:
И
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33
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:
OHN
WARD
JX 4
1554
.A 3
A 93.
THE
NEGOTIATIONS
O F
COUNT D'AVAUX,
Ambaffador from his Moft CHRISTIAN
MAJESTY to the STATES GENERAL
of the United Provinces.
CONTAINING
The Steps taken by the Prince of ORANGE to
afcend the Throne of GREAT BRITAIN; and
the Intrigues of the Court of FRANCE to coun-
teract his Meaſures during that intereſting Period.
Tranflated from the FRENCH.
IN TWO VOLUMES.
VOL. I.
LONDON:
Printed for A. MILLAR; and D. WILSON and
T. DURHA M, in the Strand.
MDCC LIV.
Ref.. st.
Trovet
7-21-48
63504
THE
PREFACE.
A
S the last revolution was one of the moſt re-
markable events in our hiftory, it must ever
appear furprizing, that the fecret feps which
led to it, have jo long been wrapped up in obfcurity;
from hence we have imagined, that a view of the
meaſures which the Prince of Orange took to afcend the
throne of Great Britain, and of the obftacles he met
with from France, in the execution of this great de-
fign, will be acceptable to a nation, which cannot but
be interested in whatever concurred to promote or dif-
appoint the projects of a Prince, who restored the pof-
feffion of that religious and political liberty which it
now enjoys.
The Count D'Avaux was fent embaſſador from Lewis
XIV. to the States General, with the fole view of
traverſing the deſigns of the Prince of Orange: this
commiffion he executed with the greatest addrefs, and
by his artifices conquered difficulties that appeared in-
furmountable, though the politics of the Prince, at laſt
fruftrated all the defigns of his enemies.
The circumstances of theſe affairs made it neceſſary
for the author to begin at their fource, to trace the gra-
dual progrefs of a long negotiation, and to dwell on
what may at first appear to have but little connection
with thofe great events, to which they will be found to
have
iv
The PREFACE.
-have an immediate relation: from hence it follows,
that this work grows more intereſting, in proportion as
it draws nearer to that period in which we are more
immediately concerned.
A tranflation of the other volumes will be printed
with all poffible difpatch; and we flatter ourselves, that
the public will give fufficient encouragement to a per-
formance, which exhibits a continued ſeries of the most
refined policy, and from which the hiftorian may re-
ceive inftruction, and the public minifter innumerable
important hints, by which he may regulate his conduct.
THE
NEGOTIATIONS
O F
COUNT D'AVAUX.
I
N order to understand the reafons why the
Dutch, fince the treaty in 1684, departed from
the intereſt of the King, as well as their an-
cient maxims, and were drawn into a greater
dependence than ever on the Prince of Orange,
'tis neceffary to know in what manner this treaty
has been made, how the people ftood then diſpo-
fed, and what were the different parties in the re-
publick fince the peace of Nimeguen.
The States General of the United Provinces,
fince a certain time, and particularly fince the peace
of Nimeguen, have been divided into two, or ra-
ther three different parties; one confifting of the
Prince of Orange, and thofe devoted to his inte-
reft: they are all, excepting five or fix perfons,
fuch as he has raiſed from an obſcure condition,
to put into the adminiftration, who have no in-
fluence but what is derived from their preferment,
and having no other fubfiftence than the profits
of their places, are confequently not a little in-
tereſted to maintain the government of the State,
in a dependence on the Prince of Orange.
The republicans form another party, which
may properly be divided into two; one is com-
VOL. I.
B
poled
2
NEGOTIATIONS of
pofed of the remains of M. de Witt's faction,
and fome others, who though not originally of
this faction, were nevertheleſs turned out in 1672.
All theſe are fuch as openly declare their fenti-
ments; they are looked upon as true republicans,
and accounted to be the fupport and bulwark of
the publick liberty. Their number is inconfider-
able, but conſiſting of the beſt families in Hol-
land; they are all ftrongly united together, and
communicate their fentiments and deſigns to each
other, by a fure and fecret correſpondence.
The other clafs of well-difpofed republicans,
is made up of thoſe who remained in the govern-
ment in 1672, or who being admitted at this time
by the Prince of Orange, do ftill retain favourable
fentiments for the commonwealth. All of this
fort are extremely fecret and referved, and fo
cautious that they will not venture to act, but
with the utmoſt fecurity, or when puſhed by ne-
ceffity. They form not a party as the others, for
every individual keeping his fentiments concealed,
or communicating them only to particular friends,
he in no fhape declares himſelf openly. Never-
theleſs, as the first clafs of true republicans, are
moftly perfons of wisdom and underſtanding, and
men of weight, they have great connections with
the laſt mentioned; who, though upon the reſerve
with each other, yet they put a voluntary confi-
dence in the former; fo that this fmall number of
true republicans, whom I have placed in the firſt
clafs, receiving fecret intelligence from the others,
and communicating to each other what they have
learnt feparately, by this means acquire a general
knowledge of the fentiments and difpofitions which
prevail in the different towns and provinces.
There are befides, the merchants and common
people, who are obliged to follow the dictates of
the Prince of Orange, or join themſelves with the
republicans.
COUNT D'A VA U X.
3
republicans. In regard to the people, as they are
generally carried away, either by zeal for religion,
or fomething or other which dazzles and confounds
their fight, they have always had a warm affec-
tion for the Prince of Orange, and in theſe latter
times have been entirely devoted to his intereſt, by
means of the clergy, who are wholly at his com-
mand, and the moſt implacable enemies of the
republicans, the greateſt part of whom are Armi-
nians. As for the merchants, they have generally
had great confidence in the true republicans; but
they being fwayed by intereft, it will appear af
terwards how the Prince of Orange found means
to gain upon them, and to hurt the republicans,
by reprefenting to the merchants, that France,
with whom the republicans defired to make an al-
liance, ruined their commerce: The merchants
themſelves were too apt to believe this, for lately
they had come greatly ſhort of the profits formerly
made in France.
I muſt likewife take notice, that fome incidents
in the last months of the war in 1672, greatly al-
tered the affection which the people in Holland had
conceived for the King. It is certain, when his
majeſty offered them peace, there was ſcarce any
one in the republic, who was not perfuaded he
could eaſily have continued the war, and that he
ſtopt in the middle of his conquefts, entirely from
a regard to the States General. They were then
of opinion, that the peace granted by his Majefty,
was the pure refult of his affection; and this had
gained their hearts to fuch a degree, that his power
was then no leſs at Amfterdam, than now at Paris.
But when they were informed, that the King in-
fifted the forts in the Low-Countries (which
ought to have been reftored to Spain) fhould re-
main in his poffeffion, till the King of Sweden
was re-eſtabliſhed in the dominions he had loft
B 2
in
4
NEGOTIATIONS of
in the war; and when the Prince of Orange had
the art to render the King's fincerity fufpected, as
if his Majeſty never intended to reſtore theſe forts:
their affections then took a different turn, and
inſtead, as before, of accounting the peace to be
an act of generofity, they now confidered it as a
thing his Majefty was forced into, by the treaty
concluded with England.
In this fituation I found the States General when
I arrived at the Hague; and as his Majefty had in-
joined me to keep no other intercourfe with the
Prince of Orange, than what was unavoidable,
and to regard him as a perfon with whom he was
highly difpleafed. I thought I could not take a
more effectual method, at once to ferve my mafter,
and obey his inftructions, than to attach myfelf
wholly to the republicans, and to preſerve only
outward civility with the Prince of Orange: for
1 conceived it would appear odious, if I fhould
openly fhew an intention, to make a divifion in the
State, by feparating the Prince of Orange and his
dependents from the reſt of the republic: more-
over, that I fhould thereby render my employ
anore difficult, nay perhaps uſeleſs, there being
icarce any one perfon, even of thoſe the moſt fan-
guine to form a fecret intercourfe with me, who
would venture to vifit me, if I ſhould make fuch a
declaration against the Prince of Orange.
I spoke upon this fubject to fome perfons of
Amfterdam, who approved of my deſign, and en-
couraged me as much as poffible, to proceed there-
in. I then, without any ceremony, waited on the
·Prince of Orange, before I had an audience of the
States General, as is the cuftom of every embaf-
fador, coming on any particular bufinefs, before
he makes his entry; for in this caſe, being obli-
ged to vifit the prefident of the States General,
and the penfionary of Holland, he cannot omit
paying
COUNT D'A VA U X.
5
paying the fame honour to the Prince of Orange,
as the head of all councils in the republic: This
ſtep however was not approved of, for I was for-
bid to return to the Prince's houfe, after having
paid the firſt viſit of ceremony. This obliged me
to refort to the houſes of perfons of the firſt rank,
to acquire fuch connections as might ferve to pro-
mote an intimacy with fome confiderable perfons
in the State: but I received letters from court,
mentioning, that information had been received of
my having been at Madame de Bederode's, coufin
to the Prince of Orange, and Madame Sommer-
dyk's, whofe hufband was ftrongly attached to the
Prince of Orange; and exprefsly forbidding me to
frequent thefe houfes. Being thus deprived of all
fuch connections, I found myfelf in an irkſome em-
ployment; for it is no eafy matter to be informed
of what paffes in a ftate, when not allowed to
keep up a free and open intercourfe with all per-
fons, which not only procures friends and acquain-
tances, from whom great intelligence may be drawn,
but alſo gives opportunity to thofe who are de-
firous to reveal fecrets, to refort to an embaſſador's,
without any apprehenfion; this could not be done
any longer, fince no perfon could come to my
houfe, without becoming fufpected, and thereby
declaring himfelf an enemy to the Prince of
Orange.
The Prince, in his turn, behaved in the fame
manner, in regard to the King, as I was willing to
do towards him. He wanted not to break intirely
with his Majesty, notwithstanding what he had
done to his prejudice, by making a treaty with
England to prolong the war, at the very time
when the States General were upon the point of
concluding peace; and afterwards attacking the
King's troops near Mons, when the peace betwixt
his Majesty and the States General was actually
figned;
B 3
6 NEGOTIATIONS of
figned. Nevertheleſs the Prince of Orange, figni-
fied to the King, he wished to have the honour of
being re-inftated in his good graces. To this his
Majefty anſwered, that when he fhewed by his
ronduct, fuch to be his real fentiments, then he
fhould know what courſe to follow. If I may be
permitted to declare what I thought of the intentions
of the Prince of Orange, I will venture to fay,
there was ftrong reafon to believe, he wanted
neither to come to a rupture with the king, nor
yet to be intirely well with him. In all probabili-
ty, he thought it fufficient to keep the King from
being his declared. enemy, that he might not op-
pofe his pretenfions to England; but he was per-
fuaded it would greatly hurt him, with the people
as well as the parliament of England, if he formed
a cloſe union with his Majefty. Beſides, 'tis evi-
dent, it was not the intereft of one, who expected
the crown of England, to make a ftrong alliance
betwixt the States General and France. He
often himſelf declared to a perſon, in whom he
confided, that he would do every thing in his
power, to preferve a good underſtanding with the
King, but that there was little probability of fuc-
ceeding therein, fince fuch things would be requi-
red of him, as might break his union with Eng-
land, but that he could not facrifice his own inte-
reft for that of his Majefty.
I leave it to the judgment of others, whether
in this fituation, it was adviſeable for the King to
endeavour to gain the Prince of Orange, intirely
to his intereft, which feemed impoffible, or to
treat him as an irreconcileable enemy; and if it
tended to his Majefty's fervice, merely to vex this
Prince, fince he could not be brought to ſuch an
attachment as was defired. It appeared to me at
leaſt, fince it was refolved to treat him as a foe,
that
COUNT D'A VAUX.
ク
​1
that the affair ought not to have been half done, but
he ought to have been utterly cruthed; for it an-
fwered no manner of purpoſe, to fhew him fo
much refentment, without making him feel the
effects thereof. But they have exafperated, with-
out hurting him; the true republicans have been
ftirred up againſt him, and not properly ſupported:
fo that he remains an avowed enemy to the King,
and the republicans have been left expofed to his
reſentment, unable to defend themſelves, or to do
any ſervice to France.
As to theſe two parties above mentioned, the
republicans, and the adherents to the Prince of
Orange, who difputed about the adminiſtration of
affairs; their deſigns and interefts were very dif-
ferent, or rather intirely oppofite. The republi-
cans wanted to preferve peace, and to be attached
to France; the Prince of Orange was defirous
to unite the States with England, and to form.
fuch a powerful league as to be able to make head
against France, and to fupport a war if he could
carry matters ſo far.
For this purpoſe the Prince of Orange had a
fcheme, as foon as the peace of Nimeguen was con-
cluded, to make an alliance betwixt the States Ge-
neral and England, not doubting, when theſe two
powers fhould be united, and the houfe of Auſtria
joined thereto, that they fhould find means to bring
over moft of the Princes of the Empire.
But as the Prince of Orange knew the States
General would be ftartled at the very name of a
league with England, he therefore did not think
proper to explain himſelf openly, but took care it
fhould be fecretly propofed to the leading men in
the States, under the name of a fimple guaranty of
the treaty of Nimeguen. I received intelligence
of thefe proceedings, and at the fame time faw
through the artifice; I informed the King thereof,
B 4
who
8
NEGOTIATIONS of
who ordered the embaffadors of the States Gene-
ial to be told, that he could indeed affign no rea-
fon, why every Prince might not make particular
acts of guaranty, for treaties of peace; but that he
fhould have great cauſe to complain, if they form-
ed new leagues under fuch a pretext: Neverthe-
lefs, the Prince of Orange continuing ftill to
follicit the States General to make this act of gua-
ranty, his Majefty ordered fuch ſtrong declarati-
ons to be made to the embaffadors of the States,
and by me, to the States themſelves; that thẻ
Prince of Orange for fome time, fufpended his
fchemes, and the better to conceal himſelf, he fell
upon a fecret way of applying to the province of
Holland, as will appear afterwards.
The Prince of Orange did not content himſelf
with working upon the Dutch only; he was like-
wife carrying on his ſchemes in England, with the
King and fome of the principal members of par-
liament; and as he had formerly fome particular
connections with the latter, by means of one Fry-
mans, who raiſed fuch cabals in the houſe of com-
mons in 1674, that they obliged the King to make
peace with the States General; he fent the fame
perfon a fecond time, to inform them of his de-
fign, not doubting to find them ready to im-
brace an alliance, which, by difengaging the King
of England from the intereft of his Chriftian Ma-
jefty, would throw him into an abfolute depend-
ence on his parliament. He, took care to have
reprefented to them all the advantages they could
leap from fuch an alliance; and that it fhould be
put to them, whether they could not affure the
King of England, they would furnish him with
fufficient ſupplies, in cafe the King of France fhould
declare war: But as I received intelligence of his
moft fecret intrigues, I was informed of theſe
Y
practices
COUNT D'A VAUX.
9
practices with the Engliſh members. I poke of
it to one of the moſt confiderable republicans in
Holland: This man had an intimate cor.efpon-
dence with the leading men in the Englih par-
liament; and by his means, I fignified to Colonel
Sidney, a famous republican, who was after wards
beheaded; that as long as the Prince of Orange -
remained ſo powerful in the States General, no-
thing could be more prejudicial to the parliament
of England, and the republic of Holland, than to.
allow the King of Great Britain, to make an al-
liance with the Prince of Orange, for it was cer-
tainly intended to hurt the common liberty; that
the grandeur and power of the French Monarch,
the pretext of this union, could not poffibly be
more hurtful to either ſtate, than fuch an alliance,
which they ought to endeavour to prevent, with all
their ftrength and vigour. Colonel Sidney wrote
to his friend, that he was ftrongly convinced by
the reaſons advanced, and that he had likewife.
communicated them with fuccefs, to the majority
of the parliament. Nevertheless, he informed him
at the fame time, that the French King began to
give powerful fuccour to the King of England;
that he had ſent him lately a confiderable fum of
money; and that if the King of England, by the:
affiftance of his Chriſtian Majefty, fhould be able to
do without his parliament, in that cafe, he would be
come abfolute fovereign; and this would oblige them
to make an alliance with the States General. 'Tis
unneceffary, to mention all the particulars wrote.
to Colonel Sidney upon that head; let it fuffice, to.
take notice, that the Colonel and his, friends were
fo thoroughly gained, that after a negotiation of
three months, the city of London, and the lead-
ing members in. parliament, pofitively refuſed
B. 5,
to
10
NEGOTIATIONS of
to furniſh ſuch ſupplies as were neceffary for the
King of England, to fupport an alliance with the
States General.
The Prince of Orange fucceeded better with
the King of England, who went fo readily into
his defigns, that at the end of Auguſt 1679, he
diſpatched Mr. Sidney, brother to the Colonel at
the Hague. This gentleman, after his firft audience,
demanded commiffaries, to whom he fignified that
the King of England having always had a parti-
cular regard for the States General, was defirous
to enter into a cloſe alliance with them, and had
therefore commanded him to propofe, the making
of a treaty of guaranty, to that of Nimeguen. He
not only made this propofal, but he called upon
the States to accept of it; to acquit themſelves
of the obligation they had laid themſelves under,
by their treaty in July 1678.
Sidney having made this declaration to the States
General, the Prince of Orange tried every artifice.
to conclude the treaty. Mean while there hap-
pened an incident, which embarraffed the Prince.
of Orange, and gave rife to many intrigues.
This Prince had made feveral feigned or real
advances, fince the peace of Nimeguen, to get in-
to the favour of his Majefty: He had not how-
ever been liftened to, either becauſe his conduct at
the conclufion of the peace, had diſpleaſed the
King, or becauſe the court believed, there was a
party in the republic, with whom they could take
meaſures to form alliances, independent of the
Prince of Orange. I had taken the liberty to re-
prefent to the King, that though there were a con-
fiderable party of the republicans, of fentiments oppo-
fite to thofe of the Prince of Orange; yet it muft be
acknowledged, nothing could be expected from
them, for they had neither inclination nor power,
to
COUNT D'AVAUX.
II
to do any thing againſt the Prince of Orange,
and I was obliged, to obferve in my letters, that I
either found them too weak, to venture upon any un-
dertaking, or not endowed with abilities to carry on
any great affair. This was the character of the whole
party, eight or ten perfons excepted; thefe indeed,
were capable of putting the reft in a proper way,
and of preferving the fundamental laws of the re-
public free from violation; but they infifted on
being powerfully fuccoured from abroad, by the
arms of his Majeſty.
I had orders at this time, which was in the month
of
1679, to liften to thofe who fhould
offer any thing from the Prince of Orange; and
to declare to them, as they demanded what con-
duct he ought to follow, as a proof of his finceri-
ty, that I was inftructed to tell them, he could
not take a more effectual method to convince the
King thereof, than by bringing about an alliance
betwixt his Majefty and the States General. This
anſwer, and the Prince of Orange's defire to con-
ceal his fentiments, the better to gain his purpoſes,
obliged him to declare, he would heartily contribute
all in his power, to make an alliance betwixt
France and the States. But as this was not his in-
tention, he therefore did not exprefs himſelf in
ſuch a manner as was requifite; he thought it fuf-
ficient, to make a promife in general terms, add-
ing at the fame time, certain conditions, which put
it in his power to drop the affair, whenever it
fuited his purpoſe; and in the mean while he took
care that I fhould be founded, to know if the
King would like that the States fhould renew the
treaty of alliance in 1662; and alfo conclude a
treaty of guaranty with England. I took care to
have reprefented to him, the incompatibility of
theſe two treaties; that it was to make one alliance
B 6
with
I 2
NS of
NEGOTIATIO
ther againſt her.
with France, and at the fame time to form ano-
Nevertheleſs this did not hinder
him, from being defirous of entring into a negoti-
ation with me upon that head: But as I intirely
diftruſted him, and faw plainly he wanted only to
fpin out matters, to gain the proper opportunity,
to conclude a league with England; I therefore
took fuch meaſures with the republicans to bring
things to a proper difpofition, that the Prince of
Orange found himſelf under a neceffity to give
full confent to this alliance, or to oppoſe it open-
ly, which he could not do without making a
breach of promife; at the fame time I fpoke fo ef-
fectually, to the leading men at Amfterdam, that
this city formed a refolution, not to allow the
affembly of the States in September to break up,
till they themselves had propofed an alliance with
France.
Mean while, I failed not to have a conference
with the Prince of Orange, as he had defired,
and every thing turned out as I forefaw, to render
any hopes of an alliance with France, more dif
tant, when he had it in his power too, to have
brought into this meaſure, fuch as were of them-
felves not inclined to it. At the fame time he gave
me to underſtand, that the act of guaranty with
England, might very well be concluded; treating
it as a matter of no confideration, as a thing per-
mitted by the treaty of Nimeguen; and which could
not be avoided. I needed not ſuch ſort of declara-
tions to perſuade me of his bad difpofition, but I
was indeed more convinced thereof after this inter-
view, for I learnt that this Prince, having three
days before, known the reſolution of the magi-
#rates of Amfterdam, to propofe an alliance
with France, at the affembly in September, had
fent
COUNT D'A V A U X.
13
fent for the deputies of this city; and after a con-
ference of two hours, in which he endeavoured
with the utmoft ftrength of rhetoric, to convince
them, there was no neceffity for propofing an alli-
ance with France in this affembly, nor any incon-
venience in deferring the affair till November; he
had infifted on putting it off till that time, and in-
treated them to go to Amfterdam, and in his
name to requeft this of the regency. Van Buning
returned to Amfterdam, with the deputies, and ad-
vanced fo many plaufible reafons in the council, to
fhew that the deferring the propoſal of an alliance
for fix weeks, could be of no confequence, that
at laft the city of Amfterdam, agreed not to make
the overture in this aſſembly, and only ordered the
deputies to fecond fuch a propofal with all their
ftrength, if it fhould happen to be made by any
other city.
As I had with reafon diftrufted the Prince of
Orange, I was therefore careful to inform myfelf,
what conduct I fhould purfue, in cafe this Prince
deviated from the rules of honour. I confulted
feveral republicans, and it will not be foreign to
my purpoſe, if I here infert what two or three of
them, but particularly one of diftinguifhed me-
rit, faid to me upon this head, becauſe it will ap-
pear from thence, what conduct people of wifdom
and penetration, were of opinion, ought to be fol-
lowed, in order to force the States General, to act
in ſpite of the Prince of Orange, as his Majefty
defired. This perfon told me, he was perfuaded
we had brought things to fuch a fituation, by
means of his friends, and thoſe to whom I had
applied, that we might oblige the Prince of
Orange to make the alliance, provided proper mea-
fures were taken. He often repeated to me, that
the genius and temper of the people, who were
S
naturally
14
NEGOTIATIONS of
·
naturally fearful and apprehenſive, ought greatly
to be confidered; that whatever advantage the King
gave them by the peace, they would never have
accepted it, had not his Majefty offered it at the
head of 60000 Men; for no fooner was their appre-
henfion, of the continuance of the war removed,
but they began to change their fentiments; that it
might be eafily perceived, what effect their fear of
the Prince of Orange (though quite imaginary)
had had upon their fpirits; and that his Majeſty
could not difpel this apprehenfion, but by raiſing
a greater. This appeared evident, from the treaty
of a league with England, which had been ob-
ftructed, by the declarations made by his Majefty,
at Paris and the Hague: that this was the only
plan to be purſued; for fo long as they remained
free from the apprehenfions of the war, fo long
would they dread the Prince of Orange: that there
were certain threats to be uſed, which, without
giving a pretext to the difaffected, to ftir up the
merchants and people, would frighten them to ſuch
a degree, as to oblige them, in ſpite of the Prince
of Orange, to make an alliance. For this pur-
poſe, he thought it fufficient, only to repeat what
had been already declared; that is, to make known
the difpofition of his Majefty for an alliance, and
at the fame time, give them to underſtand, if the
States General acted contrary to the confidence
placed in them, that his Majefty had it in his
power to purſue other meaſures; and as what had
been declared upon that head, at Paris and the
Hague, remained in a manner unknown, it was
therefore highly neceffary to render it public,
either in an audience, or by a memorial to the
States General.
Mean while the Prince of Orange, who, as I
mentioned above, durft not any longer addrefs
himſelf to the States General, in regard to the
league
COUNT D'A VAUX.
15
Teague with England, for fear of rendering it too
publick, got Penfionary Fagel, to work underhand
with the States of Holland, in order, if poffible, to
bring about the affair; and as I received intelli-
gence, not only of every particular, which paffed
in the affembly of Holland, but even of the moſt
ſecret tranſactions in the Prince of Orange's ca-
binet, betwixt him and the deputies of the towns;
I was informed he had in vain follicited the magi-
ftrates of Amſterdam, to conclude a reciprocal act
of guaranty with England, though he had given
them to underſtand, the King of France did not
oppoſe it. I at the fame time received intelligence,
that in the privy council of the towns, where
very few perfons are admitted, he had mentioned
the fame treaty, under pretext of a guaranty. I
had notice however, that it was not a ſimple act of
guaranty he aimed at, but a reciprocal and mutu-
ally binding act, couched in the ſtrongeſt terrns,
in confequence of treaties before the peace; and I
learned by another channel, that Penfionary Fa-
gel defigned next day, to propofe this reciprocal
act of guaranty, to the affembly of Holland; and
that he would endeavour to perfuade the towns, it
was not contrary to his Majefty's inclinations.
Theſe three advices were followed by another, of
no lefs importance in my opinion. I was inform-
ed Penfionary Fagel had uſed an ingenious device,
to make the deputies of the towns agree to the
act of guaranty: He told all of them feparately,
that he intended to propofe an alliance with France,
and gave them to underſtand, that his Majeſty would
nevertheleſs conſent to the act of mutual guaranty,
and thus theſe two treaties, made by mutual agree-
ment, would eftabliſh the States General, in full
tranquillity on both fides; but that it was neceffary,
the act of guaranty, fhould precede the alliance
with
16
NEGOTIATIONS of
with France; and I learnt likewife, that moſt of"
the deputies had been perfuaded thereof, by Pen--
fionary Fagel.
All this intelligence being conveyed to me, by
the fureft channels, and from perfons of the firſt
diftinction, oblig'd me to form the refolution of
taking an extraordinary step, which had never been
before practifed, to go to all the feveral deputies, of the
eighteen towns of Holland, at their houfes where
they refided in the Hague, during the fitting of the.
States of that Province. I declared to them, that
the King having been informed fome months be-
fore, that the States General defigned to make a
fort of league, he had fignified to their embaffa-
dors, and by me to the deputies of the States Ge-
neral, that this was in a manner to unite again in
peace, the fame powers which had been confede-
rated in war, that it was going beyond the guaranty
permitted by treaties; and that his Majefty would
have juft cauſe to fufpect the intentions of the
States General, if he found them endeavouring,.
under the pretext of guaranties, to form a league
againſt France; that I had proved to them that a
treaty, which fhould contain reciprocal guaranties,;
and a treaty of league were the fame; that, in con-
fequence of thefe declarations, the States General
had fignified to me, and likewife affured the King
by their embaffadors, that they had no thoughts
of making a league, nor of taking any ſtep which
might diſpleaſe him; that after having given fuch
ftrong affurances to his Majefty, and to me in par-
ticular, that they defired nothing fo much, as to
preſerve the honour of his friendship, I appre-
hended it to be my duty, to let them know they
were upon the point of entering into engagements,
which would break off this good underſtanding,
and oblige the King to purfue fuch meafures as
in the end must give them caufe to repent.
There
COUNT D'AVAUX.
17
There was not one of the deputies, but who
affured me, that it was not his intention in any
fhape, to diſpleaſe his Majefty. I replied this was
the very reafon, why I had come to wait upon
them; for as they were defirous to preferve the ho-
nour of his friendſhip, I imagined they would
have had great caufe to complain of me, if I had
not, in proper time communicated to them, his
Majeſty's fentiments, (eſpecially as it had been at-
tempted to miſrepreſent them) and if I had not
ènabled them, to take whatever meafures they
thought proper, with an intire knowledge of what
might enfue thereupon. I added likewiſe, many
other particulars, according as the deputies to whom
I fpoke, happened to be attached to the Prince of
Orange, or the republican party.
The Prince of Orange, and Penfionary Fagel,
were not a little nettled at my having gone to in-
form the deputies of his Majefty's fentiments, and at
my making fuch ftrong declarations; Penfionary
Fagel fpoke of it in the affembly next day,
with great warmth, declaring that fuch proceed-
ings were unprecedented; and if fuffered, would be
attended with the most dangerous confequences:
Theſe private vifits to the deputies, did in effect,
break through all the Prince of Orange's meafures;
as I was affured next day by the well-affected,
for this Prince, and the Penfionary; met with a tho-
rough oppofition to their defigns, from all the towns.
The deputies, who had promifed the foregoing
night, to agree to the act of guaranty, declared
next day, that they could not confent thereto, after
what I had fignified to them from his Majefty; and
that they were under a neceffity of returning to
their reſpective towns, in order to know the
fentiments of their conftituents upon that mat-
ter.
+
But
18
NEGOTIATIONS of
But before the affembly broke up, Penfionary
Fagel, and Van Buning, who wanted by any
means, to bring about this affair, propoſed that
four deputies, of the four principal towns, fhould
be diſpatched, to affure me of the fincerity of their
intentions, and to endeavour to convince me, that
the act they wanted to pafs, was intirely harmleſs;
and that his Majefty, when he knew the particu-
lars thereof, could not be diffatisfied. Theſe four
gentlemen, amongſt whom was Van Buning,
came to me after dinner: But as I fufpected the
defign of this deputation, was only to make me
enter into ſome fort of negotiation, and then to
report to the affembly, that they had explained to
me, the intentions of the States, that I had under-
took to write to the King, and to procure his con-
fent; and under this pretext, perhaps immedi-
ately to bring the league to a conclufion; this obli-
ged me to continue firm in my declarations, and
not to enter into any difcuffion, upon the form of
the acts of guaranty; I fignified only that I had
neither inftructions nor power, to enter into any
negotiation upon the act of guaranty, that they
might eafily conceive, the King could not imagine
they would confult his embaſſador, upon a league
againſt him; and that for my own part, I ftuck to
the declarations already made, ſo earneſtly, that
I took this opportunity to repeat them ſtill more
ftrongly.
The four deputies, having immediately returned
to the States of Holland, made a report of this
conference. Penfionary Fagel was obliged to
break up the affembly, and fend the deputies to
their towns, to lay the affair before their con-
ftituents.
This fame day, in the evening, I was informed
that the Prince of Orange, Penfionary Fagel, and
Van
COUNT D'AVAU X.
19
Van Buning, before the deputies were fent to
their reſpective towns, had entirely altered fome
articles of the plan of the treaty for a reciprocal
guaranty; that they had foftened others; and had
then given them to the deputies of the towns,
afſuring them the articles were now drawn up, in
ſuch a manner, that the King had declared to
their embaſſadors, he was perfectly ſatisfied; and
under this pretext, they follicited the deputies
to return, with the confent of their respective
towns.
I was afraid the magiftrates of the towns might
be drawn into this fnare. This obliged me to re-
double my diligence; I fpoke to thoſe who were
beft affected, and gave them memorials to fend
their friends. I wrote likewife to the magiftrates
of Amfterdam, repreſenting the difficulties they
were ready to fall into: I pretended even to have
received that very day, a letter from my royal
maſter; and I told them his Majefty expreffed the
greateſt regard for the States; but at the fame time
gave me fuch ftrong injunctions, in cafe I faw
them carry matters further, that I doubted not, but
he would highly reſent any engagement they ſhould
enter into againſt his intereft, as what was then
under deliberation, muſt certainly be accounted.
And that the States would repent, of not having
placed a proper confidence in his friendſhip, which
would prove a ſtronger fecurity to them than all the
treaties they could make.
Thefe fteps were abfolutely neceffary, for
Van Buning had recourſe to all manner of artifice,
to bring about this affair at Amfterdam. He af-
fured fome perfons, that I had owned what I faid
to the deputies of the towns, to have been without
orders; he told others, I had confeffed to him,
the affair was of no confequence; and that the
King
`20
NEGOTIATIONS of
King would approve thereof. But what ſpurred
me on to act with ftill greater zeal, was that I
found means to procure copies of the two plans, of
a league with England; I mean of the firſt, and of
that alſo, which had been altered. I had even the
original of the latter, with notes upon the margin,
in Penfionary Fagel's hand: And as I faw plainly
they were leagues againft France, under the pre-
text of acts of guaranty, I therefore inftantly dif-
patched them to the King. Mean while, as I had
daily information of what paffed in the towns, I
learnt that the principal amongst them, continued
favourably difpofed, and had determined to refufe the
act of guaranty.
I had likewife the fatisfaction at this time, to
receive affurances from the provinces of Friez- ·
land and Groningen, that though the province
of Holland, fhould refolve to pass thefe acts of
reciprocal guaranty, they would never affent there-
to.
The Prince of Orange and Penfionary Fagef,
who on their part, informed themſelves of what
paffed in the council of the towns of Holland,
found at the return of the deputies, that nine of
the principal towns, with whom the more incon-
fiderable almoſt always conform, had determined
to refuſe the act of guaranty: This Prince there-
fore refolved to try once more, if he could gain
ſomewhat upon me, in the way of negotiation,
making as a pretence thereof, a converfation I had
had with one of his friends two days before: he
told him he was obliged to me, for my favourable
fentiments towards him; and that in return, his
difpofition towards me, would always be agreeable
to my wifhes; he intreated me to have a confe-
rence with Penfionary Fagel, in order to explain
ourfelves fully to each other, with candour and
fincerity.
COUNT D'A VAU X.
- 2 b
fincerity. I conſented to this, when the Penfion-
ary affured me, the States would never have thought
of making an act of guaranty, had they not been
obliged to it. He added a number of other frivol-
ous reaſons to anſwer his purpoſe; but the moſt
ſpecious was, that he drew up this act, to facilitate
the alliance with France; and that he looked upon
it as a kind of preliminary, fince it was neceffary,
to give the fatisfaction due to the King of England;
after which the States would be free to engage
with his Catholick Majefty: and he informed me
at laft, as if by the bye, that the Prince of Orange
that very morning, had been upon the point of
propofing an alliance with France, at the fame
time, when the act of guaranty with England
fhould have been concluded; but that he would
know more particularly the fentiments of this
Prince; and he propofed to wait upon me again,
and inform me thereof. I faid enough to fhew
Penfionary Fagel, that the States General were
under no neceffity to make the act of guaranty,
propoſed to them; and as to what I had to ſay,
upon any other head, I referved that till he ſhould
pay me the vifit he promiſed.
The Prince of Orange, finding himſelf unable
to gain any thing with me; and that he was
equally unfuccefsful with the States of Holland,
ordered the affembly of this province to be broke
up next day, and diſpatched Penfionary Fagel to
me, about three o'clock in the afternoon: He
told me the Prince defired him to acquaint me, he
had taken care to have the affembly difmiffed
that morning, without making mention of the
act of guaranty with England; that he believed
he thereby gave a proof of his defire to merit
his Majesty's good graces; and that he aſſured
me he would propofe the alliance with France,
the
22
NEGOTIATIONS of
the next affembly in November; adding, at the
fame time, that he hoped the King would be per-
ſuaded, the act of guaranty which had been pro-
pofed, was not prejudicial to his intereft. As it
feemed proper, this affair fhould be difcuffed in
France, and the breaking up of the affembly
gave fufficient time, I would not therefore enter
upon the matter, and refolved only to make anſwer
this compliments. I accordingly pretended not
tɔ know, that the Prince of Orange broke up the
a Tembly, becauſe the deputies of the principal
towns had orders to refuſe the act of guaranty;
and I fignified to Penfionary Fagel, that I was per-
fuaded the Prince of Orange could not do any
thing more agreeable to his Majefty, more ſervice-
able to the States General, and more advantageous.
to himſelf, than to renew the alliance with France:
That without doubt the King would be highly
pleaſed with the firſt ſtep he had taken, in break-
ing up the affembly of Holland, without making
any mention of the acts of reciprocal guaranty;
that I would not fail to make it known to his Ma-
jefty, and to fet it in ſuch a light as he deſerved.
Penfionary Fagel upon this made fome com-
pliments to me, in the name of the Prince of
Orange, which I repaid in the proper manner.
Thus the league which the Prince of Orange
wanted to form betwixt the King of England and
the States General, was broke off, nor could it be
ever reſumed, notwithſtanding all the efforts made
for that purpoſe. The King upon this, ordered
me to be acquainted, that he was highly fatisfied
with the diligence I had uſed to defeat the ſchemes
concerted to bring about the act of guaranty with
England; and that he approved of my having pri-
vately waited upon the deputies, for in urgent af-
fairs forms were not to be regarded; and it was
2
COUNT D'AVAU X.
23
a mark of prudence, to uſe extraordinary means
when ordinary ones were infufficient.
About this time an English merchant, who
lived at Amſterdam, waited upon one of the zealous
republicans, and told him he had orders from two
of the leading members in the Engliſh Parliament,
to enquire if it was true that the well-affected
republicans, were without influence, and the Prince
of Orange abfolute mafter; for this was held as a
certainty in England: if it was fo, the Engliſh
would be obliged to take meafures accordingly,
with the King of Great Britain; but if the repub-
licans ftill retained credit, he adviſed them to op-
poſe the league propoſed betwixt England and the
States General, as a thing prejudicial to both.
The Hollanders defired him to write for anſwer,
That it was true, the honeft part of the repub-
licans, for fome time had had little fhare in the go-
vernment; but he affured him nevertheleſs, that
lately they had refumed courage, and re-united
themſelves in fuch a manner, that he believed he
could pofitively affirm, they would be able to pre-
vent the league; he entreated the Engliſh to ſtand
firm, and gave orders to his fon in England, nar-
rowly to obſerve all their motions in this affair.
As I was informed that the magiftrates of the
principal towns, particularly thofe of Amfterdam,
refuſed the act of guaranty, only from fear of dif-
pleafing the King, though perfuaded they acted
in this againſt the faith of treaties, and contrary
to the obligation entered into with England, I
apprehended it therefore to be of the utmoſt con-
fequence, to undeceive them: one of the republi-
cans accordingly undertook to go to fome of the
principal towns, and particularly to Amſterdam;
he ſpoke to M. Valkenir, who entirely governed
this town; and he convinced him of the truth: he
made
24
NEGOTIATIONS of
made it appear evident, that there was no obliga-
tion to make an act of guaranty with England,
in confequence of the treaty in July 1678, becauſe
this treaty not being to take place, but in caſe the
peace betwixt France and the States General, was
not figned the 11th of Auguft; and the peace
having been figned the 10th, it followed there-
fore, that the treaty was without force, as if it
had never exiſted. The 5th article, cited on this
occafion, could have no more effect, than the reſt
of the treaty, being in no ways binding till the
11th of Auguft, and not then, except the peace
fhould not be figned by that time.
Although I am unwilling to bring in any thing
here, not relative to the negotiation of the
league; yet I cannot forbear mentioning the con-
nections, which the Prince of Orange formed with
the English members of parliament, and the
views he entertained from this time, of making
himself King of England, in prejudice of the Duke
of York. I muſt take notice then, that I con-
firmed to the King, by my letter October 19,
1679, the intelligences I had before given him,
that the Prince of Orange had a defign of getting
himſelf named to the fucceffion of England, by
the excluſion of the Duke of York; that Sir Wil-
liam Temple encouraged him in this expectation;
but that I did not yet know, whether Mr. Sidney,
the King of England's envoy at the Hague, or one
Maridet, managed this negotiation.
I ought likewife to take notice, that the well
affected republicans, who wanted France to act
with more vigere for their fupport, at the very time
when they found themſelves in a condition of re-
eſtabliſhing the republic, in her true intereft;
plainly forefaw, if five or fix of the principal re-
publicans in the government, as Paets, Slingland,
7
Val
COUNT D'AVAUX.
25
Valkenir, and two or three others, fhould happen
to drop off through age, or be removed by the
Prince of Orange, in that cafe he might eafily
make himſelf abfolute Mafter of the republic.
The Prince of Orange did not account fuf-
ficient the ſteps he had taken with the King of
England and the States General, to bring about
the alliance he intended, betwixt all the Princes of
Europe againſt France, for I diſcovered the 26th
of October, 1679, that he had diſpatched M.
Amerongue, to the Elector of Brandenburg (un-
der pretence of getting payment of the fubfidies)
not only to prevent his making an alliance with
France, but to propofe alfo, an union with the
States General. I was informed of this the very
fame day, although the inftructions of Amerongue
had been fignified only by five perfons, each of
whom had taken an oath of fecrecy; nor had they
paffed through the regiſter office, being only copied
by the agent for the States.
As the Prince of Orange had no other defign,
notwithſtanding all his affirmations to me, than
to break off the alliance with France, and con-
clude the league with England; he therefore ufed
every expedient likely to attain his purpoſe, before
the meeting of the affembly in November. I was
well informed thereof, and I even knew he
had told in confidence, to one of his friends, that
the King of England was neceffitated to conclude
the league with the States General; for he wanted
to affemble his Parliament, and deferred this
only becauſe the alliance was not concluded; for
if he ſhould fummon them together, before this
affair was finiſhed, he feared he fhould lofe his
authority, and be obliged to acquiefce with every
meaſure; it was therefore of the utmoſt confe-
quence to him, that the Prince of Orange ſhould
VOL. I.
conclude
C
26 NEGOTIATIONS of
conclude this alliance before the Parliament ſhould
be affembled, fo that his Britannick Majeſty might
thereby render himſelf more confiderable, and be
enabled to bring his Parliament to a better under-
ſtanding with him.
The Prince of Orange for this purpoſe, took
care to have the affembly of Holland put off
fome days, and he fent in queft of Mr. Sidney,
who had refolved to depart, and not return again;
deſpairing of being ever able to conclude the league
with England: he prevailed on this gentleman to
embark with all expedition for England, to concert
meaſures with the King, to bring about the league;
and ordered him to return in three weeks. It may
be ſuppoſed he failed not, to repeat the declaration
he had already made to him; that fo long as the
King of England had a miſunderſtanding with
his Parliament, not only the States General would
be averſe to an alliance with his Britannic Ma-
jefty; but the Prince of Orange would likewiſe
drop the affair, and not even propoſe it. What
the Prince of Orange aimed at was, that the King
of England ſhould intirely refign himſelf to his
Parliament, not doubting but they would carry
things to an extremity, in regard to the Duke of
York; and that the King would find himſelf con-
ftrained to acquiefce, with whatever the Parlia-
ment ſhould determine, in favour of the Prince of
Orange. Theſe particulars I had the honour of com-
municating to his Chriftian Majefty.
The Prince of Orange acted no lefs vigorously,
with the States of Holland; he had recourfe to
three different expedients, to accompliſh his de-
fign; the firſt was, as long as poffible, to keep
the towns of Holland from knowing the decla-
rations of the King to their embaffadors, viz.
that his Majeſty would be highly diſpleaſed, with
the
COUNT D'A VA U X.
27
the league they were about to make with Eng-
land, under the name of a treaty of guaranty. The
Prince of Orange's emiffaries gave out, on the
contrary, that the King was not fo diffatisfied
with the affair, as I had ſuppoſed: that this league
could not offend a Prince, of too much juftice, to
hinder the States General from fulfilling an en-
gagement, into which they had entered.
I failed not by every courier, to write to our
miniſtry, reprefenting with what induſtry the
Prince of Orange endeavoured to prevent the towns
of Holland from knowing the King's fentiments;
but notwithſtanding all I wrote, it was fcarce be-
lieved, that his fentiments were fo little known as
I affirmed. At laft however, they were perfuaded
of the truth, and the King found himſelf under a
neceffity to ſend M. Pomponne to the embaf-
fadors of the States General, to declare in the
plaineſt terms, he ſhould have the ſtrongeſt reaſon
to complain of their proceedings, if the league
fhould take place, betwixt England and the States
General: Nor could he give the leaſt credit, ta
the affurances they gave him, of being defirous to
merit and cultivate his friendſhip, if, after fuch de-
clarations, they ſhould purfue meaſures diametri-
cally oppofite thereto. M. Pomponne added like-
wife, many ftrong remonftrances; and the embaf-
fadors ftill fhewing an inclination to excufe their
maſters, in regard to the act of guaranty with
England, alledging it contained nothing prejudi-
cial to the intereft of his Majefty; he thereupon
fhewed them the two papers I had fent. This
intirely filenced them, but produced a bad effect
in Holland; for M. Dikfeld, made high complaints
thereof to Penfionary Fagel, who fpoke of this af-
fair to the States of Holland, with great warmth;
throwing out the moſt bitter reproaches, that
amongſt
C 2
28
NEGOTIATIONS of
amongſt ſuch a ſmall number of the moſt con-
fiderable perfons of the ſtate, to whom alone he
had communicated articles of the league, there
ſhould be ſome guilty of ſuch perfidy; he inveigh-
ed againſt them, in the moft violent manner, and
faid, if they could be diſcovered, they ought to be
puniſhed as traitors to the ftate.
But all this vehemence availed nothing; and he
being obliged to read the letters of the embaffadors,
wherein was ſet forth, in what a ftrong manner,
M. Pomponne had explained himſelf, upon the
acts of reciprocal guaranty; this confirmed the
towns of Holland, in their refolution of rejecting
the affair. Thus the Prince of Orange, finding
always a formal oppofition to the league with
England, declared at length, on the 28th of No-
vember, that he would drop it intirely, and affect-
ed to declare this publickly, but in revenge he
purſued more vigorously his defign, of forming
leagues with other princes; he entered into a ſcheme
of concluding an alliance, betwixt the King of
Spain and the King of England.
The other artifice the Prince made uſe of
with the towns of Holland was, to endeavour to
perfuade them, they were engaged to England by
a folemn treaty, to be mutual guarantees with his
Britannic Majefty, of the treaties of Nimeguen;
and that they could not avoid performing, what
they were in equity bound to, without being guilty
of a breach of juftice to a great Prince, and even
to themſelves. But I found means to fhew the
falfity of this reaſoning of the Prince of Orange's.
emiffaries, as I have remarked above.
The third device, the Prince of Orange prac-
tiſed, to have the act of guaranty with England
paffed, was to make it believed, that an alliance
was to be made with France, at the fame time
when
COUNT
29
D'A VAUX.
I
when the act of guaranty ſhould be concluded.
was for a long time apprehenfive, he would draw
fome advantage from this artifice: for people of
little difcernment were eafily let into a belief,
that this reconciled all things; and that the King
of France, as well as the King of England, would
be thereby both fatisfied: at the fame time, it is
certain, if the Prince of Orange, under this pre-
tence, had brought the league with England to a
conclufion, he would never have allowed the alli-
ance with France, to come under confideration 4 B
and though he had concluded theſe two treaties at
the fame time, (which was not his intention, for
he only deſigned to make a feint, of propofing the
one, till the other fhould be concluded,) the alli-
ance with France muſt have become uſeleſs, by
means of the league with England, which would
have always in the end prevailed, Penfionary
Fagel remaining at the head of affairs. The Prince
of Orange faw likewife, if the States refuſed to
conclude the treaty of guaranty, he ſhould have
it in his power, to get the alliance with France
rejected, without openly appearing to have any
hand therein.
I then exerted myſelf to the utmoſt, to give the
principal deputies of the towns, proper information
upon this head, and to point out the fnare laid for
them; but not to repeat here, all I reprefented,
let it fuffice to fay, that the Prince of Orange
finding his artifices ineffectual declared, as I have
obferved, that he drost intirely the league with
England; and he now wholly turned his thoughts,
upon devifing means, to evade the promiſe he had
given, of making an alliance with France, and
to prevent the conclufion thereof, without appearing
directly to oppoſe it.
C 3
The
30
NEGOTIATIONS of
The King was fully perfuaded of the Prince of
Orange's intentions, for I communicated all I could
diſcover, by means of his creatures. I at the fame
time fent intelligence, that one of his greateſt
confidents had affured me, this Prince could have
nothing in view more confiderable, than the King-
dom of England; and that it was not impoffible,
he might, very ſoon have pretenfions thereto : but
if it was difcovered, that he had a ſtrong and
hearty attachment to the King of France, this
would be fufficient, to raiſe againſt him, the Par-
liament and Commons of England; and in this
caſe, it would be extremely difficult for his Chrif-
tian Majefty, to affift him againſt a whole people,
or to maintain him in poffeffion of the crown.
This obfervation makes it appear, upon what
principle the Prince of Orange acted, and what
was to be expected from him; I was therefore ap-
prehenſive, he would allow the time, for the af-
fembly of Holland, to elapfe, without propofing
the alliance with France, if I left it wholly to his
management: but I was no lefs afraid, if I fhould
preſent a memorial to the States General, he might
then reproach the King, with miftruſting him; and
fay if the affair had been left to his difcretion, he
could have carried it; but now it was intirely
marred, and there was at that juncture, no pro-
bability of fuccefs.
But what embarraſs'd me ftill more was, that
the magiftrates of Amfterdam flackened already,
in the refolution they had taken, to propofe an
alliance with France. 'Tis true indeed, in place
thereof, I prevailed on them to come into a pro-
pofal, which would have been ftill more advan-
tageous to the King, than the alliance, had they
carried it into execution; that was to oppoſe the
military eſtabliſhment remaining upon the prefent
footing,
COUNT D'A VAUX:
3I
footing, and to demand a reduction of the forces.
I now diſcovered, they had no longer the bold-
nefs, to propoſe an alliance with France, becauſe
they dreaded too much, the Prince of Orange,
and were not fufficiently afraid of France; this
Prince having repreſented to them, and the other
towns of Holland, that the States General had no
reaſon to be afraid of a rupture; that the King
meant only to intimidate them; but they might
follow their own courfe, for his Majefty had no
intention of declaring war againſt them.
I continued, notwithſtanding all thefe obftacles,
to work, as much as poffible, upon the towns
of Holland: and after having brought things
to as favourable a fituation as poffible, I then ap-
plied to the Prince of Orange, and fpoke like-
wife to Penfionary Fagel, to the fame effect;
the latter made anfwer, that the Prince of Orange,
deferred making the propoſal, till all obftacles from
the towns fhould be removed. Nevertheleſs I was
informed, that the towns would willingly confent
thereto: and the republicans, as well as I, were
fenfible the affair would fpeedily be concluded,
not only if the Prince of Orange ſhould propoſe
it, but even if he fhould do nothing elfe, than
thwart it underhand; but I alfo knew, and often
fignified to the King, that it would be impoffible
to bring the affair to a happy iffue, if the Prince of
Orange fhould openly oppofe it.
Before I proceed farther in what regards the
alliance, it may not be improper, to mention what
I
wrote at this time, concerning the connections
betwixt the Prince of Orange and Duke of Mon-
mouth, as they were the foundation of the revolutions,
which afterwards happened in England. I inform-
ed the King, in my letter October 5, 1679, that
the Prince of Orange had new expectations in re-
gard
C 4
32
NEGOTIATIONS of
gard to England; and as far as I could penetrate
into the matter, flattered himſelf, the King of
England would be obliged to refign his crown;
and as the proteftants would never fuffer the Duke
of York, he doubted not, but he ſhould be called
over fhortly, as may be obferved in the bill the
parliament wanted to pafs, againſt the Duke of
York, wherein it was faid, "in cafe theKing ſhould
"happen to die, or refign his dominions. " The
Prince of Orange had himſelf told one of my
friends, that he would always preſerve the reſpect
he owed the King of England and the Duke of
York, nor would he take the leaft fteps to diſpleaſe
them; but if the Parliament of England fhould
call him over, he could not poffibly avoid going.
A week afterwards, I wrote that the Duke
of Monmouth was arrived at the Hague; that he
went to the houſe of Mr. Sidney, which much
diſpleaſed the Prince of Orange; that the Duke,
next day waited upon the Prince of Orange, who
received him very coldly, and their converfation
turned upon general topics; that he had been, in
the evening, to vifit the Princefs of Orange, who
contrived to be at play when he entered, and
fcarce condefcended to rife, when he kiffed her
hand; that the Prince of Orange, about eight in
the evening, retired to the Princefs's chamber,
according to cuſtom, and in fhort, there could not
be greater coldnefs than was betwixt him and the
Duke of Monmouth; the latter, having fignified
he ſhould depart next day, the Prince of Orange
afked him if he would not dine with him before
his departure, and the Duke made anfwer, he in-
tended to do himfelf that honour; next day at
rifing from table, Monmouth whiſpering the Prince
of Orange, defired he would give him a private
audience for a moment, then went down to Ban-
theink garden, and having difengaged themſelves
of
COUNT D'AV AU X.
33
of Mr. Sidney, who was following then, the
Duke of Monmouth fhewed the Prince a letter he
had juſt received from the King of England, where-
in he affured him always of his friendſhip, and
that his exile ſhould not be of long continuance.
The Prince of Orange aſked him the cauſe of his
difgrace; to which Monmouth replied, that the
King of England was defirous the Duke of York
fhould abfent himſelf, who had refuſed to agree
to this, unleſs Monmouth ſhould alſo quit the King-
dom; he likewife informed the Prince of Orange,
that it was not the Duke of York who had done him
the moſt prejudice, he not having fufficient intereſt
with the King of England for that purpoſe; but
that the Countefs of Portſmouth, the Lords Sun-
derland, Effex, and Halifax, had brought it about;
and as to what the Prince of Orange afked him,
if the King had told him the reaſon of his baniſh-
ment, he made anſwer, that his Britannic Majefly
had not explained himſelf upon that particular;
adding, at the ſame time, that he knew fome re-
ports had been ſpread of his having fet up preten-
fions during the King's illness; but that he was
not fo fimple as to entertain fuch idle fancies. The
Prince of Orange thence took occafion to enter
into a ſerious difcuffion with the Duke of Mon-
mouth, upon the pretended marriage of his mother;
upon which Monmouth explained himſelf in a
manner quite agreeable to the Prince of Orange.
This Prince then aſked him, if he could depend up-
on what he had faid, becaufe fo long as he ſhould
maintain fuch pretenfions as were given out, he
could not be amongſt the numbers of his friends;
and Monmouth having affured him a-new, and
having given him his word of honour, that he ne-
ver had, nor ever fhould have, the leaft thoughts
of fuch pretenfions; the Prince of Orange told
him
C5
34
NEGOTIATIONS of
him he was ſatisfied, as he looked upon him to be a
man who would not break through fuch a tie of
honour. Upon this they entered into mutual en-
gagements to affift each other with all their inte-
reft, and thence was formed that union betwixt
theſe two Princes, which gave rife to fo many dif-
orders, which coft the Duke of Monmouth his
life, and foon after the Duke of York his King-
dom.
I informed the King, by my letter of Novem-
ber 23, 1679, that the Prince of Orange ftill
continued to have views in regard to England,
quite oppofite to the intereft of the Duke of York;
that this was a ftrong motive to prevent him from
entering into meaſures with France, becauſe he
believed his Chriftian Majefty would always pro-
tect the Duke of York, to his prejudice; thus de-
fpairing of any affiftance from his Majefty, he
would naturally ſeek to ſtrengthen himſelf in the
contrary party, by taking meaſures oppofite to
thoſe of the Duke of York; and it was not to be
doubted but with this view the Prince of Orange
would uſe his utmoſt efforts, that the King of
England fhould affemble his Parliament, and as
he faw no method more likely to bring this about
than to ftrengthen him by an alliance with the
States General, being perfuaded his Britannic
Majefty would then appear with more authority
in his Parliament, and that this would be the moſt
likely way for him to obtain the neceffary fubfidies;
he therefore made the laſt puſh to bring the alli-
ance to a conclufion. And as he was not ignorant
that, notwithſtanding this alliance, the Parliament
would never confide in their King, nor grant him
fupplies, unless he agreed to the exclufion bill, he
hoped that, in this cafe, fuch a cabal, and the pro-
teſtant league, would work ftrongly in his favour.
I
COUNT D'AVAUX.
35
I fent intelligence by the fame letter, that one of
the Prince of Orange's friends, had aſſured an ac-
quaintance of mine, that before three months,
the Duke of York and all his party would
be banished, and Monmouth recalled; In
fine, I added that the chagrin and uneafineſs
which the Prince of Orange's creatures openly
diſcovered, fince the Duke of York appeared to
have regained his former credit with the King his
brother, left me no room to doubt, that I had
netrated into the true defigns of the Prince of Orange,
in regard to England.
pe-
I take upon me to fay, I omitted nothing to
make known the connections formed by the Prince
of Orange, with the moſt abandoned perfons in
England. I fent intelligence the 21ft of September,
that Oates, who became afterwards fo famous,
Frimans, whom I mentioned before, and Moulins,
a bold enterprizing villain, had arrived together in
Holland fome years ago, and the Prince of Orange
had had long conferences with them. I gave
notice afterwards, on the 23d of November, that
the Prince of Orange knew there were certain
Engliſhmen at Amfterdam, who had affairs of the
ntmoſt importance to reveal to the King of Eng-
land, but would not declare them, till the Par-
liament fhould be affembled; that the Duke of
Monmouth had brought Sidney into the Prince
of Orange's intereft; that this minifter was intire-
ly oppofite to the Duke of York; and I was ap-
prehenfive, that a proteftant league would be
formed, during Monmouth's refidence at the
Hague.
And upon the Duke of Monmouth's fudden
departure for England, I wrote to the King, that I
ftrongly fufpected this ftep was concerted with the
Prince of Orange; that I had difcovered my Lord
C 6
Shaftſbury,
36
NEGOTIATIONS of
Shaftſbury, with fome others, had adviſed the
Duke of Monmouth to depart for England; that
they were in a body, to prefent a petition to the
King of Great Britain to entreat, he would call
his Parliament; that this was done with the know-
ledge and approbation of the Prince of Orange,
who was greatly furprized, when an Engliſhman
afked him, if he knew it was forbid by the laws
of England, to prefent a petition to the King,
figned by more than twelve perfons, on pain of
being declared traitors: The Prince put many quef-
tions to him, upon this head, but this he did not
think fufficient, for that fame evening, he fent
Benting to him, to make a thorough enquiry into
the affair.
And now to refume the alliance; I received in-
ſtructions from the King, to prefent a memorial,
preffing it anew: but as I was obliged to fee firſt,
what Penfionary Fagel would do in the matter, I
applied to him, and he himſelf undertook to make
the propofition to the States of Holland. I had
now placed my dependence on him, fo that I was
obliged to follow what courfe he thought proper,
and leave the whole affair intirely to his ma-
nagement.
Nevertheless, Fagel did not make the propofi-
tion like a man of honour; he contented himſelf,
with only mentioning the converfations, he and
I had upon the fubject, and defired the States to
confider, whether it was adviſeable, in the prefent
fituation of affairs, after having refuſed the act of
guaranty with England, (which they were obliged
to by treaties,) to make an alliance with France.
This propofition was put, according to cuſtom,
into the hands of the commiffaries; and though it
was drawn up in fuch a manner, as it might not be
accepted, the Prince of Orange ftill faw fuch a
difpofition
I
COUNT D'A VAU X.
37
difpofition thereto, that he was apprehenfive the
States of Holland would conclude the alliance.
This obliged him the fame day, about ſeven in the
evening, to fend for Mr. Sidney, whom he in-
ftructed, in all the fteps neceffary to be taken by
the King of Great Britain, to break off this alli-
ance; and Mr. Sidney immediately difpatched an
exprefs for England.
Application was likewife made to the Emperor's
envoy, and Van Buning had long conferences
with Sidney: I hereupon acquainted our court,
that I could not form any other conjecture, from
all theſe proceedings, than that the Prince of
Orange would never conſent to the alliance with
France, as long as he could prevent it; and that
by the management of Penfionary Fagel, he would
always find means to elude this affair.
Although the well affected republicans, had con-
fented, that Penfionary Fagel fhould propofe the
alliance with France, yet I failed not, after he had
taken this ſtep, to ſpeak to them in fuch a man-
ner, as to preſerve always their confidence. I
gave them to underſtand, it was with them chief-
ly, the King was defirous to form an alliance; that
when it fhould be concluded, (and the Prince of
Orange even heartily enter into it) the King,
from affection as well as intereft, would be willing
to preſerve the favourable fentiments, he had en-
tertained towards them, fince it was with the re-
public principally, he defired to form the moſt
ftrict union.
As I had been always watchful of the fecret
underſtanding, betwixt the Prince of Orange and
the Duke of Monmouth, and what regarded the
alliance, I gave a long recital to the King, in my
letter December 14, 1679, of what new difcove-
ries I had made, concerning their intrigues; I
mentioned
38
NEGOTIATIONS of
mentioned my being ftrongly affured of an under-
ſtanding betwixt them; that I had reaſon to fuf-
pect the Prince of Orange defigned to make
a tool of the Duke of Monmouth, to begin the
deftruction of the Duke of York, without expo-
fing himſelf, and thereby have it in his power, to
follow what courfe appeared moſt ſuited to his own
intereft; that the Prince of Orange and Mon-
mouth had been at a houſe in the country, ten or
twelve days, where they had had conferences to-
gether, of three or four hours continuance; that
the Duke of Monmouth had afterwards gone to
Amfterdam, to confer with the Engliſh there;
that he then came back to the Hague, where he
had received a letter from the King of England,
forbidding him to return to England, as he expect-
ed; that he had carried this letter, together with
fome others from his party, to the Prince of
Orange, and after a conference of three hours,
he departed fecretly for the Hague, having given
out he was gone for Cologne: and the Prince of
Orange had contributed to ſpread this report. That
M. Dodiek had publickly looked for a houſe for
the Duke of Monmouth, when he fhould return
from his pretended journey; and the farce had
been fo well acted, that they imparted to the
Engliſh, (in the Duke of York's intereft,) letters
from M. de Strasbourg, and communicated alfo
the Duke of Monmouth's defigns: that mean
while Monmouth had paffed over to England, with
an intention certainly, to head fome noblemen,
who were to preſent a petition to the King of
Great Britain, that he would call his parliament.
I fhall not repeat here many other circumftances,
which ferved to difcover the intercourfe, betwixt
the Prince of Orange and Duke of Monmouth.
Notwithſtanding all this, I could not help remark-
ing,
COUNT D'A VAUX.
39
ing, that if the Prince of Orange and Monmouth
acted then in concert, it was becauſe they had
the fame defign in view, to have the Parliament of
England affembled: but that I believed, this har-
mony would be of a ſhort continuance, only till
affairs ſhould be near a criſis, for it was not likely
the Duke of Monmouth would take ſo much
pains for the Prince of Orange's intereſt; and that
if indirect ways could be contrived, to convince the
Prince of Orange, that the Duke of Monmouth
had thoughts of eſtabliſhing himſelf to his preju-
dice; this would make an irreparable breach be-
twixt them.
A few days afterwards, the King found the truth
of what I had informed him; for the Duke of
Monmouth no fooner arrived in England, than he
preſented a petition to his Majefty, to call his
Parliament, and what followed, no leſs juſtified
the opinion I had given of the ſentiments of the
Prince of Orange, and of the Duke of Mon-
mouth, for this Prince affifted Monmouth in his
revolt; and he, difregarding all the promiſes made
to the Prince of Orange, got himſelf proclaimed
King, as foon as a proper opportunity offered;
hereupon the Prince of Orange with all expedition
imbarked the Britiſh troops in the fervice of the
States General, which haftened the Duke of Mon-
mouth's ruin.
The Prince of Orange, who raiſed all theſe
broils intirely for his own advantage, and to render
himſelf neceſſary, offered the King of England to
come to London, as a Mediator betwixt him and
his Parliament; but his Britannic Majeſty only
thanked him, without accepting his offer.
Mean while Mr. Sidney's courier returned. I
had intelligence at his arrival, that the King of
England charged him to go to M. Van Leuwen,
and
40 NEGOTIATIONS of
and inform him, that the alliance talked of in
Holland betwixt his Chriftian Majefty and the
States gave him great umbrage; that he would
fhew the higheſt refentment if it was concluded;
and that they muſt not, after fuch a tranfaction,
any longer expect his friendſhip.
The Prince of Orange was extremely pleaſed
the King of England had explained himſelf in
ſuch ſtrong terms; and I was informed, he affured
Mr. Sidney he would not give himself any
further trouble; for the alliance of France would
not take place.
I appeal to the judgment of every perſon, if af-
ter this the Republicans, to whom I applied, had
not reaſon, and if I had not ſtrong motives to urge
that the States General fhould be ſpoke to in a
higher ftyle; and if fear was not the only thing
which could force them into our meaſures, fince
the Prince of Orange, who knew fo well the
temper of the Dutch, adviſed the King of England
to explain himſelf in that manner, altho' he was
not in a condition to act on the offenſive againſt
the States General.
I was alfo informed at the fame time that the
commiflaries, in whofe hands the propofitions for
an alliance was lodged, were either perfons of no
ability, or attached to the Prince of Orange; this
obliged me to take meaſures with the deputies of
Friezland and Groningen, that they fhould ex-
plain themſelves upon the alliance with France in
the ſtrongeſt terms; I at the fame time difpatched
a courier to the king, well knowing what I ſhould
of myſelf fay to the States General, would have
no effect against the King of England's menaces;
it was neceſſary therefore the King himſelf ſhould
command his fentiments to be declared to them
with fome degree of ftrength. And as I knew the
Prince
COUNT D'AVAUX.
4I
Prince of Orange endeavoured to infinuate, that
in order to avoid incurring the diſpleaſure of France
as well as England, neither the one nor the other
alliance ought to be concluded, I therefore inform-
ed our court it was neceffary to point out the dif-
ference betwixt a fimple defenfive alliance, of which
none had reaſon to complain, and a treaty of
league. I explained myſelf in the fame manner
to the principal members of the States; I repre-
fented to them, that it was not ſurpriſing the
King fhould remonftrate, when the States Gene-
Jal, under a pretext of a guaranty, were about to
make a league againſt his Majefty; but that I
could not perceive upon what fhadow of reafon
the King of England could take umbrage if the
States made an alliance with his Majefty, which
would form no other connection than what they
preſerved with all the Princes of Europe, with
whom they had kept in friendly terms during the
war, or in peace renewed their alliances; that his
Majefty therefore could not imagine the King of
England's declaration would have the leaft ef-
fect on any deputy of the States, or honeſt repub-
lican; that the league propoſed by England was
evidently intended as an offenfive one againſt his
Majefty; whereas the defenfive alliance he offered
tended neither to break with one power, nor to
engage the States in any quarrel; but only more
firmly to eſtabliſh peace throughout all Europe,
which was the fincere and only intention of his
Majefty; that it could not produce the leaſt bad
effect againſt the King of England, if he intended
to live in peace, and not wantonly attack the
States General, as he had done in 1665; for in
this cafe his Majeſty would be obliged to defend
them. I at the fame time informed the King of
my having accompliſhed, by means of the well
affected
42
NEGOTIATIONS of
affected republicans, an affair of the utmoſt con-
fequence, of which I have already made mention,
relating to the army of the States; we had exert-
ed ourſelves fo ftrenuouſly with the people of Am-
fterdam, that they infifted on difbanding 20000
men, wanting to reduce the forces to 25000 foot,
2000 horfe, and 1000 dragoons.
Mean while the Prince of Orange acted various
parts, according to the character of thoſe to whom
he applied. He endeavoured to intimidate the
republicans who had any correfpondence with
me; he repreſented to the leading men of the
towns, that the King could not take amifs the de-
ferring the conclufion of the alliance to another
time; and that this delay, which was of no con-
fequence to his Majefty, would leffen the difplea-
fure the King of England might ſhew if an alliance
ſhould be made with his Majefty, at a time when
they refuſed to execute an engagement entered in-
to with him.
The Prince of Orange did not depend ſo much
on theſe remonftrances, nor the aſſurances he re-
ceived that part of the commiffaries to whom the
propofition of alliance had been referred, would
implicitly follow his dictates, but he would like-
wiſe be preſent when the affair came under delibe
ration; a thing never almoft before practifed.
The deputy of the nobles to whom the Prince of
Orange belongs, and moſt of thoſe of the towns,
failed not to deliver it as their opinion, that fince
they had juſt refuſed the league with England, an
alliance with France ought not to be fo foon con-
cluded, but be deferred to another time.
Although not only the commiffaries but alfo the
councils of the towns had been obliged by the
moſt folemn oaths of fecrecy in this affair, yet I
got intelligence of every particular; but as theſe
perfons
COUNT D'AV AU X.
43
perſons had given their opinions only as private
individuals, this did not fufficiently fatisfy the
Prince of Orange, who remained ſtill apprehenfive
that they might deliver themſelves in a different
manner when they came to ſpeak in the name of
their reſpective towns.
In effect, things were in fuch a fituation that
the Prince of Orange was a whole day in fufpence
whether he himſelf ſhould not earneſtly propoſe
the alliance with France, and thereby affume the
merit of a thing which he believed he could no
longer prevent.
Van Buning and Penfionary Fagel adviſed him
to wait for letters from their embaffadors, to fee in
what manner the King expreſſed himſelf.
They accordingly waited till they received the
letter of January 3, 1680, which informed them,
that the King had ordered they ſhould bc ſpoke to
in the ſtrongeſt terms concerning the alliance. Un-
luckily this letter at the fame time fignified that
the ſtrongeſt afſurances had been given, that what-
ever ſteps they followed, the King would always
adhere ftrictly to the articles of the treaty of peace;
and that his Majefty would only exert all his power
to promote the commerce of his fubjects, in pre-
judice to that of the States. The Prince of Orange
and his dependents refumed courage upon this,
and the other party became greatly difheartened;
fo that the face of affairs was quite altered.
The republicans in our intereft declared I
ought to expect nothing from my negotiation, for
after the late affurances received by the States, who
were no ways inclined to act contrary to the will
of the Prince of Orange, unleſs from the appre-
henfion of a war, it could not be fuppofed any one
would be willing to conclude the alliance with
France. They complained we had engaged them
to purſue fuch meafures as they had taken,
and
44
NEGOTIATIONS of
and now abandoned them to the refentment of the
Prince of Orange; that all they defired (and what
I had alfo requeſted) was, that our court ſhould
explain themſelves in fuch a manner as might
ftrike a fear into the States General: and without
denouncing againſt them any particular threat,
which might engage the King to purſue violent
meaſures, only to have left them room to fear
every thing. Some of them hereupon retired
from public affairs, and the reft, excepting M.
Paets, no longer acted with the ſame ſpirit.
:
I wanted much to repair the damage done by
this letter; I therefore made declarations to the
magiftrates of all the towns, much ſtronger than
thofe in the letters of their embaffadors, or my
own but all availed nothing; they ftuck to the
letters of their embaffadors, believing them ftronger
than all I could fay. I did not diffemble with
his Majeſty as to the bad effect his affurances to
preferve peace had produced; and in order to add
greater weight to what I had faid, I fent him a
copy of the letter Dikfeld had wrote to the States
General, which I had found means to get into
my poffeffion, adviſing them to fend different in-
ftructions to their embaffadors. I repeated again
what I had often before mentioned, that the fuc-
ceſs of this affair depended upon raifing in the
towns fuch an apprehenfion of the King's refent-
ment, as to force them into an alliance, in ſpite of
the Prince of Orange: What I advanced was ac-
knowledged to be founded on reaſon, and the embaffa-
dors were again ſpoke to in the warmest terms. The
proper time was now however paffed, and all
availed nothing; for Dikfeld wrote to his maſters,
that the King had indeed made ftrong declarations,
but that his Majefty, upon my intelligence, had
changed his ftyle, without altering his fentiments;
that
COUNT D'A VA 45
AU
U X.
that they might reft affured the King would not
diſturb their quiet; for what his Majeſty had at
firft declared, was his real fentiments; and what
he at prefent urged, proceeded only from what I
had repreſented.
Penfionary Fagel made me a vifit about this
time; he ſaid he had orders from the Prince of
Orange to affure me, the States General would
paſs fuch an act and declaration as would pleaſe
the King; that they would form no new con-
nection, nor enter into engagements with any
power whatever, nor take any meaſure which
could be prejudicial to the treaty of peace, or the
friendſhip offered them by his Majeſty: I replied, that
in regard to Penfionary Fagel, the ratification of
the peace, and the act propofed were the fame
thing: Nevertheleſs I difpatched a courier to give
notice of what had been offered.
As the Prince of Orange and Penfionary Fagel
perceived that the leading men in the towns of
Holland were now made eafy as to the apprehen-
fions they had entertained of the King's refent-
ment, and that the republicans were difcouraged,
they therefore endeavoured to ſpin out the time in
deliberating upon the alliance with France. They
proceeded however in this affair with great precau-
tion, and the Prince of Orange was afraid, as I
took care to diſperſe ſeveral memorials amongſt
the council of the towns, that the States would at
laft conclude the alliance, notwithſtanding all the
menaces of the King of England, the letters of
Van Leuen, and the intrigues of Penſionary Fagel:
He fent to the principal deputies of ſome of the
towns, ftrongly folliciting them not to confent to
the alliance with France. He likewife difperfed
papers amongſt private houſes, by means of the
proteſtant clergy, in order to turn the people againſt
the
46
NEGOTIATIONS of
the alliance, as a thing contrary to their reli-
gion.
In ſhort, Penfionary Fagel having it in his power
to propofe matters for confideration, only laid be-
fore them the account he had given the States of
the converfation we had concerning the alliance
with France, and the opinion of the commiffaries,
which was, to defer treating about this affair to ano-
ther time. He mentioned nothing of my memo-
rials, nor the declarations the king had ordered to
be made to the embaffador of the States: Thus it
became eafy for him to bring about a conclufion
fimilar to the opinion of the commiffaries, and to
propoſe the act, whereby they ſhould engage to
make no treaty contrary to the friendſhip which
had been eſtabliſhed by the treaties of Nimeguen.
Altho' the Province of Holland had not delibe-
rated upon all the papers they muſt needs have
feen in regard to the alliance with France, and
the refolution had been formed by the deputies,
without confulting their fuperiors, having only un-
dertaken to procure their approbation, yet hardly
could any means be deviſed of making an altera-
tion in this affair. 'Tis true, indeed, moft of the
towns difavowed the conduct of their deputies,
but not one dared propofe to confider the matter
a-new. The magiftrates of Amfterdam made
high complaints, that the Prince of Orange hav-
ing fent them the first letters of M. Dikfeld, had
affured them his Majefty would not diſturb their
peace, even though they fhould not conclude the
alliance; that nevertheleſs they found the contrary
by my memorial publickly diſperſed amongſt the
towns, which had never fo much as been taken
into confideration; yet they took no meaſures to
defeat the late refolution, believing they ſhould not
be ſupported by any other town.
The
COUNT D'AVAU X.
47
The city of Amfterdam at this time thought of
making a ſtrong effort to renew their motion for
reducing the troops, and to keep up only 25000
foot, 2000 horfe, and 1000 dragoons.
As I continued to keep a watchful eye over the
intrigues the Prince of Orange carried on in Eng-
land, I found he had been informed from thence,
that tho' every thing there appeared quiet, there
would be a general infurrection in the counties as
foon as opportunity ferved; that letters had been
wrote, urging them to preſent new petitions to the
King of England to call his parliament; that he
could hardly now avoid taking this ftep, and they
defired the Prince of Orange to wait the event.
The Duke of Monmouth had alfo given him to
underſtand, that in a little time he ſhould be again
in favour with the King of England.
I endeavoured to take advantage from the ad-
vices I received from England, not only to deftroy
all merit the Prince of Orange pretended to affume
with his Britannick Majefty, that the States General
had not made an alliance with France; but alſo to
render him ſuſpected to the King of England, by
fhewing him it was not from any regard to his
Majefty, that the Prince of Orange ſtirred himſelf
with fo much vigour againſt the alliance, but in-
tirely for his own intereft, having no other view
in all his conduct, than to bring him under the
neceffity of affembling his Parliament, for thoſe
reafons I have mentioned before.
I at the fame time informed our court of my
having diſcovered, about two days before, that
the Prince of Orange had formed new connexions
with the Duke of Monmouth, and ſeveral of the
Engliſh parliament; that Rocourt, who was at-
tached to Monmouth, had joined with M. Sidney;
that the Prince of Orange, by means of Frimans,
was
48
NEGOTIATIONS of
was renewing his fecret practices; that Mr. Sidney,
the Engliſh envoy in Holland, being an enemy to
the Duke of York, the Prince of Orange made
ufe of him to carry on his purpoſes, and to oblige
the King of England, to go farther than he in-
clined.
I had applied to the provinces of Friezland and
Groningen, the only two which did not abfolute-
ly depend on the Prince of Orange; and I enga-
ged the first deputy of Groningen, to go himſelf
to his province, to perfuade them, to demand an
alliance with France. This deputy accordingly
went to Groningen, and returned with the refolu-
tion of the province, to require an alliance with
France. Friezland alfo declared pofitively for an
alliance, and fent to give me notice thereof. I
likewife carried things fo far, that theſe two pro-
vinces refolved to back Amfterdam, in the motion
they had made for difbanding 20000 of the
troops.
But as the Prince of Orange had a great advan-
tage, in the difcuffion of affairs, and more from the
direction of Penfionary Fagel, than his own pri-
vate influence; and as he was apprehenfive the
magiftrates of Amfterdam, might carry a reduction
of the troops, in the States of Holland; he there-
fore took care, to prevent their entering upon the
military eſtabliſhment, although it ought to have
been regulated, before the end of the preceding
year, and it was then the 20th of February. By
this means he gained his point, for the year always
advancing, and the ftate of the army not being
entered upon, the troops remained upon the old
footing, and the States General were under a ne-
ceffity of paying them.
This Prince, who was mafter of Guelderland,
Zealand, Utrecht, and Overyffel, obliged them to
follow
COUNT D'AVAUX. 49
follow the fame refolution, with that of the pro-
vince of Holland, to decline an alliance with
France; and he exerted himſelf to the utmoſt, to
engage the States General, to follow the example
of the five provinces: but the deputies of Friezland
and Groningen warmly oppofed it, declaring ſuch
a refolution could not be taken, without the unani-
mous confent of the feven provinces: whereas
their provinces were of opinion, that the States
General fhould make an alliance with France.
'Tis unneceffary to infert here, all that the Prince
of Orange and Penfionary Fagel did on their fide,
and I on my part; they to oblige the States to
take this refolution, which they were defirous to
fend his Majefty; and I to prevent fuch a ftep.
Let it fuffice to fay, that after a month of threats
and intrigues, they were unable to carry their
point.
As I found Friezland and Groningen, were
the only provinces that dared deliver their fenti-
ments with freedom, and ſtand againſt the Prince
of Orange, I took care to preſerve as good an
underſtanding with them as poffible; and I fent
a gentleman to thefe provinces, to keep them
up in their fentiments, and form new connexi-
ons.
Mean while they were extremely uneafy, in the
other provinces, that the deputies had not made
an alliance with France; and they dreaded fo
much the arms of his Chriftian Majefty, that fe-
veral papers were drawn up to be difperfed amongſt
the people. One was addreffed to me, from fome
of the moft confiderable perfons in Utrecht; and
I was informed at the fame time, that libels had
been pofted up on the doors of the town hall,
beftowing the names of traitors, and fellers of the
public liberty, on thofe who had figned the refo-
VOL. I.
folution,
D
50
NEGOTIATIONS of
lution, whereby the province of Utrecht con-
formed to that of Holland. The perfons who
fent me this paper, told me alfo, that feveral peo-
ple from Arnhem, Nimeguen, and Overyffel, had
fignified to them, that they were in the utmoſt
deſpair, becauſe the alliance was not concluded.
The Prince of Orange had ſtill more fuccefs in
England than in Holland; Godolphin was intire-
ly in his intereft, of which I gave notice to our
court about this time. Two months afterwards,
I fent likewiſe intelligence, that Hyde, Godolphin,
and Sunderland, were wholly under his influence;
that they communicated to him every particular,
and received his orders, in regard to every ftep of
their conduct. Nay, even the Duke of York con-
tributed to forward his defigns, from time to
time taking fuch fteps, as feemed to have been
dictated to him, by the Prince of Orange; he
thought to act the part of a profound politician, by
entring into the views of the Prince of Orange, as
if all this Prince fchemed, had not been wholly
for his deftruction. He promiſed to promote his
defigns with the King of England, and to form new
alliances againſt France; he ftrongly follicited his
brother, who, for this purpoſe, fent a minifter to
the Elector of Brandenburg; this minifter com-
municated his intentions to the Prince of Orange,
for his approbation. What may feem extraordi-
onary, is, that theſe inſtructions, were to propoſe
to the Elector a proteftant league, for fecurity of
the reformed religion, as the King of France feem-
ed defirous to deſtroy it.
And to propofe guarantees, of the treaties of
peace, of Nimeguen, &c.
This envoy came very feaſonably for the Prince
of Orange: I was informed that the backward-
nefs, which the towns of Holland fhewed, to make
a
COUNT D'A VA U X:
51
a league of guaranty with England, had obliged
him to defer the orders, to have been given to M.
Damerongue, to propofe an alliance with the Elec-
tor of Brandenburg; the Prince at this time de-
fpairing, of being able to engage the States Gene-
ral, in new treaties; fo that he had taken another
courſe, to arrive at the fame end, that is, to bring
about a league of guaranty, betwixt the King of
England, and the Princes of the empire: believing,
when this was concluded, the States General would
be obliged to enter into it, or even if they did not,
it would be always fufficient, to prevent their ta-
king any oppofite meaſures; in this he was won-
derfully affifted by the Duke of York; for the
King of England fent likewife to the court of
Lunenburg, to propoſe an alliance, and the Prince
of Orange, for fome months, ufed all his endea-
vours to make the negotiations of England, fuc-
ceed at the courts of Brandenburg and Lunen- ·
burg.
The Prince of Orange at this time, reſolved to
fend M. Paets, embaffador to Spain, in order to
get rid of a man of fuch extraordinary abilities.
Paets confulted me upon the affair, and we deter-
mined, he ſhould refuſe the embaffy. He had the
boldneſs to advance, as one of the principal rea-
fons of this refufal, that as he believed nothing
could tend to the good of the commonwealth, with-
out the alliance with France, he was therefore a
very improper perfon to go embaffador to Spain;
and he was ſo courageous, as to go to the Prince
of Orange, and tell him the reaſons why he was
perfuaded, the alliance with France was abfolutely
neceffary. He begged leave to have a conference
on this affair, in his prefence, with Penfionary Fa-
gel, and Van Buning; and offered, if he did not
give fuch reaſons, as were unanswerable by them,
D 2
to
52
NEGOTIATIONS of
to fign the alliance with England. The Prince
of Orange, however, never durft venture theſe two,
though men of great parts, againſt M. Paets.
I was at this time lucky enough, to find means
to engage one of the deputies in fecret affairs, tó
communicate to me, all the moſt ſecret tranfactions,
in the Prince of Orange's privy council.
The year was advanced to the 25th of April 1680,
without their being able to make the magiftrates
of the towns of Holland agree to allow what
was neceffary, for the ſupport of the milice. The
difficulties ftarted by them for fix months, made
it evident, they endeavoured as much as poffible,
to thwart the Prince of Orange's deſigns.
This Prince, who defired nothing fo much, as
to alienate the States General from the King's in-
tereft, took every poffible method, by means of
his tools, to give bad impreffions to the States of
all his Majefty's conduct. M. Dodick being pre-
fident of the week in the States General, fhewed
them an edict, wherein the King commanded,
there ſhould be no midwives of the proteftant reli-
gion. You fee, gentlemen, faid M. Dodick, in
what manner the King of France treats thofe of
our religion: He wants to aboliſh it, whereas
the King of England endangers himſelf to ſupport
it, and yet there are fome perfons here, who want
we should make an alliance with France.
Religion was the firſt expedient which the Prince
f Orange uſed.
The demand which the King's deputies made
at Courtray, furniſhed him with a fecond.
The Prince of Orange and Penfionary Fagel,
failed not to exaggerate things in the higheſt man-
ner; and the States General fignified to me, the
uncafinefs they laboured under, fince his Majefty's
envoys at Courtray, had declared, if the King of
Spain
COUNT D'AV A Ú X.
53
Spain did not renounce the title of Duke of Buṛ-
gundy, by the 15th of July, they would declare
war against him.
The States at this time fent M. Ciffers into
England. I found means to procure his inftructions,
which I ſent to the King: I had alſo the inftru&ti-
ons of M. Van Lewen, who was in England,
and of M. Hemfkerk, whom they fent to Spain;
I was likewife promiſed thoſe of M. de Starem-
burg, who was going embaſſador for France.
I repeated the information I had before given,
of an alliance projected betwixt Spain and England;
but at the fame time, I had the pleaſure of being
able to inform our court, that the Princes of Lu-
nenburg would form no alliance with England,
fo long as the States General, who ought to ferve
as the line of communication, were not engaged
therein; that the Elector of Brandenburg refuſed
alfo the King of England's propofals; alledging his
Britannic Majefty was in fo bad a footing with
his fubjects, as to be unable to ſupport any alliance
he fhould make.
The Prince of Orange finding at laft, that he
could not get fufficient funds to fupport the milice,
unleſs he confented to have them levied, as the
people of Amfterdam thought proper; he agreed
to this, and they in return, acquiefced to the mi-
litary eſtabliſhment, without infifting on any re-
duction. Thus this affair, which ought to have been
determined the foregoing December, 1680, was
fcarce finished by June.
As I was perfuaded, I could not with too much
attention, obſerve the defigns of the Prince of
Orange, eſpecially thofe he formed againſt the
Duke of York, which muft certainly be attended
with the most troubleſome circumftances; I ſent
advice to our court for the tenth time, that the
Prince
D 3
54.
NEGOTIATIONS of
Prince of Orange forefaw, he fhould certainly have
broils with the Duke of York, for the crown of
England; and as he knew whatever fteps he fhould
purſue, to gain the King's good graces, his Ma-
jefty would be always attached to the Duke of
York, who was a catholic; this would effectu-
ally prevent his forming any connexions with
his Majefty.
And as I faw the Duke of York was wholly
deceived; I wrote to the King, Auguft 29, 1680,
what I had fome time before, had the honour of
communicating to him, that the King of England's
minifters were not in the intereft of the Duke of
York, as this Prince imagined, but, on the con-
trary, intirely devoted to the Prince of Orange;
that my Loid Sunderland acted as his wife directed
him; and that his wife was under the government
of Mr. Sidney, who was under the influence
of the Prince of Orange, (the truth of which
has been univerfally acknowledged, as foon as the
Prince of Orange's defigns appeared,) That my
Lord Hyde took more concern for the intereft of
his icce the Princefs of Orange, than what re-
garded the Duke of York; and as for Godolphin,
that he had been always attached to the Prince of
Orange. Thus thefe minifters conformed their con-
duct to his views, and acted in every thing as he
dictated.
1
I received intelligence, on the 20th of June, that
Borgomaniero, who came from England, and was
going for Vienna, was arrived at the Hague. I
endeavoured to diſcover what he came to do there;
and I found he had communicated the treaty of
league, in a manner refolved upon betwixt the
King of Spain and the King of England: In ef-
fect, it was concluded at London, the 21ſt of
June, and I procured a copy, the fame day they
had
COUNT
55
D'AVA U X.
had it at the Hague; and I diſpatched it on the 27th
to his Majefly.
All theſe leagues formed againſt the King's in-
tereft, obliged me more and more, to endeavour to
form a party in the republic, to prevent their be-
ing executed; for this purpoſe I thought nothing
could be more conducive to his Majefty's fervice,
than to unite the provinces of Friezland and Gro-
ningen, with the city of Amfterdam; theſe two
provinces, which are independent of the Prince of
Orange, and this city, which is the most powerful
in all the State, being able, if they acled in con-
cert, eafily to fupport themſelves againſt the Prince
of Orange. I endeavoured likewiſe, to unite to
them the Prince of Naffau, governor of Friezland
and Groningen; I employed a clergyman to tran-
fact this affair. Van Buning, on the contrary,
ufed all his efforts to bring over the city of Am-
fterdam to the Prince of Orange, and to promote
a good underſtanding betwixt him and Prince
Naffau.
"
The Prince of Orange was not difpirited, by
the difficulties he met with, at the courts of Bran-
denburg and Lunenburg, but refolved to go there
himſelf: he gave notice to the States General, of
his departure for Zell, and he alledged, as a pre-
"text for going there, that the Duke had invited
him during the war, and fince the peace, to take
the diverfions of hunting in Zell He mentioned
nothing of his going to Magdenburg, though he
had concerted it with the Duke of Brandenburg,
to go there to fee him. He got the States of Hol-
land, to come to a refolution, on the day of his
departure, to fend Van Lewen to England. For
this purpoſe he told them, that the King of Great
Britain had refolved to aflemble his Parliament,
and that all things were in fuch a favourable fitu-
ation
D 4
56
NEGOTIATIONS of
ation in England, as to promiſe a perfect harmony
again; but that nevertheleſs, he believed M. Van
Lewen would ftill contribute more to promote this
reconciliation, by the influence he had with the
King of England, and his intereft in the Engliſh
Parliament.
As the clergyman had not taken fuch steps as I
wifhed, to form an union betwixt the city of Am-
tterdam, and the provinces of Friezland and Gro-
ningen; I therefore applied to a republican of
Utrecht, intreating him to ſpeak to a certain Ar-
minian clergyman, a man of excellent parts, who
had great influence with the leading perfons of
Amfterdam. I recommended three things to this
republican: firſt, to engage the clergyman to uſe
his endeavours, to bring about a good underſtand-
ing betwixt two or three of the principal people
of Amfterdam, who had been in the government
in 1672, and M. Valkenir, who entered into
office this fame year; he was a man of worth,
a true republican, and in a manner, governed the
city of Amfterdam.
Secondly, that he would prevail upon the cler-
gyman if poffible, to eſtabliſh a ſtrict union be-
twixt M. Valkenir, and the provinces of Friezland
and Groningen.
And, in the third place, to know, if he would
communicate ſuch intelligence, as I fhould fend
him, to M. Valkenir, without diſcovering from
what quarter it came. And, in order to fhew the
clergyman, this information was well grounded,
and that he might derive fome advantage from
this correſpondence, I thought it proper to let him
know in confidence, that we had diſcovered the
Prince of Orange's defigns with the German
Princes, and the engagements which this Prince
and
1
COUNT D'A VAUX.
57
and Penfionary Fagel, had entered into with the
King of England.
The Arminian clergyman, willingly accepted
the propofal of his friend; and even agreed, for
this purpoſe, to have a direct correfpondence with
me; a few days after, I ſent him a perſon in whom
I confided. To this man he communicated the
means he intended to employ, and thofe alſo which
I ought to uſe, to reunite the two parties of Am-
fterdam, and next to engage them in the fame in-
tereft, with the States of Friezland; this fecond
affair depending in fome manner upon the firſt;
and the one as well as the other, being to be con-
ducted with all poffible prudence and precaution;
for I was certain, as foon as it should be difco-
vered, that I had any hand therein, all would be
difconcerted; fince it feemed highly improbable,
that the two factions at Amfterdam would come
to a coalition, or enter into meaſures with the
provinces of Friezland and Groningen, by the
mediation of an embaffador from France. As to
the fecret intelligence I defired to carry on with
the miniftry of Amfterdam, he fent me notice he
had procured two of the leading men, who un-
dertook to receive all the papers and memorials I
fhould fend; and to communicate them to the
council of their town, and in fuch a manner, that
thoſe who were not in the fecret, fhould not
know whence they came. I was extremely pleaſed,
that I had thus fallen upon a method of convey-
ing into the privy council of Amfterdam every
particular, which his Majefty defired they fhould be
informed of.
The clergyman, in return for the intelligence I
had communicated, let me into the knowledge of
one material circumftance, viz. That the States.
General had gone into the Prince of Orange's
D 5
propofala
58
NEGOTIATIONS of
propofal, to ſend M. Van Lewen to England, ef-
pecially fince his commiffion was given out as only
intended to prevent his Britannic Majefty from
coming to a rupture with his parliament; that as
to the States General themſelves, the affair appear-
ed quite harmleſs; but that Van Lewen had fecret
inftructions from the Prince of Orange, which were
the true purport of his embaffy; namely, to keep
up the appearance of friendſhip with the Duke of
York, but underhand to carry on a fecret intelli-
gence with the Prince of Orange's friends; that
as foon as the people became properly inflamed,
and an opportunity offered for ftriking a blow,
he was then to employ all his correſpondences to
ftrengthen the Prince of Orange's party, and
openly act againſt the Duke of York, to get the
Prince of Orange declared heir apparent to the
crown, and even to have him called over at that
time, if it was practicable; for the Prince of
Orange was perfuaded the Duke of Monmouth
acted in his intereft againſt the Duke of York
he did not once apprehend, if the Duke of
Monmouth had a defire to deceive him, what
trouble he might raife upon the Duke of York's
exclufion, not having the leaft notion Monmouth
would ever oppoſe him as a rival.
;
He was not content with having fent M. Van
Lewon into England, for he diſpatched likewife
Frimans, a moft defperate and abandoned villain,
capable of undertaking the blackeſt actions.
I gave notice of all thefe particulars to the
King; and I informed him, that this embaffy of
Van Lewen, and his private inftructions, were
conformable to a fcheme the Prince had formed
above a twelvemonth; and if the Duke of York
had any perfon in England in whom he could
confide, and at the fame time not known to be in
his
COUNT D'AVAUX.
59
his intereft, it was highly probable, if ſuch a one
would pretend to be in the Prince of Orange's
party, the Duke of York would thereby foon per-
ceive, that the Prince of Orange aimed at his
deftruction; and the King of England would
likewiſe diſcover, he had preffed him to call his
Parliament for his own purpoſes only; for, at the
time when he believed the Prince of Orange had
no other view than to bring him to a good under-
ftanding with his Parliament, and to procure an
approbation of the treaty he had obliged him to
make with Spain; this Prince made no other uſe
of the Parliament, than to ruin the Duke of York,
and to draw his Britannic Majefty's perfon into
danger.
I wrote again upon this ſubject on the 3d of
November, and informed our court, that the moſt
zealous partizan of the Prince of Orange had told
one of his friends, that the Parliament of Eng-
land would not be fatisfied with the Duke of
York's retreat into Scotland; for they would in-
fift he ſhould not even be permitted to retire into
France, the Spaniſh Netherlands, nor the United
Provinces, but only into Italy, or Germany.
The Prince of Orange being defirous to have
the family of Lunenburg intirely dependent on
him, formed two projects to promote this deſign :
to marry Prince Olnabruk to Princefs Anne, Sifter
to the Princefs of Orange; and if this marriage
fhould fucceed, to have that Prince named his fuc-
ceffor in all his honours and preferments. By this
means he reckoned he fhould have a brother in
law at the head of the republic in Holland, who
would certainly be in his intereft, as he would
have a view to the crown of England, the Prince
of Orange having at this time no hopes of iffue.
D 6
Penfionary
60
NEGOTIATIONS of
Penfionary Fagel, and Van Buning entered like-
wife into this project.
At this time M. Valkenir died. The city of Am-
fterdam as well as the republic in general, fuffered
a great lofs by his death, and I in a particular
manner, becauſe he was the only man who could
reunite the well affected republicans, who were
not of the De Witt faction, with thoſe of this
faction commonly reckoned of the government of
1672, becauſe they were thrown out in this year ;
and he was the only perſon who could undertake
to unite the city of Amfterdam with the provinces
of Friezland and Groningen. The Arminian
clergyman ftill perfifted, notwithſtanding this acci-
dent, to ufe his utmoſt efforts to reconcile the
leading perfons of Amfterdam; the republican of
Amfterdam promiſed to give all poffible affiftance,
and he managed matters fo fuccefsfully in his jour-
ney to Amfterdam the 21ft of November 1680,
that he intirely united the two parties which di-
vided that city.
The Prince of Orange foon perceived the ef-
fect of this reconciliation; for the council of Am-
fterdam unanimouſly infifted on a reduction of the
troops. This Prince, and Penfionary Fagel on the
other fide, fo far from wanting to difband any of
the forces, were of opinion that new levics ought
to be raiſed; that the form being gathering, and
about to fall, they ought therefore to put them-
felves in a condition to fuccour their neighbours.
The republican waited on the miniftry of Amfter-
dam, and fo ftrongly reprefented to them that the
King's friendship was their greateft fecurity, and
every other method ruinous to the ftate as well as
dangerous to their liberty, that they remained intirely
convinced thereof
As
COUNT D'AVA U X.
61
As I had found means, by a deputy in fecret
affairs, to have a copy of the inftructions the States
General had given to Van Lewen, I difcovered
amongſt other particulars, that he was ordered to
addrefs himſelf to the Duke of York; and tho'
Penfionary Fagel had only added this by way of
form, to conceal the fecret defigns of the Prince of
Orange from the States General, I took care how-
ever to make a proper uſe thereof, as if meant in
earneft: I prevailed on the republican to commu-
nicate it to his friends in the houfe of commons,
who at the fame time gave them to underſtand how
they were deceived; and that notwithſtanding
what they were always made to believe, there was
a fecret intelligence kept up betwixt all the Royal
Family of England. What induced me, if poffi-
ble to procure their belief of this falfe intelligence,
was, that I had diſcovered ſome time before, by a
perfon concerned in managing the Prince of
Orange's intrigues in England, that the moſt
effectual way to prevent this Prince's fuccefs in his
defigns, was to create a belief that he was too
much attached to the court; for he never could
gain the affections of the people, till he fhould
appear intirely detached from the Duke of York.
Thus what I caufed to be wrote, produced no bad
effect.
The Engliſh informed this republican, they were
fenfible there was an intention to amuſe them by
turning them to foreign affairs: But if the King
ſhould even make a conqueft of the Low Countries,
they would not interfere; fince what they had re-
folved for the fecurity of their religion and the re-
eftabliſhment of their ancient privileges, was not
yet wholly finiſhed.
I received intelligence at the fame time relating
to the negotiation of M. Van Lewen in England;
I was
62
NEGOTIATIONS of
I was informed he was little beloved there, and
would be unable to carry any thing; that he was
believed to be wholly in the King of Great Bri-
tain's intereft, and the English therefore did not
chuſe he ſhould intermeddle in their affairs; more-
over, that the houſe of commons would not ratify
the treaty with Spain, this treaty being, they faid,
not in favour of the English Nation, but wholly
intended as an artful illufion to obtain certain pro-
mifes, and chiefly to put the Duke of York on horfe-
back (as the letter expreffed it). That for their
part, they were refolved to turn their thoughts on
affairs within the Kingdom; and two in particu-
lar, they would finifh before all other matters,
namely, their religion, and liberty, in which they
would exert themſelves with the utmoft vigour ;
and that it would not be ſo eaſy for the King of
England, as he imagined, to prorogue his Parlia-
ment.
I had alfo the fatisfaction of hearing the effect of
what I had got repreſented to Colonel Sidney, con-
cerning the mischievous confequences which would
certainly attend an alliance of England with the States.
General, when the Prince of Orange would conti-
nue to be as powerful in Holland as before; for ſe-
veral of the Engliſh members wrote two perfons in
Amfterdam, that they were averfe to an alliance
with the States General, fince it would ferve only
to aggrandize the Prince of Orange, and add to
the authority of the King of England.
The famous republican, whom I have ſo often
mentioned, and who wrote to Colonel Sidney,
fent me likewiſe another piece of intelligence which
he had of him; that the Parliament of England
would not come to a reconciliation with the King
of England, but upon theſe terms.
That
COUNT D'A VAUX.
63
That his Britannic Majefty fhould renounce all
right to prorogue his Parliament, by his fole au-
thority; becauſe they pretended this was a power
ufurped for fome years.
That his Majeſty ſhould alſo give up to Parlia-
ment the right of choofing general officers by
fea and land.
And, that he fhould likewife grant them the
liberty of naming commiffioners for the manage-
ment of the treafury, and payment of the army,
I know not whether the Prince of Orange
was fully apprized of all thefe defigns of the houfe
of Commons, which aimed at the intire fubverfion
of the royal authority of a crown to which he
afpired but I am certain, that at this time he
wrote more ftrongly to the King of England, re-
preſenting it as abfolutely neceffary that he fhould
by any means whatever, come to a good under-
ftanding with his Parliament, otherwife affairs in
Holland were in fo bad a fituation, that he could
no longer fupport them, nor oblige the towns to
follow his fentiments; and he was therefore obliged
to tell his Majefty, it would be impoffible for him
to prevent their taking other meafures, unleſs a
perfect harmony was reftored betwixt him and his
Parliament.
For tho' this Prince was fenfible my Lord Sun-
derland and fome others had too much flattered
him in the hopes of turning to advantage, the ex-
clufion of the Duke of York; yet he continued
to pursue his defign, and ventured every thing
to attain his purpofe, even fo as to push things to
the utmoſt extremity; for as he feared nothing
from the Duke of Monmouth, he reckoned if the
Princeſs of Orange was not called to the
Crown, in confequence of the exclufion bill, fhe
would at least not be excluded; and the worſt
2
that
J
64
NEGOTIATIONS of
that could befal him would be only to remain with
the fame right to England, which he had fince
his marriage, and in the mean time to have the
pleaſure of feeing the Duke of York removed out
of the way, after which he would wait a more
favourable juncture to execute his defign.
Mr. Sidney uſed his utmoſt endeavours to che-
riſh theſe hopes of the Prince of Orange, and
tho' a minifter of the King of England, declared
publickly, that the English would never fuffer a
Roman Catholic Prince. He gave out every where,
that the King of England would be forced by his
Parliament to allow a penfion to the Duke of
York, and conſent to his exclufion from the throne;
otherwiſe things would be carried to the utmoſt ex-
tremity.
The Prince of Orange now refolved to make
his laft effort to ruin the Duke of York; for this
purpoſe he got Penfionary Fagel to propofe to the
States General, that they fhould requeft the King
of England, in the name of the republic, not to
prorogue his Parliament, but to come to a good
underſtanding with them: This propofal being re-
jccted becauſe the deputies of Friezland and Gro-
ningen would not confent thereto, Penfionary
Fagel propofed, fince they would not do any thing
directly in the affair, that they would, by way of
memorial, fignify to Sidney the English envoy,
that the States General interefting themselves great-
ly in the welfare of his Britannic Majefty and his
Kingdom, begged him to confider (without pre-
tending to offer him advice, or to put up any re-
queft) whether the continuation of his Parliament
would not tend thereto. The States General ac-
quiefced with this propofal, looking upon it as a
thing which could no ways difpleaſe his Britannic
Majefty.
It
COUNT D'AVAUX.
05
It was accordingly refolved that they ſhould
defire Mr. Sidney to be at the chamber of treaty
at four o'clock, where the foreign envoys uſed to
meet, upon any conference with the deputies of
the States General: but Penfionary Fagel, intent
upon his defigns, fent to tell the deputies, the
conference was not to hold, and he would next
dav tell them the reafon thereof, viz. That Mr.
Sidney being indifpofed, it was inconſiſtent with
the dignity of the States General, that all the de-
puties fhould go to an envoy's; he had therefore
gone only with two deputies, to tell Mr. Sidney
what the States General had refolved to have fet
forth to his Britannic Majefty. Fagel however
acted quite contrary to what the States General
reſolved; for after having ſpoken in their name to
Sidney, he gave them in writing that famous
memorial, which made fo great a noife in Eng-
land.
The purport of this paper was, that the States
General had with regret learnt, that the agree-
ment betwixt his Majefty and the Parliament was
not fuch as might be wifhed for the welfare of
Christendom; that did not indeed belong to them
to judge of the caufe of fo great a misfortune,
and far lefs to point out the means for a remedy;
they would therefore have waited with a refpectful
filence, tho' with great concern, till Providence
had happily ended the affair, if their own dan-
ger had not obliged them to declare their fenti-
ments.
That his Majefty knew what they had done
to avoid his diſpleaſure, and into what difficulties
they had thereby drawn themſelves; that he had
promiſed, for their greater fecurity, to affemble
his Parliament; and they had confided in his
royal word; but the miſunderſtanding betwixt
him
1
66
NEGOTIATIONS of
him and his Parliament every day increafing, de-
ſtroyed all their hopes of his affiftance, eſpecially
as this animofity took riſe from an affair fo impor-
tant, fo delicate, and of fuch a domeftic nature,
that they durft not intermeddle.
Penfionary Fagel then made a long detail of all
the preparations he fuppofed France to be making
for the enfuing war; and he reprefented to the
King of England, that the States only could hin-
der the King of France from conque ing the Low
Countries, and fubjecting the States General; and
after fetting forth, or rather reproaching the King
of England, that the miſunderſtanding betwixt
him and his Parliament, would be the cauſe of
all the misfortunes which fhould follow; he freely
told his Majefly, he ought to have known that
the prerogatives of Parliament had ferved only to
inflame their ſpirits; for, that after the firſt ſeſſion,
the fucceeding Parliament had followed the ſteps of
the former, and perfevered with more eagerness.
At laft, he came to the point at which the whole
memorial was chiefly aimed: He declared, the
States General could hardly believe themſelves fo
unfortunate, that an affair of fo much uncertainty
as a future fucceffion, in which time often brings
about confiderable alterations and revolutions, quite
contrary to what was determined, fhould be the
cauſe of their ruin; or, that the intereft of Europe,
of all the proteflant Princes, and efpecially of the
States General, fhould be facrificed for fuch an
uncertain matter.
He endeavoured next, to fhew the King of
England, that tho' he fhould at this juncture con-
ſent to the exclufion of the Duke of York, it did
not follow this act of Parliament must be put in
execution; for his Majefty knew too well to be
informed that feveral acts of exclufion from the
fuc-
COUNT D'AV AU X.
67
fucceffion, had been of no effect; thofe in parti-
cular, againſt Mary and Elizabeth, were too re-
cent to be repeated.
And after having, in a threatning manner, repre-
fented to him, as a thing greatly to be feared, that
a Parliament, compofed of men of great abilities,
well verfed in the laws of the realm, furniſhed
with confiderable examples, and fupported by the
approbation of the great cities, and almoft the
whole nation, would remain unfhaken, and there-
by widen the prefent breach; he added, that the
States General did not pretend to prefcribe rules
to the defires or inclinations of his Majefty; and
that they would fubmit to whatever he fhould think
moft proper; but they intreated him, in cafe it
unluckily happened, that he fhould chufe to facri-
fice his Kingdom, his Royal perfon, and the har-
mony of his people for an affair fo uncertain, and
which would never perhaps happen; in that cafe
they could have no hopes, of his affiftance in their
troubles, fince the fituation of his own affairs, in
all probability, would not permit him; they there-
fore defired, he would at leaft, inform them pro-
perly; that they might caft about for fome other
means, to fave their republic and the diftreffed
people committed to their care.
་
That they would always remember the favour-
able intentions of his Majefty towards them; but
it would give them the moft extreme uneafinefs, and
coft them tears of blood, if they who were fo well
difpofed to his Majefty, fhould fall the innocent
victims, for an intereft, which would never per-
haps take place, or if it fhould, would in all pro-
bability, bring on that ruin and deftruction, to
which they faw themfelves expofed.
The very reading of this memorial, addreffed to
a Prince, who had in a manner given up himfelf
to
68
NEGOTIATIONS of
to the Prince of Orange, ever fince the peace of
Nimeguen, carries with it all the reflections necef-
ſary to be made: thus I fhall think it ſufficient (in
all theſe extracts of my letters, which I have thrown
together) to confine myſelf to what only regards my
embaffy.
It is evident, that notwithſtanding this memorial
was given in the name of the States General, they
had no concern therein, and that the Prince of
Orange taking advantage of Penfionary Fagel's
high office, ufed their name for his own pur-
poſes.
It may not be improper to take notice, after
what manner this memorial was conveyed to Eng-
land, and what ufe was made thereof. Sidney
fent it to my Lord Sunderland, and ordered twen
ty copies to be given amongſt different perſons in
the houſe of Commons. Sunderland, who was
then minifter and fecretary of State, ordered like-
wife feveral copies to be taken, which he took
care to have difperfed by the tools of his party,
before he mentioned the affair to his mafter; fo
that his Majeſty received the firſt notice thereof,
from public report, for he knew the affair on'y
by the bad effect, which this memorial produced
against him in Parliament. He fent in queft of
Van Lewen, who avowed this paper in the name
of his maſters, endeavoured to excufe them, and
even preffed the King of England to confent to
what they requeſted. His Britannic Majefty,
thought it fufficient at first, to declare to his
Parliament, that he would do every thing in his
power to preferve the proteftant religion, without
breaking through the lawful fucceffion: but after-
wards, finding this declaration infufficient, to ſtop
the progress of that affair, he diffolved his Par-
liament, the beginning of February 1681, and
turned
COUNT D'A VA U X.
69
་
turned Sunderland out of the miniſtry. He refol-
ved likewiſe, to have immediately recalled Sidney
from his employ, but he fomewhat relented upon
this laft article, for he did not order him home, till
a confiderable time afterwards.
I know not whether the King of England, fee-
ing the Prince of Orange, with whom he acted in
perfect concert, and with the utmoſt confidence,
fince the peace of Nimeguen, had puſhed him on
the brink of deftruction, did not find himſelf ne-
ceffitated, to enter into meaſures with his Chriſtian
Majefty. As it is a fact which has not come
within my knowledge, I can only form a con-
jecture on fuch an occafion, and ſay that it appears
to me, very likely.
I cannot, notwithſtanding the refolution I have
formed, refrain from making a reflection on the
conduct which the Duke of York, when King of
England, obſerved in regard to the Earl of Sun-
derland: I mean only to afk, if it was confiftent
with prudence to truft his fecrets, his kingdom,
and his perfon as he did, to a man, who had fo
long laboured to bring about, his exclufion to the
Crown of England, who always kept up the fame
intercourſe with Sidney, and the other abettors of
this perfidy; and whether he could imagine that
a perfon, who had been hitherto in confidence
with the Prince of Orange, and intirely devoted
to him, would not always purſue the fame defigns:
Thefe circumftances, in my opinion, ought at leaſt
to have induced him to take fome pains, to inquire
into the truth, of a piece of intelligence afterwards
given him, that this fame man was again acting
the traitor, and betraying him to the Prince of
Orange.
I took care that the deputies of Friezland and
Groningen, as well as thofe of Amfterdam, fhould
be
70
NEGOTIATIONS of
be informed of the artifice, lately practifed by Pen-
fionary Fagel: they were extremely nettled at it,
and the former having fpoke of it in the States
General, the States reproached him very ſharply.
The deputies of Amfterdam fpoke of it alfo,
and with ſtill greater warmth: but he was acquit-
ted of the charge, although the embalador had
confeffed it to be fo in the inftructions fent him:
Fagel replied, that he knew not what Mr. Sidney
could write; and that it belonged to this minifter,
to be anfwerable to his royal mailer,. upon that
account; that as to himſelf, he could not give
him any memorial in writing, fince he had no re-
folution of the States General for that purpoſe ;
and that he had faid nothing to him, but what
was agreeable to what they had refolved.
I was informed the Duke of Zell, had ac-
quainted the Prince of Orange, that he had wrote
to the Biſhop of Munfter, defiring leave to go in
March, to hunt the ftag in his territories; and it
was upon this occafion, they met the April follow-
ing at Humelin. It is evident, that the Prince of
Orange defigned only, to form alliances with the
Princes of Lunenburg, for general affairs; for we
have not found that any thing particular has been
concluded on this occafion.
Though the Prince of Orange was not a little
chagrined at the diffolution of the Parliament, and
the difgrace of my Lord Sunderland, who being
prime Miniſter and ſecretary of State, informed him
of all the defigns of his Britannic Majefty; yet
he did not defift from his projects, and continued
to believe, that the King of England would be at
length, obliged to abandon the Duke of York; and
he reckoned that in this cafe, he could not be ex-
cluded from the crown.
6
As
COUNT D'A VAUX.
AVAU
ཏ་
As for my part; I endeavoured to make a pro-
per advantage of all the incidents which happened.
I confulted with feveral perfons of the State, and
amongſt others, with a certain republican who went to
Amfterdam, to fee what effect the troubles in Eng-
land, had had upon the fituation of affairs in Hol-
land: what I difcovered, may be reduced to three
principal obſervations, which I mentioned to the
King the 20th of February 1681.
The firſt was, that the prefent juncture was the
moſt favourable, and perhaps the only one, which
would for a confiderable time occur, to forward
his Majefty's affairs in Holland; fince there was
hardly any perfon, who did not perceive in what
danger the States General were, not only becauſe
they had rejected an alliance with his Majefty,
but on account of the juſt cauſe for refentment,
given him by the conduct, which the Prince of
Orange and Penfionary Fagel had ſo long purſued.
Moreover, that every one faw plainly, the prefent
circumſtances of affairs gave his Majefty an op-
portunity of undertaking and executing, without
difficulty or oppofition, whatever he defired for his
own fatisfaction or glory.
The fecond was, that every one ought to
be thoroughly convinced, whatever change may
happen in the affairs of Europe, it would be fear
only, which could operate upon the fpirits of the
Dutch, and oblige thofe to act, who were infen-
fible to every other confideration. And as it was
generally believed, there was a treaty betwixt
France and England, and moſt perfons were per-
fuaded, that the King had thereby engaged, not to
commit any hoftilities in the Low Countries, for a
year; he therefore imagined this prepoffeffion,
would infallibly prevent all the happy effects which
might be produced, by fo lucky a conjuncture, un-
lefs
72
of
NEGOTIATIONS
lefs fome pains were taken to remove that preju-
dice; all the well affected however, fufpended their
belief, of his Majefty's having taken fuch meaſures,
till they fhould fee whether he would make
any advantage of the prefent favourable oppor-
tunity.
The third, which must be eſteemed of the high-
eft importance to his Majefty, was, if things fhould
be brought fo far, as an alliance to be on the point
of being concluded betwixt his Majefty and the
States General, that he ſhould make it in fuch a
manner, as would juſtify the conduct of the well
affected republicans, and preſerve their credit; for
this was the greateſt advantage which could accrue
to his Majefty, from an alliance with the Dutch;
and that a conclufion of the alliance at the prefent
juncture, being fufficient to juftify them wholly,
and to add to their authority, the Prince of Orange
would find himſelf obliged to take other meaſures,
and to follow maxims more advantageous to the
State, and more conformable to the intereft of
France; but that ſuch an effect could not be ex-
pected from the alliance, if it fhould be afterwards
made by the concurrence of the Prince of Orange,
when he ſhould be perhaps forced to it, by the
bad fituation of affairs in England; or when he
fhould underſtand that his authority was not in-
compatible with an alliance with France, nor
fuch an alliance inconfiftent with his views to Eng-
land. That an alliance made in this manner,
would be uſeleſs to France as well as the repub-
lic, becauſe the Prince of Orange would ftill re-
main at the head of affairs, nor would he retain
more favourable fentiments: and having then no-
thing to fear from the well affected republicans,
he would continue to fink their credit, and would
remove them from the management of affairs;
and
COUNT D'A VAUX.
73
and notwithſtanding the alliance with France, he
would certainly turn the States General into the
intereſt of England, as foon as a proper opportu-
nity ſhould preſent itſelf.
The conclufion which thofe perfons with whom
I conferred, and efpecially the republican, drew
from theſe confiderations, was, that feeing every
body was fenfible of the juft caufe given his Ma-
jefty to be offended, and how favourable the con-
juncture was, for him to purſue what meaſures he
pleaſed; and the republican having himſelf been
informed by one of the principal men of Amfter-
dam, the laft journey he made there; that the de-
puties of this city would ſtrongly ſupport any com-
plaint, which might be made with great juftice
against the expreffions in regard to France, in-
ferted in the memorial given Mr. Sidney; it feem-
ed therefore highly expedient, that this juncture
fhould be laid hold of, to prevent a memorial to
the States General, fetting forth how little their
conduct anfwered thofe proofs of affection, his Ma-
jefty had given the States on all occafions, and
though the States General pretended, they had gi-
ven no orders to their deputies to write or fay fuch
things, or to their embaffadors to avow them; it
was neverthe efs a matter of too great importance,
not to undeceive his Majesty, and give him all pro-
per fatisfaction. And fince his Majefty, when he
reflected upon the conduct the States had obfer-
ved towards him, fince the foregoing year, had
great reafon to doubt the fincerity of their intenti-
ons, he therefore defired to have the affair once
more explained, and that he could not better judge
of their intentions, than by a categorical anſwer
of the States, given by the determination of the
whole provinces, in regard to what they had en-
tered upon the year before, concerning the alliance.
VOL. I.
E
This
74
NEGOTIATIONS of
This republican did not however pretend it was
neceffary his Majefty fhould oblige himſelf to make
very great menaces, but he was of opinion, that
as all the advantage which could be derived from
the preſent conjuncture depended on the appre-
henfion which fhould prevail in Holland of his
Majefty's refentment, it was therefore abfolutely
neceffary to keep the States in this apprehenfion;
and to remove that mistake of his Majeſty's being
engaged to the King of England, to attempt no-
thing in the Low Countries; that as to this, though
his Majefty did nothing directly, it would be fuf-
ficient if no ground was left them to give credit
to that report induſtriouſly raiſed, that all the pre-
parations in France were only intended for fome
expedition into Germany, or Italy, and that the
marching or encampment of a confiderable number
of troops in the Low Countries, would have a fuf-
ficient effect.
I added to this, that the prefent opportunity
ought not to be neglected, left the Prince of Orange
might aftewards have no cauſe to fear the well af-
fected republicans, and find no other obftacle to
his ambitious views, but a fmall number of repub-
licans without any fupport, whom he might very
eafily remove intirely from the government.
I thought it not ſufficient to have employed the
Arminian minifter to form an union betwixt the
deputies of Amfterdam, and thoſe of Friezland
and Groningen. I applied likewife to two or
three of the principal perfons of Friezland, and
with fo much fuccefs, that this province made the
firft advances, and propofed to the citizens of Am-
fterdam, that they fhould act in concert for the
mutual intereft of each other: but M. Valkenir
being dead, there was not one perfon of Am-
fterdam,
COUNT D'AVAUX.
75
fterdam, who would undertake to propoſe this
affair.
M. Van Lewen about this time returned from
England.
I received intelligence at this time, that the King
of Sweden, either through jealoufy of his Chriftian
Majefty's greatneſs, or fome other motive, offered
to make an alliance with the States General. I
fent notice of this to our court. I received inftruc-
tions to come to an explanation upon this matter,
with the Swediſh envoy, and I ſpoke to him upon
it, as an affair to which I feemed to give no cre-
dit. He told me I had the ſtrongeſt reaſon to be-
lieve it intirely groundleſs; that he was perfuaded,
nothing could tend fo much to the folid advantage
of his royal maſter, as to cultivate the friendſhip
of his Chriſtian Majefty; that for this reafon he
ſhould have been extremely uneafy, had he receiv-
ed orders, which he was obliged to conceal from
me; but on the contrary he could affure me, it
was not fo, and that he had orders to live with
me, on the moſt amicable footing; that he was:
willing I ſhould never look upon him as a man of
honour, if they had any thoughts in Sweden, of
making a treaty with the States, or if he had ever.
ſpoke to any perfon whatever, to that purpoſe.
Although this declaration wae fo ftrong, that
one could hardly doubt its fincerity; yet I did not
omit fome days after, to inquire of one of the first
men of the State, whether this minifter had pro-
pofed an alliance, and I found that this very per-
fon to whom I applied, was one of three to whom:
he had actually made the propoſal, which had been
rejected.
I informed this famous republican, what his
Majefty had ordered me to tell him; he received
with great refpect what regarded himſelf in par-
E 2
ticular,
76 •
NEGOTIATIONS of
ticular, and was highly fatisfied, as to what con-
cerned the well affected republicans in general.
He infifted nevertheleſs upon what he had already
faid: and when I endeavoured to fhew him, that
the meaſures he adviſed, would be fo far from pro-
moting our intereft, that the Prince of Orange
would turn them to his advantage; he replied, that
nothing elſe could be expected from the States Ge-
neral, till this apprehenfion of his Majefty fhould
be greater, fince the Prince of Orange would lead
them on in this manner, till a favourable opportu-
nity ſhould prefent, when he might draw them in-
to the intereſt of England.
I thought proper to confider this matter fully,
with ſome of the moſt able perfons in the repub-
lic, and fuch as had been in the government of
1672; they declared to me the weakneſs of the
preſent government; how the Prince of Orange
every day, ufurped more and more authority; the
little hopes they had of being able to check him,
without his Majefty's affiftance: the advantage of
the prefent juncture, which would perhaps never
again occur; the little appearance there was, what-
ever ftep his Majefty fhould take, that the Parlia-
ment of England would come to an agreement
with the King of Great Britain, or that the States
would enter into engagements with this crown;
the probability on the contrary, that before a year
or two at moſt, the affairs of England would be
fettled; and whether the King of England or the
Parliament gained the fuperiority; the Prince of
Orange would make an alliance with this crown;
and conclude the league he had hitherto not been
able to accompliſh, that all the advances made by
him to the King of England, were wholly owing
to the hopes he had conceived, if the King of
Great Britain fhould come to a good underſtand-
ing
COUNT
77
D'A VAUX.
ing with his Parliament, that it would then be no
difficult matter, to unite the States General to
England, and that the well affected republicans,
who had openly oppoſed this the foregoing year,
would never perhaps dare to do ſo again, or would
in vain attempt it at fuch a juncture.
I told his Majefty by letter, that notwithſland-
ing thefe obfervations had been made to me by
perfons of great underſtanding, yet I had not hi-
therto thought there was any neceffity for commu-
nicating them to him, becaufe they were almoſt
the fame in fubftance as I had before the honour
of writing to him, from the famous republican;
but that now I thought myſelf obliged to do it,
becauſe two of the moſt rich and confiderable
merchants in Holland, one of whom intirely
governed his town, had vifited me the fore-
going evening, and talked to the fame effect
which tho' contrary to the intentions of his Ma-
jefty, yet the affair appeared to me of fuch im-
portance, that I looked upon myſelf in duty bound
to give an account thereof: They fignified to me,
if his Majefty was defirous to form a cloſe con-
nection betwixt France and the States General,
and to have commerce carried on betwixt his
ſubjects and the Dutch, that he had no other
method to accompliſh this, but by changing the
preſent adminiſtration; for ſo long as the Prince
of Orange continued to be the ruling perfon, he
would incline the States to the intereſt of Eng-
land;
and even when he could not do this, he
would at leaſt prevent their entering into any mea-
fures with France; and when his Majeſty ſhould
happen to be engaged in war, the Prince would
always have it in his power to force the States in-
to whatever meaſures he pleafed. That tho' the
bad fituation of affairs in England ſhould for a
while
Ę 3
8
NEGOTIATIONS of
while abate the Prince of Orange's expectations,
the worst that could befal him would be, that he
muſt remain in his prefent fituation, till a more
favourable juncture fhould re-establish his hopes in
England, or a new war oblige the States General
to take part therein, and place him at the head
of their forces.
Thus, whatever conduct his Majefty fhould
purfue, or whatever war he fhould be engaged
in, the particular intereft of the Prince of Orange
would always lead him to biafs the States againſt
France; and fuch was the weakneſs of the States,
that it could not be expected they fhould act with
any degree of vigour; at a time too, when they
could hardly feel the effects of his Majefty's pro-
tection, when he would be involved in fo many
wars: It was true indeed, that all honeft per-
fons who wiſhed well to their country, declared,
they would not fuffer thiugs to go on at the Prince
of Orange's pleaſure; but that after the proofs
given of their want of refolution, they were by
no means to be depended upon. That his Ma-
jefty therefore had no other quicker or more cer-
tain means, than to make the republic again feel
the effects of having difpleafed him. That the
undertaking, ſo far from being more difficult than
in 1672, was on the contrary, more eafy. That
the Prince of Orange had indeed more experienced.
troops, but that the people and all the merchants
were now more irritated againſt him, than they
had been againſt the government in 1672. At
that time they had been made to believe, their
minifters had betrayed them to France, and that
under a new government they ſhould not pay
above half the uſual taxes; but they were now
ſenſible they had been greatly impofed upon, fince
they were loaded with heavier burthens, even
fince
COUNT D'A VA U X.
79
fince the peace, than ever before. That more
than a hundred thouſand families, who payed all
the expences of the State, and who had no fhare
in the government, wifhed for a change; and
that if his Majefty would only begin the march of
his troops, they would refufe to furnish the neceffary
fubfidies.
That theſe perfons plainly diſcovered from the
bad management of the public finances fince the
peace, that the Prince of Orange intended to im-
poverish them, that he might the more eaſily be-
come their mafter; and fince they must have one,
they choſe rather to have a mighty King who
would protect them, than to be under a petty
tyrant, who oppreffed them.
That provided his Majefty would convince
them, that his intentions were only to reſtore themi
to liberty, and allow them to enjoy it, he might
put them in fuch a ſituation for the future, that
they would never fwerve from his intereft; he
might then difpofe of their naval forces as he
thought proper, and have his fubjects admitted to
a fhare of the comurerce of the States.
I added, that they had given me to underſtand
they did not fpeak this of themſelves, as a thing
they had framed of their own imagination; but
they knew the truth thereof, from their correfpon-
dences in all the towns of Holland. They faid it
might be urged as an objection againſt what they
had advanced, that in 1672, (when his Majefty
had made fuch confiderable progrefs) the States
General did not even then enter into fuch conditi-
ons of peace as thoſe they now propofed to me; but
they remarked this great difference, that the per-
fons who then entered upon the government were
attached to the Prince of Orange, that is, for
war, and againſt France.
E 4
That
80
NEGOTIATIONS of
That M. Croot told one of theſe merchants,
with whom he was intimately acquainted, that
when he went envoy to his Majefty, he dreaded
the confequence of his negotiation; for he dared.
not take any ſtep of importance, notwithſtanding
the full power with which he was invefted; be-
cauſe he doubted whether he fhould have this au-
thority a quarter of an hour after his departure
from the Hague; and he knew not, but at the ve-
ry time when he ſhould enter into any engagement
with his Majefty, the States General might have
altered their fentiments. But at preſent things
were quite different; for no fooner fhould his Ma-
jelty have entered into the Low Countries, than
thole in the government would be expelled; and
fuch as fhould fucceed in the adminiftration, de-
pending intirely on his Majeſty's protection, would
fue for peace upon what terms he pleafed. That
if he would undertake this affair, they promiſed
to procure him fuch intelligence as was neceffary,
in order to inform him exactly what happened within
the republic, that he might be thereby enabled to
take proper meaſures, and that they would pur-
fue fuch a conduct in all the towns as fhould be
agreeable to his Majefty's intentions.
Thefe gentlemen pufhed the matter fo far as to
fay, if his Majefty would not undertake this war,
from an apprehenfion that England might again
unite with the Dutch, they fhould then for ever be
deprived of all hopes of fuccour, becauſe this reaſon
would always fubfift; nay, it muſt one day be
much ftronger than at this juncture; fince what-
ever effort England fhould now make, the peace
might be concluded with his Majefty before this
Crown could do any thing effectual; that all their
allies were diffatisfied with them; and even thoſe
who ſhould be willing to affift them, could not
be
COUNT D'AVAUX.
8 F
be able to do it in proper time. That all their
forts were in a bad fituation; for they had not one,
excepting Maeftricht, properly provided. That
the State was deftitute of money, and thoſe who
poffeffed riches being all republicans, refufed to
give a fupply. That the refentment they had
conceived againſt the whole party of the Prince
of Orange, who had been the author of all thr
misfortunes, would certainly puſh them on to a
general revolt. That this Prince did not in the
leaft fufpect any attack on the States, and there-
fore turned all his thoughts to fecure the Spaniſh
Netherlands; but that his Majefty could not reap
fuch advantages by beginning the attack on that
quarter, for the alarm thence arifing, not being
fufficient to raiſe a general revolt againſt the Prince
of Orange, or to bring about a change in the ad-
miniſtration, the Prince of Orange would ſtill
remain fovereign, and no doubt prevail upon the
States General to fuccour the Low Countries;
and in the courſe of fuch a war, he would have
time to deliberate cooly, and would not be with-
out means to eſtabliſh his authority, fince he would
not be troubled with the management of this
war, on the contrary, it would wholly redound
to his glory: But that which they follicited his
Majefty to enter upon against the States General
would be juft, uſeful, and glorious; that all
Europe muſt eaſily perceive, it did not proceed
from an ambition to make conquefts, but from an
honeft indignation againſt a particular faction,
and a defire to reftore a whole people to liberty.
They faid farther, that the treatment which
the Provinces of Guelderland, Overyffel, and ef-
pecially Utrecht, had received, not only gave his
Majefty a right, but even (if one may fay fo) obliged
him to act in their favour; for in the articles of
treaty,
E 5
82
NEGOTIATIONS of
treaty, which his Majefty had concluded with this
province, he had promiſed to ſupport them in all
the rights they enjoyed before the war, and that
their government and all other things fhould re-
main in the fame fituation. Nevertheleſs Penfio-
nary Fagel, as commiffary of the Prince of Orange,
in virtue of the commiffion obtained from the
States General, had turned out all the magiftrates,
under different pretences, as if the States General
were abfolute mafters of all the particular Provin-
ces; and tho' theſe alterations had been only de-
manded for a time, the Prince of Orange conti-
nued in his ufurpation, treating this province
and the other two almoft as conquered coun-
tries.
I informed the King, that befides all the par-
ticular reafons I had advanced to theſe two men,
the recital of which would be uſeleſs, I had re-
plied in general, that I was affured of his Maje-
fty's good intentions to the republic, and the well
affected republicans; but that in all the inſtructi-
ons I had the honour to have received, I could
find nothing but what convinced me, that his
Majefty was far from being difpofed to affift them
by fuch means; and that I apprehended he
would be diſpleaſed, if I fhould even mention
to him fuch propofals; upon which they made an-
fwer, that they thought themſelves obliged to make
fuch overtures, becauſe they faw no other remedy
for their misfortunes; and without fuch meaſures
were taken, in a few years the Prince of Orange
would be abfolute maſter of their liberty, and
then they would be unable to fecond the defigns of
France, as they could at preſent.
Altho' the memorial had proved fo unſucceſsful,
the Prince of Orange ftill continued to form new
fchemes againſt the Duke of York; he came to
a
COUNT D'A VAUX.
83
a refolution with his party, to have it propoſed to.
the King of England, that in cafe he died before
the Duke of York, the Duke fhould be only titu-
lar King, and refide in the dominions of the Duke
of Hanover; and his fons in law, the Prince of
Orange and Duke of Hanover, be declared re-
gents of the kingdom. My Lord Shaftſbury, who
penetrated into the affair, faid in a letter, that
this ſcheme feemed to be much of a piece with
the memorial, and would have the fame fate.
I received information of this fecret tranfaction ;
and I came likewife at the knowledge of another,
which in the end might have proved very advan-
tageous; that the Prince of Orange obliged my
Lord Sunderland to make an appearance of defert-
ing his intereft, and to endeavour to get into an
intimacy with the Duchefs of Portſmouth, and by
her means to work himſelf into the good graces'
of his mafter.
About this time the King having got poffeffion
of the county of Chiny, made great commotions
in the States General.
As I took care to be punctually informed, not
only of all the fteps the Prince of Orange took
against the King's intereft, but alfo of his conver-
fation, and the reafons he advanced to the States
General to engage them againſt France, that his
Majefty being apprized thereof, might be more
enabled to give proper orders. I difcovered that
the Prince of Orange had then a defign, which he
intended to put immediately in execution, in cafe
the States General fhould come to a rupture with
his Majefty, viz: to prohibit the importation of
corn, wine, falt, or any commodity from France:
He imagined France would be thereby gready
diftreffed, and rendered unable to carry on a war“
of any continuance.
E 6
I in-
84
NEGOTIATIONS of
I informed our court alſo, that two of the prin-
cipal perfons in the State had acquainted me, that
the injuries ſuppoſed to be done in France to the
pretended reformed religion, was the chief thing
which the Prince of Orange's party made a handle
of to their advantage. I defired memorials might
be ſent to repreſent the fact in its true light, in or-
der to deſtroy the many falfities advanced; this
affair was puſhed fo far, that I wrote on the
24th of July 1681, I had been informed fince
the laſt expreſs, that the edict of June 17th, in
regard to the reformed religion, which was tranf-
lated and printed in Flanders, had produced great
alterations, eſpecially in the province of Friez-
land; infomuch that M. de Haren, who had al-
ways been in the intereſt of France, and an avow-
ed enemy to the Prince of Orange, declared in an
affembly of the States General, that as they de-
figned in France to extirpate their religion, he
muft now break with the French miniftry, and
think ſeriouſly of following different meaſures;
in a private conference he afterwards fignified to
the deputies of Friezland and Groningen, that
notwithſtanding it was contrary to their intereft
to come under the fubjection of England, and
fubmit to the Prince of Orange, yet, as they
feemed in France refolved to deftroy the prote-
ſtant religion, it would be better in the end to
unite themſelves with England; and he undertook
in three weeks to bring the province of Friezland
into this refolution, fince it was abfolutely necef-
fary.
I received intelligence of this difcourfe and
defertion of M. de Haren, from two deputies of
Friezland and Groningen. This obliged me to
wait upon him at his houfe. I brought into our
difcourfe the topic of religion, and particularly
what
COUNT D'A VAUX.
85
;
what had been done in France relating thereto
but notwithſtanding all I faid to convince him,
that his Majefty had not acted contrary to the
edict of Nantes; and tho' I confidered the thing
in many different lights, in order to make him
fpeak, yet I could get nothing elſe from him, than
that the King was mafter of his own kingdom, and
might do there what he pleaſed.
The well affected republicans, who are moftly
Arminians, and indifferent about the intereſt of
the pretended reformed religion, informed me,
that the Prince of Orange's tools made an excel-
lent handle of all that was faid by the French
Hugonots who had fled from France; and that the
provinces of Friezland and Groningen, who had
always eſpouſed the French party againſt the
Prince of Orange, appeared fo irritated by this
affair, that Penfionary Fagel had conceived great
hopes of fuccefs in the alliance with England,
as ſoon as a proper opportunity offered for bring-
ing it on the carpet.
The effect which this affair produced upon all
the towns, and efpecially Amfterdam, appeared
in a high degree; mournful ballads were made
upon the occafion, and fung in the ftreets. The
reſentment of the leading perfons in the State was
at firſt no leſs violent alſo.
When I fignified to the States General, that
the King, being unwilling to ftorm a little caftle
in the county of Chiny, containing about twenty
men, had only commanded M. de Monbrun to
declare to the Prince of Parma, if he did not im-
mediately ſend orders to the commanding officers
in the county of Chiny and its dependencies, to
evacuate that country, and leave the free poffeffion
to his Majefty's troops, he would inftantly order
his forces to enter Flanders, and remain there at
2
the
86
NEGOTIATIONS of
the expence of his Catholic Majefty's fubjects,
till the Duke of Parma ſhould ſatisfy the King of
France. M. de Haren ſpoke with great warmth
upon this occafion, in the States General, and
repeated all he had before mentioned in regard to
religion. The States General almoſt unanimouſ-
ly acquiefced with his opinion, for they were ex-
tremely difpleafed about the affairs of religion,
and not a little piqued at the declaration againſt
the Duke of Parma. But what added ftill more
to their uneafinefs was, that fome demands were
made on the duchy of Limburg, and the county
of Namur, by virtue of a new edict from the
chamber of Metz, altho' it had been declared that
the county of Chiny was the laft article which
fhould be infifted upon by virtue of any edicts
from this chamber; fo that now they feared there
would be no end of fuch demands.
The Prince of Orange and Penfionary Fagel,
who had not yet endeavoured to avail themselves
of the complaints of the Spaniards, to induce the
States General to come into their meaſures, (hav-
ing indeed no profpect of fuccefs) now conceived
great hopes, eſpecially as the provinces of Friez-
land and Groningen had broke off from the inte-
1eft of France; and they began to declare pub-
lickly, that nothing but war would be expected,
and meaſures ought to be taken accordingly.
The Danish envoy at the fame time told me,
that M. Van Lewen had taken notice to him of
the treatment which the Hugonots had received in
France, faying, that they were not fuch an in-
confiderable body, their numbers amounting to
1600000 fouls, according to their printed memo-
rials. He informed me likewife, that this gentle-
man greatly exaggerated the King's pretenfions on
he Spaniards; and faid, it now remained no
.onger a doubt, that France wanted to break
the
COUNT D'AVA U X.
87
the peace, and fince this was the cafe, that
a treaty of guaranty ought to be inftantly made
with all the Princes willing to enter into fuch
an alliance. Altho' this was the diſcourſe of
one who had been for fome time attached to the
Prince of Orange, yet it furprized me, becauſe
Van Lewen was in his heart a well difpofed re-
publican, and a man of good underſtanding; and
therefore, furely he did not want by war to
throw the republic into the hands of the Prince
of Orange.
There was not even the famous republican fo
attached to France, who knew fo well the dome-
ſtic government in this republic, who took no
particular intereſt in the affairs of the Hugonots of
France, he being, as I remarked to the King,
an Arminian, of a party quite oppofite to the pio-
teſtants. There was not even he, I fay, but was
diſturbed at this juncture. He came poft to the
Hague to inform me, that the States General
were fully perfuaded we wanted to extirpate the
proteſtant religion in France; and this notion was
fo deeply riveted in the minds of the people, that
thoſe who were concerned in the government, or
who ſtood well affected to his Chriftian Majefty,
would be in great danger, if they fhould but men-
tion an alliance with France; in fhort, if they
made fuch an union, it would be contrary to the
inclinations of their allies, and muft weaken the
proteftant party; and they would thereby render
it more eaſy for his Majefty to extend the popiſh
religion, as far as he carried the terror of his arms.
This man added likewife, that he could give
no fatisfactory anſwer to ſuch perſons as, except-
ing the article of religion, were otherwife well
affected, when they maintained that the King
acting at this juncture out of a principle of co 1-
fcienc",
88
NEGOTIATIONS of
fcience, there was little probability his zeal for
the catholic religion would abate, when he fhould
have it in his power to extend it without his king-
dom, as well as within his realms.
He fignified, at the fame time, that the publi-
cation of theſe edicts gave him ſo much the more
uneafineſs, becauſe the States were lefs diſpoſed
than ever to enter into the intereft of the Spa-
niards, as might be perceived from their laft re-
folutions, even fince his Majefty's troops had en-
tered the Duchy of Luxemburg; that if this af-
fair could be any how foftened, nothing would
tend more to overturn the deſigns of the Prince of
Orange, who endeavoured to take advantage of
the preſent juncture; otherwiſe, he forefaw that
he and all the well affected republicans would
be expofed to the refentment of the Prince of
Orange, who would in the end manage the
States General according to his own pleaſure.
This day the Prince of Orange imbarked for
England; the night before he gave notice thereof
to the States General and the States of Holland,
fignifying to them, that the King of Great Britain
defired to talk to him upon affairs of the utmoſt
confequence; and that he hoped he ſhould be able
to take meaſures with his Britannic Majefty in
order to form more clofe alliances. And what
muft appear extraordinary is, that this voyage was
undertaken at the interceffion of M. Sidney, tho'
recalled from his employ; and the King of Eng-
land did not himſelf diſpatch a courier upon this
affair, but left it wholly to the management of
Sidney. I then informed our court, that the Prince
of Orange had no other method to fucceed in his
defign, but by means of my Lord Sunderland,
who was restored to favour at court.
M. Van
COUNT D'AV AUX.
89
M. Van Lewen came to fee me the fame day;
he did not chufe to ſpeak to me in the ſtyle he had
uſed to the Daniſh envoy: But with great caution
and referve he fignified to me the uneafinefs of
the States General, and hinted at the means of
freeing them from it, which I had already ſo often
repeated. After having mentioned the Prince of
Orange's voyage, and the letter he had ſeen from
the King of Great Britain, entreating him to come
to England to talk upon ſome particular affairs; he
turned the converſation upon Chiny, and the dif-
pofition of the States; he affirmed they never
more fincerely defired to be on good terms with his
Majefty; but that they were extremely apprehen-
five if he ſhould fet up new claims in Spain, he
would at length be fovereign of all the Spaniſh
Netherlands; and this was their only apprehen-
fion; however he affured me, if they knew the
extent of his Majefty's pretenfions on the Spa-
niards, they would then remain eafy, and give
themſelves no trouble about all the complaints of
the Spaniards. I told him the conferences at
Courtray were held on purpoſe to ſettle theſe
matters; this he replied was true, but as theſe
pretenfions were only explained one after ano-
ther; it followed, that the States, not knowing
what new pretenſions might be formed, were there-
fore more apt to take the alarm; and he repeated to
me again, that if they faw his Majefty did not
intend to deſtroy intirely the Spaniſh Netherlands,
and confequently the Barrier of the States, they
would not make the leaft ftir, notwithſtanding all
the King of Spain's complaints.
I did all in my power to encreaſe the appre-
henfion of the States General, upon the Prince of
Orange's voyage. All thoſe who were not parti-
cularly attached to this Prince, faw the confe-
quences
90
NEGOTIATIONS of
quences thereof; but they could do nothing of
themſelves alone; and as this voyage was under-
taken at a time, when the fpirits of the whole
people were inflamed about the affairs of religion,
and the new demands of the chamber of Mctz
was made, thofe of the deputies of Friezland and
Groningen, who remained well affected, told me
they were much afraid, if the Prince of Orange
endeavoured to bring about an alliance with the
King of England, they fhould not be able to
hinder it, becauſe of the general diffatisfaction
amongſt the people.
I thought it incumbent on me to apply again
to the republican, to fee if he could devife any
meaſures proper to be taken; but he had no hopes
from the well affected at this juncture; and he
fent me word, that the inclinations of the people
were quite altered fince the edict of June 14.
He confirmed what a deputy of Friezland had
faid to me a month before, that the province of
Holland had then refolved to engage themſelves
in no ſhape, nor to take any ſteps in confequence
of the complaints of the Spaniards, but to refer
the determination thereof to the conferences at
Courtray. He gave me to know likewife, that
the city of Amfterdam was at that time deter-
mined not to make an alliance with England,
upon any confideration whatever; but that he
believed, if the Prince of Orange at his return
fhould propoſe an alliance with that kingdom,
they would be fo far from oppofing it, that not
one, perfon would dare to fpeak againſt it, for
fear of being torn to pieces by the people; that
there were about feven or eight, perhaps, who
had not changed their fentiments, and who knew
well that the republic was ruined, if this alliance
took place; but not one durft open upon that
fubject,
COUNT D'AVAU X.
gr
fubject, fince it would be only facrificing himſelf
to the Prince of Orange's refentment, to no
manner of purpoſe. He defired me to acquaint
him whether it was true, that the children, who
fhould renounce the pretended reformed religion
at ſeven years of age, and refume it at ten or.
twelve, were to be executed as apoftates, becauſe
he was fo informed; aud whether there was not
fome declaration to fet forth the contrary.
As the Prince of Orange was always watchful
to improve every opportunity, to kindle a war
againſt France, he took care to form a defign,
before his departure, of making a religious war;
and he gave orders to Penfionary Fagel, to lay
the foundations thereof during his abfence. He
was perfuaded that all other means having failed,
hẹ had now found an infallible method to en-
gage the United Provinces. I was foon informed
of this, and fent intelligence thereof to our court,
Auguſt 14, 1681. It happened at this time,
that the Parliament of England ardently wifhed
for war upon another account. They wrote their
friends in Holland, that they wished for nothing
more, than to ſee the King of England engaged
in war; for if he was once imbarked in fuch an
undertaking, they would not confent to furniſh
him with money, till he ſhould ſubmit to their
conditions.
The Prince of Orange having returned from
England, Auguft 22d, told the States General,
that the King of Great Britain had ſent for him
to confult meaſures about the late ufurpations of
his Chriſtian Majeſty in the Netherlands.
He
affured the States of the friendſhip of his Britan-
nic Majefty, and that there was no collufion, nor
fecret underſtanding betwixt the Kings of France
and England; that his Britannic Majefty was
not
92
NEGOTIATIONS of
not a little uneafy at the progrefs of France in the
Low Countries; but that the remedies he in-
tended for this mifchief were flow in operation,
becauſe of the divifions betwixt him and his Par-
liament. That nevertheless, the King of Eng-
land had told him, all his endeavours proved in-
effectual with his Chriftian Majefty, and France
ftill continued to make re-unions, in that caſe he
would declare againſt them, ell the English na-
tion being for war; that however he entreated
the States to order their embaffador in France to
join with his in making ftrong remonftrances to
his Majeſty. The Prince of Orange added of
himſelf, that it was eafy to be perceived, from
the manner in which the King treated thoſe of
the reformed religion, how little regard he had
for fuch as profeffed this religion, and confequent-
ly for the States General.
I was at this time likewiſe informed by one
of the well affected republicans, that the difpofi-
tion which formerly prevailed amongſt the Dutch,
to oppoſe the Prince of Orange's defigns, no
longer fubfifted; and that if the Prince of Orange
had taken meaſures for an alliance with England,
he might at his return have difpofed the States Ge-
neral for whatever he pleafed. This man allowed
that the King of England was highly difpleafed
with the particular conduct of the Prince of Orange;
but as he was of opinion his Britannic Majetty
and the Prince of Orange were equally intereſted
to bring about a more cloſe alliance betwixt Eng-
land, the States General, and the Proteftant
Powers; he ſaid they would therefore act in con-
cert to attain that end. And, indeed, I at this
time informed our court, that the Prince of Orange
was not upon fuch bad terms with the King of
England, as had been reported; that they had
both
COUNT D'AVAU X.
93
both the fame views in regard to the overgrown
power of the King, and differed only in the mea-
fures they intended to purſue, in order to oppoſe
it.
I received intelligence the fame day, Auguſt 22,
by a very fure and fecret channel, that the depu-
ties in fecret affairs had had a private conference
with the Swediſh envoy, in regard to a treaty of
guaranty. I took all poffible care to be informed
of the truth of this piece of intelligence, and to
diſcover the event of this affair.
I was fully fatisfied, the 7th of November, be-
ing informed that the Prince of Orange, when
in England, had wrote to Penfionary Fagel, that
he had found the King of England very well dif-
pofed, but he durft not yet declare himſelf open-
ly; and he gave it as his opinion, that the alliance
with Sweden, which had been before rejected,
ſhould now be taken under confideration. That
Penfionary Fagel, after a conference with the
Swedish envoy, had privately ſpoke to ſome of the
deputies of the towns of Holland, and reprefented
to them, that Sweden offered to make an alliance
with the States; that the Princes of Brunſwic
ftrongly follicited the fame thing; and that even
the King of England would make a propofal to
the fame effect, if he thought the States would
accept thereof; fo that it was in their own power
to hinder the King of France from making himſelf
mafter of the Spaniſh Netherlands, and they had
furely no room to doubt the little affection he had
for the proteftant religion. The Prince of Orange
had privately the fame difcourfe with many per-
fons in the State; but in public he declared, great
care ought to be taken not to do any thing which
might diſpleaſe the King of France; that they
ought rather to contrive expedients to avoid the
war ;
94
of
NEGOTIATIONS
war; and he propoſed one which he ſaid could
not offend his Majefty, nor could any town refuſe
going into it; that was, to propofe to all the
Princes in Europe, and confequently to the King
of France, to enter into an affociation to guaran-
ty the treaties of Weftphalia and Nimeguen, with
theſe two principal claufes inferted, that if any of
the Princes who entered into this treaty, fhould
undertake any thing in violation of theſe treaties,
he ſhould be obliged to fubmit to the determination
of the other confederate Princes; and in cafe he
refuſed this, thet the Allied Powers fhould unite
their forces to reduce him to compliance: This
clauſe was likewiſe to take effect againſt thoſe
who, tho' not entered into the confederacy, fhould
diſturb the peace of Chriftendom, and refuſe to
fubmit to the judgment of the Confederates.
"Tis eaſy to perceive, that the Prince of Orange
imagined if the King entered into this treaty of
affociation, he would thereby form a fort of en-
gagement with the confederates; and if he ſhould
refufe, he would then give fome caufe to all the
powers in Chriſtendom, eſpecially the States Ge-
neral, to believe, that he had defigns which tended
to diſturb the peace of Europe.
This propofal was at first rejected by the depu-
ties of Amfterdam, who faid they could not enter
into any treaty, after the declaration made two
years before to the King, that the States General
would not form any new alliance with any Prince
whatever; but Penfionary Fagel having demon-
ftrated to them that this affair was quite different ;
that he did not propoſe an alliance, nor even a trea-
ty of guaranty, but only a treaty which the King
of France might enter into as well as the reft of
the Chriftian Powers, and therefore he could not
conceive, his Majefty could complain in any
manner;
COUNT D'AV AUX.
95
manner; and having upon this laid before them
what had been tranfacted in France, in regard to
religion, they went into his propofal.
Penfionary Fagel having in this manner obtain-
ed the confent of the deputies of Amfterdam, fent
the propofal to all the towns; and before it was
examined before any of the private councils, fo-
lemn oaths were exacted of all the members, not
to reveal any particulars relating to matters which
fhould come under their deliberations; fo that this
affair was kept very fecret. I was, however, in-
formed thereof the day after the towns had given
their confent, when the deputies, who were to be
at the Hague within two days, had power given
them to confent to the reſolution which fhould be
formed thereupon. Thus what I had wrote to our
court three weeks before, proved now but too
true. I fent letters likewiſe this fame day, becauſe
the well affected republicans again declared to me
upon this occafion, if the Prince of Orange fhould
attempt any thing at fuch a juncture, the fpirits
of the people were fo inflamed, that not one of
the well affected would dare to oppoſe it, fince a
perſon would only thereby make a ufelefs facrifice
of himſelf to the refentment of the Prince of
Orange, and the rage of the people.
The Prince of Orange and Penfionary Fagel
ſent at the fame time into Friezland and Gronin-
gen, to procure their confent to the treaties. The
Prince of Orange ventured to take this ftep, from
the difcourfe he had heard of M. de Haren and fome
other ruling men in Friezland, how much the
principal perfons in Friezland and Groningen
had altered their fentiments, upon the account of
religion. As for my part, I had now no hopes
from theſe Provinces, and I informed our court,
September 18, they were not in the leaft to de-
pend
96
NEGOTIATIONS of
pend on them. I at the fame time told them the
reaſon of this change, imputing it wholly to that
uneafineſs they had expreffed, in regard to the af-
fairs of religion,
But tho' I expected nothing from thefe pro-
vinces, yet I did not omit fending perfons of influ-
ence to ſpeak to them; I took care likewiſe to
repreſent to the deputies of Amfterdam, aud fome
other towns, that the engagement they had been
lately drawn into, was certainly againſt the inte-
reft of his Majefty, and confequently againft their
own advantage.
I thought it incumbent on me once more to
fpeak to the Swediſh envoy, in regard to the league
he made with the States General. He made falſe
oaths and proteſtations, according to his ufual
way; but I knew too much to give credit to his
affeverations; for I had been informed of all the
particulars of his negotiation. I had difcovered
that it was the King of Sweden, who preffed the
States General to invite all the Princes in Europe
to enter into a treaty of confederacy, for the pre-
ſervation of peace, and the maintenance of the
treaties of Weftphalia and Nimeguen. 'Tis true,
indeed, this envoy had taken fuch precautions,
and Penfionary Fagel had kept the affair fo fecret,
that the magiftrates of Amfterdam and a few par-
ticular perfons only, knew the King of Sweden
was fo deeply concerned; the reft only knew in
general, that fome King fuft propofed fuch a
treaty.
As it feemed highly neceffary, the King ſhould
be minutely informed of the difhonourable conduct
of the envoy of a Prince, from whom he had rea-
fon to expect a different behaviour; I repeated in
my letter of September 25, all I could difcover,
which it may be unneceffary here to infert. I
men-
COUNT D'AVAUX:
97
mentioned alſo in this letter, that the treaty of
confederacy having been refolved in Holland with
great fecrecy, they had defired the other fix pro-
vinces to name each three deputies, with power to
determine an affair which nearly concerned the
welfare of all the provinces, and ought to be ma-
naged with the utmoft fecrecy. That the deputies
named by Guelderland, Zealand, Friezland, and
Utrecht, had confented; thofe of Friezland not
only acquiefced therein, but ftrongly preffed the
conclufion; that the town of Groningen had in-
deed warmly oppofed it, but it was expected the
Omelandes would come into the opinion of the
other provinces; and that within two days the af-
fair would, by fome means or other, be concluded in
the States General. I fent intelligence alfo, that I had
been informed the houfe of Lunenburg had pro-
miſed to enter into the treaty, and it was not doubt-
ed, but the King of England would become a par-
ty thereof, and there was great hopes of the Elec-
tor of Saxony alfo; but they were however ex-
tremely follicitous to palliate the affair in fuch a
manner, that the treaty might give no umbrage to
his Majefty: That the States General had no in-
tention, nor indeed were they in a condition to
declare war; but that the Prince of Orange had
affured them the King of England had no deſign of
coming to a rupture; and M. Dikfeld had perfua-
ded them, he was fufficiently acquainted with the
intentions of his Majefty to affure them, that all
his threats were only intended to intimidate them ;
and if they would boldly conclude the treaty of al-
liance, the King would then change his ftyle, nor
would he venture to pufh his pretenfions with fo
much vigour. But if it fhould unluckily happen,
that his Majeſty ſhould declare war againſt them,
the war could not do them any great damage, ›
VOL. I.
F
when
98
NEGOTIATIONS of
when fuch a league was concluded. That Van
Buning gave out every where, if things remained
in their preſent fituation, and the powers in Europe
took no proper precautions, they might expect the
war to be renewed in the fpring; but on the con-
trary, if after the ſtrongeſt expreffions of regard to
his Majefty, they ſhould agree to form an alliance
for the preſervation of peace in Chriſtendom, they
might be affured his Majefty after fuch a confe-
deracy, would not imbark in a war, and they
would thereby enjoy perfect tranquillity for a feries
of years.
He had fo far confounded the magi-
ftrates of Amfterdam with his arguments, that he
intirely convinced them of two things, viz. that
it was impoffible his Majefty could really be offend-
ed at the treaties of confederacy; and, that the
conclufion of thefe treaties was the only means to
preferve the peace.
There is one circumftance in the management
of this affair which appears fomewhat extraordina-
ry that during fix months, that is, from the 13th
of March when the firft overture was made by the
Swediſh envoy, to the 28th of September when it
was concluded, Sweden always difavowed having
any intention to make an alliance with the States
General. Oxenftern, the prime miniſter of Swe-
den, gave the ſtrongeſt affurances in this refpect to
M. Feuquieres: and Bielke, embaffador from this
court at France, fpoke upon the fame affair to the
King in fo pofitive a manner, and with fuch an
appearance of fincerity, that our court would hard-
ly give credit to what I wrote.
Mean while I procured a copy of the treaty,
which I diſpatched to the King, September 28, be-
fore the provinces of Friezland and Groningen,
had given their confent. His Majeſty received it
on the very day the Swedish embaffador had made
new
COUNT D'A VAUX.
99
new proteftations, of the fincere intentions of his
maſter, to remain intirely attached to his Majefty's
intereſt ſo that he was not a little fu prized upon
feeing my letter: but we muft in juſtice to this
gentleman declare, that the Swediſh envoy at the
Hague deceived him, which he never forgave.
I found means, by the intereſt of the first deputy
of Groningen whom I had intirely at my diſpoſal,
to hinder this province from agreeing to the treaty
of confederacy; for he ftrongly oppofed the con-
clufion of this treaty in the name of his province;
and Friezland, which had voluntarily confented to
it, was now againſt its being figned, till Gronin-
gen fhould acquiefce therein.
Thus the treaty of confederacy was by his means,
in a manner obftructed. The envoy of Sweden,
and thoſe of the allies complained loudly: this
obliged me to wait upon fome of the magiftrates
of the towns in Holland, and amongſt the reſt
thofe of Amfterdam. I reprefented to them all his
Majefty had done fince the peace, to convince Eu-
rope of his defire to maintain the public tran-
quility the particular regard he had expreffed for
the States General, and the ftrict fidelity with
which he had kept his word, as not even to de-
mand the poffeffion of what belonged to him, with-
in the barrier, but contenting himfelf with an
equivalent in fome other country, that he might
create no jealoufy. I gave them likewife to un-
derftand, that after fuch extraordinary inftances of
his Majeſty's regard to them, if he faw they were
not contented, but fought their fafety by alliances
with other Princes re would then take the necef
fary precautions against their malevolence, and
against the new chgagements they fhould enter
into, in prejudice of his crown; that I looked up-
on myfelf, as obliged to remonftrate to them in
F 2
this
100
NEGOTIATIONS of
this manner, to prevent if poffible, fuch inconve-
niences as might follow.
Theſe gentlemen were fomewhat moved by
what I faid, infomuch, that fo far from preffing
the provinces of Friezland and Groningen to
fign the treaty of alliance, they complained of be-
ing deceived, and reprefented to the Prince of
Orange, that this treaty was of more confequence
than it at first appeared; and as I had declared the
King would be greatly diſpleaſed, they intreated it
might be again brought under confideration; but
he replied, that the refolution being already taken, it
could not be again reſumed.
As the taking of Straſburg had greatly con-
tributed to give ſtrength to my remonstrances, and
had given the Dutch a nearer profpect of the
danger, into which they precipitated themſelves
the well affected amongst them, ftill affured me,
there never was a finer opportunity, if properly
uſed; that the States General would rather chufe
to accept of reaſonable conditions from his Ma-
jefty, than be obliged to fupport a war againſt
him. They told me however, that notwithſtand-
ing the People in Holland had fuch an averfion to
war, the Prince of Orange would certainly force
them into fuch meaſures, unleſs his Majeſty took
the proper ſteps to prevent it, before the Prince of
Orange could bring things to fuch a fituation as
he defired.
They affured me likewiſe, that M. Paets being
perfectly acquainted with all the fteps taken by the
Prince of Orange to deftroy their liberty, and ſub-
vert the fundamental laws of the republic, had
offered to draw up a manifefto, as foon as the King
fhould enter upon action; and that he who did not
agree with them the laft Spring, in regard to
the meaſures they intended to purfue to bring
about
COUNT D'A V AUX. '
IOT
about an infeparable union betwixt the States Ge
neral and his Majesty, was now of opinion, that
the means to be uſed would have the defired effect;
that as he perceived many well meaning people,
began to open their eyes, fince the taking of Strat-
burg had given them fome apprehenfion of a
neighbouring war with France; he therefore wiſh-
ed fuch an opportunity might not be neglected,
of applying to all the principal members of the re-
public; and that he thought it neceffary, ftill to
encreaſe their apprehenfion of war, becauſe no-
thing could more affift thoſe perfons who did not
yet defpair of being able to oppoſe the defigns of
the Prince of Orange, than to make uſe of the
preſent juncture; that for this purpoſe however, he
thought nothing ought to be done, which might re-
duce the people of Holland to deſpair, or drive
them to extremity, as it would do, if France turn-
ed her arms againſt them, and gave them room to
believe the defired to reduce them under her fub-
jection, but when his Majefty was about to make
ufe of fuch powerful means, as feemed neceffary,
that he ſhould then publickly declare, he defired
nothing but to re-eſtabliſh the proper government
and liberty of the republic.
The Prince of Orange at this time fent over
Van Buning to England, as envoy extraordinary
from the States General, looking upon this man
as the moſt proper he knew, to engage the States
General, in the intereft of the King of Great
Britain.
As I faw the effect of what I had faid in regard
to the treaty of confederacy upon the minds of fe-
veral perfons in the government, I fhould have
wiſhed to have continued to ſpeak to them in the
fame manner: but the King having given me to
underſtand, that I had already fufficiently apprized
F 3
the
102
NEGOTIATIONS of
the States General, in what manner he fhould
confider this new engagement, and that it was not
neceffary to make any more formal declaration,
fince it might tend more to precipitate them into
fome violent refolution, than to keep them in pro-
per meaſures with his Majefty; I therefore ftopped,
and made anſwer to the King, that I would make
no more application to the States General, to
prevent the conclufion of the treaty of confedera-
cy, till I ſhould receive other inftructions from his
Majefty; that nevertheleſs I was perfuaded he
muſt have ſeen by my laft difpatches, the good ef-
fects of what I had faid upon this fubject, which
being ftrengthened by the reduction of Straſburg,
had produced fuch an alteration in many perfons
of the province of Holland, that there was room
to expect a total change in favour of his Majefty,
if they ftill remained perfuaded, that he would
thew his refentment to the States General, if they
ſhould conclude the treaty of confederacy; that
the Prince of Orange and Penfionary Fagel being
ſenſible of this truth, had prevented the deputies
in fecret affairs from relating to the States Gene-
ral, and confequently to the Provinces, the con-
ferences I had with them upon this ſubject; and
tho' I had given thefe deputies a memorial relat-
ing to all I had faid, agreeable to the cuſtom fome-
times practifed by other minifters, nevertheleſs they
entreated me to deliver them in writing all I had
faid upon this affair; that I had anſwered, if the
States were defirous to conform themſelves to the
fentiments of his Majefty, they knew enough al-
ready for that purpofe; but if they had refolved
to act contrary thereto, it was unneceffary to give
them memorials, or to put in writing what I had
fufficiently explained.
That
COUNT D'AVAU X. 103
That the Prince of Orange and Penfionary Fa-
gel took advantage from there being no public decla-
ration of his Majefty in regard to this affair, fay-
ing, that I would have explained myſelf more
publickly, if I had ſpoke by the command of his
Majefty; and that it was eafy to perceive from
thence, that I had of myſelf made all theſe remon
ftrances; and they were furpriſed fome perfons fhould
have been fo much ftaggered by what I advanced;
for they were pofitive his Majefty would have quite
different fentiments, when he fhould be fully in-
formed of the nature of the treaty they were about
to conclude.
That all the well affected republicans were
convinced if the King, amidft his other grand de-
figns, would beſtow a little thought on their repub-
lic, and make a proper ufe of the confternation
they were thrown into by the departure of Van
Buning for England, their uncertainty of the King's
fentiments in regard to the treaty of confederacy,
the reduction of Strafburg, and the poffeffion of
Cafel; he might engage the States General to his
intereft in fuch a manner, that they could never
again difengage themſelves, and their naval forces
be always at his Majeſty's fervice.
I had a long conference upon this affair, Octo-
ber 28, with one of the old burgo-mafters of
1672. This man had enjoyed his eaſe, and lived
a philofophic life in the country, nor ever troubled
himſelf with public affairs, fince his expulfion
from the government; and I could perceive no
motive of his coming to talk with me, but a de-
fire of becoming again an actor in public affairs.
He told me that M. Paets, fince his laft interview,
had converſed with feveral of his intimate friends
in Amſterdam, and ſome other towns; and that
he had found them all equally perſuaded, that the
Prince
F 4
104 NEGOTIATIONS of
Prince of Orange thought only of rendering him-
ſelf their abſolute mafter, by means of the war in
which he wanted to engage them; but if his Ma-
jefty would affift them, they could take ſuch mea-
fures as would put the republic upon the footing he
wifhed; that for this purpofe (as others had men-
tioned) if the people in Holland were perfuaded
his Majeſty did not take up arms to fubdue them,
he was convinced, if the King took care to keep
up their apprehenfions of his refentment, in cafe
they purſued the meaſures they had taken, and if
he thought proper, when his troops fhould have en-
tered Aloft, and taken poffeffion of the town of
Liege, as it was intended according to report, if
his Majefty fhould then demand the States General
to explain themſelves, and at the fame time de-
fire their alliance, and infift upon pledges of their
fidelity, they maintained, that by theſe means they
could give his Majefty fuch ftrong furcties of the
attachment of the States General to his intereft,
that it would be impoffible for them to act repug-
nant thereto.
It would be too tedious to infert all the particu-
lars this man mentioned, and all the replies he
made to the following queftions I put to him:
Whether he thought, when his Majefty fhould
march his troops into Aloft and into Liege alfo (as
he ſuppoſed was to be done) this would be fuffi-
cient to make the States explain themſelves? or,
if he meant that his Majefty fhould make fill
farther advance, to compleat the terror of the
Dutch? If he was not apprehenſive the Prince of
Orange would turn this proceeding to his advan-
tage, to induce the other Princes to enter into an
alliance with the States General, fince they might
be intereſted to prevent the United Provinces from
becoming dependent upon his Majefty? If the States
General
COUNT D'AV AU X. 105
General might not always have the fame uneafi-
nefs in regard to the fecurity of the barrier, even
after ſuch an alliance? and laftly, What were thoſe
fureties he pretended his Majefty might have?
I ſhall only mention, that this man was perfuad-
ed, the Prince of Orange could not bring the other
Princes into the intereft of the States Gene-
ral, becauſe in lefs than a fortnight the face of af-
fairs would be intirely changed in Holland, and
the well affected taking courage thereupon, the
authority of the Prince of Orange would be de-
ftroyed.
As to the barrier, M. Paets and his friends.
were convinced, this would be a perpetual fubject
of jealoufy and uneafinefs, which the Prince of
Orange would always turn to his advantage: That
it would be better for the States to live in peace
as neighbours to his Majefty, without diffidence or
alarıns; to render their commerce more flouriſhing,
and to enjoy their liberty, than to ruin themſelves
by keeping up troops which were ufelefs, and
might ferve the Prince of Orange to fubdue them,
under a pretext of keeping the State in a condition
to defend this barrier againſt France; that he had
convinced them, their true and folid barrier was
in the King's friendship, for, that his Majefty had
in fix weeks penetrated to the gates of Amfterdam,
when the Spaniards and they were in poffeffion
of thirty more garriſons than at prefent.
As to the fureties they pretended to give his
Majefty of their fidelity, they meant to give up
the frontier towns into his poffeffion; and he faid,
if affairs turned out as might be expected, fuppo-
fing his Majefty took the proper meaſures, M.
Paets would then in all probability be fent to
France by the States General, and he would cer-
tainly act agreeably to what he had declared to
F 5
me;
106
NEGOTIATIONS of
me; for he had no other way to deliver himſelf
from the oppreffion of the Prince of Orange.
And as this man, in the name of the well affect-
ed, intreated me to lay all theſe particulars before
the King, I aſked him, what affurances he could
give me of fuccefs in fo great an enterprize?
He replied, that M. Paets and two or three others
of his friends having ſpoke about the preſent ſtate
of affairs, to thofe in whom they could confide,
they had found them diſpoſed in ſuch a manner,
as made them hope for fuccefs in their defign;
but that M. Paets did not think proper to explain
himſelf more openly to ſeveral perfons in Amfter-
dam, till he knew his Majefty's intentions; for if
he chofe not to purfue fuch meafures, Paets would
only ruin himſelf if he went any farther; but as
foon as he knew his Majefty refolved to act in the
manner propoſed, he would then employ all his
intereft to make matters fucceed according to his
wiſhes. He repeated, in the ſtrongeſt terms, that
if this opportunity was neglected, fuch would ne-
ver, again occur; that fix weeks would be fuffici-
ent to execute this project, and to finiſh it intire-
ly; that after this, the King needed not to give
himſelf any trouble about England, fince the
States General would then affift his Majefty with
their fleets, to ſupport their common intereft a-
gainst that Kingdom; on the contrary, if things
were allowed to remain in the fituation they were
at preſent in Holland, the Prince of Orange,
fooner or later, would unite the States General
with England, and thereby induce many of the
European Powers to come into the alliance.
As for my part, I took the liberty to write to
the King, that tho' I could not take upon me to
ſay how far the terror of his arms might work
upon the people of Holland, yet I could affure
him,
COUNT D'AVAUX.
107
him, it would be a certain and powerful motive,
to make the States General change their conduct;
for I had found by experience what an effect my
only telling them of his Majefty's being diſpleaſed
at the treaty of alliance had produced; and this be
ing followed immediately by the news of the re-
duction of Straſburg, they were ſeized with fuch a
pannic, that the actions not only fell 10 per cent.
but many perſons in Amfterdam fold off their go-
vernment fecurities: his Majefty might from thence
judge what was to be expected, when they fhould
fee he was in earneſt, not thro' a defign to con-
quer them, but to make them obferve a more equit-
able conduct in refpect to his Majefty, who would
always be ready to receive them into his friend-
fhip, as foon as they ſhould alter their meaſures.
The King made anfwer, that fuch ſteps as I
propoſed, would in all appearance produce effects
more favourable to the deſigns of the Prince of
Orange, than to thoſe which the well affected had
formed to recover their liberty; he ordered me
however to preſent a memorial to the States Gene-
ral, which was fent me drawn up in proper terms,
to hinder the treaty of confederacy. The purport
of this memorial was, that his Majeſty choſe there-
by to inform the States General, that the means
ufed to engage them infenfibly, under pretext of
preferving the laft treaties, to fupport the deceitful
interpretations which were artfully wreſted, in pre-
judice of his Majeſty's rights, would certainly in-
volve them in a new war, which, perhaps, would
prove more deftructive than the foregoing.
That his Majefty doubted not but they would
avoid this misfortune, by the refolutions they ſhould
take, and he would be glad to be informed thereof
as foon as poffible, that he might know he ought
to confider them as friends for the future; or, if
F 6
not-
108 NEGOTIATIONS of
notwithſtanding the friendſhip he had always fhewn
them, he muſt now fhew a juft refentment againſt
a State, ready to imbrace every party oppofite to
his intereft.
'Tis likely, if this memorial had been prefented
before Penfionary Fagel had got the affair deter-
mined in the States General by the deputies of the
five provinces, it would have prevented the con-
clufion, fince it retarded the final completion a-
bove a month.
I was informed, October 30, by a burgo-ma-
fter of Amfterdam, that the principal expedient on
which the Prince of Orange and the King of Eng-
land depended, was a ſcheme they had formed of
cutting out work for the King within his own do-
minions, by means of the Hugonots, who were re-
ported to be cruelly uſed.
and
I wrote to our court, November 17, that the
Prince of Orange had at that time fufpended
the motion he intended to make, for augmenting
the forces twenty men each company;
that in all probability he deferred this propofal, till
the province of Holland fhould confent to the rati
fication of the treaty of Amſterdam.
That M. D'Odick had publickly declared at
the Spaniſh envoy's, that the King of England
had received pofitive affurances the King would
not carry his arms into Flanders, and that his
Britannic Majefty had fent for Don Ronquillo
to declare this to him; that this report was propa-
gated by the Prince of Orange's agents, as a thing
advantageous to their intereft; and his Majefty
might judge from thence, that the Prince of Orange
believed there was not a furer way to accompliſh
his defigns, than by removing the apprehenfion the
people of Holland lay under of a war.
The
COUNT D'AVAUX. 109
The Swediſh envoy importuned the Prince of
Orange and Penfionary Fagel, to exchange rati-
fications of the treaty of alliance, the time ap-
pointed for that purpoſe being now elapfed. Pen-
fionary Fagel uſed his utmoſt efforts to obtain the
confent of the States General; but I had engaged
the Omelandes to join with the town of Gronin-
gen, ſo that I had now the Voice of the whole
province to oppoſe it; and as I had likewiſe
found means to have it determined in Friezland,
that their deputy fhould conform to that of Gro-
ningen; the Prince of Orange found now two
provinces againſt the exchange of ratifications.
Penfionary Fagel carried them to the States Gene-
ral four times in one week, but all his labours
proved ineffectual.
On the 25th of December, he undertook to have
the affair concluded by the voices of the five pro-
vinces, a thing directly contrary to the fundamen-
tal laws of the republic. This made a great noiſe,
but it foon fubfided; the well affected, who might
have taken great advantage from fuch a proceed-
ing, not daring to act becauſe they were not fup-
ported from abroad, and the apprehenfion of his
Majefty's arms no longer fubfifted.
The Prince of Orange had no fooner procured
an exchange of ratifications for the treaty of alli-
ance, than he made a propofal in the council of
State, to augment the cavalry twenty two in each
troop, and fixteen additional men to each compa-
ny of infantry. On the rft of January, 1682,
the council of State prefented a petition for this
purpoſe to the province of Holland, who con-
fented thereto after a flight oppofition. This
augmentation amounted to 12000 men, but it was
only for fix months.
The
110
NEGOTIATIONS of
The whole of this proceeding gives us an infight
into the temper and genius of the Prince of Orange,
who acted always upon the fame principles. He
perfuaded the States General, that the meaſures
he adviſed them to purſue tended to preferve peace;
and as foon as fuch were taken, he took care to
have it reprefented as abfolutely neceffary to arm
themſelves to ſupport what they had done. The
majority were drawn into fuch meaſures, not know-
ing what they did, and thofe who had fufficient
fagacity to difcover his artifices, and courage
enough to oppoſe them, durft not undertake any
thing, not being backed from abroad, as I have
already obferved: On the contrary, the affairs of
religion had put them out of a condition of being
able to declare their fentiments.
Befides, every thing from England not a little.
affifted the Prince of Orange in bringing the States
General to purfue theſe falfe fteps. On the 25th
of December, 1681, his Britannic Majeſty ſent
to the Hague the copy of a memorial which he
defired might be preſented to the King in regard
to the pretenfions of ********, and he intreated
the States General to order their embaſſador to
join his endeavours to thoſe of his envoy, that
they might mutually fupport this memorial, which
was couched in the ſtrongeſt terms.
Moreover, Van Buning wrote letters which
produced very bad effects. I fent the King a co-
py of one, the 8th of January, 1682. In this
he told the States General, that the King of Eng-
land had fignified to M. de Barillon, that he could
not prefs the Spaniards to give an equivalent for
Aloft, not being convinced of the equity of his
Majeſty's pretenfions; that he had likewife fpoke
very ſtrongly concerning the blockade of Luxem-
burg, and had told M. de Barillon, that he beg-
ged
COUNT D'A VAUX.
III
ged the King would confider this affair, whilſt
things remained in their prefent fituation; for if
he was obliged to aſſemble his Parliament, it would
be out of his power to prevent things being carried
to an extremity. That the King of England had
informed him and M. Citters of this converfation,
telling them at the fame time, he had made this
declaration to M. de Barillon, that the King might
be informed thereof before he received the memo-
rial, and that he might be perfuaded his Britannic
Majeſty was in earneſt; and unleſs a fatisfactory
anſwer was given, he would purſue different mea-
fures. 'Tis eaſy to perceive what effect ſuch
letters would produce in all the towns and pro-
vinces; for they made every one believe, the King
of England was against the Spaniards giving an
equivalent for Aloft; and on the contrary, that he
was ready to make an alliance with the States
General, in caſe the blockade of Luxemburg conti-
nued, as Van Buning had, indeed, mentioned in an-
other letter I fent my royal maſter; that the King
of England had given his word of honour, he would
affemble his Parliament, and enter into the treaty
of alliance, if his Chriſtian Majefty did not im-
mediately raiſe the blockade of Luxemburg. Thefe
things gave great authority to the Prince of
Orange, and juftified the fteps he hrd taken; and
he never failed to take advantage from fuch op-
portunities, either by procuring an augmentation
of the forces, or engaging the States General in
new treaties.
Mean while, the magiſtrates of the province of
Friezland having by degrees, recovered from
their firſt tranſports in regard to religion, now re-
fumed their ancient maxims; and having joined
the province of Groningen, theſe two provinces
together infifted, that the differences betwixt the
Kings
112
NEGOTIATIONS of
Kings of France and Spain, fhould be terminated
in an amicable manner.
The Prince of Orange was not aftoniſhed at
this, and on his part ufed his utmoſt efforts to
fend 8000 men to the Spaniards. As I had been
informed he was to propofe this to the States Ge-
neral, the 24th of February, 1682, I prepared a
billet of four lines only, which I fent them at the
time they began to affemble, begging them to come
to my houſe that I might communicate to them
fomething relating to the Low Countries. This
prevented the Prince of Orange's tools from mak-
ing any mention of the 8000 men; and after my
conference with feveral of the members, they
thought proper to drop it intirely for that time.
The Prince of Orange did not imagine theſe
8000 men would much avail the Spaniards; I told
our court, he expected they would be defeated;
but this he accounted as nothing, as he would
alſo the taking of Luxemburg, when it ſhould hap-
pen; but what he chiefly aimed at was, that the
war fhould be commenced.
About this time, the King of England having
reflected on the confequence of the engagements
he had entered into with the Prince of Orange,
fent Mr. Chudley to the Hague, to perfuade the
States General to fettle things in an amicable
manner: But the King of England being him-
felf not quite determined in his refolutions, and
his minifters being attached to the Prince of Orange,
this negotiation did more miſchief than fervice, as
will appear in the fequel.
All the artifices the Prince of Orange practifed
to prevail on the States General to fend 8000 men
to affift the Spaniards proving ineffectual, he fent
for one of the burgo mafters of the greateſt infiu-
ence in Amfterdam, and told him he defired peace.
more
COUNT D'AVAU X.
113
more than any of the States General; that he
faw they were not in a condition to declare war,
being deferted by England and all the Princes of
the empire; but that they ought to endeavour to
make better conditions for the Spaniards; that he
knew the King would abate in many things, if
the States General fhewed an inclination to affift
the Spaniards; that it was therefore their intereſt
as well as honour, to act with ſome vigour; and
that ſuch a conduct would be fo far from drawing
a war on them, that on the contrary, it would
procure them a more fure and advantageous peace;
that the King could not break with the States for
fending the 8000 men, and the States having it
in their power to ſend them, without being obliged
to enter into a war with his Majefty till the end
of three months, they would then have fufficient
time to determine what courſe to take; and what-
ever they ſhould do in favour of Spain, the King
would receive them with open arms, if they after-
wards ufcd their endeavours to bring things to a
friendly accommodation with Spain.
•
I was informed of all that paffed at this con-
ference of the Prince of Orange with the burgo
maſter of Amfterdam. This obliged me to wait
upon the leading perfons of that city, and to re-
prefent things in a quite different light from what
the Prince of Orange had done. I fhewed on one
fide a fure and lafting peace, which nothing could
diſturb, on the other, a renewal of the war, which
was prejudicial to their intereft, and contrary to
their intentions; and I took care in this interview
to make them properly acquainted with the orders
which the King had given to M. Marſhal d'Hu-
mieres, that I might thereby render them more.
cautious in their refolutions.
I acted
114
NEGOTIATIONS of
I acted ftill more vigorously with the well af-
fected republicans; this induced one of the moft
famous amongst them to aſk me if I could affure
them the King would not abate in his preten-
fions, if the States General ſhould ſend 8000 men,
becauſe the well affected republicans having al-
ways oppoſed this propoſal, as a thing which
would be attended with mifchievous confequences,
and the Prince of Orange having on the contrary
maintained it to be the only way to procure bet-
ter terms for the Spaniards, they fhould be intire-
ly difcredited and rendered incapable of ever fup-
porting the intereſt of the King, if, after the States
General fent fuccour to the Spaniards, contrary to
the opinion of the well affected, his Majefty
fhould drop his pretenfions, and raiſe the blockade
of Luxemburg.
Thefe fteps I took, for fome time obftructed the
Prince of Orange's defigns; for, notwithſtanding
he went himſelf to the States of Holland, and
propofed fending 8000 men to the Spaniards, yet
the majority of the towns oppofed it, and he was
obliged to fend home the deputies to confult their
conftituents.
W
Befides what he had already advanced to the
States General, to induce them to fend the 8000
men, he added every thing which could furniſh
him with the leaft pretext, particularly the march
of M. Marſhal de Crequy, who then entered into
the Duchy of Luxemburg, repreſenting this as a
declaration of war. This march indeed made a
great noiſe: But the Prince of Orange could not
make any advantage thereof; for I had previouſly
informed the magiftrates of Amfterdam of the
King's defign in ſending Marſhal de Crequy, fo
that they remained firm in their refolution of fol-
lowing
COUNT D'AV AU X.
115
lowing mild meaſures, and refufing the 8000
men.
I had likewiſe the fatisfaction of being informed
that one of the well affected republicans made ufe
of this march of the troops to fhew the States into
what dangers they were about to precipitate them-
felves, if they ſhould think of ſending 8000 men.
As for my part, I remained always in the fame fen-
timents, being perfuaded nothing could tend more
to draw the States General into fuch refolutions aš
were agreeable to their own intereſt and the incli-
nations of his Majefty, than to fhew them on one
fide, a poſitive affurance of peace, and on the
other, an evident danger of involving themfelves in
a troubleſome war, by fending fuccour in fo preci-
pitate a manner.
The Prince of Orange, from the fame motive,
ſpoke in a quite different ftyle. He told the depu-
ties, he agreed they fhould lay the whole blame
upon him, if the King made war when they ſhould
fend the troops; whereas, if they did not, they
would be guilty of a breach of honour, and
their credit greatly hurt. Dikfeld added, that
it was not to be doubted but the King had fome
great defign; and if he ſhould ever be in a condi-
tion to put it in execution, he would carry it on,
even tho' Luxemburg fhould be yielded to him;
but if the proper juncture was not yet arrived, he
would not make a rupture, nor undertake a war
on account of fending 8000 men.
This affair was a confiderable time under agita-
tion in the province of Holland: The Prince of
Orange, who was always prefent at the affemblies,
brought it on the carpet above twenty times; and
when any deputy differed in opinion, he fent him.
back to his town, to deliberate upon the matter
a-new; in fine, there was not one town which he
did
116
NEGOTIATIONS of
did not tamper with in this manner, and fend back
their deputies above ten times.
Notwithſtanding all theſe efforts of the Prince
of Orange, there prevailed three different opinions
in the province of Holland, one was to grant the
8000 men; another, that the time for giving
fuch a fupply was not yet arrived; the third, for
refufing them, without entering into any difcuf-
fion. At laft, the magiftrates of Amfterdam, be-
ing warmly follicited by the Prince of Orange,
delivered a fourth opinion, declaring the proper
time for furniſhing the 8000 men was come; but
that peace being always preferable to war, it was
adviſable to try mild meaſures before they furniſhed
the 8000 men; for this purpofe, it was neceffaty
firſt to know, whether the Spaniards would give
an equivalent for the King's pretenfions; or, if
they remained fixed to the declaration they had
made, not to give up one inch of ground; becauſe
if they continued inflexible in this refolution, the
States General ſhould abfolutely refuſe the 8000
men; and if they agreed to give an equivalent,
in that cafe, it muſt be infifted on that his Maje-
fty allow provifions to be carried into Luxemburg
during the accommodation; and if he refuſed this
(which was very unlikely after a declaration that
he had no pretenfions to the town of Luxemburg,
and after the propofition of the King of England
on this fubject) they would immediately grant the
8000 men to the Spaniards.
As the Prince of Orange, had no way more ef-
fectual to engage the States General to fend the
8000 men, than by affuring them this refolution
could by no means draw upon them the King's re-
fentment; his Majefty therefore defired to know
my opinion, whether it would be neceffary to
order me, to declare to the States General, that
if
COUNT D'A VAUX.
117
if after he had on his part, taken every ſtep necef-
fary to maintain peace, and to determine all diffe-
rences in an amicable manner, they ſhould allow
themſelves to be carried away by the perfuafions, of
fuch as wanted them to break off all correfpond-
ence with his Majefty; and ſhould march a body
of troops, to ftrengthen the obftinacy which the
Spaniards fhewed in refufing what belonged to
his Majefty, or to give any juft fatisfaction; he
would confider this act as an open rupture, and
would immediately ſeize all their fhips in his har-
bours, which ſhould be condemned if they puſhed
their hoftilities farther, or be detained from the
proprietors till they ſhould withdraw their troops,
and fhew a real difpofition to have peace eſta-
bliſhed.
I took the liberty to tell his Majefty, that I was
of opinion, fuch a declaration ought not to be
made to the States General, for the Prince of
Orange would profit thereby; that he would fay
I only uſed threats of no confequence, and that he
had already faid, in regard to the report which the
magiſtrates had made of my vifit, that I had en-
deavoured on other occafions, to ſtrike a panic
into them; but would they only remain fteady,
my menaces would appear of as little confequence
now as formerly. That it was therefore neceffary
to know, if the King refolved to puſh this affair
to an extremity, in cafe the States did not regard
his threats; for if this ſhould happen, nothing could
be more deftructive to his Majefty's intereft, than
relaxing in his demands; that befides, it was cer-
tain the Dutch were apprehenfive of having a war,
as foon as they ſhould fend the 8000 men; fo that
nothing feemed more for the intereft of his Ma-
jefty, than to leave them every thing to fear,
neither
418
NEGOTIATIONS of
neither threatning them, nor affuring them of any
one particular.
The Prince finding fo many different opinions,
in the States of Holland, offered one to bring the
reft to an agreement, viz. that the States fhould
order the 8cco men to advance to Maeftricht,
and the countries beyond the Meufe; this, he faid,
could not offend the King, and the Spaniards would
be fatisfied; for this purpoſe, he made a handle
of a letter from M. de Staremburg, the fubftance
of which was, that upon the report which prevail-
ed in France, of the States General being about
to furnish the Spaniards with 8000 men, they
they had dropt their ſchemes, and would foon de-
fift from their attempt on Luxemburg. I found
means however, to baffle this falſe intelligence;
for having received a letter which informed me,
that befides the body of troops commanded by
Marfhal de Crequy, there was likewiſe another
of infantry and cavalry, affembled at Dinant, under
the conduct of M. Marfhal d'Humieres: I took
care to fend notice of this, to the magiftrates of
Amfterdam, by a billet wrote by the perſon whom
I generally employed to write to them. This
proved of great fervice, for I was informed by a
deputy of the States of Holland, that the letters
of M. de Staremburg had produced fuch an effect
in the affembly, and fo far encouraged them, that
the Prince of Orange had very nigh obtained the
8000 men; but the magiftrates of Amfterdam hav-
ing produced this letter, informed them that Mar-
fhal d'Humieres had affembled another army at
Dinant, with orders to march as foon as the States
General fhould grant the 8000 men, they had gi-
ven more credit to this letter, than to thofe of M.
de Staremburg; that the States themselves had
complained loudly of a fcheme formed to impofe on
them;
COUNT D'AVAUX.
119
them; and that the Prince of Orange had de-
manded a fight of this letter, and had kept it to try
if he could difcover the hand.
*
I was informed that the ill will of the Prince
of Orange towards the King of England ſtill ſub-
fifted; and I wrote our court, that I had difcover-
ed the Spaniards were about to make a declaration,
to prohibit all commerce with England; in this it
was mentioned, that they should always with great
pleaſure, keep up a friendly commerce with the
Engliſh nation; that it was with the utmoſt regret
they were obliged to break it off, but that his
Britannic Majefty, not choofing to aſſemble his
Parliament, that he might be in a condition to
give them the fuccour promiſed by their treaty,
they could not difpenfe with this particular beha-
viour; proteſting however, that they were ready to
re-eſtabliſh the commerce betwixt the two nations,
as foon as the King ſhould call a Parliament. This
declaration was concerted with the Prince of
Orange, though he pretended to be quite ignorant
of the matter, and was not to be publiſhed, till
the States General ſhould fend the 8000 men, in
order, if poffible, to make the King of England
enter into the war, and to engage the States Ge-
neral more firmly.
And though for ten years, no affair in the States
of Holland was carried on with more fecrecy, and
the precaution of fo many oaths, I was neverthe-
lefs punctually informed, of what paffed every day,
in the council of towns, and the affembly of Hol-
land; by this means, the King was enabled to
follow fuch meaſures as were neceflary.
I was alſo informed, that at the time when the
Spaniards preffed the States General to fend 8000
men, the Prince of Orange and Penfionary Fagel
demanded of the Swedish envoy, what troops the
King
120
NEGOTIATIONS of
King his maſter would furnish, according to the
treaty of alliance, in caſe they ſhould come to a
rupture; and that the envoy offered 20000 men,
provided fubfidies were given. That this envoy
having entered into a conference on the fame fub-
ject, with the Spaniſh envoy and the Emperor's
refident, the latter declared his Imperial Majeſty
did not pretend to furnish Sweden with fubfidies;
and he afterwards fignified to the Prince of Orange
in particular, that his maſter would be greatly dif
ſatisfied, if the King of Sweden fhould have fuch
a number of forces in the empire. That the Spa-
niſh envoy, not having ſuch a regard for the em-
pire, demanded of the Prince of Orange, that the
States General fhould furnish Sweden with fub-
fidies. That this Prince communicated the affair
to certain perfons in Amfterdam, and fome other
towns, and though he ſpoke of this affair, only
to fuch as were devoted to his intereft, yet even
thefe affured him, the States General could not
grant the ſubſidies. I gave notice of theſe parti-
culars to M. de Feuquieres, that he might be able
to fhew the court of Sweden, how little was to be
depended upon her new allies.
The Duke of Hanover; at the fame time, en-
gaged himſelf to the Prince of Orange, to fend
10000 men to the Spaniards, and the Prince of
Orange had the money he gave to the Duke of
Hanover, negotiated in his own name.
I wrote the King, March 24, that I was fuffi-
ciently perfuaded he was well informed of the King
of England's fentiments; yet nevertheleſs, that I
thought it my duty to fend him the extract of a
letter from a burgo-maſter of Amfterdam to the
States General, in which he gave them to under-
ſtand, that Van Buning had affured him, the King
of England wanted to have the treaties of the em-
pire
COUNT D'AVAUX.
121
pire concluded at the fame time with that of Spain;
and that his Britannic Majefty would readily gua-
ranty ſuch treaties.
This information in regard to the King of Eng-
land's fentiments induced the States General three
days afterwards to come to a reſolution which they
fent me; in this they entreated the King to fettle the
differences with Spain in an amicable manner; and
in order to render the peace more general, and con-
fequently more fure, they defired the King at the
fame time, to bring things to a friendly accom-
modation with the Emperor. They likewife en-
treated of his Majefty, that during the negotia-
tion of the affair, he would allow provifions to be
carried into Luxemburg, affuring him this was
the opinion of the King of England as well as
theirs; they at the fame time offered themfelves
and the King of England as mediators.
I undertook to fend this propoſal to the King,
and I told them, that tho' I knew not his inten-
tions in regard to an overture which could not be
foreſeen; yet I could venture to tell them, that
the meaſures they took were not proper to attain
what they defired, fince it was much more eaſy to
determine differences feparately which were not
in common, than to join them all together, and
make them depend on each other. I then aſked
them, if they had a promife of the Spaniards that
they would accommodate matters; becauſe I be-
lieved it to be to no manner of purpoſe to enter
upon fuch queſtions, if they remained determined
not to give up an inch of ground to his Majeſty;
the deputies appeared confounded at this, and
made no anfwer.
As they fignified to me, that the King having
no pretenfion on Luxemburg, could not in juſtice
hinder accefs to that place; I told them that the
VOL. I.
G
King
122
NEGOTIATIONS of
King had pretenfions upon Aloft and fome other
places, which he had not taken poffeffion of, out of
regard to the King of England and the States Ge-
neral; and that it was not reaſonable, after having
received fuch uſage, that he ſhould give up a
furety in his hands. I added, that we wanted
not a precedent for keeping fureties on lefs lawful
pretenfions, and which could not be compared
with thoſe his Majefty had upon whole provinces ;
I ſaid enough to make them underſtand I ſpoke
of Maeftricht which they kept contrary to treaty
for the fecurity of a debt of three millions:
But the refolution which the King took at this
time, finiſhed the whole affair; for before he
received this memorial from the States General,
which was on the 23d of March, he had deter-
mined to raiſe the blockade of Luxemburg, and
had ordered M. Marſhal de Crequy to withdraw
his forces; and he agreed to refer all the diffe-
rences which remained yet undecided with the
Spaniards to the arbitration of the King of Eng-
land; his Majefty having dropt all thoughts of
recovering his rights as foon as he received intelli-
gence that the Grand Signior was about to attack
Hungary with all his forces.
When the Prince of Orange became acquainted.
with his Majefty's refolution, he was extremely
nettled that the 8000 men had not been fent, for
in that cafe he would have imputed the raifing
the blockade at Luxemburg to their marching:
on the contrary, I ftrongly affured my friends,
who publifhed it every where, that if the States
had fent the 8000 men, the King would never
have raiſed the blockade at Luxemburg.
Penfionary Fagel took care at this time to fend
papers to all the clergy, which they were obliged
to read in their pulpits. The contents were, that
the
COUNT D'AVAUX.
123
the difcrcet, fteady, and vigorous behaviour of the
States General in theſe times, had preferved the
State from a bloody war; and one of the deputies
to the States General told his province, by com-
mand of the Prince of Orange, that the refolu-
tion they had taken of accepting the propofal of
an alliance with Sweden, had given courage to
feveral Princes of Europe, and that the continu-
ance of fuch a conduct muſt certainly produce
good effects. M. Dikfeld declared likewife in
the States General, that if they continued to fhew
refolution, they could run no rifque, as was eafy
to perceive, and would obtain whatever they de-
fired. That the King of England having ſeen
the firmneſs of the States, began now to talk in an-
other ſtyle. In a word, they put every thing in
practice to perſuade the States General, that they
had nothing to fear if they formed alliances with
as many Princes of the empire as poffible, for this
was the only means to preferve peace in the Low
Countries.
I was informed that the Prince of Orange ſtrong
ly preffed the King of England in the name of
the States General, to put himſelf in a condition
that his follicitation might have more influence
with the King; and that for this purpofe nothing
could be more effectual than calling his Parlia-
ment; and at the fame time he urged the Spa-
niards to infift upon the States General being ar-
bitrators with the King of England.
I wrote M. de Barillon, that he muft ufe all
poffible means to prevent the King of England'
from agreeing to this; for if this took place, his
negotiation would be difficult and unfuccefsful;
becauſe in fuch an affair the Prince of Orange
would be fole mafter of the States General, who
would hardly be acquainted with an affair which
would
G 2
124 NEGOTIATIONS of
would be communicated only to the deputies in
fecret affairs, and the provinces not in the leaft
confulted.
The Emperor's refident this fame day received
ratifications of the treaty of alliance betwixt the
Emperor and States General; and another deed
alſo, wherein the Emperor and Sweden entered
into the fame obligations with each other. He
had likewife orders to affure the States General,
that fome Electors and other Princes of the em-
pire would foon accede to the fame treaty. A-
mongſt theſe it was pretended there were the
Electors of Bavaria and Saxony.
The King no fooner raifed the blockade of
Luxemburg, than he ordered conditions of pacifi-
cation to be propofed, and feveral Princes of the
empire conſented to treat thereupon.
I made new diſcoveries of feveral fecret practices
of the Prince of Orange, which left no room to
doubt that his intention was to take advantage of
the time, to put the allies in a condition to carry
on war, and in the mean while to ſeek ſome pre-
text for breaking the peace.
He had procured a ratification of the treaty of
alliance with the Emperor's envoy, without pay-
ing any regard to the oppofition of Friezland and
Groningen.
He had employed Mr. Dikfeld and another de-
puty equally fubfervient to his purpoſes, to bring
about a treaty with the Spanish envoy, and there
was to be in this, as in that of the emperor,
a feparate league betwixt Spain and Sweden.
He had conveyed two hundred thouſand crowns
to the Duke of Hanover.
He had likewiſe a ſcheme, but it was carried on
fecretly (Penfionary Fagel and another perfon be-
ing only privy thereto) of drawing up articles of
a
COUNT D'AVAUX.
125
a new treaty betwixt Sweden and the States Ge-
neral, wherein, under the pretext of executing an
article in the treaty of alliance, they were to fti-
pulate what number of troops they would furnish
upon any emergency.
•
And he always preffed the King of England to
ufe his endeavours that the States General ſhould
be joint arbitrators with him.
I informed the magiſtrates of Amfterdam, May
28, of the defign the Prince of Orange had form-
ed of making a new treaty with Sweden, and
they affured me they would never confent to it.
I took care likewiſe to have the province of Friez-
land apprized thereof, who were fo averfe to this
ſcheme, that they declared they would never ac-
quiefce with the province of Holland, in regard to
the treaty of alliance, notwithſtanding all the e-
forts of the Prince of Orange to engage them in
it.
I diſpatched a courier to the King, to acquaint
him, that the Prince of Orange having, by the
raifing the blockade of Luxemburg, loft all hopes of
being able to kindle a war in the Low Countries,
wanted now to engage the States General in affairs
wherein they had hitherto taken no concern; that
he intended to reprefent to the States of Holland,
that their being put into a ſtate of fecurity on the
fide of the Spaniſh Netherlands would avail no-
thing, when they were always expoſed to be har-
raffed on the fide of Germany; that whilft the
King continued fo powerful on the Rhine, it could
not but be greatly detrimental to their intereft; and
that he could undertake whatever he pleaſed, fo
long as he remained mafter of Strafburg; that he
therefore entreated them to think on the remedy
for this evil, to get that place reftored to the em-
pire.
G 3
They
126
NEGOTIATIONS of
}
They hardly believed at court, there could be
any foundation for this intelligence: But it proved
fo true, that Penfionary Fagel five days after pro-
pofed the affair to the States of Holland. He was
not content with fimply propofing that they ſhould
confider of having this place reftored to the em-
pire; for he likewife propofed the expedients, that
they fhould make a treaty with the Emperor, and
the other allied Princes, to engage themſelves to
force his Majefty to a reflitution of all fuch places
as he held in his poffeffion, without any claim
thereto in virtue of the treaties of Weftphalia and
Nimeguen. This propofal met with a bad recep-
tion, and the deputies of Dort, Amfterdam, and
fome other towns, begged Penfionary Fagel to
diffuade the Prince of Orange from fuch a fcheme.
They told him, Strafburg was at too great a di-
ftance for them to intereft themſelves fo warmly;
and that they ought to account it fufficient, if
tranquillity was eſtabliſhed in their neighbour-
hood.
Penfionary Fagel did not however defift: He
ſpoke of it again, and ufed all poffible methods
with his friends to induce them to enter into the
defign of getting Straſburg reſtored: But the depu-
ties of the towns having remained firm in their
refolution, he for a while dropped his ſcheme.
I informed his Majesty April 23, that Penfiona-
ry Fagel was endeavouring underhand to obtain.
the equipment of twenty four fhips of war; and
in order to induce the States thereto, he propoſed
that part ſhould be fent to the Mediterranean to
convoy the merchant fhips, part to the Baltick,
and the remainder to other places for the protecti-
on of commerce; but that his real defign was,
as I knew from good authority, to fend them all
to the King of Sweden, to fupport his ſhips, in
cafe
COUNT D'AVAUX.
127
cafe that Denmark fhould pretend to hinder the
Swedish troops from paffing into Pomerania.
As I apprehended it to be of great importance
to inform the King of the intention of the States
in regard to the prefent ftate of affairs; that is,
concerning his Majefty's pretenfions in the Low
Countries, a general peace, and the treaties of
alliance; I therefore made it my buſineſs to pro-
cure the fecret inftructions which the States had
given to their minifters in England, upon theſe
three points.
I informed our court, that the Swediſh envoy
had concerted articles for a new treaty with Pen-
fionary Fagel, in confequence of that of the alli-
ance, agreeable to what I had wrote formerly of
their intention.
Penfionary Fagel ftill reprefented, at ſeveral
times, the neceffity of equiping a fleet: But not-
withſtanding the city of Amfterdam was greatly
intereſted in having fhips at fea for the pro-
tection of their commerce, yet they oppo-
fed this motion, fo much were they apprehen-
five of giving any occafion for declaring war;
and notwithſtanding he affured them that the King
of Denmark was about to fend to fea eight ſhips
of war, which were to be joined by five from
Brandenburg, yet they would not conſent to make
any naval preparations. Nevertheleſs Penfionary
Fagel told the Daniſh envoy, they would not fuf-
fer the King of Denmark to make himſelf mafter
of the Baltick; and that if the King of France
ſhould ſend ſhips to his fuccour, the States Ge-
neral would diſpatch a fleet to affift the King of
Sweden.
I acquainted his Majefty, that the Prince of
Orange's party being under no apprehenfion that
any thing would be undertaken directly againft
the States General, they feemed to be under no
uncafinefs
G 4
128 NEGOTIATIONS of
and
uneafinefs at what France could do; on the contra-
ry, they faid with a haughty air, that a foreign
war could be to them but little burthenfome; that
indeed they wanted money, but not one Prince
demanded fubfidies of them; and fuch was the
difpofition of the Princes throughout all Europe,
that if the war was once kindled upon whatever
cauſe, all would unite againſt France. So that the
States had nothing to fear; on the contrary, they
might hope to ſee the war concluded by a peace much
more for their advantage, than any agreement
which his Majefty would at prefent make with the
Spaniards.
Penfionary Fagel made another effort for the
reftitution of Strafburg; but the deputies not only
refuſed to conſent thereto, but would not fo much
as lay the affair before their towns, fo that the
Penfionary was at laft obliged to drop this mat-
ter.
The Prince of Orange at this time too gave
up his defign of making the States General enter
into arbitration: But he wrote to the King of
Spain, and entreated him in the name of the
States General, not to accept of the King of
England as arbitrator, unleſs the King of France
ſhould firſt agree to put an end to the differences
he had with Spain and the empire, by a general
pacification.
The King of England about this time fent over
to Holland, a perfon in the intereft of the Prince
of Orange, to invite him to England, to bring
about a reconciliation betwixt him and the Duke
of York, and to declare publickly they were in
perfect amity. The Prince of Orange, who would
have been highly pleaſed to go. to England upon
any other occafion, was fo defirous to fhew his
averfion to the Duke of York, that he refuſed
to
COUNT D'AVAUX.
129
to make this voyage. This confirmed what I took
notice of above, that a perſon whom the Prince
made a confident in regard to the affairs of Eng-
land told me, that this prince was perfuaded he fhould
never have the affection of the people of England,
till they ſhould fee he was entirely detached from
the Duke of York.
I diſcovered that Penfionary Fagel had a copy
of the treaty and fecret articles betwixt his Maje-
fty and the King of Denmark.
The Emperor's refident gave notice, May 14,
to the foreign minifters at the Hague, that the
treaty betwixt his mafter and the Duke of Bavaria
was figned.
Penfionary Fagel for the fourth time preffed the
States of Holland to fit out a fleet, and again.
met with a refuſal,
Mean while the States General began to be
alarmed at a piece of intelligence received from
their envoy at Denmark on the 4th of June 1682,
that his Daniſh Majefty had ordered a fleet to be
equiped to cruize on their coafts. The Prince of
Orange being willing to take advantage thereof,
got Penfionary Fagel for the fixth time to propoſe
fitting out a fleet. The magiftrates of Amfter-
dam ſtill oppoſed it: But as there came freſh ad-
vices from their envoy at Hamburg, affuring them
the Elector of Brandenburg would join his fhips
to thoſe of the King of Denmark, I wrote our
court, that I began to be apprehenfive the States.
General might at laſt think themſelves obliged to
equip a fleet.
The Prince of Orange and Penfionary Fagel
ſpoke in particular to all their friends in the go-
vernment of the towns of Holland, to obtain their
confent to a new levy of troops; but all of them
replied, they durft not agree to fuch a propofal.
G 5
I will
130
NEGOTIATIONS of
I will not fay much upon the defign the Prince
of Naffau had, of marrying Mademoiſelle the
King's niece ; for tho' he came to Paris on pur-
poſe to vifit her, yet as it was not thought proper
to grant what was neceffary for this marriage, it
took no effect.
The Prince of Naffau was likewife on the point
of eſpouſing the Princeſs of Zell.
The Prince of Orange was in the utmoſt de-
fpair; but this affair proved alfo unfuccefsful, for
want of being properly fupported.
The Prince of Orange finding he could not pro-
cure a new levy, endeavoured at leaſt to have the
recruits kept up which he had obtained partly by
artifice and partly by force, till the beginning of
the year, tho' they were to have been maintained
only for fix months.
9
He attempted likewife to ftir up the States in
regard to his private concerns, complaining loudly
of his ill treatment from France, where they had
fet up to fale his lands in Burgundy. However he
received but little fatisfaction; they allowed his
complaints to be juft, but did not fo much as
offer to affift him by their good offices, at which
he was greatly chagrined. For tho' the treaty
was concluded betwixt the Emperor and the Duke
of Hanover, and there remained only one difficulty
that the Duke wanted a furety of his enjoying the
territories affigned him by the Emperor, and tho' they
were willing to give him the fum for which he
took them in payment, and tho' the Prince of
Orange hoped the college of Princes would foon
refolve for war, yet fuch he found the difpofition
of the States General to be, that he wrote to the
Marquis of Grana, July 27, that if a rupture
commenced on the fide of Spain, the Dutch would
take no concern therein, and it would be in vain
6
to
COUNT D'A VAUX.
131
to expect that the danger of the Low-Countries
would force the States General to enter into a
war; that he had fufficiently founded the lead-
ing men in the State upon this matter, and had
found, that though he exerted all his credit and
influence, he would not be able at fuch a juncture
to prevail on the States General to furnish the eight
thouſand troops.
On the other fide, the embaffador of the States.
General at Madrid, having acquainted them, that
the Emperor had wrote to the King of Spain, en-
treating him to grant the half of 450000 livres,
which the Swedes ftood in need of, to tranſport
15000 men into Germany; and at the fame time
defiring him to uſe his intereft with the States Ge-
neral, that they might furnifh the other half: Pen-
fonary Fagel brought this affair immediately on the
carpet, and it was refolved to inform the embaſſa-
dor, that the States General could not promiſe fub-
fidies to any Prince, and that they neither intended,
nor indeed had it in their power to do fo.
This readineſs to make a reply to Mr. Hemſkirk,
did not, as it then appeared to me, fo much point
out the chagrin of Penfionary Fagel, and his fmall
hopes of kindling the war, as it ferved to fhew, that
he was unwilling the States General ſhould believe
he had taken any meaſures with Sweden, which en-
gaged them to take any ftep that would involve them
in expence. For this reafon he took care this letter
fhould appear no where in the provinces, without
the anſwer at the fame time.
The King having ordered his troops to march to
Orange, and to remain there till the walls which
the Prince of Orange had rebuilt, ſhould be demo-
lifhed; Penfionary Fagel came to me, and told me,
that the inhabitants of Orange had only built a flen-
der wall without fortifications; nevertheleſs, M. le
Mar-
G 6
132
NEGOTIATIONS of
Marquis de Montanegre had been there to have it
demoliſhed, and threatned to fend his troops againſt
them; that the Prince of Orange would be highly
pleaſed to have this affair accommodated, and eſpe-
cially without making any public noife. I had al-
ready endeavoured to take meaſures with the Prince
of Orange to prevent thefe orders; for as I knew
him, I forefaw his temper and diſpoſition upon ſuch
an occafion, that this affair would render him irre-
concilable; and though the time he employed in
confulting the King of England prevented him from
doing what I advifed, yet he always expreffed his
fatisfaction of the advice I gave him at this juncture;
and notwithſtanding he might have caufe to be un-
eafy in regard to fome conferences afterwards, yet
he always affured me he would retain the remem-
brance of my intended favour. I undertook to in-
form the King of what Penfionary Fagel had told
me, but it availed nothing; the King refufed to
fufpend the execution of his orders given to march
the troops to the town of Orange, and commanded
them to remain there, till not only the walls which
had been lately built, but alfo thofe which had been
of the moſt ancient ftanding, fhould be entirely
Jazed.
This obliged the Prince of Orange to engage the
States General to demand an audience of me. They
told me they had wrote upon this fubject to their
embaffador from the concern they took in what
regarded the Prince of Orange; and they entreated
me to join my good offices thereto. I explained
this affair in a manner agreeable to the inftructions
I had the honour of receiving from my royal maf-
ter; and I fignified to them, that they could do no-
thing more for the fervice of the Prince of Orange,
than to uſe their endeavours that the walls of Orange
fhould be immediately demoliſhed.
The
COUNT D'AVAUX,
133
The Spaniſh envoy thought this was now a fa-
vourable juncture to declare, that the marquis of
Grana had orders from the King of Spain to make
reprifals: but he was deceived, for the States Ge-
neral complained loudly of this proceeding, and de-
livered their fentiments to him with great freedom.
As for Penfionary Fagel, who had made the
loudeſt complaints to the States General, in regard
to the affair of Orange, he did not ftop here, but
fummoned an affembly of the States of Holland up-
on this affair, that the deputies might have the in-
ftructions of their towns, when they appeared in
the States General. They were accordingly af-
fembled for this purpoſe, and Penfionary Fagel fpoke
there with ſuch a vehemence as can hardly be ex-
preffed; and faid, that it would be to declare him-
felf a perfonal enemy of the Prince of Orange, not
to fupport his intereſt upon ſuch an occafion. Moſt
of the deputies allowed it to be an affair of the ut-
moft confequence, and what muft give great unea-
finefs to the Prince of Orange. They faid they
would ferve him as much as lay in their power;
but in order to do this effectually, it was neceflary
to ſee what the King of England would do in con-
fequence of the letter wrote to him by the States.
The Prince of Orange on his part gave way to
the utmoſt tranſports of paffion; he declared pub-
licly, that he had hitherto kept terms with me, and
that we had maintained a fort of intercourſe by the
vifits I made at the Princefs of Orange's, where he
entertained me; but that this correſpondence fhould
be henceforth broke off, and that he would diſown
for his friends all fuch as fhould frequent my houſe.
This declaration of the Prince of Orange obliged
me to aſk his Majefty, whether he thought it pro-
I ſhould continue my viſits at the Princeſs of
Orange's; for I was apprehenſive I might not meet
per
with
$34
NEGOTIATIONS of
with ſuch treatment there as was agreeable to the
dignity of an embaſſador.
The Spaniards failed not to embrace this oppor-
tunity of paying their court to the Prince of Orange,
by pursuing a quite different conduct. They de
clared they were ready to fatisfy him as to what
they stood indebted to him fince the peace of
Munſter; and at Bruffels they began to fettle his
claims, which were not inconfiderable, fince they
amounted to fix or feven millions of florins. The
Prince of Orange did not fend a gentleman to con-
gratulate the Duke of York on the birth of his
daughter, but only fent a letter.
As he had no other expedient to prevent affairs.
being brought to an accommodation, than by get-
ting that concerning the Empire, as well as Spain,
to be treated upon at the fame time and place, hop-
ing by this means neither would be concluded; he
therefore procured the States General to write to
the King of England; and he obliged the Engliſh
envoy at the Hague, to go to his maſter, and en-
deavour to prevail on him to get theſe two affairs
taken into confideration at the ſame time.
1
Mean while they loft no opportunity of bringing
as many Princes as poffible into the alliance. The
Circles of Franconia and the Upper Rhine entered
into it, and fent his Majefty the treaty they had
concluded with the Emperor.
The King ordered to be declared to his Britannic
Majefty, that he would till November abide by the
terms on which he propoſed to fettle the differences
betwixt him and the King of Spain, with the King
of England as mediator; but if they were not ac-
cepted by that time, he did not then pretend to ad-
here to them, but would take fuch meafures as he
thought most advifable.
The
COUNT D'AVAUX.
135
The King of England having given a favourable
anſwer, though in general terms, in regard to
razing the walls of Orange, the Prince of Orange
took an opportunity of ſpeaking again to the States
of Holland. He harangued them in a ftudied fpeech,
wherein he thanked them for the good offices they
intended for his fervice; he told them it was evi-
dent his Chriſtian Majefty was offended at him, and
that he had drawn upon himſelf the refentment of
this monarch, for no other reaſon but becauſe he
had always ferved the States faithfully; that he
might have played the politician as well as another,
and found his intereft therein; but this he had not
done hitherto, nor ever would, but would rather fuffer
ftill in their fervice. His dependents hereupon
called out, that they would ſpend their blood in his
fervice; and fome others made the fame declarati-
on, upon which it was thought neceffary to fend
deputies to confult the towns.
The anfwer with which they returned did not
pleaſe the Prince of Orange, ſo that he was obliged
to harangue the States anew. He repreſented to
them the care and anxiety he had undergone for
their welfare; he enlarged upon his toils and fa-
tigue in their ſervice; and he intreated they would
now fhew a grateful fenfe thereof, and grant him
affiftance. He durft not however aſk the States to
make reprifals; but he faid enough to induce
them thereto, if they had been the leaſt difpofed that
way. But all the intreaties he was obliged to make,
much against his humour, produced no effect as to
making reprifals. They appeared not to underſtand
him upon that head. The magiftrates of Amfter-
dam told fome of their friends, they would not re-
fuſe their good offices to the Prince of Orange; but
as for doing any thing which might involve them in
trouble, they never would confent thereto; they fig-
nified
136
NEGOTIATIONS of
nified alfo to the States, that it would be fufficient
to charge their embaffador with their remonftrances,
being unwilling any deputation fhould be named
for that purpoſe. However, they at length with
great difficulty confented to this laft article, and not
till the Prince of Orange had ftrongly importuned
them; but they continued obftinately to refuſe
chooſing a perſon from their city to go to France
in his behalf, notwithſtanding all the preffing foli-
citations of the Prince of Orange, who wanted to
draw them infenfibly into his quarrel.
As for his part, he continued to ſpeak with great
bitterneſs ab ut what was done at Orange: he ſaid
once at table, that he was extremely pleafed with
my conduct upon this occafion, and that he fhould
be glad to feparate the idea of M. d'Avaux from
that of the French embaffador; but this was impof-
fible. He declared ftill, however, that thofe who
were defirous to be accounted his friends, fhould
not refort to my houſe. Several hafty expreffions
cfcaped him, contrary to his ufual cuftom; amongſt
others, that France fhould fee what it was to have
treated a Prince of Orange in fuch a manner.
J
I received intelligence, October 8, 1682, that
the Electors of Saxony and Bavaria had entered into.
the treaty of alliance; and that the Emperor's re-
fident at the Hague had received full power from
the Circles of Franconia and the Upper Rhine for
the fame purpoſe, and that the Prince of Orange,
in purſuance of his ancient project, intended to form
an alliance with the houfe of Lunenburg, not
doubting but the Duke of Hanover would draw the
Duke of Zell into the fame meaſures.
He reſumed alſo the defign he had formed on the
fifth of June, to make a new levy; and he made
particular applications to the deputies of the towns,
to perfuade their conftituents to agree that they
fhould
COUNT D'AVAU X.
137
ſhould come to a refolution in the affembly of No-
vember for raiſing 16000 men. I informed our
court, October 22, that notwithſtanding the fi-
nances of the States General were very low, he
would nevertheleſs prefs them to fuch a refolution;
for the ruin of particular provinces would augment
his power, and thoſe who faw their deftruction by
this means inevitable, were not in a condition to
prevent it; that even thoſe who were well-difpofed,
that is, neither particularly attached to the Prince
of Orange, nor declaredly againſt him, whom I had
always pointed out to his Majefty as men of honeft
ſentiments without ability, that theſe had hitherto
followed the Prince of Orange's meaſures with re-
luctance, believing them deftructive to the repub-
lic; but that moſt of them began now to think that
the conduct this Prince obliged them to purſue, was
the only way whereby they could obtain advanta-
geous terms for the Spaniards. They imputed to
this what his Majefty had already done for the tran-
quillity of Christendom; and they flattered them-
felves, if they continued to fhew refolution, the
Spaniards and all their party would receive great
advantage; on the contrary, if they relaxed never
fo little, war would be immediately commenced;
thus the very perfons who were lately contented
with the blockade of Luxemburg being raiſed, ap-
peared now not to be fatisfied with an accommoda-
tion only with Spain; for nothing lefs would now
content them, than fettling the whole affairs of
Europe at the fame time.
I informed our court alfo, of its being given out
at Amsterdam, that the declarations made by M. de
Barillon to the King of England, would have no
effect, and that the States General remaining firm
with the Emperor, together with Spain and her al-
lies, his Majefty would confent to a general pacifi-
cation;
138 NEGOTIATIONS of
cation; that this prepoffeffion, from whatever quar-
ter it proceeded, rendered thefe perfons firm in their
refolution, from which they apprehended nothing
of bad conſequence; but on the contrary, expected
very good effects.
I fent notice, October 30, that my lord Shaftf-
bury was arrived in Amfterdam, where he concealed
himſelf. I gave information alfo, December 31,
that Oates was come there after him, together with
William Waller, one of the most noted amongſt
the Engliſh rebels.
Penfionary Fagel at this time ufed his utmoſt en-
deavours to fettle matters betwixt the Prince of
Orange, and Prince Naffau.
The Penfionary held feveral private affemblies,
whither he brought only the deputies of two or three
towns, to perfuade them to the raiſing of 16000
men, and Dikfeld went for this purpoſe to Amfter-
dam. He eafily convinced M. Heude, the princi-
pal burgomafter, of the neceffity thereof, for Heude
was perfuaded the States General would have been
already involved in a war, had they acted with lefs
vigour, and that nothing but a fteady purſuit of the
fame conduct could fecure them for the future.
But notwithſtanding the influence of M. Heude,
in the council of Amfterdam, I was informed by a
member, that they had determined to refuſe the
Prince of Orange's requeſt for raiſing 16000 men;
and on the contrary, had refolved to prefs the Spa-
niards to accept of the mediation of the King of
England.
Ŏn the 12th of November I wrote his Majeſty,
that it might be eafily feen from this refolution of
Amfterdam, that when that city perceived fhe was
likely in good earneſt of being engaged in a war,
ſhe then laid afide all complaifance to the Prince of
Orange; and if this Prince fhould prevail on that
city
COUNT D'AVAUX.
139
city to alter her fentiments, as he had done the pre-
ceding year, in regard to ſending the 8000 men, it
muft be by that argument, which the Prince, as I
had always told his Majefty, uſed; viz. that the
States General had no other means but that of arm-
ing themſelves, to hinder his Majefty from under-
taking any thing againſt Spain.
We may be ftill more enabled to judge of their
fentiments, by the joy they expreffed at a report
which prevailed, that his Majefty intended to ſeize
upon certain forts in the Milanefe, till Spain fhould
give him fatisfaction: this made it apparent they
took no concern about Spain, when their own in-
tereft was not affected; and it likewife pointed out
the effectual method to bring Spain to a proper com-
pliance, by making an attack in Catalonia.
It was carried by a majority of voices, that a
perſon ſhould be diſpatched to France upon the af-
fairs of Orange. All the leading men in Amfter-
dam, and ſeveral other perfons of diſtinction, re-
fuſed this commiffion.
Penfionary Fagel believing he had taken effectual
meaſures for raifing the 16000 men, propofed it in
the affembly of Holland, but the propofal was una-
nimouſly rejected; and the deputies of the towns
alledging their inability as one of the principal rea-
fons, the Prince of Orange offered to give up the
revenue of all his places and appointments, to help
to defray the expence, in raifing fuch a number of
troops.
But finding he could not gain this point, he al-
tered his ſcheme, and in order to fave the expence
of appointing new officers in the army, and take off
fomewhat of his Majefty's refentment, he got Fa-
gel to propofe that there ſhould be only 160co re-
cruits rated: but the fame reafons which weighed
with
140
NEGOTIATIONS of
with the citizens of Amfterdam against the levy, de-
termined them alfo againſt this reinforcement.
The deputies of Amfterdam made a propoſal,
which they communicated to me in confidence,
that only the differences which fubfifted betwixt
his Majeſty and Spain, without confidering thoſe of
the Empire, fhould be referred to the King of Eng-
land's arbitration. The Prince of Orange and Pen-
fionary Fagel faid, that the gentlemen of Amfter-
dam could have no other motive in advancing fuch
a propofal, than the defire of preferving peace; but
that the true means to maintain tranquillity was,
by following the fame maxims they had hitherto
purfued, as appeared evident from what had already
paffed. They affirmed that the King of England
was under a neceffity, for his own intereft, to pre-
vent his Majefty from entring into a war; and they
alfo averred, that his Britannic Majefty had there-
fore determined to defire the King, to defer for fome
time all hoftilities; and thus, without doing any
thing againſt their allies, but on the contrary,
fhewing a strong defire to execute their treaties,
they ſhould procure a refpite, and be in a condition
to promote the public tranquillity, agreeable to the
inclinations of the gentlemen of Amfterdam. It
happened unluckily before three days paffed, the
Prince of Orange and Penfionary Fagel were jufti-
fied in their affertion; for the King ſent me notice
the 26th of November 1682, that he agreed to a
ceffation of hoftilities till the firft of January, to fee
if conditions of peace cou'd be agreed upon. This
circumftance wonderfully increafed the Prince of
Orange's authority, and contributed n t a little to
fink the intereft of the well affected republicans.
This alfo gave confiderable weight to the argu-
ments which the Prince of Orange and Penfionary
Fagel uſed to the principal perfons in the State,
whom
COUNT D'AVAU X.
141
whom they endeavoured to convince that the inte
reft of the King of England would never permit
him to allow the King to wage war in the Spaniſh
Netherlands; and if his Britannic Majefty fhould
even at firſt acquiefce, he would at length be obliged,
whether he would or not, to embark in a war to
defend the Low Countries.
Van Buning began now to write in a ſtyle quite
different from what he had ufually done; which
not a little diſpleaſed the Prince of Orange, and
made it apparent to thofe who were endowed with the
leaft degree of penetration, that if they would affume
the fame ſpirit as he, they might foon recover their
antient liberty. It is certain, this minifter had
imagined all Europe would unite in war againſt his
Majefty, and for this purpoſe he had contributed to
promote the Prince of Orange's defigns; but find-
ing this fcheme ineffectual, he appeared now to be
in good earneſt for peace, and wrote to Holland in
the ſtrongeſt terms upon this fubject.
For four months paft they had made an inceſſant
clamour in Holland about what paffed in France in
regard to the Huguenots; there came every day freſh
letters, and fresh complaints. Thefe letters, which
were frequently filled with falfhoods, were ſtill more
exaggerated by the Prince of Orange and his party.
Penfionary Fagel at length refolved on the third of
December 1682, to propofe to the States of Holland
a general collection for the French Proteftants who
ſhould take refuge in Holland. This was immedi-
ately agreed to, and carried into execution. They
at the fame time wrote to thoſe who remained in
France, telling them, they would reſerve ſome part
of thoſe collections for thoſe who ſhould afterwards
fly into Holland. I informed his Majefty, that I
knew not how, nor from what part of the Kingdom
they were to come; but that I knew great numbers
were
142
NEGOTIATIONS of
were expected, who were to take advantage of the
ice: and that minifter Claude's fon who had been
upon a tour in France, was now returned to ſettle
in Holland.
The King ordered me to be acquainted, he was
defirous the King of England fhould fend the Earl
of Sunderland into Holland; and as he was affured
of that Nobleman's friendly intentions, he thought
it expedient that I fhould preferve a fecret under-
ftanding with him in all affairs, as a teftimony of
his Majesty's confidence in his friendſhip. He ac-
quainted me at the fame time, that he confented to
grant the requeft of the King of England, viz. to
adhere to the propofal he had offered of referring the
differences fubfifting with Spain to his mediation,
till the 15th of January.
His Majefty alſo informed me, that he permitted
me to viſit now and then at the Princeſs of Orange's,
if I thought it conducive to promote my correfpon-
dence or intereft where Irefided. But as this was left to
my own discretion, and as I knew the declarations
the Prince of Orange had made in regard to deſtroy-
ing the walls of Orange; I thought proper therefore
to make him acquainted with what I had been in-
formed, as an affair to which I at firſt gave no cre-
dit; but that I had fince entertained fome doubt,
as theſe declarations which had become fo public,
had not been difclaimed by him, as he had done
formerly when fome things of the fame nature had
been imputed to him. The Prince of Orange re-
plied, that he had before difavowed fuch a kind of
language which had been fathered upon him ; but that
things were not now in the fame fituation; that he
had not faid precifely all that was imputed to him,
but yet he would difavow nothing, and the public
might believe whatever they pleaſed; that he would
be glad to ſerve me as a private perſon when an op-
portunity offered, but would fhew me no civility
as
COUNT D'AVAUX.
143
as an embaffador of France, for if he fhould, it
would even render him ridiculous to the French
Court. The King having heard this anfwer, com-
manded me to leave off my viſits to the Princefs of
Orange.
Penfionary Fagel laid before the States General
the refolution he had drawn the Province of Holland
into, to repreſent to the King of England the
ſtrongeſt reaſons why the affairs of Spain ſhould not
be adjuſted ſeparately from thoſe of the Empire. I
will not repeat all the arguments advanced, but the
principal were, that the allies would at firft enter-
tain a diffidence of each other; that the King
would not fail to turn his arms againſt thoſe who
fhould be the laft in coming to an accommodation,
and thefe could not be fuccoured by the others; fo
that the treaty which had been made for their com-
mon defence would thus become ineffectual.
;
The Prince of Orange ſtill perfifted in declaring,
that the States would hazard nothing by remaining
in their former fentiments; that the King would not
upon that account attack the Spaniſh Netherlands
that his Britannic Majefty was even more afraid of
this than the States General, and if his Majefty at-
tacked the Low Countries, the King of England
could not avoid calling his Parliament, and entering
upon a war with France; and that the States would
foon perceive the King would relax, if they con-
tinued firm in their refolutions. And what proved
unlucky was, that the delays granted from time to
time, at the requeſt of the King of England, feem-
ed to prove the truth of what the Prince of Orange
advanced to the States General.
It is certain, theſe delays greatly affifted the Prince
of Orange to perfuade feveral perfons in Amfterdam,
particularly Mr. Heude, the moft powerful of the
burgomafters, that the meaſures they purſued would
procure more advantageous terms to the Emperor as
well
1
144
NEGOTIATIONS of
well as Spain; and even if that fhould not happen,
and things be brought to an extremity, they would
always have it in their power to enter into a war or
not as they thought proper. Moreover, though
they plainly perceived the Prince of Orange was not
fo fincerely difpofed for a peace as he would have
them believe, nay, cn the contrary, wifhed for
nothing ſo much as to fee a war kindled in Europe,
yet they believed he would not be able to engage
them in fuch an affair; and they imagined fuch a
complaiſance to him muft tend to the advantage of
their allies, without being prejudicial to themſelves.
Penfionary Fagel, who took care to have all kind
of expedients practifed as mnch as poffible to alienate
the people of Holland from France, was not content-
ed with having made public collections for the French
Huguenots; he likewife ordered all the clergy in
Holland from their pulpits to fet forth in the ſtrong-
eft manner how thofe of the reformed religion were
perfecuted in France; he injoined them alfo to re-
mind the States of the danger they ran in 1672 of
falling into the fame diſtreſs in which the proteftants
of France were now involved; that Providence had
delivered them, and they ought to exert their ut-
moſt efforts to put themſelves in ſuch a condition,
that the like calamity might not happen to them a
fecond time; for their enemies chiefly aimed at the
deftruction of their religion. One of the Dutch
preachers told this in confidence to a friend of
mine.
The deputies of Amfterdam having fhewn no
degree of courage to fupport their opinion concern-
ing the arbitration, and having contented themfelves
with only delivering their fentiments, and then
leaving the Prince of Orange and Penfionary Fagel
to do whatever they pleaſed; I wrote his Majefty,
December 31, that I had ſeveral times taken the li-
8
beity
COUNT D'AVAUX.
145
berty to tell him, that I believed, if they ever in-
tended to ſpeak with ſpirit in the affembly of Hol-
land, it would not be till the laſt extremity, when
they ſhould find themſelves on the point of being in-
volved in a war; that what had lately happened
confirmed this opinion, which I not only gave, but
all the moft wife and fenfible perfons in the Repub-
lic, who had always affirmed, that nothing was to
be expected from Amſterdam, nor the magiftrates of
any of the towns, till they fhould be filled with a
greater apprehenfion than what they yet entertained
for the Prince of Orange; fince, if they were not
forced by fomewhat of this nature, to affume
courage, they would never be able to oppofe the
Prince of Orange and Penfionary Fagel.
The Prince of Orange endeavoured to prevail
upon the Emperor to come to an accommodation
with Tekely, and the States General wrote to Teke-
ly, preffing him to make up matters with the Em-
peror.
The refidents from the States General at Copen-
hagen and Hamburgh, having wrote fo often in
the ftrongeſt terms, that the King of Denmark was
fitting out a confiderable fleet, and the affairs of
Holftein being in fuch a fituation as fhewed that
Denmark had a defign of attempting ſomewhat; the
States General at length came to a refolution on the
5th of January 1683, immediately to fit out a fleet
of twenty-four fail.
They were at this time worked up to fuch a fury
in Holland by the falfe reports which the French
Huguenots fpread of the hard treatment they re-
ceived in France, that I was informed they held a
privy council to banish the Roman catholicks from
the Province of Holland, and all priefts in general,
not natives of that Province. Penfionary Fagel,
however, would not confent to this meafure; he
VOL. I.
contented
H
146
NEGOTIATIONS of
contented himſelf with taking advantage of the
accounts from France, to do all in his power a-
gainſt his Majefty's intereft; but he always oppo-
fed any proceedings againſt the catholics in Holland,
either becauſe the intereft of the Prince of Orange,
who had no defire to exafperate the Engliſh catho-
lics, fo required it, or becauſe he was apprehenſive
of an infurrection in Holland, where the catholics
are very numerous, and had equally contributed with
the proteftants to the eſtabliſhment of the Repub-
lic, having at firſt had the principal places of truft,
eſpecially in Amfterdam.
Penfionary Fagel defired the Emperor's refident
to acquaint his maſter, that a motion was about to
be made in Holland for raifing 16,000 recruits; and
that this was expected to be carried, fince the
council of the principal towns feemed diſpoſed to it.
I had fent notice the foregoing December, that
the Prince of Orange's party were in great hopes of
bringing the Elector of Brandenburg into their in-
tereft. I alſo gave our court to underfland, the be-
ginning of January 1683, that the Prince of O-
range now flattered himſelf more than ever, that
this Elector would foon alter his fentiments; that
M. Damerongue had difpatched a courier to Penfi-
onary Fagel, and immediately upon his return, had
himfelf fet out from Berlin for the Hague; and that
Dickfeld had fhewn one of his intimate friends a
letter from M. Damerongue, which gave great
hopes of the Elector of Brandenburg.
The Swediſh envoy about this time ufed his ut-
moft endeavours, that the States General fhould
intereft themſelves in the affairs of Holftein; he
exerted himſelf in this with the more earneſtneſs, as
it was his intereſt they ſhould do ſomewhat in favour
of Sweden to ſoften the King his mafter, who was
highly diffatisfied with him, becauſe he had given
him
COUNT D'AVAUX.
147
him hopes the States General would affift him with
money and ſhips.
This minifter was no leſs earneft in preffing the
Duke of Hanover's envoy at the Hague to enter
into the treaty of alliance.
About this time Penfionary Fagel made a great
clamour in the States of Holland; for Van Buning
had wrote him, that M. Barillon had had a copy of
the anſwer from the States General to the King of
England (which I mentioned the 24th of December
1684) and that the King of England had been in-
formed thereof before Van Buning himself had com-
municated it to his Majefty. Fagel propofed, that
another fhould be adminiftered to all the members
in the States of Holland, that they had communi-
cated no fecret papers for the four preceding years.
Such a propoſal from an inferior to his maſters ap-
peared highly infolent.
He propoſed next, that
10,000 livres fhould be offered to the perfon who
ſhould diſcover from whom I had theſe papers; but
notwithſtanding all his vehemence, no fuch mea-
fures were taken.
Although I found myfelf obliged to act in every
thing againſt the Prince of Orange, I did not how-
ever fail from time to time to have his inclinations
founded. I got an intimate friend of Dickfeld to
ſpeak to him in confidence, concerning the meaſures
the Prince of Orange purſued againſt the King.
Dickfeld replied, that the Prince of Orange was not
yet without hopes of feeing either a general pacifi-
cation, or a general war; and even, if neither the
one nor the other fhould happen, he had only to
wait patiently, for application would be always
made to him when there was occafion; and though
he had done ten times more againſt France, all that
had paffed would be forgot when he was wanted, or
H 2
when
148
NEGOTIATIONS of
when he ſhould be willing to enter into his Majeſty's
intereft.
Notwithſtanding all the efforts of the Prince of
Orange, and the intrigues of Penfionary Fagel,
the military eſtabliſhment was ſettled for the year
1683 by the province of Holland, without any new
levy.
The King having commanded me to repreſent to
the principal perfons amongſt the well affected, that
the Prince of Orange was infenfibly rendering him-
ſelf abſolute maſter of the republic; I made anſwer
to his Majefty, that I omitted no opportunity of
fhewing them how this Prince oppreffed their liber-
ty; that fome of thoſe perfons who would have
had courage to act had they been ſupported, had
been to talk with me only a night before; but that I
had not hitherto mentioned this to his Majefty, be-
cauſe they had only repeated what they all along fo
often affirmed, that they were not in a condition to
do any thing themfelves; that there was too much
cowardice in their countrymen; and that they ſhould
find themſelves deceived as Van Buning continued
to be to this hour, fo long as they fhould believe the
city of Amfterdam would act for the liberty of the
republic; that, in order to animate them, an alarm
muſt be raiſed from abroad; that the Prince of
Orange exercifing a violent and unlawful power,
would foon be deferted, when the States fhould fee
that his Majesty offered (by the means he formerly
propoſed) to re-establish their government; that
this could not take up above two months, when
his Majefty's affairs would permit it, though
indeed what had pafied in France, in regard to the
proteftants, would perhaps render the matter more
difficult. That his Majefty by this means keeping
the States in dependence, would ever afterwards
exempt himſelf from many great expences, for he
might
COUNT D'A V AUX.
149
might use their fleets as his own, and thus with great
eaſe give law by fea, as he did already by land'; other-
wife it would always happen as they had formerly
told me, that notwithſtanding the general inclina-
tion of the Republic for peace, and notwithſtand-
ing it was fo much the intereft of the city of Am-
fterdam to be well with his Majefty, yet the Prince
of Orange would always remain fo much mafter
of the States as to make them break all meaſures
with his Majefty, and oblige them to declare war
againſt him, when it fuited his purpoſe.
The King of England at this time declared, if
the States would perfuade the Spaniards to accept of
arbitration, he would not act as arbitrator, but as
mediator, and would take the advice of the States.
General. The Prince of Orange, on the other
hand, preffed the Spaniards to refufe the mediation.
of the King of England, hoping that the King, tired
with their fhameful behaviour, would enter into
action; and that he fhould then find means to en-
gage the States General in a war.
I informed our court, I had difcovered that the
Prince of Orange and Penfionary Fagel, after
having forced the States of Holland to take a new
oath of fecrecy, had propofed certain treaties, where-
by it was to be ftipulated amongst the allies what
fupplics each fhould furnish, in cafe of a rupture. I
reprefented it might be eafily perceived from this
affair alone, how little was to be expected from the
city of Amfterdam, who allowed, under the pretext
of a treaty of alliance, which they at firft accounted
fo harmleſs, that the States General ſhould enter
into leagues, which might be attended with fuch
mifchievous confequences.
I fent intelligence by the next poft, that the De-
puties of Amfterdam and fome other cities had been
at firſt alarmed at this propoſal, but after a conteſt
H 3
of
150
NEGOTIATIONS of
of two days, they had acquiefced, and confented
that the States General ſhould fettle the number of
troops each power ſhould furnish; that I imagined
they would follow the plan the Prince of Orange
had concerted with the Auftrian and Swediſh mi-
nifters, viz. that the Emperor fhould furnifh fix
thousand men, Spain and the States General each
eight thouſand, Sweden fix thoufand, and the E-
lector of Saxony, with the Dukes of Zell and Han-
over, cight thouſand amongſt them.
The States of Holland had likewiſe agreed, that
the States General fhould enter into engagements
with Spain and Sweden to affift each other by fea,
on condition, if neceffary, that Spain and Sweden
fhould fuccour the States, and that they fhould
have the liberty to demand this fupply, either in
money or fhips. The number each was to furniſh
being twelve fhips each, and the Spaniards required
they might be allowed to furniſh their contingent
in money.
This refolution of the Province of Holland was
kept very ſecret, and even when I fent notice thereof,
it had not then been carried before the States Gene-
ral, for they thought by this means to keep it from
my knowledge. The treaty was concluded and
figned about a fortnight afterwards. I fent a copy
cf it, with the fecret articles, to the King, the 11th
of February 1683.
Although the Duke of Hanover declared all theſe
treaties were but empty trifles, and that others of
a different nature ought to be concluded, whereby
the States fhould furnish money, yet nevertheleſs
he failed not to enter into negotiation; but the
Province of Holland refuſed to make a treaty with
the Duke of Hanover alone, unleſs the whole houſe
of Lunenburg fhould engage therein.
Vag
L
COUNT D'AVAUX.
151
Van Buning, finding fome of his letters had dif-
pleafed the Prince of Orange, wrote him, that he
had always imagined they might have made a peace
without a general affembly; but fince, notwith-
ftanding the reafons he had advanced, the States
had been of a different opinion, he chearfully ac-
quiefced: but, nevertheleſs he petitioned for leave to
return home, which was granted. He wrote fome
more letters before his departure from England,
which contradicted all his former; and after having
altered his opinion two or three times, he at length
returned to the Prince of Orange's fentiments.
I fent notice, January 28, that the Prince of
Orange and the Marquis of Grana had fecretly a-
greed, if the King's troops fhould enter upon the
Spanish territories, that the Marquis fhould imme-
diately order the Spanish troops to march, and
though he had only two hundred men to head, he
fhould command them to attack, that there might
be a war opened, and the States General thereby
obliged to conimence hoftilities.
The Earl of Shaftsbury died of the gout of his
ftomach at Amſterdam on the 3d of February,
1683. Thus the protection which the citizens of
Amfterdam gave him, ferved only to fhew the little
regard they had for his Britannic Majefty.
As the States had refolved to fit out twenty-four
fhips, I was therefore defirous to know the ftate of
their navy; for this purpoſe I ſent to Zealand, and
I was informed they had but a very few fhips, and
theſe in exceeding bad order, and as for thoſe in
Holland, I knew they were in a forry condition.
However, that I might procure full information, I
took care to have perfons to write to all the five
admiralties.
M. Damerongue, envoy from the States Gene-
ral at Berlin, being arrived at the Hague, had fe-
H. 4
veral
152
NEGOTIATIONS of
veral conferences with the Prince of Orange and
Penfionary Fagel, but he communicated nothing to
the States General. I difcovered only, by means of
a Burgomaſter of Amſterdam, that he had been in
their city, and having dined with two or three of
their Burgomafters, who had the chief management
of affairs, amongſt whom was he who gave me this
intelligence, after a good deal of talk upon other
matters he had affured them, the Elector of Bran-
denburg would enter into every meaſure conducive
to the intereft of the Republic, if they would pro-
mife that Prince Lewis, the Elector of Branden-
burgh's fecond fon by his firft wife, fhould be fuc-
ceffor to the Prince of Orange in his honours and
preferments; but thefe gentlemen rejecting this
propofal with great indignation, the affair was puſh-
ed no farther. The Prince of Orange expected
fuch a repulfe would be given, and this was what
induced him to confent that Damerongue ſhould
take ſuch a ſtep, knowing he ſhould thereby make a
ſhew of friendſhip to the Elector of Brandenburg,
without any detriment to himſelf.
M. Damerongue, who had only made this over-
ture for form's fake, now purſued his real negoti-
ation; I received intelligence from, a perfon in
whom I could confide, that he affured the Prince of
Orange and the magiftrates of Amfterdam, that he
had the Elector of Brandenburg's promife that he
would make a treaty of neutrality with the States
General, and even enter into the treaty of alliance,
provided they would fatisfy him for the damage the
dutchy of Cleves had fuſtained from the King's army,
which the States were obliged to by treaty ;
alfo grant him the payment of the remainder of the
fubfidies which he pretended due to him till the day
wherein he had figned his particular peace: the
States, however, being willing to give it only to
the
COUNT D'AVAU X.
153
the day they had ratified theirs. The Prince of
Orange not a little exerted himſelf in this affair,
and the Province of Holland at laſt reſolved to fatisfy
the Elector in his demand, which amounted to
nine hundred thouſand crowns; but they confent-
ed upon condition he ſhould enter into the treaty of
alliance, or at leaſt make a treaty of neutrality.
They did not however determine whether they
fhould pay the whole or part, having only inftruct-
ed Damerongue to enter upon the compofition of
this affair. The negotiation was for a confiderable
time protracted, the Elector of Brandenburg and
the Prince of Orange rifing or falling in their de-
mands according as they had occafion for each other.
At length, in Auguſt 1683, they agreed upon four
hundred thouſand crowns for all the Elector's claims
upon the States General, who engaged to pay fifty
thouſand in one year, fifty more in two years after-
wards, and the remaining three hundred thouſand
in the ſpace of ten years, at three hundred thoufand
each year.
This treaty, however, was not figned in Auguſt,
nor was it wholly concluded till the year 1685; but
as there was no alterations made from that agreed
upon in 1683, I will not repeat all the advices I
fent the King from the end of 1682 to 1685, re-
lating to the ſecret correfpondence carried on betwixt
the Elector of Brandenburg and the Prince of
Orange, notwithſtanding all the declarations this
Elector continued to make, of being entirely in his-
Majeſty's intereft. The Elector of Brandenburg
did not abide by the treaty wherein the States had
made a compofition in regard to the ſubſidy and the
damage fuffered in Cleves. In 1685 he performed
the promiſe he had fo long before made to the Prince
of Orange, to make a more cloſe alliance with the
States General; for, under pretext of prolonging
H 5
for
154
NEGOTIATIONS of
for twelve years the treaty of 1678, which was to
expire in 1688, he formed new engagements with
them in 1685, as I fhall fhew hereafter.
The Prince of Orange having been unable to
obtain new levies or recruits, was at length obliged
to conſent, that the regulation of the army, which
had been fettled the preceding January for the year
1683, fhould take place; thus it remained on the
footing of the year 1682, which with-held the
twelve thouſand recruits which had been raiſed the
beginning of this year.
I wrote the King, that I could not believe but
the Prince of Orange was fenfible, that in the pre-
fent fituation of affairs he was not in a condition to
refiſt his Majeſty: that he was under no uneafineſs
about the Spaniards having loft four of their garri-
fons, or the allies being defeated, provided the war
was begun again. He imagined it could not con-
tinue long before the King of England would find
himſelf obliged by his own ſubjects to break with
his Majefty; and in expectation of this, he wanted
to hazard all for all: That he hoped the King of
England, even contrary to his own inclination,
would affift him to carry on the war to advantage,
or that this Prince would ruin himſelf; and this
would be a fhort and eafy way for him to afcend a
throne he had had always in view, ever fince he
married the prefumptive heir.
M. Heinfius, Penfionary of Delft, after having
a confiderable time refuſed to go to France about
demoliſhing the walls of Orange, was at length
obliged to accept of this employ: and when he came to
vifit me before his departure, I told him I was forry
a perfon of his honour and good difpofition ſhould
be charged with fuch a commiffion; for I made no
queftion but his journey would prove in vain; and
as he was Penfionary of Delft, which had oppofed
the
COUNT D'AVAUX.
155
the Prince of Orange with more firmneſs than any
other town, I fignified to him, that the King was
fenfible of his merit and good difpofition, and I en-
treated him not to be chagrined if he met with
1 ttle fatisfaction in his employ; and that he ſhould
wholly impute this to the nature of his commiffion,
for he himſelf muſt know he could not fucceed there-
in; and as he could feel no concern in the refuſal he
ought to expect, I entreated him not to regard the
uneafinefs the Prince would fhew upon this account.
He feemed to agree to what I faid, and promiſed
not to be uneafy at 'what ſhould happen, as he ex-
pected the affair could not fucceed. Nevertheleſs,
he returned from his employment as much an enemy
to France, and as much attached to the Prince of
Orange, as he had before his departure been againſt
this Prince, and attached to his Majefty; and thus
we loft a man who is at preſent Penfionary of the
States.
As for the Prince of Orange, when he was in-
formed at Diren, where he was taking the diver-
fion of hunting, of the King's anfwer to M. Hein-
fius, and when he found the King of England did
not fupport him in this affair, he could not com-
mand his paffion, and for two days was fo uneafy
in his mind, that nobody, not even the Princeſs of
Orange, durft approach him. At this juncture he
repeated ſeveral times, what he had faid before, that
the King of France fhould one day feel what it was
to have exafperated a Prince of Orange.
Van Buning about this time arrived from Eng-
land.
The States General refolved to fend to fea only
fixteen of the ſhips they had equipped, and to keep
the remainder to a more advanced feafon. I fent
an exact account of the ftate of their navy.
H 6
I told
15,6
NEGOTIATIONS of
辈
​I told the King, if we feriously confidered the
conduct of the citizens of Amfterdam, we ſhould
find, that ſo far from doing any fervice to the Re-
public by their fhewing fo often favourable inclina-
tions, that on the contrary they did a deal of mif-
chief; becauſe they propofed almoft all that could
be ſuggeſted for the public good, and then defifted;
fo that they took away from others all hopes of being
able to fucceed in propofals which had mifcarried in
the hands of the most powerful town of the States.
Thus it appeartd, that thoſe who were in the go-
vernment of Amfterdam only made fuch motions
to be conformable to their ancient maxims, and to
fatisfy the people whom they in ſome ſhape pleaſed,
by fhewing them it was not their fault, if the States
followed bad meaſures.
Several of the well. affected Republicans no
longer kept up a correfpondence with me as for-
merly, especial y thofe who had any poft, not that
they had altered their fentiments, but-becauſe they
could not foreſee any poffibility of affifting their
country, if they were not fupported from abroad;
and as they perceived the preſent ſtate of affairs in
Europe would not permit this, and had no hopes,
even in a more favourable fituation, of being affifted
in the manner neceffary, they thought it would
anfwer no manner of purpoſe any longer to endanger -
and expoſe themfelves to the refentment of the
Prince of Orange and his party.
I muſt moreover add, that thoſe of the well affec-
ted, to whom I ftill fometimes applied, faid to me
nothing elſe but what they had ſo often repeated;
that they were more than ever perfuaded, when
peace fhould be concluded betwixt the King and
the Emperor, his Majefty would eafily accompliſh
what they had formerly propofed; I thought it un-
neceffary to communicate this to my mafter, be-
cauſe
COUNT D'AVAUX,
157
cauſe there was nothing new in it: but I thought
myſelf obliged to acquaint him with what the deputy
of Friefland, and the Prefident from Munfter had late-
ly faid to me on the fame fubject. The former had
repeated for two years fucceffively, that if his Ma-
jeſty commenced hoftilities in the neighbourhood of
the States, he would thereby afford the Prince of
Orange an opportunity of doing whatever he pleafed
in Holland; that there was no other fafety for the
Republic, but that his Majefty fhould attempt no--
thing; that the States were not inclined to war,
and the Prince of Orange would never be able to
perfuade them thereto; that he ought to leave the citi-
zens of Amfterdam to themſelves, fince their own
intereft, that of the Provinces of Frizland and
Groningen, as well as all the Provinces in general,
would oblige them at length to put things again on
their natural footing. That the Prefident from
Munfter had often ſpoke to me much to the fame
purpoſe; that he was as much afraid of war as poffi-
ble, becauſe of his employment, and ftill more,
becauſe being married in. Holland, a war would
ruin him; but both one and the other having vifited
me ſeparately, had declared the contrary, and ac-
knowledged their error; affirming, that if his Ma-
jefty, when it fuited his convenience, came with a
powerful army, and declared to the States, that
having reafon to be diffatisfied with their govern-
ment, and being informed of the little liberty they
had in their votes, he only advanced his troops to
reftore the Provinces to their ancient. privileges;
that he demanded the States General fhould affem-
ble (for they had not affembled for forty years, be-
ing at this preſent time only the fimple deputies of the
Provinces) and that he infifted they fhould have the
power of deliberating, with a full and entire liberty,
upon whatever was judged for the intereſt of the
Republic:
158.
NEGOTIATIONS of
Republic: they both affured me, that confidering
the general difcontent which prevailed in regard to
the Prince of Orange, who governed in an arbitrary
manner, contrary to the fundamental laws of the Re-
public, the States would be highly pleafed to be de-
livered from fuch a flavery, and would readily com-
ply with his Majefty's wiſhes. I defired to know
why they had altered their fentiments, and what
foundation they had for what they advanced. The
Deputy of Friezland told me, he had found by ex-
perience, that all his Majefty had done to avoid
giving umbrage to the States General, had given the
Prince of Orange an opportunity of puſhing them
upon bad meaſures; that in all their fecret delibera-
tions, he had found that fear alone operated on their
fpirits; and as foon as this was diffipated, they had
boldly taken their refolutions for a twelve-month.
The refident of Munfter told me, he delivered his
opinion upon the ftrength of what he had heard
from ſeveral of the deputies of Holland, that is,
from thoſe in the prefent government. In effect,
this had been the fubject of converſation amongſt
fome of the leading men in the State; and it ap-
peared, that the violent means which the Prince.
and Penfionary Fagel had all along uſed to extort
from the States whatever they wanted, had opened
the eyes of feveral people, and made them difcover
a truth only known before to perſons of penetration.
I endeavoured thereby to make it apparent to his
Majefty, that this was a certain and evident truth,
fince perfons of a timorous difpofition, and with
whofe intereft it was inconfiftent to have fuch
fentiments, were yet fo fully perfuaded thereof.
I wrote the 29th of March, that I had difcovered.
the beginning of a very fecret negotiation, which
the Swediſh envoy was carrying on with Penfionary
Fagel; that he had at firft demanded of him fub-
fidies,
COUNT D'AVAUX.
159
fidies, and that he afterwards came down to a fum,
once paid, for the paffage of a number of Swediſh
troops into Germany; and that the Penfionary re-
fuſed it, not daring to make fuch a propofal to the
States.
I will not here infert all the different propofals
made betwixt the envoys of Sweden and Hanover,
the States General, and the Elector of Saxony, each
of them feeking their own particular intereft in this
common alliance; for this would be tedious, and
unneceffary for the connection of thefe memoirs.
On the 15th of April, the deputies of Amfterdam
made a motion to urge the Spaniards to accept of
the arbitration; the Prince of Orange was highly
inflamed againſt them, and vigorously exerted him-
felf with the States of Holland, that they fhould op-
poſe ſuch a propofal. He requeſted the deputies of
the towns to keep this negotiation fecret, eſpecially
from the French embaffador, for fear he fhould in-
form the King his mafter of the divifion amongſt
them. The Prince of Orange's party were indeed
greatly apprehenfive their allies fhould be difcou
raged, if they found the magiftracy of Amfterdam to
be of fuch fentiments: it muſt however be acknow-
ledged, that they ſupported their fentiments very
weakly, as had indeed been the caſe in all their re-
folutions.
It was this that obliged the magiſtrates of Delft,
when they reproached them with having abandoned
them on this occafion, to make anfwer, that they
never dared truſt to them, fince, after they had mu-
tually promiſed upon the blockade of Luxemburg,
that they would never confent to give 8000 men,
the city of Amfterdam had deferted that of Delft,
which had perfifted alone for three weeks to refuſe
giving any affiftance to the Spaniards. This reply
of the magiftrates of Delft, gives me occafion to
mention
160
NEGOTIATIONS of
mention in this place the reafon, which the reader
will certainly be defirous to know, why fuch a pow-
erful city as Amfterdam, and which confequently
ought to have drawn many others into her fenti-
ments, found herſelf frequently alone in her opinion,
and was almoſt always deferted by the others, even
in affairs where fhe contended for the intereft of the
Republic. It arofe from this, that ever fince the
death of Meffirs. Hooft and Valkenir, burgomafters
of Amfterdam, and zealous ftaunch republicans,
the government of this city was fallen into very
weak hands. Thus, though the intereft of the
people of Amſterdam continued the fame, they were
no longer ſupported with the fame vigour; fo that
the other towns having on fome occafions adhered
to the fentiments of Amfterdam, they had been de-
ferted, and left expofed to the refentment of the
Prince of Orange, who could eaſily revenge him-
felf, fince he chofe burgomafters of all the towns
in Holland, excepting Amfterdam.
I received information, about this time, that the
States General had fent fecret orders to the five ad-
miraltics to take an exact ſurvey of all the ſhips be-
longing to the republic; that the purport of all the
accounts received was, that there was not one fhip
in a condition to hold out above two months at ſea;
for they were all ſo decayed, that the ſhip-wrights
offered to build new ones at the fame expence they
would repair the old, and that they ſhould be over
and above furniſhed with all the iron neceffary.
The Prince of Orange and Penſionary Fagel had
defignedly neglected the marine of the States Ge-
neral, becauſe they thereby weakened the maritime
power of the Republic, and rendered it inferior to
that of England, which the Prince of Orange al-
ready accounted as his own: befides, it was his in-
tereſt to ſtrengthen himſelf by an army, and it was
not
COUNT D'AVAUX.
161
not an eaſy matter for him at once to raiſe two fuch
expences.
And as I thought it would be of fervice to his
Majeſty to be particularly informed of the ſtate of
the navy of the States General, I found means to
procure an exact lift of all the ſhips in the five admı-
ralties, with their bulk, the year of their con-
ftruction, their condition, and the complement of
men and arms which each carried.
Mean while the Swediſh envoy inceffantly de-
manded fhips of the States, and four hundred and
fifty thouſand livres, which was once paid to pro-
cure a paffage for the Swedish troops into Germany.
M. Witfendorf, the Hanoverian envoy, left the
Hague the 3d of May, 1683, without figning the
treaty with the States General, becauſe they would
not grant him fubfidies. He faid, in his laft con-
ferences, that the King would laugh at all their treaties
of alliance, when they were not accompanied with
a fufficient force; that it was not a quantity of pa-
pers or treaties which they ought to oppofe to his
Majefty, but powerful armies; and that as foon as
they ſhould agree upon fomething of this nature, his
mafter would then heartily enter into the treaty.
The envoy from Saxony refufed alſo to come to
any conclufion, faying, that his inftructions were
not to fign the treaty before the envoy from Hano-
ver had done it.
Mean while I was watchful to fee whether the
States would furnifh fhips to tranſport the Swediſh
troops into Germany, or to convoy them; for the
ſteps which the count de Roy then took, in the fer-
vice of Denmark, made it more to be believed than
ever before, that they were going to attack Sweden.
The affair of Bantam happened about this time:
but as the negotiations upon it were unfuccefsful,
I fhall drop it in filence; let it fuffice to ſay, that the
States
162
NEGOTIATIONS of
States General gave no fatisfaction to the King of
England, and that he ſuffered it patiently.
On the 13th of May the Spaniſh envoy, in con-
cert with the Prince of Orange, propofed to the
States General to have a general affembly at the
Hague, to fettle all differences which the King had
with the Empire, as well as Spain; and the Prince
of Orange, with Penſionary Fagel, propoſed moreo-
ver, that they ſhould requeſt the King to be me-
diator.
Van Buning now again changed his fentiments-
for the fixth time; and fignified to the Prince of
Orange, that he was perfectly convinced he was in
the right, and that no more mention ought to be
made of the arbitration of the King of England, in
regard to the differences of the Spaniards, but of a
general affembly, with the mediation of this Prince.
I wrote to the King, and informed him, that as I
had fufpected there was a trick in this defign, which
had been only half trufted to the magiftrates of Am-
fterdam, I thought there was no lefs fubtilty in a
propofal which one Morlot, a man attached to the
Prince of Orange, had lately made me; he told me
I had always appeared to wish that the Prince of
Orange would enter into a good underſtanding with
his Majefty; that he had hitherto feen great diffi-
culty to bring this about; but M. Dickfeld having
acquainted him they were going to fettle all differ-
ences by a general affembly, he was of opinion the
Prince of Orange would thereby find an opportu-
nity, without failing in duty to his allies, of giving
his Majefty proper fatisfaction; that he did not fay
this without foundation, nor without being inform-
ed that this Prince could not, confiftent with his
honour or intereft, make the first advances; but
when he knew his Majefty's intentions, he could
conform to them in certain particulars; that this
was
COUNT D'AVAUX.
163
was not an urgent affair, but that I took it into
confideration, in order to make ufe of it at a pro-
per time and opportunity. I aſked his Majeſty how
I ſhould behave in this matter.
On the 20th of May, one of the council of Am-
ſterdam fent me notice, that they had come to a re-
folution not only not to confent to any thing which
might difturb the peace, but that they had alfo de-
livered written memorials to the States of Holland,
declaring, if the States General involved themſelves
in a war, by not accepting the arbitration, or re-
fufing the propoſals of his Majefty, they would not
contribute to the expences of the war.
I told our
court it would be adviſeable to have theſe memori-
als difperfed in foreign courts, to fhew them there
could be no great hopes of affiftance from the States
General, if a war was kindled; but this was all the
advantage to be expected, there being no founda-
tion for greater hopes, fince the citizens of Amfter-
dam, under the fpecious pretext of peace, allowed
themſelves to be drawn into meaſures which directly
led to war.
I fent the King the particular ſtate of their navy,
as it had been reported to the States General. The
Prince of Orange and Penfionary Fagel went to all
the admiralties, to haften the naval preparations. The
King of Denmark's preparations, and the language of
the Danes in general, chiefly induced the States to
agree to this motion. It is certain that Denmark, find-
ing herſelf fupported by France, talked of a war as un-
avoidable; nay, in reality, fhe greatly wifhed for
it: this had alarmed the States General, upon which
I took the liberty to write the King, that nothing
would make the magiftrates of Amſterdam ftrenu-
ous for peace, but the violent apprehenfion of a
neighbouring war; and at the fame time, that a
way muſt be pointed out, whereby they may eſcape
this
164
NEGOTIATIONS of
this danger; which, though not very honourable,
they would embrace; but to make them believe
war was abfolutely determined againſt their allies
and themſelves, as had been given out in Denmark,
would ſerve only to make them arm more power-
fully.
Mean while the province of Friefland had de-
clared they would not confent to this equipment,
unleſs fome other province would advance their pro-
portion, as they were at that juncture deficient in
money. The provinces of Groningen and Zealand
pofitively refuſed it: and as for Holland, after fix
months, this province came to no determination.
Theſe circumftances, of which I apprized our
court, made it apparent the provinces acted in ma-
ny things by constraint, and contrary to inclination.
Nevertheless, the Prince of Orange, about a week
after, being on the 31st of May, gave orders that
all hands fhould work with the utmoft expedition to
fit out the fleet.
I fent notice likewife, that the Prince of Orange
had not mentioned whither the fhips were deſtined:
but as foon as ready, I apprehended he would endea-
vour to fend them to Sweden; I therefore uſed all
poffible precautions with the well affected republi-
cans, and the magiftrates of Amſterdam, to prevent
fuch a flep; I repreſented the fatal confequences of
fending this fleet to the Baltic, and they pofitively
affured me they would never allow it to go to Swe-
den to facilitate the paffage of the troops; nay, the
Prince of Orange durft not even make the propoſal.
This Prince was very defirous Van Buning ſhould
return to England, but he did not chufe to fend
him till he ſhould find him confirmed in certain fen-
timents, wherein he had hitherto found him waver-
ing, not only through a natural fickleness of temper,
but alſo becauſe Van Buning, though he would
have
COUNT D'AVAUX.
165
have been willing to come to a good underſtanding
with the Prince of Orange, yet he did not care to
imbroil himſelf with the magiftrates of Amfterdam.
I went at this time to Amfterdam, under pre-
tence of ſeeing goods from India; and I ſpoke to
one of the burgomafters, with whom I kept a cor-
refpondence he told me the city of Amfterdam had
done more than could have been imagined; for they
had ftopt fhort in the refolutions they were about
to take, which would have unavoidably engaged
the States in a war, and that affairs had taken quite
a different turn. He mentioned alfo the Prince of
Orange's having received inftructions from the
States General to declare to the marquis of Grana,
that they would not embarraſs themſelves in the
affairs of all Europe; and as they thought them-
felves highly intereſted in what regarded the Spaniſh
Netherlands, they wished the Spaniards would think
feriouſly of coming to an accommodation, and not
obftinately perfift in keeping their intereft infepa-
rably united to that of the Empire: the marquis of
Grana replied, that the King of Spain would fooner
loſe the Netherlands than detach himſelf from the
Emperor. This ſame perſon told me likewiſe, that
the Prince of Orange had had orders alfo to tell the
marquis of Grana, fince the Spaniards would not
accept the conditions offered by his Majefty, the
States General neither could nor would enter into
war, though he ſhould even attack the Spaniſh Ne-
therlands; and though they were fo much intereſted
in the preſervation of this barrier, they would give
no other fuccour than the 8000 Men; the marquis
of Grana made anfwer, that the King of Spain was
in a condition to defend the Spanish Netherlands
with 8000 men. The burgomafter knew very well
the true meaning of this anfwer, and he owned the
Prince of Orange was a bad negotiator of peace;
but
166
NEGOTIATIONS of
but he had defired to go in place of the Penfionary
of Amſterdam, who ought to have had the com-
miffion. I told my friend that the declaration made
to the Spaniards availed nothing, fince the King
was not informed of it by the States; for his Majeſty
not knowing their good difpofitions, would act up-
on the fuppofition of what he had reaſon to believe,
that the Prince of Orange would always engage the
States to efpouſe the intereft of the Spaniards; be-
fides, it was likely the Spaniards knew thefe threats.
of the Prince of Orange were not meant in earneſt,
and that he himſelf had removed all their apprehen-
fion; but if the States General fincerely defired to
hinder a war, inftead of a ſecret and filent threat,
they ſhould have made a formal authentic declara-
tion to the Spaniards, fignifying, that if after this
they did not come to an accommodation, the States
would then declare their reſolution to his Majefty,
that they might not wantonly involve themſelves in
a war, which the Spaniards only had in their power
to prevent. He approved of this expedient, and
promiſed he would impart it to M. Heude, as a thing
he had himſelf conceived; but that he was appre-
henfive the Prince of Orange would prevent the
execution of fuch a defign. He told me alfo, it had
been refolved, in cafe Sweden was attacked, to try
friendly offices, and then to fend the fuccour ftipu-
lated by the alliance, but without coming to a rup-
ture.
In a letter to his Majefty, June 4, I humbly en-
treated he would permit me to repreſent to him,
that it was wholly owing to the violent apprehenfi-
ons of a war, that the miniftry of Amfterdam had
lately taken fuch extraordinary ſteps; that theſe
would never have come to any firm refolution, had
they not believed our threats to be in earneft; that
the council of Amfterdam had been perfuaded the
6
war
COUNT D'AVAU X.
167
war was refolved againſt Sweden the 15th of June,
and againſt them too, in cafe they fhould inter-
meddle; that the first thing they had done, in confe-
quence thereof, was to make the above declaration
to Spain, and to form that reſolution in regard to
Sweden, which I had the honour of communicating
to his Majefty.
Tromp about this time had a quarrel with the
Prince of Orange, about the choice of fome fea-
officers, whom he had follicited to have under him
and the animofity was carried fo far, that he did
not command the fleet, nor ever after ſerved the
Republic; for he came not to a reconciliation with
the Prince of Orange, till fix weeks before his
death.
Tromp being turned out only made the Prince
of Orange redouble his diligence to have the fleet
equipt; he made the men work day and night with
the moſt incredible application; and he went him-
felf to all the admiralties to infpect the fhips: but
though he took care to have guards placed that no
ftranger ſhould go aboard, yet I difcovered, by the
fhip-wrights and fea-officers, that they had only re-
paired the outfides with as much expedition as pof-
fible, and that there were a great number much de-
cayed within, and ſome even in fuch a leaky con-
dition, that the pumps were frequently obliged to
be uſed.
The Prince of Orange had not yet however men-
tioned the particular deftination of this fleet, nor
had it been ſpoke of in the council of the towns of
Holland. Neverthelefs, there was fome probability
he intended it for Sweden, though the magiftracy
of Amſterdam had declared they would never con-
ſent to it; and I was apprehenfive he would carry
his defign on this occafion, as he had on many
others; efpecially as it would be much eaſier for
him
*
168
NEGOTIATIONS of
him to fettle this affair when the fhips fhould be in
the Texel, than it had been to get the fleet equipt.
But whilſt they were bufied in Holland about
fitting out the fleet, it created not a little furprize
there, to hear that M. de Barillon had declared to
his Britannic Majefty, that the King intended to
fend fourteen fail of fhips to the Baltic. This de-
termined Penfionary Fagel to propofe to the next
affembly in Holland, on the 13th of July, that they
fhould augment their land forces, and make a fur-
ther addition to their navy.
The emperor was no lefs preffing than the Prince.
of Orange for the departure of the fleet; he wrote
to the States, entreating they would ſend out their
Ships to tranſport the Swedes into Germany; for the
Duke of Hanover, refufed to engage with the allies
till he was affured of the embarkation of the Swedes.
As for the Duke of Zell, he had a particular reafon,
which I will not mention, why he did not yet de-
clare himſelf.
On the 15th of July, information was received,
by a letter from England, that there had been a con-
fpiracy to murder the King of England and the Duke
of York. The Prince of Orange not only fhewed
great indifference at receiving this news; but he
even ordered M. d'Odyck and ſome others of his
confidants to give out that this confpiracy was only
a fham affair, trumped up to ruin fome of the wor-
thieſt perſons in England, and to deſtroy thoſe who
ftood up for liberty of confcience, and the rights of
their country.
The States of Holland having affembled the 13th
of July, Penfionary Fagel propofed they ſhould fit
out twelve men of war to reinforce the fleet about
to put to fea; he did not think proper as yet to
mention any thing about the augmentation of the
land forces.
When
COUNT D'AVAUX.
169
When the States General were informed that the
King's fleet had paffed the Sound, they ordered their
embaſſadors to tell the King of England he had it
entirely in his power to ward off the war, by pre-
venting the King of Denmark and his 'Swediſh Ma-
jefty from entering into action against each other.
This fhews the truth of what I had before afferted,
that their fleet was not in a condition of under-
taking any thing; but it ferved ſtill more to juſtify
the principle I had continually laid down as the
foundation of all meaſures; viz. that nothing but
the apprehenfion of war could bring theſe people to
reaſon.
Morlot waited upon me alfo from the Prince of
Orange, and ſpoke to me more particularly than he
had fome months before, as if the Prince of Orange
was really inclined to come to a good underſtand-
ing with his Majefty. I anfwered him candidly,
and gave notice thereof to my mafter, who wrote
me that there was no great probability of this Prince
being in earneft; for he was apt to believe he want-
ed only to bring on a negotiation with me, in or-
der to raife a report, as before, that advantageous
terms were offered him by his Majeſty; and thus
not only to make new merit with the States Gene-
ral, but also by this means to cut off all hopes from
thoſe who were ftill defirous to preferve the little
remains of their liberty; fo that I had no other an-
fwer to give to whatever fhould be propofed from
the Prince of Orange, but that he would fhew the
effects of his friendly difpofition, and he might be-
lieve his Majefty would not prove infenfible; for
that there was occafion for much stronger proofs
than empty words, from a man in whom his Ma-
jefty had hitherto fo little reafon to confide.
A few days afterwards the Prince of Orange
thought it adviſeable to congratulate the King of
VOL. I.
England
I
170
NEGOTIATIONS of
England on the diſcovery of the conſpiracy, and he
fent Benting for that purpoſe. His cre.tures told
fome perfons, he had given this commiffion to Bent-
ing, becauſe he had many friends involved in the
confpiracy; that though he was perfuaded the King
of England and the Duke of York could not enter-
tain the leaſt thought upon this affair to his diſad-
vantage, yet he thought proper, nevertheleſs, to fend
a perfon in whom he could confide, who could an-
fwer properly any unjuft infinuations, which fhould
perhaps be advanced.
But I diſcovered by another channel, that the
ſtrongeſt, and in all probability, the only reafon of
Benting's fudden departure was, that the Prince of
Orange having heard of the death of the Princeſs
Electoral of Brandenburg, was defirous that Bent-
ing might arrive in England before Prince George
of Denmark; or even if this Prince ſhould get there
before him, he had ftill hopes of being able to pre-
vent his marriage, by propofing the Prince Elector
for the Princeſs Anne, and promifing to nominate
the Elector heir to all his poffeffions, if fuch a mar-
riage ſhould take place.
The Prince of Orange made ufe of a kind of
menace to force the King of England into his mea -
fures: he ordered Benting to declare to his Britan-
nic Majefty, if he did not alter his conduct in re-
gard to the States General, they would be obliged
to make terms with France. I fent information
thereof to his Majefty, who returned for anſwer,
that this only confirmed him in the opinion he had
before, how little fincerity there was in the over-
ture made me by Morlot, and alſo gave freſh reaſon
to believe, that the Prince of Orange had only en-
deavoured to bring on a negotiation with me, to
give uneaſineſs to the King of England, and thofe
of
COUNT D'AVAUX.
171
of the United Prrovinces, who had fhewed them-
ſelves the beſt affected.
As foon as it was known in Holland that fome
fhips had failed from England, they immediately
came to a refolution, that the fleet of the States
fhould put to fea, and lay off the Meufe.
I informed our court, that the Imperialiſts com-
plained to the Prince of Orange of the bad fituati-
on of their affairs, in July 1683, faying, that he
had always promiſed the Emperor ſhould have a bo-
dy of troops on the Rhine, and that he would not
have hearkened to the treaty of alliance, but upon
this condition.
I was informed, by a particular friend, that a
certain pilot had told him in confidence, that he
had orders fecretly to look out for pilots who were
acquainted with the Baltic, and to ſend them to the
fleet, which lay near the ifle of Goree. Yet no-
thing was ever mentioned in the States of Holland
about making ufe of theſe fhips to tranfport the
Swediſh troops into Germany: but the Prince of
Orange had given fecret inftructions, which were
unknown to the States General.
The envoy from Saxony, who had been a con-
fiderable time at the Hague departed highly diffa-
tisfied, without having concluded any thing; he
wanted fubfidies, and befides, he could not agree
upon the place where the troops of Saxony ſhould
act, in caſe there was occaſion.
The Emperor's refident received a letter from his
mafter, commanding him to acquaint the States
General, that he hoped providence would preferve
Vienna in his poffeffion; but whatever might be
the cafe, he would not accept of the terms propoſed
by his Majefty, and he only offered to enter into a
general accommodation.
I 2
The
172 NEGOTIATIONS of
The Prince of Orange certainly looked upon
Van Buning to be a man according to his wiſhes,
for he ſent him over again to England in Auguſt
1683.
I fent a letter to our court the 12th of this month,
informing them the Dutch fleet was to fail this day
for the north, and that no body could come at the
knowlege of the fecret inftructions; that they had
only about a week before refolved to keep the fleet at
fea till the end of October. Their firſt deſign was
to have ordered it to return the firſt of September.
The perſon who had before waited on me from
the Prince of Orange, came to me again, and af-
fured me the Prince had expreffed a ſtronger defire
than ever of getting into his Majefty's good graces;
but that he was afraid in the preſent fituation of af-
fairs, his offers would be altogether rejected, or
fuch things infifted on from the Spaniards, as in ho-
nour he could not folicit them to conſent to. I had
ſome diſcourſe with Dickfeld upon this head, but it
would be tedious and ufelefs to infert it here. The
moſt remarkable part of it was, that the Prince of
Orange was to promife he would prefs the Spaniards
to give an equivalent for Aloft, &c. in fome other
part than in the Spanish Netherlands; that this
would be gaining a confiderable point, fince the
States had not hitherto come to a decifion, whether
the Spaniards were indebted an equivalent for the
King's pretenfions; but that he could not act to any
purpoſe, till he ſhould know what would fatisfy his
Majeſty.
I ſent an account of this to the King, and I added,
that in whatever manner the Prince of Orange might
have expreffed his defire of procuring his Majefty's
friendſhip; yet he did not feem to me difpofed to
demand fuch an equivalent of the Spaniards as would
fatisfy his Majefty.
5
On
COUNT D'AVAUX.
173
On the third of September the States General re-
ceived information, by a courier from the marquis
of Grana, that the King's troops had entered upon
the King of Spain's territories; and that his Majefty
had ordered it to be declared to him, that marſhal
d'Humieres fhould remain with his army on the
Spanish poffeffions, and maintain them at the ex-
pence of the Spaniards, till they fhould fatisfy the
King as to his claims.
The King having commanded me to give him an
account of what ſhould be faid upon the entrance of
his troops into the Spaniſh Netherlands, I told him
that the moſt fenfible perſons feemed to wifh he
would at once feize beyond what he claimed as
an equivalent, becauſe the affair would then foon
be adjuſted, provided he had no other defign; and
that the magistrates of Amfterdam had ordered me
to be informed they wished his Majefty would take
Luxemburg, and then declare himself fatisfied; for
they would be highly pleaſed that all differences
fhould by this means be terminated.
I likewiſe acquainted his Majeſty of all the differ-
ent diſcourſes of every one as they ſtood affected,
which wou'd be uſeleſs to repeat here. I fhall only
take notice, that I informed his Majefty of the bad
effect of what the King of England had lately de-
clared, that the Spaniards could not give up Lux-
emburg to his Majefty, nor any other place in the
Netherlands, without weakening themſelves in fuch
a manner as to be unable ever after to depend upon
their own ftrength.
As for the Prince of Orange, as he knew that
the magiftrates of Amfterdam, ever fince the
blockade of Luxemburg, had been of opinion the
Spaniards fhould yield it up as an equivalent for the
King's pretenfions, from that time he never ceaſed
reprefenting the abfolute neceffity of keeping this
I 3
place
174
NEGOTIATIONS of
place for the defence of the Spaniſh Netherlands;
and as ſoon as he heard of marfhal d'Humieres
march, he ordered the troops of the States General
to advance to Leclufe, Hulft, Le Sas-de Gand,
Bergen-op-Zoom, and he formed a camp at Bois-le-
Duc, of the troops in garrifon at Campen, Zwoł,
Deventer, and other places.
The Prince of Orange went ftill further, for I
diſcovered, by a fure intelligence, that he intended
Penfionary Fagel fhould propofe to the States of
Holland to fend 8000 men to the Spaniards; and
that he was likewife to repreſent to them, as war
´muſt be expected, it would be neceffary to make a
new levy of 16000 men. Penfionary Fagel was alfo
to endeavour to perfuade them it would be requifite
to order the fleet, after having convoyed the fhips
from India, to go to Gottenburg to take in 15000
men, which the King of Sweden had engaged to
furnish for Germany; and notwithſtanding this,
they might be affured of all the family of Lunen-
burg. But I was informed, by a fecret intelligence,
which I had in the council of Amfterdam, that the
deputies of this city had orders directly contrary to
the intentions of the Prince of Orange.
I received intelligence likewife, that the Prince
of Orange had ſpoke to the two principal burgo-
mafters of Amfterdam, half an hour before the States
of Holland affembled; and that he had affigned three
reaſons as the moft weighty for the 8000 men.
The firſt was, that the King did not deſign to have
war, for he had not raifed fuch a number of recruits
as he would have done had he been fo difpofed; and
as ſoon as the 8c00 men fhould be delivered, he
would heartily agree that they ſhould endeavour to
fall upon expedients to fettle affairs in an amicable.
manner, without entring into a war. The fecond
was, that he knew they were perfuaded at his Ma-
jeſty's
COUNT D'AVAUX.
175
jefty's court, the city of Amſterdam would not con-
fent to give the 8000 men. He told them that his
Majefty having fuited his meaſures to that fuppofi-
tion, would confequently alter his fchemes when
Amfterdam fhould act contrary to what was ex-
pected in France. The third argument he advanced
was, that the King of England would never fuffer
his Majefty to make conquefts in the Netherlands,
nor to carry on war against Spain or Holland, and
this though not from a principle of friendſhip to the
Spaniards or States General, yet from a motive of
intereft, and a regard to the welfare of his own
kingdom; that the King of England knew very
well how far his Chriſtian Majefty would proeeed;
and this being the cafe, they ought not to be afraid
of giving the 8coo men, fince after they ſhould be
granted, the King of England would always be
equally intereſted to hinder the war.
This intelligence determined me to take all pof-
fible meaſures to difcover what paffed this day in
the affembly of the States of Holland; and I was
informed, a quarter of an hour after they broke up,
that Penfionary Fagel had propofed to furnish the
Spaniards with 8000 men, according to treaty ;
and amongſt ſeveral arguments advanced by him
for this meaſure, he had affured them, that as foon
as they ſhould fend the 8000 men to the Spaniards,
the King's troops would advance no farther in the
Spaniſh Netherlands. But notwithſtanding all his
remonftrances, that the cities of Delft, Amfterdam,
and Leyden had oppofed it; and the deputies of
fome other towns had declared they were not im-
powered by their fuperiors to confent to fuch a pro-
pofal. That the Prince of Orange, after having
heard them calmly, had told them, there was no
occafion to deliberate on this affair anew, for he
was fufficiently authorized by the refolution taken,
during
I 4
176 NEGOTIATIONS of
during the fiege of Luxemburg, to fend theſe troops,
without aſking their opinion; and that they had cr-
dered him to give the marquis of Grana affurances
thereof, which he had accordingly done, at an in-
terview with him about four months before; that
he was not a man to retract his word, and would
immediately ſend the 8oco men to the Spaniards,
unleſs the States of Holland fhould by a formal de-
cree exprefly forbid him: that this was the only
method to prevent him, but if they had a defign to
amufe him by propofing to confult their fuperiors,
and fuch like evafions, he would not be thus ob-
fructed. That if the deputies of Amfterdam would
not acquiefce, their obftinacy would difcover a dif-
agreement amongst them, but could produce no
other effect. No perfon was courageous enough
to forbid him to fend theſe troops, and he knew
very well they could not do it, becauſe no deputy
could have received inftructions on an affair fo un-
foreſeen; fo that not one ventured to ſpeak out up-
on this fubject; and even if any one had, what
would it have availed, unleſs he had been affured
of being followed by a majority of the towns. All
the well affected could do was, to infift upon having
the refolution agreed to by their fuperiors; but the
Prince of Orange made fo light of this, that he in-
ftantly fent Penfionary Fagel from the States of Hol-
land to the States General, where he had the refo-
lution paffed for granting 8000 men to the Spa-
niards, and that fame evening gave orders for their
marching. All this oppofition produced, though
weakly fupported, was, that the Prince of Orange
durft not propofe the raifing of 16000 men, nor
the tranſportation of the Swediſh troops.
The admiral of the Dutch fleet difpatched an ex-
preſs, on the ninth of September, 1683, in a fri-
gate, accompanied with a fhip which had loft her
maft.
COUNT D'A VAUX.
177
maft. He wrote the States General that the large
ſhips could keep no longer at fea, without great
danger. The generality of people faid upon this
at firſt, that ſince their large ſhips could not remain,
at fea, neither his Majefty's fleet, nor that of Den-
mark would be able to continue in the Baltic; and
therefore it would be adviſeable to order their ſhips
into port: but the Prince of Orange, who was eager
upon his defigns, gave himſelf no uneafinefs about
the vulgar opinions, nor did he even propofe that
the return of the fhips ſhould be taken under con-
fideration.
This Prince ftill continued to keep up the nego -
tiation with me, either becauſe he perceived that a
general apprehenfion prevailed, and an utter aver-
fion to war, or becauſe he wanted only to found
the King's inclinations, which to me appeared moſt
probable, or perhaps becauſe he defigned, in caſe
affairs must be brought to an accommodation, to
affume the honour to himſelf; for he told fome of
his friends, that he would die a thouſand deaths ra-
ther than fuffer the Spaniards to come to an ac-
commodation by the King of England's mediation.
He at this time gave me to know, by Dickfeld,
that if I could, without mentioning Luxemburg,
enter upon any agreement which would fatisfy his
Majefty, he would chearfully go into it, and would
exert his utmoft efforts to procure him that fatis-
faction and next day Dickfeld fent to tell me, that
if I had a power to treat about an equivalent in any
other part of the King of Spain's dominions than
the Netherlands, he would then explain himſelf
fully and fincerely upon the matter.
Mean while the Prince of Orange fet out from
the Hague, to have an interview with the marquis
of Grana; and as he had fent the 8000 men, con-
trary to form, the magiftrates of Amfterdam fent
I 5
to
178
NEGOTIATIONS of
to acquaint me they would never grant money to
carry on undertakings which they difapproved; and
at the fame time they delivered in writing to the
States of Holland the ftrongeſt protefts, whereby
they declared, they would not involve themfelves in
the danger or expence which muft inevitably at-
tend the fending the 8000 men; for the marching
of the King's troops had ftruck them with a pannic,
and they were averſe to war. This obliged Penfi-
onary Fagel to get the clergy to declaim afreſh upon
the proceedings in France againſt the Proteftants.
On the 23d of September, I ſent theſe proteſts to
the King, that he might judge what could be ex-
pected from perfons, who, after having argued fo
reaſonably, and given fuch formal and exact orders,
had allowed themfelves to be carried away againſt
their opinion and intereſt.
I wrote by feveral pofts, that I could not hear it
was yet propoſed to the States General to fend their
fleet to Gottenburg to take in the Swedes.
On the 17th of this month, I fent notice that I
had diſcovered, from the commiffions given by the
Prince of Orange, of which I had copies, that he
had fent 14000 men to the Spaniards, inftead of
8000; this was a bold ſtep, and it fhewed fuffici-
ently how little he regarded the States General: he
could indeed do this the more eaſily, as the march-
ing of the troops was wholly in his power within
the territories of the Republic; for by this means
he could march as many as he pleafed before the
number could poffibly be diſcovered. That this
Prince was alfo exerting all his efforts to procure a
levy of 16000 men; but nevertheleſs Penfionary
Fagel had not yet made fuch a propoſal in the af-
fembly of Holland.
On the 27th I fent intelligence, that the Prince
f Orange had inftructed count Waldeck to uſe aìl
his
COUNT D'A VAUX.
179
his intereft with the Emperor, that he might prefs
the Electors of Bavaria and Saxony, then at his
court, to enter into the treaty of confederacy.
The King in a letter faid, though he was per-
fuaded the Prince of Orange had no other intention
but to gain time for the Spaniards, nevertheleſs, he
was willing to fhew his inclination for peace; and
if M Dickfeld demanded an anſwer to the over-
ture he had made, I fhould acquaint him his Ma-
jeſty was not fo defirous of having Luxemburg, but
that I wonld undertake to inform him, if propoſals
ſhould be made of any other equivalent proportioned
to his juft demands.
I foon had an opportunity of ſpeaking with M.
Dickfeld, who after a long conference told me, that
the Prince of Orange would exert all his intereft to
procure fatisfaction to his Majefty; but that he had
fo little knowledge of the places helonging to the
Spaniards in Catalonia and Italy, which might be
given as an equivalent to his Majeſty's pretenfions,
that he could not offer propofals fo readily and
frankly as he defired. That the Prince of Orange
had already been at fome pains, and was ftill en-
deavouring to find out a perfon who could inform
him exactly of theſe countries; and when he ſhould
obtain ſuch a knowledge, he would not fail to ac-
quaint me what he thought ſhould be given up by
the Spaniards.
Next day he told me, if inftead of Luxemburg,
which was demoliſhed, and about twenty or thirty
villages in this principality, which now only re-
mained to the Spaniards, his Majefty was willing
to receive an equivalent in the Low Countries; the
Prince of Orange would procure him Dixmude,
Beaumont, with the villages depending thereupon,
and the diſmemberment the King had cauſed to be
formerly made from the jurifdiction of Ath, and
16
which
180
NEGOTIATIONS of
which had been re-united by the treaty of Nimegue;
that there ſhould be a line drawn from Newport to
Namur, and all the villages beyond this line to-
wards France, fhould be given up to his Majefty.
I obferved to Mr. Dickfeld, that they fet a high
value upon Luxemburg when the point was about
giving it up to his Majefty, but now they account-
ed it as nothing almoft, when an equivalent was to
be given for it. That they muft either efteem it
inconfiderable, and yield it up, or if they ſet fo
high a value upon it, they muft give a proporti-
onable equivalent to his Majefty. I faid afterwards,
if with what they offered in Flanders, they would
likewife give up fome place in Catalonia or Italy,
I would undertake to make fuch a propofal, but in
the manner the overture was made at prefent, I
durft not even mention it to his Majefty. He
ſeemed to acquiefce with with what I faid, and told
me that the Prince of Orange had not made any
mention of an equivalent in the Low Countries,
becauſe he had not yet procured fuch light as he
thought neceffary, in regard to Catalonia and Italy;
but he affured me, if I had got a fufficient know-
ledge of the fituation of the places, and the extent
of their dependencies in Catalonia and Italy, the
Prince of Orange would agree to whatever ſhould
be thought reaſonable to be given up by the Spa-
niards.
Dickfeld vifited me a third time, but faid nothing
worthy to be mentioned: this obliged me to write
the King, that if his Majefty judged it conducive
to his ſervice, to inform me of the force and extent
of four or five of the towns in Navarre, the Mila-
nefe, and Catalonia, I could then inform Dick-
feld thereof that giving fuch information by word
of mouth when it was asked, would not be to make
propofals; that I could not thereby hurt his Ma-
jeſty's
COUNT D'AVAUX.
181
jeſty's intereft, and the Prince of Orange would no
longer have any pretext or reaſon for not explain-
ing himſelf; if he was in earneft, this would foon
be perceived, and if he wanted only to gain time,
this way of proceeding would put an end to every
negotiation, without his reaping the leaſt advantage.
The Prince of Orange being at length deter-
mined by any means to force the States General to
a levy of 16000 men, went to the council of ſtate,
where he had a right to enter, and where they con-
fider the number of troops neceffary for the fervice
of the Republic; and he refolved to make them
agree to what they call A Petition to the United
Provinces. He accordingly obliged them to draw
up a petition for a levy of 16000 men, with a de-
fign, as we fhall fee, of prefenting it to the pro-
vince of Holland, which was to affemble about a
week afterwards.
The King, by a letter of the 29th of September,
told me, I might inform Dickfeld he was defirous to
have Luxemburg as an equivalent, only becauſe it
was not included in the barrier; and all the country
which ſurrounded it depending upon his Majefty,
this place could not be of any fervice to the King of
Spain for the prefervation of his poffeffions in the
Low Countries. That the exchange which the
Prince of Orange propofed in Flanders, was fo little
proportioned to the juſtice of his Majeſty's demands,
that it did not deferve to be mentioned, unleſs he
fhould add what was neceffary, to render the equi-
valent equal to his Majefty's pretenfions.
As to the exchanges which might be given in
Catalonia, or Navarre (for the King wanted no-
thing in the Milanefe) his Majefty informed me,
as to Catalonia, he would be fatisfied with Rofes,
Cap-de-Quieres, a place of no confequence, and
Gironne; or with Campredon, Caftel-Saillite, and
Seau-
182
NEGOTIATIONS of
Seau-d'Urgel, with all dependencies; and if in Na-
varre, with Pampeluna, and Fontarabia, as the only
places which could bring to a conclufion, in theſe
parts, all the difputes betwixt their Chriftian and
Catholic Majefties.
This explanation enabled me again to fee Mr.
Dickfeld, with whom I had a long conference,
which however amounted to nothing. We only
each of us advanced our reafons, in regard to the
equivalent which the Prince of Orange offered in
the Low Countries, but he would not enter into
any reaſonable conceffions, nor come to a farther
explanation than he had done hitherto : fo that I
wrote the King I was more and more confirmed in
my opinion, that the Prince of Orange had no in-
tention of procuring a juft fatisfaction to his Ma-
jefty; that he only feemed defirous to know the
extent of his Majefty's pretenfions, and it was not
unlikely he might thus make a pretext for bringing
the States General to a rupture; that the King had
acted wifely in being moderate in his claims, to
have the glory of extricating the Spaniards from a
piece of miſconduct, and in having fupported to
the utmoſt his allies, from whom he wanted, by no
means, to difengage himſelf.
The Prince of Örange ſent me a propofal, after-
wards, that a line fhould be drawn from Newport
to Namur and Courtray; Leufe, Beaumont, and
Chimay fhould be included therein, on the fi e of
France; and this line ſhould next extend from Na-
mur to Luxemburg; that he made no mention of
Catalonia, becauſe he wanted firſt to make an equi-
valent in the Netherlands to fatisfy his Majefty;
that when this equivalent fhould be fettled, he
would make two other equivalents in Catalonia,
refembling that in the Low Countries, and that he
would uſe all his intereft to bring the Spaniards into
fuch
COUNT D'AVAUX.
183
fuch meaſures; but that if he could not fucceed in
his endeavours, he would then entreat his Majeſty
to be fatisfied with what fhould be deemed fufficient
in the Low Countries. All this convinced me that
the Prince of Orange wanted to make up the equi-
valent of a number of fmall villages, and difmem-
bered feigniories in the Low Countries; and this
he thought would be the more eafily accepted, as he
was to make it be believed, that this was only the
foundation for making another equivalent in Cata-
lonia; and that afterwards he might, with a very
good grace, preſs his Majeſty to be fatisfied with
the equivalent in the Netherlands, under pretence
that the Spaniards would not confent to give up any
thing in Catalonia nor Navarre.
I accordingly made anſwer, that it would be in
vain to make an equivalent in the Netherlands, in
order to ſettle that which was to be offered his Ma-
jefty in Catalonia; that he did not defire it to be in
one place more than another; and provided they
gave him a proper fatisfaction, either in Catalonia,
Navarre, or the Netherlands, he would be con-
tent.
That what he now offered, was the fame thing
he had mentioned the foregoing Friday, but pro-
pofed in a manner lefs intelligible than before.
That I had no idea of this line fuppofed to be
drawn from Newport to Namur only, and conti-
nued from Namur to Luxemburg.
That as to the villages in Luxemburg, I had al-
ready delivered my fentiments upon that head.
That in regard to the line from Newport to Na-
mur, the poſition of it was not clearly enough ex-
preffed; that there was no mention made of what
was to be given with Courtray, nor what was to
be annexed to Leufe; in a word, the propofal, un-
reaſonable as it was, was expreffed in fuch ambigu-
ous
184
NEGOTIATIONS of
ous terms as to be above my conception; thus I
was incapable of giving an account of it to his Ma-
jefty, eſpecially as he made no other propofal, as
I had already told him, than what he offered four
days before, and what he himſelf had agreed was
unfit for me to mention to his Majeſty.
At the time when the Prince of Orange was,
contrary to the inclination of the States General,
fending not only the 8000 men which the Spaniards
demanded, but alſo 14000 more; when he was
about to confer with the Marquis of Grana, to
concert meaſures to draw the King of Spain and
the States into a war; when he was foliciting the
latter to make a levy of 16,000 men, and when he
was ſpinning out a fecret negotiation with me, in
order to found the King's fentiments; at this very
time he found means by Penfionary Fagel, to bring
the deputies of the States to a refolution, which be-
ing drawn up under the pretext of procuring an ac-
commodation betwixt the King and the Spaniards,
was a kind of invitation to their allies to prepare for
war. The purport of this refolution was, that their
embaffador fhould reprefent to the King of England,
that the States having done all in their power to
preſerve peace in the Low Countries, and finding
their remonftrances for that purpofe ineffectual, and
that they were upon the point of coming to a rup-
ture, they entreated his Britannic Majefty to con-
cur with them, in order to ſettle the differences be-
twixt his Chriſtian Majeſty and Spain as foon as
poffible. They befeeched him therefore, that he
would uſe to advantage the three months allotted by
the treaties, that they might enter as foon as poffible
into negotiation, that his Britannic Majefty and
they might examine the pretenfions of each party,
and be thereby enabled to concert means to prevent
the war. One may fee from thence, that the Prince
of
COUNT D'AVAUX.
185
of Orange wanted only to gain time without having
any defire to bring things to an accommodation;
fince by his not trufting them to the decifion of the
King of England alone, he always kept it in his
power, in the name of the States General, to raiſe
as many obftacles as he thought proper. The con-
fequence of this refolution will make it appear ſtill
more clearly, that the preamble was only meant as
a decoy to furprize the States General, and engage
them in a war, in cafe this preliminary negotiation,
as he plainly forefaw, did not fucceed: For it was
faid in this fame refolution, that the States General
fhould apply to the Spaniſh envoy, and tell him,
they were not a little concerned to find the diffe-
rences betwixt France and Spain likely to involve
all Chriſtendom in a dangerous war; that the States
would chearfully do all in their power to bring theſe
differences to an amicable conclufion; but that it
was neceffary the King of Spain, fhould on his part,
contribute more than he had yet done for the de-
fence of the Low Countries; that the allies might
not alone be incumbered with the burthen of the
war, in cafe the negotiations fhould prove unfuc-
ceſsful.
Towards the latter part of this refolution it was
mentioned, that the States fhould invite the Empe-
ror and King of Sweden to concur with them to
perfuade the King of England to be in the negoti-
ation, and that each fhould deliver their opinion, in
regard to the conduct which ought to be obferved,
to prevent all inconveniences to fecure the common
welfare, and the repofe of each individual power;
if this however fhould not be attained, and the
negotiation be broke off, their Imperial and Swediſh
Majefties fhould come to an agreement with the
States about the fuccour they would furnish for the
defence of the Spaniſh Netherlands.
Mean
186 NEGOTIATIONS of
Mean while I looked upon the raifing the 16,000
men, which the Prince of Orange intended to pro-
poſe, as the moſt important affair; I spoke to fome
of my friends, who had the moft intereft with the
leading men in Amfterdam, and fuggefted all I
thought of any weight to diffuade them from fuch
a meaſure; I told them the King was defirous of
peace, but if the States General made new levies,
the King would in honour be obliged to oppofe them,
and act againſt them with all his vigour; and thus
they would find themfelves involved in a bloody
war, from the very defire of avoiding fuch an evil.
The council of Amfterdam fent one of their mem-
bers to me, to enquire whether I could affure them,
that the King would not declare war, in cafe they
refuſed the 16,000 men. They entreated me to
let them know if I was acquainted with his Ma-
jefty's fentiments, and whether I could affure them
upon this head, promifing at the fame time, that
they would depend entirely upon the anſwer I
fhould return. I answered, with all the refpect due
to fuch a mark of confidence; and I ordered them
to be informed, that I gave them my word, as a
man of honour, that the King had no inclination
to make war; that it was even needleſs to caution
him againſt it; and that I could pofitively affure
them, if they did not agree to the levy propoſed by
the Prince of Orange, they would remain in peace:
but at the fame time I declared to them, if they con-
fented to this levy, the King would then keep no
longer terms, but direaly attack the Spanish Ne-
therlands and the States General. I informed fome
of the well affected republicans of this, who offered
themſelve as fureties of the truth of my affurance;
fo that the miniftry of Amfterdam acquainted me,
that they would reft fatisfied with what I faid, and
on their part they affured me, they would never
confent
•
COUNT D'AVAU X.
187
conſent to raiſing 16,000 men; that they entreated
me only to keep my word as ftrictly as they fhould
theirs; and that they might the more faithfully exe-
cute what they promifed, inftead of three Deputies,
whom they uſed to fend to the affembly of Holland,
they diſpatched fix, that they might ſpeak with
more ftrength and weight; and they infifted that
the propoſal for raifing the 16,000 men fhould be
put into the hands of Commiffaries to be examined.
They uſed this expedient to prevent the Prince of
Orange from bringing on this affair fuddenly, and
concluding it in his ufual precipitate manner.
The Prince of Orange this fame evening could
not help expreffing his uneafinefs at the conduct of
the city of Amfterdam to one of his friends, with
whom I was acquainted: he told him he was certain,
he ſhould make them agree to this new levy, as he had
done in many other things, but they would com-
ply too late, and out of ſeaſon; that he faw plainly
they wanted to ſpin out this affair to have it brought
before the general affembly, to be held the 15th of
November, where they uſed to regulate the ſtate of
the army, and that then, after many evafive fhifts
they would at length acquiefce; but that they did
confiderable prejudice in moft affairs by this tardi-
neſs in their motions.
The Prince of Orange not being able to hinder
the propoſal for the new levy from being put into
the hands of the Commiffaries, agreeable to the re-
queft of the deputies of Amfterdam, undertook in
one day to finifh this affair, which, according to
form, ought to have continued upon the carpet above
a fortnight. For this purpofe, he affembled the
commiffaries of the nobles, and of the eleven prin-
cipal towns in Holland; and he infifted they ſhould
immediately enter upon the affair. The body of
nobles, and eight of the town, were for making
the
188
NEGOTIATIONS of
the levy; thofe of Delft and Leyden excuſed them
felves from delivering their opinion, alledging, they
had no other orders from their fuperiors, but to hear
the reaſons advanced on each fide, and to make a
report thereof but the deputies of Amfterdam de-
clared, their city was pofitively againſt this levy,
which they faid would certainly draw a war upon
them; for no fooner would it be refolved, than
his Majeſty would raiſe thrice the number of troops.
That there was no other expedient advifeable, but
to prefs the Spaniards to come to an accommoda-
tion, and to entreat the King of England to become
mediator; for it feemed probable, his Majefty
would ftill accept of a fatisfactory equivalent. They
advanced alfo many other arguments, and always
remained firm to their orders, viz. not to confent
to this levy. In fhort, the Prince of Orange kept
them from nine in the morning till five in the af-
ternoon, without being able to make them alter
their opinion.
But what vexed him ftill more was, that the
fenate of Amfterdam gave their commiffaries a paper
of inftructions, confifting of eight particular points,
which they entreated them to be fully fatisfied upon,
before they ſhould enter upon the raifing fixteen
thouſand troops. Theſe eight points were:
I. How far the obligation extended which the
States General had entered into of affifting Spain.
II. Whether there was not hopes of bringing
about an accommodation with Spain, and if there
were not ways and means ftill remaining to effect
this.
III. If the treaty of alliance betwixt Spain and
Sweden was ratified.
IV. What the States General could promife
themſelves from treaties with the Electors of Bava-
ria and Saxony, and the Duke of Hanover, which
had
COUNT D'AVAU X.
189
had been fo much talked about, without ever being
once communicated to the city of Amſterdam.
V. What fuccour was to be expected from the
Emperor and his allies, and eſpecially from Sweden.
VI. What force Spain could furniſh for her own
defence.
VII. To confider the power of his chriſtian Ma-
jefty.
VIII. To take into confideration the decreaſe
of the public finances, which were almoſt exhauſted,
They infifted upon having fatisfaction as to theſe
articles, and delivered their own fentiments upon
them in the ſtrongeſt and warmest terms.
The Prince of Orange had next day a very warm
dialogue with the deputies of this city; he talked fo
loud, that a perfon, who was in an adjoining room,
told me he heard him ſay : "Well, gentlemen, if
I was to go into the fentiments of your city, and
be for the Spaniards giving up Luxemburg, I affure
you we could never bring them to fuch a conceffion.”
This I immediately fent notice of to the King, to
fhew him that the city of Amfterdam had openly
declared to the Prince of Orange, that the Spaniards
ought to give up Luxemburg; becauſe this would
the more enable his Majeſty to take meaſures in re-
gard to that place. The Prince of Orange was
highly enraged against the city of Amfterdam, in-
fomuch, that Benting told one of his friends, hẹ
had refolved to declare to the States of Holland, if
they continued to oppofe this levy, he would quit
the Hague, and allow things to go on any how,
without giving himſelf the leaft trouble. This was
a threat he never intended to carry into execution,
he only thought to intimidate them. As for my
'part, Ì did all in my power to confirm their refo-
lution, and the fame evening I fent them a perfon
to inform them of every thing which I thought
could
$
190 NEGOTIATIONS of
could tend to ſupport them in fuch favourable fenti-
ments.
The Prince of Orange, though greatly exafpera-
ted againſt the city of Amfterdam, was ftill more fo
againſt Van Buning, who after having engaged him
in leagues againſt France, now of a fudden deferted
him, and joined with the city of Amfterdam. This
Burgomaſter had indeed fupported him in prevent-
ing the States General from making an alliance
with France in 1679, and had affifted him to the
utmoſt of his power in thwarting all the refolutions
of this city, in favour of France. He had been no
leſs zealous than the Prince of Orange, to form an
alliance betwixt the States General and England.
He had likewife acted in concert with him, in en-
deavouring to bring about an alliance with all the
Princes of Europe, in order to fupport a war againſt
France; but when a rupture was ready to happen,
Van Buning finding things did not anfwer his ex-
pectations, and that the allies were not in a condi-
tion in two years to furniſh a force fufficient to
oppoſe his Majefty, declared to the Prince of
Orange, that the only way was to make fatisfaction
to his Majefty, and at the fame time to make a
league with England, which all the chriſtian powers
might enter into; and yet he faid, he could promiſe
France would not undertake any thing, either by open
force or re-union. The Prince of Orange would
not acquiefce with theſe reaſons, and reproached
Van Buning for deferting him when he was about
to execute the defign formed by mutual concert:
that things were now too far advanced to recede ;
and as for his part, after having engaged Spain, he
could never confent fhe fhould give an equivalent
for the King's pretenfions, nor would he fuffer him
to take it by force. Theſe different fentiments,
which nevertheleſs tended, though by quite oppo-
fite
COUNT D'AVAUX.
191
fite means, to form a league againſt France, created
a miſunderſtanding between Van Buning and the
Prince of Orange, fo that the former went in with
the citizens of Amfterdam, who openly oppofed
the Prince of Orange's meaſures, and eſpecially
this deſign of raiſing fixteen thouſand men.
This, however, did not reconcile Van Buning
to the well affected of the other towns, for he
never could procure their confidence. I aſked the
reafon of this from fome of my friends amongſt the
republicans. They faid their coldnefs to Van Bu-
ning was not ſo much owing to his fi kleneſs and
inconftancy of temper, as becauſe they perceived,
though there was at prefent a difagreement betwixt
him and the Prince of Orange, yet there was ne-
vertheleſs a great conformity in their fentiments, as
I have obferved; fince both one and the other
feemed defirous to form an infeparable attachment
betwixt the States General and England.
For this reaſon, fuch advantage as might be ex-
pected was not reaped from the conduct of Van
Buning. One of the moſt ſenſible perfons in the
Republic told me, this Burgomafter declared open-
ly at the private conferences, that the Spaniards
ought to be obliged to accept of the arbitration, that
peace might be more fpeedily concluded, and a treaty
of guaranty formed with England, and treaties en-
tered upon with the reſt of the Princes in Europe;
but as they knew this ſcheme of a general alliance had
already very nigh kindled a war in Europe, and as
they faw an alliance with England tended to the
ruin of their ſtate, and the deftruction of their li-
berty; they would, therefore, never join with a
man, who could at any time be reconciled to the
Prince of Orange; and if he acted in concert with
the Prince and Penfionary Fagel, they might carry
affairs as they pleaſed, and nobody be able to oppoſe
them.
192
NEGOTIATIONS of
them. As for thofe perfons in Amfterdam, who
were lefs daring, but more favourably diſpoſed than
Van Buning, they had quite different views; but
they had no perfon of confequence to head their
party, or to fupport their meaſures with proper
fpirit.
The Prince of Orange having fent me a map of
the Netherlands, with a line of feparation, to mark
out the King's dominions and thofe of his catholic
Majefty; I wrote my royal mafter, that I would
not have done myſelf the honour of giving him an
account of this laft propofal, did I not apprehend it
to be my duty to lay before his Majeſty whatever
fhould be mentioned from the Prince of Orange;
that the propofal, however, was fo unreaſonable,
that I would not formally charge myfelf with it;
that it plainly fhewed, the Prince of Orange fought
only with a fhew of civility to difengage himſelf
from a negotiation he had commenced when he
thought Vienna was loft, and when the Spaniards
affured him, if this misfortune had happened, they
fhould be obliged to fubmit implicitly to whatever
terms his Majefty fhould impofe upon them. That
he had fent me a map of the Spaniſh Netherlands,
wherein he had marked with a line what ſhould
henceforth be the boundary betwixt his Majefty's
dominions and thofe of his catholic Majefty. That
he placed on the fide of France, Courtray, with
that part of this chatellany upon the confines of
Deinche, Leufe, and what is beyond, as far as
Tournay, Beaumont, and Chimay. He included
on the fide of the Spaniards, Bouvines, and drew
a direct line from thence to Luxemburg, which
cut off from his Majefty all belonging to him in
that Dutchy on this fide of the line, in regard to
Holland where I then was.
All
COUNT D'AVAUX.
193
}
All the deputies of the affembly of Holland re-
turned on the 21st of October, excepting thofe of
Amfterdam: but I had received intelligence from
perfons belonging to the council of this city, that
they had come to a refolution, the foregoing even-
ing, ftill to oppoſe the levy.
The deputies of Amfterdam having arrived next
day, and the States of Holland being affembled,
they again pofitively refuſed to conſent to the levy;
thofe of Delft and Leyden joined them alfo, and
the Prince of Orange could obtain nothing. He
did not however defift, but again referred the mat-
ter to their deliberation. The deputies of Leyden
altered their opinion, and came into that of the
other towns: but the deputies of Delft remained
firmly united with thofe of Amfterdam. The
Prince of Orange fent them again to their towns to
deliberate upon the affair a-new
the affair a-new; and at the fame
time he demanded of the Spanish envoy a lift of all
the places which he pretended the King had taken
poffeffion of fince the peace of Nimeguen, and he
ordered nineteen copies to be printed, and fent them
the nobles, and the eighteen towns of Holland.
What rendered the Prince of Orange ſtill more
zealous in regard to the intereft of the Spaniards,
befides the reaf ns fo univerfally known, was, that
he had requested the Marquis of Grana, at the a-
bovementioned conference in Auguft, to write to
his court, not to confent to any thing the King de-
manded, and he gave the ftrongeft affurances, the
States would affift the Spaniards. The Marquis of
Grana having accordingly diſpatched an expreſs to
Spain for this purpofe, his courier arrived when the
council were upon the point of granting fatisfaction
to the King. His arrival produced an entire altera-
tion in the meaſures intended by the Spanish court,
for they inftantly reſolved to reject his Majeſty's pro-
VOL. I.
K
pofals;
194 NEGOTIATIONS of
pofals; and thus the Prince of Orange became an-
fwerable for the event of this affair.
The Marquis of Grana being no less engaged
than the Prince of Orange, and equally defirous of
a war, made the Dutch troops march under Bruffels,
and propoſed that they ſhould proceed in conjunction
with thoſe of Spain to levy contributions on the
French territories: but General Alva, of the Pro-
vince of Frieſland, who commanded theſe troops,
having refuſed, the Marquis of Grana was obliged
to order them back to their firſt ſtation, and he fent
a diſpatch to complain to the Prince of Orange.
The deputies of Amfterdam having returned to the
Hague, the Prince of Orange for the third time
brought the levy under confideration; but they ftill
oppofing it, he fent them back again to their con-
ftituents, and they returned on the 28th with the
fame orders, and for the third time rejected his
propofal.
The Prince of Orange endeavoured to make
advantage of the orders given at this time by his
Majefty, that Mr. Deval ſhould leave France, and
the declaration which Marſhal D'Humieres had
caufed to be made to the Marquis of Grana, when
he entered upon the Spaniſh territories, at the head
of his Majeſty's troops. He fomewhat ftaggered the
deputies of Amfterdam, but he could not entirely
perfuade them; and I, on my part, did all I could
to confirm them in their refolutions. However, I
could not reap all the advantage which might have
been expected from the favourable refolutions of the
city of Amſterdam. There were at this time two
opinions which prevailed in Amfterdam. One of
thofe, who were defircus all differences betwixt
his Majesty and Spain fhould be adjuſted, and that
a ftronger attachment than ever fhould be formed
with France: The other arofe from Van Buning,
who
COUNT D'AVAUX.
195
who was really defirous that all difputes fhould be
terminated without delay; but that they fhould at
the fame time unite themſelves with England, and
form new treaties of alliance with all the Princes
willing to enter into them. Van Buning maintain-
ed, nothing could tend more to the welfare of the
States, than forming a ftrict union with Eng
land. He affured fome perfons of the States, tha
his chriſtian Majefty and the King of England wer
irreconcilable enemies, and the Duke of York ftil
more fo; and that all this appearance of friendſhip
was only an outward fhew, occafioned by neceffity.
that his Majeſty made uſe of the King of England
to procure fatisfaction from the Spaniards, withou
being obliged to have recourſe to war; and that the
King of England and the Duke of York had fill
more occafion for his Majefty to eſtabliſh and keep
up their authority, till they ſhould dare to call a
Parliament; but that as foon as the King of Eng-
land fhould be freed from any apprehenfion of his
Parliament, and the States General be willing to
fupport him, and to enter into the league they had
formerly refuſed, then it would foon be feen, that
his Britannic Majefty would entirely defert France.
Mean while, the Prince of Orange fpared neither
threats nor careffes to obtain the fixteen thouſand
troops. He once more affembled the States of Hol-
land, and declared to them, they would foon ſee a.
year like that of 1672; that at that period he
was not fo converfant in affairs to foreſee the fatal.
confequences, as at prefent; but he could affure
the States, if they allowed two months to elapfe
without raifing new reinforcements, they would
find themſelves the year following reduced to much
greater extremity than they had felt in 1672, and
with much leſs reſources than at that time. Penfi
onary Fagel on his part too, harangued them with
great
K 2
196 NEGOTIATIONS of
great warmth; he affured the States of Holland, that
the Emperor was about to conclude a peace with
the Grand Turk, and that he was pofitive there
would be a general treaty of confederacy the enſuing
fpring, amongſt all the powers of Europe againſt
the King of France.
But all theſe efforts proving ineffectual, he now
endeavoured to make all poffible advantage of the
refolution he had drawn the States General into on
the 4th of October, to enter into a conference with
the Minifters of their allies, and the Spaniſh Refi-
dent; he appointed Penfionary Fagel to give an
account of this conference to the States of Hol-
land. He got them likewiſe to name commiffaries
to examine this affair. His defign was to fhew the
Province of Holland, fince even in the opinion of
their allies (who confifted however, only of the Em-
peror's refident and the Swediſh envoy) they could
not find means of amicably adjuſting the differences
betwixt France and Spain (for this was what the
Penfionary's report contained) there was now no
other method to purſue, but to put the Low Coun-
tries in a ſtate of defence, and conſequently to raiſe
levies.
But the Prince of Orange did not fucceed by
this expedient; for the commiffaries having exa-
mined the report, and laid it before the States of
Holland, the body of nobles and ſome of the towns
devoted to the Prince of Orange, having declared,
that though they were for trying all poffible means
of accommodation, they were of opinion neverthe-
leſs, the levy ought not to be deferred; the deputies
of the greateſt part of the towns declared, they
could fay nothing upon that particular, not having
inftructions from their conftituents. As for thoſe of
Amfterdam, they declared, before any thing could
be reſolved about the levy, all poffible means ought
to
COUNT D'AVAUX.
197
to be tried to fettle the differences betwixt France
and Spain in an amicable manner, and that they
were perfuaded the affair might be accommodated;
that they could not however explain themſelves far-
ther, till they ſhould conſult their ſuperiors; thus
the deputies of Holland feparated, in order to re-
ceive advice from their reſpective towns.
The Marquis of Grana fent Mr. Delval, upon
his 'eturn from France, to affift the Prince of
Orange, who adviſed him to go to Amfterdam
whilſt the preſent affairs were under deliberation,
and to ſpread fuch reports as might be conducive to
determine this city to confent to the levy.
I uſed my utmoſt endeavours to diſcover the fe-
cret inftructions of Delval; and I found one of the
principal things recommended to him was, to urge
the Prince of Orange to demand the Swedes at Got-
tenburg. And this indeed was the firſt thing men-
tioned in a conference with him of two hours; but
the Prince of Orange told him, that things were
not yet in fuch a fituation, that he could venture to
propoſe the tranſportation of theſe troops; that he
could not prevail on the States General to raiſe fix-
teen thousand men, and therefore was at preſent
unwilling to propoſe any other affair; ſo that the
fleet remained for a confiderable time cruizing
northward, in expectation of receiving new in-
fructions from the Prince of Orange. Twice,
however, it failed to Gottenburg, without taking
aboard a fingle Swede: though, at the fame time,
there is no room to doubt, but the Prince of Orange
flattered himself he fhould obtain permiffion from
the States General for embarking the Swediſh troops;
or that the King of Sweden would not refuſe them,
though even the commander of the fleet ſhould have
no other orders than thofe from the Prince of Orange
alone; but ſeveral perfons in Amfterdam, fometime
after, received letters from Gottenburg, and even
K 3
from
198
NEGOTIATIONS of
from Stockholm, fignifying, that the King of Sweden
had refuſed to allow the embarkation of the troops in
the Dutch fleet, though the admiral had no orders from
theStates General,but only from thePrince of Orange.
Although I did not chooſe to appear openly to
intereft myſelf in the refolution which the States
General ſhould take in regard to the levy propofed,
yet I failed not underhand to work upon the magi-
ftrates of Amfterdam; and as I knew the Prince of
Orange and Penfionary Fagel had repeated for two
years fucceffively, fometimes that his Majeſty had
refolved on war, and that the States General had
no other method to purfue but to put themſelves in
a ftate of defence; at other times they would
affirm the vigorous refolutions they had taken had
put a stop to his Majefty's defigns; I therefore
thought it incumbent upon me to inform all with
whom I had any correfpondence, that his Majeſty
had neither refolved upon war, nor was he afraid of
their power; but that he infifted upon fatisfaction
for his claims, and if the States would procure him
fuch fatisfaction, they might remain affured of the
moſt profound repofe; but if they thought by aug-
mentation of their forces, or by new treaties to fup-
port the Spaniards in their obftinacy, I left them to
judge what they might expect from fuch behaviour.
Theſe remonftrances gave a new light to feveral
perfons in Amfterdam, and prevented their going
blindly into all the Prince of Orange's propofitions;
they then repreſented to their friends, that things
were not ſo deſperate as ſome would make them be-
lieve, and as they were well affured reaſonable terms
might be obtained from France, there was there-
fore no occafion for making new levies.
On the firft of November I fent intelligence of an
affair which feemed to me of the utmoft confequence.
I had diſcovered by means of a perfon, in whom
the Prince of Orange put the higheft confidence,
that
COUNT D'AVAUX.
199
that though in raiſing fixteen thousand men, the
principal deſign of this Prince was to fupport the
war, or rather to kindle it in the Low Countries,
yet he had likewiſe, as a fecondary view in this
fcheme, to have a powerful army in Holland which
he might make ufe of in England, either when the
King of Great Britain ſhould drop off, or, as he always
expected, when any other favourable opportunity
fhould occur, when he might enter into this king-
dom with an armed force; for he doubted not, if
he could once procure this levy from the States Ge-
neral, that it would be an eaſy matter for him, un-
der one pretext or another, to have them kept up
four or five years, as he thought proper; and he per-
fuaded himſelf, that before this time was elapfed,
he fhould be able to make uſe of theſe troops to ex-
ecute his deſigns in regard to England. I not only
gave notice of this intelligence to the King and M.
Barillon, but I alſo took care it ſhould be commu-
nicated to the Engliſh envoy by a perfon not in the
leaſt ſuſpected.
On the 4th of this month I informed his Mas
jefty of another advice, which I received by a very
fecret channel, that as foon as news was received
of his Majeſty's ſquadron in the Baltic being abou、
to return to France, the Prince of Orange had ſent
inſtructions to Willem Baftians, commander of the
Dutch fleet, to fail towards Gottenburg, to meet
the French fleet: they would in all probability, he
faid, infift upon his ftriking, but this he must re-
fuſe, and if they fired upon him, he fhould imme-
diately come to an engagement. Willem Baſtians
made anſwer to the Prince of Orange, that the
States General had delivered him their refolution,
enjoining him not to ftrike to the French fquadron,
if he found them upon the Dutch coaft at a certain
depth, but otherwiſe he was to ftrike where ever he
met them. The Prince of Orange, nevertheleſs,
K 4
wrote
200
NEGOTIATIONS of
wrote him again, to do as he had ordered; adding,
he would be furety no harm fhould enſue, and if
the States General ſhould call him to an account, he
had only to anſwer, that he had obeyed his maſter,
who had a right to command him.
As to the propofal lately made by the Prince of
Orange, the King returned for anfwer, that he
could not give up any of his poffeffions near Lux-
emburg, becauſe this place being incapable to ſerve
the Spaniards in the defence of any of their territo-
ries, would only enable them to diftreſs his Ma-
jefty's fubjects; he would therefore never grant
them fuch a power. He only commanded me to
inform myſelf more exactly of the places to be
given up, and thoſe to be kept for Spain in that di-
vifion of the Netherlands, which the Prince had
lately propofed.
Mean while I availed myſelf not a little, and
gained confiderably with the magiftrates of Amfter-
dam by that readineſs which his Majefty fhewed to
fettle his differences with Spain; fo that on the
4th of November, no leſs than feven deputies re-
turned from this city to the Hague, to ſupport their
refolution againſt levying the fixteen thouſand troops,
and in this they to the laſt perſifted.
This fame day I received a letter by an exprefs
from his Majefty. In this he gave me to under-
ftand, that, as my laft letters had entirely confirm-
ed him in his opinion, that the Prince of Orange
was not in earneſt as to his propofals, he therefore
judged it proper, I fhould inform the States Gene-
ral on what conditions the difputes he had with
Spain might be terminated; and at the time when
Marthal D'Humieres by his orders attacked a cer-
tain garriſon in the Low Countries, it was his in-
tention I ſhould then declare to the States General,
the terms on which he was willing to make an ac-
commodation with Spain.
That
COUNT D'A VAUX.
201
That very evening I demanded an audience with
the States General, and I begged there might not,
according to cuſtom, a day intervene betwixt my
requeſt and the audience. This precaution fuc-
ceeded according to my wifhes, fince the States
General were informed of the conditions on which
his Majefty offered peace before they heard of the
Spaniſh garriſon being befieged; for the Marquis of
Grana's courier, who brought the news of the fiege
of Courtray, did not arrive at the Hague till an
hour after I had received an audience.. Befides, I
wanted to declare the pacific intentions of his Ma-
jefty to the States General the fame day that the
States of Holland affembled; not doubting but my
memorial, which they would immediately carry
from the States General to the States of Holland,
would be of great fervice to the deputies of Amfter-
dam, who were firmly to oppofe the Prince of
Orange's defigns.
On the 5th of November I went again to the
States General, and told them, my mafter was willing
to fubmit his difputes with Spain to the arbitration of
the King of England, and though the town of Luxem-·
burg, furrounded with towns and countries belong-
ing to his Majefty, could be of no great fervice
when its fortifications were demoliſhed, yet he
would be fatisfied with it for an equiva'ent; eſpe-
cially, as this place could no ways be prejudicial to
the barrier, which the States General fo ardently
wiſhed to preferve: but that the backwardneſs of
the Spaniards to come into any reaſonable meaſures,.
had obliged his Majefty to order his troops to ad-
vance to Flanders, and to prefs the Marquis of
Grana to give him fuch fatisfaction, as he could
in juſtice demand.. However, as they had only
anfwered his demands by acts of hoftility, his Ma-
jefty intended no longer to defer ufing the means
providence
K 5
202
NEGOTIATIONS of
providence had put in his power to do himſelf ju-
ftice, but to attack fome place in Flanders which
belonged to his catholic Majefty. Nevertheleſs, as
his principal intention was to eſtabliſh peace through-
out all Europe, he would willingly make the States
General acquainted with what he would accept
as an equivalent for his rights and claims on Aloft,
Ghent, and other places.
That the way to fettle ſpeedily the differences
between his Majefty and Spain, was to give up the
town of Luxemburg in its preſent condition, or
even with its fortifications razed, with the few
villages depending thereupon, in number but about
fourteen or fifteen.
That if the Spaniards rejected this offer, as a
fecond equivalent, his Majefly would accept of
Dixmude and Courtray, with their dependencies;
nevertheleſs, that Dintz and its dependency (though
it properly belonged to the chatellany of Cour-
tray) fhould remain to the Spaniards, and the for-
tifications of Dixmude and Courtray, nay the cita-
del of Courtray, be demolished; fo that there
ſhould only remain one wall for the fecurity of the
manufactures and commerce of theſe two towns.
Beſides, that he ſhould have the villages belonging
to the chatellany of Ath, which had been formerly
joined to the government of Tournay, but his Ma-
jefty had confented they fhould be feparated from
thence by the treaty of Nimeguen, that he might
not retard the re-eſtabliſhment of peace; Beau-
mont and Bouvines alfo, with their dependent vil-
lages, whereof there remained only four or five,
the reft having come under his Majefty, by poffef-
fion taken of them in his name, before raiſing the
fiege of Luxemburg; and lafly Chimay, with its
dependences.
That
COUNT D'AVAUX.
203
That if the catholic King choſe rather to give an
equivalent in Catalonia or Navarre; as to the firft,
his Majefty required what remained to the Crown
of Spain in the county of Cerdagne, to which Puig-
cerda (which was already demoliſhed) belongs,
with Seau d'Urgel, Campfredon, and Caſtel faillite,
with their dependences; or Rofes, Gironne, and
Cap de Quieres.
And in Navarre, his Majefty would be contented
with Fontarabia and Pampeluna, with their de-
pendencies. That theſe were the conditions on
which they might eſtabliſh a fure and happy peace
before the year was ended; and that if the Empe-
ror would accept of a truce, which the King had
offered for twenty or five and twenty years, he
confented, that the Princes of Europe, who were
willing, fhould become guaranties of thefe treaties.
;
Whilft I thus declared the King's intentions to
the States General, delivering them what I had faid in
writing, the deputies of Amſterdam ſpoke warmly
againſt the new levy in the States of Holland, this
day affembled. The Penfionary of this city de-
claimed above an hour. He reprefented the da-
mage a war would bring upon their commerce;
and that their liberty of fiſhing without moleftation,
was of itſelf more confiderable to the republic,
than what his Majeſty demanded for a fatisfaction
and that when Amſterdam had refuſed to grant the
new levy, this was not the fentiment of a few in-
dividuals in the city, but all had unanimoufly con-
curred in this opinion. The Prince made a reply,
and faid, if the embaffador of France was to ſpeak,
he could not exprefs himſelf more aptly than the
gentlemen of Amfterdam had done for the intereſt
of France. That he agreed it was right to think
of preferving their commerce, but that they muſt
not act in fuch a manner as to ruin the reft of the
K 6
country
204
NEGOTIATIONS of
country upon this confideration only. That though
Amfterdam had fo great a concern in commerce,
the rest of the towns, which had not fo much, or
even thoſe who had none, were nevertheleſs mem-
bers of the republic: that he himſelf was more deep-
ly intereſted in the preſervation of the Republic,
than all the city of Amfterdam; that he regarded
not this unanimity of the council of their city; that
he allowed all the towns were free, and uncon-
troulable in their refolutions; but that he would
never fuffer one town to give law to the reft; and
that if he muſt march with a ſtaff in the ſtreet (this
is a Flemish proverb, which expreffes with fome
ftrength, if he was driven to extremities) he would
have recourſe to this, and would confider Amfter-
dam no more than the leaſt town in the Republic.
But my memorial being at this juncture brought
from the States General into the Province of Hol-
land, the Prince of Orange was tranſported to ſuch
a degree of paffion, that though a man of temper,
yet he had now no command of himſelf, and quit-
ted the affembly, before it broke up, in the moſt
abrupt and precipitate manner.
*3
Penfionary Fagel, who on the other hand is a
very paffionate man, acknowledged, that the Prince
of Orange was too hafty; he wanted to reconcile
matters, and advanced many arguments to the de-
puties of Amfterdam to perſuade them to a levy.
One of them replied, that what related to affairs
abroad, was not to be taken under confideration, till
thoſe of a domeſtic nature were firft difcuffed. That
a levy of fixteen thousand men was demanded ;
that the city of Amfterdam payed more than a
fourth of what the feven Provinces altogether con-
tributed for the common expence, and frequently
too they advanced money for the reft; that he
entreated then the Province of Holland would con-
fider
COUNT D'AVAUX.
205
fider if they were in a condition to furniſh the ex-
pence neceffary for the fixteen thousand men ; fince
the city of Amfterdam, after having examined the
ſtate of their finances, declared, they were unable to
contribute their proportion.
Thus the affembly broke up, without the Prince
of Orange's creatures being able to effect any thing;
and the deputies were fent to their towns with my
memorial, to deliberate upon it, and to return in four
days to form their final reſolution upon my me-
morial, as well as the propofal of the levy.
On the 8th of November I informed the King
my maſter of all theſe particulars, and I acquainted
him, that as this one city ſtood out alone againſt
the other ſeventeen, the States of Holland had wrote
to the magiftrates of Amfterdam, entreating them
not to remain obftinate in their opinion; but how-
ever, if this city would not comply, by the con-
ſtitution of their Province, they ſaid they would be
obliged to ſend a very confiderable deputation from
the other cities to refide in Amfterdam, at the ex-
pence of this city, till fhe fhould acquiefce with the
general opinion; but that this was an extremity
which they had not had recourſe to but once fince
the eſtabliſhment of the Republic, when the little
city of Gorcum wanted to have money coined
which did not belong to the States General; that
nevertheleſs, they had begun this method of proce-
dure againſt the citizens of Amfterdam, the Prince.
of Orange having cauſed a letter to be wrote by the
deputies of all the other towns of Holland, to be
given to thoſe of Amfterdam; but that the inhabi-
tants of this city would not regard the deputation,
for this fort of puniſhment could only frighten the
petty towns, which might be affected with fuch an
expence.
However,
206 NEGOTIATIONS of
However, I thought it would not be amifs to
fpeak to the deputies of Amfterdam before they
returned, to ftrengthen them againſt this new ftrata-
gem of the Prince of Orange. I fent privately to
them, not venturing to go myfelf, for fear of render-
ing them too much fufpected, for the Prince of
Orange had already reproached them with acting in
concert with me; I affured them, if they perfevered
in refufing the levy, that the Spaniards would give
fatisfaction to the King, and there would be no
war. And upon the anſwer I received from them,
I wrote the King, that theſe deputies were returned
home thoroughly convinced of the reaſons his Ma-
jefty had given for attacking Courtray, and more
refolved than ever, notwithſtanding this fiege, to
refuſe the levy of fixteen thouſand men.
I was accordingly informed at their return, that
the council of their city had followed their fenti-
ments, and that they were come with the moſt
ample and favourable inflructions upon the prefent
juncture of affairs. I was even fo lucky as to pro-
cure a copy of them before they were laid before the
Province of Holland. The principal heads of theſe
inftructions were:
I. Abfolutely to refufe the levy.
II. To demand, that all the Provinces fhould
pay in, before the end of the year, all the arrears
they were indebted to the public fund, and to the city
of Amfterdam, which had advanced confiderable
fums for them.
The Provinces were not in a condition to anſwèr
this demand in the ſpace of ten years.
III. To demand that the ſtate of the finances
fhould be examined into; that if they found they
were obliged by an accommodation being refuſed,
or by a general rupture, to raiſe levies, they might
be
COUNT D'AVAUX,
207
be enabled to judge what funds there were to defray
fuch expences.
This article was wholly levelléd at the Penfi-
onary Fagel and the Prince of Orange. The former
was accounted a bad financer, for it was believed
he had allowed the Prince of Orange to make uſe
of a confiderable part of the money raiſed for other
purpoſes than the public fervice; and as the account
had not been examined fince the Penfionary entered
upon the adminiftration, it was believed fuch an
examination would bring him into difficulties, from
which he could not eaſily extricate himſelf.
IV. The deputies of Amfterdam were to declare,
the council of this town was of opinion, it would be
adviſable to accept of his Majefty's fecond propofal,
and they were to demand commiffaries to be named,
who might confer with me, in order to confider
more fully the difficulties which might happen in
the execution of this propofal, and thereby to take
away from the Spaniards all pretence for a refuſal,
and fo make them acquiefce in a general accommo-
dation.
V. They had orders to declare to the affembly, that
if, after the taking of Courtray, his Majefty fhould
attack any other place, they fhould then return to
Amſterdam to confider whether the levy was necef-
fary. They were called upon fome days afterwards,
to perform this part of their inftructions, when
news came that Dixmude was attacked; but they
made anſwer, that Dixmude and Courtray being
in one equivalent, they reckoned thefe two places
one and the fame.
What rendered the magiftrates of Amfterdam fo
refolute on this occafion (befides the general reaſons
for the public welfare and the affurances I had given
them, that they would have no war if they refuſed
the
208
NEGOTIATIONS of
the fixteen thouſand men) was the three extraordi-
nary ſteps lately taken by the Prince of Orange.
The firft was, his having fent fuccour to the
Spaniards without the conſent of the States Gene-
ral, and directly contrary to the inclination of the
city of Amfterdam, and in having given fourteen
thouſand men inſtead of eight thouſand. Se-
condly, his having fent the fleet of the States to
Gottenburg without their knowledge, or without
giving them any reafon for thus hazarding their
ſhips at ſuch an advanced feafon. This conduct of
the Prince of Orange had given juft caufe of appre-
henfion to the magiftrates of Amfterdam, that if
they granted the levy, they would no longer have it
in their power to hinder war, fince the Prince of
Orange thus difpofed of their troops and fhips ac-
cording to his fovereign pleaſure The third affair
which irritated the city of Amfterdam was, the bad
treatment which Van Buning and their other depu-
ties had received from the Prince of Orange, who
had not only infulted them with abuſive language,
but alſo endeavoured to intimidate them with me-
naces.
The affembly of the States of Holland on the
12th of November fat that day from eleven of the
morning till five of the Evening. At their break-
ing up, I was informed that the deputies of Am-
fterdam had read there the memorials which I have
mentioned, and that they remained fteady in their
refufal of the levy, and in the declaration they had
made, that the only method to be purſued was, to
endeavour to bring about an accommodation.
that after warm diſputes on both fides, the Prince of
Orange and Penfionary Fagel made the States of
Holland refolve to have recourfe to that form which
I have obferved was but once put in practice fince
the eſtabliſhment of the Republic; that they ſhould
So
name
COUNT D'AVAUX.
209
name a formal deputation from the body of nobles,
and the ten principal cities of Holland, to go to Am-
fterdam, to oblige this city to confent to the levy.
They accordingly named four deputies from the
nobles, and two from each of the ten towns, with
Penfionary Fagel, and the Prince of Orange at the
head of this deputation, as firft noble, and governor
of the Province.
The Prince of Orange now f und himself redu-
ced to a great extremity, to be thus obliged to fhew
all Europe, that the firft city of the States, and that
which payed one fourth of all the taxes on the feven
Provinces, formally oppofed what he defired.
He was extremely fenfible this would hurt him
greatly with his allies: he, therefore, that fame
evening, fent a meffage to Amfterdam, to inform
them of the reſolution taken, believing they would
make fome advances to prevent this deputation
coming to them; but they fent back word, that they
could not alter their opinion, and would expect the
deputies of Holland.
The Spaniſh envoy, who had caufed a lift to be
printed, of all the places of which the King had
taken poffeffion, prefented alfo this day a memorial,
full of complaints and falfhoods; but this, however
had no effect upon the magiftrates of Amfterdam.
On the 15th of this month, an eſchevin of Am-
fterdam having fent me word, that he wanted to
communicate to me fomewhat from two Burgo-
maſters of this city, I fet out in the night to meet
him, about three leagues from the Hague, and I
got to the place appointed at day break. Ha
told me, that the council of Amfterdam having
been fully informed of the equivalents which the
King offered to receive, were of opinion they
were extremely reaſonable: that Van Buning was
the only perfon who defired, that the King fhould
give
210
NEGOTIATIONS of
give up to the Spaniards his poffeffions in Luxem-
burg; that they had alfo refolved anew to perſiſt in
refufing the levy, and that they were not only una-
nimous in this opinion, but that the whole thirty-
fix of the council had figned a written agreement,
never to depart from this refolution.
About this time I received intelligence, that the
Prince of Orange had formed a deſign to raiſe the
levy, notwithſtanding the council of Amfterdam
refuſed to contribute thereto; and amongst many
other expedients which the Penfionary Fagel
propoſed for that purpoſe, this was one of the prin-
cipal; to get the Provinces to declare, that fince
the city of Amſterdam refuſed to contribute to the
levy of fixteen thousand men, they would not give
any thing towards the expence of the fleet, which
the city of Amfterdam wanted to have ready to
put to fea in the fpring; and that by means of this
declaration, he would have it in his power to take
the fums which the Provinces had deftined for the
equipment of this fleet, to make up that proportio-
nal part which the city of Amfterdam ought to fur-
nifh for maintaining the fixteen thousand troops.
This obliged me to write to the King my maſter,
that though I looked upon his Majeſty's deſigns to
be fo far facred as not to pretend to penetrate into
them; yet I accounted it my duty to reprefent to
him, that if he had refolved to order any place
in the Netherlands to be attacked, fuch an under-
taking would produce very different effects in Hol-
land, according to the time it ſhould be executed;
for if he attacked any place in Flanders, at the time
when the city of Amfterdam refuſed their confent
to the levy, the Prince of Orange would reproach
them as being the cauſe of ſuch an attempt, and he
would affirm this would never have happened, had
they come into the general refolution; and the
council
COUNT D'AVAUX.
21I
council of Amfterdam being thereby rendered def-
perate, would, in all probability, give into this affer-
tion, and would then not only confent to the levy
of 16000, but even 30000 troops. That on the
other hand, if his Majefty did not allow his troops
to come to action, whilft the city of Amfterdam
obſtructed the levy, and waited till the Prince of
Orange ſhould procure fuch a refolution from the
provinces, in fpite of the oppofition of Amfterdam,
and this be carried into execution: in that cafe it
might be declared, eſpecially to the city of Amfter-
dam, that the refolution of the States General to
make levies, had obliged his Majefty to order his
troops to come to action: the people of Amfterdam
would then become more inflamed againſt the Prince
of Orange, and the other cities, which he had in a
manner obliged to confent to the levy, and had en-
gaged them in ſuch a meaſure only by affurances
that it was the fureft way to avoid a war, would
then be ready to join with the city of Amfterdam,
or at leaſt would not obftruct his Majefty's under-
takings.
Mean while the Prince of Orange loft no time,
but employed all his friends to uſe their utmoſt en-
deavours with the magiftrates of Amfterdam; he
had from thence three or four expreffes in a day:
however, not being able to obtain any thing, he
fent Penfionary Fagel and the deputies of the towns
of Holland, to make the laft effort; and he himſelf
went to a houſe of his, three leagues from Amfter-
dam, to wait there for Penfionary Fagel.
But being informed that nothing could fhake the
council of Amſterdam, he went there the 15th of
November, about fix in the evening. His adhe-
rents thought his coming there looked aufpicious,
believing he would not have come, had he not been
affured of fuccefs in his defign. At his arrival he
ordered
212
NEGOTIATIONS of
ordered it to be declared, that he came there in qua-
lity of governor. No body doubted but he had
taken this ſtep to be preſent at the deliberations of
the council of the town; for when the people in
1672 obliged thofe in the adminiftration to confer
fo much authority on the Prince of Orange, and
when all ranks ftrove with a kind of emulation, to
render him more powerful, the regency of Amfter-
dam at that time granted him the privilege of being
prefent at the council of their city, as often as he
fhould come there as governor of the province.
But they avoided the fnare laid for them on this oc-
cafion very artfully; for inſtead of bringing the af-
fairs in queftion before the council of the town,
they came to a refolution to refer the examination
of all memorials to be delivered, to eleven of their
principal members, whom they appointed commiffi-
oners for that purpoſe.
Whilft the Prince of Orange was at Amfterdam,
the fleet of the States met with a dreadful difafter,
in returning from Gottenburg. I wrote the King,
that whatever intention the Prince of Orange had
in fending the fleet of the States to Gottenburg,
whether to take aboard the Swediſh troops, or to
fatisfy the King of Sweden, who infifted that all the
fleet ſhould appear upon his coafts, however it was,
that this affair would certainly hurt him greatly; that
the fleet, when ready to enter the harbours, had been
overtaken with a terrible tempeft, which had be-
gun about 12 at night on Monday, and lafted till
Wedneſday about fix in the morn ng; that the fleet
had been diſperſed, and it was not yet known what
damage it had fuftained; that the firft news gave an
account that fome of the ſhips had come in in a ve-
ry fhattered condition; three had been ſtranded,
and nothing faved but the crews, and two others
had been caft away.
Mean
COUNT D'AVAU X.
213
Mean while the Prince of Orange went the day
after his arrival to the town-hall, with all the de-
putation: Penfionary Fagel declaimed there near
three hours, and delivered what he had ſpoke in
writing, which was put into the hands of the com-
miffaries. The magiftrates of Amſterdam, at com-
ing out of the hall, invited the Prince of Orange,
and the deputation to dinner, and regaled them in a
ſumptuous manner. The burgomaſters, and all the
members of the council were prefent. The Prince
of Orange, who had brought with him fome excel-
lent topers, made defignedly a fort of debauch with
the burgomaſters of Amfterdam, to try if he could
find them more tractable in their cups.
His crea-
tures run about every where the remainder of the
day, and all next day; they cajoled, they prayed,
they folicited, and acted in every fhape to bring
over the gentlemen of Amfterdam. Nevertheless,
the advices I received, pofitively affured me, they
would not recede; and they fent me two expreffes
next day, to acquaint me, that the commiffioners
had employed the whole day in drawing up the r
opinion, which was indeed nothing but a repetition.
of the memorial fent before to the States of Hol-
land, which may be reduced to four particulars,
1. Pofitively to refufe their confent to the levy.
2. That the only way was to endeavour to fettle
the differences betwixt his Majeſty and the King of
Spain in an amicable manner. 3. That they ſhould
make an enquiry into the ftate of the finances.
4. That they fhould prefs the other members of the
ſtate to pay what they ftood indebted of arrears.
The Prince of Orange the day following invited
the magiftrates of Amfterdam to dinner. The bur-
gomafters and echevins went, and many of them
got drunk with the Prince's courtiers: but next
day after their debauch, they fhewed themſelves at
the
214
NEGOTIATIONS of
the council cool and fober, and they altered not
their opinion for all the good chear and cajoleries
laviſhed upon them.
The Prince of Orange ſtirred not from his houſe
all the 18th of this month: fome believed he did
not care to expoſe himſelf to hear the imprecations
which the people then uttered againſt him. All
the feafaring people, efpecially the wives and
daughters of the failors, were running about in the
ſtreets in the moſt frantic manner, making the moſt
hideous uproar about the lofs of the fleet, wherein
their fathers and huſbands had perifhed, of which
he had been the caufe, in fending them to Gotten-
burg, at ſuch`a ſeaſon. The bad news encreaſed
every moment; and they found at length, that above
ten of their largeft fhips were loft, befides thoſe
which had been fo difabled as to be unfit for fer-
vice. Theſe fhips were fo leaky, that they periſh-
ed at once in the ftorm; for they were not in a con-
dition to live at fea, as I before obſerved.
On the 22d of November, the Magiftrates of
Amfterdam returned fuch an anſwer to the Prince
of Orange, as I had before wrote the King they had
refolved upon; and I took the liberty to obferve to
his Majefty, that it. was extraordinary they had
kept the fecret in fuch a manner from the Prince
of Orange; that though he had tools and friends in
the council of Amfterdam, yet he knew fo little of
the matter, that when they came to declare to him
the anſwer of the city, he was ftruck with aſtoniſh-
ment, and a palenefs appeared in his countenance.
He did not however take this firſt refufal; he de-
manded that the city of Amfterdam ſhould name
commiffaries to enter into conference with the de-
puties of Holland. They accordingly met, and
each remained in their fentiments. Penfionary
Fagel having drawn up a reply to the anfwer of the
8
city
COUNT D'AVAU X.
215
city of Amfterdam, carried it with the deputation,
and called upon them for a replication. The gen-
tlemen of Amfterdam fent next day the fame com-
miffaries, to declare they had no other anſwer to
give than what they had already given: upon this
the Prince of Orange demanded a new conference;
this was granted, but there paffed nothing but pro-
teftations on each fide, of the fatal confequences
which would come from fuch proceedings.
At length he was willing to have his laſt anſwer;
and he went to the town-hall, on Sunday morning,
to receive it. He told them they entertained him
in fo genteel a manner, that it looked as if they de-
fired to keep him a confiderable time in their town;
that they must know however, that this was not
the purport of his journey; that he was to return
their anſwer to the States of Holland; and he was
apt to believe all thoſe already given, were only the
ſentiments of a few individuals, and not of the
council of thirty-fix.
That though he faw the little defire they had to
continue long in the union, he would take no no-
tice of this, but would impute it to particular per-
fons, giving them to underſtand however, he al-
lowed them to be too much their own masters; that
he had but too much reafon to complain of the fe-
cret corefpondences and unlawful practices they
carried on with France; that nevertheless, laying
afide all confideration to the deference and reſpect
due to his perfon, and regarding only the intereſt
of the ſtate, he had expoſed himſelf to all that might
happen to him from the difpleaſure of their city;
and that he had come in perfon to perfuade them
of the justice and good tendency of the refolutions
which the States of Holland had taken; that he
flattered himſelf, he in perfon, accompanied with all
the deputies of the province, would have been able
to
216
NEGOTIATIONS of
to bring them over to a reaſonable way of thinking;
but that neither they nor he, notwithſtanding all
their remonstrances, and notwithſtanding the pains
and labour they had taken day and night for this
purpoſe, could obtain any thing but ambiguous an-
fwers, and propofitions for more time and delay.
But that, as he was acquainted with the fentiments
of the States of Holland, he knew this would not
fatisfy them. So that, before he complained of the
anfwers of the commiffaries, named for this pur-
pofe, and the particular conferences he had with
them, he ſtill reſolved in perſon, and in the name
of all the deputation, to demand a categorical an-
fwer, not of the opinion of certain particular per-
fons, as he had already obferved, but of the whole
council of thirty-fix; and to lay before them all the
evils and terrible confequences which would enfue
from an anſwer not conformable to the refolutions
of the other members, that they might not plead
their ignorance as an excufe.
The Penfionary of Amfterdam, in the name of
his maſters, replied, that they all acknowledged they
wifhed the Prince of Orange had not preffed them
to give a categorical anfwer, not from any fcruple
however of declaring their fentiments, but that their
anſwer might appear lefs harſh and diſagreeable;
and this from the reſpect and veneration which they
had and always would have for his perfon: that ne-
vertheleſs they had fully and preciſely declared their
fincere fentiments by word of mouth, as well as
writing; that they faw no neceffity they were un
der to explain themſelves farther, and they knew
no perſon who could oblige them to it.
That as to what the Frince alledged about the
fentiments of particular perfons, they unanimoufly
declared he was miſtaken in this; and they folemnly
proteſted before the fupreme Being, who knows the
bottom
COUNT D'A VAUX. 217
bottom of all hearts, and in prefence of his High-
neſs, who had done them great honour; that there
was not one article in the anſwer which was not
ftrictly conformable to the opinion of all thofe who
compofed the council of the city of Amſterdam.
That they durft now aver, as they could at all
times, that he could not find more unanimity in
fentiments, nor lefs oppofition any where than
amongſt them.
That they aimed at nothing but the welfare of the
Republic, the fupport of their religion, the prefer-
vation of peace, and they believed their reſolutions
were conformable to theſe purpoſes.
That they ſhould have much to reply to what
was advanced by the Prince of Orange; and that
there were perfons in the deputation, and even fome
who depended on them, of whom they had too
great reafon to complain (meaning Fagel, Penfionary
of Holland) but they would reſerve this to a proper
time and place.
That if they had any thing particular to fay in re-
gard to the public welfare, they would give it in
commiffion to the deputies they fhould fend to the
affembly of Holland, in which they thought in
juſtice they ought to be accounted the principal
member. This was one amongst many reaſons why
they thought there was no perfon who could oblige
them to approve of the manner in which the reft
had treated them; and they thought themſelves in
honour bound to guard againft fuch ufage for the
future.
That they hoped thefe reafons would appear fuffi-
cient to the Prince of Orange to perfuade him, not
that they were unwilling to grant a levy, but that
there being no neceffity for it, they ought to op-
pofe fuch a meafure; that this was their refolution,
in which they protefted they would remain, and
VOL. I,
L
for
218
NEGOTIATIONS of
for this purpoſe would give the fulleſt commiffion
to their deputies.
That they found themſelves obliged, from the
ftrongeſt reafons, to think on the re-eſtabliſhment
of their finances, that in cafe of neceffity they might
have money to employ for the fervice of the Re-
public; eſpecially as they found themſelves fo much
drained by the great fums they had furniſhed fince
1672, amounting, as the Prince of Orange knew,
to more than 90 millions, which they were now
obliged to demand.
That they were alfo defirous to declare to the
Prince of Orange, that they thought it reaſonable
and neceſſary to take into confideration the propo-
fals for an accommodation made by his Chriftian
Majefty, which had been communicated to the
States by his embaffador, in the memorial delivered
on the fifth of November.
This reply irritated the Prince to a moft amazing
degree, and produced very warm altercations: he
repeated ſo often that they kept unlawful correfpon-
dences with France, that the four regent burgo-
maſters roſe up, and after having talked together
in a corner of the hall, they came to their feats
again, and told him they owned they kept corref-
pondence with France and many other States; that
this was abfolutely neceffary and unavoidable in a
city ſo powerful and of fo much commerce as theirs;
but that they never had any correſpondence which
they had not given an account of to the ftate; but
as for him, he had minifters who carried on cor-
reſpondences in all the courts of Europe, which he
had not communicated to the States General; that
they would however call him to an account one
day or other, but the proper time was not yet come.
One of the burgomafters told him, that if the city
of Amfterdam had defigned to alter their opinion,
they
COUNT D'A VAUX.
219
they would not now do it, but leave an example to
pofterity, that all the efforts of the Prince of Orange,
and his prefence, could not ſhake the council of the
city of Amfterdam, nor turn them from their free
refolutions.
The Prince of Orange could not contain himſelf
longer; he got up haftily and left the hall, faying,
he faw plainly they carried on fecret intelligences,
and knew with whom, but he fwore he would make
them repent of their conduct. The magiftrates of
Amfterdam propofed he ſhould have dined with them
at the breaking up of their council, and had accord-
ingly provided a grand entertainment for him and
the deputation: but when they went to wait upon
him at his houſe, they were furpriſed to hear, that
he had in great hafte ordered the horfes to his
coach, and was gone with Benting and Penfionary
Fagel, without taking leave of the Regency, as was
ufual.
Two days afterwards, the deputies of Amfterdam
returned to the Hague with their anſwer, which the
States of Holland had demanded. It was a confir-
mation of all they had faid, and confuted what the
Prince of Orange had laid to their charge, efpeci-
ally what regarded their having an unlawful corre-
fpondence with me. Mean while there were two
or three of the Echevins who durft not come to the
Hague, being afraid of fome violence, for the Prince
of Orange had particularly mentioned them in his
menaces.
He had the anſwers and memorials of the city of
Amfterdam, as well as thofe of the deputation read
in the States of Holland. After this he propoſed to
have the levy raiſed in ſpight of that city; and Pen-
fionary Fagel affured the affembly with an oath,
that he knew, if the gentlemen of Amſterdam had
granted the levy, an accommodation betwixt France
1 2
and
220
NEGOTIATIONS of
and Spain would have been already fettled. The
deputies of the towns, who had no orders to con-
fent to a refolution directly oppofed by the city of
Amfterdam, would not acquiefce without the ap-
probation of their fuperiors, and they returned to
their towns to obtain their confent. I therefore wrote
my maſter, that the only queftion was, how the
council of Amfterdam would take this affair; that
if they fteadily oppofed it, and refuſed fupplies, the
Prince of Orange would never be able to obtain his
defign, and would be obliged to fubmit; but if they
acted coldly, and contented themſelves, after having
refuſed the levy, with only making protefts againſt
the refolution taken in oppofition to their inclina-
tion, affairs would then be quieted by degrees, after
a little noife.
The deputies of Amfterdam expreffed their fur-
prize, that in an affair where the unanimous opi-
nion of all the towns was requifite, they ſhould have
taken a reſolution contrary to the most powerful city
of the ftate. They acquainted me however the fame
day, that they were obliged to ufe greater precaution
than ever in regard to me, becauſe the Prince of
Orange, in full council at Amfterdam, had re-
proached them of carrying on a fecret correfpon-
dence; he told them he knew I gave them fine words,
and afſured them of undisturbed repofe, if they would
refuſe the levy; but that, on the contrary, he could
affure them I impoſed on them, and all my promiſes
were only intended to amuſe them till the approach-
ing fpring, when the war was to be commenced;
and mean while his Majefty might ſtrengthen his
alliances, add to his forces, and keep the States
General from putting the Spanish Netherlands in a
itate of defence.
They employed a perſon to wait upon me, by
whom I was informed, they were more than ever
de-
COUNT D'A VA U X.
- 22 I
--
determined not to depart from their opinion: that
they had reſolved to demand the States General to
have a conference with me, to treat about means of
accommodation betwixt his Majefty and Spain;
but that they were well affured all their pains would
be fruitless, as the King of England did not give or-
ders to his miniſter at the Hague, to propoſe a mu-
tual ceffation of hoſtilities, whilſt they endeavoured
to bring about the accommodation, and if his Ma-
jefty did not at the fame time declare by a memo-
rial, that, being in poffeffion of one of the propoſed
equivalents, he would not attempt any thing by
force, provided they would make a proper ufe of the
time accounted neceffary for the re-establishment of
peace, and if he was not obliged to bring his troops
to action to make reprifals. The magiftrates of
Amſterdam were perfuaded they could yet be of fer-
vice, and that every body would foon be convinced
they were not deceived in the hopes they had con-
ceived, of being able by their conduct to contribute
to the re-eſtabliſhment of peace, after the favour-
able declarations already made by his Majefty on
this fubject.
It is furprifing the people of Amfterdam fhould
apply to me to get the English envoy to act in this
affair; it is certain indeed he did nothing, notwith-
ftanding the orders I was inform'd he had received
from England; fo that I know not whether his in-
ſtructions were exactly fuch as the French ambaffador
wrote me from England; for when the Magiftrates
of Amfterdam fpoke to him upon this head, and
when I urged him to explain hirnfelf on the 30th of
November 1683, he told me pofitively, he had ne-
ver received orders to declare, that the King his
Maſter, approved of his Chrift an Majeſty's p opo-
fals, but only to tell thofe with whom he had any
connection, that if the States General cou'd bring
L3
Spain
222
NEGOTIATIONS of
Spain to any conditions, the King of England flat-
tered himſelf he fhould be able to act in fuch a man-
ner as to procure an accommodation.
On the 29th of November, I received informa-
tion, that the houſe of Lunenburg had promiſed to
fend troops into the Low Countries, as foon as the
States General fhould begin to make the levy of
16,000 men.
The Echevin, by whom I uſed to ſpeak to the
magiftrates of Amfterdam, having fallen fick by
the fatigue he had undergone whilft the Prince of
Orange was at Amſterdam, Van Buning and an-
other deputy fent a perfon to wait upon me from
them. I found great difference, however, in treating
with theſe two perfons, and with the Echevin; the
fole view of the latter in procuring peace, was to
unite the States General with the King, which was
agreeable to our intereft: Van Buning, on the con-
trary, finding affairs not properly diſpoſed to ſupport
a war againſt France, wanted to bring about an ac-
comodation with his Majefty, only that he might
afterwards make a ſtronger union betwixt the States
General and England.
This man came to me from the burgomaſters of
Amſterdam, to defire I would give in a ſecond me-
morial to the States General, conformable to what
the magiftrates of Amfterdam had communicated to
me the 26th of the fame month. He made likewife
two confiderable demands; that the King would
grant a delay till the firſt of March, and that he
would name the King of England and the States
General mediators; and they affured me, the coun-
cil of Amſterdam would procure the fecond equiva-
lent entire for his Majefty.
He told me the Magiftrates of Amfterdam were at
preſent ſo much ſuſpected, that they durft hardly fee
me any more; but that they would treat with me
by
COUNT D'AV AU X.
223
by other perfons; they requeſted me not to write
to Amfterdam by the poft, but for the future to
fend an exprefs, becauſe the Prince of Orange
ftopt most of the letters at the Hague; that they
were doing their utmoſt endeavour to hinder the
town from agreeing to the 16,000 men; and that
it was abfolutely neceffary I fhould give fuch a me-
morial as they demanded; for, notwithſtanding their
repeated efforts, to get the firſt I had delivered ex-
amined, they had not been able to fucceed.
On the 30th of November, they fent me by the
fame perſon, a letter which they had received at the
Hague in this it was affirmed, that the Prince of
Orange had faid the foregoing evening, that two
burgomafters, whom he named, muſt be put out
of a condition of oppoſing his deſigns: that another
perfon near him added, that they muſt be ſent to the
other world; and the Prince of Orange replied, that
ten more must likewife accompany them. That a per-
ſon who was fourth man in the council had given
this intelligence, and that they had thereupon doub-
led the guards of their city, and in order to reſcue
them from this imminent danger, I muft deliver the
memorial with the utmoſt expedition; that in this
cafe, they would force the Spaniards to accept of his
Majefty's offers; and what they propofed would be
the only way to ruin the Prince of Orange.
I did not think I could, without the King's per-
miffion, agree to what the Magiftrates of Amfterdam
defired: but ftill I thought it not adviſeable to give
them a peremptory refufal, but that it was requifite
I fhould give them fome encouragement in their pre-
fent fituation. I therefore returned fuch an anſwer
as no ways engaged me, and at the fame time
gave
them all the fatisfaction in my power. It contained
affurances of his Majefty's difpofition for peace in ge-
neral, for the liberty of the States General in parti-
L 4
cular,
224 NEGOTIATIONS of
cular, and above all, that of the city of Amfterdam;
and that his Majefty would never fail to do all in his
power to fcreen them from oppreffion.
I repreſented to them however, that I could not
make the particular declarations they requeſted with-
out an expreſs order, nor did I believe his Majefty
could impower me to do fo; nor durft I undertake
to afk what they propoſed; and I begged they would
confider the matter more fully.
That they demanded his Majeſty would propoſe
the mediation of the King of England; but that they
had long ago expreffed the fame defire, and his Ma-
jefly had laid before them the inconveniencies of this,
in tuch a manner, that the gentlemen of Amſterdam
ought to have been perfuaded thereof; that they
knew affairs could never be fettled by means of a me-
diation; and that after having been a confiderable
time in uncertainty and mutual diftruft, which muſt
involve them in great expences, they would infal-
libly be engaged in a war, which they wanted to
avoid that there were no better means to avoid fuch
an evil than the arbitration which his Majefty had
propoſed; and at this preſent juncture, to take ad-
vantage of the time he had granted Spain to make a
proper equivalent.
That, as for the States General being joined to
the King of England in the fame mediation, they
muſt know that the States General in effect confifted
of no more than the Prince of Orange, and Penfio-
nary Fagel, and thus to refer it to the States Gene-
ral, was only giving up the affair to the determina-
tion of theſe two perfons. That they must remem-
ber, however, that the King of England had de-
clared, if he was made arbitrator, that he would
willingly take the opinion of the States General, nor
would he come to any decifion without communi-
cating it to them.
As
COUNT D"AVAUX.
225
As to the delay, they demanded till the firft of
March, I told them they knew as well as I, that
this was all the Prince of Orange wanted. That his
defign was to fpin out the winter in empty propoſals
of accommodation, becauſe he knew the advantage
which his Majeſty had at preſent, and that he him-
felf could not begin the war till the ſpring.
:
That they knew Count de Waldeck was endea
vouring to aſſemble 10,000 men upon the Rhine
that the houſe of Lunenburg had promiſed to fend
troops to the Low Countries, as foon as the States
General ſhould begin the levy of 16,000 men. (This
was agreeable to the intelligence I had received from
the magiftrates of Amfterdam themſelves) In ſhort, I
fhewed them all the inconveniencies of a new delay;
eſpecially as there was no probability that the Spani-
ards would make any better uſe of this, than what
they had done of that already granted by his Majeſty.
I took care likewife, that they ſhould be founded
as to what hopes they had from a new delay; fince
they could not even yet obtain from the Prince of
Orange, that my memorial fhould be examined.
Whether they had any means, not hitherto in
their power, to make the States General take ad-
vantage of this time, to bring about an accommoda-
tion, inſtead of thinking to raiſe levies?
If they could give affurances, that, during this de-
lay, the levy would not be refolved upon.
And what engagement they would enter into, in
cafe the Spaniards fhould allow the time to elapfe
without coming to any agreement?
In regard to the third article of the declaration,
which they wanted me to make in the name of his
Majeſty, that his troops would commit no hoſtilities
during the time agreed upon to bring about an ac-
commodation, I replied, that I had done myſelf the
honour to write upon the affair to his Majefty, after
their
L. 5
226
NEGOTIATIONS of
their deputies had ſpoke to me, for that I could
not take upon me to give fuch a declaration in
writing, till I had exprefs orders for that purpoſe.
That, in the mean while, to fhew them how
much I was perfuaded of his Majeſty's inclination
for peace, and his defire to comply with every rea-
fonable requeſt from the gentlemen of Amfterdam,
I would do what was equivalent to a memorial,
fince there was fo much danger in delay. That I
would wait upon the deputies of the towns of Hol-
land on Thurſday evening and Friday morning.
That I would tell them, though I waited for the
anſwer of the States General, nevertheleſs I addreff-
ed myſelf to them as the firſt members of the Repu-
blic, in order to perfuade them to make a proper uſe
of the time which remained to bring about an ac-
commodation; and that his Majefty having ordered
back his troops, there was no room to doubt but he
would give the Spaniards time to determine upon the
fatisfaction due to his Majeſty.
The King wrote me, that, as he did not pretend
to regulate the refolutions he ſhould take againft
Spain by what paffed at Amfterdam, he could hot
therefore enter into any engagement not to act against
that crown during the winter.
On the 2d of November, I received intelligence
by a very fure channel, that the province of Friez-
land had refolved to conſent to nothing till they ſaw
what the city of Amſterdam ſhould do; and what
was no lefs important, that ſome of the towns of
Zealand, the province which depended moft on the
Prince of Orange, had come to the ſame reſolution.
I wrote to the King, begging he would pardon.
me if I again took the liberty to reprefent to him,
(as I could do from my knowledge of affairs) that
it was his intereft, in order to preferve the friendſhip
of the magiftrates of Amfterdam, and keep up a
con-
CO UNT D'AVAUX.
227
confidence among them, in caſe his Majefty fhould
attack any confiderable place in Flanders, to im-
power me to declare to them that it was not from
a premeditated defign to invade the Low Countries
(as the Prince of Orange wanted to make them be-
lieve) but that it was the obftinacy of the Spaniards,
fupported by the ambition of the Prince of Orange,
which had obliged his Majefty to take fuch a ſtep,
that he had not propoſed the equivalent to hinder
their making levies, and to gain a proper time to
attack Flanders: but that his Majefty really defired
peace on the conditions he offered; and that, if the
Spaniards had accepted them in the limited time,
there would have been no alteration in affairs.
I fent the King a letter from the Envoy of the
States of Vienna, which mentioned that the Elector
of Bavaria would enter into the treaty of alliance.
The magiftrates of Amfterdam fent me word
feveral times, that they waited with the utmoſt im-
patience till I ſhould have orders to declare by a
memorial, that the King would undertake nothing
during the delay he had granted the Spaniards: and
I wiſhed the rather that his Majefty might give
them ſuch a mark of his reſpect, becauſe they would
then act more ſucceſsfully with the reft of the towns,
there being already fome which had refolved in their
fecret council, to difavow the conſent their deputies
had given to raifing the 16,000 men, and to order
them not to allow it to be concluded in the pro-
vince of Holland, without an unanimous confent.
Mean while the Prince of Orange waited for
Prince Waldeck at the Hague, and I difcovered
that the ſcheme betwixt him and the Auſtrian party
was, if poffible, to begin the conventions they had fo
long propofed, and to concert propoſals of peace
with all the minifters of the Allies, to be offered to
his majeſty.
L 6
On
228
NEGOTIATIONS of
On the 7th of December, I wrote to the King,
entreating him to remember that I often had had the
honour of obferving to him, that I was perfuaded
nothing but the fear of a war could keep the
States General within proper bounds, and oblige
them to bring the Spaniards to reaſonable terms;
that I was ftill perfuaded of this truth; and I hum-
bly requeſted his majefty to permit me to repreſent,
as a thing extremely conducive to his fervice, that
at the fame time when he fhewed them on one fide
an unavoidable war, that he would, on the other,
give them certain hopes of an accommodation, if
they purſued fuch a conduct as fhewed they fin-
cerely defired peace. This his Majefty had already
done with fo much prudence, that the fiege and
taking of Courtray and Dixmude, had more con-
firmed the magiftracy of Amfterdam in their refolu-
tion of refuſing a new levy.
Upon this fame foundation I took alfo the liberty
to tell his Majesty, that if he had no other defign
but to force the Spaniards to accept of the conditions
offered, I was perfuaded, from the knowledge I had
of the Republic, moft of the members of which
heartily wished the Spaniards might be forced to a
compliance, it was only neceffary to acquaint them
that all his Majefty undertook was only to oblige
the Spaniards to accept of conditions, and not with
a defign by degrees to make a conqueft of the Low
Countries, as the Prince of Orange did infinuate; fo
that, if his Majefty attempted nothing in Flanders or
Brabant, where the taking of the moft inconfider-
able place would certainly make a revolution
greatly prejudicial to his Majeſty's intereft, he
might attack Luxemburg after the delay was ex-
pired, without the fear of any fuch inconvenience,
provided his Majefty at the fame time ordered it to.
be
COUNT D'AVAUX.
229
be declared to the States General, that the Spani-
ards having allowed the time granted them for ſet-
tling the equivalent to elapfe, without coming to
any conclufion, he now himfelf chofe to adjuft all
differences, and for the expences he had been ob-
liged to run into to get poffeffion of this equivalent,
he would be contented with Bouvines, Beaumont
and Chimay, with the villages formerly difmem-
bered from the chatellany of Ath; that he granted
likewiſe two months delay to the Spaniards to ac-
cept of this condition; and that all his troops
might perform during this time to force them to an
accommodation ſhould not make any`alteration.
On the fecond of December, the King informed
me that he had refolved not to leave the Spaniards
in quiet, ſo long as they refuſed to accept of one of
the equivalents he had propoſed; and as fome of
the places belonging to the Catholic King would
by his orders in a fhort time be fired, he thought
proper to acquaint me of this beforehand, that I
might be able privately to communicate his inten-
tions to the leading men in Amſterdam.
That the city of Amfterdam could not demand
any thing more contrary to that defire they expreff-
ed of eſtabliſhing peace, than a ceffation of hofti
lities which might force the Spaniards to an accom-
modation; and that he was certain the King of
England, who knew they would come to no terms
till obliged by his Majeſty's arms, would not take
upon him to make a propofal to his Majefty, as had
been mentioned.
I was at this time not a little embarraffed: for
on one fide I had the moſt precife orders to declare
fuch things as muſt be extremely irkſome, and dif-
agreable to the magiftrates of Amfterdam; on the
other fide, I was teazed by them, and indeed they
wanted greatly to be fupported. They fent a per-
fon
230
NEGOTIATIONS of
fon again to me, reprefenting the difficulty to which
they were reduced of being obliged alone to ſtand
out againſt all the efforts of the Prince of Orange
and Penfionary Fagel; that they could not do this
but by juſtifying their conduct, and this they could
effect if his Majefty fhould order his troops to
commit acts of hoftility during the delay he had
granted. That the Prince of Orange had told
them that very morning, that tho' I buoyed them
up with fine hopes, and affured them his Majefty had
no intention to declare war, he confented they
fhould judge by what they would ſee happen in a
fhort time.
They faid their conduct muſt be juftified or
blamed according to what paffed in the Low Coun-
tries. That his Majeſty having one of the equiva-
lents he had demanded, they hoped he would grant
the time neceffary to bring about an accommoda-
tion. That they had already done beyond what
could be expected of them, but if they were not
affifted, they could do no more, and would perhaps
be irrecoverably ruined. That I had affured them
his Majefty was defirous of peace; they believed
this, but were greatly furprized that at the time
when the King of England made advances to bring
about an accommodation, I had no orders to con-
firm in Holland, what his Britannic Majefty had
told their Embaſſador, viz. That it would be ad-
vifeable the States General fhould be joint arbitra-
tors with him. That their embaſſador having an-
ſwered his Britannic Majefty, that it did not be-
come them to be joined in arbitration with a great
King, he had replied that it belonged to him to ad-
vance fuch fcruples; and as he did not, if the States
General continued to excufe themſelves, he would
look upon it as a deſign to avoid an accommodation.
That the King of England could not ſpeak fo po-
fitively,
COUNT D'A V AUX. 231
fitively, without being in concert with his Majefty;
fo that I muft either have orders conformable there-
to, or his Majeſty had no defign to execute what it
appeared to them he had promifed, and had made
them expect.
It would be tedious to repeat here all this man
urged to me, and what I anſwered. I will only
mention that I gave him to underſtand that the
King agreed to all the magifirates of Amfterdam
defired, and in a more advantageous manner than
they demanded; that if I fhould declare there was
to be a ceffation of all hoftilities this would only
render the Spaniards more infolent, and the Prince
of Orange more daring; that on the contrary the
dread and effect of theſe hoftilities would fhew the
Spaniards the neceffity of coming to an accommo-
dation; that there remained only therefore to affure
the magiftrates of Amfterdam, of the confequence
which would arife from his Majefty's forces being
put in action; and that as I had orders to affure
them, that this would not alter the propoſals his
Majefty had offered, provided they were accepted
by the end of this year, the Magiftrates of Amfter-
dam might remain affured they had nothing to ap-
prehend.
On the ninth of this month I was informed that
Prince Waldeck was not to be at the Hague till the
tenth of January; that this day being fixed upon to
begin the general convention of the minifters of
the Allies, the-Bavarian and Saxon Miniſters were
to be there, together with the Emperor's, and thoſe
of Spain and Sweden.
I was alfo informed of the principal articles
which they intended to take into confideration in
this convention, to which they likewife invited
France; they were to examine by what means they
could eſtabliſh peace; and if nothing could be devi-
fed
232
NEGOTIATIONS of
fed to give fatisfaction to all parties, they were then
to agree upon meaſures to be taken against thoſe
who refuſed to accept of the conditions which ſhould
be judged reaſonable by the majority.
The States of Holland were two days affem-
bled, and no mention was made of the levy. I
had ſome difficulty to diſcover what they had under
their confideration; I was at laft, however, inform-
ed, that theſe two mornings had been ſpent in de-
vifing ſchemes to bring all into the fame opinion;
that for this purpoſe they had ſeparately applied
themſelves to draw up plans, one of which they
had ſent to the city of Amfterdam.
The perfon
who uſed to ſpeak to me from them, waited upon
me the fame evening: he told me that the Prince
of Orange finding himfelf in the greateſt difficulty,
and the magiſtrates of Amfterdam being no lefs
embarraffed, this Prince had entreated them to fave
his honour, and not to offer him an infult, which
would ruin his reputation throughout all Chriften-
dom; that fome of the towns having thereupon un-
dertaken to find means to accommodate the diffe-
rences betwixt his Majefty, and Spain, and at the
fame time to fave the Prince of Orange's honour,
had at laſt agreed upon a ſcheme which the depu-
ties of Amfterdam had fent to their mafters for
approbation.
The import of this was, that his Majefty having
named an arbitrator, they hoped he would agree
that Spain fhould nominate another; if Spain re-
fuſed this, they would abandon his Catholic Ma-
jefty; and if the King of France would not con-
fent that Spain fhould name an arbitrator, they would
raife the levies; but if his Majefty agreed, that who-
ever Spain named fhould remain arbitrator with the
King of England, they would confent to the le-
vies for the Prince of Orange's honour, but they
would not raiſe them.
COUNT D'A VAUX. 233
They knew already that the Spaniſh court would
name the States General; and the deputies of Am-
fterdam acquainted me, if his Majefty would not
agree to them, they would fubftitute the King of
Sweden.
I exclaimed vehemently againſt this propofal:
I told them that the Prince of Orange had at laſt
accompliſhed what he had fo long defired. I re-
preſented to them, for the third time, the inconve- ·
niences of an arbitration in the hands of the States
General; I told them they were deceived by their
embaffador in England, and that his Majeſty had
no thoughts of bringing his indifputable rights to a
compromife. That ever fince my memorial deliver-
ed on the fifth of laſt November, the point was not
an arbitration or mediation, but the acceptance or
refufal of one of the equivalents offered by his Ma-
jefty. That the King of England was neutral, and
might be an arbitrator; but neither the States General
nor Sweden could be arbitrators, becauſe they were
in league with Spain for the explanation of the
treaties of Nimeguen. That the Prince of Orange
wanted nothing more than fuch a confent for the
levy; that he could eafily find fufficient obftacles
to hinder the effect of the arbitration, if it was
even accepted. That Penfionary Fagel, who had
the direction of affairs, could protract this to an im-
moderate length; that the deputies in fecret affairs
would give fuch a decifion as the Prince of Orange
pleafed; and thus the accommodation not being
fettled, he would take advantage of the confent to
the levy, and actually make it. That I therefore
hoped the council of Amfterdam were fenfible of
the dangerous confequences of this propofal, and
would reject it.
He replied, that by the peace of the Pyrenees, his
Majefty naming an arbitrator, the King of Spain
had
1
234
NEGOTIATIONS of
had a right to name one alſo. That he could affure
me from the deputies of Amfterdam, that this affair
ſhould not be trufted to the deputies for fecret af-
fairs; that the regency of Amfterdam had joined
themſelves infeparably to the provinces of Friez-
land and Groningen. That feveral towns of Hol-
land had likewife joined them: that they had only
fuch a complaifance for the Frince of Orange, as
not to diſhonour him; but that this Prince faw very
well to what an extremity he was reduced, and that
he could not ftand out againſt the laudable defigns
of the magiftrates of Amfterdam. That they could
not at preſent explain themfelves more precifely;
but they affured me his Majefty fhould be fatisfied;
and as they had uſed all their efforts to avoid a war,
they would not now run the risk of falling into one,
whatever his Majefty might defire. I replied, that
I doubted not the good intention of the gentlemen
of Amfterdam, but that I did not believe they could
effect it; that the Prince of Orange wanted only
to gain time by fuch empty propofals; that I had
good intelligence of this; and that I had the ho-
nour of communicating it to his Majefty three
months before.
I at laſt convinced this man of the fallacy of this
ſcheme, the injury which the gentlemen of Amfter-
dam were about to do themſelves, thereby to raiſe
the Prince of Orange's credit to the higheſt pitch,
after they had begun to fhew him that he could not
for the future carry on any thing contrary to their
inclination. In fhort, that under pretext of faving
the Prince of Orange's honour, they were going to
deſtroy their own, and all the fruits of their vigo-
rous conduct, and for ever to ruin the hopes of
ſuch honeſt perſons as wifhed to ſee the liberty of
the Republic re-establifhed.
I begged
COUNT D'AVAU X.
235
+
I begged this man to reprefent all theſe things to
the magiftrates of Amfterdam, and to make them
confider the reafons I advanced, and report to me
their anſwer. I was not even fatisfied with this,
for I fent a perfon in whom I could confide to
Amfterdam, and I fpoke alfo to fome of their
friends.
This perfon returned to me two days afterwards,
from the deputies of Amfterdam, to tell me they
had wrote to their mafter all I had urged; that
their conſtituents being convinced by my reafons,
had refolved to reject the propoſal, and had accord-
ingly inftructed them to keep to their firſt orders,
and abfolutely to refufe the levy.
This man added, that the council of the city of
Amfterdam, had at the fame time ordered their de-
puties to reprefent to me that they ftood in neceffi-
ty of the King's affiftance; and without this all they
had done would be of no fervice to his Majefty,
and the greateſt prejudice to themfelves. That they
would not have acted in the manner they had done
but from an entire confidence in the affurance I had
given them, that his Majefty was defirous of peace;
that the Prince of Orange affured them of the con-
trary, and had made moſt of the towns believe
what he faid; that if, after the expired time, his
Majefty fhould attack any place, the Prince of
Orange would make his advantage of this againſt
them, and they would then have no arguments to
advance againſt thoſe of the Prince of Orange, to
hinder the levy; that they would then find them-
felves obliged to confent to it, and the States Gene-
ral would be drawn into a war though againſt their
inclination.
That his Majefty having taken poffeffion of one
of the equivalents which he demanded, it could no
longer be faid, that the vigorous meaſures which the
Prince
236
NEGOTIATIONS of
Prince of Orange made the States General purfue,
hindered his Majefty from coming to action; that it
would be acknowledged on the contrary, that it pro-
ceeded from a pure defire of peace, and to fupport
the magiſtrates of Amfterdam, who had refuſed the
Prince of Orange every thing which they thought
would tend to kindle a war.
That they had never had ſuch an opportunity of
exerting themſelves as now offered, if his Majeſty
would furnish them with means; that they demand-
ed it of him in the moſt humble and preffing man-
ner, and with the more confidence, becauſe it tend-
ed to his Majefty's advantage, and becauſe they had
no reaſon to believe, that a new delay could be any
ways prejudicial to his intereft in the preſent ſituation
of affairs.
For this reafon, they entreated his Majeſty to be
fo good as to order me to deliver fuch a declaration
as he fhould judge proper, in regard to the fteps
which had been taken at the Hague for the efta-
bliftment of peace, to let them know he was will-
ing to give them time for this purpofe; and that he
would upon this account grant them another delay,
which fhould not be prolonged upon any account
whatever. They promifed to act in fuch a manner
during this time, as to bring the Spaniards to accept
of one of the equivalents; that if they could not ef-
fect this, they faid it would thereby appear, that his
Majeſty had no ways been any hindrance to the
peace, but the whole blame was to be thrown upon
the obftinacy of the Spaniards; and that the magi-
ftrates of Amfterdam would no more be answerable
to the other members of the ftate for what fhould
happen, and they would not be forced to confent to
the levy.
I gave fuch an anſwer to the gentlemen of Am-
fterdam, as was agreeable to my master's inftruc-
tions,
COUNT D'A VA U X,
237
tions, and I added what I thought most likely to con-
vince them; but at the fame time, I informed the
King that I had not convinced the perfon fent me,
and far leſs the people of Amfterdam; that they be-
lieved themſelves ruined; and that I really appre-
hended they would be greatly embaraffed, if his
Majeſty ſhould make any attack on the Spaniſh Ne-
therlands.
I ventured even to write to the King, that I fhould
look upon myſelf guilty of breach of duty, if I did
not do myſelf the honour to reprefent to him, that
it was certain, if his Majefty intended to conquer
the Spaniſh Netherlands, as they were affured in
Holland he could do, he had then no occafion to
pay any regard to the folicitations of the city of Am-
fterdam; but if his Majeſty wanted only to force
the Spaniards to a peace, I could venture to affirm,
that in the preſent fituation of affairs in Holland, a
fiege would not oblige them to it; and the Regency
of Amfterdam thinking themſelves deceived, would
be obliged, contrary to their inclination, to act in
defence of the Spaniards.
That the King knew I had for four years repeat-
ed to him, that the Prince of Orange took advan-
tage of his moderation; that, if I wrote the contrary,
it was becauſe the preſent ſtate of affairs fo required
it. That the Prince of Orange affured the States
that the King was refolved to make war, and the
magiftrates of Amſterdam maintained, his Majefty
had no fuch intention; that it was his intereft to
ftrengthen, their party againſt that of the Prince of
Orange, to preferve the affection of the people of
Holland, and to gain their confidence, which this
Prince could not eaſily deſtroy. That my duty
obliged me to repreſent to his Majefty, that if ſome
fatisfaction was not given to the gentlemen of Am-
fterdam, I ſaw no probability of keeping them;
that
238 NEGOTIATIONS of
that they and all the well affected, would run into
an oppofition againſt all his Majeſty's deſigns, and
the Prince of Orange would then acquire a greater
fuperiority in Holland than ever.
Mean while the anſwer of the city of Amſterdam
was carried to the affembly of Holland: it not a
little chagrin'd and perplexed the Prince of Orange,
who durft not the day following mention the levy,
for he found that feveral of the towns had forbid
their deputies to confent as long as thofe of Amfter-
dam fhould oppoſe it.
This Prince being in the utmoſt deſpair, to find,
that ſeveral of the towns had difavowed their deputies
in giving confent to the levy of 16,000 men, fent for
the burgomaſters to his chamber, one after another.
He threatened deſtruction to ſome and their families,
and he tried to win others with fair fpeeches; but
notwithſtanding all this, he could not make them al-
ter their fentiments: this affair greatly mortified him,
for when he had obliged them to conſent to the levy,
he doubted not but they would have met with the
approbation of their fuperiors; and indeed there are
but few examples of fuch a difavowal, fo that the
well affected, who were before diſcouraged by the
little hopes they had of ſeeing their ancient liberty
eſtabliſhed, began now to refume courage, flatter-
ing themſelves, if the magiftrates of Amfterdam
continued fteady to their purpoſe, they ſhould be
able to curb the authority of the Prince of Orange,
and re-eſtabliſh that of the Republic. The council
of Amſterdam came to a reſolution, as ſoon as pof-
fible, to bring about an accommodation betwixt
France and Spain, and then to endeavour to renew
their ancient alliances with his Majefty, being per-
fuaded if ſuch meaſures were not purſued, their Re-
public would be ruined in its domeftic, as well as
foreign concerns. I was even informed, that they
6
had
COUNT D'A V AUX.
239
had a deſign, after the accommodation was concluded,
to call the Prince of Orange to an account for certain
ſteps he had taken beyond the extent of his office; and
to aboliſh the deputies of fecret affairs, by means of
whom he had kept ſeveral important affairs from the
knowledge of the States General; and that they had
likewiſe feveral other defigns of the fame nature,
which they might eaſily carry into execution, if they
continued firm to their refolutions, of which, how-
ever, I could not take upon me to affure his Maje-
fty, for indeed it would have been highly imprudent
in me to do fo.
I had a different opinion however of the defign
they had of bringing the differences betwixt his Ma-
jefty and the King of Spain to an amicable conclu-
fion. I acquainted the King my mafter, that I was
well affured they would never recede from this, and
that I therefore, at their defire, entreated he would
grant them the only means which could maintain
and ſupport them againſt the Prince of Orange. I
likewife of myſelf fuggefted another reaſon, that, as
the affembly was about to meet in Holland where
the military eſtabliſhment was to be regulated, and
this affair muſt be decided towards the end of the
year; I apprehended the declarations which the
King fhould command me to make at this time,
would be of great weight to make them augment
their troops, or leave them on their prefent footing.
I added to this, that if the King found it agree-
able to his intereft fo far to fatisfy the city of Am-
fterdam, and the well affected of many of the towns
of Holland, and the provinces who had joined
them, by commanding me to deliver to the States
ſuch a memorial as they demanded; it would be of
great fervice that the magiftrates of Amfterdam
Thould be perfuaded, that it was entirely out of regard
to them, that his Majefty had granted it, and becauſe
he
240
NEGOTIATIONS of
he hoped that their conduct being properly fupport-
ed, they would bring the Spaniards to a peace.
For this purpofe, I entreated the King to grant
me a day or two beforehand, that I might private-
ly communicate to the magiftrates of Amfterdam,
the fubftance of the memorial which I ſhould deli-
ver to the States General; for I was certain this
would have a quite different effect, than to keep
them unacquainted with the contents till the delive-
ry of the memorial; that I could even make an
appearance of concerting it with them, if they
knew from no other quarter what the King was to
determine in their favour.
And I thought fuch a particular conference with
the gentlemen of Amfterdam, before I made any
declaration to the States General, would be ſtill
more ferviceable to his Majefty, becauſe I could
make declarations to them in a more particular
manner than I could do in a memorial to the pub-
lic, in regard to the refolution in which his Majefty
would conſtantly abide, not afterwards to grant any
longer delay. That I would give them to under-
ftand, as it was entirely out of regard to them that
his Majefty had granted this laft delay, he would
think it extremely ſtrange, if they ſhould enter in-
to any of the Prince of Orange's meaſures, if after
the time was elapfed to no manner of purpoſe, he
fhould demand any thing of them in favour of the
Spaniards, that they ought to be convinced his
Majefty was inclined to peace, fince he agreed to
give fo much time, which might be fo advantage-
oufly employed in carrying on the war which the
Spaniards had begun; and that all his Majefty
fhould after this undertake with his arms, could
not be imputed to any defire of making conqueſts
from Spain, but to the neceffity he was under of
forcing this crown to make peace, fince all the fair
6
and
COUNT D'A VAUX.
241
and gentle means uſed for this purpoſe had proved
of no effect.
The States of Holland being affembled, the
Prince of Orange kept them from eleven in the
morning till eight in the evening, without being
able to make them agree to the levy, notwithſtand-
ing all the efforts which he and Penfionary Fagel
exerted for nine hours, to accompliſh their purpoſe.
The deputies of Amfterdam ftood firm in their re-
folution: thofe of Delft and Schidam feconded
them, declaring to Penfionary Fagel, that they were
expreſsly forbid to conſent to the levy, unleſs it was
refolved upon by the unanimous confent of the
whole province.
2
The deputies of Amfterdam then called upon
Penfionary Fagel to take the votes, and to bring to
a conclufion this affair, which had been fo long
protracted but Fagel feeing the iffue would be a
refuſal of the levy, and the affair thus irrecoverably
ruined, would not afk the opinion of the towns.
which had not yet delivered their fentiments; and
adjourned the aſſembly.
The direction which the Penſionary of Holland
has in all affairs, gives him a great advantage.
They have lodged an extenfive power in the office
of Penfionary, to enable him the better to oppoſe
the ambitious fchemes of the Prince of Orange,
and to affert the public liberty: this the predecef-
fors of Fagel always did with great refolution, and
ſome of them fuffered thereby, witnefs Barnevelt
and De Wit: but Penfionary Fagel abufing the
power of his office, took advantage thereof to ruin
the liberty of the Dutch, and to raiſe the authority
of the Prince of Orange. Thus I had the misfor-
tune to have the power of a governor, and the ad-
dreſs of a Penfionary in Holland always united a-
gainſt me; fo that it was almoſt impoffible to fuc-
VOL. I.
M
ceed
242
NEGOTIATIONS of
ceed in any thing; for when an affair went as they
wifhed, it was immediately concluded; and when
it happened otherwife, they deferred it from day to
day, till they brought over the towns to the incli-
nations of the Prince of Orange.
This Prince being now almoſt deſtitute of all
hopes of getting a refolution for the levy of 16000
men, deviſed a new expedient to gain his point.
He concerted with the Spaniſh Envoy that he ſhould
notify to the States General, the order which the
King his maſter had given to treat the fubjects of
his Chriftian Majefty as enemies; but this produc-
ed a contrary effect. He intended by this to fhew
them that war being declared, they muſt now
think of means to defend the Spaniards. But the
deputies of the towns reafoned otherwife, and all
of them declared that this was a defperate ftep of
Spain, who wanted to draw all Europe into her
quarrel; and as for them, they would not engage in
it.
Penfionary Fagel perceived he had taken a falſe
ftep: fo that when the deputies of Amfterdam de-
manded that he would put this memorial of the
Spanish envoy, and the declaration the Marquis de
Grana had made in the Low Countries, into the
hands of the Commiffaries to be examined; he re-
fuſed this, knowing they wanted to take an advan-
tage of it; and that the examination of theſe papers
could not but be prejudicial to the defigns of the
Prince of Orange. Thus he contented himſelf with
only ordering the deputies of the towns, to com-
municate them to their mafters.
The magiftrates of Amfterdam conftantly preffed
me to obtain the King's permiffion to prefent the
memorial they had for fo long a time demanded,
and defired me to prevail on him to grant a new de-
lay, and eſpecially to entreat his Majefty not to
attack
COUNT D'A VAUX.
243
attack any place in Flanders or Brabant; alledg-
ing that if the folly of the Spaniards, fhould oblige
his Majefty to undertake any enterprize in the Ne-
therland's, they ſhould be reduced to great extremi-
ties, and ſhould be drawn contrary to their private
intereſt, and even contrary to their inclinations to
fupport the Spaniards, in order to prevent the Spaniſh
Netherlands from falling into his Majefty's hands;
but if he fhould attack the Spaniards in Catalonia
or in Italy, and be contented with raifing large
contributions in Flanders, with ravaging all the
open country, and with attacking the Spanish
troops when they left their garrifons, they were af
fured that the Spaniards would come on their knees
to beg of his Majeſty to grant a peace. I fhewed
them that all the King's fteps ought fufficiently to
convince them, how much his Majefty wifhed to
give pleaſure to the magiftrates of Amfterdam;
that they did not exert themſelves fo much as they
might do; and that I could not find that they
thought of doing any thing more to obtain a
peace befides their refufing to confent to the leviest
being made. On which they communicated to me
the reſolution they had taken to declare when it
ſhould be neceſſary to prepare the ftate of the war
for the following year (which ought to be done
within eight days) that they would no longer
reckon in their fervice the troops they had lent the
Spaniards; and that the ſtate being burthened with
many extraordinary expences which it could
not bear, the city of Amfterdam would no longer
pay the regiments in the fervice of Spain. They
could do nothing that would more fenfibly affect
the Prince of Orange: but Van Buning warded off
this blow, in order to favour that Prince, and this
refolution was not executed, as will be feen in the
fequel.
M 2
I wrote
244
NEGOTIATIONS of
I wrote to the King in this fame letter, that I
could not tell what methods he would employ to
reduce the Spaniards to reaſon; but that if he was
refolved to take a place in the Netherlands, and
willing to make choice of Luxemburg, I could
affure him, that of all the places there, this would
give the leaſt uneafineſs to the Dutch: that I could
not anſwer for it, and that no perfon whatſoever,
not even the Prince of Orange could know what
the States General would do in this cafe; but that
it was certain that the fiege of any other place in
Flanders, however fmall its importance, would have
a greater effect in animating the States General to
take up arms in defence of the Spaniards, than even
the taking of Luxemburg; eſpecially if, at the time
when a fiege was going to be laid to that place, a
declaration was made, by which his Majeſty ſhould
affure them, that after its being taken, he would
conſent to an accommodation with the Spaniards,
without carrying the war any farther.
The deputies of the towns being returned to the
Hague, thofe of Delft and Schidam ftill made
known their former inſtructions, not to conſent to
the levies being made, at leaſt till all the other
towns in Holland, gave their confent. The Pen-
fionary Fagel fummoned them to declare whether
they had no other orders, and on their faying that
they had not, he ſeparated the affembly for eight
days; hoping to be able, during this time, to
oblige theſe two towns to enter into his fenti-
ments.
But that fame morning, before they were feparat-
ed, the deputies of Amfterdam, who in the pre-
ceding affembly had, without effect, defired to
have the memorial of the Spaniſh Envoy, and the
declaration of the Marquis de Grana put into the
hands of commiffaries, in order to their being exa-
mined,
COUNT D'A VAUX.
245
mined, repreſented to the States of Holland, that the
Spaniards had taken a very precipitate refolution,
and defired the affembly to think of the methods
that might be taken to bring them, notwithſtanding
this declaration, to confent to an accommodation;
and in caſe they could not bring them to accept it,
to confider what was to be done by the States Ge-
neral. The Penfionary Fagel excufed himſelf from
regiſtering this propofal, on account of the affem-
bly's not being complete; for the Prince of Orange,
who had foreſeen their making this demand, had
cauſed the body of the nobles to be abfent: but the
deputies of Amfterdam, to remedy this inconve-
nience, gave their propoſal in writing.
Upon this the Penfionary Fagel, fhewed that the
Prince of Orange plainly perceived the cabals form-
ing in the province of Holland; that they would
proceed in the fame manner as in the year 1672;
that the effect of this conduct would be the ruin of
the country; that the Prince of Orange openly
proteſted that he would not be refponfible for it; and
that he would not even appear in the affembly of
Holland while things were carried on in this man-
ner.
The deputies of Amfterdam did not appear to be
at all furprized at theſe reproaches; this obliged:
the Prince of Orange and the Penfionary Fagel to
change their ſtile, which they did commonly enough
in addreffing themſelves to thoſe whom they could
not opprefs; for as foon as violent meaſures had
failed them, they knew how immediately to have
recourſe to a milder treatment, and ſuddenly to
proceed from-menaces to entreaties. The Prince
of Orange therefore fent, three days after this quar-
rel with the magiſtrates of Amſterdam, for two of
the moſt worthy men in the republic, who were well
affected, and generally known to be good republicans,
M 3
when
+
246 NEGOTIATIONS of
when he let them know, that he had propofed the raif-
ing of16000 men,believing that this was the beſt me-
thod of procuring an advantageous accommodation.
for their allies; that he had infenfibly engaged
himſelf, and that the refiftance of Amfterdam, was
arifen to the greateft obftinacy: that however he
had proceeded fo far, that he ſhould entirely loſe
his reputation if he did not fucceed, he therefore
defired them to exhort the magiftrates of Amfter-
dam not to diſhonour a perfon to whom they had
intruſted the government of the State, and the
conduct of the army: he obſerved, that their in-
tending to puſh things to extremities would be the
greateſt affront that could be offered him that in
fhort, he no longer demanded the levies being
made; but only that they would preferve his ho-
nour, and that this would infpire him with an eter-
nal gratitude to the magiftrates of Amfterdam. That
all the favour he wished to obtain from them was
their 'confenting to the new levies; that on the
word of a Prince (on which they might ſafely rely)
he agreed, that after their confent given, things
fhould remain in the ftate they were then in; that
a fingle man fhould not be raiſed, and that he
would only endeavour to obtain an accommodation
between the Kings of France and Spain.
I was informed of the Prince of Orange's having
taken this new ſtep, and therefore immediately fent
one of the well-affected to Amfterdam to prevent the
confequences that might proceed from it; for I was
afraid that I had more reafon to be apprehenfive of
this, than of any other ſtep he had made: however
it did not meet with better fuccefs; for the magi-
ftrates of Amfterdam made a pertinent reply to
every thing that was reprefented to them, and con-
cluded that they ought not to confent to a thing,
which from the manner in which it was propofed,,
would
COUNT D'AV AUX.
247
would be of no fervice, and could be of no other
uſe but to deceive and betray their allies.
The ruling perfons of Amfterdam did not ftop
here; for the prince of Orange having, as I have
juſt obſerved, ſeparated the affembly of Holland for
four or five days, in order that he might, during that
time, gain over the two towns of Delft and Schi-
dam, they took advantage of this delay, and made
ufe of it in drawing two of the towns of North
Holland into their fentiments; and thofe of Delft
and Schidam continuing fteady, the party of the
magiftrates of Amfterdam began to be ftrength-
ened.
But at the fame time they agreed not to make the
declaration they had projected of their no longerpay-
ing the troops which had paffed into the fervice of
Spain for Van Buning had either prevailed on
them to change their opinion, or they found that
the execution of this defign would be attended with,
too many inconveniences. They only refolved to
oblige the Spaniards to retract their declaration of
war; and in cafe they refuſed to do it, to draw their
troops out of the Netherlands.
The Prince of Orange, who at the fame time
cauſed all the other provinces to deliberate on the
raiſing the 16000 men, knew that the province of
Gelderland had confented to it. This is not fur-
prizing, fince he had there the greateſt authority,
from his having, in the year 1679, ufurped the right
of nominating all who were admitted into the States
of that province but the clauſe they refolved to
add to it, fufficiently diſcovered the confequences
which even the Prince of Orange's creatures fore-
faw would proceed from the raifing of thefe troops;
for they ftipulated, that troops and all forts of ne-
ceffary ammunition fhould be fent for their defence;
and added, that as their ftrong places were in a
bad ſtate, and would foon be taken, they demand-
M 4
ed
248
NEGOTIATIONS of
ed that the other provinces fhould engage to receive
into the union, and not as ſubject towns (as had
been refolved with refpect to Utrecht in the year
1673)thofe places in their province which the King
fhould take, and which he ſhould reſtore to the
ftate.
:
The province of Zealand did not fo eaſily come
into the Prince of Orange's meaſures; he had fent
Mr. D'Odyck thither and as out of the feven
voices of which the affembly of that province is
compofed, he had three, viz. that of the nobles,
as he is the only not le in Zealand, that of Fluſhing,
and that of Terveer, as being lord of theſe two
towns, it would not have been at all furprizing if
Zealand had blindly conformed to the Prince of
Orange's wiſhes. Yet Mr. D'Odyck met with the
fame difficulties there as the Prince of Orange
had done in Holland; the towns of Middleburg
and Goes abfolutely refuſing to confent to the levies
being made, and Zyrickzee, being unwilling to
give its confent, at leaft if it was not unanimoufly
refolved upon by the whole province.
The King returned me an anfwer, dated the
tenth of December 1683, on the propoſals I had
made to him on the part of the magiftrates of Am-
fterdam, and informed me, that he had nothing to
preſcribe to me, more than what I myſelf had ſaid
in anſwer to their two demands, that a delay ſhould
be granted them till the firft of March, and that
he fhould conſent to the mediation of the States
General, in conjunction with theKing of England :
that it was likewiſe very prudent in me to aſk what
they would engage to do, in cafe the Spaniards fuf-
fered the time to flide away to no purpoſe. His
Majefty alfo ordered me to let them know, that it
was not impoffible for them to preferve the Nether-
lands in the ſtate they were in, and always to efta-
blifh
COUNT D'AVAU X.
249
bliſh there a perfect tranquility. That provided
his Majeſty was well affured that the United Pro-
vinces would not affift the Spaniards for the time to
come; or that the troops they maintained in the
Netherlands would only be employed in the defence
of the places belonging to the Catholic King, and
not in doing any damage to the countries and fub-
jects of his moft Chriftian Majefty, the King would
alſo draw his troops from the faid countries; con-
tent himſelf with the poffeffions he now enjoyed,
and in other places make uſe of the means God had
put into his hands to oblige the Spaniards to cede to
his Majefty one of the equivalents he had propoſed,
and a juft fatisfaction for the expences occafioned
by a longer delay.
The King alfo refolved, in order to remove the
inquietude they were under from the apprehenfion of
the enterprizes that might be undertaken by his
troops, while they were examining with me the
means of procuring a peace, that I fhould affure
them, that he would not attack or take by furprize
any of the places belonging to Spain, before the
20th of January, which was a fufficient time for
letting his Majefty know what I ſhould have agreed
upon with them.
Two days after the King informed me, that I
was to add to what he had already ordered me to
tell the perſon who acted for the magiftrates of Am-
ſterdam, that provided the levies were not made,
and the troops fent by the Prince of Orange to the
Marquis de Grana, were really employed, as his
Majeſty had already obferved, in the fole defence of
the places belonging to the crown of Spain, his Ma-
jefty would lay himſelf under an obligation not to
attack any place in Flanders, and would conſent to
prefs the Spaniards, by the lodgment of his troops in
their country, and by the exaction of contributions,
M 5
to
250 NEGOTIATIONS of
to confent to one of the equivalents propoſed by his
Majefty fo that this affair would produce no other
change in the barrier than that of the taking of
Courtray and Dixmude, which his Majefty would
preferve in his poffeffion as well as their depen-
dencies.
The King wrote to me four days after, to inform
me, that as I had acquainted him that the city of
Amfterdam defired to have the public acquainted
with the delay he was willing to grant, he permit-
ted me to fhew that city the pleaſure he received at
hearing of their good conduct, by engaging even
by a writing not to lay fiege to any place before the
end of January; but that I fhould prepare the ma-
giftrates of Amfterdam to prevent their being fur-
prized at feeing the Marſhal d'Humier's on the one
fide, and M. de Montel on the other, enter the
dominions of Spain; and at perceiving that the
Marſhal de Crequy was going to bombard Lux-
emburg.
I found myſelf intruſted with a very diſagreeable
commiffion, and I did not doubt but the magiftrates
of Amfterdam would feel extreme vexation at
hearing that the King, after having made his troops
ſtay ſo long in the dominions of Spain, and after
having by open force taken poffeffion of Courtray
and Dixmude, would ſtill bombard Luxemburg,
and that at a time when they fo obftinately refufed
to agree to the Prince of Orange's propoſal to make
new levies, and when they were affured that the
King was not difpofed to carry on the war; this
made me imagine it neceffary that I myſelf ſhould
talk with the deputies of Amfterdam, in order, as
much as poffible, to foften this bad news; and alſo
becauſe I was perfuaded that a firmer confidence'
ought to be eſtabliſhed between us, that by this
means whatever was ſaid both on the one fide and
the
COUNT D'AVAU X.
251
the other, might have the greater weight, and that
his Majeſty might rely with the greater certainty,
on the affurances given by the magiftrates of Am-
fterdam themſelves, than he could do on what was
faid by a perfon acting as an arbitrator between us.
But I here found difficulties which I imagined almoſt
infurmountable: theſe gentlemen caufed to be repre-
fented to me the reproaches caft upon them by
the Prince of Orange for having carried on a fecret
correſpondedce with me; and that, if they ſaw me
after this, they ſhould be incapable of undertaking
their own vindication, and ſhould render themſelves-
fufpected; and a thouſand other things were faid of
the like nature; but as I was fenfible that they ge-
nerally confulted a particular perfon in whom they
placed a great confidence, I fpoke to him, and fo
thoroughly convinced him of the neceffity of their
entering into a more ftrict confidence in me, that
he perfuaded them to it, and the Penfionary of that
city came to my houſe with another deputy who was
in the fecret; after having taken, as a pretence for
this interview, an affair relating to the veffels which
go every fifteen days from Amfterdam to St.
Valléry.
As I had juſt received another letter from the
King, by which he informed me, that notwithstand-
ing the declaration of war publifhed by the Spa-
niards, he would ftill adhere to the very fame pro-
poſals he had ordered me to make to the States
General, I found myſelf in a much better condition
to repreſent to the deputies of Amfterdam the
goodneſs his Majefty had fhewn on this occafion,
and to perfuade them that his Majefty was only in-
duced by the ſtrong entreaties made ufe of by their
city, to take fuch meaſures as were fuitable to their
defires, though they might be prejudicial to his
Majefty's intereft,
M 6
I then
252
NEGOTIATIONS of
}
I then obferved, that the King had ordered me to
affure them, that he was not difpofed to carry on
the war; I alledged the reafons his Majefty had
given me, and added, that there could be no greater
proof of it, than his not doing it when he might do
it with fuch advantage. I told them that the King
had learnt with pleaſure, that the magiftrates of
Amſterdam appeared, by their conduct, fufficiently
convinced that the Spaniards would not agree to a
peace, till they faw themſelves preffed by his Maje-
fty's arms; and found that they were not fupported
in their obftinacy by the States General.
That his Majefty having been informed of the
firmneſs with which the Magiſtrates of Amſterdam
had with this view hindered, as much as poffible,
the methods the Prince of Orange was defirous of
taking in order to engage in the war, and knowing
befides how many difficulties they had to furmount
on the part of the Prince of Orange, and the Pen-
fionary Fagel, he had without heſitation ſupported
them in their good defigns, by taking all the mea-
fures which they themselves had defired.
That they had defired three different things of his
Majefty at three different times; not to perform acts
of hoftility; to grant a delay; and in cafe the Spa-
niards continued obftinately bent on refufing all kinds
of accommodation, to carry his arms into Italy or
Catalonia, and to be contented with engaging in the
open countries in Flanders and Brabant. Demands
that were equally prejudicial to his Majeſty's inte-
reft. That the ceffation of acts of hoftility, as well
as a new delay, would render the Spaniards more
intractable that the war would nevertheleſs be con-
tinued; but that it would be continued later, and
his Majefty would loſe time and confiderable advan-
tages.
That
COUNT D'AVAUX.
253
That in regard to the third point, they ought to
confider, that his Majefty had all his troops in the
frontiers of Flanders; and that he muft make them
march three hundred leagues, and traverfe all France,
in order to reach Catalonia.
But after having reprefented theſe difficulties, I
afked what judgment they ought to form of the
King's fentiments with respect to a peace, and par-
ticularly of his favourable regard to the magiftrates
of Amfterdam, if he granted all their requefts, or
at leaſt, if he put them in a condition that would
make their obtaining them depend on themſelves
alone.
I then told them, with refpect to the laft point, to
which they were the moſt attached, that it was not
impoffible to preferve the Netherlands in the ſtate
they were then in, and to eſtabliſh there a perfect
and lafting tranquillity. That, provided the King
was well affured, that the United Provinces would
not affift the Spaniards for the time to come, or at
leaft, that the troops they had in the Netherlands
ſhould only be employed for the defence of the places
belonging to the Catholic King, and not in injuring
the countries and ſubjects of his moſt Chriſtian Ma-
jefty; he alſo might oblige his troops to retire out
of the Spaniſh Netherlands, and to be contented
with what he now poffeffed, and with making ufe
in other places that could give no jealouſy to the
States General, of the means God had put into his
hands, in order to oblige the Spaniards to give him
one of the equivalents he had propoſed, and juſt fa-
tisfaction for the expences occaſioned by a longer
delay.
That, in regard to the delay, and the ceffation
of acts of hoftility, I had orders particularly to aſ-
fure them, that the King would neither attack nor
ſurpriſe any of the places belonging to Spain, before
the
254
NEGOTIATIONS of
the end of the month of January; and that, if they
thought it neceffary that this affurance of a delay
fhould be public, in order that they might be able
to take advantage of a declaration, which in fo au-
thentic a manner would juftify their conduct; his
Majefty was pleaſed, in order to give them a tefti-
mony of his eſteem, and to ſhow them how much
he relied on their good difpofitions, to confent that
I fhould engage, either by word of mouth, or by a
written memorial, which I would prefent to the
States General, that he fhould not undertake any
fiege before the end of January; and this I fhould
do according to the plan I had received, which I
would communicate to them. This memorial con-
tained nothing more, than that his Majefty would
ftill engage to reft ſatisfied till the end of next Ja-
nuary, with receiving one of the equivalents he had
propofed, and not undertake any fiege till that time
was expired; there were only fome terms which
expreffed a little too ftrongly, that this was done in
favour of the magiftrates of Amſterdam.
I at length added, as a proof that his Majeſty
placed the utmoſt confidence in them, that the mar-
Thal d'Humieres was, in conformity to his Majefty's
orders, to enter immediately on one fide, and M.
de Montal on the other, into the Spaniſh Nether-
lands, to make repriſals for the diſorders committed
by the Spaniſh troops in the countries belonging to
his Majefty; and that he alſo intended, at the fame
time, to caufe bombs to be thrown into the city of
Luxemburg, to puniſh that city for all the acts of
hoftility it had committed against his Majefty's
troops, and against his fubjects, and to fpread ter-
ror, by this example, through all the other great
cities in the Netherlands, on account of the mif-
chiefs they had reafon to apprehend in cafe they re-
newed the war.
They
COUNT D'A VA U X.
255
They could not here help interrupting me, and
telling me, that though they acknowledged that his
Majeſty was moſt fincerely difpofed to accept of a
peace, and that he had the goodneſs to refolve to
ſupport the magiftrates of Amfterdam, yet, what he
was going to cauſe his troops to undertake, would
expoſe the magiftrates of that city to the re-
proaches of all the other towns; that they had no-
thing to object againſt his Majeſty's fending his troops
to perform military executions; but his fending the
Marſhal d'Humieres on one fide, M. de Montal on
the other, and his ordering the Marſhal de Crequy
to deſtroy fuch a place as Luxemburg by bombs,
would appear fo terrible to the other members of the
State, that they would immediately fall upon the
magiftrates of Amfterdam, and tell them that his
Majeſty would never have engaged in ſuch enter-
priſes, if they had fuffered the levies to have been
made. That they did not doubt of his Majeſty's
having no further view, but merely to throw bombs
into it; and they could affure me in confidence,
that for their part they would continue firm notwith-
ſtanding this; but that they apprehended that the
other towns, which they had drawn into their party,
would abandon them. They added an infinite
number of other reaſons; to which I replied, that his
Majefty could never do any thing more proper to
fecond the defigns of the government of Amfterdam,
than by giving his troops thefe orders. That with-
out reckoning what his honour required him to per-
form, after the declaration of war publiſhed by the
Spaniards, which at leaſt made it neceffary that his
Majeſty ſhould let them perceive the danger to which
it had expoſed them; it ſeemed to me, that when they
ſaw more of his Majeſty's troops in the field than
would be neceffary for taking three of the beſt places
belonging to Spain, without attacking any of them,
7
nQ-
256
NEGOTIATIONS of
nothing could afford a ftronger proof of his Maje-
fty's having no other defign, but to reduce the Spa-
niards to the neceffity of accepting the peace. Be-
fides, the more troops were fent by his Majefty, the
more room would the magiftrates of Amfterdam
have, to let the other towns fee the dangerous fitu-
ation the Spaniards were in; and that the 16,000
men which the Prince of Orange would have them
raiſe, would not fecure them; and that they had no
other method to take but to prefs the Spaniards to
accept the conditions offered by his Majefty; or,
in caſe of refuſal, to abandon them, and defire his
Majefty not to attack any of the places in the Spa-
niſh Netherlands.
As to the delay, I was ſurpriſed to hear the frank
and open manner in which they expreffed them-
felves. They confeffed that they had defired it as a
means which they thought neceſſary for maintaining
in their intereft the other towns that had already
declared for them; but that they had agreed with
me in the reaſons I had alledged for not granting it;
and that fince his Majefty refolved to do fomething
that would be more advantageous to them, they
ſhould be glad to confult their fuperiors before they
returned me an anſwer on that ſubject. They con-
feffed that the Spaniards would reap advantage from
it; and that if his Majefty, inſtead of one month,
fhould give them two, or even three, they would
be much farther from agreeing to a peace on the laſt
day than the first; fince the Prince of Orange and
the Spaniards faid, according to cuſtom, that they
had nothing to do but remain firm; and that his
Majeſty would yield by little and little. I was very
glad to hear the deputies of Amſterdam tell me of
their own accord, what I had fo often obferved in
the letters I had the honour to write to his Majefty.
2
N.
I in
COUNT D'A VAUX.
257
I informed them that his Majefty found great diffi-
culty in granting them this delay; that he had done
it contrary to his judgment, and in oppofition to his
own intereſt, with the only view of drawing the
magiſtrates of Amfterdam out of that ftate of per-
plexity, to which they had ſhewn his Majeſty, that
they were reduced. On which I took occaſion to
repreſent, that another Prince who had lefs affection
for them, would not behave towards them in the
manner his Majeſty had done; but would think of
improving fuch a favourable conjuncture, in order to
render himſelf mafter of the Netherlands, whilſt the
magiftrates of Amfterdam found themſelves. obliged
to hinder the troops being raiſed, by their being un-
willing to become fubject to the Prince of Orange.
That, inſtead of this, his Majefty, as foon as they
demanded his affiftance, held out his hand to them,
and refolved to facrifice his own intereft to their
ſafety, and for the ſupport of their liberties. That
this delay was only granted on their account; that
I had orders privately to tell them fo; and that I had
been permitted to render them public only in com-
pliance with their requeſts; and that therefore I
fhould, in this inftance, regulate myſelf according to
their defires.
They were alſo greatly fatisfied with my telling
them, that as the memorial was only intended to
contribute to the fuccefs of their defigns, they fhould
fettle the terms in which it fhould be expreffed;
becauſe I really thought there would have been ſome-
danger in the King's goodneſs to them appearing in
fo ſtrong a light as it did in fome expreffions in the
memorial he had fent me.
At length, we entered into the particulars of every
thing they agreed to perform.
They, in a formal manner, engaged not to con-
fent to the levies being made, and to raiſe up fuch
obftacles
258
NEGOTIATIONS of
obſtacles againſt them, that they fould not be rif-
ed, provided his Majefty would not attack any place
in the Spaniſh Netherlands..
They engaged to hinder the Prince of Orange
from fending a fingle man to the affiftance of the Spa-
niards more than thoſe they had already fent.
They affured me, that they would warmly prefs
the affembly of Holland to caufe the declaration of
war made by Spain to be revoked; not that they
hoped to obtain it, but in order to have a pretence
for demanding that their troops fhould be recalled,
if Spain refuſed to agree to it; and as they could.
not be ſure of their being able to obtain the recal of
the troops belonging to the province of Holland,
any more than the revocation of the declaration of
war by the Spaniards, I defired, that in this cafe,
they would refuſe to pay the troops fent into the fer-
vice of Spain, according to the defign they had
already entertained, and which they had commu-
nicated to me fome days before; but as they had no
orders from their fuperiors with reſpect to this ar-
ticle, they could not return me a pofitive an-
fwer.
They alſo engaged not to confent to any mea-
fures capable of fortifying the Spaniards in their ob-
ftinacy, or that could give the Prince of Orange an
opportunity of entering into the war.
At length they told me, that they would do
whatever they could perform confiftently with the
conftitution of the republic; and that, as to fuch
things as they could not engage to perform, on ac-
count of their being unable to anſwer for their ac-
compliſhment, they would content themfelves with
promifing to do them, and with endeavouring to
the utmoſt of their power to perform them: as for
example, they could not give me their word that
they would make the States General abandon the
Spa-
COUNT D'AVA U X.
259
Spaniards, in cafe his Majeſty carried his arms into
Catalonia or Italy, but they hoped they fhould be
able to it.
Upon this I wrote to his Majefty, that the con-
ſtitution of the republic was fuch, that the deputies
of one town could not engage to make the States
General agree to any thing, becauſe, in order to
this, they ought to be unanimous, or at leaſt to have
a majority of votes, which they could not anſwer
for, on account of the influence of the Prince of
Orange; but that they could engage to perform
every thing that was negative, becauſe their refufal
would hinder the taking of any refolution.
:
On the 24th of December, I fent the King ad-
vice, that Mr. Citters had wrote fome time before
to the States General, that the King of England
preffed him to make known to them, that if the
Spaniards would confent to their being arbitra-
tors in conjunction with him, he would endea-
vour to prevail on the King of France to confent
to it that I had informed M. de Barillon of the ill
effect of fuch advances made on the part of the
King of England; that in the mean time no orders
had been given about it; but on the contrary, Cit-
ters had lately wrote three different letters, not only
to the States General, but alſo to the magiftrates of
Amfterdam, in which he gave them the fame affur-
ances; and that from hence the Prince of Orange.
drew great advantages againſt the ruling perfons of
Amfterdam.
I was about the fame time informed from good
hands, that the Prince of Orange had ſent troops
to the Spaniards; and that he had ordered the deputy
governor of Eclufe to let the regiment of Torcé de-
part at the first orders of the Marquis de Grana.
This laft did not fail to demand them as ſoon as the
King's troops under the command of the Marſhal
D'Hu-
260
NEGOTIATIONS of
D'Humieres were entered into the countries under
the dominion of Spain, and the deputy governor of
Eclufe made them immediately march to Ghent.
I informed the Magiftrates of Amfterdam of this
proceeding; and as they had not the leaſt knowledge
of it, they were greatly aftoniſhed, and promifed to
procure proofs, and to make a good uſe of this intel-
ligence.
I received a note from the deputies of Amfterdam,
by which they defired immediately to deliver to the
States General the memorial I had communicated to
them two days before, and only to alter fome terms
which pointed them out in too ſtrong a light. This
memorial was preſented at a proper time for deſtroy-
ing all the artifices of the Prince of Orange, and the
falfities which the Penfionary Fagel had advanced
that fame day before the States General.
The Prince of Orange hearing of the entrance of
the marſhal D'Humieres into the country of Was,
the march of M. de Montal, and the pretended
fiege of Luxemburg, which it was fuppofed the
Marſhal de Crequy was going to form, and which
was much talked of, had refolved to improve this
opportunity, and ſpoke to the deputies of the States
General with great warmth; he had even pretended,
in order to give himſelf the greater credit, that he
had received certain advice that his Majefty defign-
ed, after his taking Luxemburg, to caufe Mons to
be inveſted and attacked by the Marſhal D'Humieres
and M. de Montal; that after this, it would not be
difficult for his Majefty to render himſelf mafter of
Namur; that, within two months time, the King
would conquer all the Spaniſh Netherlands; and
that this was the effect of the good conduct of the
duputies of Amſterdam, to whom they were obliged
for it but my memorial gave theſe gentlemen room
to defend themſelves, and even more and more to
make
COUNT D'A VAUX. 261
make appear the neceffity of accommodating affairs
in an amicable manner.
The deputies of that city came to me the fame
day, at four o'clock in the afternoon, by the order
of their fuperiors, to defire me to return the King
their moſt humble thanks for the goodneſs he was
pleaſed to ſhew them on this occafion, and after
proteftations of a moft fincere attachment to his Ma-
jeſty's intereft, they entered upon buſineſs, and told
me, that they had refolved to give him the affuran-
ces he had defired from the States General, pro-
vided he would engage, according to the defire of the
magiftrates of Amfterdam, not to carry his arms
into the Spaniſh Netherlands. They informed me
that they ſtood in need of my affiſtance in the exe-
cution of this defign; and that it was neceſſary for
me to go to the houſes of the deputies of the other
towns in Holland.
1. That I fhould let them know what were his
Majeſty's intentions in relation to the delay he had
been pleaſed to grant.
2. That I ſhould convince them that the King of
England approved the equivalents propoſed by his
Majefty.
3. That I fhould infinuate to them, that if they
came to a reſolution to raiſe the 16,000 men, his
Majeſty would immediately attack the Spaniſh Ne-
therlands.
I cannot help making the remark whenever I
find occafion for it, that there was no room to fear
that the menaces made ufe of by the King to the States
General would reunite them, or draw them into
the war, fince the magiftrates of Amfterdam, who
were fo unwilling to enter into it, defired that threat-
nings might be employed whenever it was neceffary
to obtain any thing from the States, contrary to the
fentiments of the Prince of Orange.
4. That
262
NEGOTIATION S of
4. That I would make known to the principal
towns his Majeſty's difpofition to carry his arms into
Italy or Catalonia, in cafe the Spaniards fhould not
confent to the peace before the laft day of January;
and that the States General fhould agree to abandon
them.
They fhewed me, at length, that they could al-
moſt anſwer for it, that by means of this ftep, they
fhould be able to give his Majeſty the affurances he
demanded, and that the next day they would make
a propofal in the affembly of Holland to recall all
the troops the Prince of Orange had fent to the Spa-
niards, that were above 8000 men; that if they
could not obtain this, they hoped at leaſt, with the
affiftance I ſhould give them, to be able to cauſe
theſe troops to be forbid to act in any other manner
than for the defence of the places belonging to
Spain, and to cauſe them to be ordered, in cafe his
Majeſty fent word to his generals to burn the villa-
ges, to remain in the towns, and to leave to the Spa-
niards the care of defending the open country.
After having made a compliment to the deputies
of Amfterdam, I entered into the particulars of their
propoſals, and made no difficulty of confenting to
go to the deputies of the towns, to give them a
kind of explication of the memorial I had preſented
that fame day to the States General.
As to their wishes that I would declare the fenti-
ments of the King of England in relation to his Ma-
jefty's offers, I told them that this was what more
properly belonged to the Engliſh envoy than to me;
and that fuch a declaration would have much greater
weight when proceeding from his mouth than from
mine; more particularly, as there was reafon to ap-
prehend, that this minifter would go to theſe very
deputies to difavow whatever I fhould fay in rela-
tion to the ſentiments of the King his mafter. And
it
COUNT D'A VAUX.
263
it was very probable that he would have done fo, for
he had frequently told both me and the deputies of
Amfterdam, that his Britannic Majefty had never
ordered him to ſay that he approved his Majefty's
propoſals; and beſides, he was a perſon of mean in-
tellects, of a clownish behaviour, very paffionate,
and one who kept no meaſures; we therefore agreed
that I fhould mention this affair in fuch a manner
as not to run any hazard of offending the envoy of
England, from whom we might always hope to re-
ceive fome advantage.
As to the manner in which they would have me
explain myſelf in relation to the raiſing 16,000 men,
as this was entirely contrary to the orders I had re-
ceived, I reprefen.ed to them, that it did not ſeem
to me a proper occafion for my going to threaten
all the deputies of Holland, and that the declaration
they defired me to make was nothing lefs than à
menace; but that I could perform what they defired
from me with a better grace, and give the States of
Holland the fame apprehenfions of the war, with-
out menacing them with it; that, in order to this,
I need only explain myſelf as if the raifing the 16,000
men was no longer the affair in queſtion, and tell
them that they might imagine in what manner his
Majeſty would have received the news, if inſtead of
feeking the means of procuring an accommodation,
they had imployed themſelves only in levying troops;
that they doubtlefs faw the confequences this would
have produced; and therefore I readily rejoiced
with them on their not having taken reſolutions
that would have infallibly involved them in the war.
And as to their demand that I would affure the
deputies of Holland that his Majeſty would, on cer-
tain conditions, confent to carry his arms into Italy
or Catalonia, I warmly remonftrated that they had
refolved on what was contrary to their own intereft.
That
264
NEGOTIATIONS of
That without reckoning, that it was unreaſonable,
after their having ardently wiſhed for this favour,
and his Majefty had granted it only in confideration
of their repeated petitions, that they fhould now of
fer it to all the towns in Holland. That befide this
confideration, my making this propofal would be
fufficient to render it fufpected, fince the Prince of
Orange and the Penfionary Fagel would not fail to
fay, that his Majefty had great deſigns concealed
under theſe ſpecious offers; and that this would be
fufficient to hinder the States of Holland from ac-
cepting them. On the other hand, if they them-
felves made the propofal, they would have the ho-
nour of it, fince they knew the orders I had received
to give them an intire fatisfaction on this fubject;
and that it would be fo much the more eaſy, to
make all the other towns relifh the advantages of
this propofal, as they would not have any diftruft of
what appeared to come from the magiftrates of Am-
fterdam, and that even the Prince of Orange would
have fewer pretences for oppofing it. They acqui-
eſced in theſe reaſons, and we agreed that I ſhould
only speak in general terms of the good difpofitions.
of the King to maintain peace in the Netherlands, in
cafe the States General fhould not be able within
the time limited to bring the Spaniards to give fatis-
faction to his Majeſty.
They even aflured me, that if the meaſures we
were taking did not fucceed, they would find the
means of giving his Majefty affurances with which
he would be fatisfied; and informed me, that they
had orders from their burgomaflers to declare to me,
that they were very forry for the fcruples they had
hitherto made of feeing me; but that from hence
forward, they would wait upon me at my houſe,
whenever I had any thing to fay to them.
I went
COUNT D'A VAU X.
265
I went to all the deputies in the towns of Hol-
land to put in execution what I had concerted with
the deputies of Amfterdam. I informed them, that
the King, on ſeeing that the Spaniards let the time
paſs in a uſeleſs manner, which he had given them,
in order to their accepting the conditions offered by
his Majefty, had refolved to do himſelf the juſtice
which the Spaniards had for ſo long a time refuſed
him.
But that his majefty having been informed, that
many Princes and States of the Empire had thought
his offers juft and reaſonable, and perceiving like-
wife the inclination of the States General to bring
the Spaniards to give him a juſt ſatisfaction, he had
refolved ftill to give them a month's time, to fee if,
within the ſpace of this new delay, the Spaniards
would not reſolve on accepting an accommodation
which was fo much to their advantage.
That on this account I had given, by his Maje-
fty's orders, a memorial to the States General; but,
as I perfectly knew, that if the Spaniards let this
time paſs, without giving fatisfaction to his Maje
fty, he had refolved not to grant them any farther
delay, and that after this he would exert all the
power God had given him, I had thought it my
duty to inform them of it; to the end that they
might employ a time that was in itſelf ſo precious
in bringing the Spaniards to accept of the peace.
As they all anfwered me, that their defign and their
intereft led them to defire a peace, and conſe-
quently to procure it for Spain by their utmoſt en-
deavours, I had a natural opportunity to explain
myſelf conformably to what I had concerted with
the deputies of Amſterdam.
I therefore replied, that his Majefty was tho-
roughly perfuaded of what they had told me, and
that, for my part, I was very glad to fee them able
VOL. I.
N
to
266
NEGOTIATIONS of
to execute their good defigns, which would not
have been the caſe, had they made the new levies,
for then the war would have been kindled, and would
have lafted for many years: for the Spaniards, who
had performed fo many acts of hoftility fince they
had the States General's troops, and who, on the
hope of theſe levies being made, and of a powerful
fuccour, had declared war, would have engaged the
States in it, the very moment that they were in-
formed of the levies being granted.
That they ought not to doubt that his Majeſty's
prudence made it neceffary that he fhould prevent
the defign of the Spaniards, and that he would not
have failed to do it, even though the States Gene-
ral had reſolved to make the new levies; but that,
fince this was not the cafe, I rejoiced at finding
them in a condition to procure an accommodation
with the Spaniards.
At length I fhewed them, that having explained
his Majeſty's fentiments in relation to this new delay,
to fome of their members, they had fhewn great
uneaſineſs on account of what might happen after
it was expired, in cafe the Spaniards would not,
within the time limited, agree to a peace; that I
could affure them in relation to this point, that his
Majefty was graciouſly pleaſed to promote the tran-
quillity of the States General, and that if they had
any apprehenfions which it was in his Majefty's
power to remove, I was affured, that, provided they
on their fide did what he had reaſon to expect from
them, they would ever find that his Majeſty enter-
tained all poffible difpofitions to grant them what
they might reaſonably expect from him.
It was not without reaſon that the deputies of
Amfterdam had wifhed that I would pay a vifit to
the deputies of the other towns in Holland: they
knew that the Prince of Orange and the Penfionary
Fagel
COUNT D'AVAUX.
267
Fagel were to make their laft efforts to obtain the
conſent of the province of Holland to the levies be-
ing made, under the pretence of the entrance of
the King's troops into Flanders, and the bombard-
ing of Luxemburg. But the magiftrates of Am-
fterdam, encouraged by every thing I had faid to
them in relation to the King my mafter, were more
refolved than they had hitherto been to oppoſe it,
by every method in their power.
It was very remarkable, that as the Prince of
Orange had not communicated to any one the or-
ders he had given to the troops to march into the
Netherlands, the magiftrates of Amſterdam had no
proof of his having fent 14,000 men to the Spani-
ards, inftead of 8000, fo that they addreffed them-
felves to me to obtain it, and I gave them a copy
of the lift I had received out of the Prince of
Orange's family itfelf, and which I had fent fome
time before to the King.
On the 31st of December, the Prince of Orange
cauſed the States of Holland to be affembled; and
this meeting did not break up till five o'clock in the
evening. It is impoffible to exprefs all the re-
proaches and abuſe the deputies of Amfterdam met
with in this fitting. As feveral perfons made a me-
rit with the Prince of Orange of fpeaking in this
manner, and as others of them could do it with im-
punity, there were many deputies who did not fpare
them. At the breaking up of this affembly, I had
a long conference with the deputies of Amſterdam,
which may be reduced to three principal points.
The firſt confifted in the affurance they gave me
of their being more than ever reſolved not to con-
fent to the levies being made; that notwithſtanding
all the endeavours of the Prince of Orange, he had
been unable to bring this affair to a conclufion in
N 2
the
268
NEGOTIATIONS of
the affembly that had juft feparated, and that they
had taken meaſures in order to influence the Spa-
niards to agree to an accommodation.
In the fecond place they defired to know if the
King would make no abatement in the equiva-
lents he had demanded. The reaſon they had to
believe that he would, was, that, notwithſtanding
all they had faid to theEngliſh envoy, they had been
únable to draw any thing more [from him, but that
the King his maſter believed that his Majefty's
propoſals might ferve to found a negotiation upon,
but never that he thought them reaſonable, they
therefore imagined that the King of England
knew that his Majefty would make ſome concef-
fions.
I affured them that his Majefty would rather en-
creaſe than leſſen the equivalents he expected in the
rcom of his pretenfions: they then defired me to
explain the ſecond equivalent, and to let them know
what were the appurtenances and dependencies of
Courtray, Dixmude, and the other towns, and
what were the places the King had in his poffeffion,
to the end that they might have a clear view of this
affair, if it was brought to an accommodation.
In the third place they afked, whether, in cafe
they fhould be fo unhappy as not to be able to
oblige the Spaniards to conclude a peace, they
might affure themſelves that the King would carry
the war at a diſtance from their frontier; that is to
fay, that he would not attack any place in the
Spaniſh Netherlands, and that he would act there
only on the defenfive, and carry his arms into Italy
or Catalonia.
And on their aſking, whether what the King requir-
ed from them might not be reduced to two points,viz.
that the troops fhould not be raiſed, and that they
fhould make thoſe they had in the fervice of Spain
4
retire
COUNT D'A VAUX.
269
retire, or at leaſt cauſe them to remain in the ftrong
places without entering the field, either to march
into the King's dominions, or to engage the troops
that had entered into the open countries belonging
to Spain; I told them that there was ftill another
thing to be done, which was to recal the overplus
of the eight thouſand men, if they could not oblige
the whole to return, which would be ſtill better.
They replied, that they could affure me that
the levies fhould not be made, and that they would
make uſe of their endeavours to caufe the furplus of
thoſe troops to be recalled which the Prince of
Orange had fent above the eight thouſand: but, as
they did not hope to fucced with refpect to this laft
article, they promiſed to exert themſelves in fuch
a manner, as that this furplus fhould not leave the
ftrong places belonging to Spain; that they could
not give me the fame affurances with refpect to the
eight thouſand men, on account of their being fent
to the Marquis de Grana, in virtue of their treaty
with Spain; and the Marquis de Grana, according
to the tenor of the treaty, being at liberty to make
them march wherefoever they pleafed, they could
not hinder him from doing it: but they could fafe-
ly anſwer for the States General's fending no more;
and if they ſhould not be able to prevail on the
States General to give the affurances which the
King demanded in relation to their troops, they
would find expedients with which his Majeſty
would be fatisfied.
On the fourth of January I fent the King an
account of the good difpofitions of the magiftrates
of Amfterdam; and at the fame time informed him,
for the tenth time, that the manner in which the
King of England every day explained himſelf to
the States General's embaffador, and the orders
he
270
NEGOTIATIONS of
14
he gave to his envoy at the Hague, were more pro-
per to deſtroy the meaſures I took with the magi-
ſtrates of Amfterdam, than to be of any ſervice to
me; for things were reduced to fuch a point, that
it became neceffary for the States General, either to
oblige the Spaniards to give one of the equivalents,
or to abandon them; that the deputies of Amfter-
dam were unable to engage the States General to
do either of theſe; and even they themſelves could
not attempt it, till they were perfuaded and could
perfuade the others, that there was no medium
between theſe two alternatives; that therefore what
the King of England faid, which deſtroyed this
foundation, deftroyed at the fame time whatever
his Majefty could expect from the magiftrates of
Amſterdam; and this the King of England did
when he told Mr. Citters, that provided the States
would make him any propofal of what kind foever
it was, he hoped to bring the French King to
agree to an accommodation.
As to the Engliſh envoy, he was of fo little fer-
vice in this whole negotiation, that the deputies of
Amfterdam being willing to take advantage in the
affembly of Holland, of fome expreffions which
they had drawn from him; he, on the Prince of
Orange's venting fome reproaches againſt him,
disavowed them, gave the deputies the lie, and
talked in a manner the moſt extravagant, and the
moſt injurious to the King's intereft; and all that
I was able to do, was my preventing his going to
the deputies of the towns to whom he had refolv-
ed to complain of the deputies of Amfterdam, and
to declare to them that there was not one word of
truth in all they had reported; but the Prince of
Orange did it in his ftead, for he informed the af-
fembly of Holland, that Chudley had declared to
him
COUNT D'A VAUX.
271
him that he had never told the deputies of Amfter-
dam what they had advanced in his name in that
affembly, and that he exprefsly difavowed it. It
may be judged from this, whether I acted wifely
in having refuſed to explain the King of England's
ſentiments to the deputies of the towns of Holland.
However, the Prince of Orange affured the Spa-
niſh envoy, that by fome means or other, the levies
ſhould be made; that he would cauſe the reſolution
to be taken the next day, which was the fifth of
January; that his honour was here engaged, and
that he certainly would not forfeit it.
L
The END of VOL. I.
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