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A HISTORY OF THE
I N SUR RE C T ION
by
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A I  S E X T 0 N


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SOLDIERS IN THE PHILIPPINES








Soldiers in the Philippines
A History of the Insurrevtion
BY
COLONEL WILLIAM THADDEUS SEXTON


WASHINGTON
THE INFANTRY JOURNAL
1944




Copyright 1939 by WILLIAM THADDEUS SEXTON


First published in 1939 by
Military Service Publishing Company
under the title Soldiers in the Sun
All rights in this book are reserved and it may not be reproduced in
whole or in part without permission from the holder of these rights. F r
information, address the publishers.
This is a specitl edition made available through the cooperation of the
author and the original publishers as a contribution to the war effort.
First published in the Fighting Forces Series March 1944


PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA




To My Daughter


ELAINE SEXTON
Who though only four years of age, loved to sit and
watch her daddy "play map." God needed an
angel and took her away.


4








FOREWORD


THE PURPOSE of this book is twofold: First, it is intended to
close a gap which exists in American (and Filipino) history.;ifany people know that a war was fought in the Philippines
iearly forty years ago, but heretofore no one has been able to
t btain a book which would acquaint him with what actually
happened. Magazine articles, memoirs, and regimental histories
ha lc covered many phases of the Insurrection, but nowhere has
tit subject been covered from beginning to end.
I he second purpose of the book is to describe some of the
problems incident to the conduct of extended military operations
in the tropics-a situation unique in the annals of American
history. In 1898 we defeated Spairr and received her most prized
colonial possession, the Philippine Islands. We attempted to impose our American ideas and principles of government on ten
million people, who were of different race, language, and social
background. When they opposed by force the assumption of
our sovereignty, we faced a new problem. Our army was called
on to take by force what we had intended to gain by mere diplomatic procedure.
Never before had American troops left the continent of N'orth
Aiierica. Never before had our Army been called on to quell an
inspired insurrection of a people fighting for their independence
(vith the possible exception of the American Indians). Never
before had an army officer been given supreme dictatorial
authority over 120,000 square miles of American-owned territory. Never before had American sovereignty been extended over
bie polygamous Mohammedans.
Readers who participated in the Philippine Insurrection or
have heard incidents of that unusual war may question the acuracy of some of the material presented herein. The author
lefends himself on the premise that he has used the best evience available, namely the official reports. These reports were




made by the best authorities on the ground at the time.
Of the 125,000 American soldiers who journeyed to the Philippines during the course of the Insurrection, the names of few
are mentioned in this book. Such procedure is simply in keeping with the nature of the war. Grand strategy and tactics cou:l
not quell the Insurrection. It was the work of enterprising and
courageous lieutenants who finally gave the answer. A roster, f
the high command in the American Army during World War I
is a roster of the lieutenants who served in the Philippines at the
turn of the century. The American high command in the First
World War gained its practical military experience ih the P!;,
ippine Insurrection. The occupation of the Rhineland in 1 i
by the American Army was accomplished with astonish;i.:
efficiency. Perhaps the answer lay in the experience which t'
higher officers had obtained in taking over the civil administration of the Philippine Islands in 1898.
The idea of this book came to the writer while he was serving
a tour of duty in the Philippines in 1931. Numerous monuments
scattered throughout the Island of Luzon aroused a curiosity
concerning the Insurrection which could not be satisfied in ai,.
library. The author went over the battlegiounds and interviewed
what few Insurgent leaders he was able to find, and then using
the official reports as source material, wrote the story purely
because he enjoys reading history and entirely for his own satisfaction. Pressure of normal military duties delayed comple:or
of the book for nearly nine years; but finally, what started )ut
as a brief survey evolved into the present volume. If it addi to
the richness of American history and affords anyone pleasan
reading, its purpose has been served.
The opinions expressed in this book are entirely the author's
They have been reached as a result of the writer's own research
and must not be construed as reflecting in any way the though
of the United States Army or of the War Department.
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas                        W.T.S.




CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1
Preparation for the Spanish-American War.. ^..  1
CHAPTER 2
Aguinaldo Establishes Revolutionary Government...  8
CHAPTER 3
Events Surrounding the Capture of Manila.....   11
CHAPTER 4
Merritt Tries to Establish American Sovereignty....  28
CHAPTER 5
Otis and the Insurgents....................  337
CHAPTER 6
The Philippine War Starts.................51. CHAPTER 7
American Authority Extended................. 73
CHAPTER 8
American Expeditions on Luzon............... 90
CHAPTER 9
War in the Benquet Mountain................... 140
CHAPTER 10
American Control Established.......... 186
CHAPTER 11
v Aftermath of American Occupation.......  202




_I


THE PHILLPPINE ISLANDS$
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Thc Philippine Archipelago




CHAPTER 1


Preparation for the Spanish-American War
BLACK WITH HEADLINES, newspapers April 24, 1898, screamed:
"Congress Declares War," "Landing Made in Cuba," "Dewey
to Leave for Manila Bay." The declaration did not come as a
surprise. For three years Americans had been conscious of the
fact that the Cubans were in revolution against Spain. During
that revolt the pro-Cuban propaganda in the United States,
'memories of our own uphill fight for independence, and reports
of ruthless methods used by the Spanish to suppress the revolt,
'had made the rebellion front-page news. In addition, some
American statesmen felt that the bloody squabble at our back
door, only eighty miles from Florida, invited American intervention and that Spanish sovereignty over Cuba was a barrier
to American aspirations for turning the Caribbean Sea into an
American lake. Further, American "interests" had some fifty
million dollars of capital invested in the Cuban sugar industry;
revolutions that devastated cane fields jeopardized these investments. The press began a national crusade, played up "Cuban
atrocities," and nourished a feeling that Spain must get out of
Cuba.
On February 15, 1898 the battleship Maine, in Cuba on a
"friendly" visit, while anchored in Havana Harbor, was destroyed by a mysterious explosion that cost 266 lives. A month
later an investigating board concluded that the sinking was the
result of an external mine explosion, an; anti-Spanish feeling
reached its height. On April 21st President McKinley approved
a Congressional resolution demanding the withdrawal of Spain
from Cuba. Spain handed the American minister at Madrid his
passports, and on the 22d Cuban ports were declared blockaded.
On the 24th Spain declared war. The United States made a formal declaration the next day, stating that war had existed since
the 21st. The bulk of the Navy assembled on the Atlantic coast,
the President issued a call for 125,000 volunteers, and preparations were made to invade Cuba and eject the Spaniards.
The first battle, however, was not to be fought in Cuba, but
1




in the Far East. Spain held sovereignty over the Philippines ancd
maintained a naval squadron there for its protection. Upon thedeclaration of war, Secretary of the Navy John D. Long sent
this telegram to Commodore George Dewey, in command of"
the Asiatic Squadron then at Hong Kong:
War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at
once to the Philippine Islands. Commence operations, particularly agnist
the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost (ndeavor.
Dewey carried out these instructions by destroying the Spanish squadron on May 1, 1898, in Manila Bay, and occupying
the Spanish Naval Base at Cavite with bluejackets. Dewey was,
impotent, however, to carry his success farther. His nearest
base was on the Pacific coast of the United States, and had he
been forced to fight another naval engagement his position
would have been precarious.
Manila was occupied by 15,000 Spanish soldiers and had
modern defensive artillery. Dewey might bombard the city
from the Bay, but he could not claim possession until American
armed forces actually occupied it. Since he did not have these
forces, he had to anchor his squadron and telegraph the Secretary of the Navy that 5,000 troops would be needed to take
and hold the city. The occupation and control of the Philippines
was henceforth to be essentially an Army job.
News of Dewey's victory created high enthusiasm  in the'
United States. Although most Americans, including many high
governmental officials, had to dig out their atlases to find just
where the Philippines were, a quick decision was made to occupy the Islands as a diversion to the attack on the Spanish in
Cuba. Also, many "imperialists," who had been disappointed at
the aloofness of the United States in not participating in the
then impending partition of China, felt that acquisition of the
Philippines might compensate for this. Major General Nelson A.
Miles, senior officer in the Army, was asked for recommendations on an expeditionary force. On May 3 he recommended
that three regiments of volunteers and two battalions of Regular
Infantry, two batteries of Volunteer artillery and two troops of
Regular cavalry be sent. The force amounted to about 5,000
2




troops, four-fifths volunteers. The War Department tentatively
accepted General Miles' estimate, and detailed Major General
Wesley Merritt, the second ranking officer in the- Army, to take
command.
On May 12 General Merritt, then in command of the Departmerit of the East (all the eastern States) with Headquarters at
Governors Island, New York, was directed to go to San Francisco and organize the expedition assembling there. A few days
later he received from President McKinley a letter of instructions
in substance as follows:
Go to the Philippines, cooperate with the Navy, defeat the Spanish armed
forces there, establish ordersand the sovereignty of the United States. Advise the Filipinos that the United States aims to protect, not fight them;
follow existing laws as far as possible; take over public property, the collection of taxes and customs; open the ports to commerce.
Thus began an enterprise that was to see within four years
the movement of 126,468 American soldiers and officers to a land
7,000 miles away, the death of 4,234 while there, the wounding
of 2,818, armed engagements with an enemy on 2,811 occasions, the death of about 16,000 Filipino soldiers in battle, the
extinction of some 100,000 Filipino civilians from famine and
pestilence, and a cost to the United States of about $600,000,000.
Although the casualties were insignificant as wars go now, the
venture marked for the United States its only departure from a
policy continuously in existence for over one hundred and
twenty-three years.
General Merritt was 62 years of age and was held in high regard by the military and civilians alike. With Custer, Sheridan,
and McPherson he had been one of the "boy generals" of the
Civil War. Graduating from West Point in 1860 he was brevetted six times for gallantry during the war and by 1865 had
risen to Brevet Major General of Volunteers. In the 1870s he had
been a leading "Indian Fighter." Although fairly old, his ability
was proved; and his broad experience of warfare made him an
admirable choice for the command of a difficult operation.
Ignorance of Americans about the Philippine Islands was remarkable. Many had never heard of them until Manila Bay.
The expedition was little better off, as is indicated by the state



ment of Major General Arthur MacArthur, a brigade commander, before a Senate Committee on his return:
Aside from high spirits and feelings of self-confidence which actuated
all concerned, the distinctive characteristic of the command was absolute
ignorance of the Philippine Archipelago in respect to geography, climate,
people and the general aspects (f nature. There was little or no literature
aboard from which instructive information could be obtained. One writer to
whom we had access advised all travelers to carry coffins, as few returned
alive from Manila.
Command of an expedition which was to move by water
some 7,000 miles and then invade a strange country garrisoned
by hostile troops, placed a heavy responsibility on General
Merritt. Apparently he and General Miles were not particularly
good friends, for despite the obvious difficulties of his mission,
he received little response to his suggestion that the force be
increased to 14,400 troops, with forty per cent Regular Army
personnel. Miles considered the expedition to Cuba of primary
importance. He finally did increase the Philippine force to
12,500, but the ratio of Regulars to Volunteers still remained at
about five to one. Finally Merritt complained directly to the
War Department, but when the expedition finally got under
way he still had less than half of the Regular troops he had requested.
Worry over the paucity of information concerning the situation in the Philippines also actuated Merritt to write directly
to President McKinley urging him to expedite information from
Dewey on the Spanish strength in the Philippines and what
supplies it would be necessary to bring from San Francisco.
Dewey indicated there were 35,000 Spanish soldiers in the
Islands, some 15,000 in Manila; that all supplies must be brought
from the United States; that Cavite was in his possession and
could be used as a base; that the rainy season would soon start
and make military operations difficult; that the Spanish morale
was low. With this as a basis Merritt organized his expedition.
On April 1, 1898 the Regular Army of the United States
consisted of 28,183 officers and men. When war was declared
three weeks later the President issued a call for 125,000 volunteers and another call for 75,000 more the following month.
Congress also authorized an increase of the Regular Army to
4




61,000. By August the Regular Army strength was up to 56,365
and 207,244 volunteers were under arms.
This quick expansion after thirty-three years of peace threw
a heavy burden on the War Department. It suddenly had to
arm, feed, clothe and equip more than a quarter of a million
men. Prohibited by law from expending funds or letting contracts until the money was actually appropriated by Congress,
the Quartermaster General found his hands tied until within
six weeks of the declaration of war. The demand for clothing
and equipment suitable for use in the tropics added to the
confusion. There was a shortage of experienced officers. The
Government-owned arsenals had only limited facilities. Recruits
and volunteers poured into hurriedly constructed mobilization
camps to be issued unwholesome food and. defective equipment.
Medical attention was inadequate. The death of 2,500 volunteers from disease brought complaints to Congress and a thorough investigation after the war, which placed blame in general
not on individuals, but one the system. This eventually resulted
in the establishment of the General Staff.
The expansion of the pitifully small Regular Army into an
organization capable of fighting a foreign war presented other
problems. Following the first call for volunteers, Congress authorized the President to muster into federal service members of
state militia units who would enlist for two years or for the
duration. The Civil War had taught the War Department
lessons on raising volunteer troops. Mustering in state units
in toto had often meant overofficered, undermanned, skeletonized regiments of little value. Consequently, the quotas in 1898
allotted to states were for a certain number of full strength
regiments. Later when the war was over and volunteers were
still needed to quench the ambitions of the Filipinos for independence, Cbngress authorized the organization of ten Volunteer regiments to be recruited at large.
Expediency dictated that the volunteer regiments assigned to
the Philippine expedition come from western states and assemble
at San Francisco. Camp Merritt, one of the mobilization camps,
was pitched on sand dunes in a bleak area on the edge of Golden
Gate Park. Cold breezes, damp fog, and wet sand caused an
epidemic of respiratory diseases. Improper construction and an
5




insufficient number of latrines brought on typhoid fever. The'
Tennessee and Oregon regiments brought measles to the camp.
Prostitutes, as usual, brought with them venereal diseases. Conditions became so bad that a board of medical officers conducted
an investigation and caused the camp to be moved in September
to the Presidio of San Francisco.
As the volunteer units trickled into San Francisco during
May, it became apparent that the United States was not a prepared nation. Nondescript in appearance and training, they
hailed from California, Oregon, Nebraska, Colorado, Wyoming,
Minnesota, Idaho, Kansas, Utah, South Dakota, and Montana;
but a Congressman from Pennsylvania had also managed to
have a regiment from that state assigned to the expedition. The
Regular Army furnished the 23rd Infantry, parts of the 14th,
and some artillery.
All settled down to prepare for a 7,000-mile voyage and war.
Hardly a volunteer officer even knew how to make out a requisition for supplies for his troops. Some couldn't be relied
upon to report the number and condition of their men. Although
all regiments were expected to report fully uniformed, the uniforms were often badly worn and some men wore civilian
clothes. Entire units had to be rearmed because their arms were
old or defective. The War Department had slipped and permitted the moderate quantity of military supplies usually kept
on the Pacific Coast to be shipped East for the Cuban expeditions. A frenzied mass-buying from the San Francisco market
resulted. Food, clothing, equipment-nearly everything needed
to equip an army-was scarce. It's surprising that the expedition sailed as soon as it did.
Hoping to get the first part of the expedition off for Manila
by May 21, the authorities made feverish efforts to supply and
equip the 1st California Volunteers, early arrivals at the assembly point, who-had been assigned to the first expedition. However, that was hopeless due to lack of transportation. Owning
no transports, the Army was forced to charter commercial vessels and convert them into troop ships. Slowness in signing contracts and demands of shipowners for various guarantees, exasperated authorities so greatly that General Otis, who was
6




ch irged with getting them ready, threatened to commandeer
t' 'm if they were not released by the time the troops were
ready to leave.
On May 23 Brigadier General Thomas Anderson was assigned to command the first expedition consisting of the 1st
California, the Oregon Volunteers, and five companies of the
14th Regular Infantry. Arriving in San Francisco during preparations for the first troop sailing, he was given no control
over, nor any opportunity to inspect his command until it was
ready to sail on May 25.
Convoyed by-the Navy cruiser, Charleston, the expedition
stopped at Hawaii and then continued to the Spanish-owned
island of Guam. Anchoring off shore, the Charleston fired a
few shots, an action that brought an unexpected apology from
the Spanish commander who did not know that war had been
declared. He was sorry that shortage of ammunition prevented
a return of the American "salute." Explanations followed; surrender was obtained in short order; and the expedition continued to Manila, arriving there thirty-seven days after its departure from San Francisco.
Meanwhile in San Francisco lack of transports worried Merritt. He complained to the War Department, urging that charters be expedited until he was able to embark the second expedition on June 15. Comprising the Colorado, the 10th Pennsylvania, the Nebraska Volunteers, two battalions of Regular
Infantry, and two batteries of Utah Volunteers, this expedition was under the command of Brigadier General Francis
V. Greene.
With General Merritt in command, the third expedition
sailed on June 27. Largest yet to leave, it consisted of Volunteer
regiments from Idaho, Wyoming, Minnesota, and twelve companies of Regulars. The Astor Battery, mountain artillery
equipped by John Jacob Astor and.manned principally by college
students, was included. The expedition was unconvoyed. Rumors of a Spanish fleet in the Pacific caused anxiety for defenseless transports. No Spanish ships were seen and the expedition
reached Manila July 31 at the height of the rainy season, ready
to unfold a new page in American history.
7




CHAPTER 2


Aguinaldo Establishes Revolutionary Government
BEFORE FOLLOWVING THE FORTUNES of Merritt and his little band
of American soldiers, it might be well to become acquainted
with the scene of his endeavors. The Philippines were discovered March 16, 1521, by Ferdinand Magellan in the first circumnavigation of the globe. The first permanent settlement was
on the Island of Cebu in 1565, and Manila was settled in 1572.
Christianity was brought to the Filipinos, but religious groups
sought wealth through exploitation of the island's rich resources. Abuses caused periodic outbreaks among the Filipinos
through the next three hundred years. One of these rebellions,
in 1896, was to have a profound significance.
The leader, Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, was a 27-year-old
youth from the Province of Cavite. Coming from a poor fanm yI
his education was slight. He was mayor of his native barrio of
Cavite Viejo, and a recognized leader of the Katipunan, a
Filipino secret, nationalist organization. Fighting with some
success against the Spanish throughout 1896, the next year he
saw his poorly equipped Insurrectos pushed back into the mountains. Finally brought to bay in Biak-Na-Bato, a mountain
stronghold, his position proved so strong that the weary Spanish, realizing the tremendous cost of the war, proposed an
armistice. Aguinaldo accepted, and the so-called pact of BiakNa-Bato materialized.
The terms of this unwritten pact are obscure. Spaniards and
Filipinos disagree as to what they were. The Filipino version is
given here principally because it indicates the aims of the Insurgent leaders. According to them, the Spanish agreed to expel
religious orders; give Filipinos-representation in the Spanish
Cortes; afford equal treatment to Filipinos and Spaniards before
the courts; employ Filipinos in high Government posts; grant
freedom of the press and the right to form associations; pay an
indemnity of 800,000 pesos to the leaders of the rebellion who
were to leave the Islands. The indemnity was theoretically to
-8




indemnify widows and orphans and recompense those who had
lost property during the rebellion.
In return for these considerations, the Insurgents were to lay
down their arms to the Spanish Government. Except for a few
minor outbreaks, the Islands quieted down.
Regardless of what the verbal terms of the pact may have
been, Aguinaldo and about forty followers went to Hong Kong,
cashed a draft for 400.000 pesos, and formed a Filipino Junta
there. Aguinaldo refused to split the indemnity among his adherents and kept it in a Hong Kong bank. He was saving it,
he said, to finance another rebellion in case the Spanish did not
institute the promised reforms.
In April 1898 one Isabelo Artacho, a member of the Junta,
entered a suit in a Hong Kong court for part of the indemnity.
He claimed the money was due him as back salary as "Secretary
of the Interior" of the defunct Insurgent government. At a council of war among the loyal members it was decided that Aguinaldo would secretly depart for Singapore and thus avoid the possibility of a court action which might tie up the funds indefinitely.
The Americans at that point entered the picture. When
Aguinaldo landed at Singapore on April 21 war between the
United States and Spain was imminent. The American consul
general at Singapore, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, decided to send
Aguinaldo back to the Philippines as an agent provocateur for
the United States. Without authority from the State Department, it appears that Mr. Pratt held interviews with Aguinaldo.
According to Aguinaldo, Pratt promised that if the former
would go to the Philippines and foment another rebellion
against the Spanish, the United States would grant the Filipinos
independence. Although Mr. Pratt strongly disclaimed having
made any promises to Aguinaldo, he was reprimanded by the
State Department and was soon out of the consular service.
At this time Dewey was in Hong Kong making final preparations for the Manila expedition. Pratt wired Dewey concerning Pratt's plan. Dewey wired back asking that Aguinaldo
come to Hong Kong as soon as possible. Aguinaldo left on the
next boat, but did not arrive there in time to see Dewey before
he left for Manila.
9
0>




Nominally, Aguinaldo was allied with the United States.
Consequently, having settled the Artacho case out of court for
$5,000, he purchased arms and ammunition with the indemnity
funds. He also sent a proclamation to the Philippine Islands
urging the Filipinos to rise against the Spanish and to regard
the Americans as friends.
Arriving off Manila May 19, Aguinaldo conferred with Admiral Dewey and then went ashore. Controversy exists as to the
Dewey-Aguinaldo conversations. Aguinaldo claimed that Dewey
reiterated Pratt's promises. However, the weight of evidence indicates that Dewey gave Aguinaldo no reason for believing that
the United States would grant independence to the Islands. At
any rate, Dewey gave Aguinaldo about sixty-two captured
Spanish rifles and several thousand rounds of ammunition. According to Dewey, Aguinaldo returned to the Olympia after his
first day ashore, discouraged and anxious to go to Japan. Dewey
encouraged him to continue his efforts.
Aguinaldo issued a series of proclamations; then gathered a
few followers. He looted the surrounding countryside and extracted money from the Filipinos by threatening them with
death. Soon he had assembled a sizable army.
On May 24 he proclaimed a dictatorial government with
himself as dictator and promised a constitution when the Islands
should pass into his control. Four days later his undrilled but
enthusiastic army captured a small Spanish column which had
been sent from Manila to disperse his force and capture his
equipment. Before long rebellion against the Spanish spread
throughout central Luzon. Spanish garrisons throughout the
~Islands were attacked and overthrown, and control of Luzon
except for Manila passed into the hands of the Filipinos. Dewey
adopted a benevolent attitude towards Aguinaldo and hastened
the landing of Insurgent munitions shipments.
On June 23 Aguinaldo issued a proclamation establishing a
revolutionary government. This amounted to a declaration of
independence from Spain. The government provided for a
president, a cabinet, and a unicameral legislative body, a committee of which was to serve as a sort of supreme court. By the
end of June Manila was surrounded, besieged, and some 4 000
Spaniards were prisoners of the Insurgents. Spanish troops vvere
10




demoralized. Aguinaldo had received and turned down a tempting offer from the Spanish for his allegiance. He had also
gathered around him a clique of radical Filipino patriots, many
of whom were men well versed in international politics. One of
them, Apolinario MNabini, a paralytic cripple, was to exercise
an ever-increasing influence on the revolutionary government.
Dewey began to realize that in permitting this revolutionary
government to develop he had possibly created a Frankenstein
monster. On the other hand, Mr. Pratt could say that his plan
had apparently been a success. Aguinaldo had greatly facilitated
the occupation of the Philippines by the United States. The only
job left for the American troops was to capture Manila.
CHAPTER 3
Events Surrounding the Capture of Manila
GENERAL ANDERSON and his little expedition set out for the
Philippines in 1898. The journey took over a month. No cable
communication existed between Manila and the United States.
No member of the expedition knew anything about the Islands. The Insurgent government purported to be an ally but
its diplomatic status was really indefinite. Military commanders
had to make decisions on political matters which they knew
very little about and which involved a departure from traditional
American foreign policy.
Manila is exactly 6,929 miles from San Francisco, via Honolulu and Guam. General Anderson sailed into Manila Bay on
June 30, 1898 with 2,500 troops on three transports. Dewey's
squadron was anchored in the Bay and the American flag was
flying over the arsenal at Cavite. Anderson's instructions authorized him to use his judgment if unforeseen conditions arose,
and further directed him, upon his arrival, to confer with
Dewey. He was also to keep his troops under the protection of
Dewey's guns. Consequently, he boarded the Olympia immediately, had a conference with Dewey, and made plans for the
disembarkation of his command. /
From the conversation Anderson decided that Cavite, the
11




former Spanish naval base, was the only logical place to land
his troops. Then under Dewey's control, this narrow peninsula
had a small dock accessible to the shallow-draught native cascos.
The cascos were the only boats available for hauling men and
supplies ashore. Accordingly, towed by Navy launches, Anderson's command was brought ashore on July 1. It collected transportation, constructed scaling ladders, practiced marksmanship,
and further prepared for an attack on Manila.
Shortly after his arrival, Anderson had remarked to Dewey
that in the United States there was talk of retaining the Philippine Islands.
Dewey replied: "If the United States intends to hold the
Philippine Islands, it will make things awkward, because just a
week ago Aguinaldo proclaimed the Independence of the Philippine Islands from Spain and seems intent on establishing his
own government."
The next afternoon the two American commanders decided
to make a formal call on Aguinaldo at Cavite. Before they left
the Olympia, Dewey said: "We'll make this call just as unofficial as possible, no sidearms, no ceremony, give no indication
to Aguinaldo that we take his government seriously." Arriving
at Insurgent headquarters, Anderson found Aguinaldo rather
suspicious and unfriendly. During the course of the conversation
Aguinaldo suddenly asked Anderson if the United States had
recognized or would recognize his government. Anderson replied that he was acting only in a military capacity and had no
authority to recognize any government.
A few days later Aguinaldo ceremoniously returned the call,
bringing his cabinet, staff, and a band. With him he also
brought an open letter written by a group of Filipinos in Manila, proposing a scheme for self-government under the Spanish.
The writers stated that the Spanish would grant self-government to the Philippines, if Aguinaldo would give up the independence idea and place his Insurgent army under their flag.
Stating that he had no intention of joining the Spanish,
Aguinaldo asked, "Does the United States intend to hold the
Philippine Islands as dependencies?"
Anderson replied, "I cannot answer that, but in one hundred
and twenty-two years we have established no colonies."
12




A> wi.aldo then replied, "I have studied attentively the Constituti yA of the United States and in it I find no authority for
colonies, and I have no fear."
Two weeks after landing and establishing his camp at Cavite;
Anderson learned that he was separated from the Spanish lines
in Manila by about seventeen miles of practically impassable
roads and some 10,000 armed Filipino Insurgents. So, in order
to be closer to the scenes of military activity, he moved part of
his command across the Bay to Tambu, a small hamlet on the
eastern shore, and established Camp Dewey a mile and a half
south of the Insurgent line of entrenchments.
Two days after this change had been made, General Greene's
expedition of 3,586 troops arrived off Manila. It was very difficult to land these troops at Tambu. Manila Bay is about twentyfive miles broad and furnishes a wide sweep for the southwest
monsoon which was prevalent at that time of year. The beach
received the full force of the sea and roared continually from
the pounding of eight-foot breakers. The job of landing soldiers and supplies was given to the Quartermaster who possessed
absolutely no facilities of his own. Lieutenant Colonel Pope, the
Chief Quartermaster, hired one launch from Filipinos and borroveed two more from the Navy. Then a few cascos, loaded
\'th supplies or troops, were hauled to a minimum safe depth
for the launches and cut loose. Dropping anchors, the crews
of the cascos then slowly paid out the anchor lines and drifted
onto the beach. Subjected to the vagaries of the wind sweeping
across the bay, the cascos were frequently swamped, equipment
was lost, supplies damaged, and soldiers drenched. General
Merritt, his feet dangling in the water, rode the last few yards
to shore on the back of a native boatman. There were times
when the use of Navy boats for Army purposes caused complications in the chain of command.
After several cascos had been swamped at Tambu, the inefficiency of the system became apparent and another landing
place was sought. The quartermaster discovered a small river
at Paranaque, one mile south of the proposed camp site for the
troops. Supplies were then hauled up the river at high tide and
unloaded at Paranaque in comparative safety. From there, a
native carabao-and-pony train hauled supplies to the camp.
13




As in any military operation, the matter of land transport tion
was one of primary importance. The Americans were forced to
depend on what animals and vehicles they could purchase from
the Filipinos. Aguinaldo had inventoried all transportation in
the neighborhood and had issued orders that none should be sold
without his express authority. Very few Filipinos wanted to run
the risk of having a bolo hacked through their skulls in order
to receive a few pesos. Anderson made representations to Aguinaldo and threatened to seize what he needed if enough animals,
carts, and so on, were not offered for sale immediately. Aguinaldo yielded. Shortly thereafter, however, he told Anderson that
even though the United States had not recognized his revolutionary government, the Americans would, if they wanted to
avoid trouble, notify him before they landed any more troops
on his sovereign soil. Nevertheless, General Merritt, completely
ignoring Aguinaldo and his government, landed his troops the
next day. Aguinaldo was angry, but he didn't take action against
the Americans.
Established on what had been a peanut farm, Camp Dewey
was decidedly uncomfortable. But proximity to the beach facilitated bathing and washing clothes. The rainy season was in
full swing, so sleeping on the ground was out of the question.
The soldiers built double-decker bamboo beds with the bottom
deck about eighteen inches above the ground. When covered
with small shelter tents, these furnished some protection except
in heavy rains. Drinking water was a problem because unboiled
water in the tropics is contaminated. The Americans dug shallow surface wells, but water from them had to be boiled for at
least fifteen minutes before the medical authorities considered it
fit to drink. Cooking was another problem because of the scarcity of dry wood. The difficulty increased as more troops arrived.
The hazardous journey between ship and shore made the
landing of food supplies uncertain. Army regulations stated that
rations became the responsibility of troop organizations at shipside. This meant if a ration casco capsized en route to shore,
the organization for which the supplies were intended received
no more rations until a board of officers could act. In some cases
regiments went hungry while waiting for the board to meet.
The coffee issued was green and the current lack of firewood
14




ma z roasting a problem. So soldiers often went without it. Despit. these handicaps, however, morale was good.
Little more than a week after his arrival, Anderson, anticipating trouble with Aguinaldo and the Insurgents, reported to
the War Department:
He (Aguinaldo) has declared himself dictator and president and is trying to take Manila without our assistance. This is not probable, but if he
can effect his purpose, he will I apprehend antagonize any attempt on our
part to establish a provisional government.
Merritt, who arrived July 25, came armed with instructions
from the President of the United States to "establish supreme
political control over the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands."
This premise was bound to clash with the claims of the independent Filipino government. Merritt solved the rather touchy
matter of diplomatic courtesies between the two "governments"
by establishing his headquarters aboard ship and ignoring the
existence of Aguinaldo and his government. In return, Aguinaldo ignored Merritt. On July 26th Dewey cabled to the Navy
Department in Washington: "Merritt's most difficult problem
will be how to deal with the Insurgents under Aguinaldo, who
has become aggressive and even threatening towards our army."
Merritt found himself in an embarrassing situation. He didn't
want to negotiate with the Insurgents, but they held entrenchments completely surrounding the city. The Americans possessed
no terrain over which they could advance on Manila without
first riding roughshod over Filipino trenches and soldiers. It
was absolutely necessary that a portion of the Insurgent line be
obtained before any kind of an attack could be made.
The problem was solved by a diplomatic play. General Noriel
commanded the Insurgent troops in front of Camp Dewey and
was on friendly terms with General Anderson. Anderson asked
*Noriel to move the Filipinos over and permit the Americans to
occupy the line in front of Camp Dewey. The purpose of this
movement was to permit modern American artillery to be
trained on the Spanish lines. Noriel took the matter up with
Aguinaldo who gave a rather grudging permission. Aguinaldo
stated that he was still relying on promises which Dewey had
15




made him regarding independence and the intentions o the
United States.
On July 29 Noriel moved a portion of his brigade east. Part
of Greene's brigade went into the line and faced the Spanish,
800 yards away.
The Spanish Army now showed its hand. Shortly before
midnight, about two days after the Americans had moved
into the trenches, the Spaniards opened fire on the American
line with heavy rifle fire and 3.2-inch guns which they had
mounted in their trenches. The two battalions of the 10th
Pennsylvania Volunteers and one battery of the 3d Regular Artillery returned the fire. The sound of bullets passing through
bamboo thickets was mistaken for the crack of a rifle close by,
and the Americans believed that a general assault was in
progress.
The general call to arms was sounded. An artillery regiment,
which was acting as infantry, took with them ammunition for
one Volunteer regiment reported "whipped."  A battalion, of
another Volunteer regiment, also moving to the front, mistook
an abandoned Insurgent trench for the American front lines.
This battalion heard shots in their front and fired three volleys
into the backs of the regiment first demoralized. The arrival of
the artillery regiment, firing steady volleys, settled the nerves
of the front-line troops. After a discharge of 60,000 rounds of
rifle and 160 rounds of artillery ammunition in an hour and a
half, the front became quiet.
The panic-stricken Volunteer regiment had no adequate
cover, and the reinforcing troops marching up from  Camp
Dewey received the full force of the Spanish shots which were
aimed too high. These two groups suffered the bulk of the
casualties, which consisted of 10 men killed and 43 wounded.
Daylight revealed that the Spanish had never left their trenches,
but were merely indulging in the Spanish-Filipino form of
"attack" in which the attacker remained in his trenches and
sent a fusillade of bullets toward the enemy.
Nearly two years later these series of "attacks" by the Spanish
had their repercussion in the United States. The Springfield
(Massachusetts) Republican carried an excerpt from a book
written by Aguinaldo which he had designated as the True
16




Version of the Philippine Revolution. In it was the following
'statement: ~
After the Americans occupied the trenches, their outposts were surprised
by the Spaniards who made a night attack.... [The outposts] abandoned
their rifles and six field guns in their precipitate retreat. Our [the Filipino]
troops immediately rushed to their assistance, repulsed the Spanish, and recaptured rifles and field guns. Alleging that they did not belong to the
Americans since Filipino troops had captured them from the Spanish, General Noriel opposed the restitution of the arms which I ordered returned to
the Americans as a token of our good will and friendship.
Since the newspapers or army reports had carried no mention
of this "precipitate retreat and abandonment of their arms"
by Greene's troops, the American public thought it had not
been informed about all the exploits of the Army in the Philippines. A question was asked on the floor of the United States
Senate concerning the matter and an investigation was conducted under the direction of the President. Depositions were
sent to all parts of the United States in order to obtain evidence
from officers and men who had been present during the attacks,
but had been since discharged and returned to their various civil
pursuits. The substance of the depositions was an imposing list
of indignant denials from Anderson, Greene, and the regimental
and battalion commanders.
On August 4, another American brigade under the command
of Brigadier General Arthur MacArthur arrived at Manila,
bringing the total strength of the American f9rces in the Philippines up to 10,907 officers and men. General MacArthur, who
was later to be a most prominent figure in the quelling of the
insurrection and as the Military Governor of the Islands, was another product of the Civil War. Entering the Army in 1862 as a
lieutenant in the 24th Wisconsin Infantry, he had risen to the
grade of Colonel by 1865. During the war he had been twice
brevetted for bravery during action. In addition, he had been decorated with the Congressional Medal of Honor for "seizing the
colors of his regiment at a critical moment and planting themn on
the captured works on the crest of Missionary Ridge." Thirty
years of peacetime Army training had made him     a most capable and competent officer.
17




With the arrival of MacArthur's brigade, Merritt felt strong
enough to undertake an attack on Manila. He organized his
troops into a division, designating Anderson as division commander, and placed Greene and MacArthur each in command
of a brigade.
Meanwhile, Dewey had been informally negotiating with the
Spanish. He believed that General Fermin Jaudenes, the Spanish Governor General, would not fight if the Americans threatened to attack the city. Merritt was skeptical but agreed that
any arrangement with the Spanish which would save American
lives was desirable.
Jaudenes' position was hopeless. He was outnumbered by
Insurgent and American troops, both of whom were enemies.
Supplies of food and water were short and he had many sick
and wounded troops.
Early in August Jaudenes intimated to Dewey through the
Belgian consul that if attacked, he would not use the powerful
artillery defenses located in the walled city unless Manila were
shelled; and if the Americans would promise to prevent the
entry of Insurgent troops into the city, his resistance would be
only of sufficient strength to satisfy the demands of "Spanish
honor." After a consultation, Merritt and Dewey "intimated"
that if Jaudenes kept his word, the city proper would not be
bombarded and after the capture of Manila the generosity of
American terms would vary directly with the brevity of Spanish
resistance.
The old custom of the transmission of courtly communications between opposing military commanders still existed in
those days. This is indicated by the following correspondence
preceding the attack:
Headquarters United States Land and Naval Forces, Manila Bay, P.I.,
August 7, 1898.
The General in Chief
Commanding Spanish Forces in Manila.
-Sir: We have the honor to notify your excellency that operations of the
-land and naval forces of the United States against the defense of Manila
may begin at any time after the expiration of forty-eighit hours from the
hour of -receipt by you of this colmmunication or sooner if made necessary
by an attack on your part.
18




This notice is given in order to afford you an opportunity to remove all
noncombatants from the city.
Very respectfully,
WESLEY MERRITT,
Major General, United States  rii-s.
Commanding Land Forces of the United States.
GEORGE DEWEY,
Rear Admiral, United States Navy,
Commanding United States Naval Forces on Asiatic Station.
The Governor General and Captain General of the Philippines to the
Major General of the Army and the Rear Admiral of the Navy Commanding respectively the Military and Naval forces of the United States.
Gentlemen:
I have the honor to inform your excellencies that at half past twelve today I received your notice with which you favor me that after forty-eight
hours have elapsed, you may begin operations against this fortified city or at
an earlier time if the forces under your command are attacked by mine.
As your notice is sent far the purpose of providing for the safety of noncombatants, I give thanks to your excellencies for the humane sentiments
you have shown and state that finding myself surrounded by insurrectionary forces, I am without place of refuge for the increased numbers of
wounded, sick, women and children who are now lodged within the walls.
Very Respectfully and Kissing the hands of your excellencies,
FERMIN JAUDENES,
Governor General and Captain General of the Philippines.
Headquarters United States Land and Naval Forces,
Manila Bay, P. I., August 9, 1898.
To the Governor General and Captain General of the Philippines:
Sir: The inevitable suffering in store for the wounded, sick, women and
children in the event that it becomes our duty to reduce the defenses of
the walled town in- which they are gathered, will we feel assured appeal
successfully to the sympathies of a general capable of making the determined and prolonged resistance which your excellency has exhibited after
the loss of your Naval forces and without hope of succor.
We therefore submit, without prejudice to the high sentiments of honor
and duty which your excellency entertains, that surrounded on every side
as you are by a constantly increasing force, with a powerful fleet in your
front and deprived of all prospect of reinforcement and assistance, a most
useless sacrifice of life would result in the event of attack and therefore
every consideration of humanity makes it imperative that you should not
subject your city to the horrors of a bombardment. Accordingly we demand
the surrender of the city of Manila and the Spanish forces under your
command.
W. MERRITT,
Major General, U. S. Army.
GEORGE DEWEY,
'Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy.
19




The Governor General and Captain General of the Philippines,
Manila. August 9, 1898.
The Maior General of the Army and the Rear Admiral of the Navy, Commanling respectively the Military and Naval Forces of the United States.
Gentdlemen:
Having received an intimation from your excellencies that in obedience
to the sentiments of humanity to which o(u appeal and which I share, I
should surrender this city and the forces under mnv orders, I have assembled
the council of defense which declares that Vour request cannot be grantel.
But taking account of the most exceptional circumstances, existing in this
city which your excellencies recite, and which unfortunately I have to aldmit,
I would consult my government, if your excellencies will grant the time
strictly necessary for this communication by way of Hong Kong.
Very respectfully,
FERMIIN JALDENES,
Governor General and Captain General of the Philippines.
Headquarters United States Land and Naval Forces,
Manila Bay, August 10, 1898.
To the Governor General and Captain General of the Philippine Islands.
Sir: We have the honor to acknowledge the conmunication of your excellency of the 8th instant, in which you suggest your desire to consult your
government in regard to the exceptional circumstances in your city, provided the time to do so can be granted by us.
In reply we respectfully inform your excellency that we (lccline to g-rant
the time requested.
Very respectfully,
W. MERRITT,
Major General, U. S. Army.
GEORGE DEwEY,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy.
Two days previous, swashing through the mud at Pasay, MacArthur and Greene had drawn up a plan of attack and submitted it to Merritt for his approval. Opposing the Americans
was the Spanish line of entrenchments, flanked on the beach
side by the stone Fort San Antonio Abad and on the other
side, nearly a mile east, by a heavy wood and concrete blockhouse. Bold reconnaissance had indicated that all streams between the two lines were fordable, and that some firm ground
existed. But the dense bamboo thickets, a great many estuaries,
and swampy areas made a deployed advance difficult. The only
possible'route of advance was along the beach or on the two
roads running between the Spanish-American lines of entrenchments. Such an advance would, of course, be difficult for the
20




attacker if he should encounter determined resistance. However,
as a result of the unofficial negotiations, the Americans were
counting on little opposition and planned their attack on that
basis.
The American plan can perhaps best be explained by citing
a memorandum which General Merritt sent to all general officers on the day preceding the attack:
Memorandum for General Officers in Camp regarding the possible action
of Saturday, August 13th.
"The Navy under Rear Admiral Dewey is to sail at 9:00 in the morning,
August 13th, moving up to the different positions assigned to warships and
open fire about 10 o'clock. The troops are to hold themselves in readiness
as already agreed upon, to advance on the enemy in front, occupying the
trenches after they are so shaken as to make the advance practicable without
a serious disadvantage to our troops. In case the navy is delayed in dismounting the enemy's guns, and leveling the works, no advance is to
be made by the army unless ordered from these headquarters. In the event
of a white flag being displayed by the enemy on the angle of the walled
city, or prominently anywhere else in sight, coupled with a cessation of
firing on our part, it will mean surrender as the Admiral proposes after
having fired a satisfactory number of shots, to move up toward the walled
city and display the international signal "surrender." If a white flag is displayed, this will be an answer to his demand and the troops will advance
in good order and quietly.
These headquarters will be on board the Zafiro, which has been placed
at the disposal of the Commanding General by the Admiral. Six companies
of the Second Oregon Regiment, now quartered at Cavite will accompany
these headquarters, to be used in occupying and keeping order in the
walled city in event of necessity. If the white flag is displayed, the Admiral
will send his Flag-Lieutenant ashore, accompanied by a staff officer from
these headquarters, who will bring word as to the proposition made by the
enemy. The troops in the meantime will advance and entering the enemy's
works by our left flank move in such positions as may be assigned them
from these headquarters. This is not intended to interdict the entrance if
possible by the first brigade or part of the troops over the enemy's works
on the right. It is intended that these results shall be accomplished without
the loss of life; and while firing continues from the enemy with their heavy
guns, or if there is an important fire from their intrenched lines, the troops
will not attempt an advance unless ordered from these headquarters.
In the event of unfavorable weather for the service of guns on board
ship, the action will be delayed until further orders.
Memorandum of the positions to be occupied by the troops after entering
the enemy's defenses will be carried by the Chief of Staff, General Babcock,
and will be complied with as far as is practicable."


21




More detailed instructions, issued later, directed that "General
MacArthur's Brigade, in the event that it can pass the enemy
line on the road leading to Singalon, will leave a force in the
Spanish trenches at this point of crossing with instructions to
permit no armed bodies other than American troops to cross
the trenches in the direction of Manila. When the Americans
advanced, they were not to permit the Insurgents to follow.
The actual attack on Manila; carefully planned and supervised, went, for the most part, strictly according to schedule.
At 0935 August 13, four ships of Dewey's squadron, and parts
of the Utah Artillery mounted in the American trenches, opened
fire on Fort San Antonio Abad and the Spanish front lines.
No reply was received from the enemy. Forty-five minutes
later, Greene's brigade, with some three hundred members
barefooted, moved forward. Each man carried field equipment,
200 rounds of ammunition, two days' rations and entrenching
tools. It was necessary for Dewey's ships to lift their fire at
the proper time. So the front line of the 1st Colorado Volunteers,
on the left of the brigade, and wading along the beach, was
marked with large flags. Without opposition the Colorado regiment walked into Fort San Antonio Abad a few minutes later
and hoisted the American Flag. At the same time Dewey displayed from the Olympia the international flag code DWHB
meaning "Demand Surrender."
Greene's brigade waited until the 18th Regular Infantry and
the 1st Nebraska Volunteers arrived at the fort. Then the brigade advanced without any trouble through the suburbs of
Malate and Ermita towards Manila. A-straggling fire from the
second line of Spanish trenches killed one man. Arriving at the
clearing in front of the walled city, Greene's troops saw a white
flag displayed on one of the bastions and six or seven thousand
armed Spanish soldiers on the walls.
MacArthur's brigade, to the east of Greene, encountered more
'opposition from the Insurgents who were on its right. The
Americans began at daybreak, and continued until the attack
was launched, an indiscriminate fire on the Spanish lines. The
Spanish replied, showering their lines with bullets. The attack
moved forward about 1030. Spanish blockhouse No. 14, directly in front of the American lines, was silenced with a few
22




shots from the 3.2-inch guns of the Utah Artillery. The first
line of Spanish trenches was easily occupied. Dropping off two
battalions to prevent the Insurgents from following the attack,
the brigade then moved forward. Approaching the village of
Singalon, it was subjected to a hot fire, forced to halt, and then
advanced slowly. The nature of the ground prevented deployment, so it was not until 1335, when the Astor Battery was put
into the fight, that the brigade was able to enter Singalon. By
that time the white flag had been run up on the walled city.
The brigade then marched into Manila, leaving detachments
at bridges and street intersections.
Greene reached the walled city shortly after the arrival of the
leading elements of his brigade. His original orders had been
to march around the wall and occupy the bridges over the Pasig
River to the north in order to prevent Insurgents from entering
from that direction. Although the white flag was displayed, the
walls were lined with armed Spanish soldiers, and firing could
still be heard from the front of MacArthur's brigade. Greene
hesitated to leave while this large force of armed Spaniards was
at his rear. His brigade moved up to the walled city, a few feet
under the guns of the Spaniards on the wall, and halted. The
gates into the city were closed and barred. At this time the
situation was further complicated by the arrival of a column of
Spanish troops, retreating from in front of MacArthur's brigade.
Closely pursuing them was a battalion of Insurgents which had
slipped around MacArthur's right flank. As the Spanish column
approached, one could see that it was trying to reach the walled
city and that it was being fired upon by the Insurgents. Seeing
their retreating comrades peppered with shots, the Spanish
troops on the wall opened fire. The American troops were between the two, and white flag or not, anything might have
happened with Americans, Spaniards and Insurgents all excited and fingering or shooting their rifles. Two American soldiers were killed. After a hasty conference between Greene, the
commander of the Spanish column, and a Spanish officer on the
wall, the gates of the city opened and the Spanish marched in.
The 1st California Volunteers and the 18th Infantry physically
blocked further advance to the Insurgents.
At this time Greene received a message from the walled city
23




that negotiations were being pursued inside for the surrender
of Manila. He assembled his brigade and left a guard to keep
the Insurgents away from the wall. Then he crossed the Pasig
River and sent patrols into the districts of San Sebastian, Sampaloc, Santa Cruz, Kipot and San Miguel. Since the Spanish
had been definitely eliminated as a hostile factor, his mission
now was to keep the Insurgents from entering the city from
the north. His brigade patrolled the streets that night. The following morning his troops established a line running through
Calle Azcarraga, a broad thoroughfare which cut across the
northern part of the city.
Dewey and Merritt had noticed the white flag on the bastion
of the walled city at about 1120. They immediately sent ashore
representatives who obtained a nominal surrender. A short time
later, Merritt, with his staff and two battalions of the Oregon
Volunteers, disembarked and entered the city from the Pasig
River side. There Merritt met Jaudenes and the two held a
conference about the terms of capitulation.
By 1700 hours in the evening a rough draft of the articles of
capitulation had been drawn.
The substance of the capitulation which gave the United
States sovereignty over Manila-its city, harbor, and bay, was as
follows: The Spanish surrendered Manila and all of its defenses
with all "Honors of War;" officers excepted, all arms in the
hands of Spanish troops were to be placed in the custody of the
Americans pending the conclusion of peace between Spain and
the United States. Although their official status was that of
"prisoners of war," the Spanish troops were to remain at liberty,
under the orders of their own officers; the Americans were to
furnish the Spaniards with rations and necessary medical aid.
All public property and funds were to be turned over to the
American authorities. The protocol ended with the statement
that "The city, inhabitants, churches and private property will
be placed under the safeguard of the faith and honor of the
American army."
The material gain, in addition to the public buildings,
amounted to nearly 900,000 pesos in cash, 22,000 arms,
10,000,000 rounds of ammunition and 13,000 prisoners. The
total American casualties for the day were 6 killed and 44
24




wounded. It was impossible to find out the exact number of
Spanish casualties, but it has been estimated that 40 were
killed and 100 wounded between August 1 and 13.
As a matter of fact, the Battle of Manila was unnecessary.
On August 12, the day before the attack took place, the following telegram was dispatched to Merritt from. Washington:
The president directs that all military operations against the enemy be
suspended. Peace negotiations are nearing completion, a protocol just having
been signed by representatives of the two countries. You will inform the
Commander of the Spanish forces in the Philippines of these instructions.
Fu-her orders will follow. Acknowledge receipt.
The cable connection between Manila and Hong Kong had
been- cut and Merritt did not receive the message until August 16.
Meanwhile, the Filipino Insurgents had been forestalled in
every attempt to enter the walled city. They had besieged Manila for two and a half months, sacrificing thousands of lives
and millions in material interests. And they were bitterly disappointed at not getting into the city and being allowed to take
part in the surrender proceedings.
The night before the attack they had been notified by Merritt
that they must not enter the city in the event of its capture by
the Americans. However, they made their own preparations
for an attack and at dawn on the 13th, they began firing on the
Spanish trenches. Later, as the Spanish withdrew under the
pressure of the American bombardment, the Insurgents swept
forward in the lee of the American attack and occupied the
suburbs of Paco and Malate.
On the north side of the city the Insurgents also attacked.
But the Spanish line, after withdrawing slightly, held firm
until it was relieved by American troops. To the Filipinos, it
appeared as though the Spanish and Americans were uniting
to thwart the Insurgents' ambition to occupy and (possibly) loot
the city.
By 1900 on the evening of the 13th some 4,000 angry Filipino
Insurgents had massed in Malate. The American detachments
who blocked the Filipinos' further movement to the north felt
sure that the Insurgents were responsible for the American
25




casualties caused by constant sniping throughout the day. Feeling that the situation was becoming critical, Merritt directed
General Anderson, the division commander, to remove the Insurgents from Paco and Malate. Anderson, realizing the responsibility of keeping his eye on 13,000 Spanish "prisoners of
war" and faced with the possibility of a fight with the entire
Insurgent Army, hesitated to use force. He compromised by
sending the following telegram to Aguinaldo at Bacoor:
Serious trouble threatening between our forces. Try and prevent it. Your
forces should not try to force themselves into the city until we have received
the full surrender. Then we will negotiate with you.
This telegram intimated that when'the full surrender had
been received, the Insurgents would be permitted to enter the
city. At this time only a rough draft of the articles of capitulation had been signed. Four hours later Anderson received the
following answer from Aguinaldo:
I received a telegram. My interpreter is in Cavite. In consequence of this
I have not answered until now. My troops are forced by yours by means
of threats of violence to retire from positions taken. It is necessary to avoid
a conflict which I should lament that you order your troops that they avoid
difficulty with mine, as up to now they have conducted themselves like
brothers to take Manila. I have given strict orders to my chiefs that they
preserve strict respect -to American forces and aid them if attacked by a
common enemy. I do not doubt that the good relations and friendship
which unite us will be continued if your soldiers correspond to the conduct
imposed upon mine.
Anderson waited until the following morning because he had
been advised that Aguinaldo was sending a commission to confer on the matter.
The commission arrived the next morning. It was composed
of Gregorio Araneta, Felipe Buencamino, and Benito Lagarda,
three wealthy and educated Filipinos who had joined the Insurgent government. They were willing to withdraw insurgent
forces if the Americans would promise to reinstate them upon
the probable resumption of Spanish sovereignty in the Islands.
Having received instructions from Washington that there must
be no dual occupation of the city, Merritt felt unable to make
any such pledge. He advised the commission to trust America
26




and read them a proclamation which he was issuing to the
people of the Philippine Islands. It announced the establishment
of military government and asked for the cooperation of the
people in return for protection from the United States. Disgruntled, the commission retired to confer with Aguinaldo and
returned the next day with a list of conditions which they
wanted fulfilled before the Insurgents would withdraw from
the suburbs. In brief these conditions were as follows:
1. American jurisdiction to be confined to Manila proper and
the suburbs immediately adjacent thereto.
2. The Insurgents were to retain control of the Manila water
works which were located four miles outside the city. (These
water works had been under the control of the Insurgents since
the beginning of the siege.) The Americans were to pay the
cost of operating and maintaining the system.
3. Insurgent troops were to' have free access to the city and
their officers permitted to bear sidearms therein.
4. Filipino products entering the city were to be admitted
duty free.
5. The monies and arms taken in the capitulation of Manila
were to be divided between the Insurgents and the Americans.
6. Filipino Insurgents were to be given preference in the
filling of municipal offices not held by Americans.
7. American troops were to be prohibited from passing
through Insurgent lines without authority from the Insurgent
government.
Although excessive in most respects, Merritt was inclined to
consider the demands. He was extremely anxious to have the
Manila water supply turned on. In addition, he was busy organizing the administration of the city and wanted, if possible,
to avoid forcibly ejecting the Insurgents. So he agreed to all the
conditions with the exception-of forbidding the wearing of
arms by Insurgents while in the city, refusing to share any of
the "spoils of war" and insisting that Americans be permitted
to pass through the Insurgent lines. Merritt promised that if and
when the Americans left the Philippines, he would leave
Aguinaldo "in as good condition as when he found him."
Aguinaldo then agreed to withdraw his troops.
27




Ten days went by without a withdrawal. Merritt wrote a
sharp letter to Aguinaldo concerning the matter.
Further negotiations on the withdrawal of the Insurgents were
delayed by the departure of General Merritt for the SpanishAmerican Peace Conference at Paris.
The negotiations were turned over to Merritt's successor,
Major General Elwell S. Otis.
The final disposition of the Islands was contingent on the
treaty with Spain, so the American forces sat down to wait:.
The troops were moved into quarters and the officers took over
the administration of the city.
CHAPTER 4
Merritt Tries to Establish American Sovereignty
THE SIEGE HAb LEFT Manila in a demoralized condition. The only
water obtainable came from a few surface wells or what could be
caught in rain barrels. The food supply had been so nearly exhausted that most of the horses and small animals in the city had
been killed and used for meat. Such garbage and refuse collection
system as existed and most of the other public utilities had been
permitted to lapse completely. Business was at a standstill.
However, except for minor friction with the Insurgent troops,
the occupation of Manila by the Americans was easily accomplished. By late afternoon of the 13th the Spanish troops had surrendered and had been housed in their own barracks. Within
twenty-four hours General Merritt and staff were quartered in
the Malacafian, the palace of the former Spanish Governor General. Within a week practically all stores in Manila had been reopened, horsecars were running, and banks were functioning.
Merritt still had to establish American sovereignty in the
Islands, set up facilities for customs and tax collections, transfer
Spanish civil administration to the control of Americans and
open the ports of trade.
The protocol of peace signed August 12 between the United
States and Spain was ambiguous regarding the status of the
Philippine Islands. It stated that the United States would retain
28




control of "Manila, Harbor, and Bay," while the rest of the
Islands would remain in status quo until the Peace Commission
had determined their final disposition. Since the protocol had
been signed on August 12, the day before the city was captured,
the Spanish Governor General said that "status quo" should be
interpreted to mean the status of the city on August 12. In other
words, he felt the city should be under Spanish sovereignty and
that the articles of capitulation should be repealed. There was an
unsympathetic reaction to the interpretation. The idea was then
advanced that American control was to be confined to matters
pertinent only to the city and harbor of Manila, while the Spanish should retain colonial buildings, funds, and administration.
The second argument was reasonable as far as literal interpretation is concerned. But it was impractical because outside of
Manila almost every province in Luzon and many of the provinces on the neighboring islands of the archipelago were under
the control of the Insurgents. Merritt did not want to engage in
any sort of dual administration with the Spanish. Such an arrangement would have been impracticable and would have
meant Spanish retention of large colonial funds which had been
surrendered under the terms of the capitulation. He therefore
directed his activities on the premise that control of "Manila
city, Harbor and Bay" meant control of all governmental
agencies located in that area, and proceeded to take over the administration of Manila on that basis.
The result was opposition to every change the Americans proposed. In practically all cases, Spanish officials refused to surrender the keys to their offices until an American officer had
signed a statement that the change had been made by force.
Another feature which complicated the transfer of authority
was the hature and composition of the population of Manila. In
1898 the capital had about 240,000 inhabitants. Of these 181,000
were Filipinos of varying degree of racial purity, some 50,000
were Chinese, and about 10,000 European and American. Although Tagalog was the Filipino dialect usually spoken by most
Filipinos living in Manila, many of the eighty-six other recognized Filipino dialects were often heard. The Chinese, of course,
conversed in their native dialects whenever possible. The official
language was Spanish. French, German, Japanese, and Dutch
29




merchants spoke their language whenever convenient. The average American officer or soldier spoke only English. Hence in
most cases where official intercourse took place between Americans and Filipinos or Spanish, an interpreter was necessary. But
the Americans could not always be sure of the interpreter's honesty.
A third feature which complicated the smooth establishment
of American sovereignty was the assumed authority of Aguinaldo's Insurgents encamped in large numbers at all entrances
to the city. Following the capitulation, the Insurgent government
claimed the right to levy an "export tax" on all foodstuffs
brought into Manila from the interior. The price of meat rose
to a dollar a pound; eggs, over a dollar a dozen. It was later discovered that Insurgent "tax collectors" were actually entering the
city and by threatening city merchants secretly collected money
from them. Aguinaldo influenced the Filipino laboring classes
to strike for higher wages under the new administration, and in
some cases to refuse to accept proffered jobs.
Despite these handicaps, in a short time the wheels of the new
government were running smoothly.
Merritt's first official act following the capitulation of the city
was to issue a proclamation which stated in part:
The commander of the United States forces has instructions from his
government to assure the people of the Philippine Islands that he has not
come to wage war on them, but to protect them in their homes, in their
employments, and in their personal and religious rights.... The government established among you by the United States is a government of military occupation; and for the present it is ordered that the municipal laws,
such as affect private rights of persons and property, regulate local institutions, and provide for the punishment of crime shall be considered as continuing in force and that they be administered through the ordinary tribunals substantially as before occupation.... The Port of Manila and
other ports and places in the Philippines which may be in the actual possession of our land and naval forces will be open while our military occupation may continue, to the commerce of all neutral nations... The
Commanding General in entering upon his duty as military governor, desires to assure the people that-so long as they preserve the peace and perform their duties towards the representatives of the United States, they
will not be disturbed in their persons and property.
The proclamation, printed in English, Spanish, and Tagalog
30




was published in all Manila newspapers and circulated among
the Filipinos.
Obviously the reestablishment of firm municipal law and order was of prime importance. The day following the capitulation
General MacArthur was appointed Provost Marshal General of
the city and assigned three regiments of infantry. Within a week
these troops had replaced the Spanish municipal police guard
and were performing the duties of civil policemen. The judges
in the various Manila courts were replaced by Army officers.
These officers used Spanish and Filipino interpreters, and held
court in open session, following the existing laws in principle.
The Manila city council was dissolved and all matters normally
within its jurisdiction were referred to MacArthur's headquarters. City employees who were members of the Fire Department,
Water Works Bureau, and sanitation squad were retained. The
actual transfer of the municipal authority from the Spanish to
the Americans was accomplished with little difficulty.
The transfer of the financial phase of the administration was
much more complex principally because insular and municipal
affairs were closely intertwined. General Greene was appointed
"Intendente General de Hacienda" and charged with the inventory and transfer of Spanish state funds. Greene appointed a
board headed by -Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. Potter which,
despite Spanish obstructionist tactics, methodically counted all
government funds in the city. The colonial treasury divulged,
$795,517.71 (Mex); the Spanish mint, $62,856.08; the office of
the civil governor and city council (ayuntamiento), $3,624.82;
the office of internal revenue $24,527.60. Credits in the Spanish
Philippine Bank, stocks, bonds, and cash funds in various safes
brought the total amount to $938,878.92, of which $890,186.99
was in cash. The Spanish-Philippine Bank was in a precarious
position, principally because of loans made to the Spanish government. Any checks and drafts drawn on it that were found
among the seized funds, were withheld. The'municipal government of Manila, which had been run more or less jointly. with
the insular government, was evidently penniless. The seized
funds were turned over to Major Charles Whipple of the Paymaster's (Finance) Department, Who henceforth administered
them as a sort of colonial treasurer.
31




The occupation by the United States caused an influx of
American currency into the Islands. Amcrican money was
established as legal tender. The current price of gold was 2.08
(in terms of silver). The value of an Anmerican dollar was,
therefore, theoretically more than doubled when measured
against current prices in the Philippines. Nevertheless, it was
often difficult for an American shopper to convince a Chinese
or Filipino shopkeeper that the American dime should buy as
much as the Spanish peseta. The peseta was nearly twice the
size of a dime and of the same metal. After confidence in
American currency had been established, however, American
soldiers, who were paid in gold dollars, became almost rich.
The assumption by the Americans of the collection of internal
revenue involved several problems. Major R. C. B. Bement was
charged with this duty. He intended to continue in force temporarily at least the system of collections used by the Spanish.
However he found that the disgruntled Spanish official whom
he replaced had removed from the office all copies of the current
regulations and decrees then in force. After a tedious search, he
located duplicate copies which were translated into English.
One of the taxes imposed during the Spanish regime had been
an industrial tax levied on all industries, trades, and professions.
The majority of the Chinese merchants in the city took advantage of the current confusion and American unfamiliarity with
the city and tried to evade this tax. They changed their names,
the location of their shops, or the designation of their trade.
Months elapsed before the Americans were able to adjust themselves satisfactorily to the situation. The Spanish method of
collecting the "Urbana" or rent tax was so confusing that even
Army officers were bewildered. The system of collection was
changed, and the tax reduced from five per cent to three per cent.
Even though the tax was reduced, the collections under the new
system were greater than the Spanish had obtained.
Issuance of licenses to various trades and businesses was the
principal source of income to the municipal government of
Manila. Besides hotels, bars, and places of amusement, cobblers,
tinkers, and "speculators" were also required to hold licenses.
So were the three thousand Filipino vendors who assembled
their wares at the marketplaces. The Americans refused to li32




cense cockfights. This sport was the nearest approach to a
Filipino national pastime. Lack of licenses did not stop secret
gatherings. The net effect of the prohibition was merely loss of
revenue that would have been derived from the issuance of licenses. The Americans also discontinued the national lottery
which had been a prolific source of income to the Spanish.
A naval officer had charge of quarantines, emigration, harbor
improvement, marine licenses, salvage operations, and collecting
the customs-of the Port of Manila. The tariff rates in effect under
the Spanish regime and the Spanish methods of collection remained in force. But the system was modified, following instructions from Washington shortly after the occupation. Later, however, government revenue experts were sent to the Philippines
to revise the system along American lines. Customs receipts increased nearly twenty per cent under the American administration.
When Major Frank S. Bourns of the Army Medical Corps
took over his duties as President of the Manila Board of Health,
he found that no sanitary service worthy of the name had been
maintained.
The one public hospital in Manila was limited to the care of
lepers. Leprosy was said to have been introduced into the Philippines from Japan in 1633. It had infected over 30,000 Filipinos
by 1898. Some 400 of these were housed in the San Lazaro Leper
Hospital under the care of Franciscan Friars.
In municipal sanitation Manila was reminiscent of many
Etlropean cities in the fifteenth century. Within the walled city
an inadequate drainage system purported to handle the sewage
disposal problem. In the suburbs a network of tidal estuaries
theoretically served the same purpose. No underground sewage
system existed. If a surface drain or estero was not conveniently
located nearby, many Filipinos did not bother to move refuse
away from their houses. However, the 200,000 people who did
use the small streams and drains for that purpose had turned
them into rank, stinking, open-air cesspools, which were flushed
only on the occasion of a heavy rain. Surrounding the walled
city was a swampy morass which had originally been a moat,
but had deterioriated into a wallowing ground for carabaos and
a breeding place for mosquitoes. Limited as they were in the
33




matter of transportation, the Americans loaded garbage into
cascos, which were hauled into the bay and emptied where the
current was offshore. Eventually municipal incinerators were
installed. In the disposal of human wastes the new regime introduced the Chinese "dry earth" or "night soil" system. Inhabitants were required to clean indoor toilets weekly. Gradually
conditions improved. Today, of course, Manila has a modern
sewage system.
In 1898 an epidemic of smallpox, and later the bubonic plague,
swept Manila. Its spread to the American troops caused the
Army Medical Corps to realize that the general health and living conditions of the civil population of Manila affected the wellbeing of the American command. A vaccine farm was established and about 80,000 Filipinos were vaccinated; rat poison
was distributed to Filipinos living in the congested areas of the
city. Later a thorough census of the city was taken during which
almost every Filipino abode was visited by medical personnel.
The census showed that 350 cubic feet per person was considered minimum healthful space for sleeping rooms, but few
Filipino homes within the city approached this figure. Many
had as little as 24 cubic feet per person for sleeping. The actual
number of Chinese living in the city exceeded the current tabulations by about 10,000. Of the 180,000 citizens who were carried on cedula records as "Filipino," more than one-third had
Chinese fathers. Of the 60,000 Chinese living in the city only
350 were women. Of the 200 Japanese, 119 were women, practically all prostitutes. The information obtained in this census
enabled the Army Medical Corps to make rapid strides in improving the living and sanitary conditions in the city. Its pioneer
work was later carried on by the United States Public Health
Service, so that today Manila is one of the cleanest and most
healthful cities in the Orient.
The paramount health problem was the prevalence of venereal diseases. In no respect condoning prostitution, but realizing
thlat efforts to stop it entirely were Utopian. the military authorities attempted to protect tl-e soldiers by rigid control of the traffic.
Loose women were registered, segregated, and examined weekly.
If found infected, they were hospitalized at their own expense,
treated, and visited by social workers who sought to interest
34




and train them  in moral occupations. Later the Amnriccin autorities were criticized by various "white ribbon" societies in
the United States for sponsoring "licensed prostitution" in the
Philippines. But the authorities found the system reduced the
venereal rate to a level comparable with that in the United
States.
The Surgeon General of the Army compiled sickness rates
as opposed to casulaties, during the Spanish-American War and
the Insurrection immediately after. The compilation presents
an interesting light on the effect of the Philippine climate on
American soldiers. The daily temperature in any of the threeseasons never varies more than thirty degrees from the annual
mean temperature of 80 degrees Fahrenheit. It is the extreme
humidity of the air which weakens Americans and necessitates
occasional vacations to more temperate climates.
The Surgeon General's statistics on death rates from sickness
indicate that during the period from May 1898 to June 1899,
the death rate per thousand men in the United States Army
was, for the Philippines, 17.20; for Puerto Rico, 38.15; for Cuba,
45.14; for the United States, 23.81. Those figures might mean
that during the Spanish-American War, the Philippines were
the safest place for a soldier. The death rate among the civilian
population of some of our large cities for the same year shows
Washington with 20.74 deaths per thousand of population,
Boston with 20.09, San Francisco with 19.41, and New York
with 19.28. However, these figures show the deaths and not the
non-fatal sickness rate; that is, the data on malaria, dysentery
and diarrhea. These diseases, though not fatal, often permanently incapacitate an individual and are apt to recur throughout the remainder of his life. As one army medical officer said:
All sickness in the tropics, produces an effect on the general economy
that does not follow similar sickness in the temperate regions, in that it
saps vital forces which are not restored by natural processes. The effect of
illness in the tropics is therefore cumulative, each illness great or small
adding to the total until the patient becomes permanently disabled.
And experience proved that years after the war, many veterans of the Philippine Insurrection suffered again from malaria
and dysentery which they had contracted in the Islands.
A pumping station on the Mariquina River, eight miles east




of Manila, pumped water to reservoirs located four miles distant. From there the water was piped into the city. However,
the worn-out condition of the plant, coupled with the hostile
attitude evinced by Insurgent troops every time Americans approached their lines caused delay in reestablishing the water
supply system.
Ninety-seven per cent of Manila's population used the city
water, drawing it from public hydrants installed on various
streets. Two-thirds of these hydrants had been permitted to
lapse into unserviceable condition during the last days of the
Spanish regime. As the Insurgents and American forces drifted
apart during the fall of 1898, it became evident that the continuance of the city's water supply was becoming increasingly
precarious. When actual hostilities broke out in February of
1899, the Americans captured the reservoir and pumping station.
Fromn that time on it was held under Amnerican control. Later
distilling plants were shipped from the United States and they
effectively supplemented the city system.
Captain Lea Febiger was placed in charge of the department
of streets, parks, fire, and sanitation. He found it hard to hire
Filipino labor because of pressure exerted by the Insurgent
groups. The unusually crowded conditions in the city, because
of the large number of Spanish and American troops quartered
there, made city sanitation a matter of slow improvement. It
took patience and time to educate Filipinos to the standards of
sanitation prevalent in the United States. Even today this stand(lard has not been generally reached.
The Manila Fire Department consisted of about 92 professional firemen, assisted at times by some 240 laborers who also
worked in the department of sanitation. This department continued its normal duties. When the Americans took over the
city administration, the Fire Department's equipment consisted
of two steam  and five hand engines, all unserviceable. The
Americans made one serviceable vehicle out of the seven engines.
This one engine was Manila's only fire protection until new
equipment, including American horses, could be imported from
the United States.
Carried on under the tutelage of the various religious orders,
the Manila schools were continued status quo with minor modi36




fications. Chaplain W. D. McKinnon, who was placed in charge
of administration, introduced one English instructor into each
school. Required religious instruction was discontinued. Later
public schools were established, using American soldiers as instructors. Eventually subsidized by the insular government, the
Filipino educational system developed to a point comparable to
that in the United States.
An institution known as the Carcel de Bilibid had, during the
Spanish regime, performed the combined functions of insular
penitentiary and municipal jail. Using American soldiers as
guards and turnkeys, the prison was taken from the Spanish
authorities and continued in use. Of the 2,000 prisoners, all
political offenders were released. The remainder were put to
work manufacturing bamboo cots for the quartermaster.
Although Army officers are not as a rule versed in the intricacies of civil administration, their military training tends to
make them able executives. And the Army's administration kept
the financial status of the Philippine government "in the black."
Disregarding seized funds, there was a balance of $738,959.02
at the end of the first nine months. The largest single item of
income was the collection of customs which was easily susceptible to graft or losses due to inefficiency. Compared with the
year 1897, the customs receipts jumped nearly a million dollars
the first year, and six million the second.
With the city gradually resuming, on the surface at least, its
normal tropical equanimity, the American volunteer soldiers in
Manila began to think of home.
CHAPTER 5
Otis and the Insurgents
ASSUMING COMMAND of the American troops a week after his
arrival in the Philippine Islands, Major General Elwell S. Otis
inherited the incipient quarrel between the Americans and Insurgents over the joint occupation of Manila. His lack of knowledge concerning the Islands was as profound as that of any of
the other officers, and his arrival in the midst of the transference
37




of the civil administration forced him into the awkward position
of depending upon the advice of his subordinates. He was to
find that regardless of the professed intentions on the part of
Aguinaldo to evacuate the suburbs of the city, the actual withdrawal would be delayed. It would result in weeks of diplomatic
negotiation, finally culminating in the threat of removal by
force. He was also to see a rift in Filipino-American relations
which developed into an armed insurrection.
General Otis had graduated from the Harvard Law School
with the class of 1861. In. 1862 he had joined the Union Army
as a captain of Volunteers. During the war he was twice cited
for gallantry and by 1865 had been promoted to the rank of
Brevet Brigadier General of Volunteers. At the conclusion of
the war, he had accepted a commission as Lieutenant Colonel
in the Regular Army, and by 1897 had risen to the grade of
Brigadier General. Upon the declaration of war with Spain, he
had been temporarily commissioned as Major General of Volunteers.
His administration of the Philippine Islands during 1898 and
1899 has been both highly praised and bitterly censured. His
critics maintained that he was childish and that his perspective
was microscopic. They said his careful attention to minute details and his insistence that all decisions, whether made in
Manila or in the field, be referred to him, curbed initiative
among his subordinates. His admirers pointed out that despite
the difficulties involved in the administration of ten million foreign people, living some 7,000 miles from the United States, he
strove desperately to maintain peace. They said when the revolt
did occur, he broke its backbone within a comparatively short
time.
He was sixty-one at the time of the revolt, and an old Civil
War wound had caused insomnia. He spent many sleepless
hours working at his desk. General Otis refused to delegate his
authority to subordinates regardless of their rank. He personally
examined all papers requiring his nominal approval.
He was able to recite from memory the names of all towns or
sectors held by the American forces, the units occupying them
and in many cases even the names and capabilities of the com38




manders of the units, including those in company grade. During
hostilities, he meticulously directed all movements of the American forces from  his headquarters in Manila and in most cases
refused to listen to the importunities of commanders in the field.
Otis had brought with him from the United States additional
Volunteer regiments from South Dakota and Montana, five
companies of the 14th Infantry, six troops of the 4th Cavalry,
and two batteries of the 6th Artillery. These additions brought
the strength of the American forces in the Philippines up to
15,559 officers and men.
Taking over his duties as Commanding General and Military
Governor b\f the Philippines, Otis found that his primary problem was the encampment of Insurgents at the gate of the walled
city. Merritt had turned over to him the still unanswered letter
from Aguinaldo about the price of Insurgent withdrawal.
Otis pondered over the matter for ten days and on September
8 addressed a 3,000-word, judicially phrased ultimatum to
Aguinaldo, demanding his withdrawal within a week. A few
excerpts from  this communication give the tone which the relations between the Americans and Insurgents vwere taking at
this time. In substance Otis said:
The United States appreciated the services of the Insurgents in fighting
a common enemy, the Spaniards. However, bear in mind that the United
States has swept the Spanish flag from the seas, kept Spanish troops from
being sent to the Philippines for the purpose of putting down your rebellion
and has had Manila at its mercy since May 1st... Spain, the recognized
owner, has capitulated Manila and its suburbs to the United States; there
can be no legal question as to the propriety of full American sovereignty... Joint occupation of the suburbs is impossible; irresponsible members of
either army, careless or impertinent actions, might incite grave disturbances... I have no authority and am powerless to make any promises in regard to the restoration of your troops to certain lines, contingent on the
Americans leaving the Philippines... I deplore any conflict between our
forces, but find it necessary to give you notice that if your troops are not
withdrawn beyond the line of city defenses, within one week, I will force
you to move and my government shall hold you responsible.
The letter made Aguinaldo angry, and he purposed to oppose
force with force.
The day following receipt of Otis' letter some American troops
made a reconnaisance trip into Sampaloc, a suburb in the north39




ern part of the city. A minor clash between the Insurgents and
Americans resulted. Aguinaldo immediately enjoined General
Pantaleon Garcia, who was in command at Sampaloc, as follows:
I gave an order long ago not to permit our line to be passed and to say
frankly it was by my order. To be prepared to defend our rights, you are
ordered to place troops in front of the American position at Sampaloc and
to tell them plainly to leave, to warn the Sandatahan [the proletarian members of the Katipunan; those residing in Manila had been organized into a
sort of secret Insurgent Militia] and get everything ready. You must warn
the Commanders of the zone about Manila. Do not forget whenever in
doubt.
However, conditions in the Insurgent army may have determined his subsequent action. On September 13, General Cailles,
an Insurgent Brigadier General in command of troops on the
south side of the city, wired Aguinaldo as follows:
I inform your excellency that we have no Mauser cartridges; I hear there
are many in Batangas. Americans pay a good price for empty cartridges and
shells. I ask your excellency to order General Noriel to send us shells: the
General has a factory at Paranaque. I am sorry for our soldiers. I see that
the more they work and the more they expose their lives, the less they
receive. Since your Excellency has charged me with these operations, no one
has given me a cent to meet the expenses of the Headquarters at Pineda.
More than ten superior and other officers eat here at my wife's expense.
She has no more. We do not smoke. I am perplexed. Patience I suffer everything for my most beloved and unforgettable President.
The same day that Aguinaldo received Cailles' telegram, he
sent a commission to Otis. The commission was to explain that,
desirous as the Filipino leaders might be to evacuate the city,
the Insurangent soldiers were belligerent, restless, and might
not obey an order to withdraw. If the American Commander
would change his "demand" for a withdrawal to a "request,"
the Insurgent leaders could use the modification as an American
olive branch and wave it before their undisciplined troops. The
troops would then probably withdraw        quietly and save the
faces of all concerned. A practical man, Otis readily agreed to
the change.
Two days later with bands playing, the Insurgents marched
through cheering crowds out of the city. The event is best de40




scribed by quoting another telegram  from  General Cailles to
Aguinaldo:
The outgoing forcewas grand. I am at the head of a column of 1800
men almost all uniformed, three bands of music. As we camie to the Luneta
from Calle Real, Ermits, Americans and natives fell in behind yelling
"Viva Filipinos," "Viva Emilio Aguinaldo." We answered "Viva America,
"Viva la Libertad." The Americans presented arms and at command my
battalion came to a port.
Not evacuated, however, were the suburbs of Paco and Pandacan which were occupied by Insurgents under the command
of General Pio del Pilar. According to Aguinaldo, Pilar refused
to comply with Insurgent instructions to withdraw. Aguinaldo
sent a note to Otis explaining that as soon as he was able he
would force Pilar to evacuate. Weeks went by, and Pilar did not
move. Otis rightly suspected that Aguinaldo was exerting no
pressure on Pilar. Further correspondence on the matter drew
from Aguinaldo the argument that since these two particular
suburbs had not been mentioned in the terms of the capitulation
of Manila, there was no legal basis for requiring the Insurgents
to withdraw. Aguinaldo was correct, and Otis, hesitating to use
force, permitted the Insurgents to remain.
Pilar took advantage of the situation to fortify the districts
which were separated from the rest of the city by the Pasig River
and the large Estero de Paco. The Insurgent lines in Pandacan
were just across the river from the Malacafian, Otis' quarters,
and the undisciplined Filipino soldiers used their proximity to
the city as a means of provoking the Americans at every opportunity. Pilar's troops entered the American lines at night, engaged in highway robbery, kidnaped Filipinos unfavorable to
their cause, and in some cases created disturbances within a
block of Otis' quarters. Having wired the War Department that
5,000 more American troops should be sent to the Philippines,
Otis was enjoined to avoid hostilities with the Insurgents, if
possible.
Prime provocation from Pilar's troops came early in October
when General Anderson, the division commander, was arrested
by an Insurgent guard and not permitted to pass through the
41




Insurgent lines. General Anderson was so incensed that he
wrote this letter to Otis:
The Adjutant General, Department of the Pacific and VIII Army Corps,
Manila, P. I.
Sir: I have the honor to report, that yesterday, while proceeding up the
Pasig River in the steam launch "Canacao" with three officers of my staff,
the American flag flying over the boat, I was stopped by an armed Filipino
guard and informed that we could go no further. Explaining that we were
an unarmed party of American officers out upon an excursion, we were
informed that by orders given two days before, no Americans, armed or
unarmed, were allowed to pass up the Pasig River without a special permit
from President Aguinaldo.
I demanded to see the written order and it was brought and shown to
me. It was an official letter signed by Pio del Pilar, Division General, written in Tagalog and stamped with what appeared to be an official seal. It
purported to be issued by the authority of the President of the Revolutionary Government and forbade Americans, either armed or unarmed, from
passing up the Pasig River. It was signed by Pilar himself.
As this is a distinctly hostile act I beg leave to ask how far we are to
submit to this kind of interference.
It is respectfully submitted that whether this act of Pilar was authorized
or not by the assumed Insurgent government, it should in any event be
resented.
Very respectfully,
THOMAS H. ANDERSON,
Major General,-USV, Commanding Division.
Meanwhile, the evacuation of the remainder of the Insurgents
on September 15 had not been entirely satisfactory. Otis had intended them to withdraw beyond the line of Spanish blockhouses which surrounded the city. Aguinaldo maintained that
American authority under the capitulation was confined to the
city itself and that these blockhouses were outside the city limits. It appeared that no definite city boundary line had been
surveyed during the Spanish regime. Consequently, Otis, after
searching through dusty Manila municipal records, assembled
sufficient data to permit survey of the original city limits. He
sent a blueprint to Aguinaldo and said in effect, "This map
shows the official boundary line of the city of Manila. You must
withdraw beyond the line." Divided in their counsels as to
whether they should withdraw or fight, the Insurgents withdrew on October 25.
Except for Manila, Aguinaldo's government had extended its
42




authority over the whole Island of Luzon. As the rebellion
spread through the provinces the numerous Spanish friars,
priests, nuns, and civil officials isolated there became victims of
Filipino resentment which had been restrained for generations.
Thousands of these unfortunate Spaniards were imprisoned and
subjected to numerous indignities. The Spanish government
was helpless to remedy the situation.
Motivated by pressure from the Vatican and American Catholics, the War Department directed Otis to take the matter up
with Aguinaldo and obtain, if possible, the release of civilian
prisoners. On November 2, Otis wrote Aguinaldo that stories
about the condition of these prisoners was causing "a great deal
of severe criticism of-the Filipino people in the United States
and throughout Europe." He further stated that ecclesiastics
and civil officials are not normally held as "prisoners of war" in
any civilized country. Otis further offered to meet any expenses
involved in transporting the Spanish to Manila and agreed to
care for them while those who desired to return to Spain
awaited transportation.
Aguinaldo replied quickly and emphatically. In substance he
said: "I am holding civil officials because on numerous occasions
they have been formed into armed volunteer corps and have
borne arms against my troops. In regard to the ecclesiastics, since
the Vatican refuses to recognize the Filipino clergy, in holding
these priests I have an effective weapon with which to secure
that recognition. Furthermore,, numerous Filipinos have been
deported for political offenses and are rotting in Spanish prisons.
I hold these Spanish civilians as a medium of exchange." Otis
transmitted the information to Washington and let the matter
drop, but reorganized his troops into two divisions, placing
MacArthur in command of the new division and assigning it
to the front on the north of the city. Anderson retained command of the 1st Division in the southern sector.
Aguinaldo had moved his government to the town of Malolos,
about twenty miles north of Manila. In the area south of Manila
his troops were deserting, supplies and funds were exhausted,
and hunger was prevalent.
In Tarlac Province to the north, an incipient rebellion against
Aguinaldo's government broke out under the leadership of an
43




ex-sergeant in the Spanish civil guard. The revolt overthrew
Aguinaldo's authority in the rather large town of Tarlac and
was a source of alarm and disturbance to the Insurgent government until its leader was treacherously murdered two months
later. Throughout the Island numerous bands of Pulisanes,
armed robbers, roamed the countryside, recognizing the authority of no government.
By December Otis was settled fairly comfortably in Manila.
The sick rate of his troops was decreasing and total American
deaths in the Philippines up until that time had been 161.
Eighty had been due to typhoid fever, dysentery, and smallpox.
Annoyed by seditious articles in a Manila newspaper, Otis
brought the editor to trial before a military commission and
fined him $500. The arrival of more transports from the United
States brought volunteers from Washington, Kansas, Tennessee
and Iowa, detachments of the 18th and 23rd Regular Infantry
and increased his strength on December 6 to 22,312 officers and
risen.
On December 10 the news was flashed to Manila that the
peace treaty with Spain had been signed in Paris, and that the
United States had "purchased" the Philippine Islands from
Spain for $20,000,000. The announcement had a profound effect
on both Americans and Filipinos. In Paris Felipe Agoncilo, who
had unsuccessfully attempted to state a case for Philippine independence before the peace commission, announced: "The
Filipinos will not permit themselves or their homes to be bought
and sold like merchandise." In Manila, Otis was flooded with
applications from homesick volunteers for discharge and return
to the United States. Among the Filipinos resentment at the
failure of their aspirations to independence matured into open
hostility towards the Americans. Otis refused all applications
for discharge on the ground that until the United States Senate
had ratified the treaty the war was not officially ended. He completed his preparation for the defense of the city if and when an
attack by the Insurgents should take place.
Early in December the American commander received a visit
from a committee of native business men residing in Iloilo on
the Island of Panay. Iloilo was the second port of the Philippine
Islands and was about 300 miles south of Manila. Presenting
44




a Otis with a petition the committee, in effect, said: "We repre* sent the business interests of Iloilo. The Spanish garrison there
has been attacked by Filipino Insurgents and is preparing to
evacuate the Island. We fear that as soon as the Spanish leave,
a form of Insurgent anarchy will prevail. The Spanish commanding officer there states that if the Americans send troops
to Iloilo, he will be glad to turn the city and its defenses over
to the Americans before he leaves. Will you not send American
troops there to protect the banks and business houses of the
second largest port in the Archipelago?" Favoring immediate
action, Otis conferred with Dewey regarding a Navy convoy.
Dewey advised a delay until authority from Washington was
received. Uncertain, Otis waited, and then on December 14 sent
the following telegram to the War Department:
Bankers and merchants with business houses at Iloilo petition American
protection at Iloilo. Spanish authorities still holding out but will receive
United States troops. Insurgents reported favorable to American annexation. Can send troops. Shall any action be taken?
Ten days later Otis received the reply:
Answering your message December 14, the President directs that you
send necessary troops to Iloilo to preserve the peace and protect life and
property. It is most important that there should be no conflict with the
Insurgents. Be conciliatory but firm.
The Island of Panay, an area about the size of the State of
Connecticut, was progressive and enjoyed a prosperous trade in
sugar, tobacco and rice. On the southern coast near the mouth
of the Panay River sat Iloilo, the provincial capital, a city of about
13,000 inhabitants. The Island was populated by Visayans, a
Filipino tribe who differed from the Tagalogs of Luzon both
in language and racial characteristics.
The 51st Iowa Volunteers had arrived off Manila on December 6 and, pending the proposed expedition to Iloilo, had remained on the transport. On December 25 the personnel of the
expedition was completed by adding the 18th Infantry and
Battery G of the 6th Artillery. Brigadier General Marcus P.
Miller was placed in command. He was a West Point graduate
who had seen forty-one years of active service in the Regular
45




Army. However, he was strictly limited in the scope of his
actions in this endeavor by detailed instructions from Otis. The
substance of these instructions was as follows:
If upon arrival at Iloilo you find the Spanish still there, take over from
them and establish a government of military occupation similar to that now
existing in Manila. If the Spanish troops have left and the Insurgent troops
are found to be in possession, advise them that the United States has succeeded to all the rights of Spain in the Islands, and acquaint them with
the benevolent aims of the Americans. Under no circumstances engage in
conflict with the Insurgents. Should they oppose the landing of American
troops, stay on the transports and await instructions from Manila.
Miller's expedition left Manila December 26. It was accompanied by the petitioning committee and some 200 Visayan
Spanish prisoners of war, who were to be liberated on Panay as
an evidence of American good intentions. The expedition was
convoyed by the Baltimore and the captured Spanish gunboat
Callao. It arrived off Iloilo December 28.
The delay occasioned by waiting for instructions from Washington proved costly to the peaceful accomplishment of Miller's
purposes. The Spanish had given up hope that the Americans
were coming and had evacuated the city thirty-six hours previously. About 3,000 Insurgents were in possession of the place.
Martin Delgade, the Insurgent leader, politely but steadfastly
refused to deliver the city to the American emissaries without
authority from Aguinaldo. He hinted at armed resistance if the
Americans attempted to obtain control by force. Sensing a shift
in the political breeze, the petitioning committee indicated its
allegiance to the Insurgents and begged Miller not to attack the
city.
Hampered by his orders, Miller could do nothing but remain
on the transports and advise Otis of the situation, telling him
that he could capture the city with little trouble. While telegrams were exchanged between Washington and Manila, Miller
was forced to sit idly by and watch the Insurgents fortify the
city, take over the collection of customs duties in the prosperous
port, and augment their strength to about 12,000 men. The War
Department was emphatic in its insistence to Otis that the
Americans not be the first to commence hostilities in the Islands.
With ships anchored in Iloilo Harbor, Miller's expedition
46




waited until January. By that time the sanitary conditions on
the crowded transport Pennsylvania were so bad that the Iowa
Volunteers had to go ashore. The Pennsylvania was returned to
Manila. The remainder of the expedition remained at Iloilo.
Nearly four years later in speaking of the incident Otis remarked: "I should have never asked instructions from Washington. I should have gone there at once (before the Spanish
evacuated) and by so doing I would have saved two million
dollars worth of property."
Shortly after the treaty of peace with Spain was signed, President McKinley sent to Otis a proclamation announcing United
States assumption of sovereignty over the Philippine Islands.
The President directed that it be published and circulated
among the Filipino people.
Otis knew that the Malolos government had just split on the
question of a friendly or belligerent attitude towards the assumption of sovereignty by the Americans. Mabini's "war
group" had won out, and a new cabinet composed of antiAmericanistas was formed with Mabini at its head. Although
still President and nominally head of the government, Aguinaldo was being pushed into the position of figurehead. Years
of Spanish absolutism had given such expressions in the proclamation as "sovereignty," "control," "supreme authority" an
ominous meaning in the minds of many Filipinos.
Cognizant of the growing tension and acting on the advice of
a few prominent Filipinos who had disavowed Aguinaldo's
government, Otis altered the President's proclamation and rewrote it in his own words. In the revised document, he eliminated all words or expressions which he believed might be misunderstood or misconstrued. "Temperate administration of affairs" was changed to "temporary administration of affairs."
The net effect of the changes was to soften the -tenor of the
document until it did not convey a distinct suggestion of absolute control and domination by the United States. After he returned to the United States Otis was called to account for the
changes he made in the President's proclamation. He explained
his purpose by stating: "I was fighting hard for peace and I
struck out words which I thought Mabini might use to excite
the people." His explanation was accepted.
47,1




Modified or not, the proclamation which was issued on January 4, 1899, was seized upon by the Malolos Insurgent government as an excuse for the issuance of two vituperative protests
against American assumption of authority in the Archipelago.
Signed by Aguinaldo, these Filipino counter proclamations reviewed the cooperation between Americans and Filipinos which
culminated in the overthrow of Spanish power in the Islands;
mentioned "promises" of independence which Consul Pratt
made to Aguinaldo in Singapore; and referred to the Americans
as "intruders." They reviewed the situation in the Philippines
from the standpoint of the Filipinos and accused the Americans
of duplicity and ingratitude. The first proclamation, which was
withdrawn shortly after it had been concluded, closed with the
following poignant statement:
My government cannot remain indifferent in view of such a violent and
aggressive seizure of a portion of its territory by a nation which has arrogated to itself the title champion of oppressed nations. Thus it is that
my government is disposed to open hostilities if the American troops attempt to take forcible possession of the Visaya Islands (meaning Iloilo). I
denounce these (the various) acts (of the Americans) before the world in
order that the conscience of mankind may pronounce its infallible verdict
as to who are the oppressors of nations and the tormentors of mankind.
The practical reaction of the Filipinos to the proclamations
was evidenced in various ways. About 40,000 Filipinos left
Manila. The Chinese metal workers of Manila did a booming
business in the secret manufacture of bolos. Letters from
Aguinaldo to prominent citizens in Manila were intercepted.
These letters advised their readers to come to Malolos where
they would be safe. Otis was subjected to constant pressure from
Washington enjoining him to try to convince the Filipinos that
American intentions were benevolent and to stave off hostilities
until time should weaken the unstable Insurgent government.
Aguinaldo's attitude at this time is indicated by a captured
document issued over his signature on January 9. The missive
was addressed to the "Brave soldiers of the Sandatahan of
Manila." It appears to be a form of field order for an attack on
Manila from within, combined with a training manual for these.-oletarian groups which he had organized into a sort of In48




surrecto Militia. Interesting excerpts from the document are:
All Filipinos should observe our fellow countrymen in order to see
whether they are American sympathizers. Whenever they are assured of
the loyalty of the convert, they shall instruct them to continue in the character of an American sympathizer in order that they may receive good pay
but without prejudicing the cause of our country.
All of the chiefs and Filipinos brothers should be ready and courageous
for the combat and should take advantage of the opportunity to study well
the situation of the American outposts and Headquarters....
The chief of those who go to attack the barracks should send in first four
men with a good present for the American commander. They should not
prior to the attack look at the Americans in a threatening manner. To the
contrary the attack on the barracks by the Sandatahan should be a complete
surprise and with decision and courage. In order to deceive the sentinel,
one should dress as a woman and take care that the sentinel is not able
to discharge his piece.
At the moment of attack, the Sandatahan should not attempt to secure
rifles from their dead enemies, but shall pursue slashing right and left with
bolos until the Americans surrender.
The officers shall take care that on the tops of houses alpng the streets
where the American forces shall pass there will be placed four to six men
who shall be prepared with stones, timbers, red hot iron, heavy furniture,
as well as boiling water, oil, and molasses, rags soaked in coal oil ready
to be lighted and thrown down on passing American troops.
In place of bolos or daggers, if they do not possess the same, the Sandatahan can provide themselves with lances and arrows. These should be
so made that in the withdrawal of the body, the head will remain in the
flesh.
Experience has taught me, my dear brothers, that when the Sandatahan
make their attack with courage and decision, taking advantage of the confusion in the ranks of the army, the victory is sure and in that case the
triumph is ours.
Last, if as I expect the result shall favor us in the taking of Manila and
the conquering of the enemy, the chiefs are charged with seeing that the
officers and soldiers respect the consulates, banks and commercial houses.
I expect that you will respect the persons and goods of private persons of
all nationalities, that you will treat well the prisoners and grant life to
those of the enemy who surrender.
It was indeed fortunate for the little American Army,which
was isolated 7,000 miles from home, that the Sandatalan was
unable to carry out these bloodthirsty instructions.
The Insurgent Army was in the meantime becoming more*
and more belligerent. On January 10 General Cailles wired
Aguinaldo:
49




Xn American intcrprctct has come to tell me to withdraw our forces
in Maytubig fifty paces. I shall not draw back a step and in place of withlrawing I shall advance a little further. I said (to the interpreter) that I
li(d not want to have dealings with any American. War, War, is what we,rant. The Americans, after this speech went off pale.
Cailles' action was applauded by the Insurgent President.
Subordinate  Insurgent leaders were further coaxed     and
worked into a frenzy of hostility toward the Americans. They
were promised money, promotion, and the bestowal of titles of
nobility such as the Marquis of Malate and Count of Manila, in
the event the city should be captured. With an Insurgent army
of some 20,000 inen surrounding the city, the Americans found
themselves in a situation somewhat similar to that of the Spanish prior to August 13.
Realizing that s9mething must be done if peace was to be
maintained, Otis arranged on January 9 for the meeting of a
joint Filipiho-American commission. The commission was to
work out a plan for the adjustment of conflicting political interests of the parties concerned. Negotiating intermittently for
over two weeks, the commission accomplished little except postponement of the outbreak of hostilities. At the first session the
Filipino representatives stated their basis for conciliation to be
"absolute independence." They later deadlocked the conference
by modifying their demands to an insistence upon a vague sort
of American protectorate which would give them authority over
the government without the responsibility for defense against
foreign aggression.
Impatient with the proceedings of the joint commission, the
Malolos government anticipated the commission's failure. On
January 21, while the commission was still in session, Malolos
officials issued the constitution for the Philippine Republic. The
document was liberal and showed the handiwork of the brilliant
Mabini and some of Aguinaldo's other well-educated advisors.
Not dissimilar to the Constitution of the United States in many
respects, it did, however, provide that a unicameral legislature
s',ould elect a president who was to serve a four-year term and
be eligible for reelection.                      /
A week later, Aguinaldo, who had been elected President of
the new republic, officially notified Otis of the new constitution
50




and naively asked recognition of his government by the United
States. Otis replied that he had cabled a copy of the constitution
to Washington.
The American troops took necessary defensive measures
which were visible to the Insurgents. There was growing excitement among the Filipinos. An American sentry shot a Filipino
captain who crossed his post, wearing a pistol. The Provost
Marshal seized Aguinaldo's telegraph office located in Manila
and confiscated its files and equipment. Aguinaldo arrested an
American engineer mapping party and imprisoned them at
Malolos. Mistaking the feigned peaceful demeanors which Otis
enforced on his troops for cowardice, Filipino soldiers taunted
American sentries, ignored challenges and crossed their posts at
will.
On February 3, Otis wrote to Dewey:
There has been a great deal of friction along the lines in the past two
days and we wilt be unable to tamely submit to the insulting conduct and
threatening demonstration of these Insurgents much longer. Insurgent leaders are constantly asking me to make concessions that they may be able
to control their troops. The city is quiet, though there is a vast amount of
underlying excitement. We are constantly losing our employees. Yesterday,
seven of our men at the Malacalian quarters left us suddenly to join the
Insurgents. They stole and took with them whatever they could find of
value, one of them driving out of the lines Colonel Barry's carriage, which
we consider lost property.
The following night the Insurrection broke.
CHAPTER 6
The Philippine War Starts
BEFORE DISCUSSING the first, and what proved to be the most im
portant battle of the Insurrection in point of numbers engaged,
it might be well to tell about the two armies confronting each
other. How did they compare in the matter of discipline, training, equipment? How did one army assert its superiority immediately and retain it throughout the balance of the Insurrection?
51




The American Army has never been noteworthy for strict
discipline. The majority of the troops in the Philippines were
state volunteers. Few had received prior military training and
very little had been' given them since they were mustered into
the Federal Army. Many of the officers had been "elected" by
their companies and most of them called their soldiers by their
first names. For many it was the first time away from home.
Many of these civilian soldiers had the habit of writing exaggerated letters to friends in the United States. The accounts
were usually highly colored to the people back home. Many
were seized upon by newspapers anxious to exploit sensational
news. More often the letters were summaries of criticisms against
the commanding officer of a dissatisfied soldier. In 1902 various
allegations made by discharged soldiers were thoroughly aired
in Congress and witnesses were called before a committee of
the Senate.
As a rule these witnesses were unable or unwilling to produce
facts when placed upon the stand. One ex-soldier who had made
grave charges against General Funston concerning the "water
cure" (which will be described later) answered a summons to
appear before the Senate Committee with the following telegram: "Will appear Friday but it will be of no use for I couldn't
testify against anyone."
Perhaps his answer was prompted by a statement which Funston had issued to the press. The righteously indignant Funston
announced that if this particular ex-soldier made under oath the
same statement which he had given to the newspapers he would
land in the penitentiary for perjury. Further evidence indicated
that the man had never been connected with the organization
in which he claimed membership.
Another newspaper article based on a letter written by a
soldier in the 16th Infantry concerned the capture and execution
of some 1,000 Filipino prisoners in the province of Sorsogon.
Upon investigation it was determined that during the period
mentioned, the 16th Infantry had killed only two or three.Filipinos in a skirmish and captured a few others.
In a newspaper interview another ex-soldier stated that his
company commander had embezzled company ration funds and
that the Ordnance Department had issued "dumdum" bullets
52




to his organization. The company commander exonerated himself by establishing the fact that during the period mentioned
rations had been issued in kind and it would have been impossible for him to have access to ration funds. The same claimant
called before the Senate Committee produced samples of the
"dumdum" bullets which he had brought back from the Philippines. The Army Chief of Ordnance proved that the bullets
were ordinary issue and not "dumdums."
Shortly after the Battle of Manila, a private in the Kansas
Volunteers stated in a letter home that he had seen four Filipino
prisoners summarily shot on the orders of a company commander. The article was published in a newspaper at Minneapolis, Kansas, was reprinted in other papers and caused a furor
throughout the United States. Four months later an investigation was ordered from Washington. Major John S. Mallory of
the Inspector General's Department assembled the following
evidence:
The soldier had not actually seen any Insurgent prisoners
killed; the incident as mentioned in the letter was pure hearsay;
that at least two prisoners who had been directed to accompany
a guard to the rear had refused to move, and on orders of an
officer had been shot; that the evidence was conflicting and contradictory as to who had given the order.,
Otis permitted the matter to be "whitewashed," principally
because the officers involved had performed outstanding service
since the incident had happened, and he felt that pressing
charges would gain nothing. Soon the incident was expanded
into a tale that Colonel Funston of the Kansas regiment had
issued orders that no prisoners would be taken.
Brigadier General Wilder S. Metcalf, who had been a major
in the Kansas regiment at the time, was soon to be appointed
United States pension agent at Topeka, Kansas. Political enemies revived the matter and charged that Metcalf had personally murdered the unfortunate Insurgents. A long Senate investigation took place. As a result, Metcalf was completely
exonerated, and given the appointment.
Drunken, undisciplined American soldiers in the Philippines
often permitted unbridled instincts to overcome common sense.
The result was the maltreatment on numerous occasions of the
53




hapless Filipinos. Stories of "atrocities" committed by the Americans leaked back to the United States and caused numerous
orders to be sent out from Washington. Investigations revealed
that although the majority of the reports were exaggerated,
many were true.
Mr. John Foreman, a scholarly writer of the day on the Phillippines, witnessed the occupation of Manila by the American
troops. Later called to testify on conditions there, before the
Peace Commission at Paris, he stated:
Within a fortnight after the capitulation of Manila, the drinking saloons
had increased fourfold. According to latest advices there are at least twenty
to one existing in the time of the Spaniards. Drunkenness with its consequent evils is rife all over the city among the new white population. The
orgies of the newcomers, the incessant street brawls, the insults offered
with impunity to natives of both sexes, the entry with violence into-private
houses by the soldiery who maltreated the inmates and laid hands on what
they chose were hardly calculated to arouse in the natives admiration for
their new masters. Adventurers of all sorts and conditions have flocked to
this center of vice (Manila) where the sober native is not even spoken of as
a man by many of the armed rank and file, but by way of 'contempt is
called Gu Gu.
Aguinaldo complained of the American occupation of Manila
as follows:
The searching of houses was carried on just as it was during the Spanish
regime... It would make- this book a large volume if I continued to
state seriatim the abuses and atrocities committed by the American soldiery
during those days of general anxiety.
Despite efforts of the military authorities to prevent "bulldozing" of the Filipinos by soldiers, the practice continued in
small measures. A year after the beginning of the Insurrection,
an American interpreter serving in the captured town of Bangued wrote:
It is also 11my duty to regfulate the price at which the market women sold
their eggs and cigars to the soldiers and to present their complaints when
the latter robbed or cheated them which was of no infrequent occurrence.
Our soldiers are no better than those of other nations in this respect; a
great many of them stole, cheated and even robbed whenever the opportunity presented itself. The officers were ever ready to listen to complaints
but a few days in the guard house did not strike terror into the hearts
of these bullies and when they came out they wvere ready to repeat their
assaults on the helpless natives.




Strenuous corrective measures were applied by the military
authorities. During the course of the Insurrection over 350 officers and soldiers were convicted by courts-martial of offenses
involving cruelties to Filipinos.
The punishments for these crimes varied from small fines for
minor offenses to the sentence of death where murder or rape
was proved.
Actually, only 350 proved offenses against Filipinos-committed by some 125,000 men-makes the percentage low. It could
be expected that if three hundred citizens of the United States
were chosen at random the group would contain at least one
malefactor.
In the matter of equipment the American Army was in a
more or less experimental stage. The United States had never
before waged war in the tropics. Therefore, a new type of clothing and field equipment was necessarily evolved. When they left
the United States, the troops were issued cotton trousers, canvas
leggings andblue woolen shirts. A short time after the occupation of Manila, the so-called Hong Kong variety of cotton khaki
was issued and proved satisfactory for ordinary duties. The
wearing of the cork helmet was authorized but not favored by
the troops. It could be easily knocked from the head while moving through underbrush and its conspicuousness rendered the
wearer an excellent target for the enemy. The felt campaign
hat, though hot, could be used as a pillow at night and was
found to be the most satisfactory headgear.
Before war was declared the Army officially adopted the caliber.30 magazine type of rifle. The weapon not only used smokeless powder but was lighter and had a greater range than the
older type caliber.45 Springfield of Civil War vintage. Sudden
wartime expansion of the Army, however, revealed that the
number of new type rifles available was limited to Regular
Army units. To their dissatisfaction, the volunteer units were
issued the old caliber.45 rifles, modified model of 1869. This
weapon was single-shot, of short range, and gave a tremendous
kick when fired. Possibly its greatest disadvantage was the fact
that its cartridges were loaded with black powder. Every time
it was fired it not only laid down a veritable smoke screen in
55




front of the firer but definitely revealed his position to the
enemy. Company commanders complained that among recruits
its severe kick encouraged flinching with its attendant poor
marksmanship. Complaints grew so numerous that production
of the new type magazine rifle was rushed, and by October of
1899 all troops in the field were equipped with modern rifles.
The principal type of field artillery in use by the Americans
was the 3.2 inch-breech-loading rifle, normally hauled by six
horses. It was an efficient and handy weapon except when being
pulled by hand over rice dikes. Officers complained that sixty
per cent of the issued shrapnel ammunition was faulty and burst
at the muzzle. Three-inch and 1.65-inch pack-type mountain
guns were also used. The hand-operated Gatling and Hotchkiss
machine guns were issued too, and when used usually demoralized the Insurgent troops.
One of the worst problems of the Army in the Philippines
was the matter of supply. Between June 30, 1898 and June 26,
1899 twenty-nine regiments of Infantry, eight batteries of Field
Artillery, more than one regiment of Cavalry, proportional
parts of Engineers, Signal, Medical, Ordnance, and Quartermaster Corps personnel were transported to the Philippines,
making a total of 34,661 officers and men. By the following
June the strength had risen to 63,426.
The principal Filipino food was rice. It would not sustain
' the average American soldier even if he accepted it as the main
article of diet. Fresh meat locally slaughtered was impracticable
because of the humid tropical climate. To prevent deterioration
the meat had to be slaughtered at night and cooked the following morning. Hence most of the supplies had to come from outside the Philippines and receive a special treatment designed to
make them suitable for tropical use.
The principal mode of cargo transportation in the Philippines
was a native cart pulled by the slow-moving carabao which
traveled about five miles a day under, normal conditions. This
animal was impractical for military use because it needed
access to water every day for wallowing. As a means of transportation carabao proved so unsatisfactory that American mules
were shipped to the Islands. In a measure, they filled the gap
in the supply system. The Medical Corps was assisted in the
56




evacuation of wounded by the employment of Chinese-coolie
litter bearers.
Factual information concerning the Insurgent army is obscure, and can only be gained by a perusal of captured documents. As a rule no rosters, strength returns, or official reports
of operations were kept. Apparently the army was organized on
a territorial basis, the various units bearing such designations as
"Cavite Battalion," "Bulacan Battalion," and so on. On Febru- ary 21, 1899 the Insurgent government at Malolos promulgated
a decree establishing universal conscription of all men between
the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. The actual functioning of
the system was placed in the hands of town mayors or '"presidentes" who were permitted to grant exemption on the payment
of money. The matter of subsisting the troops was made the responsibility of the barrios in which the troops were garrisoned.
The normal uniform of the Insurgent army consisted of a
thin blue and white cotton coat, trousers, and a wide-brimmed
straw hat. The soldiers normally went barefoot. Later when
Insurgent soldiers found it expedient to make quick changes
from soldiers to "amigos" the uniforms became nondescript.
In numbers the Insurgent army was always strong. This
very desirable feature was nullified, however, by the fact that
there was never a sufficient number of rifles available for existing
personnel. The Insurgent army around Manila has been variously estimated as comprising from 20,000 to 40,000 troops. Of
these possibly one-half were armed. The American Military
Information staff estimated the total number of rifles in the
hands of Insurgents throughout the Islands at 40,000. However,
around Manila there were many more soldiers than rifles. An
eyewitness states that after an Insurgent soldier had done his
tour of duty in the trenches, he would turn his rifle and equipment over to the man who relieved him. When a rifleman was
wounded there were always many others nearby who would
take his rifle and continue the fight.
It also appears that at least one unit of the Insurgent army
was composed of Negritos, the negroid pygmy, Filipino aborigines who were armed only with bows and arrows. In one
battle the Americans were Qpposed by a "battalion" of children
57




whose defense consisted. of throwing stones at the advancing
line. Of course, all members of the army who did not carry a
rifle were armed with bolos.
The matter of ammunition was also a paramount problem of
the Insurgent army. Several small arsenals were established
throughout Luzon and empty cartridge cases carefully saved and
refilled. However, the technical inefficiency of the reloading
system rendered these arsenals virtually useless. On many occasions bullets fired from reloaded cartridges carried only a few
feet beyond the muzzle of the gun.
The Insurgent artillery was of nondescript variety and consisted principally of muzzle-loading cannon which had been captured from the Spanish. The few Hotchkiss and Gatling machine guns the Insurgents possessed were considered so precious
that, regardless of the tactical situation, they were often taken
out of action at a critical time and withdrawn to the rear in order
to avoid the possibility of capture.
The great weakness of the Insurgent army, however, was its
lack of training, primarily in marksmanship. It appears that the
majority of the Insurgents could not shoot a rifle. Shortage of
ammunition made rifle marksmanship training entirely out of
the question. Except for a few Filipinos who had formerly been
members of the Spanish colonial army the trigger squeeze was
unknown. Insurgent ignorance of how a rifle should be shot is
indicated by the fact that many of the soldiers removed the
rear sights from their rifles.
The caliber.45 Springfield rifle bullets, which the Volunteer
regiments used in the Battle of Manila carried a tremendous
s'hock on impact; and, in most cases, when an Insurgent was hit,
he was either disemboweled or the top of his head blown off.
General Pantaleon Garcia, one of the Insurgent brigade commanders, told the writer that after the battle of Manila it was
very difficult to get the Insurgent troops to poke their heads
above the parapet of a trench while being attacked by the
American troops. The Insurgents fired by sticking the rifle over
the top and pulling the trigger. They didn't take aim or even
look at what they were shooting. General MacArthur later said,
"If the Insurgents had known how to shoot, the losses to the
American Army would have terrified th'e nation."
58




It is generally agreed that in no sense was the Filipino a
coward. Poor shot that he was, he often stood up against the
advance of the American troops until there was no chance to
escape and then essayed to fight it out with a bolo. General
Lawton said: "Taking into account the disadvantages they have
to fight against in arms, equipment and military discipline, they
are the bravest men I have ever seen."
Turning to a brief tactical discussion of the battle which took
place at Manila on February 4-5, we find that Otis was confronted with three distinct problems in his defense of the city.
In the first place his lines were long and extended. The line
of Insurgent trenches surrounding the city covered a distance
of about sixteen miles. During the World War the normal front
of an infantry division containing some 28,000 troops, was from
two to four miles. Taking out his provost guard of about 3,000
and considering the 2,400 troops at Iloilo and Cavite and the
various members of the noncombatant branches, Otis had about
11,000 men with which to cover a sixteen-mile front. So he held
out large reserves and rushed them to danger points as the battle
developed. As a result, the Americans had no established line.
Each regiment was assigned a sector. In the regimental sector
an outpost was placed. Each regiment was then quartered within
supporting distance of its respective outpost. A prearranged plan
directed that, if and when hostilities broke out, each regimental
commander would give his particular outpost the support it
needed to repel any attack. Large brigade and division reserves
were held out for emergencies. Telegraph lines were connected
to all headquarters so that calls for assistance could be answered
promptly.
In the second place, unarmed Filipino soldiers had been permitted to enter Manila at will. This fact enabled Insurgent
leaders to become fully acquainted with Otis' strength, the composition of his force and his dispositions.
In the third place it was probable that when the attack came
from the outside, the Sandatahan within the city would attack
the AnTerican troops from the rear. It was also a possibility that
this Insurgent proletarian militia would, even attempt to burn
the city. Hence it was necessary for Otis to weaken the force
59




vhich he normally would have used for the defense of the city
from outside attack. Instead, he maintained a strong provost
guard in anticipation of an attack from within.
On the other hand, he had two distinct advantages. First, he
knew the disposition of the Insurgent forces and could use that


knowledge in planning his defense. Secondly, he was operating
on interior lines. Because the Pasig River was unfordable, Insurgent troops moving from the south side of the city to the
north, or vice versa, would have to use boats and march around
the outside circle of lines. Otis could use the three bridges over
60




the Pasig in Manila and could quickly dispatch troops directly
to threatened points.
General Anderson's division on the south side of the city
consisted of the 14th Infantry, the 1st California, 1st Idaho, 1st
Washington, 1st North Dakota Volunteers, six troops of the 4th
Cavalry, which were acting dismounted, one battalion of the 1st
Wyoming Infantry and two batteries of the 6th Artillery. General MacArthur's second division, which protected the north
side of the city, consisted of the 1st Nebraska, 1st Colorado, 1st
South Dakota, 10th Pennsylvania, 1st Montana, and 20th Kansas Volunteers, the 3d Regular Artillery, which was being used
as infantry, and two batteries of the Utah Light Artillery.
Otis had arranged with Admiral Dewey that in the event of
hostilities, several gunboats would move in close to shore andenfilade the Insurgent lines. He had also further provided a
rather unique weapon of defense in the Laguna de Bay, a Pasig
River steamboat which had been captured from   the Spanish.
This boat drew only four feet of water and was armorplated
with sheet metal of sufficient thickness to resist rifle bullets.
She was armed with two 3-inch guns, two 1.65-inch Hotchkiss
revolving cannon, four Gatling guns, and carried a complement
of about sixty armed infantrymen who could fire from protected positions on her decks. The Laguna de Bay was placed
under the command of Captain Grant of the Utah Artillery,
an experienced steamboat captain. During the battle it cruised
up and down the river causing much uneasiness to the Insurgents whenever it came in sight. It was handled fearlessly
by Grant dnd was considered the equivalent of a regiment of
infantry.
Because of the large amount of sickness in the regiment, the
1st Nebraska Volunteers had been moved in December from
their quarters in the City of Manila to a camp site in the Santa
Mesa district on the eastern edge of the city. The proximity of
this camp to the Insurgent lines resulted in numerous verbal
squabbles between the soldiers of the two armies. On February
2 a detachment of Insurgent troops deliberately entered the
American lines and took possession of a small barrio in front of
the Nebraska outpost. General MacArthur sent a note to the
61




Insurgent local commander demanding that Insurgent troops
withdraw and adding "From this date if the line is crossed by
your men with arms in their hands they must be regarded as
subject to such action as I may deem necessary." The Filipino
troops were recalled and their action deprecated by Colonel
San Miguel, their commanding officer.
On the night of February 4 Private Willie Grayson of the
Nebraska regiment was detailed on guard. He was part of an
outpost patrol which was maintained in the village of Santol,
a short distance in front of the Nebraska camp. The patrol was
instructed to "allow no armed Insurgents to enter the town or
vicinity." It was to halt all armed persons who attempted to
advance from the direction of the Insurgent lines, and order
them back. If they refused to go the patrol was to try to arrest
them; if that was impossible the patrol was to fire upon them.
Shortly before 2000 hours in the evening, Private Grayson
and two other men of the patrol advanced a short distance
ahead of the village to ascertain if any Insurgents were in the
vicinity. Private Grayson suddenly saw four armed men appear in front of him. Willie Grayson described what happened
as follows:
I yelled "halt"... the man moved, I challenged with another "halt".
Then he immediately shouted "Halto" to me. Well I thought the best thing
to do was to shoot him. He dropped. Then two Filipinos sprang out of
the gateway about fifteen feet from us. I called "Halt" and Miller fired
and dropped one. I saw that another was left. Well I think I got my second
Filipino that time. We retreated to where our six other fellows were and I
said, "Line up fellows; the enemy are in here all through these yards." We
then retreated to the pipe line and got behind the water work main and
stayed there all night. It was some minutes after our second shots before
Filipinos began firing.
It appears that Aguinaldo had not intended hostilities to
commence when they did. On this particular night he and
many of his higher ranking officers were absent from their
headquarters, intending to be away for the week end. Impetuous or ignorant subordinates took advantage of the situation
to precipitate the long-suppressed outbreak of hostilities.
Since the Pasig River divides Manila into two distinct parts,
the battle resolved itself into two virtually independent opera62




tions. It started in MacArthur's sector on the north side of the
city on the night of February 4 and extended to the south
side during the 5th.
MacArthur's left flank rested on Manila Bay. His line then
swung in a rough semicircular direction to the east, his right
flank touching the San Juan River in the Santa Mesa district.
The seven infantry regiments in the division were formed into
two brigades and distributed along the sector in line. The outposts of MacArthur's division on the night of February 4,
moving from the bay in an easterly direction, were arranged
in order as follows: the command posts of the 20th Kansas
Volunteers, the 3d US Artillery (acting as infantry), the 1st
Montana Volunteers, the 10th Pennsylvania Volunteers, the
1st South Dakota Volunteers, and 1st Colorado Volunteers
and finally on his right (east) flank, the 1st Nebraska Volunteers. Behind each outpost were regimental reserves quartered
in nipa buildings.
Shortly after Private Willie Grayson precipitated the battle
by getting his second Filipino, the Insurgents opened fire on
the Nebraska camp. Rockets were then seen to go up from
the Insurgent lines and the shooting soon spread along MacArthur's entire front. On the American side the call to arms
was sounded. Soldiers who had been attending the Manila
theatres rushed to their barracks and supports moved out to
the outposts.
The entire Nebraska regiment formed a line to protect their
camp. In the Colorado regiment located next to the Nebraska
camp, bullets poured into regimental headquarters. One officer
was wounded while standing by his bed getting dressed. From
a thick bamboo jungle in front of the 3d Artillery outpost, the
men of this regiment suffered a severe sniping fire without
being able to reply effectively in the darkness. Insurgents made
two advances in considerable force in the sector of the 10th
Pennsylvania Volunteers, but were checked without difficulty.
Intermittent fire continued during the night. At 0400 hours
Colonel Stotsenburg of the Nebraska regiment reported that
the Insurgents were closing in on him and he requested reinforcements. By the time they arrived the attack had been beaten
off. Despite several other piecemeal attacks made by the In63




surgents during the night, the Americans were able, by firing
blindly into the darkness, to hold their line of outposts.
As daylight of February 5 broke MacArthur obtained permission from Otis to take the initiative. The terrain on the
right of his sector was fairly open and sloped with a gradual
rise to the hills northeast of Manila. The Insurgent troops
were limited to small groups occupying the old Spanish line
of blockhouses. MacArthur ordered the 3.2-inch guns of the
Utah Artillery brought up to the American outposts and trained
on the blockhouses. The barrage which these guns laid on the
Insurgent line was so effective that when the Nebraska, Colorado and South Dakota Volunteers swept forward at 0800,
the few remaining Insurgents scurried into the surrounding
hills like rabbits. The Nebraska regiment crossed the stone
bridge over the San Juan River, charged up San Juan del
Monte Hill on the opposite bank and captured the Manila waterworks reservoir. With the assistance of a battalion of Wyoming
Volunteers, which had been thrown into the attack, the Nebraskans then turned south and moving along the east bank
of the San Juan River captured the barrio of San Felipe Neri.
Continuing past the junction of the San Juan and Pasig Rivers,
they swept all Insurgents out of the area on the east bank of the
Pasig to a point opposite the town of Santa Ana.
With success crowning the efforts of the right of his line,
MacArthur felt that by noon he could advance his center and
left. The terrain in these parts of the line was much more
difficult. Opposite the 10th Pennsylvania Volunteers and the
3rd Artillery was the steep, broad La Loma Hill. On its south
slope was a Chinese cemetery marked by a cluster of headstones. On its top was the stone La Loma Church, surrounded
by a rock wall. On the sides of the hill the Insurgents had
constructed elaborate entrenchments in which they had mounted
several muzzle-loading cannon. Around the base of the hill was
a dense bamboo thicket. Between the hill and Manila Bay, a
mile and a half distant, was a swampy jungle.
To assist in the attack on La Loma Hill, the artillery was
again brought into play. After a half-hour bombardment the
10th Pennsylvania attacked the hill from the west. Better protected and better organized, the Insurgents on the hill caused
64




men of the Pennsylvania regiment to fall like tenpins. The 3d
Artillery and the 1st Montana moved to the attack from the
east and after suffering numerous casualties, the three regiments
finally carried the position.
Successful operations of the division for the day were capped
by the 20th Kansas regiment which, assisted by artillery fire
from the USS Charleston, advanced nearly two miles through
the jungle on MacArthur's left flank.
By late afternoon the Insurgents on MacArthur's front had
been pushed beyond the line of Spanish blockhouses. The American troops were becoming disorganized and scattered. It was
ascertained that a gap had been created in the American line.
Also during the attack the 3d Artillery and Montana Volunteers had changed relative positions. A halt was'called, a readjustment made, and the gap closed before darkness set in,
the new front resting approximately along the old line of
Spanish blockhouses.
Except for a desultory fire throughout the night, Anderson's
division on the south of the city was not attacked on the night
of the 4th.
On the morning of the 5th, large numbers of Insurgents
could be seen in their trenches. The United States Navy monitor
Monadnbck had moved in during the night until it was within
1000 yards of the shore. Anderson's troops having rested, on
their arms all night stood anxious to make an attack. At 0800
hours Otis gave his authorization, cautioning Anderson, however, not to advance too far and to look out for his flanks and
the Monadnock.
On Anderson's left (east) flank in the Pandacan District,
a sharp bend in the Pasig River placed the troops of the' Washington and Idaho Volunteers within a stone's throw of the
Insurgent troops under the command of General Pio del Pilar.
Pilar was a former Filipino bandit who had brought his gang
into Aguinaldo's army. Poorly- disciplined, Pilar's troops had
particularly antagonized the American troops opposite. By
unmistakable gestures and taunts they had displayed their low
regard for the potential fighting ability of these western volunteers.
An order to attack was what the troops opposite Pilar's
65




brigade wanted most. On signal the Idaho and Washington
Volunteers left their positions; and, with shouts which resembled everything from a cowboy's "yippee" to an old Civil War
rebel yell, viciously charged-Pilar's redoubts in Pandacan. The
Idaho and Washington Volunteers were supported by Hawthorne's Mountain Battery. In the face of muzzle blasts from
Krupp artillery which the Insurgents had mounted in one particularly strong redoubt, the Idaho troops chased the Insurgents
out of their trenches at the point of the bayonet and pushed
them back to the bank of the Pasig. The Idaho troops suffered
many casualties, including a battalion commander.
Pilar's dispositions had not anticipated a retreat. When his
troops reached the river bank they realized they were in a
cul-de-sac, Americans to the front, the river on their rear. Many
attempted to swim the river or cross in the few boats available;
few elected to surrender. Consequently, the Americans took pot
shots at Insurgents attempting to cross the river. The marksmanship of the western volunteers was so accurate that not a
single Insurgent was seen to reach the opposite bank. It was
estimated that about seven hundred Insurgents were killed,
captured, wounded or drowned in this quick, bloody attack.
While the Idahoans were chasing the Insurgents into the
river, the California regiment on the right of the brigade took
the town of Santa Ana, capturing in it an arsenal containing
a large supply of rice, eight cannon, 78 rifles and 34,000 rounds
of ammunition.
The Californians then assisted by a battalion of the 1st
Wyoming Volunteers and a company of Engineers, moved
south and took the town of San Pedro Macati, about two miles
away. By noon the Insurgents on the left of Anderson's line
had been entirely dispersed.
In General Samuel Ovenshine's brigade, on the right of
Anderson's line, the attack did not go so smoothly. His troops
occupied the front over which the Americans had advanced in
their capture of Manila about seven months previous. It was
swampy and so thickly overgrown with trees and bamboo
thickets that deployed advance was most difficult. The Filipinos
occupied the strong Blockhouse No. 14, and poured a flanking
fire on the 14th Infantry whose line of advance was limited by
66




the terrain. The 1st North Dakota Volunteers were on the
beach at the extreme right of the line. The fire of the Monadnock caused them to withdraw after making a slight advance.
Since the advance was held up, the division reserve and a battalion of the Tennessee Volunteers borrowed from the provost
guard in Manila were rushed to the scene.
Lieutenant E. D. Scott of the 6th Artillery set up a 3-inch
gun on the front line and showered the Insurgent trenches with
shrapnel at a range of OO yards. After a desperate fight, in
which serious losses were inflicted on the 14th Infantry, an attack led by Lieutenant Perry Miles carried Blockhouse No. 14.
The spirit of the attack was perhaps demonstrated by Lieutenant James Mitchell. As Mitchell fell, mortally wounded, he
shouted, "Forward men, advance; don't mind me." After the
capture of Blockhouse No. 14, and the trenches adjoining, the
Insurgent resistance melted away. By evening the brigade had
advanced to the town of Pasay, a mile beyond. At nightfall the
division line was established through Pasay and San Pedro
Macati, about three miles south of the walled city.
The operations of the 1st Division, particularly Ovenshine's
brigade, had required all the resources of the American troops
and had been replete with acts of individual bravery. One
lieutenant colonel of infantry, recently arrived in the Philippines and temporarily without a command, was seen carrying
a rifle and shooting calmly and deliberately at the Insurgents.
A Quartermaster sergeant left his duties of bringing up supplies
and located and killed an Insurgent sniper who was harassing
artillery gunners.
During the afternoon of the 5th, American ammunition
carts and ambulances, moving through the Paco district in the
center of Anderson's sector, were subjected to a continuous
sniping fire from within that barrio. The fire was so persistent
that nearly all of the nipa houses in that district were burned
before the snipers could be dislodged. Some fifty-three armed
Filipinos dressed in civilian clothes were captured. Later General Anderson's command post received sharp musketry fire
from the rear. It was determined to be coming from the Paco
Church, well within the American lines. Artillery was turned
on the church and shortly afterwards a battalion of California
67




Volunteers sent to "clean it out." It took over three hours and
practically the destruction of the church to dislodge the one
hundred Insurgents who had barricaded themselves inside.
The expected rising of the Sandatahan in Manila did not successfully materialize. Small groups of "bolomen" actually
attempted to assemble during the night of the 4th. The three
regiments of infantry which General Hughes, the Provost
Marshal, had judiciously placed at strategic points throughout
the city, easily broke up all gatherings. Some fifty recalcitrants
were killed.
In the two divisions only 59 Americans were killed during
the Battle of Manila and 278 wounded. Insurgent casualties
were difficult to estimate because most of the wounded were
carried from the field by their comrades. American troops
buried 612 Insurgent dead. General Otis estimated their total
losses at 3,000.
The battle of Manila proved two things. First, it demonstrated
that the comparatively untrained and undisciplined volunteers
from  the western United States were, as a rule, excellent
marksmen and could be expected to advance fearlessly in the
face of hostile fire. Secondly, it proved that regardless of the
protection of entrenchments or redoubts, the Insurgents either
would not or could not stand up before the attacks of American
troops, assisted as they were by light artillery and navy guns.
On the morning of February 6, Colonel John M. Stotsenburg,
with a composite force consisting of the Nebraska, Tennessee
and Colorado Volunteers, marched to the Mariquina River,
seven miles east of Manila, and captured the waterworks pumping house. After it was found that the Insurgents had dismantled the machinery before retreating, a search revealed that the
missing parts were hidden under a pile of coal; and in a short
time the pumping station was again functioning. From then on
the eight miles between Manila and the Mariquina River were
guarded by strong patrols that prevented interference with the
water system.
Confusion existed on the south of the line. The California
Volunteers after capturing Santa Ana, had pushed far beyond
the objective selected by General Otis. Under the command of
Lieutenant Colonel Duboce they had followed the highway
68




contiguous to the Pasig River; and, unopposed, had lost contact with the division. Otis sent hurried messages for them to
return, fearing they would be cut off by the Insurgents who
were reforming south of San Pedro Macati. They finally returned safely on the eighth.
Movements of the Insurgent army following this battle were
ascertained by Otis to be as follows:
The demoralization of the Insurgents with the rough handling they
had received from the American mode of conducting warfare hitherto
unknown in these islands, and pronounced by them to be new and unsoldierly, continued for two or three days. The leaders confessing that their
men were overmatched by our troops, contended that they could overcome
by numbers what was lacking in individual characteristics. They commenced at once a reconstruction of their forces in all directions, hastening
from the north by rail every available man whether armed with a rifle or
bolo. There was no lack of subsistence or ammunition for the troops on
the north, but those on the south had lost through capture all the rice and
cartridges which they had stored near their original lines. The bolo men of
the city who had remained quiet since the afternoon of the 5th began to
show again a turbulent disposition and as early as February 8 became bold
and defiant. It became necessary to make new combinations for the Insurgents still insisted in the intention to carry out their former preconceived
plan of action which was to attack on our front, assisted by an overwhelming uprising of the city Insurgent militia.
Although as far as Otis was concerned the situation on the
southern front was satisfactory, on the north side of the city
the line was much longer and bent definitely to the rear as it
reached the bay. The town of Caloocan, in front of the left of
the line, contained an important maintenance plant for the railroad, the entire line of which was in possession of the Insurgents. Consequently, on the 10th MacArthur's division engaged
in a half-hour's artillery bombardment in which the Navy guns
participated. The division then advanced its left flank, overcoming stubborn resistance from the Insurgents who were in
strongly entrenched positions. This attack rectified MacArthur's
line so that it now stretched in a general northwest direction
and included the town of Caloocan. In Caloocan the Americans
found five dismantled engines, fifty passenger coaches, and over
one hundred freight and flat cars. Possession of this rolling
stock, which was repaired by MacArthur's troops, enabled the
69




division to make use of the railroad on its further advance to
the north.
Meanwhile Otis had not forgotten the hapless expedition to
the city of Iloilo on the Island of Panay. In accordance with
the "peace at any price" policy enforced on him from Washington, Otis had, as will be recalled, directed General Marcus
Miller, in command of the expedition, to stand by in the harbor
until something happened. After the Battle of Manila, Otis
directed Miller to go ahead and take the city by force.
Standing with Miller in Iloilo Harbor were the cruiser Baltimore and the gunboat Petrel. As soon as Miller received instructions from Otis to attack the city he scoured the locality for
water transportation with which to land his troops and the light
battery he had brought along. Finally, with difficulty, he procured two barges and three steam launches.
On the morning of February 11 Miller held an officers' conference aboard the Newport while the light battery was being
loaded on the barges. During the conference he was surprised
to hear shots and see shells from the Baltimore and Petrel landing on the Insurgent fort outside the city. Before he could do
anything, a few boatloads of bluejackets had been landed and
the Insurgent fort taken. The sailors hoisted the American flag
and advanced on the town, which was then in flames. Although
Miller finally got some troops ashore in time to assist in the
capture, the Navy had stolen the show.
Distasteful as it was to Miller, the Navy's independent attack unquestionably prevented the complete destruction of the
city. It appears that the Insurgents, anticipating their quick
ejection as soon as force was employed, had planned to burn the
city as they left. The sudden and unexpected attack of the
sailors interrupted these preparations. The handful of sailors
and Miller's men finally extinguished the fire and saved the
majority of the permanent buildings.
In Manila,-Otis, anxious to restore normal conditions as soon
as possible, authorized the opening of the Pasig River as far
south as Laguna de Bay. He hoped that such a move would
permit the resumption of trade in food products between Manila
and the country to the south. However, as soon as traffic up the
river was resumed, the Insurgent army regathered itself and
70




seized the towns of Pasig, Pateros, Tagig and Guadalupe. This
advance brought the Insurgents within rifle range of the American force at San Pedro Macati. These Insurgent forces, with
the units which were being moved from northern Luzon,
massed on MacArthur's front in the vicinity of the ManilaDagupan railroad. This movement placed the Americans in a
position -similar to that which they held before the Battle of
Manila. Otis felt the necessity of awaiting reinforcements from
the United States before he began further movement to the
north or south. The Insurgents were thus given ample opportunity to reorganize their army adnd entrench themselves opposite the American lines.
The command of the Insurgent army was now          given to
General Antonio Luna, a strong and striking character. An
Illocano by birth, Luna had a European education. While finishing his studies on the Continent, he had, played with the
study of military strategy. Upon his return to the Philippines
in 1892 he set himself up as a pharmacist, and as a sideline
conducted a fencing school. In addition, he soon became prominent in the eyes of the Spanish by his anti-government and
anti-Catholic sentiment. During the revolution of 1896 he had
been tried and deported to Spain. In prison there he publicly
announced a retraction of all his former beliefs and was pardoned. Returning to the Philippines, he joined Aguinaldo's
American-sponsored Insurrection of 1898 and was soon made
"Minister of War," with nominal authority as commannder-inchief of the Insurgent army. He established his headquarters
with the troops on the north side of Manila.
On February 9 the Provost Marshal of Manila came into
possession of a rather nefarious document which was being
secretly circulated among the members of the Manila Sandatahan. In part this document was as follows:
To the Field Officers of the Territorial Militia:
By virtue of the barbarous attack made upon our army on the 4th day
of February, without this being preceded by any strain of relations whatever between the two armies, it is necessary for the Filipinos to show that
they know how to avenge themselves of the treachery and deceit of those
who working upon friendship, now seek to enslave us.
In order to carry out the complete destruction of that accursed army
71




of drunkards and thieves, it is indispensable that we all work in unison
and that orders issued from this war office be faithfully carried out.
Such measures will be taken that at 8:00 at night the members of the
territorial militia under your orders will be ready to go into the street with
their arms and ammunition to occupy San Pedro street and such cross
streets as open into it.
The defenders of the Philippines under your orders will attack the
Zorilla barracks and the Bilibid guard and liberate all the prisoners, arming
them in the most practical manner.
The servants of the houses occupied by the Americans and Spaniards
shall burn the buildings in which their masters live in such a manner that
the conflagration shall be simultaneous in all parts of the city.
The lives of the Filipinos will be respected and they shall not be molested
with the exception of those who have been pointed out as traitors.
All others of whatsoever race they may be shall be given no quarter and
shall be exterminated, thus proving to foreign countries that America is not
capable of maintaining order or defending any of the interests which she
has undertaken to defend.
The sharpshooters of Tondo and Santa Ana shall be the first to open
fire and those on the outside of the Manila lines shall second their attack
and thus the American forces will find themselves between two fires...
Brethren, the country is in danger and we must rise to save it. Europe
sees that we are feeble, but we will demonstrate that we know how to die
as it should be done, shedding our blood for the salvation of our outraged
country. Death to the tyrant. War without quarter to the false tyrants who
wish to enslave us. Independence or death....
Malolos, February 7, 1899                             A. LUNA.
At 2000 hours on February 22 a fire started in the Santa Cruz
district of Manila. Prepared for such an emergency, the fire department and the 13th Minnesota Volunteers repaired to the
areas immediately, and discovered the flames were of incendiary
origin. Due to the nipa construction of the houses the fire, assisted by the wind, spread rapidly. The Manila Fire Department took three hours to bring it under control. Firing stray
shots from   nearby buildings, the Sandatahan hampered         the
work of the firemen.
As the Santa Cruz fire was being brought under control another fire broke out in the Tondo district, in the northwest
part of the city. The fire department hurried to the district, but
was halted by a fusillade of bullets. About 500 Insurgents under
the command of Major Francisco Roman, one of Luna's aides,
had managed to pass MacArthur's lines by going through the
swamps which adjoined the bay on MacArthur's left flank.
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These Insurgents had then infiltrated into Manila and barricaded themselves in Tondo. More provost guards were called,
but the Insurgent force was so active that the Americans were
forced to take up a defensive line and hope they could confine
the Insurgents to Tondo. It was impossible to save the houses.
At this time another fire started in the Binondo district, directly behind the force which was engaging the Insurgents in
Tondo. The Binondo, one of the principal business districts of
Manila, contained many permanent structures and large quantities of army supplies. Therefore, Santa Cruz was abandoned
to the flames, and all efforts concentrated on the Binondo. Its
large market place faced destruction. By 1430 hours the fire
department was exhausted and discouraged and little headway
was being made -against the fire. As a last resort ten-inch powder cartridges were exploded in buildings hopelessly on fire.
When the walls of these buildings fell the flames were restricted
and their progress arrested.
The provost guard which had successfully resisted the efforts
of Roman's force to advance from Tondo, was given a short
rest and then six companies were sent to drive Roman's men
out. During the night the Insurgents had securely barricaded
themselves and it took an all day running fight to clear them
out of the area. The majority were killed because they refused
to surrender when cornered, and the few who did manage to
escape, moved back through the swamps. Tondo was a mass
of ruins.
CHAPTER 7
American Authority Extended
DURING THE LATTER PART of February and the month of March,
1899, more American troops arrived in the Philippines so that
American authority was gradually extended throughout the
Archipelago. With the termination of the Spanish-American
War, Regular Army units which had taken part in the expedition to Guba became available for service in the Philippines and
were dispatched there with the hope that the revolt would be
quickly suppressed. Between February 23 and March 22, the
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3rd, 4th, 17th, 20th and 22nd Infantry regiments arrived at
Manila and were immediately put into active service. Between
March 10 and 17 a provisional brigade, dubbed "Wheaton's
Flying Column," moved southeast from Manila along the Pasig
River and cleared Insurgents out of the area as far south as the
Laguna de Bay, a large lake eighteen miles southeast of Manila.
This movement opened the Pasig River to traffic from its source
to Manila Bay. Between February 26 and March 3 the Islands
of Cebu and Negros were occupied by American troops and
American sovereignty was partially established there. Between
March 25 and 31 a reinforced division under the command of
Major General MacArthur moved north from Manila and
captured the Insurgent "Capital" at Malolos, some twenty miles
to the northwest. Since each of the movements gave some indication of the problems which would confront the Army in fulfilling its mission of pacifying the Island, it might be well to
examine them in some detail.
Cebu is a small island some 357 miles south of Manila. As to
size and the number of inhabitants, it closely resembles the
state of Rhode Island. It has an area of 1,668 square miles and
a population (at that time) of 518,000. The Filipinos who lived
there were Visayans, a Malay tribe who spoke a different dialect
from the Tagalogs of central Luzon, and were isolated from
contacts with the adherents of Aguinaldo to the extent that they
were not necessarily sympathetic with the aims of the Insurrectos. Shortly after General Miller's troops had captured Iloilo
on the Island of Panay, February 10, a United States naval ship
visited the city of Cebu and its officers took possession without
difficulty. Arrangements were made with the local business men
for the establishment of American sovereignty. Temporarily at
least, the situation seemed to be well in hand and the battalion
of the 23rd Infantry, which was sent there to preserve order
found little to do.
Within a short time, however, Tagalog agents, representing
the Malolos government, arrived and stirred up dissension
among the Visayan natives. Although the propertied classes
were practically unanimous in their endorsement of the American rule, the urban and agrarian proletarians furnished fertile
fields for Aguinaldo's trouble-makers. The necessity of keep74




ing all available troops on the Island of Luzon prevented Oti.
from dispatching a force to Cebu, which could have nipped
the incipient rebellion in the bud.
Negros is an island about the size of Massachusetts, but rot
so thickly populated. It has an area of 4,839 square miles and
about 372,000 Visayan inhabitants. It is located lust west of
Cebu and south of Panay. During February General Miller
visited the island and held conferences with the leading citizens
of Bacolod, the principal city. These citizens had accepted American sovereignty, and emulating the action of the business men
of Iloilo, had sent a committee to Manila to ask for assistance
in maintaining law and order. Otis responded on March 2 by
sending Colonel James F. Smith, a Volunteer officer who was
also an experienced lawyer. Colonel Smith, with a battalion of
California Volunteers, was to organize a government with a
measure of self-government for the Filipinos. Colonel Smith was
also authorized to organize a Filipino police force which would
eventually supplant the American troops. At first the Filipino
police carried the status of quartermaster civilian employees and
were furnished with arms and ammunition by the Ordnance
Department. Colonel Smith was designated governor of the
Island. Shortly thereafter the islands of Panay, Negros and Cebu
were organized into the "Visayan Military District" under the
control of General Miller, who established his headquarters at
Iloilo. In Negros events proceeded smoothly until Tagalog
agents moved in and incited agitation among the lesser lawabiding elements. In a short time the principal city was under
the control of the Americans and the majority of the surrounding country in the hands of dissident groups. With open rebellion rapidly developing, Otis was unable to send sufficient
troops from Luzon to cope with the situation. How the Americans eventually pacified these southern islands will be discussed
later.
It may be recalled that at the conclusion of the fighting around
Manila on February 4 and 5, the American line on the south
side of the city ran in a general northeast-southwest direction
from Pasay on the shore of Manila Bay, to San Pedro Macati,
a small town on the west bank of the Pasig River. Scattered
to the south, as a result of the battle on the 4th and 5th, the
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Insurgents had gradually reorganized themselves. Finding that
temporarily, at least, the Americans showed no sign of aggressiveness, they had re-entrenched themselves opposite the American position and spasmodically maintained a harassing fire on
the American trenches. While not causing many casualties, this
fire required the troops in the line to be constantly on the alert.
This condition necessitated loss of sleep and sometimes waste
of ammunition. Upon the arrival of the 20th and 22nd Infantry
in the latter part of February and the early part of March, Otis
felt strong enough to attack and clear the Insurgents out of this
area.
For that purpose he organized a provisional brigade consisting of the 20th and 22nd Infantry, two battalions of the Washington, and seven companies of the Oregon Volunteers, three
troops of the 4th Cavalry, and light Battery "D" of- the 6th
Artillery. From 60 to 80 per cent of the Regular Army troops
were raw recruits.
A recent arrival in the Philippines, Brigadier General Lloyd
Wheaton, was placed in command. He was another product of
the Civil War. In 1861 he had gone to the front as a first sergeant in the 8th Illinois Infantry. During the war he had been
brevetted three times for "gallant and meritorious services" and
had ended the war a brevet colonel. In 1865 he had been
awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for "distinguished
gallantry in the assault on Fort Blakely, Alabama." After the
war he had been commissioned as a captain in the Regular
Army. After 1891, he became a colonel and commanding officer
of the 20th Infantry. With the expansion of the Army because
of the Spanish-American War, he had been promoted to the
rank of brigadier general of Volunteers. Twenty-five years as a
company commander had left him, mentally at least, a company
officer. Despite the fact that he was a brigadier general, he
spent most of his time on the front line.
Of the troops in the provisional brigade, the 20th and 22nd
Infantry had taken active part in the campaign at Santiago de
Cuba, both having seen service in the action of El Caney. The
other units in the brigade had taken part in the Battle of Manila.
The Pasig River, which empties into the Bay of Manila, has
its source in Laguna de Bay. The lake is thirty-two miles long
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in one direction and twenty-eight in the other. At the time of
the Insurrection, the inhabitants of the village along the shore
brought their agricultural products to Manila via the lake and
Pasig River. On its eastern shores are the rugged Caraballos
Mountains, virtually impassable to any kind of traffic.
Communication between the Insurgent forces on the north of
Manila and those on the south was maintained along the
Arminquina and Pasig Rivers, which skirted the western flank
of the mountains. Control of these rivers, particularly the Pasig,
would have severed this communication and isolated the two
groups.
About eleven miles southeast of Manila the town of Pasig,
with about 8,000 inhabitants, is situated at the confluence of the
Pasig and Mariquina Rivers, about three miles from the northern shore of Laguna de Bay. Also running into the confluence
of the Mariquina and Pasig Rivers is the Tagig, which is
about one mile southwest of, and runs nearly parallel to, the
Pasig. Both rivers have their origin in the lake and meet at the
town of Pasig to form the Pasig River which flows northwest to
Manila and into the sea. Along the Tagig River to the south
are the towns of Pateros and Tagig. Three miles east of Pasig
are the towns of Cainta and Taytay, situated on the western
slopes of the Caraballos Mountains.
Since the Insurgents had entrenched themselves facing the
San Pedro Macati-Pasay line, opposition would be encountered
as soon as the brigade left its entrenchments. A fairly large
force was known to be entrenched in the town of Guadalupe
on the Pasig, three quarters of a mile east of San Pedro Macati.
Hence the capture or destruction of this force was the first
mission. Wheaton's plan was to place his brigade in line, its
right flank protected by the cavalry squadron, its left flank on
the river, protected and assisted by the gunboat Laguna de Bay,
which was to move up the river with the column.
In the early morning of March 13, the brigade moved forward. After advancing cross country about a mile the 20th and
22nd Infantry on the right flank of the brigade were to execute
a left wheel, entering Guadalupe from the south and preventing
the escape of Insurgents from there. A platoon of the 6th
Artillery effectively shelled'the Guadalupe Church before the
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attack was launched. This so discouraged the Insurgents that
by the time the enveloping force entered the town, they had
retreated southwest along the river. The brigade then formed
on the road and proceeded towards Pasig, five miles distant.
As the column approached the junction of the Mariquina and
Pasig Rivers, it came under two fires, one from Insurgent troops
in Pasig and the other from the direction of Pateros, one mile
south. Blocked by fire from two directions and by two unfordable rivers, the command was forced to bivouac for the night.
Obstructions placed in the river by the Filipinos delayed the
Laguna de Bay. But at dark it arrived and sent a few shots into
Pasig.
On the following day Wheaton extended his lines south.
Crossing the Tagig River in cascos the 1st Washington Volunteers, assisted by the cavalry, drove the enemy from Pateros. On
the 15th, the 20th Infantry crossed the river and stormed the
trenches in front of Pasig, driving the Insurgent force entrenched in front of the town of Cainta, two miles from Pasig.
Although greatly outnumbered, the Americans charged this
force and routed it so that it was driven beyond the town of
Taytay, one mile east. On the same day other Insurgent forces
in the vicinity of Tagig were routed by the Washington Infantry.
On March 18 a company of the Washington Volunteers,
which had been assigned as a garrison at Tagig, was attacked
by some eight hundred Insurgents. It took the battalion of the
22nd Infantry, which reinforced the Washingtonians, the entire
day to disperse the enemy. The battalion commander, Captain
Frank B. Jones, was killed. The next day Wheaton sent the
22nd Infantry, the Washingtonians, and Oregonians to the
south from Pateros and Tagig. This "punitive expedition"
burned all Filipino villages and scattered all Insurgent troops
encountered for a distance of fifteen miles around the west
shore iof the lake. On the 20th the brigade returned to Manila,
leaving the 1st Washington Volunteers to garrison Pasig, Pateros and Tagig.
General Wheaton summed up the accomplishments of the
brigade as follows:
This ended the operations of the provisional brigade. In one week, all
his [the enemy's] positions that [were] attacked [were] taken, and his
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troops killed, captured or dispersed; the towns from where he brought over
troops or in which he resisted us [were] burned or destroyed. He burned
them himself. His loss in killed, wounded or captured was not less than
2500 men.
The American casualties amounted to thirty-six killed and
wounded.
While Wheaton was clearing the Insurgents from the Pasig.
River, MacArthur's division, entrenched on the north side of
Manila, had been subjected to periodic and annoying attacks.
To protect the Manila pumping station the American line had
been extended to the Mariquina River, seven miles northeast of
the city. The isolated position of the right flank rendered it
particularly vulnerable. On March 5, 6, and 7 detachments of
the Nebraska, Oregon and Utah Volunteers, which garrisoned
this portion of the line, were obliged to drive off Insurgent
bodies attacking with the intent of capturing and destroying
the pumping station.
The 3rd, 4th, and 17th Infantry, having arrived in the Philippines, augmented the American strength by some 3,600 men.
It was reported that Malolos, the Insurgent capital, had become
a war depot and contained a large quantity of rifles and ammunition; and that between Caloocan and Malolos the Insurgents had constructed a veritable "Hindenburg Line" of entrenchments. Luna, the Insurgent commander-in-chief, boasted
that he had 16,000 armed troops. The American troops, impatient to be let loose, were in excellent health and spirits.
Consequently, Otis decided to move on to the Insurgent capital
and, if possible, destroy Luna's army.
MacArthur's division was designated to make the advance;
so it was reinforced by the recently arrived regiments, a squadron of the 4th Cavalry and a battalion of the Utah Artillery.
The composition of the division as augmented was as follows:
1st Brigade (Brigadier General Harrison G. Otis).
3rd Artillery (acting as infantry).
20th Kansas Volunteers.
1st Montana Volunteers.
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2nd Brigade (Brigadier General Irving Hale).
1st Colorado Volunteers.
1st Nebraska Volunteers.
1st South Dakota Volunteers.
10th Pennsylvania Volunteers.
3rd Brigade (Brigadier General R. H. Hall).
4th Infantry.
17th Infantry (1 battalion).
13th Minnesota Volunteers.
1st Wyoming Volunteers.
Brigadier General H. G. Otis, who commanded the 1st
Brigade, should not be confused with Major General Elwell S.
Otis, the corps commander. Harrison Gray Otis was a prominent Los Angeles newspaper man who had served capably
throughout the Civil War. In 1898, he had been commissioned
frdm civil life as a brigadier general in the Volunteers. Brigadier
General Irving Hale, who commanded the 2nd Brigade, had
graduated No. 1 in the West Point class of 1884. Following
graduation he had resigned from the Army to enter private
business. At the outbreak of the Spanish-American War he
rejoined the Army and was sent to the Philippines as Colonel
of the 1st Colorado Volunteers. After the capture of Manila he
was promoted to brigadier general. Brigadier General R. H.
Hall, who commanded the 3rd Brigade, graduated from West
Point in 1860. In 1898 he was a colonel in command of the 4th
Infantry and had been given temporary promotion to brigadier
general of Volunteers.
Consideration of the terrain- to the north of Manila indicated
that the easiest approach to Malolos would be along the ManilaDagupan Railroad which ran through the Insurgent capital.
However, such intelligence service as the Americans had been
able to organize reported that the Insurgent line ran from the
railroad possibly as far east as the Mariquina River. The right
flank of any force advancing north on the railroad would,
therefore, be vulnerable to Insurgent attacks from the east..
In order to enable one brigade to remain near Manila and protect the right flank of the division, an additional brigade under
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the command of General Wheaton was attached to MacArthur's
division. This brigade consisted of one battalion of the 3rd
Infantry, the 22nd Infantry and eleven companies of the 2nd
Oregon Volunteers, bringing the total strength of the division
available for field operations to 11,780 officers and men. The


81




force was further augmented by a Colt 1-inch automatic gun
taken from the USS Helena and manned by a Navy lieutenant
and three Marines. Also accompanying the division was an
"armored train." It consisted of three flatcars upon which were
mounted a 6-pounder navy gun, 2 Gatling guns, and a Hotchkiss revolving cannon.
The division field order for the movement prescribed that the
advance be by echelon from the right. Hall's brigade on the
extreme right was to demonstrate to the north, then stand fast
and protect the water works line and the right flank of>the division. Hale's brigade on its left was to advance on the town of
Novaliches, ten miles northeast of Manila, and then swing to
the west cutting off Insurgent retreat to the north. It was to be
assisted on its left by Otis' brigade moving approximately in a
northwest direction, just east of the railroad line. Wheaton's
brigade, on the left of the division, was to advance slowly along
the railroad, exerting only a mild pressure on the Insurgent
lines until it was certain that Hale had swung to the left (west)
and blocked the retreat of the Insurgents to the north. By this
plan the Americans hoped to capture the Insurgent army.
At the outset the envelopment idea was a failure. It was
premised on Hale's brigade, using a road which available maps
indicated ran between Manila and Novaliches. When the brigade advanced on March 25 it found that no such road existed
and that its line of advance was through jungles. This precluded the movement of any wheeled transportation, and even
reconnaissance by mounted men was extremely difficult. As a
result, Hale's brigade was forced to swing to the left, some four
miles south of Novaliches, too far south to block the Insurgents'
withdrawal. The whole operation turned out to be a series of
regimental combats, many of them bloody and devoid of either
strategy or tactics.
Hale's brigade, which was to make the envelopment, moved
forward from the trenches on the north side of the city at 0530
March 25. A picture of the brigade may be formed from the
following extract of the brigade order:
Men will carry guns with straps and bayonets, belt, haversack, mess kit,
canteen, filled with water or coffee. One day's field ration, 100 rounds of
ammunition, poncho hung in belt. They will wear brown canvas uniform
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including blouse without blue shirt. Those not provided with blouses will
wear blue shirts.
Two days' additional field rations, 200 rounds additional ammunition,
one blanket for each two men and necessary cooking utensils, tools, etc.,
will be transported in wagon and pack train.
Reveille will be at 0300; breakfast at 0400; and troops will be assigned
positions ready to start by 0500, when each regimental commander will
send a messenger to brigade commander, to that effect. There will be no
bugle calls, loud commands or shouting.
Officers and noncommissioned officers swill prevent men from throwing
away accoutrements, rations, water and ammunition.
Controlled volley firing by company, platoon or squad will be used except where enemy is scattered or retreating and individual firing when
necessary will be closely regulated. Economize ammunition. Adjust sights
to range. Aim low. Watch for dust and modify range accordingly. As a
rule fire only at visible enemy or smoke.
The advance will be pushed with energy and Insurgents driven from
their positions without unnecessary hesitation. When under fire, advance by
alternate rushes of companies or platoons, thus keeping the enemy down
by a practically continuous fire, to proper distance and then charge. Impress
upon the men that against the present enemy, the charge is the safest form
of attack.
Commanding officers will issue and enforce stringent orders against
burning, looting and abuse of inhabitants or prisoners. Offenses of this
nature will be severely punished.
This brigade, in accordance with the above order, left the line
of American trenches one hour in advance of the other elements,
moving in a general northeasterly direction on Novaliches. At
the town of San Francisco del Monte, two miles to their front,
the brigade encountered spirited resistance from the Insurgents,
who had entrenched themselves. In a hand-to-hand struggle for
the possession of the town one company commander, Captain
Lee Forby, was killed and over fifty Insurgent dead or wounded
left on the field. The brigade then continued towards Novaliches. By 1000 hours in the morning the density of the jungle
rendered the maintenance of contact between regiments impossible; and the brigade was unable to locate the road to
Novaliches over which it had intended to march supplies and
ambulances. General Hale rode to division headquarters and
explained the situation. At 1215, upon MacArthur's instruction,
he ordered the brigade to swing to the left and move in a northwesterly direction. Soon Hale's men came to the Tuliahan River
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and crossed it without opposition. They bivouacked during the
night of March 25-26 on the north bank of the river.
Hall's brigade, on the extreme right of the division, had made
its demonstration to the north and halted about three miles
north of the Manila-Mariquina road. It became evident that the
Insurgents were not extended in force as far east as Mariquina,
so-on the 26th this brigade was withdrawn and took no further
active part in the movement.
Otis' brigade, which was just to the west of Hale, had moved
forward at 0630 and encountered definite Insurgent resistance
as soon as it left the American trenches. Advancing in the face
-,of fire from the front and flank, it reached the Tuliahan River.
There the fire from the Insurgents entrenched on the north
bank became so effective that the Americans were forced to
stop and reconnoiter crossings. This river was about 40 feet
wide and 5 feet deep. With water up to their armpits and rifles
held above heads, the 20th Kansans waded the river and
chased the Insurgents out of the trenches. The 3rd Artillery, on
the left of the Kansans, was forced to advance over open ground
before reaching the river, and in the first fifteen minutes ot the
advance experienced over thirty casualties. On reaching the river
bank they improvised a bridge by tying two rafts end to end.
Crossing without further difficulty, the brigade spent the night
on the north bank of the river.
On the extreme left of the division Wheaton's brigade had
moved slowly because the plan was not to push the Insurgents
back along the railroad until Hale's brigade had moved sufficiently far to the north to prevent their escape. Advancing from
Caloocan along the railroad, the Oregon Volunteers and the
22nd Infantry took line after line of Insurgent trenches. Bearing
the brunt of the advance also was the 3rd Infantry which had
arrived only three days previous from the United States and
contained numerous raw recruits. However, by 1130 the Insurgents had been pushed back to the north bank of the Tuliahan River. The brigade did not attempt to cross the river on
the 25th but bivouacked in the vicinity of the railroad bridge.
The division casualties for the day amounted to 15 killed and
91 wounded.
The following day saw the consummation of the modified
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flanking movement. As dawn broke it was apparent to Wheaton
on the left flank that the Insurgents were preparing to retreat.
The town of Malabon to his left front was in flames. He immediately ordered the 22nd Infantry to cross the Tuliahan River
and attack the Insurgents at Malinta, a mile and a half north of
the railroad bridge. The Insurgents there had erected elaborate
defenses, part of which consisted of a church surrounded by a
two-foot-thick stone wall. There also they had measured the
ground from the railroad bridge to the church, and, at seventyfive-yard intervals, had erected large poles, bearing flags. By
means of these markers they were able to determine the exact
range to attacking troops. As the Americans passed the poles
the Insurgents could adjust the sights on their rifles accurately.
In some trenches rifles had been placed in fixed positions aimed
at the height of a man's body. It was not necessary for the defender to expose himself while firing, and it was literally impossible for him to shoot over the head of advancing troops.
The 22nd Infantry attacked this position in the face of a surprisingly effective fire. Within a few minutes after the attack
began, the regimental commander, Colonel H. C. Egbert, and
one first sergeant were killed and the first sergeant in two other
companies had been wounded. However, the regiment charged,
took the position, and drove the Insurgents north along the
railroad toward the town of Meycauayan.
At 0840 of the same day, MacArthur sent the following telegram to Otis:
I have just ascertained that by advancing to the Novaliches road, my
artillery and wagons cannot follow me. Under these circumstances, propose
to change front at once. This will threaten the Insurgent left, but somewhat
farther south than intended. This movement which is the only feasible one
in view of the character of the country, I propose to carry out at once. If
you desire to make suggestions in the premises, please answer as quickly
as possible.
At 0925 Otis wired back "No suggestions."
The flanking movement began from the bivouac occupied on
the previous night. The 3rd Artillery on the left of Otis' brigade
entered Malinta just as the 22nd Infantry was clearing out the
Insurgents. Hale's brigade, which was to make the envelop85




ment, swung to the left sharply and struck the railroad about
two miles north of Malinta; but not in time to prevent the
withdrawal north of the retreating enemy. A defensive position
at Polo was taken and Hale pushed on towards Meycauayan
three miles further north.
Meycauayan, situated on the Meycauayan River, was about
eight miles north of Manila. There the Insurgents had again
entrenched themselves on the north bank of the river, and it
took a valiant charge to dislodge them. The Nebraska and
South Dakota Volunteers were forced to wade the river and
General Hale was wounded. The advance element of the division bivouacked that night at Meycauayan. Casualties for the
day amounted to 2 killed and 29 wounded.
On the walls of the railroad station in Meycauayan, the American troops found the following proclamation posted:
I, Antonio Luna, General in Chief of Operations, ordain and command
from this date forward:
First: The following will be executed by shooting without court martial:
a. Spies and those who give news of us to the enemy.
b. Those who commit robbery and those who violate women.
Second: All towns which may be abandoned by our forces will be
burned down. No one deplores war more than I do; I detest it, but we
have an unalienable right to defend our soil from falling into the hands of
the fresh rulers who desire to appropriate it, slaughtering our men, women
and children.
For this reason we are in duty bound as Filipinos to sacrifice everything
for our independence, however great may be the sacrifices which the fatherland requires of us.
General Headquarters at Polo, February 15, 1899.   A. LUNA.
The General in Chief of Operations.
As a result of this order all Filipino barrios evacuated by
fleeing Insurgent troops were in flames. This action in no sense
hindered the advance of the Americans but caused unnecessary
suffering and loss of property among Filipino civilians.
On March 27 Wheaton's brigade was detached and left behind to guard the railroad and line of communications; and
Otis' and Hale's brigades continued to the north, one on each
side of the railroad track. The Insurgents were retreating so,
rapidly that the advance became a pursuit.
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The tactics of the pursuit may be summarized by the following extract from the 2nd Brigade field order dated March 27:
When advance party meets enemy in small force it will drive him out
enveloping his flank. If in larger force, support and reserve (if necessary)
of advance guard will turn flank. If in very strong force and position advance guard will hold front and main body will be used as may be most
desirable. Firing pigs, chickens, etc., will be strictly prohibited at all times.
The Insurgents were again met at the town of Marilao on
the Marilao River, two miles north. The South Dakota Volunteers, advance guard for Hale's brigade on the east side of the
railroad track, came under Insurgent fire and attacked immediately. Three officers and four enlisted men were killed, and
one officer and twenty-four enlisted men wounded. They forced
the Insurgents across the Marilao railroad bridge and got control of the bridge.
Otis' brigade on the west side of the railroad came under fire
on its left flank. The fire came from Insurgent trenches opposite
where the river made a bend to the south. Colonel Fredrick
Funston of the 20th Kansas, finding the river unfordable at
this point, called for volunteer swimmers to bring back a raft
which was moored on the opposite bank. One officer and four
enlisted men volunteered; and, protected by a concentrated fire
on the Insurgent trenches, swam the river and brought the raft
back without a casualty. By the time Colonel Funston and
twenty-one men of the Kansas regiment had crossed on the raft,
the Insurgents opposite had fled, leaving 24 dead and 34 prisoners, 31 Remington rifles and 4,000 rounds-of ammunition.
Farther up the river a company of the 10th Pennsylvania Volunteers crossed in a similar manner and routed detachments of
Insurgents.
At about 1700 in the afternoon the Insurgents staged a counterattack. In,full view of both brigades a large body of Filipinos
advanced within 2,000 yards of the American lines and opened
fire. The Americans were beyond the range of the American
Krag-J6rgensen and Springfield rifles and just within the maximum   range of the Insurgent Mausers. So shots that usually
went over the heads of the Americans when they charged at
close quarters were now landing in their ranks and causing
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casualties. The Insurgent left flank was charged by the if,
Nebraska and the entire line withdrew. The division casualties
for the day were 15 killed and 70 wounded.
The division was delayed at Marilao while the railroad bridge
was being planked to permit passage of supply trains; and a
new bridge constructed over a stream which adjoined the river.
The temporary bridge, constructed from cascos, sank when the
supply trains were half over. MacArthur decided to get his supply system well in hand before continuing and directed that the
28th be spent at Marilao.
On March 29 the division continued its movement along the
railroad towards Malolos, eleven miles distant. The Insurgents
had been pushed back so rapidly that they were demoralized.
As they retreated, they apparently had neither time nor inclination to damage effectively the railroad track or bridges. By
1030 on the 29th Bocaue, three miles beyond Marilao, was taken
with the railroad bridge intact. By noon the division had reached
Bigaa, a mile and a half north. After routing Insurgents entrenched on the north bank of the Bigaa River, the division
moved to Guiguinto, two miles farther. There the command
halted during the night of March 29-30.
The division was now less than five miles from Malolos,
where it was anticipated the Insurgents would offer a substantial resistance, principally because of the political effect that
capturing the capital would have on the Insurgent cause.
After spending most of the 30th distributing rations and
ammunition, the division left Guiguinto and moved towards
Malolos at 1420. By 1730, after overcoming what General MacArthur called "moderate" opposition from the Insurgents, they
were within two miles of the Insurgent capital. There in view
of the formidable earthworks to his front, MacArthur halted
and decided to attack the following morning.
For the attack on Malolos MacArthur prescribed an artillery
preparation of twenty-five minutes, to be followed by an envelopment of the Insurgent left flank.
At 0700 on the 31st, following the artillery preparation, the
1st Nebraska, on the right of MacArthur's line, moved by the
flank and pushed out weak Insurgent detachments. Apparently,
either the artillery preparation had discouraged the Insurgents
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or it had been decided that the city would be evacuated without
a struggle, for when the Kansas regiment advanced along the
railroad it encountered no opposition.
Perhaps the capture of the city itself is best told by Colonel
Funston, who was among the first to enter:
When the advance was resumed on the morning of the 31st, the first
trenches reached were found deserted, the occupants having fled during the
shelling of their position by the field battery. An extensive trench near the
railroad less than a quarter of a mile from the suburbs of Malolos was
found deserted and here the regiment in common with the whole division
halted. I received orders from the division commander to send a small
reconnoitering party into the town and accordingly took Second Lieutenant
Colin H. Ball and two squads from Company E and taking charge of
these in person advanced cautiously up one of the principal streets. We
found the convent occupied by Aguinaldo as a residence in flames and
were fired on by a dozen men behind a street barricade of stones. MFy
detachment returned the fire with two volleys and charged, the enemy
seeking safety in flight and we entered the plaza, being the first American
troops in the enemy's capital. We were immediately followed by two guns
under Major Young and shortly afterwards by several companies of the 1st
Montana.
Aguinaldo's government and army had fled to the north the
night before. General MacArthur wanted to follow up the Insurgent army at once and occupy the line of, the large Rio
Grande Pampanga, eight miles north. However, Otis sent word
from Manila for him to stop and refit. The total casualties to
the division during the advance on Malolos amounted to 56
killed and 478 wounded.
Let us glance briefly at some of the problems which the
Malolos campaign indicated the future might bring.
At the outset, Insurgent military opposition could be eliminated as an important obstacle. By the time the Insurgents had
been pushed back to Malolos their morale whs at such a low
ebb that the signal for an American advance became automatically the signal for an Insurgent retreat.
Unquestionably the greatest problem     in the Malolos campaign, and what promised to be the greatest problem in the
future, was the matter of supply. A glance at the map will indicate that there were six sizable rivers in the twenty miles between Manila and Malolos. Normally Filipino streams were not
spanned by bridges suitable for heavy transportation. In this
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particular campaign, of course, the existence of the railroad
solved the bridge problem. Partially dismantled bridges were
planked and supply trains crossed with little difficulty.
As to transportation, the native carabao cart was too slow for
a fast-moving infantry column. It appeared that American-made
wagons might shake to pieces moving over the rough, rocky
Filipino roads.
Troops were sometimes deployed and men wounded in bamboo thickets three miles from the nearest transportation. Who
was to carry them over the dikes to the nearest ambulance?
How was the health of the troops to be maintained? Drinking
water in the, field was non-existent. Each soldier who drank
from a native well or stream was inviting dysentery. Tropical
germs, unfamiliar to American doctors, infected minor cuts or
abrasions, sometimes causing death within twenty-four hours.
The movement on Malolos was held during the dry season
with the troops moving along the only railroad line in the
Islands. Campaigning away from the railroad during the rainy
season would be entirely different. If the Insurrection was to
be broken, all territory in the hands of Insurgents must be
quickly occupied.
CHAPTER 8
American Expedition on Luzon
THE QUESTION as to which army, Insurgent or American, was
superior was settled by the Battle of Manila, and confirmed by
the easy capture of Malolos. American troops could, if supplied
properly, advance in Insurgent territory at will. Occupation of
the Archipelago should then be simply a matter of road marches
to occupy key cities in Luzon, establish supply bases there, and
extend American authority into the surrounding territory from
the bases.
Following the capture of Malolos, Otis had an opportunity to
settle the Insurrection in short order. The rainy season generally
commences in June, and he had two months to extend and consolidate American authority.
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However, he failed to take advantage of his opportunity. Instead of sending small, mobile columns in all directions to occupy Insurgent territory, he sent comparatively large forces on
thrusts in two or three directions. The "thrust" idea would not
have been so bad had the occupied territory been retained under
American control. But as soon as a key point was occupied, Otis
made the expedition return to Manila. Insurgent forces, which
had become scattered and disorganized, were permitted to reorganize and reoccupy the territory without molestation. When
their activities became embarrassing other expeditions were sent
'out to scatter them.
Probably the greatest fault of Otis' administration was his
constant interference with his commanders in the field. Although a subordinate major general might be sent out on a
campaign in command of eight- or ten thousand troops, he could
not make a single move until he received authority from Otis
in Manila. If a column moved too fast, Otis would make it retrace its steps an4 halt until he gave instructions to proceed. It
took three years to do a job which most of Otis' subordinates
thought could have been accomplished in two months. Had
every officer in the American Army in the Philippines followed
Otis' orders to the letter, the Islands might have never been
pacified. Of course, Otis was the responsible commander and as
such entiled to observe a certain amount of caution. But he was
extremely over-cautious.
As far as the supply system was concerned the two remaining
months of the dry season were precious. Had the advance been
pushed and bases established throughout the Island, the American troops would not have had to wallow their way through the
mud of Luzon during the rainy season. But during April MacArthur was forced to sit idly by at Malolos while the Insurgents
destroyed railroad bridges to the north and harassed American
outposts to distraction. The remainder of the American troops
was utilized in abortive "sight seeing tours" in the vicinity of
Manila. American authority in Luzon was not extended in any
substantial manner whatsoever.
During May MacArthur was permitted to -advance to San
Fernando, Pampanga, a town twenty miles north of Malolos.
By that time his troops had been in the field so long that half
/           91




the division went on sick report. More "thrusts" during the June
rains emphasized the difficulties of operating during the wet
season. As a result, the American Army was virtually immobile
until November.
Several of Otis' abortive thrusts will be discussed, not because
of their military importance on the Insurrection as a whole, but


92




because they indicate some of the harrowing experiences the
American troops underwent while taking possession of the
Philippines.
From March 10, 1899, the date of his arrival in the Philippines, to his death from an Insurgent bullet on December 18
of the same year, there was one man whose name was enough
to alarm the Filipino Insurgents. He was Major General Henry
W. Lawton, an excellent soldier. At eighteen he had enlisted
for the Civil War as a sergeant in the 9th Indiana Infantry and
took active part in twenty-eight major engagements. He had
been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for "distinguished gallantry in leading a charge of skirmishers against the
enemy's works, taking them with their occupants and stubbornly and successfully resisting two determined attacks of the
enemy to retake the works, in front of Atlanta, Georgia. August
3, 1864." He ended the war as a brevet colonel of Volunteers
and was commissioned in 1866 as a second lieutenant of Infantry in the Regular Army. In 1871 he transferred to the
Cavalry and between 1876 and 1883 was actively engaged in the
campaigns against the Indians. He was actively responsible for
the capture of the Apache Chief Geronimo in 1886. By the time
of the Spanish-American War, he had reached the grade of
Colonel in the Inspector General's Department, and was immediately promoted t6 major general of Volunteers and placed
in command of a division in the campaign of Santiago de Cuba.
"In Cuba he took part in the battle at El Caney and was subsequently the military governor of Santiago. In January 1899 he
was sent to the Philippines where he was placed in command of
the 1st Division. A large man, well over six feet, he was entirely fearless. Had Otis permitted him to carry out the aggressive measures which he continually proposed, it is possible that
the Philippine Islands might have been pacified at a much earlier
date. A month after his arrival Otis gave him command of an
expedition into Laguna Province.
On the southeastern shore of Laguna de Bay is Santa Cruz,
one of the richest and most important cities in that part of
Luzon. It was populated by 13,000 inhabitants and was the outlet for the produce of the fertile provinces south and southeast
of Manila. It had been reported that the Insurgents were in
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force there, so in the early part of April Otis decided to send
Lawton with a provisional brigade to clear out the south shore
of the lake. The expedition had for its immediate objects the
following missions: "To destrqy or capture the enemy force at
Santa Cruz; to distribute among the inhabitants of the country
copies of proclamations setting forth the benevolent aims of
the United States; to locate and capture several gunboats and
launches which were rumored to be in the hands of Insurgents
in that area; to reconnoiter the country to the east and north of
Santa Cruz along the shore of Laguna de Bay; to make a landing on the west shore of the lake and capture the town of
Calamba."
The expedition consisted of 1,509 troops which were organized into a provisional brigade and placed by Lawton under
the direct command of Brigadier General Charles King. Since
the distance to Santa Cruz by land was sixty miles through
Insurgent-infested territory, and by water some thirty-six miles,
it was decided that the expedition would be transported to Santa
Cruz by boats.
Seventeen cascos, two bancas, eight launches, and the gunboats Laguna de Bay, Ceste, and Napidan were assembled at
San Pedro Macati on the afternoon of April 8, and the troops,
carrying rations and ammunition in their packs, embarked. No
tentage, animals, or wheeled vehicles were taken. At 1600 hours,
manned and piloted entirely by Army personnel, the flotilla cast
off and started up the Pasig River. Because inexperienced pilots
attempted to steer towed craft through the narrow winding
channel, the boats frequently went aground and twelve hours
were consumed reaching the Laguna de Bay, six miles away.
The troops started across the Laguna at 0400 on the 9th. Sailing
was easy and they reached Santa Cruz at 1000 hours.
The gunboats were distributed along the south shore of the
lake and landing operations two miles west of Santa Cruz commenced during the-afternoon of the 9th.
Because of the rough sea many of the men were forced to
wade ashore in water that sometimes reached their shoulders.
The 55-year-old brigade commander suffered a heart attack
while the landing operations were in progress, and his duties
were taken over by General Lawton. By 1700 hours the entire
94




brigade was ashore and formed in line on the beach. A scattering fire from the nearby jungle was silenced by a few volleys
and a brigade wheel to the left facing Santa Cruz was effected.
The brigade bivouacked for the night about two miles from the
town.
During the evening Captain C. C. Walcott, a quartermaster
officer on Lawton's staff, started out with'an orderly to locate
the front line. The two walked blindlythrough a gap between
the 14th Infantry and the Idaho Volunteers, and, guided by a
wily Filipino, were led right into Santa Cruz. They encountered an Insurgent patrol armed with bolos, and after a short
but decisive fight the Insurgents were disarmed and made
prisoners. After an hour of hide and seek with other Insurgent
patrols in the city, Walcott, his orderly, and the Insurgent prisoners were able to regain the American lines.
On the morning of the 10th the brigade stormed a barricade
across the bridge leading into the town, and swept the Insurgents through the town into the open where they came under
an effective fire from the Napidan. Ninety-three Insurgents
were killed and seventy-one captured. About forty-two wounded
Insurgents, who had been carried away by their comrades, were
subsequently found dead in nearby thickets. Six Americans were
wounded.
Except for a few Chinese shopkeepers, Santa Cruz had no inhabitants, and Lawton immediately -took steps to protect the
captured city from burning of buildings and looting. Proclamations were freely distributed in the houses of the city.
At 0600 the following morning the brigade proceeded to the
town of Pagsanjan. After a short fight Lawton's men entered
the town about 0800. Six steam launches and two cascos were
captured. Meanwhile the gunboats were delayed while a dredge
removed a sand bar which was blocking their progress.
Moving via Lubang on April 12, the brigade followed the
northeast shore of the lake and occupied Longos. Early that
afternoon a battalion of North Dakota Volunteers was sent
farther along the shore. They were to reconnoiter the town of
Paete as a possible embarking place for the command upon its
contemplated movement across the lake to Calamba.
During this movement, while marching through the jungle
95




adjoining the road, a flank guard of the North Dakotas was
ambushed; three men were killed and one seriously wounded.
The sole uninjured member of the patrol, Private Thomas
Sletteland, won the Congressional Medal of Honor by remaining with his comrade and "by his cool and unerring aim successfully holding the enemy back until reinforcements came."
Despite the thick'underbrush, the flanking parties were sent
up a 45- to 70-degree hill which adjoined the road and forced
the Insurgents back through Paete.
Short as had been the campaign, Lawton's command was
tired. Since no wheeled transportation had been taken along
the men carried their rations, blankets, shelter tents, ammunition, medical supplies and water.
The gunboats had proved to be a valuable asset. Standing
off shore a short distance they were able to throw retreating Insurgent bodies into a panic by dropping shells in their midst.
Lawton's instructions were based on the idea that he next
cross the lake to Calamba on the southwestern shore. However,
while his troops were in bivouac at Paete for a couple of days'
rest, he received word from Otis to return to Manila immediately.
Five Americans had been killed and 135 Insurgents buried
by Lawton's troops during the "sight-seeing tour" of the lake.
As soon as the expedition returned to Manila on April 17, Santa
Cruz, Pagsanjan, Longos and Paete were reoccupied by the Insurgents. If viewed merely as a reconnaissance, the expedition
was worthwhile; otherwise, the sole fruits were the capture of a
few Insurgent water craft.
The next episode of the war was an exchange of proclamations. Two civilian members of the First Philippine Commission
had arrived in Manilaon March 4. This body had been appointed by President McKinley during January 1899 for the
purpose of "ascertaining without interfering with the military
authorities what amelioration of the condition of the inhabitants
of the Philippines could be accomplished and what improvements in public order were practicable." The Commission was
to study attentively the existing social and political conditions
in the Islands, particularly the forms of local government, ad96




ministration of justice, collection of customs, taxes, means of
communication, and need of public improvements, and report
the results of its observations with such recommendations as
it cared to make to the President through the Department of
State.
The Commission consisted of Jacob Gould Schurman, President of Cornell University, as Chairman, Charles Denby, who
had served as the United States Minister to China for fourteen
years, Dean C. Worcester, Professor of Zoology at the University of Michigan, who in 1890 had headed a Zoological expedition to the Philippines, General Otis, and Admiral Dewey. Hostilities had broken out before the Commission assembled at
Manila, so at the outset its field of activities was limited.
On April 4 "It became convinced that the Tagalog rebellion
was due to the ambitions of a few and the misunderstanding
of the many." Consequently, the Commission issued a proclamation which enunciated the beneficial aims of the United States
towards the Filipinos, and set forth several principles by which
the United States would be guided in dealing with them. It
commenced with the statement: "The supremacy of the United
States must and will be enforced throughout every part of the
Archipelago and those who resist it can accomplish no end other
than their own ruin." It promised "most ample liberty of self
government;" religious freedom; prevention of exploitation; an
honest civil service; a sound, economical tax system; a pure,
speedy, and effective administration of justice; the promotion of
an advantageous public works program; the fostering of domestic and foreign trade; the establishment of a modern educational
system; and reform in all branches of the government.
As was customary, the proclamation was printed in English,
Spanish, and Tagalog; and copies were posted in prominent
places throughout Manila. Within twenty-four hours, the majority of the copies were torn or mutilated. It was even reported
that Insurgent leaders had forbidden Filipinos to read the document upon penalty of death. However, judging from the response that the proclamation received from some of the more
educated and conservative Filipinos, it was beneficial as a whole,
though apparently it made little impression on the Insurgents.
On April 15 Mabini, "In behalf of the Philippine Government,"
97




issued a manifesto which 'showed no intention of giving credence
to the beneficent aims of the Americans. In referring to the
Proclamation, Mabini said:
The American Commissioners who to inspire greater confidence have not
hesitated to have recourse to falsehood, shamelessly asserting that my government by not having understood the good will and fraternal sentiments
of their ambitious president, has provoked war when everybody is aware
that President McKinley had to decree war in order to force the American
Senators of the opposition to ratify the cessation of the Philippines stipulated in the treaty of Paris.
If the North American people is great and powerful, far greater and
more powerful is Providence which watches over the unfortunate and
chastises and humbles the proud. Thus if we should lay down our arms,
swe should leave our sons without liberty and without the means of retrieving our fortune and moreover we should bequeath to them all the penalties and sufferings of a conflict which of necessity they would have to
face today if we do not release them from this task.
Open your eyes, my dear countrymen, while there is yet time. Fight
without truce or respite, without faltering or desponding, without measuring the duration of the conflict, the forces of the enemy or the greatness
of the sacrifices. Annexation in whatever form it may be adopted will unite
us forever with a nation whose manners and customs are different from our
own. a nation which hates the colored race with a moral hatred, and from
which we could never separate ourselves except by war.
It matters not whether we die in the midst or at the end of our most
painful day's work; the generations to come, praying over our tombs will
shed for us tears of love and gratitude and not of bitter reproach.
Otis decided that the most effective proclamation was the bark
of a Krag-J6rgensen rifle.
North of Manila the Insurgents were becoming bold again.
On the night of April 11 a determined attack under the personal
command of Aguinaldo was made on the railroad line between
Bocaue and Marilao. Upon the small detachment guarding the
line calling for help, Wheaton, with the armored train loaded
with troops, moved along the railroad line and drove the Insurgents off. The principal damage had been the destruction of
four miles of telegraph line. The following morning a "punitive
expedition" was sent to Santa Maria, three miles east of Bocaue;
and, although they did not realize it, the Americans nearly
captured the Insurgent President.
On April 13th the Insurgents attacked an outpost occupied
98




by the 3rd Artillery at Paomban, a barrio east of Malolos. Two
Americans were killed, five wounded, and one captured before
the marauders were driven off. It became evident that if the
Americans did not take the offensive their losses on small outpost attacks would be disconcertingly high.
The total strength of the American forces in the Philippines
at this time was 26,003 officers and men. Of this number 5,000
were at Cavite or in the Visayan Islands; 836 were members of
noncombatant branches; 2,739 were sick or in confinement;
some 1,500 were on special duty or performing civil functions.
The available fighting force then numbered about 16,500. Volunteer organizations which had enlisted for the duration of the
war with Spain were beginning to clamor for discharge and
return to the United States. If Otis was to use these volunteer
troops, he would have to do it quickly; so an advance was decided upon before the rainy season set in.
Thirty miles northeast of Manila lies the southern tip of the
large Candaba swamp, which is impassable during the rainy
season. It is roughly triangular in shape and extends north
about twenty miles to the boundiry between Pampanga and
Nueva Ecija. In its widest place it traverses about ten miles, its
eastern borders roughly following the boundary between Pampanga and Bulacan. The important strategic town of Calumpit
is on its southern tip. At Calumpit the large Rio Grande of
Pampanga, which follows the western edge of the swamp in an
almost north arrnd south direction, turns southwest and empties
into Manila Bay about thirteen miles distant. Any force advancing along the Manila-Dagupan Railway had to cross the Rio
Grande de Pampanga. The railroad itself ran through Calumpit.
It was not known exactly whether Luna and his men had retreated along the railroad due east of Malolos, or whether they
had cut back to the northeast. The fact that the majority of the
Filipinos spoke no English and were either symrpathetic with
the Insurgent cause or feared to divulge information, made it
particularly difficult to trace his movements. In order to contact
Luna's army, whichever route it had taken, Otis decided to send
two expeditions north. One under Lawton was to move through
the Tagalog pro'vinces of Nueva Ecija and Bulacan, while the
other under MacArthur was to move north along the railroad
99                     V.
*.~~




into the province of Pampanga. As a matter of fact Luna's army
had actually retired north along the railroad line, while the Insurgent government had moved to the northeast and set up a
new capital at San Miguel de Mayumo. The plans did not materialize because MacArthur was unable to advance as rapidly as
had been anticipated.
The movement of Lawton's division north was a perfect example of another wasteful "sight-seeing expedition" hampered
by fussy interference from Otis.
Lawton assembled his force at La Loma Church on the outskirts of Manila. His immediate purpose was to be almost due
east of Malolos by April 24, the date MacArthur's column was
to move on Calumpit.
Lawton's column, which was designated as the 1st Division
of the VIII Army Corps, was composed of the following troops:
22nd Infantry.
1st North Dakota Volunteers.
1 squadron of the 4th Cavalry (dismounted).
2 battalions of the 3rd Infantry.
6 mountain and 2 field guns from Battery D of the 6th Artillery.
Two battalions of the 2nd Oregon Volunteers, two battalions
of the 13th Minnesota Volunteers, and a troop of the 4th Cavalry
in bivouac near Bocaue, were detached from the 2nd Division
with instructions to march from Bocaue on the 23rd and effect
a junction with Lawton's column at Norzagaray on the 25th.
Lawton's division left La Loma Church on the 22nd, marching on Novaliches, ten miles northeast. Minor Insurgent opposition was brushed aside and the troops marched into Novaliches
at 1000 the same morning. The greatest problem of the march
had been the difficulty in getting the trains over the Tuliahan
'River, which was not bridged and had steep approaches to its
rocky banks. Novaliches was abandoned. Its inhabitants had
taken with them all property of value. That night the American
troops slept in deserted nipa huts.
Leaving Novaliches the following day, the command moved
on San Jose about six miles north. The road now became a mere
footpath and great trouble was encountered moving the wagon
train over a succession of hills and deep valleys. No enemy was
100




met; but the difficulties of the road, combined with the intense
heat slowed progress to such an extent that it took the column
from 0500 in the morning until 1530 in the afternoon to reach
the Sapangalat River, four and a half miles north of Novaliches.
The whole next day was spent getting the column into San
Jose. The animals of the wagon trains were subjected to such'
heavy draft that many died in their traces, and the soldiers xwere
forced to take their places, pulling the wagons and carts in some
places and literally carrying them along the road in others. The
mounted troops of cavalry accompanying the detachment from
Bocaue had arrived in Norzagaray the same day, and then
moved south of San Jose where they established contact with the
main body. Having taken two full days to cover six miles, the
wagon train did not reach San Jose until late that night.
The following day the advance guard of the main column
reached Norzagaray, eight and a half miles north, and joined
there the Oregon and Minnesota Volunteers who had marched
from Bocaue. Colonel Owen Summers, in command of that
column, reported that he had been forced to drive the Insurgents out 6f Norzagaray before his column was able to enter.
The united division now had a strength of 116 officers and
4,473 men. The troops of the Bocaue column were formed into
a "provisional brigade" and placed under the command of
Colonel Summers.
Norzagaray is situated on the Quingua River which winds
to the east at this point. On the 25th a reconnoitering force occupied the town of Angat, two miles east. On the 27th the remainder of the division moved into Angat, its advance elements
continuing along the river as far as Marungco in an effort to
locate a road to the north. No road worthy of the name could be
found, so on the 29th the march was continued along the
Quingua River towards San Rafael. There a. force of 300 entrenched Insurgents were brushed aside and the town occupied.
Meanwhile the Signal Corps had established telegraphic communication between Angat and Manila. Otis thought Lawton
was moving too fast for his supplies; on the 29th he directed
him to return to Angat until more supplies could be moved to
that place. Lawton was forced to withdraw his troops at San
Rafael afid retire to Angat where the division remained for
101




three days. Then on May 1, having been authorized by Otis to
move out with Baliuag as an objective, the division retraced its
steps down the Quingua River.
While at Angat waiting for "permission" to advance, Lawton
had organized a company of scouts, recruited from picked riflemen of all organizations. They were placed under the command
of W. H. Young, an American ex-frontiersman and prospector
who had found his way to the Philippines. Despite the fact that
he was a civilian, Young proved his capabilities and justified the
confidence which Lawton had placed in him. Always in front of
the main column, the scouts bore the brunt of the advance, reconnoitering and maintaining contact with the enemy. Their
work was so fearless and effective that many of them were rewarded with the Congressional Medal of Honor.
As the division, moving along the river, -pproached San
Rafael on May 1, opposition was offered by some 1,000 Insurgents who had occupied the town after Lawton's withdrawal.
A flanking movement by the provisional brigade forced them
back, and to the west of the town.
On May 2 the division continued the march towards Baliuag,
four miles distant. After a short fight at Bustos the Americans
entered Baliuag at noon, announcing their arrival by ringing
the Cathedral bells. Though large numbers of Insurgents followed by native civilians had been seen wildly fleeing north, any
pursuit was precluded by the extreme heat which had caused
more casualties than Insurgent bullets.
Located near the southern tip of Candaba Swamp, Baliuag
was at the junction of seven roads. It was about seven miles from
Quingua instead of the roundabout route through Bocaue and
Norzagaray.
In Baliuag Lawton seized some 150,000 bushels of rice and
265 tons of sugar which the Insurgents had confiscated from
the natives and assembled there. These supplies were issued to
the native civilians of Baliuag, who were now returning to the
town in large numbers. Lawton also authorized the installation
of the first Filipino government in the Philippines under the
jurisdiction of the United States. The plan is best explained by
quoting the following division order:
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General Field Orders        Hdqrs. 1st Division, VIII Army Corps
No. 8                      in the Field, Baliuag, May 7, 1899
For! the purpose of official and just representation of the inhabitants of
this town with the Military authorities, as well as for temporary convenience
in restoring and maintaining order among the former, the citizens were
authorized to meet and elect a mayor, (Captain Municipal). The result of
such meeting has been the election of Senor Francisco Guerrero, who is
therefore announced as Mayor and authorized to select a council and such
other assistants or officers as may be necessary to properly administer municipal affairs. He will be accordingly respected and obeyed.
The United States will in no way be held accountable or responsible for
any salaries or compensation.
By Command of Major General Lawton.
CLARENCE R. EDWARDS
Assistant Adjutant General.
As long as the Insurgent army was retreating and unable to
influence the Filipinos living in the various barrios, the American-sponsored, native-ruled municipal regime worked well.
However, after the Insurgent army was broken up the Insurgent
soldiers returned to their homes, and were able to stir up discontent and trouble among more peaceably inclined inhabitants.
At any rate, having established a local government in a fairly
prominent Filipino town, Lawton was able to lay plans for further advance north.
A fairly good dry-weather road ran north from Baliuag to
San Miguel, fourteen miles away. Since the swamp prevented
movement of troops northwest, it was apparent that the iemnants of the Insurgent division which had opposed Lawton's
advance had escaped to the northeast.
On May 2nd Otis wired Lawton:
Remain at Baliuag watching San Miguel road until you receive rations
via Malolos. Enemy now concentrating supplies in large storehouses some
five miles east of Maasin on Maasin River, northeast of you. Look in that
direction; main force there.
Lawton replied on May 3:
I will send men to look up enemy constructing storehouses as indicated
in yours of last evening. I find enemy's strength always exaggerated. They
have offered no determined or effective resistance. Are greatly demoralized
and are breaking into small parties and disintegrating. With a squadron
103




of mounted men i could have destroyed the whole outfit from here yesterday, but our men on foot cannot stand the extra exertion in this awful
heat. Those who suffered sunstroke yesterday fell as though shot. The
mounted troop did excellent work but could make but slow progress because very small ldetachments of enemy's rear guard could catch them. It
has rained nearly every day and the country off the roads is impracticable
for vehicles.
In accordance with Otis' telegram the provisional brigade
moved north on May 3 towards the town of Maasin. A force of
about four hundred Insurgents entrenched on the north side of
the Maasin River was driven out and Maasin occupied. The
scouts were then sent to the north and northeast to locate any
Insurgent supplies, and, if possible, the "storehouses" which
Otis had mentioned in his telegram.
On May 6 the advance was again delayed from Manila. Otis
wired Lawton that 5,000 Insurgents under Generals Pio del
Pilar and Geronimo were reported proceeding from the towns
of San Mateo and Antipolo with the intent of attacking him in
flank and rear. Movement north was to be halted until the truth
or falsity of this rumor was verified. Annoyed, Lawton sent reconnoitering parties back as far as San Jose but they found no
traces of the enemy.
The search for the phantom army of Pilar continued until the
12th. Then, convinced that the rumor was false, Otis authorized
reconnaissance towards San Miguel, seven miles north. The
reconnaissance party, consisting of a mapping detail and a few
scouts, protected by two companies of the Oregon Volunteers,
gained contact with the enemy at San Ildefonso. A sharp fight
ensued and the Insurgents were driven out of the town towards
San Miguel.
The following day, led by the scouts, the reconnaissance party
pressed its advantage. About one mile south of San Miguel it
was met by volleys from an Insurgent band of approximately
three hundred. Led by Captain William E. Birkhimer and W.
H. Young, the group of eleven scouts charged the Insurgents
without hesitation and drove them into San Miguel. In this
charge Mr. Young was mortally wounded. The small band then
entered San Miguel and drove the few remaining Insurgents
northeast towards San Isidro and east towards Biac-Na-Bato.
104




The entire reconnaissance force was posted at San Miguel to
hold it until the remainder of the division could be brought up.
Captain Birkhimer and the eleven scouts received the Congressional Medal of Honor.
It appeared that the Insurgent morale was rapidly degenerating and that the Insurgent troops under General Gregorio del
Pilar, who had been opposing Lawton's advance, were becoming demoralized.
Meanwhile, the strategic town of Calumpit having been taken
by MacArthur's division, Otis dispatched the 17th Infanrry and
one battalion of the 9th-up the Rio Grande with instruction to
unite with Lawton at San Miguel or San Isidro. This expedition
was accompanied by two gunboats which pulled cascos loaded
with rations. Shallow water and obstructions placed in the river
prevented the steady movement of the column so that it did not
reach either of its objectives.
Despite the fact that detachments held San Miguel, fourteen
miles north, the slow, cautious advance ordered by Otis kept
Lawton's headquarters at Baliuag.
On May 15, Waving received permission to move, Lawton left
one battalion to garrison Baliuag and the entire division moved
forward and occupied San Miguel.
Otis then named San Isidro, capital of Nueva Ecija Province,
as the next objective of the expedition. Upon evacuation of
Malolos, Aguinaldo had designated San Isidro the Insurgent
"National Capital." Also, information had been received that an
ammunition factory was located there.
The provisional brigade under Colonel Summers moved
north on the 16th and occupied San Roque without incident.
A group of scouts reconnoitering for water discovered a small
wooden bridge in flames over an unfordable river just south of
San Isidro. Realizing its value they rushed it and, despite an
enfilading fire from six hundred entrenched Insurgents on the
north bank, extinguished the flames, and drove the Insurgents
out. Following their advantage the scouts pushed the Insurgents
back into the outskirts of San Isidro.
On the following morning the Americans entered San Isidro
without opposition. Although the delay caused by the Insurgents was negligible the average rate of advance had been little
105




more than two miles a day; and the division had consumed
twenty-seven days in covering about fifty-eight miles.
At San Isidro the Americans got their first definite information as to how their comrades who had been captured by the
Insurgents were being treated. An aged Spaniard brought the
following letter to Lawton's Headquarters:
San Isidro, May, 1899
Commander of the United States Army:
Sir: Through the kindness of the bearer, Sefior Ramon Rey, we, fourteen
prisoners held by the Philippine Government are enabled to send word
through the lines and notify you of our presence here. The following is a
list of our names: Lieutent J. C. Gillmore, USN; W. Walton, Chief QM;
P. Vandvit, J. Ellsworth, L. Edwards, S. Brisolose, A. Peterson, F. Anderson,
USS Yorktown captured at Baler April 12, 1899; W. Bruce, E. Honeyman,
Nevada Cavalry captured January 30, 1899; H. Huber, Hospital Corps; J.
O'Brien, civilian; A. Sonnichsen, civilian captured January 27, 1899.
We are about to march northward. Where, we do not know. Up to
Lieutenant Gillmore's arrival we have been treated in a most barbaric
manner, starved, beaten, bound, but since the advance of the Americantroops, our treatment has been a trifle better. We have been living on five
cents a day and most of us nearly naked. The Spaniards have been treated
even worse than we, being tortured in the stocks and starved. Some hundreds are dying of dysentery and various other diseases, but whether incapable or not caring the government does nothing for them. The bearer,
Sefior Ramon Rey, has been a true friend to us; in fact, had it not been
for him and his countrymen we probably should have been starved to death
on the retreat from Malolos. He is therefore entitled to the best consideration of every American.
Very respectfully
"ALBERT SONNICHEN
Formerly Quartermaster, SS. Zelandia.
The writer of the above letter was captured by the Insurgents
while visiting within their lines around Manila. He was held by
the Filipinos for ten months before the advance of the American
troops in northern Luzon enabled him to escape.
The capture of the naval officer, Lieutenant J. C. Gillmore,
and seven sailors merits more space.
On the northeastern coast of Luzon, practically inaccessible
from Manila by land, stood the town of Baler. The lofty Sierra
Madre Mountains to its immediate west made steamer travel
the only feasible means of communication between Baler and
the outer world.
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During the Spanish regime the garrison at the place was
normally a handful of soldiers. At the beginning of Aguinaldo's
insurrection in 1898, the native populace of the town attacked
the garrison and forced it to take refuge in the small, but substantially built, town church. There, largely through the perseverance of its commander, a young Spanish second lieutenant
named Don Saturnino Martin Cerezo, this handful of Spaniards
withstood determined attacks from the Insurgents for three
hundred thirty-seven days. Sustaining themselves with water
from a well dug-in the churchyard and eating sparingly of
their meager rations, the beleaguered garrison steadfastly refused to surrender.
After the Spanish-American War had ended the Insurgents
attempted to obtain the surrender by telling Cerezo that Spain
had ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. He did
not believe them and from then on refused to parley. Occasionally his men were able, under cover of darkness, to make a quick
foray into the surrounding jungle and obtain a few green leaves
which. they used for food. In an attempt to overcome the numerous cases of beriberi, the soldiers grew a few green. vegetables
in the churchyard behind a wall. Two soldiers who attempted
to desert were tried by Cerezo and shot within the church walls.
As the Spanish troops were evacuating the Islands, a lieutenant
colonel was sent to Baler in an effort to convince Cerezo that,
as far as Spain was concerned, the war was over and to direct
him to surrender and return to Spain with his comrades. Cerezo
believed the officer an impostor or traitor and refused to discuss
the matter with him. He was convinced that Manila newspapers,
which were thrown into the church and which explained the
true state of affairs in the Islands, were spurious imitations the
Insurgents had specially printed to deceive him.
The story of this amazing defense of a lost cause had permeated throughout the Islands and had become legendary even
while the garrison was still holding out. Aguinaldo sent one of
his most capable officers, General Manuel Tinio, with a modern
field gun to take the church. The Spaniards poured out such a
devastating fire that the Insurgents manning the gun could not
aim, and Tinio advised Aguinaldo that the church could not be
taken by assault with the artillery the Insurgents then had.
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In April 1899 the Americans decided to attempt the relief of
this brave garrison. The USS Yorktown was sent to Baler and
anchored off the coast. Lieutenant Gillmore and seventeen bluejackets were sent in a small boat up the river on which the town
was situated to communicate with Cerezo. There they were
ambushed by the Insurgents and suffered nine casualties. Their
oars were shattered, and the boat drifted ashore where the survivors were captured and taken to San Isidro.
Cerezo continued to hold the church though its wooden roof
was riddled by bullets. Finally on June 6, his supplies utterly
exhausted, he and thirty-three survivors surrendered only after
the Insurgents had promised to give them their liberty. After an
overland journey full of vicissitudes the valiant band reached
Manila. Upon its return to Spain the survivors were showered
with honors by the Spanish Government.
Returning to Lawton and the American forces at San Isidro,
indications were that the Insurgent government and the rank
and file were becoming discouraged. Two residents of San
Isidro, who had been members of the Philippine Insurgent
Congress, reported that the Insurgent President had left San
Isidro on the 15th and had moved to Cabanatuan, fifteen miles
north. It also looked as if the Philippine Congress had met and
voted for peace with the Americans under the provisions of
the plan outlined by the proclamation of the Schurman Commission. Lawton's advance on San Isidro had caused the rather
precipitate adjournment of Congress. However, these particular
members felt that at any time the Insurgent Government would
make representations to the Americans concerning peace and
the establishment of American sovereignty. Otis had attempted
to ease the road to peace by authorizing the payment of $30.00
for every Insurgent rifle turned in to the American troops. But
the response was not particularly encouraging.
By this time MacArthur had pushed Luna's army back along
the railway to San Fernando. From San Isidro Lawton could
have effectively struck this army in flank. However, as Otis reported: "The rainy season had now come and the volunteer
organizations must be hastened homeward. Occupation of Tarlac by Lawton would be seriously complicated by the difficulties
of supply. We must keep what we had gained and could do that
108




by establishing a line from San Fernando on the left and
Baliuag on the right, from which it would be easy to resume
operations. Lawton was recalled and a sufficient force placed at
Calumpit and Baliuag to hold the country in rear."
At San Isidro the division was then about fourteen miles
north of the northern tip of the Candaba Swamp and on the
Rio Grande de Pampanga. On the afternoon of May 18th the
return journey began. Lawton entered Cabiao on the 19th and
Arayat on the 20th. At Arayat a junction was effected with
Kobbe's "gunboat expedition." On the 21st the march was continued to Candaba where the division was disbanded. Lawton's
division had marched about eighty miles and made a complete
circuit of the Candaba Swamp.
In this campaign the Americans received a forceful intimation of the devastating effects of a tropical climate on the health
of troops operating in the field. There were in Lawton's division,
during the circuit of the Candaba Swamp, a total of 515 casualties. Of these only 9 were killed and 35 wounded by Insurgent
bullets. Nearly forty per cent or 187 of the casualties were caused
by dysentery or diarrhea;aover twenty per cent, or 108 were
caused by malaria. Mosquito bars had not become an article of
issue, and a soldier sleeping in the open had absolutely no protection against the bite of the anopheles mosquito. There were
37 cases of heat exhaustion. and 26 cases of "sore feet."
Among the regiments the lowest percentage of casualties was
in the 1st North Dakota Volunteers. Despite the fact that they
were actively engaged throughout the campaign and the scouts
were largely drawn from their ranks, only 51 casualties occurred
in this regiment. One medical officer attributed the low sickness
rate to the fact that the regiment never missed a meal and never
had one served more than an hour late. Every company carried
coffee boilers, other cooking utensils, and two days' rations
on small pony carts which were kept concealed within their
column.
Upon his return to Manila, Lawton called upon Otis and told
him that if the latter would furnish him with two regiments,
would allow him to arm, equip, and provision them to suit himself, and would turn him loose, he would stake his reputation
as a soldier and his position in the United States Army on the
109




claim that within sixty days he would end the Insurrection and
would deliver to General Otis one Emilio Aguinaldo, dead or
alive. Otis laughed at him. Very possibly Lawton was optimistic
in the matter, but later events proved it was an overcautious
move to withdraw garrisons from San Isidro and the towns between there and Baliuag. With Lawton's expedition disbanded,
we can now turn to General MacArthur's second division and
follow it through its movement north from Malolos.
About five miles north of Malolos the Bagbag, Quingua and
Calumpit Rivers merge. Two miles north of this confluence
flows the large Rio Grande de Pampanga. East of the area was
the impassable Candaba Swamp. To the west was a maze of
small rivers, estuaries, and arroyos running into Manila Bay
which made operations in that quarter highly unfeasible. MacArthur's division, advancing against the main Insurgent army
under Luna, would be forced to cross at least two of these four
rivers. Thus Luna occupied an almost ideal defensive position:
a double line of rivers and both flanks protected. The nature
of the terrain also made it impracticable for the American
troops to leave the railroad or main roads for any distance to
attempt flanking movements. If the division was to advance to
the north it would have to make a frontal attack on Luna's
army.
Planning the attack to the north in conjunction with Lawton's
advance fifteen miles east, MacArthur believed that firt resistance would be encountered along the north bank of the Bagbag
and Quingua Rivers. He thought a second line was along the
north bank of the Rio Grande.
For that movement MacArthur's division was divided into
two brigades, as follows:
1st Brigade (General Wheaton).
20th Kansas Volunteers.
1st Montana Volunteers.
1 battalion 51st Iowa Volunteers.
1 squadron 4th Cavalry.
3 guns Utah Artillery.
The "armored" train.
2nd Brigade (General Hale).
1st Nebraska Volunteers.
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1st South-Dakota Volunteers.
2 battalions of the 51st Iowa Volunteers.
2 field guns, 6th Artillery.
The 3rd Artillery was directed to remain at Malo1os and
guard the line of supplies.
The 1st Brigade was assigned the mission of advancing up
the railroad and forcing the Bagbag at the point where the
railroad crossed. The 2d Brigade was to cross the Quingua River
near Pulilan, then swing to the left and enter Calumpit from
the east.
It was originally planned for the movement to start on April
24. However, early on the morning of April 23 a troop of the
4th Cavalry reconnoitering towards Quingua became involved
with the Insurgents. Successive reinforcements, including the
Nebraska and Iowa regiments, built up a firing line of considerable proportions. In a charge which captured the town,
Colonel Stotsenburg of the Nebraska Volunteers was killed. He
had brought his regiment to the Philippines and was popular
with his men. One member described him as the type who,
when an attack was being launched, shouted, "Come on boys;
I'm going" instead of '"'Go on boys; I'm coming." A monument
was erected on the spot where he fell, a'nd Fort Stotsenburg, one
of the larger Army posts in the Philippines, was named in his
honor.
The following morning the brigade forded the Quingua River
under fire. Swinging to the left it swept through Pulilan and
moved along'the wagon road towards Calumpit. Insurgent barricades along the road slowed the advance, and- the brigade was
forced to bivouac for the night about two miles west of Pulilan.
The 1st Brigade remained in the vicinity of Malolos until the
25th. It then advanced along the railroad, encountering no opposition until it reached the Bagbag River. The 1st Brigade
arrived at the junction of the three rivers about the same time
that the 2nd Brigade, advancing from Pulilan, came under fire
from the Insurgent trenches on the west bank of the Calumpit
River. Both Brigades were deployed at right angles to each
other, and each found itself opposed by fire from the Insurgents
entrenched on the opposite bank of the two rivers.
At this point the rivers merged at nearly right angles. The
111




Insurgents entrenched on the inside of the angle found themselves enfiladed from two directions. The 20th Kansas Volunteers, led by their regimental commander, Colonel Funston,
were able by wading and swimming to cross the Bagbag. A
company of Nebraskans swinging well out into the Quingua
River, forded it; and advanced to Calumpit, a town of 16,000
inhabitants located on the south bank of the Rio Grande.
Reconnaissance of Calumpit led to the belief that it was untenable unless the Insurgent forces entrenched on the north
bank were defeated.
The Rio Grande de Pampanga at this point was a deep stream
about eighty yards wide with a five-mile current. Luna's troops
had carefully removed all boats. With'the absence of a ponton
train the only apparent means of crossing was by the partially
dismantled railroad bridge. On the north bank of the river on
both sides of the bridge were about 6,000 Insurgents securely
protected in thickly embrasured entrenchments.
The manner in which the crossing was forced was in General
MacArthur's words "a remarkable military achievement well
calculated to fix the attention of the most careless observer and
to stimulate the fancy of the most indifferent." Indeed the crossing was probably unique in the annals of military operations of
all time.
Credit for the feat must be given to Colonel Funston who
conceived the plan and executed it. Colonel Funston describes
the operation in his official report:
When darkness came (on the 26th), I asked Corporal A. M. Ferguson
of Company F, who has on numerous occasions shown himself to be a
fearless and reliable man, if he would be willing to attempt a reconnaissance
of the railroad bridge, telling him that the work was so hazardous that I
would not order him to undertake it. He consented to go at once. Under
the cover of darkness, Captain Flanders of Company I and myself accompanied him to the end of the bridge Ferguson took off his shoes and
armed only with a revolver crawled along through the network of iron
braces underneath where the floor had been and then inch by inch worked
his way, hand over hand until he was underneath the Insurgent outposts
stationed on the other end of the bridge and returned with a complete
description of the bridge which was afterwards verified in every particular. He was gone two hours. A single misstep would have meant 2 fall of
forty feet into the river, while the chances were greatly in favor of discovery by the enemy which would have meant certain death or capture. He re112




ported that all of the ties, rail and planks were gone from the bridge and
at its further end all but one of its steel girders. This utterly precluded a
plan that I had for carrying the bridge by assault.
During the night I took a force of 120 men, a mile down the river with
the intention of attempting a crossing by means of rafts, but we were discovered and fired upon and so returncd to camp at one o'clock in the
morning. The next day., the 27th at noon, I determined to make an attempt to force a passage about 600 yards below the railroad bridge.
A hundred picked riflemen were posted with instructions to cover the
enemy's trenches on the opposite bank so that they would not be able to
interfere with our operations. A raft which the enemy had unsuccessfully
attempted to burn was moored on our side of the river. A rope 300 feet
long had been obtained and it was necessary to get this fastened on the
opposite bank before operations could proceed further. A dozen men volunteered to swim the river although they would be under fire... I selected Privates Edward White and W. B. Trembly of Company B. These
men, naked and unarmed, swam the river with the end of the rope, although fired upon repeatedly and landed within twenty feet of a small
work containing several of the enemy who did not run out until the men
actually crawled up on all fours and tied the rope to one of the uprights
on the trench, whereupon three armed Filipinos ran out. I got on the raft
with eight men and we hauled ourselves over by hand. The raft was at
once returned and made several trips. As soon as I had three officers and
forty-one enlisted men, I attacked the enemy's strong entrenchments at the
end of the bridge in flank. After a sharp fight in which the enemy turned
a Maxim gun on us, they fled in disorder, abandoning the most elaborate
fortifications I have seen in this war, with a rifled bronze howitzer, numerous Mauser and Remington rifles and thousands of rounds of ammunition which were found scattered everywhere.
Shortly thereafter the remainder of the division scrambled
across the bridge or crossed on improvised rafts. The crossing
had been accomplished without a casualty. In his memoirs,
written thirteen years later, Colonel Funston states that when
White and Trembly reached the opposite bank of the river,
they threw mud balls into the Insurgent trench and the few who
remained fled. White and Trembly were awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for the exploit. Colonel Funston was not
only awarded the Congressional Medal but was promoted to the
grade of brigadier general of Volunteers.
General Funston was, from a Regular Army officer's standpoint, the perfect paradox of the war. As an adventurous youth
of twenty-six he had accompanied a botanical expedition into
California's Death Valley. Two years later he went to Alaska
113




and floated down the Yukon River in a canoe, alone. In 1896
he accompanied a filibustering expedition to Cuba and fought
against Spain. Wounded and a victim of malaria he returned
to the United States in 1898. When the 20th Kansas Volunteers
were organized that year, the Governor of Kansas appointed this
man of thirty-three, who had experienced a total of eighteen
months' pseudo military service, colonel of the regiment. Of
diminutive height, he was absolutely fearless in regard to his
personal safety. A most capable, practical soldier, his ability and
exploits soon made him sought by division commanders.
Few words of praise can be spoken for the Insurgents in their
defense of a virtually impregnable position. If one Insurgent in
the vicinity of the point where White and Trembly had crossed
had had the courage to put his head above the trench and shoot
the two Americans, the whole plan would have failed. Even a
well-aimed stone could have incapacitated the naked, unarmed,
and well-nigh exhausted swimmers as they stood alone on the
river bank within pistol shot of the Insurgent trenches.
On April 29, two days after the capture of Calumpit, the Insurgent Government at San Isidro sued for. a fifteen-day armistice in order "to justify itself before the people as having employed all the means in its power to avoid the ruin of the country" and to "offer the Schurman Commission a means of putting
an end to the war in the manner most honorable to the American Army." Otis agreed to permit an Insurgent delegation to
go to Manila and appear before the Philippine Commission, but
refused an armistice. In this refusal he was justified because, as
later events proved, the Insurgent "die-hards" desired the armistice merely for the purpose of gaining time for their arsenals to
produce sufficient cartridges to continue the war. An Insurgent
representative, Colonel Arguelles, actually did go to Manila to
confer with the Commission. While there he was permitted to
visit the wounded Insurgent prisoners hospitalized by the
Americans, and returned to the Insurgent lines definitely "proAmerican." Owing to his importunities, at the next meeting of
the Insurgent Congress at San Isidro the anti-American group
led by Mabini fell from power; and the Congress definitely resolved to change the policy of the war with the United States
to one of peace.
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A new commission was organized to go to Manila and treat
further with the Americans. Enroute on May 18, it was intercepted by Luna, who, by force, arrested the pro-American members and substituted three others of his own choice.
This "packed" commission passed through Lawton's lines
en route to Manila. Aware of the situation he wired Otis on
May 18:
I find that the former commission named by General Aguinaldo to treat
for peace has been dissolved by General Luna. The latter arrested Buencamino and Arguelles in Cabanatuan and has this afternoon sent them
to Talavera. Luna evidently desires to be dictator and has the greater part
of the Army [5,000 or 6,000 men] under his influence. Aguinaldo fears
Luna and is only nominally in power. The present commission bears no
more power than a request for a suspension of hostilities for a short time
to call an assembly of the congress for further action and this proposition
is from General Luna.
Luna's delegation was received by Otis who informed it that
the cessation of hostilities depended entirely upon the surrender_ ---
of arms and the disbandment of their military organizations.
It then appeared before the Schurman Commission and after
discussing American and Filipino aspirations left Manila, promising to return within three weeks. It never returned.
The second division stayed in the vicinity of Calumpit a
week for the purpose of allowing the men to rest and to permit
the supply trains to catch up. Then on May 4 the advance to
the North was continued. The 1st Brigade moving along the
railroad, was blocked at the Taong River near the town of Santo
Tomas. The ground adjoining the tracks was swampy; the large -
three-span railroad bridge over the river was partially destroyed;
and the opposite bank held by entrenched Insurgents. The river
was deep and unfordable and presented another serious obstacle
if held in a determined manner.
In the meantime, the Second Brigade had advanced north
along a wagon road. A short distance from Apalit they dispersed an Insurgent working party preparing "traps," which
consisted of a series of conical pits containing sharpened bamboo
stakes hidden by light, earth-covered bamboo mats. Destroying
the traps and continuing on, the brigade reached the Santa
Monica River where Insurgent opposition forced the Nebraska
115 -



Volunteers to deploy in a swamp. Fording the river under fire,
the line pushed on, following the general direction of the road
xvhich converged on the railroad at the Taong River. Forced to
remain in extended order, the brigade advanced through the
swampy ground in waist-deep water, the Nebraskans fording
as many as eleven streams. However, their direction of advance
brought them upon the left flank of the Insurgents who were
holding up the advance of the 1st Brigade on the railroad. At
this threat the entire Insurgent line withdrew, permitting the
First Brigade to cross the River and continue the advance.
At the Santo Tomas railroad station near the barrio of San
Matias, more Insurgents were found strongly entrenched. A
brilliant charge of the Kansans, led by General Wheaton, dislodged them, however; and with Luna wounded, they withdrew
towards San Fernando.
Despite their wet, dirty condition, the morale of the Americans was high as is indicated by a remark of Captain William
Albright of the 20th Kansas Volunteers. May 4 happened to be
this officer's birthday. As he 4vas receiving some instructions
from Colonel Funston for the deployment of his company, an
Insurgent bullet struck Albright in the leg. As he went down
the unfortunate officer remarked to Funston, "Isn't this a hell of
a birthday present?"
The division bivouacked for the night near the Santo Tomas
railroad station. The work for the day had been extremely
arduous. The difficulties of the terrain can only be apparent to
one who has examined it and seen the large number of streams
and the swampy ground over which many of the units were
forced to advance.
The following day scouts reported that the important town
of San Fernando, two miles away, was held by a small force
only. Consequently, two battalions of Iowa Volunteers were dispatched to occupy it. They entered San Fernando without difficulty, driving what few Insurgents they encountered towards
Bacalor. The remainder of the division then moved up and
occupied this resort town.
MacArthur's division had now been intermittently on the go
since February 4. Between the Battle of Manila and the advance
on Malolos, the combat units had been in trenches a short dis116




tance from the Insurgent lines and forced to "sleep on their
arms," so to speak. Following the five days of forced marching
and fighting to Malolos, they had been harassed constantly by
small Insurgent bands who attacked the line of supply. Outposts were harried to the extent that the troops were continually answering 'calls for support. During the advance from
Malolos to San Fernando, the movement over difficult terrain
in the heat of the day further debilitated the already worn out
troops. At San Fernando the division began to go to pieces. A
condition which Civil War veterans called "irritable heart" developed in a large number of the personnel. Hearts became
weak, pulses quickened. The condition resembled typhoid fever
convalescence. Stomachs refused to digest food; men were nervous and jumpy; some could not sleep at night.
The "bullet" casualties in the division for April and May had
amounted to 32 killed and 219 wounded. These figures become
inconsiderable when compared to the casualties from "sickness."
On May 12, a week after San Fernando had been captured, of
the 4,800 combatant troops in the division, 2,160, or forty-five
per cent, were on sick report. In one regiment seventy per cent
were in hospitals at Manila or San Fernando. Of the remaining
thirty per cent in this regiment there were not eight men in
each company able to endure one day's march. Conditions in
other regiments were little better.
Otis minimized the condition to newspaper correspondents
and attributed it to "The great strain attendant upon constant
fighting with lack of needed rest, the indiscriminate consumption of the abundant native fruit, the drinking of unpotable
water and general neglect of person." MacArthur laid the blame
on "The sun, field rations, physical exertion, and abnormal
excitement arising from almost constant exposure to fire action,"
and proposed that: "For prolonged field operations in this climate, a sufficient force must be maintained to afford frequent
relief for the troops at the front. Otherwise the complete collapse
of entire regiments may be expected to follow exposure and exertions such as have attended the movable column of this
division since February 4th."
With half their number on sick report, the Volunteer regi117   -




ments who had enlisted only for the duration of the war with
Spain, reiterated their clamors for discharge and return to the
United States. Otis had received instructions from Washington
to return them as soon as possible. Consequently, he decided
that until more Regular Army regiments arrived from the
United States he would have to suspend operations against the
main Insurgent Army.
About seven miles east of Manila flows the Mariquina River
which follows a general north and south course. It empties into
the Pasig River at the town of Pasig. Farther east of the Mariquina River rises a series of rugged hills which form the Mariquina watershed. Eight miles farther east are the Caraballos
Mountains, a range so wild, rugged, full of tangled undergrowth, and devoid of roads that military operations in them
are virtually impossible.
The towns of Cainta and Taytay are twelve miles southeast
of Manila in the Mariquina Valley. These towns had been captured by General Wheaton's expedition to Pasig in March. Upon
the withdrawal of Wheaton's outposts to Pasig, however, both
had been reoccupied by the Insurgents. Sixteen miles east of
Manila was the town of Antipolo, a hotbed of Insurgent activity. Nearest American force to Antipolo was the water works
guard on the Mariquina River. The Morong Peninsula is southeast of Antipolo and Taytay. The peninsula is eight miles long
and juts into Laguna de Bay. On the northeastern shore of the
peninsula lies the town of Morong.
During the latter part of May it was reported that the native
inhabitants of the Mariquina Valley were suffering heavily on
account of the various crimes committed by the Insurgents in
that area under the nominal command of General Pio del Pilar.
Prior to the Insurrection General Pilar had enjoyed the reputation of being the bandit chief in that section of the country.
Either through fear or because he was one of the few Insurgent
leaders capable of keeping his troops together, Pilar stood high
in Aguinaldo's favor; and the many depredations which the
troops committed on the native citizenry were accomplished in
the name of the Insurgent government. After Wheaton had
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driven the bandit away from Manila and Pasig in March, Pilar
had simply transferred his activities farther east.
Consequently, on June 3 an expedition was organized to
drive the Insurgents out of the Mariquina Valley as far east as
Antipolo and into the Morong Peninsula where, surrounded on
three sides, capture would be inevitable.
This expedition was placed under the command of General
Lawton and consisted of two brigades totaling 2,500 men. One
brigade was to move east from the Mariquina pumping station
and occupy Antipolo. The other was to move east from Pasig
and reoccupy Cainta and Taytay. After the capture of Antipolo
the north group was to swing south and march on Morong,
establishing an east and west line which it was hoped would
prevent the Insurgents from escaping to the north.
The northern column, which was placed under the command
of Brigadier General Robert Hall, consisted of the 2nd Oregon
Volunteers, six companies of the 1st Colorado Volunteers, one
battalion each of the 9th Infantry and 1st Wyoming Volunteers,
a dismounted squadron of the 4th Cavalry, two battalions of
the 4th Infantry and a provisional battery of artillery. The Pasig
brigade was composed of two battalions of the 1st Washington
Volunteers, the 1st North Dakota Volunteers, one battalion of
the 9th Infantry, and one platoon of light artillery. It was
placed under the command of Colonel James Wholly of the lst
Washington Volunteers.
Qn the morning of June 3 Hall's brigade left the pumping
station at 0500, hoping to reach Antipolo, twelve miles away
by 1300 hours. The route followed by the main column, under
the guidance of Filipinos, was due east over the hills and then
by a trail to Antipolo. Soon after leaving the pumping station,
however, the road was found to be so poor that in places it
was impracticable even for foot troops. The onslaught of the
rainy season had caused ravines, which were normally dry, to
become raging streams. Instead of a march, the movement became a series of halts for the construction of small bridges
which would permit the passage of wheeled transportation.
The farther the expedition progressed, the worse the road
* became. Finally one escort wagon which was carrying ammunition had to be abandoned. Shortly thereafter it became evident
119




that the ambulances were in danger of shaking to pieces. Hall
directed that they be returned to the pumping station and join
the column via Pasig. By 1600 in the afternoon, after struggling
in humid air and hot sun for eleven hours, the column had advanced only eight miles. Then as it debouched from a sunken
road, it was attacked by about three hundred Insurgents who
were so placed in the hills as to concentrate their fire from three
directions. Exhausted though they were, the Oregon Volunteers, the 4th Infantry, and the 4th Cavalry squadron attacked
and in an engagement which lasted an hour and a half, drove
the Insurgents towards Antipolo. The American casualties
amounted to 3 killed and 10 wounded. The brigade bivouacked
for the night on the battlefield.
Meanwhile Colonel Wholly's southern column had moved
from Pasig at 1300 the same day, advancing on Cainta. Opposition encountered outside the town was overcome with the
assistance of the fire from gunboats which had been strung
along the Pasig River. The brigade entered Cainta the same
day.
On June 4, virtually devoid of wheeled transportation and
carrying their wounded and dead in litters, Hall's brigade completed the remaining four miles to Antipolo. No Insurgents
appeared to dispute its entry. Some 3,500 rifle cartridges and a
small number of 80mm. shells found in the village church
were thrown down a well. The brigade then marched towards
Taytay, six miles southwest, hoping to meet its trains. Two
miles from Antipolo the brigade met not only its trains but
General Lawton, who directed that it retrace its steps to Antipolo and march on Morong by way of Teresa. The weary
brigade reached Teresa, six miles southeast of Antipolo, at 2030
that night. Insurgent opposition had apparently melted away.
Early that same morning the Washington Volunteer regiment had been withdrawn from Wholly's column at Taytay,
and sent by cascos up the river into Laguna de Bay. Following
the shore of the lake, the regiment reached the Morong Peninsula opposite the town of Morong on the morning of the 4th.
Protected by gunboats, which had accompanied the casco fleet,
the regiment waded ashore; and despite a sharp fire from
Insurgents in Morong, captured the town without a single
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casualty. There the Washingtonians were joined next morning
by Hall's brigade, which had marched from Teresa.
Leaving a squadron of the 4th Cavalry as a garrison in
Morong, Hall's brigade then commenced a circuit of the Peninsula. At Cardona, five miles south, it met the North Dakota
Volunteers who, in opposite direction, had marched around the
Peninsula from Taytay. The North Dakotas continued their
march to Morong for the purpose of strengthening the garrison
there, while Hall's command continued on. Following the only
existing road, it reached Binangonan on the western shore during the afternoon. There it met the remainder of Wholly's
column and the whole group then marched back to the pumping station on the Mariquina River, where the units resumed
their normal duties "on the line."
Unsubstantiated information indicated that Pilar and the
remnants of his force had scattered and escaped to the north
through the Caraballos Mountains and its adjoining hills. If its
purpose had been to coop up Pilar's force in the Morong Peninsula, the expedition had been a failure. However, it did advance
the outpost of American sovereignty in the area southeast of
Manila by nearly twenty miles. In Hall's brigade, although only
3 soldiers were killed and 10 wounded, 84 men became casualties, principally from heat exhaustion.
In the province of Cavite directly south of Manila, the convergence of Manila Bay and Laguna de Bay combine to form
a virtual isthmus. Five miles wide at its narrowest point, it is
in effect, a "bottleneck." The narrow stretch extends about
seven miles south of the city after which the bay and lake recede from each other. Otis had long hesitated to attack the
Insurgents in this area. It was here that the staunchest resistance
to the American attack had been effected during the battle of
Manila in February. East of the main road which ran south
from the city, the terrain was a maze of bamboo thickets and
swamps; and in other places was overgrown with thick, waisthigh, rank weeds called cogon grass. The whole area was wild
and inhospitable and known to the natives as "El Desierto."
In the Battle of Manila the previous February, the -Insurgents
had been pushed back along the road to a line running east
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through the barrio of Pasay, but had thereafter been left unmolested. Farther around the bay, isolated by land from Manila,
two regiments still garrisoned Cavite. Following the return of
Lawton's expedition from Morong, frequent Insurgent "attacks" from Pasay caused Otis to feel the necessity of making
the force of American arms felt in this portion of the line. Also
the area had been the center of Insurgent activities during the
rebellion against the Spaniards in 1896. Aguinaldo's home was
there.
Two days after his return from Morong Lawton's division
was reorganized asnd assembled in preparation for a movement
to the south. Consisting of some 4,000 men it was divided into
two.brigades as follows:
1st Brigade (General Wheaton).
8 companies of the 9th U.S. Infantry.
8 companies of the 21st U.S. Infantry.
6 companies of the 1st Colorado Volunteers.
1 troop of the Nevada Volunteer Cavalry.
1 battery (composite) of light and mountain artillery.
2nd Brigade (General Samuel Ovenshine).
2 companies of the 12th Infantry.
9 companies of the 14th Infantry.
13th Infantry.
Battery of field artillery (composite).
The plan was for the division to advance with its brigades
in column, south from the center of the San Pedro MacatiPasay line. After. the first line of Insurgents had been dispersed
Wheaton's brigade was to swing to the left (east) and continue
down the shore of Laguna de Bay on the town of Muntinglupa,
thirteen miles away. Ovenshine's brigade was to swing to the
right when opposite the town of Las Pinas and there form a
barrier which should prevent the escape of Insurgents along
the main highway running south of Manila.
As planned, the division left the line at 0430 June 10, Wheaton's brigade in the lead. Besides his rifle and bayonet each man
carried his messkit, canteen and a roll over his shoulder con122




sisting of a blanket, a poncho and 50 rounds of ammunition.
In addition he had 200 rounds of ammunition in his belt atnd
two days' rations in his haversack.
Brushing aside Insurgent opposition on a ridge running
through Guadalupe, the division continued south through the
cogon grass and rough terrain. As the day wore on the motionless heat of "El Desierto" rose to 110 degrees. By 0730 the
panting soldiers had drained their canteens-in a country destitute of wells and springs. By 0830 they were parched. Gasping
and staggering under their smothering loads of equipment,
they repeatedly deployed to return Insurgent fire. Then men
began to throw away their rations, their clothes and even their
rifles. They plodded on to topple over from heat exhaustion, and
weaved off the trail to search hopelessly for water and rest.
Unique in the history of American armies, an entire division
disintegrated.
At 1030 Wheaton's brigade came under a sharp fire from its
right and was forced to swing in that direction to meet it.
General Lawton sent a hurried message to Ovenshine to close
his brigade in on Wheaton's right. When Ovenshine was finally
located at about 1100 he pointed to where about 150 men had
been and said, "That is all that is left." At noon, a fresh-water
well having been located, the entire division was halted at a
point just east of the town of Paranaque. A check revealed that
Wheaton's brigade had 526 men missing and Ovenshine's 372.
Nearly 50 per cent of the command had fallen behind. One
company of the 12th Infantry did not have one straggler.
After resting for two and a half hours, during which time
many stragglers rejoined, the division continued the march towards Las Pinas. Wheaton's march on Muntinglupa had been
abandoned. Insurgent opposition was soon encountered, and
after a fight which consumed the remainder of the afternoon,
the Insurgents were forced back towards Las Pinas. The exhausted division bivouacked for the night one mile southeast of
the town. Battle casualties for the day amounted to 1 killed
and 23 wounded. Ninety-six Insurgent dead were found. The
division surgeon, bringing up the rear of the column, picked
up 150 stragglers from the 13th Infantry. A check made that
night, after many stragglers had rejoined their organization,
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revealed that the 14th Infantry still had 182 men missing; the
13th, 167 out of a nominal strength of 900.
That evening within rifle range of the American camp, the
Insurgent army marched through Las Pinas towards the south.
Lieutenant Scott of the 6th Artillery, wandering away from
camp on an unofficial reconnaissance, saw the Insurgent army
moving towards Las Pinas and hurried back to camp to apprise General Lawton of the situation. There he found Lawton
still in a rage over the day's happenings, with none of his staff
officers daring to approach him.:So fearsome was Lawton while
in these moods that not even the irrepressible Scott dared to
enter the Commanding General's tent. The Insurgent army was
thus allowed to escape unmolested. Later a heavy rainfall
cooled the air and permitted canteens to be filled from pools
on the ground. In the middle of the night the sleep of the exhausted Americans was interrupted by a stampede of the
Chinese coolies who accompanied the division. They ran over
the sleeping troops shouting "Insurgents —bolos." An imminent
panic of Ovenshine's brigade was fortunately checked by officers.
The following forenoon was somewhat cooler. The division
marched unopposed into Las Pinas, seven miles south of Manila.
Lawton halted his command and returned to Manila for a
conference with Otis. Upon his return in the afternoon, he relieved the 13th Infantry, and they returned to the city. The
regiment had arrived in the Philippines only twelve days previous and apparently was in no condition for tropical field
service.
After resting one day, Lawton felt that his command had recuperated sufficiently. So aboard the US gunboat Helena, he
reconnoitered the shore of the bay south of Las Pinas where the
shore line bends westward. Near the point where the Zapote
River emptied into the bay it was discovered that the Insurgents
had taken up a position on the west side of that stream. That
day Lawton sent the following telegram to Otis:
Condition of command satisfactory. Men fast recuperating and ready to
proceed. The enemy are apparently in force on the Zapote River. Men of
the 13th Infantry sent to the city yesterday should be sent over their trail
124




to recover property abandoned by them. Evidence accumulates that punishment on enemy much more severe than first thought. Twenty-six additional
dead bodies found this morning. Inhabitants of- Paranaque and Las Pinas
remain, welcoming command with enthusiasm. Food supply in this section extremely short, the Insurgents having stripped the country. I am informed bv the local priest that upward of $75,000 in cash was taken by
Insurgents from this district alone.
Early the following morning, Lawton, with a battalion of the
21st Infantry, advanced along the road towards the Zapote
River, to make another personal reconnaissance. He discovered
that the Insurgents had a strongly fortified position across the
river, about a half mile inland from where the river emptied
into the bay. With the assistance of a Filipino guide, he was
able, by crossing the salt marshes and swamps, to move completely in rear of the Insurgents' position. Seeing this force behind them, 1,000 Insurgents attacked, attempting to isolate the
lone battalion. Lawton hurried back to Las Pinas and ordered a
frontal attack on the main Insurgent position on the west bank
of the Zapote River. Occupying the banks were some 4,000
Insurgents in trenches that Lawton described as "five feet
thick." In its rear were some 6-inch smoothbore cannon. In
1896 the Insurgents had repulsed a Spanish attack at this
point; and, as was later determined, a great many of them had
made religious vows, assumed under superstitious rites, to overthrow the Americans there or die in the attempt. The intense
fire which covered the partially dismantled bridge over the
river made American advance difficult. In the face of this fire,
a 3.2-inch gun finally advanced to the bank of the river and
poured shells on the Insurgent trenches at a range of 30 yards.
In this heroic use of artillery, two gunners were killed and seven
wounded. At 1520 Lawton wired Otis:
We are having a beautiful battle, hurry up ammunition, we will need it.
Meanwhile, the 21st Infantry, on the Insurgent left flank, had
run short of ammunition and had signalled the Helena for assistance. Two officers and thirty-eight men with a Colt gun
came ashore and were followed an hour later by forty-two men
from the Monadnock.
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By 1600 the Americans had control of the bridge and Lawton
gave the order to run the Insurgent position. Several units fording the river, the American line, assisted by the sailors, went
forward from   two directions. The pressure was too great and
the Insurgents fled. One hundred and fifty of their men were
killed and an estimated 375 wounded. Insurgent opposition
here, so different from that at the Rio Grande de Pampanga,
resulted in American casualties of 14 killed and 61 wounded.
The following day the town presidente of Imus came to
Lawton's headquarters at Las Pinas and stated that the inhabitants of that town, population 15,000 and headquarters of
Aguinaldo during the rebellion of 1896, desired the Americans
to enter their city. He also stated that the Insurgents were demoralized and had fled south and west in the direction of Dasmarinas and San Francisco de Malabon, respectively. The two
battalions of the 14th Infantry occupied Imus without difficulty.
Meanwhile a reconnaissance of the 10th Pennsylvania Volunteers from Cavite on the 15th had indicated that Insurgents were
in force at San Francisco de Malabon. Lawton made two attempts to reach this town via Imus but failed because of
marshes and deep streams. From Manila Otis ordered that operations in that direction be suspended.
On June 19th one battalion of the 4th Infantry with 228 men
reconnoitering from Imus towards Dasmarinas, was attacked
and nearly cut off by about 2,500 Insurgents. Like Sheridan at
Winchester, Wheaton at Imus heard the shooting and reached
the harried battalion at a critical time. The report of this engagement is given by the battalion commander, Major John W.
Bubb, as follows:
I proceeded leisurely towards Dasmarinas for about six miles. There were
dwelling houses pretty much all along the road on both sides and the inhabitants appeared very friendly, freely supplying our men with water.
During the last mile or two of the march I noticed the absence of nearly
all the male inhabitants and suddenly I discovered all fleeing before me.
My flankers discovered what appeared to be insurgents on my flanks, particularly on my right. Halting my command I made a careful investigation by reports and personal examination and discovered a line of skirmishers being conducted by a mounted officer about 300 or 400 yards on my
right flank, marching parallel with my own line of march. As soon as I
could make a hurried disposition of my command, I opened fire. Immedi126




ately there was a heavy return fire, which soon developed across my front
and it was apparent that the enemy was there in force at least equal to my
own and having been instructed not to bring on an engagement, I after a
hurried consultation with a number of my officers, decided to withdraw.
After making a proper disposition of my command, I began the movement. It was not long before I was completely surrounded, so much so
that I didn't deem it prudent to send a message back to the brigade commander without detaching more of a detail for the purpose than I could
spare, particularly as the enemy's fire seemed to be increasing. Keeping my
command well in hand, I succeeded in getting back about three miles,
when I received word that a battalion of my regiment was coming to my
assistance and I immediately held my ground although I was nearly out
of ammunition. Captain Robinson with his battalion of 4th Infantry arrived about 1600 hours, deploying on the right and left of the road advancing in the face of a heavy fire, relieving the situation at once. During
the engagement which lasted from 1130 until 1630 I lost four enlisted
men killed and twenty wounded.
Following the charge by the relieving troops, 55 dead Insur-.
gents were found on the battlefield. The following day Wheaton
led the 4th Infantry and a battalion of the 9th'into Dasmarinas,
dispersing weak Insurgent opposition. After reconnoitering the
surrounding countryside for two days, he returned to Imus.
It appeared that the Insurgent forces in the area had been
dispersed for the time being and that the Filipinos were satisfied with the municipal governments Otis had established.
However, peaceful conditions in the south were short-lived.
During August and September the Insurgents reassembled
under General Trias. Imus, Bacoor, and Calamba, an important town of 7,000 inhabitants on the south shore of Laguna
de Bay, were attacked. Calamba had been occupied in June
by a boat expedition from Manila. Otis was anxious to turn
his attention against the main Insurgent army under Luna and
Aguinaldo in the north; but did not feel it advisable to concentrate his troops there while Insurgents still appeared to be in
force to the south and were harassing the American garrisons.
A determined attack on Imus early in October motivated
Otis to give the matter serious attention. General Lawton visited Imus and ascertained that the former Insurgent army in
that area had been resurrected and now had 1,700 men. Consequently, on October 6 a temporary brigade for an expedition
farther into the province was organized and placed under the
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command of Brigadier General Theodore Schwann. Its assigned mission was to "punish and if possible destroy and break
up Insurgent forces in the province of Cavite."
General Schwann was a native of Germany. An immigrant to
the United States, he had in 1857 enlisted in the American
Army. By 1863 he had been commissioned as an officer in the
10th Infantry. He was twice brevetted for bravery. In 1864 he
was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for "most distinguished gallantry at Peebles Farm, Virginia, while in command of his regiment which was on the picket line, and falling
back before a superior force of the enemy, at the imminent risk
of his life, in dragging a wounded and helpless officer of his
regiment to the rear, thus saving him from death or capture."
After the Civil War Schwann had retained his commission and
remained in the Regular Army. By 1898 he had reached the
grade of Colonel. The Spanish-American War brought his promotion to brigadier general of Volunteers and command of a
brigade in the Cuban campaign. A favorite of Otis, he had been
made corps chief of staff upon his arrival in the Philippines. He
was given command of the expedition into Cavite as a "diversion" from his office duties at Manila.
Schwann's provisional brigade consisted of the 13th Infantry,
3 companies of the 14th Infantry, 2 troops of cavalry, Reilly's
Battery of the 5th Artillery, and a company of "Scouts." Its
total strength was about 1,800 men. Assembled at Bacoor on
October 7, its first objective was the town of Cavite Viejo, three
miles west.
Leaving Bacoor on October 8, the brigade entered Cavite
Viejo without difficulty. However, on continuing one mile west,
Schwann's men encountered about three hundred entrenched
Insurgents. Two Insurgent officers were killed and 13 soldiers
wounded before the Filipinos were dislodged.
The next town along the shore of the bay was Novaleta, two
miles away. Novaleta was at the base of the narrow Cavite
Peninsula and a large number of Insurgents was thought to be
there. Since Cavite was garrisoned by United States Marines, it
was arranged that while Schwann's brigade attacked the town
from the east, the Marines would move in from the north. The
advance guard of Schwann's column reached the outskirts of
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Novaleta at 1530 October 8. After weathering a few scattered
shots from houses, the Americans found the town deserted. A
quantity of Insurgent uniform cloth, clothing, flags, and insignia was destroyed.
Schwann learned that the Insurgents had retreated south to
the town of San Francisco de Malabon. Although the indicated
move was to follow the Insurgents, he doubted that his trains
could follow along the flooded roads, so the plans were changed
and he marched west to the town of Rosario, where his troops
could be supplied by boat from Manila.
Between Noveleta and Rosario there was almost constant
opposition from small Insurgent bodies. It was not organized
opposition, however; and as the Americans advanced, unmistakable signs indicated that the Insurgent troops were hiding
their uniforms and rifles. Shortly thereafter they appeared in
ordinary Filipino clothing and professed to be "amigos." Fighting its way into Rosario-at 2000 hours, the brigade arrested about
two hundred suspicious civilians who showed signs of being
former Insurgents. In line with the American policy of "attraction," these prisoners were later released with the hope that
they would return to their normal civil pursuits.
After receiving supplies by boat the column moved towards
San Francisco de Malabon on the 9th. This city had been reported as an Insurgent stronghold; but the Americans entered
with little difficulty, and on the 10th Schwann wired Otis as
follows:
Enemy, with an estimated strength of 1500, abandoned this town last
night and early this morning, leaving behind detaining forces concealed
in thicket. He is retreating southward. I am sending out strong reconnoitering party to watch his movements. He seems disinclined to fight and can
easily evade fighting. The roads for wheeled vehicles are most difficult,
making the problem of supply a hard one. We find maps of the country
south of Rosario very inaccurate. Conditions of the roads to this place so
bad that wagon belonging to signal corps, though carrying a light load,
had to be abandoned. Question of garrisoning this place as well as Imus and
thus establishing a southern line, perhaps worth considering at this time.
Natives told Schwann the Insurgents had been so discouraged
by the steady advance of the Americans that Trias had dis129




banded the mass of his soldiers, and preserved only six or seven
companies for harassing purposes.
Otis, however, refused to entertain the idea of establishing a
garrison in San Francisco de Malabon; and directed Schwann to
return his wagon trains to Bacoor, via the Rosario-Noveleta
road, and to move cross country to Dasmarinas, eight miles
south. (It may be recalled that in June attempts to cross this
area had been abandoned because of the swampy ground.)
Complying with Otis' instructions in regard to the wheeled
transportation, Schwann assembled his tired troops at San Francisco de Malabon and made preparations for what promised to
be a most difficult cross country march.
Anticipating the exhausting effects of heavy packs, each soldier's personal equipment was limited to three days' rations, a
small supply of ammunition, and a blanket. No wheeled transportation whatsoever was to accompany the mobile column. It
started at daybreak on October 12.
At that season of the year rice was growing, and by means of
irrigation ditches the Filipinos kept the extensive ricefields
flooded about three inches. The brigade marched in several
columns of files along the dikes which enclosed each field, but
as described by General Schwann, the march for the infantry
was most difficult. The rice dikes were narrow and the footing
insecure: falls and slides into the mud on either side were frequent. However, by afternoon the command reached the main
road running from Imus to Dasmarinas, and marched into
Dasmarinas that night after dispersing a weak Insurgent resistance. The following day, upon Otis' orders, the expedition
returned to Bacoor, where the units were sent to their normal
stations.
The situation in the south apparently quiet, Otis could now
turn his attention to political development; and to what he considered the main seat of Insurgent activity, the Army in the
north.
Dewey had stated that 5,000 troops would be enough to take
and hold Manila. But by this time, Congress realized that that
number was not sufficient. Arrangements were in progress for
the return of the state volunteers to the United States. Of the
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34,661 troops in the Philippines in June 1899, over fifty per cent
were volunteer troops, and their departure would have left the
American forces dangerously small. A steady stream of Regular
regiments was arriving in the Philippines, but the small Regular
Army had reached the limit of its capacity to furnish troops.
Considering the Insurrection in the Philippines a temporary
emergency, and imbued with the idea of keeping the Regular
Army small, Congress authorized, in July of 1899, the organization of twenty-five new Volunteer regiments. The infantry of
these new troops were to carry numerical designations from 26
to 29, inclusive, and were to be enlisted for service in the Philippines. The 36th and 37th Infantry and 11th Cavalry were
authorized to be recruited in the Philippine Islands from discharged state Volunteers. The 48th and 49th regiments of Infantry were to be composed of colored troops. The officers for
these new Volunteer regiments were to be secured largely from
the Regular Army.
Between June 14 and October 8 the state Volunteer regiments were returned to their points of origin: Oregon, Nebraska, Utah, Pennsylvania, Colorado, California, Wyoming,
North and South Dakota, Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, Kansas,
Washington, Iowa, Nevada, and Tennessee. These volunteers
had nobly borne the brunt of the heaviest fighting during the
Insurrection. Because of ignorance of the Philippines, they had
been, in effect, War Department "guinea pigs" in regard to
clothing, equipment, and weapons. Undisciplined perhaps,
when judged according to Regular Army standards, they
showed throughout their campaigns the initiative so necessary
to win battles.
On their return to the United States these Volunteer regiments brought with them about twenty-five Congressional
Medals of Honor and stories (many exaggerated) concerning
"service in the Philippines."
While the volunteers were being sent home, a unit rare to
American arms was organized, namely a battalion of "Macabebe Scouts." The Macabebes were a Filipino tribe living east of
Calumpit in an area about 10 miles square. Their ancestors had
been imported by the Spanish from Mexico so that in addition
to a Malay strain gained by intermarriage, they were also part
131




American Indian. Contrary to the majority of Filipino tribes,
thev had remained loyal to the Spanish, a large number of the
men enlisting in the Spanish Army and some rising to high
positions in the Church. They loathed the Tagalogs. When the
Spanish left the Islands, the Macabebes transferred their loyalty
to the Americans and offered their services. Otis refused until
the Tagalogs, who lived in the maze of swamps and estuaries
bordering the north shore of Manila Bay, started making frequent raids on MacArthur's lines. Realizing the feasibility of
using Filipinos familiar with the terrain, Otis organized the
Macabebes into an American military unit to avenge these
forays. Under the command of Lieutenant Matthew Batson this
company proved so effective that it was expanded to a battalion
and used for scouting purposes throughout the Island. The
antipathy of the Macabebes towards other Filipinos in general
was so great that a strong hand was necessary to prevent disorders. However, the Macabebe Scouts were a valuable, loyal
adjunct to the American Army. It was largely through their efforts that the capture of Aguinaldo was finally accomplished.
The native scout idea was so successful that other Filipino
troops, including Tagalogs, were later organized into "Scout
units."
Between June and October, the 6th, 16th, 19th, 24th, and
25th Infantry regiments arrived in the Islands. Despite the return of the state Volunteer regiments, the strength of the
American troops still amounted to 35,683. In October the newly
constituted Volunteer regiments recruited in the United States
commenced to filter over. By March 1900 the American forces
numbered nearly 56,000.
In his cabled reports to the War Department, Otis had invariably assumed an optimistic view. He had deprecated the
necessity of the large number of troops which were steadily arriving from the United States. His dispatches minimized the
stability of the Insurgent government; and by strict censorship
of the press, he had prevented information regarding the large
amount of sickness among American troops from reaching the
United States. The newspaper correspondents in Manila, disgusted with what they considered an unnecessary curtailment of
their activities, created no little excitement in the United States
132




at this time by publishing a "round robin" dispatch which had
been taken by boat to Hong Kong and cabled from there. The
text of this unusual message was as follows:
The Undersigned, being all staff correspondents of American newspapers,
stationed in Manila unite in the following statement:
We believe that owing to official dispatches from Manila, made public in
Washington the people of the United States have not received a correct
impression of the situation in the Philippines, but that these dispatches
have presented an ultra optimistic view that is not shared by the General
Officers in the field.
We believe that the dispatches incorrectly represent the existing conditions among the Filipinos in respect to internal dissention and demoralization resulting from the American campaign and to the brigand character
of their army.
We believe that the dispatches err in the declaration that the "situation
is well in hand" and in the assumption that the Insurrection can be speedily
ended without a greatly increased force.
We think that the tenacity of the Filipino purpose had been underestimated and that the statements are unfounded that the Volunteers are
unwilling to engage in further service.
The censorship has compelled us to participate in this misrepresentation
by excising or altering uncontroverted statements of fact on the plea, as
General Otis stated, that "They would alarm the people at home" or
"have the people of the United States by the ears."
Specifications: Prohibition of hospital reports; suppression of full reports
of field operations in the event of failure; numbers of heat. prostrations in
the field; systematic minimization of Naval operations; and suppression of
complete reports of the situation.
The dispatch was signed by John T. McCutcheon and Harry
Armstrong of the Chicago Record, Oscar K. Davis and P. G.
McDonnell of the New York Sun, Robert M. Collins, John P.
Dunning and L. J. Jones of the Associated Press, John F. Bass
and William Dinwiddie of the New York Herald, E. D. Skene
of the Scripps-McRae Association, and Richard Little, of the
Chicago Tribune.
Otis was furious with the Press representatives. He accused
them of conspiracy, and threatened to have them tried by a
court-martial. In the United States the dispatch caused much
comment, particularly in Congress and among the anti-imperialistic groups. In September the Adjutant General of the Army in
Washington announced that censorship of news from the Philippines had been abolished. However, three months later news133




paper men complained that it was still being exercised.
Both Otis and the representatives of the Press had legitimate
reasons for their viewpoints. Otis knew that many of the heat
exhaustion cases in the field were pure bluff and that many
soldiers in the hospital were shirkers. The Navy had antagonized him by attacking and capturing Iloilo in February, in
advance of the prearranged plan. Further, the retention of the
Philippines was a rmajor issue in the ensuing presidential election, and a minimization of the disorders was a matter of loyalty
to the administration. On their part, the newspaper men wanted
to get accurate information to their papers, and they were either
not being permitted to do so, or were required to color their
reports until they felt they were not doing their duty to their
employers.
After Aguinaldo's army was dispersed, correspondents were
permitted to telegraph facts as long as they carefully differentiated between facts and opinions, particularly in regard to the
political situation in the Islands.
In San Fernando, Pampanga, forty-three miles north of Manila, MacArthur's division had been forced to grant the Filipinos, actually if not officially, the armistice which they had requested in May. The physical condition of the troops in the
second division was so bad that nearly fifty per cent of the command was on sick report, and operations had been suspended.
Aguinaldo took advantage of the temporary breathing spell
to clear up the dissension within the Insurgent ranks. When
Antonio Luna had dissolved the pro-American Peace Commission while en route to Manila, and substituted his own delegation, he had definitely challenged Aguinaldo's authority. However, Aguinaldo was the puppet of the rabid, paralytic, antiAmerican, Appolinario Mabini. The Insurgent Congress and
Cabinet had met in May, ousted Mabini as President of the
Cabinet, and adopted a program designed to establish peace.
Aguinaldo appears to have concurred with the majority, but
was apprehensive as to Luna's attitude and that of the Insurgent
army. Shortly thereafter he received definite information that
Luna was laying plans for the overthrow of the "Peace Cabinet"
by means of a military coup d'etat, and intended to assume the
dictatorship of the Filipino government himself. After the cap134




ture of San Fernando by the Americans, Luna had withdrawn
his military headquarters to Bayambang, a town on the railroad
in the province of Pangasinan, eighty miles north of the scene
of military activities. From his capital at Cabanatuan Aguinaldo
decided to strike first.
It appears that in order to allay suspicion, he had intimated to
Luna that the latter would be made head of a new Filipino
cabinet soon to be formed. On June 5 Luna was invited to a
conference at Cabanatuan. Arriving there with a small bodyguard, he proceeded to Aguinaldo's headquarters where he had
been advised he' would find the Insurgent President. As he and
his aide, Colonel Francisco Roman, entered the house they were
met with a hail of bullets which proved fatal to both. Aguinaldo was not in the town at'the time; but had gone to Tarlac
that day, where, following Luna's death, he assumed command
of the Insurgent army. It was a well planned and executed
assassination. But doubt remains as to Aguinaldo's responsibility
for it.
Illocano troops, who he thought might dispute his assumption of command were disarmed by Tagalogs and held under
guard until it became evident that they had no intention of causing trouble. Before the Filipinos Aguinaldo gave justification
for the crime as a "state necessity." Although indignant, Luna's
Illocano tribesmen permitted their feelings of patriotism to overcome their anger; and, as a whole, remained loyal to Aguinaldo.
Discord among the Filipinos did not cease entirely, however,
as indicated by a letter written in July by a well-to-do citizen
of Tarlac, the then Insurgent capital, to a friend in Manila:
For some days, I have been trying to get into your city and leave this
band of thieves, but with my numerous family it is impossible to travel
off the road and they watch us here so closely that it is impossible to get
away, which I very much regret. However, I believe that this will all end
up some way or other and a great many of the people here long for the
American troops to advance, for everyone is desperate with so much savagery committed by our army. Quiet citizens are never left in peace, nor
anyone in fact who has as much as a grain of rice put aside... I will not
go into details as to occurrences here as this letter will be too long. I do not
sign this letter or put down the address, as to do so might bring disagreeable consequences.
135




In a measure, this letter expressed the opinion of the majority
of the Filipinos of means, many of whom had been forced to
contribute to an Insurgent bond issue amounting to $500,000.
However, to quote Otis:
'It did not voice the sentiments of Army officers who were enjoying a
license of action never anticipated before its realization and of the ignorant
masses who composed the enlisted strength of the army and preferred to
gain subsistence through exaction rather than the severe manual labor of
former days. The army offered an excellent field of operations for the Ladrones. They had been gathered from all portions of Luzon and were
of great service in recruiting diminished Insurgent ranks by drafts on the
people.
From the mountains south of Manila, the bandit chieftain Pio
del Pilar wrote to a friend in Manila that for $1,000,000 he
would hand over to the American authorities Aguinaldo and
his entire government.
Even though Mabini and Luna had been removed from the
picture, the idea of peace faded. Taking command of the army
and government, Aguinaldo determined to continue the struggle to the bitter end.
A few days after assuming command, Aguinaldo personally
directed an attack of some 7,000 Insurgents on MacArthur's
troops at San Fernando. No military man, Aguinaldo spread
his entire force in a seven-mile arc which practically surrounded the city. During the attack, telegraph communications
with Manila were interrupted, and fifty feet of the railroad
track between San Fernando and Calumpit were removed. The
attack of the thin, over-extended Insurgent line, however, was
easily repulsed by the Americans. In the sectors occupied by the
Kansas and Iowa Volunteers, several Filipino units were scattered by vigorous counter attacks. Henceforth, Insurgent tactics
were to follow a Fabian policy-a series of defensive positions,
which were quickly abandoned when attacked. They contented
themselves with occupying trenches opposite the American lines
and harassing the American outposts with occasional unorganized attacks.
To quote the division commander, the time between Aguinaldo's attack on San Fernando on June 16 and August 9 was
"an exceedingly languid period." However, the opposing armies
136




were so close together that the outposts frequently clashed. During June and July 2 Americans were killed and 24 wounded.
Early in August Otis, realizing that the backbone of the
Insurrection was in the Insurgent army on the railroad, conceived the plan of having MacArthur restrain that force until
another column could move around in its rear and cut off retreat. To hold the forces on the railroad while the details of the
plan were maturing, MacArthur was directed to push his advance on August 9 to Angeles, ten miles north of San Fernando.
For the movement the 2nd Division was reconstituted Is folLows:
1st Brigade (General Hale).
3 Battalions, 9th Infantry.
12th Infantry.
1 battery, 3rd Artillery.
2nd Brigade (General Wheaton).
17th Infantry.
51st Iowa Infantry.
22nd Infantry (1 battalion).
1 battery of 1st and 1 battery of 3rd Artillery.
The division was to straddle the railroad, with one brigade
on each side of the track. The 36th Infantry, one of the new
Volunteer regiments which had been organized in the Philippines and placed under the command of Colonel J. Franklin
Bell, was to protect the left flank and to demonstrate towards
the town of Bacalor.
Moving with difficulty because of rain followed by steamy
sunshine, and the poor condition of roads, the division left San
Fernando at 0500 August 9. At Calulut, a small town about
seven miles north of San Fernando and three miles south of
Angeles, the Americans surprised and dispersed about 3,000
Insurgents. At noon that day MacArthur telegraphed Otis:
Movement commenced at 0500 this morning. Command now occupies
a line extending right and left from railroad at Calulut. The movement
has been entirely successful up to this time. We have contact at almost
every point on line but opposition has not been desperate. Weather conditions have been favorable except as regards heat. Command is now
137




halted to rectify alignments which have been badly broken by usual jungles and ditches. Casualties number possibly thirty. Losses inflicted have
been considerable, probably fifty or sixty killed and proportionate wounded.
So far as can be determined, enemy have retired in direction of Porac and
not directly up railroad. Everybody nearly exhausted but we are getting
rest while lines are being rectified.
Porac was a town seven miles east of Calulut and the base of
the Zambales Mountains.
The Insurgents had anticipated further American advance
along the railroad, and had taken advantage of the lull between
May and August to make the railroad as useless as possible.
Between San Fernando and Calulut they had removed about
five miles of track. They had destroyed all bridges and culverts
and had plowed grades in places, planning to make a water
course which would wash the tracks out. At the end of the day
MacArthur felt that even if he did take Angeles, it would be
impossible to supply his troops there until the railroad was
repaired.
Two companies of Iowa Volunteers, who had been left to
protect MacArthur's right flank on the Mexico road northeast
of San Fernando, had been attacked by about five hundred
Insurgents and with difficulty had driven the Filipinos off. Perceiving the necessity of dispersing the Insurgents from  his
flanks if he was to advance unmolested, MacArthur proposed
to Otis that his division halt for the time being at Calulut. Then
while the railroad line was being repaired, he could use this
time to clear out the Insurgents on his flank. Otis approved
and on August 11 reconnoitering detachments sent out on his
left flank reached Guagua, a town about twelve miles southwest of San Fernando and situated on the Guagua River. The
Guagua is a navigable stream* which empties into the bay.
On August 10 Colonel J. Franklin Bell, with a detachment
of the 36th Infantry, reconnoitered the road between Angeles
and Bacolor. Encountering no opposition, he soon found himself on the outskirts of Angeles itself, some three miles in advance of the American front lines. Determined to carry the
reconnaissance as far as possible, he and a small group of
mounted men galloped on, yelling and firing their pistols like
a band of cowboys. In the heart of the town they were stopped
138




by a scattering fire. They returned to Calulut to report that
Angeles was lightly held. The following day an exploring party
of fifty men from the Iowa regiment entered the city and found
it deserted. Another reconnaissance on the 13th indicated that
the town was then held by about 500 Insurgents. It appeared
that their councils were debating whether they should oppose
American advance into the town. At any rate, MacArthur decided on the 16th that the town should be occupied by at least
a regiment to prevent opposition after the railroad had been repaired and the division advanced. He made the decision about
five days too late. When the 12th Infantry advanced on the
16th they were opposed by about 2,500 Insurgents. A charge by
ten companies of the 12th Infantry was necessary before the
Insurgents were dislodged from their entrenched positions ana
the town taken. Indecision as to the occupation had caused the
deaths of five Americans and the wounding of thirteen. In
Angeles, the 12th Infantry captured three railroad locomotives,
twenty-five cars and a large quantity of rice. Most of the town's
12,000 inhabitants had left upon the advance of the Americans.
Reconnaissance groups were sent west of the town, reaching the
site of the present location of Fort Stotsenburg. At 0500 the
following morning Angeles was attacked from two directions
by about eight hundred Insurgents, but the 12th Infantry was
able to drive them off without casualties.
Although the division then held the railroad line between
San Fernando and Angeles, it by no means controlled the surrounding country. To the west were the Zambales Mountains
which furnished ample refuge for small bands of marauders.
During the next three weeks repair on the railroad was interrupted and the American troops were constantly harassed by
Insurgent attacks. On September 9 outposts at Santa Rita and
Guagua were attacked.
On September 19 the railroad between San Fernando and
Angeles was finally repaired, and steps were taken to make
Angeles the base for the division. On the 22nd the Insurgents
slipped through the American lines and placed a mine under
the railroad track a mile and a half south of Angeles. As the
next train passed over it the mine exploded, derailing five cars,
killing 2 and injuring 5 Americans.
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Since the town of Porac, six miles southeast of Angeles
seemed to be the center of Insurgent activity, MacArthur sent
two columns, one from Angeles and one from Bacolor, there
on the 28th. In a charge, the columns entered the city. One man
was killed and four wounded. Ten of the 600 Insurgents who
defended the town were killed and the rest scattered into the
mountains or to the north.
On October 9 a detachment of the 36th Infantry under
Colonel Bell, moving out from Guagua, entered Florida Blanca,
a town fifteen miles west of San Fernando. After capturing six
Insurgents it returned to Guagua by way of Lubao, scattering
several small Insurgent bands encountered along the route.
At 0200 October 16 some 3,500 Insurgents made an attack on
Angeles. Supported by artillery fire, detached bands attempted
to enter the town from all sides. Although the attack was repulsed, eight Americans were killed or wounded.
During the remainder of October repeated attacks on the Insurgents at Porac, Guagua and vicinity had completely disorganized and demoralized the Insurgent brigade. It had been
operating under General T6mas Mascardo from the Zambales
Mountains. Mascardo himself was temporarily forced into hiding. Reconnaissance to the north indicated that the main Insurgent force opposing MacArthur's division numbered about
6,000 men. It extended from Magalang, about eight miles northeast of Angeles, through a line north of Angeles to entrenched
positions north of Porac.
With the Insurgents on his flanks dispersed, MacArthur was
ready for further advance north.
CHAPTER 9
War in the Benguet Mountains
IT MAY BE RECALLED that the Americanr lines north of Manila
ran through the towns of Angeles and Baliuag. They were not
straight lines because the Candaba Swamp was between the
two towns, which were garrisoned by American troops. Angeles
and Baliuag may be considered the limit of American advance
140




into Insurgent territory. It may also be recalled that during the
previous April Lawton's division had advanced as far north as
San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, a town thirty miles north of Baliuag.
Lawton had wanted to garrison the town and establish a base
for future operations to the north but Otis had required him
to withdraw to Baliuag. The Insurgents immediately reoccupied
the intervening territory as soon as Lawton withdrew.
During October the new Volunteer regiments began trickling
into the Philippines and Otis decided that he was sufficiently
strong to deliver one sweeping coup de grace to the Insurgent
army. The Fabian policy which the Insurgents had adopted
after the first few fights with the Americans, made the capture
extremely difficult. It is axiomatic that an enemy which will not
stand up and fight cannot be decisively beaten. And the farther
the Americans advanced into Insurgent territory, the greater
became the supply problem and-the number of troops required
to protect the lines of communications. Eventually the Insurgents might be driven into the mountains of northern Luzon,
but what then? The mountains were completely impracticable
for large-scale military operations. Native forces scattered
through them could have prolonged the rebellion indefinitely.
Consequently, with his map spread in front of him Otis conceived an almost brilliant plan for capturing the Insurgent
army. He knew the main Insurgent force was in front of MacArthur's division at Angeles. The logical line of its withdrawal
was along the railroad which had its terminus at the town of
Dagupan on Lingayen Gulf, 150 miles north of Manila. Otis
thought if MacArthur's division could pin Aguinaldo until an
encircling force could get around his rear, access to the mountains in the north would be cut off. Then the Insurgent army,
including Aguinaldo, would be caught in a virtual cul-de-sac.
The geography of central Luzon was well suited to such a
plan. The broad, flat Pampanga plain extended from the mountains in the north to Manila. While the main Insurgent Army
was pinned by MacArthur at Angeles, one mobile force, predominant in cavalry, could sweep around the Insurgent left
(east) flank, and block passes to the east and northeast. Another
expedition, moving by boat into Lingayen Gulf in the vicinity
of Dagupan, could block escape to the north. Then when the
141




stage was set MacArthur would push the Insurgents back into
the waiting arms of the blocking forces, and the Insurgent
army would either be captured or destroyed. The plan appears
more practicable when one notices that the large Rio Grande
de Pampanga cuts diagonally across the Pampanga Plain. This
river, normally navigable, could be used as an artery for supplying one encircling force.
Specifically, the plan was as follows: General Lawton's division, operating from San Isidro, was to move north through the
province of Nueva Ecija, closing as he went all passes into the
Caraballos and Sierra Madre Mountains.
Another force under General Wheaton was to move by boat
from Manila, land near San Fabian, extend its lines to the east,
close all movement north along the west shore of Luzon; and
block all passes into the Benguet Mountains. When the two encircling forces were in position, MacArthur was to advance
along the railroad, and push Aguinaldo and his army into Lawton's or Wheaton's forces.
An inexplicable weakness of the plan was Otis' apparent
failure to have specified where the two forces would join.
Since the success of the whole movement depended on blocking mountain passes to the north, it is hard to understand how
meticulous Otis could have overlooked such a detail. A glance
at the map would indicate the town of Tayug as a logical point.
If the forces had met at Tayug, Lawton's cavalry force would
have marched about sixty miles, while Wheaton's infantry
column would have had to move only twenty miles from its
base. Possibly Otis intended to leave the matter of uniting to the
commanders in the field, trusting to their initiative and aggressiveness. If he did, Wheaton was the wrong man to send.
Lawton's mission was by far the most difficult. His base was
to be thirty miles from the railroad. He was advancing into a
strange country where the amount of opposition was problematical. He was operating in a portion of the Islands where the
roads were notoriously bad.
Insurgent opposition to Lawton's advance was inconsequential. His battle casualties were too small to mention. His big
problem was supply. From the time his division left San
142




Fernando early in October unJil it became scattered all over
Luzon late in December, Lawton acted as his own chief quartermaster. The longer the campaign continued, the more difficult the supply system became; and it finally broke down completely.
The Manila-Dagupan Railroad crosses the Rio Grande at
Calumpit. Lawton decided that if he established a base at San
Isidro, thirty miles up the river, supplies could be hauled by
rail from Manila to Calumpit. Then they could be hauled to
San Isidro by boat. The map indicated that his advance would
follow the river at least as far north as the town of Cabanatuan,
twelve miles away. From then on the column would have to be
supplied by mule-drawn escort wagons or carabao carts. On
paper the plan for supply seemed feasible, but it didn't work.
Lawton's force assembled at Calumpit and San Fernando
during the early part of October. It consisted of eight troops of
the 3rd Cavalry, nine troops of the 4th, the 24th Infantry (colored), and two battalions of the 22nd Infantry. All of these were
Regular Army units; and, with the exception of the 4th Cavalry,
all had seen service in Cuba. The 4th Cavalry had been in the
Philippines since the beginning of the war. The artillery for the
division consisted of G and H Companies of the 37th Infantry.
One of these was armed with 12-pounder Hotchkiss guns, while
the other, armed with rifles, habitually accompanied the "battery" as protection. It was a rather peculiar arra:ngement for the
"divisional artillery." However, experience had shown this
method to be the most effective use of artillery for the type of
warfare then waged in the Philippines.
This artillery was placed under the command of Captain
Ernest D. Scott (later Brigadier General) of the 37th Infantry.
He had graduated from West Point in 1898; and, despite his
youth, had proved to be the artilleryman ne plus ultra of the
Insurrection. He had participated in practically every campaign
since the beginning of the war with the Filipinos. His fearless
handling of guns, in some cases within a stone's throw of the
Insurgent lines, had attracted the favorable attention of many
high officers, particularly Lawton, who cited him repeatedly for
bravery and efficiency.
When the Volunteer regiments were organized Scott was
143




commissioned as a captain in the Volunteer Infantry, and at
Lawton's request assigned to the latter's division. Also assigned
to the division was the 16th Infantry, garrisoning Baliuag, and
the 34th Infantry which was marching to join the 16th at the
earliest possible moment. The division was further augmented
by a battalion of Macabebe Scouts under Lieutenant Matthew
Batson, and two companies of "Tagalog Scouts" under Lieutenant Joseph C. Castner. The majority of both the Macabebes
and Tagalog scouts had been members of the Spanish Army,
and as such had received what might be called "western military training"-had been taught to shoot. Both units were
worth their weight in gold.
The cavalry was formed into a brigade and placed under the
command of Brigadier General Samuel B. M. Young. General
Young had enlisted as a private in the 12th Pennsylvania Infantry in 1861 and by 1865 he had been brevetted four times
for gallantry and promoted to the grade of brevet brigadier
general of Volunteers. In 1866 he entered the Regular Army as
a second lieutenant of Infantry, and had reached the grade of
colonel of the 3rd Cavalry by 1897. With the declaration of war
against Spain, he was commissioned as major general of Volunteers and commanded the III Army Corps in the expedition to
Cuba. The war over, he was reduced to the grade of brigadier
general of Volunteers and ordered to the Philippines. Prior to
his departure from the United States, he had told the War
Department his views on how to pacify the Islands, and had
criticized Otis' administration. The War Department forwarded
the communication to Otis. The story goes that when Young
arrived in the Philippines Otis immediately called him to headquarters and gave him a thorough "dressing down" for interference and criticism of military superiors.
Moving from San Fernando on October 12, the 24th Infantry
drove entrenched Insurgents from Arayat with but one casualty.
The engineers constructed a cable ferry over the Rio Grande de
Pampanga at Arayat, and, after crossing the river, the division
proceeded on the 18th towards San Isidro. At Cabiao the 22nd
Infantry captured an Insurgent blockhouse and 70 prisoners,
and on the 19th marched into San Isidro, after routing about
nine hundred Insurgents under the command of General Pilar.
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Established at San Isidro and having ordered the supply
from Calumpit to start, Lawton immediately found himself
faced with an unexpected and exasperating struggle with the
Rio Grande River. By October the steady rains of the summer
months had changed to intermittent cloudbursts. On rainy days
overworked launches were unable to tow the laden cascos upstream because of strong currents. Other days the river dropped
so quickly that the launches and cascos frequently went
aground. Since most of these rains occurred in the nearby
mountains the condition of the river was unpredictable. The
first convoy of boats illustrated the difficulty of shallow-water
transportation. Abandoning the towing launch, a detachment
of troops undertook to pull the cascos to San Isidro by means
of shore lines. Although a detail was sent ahead to cut a path
through the jungles for the pullers, the men strained at the
tow ropes for an hour and ahialf to gain only 300 yards. The
opposite bank looked better, so the casco was poled across the
river. However, in crossing, it drifted about 400 yards downstream. After two hours of work the casco was actually behind
its starting point. By that time it was nearly dark, so the detail
quit in disgust, and started at daybreak*the following morning.
The bank was in some places a twenty-foot bluff. At other
points trees extended so far into the water that a man had to
take the tow rope, jump into the river, swim around the trees,
and clamber up the bank again. The casco went aground once
and the whole party had to take to the water to release it. A
detail from the 22nd Infantry was sent to assist the pullers.
After two days the bedraggled party waded through waist-deep
mud flats at San Isidro and brought the boat to its destination.
The work of pulling up the river was also embarrassed by
intermittent fire from Insurgents hiding along the bank. One
man, lying in the bamboo thickets lining the bank, could fire
to his heart's content at a slow-moving barge. The barge frequently became stuck on a bar and sniping made the task of
removing it extremely dangerous. By the time a detail could
reach the bank the malefactor would have disappeared.
With the river at low ebb Lawton realized the need for shallow-bottomed launches which could go over the sandbars. He
sent his quartermaster, Colonel Guy Howard, to Manila with
145




instructions to beg, borrow, or steal every shallow-bottomed
launch he could put his hands on. En route to Manila via boat,
Colonel Howard was killed by a fusillade of bullets from the
shore.
On the 24th of October a heavy rain caused the river to rise
ten feet. Taking advantage of the situation, the entire division
worked day and night for three days assembling 10,000 rations
at San Isidro. Although he regarded the supply as insufficient,
Lawton felt that the movement north must start. So as a
feeler, he issued orders for detachments to push out towards
Cabanatuan, twelve miles north. Although Lawton invariably
marched with the leading elements of his division, he realized
that the critical feature of this campaign would be supplies;
and remained with the rear units to push supplies through.
When two cavalry squadrons, a battalion of the 22nd Infantry, Scott's mounted Infantiy-Artillery, and a company of
Tagalog scouts, all under the command of General Young,
moved out of San Isidro on October 27, the supply problem entered upon a new phase. The problem this time was pushing
wheeled vehicles over poor roads.
At San Isidro Lawton had assembled a supply train consisting
principally of 22 four-mule-team escort wagons and 110 bull
carts drawn by carabaos. This train was to follow Young's
column. The Tambu River bridge eight miles north of Sar
Isidro was out. So the men of the 22nd Infantry constructed
a floating bamboo bridge for the trains. At the Tabotin River
a few miles farther on, the advance was held up for some time
by 400 Insurgents entrenched on the north bank. In the ensuing
fight Scott's artillery was brought up to the river bank and firec
at point-blank range. The 22nd Infantry waded and swar
the river under fire. The Tagalog scouts crossed the river or
the flank of the Insurgent position, and advancing through the
water-soaked rice fields forced the Insurgents to retire. Two
Americans were killed and one wounded. The gunboat Laguni
de Bay, which had steamed up the Rio Grande and the Tabotir
Rivers to assist in the attack, went aground and lay helples
until rains nearly a week later disengaged it.
Late on the afternoon of the 27th the column marched into
Santa Rosa without opposition. The Signal Corps followed
146




despite marching difficulties, and established telegraphic communication between Santa Rosa and San Isidro.
Young stopped at Santa Rosa for two days awaiting the
supply train which had been held up at the makeshift bridge
over the Tabotin. Then on the 29th, Ballance's battalion of the
22nd Infantry moved forward, and, brushing weak Insurgent
resistance aside, entered Cabanatuan.
Back at San Isidro, Lawton had his hands full keeping the
supply system from bogging down. The river was falling rapidly. Although he had expressly asked Otis for shallow-draft
launches, those sent continually went aground. It appeared impossible to accumulate a surplus of supplies. Tired and worried, Lawton became so irritated that he sent the following.
message to Otis:
All boats sent to me draw too much water. The question of supplies is
the only serious one confronting me and this should have been solved long
since. I have been able so far only to maintain supplies for current use
and have no supplies of consequence. Supplies should have been placed here
during the rainy season when for more than three months there was from
ten to twenty feet of water in the river. The supply question has to this
time occupied my whole personal attention...
Then as if to lend emphasis to his point he placed the entire
division on half rations of bread and meat.
The advance stopped at Cabanatuan. Rain washed out the
temporary bridges over the Tambu and Tabotin Rivers, and
the heavy-wheeled supply wagons simply could not reach
Cabanatuan until-these bridges were repaired. Young's column
was supplied via the river, but since the contemplated advance
was to leave the stream at Cabanatuan, this procedure was only
a temporary stopgap. Though the Engineers had arrived and
were repairing the bridge'with all possible dispatch, frequent
rains, followed by floods, slowed down the work. It was finally
decided to construct new flood-proof bridges. Young bided his
time by sending out detachments on each flank and clearing the
Insurgents out of the towns of Bongabong and Aliaga.
On November 4 another heavy rain fell and the flood-proof
bridges washed out. In disgust Lawton wired Otis, "Everything waterbound. Bridges constructed by our Engineers
washed out. Young's advance will be delayed until water falls."
147




The inactivity of the situation reached a crisis on the following day. In a skirmish with some Insurgents Young's men captured a proclamation which had been issued by Aguinaldo at
Tarlac a month previous. The proclamation read:
In view of the fact that Tarlac does not possess the hygienic and geographic conditions becoming the numerous population of the Republic of
the Philippines, the honorable President of the Republic and his council
of the government have been pleased to order that the capital of the Republic be removed provisionally to Bayombong, the capital of Nueva
Viscaya.
Receipt of this information made a quick movement to the
north imperative if Aguinaldo was to be cut off from his new
capital. The route to Bayombong, in the mountains about seventy-five miles north of Cabanatuan, led through passes which
Lawton had intended to block. If Aguinaldo and his government reached these mountains one of the main purposes of the
expedition would fail.
Young proposed to Lawton that the former immediately
move to the north regardless of the weather or conditions of
the road. He said: "This month is the rainy season here and
in the north. We cannot expect any complete success anchored
to our wagons and carts. My people understand the hardship
that we may undergo in any long separation from our train,
but they are ready and willing to make the attempt and I am
ready and willing to assume the responsibility whenever it may
please you to give your approval."
Lawton hesitated because he knew that Otis would never
approve such a proposition. However, Young was under Lawton's direct command and once the latter broke loose, Otis'
constant supervision via telegraph would be eliminated. He decided to let Young go ahead with the hope that the mountain
passes would be closed before Aguinaldo reached them. Young
was authorized to take two squadrons of the 3rd Cavalry, one
of the 4th, Ballance's battalion of the 22nd Infantry, Scott's
artillery, and Batson's battalion of Macabebe Scouts-about
1,000 men. The remainder of the division was to follow soon
In- order to make Young's column mobile, all wheeled transportation except four light ration carts per company were left
148




behind. Each man carried 120 rounds of ammunition on his
person with an extra 100 rounds carried on the light company
transportation. The bare minimum in food supplies was taken.
November 6 was devoted to preparation; departure was planned
for the early morning of the 7th.
The Rio Grande turns to the east at Cabanatuan, so at this
point the expedition left the stream. Also at Cabanatuan the
river is about one hundred yards wide and of strong current.
As neither a bridge nor a ferry suitable for transporting wagons
existed there, the 22nd Infantry hastily constructed a large raft
and stretched a rope cable between the two banks to permit
ferrying the troops.
The first load consisted of two horses and fifteen men. In
midstream the swift current snapped the cable, and carried the
raft rapidly downstream. The frightened horses jumped overboard, careening the raft and spilling the men, arms, and
equipment. Lieutenant Thomas Hannay and three soldiers of
the 22nd Infantry, watching operations from the bank, plunged
into the river and, at the imminent risk of their lives, saved
those who could not swim. The horses gained the bank, but
all the equipment was lost. The raft floated downstream for a
mile and ran aground on a sandbar. After much tedious labor
it was finally returned to the ferry, the tackle rope replaced, and
another attempt made. Bit by bit, the command was
taken across. By 1730 part of the command was still on the
south bank. So General Young, impatient with the delay,
mounted his horse and boldly swam the river with his heavilyladen escort of thirty cavalrymen.
Anxious to accomplish more than a mere river-crossing in
one whole day, Young and a squadron of the 3rd Cavalry,
under Lieutenant Colonel Henry W. Wessels, pushed forward
through the mud. Late that night they entered Talavera, nine
miles north. The trains were, however, bogged down to their
axles, and it was necessary to unload the ration carts and carry
them by hand over bad stretches, thus delaying their arrival.
On the morning of November 8 the 3rd Cavalry and the
Macabebe Scouts pushed forward and marched into San Jose,
capturing a large amount of Insurgent dispatches, personal efEects, and papers of the Insurgent General Llanera. A captured
149




dispatch signed by Aguinaldo on November 8 directed the re
pair of a military road through Tayug towards Bayombong
This indicated that Aguinaldo had not yet reached Bayombong
and that if Young moved quickly he might be able to block the
passes.
Consequently, Young determined to push forward immedi
ately to Tayug. Colonel Hayes, with a squadron of the 4tl
Cavalry, was sent to Carranglan, a mountain town eighteei
miles northeast of San Jose. Young, with one troop of cavalr
and the Macabebe battalion, pushed forward towards Tayug
Colonel Wessels and his cavalry squadron and Ballance's bat
talion of the 22nd Infantry were ordered to push forward a
quickly as possible. If necessary they were to abandon thei
wheeled transportation north of San Jose. On some roads th
Filipinos used primitive bamboo sledges instead of carts. Anm
after a forty-eight hour rain these roads were impassable t,
army wagons.
At one place the ration carts sank to the wagon bodies where
virtually floating in the muck, they fell apart under the strail
of draft. Some forty abandoned Filipino vehicles periodicall
blocked the path of the struggling column. The only ambulanc
fell over on its side and was left there. After one artillery piec
had almost disappeared in the roadbed a new road was cu
through the woods. Finally, with most of its wheeled tran
portation abandoned, the column emerged into the open roac
At stretches where the occasional rainy-season sunshine ha,
partially dried the road its composition changed from a thicb
dirty soup to heavy, sticky mud. Large quantities of cogon gra,
which Filipinos had thrown on the roadbed to improve trac
tion served only to make the road a glutinous, odorous mas
The troops had by this time been campaigning in the ope
for over a month and had been on half rations for two week:
The infantry waded through hip-deep muck, lugging ten-poun
rifles and belts filled with ammunition. Only promise of foo
in the next town and the fear that they would be butchered b
Insurgents forced some soldiers to struggle on.
The road was difficult for mounted troops too. The infantr
column passed a troop of cavalry which had left San Jose twenty
four hours ahead. In the rain this troop had been able to mak
150




only two miles in thirty-six hours. When the column finally
reached Lubao, ten miles from  San Jose, almost every wheeled
vehicle had been abandoned. From there on, the troops would
have to live on the country.
Fortunately, because of Young's desire to rush to Tayug, the
battalion of Macabebe Scouts and the main elements of the
cavalry had passed the bad stretch of road before the forty-eighthour rain started.
Reaching Lubao at 1330 on November 10, these troops pushed
on to Humingen the next day. This city was captured after a
fifteen-minute fight with one hundred Insurgents. The 3rd Cavalary under Colonel Wessels then pushed on to Tayug, five miles
away.
The sudden thrust of the cavalry into the center of Insurgent
territory had borne considerable fruit. As Wessels entered Tayug
at 1330 he captured Aguinaldo's main supply train marching to
Bayombong. The booty included the printing press of the Insurgent Herald of the Revolution, 270,000 pounds of rice, 3,000
pounds of sugar, 1,000 pounds of coffee, 1,000 Insurgent uniforms, 25,000 pounds of salt, 4,000 ball cartridges, a large batch
of Insurgent orders, and some equipment and flags.
After sending detachments into all passes in the vicinity,
Young then pushed his cavalry forward towards San Manuel
and Asingan in an effort to establish contact with Wheaton's
force.
Within the previous five days Young's force had, without
supplies, marched more than fifty miles over the most difficult
roads. Having left garrisons in each town he passed through,
his command was stretched to the limit. One squadron of the
4th Cavalry was in the mountains at Carranglan, one company
of scouts and a cavalry guard for the trains was at San Jose, and
Ballance's battalion of the 22nd was at Lubao. The field artillery
battery was stuck in the mud near Lubao. Two other squadrons
of the 3rd Cavalry were escorting trains south of San Jose. The
Macabebe Scouts were at Humingen. One troop of cavalry was
guarding the pass into the mountains at San Quentin, another
at San Nicolas, another at San Manuel, and a fourth at Asingan. Young had formed a veritable cordon around the moun151




tain passes between Cabanatuan and San Manuel. However, he
said: "Aguinaldo's chances of getting away west of us were
good unless Wheaton connected with me."
The march through the mud from San Jose had nearly finished Ballance's battalion of the 22nd Infantry. By pushing every
man to the limit however, Ballance finally managed to get the
battalion through to Humingen. There, on Young's orders, it
had stopped. Blankets had been thrown away, and there was
no shelter at night. Many of the men's clothes had not been dry
for two weeks. Constant wetness had rotted leather and stitching in shoes, and many were barefoot. The majority were suffering from malarial fever and chills. Many faces were pale and
emaciated, an indication of dysentery. Nearly everyone had
dhobie itch in one form or another. Everyone was hungry.
On November 14 Ballance received orders to take his battalion on a flank march through Rosales, a town on the Agno
River, fourteen miles west of Humingen. Rosales was on the
main road north from Tarlac and within fourteen miles of the
Manila-Dagupan Railroad. It was probable that his battalion
would encounter detachments from the main Insurgent Army
and even possibly, as Major Ballance said, "Have to fight Aguinaldo's entire army of five or six thousand men with the three
hundred in his battalion."
Shortly after the march started the battalion was opposed by
Insurgent delaying forces, so the column was deployed almost
the entire day. Going through the water-soaked rice fields was
little better than the San Jose-Lubao road. Moreover, the advance
was held up at a small river until a bridge could be constructed
for the battalion's attached artillery platoon. The only available
tools being a hatchet and an axe, American pioneering ingenuity
was taxed to the extreme. Still, Rosales was reached that night
and stores of rice, Insurgent uniforms, and documents captured.
Rosales is situated on the Agno River, a wide, unfordable
stream, with a swift current. Despite a sudden rise in the water,
Ballance managed to construct rafts and carry his troops across.
Pushing on through the town of Villasis, the battalion reached
Binalonan on the night of November 16. The men were ordered
152




to Pozorrubio, but the battalion was unable to make the objective as nearly all were in a state of collapse. Ballance "threw up
the sponge," and then three hundred men, practically the entire
strength of the battalion, went on sick report. Several died later.
Returning to the cavalry, it may be irecalled that Young's advance elements had reached San Manuel and Asingan on the
12th. These towns were only twenty miles from San Fabian.
Word had been received via Manila that Wheaton had landed
at San Fabian on the 7th, nearly a week previous, and Young
felt certain that Wheaton's troops must be nearby. The cavalry
had closed all passes to the mountains as far as they had come,
but contact with Wheaton still had to be established. Despite
the fact that his force was stretched to the limit, Young determined to push farther west.
Though he did not know where Aguinaldo was, Young's
energy and initiative were rewarded by almost capturing the
Insurgent President. Dr. Simeon Villa, a member of Aguinaldo's
staff, kept a diary of the movements of the Insurgent Presidential group, and by comparing this diary with Young's report,
we are able to follow closely the movements of both elements.
On the night of November 13 Aguinaldo, with a bodyguard
of troops commanded by General Gregorio del Pilar, left Bayambang (not to be confused with Bayombong, his destination)
by train, proceeding north. A brigade of Ilocano Insurgents
under General Manuel Tinio joined Pilar's troops, and at
Calasio the party detrained. This group of about 1,500 marched
all night, reaching Manaoag at 1600 hours the following afternoon. Aguinaldo, with his wife and sister, a small staff, and
about 250 troops then continued the march towards Pozorrubio.
A rear guard of about 1,000 of Tinio's troops escorted the
President's mother and son.
Meanwhile on the 13th Young had sent Lieutenant Thayer
with a troop of cavalry west to Manaoag with orders to push
through to San Fabian if such a move became necessary to contact Wheaton. The afternoon of the 13th, before Aguinaldo had
left Bayambang, Thayer passed through Manaoag and continued west towards San Jacinto.
On the 14th, while Aguinaldo and his party were marching
153




from Calasiao, Young pushed forward to Binalonan, and directed Major Swigert with a squadron of the 3rd Cavalry to
push on to Pozorrubio. He knew that control of Pozorrubio
would block another pass north along the west side of the
Benguet Mountains, and reasonably assumed that Wheaton had
closed this pass. Swigert's guide, however, instead of heading
the column to Pozorrubio, followed the road to Manaoag.
At about 1700 Swigert's column ran into the head of Aguinaldo's rear guard which was moving from Manaoag to Pozorrubio. Both forces were surprised. Swigert's force was outnumbered by about 800 men. Principally because of the insistence
of Lieutenant Colonel James Parker, one of Young's staff officers, the Insurgent force was charged and dispersed. When
General Young arrived on the scene a short time later, he was
disgusted to find his troops on the outskirts of Manaoag instead
of Pozorrubio.
Aguinaldo, meanwhile some distance ahead, was continuing
on to Pozorrubio, unaware of the proximity of the American
cavalry. He and his party spent the night at Pozorrubio.
Early the next morning Swigert and his squadron were sent
from Manaoag to Pozorrubio. After two skirmishes the squadron reached the outskirts of Pozorrubio.
Major Swigert held Aguinaldo within hi~ grasp but permitted the Insurgent President to leave the town and continue
north. Reasons for Major Swigert's lack of energy are not particularly difficult to find. He was a graduate of West Point in
the class of 1868, and after thirty years of commissioned service
had reached only the grade of major. He had not received
temporary advancement as had many officers by being given a
Volunteer commission. The day before he had engaged in a
verbal altercation with Lieutenant Colonel Parker of Young's
staff, who was eight years his junior in the Regular Army but
was temporarily senior to him by virtue of a Volunteer commission. When Swigert's squadron had run headlong into
Aguinaldo's rear guard, Parker had, in a measure, assumed
command of the squadron and given the order to charge.
Swigert and Parker were at such swords' points that when the
former's squadron was sent to Pozorrubio the following day,
154




Parker, who was detailed to accompany it, begged off. Swigert
entered Pozorrubio as Aguinaldo left but made no effort to
pursue and returned to Binalonan. Upon his return he was
asked if he had heard anything about Aguinaldo. He replied:
"Oh yes, he was there. He left Pozorrubio as I entered."
"Why did you not pursue him?"
"'I had no orders to pursue him."
General Young later told Parker that if he (Parker) had
accompanied Swigert's squadron, Aguinaldo probably would
have been captured. Young was bitterly disappointed and immediately issued orders for the pursuit.
Aguinaldo had escaped for the time being at least, and Otis'
plan for "closing the circle" had gone awry. Young's Cavalry
had moved 120 miles through terrain of the most difficult
nature. However, it had not established contact with Wheaton's
force, which had arrived at its base by boat, and then apparently
had not moved even ten miles away.
General Wheaton's lack of aggressiveness is difficult to understand. He had taken part in practically every campaign since
the Insurrection had commenced; and had been prominent because of his aggressiveness and rashness. Lack of supplies was
less of a problem to him than it was to Young. His troops were
experienced and conditioned. Had Wheaton made the slightest effort Aguinaldo undoubtedly would have been captured,
or at least kept out of the wild mountain regions to the north.
The pacification of the Islands would probably have been shortened by two years.. American and Filipino lives, as well as
American money, would have been saved. The only explanation
for his inaction is the possibility that he had been in contact
with Otis for so long that he had absorbed Otis' fear of any
movement into Insurgent country until the stage was completely
set and ample supplies and troops assembled. Wheaton's orders,
given verbally by Otis, stated that he would sail to the Gulf of
Lingayen and land at or north of San Fabian, placing his command on the roads leading north and near the coast. This was
to prevent the retreat of the Insurgent army to the north. Bare
compliance with these orders indicated that Wheaton would
have blocked the road leading north through Pozorrubio and
155            "




Alava, but he appears to have contented himself with merely
blocking the road through San Fabian. His negligence was
directly responsible for Aguinaldo's escape.
Wheaton's force consisted of the 33rd and 13th Infantry,
veterans of the debacle in Cavite in June. The 33rd had been
recruited in Texas and was noted for its large number of expert riflemen. In addition he had a platoon of artillery, a detachment of engineers, and some signal corps troops. He carried
100,000 rations, a supply sufficient to subsist his command of
2,000 men for fifty days. Loaded into transports and convoyed
by three Navy cruisers and three gunboats, the expedition left
Manila on November 6. On November 7, while Young was
leaving Cabanatuan, it arrived at Lingayen Gulf off San Fabian.
The transports anchored about a mile and a half off shore,
while the three cruisers and three gunboats steamed inside the
line of transports. A battalion of the 33rd and 13th Infantry
each disembarked in cascos, and started for the shore in the
face of fire from entrenched Insurgents in front of San Fabian.
The Navy ships opened up and swept the Insurgent line with
well-directed fire from their artillery and automatic weapons.
The two battalions landed on the flank of the entrenchments
and easily drove the Insurgents into San Fabian.
The following day reconnaissance was instituted towards
Mangaldan, Rosario, and San Jacinto. About two hundred Insurgents near Mangaldan were routeitby a battalion of the 33rd
Infantry under Major Peyton C. March. Upon Wheaton's orders the reconnaissance parties all returned to San Fabian.
On the 10th Wheaton received word that about 1,200 to
1,600 Insurgents under the Ilocano General Tinio were entrenching themselves at San 'Jacinto, six miles east of San
Fabian. The 33rd Infantry dispersed this force, but one battalion
commander, Major John H. Logan, and six enlisted men were
killed. Fifteen other soldiers were wounded. One hundred
thirty-four Insurgents were killed. After the San Jacinto fight
the 33rd Infantry returned to San Fabian. Had it moved forward and occupied Manaoag, two miles east, or even remained
at San Jacinto, Aguinaldo would have had difficulty in slipping
past them.
156




On November 14 Wheaton was still unaware, principally because of lack of enterprise, that Aguinaldo was evading him.
The American officer sent the 13th Infantry north to the town
of Santo T6mas, with instructions to reconnoiter to Rosario.
This force encountered opposition at the Rabon River and then
proceeded to Santo Tomas, five miles north. Returning from
Santo T6mas the following day, a battalion of the 13th Infantry
was sent to reconnoiter Rosario. It left the junction of the Santo
Tomas-Rosario roads, moved four miles in the direction of
Rosario and then returned because Lieutenant H. T. Ferguson,
in command of the battalion, "could see nothing but range after
range of high hills beyond." According to the map this battalion
was within one mile of Rosario. Had it continued into the town
it probably would have encountered Aguinaldo and his party
which was moving north from Alava, and entered Rosario at
1300 hours that day.
Aguinaldo's wife was ill and consequently, if the Insurgent
President had encountered a battalion of American infantry, he
probably would have been very much inclined to surrender.
Had Wheaton carried out his original mission of blocking the
roads along the coast, Aguinaldo could not have got through.
Ferguson returned to San Fabian with the remainder of the
regiment that night, little knowing that Aguinaldo had been
within his reach.
On the morning of the 14th Lieutenant Thayer, with twelve
men of the 3rd Cavalry from Young's force, rode into San
Fabian and told Wheaton about the efforts Young was making
to connect with him. Two days later Wheaton took the 33rd
Infantry to San Jacinto, one battalion marching via Alava and
Pozorrubio. Had he done this the same day that Thayer arrived
at San Fabian, or even the following day, Aguinaldo would have
been blocked as he spent the night of the 14th at Pozorrubio
and passed through Alava at noon the 15th.
Wheaton's dilatoriness throughout the campaign appears to
be inexcusable. On the 16th the 33rd Infantry clashed with the
remanants of Aguinaldo's former army, which was fleeing before MacArthur's advance. The 33rd drove Aguinaldo's men
toward Mangatarem in the Zambales Mountains to the south157




west. This force captured Aguinaldo's son, his mother and
Felipe Buencamino, a member of his cabinet, all of whom had
been in hiding since Young had dispersed Aguinaldo's rear
guard on the 13th. About $2,000 in specie were also captured,
and the Insurgent army was dispersed. Wheaton permitted his
troops to pursue Aguinaldo under General Young's supervision.
Let us turn momentarily to the events in the front of MacArthur's division which had been pushing the main Insurgent
army along the railroad. That force apparently did everything
that could be expected.'As with Lawton's division, the weather
made the movement of supplies extremely difficult. However,
since MacArthur's mission was not one of rapid movement, delays caused by bad weather and poor roads did not necessarily
jeopardize the success of the combined movement of the three
forces.
MacArthur's supply problem was theoretically simplified at
the outset by the fact that he was moving along the railroad.
This facility was, however, nullified by the Insurgent habit of
destroying railroad lines as its army retreated. But MacArthur
felt that if he could push the Insurgents back rapidly they might
not have time to destroy the line and the bridges.
However, it was necessary for both Lawton and Wheaton to
get in the rear of the Insurgents before any advance could be
initiated. Preparations began on November 5, but the actual
movement north did not commence until the 8th, the day after
Young cut loose from his trains at San Jose and one day after
Wheaton had landed at San Fabian.
It may be recalled that the Insurgent line ran from Porac
through entrenched positions just north of Angeles, thence east
about eight miles to the town of San Pedro MagaTang. Magalang
was at the foot of Mount Arayat, an extinct volcano jutting
3,500 feet up from the center of the Pampanga plain.
Consequently, before advance could be safely made, the left
flank of the Insurgent line at Magalang would have to be dispersed. Otherwise there would be constant harassing of the
American right flank. On November 5 a mixed force was sent
to oqcupy Magalang. The 12th Infantry approached the town
158




from Angeles, and the 17th Infantry and two troops of the 4th
Cavalry marched from Calulut. In the outskirts of the town a
running fight ensued and about 1,000 Insurgents under General
Concepcion were dispersed. About one hundred of them were
killed and wounded. American possession of Magalang made
Mabalacat, the next town north of Angeles on the railroad, decidedly vulnerable from a flanking attack.
MacArthur's plan was to strike quickly and decisively once
the advance had commenced. He directed the 36th Infantry to
become the "spearhead" of the advance as soon as the town of
Capas was taken. And he instructed the 36th to keep pushing
forward to maintain constant contact with the Insurgents.
The 36th Infantry was not random-picked for this mission.
It was one of the newly constituted Volunteer regiments, recruited in the Philippines. Almost every member had formerly
belonged to state Volunteer regiments and had seen service
against the Insurgents. In command was Colonel J. Franklin
Bell, a most aggressive, enterprising officer; He had graduated
from West Point in 1878. In 1898, with a commission as major
of Volunteers, he arrived in the Philippines with Merritt's expedition. A few days after his arrival he had crept to within
one hundred yards of the Spanish trenches and made a sketch
of the Spanish position. Assigned as division intelligence officer,
he had repeatedly made bold and often rash reconnaissances into
Insurgent territory. With the'formation of the 36th Infantry in
July 1899 he had been given the Volunteer rank of colonel and
placed in command. In September, during an attack on Porac,
he charged into the town in advance of his regiment and captured several Insurgents who had been too surprised to escape.
The Congressional Medal of Honor had been his reward. Before the Islands were pacified he attained the rank of major
general and eventually became Chief of Staff of the Army.
From Porac, Bell's 36th Infantry, augmented by a troop of
the 4th Cavalry, was to operate against the Insurgent right flank.
These troops planned to converge towards the railroad at Capas.
From San Pedro Magalang, the 17th Infantry plus a platoon of
field artillery and a troop of the 4th Cavalry, all under Colonel
Jacob Smith, was to operate against the Insurgent left flank.
159




And from Angeles the 9th and 12th regiments of Infantry, a
battery and a half of field artillery, and a company of engineers
under Brigadier General Joseph Wheeler, were to move forward
along the railroad. The 32nd Infantry, assigned to the division,
was to remain in Angeles to guard the supply lines to the rear.
General Wheeler graduated from West Point in 1859. During
the Civil War he became the senior cavalry officer of Lee's
armies. He was a Congressman from Alabama from 1881 until
1898. Then, feeling the war urge, he managed to have himself
appointed Major General of Volunteers and placed in command
of the dismounted cavalry division in the Cuba campaign. At
Las Guasimas, while Lawton's division was forming the advance guard for the movement on Santiago, he had perceived
that under cover of darkness he could hurry his first brigade
up and neatly outflank Lawton. By'assaulting the Spanish position he thought he could have the first battle all to himself, thus
scoring a brilliant victory over the Regular Infantry. His premature attack caused sixty-eight American casualties and criticism of Wheeler by other officers. Later Lawton was supposed
to have told Wheeler, "This is no political campaign but a military campaign." The eagerness of "Fighting Joe," as he was
called, to push rashly forward regardless of his orders or the
military situation, finally resulted in strict instructions from
General Shafter, who commanded the expedition. Shafter told
him to stay where he was and attempt no more battles. Following the Spanish-American War, "Fighting Joe" was recommissioned a brigadier general of Volunteers, and sent to the Philippines. MacArthur was determined to keep him repressed.
The original advance on M abalacat had been scheduled for
November 8. Bell, while making reconnaissance on the 7th,
moved around the Insurgent, right flank, and walked into
Mabalacat unopposed. He returned to Angeles that night with
the information. The Insurgents north of Angeles had withdrawn during the night. The "attack" the division made the
next day consisted principally of a road march along the destroyed railroad between Angeles and Mabalacat. Wheeler's'
brigade entered Mabalacat at 0900 November 8.
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The advance of the division was threatened by two unforeseen obstacles. The first was a series of heavy rains, unprecedented for that period of the year. They turned normally fordable streams into raging torrents, washed away river banks and
even the railroad track. The second was the fact that the Insurgents had destroyed the bridge over the Paruao River, just
south of Bamban, four miles north of Mabalacat. This railroad
bridge was about thirty feet high and contained four seventy-, foot spans. The bridge piers were metal tubes filled with concrete. One span and its piers had been blown up; another pier
was destroyed; and a third had fallen about two feet. The Insurgents had run seven locomotives and seventeen cars into the
river. An eighth engine had run off the track and was lodged
on the partially destroyed structure.
There wasn't enough suitable material to repair the bridge.
Large timbers necessary for construction of temporary piers
were not available in that part of the country. To stop while
the bridge was being repaired would have destroyed the purpose of the whole campaign. Consequently, MacArthur planned
to ferry supplies over the Paruao River.
He stopped at Mabalacat two days, moving supplies forward
and reconnoitering to the north and on both flanks. On the left,
near what is today the Fort Stotsenburg artillery range, Bell and
a reconnaissance group of eighteen men met and charged 100
entrenched Insurgents. They killed or wounded 29, captured 6
prisoners and 30 rifles. On the right flank Colonel Jacob Smith
and the 17th Infantry reconnoitered the muddy roads towards
Capas, fourteen miles north of Mabalacat.
On the 11th the Paruao River had fallen enough to be fordable and the advance was resumed, the next immediate object
being the town of Capas.
MacArthur had planned to have Bell and Smith, moving
along the flanks of the division, enter Capas from the west and
east respectively. Wheeler was directed to "demonstrate" along
the railroad with the hope that the Insurgents would not retreat
so fast that their force would melt away.
A "demonstration" was not "Fighting Joe's" idea of the
mission his brigade should have been assigned. He thought that
161




he should be permitted to "attack" and so advised MacArthur.
The suggestion was flatly rejected.
On the 11th Smith and the 17th Infantry, moving through
the town of Concepcion, and Bell, advancing west through the
hills, entered Capas without difficulty.
In Wheeler's brigade more interesting events occurred. In
accordance with division orders, the brigade moved forward
from Mabalacat with three battalions of the 9th and 12th Infantry in advance. On the north bank of the Paruao River the
Insurgents had constructed a strong line of entrenchments, and
again "Fightin'g Joe's" impetuousness got him into difficulty
with the division commander.
MacArthur had directed Wheeler to demonstrate only towards
the Insurgent trenches. However, when his advance elements
came under fire, Wheeler deployed his brigade and ordered it
to charge. Seeing the situation, MacArthur sent a messenger
directing Wheeler to report to him immediately. Wheeler rode
at a dead gallop to the division command post where MacArthur
told him to recall the line of skirmishers and send only a few
scouts up to the river bank. Wheeler galloped back to the firing
line, and ordered his entire line across the river. The brigade
became disorganized in crossing and scattered as it followed the
retreating Insurgents through Bamban. Wheeler and his brigade
had advanced two miles before another messenger from the
division commander could locate him and again direct him to
report to General MacArthur.
-What MacArthur said to Wheeler in this instance is not recorded. Probably had not the Federal administration been
sponsoring a boys-of-the-Blue-and-Gray-fighting-under-the-sameflag idea, Wheeler would have been relieved of his command.
The brigade was finally rounded up and marched back into
Bamban; the remainder of the division marched on into Capas.
The next day "Fighting Joe" was directed to keep his brigade
in the rear and supervise the movement of the supply trains.
On November 12, despite a heavy rain which immobilized
the supply trains, Bell's 36th Infantry pushed through the mud
to Tarlac. The town was deserted and the railroad line north
from Capas, intact. Bell's men found 40 partially-burned freight
162




cars and 2,500 rails there. Two miles north reconnaissance
groups located four disabled locomotives.
Unknown to MacArthur, that same day Aguinaldo and his
few remaining loyal commanders had held a council of war at
Bayambang, about twenty-six miles north of Tarlac. There they
decided further united Insurgent, resistance was useless, and the
only alternative was to break up into small bodies and engage
in the guerrilla warfare which had been-their last resort in the
Insurrection of 1896.
Aguinaldo, with a small group of followers, moved north
towards the mountains where, as has been related, he was nearly
captured by Young's troops. Generals Concepcion and Alexandrino, who had been opposing MacArthur's advance, moved
west into the Zambales Mountains. From this time on, MacArthur encountered no Insurgent resistance. -
The wagon road between Capas and Tarlac was, to quote
MacArthur, "indescribably bad." The railroad was, therefore,
the only means of supplying the division, even though MacArthur had no usable engines. As a substitute for locomotives
he organized a "pusher train" consisting of relays of Filipinos,
one hundred in a group, spread along the track. These groups
pushed the cars and thus formed the supply link between Capas
and Tarlac.
On November 15 ten inches of rain fell within twenty-four
hours. So sudden and violent was the storm that the Tarlac
River, three miles north of the town of Tarlac, overflowed its
banks and actually cut a new channel, a half-mile wide.
About 2,000 feet of railroad track was submerged under two
to three feet of water, and at the north end of the washout 250
feet of track and roadbed were completely gone. It was impossible to ford either men or pack animals. This condition effectively blocked further advance until the flood should recede.
The same day that Young was stepping on Aguinaldo's heels
about sixty miles north, MacArthur wired Otis:
It seems to me this washout here is a crisis in the campaign, and if this
problem can be successfully solved we will stand a very good chance of
finishing the war within a week as far as the organized forces are concerned north of the Pasig.
163




Fortunately the rains stopped the following day; and six hundred picked men of the 36th Infantry, two hundred and fifty of
the 17th, fifty cavalrymen, and a pack train carrying six days'
rations were able to cross the washout in improvised rafts.
These men and supplies entered Gerona that day while the
cavalry, under Lieutenant Salvens, pushed forward to Paniqui,
fourteen miles north of Tarlac.
At Paniqui MacArthur's men found four damaged locomotives and thirteen cars in good condition. They also discovered
that Bayambang, thirteen miles farther along the railroad, had
been occupied by American troops, probably from Lawton's
command. A Filipino scout was sent forward and reported the
railroad intact into Bayambang.
The battalion of infantry, which was loaded on the train
found at Paniqui, entered Bayambang the 19th and that night
continued to Calasiao, seventeen miles farther. Five miles of
track, from Calasiao to Dagupan, had been destroyed. Insurgent
resistance along the railroad had died.
Back with the supply trains at Bamban, "Fighting Joe" was
champing at the bit. November 11 MacArthur had directed
that the trains be moved to Capas the following day, adding
"an unusually early start is not necessary as the artillery is stalled
by an impassable stream." Under "Fighting Joe's" orders, the
brigade and the drivers of the supply wagons stood reveille at
0330 and moved out at 0430, only to be stopped by the exasperated MacArthur and forced to stand fast until 0900.
November 13th, the "pusher" railroad train having been
organized between Capas and Tarlac, "Fighting Joe" was
authorized to march his brigade into Tarlac. Wheeler gave his
horse to a sick man, carried the rifle of another sick man; and,
marching at the head of the column, made the twelve and onehalf mud-heavy miles to Tarlac in four hours. Arriving there, he
begged MacArthur to let him push on and attack an Insurgent
force reported at Gerona. MacArthur ordered him to stay at
Tarlac and assist in getting supplies over the Tarlac River washout.
Next day Wheeler and a staff officer waded through the washout for over a mile. There, finding a bridge submerged under
eight feet of water, this brigadier general took off his clothes
164




and dived in to "personally determine whether the iron rails
still adhered to the stringers of the bridge." From this point to
a distance of 250 feet it was impossible to wade. Wheeler directed the construction of an improvised bamboo bridge over
the gap; and then, working his infantrymen all night, pushed
25,000 rations across the washout in fourteen hours.
Feeling that he had done his duty in the rear areas, the next
day Wheeler intimated to MacArthur that if he was being held
back from "active service" because he was an ex-Confederate,
such was not the idea of the President of the United States.
MacArthur replied: "Do not attempt to move forward until
further orders. No enemy in front between here and Bayambang
and none in that town." Joe was henceforth doomed to inactivity.
MacArthur had moved to Bayambang. On the 20th he received information that the remnant of the Insurgent force
which had opposed him had retreated west into the Zambales
Mountains; and intended to institute a system of guerrilla warfare there. The same day American troops occupied Dagupan,
thus placing the entire road in American hands. It had taken
the American troops ten months to get control of the 120 miles
of railroad from Manila to Dagupan.
On November 23 MacArthur sent this wire to Otis:
The so-called Filipino Republic is destroyed. The congress has dissolved.
The President of the so-called republic is a fugitive as are all his cabinet
officers, except one who is in our hands. The Army itself as an organitation has disappeared... In this view how would it do to issue a proclamation at an early date, offering complete amnesty to all who surrender
within a stated time, with a payment of 30 pesos to every soldier who
gives up a rifle and declaring with emphasis that after the date fixed, the
killing of American soldiers will be regarded as murder and that all persons concerned therein would be regarded as murderers and treated accordingly. Such a proclamation would have the effect of forcing the generals to consider the expediency of continuing a hopeless struggle which
would commit them irrevocably to death or to lifelong expatriation' and
I think would have a powerful influence at a time when it is apparent
that most if not all of the leaders are more or less doubtful of what course
to pursue.
MacArthur hoped that if the killing of an American soldier
made the perpetrators guilty of murder, it would prevent guer165




rilla warfare. But Otis said the enemy had a formidable army
in southern Luzon and maintained many strong armed organizations in the immediate neighborhood of Manila and in the
southern Islands. Besides, the Insurgents had in captivity about
twenty American soldiers and more than 5,000 Spanish subjects.
Otis thought they would retaliate if the Americans publicly proclaimed an intended strict enforcement of the law. However, he
agreed that they should urgently pass the paying of $30 (Mex)
for each rifle surrendered.
Meanwhile MacArthur's troops were still busy. On November
28 Bell, with the 36th Infantry, was reconnoitering in the Zambales Mountains near Mangatarem, ten miles west of Bayambang. He surprised the last remnants of the Insurgent army.
These Insurgents had assembled there under Generals San
Miguel and Alexandrino to establish a base for guerrilla raids
into the Pampanga Valley. Bell scattered them in all directions
and captured what few "war" materials they still had. The captured supplies included several quick-firing modern Krupp
cannon, thousands of pounds of lead and copper sheeting, large
supplies of clothing, engineering tools, and food. Bell then continued west and occupied Santa Cruz on the west coast of
Luzon.
"Fighting Joe," who with his brigade had been forced to
"cool his heels" south of Paniqui, was finally permitted to make
a reconnaissance of the mountains to the west. He met no hostility.
The effects of the guerrilla warfare manifested itself immediately. The 9th Infantry was garrisoning Mabalacat. Only ten
days after MacArthur's division had passed through there, four
soldiers of the 9th wandered into the surrounding barrios "in
search of some chickens." About four miles from town they
were suddenly surrounded by fifty or sixty armed Filipinos who
commenced to fire on them. In the ensuing fight three Filipinos
were killed, four wounded, and one American soldier was killed
and the other three captured. The dead American was mutilated
by bolos and the three prisoners hurried off to a small barrio on
the slope of Mount Arayat. For six weeks they were subjected to
numerous indignities. A favorite amusement of the Insurgents
was snapping cocked pistols in the Americans' faces, the prison166




ers not knowing whether the guns were loaded or not. A
Macabebe prisoner had his throat cut before the Americans'
eyes. The diet was rice, sometimes interspersed with a little
salmon. In a short time the Americans became so weak and
emaciated that they could barely stand. In January the camp,
which was occupied by about six hundred Insurgents, was attacked by a detachment of the 25th Infantry. As the American
troops approached the camp the prisoners were lined up, forced
to kneel, and shot by a Filipino firing squad. As the Americans
entered the Insurgents hacked the wounded Americans with
bolos. Two Americans survived the horrible incident.
As far as MacArthur's division was concerned the active Insurrection was ended, and the pacification of the Islands became
a problem  of occupation. The situation is perhaps best sumned
up by MacArthur's following message to Otis:
The time has arrived for the movement of several columns west from
the railroad to the China Sea...I would proceed rapidly to a general
cleanup of Zambales and Bataan wherein are now located the fragments
of that part of the Insurgent army which was formerly in my immediate
front. In the first place I should start a column from O'Donnel (seven miles
west of Capas) to move directly west to Botolon or Iba, the movement to
be connected by water through a small ship to arrive at designated point.
simultaneously with the troops... Another column not to exceed 500
men to be assembled at Florida Blanca (about twenty miles west of San
Fernando) from thence to pass into Bataan as far south as Balanga and
therefrom returning to Llana Hermosa and from thence to Subig. For purpose of cooperation, communication and supply another ship should be
placed in the vicinity of Orani and Balanga and proceed at the proper time
to Subig and meet the column at that place.
Otis approved and during December the proposed march was
made under the command of Brigadier General F. D. Grant.
Detachments from the 3rd and 32nd Infantry marched from
Florida Blanca, and 400 men of the 25th Infantry (colored)
marched across the Zambales Mountains from O'Donnel. On
one occasion the 25th Infantry became so short of food that it
had to shoot wild monkeys. But, for the most part, enough supplies were brought to the various towns along the coast of Zambales Province by naval vessels. Frequent skirmishes resulted in
the death of 20 Insurgents, the wounding of 21, the capture of
52 prisoners, 65 rifles, over 8,000 rounds of ammunition, 100
167




cattle, 25 ponies, and the release of several Spanish prisoners
held by the Insurgents. The provinces of Zambales and Bataan
were occupied and brought under American control.
Let us return to General Young whom we left at Binalonan
on November 14 after he had just missed capturing Aguinaldo.
Young's troops were scattered from Cabanatuah to San Fabian.
His cavalry was exhausted and the majority of the horses were
unshod. Anxious, however, to take up the quick pursuit of
Aguinaldo, he rushed couriers to Colonel Wessels at Tayug,
directing him to send all cavalry capable of movement to
Binalonan.immediately. Messages were also sent to Major Ballance and Major Batson, who were at Villasis, each with a battalion of the 22nd Infantry, and to the Macabebe scouts. They
were all asked to come forward as soon as possible. The
Macabebes responded instantly and on the 16th pushed on to
Pozorrubio, seventy-four hours behind Aguinaldo. Ballance's
battalion reached Binalonan but could not go any farther and
was ordered to San'Fabian where practically the entire command collapsed. On the 17th Young and Captain Chase's troop
of the 3rd Cavalry following the Macabebes, received definite
information that Aguinaldo had moved north through Alava
and Rosario. Young determined to follow if for no other reason
than to prevent the scattered commands from uniting. He also
wanted to release all the prisoners.
Leaving Chase at Pozorrubio to obtain sugar, coffee, and salt,
Young and the battalion of Macabebes pushed north to Alava
and Rosario. Young's temerity must be admired. He was about
142 miles north of Manila with a lone battalion of about 300
Filipino troops. He was advancing, though no arrangements
had been made for supplies, into a country never before occupied by the Americans. The troops accompanying him had for
the past month been engaged almost daily in skirmishes with
Insurgents and had moved over the most difficult roads without
adequate food supplies. Before leaving on the venture, Young
sent a message to Otis advising him of his intended pursuit.
Unquestionably Otis never would have sanctioned such an
expedition, but Young could not be reached by telegraph.
November 18 Young and the Macabebes pushed north to
Rosario, sixty hours after Aguinaldo's departure, and there
168




found some of Aguinaldo's abandoned carts. Then they went on
to Tubao, following a difficult mountain trail.
On the 19th, feeling that his force "was too small to allow
any concentration of the enemy," Young sent this message to,,RRI,,  SAGI   "St
VI///,/ ANE.,'  2 -" -'.   I-,"~"
\ i;' N U                  '     a
(/> "^T/    BANDW
i SS.
SEVILLAA                                  3
/A"I   " \..dAS TS                           i /
\   UNION                  X
IH~oaw  J  r^ ///,8\GI|           o"'BAYOMOON G


169




Lawton: "I need additional forces but cannot wait. A battalion
of light Infantry which can march rapidly without impedimenta
should follow on my trail, with an officer in command who
will push for all he is worth."
From Tubao Young followed the trail for Aringay, a coastal
town about eight miles distant, and at dusk had to disperse Insurgents entrenched on the outskirts of the town. Lieutenant
Batson in command of the Macabebes was wounded and one
Macabebe soldier killed in the engagement.
On the 20th, leaving a small party at Aringay to guard the
sick and wounded, the small command pushed up the Camino
Real towards San Fernando La Union, capital of La Union
Province and a rather important seaport. Near the town of
Booang Young was able to establish flag communication with
the Navy gunboat Samar, and to request its assistance in the
attack on San Fernando. The Samar was successful at San
Fernando, permitting Young's troops to disperse about three
hundred Insurgents there with little difficulty. From San Fernando reconnaissance was initiated towards Naguilian, a town
in the mountains about six miles east. Information was received that Aguinaldo had left Naguilian two nights previously. Actually, as indicated in Dr. Villa's diary, Aguinaldo
had left Naguilian at midnight of the 19th and had passed
through San Fernando the next morning. He then proceeded
north along the coast to the vicinity of Napacpacan, twenty
miles away, where he remained until the 21st.
Meanwhile, to quote Young: "The situation was perplexing;
my cavalry was crippled for want of shoes; the Macabebes were
disheartened at the loss of their beloved leader Batson, and many
were sick and footsore."
Hearing that a battalion of the 33rd Infantry from Wheaton's
force had entered Aringay, eight miles in his rear, Young sent
orders for this battalion to follow as quickly as possible in his
trail. The battalion started to follow him but was intercepted at
Booang, and upon Wheaton's orders returned to San Fabian.
Young had received information that Aguinaldo intended to
continue up the coast into Abra Province where it was intimated that the American prisoners and about 4,000 Spanish
prisoners were being held.
170




On November 21 Young sent the following message to
Wheaton who was still at San Fabian:
My forces are much depleted and worn out. Aguinaldo has been playing
hide and seek. One day in the mountains, the next day he or some of his
generals on the coast road... Am sorry that you found it necessary to
recall Faison. The Infantry force promised has not arrived... Aguinaldo
is an outlaw and fugitive in the Mountains and can be caught with fresh
troops. If you can assist me in this matter, I don't see how he can escape.
In another effort to cut off Aguinaldo's escape from the rear,
Young sent Colonel Parker aboard the Samar. Parker was to
proceed to San Fabian and attempt to obtain at least a company
of infantry which would be taken to Vigan on the coast about
ninety miles north of San Fernando. If this force could be landed
at Vigan it could operate from the north and possibly cut
Aguinaldo off from that direction. Parker went to San Fabian
on the Samar and there found that a battalion of the 33rd Infantry under Major March was already en route to San Fernando.
Wheaton refused to release any more troops. Disheartened,
Parker noticed that the U. S. battleship Oregon lay at anchor
off San Fabian. He paid Commander Wilde of the Oregon a
courtesy call and suggested that the Oregon accompany the
Samar back to San Fernando. Wilde consented, and Parker decided that if the Army refused to furnish soldiers for the venture to Vigan he would call upon the Navy.
Upon his return to San Fernando, accompanied by the Oregon
and the gunboat Callao, Parker found March's battalion already
there. Parker had instructions from Young to assume command
of whatever troops he was able to obtain. He was to take direct
command if he were the senior of a staff officer, or to give orders in Young's name if he were junior officer. However, Major
March was unsympathetic to the expedition to Vigan. Parker
was March's senior by about twelve years in the Regular Army,
and held higher rank by virtue of his commission in the Volunteers. Nevertheless, March flatly refused to follow Parker's orders on the basis that his organization was part of Wheaton's
command; and, therefore, not subject to General Young's orders. After a "sharp discussion" Parker's written demand was
171




answered by March's written refusal. Parker was forced to leave
on his expedition without any troops.
Not discouraged, Parker boarded the Samar and accompanied
by the Callao and the Oregon, steamed towards Vigan.
The capture of Vigan, 213 miles from Manila, by the Navy
under Parker's supervision was both amusing and interesting.
Until Young had started his rapid march north, no Americans
except prisoners had been within 150 miles of the place. On the
morning of November 26 the Samar approached the shore opposite the town and received fire from Insurgent entrenchments.
This was the provocation the Navy sought. The Oregon
opened up on Vigan with one of her 13-inch guns and several
6-inchers. The Callao and Samar fired their 3-inch and Gatling
guns. One of the Navy officers remarked to Parker, "I guess the
old man will shoot until he has used up his annual allowance.
He hasn't had any target practice this year."
The effect of this bombardment is vividly described by an
American prisoner who was in Vigan at the time:
We had been conversing when suddenly a loud report startled us all.
Again it came and then boom-boom-boom. Rushing to the balcony we
saw soldiers flying helter skelter up the street. Suddenly there came a report that shook the building and a shell hissed over the town, exploding
in the jungle between Bantay and Vigan. A second explosion seemed to
rend the universe to pieces and again a terrific whirling and screeching
overhead brought a shriek from a hundred voices outside. In a group stood
all the civil officials, both Provincial and municipal, the local president,
the governor. the chief justice, the tax collector and the chief of police. A
third shell was fired over the town causing the governor and all his councilmen apparently to leap several feet in the air. Just then the earth again
seemed to split under us and the limb of a large tree growing within two
hundred yards of us was neatly cut off, the shell burying itself six feet in
the ground without exploding fortunately...As we learned later in the
day, three persons were killed.
With due credit to the Navy it should be said that Commander Wilde had no intention.of bombarding the noncombatant inhabitants of Vigan. The shells were purposely laid at
what was intended to be harmless ranges.
Following the bombardment a detachment of sailors and
Marines landed on the beach and proceeded towards the town,
172




two miles away. Parker had also managed to get ashore, and,
following the landing party, found it halted while its commander gave instructions in advance-guard and patrol duty.
Accompanied by only four sailors, Parker entered the town,
and was received with cheers and the ringing of bells. Native
explanation of the reception was that Ilocanos were glad to be
freed from Insurgent domination. The Navy formally occupied
the town. Two days later a company of the 33rd Infantry, which
General Young had dug up at San Fernando, arrived on the
gunboat Callao and took over from the Navy. A few days after
that 113 more men, under Major Marcus Cronin, also arrived.
Parker then took charge of the prosperous city of 20,000 inhabitants.
Meanwhile General Young at San Fernando had been joined
by Major Swigert. On the 23rd, with three troops of cavalry
and the 75 remaining effective Macabebes, Young marched to
Napacpacan, twenty-five miles north. There he received 'information that Insurgent General Tinio had gathered a force of
about 1,700 men to oppose movement north. Young sent another
message asking Wheaton to send troops to his assistance. Major
March's battalion of the 33rd Infantry had already been sent.
On November 26 March's battalion joined Young and was
sent forward to garrison the town of Tagudin, four miles farther along the coast. Young and the cavalry moved six miles
north to Sevilla and on the 28th to Candon. The mass of people
along Young's route said they had been robbed by the Insurgent
troops and welcomed American occupation.
On November 28 Young obtained a captured letter which indicated that Aguinaldo was at Anagui. The letter also disclosed
that Tinio, who held 20 American and about 4,000 Spanish
prisoners in the mountains of Abra Province, was fortifying a
position in the rugged hills of Tangadin.
Young was reinforced on December 1 by a battalion of the
34th Infantry under Colonel Howze. So he decided to send
March's battalion into the mountains towards Anagui on the
trail of Aguinaldo. He planned to continue north along the
coast road, destroy Tinio's force at Tangadin and, if possible,
release the prisoners.
Moving into the mountains November 30 March's battalion
173




passed through Concepcion and marched to Tila Pass where it
exterminated Aguinaldo's Tagalog bodyguard and nearly captured the Insurgent President. The following is from March's
report:
The trail was very narrow, the entire command having to proceed in
single file up the mountains. Tila Pass is 4,400 feet high and the rise is
extremely rapid. The enemy had constructed a stone barricade across the
trail where it commands the turns of the zigzag for a considerable distance.
Thb advance was checked by heavy fire -from this barricade which killed
and wounded several men. It was evident that the position could not be
taken by a frontal attack, when the trail only allowed the men to pass one
at a time. On the left of the barricade was a gorge several hundred feet
deep.-On its right was a precipitous mountain which rose 1,500 feet above
the trail. I ordered Lieutenant Tompkins to take his company, move along
a slight ridge which struck the face of the mountain about 150 feet from
the summit. From there he had a straight-up climb to the top where the
men pulled themselves up by twigs and by hand. The ascent took two hours
during which time the enemy kept up an incessant and accurate fire which
they varied by rolling down stones on our heads. When Tompkins appeared
upon the crest of the hills above their heads, I charged the barricade and
rushed the enemy over the hill. We found eight bodies on the trail among
which was that of General Gregorio del Pilar, Commanding General of the
Insurgent forces. The Insurgent loss was 52. My loss was two killed and
nine wounded. I reached the summit at 4:30 p. m. and camped there for
the night, finding at that point a large amount of rice...
From their positions in the mountains the Insurgents had
watched the American advance from Concepcion. General
Gregorio del Pilar was only 22 years old. He became a hero to
many Filipinos, and a large monument has been erected to his
memory at Calumpit.
Aguinaldo, who had been resting at Cervantes about fifteen
miles southeast of Tila Pass, received word of del Pilar's defeat
and death at 1700 November 30. He immediately decamped
and set out for the village of Kayan, farther east in the mountains. He reached there at midnight and continued his flight
northeast towards Bontoc.
On December 1 March heard that Aguinaldo was at Cervantes (Cayan) and continued on. Major March told the story this
way:
Aguinaldo was reported at Cervantes so I made a forced march to that
place 28 kilometers from the summit, arriving at Cervantes at 1830. (Agui174




naldo had left the place nearly twenty-four hours previotus). I spent the
4th resting and sifting evidence of his whereabouts. All large numbers of
Spanish prisoners were abandoned and from their talcs, I located him as
passing through Cayan at 0200 on the 3rd. I set out on the 5th for Cayan
with a picked force of 100 men and officers who vwere the least exhausted
from their long march and the fighting. The road imnicdiately begins to ascend and goes straight up until a height of 9,000 feet is reached. Upon arriving at Cayan, General Venancio Concepcion, Aguinaldo's Chief of Staff surrendered and was sent back to Cervantes. A number of the men were now
exhausted by the climb to Cayan so I weeded out the command again and
set out after Aguinaldo with eighty-six men. I had been living off the
country and now got into a country which produces very little besides yams
and in which the marching was extremely severe. However, I pushed on to
near Bontoc where I learned that Aguinaldo had gone through three days
before. He was gaining on me with fresh ponies and bearers and with his
party unencumbered. I therefore rounded up the Spanish prisoners throughout the region and returned to Cervantes. The number of prisoners released
was 575, including 150 friars.
March's expedition had destroyed the last vestige of Aguinaldo's Tagalog army and had sent the leader dashing through
the mountains like a hunted animal.
Returning to Young, who was determined to destroy Tinio's
force and release the American prisoners, we see that by December 3 he had been reinforced by Penn's battalion of the
34th Infantry. He had moved along the coast road to Narvacan,
about twelve miles south of Vigan. Also on December 3rd Otis
had relieved Lawton of the command of the troops in the north,
and had sent him on an expedition against the Insurgents. The
Filipino Army had again assembled southeast of San Miguel
de Mayumo. On the same date Lawton sent the following message to Young:
Wheaton has relieved me at Tayug; you must look out for yourself from
this time. Hope you will find as good a chief quartermaster as I have been.
Good luck and best wishes for you and your command.
When Lawton left Young lost a most loyal and sympathetic
superior.
Young's fighting force now consisted of 145 infantrymen and
115 cavalrymen. At midnight December 3 a Filipino told him
that Tinio with 1,200 men was building an elaborate system of
defensive works at Tangadin, a narrow pass in the gorge of the
175




Abra River, about six miles east of Vigan. It was rumored that
the prisoners were at Bangued, five miles beyond this pass. Despite the inequality in numbers, Young decided to attack Tinio
immediately.
The idea of 260 weary and poorly equipped troops, over
eighty miles from the nearest reinforcements, atacking 1,200
securely entrenched Insurgents in a difficult mountain defile
would have given Otis a nightmare. Young marched ahead.
The Ilocano, General Manuel Tinio, was of different stamp
than the majority of Insurgent generals. He knew that Young
was marching towards him, intending to release the prisoners.
Knowing that the American garrison at Vigan consisted of
Colonel Parker with about one hundred effectives, he decided
to make a night raid on that town before Young could either
attack him or reinforce the small garrison at Vigan.
On the night of December 3, while Young was marching on
Tangadin, Tinio sent 400 men on boats down the Abra River
to attack Vigan. The Americans in public buildings facing the
main plaza of the town, awoke to find Insurgents pouring a
hot fire on their quarters. Parker's men grabbed their rifles and
returned the fire. In a short time the city plaza was swept with
a storm of bullets from both sides. After two hours the Americans located their assailants' exact positions in the darkness and
prepared to rush the buildings they occupied. The charge of
Parker's men was repulsed, and the attackers were forced to
take cover in shrubbery only thirty-five yards from the muzzles
of hostile rifles. As dawn broke the fight developed into a sniping contest, and with daylight the Insurgents became discouraged and melted away. Eight Americans had been killed and
three wounded. Sixty-five Insurgent dead were found in the
plaza; their wounded, as usual, had been carried away.
While Colonel Parker was chasing the raiding force out of
Vigan, General Young's small group reached Tinio's fortified
position at Tangadin. As he approached the position Young
realized that it was indeed a strong one. Located on the slope of
a bald knob it had line after line of entrenchments. Midway
up the hill was a Vauban-type earthen redoubt containing
lunettes and covered ways. On the summit of the knob was
another redoubt flanked by trenches. Had Young possessed
176




artillery his attack would have been simplified. With only a
small force of infantry and cavalry, however, he realized that
a direct attack on the position would be disastrous. The only
solution was to "flank the Insurgents out." North of the defenses was another hill the crest of which was somewhat higher
than the summit of the knob. Young sent two companies of the
34th Infantry on a flank march with instructions to climb the
hill and attack the Insurgents from that direction.
The march of the two companies of the 34th Infantry to the
top of the hill was difficult. No trail up the steep incline existed, and the men had to cut their way through the thick
tropical underbrush. After trying four hours the group was still
far from the top, and men began falling out from exhaustion.
The entire group then worked its way down several hundred
feet to a small canyon where there was water. Finally at sundown, after eight hours, the men reached the summit. The Insurgent position was about 1,000 yards away, across an impassable gorge but the Americans could look down into their
trenches.
Meanwhile General Young had become worried as to the
condition of the flanking force and sent a dismounted troop of
cavalry to ascertain its situation. His force was then split in
half. Had the 1,000 Insurgents in the entrenched position attacked the group in their front, they would have been opposed
by about 125 men. But at 1600 in the afternoon a battilion of
the 33rd Infantry joined Young's group. It had made a forced
march from Candon.
When the flanking force began firing from above and slightly
to their rear, the Insurgents began to evacuate the trenches.
When Young's main force charged up the slope another "impregnable" position was taken without a casualty.
The next morning a battalion of the 34th Infantry under
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Howze and Lieutenant Colonel
Luther Hare's battalion of the 33rd Infantry, were assigned the
mission of following up Tinio's retreating forces. They were to
effect, if possible, the release of the American prisoners.' General Young and the cavalry marched to Vigan.
The march of the two battalions of infantry through the wild
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Benguet Mountains on the trail of the American prisoners is
one of the outstanding feats of American arms. Under Colonel
Hare, the column proceeded to San Quintin where 50,000
pounds of Insurgent rice were destroyed. A report was received
that the American prisoners were at Bangued, five miles farther
in the mountains. Hare rested his command and then, leaving
his fires burning as a ruse, left for Bangued at 0200 hours. The
column reached the town of Pidican at 0600 in the morning,
and Hare heard from the 800 Spanish prisoners there that the
Insurgents were moving south to San Jose. Howze and the
battalion of the 34th were sent on to Bangued; and Hare, with
the battalion of the 33rd, moved southeast towards San Jose,
thirty-eight miles away.
Covering the thirty-eight hilly miles to San Jose in two
marches, Hare learned that the trail had been false, and that the
Insurgents had moved north through the mountains rather than
south. He immediately turned north and moved along the
Abra River, intending to catch Howze's battalion if possible.
At the town of Dolores Hare received a message from Howze
which stated that he was on the trail of the Insurgents and that
the American prisoners were with him. Taking 100 picked
men, Hare moved north with all possible dispatch through the
mountain villages of Bandi, Dingras nd Solsona, following
Howze's trail. On the 13th he caught up with Howze's column.
Comparing notes with Colonel Hare, Howze reported that
he had entered Bangued December 6. There he had been informed that the American prisoners had left that town two days
previous, and had been taken to either Dolores or La Paz.
Howze followed a hunch. He took the mountain trail to La Paz
where he met three Americans who had escaped in the confusion incident to the flight of Tinio's force. These three were
L. R. Edwards, a Navy landsman; William Bruce of the 1st
Nevada Cavalry; and an English civilian, J. O'Brien. Edwards
had been captured with Lieutenant Gillmore's landing party at
Baler the previous April. Bruce had wandered away from
Manila on a payday pass in February 1899, had been arrested
and detained until after the Battle of Manila. At that time he
became the Insurgents' "Exhibit A" as an "American prisoner
of war." O'Brien had attempted to extort a gold-mining conces178




sion from the Insurgent Government so had been arrested as a
spy.
The three Americans thought they had escaped at Dunlass,
and offered to guide Howze's battalion there. The trail to Dunlass was narrow, steep, and impassable for carts. The inhabitants
of the area were Tinguines, a wild, primitive tribe, illiterate
and crude. Howze impressed two Tinguines into service as
guides and pushed on, following closely the trail of Tinio's
dwindling force. Lining the trail were seven cannons, several
hundred rifles, and thousands of rounds of ammunition. Near
the village of Bandi Tinio's rear guard of about one hundred
men made a short stand. Howze's battalion destroyed the force
and after that Tinio's "retreat" became a rout. The battalion
reached Dunlass December 9, but the quarry had flown farther
into the mountains. Howze followed.
At Dingras Howze forced Tinio to drop 800 Spanish prisoners, 500 of whom were officers. Continuing the chase, the
Americans entered Solsona and then pushed on to Manating
where the trail entered a canyon leading into the wild country
around the head of the Apayao River.
Howze had little food. The trail led through mountains, absolutely impassable for even pack animals or ponies. Among the
120 men of his command there were only twelve pairs of shoes.
In six days his force had marched one hundred miles over
mountain trails, engaging in a skirmish almost every day.
Howze sent word to General Young that the former must stop
to wait for shoes.
Two days later Hare, with his 100 picked men, joined Howze
at the mouth of the canyon. Hare weeded out of his command
all but seventy men and twelve officers. He left Manating with
them the same night and went up the canyon.
The ever-active Young, meanwhile, had proceeded by Navy
boat up the coast to Laog which was about twenty miles east
of Manating. Receiving Howze's message as to the condition
of his troops, he immediately dispatched to Manating a troop
of cavalry with supplies and shoes borrowed from the Navy.
This force arrived on the 14th, and Howze, his men refreshed
by their two days' rest, immediately followed Hare up the
canyon. He overtook Hare at 2030 that night. The following
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day the command, then consisting of 17 officers and 133 men,
continued the march over the wild mountain trails. On the 16th
three more escaped Americans joined the column. They were
Norman Fitzgerald and John Burke, sailors, and Sergeant
Frank McDonald of the 21st Infantry. Fitzgerald had been a
seaman aboard the USS Baltimore and had been captured at
San Fabian on November 8; Farley, a fireman on the Oregon
had been captured at Orani September 8. McDonald had been
captured at Imus, Cavite.
On the 17th the column reachqd the headwaters of the Apayao
which, pursuing a tortuous course through the mountains,
empties into the China Sea at the northern tip of Luzon.
That same day the column was moving down a trail which
crossed the river frequently and necessitated the construction
of rafts for crossing. The pursuing party found a note in the
sand from the fourteen remaining American prisoners saying,
"Here we are but God knows where."
The prisoners had been abandoned two days before. They
were located the next morning. The meeting is described by
Major Penn of the 34th Infantry:
The prisoners dazed for a moment rushed to meet us and commenced to
embrace the first man. It took some minutes to make us understand that
they had been abandoned two days before by the Insurgent guard and left
to their fate in a wild unknown land, filled with savage tribes, left without
arms, without food, nearly starved, almost naked, footsore, weak, emaciated.
The Lieutenant in charge of the prisoners told Lieutenant Gillmore that
his orders from General Tinio were to take the prisoners into the mountains
and kill them. He told Lieutenant Gillmore that his conscience would not
permit him to carry out the orders that he had received, that he would not
kill them but would abandon them to their fate.
Colonel Hare's party was at first undecided as to whether
they should return to safety via Manating or go on down the
river to the sea. The trip to Manating meant four days or
longer without food as the march with the enfeebled prisoners
would be slow. Hare decided to take his chance on the river.
The trip by water proved to be more arduous and dangerous
than was anticipated. The river was full of rapids and the current destroyed rafts almost as quickly as they were constructed.
The prisoners' condition made short marches necessary, and on
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several days only two miles were covered. Through Christmas
and New Year's Day the benighted force staggered over the
countryside in search of food. One soldier contracted measles
and died. On January 2, virtually in a state of collapse, the
group arrived at Abulug, at the mouth of the river and on the
northern tip of Luzon. Succor was reached from Navy ships
stationed at Aparri, a city on the coast ten miles east of Abulug.
The veterans were taken by boat from Aparri to Vigan and the
released prisoners on to Manila. The expedition had released
about 1,500 Spanish prisoners, 12 American sailors including
an officer (Lieutenant Gillmore), 10 soldiers, and 3 civilians.
General Young had every reason to be proud of the accomplishments of his brigade. True, he had not captured Aguinaldo,
but he had chased the Insurgent President into hiding. On
January 1 Aguinaldo's wife and sister, finding the rigors of
mountain traveling too great, surrendered to Major March, as
did several of Aguinaldo's staff officers.
General Young reported the accomplishments of his brigade:
The endurance of the men of my command surpasses the belief of a nonparticipant and is beyond any ever encountered by an American army. It
traveled over miles of road which were always wet and muddy, sometimes
only a few inches deep, at other places two feet; sometimes covered with a
little water, at other times waist deep, and at others the bed of a torrent;
wading, swimming, rafting and bridging innumerable streams, torrents,
rivers and lagoons. Poorly clad and shod and generally hungry. After leaving San Jose, all issues of rations ceased and the men had to live on what
they could find in the country which had been largely desolated by the
Insurgents. The officers and men of my command are entitled to the best
and highest substantial recognition that it is possible to give them who
have given to their country's cause the best that is in them regardless of
life, health, food and shelter.
General Young might have expected that the smallest recognition for his services would be to place him in command of the
division Lawton had left. Despite Wheaton's inactivity and lack
of cooperation, Young had turned the campaign into a brilliant
maneuver and a most creditable feat of American arms. However, General Otis had not forgotten the letter Young had written the War Department, and, besides, was not particuarly
pleased with the way Young had broken away from the tele181




graph line and gotten out of control. Brigadier General R. H.
Hall, junior to Young, was given command of the division.
The brave, energetic cavalryman was relieved and given another
assignment. However, when the smoke of the Insurrection had
cleared away Young's services were recognized. In 1903 he was
promoted to the rank of lieutenant general in the Regular Army
and made Chief of Staff.
It would be a culpable omission not to describe what might
be considered a side trip, made by a company of Filipino scouts
under Lieutenant Joseph Castner and a battalion of the 24th
Infantry under Captain Joseph B. Batchelor. Otis must have
squirmed at his desk in Manila while reports of the movement
came in.
Young's pursuit of Aguinaldo had led him up the Benguet
Mountains on the northwest coast of Luzon. Just east of this
range, through the provinces of Nueva Viscaya, Isabella, and
Cagayan, ran the fertile tobacco-growing Cagayan Valley, split
through the middle by the Cagayan River.
In order to follow the movements of Batchelor's little expedition we must go back to November 1899, shortly after
Young had cut loose from his supplies at San Jose. On November 23 Batchelor's battalion of the 24th Infantry reached Tayug.
General Lawton called Captain Batchelor to his headquarters
and directed him to march over the mountains to Bayombong.
That is the town Aguinaldo had intended to use for the next
Insurgent capital and which could be reached only by mountain
trails. After Young had shunted Aguinaldo into the mountains
farther west, the military importance of Bayombong ceased, but
Lawton thought it would be a good idea to garrison the town
anyway. Batchelor was authorized to live off the country, giving
receipts for whatever he found it necessary to take.
His orders were quite vague as to his movements after he
reached Bayombong, and possibly Lawton desired them to be
so. A few days previously Young had proposed that an expedition be sent over the mountains to enter the Cagayan Valley.
Lawton knew Otis would never consent to an unsupplied expedition moving through an area far beyond the regions American troops had penetrated, and perhaps even Lawton himself
182




was dubious ot the efficacy of such a march. However, a troop
of the 4th Cavalry and a company of Filipino Scouts had already occupied Bayombong. So Batchelor had some grounds
for believing that, whether specifically mentioned or not, he was
authorized by General Lawton to operate farther north if he
felt able.
Loading his men with as much salt as they could carry,
Batchelor started out for Bayombong on November 24. The
route he was to follow over the mountains was fittingly named
the "Infernal Trail." It led in zigzags up hill and down caverns,
over and around mountain streams. It was only eighteen inches
wide, and at places bordered precipices 300 feet high. At other
places tall grass hid from view drops of hundreds of feet. The
pack animals could not follow because of abrupt turns overlooking steep cliffs. The second day the battalion was without food
except what wild animals they could shoot. Wearing light
clothing and carrying no blankets, the men were unable to
sleep during the cold nights in the mountains. The command
lad already been marching through the mud for a month before the trip started and the rocky trail put the finishing touches
on the almost rotted shoes. The soldiers suffered lacerated feet.
Nevertheless, dragging themselves forward, the men managed
to cover the twenty-eight miles to Bayombong in six days.
At Bayombong Batchelor received information that Insurgent
forces in the Cagayan Valley numbered about 1.100 and that
Aguinaldo was making preparations to enter the valley. Then
in order to carry out the spirit of his orders, Batchelor decided
to move across the mpuntains to Cagayan River and follow the
river to its mouth at Aparri. He sent a message back to Lawton,
advising him of the move and requesting that transportation
and rations be sent by boat from Aparri up the Cagayan River
to meet him as he marched down. With his force of 300 Negro
soldiers and fifty Filipino Scouts of Castner's force, be struck
out from Bayombong on December 1.
It was about forty miles across the mountains from Bayombong to the Cagayan River, and the route was over difficult
mountain trails. After Batchelor reached the river he would still
be 135 miles from Aparri. Bayombong was 160 miles from
Manila, and American troops had never been near the area.
1'8




Everyone who heard about the proposed march shuddered.
When Lawton discovered that Batchelor had struck out from
Bayombong he remarked: "If successful, good results will follow to the probable credit of the officer, but very different if a
failure," He immediately rushed to Bayombong a battalion ol
the 22nd Infantry under Major Baldwin. The Major had in
structions to stop Batchelor if possible. Baldwin's men hurriec
over the "Infernal Trail" as fast as they could but reachec
Bayombong one day after Batchelor had set out.
Rushing a courier to Batchelor, who was then only twent3
miles away, Baldwin transmitted Lawton's order. Batchelor re
fused to obey, stating that he was acting under the direct order:
of General Lawton, besides pursuing an Insurrecto force. Three
days later Baldwin sent Batchelor another message directing the
latter to return. The message was ignored.
On December 9 Lawton, the alleged sponsor of the expedi
tion, wired Otis:
Batchelor had no instructions to go farther than Bayombong and vicinity
His departure for Aparri was as much a surprise as though he had startec
for San Francisco. A message was sent with all haste with orders to him t,
remain at Bayombong. The enthusiasm and desire on the part of all officer
to do something has led them to unauthorized conduct, which has em
barrassed me greatly.
The first day out Batchelor routed about two hundred an(
fifty entrenched Insurgents -at San Luis and marched into th
settlement of Estella. The people there were more afraid o
marauding Igorot headhunters, who lived in the-nearby mour
tains, than they were of the Americans. Batchelor then cor
tinued to the town of Carig, where he was met by the locs
brass band and informed that the Insurgents had collected
large force at Echague.
Echague was a town 27 miles beyond where the trail Batct
elor was following met the Cagayan River. Arriving at Echagu
the morning of December 5, the captain was "disappointed" t
find the Insurgents had evacuated the town.
Resting there a day and hiring carts to carry his sick, h
continued on the 6th twenty-one miles down the river t
Cagayan. At that city Batchelor received information that th
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,iiurgents were entrenched at the junction of the Cagayan and
the Rio Magat, seven miles farther.
Forced to fight at this point, he was able to rout the enemy
on the opposite bank only after nine men had crossed the river
on a raft and had driven them back. The Americans killed 9
and wounded 8 Filipinos. One of Batchelor's men had drowned
while trying to cross the river, and three had been slightly
wounded. But Batchelor's only anxiety was his short amrnmunition supply.
On the 8th his command marched into Ilagan, a prosperous
town of 13,000 inhabitants, and was met by the rrunicipal
authorities with the "keys of the city."
Batchelor was then 60 miles from Bayombong, where the
nearest supporting American troops were. His force at that
time consisted of only 300 men. About sixty were disabled by
sickness and many were without clothing. Only sixty cartridges
per man remained. The next day General Daniel Tirona, commander of all Insurgent forces in the Cagayan Valley, surrendered.
At Ilagan Batchelor borrowed cascos from a Spanish tobacco
company and, placing his command in the boats, floated down
the Cagayan River in comfort. At Tuguegarao, the capital of
Cagayan Province, 20 miles farther on, city officials met him
at the dock with carriages. They formally turned the province
over to him. Four hundred and twenty Spanish prisoners were
released.
On the 13th naval officers, who had steamed sixty miles up
the river from Aparri, met Batchelor at Tuguegarao. Leaving
one company to garrison Tuguegarao, he and the remainder of
his command were then transported on boats down the river to
Aparri. On the 21st he was taken to Manila on the gunboat
Helena. The daring march had been amazingly successful.
Batchelor reported as follows:
A force of about 350 men, insufficiently clothed, marched without guides
into an unknown country; following trails, just passable, through chilling
nights and sweltering days. Made 123 deep fords. Crossed eighty miles of
precipitous mountains in five days where the daily average ascent and
descent was not less than 8,000 feet. Lived three weeks on unaccustomed
and insufficient food; twice drove the enemv from strong positions. In
185




twenty-four days turned over to the United States three provinces, said to
contain seventy towns. Liberated more than 400 prisoners. Forced the surrender of the General commanding the Insurrecto forces in its front, with
one large seagoing steamer, one river steamer, one steam launch, more than
100 cascos, 4 modern field guns, 800 rifles and 1,100 men; restored and
continued order and neither maltreating men nor insulting women, left
people of the valley enthusiastic advocates of American supremacy.
One might expect that Batchelor would have been decorated. But such was hardly. the case. General Otis was very
much annoyed. He later said in his report:
Captain Batchelor conceived the idea of proceeding northward by the
Magat and Cagayan Rivers to Aparri, which he proceeded to do without
any definite knowledge of the country over which he intended to pass or the
force with which he might be obliged to contend. Every possible effort
was made to arrest him but without avail. He proceeded on this perilous
journey, short of rations, clothing and ammunition, after having sent back
a request to have the navy supply at the headwaters of Launch Navigation
on the Cagayan River. This movement necessitated the holding at Bayombong of the battalion of the 22nd Infantry (Baldwin) which was needed
at other points and gave great concern for the safety of Batchelor's men
who could hardly escape destruction if the Insurgents in the Cagayan valley
should press hostilities.
CHAPTER 10
American Control Established
MILITARY OPERATIONS during January and February 1900 were
monotonously similar to those that had taken place during the
past eleven months. The Insurgents entrenched themselves; the
Americans attacked; and the Insurgents retired. This was the
so-called cool season which made campaigning and marching
comparatively simple.
To pick up the thread' of the story, let us return to General
Lawton who late in December had been recalled from northern
Luzon. Otis had directed him to clear a force of Insurgents that
had assembled in the vicinity of Baliuag and San Miguel de
Mayumo. Lawton accomplished this assignment without difficulty and then evolved a plan for delivering a coup de grace to
the Insurgents in the southern part of the Island.
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For all practical purposes the Island of Luzon is divided into
two parts. About a hundred miles southeast of Manila in the
vicinity of the town of Antimonan, the island narrows down
to a slender isthmus. Farther south it again broadens out, but
the isthmus is separated from the southern portion by a mountain range inaccessible to wheeled vehicles and impracticable for
any kind of traffic. Consequently, all traffic from Manila to the
southern portion of the Island moved by water. This southern
portion was rich and fertile, particularly in the production of
the commercially valuable abaca, more generally known as
Manila hemp.
General Lawton intended to make a bold move into the
provinces south of Manila, quickly occupy the Antimonan
Isthmus, and cut off all Insurgents in that area from possible
escape to the south except by boat. His detailed plans included
taking one regiment of infantry and one of cavalry, moving
around the east shore of Laguna de Bay, and reoccupying Santa
Cruz. (It may be remembered that he had led a "sightseeing
expedition" to Santa Cruz the previous April.) He then intended to swing south through the provinces of Laguna and
Tayabas and herd all Insurgents in the area towards Manila
where capture would be easy. His swinging movement would
have extended to the. west coast of Luzon and would have included the province and city of Batangas. He was interrupted
in the midst of his preparations by peremptory orders to return
to Manila. If he had ever presented the plan to Otis, it had
apparently not been approved, because Lawton was forced to
cool his heels at Manila for two weeks. Then he was given
command of a comparatively minor expedition against a small
Insurgent group at San Mateo, northeast of Manila.
Good soldier that he was, Lawton accepted command of the
San Mateo expedition without a murmur. Consisting of but two
battalions of infantry and two squadrons of cavalry the command hardly justified the services of an officer of his rank.
During December 1899 more rain had fallen in Manila and
vicinity than during any December in thirty-three years. On the
night of December 18 a typhoon struck during which six
inches of rain fell within twenty-four hours. The San Mateo
187




expedition was slated for that night; and despite rain, wind,
and mud, Lawton determined to go ahead with it.
The troops assembled at La Loma church and started shortly
after dark on the eighteen-mile march to San Mateo. Stopping
by Otis' quarters in the Governor General's Palace at 1900
hours to ascertain if Otis had any last-minute instructions, Lawton found the Military Governor and his staff enjoying dinner
in well-furnished, well-lighted luxury. When Lawton appeared,
dripping from the downpour, Otis suggested that in view of the
weather the expedition be called off. Lawton replied that the
troops were already on the march and begged that the orders
not be changed. Otis finally consented.
The expedition arrived near San Mateo at dawn and found
that the Mariquina River, which had to be crossed in order to
occupy the town, was a raging torrent. Lawton sent the two
cavalry squadrons to the north to find a ford and to prevent
the escape of the Insurgents to the north. The two infantry
battalions were then deployed opposite the town; and in the face
of an intense fire from the Insurgents entrenched on the opposite bank, worked their way towards a ford known to exist
at that point.
From a hill a short distance in the rear of the infantry line,
Lawton, conspicuous in his yellow raincoat and white helmet,
watched the advance of the two infantry battalions. About 0900
one of his aides, Lieutenant Breckenridge, was wounded. Lawton personally helped carry Breckenridge to cover and said that
Breckenridge was not seriously wounded because a mortally
wounded man had a peculiar ashiness which he did not have.
His aide placed as comfortably as possible, Lawton returned to
the firing line. Standing there with his other- aide, Captain
E. L. King, he suddenly waved his hand before his face in a
peculiar manner.
Captain King asked, "What's the matter, General?"
Lawton replied, "I'm shot."
King asked, "Where?"
Lawton answered, "Through the lungs."
The staff gathered around the stricken general, who was
gritting his teeth, apparently attempting to overcome increasing
faintness. Then he lay down, and after ha, turned his head to
188




one side blood gushed from his mouth. He said npthing more
but died in about three minutes with his head on one of his
officer's knees. Thus was lost the man who should have been
in Otis' place; and who in that position would have shortened the
Insurrection. People who knew Lawton intimately say that a
kinder, braver, more tolerant, more understanding officer never
lived.
The San Matco expedition itself wuas of minor importance.
The Americans took the town and as usual scattered the Insurgents. The troops who returned to Manila in the rain the
following day did not make a victorious procession. They carried the body of a soldier who died exactly as he would have
wanted to die. Lawton's body was shipped to the United States
where it was laid to rest with great reverence in Arlington
Cemetery at Washington. A floral wreath which friends sent
to his funeral expressed the feeling that all felt who had
known him. It simply said, "Duty Done, Rest Won."
Two weeks after Lawton's death Otis authorized a more conservative execution of Lawton's plan for dealing with the Insurgents in the area south of Manila.
It may be recalled that prior to this tithe two expeditions had
gone out from Manila, and toured through the Province of
Cavite. Although these expeditions had penetrated as far west
as Rosario, on the China Sea, and as far south as Dasmarinas,)
about twenty-six miles south of Manila, Otis' policy of a thrust
followed by a withdrawal had made the net result of these expeditions nil. The retirements invariably increased Insurgent
morale, and gave the belief that the Americans were actually
weaker than they were. The most distant American outpost in
Cavite province was at Imus, about thirteen miles south of
Manila. On the southern shore of Laguna de Bay the towns of
Calamba and Los Bafios had been occupied by American troops
moving via boat. However, since the intervening territory was
in Insurgent hands, the posts at Calamba and Los Bafios were
necessarily supplied by boat.
The command of Lawton's division was, given to Major General John C. Bates. General Bates had served throughout the
Civil War but having been commissioned originally in the
189




Regular Army, did not receive the phenomenal promotion accorded the officers holding Volunteer commissions. However,
he had come out of the Civil War as captain in the Regular
Army. This placed him fairly high on the promotion list. By
1898 he was the fourth ranking colonel in the Regular Army.
At the beginning of the Spanish-American War he was commissioned as a brigadier general, then a major general of Volunteers and given command of a division in the Cuban expedition.
Bates' division was divided into two brigades which throughout the campaign operated practically independently of each
other. One was placed under the command of Otis' Chief of
Staff, General Theodore Schwann, and officially labeled
"Schwann's Expeditionary Brigade." It consisted of the 20th
and 46th Infantry regiments, a squadron of the 4th and a
squadron of the 11th Cavalry, a detachment of the 6th Artillery,
two companies of Macabebe Scouts and a company of engineers. The other brigade, under the command of General
Wheaton and dubbed "Wheaton's Expeditionary Brigade,"
consisted of the 4th, 28th, 38th, and 45th Infantry regiments,
Companies G and H of the 37th Infantry, detachments of the
4th Artillery, Engineers, and Signal Corps.
Wheaton's brigade was to hold the Insurgent forces in the
vicinity of Imus until Schwann's brigade, marching along the
west shore of Laguna de Bay, could establish a line running
from the town of Binan (on the Lake) to Naic on the west
coast of Luzon. Then as Wheaton's force attacked, the Insurgents would be pushed into the arms of Schwann's brigade.
Schwann's men left San Pedro Macati on January 4 and
marched the twenty miles to Muntinglupa. On the following
day they took Binan after a short engagement with about three
hundred Insurgents. Supplies for the brigade were sent by boat
to Binan, and the 6th was spent in preparing for the movement
west towards Naic. On the 7th, with the cavalry in front and a
battalion of the 46th Infantry left to garrison Binan, Schwann's
force moved southwest towards Silang, about fifteen miles distant. On the same day a battalion of the 4th Infantry (part of
Wheaton's force) reconnoitering from Imus towards Dasmarinas, defeated a force of Insurgents in the.vicinity of Dasmarinas. Also on the 7th a battalion of the 28th Infantry
190




(Wheaton's force) reconnoitering towards Cavite encountered
opposition at Putol. In the ensuing fight 74 Insurgents were
killed and 11 Americans wounded.
Reilly's Battery of the 4th Artillery suffered one-fourth of
the American casualties in this fight. The 4th Artillery had
been brought to within 250 yards of the entrenched Insurgents.
Not long afterwards this same battery of Reilly's was blasting
at the gates of the Forbidden City of Peking, when its intrepid
commander was killed.
The two engagements in which the elements of Wheaton's
brigade had become involved were a bit in advance of the contemplated time. Schwann's brigade had not reached Naic. Since
the Insurgents in both encounters with Wheaton had been sent
in flight towards the south, it was feared that they would
filter through Schwann's barrier before it could be completely
established. Consequently, Bates sent word to Schwann to move
on Naic as fast as possible. Schwann sent Colonel Hayes and the
cavalry ahead with instructions to push through to Naic with
utmost speed.
Hurrying towards Silang, Hayes found the roads for miles
out of Binan impassable for wagons. Going on with his cavalry,
however, he caught up with the Insurgent force retreating from
Binan. So close did Hayes press the Insurgents that he found the
road strewn with household goods, rice, chickens, bull carts,
ammunition, and records, which the Insurgents abandoned in
the hasty flight. About five miles east of Silang a rugged
gorge, which was hard for mounted men and pack animals to
cross, barred the road completely for wheeled transportation.
The 30th Infantry, following close in Hayes' rear, abandoned
their wagons at the gorge, pushed on behind the cavalry, and
arrived at Silang during the evening of the 7th. Hayes had
meanwhile marched towards Indang, eight miles farther west
where he routed 200 Insurgents that same evening. At Indang
he captured 62 rifles, 400 rounds of ammunition, $7,000 in
Insurgent funds, and found a well equipped Insurgent hospital containing many sick and wounded Insurgents.
On January 8 and 9, while the leading elements of Schwann's
brigade were approaching Naic, Wheaton's brigade attacked the
Insurgents at San Francisco de Malabon and drove them south.
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Bates advised Schwann to watch for this force and not let it
through his lines. On the same day Hayes' cavalry reached Naic
and the barrier line was complete. Hayes encountered the main
body of Insurgent force, which was retreating from Wheaton's
front. In a sharp skirmish fought in ricefields knee deep in
mud and water, he scattered them. With Schwann's line now
established from Binan to Naic, the escape of large bodies of
Insurgents to the rear was cut off. General Trias' Insurgent
force, which had been composed of some 1,500 men, was scattered and could not be reassembled. Small bodies of Insurgents
unquestionably did sift through Schwann's lines but owing to
the nature of the country such escapes could not be prevented.
The Province of Cavite, home of Aguinaldo, birthplace of the
revolt, and the province which had for a hundred years been a
thorn in Spain's side, was finally in American possession.
The next phase, which Lawton would have accomplished in
one fell swoop, was the conquest of the Province of Batangas.
It was prosperous territory, with its capital city on the easily
navigable Batangas Bay. This bay had been the seat of Insurgent activity in the unloading of imported arms and ammunition. In the center of the province is Taal Lake. The active
Taal volcano is on an island in the middle of this lake.
On January 10 the 39th Infantry defeated a force of Insurgents at Santo T6mas. The 39th was operating from Calamba,
and was under Colonel Robert L. Bullard. Bates feared that
this force, uniting with the scattered remnants of Trias' forces
from Cavite Province, would cause sizable opposition in the
future. Therefore, he rushed the 38th Infantry to Bullard's assistance with instructions to continue south towards the town
of Lipa.
After a brisk fight in which the artillery figured prominently
on January 15, the 38th and 39th Infantry regiments occupied
Lipa. Of the lieutenant in command of this artillery, Colonel
Bullard later reported:
Too high praise cannot be given Lieutenant Summerall and his battery.
His. judgment was ever sound; he was full of vigor and activity and as
cool and grave as anyone I ever saw. He should receive some reward.
Nearly thirty years later, after a brilliant World War record,
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Lieutenant Summerall was given the rank of general and appointed Chief of Staff of the Army.
An hour after the capture of Lipa, Colonels Bullard and
Anderson, commanding the two infantry regiments, heard that
American prisoners were being held in Rosario about eight
miles southeast of Lipa. Acting on an impulse, the colonels,
accompanied by a lieutenant colonel, a major, a captain, two
lieutenants, and four enlisted men, rode horseback to Rosario.
It is difficult to figure their line of reasoning, for if American
prisoners were being held oat Rosario, undoubtedly a sizable
band of Insurgents would have been there also. It was unreasonable to expect that eleven Americans, brave as they might be,
could disperse any large band of Insurgents and take the prisoners. At any rate, the group, armed with rifles, started for
Rosario at 1430 in the afternoon.
American prisoners were not found; but, acting on the information of a Spanish officer they had relieved, the group located $20,000 in Insurgent funds and carried the booty back to
Lipa the same afternoon.
Brilliant an exploit as it was General Bates was not particularly pleased. He later reported:
This exploit in which two colonels left their regiments in violation of
their responsibilities as commanders, in obedience to an impulse of enterprising courage, is so peculiar that it is impossible to praise it without
combining rebuke with approbation or to censure it without expression of
admiration for the dash and gallantry displayed.
Perhaps it was while these officers were absent that their
regiments in violation of all orders looted the town of Lipa.
Colonel Cornelius Gardner of the 30th Infantry reported one
battalion of the 39th Infantry as being "loaded down" with
booty from Lipa.
On January 16 Schwann's brigade moved along three parallel
roads towards Batangas and after a couple of minor skirmishes,
arrived there the same day. Schwann immediately issued the
following proclamation:
The authority of the Government of the United States has come to you
not in the spirit of ruthless invasion but in the spirit of peace and good will
to all citizens and with the object of establishing good government among
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you, which will secure to individuals the protection of their persons and
the peaceful pursuit of industry and happiness. It is enjoined upon all citizens to continue in or to return to their homes and to pursue their peaceful
avocations in'which they wvill not be molested.
The Commanding Gencial or in his absence the local commander will
be glad to receive the peoples' representatives for the purpose of advising
with them as to the measures necessary to promote prosperity and contentment under the authority of the United States Government.
Garrisons were then established in the principal towns of
Batangas Province. Wheaton's brigade was left in Cavite and
Batangas Provinces, while Schwann's brigade undertook to
occupy Laguna and Tayabas Provinces.
With his headquarters at Lipa, Schwann was directed to
make Santa Cruz the next objective.
Santa Cruz was about thirty miles northeast of Lipa. The
territory directly east of Santa Cruz included the sizable towns
of Candelaria, Lucena, and Tayabas, and was new to the
Americans. The idea was to take the entire area in one movement, and prevent the escape of Insurgent bodies through the
Antimonan Isthmus to the wild country on its south. The infantry was -instructed to make a direct movement on Santa
Cruz while the cavalry was ordered to make a wide sweeping
movement as far south as Lucena and as far east as Tayabas.
Very little Insurgent opposition was expected or received
with the exception of harassing operations from small Insurgent bands. On January 17 a pack train guarded by 21 recruits and accompanied by 53 convalescent soldiers, was attacked by 150 Insurgents near the town of Alaminos. The recruits went into a panic and the Insurgents captured the pack
train, killing 2 and capturing 8 Americans. Lieutenant Ralston,
the commander of the pack train, came very close to being
tried by a court-martial. On the following day a reconnaissance
party from  the 30th Infantry was surprised while eating dinner, and beat off the attack with difficulty. The commanding
officer of this detachment was tried by a court-martial but was
eventually acquitted.
The infantry elements of Schwann's brigade encountered
little difficulty in advancing. They concentrated at San Pablo on
January 20 and commenced the march towards Santa Cruz. At
San Diego they ran into Insurgents entrenched on a high hill
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which commanded all approaches. After a short fight in which
1 American and 37 Insurgents were killed, the position was
taken.
On the 22nd Narcarlang was occupied without opposition. An
escaped Spanish prisoner told Schwann of an allegedly impregnable position held by about 3,000 Insurgents at Mayjayjay
about five miles farther. Reconnoitering the enemy position he
found it very strong. Entrenched on the opposite side of a thirtyfoot gorge was a large group of Insurgents apparently well
armed and well supplied with ammunition. The only apparent
means of crossing the gorge was a narrow footbridge which was
flanked for 250 yards on either side by trenches. Schwann feared
an excessive number of casualties if the bridge were rushed. So
he halted and looked for another place to cross, with the idea
of attacking the Insurgents from flank. After several hours of
reconnaissance a battalion of the 39th Infantry under Major
Mulford, found a place where, by lowering troops about thirty
feet on ropes, they were able to scale the bluff on the opposite
side of the gorge. Two companies crossed this way, and when
they presented themselves on the Insurgent flank the entire
position was abandoned. The command then marched thirteen
miles north, arriving at Santa Cruz on the 23rd.
Swinging around the right (south) flank, the cavalry had not
experienced such easy going. Near Candelaria a skirmish cost
the lives of three Americans. Sariaya was entered without opposition on January 20. The unit split into two,groups. One
column moved on Tayabas by the main road while another
swung through Lucena and approached Tayabas from the
south. It was comparatively easy to occupy Tayabas because
Insurgent trenches and earthworks along the road had been
abandoned. Hayes then meant to swing north through Lucban
and Luisiana to Santa Cruz and there unite with the remainder
of the brigade. Hayes' men reconnoitered the road from Tayabas
to Santa Cruz via Lucban. They decided the road was entirely
impracticable because of the condition of the command. The
cavalry had been the spearhead of advance all the way from
Binan to Naic, then to Batangas. Twenty per cent of the command was on sick report and the horses were shoeless. Consequently, Hayes gave up the maneuver and marched to Santa
195




Cruz via liaongs and San Pablo, arriving there on the 25th.
His movement had scared all Insurgents out of the Province of
Tavabas.
Schwann heard that American prisoners were being hustled
towards the Camarines' provinces south of Antimonan, so he
sent a battalion to Antimonan on January 26. He also anticipated that this force might be able to cut off the retreat of
Insurgents who had been pushed east qf Santa Cruz. The battalion occupied Antimonan but did not locate the American
prisoners. The march to Antimonan was pver difficult mountain
trails. When one battalion of 240 men returned to Tayabas
early in February, 230 of them were shoeless.
Strategic towns in Tayabas were garrisoned, and except for
minor attacks by roving Insurgent bands, the province was
under American control. Within three weeks three provinces
had been occupied with negligible American losses. General
Bates reported:
Now it became evident to the natives that the Americans had come to
stay and those who felt well disposed towards our rule felt a sense of protection that had been formerly lacking. The result was apparent in the
labor and building of new houses in the conquered provinces and only the
lingering fear of robber bands seems to stand in the way of peace and
contentment.
Schwann's estimate of conditions in the provinces proved a
bit optimistic. Casualties in his brigade during these entire operations amounted to 6 killed and 5 wounded. Forty-five Insurgents were known to have been killed. Eighty-seven rifles, 4,500
rounds of ammunition, and $27,000 in Insurgent funds had
been captured.
Except for the so-called "hemp provinces" on the southern
end of Luzon the entire island was now occupied. The insurrection was blocking the source of materials for the American
rope and twine industry and prices of rope and twine in the
United States were going up. Otis received orders from Washington to open the hemp ports as soon as possible.
While Bates' division was clearing out the provinces south
of Manila, Otis organized an expedition under the command
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of Brigadier General William Kobbe to move by boat to the
hemp ports to try to put the hemp industry back on a paying
basis.
General Kobbe had enlisted in the 178th New York Volunteers as a private in 1862 and had ended the war as a brevet
colonel. In 1866 he was commissioned a 2nd lieutenant in the
Regular Army. By 1898 he had attained only the rank of major
in the Artillery and had gone to the Philippines in command
of the 3rd Artillery. His regiment was a part of MacArthur's
division, and with it he fought his way up the railroad to San
Fernando. When the new Volunteer regiments were organized
he was rewarded with a promotion to brigadier general of
Volunteers.
The expedition consisted of the 43rd and 47th Infantry regiments and one battery of field artillery. Accompanying the
transports conveying Kobbe's troops were! the navy cruiser
Nashville and the gunboats Helena and Mariveles. General
Kobbe later reported that the cooperation he received from the
Navy on the expedition was "not only valuable but indispensable."
On January 20 the expedition arrived off the port of Sorsogon,
capital of the province of the same name. No evidence of hostility being present, a party landed and raised the American flag.
It appeared that the Insurgent governor of the town with 300
armed men had fled at the approach of the transports. Leaving
a battalion of the 47th Infantry equipped with custom blankets
and stamps, the expedition sailed south to the port of Bulan.
Bulan was also occupied without incident, the inhabitants apparently friendly. Continuing around the southern tip of Luzon
through the San Bernardino straits, the expedition landed at
Donsol and found the town deserted. Shortly after occupying
Donsol, the Americans received long-range fire from the Insurgents in the surrounding hills. Leaving a battalion at Donsol
the expedition proceeded north to the large port of Legaspi.
There the planking from the wharves had been removed and
well constructed trenches manned by 800 armed Filipinos lined
the shore. Anticipating a dispute, Kobbe granted permission to
the commanding officer of the British gunboat Plover, to go
ashore and remove British residents from the town. The Insur197




gents refused to allow the British citizens to leave, naively stating that as long as the British were there the town probably
would not be bombarded.
The situation placed Kobbe in a quandary. There were so
few boats available for landing troops that not more than 75
could be put ashore at once. He feared the concentrated fire of
800 Insurgents on such a small group would cause an unnecessarily large amount of casualties. Further, he hesitated to bombard the town. He requested the captain of the transport Venus
to steam alongside one of the dismantled wharves so troops
could fire upon the trenches, from the Venus' decks. But the
captain said the steering gear would not work.
Kobbe finally decided that a bombardment of some sort
would be necessary and set about to force the landing. Seventyfive men of the 47th Infantry were loaded into small boats and
pushed towards shore near the flank of the trenches. The Nashville opened up on the trenches with its 4-inch guns and automatic weapons. This fusillade kept Insurgent heads below the
parapets until enough troops could be landed to attack safely.
Then the Americans moving on the trenches from the flank,
drove out the Insurgents. However, Kobbe said Insurgent opposition "was so stubborn either from ignorance or indifference
to consequences that many were killed or wounded at hand-tohand range without giving any sign of surrender." American
casualties amounted to 6 wounded, while those of the Insurgents totaled 100. The Americans spent the rest of the day and
that night bringing troops and supplies ashore.
On January 24 the town of Virac on the small Island of
Catanduanes was occupied without incident. The expedition
then moved south to the Island of Samar and occupied Cal'
bayog. The Americans then moved around Samar to the port of
Catbalogan. General Lucban's Insurgent troops did not oppose
the landing, but did attempt to burn the town as the Americans
landed. The Americans, assisted by fire-fighting parties of bluejackets, managed to save the majority of the permanent buildings. The expedition occupied the, port of Tacloban on the
Island of Leyte without difficulty.
There still remained the two provinces of North and South
Camarines. The capture was accomplished by two battalions of
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the 40th Infantry on February 13. They moved by boat to the
Port of Barcelonetta on the southeastern coast of Luzon. The
landing was sharply disputed by a large body of Insurgents. In
the ensuing fight at the town of Libmanan 1 American officer
was killed and 10 men wounded. The Americans buried 64
Insurgents after the battle. In a march through the provinces on
February 24, 60 Spanish prisoners were released. American
garrisons were established in principal towns. The occupation
of Luzon was complete. Eventually some one thousand prisoners of the Insurgents. many of them Spanish friars, were released by the Americans. Many of the released prisoners had
been slashed with bolos and were in pitiful condition.
By this time the principal ports of the hemp provinces had
been occupied. Apparently the majority of the Filipinos living
in and near the ports welcomed the arrival of the Americans.
Presence of American troops gave them protection in following
their normal pursuits. In the thickets outside the towns, however, small groups of recalcitrant Insurgents still remained.
These groups not only threatened the lives of Filipinos who
accepted American rule, but in many cases attacked the American garrisons. An Insurgent group near the town of Donsol
was particularly active. The battalion of the 47th Infantry garrisoning the place was attacked time after time. Many attempts
to burn the town were made. Wily Filipinos would slip through
the American outposts and set fire to nipa houses. Small groups
of Americans sent on reconnaissance were constantly attacked
by bands armed with bows and arrows and spears.
The occupation of the other islands of the Archipelago went
on. In March a battalion of the 44th Infantry peacefully occupied the Island of Bohol. By the end of May American troops
controlled Marinduque and Masbate, Calamaines, the Cuyos
group, and Palawan. In the majority of the southern Islands the
dissident influence of the Luzon Tagalogs had not been felt,
and the occupation was accomplished in good order. /
The occupation of Mindanao deserves special mention. This
island is second in size to Luzon. It was inhabited, except for
a few Visayan and Spanish settlements on the coasts, by
Mohammedan Filipinos known as Moros. The Moro was a
religious fanatic who believed that the more Christians he
199




killed the more maidens he would have in paradise after his
death. He was adept with a bolo and a long, curved, well
balanced knife known as the barong. In the hands of a trained
wielder a barong can take a man's head off as easily as a sharp
knife cuts bread. Periodically a Moro would work himself into
a religious frenzy and start through a barrio to cut and kill
everything he met. On such occasions a bullet was the only
thing that would stop him. A "juramentado" (as the frenzied
individual was called) would continue to fight and slash long
after he had been mortally wounded. One eyewitness of such a
fight saw one man receive fourteen wounds in five minutes,
three of which penetrated the brain, and the man still fought on.
For centuries the Moros had followed revolting customs. By
the Koran they were authorized to practice polygamy. Many
exceeded the quota of wives authorized by the Koran and
others kept a large number of concubines. For years they had
practiced slavery and even in 1900 raided villages of weaker
tribes for captives. Moro slavery was not the same type as that
practiced in the United States prior to the Civil War, but was
a form of serfdom. Slaves were well treated and enjoyed the
status of unpaid retainers rather than slaves. Any slave could
buy his freedom for twenty dollars. However, the fact that
polygamy and "slavery" were thriving under the American flag
was an anathema to the various "anti" societies in the United
States. Otis realized that hostilities with.the Moros would be
unfortunate for all parties concerned, and would be expensive
to the United States in men and money. So he decided that the
Moros would have to be handled with kid gloves, particularly
in regard to their customs.
Residing on the Island of Jolo, just south of Mindanao, was
the so-called Sultan of Jolo. This man was not only recognized
as the spiritual head of all Moros in the Philippines, but was
politically respected as a sort of super tribal chieftan (Datu). His
influence extended to large numbers of Moros living in the
British-owned portions of Borneo.
The Spanish had never successfully brought the Moro tribes
completely under control. In 1857 they had made a treaty with
the Sultan of Sulu under which Spanish sovereignty of the
200




Islands was accepted. But the Moros had been permitted to
continue their old customs.
During the early part of 1899 Aguinaldo's emissaries had set
up Insurgent governments on the Filipino-inhabited coastal
cities of Mindanao. However, Otis at once recognized that the
real problem  of Mindanao and Jolo would be maintaining
friendly relations with the Moros.
Upon the evacuation of the Moro Islands by the Spanish
garrisons following the Treaty of Paris, Otis sent General Bates
to negotiate with the Sultan of Sulu. At Jolo in July 1899 Bates
found the Sultan aloof and expecting to receive large annual
payments from the United States, as he did from the British in
North Borneo. Negotiations lagged for two months.
Finally Bates got leading Datus aboard the cruiser Charleston
and showed them the marvels of American science. He fired
the Charleston's 8-inch guns. He allowed one Datu to pud the
trigger of a Colt Automatic. To their delight he gave the Datus
mild electric shocks. He showed them how the Americans were
able to press a button and "kindle a light on the masthead."
The Moros stared at the mysterious box that produced the
wind. At length one Datu admitted, "What could an ignorant
people like the Moros do against you?"  '
Bates was finally able to make.a favorable treaty with the
Sultan concerning the Moro-inhabited islands. The sovereignty
of the United States was recognized and the Sultan agreed to
fly the American flag throughout the area. The Moros were
permitted to retain their own customs, including that of slavery,
and were allowed a sort of extra-territoriality in regard to trials
and punishments among themselves. The Sultan agreed to cooperate heartily in the suppression of piracy. For maintaining
order among the Moros the United States agreed to pay certain
Moro salaries, ranging from $250 (gold) per month for the
Sultan, to $15 a month for the minor Datu Serif Saguin. The
agreement was made with the understanding that it had to be
approved >y the President of the United States.
With the Moros on the American side, so to speak, the handling of the Tagalog Insurgents became simple. They quarreled among themselves. When early in 1900 Otis sent expeditions to occupy the principal ports the Insurgent groups either
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surrendered or moved into the hills. The ports of Zamboanga,
Cotabato, Pollack, Parang Parang, Davao, Surigao, Cagayan,
Ilagan, Misamis and Dapitan were all occupied without firing a
shot.
CHAPTER 11
Aftermath of American Occupation
WHEN THE INSURGENT ARMY was dissipated, Aguinaldo chased
into the Benguet Mountains, and the inhabited parts of the
Archipelago occupied by American troops, Otis believed the
Insurrection was practically ended. But the hardest job of the
American Army was yet ahead. It had taken eleven months to
disperse the Insurgent Army. It was to take two years and a
half to pacify the Islands.
In May 1900 Otis said in an article in Leslie's Weekly:
You ask me to say when the war in the Philippines will be over and to
set a limit to the men and treasure necessary to bring affairs to a satisfactory conclusion. That is impossible for the war in the Philippines is already
over The Insurrection ended some months ago; and all we have to do now
is to protect the Filipinos against themselves and to give protection to those
natives who are begging for it.
'Ihere will be no more real fighting in the Philippines... of course the
Islands must be thoroughly policed and it will take a good many men
to do it...
Since peace was practically restored throughout the Archipelago, many
towns have appealed to us for protection. Luzon is pacified and there are
only a few outlying districts where the natives are still terrified by the
ladrones into a show of opposition to us. You will see that there will be no
more fighting of any moment. What there is will be but little skirmishes
which amount to nothing...
It is somewhat shocking that an officer in as high and responsible a position as General Otis should have mistaken conditions so thoroughly. During the last four months of 1899 when
the Insurgent army was dying, American casualties in 229 engagements amounted to 69 killed and 302 wounded. During
the first four months of 1900, at the beginning of the so-called
guerrilla warfare period, 442 encounters with the Insurgents
202




had netted the Americans 130 killed and 325 wounded. Otis
had characterized these encounters as "little skirmishes that
amounted to nothing."
After the so-called end of the war, the number of American
deaths doubled. The number wounded remained about the
same. The new type of fighting during the guerrilla period accounted for more deaths than wounds. The American casualties
were caused by ambushes, firing at close range, or by sudden
attacks on small parties of American soldiers who, believing the
war was over, ventured away from villages. More soldiers were
hacked to death by bolos than wounded by Mauser bullets. The
Americans were not fighting a uniformed army. They were
fighting determined groups of men who tilled the fields by day
and stalked outposts by night.
The War Department found it necessary to increase the
strength of the Army in the Philippines to two-thirds of the
armed forces of the United States. It was to take ten thousand
more American troops to pacify the Islands than it had taken
to beat the Insurgent Army. The strength of the Army in the
Philippines had increased from 15,000 troops, which defended
Manila in February 1899, to 59,722 by December of the same
year. By December 1900, when the Insurrection was at its
height, the United States forces in the Philippines numbered
69,420 officers and men. On November 1, 1899, 55 stations were
occupied by American troops. By September 1, 1900 the number had risen to 413.                                 /
The duties of the troops were in no sense merely that of
police, for General MacArthur said each command had to
provide its own service of security and information by neverceasing patrols, explorations, outposts, escorts and regular
guards. Troops had to march farther under more difficult conditions than during the so-called organized Insurrection. Few
of the hundreds of engagements with the Insurgents involved
a sufficient number of combatants to be called a battle yet they
were dangerous and nerve-wracking.
Credit is due Aguinaldo's devoted subordinate leaders for
their persistence and efficiency in the guerrilla warfare. Backed
by 10,000 rifles still in their possession, they were for a time
203




able to dominate completely the Filipino civilians. While
American troops were occupying towns and establishing
municipal governments with the Filipinos holding offices, the
Insurgents arranged a parallel organization. In many cases
they employed the same Filipinos who held office under the
Americans. The towns were taxed, contributions and supplies
collected, and recruits for the guerrilla forces enlisted right
under the noses of the unsuspecting Americans.
Their method of conducting guerrilla warfare is indicated in
an instruction pamphlet printed in Madrid by an Insurgent
revolutionary Junta there. Parts of the pamphlet appear to have
been copied from   a foreign army's drill manual. Some excerpts
follow:
The purpose of the guerrilla will be to constantly worry the Yankees in
the Pueblos occupied by them, to cut off their convoys, to cause all possible
harm to their patrols, their spies and their scouts, to surprise their detachments, to crush their columns if they should pass favorable places and to
exterminate all traitors, to prevent natives to [from] vilely selling themscses for the invader's gold.
The guerrillas shall make up for their small numbers by their ceaseless
activity and their daring. They shall hide in the woods and distant barrios
and when least expected shall fall upon the enemy... but they shall be
careful to never rob their countrymen.
We repeat that we must not give or accept combats with such a powerful
foe if we have not the greatest chance of success... even as should we
rout him three times or five times the question of our independence would
not be solved. Let us wait for the deadly climate to decimate his files and
never forget that our object is only to protract the state of war...
The success of the system, of course, depended on the loyalty
of the townspeople who furnished the supplies, and who could,
if they dared, advise the American authorities that the guerrilla leaders were town presidentes. But leaders made dire
threats to one who divulged information to the Americans.
The vast majority of Filipinos were pro-American and favored American sovereignty. But even though, they were sick of
the war they refused to tell the names of Insurgents who lived
in the same towns or the hiding places of rifles. General MacArthur said: "This characteristic reluctance of everybody even
among the most active pro-Americans to give any information
204




of military value is one of the greatest difficulties of the existing
system."
The few Filipinos who divulged information concerning the
activities of guerrillas suffered heavily at the hands of their own
countrymen. Instances occurred where women, children, and
sick or weak men were beaten to death with clubs or stones.
Other Filipinos were conducted to spots beyond the sight of
passersby and killed with bolos or even buried alive.
But the Americans were equally eager to pry information
out of Filipinos. It was probable that any native in the numerous
barrios occupied by American troops knew the names of all
Insurgents living there. As a result, the average Filipino lived
in constant terror, his wife, property, and family never secure.
In 1902 the Senate Committee on the Philippines, while investigating the conduct of the Army, found plenty of witnesses
who had seen "atrocious practices" by American soldiers against
Filipinos.
The Insurgents possessed hidden rifles. As long as these
weapons were in hostile hands they represented a potential
threat to lives of American soldiers. The Americans did not torture for sport; it was a matter of self-defense. In view of the
type of warfare, or mass assassination which the Insurgents
were conducting, anything was considered fair. The so-called
tortures were invariably used only to force Filipinos to divulge
the hiding places of arms or of Insurgent bands. The casualty
list was constantly mounting under the methods employed by
the Insurgents, so a tolerant view would indicate that under the
circumstances the end justified the means.
The most common torture used by the American soldiers
was the so-called "water cure." The "cure" was given by laying
a Filipino flat on his back, his mouth pried open with a stick,
bayonet, or even a cartridge case. Large quantities of water,
sometimes salty, sometimes dirty, were then poured down the
victim's throat until his stomach became distended. When no
more water could enter, someone sat or stood on his stomach
until the water was disgorged. Them-the process was repeated.
Apparently the water cure was efficacious, for the American
troops employed it to a great extent.
The so-called "rope-cure," which appears to have been used
205




rarely, was given by wrapping rope around the victim's neck
and torso two or three times until it formed a sort of girdle.
A stick was then placed between the ropes and twisted until a
combination of smothering and garroting was created.
Sometimes the Americans gave an Insurgent a good "beating up." This method was not particularly effective.
During the Insurrection several American officers were tried
by courts-martial for alleged cruelty to Filipinos. It was assumed
that the soldiers involved were acting under orders.
Two officers in the 27th Infantry, Captain George Brandle
and Lieutenant Alva Perkins, were tried for "wilfully and
cruelly causing six Filipinos to be hung by the neck for a
period of ten seconds, causing them to suffer great bodily pain."
The court found the two officers guilty but changed 'great
bodily pain" to "mental anguish" and sentenced both to reprimands. General MacArthur apparently thought the sentence too
light, for he denounced the court for its findings.
The 9th Cavalry used a rather unique and harmless method.
A Filipino was taken into a semi-dark room and securely bound.
Then a huge black, dressed only in a loin cloth and carrying a
cavalry saber, entered and danced around the victim making
threatening gesticulations with the saber. To an ignorant Filipino, the black undoubtedly looked like the devil incarnate.
Quite often the method made the victim talk. As a rule a medical officer was present to prevent serious injury.
During 1900, acting on the assumption that the Insurrection
was over, the actual divisional tactical organization of troops
was dropped and a geographical occupation system adopted.
The entire Archipelago was divided into four departments,
each subdivided into from three to six districts. The Department of Northern Luzon, under General Wheaton, consisted
of all the island north of the Pasig River. The Department of
Southern Luzon, under General Bates, took in the part of
Luzon south of the Pasig River. The Department of the Visayas, under Geiieral Hughes, consisted of the Islands of Panay,
Leyte, Bohol, Cebu and Negros. The Department of Mindanao
and Jolo, under General Kobbe, comprised Mindanao, Jolo, and
the small islands in that area. Each departmental district was
206




under the command of a brigadier general or colonel who was
directly responsible to his department commander. The city
of Manila was organized as a separate command, something
similar to the District of Columbia, and placed under the command of General J. Franklin Bell. At the top of the pyramid
formed by the districts and departments was General Otis,
the Military Governor of the Philippines. Each district had
garrisons of troops to keep that area pacified.
During 1900 the Insurgents were eminently successful with
their guerrilla warfare. Mobilizing the Filipino population as
they did, Aguinaldo's henchmen were able to harass the American garrisons to distraction. On several occasions small bodies
of American troops were roughly handled.
March 4, 1900 two companies of the 9th Infantry marched to
the town of Tinuba, near Tarlac, to round up a force of Insurgents reported there. The Americans took with them two Filipinos, former Insurgents who purported to be able to identify
the Insurgents living in the town. Arriving at Tinuba, the
infantrymen lined up all male residents for identification. Twenty-nine men were identified as active Insurgents and told to
divulge the hiding place of their rifles. Captain John Sigworth,
in command of the expedition, reported:,
They led the guards in various directions in and out of the barrios but
persisted in disclaiming the knowledge of the whereabouts of any rifles,
stating that all had' been taken to the mountains. Three Insurgents were
then taken some distance away and informed that they would be harshly
dealt with unless they divulged where their rifles were hidden. One of these
three men then announced to Lieutenant Koehler that he would show where
his rifle was hidden and started out in a southwesterly direction. Lieutenants
Koehler and Wallace followed him on a trail which led into a forest. They
followed him about a half a mile from the barrio when they came to a
bend in the trail. This was immediately followed by some rifle shots fired
from a short distance in front. Lieutenant Koehler fell on his face and
although mortally wounded raised himself and emptied his revolver at the
Insurgents. Lieutenant Wallace fired -away all his ammunition and then
being unable to see anyone, pulled Lieutenant Koehler off the trail, made
him as comfortable as possible and ran down the trail to inform me what
had happened. The mounted detachment galloped to the rescue of Lieutenant Koehler, who was still alive, but unable to speak. In the meantime
barracks were discovered about 100 yards from the trail. These were all
burned and Lieutenant Koehler was brought to the barrio, dying just as the
barrio was reached.
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Just after dhe firing had been heard in the dirLction Lieutenants Koehlei
and Wallace had gone the Insurgent prisoners under guard made a break
t escape. I ordered my company to fire on themn, which they did, killing
twentv-sevcn ilen
Captain Sigworth told how the town was burned, the inhabitants first being permitted to remove their belongings. No
rifles were found, but 1 American officer and 27 Insurgents
were killed. The question runs through this writer's mind as to
whether the Insurgents actually made a bona fide "break for it"
or whether Sigworth applied the "Ley de Fuga" so efficacious
in Mexico. Twenty-nine Insurgents had been found in the
town and twenty-seven were shot, the other two escaping.
On May 14 the barracks of a detachment of the 40th Infantry
at Loculan were rushed by 300 Insurgents dressed as civilians
and armed with bolos. At a given signal they attacked the
American guard detail of four men on the first floor of the
barracks. The guards were killed 'before the remainder of the
detachment could obtain their rifles and fire on the Insurgents
from the second story windows of the building. The Insurgents
were finally driven from the town, but not before they had
killed seven Americans.
At the isolated town of Catubig on the Island of Samar a
detachment of 31 men of the 43rd Infantry came very
close to being massacred. At daybreak April 15 the detachment, which was quartered in the town convent, received a
heavy fire from about 600 Insurgents located on a nearby hill.
Taking refuge in the convent, the detachment returned the
fire all through that day and night. The following morning a
large number of Insurgents gained access to the town church
which joined the convent, and attempted to set fire to the
convent by throwing lighted bundles of kerosene-saturated
hemp. An American attempt to drive the Insurgents out of the
church was repulsed. The following morning the Insurgents
fired the convent, and the beleagured detachment, which up to
this time had suffered one casualty, had to leave its shelter.
Loaded down with ammunition, the Americans attempted to
move down a street toward the river but were forced back by
Insurgents. The detachment then appears to have become panic
stricken, for it broke into two groups, one rushing for some
208




boats on the river bank and the other for a clump of grass behind the convent. Those who reached the river were annihilated as they attempted to enter the boats. The other group
entrenched in the grass. There, these fifteen men held about
200 Insurgents at bay for two days until another American detachment, making a routine visit to the village, relieved them.
Of the garrison of 31 men, 18 had been killed and 3 wounded.
One hundred fifty dead Insurgents were found on the streets.
In the Province of Ilocos Norte the Insurgents, within a
period of six weeks, cut the telegraph line twenty-three times,
killed 15 American soldiers in ambushes, and kidnaped and
killed 15 native policemen.
The surest way for an American soldier or a Filipino policeman to commit suicide was to wander away from a town alone.
Consequently in June General MacArthur authorized the
Filipino police to carry American revolvers for protection.
In the midst of these conditions General Otis wired for his
relief as Military Governor of the Philippines. His official reasons were that private interests required his return to the States.
Some people believed that he asked for relief because of the
new Philippine Commission which was en route to the Islands.
Since Otis had reported the Insurrection over, the President expected the Commission to assume some of the Military Governor's authority. Whatever his intent, Otis left the Islands on
May 5, a few days before the Commission arrived.
It seems only fair to temper criticism of Otis with a few
words of appreciation of his accomplishments. His problem was
new to an Army officer. He was not only 7,000 miles from his
next immediate superior, but was constantly forced to make
decisions with no precedents to guide him. The adaptations of
Spanish law, worked out under his direction to meet the new
conditions, were the basis of Philippine administration until the
Japanese overran the Islands in January 1942. He was an excellent civil administrator. His transition from the Spanish to
the American regime was efficient and gained him Filipino
respect. His interference in the operations of the troops in the
field was only one phase of his multifarious duties, and was
unquestionably motivated by a supersense of responsibility. Apparently his administration of the Philippine Islands was emi209




nently satisfactory to President McKinley, for shortly after his
return to the United States he was promGod to the rank of
major general in the Regular Army.
The new Philippine Commission was headed by William
Howard Taft, at that time the senior Federal Circuit Court
Judge of the United States. Members were Bernard Moses, Professor of Political Economy at the University of California;
Luke E. Wright of Tennessee, a Democrat and considered one
of the ablest jurists in the South; Henry G. Ives, a prominent
Vermont Republican; and Dean C. Worcester, a member of
the former Philippine Commission. Mr. Ives had acted as
American Commissioner in settling land troubles in Samoa
with the Germans and British, and Worcester was regarded as
an authority on the Philippines.
The Commission was supervised by the Secretary of War. It
was directed to proceed to the Philippines for the purpose of
"continuing and perfecting the work of establishing civil government already commenced by the military authority."
After the Commission had familiarized itself with conditions
in the Philippines it was supposed to set up municipal codes
throughout the Islands. The natives in the cities and rural
communities were to be allowed to manage their own local and
provincial affairs in so far as they were capable. The Commission was to advise the Secretary of War whenever it felt that
the central administration could be safely transferred from the
military governor to civil authority. To give the Commission
some actual authority in the'Islands, it was further provided
that on September 1, 1900, it would assume direction of the
legislative phase of the government, as distinguished from the
executive, which was to be retained by the military. This 'legislative authority" included the passing of laws for the raising
of revenue, the appropriation and expenditure of insular funds,
the establishment of an educational system, and the organization
and establishment of civil courts. Until the complete transfer of
control the Military Governor was to remain the chief executive
head of the Islands.
It is beyond the scope of this book to go into the accomplishments of the Taft Commission. The members carried out their
instructions to the letter and within one year after arrival, Mr.
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Taft had been installed as civil governor of the Islands. Considering that for the first time in United States history the
military was not subordinated to the civil for at least a short
period, the executive and legislative branches of the government
got along quite famously.
General MacArthur succeeded General Otis as military governor. Having campaigned in the field MacArthur realized that
until the Filipino civilian population of the towns became proAmerican, guerrilla warfare would continue. He said at the
time:
The Filipinos are not a warlike people. Left to themselves a large number (perhaps a considerable majority) would accept American supremacy.
The people of the Islands, however, during the,(past five years, have been
maddened by rhetorical sophistry and stimulants applied to national pride
until the power of discrimination in matters of public concern has for the
time being been almost entirely suspended... The truth is, the real effective opposition to pacification comes from the towns. The "skulking bands
of Guerrillas" as the remnants of the Insurgent Army have beerr called,
are mere expression of loyalty of the towns. They could not exist for a
*month without urban support... Intimidation has undoubtedly accomplished much to this end, but it is more probable that the adhesive principle
comes from ethnological homogeneity which induces men to respond for
a time to the appeals of consanguineous leadership, even when such action
is opposed to their own interests...
As a trial balloon, MacArthur issued a proclamation six
weeks after he became Military Governor stating that all Insurgents (except those who had been charged with murder) would,
if they surrendered and took an oath of allegiance to the United
States within ninety days, be given complete amnesty without
fear for the future. Insurgents who surrendered rifles would be
paid the usual bonus of thirty pesos.
As a result of the proclamatioon, 5,022 people, including 115
Insurgent officers, took the oath. These people included Aguinaldo's Chief of Staff Pantaleon Garcia, Generals Concepcion
and Soliman, who had been captured, and Pedro Paterno, former president of the Philippine Cabinet. Although the population of the Archipelago was some ten million, only 140 rifles
were surrendered, 130 coming from one vicinity.
Meanwhile guerrilla warfare broke out in renewed intensity.
211




In a report signed August 1, 1900, General Bates, commanding
the Department of Southern Luzon, stated:
I regret that I cannot recommnend the reduction of the forces in this Department by so much as a single soldier. The duts of occupation in fact
renlers necessary a larger number of troops than would be needed in conducting a campaign against armed fofces... A single battalion can today
march from one end of this I)epartment to the other without encountering
enough resistance from the enemy to seriously impede its progress, but
small parties of troops cannot leave the garrisoned posts without incurring
the danger of attack. The Insurrectos, after making an attack, disperse,
assume civilian garb and conceal themselves among the peaceable inhabitants by threatening punishment to those who display friendship towards
the Anmericans.
Major Mulford, in command at Calamba, complained that
~he town Presidente was an Insurrecto who, while professing
friendship for the Americans, gave information and assistance
to the Insurgents in the neighborhood.
On the Island of Bohol, which had been peaceably occupied,
not a shot had been fired until August 1900. Then, under the
leadership of Pedro Samson, guerrillas attacked an American
patrol, killed 1 American and wounded 6 with bolos. One hundred Filipinos were lost in this skirmish.
In the Province of Cavite 375 armed Insurgents under the
command of General Manuel Trias were quartered in San
Francisco de Malabon while the town was occupied by an
American garrison.
On September 17, 1900 something occurred that might be
called a disaster to the American troops. The town of Siniloan
is on the northeast corner of the Laguna de Bay. West of Siniloan and separated by a wide, shallow estuary of the Laguna is
the barrio of Mabitac. Siniloan and Mabitac were connected by
a narrow causeway. In Mabitac the Insurgent leader, Juan
Cailles,' had raised an Insurgent flag and sent an insolent message to Colonel Cheatham, commander of the American troops
at Santa Cruz. Colonel Cheatham decided to send a company
of the 37th and one of the 15th Infantry regiments to make
Cailles "eat his words." Captain David Mitchell of the 15th
Infantry headed the expedition. Mitchell's company of the 15th
Infantry was supposed to move around the east side of the
212




estuary and attack Mabitac from that direction, while Company
L of the 37th was to approach the village in boats from the west
and wade across the shallow bay. On September 17 Colonel
Cheatham, watching operations from a launch, was horrified to
see Mitchell's company approaching Mabitac directly across the
narrow causeway. As the advance elements of the company
came under the fire of the entrenched Insurgents, one officer,
the first sergeant, and the entire advance party were killed.
The remainder of the company deployed in the estuary where
they became excellent targets and sure fatalities from drowning
if struck by bullets. None of Mitchell's men had ever been
under fire before and they refused to advance farther. Mitchell
was killed in attempting to rally the men. Finally some troops
of the 37th Infantry, which were being held in reserve, were
pushed into action and forced the Insurgents from their
trenches. But by that time 20 Americans had been killed, 24
wounded, and 30 rifles had been lost. The entire command then
withdrew, and.the Insurgents reoccupied Mabitac immediately.
The following day General Cailles returned to the Americans
the bodies of eight American soldiers killed in the engagement.
All personal property remained on their persons. Cailles claimed
to have had only ten casualties in the encounter.
Successes like this emboldened the Insurgents to an extreme
degree. The following day they attacked the American garrison
at Novaliches, a town within ten miles of Manila.
The crowning blow came on the Island of Marinduque.
About twenty by thirty miles in length and breadth and just
east of Luzon, this island is mountainous and at that time had
few roads. It had been garrisoned without difficulty since April
1900 by two companies of the 29th Infantry. The majority of
the 29th's members had never been under fire. On September
11 Captain Shields, the Commander of Company F, took 51
men by boat to the town of Torrijos on the southern side of
the Island. He intended to march back across Marinduque on
the only trail between the two towns. A garrison consisting of
a lieutenant and 39 men was left at Santa Cruz.
At 0200 on September 13 Captain Shields' column started its
return march to Santa Cruz. Not anticipating trouble, the company carried little ammunition. When it was unexpectedly at213




tacked at daybreak, Shields decided to push on as rapidly as
possible, rather than stop and fight. After the column had
marched four miles under incessant Insurgent fire, Shields was
severely wounded. Helpless himself and fearing that if the company exhausted its ammunition supply the entire group would
be massacred, he then sent orders to his senior sergeant for the
company to leave him and cut its way back to Santa Cruz.
Then fearing that the men who were attending him would be
boloed, Shields directed that a white flag be raised over his helpless body. Either the sergeant who had been directed to cut his
way back to Santa Cruz had become panic-stricken, or had
never received the order, for when the white flag was raised
the entire company surrendered to the Insurgents. The casualties by that time were 4 killed and 6 wounded. Eight of the
men in the company refused to surrender and attempted to
reach the sea but were captured that evening. The Insurgents
obtained 51 Krag-J6rgensen rifles with 800 rounds of ammunition from the Americans. The next day the pro-American Presidente of Santa Cruz was assassinated in the main street, and
the small garrison-left behind was forced to take refuge in the
convent while the remainder of the town was burned. The
garrison managed to hold out until assistance arrived four
days later, but Shields' surrender was long remembered.
There were 1,026 American-Insurgent military events between May 1900 and June 1901. In the same period 245 Americans were killed, 490 wounded, and 118 captured; 3,854 Insurgents were killed, 1,193 wounded, and 6,572 captured. The situation was so chaotic that the soldiers coined a song, the words
of which implied that the actual governor of the Islands was
not General MacArthur but Aguinaldo.
After November 1900 there was a definite if gradual cessation
of Insurgent activities. There were probably four reasons for
this: the adoption of sterner repressive measures by the Americans, the result of the presidential election of 1900 in the United
States, the formation of the Filipino Federalist Party, and the
capture of Emilio Aguinaldo.
The guerrilla situation had become so bad that from Northern Luzon General Young proposed the establishment of a
virtual military dictatorship throughout the Islands. He advo214




cated the summary death penalty for all persons caught with
arms after having taken the oath of allegiance to the United
States and the confiscation of all property owned by Insurgent
leaders. He proposed to replace Filipino office holders with the
American military, to lay waste all parts of the country used by
Insurgents as hiding places, and to deport all persons whose
presence in the country was deemed prejudicial to the interests
of the United States. He recommended strict censorship of the
press and the concentration of people living in rebellious zones
into circumscribed zones.
General MacArthur thought the American people would not
stand for such stringent measures. However, he did take steps
to tighten the reins of government. On December' 20, 1900, he
issued a proclamation placing the Islands under martial law.
He directed that Insurgents who alternately took to the field
and then returned to their barrios in civilian garbs would, if
captured, be subject to trial for murder. He directed that known
Insurgents be imprisoned in Manila; he advised the civilian
population that fear of Insurgents would not be accepted as a
legitimate excuse for failure to give full cooperation and loyalty
to the American authorities, that civilians who were not, because of overt acts, loyal to American authority would be considered as against the government. MacArthur also obtained permission from Washington to deport to Guam certain Insurgent
'leaders who were recognized as irreconcilables.
The proclamation produced a signal effect in some parts of
the Islands. In the province of Ilocos Sur 2,000 Filipinos took
the oath of allegiance. As a result of the punitive provisions,
some 79 Insurgents were tried for murder and hanged, 32
irreconcilables, including Mabini, were deported to Guam. It
is difficult to judge accurately the practical effects of the proclamation since the presidential election in the United States
also had an effect upon this period. However, in commenting
on the proclamation later, General MacArthur stated:
As an educational document, the effect was immediate and far reaching.
From the date of its issue secret resistance and apathy began to diminish
and kidnaping and assassination were much abated. In a very short time
these malign influences were to a great extent superseded by cooperation and
active interest in American affairs. Rarely in war has a single document
been so instrumental in influencing ultimate results.
215




Turning to a brief discussion of the effect of the presidential
election in the United States upon the Insurrection, it may be
recalled that the acquisition of the Philippine Islands had been
a bitterly fought matter before the United States Senate. The
issue had been so hotly contested that the two-thirds majority
necessary for the ratification of the treaty with Spain had been
gained by only one vote. Greatest opposition came from Democrats who questioned the advisability of putting an iron in a
fire so distant, particularly in view of a traditional isolationist
policy. Ratification of the treaty With Spain settled the matter
of acquiring the Philippines. However, certain well educated,
prominent, and politically powerful citizens belonging to both
political parties, insisted on regarding the issue as not closed.
Although Senator Lodge, the senior Senator from Massachusetts and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, strongly favored the acquisition of the Philippines, his
colleague from the same state, Senator Hoar, bitterly opposed
the idea.
During the early part of 1899 the so-called Anti-Imperialist
Society was founded in Boston. It launched its campaign with
an "Address to the People of the United States." The aims of
the Society as expressed in the address were reasonable enough.
They urged all Americans to disregard party affiliations and
cooperate with the Society in accomplishing the following ends:
First. That our government shall take immediate steps toward a suspension of hostilities in the Philippines and a conference with the Philippine
leaders with a view to preventing further bloodshed upon the basis of a
recognition of their freedom and independence as soon as proper guarantees
can be had of order and protection to property.
Second. That the Government of the United States shall tender an official
assurance to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands that they will encourage and assist in the organization of such a government in the Islands
as the people thereof shall prefer and that upon its organization in a stable
manner the United States in accordance with its traditional and prescriptive
policy in such cases will recognize the independence of the Philippines and
its equality among nations and gradually withdraw all military and naval
forces.
Also, the following means by which the Anti-Imperialists intended to accomplish their aims were reasonable:
216




...to continue the circulation of literature, to assist in the formation
of leagues, and by public meetings and every means known to a free people,
to agitate for the revival in the land of the spirit of Washington and Lincoln; to protest against a spirit of militarism and force; to oppose the
colonial idea and a permanently large standing army and to assert the vital
truths of the Declaration of Independence embodied in the Constitution and
indissolubly connected with the welfare of this Republic.
The anti-imperialist "address" was signed by twenty-nine
eminent citizens. It contained such formidable names as Andrew
Carnegie, multi-millionaire steel manufacturer and philanthropist; Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of
Labor; David Starr Jordan, president of Leland Stanford University; and Charles F. Adams, former president of the Union
Pacific Railroad. Three of the signers were ex-United Siates
Senators; four were former members of the House of Representatives; four were ex-Cabinet members; three were eminent
writers or editors; three were prominent clergymen; two were
what might be termed professional reformers; and eight were
educators of a varying degree of prominence. Twenty-six of the
twenty-nine signers were listed in Who's Who in America
for 1899.
Regardless of the announced purposes of the Society, its methods and the effect of its propaganda laid it open to heavy condemnation. One of the Society's most enthusiastic adherents,
Edward Atkinson, a Boston insurance underwriter, edited a
magazine known as the American Anti-lmperialist. The periodical deplored the cost of the Insurrection and gloomily predicted
that the tropical climate and prevalence of venereal disease in
the Philippines would ruin the American youth sent to quell
the Insurrection.
The greatest wrong of the Anti-Imperialist Society was not
propaganda among the Americans, however, but the assistance
and false hopes it gave the Filipinos. The Society believed that
if the Insurrection persisted until the presidential election of
1900, the American voters, tired of a war 7,000 miles away,
would send an anti-imperialist, William Jennings Bryan, to
the White House and thereby change the policy of the United
States in regard to the retention of the Islands. The idea was
built up so that Aguinaldo and his adherents honestly believed
217




the election of Mr. Bryan would mean independence for them.
After Aguinaldo was forced to take to the mountains, the guerrilla warfare was continued mainly with the hope that it would
have a definite influence on the American election. On November 4, 1900, election day, a prayer appeared in a pro-independence Manila newspaper, which ran somewhat as follows:
On this day there is a struggle indeed in America: On this day is
decided our life...
Glory to Bryan, Glory to America, Glory to the Fostering Fatherland,
Glory to the sons of the nation...
Grief to Imperialism, grief to McKinley, grief to the hated
Mother Philippines-Blessed be Thou
Mr. Bryan-triumphant be Thou
Our independence may we win thee
The life of Aguinaldo may it be for a thousand years
Our Army be thou great
By this mercy, Lord curse those who watch over us. Do so then Lord
all this, Lord. So be it.
It has never been definitely established that the Anti-Imperialist Society actually aided the Insurgents with money and arms.
The story goes, however, that many of its members were in constant correspondence with Aguinaldo and his aides, giving them
advice and moral support. When Aguinaldo was captured papers found in his possession revealed the extent of his correspondence with American citizens.
The influence which this anti-imperialistic influence exerted
throughout the country is indicated by the fact that in January
1901, while the guerrilla warfare was at its height and American soldiers were being attacked and killed daily, the Missouri
House of Representatives passed the following resolution:
Whereas the sympathies of the American people go out to all nations and
all peoples struggling for liberty;... the House of Representatives of the
Forty-first General Assembly of Missouri extend sympathy to the people of
the Philippine Archipelago, in their heroic struggle for freedorr.
It was common talk in the Philippines that every anti-imperialistic speech of any importance made in the United States
caused a corresponding attack by guerrillas on some tired and
harassed American garrison stationed in the Philippine bosque.
218




Of course, the members of the Army in the Philippines realized that they were receiving a blow in the back from home and
were justly indignant. A document captured at Tarlac revealed
a communication from the United States advising Aguinaldo ol
banquets and meetings being held in his honor in that country.
Most of the military personnel in the Philippines believed that
the Anti-Imperialist Society was furnishing the Insurgents with
money and arms. This belief was substantiated in August 1899
when several Insurgent artillery "duds," falling into the town of
Angeles, indicated that the shells had been manufactured in the
United States.
General Lawton felt so strongly on the subject that a short
time before his death he wrote to a friend:
I wish to God that this whole Philippine situation could be known to
everyone in America as I know it. If the real history, inspiration, and conditions of this Insurrection and the influences local and external that now
encourage the enemy could be understood at home, we would hear no talk
of unjust "shooting of government" into the Filipinos or hauling down our
flag in the Philippines. If the so-called anti-imperialists in Boston would
honestly ascertain the truth on the ground and not in distant America, they
whom I believe to be honest men misinformed would be convinced of the
error of their publications here. If I am shot by a Filipino bullet it might
just as well come from one of my own men.
These are strong words and yet I say them because I know from my own
observation confirmed by stories of captured Filipino prisoners that the continuance of the fighting is chiefly due to reports that are sent out from
America and circulated among these ignorant natives by the leaders who
know better.
Possibly fate had given Lawton a premonition of the future,
for he was killed two months after the above letter was written.
The re-election of McKinley had an immediate repercussion
in the Philippines. Within three weeks after the. issue was decided, another 2,000 Insurgents had taken the oath of allegiance
to the United States.
Early in January General Delgado led the Insurgents on the
Island of Panay into the capital where 30 officers and 140 men
surrendered their rifles and equipment. General Delgado had
been a thorn in the side of the Americans since the occupation
of Iloilo in February 1899.
During September and October of 1900 the Americans and
219




insurgents had 241 clashes, 52 of which were started by the
Insurgents. During November and December there were 198
contacts, 27 of which were started by Insurgents. During September and October 54 Insurgents surrendered; during November and December the number rose to 2,534. During September
and October, 18 rifles had been surrendered, and during November and December the number jumped only to 47. This would
indicate that the Insurgents who surrendered as a result of the
election were (possibly with the exception of Delgado's force)
not the rifle-toting variety. The majority were bolo men who,
not being equipped as soldiers, were awaiting the result of the
election to see which way to jump. The real Insurgents were
still at large.
Another decisive influence on the pacification of the Islands
was the formation of the so-called Federal Party among the
Filipinos. Its organization might be said to have been a direct
result of the Presidential election, combined with MacArthur's
proclamation of December 21.
A few well educated Filipinos who had filled cabinet positions
under Aguinaldo were held in Manila at this time under "protective custody." When the Insurgent army had been scattered
in November 1899, the majority of these Insurrecto politicos
had been captured and taken to Manila. One small group headed
by Felipe Buencamino and Pedro Paterno had represented the
pro-American elements (if one considers such a group really
existed) in Aguinaldo's cabinet. This group had proposed peace
during April 1899 and had formed a commission to go to
Manila and confer with Otis. It may be recalled that the commission was arrested by Luna, the commanding general of the
Insurgent army at the time, and its members imprisoned.
At any rate, contact with the Americans in Manila, perhaps
the friendly, lenient way the Americans treated them, swung a
number of these former cabinet members over to acceptance of
AmericaA sovereignty as outlined in the proclamation issued by
the Schurman Commission.
On December 23, 1900 a group of Filipinos issued a so-called
manifesto for the formation of the Federal Party which included
the party plank. The platform advocated the immediate acceptance of the sovereignty of the United States by all Filipinos. It
220




proposed a form of government as promised in the proclamation of the Schurman Commission, which in many respects was
the form finally adopted-that is, government of the Islands by
a civil governor general. The only aspiration of the party which
the American authorities frowned on at the time was the announced hope of having the Philippines eventually admitted to
the Union as a state. With the assistance of the military and
civil authorities, the party extended its influence throughout the
Islands.
The outstanding benefit of the Federal Party was to cause the
surrender of General Manuel Trias in the province of Cavite.
Trias, who was a Robin Hood sort of individual, was held in
high esteem by the majority of the Filipinos in the Province;
and had been operating successfully a government parallel to
that established by the Americans. The surrender of Trias not
only brought an eminent Insurrecto into the American fold, but
also insured the wholehearted cooperation of the people living
in the Province. The Americans rewarded the organizers and
promoters of the Federal Party by giving them high positions
in the civi l government of the Philippines which was established shortly thereafter.
In March 1901 Emilio Aguinaldo was captured.
Otis had minimized the influence which Aguinaldo, from his
hideout in the Benguet Mountains, was exercising on the Insurrection. Shortly after his return to the United States Otis
said:
Aguinaldo is merely a figurehead. His power was gone when we broke
up his government and captured his advisors and friends... what difference does it make whether Aguinaldo is dead or not when we know that
if he is not dead he is a refugee in the mountains where he can do no
one any harm.
MacArthur's attitude was just the opposite. He not only believed that Aguinaldo should be captured, but captured alive.
In referring to the capture, he said:
It dispelled the growing tendency to idealize his personality and to surround him with mythical legends of invincibility which millions of natives
believed to be true and which they also believed would ultimately insure
the success of the revolution. Auinaldo was the incarnation of the Insur221




rection and as such his death would have magnified the legend... Accordingly his capture alive by legitimate military methods, or his surrender... became a prominent feature of the military administration of the
islands...
Credit for the capture of Aguinaldo must go to General
Frederick Funston. As brigadier general of Volunteers, Funston
had been placed in command of the military district which embraced the territory in the vicinity of Nueva Ecija Province.
On January 8 Cecilio Sigismundo, an Insurgent, presented
himself to Lieutenant J. D. Taylor, in command of the American garrison in the town of Pantabangan. Sigismundo was a
courier for Aguinaldo, who was hiding in the town of Palanan,
an isolated locality in the northest part of Luzon. Sigismundo
carried twenty letters from Aguinaldo to guerrilla commanders
scattered throughout Luzon. Near Pantabangan his escort of
twelve Insurgents had encountered American troops and been
dispersed. As was customary, Sigismundo appealed secretly to
the native Presidente of Pantabangan for assistance in getting
through the American lines. By mere chance the Presidente actually was loyal to the Americans and convinced Sigismundo
that his best bet was to surrender and forget about his mission
from Aguinaldo. After negotiations with Lieutenant Taylor, he
surrendered not only himself but all his dispatches. Taylor
sent the prisoner with the papers to district headquarters at San
Isidro. One of the dispatches gave an idea for capturing the Insurgent President. This dispatch was addressed to Baldomero
Aguinaldo, the cousin of the Insurgent President; and directed
him to send 400 armed Insurgents to Aguinaldo's mountain
hideout, using the courier Sigismundo as a guide. The dispatch
had been in cipher and was decoded with great difficulty.
On interviewing Sigismundo, Funston ascertained that
Aguinaldo, with an armed escort, was living in Palanan, Isabela Province, ten miles from the coast. The only trail to Palanan
from the coast was carefully watched and any attempt to capture
Aguinaldo by ordinary methods would surely fail. The Insurgent President would receive warning of the approach of a hostile force in time to retreat to a mountain stronghold.
Funston decided to have a force of Macabebes disguise them222




selves as I agalogs and represent the force of 400 men which
Aguinaldo had requested and Sigismundo agreed to guide the
expedition to Palanan. Despite its unorthodoxy, MacArthur approved the plan and Funston went to Manila where final preparations were made.
Eighty Tagalog-speaking Macabebes were selected for the expedition and it was decided that the American officers would
pose as soldies who had been captured by the column en route
to Palanan. The officers that went along were: General Funston,
Captain R. T. Hazzard and Lieutenant 0. P. M. Hazzard,
brothers who had been on duty with the Macabebe Scouts,
Funston's Aide-de-Camp, Lieutenant B. J. Mitchell, and Captain
H. W. Newton, who had at one time been in Palanan.
Feeling it necessary to have a few bona fide Tagalogs to act
as Insurgent officers, Funston dug up four whom he considered
quite loyal. The Spaniard Segovia, who had helped unravel the
cipher, completed the complement for the expedition.
Greatest secrecy and detailed precautions accompanied the
preparations. The Macabebes were clothed in nondescript Insurgent uniforms and armed with Mauser and Remington rifles.
They were carefully rehearsed in the story of the "march" north,
the fight with the Americans, and the capture of the American
prisoners. They were instructed that the American officers must
be treated like prisoners and not like officers. The Macabebes
fell into the plan wholeheartedly.
To make the deception complete, it was decided that the force
would not make an overland march to Palanan, where daily
contacts with Tagalogs might expose the real purpose of the expedition, Instead, the force would be taken by boat around the
southern tip of Luzon, landed on an isolated spot on the east
coast, and make the march to Palanan from. there. That part of
the Island was so isolated from the central plain that an Insurgent force might appear there as out of nowhere without causing undue questioning.
The expedition left Manila March 6 on the gunboat Vicksburg. The arrangements had been kept so secret that even the
captain of the Vicksburg did not know the purpose of the expedition until it was well out to sea. The town of Casiguran, on
a bay by the same name, had been picked as a landing place. It
223




was over one hundred miles from Palanan, but Funston feared
that if an American gunboat approached too close to Palanan,
Aguinaldo's suspicions would be aroused. After a turbulent
trip through the San Bernardino straits, the VTicsburg arrived
in the vicinity of Casiguran, on March 13 and in the dead of
night landed the adventurous expedition about ten miles from
the town. The 5 American officers, 80 Macabebes, 1 Spaniard,
and 4 Tagalogs were left entirely on their own resources in a
part of Luzon which had never before been occupied by American troops. One defaulter would ruin the whole plan, possibly
cause a wholesale massacre. It was arranged that the Vicksburg
would contact the coast near Palanan Bay on the 25th.
To allay suspicion on the part of the Filipinos in Casiguran,
Funston sent couriers ahead with a message for the town Presidente. The message stated that the force was en route for Palanan with reinforcements for Aguinaldo, and asked that in view
of their "difficult march over the mountains," quarters and
rations be furnished. The inhabitants of Casiguran were completely deceived. General Funston said:
There was much excitement in the little town of Casiguran and crowds
of people came to greet us. Of course they thought that they were greeting
some of their own victorious soldiers bringing prisoners that they had captured. The village band was pressed into service and we entered the town
in great style. Of course we were a great show, being the first Americans
they had ever seen. They crowded around us and. there were some black
looks and some remarks not of a complimentary nature, but in general
there was nothing in their conduct to criticize.
The expedition remained in Casiguran two days, assembling
food for the 100-mile march to Palanan. Funston took advantage of the delay to send forward by two Filipino couriers forged
messages to Aguinaldo stating that the expedition was on its
way to join him. To further confuse the Insurgent President,
Funston had prepared these messages before he left Manila,
using stationery captured from the Insurgent General Lacuna.
Lacuna was known to be loyal to Aguinaldo and his signature
was forged by the adept Segovia. Aguinaldo later admitted that
it was this forged letter which completely allayed any suspicion
he might have had.
224




Leaving Casiguran, the expedition journeyed north following the irregular coast line. General Funston said:
The rain never ceased pouring and from the morning we left Casiguran
we were drenched to the skin for a week. We waded more than sixty
streams, some of them mere brooks but others so deep and swift that we
had to put our hands on each others' shoulders and go in up to our armpits.
The food soaked through and through and became a soggy fermenting
mass. From the start we went on half rations and in a few days were
ravenous with hunger. Of sleep we could get very little as our bed was the
bare ground and we were exposed without shelter to the never-ending torrents of rain. To eke out our food supply a few small fish were caught in
their hands by the Macabebes and they scraped limpets from the rocks and
gathered snails. The snails, limpets and small fish were stewed up with
corn and made a revolting mess... Segovia had developed a terrible
abscess on one of his feet... all day of the 22nd we stumbled along in a
half dazed condition, our men were scattered for a mile along the beach,
some of them so weak they reeled as they walked... It seemed impossible
that the madcapenterprise could succeed and I began to have regrets that
I had led all these men to such a finish.
In the evening of the 22nd the band reached the town of
Dinudungan, where the trail started to Palanan, ten miles away.
There it was met by a messenger from       Aguinaldo who directed that the American prisoners be left on the coast. On the
request of the exhausted expedition Aguinaldo sent food. Fearing that the absence of the American officers might make the
whole plan go awry when Palanan was reached, Funston decided to disregard Aguinaldo's instructions about leaving the
"American prisoners" on the coast. En route to the town the
Americans hid in the brush while an Insurgent patrol sent from
Palanan to guard them    passed the column on the trail.
The actual capture of the Insurgent President was accomplished without the presence of the American officers. Funston
knew that if the officers appeared in Palanan with the column
of Macabebes, Aguinaldo would sense something wrong. So
Funston sent the Macabebes with the purported Insurgent officers ahead into town. The 22nd of March had been Aguinaldo's birthday and Palanan was bedecked in festive colors.
As the column of Macabebes marched into the town plaza,
Aguinaldo's bodyguard of about fifty men was lined up at
present arms. The band was playing. The Macabebes swung into
225




line opposite Aguinaldo's troops. Aguinaldo, with several aides,
was in the second story of the municipal building overlooking
the Plaza. Segovia and Tal Pacido, one of the Tagalogs who
had accompanied the expedition, walked upstairs to report to
Aguinaldo. After receiving a few congratulatory words from
the Insurgent President for making the difficult march, Segovia
walked to a window and gave the signal to the Macabebes below. The surprise was complete. The Macabebes raised their
rifles and opened fire on the Insurgents lined up a few yards
away. Exhausted and nervous as Funston's men were, the volley
resulted in only three casualties, one being the band leader.
However, the bodyguard scattered and disappeared in the
nearby woods. In the municipal building Segovia fired at
Aguinaldo's aides, who either escaped by jumping out of the
window or were shot. Tal Pacido tackled Aguinaldo and threw
him under a table saying, "You are a prisoner of the Americans." When Funston and the other Americans entered the town
a few moments later, the situation was well in hand.
The expedition rested at Palanan for one day and on the 25th
marched to the coast where it was picked up by the Vicksburg.
On the 28th the Vicksburg reached Manila. Funston took his
prisoner ashore and presehted him to the astonished MacArthur.
A few days later, as a reward, Funston was made a brigadier
general in the Regular Army. He had attained in three years a
rank which few officers attain in forty years of service. The
Macabebes and Tagalogs on the expedition were liberally rewarded by cash payments for their part in the capture.
MacArthur installed the Insurgent President in a spacious
house near the Malacafan and sent for his family. The everpresent guard was as unobtrusive as possible.
In a short time Aguinaldo issued a proclamation advising his
followers to come under the American flag. He said in part:
The country has declared unmistakably for peace; so be it. Enough of
blood; enough of tears and desolation...after mature deliberation I
cannot refuse to heed the voice of a people longing for peace... By
acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty of the United States throughout the entire Archipelago, as I do now without any reservation whatsoever. T believe that I am serving thee, m! beloved country. May happiness
be thine.
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From then on Emilio Aguinaldo, the bete noir of the American sovereignty in the Philippines, ceased to be a problem. To
praise an honorable opponent the following eulogy printed in
the anti-imperialistic magazine, The Nation, in its issue of April
4, 1901, shortly after Aguinaldo had been captured, is quoted:
Whatever fate may be in reserve for him [Aguinaldo] he will be known
to history only as a defender of liberty under desperate circumstances and
against terrible odds. With little money and scant resources in arms, ammunition, and supplies, he has maintained the fight for more than two
years against an organized army of more than 65,000 men, possessing every
appliance of modern warfare and having entire command of the sea. That
in this heroic endeavor he was moved solely by patriotism and that his
character was above reproach is the testimony of officers of our own, both
military and civil. Nor has his career been stained by any act of cruelty.
At the time when these great responsibilities were thrown upon him he
was only twenty-seven years of age. History can show few brighter examples of patient endurance, intellectual resource and high principle. We feel
sure that such virtues will stir the admiration of every lover of liberty in
the world and that the name of Aguinaldo will find a place eventually, in
all American hearts...
General Aguinaldo later received a pension from the Insular
Government, and settled down to complacent farming and acting as the head of the Philippine Veterans Association.
His proclamation was issued on April 19. Five days later over
1,500 Insurgents in the vicinity of Manila surrendered. On May
1 General Manuel Tinio, the soul of the Insurrection in the
Ilocano provinces of northern Luzon, surrendered with 36 of
his officers. He admitted that his surrender was a result of
Aguinaldo's proclamation. As a gracious gesture for Tinios' surrender, MacArthur directed that 1,000 Insurgent prisoners be
released. In central Luzon Generals Mascard6, Alexandrino and
Lucuna surrendered. After their surrender 500 Insurgent prisoners were released. In June, General Juan Cailles surrendered
and another 1,000 prisoners were released. Within a comparatively short time almost every Insurgent of importance in Luzon
had surrendered. But General Miguel Malvar in the Province of
Batangas had not. Except for General Lucban on the Island of
Samar, the Insurgents in the other Islands came in and laid
down their arms. Between June and September of 1901, besides
the numerous leaders, over 4,000 Insurgents surrendered, bring227




ing with them 1,363 rifles. Those who refused to accept American sovereignty were rapidly assuming the status of bandits.
The operation of the above-mentioned factors towards pacification permitted the gradual transition from military to civil
government in the Islands. In January 1901 Manila was taken
from the direct jurisdiction of a military provost guard and
given to a civilian police force. Within the next few months
nine companies of native police were organized and distributed
throughout Luzon. In February 1900 the Philippine Scouts, a
native military unit built around the Macabebe Scouts, was organized and its members stationed throughout the Archipelago.
These "Philippine Scouts" formed the nucleus of the American
armed forces in the Islands. In February 1901 the Taft Commission authorized the establishment of provincial civil governments, provincial governors to be elected by the Filipinos.
Municipal codes and native councils were set up in barrios
which were felt to be loyal to the United States. As fast as'
pacified provinces could be organized and civil governments
established, they were removed from the jurisdiction of the
military authorities and placed under the supervision of the
Civil Commission. Throughout the Archipelago the number of
American troops under arms had decreased but little. They were
still forced to make night marches in attempts to capture minor
recalcitrant leaders. By June 1901 about half the people of Luzon
were living under military rule and about half under civil government.
A particularly refractory Insurgent captured at this time was
Major Manuel L. Quezon. This 23-year-old youth had been a
law student at the University of Santo T6mas at the outbreak
of the Insurrection and had immediately enlisted in Aguinaldo's
army as a private. Promotion had been rapid and an almost
fanatical belief in the righteousness of the Insurgent cause
motivated him to remain hostile to the Americans even after
Aguinaldo's proclamation. Following his capture he was imprisoned for six months. With the establishment of peace he engaged in law practice, and then drifted into politics, still a
passionate, if peaceful, apostle of Philippine Independence.
Possessed of a brilliant mind, a pleasing personality, and publicspeaking ability, he saw his ideals materialize thirty-five years
228




later in his own inauguration as first President of the Philippine Commonwealth.
By June the number of American troops in the Philippines
had been reduced to about 42,000, and 23,000 Insurgent rifles
had been either captured or surrendered.
On June 20, 1901, by proclamation of the President, the executive authority in the Islands was transferred from the Military
Governor to the civil authority. William Howard Taft, chairman
of the Philippine Commission, was designated as the civil governor, but the legislative power still remained in the Commission. Three Filipinos were added to its membership. The proclamation was based on the idea, however, that in provinces
which were not sufficiently pacified for full inauguration of
civil rule, the Military Governor would be the executive authority. Of the seventy-seven provinces in the Archipelago twentytwo were placed under the civil authority and fifty-five under
the military. At first glance it may appear that the provinces
in which the civil government was instituted contained nearly
fifty per cent of the population of the Islands. Many of the
provinces during the Spanish regime had not even been occupied; many of them were peaceful, and the inauguration of civil
rule was merely a matter of running down a few local bandits.
On July 4, 1901, the day that the new regime became effective, General MacArthur returned to the United States. He was
succeeded by Major General Adna R. Chaffee. Chaffee had just
returned from China as commanding officer of the American
forces sent there as a result of the Boxer Rebellion.
Within three months thirteen more provinces had been placed
under civil authorities, and the Insurrection as such was definitely on the wane. American garrisons were kept in many
towns; but relations between American soldiers and Filipinos
were friendly, and in many respects similar to conditions in the
United States. The main duty of the military was protecting the
civilian population of the native villages from wandering, isolated bandit bands. Except for the provinces of Batangas, parts
of the Islands of Cebu, Bohol, Samar, and Mindoro, the situation was peaceful. During the summer Cebu and Bohol became so quiet that civil government was instituted there.
Just as peace appeared to be in sight a horrible affair occurred
229




at the town of Balangiga on the wild, unsettled Island of Samar.
The Island had few roads, and the settled towns were scattered
along the coastline. During the Spanish regime the Island had
not been fully occupied, and the few garrisons maintained along
the coastal barrios were commanded by noncommissioned officers. These officers were usually directed to "marry a relative
of the leading Filipino in the town and secure the protection of
the natives." The interior of the Island was inhabited by a
mongrel type of Filipino whose blood was mixed with the
aboriginal negritos and the Moro pirates who had raided the
Island for centuries.
The 9th Infantry had but recently returned from the China
expedition. It had performed signal service there, had taken
part in the capture of Tientsin, and had been among the first
to rush the walls of the Imperial City of Peking. With the cessation of the Boxer activities in China it had returned to the
Philippines and had been scattered in small garrisons throughout the Islands. On August 11, Company C had been sent to
Samar and had occupied without opposition the small coastal
village of Balangiga. The officials of the town professed friendship for the Americans. The seventy-four men of the company
were housed in the public buildings. The company commander,
Captain Thomas W. O'Connell, was a West Point graduate in
the class of 1894. Lieutenant E. C. Bumpus, second in command, had served throughout the Insurrection in Luzon and
had accompanied the regiment to China. Major Richard S.
Griswold, attached to the company as surgeon, had seen service
throughout the Insurrection. The company itself consisted
mainly of veterans: a few had gone through the campaign in
Cuba, many through the Insurrection in Luzon; and all through
the Boxer Campaign. One man had been a member of the crew
of the Olympia during the battle of Manila Bay.
The Insurgent leader, Vincente Lucban, was active throughout Samar; however, he had confined, his activities to the regimentation of the hapless Filipinos in the interior of the Island,
or the attack of small patrols of American troops; so no particular trouble was expected from him.
Established comfortably in Balangiga, Captain O'Connell set
out to clean up the town. He directed the local presidente to put
230




the citizens to work sweeping up the years-old accumulation
of rubbish and trash scattered throughout the streets and clearing the underbrush which had grown unrestricted under houses
and in the streets. In response to a complaint from the Presidente that he was unable to get the people to volunteer for work,
the company canvassed the town and forced about one hundred
able-bodied men to work under guard. A short time later the
town presidente and the chief of police suggested that since several Filipinos in the hills close to the town were supposed to
work out their taxes, it would be a good idea to have them assist
in the work. O'Connell assented and a couple of days later
eighty Filipinos were brought in and lodged in conical tents in
the vicinity of the soldiers' barracks. As was later determined,
these men were picked bolomen from the guerrilla force of
General Lucban.
The evening of September 27, Lieutenant Bumpus with a detail of men, returned from the town of Basey, about twenty
miles away, with the company mail. Basey was just across the
narrow Sanjuanico Straits from-the large town of Tacloban on
the Island of Leyte. With Tacloban it contained a fairly large
garrison. Company C of the 9th Infantry had received no mail
for four months, and the men were overjoyed at the large sack
which Lieutenant Bumpus brought back with him. Also they
learned of the assassination of President McKinley, three weeks
previous.
By 0630 the following morning the men were up and anxious
to read their mail. The Filipino workmen were lining up near
the barracks under the supervision of the civilian chief of police.
On guard were three sentries. The remainder of the company
was at breakfast at an outdoor kitchen about thirty yards from
the barracks. The only time that the soldiers were permitted to
move out of their barracks without a loaded rifle was at mess.
While everything was apparently quiet and according to routine, the Filipino chief of police walked up to one of the sentries and without warning snatched the rifle from his hands and
felled him with the butt. Immediately the bells in the town
church rang, conch shells blew from the hills, and the entire
male populace of Balangiga, assisted by the bolomen from
Lucban's force, rushed Company C.
231




The few survivors of this massacre were able to give vivid
details. The three sentries armed with rifles were dispatched in
the twinkling of an eye. A Filipino group hidden in the town
church rushed the officers' quarters which were in the convent
across the street from the barracks. Captain O'Connell jumped
from the second story window of his room, started to cross to
the barracks, was hacked to death by twenty or thirty bolomen.
Lieutenant Bumpus was sitting in a chair in his room, his mail
on his lap. A bolo cut on the bridge of his nose severed the
entire front part of his head. The surgeon, Major Griswold, was
overwhelmed and stabbed to death.
Across the street the majority of the Company were seated at
mess tables and most of them were killed before they could get
on their feet. The first sergeant was washing his messkit and
had his head split by a blow from an axe. One sergeant's head
was completely severed from his body and fell in his plate. In
his hands were grasped a knife and a fork. The company cook,
one of the few survivors, threw a pot of boiling coffee at the
first Filipinos who rushed him, and then held them off by hurling all the canned goods he could reach. When these were exhausted he grabbed a meat cleaver and fought his way towards
the barracks where the rifles were located. The few men who
had gained their feet and survived the first onslaught grabbed
any weapons they could-picks, shovels, baseball bats, clubs, or
a bolo wrenched from a Filipino's hand. Then they tried to
reach the barracks. Three men mounted a rock pile and defended themselves with rocks. Sergeant George F. Markley, a
huge man, was wounded but managed to reach the barracks
by swinging his arms like a flail and kicking Filipinos in their
stomachs. He obtained a rifle and pumped bullets into the
Filipinos surrounding him. One soldier reached the barracks,
but was grabbed by three Filipinos who threw him down under
a shower of bolo cuts. Reaching out in a last effort, his arm
touched a pistol thrown on the floor in the melee, and he was
able to save his life by shooting his assailants. Hopelessly outnumbered, the Americans were butchered like hogs. American
brains and entrails strewed the plaza and barracks. A few who
sought flight in the water nearby were hunted down in boats
and boloed to death. Fifteen minutes after the attack started all
232




but 5 of the 74 men in the Company had either been killed or
wounded. Of those wounded, twelve were able to be on their
feet; and, under the protection of Sergeant Markley's fire, had
managed to unite and gain possession of rifles. This group fired
rifles until they became too hot to hold, and thus finally drove
the bolomen away from the barracks.
A quick check indicated that the small group could not expect to hold the town. So the men decided to escape by boat to
the nearest American garrison. Under fire from the Filipinos
who had retired to a respectful distance, the senior survivor,
Sergeant Bentron, loaded the group on five barotas found in the
vicinity, and started towards Basey. The dead, fifty-six rifles, and
several thousand rounds of ammunition were left at Balangiga.
Before leaving, at the cost of two more casualties, the survivors
hauled the American flag down from the city hall and took it
with them.
The trip of the survivors to Basey was nearly as harrowing as
the massacre itself. Barotas are small, narrow, canoe-like craft.
Their equilibrium is maintained by outriggers, so they have to
be rowed slowly. A short distance out, one barota containing
four men filled up with water and slowly drifted back to shore.
There two wounded men were boloed to death. The other two,
by running to cover, finally found another boat and put to -sea.
They were picked up the following day by a steamer. Another
boat containing two men floated away from the rest and drifted
into shore where its occupants were butchered. The other three
boats contained enough unhurt men to row, and they gradually
worked their way along the coast towards Basey. At noon the
water supply was exhausted and drinking salt water increased
the suffering of the wounded. Filipinos armed with spears and
bolos put out from shore in boats. They intended to board the
barotas but were held off by the rifle-fire of the few who were
able to shoot. Several attempts to land were prevented by the
appearance of Filipinos on the shore armed with spears and
rifles. With only one man able to talk, the survivors reached
Basey at 0330 the following morning. Of the twenty-six survivors, twenty-two were wounded. Two had died en route.
Company G of the 9th Infantry, under Captain Edwin V.
Bookmiller, was stationed at Basey. Bookmiller obtained the
233




services of the steamer Pittsburgh, which was at Tacloban, and
with 55 men of his company, immediately returned to Balangiga, arriving there at noon the same day. The Insurgents were
driven from the town without difficulty. About 250 Filipinos
had been killed in the massacre. Company C's score was as
follows:
Killed during the massacre....................... 36
Wounded, died later............................ 8
Wounded................................... 22
Missing....................................... 4
Not wounded............................  4
Total present during massacre............... 74
Shortly after the massacre Lucban issued a congratulatory
proclamation to the natives of Balangiga and enjoined the citizens of other towns to follow their example. A similar attempt
was made on Company E of the 9th Infantry in the town of
Gandara October 16. The same methods employed at Balangiga
were used. However, the attempted massacre was frustrated by
the watchfulness of the garrison. Ten Americans had been killed
and six wounded.
The Balangiga incident, in the face of growing peaceful conditions throughout the other parts of the Islands, called for
strong measures of repression. The number of troops on the
Island was increased and the job of pacification given to
Brigadier General Jacob ("Hell Roaring Jake") Smith. As General Smith was leaving for Samar General Chaffee said to him:
"We have lost 100 rifles at Balangiga and 25,000 rounds of ammunition. You must get them back. You can have $5,000 gold.
Capture the arms if you can, buy them if you must; whichever
course you adopt get them back."
As soon as he arrived at his headquarters General Smith
issued a proclamation to the officers of his command. The proclamation said in part:
The policy to be pursued in this brigade will be to wage war in the
sharpest and most decisive manner possible... No civilized war, however
civilized, can be carried on on a humanitarian basis.. Every native
234




whether in arms or living in the Pueblos will be regarded and treated as
an enemy until he has conclusively shown that he is a friend... Neutrality must not be tolerated on the part of any native... if not an active
friend, he is an open enemy...
A-battalion of Marines was sent to garrison the southern ports
of Samar and to assist in cleaning up the Island. The commanding officer of the Marines, Major Littleton W. T. Waller, a capable, energetic officer, took his duties most seriously. It appears
that General Smith instructed Major Waller in the methods he
was to employ, as follows:
I want no prisoners. I wish you to burn and kill; the more you burn
and kill the better it will please me.
Major Waller took the General at his word and undertook a
campaign of death and pillage unique in the annals of American warfare. One of Major Waller's reports ran in part as follows:
On the 7th [November] a party went out from Balangiga scouting to
the northward and discovered an entrenchment with 30 rifles. The Insurgents fell back but the party was too small to follow, being only 20. They
got shells and ammunition, all Krags. On the 8th sent a party to Eba to
destroy it and kill or capture all men. They destroyed 40 houses, 3 caraboas
and about one-half ton of hemp, killed 9 men, captured 11. One of the
captured men admitted that they were Insurrectos and stated that he had
been fighting against us on the 6th.
On the 9th sent a party across the Cadacan River to follow the trails and
destroy all houses. They destroyed 55 houses and killed 2 caraboas. Another
party on the 10th destroyed 40 houses and 3 caraboas. Captain Porter took
out an expedition and worked around his place for three days. He found
strong entrenchments everywhere and many relics of the 9th Infantry. He
destroyed 100 shacks, killed 1 man and captured 7. Resume of the happenings: 255 houses burned, 39 men killed, 18 men captured, 17 bolos
captured, 1 ton of hemp and one-half ton of rice destroyed, 13 caraboas
killed, 50 bancas captured (approximately).
Late in December another American tragedy occurred on
Samar. The Marines this time were the principals. During the
last week in December Major Waller with 4 officers and 50
Marines, accompanied by 30 bearers, made a brave but foolhardy attempt to cross the Island. They started from Laoang
235




on the east coast and meant to go directly across to Basey thirtyfive miles away. Incessant rains, swollen streams, and other
natural obstacles made progress extremely slow. The trail became so faint in places that the small band lost its way in the
dense tropical jungles. Shortly thereafter the rations became exhausted, and men fell out of the column from weakness. Leaving the bulk of the company, Major Waller with 15 men pushed
on ahead and finally reached Basey on January 9, utterly exhausted. A relief expedition rushed back into the mountains
from Basey, but after searching for ten days returned without
the lost Marines. Meanwhile on January 11, Captain David
Porter and two other men in the company returned to Laoang
in a starving and mentally disordered state. They reported that
over 30 men were still lost in the mountains, and Lieutenant
Kenneth P. Williams of the 1st Infantry stationed at Laoang
immediately organized another relief expedition. The expedition rushed up the Laoang River towards the interior in small
boats which were frequently overturned because of the swollen
condition of the river. Williams and his men were further delayed by sporadic shots from Insurgents lurking in the jungle
depths, but on January 18 they finally located the remnants of
the band.
The twenty survivors were virtually naked; none had eaten
for eighteen days. Eight men were lying helpless on the ground,
delirious with fever, the remainder were on the verge of insanity, could not remember who they were or where they had
been. Lieutenant Williams carried them back to Laoang where
they were given medical treatment. Ten members of the band
were never located and undoubtedly died of starvation or at the
hands of the Insurgents.
Undeterred by this tragedy, American troops continued to
push into the mountains, using rivers as means of entry wherever possible. Scores of Filipinos were shot; hundreds of houses
burned.
Two months after he started to clean up Samar, Smith realized that Lucban was receiving assistance from outside the
Island. Across the. narrow Sanjuanico Straits on the Island of
Leyte, civil government had been established. Although ostensibly peaceful and pro-American, the natives of Leyte were as236




sisting Lucba in inumerous ways. The strait between the Islands
was so narrow that small boats could cross with ease; and rice,
arms, and ammunition were supplied to Lucban by sympathizers across the straits. Moreover, several British hemp firms, of
which the Smith-Bell Company of Manila was an outstanding
example, insisted on maintaining trade relations with the Filipinos on Samar. Smith believed that it was the income derived
from trade with these British firms which enabled the Insurgents to continue their resistance.
In order to curb these activities, he issued an order cutting
off all marine intercourse between Leyte and Samar. This immediately brought him into conflict with the American Civil
Governor of Leyte, Mr. J. H. Grant. Governor Grant felt that
Smith's peremptory orders affecting Leyte usurped his authority
as civil governor. He pointed out to General Smith that Leyte
was under civil jurisdiction and as such not subject to the orders
of the military commander of the district. Smith replied that if
Leyte was pacified and fit for civil government, no more troops
should be necessary. He ordered the American troops off the
Island, leaving as the only protection a few civil Filipino Constabulary troops which Grant was organizing. Realizing that
the absence of troops on Leyte was very apt to cause trouble,
Grant called on Governor Taft for assistance. The matter was
finally ironed out between Mr. Taft and General Chaffee, whose
policy it was to bend over backwards in acknowledging the
authority of the civil power in the Islands. The troops remained,
and supervised, restricted boat trade between the Islands was
permitted.
Smith's policy of blood-and-iron had its effect. Lucban's force
was chased from one end of the Island to the other. It was
scattered and Lucban became a fugitive. By February 1902 conditions were such that Smith felt able to issue a proclamation
authorizing the Filipinos to return to their homes and relaxing
many of the restrictions which had been placed upon them. Five
days later Lucban himself was captured. By April the few Insurgents who remained in the field had surrendered, and henceforth peace reigned on the Island.
General Smith's career was not to have such a happy ending. While his stern policy in Samar was at its height, a news237




paper man visited the Island and on his return to the United
States published the details of the policy in force there. Various
"Anti" societies fomented a wave of indignation at the way the
poor Filipinos were being treated by the American soldiery and
instigated another Congressional investigation. General Smith
was brought to trial for conduct to the prejudice of good order
and military discipline, found guilty by a military court, and
sentenced to be admonished. Shortly thereafter he was retired.
Whenever stories of the fighting in the Philippines are told
around a campfire the majority seem to center around the
Moros. Possibly it is because the Moro is a Mohammedan with
a romantic religious difference. At any rate, the fighting with the
Moros in the Philippines has always seemed to stir patriotic
imagination. Actually the little trouble the Moros caused was
brought on by fear of the Christian Filipinos or simply plain
restlessness born of their native customs.
American garrisons on Mindanao and JQ1o spent most of
their time keeping peace among the Moros or insisting that
piracy be stopped. The political situation in Mindanao and Jolo
was ably summed up by Colonel 0. J. Sweet, commanding the
district, in May 1901. Colonel Sweet reported:
Our relations with the Sultans and Chief remain friendly. They will
promise anything in the shape of reforms but these are never carried out.
The best way to look out for No. 1 is their only object in life and every
other interest is secondary to it. Nine out of ten of the population of the
Islands would gladly renounce allegiance to the Sultans and Datos and
swear allegiance to the United States. There can be no progress until the
United States takes complete control of the Islands. Neither the Sultan or
any Dato who is in line of succession to the Sultanate can make anything
out of the country. They are bound up in traditions and to do anything
their ancestors did not do would be wrong. In many things they are inferior
to the American Indians and I know of no trait in which they are superior.
The Sultan stands on his dignity and quotes erroneously from the Koran
as to his duties of Sultan toward his people. So far I can find no case where
he lives up to his model.
The principal duty of the American officers in the Moro countries was to prevent hot-headed Moro datos from taking the law
into their own hands. On one occasion a dato shot a trader be238




clause the latter had charged the dato more for oranges than
the merchant had charged another man.
Correspondence between the American officers and Moro
datos was sometimes humorous. This is indicated in the letters
between Colonel Sweet and the Sultan of Jolo concerning the
theft of the cemetery gates of the American garrison. The correspondence is in part as follows:
To his Highness the Sultan of Jolo, from his brother the Governor of
Tiange, Greetings:
Three nights ago the iron gates of the cemetery were stolen. Indications
point to the Moros living in your territory as thieves. I desire you to make
a thorough search for said gates and have them returned and the thieves
punished... I do not know who committed this theft; if I did I would
not call on you but would act myself. The thief was a Moro; this being
the case it is your duty to act. The graves of our dead are respected. This
act was worse than any of the acts so far reported and it was to a certain
extent a desecration of our dead and will not be tolerated.
Very Respectfully,
0. J. SWEET
Major 23rd Infantry, Military Governor
The Sultan's reply follows:
This letter comes from your son the Sultan Hadji Mohammed Jamalul,
Kiram to my father the Governor of Tiange:
Your letter of the 23rd instant received and I understand its contents. I
am very sorry indeed that the gates to the cemetery were stolen. It would
have been better if the thief -had robbed the property belonging to the living, because they have a chance to earn more but the dead have not. Therefore aid me to think how to get rid of stealing in this country. Let us inquire at all places-where there are blacksmiths. There are no blacksmiths
in Maibun. Above all you must closely examine the blacksmiths in the Buz
Buz and Moubu as these gates were too heavy to be carried a long distance.
Very likely they are in these two places. I will have a search made in all
places where there are blacksmiths. If we find the thief let us bury him
alive. I did not tell the thief to steal nor did he do it with my knowledge.
You are an old man... and perhaps you have pity on me. As for me I
detest thieves...
The trouble between the Americans and Moros of Mindanao
came primarily from twvo causes-the American attempt to stop
the constant raiding and stealing between the various Moro
239




tribes; and American explorations into the interior of Mindanao.
Lake Lanao is sixteen miles from the north coast of Mindanao. It is twenty-two miles long. At the time of the Insurrection its shores were dotted with villages which had a population of about 100,000 Moros. These inhabitants maintained few
contacts with the outside world and resented the intrusion of
foreigners, particularly Christians. In 1891 a Spanish force of
4,000 men had penetrated to the lake and undertaken the pacification of the surrounding area. Materials for constructing boats
had been packed to the interior and several gunboats erected
which cruised along the shore. When the Americans took over
the Philippines, the area was by no means pacified and the disgruntled Spanish sank all their boats in the lake before they
left. As long as the Moros had attended to their own business
the Americans had adopted a hands-off policy towards the Lake
Lanao Moros. Then during 1900 raiding parties began to appear from the lake, carried off friendly coastal Moros, and stole
American-owned horses. On several occasions these parties
boloed small groups of American soldiers.
Brigadier General George W. Davis, commanding the department, sent messengers to all datos in the neighborhood
demanding that the stolen property be returned and that the
murderers of American soldiers be turned over. The response
from the representatives of the Lake Moros was decidedly hostile, so it was decided that an American expedition be sent to
Lake Lanao. Colonel Frank'Baldwin commanded the 27th Infantry with a battery of mountain artillery attached. The expedition blazed a twenty-five mile trail into the interior. Near
Lake Lanao in the territory of the Sultan of Bayang and the
dato of Bindayan, the Americans ran up against two Moro
cotas, or forts, a relatively medieval type of defense, but under
the circumstances, a distinct obstacle. Around the outside of the
cotas were lines of trenches. The walls, ten feet high and several
feet thick, were covered by a thick, thorny growth so sharp that
a ladder provided the only means of crossing. A few hundred
men armed with rifles and several brass cannon garrisoned the
fort. The expedition fought its way up to the walls, but could
240




not scale them. Baldwin surrounded the fort and waited until
scaling ladders could be constructed during the night.
Colonel Baldwin's report shows conditions in his ranks:
We had met with very serious losses having had 1 officer and 9 men
killed and 3 officers and 37 men wounded, few of whom could be brought
to the rear in daylight as the moment they showed themselves the bearers
would be shot down. When night came it was intensely dark and it was
found impracticable to move them until the following morning at (laylight... Medical officers were on the field attending the wounded as
best they could. Added to the misery of the situation both for wounded
and men on the line, a heavy rain set in which lasted all night long. The
suffering of these wounded men, having to lie on the battlefield as they
did, could not be alleviated and would have been made more aggravated
had an effort been made to move them to the rear during the darkness, as
the country to be traversed was filled with pitfalls, sharpened stakes, and
ditches covered with grass.
White flags were flying over the cota at daybreak, and after
short negotiations the Moros surrendered.
After this lesson the Lake datos established friendly relations.
A few remained rebellious, however, and continued annoying
and attacking Americans. Between May and September American garrisons were attacked twelve times with 4 killed and 12
wounded.
In September 1903 an expedition under Captain John J.
Pershing made a tour of the area, severely punishing the Maciu
Moros; and in 1905 Captain Frank R. McCoy led a punitive
expedition into the Cotabato Valley, destroying many cotas.
The Moros were comparatively quiet for the next year, but sporadic uprisings took place in 1906 at Bud Dajo on the Island
of Jo0b.
The Islands were virtually pacified when shocking conditions
were found to exist in the provinces of Batangas, Laguna, and
Tayabas, a short distance south of Manila. Under the influence
of General Miguel Malvar, the natives of this area were found
carrying on a dual government even worse than that at the
height of the guerrilla warfare. The Americans had been completely hoodwinked. True, it was known that Malvar controlled
isolated bodies of guerrillas who occasionally harassed the
241




American garrisons; but it was generally believed that the people living in the towns were heart and soul behind the American
administration. The facts came to light in a rather unusual
manner. Colonel Cornelius Gardner of the 30th Infantry, in
command of the American garrison at Tiaong in Tayabas, had
instituted a policy of extreme leniency. The province had been
placed under civil rule and the natives had elected as the governor of the province their friend and protector, Colonel Gardner. The Colonel complained to Governor Taft that the Filipinos under his jurisdiction were being mistreated by the
Americans. The report got to Washington, and since it came
from an Army officer, caused another uproar and investigation.
Placed somewhat on the defensive by Colonel' Gardner's accusations, the military, through secret service and other means, unearthed the shocking state of affairs.
In May 1901 the Insurgents had held a junta, and had sent
word to the American authorities that they wanted to organize
Tiaong under civil government. All appointive offices in the
town were allotted to guerrilla leaders. An Insurgent colonel
was charged with organizing the police force whose principal
duty was to notify the Insurgents of the American movements.
One-half the profits of supplies sold to American troops was to
go to the Insurgents. No Filipinos of military age were permitted to marry except upon the contribution of thirty pesos or
a rifle. One-tenth of all agricultural produce was exacted from
the farmers. Nothing could be carried to market without the
farmer paying a highway tax to armed guerrillas who patrolled
the road. Brass bands had to give half their earnings to the Insurrection. All Filipinos drawing salary from the American
government were forced to contribute a portion of the church
tithes to the Insurrection and were secretly licensed to gamble
in private houses. In the three provinces of Cavite, Tayabas, and
Batangas, Malvar was purported to have some 5,000 guerrillas
off and on in the field.
The Vice President, Isidoro Argao, had surrendered in 1900,
lived in the town awhile, and then rejoined the Insurgents, accepting a commission as captain. In 1901 he again took the oath
of allegiance to the United States. He then contributed money
242




to the Insurgents and furnished them information as to the
movements of American troops.
The situation was turned over to Brigadier General James F.
Bell, the former Provost Marshal of Manila. General Bell threw
aside any idea of a policy of attraction, since he realized that
the only way to break Malvar's influence was to make the Filipinos fear American authority more than they did Malvar's.
Consequently, the policy of reconcentration was established in
the province of Batangas and those portions of the adjoining
provinces where it was certain that Malvar's influence was predominant. Around each sizable town which had an American
garrison a boundary line was drawn. The area was extended to
permit large numbers of families to live within the lines. If
they desired, the Filipinos were authorized to move their houses
within the zone. Areas were set aside for grazing cattle. These
areas around the towns were carefully patrolled by American
troops. All Filipinos who refused to accept the protection of the
Americans were to be classed as enemies. Troops then scoured
the countrysides and confiscated all food and military supplies
that could be found. That which could not be brought into the
towns was destroyed. In the protected areas able-bodied men
were not permitted to leave the town except in dire emergencies
and then only by written pass. In the towns Filipinos were required to be off the streets by 2000 hours. Those who desired
to reap standing crops on their former homes were allowed to
work there under protective guard. A proclamation was issued
to the effect that in the future whenever an American soldier
or loyal Filipino was assassinated, an Insurrecto prisoner would
be chosen by lot and executed. Rifles were taken from Filipino
municipal police. Whenever Army property or telegraph lines
were destroyed Filipino houses in the vicinity were destroyed.
Thousands of Filipinos, many of them impoverished, flocked
into the protected areas. As shortage of food became imminent
paupers were permitted to accompany scouting expeditions, and
when a cache of food was found the paupers were allowed to
take it to the town. Later the government sold rice to the Filipinos at cost. Able-bodied men were required to work on provincial roads. The wealthy were excused upon payment of money
which went'for the purchase of rice for the impoverished.
243




The American troops went after Malvar with enthusiasm and
finally forced his surrender in April 1902. These last campaigns
of the Insurrection taxed the energy and endurance of the troops
who scoured every foot of territory in the area. General Bell
said:
We continued to pursue them with relentless persistence. Not waiting for
them to come out of hiding we penetrated into the heart of every mountain
range, searching every ravine and mountain top. We continually found their
barracks and hidden food in the most unexpected and remote hiding places.
We burned hundreds of small barracks and shelters as fast as they could
construct them. We destroyed their clothing and supplies and pursued them
so persistently that they finally ceased to stay more than twenty-four hours
in one place..
We maintained as many as 4,000 troops in the field at once, keeping them
supplied in mountains where no roads existed. They camped by companies
at strategic points on trails... each sending out detachments radiating
from the base. In this way it was rendered unsafe for Insurgents to travel
at any time and having no longer a safe retreat in which to hide themselves, they became so scattered and demoralized that they continued to
surrender and be captured by wholesale.
By this method we succeeded in securing and sending into towns or
destroying almost every pound of food which-the Insurgents possessed or
could obtain and about the first of April it became exceedingly difficult for
them to maintain themselves. Their appearance indicated great want and
suffering and a number were so sick when captured as to need medical
attention.
It must not be supposed, however, that we were able to continue such
operations so persistently without cost to our own men, many of whom
came down with fever, dysentery and other complaints. Though we had
managed to keep them supplied with food, it was impossible to get sufficient clothing to them. Because of the destructive effect of mountain brush
and rocks, nearly all became ragged and many almost barefooted...
General Malvar's consistent refusal to surrender had made
necessary this rigorous reconcentration policy. He would have
done much better and prevented much suffering among the
compatriots, whom he claimed to love so dearly, had he surrendered at the start. With the capture of Malvar, opposition
in the affected provinces collapsed and the Insurrection was, in
reality, finished.
Later General Bell was thoroughly criticized for the vigorous
reconcentration policy he had adopted in Batangas, but he was
not brought to trial.
244




By July 1902 the number of occupied stations had dropped
from the maximum 552 to 195. The number of troops in the
Philippines had decreased from the maximum 70,000 to 34,000,
Although the Army had pacified the Islands so that civil government could be inaugurated, the necessity for an armed, lawenforcement agency still existed. Filipino bandits organized
small bands of Pulajanes, and made travel unsafe, particularly
in the thickly vegetated mountainous districts. In 1902 the Philippine Constabulary was organized. It was defined as: "The
armed police force of the government of the Philippine Islands,
established and administered under the general supervision of
the Governor General for the purpose of maintaining order,
preventing and detecting crime, and enforcing the laws."
The Constabulary was organized on a military basis and its
units distributed throughout the Islands. Its officers were members of the American Army or United States civilians who were
graduates of accredited colleges. The various Filipino tribes
furnished its rank and file, outstanding natives being gradually
raised to officer rank.
Systematized under Major (later Major General) Henry T.
Allen, the Constabulary proved its worth countless times.
Marching in small groups over narrow mountain trails, through
dense, tropical jungles, facing death at every turn, occasionally
being forced to call on the regular army garrisons for assistance,
it rooted out the last vestiges of disorder in the Islands. Several
of its officers, notably Major Generals Henry T. Allen, William
C. Rivers, Harry H. Bandholtz, and James G. Harbord, became
outstanding military leaders in the American Army during
World War I.
On July 4, 1902 President Roosevelt issued a proclamation
announcing the establishment of peace, an amnesty to all who
would take the oath of allegiance to the United States, and the
establishment of civil government throughout the Christianinhabited portions of the Islands. Except for ordinary peacetime
pursuits, the work of the Army was at an end.
On the same day the civil power assumed supreme control,
the President also issued a proclamation of thanks to the Army.
The proclamation is such an able synopsis of what the Army
245




did in the Philippines that part of it is published as the closing
passage of this book:
The President thanks the officers and enlisted men of the Army in the
Philippines, both regulars and volunteers for the courage and fortitude, the
indomitable spirit, and loyal devotion with which they have put down and
ended the great Insurrection which has raged throughout the Archipelago
against the lawful sovereignty and just authority of the United States. The
task was peculiarly difficult and trying. They were required at first to overcome organized resistance of superior numbers, well-equipped with modern
arms of precision, entrenched in an unknown country of mountain defiles,
jungles and swamps apparently capable of interminable defense. When this
resistance had been overcome they were required to crush out a general system of guerrilla warfare conducted among people speaking unknown
tongues from  whom   it was almost impossible to obtain the information
necessary for successful pursuit or to guard against surprise or ambush.
The enemies by whom they were surrounded were regardless of all obligations of good faith and all limitations which humanity has imposed
upon civilized warfare. Bound themselves by the laws of war, our soldiers
were called upon to meet every device of unscrupulous treachery and to
contemplate without reprisal the infliction of barbarous cruelties upon theirs
comrades and friendly natives. They were instructed while punishing armed
resistance to conciliate the friendship of the peaceful, yet had to do with a
population among whom it was impossible to distinguish friend from foe
and who in countless instances used a false appearance of friendship for
ambush and assassination. They were obliged to deal with problems of
communication and transportation in a country without roads and frequently made impassable by torrential rains. They were weakened by tropical
heat and tropical disease. Widely scattered over a large archipelago extending a thousand miles from north to south, the gravest responsibilities involving the life or death of their commands frequently devolved upon young
or inexperienced officers beyond the reach of specific orders or advice....
Under all these adverse circumstances, the Army of the Philippines has accomplished its task rapidly and completely. In more than two thousand
combats, great and small, within three years it has exhibited unvarying
courage and   resolution.... It has submitted  to no discouragement
and halted at no obstacle. Its splendid virile energy has been accompanied
by self-control, patience and magnanimity.... It has added honor to
the flag which it defended and has justified increased confidence in the
future of the American people, whose soldiers do not shrink from labor
or death, yet love liberty and peace.
The President feels that he expresses the sentiments of all the loyal people of the United States in doing honor to the whole Army which has
joined in the performance and shares in the credit of these honorable
services.


246




















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