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WHAT IS REAL DEMOCRACY?
ANSWERED B13Y AN      EXPOSITION     OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES.
BY KARL HEINZEN.
Published as a Precursor to the Presidential Campaign,
BY THE
ASSOCIATION FOR THE PROPAGATION OF RADICAL PRINCIPLES.

__

M. LIEBER, INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANAm
187 1.;I



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WHAT IS REAL DEMOCRACY?
AGENCIES OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE STATE.
A term only belonging, in fact, to the realm of natural
history, and the world of elements, has become current among
historians and politicians, although by them analogously
applied,- we mean the expression 'organic development.'
It is most often made use of by those teachers of statesmanship who have need of some palliating or imposing phrase by
which to defend or support that which exists, particularly
that among existing things 'which deserves to be destroyed.'
But even liberal politicians still seriously engage in discussion
of the question whether States, like plants, develop 'organically', that is to say, by means of an unconscious, limited
growth, determined by the first germ, or whether, in their
origin and development, they are and should be the mutable
work of the thinking and directing mind of man: in other
words, the question would be-Is man an unconscious production of nature, like the plant? or is he a self-conscious,
self-determining, thinking being? If he is the latter, no one
who agrees to this will care to take upon himself the responsibility of the doctrine that an association of those selfconscious, self-determining, thinking beings, in regulating
their affairs, are obliged to give up or do away with that
which is the greatest advantage of the single individual;
that if common sense and his own interests bid the single



4

individual undo a step in the wrong direction, turn back upon
a false path, rectify a committed mistake, an organized union
of single individuals might follow common sense and preserve
their interest by doing just the reverse of all this: and yet
the teachings of the organic development of States is nothing
but this nonsensical doctrine in an other garb. It is a coarse
mysticism, yet involved in the superstitions of former times,
which, however, suits equally well both that indolent thoughtlessness which does not take the trouble to arrive at any
clearness in regard to the questions naturally arising in an
organized society, and that pseudo-democratic prudence which
fancies that all political problems may be solved by a shiftless
laissey aller, as well as that reactionary spirit of calculation
which attempts to keep the influence of thinking minds at a
distance from political development, so that every ' historical'
wrong may grow on unchecked. Again, this mysticism is
closely allied to that pernicious, bigoted belief that ascribes
all evil issues and events brought about by the folly of men,
as well as every fortunate turn their heedlessness has not
deserved, to some superhuman power or dispensation, so that
one does not tend to increase their prudence, nor the other to
stimulate their energies. Have they caused a misfortune, by
some action or non-action, then they save themselves from a
recognition of their guilt by pointing to the will of providence.
Have they escaped some danger, with 'more luck than sense,'
to which their carelessness had exposed them, then they avoid
reflecting upon the conditions of their future safety by rendering thanks to a merciful Supreme Being.
If ten intelligent men, having a common purpose, should
constitute themselves a society, it would not enter their minds
to rely, for attaining their object, upon 'organic development', which they can not survey, nor yet hold in their own
hands; but after examining, and agreeing upon the conditions
of their union, they will expect success only from a correct
choice of the needful ways and means,-in short, from their



5
own intelligence and activity. Should they come to the conclusion that they have made a mistake, or started from a
false principle, they will correct their own work. It is exactly
the same with an intelligent State, except that here the interests are multiplied, and the greater number of members, as
well as the extension of space, make a rapid survey and communication difficult and complicated. But this complication,
instead of justifying a thought- and action-less falling back
upon the mysticism of' organic development', makes rather
the imperative demand upon us to so act upon the universal
understanding that the nature and aim of society will become
clear to all, and to simplify the mechanism of the State as
much as possible.
Of course, the more primitively a State is constituted
the more forcibly will its condition and development recall
organic, natural formations; but a purely organic, political
development, effected only by a blind pressure forward, or a
state of unconscious, uncontrollable growth, existing in present elements and circumstances, was never known. Every
State, even the most uncivilized of the remotest past, was an
artificial production which, at least in its chief, claimed for
itself all the intellectual powers existing at the time. *o
many of its elements as excluded themselves from taking an
intelligent part in public proceedings were but material made
use of by the other elements: its further development, however, only consisted, and could only consist, in the increase
of those elements who took such active, intelligent part.
If we picture to ourselves a political association numbering
thirty or fifty millions of clear-minded, intelligent people who
all recognize and claim their just part in the community on
the basis of perfect equality, we shall find that not an inch
of room is left for a mysterious 'organic development'; and
all manifestations, all actions, all reforms, every step of progress made in the State, will be the pre-calculated result of the
intelligent action of these thirty or fifty millions.



6
While we thus banish all mystical views that would make
political activity and development dependent upon mysterious
laws or powers that may not be controlled by the members
of the State, we are far from losing sight of the outer conditions of development, from considering the necessary effects
of natural causes as disposed of, and of excluding from our
calculations the obstacles brought about by given circumstances, for, in short, from imagining that we may govern by
the speculative mind alone, every element and actual fact that
exerts an influence on society, or perhaps even do away with,
by ignoring, it.  To make our calculations according to
existing circumstances is a requirement that we need not
particularly recall to even the most ordinary mind. What
we must recall, however, is the requirement that circumstances
must be acted upon with intelligence. Wherever these two
contradict each other, we must simply put the question
whether circumstances or intelligence shall give way. Whoever decides against the latter has ' organic development' with
him, and must suffer the consequences. Kingship, aristocracy,
slavery, are historical institutions whose advocates attempt
to perpetuate as the basis of 'organic development'. Whospever does not oppose this pretension with the peremptory
demand made by reason, that those institutions must be completely abolished, will wait in vain to see the republic, equality,
liberty, developed from their 'evolution'. A sensible politician will just as little expect freedom when the conditions
that naturally lead to it do not exist as demand equal performances of unequal abilities, or hope to make new circumstances without the necessary preparations. Ask the present
Chinese, for instance, to proclaim a republic, of which they
have so far not the slightest idea or conception. The question
is to follow up recognized and indisputable aims, in the direction of which development according to reason, not according
to given circumstances, goes on, in spite of all obstacles and
under all conditions; not to sacrifice the general principles



of reason to any regard for particular circumstances, or
because of the difficulty of their immediate execution; and
not to expect progress of any mysterious agencies, but to
call to mind upon every occasion this truth-The attainment
of any progressive aims solely depends, and must depend, on
the intelligence and will of the members of the State. Is it
impossible for the Chinese to be republicans just yet, then
must the republicans not turn Chinese on their account, but
wait until the sons of the Celestial Empire may some time
establish a republic too, and labor to that effect. Of the
spirit of serfdom they will be cured by no organic development, but only by the gradual rise and progress of republican
views and convictions, whether these be brought into active
play by the extreme consequences of present circumstances
or by a train of abstract reasoning.
Where some perceive ' organic development' others would
see the 'logic of events', which is wont to accompany the
former. Both terms point to similar conditions, that is, such
in which human beings are surprised and pushed forward by
effects whose causes they either created or suffered to exist,
through obstinacy or want of foresight. That there is logic
in events is as much as to say, in these cases, that those who
brought them about had none. He who holds fast to the logic
of correct principles is saved from the logic of events, which,
to give it an other name, is nothing but the ill experience
caused by unlogical action. It is only possible to foresee
consequences through the recognition of principles whose
embodiment or realization constitutes actual development.
History shows that nations as well as their rulers were
scourged and punished and compelled, to change their action
by the logic of events, because they did not permit themselves
to be taught, guided, and warned by the logic of principles.
Wherever they progressed, they did so because they were
obliged to, not because such was their intention: they abandoned the old because it had grown to be untenable and



8

insupportable, not because they had in advance recognized or
aimed at the new. Even slavery was not abolished in the
Republic of North America because the nation had recognized
its wrong in principle, and calculated its destructive consequences in advance, but because these unlooked-for consequences swelled into a fearful evil that threatened to overwhelm the country. The logic of events forced the people at
last to acknowledge their want of logic in principle by at
least annihilating its consequences. As professor of the logic
of events, Jefferson Davis had to teach them what they had
not learned of the former Jefferson, the teacher of the logic
of justice. This lesson however, paid for at so dear a cost,
which recent events have taught them, will be entirely lost
upon them in other questions if they have not through it
arrived at the conclusion that principles altogether must constitute the line of conduct in the development of the State,
of the whole State, and that the ' organic development' of conditions and institutions that exist in contradiction to correct
principles is nothing but a growth of destruction.
The great question arises whether the nations, after
reaping for thousands of years only misfortune and misery
from the 'organic development' of existing circumstances
and perverse institutions, and after having been shown the
consequences of their want of foresight and timely resolution
by the logic of events, will not arrive at length at such a standpoint of intelligence and energy as will enable them to so
form their own destinies with clear self-determination, according to the immutable laws of right and reason, so organize
their relations to each other, so secure their reforms, and
thereby balance their. interests, that they may in future be
spared from oppression as well as plunder, wars as well as
revolutions, in short, from all former calamities and convulsions. Not organic development but developed organization is
the means to this end. As in physics, thus in politics prevention should make the cure unnecessary. Of course, it is



9

only possible for the people to possess the capacities for this
under a democratic form of government, where free expression, according to generally accepted rules, is secured to all
desires and interests; and since we are to analyze the question what constitutes true democracy, our first task was to
purify the ground on which it is to be built up from all the
obscuring fogs of mystical views and beliefs. A people possessing a democratic organization may attain every thing it
requires; and for every thing it lacks, a people possessing a
democratic organization is itself responsible..----o--oCHIEF CONDITIONS OF TRUE DEMOCRACY.
Perhaps the word 'democracy' suffers even more abuse
than the word ' freedom'.  What were the southern slaveholders fighting for in the war of the rebellion? Every third
word with them was their 'liberty',-that was to say, the
liberty to make slaves of other human beings. Every European despot does battle for the ' liberty of his people' when
he leads them on to be slaughtered in his struggle with some
foreign despot, his competitor in the business of oppression.
L. Napoleon, a chief representative of this liberty, was at the
same time democratic through and through. Sword in hand,
he drove the people to the polls, so as to put an end to all
democracy by his ' democratic' election to the imperial throne.
In a similar manner, he attempted to make Mexico happy by
one of his colleagues, who he said was 'democratically
chosen.' In Prussia, whose king, as emperor of Germany,
also discovered Napoleonic ' liberty', all are with characteristic
modesty called 'democratic' who do not actually swear by



10

the absolute rulership of 'by the grace of God'. The English, with their inviolable queen, whose whole task seems to
consist in furnishing as large a number of descendants as
possible, on which the property of her subjects may be squandered, with their privileged aristocracy, that owns almost all
the soil in the country, and their six millions of paupers who
have no right to vote, consider themselves the first democrats
in the world. They are only excelled by the 'democrats' of
this country, who discovered the spirit of true democracy to
consist in the unchecked trade in human flesh, and in the
right of parts of the State to commit with impunity crimes
against the whole of the State, in the name of Slavery.
In view of such a misuse of language, and such a falsification of conception, it is necessary in a few words to explain
true democracy, and define its conditions.
By the people, unless it permits itself to be degraded by
some despot to an irresponsible herd of subjects, we understand not some select or separate part of the body politic,
but the whole population dwelling upon the soil of the State.
The people and the nation in this sense are one. The government of the people (democracy) then means the government
of the whole population, or nation (so far as it is not excluded
from participation in it for particularly valid causes, such as
minority or loss of reason). Democracy without an equality
of rights of the whole people is a contradiction in terms. The
authorization of one part of the population to govern, with
the exclusion of any one other, is even in its mildest form
aristocracy, or ochlocracy, but not democracy. "And if a
so-called demo-cratic body politic of one hundred millions
exclude only the smallest fraction of its number, say one
hundred individuals, from the right to vote, it will consist
of one hundred millions less one hundred aristocrats. So long
however as the equal rights of women are not acknowledged,
true, complete democracy is out of the question anywhere:
so far only andro-cracy exists all over the world.



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So soon as the participation of the whole people is necessary for the realization of democracy, it also requires a common center, where the universal will may manifest itself, and
be put into action. A scattering of this manifestation and
putting into action necessarily destroys the unity of the
people, and changes democracy into anarchy. A sovereignty
of States or provinces or communites would be the absolute
dissolution of the State.
Democratic principles are always put into practice
through the votes of the majority. This majority, however,
can only be justified in its action if, and so long as, it grants
to the minority the same means of action and of expression
as are possessed and made use of by itself. Without unlimited freedom of the press, and of public discussion for all,
and of everything, it is as impossible to think of democracy
as without equal rights before the law and at the polls.
No citizen is bound to recognize a government in whose
establishment he was not able to cooperate by freely giving
his vote: none is bound to obey laws that were made without
his consent. Such a government would be a despotism to
him, and such laws only dictates of absolute power.
Democracy is destroyed so soon as it institutes a power
which is capable of opposing the will of the people, or of
leaving it unexecuted. The will of the people is, gnd must
be, the sole law; and to execute this law, tools, but not
rulers, are needed. In order-to be really able to rule, the
will of the people should be manifested as directly as possible both in making 'and in executing the laws. Their will
must not be suspended in order to delegate its power to
officials, or its sovereignty to representatives. As it is always
in their pleasure to undo again acts they have concluded, so
must they always be able to dispose of the agents entrusted
with the execution of those acts. These agents must not
only be accountable to but also ever dependent on the people.
As there should not exist in the State any institutions or any



12

law, any power or any court, which is not an expression or a
tool of the will of the people, so should there be none either
that might hamper it or exclude themselves from its jurisdiction.
These, then, are in brief the chief conditions of a real or
direct democracy, without which there can be no true freedom,
no lasting security, no universal progress. In the course
of our examination, we shall see in how far the constitution
of the United States, that has heretofore always been regarded
as an ideal of democratic institutions, fulfils these conditions..----o--
COMPROMISE AND        PRINCIPLE.
We have just made the demand that not the unchecked
natural growth of that which exists, or that which. has accidentally originated,-this being called organic development,
-but the leading principle of reason should shape and guide
the movements of the body politic. Of course we do not by
this make the assertion that this leading principle existed,
and could exist, from the beginning. It is not necessary to
teach anyone any more that States did not at first spring into
being as the embodyment of pre-developed theories, but
through the cooperation and putting to use of existing, actual
circumstances, often enough brought about by mere accident.
Theories, only developed from experiences supplied by this
cooperation of circumstances, and reforms at first were nothing
but the result of unforeseen evils. In this manner, however,
some insight was gradually gained, and the attempt made to
subordinate given circumstances to the theories that had been



13
developed from experience, and' to remodel the body politic
according to these. Sparta made such an experiment through
Lycurgus, Athens through Solon; and every people that after
a revolution adopted a new constitution did the same.
The success of such remodeling, however, always depends on
two conditions,-first, in the establishment of correct principles for the future, and, secondly, in the annihilation of the
destructive elements of the past. Yet, it is exactly the neglect of these conditions which generally defeats these attempts
at reformation. Even when correct principles for the future
have been found, either insight or determination or power is
wanting to sufficiently do away with the destructive remnants
of the circumstances that have been triumphed over for the
present.  They are generally again assimilated with the
process of development, either by silent connivance or by a
compromise, where confidence in the effect of the victory won,
and the progress of time, serves as the deceptive mediator;
and the consequence is wont to be that these elements, by
the aid of old connections, means, and experiences, gradually
regain their former power, and then again necessitate a new
and still.more thorough reformation.  Every compromise,
then, that does not at least completely secure the gradual supplanting of the old by the new is nothing but the apparent
cancelation of an old debt by the contraction of a new, or the
eradication of one disease by the inoculation of an other.
The danger attending the conclusion of a compromise is
all the greater the more we are deceived in its nature. Whoever adopts something that, at certain times and under certain
circumstances, may have served as an expedient to escape
certain embarrassments as a cure on this account, at all
times and under all circumstances, and as a preventive of all
embarrassments, condemns himself to an everlasting struggle with evils that he considers benefits; and, by mistaking
their nature, cuts off all means of having them removed.
Whoever may desire to have a striking proof of the truth



14
of these remarks, let him look back on the struggles that
have grown out of the constitution of the United States,
while the people were continually praising this same constitution as the panacea of all evils, and desired to preserve it
unchanged.
The constitution of the United States is the result of a
four-fold compromise:Firstly, of unity with individual interests,-of national
sovereignty with the so-called sovereignty of States.
Secondly, of the republic with monarchy.
Thirdly, of freedom with slavery.
Fourthly, of democracy with aristocracy.
It is founded, therefore, on the four-fold combination of
principles perfectly incompatible, and eternally excluding each
other,- founded for the purpose of equally preserving these
principles in spite of their incompatibility, and of carrying out
their practical results,-in other words, for the purpose of
making an impossible thing possible.
This combination, and the contradiction of principles
which it covers, was only partially recognized when the constitution was first drawn up; and most people do not recognize it yet. The constitution had momentarily served the
purpose of uniting under difficult circumstances contradictory
elements to one apparently harmonious whole; moreover, it
certainly possessed indisputable advantages that favorably
distinguished it from other constitutions; and this was sufficient for its admirers to set it up as an unsurpassable, inviolable model for all times. Even all these advantages for development, which the United States owed only to the natural
qualifications and the isolated position of their country, were
ascribed to the influence of a constitution which in some
other country, more exposed to the influence of heterogenious
surroundings, might not have remained unchanged ten years.
But these deceptions not only did not check the antagonism
of incompatible elements, secured by the constitution, and



15

apparent in all the history of the United States, but they
made it even more destructive since its causes were not clearly
perceived, and, therefore, the means to end it not adopted.
Only in regard to one contradiction clearness has been
gained. The rebellion of the slaveholders has opened the
eyes of even the most devoted admirers of the constitution
to the fact that freedom and slavery can not exist together,
even in the name of the great founders of the republic and
that of the much-praised union. A distinguished American
statesman strikingly characterized this constitutional copulation by the remark that "the war of the rebellion was waged
in order to expound the constitution." A most costly constitution which requires such expounding! Those who but a
short time back desired to preserve this cherished constitution unchanged at every price now congratulate themselves
that an amendment has delivered them from the unpleasant
task of serving both as an authority for as well as a protection to two principles eternally at war with each other to the
death. Since a beginning has been made, however, with this
one amendment, and its most necessary supplements, propositions for a dozen other amendments have already followed
in its train,-all called forth by that one evil, slavery, now
abolished at least in name and principle.
Should not this be an inducement to even the most contented admirers of things as they are to reflect on the other
hostile principles as contradictions wfiich men still attempt to
keep united by the paragraphs and the authority of the constitution, whose union, however, must and will prove in its
practical consequences as impossible to preserve, and in part
as pernicious, as that of freedom with slavery? Are we to
wait till here, too, we are taught better by experiences that
must be paid for by incalculable sacrifices? Is the constitution to retain its other defects, too, till it is 'expounded'
by civil war? or shall we conclude to listen to reason while it
is yet time? permit the critical analysis of an age that has



16

since made a great step forward to take the place of the blind
worship of institutions of former times, and learn to trust in
immutable principles more than in untenable compromises?
It seems to us the time is not far distant when the people
of the United States should prepare for a national convention,
there to remodel their constitution in the spirit of true democracy. A short critical review may help to point the way.
ORIGIN   OF THE UNION.
In general, compromises have been the practical means
of reformation and transition in political developments. Of
the United States, however, it might be said that they came
into the worl4 with a compromise, and through a compromise.
Their original members were still less prepared for a union
than for a republic. The different English colonies, having
sprung into being through associations for settlements, and
grants of land to single founders, had so little in common
that they were not even permitted to carry on trade with each
other. Outer circumstances first forced them to unite,-the
same power, moreover, which had separated them. Only the
arbitrary act of taxation without representation, that pressed
equally on all, the Stamp Act, the duty on imports, and
similar annoyances, roused a spirit of unity and a desire for
association. But even upon this desire no action was taken
till it rose into a positive, exacting necessity; so that in the
beginning only seven of the colonies came to the joint conclusion of declaring themselves independent; the other six
entered the union at a later period; and only the war against
England induced them in 1776 to establish a confederacy.



17

But even in this confederacy there was so little true patriotism and public spirit to be found that without a French loan
and the aid of Generals Rochambeau and Lafayette, who
made it possible for Washington to win the decisive victories
of New York and Yorktown, the whole movement would
probably have failed. It is questionable, too, whether without
S   France, which in 1783 concluded the peace of Versailles with
England, and therein stipulated the independence of North
America, that independence would have been preserved and
maintained.
After the conclusion of peace, however, the evils of a
loose connection, brought about only by outward dangers,
became more than ever apparent. There was only the choice
between a closer union or new isolation of the single States;
universal dismemberment was to be prevented; and after the
confederation had barely escaped the danger of being broken
up again by the struggles of the federalists and democrats,
it was not till 1787 that the constitution was adopted, and
the union firmly established, all conflicting party interests
and embarrassments of the varying parts of the country
being spared and protected as much as possible by compromises. Let us consider first.--o----
THE COMPROMISE BETWEEN A UNITED STATE
AND A CONFEDERACY.
What, then, was this union and confederacy? An absolutely necessary association of different colonies that originally
had nothing in common but their oppressor, and were brought
together by nothing but the common war against him. Neither



18

a natural impulse nor an originally common interest was the
tie of their union, and their party egotism insisted on making
this tie as loose as possible, for which reason they did not rise
to the conception of one common State, but attempted to perpetuate their individual existence as united States. And this
accidental association of political individuals, founded through
no inner necessity, but brought about by outward considerations, and even yet marked as single corporations by a constitutional stamp of separation,- this association is to be looked
upon as the most perfect embodyment of the conception of an
ideal State! making a virtue of necessity, that is to be set
up for a model of creation, which in fact was nothing but a
work of expediency at a time of temporary danger from without, and then was barely changed into an expedient to serve
interior purposes also. We should be very desirous to hear
the answer of some genuine defender of the federal system
to the question what the fathers of this republic would have
done, or should have done, if only a single colony had existed
at the time of the declaration of independence in place of
thirteen.  Would they have divided or dismembered this
one and made thirteen of it in order to form 'United States'
instead of a united State, and thus realize the present so
highly-lauded ideal, where the single members, with their
individual egotism, still constantly rebel against the common
interests of the whole body? They would have been content
with that division which the mechanism of government requires
in every larger State, that is, with the classification into
counties, districts, and communities, and the proposition tp
introduce a spirit of dualism into their union, by the formation
of States to be as independent as possible, would certainly
have appeared to them like intentional treason. The predilection of Americans for the character of their confederacy,
which has given them so much trouble already, and even
through its adopted child, slavery, brought them to the brink
of ruin, can only be explained by the blind prejudice that



19
long habit is wont to produce, and that occasionally amounts
to actual ridiculousness. Nowhere, however, has this predilection appeared more ridiculous than in President Grant's
message of February 7th of this year, where he recommends
congress to elevate the character of the embassy to the German 'Empire', but just newly cemented.with blood, by an
increase of salary. In this message he makes the discovery
that the military connection of the German States, under a
caricature of the bug-bear in Kyffhauser, " in some manner
resembles the American Union", and must, therefore, "arouse
the deep sympathy of the people of the United States." He
sees in this " event" an adoption of " the American system of
union", while it does not disturb him in the least to be
obliged to acknowledge that the separate German 'fatherlands' were divided and separated by the dynastical jealousy
and the ambition of short-sighted rulers.  But the German
fatherlands were not only separated by, they also originated
through, these rulers, formerly plundering knights-errant,
who stole a piece of land with their two-legged chattels, and
later, according to how much more they stole, or bought, or
inherited, assumed the title of duke, king, etc. Now, instead
S of starting from the idea that these thieves, who stole land
and human beings, should not have existed at all, or been
swept from off the face of the earth as soon as possible, by
which the division and separation of the German people would
have been prevented at the very outset, our statesman, General Grant, considers the existence of these thieves, and the
separation caused by them, as a necessary and desirable condition, so that at a later period might spring from it the possibility and necessity of a union, and perceives in this the
development of his American ideal State. It is almost like
breaking a man's arms and legs, in order to make his limbs
barely whole again by a superficial cure, and then setting him
up as a model of good health to those who have always enjoyed
unbroken limbs; and if this model, then, meets a companion



20
who has undergone the same fate, suffered the same misfortune, he feels "deep sympathy" with him, and proudly congratulates him on the advantage of having mended limbs like
himself, instead of sound ones like foolish, common-place
people.
So long as this planet is in existence, no united State
ever yet sprung into being of its own accord from natural     A
impulse as the manifestation of an inner necessity, or the
embodyment of an original conception of a State. All united
States were established through outward causes. They were
always the children of the distress caused by outside wars;
and when those were over, they became the generators of
inner, civil wars. The Greeks were forced into a union by
the Persians, the Netherlands by the Spaniards, the Swiss by
the Austrians, the North Americans by the English, and the
Germans by the French; and as they all have the same origin,
the same fate awaits them all,-either to be separated again
by inner dissensions or to be blended into a real, a united,
State. This, not taking into any consideration any outward
causes, is also an inner, logical necessity: for if the single,
united States are strong enough to assert their individuality,
they will feel neither the want of subordinating themselves so
much to the power of the confederacy that this is enabled to
solve its problem, nor any inclination to do so; and if they
are not so strong, they will lose with the power also the purpose for which they might desire to perpetuate their existence
as separate States.
To illustrate the necessity of such a course by examples,
it is enough to cast a look on the latest history of the most
highly-praised confederacies, those of Switzerland and North
America.   Switzerland attempted to guard the celebrated
peculiarities and local difference of interest as much as possible by preserving sovereignty of the cantons. What followed
as the consequence? There developed in the sovereign hotbeds of philistinism, of bigotry, of reaction, of treason, such



21

threatening " peculiarities" and contradictions against the
common interests of the republic that they endangered the
whole confederacy, and the country was obliged to put an end
to them by main force through a war; and after this bloody
lesson had been taught, the constitution of the confederacy
was completely remodeled, so that now the federal government possesses even greater ascendancy over the cantons
than the cantons once possessed over the impotent government. Only an other foreign war is needed to force Switzerland to adopt a course that must lead to a united State. And
how is it with the North American union, that formerly put
forth such tender care for the preservation of Southern peculiarities? A much severer lesson was administered to it by
the rebellion of the slaveholders than to the Swiss confederation by the war of the jesuits; but although congress has
since then often been obliged to reject and suppress the
refractoriness and the individual pretensions of single States
in the spirit and in the interest of the common weal, no one
appears to have yet arrived at the conclusion that these dissensions can not end before a united State is definitely established, that a federal State is a mistake in principle, and,
therefore, in practice, too, and that the local peculiarities to
be preserved by it, which are in opposition to the idea of
unity, and, therefore, to the common interest, have no right
of existence, much less to constitutional protection.  The
State rights, so jealously guarded by the 'democrats', are in
practice but a safe-guard for individual rights; and without
them it would have been as impossible for slavery to take
root in America as for the rule of the jesuits to grow up in
Switzerland. A safe-guard of freedom, however, against the
federal power, as their defenders claim for them, they can not
logically be for this reason,- that we should then be obliged
to assume they would in a given case possess an ascendancy
over that power, and thereby annihilate the confederacy.. The
balance of common and local rights and interests is just as



22

much of an untenable fiction and delusion as that of the balance of the different State powers. In the State, in the democratic State, there can exist but one supreme interest, that
of the whole people, represented in the central government.
It becomes plain from what has been said that the federal
State, which is called a safe-guard of democracy, is in truth
actually undemocratic, a constant hindrance of true democracy, and a clog on universal progress. In this connection,
I need only call to mind the absence of a common code of
laws and system of education, to which only now some attention is being given in Washington, and the opposition which
all propositions for so-called interior improvements are obliged
to contend against there.
The prejudice in favor of the federal State quite commonly entertained may be very simply explained from the
fact that it was always only free States, republics, that were
wont and able to form a union. In the very nature of the
thing, such republics, founded by single communities, are
originally small, while monarchies attempt to extend their
territory by conquest as soon as possible. When these small
republics, then, are threatened by any danger, which generally
proceeds from monarchical conquerors, they feel too weak to
meet it singly, and the common necessity of defence united
them not only for the moment but also makes plain to them
what other interests they have in common for whose protection that form of union serves, which is called a federal State.
Now, instead of recognizing that those advantages of freedom
which federal States are wont to show are to be ascribed only
to the original nature of their single individuals, that is, to
the republic in itself, they are erroneously supposed to be the
outgrowth of the form of their union, the federal system.
Again, monarchies, the representatives of non-freedom, are
not capable of real union at all, because they do not admit
of any equality of rights among the confederates, but require
the predominating action of a single power, towards which



23

the others occupy more or less the position of vassals. Only
a Prussian prince who carries on the work of making federal
unions by means of 'blood and iron', but was obliged to
pause half way, could have had the idea of trying as a momentary expedient an experiment with a monarchical fedetal State.
But whoever enjoys sound eye-sight may already perceive the
great black and white sack prepared in which one member
of the German confederacy after the other is to disappear,
with every one of Grant's " peculiarities"; and if the emperor
mania was necessary at any rate, in order to educate the German nation by a pessimistical course up to a republic, it is
very desirable that the black and white sack should be filled
full as soon as possible. Through a united monarchy, the
Germans will then be spared from the wearysome labor of
attaining a united republic by going through a union similar
to the American, while France, the much abused, is far in
advance in regard to the attainment of such a republic.
----o---*
CENTRALIZATION.
This united republic is an actual bug-bear to the adherents of the federal republic. The horrible vision by which
they are haunted is the danger of ' centralization'. They mean
with the evil of the independence of States to contend against
the evil of independent centralization, without considering
that both evils are unnecessary, and may be equally well
abolished at the same time. They would soon forget their
fear if they would do away with that want of reflection which
builds up the republic on monarchical institutions, and then
expects it to show anti-monarchical results. Whoever cen


24

tralizes the power and the means of the people in a monarchical head, separated from the people, will prove himself a
fool if he imagines he may establish a democracy only by
giving that head a republican name. Centralized power in
the hands of a ' republican' president is only different in name
from the centralized power in the hands of a king. If the
character of the State, however, be such that the people rule
at the pinnacle as well as at the basis, then centralization is
the simplest means for the manifestation and execution of
the universal will. The center can only rule over the circle,
if all power actually proceeds from the former: does the
power, however, freely flow into the center from all parts of
the circle only to unite there, then this center will be but the
form and the means of the universal power that can never
become dangerous to itself. It is one of the most preposterous suppositions in the world to believe that a free people,
itself holding and exercising its whole power, instead of
delivering it up to an independent rule, would ever in the
centralization of its will oppose this same will or annul it:
could ever turn the government against itself as a means
of oppression, after making that government but the means
of manifesting and executing its desires: that it would have
the same danger to fear from a cernter which can not exist
and work at all without its (the people's) action as from a
center to whom it delivers up all action, and all means thereto.
The prejudice against centralization originated through
absolute monarchies, particularly through the warning example of France. Here no one takes into consideration, however, that the union of all means of power and of rulership in
the hands of an authority outside of and above the people is
the direct contrary to a union of those means through the
people themselves. If the people surrender their sword to a
master, they are in his power; but, if every citizen has his
hand on the hilt of that sword, it is ridiculous to imagine
that he will draw it on himself. It is equally ridiculous to



25
fear that the separate parts of the State would make use of
their free union in the central government to put fetters on
themselves at home, that is, to have the central government
rule over the local affairs of the municipalities, as was the
case in monarchical, centralizing France. As a matter of
course, they would introduce a constitution for the municipalities, according to general principles, like the constitution
of a State; but they would have no manner of interest in
taking its enforcement from the municipal powers, and charging it upon the central government. In France, too, after
the monarchical yoke had been thrown off, it became plain
that the first desire of the people was the emancipation of the
municipal powers from the central government. In short, it
is a supposition altogether contradictory in itself that true
democracy, which permits of no power outside of the people,
should make use of the State as a whole in order to arrange
and govern it undemocratically in detail. The separate executive power, and the representative system, it is these alone which
make centralization a danger and a means of oppression,
because, as we shall see further on, they entirely exclude real
democracy.
0-o-------
THE COMPROMISE OF MONARCHY WITH THE
REPUBLIC.
The question whether there should be a 'united State or
a confederation of States' required a detailed answer, because
this point is in general so little understood. It touches, too,
the chief compromise with which the other compromises of
incompatible contradictions are connected, and which gave



26

rise to the constitution of this 'model republic'. The second
compromise we have to take into consideration was that of the
republic with monarchy. When the constitution of the United
States originated there was no proper pattern to copy. The
nearest pattern was the constitution of England, under which
the United States themselves had grown to power; and
against which they would not have rebelled at all had the
rights it guarantied been accorded to them as fully as to the
mother country. It is not surprising, therefore, that they
made the English constitution the basis of their own. It is
well known that several of the prominent statesmen of that
time were favorably inclined towards a constitutional monarchy, after the model of the English; and equally noted
that it only depended on Washington's will to be made king
of North America. Had this man, like the brand of European
princes, possessed so little self respect as to consider it compatible with his dignity as a man and a human being to permit himself to be degraded to an oppressor of his fellow
citizens by having a crown put on his head, this country would
now have His Majesty Washington the Xth to worship in
place of His Excellency Ulysses the Ist; and the German
subject would have no need of perjury any more to remain
here too what he was at home. Possibly, the progress made
ahead of England might then have consisted only in the introduction of a representative hand-shake on particular occasions, for instance, at the opening of the parliament, that
of course would have had its house of lords, or planters,
and its house of commons, or business men. But since kingship failed, because of Washington's honorableness, and the
radical spirit of a Paine, a Jefferson, and others had taken
care to spread democratic ideas, an expedient was discovered
in the establishment of a kind of constitutional monarchy,
with the name of a republic, in which the hereditary monarch
was supplied by an elected president; the upper house, by
the senate; and the lower house, by the house of repre


27

sentatives. The whole was mut. mut., an improved copy of
constitutional monarchy, while its chief evils, separate executive power, the representative system, and its embodyment
in two chambers, were retained.
0
-     o---~ --------
THE PRESIDENCY AS A         SEPARATE EXECUTIVE
POWER.
There are but two systems of government founded upon
logically consistent principles, - absolute monarchy, and
absolute democracy.
Every form of government suspended mid way between
these two opposites is an untenable compromise, and must
sooner or later fall back into one, or, moving forward, be
changed into the other.
True, absolute monarchy recognizes no rights of the
ruled, and unites all powers, the law making, the executive,
and the judiciary also, in the person of the monarch. Since
the development of mankind however tends towards democracy, and absolute monarchy can neither suppress this tendency for any length of time, nor offer anything in place of it,
it has been compelled in the course of time to make more or
less concessions to it; and as, on the other hand, democracy
was not yet strong and developed enough to render absolute
monarchy incapable of doing harm, by abolishing the whole
monarchical system, it was content with those concessions
which consisted in a 'division of power'. This was the origin
of so-called ' constitutional monarchies'. Since the times of
Montesquieu, Europe had held the belief that in them had
been discovered the political philosopher's stone, while in



28
truth they are nothing else but the deceitful compromises
of two opponents who affirm that they are laboring for a common aim, while, according to their different interests, they
must always combat each other till one of them succeeds in
annihilating the other; and since in the 'division of powers'
the really decisive one, the executive power, armed with the
sword, and in possession of the public treasury, was left in
the hands of monarchy, democracy, of coarse, will naturally
always have the worst of it in that struggle, unless, which is
barely the case, the chief tool of the ruling power, the army,
throws up its allegiance to its superior.
In spite of this plain defectiveness and danger, necessarily existing in the very nature of constitutional monarchy,
and the division of power, the same order of things was
transferred to the republic. It was supposed that a great
difference was being constituted if, under the name of president, a king was elected instead of being inherited, if his government was limited to a certain time instead of being suffered during his life, and if the body politic was called a
republic instead of a monarchy. Only the name, however,
had been changed: in the main, the old order of things was
retained. It was acknowledged that all power proceeded
from the people, but one had forgotten to make sure, also,
of the power remaining with the people. True to the old
'constitutional' superstition of the necessity of a 'division
ofpowers', France put the chief force, the executive power,
having command of tLe sword and the public treasury, which
she had just wrested from a perjured king, into the hands of
a perjured president, and then felt astonished on discovering
one fine day to find the new republic strangled, and upon its
coffin the president turned into an emperor.
But why do we speak of the French? They only followed the example set them by the greatest republic in the
world, the North American. We only spoke of them first
because they first put into decisive practice the example set



29
by North America. It will be the question now whether this
country shall heed the warning others have given it at their
expense.
At the time when the North American colonies renounced
their allegiance to England, the republican spirit, as we have
mentioned before, was but little developed within their borders. They threw off the monarchical yoke not because it was
monarchical, but because it pressed heavily on them. Had
some English prince resided in the colonies at the time, who
had sustained them in their opposition against the oppression of the mother country, they would immediately have
placed him at their head, and later proclaimed him for the
hereditary ruler. In default of a candidate for hereditary monarchy, they founded an elective monarchy. They attempted
to manage by a mixture of monarchical and democratic institutions, at whose head they placed a president. Had they at
that time been blessed with a Tyler or a Pierce, a Buchanan
or a Johnson, they would probably have thought of establishing the executive power in some other shape; but since a
Washington was at their head, they did not suspect that with
a president they only set up a king in a dress-coat, in whose
pockets decrees of usurpation and coups d'etat might be concealed just as well as in the pockets of a Louis Napoleon.
The constitution of the United States establishes that
the president is to be the executor of the laws proceeding
from congress. But, neither constitutional nor legal regulations have ever yet answered their purpose where they were
not directly sustained by material power, but rather opposed
by a power capable of maintaining itself more or less independently from them. If the executor holds more power
than the law-giver, the master is dependent on the servant,
and the servant always tempted to make himself the master,
In the very nature of things, it is only a matter of course
that an executive power endowed with equal rights, and compelled to exist by the side of the law-making, will submit to



30

the latter only with reluctance; that, supplied with all power
to act, and at all times called on to act, it should feel superior
to that political power which is only called on at certain
times to deliberate and conclude; that, being the object of
universal attention, the center of all political action, the organ
of all national manifestations, and the source of all marks
of power, it should ascribe to itself a higher importance, and
more authority, than to an assembly, which, although it is
intended to represent the people, has yet no head whose
action is of any importance, and no means of direct manifestation; that, finally, in the fill sense of its power and
importance, it must be easily tempted to abuse that power by
opposition to the powerless legislative branch, in order to
carry out its own will, or perform acts of usurpation.
It is a vain undertaking to attempt to effectually prevent such danger by particular legal restrictions. If such
restrictions go so far as to make the executive branch completely powerless to do harm, fetter it, so to speak, hand and
foot; they, also, make it powerless to perform its office,
render it, therefore, not only perfectly superfluous but even
harmful through this powerlessness; does it, however, retain
in its own hands the means of performing its office,- among
which may be chiefly numbered the command of the army
and navy, the management of the public treasury, the power
to appoint and remove officials, to have the republic represented abroad, etc.-it thereby again possesses the means of
manifesting its own will, and becoming dangerous to the
republic. A. Johnson fiirnished the practical proof of the
uselessness of the experiment to deprive a dangerous executive power of the ability of doing harm, by restricting laws
on particular occasions. This danger, however, rises to its
greatest hight if at extraordinary times, particularly in case
of a war, all the powers of the country are placed at the disposal of the executive, when his judgment becomes the only
leading, his will the only conclusive, one,-the fate of the



31

whole people, in short, is put into his hands, and the whole
republic learns to submit to the decision, obey the command,
at the sign of a single man.
Before we speak of the warning experience has already
given us on this hand, it is necessary to first glance at the
privileged position assigned by the constitution itself to the
executive power.
Already at his election it becomes apparent that the
president occupies an exceptional position by his being elected
not by the people direct, but by electors not bound to the
will of the people.
After his election, he holds command not only of the
army and navy, but also of all the militia in the country, in
case it is called out. He has not the right to declare war,
but if he desires it, he can easily bring it on with any foreign
power through his secretary of State, or, as Mr. Buchanan
showed us, encourage and passively prepare for it in the
country.
By the royal right of pardon, his favor is placed above
law and justice. Dispensation from punishment should proceed only from the same power that dictated the penalty, that
is from the law-giver, the people.
In concluding treaties with foreign powers, he is dependent on the consent of the senate; but, as Mr. Seward showed
us, it is not difficult for him to force treaties secretly prepared
upon the senate as well as the house of representatives in
such a manner that they can not be rejected any more without compromising the government. General Grant, too, gave
proof by his St. Domingo business what embarrassments and
dangers may arise to the country from the right of the uncontrollable executive power to take the initiative step in foreign
affairs.
He nominates the judges of the supreme court. He then,
who is the first to have the temptation offered the power
given him to violate the constitution, may make his creatures



32

members of that court, whose office it is to decide upon violations of the constitution. Nay, more, he nominates in the
judge of the supreme court the president of that tribunal
which, in case of impeachment, is to judge himself! A right
of this kind, where the possible criminal nominates his own
judges in advance, is an anomaly that borders on a monstrosity.
He is to execute the laws of congress: he himself, however, is endowed with the power to make them laws first.
Without his signature, the laws of congress are only propositions; and if he refuses his signature, two-thirds of a legislative body of several hundred members are required to vote
down the veto of a single man. Through these, altogether
anti-democratic regulations, the constitution itself attributes
to him not only greater importance and power than to the
representatives of the people, but also, from the very outset
brings about a conflict between them and him by first making
a legislator of the executive, and then putting him into the
position of being obliged to execute laws he first rejected by
his veto.
An other ascendancy over congress is given to him by
the power (borrowed from constitutional kings) of not only
convening the representatives of the people but also adjourning them for any length of time (in case the two houses can
not agree upon the term of adjournment).
All these exorbitant privileges of the president, all
derived from the ' constitutional monarchies' of Europe, form,
as almost insurmountable obstacles practically, the most glaring contrast to the provision according to which congress
may call him to account, and summon him before its bar.
The conception of accountableness presupposes decided subordination, the dependence of him who is called to account upon
the one who is to call him to account. After all that we have
shown, however, it appears that congress is more dependent
on the president than the president on congress. The presi


33

dent has the means of power, congress only words; he may
act, congress can only talk; he sends the legislative body to
the capitol, and, if it so happens, home again: the legislative
body must go to him 'at the other end of the avenue'. He
has a thousand opportunities of showing or refusing some
favor to the legislators; the legislators may at the most, in
rare cases, refuse one of his creatures an appointment. Not
only in the interest of their proteges but in their own interests
they are thrown upon his favor, and many of them expect
some office from  him when their congressional term has
expired.  Under such circumstances, his accountableness
before congress will not rob even the worst president of his
night's rest, particularly since he is still further protected by
the constitution through the provision that the representatives of the people have only the right to impeach him; and
that two-thirds of the representatives of the States are
required to convict him.
Now, if anything else were yet needed to encourage the
president in any overbearing sense of the fulness of his
power, and the most extended use he can possibly make of it,
it is the hazardous arrangement which, according to the constitution, leaves him for nine months in the year, during the
adjournment of congress, alone without any control at the
head of the government. He may do or leave undone whatever he pleases during this long period of time. Congress,
unless particular provisions to that effect have been made,
has no right as well as no opportunity to oppose him,-in
short, the country during nine months in the year'is resistlessly at the mercy of the autocrat of the 'white house'. The
Mexican constitution attempted to remedy this evil by establishing a permanent congressional deputation, whose office it
is to watch over the executive during adjournment, and who
also has the power of convening congress; but even this
expedient, which may serve in ordinary times, can not on
extraordinary occasions do away with the dangers necessarily



34
arising from an executive power which is separate from the
legislative.
If these dangers were ever brought close to the American
people, it was during and after the war of the rebellion. If
we imagine the case that in the year 1860, or even so late as
1864, an A. Johnson had succeeded in making himself president by the same deceptions that made him vice-president,
we shall not doubt for a moment that today the North American republic would no longer exist,-that slavery would'rule
with an iron rod over its whole territory. What though would
have been the essential cause of this calamity?  Not the
baseness of this A. Johnson, but the position in which he
would have been placed, a position where the whole power
of the republic would have been entrusted to the hands of one
single, uncontrollable man. Fortunately, A. Johnson came
into possession of power only after the war was at an end.
A. Lincoln did not make use of his position for the subjugation of the republic through the slave-holders, but he, too,
showed the people plainly enough in what manner he might
have made use of it. The preponderance of the executive
power which appeared already in so suspicious a manner
under Pierce, and rose to a regime of unscrupulous brutality
under Buchanan, under Lincoln, favored by the concentration
of the immense forces of war, assumed almost the shape of
an absolute, unlimited power. Not only friends of the rebels,
but also many sincere friends of the republic, already at that
time dubiously shook their heads over the possibility of a
coup d'etat. But if already a former rail-splitter, a flat-boatman, who was set up as a model of simplicity, and who
enjoyed the full confidence of his party, could, when in the
presidential chair, give rise to the idea of a coup d'etat, this
may well be to us the most serious inducement to examine
closely the dangerousness of a position which gives to a single
man command over a million of soldiers. Can, aye, must it
ndt encourage a treasonable occupant to some outrage against



35

the republic? Who would have the power to save the republic, if in some new war some fortunate general, having the
army on his side, occupied the 'white house', and undertook
to give a king to the people, dazzled by the glories of war,
change 'His Excellency' into 'His Majesty'? Did not, even
after the war of the rebellion was ended, when by the disbanding of the army'the power of the president was reduced
to a minimum, Lincoln's successor throw the country repeatedlj into disgust and agitation by the excited expectation
of a coup d'etat? Did not his secretary of State, with autocratic overbearing, put to the people the alternative of ' president or king'? and who can assert that the expectations of a
coup d'etat would have been disappointed if the courage of
the usurper had been equal to his desire, or if congress, by
an impeachment, had put to the test the threat contained in
his last message?
The sole weapon offered by the constitution against the
abuse of the executive power, which already now yields
nothing to any king on the face of the earth, in power and
influence, is impeachment. But this sole weapon not only
proved itself unserviceable at the very first attempt to put it
in use, but was even received by him against whom it was
turned with contempt and menaces. This attempt justified
the worst fears in regard to the powerlessness of the legislative body over the executive; it showed us how far a president of this republic may carry his insolence, his want of
principles, his arbitrariness, his lawlessness, his usurpations,
without being called to account for it; it made manifest how
much harm, how much ill treatment, how much contempt a
republican people is obliged to suffer from a so-called public
servant without being able to employ any lawful means to
remedy the evil; it caused it to appear that in practice the
president is as 'inviolable' as a constitutional king, while he
has not, like the latter, a responsible ministry about him; it
not only justified A. Johnson in repeating all the sins he had



36
committed before, but encouraged him to even overstep yet
the bounds within which he had so far kept; and finally it furnished a precedent to every one of his successors, which from
the very outset must deprive him of all scruples as to any
assumption of power that might go too far. If the deeds of
A. Johnson did not bring about his removal from the ' white
house', we can only think of such acts of violence yet, for
sufficient causes for the deposition of a president, as would
make him at the same time the all-powerful master of his
judges. The French national assembly, too, at length condemned L. Napoleon for high treason, but the condemned
man sent his judges to prison. But, even if none of A. Johnson's successors should overstep the bounds wherein he may
abuse the powers of his office with impunity, the bounds conceded to them by the vote on the impeachment, this alone
would be sufficient to render all constitutional guaranties
worthless, for it needs only two successive Johnsons to ruin
the republic, even without a coup d'etat, unless, by the abolition of the presidency, all Johnsons are made impossible.
The presidency is more than any other office an office
of confidence. Its dangerousness can only be covered for
the time being by the complete justification of the confidence
placed at his election in the occupant. But the majority of
the presidents we have had so far did not justify the confidence placed in them, which speaks more for the corrupting
influence of the office than gives proof that the occupants are
unworthy of confidence. This experience should teach us
anyhow that in a demdcratic body politic, where 'eternal
vigilance' (that is, eternal mistrust) ' is the price of freedom',
personal confidence should never take the place of constitutional guaranties. The confidence of the people must always
become injurious after a while if they grant more power than
they retain themselves to put a stop to the abuse of this confidence. The best constitution is certainly the one which
makes confidence in the holder of the public power as super


37

fluous as possible, by rendering any abuse of it as difficult as
possible.
It is impossible, as has been shown above, to attain this
object, and at the same time retain the presidency. But, even
were it possible, without taking from him the means of carrying out the duties of his office, to so control the powers of the
president that he shduld no longer be able to rise above the
laws, or feel tempted to undertake any act of violence, the
office would yet be incompatible with the weal of the republic,
because of the president's position as the very center of party
struggles, and a source of corruption.
When the presidency was established, it was regarded
as a means of executing the will of the people, and of protecting the common interests. In this spirit, the first occupants of the office carried on the administration. Gradually
it came to be regarded more and more as a means of satisfying the ambition of the candidates, and procuring for the
leaders of the party that secured the victory to them the
advantages at the disposal of the president. In former times,
the victor had the honor of promoting the interests of the
people; at a later period, nobody was abashed at proclaiming
and carrying out the shameful maxim of 'to the conqueror
belong the spoils'.  The father of the republic' changed
into the fathers of the booty-hunters. Principles that formerly
determined the formation of parties afterwards served as bait
for the voters,- the chief motive of the leaders and wirepullers was booty. The presidency became the aim of every
ambitious politician; to attain his aim, he was not only obliged
to accommodate his principles to circumstances, but also to
engage himself to every associate who might possibly have
furthered his interests, and when the aim was attained, he
was compelled to appoint to the offices on whose administration depends the weal of the country not those who might
serve the people best, but those who would serve him best.
Thus the whole struggle for the highest office in the republic



38
became a chase for booty, and a traffic where regard for the
public weal was set aside for the sake of personal interests,
and where intrigue and corruption served as the most effectual
means; and when the struggle was over, and the victor in
possession, there instantly began preparations to have the
whole repeated.    The whole power, and the immense patronage at the disposal of the victor, were now employed as
means to secure his position for the next term also, or at least
to maintain his party in possession of the booty. Thus the
chief activity of politicians, which should be devoted to the
public weal, consists from year's end to year's end in the pursuit of, and the struggle for, personal advantages, whose
inexhaustible store-house is the ' white house'. To the ' white
house' everything is drawn, from the white house' everything proceeds, and even the capitol is occasionally changed
from a hall for the discussion of the interests of the people
into a head-quarters of the struggle for the 'white house'.
The 'white house' is the high school of corruption, as it is
the seat of treason.  Whoever shares the opinion that a
republic can only live through the virtue of its citizens must
believe this virtue capable of superhuman firmness, if he does
not object to having it put to the test by the institution of
the presidency. How many hundred millions in money the
presidency has already cost the American people is difficult to
calculate; how much though the masses and their politicians
have lost by it in public morals and genuine republican spirit
appears daily everywhere in the most frightful manner. The
institution of the presidency exerts so pernicious an influence
that it becomes even questionable whether the president does
not do more mischief before his election than after his inauguration,-for every campaign is a school for all the lies,
intrigues, and evil passions that ambitious politicians, hungry
for booty, can possibly make use of; and the whole people is
obliged to pass through this school without perceiving what
a corrupting influence it exerts on public morals.



39

If the constitution of the United States should in future
serve other nations for a model, this will not at least be the
case, we trust, in regard to the institution of the executive
power. When in 1848 the Swiss republic altered its constitution, it retained it *is true two defective institutions which
it shares with this country, that is, the constitution of the
States (cantons), and the two-chamber system; but it took
good care not to adopt the American institution of the presidency. According to its new constitution, its executive power
consists in a confederate council of seven members, which,
like the confederate court, is elected for three years, by the
confederate assembly, from all the eligible citizens of the
country. The members of this council elect their own president every year. The same person can not be president two
years in succession. The council has no veto, and no right
to grant either amnesty or pardon, which power is reserved
to the legislative body. In case public safety demands the
enrollment of troops, the council is obliged to convene the
confederate assembly so soon as the number of troops to be
enrolled exceeds 2000 men, or the enrollment lasts over three
weeks.
All these arrangements give proof of the recognition
of the dangers attending an executive power when it holds
too much authority, and is exercised by one person. They
make the executive power directly dependent on the legislative, and a sort of ministry to the confederate assembly; and
this, the subordination of the executive to the law-making
power, or the union of the two, is the great point. To divide
them, place them on a footing of equality, or permit them to
oppose each other, is just as illogical as it is undemocratic.
In a democratic commonwealth, all power proceeds from the
people, and just as little as the people themselves divide may
the power divide that proceeds from them, and acts as their
agent. The people are politically a unit, as a single individual
is such; and as no individual has his ideas and resolutions



40

carried out by a power separate from and outside of himself,
so little do the people require a separate executive authority
for the resolutions and laws they cause their legislative organs
to adopt and establish. As the legislative body is the organ
of the people, so must the executive power be the tool of the
legislative.
0
-------~---Q---------.
THE EX-PRESIDENT.
An American knows no higher aim than to grow rich, or
become president. Many, though, would certainly check
their ambition if they had a clear picture in time of the contrast presented by the quiet farewell from the ' white house'
at the expiration of the term to the loud triumph with which
the fortunate candidate took possession of it. A mistress
once adored and then deserted offers no sadder image of bitter
vicissitude than a president for four years worshiped like an
idol, and then perhaps sent home with imprecations. Even
the worst president might after his dismissal disarm hatred
by pity. Let us fancy the sun, who today shines upon all,
and is admired by all, endowed with consciousness, and then
tomorrow extinguished, to see his place taken by some former
planet, and we shall have the picture of a man who today is
the head of all heads, in the possession of all power, the object
of the attention of all creatures, and then must suddenly go
his way as an ordinary mortal, silent and unnoticed, betake
himself off almost like a dismissed servant, in the midst of
the noise and the shouts that accompany his successor to the
throne he has just left. In truth, there is something of cruelty
in this change of presidents. A king in the purple is at least



41

fortunate enough never to see his successor, as such: he
remains the worshiped king until he becomes unconscious
food for worms, and the 'love' of his subjects, as well as the
'loyalty' of his servants, accompanies him until he reaches
that point where love and loyalty, and rower and glory,
become entirely indifferent to him. But one of these kings
in a dress-coat is obliged to see all the splendors in which he
played a chief part suddenly change while he is yet in the
possession of full consciousness, and must disappear in a corner behind the scenes as one who has no longer any business
there; after he has become quite accustomed to the luxurious
table of rulership, and his whole system has become filled and
satiated with the rare dishes of ambition, he now sees himself
suddenly ordered away from the table, forced to content himself again with the old, ordinary, frugal food with which every
good-for-nothing among the 'people' keeps body and soul
together. The presidents that were form a particular, and
certainly not enviable, class of people; haunted all through
life by the wants and pretensions engendered by their former
prominent position, without the means and the chance to
gratify them, they are a kind of artificially-produced geniuses
who, after the expiration of their term, belong to the 'unacknowledged', and then suffer to the end of their days from
the withdrawal of the tribute of admiration due them, and
formerly promptly paid. Even among the Romans there was
but one Cincinnatus. Among all the great men that survive
themselves, the kings in dress-coats are the most pitiable,
because their living death overtakes them so suddenly, and
the neglect that succeeds it shows them with such cutting
clearness that all the demonstrations of honor to which they
have accustomed themselves were meant only for their position, and the marks of favor proceeding from it not for themselves, and as a tribute of respect to their personal worth;
and how sharply must the contrast to the former homage be
felt by a genius who, like the illustrious Johnson, hears



42

already before he takes leave the moral kicks preparing for
him, that wait for his appearance outside the door. We can
not really find much fault with him that, at the very last he yet
made use of, we may say the hour before execution, would eat
his fill in an extra treat, and take something with him on the
way that would make his transit easier; and this the excellent Johnson did, with all his power, when he was on the
eve of taking his departure from the 'white house'. He kept
a quantity of bills that congress had tired itself over in solemn discussions in his pocket, so they were nothing any more
but so much waste paper; he left his enemies a sermon in
which a four years' crop of gall was deposited; on the other
hand, he liberated his best friends and brothers in spirit, that
is, all the criminals his pardon could reach, the last traitors,
forgers, pirates, and assassins of Lincoln included, in order
to set them upon the villainous company that had not elected
him again; and thus he departed, so to speak, with his tongue
put out, and turned towards congress and mankind and his
successor with an infernal,.or goblin-like, "Aha!"  That is
the revenge of an ex-president. First, the presidency furnishes its occupant with all the means of corruption and misuse of power to maintain himself in office, but if he has not
succeeded in this, it furnishes him with the means of making
even his departure, which the whole people had the greatest
desire to see, as pernicious as possible. Of a president it may
be said,-he is an evil before he exists, an evil when he
comes, an evil when he is there, and even an evil when he
goes again.
-     o-------------
THE PRESIDENT AND PARTY ORGANIZATION.
'In republics parties are a necessity'. This phrase is
everywhere repeated as an axiom, and S6lon is here quoted



43
for an authority.  Solon's precept, however, to join some
party in the State only means that the citizens of the State
are to take an interest jn its affairs, that they are to lend their
cooperation in the decision of questions concerning the public
weal, and are not to leave it to those holding power, or to
the politicians by profession, or the demagogues, only. In
countries where the unquestioning obedience of good subjects
is the order of the day, for instance, in Herr Bismark's
'empire', the law of Solon would be considered a sort of high
treason: there no party is allowed to exist save that of those
who hold the power. In a republic, however, obedience to it
is the first condition required to maintain liberty, and secure
the rule of the people. Not to join a party here means to
inactively surrender up the power of tLe citizens, and, under
certain circumstances, it may mean the betrayal of the
republic.
The question is now, however, to understand Solon's
precept correctly, and not through a deceptive, mistaken
interpretation permit it to be employed for false purposes.
The taking of sides is in general the duty of the citizen; but
it may be still a higher political duty to take sides against the
parties. The taking of sides must not be so interpreted as
though it were a duty to support one of the existing parties.
In the question which of two opposite parties is to be supported, the citizen must proceed from the supposition that
one of them represents, according to his conviction, right,
the other wrong. If he holds them both to be in the wrong,
however, it is not his duty to join either, but rather to contend against both. Now, the chief point is whether standing
parties, as they exist in this country, are necessary at all;
whether they do not even exert a pernicious influence. How,
then, if it should be proved that standing parties are to be
combated and abolished just as well as standing armies?
In the question of taking sides in a democratic republic,
we must originally-start from the single, independent indi


44

vidual, and entirely ignore the existence of parties already
formed. Let us imagine now a commonwealth of twenty millions of such individuals, none of whom are yet ompromised
or bound by participation in any organization. Let some
public question arise in this commonwealth,-the proposal
for some regulation in the State, the draft of a law, a proposition concerning the constitution. The question is thoroughly
discussed in meetings as well as by the press. The result is
that these twenty millions take sides individually, according
to their convictions and their interests, for and against the
question, without an organized party, and that the will of the
people is manifested freely and honestly, without secondary
considerations. The citizens give their vote for or against
the question under consideration, but not for or against the
party that represents or combats it. Let us now imagine a
second, entirely different question brought up after the one
just disposed of, and the same manner of decision through
independent individuals, perhaps millions who occupied the
same position before now oppose each other as enemies. The
result, however, is the same,-a taking of sides, without any
binding party, and the true expression of the will of the people on the question under consideration, without any regard
to party advantage or party disadvantage. Through a proceeding of this kind, an independent taking of sides, without
closed parties, we should approach also as near as possible to
that which we call a representation of the minority. Had the
controverted questions, however, been disposed of through
party organizations already existing instead of through independent individuals, the decision would have resulted quite
differently. Instead of the reasons for or against the matter
to be decided, a looking to the advantage or disadvantage
of the party would have turned the scale; the single individuals would have permitted their votes to be dictated by the
command of the party, instead of by the command of their
own independent reason; and not the spirit of truth and



45

right, but party spirit would have been the leading one. Even
if we assume that it would not be well possible to always
maintain the independence of individuals, even when no
organized parties are in existence, that in many cases it might
be sacrificed to impure influences, and might not entirely
exclude corruption, it yet would certainly never be endangered
in whole masses by the powers and means of an organized
party, nor paralyzed by the habit of following where others
lead. The cases where it should succumb would remain single ones, would be of private nature, and could not on every
occasion be repeated in the same manner, while an organized,
permanent party continually practices them.
The great defect of standing parties, a defect brought
about by this origin, and their striving after the possession
of power, lies in this, that their chief aim is rulership, permanent rulership. Although originally perhaps first called into
being by the purpose of carrying out certain principles or
measures, they were yet, as bodies politic have so far been
organized, always obliged to direct their chief efforts towards
the overthrow of existing powers, so as not only to take
authority into their own hands, but also retain it by every
possible means. They attempted, therefore, to perfect their
organization as much as possible, strengthened the ties of
principle by the ties of corruption, and by discipline and
intimidation made it a duty to join their ranks, while originally their members had come to them of their own free will.
In this manner they came to gradually forget the aim that
had called them into being, and to regard the continuance
of their rule as the chief aim, to which every other was subordinated. The chief aim of their rule, however, became'booty'; and when this purpose is gained, the result is wont
to be that they continue adding to corruption and the abuse
of power till the measure overflows, and then an other party
takes their place to play the same game over again. Thus
the masses called the people are being continually drawn



46

hither and thither in two organizations, to both of which they
are continually lending their support, without in fact having
much to say in either.
To remedy this evil there is no other means but to sustain a free taking of sides, to liberate it from the ban of
organized parties, and reduce it as much as possible to the
independence of individuals. The means of gaining this purpose, however, is to change that organization of power which
makes it possible for one particular party to hold the rulership and its possession the chief aim of the party. Here the
rule of this or that party is decided by a single act, on which
all efforts are concentrated,- the struggle for the executive
power, the presidential election. The result of this one election makes' so and so many millions of the 'people', calling
themselves I democrats' or 'republicans', or rather their leaders, masters of th6 republic for four years at least. Let them
do as much mischief as they please, their rule for these four
years is assured, and by means of this rule their party keeps
together, only anxious to prolong it as much as possible,
while that portion of the people not belonging to this party
has no means of manifesting itself. Would this condition be
possible if ruling politics were not based on a power established for so and so many years, but were continually under
the living influence of the people themselves?  Could one
party, as such, secure to itself exclusive power, if this power
were exercised through organs or agents, determined in their
actions at all times by every portion of the people? In a
word, could the present party organizations, a public nuisance, continue in existence if the presidency and the senate
were abolished, and their place were taken by a permanent
assembly of agents of the people, that may be influenced by
their electors at all times, and replaced by others? With
such an arrangement, there would be no fixed center of power,
of authority, and of patronage from which a standing party
might be directed, and kept together. Politics would origin


47

ate from below, not from above; they would not be the fixed
business of a party, but would accommodate themselves each
time to the will of the people; they would not be dictated by
one portion of the country to an other, but independently
influenced by every electoral district; and the taking of sides
would change according to the questions each time under
consideration, instead of being pointed out for all cases by a
party programme. Now there are only ' democrats' or ' republicans' in congress. Let the present support and center of
party organization be destroyed, and the national assembly
taking the place of congress will consist only of independent
members, bound to each other by no party tie, and dependent only on their constituents. In this, it is true, a majority
will decide that in chief questions shall be united-by like convictions; but this majority is no fixed one, formed only for
party interests, one that was organized from the very outset;
it may change just according to the questions brought up for
discussion, and can only exist by conformity with its independent electoral circles, that have not united for the maintenance of rulership, or the division of booty, but chosen the
representatives of their principles and interests, according to
their individual convictions.
-     o--------
THE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM.
Still more dependent than congress from the president,
who ought to be its executing servant, is the so-called master
of both, the people, from congress, that ought to represent
it. The right of representation originated in Europe through
a compromise of monarchy with democracy: in America it



48
amounts actually to an abolition of democracy. Here representation does not mean the making good of the claims of
the people through their attorneys opposite a power above and
outside of the people, generally designated as the 'crown';
no, here it means the surrendering up of all rights of the
people, all the intelligence of the people, and all the power
of the people into the hands of the authorized agents, who,
by means of their mandate, monopolize the whole business
of the management, and the administration of the State.
Here the representatives are, so to speak, the guardians
through whose election the people make minors of themselves, and put themselves under guardianship. The election
of a represenative, which the people regards as an act of the
manifestationl of its will, is only an act of resignation. After
the election, no people exists any more; for a certain period
of time it is entirely done away with, defenceless against
and without a will towards its own representative. May it
manifest to him its displeasure through the press, or in meetings, or by any other means,-practically, it has given up
its sovereignty to him, and it depends on the representative
only, whether he is inclined to pay any attention to the protest of his constituents or not. What he who is elected concludes, not what they who elect desire, is law. IHe commands,
they must obey; and whoever has ceded his right must not
expect to have as much regard paid him as one still in the
full possession of it.
Strange to say, some cases have occurred where representing sovereigns were requested by the represented ones
to resign their positions, because of bad conduct. (We call
to mind, for instance, Messrs. Doolittle and Yates.) What
was the result? The gentlemen so requested each time refused
to obey; and they were right. They might have answered,
S-"You sovereign at home have resigned by my election;
how do you arrive at the logic of believing you have the
right to request me to resign? I am you, and you are nothing



49

so long as I am. So long as I exist as your representative,
you do not exist; and whoever does not exist, has no rights.
I refuse your request as an absurd piece of arrogance. Possess yourself in patience till, after the expiration of my term,
you receive back existence, and with it the right of ' abdicating' again in favor of an other sovereign."  If congress, in
company with the president, concluded to empty the pockets
of the sovereign people to the last cent, for the benefit of its
representatives, the sovereign people, unless they were willing
to overthrow their much-praised constitution, would have no
means of resistance; they would be obliged according to the
constitution to lay down their last cent on the altar of the
representative system until that period had arrived when
they might choose new guardians for themselves: This would
Sbe a ' legally' irrefutable result of the representative system.
Some time ago the London Spectator observed that the
people of the United States had outgrown their constitution.
It would be more appropriate to say they were grown into
their constitution. This may anyhow be said of any people
who through their constitutions established powers that are
obstacles to the continual exercise and direct manifestation
of their will. Constitutions of such a character are all more
or less straight-jackets, and the most absurd straight-jackets
are the 'representative' ones. To comprehend the whole
absurdity of the conception of 'representation', we must join
it to the conception of the 'sovereign people'. The people,
it is said, is everything,- it is the State, and the aim of the
State; it is the power, and the sovereign; and this everything, this State, this sovereign, is (consider the whole contradiction of the phrase) represented; and towards whom?
Towards itself!   Represented not only in the sense that
agents act in its name, no, the agents take the place of the
sovereign who empowers them, they assume his position,
they become sovereign themselves for a certain time, while
the sovereign they 'represent' retains neither a will nor



50
rights, neither authority nor the power to take the initiative,
-in short, does not legally exist at all any more. The people elects its representatives' not to give them business to
execute, but to itself disappear for a time, for the benefit of
these representatives. After the election, the people is nothing
any more: its servants are everything. The people is only
the master in order to make its servants its masters; it only
possesses rights to yield them up to those whom it should
regard only as tools in the exercise of these rights.
The necessary consequence of this preposterous relation
is an inconsiderateness towards, and a contempt of, the people, in the capitol as in the 'white house', and among the
governors and legislatures of the single States, which no
longer shrinks from any arbitrary act, nor any corruption.
Do we perceive in a single one of these gentlemen in congress, or in the legislatures, that they regard themselves as
tools to carry out the will of others, as agents for the dispatch of the business of others? Do they show the least
regard for the many-headed sovereign when they squander
his money, waste time, neglect business, raise their salary
and their mileage, supply themselves with stationery articles,
retain their shameful franking privilege, squander the public
lands, apply themselves to corruption with the 'representative' at the other end of the avenue, or with the lobby,
adjourn for weeks over the 'holy days', devote all their energies to presidential intrigues instead of to the interests of
the country? Could they act more sovereignly and more
regardlessly if the sovereign' they ' represent' had entirely
disappeared from the earth?
The disadvantage, however, which accrues to the people
from the representative system consists not only in this that
it makes their representatives careless of their desires and
interests, but in something that proves much worse in the
course of time, the fact that it accustoms the people to the
most patient, most apathetic endurence of all evils the rulers



51
of their fortunes may prepare for them. Submitting to it
'according to the constitution', that after the election it practically does not exist any more as a sovereign power, the
people, according to the constitution, suffers everything its
chosen representatives do and leave undone, so that in fact
its political activity, which should never slacken, is reduced
to the act of election only, and it learns to seek in this mere
act of election all its aid and comfort. Without this thoughtless habit, and this apathy, it would be quite inexplicable
how accusations like those of Mr. Washburne, who represented his colleagues in general as the greatest swindlers, or
those of Senator Sprague, who calls the congress composed
of corrupt lawyers, and men of wealth the destruction of the
republic, should remain without any consequences; it would
be inexplicable how the people should continually suffer without serious opposition the perfectly gigantic corruptions whose
mediator congress is, and particularly the unprincipled squandering of the public lands. Whoever read only the speech
in which Mr. Julian of Indiana on the 21st of January, 1871,
in the house of representatives reproached congress with the
crimes committed by throwing away hundreds of millions of
acres of the best land belonging to the people, and to be
made use of by the people, upon railroad companies, capitalists, and other speculators, he should certainly imagine the
whole people would rebel against those who so outrageously
and so shamelessly abuse its rights and its property. The
people murmured a little here and there, and then was silent
as usual: it knows that the theft committed against it is
'lawful', that it has itself elected the thieves, and then--it is
'represented'
And thus matters will remain so long as the people does
not secure to itself a constitutional right to send home its
law-making agents so soon as they act against its interest, *
and, moreover, reserves to itself the approval or rejection of all
the more important laws and conclusions proceeding from these



52

agents. Let us put only this one question,-would a squandering of land ever have taken place if the people had had a
voice in the matter? Their ' platforms', those election-baits,
the politicians very willingly let the people ratify, but to let
it ratify their laws, their grants of land, their assessment of
taxes, which acts practically-answer the question after the
execution of those most promising platforms, would never
enter their minds.
----o----
THE TWO-CHAMBER SYSTEM.
Almost more contradictory yet than the combination of
democracy with representation is the division of that representation into two chambers. One of these chambers represents
that part of the people which constitutes the union, or the
nation, and the other that part of the same people which constitutes the States of the union, or portions of the union,
and in such a manner that the union-people may contend
against and paralyze the States-people, and the States-people
the union-people. It is just as though the people were afraid
of itself, and were obliged to fetter its own limbs to be safe
from its own will. But this contradiction is not the only one.
The smallest State sends, in true democratic spirit, just as
many representatives to the senate as the largest, and the
again truly democratic consequence of this is that the people
occasionally upsets its own majority when the States having
the smallest population vote down those having the largest.
STen States, each with 100,000 inhabitants, may entirely paralyze nine States, each with 10,000,000, and annul all the
resolutions they may have made in the so-called popular house.



53

It may also occur that the two votes which a State, as such,
gives in the senate annul the thirty and more votes which the
inhabitants of the same State give in the house of representatives. If this is democracy, it ought to be defined somewhat
after this fashion,--Democracy consists in the artifice of procuring for the smallest possible minority the government over
the largest possible majority. To such an absurdity we are
quite logically brought however by that thoughtlessness which
attempts to escape the specter of a united State, that is, of a
united people, by shutting up that people in separate cages,
and then secures to those cages a particular representation
towards their assembled inhabitants.
0
---o----
THE SUPREME COURT.
Besides the fiction which concedes to the States, as such,
particular rights, particular wisdom, and therefore, also, a
particular representation, to guard themselves from themselves, that is, the very people that constitute it, we must not
forget that fiction which intended establishing in the supreme
court an independent protection for the people against their
own justice. The unremovable board of the supreme court
stands for a sovereign representation, as a power for pronouncing sentence, as congress stands a power for making
laws; and the court is even placed above congress as a decisive expounder of the laws. If, however, all sovereignty and
power rests with the people, the people must reserve to theihselves the right to have a last word to say in matters concerning the courts as well as in matters of legislation. It is true
that the position of the judges should be as independent as



54
possible, so that they may not be exposed to ordinary influences; but this independence can not be an unqualified one
towards the whole people without destroying the conception
of democracy, and occasionally making the judges masters
of the State. Moreover, the supreme court of the United
States suffers under the strange defect of its members being
creatures of the executive power, which lends a peculiar coloring to its pretended independence, and under certain circumstances might disturb the celebrated equilibrium of the three
'coordinate powers' in a serious manner.
As it was attempted to render slavery and the presidency harmless by all kinds of patching, and laws made fr
the occasion, and no one perceived that this purpose could
only be gained by their abolition, so efforts were made to
exorcise the dangers connected with the power of the supreme
court by occasional changes, without examining into the
nature of its whole position. Already Jefferson considered
this position of uncontrollable judges nominated for life venturous in the highest degree, and proposed to nominate them
for five or six years only, and empower the president and the
senate to remove them. But this proposition does not go to
the bottom of the evil either. The chief objectionableness
to the supreme court, as that to the president and to congress,
consists in its undemocratic position, inaccessible to the people, and in this position it is moreover protected by the old
prejudice, which makes, so to speak, superior beings of the
judges, is wont to surround them with a mysterious glory,
a sort of worldly holiness; and when, corresponding to this,
these superior beings appear in the imposing uniform, in black
robes and white ermine, no one thinks of remembering any
more that such venerable figures rise from the people, and
ought to be dependent on the people,-the people, whose
pockets, under certain circumstances, might be emptied, and
whose heads cut off, at their command. A court-room appears
to people like a church, where even Americans take off their



55
hats; and even if the people is here liberated from that petty
tyranny of monarchs which sees a particular crime in the
'offence against an official', it yet permits a 'contempt of
court' to be looked on as a crime, in such a manner that a
judge has a right of imprisoning the sovereign citizen according to his pleasure, because he does not treat him as though
he were a superior being. This whole worship of the court
is simply based on tradition, superstition, thoughtless:ness,
and humbug. It is true that it is necessary that particular
persons, possessing the requisite knowledge, and whose character inspires confidence, should act as judges; but these
judges should have no privileges more than other servants
of the people; and the people should always secure to itself
the right and the means to judge its judges, as all its other
servants; and it is certainly the destruction of all democracy
that certain persons, placed like inviolable saints above the
level of the people, are to dictate as the highest authority
to the people what is right or wrong, what lawful or unlawful. From the people must proceed the legislative, from the
people the executive, from the people the judiciary power;
and it must be accessible to the people through their chosen
representatives.  These representatives are first of all the
legislators; and as the executive, so should the judiciary
power be subordinate to the legislative. Why should a judiciary commission of congress not be able to pronounce on the
justice of some decision, or the constitutionality of some law,
just as well as the wise heads of the supreme court? Are
the judges, however, not to be nominated by the law-making
agents of the people, then ought they to be elected by the
people itself, and the people reserve to itself their removal,
in the same manner as the change of those agents.



56
COORDINATE POWERS.
It will not be superfluous to examine also the muchpraised coordination of powers, looked upon as the most profound statesmanship, under a magnifying-glass.
The constitution of the United States fixes the purpose
and the authority of the three powers that are to act as the  A
political organs of the people, without by special regulations
defining their relation to each other. It nowhere speaks of
'coordinate powers'; but it was intended to practically establish that which is generally designated by that term, and this
was established. Each of the three powers -the legislative,
the executive, and the judiciary-should, existing beside the
two others, perform the duties of the sphere assigned it in
such a manner that the activities of all should work together
for one harmonious whole, and it was supposed that this
would be the realization of the constitutional ideal.
Upon a closer examination, we discover that these institutions are based upon a great mistake, and that a contradiction was with them admitted into the State mechanism, which
might remain silent for a while, but could not be suppressed
for any length of time. The three powers may be represented
as three horses before the car of State. Guided by a coachman, they may carry their load evenly and harmoniously;
without a coach-man, they would infallibly collide, particularly if it were intended that they should not only draw
together, but also check or clog each other. If the organs
called State powers could act quite independently of each
other, there would be a possibility for each to fulfil its purpose without encroaching on the rights of the other, or having its own rights encroached on,--provided there should
exist again some higher power to guide them all towards one
common aim. But they are to be not only dependent on
each other, by mutually supplying and completing each other's
activity, but they are also to watch over each other, and in



57
this complicated activity show and exercise the united highest
power and authority, that is, that of the people, in a representative manner; and this they are to do, endowed with
equal rights, placed in equal positions, 'coordinated'. Let
us now see how this relation of coordination appears in
practice.
Congress makes the laws. As traditional political views
left no room for the idea that he who makes the laws could
and should execute them too, but considered a particular
executive power necessary, a president was instituted. To
make this president expressly and unconditionally a servant
of congress, as logically his executive destination would have
required, was considered somewhat venturous. As the senate
was to serve as a brake on the house of representatives, so
the president was to serve for a brake on both. He was
therefore not subordinated to congress, but placed opposite
to it, and authorized to annul its laws if possible by his veto;
and where he would not or could not do this, execute them
with the power put at his disposal alone. Now is congress
coordinate with the president, and the president with congress? Congress, as a legislator and a judge, is the superior
of the president, but through his veto it is his subordinate
again, and without his power it is nothing at all. The president as an executor is the servant of congress; but, armed
with the veto, the military forces, the public treasury, the
power to appoint all officials, and have the republic represented abroad, he is its master: and how is the relation of
both to the supreme court? Congress is to decide on the
arrangement of the supreme court, and also be a judge of its
judges; at the same time, however, these same judges are
the authority for the laws of congress; and the president is
actually made the appointer of these judges, whose presiding
officer, in case of impeachment, is to be his, the president's,
judge.
May this be called coordinate? Coordinate only in con


58
tradictions  All three powers are both the superiors of
and subordinate to each other at the same time. But what
they are not, and can not be, is of equal rank,-' coordinate'.
They must occasionally jar therefore, and the events of the
last years have given proof how much trouble it costs to
silence and hush up their conflict by shifts and expedients,
and laws made for the occasion. But this conflict will arise
again, and not be set at rest before true democracy makes an
end of it,--a democracy which knows and suffers to exist no
other power but that directly established, dependent upon,
and directed by, the people.
Let politicians meanwhile remember that the term 'coordinate powers' is not only an empty phrase but an actual lie,
---in short, that no really coordinate powers exist, or can
exist, in the State.
-o----0
THE COMPROMISE OF FREEDOM WITH SLAVERY.
The third compromise we are to expose is that of freedom with slavery. This, however, has within the last ten
years been exposed already in the red light of the torch of
war in such a manner that to enter upon the subject in detail
would appear as a waste of words. We shall say but one
word here upon a clause in the constitution, which we have
that compromise to thank for. It is characteristic of the
young days of the republic from the outset, that it was more
liberal in its views when it ran away from its master than
when it became its own master. In its declaration of independence it established the equality of the rights of all men;
in its declaration of rights, however, the constitution, it imme


59
diately introduced inequality. Yet this was not done without
some shamefacedness. To preserve at least the appearance
that, in spite of the connivance at slavery, that demand of
the declaration of independence, according to which 'the
governed must be represented in the government', was being
respected, the slaves, three-fifths of them, were indirectly
represented too, of course not in their own interest, but in
that of their masters. This might be called a compromise
between man and beast. As a man, a whole man, the slave
was not to be acknowledged, or he would have had to be represented not by three- but by five-fifths, and by his equals;
nor was he to be regarded as a beast, or either all representation must have been denied him, or other working animals, as
horses and oxen, must have been admitted to congress for
representation also. What, then, was done? The slave was
made a beast-man, and the grace shown. him to acknowledge
him three parts man and two parts beast. In all cases the
beast-man, who was not and could not be a citizen, was
admitted to representation in the constitution of the United
States. The question we now have to ask is this,-have
women, who are everywhere acknowledged five-fifths of human
beings, and also citizens, less right to representation than the
former beast-men? That they are already represented by the
men, as is often asserted, of that the constitution says not a
word, possibly because the fifth question puzzled its authors.
Consequently they are, according to the constitution, placed
even below the former slaves, that is, not represented at all,
neither directly nor indirectly, and yet they belong to the
' governed',-aye, they are nothing else but governed, the
governed par excellence. If this shameful conclusion, that the
glorious republic places women legally even below the former
slave, or beast-man, is not to be drawn, there is but one way
to save its honor, that is, the acknowledgment that their
quality as citizens of the republic comprehends the complete
equality of their rights.



60

THE COMPROMISE OF DEMOCRACY WITH ARISTOCRACY.
The fourth compromise to which the origin of the constitution may be traced is that of democracy with aristocracy.
Aristocracy was guarded by the same means which gives
expression to the individualism of the States, that is, the
senate. The senate, exclusive of the right of granting money,
constitutes the dominating part of congress, possesses powers
which, according to even the most modest democratic conception, belong to the popular house; and already the indirect manner of its election gives to it an aristocratic character. The union senators are, so to speak, the essence of the
State legislatures, who, in their turn again, are a copy of congress, and represent a State aristocracy in their senates.
Moreover, the single States possess the means of fostering an
aristocratic element through the power they hold of deciding
who is entitled to vote, through the census, and similar
restrictions; and this brings us to the so-called
0-------
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS,
Which are but very imperfectly guarded by the constitution
of the United States, evidently from consideration towards
the fundamental compromise which guarded the individual
interests of the single States. The celebrated constitution
of the German empire of 1848, as ludicrous as it may be in
many respects, devotes not less than fifty-eight paragraphs to
fundamental rights; even the Mexican constitution protects
them by twenty-nine articles. What the constitution of the
United States says on the subject may be put into the hollow
of a hand, and applies only partly to the whole of the repub


61
lie. It guaranties to the single States a 'republican form of
government', without, however, explaining by a word what is
to be understood by this; it also secures to the citizens of
the whole country the right of habeas corpus, and of trial by
jury, protection against arbitrary searches, or seizures of
their houses or property, etc.; but the chief liberties, that
first lend value and stability to all the others, it indirectly
abandons to the single States. Entire exclusion from the
right of voting, that was formerly permitted in consideration
of the slave-holders, is now, when there are no more slaveholders, save the male sex, abolished, it is true, save in regard
to women; but the laying down of the conditions as to the
exercise of this right of voting in the single States is still
left to those States themselves. In the same manner the constitution surrenders to them religious liberty, the freedom of
the press, etc. It permits the States to do everything it does
not expressly prohibit, or reserve to itself. It prohibits, for
instance, the issue of paper money, the laying of any duty
of tonnage, and so forth; but it does not forbid them to
'legally' silence an abolition speaker, to 'legally' imprison
an atheistical writer, to 'legally' exclude an unbeliever from
office. Neither does it prohibit laws concerning Sunday, the
oath upon the bible, and other religious restrictions and regulations, by which the personal rights and liberties of persons
of opposite convictions are violated. All this only congress
is expressly forbidden to do, by the regulation according to
which no law is to be made abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press, the free exercise of religion, or the right of
the people to peaceably assemble, and no religious test
required as a qualification to any public office. These guaranties for the union on the whole are worthless however, or
illusory, if the single cantons of the union may overthrow
them at pleasure. That they may do so, and that in a most
barbarous manner, is shown by the draconic laws often enough
employed in the former slave and Puritan States, for whose



62

sake the constitution established no general guaranty for the
chief liberties of a democratic commonwealth.*
With these remarks we may close the general review of
the constitution of this country. It has shown us that this
celebrated constitution is in the main points entirely undemocratic, that it must render impossible a true democracy, a
general, effective, and sute manifestation of the will of the
people; and the history of the present as well as the past
shows by a thousand facts that this theoretical conclusion
finds complete confirmation in practical reality. The real
people is in America, as well as in Europe, little more than
a voting and paying machine; and, with the best of intentions, it will never bring about a change so long as it considers its constitution an ideal.
---o---
SKETCH OF A NEW CONSTITUTION.
In conclusion there yet remains the task of sketching in
brief the changes to which this constitution should be subjected. They are as follows.
The former union of republics must be declared one, indivisible republic, and the former States, more practically
divided, made provinces, that, after the abolition of their
expensive legislatures, have their special affairs settled by
circuit deputies.
The presidency and the senate must be abolished; the
house of representatives, however, changed into an assembly
* How few guaranties are offered by the constitution against the annihilation of the most important rights by the single State was shown but
quite recently by a 'law' of the New York legislature, which, except for
the governor's veto, would have, in view of the corruption of the courts,
completely fettered the freedom of speech and of the press.



63
of agents or deputies of the people, in permanent session,
who may be instructed by their constituents, or replaced by
others, at any time. The executive power, as well as the
legislative, rests with the house of the deputies of the people, that has its laws executed, and the general business of
administration attended to, by an executive and administraStive commission chosen from among its own members, or
from among the people, and to be controllable and removable
by the house of deputies.
All more important laws are to be submitted to the people to have a particular vote taken on them, and only become
valid by their direct approval.
If business permits, the house of deputies may adjourn
for a certain time, maintaining its permanence, however, by
a deputation which, during the time of adjournment, is to
watch over the executive commission, prepare necessary
questions for the next session, and in urgent cases convene
the assembly in an extra session.
The fundamental rights that are to be laid down, conclusively and in detail, must not be contradicted either by
the general laws of the republic, nor by special regulations
in the provinces.
The provinces, circuits, and municipalities are to have
the disposal, according to generally accepted rules, of all
local interests, and all affairs not concerning the general public weal; but in doubtful cases, the house of deputies is to
have the decision in the matter.
The courts are to be made as independent as possible,
but remain subject to the control of the people; and the
house of deputies shall be the last court of appeal, above the
supreme court.
In the selection of deputies, the electors are not to be
limited to persons from their own circuit, but may make their
choice within the boundaries of the whole republic,- an
arrangement by which the employment of the best and most
*



64

independent powers of the country, and the manifestation
of the desires of all shades of party, are made sure of.
These would be the chief points in a constitution in
which the democratic principle, logically carried out, would
be embodied, and which might fulfil all the conditions, drawn
up above, necessary to a real government of the people.
It is true that even the best of constitutions is not alone
able to attain that purpose. The last question always remains,
what use the people would put it to. If the mass of the people be indolent, unprincipled politicians will make use of
even the best of constitutions for the disadvantage of the
people; if the people be bigoted and ignorant, its incapacity
of judging will expose it to being misled and abused; if it
be financially dependent on a wealthy minority, the complete
assertion of its rights will be doubly difficult. Political reformation, then, can not be a radical cure for all evils without
the so-called social reforms that are to make education and cultivation, and economical or financial independence, as general
as possible. But political reformation is the indispensable
condition for those other reforms: only through it will the
needful freedom and opportunity be gained for the manifestation of all social wants and interests; and while it works
thus, while a truly democratic constitution introduces the
whole people into the political arena, and makes the means
by which it may manifest its will as easy of access as possible,
it at the same time opens to it the only school where it may
attain to the full qualification for independent citizenship.
It is a dogma established, with mathematical incontestableness, that the improvement of social conditions goes on in
closest proportion to the degree of freedom established, and
the participation of the people in political action. Only by
way of democracy can the social problem' ever be solved:
the first of all 'social', as well of political questions, all over
the world is,therefore, true democracy.