suggestion. This of course, although it is meant for a lay audience, it is meant primarily to have AIAA members communicate it, use it as a resource book for them to further interpret it. I hope it is going to be used. We have not yet faced that problem of dealing with the public. We are looking at it and very frankly, we are going up a learning curve that is going to be difficult there too. It takes money. When you try to talk to 200 million people, even if there are 24,000, it requires a budget and we have got to nurse that one along because the AIAA fortunes have more or less matched the fortunes of the field. Mr. FREY. Unfortunately I am very aware of your fortunes, the fortunes of the field. One other thing too. They say in politics that there are the saints, sinners and the savables. The saints are the people with it. The sinners are ones, you know, they might come from a Northern State or some place, and, well, I won’t say that, but there might be some Senators for instance in certain areas, you know, the facts don’t mean anything to them, especially in the area of space. And then there are the savables. Mr. HARFORD. What is the last word? Mr. FREY. Savables. You can reason with them. If you have facts you can do it. I would hope your groups throughout the country would be working in this way and informing Members of the Congress and the public of the facts about space and on keeping the public behind it. We are going to face another fight in the Congress as we usually do. We are going to have stuff thrown around, “this is a $100 billion project,” and a lot of other nonsense. It is really only organiza- tions such as yours that have the broad expertise, I think, to add a little bit of credibility to what we are trying to do. Mr. HARFORD. We will do our best. Mr. FREY. I would appreciate that. I really think most of the other things have been covered. I assume that if we ask you about the goal of the program, of the cost of the $5.15 billion, what you have done so far would tend to support that as a reasonable goal? Mr. HARFORD. We do. Mr. FREY. We will stop on a nice answer. Mr. Fuqua. Thank you, Mr. Frey. What do you think would be the effect if we went into a stretchout? It would amount to a scientific stretchout as well if we decided to delay the shuttle a year, 2 years, and reduce our commitment. I am speaking in dollars. If you did that I think it would. What would this do to the scientific community as representing a professional organization? Mr. HARFORD. Would you take a crack at that? 498 Mr. LAYTON. There are some peculiarities in the dynamics of large programs. The programs that we observe to be successful, seem to have a certain energy, a certain real effort behind them that maintains and Sustains them. We think that the present shuttle program has the capability of carrying through. How much you could reduce it and stretch it out and still have it viable, we are not sure. Mr. Fu QUA. Would it have an adverse effect? Mr. LAYTON. The fact is it is producing distortions in the NASA budget and will continue to do so. They may worsen. Beyond that, we think that the shuttle program and the manned space flight program is tied to the health of the whole space program. Mr. HARFORD. Science included. Mr. LAYTON. Yes, and so whereas you might get some quick dollars by suppressing the manned space flight program we think in the end the whole space program would suffer. Mr. FUQUA. What would this do to our scientific and technological progress? Mr. LAYTON. It could hurt it very severely because we may end up without a space program of any kind. Mr. Fuqu A. But I mean if we did this, then it is your conclusion that it would have a very serious detrimental effect on our scientific and technological advances? Mr. HARFORD. Broadly you mean? Mr. Fu QUA. Yes. Mr. HARFORD. Indeed. I mentioned before that the space trans- portation systems program is one of the major high technology pro- grams which has maturity, which can engage people in developing technology in terms of products. You hear some critics say, great, space, but why don’t we put those engineers and scientists to work on urban this and domestic that, and we believe very strongly that it is sad that we have neglected applying technology to urban and domestic problems, but unfortunately, and realistically there are yet no major or Federal programs in those areas that could employ engineers and scientists right now. That is No. 1. No. 2, the technology component of urban and domestic programs is by and large low. It is not high technology, the kind that generates wealth. It is relatively low technology. It is important that we do it and we in the institute by the way are hard at work trying to apply it. We are sponsors of an annual Urban Technology Conference for example with the mayors and city managers. It is very important to do this. But it does not give us that strength in high technology and science—generating that is important to the country, and that multiplies jobs among other things, and whole industries. Mr. FUQUA. Beyond the shuttle, if the shuttle were stretched fur- ther out, several years, or maybe even canceled for that matter, what would this do with the benefits that we could obtain from the use of the shuttle in other exploratory matters, even to the matter of space manufacturing and other down-the-road activities that the shuttle would be the transportation system by which we could accomplish these other goals? - Mr. HARFORD. Dr. Grey, will you take a crack at that? Dr. GREY. Mr. Chairman, there is no question that the entire space program in effect is hinged in some way to the shuttle. This is 499 comparable to the fact that virtually all of the scientific space explora- tion and space applications missions that were accomplished during the last decade were really hinged to the Apollo program in one way or another, even though they were not specifically a part of that program. The development of the Apollo technology provided the technological and financial basis for virtually our entire space Science program during this period. I think the same parallel may be drawn during the decade of the 1980's with regard to the shuttle. It would be comparable to viewing our transatlantic passenger- carrying capacity today and trying to think of sustaining that level of activity with DC-3's. It is impractical to think of performing the space program, we might consider for the 1980's and the 1990’s with the kind of expendable space transportation hardware available today. Mr. FUQUA. You mentioned the space tug. At what juncture do you think we need to make some type of decisions on the space tug for the effective utilization of the shuttle? • Mr. HARFORD. Our expert is Mr. Layton. Mr. LAYTON. We believe that the present plan is a sensible one. It was recognized from the first that we would need the tug and the thought was that the European space community might develop it but for political reasons the administration disapproved of that possibility. It is now being studied in several interim versions on a joint NASA-Air Force basis, as General Stelling said, and we believe that an interim concept could serve well into the 1980's. You could even continue to use modified expendable upper stages for a period, phase into an interim tug at some later date and ultimately have the fully usable all-up capability as the missions show that we require it. I believe the pattern we have now is a proper one. Mr. FUQUA. Thank you. Mr. Gunter? Mr. GUNTER. No questions, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Fuqua. Mr. Winn has another question. Mr. WINN. You brought up the part about scientists and engineers going into urban problems. Have you run any numbers studies? I have always been of the opinion that we have got plenty of engineers and Scientists and technological people that can handle both the space program and our urban problems if the Federal Government ever got organized on our urban problems. Have you got any numbers that might be available to the committee? Mr. HARFORD. I am not so sure we have got plenty. I think in fact in an ideal world if we were to do all of the things we ought to be doing in applying technology we might very well employ all of those en- gineers who are unemployed and there are still large numbers of them, and some still getting laid off in our field, but we might need more. That is an ideal world. I am hoping in fact that the Federal Govern- ment, and we as citizens, will assist the Federal Government to make some decisions on applying high technology to not only aeronautical and space efforts, but high speed tunneling techniques and the develop- ment of fusion power, and many other areas. Mr. WINN. Energy systems. Mr. HARFORD. Energy systems. It is a shame that we have not yet done that. 500 Mr. WINN. The field is a pretty broad one for these people and I hate to see the enrollment in engineering schools going downhill. Particularly when I know examples of where some of our top people in the space program are flipping hamburgers or filling gas tanks out in California, and then I see the scientists in Moscow and Leningrad that are living in the finest living conditions that are possible over there anyway—they don’t compare with ours in most cases—but they have the finest high-rise apartments and the top floors because they look up to those people. There is quite a difference. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Fuqua. Thank you, Mr. Winn, and you Mr. Harford and Dr. Grey and Mr. Layton and to the other members of the AIAA let me say we want to commend you for taking an active role. I think that we all recognize the tremendous prestige of your organization. We are happy to have you before our committee. We hope in the future that you will be back and give us the benefit of your thinking on our space program as we proceed down the road and hope that those decisions that we make are the correct ones. President Johnson made the state- ment it was not so easy to want to do right but what was right and this we hope we can do. We appreciate your organization for the efforts that you have put forth in a very informative book. I don’t suggest it for bedtime reading for many of us but I think it is a very stimulating publication. I do look forward to reviewing it more thoroughly than I have previously. We want to thank you for your contribution. We look forward to having you before us in the future. Mr. HARFoRD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. LAYTON. Thank you. Mr. FUQUA. The subcommittee will stand adjourned until tomorrow morning at 10 o’clock in this room. We will have the Apollo wrapup, with Dr. Rocco Petrone, Director of the Marshall Space Flight Center and Dr. Harrison Schmitt the scientist-astronaut on Apollo 17, as well as the life scientists with Dr. Charles Berry, the NASA Director of Life Sciences. Available hardware will be discussed with Mr. Phil Culbertson, again, who is Director of the Mission Payload Integration in NASA. The committee will stand adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, March 14, 1973.] 1974 NASA AUTHORIZATION WEDNESDAY, MARCH 14, 1973 Hous E OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICs, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in room 2318, Rayburn House Office Building, the Hon. Don Fuqua (chairman of the subcommittee), presiding. Mr. FUQUA. The subcommittee will be in order. We are happy to have this morning the distinguished people who helped make our Apollo program the success it was. We have with us Mr. Dale Myers, who is the Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight and Dr. Rocco Petrone, the new Director of the Marshall Space Flight Center. Congratulations to you, Rocco. We also have with us Dr. Harrison Schmitt of the crew of Apollo 17. We will get to the other witnesses later. I understand that Dr. Schmitt has some other commitments, and we would be happy to hear from him at this time. Congratulations Dr. Schmitt. I think this is the first time you have been before the committee. We want to congratulate you and the other members of the team for your most successful mission. From what we all gathered, I think all of you enjoyed it. Mr. Winn? Mr. WINN. I have no comments now. It is good to see all of you. We are extremely easy on astronauts. Mr. FUQUA. Except those with doctorate degrees. |Laughter.] Please proceed. STATEMENT OF DR. HARRISON. H. SCHMITT, ASTRONAUT (APOLLO 17) Dr. SchMITT. Gene and Ron send their best. They are out beating the bushes in Oklahoma today. And I will join them in Colorado today. I am very appreciative of the opportunity to continue my report. On our explorations of the Earth's frontier. The explorations conducted during the Apollo program, and the continued examination of informa- tion returned through those efforts represents man's first, I believe, halting, but nonetheless audacious, personal look at his solar system and his Moon. Man's unique character among the living species of nature is manifested in many ways; one such manifestation is that he has the audacity to try to understand his place in the long scheme of things, (501) 502 and the further audacity to try to use that understanding to alter the long scheme of things. The record of Apollo, I believe, is a record of man's audacity to understand his Moon; the record of his use of that understanding is just beginning. I shall try to outline the pattern of our present understanding of the evolutionary sequence through which this sister planet of ours has passed over the last 4% billion years. I shall do so through a series of slides, if you will permit me. Understanding, however, is a transient thing, and even today, alternative explanations exist for the phenom- ena we have observed. On the other hand, the sequence to which I shall refer is consistent with most, if not all, of our present knowledge. This interpretative sequence gives us a framework for future investi- gation, including a new look at our Earth, through the corrective vision of the Moon. |Slide 1–Lunar Sunset.] F- - - - - º --> → º: º-º-º-º-º-º: SLIDE 1 Apollo required a Newtonian match between the explorers' sunrise and the Moon's sunset. Sunset on the far side of the moon was not always so starkly tranquil as it is now. About 4.6 billion years ago, when the Moon was approximately its present size, the sun probably set on a glowing seething sea of molten rock. Storms of debris still swept its surface, mixing, quenching, outgasing, and remelting a primitive melted shell, while inside the shell of the crust of the Moon was gradually taking form. 503 SLIDE 2 By about 4.4 billion years ago, the Moon's crust must have looked not unlike the highland areas we see today, although still hot and violently changing in appearance as the debris storms continued the declining, though still dominant ways. This cratered and pulverized outer crust is composed largely of plagioclase feldspar, a mineral rich in calcium and aluminum. |Slide 3–The Basin Ingenii. SLIDE 3 As the residue of creation was consumed by Earth and Moon alike, the debis storms decreased in frequency, although not without occasional unusually massive reminders of the past. Sometime prior to about 4.1 or 4.2 billion years ago, large basins began to form by major impact events at a time when they could not be obliterated by more numerous smaller collisions. 505 |Slide 4–The Basin Van de Graff.] SLIDE 4 During this same time, the Moon's interior, through the accumula- tion of the heat of radioactive decay, gradually reached temperatures by which it could begin to influence the character of the surface regions. First, a hot core of liquid solution of sulfur and iron appears to have accumulated, and, in this core a remarkable and still little understood phenomenon occurred: An electric dynamo probably came into existence, began to perpetuate itself, and produced a magnetic dipole field about one-twenty-fifth of that presently associated with the Earth. Although the dipole field has disappeared, the magnetic anomalies persist to the present. SLIDE 5 The second event generated by the Moon's interior processes was the apparent eruption on the surface of light-colored materials, composed largely of the pulverized remnants of the ancient crust. These light- colored felspar-rich materials appeared to have partially filled all the great basins that then existed. Their eruption may have been driven by the melting and upward migration of the materials, rich in radio- active and gaseous components, that were left over after the crystaliza- tion of the Moon's original melted shell. 507 |Slide 6–The Basin Tsiolkovsky.] SLIDE 6 As the last of the large basins were created, about 3.9 billion years ago, the final major internally generated episode of evolution took place. This chapter tells of the flooding of all the great basins on the front side of the Moon, by vast, now frozen, oceans of dark basalt. Only the very deepest of basins on the far side were affected by the formation of the maria, although, to some degree, all portions of the . crust must have been permeated up to a general mare “sea- evel.” 508 |Slide 7–Tsiolkovsky Sunset.] SLIDE 7 This tremendous upwelling and extrusion of molten rock was prob- ably triggered by heat from radioactive elements; and, in this case, portions of the Moon's deep inner crust or the even deeper outer mantle melted. Variations in the internal composition of the Moon caused the period of mare flooding not only to span the time from 3.8 to about 3.2 billion years ago, but to also cause profound chemical dif- ferences in the character of the basalts that were produced, as this time passed. Then, a relative quiet settled forever on the surface of the moon. When the waves and currents on the maria had finally been arrested, the moon’s appearance differed only slightly from that of today. 509 |Slide 8—Swirls of Marginus.] SLIDE 8 The storms of debris had decreased and disappeared; the last huge basin had been formed; and the seas of basalt were finally quiet. Only an occasional stony or cometary traveler of our solar system collided violently with the surface; only local volcanic fields developed over unusually high heat sources; only isolated stresses fractured the hard- ened lunar crust and changed ever so slightly the face of the Moon. Some of these changes, such as unusual swirls of unknown character, a large ridge system with associated volcanic fields, and evidence of global stresses, suggest that beneath the crust major chapters of history were being recorded. Possibly, the Moon's interior reached a thermal state where great slow convection cells were formed. These cells may have wrinkled, stretched and broken portions of our aging moon, as heat and some new materials reached the surface, but as the cooling progressed, even the phenomenal dynamo and magnetic field of the core ceased to function. 93-466 O - 73 - 33 510 [Slide 9–Earth Rise.] SLIDE 9 Now, except for faint rumblings and occasional sharp ringings as reminders of the past, the storied moon has completed the record of its tale. The next book is being written by man as he begins to peruse the library of the planets. Apollo 8 finally and irrevocably broke the bonds of biological evolution that had thus far bound our species. For the men of Apollo, living out our exploration on the ground, this was “the mission.” Apollo 11 was our job, but Apollo 8 was our spirit, our daring, and our imagination. With it, we and all mankind evolved into the universe, never to be satisfied with only the beauties and comforts of Earth. Paradoxically, we also found enhanced awareness and appreciation of those beauties and comforts we were now so willing to leave behind. 511 |Slide 10–The Smythic Mare.] SLIDE 10 As we progressed toward our historical goal of a lunar landing, Apollo 10 provided the final technological verification that we were ready. While showing the world an orderly progression of engineering and orbital procedures, the mission emphasized how ordinary, but then how extraordinary the new breed of explorers were to be. 512 |Slide 11–The Tranquillitatis Mare.] - SLIDE 11 The far horizon of Mare Tranquillitatis holds a unique place in the annals of man. Even though we speak personally in so special a way about Apollo 8, the event which history will remember as having changed the course of that same history was the landing of Apollo 11. The returns of that mission will span the history of science, the history of men and the history of man. Science finally had real and factual insight into the temporal dimensions, if not all of the actualities, of the evolution of our sister planet and its sun. Men finally had seen their first truly space-faring nation and saw that it carried the traditions of freedom as super-cargo; and, man saw himself as a creature of the universe. 513 [Slide 12—The Near Side Highlands.] SLIDE 12 Then, the relatively unheralded work of exploration began and progressed. Apollo 16, while finding that we were not yet ready to understand the earliest chapters of lunar history recorded in the Descartes Highlands, also found that the major central events of that history were apparently compressed in time far more than we had been prepared to imagine. There appeared to be indications that the formation of the youngest major F. basins, the erruption of light-colored plains materials and the earliest extrusions of mare basalts took place over about 200 million years of time, around 4 billion years ago. 514 [Slide 13—The Southern Imbrium Region.] SLIDE 13 After the heady findings and conclusions following the landing at Tranquillity base, Apollo 12 returned precision to lunar navigation and obvious complexity to lunar science. The structure of the hardened upper few meters of the lunar surface became clearly a complex history book in its own right; representatives were uncovered of heretofore unsuspected rocks rich in potassium, rare-Earth elements and phos- phorous, elements thought to be present only in trace amounts on the º surface; the ages and character of the mare basalts began to unfold. 515 [Slide 14—The Crater Copernicus.] SLIDE 14 To the west of the mare cognitum landing site of Apollo 12, and south of the crater Copernicus, we targeted the Apollo 13 mission. Instead of the insight into the intensity and timing of the event that formed the Imbrium basin, we received new insight into ourselves. The courage of the crew, and the resourcefulness of the controllers of that mission, following the explosive destruction of the service module, gave history's most graphic and human example of man's potential in the face of extreme adversity. Apollo 14 picked up Apollo 13's torch of exploration at Fra Mauro. The mission told us that not only did the Imbrium event occur barely 100 million years before the oldest mare basalt extrusions, but that such massive collisions transferred much more heat energy into the planet's surface than we had ever imagined. 516 |Slide 15–The Eastern Imbrium Region.] Nasa As-Tº-39-21311 SLIDE 15 The Apollo 15 mission to Hadley Rille, at the foot of the lunar Apennine Mountains, introduced a new scale to lunar exploration. We began to look at the whole planet through the eyes of cameras and electronics. On the Moon's surface, we reached beyond our earlier hopes, and began to rove and observe the wide variety of features available for investigation. The varied samples and observations in the vicinity of Hadley Rille and the mountain ring of Imbrium |..". our knowledge of lunar time and processes back past the 4 illion year barrier we had seemed to see on previous missions. 517 [Slide 16–The Apennines of the Moon.] SLIDE 16 Of equal importance was the realization, by ourselves and by millions of people around the world, that there yet existed sheer beauty and majesty in views of nature previously outside human experience. 518 |Slide 17–The Serenitatis Basin.] SLIDE 17 Near the coast of the great frozen sea of Serenitatis, Apollo 17 visited the valley of Taurus–Littrow. The unique visual character and beauty of this valley has been reported to you previously (Record 22 Jan. 1973, vol. 119, 17011). The unique scientific character of this valley helps to mitigate the sadness that, with our visit, the Apollo explorations ended. If this end had to be, it would have been hard to find a better locality to synthesize and expand our ideas on the evolu- tion of the moon. 519 |Slide 18–The Valley of Taurus–Littrow.] Nasa Asiº 147-22.65 SLIDE 18 It now appears that at Taurus–Littrow, we have looked at and sampled the ancient lunar record, ranging back from the extrusion of mare basalts, through the formation of the Serenitatis mountain ring, and thence back into materials that may reflect the very origins of the lunar crust itself. Also, we have found, and are studying materials and processes that range forward from the formation of the earliest mare basalt surface, through 3.8 billion years of modification of that surface, including the addition of mantles which may be the culmination of processes active within the deep interior of the moon. 520 |Slide 19–Lunar Sunrise.] 2.451. SLIDE 19 For all of our Apollo missions, we left the Moon before the lunar sunrise had progressed into the vast regions of the lunar west; Mare Procellarum, where the young mysterious features of that region's central ridge system still await the crew of a mission diverted after Apollo 13; Mare Orientale, whose stark alpine rings have been viewed closely by man, only in the subdued blue light of the Earth. The promise of the story in these regions has not diminished but seemingly watches for the progression of the sunrises and the landing craft of another generation of explorers. 521 |Slide 20–Earth Set.] asiº. ---- SLIDE 20 A tour of the Moon both begins and ends with a setting Earth; a reminder that knowledge for knowledge's sake is tremendously interest- ing and exciting to many men, and essential, in the long run, to all men. However, without, at least, a temporary focus, knowledge can de- generate and be lost even to the future. The focus of our lunar knowl- edge is the planet Earth. 522 |Slide 21—Earth.] NASA Asiºlº-2725 SLIDE 21 That fragile piece of blue with ancient sails and rafts of life is our Earth and will be our home as men travel the solar system. For 3 billion years, there has been little resemblance between the static history of the Moon and the violent dynamic history of the Earth. º 3 billion years is about as far as we can see into the past on arth. What of the preceding billion and a half years? Does the view we have had of the Moon tell us potentially useful things about our past? The answer is clearly, yes, to the last question, although more specific insight is just beginning to emerge. The oldest rock complexes on Earth are rocks rich in calcium and aluminum, as are the oldest known rocks on the Moon. Understanding the origin and evolution of these terrestrial rocks is not a trivial problem, as most of our known titanium resources are found in such rocks. The association of large amounts of titanium with the oldest lunar basalts may also be related to this terrestrial association. The oldest rock terrains on Earth also contain vast layered rock sheets, which in aggregate are basaltic in composition. Their resem- blance to the lunar maria may be more than coincidental. Again, this is not a trivial problem, because much of the nickel, chromium, and platinum group metal resources of our planet are located within these sheets of basaltic rock. 523 Throughout the Earth’s crust, there have long been recognized regional provinces that are rich in certain elements, and are the locus of ore deposits of those elements. My home country, the Southwest is one such geochemical province rich in copper. Our present under- standing of the origin and structure of these provinces is very weak, even though much time, effort, and money has been spent in endeavor- ing to understand. Locked in the mechanics of the formation of the very large lunar basins, and their penetration into the crust, and in the distribution of ejecta around such basins may be the clues for which we have been waiting. Finally, as we merge the scientific revolution brought about by Apollo on the Moon with the simultaneous revolution brought about by new insight into the origins of ocean basins and continents on the Earth, we may begin to understand the great stresses and strains within our crust as ocean floors grow and continents move. These stresses and strains profoundly affect the everyday lives of people living within belts of present earthquakes and volcanic activity. Within future understanding of the frozen ocean of basalt of Mare Procellarum and the vast ridge and volcanic system that splits it, may lie the simplification of thought about past events that leads to the expansion of thought about present events. I will be the first to admit that these last comments give free run to the imagination. However, knowledge never becomes a resource until it is married to imagination. It is thus, and only thus, that the scientific legacy of Apollo will be realized. As to the historical legacy of Apollo, I have found no reason to change my thoughts expressed as we left the Moon, and the valley of Taurus–Littrow, last December. “That valley of history has seen mankind complete its first evolutionary steps into the universe. With those steps, a tradition of peace and freedom now exists in the solar system. From this larger home, we move to greet the future.” Thank you for your attention. I will be happy to answer any questions. Mr. FUQUA. Thank you very much for a very fine statement and also for a most successful Apollo 17 mission. While you were orbiting, or while Ron was orbiting, were you able to get any photographs of the other landing sites and what was left of the descent stages from which the LM's had previously been fired? Dr. ScHMITT. We got some good pictures. I showed one earlier, but I did not point it out specifically. They were of the Apollo 15 site, plus our own, Apollo 17. There was, with the naked eye, a visual indication that something different had happened; namely, the Sur- face had been lightened around that point. That apparently happened during the final phases of descent. But as far as visually being able to see the artifacts of exploration from orbit, no; we could not. The panometric camera which we had in the service module is capable of and has photographed the descent stage of lunar modules on one or two of the missions. Mr. FUQUA. Do you feel, as a scientist, that we have missed some- thing by not having other scientists in earlier missions? Was it just an engineering exposition? Maybe this is an unfair question, but based upon the technology we had at that time, should we have had more scientists sooner? Also, were they capable of having gone into the program as scientists and astronauts sooner? Would you care to comment on that? 524 Dr. ScHMITT. That is a very difficult and complex question. From a purely personal point of view, I would be less than the egotist that I am sure I am to say I was not ready to fly sooner. But from the long-range view, I have to think of what we were trying to do with Apollo, think of where its origins were; namely, in the international field, think of the uncertainties which existed when we were selecting not only scientists but pilot astronauts, and think of how long it might have taken to land on the moon and what might be the problems. Nobody, in 1965, when I entered the program, or even in 1968, was absolutely certain we were going to land on the moon. We felt we were and we knew that was our mandate, but the actual capability of the lunar module was not yet clear. The selection and use of numerous test-pilot astronauts was the perfectly logical thing to do, I think, and I do not see how you could ever second-guess that now. When you do that, you have to question the then existing management within NASA about how long it could have taken to do the job of landing there; you then ask how soon would it have been humanly and actually possible to fly scientists. I suspect when the final history is written we will see that we did it about as soon as we could. Again, that is a different perspective from what my personal one is, but we always think we are much more capable than maybe our peers around us think we are. Mr. FUQUA. I appreciate your observations. I am not trying to put you on the spot or anything of that nature. There has been some criticism that scientists should have gone into this sooner. Even some of your former colleagues have expressed regret that they were not given a mission sooner to fly. Dr. SchMITT. I think from a short-range view that it is under- standable why they say that. But I always try to take a somewhat broader view of what we were trying to do. The program was not initiated for science, I would be the first to admit it. But it did produce a tremendous capability for science. And, as I have said before, science became a major beneficiary of the Apollo program. I think to have expected to fly immediately after a successful landing and to be assigned to a crew would be very premature, because I do not feel it is an easy job for someone to commit a certain man or group of men to go to the moon. It is still not the simplest thing in the world, or the most safe. And you have to be confident of the people you are dealing with as crews. I think, after a year or two of looking at what NASA had to offer and then getting out because you were not assigned to a flight was very premature at this stage of our involvement. I can see in the future where it may be possible to assign specialists over a 6-month period. Now that we understand the space environ- ment and what happens to men when they are in it, I think we can come up with the evaluation techniques to decide within a 6-month period if a person is capable of flying in a laboratory. You just make that decision, if, you are physically and mentally qualified to doing it. We did not have that information in 1965. Mr. Fuqua. There were a lot of unknowns. Dr. SCHMITT. Yes. Mr. FUQUA. And the leadtime you had to start preparation and the information on which it was based at that time would have made it extremely difficult. 525 Dr. ScHMITT. I do not claim to have any more maturity or fore- sight than anybody else. I did do one thing when I got into the program, after I had been there a few months and had begun to under- stand it; I made the decision that flying to the moon was not the most significant thing I could ever do and that there was much to be gained within the Apollo program by science, by the Nation, and by mankind, without my going to the moon. Being the only geologist, I sort of had to make this decision. You could not gear a program toward flying a single geologist to the moon. He might disappear in a jet aircraft. So with that decision I found there were many, many avenues for productive research within the Apollo program. I wish more of my colleagues who eventually decided to leave had felt that way. But they all had their own likes and their own desires in science. And they will have to speak for themselves. Mr. Fuqua. Surely. As the only scientist who has been to the moon, your previous comments about the procedure that NASA used in the selection of crews and when they started the scientist part of the crew, and some of the criticism that has happened, can you fill us in on why some of the apathy toward the space program exists in the scientific com- munity? Some I know are very avid supporters, and yet there are others who have a question mark about our program, that this is kind of i ide how we are putting on to improve our prestige around the WOTIC!. Other comments have also been made. I am sure I do not have to explain this to you. Dr. ScHMITT. I am certainly well aware of it. And I again have to speak only for myself. But I attribute it, frankly, to a lack of imagi- nation. I do not think that much of the scientific community, par- ticularly the specialized disciplines within that community, have really sat back and thought what might be done with some of the resources that now are available to us if we want to use them. I can speak not of the lunar resources and actual hard materials, because that is an entirely different question, but the resources of near-earth space, which I put into four general categories: the existence of an environment that is free of gravitational stress; an environment where there is an infinite high vacuum available to you plus ability to cool things at very low temperatures; the capability to view our Sun instantaneously and continuously, which is the major molder still of our environment, despite what we try to do to it; and the obvious instantaneous and continuous view which you have of the earth. These four general areas of resources I think have a tremendous potential, if we start thinking about them. It may turn out that the engineering feasibility of carrying out imaginative ideas will disappear. I do not think so, but I think once we make that resource available to people that we can in fact do some very imaginative things. I am speaking again just purely from my own imagination, but I can visualize, let us say, in the absence of gravitational stress, the possibility of hospital clinics, a very specialized thing—I am treading on Chuck Berry’s toes here a little bit—but I am trying to force some imagination. - One of the very difficult things in the treatment of burns is the fact that the patient lies on his burns and has to do that. There is no way I know of by which we can support him in any reasonable way. 93-466 O - 73 - 34 526 Maybe that is one of the things we can do and save people that we might otherwise have lost. Maybe there is particularly delicate surgery that surgeons are not willing to tackle now. They may not even think of it because of the presence of the gravitational field. I do not know. I am guessing. You can think of manufacturing processes and research and chem- istry where you are doing very delicate separations of elements, where convection, which is a function of the gravitational field, is hurting you. I think we ought to ask that community, if you had that environ- ment free of gravitational stress, what would you do with it which you do not do today? Putting very special fluids into space where you do not have to have a container for them; this cannot help but open up new avenues for research and also for manufacture. In view of the high vacuum, I think theoretical physics and prac- tical physics almost certainly are going to have an imaginative use for these resources, if we make them available to them and talk to them and find out what they think is important. I am suggesting also that with looking at the Sun and monitoring Our Earth, maybe, for example, through synchronous weather sta- tions, that we can in fact produce imaginative manned and unmanned payloads for the future. I do not particularly like the term “payload,” because some of these things will be service loads and some will be things that you just feel like you should do for your people. But I also feel that with the kinds of imaginative thought I would like to see, there will be a pure and very strong and continuous economic base for space, something beyond the government, something that is truly paying for itself. In my view it will furnish the foundation for another exploration program in the plants. Mr. Fuqua. Do you think the shuttle program will provide a new avenue of space research such as an extension of our knowledge of the Earth as well as a great laboratory in space to conduct all of these experiments? Dr. SchMITT. I am not, because of my activity in the last few years, tremendously familiar with the shuttle. I know the general objectives; and the objective, as I see it, is to make those resources I just men- tioned—maybe I’m putting thoughts into other people's heads— make the resources which I just mentioned available for use. The shuttle itself is not a laboratory. It is a transportation system. Now if we have laboratories that we want to put there and people who ought to be in those laboratories, then we can start to make use of those resources. The big thing which I think is important is to start not only progressing with the engineering of the shuttle but progressing with the imaginative thoughts of how we are actually going to put that capability to use. I think we are doing that. I think over the next couple of years we will be able to come to you and other people in the country and say these are the kinds of things that will very clearly make the shuttle a continuous and economically feasible venture. Mr. FUQUA. Thank you very much. Mr. Winn? - Mr. WINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 527 You talked about some of these questions that may seem pretty much like a layman’s viewpoint. But is there a wind on the Moon? Dr. ScHMITT. There is not a wind as we know it, Mr. Winn. If you will pardon the pun. [Laughter.] The atmospheric pressure is extremely low. It is 11 or 12 orders of magnitude less, a factor of 10 less than what we have on the Earth. However, there is the solar wind which is produced by the influx of particles from the Sun. They are really high-energy and high-speed pieces of atoms, protons, electrons, and nuclei of atoms ejected from the Sun in the process of producing heat and light. Mr. WINN. Do they fall on the Moon? Dr. SchMITT. They hit the Moon and modify its surface. One of the things we have yet to really tap, but which we have in our hands, is this history book of the Sun which goes back as deep as our drill cores have gone. As a new layer of debris is deposited, it essentially covers up and preserves the old record. So there are pages of history in the debris, if we go into it cleverly. We are not quite clever enough in our present techniques in many cases to do this, but much of it is being preserved so that as we be- come clever we can go back and see how the Sun has changed with time. I do not know the full length of time we will be able to go back with some of these cores, but it may well be in excess of 1 billion years. You say, OK, that's the old Sun and what does it tell me about the Sun today. Well, it tells you trends. It tells you what the Sun is doing and how it has reacted and changed in the past. These are things on which a general understanding of the Sun de- pends and which is required in the long run as to both its past and its present, in order for us to understand what it is doing to our Earth. We still have to live here, and the Sun is still the major modifier and controller of our environment. We do not yet understand it. One of the fascinating things of Skylab, of course, is the extensive effort now to monitor the Sun over an extended period of time outside of the atmosphere where we can look at it in all wavelengths. I think this will be extremely enlightening as to how we need in the future to prepare to establish a continuous monitoring of the solar influence on our Earth. Mr. WINN. The energy which you referred to on the Moon, is that only Sun energy reflection? Dr. SCHMITT. No, energy that modified the Moon in the early days was primarily the energy first that was accoumulated as the Moon ac- Creted. It is a transfer of kinetic energy into heat energy. As a particle hits the Moon, much of that energy and motion is transferred into heat. That was the initial heat load the Moon had which probably melted its Crust. Now over time you also accumulate heat energy through radioactive decay. It is the same way it happens on Earth. The unstable isotopes of uranium, thorium and potassium decay over a certain period of time. And when they decay, they produce heat. It is the basis of our nuclear engines and powerplants in general. So that on the Moon as well as on Earth this radioactivity is the main heat or energy engine which we have to drive the dynamics of the planet. The Moon seems to have been largely turned off 3 billion 528 years ago, because it is smaller and most of the heat has already dis- sipated from it. - The Earth is big enough that heat accumulates, and we keep this heat engine going. Mr. WINN. Is there any belief that this energy or this heat comes from the core? - Dr. SCHMITT. Some of it does. Most of the sources of the Earth’s heat energy are probably now located within the Earth’s mantle because the materials have separated into Jayers within the Earth. The core is hot, do not get me wrong; it is a heat which is stored there because it is very difficult to conduct it out through several thousand kilometers of rock. Mr. WINN. Are you talking about Earth? Dr. ScHMITT. The same thing applies to the Moon. Mr. WINN. They are comparable as far as interior heat. Dr. ScHMITT. They are comparable as far as heat sources and also as to the character of the interior. If some of the recent seismic evi- dence is correct, the Moon's core is probably slightly molten. It has a stored amount of energy, but the radioactive elements are probably not concentrated in that core. They are concentrated out in the mantle and the crust. Mr. WINN. They do not have anything like tornadoes on the Moon? Dr. SCHMITT. Not like here. Mr. WINN. You have seen no evidence of that. Dr. SCHMITT. Not on the Moon. Mr. WINN. The swirling we have seen on some films is mainly from our own LM or our own equipment? Dr. SCHMITT. In part that happens, but we also have evidence that some internal processes such as outgassing, gas moving out of the Moon, will alter the surface in strange swirl-like patterns. But that gas over a period of a few months is gone. The gravitational field of the Moon is not sufficient to hold gas molecules. Mr. WINN. One last question. On the famous orange, glassy-type rocks, I think I read a story within the last 10 days that they have now changed their opinion again on that. Can you tell the committee really what is your opinion of those? Dr. ScHMITT. This is turning out to be one of the most fascinating small problems we have put together on the Moon. There are two kinds of ages which we talk about in geology. One is an exposure age. How recently has something been exposed to the environment, whatever that environment might be? In the case of the Moon, the environment is largely the solar wind and the impact of the small meteorites. The other age is that time when a rock cools to a temperature which allows it to hold in the products of radioactive decay. Now in the case of the orange glass, the exposure age is extremely young. It has not been sitting where it is now for very long—like 10 to 20 million years, now that the present data is coming in. But the absolute age, the age at which it cooled, is 3.7 billion years. So there is a tremendous differ- ence between these ages, and the material is still very pure chemically. 529 The big question is how did that material formed 3.7 billion years ago maintain its purity in an extremely violent environment and then be put into its present position on the crater only 10 million years ago. And this we do not have an answer for now. But it makes an extremely intriguing problem, because this glass is turning out to have chemical characteristics which are very unusual compared to anything else we have seen. Mr. WINN. Comparable to what? Dr. ScHMITT. It is basically a basalt. It is basically like the rocks We got from Apollo 11, but the trace element chemistry has some unusual characteristics. It is rich in zinc relative to other rocks. It is rich in chlorine and tellurium and a number of fairly exotic elements that we are not used to seeing associated with rocks that we get back from the lunar crust. It is more suggestive that these rocks had their origins fairly deep within the moon, 3.7 billion years ago, and may represent the sample of the deep interior, or at least the representative of the deep interior through partial melting, which we have been Searching for for a long time. Mr. WINN. Was there much of that where you found them? Dr. ScHMITT. There was quite a bit. There was an area about 1 meter by 4 meters. It was at least that size. And underneath the orange Soil is a black glass. Mr. WINN. The orange is not glassy? Dr. ScHMITT. It is, but there is a black glass and a devitrified glass underneath it which is much more extensive. Mr. WINN. How orange is it? Dr. SCHMITT. It is very clearly orange. The reason it does not look Orange in a lot of the photographs and even in the LRL is that the light you get in a normal laboratory is nothing like the sun. The sun provides the most beautiful laboratory light that you could ever imagine. It acts like a beaded reflector, like the highway signs. These are little tiny beads of glass, and when you shine a collimated light directly on it, it gives you a bright visual return. - Mr. WINN. How come the cameras don’t pick it up? Dr. ScHMITT. They did. Unfortunately, the prime film shows the color very well, but as soon as you go a couple of generations down in printing it is hard to get it out. But the Aviation Week carried a picture of the glass on the cover and also a picture inside which showed the color very well. Mr. WINN. Why don’t you just bring us a rock? [Laughter.] Dr. SCHMITT. That is more your responsibility than mine. Mr. WINN. We may get it to look at anyway. Is the radioactivity as high as our scientists have predicted? Dr. SchMITT. It is turning out to be a very intriguing question. The heat flow from the moon is turning out to be two to four times higher than we expected. When I say “we expected,” that is based on an extrapolation of what we know about the Earth and what we felt its composition was relative to the radioactive materials. When we extrap- olate that to the Moon, we would get much less heat flow. And this means since the Moon's heat flow is higher that there is more radio- active material within the Moon per gram, per unit mass, than there is on Earth. 530 This is an unusual situation which we do not fully understand yet. Within the individual rocks, we are finding that the crust is compara- ble in many respects to what we are used to seeing on Earth, so there is still radioactivity at depths which we have not sampled. We do find some of these crustal rocks—you may have heard the term “Kreep”—which are themselves rich in radioactive components. We have not found them in abundant quantities, however. Mr. WINN. Thank you. I appreciate your appearing before the committee today. And I am sure everyone on the committee and everyone in the room thoroughly understands what you are talking about. - Dr. ScHMITT. I tried. Sorry. [Laughter.] Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Wydler? * WYDLER. First, may I understand where you got the name Jack. Dr. SchMITT. My father was a well-known geologist in the South- west and his name was Harrison. And that is my name. Since we both got into trouble with my mother quite frequently, in order to figure out who was in trouble, they started calling me Jackie, which grad- ually degenerated to Jack. . Mr. WYDLER. I never heard it as a nickname for Harrison before. Dr. SchMITT. Well, it is not. It really was my dad’s uncle’s name. Mr. WYDLER. I am not a scientific type either, so I hope I use the right words. Have we discovered any new metals, materials or ele- ments on the Moon that we did not know about before? Mr. SchMITT. We have not seen any. Mr. WYDLER. Have we been able to identify everything on the Moon so far as something that we also have seen on the Earth? Dr. SCHMITT. We have seen isotopes that we don’t see naturally on Earth, but that we understand what may have produced them. For example, on the last mission we started to see beryllium 7 which is an unusual, short-lived radioactive isotope produced in the sun. It is part of the solar wind which it usually disappears very quickly. It turns out there was a solar flare last year of unusual intensity, and we are seeing the residual effects of it in the soils. There is something we usually do not see except in special physics experiments. There is evidence of some of the daughter products of radioactive elements that have completely decayed out of our solar system—they were formed when the solar system was formed, but their half life, or decay time, is so short that all you see is the daughter products. You cannot find the original or parent elements. We have seen traces of those daughter products showing that those parent elements used to exist in the solar system. We have also seen the daughter elements in meteorites. These are the kinds of trace elements we have seen which we do not normally see on Earth just because of unusual preservation in the lunar environment There are new combinations of elements into minerals because of unusual chemistry, such as the high titanium in the basalts. Thus, we see some minerals which we have not seen before. There is nothing at this point that we would say would be very unusual. . Now that is not to say that as our work continues on the lunar samples that we may not find something that in some exotic way will }. important economically, but I would not hold out too much hope or that. 531 Mr. WYDLER. Did we ever land on the so-called other side of the Moon, the dark side? - - Dr. ScHMITT. No; we didn’t. Mr. WydlīR. Why not? Dr. SchMITT. I'm afraid I can’t answer that. I have my own Opinion. º Mr. WYDLER. I am interested. It seems to me it was a big OHOISSIOI). - Dr. PETRONE. I hope that is what we are going to do in the next generation. I must say that Jack held out for a landing on the backside. Mr. WYDLER. It just struck me as to why in all of these flights we did not go to the other side. Dr. PETRONE. We have reasons, and the prime reason is the lack of communication. As the crew prepares to land on the Moon, they get a tremendous assist from the ground on exactly what is going on on the LM. We give them continuous updates of required data. We would never have felt confident. We would totally lose communi- cations on the reverse side. So until someone puts satellites around the Moon to give us communication, it is not feasible. Dr. ScHMITT. I think the estimates at the time were about a $100 million addition to the mission to get a communications satellite placed in the right position behind the Moon so that you could communicate during all this period of time. Dr. PETRONE. Mr. Wydler, I would like to say that that certainly is an intriguing thing for the future and there are other sites which are just as intriguing. It is one place we did not cover within the limitations we had on Apollo. There are more lessons and more mysteries to be discovered on the Moon, and that backside will be one of them. Mr. WYDLER. It seems to me it leaves a big blank in a very basic way. Now we are left with the unanswered question. There might be something very different on the other side of the Moon. Dr. ScHMITT. We thought about it. It was just a question of limitation on the basic system we built to land on the Moon. Dr. PETRONE. It was a question of safety, frankly. We felt that without communications and tracking that it was not safe. - Dr. ScHMITT. It would have been a major diversion of effort to make it a safe landing. And in the time element which was being discussed, I do not think NASA or anybody had the money or capability to divert effort from other projects to do that. That is not to say we did not learn a lot about the far side of the Moon, both photographically and with remote sensors. We know something about the chemistry because of the X-ray spectrometer we flew. Mr. WYDLER. I think it would have been a very interesting experi- ment with rocks from that side and the other side of the Moon. That comparison might have given you more scientific information about the universe. - Dr. SCHMITT. No question. - Mr. WYDLER. It would take you from one point on that side of the Moon to another, and it would seem to me that would have been the area where we might have gotten a breakthrough. Dr. SchMITT. No question about it. But within the time frame and the money we needed to complete the program, it was not technically 532 and economically feasible. It is not to say we couldn’t do it, but you have to devote resources and money to it. During the next generation we have something to shoot for. Mr. WYDLER. Dr. Petrone, I would like to ask you this general question: Was the number of people that you had assisting at the launches greatly reduced over the years? I am talking about the Apollo launches and the people working at the Cape in the launch effort? I’m not talking about the control personnel. Dr. PETRONE. In the early years, around the time of the 501 and 502, the first Saturn V’s, there had to be a tremendous learning curve. You had procedures of thousands of pages that had to be written. Every step had to be meticulously surveyed. Now once those procedures had been run two, three or four times, then the people needed to do that work could be taken off the rolls; so the numbers required to launch the Saturn V and the Apollo spacecraft and the LM did reduce as we gained experience. We did not have this experience for the first or second launch. Mr. WYDLER. I was always impressed with the control room with as many as 500 monitoring boards and tens of personnel sitting there with all types of control panels to watch the launch from the Moon's sur- face. The astronauts appear simply to push a button and it seems to work perfectly. - Dr. PETRONE. We have discussed that many times, but I would also say this: There is quite a difference between a LM on the surface and a Saturn V sitting on the pad. I don’t have to mention that. And it is also the work done by those people on Earth that gave us the confi- dence to put two men on the Moon where just touching that button would get them back up. It did not happen accidentally. It was the work of those dedicated people you saw that made it possible for us to take that risk to put men on the Moon. There is not much they can do except to expect that button to work. Mr. WYDLER. Thank you. Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Flowers? Mr. FLOWERS. No questions. Mr. FUQUA. Thank you very much. Again, on behalf of the subcommittee—and I’m sure I speak for the chairman and all the other members of the full committee—we want to thank you and the members of all Apollo missions for the great contributions which you made not only to your country but to man- kind. I hope you relate that back to your fellow astronaut colleagues. Dr. SCHMITT. Thank you, sir; it was a service we were happy to per- form. I know it sounds redundant, but the real flesh and blood ex- plorers were on Earth. I think that is the unique thing about the pro- gram. At least in the last few years we suddenly have an exploration program that everybody can participate in. I think they have, and I think they have enjoyed it. Mr. FUQUA. You have had a lot of help on the ground from very dedicated and intelligent people. I imagine when you are sitting on top of that launch pad with the bird fueled up and you have to wait a few hours that certain thoughts go through your mind. 533 Dr. SCHMITT. I’ll tell you that the confidence is so high by that time, through the training and the understanding of what people are doing and what their capabilities are, that it is actually possible to take a nap. Mr. Fuqu A. Thank you very much. We appreciate it. Mr. Director, we are happy to welcome you back. I think one of the first times we met you were down at the cape getting ready to launch one of the Gemini programs and you had been up all night. I hope you got some sleep last night. [Laughter.] The launch schedule is not quite as pressing as it has been in the past. Dr. ScHMITT. I am very reluctant to leave Rocco by himself, but, I do have to leave. Mr. Fu QUA. We understand, and you are certainly excused. Dr. SCHMITT. If you order me to stay, I would be happy to stay. |Laughter.] Mr. FUQUA. Please proceed, Dr. Petrone. STATEMENT OF DR, ROCCO A. PETRONE, DIRECTOR, MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER AND APOLLO PROGRAM DIRECTOR Dr. PETRONE. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee: In a way, my appearance here is a milestone as a valedictory state- ment in the Apollo program which has occupied my thoughts over the last 12 years. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit a statement for the record summarizing our accomplishments on Apollos 16 and 17. Many of the results are preliminary, but we have sum- marized the last two missions since we last reported to the subcommittee. Mr. FUQUA. We will make that a part of the record. [The above-mentioned statement follows: APOLLO PROGRAM STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD (By Dr. Rocco A. Petrone, Director, Marshall Space Flight Center, NASA) APOLLO INTRODUCTION The achievements of the Apollo Program stand as a monument to this genera- tion. In the last decade, man has extended his domain from the seas, the surface, and the atmosphere of this planet Earth into space; first with suborbital flight, and then, in the “One Giant Leap for Mankind” by the Apollo 11 crew, (MA70– 5098) he reached across thousands of kilometers of space to land and walk on the dusty ancient surface of another planetary body, the Moon. History may well call this the greatest adventure and achievement of man in the 20th century. Aeons have been required for terrestrial life to evolve the capability of one species to make the jump to another body of the solar system. To deny that man will not eventually consolidate this hard-won foot-hold would require a very short- Sighted view of the nature of man. Nine teams of astronauts have now made the epic journey and 12 Americans have walked the lunar surface. They have returned some 387 kg (851 lbs.) of lunar rocks and soil for analysis in earth-based laboratories, and have established scientific stations on the moon that are continuing to transmit scientific and engineering data back to earth. 534 One of the first scientific instruments placed on the moon by the Apollo 11 astronauts, the laser retroreflector, (MA72–5116) will provide scientific informa- tion that over the next decade will be very important. Two other retroreflectors have been strategically placed on the moon by the Apollo 14 and 15 astronauts; these instruments now form a net (MA72–5194) with a terrestrial application for study of continental drift, and perhaps earthquake prediction. All the ALSEP (Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package) stations established on the moon are continuing to transmit useful data (MA72–5196). Furthermore, the Apollo 17 ALSEP was designed to be more lugged and dependable than the other ALSEPs, and so it too should continue to provide useful lunar scientific and en- gineering data for several years to come. The Apollo Program has increased our knowledge of the moon beyond expecta- tion, it has provided new knowledge and techniques for study of both the earth and Sun, it has led to a wealth of new technology, and has given mankind a new frontier and the beginning of the technology necessary to exploit it. With the conclusion of the Apollo Program, not only do we know much more about the moon, enabling us to formulate much more sophisticated questions about it, but equally important, we know more about the earth and the solar system as well. The moon is a scientific treasure-house of knowledge to aid in understanding the origin and evolution of the terrestrial planets and the material they are made of. The Apollo Program is important not only for the information that it has given us about our physical surroundings, but perhaps its greatest long-term effect will be due to the information it has given us about ourselves. It has proved that we can dedicate our resources to the achievement of a large-scale demanding tech- nological goal without the stimulus of war. Although we have now completed the initial flight phases of lunar exploration, study of the moon will remain a dynamic and viable enterprise due to the wealth of data that will now be studied as the concluding capstone to our past efforts. APOLLO PROGRAM The fifth and sixth manned lunar landings were accomplished in April and December, 1972. Apollo 16 and 17 are the final Apollo lunar missions. Science in- vestigations using data already obtained as well as data that will be received from experiments deployed on the lunar surface are to continue over the next several years. (MA72–5444) APOLLO 16 The fifth Apollo manned lunar mission was launched on April 16, 1972, carrying the crew, John W. Young, Commander; Thomas K. Mattingly II, Command Mod- ule Pilot; and Charles M. Duke, Jr., Lunar Module Pilot. (MA72–5113) (MA73– 5200) The landing in the Descartes area was 230 meters NW of the planned target point. Because of the 6-hour delay in landing caused by an oscillation in the back up thrust vector control system, EVA-1 was rescheduled to follow a full crew rest period. At the beginning of EVA-1, the crew deployed and activated the Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package (ALSEP) an other experiments. During ALSEP deployment, the heat flow experiment cable was inadvertently pulled loose at its central station connector. Capability to repair the cable was established but other objectives assumed high priorities and the experiment was abandoned. Approximately 42 pounds of samples were collected during the 7-hour 11-minute EVA and total distance traveled by the LRV was 4.2 km. The second traverse (11.4 KM) took place during EVA-2 and took the crew half way up 500-meter high Stone Mountain, 4.1 km south of the LM. The lunar roving vehicle (LRV) provided excellent mobility and stability, achieving eleven to fourteen kilometers per hour (kph) over rocky, cratered surfaces and easily climbing 15- to 20-degree slopes at about 7 to 8 kph. About 71 pounds of Samples were collected during this 7 hour 23 minute EVA. The extended EVA (over 7 hours) was possible because portable life support system consumables usage was lower than predicted. EVA-3 lasted 5 hours, 40 minutes. This EVA was curtailed from the nominal 7 hours to permit rest and preparations for liftoff on Schedule. The LRV traverse was 4.5 km to North Ray Crater, the largest yet explored on an Apollo mission. Rocks were sampled, one about house-size another with permanent shadowed area in the lee of the sun line and interesting “drill-like holes” normal to its surface. Polarimetric photography was accomplished and additional portable magnetometer readings were obtained. At one point during the downslope return to the LM the LRV recorded about 18 kph. (MA73–5201) Approximately 45 kg (100 lbs.) of samples were collected during the 11.4 km traverse and the film cassette from the far ultra-violet camera was retrieved after recording 11 planned celestial targets. 535 APOLL011 DESCENT T0 LUNAR SURFACE Nasa homºsºme Rev 2-8-73 EARTH BASED STATIONS McDONALD OBSERVATORY HALEAKALA, HAWAll FOREIGN STATIONS º, º ºut 2, PASSIVE SEISMIC METWORK LUNAR APOLLO 16 PRIME CREW LEFT TO RIGHT Jºhn W. YºUN: CHARLEs M. DUKE ſº. THOMAS MAITINGLY || NASA Ho-MA12-51-13 1-12-72 LANDING SITES Pºl-Lº. 1 SEA OF TRANJuliº APULLU 12 ºn ºf Sºs Pºl-Lº. 14. Fºº Mºº APOLLU 15 HALLEY-APENNINE APULLU 15 DES CARTES APULLU-17 TAURUS-LITTROW 538 APOLLO 16 LANDING SITE WITH TRAVERSES NASA HQ -----520- ------ APOLLO 16 ROVER ON THE SURFACE AT DESCARTES 539 The 71 hour stay in the Descartes area featured excellent experiment, LRV, TV, and crew systems operation; revised theories of Cayley formation; provided less evidence of volcanism than expected and the highest recordings of local magnetic field of any Apollo landing site. One thousand, eight hundred and nine frames of 70 mm film and 4% magazines of 16 mm film were exposed during the 20 hour 15 minute total EVA time. One hundred and eleven documented samples totaled approximately 96 kg (213 lbs.). LM ascent from the lunar surface, ren- dezvous, and docking were normal. After jettison from the CSM the LM ascent Stage began tumbling, probably due to an open circuit breaker in the attitude Control system, and could not be deorbited for use as a Seismic source as planned. Lunar orbital science and photographic tasks were successfully conducted throughout 64 CSM lunar orbits. The subsatellite was launched 4 hours 20 minutes before transearth injection; however, because the orbit shaping burn was deleted, its lifetime was much shorter than planned, and it impacted the moon five weeks (425 orbits) after it was launched. The spacecraft was depres- surized for 1 hour 23 minutes during transearth coast for an EVA to retrieve mapping and panoramic camera film cassettes. The scientific instrument module bay was inspected to determine experiment conditions, and the microbial response in space experiment was conducted for 10 minutes outside the open hatch. During transearth coast final detailed objectives were completed and an 18 minute TV press conference was conducted. CM separation, entry, and descent were normal, with water landing 0.3 NM from the planned target point and 3.4 NM from the recovery ship on April 28, 1972. Total time for the Apollo 16 mission was 266 hours. LUNAR SCIENCE Preliminary analysis of Apollo 16 data indicates that the mission, the first dedicated completely to the exploration of the lunar highlands, was very successful. Based upon only preliminary examination of the data, it has already provided information necessary to fill many of the gaps in our understanding of the moon. But it has also enabled us to raise more penetrating questions. The preliminary analysis of data from the Apollo 17 mission is still fragmentary, but its success is a fitting conclusion to man’s first step in reaching out to his nearest neighbor in the solar system. The following discusses each Apollo 16 experiment to show how it has contributed to lunar exploration. - FIELD GEOLOGY EXPERIMENT The Field Geology Experiment is concerned with investigating the geologic units at the landing site. This is done by planning the EVA traverses to key stations, designing sampling procedures, training the crew to observe and to document their observations verbally and photographically, and after the mission by fitting sample analyses into the geologic framework. The mission to Descartes had two prime highlands sampling objectives. One was the Cayley Formation, a plains unit which is a common basin-filling material covering about seven percent of the frontside lunar highlands. The rather flat, slightly undulating topography, as seen on photographs before the mission, gave the unit the appearance of a lava-type material. The second unit, the Descartes Formation, is a light, hummocky, hilly terrain which also appeared from photog- raphy to be volcanic. - The results from this experiment started to come in during the mission as the astronauts, John Young and Charles Duke, repeatedly told Mission Control at JSC that most of what they were seeing were breccias (MA73–5202) (rocks com- posed of a mixture of angular fragments of previously coherent rock units) rather than the expected primary volcanic rocks. The preliminary examination of the returned sample confirms the initial judgement, with over 75% of the samples being breccias derived probably from the impact of meteorites on lunar rocks. Evidence from photography and astronaut observations indicates that the breccias are not simply a thin surface ejecta deposit from the two large craters at the landing site but that the entire region, to depths of at least hundreds of meters, consists of breccias. This tells us that the role of meteorite impacts in creating ancient lunar landforms has been seriously underestimated. In addition, we now have the first, and largely unexpected, evidence that impact processes are capable of creating geological units which have many of the same morphological characteristics as those created by volcanic processes. 540 APOLLO 15 LUNAR SAMPLE NO. 37015 - º 0 || º ------------- ----- The discovery that the Apollo 16 site is not what it was expected to be, brings home a most valuable point: The Apollo Program is exploration in its most classical sense. The site was selected because it represents a large region of pre- viously unexplored lunar highlands on which we now have the basic data with which to decipher its origin and evolution. PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION AND EARLY ANALYSIS RESULTS Upon return to Earth, the Apollo 16 rocks and soils were subjected to prelim- inary analysis and described and photographed for the record. Examination of thin-sections of Apollo 16 rocks confirms the dominance of breccias among the returned samples. As was the case with Apollo 14 breccias from Fra Mauro, many reflect a multiplicity of individual impact events. Present among the breccias is a new type referred to as cataclastic, i.e., exhibiting a highly-crushed texture presumably resulting from meteoroid impact and representing one part of the spectrum of shock features ranging from simple fracture to complete vaporization. The cataclastic breccias are composed largely of anorthite, a mineral high in calcium, aluminum, and silicon content. Rocks formed largely of this material are called anorthosites. (MA73–5203) Such anorthositic rocks were hypothesized to constitute the major constituent of the highlands. This con- clusion was drawn from the fact that only a small fraction of the soils found at the mare landing sites contained this material, it having been ejected, presumably, from highland areas by meteor impacts. The foregoing has led to the development of models of the moon with an anorthositic crust, hence, the excitement of finding the anorthosite rock on Apollo 15 (often referred to as the genesis rock). (MA72–5118). The Apollo 15 rock, a piece from a breccia, was out of context with that landing site since it could not be related to any other rocks found there. The widespread occurrence of anorthositic rocks at Descartes, our first highland landing site, removes any doubt as to their substantial presence beneath the site and the surrounding highlands. 541 Mºllº 15 LUNAR SAMPLE 1545 geness ROCK" NASA Ho MA/2-51.18 1-12.72 93-466 O - 73 - 35 APULLU 15 - º Nº. º ºsme Tº º ºs-Hºº-ºº: --- 542 The Soils at the Apollo 16 site are remarkably uniform, reflecting an efficient mixing process and/or a relative uniform source region. Chemically, the soils can be represented by a simple mixture of the anorthositic rocks and a more iron-rich, highly radioactive-type similar to those found on the Apollo 14 mission. One of the most important objectives in lunar science is to decipher the ages of the surface units and the times during which various processes, such as impact and volcanism, were operating. Data from previous missions showed that the moon formed about 4.6 aeons ago (an aeon, abbreviated AE, is one billion years) and that the mare basalts were generated between 3 and 3.9 AE ago. The time “gap” between 3.9 and 4.6 AE is particularly significant because it includes that time interval the record of which has been obliterated on earth. Thus, we hope to find evidence that will bear on the history of the earth during that period time. The first age dates obtained on Apollo 16 rocks are most intriguing because among them are ages which fit in the period between 3.9 and 4.6 A.E. The “gap.” ages cluster around 4.1-4.2 AE. As such, they probably represent a time when the radio-active clocks were reset by impact events. In view of the evidence from previous missions that the cratering rate on the highlands was much higher prior to 3.7 AE ago, it is not surprising to find old breccias. What is gratifying, however, is that we now know that rocks exist which have survived from times earlier than the large Imbrium impact approximately 3.9 AE ago; it had been feared that the Imbrium and other large impacts might have obscured any earlier history. All available evidence indicates that the lunar soil is formed from the lunar rocks, and represents the end product of the mechanical breakdown of these rocks by impacts and thermal stresses. Thus, it came as a perplexing surprise when it was found that the soil ages do not agree with the ages of the, presumably, parent rocks but, instead, clustered in the range 4.2–4.7 AE. Soil “ages” from all Apollo and Luna missions are clustered in the range 4.2–4.7 AE. Those ages do not indicate discrete lunar volcanic or impact events, but indicate that the soils contain an ancient component which is exotic and rich in radioactivity. However, the common interpretation of this exotic material is that the ancient component is approxi- mately 4.6 A.E old and represents the time of formation of the moon. A de- termined search for identifiable old rocks has been made on each mission; on Apollo 12 there was a peculiar brecciated rock (12013) which appeared to have a component approximately 4.5 A.E old. The evidence was not compelling, but now a second such rock has been found which is more convincing. This is rock (65015), a partially recrystallized breccia. (MA73–5269) The recrystallized part gives an age of 3.93 AE, while Small, apparently unrecrystallized pieces give an age of 4.4–4.5 AE. This is the best evidence to date for the preservation of pieces of a lunar crust formed very soon after the moon’s origin. The data discussed so far do not prove that the moon is 4.6 A.E old, but only hint at it. However, there is now evidence from an Apollo 16 rock which indicates not only that the moon is as primitive as the meterorites, which can be shown to have formed 4.6 AE ago, but also that the moon may have formed 1% million years before some of the meteorites. The lunar surface is nature’s “sanitary landfill” for solar system debris. Analysis of the soil and rocks shows trapped solar wind, ancient cosmic ray activity (as detected by radiation damage tracks) and meteorite debris. One might ask that if meteorites impact the moon, why not comets? Indeed, several scientists have hypothesized that certain peculiar-looking lunar craters were formed by comet impact. One reason that it has been difficult to pursue the point is that it has not been possible to simulate the process in the laboratory, as has been done with meteorites, both on account of the difficulty in physically simulating a comet and, more to the point, because we do not know in detail what a comet is. What is known about comets, however, indicates that they contain a large proportion of volatile gases surrounding a more solid nucleus. Thus, a comet impact on the moon Should drive gases into the lunar soil. The chance of such gases remaining on the Surface, which is baked at approximately 205°F once a month, is small. It is thus extremely fortunate that an Apollo 16 sample, taken from the bottom of a trench where it was protected from solar heating, appears to contain traces of Cometary gases. The sample contains about 100 parts per million of water, methane, and hydrogen cyanide, all being suspected components of comets. Even this small amount of water is greater than that naturally occurring within lunar rocks and Soil. In fact, previous analyses indicate that there is close to zero water content in indigenous rocks and soils. Although these gases are present in the Lunar Module exhaust, the sample was collected almost 1% kilometers downrange from the landing point and is thought to be well beyond the contamination zone. 543 APULLU 15 UNAR SAMPLE NU, Gºuls --------------- 2-º-º- The preservation of possible cometary matter indicates that lunar subsurface soil remains cold enough to retain volatile elements and compounds once implanted. Similarly, lunar scientists have predicted that any surface areas permanently shadowed would serve as a cold-trap for volatiles. For that reason, Apollo astro- nauts have been trained to keep an eye open for such areas, especially in the region of rocky crater ejecta where a rock-overhang might provide the necessary shadow. Finally, on Apollo 16, a near-permanently-shadowed region was located under a large boulder on the rim of North Bay crater. Preliminary analysis shows that the sample acquired is enriched in lead, a relatively volatile element. This is particu- larly significant because lead is one of the elements used in age-dating lunar soils. In fact, it had been hypothesized before the mission that lunar lead can be trans- ported easily across the moon in the vapor phase and thus alter the “age” of soils far from the original source region. APOLLO LUNAR SURFACE EXPERIMENTS PACKAGE (ALSEP) The Apollo 16 ALSEP (MA73–5204) is the fourth emplaced on the lunar surface and, in view of the location of the others, is particularly significant because it provides the anchor point for the seismic triangulation network and provides the first geophysical station in the lunar highlands. Of the ALSEP instruments, the Active Seismic Experiment, the Passive Seismic Experiment, and the Lunar Surface Magnetometer, are all functioning well and returning data which comple- ments that from sample analysis and geologic observation. A most unfortunate accident disabled the Heat Flow Experiment when an astronaut tripped over the cable and broke it. But, the Heat Flow Experiment has been again deployed on Apollo 17. All Apollo 17 cable systems were strengthened to minimize the possible recurrence of the cable break. The Active Seismic Experiment was designed to detect layering in the lunar near-surface. Analysis of the seismic waves shows a surface soil velocity of 114 m/sec, remarkably similar to that found at the mare sites and at Fra Mauro but much lower than the 200–300 m/sec found in terrestrial soils. This is consistent with the theory that the generation of the low-velocity lunar debris layer is caused by the moon-wide phenomenon of meteorite impact. The Earth's atmosphere effectively shields the surface from a similar meteorite bombardment. Of greater interest, however, is the thickness of the debris layer and the possible presence of 544 any underlying layers. Preliminary analysis of rocket-launched explosive charges combined with analysis of the signal generated by the crash of the Lunar Module ascent stage on previous missions resulted in the detection of a velocity change at approximately 12 meters depth. This is interpreted to be the interface between the soil and the underlying material which has a characteristic velocity of approxi- mately 250 m/sec. That velocity, which is estimated to extend to at least 70m depth, is characteristic of a breccia terrain and supports the contention that there are no layered volcanic rocks at the Descartes landing site. (On Earth, near- surface volcanic rocks typically have velocities of approximately 800 m/sec). The seismometer on Apollo 16 has proven to be the most sensitive of all the lunar seismometers. (MA73–5205) The sensitivity seems to be directly related to the physical properties of the subsurface, the more brecciated rock at Apollo 16 providing a better “amplifier” for natural seismic events. The majority of moon- quakes arise in the lunar interior and many of these have been shown on previous missions to occur in groups originating at the same locations, and correlated in time with the position of the moon in the lunar orbit thereby indicating a tidal tº: he establishment of the seismic net enables very accurate locations to be established for major moonquakes. We can now say with high confidence that internal moonquakes arise from great depth, 800–1000 km, indicative of a generally cool interior. Quakes on Earth are rare below 400–500 km and do not occur at all below about 650 km. This is thought to be a result of the Earth's interior below that depth being sufficiently warm such that rocks yield to stresses by continuous slow flowing rather than by fracture. Two large meteorite impacts, weighing approximately one ton, have occurred since establishment of the seismic net, one on May 13 on the frontside and the other on July 27 on the farside. The May 13 event and the Apollo 16 S-IVB impact have provided data which clearly establish the presence of a lunar crust underneath º mare and extending to a depth of about 60 km in the Oceanus Procellarum region. Below this, and extending to 120–150 km is a second layer which may correspond to a lunar mantle. The crustal layer is hypothesized to be composed dominantly of anorthositic rocks and the underlying mantle to be made of iron-rich minerals. Preliminary analysis of the July 28 impact shows the first direct evidence for the possible presence of molten rock in the deep interior of the moon (below approximately 1000 km), possibly in association with a lunar core. APOLLO 15 NASA HQ MAZ3-5204 2-5-73 545 The lunar seismometers continue to be excellent meteoroid detectors. Further refinement of the data shows a flux almost 100 times less than that measured near Earth, bringing into question the very basis of the terrestrial observations. It appears that 30–40 impacts per year will be detected on all seismometers. Given several years of operation, the seismic network will exceed pre-Apollo fondest hopes and should lead to an excellent understanding of both lunar structure and the meteoroid environment. The magnetometer deployed at Apollo 16 complements those deployed on Apollo 12 and 15. The value of the magnetometer is in its ability to detect small fluctuations in magnetic fields where the fluctuations are a measure of the electrical conductivity profile of the lunar interior. The electrical conductivity can in turn be interpreted in terms of a temperature profile. Results to date, mainly from Apollo 12, indicate a cool moon (well below melting) to depths up to about 1000 km, in good agreement with seismic results. The data from the Apollo 16 magne- tometer have not been analyzed in detail yet, but one significant finding is in hand. That is, the Apollo 16 magnetometer has recorded a response to the induced field very similar to that of the Apollo 15 instrument indicating that the response is global in extent and does not apply only to the small isolated region of either instrument. A small portable magnetometer (not part of the ALSEP) was taken on the Apollo 16 mission. (MA73–5206). It measured magnetic fields that varied from 121 gammas to 313 gammas over a distance of about 7 km. This was a relatively large magnetic field for the moon, but was very small compared with the Earth’s magnetic field of 30 to 50 thousand gammas. These observations, taken together with orbital data and other data from earlier Apollo missions, suggest that the so-called fossil lunar magnetism is found weakly everywhere on the moon. How- ever, the moon does not have a single or total magnetic field with north and south magnetic poles, as does the Earth. If any such field were originally present, it may have been obliterated by the many large impacts suffered by the highlands crust in its early history. 546 APOLLO 16 PORTABLE MAGNETOMETER NASA HC -----520- --5-73 Apºllº 15 FAR * †. ULTRA-VIOLET Tº CAMERA- - - SPECTROGRAPH NASA HC MAZ3-5207. 2-5-73 - - º 547 The mangetic evidence also shows that when the lunar rocks first crystallized, the lunar field had a strength of about 1000 to 2000 gammas. Scientists are not certain about the origin of this field, but believe that it may have been produced by the rotation of a liquid core, as in the Earth today. Recent seismic evidence, jiscussed above, has suggested that the moon may still have a fluid core today. The magnetism of the lunar materials serves as a kind of magnetic tape recorder of much of the history of the moon, but it seems to be in a language that scientists do not yet completely understand. OTHER SURFACE EXPERIMENTS The lunar surface was used as an astronomical observatory on Apollo 16. A far ultra-violet camera/spectrograph was trained on the Earth, stars, and in- terstellar gases and observed phenomena not visible from the Earth’s surface because of atmospheric absorption. (MA73–5207) An additional advantage of using the moon was that an entire hemisphere of the Earth could be viewed in one photograph. Preliminary analysis of a few of the photographs of Earth shows a glow in the Earth's nightside equatorial atmosphere. The glow arises from oxygen and Supports the hypothesis of oxygen recombination as the producing mechanism. (MAZ3–5208) -- The Solar Wind Composition Experiment was flown again in order to continue the study of the time-variation of the elemental and isotopic abundances in the Solar wind, especially of the gases helium, neon, and argon. It had several new objectives also including determination of energy and determination of arrival direction. The latter is important to the study of how the solar wind fields drive lunar atmospheric gases into the soil grains. This is thought to occur after the atmospheric gases become ionized by solar ultra-violet light, then become ac- celerated by solar wind electric and magnetic fields. Preliminary results show that the Solar wind gases have about the same abundances as measured previously. The significance of this is that the high-surface magnetic fields at Descartes do not result in any apparent modification of the solar wind reaching the surface. During times of solar flare activity, there is an increased abundance of solar iron and other heavy elements leaving the sun at low energies relative to the light elements such as hydrogen and helium. This effect was first observed in a study of the Solar flare cosmic ray tracks in the Surveyor III television camera lens returned to earth on Apollo 12. However, the Cosmic Ray Detector Experiment showed that this ratio of heavy to light elements was at least ten times greater than was estimated from the Surveyor data. The Surveyor data do not extend to the low-energy flare particles. The low-energy region is of interest because it can be compared directly with abundances at the same energy in the solar wind. Such a comparison is a necessary ingredient in determining the differences between the mechanisms which produce, on the one hand, the steady flow of the “quiet” solar wind, and on the other hand, the sporadic, violent outbursts of solar flares. To investigate the low-energy region, a Cosmic Ray Detector was exposed on the way to the moon and on the lunar surface and resulted in acquisition of much of the desired low-energy data. The information is already being incorporated into studies of solar flare particle acceleration and in the interpretation of solar flare particle damage tracks in lunar soil grains. (One should note that the occurrence of a flare during the mission could not be predicted. Had the flare not occurred, the Cosmic Ray Detector Experiment would have obtained data on low-energy galactic cosmic rays.) OREITAL SCIENCE Apollo 16 contained a complement of orbital experiments identical to that flown on Apollo 15: X-ray, Gamma-ray, and Alpha-particle spectrometers, a mass spectrometer, a camera system which included panoramic, mapping, and stellar cameras, and a laser altimeter. (MA71–7456) Additionally, a subsatellite with a magnetometer, S-band transponder, and plasma probe was ejected into lunar orbit. The bulk of data returned from Apollo 16 is new because the area overflown was significantly different from that of Apollo 15. The small region of overlap is advantageous in that it provides a tie-point for data from both missions. 548 APOLLO 15 AND 16 LASER ALTimeTER MAPPING CAMERA Eva FOOT RESTRAINT PANORAMic CAMERA SUBSATELuTE Position Ganana A-RAY SPECTROMETER MASS SPECTROMETER NASA Ho Mazh-7455 x-RAY SPECTROMETER 11-5-7 ALPHA PARTICLE spectrometer 549 The X-ray Fluorescence Experiment measured the flux of X-rays arising from the lunar Surface. Those X-rays, induced by solar radiation, can be used to identify the surface elements. In this way it has been possible to map accurately the ratio of aluminum (A1) and magnesium (Mg) to silicon (Si) and to derive good estimates of the abundances of each of those elements. The Apollo 16 data have extended the Apollo 15 measurements and show the high Al/Si ratio and low Mg/Si ratio to be characteristic of much of the lunar highlands. These ratios demonstrate that the Al-rich anorthosites dominate in highlands surface samples and give confidence in the extrapolation of results to areas not landed on. The Gamma-ray Experiment had as its main objective the mapping of naturally- occuring lunar surface radioactivity from the decay of potassium, uranium, and thorium. These are important elements because they are responsible for generating heat inside the moon and because they were apparently concentrated near the lundar Surface early in the moon’s history. The Apollo 16 measurements show, as did those on Apollo 15, that the western maria are unusually high in radioactivity and that there are no observable geochemical boundaries between the various Western maria. This implies to some scientists a genetic relationship among western maria. Alternatively, it is possible that the western maria are covered with the highly radio-active Fra Mauro-type material found at the Apollo 14 site (exposed on the mare by cratering events which either bore through thin mare layers or which cover large areas with ejecta.) The far side western highlands are very low in radio-activity and highlands in general are low. Measurements of the potassium-to-uranium ratio indicates that the entire lunar surface is characterized by a value close to about 2500, clearly distinct from a terrestrial value of about 10,000. This adds weight to the argument that the moon did not fission from the Earth. The Alpha-particle spectrometer was designed to detect Alpha-particles Coming primarily from the radioactive decay of radon gas and polonium near the lunar Surface. Thus, location of areas of enhanced activity would indicate either an enriched uranium or thorium region and/or region of very recent gas escape. The preliminary look at the Apollo 16 data does not show any indication of unusual radon activity. However, an increase in the amount of polonium (a product of the radioactive decay of radon) over the Sea of Fertility indicates that there has been enhanced escape of radon in that region at some time in the past few decades. The Orbital mass spectrometer flown on Apollo 15 indicated that a “cloud” of Contamination accompanied the spacecraft around its orbit. Effort was made on Apollo 16 to reduce the contamination effect and thus enable the detection of lunar atmospheric gases. This effort appears to have been successful in that lunar neon was successfully measured. This measurement suggests that the neon in the lunar atmosphere is of solar wind origin and not a result of lunar volcanism. The Orbital photographic systems on Apollo 16 resulted in the exposure of 1587 high resolution, stereo panoramic camera frames and 2514 stereo surface imagery mapping camera frames with associated stellar photography. The bulk of the mapping camera and stellar photography will be used in the construction of a lunar coordinate system and for the production of accurate topographic maps. In turn, those maps will be used, along with both the panoramic and mapping photography, for geologic and geophysical studies. It is not necessary to wait for Cartographic products before using the photography for photointerpretation; already over 20 studies of lunar features have been conducted using Apollo 16 photography. Laser altimetry conducted on Apollo 16 will be used to support the cartographic program by providing the altitude to the spacecraft to an accuracy of + 2 meters. (MA73–5209) Additionally, it has provided several complete orbits of data from which rough topographic profiles can be constructed. Preliminary analysis of the profiles indicates a confirmation of the off-set of the lunar center of mass from the Center of figure (about 2 km towards the Earth and about 1 km eastward) and that the mean lunar radius is 1737.8 km. The radius value (and specific altitudes) is an important parameter in geophysical models in which one attempts to explain the Origin of the lunar mass concentrations. STUESATELLITE The Apollo 16 subsatellite continued, but in a (MA71–7472) different orbit, measurements made on the Apollo 15 subsatellite. Its magnetometer experiment had as a prime objective the study of the fossil magnetism of the moon. Prelimi- nary analysis of the data indicate fewer large-scale magnetic anomalies than have been seen in the higher inclination orbit of the Apollo 15 magnetometer. 550 APOLLO 16 LASER ALTIMETER DATA REW 28 Frontside PtoleMAEus E * G --------4-------------->-1-\-A-----------4------ 1733-km-Ean Lunar Radius : Fecunditatis -2 4. PROCELLARUM T T I ~ Twº- -5 Gnimaldi Musium raangutmans `suſematºs -- l l l l l l l _l l . -100 --0 -50 -40 -20 0. 20 40 50 20 100 Backside ſº * f º T zsprun G ------------------------------------- - 1733-km MEAN LUNAR RADIUS : o y T H. E m G E L H A. n T -- −I Mills - - - : * Data 4. -5 F-Daugav- F-tº- T T i T s—l l l l l l l 1 . 30 100 120 140 100 180 -100 -140 -120 -100 -20 ****** APOLLO 15 SUBSATELLITE particut Experiment MAGNETOMETER GRAVITY MEASUREMENT 551 However, data now being processed indicate that many small-scale variations exist, such variation being observable only on those very low orbits available shortly before the subsatellite impacted the lunar surface. Analysis of those magnetic features and their correlation with geologic features is expected to aid in the explanation of the origin of the lunar magnetism. Tracking of the Apollo 16 subsatellite and the LM-CSM has provided new data on lunar gravitational anomalies. Although the orbits did not take these space- craft over known frontside mascons, an extensive positive gravity anomaly was found which is near the Riphaeus Mountains located in the center of Mare Cog- nitum. The cause is unknown but it seems likely that it is due to some buried structure. APOLLO 17 The Apollo 17 Mission was planned as a lunar landing mission to accomplish selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials and surface features in a preselected are of the Taurus–Littrow region of the moon; emplace and activate surface experiments; and conduct in-flight experiments and photographic tasks. Flight crew members were Commander (CDR) Captain Eugene A. Cernan (USN), Command Module Pilot (CMP) Commander Ronald E. Evans (USN), Lunar Module Pilot (LMP) Dr. Harrison H. Schmitt (Ph.D.) (MA73–5210). Launch took place at 12:33 a.m., EST on December 7, 1972, 2 hours and 40 minutes late. (MA73–5211) The countdown proceeded smoothly until T-30 seconds when an automatic cutoff occurred. After a recycle and hold at T –22 minutes an additional hold was called at T –8 minutes. The hold was caused by a failure of a function in the terminal count sequence card which monitored and commanded S-IVB stage liquid oxygen tank pressuriza- tion. A workaround to bypass the failed function was devised and a decision was made to proceed with the launch. Earth parking orbit, translunar injection, translunar coast, lunar orbit inser- tion, and S-IVB stage impact were all nominal. The S-IVB impacted the lunar surface at 4°12' South and 12°18' West and was recorded by the Apollo 12, 14, 15 and 16 ALSEPs. The lunar landing occurred on December 11, 1972, at the Traurus–Littrow site (MA73–5212). apola in PRIME CREW LEFT TO RIGHT HARRISDN. H. SCHMITT RONALD. E. EVANS EUGENE A. CERNAN Nasaaq ºs-Sºlo - - 552. APOLLO 17 LIFT OFF 12:33 A.M. EST DECEMBER 7, 1972 Apollo 17 TAURUS-LITTROW LANDING STE ----- º º |º sºlº iſ LANDING STE WITH TRAVERSES --~~~ - Eva: NASA HQ MAZ-52-13 - - - - - Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA)–1 started approximately four hours after touch down with deployment of the Lunar Roving Vehicle (Rover). (MA73– 5213). After deploying the Rover and prior to traversing to the ALSEP site, the right rear fender extension of the fender was inadvertently pulled off. The fender extension was secured with tape. The ALSEP and the Cosmic Ray experiment were deployed. (MA73–5214) Steno Crater was sampled in lieu of the preplanned station (Emory Crater). The new station was selected because of accumulated delay time in completing preparations for the traverse. During the traverse the fender extension came off and, as a result, the crew experienced a great deal of dust. The Surface Electrical Properties (SEP) Transmitter was deployed near the end of the EVA. The 0.23 Kg (1/2 lb.) and 0.45 (1 lb.) explosive packages (EPs) were deployed and tidal gravimeter readings were made at select locations. Duration of EVA-1 was seven hours, twelve minutes. On December 12, 1972, prior to starting EVA—2, the crew received instructions from the ground controllers for improvising a replacement for the lost fender extension. Four maps, taped together and held in position by two clamps from portable utility lights, made an excellent substitute for the extension and the crew did not experience the dust problem as on EVA—1. All preplanned stations were visited although station times were modified to accommodate changing priorities. A brief stop at the South Massif was made to obtain Traverse Gravimeter readings and additional samples. (MA72–5106). During this traverse, the crew deployed the 0.06 Kg (1/8 lb.), 2.7 Kg (6 lb.) and 0.11 º: (1/4 lb.) explosive packages, obtained photographs, and documented Samples. EVA-3 was initiated on December 13, 1972, and was terminated 7 hours and 15 minutes later. Exploration of the stations was modified during the traverse to permit the crew a longer stay time on the North Massif and to explore unusual landforms called the Sculptured Hills. Photographs and documented samples were obtained at all stations. About 66 Kg (145 lbs.) of samples were retrieved, and the LRV traversed a total of 11.6 Km (6 mm). The 1.4 Kg (3 lbs.) explosive package, left over from EVA-1 was deployed in addition to the 0.11 Kg (1/4 lb.) and 0.06 Kg (1/8 lb. ) packages. 554 APOLLO 17 ALSEP DEPLOYMENT TRAVERSE GRAVIMETER **s-º-º-º-º-º: ----- 555 The total time for the three EVAs was 22 hours, 5 minutes, 4 seconds. The total distance traveled in the lunar rover was about 35 km. The combined weight of samples was about 116 Kg (255 lbs.) plus 2 double cores and 1 deep drill core. Surface photographs taken during the three EVAs total at least 2389. Good quality television transmission was received throughout the mission. Ascent on December 14, 1972, rendezvous, docking, LM ascent stage impact on the lunar surface, transearth injection, coast, reentry, landing and astronaut recovery on December 19, 1972 were all nominal. Total mission time was 301 hours, 51 minutes. * SURFACE SCIENCE The Apollo 17 site was the first site selected largely in response to new knowl- edge acquired on earlier missions. Similarly, the scientific instruments placed on the lunar surface and those used on the traverses and in orbit were designed predominantly to obtain data useful in solving problems whose existence could not be predicted in detail prior to the first several Apollo flights. The sampling objectives were likewise well defined: (1) to sample some of the youngest lunar material to determine whether lunar volcanism ceased three billion years ago; (2) to sample for the presence of volatiles; and (3) to sample highland material which may have formed between four and four and one-half billion years ago, a time for which the history of the Earth has been erased. In these objectives, the mission was quite successful. The instruments included in the ALSEP have already provided some concrete preliminary data concerning the heat flow from the interior of the Moon and the character of the near lunar surface formations. Results from the Heat Flow Experiment (MA73–5215) confirms the high value found at Apollo 15 and that the heat flow is not an anomaly. Eight explosive charges were detonated as part of the Lunar Seismic Profiling Experiment. (MA72–5216) An analysis of the seismic velocity data suggested a layered consolidated material underlying the site. Diffi- culties were experienced in the initial turn on and calibration of the Lunar Surface Gravimeter and performance in its present operational mode is still under analysis by the Principal Investigator. At this time he feels he will be able to recover a high percentage of the planned seismic, free mode, and tidal data—thus fulfilling most of the major objectives of the experiment. However, this will be verified by analysis of data during the next three months. The other ALSEP instruments, the Mass Spectrometer (to study the lunar atmosphere) and the Meteoroid Detector (to study particle impacts of the Moon) are functioning normally. Two traverse experiments were employed by the astronauts. The Surface Elec- trical Properties Experiment, employing an electromagnetic subsurface explora- tion technique, has confirmed the dielectric constant of subsurface rocks also detected from lunar orbit and the data have suggested a subsurface interface ap- proximately 100 meters deep. The Traverse Gravimeter experiment obtained data, indicating that layered igneous rocks, similar to those sampled on the traverses, probably extend to depths of at least a kilometer. The crew visited, observed, photographed, and sampled each of the diverse, major geologic features of the Taurus–Littrow area. The remarkable performance of the crew thoroughly exploited the potential of the landing site and met the highest standards for scientific exploration. Samples obtained on the Massif's could include the oldest materials returned from the moon. The discovery of bright orange material lends credence to suggestions that the area may contain relatively young volcanic features (MA72–5217). The material appears to be a finely struc- tured glass of volcanic origin. Samples obtained from this site may include ejecta not only from Serenitatis but also from Tranquillitatis, Crisium, Fecunditatis and Imbrium basins. ORIBITAL SCIENCE All of the major objectives of the Apollo 17 science were successfully achieved. The scientific payload consisted of an Infrared Scanning Radiometer, Radar Sounder, a Far Ultraviolet Spectrometer and the camera and laser system also flown on the Apollo 15 and 16 missions. Doppler tracking of the Command and Service Module S-Band transponder provided lunar gravity data. 556 APOLLO 17 HEAT FLOW ExPERIMENT DEPLOYMENT APOLLO 17 EXPLOSIVE PACKAGE FOR THE LUNAR SEISMIC PROFILING EXPERIMENT ſºlº ſº. ORANGE SOL | * Sº - - NASA ---------- ----- 93-466 O - 73 - 36 558 Operation of the radar (MA72–6968) sounder, a device designed to acquire imagery of both surface and subsurface lunar structure up to 1.3 km, functioned nominally throughout the mission. The radar sounder data are recorded on film which is being processed and analyzed. However, preliminary analysis of telem- etry data has revealed that the lunar highlands and mare show distinctively different reflected power signals. The signals indicate the presence of mare sub- surface structure while the highlands indicate a lack of subsurface structures. The Infrared Scanning Radiometer thermally mapped over one-third of the lunar surface to an accuracy of one degree. Temperatures as low as 86°F (-306°F) were observed just prior to lunar sunrise and temperatures as high as 400 °K (26.1 °F) were observed at lunar noon. The Far Ultraviolet Spectrometer was de- signed to detect elements of the lunar atmospheric composition and determine their density. Preliminary analyses of the data indicate that the moon is not degassing and that it does not, on itself, create an atmosphere. The camera system comprised of panoramic, a mapping and stellar camera, and a laser altimeter, obtained photography of the lunar surface for geological inter- pretation and for the production of a lunar control system for accurate mapping. A total of 1603 frames of high resolution (approximately 2 meter resolution) panoramic photography and 3554 frames of precision, medium resolution (approxi- mately 20 meters resolution) mapping photography were obtained. The laser altimeter supporting the mapping camera system also provided about six complete revolutions of lunar global altimetry which will significantly aid in understanding the figure of the moon. SUMMARY OF MAJOR ScIENCE FACTS AND ConCLUSIONS FROM APOLLO The Apollo Program has increased our knowledge of the moon beyond expecta- tion, it has provided new knowledge and techniques for study of both the Earth and Sun, it has led to a wealth of new technology, and has given mankind a new frontier and the beginning of the technology necessary to exploit it. With the conclusion of the Apollo Program, not only do we know much more about the moon, enabling us to formulate much more meaningful questions about it, but equally important, we know more about the Earth and the solar system as well. The analysis of data from Apollo 17 has just begun. However, based primarily on the results of the previous missions, the following are a few major scientific facts and conclusions about the moon derived by the Apollo Program. - 1. The moon is a complex heterogeneous body that has been partly or wholly melted to form mineralogically different layers. •, 2. We now know that the highlands of the moon are made up of rocks composed largely of the mineral anorthite. These Calcium-Aluminum rich rocks contrast chemically with the mare basin basalts. - 3. Very old rock material, representing pieces of the lunar crust formed very soon after the formation of the moon, is evidenced in several samples. 4. Soil “ages” from all Apollo and Luna missions are clustered in the range 4.2–4.7 billion years. f 5. Rock age dates obtained on Apollo 16 are very intriguing because among them are ages which fit in the time period 3.9 and 4.6 billion years ago, a period previously represeted almost as a gap in the lunar time scale. 6. An Apollo 16 soil sample taken from the bottom of a trench where it was protected appears to contain a relatively high abundance of the materials, Water, methane, and hydrogen cyanide, thought to be the remains of interaction of the moon with a comet. e 7. Seismic velocities at the Descartes landing site are characteristic of breccia terrain and support the contention that there are no layered volcanic rocks near the surface at this site. 8. We can now say with high confidence that internal moonquakes arise from #. depth, 800–1000 km, indicative of a relatively cool, rigid interior at that epth. - 9. Preliminary analysis of an impact event, which occurred on the lunar farside last July and sent seismic waves through the moon, shows evidence for the possible presence of molten rock in the deep interior of the moon (below approximately 1000 km), possibly in association with a small lunar core. 10. During times of solar flare activity, there is an increased abundance of solar iron and other heavy elements leaving the sun at low energies relative to the light elements such as hydrogen and helium. 11. The western maria are unusually high in near surface radioactivity. 559 12. Measurement of the potassium-to-uranium ratio indicates that the entire lunar surface appears to be characterized by a value from 2500 to 5000, clearly distinct from a terrestrial value of about 10,000. This adds weight to the argument that the moon did not fission from the Earth. 13. An increase in the amount of polonium (a product of the radioactive decay of radon) over the Sea of Fertility, as detected by the Apollo 16 particle spectrom- eter, may indicate very recent volcanic gas venting in that region. 14. Analysis of the laser altimetry profiles from Apollo 16 confirms the earlier observation of the off-set of the lunar center of mass (about 2 km towards the Earth and about 1 km eastward), and gives the mean lunar radius as 1737.8 km. 15. The role of meteorite impacts in creating ancient lunar landforms has been underestimated. In addition, we now have the first, and largely unexpected, evidence that impact processes are capable of creating surfaces with many of the same characteristics as those created by volcanic processes. 16. The indigenous lunar fossil magnetism is lunar-wide, but it is not repre- sented by a simple dipole field as is Earth’s magnetism. The lunar field is contained in crustal rocks that have been subsequently broken and reoriented. 17. The lunar surface was used as an astronomical observatory on Apollo 16 for an instrument called a far UV camera/spectrometer. The data show a huge amount of dissociated oxygen in the outer portions of the Earth’s atmosphere that may represent an important source of the atmosphere's free oxygen. 18. Appreciable heat flowing from the moon’s interior is typical over wider areas than was believed likely a year ago. Dr. PETRONE. With your permission this morning I would like to reflect on Apollo for the last 12 years and what in summary we have been able to accomplish. - With the splashdown of Apollo 17, the flight program of Apollo has ended, but the legacy of Apollo will continue for many years into the future. The goal for Apollo was clearly established by President Kennedy in May 1961, when he stated in very concise words “That this Nation would send a crew to the moon, land on the moon, and return them safely home in this decade.” This very simply stated program required the mobilization of tremendous resources in this country, the initiation of new projects that, at that time, were undreamed of, and the establishment of new ºlogical developments in order to convert this challenge into a reality. Today we can reflect back over the nearly 12 years since that goal was established, and assess what Apollo has brought to this Nation. Clearly, one of the aims was to have this Nation become pre-eminent In space. In the late fifties and early sixties, this country was striving to catch up with the Russian exploits in space. It appeared that the Soviet Union had established a dominating lead in this new arena of space that would leave the United States second, for some time to come—maybe, forever. Many people in the country, and also in the rest of the world, clearly thought that to be true. The U.S.S.R. had seized the imagination of the world with her exploits in the new frontier of space. This new arena for competition and these new seas for man to explore had become Soviet domain. Our response to the Soviets started with some small programs, but it took the Apollo program, with the lunar landing as its goal, to fº our efforts in space so that we could stand a chance of becoming St. Today, our country does stand preeminent in space, as explorers of the Moon and sailors of the seas of space. Scientific returns from our six lunar landings will take many years to fully understand. 560 The five Scientific stations we deployed on the Moon will be sending back information from our remote neighbor plant for many years yet to come. Our first station deployed by Apollo 12, in November 1969, is still functioning over 3 years after its initial deployment in the very demanding environment of the Moon, where the temperatures range from 250° F above zero to 250° F below zero, over each 28 days. The fact that this equipment can stand these rigors of temperature and vacuum on the Moon and still function after this lenght of time demonstrates one facet of the technology we have developed. Now, the question could be raised, “Was it worth the price”? Certainly, there were great demands placed on the financial and manpower resources of this country to meet that challenge. But, in many ways, Apollo has left our Nation a richer Nation, not only richer in a heritage of space exploration, not only richer in the fields of Science, but richer as a people, a people who demonstrated in adversity that we could do what we set our minds to do. The goal so clearly established by President Kennedy was carried Out not only in the full view of our people, but in full view of the world. The program was, in a sense, accomplished in a “fishbowl.” Every move, every step we took, was open where the people on Earth could share the moments with the valiant explorers flying those spacecraft. Never in the history of mankind have the thoughts of so many people in this world been focused on one event as they have been during the flights of Apollo. Yes; and the Nation is also richer in technology. Many new techniques had to be developed in order to build the hardware that reliably could fly men from Earth to the Moon, land on the Moon, and return safely. These techniques are available today to American industry. The computer techniques, the techniqes of manu- facture, testing, and proofing our equipment, the management tech- niques that controlled this highly technical and dynamic program. All that experience is here today. It is available and is being used by our industry to build new products—to build products which we can export, products such as the computer and the airplane which make up a great share of the products we export. But, one can now ask, since we are now preeminent in space, “Is it now time to slack off? Is it now time to diminish our efforts and pu resources in other fields?” - There already has been a slackening of the space effort, clearly indicated by the size of our budget and by the number of people that we now employ in our contractor facilities. But, the fact that we are preeminent in space today does not mean that we will stay preeminent. We must continue to develop new technology and we must continue to take new steps, and to continue sailing further on the seas of space, if our Nation is to remain first in this new arena for international competition. - - & Technology is perishable and technology grows old. One cannot sit back and say, I have developed technology, and now I can rest. If you are not moving ahead in the field of technology, you are falling behind. We need new technology in our country in order to cope with the many problems we have. We need new technology to create new products and new jobs that both increase the standard of living of 561 our people and provide new methods needed to better handle the problems of our environment, our demands for energy, and our needs for quick transport. - The goals and achievements in the Apollo Program have not all been understood by the public. The dramatic demonstration of our tech- nological capability by Apollo 11, with man’s first steps on the Moon, was easily understood by the public. One could clearly envision man walking and picking up samples on the Moon, and returning them to Earth, but the achievements that went right along with that were not clearly understood. Here, truly, was an expansion of man’s mind, man who had looked up at the Moon for thousands of years, had now placed himself there. - - - - Man has looked out to the frontier of space, the Moon and the stars and has dreamed—what are they? What put them there? Now, he truly had taken, “A giant leap for mankind.” The impact of this upon man’s mind, and how he relates to the universe will tak years to fully manifest itself. - - With Apollo, we have taken the first step into the universe to answer these questions that have been on the minds of men since the thought process first came to man. Man has always needed new frontiers, he has always had to sail over those new waters, climb over that next line of hills, reach for the sky, and as he has done these things, over the years, so has his way of life improved. Now we reach for the frontier of space, and as we reach, we must stretch ourselves and, with this stretch, we increase our capabilities, we increase our understanding and appreciation of the universe we live II]. As one looks back over the 12 years of Apollo, the biggest effort that had to be carried out, of course, was the engineering effort—the under- standing of the demands that would be placed on the flight hardware, the understanding of the laws of nature that we would have to work with, in order to fly to the Moon, the conversion of these dreams into hardware, the manufacture and test of this hardware, so that we would feel confident to fly our men to the Moon and return. But, within that overall engineering program, we knew we would be exploring, we knew sailing on these new seas would open up new vistas and, for that reason, we started the development of experiments to be taken along on later flights. After the landing of Apollo 11, there was some furor in the press about a clash between scientists and engineers over relative priorities. Much of this furor was a “tempest in a teapot.” There was only one reason for flying Apollo after the initial landing of Apollo 11, and that was for the purpose of gathering information and new data for science and for continuing the exploration of the Moon. For that purpose, some years prior to the first landing, we had started to develop the scientific packages of which we now have five on the Moon, sending us back data minute by minute, 24 hours a day, of the changes occurring on the Moon—the seismic tremors, the heat flow, W. magnetic field, the solar wind, the impact of meteorites on the OOIl. All this information will enable scientists here on Earth to under- stand a small portion of what goes on in space, and what is happening on the Moon. - 562 The planning for these scientific stations, the development of the hardware, the proofing of the hardware, took many years, and today these five remote stations on the Moon are sending back untold data that will be used to decipher some of the mysteries of the Moon and the universe, including our planet, Earth. Each of the six sites we went to on the Moon had its own mysteries to shed—names that will go down in the history books as mankind’s first venturing away from his home planet—Tranquillitatis, Pro- cellarum, Fra Mauro, Hadley Apennine, Descartes, and Taurus Littrow. Each of these sites helped us to better understand the Moon, its formation and evolution, and let us look back over 4 billion years into the history of the solar system. Many of the mysteries of our solar system are still locked up in the lunar samples we have returned, but the extremely detailed analysis of these precious lunar samples, now being carried out by 134 teams of American scientists and 55 teams of foreign scientists representing 15 countries, are gradually unfolding these mysteries and will enable us to better understand the history of the Moon and, as a result, better understand the history of the solar system, including the early history of planet Earth. With the conclusion of the Apollo Flight Program, we bring to a close a golden chapter in the age of space exploration, an age that, I feel, history may well classify as “The Romantic Era of Space Exploration.” But, as this chapter closes, another chapter is already being writ- ten—the chapter on Skylab and the era of exploiting and utilizing near-in space for the benefit of mankind. And, on the horizon are future chapters yet to be written, as we push forward the develop- ment of the Space Shuttle and its varied payloads in the fields of Earth resources, communications, manufacturing in space, medical investigations, astronomy, and many other fields too numerous to list here. When these chapters are written, I am certain that we will have delivered on the “promises of space” for the benefit of all mankind, as we have already delivered on the promises of Apollo, to open up the new frontier of space and to make our Nation preeminent in space. Thank you, sir. Mr. Fu QUA. Thank you very much, Rocco. We appreciate the fine statement and the element of sadness that comes with the final wrap- up of Apollo. What do you think could have been accomplished by the two Apollo missions which were canceled, 18 and 19, had they been flown? Where would we have gone and what additional information might we have received? Dr. PETRONE. That would be a very difficult thing to answer regarding a field of exploration where one is searching. As I men- tioned, each of the six sites that we went to shed light on certain mysteries. There are other sites on the Moon that, as we studied them from Earth, we had also felt would be very remunerative in the type of return we would get. But one would not know until one got there. In terms of saying what we would have returned, it is sort of an unknown question. As one performs an experiment, one expects good and new answers. To weigh it at this point is very difficult. There is 563 no question in my mind that they would have added to the store of knowledge of both the Moon and the universe, but to identify specifics would be very difficult, because you are going into an unknown area behind a curtain and trying to say what is there. I only know that the Moon has many more mysteries yet to unfold, and I’m very hope- ful that someday this country will establish a base on the Moon like we have in Antarctica to better study not only the Moon but the Earth and also our solar system out from underneath the canopy of air which we have protecting us here on Earth. Dr. FUQUA. I recall the comments I have heard many times by our late colleague and ranking minority member on this committee, Jim Fulton, who compared it to the discovery of America. If our fore- fathers had only landed on the east coast and never proceeded west of the Mississippi River, such a vast change in this country would probably never have occurred—I think this is a historical parallel to what you are saying, that we have only explored a small part of it. As Mr. Wydler mentioned a while ago, there is the dark side of the Moon, too. Dr. PETRONE. The six sites themselves are very different from one another. If one compares scientifically what we have found at the six sites, one finds a common thread, but also different threads woven into the same tapestry. Mr. Fuqua. What was the final runout cost of the Apollo program? Dr. PETRONE. Mr. Chairman, it was approximately $25.4 billion. I would like to submit that for the record, but it was approximately that amount. [Information requested for the record follows: Actual costs incurred through July 1969, the time of the first manned lunar landing, were $21.349 billion. These costs included Apollo Program Research and Development; Tracking and Data Acquisition; Facilities; and Installation Operations, including civil service salaries. On a comparable basis, the total cost through Apollo 17 and completion of the lunar exploration effort is $25.4 billion. Mr. Fuqua. At this point I would like to present a staff memoran- dum to Mr. Myers on some cost allocations within the Apollo program and have him provide answers for the record for us, if he will. I do not expect an answer today. [Information requested for the record follows: Mr. MYERs. The staff memorandum and the letter from the Comptroller General of the United States that is attached to it both refer to our practice during the Apollo program of budgeting and funding all of the common support activities at the three Manned Space Flight Centers in the Apollo program. This was done for two reasons. First, as reported to the Congress in the FY 1965 Budget Request (the first year that Apollo became an Authorization line item) “The ultimate Objective of the manned space flight program is to provide the capability for a broad program of exploration which will achieve and maintain a position of space leadership for the United States. A specific goal in acquiring this capability is the landing of men on the moon and returning them safely to earth; this goal will be realized through the Apollo program.” A second factor was the predominance of the Apollo program in relation to other space activities being conducted at our Manned Centers during the 1960's and the desirability of controlling supporting activities as a part of that program. This factor has been recognized in the Comp— troller General’s letter. Consistent with our stated policies on the Apollo program Content and budgeting, all the support activities at Our Centers were funded for and managed by the Apollo program. !. With the Manned Space Flight canability well established, a decision was made at the time of our submission of the FY 1973 Budget to separately identify all common support activities as “Development, Test and Mission Operations” and 564 to include it as an identifiable line item in budget submissions to the Congress. In addressing ourselves to the subject we reported to your Committee last year that “In the past, all of these basic functions have been performed primarily in support of the Apollo program. With the Apollo program almost complete and smaller programs gradually phasing in, we felt it important to separately identify cost and control of maintaining our basic manned space flight capabilities. It provides a better control of functions and associated costs that are not directly attributable to specific programs, Included in Development, Test and Mission Operations are the skills and services that are necessary to maintain the functional integrity and technical excellence of our field centers, regardless of the program or programs they support.” While it can be argued that programs supported by common support services are “understated”, this is, in our opinion, a retrospective approach. Budgets for other programs have historically been based on the availability of common support from Manned Space Flight Centers and any anticipated contributions from this support were taken into account when the budgets were prepared. Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Winn? Mr. WINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Rocco, you mentioned the five experiments which are still on the moon. Are all of the experiments that we left on the moon still func- tioning? Have you had any malfunctions? Dr. PETRONE. All of the stations are functioning, but some of the experiments have been lost by virtue of either something opening or breaking. The great extremes of temperature, the almost 500° swing, can cause a certain fatigue in soldered joints and things of that nature. We obviously do not know why certain of them failed. The magnetom- eter on Apollo 12, for example, sent information for about a year and then half of it failed and then about a year later the second half failed. Mr. WINN. Some of those were not designed for a long period of time? Dr. PETRONE. Only a 1-year life. The first total station on Apollo 12 was designed for a 1-year life. And yet we have had it over 3 years as a station, and the seismometers worked beautifully all 3 years. We have an instrument up there called the superthermal ion detector. It is working beautifully and has for 3 years, night and day. So in many ways they have exceeded our expectations in terms of lifetime. Mr. WINN. In most cases we are getting more than our money’s worth, because they were only designed for a year. Dr. PETRONE. Certainly more than we thought initially. We are getting much longer life. In fact, in the early days of the program I must confess that we knew that we needed a network of three stations up there to fully understand where meteorites might be impacting. And I knew if we could only get three stations up there working at one time, we could then triangulate when we had an impact. Today we have five. We have five seismic units just giving us beautiful information on the seismic tremors of the Moon and meteorite impacts, so we can now locate them fairly accurately. Mr. WINN. All this information which we are receiving from the Moon, are we sharing our findings and conclusions with other countries? Are we making this information available to all other countries? Dr. PETRONE. Yes; we do, Mr. Winn. We do it in many different ways. For example, a week ago, we had our fourth annual Lunar Science Symposium in which we do get foreign participants. It is held annually at Houston. Primarily it concerns the results of analysis of the sample material but also includes data from the stations. 565 In turn, we have foreign teams and we make samples available to other countries. With the Soviets we have exchanged samples. I know you have been informed of this. We make samples available to any country in the world which makes a scientific proposal that we feel worth pursuing. The United States will supply the sample and the foreign country will pay the scientist. So when we work with foreign nations we make available a lunar sample which they return when they are finished. They pay the laboratory fees and the scientist's fees. In other cases, where we have foreign scientists, we have the same agreements. The country or its academy of science will pay the cost of the manpower and laboratory fees and we provide the material. It has been a very worthwhile program. Mr. WINN. So we are still following the open policy that was a part of our original presentation? Dr. PETRONE. Yes, sir, in many ways. It was in the original Space Act, “for the benefit of all mankind.” And I think in Apollo we have shown how our country can carry that out without compromising any principles and have everyone participate and be a party to what was man’s greatest exploration. Mr. WINN. Just as a personal opinion, because I know there is a variation of opinion on this matter, do you think the Russians will ever follow that line of endeavor? Dr. PETRONE. Sir, I think over the years we have seen a certain moderating of their policy. It is very difficult to say what a nation will do when you are speaking of one which has had closed doors. I have seen an opening of the doors. Their scientists very much want to compete. When we go to symposia—and I happened to be at one last August in which we presented Apollo findings—the Russian scientists there do not want to come off second best, and yet in the eyes of their colleagues, if they are not able to put forth their findings, they will come off not only second but maybe third best. I think you are seeing a gradual opening of the doors. Now exactly how far this will go in their country, one cannot predict, yet I have seen over the 10 or 12 years of Apollo a certain opening, a certain thawing in their policy, and we have seen certain information. - Mr. WINN. When we met with the Russians, I had the feeling that the Russian scientists did want to share their knowledge with us and were very pleased with our open door policy. But they were very guarded in some of their language also. At one time they stopped speaking English to us and switched to an interpreter, which was obvious to me that the political side of the coin did a complete turn. This occurred when we got to probing into their future, whether they wanted to continue other than the one joint docking of their Soyuz and our Apollo in 1975 and what other types of missions they might be interested in. And I do not think these people we were talking with had the political right to say what they were going to do. Dr. PETRONE. I think you have assessed the situation there. Their plans for the future are kept very closed in their society. Yet the fact that they are willing, in the case of Soyuz, to talk about certain things and launch dates—again, that's another small step. 566 I do believe that the two nations can find ways to talk and work; Apollo has provided some of that. I hope in our future space program and specifically the Apollo–Soyuz mission we can keep moving forward. Mr. WINN. Aren’t they coming here? - Dr. PETRONE. I believe they are arriving the end of this week with their working groups for Apollo–Soyuz. Mr. WINN. What has been the disposition of the 850 pounds of lunar samples that have been returned to Earth? You say we have shared them with other countries. Dr. PETRONE. We guard them very carefully. We have in our curatorial facilities at the Lyndon Johnson Space Center in Houston, the responsibility to store and guard—and we make available to our scientists and scientists of the world an inventory of what is available. And when a scientist says he has a certain study he wants to perform, there are only certain types of rocks that would fit it. - Mr. WINN. He gives you the results of his study? Dr. PETRONE. Correct. And he returns the sample. Now in some cases the sample gets destroyed, but this is a very small number of cases. If he is making a chemical etching of the rock, he will lose a gram or two that way, but that also has to be inventoried. We are guarding those samples for many reasons. They are precious to the scientific world. Mr. WINN. Do they go to the universities? Dr. PETRONE. Of the teams in this country NASA pays the univer- sity for the work those scientists do. They give us their results and we give them the sample which they return to us. And they publish this information in journals, literature, and textbooks. Mr. WINN. Does NASA accumulate all of this? Do they channel the entire interpretation or findings back out to the universities? Dr. PETRONE. Yes, sir. The Fourth Annual Conference was a 4-day conference that we held at the Johnson Space Center a week ago. Every paper is published in a bound proceedings which is then made available. When you use the word “interpretation,” there I must say that you run into differences of opinion on interpretation. This is what you would expect in the field of science. That comes out in the discussion of the papers that are presented and in summary papers which come later. But this material is made available to all and it is distributed internationally as well as in the scientific com- munities of our country. Mr. WINN. We are not sending rocks to stamp collectors, are we? Dr. PETRONE. No, sir. [Laughter.] Mr. Fuqu A. Mr. Flowers? Mr. FLOWERs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have to take this opportunity to make a little speech welcoming Rocco to Alabama. He has been talking about Apollo from the Wash- ington standpoint, but I think that we should note he is Director of Marshall Space Flight Center in the heart of Dixie. We are glad to have you down there, Rocco. Dr. PETRONE. I am glad to be there, Mr. Flowers. Mr. FLOWERS. I enjoyed being with you recently. And I am looking forward to the trip down there next week. I will personally be with them. We will show them where the true expertise lies while they are at Marshall. Dr. PETRONE. I hope your busy schedule allows it. 567 Mr. FLOWERS. I have a little more of a speech to make, Mr. Chair- man, to Rocco. Just seeing him sitting there and moving to Huntsville and being aware of what is happening at the Marshall Center in terms of reduc- tion of personnel—this troubles me deeply. It is not just because I am an Alabamian and I like to see a viable program going on at the Marshall Space Flight Center, but it troubles me because this is, I think, symbolic of what may be happening in our whole space effort and that is the loss of the capability for this new technology that he so aptly talked about in his paper. In numbers what will be the necessary reductions at Marshall over the next 12 months? Dr. PETRONE. In the fiscal year 1974 budget we will be reduced in strength at years end by a total of 650 civil service people, which will leave us with 4,564 as of June 30, 1974. Mr. FLOWERS. How many people will be professionals, engineers and scientists? Dr. PETRONE. We are not able to answer that, Mr. Flowers, because in looking at the long range goal we will have to assess exactly the future of the center and our missions and so forth. So where those reductions will come and how many will be attrition or reduction in force, has yet to be arrived at. The reduction would not start to take place before January of 1974 which is a 6-month period from January to June. We are now making our plans. Mr. FLOWERS. But the point is that Marshall is being hit very hard with this reduction. We all understand the economics of the situation but I should hope that this Nation could afford to continue a viable space program that would include, of course, Marshall as well as the other areas. And just because we have achieved technology, as you said, it is changing. And what is very good today will be nonSense tomorrow. It is either our side, American, which will keep moving ahead or we, once again, will look up and see Smething Russian in space that we are not capable of doing ourselves. So welcome to Alabama. I hope that Huntsville is not going to be a ghost town for you to preside over. I do not think it will be. Dr. PETRONE. We have a very viable mission, as you know. My aim, of course, is to have our Center be able to meet the test of that mission and in that way be able to continue producing as we have produced in the past. *~ Mr. FLOWERS. In my humble judgment, we could not have a better director than we now have at Marshall Space Flight Center. Dr. PETRONE. Thank you for the kind words. Mr. MYERs. Mr. Flowers, I might add a few words. In my humble judgment, I am also very proud to have Rocco as the Director of the Marshall Space Flight Center. He has done an outstanding job on Apollo and we expect that same outstanding job at Huntsville. NASA depends on the Marshall Space Flight Center. It is a vital and creative group of personnel that the space program could not continue without. They are fundamental to the future of the shuttle and to many of the payloads that we expect to carry in the shuttle program. They have a lead role in the Skylab program. It is their 568 responsibility to carry off the Skylab program with the same proud results we have had in Apollo. There is no question in NASA’s mind as far as the continuation of Marshall. It is a very important part of our effort. Mr. Fuqua. Thank you, Dale. And I certainly agree with your comments. I am sure that Marshall is not a new area for Rocco. He “cut his teeth” at that Center. Thank you very much. Phil Culbertson, we are running short of time. Dale Myers has covered the subject of available hardware in pre- vious testimony. We will put your statement in the record. [The prepared statement of Philip D. Culbertson follows: STATEMENT OF PHILIP E. CULBERTson, DIRECTOR, Mission AND PAYLOAD INTEGRATION, OFFICE of MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, NASA Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, my purpose today is to tell you about our present plans for hardware which was procured for the Apollo Program, but which, because of both flight success and program cutbacks, was not used in the program. I will include in this summary our present plans for a limited amount of program peculiar back-up hardware which was procured within the Skylab program and is being procured for the ASTP program. If all goes well, this back-up hardware will not be used in those programs. When the Apollo Program was started, a program was planned which made a reasonable allowance for development contingencies and provided satisfactory assurance for high probability of a lunar landing in the 1960's. Our procurement of flight systems included 15 Saturn V vehicles, 12 Saturn IB vehicles, and 23 CSM's. With the advent of all-up development fight tests, and the flight success that was demonstrated we were, as you are aware, able to move forward with the program in fewer flights than anticipated. The success of the development and flight program was such that manned flight was actually accomplished on the third Saturn V launch instead of the seventh as had originally been anticipated. In addition, although our science program was planned through Apollo 19, the last two missions were, as you are aware, dropped from our planning. As the program unfolded and reliability was demonstrated, NASA began to consider alternate uses that might be made of the hardware that apparently would not be utilized in Apollo. The Skylab Program, previously called Apollo Applica- tions, and now nearing launch, will be the first of these uses. The second is the Apollo Soyuz Test Project. (ASTP). Other applications were considered as the near perfect record of the Apollo Program made it apparent that flight systems already on hand would be available for new mission concepts. Of the many missions that could be conducted, a second Skylab and a second ASTP mission have been most thoroughly studied. Each offered an opportunity to conduct productive activity in space extending the goals and objectives of the Skylab and ASTP programs. Each, however, required sig- nificant funding for contractor effort even with the advantage of using backup hardware already procured. The Shuttle System, moreover, with its promise of multiplying the return we might get from each dollar invested in space, dictated against further missions with Apollo hardware. NASA has examined numerous options but with the program chosen, illustrated here in MB73–5180, we sought to insure the attain- ment of the Shuttle capability as rapidly as was consistent with the technical challenges of the Shuttle itself. Except for the Skylab and the ASTP programs, the latter to support the policy objective of seeking new roads to international cooperation in space, Manned Space Flight effort is now focused on the Shuttle and Shuttle related developments. After consideration of a number of plans for storage or disposal of the remaining flight systems which will remain after the successful completion of Skylab and ASTP, we now plan to place the flyable hardware into a low-cost storage mode. This will keep it in a condition where it could be brought into flight readiness if a desirable new project is approved and funding is made available for that purpose. 569 MANNED SPACE FLIGHT FLIGHT ACTIVITY PROGRAMS 1973 |1974|1975|1976|1977|1978|1979| 1980 SKYLAB WORKSHOP MANNED ASTP | SHUTTLE HORIZONTAL TEST FLIGHTS - [ ] FIRST MANNED * ORBITAL FLIGHT OPERATIONAL || - º- SORTIE LAB . A TUG | * NASA HQ MB73-5 180 REV .. 2–20–73 AVAILABLE APOLL0 / SATURN / SKYLAB / ASTP HARDWARE ASSUMING NO FAILURES IN SKYLAB AND ASTP LAUNCH WEHICLE BACKUP ASTP D0CKING MODULE AND D0CKING SYSTEM L-SATURN W — SPACECRAFT ſº - ſº-º: COMPLETE -ſº || | || || º l CSM —l BACK UP SKYLAB CLUSTER NASA HQ MT73–5088 REV. 3–8–73 570 MT73–5088 illustrates those systems which we plan to store. We have initiated action to place this hardware in storage and plan to make no further expenditure except storage costs on it until such time that it is needed. For hardware no fiyable, we will initiate disposal action. This includes three Saturn IB first stages which would have required manufacture of new upper stages.in order to make them useful for flight, one Instrument Unit and some GSE. We have authorized removal of the rocket engines from two of these Saturn IB first stages for transfe to the Goddard Space Flight Center for use in Delta vehicles. We anticipate that other components will be used as spares or will find application in other programs The next chart, MTV3–5510, shows the location and estimated cost for storage of the flyable hardware. STORAGE LOCATIONS AND COST e STORAGE AT GOVERNMENT FACILITIES AT THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS: •KSC • MI CHOUD ASSEMBLY FAC ILITY •MSFC •NAR DOWNEY. • ANNUAL STORAGE COST: •APPROXIMATELY $100K/YEAR NASA HQ MT73–5510 3–8-73 In addition to the flight hardware marked for disposition, we are well into the disposition of Saturn V production assets. Here again, we are making an effort to find other utilization. The Shuttle Program will be the principal beneficiary of this effort. For example, at the Michoud Assembly Facility which has been selected for the production of the Shuttle External tanks, we are going to make maximum use of Saturn tooling and other equipment for that purpose. We are making similar effort at other locations such as the Canoga Park and Santa Susana sites for manufacturing and component testing of the Space Shuttle main engine, and MTF—as the site for the SSME orbiter propulsion system develop- ment testing. In total there are nine manufacturing and test sites involved. The acquisition value of land, buildings, structures and equipment is approximately 528 million dollars. These assets are now under evaluation for possible use in the Shuttle Program. The elimination of the Saturn V production and test capability will result in a total cost avoidance of $1,750,000 per year at SACTO, Seal Beach and other sites, at the conclusion of Skylab and ASTP. To summarize our present status, we are in the process of disposing of all Apollo flight and ground hardware for which there is no reasonable probability of use. 571 SKYLAB & AsſP SELECTED MAJOR CONTRACTORS MANPOWER 12,000 10,000 H. 8,000 H. 6,000 H. i 4,000 H. 2,000 H. 1973 1974 1975 CALENDAR YEAR NASA HQ MB73-5294 2-9–73 We are mothballing completed and nearly completed spacecraft and launch ve- hicles in a manner which will permit them to be reactivated at some later time if needed. MB73–5294 shows the manpower level versus time in calendar years for the major contractors involved in Skylab and ASTP, based on our present plan- ning. In August of this year we will begin to reduce the contractor manpower supporting Skylab and accelerate the downward trend as shown for the latter part of this year. With these reductions we begin to diminish our engineering and manufacturing support at the contractor plants to the point where we would find it increasingly difficult and costly to reassemble the team for a second Skylab mission. In addition to bringing hardware out of storage and preparing it for check-out, reactivation of engineering, launch, and mission operations crews would become more difficult, and expensive. Therefore, although the storage of flight systems appears to be a valid form of insurance at this time, it must be recognized that the option for their use in new missions will become progressively more difficult to exercise. It is therefore NASA’s intention to review our storage decision periodically in terms of budget and mission probability. I just have one question. Do you have any estimated cost figures for the storage of this hardware? That is, for the unassigned Apollo hardware. Mr. CULBERTSON. The present plan we have is in the statement which will be filed. We expect it will cost about $100,000 a year to maintain minimum, effective storage of that equipment. Mr. FUQUA. We do have some questions we are going to submit to you, and you can supply the answers for the record. |See app. B.] Dr. Charles Berry, Director of Life Sciences for NASA. We have not had you before our committee yet this year. We would like to welcome you and we would be happy to listen to any comments you may have. | | 572 STATEMENT OF DR CHARLEs A. BERRY, NASA, DIRECTOR OF LIFE SCIENCES Dr. BERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the com- mittee. It is my privilege to discuss the space life sciences program today. And as the others did, I would like to submit for the record a detailed statement and then I will summarize it for you at this time. Mr. Fuqua. We will make the statement a part of the record. |The above-referenced statement follows: STATEMENT OF CHARLES A. BERRY., M.D. NASA DIRECTOR FOR LIFE SCIENCES Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, it is my privilege to discuss the Space Life Sciences Program today. Space life sciences represents perhaps the most applied of the various areas of specialization within the broader field of medicine. The mission of this specialty has been quite clearcut: to keep man alive and in good functional order and to support and aid him as he operates under the physical stresses of the space environment. The challenge imposed by space travel has been met successfully to date. In over 9500 man hours of manned space flight in the American program, not one life has been lost due either to illness, to a failure of a life Support system component, or to the direct action of some environmenta Stress agent. Now we are entering a new era in space flight. In the coming Space Shuttle, we will be able to make further needed detailed and fundamental medical measure- ments on man as a result of our Skylab experience. For this purpose, we are developing new measurement tools, “space age” tools whose conceptual beginnings reach back into the 18th Century. The first objective measurement of heart performance was made by Stephen Hales in 1731. His tool was a simple, vertical glass tube as shown in Chart MM73–5234. Today, we can measure many more parameters of the cardiovascular system in addition to blood pressure without ever invading the body. For example, a portable, battery operated echo-ultrasound device has been developed for determining both cardiac output and size at the Ames Research Center. This device, shown in Chart MM72–7336, is called an ultraSonoscope. Although intended for use in the zero gravity environ- ment, it offers great promise as an improved instrument for day to day clinical Observations. In this system, an ultrasonic transducer (a 2.25 MHz piezoelectric crystal) emits a signal which travels through the skin and chest wall to the heart, is reflected from the front and back walls of the heart, and travels back to the same transducer. The signal echoes are processed so that a quantitative readout of left ventricular volume and size during a cardiac cycle can be calculated. In addition, the device accepts ERG inputs and provides simultaneous display and printout of electrocardiogram and ventricular dimension. Both continuous wave and pulsed doppler ultrasonic flow meter systems are under development at Ames Research Center and at Stanford University. These Systems are now in use in different specialized applications, such as studies of blood flow in the carotid and temporal arteries in relation to grayout and black- out during exposure to high gravity loading and in studies of blood flow in the renal artery as an indication of kidney function. All these studies have been indicated by both Space flight findings and supplementary ground based experi- ment data. • RECENT DATA on SPACE FLIGHT EFFECTs Now, at the conclusion of the Apollo program, we have an excellent, opportunity to review what we have learned from space flight so far. We are vastly wiser in many medical and technical areas for our “decade in space.” Much has been learned about the effects of the space flight environment upon man. We have found that some body systems respond to space flight factors, perhaps to weight- lessness itself, with changes sufficiently marked to be observable in the period immediately following space flight. Occasionally changes have been noticeable during the inflight period of the mission. None of these changes has been of such a severity as to cause any real concern for man’s safety in space, but all changes are, nonetheless, being watched closely lest they have implications for long dura- tion flight. 573 THE BETTMANN ARCHIVE INC. NON-INWASIVE MEASUREMENT ---------Tº-Sºº-ºº: JF HEART PERFORMANCE ºscopewmrºzºº transºucº and tº - Cº-CºA ->icº. K- ANIERIOR WALL PDSIRIUR WILL CHEST WALL º | º º L F. WOLUME A1 E. ºr systºl- 1. WOLUME AT END DF DIASTOLE º miliº - Twº- sº- º DF STSLLE *- wºlºws: - AL END º ºf Dilºlºlº - CHEST WALL HEAR LEFI WENTRICLE - EME SIGNAL DISPLAY OF LEFT went RICULAR wolume AND ELECTRUCARD10GRAM 93-466 O - 73 - 37 574. Cardiovascular system changes were the first to be observed and have exhibited the most noticeable alterations. Cardiovascular deconditioning, or reduced toler- ance on return to Earth’s gravity, has been the most consistently observed effect. The condition is reversible and appears to have no serious implications. The decrements in work capacity seen after space flight may be another reflection of the cardiovascular and hemodynamic changes which occur. Rare irregularities in heart beat have been noted, but these seem to be controllable. A decrease in heart size has been noted in both U.S. and Soviet crews. Bone density may be minimally reduced after space flight, and some Soviet crewmen have experienced muscular difficulties postflight. Both astronauts and cosmonauts have also re- ported sensations resembling sea sickness during spaceflight. On the whole, how- ever, U.S. astronauts do not appear to be excessively plagued by motion sickness symptoms. The growth of opportunistic microorganisms appears to be favored in the Space environment. It should be stressed that none of the physiological changes noted have caused any severe or lasting difficulty to the individuals exhibiting these changes. Never- theless, because we do not know whether these alterations will become more marked with increased duration of space flight exposure, countermeasures are being sought. Fortunately, cardiovascular system responses which, as we have noted, show the most marked change also appear to be the most amenable to regulation by the application of inflight countermeasures, such as the use of lower body negative pressure. Medication, in our experience, has not proved to be of value in treating either the cardiovascular deconditioning or the loss of exercise capacity noted postflight. Countermeasures are also being investigated for the Small bone density losses noted. There is some early indication from bedrest studies that combinations of calcium and phosphate help to forestall the loss of calcium from the bones. Areas that have not posed problems thus far because mission durations have been short could conceivably pose problems on longer duration flights. Radiation effects fall within this category and are consequently being closely watched. Most crewmen on each lunar mission have reported seeing streaks, points, or flashes of light not noted by crews whose missions were Earth orbital and did not penetrate the Earth’s radiation belts. The phenomena were observed both with eyes opened and closed. In a number of cases, the light flashes were seen by several crewmen simultaneously. Coincidence of light flashes with two crewmen, if a true coincid- ence, would indicate that flashes originated from an external radiation source and that they were probably generated by extremely heavy, high energy particles, presumably of cosmic origin. To further investigate this phenomenon, advantage was taken of the opportunity afforded by the last missions in the Apollo series Outside the protective radiation belts of the Earth to include radiation effects experiments in the payloads. The most interesting and revealing of these are referred to as the BIOCORE and BIOSTACK experiments. The BIOCORE experiment, flown on Apollo 17, was designed to deal with the question of whether or not heavy particles of galactic cosmic radiation have the capacity to inactivate non-dividing cells as those in the brain and the retina of the eye. In this experiment, five pocket mice (chosen because they require no water) were exposed to the galactic cosmic radiation encountered during an Apollo lunar mission. The configuration of the experiment is shown in Chart MMZ2–7303. A radiation dosimeter was implanted underneath the animals’ scalps to permit correlation of penetration of tissue with passage of radiation particles into the brain. Each mouse was housed individually in a tube, with a mixture of seeds for food, concentrically arranged around a central core containing a chemical Sub- stance which provided the simple life support elements, oxygen generation and carbon dioxide removal. - Four of the mice survived the Apollo 17 mission. The survivors appeared to be physiologically normal and displayed no behavioral manifestations that would be indicative of any untoward effects of stress of space flight. The death of the fifth mouse did not appear to be related in any way to space flight effects. Autopsy material from all of the animals is being studied. The brain and eye tissues are now undergoing pathological and histochemical analyses for any evidence of interaction between the tissues and heavy cosmic particles and subsequent bio- logical damage. Other tissues are being closely examined as well. - 575 Apollo 17 Biocore, M212 EFFECTS OF COSMIC RADIATION ON BRAIN CELLS DEVELOPMENT HARDWARE BRAIN CELLS - OBEctive of STUDY. P0CKET MICE, PERQEMATHUS LONGIMEMBRS. ExPERIMENTAL SUBJECTS DETECTION AND INTERACTION of COSMIC PARTICLES stopping END HIGH ENERGY - High Atomic sº Number (HZE) . PARTICLE . STOPPING IN PLASTIC DETECTOR HZE PARTICLE PASSING THROUGH water CRESS SEED - seed hiſ exº H2E PARTICL 576 The Apollo 16 and 17 Command Modules carried two slightly different versions of another experiment to investigate the various biological effects of exposure to cosmic radiation. The experiment, designated BIOSTACK (Chart MMZ2–7300), was the first biomedical experiment designed, developed, fabricated, financed, and analyzed by a foreign government (West Germany) and flown in a U.S. manned spacecraft. The basic elements of the experiment consisted of four layers of biological systems (watercress seeds, brine shrimp eggs, and bean root) sand- wiched or stacked alternately between radiation detection materials. Investigators are correlating data from the detectors and biologic systems and looking for indications of molecular and cellular inactivation, cellular and sub- cellular damage, mutations, and modification in tissue growth and development, as these effects related to exposure to cosmic radiation. The experiment, as flown on Apollo 17, contained different radiation detection materials from those used for Apollo 16. Some of the preliminary observations from the Apollo 16 BIOSTACK experi- ment are illustrated in Chart MMZ2–7300. The chart shows the path of one of the heavy particles of galactic cosmic radiation stopping in a plastic detector of the BIOSTACK. A watercress seed can be seen to be “hit” by one of these par- ticles. The most striking effect of these hits occurred in the eggs of the brine shrimp, Artemia salina. Of 110 hit eggs examined thus far, only a few developed into swimming larvae without evidence of any abnormality. Some effects due to space flight exposure were also seen in biological specimens not hit by cosmic particles. There was a slight increase in budding in a plant grown from a water- cress seed returned from space. There was also a decrease in the number of emerging and hatching brine shrimp larvae from space flight exposed eggs com- pared with the Earth controls. At this phase of evaluation of the Apollo 16 BIOSTACK results, the mechanism or mechanisms of cosmic particle-induced change are not known, nor has the site of interaction in the biologic system been identified. The BIOCORE and BIOSTACK experiments should provide meaningful information on space radiation effects requisite to planning of future missions. This information may also be important in designing facilities to duplicate ionizing radiation particles on Earth for applications such as “ionic” or noninvasive surgery. THE SEYLAB PROGRAM While a great deal has been learned about man’s response to space flight on the missions flown thus far, even the longest of these, the two week Gemini mission, has been too short in duration to yield data on effects with a long total time course. Some physiological “price” is paid by the human organism for adpatiaton to zero gravity. This has been apparent after return from space to Earth on almost every mission. The medical experiments of the 28-and 56-day Skylab missions are designed to determine just how high or low this price is over the long trerm. Reduced orthostatic tolerence is one important effect noted in space flight. The response classically involves elevated heart rate and lowered blood pressure during stress testing in the immediate postflight period. It results from the develop- ment of a relative deficiency in the normal circulatory reflex mechanisms which, under ordinary circumstances, counteract the downward pull of gravity on the blood in the erect, standing position on Earth. - As an upright, walking animal, man's circulatory system possesses well-developed regulatory mechanisms because the presence of gravity on Earth acts as a constant' stimulus to maintain the integrity of this compensatory capability. In space flight, the stimulus is absent. As man’s physiological functions become adapted to his new environment, the gravity-related regulatory mechanisms are not stimu- lated as they are on Earth, and cardiovascular changes ensue. When the astronaut returns to Earth, the gravity-related regulatory mechanisms begin to function again, and Orthostatic intolerance may appear. This has been a temporary finding which disappears as readaptation to gravity takes place, over a period of several days. However, as we seek to understand space effects, Orthostatic intolerance and its causes have been, and continue to be, of prime importance in Space life research. A principal research tool used in Orthostatic tolerance studies for many years here on Earth has been a simple device called the tilt table (Chart MM73–5022). This device supports the subject as he is tilted through any angle, from full horizontal to fully upright (vertical), and while various physiological measure ments are taken, such as blood pressure, heart rate, electrocardiogram (EKG), limb plethysmography, etc. Typical postflight results at 70 degrees tilt (from horizontal) are shown in Chart MMZ3–5022. 577 TILT TABLE TEST -> ------- -- *_ _- ----------- --- º ------ - ºs------ -as-Hº--7------ ----- These data are for the Gemini 7 Command Pilot and were obtained six hours postflight. There are several limitations to the tilt-table device which restrict its value for stress testing in space. First, because the tilt-table technique depends on gravity to induce physiological responses, it cannot be used during space flight. Secondly, the circulatory response to incremental step changes in angle of tilt is highly variable. For example, only minimal changes in blood pressure may be noted as the subject is rotated as far as 45 degrees from horizontal, while changes observed at 65 degrees may be indistinguishable from those of a full 90 degree tilt (fully upright). . During the Skylab program for the first time, inflight measurements will be made of orthostatic tolerance to reveal the status of the cardiovascular system in weightlessness. These will be made with a device which duplicates the phys- iological effect of gravity while the astronaut is experiencing, and becoming adapted to, weightlessness. The apparatus, known as the lower body negative pressure (LBNP) device, is illustrated in Chart MM73–5025. The study subject is placed in the device and a mild, fully controllable negative pressure is applied from the waist down. Although the subject (and the device) remain in the hori- zontal position, the negative pressure creates a force on the circulatory blood volume, tissues of the lower extremities, and viscera, producing the same reflexes as would gravity in the upright position. As the negative pressure is applied, a time profile is obtained for various physiological measurements, such as EKG and blood pressure, the same measurements made during the tilt-table studies conducted on the ground to test for orthostatic tolerance pre- and postflight. Besides being independent of gravity, the LBNP device is more precise than the tilt-table for correlating cardiovascular responses with the degree of circulatory stress. Typical results of orthostatic testing during the Apollo program are shown at the left side of Chart MM73–5025. The higher heart rates, lower blood pressures, and increased leg volumes are indicative of pooling of blood in the extremities during postflight LBNP test. In ground studies with subjects at bed rest, used as an analog of weightlessness, we are evaluating the possibility of employing LBNP with longer exposure and different pressures as a countermeasure to ortho- static intolerance. 578 INFLIGHT LOWER BODY NEGATIVE PRESSURE EXPERIMENT MU32 ------------ --- -------------------- --- -------- ------ --- ------ -- --- ------- __ - __ - - - -- - - - -- -------- ------ --------- ------- ---------------- ---------- Rev. 3-8-7- The LBNP experiment is just one of sixteen medical experiments to be con- ducted during Skylab missions. Another important experiment will investigate metabolic activity, or work capacity, inflight. Reduced work capacity has been a consistent postflight finding. While this reduction is fairly quickly restored and preflight levels are ultimately reached, even temporarily reduced performance capability engenders some concern since it may be an indication of deconditioning of the cardiovascular and musculoskeletal systems. To learn more about the nature and extent of the effects of space flight on metabolic processes, a metabolic experiment is included in the Skylab payloads. The basic objectives of the Skylab metabolic experiment will be: to determine the difference in metabolic cost (energy expenditure) in performing identical tasks of equal workload on Earth and in the weightlessness of space; to determine if man's metabolic effectiveness in doing mechanical work is progressively impaired by exposure to the space environment; and to provide inflight data reflecting the physiological status of the crewmembers. This will be accomplished by measuring respiratory gases * physiological variables during rest and calibrated exercise during the flight. To provide precise inflight metabolic measurements, NASA has developed a sophisticated metabolic analyzer (Chart MM73–5024) which provides continuous measurements of vital capacity, minute volume, respiratory quotient, oxygen consumption, and carbon dioxide production. A bicycle ergometer will provide an automatically programmed, calibrated workload for the metabolic experiment. Heart rate, the workload indicator, will be measured by means of a cardiota- chometer. Additionally, a newly developed automatic blood pressure measur- ing system will be employed. The Skylab metabolic experiment will provide, for the first time, inflight information in real-time, reflecting the time-course of alterations in energy metabo- lism as well as the extent of such changes. Such information will be very useful in planning future long duration missions. At the same time, the Skylab experiment may also provide indications of the value of the bicycle ergometer exercise device as an aid to delaying or preventing undesirable physiological alterations associated with space flight. 579 METABOLIC ACTIVITY EXPERIMENT M171 METABOLIC ANALYZERWITH BICYCLEERGOMETER DATA PROVIDED. -CALIBRATED WORKL0A0 –VITAL CAPACITY –MiNUTE VOLUME –0xYGEN CONSUMPTION -C0. PRODUCTION -cardºtACHOMETER RECORD –BLOOD PRESSURE -500y TEMPERATURE º Pºliº Mºabolic Cºsì EXPERº - -as-Ho -73-50.24 - - ------- |- º - The Skylab Medical Experiments Altitude Test (SMEAT) In preparation for the Skylab missions, a ground-based test simulating mission profile was undertaken to afford an astronaut crew the opportunity to practice medical and experimental procedures and to provide baseline medical data. A 56-day altitude chamber test was begun on 26 July 1972 at the Johnson Space Center. The test ran for its planned duration of 56 days—the length of the longest scheduled Skylab flight. The primary purpose of this Skylab Medical Experiments Altitude Test (SMEAT) was to obtain and evaluate baseline medical data on astronauts for those Skylab experiments which could be affected by various aspects of the system environment. Additional objectives were to evaluate selected equipment, data handling, pre- and postflight medical support operations, inflight experiment operating procedures, and the training of the Skylab medical operations team. Chart MM73–5023 shows the test chamber, the environmental parameters, and summarizes the results. Despite the constraints imposed by the Earth-based situation, the test configuration had a high degree of fidelity to the operational setting. The internal arrangement of the chamber was configured to resemble the crew quarters segment of the Skylab Orbital Workshop, and the gaseous environ- ment was identical to that planned for Skylab, 70 percent oxygen and 30 percent nitrogen at 5 psi and with a nominal carbon dioxide level of 4.0 to 5.5 mm Hg. Temperature and humidity were also controlled within the limits planned for the flight mission. Some deviations from the Skylab architecture were required for sleeping and waste management facilities, both of which are zero-gravity configured for the flight. Test results provided useful information for the operational Skylab missions. The crew very clearly felt the need for extensive exercise and used a bicycle er- gometer provided for that purpose. One crewman who exercised a great deal lost considerable weight during the test. This underscored the need for precise pre- flight determinations of expected inflight caloric requirements. While the food provided was acceptable to the crew, the test indicated that spare food items should be stowed in case of need. The crew also approved of the whole-body shower. Although austere in comparison with Earth-based facilities, the hand-held shower provided adequate cleaning and refreshment. Discretionary, off-duty time was principally spent reading and studying. The medical baselines established for the 580 ENVIRONMENTAL PARAMETERS ------------> RESULTS - Su-ESSFULL-º-º-º-º-º-º: P-----------> ------------------------ - Q2 20- Nº 30- - Cº-º-º-º-º- - co- a to 5.5 mm ºn -nosignificant unmowann - rene to sº nºt PHYSOLOGICAL EFFECTS - Rº 8-12 mm Hg. ºzo - | | - | _ - INVESTIGATIONS COMPLETED --------------- Exº-R-E--> ----------- TEST -------> was a º- astronauts in the past are available for comparison with flight data on actual crews. This information will be augmented by ground-based medical data for the actual Skylab flight crewmembers as they proceed through their training programs. PREPARATION FOR SPACE SHUTTLE MISSIONS Much of our work in the areas of life support system development, man-machine technology, and space life research is geared toward the Space Shuttle missions of the future. We are continuing to emphasize life support systems that regenerate vital supplies and are sufficiently lightweight to be used in the Space Shuttle Earth-orbiting vehicle and the Shuttle itself. Refinement in teleoperator tech- nology will expedite satellite servicing, cargo handling, and other space Shuttle operations. Space life research will establish the most effective and efficient techniques for the prevention and correction of the undesirable effects of space flight on man. Parallel development of bioinstrumentation will insure accurate measurement and monitoring of any changes of a physiological nature that do Occur. With the introduction of the Space Shuttle in the 1980s, space travel will be relatively economical and practical for scientists, technicians. and people in many relevant professional disciplines. NASA is developing appropriate medical stand- ards for use in screening and evaluating non-astronaut personnel who may partic- ipate in these missions. Since some of these individuals, notably scientists, may be advanced in years, cardiovascular system integrity and its tolerance to post- weightlessness, reentry acceleration forces take on increased importance The NASA Ames Research Center has begun a program to investigate this problem. Scientists at Ames have completed two studies so far, exposing healthy males to 14 days of bed rest to simulate weightlessness and then to head-to-foot accelera- tions in the order of two, three, and four g, typical of Space Shuttle accelerations. In the most recent study, as shown schematically in Chart MM73–5063, various remedial measures (isotonic exercise, isometric exercise, and rehydration) were examined. The Johnson Space Center has conducted a similar study in which seven days of bed rest were followed by Shuttle acceleration profile runs. Observations. on a wider segment of the population, in terms of both age afind sex, are planned. 581 "G” TOLERANCE AFTER SIMULATED WEIGHTLESSNESS --- - -º-º-º-F-G-tº-º-º-º-º-º: ------------------ --------- ---------------- nasano wasnes -15-7- Shuttle Life Support and Protective Equipment We have several efforts in life support equipment development underway for the Space Shuttle. The most important is the Representative Shuttle Environmental Control System (RSEC) (Chart MM73–5133). It is a test-bed to evaluate and compare the baseline environmental control system design approach with alternate advanced techniques. These advanced techniques include a regenerable desiccant for humidity and carbon dioxide control in lieu of replaceable carbon dioxide absorber canisters. Chart MM73–5133 depicts the atmospheric revitalization section of this system. The RSEC program will also verify maintenance, checkout, and turn-around procedures to enhance flight systems design. Specialized component development and testing necessary for this task will be conducted. An example is the mainte- nance disconnect valve (Chart MM73–5004) for integrating the various life support subsystems. To accomplish the reliability goals of the program, it was necessary to design and develop a valve concept which would allow components to be removed and replaced and allow the valve itself to be repaired without depres- surizing the system, without introducing gas into the system liquid loop, and without significant loss of liquid. The selected concept was a cartridge valve which can be applied to nearly all liquid and gas line components. Advanced Life Support Processes Work is continuing on better processes to handle the various life support functions. These include atmosphere pressure and composition control, oxygen generation, carbon dioxide collection and reduction, contaminant control, cabin temperature and humidity control, water reclamation, and water monitoring. The life support subsystems presently being used are now known to be opera- tionally feasible and adequate for early Earth-orbiting missions. However, there are some operational limitations or constraints associated with these concepts. Efforts are underway to improve and simplify these subsystems. The aim of our advanced process development is to use simple methods requiring the minimal number of components and to achieve relatively complete regeneration. A tape cassette bacterial detection system for potable water provision typifies movement in the direction of simplification. This instrumentation automatically maintains 582 REPRESENTATIVE SHuTTLE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM (RSECS) carbon dioxide - Huºunty º cºntrºl McDuut - tº Nº. 2 º º * - --~ º - º - C.- FA-Mºul- º º - º º - - waste -anage-ºut support - des-ºn and lºst Representative Ecs subs-stEus - - - --Luate ----TEnance techniques - - ----------> --Pºº-º-º-º- tº PROGRA- COST S----> - -----TR-TE -R-RE CO-O-L-T- - - - Esrael-sh. F-LURE LETECTION AND SOL-TION TECH-1-UES --- - MAINTENANCE DISCONNECT WALWE NSTRUMENTATION/ BYPASS-PORT PARTING FºE RETAINING RING- END CAP Q sums * º . REPLACEABLE CORE Bºass PORT END CAP N. - º PARING ! :º - ºf º- - - º º - --~ RETAINING RING 583 potable water purity and appropriate biocide levels and eliminates the need for water storage tanks and treatment processes. This not only reduces system complexity, but effects a considerable weight savings. Such a system has been built and is under test (Chart MM73–5062). The projected sensitivity for the system is five viable bacteria per milliliter of water, or ten total bacteria (non- viable and vaible bacteria) in a milliliter of water, utilizing a 400 milliliter sample. The processing time for viable bacteria detection is two and one-half hours. The key feature is the processing of each sample in an individual sterile capsule to preclude cross-contamination between discrete samples. Crew Equipment Systems This year three parallel design efforts are being pursued for space suit gloves. The goal is to achieve as much mobility for the gloved hand as is achieved by the nude hand. It is hoped that the miniconvolute technology concept developed for finger mobility, integrated with new wrist and thumb designs, will accomplish this aim. Chart MM73–5007 shows the glove pressurized to 8 psig. It has ex- hibited low torque and a good neutral range of motion. Efforts are also being made to reduce the mass of the one-man portable life support backpack. The best candidate for mass reduction is the thermal control package. A regenerable ice water-thawing device (Chart MM73–5008) capable of absorbing astronaut heat loads is currently being evaluated. The thawing regenerable heat sink will transfer a large fraction of the latent heat of fusion of its contents to a man-cooling transport fluid at about 40° F. The heat sink module would be returned to the parent location where it would be regenerated by re- freezing. An additional significant advantage of this method is that no venting § required. Venting could contaminate the surrounding work area and fog optical evices. Another important part of our Shuttle support program deals with the develop- ment of teleoperator and man/systems technology. The contribution of Shuttle missions will be increased as man’s capability to perform tasks is extended. Teleoperator technology will allow man to do “long-distance”, remote-site work with the dexterity and sensory inputs his actual presence would bring to bear WATER MONITORING SUBSYSTEM sta 3 - |INCUB- *Tºyºtºut" Ivº st- st-2 - sample Mutºlent st-4 sia. 5 CONC. ADDM- |UREA wash |READOut - REAGENT capsule - º is at - º - was Film * * . - * - º FLIGHT HARDWARE CONCEPT PROCESSING STATION ASSEMBLY NASA ºn M-73-5057 1/2-73 584 g|ESIGLOVEWORKCAFETY º Artist concept TEST ICE CHEST-ASSEMBLY ASTRONAUT THERMAL CONTROL NASA Hº MM73-5008 REv. 1-24-73 585 There are currently two basic classes of teleoperators under development: The Shuttle-attached manipulator that operates out of the cargo bay and the Shuttle free-flying teleoperator for use at distances beyond the reach of the attached manipulators. Still another advancement in teleoperator technology is represented by improved end effectors. The objective of these latter efforts is to give the operator, by means of display systems, something tantamount to a “sense of feel” during remote operations. The Shuttle attached manipulator (SAM) is an electromechanical device consisting of wrist, elbow and shoulder joints, an end effector (fingers or grasping mechanism), and connecting members designed for the purpose of enhancing Shuttle unmanned extravehicular activities. The SAM system in the Shuttle baseline design is comprised of two manipulator arms (approximately 15.25 meters, i.e., 50-feet) attached at the edge of the orbiter bay, a teleoperator work- station, and visual system. As shown in Chart MM72–7334, the SAM system conceived by the Johnson Space Center, is controlled by an operator located in the workstation in the Shuttle crew compartment or within the Space Laboratory. Using the TV cameras near the SAM end effector and around the orbiter bay, this system can transfer experiment packages and cargo in and out of the orbiter bay, emplace into orbit spacecraft carried up by the Shuttle, and inspect re- trieved orbital spacecraft. It can inspect critical areas on the Shuttle exterior, such as its heat shield. Studies were conducted to examine significant man-machine problems in the handling of large inertia payloads and the required control features of the SAM system. Results of in-house simulations indicate that depth perception and force feedback factors strongly influence the remote operator's ability in the use of manipulators. An engineering breadboard model was used by test subjects to ex- amine man-machine factors in payload handling and to identify manipulator design requirements. Analysis of data indicates strongly that a wide range of operators was able to learn quickly the handling of the attached manipulator. in FY 74, a prototype manipulator will be fabricated based upon the design studies completed this year. The laboratory manipulator will be used to examine payload handling parameters and modes of control. Actual hardware will be used to assess visual system technology (developed at the NASA Marshall Space Flight and Ames Research Centers), candidate hand controllers, and computer aided con- troller systems. Studies will be initiated to define and evaluate Shuttle teleoperator workstations. MAN-MACHINE SIMULATION ATTACHED MANIPULATOR SYSTEM STUDY. - Nº. INTERACTIONS • CAPTURE TECHNIQUES e GRASPING REQUIREMENTS • CONTROL FEEDBACK • DIRECT WISION ------------ ------- 586 The second type of Shuttle teleoperators under study are the free-flying tele- operators (FFTO). They are remotely controlled devices under man's supervisory management. These units are designed to augment man’s capabilities in Space by performing tasks in areas where it is not practical to place man. Earth orbital mission planning has indicated that scientific and application spacecraft will be in orbital planes and altitudes, as high as synchronous, different from the low Earth orbit of the Shuttle. The FFTO’s, under remote control, potentially can proceed to these different space locations at lower fuel costs and perform the required tasks. - Studies have been pursued under the direction of the Marshall Space Flight Center to identify the man-machine and operational mode requirements for cap- turing, inspecting, repairing and retrieving scientific satellites. Repair, such as module replacement, of the spacecraft can be made in orbit. If damage is beyond the capability of the FFTO, the free-flying teleoperator can return the Satellite to the orbiter bay. Simulation results indicate that an FFTO can be designed to perform such space tasks as data collection for space environmental experiments or fuel line connections. Other functions studied and shown to be feasible are replacement of omnidirectional antennas and satellite components, such as batteries. The capacity of teleoperator and effectors determines in large measure the overall capability of the devices themselves. We are therefore attempting to ad- vance this vital technology. Chart MMT 2–6951 shows an advanced end effector under development through the Ames Research Center. Tactile Sensing is being incorporated into the design to give the remote operator a “sense of feel” of the object being held and to dsplay to him the application of the finger force. This adds safety in the handling of equipment in Space by providing information to the remote operator of the firmness of the manipulator grip on the target handle. The technique being investigated uses an array of several hundred fine electrical con- ductors designed into the gripping portion of the effector to Show placement position of the handle. Program efforts in FY 1974 will investigate the use of optical devices to sense shape of objects. These new “sense of feel” developments will be integrated into the control system software programs in the development of more “intelligent” automatic control systems. Man-Machine Technology In the area of man-machine technology, we are continuing to improve the match of man and the machines and systems with which he must work to obtain greater safety and efficiency in manned space flight. Crew comfort and the means of enhancing comfort fall within this area of endeavor. The convenience and comfort afforded by design of living and working Spaces will have an impact on Shuttle crew work performance efficiency. Crew comfort must be ensured for Shuttle orbiter and scientific laboratory missions which will range anywhere from seven up to fifty-six days. Prior studies have produced several couch designs for the purpose of keeping the crew in their best physical and mental state while performing a variety of exacting tasks throughout a mis- sion. Results of these studies led to a concept which can be developed as a seat for the experiment crew during the launch and entry flight phases as well as for resting and sleeping periods. Under the guidance of the Johnson Space Center, a prototype loungeſberth design has been finalized and is being fabricated for evaluation. The couch is placed in a fixture which permits optimum crew compartment installation and facilitates adjustment from the lounge to the berth position. Chart MM72–7335 shows a view of the Shuttle crew quarters with several such couches arranged. The insets show the lounge position for activities such as eating and reading and the berth position for resting and sleeping. The lounge has provisions for storing reading matter and toiletries. Candidate Shuttle Ea:periments Finally, we note that the Space Shuttle will carry scientists of many disciplines whose tasks will be to perform various studies for which the absence of gravity would represent an invaluable experimental variable. Many of these experiments will be conducted on lower forms of life to advance the state of plant and animal biology. However, others will follow lines of investigation that have specific applicability to the physiology and physical welfare of man. At the current time, baseline information is being collected for candidate experiments. 587 TACTILE SENSING OPERATOR DISPLAY -------- GRASP facult senson - - ASA HQ MM72-6951 SHUTTLE LOUNGE/BERTH CONCEPT - EATING - READING N LOUNGE/BERTHS 3. MAN CREW 588 The case of using space parameters to advance our understanding of life processes is illustrated in Chart MM72–7304, which depicts a prototype chamber for study- ing the growth of plant tumors in simulated zero g. The plant tissue employed is carrot which is exposed to a bacterium that carries a tumor-inducing principle. The rotating clinostat is used to simulate the effects of weightlessness here on Earth. It has been found that the tumors are larger in plant tissues exposed to clinostat treatment, as shown on the bottom of the chart. There are also clear differences in enzyme patterns and profound changes in cell wall structure. It could be that the clinostat-treated plant cells are smaller, divided more rapidly, and remain juvenile for longer periods of time. It is possible that during simulated weightlessness, plant nutrient materials are more thoroughly mixed and more readily available to cells than when those nutrients “clump” under the influence of Earth’s gravity. Another effort involves the measurement of cardiac adaptation to long term weightlessness. Significant progress has been made toward the development of a computer-based data acquisition and reduction system for cardiac cycle defini- tion and calculation of the variables derived. Techniques have been developed for reducing data from large samples (4 minutes) containing 200 or more consecutive cardiac cycles in near real time. Chart MM73–5039 shows the computer installa- tion and display at the Howard University Cardiovascular Research Laboratory. Some of our candidate experimental efforts relate very directly to clinical health care on Earth. Because the effects of gravity profoundly alter the distribution of blood and gases in the lungs, many problems of basic pulmonary physiology can be studied in the weightless state. In fact, some can be studied much more effec- tively under zero gravity conditions than is possible under normal gravitation. One of the dividends of space flight in the future will be the opportunity to carry out such experiments. In a preparatory study, we have developed a new system for the thorough and rapid evaluation of pulmonary function. This development for the NASA Ames Research Center has yielded a device now under baseline study by the University of California, San Diego, at the San Diego Veterans Administration Hospital. The device has been tested with normal, healthy subjects and is now being used in º#º patients with chronic pulmonary diseases, as shown in Chart –5132. GROWTH OF PLANT TUMDRS IN "ZERO" G PROTOTYPE CHAMBER FOR EXPERIMENT ºn ANE Ass: MELE, PLANT specimen HOLDERS y s ºs- - -º-º-º-º: - sº ---------- Foº MATION AFTER 5 DAYS Enºcº of Roots nºor ºvelopºn cºmputer - ºs º- section/display ºf º Hºwº UNIVERS CARD10NASCU AR Research lºgº ºn º - * - - ------- ------- - - --- - º ------ -*- : - - - - RAPID PULMONARY FUNCTION EVALU 93-466 O - 73 - 38 590 The pulmonary test package determines rapidly the standard lung volumes and respiratory velocity parameters but adds (1) carbon dioxide, oxygen, nitrogen and oxygen washout (giving information on metabolic rate, pulmonary ventilation, perfusion and ventilation/perfusion rates); (2) pulmonary diffusion (giving infor- mation about the alveolar membrane); and (3) pulmonary blood volume and mixed gas tension (giving information about pulmonary blood flow). The entire test battery can be administered in ten minutes as compared with hours for the standard pulmonary function workup in the usual clinical setting today. Future plans are to make the test package more rugged and more compact so that it will be suitaple for inflight use. These characteristics would also enhance the portability of the device and, therefore, its usefulness here on Earth. Collaboration. With Other Agencies—OSW, Navy, EPA The life support technology being developed by NASA for Space Shuttle use has much in common with the technology needs of national federal agencies work- ing toward environmental restoration. Reference here is to technology for purifi- cation of air, water, and waste, and reuse of resources. The major difference is in the scale of the environment of concern. Where NASA-developed technologies have common applicability to the problems attacked by other agencies, joint endeavors may be, and have been, undertaken. Solutions to the problem of waste water reuse in space vehicles and here on Earth is continuing with the Office of Saline Water (OSW). Considerable progress has been made in development of advanced membranes for water purification. One membrane made of sulfonated polyphemylene oxide (PPO) which operates at temperatures of 165°F has shown high flux rates when used for waste water recycling. A reverse osmosis breadboard test module (Chart MM73–5032) of this membrane, along with two others, is under evaluation at NASA Ames Research Center. This year, the PPO membrane will be fabricated into configurations of high surface-to-volume ratio, i.e., spiral wound and/or tubular units, for OSW. The Environmental Protection Agency has underway an effort for accelerating waste sludge treatment. If the process can be made more efficient, it will also be of great interest to NASA for spacecraft application. A joint effort is underway between NASA and the Environmental Protection Agency for achieving a higher level of efficiency in the process. The key to this efficiency is the substitution of ozone for oxygen in the treatment of secondary effuent. Ozone speeds oxidation and also affords a certain degree of sterilization. The prototype unit which will result from the joint effort will be tested at the NASA Ames Research Center. In another collaborative effort, the U.S. Navy has utilized NASA-developed atmospheric sensing equipment in the control of submarine atmospheres. Two of these units successfully completed a three month operational evaluation aboard two nuclear submarines. The installation onboard the USS Pintado is shown in Chart MM73–5011. The commanding officer of the USS Pintado has reported that the rapid response to atmospheric changes and the continuous, real time read- out capability of the sensor system provided ship personnel with timely, factual information and gave maintenance-free performance. The U.S. Navy is currently purchasing a large number of these units for installation onboard other nuclear Submarines. US/USSR Joint WoRKING GROUP IN SPACE BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE As the Committee knows, the exchange of life sciences information, and infor- mation in other fields, is continuing between the United States and the Soviet Union. Following the establishment of the US/USSR. Joint Working Group in Space Biology and Medicine under an agreement between NASA and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in 1971, an initial meeting was held in Moscow in October 1971. This was followed by a second in Houston in May 1972, and a third in Moscow this February. A detailed exchange of medical findings from Apollo and Soyuz took place. The Soviet scientists presented medical results of the Soyuz 11/Salyut 24-day mission. The Houston meeting also resulted in an agreement to take definite steps toward establishing common US/USSR pre- and postflight medical examination procedures to facilitate comparison of space flight results. An effective doubling of the number of individuals for whom space flight data are available would greatly increase the reliability of our interpretations of the effects of space flight on man. - 591 REVERSE 08MOSIS PROOF TESTING-BREADB0ARD UNIT FEED Pºn --- º- -- Punºus MEMERAME support | CUMPOSITE RU º . PURIFICATION OF wash water AT STERILIZATION TEMPERATURE 155 EL -º-º-º-º: ºn 1-7- ATMOSPHERIC CONTAMINANT SENSOR INSTALLATION-USS PINTADO CO SENSOR electronics—- analyzer on PUMP Powen Supply cooling Fans- - Filters, etc. A - - - - - Nasa HQ \ - 592 The exchange has already been of practical benefit. A review of the medical data from the Soyuz 11/Salyut mission has assured us that no modification of current Skylab mission plans are required from a medical point of view. Additional information exchange is being accomplished through the publication of the “Foundations of Space Biology and Medicine,” which will document the space studies in both countries. A draft of the three-volume work has been com- pleted, and printing is scheduled for the end of 1973. INTEGRATION OF NASA LIFE SCIENCES ACTIVITIES Several years ago, the life sciences activities within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration were consolidated to insure the effective and coordi- nated accomplishment of the total life sciences program, under the direction of the Office of Life Sciences. Efforts in biomedical research, bioengineering, bio- environmental systems, and flight project support are now coordinated with work in the areas of exobiology, planetary quarantine, ecology, aeronautical life Sciences, occupational medicine, and life sciences applications. Chart MM73–5267 illustrates the spectrum of the total NASA life sciences programs. Most space life sciences research tasks are conducted by the NASA Centers and through grants and contracts with universities and industry. This combined use of government, academic, and industrial talent has been highly effective in the past and will be continued. Integration of efforts is insured by periodic reviews by Center and Headquarters personnel. SUMMARY Now, at the close of the Apollo program, men have worked on the lunar surface on six different occasions and have brought back to Earth materials of inestimable scientific value. Much has been learned about the effects of the space flight environ- ment upon man, but we expect to learn much more in Skylab because we can make inflight measurements and follow changes as they occur. The Space Shuttle system will open the experience of living and working in space to large numbers of people other than the select astronaut population privi- leged to participate thus far. Space Life Sciences is concentrating its research and development efforts toward the successful implementation of these missions. Life support and protective equipment development, basic research, medical selection criteria, are but a few of the areas being stressed. The resultant body of knowledge and technology will insure safety of space travelers of the future as similar efforts have those of the past. In addition, as before, travelers on space ship Earth will º: much benefit from the technology progress and the new understandings galned. Dr. BERRY. Space Life Sciences represents perhaps the most applied of the various areas of specialization within the much broader field of medicine. The mission of this specialty has been quite clearcut—to keep man alive and in good functional order, and to support and aid him as he operates under the physical stresses of the space environ- ment. The challenge imposed by space travel has been met successfully to date. We now have over 9,500 man-hours of manned space flight in the American program. - - The Russians have some 4,377; and, there is a grand total of 59 ºuts and cosmonauts, with over 13,000 man-hours of space ight. - Now, we are entering a new era in space flight. In the coming Space Shuttle, we will be able to make further needed detailed and funda- mental medical measurements on man, as a result of our Skylab experiences. We are developing new measurement tools, “space age” tools whose conceptual beginnings reach back into the early 18th century, when the English clergyman and physiologist, Stephen Hales made the first objective measurement of heart performance. As you can see from this picture—MM73–5234—when Stephen Hales made the 593 HALES’ BLOOD PRESSURE EXPERIMENT - 1731 NASA Ho MM73-5234 2-5-73 594 first objective measurement of heart performance, his tool was a very simple vertical glass tube. Today, we can measure many more parameters of the cardio- ... system, in addition to blood pressure, without ever invading the body. * - - Mr. Chairman, we have here on the table, an ultrasonic device for noninvasive measurement of heart performance, which was developed at the NASA Ames Research Center. As you can see, in order to operate the device, the demonstrator places the ultrasonic transducer in the designated area of the chest. It transmits a signal to the left ventricle of the heart. There, the signal is reflected back to the same transducer by the front and back walls of the heart, and is then dis- played on the scope. g The changing signals seen on the scope are, therefore, in synchroni- zation with the heart beat, representing the front and rear cardiac walls, with the cavity between. gº I am sure you can see that from where you are sitting, and we will be glad to have any of you come down and look at this after the session. This allows computation of heart dimension and the volume of blood pumped by each heart beat. - In the space program, we need such a device to measure adaptational changes in heart performance, during weightless flights. This device is intended for use in the zero gravity environment, but it also offers great promise as an improved instrument for use in day-to-day clinical measurements of heart performance, and it is being so used today at Stanford Hospital. While a great deal has been learned about man's response to space flight, on the missions flown thus far, the longest of these was only 2 weeks, too short a time to yield data on changes with a long develop- ment time course. ſº Some physiological “price” is paid by the human for adaptation to zero gravity. This has been apparent after return from space to Earth, on almost every mission. Some body systems have responded to Space flight factors, perhaps to weightlessness itself, with changes suffi- ciently marked to be observable in the period immediately following space flight. - Occasionally, changes have been noticeable during the actual mission, but none of these changes has been of such severity as to cause any real concern for man’s safety in space, but all changes are, none- theless, being watched closely, lest they have implications for long duration flight. - The 16 medical experiments of the 28 and 56-day Skylab missions have been designed to determine just how high or low this price is over the long-term period. The apparatus to be used in evaluating the cardiovascular system is known as the lower body negative pressure (LBNP) device, and is illustrated in this picture. (MM73–5025). The astronaut is placed in this device, and a mild, fully controllable negative pressure is applied, from the waist down, simulating the pull of gravity, as if he were in the vertical position. hº Apollo 8 postflight test results are shown on the left of the Chart. 595 |MFLIGHT LOWER BODY NEGATIVE PRESSURE EXPERIMENT MO52 -------------- --- ---------------------- --- ------- -------- -- . - -- ----- | ºne-sung tº -- - -------- - __ _ - ---- | --- - - - - - - - -- -- Nº -------º-º- --- ----- -------- ------- ------------------- Revºlº. T Note Frank Borman's postflight changes in blood pressure and heart rate. The blood pressure is at the top. The left side is the pre- flight data, and on the right is the postflight data. In the lower graph, you can see the marked increase in heart rate, which occurs. In Skylab, we will be following the course of these changes in flight, for the first time. Much of our work in the areas of life support system development, man-machine technology, and life sciences is geared toward the Space Shuttle missions of the future. We are continuing to emphasize life support systems that regenerate vital supplies, and are sufficiently lightweight, to be used in the Space Shuttle Earth-orbiting vehicle and the shuttle itself. Refinement in teleoperator technology will expedite satellite serv- icing, cargo handling, and other Space Shuttle operations. Space life sciences research will establish the most effective and effi- cient techniques for the prevention and correction of the undesirable effects of space flight on man. Parallel development of bioinstrumenta- tion will insure accurate measurement and monitoring of any changes of a physiological nature that do occur. With the Space Shuttle, it will be relatively practical, and more economical for scientists in many relevant professional disciplines, to fly and conduct their experiments inflight. We are developing appropriate medical standards for use in screen- ing and evaluating these personnel. Since some of these individuals may be advanced in years, cardiovascular system integrity and its tolerance to postweightlessness, reentry acceleration forces take on increased importance. 596 A recent study by the Ames Research Center assessed the effect of shuttle Greentry profiles on healthy males, following 14 days of bed rest, to simulate weightlessness. Performance baselines were obtained prior to the bed rest. The subjects were instrumented then for black-out and other physiological parameters. We subjected them to head-to- foot acceleration stress, with 1, 2, 3, and 4 G, typical of Space Shuttle accelerations. Observations on a wider segment of the population, in terms of both age and sex, are planned, to permit a better understanding of the response to gravity after weightlessness, in the selection of non- astronaut scientists for Space Shuttle missions. The subjects worked sophisticated performance tasks while under- going the reentry G, all the while the G profile and physiological parameters being monitored. We have several efforts in life support equipment development un- derway for the Space Shuttle. The most important is the Representa- tive Shuttle Environmental Control System. It is a test-bed to evalu- ate and to compare the baseline environmental control system design approach with alternate advanced techniques. The atmospheric revitalization section is depicted in this picture. (MM73–5133.) Another advanced technique to be tested is a regener- able desiccant for humidity and carbon dioxide control, in lieu of replaceable carbon dioxide absorber canisters. This program will also verify maintenance, check-out, and turn- around procedures to enhance fligº. systems design. This year, we are also pursuing improvements in space suit gloves. The goal is to achieve as much mobility for the gloved hand of shuttle crews as the bare hand achieves. A concept has been developed to increase finger mobility, using a miniconvolute. REPRESENTATIVE SHuTTLE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM (RSECS) -º-º-º-º-º-autº- cºntrºl -ºu LE º º - - - - - º -- - - -- - º - - - º -TE- - º- - - - - - - - -- - - - - *~. * \! º - - —º C’ -- - - - - - ----ºut- (- was it manage-twº suppºrt design and Test REPRESE-Tative Ecs subsystems - - Evaluate main ſºn-McE TECH-Ques investigate approaches to PROGRAM cost savings - DEuºnstrate HaRºwant COMMOMALITY - - Esrael-ish Failure nºrtcro- and isolation TECH-ºuts --- -- 597 I would like to pass around one of these new gloves. You will note the convolutes are in the wrist and the thumbs, and greatly enhance hand movement. Even at pressures as high as 8 psig, this design has exhibited low torque and a good neutral range of motion. Mr. Chairman, we also have here a low-pressure glove test box. After the hearing, you may wish to feel the differences in a new glove corresponding with an Apollo glove. Both of these are in the low- pressure box, and you may test the difference. Another important part of our Shuttle support program deals with the development of teleoperator and man/systems technology. The contribution of Shuttle missions will be increased as man’s capability to perform tasks is extended. The teleoperator technology will allow man to do “long distance,” remote-site work, with the dexterity and sensory inputs his actual presence would bring to bear. Here in this film, you can see, by electronic scene generation, how man can extend his capabilities, by using a boom attached to the Shuttle. He is taking out and handling a typical space lab module from the orbiter bay and bringing it to another module for docking. In the next sequence, the operator at the far right, using direct vision and a hand controller similar in form to the boom, moves a 7,000-pound target on airbearing pads through a maze simulating anticipated handling modes for large payloads. You can see how carefully that is done. . - - In this scene, we see how he can capture a target while it is freely moving across the floor. In these laboratory simulations, man-machine factors related to teleoperator technology, such as direct vision and control sensitivity, are investigated to establish the safest techniques to meet Shuttle payload requirements. As I have noted, the Space Shuttle will carry scientists of many disciplines whose tasks will be to perform various studies for which the absence of gravity would represent an invaluable experimental variable. - At the current time, baseline information is being collected for candidate experiments. I would like to give you two examples of our work underway, leading to potential experiments. In the first, significant progress has been made toward the develop- ment of a computer-based data acquisition and reduction system for cardiac cycle definition, and calculation of the many variables derived. (MM73–503.9.) Techniques have been developed for reducing data from large samples, containing 200 or more consecutive cardiac cycles, in near real time. This sort of data will be necessary in evaluating cardiac adaptations to long term weightlessness. These data are generated by the various sensors you see, placed in the heart and the aorta, at the lower left. - -- The picture shows the computer installation and display at Howard University here in Washington. - Many of our candidate experimental efforts relate very directly to clinical health care on Earth. 598 --- ** ** . - ºn tº - **u º - - º - - - - --- ----------- ----- ------------ - Because the effects of gravity profoundly alter the distribution of blood and gases in the lungs, many problems of basic pulmonary physiology can be studied in the weightless state. In fact, some can be studied much more effectively under zero gravity conditions than is possible under normal gravitation. One of the dividends of space flight in the future will be the oppor- tunity to carry out such experiments. There are many areas of body physiology which can be investigated, in detail, in the weightless environment. In a preparatory study, we have developed a new system for the thorough and rapid evaluation of pulmonary function. This develop- ment, by the NASA Ames Research Center, has yielded a device now under baseline study by the University of California, San Diego, at the San Diego Veterans' Administration Hospital. Here, we see the mouthpiece being adjusted in a patient, and the sequence of breathing maneuvers started. You will notice, he is breathing from a bag in a box. This provides very accurate measure- ments of the volume changes. The data from the mass spectrometer—which measures changing gas concentrations—and spirometer—which measures the volume changes—are recorded on magnetic tape, for analysis later by com- puter. However, we use a pen recorder for monitoring the signals which are going into the tape recorder. You can see the pen recorder here. The entire test battery can be administered in 10 minutes, as com- pared with hours for the standard pulmonary function workup in the usual clinical setting today. 599 Future plans are to make the test package more rugged and more compact, so that it will be suitable for inflight use. This last test is very important. It is called a closing volume test. Helium is injected into the tubing in such a way that it is breathed into the lungs first. If its concentration is followed during expiration, a sharp change heralds the closure of some of the air passages in the lungs. This is a sensitive test of early disease. As you gentlemen know, the exchange of life sciences information, along with information in other fields, is continuing between the United States and the Soviet Union. Following the establishment of the U.S./U.S.S.R. Joint Working Group in Space Biology and Medicine, under an agreement between NASA and the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., in 1971, an initial meeting was held in Moscow, in October 1971. This was followed by a second in Houston, in May 1972, and a third in Moscow from February 26 through March 7, 1973. A detailed exchange of medical findings from Apollo and Soyuz took place. The exchange has already been of practical benefit. A review of the medical data from the Soyuz 11/Salyut mission has assured us that no modification of current Skylab mission plans is required, from a medical point of view. Several years ago, the life sciences activities within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration were consolidated to insure the effective and coordinated accomplishment of the total life sciences º". under the direction of the Office for Life Sciences. (MM73– 5267. 600 Efforts in biomedical research, bioengineering, bioenvironmental systems, and flight project support are now coordinated with work in the areas of exobiology, planetary quarantine, ecology, aeronautical life Sciences, occupational medicine, and, even life sciences applica- tions. Each element is depicted here in this slide. In summary, I would like to reiterate that much has been learned from our decade in space about the effects of the space flight environ- ment upon man. Nevertheless, we expect to learn much more in Skylab, because we can make inflight measurements, and follow changes as they occur. In the future, the Space Shuttle system will open the experience of living and working in space to large numbers of people, other than the Select astronaut population, privileged to participate thus far. Space Life Sciences is concentrating its research and development efforts toward the successful implementation of these missions. In addition, as before, travelers on spaceship Earth will receive much benefit from the technology progress, and from the new understandings gained from our program. Now I heard Jack Schmitt say, “Thank you for your attention.” That statement worries me, because recently in Russia that was a closing statement that had to be used just before the series of 44 toasts. I say this concludes my oral statement and I will be happy to answer your questions. Mr. FUQUA. Thank you very much, Chuck. While we are passing out bouquets, let me also extend one to you for the fine job that you and your office have done in the life sciences program and the many contributions that have been made to medical science through your efforts in our space program. There has been some comment in the press recently, and with the Skylab up coming 28-day and 56-day missions, it is probably appropriate that we explore the effect on man of prolonged space flight. With the Gemini 14-day mission we felt we had the medical knowledge to proceed with a 28-day mission. - Based on the analysis of those who have been to the Moon and been in a weightless environment for some time, what psychological effects have there been, or do you anticipate there might be after a 28-day mission or maybe even a 56-day mission? - Dr. BERRY. Mr. Chairman, we have been concerned about this as we originally looked at these missions as to their duration. We looked very carefully at information which was available from ground-based experiments all the way from special studies that were done up to and including incidents that had been observed and followed carefully in Antarctica and places of this sort. It is our feeling at the moment with the motivation and selection process that has been used upon our crews today that we really do not expect to see any psychological response that we would consider to be abnormal from missions of this duration. - Most of the studies where one gets into difficulty here are related to areas where individuals are not busy, where there is not enough activ- ity, that certainly is never going to be the case from what we can see in our Skylab plans today. We are continuing to be aware of all of the activity and the research which is going on in this area. It is very a difficult area to deal with, as I am sure you know. 601 We have looked very carefully at what we have seen from our re- sults thus far. We have just finished a meeting this week with one of our advisory committees, and we have a group of people from that committee also looking at this particular area with us. But we feel very comfortable about Skylab. Mr. Fuqu A. In fiscal year 1973 you asked for and Congress appro- priated $25.5 million for life sciences. This year, according to the figures, your budget plan includes only $23.5 million. What has hap- pened to the other 2 million? Dr. BERRY. The reduction was the result of reductions in NASA's budget, the cuts which I think have been explained previously to the subcommittee. It was our portion of those cuts. Mr. Fuqua. Will all of the $23.5 be obligated before the end of this fiscal year? Dr. BERRY. Yes, sir, it will be before the end of the year. Mr. FUQUA. Will there be any carryover funds into fiscal year 1974? Dr. BERRY. There should be none. Mr. FUQUA. What are you asking for in 1974? Dr. BERRY. In fiscal year 1974, that figure is $21 million. Mr. FUQUA. An even $21 million? Dr. BERRY. $21 million for Space Life Sciences. Mr. FUQUA. I think you have touched on it, but I would like you to elaborate. What do you think is the most critical area requiring research or activity as far as man in space for prolonged periods? You mentioned the question of being active. Is that the most critical? Dr. BERRY. I think, Mr. Chairman, it is quite obvious—one of the first systems we recall having any difficulty or showing any responses that could be measured in the postflight period was the cardio- vascular system. As a result of that, much of our program thus far has concentrated on that system. We have been very fortunate I think with Apollo to add to that, in a way that has allowed us to develop some hypotheses for what is actually happening to man physiologically, some data involving the endocrine system and the fluid and electrolyte systems of the body. These all become very intertwined. You cannot really separate the cardiovascular system from the fluids which it pumps and from the hormones which make it function in a certain way. We have been, I think, very fortunate in having a series of experi- ments developed for Skylab which are going to allow us to examine that particular area in flight in real time. I would say the two most important experiments which will be used operationally as well as for experiments are the lower body negative pressure as a means of evaluating the cardiovascular response and the pulmonary function metabolic studies that will be done to determine what is really happen- ing to the lungs, heart, blood vessels, and muscles functioning in their entirety. Those things can be watched on a repeated basis in flight, and we will have some information about what is happening in the fluid and electrolyte area in flight just by means of knowing what is happen- ing to weight and whether we are continuing to lose weight or whether that weight is maintaining itself during flight. We will have the capa- bility postflight to analyze in great detail what is happening in these systems, because of the samples which will be obtained during the 602 mission period. But, of course, those will not be available to us on a real time basis. So I think the areas where we must really concentrate our effort at the present time involve the cardiovascular system and the combination of the cardiovascular system with the lungs and the muscles and, finally, the fluid and electrolyte systems, which all then function together to allow man to do his particular job. w In our conversations these past couple of weeks with the Russians, I think there is no doubt at all that that is the same situation they face; exactly. Mr. Fu QUA. Mr. Flowers? Mr. FLOWERs. Thank, you, Mr. Chairman. One thing which has occurred to me is that I am wondering when the women’s liberation movement is going to get hold of the space program. [Laughter.] Seriously, has any thought been given to having a female astro- naut? Are we assuming that everything works the same in a man as it does in a woman? I think a lot could be gained scientifically from the same sort of inquiry. Dr. BERRY. Of course, I think we all know there are some differences. There are hormonal differences and other differences between the sexes; and we are all very happy about that. [Laughter.] Certainly, we have considered having women astronauts. It has been considered for many years. As a matter of fact, it was considered very early in the program. There have been women applying in almost every selection cycle, and none of them really qualified in those selec- tion cycles, usually due to the initial requirements, not due to any physical or medical requirements. Now we do plan to consider women for the shuttle. I’m convinced that we will eventually have women scientists wanting to fly aboard that vehicle. So we have looked into the design of the environmental control systems, the waste management systems and things of that sort, relating to such a requirement. We have testing underway, as a matter of fact, at the present time in that area. We also have looked toward determining the tolerance to accelerations in women versus men. And we have some studies in that area that we are just ready to initiate. The background has been done and we plan to initiate those this summer. Those are the only things at the present time. And as you know, there is no formal selection program underway at the present time for additional astronauts. I do not know when we will have female astronauts as such, versus female scientists who want to go. But I am sure in my own mind that eventually it will probably come about. Mr. FLOWERs. Thank you. If the equal rights amendment passes before the third crew of the space lab, you might be subject to suit. Mr. Fu QUA. Mr. Gunter? Mr. GUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I notice your statement indicated that some physiological prices are being paid during space flight, but you do say that none of the changes have been of such severity as to cause any real concern for man's safety in space. 603 I am wondering, Dr. Berry, is it just too costly to create the gravity type of atmosphere we are used to here on Earth? Is that the reason for not moving in that direction? Do you ever visualize the need to create artificial gravity in space flight for these long flights? Dr. BERRY. From the medical point of view, we have been very interested in determining if gravity is really needed versus how long man can function in weightlessness and what is the price. Of course, adaptation to weightlessness is the thing we are trying to measure very carefully, so we can determine what man can really do. We have not been convinced in any way, medically, that that price is high enough that we have to do anything toward providing any form of artificial gravity. It is quite obvious that it would in some people's minds make things more comfortable. Things will stay on the table and this sort of thing. But ways have been found around that, and the crews are very, very happy without gravity. * We do know there is something happening within man’s physiology in which he adapts to a less demanding environment and then he readapts when he comes back here to earth to 1 G. That is the differ- ence we have been measuring to date. Skylab will give us the oppor- tunity to measure how much he really goes downhill during that in- flight period and we will assess whether or not it in any way compro- mises him. We have seen no evidence thus far that it does. So from our point of view we cannot lay a requirement for artificial gravity. Now as to the cost of that activity, I will defer to Mr. Myers. Mr. MYERs. We have continually studied the possibility of giving the astronauts artificial gravity, Mr. Gunter. It is expensive. It requires a rotation of the spacecraft, with the living quarters on the outside edge of the rotating element, to get artificial gravity. You then induce a new element involving the rotation of man. We have not seen any major problems yet developing, for the time periods we are talking about, although we will continue to study the effects of gravity and the techniques for applying gravity. We really do not have it as a requirement now. Dr. BERRY. May I add one other thing? It is quite true what Mr. Myers said that it is not all advantageous to provide gravity because you produce some disadvantages by the very process of doing that, as far as man is concerned. You produce another physiological problem for him which you have to solve. But in addition to that, trying to solve that particular problem, I think it is very important for us to understand what hap- pens to man's physiology in a zero G environment. That is one of the advantages of the space flight environment. It is a very great advan- tage of that environment. You heard Jack Schmitt say earlier today it is one of the things space provides—vacuum and weightlessness, and so forth. I think if we destroyed totally that laboratory capability, then we would have lost one of the advantages of space flight. Mr. GUNTER. Dr. Berry, is there one thing you would say above all else that the space life sciences program of NASA has contributed to the medical community thus far? Dr. BERRY. This is one of those topics that could go on for a long time, Mr. Gunter. 604 Fortunately, there are so many things. You could talk about in- dividual pieces of hardware, but if I were asked to name a single thing that I thought we had given to medicine on the ground, I feel that it is what I would call dynamic medicine. It is the capability to practice medicine with the use of a fair amount of technology, to practice that medicine from a distance, and to have a great deal of information about the patient at the time of examination. And I think you will see, even within the next couple of years, some very great things happening in the practice of medicine on the ground because we are feeding that information into this practice. It is the one area that is receiving a great deal of scrutiny as far as the entire Nation is concerned. Health care is one of the No. 1 problems in this Nation, as you all are acutely aware. And certainly we have a capa- bility for extending the eyes and the hands of the physician who is in short supply by using other people and giving him information with which he can make the decisions which are necessary based upon his training. - And I think, looking at man as a dynamic individual rather than as a static creature sitting on the examining table is something we are providing to medicine which will change the scientific flavor of medi- cine. It will make it more scientific. It will make it more real as far as predicting what man can do on the basis of any ailment that he might have. It will allow him to get care wherever he is. Mr. Fuqua. Thank you, Mr. Gunter. Mr. Winn? Mr. WINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Berry, I am sorry I was not here for your testimony, but I did have a chance to go over the advance text that you sent to us yesterday. I would like to ask you a series of questions that are related. According to the justification, NASA plans to initiate in the year of 1974, the design and evaluation of potential candidates for the Apollo–Soyuz test projects. What do you contemplate the nature of these experiments would be? Dr. BERRY. Mr. Winn, we have looked at a number of candidates recently. We have discussed these strictly within our own group to date as far as potential candidate-type experiments. These cover two principal areas. One of the areas is basic biology where we are getting down to something as specific as looking at a particular organism like 8, º organism, or down to the level of something like growth of a IISn egg. - There are a couple of experiments of that type. Those are two repre- sentative types of basic biology, things that have been looked at with one of the ground rules being that we would like to do something that could be done jointly with the U.S.S.R. Then information could be traded or they could provide part and we could provide part, so that it could be a joint type of experiment. The other things we have looked at are experiments that have to do again with man and looking at some of man's physiological re- sponses. In those areas, we have been talking with the Soviets in our joint working group activity, not related specifically to this mission but just what do we do pre- and post-flight and how can we do it together to increase the information that would be available by being able to directly compare data. 605 There are only, as I said earlier, some 59 individuals who have flown in the 10 years we have been flying. And there are a lot of indi- vidual variations in people. If we could directly compare that data, it would be very important to us. So every time anybody flew it would provide additional data to be used by either group. Mr. WINN. Then you have been consulting with the Russian med- ical teams? - Dr. BERRY. Yes, sir. - Mr. WINN. In these meetings and discussions do they have any particular medical experiments that they want to do? Dr. BERRY. Yes, sir. They have been considering the same area. This will actually be discussed in the meetings which will start the latter part of this week down in Houston when their working group arrives here. There have been some preliminary looks at the kinds of things each of us are doing, and the actual discussions will start the end of this week. Mr. WINN. What are some of the things they would like to do? Dr. BERRY. They have had a very active biology program going for a number of years. They have flown a basic biological package on every one of their manned flights to date. So they are quite interested in doing some basic biology from various types of seeds to various types of organisms that could be carried. They are looking at that kind of small package which would lend itself to that type of mission also. And it could be jointly stocked by U.S.–U.S.S.R. sources, and they could even be traded in flight and some brought back to each country for analysis. That is the kind of thing we have been trying to look at and they are too. They also are very interested in trying to look at evaluation of the total heart–lung system in some way and coming to some sort of arrangement whereby we could do that in a pre- and post-flight mode that would be comparable. They are very interested in that kind of experiment. I think that is the type of thing that will be proposed and which was discussed with them. Mr. WINN. Do you feel that any of their experiments in the life sciences that might be aboard Soyuz would be available to us? Dr. BERRY. Yes, sir, I do feel that. Mr. WINN. You don’t think they would be running any experiments then that we would not have access to? Dr. BERRY. No, sir. I think when we see what has happened, just over these three meetings which I’ve mentioned in the testimony, it is quite amazing to me to see the progress that has been made through these three meetings. Mr. WINN. How many men are on a team. Dr. BERRY. They have four people in their working group. And they have recently added two. We started out with four people on ours and have kept that number, although we took some additional experts in the areas that we were particularly going to discuss, like the cardiovascular testing and some of our blood and urine analyses. We took an expert in each of those areas. When we meet in their country, of course, they may have as many as 12 or 14 additional experts there in the meeting room. Mr. WINN. But only the four or the six do the talking? Dr. BERRY. Correct. . 93-466 O - 73 - 39 606 It is controlled by Dr. Gurovskiy on their side and by me on our side. And we do the talking in that way. Normally, the questions are funneled or passed back and forth. Mr. WINN. Are they excited about this? Dr. BERRY. Very excited. There was a marked opening up from that first meeting and even from the second to the present one. As I think you may have seen in the press release, we saw medical gear that was flown aboard Salyut, their space station vehicle, for their analysis of the crew. And that is the first time we have ever seen any of their real hard- ware that was utilized. They went to great lengths to have us see this and to answer any questions we had about it. They are working very hard to try and come to some arrangements with us to modify pre- and post-flight evaluations. They are willing to make modifications in order to make our procedures comparable. I think it is a great step forward. Mr. WINN. That shows they are very sincere about this, and I’m glad to hear it. - It seems that in the medical field they want to exchange ideas the same as they do in the other scientific fields. - Dr. BERRY. Yes, sir. Mr. WINN. I don’t know if you want to answer this and if you would rather not, just say so: But I have talked to several medical teams, particularly teams that have gone to Russia in the last few years in these exchange programs, one dealing with cancer, and the general consensus, particularly in our off-the-record discussions, is they feel the Russians in most cases are behind us in the medical field. In the experiments and in the information that they gave you on the Soyuz medical packages, did you get that feeling? Can the two be compared? Dr. BERRY. There are ways they can be compared. Some are not directly comparable. We find that in some areas they certainly are behind us. In some of their laboratory analysis techniques and things of this sort they are behind us. Mr. WINN. That is exactly what our teams said, that they were using techniques that they were proud of but that we used 10 years ago. Mr. BERRY. As we tried to discuss agreement on ways of doing things we became aware certainly that there are techniques that they have which we are doing in an entirely different way. Some of it is due to equipment and things of this sort. They want to discuss that and they want to understand why we are doing it a different way. So I think there is no question that in some areas they are behind. I was impressed, however, with some of the things that were flown and some of the equipment that was used. Some of the Soviet equipment illustrated previously was very gross. It was not refined. It works nonetheless. - The equipment I saw this time for Salyut was very, very excellent equipment. And it looked like an entirely new generation of equipment from anything that I had ever seen pictures of before. I had never really seen their hardware before; I had seen only pictures. . So I think they have the capability to develop some very ingenious kinds of gear. They can do it, and I think they have in certain areas. 607 Mr. WINN. But you have no doubt we are going to benefit from this exchange of ideas. Dr. BERRY. I have no doubt at all that medically we will very definitely benefit from this exchange. I would say also that I have already seen, just in our visit, as far as the ASTP program is concerned, some very evident fallout from that. I have seen an attitude about certain things, saying, “Of course you must know about this, we must tell you about this and we must exchange and discuss this, because we will have your astronauts here and our astronauts will be there or they will be in the same vehicle and exposed to the same environment and we ought to discuss what that environment means.” So I think we are going to see a great deal of benefit just from having people discuss things with each other. Mr. WINN. Thank you, Dr. Berry. Mr. FUQUA. Thank you very much, Dr. Berry, for your very interesting and exciting comments about life sciences and the contribu- tions being made to medical science. We are all very much concerned about these things. I want to thank you, Dale Myers, for being here this morning. The committee will adjourn for today and will resume tomorrow, March 15, at 10 o’clock in this room. Our witnesses for tomorrow will be David Fradin, chairman of the Federation of Americans Supporting Science and Technology, and Craig Howell, director of the Space Shuttle Studies, Universe Astro- nautics Foundation, Inc. We will stand adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, March 15, 1973.] 1974 NASA AUTHORIZATION THURSDAY, MARCH 15, 1973 Hous E of REPRESENTATIVES, CoMMITTEE on ScIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS, SUBCOMMITTEE on MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in room 2318, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Don Fuqua (chair- man of the subcommittee), presiding. Mr. FUQUA. The subcommittee will be in order. We are happy to have with us again this year David Fradin, the chairman of FASST, the Federation of Americans Supporting Sci- ence and Technology from the University of Michigan, Tom Brownell, and T. A. Heppenheimer. Let me say that I had the pleasure of hearing your testimony last year and we appreciate very much you taking the effort, the time to be here again this year in support of our space program and the advancement of science and technology in general. This is not only of benefit to us, but to the great program that we have. We appreciate your efforts in behalf of this and in coming before the committee. Mr. FRADIN. Thank you. Mr. Fuqua. You may proceed in any way you desire. & Mr. FRADIN. We would like the entire written statement placed in the testimony. Mr. Fuqua. We will do that. [The full statement of David Fradin follows: (609) 610 - YOUTH SPACE BENEFITS and the SPACE SHUTTLE Testimony by the Federation of Americans Sup- porting Science and Technology before the United States House of Representatives Manned Space Flight Subcommittee of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, March 15, 1973 DAVID FRADIN, Chairman THOMAS BROWNELL, Executive Director DR. T.A. HEPPENHEIMER, Vice-Chairman/Technical 736 Packard #202-B Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104- (313) 763-6537 611 COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515 February 22, 1973 Mr. David Fradin Chairman FASST 240 Michigan Union The University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104 Dear David: Mr. Fuqua has asked me to advise you that we have scheduled your organization to appear before the Subcom- mittee on Manned Space Flight at lo a.m. on Thursday, March 15, 1973. We hope you will find this date satis- factory since we have an extremely tight schedule for hearings this yar. We assume that the subject matter which you will cover will be that which you outlined in your letter of January 31, 1973, to Mr. Teague. As is customary we would plan on your testimony being concluded in one hour since a witness will follow you. You may submit the statement of whatever length you may wish for the record and summarize for the Sub- committee your comments in a period of 30 to 40 minutes allowing the balance of the hour for questioning. Please submit your statement for the record at least 48 hours in advance of the hearing date. Mr. Fuqua has asked me to tell you that he is looking forward to you and your associates appearing before the Subcommittee. Sincerely, J. E. Wilson 612 CONTENTS TESTIMONY BY DAVID FRADIN, CHAIRMAN Introduction l FASST l Technology Assessment l; The Youth Council 6 Survey Research: Student Attitudes Toward the Space Program 23 Priorities and Technological Growth 2l. Aspects of the Space Program 27 Space and the Limits to Growth 31 The Macro-Problem 31 Analytical World Model 32 Incorrect Assemptions 33 A Scenario: 2050 AD 35 Conclusion 37 TESTIMONY BY DR. T. A. HEPPENHEIMER, WICE-CHAIRMAN/TECHNICAL Criticism of the Shuttle l The Current State of Shuttle l; Shuttle Payloads T The Resources of Space 9 APPENDIX "Satellite Long-Life Assurance--the Impact of the Shuttle Era, AIAA Paper No. 72–225 by E.H. Diamond and J.R. Fragola "Design of Low-Cost, Refurbishable Spacecraft for Use With the Shuttle AIAA Paper No. 73-73 - by M.W. Hunter II, R.M. Gray, and W.F. Miller "Manufacturing in Space" Astronautics & Aeronautics by Hans F. Wuenscher III 613 * CONFENTS TESTIMONY BY THOMAS H. BROWNELL, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR Introduction l Space Benefits l; Weather Satellites l; Communication Satellites 7 Education lo Economic Impact 12 Medical Spinoffs 11, Highway Safety 17 Earthquake Detection 17 Commercial Spinoffs 19 Conservation 21 Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS) 23 Hydrology 25 Geology 26 Geography 27 Oceanography 27 Agriculture 28 ERTS Spacecraft 31 Summary 33 Skylab 36 Earth Resources Experiment Package 36 Study of Solar Activity 39 Effect of Long-Term Spaceflight on Man liO Preliminary Lunar Results l;2 Better Knowledge About the Sun l;8 Dating of Lunar Events 50 Meonquakes 52 614 sº o o G © © © O © © o SUMMARY © © o O © O o G o o © This testimony entitled Youth, Space Benefits, and the Space Shutt. is highlighted: - .” —FASST is a nationwide organization of American high - school and college students dedicated to the concepts of international stability, a clean environment, and social progress through science and technology-- Three particular FASST Programs are discussed. -Technology Assessment: There is no lack of able young people who have much to offer and more importantly the desire to offer ºuch to government and industry policy makers. - - -The Youth Council: A communications and educational link that will enable young people to help plan and participate in major technological problems like the Space Program and the Energy problem. - -Interest members of Congress should offer. FASST their assistance, support, and advice so Youth Councils can loe established in the near future. -Survey Research: A FASST study shows over half of the students at the University of Michigan feel the money spent on going to the moon was wasted, but the Space Program has helped America's technological growth. -Students definitely misunderstand the Space Program and they feel tangible benefits of Space exploration are more important than intangible ones. -Using the Limits to Growth model, we conclude that to avoid worldwide doom we must go forward with a viable Space Program and the Space Shuttle. —Similarly, using a scenario, we must go forward with a viable Space Program and the Space Shuttle because they offer more and better alternatives for the future. -This is because the Limits to Growth ignore resources under their own feet. -If the world suffers catastrophe, it will not be because of o failure to limit growth, but because some advocates of limited growth have limited imaginations. 615 -The Space Shuttle will save money. -Shuttle's critics have not bothered to study Shuttle in detail; hence their criticisms have shown gross ignorance. -The Shuttle program is in excellent shape due to conservatism of design and program plan. There is close attention to control of weight and cost. -Low-cost payload design studies are shaping up as two design methodologies: one based on Shuttle's refurbishing satellites, the other on modularized satellite design. The two approaches should be integrated into a single approach. - -Shuttle's applications will tap the resources of space: its view of the earth, its conditions of vacuum and weightlessness, and the light and power of the Sun. -There is a fourth resource of space: new worlds. They may be reached through controlled-fusion engines, demon- strating and advancing the laser-fusion technology needed here on Earth for energy production. - -The Space Program has produced a broad movement forward in science and technology by which we have gained many new approaches to old problems. -The Space Program has produced many technological "tools" that can be applied to many of the social and economic problems. –An agency can have all the needed funding in one hand and all the dreams in the world in the other. But without the science and technology to bridge that gap, the problem cannot be solved. -Due to the Space Program we have gained new technology that can be seen as spinoff benefits. -In 1972, NASA received $3.2 billion while social programs received 33 times more or over $100 billion. -Not one single penny was spent on the moon, it was all spent here on Earth. 616 -ERTS will help detect water pollution and will help hydrology, geology, agriculture, oceanography, and geography. —Each ERTS picture equals l,000 high-flying aircraft pictures. —By studying the moon we can learn more about the Earth's past which has long ago been erased by erosion. -Due to preliminary studies of lunar samples, the moon's history has been divided into four major periods. -Skylab will be the first manned Space mission with the specific aim of gathering information to better man on the Earth. -Three major areas of study are planned on Skylab. First, a survey of Earth resources will be taken. Second, over 500 hours of solar studies will be performed by the three crews. Third, the effect of long-term weightlessness on man. will be studied in detail. -The United States' major export is high-technology products because we lead the world in science and technology. 617 THE AUTHORS DAVID FRADIN David Fradin is a senior in Engineering at the University of Michigan. He is chairman and founder of the Federation of Americans Supporting Science and Technology (FASST). He is a certified flight and ground instructor with over 1200 hours, and as a freshman he founded and organized the U-M Flyers, the University of Michigan's first student flying club, and served as its first president. As a sophomore, he founded and organized FASST. He testified before the U.S. House Committee on Appropriations in March of 1971. In November of 1971, he co-authored FASST's review of the Space Shuttle for the White House at the request of Mr. William Magruder. He testified in support of the Speice Shuttle before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight in March of 1972. In addition, he is a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science's committee on Science, Industry, and Society, a syndicated columnist for Public Aviation News, and a member of the Aviation/Space Writers' Association. } THOMAS BROWNELL Thomas H. Brownell holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Earth Science from State University College, Oneonta, New York. He joined FASST as its Executive Director in September, 1972 after many years of interest in technology and the Space Program. He has attended all of the Apollo moon launches, (at his own expense) with the exception of Apollo 13. He has done extensive studies of sunspot activity on the Solar disk. In addition, his work at the State University of New York has included the charting of many meteor showers. Tom is also an active donor to the National Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian Institution. He is an accomplished speaker and in the past five years he has spoken to over liO organizations and many Congressmen about space benefits and the importance of the Space Program. He is a member of the Aviation/Space Writers' Association and has authored numerous articles on space benefits. T. A. HEPPENHEIMER Dr. T. A. Heppenheimer has closely studied the Space Shuttle since 1970. He attended the AIAA Space Systems Meeting in July 1971, and reviewed its pro- ceedings in Science. He co-author ed FASST's review of the Shuttle for the White House, and testified in its behalf before this Subcommittee last year. Recently he co-authored a FASST Shuttle review for distribution at a Smithsonian Institution exhibit. He received his Ph.D. in aerospace engineering in May 1972, from the University of Michigan, and received that school's Distinguished Achievement Award. Author of numerous papers in astrodynamics and mission planning, he recently published a novel concept for manned flight to Jupiter's satellites. - VIII 618 TESTIMONY BY DAVID FRADTN, CHAIRMAN Mr. Chairman, my name is David Fradin and I am the Chairman of the Federation of Americans Supporting Science and Technology. With me is Mr. Thomas Brownell, FASST's Executive Director, and Dr. T. A. Heppenheimer, FASST's Vice Chairman/Technical. Our testimony today is entitled: Youth, Space Benefits, and the Space Shuttle. I will begin with a description of the FASST organization - what it is, what its objectives and programs are. In particular, I will discuss three major FASST programs: Technology Assessment, Youth Councils, and Survey Research. Then I will discuss two methods of making the policy decision whether or not this nation should proceed with the Space Program in general and the Space Shuttle in particular. Tom Brownell will discuss the benefits of the Space Program in terms of Apollo, Skylab, and space satellites. His written statement, we believ is the first comprehensive review of space benefits ever published under One COver , Dr. Heppenheimer will discuss the critics of the Space Shuttle and will amplify previous remarks in terms of the five resources of Space - weightlessness, vacuum, solar power, unparalleled view of the Earth, and new worlds. He will also review the current state of Shuttle based on the technical literature and on personal observations. FASST To begin, FASST is a nationwide organization of American high school -l- 619 and college students dedicated to the concepts of international stability, a clean environment, and social progress through science and technology. FASST will soon receive an IRS non-profit tax exemption as a literary, educational, and scientific organization. The objectives of FASST are: 1). To bring about a better student understanding of the different uses of science and technology; 2). To enhance communications and understanding between students and industry, and between students and government; 3). To enable youth to help plan and participate in - technological programs that affect their lives. The purposes of FASST are to: -Develop student awareness and understanding of the importance of technology to our society –Give an opportunity for responsible young people to contribute to important public decisions -Provide a channel for students to advise the government of their views on science and technology programs -Provide industry with student views on science and technology programs -Support growth of the nation's economic development and international trade through U.S. technological leadership -Endorse technological progress, not technological stagnation, to help solve America's social problems –2- 620 -Promote solutions to national environmental problems through the advancement of technology -Provide an organization that both government and industry can turn to for balanced technology assessment. Although FASST is only two and one-half years old, the following persons, who see its potential, have agreed to serve on its National Advisory Board: Congressman Olin E. Teague Chairman, Science and Astronautics Committee William M. Magruder Special Consultant to the President William P. Thayer Chairman of the Board, The LTV Corporation FASST's action programs will include: -Industry/Student Interchange program which will provide a means for companies periodically to invite FASST members to visit their plants and engage in round table discussions of the company's technology activities -Technology: Friend or Foe?, an audio-slide show with handout material designed to develop a better understanding of science and technology -Youth Councils to advise government and industry on ways to best relate the importance of specific technology programs to young people -Establishment of FASST chapters and federated organizations on the nation's campuses 621 -Speakers Bureau, a comprehensive listing of experts from industry and government who will serve as volunteer speakers on specific technology subjects -Independent studies of federal technology programs to provide student views to the government -Student opinion surveys on college campuses to pinpoint areas of misunderstanding about technology -Student internships in key government offices during summer months to give students a working knowledge of government, and to give government inexpensive technical assistance -Newsletters and other publications to advise students of FASST activities, government plans, and industry programs. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT I would like to go into more detail at this time about three particular FASST programs. The first of these is Technology Assessment. A major cause of discouragement in contemporary society has been the lack of adequate opportunity for serious and responsible young people to make meaningful contributions in important public decisions. Advanced university students have invested considerable time and energy in the acquisition of skills and knowledge. Too often they are obliged to apply their talents to irrelevant problems. There is no lack of able young people who have much * offer and, more importantly, the desire to offer much to government and industry policy- A \, …” makers. | - t -h- 93-466 O - 73 - 40 622 Independent technology assessments can be conducted by students in such fields as: -Transportation -Communications -Natural disasters -Education -Energy -Health care -Environmental technology These studies may be incorporated into the university curricula or into independent study programs for college credit. FASST will assist those conducting the studies by providing information from industry and government, and by publishing and distributing completed studies. The present testimony is one form of FASST's Technology Assessment. However, it was prepared almost exclusively by the three of us. But, we feel, FASST's input should be more widely based. Therefore, FASST will start preparing next year's testimony in a few months by soliciting young people's views and opinions about the Space Program on a nationwide scale. THE YOUTH COUNCIL The second major FASST program I wish to discuss is The Youth Council. The following is a paper prepared by Tom Brownell and myself. We consider it a vital and important concept and urge your attention to it. THE YOUTH COUNCIL March, 1973 Prepared by: DAVID FRADIN Chairman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CONTENTS FASST . . . 1 The Problem. ...l Definitions. . .5 Other Youth Councils. . . 7 Funding...8 Possible Opposition... 8 An Example...10 The Charter The Structure Activities Youth Councils. . . 12 How to Establish a Youth Council...ll. Funding. ... lº . Approximate Annual Funding... 16 THOMAS BROWNELL Executive Director -6- THE YOUTH COUNCIL March, 1973 Prepared by: DAVID FRADIN - THOMAS BROWNELL Chairman . - Executive Director . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CONTENTS FASST . . . . The Problem. . . l Definitions. . .5 Other Youth Councils. . . T Funding. . .8 Possible Opposition... 8 An Example...l.0 The Charter The Structure Activities Youth Councils...12 How to Establish a Youth Council...ll. Funding...lº : - Approximate Annual Funding... 16 -6- 625 THE YOUTH COUNCIL Over the next 30-l;0 years the United States population will increase to about 300 million people. Because of this several nationwide technolo- gical programs must be conducted in order to avoid major crises. Programs to meet our future energy and transportation needs are just two examples. These problems are among the reasons we have organized the Federation of Americans Supporting Science and Technology (FASST). FASST is a nationwide organization of American students dedicated to the concepts of international stability, a clean environment, and social progress through science and technology. The objectives of FASST are: l). To bring about a better student understanding of the uses of science and technology. 2). To enhance communications and understanding between students and industry, and between students and government. 3). To enable young people to help plan and participate in technological programs that affect their lives. It is the third objective of FASST, the Youth Council, that this paper is devoted to. It will discuss the Youth Council in terms of the problem, the solution, and the structure of the solution, such that Youth Councils can 'be started with broad support in the near future. THE PROBIEM "A major cause of discouragement in contemporary society has been the lack -7- 626, C. f. adequate opportunity for serious and responsible young people to make cºngrul contributions in important public decisions. I am concerned that advanced university students particularly have expressed frustration over the limited opportunities tor such involvement. It frequently happens that after they have invested time and energy in the acquisition of skills and knowledge, and pursued their advanced academic work they are obliged to apply their talents in esoteric research and analyses which go largely unnoticed and unused beyond the classroon. This situation gives substance to the complaint that much of formal. education is not relevant to the pressing problems of our times. There is no lack of sºle young people with good ideas to call wºn. In ºny view, it is wasteful to allow many man-years of the best intellectual efforts of trained graduate students - tommorrow's leaders - to be focused on exercises which lack relevance to today's concerns. We must find the means to better utilize this valuable and searce resource." So states senator Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, after a group of students from MIT presented his committee a major study of national land use. ** It has become increasingly clear that: 1). Young people find it difficult to obtain information and to get ques- tions answered about major technological programs. the reason is many young people do not know who to ask. Occasionally questions directed to government and industry never get answered. On the other hand, films and literature developed by government agencies and industry to -8- 627 2). 3). h). 8.08Wer auestions sit on storage room shelves and collect dust with no effective way to get them into the hands of young people. Young people find it very difficult to participate in the planning and executing of major technological programs. According to The Science Committee, published by the National Academy of Sciences, the average age of the 15,000 members of 1500 Federal advisory committees is 50 years old. Clearly there is the need for more young people to get involved - if for no other reason than to gain experience in the advisory-committee process. Young people want to be brought into the decision-making processes to help plan and execute programs which affect their lives. In this decade, our rapidly changing society has produced a generation of young people who are better educated and informed than their parents were. Young people wish to shorten the prolonged period between childhood and adult responsibility, thus opening up channels for parti- cipation in society earlier. This theme of youth involvement COrdeS from the White House Conference on Youth, 1971. This concern by young people and desire to become involved could be considered useful cri- teria on which to base the acceptability by youth of any major technological program. Young people will, in the future, reap the benefits and confront the problems of major technological programs. An example of this is the energy problem. Clearly, the nation is about to embark on major new initiatives to solve today's and tomorrow's energy problems. Today's young people may benefit from these new initiatives or they may not. • - In any case, . - today's young people will ixiherit, 628 \, ^. \ \ the woºlean of tomorrow created by today's policy makers. 5). Young people will reject major technological programs they are not involved in. A classic example of this is the American ſ Supersonic Transport Program. Not once were young people asked if, in 1985, they wanted to fly faster from one point on earth to another. The l,500 young participants at the -* White House Conference for Youth, 1971, pointed out that lack - of involvement right from the start will be the cause of rejection of major technological programs. Clearly, a way must be found to involve young people in major technological programs 6). Young people are better educated, better informed , and better equipped to meet today's problems than their parents were. This is a recurring observation of commencement speakers commonly full of praising words for today's youth. Then why must young people wait until they are middle-aged before they are considered competent to advise? –7). Young people will help provide the creative spark that will help to change, to improve, and to renew aging institutions, organiza- tions and governments. This is one of the themes of Self-Renewal by John Gardner, 1963. 8). Young people, in 1973, constitute over 25 million or 20 percent of the voting public with little representation in the planning and executing of major technological programs. Clearly, young people have become a voting constituency to be reckoned with. Therefore, considering these problems (and others) it is clear that only two alternatives exist. First, to ignore the problems and hope they go quietly away. -10- 629 Second, to try to do something to solve the problems. Obviously, the second alternative is the responsible one. The best all-encompassing solution, the subject of this paper, is the Youth Council. DEFINITIONS In the context of this paper, the Youth Council is ten young people (up to 28 years old) representing ten regions of the United States, who meet four times a year for the purpose of: l). 2). 3). l;). Providing young people a communications and educational link with major technological programs. Providing government and industry with young people's opinions and advice about major technological programs. Enabling young people to help plan and participate in major tech- nological programs. Enabling young people to get involved in parts of major technological programs right from the start. Examples of major technological programs are: The Space Program The Energy Problem National security Communications Education Transportation Health Care Environmental Protection —ll- 630 It is the nature of major technological programs to have these characteristics -Each of the programs meets the criteria of urgent national needs and/or new economic opportunities; —Each of the programs has a Federal government agency concerned with it; and —Each of the programs has industry and trade associations concerned with it. These characteristics are important for two reasons. First, urgent national needs and/or new economic opportunities will involve the interest and enthusiasm of young people. Second, these characteristics help define a Federal government agency, industry, and trade associations as potential "supporting agencies" of a Youth Council. While - it is true that the technology from some of the major technological programs overlap; it is not true that, an individual young person would be interested in all programs at once. Therefore, instead of one large Youth Council it would be better in terms of young people's interest, activity, and support to form separate yet related Youth Councils. That is : -Space Youth Council -Energy Youth Council -National Security Youth Council -Communications Youth Council -Education Youth Council -Transportation Youth Council -12- 631 -Health Care Youth Council -Environmental Youth Council. As of February, 1973, there already exist similar Youth Councils on Transportation, and the Environment. OTHER YOUTH COUNCILS The Environmental Protection Agency has its Youth Advisory Board (YAB). YAB is a nationwide organization of young people for the purpose of youth activism for a clean environment. YAB is broken into ten regions each with its own elected environmental representative. The ten YAB members meet several times a year including at least one interface with the Administrator of EPA. Many of the regions publish newsletters, hold meetings of environmentalists each month, support programs, and projects. This type of activity costs EPA approximately $500,000 per year. The YAB has a full-time director in Washington with a staff of several one-year student interns. Each year ºne YAB sponsors large numbers of numer interns in Washington. When forming the EPA Youth Advisory Board, Administrator William Ruckelshaus said, "It has become clear that young people have much to offer and, more importantly, the desire to offer much to aid the EPA in the development of its mission and achievement of its goals. It is clear that young people are a reservoir of enthusiasm, public spiritness and intelligence - a force for public good and for the environment. As such, they can and should have input into our decision-making processes." In 1971, the National Transportation Safety Board of the Department of l Mr. William Ruckelshaus, Establishment of the EPA Youth Advisory Board, September 16, 1971 -13- 632 Transportation recommended that DOT solicit youth views toward highway safety. This is because the majority of highway deaths are people less than 25. Accordingly, the Transportation Secretary started YOUTHS -- Youth Order United Towards Highway Safety. YOUTHS, very similar to YAB in concept, is funded for 1973 with $25,000 of government money. This does not include the salaries and support expense of the full-time staff in Washington. In the case of the YAB and YOUTHS all support comes from the Federal government. FUNDING In the case of other Youth Councils, the financial, support should best come from goverrimºnt, industry, foundations, individuals, and Youth Council mem- bers themselves. In this manner, the Youth Council cannot be accused of being the captive of a special-interest group. POSSIBLE OPPOSITION Initially there may be some opposition to the Youth Council concept. The reasons for this are understandable. First, there may be the feeling of no need. That is, because young people have little experience, their advice anº. opinions are not valuable. Second, the Youth Council :cas ºpt may be interpreted as an advocate or lobby for one of the supporting agencies, thus opening them up to critism. Third, the potential supporting agencies may feel they are required by law or policy to maintain a passive role. That is, they cannot, promote their agencys' goals and objectives because that may cause critical scru- tiny or public critism. —lk- 633 While these are reasonable objections, they are, on the whole, super- seded by other factors. First, the lack of experience. Why must a young person be an expert before he can give his opinions and advice? In New England during the 1750's, young teenagers were ship captains. Alexander"the Great" was 28 *rhen he conquered the Roman Empire. Hundreds of young people have been sent to foreign countries in the Peace Corps to provide advice and guidance. Every young person has been told at graduation time that he is better informed and better educated than his father was. Today, other than the Peace Corps or Vista, there are few opportunities for young people to get involved. Second, the concern for advocacy. Careful examination of the purposes of the Youth Council shows that it is not an advocate in the true sense of the word. An advocate is one who pleads another's case. However, the purpose of EPA's Youth Advisory Board is to develop youth advocacy for the environment. The purpose of YOUTHS is to develop youth advocacy for safe highways. Is there anything wrong with advocacy for solutions to exploration, energy, national security, communication, education, transportation, health care, environmental problems? No, not if it is the national will to solve these problems and it is the goal of government and industry to solve these problems. The question of advocacy occurs only when one solution is advocated above another. The objec- tives and guidelines set for each Youth Council will clearly prohibit this. Third, the concern for promotion. While it, is true that governmerit agencies are required by law to remain passive - that is, they cannot promote their agency's goals and objectives - it is also true that a Youth council will not change that. Again, the purposes of a Youth Council are to help develop under- -15- 634 : Handing, participation, advice, and involvement from youth in that agency's :-oals and objectives. AT: EXAMPLE In summary, as a means of clarification, a discussion follows in terms of the charter, the structure, and the activities of a Space Youth Council. Other Youth Councils may be similar. The Space Youth Council (SYC) is ten young people (up to 28 years old) representing ten regions of the country who meet four times a year for the pur- pose of: . 1). Providing young people with a communications and educational lini: with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, with tie Department of Defense, and with the Aerospace Industry. 2). Providing NASA and the Aerospace Industry with young people's opinions and advice about the Space Program. 3). Enabling young people to help plan and participate in the Space Program. h). Enabling young people to get involved in the Space Shuttle Program - right from the start. Financial support for the Space Youth council will come from NASA, DOD, Aerospace Industry companies, trade associati ons, foundations , individuals, and members of the SYC. * The SYC would be made up of 10 young people geographically located across the country. These ten young people (Regional Directors) would initially be -16- 635 selected from the FASST membership. selection would be made on the basis dº appropriate references, curriculum resumes, interest, and dedication towards the goals and purposes of the Space Youth Council. At a later date Regional Directors will be elected. The 10 SYC members would be directed by a full-time Executive Director (a young person) from FASST Headquarters. Each Regional Director will select ten District, Directors who wrill in turn select ten Local Directors. This will create a Youth Council membership of 1,000. The reason for this structure is to achieve the purposes of the SYC by developing an organization that extends to the grass roots level. Eventually each of the directors will be elected by the membership. Meetings of the National Space Youth Council would take place four times a year in different locations: Houston, Cape Kennedy, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, etc. At each of these locations there will be an interface with NASA and/or parts of the Aerospace Industry. These meetings will provide a systematic link with young were at the grass-roots level with NASA and the Aerospace Industry. Through these meetings young people's opinions and advice will be provided to NASA and the Aerospace Industry in the form of resolutions and recommendations. This will enable young people to help plan and participate in the Space Program and to get involved in the Space Shuttle program. Each region will hold meetings at least four times a year and likewise for the districts. These meetings will help achieve the purpose of the SYC at the -l'ſ- l 636 local level. other potential activities carried out under the Space Youth Council Char- ter would include: 1). Advising NASA and the Aerospace Industry how to best relate their particular programs to young people. 2). Conducting of youth opinion surveys towards the Space Program. 3). writing and distributing materials to young people concerning the Space Program. li). Briering legislators on the Space Program, for example, from a youth point of view. - 5). Presenting forums and discussions on campuses to bring the pro vs. con aspects of the Space Program to the students' attention. 6). Briefing University and High School news rease on the Space Program. 7). Giving interviews to news media. - - 8). Arranging speeches before youth groups by NASA, Aerospace Industry - and SYC members. - 9). Developing an actual membership (constituency) in favor of the Space Program. It must be pointed out here that these are just suggested activities. During the actual development of a SYC, initial discussions will center about a clear charter and specific guidelines for all SYC activities. YOUTH COUNCILS While the preceeding discussion applies directly to the Space Program, -18- 637 similar concepts apply to all other major technological programs. Accordingly, the following recommendations” are made: l). 2). 3). h). 5). 6). That the one criterion for the formation of each Youth Council be a needed and worthy objective, carefully related to the activities of the supporting agencies involved. That each supporting agency internally review the status of its Youth Council at least once each year, ask itself why the Youth Council should not be terminated, and act promptly and decisively if it does not find convincing answers. That FASST, with the assistance of the supporting agencies, clearly define the functions of the Youth Councils, prepare guidelines for the conduct of Youth Council activities, and see that every member is acquainted with them. That the performance and justification for continuance of each Youth Council be evaluated regularly and frequently by the spon- soring agency and by the Youth Council. That sponsoring agencies provide timely and adequate supporting services so that each Youth Council can make the most effective - use of its members' time and energies. - That each sponsoring agency publish interim reports, issue news releases, and encourage oral reports on those aspects of a Youth Council's work that can properly be made public without 2 The Science Committee, National Academy of Sciences, 1972 93-466 O - 73 - 41 -19- 638 7). 8). 9). jeopardizing the effectiveness and integrity of the Youth Council. Thai; sponsoring agencies make determined efforts to keep Youth Council rembers informed about the results of their work, such as decisions taken or difficulties encountered, policy changes, awards rade, and new programs or institutions created. Such feedback should continue during the lifetime of the committee and for a reaconable period after its discharge. - That sponsoring agencies pay attention to recognition of Youth Council members. That educational opportunities connected with Youth Council service be enhanced wherever feasible by such devices as special. briefings, discussion of scientifically relevant topics during committee hearings, circulation of documents, and invitations to special conferences. Up to this point the Youth Council has been discussed in terms of defining the Youth Council, outlining the problems that dictate the Youth Council as a solution, outlining other existing Youth Councils, funding cf Youth Councils, opposing views to Youth Councils, clarifying example of a Youth Council, and recommending guidelines and policies for Youth Councils. Only two questions remain. How does one proceed with establishing a Youth Council and how much does it cost? HOW TO ESTABLISH A YOUTH COUNCIL The following suggested guidelines are provided to begin a Youth Council. -2O- 639 First, all supporting agencies must be identified and a letter of intent received from each to proceed with Youth Council development. This letter is ‘t. O identify initially the extent, of interest and support to be expect:3 and Yºrith whom all communications should take place. This is very important because it is at this juncture that the Youth Council may fail. It is here that a great deal of misunderstanding may take place because of a break down in º communications. Second, an initial grant must be made to FASST by one or more of the supporting agencies in oxº~ to proceed with organizational development. The organizational development prase of the Youth Council will probably last approxi- mately Six months and cost $5,000 to $10,000. This organizational phase fill clearly &c.fijie. *he needs of young, people and the supporting agencies that, must be met; y the Youth Coºncil. Fron: a needs—and problem definition, clear and comprehensive objectives will he developed for the Youth Council. Also, organizational objectives like size of membership by a particular time will be set. Youth Council guidelines for all. activities will be set up. Regional Directors will be selected and a member- ship drive started. The first national meeting will take place at the end of the organizational phase with the Regional Directors and representatives of the supporting agencies in attendance. FUNDING The actual funding for any Youth Council depends entirely upon the 3xtent, –2l- 640 of the activities and effectiveness desired by the supporting agencies. However, it is estimated that optimum funding of approximately $35,000 is necessary for the first year, after the organizational phase. APPROXIMATE ANNUAL FUNDING Executive Director : $10,000 Burden (travel, phone, sup- plies, office, electricity, printing, etc.) $10,000 Secretarial $ 5,000 Travel for 10 Regional Directors $10,000 TOTAL $35,000 -22– 641 Already FASGT has accumulated an impressive list of supporters for space and Energy Youth Councils. Some of them are: Congressman Olin E. Teague Chairman, Science and Astronautics Committee William M. Magruder Special Consultant to the President Dr. George M. Low Deputy Administrator, NASA John P. Donnelly Assistant Administrator for Public Affairs Michael Collins Director, National Air and Space Museum Fredrick C. Durant, III Director, Astronautics Smithsonian Institution William P. Thayer Chairman of the Board, ITV Corporation Carlyle Jones Vice-President, Aerospace Industries Association The only obstacle to the initiation of the Youth Councils is the obvious -- lack of financial support. Therefore, FASST would like to make the following recommendation: That interested members of Congress offer FASST their assistance, support, and advice so Youth Councils can be established in the near future. SURVEY RESEARCH The third and last major FASST Program that I wish to discuss is survey research. The reason for it is simple. In order for FASST to achieve a better student understanding of technology, we must first find out what students think and know about technology. Therefore, I conducted a study of student -23- 642 attitudes, perceptions, and knowledge about technology, the economy, and the Space Program at the University of Michigan last August. The first volume of the report, entitled Technology, the Economy, and the Space Program, was published and distributed in January, 1973. Because complete copies of the report have already been sent to the members of the Science and Astronautics Committee, and additional copies are available from FASST for a $2 contribution, I will discuss only those aspects of the survey that pertain directly to the subject of this testimony -- the Space Pro- gram. STUDENT ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE SPACE PROGRAM PRIORITIES AND TECHNOLOGICAL GROWTH Pick up a newspaper and read the letters-to-editor column. On occasion there is a letter deriding the evils of space spending. It says that the §oney should be used to solve earthly problems. Do students feel: -The Money Spent on Going to the Moon Could be Better Spent Elsewhere? Some critics also say "Why not spend money directly on earthly problems rather than wait for benefits from large efforts like the space program?" To which the space advocates reply "It just doesn't work that way." In any case, the basis for this argument is: -Has the Space Program Helped America's Technological Growth? -2'- 643 1. COULD MONEY SPENT ON GOING TO THE MOON BE BETTER SPENT ELSEWHERE2 This is one of the mc st-repeated questions asked today about the Space program. - PAEET The money spent in going to the Moon could have been better spent elsewhere. 60 50, - £40 3 TL_ #30 Mode = 1 Median = 2 20 Mean =2.56 10 Number of Responses =896 O °ver half of the students believe that the $25 billion cost to explore the moon could have been better spent elsewhere. –25– 644 2. EAS THE SPACE PROGRAM HELP AMERICA's TECHNOLOGICAL GROWTHT "Spearheaded by our space program, America's technology moved rapidly forward during the past decade." states General Electric's Aerospace Group Vice President, Mr. Mark Morton. Do students agree? | PAEET The space program has helped America's tech- nological growth. 60– — 50 £40 § * 30 Mode = 1 20 Median = 2 10 Mean = 2.09 Number of O 5 Responses = 916 Agree Disagree Clearly a large majority of students agree with Mr. Morton and feel that the space program has helped America's technological growth. –26- 645 3. CONCLUSIONS: PRIORITIES AND TECHNOLOGICAL GROWTH Consider this: technological growth is good: good for solving hunger, pollution, clothing, transportation, unemployment and other prob- lems. The space program provides substantial technological growth. Therefore, the space program is good and money should be invested in a space program. However, the survey shows the majority of students feel that the space program has helped America's technological growth and the money spent going to the moon was wasted. Why this apparent dichotomy? Either the students feel that technological growth is no good (i.e. anti-technology) or the students lack understanding of the space program. Students, in another part of the survey, want technology to be used to help solve social problems. If this could loe called technological growth., then students definitely misunderstand the space program. This is perhaps more reason than ever to start a Space Youth Council. THE SPACE PROGRAM If one were to simply list out all of the possible reasons for a space program, he would come up with about nineteen justifications. Therefore, what do students think are the: —Most important aspects of the space program? -Least important aspects of the space program? l. WHAT ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE SPACE PROGRAM? The students were asked: "The space program is important to the United -27- 646 States because of the reasons listed below. Rate their importance to you, personally, using a scale from 1-5. mEAEET Most important aspects of the space program Scale Very Important Not important Mean 1 2 3 4 5 1.89 Increases knowledge of Earth's environment 2.09 Advances scientific knowledge, Expands the frontiers of knowledge Fosters international cooperation Produces medical, manufacturing and social benefits 2 1 O : 2.50 6. Creates employment opportunities 2.56 7. Challenges man's physical and mental capabilities 2.58 8. Forces development of new technology 2.74 9. Improves the quality of life on Earth - 2.74 10. Demonstrates man's ability to solve problems and achieve goals 2.88 11. Fulfills man's basic need to explore Number of Responses = 948 Students feel that the environment, knowledge, international cooperation, medical, manufacturing, social benefits and jobs are the most important aspects of the space program. ~28- 647 2. WHAT ARE THE LEAST IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE SPACE PROGRAM? Least important aspects of the space program Scale Very Important Not Important 1 2 3 4 5 Mean 4.39 1. Keeps us ahead of the Russians 3.91 2. Increases international prestige 3.90 3. Assures U.S. aerospace leadership 3.79 4. Provides spiritual uplift 3.75 5. Contributes to national security 3.45 6. Maintains our technological and scientific leadership 3.34 7. Inspires sense of national pride 3.10 8. Contributes importantly to the nation's economic strength Number of Responses = 948 Students feel that the least important aspects of the space program are: keeping us ahead of the Russians, prestige, and aerospace leadership.. For a highly educated and sophisticated audience, like the students who responded to this survey, the concept of the space program providing "spiritual uplift" seems ludicrous. That is perhaps why it is so far down the list. National security is on the least important list because of the negative feelings that students have towards the Department of Defense. –29- 648 (Note: It is an assumption that students have negative feelings towards DOD.) 3. CONCLUSIONS: THE SPACE PROGRAM The results are somewhat surprising. All of the most important aspects revolve arcund environment, knowledge, international cooperation, benefits and jobs. The least important aspects revolve around the theme of getting there first. In other words, the old clichés about intangible benefits that started the space program are no longer important. The students are instead looking for tangible results from space exploration. Because students feel tangible berätºfits are most important, Tom Brownell, in his testimony, has compiled one of the most comprehensive listings of the tangible benefits mankind has derived from the Space Program. VALIDITY OF RESULTS Without going into a great amount of detail concerning the validity of the sample (which is covered in the complete report), there were 9118 responses with a very slight bias towards engineering students. This is a large enough sample to give an error of no more than plus or minus lºft. The typical respondent is a male and an undergraduate student in liberal arts. He is 22 years old with a family income of over $18,000/year. His political philosophy is generally liberal to middle- of-the-road. Therefore, the con- clusions are representative of the University of Michigan student population as a whole. They should also be representative of liberal, intelligent, and middle-to upper-class students nationwide. -30- 649 SPACE AND THE LIMITS TO GROWTH Congress decides each year for or against the Space Program and the Space Shuttle. The result of these decisions has a significant impact upon the future of young people worldwide. Unfortunately, there are some like Michigan's Senator Philip Hart who says: I have become increasingly concerned about our tendency to vote billions for space exploration and defense and at a time when hungry children lack good schools . . . I am not willing to push costly proposals for be break- throughs in outer space, which will require years to develop, while programs directed at education, health, pollution and all the things making for a better quality of life go under-funded. I propose to show that the Space Program including the Space Shuttle can be justified as a cost-effective way of solving the very problems posed ty Senator Hart, and to solve the ecological macro-problem as well. THE MACRO-PROBLEM The macro-problem, according to the University of Michigan's Project PROPE (Growth-policy, Population, Environment and Beyond), is caused by four factors: population growth, population distribution, resource consumption, and technological development. First, a discussion of these four factors. Population growth is just that.--the increase in population by births exceeding deaths. Population distribution has to do with where the population lives. For example, New York City has a greater population density than does the state of Utah. Resource consumption deals with the use of natural resources by the population. Technological development is seen as the development of new technology to help solve aspects of the macro-problem. -31- 650 The macro-problem is seen as a combination of those four factors. It, is seen as a constantly increasing population unabated by anybody or anything. It is seen as growing inequities in population distribution causing urban ghettos and related problems. It is seen as exponential growth in natural resource consumption to the point, despite technology, that the world runs out and billions of people die. It is seen as prob- lems caused by technology growing faster than technology's ability to - • cope with them. There are two techniques that can be used to determine if the Space Program and the Space Shuttle are justified, in terms of solutions to those problems: analytical models and alternative futures. ANALYTICAL WORLD MODEL First, a discussion of analytical models. An analytical model is, in general, an ordered set of assumptions about a complex system. Perhaps the first such worldwide model is the one used in the Limits to Growth study, sponsored by the Club of Rome. - The authors of the study define the Earth (and the macro-problem) as a world system including man, his social systems, his technology, and the natural environment. They say these interact to produce growth, change, and stress and that only recently man has become aware of problems that cannot be solved by migration, expansion, economic growth and technology. Their mathematical dynamic model uses six critical factors: population, -32- 651 capital investment, geographical space, natural resources, pollution, and food production. Only one of these needs explanation: geographical space, which is seen as land available for farming or urbanization. The authors use five basic elements in their study: population, food production, industrialization, pollution, and consumption of nonrenewable natural resources which, they say, are increasing exponentially. If the present growth trends in world population, industrialization, pollution, food production, and resource depletion continue unchanged, the limits to growth on this planet will be reached sometime within the next one hundred years. The most probable result will be a rather sudden and un- controlable decline in both population and industrial capacity. They reach this same conclusion, they say, even if the world model is applied with unlimited resources, pollution controls, increased agri- cultural productivity, and perfect birth control--in other words, the application of technology to the fullest extent to circumvent the limits to growth. The result, they say, is growth stopped by three crises: 1). Overuse of land leads to erosion, and food production drops. 2). Resources are severly depleted by a prosperous world popu- lation. 3). Pollution rises as industrial output and population increases, then pollution drops with food per capita because of (1) and resource depletion (2), then pollution rises again. (Note: no apparent reason is given for this second rise in pollution.) INCORRECT ASSUMPTIONS However, there are two basic invalid assumptions made by the Limits to Growth study: -33- 652 1). That the only way to produce food is by growing it on land and therefore because of limited land there is a maximum of food production. 2). That the Earth is a closed system with no possible input of natural resources from the rest of the Universe. First, the members of the Limits to Growth study group ignore farming the sea. In addition, they ignore synthetic food produced by chemical means thus eliminating the need for land. Second, they ignore future sources of natural resources. As I pointed out in last year's testimony: "Consider: One hundred tons of average igneous rock such as granite contains 8 tons of aluminum, 5 tons of iron, l,200 pounds of titanium, 180 pounds of manganese, 70 pounds of chromium, l;0 pounds of nickel, 30 pounds of vandium, 20 pounds of copper, 10 pounds of tungsten, and l, pounds of lead. To extract these elements would reguire not only advanced chemical techniques, but very considerable amounts of energy. The rock would first have to be crushed then treated by heat, electrolysis, and other means. However, a ton of granite contains enough uranium and thorium to provide energy equivalent to fifty tons of coal. All the energy we need for the processing is there in the rock itself. "Arthur Clarke pointed this out some ten years ago. Think about it. Ten years ago it was impossible to put a man on the Moon. Today, eight (now it is twelve) men have already walked on it. Tommorrow, perhaps an advanced version of the Space Shuttle will be bringing back from space high-grade nickel-iron asteroids. Think about it. Man can do just about anything he may want to do. If man becomes extinct as the dinosaurs, it won't be for lack of resources, but for lack of brains." Not only do they ignore the natural resources under their own feet but also the resources of space: new worlds, Solar power, weightlessness, vacuum, and an unparalleled view of the Earth. At this point, many people would dis- miss the possibility of obtaining resources from other planets in the forseeabl future. In the same way, the Talavera Commission (Spain, 1191) said while considering a proposal from a fellow named Columbus, who wanted some financ- ing for an exploration he had in mind: 653 The committee judged the promises and offers of this mission to be impossible, vain, and worthy of rejection: that it is not proper to favor an affair that rested on such weak foundations and which appeared uncertain and impossible to any educated person, however little learning he might have. The New York Times said, just a few months before the Wright Brothers' first flight that it would be millions of years before man will learn to fly. And in my own lifetime, the Astronomer Royal of Great Britian dis- missed the possibility of going into Space with the immortal phrase: Space flight is utter bilge. That was one year before Sputnik I. Now do not misunderstand me. I do not advocate the plundering and exploitation of other planets for the sake of greed. Nor do I advocate unlimited population growth. I do advo- cate giving mankind an opportunity to avoid the crises predicted hy The z Limits to Growth and to help solve the problems cited by Senator Hart, with a viable Space Program, based on the reusable Shuttle. If the world suffers catastrophe within the next one hundred years, it will not be because of our failure to limit growth, but because some advocates of limited growth have limited imaginations. But there are other things we will need ror a better world and I will sum them up using the sec- ond technique of determining if we should proceed with the Space Program and the Space Shuttle--the scenario. A SCENARIO: 2050 A.D. Mankind has avoided, at least for the near future, the prophesies of doom made back in 1972. The main reason is that exponential growth in technology has offset increased population and energy demands. Although 93-466 O - 73 - 42 -35- 654 most fossil fuels are now gone, there is little concern. Scientists and engineers have captured and are using solar power. Large Solar collectors were erected in space 25 years ago and the energy is now beamed to large stations at sea. From there the Sun's energy is used to break sea water into hydrogen and oxygen. The hydrogen is then liquified and shipped around the world to be used in various power-producing plants. There is almost no pollution from this all-hydrogen society because the only by-product of hydrogen combustion is water vapor. Now in 2050 A.D. enough Solar stations and power plants have been con- structed to provide everybody with virtually unlimited and clean energy. Hundreds of sewage and re-cycling plants have been constructed and now all rivers, lakes and streams flow clean and pure again. Smog is fio more and thermal pollution is no longer a problem because power production is in space. The world's economic growth has flourished and the cost of pollution abatement has decreased. Also, the world's population stabilized in 2015 A.D. and since then the average personal income worldwide increased to $15,000/year. The key to this scenario is a viable Space Program with the Space Shuttle. The Space Program will help technological growth to develop the technology required for an all-hydrogen society. Also, the Space Program will help Earth resources, communications, energy production without waste heat, and all of the other benefits cited by Tom Brownell in his testimony. In addition, the Space Shuttle will reduce the cost of space transportation, thus making power stations in space economical. -36- 655 CONCLUSION We conclude that the Space Program and the Space Shuttle are justified * because they offer us more and better alternatives for the future. Better alternatives than those who would end our technological growth and thereby forfeit all hope of ever solving the problems mentioned by Senator Hart. And this I have done without even mentioning the enormous impact aerospace technology has on correcting the United States' imbalance in world trade. Nor have I mentioned the enormous spinoff benefits of the Space Program. But there is one major question that still remains: Will the Space Shuttle reduce the cost of putting a payload into Space? My associate, Dr. T. A. Heppenheimer, has made a number of independent economic studies of this question. His conclusion: the Space Shuttle will save money. -37- 656 STATEMENT of DR. T. A. HEPPENHEIMER, WICE-CHAIRMAN/TECHNICAL, FASST CRITICISM OF THE SHUTTLE Late 1ast December, the American Association for the Advance- ment of Science held its Annual Meeting here in Washington. On the final day, there was a session in astrophysics. It was a grand scientific confrontation. Here was Dr. Halton Arp of the Hale Observatories, boldly proposing novel concepts in cosmology. And here, too, was the cautious Dr. John Bahcall, of the Institute for Advanced . Study, challenging Arp's claims and calling for more rigorous standards of proof, Their debate proceeded with sharp argument and pointed wit, but it was clear that they had much to agree on, and that their controversy would be fruitful for new work in astrophysics. . At this same AAAS Annual Meeting, there was a two-day symposium on Space Shuttle payloads. The chairman, George Morgenthaler, stated that he had invited leading Shuttle critics to attend, either to give papers or to participate in a panel discussion, Certainly, there was the opportunity for a great debate, for the leading Shuttle advocates were all there.--Donlan, Heiss, Runge, and many others. Yet, no such debate took place. For no Shuttle critics appeared. Now, we have heard the Shuttle presented as a matter for controversy. An AAAS Annual Meeting provides a forum par eaccellence for such controversy. This forum was used in this fashion by the astrophysicists. But Shuttle's critics disdained to appear where their statements could be challenged and tested. This, however, is no new thing. Since 1970, in addition to -1- 657 this AAAS Shuttle symposium, the AIAA (American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics) has hosted some seven major meetings dealing with Shuttle--its design, technology, or applications. I personally have attended six of them, missing only the March 1971 meeting in Phoenix. At all of these, I have searched--searched in vain--for papers, presentations, or even attendance by Shuttle's critics, -- They have not come, They have repeatedly, on every occasion, disdained opportuni- . ties to appear before scientific or technical bodies--either to present their own views, or to learn from the views of others. - Nowhere is this better illustrated than by some events of last spring, In March, I attended the AIAA's Man's Role in Space Conference in Florida. Upon my return to Michigan, I found a telephone call awaiting me. It was from Mr, Wayne Satz, a producer of the PBS program "The Advocates". For this show was to shortly feature a debate over the Space Shuttle, and Satz wanted to learn something about it. I discussed the Shuttle with him in several long-distance calls, one of which I made from a movie lobby while waiting for the show to start. I emphasized that Shuttle's critics seek the public or political spotlight but shun the technical meeting. Then, on April 11, "The Advocates" was aired. And on the panel were George Rathjens and Von Eschleman, speaking in opposition. Rathjens attacked claims that Shuttle would lower payload costs. He did so quite vigorously. This prompted the following exchange between Rathjens and a moderator, William Rusher: RUSHER: Did you attend the meeting of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics in Florida on March 27th on "Man's -2- 658 Role in Space"? RATHJENS: No, I did not. ." RUSHER: Are you familiar with the report presented there by Fragola and Diamond? RATHJENS: No, I'm not. usher then went on to discuss that report--which showed shuttle-derived payload savings of 60% for the Large Space Telescope. And I may add that this paper was no obscure reference, but rather was the lead paper in the conference. It is one of the most important Shuttle papers to appear in the past year, and its conclu- sions were used by Charles Donlan in his own Shuttle overview for the AAAS. I am attaching it as the first paper in the Appendix. A similar pitfall befell Congresswoman Bella Abzug, who appeared here to testify last year. She, too, claimed that Shuttle would not cut payload costs. She was challenged on that point by Congressman Wydler, and replied: I am at a disadvantage, I do not have a 10t of technical knowledge of this. . . . Hopefully, I will learn more about it as time passes so that I will be able to argue better against it. Another leading Shuttle critic is Dr. Ralph Lapp. Last May he published the remarkable conclusion that Shuttle would not decrease, but increase, payload launch costs. Let's see how he arrived at that conclusion. He began with NASA's own launch costs estimates, of $1000 per pound for current systems and $160 per pound with Shuttle. Now, NASA defines "payload" quite straightforwardly as "everything carried to orbit". Lapp, however, introduced a different definition: "payload" is only the scientific instruments carried, typically 5000 pounds per Shuttle launch and only one-twelfth of all weight carried to orbit. Dividing Shuttle's launch costs--$10.5 million per 1aunch--by Lapp's -3- 659 5000 pounds of "payload" gave him his figure, $2250 per pound. There was then the following: —liaia raise"—late-tre+2+. current $1000 ºr me Payload launch costs: - -ms-r- —ºr----------—FT ~f~~~. — w r—--~~~~ Shuttle $160 y $2250 i *-i-º-ºry- Comparing his own $2250 with NASA's $1000, Lapp chortled and said, "Down with Shuttle !" But he left out a Lapp analysis of current systems. I then tried to remedvy that lack. Lapp's own claim was that in 1971 NASA launched 12,400 pounds of "payload" (scientific instruments). I then checked the line item in NASA's budget for "launch vehicle procure- ment"; it was $151,400,000. Dividing these numbers gave a new entry for the above table, as follows: |-º-'ra-lºad-i-Haut-º- Current $1000 $12,210 Payload launch costs: --- --- Shuttle $160 $2250 -º-º-y rº - -y- Dr. Lapp stated that his work represented a great triumph for what he called "adversary science". It certainly is adverse. Whether it is "science" I leave for others to judge. THE CURRENT STATE OF SHUTTLE Now let us consider the current state of Shuttle. My discus- sion which follows is based on what I have learned at technical meetings, as well as on personal observations and discussions with leaders of the Shuttle community. I find Shuttle is well-founded and in good condition, 660 In Jai: 1971, I attended the AIAA Space Systems Meeting in benzer. Here, the concept of the fully-reusan le two-stage Shuttle was prescrited in act a, not only the systems design, but also the sub- systems. ºre then were several months of redefining shuttle's con- figuration, ending a year age with Dr. Fletcher's presentation in the senate. with: the allowing month there were two major AIAA meetings on shuttle. - - - • * - - I must as was disappointed. The shuttle studies presented there for the new configuration did not show the depth of understanding evident the revious July. I was convinced that shuttle would require many more months of wreliminary design before it would be ready for a proper effort in these c, detailed design. and so I was very pleased, after Rockwell won the contract, to learn that a key feature of their proposal was just such an extensive preliminary design effort, prior to the large manpower buildup required for detailed design and prototype construction. Under this plan, we will not see metal cut for Shuttle till 1974--a year from now. Instead, we will see continued study and design efforts, culminating in the Preliminary Design Review in July 1974. In December and January, 1 attended two more shuttle confer- ences, and I saw a greatly enhanced understanding of the configuration. It is this I will now describe. • * - - - First, the shuttle tº an aluminum airplane. I repeat: an aluminum airplane. - This is possible because of its theral-wrotection system, consisting of tiles of RSI--reusable surface insulation--applied to the - outside skin, RSI completely eliminates the hot-structure approach, of -3- 661 integrating thermal protection with the basic vehicle structure. instead, thermal protection is entirely separate from the vehicle - structure, and the two can be designed and studied separately. The - result: a vehicle design far 1ess sensitive to the requirements of - - - thermal protection, and hence better understood, with greater credibil- ity of cost prediction. - - Second, to enhance cost credibility, Shuttle incorporates the - "milestone" concept. - SSME engines, orbiter, external tank, and solid boosters. They are all \ Shuttle involves four major hardware procurement items: liquid closely interrelated, and the last two in particular are very sensitive in design to changes in orbiter weight. So, these four hardware items have not been let all at once as contracts, but have been spread OUIt s The SSME was let in July 1971, but authority to proceed came only last April. The orbiter contract was let last July. The external tank and solid boosters are to receive authority to proceed, respec- tively, in March and July 1973. • - Thus, there is some 9 to 12 months of study and design effort, defining the orbiter weight and other parameters, before the critical and sensitive items of external tank and solid motors receive program authority. - Third, recent design changes have cut Shuttle's weight and cost. Prior to the Preliminary Requirements Review, last November, it. was decided to drop the abort solid rocket syster and to install thrust-vector control on the solid motors. This decision cut 100,000 lbs. and $20 million from Shuttle system costs. -6- 662 hen, last December, Shuttle's designers came up with a new jing, featuring better aerodynamic performance and hence reduced weight. Also, a double-delta planform was selected for enhanced manu- facturability. These decisions cut orbiter weight by 20,000 lbs. , to 150,000 lbs. Consequently, total system weight could be reduced some one million pounds--to 4.1 million pounds at liftoff. Solid motor diameter was reduced from 162 to 144 inches. And cost per flight was also reduced--to $10.1 million per flight. So the Shuttle itself is in fine shape. SHUTTLE PAYLOADS Now consider the matter of payloads. This matter is now receiving extensive attention. At Rockwell, Jim Madewell heads up pavloads work; his office is right across the hall from Buz Hello. At NASA Headquarters, Phil Culbertson heads similar efforts and works closely with Bale Myers and George Low. A most exciting and promising development is the European commitment to Spacelab, the sortie module. Spacelab represents a dramatic demonstration of Shuttle's internationality, flexibility, and wide use. It has the potential to get a lot of people very excited over Shuttle, since Spacelab will carry non-astronauts into space. Notable among these will be astronomers. At the AAAS Shuttle Symposium, br. Harlan Smith of University of Texas made a widely-quoted speech on - Shuttle's applications in enhancing astronomy. I can well imagine that astronomers like Dr. James Van Allen, or Brian O'Leary, or Thomas cold are even now awaiting the first Announcement of Flight Opportunitv for Spacelab. º The matter of low-cost satellite design now appears to be -7- 663 haping up into real design methodologies. A design technique leveloped at Grumman is outlined in the first paper in the Appendix, 'Satellite Long-Life Assurance--The Impact of the Shuttle Era," by - i. H. Diamond and J. R. Fragola. This is the paper I mentioned - arlier, as unknown to Shuttle's critics. Their method relies upon use of Shuttle's ability to retrieve, repair, and refurbish failed spacecraft. To quote from the abstract, The ability to repair, refurbish, or retrieve failed satellites produces many cost benefits, some of which are not very obvious and are just now being explored. In this paper we have attempted to identify the program variables which influence the cost of a space- craft program in the shuttle era and their dependence on satellite mean-time-to-failure (MTTF). Applying their method to Large Space Telescope, they reached the following conclusions: For a 12-year-up time program, the shuttle program shows a 60% cost advantage over the program using the expendable launch vehicle. These savings are 50% from satellite-derived areas and 10% from launch-derived areas. Additional savings not reflected in this study may be realized . . . through commonality in the design of subsystems, The matter of commonality constitutes the theme of a second design methodology, developed at Lockheed. This is reviewed in the second Appendix paper, "Design of Low-Cost, Refurbishable Spacecraft for Use with the shuttle," by M. W. Hunter, R. M. Gray, and W. F. Miller, This paper analyzed an entire NASA/DOD space program, involving 77 projects with 606 satellite placements. It was found that this - entire space program could be built with 21 standardized satellite modules and 24 variants of these modules. To quote from the paper, An entire space program was assembled from a relatively small number of understandable modules. The whole program was thereby greatly simplified. . . . A complete space program was analyzed, and the mutual support of equipment from one individual program to -8- 664 another freely considered. This could not have been done 10, or even 5, years ago [when] individual programs were treated as the absolute private property of the program manager. The Shuttle may, indeed, greatly change our spacecraft outlook. - w . The Lockheed studies showed space program savings of up to $1 billion per year through modularized satellite design. Thus, we see two separate and independent design methodologies. But we should not be content with this. We should seek to see them integrated into a single design methodology, and I hope to see this done. THE RESOURCES OF SPACE Earlier this hour we heard Tom Brownell discussing specific applications of space. For the coming Shuttle era, such specific applications point the way to a broader concept--the resources of space. The first resource is the unparalleled view of Earth from space. we can see two distant points at the same time, and thus link them by communications, We use this in our present communications satellites and in our forthcoming direct-broadcast satellites and educational satellites. And for the farther future, there is Krafft Ehricke's concept of power distribution by space microwave relay, transmitting generated power via microwaves to distant markets, thus uncoupling power generation from power use and permitting power production to be relocated to the most advantageous zones. The view from space also permits close study of individual areas, and is applied in our weather satellites and earth-resource satellites. It is also tapped by our reconnaissance satellites--those "national means" used to enforce the strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. And future infrared satellites, using this resource, may discover -9- 665 reserves of geothermal power or warn of impending volcanic eruptions. - Another major resource of space is its conditions of vacuum and zero gravity. This resource is to be tapped in space manufacturing. ſhe promise of space manufacturing is outlined in the third paper in the Appendix, "Manufacturing in Space," by H. F. Wuenscher. This paper includes a full-page list (in small type) of potential space products. To quote the abstract, - It is not simply that through space processes we can create new materials and structures, but that in doing this we inaugurate a new age of technical civilization. - resource, since we already possess vacuum technology here on Earth. Wuenscher regards weightlessness as by far the most promising We accept without a thought the discovery of vacuum--the fact that we can escape our "Ocean of Air"--and now apply vacuum widely in industrial processes. Now we approach a similar momentous change in mental habits. For, with our capability to go into orbit, we can escape the "Ocean of Gravity". A third great space resource is the light and power of the Sun, now available to us in new ways. Krafft Ehricke has proposed the "lunetta"--a space mirror reflecting sunlight to the night side of Earth, providing a gentle, uniform illumination brighter than moon- light. This could be valuable in allowing night agriculture in the tropics, where the heat of day saps workers' energy, thus diminishing food production. And Peter Glaser has proposed his SSPS--space solar power system--generating electric power with immense solar panels and beaming it to Earth, studies of space solar power generation also may greatly enhance our ability to generate solar power in terrestrial deserts. These, then, are three resources of space, to be tapped by the shuttle, -10- 666 But there is a fourth resource as well: new worlds. We begin to find our new worlds in 1unar orbit, looking back at Earth. Many years before Apollo 8, the astronomer Fred Hoyle predicted When a photograph of the earth taken from space becomes avail- able——when the sheer isolation of the earth in space becomes apparent--then a new idea, as powerful as any in history, will be unleashed. As we move outward, we come to Mars. In the past year, we have 1earned that Mars possesses mile-thick permafrost layers of water and carbon dioxide; that, indeed, Mars once had a "water age", when water flowed in rivers and her atmosphere was as thick as our own. We hear 4t said that man now has the technology to render Earth uninhabitable. But we may apply this technology to planetary engineering, recreating Mars' clement conditions--rendering Mars habitable. Then, on Mars--and perhaps on Saturn's large satellite Titan, or on the Galilean satellites--our children may again face that great opportunity of the frontier: a fresh start. Though the planets may Inever see large-scale colonization, the knowledge of that frontier will surely aid human optimism, and obviate a spirit of hopelessness which may arise if man is eternally limited to Earth, with no new opportuni- ties open for his spirit. Beyond the planets, a million times more distant, lie the stars. There is already a large literature of inters tellar flight. However, many writers have appealed to unknown physical principles in designing their starships, or used current technology in anachronistic combination. So might Jules Verne have written of a steam dirigible carrying anti-gravity material for a moon flight. . But recent developments in physics may point the way to an engine equal to the challenge of the stars. John Nuckolls and co- -1 1 - 667 workers, at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, have developed the concept of laser-induced controlled thermonuclear fusion. Significantly, last Sovember they described its application in a rocket engine. The engine they discussed had thrust of 5500 lbs., specific impulse of 333,000 seconds. - - And I am convinced, after discussions with these people, that their engine could triple its thrust and specific impulse. Such an engine could propel a vehicle to 10% of the speed of light, and open up the way to the stars. In the 1930's, developments in metallurgy made possible the gas turbine. This was applied in the jet engine, and in commercial power production. Today, both gas turbine applications are thriving. But the most advanced gas turbines are found in the latest jet engines. Only later is advanced gas-turbine technology applied in power plants, with their more difficult economic requirements. So it may be with laser fusion. The first and most advanced applications may be for space propulsion. Only later may laser fusion advance to meet the economic requirements of commercial application. In the coming decades, we may see fusion-powered ocean-going vessels and large hovercraft, burning deuterium taken from the very ocean which is their medium. We may see a world lighted by fusion. And these - things may be derived from an earlier application of fusion--in great, far-ranging ships. we live upon a small archipelago in an ocean. Our island is green, well-watered, volcanic-—the Earth. Nearby, too far to swim but easily reached by the crudest ships, we see each night a small, sandy, barren islet--the Moon. Very few of us have been there. But there is -12- 668 a deep connection between our islands, and if we would better under- - stand our own then we must study our companion. And from our mountaintop, men with telescopes can look over t ocean and see other archipelagoes. We give them names--Venus, and tars, and Jupiter. They appear similar to our own island group in ma respects, and we know that someday we shall visit them, But far across the ocean lie not islands but great continents These, to us, are the stars. And if we truly wish to grow beyond the limitations of an island race—-if we truly mean to seek new opportuni- ties through exploration--then we must accept their challenge. Today, in engineering offices, we see designs prepared for the Space Shuttle. And elsewhere, in physics laboratories, we see abuild- ing the first great 1asers, which may test and demonstrate the prospec of fusion. These two developments represent two promising streams of new technology, which must surely hold the greatest hope for new resources and new human opportunities. And on this day, before this Subcommittee, I challenge you: See that these two streams go forward, and grow, and ultimately merge, that man may set his foot upon the road to the stars. -13– 669 STATEMENT OF THOMAS BROWNELL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, FASST In 1958, the United States entered the Space Age by launching its first satellite into orbit. Since then we have seen a progression not only in unmanned satellite capabilities but also in the manned program. On May 5, 1961, Alan B. Shepard became the first American to fly in Space. The Mercury flights were basically a test to see whether man could actually fly in Space, perform comfortably, and return to the Earth. Through the knowledge gained by the 6 Mercury missions, the second program, called Gemini, was undertaken. In 1965 and 1966, ten Gemini (two manned) missions took place in Earth orbit. Their main objective was to prove that, a spacecraft could rendezvous and dock with a second piece of hard- ware in space. This step washerinite necessity for the third and final program to land man on the moon. In 1968, with 3 men aboard, the Apollo 7 spacecraft orbited the Earth to check out its systems. It was so suc- cessful that the Apollo 8 mission in December, 1968 was a flight to the moon, a glimpse of the far side and a return home. From the knowledge gained from the previous missions, Apollo ll wns launched and Neil Armstrong became the first man to set foot on the moon on July 20, 1969. Since then we have seen an even dozen Americans walk on the moon and explore. Over 830 pounds of varied moon samples have been returned and will be scruperously studied for years to come. This program has been so suc- i cessful in view of its objectives that I feel we should look at it in closer detail to better understand why it was successful. -l- 93-466 O - 73 - 43 670 In 1961, President John F. Kennedy set a national goal of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to the Earth by the end of. the decade. This set the stage for an effort that involved over H20,000 people from all 50 states working on toward the same goal. It involved 20,000 contractors and subcontractors building parts for each spacecraft. and solving the problems that were in our way of progress. Hence, the Space Program has truly been a broad movement forward in - science and technology to obtain new ideas, new approaches to problems - and the "tools" by which we can better solve many social and economic problems on the Earth. As the Congress knows, there are social programs and there are programs to support social programs. I believe that the Space Program is truly a socially supporting program and will show this in my testimony, - - Many people have complained about the amounts of money wasted on soins to the moon. I feel that this is not the case. The money was appropriated by Congress to NASA. They then paid companies to build the equipment that would perform the missions. Hence, most of the monies were paid to workers and were used to buy their food, clothing and pay their bills. Hence, these monies were actually being returned into the economy of the United States, contributing to a more healthy economy. In viewing the expenditures on the Space Program, compared to the amounts spent on social welfare programs, Space costs are minute. The total cost of the Space Program from 1961-1971 has been approximately $38 billion dollars. Of that, approximately $2 billion dollars was spent on -2- - 671 the Apollo Program. During the same time period, over $340 billion was spent on health and welfare programs. In 1969, over $65.2 billion dollars was spent on social action programs while only $l.2 billion dollars was spent on the Space budget. In 1970, the social programs increased to $75.4 billion dollars while the Space Program budget decreased to $3.7 billion dollars. In 1972, the federal budget called for over $100 billion spending on social programs while the space effort received only $3.2 billion. Below is a list of those expenditures. 1972 FEDERAL BUDGET ESTIMATE EXPENDITURES IN SOCIAL ACTION PROGRAMS %OF TOTAL BUDGET BILL, OF DOLLARS Income Security 26.5% $60.7 Health 7. O - 16.O veterans Benefits & Services lº.6 10.6 Education & Manpower - 3.8 8.8 Community Development & Housing 2. O lº. 5 TOTAL l;3.9% $100.6 SPACE RESEARCH & TECHNOLOGY 1.1% $3.2 This year the Space Program will be taking another budget cut. The program itself accounts for only 1.1 cents of every tax dollar and 1/3 of 1% of the total Gross National Product of this nation. I don't feel -3- 672 (as many do) that taking this $3.2 billion and applying it to the more than $100 billion spent on social problems today, that it will make these programs any more effective. Social programs receive 33 times more than the Space funding to date. I think that this $3.2 billion spent on Space technology has given this nation many direct benefits and spinoff. I personally feel that many people have seen the tax monies "go up in smoke" as the rocket lifts off, but I don't believe the average "man in the street" has had an opportunity to learn of the many benefits that he has gained due to Space Age technology. Hence, the first part of this testimony will include many tangible benefits that man is reaping, due to the Space Age. SPACE AGE BENEFITS WEATHER SATELLITES A ** importance of the Space Program has lbeen the building of weather satellites. These spacecraft orbit the Earth and send to ground -- stations many pictures of major weather patterns that will be moving over that area of the country. The first Tiros weather satellites were launched in 1960 cost about $6 million dollars. re took over 23,000 photographs of the Earth and its weather patterns in its' 2 1/2 month lifetime. In 1961, the first in a series of four Nimbus weather satellites was launched. In the first 3 1/2 weeks of its lifetime it had taken over 27,000 Earth photographs. Due to the Tiros satellites, over 500,000 usable weather photos were sent back to Earth. The expense for these satellites was great, but the -lº- 673 benefits gained especially in the Southwestern U.S. were enormous. In this area of the country, there is a great dependence on irrigation for the growing of crops. By the use of weather photographs, farmers could determine how to ration their water supply until the next predicted rain fall. So, the use of these satellites has been of the greatest interest to the asraeuiwai community. - In another use of weather satellites has been in the early detection and warning of typhoons, storms, and hurricanes. During the Tiros series, some 93 typhoons and 30 hurricanes were charted. In more recent times, it is hard to forget the devastating Hurricane Camille that hit the Gulf Coast in 1969. The people were alerted of its movement toward them up to two and one-half days in advance. Hence, they were able to evacuate from its path by moving inland. In that tragedy, some 31', people that would not leave their homes were killed, and over $1.1 billion dollars in damages occurred due to the 200 m.p.h. devastating winds. But, were it not for the weather satellite, it is estimated that over 50,000 lives would have been lost. s Even more recently, Hurricane Agnes was pinpointed off the Southeastern Coast in time to evacuate thousands of people from that area. Again, hundreds of millions of dollars damage were incurred, but at least another 50,000 lives were saved. If we compare these figures to the l,500 men, women and children who lost their lives in Mexico in 1959 due to an unpredicted storm, we realize how important the weather satellite has become. Through these examples, I think that it is evident how the weather satellite has been of direct -5- 674 benefit to the "man in the street". - Due to weather satellites today, shortrange forecasts of 36 to 18 hours are 80% correct. Eventually, due to sensor technology, a two week forecast will be possible. This extended weather prediction will save people from all walks of life, and billions of dollars per year (i.e. farming, recreation, fishing, construction and numerous other industries). Without the weather satellite, only about 20% of the Earth's weather can be directly observed. By satellites such as Nimbus, the total weather circulation can be observed. It is amazing to think that the newest Nimbus spacecraft can take readings of the temperatures at different levels within the atmosphere. The data collected from one satellite is equiva- lent to the readings obtained from 5,000 rocket and balloon soundings taken in the Southern hemisphere each day. - - Today, a special segment of the Commerce Department called NOAA (or the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) has the job of interpreting the numerous photos received from Earth orbiting satellites. one of their jobs is to watch for weather patterns originating especially over the oceans and warn the public of those storms that may be a hazard to human life. In total, weather satellites have returned over 1,000,000 photographs of weather fronts, hurricanes and other weather patterns, thus warning of their movement. Through early aetection and warning, the weather satellite has truly saved thousands of lives and millions of dollars in property to this date. Over 50 nations are now receiving information on weather patterns -6- 675 due to NASA satellites. COMMUNICATION SATELLITES There are many types of satellites orbiting the Earth and benefiting this nation to just as great an extent as the weather satellites. The communication satellite is truly one of the greatest satellites devised by man. Due to communication satellites, we can sit in our living room watching an event on television occurring live, as it happens somewhere on the other side of the world. Examples of events viewed due to communi- cation satellites were the 1968 Olympics from Mexico City, the crowning of the Prince of Whales, many of the Mohammed Ali fights against famous world opponents, and the 1972 Olympics from Munich, Germany. Many of these events are taken for granted as we watch television, but without the communications satellite, only filmed coverage at a later date would be possible. "Live" television communications seems to have brought the world together and made it somewhat smaller. Also, a better understanding of the ways of life and culture can be better seen through the commentions satellite. Tn another perspective, we see news around the world as it happens. In the past, battles in Vietnam were seen on the evening news, the same day that they were happening in a place half way around the world. Other events seen "live" due to the communications satellite were President Nixon's visits to the Soviet Union and The People's Republic of China last year. In 1970, a communications satellite enabled more than 30,000 doctors -T- 676 in Houston and San Antonio, Texas. In the near future it is hoped that 8. satellite system could link all doctors and medical personnel together across the nation. Hence, if a "split second" decision on a particular operation has to be made, this doctor can obtain a direct line to, as wn as all of the information from the past experiences of other doctors who have faced that same type of situation. It would be a data bank on file concerning all types of operations and diseases. The information could be available through the use of the satellite in a matter of min- utes. In an emergency, this could be the difference between life and death. - - All of the previous events listed in this section were seen "live" as they occurred. Without the communications satellite, none of these would have been possible. - Due to the Space Program, at least one new industry has come about. That is Comsat. It is a commercial enterprise started in the U.S. to orbit satellites containing telephone circuits. This was so successful that 17 countries have joined together in an enterprise called INTELSAT. Three IRTETSAT satellites now orbit the Earth at a height of 22,300 miles. One is situated in a position over the Pacific, one over the Atlantic and one in a geosynchronous orbit over the Indian Ocean. Each has a 5,000 voice circuit capacity and contains 12 television channels for transmission of events around the world. It has been stated that the United States puts about $300,000,000 worth of copper wiring and cables into the ground to continually expand –8, 9- 677 and improve our communications system each year. At the same time we pollute the appearance of the environment by putting up wires and tele- phone poles. It is hoped that in the future, satellites will help to alleviate this pollution. It is estimated that if four INTELSAT satel- lites were placed in orbit (one between Alaska and the mainland, one between Hawaii and the mainland, and two over the mainland U.S.) the cost would be $2 million dollars per satellite. This would serve the same communications purpose as the continual stringing of wires and at 8. lesser cost. - The communications satellite have already increased by 2 1/2 times - the commercial communications channels between the U.S. and the Atlantic - countries and between the U.S. and the Pacific countries. In fact, the rental for a satellite voice circuit has now been reduced below the cost of a present day under water cables line that extends across the ocean floors to other countries. Another benefit is that there is no need to hunt for broken underwater cables after a storm or to restring a cable after a few years. It is estimated that millions of dollars could loe saved each year if we put more dependence on satellites for communications in the future. EDUCATION Due to the sudden start of the "Space Age" in 1957 (Sputnik), there has been a dramatic re-evaluation of our scientific practices. Much new information is now available and has radically altered and updated past -10- 678 scientific theories. Between 1965 to 1971, NASA awarded grants and research contracts for 1,6b0 programs in 223 colleges and universities in all 50 states. This money added greatly to the nation's educational goals by the development of new scientific diciplines, technologies, and educational facilities. New college courses have appeared such as lunar geology end new forms of math and physics are being taught in the high schools today. In the area of cooperation with foreign nations, the U.S. and India are working together ir, an educational venture called ATS-F. The ATS-F is a satellite that will broadcast TV programs directly to receivers in small hamlets and towns throughout India in 1971. ATS-F - vºl. Toroadcast farming infoy Fººtion for better food requester, b i r & control information and other educational activities in the Indian lan- guage. Some 5,000 villages will receive the benefits from this program. From a few transmitting stations the Indian government will beam up edu- cational programs to the ATS-F and it will re-transmitt the programs to the 5,000 receivers throughout India. - This is a tremendous potential for the die relopment of a country such as India. It gives them an opportunity to gain a complete nationwide communication link with every hamlet. This is sure to help unify the nation of 500,000,000 and at 1/10 the cost of the conventional land com- munications systems. The installation of the equipment is more quickly deployed too. It is interesting to know that India is spending $1 billion over the -ll- 679 next ten years to build up 8, space Program. They feel that it will better increase their technological ability to core with their nation's social and medical, and economic problems. They take great pride in this.edesvos and hope that their nation can reap just half of the penefits that the U.s. gained due to its Space Program. - . - - In another joint venture, the United States and West Germany are working together on a $100 million project to send a probe closer to the Sun than ever before. - The U.S. and France are also working on a joint project to orbit a satellite which will track several housand balloons, mºns possible the charting of global wind circulation patterns. And of cºurse, as this committee is aware, the v.s. and the soviet Union will fly the sour/polio Joint docking mission in 1975. - Hence, through the Space Program, we are helping other nations of the world cope with some of their problems, learning much new knowledge While helping them, and through cooperation gaining a greater friendship with many nations of the world. ECONOMIC IMPACT Over the last ten years, over 20,000 new ideas, products and patents have come about directly aue to the Space Program. One major area that I'm sure Presidents' Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon were aware of over the last ten years was the need to maintain the number one position of leadership in the aerospace industry. Many people ask the * 12- 680 question, "Why does the U.S. have to be number one in everything?" The reason, of course, is that of balancékrade. In the past, due to our leadership in aerospace, foreign countries have bought high technology items from the U.S. not because they liked prices, or our foreign policies but, specifically because our products were the best that could be bought in the world. In fact, because we have lead in the aerospace field we sell 77% (as of 1970) of all commercial jet planes to the free world nations. Also because of Space Age technology, the computer has been perfected. In fact, this one industry has become an $8 billion a year business, employing over 800,000 people. In 1971, over 1.3 billion dollars worth of computéº exported to foreign countries. While we are in the position of such a tight budget we must be able to export more than we import to stay in a stable position as a nation. Due to Space exploration, I feel that the sales of goods to foreign countries have been positively affected. I only wish other programs could show the same output and sales as many of the high technology pro- ducts that help our trade position today. In fact in 1971, the aerospace industry had a net balance of trade in the +$3.9 billion bracket with foreign countries due mostly to sales of commercial jet transports. It is amazing to think that all of these previous benefits have originated from a program that accounts for only 1/3 or 1% of the total Gross National Product. As a nation, we spend three times as much Od alcohol, twice as much on cigarettes and twice as much on foreign travel •l3- 681 as our total space budget each year. So, this small amount is proving to be an investment that is paying enormous returns and after only 15 years of involvement in the "Space Age". - wnical SPINOFFS Computer techniques that have clarified photographs from Mariner IV to Mars (1965) are now being used to make medical x-rays more revealing. Also, due to the perfection of computer enhancement of x-ray photographs of lunar samples (to see clearly inside them without cutting the sample)s a technique has been perfected to clarify photos of brain tumors. Blood - vessels can also be viewed without having to probe for the problem 8 rea, s It can be pinpointed by enhanced computer x-ray photos and the surgeon is then able to study exactly what it is "up against". He can then operate quickly without excess probing and close the suture in a shorter time than it would normally take. Hence, there is less of a chance of infec- tion due to outside bacteria. - In analyzing the oxygen consumption of patients, it is no longer an uncomfortable process of wearing a noseclip and breathing through a mouth we. Now many medical schools and hospitals are using a helmet patterned after that of the NASA astronauts to measure the rate of oxygen consumption of the patient. In another area, those people with neurological defects such as parkinson disease will soon start to be detected earlier in life due to a special micro-meteorite sensor built by NASA. This sensor can detect even minute muscle tremors, hence giving an early warning of the possible -lk- 682 problems to come. It is hoped that through the use of this device prompt treatment of this disease and other neurological defects will come about , One scal of Space technology applied to medicine is to improve the ability of a limited number of medical personnel to provide medical care for larger numbers of people, Due to application of technology from the Space Program, a television monitoring system has been perfected so One nurse can oversee the conditions of all of the Patients on one corridor, The system is quite simple. A patient would wear a pair of glasses with 8. lient source on each side, When he needs something, all he h;3.5 to do is glance at a specific item on a checklist next to his bed. The message would be then sent to a central monitor in the main lobby and alert the nurse on auty to the patient's need. This same type of monitoring is now being used on infants and other young people who have problems breathing. A sensor device would be attached and an alarm would ring if the child started to have great difficulty in inhaling oxygen. Hence, upon detecting an alarm on her console, the nurse would be able to reach the patient in a hurry and assist him in administerns oxygen, ir needed. Another new breakthrough in patient monitoring is an infra-red radiation device for measuring blood oxygen content in a critically ill lekumia patient, Hence, when the oxygen content is deemed at a minimal level, a new supply of blood can be furnished for the patient's system. Wew materials such as titanium that have been made for Space boosters are now proving to be good materials for artificial hips and elbow joints. Because of the small, amount of friction, the low corrosive character and the strength, this material is proving to be tremendously useful. -lj- 683 Over the past few years, many peºple have been kept alive by heart pacemakers developed through the means of Space Age technology. A new design of heart pacemaker electrode is now being put into use by injecting it into the proper area of the heart with a hypodermic needle. In the past, an operation was naeded to implant this type of device. This will help to keep an irregular heart beating normally, Today's newer heart pacemakers even allow some strenuous activity and will speed up with exer- cise, while in the past this person has had to obstain altogether to any kind of exertion. - The same equipment used to measure an astronauts heartbeat in Space is now being used to monitor the body condition of 6l. patients On One corridor in a Palm Beach, Community Hospital in Florida. In another area, the gling support device designed to familiarize astronauts with the reduced gravity on the moon was modified for use in the treatment of the handicapped and rehabilitation of bed-ridden patients who find it difficult to re-train unused muscles to walk again. An electric eye device, designed from Space technology, has been modified so a para- plegic can control a wheel chair by eye movements. New techniques, that were previously used in working on a spacecraft, are now being adapted for surgery. A lo' by 10' plexiglass enclosure can be set up in a conventional opera- ting room. Into it comes pressurized air that is filtered and germ-free. - The air in the operating room then flows out the side of the room with no wall and takes with it any bacteria that might have been in the room. There is a constant flow of air outward that keeps the airborne germs from -16- 684 attacking the sterilized area of the patient. This system has been patterned after the NASA "white room", Also, some surgeons are now using NASA helmets and a type of paper garment coated with plastic for almost germ-free protection of patient during operations. The helmet has a continuous oxygen supply entering by way of vent in the top and the carbon dioxide is extracted outward from the room by e vacuum line, HIGHWAY SAFETY NASA has found that when a plane lands on a wet runway, there is a layer of water that builds up under the wheels and it skids for a distance. Hence, they have developed a grooved type of runway. It has worked to prevent skidding with great success, In fact, the California Highway and Road Department has built roads of the same type and after a 2 year study it was found that rainy day accidents decreased 93% on grooved highways as compared to accidents occurring on cement highways, Dangerous high- way sections in 18 states are now being grooved in hopes that accidents will be decreased. Hence, due to this benefit of the Space Program many lives are saved each year. EARTHQUAKE DETECTION Because ºf the numerous earthquakes and volcanic eruptions that have taken place recently, it is of the utmost importance to study these areas and be able to warn its inhabitants previous to an eruption or earthquake. The following is a story from a recent issue of Newsweek magazine discusses how, due to the Space Program, prediction of earthquakes has become a -l'ſ- 685 feasible goal in the near future, NEWSWEEK, March 2, 1973 "THE volcANO WATCHERS" "Though the experts were convinced that it had been dormant for more than 8,000 years, Iceland's Mount Helgafell erupted last month and forced the evacuation of nearly 5,500 persons from the slopes surrounding it. In 1968, costa Rica's presumably extinct Mount Arenal blew and killed several score of nearby inhabitants. But recently the technology available to geologists charged with monitoring volcanoes has improved markedly. Now thanks enterly to instruments devised during research on missile technology ead the space program, seientists at the U.S. Geological, Survey are devel- oping monitoring networks that they hope may accurately predict imminent volcanic activity, and thus give threatened populations at least a few hours to flee from the eruptions, - SWARMS: The buildup of molten rock that precedes an eruption produces three measurable manifestations: (1) tiny changes in slope or tilts on the ground around the volcano, (2) swarms of tiny earthquakes, and (3) increases in the temperature just beneath the surface of the area around the volcanic come. USGS researchers in Washington and Menlo Park, Calif., are installing instruments to detect such manifestations in volcanoes ranging from Central America to Hawaii. - Tiltmeters, which measure the minute changes in ground slope, have benefited substantially from technological improvements in recent years. The new devices, originally developed for the guidance systems of Minuteman 93-466 O - 73 – 44 ~18- 686 missiles and used in the Space program, operate from 3-inch holes in the rock. They can relay their data directly to earth satellites. USGS scientists are experimenting with large networks of tiltmeters around specific volcanoes. - Geological survey experts have also developed an "event counter" which is an instrument to count the number of micro-earthquakes in an active volcanic area such as the Cascade. Range in the American Northwest. The principle behind this form of monitoring is that in increase in the number of such mini-quakes normally precedes a volcanic eruption, but interpretation of the results in areas with continuous seismic activity is little understood at present. A more direct method of forecasting eruptions is temperature moni- toring. As the molten rock rises, it heate up the sub-surface areas around volcanoes, To detee; this heating, Drs. R.M. Moxham and J. C. Friedman have planted arrays of sensitive thermometers around Mount Kilauea in Hawaii and Mount Raker in the Cascades, A more promising method of tempera- ture monitoring, however, is the use of infra-red scanning from the air - and particularly earth-orbiting satellites. "It is definitely possible that we can get volcanic early warning from space," says Douglas Carter, chief of remote observations for the Geological Survey, "but it will require 8. considerable period of development. For a long time to come, the first - indication will have to come from a network of tiltmeters or a mini-quake swarm, telling us to focus our satellite's attention on a given volcano." cowºcrat SPINorrs There have been many commercial spinoffs due to the Space Program. one -19- 687 such item is the pocketsized sportsman blanket. It was originally used in astronaut training. The blanket is aluminum on one side to reflect the •unitent in the daytime and plastic on the other side to keep a person's body heat at a comfortable temperature even during the coldest evenins". This item is popular with many hunters today. A new type of fireproof paint has been invented due to research done for the Space Program. It is painted on a surface and in the event of a fire, it will give off a vapor to extinguish the flames. It is also interesting to note that the wint fumes are not toxic to human inhalation, • Better navigation by many commercial jets has come about due to a navigation computer originally developed for the Apollo moon flights. The device can tell a pilot where he is at any moment and this can lead to shorter flight times between two points and a saving in fuel. Hence, these savings ºn be passed on to the passengers in a more economical cost per ticket on certain flights, The Houston, Texas Fire Berartment is now using firefighting suits and equipment made of fireproof materials developed for the Space Program. Many other fire departments are soon to follow this example. A computer program developed by NASA is proving to be of great benefit to many companies today. Originally NASTRAN (a general digital computer program) Wà8 invented to analyze the stress on a spacecraft as it flies through maximum dynamic pressure of the Earth's atmosphere before it achieves orbit, It was specifically invented for work with the Space Shuttle. It has now been adapted to analyze the amount of structural strain 688 a bridge, or the steel construction of a skyscraper can take due to a certain stress. There are over 185 present applications of this computer program ranging from suspension units to steering linkages in automobiles. Hence, many areas of life are being made safer by the Space Program. A new cadmium battery system was invented due to Project Apollo. These batteries that are longer lived and smaller so that they can be efficiently used in hearing aids, power tools and improved electronic heart pacemakers, Space Age technology has also been used in the Bart Project (or Bay Area Transit System) in San Francisco, The control center is actually patterned after the launch control center at Cape Kennedy, Florida. The center it helf gan automatically control and pinpoint the position of each of the cars at any instant in time. - w Navigational beacons or other types of satellites are now being placed in fixed orbits about the oceans. Hence, by knowing the proper co- - ordinates, a ship captain can navigate the shortest route between two points on Earth in a more rapid time period. CONSERVATION - - Before the Apollo flights there were many conservationists who tried, in vain, to tell the American public that ve were using up our natural resources too fast, They stated we must start to decrease pollution and that we must; start to conserve the resources available to us, But few people listened to them. Now that man has been away from the Earth and has w?l- 689 *ā- ...states Jºsun'ſ Kraufurtezá, petºfºue ** Kin Jó * 2334tt but up resºns -sºp aq II; a unaaSoxd ottody etú toº peutt's estates 49ea;p * *bitwº “ttº-tº bu% uo etúbed TIts go ºffeued attº, Joj boºds q.fotáxê of; •uta qsatºg attº Jog usu Aotte TTP, assut ‘usazoad det^ls attº pus ‘84;tte‘ſ as Kāotout waſ sedanoses uqawa eu, asnosyp (tPA I ‘Kuomtºse; ºn to buotages sutaotto; eu', ur - 'aouept guoc * axes, essa assass 9% * àtº, tººk uaat, pu`a uotawawon at{3. ‘ssuette‘ſo ot{} ‘Āšotoutſoe, §tt: tata gn softd. -dris oste §T 'seatesmo eas Ö4 tſottº, tºga &cdºtful * Ano §ptot! 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Jo Mountº 38tº 3° * At go Ku Kq Mosa pºtoot 690 ERTS As previously stated in Mr. Fradin's testimony, "FASST is a nation- wide organization of American students dedicated to the concepts of international stability, a clean environment, and social progress through science and technology, º * Because of the derinition, this part of my statement will be COrl- cerned with the benefits rained specifically from the Earth Resources technology satellite in reference tº scCial progress through £&iełłce and technology. In viewing ERTS, it is an opportunity to take one step - toward better recognizing different crops from Space, the health of these crope, and provides us with a different view or perspective of vast regional areas. - ... • Iast July, the first ERTS satellite was launched into a 520 mile (sun-synchronous) polar orbit of the Earth. Weighing approximately 1,965 pounds, it carried infra-red sensors ana multi-spectral scanners. The basic purpose of ERTS is to demonstrate the usefulness of remote censing # ". devices to detect conditions on the Earth's surface, on a global scale and a repetitive basis. Each ERTS photograph will cover an area ll:5 miles x 115. miles and will complete global coverage once every 18 days. During each 103 minute orbit, ERTS will be primarily concerned with image analysis to determine the signatures of different crops on Barth. Everything on Earth either absorbs, radiates or reflects the Sun's energy in one or more - wavelength, Hence, through spectral analysis, these signatures for a par- ticular crop or resource will be detected. This signature will be the * -23- 691 same for all ºf that wºn of resource or crop. The ERTS sensors are wins w8ed in cooperation with high altitude sensor carrying aircraft to survey different crops in the United States. It, w: diseased crops from Space, by way of infra-red photo- graphy even before the * * * within the crop on Earth, Hence, the proper innesºtates, can be used to save this crop. It is estimated that by the continuous use of this technique, food yield may be doubled in the years to come, - - - in another experiment, Ears $g being uses to monitor thermal and wagte pollution into large lakes, from outer space. In this area it has - been quite successful. ERTS can even see light, as well as aark colored oil. slicks that may occur in the oceans, - - Much of the mapping by ºne will make obsolete maps of an area "renewed". It takes over 500,000 high altitude aircraft photos to cover the whole United states, while it only takes 500 photos for ERTs to cover the same area, - * * - - - We hear go much about conservation of natural resources, but until ERTs we did not know how much of each resource that his nation had. Through ERT5, a total survey of all minerals, crops and water is being taken, - '. The potential gains from this new view of the Earth are almost end- less, For instance, through ERTs, proper management of farmlands and timberlands will assure future generations of having the needed resources tºo garry out; their lives in comfort. By wkins an inventory of tree types, we will find which are scarce and what classes are numerous. Then by +2}~ 692 planting more of the scarce type tree and less of the more numerous type we will. wreserve a balance in the availability of resources for future generations, This catorization will also be done with grazing - lands. The United States has a policy that the government is not to issue anymore forage land for sºarins than the country as a whole can produce (Taylor drawing Act). This can become a problem especially in the southwest part of the U.S., where the grazing conditions way be good for only two of five years. So, ERTS will monitor total land areas and will detect the health of grazing areas from year to year. other ween of the Earth Resources Technology Satellite are numerous and widespread in character. Some potential benefits are listed below. In the area of Hydrology, ERTS is: - z (a) workins to detect water pollution trends, (b) Taking an inventory of available fresh water supplies and (c) Is measuring those factors needed to predict the locations of new water reserves, In the past, there laws been problems in determining the ability of the soil to absorb water. Hence, hydrologists have gone into the field and taken samples of the moisture content in the soil at several locations. Then they have built their water sheds or dams downslope in the direction of the runoff. Well surprisingly enough, about 50% of the time their guess was wrong. With the dams costing. hundreds of millions of dollars, the warsiestate cannot afford to be wrong. Through ERTS, this capacity of certain 50 ils to absorb water can be calculated and monitored from Space, -25- 693 The U.S. also faces a great water management problem, should • 1st the H20 be •was in dams, use it for recreation areas, or use * for irrigation, or to generate hydro-electric power. By studying he regional runoff and soil absorbtion capacity through ERTS, we will e better able to determine how much water we will have to work with or all of these needs. " - - . . . . . #EOLOGY - In an area of geology many experiments are planned. | ERTS should improve Geologists view of rock and regional structure n the Earth's wrace, These relationships can then be used to compare 5ther formations that have a certain mineral in them. This comparative uniyºs will, lead to new mineral finds in the near future. It will be possible to dºtect cracks in the Earth or faults and other anomalies (ºatholiths, als dºmes, etc.) even below fland, which ºuts us on the track of new mineral deposits, As a result of Apollo 9 photographs, tº, extensive system or faults was discovered in the area of San Diego, California. Then when specific areas are pinpointed, they are narrowed down even further by sensºr carrying aircraft. Finally, man goes into the area and looks for mineral sources. This process will greatly reduce the exploration costs in the future and all result in many new yields of mineral resourceſ, - - Further study of the earthquake problems and faults areas are des- perately needed and HRTs will be one way these studies will be carried out. Many regional, ºrwewee especially in the SW part of the U.S. have shown up on Apollo photographs while not detected on the sound. So, -as- 694 further research and studies of these areas may bring us new knowledge about, the true structure of the Southwest (shear zones or dike swarms). There is also the possibility that ERTS may be able to detect "hot spots" which would indicate the area. that, could best supply geothermal heat and steam, a future eners, supply (steam turning turbines to produce electricity). These are found just beneath the surface. ERTS is a possible means of detecting activity in a volcano--in time to warn and evacuate an area before an eruption-thus saving those living in the surrounding area. Also, glacier movement will be photographed to better understand whether the Earth is heating up or cooling off. GEOGRAPHY *—. In the area of geography, ERTS will send constantly updated maps showing various manned and natural changes on the Earth's surface. These photos will be of interest to urban planners, regional planning commissions, and the transportation industry. For the first time ever, ERTS will be able to monitor the environmental impact of an area once every 18 days. No longer will there be a question of whether a road, for example, has caused a bad effect on the ecology of a region. Every 18 days the impact will be recorded Or, photographs and sent; back to Earth. ERTS photos should be a great help in the planning and development of urban centers on as of yet underdeveloped lands. oCEANOGRAPHY In the area of oceanography, if an area is deep blue, then it is low chlorphyll and nutrient productivity. The greener the appearance, the *27s 695 igher the food productivity. This greeness along with temperature eadings can help to locate new schooling areas for fish. This in turn elps the fishing industry to reed more of the people of the world. atellite photographs have already led fishermen in Tiawan to new areas ich in fish. ERTS will also photograph reefs, shoals, icebergs and ther shallow water hazards--that will definitely prove useful to ship avigators. - - - - It is amazing to think that 71% of the Earth is covered by oceans. ese formations beneath the ocean floor contain oil, minerals, natural gases and other resources. In the rest we have been unable to pinpoint these areas. But, due to ERTS many of the formations on the shallow areas of the ocean bottom will be photographed. Due to Frts observations of surface conditions, currents, and ero- sional and depositional effects on coastlines will be photographed. AGRICULTURE In the area of agriculture, the first aerial black and white photo- graphy was used in 1930 to obtain crop estimates and yield productions. Also from photographs coś8371and acreage was estimated. Today we are in the second stage with the multi-spectral sensors used on ERTS, We are able to pinpoint particular types of timber, hence keeping a balance in the different types of forests. Also, we can now not only pinpoint certain crops, but we can view healthy and diseased crops from 520 miles above the Earth (from ERTS). As you know, remote sensing came into being during WW II for recon- naissance missions. The Space Program has adopted this concept and has -as- 696 also perfected the multi-spectral scanners which came into being in the mid 60's. Through the use of FRTS and other satellites man will be better able to understand his environmental condition, and the available resource supplies that exist on the Earth. Hence, we have come from satellites doing a specific job for a short time to a satellite that is able to do a multitude of different things with a minimal one year life, It is true that the northern temperate zones accounts for 85% of the industrial, wood used in the world today. But the major timber resources of the tropical rain forests (the Amazon area) have not even been seen by man as of yet, ERTS is now compiling an inventory on each type of timber on a global scale. These photos will also show which trees are healthy and which are dying. Through infra-red photos, lumberjacks can determing the best areas of good wood for cutting. Early detection of forest fires can also be photographed by ERTS. Eventually, in future satellites, a system to alert ground control of a forest fire in "real timé will be incorporated, causing a loss of less land and property damages. With over 600,000 acres of land lost due to forest fires in 1971, it is of the utmost importance to map the areas of highly dry forest. These areas can be charted as highly probable forest fire hazards. The forest ranger can then keep a close watch on these particular areas in case a fire does breakout. Pine trees being attacked by bark beetle can be spotted from ERTS. Then, due to these photos, man on the ground will have a chance to save ~29- 697 the trees. Bark beetle cause ten times as much loss of lumber as for- est fires each year. In 1970, 15% of the corn crop was lost due to a corn blight and º - arought conditions. By the use of ERTS photos, these conditions can be isolated, keeping the total logs to a minimal amount. t disease called wheat rust. Through early detection of disease occurrence There are also heavy losses each year in the rice harvest due to a in both corn and rice, a savings of over $1 billion could be realized during the next ten years. Through infra-red photography ERTS. photos can readily pinpoint healthy crop and vegetation. They will show up in bright red. Near infra- red information will also be important to farmers because it will show definite areas that are diseased. Hence, the farmer can apply the proper insecticides to save his crop. At this time, there are over h billion people living on about 20% of the Earth's surface. Hence, through the sensors on ERTS, it is hoped that better land management and use will come about. If we do not start managing our resources wisely, the existence of future generations on Earth may be jeopardized. It is estimated that the United States will need to increase by nearly twice its' present food production to feed its people by the year 2000. Through the proper identification and combating of crop diseases, range management techniques, and improved irrigation planning, man will surely be able to reach this production demand of only 27 years from now. -30- 698 ERTS SPACECRAFT As stated earlier, ERTS is a l,965 pound spacecraft that looks like a butterfly. It stands some ten feet tall and contains three return beam vidicon cameras (green, red, and infra-red). It also carries a !? multi-scanner system which takes photographs on a continuous video-strip and returns them to Earth in all four bands. Remote sensing is expected to increase identification of major crop classifications, forest types, water temperatures and currents, and salinity of the soil. Also being detected will be crop diseases, new sources of fresh water, and pinpointing of the polluters of lakes and streams in different areas of the country. Oil, wastes, plastics and other pollutants can be easily charted from a satellite in Space. In all, ERTS orbits the Earth lll times a day and takes 9,200 master images per week. There are three major data aquisition stations for ERTS. One is located at Fairbanks, Alaska; the second is at Greenbelt, Maryland; the third is located at Goldstone Tracking Station in California. ERTS is in an orbit such that it is over part of U.S. only a short time each day. Hence, only 21% of the daily photos are of the U.S. Skylab will be much different in this respect. It will have a 500 orbit set so it will cross over the U.S. and take more than 50% of the photos of this country. It requires about 80 hours a week to convert the video-tape to high quality photos by electron beam recorder. Hence, we can see a problem occurring at the end of the week, but could not use the information in real time!' –31- 699 With man in the spacecraft, studying these colors below, he will be able to better relate what an area appears like, to the ground sta- tion below. Many agricultural economists estimate that for every $1.00 put into remote sensing, it promises to return $5.00 in benefits. Over the next two decades this savings could be as much as $1.5 billion. One of the greatest abilities of ERTS is to repeatedly map large areas of land. It is ironic that Mars and the moon have been totally mapped by orbiting spacecraft, and yet only 52% of the Earth's surface is mapped. ERTS will help to totally map Earth and return photos of many areas that man has never seen, The total cost of ERTS Program is $17h million dollars. This includes ERTS A & B, data aquisition and handling at Goddard Space Center, inves- tigations and 2 delta launch vehicles. 2 launch vehicles $l.2 million each Investigations $34 million Data Handling $28 million 2 spacecrafts $52 million each The lifetime of the ERTS-A is one year. Some 300 investigators from l;3 states and 31 foreign countries are now busy on many studies involved with ERTS. In the next year their findings should be released and the capability of the instruments for future orbital satellites will be better understood. -32- 700 In summary, the following wavelengths are used to survey the Earth's surface and to inspect changes in the environment. The first band is from .5-.6 micrometers. This range appears green to the eyes bodies of water are transparent in this band; and we are able to see sedimentation and other sea floor features in shallow areas such as the Bahamas. The second band is from .6-.7 micrometers. This band appears red to the eye. It is excellent for seeing through the atmosphere from a satellite. There is a high contrast between vegetation and soil in this band. Also, man-made buildings can be seen in bright red while vegetation is a darker color. This is a good band to use when photographing regional population patterns. There are two infra-red bands from .7-1.2micrometers. They pick up reflected light invisible to the human eye. In the infra-red, wheat reflects 80% of the sunlight that hits it. vegetation is as bright in infra-red as snow is in the visible. Crop brightness depends on size of the leaves, and the health of the plant. Healthy crops will be much brighter in the infra-red than diseased plants. So, from compiling information from high flying sensor aircraft and ERTS, we can start to: (a) detect water pollution trends (oil, chemicals, plastics, etc.), -33- 701 (b) photograph rain or snow levels and predict more quickly the danger of floods occurring (c) monitor crop conditions (d) measure precipitation, winds, soil moisture to help aid in the prediction of areas where forest fires may be most likely to occur (e) monitor the contamination of the Earth's atmosphere and specifically its' ozone layer (f) improved earthquake prediction and warning (g) pinpointing geologic areas where oil, and other mineral supplies may be found and (h) for safer navigation, the icebergs, shoals, and other ocean-going hazards can be charted too Today, due to infra-red, ultra-violet and visible light wave photo- graphy from a satellite in orbit, many benefits can be gained. First, as stated above, identification and measurement of crop types can be inter- preted. Also, measurement of soil types can be detected. Those areas with the best nitrates and most water can be pinpointed and the crop planted there would give the best yields. Those areas that had little soil mois- ture would be left fallow. Photos of Saudi Arabia during Apollo 7 yielded a great amount of information about new water deposits in that predomin- antly desert country. In conclusion, the ERTS mission is: (a) to define the practical Earth resource management problems where Space technology can make beneficial contributions (b) to test sensors and calculate their reliability (c) to develop handling and processing techniques for Earth resources surveys 93-466 O - 73 - 45 -3k- 702 Hence, remote sensing merged with Space Age technology surely appears to be one of the greatest investments that this nation has ever become involved with. I think as the years go on we will gain a better ability from satellites to formulate a more efficient management of the Earth's resources. The technology and "signatures" of resources gained from ERTS will also be used in our next step into Space this May, with the coming of Skylab. One of the best arguments for man in Space is that he can con- trol the equipment and in the event of a failure, can bypass that system, and use his mind to correct the problem. In the case of an unmanned craft, in the event of a failure of a major system, the whole mission would have to be curtailed. Hence, as we gain new insights and the technological capability to detect crop diseases, forest fires, schools of fish, and predict earthquakes, it would truly be in the best interests of the U.S. and the world to cultivate our newest resource, "Space", to an even greater extent. This can be accomplished by the launching of additional orbiting satellites such as ERTS. I urge this subcommittee to review the successes that ERTS has already attained and the potential gains that the American people may reap from this program. If you feel that the benefits warrant it, I urge you to consider future Earth orbiting satellites following the ERTS program. ,- -35- 703 SKYLAB In mid-May, the first 3., man Space workshop, called Skylab, will be placed in orbit around the Earth by a Saturn V vehicle. On the following day, a Saturn I-B rocket will boost 3 Americans into orbit. These men will dock and transfer into the workshop for a period of about 28 days. The workshop is a modified 3rd stage of the Saturn V vehicle fitted with living and laboratory facilities. The Skylab, with Apollo command and service module attached, will be about llê' long and will weigh 180,000 pounds. The studies involved in Skylab will be originated to three major Teatagories. EARTH RESOURCES EXPERTMENT PACKAGE First, Skylab will evaluate systems and ways of gathering infor- mation about Earth resources, air and water pollution, and crop health. Skylab will have an EREP (or Earth Resources Experiment Package) located in the multiple docking adapter with infra-red sensors and a multispectral scanner to survey resources on the Earth below. The EREP will survey many crops, indentifying their signitures and will take an inventory of the different crop types. The area of each photo will cover 88 nautical miles square. Also, the ability of soil to hold water, which leads to statistics on runoff and the richness of nitrate content of the soil, will be interpreted. Hence, the time and expected places of flooding will be better predicted in the future. By watching runoff of a certain region, an individual can better plan where to put a watershed or dam. -36- 704 From Space an inventory of all water resources will be taken pinpointing new sources of fresh water and monitoring the possible deterioration of many lakes due to pollution. From the total water resources that the U.S. and other countries of the world have available, they can then regionally plan the use of the water for such things as parks and recreation, irrigation, electrical power generation and other programs that will allow them to get the most out of the total resources that they have. - In oceanography, fishing grounds will be better pinpointed due to measuring proper thermal conditions of the water and by monitoring those areas richest in algae and other nutrients through infra-red photo- graphy. Also, improved ship navigation will be realized due to charting of icebergs and shoals located in otherwise dangerous waters. In the area of geology, new faults and folds will be pinpointed and compared to photos of similar formations that are known to have oil" or other mineral deposits in them. By comparative analysis it will sº geologists a better idea of where to explore for the needed resources of the future. Also, the ocean floor features in shallow areas such as the Bahamas will pe photographed as well as deposition due to ocean currents and erosion due to wave activity. Many such characteristics on the east coast will be styxdied. It is eventually hoped that from Space a better way to predict the increased activity inside a volcano by the use Of infra-red sensors will come about. Hence, the people of a certain area could be given enough of a warning to evacuate from that area before the eruption occurs. ~37- 705 As far as mapping, the EREP on Skylab will photograph the mainland U.S. and, through infra-red sensors, will show all man-made buildings and bridges, etc. set off from the natural vegetation. These photographs will help in studies of plans to improve rural and urban center's develop- ment. There have been over 1ko proposals for EREP including areas such as: (1) Agriculture and Forestry production (2) map making (3) geology (h) utilizatition of natural resources and (5) oceanography. The Skylab will be placed in an orbital inclination of 50° to the Equator and at an altitude of about 23h miles above the Earth. In its total 8 months of activity it will fly over every state in the U.S. except Alaska. It will also photograph the areas of Europe, Africa, most of South America, China and all of Australia. It will cover 75% of the total land surface and will duplicate its same ground track every 5 days. In all, the observations will cover 80% of the food producing areas and 90% of the population of the complete Earth. About three-fourths of the total information (photographs, etc.) will be returned to Earth on film by each crew, while one-fourth of the data and images will be sent back by way of electronic beam. From the initial photographs taken on Skylab, it is hoped that man will be able: (1) observe the environmental impact on many different areas of the United States (2) to regionally plan cities (3) to gain a more efficient crop management and (l) to realize the amount of resources available due to an inventory of the United States. This will hopefully lead to better management of dwindling mineral supplies and will assure -38. 706 preservation for future generations. One major experiment will be carried out from orbit over the states of Texas and Oklahoma. Infra-red sensors on Skylab will be trained Earthward in an attempt to find regional structures that may contain oil. Specialists predict that 25% of the $500 million pre- drilling costs as well as the $315 million spent last year due to the drilling of dry wells, could be saved by pinpointing likely oil bearing structures from Space. STUDY OF SOLAR ACTIVITY The second major area of interest from Skylab missions is that of studying solar activity. They will be able to study solar flares, the emissions of ultra-violet light and cosmic radiation from the Sun. Also, due to a camera on the telescope mount, they will be able to study the images of sunspot activity on a television system located in the multi- ple docking adapter area. In all there will be 8 instruments (on the Apollo Telescope Mount) that will measure different aspects of solar activity. This will be the first time that man has had an opportunity to really study the Sun outside the Earth's' distorting"atmosphere. Learning more about the Sun is important because it is our major source of light, heat and energy. If effects our environment, atmosphere, climate and weather. So by better understanding the activities of the Sun, we may better learn about the causes for geo-magnetic storms that some times affect radio transmissions. Also by studying the Sun we may -39– 707 gain an insight into how it heats the Earth, causing wind pressure circu- Tation patterns that move weather systems around the globe. Also, by better understanding the solar reactions taking place, it may help man on the Earth control nuclear energy to produce a relatively pollution free source of electricity on the Earth. The 3 crews will have over 500 hours of extensive solar studies during which they will investigate the relative abundances of chemical elements in the Sun, and the relationships between the activities on the Sun and the effect on the atmosphere and magnetic fields of the Earth. EFFECT OF Long-rºw SPACEFLIGHT ON MAN The third major area that Skylab is concerned with is that of the monitoring the long term weightlessness of spaceflight on man. Up to now the longest Space mission was Gemini 7 in 1965. That was a ll day flight in Earth orbit. - By using avecial instruments, the astronauts will be able to measure the affect of long duration missions on the heart and other blood vessels of the body. Also tests on equilibrium will be performed to determine the need for artificial gravity on future spaceflights. Other experiments include a study of sleep quality and quantity will be recorded by a sensor type helmet worn by one astronaut during his sleep period. From these tests will come the under- standing of what long-term spaceflight does to man's body. It will also give us a major indication of whether future manned Space stations would be feasible. In all, Skylab will be active for some 8 months. It will greet the first 3 man crew in mid-May of this year, to be occupied for about 28 days. Upon the return of the first crew, there will then be a 2 months time period when -ko- 708 the skylab will not be occupied. During this time the second Skylab crew's l-B rocket will be readied. Then the second 3 man crew will be launched and will occupy the Skylab for up to 56 days. When they return, there will a one month gap and the third crew will then be launched. They too will occupy the Skylab for up to 56 days. From the data returned Earthward, man's capabilities as well as the benefits from a Space labortory will be better understood. - Due to an in Space, a more and varied selection or experiments can be accomplished with less lead time planning. Unlike unmanned satellites, if anything goes wrong the mission does not have to be curtailed. Man is there and is able to use his mind to solve many problems, and hence continue on with the mission. If the data from the Skylab missions, as well as from the unmanned ERTs, is as productive as it is now expected, I urge this subcommittee to consider future Earth orbital missions to help detect and transmit valuable information homeward to better man on the Earth. During the 3 Skylab missions, lasting altogether over 5 months in Space, some 50 major experiments will be conducted. This is the first manned mission with the specific aim of gathering information to better man on the Earth. - As ex-astronaut Walter Cunningham recently stated, "Skylab will be the greatest use of Space yet. The 'man in the street' will finally start to see what Space can do for him." —ll- . 709 PRELIMINARY LUNAR RESULTS In recent years, we have heard many comments about man spending billions on lunar flight while millions starve in the U.S. today. Many people have stated that we have gone to the moon to pick up some worthless pieces of rock. But, I believe from an Earth Scientist's point of view, these small pieces of another world may prove to be one of the keys in relating to us just what occurred li.6 billion years ago. Anotherwords, by studying the moon which is literally "down the street" in space travel terms, we can relate this newly gained information to the evolution of the Earth and some of the other planets of our Solar System. As you know, the Earth has been badly eroded by wind, water and ice over the last li.6 billion years while the moon with no detectable atmos- phere has been lying relatively stagnant during this time (except for some meteorites and early volcanic activity). Hence, by going to the moon and wiping away the dust from the forma- tions, we are able to study the evolution of the moon just like reading a history book. The lunar exploration has already told us much about our nearest neighbor. In recent years, for example, through studies of the Apollo 11 landing site (the Sea of Tranquility) it was found that dark basaltic flows flooded the area about 3.7 billion years ago. The flows were intermittant for some l:00 million years. The dark basalt is thought to have flowed from cracks or fissures into large basins made previously by meteorite impacts. The -lº2- 710 filling of these basins by basalt flows gives many areas a circular appearance. By radial sampling, some lunar rocks were returned from the top 30' or so which is basically the reminants of the pulverized lava flows. The Apollo 11. crew found that the samples from the Ocean of Storms site were about 3.3 billion years old. - On Apollo 15, the first mission to use the moon rover, lava marks were sited some 300' about the present maria on the Hadley delta. This te thought to be due to the lava changing its level or sloshing back and forth before it solidified. From laboratory studies it has been found that lunar lavas are about 1% as vicious as the least vicious lava on Earth. This added to the fact that the moon has 1/6 the gravity of the Earth, accounts for the reason that lava flows on the moon extend for over hundreds of miles. This gives a broad, relatively flat appearance to much of the lunar terrain in maria areas. The major reason that the lunar lavas are less vicious is that they contain more of Fe and Ti and less silicon. Through photography from the Lunar Orbiters and the Apollo missions, it has been estimated that about 20% of the total moon is ºria areas and 80% is highlands. On Apollo 15 one of the major features studied was the Hadley Rille. Though the exact method of formation is not yet known, lunar geologists do have a major theory of how it came into existence. In the early stages of the moon's formation, the hot, fluid lava flowed a great distance before solidifying. Eventually, it slowed down - -k3- 711 and started to cool at the head of the flow. A small levee built up around the channel. Near the end of the flow the lava still was fluid and flowing while the front was solidifying. Eventually, the top layers started to solidify while the interior lava continued to flow. The lava moved slowly forward and seemed to form a tunnel or tube with the roof already solidified. In later history, due to the extent of its own weight, the roof collapsed leaving an extensive sinuous rille system. The law. marks 300' up the wall of the Hadley delta (above the maria) as well as lunar rock spewed down the slopes of the rille walls bear out this concept. Experiments on this concept have also be enacted by melting lunar samples in an Earth laboratory. The findings have reinforced this basic concept for the formation of the sinuous rules. If the roof does not collapse, or if the lava solidifies before it, exits the tube, features called "wrinkle ridges" will occur. These are a common feature on many lunar maria. After much lunar photography from orbit, an interesting fact has been lorought to light. It seems that the basins on the near side of the moon are filled with dark basaltic flows while those basin areas on the far side of the moon relatively void of basalt. Scientists, are trying to answer the basic question of why one side of the moon has a basalt filled area the size of the U.S., while the other side has virtually none. So far, their efforts have been unproductive. Scientists have found that the moon is at least partially layered with the lighter rocks forming the crust or outer layer and the denser -lil- 712 rocks forming the layers beneath the crust. Orbital tracking from Apollo spacecraft (laser altimeter) suggests that the crust is thicker on the far side or the moon. Perhaps the basalt flows (coming from - beneath the crust) merely had farther to travel upward through the fis- sures in the crust. Hence, the flows filled only the deepest basins on the lunar far side. - It has been calculated that 95% of the large lunar craters had already formed before the maria feature originated. Hence, the maria are thought to be the last step in lunar evolution (3.9 to 3.3 billion years ago). This can be realized by observing that there are about 5% as many craters on the maria surfaces today as compared to an equal area of wnriocaea highland. So most of the major impacts occurred far before maria formation. This fact was learned from the Apollo ll mission. Upon dating of Apollo ll samples, scientists found the age of these lavas to be 3.5 to 3.7 billion years old. This meant that we were sure that 95% of all major impacts craters formed in the first billion year period of the l; l/2 billion year history. So, some reference points for major events were being calculated even after the first lunar landing. It appears likely that the moon formed by a gradual accumulation of smaller particles (accretion) and the old craters that we see today were . formed in the final stages of accretion. If this is true, we are able to see a record of the actual formation of a plantery body. on Earth, our first l to 2 billion years has been eroded away be water, wind, and ice. But by studying these ancient features we may be better -l;5- 713 able to relate our findings to the formation of the Earth during that time. Another discovery is that most lunar craters are explosion or impact craters. A typical crater is not just a hole in the ground. It is a depression surrounded by a rim of boulders or possibly mountains. It has a relatively flat floor at a lower level than the surrounding terrain. Outside the rim of the crater will be found ejecta spread in all directions. Smaller secondary craters formed due to the impact of a piece of debris strewn from the primary crater on initial impact will also be seen. Areas such as the Imbruim Basin, Tycho, and Clavius are good examples of impact craters. In fact, one of the major events in the lunar history was the formation of the Imbrium Basin. This giant crater which is 820 miles in diameter and over 100 miles deep is thought to have been formed by a small asteroid that impacted into the lunar surface. Due to studies of samples of ejecta taken by Apollo ll (which landed some 750 miles from the basin) and Apollo 15 which landed near the basin's wall, it has been calculated that the Imbruim Basin was formed about 3.9 billion years ago. It was then flooded by maria material during the time frame of from 3.9 to 3.3 billion years ago. So, due to radial sampling and combining of facts from the two missions, NASA is projecting a better picture of the moon during this time in past history. There are also many such basins on the far side of the moon, but for some reason they are not filled with mare material. Scientists have observed that most of the lunar mountain ranges are literally the rims of outlying impact basins that have been filled with -l:6- 714 with maria material. Another observation is that there appears to be no folded mountains on the moon which would discount theories about much internal lunar activity. Some scientists have stated that they believe there are many volcanic eraters that have literally "blown their tops" and the steep cone has collapsed. This type of crater is called a Caldera. An example of this feature is "Crater Lake" in Oregon. So, some of the more pecular lunar cra- ters are thought to be Calderas. From Earth we can see over 300,000 craters (1/2 mile or more in diameter) on the moon with the help of a 6" telescope. The lunar orbiter photos showed us an estimated 20 million craters. Hence, many craters from giant basins to small pits can be found on the moon. In fact, they are so numerous that many overlap. Due to the rain of meteorites striking the moon over the last it 1/2 billion years, the underlying bedrock layer has been broken into small frag- ments called regolith. The particle size of regolith varies from as fine as sand to large boulders. Many of the rocks that the astronauts have returned are the bigger samples from this regolith layer. The regolith is thought to cover most of the moon (both maria areas and highlands) as a layer between 30-200' deep. This can be detected by precision photographs taken from lunar orbit or by laser altimeter readings on the depths of young craters that have broken through this regolith into solid bedrock. The lunar soil itself does hold many secrets to the moon's past history. In fact, on the Apollo 15 mission an 8' core sample of the Mt. Hadley area was taken. As it was examined in the Lunar Receiving Laboratory in Houston, -l:T- 715 it was found to have some 58 layers. These layers coincide with 58 different chapters in the local history of the Hadley area. In other areas such as the Sea of Tranquility, core samples showed no layering. These first core samples were quite shallow and hence the "gardening effect" due to bombardment by meteorites had churned up the surface layers into a fine "mixed material". The regolith layer covers most areas of bedrock on the linar surface. and hence direct sampling is nearly impossible. Because of this, geolo- gists have come up with a new method called radial sampling to obtain ages on pieces of bedrock. rt has been found that in an area where a young impact crater has been formed, the ejecta closest to the rim on the surface came from the greatest depth and hence are the oldest samples. The ejecta round farthest from the crater has scattered from the upper surface area and hence is younger in age. This concept has been proven by potassium/ argon dating. The "radial sampling" technique was first used on the Apollo 15 mission. Another interesting factor about the moon is its temperature ranges. In the daytime, temperatures reach +220°F and during lunar night, tempera- tures reach -300%. It has been found that moon dust is very cohesive and is a very good insulator. An example of this can be seen by observing that just a few feet below the surface the temperature remains a constant -100°F. BETTER KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE SUN Lunar Samples are starting to fill the gap of the Earth's first l.O to -l;8- 716 1.5 billion history. Scientists generally agree that the moon is approxi- mately the same age as the Earth and meteorites (i.e. li.6 billion years old). Initially there appears to have been large scale melting and differentiation accompanied by large scale impacts that lasted some l. 5 billion years. This culminated by lava flooding these large mare basins from 3.9 billion years until 3.3 billion years ago. - An unexpected discovery from the first lunar samples was small amounts of gas trapped in the soil and breccias. It didn't take scientists long to realize that this material was from an extremely thin but steady stream of gas that moves constantly outward from the sun at approximately 300 miles per second. For billions of years it has rained steadily on the airless moon, and has become trapped in whatever layer was at the surface at the time. It is thought that an 8' core sample from Hadley Rille area may show the effect from Solar activity over the l billion years. It will show the heavy perticle as well as low particle stages in the Sun's development . (The imprint of Solar activity is left on the soil layers.) Scientists must study the concentrations as well as the nature and distributions Of Solar particles, layer by layer, to gain this new insight into the Sun's past history. By better understanding the Sun's history of radiation, we will be better able to understand the history of the Earth, its' ice ages, climate, environment and those conditions for supporting life. The purpose of the 6 Apollo moon-landing missions was to explore and 'better understand a few chapters of lunar history. By going to the moon and --- -lºg- 717 "kicking up dust" we can truly study the past history of our nearest neighbor. Hence, this information can be related to the evolutionary stages of our planet Earth. On Earth l to 2 billion years of accumulation of rock and sediments have been eroded away by water, wind, and ice, while the moon has lain stagnant for over 3 billion years. So, to explore the moon and having man wipe away the dust from the rocks, we can read the history of the lunar activity, just like a storybook. From a geologic stand-point, we have learned a great deal from the Apollo missions. But most of the information and moon mºvies take years to deceipher. Scientists are busy at the LBJ Space Center in Houston, Texas trying to put together this geologic puzzle to give man a good pic- ture of the past history of the moon. NASA has also distributed moon rocks and dust to over 105 major universities in the U.S. and other foreign countries to be analyzed. It will take several years before all the data is compared and the results are compiled, but in just four years after man's first step on the moon, we have a pretty good indication of the large scale happenings in the moon's past. DATING OF LUNAR EVENTS The age of lunar rocks are determined from the extremely small amounts of radioactive material present as impurities in any lunar rock. A radio- active atom is one that in a given time changes (or decays) into some other kind of atom. By Comparing the amount of original material to that of changed material within the sample, a relative age can be reached. For 93-466 O - 73 - 46 -50- 718 lunar samples potassium/argon dating is quite effective in determining ages of moon rocks in the range of l.2 to l.5 billion years old while uranium dates well up to li.5 billion years of age. From these dating techniques, as well as from the results of other experiments conducted Orl the Apollo missions, lunar scientists are able to divide the moon's history into four major catagories. These periods were each named for an event that occurred during that time span. First is the Pre-Imbrium period. This is the segment of time from the formation of the moon, some li.6 billion years ago, to about H.O billion years ago. This period precedes the Imbrium basin impact and the maria formations on the moon. Some accretion occurred during this time and at least a partial layering affect was caused in the uppermost areas of the moon. The less dense materials floated to the surface to solidify into the highlands, while the denser layers sunk and solidified to form layers deeper within the moon. The second period is called the Imbrium period. This was the time period when a large meteorite formed the Imbrium basin and other similar structures on the moon. It is thought to have occurred approximately 3.9 billion years ago. This event occurred before maria formation. The third time division is called the Eratosthenian period. This is the period after the maria formation (3.8 to 3.3 billion years ago) when young impact craters formed on the lunar surface. The craters formed during this time are still quite sharp in appearance but the ' - ejecta rays have disappeared due to gardening and particle bombardment from the Sun called -51- 719 "Solar wind". The fourth and final division is called the Copernican period. This is the time period when the Crater Copernicus was formed by an impact of a meteorite into the moon. Craters within this period are sharp rimmed and still have extensive ray systems. The age that Copernicus was formed is thought to be 900,000,000 years ago. Before the Apollo missions, Ranger, Surveyor, and Lunar Orbiter had given scientists some kind of cronology, but they were at a loss for relative dates in time when these events occurred. The Apollo missions have returned varied samples, and these dates have coincided directly with the four particular time divisions. Through continued studies, more details about past lunar events will come to light. At this time only 10 or l1% of the total samples have been analyzed. In all, over 800 pounds of lunar samples have been returned to Earth and the data will not even peak until late 197l or early 1975. MOONQUAKES Much new data on moonquakes has been recorded from the Apollo 12, 1], and 16 seismographs left on the lunar surface. By measuring the speed of a wave from its epicenter to the seismometer, we can tell generally about the composition and structure of the interior of the moon. From these unique seismometers, the lunar quakes on Earth originate within the first 20 miles of the surface while lunar quakes can occur at a depth of li BO miles below the surface. This fact suggests that the moon is capable of storing a greater stress within its elastic layers, at a greater depth and -52- 720 for a longer time than the same stress in Earth layers. The moon is, of course, much less seismically active than the Earth. In fact, there has been an average of only one impact or quake per l.5 days over the last 2h months. Hence, geologists feel that the moon's interior is much cooler and less active than on Earth. Also, the force of these moonquakes is a relatively mild l. 5 to 2.0 on the Richter scale. Moonquakes have been pinpointed as recurring at 10 to 12 specific sights on the moon. One area that is located 600 km. SSW of the Apollo 12 and ll: sights accounts for about 80% of the total moonquake activity. Moonquakes occur exclusively during two 3 day periods each month. First, they occur when the moon is at perigee or at its closest approach to the Earth. The second period they occur is when the moon is at apogee or the position farthest from the Earth during the month. It is believed that the tidal factors trigger the quakes. That is, due to the gravitational force of the Earth trying to pull tides out of a. solid moon, it causes undue tension on the inner structure and hence pressures are relieved by way of the moonquakes. It appears that from these quake readings, the moon may be solid at a depth of 500 miles or more. Also, due to the lack of water in the soil, the seismic waves take much longer to travel to the seismometer and last a much longer time. (Reverberation occurs.) A major goal is to pinpoint those epicenters or points where moonquakes continually occur. By studying the Earth-moon system we may obtain a better insight concerning new quakes occurring on the Earth. -53- 721 Also, by using the laser reflector left on the moon, and bouncing a las ºr beam off the lunar surface back to Earth, we can watch such things as the movement or the different crystal plates on the Earth. Through a . worldwide network of laser beam equipment, we could much better understand the earthquakes that are occurring on a worldwide basis. Another find was that less large scale or regional movement of crust takes place on the moon as it does on Earth. This called plate tectonics. The activities that are now occurring is most probably on a less local scale. So, in studying the earthquake patterns in detail, it appears that the moon and Earth have had a much different thermal history. In other experiments it was found that the moon has little, if any, magnetic field. In some places, there are small areas of local magnetic fields, but these may be due to mascons or large meteorites that impacted the moon while it was still molten. The second possibility is that the moon had a molten core and generated a magnetic field. But due to meteorite impacts over billions of years, the field has been lost except for a few local areas. Tha third possibility is that the moon may have formed a weak mag- netic field while in the influence of the Earth or Sun. In any case, this magnetic field is very weak and cannot be detected on a local scale. Another surprising find from lunar orbit, was that the far side differs from the near side structually, chemically, and topographically. Using the lazer altimeter it was found that the front side of the moon is depressed 1.2 miles below the so called lunar norm for sea level and the far side is –5k- 722 elevated about l.2 miles above the lunar sea level. (The lunar sea level is a norm set by tracking data and the laser altimeter information.). Chemically, the lunar highlands were found to be higher in aluminum and lower in magnesium than the maria basin areas. It was also found that the highland areas are low in radioactivity while the maria areas are relatively high in radioactive content. Hence, all of these findings and many more will come to light in the near future due to the Apollo project. The oldest known formations on Earth are about 3.7 billion years old, western part of Greenland), but the previous l billion of Earth's history has been eroded away by water, wind, and ice. By studying the history of the moon, this may help us to account for the events occurring the first billion years on Earth. s It is worth recalling that at the early part of the 1960's, the infor- mation that we knew about the moon rested primarily on Galleo when he pioneered the telescope in 1610. He named the dark areas seas and the lighter mountain areas highlands. He was first to make a topography map of the moon and this basic form was used until quite recently. Until the 1960's when we started the construction of unmanned spacecraft to explore the moon from closeup, all previous study had been done by telescope. In 1961, came Ranger Project; it sent back many pictures and crashed landed the moon; then Lunar Surveyor in 1966 soft landed on the moon. It sent back still TV pictures from the moon and incorporated a scoop to dig up moon dust and place it on a foot pad of the craft near a "color wheel". The -55- 723 comparative color of the soil and the dust was studied to see what man would be up against when he too was ready for a moon landing. Eventually, from 1966-69 came the Lunar Orbiter series. It mapped the lunar terrain from 113 miles up in orbit around the moon. It paved the way that ultimately allowed man to see his future landing sites and showed him exactly what he was in store for in the near future. While this was all occurring in the unmanned field, exploration was also going on in the manned aspect of spaceflight. We saw the first Mercury (one manned flights) followed by project Gemini (2 manned flights), and eventually the Apollo moon landing program. By using the knowledge and technology gained from one phase, the U.S. was able to move onward into the next phase. Both manned and unmanned programs went hand in hand. Each benefitted from the other and it was clearly recognized that space travel was quite safe and very rewarding as far as exploration was con- cerned. Prior to Apollo, only an occasional meteorite was discovered. These few samples gave us the only key to what occurred on Earth and throughout the Solar System over the past billions of years. As astronaut David Scott has stated, "From exploration comes discovery, and from discovery comes better ways of doing things". In summary, I feel that, due to the Apollo Program, we have gained much new knowledge about our closest neighbor, the moon. Through studying these records of past history (that have been long erased from the Earth's surface) we will be better able to understand the moon's evolutionary stages –56- 724 of development. It is a known fact that the Earth and moon travel through Space as one "system" in their orbit about the Sun. Hence, by studying the events of past lunar history we may be better able to correlate those events to events that took place on Earth during the same time period. In studying samples from the moon, we may ultimately uncover many of the chapters in the past history of our Earth and the Sun as well. -57- 725 APPENDIX AAA Paper N0.73-13 DESIGN OF LOW-COST, REFURBISHABLE SPACECRAFT FOR USE WITH THE SHUTTLE by M. W. HUNTER II, R. M. GRAY, and W. F. MILLER Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, Inc. Sunnyvale, California a * : º . . . § * º .** ** * - sº º º, ºn.” s ſ N º t : ſº : . WASHINGTON, D.C./JANUARY 8-10, 1973 First publication rights reserved by American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. 1290 Avenue of the Americas, New York, N. Y. 10019. Abstracts may be published without permission if credit is given to author and to AIAA. (Price: AIAA Member $1.50. Nonmember $2.00). Note: This paper available at AIAA New York office for six months; thereafter, photoprint copies are available at photocopy prices from AIAA Library, 750 3rd Avenue, New York, New York 10017 726 Abstract This paper describes the principal characteristics ºf fºu?'t modularized spacecraft to be launched and serv- jº.! ... the Space Shuttle, the potential standardization ...Fºi (perational methodology to be employed, and the im- pact 3 alpon the space program in the 1980's. The discus- s: cº) is, presented in five parts: - Modularized Spacecraft and Refurbishable Component Designs o Standardization of Space Hardware o New Logistics of Space-Maintainable Spacecraft o Cost Impacts on the Space Program o Management Considerations for Implementation 1. Introduction The Space Shuttle, now being implemented as the principal element of the new reusable space transporta- . tion system of the 1980's, has an interesting relation- ship to Space payloads. The Shuttle provides the incen- tive and base for significant improvements and cost reductions in payloads, spacecraft, and transfer stages; these cost reductions, in turn, constitute some of the strongest justifications for the shuttle program. During the past 15 years, the spacecraft designer has adapted his designs to the constraints of off-the- shelf launch vehicles, which in most cases forced him to highly specialized equipment, stressing small size, light weight, and very high reliability. These qualities in the spacecraft hardware, were gained at considerable expense throughout the research and development, man- ufacturing, and flight-qualification processes. We have iearned much in these initial years in space; this knowledge, applied in combination with a relaxation of spacecraft weight and volume allowed with the Shuttle, can yield designs which are significantly lower in cost than the historical. Moreover, the Shuttle can retrieve spacecraft, perform on-orbit repair, and return sub- system modules to earth for repair, refurbishment, and Subsequent reuse. Modularized spacecraft with compo- nents which can be readily ground-refurbished and re- tested will offer further cost reductions in terms of re- usc value. - Finally, the Shuttle has provided the impetus for developing an inventory of standard spacecraft subsystem modules which can be applied to a number of different spacecraft and missions. This paper provides an outline of designs and data created by Lockhoed Missiles & Space Company, Inc., over the past 2.5 years in various studies of low-cost and standardized spacecraft hardware, and discusses the new logistics concepts to be used with shuttle-era payloads. The cost impacts of low-cost and refurbish- able design and standardization upon future space pro- gram costs are also summarized. Finally, a brief anal- ysis is offered of the special management considera- tions arising as a result of implementation of the "new look" spacecraft and standardized subsystems, modules, and components. Phase A studies by NASA and industry. 2. Modularized Spacecraft and Refurbishable Qomponent Design LMSC started low-cost payload studies in 1970. The initial study involved the redesign for low-cost three historical earth-orbiting satellites: the Orbiti Astronomical Observatory (OAO-B), a Synchronous Equatorial Orbiter (SEO), and a Small IResearch Sat- ellite (SRS). Results are discussed in Reference 2 and 6. - During this initial study, much was learned rega ing the type of cost reductions which could be innple- mented, and the approximate impact upon various co: categories. A typical matrix of cost reduction areas shown on Figure 1. These principles were applied al in a follow-on study implemented in 1971 wherein the scope of investigation was widened to include (a) dev opment of several additional low-cost point designs to provide a firmer basis for application of Shuttle benef to the complete NASA mission model of 45 different m Sions, (b) a more complete analysis of refurbishmen and (c) an investigation of the effects of spacecraft/ subsystem standardization on the total space program Modularization of Spacecraft and Experiments. Throughout the initial study and the follow-on, inv tigations of low-cost, refurbishable, standard designs have been limited to unmanned payloads only (see Figure 2). The other payloads to be carried by the Sh tle have not yet been exposed to a detailed analysis for low-cost potential. To supplement the initial "program spacecraft," new point designs were developed to fill-in, the design and cost voids on the mission model. Figure 3 lists seven additional spacecraft point designs which were developed. As an example, a long duration spacecraft was not included in the earlier work; therefore, a 5-year mean mission-duration (MMD) U. S. Domestic COMSAT de- sign was added. These designs were not compared in detail to previously-flown designs as in the original stu but rather were developed from the bottom up with re- spect to the known requirements of such systems from An external view of the future Earth Observatory Satellite is shown in Figure 4, and the modular arrange ment for this design is shown in Figure 5. The space- craft modules themselves, those which supply the oper tional functions of the spacecraft, are mounted in the tº portion of the satellite facing away from earth. All bay on the side of the satellite facing earth uro dovotod to experiment instrumentation. This design features fixeſ position solar arrays whose extended Beta angle is ad- justable prior to launch depending upon the orbit to be flown. An external view of a future COMSAT design is shown in Figure 6, with the modular arrangement sho in Figure 7. Again, spacecraft modules are facing awa from earth while the communication modules face earth The solar arrays required for this design are so large that a major change from the previous work was intro- duced, namely, the utilization of large oxtendable- retractable flexible arrays. Single-axis rotation is util ized. 727 All designs have been based upon a fairly uniform set of criteria which will provide lowest spacecraft pro-. gram costs. These criteria are listed on Figure 8. These designs feature a completely modularized satel- lite, both spacecraft subsystems and experiments or mission-equipment, to allow in-orbit replacement of modules (discussed in Section 4). Typical modules are illustrated in Figures 9a and 9b. Design for Ground Refurbishment Because of the critical cost impact of refurbish- ment and reuse of spacecraft hardware, increasingly heavier emphasis has been placed upon design for re- furbishment. In the earlier low-cost payload studies, general analyses were made synthesizing the refur- bishable component designs. Manhour estimates were made of disassembly/assembly, QA and test and engi- neering support; these were combined with estimates of cost for new replacement parts to derive a total re- furbishment cost for each component and module. The amount of work and the cost of "throwaway" parts in each type of module will vary, thereby altering the refurbishment ratio, i.e., the cost of refurbishing the module compared to the cost of buying a new module. The results obtained from the first two studies are sum- marized on Figure 10. Rigid solar arrays, particularly the solar-cell pan- els thereof, comprise primarily throwaway elements; the refurbishment ratio is therefore higher than for other subsystem modules. With small increase in unit cost, however, the design life or refurbishment time cycle for solar arrays can be doubled, thereby reducing the average refurbishment cost on a long-term mission. Also, with the flexible extendable/retractable arrays proposed for a standard hardware approach (see Sec- tion 3), the stowage container, extension mechanism, sun-orienting drive, and other mechanical elements are reusable; usage of this type of solar array module will tend to further reduce the refurbishing cost. In a current study for NASA/MSFC, LMSC is going into more depth in the special design of spacecraft mod- ules and components to allow cost-optimized ground re- furbishment. The designs of off-shelf components such as star trackers, reaction wheels, horizon sensors, and similar equipment are being analyzed with the ob- jective of redesigning the components to low-cost, re- furbishable hardware with equivalent performance. An example of a potential reaction wheel redesign is shown in Figure 11. The existing off-shelf wheel assembly is a sealed unit with the flywheel shaft assembly double-end mounted in two housing halves before final braze sealing. The proposed redesign utilizes a one-side mounted wheel with bearings, motor, and other parts readily removable for cleaning, inspection, and reuse in the refurbished assembly. Using this design approach, field depot refurbish- ment of modules/components will become a reality for Shuttle spacecraft; refurbishment ratios of 0.15 to 0.20 (weighted average) are feasible of attainment. In other words, refurbishment for a complete set of modules for a spacecraft will cost only 15% to 20% of the cost of a replacement spacecraft (the modular design of the space- craft allows module replacement and spacecraft retest at essentially zero cost). 3. Standardization of Space Hardware Once one adopts a completely modularized design, it is a very natural thought to consider the standardiza- tion of the modules. In order to approach this problem in depth, several levels of standardization were consid- ered, namely, the use of standardized modules, the use of standardized spacecraft, and the use of the so-called cluster spacecraft. A standard spacecraft is defined as a spacecraft which can be used on a number of individual missions, and a cluster spacecraft is one which can do 'many missions on a single flight. It was in the process of approaching standardization logically that a different approach to the whole low-cost design area evolved. It was decided to modularize all spacecraft of the entire space program, Mission Model Used as a Base The NASA/DOD mission model utilized consists of 77 programs involving 606 satellite placements. In or- der to make the study more manageable, two subgroups of the 77 programs were broken out as shown in Fig- ure 12. The 45 program subgroup comprised all pro- grams except DOD, the NASA manned sortie and space stations flights, and seven of the deep-space planetary programs. This subgroup was examined in complete detail. The results were later extrapolated from the 45 program subgroup to the total 77 programs by assum- ing that similar results would be obtained for similar type missions. Standard and cluster spacecraft were investigated, however, only for the 15 low-earth-orbit (LEO) program subgroup. No effort was made to apply these concepts to either the 45 program subgroup, or the total 77 programs, thus leaving a further conservatism in the total program cost-reduction estimates. Methodology for Standard Module Designs. The general approach used in developing a potential set of subsystem standard modules to support most of the spacecraft in the NASA Mission Model is shown graphically in Figure 13. First, the subsystem require- ments for each mission were determined by successively analyzing the mission requirement and then the specific support requirement for each experiment carried by the spacecraft. The spacecraft total hardware was divided into six subsystems. Four of these were examined for standard- ization: Stabilization and Control (S&C); Communica- tions, Data Processing, and Instrumentation; Electrical Power (EPS); and Attitude Control (ACS). The two other subsystems, structures (Struct) and environmental con- trol (ECS), were considered essentially tailored to each mission (space frame plus passive or quasi-passive ECS). and not as appropriate for standardization. However, the space frame cavities for modules were "standard- ized" in terms of module guide rails, locating pins, latches, and electrical disconnects. A standard propulsion module (integral kick stage) was considered initially as a standard module but tenta- tively discarded because very few missions required a kick stage (based upon assumption that spacecraft deliv- ery is by the Space Tug on direct injection by the Shuttles. The second step convºrised the polnt tiesłgns of a few representative spacecraft which incorporated the 728 subsystem module concept. Specific designs for two sets of modules were derived. - These module point designs were then compared to the requirements list for each separate mission. Where the mission design life (MMD) was sufficiently different from the point design, additional (redundant) components were added to module as a "variant" to accommodate the new MMD. An example of this for a CDPI module is shown on Figure 14 where a -1 module is altered to a -1-1 variant by redundifying four components to increase the MMD from 3 years to 5 years. Similarly, variants were created for performance-level changes; an example of a solar array also is given on Figure 14, wherein the EPS-1 module is converted to an EPS-1-1 variant by re- placing a "component" (flexible solar array assembly) with a larger size to obtain an increase from 100 watts to 200 watts capacity. In this case, the container and boom elements were designed initially to accommodate larger "window-shade" flexible solar array assemblies. The final step (Figure 13) entailed a commonality analysis of the mission-peculiar module designs and selection of a minimum quantity of modules and variants to cover the 45 different missions. The results of the analysis are shown in Figure 15. Although 425 mission- peculiar modules were required for the 45-programs, these same missions can be performed using only 21 standard modules with 24 variants. Thus, an entire relatively complicated space pro- gram was assembled from a relatively small number of understandable modules. The whole program was there- by greatly simplified. All of this is made possible pri- marily by the Shuttle's leniency with respect to the weight and volume allowed for unmanned spacecraft. It is also a product of the type of analysis made. A complete space program was analyzed, and the mutual support of equip- ment from one individual program to another freely con- sidered. This could not have been done 10, or even 5, years ago. Previously, no one knew enough to try to as- semble a total program in the new, mysterious realm of space with any degree of confidence, and individual pro- grams were treated as the absolute private property of the program manager. The Shuttle may, indeed, gr change our spacecraft outlook. - 4. New Logistics of Space-Maintainable Spacecraft The families of modularized payloads derived by these studies has strong interactions with the Shuttle/Tug system. In particular, it is not easy to get the required performance to synchronous equatorial orbit from a sim- ple chemical tug. At first thought, it appears that the payload-effects activity compounds this problem, since, in general, larger weight spacecraft are required. On the other hand, the use of the easily replaceable modules permits servicing the spacecraft on orbit while carrying to it only a fraction of its weight in replacement modules. This module exchange, with return of the used modules to earth for refurbishment and subsequent reuse, is a strong feature of the system, and both the weight of mod- ules required for such an operation and the interface equipments required on the Shuttle and Tug, have been analyzed. Module weights for all synchronous equatorial * are within 40 - 60% of the total spacecr W t. Payload Interface Equipment Estimates of the interface equipment weights re- quired, both Shuttle-mounted and Tug-mounted, are \ shown in Figure 16. The storage, checkout, and trans- mission revisit in low-earth orbit is shown in Figure the j: quantity of payload failures which occurs in portation rack (SCAT rack) stays with the Shuttle at a times. The weights required which remain in the Sht should not be particularly troublesome, but due to the critical performance nature of the Tug itself, the Tu mounted weight should be reduced further, if at all p sible. A possible cargo bay configuration for a multi Here, additional orbital maneuvering system (OMS) age is carried in the Shuttie cargo bay to permit addi aſ maneuvering among the orbits; four SCAT racks additional monitoring and test equipment are also c ried. Interactions among the subsystems, payloads, Tug, and the Shuttle require further definition. Significance of On-Orbit Checkout The significance of performing on-orbit checkout module replacement becomes evident when one consid ascent. Historical records of U.S. spacecr launched in the period 1957 through 1970 indicated th a total count of i230 anomalies, approximately 46% oc checkout and fault discrimination to the module level, and (2) on-board spare modules to replace the failed units, will provide the means for returning the payload its pre-launch condition and reduce the expected overa failures on the mission by 46%. This is diagrammatical shown on Figure 18 as "Zone 1 ". This zone includes the Shuttle loiter period of 7 days; the cost of the loiter versus the potential mission savings in correcting a fai ure is one of the tradeoffs which are being done by LM * Note: These data were collected and cataloged, and summary results were released, by Planning Re- search Corp. (see Reference 7). 5. Cost Impacts on the Space Program Costs were assembled, mission-by-mission, for total 1979-1990 space program. The Shuttle costing included simply as a Shuttle user's fee at a constant v per flight; a cost of $10.5 million per flight was used (t is slightly higher than the current figure being used by NASA). The baseline cost estimates, to which the low- cost programs were compared, were obtained from dat prepared by the Aerospace Corporation for NASA/HQ (Reference 8). A number of alternative approaches was establishe relevant to the degree of implementation of spacecraft hardware standardization. A typical example of the coi impact is illustrated in Figure 19. The "best-mix" ind cated thereon comprised: (1) use of standard subsyste. modules on 45 NASA missions, (2) use of a standard spaceframe to support 4 low-earth-orbit (LEO) mission and (3) use of a cluster spacecraft to support an addi- tional 11 LEO missions. - In Figure 19, the costs are displayed as a function year. The total savings are about $5.2 billion for the 12 year period; they average almost $430 million per ye The most significant effect, pººnaps, is that maximum savings accrue in the 1978 to 1984 time period, wher: th Shuttle funding will be most critical. 3. 729 The savings on the total NASA plus Non-NASA plus DCD space programs are shown on Figure 20; comparison is made between 15 missions (LEO only), 45 missions, and 77 missions. The totals represent the 1979 through 99th space program. The maximum savings were for a group of 77 missions employing Cluster spacecraft to ac- conilºish 4 ºf the LEO missions. The transportation costs were conservatively assigned on the basis of dedicated Shuttle flight for each payload placement (except for the Cluster spacecraft). Use of multiple-payload delivery techniques has been investigated and will markedly de- crease the costs shown. - Thus, approximately $700 million to as high as $1 billion per year can be saved (on the average) by use of low-cost, refurbishable, and/or standard spacécraft hardware on the 77-mission space program. It is important to point out that in the studies to date, no attempt has been made to make low-cost nor to standardize experiments or mission-equipment. Be- cause almost one-half of the program baseline costs are estimated to be in the experiment packages, further pro- gram savings are possible in this area. 6. Management Considerations for Implementation. The large program cost savings achievable by im- plementation of the "payload effects" system of space- cºaſt design and operation islake it mandatory that such a system be instigated. When such large savings are un- govered, it almost certainly implies a change in the basic way of doing one's business, and consequently, a large change in management outlook. The new system of spacecraft design described here is no exception in this respect. The logical consequence of the relaxed weight and volume, the high degree of modularization, and the desire to make maximum use of flight-proven hardware concepts and technology is to develop a stand- ard set of modules and apply these throughout the space program. - ºlncentive for Standardization The word "standardization" evokes varying respon- ses. Standardization has always seemed like the answer to high costs, and it has consequently been discussed and tried at various times in the space program. The re- sults to date have been inconclusive and it has usually been abandoned. Standardization, which has been the backbone of the American industrial system, is sensible when: (1) low cost is necessary; (2) thero is a multi- plicity of requirements; and (3) the penalties for it are acceptable. Low cost was not really a prime development con- sideration during the first space decade. The nation was excited over this new and important frontier. Many new techniques were thought to be required for space; agencies, programs, and companies simply could not wait to learn in their way all these techniques, regard- less of cost. We are now well into the second space de- cade, and it is clear that the ground rules bave changed. Unless the costs of the national space program are made reasonable, there will be no appreciable space program. The incentives to obtain low cost are now very strong. -- An Excellent Basis for Standardization A multiplicity of requirements is a prime requisite; otherwise there is nothing to which to apply standardiza- tion. This implies also that the total spectrum of re- quirements is sufficiently well understood that a sensible system of standardization which will cover most of the requirements can be applied. Although there has always. becn a multiplicity of space program requirements, only recently has the space program become sophisticated enough to mount a concerted effort to evaluate total space program requirements with standardization in mind. The studies done surrounding the Space Shuttle economic justification, in fact, are probably the most elaborate of such analyses ever accomplished. It is not necessary that the total program used be correct in detail. Actually, no one can predict such a future program with severe accuracy. The important element, however, is that the components of such a mis- sion model contain essentially all of those functions which will constitute sonne final program. Then it is possible to exercise the total mission model, distill the proper standardized items from it, and set up a system that will be insensitive in the future to rather large changes in mission requirements. In recent studies, it has been demonstrated that the entire space program, which involves 606 satellite placements, could be done with only 21 standardized modules with 24 minor variants of same. Thus, a vastly complex space program could be supported by a small number of parts. But more important, it has become apparent (from analysis of the requirements mission- by-mission and the application of small inventory of subsystem modules to support these requirements) that many other vastly different programs of greater or 'less complexity could also be assembled from these. There is now strong indication that the U.S. has matured sufficiently in space knowledge that we can fin- ally distill a standardized system from a multiplicity of requirements and be able to set up a system relatively insensitive to requirement changes in the future. . Standardization vs Advanced Technology and Special Requirements. It has been suggested that the use of standardized modules would never work because it allegedly involves freezing technology at the time of module production. This, of course, is not true. Advancing technology would be incorporated in the module system at periodic times in the future. However, a restraint would be applied: advance of technology would be incorporated in the modules on the basis of its worth to the overall space program, rather than being a unilateral decision of an individual program manager. Of course an individual pro- gram could conceivably come up with a requirement so unique that it made rºore sense to handle it individually than to incorporate it in the module production system. This would be a decision which should be surfaced to the top level of the total slace program, for such exceptions must be very rare or the system will quickly deteriorate. 730 This system of standardization is really much like :hº modern automobile industry's and for much thr same “it sons. Modern production lines are not the "You can ... we any color you want as long as it's black" systems wºuich started the industry. They are highly standard- . . . . ºr oduction systems which are technically updated co-tim:ously; the parts from these systems can be as- sembled into a dazzling variety of products so that the * †. ich.:ll automobile owner has a wide selection, yet he ; : 1st still operate within certain constraints. One can get alºnost any color he wants, a variety of interiors, tº hi nunnerous engines and transmissions in an automo- b.le tºday. It is difficult, however, to buy a three- wheeled car. It is not surprising that the maturing of the space industry should lead to essentially the same system for obtaining a large variety of benefits at rea- so able cost which has occurred in other industries. It may offend the technological sensitivities of space engi- neers and scientists to think of it this way, but that, too, is a transient which inust pass as the sto:icle industry m atu ros. Riſest of Standardization on Procurement āīāTS5āGOTOEISTIES - --- The implications of spacecraft standardization ap- plied to Shuttle-era payload logistics are profound. Commonality of modules allows use of the same module or component on several missions and reduces the total quantity of hardware in the logistics chain. Training of field maintenance personnel can be reduced in scope and intentified in durit: Gº & fxyz wery similar rºodules, Spares provisioning can be simplified and a "new look" of common sources for long-term and higher-quantity procurement can be envisioned. Figure 21 is a flow diagram showing a hypothetical fu- ture procurement and logistics plan for full implement- ation of a standard-module system. Alternate plans, considerably more in detail, are being developed cur- rently by NASA and LMSC. The total plan represented has more overall management discipline than currently, but it is not inflexible. What is envisioned, quite simply, is some sort of a module production system superimposed on various individual programs run much in the manner that they are today. The program officers would be con- strained to assemble their spacecraft with modules sup- plied from the module production system. In return, individual programs will feed requirements to the module production system. Before these new requirements are incorporated in the module production lines, however, the nodule-production miunagement will analyze them with respect to all missions so that the module update will always be done with the total space program (all missions) in mind, 6. Hunter, Maxwell w. II; Miller, wayne F.; Gray, 7. Conclusions o The continuing analysis of the effects of the Space Shuttle on payload and spacecraft design shows that large cost sav'ngs can be achieved. The use of highl modularized det;igns and the standardization of these modules is a key feature of the new finily of spacec o The entire mission model postulated (77 prog with 606 satellite placements) can be accomplished b only 21 standard modules, with 24 minor variations. The weight increases tend to be 1000 to 2000 kg per spacecraft and are indeper ſent of spacecraft size 33 the weight increase for lar :e spacecraft will not be g o On-orbit repair or refurbishment can bc accom- plished by the exchange of modules in space. About half of a spacecraft's weight must be cxchanged for a complete refurbishment (replacement of all modules). o Strong interactions arº apparent among payloads, shuttles, and space tugs; these require still further investigation. o Total program cost savings approximate a billion dollars a year over a 12-year program. These savin are almost completely due to low-cost payloads. o Certain overall management viewpoints will have be changed in order to implement the cost savings de- scribed here. These are in many respects analogous the changes which have occurred in other maturing irdustries. - 8. References 1. Economic Analysis of the Space Shuttle System, Heiss, Klaus P.; Morgenstern, Mathematica, Inc., January 31, 1972. 2. Payload Effects Analysis Study, LMSC-A990556, Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc., June 30, 1971 3. Heiss, Klaus P. , "Our R&D Economics and the Space Shuttle." Astronautics & Aeronautics, Oct. 1971. 4. Hunter, Maxwell W. II, "Space Shuttle Influence on Payload and Spacecraft Design, " Raumfahrtfors- chung, March/April 1972. 5. Impact of Low-Cost Reſurbishable and Standard Spacecraft. Upon Future NASA Space Programs, Final Report, Payload Effects Follow-On Study, LMSC-D157926, Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc., 30 April 1972. Robert M.; "The Space Shuttle Will Cut Payload Costs, "Astronautics & Aeronautics, June 1972. 7. Reliability_Data from Inflight Spacecraft; 1958-1970 PRC-R-1453 Final Report, 30 Nov. 1971, Planning Research Corp. 8. Integrated Operations/Payload/Fleet Analysis Final Report, Report No. ATR-72 (7231)-1, Aerospace Corporation, August 1971. • 731 simplit tº:*R* \s ----------- T | UNIT | Rotºr ' rºoººº, on ortrations - TI-TT . sº |sſ I is: É :csl REDuctiºn arra E = |* i ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ) is ... ig f # E is tº E. z i ; ºf E is tº 15 $ lº § 3 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ########|######### ### G# 3 # 3 & # 5 tº 15 5 - +--- T-I -- | i i stMotif itſ to NTRACTIDOCUMENT Rtº:indººit; x [x |x| < | | < || |x|x|x ... configuration MANAGEMENT (TRACEABILIn x Ix Ix Ix | | | | |x|. ust nº proven ſtchnology-off shru. x IX ; : x x ... & of lºw-cost Materials x 1.x 1 x x x I XI X Dickuas: «Trfssurvel on parts x Ix x * x - use towr-Quality parts x Ix. IX i x|x x Xi Xi Xi X . . .4, sº structurf safety Marcin x |x|x|x | x |}. x I XI XI XI X | use unwºrffitability CoAustwºwaiwºmancº * IX 1.x Ix X |x | xi xj x | Volume of Patxaces x x i ix | xi x increase HARDWARE wricht Auowance x IX x x x . x|x | simplºymentularize wartware x |x|x|x| | x : x x . x|x|x|x x simplify trfdUCE Ground TESTIMG x Ix Ix Ix Ix Ix x Lot ORRIt maintenancEntºurbishment AND Pause x |x|x|x|x|x| xi xj xi x x . x|x|x|x|x|x|x partny Hardware update tws nºw hardwara x Ix Ix Ix Ix Ix I Xi Xi Xi x Ix XI XI XI X | x ". Pºt-DEPudyMºntorºir CHEckout x Ix Ix Ix x: xi x x . . xi xj xi xj x | i i Figure 1. Poteºt al. Cost Reduction Areas for Shuttle Payloads [[INMANNEDEVISAS SPACE TUGS MANNED PAYLOADS SORTIE PAYLOADs Figure 2. | r | | Large Observatories Earth Satellites Planetary Orbiters/Probes/Landers Centaur Expendable | Agena Reusable - 00S-C Space Station Segments Personnel/Cargo Logistics Containers Manned Experiment Modules Marined Modules Test Lab Paſſets - Misc. Experiments Low-cost Studies Limited to Unmanned Payloads 732 Mission Application - Spacecraft Design Paylcad Hareware. - - | Type LIfe Reliability LEO [Syneq º : Program ono lyr. I - .60 x t *-nºrºrrºft Sto 2 yr. .6. x SRs lyr. .60 X OAO Orbiting Astronomical Observatory - sco Synchronous Equatorial Orbiter | Standard Eos lyr, .60 x srs small Research satellite Sulisystem CoMSAT 5 yr. .75 X x EOs Earth Observatory Satellite Modules Planetary 2 yr. .75 x Laos Large Astronomical Observatory Satellite Standard LA0s lyr, ,60 x Spacecraft Eos 2 yr. .60 X Cluster Laos lyr. ,60 x Spacecraft EOs lyr, .60 X Figure 3, Point Designs _2^ WEIGHTS: 1.6m -- Spacecraft (Dry) 2343 Kg - Experiments 464 º - sm : Sº Propellant 70 2877 Kg Figure 4. Future Earth Observatory Satellite (EOG) D-1. Passive Microwave Radio-ter (A -o.81 cm) D-2 thematic *apper D-3 Passive Microwave -adio-ter (A - 2.81 ce.) E-1 Passive Microw-e-Radio-ter (A - 6-91 cm) E-2 or in Scºnning spectrophoto-eter **º-ric Pºllution-5-n-or upper at-o-pºwer-sounder E-3. Cloud Physica Radio-eter 5-a-surface tºp. Radio-eter Passive w Ranio-eter (A - 1.67 cm) Passive Mw Rºdiº-eter (A - 1.ho ca) |- 5TrM Mºulº. -------itude C-trol Module -o- 1 -2 5 - Whe Band co-unication Module -3 Battery Module ºn-l a.k. Power control Module a-6 attitude control Module wo. 2 B-1 x-Band Co-unication Module B-2 5-c serona-ry reference Module | B-3 sac Priºrary ºef-rence Module º B-6. Reaction torque Module C-1 attitude cºntrol woule wo. 3 Earth C-2 Data Processinº rodale c-3 Battery Mºu-e No. 2 c-k Battery Molute to. 3 t-6 attitude control zodule wo. * Module Installations in EOS - 733 DIRECTION OF FLIGHT - _7 Ş WEIGHTS: , Spacecraft (dry) 1389 kg Mission-Equipment 414 Propellant 314 Total . . . 2.17 kg Figure 6. Future Communications Satellite (COMSAT) $pacecrºft Subs ! A-1 Attitude Control Module No. 1 A-3 Attitude Control Medule No. 2 B-1 Battery Module No. 1 B-3 Battery Module No. 2 C-1 $olar Array Drive Module D-1 Power Distribution Module D-3 CDP. Module E-2 S&C Sensing Module E-4 Momentum Wheel Module H-2 Attitude Control Module No. 3 H-4 Attitude Control Module No. 4 Mission Equipment F-2 Transponder Module No. 1 |F-4 11 ºt ; : 2 G-2 uſ $5 º 3 4 G-4 it' ºn n Figure 7. Standard Module Installations in COMSAT 93-466 O - 73 - 47 734 Manufacturing cess Effect: • Elimination of high-cost materials #~ch as beryllium, composites, tc. & Elimination of high-cost processes , such as contour machining, chemi- cal milling, etc. Simplification of design, standard- ization of parts, and simplifica- tion of assembly, • • Relaxation of dimensionai toler- ançºs. • Reduction of quantity and complex- ity of tool ing. Tºsting £25t Effects Use high factors ºf safety for safe- ty for structures and pressur, ves. sels. Detailed strength testing is not required, º Provide (or on-orbit testing in - Shuttle after launch ascent. :*: - tance testing of flight payloads is . significantly reduced. Q Emphasize module and subsystem test- ing and diminish all-up system test- ing, - ſº Simplification of modulo interfaces. to permit removal and replacement of modules without readjustment or alignment, ºperation: cost Effects Reduction of on-pad pre-launch testing of payload. Payload is made-ready before installation in Shuttle and extended system testing on the launch pad, char" acteristic of some historical payloads, is eliminated, Reduction of ground support of payload flight operations by providing greater payload auton- omy, - Q Reduçing or eliminating payload use of ground data links by use of TDRS for primary communications, • Exploiting available volume to re- duce packing density of parts and components, thus facilitating as- sembly and inspection. • Avoidance of complex, miniaturized mechanisms. e Reliance on on-orbit qualification test in the Shuttle (sortie mission) to reduce ground qualification test- ing scope and complexity. Reduction of the stope of testing of flight hardware because the conse-- quences of equipment failure are not catastrophic. • Reduction of equipment sensitivity to environment thus reducing the scope and critical ity of environmental test. ing. • Providing for in-orbit repair and refurbishment of payloads rather than abandoning failed payioads and launching a new replacement payload. Providing for ground refurbish- ment of equipment modules for reuse. Simplification of logistics by modular design and by standard- ization of components. Figure 8, Criteria for Low-cost Designs 9 735 ; Equipment. 8ty. —lº- Horizon Sengor . Rate Gyro Pºg. 5un Aspect Bensor sas electronics secondary Control electronics i l 5 Internal wire Harness - 3 page & Cover - 20 subtotal 58 19% contingency —£4 66.7 Total we igh t Equipment: Hybrid Coupler Receiver Decoder, Command Deccaer, Failure Correct Range Detect, Test & Switch Modulator & Summer Telemetry Transmitter Beacon Transmitter Amplifier, Gate & Switch Filter, Input Computer interface Unit Internal wire Harness Base and Cover Subtotal 15%. Contingency Total 3 : # 8º Fibure 9b. Typical CDPI Communications Module 10 736 1.00 i. * * Payload Refurbishment Ratios S$.32-, 39 Initial study * ,20°,-3 Current Study 0.80 H. Refurbishment Ratios 0.60 - tº | R - (Percent New Unit Cost) | | | | | 1 sy § | | ! | F. 0,40 H | | ta | | | | | | | # , ; ; ; ; ; : F. F. : ; ; Ei i ! : #| | | | F. 1 E 3 #; ; ; ; ; ; ; 5 : ; ; , s: ; : F, 0.20 – t t = 㺠# * *: | | 3 | 1 || || 3 *—s #[] | ! § . # U } iš wn sº | 3 £3 ſº * 3 * § flºw §: E sº gº Ö Co 3 # is Jºe É £ #, 33 # 5 0 # 3 3 5 § 3 f: # 3 #2 "Eps" "Eppi " " " scs' ACS Subsystem Figure 10. Subsystem Refurbishment Ratios HOUSING ASSEMBLY MAGNETIC PICKUP (TACHOMETER) * PRESSURE SENSOR HERMETICALLY SEALED HEADER SEALING Rings CENTER SHAFI 10CKING RING PRELOADING NUI MOTOR STATOR Oil IMPREGNATED LABYRINTH SHIELD, Existing Off-Shelf Wheel , , BUSHING SELF-ALIGNING - | WASHER PAIR BEARING OiL |MPREGNATED BUSHING BEARING CLOSURE BASE PLATRORM wop cap RGWOR (FLYWHEEL) TACHOMETER ROTOR RING WACHOMETER- MOTOR ROTOR ROTOR SUPPORT SHAFT - BEARING BUSHING OIL (MPREGNATED BUSHING MOTOR ROTOR ASSEMBLY MOTOR STAIOR ASSEMBLY ROTOR (R-YWHEEL) RETAINER RING THRUST RING - PRELOADING NUI $EAL RING Wheel Designed for Ground Refurbishment Figure 11. Redesign of Reaction Wheel for Ground Refurbishment li 737 Physics|Astronomy Earth ºbservation • Met, Comſaw, Non-NASA Planetary OMSF 30ſ) *No lºsses Assumed 77 Programs sºn, 45 Programs 112 Placements * Placement: 7 - 16 16 4. 7 7 2 9 9 2 9 9 ºp 4 11 * º 9 w . aw 16 Figure 12, Grouping of Missions Figure 13. Basic Design Approach $PACECRAFI 12 Misskºn-Peculiar Module Designs 606 Placements” $tandard Designs 738 Module tºo. Module Hasle Equipment Des • Life (Yrs) Wt. (kg) Point Design Reference CDPI-l Band Cocºnunications Ku Band TWTA (2) (50 watts output) K Band PLL Receiver * Band QPSK Modulator/Driver Al Band Multicoupler Interface Unit (High Data Rate) Module Base and Cover Waveguide, Cables & Connecters 38.6 LMSC PE-103 LMSC PS-106 CUPI-L-l K Band cºmmunications CDPI-l. + K. Band TWTA (2) + & Band PLL Receiver * K. Band QPSK Modulator/Driver 5l.l. LMSC PE-103 LMSC PE-106 FPS-l. Solar Power Solar Array Container Extendable Boon Assy. (Max. Deployed Length = 6: Module Base and Cover Cables and Connectors Flexible Solar Array (l.8 x 1.2m) 1800 2 x li cra cells) LMSC PE-12, LMSC PE-126 | *PS-l-l Solar Power EPS-l. • Flexible Solar Array (l.8 x 1.2m) + Flexible Solar Array (1.8 X. l.8m) 3000 2 x_k cm cells) -º lº LMSC PE-12k LMSC PE-126 Figure 14. Typical Standard Module and variants Quantity of Modules Requiring Development Subsystem Mission- Standard Peculiar Basic Variants ;ºn 115 6 3 Communications, Data Processing 110 6 5 & Instrumentation Electrical 158 7 15 Attitude Control 42 2 l Totals 425 21 24 Figure 15. Impact of Standard Modules (45 missions) 13 739 ~. - Space Shuttle - /* N SCAT-Rack (Storage, Checkout and Transport Rack) Fwd. Aſ iſ / Typical SYNEQ - Not Deployed . Ti; ; #y * Sate!!ite *N * Umbilicaſ z $ PTS (Payload Ş Test Set) - Space Tug Reusable `-- $ (10,LH2) INTERFACE EQUIPMENT WEIGHTS Shuttle Mounted Tug-Mounted Payload Test Set 204 kg Manipulators 340 kg 816 Module Rack 68 Payload Manipulators Module Storage Rack 113 - Tug Cradle/Supports 363 - Total 1496 kg Total 408 kg Figure 16. Typical Syneq Mission in Shuttle OMS Tankage 4 SCAT-RACKS {ll Modules per Rack) Monitoring and Test Equipment (4 sets) Figure 47. Typical Multimission Revisit (LEO) 14 740 # º $J3 i º, ! Zone(D |nfant Mortality Zone(2) - –º Zone(3) —tº t Stable —º. Testing - Wearout i º j ; - º \ - *—5% -º-; *—-46% - \ -—º. =& LatinchiASCent º | *~~ | *-i-Shuttle Loiter zº-H i Liftoff Reft. 9?' • - Replace Time - {º- • Figure 18. Payload Failure Zones Hardware No. Prog. Total $ Std. SIS 35 T5.535- Std. SIC 4 0.805 2.5 T- Cluster SJC 11 3.767 Best Mix Total 45 14.547B * Baseline 45 15,777 2.0 Savings º 5.2308 Baseline (per Aerospace) 1.5 - 1.0 Standard Hardware Best Mix 0.5 i – 1 - 2 – 1 –– 1–1–1–1– % * 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 Years 94 35 Figure 19. Best-Mix Funding Spread for 45 Programs .5 * *d- 74.1 --- T----- - - ---- - Prºgram º | ------T-FI. Sºngs **º ſº, ... . . . Group | fººt Lº, -Cost Standard bºard Cus' ºf - | Refurb | Sºbºystems Spacecraft | Sºccº . . . . . . . ... ºsé P. L. Case E. J. Case f__ºs & 15 Pºrºſ's $8.2 ſº pſ. 3.85 4.16 4.56 , 4.6% ...: , ; i.33- . Sº frºn:p. ; (.76) (.76) (.57) (. 13) ..., (1E0 only) i 9.1% tº 3.10 3.40 3.90 4.53 i., §Kºń- 3, tº ºr risp. (2.61. (2.61) (2.39) (1.23) *** A 1. º. Tºtal 3.38 4.10 4.72 5.23 77 Prºn: aims 4 10.6 11.1 11.3 I. : *ssion 0) ( 1.0) (0.7) ( 0.2) -- 4 9.6 | 10.4 13.1 : …'", - -- *3.Frºſis 13, ºf ºut 5.99 6.71 7.11 7.21 ſ - 9. iºns.º. (1. * --> 8. * I'm lººses assumed Figure 20. Space Program Savings ($10.5 M Shuttle) F--------, --- --- ——---— *--- ------ ! ! - - - --- --- -- artin-- rucia-Ca- ~ | -----twºxt- - --- - ---> --- --> j --- T - T - —- -- == - --- | [ ----- L arºa [- ------ | - **** l :* -- —-º-º-º: º ---it- - -- - --- | I cº- ------ - - - [+º] D # 3 Lº Dº -------- --- ------ --------- --- ------ -n-ruarvº -- ---------- _jiaiuºis. --- - ------ f ----- ºrſtrºTºrºnanºrFrºn -----it--in-1.sºrºr Lºw- ºr “n” . ! Lauw-M, ascert -------- L_*tuals arrata Rºſſ wºuT ----- --- Figure 21. Typical Logistics Plan for Standard Modules - ſº 742 AM Paper N0.72-225 SATELLITE LONG-LIFE ASSURANCE - THE IMPACT OF THE SHUTTLE ERA by E. H. DIAMOND and J. R. FRAGOLA Grumman Aerospace Corporation Bethpage, New York AIAA Man's ROIG in SDàC8 G0IIIBFBIG6 COCOA BEACH, FLORIDA/MARCH 27-28, 1972 $ First publication rights reserved by American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. 1290 Avenue of the Americas, New York, N. Y. 10019. Abstracts may be published without permission if credit is given to author and to AIAA. (Price: AIAA Member $1.50. Nonmember $2.00). Note: This paper available at AIAA New York office for six months; thereafter, photoprint copies are available at photocopy prices from AlAA Library, 750 3rd Avenue, New York, New York 10017 743 SATELLITE LONG-LIFE ASSURANCE - THE IMPACT OF THE SHUTTLE ERA E. H. Diamond and J. R. Fragola Grumman Aerospace Corporation Bethpage, New York 11714 Anstract The long-liſe requirements of recent satellites could only be satisfied by increasing the inherent expected life of previous satellite subsystems. This increased life was achieved by using high-reliability units and backing their operation with redundant units or functions. Extensive testing programs were estab- lished to ensure that the designed-in life would be achieved in orbit. These methods, although very costly, could be justified by program economics be- cause the loss to a program due to an in-orbit failure was intolerable. The advent of the shuttle, with its capability to correct malfunctions through in-orbit repair, has added a new dimension to satellite mission planning. The emphasis, previously placed almost exclusively on increasing inherent reliability, has shifted to life-cycle reliability. The proper emphasis to be placed on these two measures and, thus, the extent to which in-orbit maintenance should influence design can now be decided largely on an economic basis. The ability to repair, refurbish, or retrieve failed satellites produces many cost benefits, some of which are not very obvious and are just now being explored. In this paper we have attempted to identify the program variables which influence the cost of a spacecraft program in the shuttle era and their dependence on satellite mean-time-to-failure (MTTF). The relationship between cost and lifetime (MTTF) has been developed at the parts/component, module, subsystem, and system levels, using data obtained from commercial aircraft, military aircraft, un- manned space, and manned space programs. The total cost has been apportioned among materials, manufacturing, design and integration, quality con- trol, and test. Possible explanations for the varia- tions observed at each level are presented. The cost-vs-life relation developed is utilized to develop the total cost of the Large Space Telescope Program (LST) (Fig. 1) for various combinations of shuttle resupply and inherent satellite life. These are compared to the costs of equivalent programs employing expendable launch vehicles. The tech- niques used are fully explained and the quantitative effects of the shuttle are presented. The flexibility of the shuttle resupply program is shown to enable total program costs to remain well below those of the expendable booster program, regardless of the program strategy chosen. Some of the strategies investigated were: • Minimizing total program cost for a given, expected observing time • Maximizing the expected observation time for a given total program cost • Minimizing the cost per unit of expected ob- servation time Fig. 1 Large Space Telescope (LST) Results indicate that with the addition of the re- supply capability, the program cost is driven by the resupply cost for low-MTTF satellites, and by the cost of design and test for high-MTTF satellites. The lowest-cost programs result from satellites with 9- to 18-month MTTFs, which is well within the range of existing technology. In general, the total cost for an LST program utilizing the shuttle is about one-third that utilizing an expendable booster - for equal view- ing time. In addition, schedule delays of up to 3 months, due to shuttle availability or turnaround time, were seen not to significantly affect program costs. Shuttle flight costs can increase to $20 million and still be more cost-effective than design-life improvements. Orbital resupply enables higher uptime ratios for equal cost. With the shuttle, the ability to abort eliminates mission loss due to early spacecraft failure or launch failure. The methodology described here may be utilized to evaluate the economics of all space programs, which may range from the low-cost expendable satellites to the high-cost sophisticated satellites of the 1980s. 1. Introduction The advent of the reusable space shuttle has pro- vided additional options which can be utilized in defining the economics of new space programs. In the past, increasing the observational time of a satellite program could be attained by either increasing the inherent reliability of individual satellites or by launching more satellites. The most cost-effective program provided the lowest total program cost for a given observational time, considering satellite reli- 744 ability and launch costs. In instances where the initial total satellite cost (including launch) was low, the tradeoff usually favored increasing the number of satellites. For the larger, more costly satellites, however, program planning usually favored increasing observation time by increasing satellite reliability. Considerations other than economics also influ- enced the decisions. Launch vehicle and shroud fail- ures caused the early termination of many missions which might otherwise have been successful, as shown in Fig. 2. In-orbit failures frequently caused early termination of a mission, as the possibility of retrieval did not exist with the expendable booster. (See Ref 1.) For some programs, any significant downtime was considered intolerable; thus, redundant satellites or satellite coverage overlap was required, as well as quick backup capability. These considerations re- quired that program risks be minimized even below the level dictated by economics. Generally, this was done by emphasizing reliability. *ſ • ANOMALY RATE DECREASEs witHTIME & HALves AFTER FIRST 100 HR i.e. - DAIA REPRESENT 72 spacecraft & 700,000 OPERATING HR 4.8.2 0 TIME, 1000 SPACECRAFT HR Pig. 2 Anomaly Rate vs Time Designs which could not meet the reliability levels imposed underwent reliability improvement programs. These programs, which proved very costly, usually involved incorporation of redundancy. When even these techniques failed to meet the imposed goal, or when the design could not be modified, additional redundancy on the unit or functional level was incorporated, usually at great cost increase. - Extensive use of redundancy at all levels greatly increased the complexity of designs and, thus, the testing costs. The costs were further increased by the additional testing required to ensure that the designed-in life of the hardware would be achieved in orbit. Each mission failure caused even greater emphasis on reliability, which resulted in a spiraling of satellite hardware costs. In the past, the Figure of Merit (FOM) of interest to most satellite reliability analysts was inherent satellite reliability. The advent of the shuttle and the correspond- ing decrease in launch costs have added a new dimension to satellite mission planning - optimization of mission cost per unit observation time. The launch-cost de- crease has not only made multiple-launch missions feasible, but also allows for the ability to repair, refur- bish, or retrieve failed satellites. The cost advantages of a cheaper launch are addressed in previous studies . (Ref 2). The advantages are significant, even when using a flight schedule from 1978 to 1990 with as few as 40 flights per year. (NASA and Air Force payloads in 1970 totaled 36). The study (Ref 2) also concluded that any economic analysis of the space shuttle must include the payload cost savings as well as the launch cost saving, and that the expected cost savings for payloads can be three times the launch savings when the total spectrum of future satellites is considered. The launch savings are included, but not specifically addressed in this study. The payload effects of the shuttle on a general space- craft have also been addressed from the viewpoint of overall savings to NASA through 1990. In this paper, we indicate the advantages of the shuttle from the as- pect of satellite program planning and, specifically, the cost savings realized on a particular large satellite program — the LST. For this program, the payload savings are five times the launch savings. 2. Analysis There are two basic savings to be obtained in satel- lite programs: build fewer satellites, and build less costly satellites. A question arises: Does a less costly satellite result in the lowest program cost? If the satellite cost is too low, its low quality will require many shuttle repair flights for maintenance. The lower the satellite cost, the higher the cost of resupply. Conversely, an extremely reliable satellite would seldom require resupply, but its initial cost would be high. The most cost-effective system lies somewhere between. The problem becomes one of finding the proper balance of inherent reliability and shuttle resupply. The balance is determined by trading-off the cost to increase satellite life through supply vs the cost to in- crease life through design. For the resupply case, if a repaired-in-orbit satellite is considered to be as good as a new satellite, its lifetime is doubled by a shuttle resupply. The cost of resupply is then the cost of a shuttle launch plus the cost of refurbishment spares. Thus, the key relationship to be determined is cost to increase life through design. This relationship is not easily developed. Several approaches were con- sidered, from a purely analytical construction to a purely empirical construction from data. The approach selected constructs the satellite cost/life relationship from empirical data combined with a simple analytical construction. 3. Development of Parts/Component Cost vs Life Data were gathered from several sources for the component cost-vs-life relationship. The sources included Grumman in-house historical data, vendor quotes, and published documents. - There are many factors affecting the MTTF of parts/components. Among these are design-related considerations such as operating temperature, percent derating, and vibrational environment. The effects of these are developed in many other sources and are not considered here. (See Ref 3 and 4.) There are other identifiable costs related to the quality control standards of parts/components. These can be attributed to labor, handling, test, and part 745 rejection, and are the costs utilized to quantitize the cost-life relationship. The parts in the commercial-aircraft region are, in general, tested to parametric norms. A sample from each lot is subjected to the simulated stresses and shocks of normal use. Failure of the sample usually causes rejection of the entire lot. The parts in the military-aircraft region are man- ufactured in a special production run. They are tested against the specification requirement; if the sample passes the test, the lot is accepted. The parts in the space region came from special production lines. All the parts were screened and burned-in. Failures usually required extensive failure analysis and re- design, and unsolved defects were publicized industry- wide to alert possible users to the fact that these parts were nonpreferred. Other studies (Ref 5) indicate that 100% burn—in, although expensive, is the most cost- effective approach to testing at the part level, since a great percentage of system-level test failures are part-related. System-level failures are, by far, the most costly, since their cost includes program man- power loss due to the schedule delay while waiting for the failure to be fixed. The data obtained were plotted on log-log paper to determine the cost/life relationship. It was found that the best-fit relationship of the data took the form: Parts Cost = fixed cost + variable cost X | F | MTTF base The value of x was variable. In raising the MTTF from commereial to military aircraft, the value of x appeared to be 0.75. In raising the MTTF from military air- craft to Hi-Rel (space) hardware, it was approximately 1.0. In extending the state-of-the-art beyond today's hardware, its value was 1.25. The data indicated a conclusion which matches sub- jeetive judgement. The cost savings in reducing the MTTF below state-of-the-art are comparatively light; however, the cost of increasing the MTTF beyond state- of-the-art is high. This relation permits an estimate of the increased total part cost above a given baseline, once the fixed and variable costs of the baseline as well as the base- line MTTF are known. - funºtion. the same function from one level to the next (i.e., from aircraft to space), candidate subsystem hardware units were selected which performed basically the same The candidate units selected were: e Inertial reference units (LRUs) e Computer memories e Solenoid valves e VHF transceivers e Batteries Cost/life data were collected for each unit at com- mercial aircraft, military aircraft, unmanned space, and manned space hardware quality levels. The re- sulting data are shown in Table 1. Entries in this table should be considered estimates of cost for the hardware listed and not actual data in all cases. Life estimates, however, were taken from actual experience data, when available. When these data were not avail- able, test data were used. Where no other source was available, vendor estimates provided the remaining values. The cost/life relation for each candidate was developed by plotting the tabulated data on log-log paper. A straight line was then fitted to the data points and the slope determined. This slope was used as the power of the cost/life function for the given candidate hardware. The resulting curves are shown in Fig. 3 through 6. Figure 7 is a composite of the cost/life functions. Total Spacecraft Cost vs Life Total spacecraft cost vs MTTF was constructed from the constituents shown in Fig. 8. Part of the vehicle costs were driven by factors not related to satellite life. Included in this category were structural, optics, and various manpower costs. These costs are called the vehicle fixed costs. Other costs vary with vehicle life. In this category are subsystem, redundancy, and some manpower-associated (quality control, reliability, and test) costs. Thus, one portion of vehicle costs do not vary with MTTF, while another portion does. Total vehicle cost is, then: cost of sub- systems that do not vary with MTTF (fixed cost)1 plus the cost of subsystems that vary with MTTF_(fixed cost)2 + variable cost[MTTF/MTTFease].”. This redades to: Total Vehicle Cost = Base Cost + Variable Cost [MTTF/MTTFeas J” 25 4. Cost/Life Relation for Subsystem Units After completing the study of the collected parts data, an estimate of the cost/life relation for subsystem units was attempted. Since many units do not perform It can be seen that the fixed portion of the costs continue to increase as more factors are considered. At the parts level, the fixed portion may represent less than 20% of the costs; at the vehicle level, 50% Table 1 Cost ($) & MTTF (hr) Data -T— COMMERCIAL | MILITARY AIRCRAFT AiRCRAFT t_M OAO MTTF | COST MTTF COST MTTF | COST | MTTF | COST |RU 380 37,000 || 200 100,000 43,000 900,000 || 54,000 || 750,000 COMPUTER 2000 || 11,446 5000 || 20,000 14,000 || 80,000 22,000 || 100,000 MHEMORY SOLENO;0 6500 || 1500 | 4000 2000 110,000 4000 | 200,000 6000 VALVES BATTERIES 700 530 1500 3000 || 9000 || 20,000 || 10,000 90,000 746 1000 ſ e LM 800 l • OAO g ºf SLOPE = 1.11 s H. 3 MILITARY 1.11 O ºf AIRCRAFT COST = MTTF '- 200}- º • COMMERCIAL Al RCRAFT 0 L f | —l O 20 40 60 80 100 MTTF, MO Fig. 3 IRU Cost vs MTTF 100T- © OAO 80H 3 ºf * SLOPE = 1.01 €º H 3 - Ö 40H- cosſ = MTTF1.01 20 F MILITARY AIRCRAFT COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT 0 R 1— | l —f 10 20 30 40 50 MTTF, MO Fig. 4 Computer Memory Cost vs MTTF Some insight into the cost drivers of space pro- grams can be gained by apportioning costs into categories. The cost of some space-qualified electronic components may be three times that of their military-aircraft equi- valent. In reality, it consists of the cost of the materials plus the extra cost to screen, test to performance, and burn-in the space-qualified components. Reasonable categories them are the cost of materials and the cost of ality control. The cost of the components may then be 33% material, 67% quality control. Satellites have more redundancy (internal, module, and functional) than an equivalent aircraft program and, therefore, have higher material and manufacturing costs. Additionally, the tests performed on a satellite are considerably more extensive than those performed on an aircraft. Costs for a typical, complex satellite (The Orbiting Astronomical Observatory - OAO) were, therefore, apportioned into manufacturing, materials, design, 7 P- 6 H. OAO 5 H. SLOPE = 0.55 34}. cost = MTTF955 * MILITARY H Al RCRAFT gº 3 |- O O 2 e COMMERCIAL Al RCRAFT 1| 0 _{ I I º I f ſ 0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 MTTF, MO Fig. 5 Pneumatic Solenoid Valve Cost vs MTTF 100 r 80H 3 *H 3. SLOPE = 1.7 3 - C 40 He MILITARY AIRCRAFT cost = MTTF17 * O LM COMMERCiAL AIRCRAFT - | —l- —l— *0 5 10 15 20 . 25 MTTF, MO Fig. 6 Battery Cost vs MTTF quality control, and test. Costs were also determined for an OAO designed to aircraft philosophy. The equivalent aircraft—designed OAO costs were signifi- cantly lower than for the space-philosophy OAO. The most startling difference is in the cost of test and quality control. Figure 9 shows cost correlated with MTTF. It can be seen that the aircraft—technology OAO cost is 50% of the space-technology OAO. However, its MTTF is but one-tenth. 5. Costs to Double Satellite Uptime As previously stated, increasing the observational time of a satellite program could be attained by either increasing the inherent reliability of individual satellites or by launching more satellites. The shuttle allows the choice to be between increasing inherent reliability through design, or increasing life through a repair/re- furbishment shuttle flight. Economics is the major de- cision driver. 747 1000 slope UšEt, n cost Analysis BATTERY to ** ange of values of Lºe used incom osite cost vs MTTF a rºans-riven É MTTF Fig. 7 No-ºlized Cost vs MTTF showing Composite Slope Construction two-nu-Ecost. vs. MTTF - _ LZ _^ T-- º 1–ſ ſota.L. spact chart cost vs MTTF – —suasºstrº- cost vs. mTTF - cost category 1. Manufacturing: Tool in G, MACHINING, FABRICATIO*N. Assevº. * 2. MATERIALs: METAL, Raw MATERIAL COMPONENTS, FASTENERS. ETc 3. DESIGN. DRAFTING.SYºtºſs InTEGRATION 4. Ouality contRol: Pants screening & Burn-in. INSPECTION, PREASSEMBLY TESTs. AccEPTANCE TESTs 5. TEST & TEST support: Post Assembly TESTs (DESIGN verification, QuAL, SYSTEM) NoTE: MANAGEMENT. G&A. - FEE ARE APPORTIONED AMONG THE Five cATEGorries - MTTF 1.25 cost = Fixed Basfline|WTTF BASE 100- 5 -- - - o - - 4. > F - H - # 50 3 i i i +- Fig. 8 Total Spacecraft Cost Construction 1+c cost/life relationship permits determining the cost to double satellite life in orbit by design, at each MTTF. * (See Fig. 10.) From the cost-to-double- MTTF curve it can be seen that as the MTTF increases, the cost to double life through design increases signifi- eart”. However, the cost to double satellite life through **.*.* tº rest nºis is constant, regardless of spacecraft *TTF. ºne intersection of these two curves represents the major decision point. At higher MTTFs, it is cheaper to increase lifetime in orbit through resupply. At lower MTTFs, it is cheaper to increase itſe throug: redesign. The amortized cost of each ºhuttie flight also affects the decision point. The higher the cost of shuttle flights. the higher the satellite MTTF must be before it is more economical to resupply. For a 12-month-MTTF satellite, it is still cheaper to resupply, even if a shuttle flight costs $20 million. If a shuttle flight costs the projected $5 million, the preponderence of facts favor resupply. - - - - - RELATive MTTF Fig. 9 sparecraft Cost/Life Relationship COST TO DOUBLE 60- SATELLITE LIFE THROUGH DESIGN 50 - 40- º - - Z H 30} cºff º º design-in- A - attºº f CHEAPERTO 20- f º Resuppl Y f / º / ld- / cost To DCUBLE satel-LITE 1. Lir: THROUGH RESUPPLY y o l l —l o 12 24 36 MTTF, MO Fig. 10 Resupply/Design Tradeoff *Approach evolved from communication with Dr. J. Kupperian of NASA/Goddard Space Flight Center, August 1970 748 6. Total Program Costs Two computer-implemented simulations of the 15- year program were developed to assist in the system Satellite costs are but one element of total program optimization process. Both were Markov models - costs. OAO experience was utilized to develop costs t one, continuous-state discrete-time (Ref 6), the other, for other categories. These costs includedi: nission continuous-time discrete-state (Ref 7 and 8). One of (pºration, ground stations, facilities, test, and support the state diagrams is shown in Fig. 12. These equipment and experiments. The costs were combined models determine total program cost for a large num- with the programatic variables, as shown in Fig. 11. ber of variations in program parameters, which included: iſian SHUTTLE w - - - "T-a- - - $ºint --> BASELINE e Number of spacecraft SYS, i.M - SYSTEM r ('O Sł COSTS e MTTF Mr- - - - * * * * * ~ * !" —r !— e Shuttle schedule delay F- •rr- -T - STATE fºrmation 3D PLOT e Repair percentage DEscăIPTION -º cºmputeR *> AN/AI.YSIS - - - PROGRAM e Module repair time (ground) —- F----— :---------------, - e System uptime ratio subsystem "º cost of TVERs.``" º • § E : DESIGN !ºrts • Survival-mode probability V8 MTTF CE EXPECTATIONS RELATION- : º For a constant shuttle delay, total program cost Sºlºš. F- : - - - -ij-. * : --- was found to vary, as shown in Fig. 13. The low - oint represents the lowest-cost program for that par- Fig, 11 Program Cost Methodology point rep progr ticular value of shuttle delay. A tangent to the curve, drawn through the origin, represents the most cost- effective program, that is, the lowest cost per unit uptime. Fortunately, the lowest-cost program falls near the most cost-effective program. Total program cost was developed as a function of satellite viewing time, This included the effects of re- Low-MTTF satellites yield low uptime at high supply and number of satellites. This relationship was program costs. Here, the costs are driven by the developed utilizing the output of two programs which high cost of shuttle revisits. simulated the 15-year LST mission. The statistics on viewing time were developed considering that losses in * - satellite viewing time were the result of: delay due to High-MTTF satellites yield the highest uptimes, shuttle unavailability, replacement parts unavailability, with the costs driven by the high cost of design. or catastrophic failure of individual satellites. The total program costs were collected for various combinations The lowest-cost programs occur at MTTFs of about of parameters, as described in the following paragraphs. 12 months, which is considered within state-of-the-art. 7. Total Prº ram Cost and U time TATE 6 • GROUND REPAIR COMPLETED a SHUTTLE LAUNCHEC STATE 5 a CATASTROPHic FAI LURE TATE 12 a GROUND REPAIR COMPLETED e SHUTTLE LAUNCHEC 1/GROUND REPAIR e RETRIEVAL POSSIBLE 1/GROUND REPAIR + 1/DELAY STATE 4 e CATASTROPHIC FAI LURE • NO RETRIEVAL 1/DELAY STATE 11 e CATASTROPHIC FAILURE e RETRIEVAL POSSIBLE a SHUTTLE ARRIVAL - e SURVIVAL- • REPAIR STARTED • AWAITING RESUPPLY STATE 7 e VEHICLE 2 FULL UP STATE 10 e CATASTROPHIC FAILURE • NO RETRIEvaL T/MTTF n = REPAIR PROPORTION y 1/SURVIVAL MTTF STATE 9 e SHUTTLE ARRIVAL e REPAIR STARTED STATE 8 e SURVIVAL e AWAITING RESUPPLY Fig. 12 Two-Spacecraft State Diagram 6 749 costs DRIVEN ay Design . 1-MOSHUTTLE > SCHEDULE QELAY | | | | | | | | 24-MO.MTTF SATELLITE cośrs DRIVEN BY RESUPPLY | 6.MQ-MTTF | SATELLITE | Lowest.coST POINT, | 12-MO-MTTF $ATEL.] | LOWEST | COST PER | UNIT OF OBSERVATION | TIME COST PER UNIT O8SERVATION TIME —r w” r-º- ME 1 Fig. 13 Optimized cost of Observation Time The cost-observation time curves (Fig. 14) were developed for several values of shuttle schedule dalays, which varied from zero to 24 months. The zero to 1, º are shown as they are considered most represen- Vee The number of spacecraft required for a shuttle- resupplied program is significantly different than that of a program using a conventional launch vehicle. If the shuttle could respond immediately, and if every failure could be repaired in orbit, only one spacecraft would be required to achieve the required mission time. However, there is a delay associated with repair con- sisting of delay to dedicate and schedule a launch, plus schedule turn around time, plus module ground repair queing delay). There is alsº a probability that a satel- lite may fail in a manner which prºhibits resupply or retrieval by a shuttle. The cost uptime curves were generated for one-, two-, or three-satellite program to enable comparisons, The use of these curves to perform tradeoffs is de- scribed completely in Ref 2 and 10; a brief description is given here. For a given observational time goal, we can determine the lowestwoost program for a given de- lay by finding the low point on the delay curve. The value of satellite MTTF which produces ; minimum should be chosen as the satellite design-life goal. An interesting result which can also be derived from these curves is that, since the number of failures which would be experienced over a given time is related to satellite MTTF and since each failure requires a . shuttle flight, the number of additional shuttle flights 93-466 O - 73 - 48 3 SPACECRAFT 450 |- 6-M O 24-MO MRTTF O DELAY 1.5-MO DELAY —l 0.75 1.0 1 SPACECRAFT 6-MO MTTF 12-MOTMTTF | 350----- tº- T0.5 0 UPTIME RATIO Fig. 14 Performance & Cost for Equal Science required for LST repair over its mission life can be determined. From Fig. 14, it can be seen that the one-vehicle program is the lowest in cost, the three-vehicle the highest. The 12-month—MTTF satellites are always the lowest cost for each satellite program. As the shuttle delay increases, the costs and uptime decrease. How- ever, the loss in uptime is greater than the equivalent cost saving. This indicates that the greater the lost time due to delay, the lower the program cost due to the lower number of repair flights. A tangent drawn from the origin to each of the constant-delay curves indicates that the most cost-effective program has the shortest shuttle delay. The desirability of a one-, two-, or three-satellite program cannot be made independently of program ca- tastrophic-failure probability. For each spacecraft, it is the probability that the spacecraft will fail in a manner which prohibits resupply or retrieval by a shuttle. The probability is derived by defining the pro- babilities of the spacecraft survival package which must stabilize and maintain essential functions until the shut- tle arrives. Program catastrophic-failure probabilities are shown for a one-, two-, and three-satellite program in Fig. 15. The two-satellite program was considered the most attractive, when cost, uptime, and catastrophic failure are considered: e The single-satellite program, although attrac- tive in terms of total program cost, is highly risky in terms of program catastrophic-failure potential • The two-satellite case is less risky than a single spacecraft and should be considered op- timum in most realistic ranges of program parameters since it provides about the same cost per unit of observational time as the single- spacecraft program e The three-satellite case does not add enough up- time to make the additional expense attractive, and results in the highest total program cost, as well as the highest cost per unit uptime 750 • The three-satellite case is relatively insensitive to increases in dolay of the shuttle's response and, thus, should be considered as a viable al- ternative if large delays are expected 0.8 P- NO. OF SPACECRAFT: 1 > 0.6}. t—- – co of º C CC n- 0.4}- 0.2H- 2 *T- * ! H. Bºxº "g Q.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 SATELLITE MTTF, YR Fig.15 Program Catastrophic Failure Probability The availability of spare modules is also an impor- tant consideration, The computer models showed that a two-vehicle program, with one set of spare modulea, will suffer Hittle loss of satellite uptime if the time to repair failed modules is less than the satellite MTTF. (See Fig. 16.) The model also assumed that only one out of every thousand potential failures would be unrepairable in orbit, therefore requiring that the spacecraft be re- turned to earth and replaced. This is considered reasonable since a major effort would be expended in designing satellites for ease of in-orbit repair, in the shuttle era. 8. Shuttle Savings Over Conventionally Launched Program Satellites Haunched via expendable launch vehicles have few programmatic options. Total viewing time (uptime) of the gatellite program is the product of satel- lite MTTF and number of satellites. If more viewing time is desired, either more satellites can be launched or the MTTF can be increased via design, The baseline program, for cor, parative purposes, provides for launching six satellites via expendable launch vehicles. Each satellite has a one-year MTTF. This provides approximately 6 years of viewing. The only way to increase aatellite viewing to 12 years is to increase the MTTF to more than 2 years. The cost of this can be developed using the cost life relationship. Total program cost for this is shown in Fig. 17. The shuttle program can provide the same 12 years of viewing using two satellites and repair/refurbish- ment in orbit. The cost comparison is also shown in Fig. 17. There are two major savings in the satellite area; utilization of two satellites instead of six, and increas- ing lifetime in orbit through supply instead of through improvement in design, MODULE REPAIR TIME, MO: 500r- 6 H' 3 24 (MTTF) CD 450- 12 > < ſº 3 24 ſº. ſº- - —ſ - g 400H MTTF, MO: 3 6 P 12 • 2 SPACECRAFT • 1 SET OF SPARES ºr sº —i I ſº ſº 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 UPTIME RATIO Fig. 16 Cost Sensitivity to Module Repair Time $ vs MTTF SLOPE = 1.25 P º I UPTIME GAiNED THRU DESIGN FOR CONVENTIONALLY LAUNCHED PROGRAM N 200 i e = TITAN - LAUNCH i Tf UPTIME GAINED THRU SHUTTLE RESUPPLY OT3T 6T gTT2 T15 YEARS - I I I I I 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 RATIO PROGRAM UPTIME Fig, 17 Shuttle Program Savings vs Uptime It can be seen that there is no cost advantage to the shuttle for a two-year satellite uptime. However, as the desired viewing time increases, the cost advantage of the shuttle also increases. For a 12-year-uptime program, the shuttle program shows a 60% cost ad- vantage over the program using the expendable launch vehicle. These savings are 50% from satellite- derived areas and 10% from launch-derived areas. 751 Additional savings not reflected in this study may be realized in the development cost of future satellites through commonality in the design of subsystems. The gains due to commonality have been recognized but not realized in practice because commonality required overdesign for many satellites to meet the needs of the most stringent, and the weight and volume penalties could not be tolerated. The reduced weight and volume constraints of the shuttle will allow subsystem commonality. The savings produced through commonality for 53 proposed payloads could be as high as $2.3 billion, and the use of common spacecraft for 38 of those payloads could produce an additional $0.5 billion saving (Ref 11). 9. Extension of Present Studies Although this study has presented quantitative test costs for different hardware qualities, it has not pre- sented a specific functional relationship between test costs and changes in testing emphasis. A methodology similar in approach to that used here has been applied to this topic to develop an equation for cost for the Nth- level tests (i.e., first level, component; second level, module; etc.): C x1N _ ] TEB º Cr(N) = H. T, 4 }. exp |- KNºi T (N …] (ew.) Hour * *2 -* *3 N+1 * CRH * \*M " "cMB (#)|-|(s)” (; ) (*) The variables in this equation represent expected test costs, and depend on the use of historic data of specific test costs, the observed failure frequency, and the direct test time. These data will be used to develop the exponents (x1, x2, ...) of the equation shown, using the method outlined in this paper. The essential element of the application of this relation is incorporation of the penalty incurred by allowing a defect to pass a given test level undetected, only to be discovered at a higher level. A block diagram of the technique to be empioyed is given in Fig. 18. Use of this technique would allow identifica- tion of the new testing emphasis that would result from the advent of the space shuttle. 10. References 1. D. Q. Bellinger, E. H. Boothman, and H. N. McBride, "Reliability Prediction and Demon- stration for Missile and Satellite Electronics," RADC-TR-68–281, November 1968 2. K. P. Heiss, "Our R&D Economics and the Space Shuttle, "Astronautics and Aeronautics, Vol 9, No. 10, Ocboter 1971 3. "Military Standardization Handbook - Reliability Stress and Failure Rate Data for Electronic Equipment," MIL-HDBK-217A 4. W. Yurkowsky, "Data Collection for Nonelectric Reliability Handbook (NEDCO I and II)," RADC- TR-68–114, Vol I, June 1968 5, R. W. Fink, "Reliability Screening – Observations & Conclusions,” ASQC Transactions of the 9th Annual Conference on QC & Reliability, April 17, 1971 6, E. H. Diamond, Unpublished Computer Pro- gram 7. J. R. Fragola and R. Farkas, "Large Space Telescope Mission Model Optimization," Grum- man Memo LST-ENG-71-050, June 28, 1971 8, E. H. Diamond, J. R. Fragola, and R. Farkas, "Equivalent Uptime LST Program Without Resupply," Grumman Memo LST- ENG-71-051, June 30, 1971 9, E. H. Diamond and A. Salee, "Operations Analysis OAO/LST Economics Study Input," Grumman Memo, December 17, 1970 10. A. Salee, "An Analytic Technique to Assess the Economic Impact of the Shuttle on Satel- lite Payloads," AIAA Space Systems Meeting, Denver, Colorado, July 19–20, 1971 11. "Payload Effect Analysis Study," Lockheed Missiles and Space Company Report, 7 June 1971, Contract NAS W-2156 11. Acknowledgment The authors are grateful to Messrs. F. P. Simmons, M. Olstad, and R. Farkas of Grumman Aerospace Cor- poration for their invaluable contributions to this paper. * aſh. INPUT DATA* ** Vº Nº LEVEL | LEVEL || LEVEL || ILEVEL IV LEVEL V LEVEL VI TEST MODEL EST TEST MODEL TEST MODEL | TEST MODEL ITEST MODEL LEVEL IV LEVEL V LEVEL Vl } PENALTY LEVEL | LEVEL || LEVEL ill LEVEL Iv LEVEL V - —ſ | TEST COSTS LEVEL V1 BASELINE OPTIMUM *INPUT DATA FOR EACH LEVEL: iNTEGRATED -º-º- INTEGRATED HP, INPUTS TO NEW - TEST COST N. TEST COST INTEGRATED e HARDWARE CRITICALITY TEST PLAN, e APPORTIONED MTTF - º§" BASED ON e HISTORICAL TEST DATA S EMPHASIS – COST |NDICATED - NO. OF FAILURES AMAINTENANCE FACTOR Fig. 18 lintegrated Test Model 752 ExPLOITING GRAVITY FIELD's LEss THAN. 1 G Manufacturing in Space By HANS F. Wuenschen NASA Marshall Space Flight Center It is not simply that through Space processes we can Create new materials and structures, but that in doing this we inaugurate a new age of technical civilization HANS F. wuensche R (M), assistant director for advanced projects in Marshall's Process Engineering Laboratory, conducts programs in advanced processing technology to support prototype developments for space vehicles and payloads. For his con- tributions to the new space-manu- facturing field, he has received the NASA Medal for Exceptional Scientific Achievement. He has received advanced degrees in M.E. and A.E. With much pioneering of space technology behind us and the prospect of low-cost space-transporta- tion systems just ahead, the time has come to think about manufacturing in the space environment—to create products not attainable in the terrestrial factory. The Earth-bound environment permits but also limits many processes, especially by its large gravitational action. Space, in contrast, offers total gravity control and unequaled vacuum, tem- perature, pressure, and radiation characteristics. Can the space environmental benefits be acquired for manufacturing operations in any other way than setting up shop in space? I think not. The search for matchless space processes might yield a few new terrestrial concepts, which employ space conditions transiently, as far as they can be reproduced on the ground. But to tap the extraterrestrial environment as an unrestricted natural resource, we must occupy it as we would a new continent. While other fields of space utilization, such as astronomy, meteorology, communications, and Earth-resources survey, offer services, manufac- turing in space will create new products. So its growth potential should key our plans. We will be looking for products that justify the effort of emplacing critical phases of the manufacturing process in space. I for one expect to find such products. This article explains the opening course of this aim. Philosophy and Fundamentals: With the ex- ception of the orbital gravity characteristics, all other space environmental factors can be reproduced on Earth in at least sufficient ex- perimental quantities to investigate prolonged effects, and are widely used in existing terrestrial processes. Moreover, besides our natural gravity, we can superimpose accelerations and easily apply higher g-loads in manufacturing processes, for instance, in centrifugal separation. It is different with processing at less than 1 g or weightlessness (zero-g), which can only be produced by free fall on Earth, restricted to about 20 sec during special trajectories of an airplane. Here on Earth only a very few, but remarkable, manufacturing processes of very short processing cycle exploit less than natural gravity—of historical interest, free-fall casting of lead shot, and of more contemporary value, the “atomizing” of metals and nonmetals to powders, tiny glass spheres, and even hollow spheres called “microballoons,” where the solidification takes place during free fall in a vacuum chamber. However, there is no process possible where a true equilibrium condition is reached until the free-fall duration can be extended to greater length. This happens only in orbit and its defined condition of free fall. Looking at low-g and zero-g environments, we 753 F-1 step toward a new age of technical civilization-looking into the chamber of the M512 Skylab Materials Processing Facility showing the sphere-forming experiment. A defocused electron beam coming from the lower left wall strikes a sample mounted on the ninwheel in the center. Fourteen speciment are carried on one pinwheel. can compare our situation now to what happened during the 17th Century with the discovery and development of vacuum processes. Until then every process was at or above 1 atm of air pressure. The development of vacuum processes was actually delayed because of the Horror Vacui philosophy. Once this philosophy was overcome, applied research readily produced such technological developments as the steam engine and the vacuum tube. We accept without a thought the discovery of vacuum-the fact that we can escape our “Ocean of Air"—and now apply vacuum widely in in- dustrial processes. Now we approach a similar momentous change in mental habit. For, with our capability to go into orbit, we can escape our highest-order environment, the “Ocean of Gravity.” We can readily manipulate gravity there to our advantage, up and down the scale. Weightlessness lets materials in liquid state become objects in their own right. From our terrestrial experience, liquids alone practically do not exist. They always need a container. The ever- present action of gravity causes buoyancy separation and thermal convection during the interaction with other liquids, solids and gases, and overshadows and prevents many processes. Fur- thermore, on a macroscopic scale molecular forces, such as cohesion and adhesion, do not play a large role, while in zero-g they represent controlling factors, even in the largest bulk processes. Finally, our terrestrial idea of the possible and practical size of processing equipment and facilities might need adjustment—because the disappearance of dead weight will allow us to build tools of truly extraterrestrial dimensions, capable of using cosmic phenomena as production means. The potential processes and products I will discuss here represent only an exploratory beginning of exploiting our new access to zero-g. If one could have asked Torricelli, the inventor of the vacuum pump in 1650, what his vacuum en- vironment was good for, and if he would have answered, “It opens the age of engines, radio, and television," nobody would have understood. We should keep that in mind with respect to predicting the impact of access to the weightless environment on future technology. Unique Space-Manufacturing Processes: The most apparent effect of the weightless environment upon matter is the absence of relative mass ac- celerations. This not only eliminates the need for support of solid matter, but also precludes any relative motion in fluids, due to differences in density, resulting in the stability of liquid-solid, liquid-liquid or liquid-gas mixtures and the ab- sence of thermal convection. Liquid-solid mixtures find primary application in the casting of composites.” On Earth, the liquid-matrix preparation of composites is limited 754 SPACE PRocessEs | Ev11 ATION MELTING POSITION CONTROL AT ig At 0g F-2 On Earth, small quantities-of high-temperature liquid metals, (L) can be levitated by high-frequency (HF) electromagnetic field forces, as indicated at left. . Then, as indicated at right, very small electromagnetic fields are sufficient to position the weightless liquid materials during processing. coat t HD=% F-4 Surface-tension drawing. From º suspended liquefied materials, solid and hollow filaments and membranes can be drawn without contamination of extrusion dies. M&Rabºtane F-6 Blow casting. Upper left: formation of a holiow sphere from solid material with a gas bubble by melting in weightless environment. Upper right: blowing of shapes through a cutout in a die. Lower row: blowing of a hollow sphere by gas injection. " .. " If it. RTA FREE castina - - > , cAsting F-3 Free-floating liquefied materials, can be rocessed without container or mold and shaped by nertia, electric, and other force fields. sººººººººººººººº- SºSºº sting & FilastENT DRAwing tº BRAne oftawing F-5 Adhesion casting—layers of liquefied materials will flow around the solid mold. ºntoo ! zoºspenate *º- ** tº array *º- 4 tº APGR v \ N N \ Po 3 Axis $Maxent F-7 Fºº casting. Upper row: Con- tainerless processing of metal foam by vapor formation of dispersed particles; lower row: metal foam by mechanical gas dispersion in a container with shaking equipment. 755 o liquids of high viscosity like polymers and lasses. Metal-matrix composites are exclusively roduced in solid state in view of the extremely low iscosity of molten metals. Under zero-g con- itions, preparation in liquid-matrix state can be pplied in various combinations. Fine particle ispersion may be used for nucleation during olidification, resulting in fine-grain castings. the formation of gas bubbles and foams. In alloying, the liquid-liquid mixture stability in space will prevent segregation between elements of different density and permit preparation of Supersaturated alloys, including combinations which exhibit liquid-phase immiscibility. Zero-g effects on supercooling, solidification, crystal formation, and single-crystal growth should improve uniformity and perfectness, because of eliminating thermal convection at the solid-liquid interface and nonuniform concentration gradients f the solute. The absence of gravity, of course, will influence hemical reactions.” In cases where the chemical energy is comparable to the gravity-induced hydrostatic pressure gradient, the small change due to lack of gravity energy in space can trigger chemical reaction. The gravity energy (Eg) for one cc of water (h of 1 cm) equals 981 erg. In chemical reactions the energy is evaluated in Mol units. Water has a molecular weight of 18 grams, which brings the gravity energy to Eg/Mol = 981 x 18= 18,000 erg/cm3. Reactions affected by zero-g fall below this value. They may be thought of in these terms: - Crystal growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 erg/cm3 Wetting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 erg/cm2 Surface energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40-400 erg/cm2 Bubbles or droplets . . . . . . . . . . . . 100-200 erg/cm3 Catalytic reaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,000 erg/cm2 Biological reaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,000 erg/cm’ Probably the most typical of all space processes is the containerless free suspension of materials. On Earth we help ourselves with levitation melting (F-2, left), which is limited to very small amounts of metals at high temperature. Control is possible only for high-melting and good-conducting metals, because the high-frequency current must be maintained so that the electromagnetic field stays strong enough to balance the weight of the melt. The field forces act at the circumference of the molten mass; the bottom area must be supported by the surface tension of the liquid material. This limits severely the size to just several ounces of metal for levitation on Earth. In spite of this restriction, as a laboratory method levitation melting has been basic for high-temperature-alloy development. It is not suitable for metals of low melting point, glasses, ceramics, and liquid chemical compounds. ispersed particles also may serve nucleation for T-1 MATERIALS DATA FOR THE LIQUID STATE sūFFACETViscosiſy TDEF5FMRATE TENSION | IN POISE INDEX TEMPERATURE. C. m 2|, .3%| MATERIAL oc DYN/CM DYN SEC/CM* CM/SEC WATER 18 73 0.01] 0.7 x 104 150 MPH . MERCURY 2O 465 O.O2] 2.2 x 104 |THM' 232 $26 0.020 2.6 x 10° LEAD 327 452 O.O28 1.6 x 10^ COPPER 113] $103 O.O.38 2.9 x 104 |RON 1420 1500 0.040 3.7 x 104 ENGINE OIL 2O 15-30 10-20 1.5 + 3.0 GLY CERIN 20 (20). 15 1.3 DEFORMATION RATE V FOR A BODY OF THE SURFACE AREA A AND A DISTANCE BETWEEN SURFACES H. dv= F C. – º – dh 77A 7 In space, levitation is the natural condition for materials. There you need only very small electric field forces for positioning and handling them for processing (F-2, right). Processes expected to show drastic changes in the space environment owing to weightlessness or partial gravity may be classified as follows: e Buoyancy and Thermal-Convection-Sensitive Processes: - - Containerless Positioning 4 KTTP Gos released Degassed material in free spinning forcidal configuration Free suspended liquid material with gas bubbles Free spinning liquid material with gas centred Increase spin rate to critical stability