Naval Evolutions
A MIEMOIR

I E

SIR  IOVWA1RD) DOUGLAS, BA1,T,
ItFUTI TNC
C141 CLERK'S C  1S
IN RE  XI I'\
LOD I)ODNEYS ENG(A(GE1 MENT
ON  rT II  I? 1 OF  Ak R I  I t.,.



7-, -



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THE HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA,
AND IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE;
From the Year 1807, to the Year 1814.
By W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B. Colonel, H.P., Forty-third Regiment.
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A REPLY TO VARIOUS OPPONENTS;
PARTICULARLY TO
" Strictures on Colonel Napier's History of the War in the Peninsula:"
together with Observations illustrating Sir John Moore's Campaigns.
BY COLONEL NAPIER.
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cnmstances combined to point him out as a man peculiarly fitted for the
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seeming interest, would, on any occasion, induce him to speak other than
the language of truth.  We have no hesitation in saying that, however
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extensive, we freely confess that in no language, ancient or modern, have
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merely in respect to the beauty and spirit of its style and arrangement;
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War."- United Service Journal, February, 1830.
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ADVENTURES IN THE RIFLE                               BRIGADE
IN THE
PENINSULA, FRANCE,
AND THE NETHERLANDS,
From the Year 1809 to 1815;
BY    CAPTAIN       JOHN     KINCAID,      FIRST   BATTALION.
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veluti in speculo. A capital Soldier, a pithy and graphic narrator, and a
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Service, and the faithful and witty history of some six years' honest and
triumphant fighting.
6" There is nothing extant in a Soldier's Journal, which, with so little
pretension, paints with such truth and raciness the " domestic economy" of
campaigning, and the downright business of handling the enemy.
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"' His Book has one fault, the rarest fault in Books, it is too short."Monthly Magazine. April.
" His Book is one of the most lively histories of Soldiers' Adventures
which have yet appeared; their entire freedom from affectation will sufficiently recommend them to a numerous class of readers."-Athenceum.
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i



NAVAL EVOLUTIONS;
A MEMOIR
BY
MAJ.-GEN. SIR HOWARD DOUGLAS, BART.
K.S.C. C.B. F.R.S. &c.
CONTAINING
A REVIEW AND REFUTATION
OF
THE PRINCIPAL ESSAYS AND ARGUMENTS ADVOCATING
MR. CLERK'S CLAIMS,
IN RELATION TO
THE MAN(EUVRE OF THE 12TH OF APRIL, 1782;
AND VINDICATING, BY TACTICAL DEMONSTRATION, AND NUMEROUS AUTHENTIC
DOCUMENTS, THE PROFESSIONAL SKILL OF
~|)e jsritt'i) ~fion
CHIEFLY CONCERNED ON THAT MEMORABLE OCCASION.
LONDON:
THOMAS AND WILLIAM BOONE, 29, NEW BOND STREET.
MDCCCXXXII.



LONDON:
E. RO'WOOITH AND SONS, BEELL YAIRD,
TEMPLE BAR.



ADVERTISEMENT.
THE reader will perceive by internal evidence in several
parts of this Memoir, and particularly at page 19, line 11, that
the greater part of it must have been printed-off for a considerable time. The truth is, that these pages were sent to
press last year, and would then have appeared, had the
Author not been drawn away, by other calls upon him, from
attending to the publication.



ERRATUM.
Page 44, line 31, for "as his son-in-law writes"-read " as an old naval officer writes."
Directions to tje 3intrer.
Place the Plates 1, 2 and 3, facing page 15.
Plates 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, facing page 16.
Plate 10, facing page 30.
The Fac-simile of Sir Charles Douglas' Letter, facing page 52.
Plates 11, 12 and 13, facing page 59.
Plate 14, facing page 60.



NAVAL TACTICS.
THOSE Of my readers who may have perused my former Statements,
are requested to bear in mind, and such as come fresh to the subject,
are entreated to observe, that my appeals to the public, on the matter
which I now, finally, bring before them, arose from what I must be
permitted to call a very injudicious attempt made by some friends of
the late John Clerk, Esq. to ascribe to that Gentleman the merit of
having invented the maneuvre by which the Battle of the 12th of
April, 1782, was gained; and of having communicated the discovery,
and fully explained the mode of operation, to my Father, after his
appointment as Captain of the Fleet under Sir George Rodney, expressly that he, my Father, might take out with him, to the West Indies,
(whither Sir George is affirmed to have proceeded,) and there impart
the discovery to his Admiral, for execution by the Fleet under his
command.
Professional opinion, tactical writers, and the voice of the public,
having given to my Father's memory enough of credit and honour to
satisfy my solicitude for his fame, I should have had no occasion to
take the pen in his behalf, had it not been for these, and certain other
assertions and pretensions, which, if not disproved, might hereafter
obscure his services, and injure his reputation. Under these circumstances I felt it to be my duty to lay before the public the facts of that
celebrated operation, to prove that the breaking of the enemy's line
was not put in practice in a deliberate and systematic manner, on any
premeditated plan, far less on any suggestion of Mr. Clerk's; but on
the advice of the Captain of the Fleet, in the heat of action, to take
decisive advantage, in a peculiar manner, of an unexpected error
committed by a part of the French Fleet, in order of sailing.
Compelled, by some observations in the Quarterly Review, to go
further into the facts of extcution, than I originally intended, or wished,
it would have afforded me much satisfaction, if, in my Second Statement, I could, at the same time, have replied to any fresh matter which
the advocates of Mr. Clerk might have it in their power to adduce, in
support of their assertion, that to him is due the merit of having



invented and fully explained the manoeuvre, by which it is allowed on
all hands the victory of that day was owing; but no case, in behalf of
Mr. Clerk, having appeared, in time to enable me to take up both points
of the matter in controversy at once, I was obliged to reserve myself
for a distinct reply to that part of the question which relates to Mr.
Clerk, until the case in his behalf, which I knew was preparing, should
be published. That case appeared in the shape of an article on my
Statement of Facts, in a late number of the Edinburgh Review,* at
a time when I was absent from England on the public service; since
which, till very lately, I have been so much occupied, as not to have
had time to prepare for the press the reply which I threw together
upon reading that article.
My object having been, to prove the facts of execution, I need scarcely
contend for more of credit, to the Captain of the Fleet, than the Reviewer allows me to have established in my former Statements. For
he admits that I have " proved, beyond all possibility of doubt, by a
great mass of evidence, collected from the highest and most honourable sources, the facts of execution to have been," as I have asserted
in the Statements bound up with the Naval Gunnery;-that I have
" triumphantly vindicated my Father's claim to the honour of being
the immediate adviser of the grand operation by which the battle was
gained," and that " but for his promptitude, energy, and decision the
enemy's line would not, in all probability, have been broken, nor the
victory gained;" -that " this distinguished Officer, and this great service, were unduly overlooked in the distribution of honours on that
occasion;"-and that " it was fitting for the Son, even at this distance
of time, to reclaim for the Father, the honours that had been so long
withheld."
These acknowledgments are so ample, as to the services actually
rendered by the Captain of the Fleet, on this great occasion, that they
might have satisfied all the obligations which filial duty had imposed
upon me, had they not been accompanied by assertions and insinuations, in arguing the other point, which it is quite impossible for me to
admit.t   But I cannot consent to compromise my Father's character
for his services.-I accept not, therefbre, the proffered terms, that,
* Number 101, April 1830.
t Mr. William Clerk having transmitted to me a copy of the Review of my Statements, with a polite letter in which he acquainted me that the article on Naval Tactics
was drawn up, in great part, on documents furnished to him, but that the arguments
and conclusions are the Reviewer's own, I immediately turned over the leaves of the
article to see in what terms the Reviewer had noticed my previous Statements of Facts;
and upon reading the above very satisfactory admissions on the point which it had been
my great object to establish, I acknowledged the receipt of Mr. Clerk's letter, in corresponding terms. But when I had time to read the whole article, and to consider it
attentively, I found abundant reason to view it with very different sentiments. Many
of the Reviewer's pleadings and conclusions are not only highly prejudicial to my
Father's professional reputation, but injurious to his moral character; and accordingly
lay me under the necessity of going further and more fully, into this part of the subject, than I intended at the time I wrote to Mr. Clerk, under the impression which a
partial perusal of the article had occasioned; but which I soon found cause to alter.



(3)
" whatever may be the facts of execution, Mr. Clerk invented, and
fully explained, to Sir George Rodney, and to Sir Charles Douglas,
the splendid manoeuvre which they, advisedly and systematically, put
in practice;" because that were to admit, that these eminent officers
availed themselves, discreditably, of a discovery of Mr. Clerk's, and
acted, fraudulently, upon plans which they never would acknowledge.
In proceeding to investigate whether Mr. Clerk was the inventor of the
manoeuvre, it is not necessary to go, again, into that part of the question
which relates to the facts of execution; for they are admitted, by the
Edinburgh Reviewer, to be proved beyond all possibility of doubt:
nor is it necessary to distinguish between the Admiral and the Captain
of the Fleet, in considering the subject as it relates to Mr. Clerk; for
the Reviewer asserts that they acted, in concert, upon his ideas. I
shall, therefore, take up these eminent officers conjointly, the one as
having suggested, the other as having adopted, the successful manoeuvre.-I shall fully vindicate them from the aspersion, that they acted,
surreptitiously, on any ideas of Mr. Clerk's, or were less learned and
reflecting in nautical war than he;-and I shall prove, likewise beyond
all possibility of doubt, that this celebrated battle would have been
conducted by the British Admiral and his Flag Captain, and gained by
the British Fleet, exactly as it was fought and won, if the author of
the " Naval Tactics" had never existed.
Having admitted " that Sir Charles Douglas was the immediate
adviser of the operation," it became absolutely necessary for the
Reviewer to endeavour, by every means, to " fasten down" on the
Captain of the Fleet a knowledge of this manoeuvre as a recent discovery of Mr. Clerk's. This the Reviewer labours to do in two ways.
First, he asserts " that if the evidence be allowed to be true, which
attaches that knowledge to Sir G. Rodney, the discovery could not
have been unknown to his Captain of the Fleet; and, secondly, that
this particular manoeuvre, the alleged invention of Mr. Clerk, was
communicated, and fully explained by him, to my Father, after his
appointment as Captain of the Fleet, as the most direct channel of imparting it to Sir George Rodney.
Now with respect to the first. The case asserted by Mr. Clerk's
advocate, is this, " That in January, 1782, that gentleman published a
book, containing a full description of his invention of the manoeuvre
of breaking the enemy's line, with full explanations and demonstrations of its advantages;-that Sir G. Rodney did not leave England
till after the book was published, nor meet the enemy till three months
after it was out:--that during this interval, Mr. Clerk's book was
transmitted to Sir G. Rodney;*-that Mr. Clerk's invention was more
particularly confided to Sir Charles Douglas, who had been appointed
Captain of the Fleet, but remained in London for some time after Sir
G. Rodney's departure:-and that the manoeuvre discovered by Mr.
Clerk was put in practice, in a deliberate and systematic manner, in
the battle of the 12th of April ensuing, on the plans and explanations
contained in that book."
* Edinburgh Rev. p. 8.



(4    )
The public have, very generally, been led to believe, that the work
now designated " An Essay on Naval Tactics, systematical and explanatory, with Notes by Lord Rodney," is a correct version of the identical tract upon which Lord Rodney annotated; and that the tract so
" enriched with his Lordship's notes," was a book "published before
the battle, and did actually contain full explanations of the particular
manoeuvre by which it was gained." It is, moreover, very generally
believed out of the profession, that " the book," upon the margins of
which those notes were written, is the original copy, said to have been
received by Lord Rodney before the battle, of the work as it now
appears.
To establish this, the Reviewer appeals (p. 20) to a copy of the
book " bearing openly on its title-page the date of the 1st January,
1782, on which Lord Rodney's notes are written, "and in which as the
Reviewer asserts (p. 19), " the particular maneuvre, by which the battle
was gained, is fully explained and anxiously recommended:" so that
(p. 20) " the noble Admiral could not have failed to learn that the
manoeuvre had been, not only invented, but fully investigated and
deeply considered, before he practised it." Upon this, as " the main
and fundamental fact," the Reviewer affirms (p. 30) my Father's " inspirations and suggestions" to have been taken from Mr. Clerk's book,
then in his pocket; and indeed, the writer goes so far as to assert
(p. 25 and 30), that " both these brave and skilful officers studied in
that book, on the very morning of the battle, the reasons and calculations,
upon the strength of which Mr. Clerk, the inventor, had recommended
the manoeuvre;-that they were generally impressed with a favourable notion of its value and importance, and prepared themselves,
accordingly, to carry it into effect."
On these, " as material and indisputable facts," the Reviewer proceeds to argue, that Sir George Rodney is thus proved, and, by his
own admission, ascertained, " to have had before him, in that identical
tract, on the great occasion in question, directions, fully explaining and
teaching the manoeuvre, as a prior discovery made by Mr. Clerk;" and,
consequently, that his, Lord Rodney's, annotations on the margin of
that identical book, are admissions and acknowledgments of all the
claims and pretensions put forward on behalf of that gentleman.
Now, if the reader will refer to any copies of the work containing
those notes,* he will discover, with much surprise, that no annotations
whatever appear, on the only part of " the book" which has any thing
at all to do with breaking the line, or relating to the manoeuvre in
question! To reconcile this very remarkable omission on the part of
the noble annotator, with the assertion " that the original tract, upon
which Lord Rodney annotated, did, nevertheless, contain a full demonstration and explanation of the manoeuvre which he put in practice,"
and perceiving all the fundamental importance of explaining whyLord
Rodney should have omitted to write notes on the only parts of the
book which related to the point which the Reviewer wishes to establish,
namely, the priority of Mr. Clerk's discovery, (any acknowledgment
SAppendix I.



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of having previously seen which, would have been so much in Mr.
Clerk's favour,) the Reviewer, with vast ingenuity, pleads,* that " the
omission of any direct or specific notice, which appears in the notes
with which Lord Rodney enriched his own copy of the Naval Tactics,
is a complete admission of his obligation to Mr. Clerk for having
taught him this manoeuvre; and a conclusive proof of consciousness
that he, the Admiral, had been anticipated, by the learned civilian, in
this, the most brilliant conception and achievement of his, Lord Rodney's, professional life;" for thattf "it is not to be conceived that he
would sit down quietly to write annotations and remarks upon
the author's various speculations, without once noticing the miraculous
coincidence between his practice and the precept then before him; and,
if the fact had been so, of asserting his own separate originality, and
collecting evidence to dispute a claim, which, if the book had not contained that invention, and full directions for carrying it into effect,
would, obviously, have laid Mr. Clerk's pretensions open to suspicion;" and that, therefore, the circumstance of the Admiral not having
made annotations on that part of the tract, which is asserted to have
proved Mr. Clerk's priority of invention, is the most conclusive proof
of his claims.  But what becomes of the Reviewer's " material and
indisputable fact," and all the reasoning and special pleading contained
in pages 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 30, and 32, upon this hypothesis, when the
public are informed that no such facts exist? What becomes of the
attempt to " fasten down the knowledge of the discovery on the Admiral and his Captain of the Fleet," conjointly, through the instrumentality of " the book," when we find that neither the original tract,
nor the " identical copy" upon which the Admiral annotated, contained
any such discovery or observations as those now standing in the first
part of the Naval Tactics?-nor any such matter, positively, as that
upon which, to support this vain pretension, Lord Rodney is surmised
to have admitted such a want of candour and generosity, and, moreover,
to have been unjust to the chief executive officer of his fleet. By the
Clerk hypothesis, and the manner in which the Reviewer uses it, reckless of all but his client's case, the writer not only places Sir C.
Douglas in a situation to compel me again to come forward; but, by
such a surmise, he places Lord Rodney's character for justice and
generosity in a most ignoble and disingenuous position,t as well in
regard to Mr. Clerk, as with respect to my Father, for the real share
he is proved to have had in advising and urging the operation. But
the clouds which such an hypothesis would cast on the professional
transaction, and the shades which it would throw on personal character,
are at once dispelled,-all the " grievous perplexities of the case"%
disappear;-and all the opprobrium with which Lord Rodney, in particular, would be covered, are cleared, by the fact, that there was no
such " peg to hang a note upon" as that asserted by the advocates
of Mr. Clerk, to have stood in that book, in the shape of a " full explanation," nor any explanation or earnest recommendation, whatever,
of the manoeuvre by which he, Lord Rodney, had some years before
*P. 19. tP. 20. f P.32.



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gained that battle. If such had been the contents of " the book," and
Lord Rodney had been conscious that the victory of the 12th of April
was owing to any suggestions contained in it, or if such information
had been communicated in any way by its author, he, Lord Rodney,
could not have failed to have expressed this, distinctly and manfully,
while annotating, thus deliberately, on a book, which is alleged to have
contained precepts which he practised; and, likewise, to have noticed
the assertion as to the communication said to have been made to him,
through Mr. Atkinson, if that assertion too had stood in " the book," or
had that name been therein mentioned. The advocates of Mr. Clerk
ground their arguments entirely on the existence of such a book, and
on its competency to teach and explain the manoeuvre which Rodney
practised. Upon this the Reviewer founds his case; and even the
House of Clerk appeals to the book, " the margins of which are
covered, from beginning to end, with notes in SIR GEORGE Rodney's
handwriting," as if he had been in possession of that identical work,
previously to the 12th of April, 1782; and "attached high importance
to the valuable information it contained," as to laying down the particular manoeuvre. Now to this I reply, that it is ascertained " the
book" contained nothing relating to, much less explanations and
demonstrations of, any such class of operation, or description of manoeuvre, as that by which the battle was gained. It is wholly denied,
by Lord Rodney's family and friends, that he was in possession of any
such suggestions, as those which have since his death been asserted to
have been communicated to him, viz. observations on the attack from
the leeward; and it is certain that Sir George Rodney never annotated
on the book; for the notes with which " the margins of the book now
in Pennycuick library are covered," were written by Lord Rodney in
1789 or 1790! The Reviewer indeed says, p. 21, that they were probably written in 1788 or 1789: but whether they were written at that
time or not, is of no importance; for Mr. Clerk did not receive them
till after the first edition of his work was published in 1790. Mr.
Clerk understands his own case best, and he says, p. 273, Naval
Tactics (edition 1827), " that the copy of the Naval Tactics, which
contains a number of valuable marginal notes in his (Lord Rodney's)
own hand-writing, came too late to be introduced, though particularly
relating to part first of this work (on the attack from the windward,
mind,) when reprinted and published in 1790." The reader will be
able to judge for himself what importance Lord Rodney attached to
any matter or information contained in that tract, or how far he admitted that it taught him and his Captain of the Fleet the manoeuvre
practised on the 12th of April-or what possible practical utility that
tract could have been on that occasion, by referring to the summary 1
have given at pages 15 and 16, of the matter contained in the original
tract, and to the notes written by Lord Rodney, on the copy sent to
him, in 1790-copies of which I have given in the Appendix; or the
reader may consult the first part of the Essay on Naval Tactics, with
reference to the preceding observations, and to the very important
fact, which I shall now establish, that the observations on the attack



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from the leeward, were interpolated into Part I. after Lord Rodney's
notes were written.
Let us see now, with what reason the Reviewer complains (p. 8),
that " no public impeachment of Mr. Clerk's originality, or claim,
should have been made by the other parties, to a share in the discovery, at the time the second edition of his Naval Tactics was published,"
when, it is believed, " most of the parties concerned were alive." To
ascertain with what justice such a complaint may be made, in the behalf of Mr. Clerk, it will be necessary to go a good way back, to
inquire, who was the originator of this controversy;-what were the
circumstances under which Mr. Clerk's claim to any share of credit
in having treated of the manoeuvre, was first distinctly stated;-and
the precise period at which such claim was brought before the public.
To investigate this, it will be necessary to scrutinize very closely the
dates and nature of Mr. Clerk's claims, as stated by himself.
So much confusion appears in the dates and matter contained in
the several tracts, books or works, whether MS. printed or published,
to which the Reviewer appeals and refers; so many contradictory
arguments are used, in advocating the claims that have been advanced;
and so many remarkable circumstances attend their progress, from
the very slender grounds upon which they rest, that I find it necessary
to go into the whole of this matter, from its very origin. I shall
therefore present to the reader, an exact summary of the matter which
Mr. Clerk really did first print, or publish;-show at what period the
" other Observations" relating to the manoeuvre, first made their appearance;-prove, by Mr. Clerk's own showing, that they were published
in 1790 for the first time, as a commentary on what had passed, and
professedly not to teach;-and, lastly, I shall investigate Mr. Clerk's
system of Naval Tactics as they now are, so far as they relate to such
a manoeuvre as that by which the battle was gained-to ascertain what
title he has to the pretension of having made any " magnificent discovery in naval tactics," or of being " more learhed and reflecting in
nautical war" than the professional men who did the glorious deed,
under circumstances, which, in point of fact, he did not contemplatenever rightly understood, or soundly treated; and, without comment
of my own, I shall fearlessly submit to the country, and to the naval
profession in particular, whether, in the battle-scene of the 12th of
April, the "enlightenment," or the " thunder," was Mr. Clerk's?
The first edition of Mr. Clerk's book was not published till 1790;
and then, only, appeared, for the first time, before the public, the part
upon the attack from the windward, of which, as the author informs
us in his advertisement to the first edition, dated January, 1790, " a
few copies, about 50, were printed in 1782, and handed about among
a few friends." That the tract then printed contained nothing on the
subject of breaking the line, or any thing relating to such a manoeuvre
as that put in practice on the 12th of April in that year, the reader
will find distinctly admitted at page 119 of the edition of 1827,
intended to explain the very singular circumstance of having interpolated into that division of the subject, (which treated only of an



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oblique attack upon two or three of the rear ships of an enemy to leeward, desirous of avoiding battle,) some " additional observations,"
which have nothing to do with that part, and which did not stand in
the original tract, nor in that on which Lord Rodney annotated.
In the reasons given for then and there introducing those " obsertions," we find the first mention made in Mr. Clerk's works, of such
a class of manoeuvres; and here it is essential to remark, that the very
note which states, vaguely, that he had formed those and other ideas
for improving naval tactics, declares distinctly, in 1790, that none
relating to the attack from the leeward were " advanced:"
" With respect to the above observations, it seems necessary to mention that
they made part of a former description of this battle of the 27th July, 1778,
written soon after, and then put into the hands of a few friends; that the author
being in London, in 1780, many discussions were held, at the desire and in the
presence of the same friends, as well for improving upon, as for the communicating of these and other ideas on naval tactics, and particularly on one occasion,
by appointment, with an officer of most distinguished merit. That they were
afterwards intended to be inserted in the first edition of this essay, printed 1st
January, 1782, as being applicable to the two similar rencounters of Lord
Rodney of the 15th and 19th May, 1780, as well as to this of the 27th July,
where the adverse fleets had passed each other on contrary tacks. But it was
thought afterwards proper to omit them, as it was conceived it might be prejudicial to the other parts of the subject to advance any thing doubtful, no example
of cutting an enemy's line, in an attack from the leeward, before that time,
having been given."-Naval T'actics, p. 119, note.
The reader will remark, that the author does not here, in 1790, advance what he brought forward, for the first time, in 1804, " that when
in London in 1780, he communicated his ideas on the subject of naval
tactics to Mr. Atkinson, the particular friend of Sir G. Rodney."  He
merely says, that " discussions were held in the presence of some
friends; and particularly, on one occasion, by appointment, with an
officer of most distinguished merit." If by this my Father were
meant, he could make no reply, for he died in 1789; and, in 1804,
when Lord Rodney was, for the first time, named, as having received
the communication through Mr. Atkinson, (but which the family of
Rodney utterly deny, and which Mr. Atkinson never affirmed,) his
Lordship was dead too! The circumstance of its being generally
understood and firmly believed, that the edition on which Lord Rodney
annotated, contained the author's preface, in which he asserts the
communication by Mr. Atkinson to have been made to Sir George
Rodney, but which preface was not published till the second edition
appeared in 1804, has raised a very strong impression in favour of Mr.
Clerk's claim; for, as in the case of the alleged intentional omission
on the part of Lord Rodney, in not having annotated on the " explanations" teaching the manoeuvre, which are asserted to have stood in " the
book," so it appears strange, that, when making notes upon a tract said
to contain a declaration as to how, when, and by whom, that suggestion
had been conveyed to him, his Lordship should not, if this were not
so, have denied it in a specific note. But here again the reader will
perceive that there were no such explanations upon which to annotate. It



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was not until 1804, when both Lord Rodney and Mr. Atkinson, as
well as my Father, were dead, that this preface, or any such
declaration, appeared. I declare that I mean no charge against
Mr. Clerk, in noticing these discrepancies; but when the Reviewer
complains that " no impeachment of Mr. Clerk's originality, or claim,
should have been made" by the other parties, at the time the second
edition of his Naval Tactics was published, when, as the Reviewer
asserts, " most of the parties concerned were alive," I must be permitted to show the reader, that this declaration of Mr. Clerk's did not
appear till twenty-two years after the battle; and so far from the
" parties chiefly concerned being then alive," they were all dead! I
beg, then, to say, that it is the other party-the claimant party-to
whom, only, such a reproach applies; but I make none-I only repel
that made against me.
Mr. Clerk's declaration as to the assumed communication by Mr.
Atkinson, was brought before the public for the first time in 1804, in
the Author's Preface to the second edition, dated May 19, published
in that year. It is in these words:" In January, 1780, when I was in London, being fully impressed with the
importance of the naval ideas which long had been working in my imagination,
and in consequence of the strictures on Lord Keppel's engagement, sent the year
before, some appointments, for the purpose of further communication on this
subject, were made by my friends. Among the first of these was an appointment with Mr. Richard Atkinson, the particular friend of Sir G. Rodney, who
was then in London, and was immediately to set out to take the command of
the fleet in the West Indies. At this meeting, the whole of my acquisitions on
the subject of naval tactics, for many years back, was discussed. I communicated to Mr. Atkinson the theories of attack both from windward and
leeward, &c. I also produced the strictures on Lord Keppel's rencounter of
27th July, which contained all my ideas on the subject of naval tactics. All
this Mr. Atkinson undertook to communicate to Sir G. Rodney, which he
could have no difficulty in doing, as I left with him sketches made according
to my usual method of demonstration, together with the necessary explanations."
Such are the nature and dates of Mr. Clerk's own declarations;
yet, in the face of these, and of the fact that he never publickly brought
forward such claims as have since his death been asserted, and that
the first edition of his book was not published till the year after my
Father's death, the Reviewer says, that " Mr. Clerk's claim was distinctly
stated by Mr. Clerk himself, in the preface to the second edition, published when most of the parties concerned were alive; and when, so
far as he, the Reviewer, was aware, no public impeachment of his
originality, or claim by any one else, to a share in his discovery, had ever
been made!" Mr. Clerk did not even assume such a communication
to have been made till twenty-two years after the battle, and never did
more than infer, that it had been made. He never brought forward
one particle of proof upon the subject; and nothing short of producing
the very papers alluded to, (for as to the book I have disposed of it)nothing but Mr. Atkinson's declaration as to whether he did, and how
he did, make the communication, which Mr. Clerk only says " he



( 10 )
engaged to do:"-nothing but PROOF who the officer of distinguished
merit was, whom Mr. Clerk never ventured to name, when doing so
would have brought the question to issue, (my Father, observe!
having publicly declared, as I have shown, that he was not one of the
persons to whom such an allusion might be supposed to attach)nothing but proof that the " additional observations" and the Diagram
Plate XIV. upon the attack from the leeward, (interpolated into Part I,
and which Mr.Clerk admits, page xlii. Author's Preface, was not finished
at the time " the attack from the windward was got ready with as
great speed as possible by the 1st ofJanuary, 1782,") were actually in
the possession of these officers, and did regulate the proceedings of
the battle-nothing but the production of such documents, and such
proof, can confirm Mr. Clerk's assumption that the communication was
made, or give him the remotest possible share in the credit of having
previously thought of such a manoeuvre as that which had been
practised. It is quite inconceivable that such papers, sent in every
direction to ministers and admirals, can all have been lost or destroyed.
Mr. Clerk, in the passages quoted from his work, " founds," in law
language, certain claims upon those papers; and no other proof but
the production of those identical documents, would, or could be allowed
to him, in any court of justice; and none surely will be admitted in a
court of honour, in which the character of the profession, and the reputation of gallant officers are concerned. I have carefully and faithfully
'searched all my Father's papers in the order in which they were found
after his sudden and unexpected death, and evidently put up as they
were received, to ascertain whether any official correspondent, scientific
acquaintance, or brother officer, had made any mention of, or allusion
to any papers, propositions, plans or suggestions, either from Mr.
Clerk, or any other person, on naval tactics in general, or on any
particular mode of operation; or if any thing could be traced, in the
vast number of letters which were received by my Father from public
characters after the battle, which might show whether any such communication had been received by, or was known to them in any way.
I find numerous letters congratulating my Father on his appointment
as Captain of the Fleet; and a greater number still, congratulating him
on the great and peculiar share he had in the successes and glories of
that day; but no mention whatever of any such papers, nor the remotest allusion to any such person as Mr. Clerk, or to the receipt of any
suggestions for the improvement of Naval Tactics. Yet among these
letters I find some from those very ministers, to whom, in proper
course, such communications should have been addressed, and whose
peculiar duty it was to consider, report upon, and, if approved, transmit to the fleet, for execution, all such communications as might be
considered deserving of any attention.
If papers containing any real discovery in nautical warfare, or proposing any new and useful mode of attack, had been transmitted to
the Naval Administration, or sent to the most distinguished naval
pfficers of the time, some notice or knowledge of such a discovery or,proposition must have appeared in the correspondence of such men



( 11 )
as Lord Howe-Lord Keppel, the First Lord of the Admiralty-Lord
Sandwich, the preceding First Lord of the Admiralty -Captain
Adam Duncan, afterwards Lord Duncan-Sir John L. Ross-Mr.
Stephens, Secretary of the Admiralty-The Honourable (I believe)
Robert Duff- General Smith - General Skene, commanding at
Jamaica - Admiral Thomas Graves*-Captain (Admiral) HughesThe Duke of Queensbury-Admiral Ogle-Sir John Jervis-Sir
Charles Middleton, the Comptroller of the Navy-Admiral E.
Gower-Admiral G. Darby-Sir R. Hughes, &c. &c.? Letters from
all these persons, and about ten times as many from others of inferior
distinction, now lie before me? I shall enumerate some few of these,
arranged in two divisions:-first, those congratulating my Father on
his appointment as Captain of the Fleet.
Lord Keppel, private, London, Dec. 6, 1781.
Captain Adam Duncan, Gosport, Dec. 9, 1781.
R. Hughes, Harley Street, Dec. 7, 1781.
Duke of Queensbury, Piccadilly, Jan. 7, 1781.
C. Ogle, Dec. 25, 1781.
Sir Charles Middleton, several.
Sir John Jervis, Plymouth Dock, Dec. 19, 1781.
E. Gower, Dec. 2, 1781.
G. Darby, Cavendish Square, Dec. 6, 1781.
R. J. Hughes, Downs, Dec. 7, 1781.
Sir John L. Ross, Dec. 17, 1781.
These, and many other letters, congratulating my Father on his
having been selected for the appointment, express in various termsand particularly that from Lord Keppel-confidence " that my Father
would execute the important trust and duty reposed in him to his own
honour, and to the advantage and glory of his country;"-they notice
the critical state of the war-the necessity of making a great exertion,
&c. &c. and " the opportunity which his situation would afford him
of introducing his improvements in naval science, which were so much
wanted;" but not one word or allusion appears, in any of these letters
or papers, to any such suggestions or propositions, as those stated to
have been sent in by Mr. Clerk; or to any other reliances, hopes, or
expectations, than the professional talents and experience of those to
whom the fleet was intrusted, with the fullest dependance on these,
and on these only.
The following are extracts of a few of the many and strong letters
of congratulation which my Father received on the great share he had
in the success and glory of the day.
Lord Howe writes, (Victory, St. Helen's, 30 June, 1782.)
" I would denominate your celebrated battle, the battle of the Saints, but
that I know not how to reconcile the appellation with the infernal fire, whereunto you are said to owe your victory on that occasion. I have the pleasure
* I take the names from the signatures to the letters, and may be wrong as to the
rank I have assigned to the writers at the time.
c 2



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to see that the desire to do you justice, in a point of such national consequence,
is universal."
Lord Keppel writes, (Admiralty, May 29, 1782.)
" You will believe me sincere in my congratulations to you upon the great
and glorious victory obtained by Sir George Rodney over that of France, on the
12th of April, 1782, off Dominique. Sir George Rodney by it establishes his
name and greatness as a sea admiral, over all Europe. He endears himself to
his brother citizens, and he has a right to claim comfort and indulgence, with pride
and happiness, the rest of his life. He has, and ever will have, my warmest
friendship and assistance. The share your situation gave you in the important
services mentioned, you have well profited of, by the assistance you afforded
to Sir George in the great calls he must have had for officers about him of such
knowledge, experience, and zeal, as is possessed by you."
Lord Sandwich writes, Hertford Street, May 26, 1782.
" Though I am no longer entitled to write to you upon business relative to the
naval department, I cannot avoid thanking you for the letter with which you have
favoured me, and congratulating you upon the late glorious successes of the
British fleet, and the considerable share you have had in the honours obtained
to this country in the best fought battle, and the most decisive victory, that has
ever graced the annals of England. I most heartily wish you a continuance of
successes wherever you are employed, though I fear that, by the unaccountable recall of Sir George Rodney, your present career is stopped; you have,
however, gained glory enough to satisfy any reasonable man, and I am persuaded that, whenever you have a fresh opportunity of signalizing yourself, it
will not be neglected."
Captain Duncan writes, Chatham, June 22, 1782.
" Amongst the many congratulations which your great conduct and successes will receive from a grateful country, give me leave to add my mite,
which, like the widow's, though small, I hope will not be the less acceptable,
as it is from the heart it comes. I particularly trouble you with this, as my
friend Crauford, in a letter, expresses himself under many obligations to you
for your attention, and thinks it is on my account, which at all times I shall
be happy to acknowledge to you.    I dare say you will not forget my
young friend Craigie, who I am much interested for, and who writes to me
you have taken notice of him-I recommended him to Admiral Pigot before
he sailed. I am now fitting out the Blenheim here, but we are in great want
of men, many ships ready, but stopped on that account. I shall at all times
rejoice at any great fortune that attends you."
Sir John L. Ross writes, Edinburgh, September, 1783.
"' I am this day returned from Ross-shire. Sorry I had not the pleasure of
seeing you before you left Edinburgh to have congratulated you in person on the
signal services done your country, and the honour you have acquired against
our enemies on your late service in the West Indies, in which I, amongst the
rest of your friends, feel much satisfaction in your having so great a share in
the honour done to the navy on the 12th April.
The ministers and others are not named to whom Mr. Clerk is said
to have transmitted his papers; but the utter silence-the obvious
ignorance of the writers of the letters I have cited, as to any such



( 13 )
having been received by them, must be considered conclusive, that
neither the naval administration, nor the distinguished officers I
have named, received, or had any knowledge of, such papers; and
there can be no doubt that if any communications which Mr. Clerk
may have made, could be discovered, they, like " the book," would
be found to contain nothing new,* and positively nothing in the shape
of a suggestion, explanation, or demonstration of such a manoeuvre as
that practised on the 12th of April.
The Reviewer, however, asserts, that the Admiral and his Captain
of the Fleet, actually laid their plans, systematically and deliberately,
upon " the book," and put in practice, accordingly, the manoeuvre
which it taught and explained. Now, what I have said will be enough
to show, and of this the reader may soon satisfy himself, that the Admiral and his Captain of the Fleet could not possibly have been
" studying or preparing a deliberate plan for breaking the line from"
any " explanations, directions, or sketches of Mr. Clerk's,"t even if
it had been admitted, (which it is not, by either of the executive parties,) that his tract was in their possession; for no such matter, positively, was in " the book." The figure, then, by which it is meant to
charge an officer, who, in another part of the article, is characterized
" a pure, high-minded, and honourable man," with having acted as
one who should steal an important and " beautiful idea from a
book then in his possession, printed with another man's name," + and
use that discovery, surreptitiously, as his own, is as unfeeling, as it is
unfounded. I regret that the writer's pages should have contained
such an observation: I regret that he should have been so inconsiderate of the feelings of others, and I marvel that he should be so
ignorant of his client's case, as not to have taken advantage of the
notice I fairly gave, in my first statement, page xxxviii, and note,
page xxxix, that I knew the idea was not printed in that " man's
book," nor in any book of his, until eight years after the battle; and
that the claim was never brought before the public, until the death of
the person who, no one can now doubt, has been deprived of much
of his due, by the belief which the public has been led to give to the
assertions which Mr. Clerk's advocates have hazarded, that the idea
was written in that book, and that Sir George Rodney admitted this
whilst annotating upon it. This (namely, in 1790) is what the Reviewer calls " taking the first opportunity" after the battle, of " explaining, historically, how that event was connected with his speculations." Lord Rodney was living in 1790, though my Father was
dead; and if Mr. Clerk had, even then, advanced his pretensions in
the shape of such " full explanations" as those, which the Reviewer
asserts were before Lord Rodney when he wrote his annotations,* Professor Playfair confirms this. He declares, page 461, vol. iii. of his works,
that the contents of the book and the papers were alike; for that " the papers which
had been circulated, more than a year before the printing of the book, among Mr.
Clerk's friends, were copies of the book."
t Edinb. Review, p. 25.
S Edinb. Review, p. 31.



( 14 )
if, in the first edition (1790) Mr. Clerk had named Lord Rodney, and
Mr. Atkinson, as he did in that of 1804, when he, for the first time,
brought forward the claim of having communicated the idea through
Mr. Atkinson, who was dead also; or if the " other observations,"
page 119,* had stood in the tract that was submitted to Lord Rodney,
he, at least, would have had a distinct opportunity of making annotations upon Mr. Clerk's whole claim. But no!-not until 1804,
twenty-two years after the event, when Lord Rodney and my Father,
and most of the parties were dead, was any distinct claim asserted in
the behalf of Mr. Clerk, to the merit of having invented and suggested
the manoeuvre by which the battle was won; whilst the terms in which
Mr. Clerk had rather inferred or insinuated, than asserted this, evince,
not only that he could not distinctly claim the merit, but a consciousness of not being the inventor of the manoeuvre; for he states, page
xliv. Author's Preface, 1804, " I may also here be permitted to observe, that although Sir G. Rodney should be supposed to have had the
merit of adopting the manoeuvre by which he gained the victory of the
12th of April, without any previous suggestion or knowledge of my ideas
on the subject, still it is impossible to deny the efficacy of the method;
and that, had it not been for my work, the system on which it proceeded might have remained unknown or unexplained." This, I observed, see page xx, first Statement, " would not be generally admitted; for that the system was taught and explained by Paul Hoste,
in his Traite des Evolutions Navales, in 1727."
It should here be observed, that my Father's letter, denying all
previous knowledge of Mr. Clerk's book, or " system," as it is called,
was in reply to verbal rumour, which had surmised my Father to be
one of those " distinguished officers" to whom Mr. Clerk's tract is
stated to have been handed, or sent; for neither in it, nor in any other
publication, did Mr. Clerk name my Father, or publicly assert, what
has been advanced since his death. It was surely incumbent upon
Mr. Clerk, as the asserter, to bring before the public, in distinct, express, and nominal terms, at the time, any claims he might think he
had to the merit of having invented and suggested the manoeuvre:not having done so, his, surely, is not the party which has any right to
use reproach, that claims had not been " impeached till after the death
of the parties concerned."
I am sorry to take up so much of the reader's time:-he will bear
with me,-I am not only vindicating my Father's professional claims,
and defending his character, but I undertake, too, the vindication of
the British Navy in what they consider, and I feel, to be a subject of
great professional interest. To go to the very root of this matter, I
shall leave no fact, which can be got at, unexplored or undisplayed,
that may explain, beyond all possibility of doubt, the real circumstances of this extraordinary pretension:-and first, it will be necessary
to present the reader with an accurate summary of the matter really
contained in " the book," which the Edinburgh Reviewer asserts to
* Naval Tactics.



*' *
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P.-L-ATE V. Part I. P. 40.

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( 15 )
have been " studied by the Admiral and his Captain, on the very day
of the action," and to have " contained sketches and plans, explaining
the text."
The " book," a few copies of which are stated by Mr. Clerk himself, (in his Advertisement to the first edition, dated Edinburgh, Jan.
1790,) to have been " printed in 1782, and handed about among
friends," is declared by him to have been only on the attack from the
windward; and accordingly, " the mode of attack proposed" in that
tract, was confined to that class of operation. That the author had
no intention of treating upon the attack from the leeward, at that
time, is put beyond all doubt, by the declaration, page xlii. Author's
Preface, and in article 193, page 158. (Edinb. 3d edit. 1827,) " a
further prosecution of demonstrations which are likely to lead us on to the
attack from the leeward, we think proper to decline for the present. (1782)
It is a new subject, and, of itself; requires a separate discussion."
The Introduction, "by a Naval Officer," which the reader will find
in the present edition of the Naval Tactics, and to which so much
importance has been attached by the Reviewer, was written for the
second edition in 1804.  The officer who wrote that Introduction,
must have imagined, or have been led to believe, that the original tract
did fully explain the manoeuvre, or he could not have asserted, page
xxiii. " that Rodney's practice was taken from that book,"-a passage
which, the Reviewer cites, page 2, " as an acknowledgment, made in
the name, and on the behalf, as it were, of the profession, that Clerk
was the inventor of the operation, and taught the British navy how to
execute it, before it had been thought of, or practised, by any other
person."  In my Father's name, and for the credit of the profession,
I deny, and will disprove this vain assumption of the Reviewer.
The Author's Preface was written for the second edition in 1804,
and is dated Edinb. May 19, 1804.
The First Section, on the " mode of attack proposed," is in the case of
single ships.
The Second Section is, on the comparative effects of shot directed
against the rigging, and those produced by directing them
against the hull. (Upon this, as a case of gunnery, I shall
observe hereafter.)
Section Third, which is announced to be on bringing Great Fleets to
action, treats, in four pages only, of the distance which one
line must be from another to admit of any one ship, in line of
battle, being exposed to the fire of three, or more ships, at the
same time.
Section IV. is on the attack from the windward, by a fleet desirous of
fighting, on a fleet to leeward wishing to avoid battle. This is
illustrated by three Plates, of which Plates 1, 2, 3, of this are
exact copies.
I exhibit fac-similes of all the plates explaining the text, as the
best and fairest way of showing the mode of attack proposed by Mr.
Clerk. In this section there are some observations on gunnery cases,



( 16 )
which I shall have occasion to notice. Then come Five Sections of
" examples of engagements in former wars;" and lastly, " the new
mode of attack proposed."
Section I. Attack from the windward upon the enemy's rear; in 1
page; the text explained by Fig. 1 and 2, Plate 4 of this (Plate
17 of Clerk.)
Section II. Attack upon the enemy's three sternmost ships, in 2
pages; the text explained by Fig. 2, Plate 4 (17 of Clerk.)
Section III. The enemy's attempt to support his three sternmost
ships by tacking; 2 pages; the text explained by Fig. 3, 4, 5,
Plate 4, and Fig. 6, Plate 5 (17 and 18 of Clerk.)
Section IV. The enemy's attempt to support his three sternmost
ships by wearing; 3 pages; the text explained by Fig. 2, Plate
4, and Fig. 7, 8, 9, Plate 5 (17 and 18 of Clerk.)
Section V. The lee fleet endeavouring to avoid the attack from the
windward, by wearing; 2 pages; the text explained by Fig.
10, Plate 5, Fig. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, Plate 6, and Fig. 16, 17,
18, 19, Plate 7 (18, 19, and 20 of Clerk.)
Section VI. is on the effects of shifts of wind on the preceding operations, Plate 8 (21 of Clerk.)
Section VII. on partial breezes of wind.
Section VIII. of winds blowing in contrary directions.
Section IX.  Other opinions " on how the attack from the windward
should be conducted;" about 4 pages; the text explained by
Fig. 1, 2, 3, 4, Plate 9 (26 of Clerk.)
Section X. conclusion, with general observations, 1 page; in which
there is not the most distant allusion to any other "mode of
attack" than that of the attack from the windward upon the
rear ships of a fleet to leeward; and not one word about
breaking the line.
Lastly, an Appendix to Part I., on the attack from the windward
and " On the curve of pursuit from the windward."
If " the book," upon which Lord Rodney annotated, contained all
this, certain it is that it contained no more.  Neither the description
of Sir George Rodney's actions of May, 1780; nor Plates XI. and
XII., see Clerk's book as it now stands, page 103, third edition; nor
the account of " Keppel's battle of July, 1778, nor Plates XIII. and
XIV.; nor the "other observations," page 119, stood either in the tract
printed in 1782, nor in the copy upon which Lord Rodney annotated
in 1789 or 1790.
The reader will now have assured himself, that the whole reasoning
of the Edinburgh article is constructed upon an erroneous hypothesis;
and that "the book" (which the reviewer acknowledges* is the only
part of Mr. Clerk's work as it now stands, which the Admiral and his
* p.25.



"'-AIT.7.

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40



( 17 )
Captain of the Fleet had to study) contained no explanations, illustrations, or demonstrations, whatever, of the manoeuvre by which the
battle was gained.
These important facts clear up a great deal of the difficulty, and
complexity, in which this case has been involved. It is from the public
having laboured under the error of believing, that the grand secret was
disclosed, and taught, in " the book," that so much credit has been,
hypothetically, ascribed to Mr. Clerk. All the hearsay and inference,
which the writer has drawn into the article-all the letters-all the
conversations, in which reference is made to " Clerk's book on Naval
Tactics," refer to nothing more than to the matter contained in " the
book " printed in 1782, which the public has been led to believe, contained some " magnificent discovery in nautical warfare," and to have
fully explained the very manoeuvre which Rodney practised; but
which contained, as I have proved, nothing more than some insignificant operations, from the windward, on the rear ships of a fleet to leeward, running away, on the same tack!    Thus, referring to " the book"
which is supposed to have taught all this, Lord Rodney is stated to
have spoken of a Scotch gentleman who had written an admirable
book. Again, he is stated by Mr. Playfair to have " talked very unreservedly to Lord Melville of the Naval Tactics, and of the use he
had made of the system, in his action of the 12th of April."*        And
again, General Ross says, " that meeting Lord Rodney at the table of
Sir John Dalling, he heard his Lordship distinctly state, that he owed
his success in the West Indies to the manoeuvre of breaking the line
which lie learned from Mr. Clerk's book."       And then we are told of
* P. 15.
t The Literary Gazette, and another extremely respectable journal, (the Caledonian
Mercury,) called the public attention, and mine in particular, some time ago, to the
following extract, stated to have been taken, verbatim, from Mr. Price Gordon's
iMemoirs, vol. i. pages 135, 136.
" This year, 1782, Rodney fought his celebrated battle in the West Indies. He
arrived in England soon after this glorious affair, and landed at Kingroad. Our RaceHorse was at anchor there, when the Admiral ordered one of our boats to convey him
to Bristol, and, requesting some officer to accompany him, I offered my services, which
were accepted."
" The Admiral landed at Pill, as it was feared the tide, which runs at a furious rate
in this river, might fail him. He politely gave me a seat in his chaise, and begged I
would conduct him to the best inn. I mentioned the Bush as being celebrated for its
larder, so we drove thither. The landlord, Weeks, a well-known character, received
his Lordship with all possible honours, and a most superb entertainment was put
before him, to which I had the honour of being invited; and two officers in his suite
made it une partie carree."
It is further stated in those journals, that whilst thus accompanying and dining
with Lord Rodney, the conversation relative to Mr. Clerk, which Mr. Gordon reports
on recollection, took place.
It would appear from this account, as if Lord Rodney had come home in a merchant
vessel. But knowing, by a letter from his Lordship to my Father, written " at sea,"
that Lord Rodney came home in a line-of-battle ship, attended by a frigate; and being
desirous of ascertaining from what extraordinary contingencies the officers and equipages of those ships should be so circumstanced, as, in violation of the regulations,
customs, and all the 6tiquettes of the service, to be obliged to relinquish the honour of
landing their gallant Admiral on such an occasion, and to devolve that honour on a



( 18 )
his Lordship's candid and generous out-breakings in praise of the
Naval Tactics:* Again, " Lord Rodney dined one day with Colonel
* p. 16.
boat's crew and the marine officer of the Race-Horse sloop, which happened to be
lying at Bristol-I made reference to official documents in my possession-and some
professional and literary gentlemen have addressed to me numerous extracts of othersfrom which it appears, that Lord Rodney sailed from Port Royal, Jamaica, in his
Majesty's ship Montagu, on the 23d of July, 1782, the Flora frigate in company; and
the log-books of these ships show that they came to anchor off the Holmes, in the
Bristol Channel, on the 21st of September, 1782; that on the 22d (nautical time)
Lord Rodney shifted his flag to the Flora, and sailed in her on the same day towards
Bristol. The Flora's log then shows that the Admiral landed from her that night at
Bristol, in his barge, attended by Captain Marshall, the captain of that ship, leaving
her in charge of another officer, Captain Manly, in order to accompany Lord Rodney.
The log-book of the Race-Horse, extracts of two of which have been sent to me, state" Sloop Race-Horse, Sept. 22d, 1782, in Kingroad, Bristol, arrived H. M. S. Flora
with Admiral Rodney."   The other-" arrived here H. M. S. Flora with Admiral
Rodney."
Then as to the point of landing, and the house to which Lord Rodney went, and at
which he remained whilst at Bristol-the following is a copy of a minute made, at the
time, by Samuel Bowden, Esq. " Admiral Rodney, in the Montagu of 74 guns,
arrived in Kingroad, came up to Bristol in the evening, slept that night at Mr. Tindal's,
in the fort. A large party from the Bush Inn went with torches, and paid their respects
to him." Another account states " Sir George Rodney did not land at Pill, as can be
proved by the evidence of the four following pilots residing at Pill: John Chafey,
Richard Musto, John Musto, and John Bowles."
The following extracts, confirming this, have been transmitted to me by a literary
gentleman from the British Museum, with the following minute. " One Bristol and
several London newspapers announce, as follows, the landing of Lord Rodney, and
show that his Lordship was rowed in his own barge to Bristol; slept on Saturday
night the 22d, the only night he remained at Bristol, at Thomas Tindal's Esq. at the
fort; and that his Lordship does not appear ever to have been at the Bush Inn."
Farley's Bristol Journal, published weekly, Saturday, Sept. 28th, 1782.
" Saturday last his Majesty's ship Montagu, (which brought Lord Rodney from the
West Indies,) and the Flora frigate, arrived in Kingroad, and the same evening, about
6 o'clock, the noble Admiral came to this city, and alighted at Mr. Tyndall's, at the
fort. The news spread immediately over the town, and excited the utmost joy; the
bells began ringing and continued to a late hour that night. A considerable party of
respectable citizens proceeded in the evening from the Bush Tavern, each with a lighted
torch, and accompanied by a band of music, and an incredible number of the inhabitants, to pay their respects to the gallant veteran. Soon after their admission into the
inner gates of the fort, the brave old man, attended by his honoured host, Mr. Tyndall,
and some naval officers, appeared upon the steps outside the door; but it being understood that he was not sufficiently elevated there to be seen by all his visitors, he went up
stairs and expressed from one of the windows (as well as gesture could express) the
sense he entertained of their attachment to his person, and their intention of honouring
him on his arrival. The most vociferous repetitions of applause were, after a moderate
stay, succeeded by a very orderly retreat, from whence they paraded through Queen
Square, and the principal parts of the city, and returned in procession to the Bush
Tavern, which Mr. Weeks (the proprietor) had elegantly illuminated; and so much
was he elated at the appearance of a man in this city, who had done such essential service to his country, that he for that evening bid all his guestsfreely welcome, and liberally treated the populace with liquor without doors. Sunday morning, about 7 o'clock,
his lordship left the city, amidst the acclamations of multitudes, whom the day could
not restrain from uttering their vociferations. The shortness of his Lordship's stay



( 19 )
Fullarton in Berkley Square, in the year 1786 or 1787, where, being
very communicative, he declared that he had followed the plans and
principles recommended in      Clerk's Naval Tactics, a work to which
Lord Rodney gave the highest praise."* These, and all the other
allusions made to " the book on Naval Tactics," refer to " a book"
which the reader now knows contained not one word about breaking
the line, nor any conception or illustration of the way in which it was,
or could have been, effected on the 12th of April.    Lord Rodney must
have been in his dotage when he spoke thus; and whether he was
or no, the fact positively was not as he is represented to have
admitted. The writer says too, that " the testimony of Sir Walter
Scott (my early and, as, I love to call him, my venerated friend) is
distinctly in favour of Mr. Clerk's claim to the merit of having
invented and taught the manoeuvre in question, previous to the battle
of the 12th of April." Sir Walter's testimony, as given incidentally
in a note in the Life of Napoleon, goes only to a recollection of seeing
Mr. Clerk navigate cork vessels on a dinner table. It is not disputed
that Mr. Clerk had long amused himself, as an amateur, with naval
tactics; but I am quite sure that Sir Walter Scott, when he shall have
*p. 17.
would not permit the corporation and West Indian merchants to pay their personal
respects to him, but they did not omit imparting to him their grateful sense of his merits
and services."
Morning Chronicle, London, Tuesday, Sept. 24th, 1782- Extract of a Letter from
Bristol, Sept. 22.
" This day arrived the Montagu man-of-war, with Lord Rodney, and the Flora
frigate, from Jamaica and Kinsale.
" Lord Rodney was received with great demonstrations of joy, the bells ringing, guns
firing, and every mark of respect. He sleeps this night at the house of Thomas Tyndall, Esq. in our fort."
Morning Herald, Tuesday, Sept 24th, 1782.
" London.-Last night the Rt. Hon. Admiral Lord Rodney arrived in town from
Bristol, in perfect health; his Lordship sailed in the Montagu, of 74 guns, from the
Cove of Cork, on Thursday, and arrived in King Road on Saturday last about noon,
when he was immediately rowed in his own barge to Bristol, where a general illumination was made in honour of this gallant but ill-treated commander."
Public Advertiser, Wed. Sept. 25. The same account.
London Chron. Sat. Sept. 21st, to Tuesday, Sept. 24th, 1782.-Extract of a Letter
from Bristol. Sept. 21.
Morning Herald, Wednesday, Sept. 25th, 1782.
Morning Chron. Sept. 26th, 1782, Thursday.
Morning Herald, Thursday, Sept. 26th, 1782.-Extract of a Letter from Bristol,
Sept. 22d.
Parker's General Advertiser, Sept.27th, 1782.
Either the whole of the preceding official documents, public Journals, and authentic
records, from which the foregoing extracts have been made, are absolute forgeries, or
there must be some strange mistake here.
D2



( 20 )
read this, and reconsidered, well, the subject, will not continue to
assert that Mr. Clerk invented or explained the manoeuvre that was
practised on the 12th of April, even if he should still think that Mr.
Clerk has since " taught the British Navy how to know and use their
force."
The Reviewer affirms,* " that the first part of the Naval Tactics
was published in London on the 1st of January, 1782."  It is scarcely
worth while, so far as the matter in controversy is concerned, to consider whether that brochure was ever published or no; but so much
importance has been attached to the alleged publication of that tract, as
well as to its contents, that, although I have disposed of these, so far as
to show that they relate not in any way to the manoeuvre of the battle,
I shall proceed to prove that it was never published till 1790.
Mr. Clerk distinctly states in the advertisement to the first edition,
published in 1790, (and which is the first edition ever seen by the public,) that " a few copies of the first part of his Essay on Naval Tactics,
being printed in 1782, were handed about among a few friends." This
" Advertisement" is dated Edinburgh, January, 1790. Again, in his
Preface to the second edition, published in 1804, see page xxix., he
says, " that the following system appeared in print about twenty-two
years ago." This preface is dated, Edinburgh, May 19th, 1804, so
that " twenty-two years ago," fixed the date of the printing to be
about May, 1782. Again, in a note to the Author's Preface, to the
second edition 1804, it is stated, that " the first impression of Part I.
consisted of a few copies, not fr sale, but to be given away;" and in
another part, see page xlii., Author's Preface, he says, " a few copies,
only fifty in number, were printed and handed about among friends, and
some copies I took the liberty to present to professional men:" and
again, page xliii., " encouraged by many flattering letters of approbation, which I received from naval officers of distinguished merit,
and of the highest rank, I was advised to send copies to his Majesty's
Ministers at the time, which was in Spring, 1782; and my opinions, if
just, no doubt deserved the immediate attention of government."
Again, in the Introduction to the third edition, by a Naval Officer,
see page xxiv., it is asserted that Clerk's book " had not then, (viz., on
the 12th April, 1782,) been published, and that it was a manuscript copy
which Lord Rodney had in his hands in the battle."
Now, though it is not possible to reconcile all these contradictions, I
will give to them a construction the most favourable to Mr. Clerk,
by adopting what he says, and what his biographer Mr. Playfair
declares; namely, that fifty copies of the tract, were printed on the
1st of January, 1782, and handed about among some friends; some
copies presented to professional men, and others sent to his Majesty's
Ministers in the Spring of that year; and, which is very important, that
" the Naval Tactics which appeared in print in the beginning of 1782,
were copies of the papers which had been circulated more than a year
before.t-" But on the 1st of January, 1782, Sir G. Rodney and my Father had left London, together, for the West Indies: the tract therefore

* pp. 8, 20, 30.

t Playfair, vol. iii. p. 41.



( 21 )

could neither have been PRESENTED nor HANDED to them. Sir Gilbert
Blane says,* " that on the first of January, 1782, the fleet was windbound in the channel, and all communication with the metropolis
(where it was believed the fleet had quitted England) and the fleet,
being interrupted, it does not appear possible that " a book " printed
in January could have been brought on board; and moreover that he
never saw, or heard of such a work, though he spent a great part of
his time in the Admiral's cabin; and it is certain that no copies, sent
through the Ministers in the spring, could have reached the West Indies
before the battle, which took place in the spring: if they had, they
could have been of no use, for " the book" is proved to have
treated only of bearing down from the windward.
Now with respect to the communication presumed to have been
made to Sir G. Rodney by Mr. Atkinson. The Reviewer asserts, as
another " fundamental fact" of his case, that Mr. Clerk had, long
previous to 1782, " fully ascertained and demonstrated, by reasoning
and calculation, the advantage of bearing down as it were in column,
on an enemy's line on the defensive, and cutting it in two." Here, in
the very outset, the writer falls into the extraordinary notion, upon
which Mr. Clerk's speculations have been, most erroneously and
groundlessly, " connected with the battle of the 12th of April,"namely, the ridiculous error of supposing that this was, in principle,
the manoeuvre practised on the 12th of April. The operation of
".bearing down on an enemy's line," can be nothing but an attack from
the windward; and, accordingly, this " first fact" of the Reviewer's
is proof, on his own admission, that nothing had issued from Mr. Clerk,
but a tract on the attack from the windward, before 1790. If, therefore, it were proved that Mr. Atkinson did actually make such a communication as this to Sir G. Rodney, at the time stated, it could give
Mr. Clerk no claim, whatever, to any share in inventing, suggesting,
or explaining the manoeuvre of breaking the line. To get rid of this
difficulty, and to endeavour to connect the book, in principle, with the
matter alleged to have been communicated by Atkinson, the Reviewer
would indeed persuade us, that " bearing down on an enemy's line"
is a sort of general theorem for breaking the line, which may be applied either from the windward, or from the leeward. He lays it down,
accordingly,t that " the principles on which the breaking of the line
from the windward depends, apply equally to a position to leeward,"
although, he does confess, that "the book may not have contained
specific directions for obviating some difficulties which might occur in
the latter case."  The writer cannot be supposed to understand
wherein the difference of these two diametrically opposite operations
consists. To set him right, and to prevent those who are not more
conversant with the subject, from being put, or kept wrong, I shall
explain the essential difference there is, in principle, practice, and
practicability; in absolute and relative position; in power of speed,
choice of engaging distance, and in every other circumstance that
* See United Service Journal, No. XX. page 20, 22.  t p. 25.



( 22 )
enters into the combination, between the mode of attack from the
windward, and that from the leeward.
The Reviewer, descanting on this part of the subject, observes,
page 25, "that there were difficulties in the mode of attack from the
leeward, which did not occur in that from the windward; and admits
that, for obviating these difficulties, " the book " asserted to have
been "studied by the Admiral, afforded no specific directions." I
shall merely ask, en passant, what possible claim, then, can Mr. Clerk
have to credit, for the manner in which any difficulties that may have
occurred in the earlier part of the encounter, were obviated? What
those difficulties were,-which are thus admitted to have been foreseen
by Mr. Clerk, as occurring in the attack from the leeward, but for
obviating which, his advocate admits, that no plans, demonstrations,
or specific directions were given, in "1the book," which, in another
part of the article, is so seriously asserted to have "settled the conditions on which depend the safety and success of," and to have
"contained plans and sketches explaining the text and teaching fully
and systematically, that very manoeuvre,-we are not told; but if, in
two classes of operation, there be differences, requiring specific directions, which "a book," professing to explain, fully, the practice,
does not show the means of obviating, then, I suppose, the Reviewer
will admit that book could be of no use on such an occasion. The
only difficulty that did occur in the early part of the operations of the
12th of April, was the difficulty of getting to windward of the French
line.  The difficulty avoided was precisely that into which such
notions as those which the Reviewer has ascribed to Mr. Clerk,
would lead, headlong. Some difficulties do indeed occur to the
Reviewer, and he has gone into them completely out of his element.
After mistating the case, as I shall show he has done, both relatively
and absolutely, he says, page 26, " the French fleet might have been
so placed, or trimmed, with regard to the wind, as to make the
operation of ' bearing up from the leeward' to cut across their line,
not only very difficult, but absolutely impracticable, more especially if
they were so close to each other as to enable them to bring several
ships to bear against the assault." It is scarcely necessary to observe,
that the term " bearing up from the leeward," is a nonsensical confusion
of two distinct things, which in their very essence are differentevincing a total, but very excusable ignorance, of the very first principles of the subject. It is, therefore, for the sake of keeping the
reader right, that I shall digress, a little, in order that he may not be
misled into a belief, that because the term " bearing up" is used by
the Reviewer, as the reverse of "bearing down," that, therefore, the
one signifies the attack from the windward, and the other the attack
from the leeward, so as to embrace both operations under one general
principle or theorem.  According to this erroneous acceptation, Sir
George Rodney, although to leeward, and upon a wind, is described
as " bearing up for the enemy's line."  In another place, the writer
defines Mr. Clerk's work to have "taught only the advantages of
bearing down, as it were, in column; " and adds, (thinking that this



( 23 )

grasps both cases, in principle,)" this, and this only, is the manoeuvre
which Mr. Clerk discovered, and Rodney carried into effect."  Now,
neither of these terms, "bearing up," nor " bearing down," apply to
an attack from the leeward. The Reviewer is in fact right, and
pleads to the truth, that "bearing down upon an enemy to leeward,"
is the only operation of which Mr. Clerk treated previous to 1790;
but such a manoeuvre was exactly the reverse, in every respect, of
that which Rodney carried into effect! The British fleet, being to
leeward, could neither bear up, nor bear down in column upon the enemy: it had to haul up, in order to fetch through; and it was by doing
so, in a prompt, decisive manner, that the Formidable was pushed
through their line. To bear up is when a vessel, or fleet, close hauled
upon a wind, keeps away free, to shape a course to leeward: to bear
down, is to run down upon a ship or fleet to leeward: so that these
terms merely specify degrees of the same thing, viz. first to bear up,
and then to bear down: a fleet to windward must do both, to attack
one on the defensive, directly to leeward; but a fleet to leeward can
do neither, in attacking, as Rodney did.  These distinctions must be
well understood before any person can comprehend, far less teach,
naval tactics; and it is quite preposterous, and would be extremely
derogatory to a person of Mr. Clerk's sagacity and acquirements, to
suppose that he did not understand the distinction.  That, and that
only, then, which Mr. Clerk did write or have printed, as by the
author's " first fact," was, the attack from the windward;-not to
break the line of an enemy intending to fight, but to attack the rear
ships of an enemy running away!       This is the fact, which the
Reviewer has been all along, though unconsciously, proving; for in
no other position can his columns either " bear up," or " bear down;"
and this alone, as proved by " the book," is sufficient to dispose of Mr.
Clerk's claim.
But the Reviewer gets into other difficulties.-He observes, page
26, " if the ships of the enemy's line, being to the windward, were
also close hauled* to the wind, it seems obvious that a fleet to leeward
must entirely lose way, in attempting to pass through them, or could
only gain such way by a complex manoeuvre."    This, indeed, would
be " awkward,"-this is a difficulty that could not well be obviated.
If a vessel be suffered to " lose entirely her way," in any attempt, that
attempt must fail; and by no "complex manoeuvre" can she be made
to go to windward. She must go to leeward first. The writer is again
out of his element, and may be excused; but he may depend upon it,
there is no other way of getting out of the difficulty, than by "backing
out" as soon he can.-And, let me tell him, if he does not extricate
himself in an expert, seamanlike manner, from a very discreditable
and perilous predicament, he will get the ships of his fleet into irons,t
* In another part, p. 25 at bottom, the Reviewer says, " how near the wind they
were sailing when approached by the English, does not appear."
t A vessel is said to be in irons, when, by mismanagement, she is permitted to
come up in the wind, and lose her way, so that having no steerage, she cannot be
brought out of this predicament, but either by boxing her of, on the former tack, or
bracing round the after yards and letting her fall off on the other tack; to do either of
which, the vessel which has thus been paralysed, is forced to make a stern.board, with
the helm worked in a contrary direction.



( 24 )
and bring his theory into sad derision. No such difficulty as this,
occurred in the British fleet.  Such mismanagement and misconduct
as that of " losing way," and not keeping proper distances in following their leaders, were committed by some of the French ships; and
this it was that suggested the manoeuvre which threw their whole fleet
into disorder, and occasioned its defeat.
Dealing as much as possible with facts, established by authentic
official documents, and possessing some which are conclusive against
the very vain pretension that the battle of the 12th April was fought in
a deliberate and systematic manner on Mr. Clerk's ideas, or on any
premeditated plan, I beg the reader to follow me to a full consideration
of all the tactical circumstances of the operations which preceded the
battle -those with which it commenced-and the immediate effects of
the manoeuvre by which the French line was broken.
To this course, indeed, I am led by the Reviewer, who, at page 25,
invites us to consider " what were the circumstances of the case, as to
the position of the fleet in relation to the enemy, on the morning of the
12th of April, 1782?"  The Reviewer, answering his own question,
asserts, that " the French fleet, when first descried on the morning
of the 12th of April, was to windward."*  Here, at the very outset,
is an error, in point of fact, of the greatest possible magnitude. I
have before me the Journal of the Formidable, which states, that
" on the 12th, at break of day, the enemy's fleet was discovered broad
on the lee bow;" the wind E.S.E. our heads to the northward, (that is,
on the starboard tack), and one of M. de Grasse's fleet, towed by a
frigate, square under our lee."  Again-the Reviewer not only mistates
the relative positions of the two fleets, but entirely omits all the very
material operations, of the preceding days, which led to the " true
position in which the fleets were, in relation to each other, on the
morning of the 12th." By these omissions, and this error in position,
it would appear as if the lee-gage had been " deliberately chosen," for
the purpose of carrying " systematically into efect," the attack from
the leeward. Now, the same authentic documents, which enable me
to correct this capital error, furnish me with authentic means to supply
the omissions. The great object of the British Admiral, in all the
operations of the 9th, 10th, and 11th, was to avoid the lee-gage, and
get to windward of the enemy. About half a dozen official journals,
kept by different officers, and in different ships, (that of the flag-ship
being one of them) are now before me; and they all state, expressly,
that every exertion was made by the British fleet " to get to windward
of the enemy, so to force them to close action, which they avoided
by keeping as much as possible, and with scrupulous attention, to windward, at their much loved long cannonading distance."  That " on the
10th Sir George Rodney endeavoured to keep his fleet to windward:"
-" that on the 11th, this great object was deliberately and ardently
sought, by menacing one of the two French vessels which had suffered
in the action of the 9th, and had fallen to leeward-one from the loss
of her fore-yard, and the other from the loss of her main top-mast.
" That to make his Majesty master of those ships, or to bring M. de
* p. 26.



( 25 )
Grasse to leeward of the British fleet, and thereby draw him into a
general engagement, the signal was made for a general chase--that
in the afternoon the Agamemnon, and some other weathermost ships,
gained ground so fast on the enemy's mutilated vessels, that M. de
Grasse was forced to bear down with all his fleet to protect them. On
the 12th, after stating the position of the enemy to be " broad on the
lee bow," as already described, the entry of that day's proceedings is,
that " to draw him," de Grasse, " yet further to leeward, the Valiant
and Monarch were sent in chase of the two disabled ships, which were
square under the lee of the British fleet; when the high-spirited de
Grasse edged down to support them; while Rear Admiral Drake
pushed on with his division to secure the weather gage, and thereby a
general and decisive battle."    These accounts further state, that
" when the French Admiral had been brought far enough down for this
our purpose, the signal of recall was made to the Valiant and Monarch
(the signal for line of battle ahead having been displayed some little
time before;)t the French forming their line on the larboard tack to
try to regain the weather gage."-They, therefore, were to leeward.
The Reviewer having made this great error in stating the case, with
respect to the relative position of the two fleets, shows no less want of
precision in describing the absolute position, course, and movement of
the enemy. He says,+ " how near the wind they (the enemy) were
sailing, when approached by the English, does not appear from any
documents now before us." But if he had searched into the documents of the day, as he ought to have done, in order to ascertain the
real circumstances of the case, he would have found, even from documents in his client's possession, " that when our chasers were called
in, the French fleet hauled up on the larboard tack to endeavour to regain the weather gage;" and that, therefore, they were sailing close
hauled, that is, close to the wind, when approached by the British
fleet.~
The wind, which for some time after the British fleet had got sight
of the enemy, was at S.E. began soon afterwards to shift to E.S.E.;
but still the British line laid up to windward of the French van; and
to show that the British fleet continued, to the last moment, to
contend for the weather gage, I may here mention, that the signal was
made to the leading ship the Marlborough, to keep her wind as much
as possible.l  The wind, however, "reverted gradually, afterwards, to
* Journal of the Formidable.
t Since this was written Lnrd Rodney's Memoirs have appeared. The following is
an extract of a letter from that Admiral to Lady Rodney, dated April 13, 1782.
" This, however," (the manoeuvre made by his two ships on the enemy's disabled
vessels,) " brought the French fleet near me; and by making a signal after it was
dark, that it was my intention to make a press of sail all night and stand to the southward, which was from the French, and tacking at two in the morning, at daylight on
the 12th, I had the happiness to perceive that my manoeuvre had succeeded, and that
we had gained the wind of the enemy."
f Page 25, at bottom.
~ Journal of the Formidable.
SNo entry of this signal appears in the Log of the Marlborough; it was made, however, and repeated. One proof of this is sufficient, and 1 exhibit it in the Log of the
E



( 26 )
E."* which headed-off the British ships, and enabled the French van
Bedford, because I shall have other occasion, I now find, to refer to that ship's proceedings.
Extract from the Log Book of His Majesty's Ship Bedford.
H. K. F. Courses. Winds. Remarks on Friday, 12th April, 1782.
1  5 4 S. E. b S. E. b N. Fresh gale and clear weather at
2  6 3                  half-past, set top gallant sail.
3        N. b E.        Split the jib.
4  56
5  6                    At 5 the Admiral made the sig6  5 5 S.E. b S.        nal to call in all Cruizers, the
Santa, E. N. E. 3 leagues
7  2 4 S.S. E. E.N.E. Joined the Admiral and formed
8  2 4                  the order of sailing.
92
10  2                    Ditto weather.
11  2
12  2 2                  At daylight saw the enemy's
1  2                    fleet in the N. E. quarter in
2  2 2                  order of battle-the Admiral
3  2 2 N. bEE. E. bN. made the signal to call in all
4  1 4 N. E. bE.        Cruizers, and the signal to form
5  1 4    N. E.         the line battle a-head 2 cables'
6  1 4                  length asunder. At ten minutes
7  3 2                  past 8 the Van began the action
8  3                    with the enemy-Repeated the
9  3                    Admiral's signal for action-At
10  2                    fifteen minutes past, repeated
11  2                    the Admiral's signal for close
12  2     S. b E. E. b S. action. At twenty minutes past
8 repeated the Admiral's signal
for the leading ship to alter her
course to starboard. At 9 A. M.
began to engage the enemy as
we passed the line. At 11
ceased firing being past their
line. Twelve minutes past 11
the Admiral made our signal to
come within hail.  At fifteen
minutes past 11 repeated the
signal and tacked as did the
Admiral andfleet, hauled down
the signal for the line of battle
and made the signal for close
action. At noon bearing down
on the enemy's fleet.
* Journal.



( 27 )
to lay up in a commensurate degree; and it only then became distinct
to the British Admiral, that he would fail in his object of getting to
windward of the enemy.  By this disappointment, the British Admiral
was placed in a situation to do one of two things-either to manoeuvre
afresh, or to meet the enemy on their terms, since he could not have
his own.-He gallantly chose the latter.
The position in which the two fleets now were, in relation to each
other, and out of which the manoeuvre arose in an unexpected and unpremeditated manner, resulted, therefore, from the British Admiral
having failed in a deliberate intention-a systematic attempt, to gain
a position (that to windward,) the very reverse of that which the
Reviewer asserts was premeditatedly taken; and I shall moreover
show, that even after the British Admiral was of necessity obliged to
engage the enemy from the leeward, or not at all, there still was no
intention, whatever, of attempting to break his line.
Whilst the two lines were thus approaching each other, it became
my Father's duty, as Captain of the Fleet, to advise with Sir G. Rodney, as to his intentions and plan of operations. It was impossible
that any officers in either fleet, looking a-head of their respective ships,
and perceiving the British line fetching-in with the French van, laying
athwart, could fail to observe, that the actual course of the British
fleet lay through the French line; and that, if not ordered to the
contrary, by signal, it would be the duty of the van ship to stand
through. The intention of the Admiral, as to what was to be done,
was, therefore, a matter of the most intense interest, and the Formidable's mast heads, and those of the repeating frigates, were observed
with the closest attention and solicitude. This alone, as I have
already observed, (p. 45. Preface, Naval Gunnery,) is sufficient to
account for the observation stated to have been made by Lord Cranstoun: and here, as the Reviewer has referred to Sir G. Blane's
Select Medical Dissertations, I adduce the following declaration from
Sir Gilbert, who states that what is therein said, as to the Admiral
having visibly caught the idea, was mere matter of conjecture-for
that nothing was said upon the subject. In a letter from Sir Gilbert
to me, of the 9th October, 1829, he says, " upon reading over my own
printed account, I recollect no omission of any important circumstance
that fell under my observation, except that Captain Byron came alongside about daylight, and hailed that he had observed the position of
the enemy to be such, that we should weather them; and, if I were to
tell over again what passed at breakfast, I should say, Lord Cranstoun
came into the captain's cabin, at the starboard side from the quarterdeck, where he had been taking a view of the two fleets, and said,
that if we stood on, and kept our wind, or words to that purpose, our
van ship would pass through the enemy's line: no answer was made
to this, and what I have said about what appeared to be passing in the
Admiral's mind, was mere matter of conjecture." The conjecture
entertained by Sir G. Blane proves that there was no previous mention
of such a plan. Sir Gilbert Blane says,* expressly, with regard to the
* See United Service Journal, No. XX. page 206.



( 28 )
passage taken from his dissertation by the Edinburgh Reviewer,
" that it cannot be adduced in proof of anything preconcerted or
imagined, but only the momentary impression of Lord Cranstoun," he,
Sir Gilbert, "never having admitted any such previous conception."
He says the Admiral appeared to catch the idea: the Reviewer asserts
that the Admiral had, long before, caught the idea from Mr. Clerk's
book, and discussed it during the voyage. Why such an interception
of the enemy's line was not only obvious to every officer " looking
out," from the very nature of the case; but no officer could fail to
remark it; for there were then, and have been ever since signals were
invented, appropriate signals for such an operation; and if the
manoeuvre had been premeditated, these might and would have been
made, to carry it into effect. If it had been Sir G. Rodney's deliberate
intention to attack the enemy's van, the flag, blue and yellow, with a
red pendant over it, would have been hoisted at the main top-mast
head. Had the enemy's centre been the point of attack, that flag only,
would have been displayed there: if the rear had been the object of
attack, the same flag, with a white pendant over it, would have directed
the operation; and had it been intended that the fleet should stand-on,
through the enemy's line, the signal red, white, and blue, with a blue
pendant under it, (which directed the fleet to bear up in succession
along the enemy's lee,) would not have been made; but the flag quartered red and white, at the main top-mast head, would have been displayed: instead of which, the Formidable, after having followed her
leader in line a-head, down under the lee of the French fleet, hauledup suddenly, fig. 2, plate 10, through an unexpected opening in their line.
In addition to the signals already mentioned, we find white with a
blue cross, at the fore top-mast head, for particular ships, or divisions
(to be designated by signal,) to attack any part designated, of the
enemy's fleet. Red primed with white, for divisions (to be desig.
nated by signal) to attack the enemy's rear. Flag blue and yellow,
with pendants under, or over, direct various modes of doubling on the
enemy's rear, or van, and to prevent being doubled upon. White with
a blue cross, in combination with the different pendants, designate all
the orders of battle, and orders of sailing upon the starboard bearing
and larboard bearing.
I have stated at page xli. First Statement, "' that no general signal
was used, indicative of an intention to break the enemy's line." But the
book, containing signals as above, was in my Father's possession, whilst
he was receiving Sir George Rodney's instructions and orders;-and
what were they? To direct the Marlborough to lead along the lee of
the French line, when the British van should have closed with it; and
then to make the signals line a-head-battle-and close battle; all of
which were displayed accordingly.
Thus systematically directed, the British fleet followed the leader
along, and to leeward of the French line-when, so quick was the coup
d'oeil which perceived the fatal error committed by the enemy, and so
prompt the blow which it appeared to invite, (that of hauling-up through
the opening,) that it was executed without hauling-down or annulling



( 29 )
the signal line a-head!  As soon as the Formidable broke through the
enemy's line, the log-book of that ship shows that "she bore away and
raked the four ships of the enemy that were coming up in succession:"
the Journal states that the Formidable, " wearing round upon her
heel," opened her larboard broadside upon the enemy's ships, and
continued to fire upon them for three-quarters of an hour---" not a shot
missing, and occasioning the most dreadful havoc." All the accounts
cited below,* concur in stating that the French fleet were, by this bold
movement, thrown into the greatest and most inextricable confusion.
As soon as the Formidable had stood through the opening in the
French line, the signal was made for the van to tack; and at forty-five
minutes past nine, after having committed the most dreadful ravages
on that part of the French fleet, the Formidable tacked. Never was
a movement executed in a more off-hand, unpremeditated manner,never was an enemy taken more by surprise. So much, in point of
fact, for the assertion, that the Admiral and his Captain of the Fleet
were prepared, by Mr. Clerk's tuition, to " bear-up from the leeward,
through the French line on the defensive," and so to carry his mode
of attack, deliberately and systematically, into effect!
Now with respect to the extraordinary assertion, that the manoeuvre
of breaking the line, was, in principle, the invention of Mr. Clerk.The Reviewer asserts, p. 29, that Mr. Clerk not only " made and
matured this magnificent discovery," but actually " settled the conditions on which its safety and success depend."-First, as to the
invention;-the conditions hereafter.
For the sake of chronological arrangement, and without going
farther back into abundant proof which might be adduced from
modern as well as ancient history, I shall, in reply to this pretension,
first show, that the breaking of the line from the leeward was put in
practice about one hundred years before Mr. Clerk was born; namely,
on the 16th of August, 1652, by Sir George Ayscue, in his battle off
Plymouth with the Dutch: " Sir George Ayscue, with nine sail of his
headmost ships, charged through the Dutch fleet, and got the weather
gage."-(Ledyard's Naval History, book iii. page 542.)
In the Annales des Provinces Unies, par M. Basnage, 1719, we
find the following description of the battle of the 14th June, 1665,
p. 741, vol. i.
" L'Amiral Hollandois, qui etoit au dessous du vent, prit le parti de percer
au travers de la flotte Angloise, et le Due d'York, au lieu de l'arrkter sur son
passsage, en lui opposant ses gros vaisseaux, le laissa passer, et perga a son
tour au travers des vaisseaux Hollandois. C'etoit une faute considerable; car
le due pouvoit ais6ment s6parer une partie de la flotte de l'autre, et la battre
s6parement."
The only other instance I shall cite, is the battle of the 15th and
16th of August, 1704, off Malaga.
* Rodney's Narrative, Journal of the Formidable, Ekin's Naval Battles, De Grasse's
Journal, and other authorities given in full, in the latter part of this paper.



( 30 )
BATTLE OFF MALAGA, 1704. 0. S.
15th and 16th August.
THE French line, which consisted of fifty ships, was very strong in the
tentre, but weaker in the van and rear; to supply which most of their gallies
were divided into those quarters; the Marquis de Villette, lieutenant-general,
commanded their van, with the white and blue squadrons, having on his
second line the Duke of Tursis, with the seven French gallies of his squadron
and five Spanish. The Count de Toulouse was in the centre, with the white
squadron, having behind him the Marquis du Roge, with four gallies; and the
Marquis de Langeron commanded the blue squadron in the rear, having behind him eight French gallies, under the command of the Marquis de Ferville.
The line of the confederate fleet consisted of fifty-three ships: Sir George
Rooke, the Admiral, and Rear-Admirals Byng and Dilks, being in the centre;
Sir Cloudesly Shovel and Sir John Leake leading the van; and Vice-Admiral
Callemberg, with Rear-Admiral Vander Dussen, with twelve Dutch ships,
commanding in the rear. The Admiral ordered the Swallow and Panther, with
the Lark and Newport, and two fire-ships, to lie to the windward, that in case
the enemy's van should push through the confederate line with their gallies and
fire-ships, they might give them some diversion. A little after 10 of the clock,
Admiral Shovel, with the van, bore down upon the enemy, and was at some
distance from the centre, which, the Marquis de Villette observing, and thinking he might get a-head of that squadron with his foremost ships, made a signal
to the headmost ships of the French line to crowd all the sail they could. Admiral Shovel, still bearing down upon the enemy, insensibly found himself in
their line a-head of them; which the French, judging to be a favourable
opportunity, resolved to make their advantage of it by keeping their wind, and
crowding all the sail they were able, in order to cut off the van of the confederates
from the rest of their line; hoping, with reason, that if it grew calm, which
usually happens in a sea fight, their gallies might tow them off, so as they might
make a double, and weather Sir Cloudesly Shovel, and fire on him on both sides.*
Paul Hoste introduces the subject, " Traverser l'Armee Ennemie,"
thus, p. 388, (Lyons edition, 1697.)
" On trouve dans les relations des combats donn6s dans la Manche, entre
les Anglois et les Hollandois, que leurs armies se traversoient souvent; c'est-hdire, que l'armee qui etoit sous le vent, (to leeward,) ayant un peu couru de
l'avant, reviroit par la contre-marche, et coupot cot I'autre arm6e," fig. 1, plate 10,
&c.; " que de cette manibre les deux arm es se traversoient plusieurs fois;"
"que le Comte d'Estries, Vice-Amiral de France, dans le combat du Texel
1'an 1673, traversa l'escadre de Zelande, lui gagna le vent, la dissipa, et mit
les ennemis dans un si grand desordre, qu'il fit declarer la victoire qui etoit
encore en balance."
It is upon these facts that the Professor proceeds:" II. II me semble qu'il est ais6 Fl'arm6e C D d'empccher que l'armee A
B, Planche 125, ne la coupe. 1. Quand l'arme A B revire par la contremarche, l'arm6e C D peut revirer toute en meme temps, cequi empechera la
t&te A d'atteindre jamais l'ennemi pour le couper. 2. Si l'armie C D ne vput
pas revirer d'abord toute en mrme temps, de peur qu'elle ne paroisse fuir, elle
pourra laisser passer la tete A de l'arm6e A B, fig. 1, plate 10, au point E,
* Yet Mr. Clerk's advocates assert, that he invented the method of bringing the
whole of a fleet, against a part of that of the enemy; and that before his system was
promulgated, this was never done. See Playfair's assertion to this effect, cited at p. 33
of this Memoir.



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revirant ensuite toute en mtme temps elle mettra les vaisseaux ennemnis E
entre deux feux, et les ayant bient6t d6faits, elle coupera sans peine la tate A,.
et les autres vaisseaux ennemis qui l'auront ddja traversie.
"III. Je ne vois donc pas qu'il faille beaucoup craindre l'ennemi qui veut
nous traverser; et mime je ne pense pas qu'on doive jamais faire cette manoeuvre sans une des trois conditions suivantes. 1. Si on y est contraint,
pour eviter un plus grand mal. 2. Si l'arm'e ennemie, laissant un grand vuide au
milieu de ses escadres, rend inutile une partie de notre armte. 3. Si plusieurs
vaisseaux F G de l'arm"e CD sont d6sempares; car alors on pourroit faire
revirer les vaisseaux E H tous en mime temps, et ensuite le reste H B de
l'arm6e A B par la contre-marche, pour thcher de couper la queue C D.
IV. On est quelquefois oblige de traverser l'armte ennemie pour d6gager
nos vaisseaux que les ennemis auroient coup6s; et en ce cas ii faut risquer
quelque chose; mais on doit garder plusieurs pricautions. 1. On doit extr~mement se serrer. 2. On doit forcer de voiles, sans se mettre en peine de
combattre en traversant l'ennemi. 3. Les vaisseaux qui ont travers6 doivent
revirer le plutbt qu'ils peuvent, pour empicher que l'ennemi ne continue la
meme bordde que l'arm.e qui le traverse.
Exemple. Jamais personne ne menagea mieux ces sortes de traversdes que
l'amiral Ruiter dans le combat oil it battit les Anglois l'onzibme de Juin, et les
trois jours suivans, l'an 1666. Les deux armies 6toient chacune de cent
vaisseaux de ligne: mais le Prince Rupert, avec vingt gros vaisseaux, s'etoit
detach6 de l'arme3e d'Angleterre, pour aller au devant d'une escadre Fran9oise
qui venoit joindre les Hollandois; et ii avoit laiss6 le commandement du reste
de l'arm"e au Gendral Monk. L'arm e de Hollande avoit mouille en ligne A
1'Est-Sud-Est de la pointe Nord d'Angleterre; Ruiter en avoit le corps-debataille, Tromp l'avante-garde au Sud, et Evers l'arribre-garde au Nord: le
vent 6toit au Sud-Sud-Ouest. Le General Monk, qui dtoit au vent des ennemis, resolut d'aller h eux, quoiqu'il efit environ vingt vaisseaux de moins.
Peutltre qu'il crat les surprendre a l'ancre; peut-ýtre aussi que la victoire de
l'annde pr(cidente lui fit mepriser l'ennemi; ou m~me le desir d'avoir tout
I'honneur du combat l'aveugla, et le fit pr6cipiter de se battre durant 1'absence
du Prince Rupert. Quoiqu'il en soit, it vint a toutes voiles sur les Hollandois,
qui l'attendirent a l'ancre jusqu'a' ce qu'il fitt h port6e. Alors, ayant coup6
leurs cables, ils commenchrent le combat sur le midi avec beaucoup de vigueur.
Le vent ('toit si frais que les Anglois ne pouvant pas se servir de leurs batteries
basses, avoient beaucoup de disavantage: c'est pourquoi aprbs trois heures
de combat ils revirbrent tous en mime temps au Nord-Ouest, et, arrivant de
quelques rhumbs, ils prirent le parti de la retraite, aprbs avoir laiss6 quatre de
leurs vaisseaux disempares au pouvoir des ennemis. Les Hollandois poursuivirent les fuyards, mais ceux-ci tournant tite continubrent le combat jusques
ia dix heures du soir. Le lendemain les Anglois revinrent t la charge, et le
combat fut plus opinihtr6 que le jour pr&cedent: les armies se traversbrent
plusieurs fois, et ce fut dans cette occasion que Ruiter fit dclater son habiletd et
sa valeur: car, voyant que la plus grande partie de son avant-garde avoit 6td
coupe, et qu'elle couroit grand risque d'etre la proie des ennemis qui l'entouroient, ii traversa de nouveau l'arm6e Angloise, et donna dessus avec tant
de fureur qu'il ddlivra les siens, et mit les ennemis en fuite. Mais le lendemain
le Prince Rupert, qui avoit rejoint son armie, recommenga le combat, ohi
Ruiter gagna enfin le vent aux ennemis, et parcequ'il n'etoit plus si frais, il en
profita si bien, qu'il auroit entibrement defait les Anglois, si une brume ne les
eit tire's des mains du victorieux, aprbs la perte de leur amiral blanc, et de
quinze autres de leurs gros vaisseaux; les Hollandois n'en perdirent que
quatre."



( 32 )
Until the telegraphic system of integral and alphabetical signals
was introduced, by which numeral combinations to any eitent might
be formed, or words spelled, to convey orders and direct operations
out of the ordinary course, codes of signals consisted of a multiplicity of flags, numbered from one upwards; and beyond this simple
and primitive expression, no method had been adopted of increasing
the number of signals by different combinations of the flags with each
other. This was only effected by displaying them, severally, at different parts of the masts and rigging (sometimes with pendants),
namely, at the fore, main, or mizen topmast heads; at the fore, or
main top-gallant-mast heads; the mizen peak; the ensign staff; and
even at the different shrouds, yard-arms, and stays.
In the grand fleet, through the whole of the American war, the
code of signals (arranged, there can be no doubt, upon the system of
former wars, for there had been very little improvement for some
years,) consisted of no less than fifty-four different signal-flags, each
representing a number; to which were added signals by drum, bell, a
gun, a musket, making in all fifty-eight numbers. The flags had no
specific signification attached to them; it was only the particular part
of the masts or rigging, at which they might be displayed, that gave
them value as signals; and there was no possibility of conveying
orders for executing any manoeuvre, that had not been previously
posted to the code, with an appropriate signal affixed. It was, therefore, indispensable that every evolution that had ever been practised,
tactically treated, or which might be deemed fit for adoption under
all conceivable circumstances, and in every combination-viz. fleets
drawing towards each other-laying athwart each other-edging down,
bearing down, or bearing up, from the windward; -laying up or
hauling up, from, or passing to, leeward;-attacking the van, the
centre, or the rear-" charging through the line"-doubling upon the
van or rear, to bring the whole force of one fleet against a part of the
other-and all manoeuvres which might defeat such attempts-it was
absolutely necessary that signals for all such evolutions should be
posted to the code. There was not, either in Rodney's time, or in
Sir Charles Hardy's time, or in Keppel's time, or at any time,*
a want of signals for directing the standing through an enemy's line, in
any way that it could be fallen in with, or in which such a " charging
through a line," had been practised, or is practicable. Tried by the
test of signals, then, the operations of breaking the line, doubling,
cutting off some of the enemy's ships, &c. of which we read in
naval history, were either mere desultory, individual disorders of
ships, acting without instructions, concert, or professional combination; or that they were regularly organized manoeuvres, laid down
upon tactical principles and indicated by signals. That they were
not disorderly movements, we have abundant proof, in the practical issues, and official accounts of those combats; and, if even the
first examples of such operations had been fortuitous, disorderly
fights, which no person who studies the deeds of those days will
* Signal Book.



( 33 )
contend, we have abundant proof that they were reduced to system,
and adopted, tactically, long before Mr. Clerk's time.
The evidence of signals has disposed of many a life, and pronounced
upon many a reputation.  What I have said upon this one point,
page 28, effectually disposes of Mr. Clerk's claim to the merit of having
made any discovery to the profession; and likewise shows another
grievous error into which Professor Playfair fell, when, with the other
assertions which are launched at random in his paper on Naval Tactics,
he wrote, page 466, vol. iii.-" Lord Howe was the first who introduced
into the signal book, signals directed to the objects of cutting off the
rear, bringing the whole force to bear upon one point, breaking the
line, &c." If this were so, all the splendid actions of earlier times were
mere fortuitous, disorderly combats; the nautical fame and celebrity of
this country were degraded; and all her earlier heroes reproached and
disgraced. What!-no conventional means devised, of attacking an
enemy but by straightforward force-ship to ship-pble-mele-without
the aid of science, or the facility of system, by which to attack to any
advantage, till Mr. Clerk's brochure was printed!-for that is the
amount of the Professor's record. How were such manoeuvres as had,
incontestibly, been previously imagined and practised, to be executed,
thereafter, but by arranging proper signals to indicate, explain, and
direct them? Why the identical signal book now before me, from which
I have made the extracts given at pages 28, 29, was, actually, the
code of signals of the grand fleet from 1778 downwards, and was in
use, as I can prove by the evidence of the signals cited by Keppel on
his trial, from the beginning of that war at least, and I have no doubt
from a much earlier period:-the French signal books, too, completely refute the Professor's rash assertion. Not a word more need
be said upon the subject. But writing to vindicate my Father, and
the profession to which he belonged, from the aspersions which the
pretensions and assertions I am now meeting would cast upon them,
I shall establish, beyond all possibility of doubt, that Mr. Clerk had no
title whatever to be considered the inventor of the manoeuvre of the
battle,-that no previous suggestion was made by him of such an
operation,-and that the day would have been won as it was, if he had
never been born. Whether my Father may, or may not, have been
quickened in his perception, by such elementary observations as those
of Paul Hoste, and other acknowledged authorities who had treated
of naval tactics, is impossible for me to say. I not only admit, but
plead for him, that he had not failed to accomplish himself for his
tactical duties, by studying every professional treatise that had been
published on the subject, to store his mind with resources suited
to all circumstances, applicable to all contingencies, and " ready"
with the quickness of volition. But the circumstances under which
he acted, fig. 2, Plate 10, and the advice he gave, are not in point with
any previous case; and, unless all that I have shown be forgeries, the
victory cannot be attributable to any theorist, or to aught but the
occasion which suggested, practically, the idea of standing through the
enemy's line; and my Father is no more to be shorn of his beams, by
saying that he committed plagiarism on any elementary writer, than
F



( 34 )
that Wellington at Salamanca and Vittoria committed a plagiarism on
Guibert, or that Nelson at Trafalgar is to be less honoured than
Rodney. Does the Reviewer really think that Sir Charles Douglas,
certainly one of the most scientific and able tacticians of the time,
had not profited, from experience as well as constant discussion, by
the strictures that appeared on Keppel's action?  Why, on such an
unjust hypothesis, should it be presumed that Mr. Clerk, in his
"learned retreat," and in navigating his father's fishpond, should have
hit upon ideas which had not occurred to men such as these, acting
for years a most distinguished part in the grand fleet, and who were
in the very action from which Mr. Clerk is said to have deduced his
plan. Will any reader ascribe to Mr. Clerk credit, and to Sir Charles
Douglas the reverse, by such an unfair inference? Does the Reviewer
really think that Sir Charles Douglas was not thoroughly acquainted
with the battle of the 16th of August, 1652? " Sir George, with nine of
his headmost ships, charged through the Dutch fleet, and got the weather
gage!"*   Why this was, positively, the cross attack from the leeward-and this one sentence would cast Mr. Clerk, and throw his
pretensions into ridicule, in any Court of Justice in Europe, as to his
being the inventor of the manoeuvre of breaking the line. If Mr.
Clerk had taken out a patent for his supposed invention, this one fact
would vitiate the specification; and so truly preposterous are the
Reviewer's pleadings, that, whilst he asserts his client's claim to the
principle of the invention, he actually ridicules the only condition, viz.
a gap, in which it is justifiable to attempt, or practicable to execute it.
That Mr. Clerk did not mean to assert that he had invented any thing
new, I have shown by an admission of his own; and the subjoined
notet is very conclusive upon this point; and the unpretending
modesty of it does him credit. But when we are told by the Reviewer, that his client was the inventor, notwithstanding, of the
manoeuvre of breaking the line, for that Mr. Clerk (page 7, line 9,)
had never seen or heard of Paul Hoste's work, I must say, it is too
much to infer, that because he was ignorant, others were so too, of a
Treatise published by a Professor of Naval Tactics, translated into
English in Mr. Clerk's day,: and which, as I have observed in my
first Statement, " is justly considered to be the root from which all
tactical works have sprung." It was at any rate much more incumbent on the Reviewer, in endeavouring to substantiate the claim to
practical originality set up for his client, to prove that the British
Admiral and his Captain of the Fleet had no knowledge of this
Treatise, than to plead ignorance upon the part of the person who is
seriously asserted, in the beginning of the article, to have been "more
learned than they."  So far as Mr. Clerk is considered an amateur,
who, as he informs us, (page xxxi. preface to the second edition,
* Ledyard's Naval History, book iii. p. 542.
t " An offer of anything new, it is to be hoped, may be examined with that attention which the importance of the subject demands. By the phrase new, is not here
meant, that what follows was never either spoke of or thought of before; but it is surely so
far new as never to have been put in demonstration by writing."-Clerk's Tactics, page
141, ed. 1827.
t By Lieut. Christopher O'Brieni R. N. in 1762.



( 35)
1804,) "had no other practical knowledge, or opportunity of acquiring
experience, (never having been at sea in his life,) than in seeing
vessels take their departure from a mole or pier-head," and " in
sailing on a piece of water in his Father's pleasure grounds," he
certainly deserves infinite credit for what he has produced; * and
every person must be disposed to deal indulgently with his work, and
none otherwise than respectfully with his memory. But when he is
asserted to have "made magnificent discoveries" in naval warfare,
which were repeatedly practised before he was born;-when he is
declared to have settled, practically, the conditions of what he manifestly never understood;   and that his advocate is obliged to plead
pretensions to originality, by asserting his client's ignorance of an
elementary treatise, which, as a professor, it is discreditable to him
not to have known-though as an amateur, this might not have been
expected-he is really " placed, by his friends, in a very awkward
predicament;" and I must be permitted thus to underscore the above expressions which the Reviewer has thought proper to use, but which can
only be applied to the extraordinary case he has made for his client.
Having shown that Mr. Clerk made no material discovery to the
profession at any time, whatever he may have done in amusing himself
in his own closet, it is scarcely worth while to say anything as to
the other medium through which Sir George Rodney is asserted to
have become acquainted with Mr. Clerk's speculations; but to leave
no part of this case unanswered, I shall go into this point likewise.
Mr. Clerk does not say, or even surmise, that Mr. Atkinson was
acquainted with my Father, or communicated " the discovery" to him;
but, as the Reviewer attempts to " fasten down" on Sir Charles
Douglas, in common with Lord Rodney, a knowledge of the alleged
discovery, asserted to have been communicated by Atkinson, so it is
proper that I should meet this assumption.
The reader is requested to refer to pages 8 and 9 of these observations, for what Mr. Clerk himself says upon this point. The Reviewer
affirms that the " fact of this communication has never been disputed."
It has never been admitted.+ Disputed by Lord Rodney himself it could
not be; for the assertion, that this communication was made to him personally, through Mr. Atkinson, was not brought forward till 1804, when
they were both in their graves.~ Mr. Clerk, though repeatedly called
upon to do so, never proved, or even positively asserted, in his oft* Sir Gilbert Blane, in his very interesting observations (see United Service Journal,
No. XX. page 204,) says, "it cannot be denied, and he has heard many eminent
officers say, that Mr. Clerk's book was a wonderful work for a landsman; and that it
would, perhaps, have been better judged in his friends, to have been satisfied with this,
than to have melted their wings by attempting too high a flight."
t See pages 60, et seq. of this Memoir.
t Vol. ii. Life of Rodney, p. 295.
" "With respect to the grand manoeuvre of breaking the enemy's line, as practised
by Sir George on this occasion, little was intended to be said in this work, as the long
canvassed question, whether Sir George Rodney had, prior to his departure from England
in the winter of 1781-2, ever seen Mr. Clerk's, of Eldin, Essay on Naval Tactics, or
been made acquainted with its remarks relative to breaking the line, has been completely
negatived and for ever set at rest."-Rodney's Life.
F2



( 36 )
revised publications on this subject, that the communication was made.
He only infers that it was, "as Mr. Atkinson could have had no
difficulty in doing so; "* but no question appears to have been put to
Mr. Atkinson, whether he had taken any, and what steps, to perform
his engagement. I have clearly proved that it could not have taken
place in the manner, and at the time stated by Mr. Clerk in the passage to which I have referred the reader; for Sir George Rodney was
appointed to the command of the fleet on the Leeward Islands and
Barbadoes station on the 1st of October, 1779, and proceeded with
all dispatch, to Portsmouth, to expedite the equipment of the fleet.
There he remained till he sailed from England, on the 25th December,
1779.t Mr. Clerk says, that it was " in January, 1780, when he
was in London," that he intrusted his theories "to Mr. Atkinson,
the particular friend of Sir George Rodney, who was then in London,"
and was " immediately to set out to take the command of the Fleet
in the West Indies."  But Sir George Rodney left London on the 1st
of October, 1779; and had left England before January, 1780! Mr.
Atkinson, therefore, did not, and could not, communicate personally
with Sir George Rodney in London. " This," the Edinburgh Reviewer says, page 9, " is little better than cavilling;" but he is forced
to admit, that it is fact.
As the Reviewer has requested the reader's attention to the passage
in the Memoirs of the late ingenious Mr. Cumberland, which I thought
I had already disposed of, (see my last Statement,) I must make a
few more observations upon it, though, I must confess, I do not see
why the Reviewer should cite it; because if what Mr. Cumberland
advanced were correct, in fact, it effectually disposes of Mr. Clerk's
claim. But, however---Mr. Cumberland was entirely mistaken as to
the objecting party; he confounded the Admiral, with the Captain of
the Fleet. I have proved that my Father suggested, urged, and ultimately induced Sir George Rodney to give up his objections to, and
adopt, the manoeuvre. This fact of execution I have, by the Reviewer's own admission, "established beyond all possibility of doubt;"
and have, therefore, no less conclusively proved Mr. Cumberland's
gossip to be erroneous. The fact being, then, that my Father was, even
as the Reviewer argues, " the immediate adviser of the manoeuvre,"
and that, if it had not been for his promptitude and energy, the line
would not have been broken, what need have I to notice a literary
error which is at variance with that fact? I take the fact as it has
been proved and acknowledged, and leave the Reviewer to make what
he can out of the contradictory position of citing at page 35, that
gossip which, by transposition, alleges that Sir George Rodney proposed, and my Father objected to the manoeuvre, but which at page
31, the Reviewer admits was " advised, and energetically urged by
the Captain of the Fleet!"  The accuracy of Mr. Cumberland's statement was, and has always been, called in question; and I have
proved that it was not consistent with the fact, and, therefore, that he
* Vide Author's Preface, 2nd edition, 1804, p. xxxvii.
t Rodney's Life, vol. i. p. 193.



( 87 )
must have been mistaken. My Father, on his return home, always
made it a rule, either to decline speaking at all of the particulars of
the battle, or to reply evasively, whenever this delicate matter was
broached in society; and there are many persons now living, who remember, well, the delicacy with which he stopped or waived the subject, when pressed or complimented upon it. He always attested the
courage, and extolled the noble and magnanimous conduct of his Admiral; and in writing, in society, and unreservedly to his friends, declared that neither through Sir G. Rodney, nor through him, had Mr.
Clerk any title to share in the merit of the manoeuvre, and that it entirely took place from ideas that arose with the occasion; and when
questioned or congratulated as to the share he had in the manoeuvre,
his answer invariably was, as Sir Gilbert Blane reports, such as to
quash the subject, or to say, " We had a great deal to do on that occasion, and we did a good deal.-I trust my Admiral was satisfied
with my services, and that the country is satisfied with his." The
reader will find many such versions of my Father's brief, dry, and
evasive replies, in almost all the chronicles of the time.
I shall now proceed to reply to the attempts that have been made
to "fasten down" on my Father, directly, a knowledge of Mr. Clerk's
magnificent " discovery."
Mr. Clerk died in 1812, having, during the last thirty years of his
life, made use of all the proof in his power, " to connect his speculations, historically, with the battle of the 12th of April, 1782." No
one, therefore, can believe, that in thus deliberately devoting himself
to what had been the sole object of his ambition, in a deliberate and
oft revised manner, Mr. Clerk would have failed to name my Father,
in publications at the time, if he, Mr. Clerk, had really communicated
to my Father any explanations, plans or demonstrations, of such a
manoeuvre as that which was put in practice on the occasion with
which he was so desirous of " connecting his speculations." Mr.
Clerk named, in 1804, Mr. Atkinson, Lord Rodney's CONTRACTOR, as
the assumed medium of communication in 1780.-Would he have
hesitated, or abstained from publicly naming Sir Charles Douglas, if
there had been the slightest grounds for asserting such a channel of
communication with Sir George Rodney in 1780, or if, as the Professor
asserts, it took place in 1782, through the Captain of the Fleet?
But though Mr. Clerk did not name my Father, in the "observations"
page 119, introduced into the first edition of the Naval Tactics, published in 1790, yet the allusion made therein " to an officer of most
distinguished merit," was calculated to apply itself, though never under
Mr. Clerk's hand, or distinct public declaration, more particularly, to
the person who was known to have had a considerable share in the
successes of that day; and, accordingly, this allusion occasioned,
after my Father's death, the revival of certain verbal rumours which
he had put down in 1783, and to the day of his death contradicted.*
* Page xviii. my First Statement, and pages 51 and 52 of this.



( 38 )
In the year 1790 I was too young to concern myself, much, with
this affair; and from that period, for many years, I was almost entirely absent from Scotland. After having passed some years on
foreign service, I returned to Edinburgh in 1798; and having then,
for the first time, seen Mr. Clerk's book, and hearing a good deal of
what had been surmised and rumoured on this subject, 1 took every
opportunity of contradicting, publicly, some reports that were again
afloat as to my Father having had previous knowledge of Mr. Clerk's
alleged invention or system, or that he had any recollection of ever
having met or conversed with that gentleman upon such a subject;
and there are persons still living, who well remember, these my
declarations at the time. I stated this to Mr. William Clerk himself,
in the spring of 1799, expressly, that he might mention it to his
Father; and the letter, No. II. in the subjoined correspondence,*
* (Copy.)                       No. 1.
Edinburgh, 4th November, 1829.
MY DEAR SIR HOWARD,
I HAVE within these few days received the favour of your communication, which my absence from Edinburgh has prevented me from acknowledging
sooner.
I feel highly gratified with the sentiments of respect towards myself and family you
have done us the honour to express, and beg to assure you they are reciprocal to you
and yours.
However new and unexpected, I cannot be surprised, that, since you are convinced
it is your Father's due, you now bring forward your Father's claim to the merit of originating the celebrated and important manoeuvre which produced the victory of the
12th April, 1782.
On the other hand, you cannot wonder, if, after believing for near half a century,
upon what I hold the most irresistible evidence, that the manoeuvre alluded to, (unquestionably conceived by my Father years previous to the battle,) was adopted in consequence of his suggestion on that occasion, my conduct should be regulated by the same
feelings of filial duty by which you yourself are actuated, and which you express so
well.
I remain, my dear Sir Howard,
(Signed)        WILLIAM CLERK.
Major General Sir Howard Douglas, Bt.
(Copy.)                         No. II.
17, Montague Street, Nov. 14th, 1829.
MY DEAR SIR,
I HAVE the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th
instant.
It appears to be extremely desirable, that, if your family be in possession of any
matter or information, not already before the public, bearing upon the subject upon
which I have lately written, no time should be lost in bringing it forward. It is therefore
with much satisfaction that I gather from you that it is your intention to reply to my
" Statement."  You are, no doubt, aware that my detention from my government, on
a special duty, is of a temporary nature; I trust, therefore, that I shall be afforded an
early and distinct opportunity of bringing forward what further it may be necessary to
show. I perceive, with much pleasure, from the tenor of your note, that this will be
done in a manner to harmonize with those good feelings by which we are actuated, and
to keep entire those sentiments which we entertain for each other.
With regard to the belief you declare yourself to have been under, it is incumbent
upon me to state, that my family never admitted or acquiesced in the circumstances
upon which that belief was assumed; but, on the contrary denied them publicly from
the first. I myself never failed to do so whenever an opportunity offered; and I well



( 39    )

together with the other proofs of the denial made by, and on behalf
of my Father, will show, that, whatever may have been rumoured,
assumed, or surmised, as to the claim having been admitted by Sir
George Rodney, no such admission was ever made by Sir Charles
Douglas, or any of his friends. It was therefore incumbent upon Mr.
Clerk to come forward at the time, in a straight-forward, manly
manner, to put his claim in a tangible shape, nominally, if he meant to
prefer it; and if not, that no mention of, or any allusion to my Father,
should be made in any future publication by Mr. Clerk on the
subject of Naval Tactics. I will not believe, what the Reviewer's
remember to have stated to you, when walking with you in Prince's Street, thirty years
ago, adverting to certain rumours relating to the manoeuvre of breaking the line, as
practised on the 12th of April, that the family were in possession of letters and facts
showing that the suggestion was made by my Father in the heat of action; and denying that he had any previous knowledge of your Father's system.
My Father's letter, from which the extracts which I have printed are taken, was
written expressly to authorize the contradiction of the rumour to which it alludes; and
it will be in the recollection of the society of Edinburgh, that this was made abundant
use of. Nor have public writers acquiesced in the claims made on the part of your
Father, witness Admiral Ekin's Naval Battles.
I think it material to premise this to you, lest I should be held to admit that the
belief you have entertained on the subject has not hitherto been controverted or
disputed.
(Signed)         HOWARD DOUGLAS.
William Clerk, Esq. Edinburgh.
(Copy.)                         No. III.
Edinburgh, 25th Nov. 1829.
MY DEAR SIR,
I HAVE received the pleasure of your letter of the 14th instant.
I beg to assure you that it is equally my wish and my intention to preserve the tone
and sentiments we have hitherto mutually expressed, in whatever is brought forward on
my part in regard to the subject alluded to in your letter; and that I have no desire
but that the question shall meet with a fair and temperate discussion.
I sincerely hope that the matter may be laid before the public sufficiently early to
suit your fullest convenience; but you must be aware, that, from the very long time I
have been led to consider the question as entirely at rest, it will require some little time
to recall the subject to mind, to arrange the evidence and put it in proper shape. At
present I am very much occupied with my official business, but I flatter myself by the
month of January ensuing, the public will be put in possession of the evidence on our
part.
I have no recollection of the conversation you mention, in which you say you adverted (about thirty years ago) to documents in the possession of your family, establishing
your Father's claim to the merit of having suggested the breaking the line. It must I
presume have taken place after some of those agreeable convivial parties, of which I
partook along with you occasionally at Lord Reston's, which were not favourable either
to receiving or retaining impressions; in any other circumstances I am pretty certain I
should have remembered so interesting a communication. I merely retain an indistinct
idea that your family were dissatisfied with the precise degree of merit that had been
ascribed to your Father, and whether this was gathered from vague reports, or from
something in your manner when the subject of the 12th of April was alluded to, I am
quite uncertain. But as nothing was brought forward on your part in any tangible
shape, (so far as ever I heard,) I had long ago believed the matter, whatever it might
be, at an end, therefore, in my last letter described your present claim as new and unexpected, as to me it certainly was. But as this is a subject upon which we cannot
expect to convince each other, it is unnecessary to continue.
I remain, my dear Sir,
(Signed)    WM. CLERK.
Major General Sir Howard Douglas.



( 40 )
pleadings amount to, that having no grounds upon which to assert
this, openly and publicly, when all parties were alive-and in point of
fact, never doing so under his own hand, or in any of his works,
Mr. Clerk should, in after life, be whispering away the merit of
others-insinuating " by word of mouth" what he could not establish.
I will not-cannot believe this. If Mr. Clerk could have asserted
that he had had many, or any conferences, with Sir Charles Douglas,
the one must have declared this, and the other could not have denied
it. The next edition of the Naval Tactics that appeared after this,
was in 1804; and in it a preface "written by the author," naming
others, but not my Father. So far, indeed, from attempting to prove
the particular appointment "with an officer of most distinguished
merit," to have been with my Father, that particular assertion was not
even repeated; it was generalized, and not particularized. A vague
declaration, only, appeared that he, Mr. Clerk, " presented or handed
copies to some naval officers of distinguished merit,-and that he sent
copies to his Majesty's ministers in the spring of 1782;"* but my
Father was not named, nor any particular allusion made to him: it was
unnecessary, therefore, for our family to do more than we had done.
Mr. Clerk, having over and over again, arranged and revised his
works, without ever naming my Father, closed his own deliberate
evidence on his own case, as I have shown at pages 8, 9, 14, 15, 20,
and descended to his grave; and now that is asserted for him, upon
mere hearsay and inference, which he could not, and therefore did not,
publicly advance. The Reviewer, indeed, is forced to admit, page 10,
that " Mr. Clerk did not name my Father in any thing that he wrote
on naval tactics," yet the article in another part asserts, on " word of
mouth" authority, " that Sir C. Douglas was among the individuals
with whom Mr. Clerk conferred by appointment in 1782," when, in
point of fact, Sir Charles was on the ocean!"
This assertion is thus made by the Reviewer, on the authority of
Professor Playfair's Memoir of Mr. Clerk's Life, published in 1821.
" Sir C. Douglas, before leaving Britain, had many conferences with Mr.
Clerk, on the subject of naval tactics, and before he sailed was in complete
possession of that system. Some of the conferences with Sir C. Douglas were
by the appointment of the late Dr. Blair, Prebendary of Westminster; and
at one of these interviews were present Mr. Witham and Mr. James Adam,
with their nephew, the present Lord Chief Commissioner for Scotland. Sir
Charles had commanded the Stirling Castle in Keppels engagement; and
Mr. Clerk now communicated to him the whole of his strictures on that action,
with the plans and demonstrations, on which the manner of the attack from
the leeward were fully developed."
But if the reader will refer to the original paper, printed in the
Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, or to Professor Playfair's works, (Vol. III. p. 458,) he will find, that the assertion advanced,
as above, by the Reviewer in general terms, specifies expressly the
particular time, place, and circumstances, of the alleged conferences, as
well as the matter said to have been then and there communicated.

* P. xliii. Author's Preface, Naval Tactics.



( 41 )
By these specifications the alleged conferences are stated, by this evidence, to have taken place in the spring of 1782, " several months of
which my Father is asserted to have remained in London after the
Admiral's departure; and, before leaving Britain to serve as his Captain of the Fleet, to have been then and there put in possession, by
Mr. Clerk, of his system. But the Reviewer has very improperly
omitted to recite those important adjuncts which prove the utter impossibility of the '" conferences" which the Professor " records," and
which, on his authority only, the Reviewer asserts. The Professor
says, page 458, in one and the same paragraph,
" In the following year, he (Mr. Clerk) visited London himself, and had
many conferences with men connected with the navy, among whom he has
mentioned Mr. Atkinson, the particular friend of Sir George Rodney, the
Admiral who was now preparing to take the command of the fleet in the West
Indies. A more direct channel of communication was the late Sir Charles
Douglas, who went out several months after the Admiral, in order to serve as his
Captain, and did actually serve in that capacity in the memorable action of the
12th of April, 1782. Sir Charles, before leaving Britain, had many conferences with Mr. Clerk, on the subject of Naval Tactics, and before he sailed
was in complete possession of that system. Some of the conferences with Sir
C. Douglas were by the appointment of the late Dr. Blair, Prebendary of
Westminster; and at one of these interviews were present Mr. Witham, and
Mr. James Adam, with their nephew the present Lord Chief Commissioner
for Scotland. Sir Charles had commanded the Stirling Castle in Keppel's engagement; and Mr. Clerk now communicated to him the whole of his strictures on that action, with the plans and demonstrations, on which the manner
of the attack from the leewardwere fully developed."Now my father did not go out several months after the Admiral.
They went out in the same ship! On the 24th November, my Father
was appointed Captain of the Fleet to Sir G. Rodney. They left
London on the 2d of December, 1781, and sailed from Portsmouth
together in the Arrogant on the 2d of January, 1782. On the 6th
of January, Sir George shifted his flag to the Formidable, which
had followed from Torbay, and on the 15th, these two officers sailed
in that ship for the West Indies! Yet the Reviewer, in the face
of this, asserts, " that Mr. Playfair's record, the articulate testimony of
Mr. Clerk himself, and Mr. Adams's direct testimony, corroborate each
other," as to Sir Charles Douglas having " remained several months
in London after Sir George Rodney's departure for the West Indies,"
and, in that time, to have had many conferences with Mr. Clerk, by
appointment; so that " before Sir Charles sailed to follow his Admiral,
in order to act as his Captain of the Fleet, he was thus put in complete
possession of Mr. Clerk's system"! I regret extremely, that the name
of the eminent and distinguished person, the amiable and excellent
character, the Lord Chief Commissioner, should thus have been used,
incorrectly and unjustly, and left in print, for several years, as vouching for the truth and accuracy of an assertion which neither in time,
place, circumstances, nor bearing upon the case at issue, could possibly be true, and which that eminent person now declares he does
not recollect! I entreat that excellent person to believe that I charge



( 42 )
none of these grievous errors to him-that I mean nothing, feel nothing, but respect for him, in the astonishment with which I have
viewed this extraordinary assertion. This is another result of what is
very generally condemned as an injudicious and inconsiderate claim,
urged by some of Mr. Clerk's friends, in his behalf. I appeal to the
distinguished and learned judge, whose name has been improperly
connected with the Professor's record of an impossible occurrence,
which has laid me under the necessity of coming forward in my
Father's behalf, (for had it not been for the assertion, that Sir Charles
Douglas had conferences with Mr. Clerk, in London, in the spring of
1782, the public might never have been troubled with this appeal,)
whether evidence, proved to be impossible in the adjuncts of time,
place and circumstances, specified therein, can be retained?-I ask the
Advocate, who thus continues to asperse my Father's character and
injure his fame, by adopting, and persisting in, allegations proved to be
utterly groundless and impossible-I demand of him whether this be
the practice of the faculty over which he presided? Mr. Playfair was,
I repeat, mistaken, grievously mistaken, or misled. He was greatly
in error; he was an honourable and excellent man, but he was on this
occasion, somehow or other, led to assert impossibilities. What I have
proved, is fatal to his evidence, destructive of the validity of his record;
and I solemnly protest against, and throw it aside.
Now with respect to what is advanced as the testimony of Lord
Cranstoun.-The Reviewer states, at page 13, that his Lordship went
out in the Formidable, as a volunteer, with Lord Rodney, and was
very much in his confidence during the voyage; that (page 22) " Lord
Cranstoun always asserted that the manoeuvre had been repeatedly the
subject of conversation and discussion at the Admiral's table, on board
the Formidable, during the voyage, and particularly in the earlier part
of the voyage," and that " this distinct testimony of Lord Cranstoun
proves, (page 32,) not only that Mr. Clerk was the acknowledged instructor, both of Sir Charles and the Admiral, but shows the utter
absurdity of the notion or assertion, that the manoeuvre was not contemplated till it was urged on the Admiral by Sir Charles Douglas."
Upon this "distinct testimony," as the Reviewer calls it, of Lord
Cranstoun, the Reviewer asserts, that "the Admiral and his Captain
had been heard to discuss that very manoeuvre repeatedly during the
voyage, and even in the earlier part of the voyage.*
Having, in several parts of the article, made these assertions, the
Reviewer asks, "What is to be said of this?" and adds, " A complete and satisfactory explanation, we fear, is impossible." It is very
painful to be obliged to reply to this. With every respect for Lord
Cranstoun, I have only to say that the Reviewer will find he has exhibited his Lordship as the very reverse of an authoritative witness;
and the solution will very much surprise, and be far from satisfactory
to the Reviewer. Lord Cranstoun was not on board the Formidable
in the early part of the voyage, nor in any part of the voyage; nor did

* Page 28, Edin. Rev.



( 43 )
he dine in the Admiral's ship until the very day on which the operations
commenced which led to the battle.*    Lord Cranstoun was in the
West Indies a considerable time before the Formidable arrived-he
was posted into the St. Eustatius on the 31st of January, 1782, and
remained in her till the 8th of April, when he was discharged from
that ship, and on the afternoon of that day, or on the morning of the
9th,t came on board the Formidable as Supernumerary Captain, and
remained in her till the 13th of April, when he superseded Captain
Symmons, the former Captain of that ship.
Mr. H. Cranstoun writes,+ that he has a perfect recollection of Lord
Cranstoun having told him that the manoeuvre of breaking through
an enemy's line had been repeatedly discussed at the Admiral's table
on board the Formidable during the voyage, and consequently that he
(Mr. H. Cranstoun) had a decided conviction that Mr. Clerk was the
original proposer of this celebrated manoeuvre, and that Sir Charles
Douglas could claim only the merit of recommending it to Lord Rodney. Mr. Cranstoun is an honourable and respectable person, and
incapable of wilful misrepresentation.  Unacquainted with the subject
professionally-hearing only one side of the question, and having, no
matter how, such persuasions, (whether upon a misunderstanding on his
part, or a mistake on that of Lord Cranstoun, is not for me to say,) it is
not surprising that he, as a friend of Mr. Clerk, should have entertained
such a conviction; but Lord Cranstoun did not join the Formidable
until the fleet was in full operation in attempting to bring the enemy to
action, or actually in battle. Sir Gilbert Blane, who dined at the Admiral's table every day throughout the voyage, declares, that he never
heard of such a person as Mr. Clerk till many years after the war, for
that not one word about the manoeuvre ever passed at the Admiral's
table;~ and this is confirmed by Mr. Knight my Father's Secretary,
Sir Joseph Yorke, and a host of other officers, who were on
board the Formidable throughout the voyage, and dined, some daily,
others in turn, at the Admiral's table, all of whom declare they
never heard of Mr. Clerk till long after the battle, and state their conviction, that neither of these eminent officers were in possession of,
or were actuated by Mr. Clerk's ideas or plans; and this is proved,
* On the 8th the signal to prepare for battle was made, on being advised by signal
from the Alert that the enemy were in the offing. On the 9th the fleet was in action,
or clear for action, the whole day. On the 10th in chace, and clear for action the
whole of the day. On the 11th working to windward in chace-the enemy three leagues
distant only-the fleet clear and ready for action. The reader may judge how far there
were sittings at table, and he will observe that in all these operations the British fleet
was endeavouring to get to windward.
t Lord Cranstoun's commission is dated the 10th of April.  t In 1830.
~ Sir Gilbert Blane remarks, (see United Service Journal, No. XX. page 292,)
" As to the assertion that Clerk's manoeuvre had been the frequent subject of conversation at the Admiral's table," that "if his (Sir Gilbert's) denial of this depended on
his memory through a space of time extending from that time to the present, that is,
forty eight years, he would have reason to distrust it: but that he perfectly recollects
having the same opinion from the first hour he heard Mr. Clerk's name mentioned,
namely, at Lord Spencer's seat, in 1802; for that not one word about it (the manoeuvre)
ever passed at the Admiral's toble."
02



( 44    )
not only with respect to the Formidable; but by Lord Saumarez and
a mass of evidence which has come to me since I last wrote, it is
shown to have been the case throughout the fleet. Mr. Cranstoun's
letter, then, amounts to nothing more than this-that he remembers to
have heard Lord Cranstoun say fifty years ago, that he, Lord Cranstoun,
had heard that the manoeuvre of breaking the line was suggested to
Sir Charles Douglas by Mr. Clerk in a conversation with that gentleman
a considerable time before, and likewise communicated to Sir George
Rodney at a dinner party in London in the beginning of 1782. Why
this is hearsay on hearsay, and error upon error! Both Sir Charles
Douglas and Sir George Rodney left London on the 2d of December,
1781, and sailed from Portsmouth on the 2d of January, 1782. Nor did
Mr. Clerk ever pretend to have met Sir George Rodney at dinner, or to
have communicated in any way with him, but through Mr. Atkinson.
Where, besides, did Lord Cranstoun hear all this? The Reviewer
(page 14, 28) and Mr. Cranstoun (page 14) say, "on board the Formidable, where it was repeatedly spoken of and discussed during the
voyage, and in the early part of the voyage."  I beg to quote the logbook of the Saint Eustatius, to show that Lord Cranstoun was not in
the Formidable in any part of the voyage; and I refer to the living
testimony of many who were on board the Formidable, to prove that
neither Mr. Clerk's name nor his system were ever mentioned during
the voyage. Lord Cranstoun must, therefore, either have been mistaken or misunderstood. As to what is stated by Mr. Fordyce in his
letter of the 11th of June, 1809, (page 16 and 17 Edin. Rev.) that
relates to the "Naval Tactics"-the plans and principles recommended
in the Naval Tactics, "a work to which Lord Rodney gave praise."
In short, to the book, the first part of which is so erroneously supposed
to have contained "full explanations and demonstrations of the manoeuvre" which Rodney practised, but which contained no such
matter. Poor Lord Rodney! "it is," as his son-in-law writes, " strange
to observe what advantage was taken of the praise which the liberalminded, generous old man bestowed in convivial moments, towards the
close of life, upon Mr. Clerk's work, and the means that were used to
pervert these good intentions." But the inferences drawn from this, and
other social conversations, which have been raked up by the Edinburgh
Reviewer, from the conversations in Berkeley Square to the exclamations at Spa, attach only to Lord Rodney's character;-they have
nothing to do with my Father's case. Those who assert that they
heard Lord Rodney distinctly state that he owed his success in the
West Indies to the manoeuvre of breaking the line which he took
from Mr. Clerk's book, will have found proof, in my pages, that no
such manoeuvre, positively, was in the tract of 1782; and all that
is stated by the Reviewer as to Lord Rodney's acknowledgments
that he acted premeditatedly and systematically, upon Mr. Clerk's
suggestion, can only throw his Lordship's character, and conduct in
the battle, into shade; for unless the signal book, the journals, and all
the logs of all the ships in the fleet are forgeries, Lord Rodney neither
premeditated nor took from any preconceived plan, the mode of attack



( 45 )
that was adopted.-Unless a mass of evidence, collected from the
highest and most honourable sources, be, in this particular, only,
positive falsehood, the manoeuvre was a sudden impulse adopted in the
heat of action on the suggestion of my Father; and unless all that
I have brought forward and cited, establishing for ever the facts of the
case, can be overturned, that which was done would have been effected,
if Mr. Clerk, of Eldin, had never existed.
To the preceding evidences which I have adduced as to Mr. Clerk's
tract not having been known in the fleet, I add the testimony of
Captain M'Kinlay, who was then one of the Lieutenants of the Barfleur, the flag-ship of Sir Samuel Hood. This letter is a remarkable
confirmation, besides, of an observation made by Sir Joseph Yorke at
the time, upon which the Quarterly Review made some severe remarks. Captain M'Kinlay writes under date the 28th of April, 1831,
" I was quartered on the lower gun deck of the Barfleur, and had
not the opportunity of observing the manoeuvre of the van and centre
of the fleet; but when it was known to us that the Formidable had
broken the line of the enemy, the importance of this, before unknown
manoeuvre, performed by the commander-in-chief's own ship, created
an animation that I never can forget, more especially as it led to the
brilliant achievement of the victory.
" Had Mr. Clerk's work been known in the fleet at that time, it
would not have been possible to have escaped observation; for I full
well remember, some time after in the peace, perusing that work, and
observing, with many other officers, how fortunate that the manoeuvre
had been effected before Mr. Clerk's work was known."
But Mr. Adam says, " that my Father met Mr. Clerk at his, Mr.
Adam's house, in the end of 1779, or beginning of 1780." This is
enough; I have too much respect for Mr. Adam, and too much reliance on his veracity, to dispute this for a moment.
The Reviewer's attempts, then, to "fasten down on my Father"
the knowledge of the manoeuvre as the invention of Mr. Clerk, are,
after all, reduced to this, that he and Sir Charles Douglas met at dinner,
at the Lord Chief Commissioner's, in the end of 1779 or the beginning
of 1780, where it was surmised in the Quarterly Review, (Number
LXXXIII. page 54,) " that Mr. Clerk might have seen Sir Charles
Douglas," who, as the Reviewer of the Quarterly believed, " was
then unemployed, and residing in London!"-Sir Charles Douglas unemployed in the middle of a war in which he acted so distinguished
a part! There is something so slighting to my Father's services, as
well as incorrect, in this surmise, that I hope I shall be pardoned for
a short digression to set this matter right. After my Father's return
from Canada, where he had performed a splendid service, for which he
was rewarded with honours which have descended to me, he was appointed to the command of the Stirling Castle, in which ship he remained until the 26th of Angust 1778, when he was appointed to the
command of the Duke of 98 guns, and remained in the actual command



( 48 )
of that ship till the 24th of November 1781, when he was appointed
Captain of the Fleet to Sir George Rodney. During the time in
which my Father is thus, incorrectly, represented to have been "living
unemployed in London," he was actively performing some of the
many signal services he rendered to the country, by cultivating and
bringing into operation various important improvements in naval gunnery, by which that ship in particular, was brought to a state of efficiency, which enabled her to prove, in the splendid action in which she
bore so distinguished a part under the first Lord Gardner, the value
and efficacy of my Father's services at the very time the Reviewer has
consigned him to the shelf; and, instead of living at his ease, unemployed, in the bosom of his family, his devotion to the public service
was such, that he kept himself separated from his family, under circumstances of the severest domestic affliction. He had established his
domicile for the time, at one of the great naval ports, and there, whilst
he was at sea, his wife, my beloved mother, died, towards the end of
1779, and soon afterwards her grave was re-opened to receive the body
of one of his children! My Father was within reach of the post, which
regularly transmitted to him the afflicting accounts of the approach
of these melancholy events; but lie remained doing his duty on the
quarter-deck of the Duke!"*
My Father returned to Spithead in the Duke towards the end of
1779, and soon afterwards, on the ship going into harbour to refit,
obtained leave of absence to remove his infant children to Scotland.
He tarried for a short time in London, in deep affliction, and even
found it necessary to apply for an extension of leave to remain in
privacy and retirement until his ship should be refitted.
It is scarcely necessary to point out to the consideration of the
reader, the total difference, in time, circumstances, and bearing upon
the question now at issue, between such a meeting as that in 1779, of
which Commissioner Adam now speaks, and "conferences in 1782,"
as asserted by the Professor, and, strange! still maintained by the Reviewer. Every person must have considered, that it was the particular
time and circumstances specified in the Professor's testimony, and the
official capacity in which my Father is represented to have been at the
time of the alleged conferences, that seemed to fix down upon the
Captain of the Fleet the matter asserted to have been communicated in
those " conferences!"  The time now spoken of, is two years earlier,
* Sir J. Saumarez states, in his letter of the 19th of September, 1829, an extract
from which I have already given, " before entering upon this particular point, permit
me to state, that having been a lieutenant on board the Victory above two years, under
the flag of Sir Charles Hardy and Sir Francis Geary, and acting the chief part of that
time as signal officer to the highly respected Rear Admiral Kempenfelt, Captain of the
Channel Fleet, an opportunity was afforded me of making observations on the different
ships. The Duke, commanded by Sir Charles Douglas, was always considered one of
the best ordered and best regulated ships of the whole fleet, consisting of above forty
sail of the line; and although strong prejudice and attachment to old customs prevented
the general adoption of that excellent system of naval gunnery, of which Sir Charles
was the sole inventor, it was found to answer so well, by Captain Gardner who had so
great a share on the 12th of April, that it afterwards became universally adopted in the
navy."



(  47   )
when my Father, captain of a private ship, had no official connection,
and very little acquaintance with Sir George Rodney, and was not even
thought of as the Captain of any Fleet, far less of that for which he is
represented as having been specially selected, to be primed for execution with Mr. Clerk's grand secret, so to be made the direct official
channel of communicating it to, and thus fixing it down upon Sir
George Rodney likewise. The afflicting and very different circumstances, in which my Father was in 1779, when the meeting to which
only Commissioner Adam now speaks, can have taken place, divests
it, entirely, of all the point or relevancy which the Professor's record
would give.
So much use has been made of the Professor's erroneous record, to
endeavour to " fasten down" upon my Father the alleged communication, in " several conferences" with Mr. Clerk, in 1782, that I must
entreat the reader's particular attention whilst I sum up, and finally
refute, the evidence, upon which only these alleged conferences have
been believed. The Reviewer says, (page 11,) that the articulate testimony of Mr. Clerk himself, corroborated by the record of Mr. Playfair, and by the direct testimony of Mr. Adam, establish this. Let
us examine Mr. Clerk himself. The only part of his work which
admits even of an allusion to my Father, is that in which, speaking of
his discussions when in London in 1780, he says "particularly on one
occasion by appointment with an officer of most distinguished merit."
This was his written testimony; and never, to the day of his death,
though knowing my Father's denial, did he ever venture to name him
in writing or in print. The testimony of Mr. Clerk, therefore, so far
as it has ever been taken to allude to my Father, or to any other distinguished officer, is, that with the person, whomsoever he was, there
was but one meeting, and that in 1780. Yet the Reviewer, on the
alleged verbal authority of Mr. Clerk, asserts, that there were " many
conferences in 1782." Mr. Adam, so far from corroborating the Professor, now says, as well he might, for there is no truth in the allegation,
that he has no recollection of any meetings or conferences in 1782,
(at which he is asserted to have been present,) but perfectly recollects
Mr. Clerk and my Father meeting at his house in London about two
years earlier! The Professor's record, and the Reviewer's assertions,
are, therefore, the reverse of being corroborated-they are quashed
by the direct testimony of Mr. Adam, even if they had not been completely disposed of by thefact, that the Captain of the Fleet was then
with his Admiral on the ocean, and likewise denied by the deliberate
testimony of Mr. Clerk himself, who never asserted that he was in
London in 1782! If, by the "articulate testimony" of Mr. Clerk, the
Reviewer means " word of mouth" testimony, it is inconsistent with
Mr. Clerk's deliberate, written evidence. In one part of the article,
my Father and Sir George Rodney are coupled as having been primed
in after-dinner conversations. Lord Cranstoun states, that he heard
Sir G. Rodney learnt this secret at a dinner party in London in January 1782!  Rodney was not in London in any part of 1782, till after
his return from the West Indies. Another party asserts, no! it was



( 48 )
" the Captain of the Fleet, who remained some months in London in
the spring of 1782, and who in that time was put in complete possession
of Mr. Clerk's secret, in several conferences."  Why the Captain of
the Fleet was with his Admiral! Thus, in the year 1780, when Sir G.
Rodney and my Father are represented as being together in London
at the period of Mr. Clerk's visit-they were never there at the same
time. In that year, when they are thus alleged to have been training,
under Mr. Clerk, for an operation two years deep in the womb of time,
they had no official connection with each other: and in 1782, when,
for the same purpose, Sir Charles Douglas is asserted to have remained
behind his Admiral, they were never separated, nor was Mr. Clerk in
London!-Whilst one party asserts that Sir G. Rodney learnt Mr.
Clerk's secret from him at a dinner party in 1782, Mr. Clerk's written
and printed testimony is, that Mr. Atkinson, one of Sir George Rodney's friends, undertook to communicate the discovery to him in
writing, and that it was supposed to have been so communicated to
the Admiral, in London, in January 1780.-But Sir George Rodney
left London on the 25th of October, 1779, to take command of the
fleet, and remained at Spithead till he sailed; and neither Sir George
Rodney nor my Father were in London in any part of 1782.
The case, then, as it concerns my Father, is reduced entirely to this,
-that in 1779, when captain of a private ship, (happening accidentally
to be in London, in affliction, seeking temporary retirement,) he is said
to have met Mr. Clerk, on one occasion, at dinner, and, in an afterdinner conversation, to have discussed fully with him, " the whole
subject of naval tactics."  Truly such a meeting may be admitted
without dread. I will venture to say that in any such discussion,
Mr. Clerk was the instructed, and not the instructing party; and so
far, such a conversation may have been profitable to. the amateur, and
he, therefore, may have had occasion to note and recollect it. Upon
my Father it made no such impression: he always averred that he had
no recollection of any such meeting or conversation. But supposing
my Father had recollected, and accordingly admitted, such a communication of what is called "( Mr. Clerk's acquisitions on Naval Tactics,"
will the shallow inference upon which only Mr. Clerk's pretensions
proceed, be admitted, that never till then, had Sir Charles Douglas
heard of the operation of breaking an enemy's line? Shall my Father's
character as a man, and his learning and experience as an officer, be
arraigned, on mere inference, drawn from having met, at dinner, an
inexperienced amateur, who imagined he had discovered what was well
known; and is now cried up, by injudicious friends, as having been
the first to demonstrate, what had been repeatedly executed? What
I have shown at pages 30, 31, to have been the state of tactical knowledge of such manoeuvres long before Mr. Clerk's day,-the practical
cases which I have cited at pages 29, 30, and 31,-the evidence of
signals, pages 28, 29, 32 and 33,-and the observations introduced
at pages 33, 59, 60, 61 and 69, are, incontestibly, sufficient to forbid
such an inference, in principle, and fully prove that Mr. Clerk never,contemplated the conditions of the battle, nor laid down those on



( 49 )

which only the manoeuvre which gained it is safe or practicable; and
these, finally, refute the charge, that my Father, acquiring thus a professional discovery from Mr. Clerk, laid it by, cunningly, in the stores
of his own mind, and two years afterwards, dared to impose it, as an
off-hand suggestion of his own, on his Admiral, his profession, and his
country, to the prejudice of the inventor,-for to such a charge do the
Reviewer's assertions amount. I disprove and repel it as I ought.
Stationed, and circumstanced as my Father then was, the meeting in
1779, of which Mr. Adam now speaks in the letter quoted by the
Edinburgh Reviewer at page 11, could not have been devised with any
view to afford Mr. Clerk an opportunity of communicating his grand
secret to Sir George Rodney, through, or of suggesting its adoption to,
my Father " as the distinguished officer who had been selected to
serve as his Captain of the Fleet;" and, accordingly, the " discussions"
mentioned by Mr. Adam, are not particularised, but stated to have
been on Naval Tactics generally. Naval Tactics is a wide subject for
" full" treatment, in an after-dinner conversation.-Wide and groundless were the inference that would assume such a conversation with
my Father in 1779, to have had the particular object which the Reviewer, on the Professor's authority, asserts; or to have had any reference to the long subsequent battle; for, unless Mr. Clerk had
divined the coming event, and foresaw that my Father was predestined to that distinguished post, and to that decisive influence, which,
very unexpectedly to him, he two years later exercised in that event,
Mr. Clerk could have had no motive for attempting to "fix down" any
of his imagined discoveries on my Father for execution.  It is clear
moreover from Mr. Clerk's own showing, that he was not prepared
to " advance" that part of his subject, which was published for the first
time in 1790; for, as he tells us in the first edition, " the part on the
attack from the leeward was not finished" at the time the tract of January, 1782, was printed, for circulation amongst his friends. He says
(page xliii. Preface 3d Edition,) that the part on the attack from the
windward, (with which the reader is now well acquainted,) " was first
executed with as great speed as possible by the 1st of January, 1782;"
and again, (page 158, Art. 193, Part I.) " a further prosecution of
demonstrations, which are likely to lead us on to the attack from the
leeward, we think proper to decline for the present." We have here
a public declaration, from the Author, that nothing on the cross attack
from the leeward was brought forward, in 1782, " because no example of such an operation" had, as he imagined, "occurred."  Mr. Clerk
having, for this reason, declined treating on such an operation till 1790,
" not to prejudice his subject (the attack from the windward) by
advancing any thing doubtful on an operation which had not been executed," is it likely that in 1780 he was either prepared or disposed
to bring those observations, in particular, before one of the most competent judges in the service, in a general conversation on Naval Tactics?  In these passages, and in the note page 119, page 8 of this,
Mr. Clerk distinctly avows that his object was only to commentate on
operations of which examples had, according to his notions, been given;
1H



( 50 )
and, page 14, " to explain the principles upon which they proceeded."
Yet his advocates will infer that he promulgated what he expressly says
he declined to advance,-that he matured and completed, plans and
demonstrations upon a branch of the subject, which he declares he
had neither " prosecuted" nor " finished" in 1782; and that my Father
swallowed and digested the whole of these crudities, as grand discoveries, in an after-dinner conversation in 1779.
Such is the sad case made for Mr. Clerk, by his over-zealous, injudicious friends. I acquit him of having intended that any thing to the
prejudice of others should be insinuated after his death, which he had
never asserted, distinctly, under his authority, whilst he lived. I will
not believe that such an honourable and upright man could intend to
whisper any thing that he had not ventured publicly to assert. I not
only reject such an accusation, but I maintain that if Mr. Clerk's case
had stood on such grounds as his advocates now represent, it must
have worked itself to issue whilst he lived. I read Mr. Clerk to have
been as he wrote, an acute, industrious, and in some cases a useful
amateur commentator. His plain-sense strictures are admirable, and
some of his conclusions just; but his tactical theorems are almost
without exception erroneous, and his practical problems unsound.
Mr. Clerk did not dispute that Sir George Rodney may have adopted
the manoeuvre, without having received any previous suggestion from
him. (Author's Preface, page xliv.)  He only contended for the
credit of having afterwards explained the system upon which it had
proceeded, page 141, Naval Tactics. He did not assert that what he
advanced was new, but only that it had not been properly laid down,
and put in demonstration.
My object, in giving the reader so much matter to wade through,
is, to enable him to try the case asserted for Mr. Clerk. First, by the
matter actually contained in the tract printed in 1782, and by what
Mr. Clerk has subsequently published. Secondly, by the actual, tactical circumstances of the case. Thirdly, by the evidence of living
witnesses. Fourthly, by the evidence of the code of signals then in
use, and those actually made; and by reference to log-books, journals,
and other authentic records. Fifthly, by epistolary and declaratory
testimony, other than my Father's, so that by not making him an evidence in his own case, I might explain and establish it on proof which
the other party could neither object to nor cavil at.
But, to confirm the more effectually that refutation of the pretensions urged for Mr. Clerk, which the preceding expositions and facts
establish, I shall further cite my Father's letter of March, 1783, and
put other proof in evidence of his repeated denials that the manoeuvre
of breaking the line, on the 12th of April, was, in any way, attributable
to any idea supposed to have been thrown out by Mr. Clerk, but
entirely from accidental circumstances which took place, and ideas
which arose with the occasion.
The Reviewer, well aware of the decisive effect of this denial, more
particularly if it should appear to have been given in a " confidential
word" or " private document," represents (p. 39) my Father's commu


( 51 )
nication, of March, 1783, to have been a preconcerted declaration,
proceeding disingenuously, from the Formidable, to preclude some
claim, of which the officers concerned on the recent memorable occasion
were not unconscious, by " a demi-official letter, written to answer
that ostensible public purpose"-not " a private note or memorandum
to a confidential friend." To set this matter right, it will be necessary
to revert to the circumstances which produced that important document, and so show up another capital error upon which the Reviewer
has permitted his pleadings to wander, in a very insidious and unwarrantable manner, to object to the integrity of a document which, as I
shall now show, was a private letter to a very confidential friend.
In the beginning of 1783, my Father's sister, writing to acquaint
her brother that his son Charles had recovered from a dangerous
malady, and on a great many other private and domestic concerns,
took that opportunity of advising her brother that some vague surmises
had lately been circulated in Edinburgh, insinuating that my Father,
who was then very generally known to have suggested and urged the
evolution of breaking the line on the 12th of April, may have been one
of the officers to whom some instructive communications were reported
to have been made by a gentleman of the name of Clerk, who was
said to have written a book on sea engagements, and to have had some
conversation with the Captain of the Fleet on that subject. To ascertain whether there were any and what grounds for such surmises, the
writer desired to learn, expressly, from her brother, whether he knew,
or had any recollection of ever having met, or conversed with, such a
person; and if so, when, and who such person was. She likewise
desired to know whether my Father had any knowledge of Sir G.
Rodney having received any such communication or information; and
how she should treat the rumours and insinuations in question. My
Father's answer is dated St. Lucie, March 2d, 1783. It acknowledges
" the receipt of his sister's letter by the Sandwich Packet"-expresses
" thankfulness to heaven for the happy recovery of his son"-" gratitude which it is not in the power of words to express for the maternal
care taken of his children"-and "affectionate prayers that Almighty
God might long preserve his sister." He then enters on pecuniary
affairs-promises that, " should he live to revisit home, his dear boy
Charles should have his Shelty;" and then proceeds to some very confidential communications relating to my elder brother, then commanding
the Licorne frigate, and other private affairs. To the queries respecting
the rumours and insinuations which his sister had imparted to him,
my Father returned a full and absolute denial. He declared that he
had no knowledge of or recollection of ever having met, or conversed
with, such a person as Mr. Clerk: that he only knew of two persons
of that name, both lieutenants in the navy-one, our cousin in the East
Indies-the other, a lieutenant, whom he designated Lieutenant Clark;
that he had not seen the former for many years, nor the latter for
several, before his appointment as Captain of the Fleet: that if this
Lieutenant Clark were the person alluded to, he could not answer for
never having conversed with him on professional subjects, as with
H 2



(   52  )
other brother officers; but that he did not retain any, even the faintest,
trace of any particular conversation even with this Lieutenant Clark:
that he had never received any communication or information from
such a person as that surmised or inferred: and that, so far as he (my
Father) knew, Sir George Rodney had not and could not have derived
any information from Mr. Clerk. Taxing thus his memory, reviewing
and enumerating his acquaintance, to reply fully and ingenuously to
his sister's queries, he declared " the whole story to be so far-fetched,
groundless and ridiculous, as not to deserve serious refutation:" and,
since the Reviewer will have what I had thought it right to reserve,
for reasons which I shall now explain, my Father instructed his sister
to treat the "ridiculous insinuations" and " groundless inferences"
with contempt, as by the annexed facsimile.
Can any one believe that this denial, under the hand of an officer of
undoubted probity and well-established honour-embodied in a private letter filled with confidential and unreserved communication, was
a tissue of demi-official craft and dissimulation; or that these answers
to questions put confidentially to my Father, by a person so nearly
and tenderly interested in his professional fame and so sure of his
integrity, were not used, as he intended they should, to deny that there
were any grounds for such surmises or insinuations? That letter was
freely used:-it was shown to every member, and to all friends of the
family, at the time. My Father visited Scotland in 1783, on his return
from the West Indies, and repeated, every where, those denials-always
designating the whole story which had been rumoured " ridiculous, and
to have proceeded upon random inferences;" and the fact moreover is,
that no claim was at any time admitted by my Father of any personal
acquaintance with Mr. Clerk, nor, in point of fact, did any subsist.
Then surely, in 1783, when my Father was on the spot, and the battle
recent, then was the time for Mr. Clerk to assert, publicly and distinctly, the reality of any claims which had been insinuated, and to
disprove my Father's denial of them; and this no one can doubt Mr.
Clerk would have done, if there had been any grounds for such pretensions as those now asserted for him, or any proof of having conferred, either with Sir G. Rodney or the Captain of the Fleet, on the
manoeuvre which they had executed.  But what is the fact? With
whatever person, or from whatever circumstances, the rumours of
1782 had originated, my Father's declarations so completely put them
down, that they were never, to his knowledge, or to that of the
family, revived, whilst he lived; and so far was Sir Charles Douglas
from ever having had a distinct opportunity of contradicting such printed
claims as those which it has now become my duty to refute, he was
actually dead before the first edition of Mr. Clerk's work was published.
Nor does this denial rest only on the preceding declaration.Scores of times have I heard it repeated, by elder members of
the family, in the days of boyhood, and since, by many confidential
friends. Sir Gilbert Blane, and all those now living, and the muchlamented Sir Joseph Yorke, who were on board the Formidable



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( 53 )
before, at and long after the battle, confirm this, by averring that
" they never heard of Mr. Clerk's name or book, till many years after
the war." Lord Rodney's family publicly deny that any communication
from Mr. Clerk was received by Sir George Rodney: Lord de Saumarez
declares his "conviction that neither Sir George Rodney, nor the
Captain of the Fleet, was in possession of, or actuated by, Mr. Clerk's
ideas:" no notice whatever of Mr. Clerk or his communications, appears
in letters, pages 11 and 12, from the very persons to whom, if not addressed, such communications would have been submitted and referred: and
besides these, and the other evidences contained in my last Statement,
(see Appendix), numerous communications have since been addressed
to me, by Officers with whom I have little or no acquaintance, declaring
this to have been the case throughout the fleet. My eldest Brother,
the late Vice-Admiral Sir William Henry Douglas, who was made Post
Captain into the captured Glorieux, has often told me that he never
heard of Mr. Clerk till long after the battle, and had frequently heard
my Father declare that he knew nothing of Mr. Clerk's book, and
never received any communication from him: and this I particularly
remember, in a conversation I had with my Brother, at High Wycombe
in 1805, upon urging him to take up the subject in consequence of
an Article that had recently appeared in the Edinburgh Review on
Breaking the Line.
Finally, to reply to the Reviewer's confident announcement, page 38,
of " surprise, if a single confidential word of Sir C. Douglas's be ever
put in evidence by any surviving friend, denying that both he and his
commander had been instructed by Mr. Clerk in the general nature
of the manoeuvre," I select, from the proofs in my possession, the following letter from Captain Hewit of the royal navy, and the letter
annexed to that communication will prove that Captain Hewit was a
confidential friend of Sir Charles Douglas.
Copy of a letter from Captain Charles Hewit of the Royal Navy to
Commissioner Edgecombe, dated London, 9th June, 1830.
" Observing in the last number of the Edinburgh Review, that the
discussion between Sir Howard Douglas and the representatives of
Clerk of Eldin, relative to breaking the French line of battle by the
British fleet in the West Indies, on the 12th April, 1782, has been
resumed, I have to state, that in the autumn of 1786 I was an inmate
of the same house, No. 3, Great Pultney Street, Golden Square, with
Sir Charles Douglas, and living on terms of the closest intimacy with
him, of which I have testimonials in his own hand now in my possession; and I most perfectly remember on one occasion when he had
S'en dining with some person, I believe a relative, afterwards Bishop
of Salisbury, at St. James's, after his return home, he told me that he
had, with great surprise, learnt that the merit of breaking the French
line had been attributed to an idea thrown out by Clerk, to which I
most perfectly recollect he said, that at the time it took place he had
never seen or heard of Mr. Clerk or his book, and that in his own
mind he was conscious Sir George Rodney had not; and that the



( 54 )
manoeuvre in question entirely took place from ideas which arose with
the occasion.
(Signed)       CHARLES HEWIT,
Captain, R. N."
Copy of a letter from Sir Charles Douglas to the Honourable George
Berkeley, dated 3, Great Pultney Street, June 1st, 1786, put in to
prove that Captain Hewit, who now survives, was a confidential friend
of my Father's.
" DEAR SIR,
" Having yesterday done myself the honour of calling in
Spring Gardens to ask your commands for Holland, I now do myself
that of acquainting you that the bearer, Mr. Charles Hewit, a gentleman whose welfare I, because of his merit, have closely at heart, is the
person whom I recommended to you for a midshipman's birth on your
quarter-deck: you will find him very useful, and if occasion should so
require, very deserving of having confidence reposed in him, as I did on
board the Assistance. Ardently wishing for Mrs. Berkeley's speedy
recovery, and to you both, long health and happiness, I remain with
great consideration, &c. &c. &c.
" A true copy.            (Signed)   CHARLES DOUGLAS."
(Signed)  CHARLES HEWIT."
The original of those, and many other confidential letters from Sir
Charles Douglas to Captain Hewit, are extant, and may be seen by
any person.
Before I close this part of my subject, there is one very material
circumstance to which I request the reader's attention. When the passage printed in the text at pages xxxv. and xxxvi. in my First Statement, was written, my Father's letter so far as it relates to this matter,
stood in a note to which the text referred. With the greatest desire
not to give to any person offence, I submitted the intended publication
to an Officer of the very highest character-a man of the highest order
of intellect-to intreat his opinion whether I might, or might not,
without prejudice to my Father's case, dispense with any, and what
parts of my proof, that might be felt unnecessarily hurtful of other's
feelings. That part of the opinion of this officer which relates to the
controversy as it concerns Mr. Clerk, is thus expressed.
October 13th, 1829.
"I have very attentively read Sir Howard Douglas's interesting and
manly statement, and I have not found in the narrative or in the argumentative part a single expression that can give just cause of offence.
As to Lord Rodney's yielding his own opinion and adopting in such a
trying moment the advice of another person, and that person an inferior Officer, there, cannot, I think, be a stronger proof of true greatness of mind. With respect to the propriety of inserting all the letters,
so and so might be spared; as to controversy, that must depend on the



( 55 )
other parties, and on their view of the matter; certainly there is nothing
to excite it in Sir Howard's manner."
" A question however does arise, about the propriety of inserting
Sir Charles Douglas's letter, page 37,* Statement. All those parts of it
which materially bear on the subject, have been already appositely
quoted, and upon the whole it would be more dignified and prudent
not to publish it."
In conformity with this opinion, I struck the letter out of print; and
I can assure the Reviewer, as I have declared in my last Statement
page 4, that my reason for doing so was a motive of delicacy to Mr.
Clerk and his family. " Arrogance and impertinence," &c. are very
strong words, and I would rather not have shown these up.
Now the reader will perceive, and this is a very important circumstance, that the words, " or any other person," (which by mistake stand
in the text in my First Statement with reference to the letter which,
when that text was written, stood in a note-and which words, being
there, are fairly used by the Reviewer at page 23, line 28,) are not in
the letter. The passage was meant to recite, in substance, the declaration contained in the letter, that Sir George Rodney had not derived
any instructions, directly or indirectly, from Mr. Clerk. But, however,
here, at page 52, is proof that those words do not stand in the letter,
and therefore all the argument founded upon them, as to their being a
disclaimer on the part of my Father, falls entirely to the ground, and
leaves the sentence clearly and distinctly averring, that Lord Rodney
did not, and could not have received any instruction from Mr. Clerk
that my Father knew of. The facts of execution proved, as admitted
on all hands, beyond the possibility of doubt, (and some important
communications have recently come to my hands, see Appendix, p. xix,)
render utterly vain the Reviewer's pleadings, page 37, that because my
Father did not distinctly assert his own separate claim in that letter, it
may be taken as evidence against himself. The letter, taken in relation
to the facts, proves the nobleness and disinterestedness of his conduct.
Though Sir George Rodney and the Captain of the Fleet had differed,
seriously, on points of service, they parted on the best terms,-my
Father, deeply mortified at being overlooked in the honours that had
been awarded, relied on the justice and generosity of his Chief; and the
Admiral, when he learnt the distinctions that were conferred upon
others, omitting my Father, charged himself, under his own hand,
under date Montagu, at sea, August the 8th, with " procuring for my
Father whatever he most wished or desired." Under such circumstances it would have been unwise, ungenerous, unjustifiable, and uncalled for, that my Father should assert his own separate claim at the
time he wrote the preceding letter. But had he not been struck dead
in the activity of his career-had he lived to hear that asserted, which
since his death has been published,-to read Mr. Clerk's works-Professor Playfair's record, and all the conversations reported of Lord
* This refers to the page in which the letter was printed, in the proof sheets of my
first Statement.



( 56 )
Rodney; of himself even, as having been " hard to persuade"* in
several conferences, which, in point of fact, never took place:-had he
read all the literary gossip and twaddle that we have lately seen;-had
he lived to hear claims seriously urged upon the country, for honours
and rewards to Mr. Clerk, on grounds such as these, without even the
remotest mention of his name, who had, in fact, executed the important
duties which I have proved;-had my Father lived to hear all this, he
would have come forward to assert the facts, and prove the services
which I have established, in the statement of which the Appendix to
this Memoir is made up. He would have vindicated the skill and
conduct of all concerned on that ever-memorable occasion, from the
aspersion, that had it not been for Mr. Clerk, the manoeuvre which
gained that battle would neither have been imagined, nor executed!
That duty which I know my Father would have done to himself, I have
effectually done for him; and that vindication which he would have
established, I too undertake.
Professional readers, and all who understand this matter, must now
be convinced that the operation in question would have been conducted, exactly as managed and achieved, if Mr. Clerk had never existed; but I owe it to the profession and to the country to put this
upon higher grounds. I have refuted the assertions which reflect
upon my father as an honourable man, and an accomplished officer.That is enough for me, as his son. I shall now investigate the subject, tactically, to correct many wrong notions which inexperienced
officers might be led to form, from the unqualified manner in which Mr.
Clerk's theories have been lauded, in urging pretensions which some
professional men proclaim to be " grand discoveries in the science of
naval tactics." This is necessary, to keep landsmen, and amateurs,
from being led astray on the practical part of the controversy likewise, by the pleadings of the Reviewer, which, though full of error,
are dexterously managed to induce the general reader to believe that
there is no difference, in principle, between the operation of breaking the
line from the windward, and breaking it from the leeward. I shall,
therefore, endeavour to place distinctly before the general reader, and
young officer, the real, absolute and total difference of these two distinct classes of operations; for I know well enough what might be
pleaded by critics to landsmen, if I were merely to assert that there
are such distinctions.-We should be told that these are mere technicalities-professional cavillings-tactical ambiguities-for that the
" principles on which depend the practicability of the manoeuvre" do,
notwithstanding, " apply equally to both cases." That there may not
remain any grounds for the landsman to surmise that these operations,
though laiddown by all tactical writers as totally distinct and opposite
classes of evolution, may, notwithstanding, mean the same thing, and
be applied accordingly, on principles common to both; and that I may
satisfy the general reader-the Profession needs no proof-of the absurdity of the Reviewer's composition to the above effect, and demon* Playfair's Works, vol. iii. p. 459. Edin. Rev. p. 32, 1. 20.



( 57 )
strate the extravagance of those assumptions and practical expositions
in Mr. Clerk's theory of the attack from the leeward, which, under the
denomination of bearing up, the Reviewer would assimilate in principle,
to the movement of bearing down, I shall here introduce some diagrams
and explanations which I had intended to bring before the public hereafter in more comprehensive form, when I should follow up and generalize what I have already published upon the tactic of single actions.
I have explained at pages 22 and 23, that the terms bear up and bear
down apply only to movements off the wind, and therefore, exclusively, to the attack from the windward; and that these cannot, in
any way, be connected or confounded with the term hauling up, which
is the distinctive sign of a lee position, in which a fleet or ship hauls to
the wind, to fetch-up to the windward. In these two diametrically opposite classes of evolutions, all the principles and circumstances that
enter into the tactical combination, as well as the particular points of
bearing and sailing by which these operations are severally practicablewhether to approach-pass-cannonade or penetrate, or to gain and keep
relative position for battle, are dissimilar, and dependant on very different conditions. A fleet to windward may approach, and attack a fleet
to leeward, in line of bearing,* by each ship bearing down, and keeping
its corresponding antagonist always on the same point of the compass.
The windward fleet may, at any time, form line a-head parallel to the
enemy, by simply bringing each individual ship to the wind; and may,
at pleasure, take any engaging distance; or a windward fleet may bear
down, or bear up, upon a fleet in line to leeward, and pass through it,
even if its intervals should be compact and correctly kept, at as many
points as the windward fleet may choose, if the lee fleet does not bear
up too, and run away; or, instead of coming down in line of bearing,
parallel to the lee fleet, and forming line a-head to windward of it, as
Rodney did on the 17th of April 1780, each ship may make directly
for its corresponding antagonist, pass through the enemy's line at the
several intervals, and engage it to leeward, as Duncan did; or the
windward fleet may bear down in columns in line a-head, and each
of these penetrate through one and the same interval, or each ship
break off to take its bird; or the weather fleet may bear down in divisions in line a-breast; and, in all these cases, the relative positions of
* The lines of bearing are the directions of the two close-hauled lines of sailing,
at about six points each way from the wind. Thus, if the wind be N. the two lines
of bearing at six points are E.N.E. and W.N.W. So long as a line keeps either of
these directions or " bearings" with respect to the wind, no matter in what course, or
on what tack the ships may be sailing, line a-head, close-hauled upon the corresponding
tack, may be immediately and readily formed, by tacking or wearing the ships individually. This is the simple order, in line of bearing. The order is compound, when the
fleet is formed in angular position, composed of both lines of bearing. In this case, a
part only of the fleet has the power of readily forming line a-head, the other part must
necessarily remain on the bow-and quarter-line. By tacking or wearing the fleet, altogether, the order reciprocates, so that the part that was in line a-head, now comes into
bow-and-quarter line, the other into line a-head. To form one line out of this order,
the part of the fleet not in the line of bearing which it may be desired to retain, must
form line upon the other, either a-head, or in rear, as the case may require.
I



( 58 )
the lines, or vessels, may be maintained, arid the intervals kept steadily
open, by keeping them constant in bearing.
The distinctive properties, therefore, of this class of evolutions are,
that they may be made either in parallel or oblique order, without
exposing the attacking part of the windward fleet, to the broadside
batteries of the ships a-head of that part of the enemy's line which it
is not intended to attack;--relative position may be preserved;-all the
intervals in the line to leeward may be kept open to the offensive movement, in the same degree as at first;-and the enemy's ships a-head of
the point of attack, allowed no prise of the attacking part of the windward fleet, whilst it is closing with them. These, and other modes
of operation, belonging, exclusively, to this distinct class, have their
several advantages and disadvantages, and may all be met by appropriate and timely counter-manoeuvres, upon which I may, on another
occasion, presume to offer some practical observations.
To leeward, every thing is different.-The lee fleet, standing on the
same tack, cannot approach the other sailing close hauled in line a-head.
If the lee fleet sail faster, it may fore-reach upon the other, and
then tack and stand towards it. A windward fleet close hauled, can
only be approached by the lee fleet fetching-up on the contrary tack in
line a-head; or by the lee fleet, after having sufficiently fore-reached
upon the other, tacking altogether, and forming bow-and-quarter line,
that is a line in the same bearing as the enemy, (consequently parallel
to them) but upon the contrary tack, each ship stemming obliquely
towards the enemy, and threatening an interval in his line. But in all
these cases, relative position, which it is so vastly important to consider
in Naval tactics, so difficult to allow for, involving so many uncertain
results, and so fluctuating in degree, cannot be preserved. All the
relative circumstances are continually altering. The intervals in the
enemy's line do not remain open to the offensive movement.  They
pass athwart the offensive course, at rates composed of the two celerities with which the fleets are moving; and not only is it uncertain
which interval may be fetched, but the practical width of that which
is gained, is greatly reduced, when projected upon the oblique course
of the lee fleet; and further diminished, by the continued movement of the other: the leading ship, or ships, must be exposed
to the broadside batteries of all the ships a-head of that part of the
windward line which it is intended to attack, as those ships pass, in
succession, athwart the bows of the vessels fetching-up; and a fleet,
in line a-head, fetching up against a fleet keeping its wind on the other
tack, with compact and correctly kept distances, cannot possibly pass
through one and the same interval:-any attempt, therefore, that may
be made by a lee fleet to force its way through a compact, well regulated line, should prove disastrous, or greatly disadvantageous.
A line in motion, in the direction of itself, meeting another line in position and likewise in motion, cannot cut that line in one point, or divide
it at all, without being itself divided. Parts of each of the lines, thus
moving, will intercept each other. In cases of fleets in line a-head,
those portions will consist of several ships, more or less, and their





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intervals, mutually separating, intercepting, or getting foul of each other,
according to the direction and celerity of their movements, the magnitudes of their intervals, and the manner in which the vessels are handled.
The lines are composed of vessels of nearly equal size, placed at nearly
equal intervals from each other-sailing, in this case, at nearly equal
angles-with the wind,* and going pretty nearly at the same rate.
If the intervals are maintained, as they may, and ought to be; and as
they most certainly will, after the severe lesson given on the 12th of
April 1782 for not having done so, it is clear, that no more than
one ship can pass through one interval; and through whichsoever
space any one vessel fetch, she will, in like manner, be divided from
her follower, by the next adjoining ship of the adverse line passing
through the corresponding interval. This alternate cutting of each
other's line may proceed, one ship passing through one interval, and then
being divided from her second astern; and thus many ships may pass
through each others intervals; but this will be attended with much
difficulty and danger to the lee fleet in particular, if the enemy's intervals be compact; and, if they do what they ought, it is impracticable.
Mr. Clerk assumes, in his theory of the cross attack from the leeward,
(which the reader will observe was published for the first time in 1790, and
no part of which was in the tract of 1782,) that the lee fleet, (see plates
v. vi. and vii. Clerk,) plates 11, 12, and 13 of this, may penetrate a fleet
standing athwart to windward, in "any one point, and so cut it in twain:"
that the incision may either be made in the enemy's van, centre, or rear;
and that whichever of these be chosen by the fleet "bearing up from the
leeward," as his advocate calls it, (hauling up,) stemming close-hauled,
towards the broadside batteries of the enemy, that " the windward
fleet must be cut in twain at that one point, or otherwise the leader,
getting foul of the lee ship at that interval, will stop her course, and
that of all her followers," (without stopping his own, which are precisely under similar circumstances-for otherwise there is a gap-an
enormous gap,)-throw all their sternmost ships into confusion, whilst
he gets clear, maintains his order, and forces them to leeward. Thus, as
we perceive by his plates and learn from his text, all the attacking, and,
as they ought to be, well battered ships, fetch unhurt through one
and the same interval, to the weather beam of this easily defeated
enemy! Mr. Clerk's notion is this; that whichever part of a windward fleet standing athwart, the ships of a lee line may have it in
their power to fetch,-whether the rear, plate 11 of this, (plate v. part ii.
page 207 of Clerk,) or the centre, plate 12 of this, (plate vi. part ii.
page 209 of Clerk,) or the van, plate 13 of this, (figure 26, plate vii.
part ii, page 211 of Clerk,) they, by keeping their wind, will either force
their way through one and the same interval; or otherwise, by getting
foul, not only stop the course of all the enemy's ships, but likewise
* Usually at six points from the wind. A long line of battle cannot, however, be
preserved, and kept in hand, or its intervals assured, if kept so close to the wind; and
therefore seven points from it are generally considered necessary. If it were not thus,
and ships were to push on, making the most of the sail they had set, there would be no
commanding means of ensuring the correct keeping of intervals, and line.
12



( 60 )
throw all those astern into complete confusion; and in which ever case
this may happen, that the enemy's sternmost ships must be intercepted,
forced to leeward, and captured. This theory, as a practical maxim
for future guidance, is deduced from the observations given by Mr.
Clerk at p. 49, on Admiral Byng's engagement in 1756, in the following words:-" While matters were going on after this manner in the
van, the Intrepid, one of the van ships, having lost her fore-top-mast,
was so taken a-back, that her course was stopped."  " This, of consequence, produced a disorder and stoppage in the ships next astern,
some designing to go to leeward, and others endeavouring to go to
windward of the distressed ship." From this " observation" we are
referred to Art. 19, page 32, where we find this piece of mismanagement-this gross misconduct, drawn into a " Demonstration" for the
Guidance of the British Navy, in these words: " It is evident that
should any ship be crippled, her way must, of consequence, be stopped,
and occasion confusion amongst the ships astern, some moving to
leeward, others endeavouring to get to windward, and those a-head
(never looking behind them) running away from the rear." It is in vain
that it had been laid down as an instruction, " the stoppage of one
ship need not necessarily produce a stoppage in every ship astern,"Mr. Clerk illustrates his theory by the errors of the Intrepid! The
misconduct, not only in the handling of that ship, but in the management of her followers, who did not immediately pass her, and close up
their intervals, should be condemned in the severest terms, and the
heaviest censure pronounced upon such errors by every person
engaged in tactical investigation. This theory is not only tactically
erroneous, in the very first principles of the science, see page 62, but it
is highly dangerous to the country, that a book containing such doctrine
should be so much cried up and advocated, as this has been, without
pointing out its great and manifold errors. The following investigation of the case will abundantly show, why the penetration of the line
from the leeward, though imagined long before Mr. Clerk was born,
has been so rarely attempted;-why the case which I am now proving, as
one of exception to a tactical precept,* and one of great practical skill
and promptitude, succeeded; and it will admonish practitioners to avoid
attempting such an operation against a compact line, and to beware
of the dangerous position into which Mr. Clerk's theory would unquestionably lead, namely, that of throwing the fleet fetching-up into
confusion, with an enemy on both bows ready to take advantage of its
disorder.
Let A B, and C D, figure 1, plate 14, be two fleets standing on
different tacks towards each other, in line a-head, with equal and
correct intervals; and let the leading, or any other ship, of the lee line
fetch any point E, in the weather line, and there attempt to penetrate.
We shall, at present, put out of the question the severe treatment, the
serious damage, which the ships F, I, D, &c. must sustain, whilst fetching-up under the broadside batteries of the enemy's vessels B, K, &c.
* See Art. III. Tactique Navale, printed at page 31 of this.



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( 61 )
passing in succession athwart their bows. To get clear through the
interval which F may be able to fetch, it will be necessary for that
ship to pass close under the lee quarter of the ship G on the starboard hand; in doing which F will be raked, fore and aft. We will
admit, however, that F gets through, clear, (certainly not unhurt,) and
that, when in the interval, she gives her fire, both ways, into the vessels
between which she is passing, raking G by the stern, and H by the
bow, as in fig. 2. But whilst she is getting through that interval, to
the position F, fig. 3, the enemy's ship H passes on to do the very same
thing, by penetrating between F and her follower I, and so breaks the
line C D, raking both F and I. Again, it is clear that the ship I cannot
pass through the same interval as the leader F, if H maintain her
proper distance from G, and therefore I can only attempt to pass
between H and K, after having been raked by H exactly as will
have been done by F, in passing between G and H. Mr. Clerk has
here not only committed a capital error in tactical principle, but supposes one of a still greater degree on the part of his adversary. He
causes the enemy to remain apparently at rest; makes no allowance
for relative movement and position; greatly accelerates his own speed;
extends prodigiously the enemy's line; contracts his own; and
assumes, that the contact of any two ships getting foul of each other,
will be as partial to him, as all the other circumstances are assumed to
be.
Should any ships of the attacking fleet fetch through a windward
line in compact and proper order, it cannot be through one interval;
it must be performed by several succeeding ships fetching through
several succeeding intervals, whilst their own line will have been similarly penetrated by the enemy's vessels: and, should any of the attacking ships get foul of those of the enemy in attempting to get through,
it will be, at the very least, quite as likely to stop that ship and her
followers, and throw them into confusion, as to stop and confuse those
of the enemy. If this should happen, after two or three of the lee line
have got through,* what is to become of the ships which will thus
have penetrated, without being followed, and upon which the van of the
enemy's fleet should double, by moving free, and therefore fast, upon
them? Such an obvious counter-manoeuvre would, indeed, defeat the
attempt altogether, or it might be prevented by such earlier applications as I have glanced at in page lxv. First Statement, and page 5,
Additional Statement;-not by so feeble a movement as tacking and
doubling in succession from the van, but by tacking the part of the fleet
headward of the point of attack, altogether, and thus reversing upon
the attacking ships which have got through, and which, by proper measures, would be placed in a very perilous predicament.
Mr. Clerk seems to have imagined that a fleet cannot be kept in
position, in proper order, but by fresh way, with full sail. No fleet is
permitted, in manoeuvring, to make the best of their way with the sail
they have set. If they were not thus kept in hand, intervals could not
* Lord Howe on the 29th of May, 1794.



( 62 )
be maintained. The faster ships would leave the slower, and the bad
sailers impede the swifter astern of them. That Landsmen may understand this, I shall explain the means by which fleets are kept in
hand, and how intervals are correctly ascertained and accurately kept.
One or more powerful sails, either the mizen-top-sail, or the main-topsail,(and top-gallant-sail, if set,) or both occasionally, are kept shaking
or backed, or more or less filled, if going upon a wind; or braced by,
if going large, so as either to increase, or check, the ship's speed.
The interval, from ship to ship, at the distance directed by signal, is
regulated by observing the angles subtended by the mast-head above
the water line, of each adjoining ship, which angles, being calculated for
the various distances that may be signalled, are entered in a table,
whence, by setting the limb of a sextant or quadrant to the angle
corresponding to the distance ordered, it may be ascertained in every
ship, whether she is drawing a-head, or dropping astern, or steady to
distance. I need scarcely say, that this is of the very first importance.
Of such importance indeed, that an officer who should permit his
vessel to " lose her way altogether," that is, her distance, so long as his
masts stand with sail upon them, deserves to lose his head, and
certainly would now-a-days lose his commission: and, moreover, any
officer of a following ship, who, as in the case of the Intrepid in
Admiral Byng's battle, should hesitate, for one moment, to obey the
signal " line a-head," by passing immediately any ship that might,
either by damage or getting foul of another, occasion a gap or interval
in his line, such officer, and all his followers astern who did not
immediately close up in file, by every exertion of sail over and above
that which he, or they, may have been carrying, would deserve, and
justly incur, the most severe punishment.*   And what, will it be
said, is to become of the damaged, or, as the case may be, the ship
boarded? Why, if she cannot keep her station, let her go to leeward,
or to the bottom; or let her fight it out, hand to hand, with the ship
alongside of which she has fallen. If she be of our side, we trust she
will conquer; but if she should be beaten, the battle is not lost.
Mr. Clerk's doctrine of cutting the line from the leeward, therefore,
proceeds upon an assumption of the grossest misconduct on the part
of his enemy, or comes practically to this,-a melee, in which Mr.
Clerk asserts that, without sacrificing the activity, or compromising the
safety, of any of his own ships, by running foul of the enemy's vessels,
he must disable and detain them and their followers, but not his own,
and so cripple the enemy's ships, and ruin their fleet. Truly, there is no
great science in this. Such a mode of fighting would be going back
to the times of the ancients-skirmishing with three-decked ships as
if they were galleys! Professional men know well enough that such
* The rule is, when the enemy is to leeward, the followers should all pass to leeward
of the crippled ship, which should on this account keep to windward, as much as she
can. The Intrepid, with only a fore-top-mast gone, might have kept up out of the way,
with her main and mizen top-sails and fore-sail. The officer in command of the ship
that attempted to go to windward of her, should have been brought to a court-martial.
When the enemy is to windward, a crippled ship should go to leeward out of the way,
to let the followers pass to windward to close up their distance.



( 63 )
a practice has been often, and universally, condemned. A line-of-battle
ship may get foul of an enemy in battle; but, in manoeuvring, this must
not be done, if it can possibly be avoided: and that form of the predicament which Mr. Clerk thinks most advantageous, is unquestionably
most dangerous, namely, when a fleet fetching-up, attacks the enemy's
rear; because, in that case, the van so fetching-up, must first be closely
pelted, and more or less raked, by nearly the whole of the enemy's
vessels standing in succession athwart; and if it should get entangled with the rear of the enemy, a mele must be formed, which the
followers in the lee fleet cannot pass, to windward, whilst they will be exposed to the most formidable and unavoidable danger, from that part of
the enemy's fleet which is to windward of them, and which may fall upon
them in various critical and decisive ways. To make an interval in the
enemy's line, by collisions of ships, as Mr. Clerk imagines, must not be
attempted; nor will an opening be ready-made to our hands, by such
faults as he ascribes to his very incapable, and easily defeated enemy.
We shall look for such in vain:-Order of battle in every form depends
essentially upon keeping distance. It is only by well directed cannonade, that impressions are to be made, and effects produced, that may
disturb the enemy's order; and it is upon the talent with which this is
watched for, and the promptitude with which advantage may be taken
of such an effect, that success will depend. This was magnificently,
and splendidly done, on the 12th of April, years before Mr. Clerk
published any thing upon the subject; and now, even with the benefit
of that practice upon which he has theorised, he overlooks the real
conditions, and would actually set about skirmishing with threedeckers! It was from the rear squadron of the French fleet not having
been altogether able, or from not having been careful, to observe this
very important regulation, (" la ligne ne fut plus serre"'-De Grasse's
Journal,) that an opening took place, sufficient to permit several of
our ships to haul-up through one and the same interval, and that the
Formidable and her followers were pushed through the French linean operation which Rodney would otherwise no more have attempted
than Keppel did, and which the absence of signal proves was not contemplated until it was perceived, " que la ligne ne fut plus serree."
What does the Edinburgh Reviewer say to this? The victory of the
12th of April was gained from the very circumstance at which he scoffs
(p. 5.)-the enemy, by leaving a gap in their line, afforded an opportunity for several ships to pass through one and the same interval.
The great solicitude which our Admirals have always shown to gain
the weather gage, (and notwithstanding what Lord Rodney has noted
p. 18, Introduction, Naval Tactics, pages i. and ii. appendix, he was invariably desirous of acting thus, see p. 24, 25, 27,) arises from the difficulty, which I have endeavoured to explain, of forcing an enemy to close
action from the leeward. Thus we read in Rodney's despatch of the
affairs of May 15th and 19th, 1780, " That he was in hopes he should
have weathered the enemy, but had the mortification to be disappointed." It appears, however, from the relative position of the fleets,
that it would have been in the power of the British van to have passed



(  64   )
through the enemy's line on that occasion, if such an error as that
committed by De Grasse's fleet had taken place: but the line was compact and this was not practicable. So in Keppel's action there was no
opportunity, no fact upon which Keppel can fairly be condemned for
not having made the attempt. There is a good deal of obscurity in
the details of Sir Robert Calder's battle 22nd July, 1805: he twice
led up his van, under the 'lee of the French fleet on the contrary
tack; but the French manoeuvred, and he could not penetrate.
In Howe's action, on the 19th May, 1794, the British fleet, standing
on the larboard tack, parallel to the enemy to windward on the same
course, tacked in succession, by signal, to pass through the enemy's line.
The Caesar failed in the attempt, from an accidental shot in her rudder;
but the Queen Charlotte, (followed by two other ships only,) passed
through between the fifth and sixth ships from the rear, and then put
about on the larboard tack. The rest of the British fleet passed
to leeward. If proper advantage had been taken of this, the Admiral
and his two seconds might have been cut off. Though the Caesar may
not have made proper exertions to break the enemy's line, in conformity with the signal, yet the Orion and many other ships did; " but
they were prevented by their own disabled state, and by the compactness of the French line, from effecting this."
Lord St. Vincent, on the 14th February, 1797, took prompt advantage of a very considerable interval between the two divisions of the
enemy's fleet,-formed his line with the utmost celerity,-and passed
between them, before they had time to form a line of battle.
Nor should the operation, even as executed on the 12th of April, be
attempted hereafter without great circumspection and precaution. New
modes of operation are generally successful at first, from being
unexpected and unprepared for: such would not be the case again
with respect to this evolution. The leading movements of first haulingup to fetch a fleet to windward on the contrary tack, and then bearingup in succession under its lee, are not easily connected with each other,
in correct order and distance. All compound movements of fleets-that
is, those in which different parts of the same fleet are made to sail on
different courses at the same time, are exposed to serious derangements. Compound order in formation, such as the angular order of
retreat, page 57, and the several descriptions of echellon or lozenge
formations (and on the merits and great advantages of these I wish to
enlarge), admit of all the ships keeping on one and the same course,
though forming several oblique lines of sailing: but the ships of a
fleet sailing in angular form, as in this case, some fetching-up in line
a-head, others running down with the wind abaft the beam, can
scarcely be kept in proper distance from each other. If there be much
wind, the ships going free could scarcely be prevented, by bracing by,
from drawing away from those still hauling-up; and if the wind be
light, it may not be in the power of these to keep in proper proximity
to their leaders; or, as in the 12th of April, the rear may be becalmed,
as the day advances, in the most critical part of the operation.
Enveloped in smoke, as the lee fleet must generally be, it will on that



( 65 )
account be still more difficult for it to keep the proper intervals; and
if a glimpse of such an exposure should be caught by the admiral of
the windward fleet, and he know well his business, the consequences
might, and should be, most serious.
There are two classes of counter-manoeuvres applicable to the cross
attack from the leeward. By the one it may be prevented; by the
other defeated. When the windward fleet perceives it is the intention of
the enemy to attack its centre or rear, it should wear from the van inr
succession, before the leader of the attacking fleet arrives directly to
leeward of the other's van. This, too, is in accordance with the principle
which I have ventured to lay down for the tactic of single actions,never to let a movement be shaped into the wake; for should such a
design be permitted to operate against the centre of a fleet, it would
menace the wake of all the ships a-head of the point of attack. The
windward fleet should therefore counteract such a design, by meeting
it, in time, with a front-encounter it with its broadside force, and
not expose to it, a rear; come round in time, and offer battle on equal
terms, on the same tack, if no better can be had. The most effectual
method of defeating any attempt of this description, is to keep the windward fleet in two divisions parallel to each other,-the windward division
so far a-head, as to keep it open to leeward. In such a formation it
would be very advantageous to it, if the lee fleet should attempt to lead
between the divisions of the other; because by tacking or wearing,
altogether, at a proper time, a combined attack may easily be executed
upon the van, or windward part of the lee fleet, and so bring the whole
of the windward fleet to act against a part of the other. We do not
work enough in divisions. In the windward position, more particularly, such a formation will be found highly advantageous and safe,
whether for offence or defence.
It is not my object to remark upon divers other matters, treated
erroneously in Mr. Clerk's book; but it is necessary for me to notice
all those parts which in any way relate to the comparative merits of the
windward and leeward positions: and first, to say a few words on Mr.
Clerk's manoeuvre of bearing down, from the windward, upon the rear
ships of a fleet to leeward.
The ships detached to act against the rear of an enemy's fleet, as represented in Mr. Clerk's fig. 20, plate xxi, (plate 8, p. 16, of this,) might
infallibly be cut off; or their fleet brought to action on very disadvan.
tageous terms, if the antagonist know his business. No naval officer
would act in the manner the author makes his foe to do, by the position and movement which he has assigned to his opponent's fleet. Mr.
Clerk makes the enemy abandon his rear ships! Why, this were a
disgraceful flight, not a battle;-a retreat at least; but according to
tactical science, neither. If the enemy meant to fight, it is impossible
he should act thus: if to manoeuvre for better terms, he would still
conduct himself differently.-If retreat were his object, (and it is so,
according to Mr. Clerk's supposition and exposition,) he would withdraw in the-well-known " order of retreat," either on a single line of
bearing (starboard or larboard, as the case might be), by which to keep
K



( 66 )
the broadsides of all his ships open, and be able to haul-up, by ships,
into line a-head on the proper tack; or he would retire in angular order,
formed of both lines of bearing, by which one-half of the fleet may
always be ready to haul-up into line a-head, and the other to form upon
it, p. 57; or the fleet would retire in line abreast, which, with roundsterned ships, as Admiral Ekins justly observes, makes that order of
movement less objectionable now, than it has hitherto been. But Mr.
Clerk knew nothing about these fundamental orders of sailing. A fleet
sent to meet an enemy, is sent to fight; and Mr. Clerk's enemy, who is
represented by him to be of equal force, would not dare, or venture, to
act as he supposes. First, he ought not to let the enemy get, or at
least keep, upon his weather quarter. Applying here what I have said,
page 273 Naval Gunnery, as to the most advantageous way in which a
vessel to leeward can act, to receive an attack from the windward, and
so bring on close action, on, at least, even terms, it appears, that a fleet
likewise should take care to avoid being approached or attacked in
rear. For this purpose, it should endeavour to keep as directly as possible to leeward of the enemy. So far, therefore, from running away,
or even moving fast, the lee fleet should make no more head-way than
is necessary to keep in due order. The object here should be, not to
go faster than the enemy; but to oblige him to come abreast of you,
by keeping on a proper bearing with him, forereaching only, if he should
alter his course, and so endeavour to meet him gradually, and fight him
on equal terms if no better can be worked out of him. In this way, a
good tactician may, and ought, to prevent his enemy from making an
attack slanting upon his rear, or quarter, in the manner recommended by
Mr. Clerk. If the lee fleet, thus acting, be approached, it must be more
or less direct, in proportion to the slowness with which it forereaches;
and when the enemy does " bear down," it must be upon the broadside
batteries of his opponent. When he comes near, the lee fleet should
then fill and stand-on, to cause his antagonist to haul-up a point or
two, but still keeping him on the most advantageous bearing, for effect.
This will produce, what should always be contemplated, and if possible forced upon the enemy, namely, an alteration in the direction of his
course, after his vessels shall have been some time under fire. The lee
fleet then fillifig and standing on, the other must haul-up more or less, to
keep in proper bearing; and this may not be convenient, or even
practicable with due regularity, after a well directed cannonade shall
have raked the enemy's columns bearing down, or bearing up, from
the windward, and shot away some of the running rigging. If the
fleet to windward, when yet a distance on the quarter-perceiving that
the lee fleet is not disposed to avoid battle-should decline to come
fairly to the point, and show a disposition to bear down into its wake
instead of standing-on to windward, or should manifest any intention
whatever of attacking the rear ships, the lee fleet should be careful to
tack, or wear, altogether, in good time, to meet, thus, the offensive
movement. Much of what I have said upon this subject, pages 273
to 276, Naval Gunnery, applies, in principle, to this case. A course
shaped into the wake of a fleet, or quarterly against its rear, is an offen


( 67 )
sive movement so disadvantageous and dangerous to afleet, as well as
to a single vessel, so approached, that it should never, on any account,
be permitted. If the above offensive movement cannot, or should not
be executed to meet the enemy, then it must be remembered that
the lee fleet is a retiring fleet, and its admiral would be dishonoured
for ever as a tactician, were he to attempt to make his retreat in the
manner Mr. Clerk represents his enemy to be acting in his figures 2, 3,
plate xvii, and fig. 20, plate xxi., plates 4 and 8 of this. To permit an
enemy to attack the rear of a fleet in this way, would evince total incapacity on the part of its commander. It may not always, perhaps, be
desirable for a fleet to refuse fighting upon such terms as the enemy to
windward may offer; but the lee fleet standing-on, cannot be certain
that this will be fairly met in a straight forward way by an enemy
manceuvring so shyly, nor be sure of being able to bring all its force
into action. If the enemy is disposed to come fairly to the point, lay
by and meet him;-but if he hang upon your rear or quarter, get
round and face him. It is only by active measures of defence-meeting an offensive movement in a timely manner, and not receiving it passively, that the affair can be engaged on even terms, far less with odds
in your favour. It should always, therefore, be recollected, that a
stem may readily be substituted for a stern, by tacking or wearing the
fleet in good time, all together; and that thus a defensive line, menaced
and exposed in rear, may be wholly and instantly converted into an
offensive and formidable movement with a van,-thus reversing the case
upon an enemy when so nearly under your guns, as to be no longer able
to avoid coming to the point, in a close and general affair. The Strat6gie
of Naval Tactics has not, it appears to me, been properly considered or
treated. This, I believe, should be more thought of and pursued. I
believe, too, that the manoeuvres of fleets should be more generally performed by the individual movements of ships, than by wearings and
tackings in succession-that large fleets should be kept more compact
-worked more frequently in divisions-rarely developed in line, particularly in the windward position,-and kept more in hand than they
have usually been.
Totally unqualified in practical knowledge, either of gunnery or seamanship, to treat this matter rightly, it is not surprising that Mr. Clerk
should have formed some strange and erroneous notions on the servicepractice, capabilities, and comparative effects of naval ordnance. So
far was that commentator from having taught the British navy how to
know and use their force, properly considered, he was so little skilled
in what he undertook to explain and demonstrate, as to be incompetent to detect the serious errors that were committed by sail as well
as by gun-in evolution and explication, in the very cases to which he
refers. Ascribing that insufficiency which could not but result from
deplorable mismanagements, on particularly discreditable occasions, to
some imaginary disabilities of cannonade inherent in particular positions, and supposed to admit not of rectification, the author of the Naval
Tactics framed general theorems for the guidance of the British navy,
on conclusions drawn from the worst of practice; and calls that
K 2



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" demonstration," which is demonstrative only, of the practical ignorance and error upon which the proposition proceeds.       Thus Mr.
Clerk lays it down as an invariable maxim, " that fleets passing on
contrary tacks cannot injure each other;"-" that in all such cases it is
vain to expect that the most artful management of sail-the closest
approximation, or the most spirited cannonade can avail anything," on
account of the celerity which, as he assumes, the two fleets must pass
each other. Let us investigate this;-there is error, and much danger
to us in doctrine so eulogized as Mr. Clerk's has been. Now, though
such a movement is, usually, the result of an intention on the part of
the windward fleet, not to come to a decisive action, and therefore
may pass off, indecisively, if permitted by inefficient gunnery as Mr.
Clerk takes it for granted must be the case; yet, as the 12th of April
proves, a well-directed cannonade from a fleet to leeward, may be so
efficient as to procure favourable opportunities of bringing on a close
and critical battle. A professor of naval tactics should not only
understand practical seamanship, but be moreover skilled in the principles and practice of naval gunnery; for whilst it is the object of the
tactical combination to form such a plan of operation, and direct such
evolutions, as may be best calculated to bring the enemy under your
guns, the effect of the movements, however ably conceived, will depend upon the manner in which the vessels are made to conduce to the
efficiency of their gunnery, by no unnecessary spread or use of sail,
and celerity of movement; and upon the intelligence with which floating
motions which cannot be controlled, may be taken advantage of, to
discharge the ordnance, in the nick of time, in right directions. It is
true that when fleets are passing each other at any rates of going, the
apparent velocity of the transit is, as if one were at rest and the other
moving with a velocity equal to the sum of the two rates: but this apparent circumstance is not absolute; it is in a great degree under the
coritroul of, and reducible by either party; and, moreover, only applicable to express the time of acting of the evolution. Applied to effect,
it would lead the student to very wrong conclusions, and justify the
very worst of practice. In the first place, as Keppel well said upon his
trial, " it is a contradiction of terms to speak of a general engagement
where the fleet that has the wind tacks, to pass the fleet to leeward on
the contrary tack."*  If the enemy will run away at this rate, why let
* If I were not fearful of taking up too much time, I would prove that the discussions
which took place amongst professional men between the period of Keppel's battle, July
1778, and his trial, January,1779, and the strictures which were current, and many of
which appeared in the chronicles of the time, are quite sufficient to show that, if to any
previous circumstances the manoeuvre of the 12th of April may in any degree be ascribed,
it was to such very important observations as the above, and many others, which may
be found in the chronicles and correspondence of the time, vehemently urging the necessity of using every possible endeavour-taking advantage of any unforeseen circumstance that might occur, to force the enemy, thus endeavouring to avoid a general
action, into close and critical battle. De Grasse, in 1782, was endeavouring to do,
exactly, what D'Orvilliers had done in 1778. De Grasse was absolutely under the
greatest obligation not to fight, and Rodney had every motive for grappling with him, if
he could. Now there was not only every appearance that the initial movement of the
day would pass off indecisively, as De Grasse designed it should; but the signals, the



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him do so if he can. The more sail he uses, the quicker, certainly,
will be his absolute motion; but the quicker, greater and more frequent
too, will be the jerks and lurches, inseparable from the use of a press
of canvas, a full sail and a swift course; and the more hurried and inefficient his gunnery. But if both fleets fly with such speed, then indeed both may be declared to be shy of fighting, and neither admiral
to understand his business. I, by " artful management" of the sails,
would diminish my speed as much as possible-keep my vessels steady
for the best effect-prohibit what is usually called " a spirited cannonade,"-a term generally applied to a noisy, random volley-and throw
in my fire, by guns in succession, as the enemy comes-on with their
sights, in glimpses caught through intervals clear of smoke, and which,
if properly watched, and not precluded by random firings which produce little but smoke, may, from the obliquity of the wind to the course
of a fleet close hauled in line a-head, generally be caught as the
enemy's ships come, in succession, a-beam of the vessels of the fleet
fetching-up, when they are to leeward of the intervals in the windward
fleet. Here, in particular, may be noticed the methods, pages 219,
220, Naval Gunnery, by which horizontal fire may be nicely adjusted
to hit the hulls of the enemy's ships which may be enveloped in their
own smoke, but whose masts' heads, seen over it, indicate the line
upon which a well-regulated horizontal fire may be projected, with
a certainty of effect.  If, therefore, the sails be " artfully managed,"
the " proximity" sufficient, and the guns well handled, I deny that the
celerity of transit must, necessarily, be such as to interfere essentially
with the effect of the discharges that are made; and Mr. Clerk's
advocates may depend upon it, that the cases in which great inefficiency
of fire have appeared, and upon which he has commentated in this
prejudical manner, (pages 122, 123,) arose from      gross ignorance of,
general orders of the Fleet, and every testimony, prove, that the British fleet would have
passed the other in line a-head, if the glorious opportunity, which happily presented itself, had not occurred. My Father had commanded a line-of-battle ship in Keppel's
action;-he had been an evidence on the trial-he had deposed to the gallant bearing
of Keppel's advance-to the impossibility of doing more than was done, on the 27th,
and to Keppel's inability to bring the French Fleet to action on the 28th. My Father
had partaken, deeply, of the mortification felt throughout the Fleet, from not having been
able to grapple with the enemy on that occasion, and he was alive to the severe dissappointment which the nation had suffered, at an issue so indecisive. Can it be doubted,
that this person, when Captain of Rodney's Fleet, was, under all these circumstances,
in a state excited to the utmost, to be watchful and fearful lest this might recur; and
that science, responsibility, reputation, participation in former disappointments, all
eminently predisposed him to the quickest perception of any circumstance which might
enable the British admiral to force De Grasse to a close and critical affair, and the
readiest and boldest mode of effecting this? This was stfficient. The prospect that
now opened, flashed upon my Father with a vehemence such as to strike all present
(See the evidence of Sir Charles Dashwood, Sir Joseph Yorke, Sir Charles Thesiger,
&c. Appendix). He instantly advised and urged that bold course which, if not adopted,
would, in all probability, have left that affair to terminate as Keppel's had done, and
to expose the nation to perils still more serious. I may have occasion to say more of
this hereafter, not controversially but historically. My Father's evidence on Keppel's
trial shows, that he was an eminent tactician; and by the bye he speaks familiarly in
1778 of another movement which Mr. Clerk says he was the first to explain in 1782.



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and great defects in practical gunnery, such as we shall no more witness. There is no case in which fire can be thrown into an enemy with
greater effect, than when a ship's broadside is passed by another in an
oblique position. The fire is then given perpendicularly, and received
diagonally. The guns are all ready-the line, whether horizontal or elevated, regulated according to distance-the chiefs of pieces looking over
their guns, ready to pull the trigger-lines, in succession, as the body of
the enemy's vessel comes-on with their respective sights. The offering
may be mutual.-It is " shooting flying," certainly; so is all the practice of naval gunnery; but I had rather one such chance, than a hundred random broadsides. As to which may have the best or the worst
of it, that depends upon relative position-on the weather-on the
swell--and many other circumstances which have no relation to the
duration of the particular evolution. Admiral Ekins ably and justly
observes, " from the great improvements in gunnery, all future naval
contests must be speedily decided; and he who best knows how to set
about this, must win the day." Instead of adopting the grievous error,
that because the enemy may be running away as quick as possible, you
should assist him with a full sail and excess of speed, and so apparently
give double celerity to his flight, absolute inefficiency to your practice,
and shorten the duration of the cannonade, I should, by "artful
management" of the sails, diminish my speed as much as is consistent
with retaining head-way sufficient to keep the line in due order, and so
prolong the affair as much as possible; endeavouring to prevent thus
the heeling and rolling motions from being aggravated by the wind,
and taking care that my cannonade avail a great deal, and either
partially or wholly stop the enemy in his flight. If I succeed I should
follow up the blow with vigour. There is no part of Mr. Clerk's
theory more vicious than the " demonstration" which I am now combating; and any officer, from whom an enemy may thus be endeavouring to run past, who should run away too, with equal speed, would lose
his fame and deserve to be deprived of his commission, though he
should cite Mr. Clerk's demonstration in his defence.
Mr. Clerk likewise enumerates, page 39, article 34, as one of his
" demonstrations," that " when the ships of a weather fleet are brought
to at their position, the shot from the lee fleet, by the lying along of its
ships, will be thrown up in the air, and have an effect at a much greater
distance; whereas the shot from the windward fleet, from the lying
along of its ships, will be thrown into the water, and the effect lost."
This very extravagant conclusion, called a " DEMONSTRATION," appears
to have been drawn from Admiral Byron's account of his engagement
of the 6th of July 1779, if we may judge from the following extract
printed in italics at page 55 of the Naval Tactics,-" that, being to leeward, they, the enemy, did great damage to the masts and rigging, when
Our shot could not touch them." In blowing weather, and a heavy
swell, the heeling and rolling of ships may, no doubt, be such as to
baffle all attempts to point guns with precision, and consequently to
produce much effect, on either side; but in Byron's action the wind
was light and the sea smooth; and, as a general position, the disturbing



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effects of quick motion occasioned by bad weather, should not be admitted to operate partially on one party. The principles of gunnery,
and the fittings of naval ordnance, were, it is true, not so well understood and provided in those days, as at present; and the practice was,
in many cases, uncertain, inefficient, and discreditable to the country.
Mr. Clerk, therefore, as an amateur, may well be excused for falling
into the error of believing that the damage done to Byron's fleet,
" whilst his shot could not reach the enemy," were comparitive capabilities or disabilities, inherent in, and unavoidably attaching to, the leeward and windward positions respectively; and for having drawn, from
this wretched apology made by Byron for the inefficiency of his gunnery, the conclusion, that shot from the lee fleet must be thrown up in
the air, and may have an effect against the windward fleet, whilst the
shot from the windward fleet, by the lying along of its ships, cannot be
levelled at the lee fleet, and therefore must be thrown into the water!
This extraordinary annunciation, drawn from a case in which the weather
was so moderate, and the sea so smooth, as not necessarily to interfere
with, or restrict, a proper use of the ordnance on either side, according to precise rules for regulating the practice, far less to operate partially, as by this conclusion-is seriously advanced as demonstrating,
as a general theorem, that the vertical direction in which shot are
projected, must depend upon the angle of heel, or the inclination of
the deck; or, in other words, that ships to windward, fighting their
lee sides, even in moderate weather, must heel so much that their guns
cannot be sufficiently elevated, with respect to the plane of the deck,
to give either a horizontal direction, or actual elevation to their ordnance: and that the lee ships, fighting their weather guns, having no
power of depressing them with respect to the deck, must throw their
shot up in the air, and by this random power may " reach " a fleet to
windward, without being exposed to be " touched" by it in return.
This exposition of Mr. Clerk's theory of the comparative advantages
and disadvantages of these two positions, is advanced by him as " demonstrating" the superior advantages of the lee position. But there
is no more necessity for the ships of the lee fleet to " throw their
shot up in the air," than for the other " to throw theirs into the water:"
-the one, indeed, could scarcely be more wasteful than the other. If
the fleets be near, shot thrown " up in the air" at the weather fleet, from
the lee fleet, might just as well be " thrown into the water;" and if the
distance between the fleets be such as to require an actual elevation
equal to that of the average inclination of the deck of a vessel under sail
when it blows hard, her shot had much better remain in her lockers.
Mr. Clerk has not only here brought forward again the error of working his ships, though in strong winds, under full and filled sails-flying
with a speed such, that, as he asserts, " they cannot possibly injure
their enemy, passing on the other tack;" but he moreover concludes
that in using ordnance in any such cases, there is no resource by which
to rectify the pointing of the guns, nor any other alternative than to
throw away the shot either " up in the air, or into the sea."  But a
very slender knowledge of practical seamanship and gunnery would have



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taught Mr. Clerk, that the " lying along" of ships under a spread of
sail proper for action, according to the force of the breeze, and skilfully
managed to spill, or catch it-full or aback-as may be requisite to
keep due order and to conduce as much as possible to smoothness,
may be so controlled, or counteracted with respect to the guns, as to
admit of giving them either a horizontal or actually elevated direction,
even in the ship's mean deflections;--that the rolling motions which result from the actions of wind and agitations of the sea, in strong breezes,
afford intermediate opportunities, incessantly recurring, which may
always be taken advantage of to project the shot in proper directions
to hit the enemy's ships; or that the discharges may be made at the
precise moment in which a vessel, rolling in the proper direction
(articles 186, 187, 188, Naval Gunnery), is most nearly, or quite
upright. It may be difficult, and sometimes impossible, to discover
and determine that moment, by sight of the enemy's hull, on account
of smoke, and it certainly requires a great deal of skill and dexterity,
" watching the roll" with the experienced eye and practised hand
of a seaman-gunner, to strike the lock at the critical coincidence;* but
it is strange that, instead of perceiving that this could not have been
executed in a proper manner, on the occasions cited in Mr. Clerk's
commentaries, and accordingly condemning, in the severest manner,
such wretched practices, it should thereupon be propounded to us, as
good doctrine, that on all such occasions (for Mr. Clerk's theorem is
general,) shot must, necessarily, be thrown either " up in the air," or
" into the water."-Strange that a writer who would thus countenance
the wasting of our forces on the winds and the waves, should be declared
" most learned in nautical war," and be held up as a professor " teaching the British Navy how to use its force." A knowledge of practical
gunnery would have disclosed to the amateur, that even when he
wrote this commentary, there was a very ample allowance, in the vertical dimension of ship's ports, to admit of elevating the guns, with
respect to the planes of the decks, sufficiently to compensate for the
"lying along " of ships fighting to windward; and a considerable, though
not then sufficient quantum of scope, to provide for the leeward
case. At present the vertical dimension is ample for both; and there
are expedients by which the power of giving depression may be increased to any requisite extent: whilst the horizontal scope allowed for
" training guns" to fire obliquely, either before or abaft the beam, put
completely out of date Mr. Clerk's observations, section 111, "on the
distances which one line must be from another, to admit of any one ship
in the line of battle, being exposed to the fire of three or more ships at
the same time." Indeed the power of giving a converging or oblique
fire (see the action between the Foudroyant and the P6gasse), was
* See Naval Gunnery, art. 182 to 190, on the aberrations in the pointings and
practice of naval ordnance, occasioned by the floating motions, showing the several
effects of firing during the rising and falling of the side engaged, to windward and to
leeward, respectively; and the particular positions, or periods in the movements of
vessels in floatation, which, if properly observed and nicely taken advantage of for
firing, tend least to disturb the pointings and efficacy of their gunnery,



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sufficient to admit of throwing-in a concentrated fire, from several ships
upon one, greatly within the distances which Mr. Clerk's trigonometry
exhibits, without altering the lineal position of the ships-a practice so
vicious, (for this would be a random volley given in the act of yawing,
see Naval Gunnery, article 197) as to be strictly prohibited, utterly exploded, and universally condemned. Other considerations and circumstances must likewise be taken into view, in deciding which of the two
positions to prefer; and I have already, at page 57, treated, tactically,
the several modes of operation which belong, exclusively, to each.
Further, with respect to the effect of gunnery-if, indeed, it blow so
hard, that a line-of-battle ship cannot open her lower-deck ports, the
weather fleet is at disadvantage in this respect; but this is not usually
the case; and then lee ships, by heeling their fighting sides out of water,
are exposed in tender parts, to the guns which the weather ships may
still effectually use. If the fleets be near each other, the quarter-decks,
poops and forecastles of the windward ships would be much exposed
to musquetry, grape and cannister shot: this gives an advantage to the
lee line; but then again it is exposed to this most serious of all contingencies-that their weather rigging being most exposed, the masts
might be endangered from the effects of the fire of ships to windward
cutting away what is necessary to their support; and therefore, body
blows, which moreover kill and wound the people, are most likely to
produce dismantling effects on the leeward fleet.
Mr. Clerk, referring to the former French practice, mistook an error
(now confessed to be such) for an excellence; and upon this misconception framed the section, page 24, " on the comparative effects of
shot directed against the rigging, and those directed against the hull of
a ship."  He puts two cases: one, an eighty gun ship running down
upon another lying-to to leeward, which directs its fire, exclusively, at
the rigging of the assailant: the other, a ship running down to engage
his antagonist lying-to, who directs his fire, exclusively, at the hull of
the assailant. He supposes, for the exemplification of his theory, the
ship coming down, as in the first case, " to lose some of her principal
stays, eight or ten windward shrouds, or a fore top-mast, or some other
spars and rigging, but without sustaining any loss of men; whilst the
other assailant, without having sustained other damage, has thirty or
forty men killed." Upon this hypothesis Mr. Clerk observes, that " the
first ship, by having lost this part of her rigging, will be less serviceable
to the attacking fleet, in the battle to be fought, than if she had lost a hundred, or even two hundred, of her complement of men;" and, therefore,
as the probability of hitting an object so large as the vertical space made
up of the hull, sails and rigging of a ship, is vastly greater than the
chance of striking and perforating those portions of the hull which cover
the men occupying the decks, so he lays it down as a general rule, that
the fire of a ship or fleet should, in all such cases, be directed rather at
the masts and sails, than against the hulls of the attacking ship or ships.
This exposition might be deserving of some consideration, if the statements upon which it proceeds could possibly hold; but the terms of
supposition in which the cases are expressed, are practically irrational,
L



( 74 )
and, consequently, the premises upon which the doctrine is founded,
impossible. Indeed the whole of this section (sect. i. p. 24, Naval
Tactics,) is practically erroneous, vicious and dangerous, inasmuch as
it proceeds upon chance at all. To fire 24, 32 and 48 lb. shot " at the
whole body"-at random-to take a chance, which, in a vast ratio, is in
favour of only making holes in sails-instead of aiming at the hull, by
which both materiel and personnel may be destroyed-is wretched,
wasteful, random practice-discreditable gunnery, which I trust the
British navy will never attempt, and which I am quite sure they will
suffer for, if they do. That it is of use, and is an important object, to
dismantle rigging, there is no doubt;* but it should be set about deliberately, and not at random. Mr. Clerk assumes, on the one hand, that a
cannonade, directed against the hull, may take effect upon the personnel
apart from the materiel, and " kill thirty or forty men without doing
other damage;" and, on the other hand, that ravages may be committed on the materiel, exclusively. Shot thrown at random (for aiming
at the " whole body" is random practice) may carry away a few
spars--cut some of the rigging, or make holes in sails. 68 lb. shot
may cut half-inch lines; but they will kill no man, unless they chance
to meet an unfortunate knotter or splicer scrambling aloft. But body
blows will do both; and can scarcely do one without the other. I too
have computed the vertical area of those portions of a ship which are
"crowded with men," namely, the sides which screen them, and compared it, accurately, with the whole vertical area or expanse of the
body; I have computed, too, how much of that vertical space is taken
up by chain plates, shrouds, lanyards, stays, masts, and such parts of the
running rigging as come down to, or pass through the deck, and may
therefore be considered as projected upon the vertical plane; and I
assert, upon that comparison of the horizontal strips-the decks occupied by men-with that upon which vital parts of the materiel are projected, (and upon the well-known proportion of wounds to deaths,)
that thirty or forty men cannot possibly be killed without there being
about three times as many wounded; and that 100 or 120 men cannot
be put " hors de combat," but by penetrations and ravages so numerous,
as to inflict, moreover, upon the whole materiel of the vessel, injury and
damage far greater, and far more vital, than any that could be produced by firing exclusively at the rigging. This error is well understood, and very generally admitted. Mr. Clerk was under a great
mistake, in supposing that the French made it a rule to throw the
whole effect of their shot into the rigging of their enemy. That
practice was the effect of random errors in gunnery, just such as those
upon which Mr. Clerk proceeds. These arose from an improper use
of the line-of-metal sight, which the French call point-blank, by which,
with gunners not well instructed, shot which ought to have been projected horizontally, were, in error, fired at some elevation, and that,
frequently, not reduced to what we call point-blank, even when at close
quarters. The French also made it an invariable rule to fire with the
* See Articles 194 to 199, Naval Gunnery, on the destruction of masts and rigging.



( 75 )
rising motion, which, I have shown (article 188, Naval Gunnery) is, in
the position which they preferred to take, a lee lurch, quickened by the
pressure of the sail, and consequently acting so rapidly as to cause any
aberrations, which that motion might occasion in gunnery, to take effect
high, as it has been thought, purposely, to aim at and damage the
rigging. But I have proved, and it is now generally admitted, that it
is much better that the pointing of the guns should be calculated to let
inconsiderable errors take effect low, on the body, than to aim so that,
missing it, the rigging might be, by chance, hit. A shot striking the
hull may desperately wound a mast, carry away many of its supportscut braces, bowlines and haulyards-dismount guns, and do execution to the crew besides: but a ball taking effect high, in nearly the
same vertical line, can only injure the rigging, and that with
little effect. A lower-mast, wounded aloft, will be more likely to
stand, than if the same wounds were inflicted by shot which had previously perforated the ship's bulwarks. I repeat, it is extremely important to effect destruction of rigging; but this should never be attempted by a supplementary, random speculation, that must interfere
with the far more important and decisive uses the ordnance should be
put to, and which may produce a double effect. At a distance which
cannot be reached but by round shot at random ranges, it were absurd
to open ships' broadsides against rigging; and when vessels are once
fairly engaged in close, critical action, the main object should be to kill
and wound as many men as possible. Within the former distance, but
before the contending ships approach to critical proximity, it will certainly be proper to try what skill and precision, with suitable charges
and projectiles, can effect, upon the enemy's sails and rigging;* but I
would never fire a heavy gun, directed at random, to cut, perhaps, a
top-gallant bowline.
It is entirely to the injudicious attempts of the Professor and the
Reviewer, who have thought proper to urge Mr. Clerk's performances
out of all place, by representing them as evincing a superior degree of
learning and skill in nautical war to any such qualfications possessed
by those professional men with whom Mr. Clerk has been unwisely
put in competition, and to the disparaging tendencies of the pleadings
and conclusions of the Reviewer in particular, that these strictures on
his client's work are owing. I may appeal to former writings to show
that I had forborne to notice the manifold errors and defects which are
to be found in that work; and I deny not " that it is a wonderful book
for a landsman, who had never been at sea in his life, to have written."
But when the contents of that book are cited by his advocates thus to
depreciate the skill of the eminent officers concerned, and doctrine
such as the preceding is cried up as evidence of that superiority, I am
obliged to show cause against the pretensions urged for the author as
a learned teacher of naval tactics, though by no means disposed to
refuse my tribute of respect for the ability and industry evinced by
the acute but inexperienced commentator,-the ingenious but erring
amateur.
*Naval Gunnery, article 193.
L 2



( 76 )
It is not an agreeable task, even though a bounden duty, to be under
the necessity of discharging facts, unsparingly, as I have done, to refute
arguments and demolish pretensions raised and advocated as those
urged for Mr. Clerk have been. Even with these overwhelming
evidences in my hands, it was, as it always ought to be with persons
of right feeling, a question demanding the most serious consideration,
in courtesy to others as well as in duty to myself, whether, under all
the circumstances of the case, I could avoid bringing those facts to
bear upon a question in which the names of some distinguished and
respectable persons had, however erroneously and inconsiderately of
others, been used, as asserting or vouching for, what I knew my facts
would effectually refute and overthrow. I am, or I am not, chargeable
with having taken up, unnecessarily and uselessly, the question which
was opened afresh by the Professor in his paper on naval tactics, as
I shall, or shall not, be deemed to have succeeded in vindicating my
Father's professional reputation and integrity from the aspersions
which the claims and pretensions urged for Mr. Clerk, and the insinuations of the Reviewer in particular, would cast upon my Father's fame.
If the reader, after a careful perusal of this memoir, find himself
under any doubt as to the impossibility of the meetings asserted by
the Professor, and the absolute injustice of his " record," as recited
at pages 40 and 41 of this memoir,-if I have not succeeded in
establishing conduct, and proving services on the part of my Father,
which those conflicting claims would obscure and disparage,-if the
reader do not now consider Sir Charles Douglas's character and services
justly entitled to a very different place in the history and grateful
recollection of the country, than that in which these must have appeared
to any who may have been led away by the Professor's allegations and
the Reviewer's conclusions,-if I have not proved by evidences which
cannot be disputed, that the tactical circumstances, which gave rise to
the evolution in question, were entirely incidental, and the execution as
unpremeditated as the occasion was unexpected,-if I have not thus
vindicated the skill and conduct of the eminent officers concerned on
that memorable occasion,-then shall I have failed in the use I have
made of facts which are abundant to establish these points, and be
chargeable with having entered imprudently on an undertaking to
which I am unequal. But if, on the contrary, I have established these
propositions,-if I have shown that my Father, selected as an eminent
tactician " to assist and advise" his Admiral, acted consistently with
the duties and obligations attached to that situation, on a quick perception of unforeseen circumstances in the fight, with a prompt unadvised
suggestion of an evolution peculiarly appropriate to take instant
advantage of a fatal error; and that the Admiral adopted, accordingly,
with true greatness of mind, that proof of his Captain's off-hand competency;-if it appear to the reader, from these facts, that Sir Charles
Douglas was unfairly treated at the time, by not sharing with others
of his rank, in the distribution of honours conferred for a victory which
he had so great a share in gaining, and that he might go down misrepresented and doubly injured to posterity, had I permitted those



( 77 )
assumptions to prevail, which were obtruding upon the precincts of his
monumental urn,-then shall I have discharged my duty to his ashes,
righteously and successfully, to ensure, that, if recorded truly, his name
shall hereafter be inscribed in history and biography in terms which
shall do him ample justice.
To the Reviewer's observations, page 12, then, that Sir Charles
Douglas has been placed by his son in the " awkward predicament of
taking a leaf out of another man's book," and to all that is said about
" building a house on original and beautiful designs, furnished by a
skilful and experienced architect," and used surreptitiously to his prejudice-to all this special pleading, the surest evidence of a case having,
in fact, no legs to stand upon, I refer to proof on my pages, that " the
leaf" is not to be found in that " man's book" to which the reviewer
refers. That the " beautiful idea" was no original design of his client's;
and as to the " jumbling of types," I leave it to the reader to pronounce who has fallen into that grievous error. Finally, to answer the
concluding part of the Reviewer's article, and no doubt to his very
" painful surprise," here, page 52, in the face of day, is " a private
document under the hand of Sir Charles Douglas," solemnly declaring
in 1783, that the pretension, whether rumoured without authority, or
asserted by " word of mouth," was, " ridiculous, groundless and arrogant,"-that the allusion made to my Father, as having been instructed
by Mr. Clerk " was impertinent."-That so far as he, my Father
" knew, Sir George Rodney had not, nor could not have derived any
instruction from that person;" and, in short, that the " whole story
rumoured, was far-fetched, ridiculous, and groundless," and procedeed
" inconsiderately, upon random inference."  Here too, page 54, is " a
confidential word of my Father's, put in evidence by a surviving friend,"
denying that either he, or his Admiral, had been instructed by Mr.
Clerk.
To the Editor of the Edinburgh Review, I have peculiar, and, I
trust, praise-worthy motives for transmitting a copy of this memoir.The writer tells us, page 3, that the reviewers, being Scotchmen, are
disposed to maintain their original opinion, that their countryman, Mr.
Clerk, was the original proposer, to the profession, of the manoeuvre
of breaking the line:-that if it had not been for that learned gentleman it never would have been known:-that Professor Playfair's
record is true; and that, therefore, the victory gained on the great day
in question, is chiefly to be ascribed to Mr. Clerk. Now I, being a
Scotchman too, have no less disposition to prove that opinion to have
been made up on erroneous and utterly untrue hypotheses; and determine, accordingly, to show cause why that opinion cannot, consistently
with truth and justice, be maintained. I call then upon the Editor of
that journal, in particular, and upon the public press, every where, in the
" land of my sires," to hear me-to read me-to consider my facts; and
then to say, whether an opinion formed exparte, upon hearsay, inference,
manifest mistake, and groundless record, is to prevail, to the prejudice of,
I think, as good and true a Scot as ever lived. I love and honour my
country.-I laid my Father's ashes in the dust there, and I do hope,



( 78 )
with the blessing of God, and a just regard of my efforts by those who
preside over the public journals, to gather "his remains together," in
an honorary sense, and deposit them in one of the niches of that temple
which is destined to adorn the capital, and perpetuate the fame of the
heroes and worthies of Caledonia.
Firmly and devoutly satisfied as I am, and as I think the reader will
be, that there is not a shadow of right in the claims and pretensions
asserted in behalf of Mr. Clerk-" that if it had not been for him the
manoeuvre would not have been known, and that he is entitled to the
chief merit of this great event'-what retraction is there for me to
make, on my own account--what restitution on the part of my Father?
-None! That which is demanded of me by the Edinburgh Reviewer,
as retraction and retribution due to the author of the Naval Tactics, I
resist, and treat as a claim, that would detract from my Father's
rights, reputation and character, and from the practical skill of the profession to which he belonged. That duty to himself, which I, in my
conscience, believe my father would have effectually done, had such
pretensions been distinctly preferred whilst he lived, I have irrefutably
discharged, in the behalf of the honoured author of my existence:not without reluctance;-not without a consciousness of my inability
to clothe the facts in literary elegance, far less to adorn them with the
beauties of the Reviewer's style. I do confess that I wish I could have
avoided, with inward satisfaction, this very difficult and delicate task.
I had no disposition to enter into controversy, directly or indirectly,
with persons of a family which I greatly respect; whose characters I
esteem; whose acquaintance I value; and, to conflict with literary characters whom it behoves me, as a very unpretending writer, to hold in
respect. I hesitated long ere I moved; but, after having been brought
by my friends to consider, more particularly, what Mr. Playfair had
asserted;-when I read a statement published, republished, and industriously circulated, alleging that my Father remained in London, after
the departure of Sir George Rodney for the West Indies, in 1782, purposely, as it is insinuated, that, in the capacity of Captain of the Fleet,
he might be put in possession of Mr. Clerk's system, and that he was
accordingly instructed by that gentleman, in the spring of that year,
" in the identical manoeuvre soon afterwards put in practice systematically and deliberately upon his plan."-When I read all this, and knew
that my Father accompanied Sir George Rodney to the West Indies in
the same ship, and was not in London in any part of 1782-I felt, so
long as I hesitated, as if reproached by my Father's spirit, his
character suffering, and his professional reputation withering in my
hand. When brought, by a sense of filial duty, to view the matter
thus, neither antagonists the most powerful, nor pens the most pointed,
nor diffidence in my inferior powers, could deter me from taking the
course which that duty prescribed. I sent forth my statement: I
transmitted it to the chief members of the distinguished house of
Clerk, and called upon them to come forward, in their own names, as
I had done, if they had any thing new to produce, which might
support the claims and pretensions urged for their kinsman; so that



( 79 )
in this way we might exhibit ourselves in the amiable light of men
contending, fairly, for what we believed to be our respective relative's
dues, in a manner to harmonize with those good feelings, and to keep
entire those sentiments which we entertain for each other. This was
not met, as I expected.    Materials, furnished by the family of
Mr. Clerk, have been worked up, together with a great many inferences, assertions, and conclusions of the Reviewer's own, in an article
on Naval Tactics, which could not fairly sum up between us, until
I should bring out what I might find it necessary to select from my
desks, in reply to any additional evidence which the family of Mr. Clerk
might produce in support of the claims urged for him. I have thus
been brought to contend, single-handed, with the ablest pen, the most
accomplished journalist, the most dextrous critic of the present
day-a distinguished and learned person, who " had withdrawn from
his literary labours," but, as he informs us, resumed the critic's
pen, "buckling on his armour afresh," expressly to plead the case of
his friend, and write an article on " Naval tactics."  I have no
doubt that learned and well practised gentleman might, if he be
so minded, pick up the " shreds and patches" of his client's case,
and, again " buckling on his armour afresh," write another " clever
article" on this, or any other subject, however tattered, stale or unprofitable to him it might be. But this is no matter for literary criticism;
and I have no pretension or desire to emulate the flights and pleasantries of the learned Gentleman's pen. I am invincible in my facts: and,
as the Reviewer will have felt, I have thought too much of tactics lately,
and know my antagonist too well, to fall into the error of deviating
from the sage maxim " always to keep something in reserve;" and,
which is the surest sign of a good case and a righteous cause, at every
movement I make, I come upon fresh facts, additional evidence, powerful, voluntary support, from persons, strangers to me, and from coincidences as remarkable as they are irrefutable. Even within this month,
June 1832, I have acquired very important additional information and
proof. I put facts upon record-and I could multiply them, infinitely *---which shall prove to the future historian, that this great battle
would have been fought and gained, exactly as it was conducted and
won, if the author of the Naval Tactics had never existed. Tacticians,
too, will perceive and be convinced, that Mr. Clerk's notions and
theory of the attack from the leeward proceed, to this day, upon
incorrect and extravagant assumptions on the one hand, and on erroneous principles and practices on the other.-That so far from having
made any discovery of a manoeuvre sound in principle, and therefore
universal in practice, Mr. Clerk's work treats, incorrectly, a class of
evolutions well known to the profession for ages before he was born:and that, therefore, the pretensions, asserted in behalf of Mr. Clerk,
of having " invented, matured, and fully explained the manoeuvre by
which the victory of the 12th of April was gained, before any other
person had thought of it," and that " he was more learned and re
* Appendix, p. xix.



( 80 )
fleeting in nautical war " than those who conducted, directed, and
gained that great battle-are unjust to the Admiral and his adviser,
injurious to the profession, and dangerous to the country, inasmuch as
the unsound theory is recommended and advocated in an able and influential journal, which may lead inexperienced, unscientific officers
into the Reviewer's error, of a fatal disregard of practical conditions
which the author never correctly understood, and which the Reviewer
evidently does not comprehend. To the country, then-from whose
parental guardianship, and for whose bright annals, public justice and
national honour demand a grateful recollection of the services of
public men, and a correct inscription of the deeds that were done in
their day-to the country I dedicate this vindication of the skill and
conduct of those eminent professional men, to whom, exclusively, the
nation is indebted for this great and glorious victory. To the profession I appeal, that it was from a quick perception of the manner in
which instant advantage might best be taken of an unexpected error,
by an unpremeditated and undesigned evolution, that the idea, of standing through the enemy's line, arose in my Father's well exercised
mind.-That this suggestion was adopted with true greatness of mind,
as an emanation from him, by the gallant Rodney; that this took
place under circumstances which had never occurred before, in a way
never precisely taught, and which could not possibly have been premeditated or preconcerted; and that the signal to pass in line a-head,
beneath which my Father conceived and urged the sudden deviation
from the predetermined evolution which that signal continued to indicate, is proof as victorious against the vain assumption of a deliberate
systematic adoption of Mr. Clerk's speculations, as the unpremeditated
off-hand evolution was triumphant over the foes of Britain.
Having brought my proofs of the leading operations and circumstances of the battle, to the point at which they cease to relate to the
claim and pretensions asserted for Mr. Clerk, I should not think it
necessary to proceed further, into the ulterior operations, occurrences,
and prospects of that day, were it not for some circumstances which
have recently come to my knowledge, and some observations that
have been published, since I threw together the matter contained in
these pages.
An opinion has recently been advanced (and so far as it is favoured
by Lord Rodney's friends, this surprises me very much), that " if the
Admiral had not led the centre of the British fleet through the French
line of battle, but had followed along its lee, and then tacked to
windward of it, more ships might have been captured;"-that, in short
" the victory of the 12th of April was so far from having been gained
by the manoeuvre of breaking the line, that it produced only the effect
of allowing seventeen or eighteen ships of the French rear to encounter
a less destructive fire, than that to which they would have been exposed if their line had not been broken"-and that, by this manoeuvre,



( 81 )
"at least thirteen ships of the enemy's fleet escaped, which would
otherwise have been captured." Indeed, a professional writer goes
so far as to assert " that Rodney himself would acknowledge that
had not the centre of the British fleet led through the French line, deviating, consequently, from the continuity of his own, the victory would
have been more complete."
These views of the subject place Lord Rodney in a position far more
extraordinary than any that has hitherto been imagined.  If well
grounded, they would convert into censure, all the exultation in which
this great maritime country has ever indulged, in that great proof of
nautical ability, and tactical superiority which we have hitherto claimed,
and are admitted to have earned, in the operations of that day in particular-erase from history the praise and admiration which have hitherto
been bestowed, at home and abroad, on the manner in which the
Comte de Grasse, seeking to avoid action, was closely grappled with
and defeated, in a battle which turned the balance in which the long
boasted naval supremacy of Britain was, at that time, in a state of
fearful and anxious suspension; and permit foreign authors to write
down the defeat of the French fleet on that day to have been the fruit
of accident, and our victory but the offspring of error.
These speculations having appeared in publications which my
assertion of the real merits of this action have educed-and perhaps
from very right views, of the errors and defects of Mr. Clerk's theory
-I hold it to be my duty to the naval profession, and to the maritime reputation of the country, to meet these speculative observations
likewise, with proof which shall effectually maintain the character of
this battle, as a tactical, well conducted and splendid action, in that
bright place in the page of history, which all authorities have concurred in assigning it.
And first-The strictures which I have recited are not expressed in
what is technically called rational terms. The victory gained on the
12th of April, was gained by the manceuvres that were actually executed
on that day. It could not have been gained by movements that were
not put in practice. Other operations might have gained a victory; but
not the victory that was gained. Whether therefore a victory, more
complete than that which was gained, might or might not have been
won in another form of battle, is entirely another question; but whether the victory that was gained, might, or might not have been
made " more complete," is a question of degree, which can only be
resolved, by investigating whether the manoeuvre which, incontestibly,
gained the victory, was, or was not, properly followed up, and made
the most of. Both these questions are, certainly, open to be taken up
and reasoned upon: but they cannot be confounded with each other,
the one being hypothetical and speculative, namely, whether, if the
manoeuvre of breaking the line had not been attempted, and another
executed, a more productive victory might not have been gained;the other proceeding upon a splendid fact, to inquire, whether the most
was made of the manoeuvre that gained the victory as it is upon record.
I shall take the case which proceeds upon the facts, and with the cer


( 82 )
tainty of fact, develope all the circumstances of that case-show in what
manner that glorious day was won, and has been recorded in the triumphant annals of this country, by all writers, as a splendid tactical
operation-I shall cite the terms in which Rodney wrote it down, and
De Grasse and all his countrymen admitted it to have been the sole
cause of his defeat: I shall then deal, shortly, with the hypothetical
case.
If the effect actually produced by the operation that was executed,
be really to be regretted, as inferior to what might have been effected
by another mode of acting, and this speculation can be relied upon
with the certainty of fact, then the friends of Lord Rodney, and the
advocates of Mr. Clerk, have little reason to contend with me, for my
Father's conduct in advising and urging that operation-I shall have
been doing the reverse of contributing to my Father's reputation, by
having proved the facts of execution to have been as I have shown;
and much that has been conceded to our glory, must be blotted out of
the page of history.  I need therefore be under no such delicacy, as
that which has hitherto restrained me from going into the whole subject
of the battle; for, according to these views, I shall only charge my
Father with responsibility which he exclusively should bear.
When any attack proves so successful, as to penetrate an enemy's
defences, and throw his line, whether a fleet or an army, into disorder
and confusion, then that operation has effected all that the most consummate science can devise, or tactical skill and promptitude accomplish. The trophies that may be taken, the losses that may be sustained, the fruits, more or less abundant, that may be reaped from the
victory so gained, will entirely depend upon the manner in which the
one party follows up his success, and upon the degree in which the
other may succeed in restoring order, and rallying his divided forces.
The victory of the 12th of April, which was immediately produced by
the manoeuvre of breaking the enemy's line, was so far complete, in effect,
as to frustrate the ulterior plans of the French Admiral, (to form a junction with the Spanish fleet at St. Domingo, and then to make a combined
attack on Jamaica,) but the immediate fruits of the victory, in number
of ships captured, have always been considered unsatisfactory, compared with the confusion into which the enemy was thrown, and particularly when contrasted with some of the great battles of the last war.
If the remains of the French fleet under Vaudreuil, consisting of twentythree sail of the line, and the Spanish fleet consisting of sixteen sail of
the line, had acted as they ought to have done, after the battle, when
watched by Sir Samuel Hood with only twenty-five or twenty-six sail
of the line, there would have appeared serious cause for regret that the
successes of the 12th of April had not been more closely and vigorously followed up;* but happily no such attempt was made as that
* Desirous of showing, before I proceed further, that I am not the originator of any
such strictures as the preceding, I refer the reader to the numerous works, journals,
professional opinions, and discussions,t which were published at the time, from which
t Newspapers of the time; Annual Register, 1782; French official documents;
Rear Admiral Ekins; A Short Account of the Naval Actions of the last War, 1790,
&c. &c. &c.



( 83 )
which might have thus damped the general satisfaction with which the
nation received the accounts of this victory.
The point from which we have to set out is, that De Grasse had
positive orders to avoid battle by every possible means, in order that
he might proceed to form a junction with the Spanish fleet, at St.
Domingo, and then, with the combined forces, attack Jamaica; and
that if he had not been grappled with as he was, in a decisive and critical manner, and the British fleet had stood-on, in continuity of line,
it is very probable that he would have evaded a general action altogether, or that a battle of a far less decisive character would have
taken place.Extract of Comte de Grasse's narrative.
"L'execution ou le succes de mes ordres, ne dependait aucunement
de moi. Tel est le sort de tout general d'armee navale, fixe sur le
pont de son vaisseau, il ne peut qu'ordonner. Il ne saurait comme sur
terre, se porter rapidement a l'aile attaquante ou attaquee, pour faire
executer ses manoeuvres. 11 ignore meme ce qui peut les emp&cher
ou les retarder.
Le 8 Avril je fis appareiller de la rade de St. Pierre de la Martinique, le
convoi que je devais escorter. L'armee du Roi mit sous voiles a dix
heures pour le suivre-a 4 heures on me signala l'armee ennemie.
Je fis signal aux vaisseaux de l'arriere de forcer de voiles, et j'en diminuai pour les attendre et pour laisser prendre plus d'avance au convoi;
au soleil couchant, nous etians presque sous la Dominique, et le convoi
commencait a se ressentir du calme sous la terre de cette isle. Le 9,
au point du jour, je decouvris l'arm&e ennemie, composee de 37
vaisseaux de ligne, dont 5 a trois ponts, et de nombre de fregates
et autres batiments legers. Elle etait sous le vent et profitait de
brises pour nous approcher. Je fis  l'armee le signal de se former en
ligne de bataille, bas-bord amures, pour me mettre entre le convoi et
l'armee ennemie, et je fis au convoi le signal de forcer de voiles vers la
Guadaloupe, oj je donnai ordre par une fregate de le faire mouiller en
attendant. Je manoeuvrai ensuite pour que l'Auguste et le Zele, qui
etaient encore en calme sous la Dominique, pussent se rGunir a l'armee.
Je fus oblige de virer plusieurs fois pour les empecher d'etre coupes.
L'avant-garde  ennemie s'etant avancee, il me parut qu'elle ne
pouvait etre assez tot protegge par le reste de son armee, qui etait
encore retenue par le calme. Je la fis attaquer par mon avant-garde.
Quoique l'avant-garde Anglaise fit superieure, elle plia et fut assez maltraitee.  J'aurais pu remporter un avantage plus decisif si je n'avais
pas eu, d'un c6te, le convoi i couvrir, et de l'autre, a conserver une position qui protegeait le ralliement de l'Auguste et du ZGeil  l'armee.
J'avais lieu de craindre que l'arriere-garde ennemie ne les interceptAt,
pendant que j'aurais poursuivi l'avant-garde, ainsi je fis virer l'armee du
it appears that considerable doubt, some animadversion and dissatisfaction, were entertained on our side--surprise and vaunting on the other-that Rodney did not make
more of his victory; and that if he had, " consequences the most disastrous to the
French must have ensued."
M 2



( 84 )
Roi toute h la fois, pour aller au devant de ces deux vaisseaux. Ils me
rejoignirent a la faveur de ce mouvement. Le convoi continua la route
pendant la nuit, suivant mes nouveaux ordres, et je courus des bords
dans le canal des Saintes et de la Dominique, pour observer de pres
si l'armee Anglaise ne ferait pas quelques mouvements pour troubler
la marche de mon convoi. Le 10, i la pointe du jour, I'arm-e Anglaise
6tait sous le vent. Le Souvenir parut au vent de l'armee du Roi, et il
s'y rallia. Celle-ci continua ' courir des bords dans le mbme canal,
pour observer les ennemis.  Le convoi n'avait pas encore assez
d'avance sur I'arm-e pour que je le suivisse; je le protegeais plus
sfirement en restant en presence des ennemis."
Extrait de l'ouvrage de Joly de St. Valhier.
" L'Amiral Rodney arriva aux Indes Occidentales avec un renfort
consid6rable, et fit sa jonction avec l'Amiral Hood, sans le moindre obstacle; par cette jonction l'Amiral Rodney se trouva tres sup6rieur au
Comte de Grasse. La flotte Frangaise 6tait alors a la Martinique, oii
l'on pr6parait un nombreux convoi pour une expedition que l'on avait
projetee. Lorsque tout fut pr6t, la flotte Frangaise mit a la voile pour
se rendre h St. Dominique, oii elle devait se joindre a une flotte Espagnole et aller ensuite de concert attaquer la Jamaique. Le Marquis
de Bouillh devait commander les operations dans l'ile, et il suffit de
le nommer pour apercevoir que la conquAte de cette ile &tait certaine.
Des que la flotte Franqaise eft mis en mer, 1'Amiral Rodney se mit a
sa suite, et l'atteignit le 9 Avril, oA il y eut un de ces combats de peu
d'importance, et sans aucun avantage de part ou d'autre. L'objet de
l'Amiral Frangais dans cette circonstance devait 6tre de poursuivre sa
route avec toute la c63lrit6 possible, et d'eviter le combat d quelque
prix que ce pit tre."
The next point to be established is, that De Grasse executed his
orders with great ability in avoiding battle, covering with consummate
address, as is admitted on all hands, his convoy of transports and
store ships, and protecting with so much science and dexterity two
of his ships, which, had fallen to leeward, and were menaced by
Rodney, as to foil the British Admiral in every attempt, throughout
three successive days, to bring the French fleet to action; and I shall
show that the operations of the 12th, brought on by the French fleet
bearing up to protect the Zl16, were undertaken by De Grasse with
an expectation, which the event in some degree justified, that the
Z61We might be saved without coming to general action.
" Le 11 nous 6tians presque tous au vent des Saintes, lorsque sept
vaisseaux ennemis chasserent de pres le Magnanime, qui avait h passer
un mAt-de-lune, et le Zlde qui se r6parait de son abordage de la nuit
prec6dente. Ces deux vaisseaux, je ne sais pourquoi, portbrent leur
bord6e au sud, ce qui leur exposait, Atre pris. Je ralliai l'armbe
pour aller a leur secours, je les fis forcer les voiles, par des signaux
reiter6s, et sur ce mouvement, les vaisseaux ennemis s'arrkthrent et se
rallierent sous le gros de leur armbe. Je repris alors l'exdcution de
mon premier plan, que cette manoeuvre avait retardS. Je fis signal



( 85 )
de tenir le vent, et pour mieux indiquer mon intention h l'armee,
avant d'Atre sous la Dominique, je fis signal de virer, et je continuai h
courir des bords, mes feux et ceux de l'armee allumes.
" Outre cette precaution contre les abordages, j'avais donne une instruction par ecrit, qui aurait pu les prevenir tous.  Je m'y &tais
soumis moi-meme, elle portait: que tout bdtiment ayant les amures d basbord devait arriver sans egard & l'anciennete.
Cependant le 12?' deux j apres minuit, le Zh16 ayant les amures a
bas-bord n'arriva pas, et aborda la Ville de Paris. Il rompit son
beaupr6 et son mdt-de-misaine; mais avant que ces deux vaisseaux
se fussent degag6s ils &taient tombes sous le vent, par une suite naturelle de tout abordage.  La Ville-de-Paris moins endommag6e, reprit
le vent pour s'ilever et rejoindre l'arm6e, des l'instant qu'elle se fut
reparee; le Zele, au contraire, qui avait des mAts rompus, fut remorque6 par l'Astrke, ces deux bitiments tomb6rent encore plus sous le
vent. A cinq heures, cette fregate me signala l'approche de l'arm6e
cnnemie.
" Des que je crus l'arme'e pouvait distinguer la couleur des pavillons
de mes signaux, je fis le signal de se rallier, peu apres celui de forcer
de voiles, et ensuite celui de se preparer au combat. J'appuyai chacun de ces signaux de plusieurs coups de canon, pour marquer combien je d6sirais de cllbrit6 dans leur ex-cution; en effet, le danger du
Z6~el ctait imminent.
" Je ne pouvais pas 1'abandonner, et quoiqu'on ait pu dire, je ne le
devais pas. L'issue du combat a pu seule faire penser le contraire, mais
elle e"tait incertaine, et la perte de ce vaisseau infaillible. Or, mon premier devoir btait de le sauver sije le pouvais, et je le pouvais, puisqu'il
n'a pas it6 pris.  Ma contenance, et le mouvement ordonn6 le 11,
avaient sauvi? le Magnanime et le Z'I16. Aurais-je du les laisser prendre plut6t que d'offrir le combat? Etais-je assure que je serais oblige
de combattre le 12, pour sauver un seul vaisseau, tandis que je ne
l'avait pas et6 le 11, pour en sauver deux? Pouvais-je m'attendre h
combattre si malheureusement le 12, apr's l'avoir fait si heureusement
le 9? La manceure qui avait garanti le 9 mon convoi, I'Auguste et
le Ze'l, pouvait me procurer encore l'avantage le 12, si elle avait e6t
excutee. Pouvais-je prevoir, qu'elle ne le serait pas?  D'ailleurs
I'honneur des armes du roi, le mien ne me permettaient pas de laisser
prendre, sous mes yeux, un vaisseau hors d'etat de se defendre, bien
plus, tous les jours, comme on vient de le voir, depuis mon depart de
la Martinique, il y avait eu quelques vaisseaux traineurs dans l'arm&e;
il fallait done tous les matins, ou presenter le combat pour les rallier,
et pour les sauver, ou augmenter mon inferiorite par une lichet6
journalie're. Quelle perte, quel d&couragement pour l'arm"e! Quelle
fletrissure pour le pavillon  Franqais!  Quel general edt pu s'y
d6terminer?"-De Grasse's Narrative.
" I1 avait d6ja' gagne assez d'avance sur l'Amiral Rodney pour etre
assur6 de riussir, lorsqu'un 6venement de peu d'importance fit oublier
au Comte de Grasse le veritable objet dont il devait s'occuper.  Il y
avait dans l'arriere-garde de la flotte Franqaise, un vaisseau qui, mar


( 86 )
chant moins bien que les autres etait sur le point de tomber entre les
mains des premiers vaisseaux de l'avant-garde de la flotte Anglaise.
La perte de ce vaisseau n'6tait rien dans un moment oui Mons. de
Grasse savait qu'il avait une operation de la plus grande importance
h executer, et qu'apres sa jonction avec la flotte Espagnole, il
aurait une superiorite qui le rendrait maitre de la mer, il n'ignorait
pas qu'il etait de beaucoup inferieur h l'Amiral Rodney; enfin il savait
que tout le succes de cette campagne dependait de la celerite de sa
marche, malgre toutes ces considerations le Comte de Grasse voulut
sauver ce vaisseau et marcha lui meme B son secours."-Joly de St.
Valhier.
This movement of the Count de Grasse caused Rodney to call
in his chasers; and produced the effect he desired with respect to the
Z616, which got safe into Guadaloupe. As soon as this recall was
observed, De Grasse hauled-up on the larboard tack, determined
"de ne pas combattre que l'avant-garde," and this he hoped to do
" avec autant, et peut-&tre plus d'avantage que le 9, si elle continuait
a porter sur son centre, car il n'avait plus a veiller a la conservation
d'un convoi, et des vaisseaux traineurs comme le 9."-De Grasse's
Narrative.
At 8 the position is thus described by my Father, in a letter to
Admiral Greig, in the service of Russia.
" Thus standing towards each other upon contrary tacks, the wind
moderate, the weather clear, and the water perfectly smooth, the
Marlborough, being the leading ship of Rear Admiral Drake's division,
fetched in with the sixth or seventh ship, counting from the headmost
of Count De Grasse's line, and at half past seven was fired upon,
whereupon the signals for battle and close battle were made, our said
leading ship, supported by the quick and well-directed fire of her
followers, sailing in due and close succession, now leading large, sliding
slowly and closely down along under the enemy's line."
Whilst the British fleet was thus passing to leeward of the French
line, the opening already described was discovered, or as De Grasse
says, "la ligne ne fut plus serree."  Upon this it was, as already
proved in the Appendix, that my Father urgently advised his method
of "grappling with De Grasse," and so force him to a close and
decisive battle.
Here then the question presents itself, whether, under all the circumstances of the case, and the opportunity there appeared to beand which the result proves there was-of forcing to critical battle
the enemy whom the British admiral had been striving in vain for
several days to bring to action-whether, under all these circumstances, it would have been the duty of the admiral to resist that advice,
and let slip that opportunity of doing that which produced the victory,
-or whether it may be regretted that Sir George Rodney had not
declined that advice, and stood-on, following his leaders, for the purpose of causing his van to tack when it should have passed the rear
of the French fleet, as a mode of assuring at victory more abundant
than the victory which was gained.



( 87 )
The reader is here referred to pages 28, 29, 50; to fig. 2, plate
10, page 30; to note page 68; and to the chronicles of Keppel's
time. No person who shall have perused those, and the following
proofs and records, will doubt that if the Admiral had declined what
my Father urged, De Grasse might have evaded, as it was his duty
to do, a general action, and that Sir George Rodney would never, in
all probability, have become Lord Rodney.
To show what effect was actually, and immediately produced by
the prompt execution of the manoeuvre in question, and to prove that
it did all that a bold and decisive evolution can possibly accomplish,
I put in the following proof:1. Rodney's Narrative.
2. Memoirs of Comte De Grasse.
3. Journal of the Formidable.
4. Extract of a letter from my Father.
5. Extract of a letter from my Father to Admiral Greig, in the
service of Russia.
6. Explanations written at the time by Captain Rotherham, who
was Captain of Lord Collingwood's flag-ship at Trafalgar.
7. Extract of the Log of his Majesty's Ship Anson.
8. Naval Battles, by V. Admiral Sir Charles Ekins.
9. Dodsley's Annual Register.
10. Campbell's Lives of the Admirals.
11. Leyden Gazette.
12. Leyden Gazette.
13. Leyden Gazette.
14. Tactique Navale par M. le Viscomte de Grenier.
1. Rodney's Narrative, page 127.
" The British Admiral's ship, the Formidable, reached the enemy's
fourth ship from their van, and began a very close action within half
musket-shot, and continued such action close along the enemy's line,
under an easy sail, till an opening appeared at the third ship, a-stern of
the enemy's admiral, which gave an opportunity of breaking their line,
and putting their rear in the utmost confusion; when six of their ships
falling on board each other, in that condition the admiral and division
attacked them, tore them to pieces, and the moment they had disengaged themselves, they bore away right before the wind."
2. De Grasse's Narrative.
" Par toutes ces causes la 3me escadre avec les vaisseaux de la Ire
qui la suivaient, fut coupee de mon corps de bataille, par le reste de
l'armee Anglaise."
" Deja jointe et prise en flanc par quelques vaisseaux, et attaquee de
l'arriere par plusieurs autres, cette escadre cessa ses efforts en ma
faveur, et peu apres je fus entour6 de partout. Mon malheur me
parut inevitable, d'autant plus que ma chaloupe et mes canots avaient
et6 perces de part en part en plusieurs endroits dans le cours du combat, et qu'il m'etait impossible de transporter mon pavilion sur un
autre vaisseaux."



( 88 )
3. Journal of the Formidable.
" The immediate effect which this penetration produced, was the
bringing all together almost, if not quite in contact with each other,
the four ships of the enemy which were nearest to the point alluded
to and coming up in succession. This unfortunate groupe, composing
now only one large single object to fire at, was attacked by the Duke,
the Namur, and the Formidable, and receiving several broadsides from
each, not a single shot missing, and dreadful must have been the
slaughter. From this moment victory declared against De Grasse,
who defended himself with much courage, found himself separated
from all his ships a-stern of the point of intersection never to join
them again. All was now a scene of disorder and confusion throughout the enemy's fleet from end to end," &c. &c.
4. Extract of a letter from my Father, dated 13th of April, 1782.
After describing the Formidable passing between the third and
fourth ship a-stern of the Ville de Paris, the preceding ships having
passed our " thundering starboard side," almost in contact, proceeds to
state nearly as the journal, that all was now a scene of disorder and
confusion in the enemy's fleet from end to end, and that De Grasse
could never restore any thing like order.
5. Extract of a letter from my Father to Admiral Greig.
" The instant the enemy's order ofbattle was thus broken, the signal
for the line a-head was hauled down, and the signal for Rear-Admiral
Drake to tack and gain the wind of the enemy made, in order to secure the
victory by reuniting his division to the body of the fleet. From the
moment the Formidable led, as described, through M. De Grasse's line,
victory declared for us; the count, finding himself separated from the
Glorieux, and all ships astern of her in his line-of-battle, and all being
consequently a scene of confusion and disorder from end to end
throughout his fleet, so as to render the reunion of its parts impossible."
"This great battle was distinctly seen from an eminence on the
Island of St. Dominica, particularly the act of penetrating the enemy's
line by the Formidable, whereat the French spectators as much desponded, as did the English ones exceedingly rejoice, whereupon
some of the latter seeing the day thereby won by their countrymen,
drank freely in honour thereof, not forgetting Rear-Admiral Francis
Samuel Drake, whom they had seen lead his Majesty's fleet to battle,
in a manner worthy of his country and his family. Commodore Affleck
acted in the centre division, which, according to custom, was that of
the commander-in-chief, the fleet having consisted of three divisions."
6. Extract from Explanations written at the time, by the late Captain
Rotherham.
" A little before ten the enemy's line was broke, as represented by
the third position in the accompanying plans, when one of the most



( 89 )
glorious naval prospects a Briton ever saw, presented itself on the
smoke clearing away. The body of the French fleet to leeward, many
of them much disabled in their masts, &c., and the whole in great confusion, one ship being entirely dismasted, and in tow of a frigate,"
&c. &c.
7. Extract of the log of his Majesty's Ship Anson, taken down by the
Master.
" Admiral Rodney in the Formidable, followed by the Namur, broke
the French line, which occasioned great colfusion amongst them; three or
four of their ships got foul of each other, one of which ships sunk,* supposed to be the Diademe, of 74 guns.
" Twelve of these soon bore up and made all the sail they could in
great confusion."
8. Sir Charles Ekins's Naval Battles.
From this plain narrative, taken by the master of the Anson, and
copied by one of the young midshipmen, it is seen, that breaking the
enemy's line occasioned confusion, and confusion led to defeat.
9. From Dodsley's Annual Register, 1782.
" Sir George Rodney, in the Formidable, with his seconds the
Namur and the Duke, and immediately supported by the Canada, bore
directly, with full sail, athwart the enemy's line, and successfully broke
through it, about three ships from the centre, where M. de Grasse
commanded in the Ville de Paris. Being followed, and nobly supported, by the ships astern of his division, he wore round upon his
heel, and thus doubling upon the enemy, and closing up with their
centre, completed the separation of their line, and threw them into inextricable confusion. This bold push decided the fortune of the day.
The French, however, continued still to fight with the utmost bravery,
and the battle lasted till sun-set, which in those latitudes is almost
immediately succeeded by darkness."
10. From Campbell's Lives of Admirals, vol. vii. p. 76.
" As soon as the Formidable had broke the line, she wore round,
and a signal being made for the van division to tack, the British fleet
thus gained the wind, and stood upon the same tack with the enemy.
By this bold and masterly manoeuvre, the French line was completely
broken, and the whole thrown into confusion: the consequences were
decisively advantageous and glorious to the British; for though the
enemy still continued to fight with great gallantry, it was evident that
the victory was with Admiral Rodney. The action hitherto had been
chiefly supported by the van and centre of the British; for the rear,
under Sir Samuel Hood, being becalmed, did not for some time get
into the engagement; and when the breeze did spring up, it was so
trifling, that Sir Samuel Hood, in the Barfleur, took an hour and a half
to reach that part of the enemy's line where it had been broken
through by the Formidable: during all this time, however, he kept up
a most tremendous fire."
* This was a mistake.
N



( 90 )

11. From the Leyden Gazette, June 11, 1782.
(EXTRACTED FROM THE PARIS PAPERS.)
" A sept heures et demie notre avant-garde commenqa l'action et
prolongea la ligne Frangaise de pros; mais lorsque le tour vint au
Formidable d'entrer en action, il coupa hardiment la ligne ennemie et
fut intr6pidement soutenu par le Namur, le Duc, et tous les autres
vaisseaux de la division du centre, qui les suivirent. Alors nous nous
trouvdmes au milieu des ennemis, et nous les jetimes dans une si
grande confusion, que jamais ils ne parvinrent plus a se former durant
l'action, quoiqu'ils en fissent plusieurs fois la tentative."
12. From the Leyden Gazette. 3laidi, June 4, 178R.
(EXTRACTED FROM THE PARIS PAPERS.)
" Selon des avis particuliers, elle a 6t6 principalement gagnCe par le
bonheur, que Sir George Rodney, prc~ede du Duc, Captain Gardner, et suivi du Namur, Captain Fanshawe (qui s'acquit beaucoup
d'honneur en cette journee) eut, de rompre par le feu violent de ces
3 vaisseaux de 98 canons, la ligne Frangaise, de fayon que l'ayant
perc6e entre le 8me et le 9me vaisseau, h compter de la queue de la
flotte Frangaise, il fut suivi par le reste de son centre et de son arribre
garde. Parvenus ainsi au vent du centre et de l'avant-garde Frangaise
et les ayant doubles, ils se rangbrent en ligne de l'autre c6te; et deslors
la confusion fut si grande dans l'armee ennemie, coupee en deux, que
l'ordre ne put plus s'y retablir."
13. From the Leyden Gazette, Juin 11, 1782.
(EXTRACTED FROM THE PARIS PAPERS.)
" La ligne une fois rompue, les arnmCes combattirent par pelotons.
Les Anglois s'acharnbrent contre la Ville de Paris, et, malgr6 les effbrts
du Triomphant, et du Pluton, et de quelques autres vaisseaux pour
leur faire l~cher prise et les d6tourner de leur proie, 7 ou 8 vaisseaux
ne cesserent de la canonner."
14. L'A4rt de la Guerre sur Mer, par M. le Vicomte de Grenier, p. 5.
" Je ne parlerai point de la journee du 12 si ce n'est pour la citer
comme un exemple qui prouve que, dans toutes les occasions, les
Anglois se portent en nombre infiniment superieur sur une seule partie
de l'arme'e de leur ennemi, dans l'idee qu'aprbs l'avoir de~truite ils
peuvent plus ais6ment se rendre mditres du reste."
From this moment the gallant De Grasse thought of nothing, speaks
of nothing in the journal given in to his government in his defence, but
to rally his scattered forces. As soon as possible after his line was
couple he made the signal for a ralliement g&n"ral, and signal followed
signal, for the van to shorten sail-to tack-to wear--for the rear to
close up, to endeavour to restore some order. But all in vain; all was
lost for the brave De Grasse. All he hoped for was " imposer aux



( 91)
ennemis de ralentir leur retraite.  Mon malheur me parut inevitable.
Je continuai seul le combat, pour satisfaire a mon honneur, h celui du
vaisseau oiN le sort me fixait, et pour occuper les vaisseaux ennemis
qui auraient pu inquieter la retraite de l'escadre qui m'avait si dignement secouru; mais que pouvoient le nom et les cent canons de mon
vaisseau, contre dix autres qui le foudroyoient par plus de quatre cents
tous 'a la fois, en ne lui pretant qu'un seul cotk."
Thus De Grasse himself-Rodney-the other admirals on both
sides -professional persons of all countries-journalists--biographers
-numerous documents published     and unpublished-all concur in
ascribing the victory to the Formidable having led suddenly through
the French line. From a mass of other testimonials, I select the subjoined, to show the terms in which this evolution is recorded and
extolled by French historians.
Histoire de France, depuis la mort de Louis XIV., jusqu'd la paix. de
Versailles de 1783, par Antoine Etienne Nicolas des Odoards Fantin.
Tome huitieme, p. 274.
" L'action s'engagea de 12 AOut a huit heures du matin: l'armee
Franyaise avait l'avantage du vent: les Anglais, pour profiter de toute
leur superiorite3, s'appliquerent t rompre la ligne Frangaise, et y re-ussirent ' dix heures, en profitant, avec litchet6 d'une variation dans les
vents, qui passerent de l'est au sud est. Le Sceptre et le Glorieux
avaient vigoureusement repouss& les premiers vaisseaux Anglois qui
se present'rent pour executer cette manoeuvre; mais le dernier se vit
bientit dcmat6 par un vaisseau qui l'avait malheureusement accroch6,
et il fut forc6 d'arriver: le d6sordre, qui fut la suite de ce mouvement,
donna h l'amiral Anglais la facilite" de traverser la ligne Frangaise, en
arrie're du vaisseau amiral; alors les escadres Franfaises ne pouvant plus
combattre que par pelotons et sans ensemble, la bataille fut perdue."
Extrait de l'Histoire de France pendant le dix huiti'me Siecle, par Charles
Lacretelle.  Tome cinquidme, p. 291-2.
" Le Sceptre et le Glorieux, avaient soutenu le choc d'une grande
partie de l'avant-garde Anglaise: mais le vent changea et passant de
I'est, au sud est, servit les desseins de Rodney. A l'impe~tuosit6 de
ses mouvemens on elft dit qu'il commenqait seulement la bataille.
Les vaisseaux Frangais du centre et de l'avant-garde avaient beaucoup
souffert: l'arriere-garde restait un peu en arriere. Le Glorieux 6toit
d6mitt": quatre vaisseaux Anglais viennent d'assailler; il cide et se
retire: la ligne des Frangais est coupee: les signaux de Rodney sont
entendus: tous ses vaisseaux viennent, dans un ordre savant, suivre la route
que leur indique le Formidable.  Les Franqais vont combattre partiellement et sans concert; mais leur courage n'est point epuise."
Description du Combat du 12 Avril, 1782.--Tactique Navale de 31.
Daniel Lescallier, p. 120.
" Les 30 vaisseaux Franyais ne formoient plus une arm&he: le desordre et la dbsunion etoient extremes.  L'Amiral Franqais avoit alors
N2



( 92 )
le signal de ralliement a la ligne babord amures dans lordre renverse;
il couroit lui-meme presque vent-arriere sur la deuxieme escadre,
laquelle etoit beaucoup sous le vent du reste de l'armee; il indiquoit
par-la expressement la formation de la nouvelle ligne sur cette seconde
escadre, et imposoit a tous ceux des vaisseaux du vent qui pouvoient
manoeuvrer, l'obligation d'arriver pour prendre leur poste dans cette
ligne.
" II abandonnoit par-la les vaisseaux degrees du corps-de-bataille et
de la troisieme escadre, qu'une douzaine de vaisseaux Anglais etablis
d6ja babord amures, et peu maltraites, chasserent aussitot que le vent
recommenca a souffler. Ce signal de ligne babord, joint aux manoeuvres
de 1'Amiral Samuel Hood, qui commandoit cette division de l'armee
Anglaise, firent bient6t separer, sans ressources, les vaisseaux degrees
d'avec le reste de notre armee: et plusieurs autres furent ensuite
coup6s et dans le plus grand danger."
The following is from an officer of the French navy, who, though
not in the service at that time, heard the battle often discussed by
those who were in the action.
" I have an authority of some weight for being of opinion that the
victory of the English, in that action, is to be attributed solely to the
bold manoeuvre of breaking through the enemy's line-that authority
is Admiral Trogoff, who commanded the French fleet at Toulon in
1783. I was two years under his immediate command; he entertained much friendship towards me, and often took pleasure in talking
to me upon naval tactics, by way of giving me instruction, and showing
his satisfaction for the enthusiasm he saw I had for my profession. I
recollect perfectly well his mentioning more than once the action
between Admiral Rodney and Comte de Grasse, and attributing the
victory of the English entirely to their taking advantage of the vicious
formation of the French line, which was, according to his expression,
sottement trop itendue, which not only exposed it to be broken through,
but rendered it impossible for several ships to take any share in the
action."
The rear and part of the centre of the French fleet having thus
been thrown into " inextricable confusion," by the blow that took such
prompt advantage of the fatal error of not keeping in compact order,
were unable to close to their leaders; and the van, instead of taking
and regulating distance from the centre, increased the confusion by
drawing a-head out of interval. The result of this, as an effect produced by the manoeuvre that had been executed, was, that, at about
11 A.M. another opening was observed to have taken place in the
French line. Thus the disorder and confusion into which it had been
thrown, extended throughout, and gave the most abundant prospects
of capturing or destroying a great portion of the French fleet.
It has lately been said, (and the tendency of the stricture is not
only to disparage the manoeuvre of the Formidable, but to lower this
battle in the estimation of the public,-in the review of the historian,and consequently in the consideration of posterity,) " that the Bedford,



( 93 )
as well as the Formidable, made her way through the enemy's line,
though in a different part;" and that " Commodore Affleck was just as
deserving as Sir George Rodney, or the Captain of the Fleet, of the
honour of executing the over-vaunted manoeuvre of breaking the
enemy's line, for that the gallant Affleck achieved an exploit precisely
similar to that which Sir Charles Douglas advised and Rodney executed." Affleck was a gallant and most excellent officer.-No one
knows this better than 1-no one was more assured of this than my
Father-for no one respected Affleck more. I know a great deal of
this part of the battle too; and in no part of this exposition of the
real circumstances of this celebrated action shall I be found to vindicate more effectually the skill of those who conducted it, and the
character it ought ever to retain, than by the following proof that the
passage of the Bedford through the enemy's line was not fortuitous,
simultaneous with, or similar to the breaking of the line by the
Formidable; but a movement directed by signal from the Admiral
to take advantage of the disorder which had ensued in another
quarter from the manoeuvre which he had executed nearly three years
earlier. The Bedford did what she was ordered, and she did it most
gallantly. I have not, as the reader will have perceived, advanced
a single argument in the whole of this controversy which is not
founded upon, and supported by, authentic documentary proof which
cannot be disputed; and here I refer to the log of the Bedford, an
extract from which is given at page 26, in which the reader will find
entries by which it is proved, that the Bedford, after commencing
fire at 9 A.M., stood-on, engaging, to leeward, the French van, till
she came opposite to an opening ready made to her hands, in the manner
I have already explained, when, having no enemy to fire at, she ceased
firing at about 11 A.M.: at twelve minutes past 11 the Admiral made
her signal to come within hail, and at fifteen minutes past 11 the signal
to tack,-obeying which, and the signal for close action, the Bedford
led through the interval which was then open to her, and at noon bore
down in pursuit of the enemy's van. A compound fracture, the resultant of the first, was thus inflicted-by signal-on the French fleet,
and the enemy fled in three different directions!
Now there, in the centre division of the enemy's fleet, thus cut off
from both wings-surrounded-in confusion-and, as it appears by
numerous accounts, in dismay-there, as well as in the crippled rear,
at this auspicious crisis, were abundant fruits, in prospect, of a victory
more productive of trophies-of a defeat more signal-than any that
had ever been achieved. That part of the dispersed fleet, ought not
to have been suffered to reunite with the others; but that portion
was not pursued; it remained separated from the other fragments,
which were flying in two different directions, till the ensuing night,
when it rejoined the ships of the southern division which had likewise
escaped. There is no part of the transactions of that brilliant day
which exhibits more distinctly the value and vigour of the sudden
and unexpected evolution, than the opportunity which it afforded
to the rear of the British fleet, to complicate still more De Grasse's



( 94 )
disaster.  Whether we refer to the position of the French fleet as
proved by De Grasse-or to Admiral Ekins's standard work-or to
Clerk's sixth plate, page 285, fig. 9-or to plates 3 and 4 of Captain
White's work-or to any other authority that ever was published,
or is extant -no one can dispute that the French fleet was, at this
time, in a state of the greatest possible confiusion; and either all that
body of authentic record and evidence, which I have amassed from
all quarters, is erroneous, or that confiesion was produced by the manceuvre. That the British fleet was itself divided, by the central movement which broke the line of the enemy, is so true, that two lines in
position and movement cannot be made to divide each other, by their
respective centres, without " breaking their own continuity;" and to
object that a manoeuvre which should have the effect of breaking the
continuity of your own line, ought, on that account, to be avoided,
would be to renounce, under all circumstances, the " severing that of
the enemy" by central operations or by divisions, and to reject all combinations by which a part of an enemy's fleet may be cut off, or attacked
on both sides. According to this, indeed, Rodney and my Father were
wrong, and so was Nelson at the Nile and at Trafalgar; and so no
more need be said upon the subject. I do acknowledge that Lord
Rodney was placed in a situation of great difficulty and responsibility,
in deciding whether to follow up his successes by a close and vigorous
pursuit, or to bring the fleet to. By what he had done, when the
expediency of pursuing became a question, Rodney had gained a
splendid victory, which he might very fairly consider would defeat the
purpose for which the fleets of France and Spain had been sent to the
West Indies; and his reasons for not pursuing, as stated in his memoirs, are certainly entitled to great consideration, and may acquit
him of all blame. No person ever did, nor can any one doubt, the
gallantry of Rodney's spirit: to this day, many approve his decision
not to attempt more; and, judging by the misconduct of the French
and Spanish admirals, no prejudicial consequence resulted to the
country, from this decision. But then, there was great want of enterprise on the part of the enemy, in not making use of the superiority
which, after the battle, they still had. The propriety of a decision,
formed in such a case, should not be judged by what the enemy did not
do, but by what they might have efected; and, as at Cintra, so in this
case, such resolves become the legitimate property of professional
writers and historians, to investigate, and deal with, as may be for the
advantage of the country, in like cases, for the future. Without saying
more upon this point, I must here declare, that pursuit was my
Father's opinion and advice.  He earnestly and urgently recommended a close, vigorous, and continued pursuit by those ships
which appeared to have suffered the least, and which were most
at hand to pursue; and if, in consideration of having done so much, it
may not be regretted that this advice was not adopted, yet, if any
doubt is to be entertained, whether everything that could be done, was
done, to capture more ships, that doubt can only be resolved by
investigating whether, in the state of the battle towards the after


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noon, there were, or were not, circumstances decidedly propitious to
the prospect of picking up many more winged birds, flying in every
direction, and whether in this way the victory might not have been
made more complete.
Reasoning upon the probable issue of the advice which my Father
gave, it appears to me, that there is far less of risk in following up
a successful operation on the sea, than on the land. The effect that has
been produced in the preceding battle, is usually more apparent on the
flood than on the field. The enemy may be obscured, occasionally, at
sea, by clouds of smoke hanging on the surface of the water: so is he
in the field, and, moreover, enveloped in dense clouds of dust. The
sphere of naval operation is an apparent plain, open to view when
not interrupted by passing smoke: not so the movements of an army
taking proper advantage of the inequalities of the earth's surface,-profitting by the concealment which woods and bushes afford, and availing
themselves of the natural defences which are to be found in all countries. The order and direction in which a discomfited fleet retires or
runs away, are soon seen; and are necessarily limited in combination,
course and speed, by the force, and direction of the wind-by the
degree of injury, likewise apparent, which the ships of the enemy may
have sustained. The capability or incapability of further resistance,
may therefore be pretty accurately estimated at sea, by observing the
condition to which the material of the enemy's fleet is reduced; and
no limit is assigned to the intensity of pursuit, by the wasted physical
energies of men, exhausted, as on shore, by the " heat and burthen of
the day." The seaman, his exertions in the fight over, finds rest, and
is restored to strength by an immediate supply of good food, whilst his
vessel carries him onward to reap the fruits of his recent victory.
Dismasted ships of the largest size, may be picked up, and secured, by
very inferior vessels; and as to a night pursuit, there will be no difficulty in making out what direction the enemy's ships take, if victorious
vessels stick close to them. It appears to follow from all this, that
an Admiral who has succeeded in throwing the enemy's fleet into
confusion, and in driving it into disorderly flight, whilst a large portion
of his own fleet is in efficient condition, has done but half his business
if he do not follow up his successes vigorously, and that a decided
advantage gained over an enemy in battle at sea, should always be
attended with great results.
Entertaining such opinions, the Captain of the Fleet advised and
earnestly recommended a close and continued pursuit of the enemy's
flying ships. The signal was actually bent, and ready to hoist, when
Sir George Rodney determined to bring the fleet to. Forced into
this part of the subject, by the assertion that, " whether of his own will,
or by the suggestion of others, Rodney imprudently broke the continuity of his own line, and so suffered twelve or thirteen ships to
escape, which might otherwise have been captured," no reflection
will, I trust, be cast upon me for entering upon this very delicate part
of the proceedings of the day, which it was not my intention to
touch. It is, however, no less incumbent upon me to vindicate my



( 96 )
Father from this stricture, than it was to defend him upon the other
point; and this I have effectually done, by proving, first, that it was by
breaking the continuity of the British line, in order to sever that of the
enemy, that the victory was gained; and secondly, that in the confusion
which that evolution produced, there manifestly was, in the opinion of
the most experienced officers, a prospect of capturing many more ships
than were taken; and, consequently, since a question has been raised
why the victory was not made more complete, it can only be to the
state of the case as I have proved it, that this question can be referred.
The operation, which it is contended should have been adopted by
Rodney, in place of standing through the French line, is, that he
should have followed his van, in line a-head, as the signal at his own
mast-head designated; and then cause the van to tack, in succession,
to windward of his enemy's rear, after having sufficiently passed it to
be able to double upon it. This stricture proceeds upon the Itypothesis, that if the British fleet, instead of breaking the French line, had
stood-on, and then tacked in succession from the van, it might have
fetched to windward of, and overtaken the French rear, and so placed
it between two fires. Now the skill and tact which perceived, at
a glimpse, the decisive importance of taking advantage, of the opportunity so unexpectedly offered, of breaking the enemy's line-and
so crippling and intercepting a part, as to expose it, unavoidably, to
whatever subsequent operations might appear best calculated to reap
the fruits of that decisive operation,-had no sooner effected that
object, than the Admiral and the Captain of the Fleet saw in what
manner that decisive evolution might be improved, by combining with
it the very movement which it is contended should have been applied
solely. It is in proof on all sides, as I have shown, that it was
consequent to the breaking of the line that the French ships on the
larboard hand suffered such dreadful havoc as to impede the progress
of the centre and rear. If therefore that operation had not been
executed, the British fleet, after having passed, would not have been
able to overtake the French fleet on the other tack, because the ships
of the British van, in running down under the lee of the French line,
were, in general, very severely crippled; some incapable for a very
considerable time, and others altogether, of tacking and keeping their
wind to windward of the enemy; far less of overtaking them. The
following is an extract from the Log of the leading ship, the Marlborough:" 12th April, 1782.-At five A. M. saw the enemy's fleet bearing
E. S. E.; at six saw one of the enemy's ships with her foremast gone,
a frigate having her in tow steering to the S.W.; Admiral made the
signal for the Valiant and Monarch to chase ditto, and the signal for
the line a-head two cables distance; the Admiral made the signal for
the rear division to lead; half-past ditto the Admiral made the signal
for the commander of the second post to send out ships in chace, and
the signal to form the line N. N. E. and S. S.W.; the signal to form
the line a-head one cable distance; quarter-past seven the signal to
engage the enemy, and to keep in closer order of sailing. At forty



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minutes past seven we began to engage the van of the enemy's fleet;
at forty minutes past eight hove to, to repair damages, after passing and
engaging twenty-two of the enemy's line; found four main shrouds, five
fore ditto, main and fore-top-mast spring stays, all the fore-top-mast
back stays, main-top-gallant stays and rigging shot away; all the sails
much shattered; people employed knotting and splicing the standing
rigging; five shot between wind and water; two lower deck ports much
damaged; great many shot holes starboard side; the lower sill of one
of the upper deck ports shot away; the upper deck shot through in
two places; one of the upper and lower deck guns dismounted; the
fore and main-top-masts and top-gallant-masts wounded in several
places; the fore mast cross-tree shot away and main yard wounded,
also mizen and cross jack yard, and spare main-top-sail yard. Eighteen
minutes past nine the signal made to tack; twenty-three minutes past
ditto to wear; wore ship, as per signal. Had killed in the action John
Porter and Laurence Lyne, seamen, and George Hunt, marine; seventeen wounded, two of whom lost a leg each. Ten the signal to come
to a closer engagement; twenty-five minutes past ditto the signal for
the Rear-Admiral and his division to make more sail; at meridian the
N. W. end of Dominica, N.E. by E. dis. seven leagues."
The following is an extract from the Log Book of the Prince
George, the sixth ship from the van:
" April, 12th, 1782.--At eight the van of the British fleet having
fetched near the enemy's van, began to engage, which became general
as the ships came up, the fleets passing on different tacks; three minutes after eight Rear-Admiral Drake made the signal for battle;
eight minutes ditto for the fleet to close and for close action; ten
minutes after nine, having passed the French line, left off engaging;
had in the action all our sails, standing and running rigging cut to
pieces; the yards and masts all wounded, the mainmast in several
places, the foremast dangerously; forty minutes after nine carried away
the foremast about a third above the deck, which fell within board, and
stove the pinnace and flat boat to pieces, and broke down the skeids,
by which they came on deck; at ten Rear-Admiral Drake made the
signal to tack, and soon after changed it to the signal to veer; fortyfive minutes after ten to renew the action; at eleven to tack, and gain
the wind of the enemy; the Triton came with orders to stay by and
give us all the assistance in her power; employed clearing the wreck,
refitting the rigging, &c.; the fleet in action standing to the southward. Had in the action nine men killed and twenty-four wounded."
The following is an extract from the Log Book of the Anson:
" April 12th, 1782.-At forty minutes past seven we began to fire
at the enemy; the first ship that we engaged was the twenty-fourth
ship from the enemy's rear: we kept our wind, and passed close alongside, to leeward of their line. At eight we received the whole broadside from the Ville de Paris: at half-past eight Captain Blair was
killed: at nine, having passed all the French line, we ceased firing.
Our centre and rear still engaging the enemy, the admiral made the
o



( 98 )

signal for a closer action. We began to repair our rigging (it being
much cut), so as to enable us to keep our station in the line. At halfpast nine the admiral made the signal to tack: ditto hauled down, and
the signal made to wear. We wore ship, but were so much disabled
that we could not keep up with Admiral Drake: our damages received
were, the main-top-sail yard, cross-jack yard, fore and main-top-gallant masts shot away; the fore, main and mizen yards much wounded;
the fore and main masts and bowsprit slightly wounded; all our stays
and rigging shot away; two shots betwixt wind and water; and our
sails shot all to ribbons."
It is unnecessary to refer to the Logs of the other ships; but it is
plain,-(from the preceding extracts on the one hand, and from what is
in proof at pages 87, 88, et seq. as to the tremendous havoc produced in
the French fleet by, and consequent to, the manoeuvre of breaking
their line,) that if the previous movement had passed off indecisivelythat is, if the Formidable had not stood through the French line,the condition of our van ships would still have been as shown in
the preceding Logs, because their operation and exchange of cannonade
in passing along the lee of the French line was in no way subject to
alteration, by what might follow in their rear-whether the decision
of Rodney had been to follow his leaders, or to stand through the
enemy's line; whilst, on the other hand, it is in proof, that it was by
breaking the continuity of his own line, and standing through that of
the French, that their whole fleet was thrown into a degree of confusion that rendered its defeat certain. If that evolution had not been
executed, that effect would not have been produced.    Then as to the
other mode, if adopted exclusively, how was the Marlborough, the
Prince George, the Anson, and other ships--" their masts wounded
in several places-most of the shrouds, stays and running-rigging shot
away,"-how was a vessel without a fore mast and bowsprit-how was
another without a main-top-sail yard, to tack, fetch to windward of,
and overtake a fleet which, in this case would, actually, have been in
a far better condition than ours, and in a position more favourable for
getting away and avoiding a general action, as De Grasse was enjoined
to do? It is, therefore, extravagant to assert that, if the opportunity,
which it is in proof stopped the progress of the French fleet and
brought on a close decisive battle, had been declined, the British
fleet would have been able to overtake the French on the other tack,
after having permitted it to pass, and so might have gained a more
brilliant victory.*
* It is an extraordinary circumstance that the very work (Naval Researches, p. 101)
which asserts that this might have been done, contains the most direct admission, and
affords the strongest proof, that the French fleet would, on the contrary, have been able
to avoid close action, if their line had not been broken; for it is affirmed, in that work,
that the French ships possessed a decided superiority in sailing-that they had ever
been able to get away to windward of our fleets, when they did not wish to engageand that had it not been for accidents which happened to some of their ships, Sir
George Rodney might not have been able to overtake the enemy. Those observations
were, it is true, written with reference to the battle of the 9th; but they attach,
equally, to all the other rencontres of that time. The following is a copy of the



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The officer who, in manoeuvring or in battle, declines to seize any
present advantage that fortune may place within his reach, in the expectation of finding some more favourable opportunity thereafter,-and
he particularly who acts thus in the uncertain contingencies of naval
operations-does not deserve success. The advantages which presented
themselves on the 12th of April were not problematical; they were real,
as the issue proved. I have incontestibly shown that the van of the
British Fleet was not in a condition to execute the movement upon
which the author of the Naval Researches would, it appears, have
entirely depended for the expected " more complete victory." What
then would have been Sir George Rodney's situation-what would he
not have deserved, if, under the circumstances which I have proved, he
had refused my father's advice, and, thus permitting the opportunity
which he urged of striking so decisive a blow to pass, the greater part
of the British Fleet had been left a-stern of the enemy, not only disabled, but becalmed?     Where and how, and when would Sir George
Rodney have been able to retrieve this, and make up for the disappointment which assuredly would have ensued?        Why, it was this very
standing-on to tack in succession that blemished the battle of the 14th
of February, and left the brunt of the conflict upon Nelson, supported
by a few ships which followed him in defiance of signal; and it were
easy to point out great errors in other cases from the manoeuvre of
standing-on, and then tacking in succession.
Whatever importance professional men may be disposed to attach in
principle to the manoeuvre of tacking the British van in succession to
double upon the French rear, it is greatly to my satisfaction, and
vastly to the credit of the tactical skill displayed in the operations of
that great day, to be able to show that this very manoeuvre was combined in the best way, with the evolution of first intercepting the
enemy's progress, in a manner calculated to produce effects which the
suggested manoeuvre could not have effected singly, and that it was
directed by signal from the Formidable as soon as she had executed
the daring and decisive movement. The Logs and Journals which I
have cited at pages 96 and 97 prove this. It is thus entered in the Formidable's log, and recorded by my Father in the journals and letters which I have inserted at page 88.-" The instant the enemy's
order of battle was thus broken, the signal for line a-head was hauled
down, and the signal made for Rear Admiral Drake to tack and gain
passage:-" The French naval architecture had attained a degree of excellence in the
construction and capacity of the ships of that nation, which gave them serious advantages over us in point of sailing, either on a wind, or going large; and from their
having a greater depth of hold, they possessed a decided superiority in the most essential point of keeping a better wind. The fineness of their construction gave them
important facilities in smooth water: hence, in a fine-weather climate, where nautical
skill is not so frequently required as under an inconstant sky and on our more boisterous ocean, they could at all times either commence or avoid close action at pleasure:
hence also the facility with which they got away to windward of our fleets when they
no longer wished to engage; and, most likely, had it not been for the accidents which
happened to some of their ships in consequence of the battle of the 9th, Sir George
Rodney might not have been able to overtake the fleet of the enemy, even had both
been equally in possession of the breeze."



( 100 )
the wind of our enemy, in order to secure the victory, by re-uniting
his division to the body of the fleet." The Marlborough's log acknowledges this signal at eighteen minutes past nine, when she tried to tack,
but could not, on account of the damage she had sustained; and at
twenty-five minutes past nine, wore by signal. After this, a succession of signals was made to the van-for close engagement-for the
division to make more sail-for the van to close to the centre, &c.
These signals were obeyed, with every practicable promptitude, by the
Rear Admiral, and by every ship in his division-all gallantly emulous
to close, as directed, with the enemy. If to this it be objected, that
this double was not speedily or fully effected, that assertion of the inability of the van to do so, is the strongest admission of the grievous
error there would have been, if, depending upon the feasibility of that
ulterior operation, Sir George Rodney had declined the advice to deviate from the continuity of his own line, and had, consequently, neither
severed nor crippled that of the enemy in the manner which I have
put in proof. The signals directing the van of the British Fleet to
tack and double upon the French rear, were made quite as soon as
they could have been, if that evolution had been the only, and not the
secondary object. The Marlborough did not cease firing on the rear
of the French fleet till 40 minutes past eight, A. M. Having passed,
she hove to, to repair damages; and at eighteen minutes past nine,
acknowledged the Admiral's signal to tack and double on the French
rear. Thus, all the effect which such a movement was capable of producing, was superadded, with additional facility, to a decisive effect previously produced; and the combination was so skilful, that I have no
doubt the proofs which I have exhibited in reply to strictures, which
(though this might not have been intended) would reflect much discredit
on the tactical character of this great battle, will not only vindicate,
but illustrate the skill and conduct of those who gained that important
victory, and still more indelibly establish it in naval history, as the best
tactical battle that ever was fought.
I here need but a few words to conclude. Opinions similar in some
respects to the preceding, appear to have been entertained by some
other persons, and in particular by a literary gentleman of great
celebrity, who condemn the manoeuvre of breaking the line from the
leeward, as laid down by Mr. Clerk; and who, dissatisfied with the
result of this battle, in number of ships taken, have thereby been led
to inquire, whether a more satisfactory result might not have been obtained. I have demonstrated the errors and extravagancies of Mr.
Clerk's theory, and the absurdity of the pretensions which have been
urged for him; and I have proved the futility of these strictures, and
clearly shown, that an indecisive disgraceful issue must have been the
consequence, if the Admiral had declined to adopt the advice of the
captain of the fleet to stand through the enemy's line. Mr. Clerk's
notions of the conditions of the cross attack, and the vain pretensions
urged for'him, may therefore be treated as they deserve, without
touching a sprig of the wreath, or altering a word of the inscriptions,
which have hitherto been to the glory of the unpremeditated, unex


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pected, and masterly evolution, which the enemy whom it defeated
had so much reason to regret. If, therefore, there be any thing for
us to regret in the proceedings of that day, it can only be that more
had not been made of the confusion into which the French fleet were
thrown by that decisive evolution. Those who assert that we should
regret that Sir George Rodney, " whether upon his own opinion or
upon the advice given him, had been induced to stand through the
enemy's line," must be sensible that this observation imposes upon me
the necessity of vindicating the advice that was given throughout that
memorable day. If any there be who still entertain such regrets,
they must not only themselves utterly disbelieve, but by overpowering facts must disprove and discredit all the authentic documents,
entries, letters, opinions, and other British evidence by which the reverse has been established in these pages. This would discharge
from the pages of our own history, the eulogies which up to this day
have been ascribed to the excellence and efficacy of that blow, and
release all foreign authorities from the acknowledgments which the
successful evolution won, to the glory and security of our country,
fifty years ago. Who shall venture to set about this? Who shall
proclaim to those who suffered and acknowledged defeat from the application of that masterly manoeuvre, that they may write down their
discomfiture to have been but the offspring of error?-Who shall
declare our glorious victory to have been but a favour bestowed undeservedly by capricious Fortune, upon a false, faulty, and much-tobe-regretted movement?





APPENDIX.





APPENDIX I.
NOTES WRITTEN BY LORD RODNEY,
UPON THE MARGINS OF MR. CLERK'S TRACT,
Sent to His Lordship in 1788 or 1789,
AS PRINTED IN THE
FIRST    EDITION      OF MR. CLERK'S ESSAY,
IN 1790.
" ADMIRAL BYNG,.. by flying to Gibraltar,* abandoning Minorca."Part I., Introduction, p. 14.
* " Note.-His orders were, to be most attentive to Gibraltar, by the
Council of War, which was unanimous, and of course equally to blame with
their Admiral; but his orders were vague from the Admiralty."
" During the course of the wars with the Dutch, before mentioned,
much improvement was made, particularly in the invention of signals.
But the naval instructions* then framed," &c.-Part I., Introduction,
p. 16.
*" Note.-The naval instructions want a thorough reformation; but'tis not
in the power of every commander-in-chief to make what additions he pleases."
("...A circumstance which is plainly a confirmation that their
system or mode is different from ours, and that they are uniformly
determined never to be brought to make the attack, if it can be
avoided."*-Part I., Introduction, p. 17.
* " Note.-This is too true."
S... That, in bringing a single ship to close action, and in conduct
during that action, the British seamen have never been excelled."*Part I., Introduction, pp. 17, 18.
* " Note.-And it is well known, that attempting to bring to action the
enemy, ship to ship, is contrary to common sense, and a proof that that Admiral is not an officer, whose duty is to take every advantage of an enemy, and



APPENDIX I.

to bring, if possible, the whole fleet under his command to attack half or part
of that of the enemy, by which he will be sure of defeating the enemy, and
taking the part attacked, and likewise defeating the other part by detail, unless
they make a timely retreat. During all the commands Admiral Rodney has
been entrusted with, he made it a rule to bring his whole force against a part
of the enemy's, and never was so absurd as to bring ship against ship, when the
enemy gave him an opportunity of acting otherwise; and, as he told the King
before any of his actions took place, that he would always take the lee gage;
first, because it prevented the enemy's retreat; secondly, because if any of his
ships were disabled, by putting their helm a-weather the next ship closed the
line, and secured the disabled ship."
" Hence, if the American colonies shall accomplish their wishedfor separation, Britain, by her force being more collected, and with
these resources, will yet be more powerful than ever."*-Part I., Introduction, p. 20.
* " Note.-This I believe to be the fact; for I am convinced that the
British fleet, when full manned, never had 2,000 Americans on board them:
they were never to be trusted."
" Let us suppose a ship of eighty guns wishing to avoid the effects
of a close engagement, but, at the same time, lying-to."*-Part I.,
Sect. II., p. 24.
* t' Note.-By lying-to, she would expose herself to be attacked with advantage by the enemy. The only way to be on her guard, is to be on easy
sail, and ready to make more sail, bear away, or wear, as occasion may
require."
".. Outsailing B, who would be obliged to repair his rigging,
before he can be in order to follow, and make a second attack?"*Part I., Sect. IV., p. 31.
* " Note.-This is incontrovertibly true, and what an enemy who wishes to
fight at a distance will always do, and keep the enemy from closing with him."
"... Two or three miles to leeward."*-Part I., Sect. IV., p. 33.
* " Note.-The French almost always act in this manner."
" That F will also have a greater facility of withdrawing from
battle, the whole, or any one of the disabled ships of his line."-Part I.,
Sect. IV., p. 40.
* " Note.-All this will certainly be the case."
S... The French, have never once shown a willingness to risk the
making of the attack, but invariably have made choice of, and earnestly
courted a leeward position."*-Part I., Sect. IV., p. 40.
* i" Note.-A lee gage has certainly a very great advantage, and should
always le taken when a proper opportunity offers of being close; and in case
the enemy retreats, the heaviest ships should be placed in the van, to attack
the enemy's rear, which, as the heavy ships advance along the enemy's line,
will leave an easy conquest to the fleet that follows."... The Intrepid having lost her fore-top mast, and her way by



APPENDIX I.

iii

that means being stopped, occasioned a disorder among the ships immediately astern, some endeavouring to pass her to windward, and
some to leeward."*-Part I., Examples, Sect. I., p. 49.
* " Note.-They ought all to have gone to leeward, as the enemy were to
leeward."
" IV. Admiral Graves' Engagement with the French Fleet off the
Mouth of the Chesapeak, the 5th of September, 1781."*-Part I.,
Examples, p. 79.
* " Note.-In this battle, the whole of the British rear (though to windward) never came within two random shot, though the signal was for close
battle. This I had from Count de Grasse, who commanded the French fleet,
and seemed astonished at the behaviour of the British rear.-Vide Admiral
Graves' letter of complaint to the Admiralty."
"(... Who had been before greatly hurt in their rigging, by making
the attack as they did, insomuch, that hardly a ship was able to stand
after, and prevent the enemy from forming a new line to leeward."Part I., Examples, Sect. IV., p. 84.
* " Note.-Had Admiral Rodney's letters or orders been obeyed, the
British fleet had been six more line of battle ships; and the British fleet had
been off the Chesapeak before the French, and of course Lord Cornwallis'
army had been preserved.-Vide letter to Sir Peter Parker at Jamaica, and
his letter to the commanding Admiral in America, both of which were timely
received, but neglected to be complied with.-Vide his letters of correspondence 1781, which have been printed."
" 'At forty-five minutes after six, I gave notice, by public signal, that
my intention was to attack the enemy's rear with my whole force.' "*Part I., Examples, Sect. V., p. 87.
* " Note.-And never altered."
" 'At thirty minutes after eight A. M. I made a signal for a line of
battle a-breast, each ship bearing from the other N. by W. and S. by
E., and bore down upon the enemy.' "t-Part I., Examples, Sect. V.,
p. 87.
t " Note.-In a standing line."
" ' At fifty minutes after eleven A. M. I made the signal for every
ship to bear down, and steer for her opposite in the enemy's line.' "*Part I., Examples, Sect. V., p. 88.
* " Note.-That was in a slanting position, that my leading ships might
attack the van ships of the enemy's centre division, and the whole of the
British fleet be opposed to only two-thirds of the enemy. The moment before
the battle began, the signal for the line was hauled down, and no other signal
kept up but for battle, and close battle, which signals were repeated by the
frigates appointed for the purpose."
" F, The enemy in line as before."*-Part I., Examples, Sect. V.,
p. 92.
* " Note.-Standing on in a very extensive line of battle, which gave the
b2



iv

APPENDIX I.

Admiral an opportunity of bringing the whole British fleet against a part of
the enemy; and had his orders been obeyed, the whole of the enemy's centre
and rear divisions had been disabled before their van could have made a motion to assist them."
" Why did Sir George change his resolution?"*-Part I., Examples,
Sect. V., p. 94.
* "Note.-It was never changed. His fleet disobeyed his signal. His rear
tacked without orders, and his van disobeyed and stood to windward of the
enemy's van at a distance, and scarce within random shot."
" It has been said, that the French Admiral, upon perceiving the approach
of the British fleet, according to the first intention, broke out with an exclamation, That six or seven of his ships were gone!"*
* " Note.-This is true, and he sent him word that if his signals had been obeyed, he should
have been his prisoner. The Marquis De Bouillie told him the same afterwards."
"... He might have been assured of getting every ship so disabled
by the raking fire of the enemy, as to be incapable of any future pursuit."*-Part I., Examples, Sect. V., p. 95.
* " Note.-The Sandwich, the Admiral's ship, was totally disabled; her
foremast gone, her inainyard down; yet in that condition she beat the French
Admiral and his two seconds, though unsupported; but in less than twentyfour hours, such was the diligence of his officers and seamen, that all was
aloft again, and in pursuit of the enemy."
S... And as they sailed far better than his Majesty's fleet.' "*Part I., Examples, Sect. V., p. 99.
* " Note.-All the British fleet but four very foul, leaky, and much out of
repair."
"' His Majesty's fleet, by this manoeuvre, had gained the wind.' "*Part I., Examples, Sect. V., p. 100.
* " Note.-Though the wind would then have permitted the British fleet to
get to windward, the moment the British van had got near the enemy, the signal
was ready to take the lee gage close, had not the wind changed six points at
once."
" 'The enemy kept an awful distance till the 19th instant, when I
was in hopes that I should have weathered them.' "*-Part I., Examples, Sect. V., p. 101.
* " Note.-Though the British ships might have had it in their power to
have weathered the enemy's van, Sir George never intended to have taken the
weather gage, but to have bore away close under the enemy's lee, and prevented
their getting into Martinique, and have engaged them close to leeward."
".. His Majesty's ships being such as not to allow a longer
pursuit.' "*--Part I., Examples, Sect. V., p. 102.
* " Note.-Every day during the cruize Admiral Rodney had letters from
many of his captains that their ships were sinking, and many of them were
never in a condition again to go to sea, and two sunk in St. Lucia."



APPENDIX I.                           V
" Extract of a letter from Rear-Admiral Sir Samuel Hood, May 4,
1781."*/-Part I., Sect. III., p. 107.
* " Note.-There is a mistake in this letter.  The Amazon joined Sir
Samuel Hood the day before, and gave intelligence that a superior fleet was
to windward of the island. Sir S. Hood, instead of turning to windward of the
Diamond Rock, amused himself in forming a line of battle, and lay-to all night,
holding a council, and gave the four sail he had been so long blockading an
opportunity to get out and join their fleet; whereas, had he been to windward
of the Diamond Rock, he had prevented the junction, and had it in his power
either to have given battle, or retreated into the Bay of Gross Islet, St. Lucia.
By laying-to, the lee current drove him to leeward, and afterwards, by keeping from the wind, gave the enemy an opportunity of cutting him off St.
Lucia, where all our stores and provisions were deposited."
S'... Though the French Admiral had ten sail astern of him, and
three others to windward, he did not make a nearer approach.' "*Part I., Sect. III., p. 109.
* " Note.-See Admiral Rodney's letter to the Governor of Barbadoes on
this occasion, to know the real truth of this strange affair.-Vide his correspondence with the Governor, &c. 1781."
" ' At seven, made sail to the northward, it being the opinion of the
officers of the squadron acquainted with this country, that it was the only
way of getting to windward, as the currents run very strong to leeward,
to the southward of St. Vincent's.' "*-Part I., Sect. III., p. 113.
* " Note.-The whole affair, and Admiral Hood's letter to Sir G. Rodney,
was such that he sent the original letter to the Admiralty, that it might not
be thought he had made a mistake in copying."
" Mr. Lestock still astern."*-Part I., Sect. III., p. 128.
*" Note.-The conduct of Admiral Lestock from the beginning, was such as
plainly showed he meant to betray his country, even to his Admiral. The night
before the battle, when Mathews made the signal to bring-to, Lestock, instead
of coming into the wake of his commander-in-chief, agreeable to the known
practice, brought-to three leagues to windward, by which means, when the
signal was made in the morning for the line abreast, the whole was greatly
delayed, and he never was in his proper station. Had any Captain under his
command acted in that mauner, he would certainly have broke him. Yet this
very man, from party and faction, found friends to support him, and from a
partial jury, gave him an opportunity of disgracing a brave and honest Admiral; but impartial posterity has done justice to his memory, and execrated
the memory of Lestock."
" That if Mr. Mathews and his seconds had been properly supported, the greatest part of the Spanish rear might have been cut off."*
-Part I., Sect. III., p. 133.
* "Note.-This is too true. Few ships followed the example of their truly
brave Admiral and his seconds."



vi                         APPENDIX I.
" After so many circumstances being allowed to take place, can the
distance be thought to be less than 400 or 500 yards at least."*Part I., Sect. III., p. 135.
* " Note.-I believe none of the ships were in what I call close action,
and in which Britain will always succeed."
" For, if this deficiency is a truth, would it not have been more
natural, upon a chase of the enemy, to make sure of the slowest sailing
vessels to be found in the rear, than to attempt to get up with the
swiftest ships to be found in the van?"*-Part I., Sect. III., p. 140.
* " Note.-Certainly, and a good officer will act accordingly."
" From hence the enemy ahead must either abandon his three sternmost ships, or he must double back to support them."*-Part I.
Sect. III., pp. 145, 146.
* "Note.-There will ever be a manifest advantage in obliging your enemy
to depart from their original intention, and attacking them in a different mode
from that they offer you."



APPENDIX II.
DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE FACTS OF
EXECUTION.
I.
Copy of a Letter from Captain Sir Charles Dashwood, K.C.B., 8c. 4c.. c.
Torquay, July 8, 1829.
DEAR SIR,
I AM very much obliged for the trouble you have taken in forwarding me
the various documents, (which I herewith return,) relative to the glorious
battle of the 12th of April, because, if I cannot throw any new light on this
interesting subject, I can, at all events, corroborate the statement made by
Admiral Ekins.
Whether Sir George Rodney, or Sir Charles Douglas, had any conversation
with Mr. Clerk previous to their leaving England, relative to the practicability of
breaking an enemy's line; or whether these great and gallant officers ever conversed or consulted together on such a subject, is impossible for me to say; but
I think I can sufficiently prove from circumstances that eventually occurred,
and which came within my own knowledge, the absolute improbability of such
a conversation having occurred with Mr. Clerk, or, that the Admiral and Captain of the Fleet had previously consulted together on the important subject;
but, that the idea emanated from the mind of your excellent Father, in the
hour of battle.
I shall simply relate facts, to which I was an eye witness, and can vouch
for their truth. Being one of the aide-de-camps to the Commander-in-Chief
on that memorable day, it was my duty to attend both on him and the Captain
of the Fleet, as occasion might require. It so happened, that some time after
the battle had commenced, and whilst we were warmly engaged, I was standing near Sir Charles Douglas, who was leaning on the hammocks, (which in those
days were stowed across the fore part of the quarter-deck,) his head resting on
one hand, and his eye occasionally glancing on the enemy's line, and apparently in deep meditation, as if some great event was crossing his mind: suddenly raising his head, and turning quickly round, said, " Dash! where's Sir
George?" " In the after cabin, Sir," I replied. He immediately went aft; I
followed; and on meeting Sir George coming from the cabin close to the
wheel, he took off his cocked hat with his right hand, holding his long spy-glass
in his left, making a low and profound bow, said, "Sir George, I give you joy



viiii

APPENDIX II.

of the victory!" " Poli!" said the Chief, as if half angry, 1' the day is not
half won yet.  " Break the line, Sir George!" said your Father, " the day is
your own, and I will insure you the victory." " No," said the Admiral, " I
will not break my line." After another request and another refusal, Sir
Charles desired the helm to be put a-port; Sir George ordered it to starboard.
On your Father ordering it again to port, the Admiral sternly said, " Remember, Sir Charles, that I am Commander in Chief: starboard, sir," addressing
the Master, who, during this c ntroversy,- iha  placed the helm amidships.
Both the Admiral and Captain then separated; the former going aft, and the
latter forward. In the course ofa couple of minutes or so, each turned and
again met nearly on the same spot, when Sir Charles quietly and coolly again
addressed the Chief-" Only break the line, Sir George, and the day is your
own." The Admiral then said, in a quick and hurried way, " Well, well, do
as you like;" and immediately turned round and walked into the after cabin.
The words " Port the helm!" were scarcely uttered, when Sir Charles ordered
me down with directions to commence firing on the larboard side. On my
return to the quarter-deck, I found the Formidable passing between two
French ships, each nearly touching us. We were followed by the Namur, and
the rest of the ships astern; and from that moment the victory was decided
in our favour.
You may naturally suppose I was very young at the time; but the circumstances made such an impression on my mind, that they are as fresh in my
memory as if it occurred but yesterday; and I much doubt if there is a man
now living who saw and heard so much of the transaction as myself, except,
probably, my friend Sir Joseph Yorke, who was also a brother aide-de-camp.
Having thus stated mere matters of fact just as they occurred, and within
my own knowledge, I leave any man to draw what inference he pleases; hut I
would ask him, supposing the Admiral had had such a conversation, either
jointly or separately with Mr. Clerk, previous to their leaving England, or that
these great and gallant officers had ever consulted together on the subject of
breaking the enemy's line, would such a difference of opinion have existed, or
such a kind of controversy, as I have related, have taken place? I say, no. I
am most clearly convinced, and my mind most thoroughly satisfied, that the
idea of beaking the line never entered into the imagination of even your gallant Father, till the moment of his leaning on the hammocks, and looking towards the enemy's ships. His deep thought at that instant-his sudden raising his head from his hand, as if he had just then settled something in his
mind-the quick way of his turning round, and the anxious look he gave when
he said, "Dash, where's Sir George?"-all convince me that the idea of
breaking the line first entered his mind at that moment, and that he seized it
with avidity.
I think I have sufficiently shown, to the satisfaction of every impartial man,
the great probability, if not absolute certainty, that the idea rose in the mind
of your excellent Father at the very time I have pointed out; and that this
great event decided the battle is beyond doubt. This is my firm opinion; I
have held it for seven and forty years, and I shall continue in the same sentiments to the last moment of my existence.
I had the good fortune to be much noticed by the Captain of the Fleet,
daily and hourly in his cabin, and my time was much occupied in copying
various documents; amongst them was a " Comparative Statement of the
Force of the French and English Fleets, showing the Weight of Metal and
Shot thrown in a Broadside from each." If, peradventure, you could find such
a document amongst your Father's papers, I shall be thankful for a copy. I
am sure I wrote some hundreds, and kept one myself, but it has disappeared
in the lapse of time.



APPENDIX II.

ix

I shall feel great satisfaction in giving the son of so good and so great a
man any further information in my power.
I have the honour to be,
With great esteem,
Your very obliged and devoted
humble servant,
Ca. DASHWOOD, Capt. R.N.
Major-Gen. Sir Howard Douglas,
fc. sfc. f4c.
II.
To the Editor of the United Service Journal.
(Copy.)                               Torquay, Devon, January 30, 1830.
MR. EDITOR,-I have just seen in the last Quarterly Review, a very long
statement on the subject of Lord Rodney's battle on the 12th of April, 1782,
in reply to the one published by Sir Howard Douglas, and in which my letter
to that officer is canvassed with no small degree of acrimony. I am not so
weak as to enter the list of controversy with such fearful adversaries, yet it is
necessary I should give some explanation in my own defence; and though
they may turn, and twist, and criticise all and every expression contained in
that letter, it does not alter the case one iota; and whatever ridicule they may
endeavour to cast on what they have been facetiously pleased to term the
"C wheel-scene," the whole is, nevertheless, substantially true, and with all
their ingenuity they cannot confute it;-they must at least do me the justice
to believe that I could not have been actuated by interested motives when I
tell them that to this hour I have not the honour of even a personal acquaintance with Sir Howard Douglas; nor did I know he was a son of the
late Captain of the Fleet until about six months ago, when he wrote, requesting I would give him such information on breaking the enemy's line as came
within my own knowledge. I did so without reserve, and I can assure you,
Mr. Editor, it is a matter of no importance to me whether the merit of that
great deed is fixed on the escutcheon of Lord Rodney, or on that of Sir
Charles Douglas; but called upon by the son of the latter, a perfect stranger,
I conscientiously imparted what I heard and saw. Beyond this, I have nothing more to say than to regret that such a delicate question should ever
have been brought before the public, and to assure the friends of my Lord
Rodney that it never was my intention to show the slightest disrespect to the
memory of so great and so distinguished an officer. I cannot, therefore, but
be much distressed that it should even be supposed that when I mentioned the
Admiral's going into the after-cabin, it could be construed into his going off
the deck; every naval officer is aware, though the Reviewers may not be, that
the cabin is merely a continuation of the quarter-deck. It is certain the Admiral was in the stern and quarter-galleries the greater part of the battle, and
it was in the latter situation, whilst leaning out of the window, viewing his own
and the enemy's fleet, that f presented him with a glass of lemonade which
he had desired me to make. I never said that the Admiral was not on the
quarter-deck at the moment the Formidable was passing through the enemy's
line, for he was repeatedly in and out, but merely observed that when he
sanctioned that operation, he turned to the cabin; but how far he advanced,
or how long he remained, is impossible for me to say, as at that moment I was
ordered below to give the necessary directions for opening the fire on the larboard side. The whole of my observations do not, in point of time, occupy
more than five or six minutes, commencing whilst the Captain of the Fleet
c



X                           APPENDIX II.
was leaning on the hammocks, meditating, as I still think, on some great design, to the conclusion of the " wheel-scene," and as it would not take up
more than from ten to fifteen seconds to go from the wheel to the stern gallery,
and about twenty more from thence to the gangway, it is both easy and clear
the Chief was on that very spot at the critical moment of passing under the
stern of the Glorieux, as stated by Sir Gilbert Blane, and then it was, I take
for granted, the Admiral desired him (both the aides-de-camp being previously
dispatched) to go down and order the guns to be depressed;-I do, therefore,
most cordially join with, and beg to corroborate, the statement of the Reviewers, "that the Chief was on the quarter-deck, bfobre, during, and after
the Formidable passed through the enemy's line." No one ever asserted to
the contrary, or doubted it: then how they can, even by possibility, construe
this into the Admiral's retirement into the cabin, is best known to themselves.
But it is neither candid nor just thus to torture my meaning to the dishonour
and prejudice of so great a man. I disclaim it with indignation.
However, young as I certainly was when this great battle was fought, yet
early impressions are the most lasting, particularly one of such an interesting
nature as those described; but if they imagine it has lain dormant in my
breast for seven and forty years, and only now brought forward for the first
time, merely at the instigation of Sir Howard Douglas, or any other man, they
are much mistaken; for I have mentioned it in all societies whenever it has
been the subject of conversation during the whole of that long period.
I have the honour to be, Mr. Editor,
Your most obedient humble servant,
CHARLES DASHWOOD,
Captain, Royal Navy.
III.
Notes written at the time, by an Officer, (now a Flag Officer,*) who served in the
Formidable in the Battle of the 12th of April.
" About six o'clock on the morning of the 12th of April, 1782, Sir Charles
went into Lord Rodney's cabin, who was then a-bed, and told him that Providence had given him the French fleet on his lee-bow, on which the Admiral
got up, and gave his general orders to prepare for battle. At half-past seven
the engagement began. At eleven A. M. there appeared an opening sufficient
for our ships to divide the French line. Sir Charles observed to the Admiral,
that there was now a fine opportunity for severing the rear and half the centre from the Ville-de-Paris; to which Lord Rodney replied, that it was a very
hazardous experiment. Sir Charles said, the more danger the more glory, if
it succeeded, which he doubted not it would. But the Admiral still objected,
and called out to the helm, (for we were then, as the wind favoured us, luffing up,) No nearer!
A discussion, which it is unnecessary to repeat, then took place between the Admiral and his First Captain, in which
"Sir Charles maintained his opinion, and again called out to the helm 'to
luff.' "
Upon further consideration, Sir George Rodney determined, most
gallantly, with true greatness of mind, to adopt the advice of the
Captain of the Fleet; and the writer adds" The Formidable then pushed through the line, amidst the shouts and applauses
of our fleet, and by this gallant manoeuvre fied the fortune of the day."
* Vice-Admiral the Hon. Sir Joseph Sydney Yorke, K.C.B.



APPENDIX II.

xi

The gallant officer by whom the letter and narrative, of which the
preceding are extracts, were written, had confidential access to the
cabins of both those officers, and knew perfectly well all that was
going on; and he has assured me that there was positively" no premeditated plan of breaking the line entertained."
IV.
Letter from Charles Thesiger, Esq.
(Copy.)          13, St. Alban's Place, St. James's Square, 17th Feb. 1830.
SIn,-I have just seen a recent number of the Quarterly Review, containing a laboured article, endeavouring by specious argument to invalidate the
facts you had adduced in support of the claim which you had so meritoriously
asserted in favour of your lamented Father, as having been chiefly instrumental to the victory gained on the 12th April, 1782, by the daring exploit of
carrying the British fleet through the French line; and knowing that I had in
my possession a letter from my brother, the late Sir Frederick Thesiger, who
acted as aide-de-camp to Lord Rodney on that important day, I have referred
to it, and hope you will not consider me intrusive in having forwarded some
extracts relating to the action, as strongly corroborative of the claim you have
endeavoured to establish, and coinciding in a remarkable manner with the
living testimonies which you have already been enabled to procure.
My brother, at the time of the action, was twenty-four years of age, and
was well known in the navy at the time of his death, when he had attained
the rank of post-captain. He accompanied Lord Nelson to Copenhagen,
where he also acted as his aide-de-camp, and was charged by his Lordship
with his letter to the Crown Prince, which caused a cessation of hostilities.
His life is to be found in the Naval Chronicle, very minutely and correctly
given; and he was not only a gallant officer, but a man of unquestionable
veracity.
I have the honour to be, &c.
(Signed)       CHARLES THESIGER.
To Sir Howard Douglas.
If you should have the least curiosity to compare the original with those
parts which I have copied, I shall at all times be ready to produce my
brother's letter.
V.
Extractsfrom F. Thesiger's Letters, commenced December, 1782, and continued till 25th of
February, 1783. He had before announced his safety, and the event of the battle
of the 12th of April, and this was in answer to one of mine, desiring to be furnished
with more particular information. C. T.
" About seven on Sunday morning, being the 8th, our cruizers made the
signal for the enemy being under sail. We immediately made the signal for
our ships to get under way; and in the evening, about nine o'clock, one of
our ships hailed us, and informed us the French were close a-head of us. We
kept on our course until we could plainly discern their lights, and then made
the signal for the fleet to lay-to, being in the order of sailing. The Admiral
called for his aides-de-camp on the 9th, before we began to engage, and finding they were mere boys, he told Captain Symonds to let him have somebody
c2



xii

APPENDIX II.

he could depend upon; he immediately introduced me, who was his aide-decamp, and the Admiral was satisfied."
The action of the 9th of April is then described, which was only
partial, sixteen or seventeen of our ships being mere spectators, having
no wind to manage them.
" The ship astern of us came into action; the rest of the centre and all the
rear were prevented, from the cause 1 have mentioned: we lost three men
and about ten wounded. Lieutenant Hale was among the killed-a very
amiable young man."
The cause which led to the action on the 12th of April is then
explained.
" We certainly sailed much superior to the enemy, our ships being all coppered, whereas the French had not twenty clean ships. The superiority of
our sailing was very conspicuous, for although the French fleet had got off so
great a distance to windward, yet before night we came up within three or
four miles of them, and had we carried the same sail, we should have brought
them to action long before; we may consider the accident which happened to
the ZMle, as a very favourable circumstance to us. She got foul of the Villede-Paris in the night and carried away her foremast and bowsprit, which
brought the fleet very much to leeward; in the morning of the 12th we saw
the ZBle in tow by a frigate, which was going with her into Guadaloupe. We
sent two or three ships after her, but the French fleet bearing down, we recalled them, and they formed themselves into the line of battle close to the
wind: the enemy did the same, but they were too late, for they thought to
pass our line at the distance they did on the 9th, and in every action this war;
but they fairly entrapped themselves, and we chose our distance. The van
and the centre divisions a-head of us,passed close along the French line. The
Formidable went through, and the rest of the centre and rear divisions followed. *   **    *     *  *  * *   *  *  *   *  *  *  *  *  *  **
*  *  * neither should we have got through if his orders had been obeyed.
*  *  * *   *  * *   *  *  *  * *   *  *  *   *  * *   *  *  *  Sir
Charles Douglas is the man who had the sole merit of fighting the Formidable; * *   *  * *   * * *    * *   * *      * *   As we were passing the French line, it was glorious and animating to hear Sir Charles giving
his orders with so much clearness, and at the same time so much elated; it
had a wonderful effect upon me, and I felt myself honoured fighting by a person possessing so much magnanimity. He conducted the Formidable as close
along the French line as it was possible; the five or six last ships I could have
thrown cold shot aboard them, they were so near. The Admiral cried, 'No
nearer;' Sir Charles, ' Luff, my boys, and the day's our own.'  No nearer, I
say,' repeated the Admiral. 'Don't fall off,' answered Sir Charles. The Admiral came to me, and ordered me to go to the wheel and see the helm put
up; but as Sir Charles kept incessantly crying, 'Luff, my boys, luff,' and it is
always an inferior officer's duty to obey the last command, therefore I did not
put the Admiral's orders into execution."
"The letter so often adverted to, and to which you attach some importance,
contains matter of a private and domestic nature, which prevents me from
trusting it out of my own possession; but those parts relating to the naval events
of that period may be inspected by any one on either side of the question.
(Signed)       C. T."



APPENDIX II.

xiii

VI.
Extract of a Letter from Prederick Knight, Esq., now living at Stonehouse, Devon, who was
Sir Charles Douglas's Secretary at the time of the action, was present on the quarter-deck,
and whose peculiar duty it was to observe and note all that passed.
(Extract.)                 Union Street, Stonehouse, February 26th, 1830.
" In reply to your inquiries concerning the subject of breaking the enemy's
line on the 12th of April, 1782, I beg to state, that the merit attached to that
bold and fortunate manoeuvre rests wholly on the late Sir Charles Douglas.
Sir Charles saw an opening at the stern of the Ville-de-Paris, and, on meeting
Lord Rodney, said, 'I give you joy of the victory; only break the enemy's
line, and we shall have possession of the Ville-de-Paris before night.' "-The
writer then goes on to state, that at first the Admiral objected, and in very strong
terms. " But Sir Charles persisted in the propriety of breaking the line, and
said,' Mr. Harris, put the helm a-port.' The Admiral ordered it a-starboard.
The Admiral then went into the cabin. He remained a very short time, and
then returned to the quarter-deck again, when Sir Charles repeated his desire
to break the line, when the Admiral said, ' Do as you please. The helm was
then put to port, and the Formidable passed through the line, and was followed
by the Namur and the other British ships in gallant style. The enemy were
put into the greatest confusion, and were terror-struck by this new manner of
fighting.
" From the situation I held at the time (Secretary to Sir C. Douglas), I
think I may positively assert that the idea of breaking the line was never mentioned between him and the Admiral till the time of its being put into execution, and from what I have already stated, the thought was momentary, and
originated with Sir Charles.
(Signed)        FREDERICK KNIGHT."
" Commissioner Edgecombe, Victualling-Ofice."
VII.
Extract of a Letter from Captain Blaney, who was a Midshipman on board the Formidable
in the Action.
Plymouth, February 3d, 1830.
" MY DEAR SIR,-I am favoured with your letter of the 1st instant, and
hasten to comply with your wishes.
"I do not think there was the smallest intention of breaking the enemy's
line, until a few minutes before the opportunity presented itself of doing so
with the effect that followed. There can be no doubt of an altercation between the Commander-in-Chief and the Captain of the Fleet, whether the
helm should be put a-starboard or port, which was alternately done, and even
a-port by the motion of Sir Charles's hand. In this situation was the Formidable, making an angle with the ship our second a head, when the helm was
desired to be put a-port without further opposition. Sir Charles had frequently
called to the man at the wheel, 'Luff, my man, luff; keep her close at it.
Almost in an instant were four of the enemy's ships opposed to our larboard broadside, who had, on our breaking through, fallen aboard each other.
"It was generally understood that Lord Rodney said, 'do as you please, Sir
Charles,' and from this permission the helm was ordered down, that is a-port.
The Admiral was mostly in his chair on the quarter-deck, and with difficulty
could walk with the gout. My journal for the Formidable from December,



xiv

APPENDIX II.

1781, to April, 1783, is at this moment before me: the transactions of the
9th and 12th April were wrote the next day.
" Should you have any wish to peruse them, you have only to say the word.
Believe me, my dear Sir,
With much esteem, your's very truly,
G. W. BLANEY."
" Commissioner Edgecombe."
VIII.
Extract of a Letter from Sir G. Blane.
"My being late in coming home when I received your letter, prevented me
from answering it so soon as you wished.
" I can have no objection to your inserting the note you propose. I certainly never heard either the name of Mr. Clerk, or his work, till some time
after the peace, when in England.
" The Admiral certainly was a good deal in the cabin under the poop during
part of the action, and I employed myself in assisting to work a nine-pounder
there. But a short time before the breaking of the line, we were both on the
quarter-deck, as must ha e been the case, when on observing us fast approaching the Glorieux, he looked round, and seeing none of his aides-de-camp,
he sent me to the lower gun-deck to order them to lower their metal. I think
it likely that it was while I was so engaged, that what Sir Charles Dashwood
told you took place. I should like much that Sir C. Dashwood were to see
my printed account of the action; and as I do not mention the circumstance
of my being sent to the lower gun-deck, could you ask him whether he remembers it? I abstained from publishing it, as it would look vainglorious and out
of character for me. There is not the smallest item of contradiction or inconsistency between my printed account and the statement you showed me.
(Signed)        GILBERT BLANE."
" It is not much out of place here to remark, that it was considered as a
fortunate circumstance for the service that the Commander-in-Chief of the
fleet in the West Indies, in the memorable campaign of 1782, should have had
about his person to assist and advise him, so able an officer as Sir Charles
Douglas, he himself being almost always in such bad health, either from illness
or convalescence from the gout, from debility and unequal spirits, as to render
him less equal to the fatiguing and anxious duties inseparable from such high
responsibility."-Memoir on Military Punishment, by Sir Gilbert Blane.
IX.
Extract of a Letter from Frederick Edgecombe, Esq.
" VictuallingOffice, February 5th, 1830.
" Immediately after parting with you the other day, I committed to paper
the impression on my mind of the transaction in question. It is as follows:" When opposite the Glorieux, Sir C. Douglas is reported to have said,
'Now is the glorious moment for breaking the enemy's line;' Lord Rodney
to have replied, 'Suppose the fleet should be scattered;' Sir Charles to have
rejoined,' The fleet will not be scattered;'-that port and starboard was alternately ordered by those officers; that in the end Lord Rodney said, 'Do as
you please,' and went into his cabin, when Sir Charles said, 'Down with the
helm? Of course there were many versions of this conversation in circula


APPENDIX II.

XV

tion, but I have the strongest recollection I have stated the substance of what
I heard on joining the Formidable, in July 1782.
(Signed)      F. EDGECOMBE."
" Sir Howard Douglas."
X.
Extract of a Letter from Lieutenant Cleiland, of the Fame, 74, who was present in the
Action, to Sir Charles Douglas, dated Fame, Monday morning.-Selected from my
Father's papers.
S"Fame, Monday Noon.
" SIR CHARLES,-I have been exceedingly unhappy in hearing of your indisposition, and more so by not having it in my power to have called in person.
" I pray to God, Sir Charles, for your health; which is of more consequence to the nation, than two-thirds of the nation are at present acquainted
with. I have wrote as far as my humble abilities can scan over the ever
memorable day, and this I'm sure, that Royalty, if not Majesty, will see.
And it contains nothing but truth,-it will add lustre to those who gloriously
fought and pointed out so masterly a stroke that records cannot show.
I have the honour, &c. &c.
(Signed)      ROBT. CLEILAND."
" To Sir Charles Douglas, Bart."
XI.
Extract of a Letter from the late General Edward Smith, to Sir Charles Douglas, dated
Charles Street, December, 13th, 1782.-Selectedfrom my Father's papers.
" Hughes in the East Indies has had hard blows, and has fought well; but
I think if manoeuvre was more fashionable, and Sir Charles Douglas's system
with De Grasse closely copied and imitated, we should save lives and gain
more glory, perhaps not so complete as yours, but still sufficient to master
always the enemy we may have to deal with."
XII.
Letter from Captain Rotherham, Lieutenant of the Monarch, Collingwood's Captain in
the Battle of Trafalgar.
" Royal Hospital, Greenwich, November 7th, 1829.
" DEAR SIR,-I beg you will accept my sincere thanks for the honour
done me by your having forwarded your excellent pamphlet, containing the
important facts relative to the glorious victory obtained by our fleet on the
12th April, 1782.
" Being myself a lieutevant of H. M. S. Monarch, on that occasion, I have
it in my power, by a reference to the plans and minutes I then made, to
vouch for the truth and justness of your statement, being always of opinion
that the success of that eventful day may be attributed to that masterly (but
before unheard-of) manoeuvre of passing through the enemy's line, and which,
from conversations I have had with a distinguished officer in that fleet, now
defunct, and who was Sir George Rodney's second astern, I am as fully convinced as man can be, that the invention originated with your zealous and
revered Father, whose memory deserves to be retained in grateful remembrance by the service, to which he was an ornament, and our beloved country,
which was benefited so materially by his able exertions.
I have the honour to be, &c. &c.
(Signed)    EDWARD ROTHERHAM."
" Sir H. Douglas, Bart."



xvi

APPENDIX II.

XIII.
Extract of a Letter, dated Stoke, Devonport, 6th February, 1830, from Captain Sayer,
Royal Navy, to F. Edgecombe, Esq.
" I was myself in the battle as a midshipman on board the Anson, Captain
Blair, (who was killed in the early part of it), and was myself slightly wounded
in the leg: our lieutenants were--st, Anthony Gibbs; 2d, James May, and
3d, Sir J. Athol Wood, all since dead; and I remember perfectly the opinion
was, on approaching the enemy's fleet, Sir Charles Douglas signified the fine
opportunity now coming for going through the line, which Lord Rodney was
supposed to be much against, fearing it would cause great confusion among
our own ships, and probably separate them; however, it was said, that Sir
Charles being so firmly decided on making the attempt, that his lordship was
induced to give it up to him to act as he pleased; and in consequence, the
Formidable was kept to the wind by order of Sir Charles, and the enemy's
line was broken through: of course I was too young to know much about the
matter, but I have always understood that the line would not have been
broken but for the firmness of Sir Charles Douglas.
(Signed)     GEORGE SAYER."
XIV.
Letter from Sir David Milne.
" Coldstream, 18th February, 1830.
" SrR,-I had the honour yesterday of receiving your letter of the 13th
instant. In answer to which I can only state what was generally the opinion
in the fleet regarding the breaking of the French, on the 12th of April, 1782.
" It was generally understood, that at the time the centre of our fleet came
along the French line engaging as they passed, that at that moment a difference
of opinion prevailed between the Commander-in-Chief, Sir George B. Rodney
and Sir Charles Douglas, Captain of the Fleet, regarding passing through the
French line; that this was not settled until the event actually took place.
The Commander-in-Chief, not approving of the measure, was calling to the
man at the wheel to starboard the helm, while Sir Charles Douglas, who was
for the measure, was calling out to port the helm; and during this altercation
the Formidable passed through the line, followed by the ships astern, thus
throwing that division of the French fleet between two fires. I was at that
time in the Canada, commanded by the Hon. Captain Cornwallis, the third
ship astern of the Formidable. This is, as far as was generally understood at
the time, what occurred regarding the above-mentioned manoeuvre, and I have
never understood it otherwise; this was also corroborated by an old and intimate acquaintance of mine, now dead, a Mr. Norris, afterwards lieutenant
Norris, who was on board the Formidable at the time, and, I believe, on the
quarter-deck, who often mentioned the circumstances to me.
"This is what occurs to my recollection respecting your queries, and the
impression at the time was, and always has been, as I have stated above.
I have the honour to be, &c. &c.
(Signed)     DAVID MILNE."
"Major-Gen. Sir H. Douglas, Bart."
XV.
Letter from Admiral Lawford. Namur.
SMY DEAR SIR ALEXANDER,-Should you see Sir Howard Douglas, will



APPENDIX II.                        xvii
you have the goodness to thank him for the honour, I conceive, he does me,
in sending me his Statement of Facts respecting the Breaking of the Enemy's
Line in the Action of the 12th of April, 1782.
" I have read it with much interest, as it recals to my recollection all the
circumstances of that important event. It was my good fortune to be a
Lieutenant in the Namur, the ship immediately astern of the Formidable,
and remember it was generally said, and believed, that Sir Charles Douglas
had the merit of pointing out to the Commander-in-Chief the glorious opportunity which then presented itself of passing through the opening in the
enemy's line.
" With best compliments to Lady Bryce, in which Mrs. Lawford begs to
unite.
I remain, my dear Sir, &c. &c.
(Signed)     JOHN LAWrFORD."
"Major-Gen. Sir A. Bryce."
XVI.
Letter from Captain Tobin. Namur.
" Teignmouth, February 9th, 1830.
" It is somewhat strange that I never knew any thing of a third edition of
Mr. Clerke's Naval Tactics; nor can I now find any account of it in the
periodical journals; but, whatever may be stated in the work, respecting the
breaking of the line on the 12th of April, my mind has always been under an
impression that it was put in force on a sudden suggestion of your excellent
Father to the Commander-in-Chief, and the strong testimony recently adduced
in your pamphlet, cannot but (of course) serve to give stability to such an
opinion. Indeed, what right have I to doubt, when two officers, of high reputation and integrity, who were on the quarter-deck of the Formidable, and
whose duty it was to watch every word, look, and motion of the Commanderin-Chief and Captain of the Fleet, declare such to have been the case?
(Signed)     GEO. TOBIN."
" Major-Gen. Sir H. Douglas, Bart."
XVII.
Copy of a Letter from Admiral R. Dacres. First Lieutenant of the Alcide.
" Bathford, February 27th, 1830.
" SrR,-In replying to your letter of the 20th instant, I beg to state that I
cannot, after such a lapse of time, presume to give a positive opinion on the
question you put to me. On the 12th of April, 1782, I was first lieutenant
of the Alcide, the third ship in the van, therefore know little of what happened
in the rear, but perfectly remember, on the smoke clearing up, seeing the
Formidable and Namur to windward of both lines. The impression on my
mind was then, and ever has been, that the breaking the line was accidental,
and never contemplated;- had it been so, the fleet ought to have known it.
There, no doubt, were reports in the fleeb that your Father was the person
who suggested.it to Sir George.
I have the honour to be, &c. &c.
(Signed)     RICH. DACRES."
" Sir H. Douglas, Bart."



xviii

APPENDIX II.

XVIII.
Extract of a Letter from Sir Arthur Legge. Prince George.
" Blackheath, 27th January, 1830.
" In the action of the 12th of April, I served as midshipman on board the
Prince George, and was quarterd on the main-deck; we were second to Sir
Francis Drake in the van; I could not, therefore, see what passed in the
centre, but I perfectly recollect that it was reported among the officers of the
fleet when we got to Port Royal, and generally believed, that the cutting
through the enemy's line was suggested to Sir George Rodney by Sir Charles
Douglas, Captain of the Fleet, though I can't say that I heard Sir George had
objected to the measure.
Believe me, &c. &c.
(Signed)      A. K. LEGGE."
XIX.
Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant Frederick Maitland, in Garrison at Port Royal.
" London, 28th January, 1830.
" I send you in writing the substance of what I expressed to you a few days
ago, when I happened to converse with you on the subject now debated,
relative to Admiral Lord Rodney and Sir Charles Douglas.
" That I was in Jamaica, being then an officer in the 14th Regiment, when
our fleet and the French captured ships arrived at Port Royal; that, at that
time, the action which had just taken place was the common subject of conversation; and that it was very generally said and understood, that the
manoeuvre which had decided the victory, meaning the breaking the enemy's
line, originated with Sir Charles Douglas, and that it was Sir Charles who
proposed to and urged the measure with the Admiral.
" This I heard certainly then in general conversations, and I have often
since heard the same opinion expressed among naval officers.
(Signed)        FRED. MAITLAND."
" Major.General Sir Howard Douglas, Bart. "
XX.
Letter from Captain Fyffe. London.
" Albany Street, Edinburgh, 19th February, 1830.
" SlI,-I was favoured with your's some days since, but delayed replying
to it till I could see some brother officers (here) that I knew had been in the
action of the 12th of April, 1782. I was not in that fleet with Sir George
Rodney, but was in the London, at Jamaica, when the squadron came down
with the prizes, and the impression is strong on my memory that the prevailing
opinion amongst the officers was that Sir Charles Douglas had the merit of planning and carrying into effect the breaking of the French line of battle on that
day. Captain Alexander Robert Kerr (residing here), who was midshipman
of the Endymion repeating frigate on that day, has the same opinion as to the
officers. Captain Spear says, in his note to me, ' I was midshipman in the
Marlborough, in the action of the 12th of April, 1782, but quartered on the
lower-deck, therefore can only speak from hearsay; that ship led the line on



xix

APPENDIX II.

that day and fetched upon opposite tack to the enemy, within five er six
ships of their van ship, then edged away along their line; recollects it was
afterwards said that the breaking of the line was accidental, but had been
suggested by Sir Charles Douglas to Sir George Rodney, and that Clerke's
Naval Tactics had nothing do with it.' I am sorry that I cannot give you
better information on a subject that you appear much interested in.
(Signed)      JOHN FYFFE."
" Major-Gen. Sir H. Douglas, Bart."
XXI.
Letter from Dr. Black.
" Kirkaldy, March 15th, 1830.
" Srn,-I had the honour to receive your letter of the 8th instant, in which
you request to know what I recollect concerning the opinion in the fleet
formed of the memorable engagement of the 12th of April, 1782.
" I was in the West Indies at the time, but not present at that brilliant
achievement. The ship I belonged to was at Jamaica, where the victorious
fleet with the captured ships came to, immediately after the engagement, and
I had considerable intercourse with the officers of many of the ships. The
facts generally stated were, that Sir Charles Douglas noticed the practicability
of breaking the French line, and pointed it out to Lord Rodney, and urged
the measure strenuously. I do not recollect hearing that Lord Rodney had
premeditated or predetermined on this mode of attack whenever the fleets
should meet.
" It is now near fifty years since, and I am fourscore years of age; yet I
think my recollections are distinct still concerning the share of merit which
was allowed Sir Charles Douglas, by those who were present, and knew all
the circumstances of that eventful day.
I have the honour to be, &c.
(Signed)        W. BLACK."
" Sir H. Douglas, Bart."
It would be superfluous to exhibit any additional evidence upon a point
which has been pronounced, on all sides, to have been proved beyond all possibility of doubt: I need therefore, make no public use of the numerous, and
very remarkable confirmations of my Father's case, which my publications have
recently brought forth, and which, up to this time, continue, and I have no
doubt will continue, to be addressed to me.
There is, however, one communication so interesting and remarkable, that I
shall briefly state it:--The Surveyor General of Upper Canada, Mr. Hurd,
had occasion, very recently, to remain for a few days at Utica in the
United States, on his way from New Brunswick, in which Province he
had held the like situation, to York. During his stay at Utica, he was waited
upon by an aged person, who stated, that having been many years in
the service of the late Sir Charles Douglas, and hearing that Mr. Hurd had
recently been in New Brunswick, he, the applicant, (George Stewart,) wished
to make enquiry respecting his old master's son, (myself,) who had been
Governor of that province. Mr. Hurd received the applicant, and finding
by documents which he produced, that he had long attended my Father in
the capacity of Valet, and that he was on board the Formidable, in the
d '2



XX

APPENDIX II.

battle; he, Mr. Hurd, questioned him very closely as to all the particulars which
passed under his own eye, in relation to my Father. The man detailed all
the occurrences of the day, clearly and distinctly, and explained, that he had
the best opportunity of seeing and hearing what passed, by being immediately
about my Father's person, as his valet, before the action commenced, and by
being posted to one of the quarter-deck guns during the battle, that he might
be in the way to attend upon his master, if needful. Finding the account
given by Stewart to corroborate remarkably what Sir Charles Dashwood and
others affirm, as to the facts of the case, Mr. Hurd told the faithful old man, that
the splendid service performed on that occasion by his late master, had been
much disputed and obscured, and that if he, Stewart, was clear and positive as
to the truth of his averment, that his deposition to that effect would no doubt
be acceptable to the members of the family. The man immediately expressed
the strongest and most affectionate desire to depose to the truth of what he
stated, and this was accordingly done, in due form, in presence of Tho. Rockwell, Esq., Notary Public, at Utica, on the 19th of March, 1832.
I well remember the person named George Stewart-Black George; but to
put beyond all doubt the fact, that the deponent was my Father's valet, in
1782, I annex certified extracts from the documents in his possession; and
having referred to Sir Gilbert Blane as to the circumstance of George Stewart
having been stationed to a gun on the quarter-deck, received an answer, of
which the following is an extract. " June 9th, 1832.-I have great pleasure
in certifying that George Stewart is no impostor. He was, and no doubt is
now, (but I had no idea of his being in existence) a little, round, squat
African, much attached to Sir Charles, and I have often heard Sir Charles
express himself with great partiality towards him, as an honest and faithful
servant." Further, Sir Gilbert states, that he perfectly recollects George Stewart
assisted in fighting the quarter-deck gun at which Sir Gilbert stationed himself.
Copies of Certificates of Servitude and Character exhibited by George
Stewart, the late Admiral Sir Charles Douglas's Servant, to Mr. S. P.
Hurd, late Surveyor-General of New Brunswick, and now of Upper
Canada, and Dr. William Turner, M. D. an English Physician, and
compared with the Originals in the presence of the Gentlemen of Utica,
State of New York, whose Declaration is hereunto attached,
" I herewith certify that the statement drawn up by Mr. S. P. Hurd, late
Surveyor-General of New Brunswick, and now of Upper Canada, is in every
particular perfectly correct; that I was present during the examination referred
to; that I afterwards asked the said George Stewart a variety of questions,
most especially as to the conversation on board the Formidable between Sir
George Rodney and Sir Charles Douglas, but found it impossible to stagger
his evidence on any one point whatsoever.
" I also declare that the accompanying Certificates of servitude and character are faithful copies of the originals.
WM. TURNER, M.D."
" Utica, State of New York, March 19, 1832."



APPENDIX II.

xxi

" United States of America,
State of New York.
" On the 19th March, 1832, before me came the within-named William
Turner, who, being by me duly sworn, made oath to the truth of the within
Certificate.
" In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my name, and affixed my official
seal, the day and year above written.
L. S.                          THOMAS ROCKWELL, Notary Public."
" Copy."            No. I.-Sir Charles Douglas.
" These are to certify, whomsoever it may concern, that George Stewart, a
native of the Island of Barbados, and a free man, served me as my valet de
chambre on board his Majesty's ships Duke, Formidable, and Resistance, and
on shore as occasion required, from the beginning of the month of May, 1779,
to the date hereof, during all which time he ever behaved himself with diligence,
sobriety, honesty, fidelity, and respect towards me, and I hereby recommend
him as a person deserving of having confidence reposed in him accordingly.
He is of a good capacity, having taught himself to read, write, and tolerably
well to cast accompts, and is discharged from my service at his own request.
" Given under my hand on board His Majesty's ship Hermione, in Halifax
harbour, this first day of August, 1785.
(Signed) CHA. DOUGLAS."
No. II.- W. Bentinck, Esq.
" This is to certify, that George Stewart lived with me six months, during
which time he behaved himself with diligence, sobriety, and honesty.
(Signed)    W. BENTINCK."
" Halifax, Nova Scotia, March 9, 1786."
No. III.-Lady Douglas.
" George Stewart lived with the late Sir Charles Douglas near ten years,
during which time he behaved with remarkable diligence and attention, was
an affectionate, honest, and trusty servant.
" Witness my hand, London, March 21, 1789.
(Signed)    JANE DOUGLAS."
No. IV.-Captain David Knox, R.N.
" The bearer hereof, George Stewart, was in the service of Sir Charles
Douglas, Bart. during the space of ten years, and he has since served with me



xxii

APPENDIX II.

for the space of two years more, until he was discharged by his own desire to
reside in New York, during which time he served with great reputation as an
honest, sober, and attentive man. As witness my hand, this 4th day of
August, at New York, 1791.
(Signed)    DAVID KNOX, Captain in the British Navy.
No. V.-Jonas Platt, Judge.
" I certify that the bearer, George Stewart, a black man, has resided in this
town several years, and has uniformly maintained the character of a sober, industrious, and honest man, and as such I recommend him wherever he may
go.
(Signed)    JONAS PLATT."
' Utica, 12th October, 1824."
No. VI.-Rev. H. Anthon.
" This is to certify that George Stewart is a Communicant of the Parish of
Trinity Church, Utica, and that during my acquaintance with him I have
noticed nothing inconsistent with his obligations as such.
(Signed)        HENRY ANTHON,
late Rector of Trinity Church, Utica."
" Utica, State of New York, U. S.
April 25, 1829."
" United States of America,
State of New York.
" J. H. Rathbone, Counsellor at Law, residing in the city of Utica, State
aforesaid, being duly affirmed, says, that he has for many years been intimately
acquainted with the Honourable Jonas Platt, late Justice of the Supreme Court
of the State of New York, and with the Rev. Henry Anthon of the city of New
York, late Rector of Trinity Church, Utica, that he has examined the original
Certificates, of which the above (Nos. 5 and 6) are copies, and knows them to
be in the proper handwriting of the gentlemen whose names are subscribed
thereto: and further, that he has compared the above copies of Certificates,
Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4, with the originals, and that they are true copies.
J. H. RATHBONE."
" United States of America,
State of New York.  S
" On the 20th March, 1832, before me came J. H. Rathbone, to me known
to be the same person described in, and who subscribed the above affidavit,
and affirmed to the truth thereof.
" In testimony whereof I have hereunto affixed my official seal, and subscribed my name thereto, this same day and year above written.
THOMAS ROCKWELL, Notary Public." (L. S.)



APPENDIX II.

xxiii

Copy of a Letter from John Barrow, Esq. Secretary to the Admiralty, to Commodore
Barrie, C.B. touching the Claims of George Stewart to a Pension.
(Copy.)                          " Admiralty Office, 19th November, 1829.
" SIR,
( Having laid before my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your letter
of the 17th September last, in behalf of George Stewart, whose services and
destitute situation you have recommended to their Lordships favourable consideration, I am commanded to acquaint you, that it appears that the said man
served only *six years and three months in the Royal Navy, from which he
was discharged in the year 1785, then only twenty-six years of age, and that
under these circumstances their Lordships have no means of affording him any
assistance.
I am, Sir,
Your most obedient humble servant,
(Signed)    JOHN BARROW."
" To Commodore Barrie, C.B. 4c. 8c."
* See the annexed Memorandum touching this.
Memorandum.
' The six years and three months seem to be made out thus:-from May
1779, when the said Stewart joined Sir Charles Douglas and his discharge
by Sir Charles in August 1785. He, however, states that he was again
borne on the Adamant's books after Sir Charles Douglas's death, when he
accompanied Captain D. Knox. See his certificate. This point may increase
the claim for servitude, and should be inquired into.
S. P. HURD."







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