WILLIAM L.CLEMENTS
LIBRARY OF
AMERICAN HISTORY
UNIVERSITYOF MICHIGAN

때
​Conway, Henry Seymour
1721-1795
1. Rebort of the General officers...
8
2. Heury Fox's Canded reflections
on the Report
3. Thomas Potters The expedition...
de à letter to the author of
아
​the Candid reflexions...
A. Heury peyonour Conway The mili-
lary arguments in the letter
5. Thomas Potter's the reply of the
country gentleman to the
military arguments
DNB. Conway, 6, 978, gives a 6th
pamphlet in this series. "The
officers anoser to the Reply




THE
MILITARY ARGUMENTS
IN THE
L E T T E R
ΤΟ Α
Right Honourable AUTHOR,
FULLY CONSIDERED
By an OFFICER.
LONDON:
Printed for JACOB ROBINSON, at the Golden Lyon in
Ludgate Street. M.DCCLVIII.
(Price One Shilling)

(une ou arms
DEGTA
ning Sort е молитвоя 35ло !
TO DOW:
ТВО LE ICE
DIA.CONSIDEED
oldsruonoll i
COHTUA
AO
WELVET VICENDE

()
(33)
Military Arguments, &c.
conſidered.
I
THOUGHT I had done "reading and almoſt
thinking on the ſubject of the late Expedition,
when the letter to a ſuppoſed Right Honourable
Author fell into my hands: the novelty of ſeeing
a difficult military queſtion fully ſtated and con-
ſidered by a Country Gentleman, revived my curioſity;
but I ſoon found, by the finartneſs of the ſtyle, and
the fallacious ſubtlety of the argument, that it was
rather the work of fome eleve of the courts, now
perhaps acting as a ſort of ſecond or third rate
Miniſter; and that there was as much reality in
the character of the author as of the perſon ad-
dreffed to; and as much truth in both as in many
of the poſitive affertions contained in it.
I could not however lay it aſide : What at firſt
was mere curioſity, turned into aſtoniſhment at
the uncommon malignity and falfhood of this
work. And though I felt as little care or intereſt
as poſſible from what quarter it came, I felt too
much for the characters of the gentlemen ſo
ſhamefully calumniated, to let the world be any
longer impoſed upon by that heap of falſe facts,
falſe reaſonings, and falſe conſtructions, that are
the chief ingredients of this curious compoſition :
not that I intend to follow the author through all
that medley of party, political, miniſterial, and
naval conſiderations, with which his piece is en-
riched ;
A 2

( 4 )
riched : But as I write neither for, or againſt any
party, or any perſon that either is or has been a
Miniſter, ſhall content myſelf with treating this
matter in its proper light, as a military ſubject
only; by ſtating facts as they paſt, with all the
plainneſs and firmneſs of a ſoldier and a friend to
truth, and without conſidering whom I may pleaſe
or diſpleafe.
I have from the firſt obſerved all the tranſactions
of this extraordinary enterprize with attention.
I have endeavoured to obtain the beſt information
I could, of every material circumſtance relative to
it; and though I wiſh well to the gentlemen who
had the conduct of this Expedition (ſo far I will
own my prejudice too) I am not ſurprized at the
ill temper ſhewn by our people in general on its
failure. I do not even condemn it, they have had
diſappointments enough to four them: the fer-
vice propoſed was important; the idea of it was
dazzling; they had been taught to expect ſucceſs
from all the meaſures of the Miniſter who has de-
clared himſelf the author of this; and I only wiſh,
and very ſincerely wiſh, this may be their laſt dif-
appointment.
But though I can forgive their prejudices, I can-
not look with leſs horror at the ſhameful arts uſed
to foment them; nor can I humour them at the
expence of truth, or of thoſe characters which, to
the beſt of my judgment, have been moſt wickedly
and unjuſtly aſperſed.
I ſhall not however enter into the detail of all
the little motives I think I fee operating upon this
occaſion; and as it is by facts, and not by words,
I mean to vindicate thoſe characters, I ſhall direct-
ly enter into the confideration of them, and leave
to thoſe who have more leiſure or inclination the
management of ſuch controverſies, as rather tend
to

( 5 )
to encreaſe, than allay; thoſe heats which I moſt
heartily lament.
I ſhall therefore from this moment no longer
conſider by whom this project was framed, by
whom it was approved, or diſapproved, or to whom
it was communicated.
The author's example has given me ſufficient
diſtate to ſuch confiderations; as I think there
cannot be a ſtronger inſtance of diſingnuity and
malevolence than in his reflexions on that head,
particularly in the following one: Pag. 8. “That
a plan approved and recommended by his R.
« H. the Duke would not have ſo ſhamefully
' failed without any attempt to execute it.”-
By which a ſet of gentlemen of diſtinguiſhed
loyalty and affection to his Majeſty and this go-
vernment, and even by a ſort of implication the
great perſon himſelf whoſe name is ſo wantonly
and fo indecently introduced, are charged, without
the leaſt colour of fact or reaſon, as traitors and
enemies to their country: for what is infinuated,
is too plain to need a comment. The intereſt
and honour of this nation, we are to under-
ſtand, were ſacrificed by theſe gentlemen, in or-
der to gratify the reſentment of a great perſon,
who had not been conſulted; their own honour was
not leſs abandoned, and all this even before they
could poſſibly know how gratefully this unnatural
facrifice would be accepted !
But let the author recollect that he has owned
himſelf prejudiced, p. 9. And let him in his cooler
hours, when they return, reflect with horror upon
the effect of that prejudice which carries him thus
to give up all truth, honeſty, and even that com-
mon ſenſe he ſo often appeals to, in his unjuſt re-
preſentations of men and things. --To theſe res
Hexions I ſhall leave him, as I think to ſtate this
calumny
А 3

(6)
calumny is to confute it; and have to a good an
opinion of my countrymen to imagine I need even
warn them not to be abuſed by ſo groſs an attempt
to impoſe on their underſtandings. From this
earneft too I would have them convinced in what
ſpirit this piece is compoſed, and what ingenuity,
candor, and veracity, are to be expected from the
proſecution of the work.
I had no thoughts of attacking the board of
Enquiry, I have none now of cafting any reflexion
upon the individuals who compoſed it, or of dif-
puting with the author their acknowledged merit ;
but as he very artfully undertakes its defence, that
he may the more freely ſpit out his venom under
the ſanction of its report, I ſhall freely, but
yet very candidly, give my opinion on the conſti-
tution of that board, not only as it regards the
cauſe of the General Officers in queſtion, but as
a matter in which I really think that of the whole
army effentially intereſted.
For as this board differed in its conftitution,
powers, and method of proceeding, from every
other of the kind that I believe was ever yet efta-
bliſhed; ſo I cannot but think it the moſt irre-
gular in its form, the moſt dangerous in its nature,
and the moſt contrary to all the known and ſettled
rules of juſtice; a court (if ſo it might be called)
which without a formal power to condemn and un-
able fufficiently to acquit, could paſs a ſentence lit-
tle leſs than capital, by taking away the character
of officers under circumſtances, where both the
civil and military laws of their country would give
them protection.
A court conſtituted of perſons choſen by the
Crown, orits Miniſters, without any regular rotation
in the ſervice; from whence alone it is eaſy to
gueſs what uſe might be made of it on occafion:
ſuppoſe

(7)
ſuppoſe a Commander were obnoxious to a Mini-
ſter; ſuppoſe him connected with thoſe of an op-
poſite party ; ſuppoſe the honour of a Miniſter and
his ſchemes depended upon the condemnation of
the Officer who had not executed them. I am, how-
ever, far from inſinuating this was the caſe at preſent,
and do really think the rank and character of thoſe
made choice of much above ſuch a ſuſpicion. To
ſpeak ad hominem too, as the author ſays, and in
the phraſe of party (though it is a language I do
not delight to talk) I think their connexions do in ge-
neral by no means favour ſuch a ſuſpicion ; but I
repreſent againſt a precedent (zehoever began it)
which, if followed, will, I think, in worſe times
prove ruinous to the army and its liberty ; and
how nearly an enſlaved army is generally the forem
runner of an enſlaved people, I need not re-
mark.
The manner of proceeding without any charge
given, or any indictment laid ; the public in-
vitation for all perſons that pleaſed to come and bring
accuſation, for which a ſort of proclamacion was
made by the Judge Advocate ; the public examin-
ation of the ſame witneſſes on their parole, whe
were afterwards to be examined on oath in the ſame
cauſe: all theſe were not lefs contrary to the efta-
bliſhed courſe of juſtice than the arbitrary appoint.
ment of the judges.
The very ſmall number of thoſe appointed muſt
alſo be in its nature extremely liable to objection,
There muſt be thirteen Judges to take away an
Officer's commiffion; he may be deprived of his
character by three : which in the preſent caſe, were
it not for the conſideration and figure of the perſons
themſelves, I ſhould fay was ſcarce decent, as
three gentlemen only were to conſider and have in
effect paft a very ſevere judgment on the opinion
A A

( 8 )
of eight given in a General Council of War on the
fpot : of thoſe eight it may be obſerved, withour
offence, that four were in another branch of the
fervice, high and reſpected in it, and three more
were in military rank equal, and in ſervice and ex-
perience certainly not inferior to their Judges ;
had not been lefs in action, had not diſtinguiſhed
themſelves leſs, and have in the courſe of that
ſervice never had any imputation thrown on their
conduct.
I do not, however, mean to lay any blame on
the intentions of this board. I do think I have
a right to appeal from their deciſion; eſpecially
ſince the determination of another more regular,
more folemn, and more legal court.
Having faid thus much of the eſtabliſhment of
this board; I cannot but remark one inſtance
among many of the candor and veracity of our au-
thor in the reaſon given p. 13. as a principal one
for eſtabliſhing this enquiry, which is as follows:
66 But if ever ſuch an Enquiry was right and
proper, it was ſo in the preſent caſe, where the
e parties to be tried had agreed upon a total ſup-
" preſſion of evidence. For in the very Council of
66 War which unanimouſly reſolved to do nothing, far
* from a deſire to ſtate the evidence on which
they proceeded, and their reſpective opinions
upon
that evidence, which one would think na-
“ tural for every one who was follicitous for his
« honour and juſtification, the firſt thing reſolved
on was to take no minutes of opinions, and that
“ even the informations of the perſons examined
Should not ſtand part of the minutes so as to be
tranſmitted to any perſon : Enq. p. 10.--Here
o then, as far as in them lay, was a total ſuppreſſion
“ of evidence.”
Will
to algo
65

(9)
Will the reader now believe me when I ſay
there is not a ſingle word of truth in this whole
paragraph, nor in any one of the affertions con-
tained in it? or will he convince himſelf by look-
ing into the Eng. P. 10. referred to by the author,
and into the Appendix, p. 104 ?-In the former he
will find that all the evidence there ftated on the
rejecting of minutes relates to the ſecond, and not
to the firſt Council of War; not to that council
which, as the author tells us, Unanimouſly reſolved
to do nothing, but to that which unanimouſly reſolved
to land. In the latter, Eng. p. 104. he will find
the firſt Council of War at length, containing in
the body of it thoſe very minutes, evidence, and is-
formations, which the author poſitively tells us
were ſuppreſſed.
But he will ſay, it was only an innocent miſtake of
one Council of War for the other: a ſlight inaccuracy
to be ſure, when the failure of the Expedition is in
a manner laid upon the reſolution of that very
Council of War, and when eight gentlemen of rank
and character are accuſed as neglectful of their ho-
nour, and as being ſuppreſſors of truth and evi-
dence, which the author will allow with me is the
next ſhame to that of being an aſſerter of falfe-
boods.
He next accuſes one of the Generals for ad-
vancing ſo ſtrange a doctrine as, that he did not
conceive himſelf anſwerable for an opinion given
at a Council of War: and ſays, He is ſorry to find
this doctrine ſo much received among officers (p. 13.)
and afterwards, God forbid that ſuch a doctrine
Slould be eſtabliſhed ! &c. Yet does he himſelf
do that doctrine the honour to countenance it,
where he ſays, p. 13. That criminally reſponſible
for kis opinion no officer can be. So far, I believe,
that point is quite agreed ; criminally reſponſible is
che

( 10 )
the very thing infifted upon, the
very term uſed
by one of the General Officers, Eng. p. 36. and
all that, I believe, any officer is deſirous to eſtabliſh;
for as to his Majeſiy's power of judging who are fit to
continue in his ſervice, into which the author ſeems
at laſt to reſolve his propoſition, it was never
diſputed upon this or any other occaſion ; though
to ſtrip a gentleman of his commiſſion for an opi-
nion given where he was bound by his duty as a
foldier to attend and give it, would be an exerciſe
of prerogative not of the moſt humane or juſtifiable
kind: it is poffible his Majeſty may have been ad-
viſed, not long ago, to ſuch an exerciſe of it.
For as the Crown has certainly the power, as
the author ſays, though perhaps not the right, to
puniſh men for their opinions ; ſo have miniſters
the power, the author may poſſibly think they
have the right too, if it ſuits their purpoſe, to mil-
repreſent the conduct of his Majeſty's moſt faithful
ſervants to their ſovereign, who is more to be
pitied than blamed, if he acts in conſequence of
luch repreſentation.
I now come to thoſe preliminaries which the
author fettles as the ground-work on which his
approbation of the plan, and his cenſure on the
non-execution of it, ſeem principally to reſt ; the
firſt regards the intelligence relative to the defence-
leſs ſtate of the coaſt, and the ſmall number of
troops ſtationed there.
In reſpect to which I muſt be fair enough to own, I
have not ſeen any good accounts of the regular troops
of France that ſtate them ſo high as the Dutch
liſts make them ; nor can I, on the other hand, by
any means, agree with the author in his opinion of
the accuracy of that memorial of the troops of
France laid before the board of Enquiry, p. 69.
of which he ſpeaks with ſuch confidence; much
leſs

(11)
lefs in his concluſion drawn from it of the defence-
leſs ſtate of Rochfort.
To me it appears ſo very imperfect, fo full of
gueſſes and ſuppoſitions, and at laſt leaves fo
many
men (no leſs than 77,000) unaccounted for, that I
am quite at a loſs how to draw any concluſion at
all from it in the preſent queſtion; as, inſtead of a
vague ſuppoſition, the greateſt preciſion ſeemed ne-
ceſſary in eſtimating a garriſon to be attacked by
eſcalade, or ſurprize, with a body 7 or 8,000 men
only; and where of courſe the difference of 2 or
3000 might be fatal to the expedition.
But as that Memorial is thus become one of the
chief baes of this accuſation, I ſhall think ſome
minutes not ill employed in a more particular con-
fideration of it.
It ſtates as follows: That the regular troops
in the pay of France, now conſiſt of about 200,000
men: viz.
Before the preſent troubles
Augmentations ſince
157,347
38,420
195,767
Or reckoning two regiments raiſed in the
biſhoprick of Liege, about
200,000
That of theſe 160,000 are employed in different
ſervices out of the kingdom, or for guarding the
coaft along the Mediterranean, &c. So that for
the garriſons, &c. in the other parts of France,
there remain only 40,000.
It farther fets forth, that of theſe 40,000, about
20,000 are reckoned to be from St. Valleri to Berg :
and that there is reaſon to think, there cannot be
above 10,000 from St. Valleri to Bourdeaux.
The whole of which reaſoning amounts to this:
That if the calculations there made are all juſt,
and

( 12 )
and all the ſuppoſitions exactly trưe; then it is
probable there were not at the time the late Expe-
dition was reſolved
upon
above 10,000 men from
St. Valleri in Normandy to Bourdeaux, excluſive of
any proportion of the invalids, militia, &c. which
amount by that Memorandum to no leſs than
67,000 ; beſides which there alſo remain another
10,000 men out of the 40,000 not particularly
diſpoſed of ; ſo that the whole number of men, of
whoſe cantooning there is no particular account or
ſuppoſition, is 87,000; including thoſe between
St. Valleri and Bourdeaux.
Thus it ſtands upon the footing of that account.
From whence a concluſion is drawn, that Rochefort
muſt be left without a garriſon fufficient to defend it
againſt a coup de main, or eſcalade, as there were
but 87,000 men, at whoſe deſtination the Miniſtry
could not particularly gueſs.
But as it is fit ſuch accounts fhould be exact
where the difference of 2 or 3000 men muſt be fa-
tal to the ſucceſs of an expedition ; I think it will
not be improper to give the ſeveral articles of the
Memorandum a little farther examination.
The iſt article is, “ Minorca, Corſica,
-
65 and the American colonies, take up at
66 leaſt
25,000
But of theſe there is no particular ftate;
ſo that it is rather a gueſs than an account.
“ Marſhal d'Eſtree's army, if the regi-
as ments were compleat, would amount
o to about (iroit, à)
" Embarked laſt ſpring for various
es ſervices in the two Indies, about 3,000 or 4,000
If it was really that number, or about it,
it may be aſked whether theſe men ſo
fent were all of the regular troops, whether
battalions
a
92,000

(13)
battalions or companies, or whether only
drafts or recruits. Neither of which lat-
ter, being ſent in the ſpring, would di-
miniſh the number of troops, as their
place would certainly be ſupplied.
" For guarding the places and poſts
$6 along the Mediterranean coaſt, about
6,000 or 7,000
" It is reckoned that there are from
$6 St. Valleri to Berg, about
20,000
And laſtly, “ That there is reaſon to be-
lieve that there cannot be from St. Valleri
to Bourdeaux above
10,000
What that reaſon is, does not, I think,
{o plainly appear.
Now, as every one of the above articles are
plainly nothing more than gueſſes at the number of
men mentioned in them, it is natural to imagine,
that a few thouſand may eaſily be miſtaken amidſt
ſo many fuppoſitions, and in fo large a number as
160,000 or 180,000; and conſequently that the
garriſon of Rochefort, or ſtate of the troops near
it, cannot be determined by ſuch an account.
But I have hitherto conſidered this matter upon
the calculations of the Memorial only.
The true ſtate of the French Army at the Begin-
ning of the preſent troubles, from the ordonances
of the King, ſettling the eſtabliſhments after the
the peace of Aix, and from the beſt calculations
and authorities, I take to be as follows:
Numb. of men.
French guards, fix battalions
viz. Each battalion has five com-
panies of fuſiliers, of 126 each 3,780
4,328
Three

( 14 )
Brought over
3,780 4,328
Three companies of grenadiers
to the whole, of 110 each
Officers
212
338
w
4,328
-
2,400
Swiſs guards, four battalions
viz. Each battalion has three
companies of 200 each, of-
ficers included
600
Tot. four battalions
2,400
93,392
French infantry, as ſettled by ordonance
the roth Feb. 1749, 168 battallions
viz. 12 regiments of 4 batta-
lions, officers included, 2,220
each
26,640
52 regiments of 2 battalions,
112 each
57,824
16 regiments of i battalion,
8,928
558 each
93,392
2,338
Grenadiers de France, 4 batalions
Conſiſting of 12 companies in each
battallion
Tot, regim. 1 Inſpect. Comm. 16
Colon. 8 Lieut. Col. 1 Major,
* Adjud. 4.8 Captains, 48 Lieut.
48 ſecond Lieut. 96 Serjeants,
144 Corporals, 144 Anſpeffades,
1728 Grenad. and 48 Drummers,
Total
2,338
Royal regiment of artillery, 5 bat-
talions
4371

( 15 )
Brought over
viz. Each battalion 10 companies
106,829
of 72
720
3600
Total 5 battalions
Miners and workmen
Officers
506
251
4371
12,201
19 German battalions
Each batt, at 600
Tot, officers in battalions
I1,400
801
19
I 2,201
9 Swiſs regim. of 3 battalions each,
3
=2 7 battalions los
27
12,978
viz. Each battalion has 4 comp.
of 120.=480 per battal. officers W STON
included.
Tot. 27 battalions
12,960
Etat Major, &c.
000
18
12,978 wa
Six Iriſh battalions of 496 each, of-
ficers included
Two Scotcb battalions at ditto 33
Two Italian battalions at 557 each,
officers included 101
2,976
992
1
1,114
Total infantry Blog 137
137,090
Houſhold cavalry, including the
gendarmerie
3414
French cavalry, 12 i ſquadrons, 4
,
so
troops each or -1 10 5 14,872
Foreign ditto, 8 ſquadrons
2
HOE 1056
Total cavalry
19,342

( 16 )
Brought over
Dragoons, 16 regiments of 12
156,332
troops each
-
8,852
918
Huffars, 8 ſquadrons
Light troops (as in the memo-
randum)
Com
2158 23
11,928
168,360
157,347
Total troops in the memorandum,
Difference 11,003
By this it appears there is a miſtake in the me-
morandum of 11,003 men; which being added to
the Number of regular troops allowed by that ac-
count to remain in France, the whole remaining
there will then be as follows:
On the Mediterranean coaſt about 7,000
Between Bergue and St. Valleri,
about
20,000
Between St. Valleri and Bour-
deaux, about
10,000
Not particularly diſpoſed of 10,000
Omitted in the account as above 11,003
Total bebplot 58,003
To theſe are to be added 145 hilo
companies of Invalids doing duty, lepo
which amount to
9,015
3 companies of guards omitted 282
Marines, as in time of peace, 100 l
companies of 52 each ano --- 5,200
1 Swiſs regiment ditto
950
Napoleon 3 com-

( 17 )
Brought over
58,003
3 companies of bombardiers ac
the maritime places
107 battalions of militia at 520,
officers included
55,640
- 71,246
159
Total 129,249
Theſe are excluſive of the companies of cadets,
of all the invalids not regiinented; of the Mare-
chauffèes, and many others, armed, and on the
military eſtabliſhment, amounting to ſeven or
eight thouſand men, and alſo of the Militia Garde-
côtes, which are a diſtinct body from the 107 bat-
talions of militia before mentioned.
Theſe are very numerous, reckoned at 150 or
200,000 men ; they are compoſed of both horſe
and foot, and have their officers appointed by
commiſſions from the king; they were particular-
iy inſtituted for the guard of the coaſt, and often
encamped for that purpoſe, during the laſt war.
But I will call the whole of theſe troops 50,000,
which added to the 129,162 before mentioned,
makes 179,162. From which, if you deduct thoſe
ſuppos'd to be ſtationed as in the memorandum,
viz. on the Mediterranean 7000, between Bergues
and St. Volleri 20,000, in all 27,000.
There then remain 152,162 men, of whom the
memorial has not even ſuppoſed any diſtribution,
all or any part of whom, (for ought that appears in
that paper) might be ftationed ar or near Roche-
fort, for its defence. But that out of 152,162
men, there cou'd not be aſſembled in a few days
2 or 3000 for its defence againſt a Coup de Mein,
to be attempted by 7 or 8000 only, requires an ex-
traordinary degree of penetration to diſcover ; yet
ſuch was the concluſion then drawn, and now in-
B
fifted

( 18 )
ſiſted on as an unexceptionable foundation for this
expedition.
I do not pretend to have any accurate account of
the augmentations made fince the commencement
of the preſent troubles; and therefore take them
upon the footing of the memorial, tho', as far as
ſome private advices go, I have reaſon to think
they are conſiderably higher than is there ſtated.
As to the arguments drawn from ſubſequent
accounts of the troops on the coaſt, the march of
the French guards, the tears of marſh. Seneterre;
and an heap of ſuch Pontneuf Intelligence ; they are
ſo full of abſurdity in themſelves, and ſo totally
contradicted by other accounts of at leaſt equal au-
thority, that it is impoſſible to lay any ſtreſs upon
them :-If one maſter of a ſhip has ſaid there were
but four battalions in the neighbourhood, and but
two in the town of Rochefort ; another has ſaid, and
was ready to have depoſed in form, (if ſuch evidence
cou'd have been admitted) that at the very time
our expedition was fent, there were ten or twelve
thouſand of the beſt troops of France in thoſe very
parts : Others have, ſince the affair was over,
given accounts to the ſame effect; as to Marſhal
Seneterre's crying, it is impoſſible to treat it ſeriouſ-
ly, and probably is about as true, that he wept at
the approach of our Armada, as that a great mi-
nifter Broke bis heart on its return. If one cou'd be
ſerious about it, I have ſeriouſly heard an account
diametrically oppoſite of that gentleman's charac-
ter and behaviour on this occaſion : he ſerved, as I
am well informed, throughout the laſt war with
reputation both in Flanders and Germany, had a re-
markable vivacity of diſpoſition; and, as I am
told by a gentleman who was perſonally acquaint-
ed with him, is the laſt man in France he ſhou'd
think capable of crying on ſuch an occaſion.
I have
2

( 19 )
a
I have alſo myſelf ſeen a letter from one of his
M-'s miniſters at a foreign court, which ſays,
that, by his accounts from Paris, at the time when
marſhal Seneterre's firft letters came there, he wrote
to his court in the greateſt Spirits, ſaid he had troops
enough for the defence of Rochefort, and that he
would anſwer for the ſafety of the place with his
bead.
As to the houſhold troops, I can only ſay, that
tho' it is poſſible ſuch a meaſure may have been ta-
ken for the general ſecurity of ſo long a range of
coaft; yet I believe even the author will agree,
it is impoſſible they ſhould have ſet out on a
march of 14 or 16 days from Paris to ſave
Rochefort from a Coup de Main, which muſt have
been decided in almoſt as few hours. If they were
therefore really alarm'd for Rochefort, as is pretendo
ed, it was becauſe they knew, what is on all hands
acknowledged, that Rochefort is from its conſtruc-
tion as weak againſt a regular attack, as I think it
muſt be ſtrong and defencible againſt a mere af-
ſault on the ſhorteſt preparation ; it was becauſe
they expected a fiege, and did not conceive it pof-
fible, that our miniſtry ſhou'd ſend out a grand ar-
mament 100 leagues to ſurprize a town in the bote
töm of the bay of Biſcay.
I ſhou'd therefore not be at all ſhaken in my o-
pinion, as to the ſucceſs of our Eſcalade, even on
admiffion of all the wildeſt ſtories we have heard on
this head. I will ſuppoſe the houſhold troops
march'd; I will ſuppoſe the marſhal cried, if you
pleaſe; I will ſuppoſe there were but two batta-
lions collected in Rochefort, after a long alarm on
the coaſt, and 8 or 9 days certain notice from the
actual appearance of our army there, and yet I will
;
maintain, that with thoſe two battalions, with the
great number of dockmen in the yards, a vigorous
and
B 2

( 20 )
and hardy race of men ; with the marines, ſome
of whom are conſtantly ftationed there ; with the
numerous inhabitants of the place, always uſed to
arms, and garriſon duty; with a company of ca-
dets, and another of bombardiers ; and with the
crews of the ſhips then in the river, which alone, if
compleat, amounted to near 3,000 men ; I will
maintain, I ſay, that unleſs the whole were infect-
ed with the marſhal's imaginary tears, there was a
garriſon much more than fufficient to make the
place perfectly ſecure againit ſuch an attack.
But, after all, this ſubſequent intelligence is
little to our purpoſe, as the conduct of the officers
on the late expedition can certainly not be deter-
mined by any circumſtances that were not before
them : no court of juſtice wou'd admit of ſuch
evidence, and I think the ſame tenderneſs and
ſtrict equity ought to be uſed in the trial of mens
characters as of their perſons. This the author
himſelf has diſcover'd at laft, tho' not till the very
poſtſcript of his work ; where, after his invention,
prejudice, and invective, had enjoyed their full
ſcope thro' 67 pages ; after telling us of the Re-
ports of 4,000 men only ftacioned from Port
POrient to Bourdeaux, of marſhal Seneterre's paling
bis bours in tears, &c. he is feiz'd with a ſudden
fit of candor, and tells us with a noble air of gene-
rous triumph, that he ſcorn'd to avail himſelf of the
intelligence lately brought from Rochelle, by a maſter
of a transport, that he diſdained to prejudice the mind of
the reader by a teſtimony of this ſort, and that be deter-
mined the conduet of the generals pou'd be judged of
from the fame evidence, on which they may be ſuppoſed ta
act, but as an opinion is by that time form’d, (which
our candid country gentleman has indeed taken due
pains to form) he thinks he may as well give the
Coup de Grace, and from an exceſs of candor, keeps
this
-

(21)
a
this ſtory in reſerve to leave a favourable impreſſion
on the mind of the reader.
In regard to the term of Coup de Main, and the
interpretation to be given it, it is a diſpute for
grammarians, and not for foldiers. In fact, I do
maintain, that both in the nature and intention of
this enterprize, Surprize was the plan of it; the re-
fuſal of a few more battalions, and a proper artil-
lery to force the place; the refuſal to attempt get-
ting newer or better intelligence of it, for fear of
diſcovering the ſecret, tho' it lay venting itſelf for
fix weeks together, during the delay of the troops
at the iſle of Wight; and more ftill, the nature of
the attack (in the view of a mere affault ) which
made ſurprize neceſary to its ſucceſs; all prov'd
That to be the plan, and the only plan of the en-
terprize on its outſet : I maintain alſo, that it gra-
dually varied from that plan, and that the very
idea of it was totally vaniſhed at the time when the
council of war ſat on the 25th of September ; I don't
ſpeak of an actual perfect ſurprize only, where the
march and attack are all included in the compaſs
of a few hours, but of ſuch a degree of ſurprize as
ſhou'd afford, in all human appearance, any pro-
Spect of practicability in the attempt ; which I rec-
kon would have been the caſe, if the troops had
landed in 24 or 48 hours after their appearance on
the coaſt; whereas it was the 6th day ſince the ap-
pearance of the fleet, when the firſt council of war
ſat, and muſt have been the eighth or ninth before
the eſcalade could have been made; it was no lon-
ger time, then, for ſuch an attempt; the opportuni-
ty was gone : It was not the fame of any other
mode of attack; which made the weakneſs of con-
fining the operation to that ſingle idea.
The argument drawn from the article in Lord
Ligonier's inſtructions, where he mentions, that it
-
B 3
MAY

( 22 )
MAY SUCCEED AFTER THE PLACE HAS been the
roughly reconnoitred, I think changes little in the
ſtate of this queſtion ; as that reconnoitre, if
thought proper, cou'd not take up much time.--It
was ſtill the ſame mode of attack.
As for the inſtances of Bergen-op-zoom and St.
Philips, tho'it is allowed, that attacks of that kind
may have ſucceded in ſome particular caſes without
ſurprize ; yet are thoſe caſes very rare, and very
unlike the preſent in almoſt every circumſtance, ,
being generally after the garriſon has been tired
and diſpirited with a long ſiege, their defence's
ruined, their works long batter'd by a ſuperior ar-
tillery, thoſe attacks ſupported by large armies,
and the plan of attack ſuddenly chang'd, (perhaps
on intelligence that the guards were remiſs, or ill
poſted, or of ſome treachery in the place, &c.)
which conſtituted ſtill a ſpecies of Surprize. This
was remarkably the caſe at Bergen-op zoom, where
the defence was ſo entirely neglected, that it was
univerſally thought to be from treachery, and
deſign to let the place fall into the hands of the
French; yet, even here a breach, in ſome degree
practicable, was made. The caſe of St. Philips was
of the fame kind in moſt reſpects; except that the
attack was there, I think, confined to ſome of the
outworks, and no attempt made on the body of the
place.
I have but one more, of what our author calls
his outworks or preliminaries, to conſider, and ſhall
then come to my defence againſt his attack in
form. It is his complaint againſt the land officers,
or their advocate, p. 21, “ For having forced into
p
" their ſervice, an argument drawn from the con-
6 currence of the fea-officers to the reſolution of the
“ firſt council of war : " yet nothing fure can be
more natural than the compliment thereby paid to
the

(23)
the judgment, as well as intentions, of the gentle-
men in the ſea-ſervice. The queſtion was not, as
the author repreſents, a queſtion merely for the
eſcalade of Rochefort, that would have been pro-
perly determined by the land-officers only, after the
landing was effected ; the queſtion certainly was,
;
whether it was proper to land the troops at the place
therein-mentioned, and under the circumſtances there-
in deſcribed, in order afterwards to eſcalade Rochefort,
no other ſpecies of attack then offering itfelf? This
the whole tenor of that council of war ſo plainly
evinces, that it is impoſſible a doubt ſhould remain
about it, in the mind of any man who takes the
trouble to read it over, as it ſtands verbatim in the
Eng. P. 104.
Where in the beginning of it he will find,
" That the firſt object was to determine, whether a
proper landing-place could be found for landing the
" troops, and that a report made by the rear-admi-
$6 ral, &c. being produced,
« The council having taken the ſaid report into
$6 conſideration, and examined the pilots, &e.-it
at appears that there are but two landing places,
" and that the troops could not be reimbarked
“ from either in bad weather, the ſwell of the ſea
making ſo great a ſurf on the ſhore, that no
" boats would be able to approach it to take off the
" troops ; the ableſt pilot having informed the
66 council, that he had been at anchor ſeven
ço weeks in this road, and not a boat been able to
“ paſs or repaſs: and it likewiſe appears, that, in
caſe the troops ſhould be overpower'd by the
enemy, they could have no protection from the
ſhips, the ſhoal water preventing their coming
66 within gun-ſhot."
It then, in the ſecond place, conſiders the nature
of the attack on Rochefort, and concludes,
B 4
AL
66
60
66

( 24 )
66
66
« All which being taken into conſideration, &c.
" -- or conſequently ſucceeding in an enterprize
** founded on the plan of an aſſault or eſcalade
merely, and the uncertainty of a ſecure retreat for
* the troops if landed, the council are unanimouſly
of opinion, that ſuch an attempt is neither ad-
“ viſeable nor practicable."
Thus it is plain to a demonſtration, that the na-
ture of the landing place, the openneſs of the bay, the
want of protection for the troops from the ſhips, and
of ſecurity for their retreat, were as much the ob-
jects of deliberation, as the eſcalade of Rochefort.
The operation in queſtion, therefore, conſiſted of
two branches ; that of the landing and bringing off
the troops on one hand, and the attack of the place
on the other; in the former of which, the ſea-of-
ficers being the proper judges, as the land officers
were in the other, it ſeem'd natural, and agreeable
to his M's inſtructions, (which preſcribe a joint
council of war in that ſituation) that one general
opinion ſhou'd be taken on the whole, which was
done. So that, if the opinion of the ſea-officers
was founded in their acquieſcence to that of the
land-officers, as the author advances, I apprehend
the land-officers might, with as much reaſon, a-
ſcribe their part in the determination to the opinion
they had of the judgment and knowledge of the
ſea-officers ; as, in fact, that determination was
principally form’d upon thoſe conſiderations, which
thew'd how extremely precarious the retreat of the
army
muſt be, from that ſtate of the landing place ;
as is explicitely declared by every one of thoſe
gentlemen who were members of that council. So
that in both ſervices, they ſeem to have acted
@qually in compliance with his M's inſtructions to live
in harmony with each other.
I beg the reader's pardon for the diffultory and
un-

( 25 )
unconnected method of argument I have hitherto
purſued, in compliance with that of the gentleman
whoſe ſteps I follow ; but as this ſkirmiſhing was
but the prelude to his attack in form, which we are
now come to, againſt That, as carried on with no
leſs formidable an artillery than the very articles of
the Report itſelf, I muſt endeavour to make a more
methodical defence.
In which I ſhall attend him thro' the ſeveral ar-
ticles, and his obſervations thereon, as regularly as
I can; without neglecting thoſe ſallies of his pen,
which it would be an affront to leave quite unno-
ticed.
On the firſt article, which regards the attack of
Fouras by fea, I ſhall give the reader very little
trouble: that it was propoſed by the land-officers,
on the footing of a joint attack by ſea and land,
particularly in the plans propoſed by M. G. Con-
way and by Col. Wolfe, for that purpoſe, appears
from Sir John Mordaunt's evidence, Eng p. 28. —
As alſo from his and Gen. Conway's narrative, and
by Col. Wolfe's and Col. Howard's evidence at the
board. So far at leaſt the land officers ſtand acquit-
ted, as the author, I think, confeſſes : tho' in an-
other place, he ſays, or inſinuates, the land-officers
would have taken no part of it. “ If the fleet cou'd
66 bave taken Fouras, they were ſtill at liberty to do
" it.” “Of the whole which was their department
66 have they, or did they attempt a ſingle pari, &c. ???
How far it was practicable to have come at it
by ſea, I ſhall no more than the board of General
Officers pretend to determine; what appears in
evidence is, that the Vice-Admiral on the report of
his Maſter and others whom he ſent to found;
and afterwards on trials made by himſelf, and by
Thirri the pilot, with the bomb-ketches and Coven-
try frigate, judg’d it impracticable: but how far
the
66
29
66

( 26 )
the poſition of the fort, and the wiſdom of the French,
who the author cannot ſuppoſe built it to guard a
Sand-bank weigh againſt this evidence, the reader
muft judge ; one thing is certain, that the guns of
a fort can annoy ſhips at a diſtance much too great
for ſhips to form the attack of a fort.
I come now to the ſecond article of the report,
which contains the principal charge againſt the
Commmander in Chief, and againſt the whole
Council of War; enlarged upon and ſupported
by the author with all the bitterneſs his imagination
could ſuggeſt againſt the Land Officers particular-
ly, and ſtill more particularly againſt three of
them, whom he has ſelected out of the eight who
compoſed that Council as the deſtined objects of
his rancour.
The iſt part is an accuſation againſt the Com-
mander in Chief Sir 7. M. for calling a Council of
War inſtead of immediately ordering the troops to
land. But as the reaſon he had for taking that ſtep
are ſo ſtrongly and clearly ſtated in his defence be-
fore the Court Martial, p. 50. that nothing can be
added to them, to thoſe I refer the reader ; the
rather as they were in a great meaſure the ſame
which afterwards determined the Council of War
in their Reſolution, and which I ſhall be obliged
to recapitulate on that account.
He ſays there, that he had a latitude given him
to judge; and a council to aſſiſt him in judging:
That he therefore acted agreeably to his Majeſty's
inſtructions by ſummoning that Council in ſo im-
portant and difficult a cafe.
" That it could not be diſobedience to doubt.
" That it could not be difobedience to deſire
« affiſtance to clear up that doubt."
But as this part of the accuſation is not dwelt
upon by the author, I ſhall proceed to thoſe which
follow,

( 27 )
65
follow, and which all relate to the reſolution of the
Council; not, as the author ſays, p. 36. Their įms
mediate reſolution to go home again ; or to lay aſide
all thoughts of proſecuting the whole plan, as he ſays,
p. 56. --But merely not to land under the parti-
cular circumſtances, and for the particular end (that
of the eſcalade) which were then alone, before
them.
For the reſolution to go home again, which was
propoſed in that Council of War, was over-ruled
there, as appears from General Conway's Narrative,
Enquiry, p. 37
" But a queſtion being then pro-
poſed for determining to come back to England,
56 I oppoſed it, as it was not in that view I gave
my affent to the former queſtion ; and thought
çs we ſhould by all means ſee what farther could be
6 done, &C."
Thus it appears not only that the Council of
War did not, immediately reſolve to go home again,
as is advanced, but did in effect reſolve the contrary,
by conſidering and rejecting a propoſition ſtated
for that purpoſe.
But as the grand queſtion, Why they did not ačtu-
ally reſolve to land ? ſtill remains to be cleared up,
I muſt beg the reader's patience, while I en-
deavour to retrace in his mind thoſe facts and thoſe
ideas which the author has exhauſted all his logick
and eloquence to obliterate.
Firſt then it muſt be conſidered, upon what in-
telligence, and upon what plan, this Expedition was
2dly, What new intelligence, or what new cir-
cumſtances, intervened to affect that plan previous
to the Council of War of the 25th September.
And 3dly, What particular evidence appeared
at that Council to induce them to come to that un-
animous opinion which they gave,
As
ſent out.

( 28 )
As to the intelligence the government had re-
ceived, it lies in a pretty ſhort compaſs, and was
in ſubſtance as follows.
Some time in the year 1754, an Engliſh officer
(Captain, now Lieutenant Cimke) returning from
Gibraltar, was led by his curiofity to Rochefort,
where he ſtaid a few days, and was, I think, allow-
ed to walk, in company with a French engineer,
twice round the works, which he imagined to be at
that time fo weak, that it would not be difficult
to take the place by eſcalade or ſurprize.
The account he gave was in ſubſtance, That
there was an opening in the rampart by the river-
fide; that the greateſt part of the rampart was not
regularly flanked; that there were no outworks,
and that the ditch was imperfect; nay, that in
ſome places there was no ditch at all. On the
other hand, as he himſelf ftates, there was a large
and high rampart of earth well faced with ſtone
round the place; that rampart was every where
flanked with redans (there were alſo ſome baſtions,
or half baſtions) the ditch was wet good part of
the way round on each ſide from the river; the
opening he mentioned was in low, marſhy ground
by the river-fide, already cut with muddy ditches,
into which the tide fiowed ; and there were, when
he was there, though in time of peace, 1,000
marines in garriſon; he had taken no plan of the
place; he did not know the heighth of the ram-
part; he did not know poſitively, whether there
were draw-bridges before the gates; he could not
account for the vaſt maſs of earth that compoſed
the rampart ; which by his own gueſs, and by the
account he took from an Old Geographical Dicti-
onary, was not leſs than twenty or twenty-five feet
high, and by all accounts thick enough to bear
two rows of trees, and to be, I think, the chief
airing

( 29 )
airing of the town for coaches, and yet formed, as
he ſays, in ſome places without any ditch at all be-
fore it. He knew nothing of the ſtate of the place
ſince the year 1754, nor of the number of troops in
garriſon there, or fiationed near it, and had no
knowledge at all of the coaſt or landing, or the country
leading to the place.
Such was the evidence of Colonel Cl-ke, after-
wards confirmed in ſome parts by Jof. Thierri, a
French pilot, as may be ſeen in his depoſition laid
before the board of General Officers, Enq. p. 68.
but with equal ignorance of the landing and coaft,
as alſo of the preſent ſtate of the place, the garriſon,
and troops in the neighbourhood, he not having
been at the town for ten years paſt. Which on the
whole amounts to little more than this, That three
years and an half ago, a town on the continent of
France, had a breach in its rempart in a low marſhy
Spot, and its ditch not compleat all round; though
that circumſtance was totally incredible as the im-
menſe quantity of ſolid earth, which compoſed its
rampart, could no where be had ſo ready, fo cheap,
and fo convenient as from the excavation of a ditch
before it.
Such was the only intelligence received previous
to the embarkation of the troops ; except in-
deed that authentick account of the French King's
forces furniſhed the Miniſtry by their moſt con-
fidential correſpondent, by which it appeared, as I
have fhewn, that there did not remain much
above 150,000 men, who were not imagined to be
probably a great diſtance from Rochefort at that
time.
Having thus ftated what was the intelligence,
I ſhall next fhew what was, as I apprehend, the na-
ture of the plan on which this Expedition was
fent out.
Which

( 30 )
Which, as appears by his Majeſty's inſtructions
to Sir Edward Havke and Sir John Mordaunt, was
in the firſt inſtance to cauſe a diverſion in favour of
his R. H. the Duke and the Electorate, at that
time in the utmoſt danger of being overpowered
by the vaſt ſuperiority of the French forces. For
the battles of Roſbach and Liſſa not having been
then fought, it was not expected as a thing of
courſe, that 25 or 30,000 men were to beat 80 or
90,000; nor was it yet the ſyſtem to complain,
that a General, with 25,000 effective men in the
field, did no more than ſtand a battle, and almoſt
gain a victory againſt 70,000. For as the author
ſays ironically, but very truly, p. 64. There were
certainly not ſo many men in the German as in the
French army: he might have added, by at leaſt
50,000.
I ſay therefore, that in this light the meaſure was
wiſe and ſolid; to draw back any part of the
enemy's troops from Germany, or to prevent more
from being ſent there, was in that conjuncture of
the utmoſt importance to the common cauſe, no-
thing was better calculated for this purpoſe than an
alarm on the coaſts of France; and if, in the courſe
of that operation, any material ſtroke could be
ftruck, that might eſſentially annoy the enemy, no-
body can doubt of the propriety of making that
attempt.
Such an one, I muſt be candid enough to own,
was the attack of Rochefort; then the favourite,
and ſince become the only object of this enter-
prize. But that the foundation on which it reſted,
or the particular mode pitched upon for the exe-
cution, did in any degree anſwer the wiſdom of the
deſign, I muſt, according to the beſt of my judg-
ment, abfolutely deny.
Becauſe

(31)
Becauſe our intelligence was very defective as I
have ſhewn; and becauſe we choſe to attack a
place on the footing of a ſurprize, which could
ſcarce poſſibly be ſurprized, and, by our eagerneſs
in that vain purſuit, neglected every mode of at-
tack to which that place was by its ſituation, and
by the ſtate of its works, unalterably expoſed.
The Admirals and Generals, it is ſaid, ſtrongly
objected to the prudence of proceeding on this
plan, and on this ſcanty intelligence; they aſked
for a few more battalions and an artillery fit to at-
а
tack the place (Court Martial, p. 67.) knowing
from its conſtruction it could make little reſiſtance
againſt ſuch an attack, probably not more than of
a few days only, if the garriſon was weak; it was
alſo urged, that even then it did not ſeem too late
to get ſome farther and freſher intelligence : to
which it was anſwered, That no more battalions
could be ſpared ; that more artillery was unne-
ceſſary, as the ſcheme was formed upon the footing
of a Coup de Main, or ſurprize, and not of
gular fiege; and in regard to intelligence, it was
not to be ventured, as the leaſt alarm muſt be fatal
to the enterprize ; ſo that it was thought better to
truſt to chance for the nature of the coast and land-
ing, the preſent condition of the place, the state of
the garriſon, &c. than attempt to get any better
information at the riſque of the ſecret.
Thus I think it is clear beyond a doubt, that
whatever terms were uſed in the inſtructions of
forcing, vigorous impreſons, warm alarms, burn-
ing and deſtroying, &c. they do by no means prove,
as the author is willing to conclude, that ſurprize
was out of the queſtion in any part of this operation,
ſurprendre une place de vive force; to ſurprize a
place by form or aſſault, is an expreſſion uſed by
Monſieur de Feuquieres, and exactly anſwers the
idea
a re-

( 32 )
idea of this attack ; of this ſpecies of ſurprize,
which could in no ſhape be on the footing of
ſtealing into a place, as the author ridiculouſly ſtates ;
but of coming near or before it by ſurprize, or with
giving as little notice as poſſible to the enemy, in
order afterwards to make your vigorous impreſſion,
and make that impreſſion ſucceſsful. It does not
follow, even where the utmoſt precautions are
taken, that becauſe it's a ſurprize, in the ſtricteft
ſenſe, there is to be no force uſed, and no fight-
ing; as Prince Eugene found at Cremona, Man-
tua, and Briſſac, at every one of which he was re-
pulſed, though he came before thoſe places by ſur-
prize.
I come now to ſhew how ſurprize being the
pla and the neceſſary plan of this undertaking,
on the footing of a Coup de Main; that plan failed,
and the very idea of it ſeemed vanilhed even be-
fore the fleet came in ſight of the French coaſt, and
much more ſtill during the ſix days delay between
that and the meeting of the Council of War.
For firſt, by the tranſports being taken up in the
river, while the troops were aſſembled in the Iſle of
Wight, it happened that the embarkation was de-
layed near two months from the time of the firſt
preparations, made pretty early in July,
2dly, No feint was ever made to draw off the
attention of the enemy; but on the contrary, all
our preparations carried on in ſuch a manner as
clearly indicated the true deſign, againſt the coaſt of
France, which however it might be overlooked by
ſome of our politicians at home did not eſcape the
vigilance of our enemy. For the aſſembling the
troops at the Iſle of Wight, ſhewed the deſtination
was Southward; but the victualling of the fleet
for ſo ſhort a time, and particularly the troop of
horfe embarked with forage for fix weeks only,
fhewed
1

( 33 )
Thewed it was neither for America, nor for the Me-
diterranean; it could therefore only be for the coaſt
of France.
And the ſcaling ladders, petards, and other pre-
parations for a ſurprize were ſo publicly ſhipped,
that they were mentioned in all the News-Papers.
From theſe circumſtances alone, it was pretty
plain to an intelligent obſerver, our deſign muſt be
diſcovered : the intelligence received, during the
delay at the Iſle of Wight, plainly ſhowed it was
diſcovered.
As early as 11th Augut, there was, in the Lon-
don Chronicle, an article from Paris, ſaying, The
French knew our deſign was againſt their coaſt, but
that it gave the court no uneaſineſs. That they ſhould
not draw a ſingle man from Germany, but only ſend
down to the coaſt, what was ſufficient for its de-
fence.
Another article from Rochefort, That an Eng-
liſh veſſel had been taken, which diſcovered our deſign
to be against the Iſle of Rhé or Oleron, or that part
of the coaſt.
15th Auguſt, a Captain of a veſſel who had been
prifoner at St. Maloc's, and was ſent back to
Guernſey, ſwore before a magiſtrate, that the Duke
d'Aiguillon was come to viſit the coast, that they were
making all ſorts of preparations there, and that he
heard a large body of troops, he ſaid upwards of
20,000 men, were to march through that place next
day.
Soon after this, an intercepted letter to a French
priſoner here, ſaid, The Duke d’Aiguillon had then
finiſhed the review of the coast, and ordered all things
necesſary for its defence.
Captain Cleveland, Captain of a Man of War,
about the ſame time ſpoke with a Dutch Man of
War immediately from Rochelle, the firſt Lieutenant
C
of
a

( 34 )
of which told him the Engliſh were then expected at
Rochelle, &c. but that they thought themſelves ſo
ſecure, they were making no extraordinary prepara-
tions. This account was ſent up to the Admiralty
10th August.
Thus even before the embakation of the troops,
was the alarm traced all along the French coaſt from
St. Maloe's, &c. quite down to Rochelle and Roche-
fort.
The moſt fanguine now ſhook their heads, and,
how little willing ſoever they may be to own it
ſince, I know, from very good authority, that
ſome of the chief promoters of this project in the
cabinet told their friends, They thought the oppor-
tunity was loſt, and that the alarm had now been toa
long taken to have any hopes of ſucceſs.
With theſe auſpicious omens for a ſurprize, the
fleet failed from Spithead on the Eth September, be-
ing about two months after the firſt ſo public pre-
parations for this ſecret Expedition ; and ſtill failed
without any newer or better information of the coaſt
or place they were going to, than thoſe I have
mentioned to have been received two months be-
fore ; fo fatal was the least alarm ſtill underſtood to
be to the deſign.
The 'very day after it failed, a Spaniſh veſſel
bound to Havre-de-Grace paſt through our fleet, as
did almoſt every day fome neutral veſſel.
On the 11th September, Captain Proby of the
Medway ſpoke with a Dutch ſhip, the Marguerita,
from Vannes to Dort, who ſaid, An embargo was
then laid on all ſhipping in France, as they expeeted a
defcent
on the coaft
, and particularly on the ſide of
,
Rhé, Rochelle, &c.
13th September, being then a little to the Weſt-
ward of Plymouth, Captain Gilchriſt of the Southamp-
fon brought into the fleet a French frigate, called
a
thc

( 35 )
66
the Emerald, which he took off Breſt the day be-
foré, among whoſe papers was found a letter to
Captain Perigni, Captain of that ſhip, who was
killed in the engagement, of which the following
is an extract:
St. Mathieu 4th Sept. 1757.
" I received lately your letter, my dear Perigni,
« in a trip I made to Breſt. You know that I ar-
56 rived there the 20th ; the Duke d’Aiguillon the
day before in the evening. I was ſent here the
“2ift, to inſpect the batteries, and to ſee them in
6. condition, &c.-- If the marine has taken care to
" fecure Breſt, the land has not been idle. We
« have here, at two or three leagues about us, near
,
7000 regular troops, and 1500 gardecotes. There
"s are alſo regular troops and gardecotes in the
"s diſtrict of Croſan; and all the batteries of that
< fide are alſo prepared.”
By this it appears authentically, that the coaſt
had been long alarmed, and that there were more
regular troeps upon it than our Miniſters gueſſed;
7000 near Breſt, and more on the other ſide the
Breſt Water.
odos
Afterwards it is ſaid, there was farther in-
formation by fome Dutcb veffels from Rochelle of
the alarm and preparations making in thoſe parts.
The fleet came in ſight of the Iſle of Oleron on
the 20th September, the 22d at night they entered
the Pertuis d'Antioche.
The Ide of Aix was taken on the 23d.
The report from the Rear Admiral and Captains
ſent to found and reconnoitre the coaſt, in order to
diſcover a landing-place, was made on the 24th in
the afternoon, and the Council of War met next
morning, 25th.
C2
Thus,

( 36 )
Thus, I think, I have ſhewn, that ſurprize was
really the plan of this Expedition, and alſo that
the idea of it certainly no longer exifted when the
Council of War met. So that I do not ſay it was
improbable, it was impoſible the enemy, amidſt all
their alarm and care for every other part of the
coaſt, ſhould have totally neglected Rochefort,
perhaps the moſt important, and one of the weak-
eft on it, to the degree that is now fuppoſed or
pretended; to the degree of not repairing a breach,
not making a coupure for their defence, when an
enemy had been aktually in fight fix days. For, as
our author fays, p. 28. Though we ſhould not have
too bigh an opinion of the French wiſdom and ability;
yet I do ſuppoſe, that in matters of defence, they do
conduet themſelves on principles ſimilar to thoſe which
are édopted by the rest of mankind. 10
But, ſays the Report of the board of General
Officers, and ſo ſays the author after them, It does
not appear that there were then, or at any time after-
wards, either a body of troops or batteries on the shore
ſufficient to prevent the attempting a deſcent. og
It is not quite clear, what number might be
ſufficient to prevent a deſcent: The Quarter-Ma-
fter General, on the Expedition, Colonel Wolfe,
being aſked the queſtion, ſaid, " He imagined
66 1000 foot and 2000 horſe might be fufficient
" to oppoſe the landing of 2 or 3000 men from
6. boats;” which was more by all calculations
than the boats of the fleet contained. But as
there were fand hills near the ſhore (which the
author remarks, with a fort of triumph, were no
leſs than forty yards from high-water mark, p.
37.) and as the troops could have no affiftance
from the cannon of the ſhips, it is imagined half
that number doing their duty, might prevent it';
and
9

( 37 )
and more than theſe were ſeen by Admiral Brode-
rick on the 23d or 24th at that very place.
But in this the report has ſelected the only ob-
jection, on which no ſtreſs was laid, and which is
not even taken notice of in the Council of War ;
for had the reſiſtance to be expected in the landing
been the chief objection, it certainly ſhould have
been riſqued, as it appears was the opinion of the
Generals and the Council of War in their ſub-
ſequent reſolution to land ; if they were repulſed
in that attempt, the evil was not very great, perhaps
the loſs of a few hundred men; and certainly, as
the author ſays, Lives muſt be riſqued, and Chriſtian
blood ſpili upon ſuch occaſions. But the danger here
aroſe from the total want of protection from the
ſhips in caſe of a retreat; and the total inſecurity
of any communication with the fleet from the
fituation of the landing-place on the open bay:
as appears from the words of the Council of War,
the opinion of the Sea Officers given there, and
the evidence of the Pilot who had had experience
of it; and alſo by the depoſitions of Admiral
Knowles and Admiral Broderick at the board of
General Officers, p. 35 and 46.
And though in theſe times of clamour and en-
quiry, an Officer is almoſt afraid to name the
word Retreat ; I know, of no one General of cha-
racter, ancient or modern, nor no writer on the art
of war, who has not looked upon that as a capital
and moſt eſſential point in all military under-
takings.
If you
land in an American ifland, where you
know the amount of the force that can come againſt
you, you may be eaſy about it ; but none but a
madman could be indifferent about the retreat of
his army from the continent of France.
I muſt alſo infift, if authority were wanting to
prove
C3

( 38 )
66
prove a thing ſelf-evident, that Lord Ligonier's
paper delivered to Sir John Mordaunt does, not-
withſtanding the author's attempt to invalidate it,
contain a moſt diſtinct and explicit inſtruction on
this head, not at all weakened by any other part
of thoſe inſtructions.
His words, which do honour to his ſkill and
judgment, are,
“ If an attempt is to be made on Rochefort, it
6 will be the part of the Admiral to know the coaſts
to cover the landing by the diſpoſition of his ſhips,
" and to deſtroy any barbette batteries the enemy
may have upon the ſhore, ſtill remembering
" that if the troops are landed at too great diſtance
6 from the place, the deſign will become dangerous,
66 and probably impracticable.
“ A ſafe and well-ſecured communication between
" the camp and the ſea, from whence you are to re-
« ceive your ſupplies of all ſorts, is abſolutely neceſ-
“ Sary ; THE WHOLE DEPENDS UPON IT.”
It appears here upon the moſt reſpectable autho-
rity, That the ſhips ſhould lye up to olift the landing ;
that the retreat, and alſo the communication with the
Ships, ſhould be ſecured ; that the whole depends upon
it; and that the deſign would become dangerous
and probably impraEticable, if the troops were land-
ed at too great diſtance from the place.
Now it is certain the landing-place, or places
near Chatelaillon, had all the diſadvantage they
could have under every one of theſe circumſtances;
the ſhips could not lje up within two miles ; the re-
treat and communication were not ſecured, and the
landing-place was ten er twelve miles from Roche-
fort.
But the author tells us gravely, that by throw-
ing up an entrenchment on the ſhore, the retreat
would have been ſufficiently ſecured; and, with the
greateſt
2

( 39 )
greateſt injuſtice to Lord Ligonier's judgment,
quotes his authority for this egregious blunder; as
if cafting up an entrenchment on the ſhore would
prevent the wind from changing to the Weſt, or
the open bay from being ruffled with a ſtorm ;
without which the ſecuring the retreat by land,
while the communication was cut off by ſea, would
be like conſtructing a Tête de Pont to repaſs a river,
when you had no bridge to croſs it.
But that a weſterly wind would have cut off the
communication, has been already proved, and even
the author is candid enough to allow the poſſibility
of the winds changing ; which the Council of War
thought a contingency too probable to riſque the
lofs of the whole army upon, at a time when they
had no proſpect at all of fuccefs, in the only mode
of attack which then offered.
But we are told, p. 37. that Sir Edward Hawke
ſays in his letter to Mr. Pitt: He and every one
elſe were of opinion the landing might be effected. I
have already ſaid, That every one was of that opinion,
at leaſt that it was poſible ; but I have alſo ſhewn,
that every one (Sir Edward Hawke not excepted)
was againſt that landing, as appears from the firſt
Council of War, not merely on account of the ef-
calade.- We are told alſo that Admiral Broderick
ſays, “ He could have got out of the boats with-
<< out wetting his ſhoes!" that is true; but then
the ſame Admiral Broderick alſo ſays, (being aſked,
If the men of war could cover the landing or retreat ?)
He don't think they could do either the one or the
other. Court Martial, p. 45.
He alſo ſays, That the changing of the wind
would have cut off the communication with the
ſhips at that landing-place.--For, being aſked,
" Whether ſeveral winds might not have detained
$6 the fleet in the road of Baſques ? he anſwers,
C 4
that

( 40 )
66
6C
that " he refers to the Council of War, ſaying,
That the ſame wind which would have prevented
" the troops from reimbarking, would have de-
tained the ſquadron there,” Enq. p. 46.
Admiral Knowles alſo gives his opinion preciſely
to the ſame effect, and almoſt in the ſame words,
Enq. p. 35. which ſhews, that there were other
confiderations attended to in that Council, beſides
the opinion of the Land Officers on the eſcalade.
But as a farther proof of Admiral Broderick's
good opinion of this landing place, the author tells
116, that the Admiral declares, " That men of
us
war could come within two miles; and that the
“ fand hills were forty yards diſtant from high-
66 water mark.”
Theſe may be very good reaſons in the new
fyftem of warfare ; according to the old notions of
things, they would have been reckoned very bad
ones. As two miles is confeſſedly out of gun-ſhot,
which all the Admirals declare at the Council of
War; and forty yards, the diſtance of the ſand
hills, is about one fifth of a point blank muſquet-shot.
So that I am very curious to know what the
Country Gentleman's idea is of the utility of men
of war at two miles diſtance; or, how near he thinks
the fand hills ſhould be to annoy the troops on
their landing?
As to the effect of the bombs in clearing the
ground for a mile beyond them, as we are told, p.
43. and the landing under the protection of bomb-
kelches: it is ſo much the idea of a Country Gen-
tleman indeed, that it is impoſſible to reaſon feri-
ouſly upon it: it being known there were but two
bomb-ketches in the fieet.
Blow
There is yet another extraordinary inſtance of
this plain Country Gentleman's veracity on this
fame head, p. 41. where he tells us poſitively,
66 That

( 41 )
66
>
C
66 That Admiral Knowles, in concurrence with
“ the Admiral and Captains who went to recon-
“ noitre, had aſſured them (the Generals) there
s6
56 were two landing-places out of the reach of any
battery; that the beach was dry, ſandy, firm,
“ & c. and though the cannon from the men of
“ war could not annoy the troops, yet the bomb-
« ketches might,” &c.
I have looked over Admiral Knowles's evidence
with attention, and can find no ſuch words in ic
any where, nor any thing relative to the landing-
place at Chatelaillon, but what follows: Bolo
• Being aſked what kind of landing-place there
was at Chatelaillon bay for boats ?” anſwered,
“ He was not there, but refers to Rear- Admiral
Broderick,” Enq. p. 45.
So that Admiral Knowles's Concurrence does not
add much weight to the opinion of thoſe Gentle-
men ; what that was I have already ſtated.
Such was the nature of the intelligence received
by the Council of War and by the General Officers
on this head, and ſuch their reaſoning upon it.
But Oficers it ſeems ſhould not reaſon ! and one
of them is expreſly condemned for judging by rea-
ſoning and intelligence, p. 36. their duty all lys!
ing in the narrow compaſs of the word Obedience..
The firſt duty of a ſoldier is obedience.--If he is or-
dered on an attack, he is not to aſk whether he can
get back.—Who conſtituted them Counſellors of ſtate,
and ſubmitted the propriety of their orders to their de-
ciſion, &c ? p. 34.
bus skait bra
It is rather odd, that the author himſelf ſhould
overturn all this fine declamation in the
very next
paragraph : where he ſays, “ This muſt be the caſe
66 when orders are expreſs and poſitive. Where in-
6 deed diſcretionary orders are given, there ariſes a
5 latitude and power of judging. Such was un-
doubtedly
-
66

( 42 )
6 * doubtedly the preſent caſe.” He allows they had
a latitude to judge in the preſent caſe! To his
queſtion therefore, Who conſtituted them Counſellors
of State ? the anſwer is eaſy, It was the author
himſelf: he firſt conſtituted them ſo in order to
condemn them afterwards for being ſo; ſince in
reality their part was no more than this, that be-
ing to determine on the execution of an enterprize,
of wbich they were made the judges, by his own con-
ceſfion, they did preſume ſo far as to form that
judgment on reaſoning and intelligence, two af-
fiftants, which, if fomo friends of the author had
conſulted a little more fully, it would not have
done them any diſcredit,
But to think at all was the crime; and to think
about fecuring a retreat for the army, abſolute
cowardice: If a soldier is ordered to an attack, be
is not to aſk whether he can get back, p. 34.
The author to be ſure means this of a General
atting with diſcretionary power, or elſe it is imper-
tinent, and no way applicable to the preſent
queſtion ; and yet ſo applied, certainly conſtitutes
a very curious doctrine for the cominand of armies.
I remember in a filly Novel an account of a great
General, called Tête à Peruque, or a Wig-block;
who is deſcribed as a perſon of undaunted courage
and heroic reſolution (a beaven ſent general) but
who never made calculations, ſuppoſed difficulties,
or thought of retreats; he makes a noble cam-
paign with infinite perſonal fpirit, and many brave
exploits, but at the end of it has the misfortune to
find himſelf and the remains of his army, after
many defeats, caught in a mouſe-trap.
Inſtances not much unlike it are to be found in
more ſerious Hiſtory, particularly that of a prince
of Saxe Eiſenach, who having landed 10,000 men
in an iſland of the Rhine, without ſecuring his re-
treat,

( 43 )
treat, was forced to ſurrender himſelf and his whole
army by capitulation to Marſhal Crequi.
Another inſtance of a ſimilar kind happened, as
I remember, to a corps of Spaniſh troops landed in
Ireland, who were obliged to ſurrender priſoners
of war, having no care taken for their retreat.
Monſieur de Feuquieres condemns the miſconduct
of the Duke of Saxe Eiſenach as a moſt ſhameful
breach of military duty, and ranks it among thoſe
diſhonourable capitulations of places for which
governors have been puniſhed; not on account of
the capitulation itſelf, which his ſituation made ne-
ceſſary, but of the imprudence with which he had
brought himſelf into that ſituation, Mem. de Feuq.
vol. iv. p. 214. Nor could any officer, or any
man of common ſenſe, form a different opinion of
it, till this new fyftem of Generalſhip was eſta-
bliſhed.
Thus it ſtood with reſpect to the landing; the
next part of the charge regards the attempt to be
made on Rochefort. Where the board of General
Officers declare, That it does not appear to them,
that there were any ſuficient reaſon to induce the
Council of War to believe that Rochefort was so far
changed in regard to it's ſtrength or poſture of de-
fence, as to prevent all attempts of an attack upon
the place, in order to burn and deſtroy the docks, ma-
gazines, arſenals, and ſhipping.
By the words all attempts of an attack upon the
place, one ſhould imagine, that a great variety of
attacks or attempts offered themſelves, in that
Council of War; whereas it was impoffible to
have heard the examination with common attention
or candour, and not perceive that the attempts on
Rochefort were all then reduced to a ſingle one,
namely, that of a Coup de Main or ſurprize.
For

( 44 )
For firſt, it is known that an attack in form was
out of the queſtion, as the Chief Engineer declared
before the Council of War in theſe words: That
be does not imagine any regular attack was intended
againſt that (Rochefort) or any other place, the ſmall
quantity of artillery we have not being ſent on that
plan, Enq. p. 105.
And, if that could not be done, neither was
there any better chance of ſucceſs againſt the docks
or magazines, as the ſame gentleman declares be-
fore the board of General Officers, where being
alked, whether, though the Town could not be taken,
we might not deſtroy the docks, magazines, &c. with
bombs and red bot balls?
He ſays, Undoubtedly by carcaſes and shells one
might deſtroy a great many of the ſtores, but to do it
in any tolerable degree, would require five times the
number of mortars we had: Beſides, ſuch a method
would take up time, and there would likewiſe be great
difficulty in bringing up ſufficient ſtores for that pur.
poſe to the place, Enq. p. 57.
This could not well be otherwife, as the landing-
place was not leſs than ten or twelve miles from
Rochefort; as the tranſports could not lie nearer
than a mile and half from the ſhore, and as the
leaſt ruffle of wind would have made the landing
any ſtores impracticable in that open part of the
bay.
But the regular attack of the place being thus
found impracticable, as alſo any conſiderable im-
preſſion on the magazines, docks, &c. on that fide,
it was plain, that in the queſtion before the
Council of War of the 25th, all was reduced to
the conſideration of the direct aſſault by ſtorm or
efcalade. The nature of which, and the proba-
bility of its fucceſs, I ſhall now conſider ; as that
whereon the whole of this queſtion ſeems to de-
pend,

( 45 )
pend, as far as relates to the reſolution of the firſt
Council of War.
2029101
Firſt, then, it appeared by the concurrent teſti-
mony of the priſoners ſeparately examined, that
there was a Marſhal of France at Rochefort. There
were alſo by the whole tenor of their accounts, a
conſiderable number of troops there, or in the
neighbourhood which might be thrown in at plea-
fure. - The names and number of battalions had
been particularly mentioned by ſome of them
which was confirmed by the appearance of men
and officers in different uniforms on the ſhore, with
colours, &c. A body of troops had been ſeen by
Admiral Broderick on the 23d and 24th near Cho-
telaillon ; another by Major Deſtriſay and others
on the 24th near Rochelle; more were ſeen palling
from Oleron to the main land, and another body
near Fouras : There were certainly marines in
Rochefort, even when Colonel Clerke was there,
though in time of peace, there were 1,000; the
dock-men are very numerous, as I have ſaid, the
place is populous, and the inhabitants conſtantly
uſed to arms; there is generally, and was now ſaid
to be, a Swiſs regiment there; there is always a
company of cadets, and one of bombardiers ; and
the crews of the ſhips alone then in the river, if
compleat, amounted to near 3,000 men. $1900
SIS
So that excluſive of either troops or militia from
the country or adjacent towns, there could not fail
of being a garriſon of ſome thouſand men in the
place; whereas our 10 battalions deſtined to the af.
fault or eſcalade, confifted of no more than 7,288
men fit for ſervice.com
I deſire the reader to recollect what has been ſaid
of the ſtate of the place from Colonel Clerke's and
the Pilot's evidence
.. DRUSE) 2018
TO
Now

( 46 )
.
Now from that ſtate alone, it is plain that the
hopes of ſucceſs muſt be either from the opening
by the river, or by an eſcalade of the rampart. As
,
to the former, it muſt appear to any one at all ac-
quainted with military affairs, that twenty-four, or
at moft forty-eight hours would make that part,
ſo ſituated, as ſtrong, (at leaſt againſt a Coup de
Main) as any part of the rampart, by means of a
good entrenchment and paliffade, eſpecially as, be-
lides the ditches mentioned, there was a large canal
to paſs, or rather two, as it muſt be twice paſt
before you come into the place; and as that part,
beſides the cannon on the rampart, would be
flanked by the broadſides of the five ſhips then in
the river, being on the water level ; and that with-
in leſs than half muſket-fhot; the canal and ditches
ſerving as avant foles, to be paſt in fight of the
enemy
As to the rampart, it was ſtrong and high, as I
have ſaid; but the exact height of it was not
known, which was a capital defect in an attempt
by eſcalade, as it would be difficult, if not impoſſi-
ble, to get it afterwards, and yet neceſſary to be
known with preciſion. L. C. C-ke, ſenſible of
this omiffion, ſays in his letter to Sir J. Lig-r,
-r
66 I have thought ſince, that it would not have
cc been amiſs, if I had known for certain the exact
" height of the rampart, I think that it could not
as well exceed twenty-five feet, &c."
It would indeed have been not amiſs, but very ma-
terial, as in an eſcalade, which was in a manner the
only reſource, every thing depended upon
“ I ſuppoſe, ſays Monſieur de Santa Cruz, that
before you attempt the ſurprize of any fortified
s or encloſed place, you have an exact knowledge
“ of its ſituation, its works, and the height
6 of its walls, in order to carry ladders of a
proper
it.

( 47 )
“ proper height, or exact meaſure - d'une juſte
** meſure.
“ It is impoſſible to ſcale walls that are too
high, &c. for if you plant your ladders too pera
“ pendicular, there will be no getting up them,
" and if you give them too much flope, they bend
" with every motion and break.”
If they are too long, they are eaſily overturned
if too ſhort, they are abſolutely uſeleſs.
Now though Col. C-ke in this account ſup-
poſes the rampart only twenty-five feet high, others
acquainted with the place ſaid, they imagined it
was not leſs than thirty, and ſome even more.
Our ladders were part of them thirty, and part
twenty-five feet long; if the rampart was twenty-
five feet, cur ladders of twenty-five would have
been ſcanty, as there muſt be allowance made for
their ſlope ; if it was thirty feet, quite too ſhort, and
thoſe of thirty feet ſcanty.
One of theſe ladders planted againſt the wall at
the fort of Aix, was too ſhort by ſeveral feet; and
at the ſame time ſo weak and tottering, that ſeveral
officers have declared, if their duty did not require
it, they would not have gone up for 500 1. though
no enemy oppoſed them. I mention this to ſhew in
part how tickliſh an operation a mere eſcalade is.
Indeed to that degree, that it is quite exploded,
except where it can be done by ſurprize. I won't
enter into any of the many ways there are of de-
feating it; but to ſhew I have not advanced any
thing lightly, will here ſet down the opinions of
ſome of the moſt approved authors on that ſubject,
Monſieur de Feuquieres, in his treatiſe on fur-
prizes, ſays *,
* “ Une maxime generale eſt d'entreprendre toujours avec
ſecret, avec une connoiſance parfaite de l'entrepriſe meditée, de la
* diligence dans la marche, de la vivacité, dans l'execution,
& de beaucoup de prevoyance dans la retraite.
06
66 A con-

( 48 )
C6
6G
12
66
c
60
CG
"A conſtant maxim is to conduct theſe enterpriſes
66 with ſecrecy, with a perfeet knowledge in the de
ellow glass of diamo
« Il doit auſſi être couvert par quelque demonftration, quis
en cas qu'il parvienne à la connoiſſance de l'enemi detourne
“ fon attention du veritable projet.
“ On doit avoir une exacte connoiſſance du pais qui conduit di
l'objet de l'entreprizes de fa fituation, de la force naturelle, de
" celle des troupes enemies ſur leſquelles on veut entreprendre ;
« de leur negligence ou precautions à ſe garder ; parceque de toutes ces
connciſſances depend la reuſſite du projet.
« La marche vers l'objet de entreprize doit être faite avec un
grand ſecret, & beaucoup de diligence.
« En general, rien ne doit être tenté ſans une certitude preſ-
que fure de reuſſir. Il faut donc avoir exactement fait re-
connoitre
par des eſpions fideles & capables le terrein des en-
si virons de la place & tous les manquemens de ſa garde.
“ Il faut arriver de nuit avec grand filence.
9
• Les places les plus expoſées à être inſulteés de vive force
< font celles dont les ouvrages ne font point revétus, parce que fi
« la fortification de terre n'eſt pas entretenuë & que les foſſés
ne foient pas à fond de cuve ou fort fangeux, il n'est pas im-
poffible de ſurprendre ces places de vive force, lorſqu'on peut les
porter devant avec aſſez de ſecret pour que l'enemi ne ſoit pas
« averti de l'entreprize.
bus :1991 l Du Marq. De Santa Cruz.
i to bolo
xes Je ſuppoſe qu'avant de vous determiner à vouloir ſurprendre
une place ou lieu fermé, vous avez une connoiffance parti-
“ culiere de ſa ſituation, de ſes ouvrages & de la hauteur de ſes
“ murailles, afin de porter des eſchelles d'une juſte meſure.
03
« Je ſuppoſe auſli que vous avez connoiffance du nombre de
ceux qui la defendent, de la maniere dont les gardes ſont diſtribuées ;
« de combien d'hommes chacune de ces gardes eſt compoſeé, &c.
“ Vous calculerez ſi vous pouvez vous retirer en ſureté du poſle
que vous voulez ſurprendre eu egard aux heures dont vous
avez beſoin pour la marche, pour l'expedition & pour le re-
“ Les foſſés pleins d'eau font un obſtacle aux eſcalades.
6. L'obſcurité & le vent qui accompagnent les nuits d'hyver
favorizent vos troupes pour n'etre vuës ni ouïës des enemis.
De Monf. De Quinci, ſur les ſurpriſes. POSITO
« Dans toutes ces entrepriſes il eſt abſolument neceſaire de
« ſçavoir le nombre des habitants, & des troupes de la garriſon ; la
force & la ſituation des corps de garde, les lieux ou l'on poſe les
ſentinelles, l'ordre des rondes & des patrouilles, &c.
“Sign
66
66
CS
26
66
66
tour.
66
66

( 49 )
66
CG
66
66
66
** Jign meditated, diligence in the march, vivacity
"s in the execution, and much precaution for the
66 retreat.
" It ought alſo to be covered by fome ap-
“pearance, which may divert the attention of the
5 enemy from the real object.
" There ought to be an exaet knowledge of the
country that leads to the object of the enterprize,
“ of its natural ſtrength, that of the enemy's troops
" on whom the attempt is to be made, their neg-
ligence or precaution in their defencé, &c. becauſe
« on all theſe depends the ſucceſs of the project.
“ The march to the place to be attacked, ought
to be made with great ſecrecy and expedition.
" In general nothing ought to be attempted
es without almoſt an abſolute certainty of ſucceed-
« ing. You muſt therefore have the place ex-
« actly reconnoitred by faithful and able ſpies :
" its environs and all the defects of its guards.
“ You muſt arrive by night in great filence.
“ The places the moſt expoſed to be inſulted,
are thoſe whoſe works are not faced, becauſe, if
" the fortifications being of earth are not kept in
& repair, and that the ditches are not wet or very
F muddy, it is not impoſſible to ſurprize ſuch a
place by ſtorm or affault, provided you can bring
your troops before it so ſecretly that the enemy is
6 not apprized.
From the Marquis De Santa Cruz. Mes
" I ſuppoſe, that before you determine to at-
"tempt the ſurprizing any fortified place, you
“ have an exact knowledge of its ſituation, its
" works, and the heighth of its walls in order to
carry ladders of a proper heighth, &c.
Gorn
bro
“Si la place qu'on projette de furprendre eft fi avant dans le
pais ennemi qu'on ne peut y arriver en un jour, il ſera pour
difficile de reullir dans cette entrepriſe."
D
6 I alſo
66
66
lors
66

( 50 )
C
66
66
.
60
« I alſo ſuppoſe, that you know the number of
thoſe who defend it, the manner in which the
guards are poſted, of how many men theſe guards
« confit, &c.
OGUE
" You will calculate whether you can retreat
" with ſafety from the post you would ſurprize,
conſudering the time neceſſary for the march,
65 the attempt, and the return.
“ Ditches full of water are alſo an obſtacle to
eſcalades.
or's no no
“ The darkneſs and wind that accompany winter
nights are favourable to your troops, becauſe
" they prevent their being ſeen or beard by the
enemy.
From M. De Quinci, on ſurprizes.
" In all theſe enterprizes it is abſolutely neceſſary
s to know the number of inhabitants and of the
" troops of the garriſon; the frength and ſituation
of the guards, the places where the centinels are
placed, the manner in which the rounds and patroles
56 are made, &c.qxo do 25
6. If the place you intend to furprize is ſo far
es advanced in the enemy's country, that you
s6 not arrive there in a day, it will then be difficult
65 to ſucceed in ſuch an enterprize."
?
Theſe are ſome among the many military rules
and maxims upon this ſubject, which whoever is at
the trouble of examining will ſee are in every cir-
cumſtance contrary to the nature of the late ſcheme,
and the manner of its execution as in the queſtion
before the firſt Council of War. For they neither
knew the coaſt nor country, the ſtrength of the gar-
rifon, the guards the enemy mounted, the centinels
they poſted, nor the rounds they went, nor were in-
formed with preciſion of the heighth of the ram-
part, &c. What they appear to have known by
poſitive evidence was, that the ditch was wet, the
CO
ramparts
can-

( 51 )
ramparts bigh and faced with ſtone; that the nights
were light, and that they were ſo far from being
able to arrive in one day, or to conceal their march,
that the enemy muſt have known of their approach
for ſeven or eight days at leaſt, and ſeen every motion
made for the attack.
Such was the nature of this attempt for ſur-
prizing Rochefort, after the alarm, I have men-
tioned from certain authority, and after the fleet
bad already been ſeen fix and muſt have been eight
or nine days before that attempt could have been
made.
I now deſire the reader to recollect what has
been ſaid, touching the only landing-places diſco-
wered: he will then fee that, in order to make this
hopeleſs and truly impracticable attempt, equally
contrary to the rules of war and reaſon, the Council
or the Commanders in chief muſt have acted as
contrary to common ſenſe, to the inſtructions
given, and to the prudent and ſenſible direction of
our preſent Commander in chief of his Majeſty's
forces, by landing the troops at a great diſtance
from the place, without any protection from the ſhips,
and without any ſecurity for the communication wilh
the fleet, or the retreat of the troops.
For had thoſe been at all ſecured, it certainly was
the intention of the Commander, as it was the opi-
nion of the Council in general, hopeleſs as the pro-
ſpect was, to have made the actual tryal. But it
was not thought adviſeable to riſque the cutting off
the whole army merely to reconnaitre with ſcarce a
poſſibility of doing more; and a ſmaller number
could not reconnoitre the place, as it lay ſo far up
the country, without a certainty of being inter-
cepted.
I fhould now think enough was ſaid upon this
ſubject, to convince every impartial reader, that the
deter-
a
D 2

( 52 )
determination of that Council of War, and the
conduct of the General in adhering to that de-
termination, were founded in reaſon, agreeable to
the ſpirit of the orders and inſtructions with which
he was ſent, and to that latitude and diſcretion with
which he was directed to judge.
But as the report of the board, and the author in
fupport of it, ſeem to lay great ſtreſs in that, It
did not appear to them that there were ſufficient rea-
fons to induce the Council of War to believe that
Rochefort was so for changed in reſpect to its
ſtrength or poſture of defence, ſince the expedition was
firſt reſolved on in England, as to prevent all at-
tempts, &c.
I ſhall ſhortly recapitulate thoſe circumſtances
by which I think it plainly appears, that the
ſtrength and poſture of defence of Rochefort, and
the proſpect of ſucceeding againſt it were very much
changed ſince the Expedition was firſt reſolved on in
England; though even then it was framed on no
very promiſing grounds, at leaſt on the footing of
a Surprize, or Coup de Main only.
The circumſtances, then unknown, which ren-
dered it ſtill more hopeleſs, and indeed quite im-
practicable on that footing, were the following:
1. The long delay fince our preparations were
publicly known.
2. The alarm all along the coaſt quite down to
Rochefort, previous to, and during the voyage.
3. That the fleet had actually been ſeen on the
coaſt fix days, when the Council of War was held
on the 25th.cos 570
4. That they muſt have been two or three days
more in landing the troops and ſtores, and march-
ing up to the place to ſurprize it.
5. That there was thereby time given to
the enemy to aſſemble their troops, and that
there

( 53 )
there was certainly a numerous garriſon in the
place.
6. That any hopes from the opening near the
river were totally cut off as has been ſhewn.
7. That there was a Marſhal of France then in
the place.
8. That it was proved by pofitive witneſſes the
ditch was wet, or could be flowed with water all
round.
9. That our Chief Engineer (Lieutenant-Colonel
CV-ke) declared at the Council of War, that that
circumftance alone would defeat the eſcalade.
10. That the nights were light.
11. That the plan of the landing and approach
were changed, by the failure of the attack on Fouras.
12. That at the only landing-places diſcovered
near Chatelaillon, the ſhips could not lie up to co-
ver the landing or retreat.
13. That thoſe landing places being on the open
bay, all retreat and communication with the ſhips
would at once be cut off by the winds coming to
the Weſt, which was expected every day.
In every one of which circumſtances it is plain,
there was a change ſince the Expedition was firſt
reſolved on in England, as theſe circumſtances either
did not exiſt, or were not known at that time; and
every one of them did undoubtedly tend to put
Rochefort in a better poſture of defence, againſt the
intended furprize, and render the ſucceſs of it quite
impracticable.
So much that, had but half chefe circumſtances
been known before the Expedition was reſolved on,
I believe there is ſcarce a man in England wild
enough to think it would or ought to have been
ſent; at leaſt on that plan.
Such were the circumſtances in which the
ſtrength and poſture of defence of Rochefort were
changed
D 3

( 54 )
of war.
changed, and doubtleſs moſt eſſentially changed
ſince the Expedition was reſolved on. A numerous
garriſon in the place, a wet ditch, light nights, and
a long alarm, were ugly circumſtances againſt an
eſcalade; theſe were the very circumſtances appre-
hended, when the ſecret was ſo ſtudiouſly kept ; when
it was thought dangerous to get intelligence even in
the moſt private way; and when the Miniſtry re-
jected all propoſals for a plan to attack the place
in form, for fear it should take up fix or eight days:
a regular attack was not adviſable that might take
up fix or eight days, but a Coup de Main might be
reaſonably attempted at the end of that time! This
is one among many of our new doctrines on the art
As to any material alterations in the form
or conſtruction of the works that could never be
the object of all this caution and apprehenſion for
the ſecret, as they are not to be made on ſuch
warning.
Having thus gone through the confideration of
the report, as far as relates to the reſolution of the
firſt Council of War, I muſt now remark ſome
extraordinary inſtances of our author's candor, judg-
ment, and veracity in his obſervations upon it.
.
Firſt, as to the opening in the rampart, he tells
us, p. 50. " That Bonneau the fiſherman, affured
.
cs Colonel Clerke, that upon the 21ſt of that very
month, when our fleet was on the coaſt, that
""* very ſpot remained as open, and as unfortified,
s as when Colonel Clerke ſaw it in the year 1754 ;
" and that this, though reported to the General, he
66 would not believe." I have looked at the part
of the Enquiry referred to viz. p. 52, and do not
find there, nor indeed elſewhere, that any ſuch re-
port was made to the General by Colonel Clerke,
much leſs that the General would not believe it, as
the author afferts.
What
CG

( 85 )
១
What Colonel Clerke ſays, Enquiry p. 51 and 52,
is, « That Bonneau the Fiſherman, whom be ex-
66 amined on the 28th, after the Council of War had
"" come to a reſolution to land, and who had been ex-
** amined by Major General Conway, &c. ſeemed to
« be very diſtinct in regard to many particulars,
« for ſo common a man, much more than he could
“ have imagined; he mentioned particularly that
6 he went by Rochfort on the 21ſt of the month,
" and that the place which he, Colonel Clerke, de-
« ſcribed to bim as open and unfiortified, was in the
6 ſame condition that day.” Theſe are Colonel
Clerke's words, on which I have two things to re-
mark, beſides the veracity of this report being made
to the General, and his not believing it : As firſt, that
it was on the 28th, after the ſecond Council of War
had determined to land, and conſequently could
not any ways affect the reſolution of the firſt Coun-
cil of War; and ſecondly, that the man, by that
account, had only poſt by Rochefort, at leaſt by that
part in queſtion, and conſequently that an entrench-
ment thrown up there, which is not a very con-
fpicuous or ſtriking object, might eaſily eſcape the
obſervation of a fiſherman paling by in a boat.
As to the General reaſoning on the nature of this
opening, I refer to what has been laid in the former
part on that ſubject : But as it is affirmed, That all
the reaſoning relative to the throwing up an entrench-
ment, and fortifying that opening was only ſuppoſition,
I muſt obſerve, that the evidence of Pierre Girard,
who was there on the 20th September, the day be-
fore Boneau paſt by, and depoſed, " That the
66
« Avant guard (which is the part immediately be-
5 fore that opening) was then fortified and defended
by a faſcine battery of ſeveral pieces of connon juſt
finiſhed,” Enq. p. 58. As alſo the Poſtſcript of
the Letter from Rochefort of the 18th, found in
D 4
the
66

( 56 )
the Prieſt's houſe on the Iſle of Aix ; which fays,
the Governor was then taking the beſt precautions for
ſecuring the place, prove it was not mere ſuppoſition.
But granting that it were ſuppoſition, the fuppofition
that the enemy would on expectation of an immer
diate attack, certainly entrench and fortify that
opening (unleſs they could overflow the ground) is
ſo natural, that it would be ſtupidity not to fuppoſe
it. That we ſhould never take it for granted, that
all is done which ought to be done even in France, I
do agree is reaſoning right, as the author ſays; but
to ſuppoſe that an enemy will not do any thing at
all, or will neglect ſuch things as are things of
courſe, and can neither be overlooked, nor forgot,
is not to reaſon at all; and I think one might juſt
as well ſuppoſe an enemy would not fire their muf-
quets, or draw their ſwords, as that with hands
and materials at command, they ſhould not make
up a breach in their rampart. To make ftrained
calculations of what your enemy will do argues
timidity, but not to make any calculations at all
argues folly; and an army may as well have no
General, or a General no head, if ſuch calculations
are not made. --One of the greateſt Generals among
the moderns, the Duke of Parma, once mift an
opportunity of taking Hentry IV. of France, who
came out to ſkirmiſh with a ſmall party of light
horſe; but being reproached with it afterwards,
when it was known the king was there, he an-
fwered *, " That he ſhould do the ſame again,
“ becauſe his conduct was founded in reaſon, as he
si thought he had to do with a General of an army,
6 and not with a Captain of Huffars." He
а
* " Che ſe foſſe a farla tornarebbe a far la medfima deli-
“beratione perche era dettata dalla ragione havendo creduto
“ di aver da fare con un Capitano Generale d'un exercito, &
non con un Capitano di cavalli leggieri.” Davila, Hiſt.
ſpoke

( 57 )
ق
ſpoke like a man and a ſoldier, as he had acted;
and felt himſelf above judging, or being judged,
by ſubſequent intelligence.
I muſt add to this article of ſuppoſition what has
appeared farther relative to the fortifying this open-
ing: Firſt, Colonel Clerke declares, “ That ſucb
“ an entrenchment as he himſelf threw up in the Iſle
66 of Wight might be thrown up in a day and an
half, or perhaps even in a day.” Enq. p. 56.
As in fact, Ten yards of that entrenchment, though
of a ſtronger profile than an ordinary entrenchment,
and in so holding a clay that it was neceſſary to mat-
tock it, was thrown up by ten men, which was not so
many hands as might bave been employed on it, in
thirty-fix hours.
2dly, Lieutenant Roy Engineer, depoſed at the
General Court Martial, “ That in an ordinary foil
" fo ſmall an extent of entrenchment as fixty,
an hundred, or three hundred yards, might be
" thrown up; and in the ſpace of two or three
days made ſo ſtrong as to render it unaſſailable
“ till ſuch time as it was battered and laid open by
cannon;
and in the ſame time he thinks even
66.covered way, glacis, and perhaps an advanced ditch
" might be made." Court Martial, p. 89.
Colonel Clerke alſo declares he imagines, “ That
“ ſuch an Entrenchment might be thrown up,
so as to put it on a footing with the reſt of the
place in a few days time.” Court Martial, p. 34.
I ſhall now ſum up the evidence on this head,
by which, I think, it will appear there is a de-
monſtration, on the footing of that evidence, that
Rochefort could not be taken by eſcalade.
It was proved to the Council of War by direct
and poſitive evidence, that the ditch could be filled
with water. Enq. p. 105.
Colonel
66
66

( 58 )
Colonel Clerke declared before the fame Council
of War, that, if it were ſo, the rampart could not
be ſcaled, Enq. p. 105.
Colonel Clerke alſo declares at the General Court
Martial, that in a few days the opening might be
made as ſtrong as the rampart. General Court
Martial, p. 34.
So that the rampart being unaſailable by an ef-
calade, and the opening made as ſtrong as the rampart;
it is plain, on that evidence, that unleſs the French
had neglected to make the entrenchment in eight
days, which might have been made in two; a neg-
lect which, I think, I have ſhewn was not only im-
probable, but imposible; then it ſeems impoſible
alſo on the evidence before that Council of War,
and on Colonel Clerke's own principles, That the
place could be taken by eſcalade.
Before I go into the author's candid reflexions on
the evidence relative to the ditch being flowed, it
will be proper to obviate an aſſertion of his (for he
loves aſertions) which would ſave the trouble of all
argument on that head; namely, That a couple of
field pieces would blow up a ſluice in half an hour, and
then what would become of the wet ditch? p. 54.
Suppoſe I were to imitate the author's ſtyle and
method of reaſoning; and anſwer this round la-
conic aſſertion by as round an one, viz. That a
couple of field pieces could not blow up a ſluice in
half an hour ? my logick would certainly be as
good, and my aſſertion, I believe, much better and
truer.
For, if wet ditches were to be diſpoſed of with
this expedition and facility, I fancy few Engineers
would have been at the trouble of making them by
raiſing ſluices with great labour and expence; nor
would Marſhal Vauban, a tolerable judge in thoſe
caſes, have given his opinion as he does, that thoſe
ditches

( 59 )
ditches which are dry, but can be flower with water,
are the very beſt ſort of ditches for the defence of a
fortified place.
Les Meilleurs (Foſſés) ſont ceux qui étant ſecs peu-
vent étre inondés, Att. & Def.
P.
26.
He conſtructed many on that plan; and doubt-
leſs was unacquainted with the author's ſecret for
blowing up his ſluices with two field pieces of can-
non in ſo ſhort a ſpace of time.
In the preſent caſe it ſeems particularly difficult;
as one does not at firſt fight conceive how two
field pieces could be mounted in battery, or ſtand at
all againſt a place which is able to mount above
100 pieces of battering cannon; and was under no
neceffity of raiſing batteries, as they could run their
cannon to any part of the rampart, and open what
embrazures they pleaſed. And certainly where-
ever the fluices were, they muſt be under protection
of the rampart. So that the author muſt firſt
make the juices as he pleaſes, next place them as he
pleaſes, and laſtly, engage the French not to fire
their cannon (which is juſt as probable a ſuppoſition
as their not raiſing the entrenchment) and then, per-
haps, his two little cannon may do ſomething.
I come now to his reflexions upon the ſtate of
the ditch equally juſt and true with moſt of the
foregoing; particularly where he ſpeaks of the
concurrent teſtimony of Colonel Clerke, and the French
Engineer, that it was a dry one : By which one
would imagine, that this concurrent evidence was
produced at the Council of War of the 25th, and
was among the arguments urged againſt the reſo-
lution of that Council; whereas it appears by
Colonel Clerke's teſtimony, Eng. p. 54. that this
evidence of the French Engineer was not pro-
cured by Colonel Clerke till the 26th, being the day
after that Council of War Sat, nor communicated
to

( 60 )
to Sir John Mordaunt till the 27th, which, as Major
General Conway remarks, Enq. p. 54. was the day
he made two different propoſals for landing, and
the day before it was unanimouſly reſolved in the
ſecond Council of War to land.
So that it can poſſibly have no weight againſt
the conduct of the Generals, or the reſolutions of
the Councils of War, being ſubſequent to that
which reſolved not to land, and previous to that
which determined to land.
As to the contradi&tory evidence on the ſubject of
the ditch being wet mentioned by Sir John Mor-
daunt, on which the author plays ſo ingeniouſly, it
does not appear what it was ; but, by the teſtimony
of ſome members of the Council of War examined
at the Court Martial, it amounted to no more than
that the ditch was by ſome one or more of the
priſoners ſaid to be ordinarily dry, but not that there
were no ſuices, or that it was not posſible to fill it.
Procedings of the General Court Martial, p. 68,
and 10.
a
Now then let us conſider a little that evidence,
which, it clearly appears, was produced before the
Council of War relative to the ditch being wet, as
ftated in thoſe minutes or evidence taken by the
ſaid Council, which make a part of it, and which
our author again laments, p. 50. were totally ſup-
preſſed.
Firſt then the evidence of Lieutenant-Colonel
Clerke is in the following words: “Being aſked, if
66 the ditch were flowed with water, whether he
" ſhould then think it practicable to take the
place by eſcalade ? ſaid, He thought not; but
" that when he ſaw the ditch, it did not appear to
« him capable of being flowed.”'
On the other hand, Monſieur de Bonneville,
volunteer, being aſked what he knew of Roche-
fort,
)

( 61 )
fort, ſaid, “ That there are ſluices there by which
6k they can flow the ditch, and that it was full of
56 water all round when he was there."
The pilot of the Neptune, being called in, ſaid,
“ That he had been very frequently at Rochefort,
" that he had commanded a ſmall veffel there
many years: that they have ſluices near the
" Hoſpital, by which they can fill the ditch with
" water; and that he has ſeen water in it quite
66 round the town. Enq. 105.
There is alſo mention made of a confirmation of
this evidence by priſoners, but as that is but
Nightly mentioned, and at beſt is not the moſt
eligible kind of evidence, where any better is to
be had, I ſhall entirely wave that; and then, I
think, I may appeal to the candor of all mankind,
almoſt to that of the author, whether the evi-
dence of a gentleman faying, He thought the ditch
46 could not be flowed;" is to be weighed againſt
the poſitive declaration of two credible witneſſes,
depofing that they ſaw the ditch filled with wa-
"
" ter all round the town;" one of whom, ſays he,
had lived many years at the place, and particularly
defcribes the manner in which the ditch was filled.
I ſay credible witneſſes, in ſpite of the author's
reflexions on Monſieur Bonneville, as their evidence
then appeared credible, and ſtood unimpeached;
if it was falſe, it certainly was not the fault of that
Council, it deceived them, as I believe it would
have deceived any court in the world, and it muſt
require all the good-nature of the author to ſup-
poſe they themſelves contributed to that deception.
But before I take leave of Monſieur Bonneville,
I muſt obferve another remarkable inſtance of our
auchor's veracity in his account of that gentleman,
and his evidence, p. 54. where he tells us that he
ſaid, “ To the beſt of his recollection, there was wa-
66 ter

(62)
** ter in the ditch when he was there, &c." I have
already quoted his words from the Council of War
itſelf, and therefore need not repeat them; thoſe
words are as poſitive as words can be; I have alſo
aſked ſeveral members of that Council of War,
who all agree thoſe were his words: and who alſo
agree that his ſcheme of filling up that ditch put fo
emphatically in Italicks, was not ſo much as men-
tioned in his evidence at that Council; nor by any
information I can get at any time previous to it.
After he had heard of Colonel Clerke's opinion, de-
claring, that if the ditch was wet, the place could not
be eſcaladed; he did indeed advance this doctrine
of filling up a wet ditch with fand bags, in order
to plant ſcaling ladders upon them: a doctrine ſo
wild and extravagant, that though they had not
had the opinion of the Chief-Engineer on the Ex-
pedition, Colonel Clerke, diametrically oppoſite to
it, the idea of filling up the ditch of a town with
fand bags, in order to make a foundation large
enough for thirty or forty ſcaling ladders abreaſt,
and then to plant thoſe ladders in ſight of an ene-
my, and ſcale walls of twenty-five or thirty feet
high, is ſo ridiculous, that one muſt have a very
mean opinion of a Council of War reſolving to land
а.
an army, eſpecially ſuch an army, ſuch an handful
of men for ſuch an experiment.
But this Monſieur Bonneville, the author has
beard, and is well founded in aſſerting it (as well as
in many more things be aſſerts) was under the pro-
te Etion of one of our Generals; that is a part of his
crime and of the General's : now as from this em-
phatical mention of ſo inſignificant a circumſtance,
were it true, one would imagine there was ſome
terrible ſecret hiſtory, or ſome wicked combination
ſuſpected between theſe perſons protecting and
protected. I have taken ſome pains to inform
myſelf

(63)
myſelf of the hiſtory of this gentleman, by which
I find (and I am very well founded in what I afert)
that Monſieur B nneville, a Swiſs gentlemant, and a
Proteftant, formerly in the French ſervice with
Marſhal Saxe; and, ſince his death, four years in
the Pruſſian ſervice, was taken into ours, and ſent
as a Captain, in Lord Loudon's American Regiment,
to America; that he had not been long returned
from thence, when he was one day mentioned to
fome of the Generals and others concerned in this
Expedition, as a perſon who might be of uſe on
ſuch an occaſion, being acquainted with the French
ſervice, and alſo with most of their places, so that he
might be able to give them fome uſeful intelligence.
This being afterwards reported to the Miniſtry,
they thought proper to ſend him down, on this foot-
ing, to the Ife of Wight, with a ſtrong letter of re-
commendation, as I have heard, to the Commander
in Chief; which was the firſt of his introduction to
any of the Generals on the Expedition. By the
diſtribution made afterwards of the Officers of the
Staff, &c. in the ſeveral Men of War, this gentle-
man happened to be put on board the ſame ſhip
with one of the Generals, who, till his arrival at
the Iſle of Wight, had never ſeen, nor, till fome
few days before, ever heard of Monſieur Bonneville.
This, I believe, is the hiſtory of that gentleman, as
far as relates to this Expedition, and to the very
ſmall part he appears to have acted there, which
was only that of being called as an evidence to a
plain matter of fact ; of which he muſt certainly
have been a very competent witneſs.
I cannot quite leave the ſubject of the ditch,
without taking notice of another obſervation made
by the author relative to it, viz. that the ditch
could not be flowed on account of the level of the
ground: Que cela ne pouvit être à cauſe de l'inegalité
du

( 64 )
du Terrein; and that our Generals ſhould not have
doubted about the filling the ditch of a place wbic)
lay on the ſide of an bill
. This would certainly be
true, had the fact been ſo made out to them;
but it happened otherwiſe, as by all the accounts
of Rochefort, they had always underſtood that it
was on a flat, and entirely drained from marſhes,
&c. as the ſame evidence, which had ſeen water
quite round, declared it to be fo; and as Colonel
Clerke ſeemed by no means clear of the level of the
ground ſo as to determine poſitively whether the
ditch could be filled by ſluices or not; the moſt
that was then deſcribed being a gentle riſe of the
ground; the author is pleaſed to exalt it into an
hill, though even at the Court Martial Colonel
Clerke ſeems to ſpeak rather dubiouſly on this
fubject, and though be conceives the upper part is
higher than high-water mark, he owns it is dif-
ficult to judge of the level of ground with the eye.
Court Martial, p. 35.
* I come now to the attack of Fouras, and the
conſequences of it, on which ſubject the author
begins p. 36. with aſſerting, « That as to taking
" that fort by land, without a ſea operation, it
“ never entered into the heads of any of the Coun-
< cil to order it to be reconnoitred, &c.”_ And
" that it was higheſt imputation on the Council of
“ War never to have conſidered this point till af-
« ter they had determined to lay aſide the only meaſure
" which made the fort worth attacking. And
again, “ Is it not aſtoniſhing that when Vice-
"
" Admiral Knowles had reported the impracticabi-
u lity of taking it by fea; the Generals ſhould
“ firſt lay aſide all thoughts of proſecuting the whole
6 plan before they ever aſked, whether this ne-
ceffary place could be taken without the af-
« fiſtance of ſhips ?” p. 56.
But
66
66

(65)
But firſt, it appears that Fouras was reconnoitred
together with the reſt of the coaſt by Admiral
Broderick, and the four Captains who attended
him, and who, by their report, reconnoitred from
Rochelle to Fort Fouras.
It appears alſo by what I have already faid, of
the propoſals for landing near and attacking that
fort; that a land attack was not out of the queſtion.
Though at that time (I mean before the report
was made by Admiral Broderick) Thierri, the pilot
of the Magnanime, who was then much depended
on, having declared, He could carry a ſhip up to it,
and beat it down in half an hour ; which then ſeemed
the opinion of the Admirals alſo; this occaſioned
thoſe propoſals being made for a joint operation by
land and ſea. Yet it alſo appears by Sir John Mor-
daunt's evidence, that after the report of Admiral
Broderick and the Captains, who had found no land-
ing near Fouras, aud after Admiral Knowles had
reported that Fouras could not be attacked by ſea;
all thoughts of attacking it by a land operation only
were not laid afde, for " that it was propoſed by
66 Major-General Conway to go that afternoon to
" the Iſle of Aix, to reconnoitre from thence, whe-
66 ther they could find out any place near or towards
“ Fouras, and alſo to examine the priſoners,” Enq.
P. 25. Sir John Mordaunt alſo declares, they did
thereupon go to the Ine of Aix, where the priſoners
were, and afterwards that the priſoners and other
witneſſes were examined that evening,
But the information then obtained not being fa-
vourable to the landing near Fouras, or attack of
that fort on the land ſide :
In this ſituation the General thought it neceſſary
fome immediate determination ſhould be come to in
regard to the landing, and the Coup de Main ; al-
ready too long delayed; he called a Council of
E
War
9

( 66 )
War for that purpoſe, and it ſeems impoſſible, I
think, to have come to any other reſolution than .
they did, informed as they then ſtood, without
riſquing the whole of his Majeſty's troops upon an
attempt in which there ſcarce ſeemed a poſibility of
ſucceſs.
In regard to their immediate reſolution to go home
again, mentioned p. 36. it is falſe, and has been
already confuted.
The only queſtion therefore remaining on this
head is, whether after thus giving up the Coup de
Main or eſcalade (which is confeſſed) they therefore
gave up, or laid ofide the great obje Et of the Expe-
dition, as the board of General Officers declare, or
the only meaſure which made the fort worth taking,
as the author advances, p. 37.
Firſt then, to proſecute the idea of Fouras, it
appears that on the 26th, which was the day af-
ter the Council of War, ſeveral ſchemes were
agitated among the Admirals and Generals, and
evidence examined, particularly concerning the ſitu-
ation of Fouras, Enq. p. 18. and that, in con-
ſequence hereof, it was again propoſed by General
Conway to go and reconnoitre the forts of Fouras,
l’Eguille, &c. which was done next morning from
the Tower of the fort of Aix with a teleſcope.
Here, as Sir John Mordaunt ſays in his Narrative,
66 there was ſome difference of opinion in regard
" to an attempt upon it.” Enq. p. 18. General
Conway, in his Narrative, ſays, “ He gave his
“ opinion for the landing and attack of that fort,
ac' &c. but that being in general judged too diffi-
< cult, it was dropt.” Enq. p. 38. Or as Sir John
Mordaunt ſays: “ No final reſolution taken till
" the afternoon, when a propoſal was made to land
66 at Chatelaillon, and make a ſudden attack upon
a
e Fouras, and the other forts leading to and upon
66
>
66 the

( 67 )
66
Jon
* the mouth of the river Charente, with the land
forces.” Enq, p. 18.
This propoſition was by Sir John Mordaunt re-
ferred to a general Council of War, and there (as
appears by that Council) unanimouſly reſolved
upon. “ But this, ſays the author, was done for
" the ſake of employing the ſoldiers, without in-
tending to draw any other utility from it. p. 56.
And afterwards, “ That the riſque (of the re-
s treat) which was magnified when it was to juſti-
" fy the Generals in the non-obedience of their
sc orders, funk to nothing," when the only con-
,
ſideration was, whether it would not be ſafer for
them to do ſomething that might allay the national
clamour againſt them.
ovit si to
But how does this appear? I do not think the
words alluded to in Sir John Mordaunt's Letter,
Eng. p. 109. authoriſe ſuch a concluſion, and
therefore muſt agree with the author of the candid
reflexions, that nothing but a zeal to carry on the
enterprize, and a perſeverance in the proſecution of
it, could have been the foundation of thoſe pro-
poſitions. Nor is it true, that the ſame riſque was
run in regard to the retreat ; as the knowledge now
obtained of the weakneſs of Fouras on the land
fide, and the ſituation of that fort, in ſtill water,
made it in a good meaſure ſecure; at leaſt greatly
diminiſhed the riſque ; nor was that operation con-
fined to the attacking one inſignificant fort, or to
the paltry view of allaying clamour, as is aſſerted,
but by taking the forts that guard the river, and
thereby poſſeſſing the channel quite up to Roche-
fort, was meant as a ſolid method really to force by
a vigorous impreſſion, and not to ſteal into the place :
As would have been ſhewn, had the board thought
proper to enquire into the nature of that propo-
ſition, which was the ſubject of the ſecond Council
E2
of

( 68 )
of War from the General Officer (of no leſs rank
than the fecond in command) who, in his Narrative,
ſays he made it, Eng. p. 38.- This at leaſt I
have heard from hands, and, in a manner, not to
doubt of it. I will go a ſtep farther and declare,
that if any thing except our favourite but fooliſh
Coup de Main will be allowed to be the great object
of the enterprize, if the taking the town, or de-
ſtroying the magazines, have any title to be called
ſo, that obje&t would have been more folidly and
ſenſibly purſued by the attack of the forts on the
27th or 28th, than by the hopeleſs landing for the
eſcalade alone on the 25th or 26th, when that
landing would probably have been made.
As by taking theſe forts, the army would be ma-
ſters of the river navigable quite up to Rochefort,
and might then either bring up frigates, or at leaſt
any quantity of artillery, ftores, &c. they pleaſed
from the fleet, might raiſe batteries on each ſide
the water, and, if they could not take the town
(of which they would have had a much better
chance this way) might at leaſt have had ſome
hopes of deſtroying the magazines, &c.
C
Such was the nature of this plan; nor could it
indeed be otherwiſe, the idea of attacking the forts
on the river, without any farther view, being too
ſenſeleſs for any Child, much more any Officer of
rank in the army to propoſe, and much too ridi-
culous for eight gentlemen of character and ex-
perience in the ſervice to come into. What was the
propoſition as ſtated in that Council of War?
To take the forts leading to and upon the mouth of the
river Charente; and what then? why then, ſays
the author, turn about and go home; the Generals
would not riſque their army from Fouras. Though
in poffeffion of the forts that guard the river, and
conſequently of the river (for thoſe higher up were
logo
deſcribed

( 69 )
deſcribed either as very weak forts, or little more
than batteries to the water) and though no army
oppoſed them, yet their determination, he believes,
was to finiſh there and to go home! Which would
be juſt ſuch an operation as to ſtorm the out-
works of a town without any view to taking the
place ; in ſhort, it is ſuch an idea as I have no pa-
tience to reaſon about ; nor have I faith enough to
believe that any of our Generals could either make
or come into fo trifling and ridiculous a project.
There were alſo other ſchemes agitated among
the Generals and Admirals, in which the great
object was not forgot; particularly that men-
tioned in General Conway's Narrative, “ For at-
tacking the caſtle of Oleron, and paſſing from
$6 thence to the Continent between Brouage and
“ the Charente, which is about a league, and from
" thence not more than two leagues to Rochefort ;
66 and as no attempt was probably expected on
“ that ſide, we might poſſibly ſucceed ſo far as to
deſtroy ſome of the ſhips or magazines. Enq.
p. 38. For both the magazines and town lay quite
open to the river on that fide, without either ram-
part or batteries to defend them; as Colonel Clerke's
Letter fhews, Enq. p. 66.--I have heard that this
ſcheme went ſo far, that an order was actually ſigned
for putting it in execution : however, I don't mean
to diſpute the grounds upon which it was laid
aſide, I make no doubt they were very good ;
what I propoſed to fhew was, that the General
Officers did neither immediately reſolve to go home,
nor to give up the great obje&t of the Expedition, as
the author afferts, but did by every means ſtudy to
make the moft of the plan; and that after the vain
hopes of a ſurprize and an eſcalade (upon which
it proceeded) were reaſonably laid aſide as an oper-
ation quite ſenſeleſs after ſo long an alarm, the
great
66

( 70 )
great object of the Expedition was not therefore
laid aſide.
But as the proſpect in theſe attempts was great
on one hand, the difficulties were judged great on
the other, and by ſome thought quite inſuperable ;
as, being furniſhed with no plans of thoſe forts, the
intelligence obtained in regard to them not being
thoroughly to be depended upon, and the enemy
having by ſo long an alarm had time to aſſemble
their troops, an operation of this ſort muſt be very
hopeleſs at beſt, if not quite impracticable.
Yet while any even the ſmalleſt proſpect of fuc-
ceſs remained, it was thought an attempt of this fort
was juſtifiable, as the retreat would now be fe-
cured, and it might then be ſeen what farther
could be done.no
I Such it is to be ſuppoſed were the ideas and in-
tentions of the ſuperior Officers in both ſervices
when they entered into the propoſal made at the
ſecond Council of War; they could not indeed
be otherwiſe, as the thing was ſelf-evident; though
their opinions of, or hopes from that operation,
probably varied according to their different judg-
ment of things.org
2 What muſt be confeffed is, that thoſe in the
Council of War, who had leaſt opinion of thoſe
operations, and leaſt hopes of ſucceſs from them,
ſhewed by their readineſs to concur in what was
propoſed, at leaſt equal zeal and inclination to carry
the ſervice intended into execution. They could
not have the ſame reaſon for perſevering in them.
Which naturally enough accounts for what the au-
thor is, or pretends to be ſo much ſurprized at,
viz. “ That being prevented from landing on the
«6 28th, they ſhould not (according to the author's
phraſe) think it worth while to detain the fleet a
5 day, &c.” He is to be ſure aware, that it was
not

( 71 )
60
not for one day only the fleet was to be detained;
that the operation was now become very critical ;
that, as Sir John Mordaunt declares in his Narra-
tive, “ It was imagined the fleet was to be em-
ployed in more conſiderable ſervices after this
Expedition was over ;” and that the time for
its return had been very ſtrictly limited in his Ma-
jeſty's inſtructions. In this ſituation, ſince it was
not thought proper to hold a General Council of
a
War (Vid. Court Martial, p. 114.) it will not
ſeem extraordinary, that thoſe Land-officers of the
Council of War, who had no great opinion of this
operation at firſt, did not think it expedient to pro-
ſecute it any farther; nor that the General Officer,
not firſt in command, who had made the propoſal,
rather choſe to acquieſce in the opinion of the Com-
mander in Chief and the other Officers of the
Council of War, ſo formed as appears, than take
the whole on himſelf in ſo delicate a ſituation
againſt that general opinion; as he declares, Enq.
p. 39. Nor do I think there is room for either
cenſure or aſtoniſhment, or for the ridicule at-
tempted by our author, in any part of this pro-
ceeding
This, I think, is a fair and true ſtate of our late
unfortunate Expedition from its firſt riſe to its final
diſappointment. But I hope while the reader re-
fiects coolly on this, he will alſo remember this was
not our firſt Expedition to the coaſts of France.
It would have been the firſt ſucceſsful one among
all our modern attempts, had it proved fo.an
Sir Stafford Fairborne failed 1706, with a large
armament to the ſame place, and with the ſame
ſucceſs.
The Duke of Buckingham was baffled before a
{mall fortreſs in the Idle of Rbé.
And

( 72 )
And General Talmaſh's merit, in knowingly fa-
crificing himſelf and ſome hundred men to his un-
juſtifiable vanity, is now for the firſt time dif-
covered and applauded; his ſucceſs was like the
former.
Nor was that of our neighbours better than
our own; Admiral Tromp, with fixty ſhips of
the line, and 10,000 land-forces, failed 1674 to
this very coaſt, and was not diſgraced for return-
ing even without an attempt, nor reckoned either
a coward, a fool, or a traitor.
I don't mention all our idle parades on the coafts
of France, nor our fooliſh, ill-calculated bombard-
ments of towns; whoſe damages would have been
more than repaid by the expence of our pre-
parations; nor do I mean from theſe to conclude
that France is invulnerable ; nor even that the at-
tempt on Rochefort was impracticable. Nothing is
more dangerous than arguing from precedents,
eſpecially in military caſes, of which ſcarce two are
alike; though I think they are as good proofs
againſt the attempt, as the taking of Bergen-op-
zoom and St. Philip's are in its favour; what I
pro-
poſe in mentioning the failure of our former Ex-
peditions, is not to prejudice, but to take off pre-
judices.
I mean to leſſen the violence of our diſappoint-
ment, and to ſoften the ſharpneſs of the unjuſt and
unneceſſary ſuſpicions, propagated on this occaſion,
by the examples of both great and brave men, who
have either failed in attempts of this kind, or not
judged it expedient to make them on grounds per-
haps much lighter and leſs concluſive than what
weighed in the Council of War on the 25th
September.
In a Council of War held on board the Breda,
Admiral Ruſſels fhip, 1692, it was agreed, “Not
66 to

(73)
>
ti to attempt St. Maloe's, as the troops could do no
** ſervice without the aſſiſtance of the ſhips."
Not to attempt Brejt, “ For fear they ſhould be
55 wind-bound on the coaſt; and becauſe the
6 Land-officer's declared, they could do nothing
s6 without the protection of the fleet.”
Alſo not to attack Rochefort, « The ſeaſon be.
66
«« ing ſo far ſpent, and the place lying ſo deep in
" the Bay.” This, I think, was on the 28th July.
Yet on this Council appear the moſt reſpectable
names both in the land and ſea-ſervice; Admiral
Ruſſel, Sir Ralph Delaval, Sir George Rooke, Sir
Cloud. Shovel. –The Duke of Leinſter, the Earl
of Galway, the Earl of Argylé, &c.
On the Cadiz Expedition 1702, under the Duke
of Ormond and Sir George Rooke; the reaſons that
chiefly weighed againſt attacking the Ine of Cadiz
were, « That from ſome intelligence received
,
< from Mr. Methuen, &c. and from the concurrent
teſtimony of fiſhermen taken on the coaſt, it ap-
peared that the enemy had about 4,000 diſ-
ciplined troops, and 1,000 horſe, &c. that the
56 fleet could give no other aſiſtence than covering
to the landing, and that it would be impoſſible to ſup-
ply the troops from the fleet in blowing weather.
From theſe circumſtances the attempt was judged
impracticable, though the Duke of Ormond had
13,500 land-forces, with battering cannon, and did
not depend on a Coup de Main.
It is true, Sir George Rooke was blamed for his
conduct in this Expedition, but as true that it was
from the malice of his enemies; that no matter was
found againſt him on an Enquiry ; that all foreign
hiſtorians, as well as our own (except Biſhop Burnet,
who takes every occaſion to cenſure him with too
apparent a prejudice) have conſtantly juſtified him;
and that he received the thanks of the Houſe of
F
Commons
60
6

( 74 )
Commons for his great ſervices done the nation in
the courſe of that very Expedition.
I have thus gone through my tedious, trouble-
ſome taſk; which I heartily wiſh, not for my own,
but the ſake of thoſe concerned, may be read with
the ſame candor I have writ it. It has no fallies of
wit to engage, no bold ſtrokes of invective to
awaken, none of ridicule to amuſe; it is what it
profeſſed to be, an argument, not a declamation.
I have confined myſelf in the dull, humble path
of mere defence; I have diffented with candor
where I might have blamed ; I have even praiſed
where it was the intereſt of my cauſe to condemn:
though I could have worked up the piece with
other colours ; I might have arraigned, as well as
vindicated; I might have declamed; I might have
ridiculed : But the charms of truth are greater with
me than thoſe of vanity; I write to convince, not
to pleaſe ; I deſpiſe pamphleteering, and the dirty,
ungenerous war of words; and I abhor that baneful
ſpirit of party, which ſo ſhamefully mixes its poi-
ſon in all the tranſactions of this unhappy iſland.
I ſigh as the author does for the calamities of
this country; I lament our paſt diſgraces; I look
with horror on thoſe too probably reſerved for us.
Diſappointed in our perhaps too fanguine ex-
pectations here; outwitted in America, and over-
powered in Germany; at home, abroad, at land, at
ſea, our proſpect is every where unpleaſant.
Yet becauſe we are diſappointed, let us not be un-
juſt; to preach candor to men immerſed in party
is preaching to the winds, but juſtice founded in
plain facts, and plain reaſon, may perhaps find its
way to their hearts through all the prejudices with
which they are guarded.
I lament as the author does; I mourn over the
long liſt of our General Officers thus condemned
as

( 75 )
a
as it ſeems to inſignificance and inactivity. If they
are really what of late they have been repreſented
to be, I muſt think them a diſagrace and a burthen
to their country; if while the men are brave, there
are no commanders to lead them on; and if they are
either unwilling or unworthy to be employed in
her moft eſſential ſervices, while boys are called
forth from the rank of Colonels and Lieutenant-
Colonels to head her armies, and have commands
on which almoſt the being of this country depends.
Where indeed, as the author fays, where is the
glory of the Britiſh Name! if this be fo. I ſhould
not have ventured to draw the picture the author
has drawn ; I thought them able, and fure they are
willing to ſerve their country!
Or if this be the melancholy truth, as he inſinu-
ates, let him remember there is one blame at leaſt
not theirs who went on this fatal Expedition ; they
are not cenſured for declining, they are blamed for
accepting of command, or not ſufficiently remon-
ftrating againſt a plan they did not approve ; yet
they made their obječtions, they ſtated their doubts,
and then ſubmitted to their orders, as became them:
it is a delicate thing for Officers to remonſtrate too
ſtrongly againſt ſervices they are ordered upon!
But amidſt all our author's lamentations on the
military ſtate of this country, does he think he ſhall
mend it by making deſperate, and thruſting out of
the ſervice, men, who on his own principles, I
think, have no blame, but that of not having
judged practicable a thing he thought ſo, or perhaps
not judged it practicable in the particular mode he
moſt approved. He does not ſeem to think they
want fpirit; he does not quite arraign their capa-
city; and ſure the idea of their treachery is too ridi-
culous to deſerve a ſecond mention; men, as he him-
felf fays (and his is an honourable teſtimony) who
will
a

(76)
will be acquitted of perſonal cowardice by whoever is
acquainted with their characters; who bave ſerved
with ſpirit and gollantry, and who lately ſtood among
the firſt fór rank and reputation.
SWS60 S600386 GSE SONG
-06 POSTSCRIPT.
க
I
MUST add one obfervation, which I omitted,
on the ſeveral quotations made from the En-
quiry, of words ſpoke by the General Officers, or
anſwers made by them, before that board; viz.
That thoſe anſwers were not accurately taken
down, as was obſerved by many who were pre-
ſent; were not regularly read over when taken ;
and are ſcarce ever in the words they were ſpoke ;
which is very material, when words are fo critically
weighed and fo invidiouſly commented upon.
I muft at the ſame time do the Judge Advocate
the juſtice to fay, I believe it did not proceed from
the leaft want of candor in him ; and that it was
quite otherwiſe at the Court Martial, where he
alſo officiated, and where every thing ſeemed to be
taken down with the utmoſt exactneſs.
bir
F I N I S.
OT
rinnosobo
molo
Pomoci id bone




1958 Conway, Henry Seymour

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