BRING AMERICAN BOYS HOME FROM RUSSIA


I - — i-r
~- ________


SPEECH


OF


HON. HIRAM W. JOHNSON
OF CALIFORNIA


IN THE


SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES


WWEDNESDAY JANUARY 29,;19


Am&


WASHINGTON
1919


0-19232




Oak 6Qh.




SPEE C I


I-ION. HIR AM W. JOHNSON,
OF CALIFORNIA.
BRIN-G AMERICAN BOYS HOIME FROM RUSSIA.
Mr. JOHNSON of California. Mr. President, recently I gave
a wholly unnecessary notice, but the usual one, that to-day I
would address myself to the resolution which I presented some
weeks ago, and which it was my expectation on this occasion
to call from the table and to have considered by the Senate.
The pendency of the measure, however, that is before us now
precludes me from taking up tlhe 'particular resolution, but,
nevertheless, the time being propitious, I wish to address myself
to it and to tile present situatio':in Russia.
On the 12th day of De'ember last I introduced a resolution
asking the State Department to define to us the policy of the
United States toward Russia.
I was mighty lonely then, Mr. President, in the presentation
of zhat subject lmaltter. To-day, sir, I have my warrant here in
tile letters of mothers and fathers:and wives of men who are suffering and whlo.are dying in Russia. It became obvious to me that
this resolittion would not be acted upon by the Foreign Relations
Committee, and subsequently I introduced the resolutiol, of
which I speak to-day, expressing the opinion of the Senate that
our troops should be withdrawn from Russia. Until the introduction of my first resolution, our relations with Russia, the
activities of our soldiers there, and our policy in fighting, after
the conclusion of the war with Germany, with another people
against whom we never had declared war, had scarcely been
mentioned publicly, and the subject, apparently, was one from
which the supposedly popular branch of our Government timidly
shrunk. In the last month and a half, however, a very healthy
discussion has been stimulated within andl witlhout this body,
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4
and the American people have learned for the first time during
this period a little, though not much, of American troops still
battling on foreign soil. My original resolution was received,
as I presumed it would be, in hot indignation and resentlment
by the part of the press which has rejoiced in its attitude of
merely echoing approval of whatever the administration might
do, but the subject'matter has been taken up by that portion
of the press of America which yet is free. Legitimate discussion has been stimulated, and our people, at last, by a modicum of free expression, have been faintly heard. What I
sought to accomplish originally has in part been realized, and
I thihk it no exaggeration to say that while the Senate, yet
under the spell of the strange psychology of war, may yield its
/    ssent to a policy concerning which it was not consulted anl
about which it has not been informed, and which is at variance
with our professions and violates our Constitution, the people
of the country, emerging from this psychosis, and now far in
advance of their representatives, with practical Unanimity
favor not only the original resolution but also the one now
under discussion.
The peace conference recently has issued a formal statement
concerning Russia, which, apart from its expression of esteem
and love for the Russian people, asks all of the factions to
meet in the Sea of Marmora on the 15th day of February. We
are wholly in the dark as to what is contemplated when all
parties meet upon an almost uncharted island in a distant sea;
but we are becoming accustomed to the open diplomacy which
in daily communiques with few words telling nothing soothe
the perturbed spirits of the democratic peoples of the world.
Because I lassmi e that an address couched ii such friendly
language, specifically recognizing the revolution and disclaiming
any desire to interfere in Russia's internal affairs, is but the
initial step in a carefully prepared and thoroughly accepted
plan of all the powers for the settlement of every question respecting Russia, I will not speculate upon the possibilities nor
discuss the pronunciamento which has added to the case only
the knowledge of the extraordinary affection in which the Russian people are held by the allies.
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My interest has been in America's policy and in the soldier
boys of the Republic, who, seemingly, for months were forgotten
by their Government. My prime interest and concern yet are
these American boys. The action of the peace conference thus
far leaves these American boys where we discovered them a
month and a half ago, and, so far as they are concerned, unless
we take it for granted that they are to be withdrawn immediately after the 15th day of February, their situation is no
different than when this subject first was broached. I ask
for them nothing more than I ask for all American troops on
foreign soil. I ask for us an American policy.
I am  quite aware that there exist two distinct lines of
policy for our country in the near future to pursue. I know
that in this body the line of demarcation between these two
policies is becoming increasingly plain. Recently the Republican floor leader, in an epoch-making speech, stated with clarity
and precision his view of our future policy. With logical force
and plainly he stated that he deemed it essential by the peace
terms immediately to create the following:
1. A Jugo-Slav State.
2. A Czecho-Slav State.
3. The security of Greece.
4. Albania.
5. Montenegro.
6. Roumania.
7. Armenia.
S. Syria.
9. Palestine.
10. Poland.
11. The independence of Russia's Baltic Provinces, thus:
1, Finland; 2, Esthonia; 3, Lavonia; 4, Courland; 5, Lithuania;
6, Ukrainia.
And, in addition, that we must take and hold ample security
from Germany and Austria.
I will not quarrel with his creation of the various new nations.
But the distinguished Senator prescribes our future duty in this
language:
We must do our share in the occupation of German territory whihlh
will be held as security for the indemnities to be paid by Germany. We
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can not escape doing our part in aiding the peoples to whom we have
helped to give freedom and independence in establishing themselves with
ordered governments, for in no other way can we erect the barriers
which are essential to prevent another outbreak by Germany upon the
world. We can not leave the Jugo-Slavs, the Czecho-Slavs, and the
Poles, Lithuanians, and the other States, which we hope to see formed
and marching upon the path of progress and development, unaided and
alone.
There is but one conclusion from thle language used, and that
is that after the creation of the 16 nations the duty devolves
upon the United States, in part at least, to maintain these nations, and aid them in establishing themselves with ordered governments by America's soldiers. I will not subscribe to this
doctrine. I will not for one instant concede that it is the duty
of the Republic to maintain order in a Jugo-Slav or a CzechoSlav State, in Albania or Montenegro, in Roumania or Armenia,
in Syria, Palestine, Poland, Finland, Fsthonia, Lavonia, Courland, Lithuania, or Ukrainia. I am opposed to American boys
policing Europe and quelling riots in every new nation's back
yard. The perils of such a course to the Republic seem to me
obvious. Aside from the material aspect-and you may ever
keep in mind that the establishment and maintenance, in part
by us1 of these distinct peoples must be paid for by our already
overburdened taxpayers-I would not shed the blood of American boys in the internal disturbances of an Esthonia, Lavonia,
Courland, a- itlhuania, or Ukrainia. I decline to be frightened
now by the " German menace." Germany is whipped and thoroughly whipped. The central empires, in the language of the
Presidlnt, are in process of iiquidation. The German Army has
been;. practically  demobilized.; her ordnance has been relinquished; her means of transportation delivered; her fleets
surrendered; her towns occupied. She is involved in such civil
strife that it is doubtful if there will be a stable government
with which a peace ma'y be made. She has been so thoroughly
disabled that she could not, a few days ago, resist a small advancing Polisl army. She is suffering just retribution for her
offenses. The central empires are incapable of aggressive
action now.  Our help, therefore, to the 16 nations which
would be created " in establishing themselves with ordered governments" must be the aid which our arms would give to
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one faction or another in these new States, and I am not ready
to shed American blood for any faction of any foreign State
or in maintaining the government in any Baltic province. It is
staggering to speculate upon the number of armies and the
hundreds and thousands of American boys that would be required in these 16 nations. It is time for an American policy.
Bring hole American soldiers. Rescue our own democracy.
Restore its free expression. Get American business into its
normal channels. Let American life, social and economic, be
American again.
I heard it said recently upon the floor of the Senate that the
President had a most difficult task abroad. I recognize this,
and wish that some real aid could be extended to him in the
one possible accomplishment which may be his. I listened with
ralpt attention to the scholarly and statesmanlike address of the
junior Senator from PLennsylvania recently, the point of which,
as I understood it, was.hat we should at once conclude our
peace with our foes and bring our boys home, leaving to subsequent determination the formation of a league of nations. I
take it that le is no more opposed to a league of nations than
I am; and I am very frank to say that if the President can
return to the United States with at league. of nations which
does not relinquish our sovereignty, and which in reality will
be a preventive of future wars I shall welcome most gladly and
enthusiastincally, this great accolmplishment.
But America wants peace. It has achieved its great primal
idealistic purpose and crushed a ruthless militarism. I reecho
tlie words of the great commander of the Union forces in the
Civil War immediately upon surrender of his adversary "Let us
have peace." Let us have peace and get out of Europe. On the
11th day of November the armistice was signed. Two months
and a half have passed. The censored dispatches from Paris.are conveying to us now the news that it is hoped the conference may conclude its labors in June and we are being prepared,
apparently, for a second trip some time in the summer by our
Chief Executive to Europe. I would not minimize, of course.
the nmacgnitude of his task, but I have a very distinct recollection that much of it has already been agreed upon. Because of
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prior agreement among our cobelligerents the idealism of tlle
President Is likely to be severely taxed, and his difficulties will
be manifold.  But the pitiless logic of events, the ironclad
prior understandings of our allies, have lessened his labors and
reduced to a minimum the subjects witll which he must deal.
He announced in January, 1918, land subsequently, fourteen
peace points. The first of theseOpen covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall
be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy
shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.
we have had adequately demonstrated to us. The language of
this covenant by bitter experience we have now learned is perfectly plain; in the interpretation it has been distorted and
misunderstood. The senior Senator from Idaho has been insistent in his advocacy of peace point No. 1. For it, and for
the other 13 peace points, we have been told that our soldiers
gladly and cheerfully fought and died in France, but the
senior Senator from Idaho, and others who thought as he did,
with a singular obtuseness, have insisted "open covenants of
-peace, openly arrived at" mean what the words import. We
should have known when we distinctly announced this particular point, for which our soldiers suffered and bled and died,
we meant it in a Pickwickian sense only, and spoke the usual
language of diplomacy. Anyone not affected with a mental
strabismus ought readily to understand that when we say "open
covenants of peace, openly arrived at," we mean "secret covenants of peace, secretly arrived at," and, after their arrival.
doled out il homeopathic doses to an ignorant and ill-informed
populace.
The second peace point wasAbsolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial
waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in
whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.
And is quite as plain to him who reads with intelligence as
was peace point No. 1.
But we need not further discuss peace point No. 2. It
has been lost for a considerable period now in historical mystery,
and rests in oblivion with the unrealized dreams of the Akound
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of Swat and the Maharajah of Ruritania. Peace points three,
for the reluoval of economic barrier, four for the reduction of national armaments, and five for the impartial adjustment of all
colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the interests of
the populations concerned with the equitable claims of the goveminent whose title is to be determined, apparently, have been
submerged in weightier questions and no longer agitate the overburdened minds of statesmen. The sixth peace point, regarding
Russia, I 'will mention hereafter. All of the other peace points,
with the exception of the league of nations, deal with territorial
adjustments. as does indeed No. 5. Now, the difficulty of the
President in interpreting his peace points as to territorial acquisitions is that long ago England, France, and Italy reached their
conclusions, and the President is up against the contracts, signed,
sealed, delivered, and in the pockets of the allies. The secret
treaties which were executed before our entrance into the war
were quite definite in form, and apportioned territories to the
three great belligerents, and also to Russia. These secret
treaties, with the elimination of Russia, I feel sure, are deemed
effective and binding; nor do I doubt that substantially the territory they embrace will be divided in accordance with their provisions. If the President can break through the traditions of
diplomacy; if he can revive and have adopted his peace points
apparently discarded with the opening of the peace conference;
if he can effect a disregard of the secret treaties entered into for
territorial dispositions and acquisitions by the three great
powers; and if he can compel the altruistic and idealistic peace of
which he has so often spoken his will be the greatest achievement
of any statesman of any time. My hopes and my prayers are
with him in his extraordinary task.
But Russia was the subject of the sixth definite peace point
enunciated by the President. From the time of the Russian
revolution until long after the control of Russia by the soviets
and the cruel administration of Lenine and Trotsky the President often spoke to Russia and the Russian people, and always
in gentle, kindly, and friendly fashion. His policy, which, by
our acceptance, became the policy of this Nation, was distinctly
enunciated in the memorable address of January, 1917. Al102630-19232




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though this policy, apparently, has been forgotten in our dealings
with Russia, whether it will ultimately be carried out may,
perhaps, be determined by the fate of the other definite terms of
peace prescribed by the President. The Kerensky government
fell November 7, 1917, and the soviets, with Lenine and Trotsky
in command, came into power. On the 4th day of December we
were asked to declare war against Austria, and, in the course
of the address demanding a declaration of war against Austria.
the President adopted the formula of the Bolsheviki of Russia,
the formula under which they were making peace with Germany.
He said:
You catch, with me, the voices of humanity that are in the air. They
grow daily more audible, more articulate, more persuasive, and they
come from the hearts of men everywhere. They insist that the war
shall not end in vindictive action of any kind; that no nation or people
shall be robbed or punished because the irresponsible rulers of a single
country have themselves done deep and abominable wrong. It is this
thought that has been expressed in the formula " No annexations, no contributions, no punitive indemnities."  Just because this crude formula
expresses the instinctive judgment as to right of plain men everywhere
it has been made diligent use of by the masters of German intrigue to
lead the people of Russia astray and the people of every other country
their agents could reach, in order that a premature peace might be
brought about before autocracy has been taught its final and convincing lesson and the people of the world put in control of their own destines.
At tlis time the Russian armies had practically disintegrated
and the -Russian Bolshevili were negotiating with Germany.
On January 8, while Russia was in collapse, and it was obvious
that those in control of her government were about to make a
shameful peace, the President, with full knowledge of the situation, presumably, had this to say:
There is, moreover, a voice calling for these definitions of principle
and of purpose which is, it seems to me, more thrilling and more compelling than any of the many moving voices with which the troubled air
of the world is filled. It is the voice of the Russian people. They are
prostrate and all but helpless, it would seem, before the grim power of
Germany, which has hitherto known no relenting and no pity. Their
power, apparently, is shattered. And yet their soul is not subservient.
They will not yield either in principle or in action. Their conception
of what is right, of what it is humane and honorable for them to
accept, has been stated with a frankness, a largeness of view, a generosity of spirit, and a universal human sympathy which must challenge
the admiration of every friend of mankind; and they have refused to
compound their ideals or desert others that they themselves may be
safe. They call to us to say what it is that we desire, in what, if in
anything, our purpose and our spirit differ from theirs; and I believe
that the people ct the United States would wish me to respond with
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utter simplicity:nd frankness. Whether their present leaders believe
it or not, it is our heartfelt desire and hope that some way may be
opened whereby we may be privileged to assist the people of Russia
to attain their utmost hope of liberty and ordered peace.
This was said after two months of government by the Bolslheviki and after they had publicly proclaimed to the worfd
their mode of government and what it was their purpose to do.
And, lest ye forget, I quote again tie sixth of the celebrated
peace points, uttered January 12, 1918:
The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all
questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest coopet]tion of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure
her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a. welcome assistance
also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The
treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come
will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her
needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.-.
On February 11, 1918, when the proceedings of the peace
conference between the Germans and the Bolsheviki were fully
known and understood, the President thus spoke to us:
Peoples are not to be handed about from one sovereignty to another
by an international conference or an understanding between rivals
and antagonists. National aspirations must be respected. Peoples may
now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. "Selfdetermination "' is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative tpritniple!of
action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril..
Self-determination has fallen by the wayside with. " oln
covenants of peace, openly arrived at."  Or, perhaps, self-determination may have been used with tle same delicate shades of
meaning which have distinguished the use of "open covenants."
All through our idealistic statements in this war runs the theme
of self-determination and the rights of people for themselves
to( determilne their own forms of government. It was the underlying principle which stimulated our judgments and aroused
our enthusiasm. It is not the fault of those who coined the
phrase, and those who have used it, that we may, perhaps, have
misunderstood it, and that self-determination really means
determination by ourselves of the kind of government others
shiould have and then impressing that kind of government upon
an unwilling and a rebellious people. With tills possible ex102630-19232




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planation, we may see with greater clarity the reason for our
activities in Russia. During February, the peace terms at
Brest-Litovsk had been concluded and there remained but
the ratification of those peace terms by the all-Russian congress
of the Soviets.
I now deal with the historical events of the fateful month
succeeding the President's address.   So far as I am    aware,
what I now present has not been published in this country. I
present it because it is the truth, and because upon us rests a
heavy responsibility for what has since transpired in Russia.
I will not be put in the attitude of defending in any degree the
soviet power or Lenine and Trotsky. Their fantastic theories
no sane man, in my opinion, can indorse. But our dealing with
Russia and the dealings of the allies with Russia have been
not only an exhibition of the crassest stupidity, but have contributed to the awful tragedy there. Early in March the soviet
government officially presented to the allies certain questions,
favorable answers to which every man then in Russia agreed
would prevent a ratification of the Brest-Litovsk treaty by the
all-Russian Soviet congress, and then there would have been
a renewal of the war by Russia against Germany. A translation of the official document thus transmitted to the allies from
the soviet government is as follows:
In case (a) the all-Russian congress of the Soviets will refuse to
ratify the peace treaty with Germany, or (b) if the German Government, breaking the peace treaty, Will renew the offensive in order to
continue its robbers' raid, or (c) if the Soviet government will be
forced by the actions of Germany to renounce the peace treaty-before
or after its ratification-and to renew hostilitiesIn all these cases it is very important for the military and political
plans of the Soviet power for replies to be given to the following
questions:
1. Can the Soviet government rely on the support of the United
States of North America, Great Britain, and France in its struggle
against Germany?
2. What kind of support could be furnished in the nearest future,
and on what conditions —military equipment, transportation supplies,
living necessities?
3. What kind of support would be furnished particularly and
especially by the United States?
Should Japan-in consequence of an open or tacit understanding
with Germany or without such an understanding-attempt to seize
Vladivostok and the Eastern-Siberian Railway, which would threaten
to cut off Russia from the Pacific Ocean and would greatly impede the
concentration of Soviet troops toward the East about the Urals-in
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such case what steps would be taken by the other allies, particularly
and especially by the United States, to prevent a Japanese landing on
our Far East, and to insure uninterrupted communications with Russia through the Siberian route?
In the opinion of the Government of the United States, to what
extent-under the above-mentioned circumstances-would aid be assured from Great Britain through Murmansk and Archangel? What
steps could the Government of Great Britain undertake in order to
assure this aid and thereby to undermine the foundation of the
rumors of the hostile plans against Russia on the part of Great Britain
in the nearest future?
All these questions are conditioned with the self-understood assumption that the internal and foreign policies of the Soviet government vwill continue to be directed in accord with the principles of
international socialism and that the Soviet government retains its
complete independence of all nonsocialist governments..The men who were then in Russia familiar with the situation, including the representative of England and the representative of the United States, advised their Governments to
respond favorably. I have copies of the telegrams which wert
sent at that time to different Governments. But the communication was received, apparently, in indignant and contemptious silence. I can hear the voices in this Chamber saying that
this was right, that there should be no comipromise with crihe;
that the allies were correct in their position'in utterly refiising to deal, or to talk, or to communicate with this awful soviet
government.   That it would have been' in derogation of 'mir
dignity and would have been an affront t6 civilizatioi d hidle
responded, or to have uni    ited withi t-f Sovie  governement in
fighting Gerlmany. I may think that you,are entirely: right -;i
what I thius see passing through your- minnds. I may 'iholly
agree with you that the civilized nation  of the worldl coIJd not
without defflemeit touch this awful tliitg in Rlussih   And if
thils had been the attitude of our Government and other Govern'
ments, we might pass the incident as onie of th6se unavoidable
historical occurrences where idealism  and civilization's champions must of necessity hold aloof from civilization's assailants.
But during this period what was the Government of the, United
States doing?. It: could not, you say, have any dealings with
these men who had set at defiance, in the language of one of
the Senators upon this floor, the laws of God and man alike.
In its virtuous indignation it could permit no communication
of any sort, you assert, with cruelty, rapine, murder, and
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anarchy. But just before the Brest-Litovsk treaty was to be
presented to the all-Russian Soviet congress the United States
Governlent went to the city of New York, interviewed the
socialists and extremists, and even anarchists, who preached
lawlessness and destruction, and begged them for telegrams to
be sent to Lenine and to Trotsky, and to the Bolshevik governnent asking that the Bolsheviki continue the war. I read the
headlines of one of the papers at that time:
United States lets "Reds" send messages to Bolsheviki. State Department cables their appeals to Russians to stand firm.
And in the body of the article appear these things:
The United States Government yesterday aided radical socialist and
pacificist organizations in New York in sending to the Russian revolutionists cable messages urging them to resist the German invasion.
The messages were sent not or;ly with the approval of the Government, but through the Government's agencies and at the Government's
expense. * * * These messages were gathered by a person designated by the authorities and were sent to Washington to be forwarded
through the State Department to Petrograd.
The socialists and extreme radicals in New York City were
importuned for messages, and most of them responded. All of
the messages were sent by the United States Government to the
Bolsleviki at Petrograd. This, of course, is common knowledge,
and has been common knowledge since its occurrence. I am
not (riticizing it. I am stating. now something of the truth
-whichl we have carefully concealed during these months. You
may say to me, of course, that this was a very different thing
from communicating with the soviet government itself, and thus,
in a measure, recognizing it. You may say that the exigency
and the emergency justified the Government in using every
means in its power to continue Russia's resistance to Germany.
I may agree with you. But, if the emergency and the crisis
justified the Government in using the anarchists of New York
to communicate with the anarchists of Petrograd, it would have
justified the United States Government answering the communication of the soviet government, without recognition of that
government at all, and in encouraging it, by its answer, to
renew the war with Germany. A very different proposition,
you insist, between the Government itself communicating with
the soviet government, and the anarchists of New York communicating with their comrades in Petrograd. Perhaps so.
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But, beyond this, what did we do?   With an authoritative and
an official communication before us, which we were advised
meant if we replied favorably that tlre soviet government
would make war upon Germany, we refused to respond at all.
And yet just before the meeting of the Soviet congress which
was fixed for the week of Tuesday, March 12, the President of
the United States himself cabled the Soviet congress.
Oh, we could not touch this awful tiing in Russia! We
could not touch it, with the document before us by which war
mright have been renewed, and under which the Brest-Litovsk
treaty might have been repudiated in: the all-Russian Soviet
congress in the week of March 12, 1918. We could not be contaminated by touching such a thing, even for so good an end.
But on March 12 the Official Bulletin of the United States Government tells us this:
President assures Russia that United States will aid in restoring its
sovereignty. Following message from the President of the United States
to the people of Russia through the Soviet congress has been telegraphed to the American consul general at Moscow for delivery:
" May I not take advantage of the meeting of the Congress of the
Soviets to express the sincere sympathy which the people of the United
States feel for the Russian people at this moment when the German
power has been thrust in to interrupt and turn back the whole struggle for freedom and substitute the wishes of Germany for the purposes
of the people of Russia.
""Although the Government of the United States is unhappily not
now in a position to render the direct and effective aid it would wish
to render, I beg to assure the ipeople of Rusia through' the Congress
that it will avail itself. of,every opportunity! to secure for Russa once
more complete,sovereignty and independence in her own affairs, and
full restoration to her great r6Ie in the life bf Europe and the modern
world..
"The whole heart of the people of the United States is with the
people of Russia in the attempt to free theiselves forever from autocratic government and become the masters of their own life.".:(Woodrow Wilson.)
During that week the meeting of the Soviet congres       was
postponed for several days in the hope that from     the allied
Governments would come a response to the propositio9 submitted, upon which a repudiation of the Brest-Litovsk treaty
could be obtained from the congress. I do not care to speculate upon what might have transpired if the appeals of the
Englishmen and Americans who were then in Petrograd to
their Governments had been successful. I am relating to you
only the facts. During this critical time in Russia the Germans
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were advancing through EFinland. Marching and fighting with
them were the Finnish White Guard. The army of the Bolsheviki were called the "Red Guard "; that of their opponents in
Finland, the " White Guard."
We have been very tender of 'Finland, and a part of the
hundred million dollars recently appropriated to feed Europe
is to be devoted to Finland. The historical fact, however, is
that the only soldiers who fought the advance of the Germans
were the Red Guard of the Bolsheviki. They whipped the
White Guard, representing the so-called government of Finland,
and they were forced back only when that government and the
White Guard called the Germans to their aid. It is a historical
fact, as well, that wherever the Red Guard fought those of their
own country opposed to their revolution they won. They were
whipped only when their opponents called in German troops.
This was so not only in Finland but in Ukrainia, too. During
this period repeatedly-it wvas stated the  tlhe' ailies wodiitl: iJtervene.
Intervention was never predicated upon the score of guardling supplies until the disingenuous August announcement of our
Government. Iintervention was suggested early il the year, and
througlout tle early months of 1918 it was a matter of common
rumor an4 frequent discussion. During March the men who
were most fanilHiar with the Russian situation on the ground
vigorously protested against this intervention, and no one protested mose vwigporusly itben, and at subsequent times, too, than
did the amnassador of the United States Government.    At
Murmanski, early iAn Iarclh, because of the advancing Germans,
the situation was acute, and then what happened? A mutual
arrangement was made between the French and British, and
the Russian Soviets for the defense of the district of Murmansk. And during this month of March, nothwithstanding the
horrible doctrine of the Bolsheviki, notwithstanding with an
iron hand they were suppressing opposition, there was cooperation between them and the representatives of the Allied Governments in Petrograd.   I learned, incidentally, that Maj.
Thomas D. Thacher, of the law firm of Simpson, Thacler &
Bartlett, New York, who was a miember of the Red Cross mis102630-19232




17
sion to Russia, had been at Murmansk, and lhad seen the cooperation there existing between the French and British and
thie Bolsheviki, and on the 20th day of January I wviried him.
asking him succinctly to advise lme of the facts. I received in
response this telegram from   him:
One company British marines, about 130, landed 3Muriansk March
5 or 6, pursuant invitation Murmansk Soviet, acting under telegraphic
instructions Trotsky to accept all necessary aid from allies. Before landinig supreme military ccmmand Alexandrovsk and entire Murman railway granted by Soviets to committee, composed of Bolsheviki sailors,
French military officer, and British military officer. This committee subject, however, complete control Murmansk Soviet. From this time until
my departure March 22, French, British, and American military authorities in daily cooperation and complete harmony with local Soviet.
Seventeen guns fired by British ship Glory as salute to Russian flag.
Only flag visible red flag. Salute answered same number of guns, Russian cruiser Chesmar. Red Cross received effective and iinvaluable assistance from Soviet authorities at Murmansk as well as everywhere else
in protection and tratsportation of supplies. Five hundred CzechoSlovak troops in Murmiansk, assisted by Soviet authorities, returned to
France. Sailed on my ship. I trust that this will give you the necessary
informnatioh. I neglected to add a statement of the fact that the Soviet
authorities cooperated with the allied authorities in the protection of
supplies at Kandalaxia, as, well as at Murmansk. The supplies-at Kandalaxia were, of course, more exposed to the attack of Finnish white
gu.ards, who were then cooperating with the Germans:
I received yesterday a letter from Col. Raylmond Robins concerning the closing paragraph in the story of George Creel re(ently publhished.  That closing paragraph of Mr. Creel is as
follows:
Russia was a hard fight to lose.  It seemed for a while that we
should surely win, and to this very day I believe that the people were
with us then and are with us now. But the political control of Lenine
and Trotsky abolished the freedom of the press and tu'ned the power of
the Government against us. Our men were the last to leave Petrograd
and Moscow. Mr. Slsson stayed until the ultimate danger to secure the
documents that proved Lenine and Trotsky to be German agents and
then slipped out through the far reaches of Finland. Mr. iullard
and his force transferred to Vladivostok, from which point he began
working back into European Russia with the allies.
One real result was achieved. Intensive work was carried on in
the prison camps of Russia, and thousands Of Czecho-Slovaks and JugoSlovaks learned of the purposes and power of America, receiving
thereby the courage and inspiration that had its climax in the march
of the Czecho-Slovak legion from the Ukraine to Vladivostok.
Col.' Robins writes me:
The inclosed clipping from  the last page of George Creel's eight
pages of. self-laudation in February's Everybody's 3agazine, suggests
that Mr. Creel is unable to relate facts. The facts are:
The President's speeches were printed on the:' olsheviki government
)resses by special permission of that government.  They were dis102630-19232 —2




18
tributed under Government frank and posted on the dead walls of
Petrograd by the Bolsheviki posting service.
The money for this work was drawn from the Petrograd State
Bank by special 0 K. of the Bolsheriki government. The President's
speech of January 8 was sent over the private wire of the Bolsheviki
Government to Brest-Litovsk by order of Leniae, aned I secured tlih
order for its transmission in the prsence of Mr. Sisson.
Mr. Sisson fled from Petrograd on the 4th of March, 1918, shouting
that the Germans would takei the city within a few days in collusion
with the Bolsheviki.  The American Re d Cross was feeding starving
children and evacuating war supplies from Petrograd under Bolsheviki
protection in quantity until the 1st of May, 1918.
The allied military  nissions were helping to train the Bolsihevikl
Red Army on the 1st of April, and the American  mbassaldor was seeking, with the conselnt of the allied embassies, the  ooperation of the
American Railway Mission with the Bolsheviki governbent, wneeks
after Mr, Sisson had fled in terror from Petrograd.
Mr. Bulla rd and all the Am erican members of the   ommittee on
public information in Bussia fled fr o  Moscow on the 5th of May,
reaching Archangel and suffering from the worst case of " buck fever"
in my observation. They telegraphied the American ambassador to get
them the permission of the British high commissioner, still in Petrograd,
to get on the English ice breaker, which lernlission I secured for them,
and they were on this ice breaker drssesd in English uniforms for
several weeks, while the A merica.n Red Cross was doing iusiness as
usual in Moscow, and English, Frcnch, and Japanese were still working
for their Governments under the protect iOn of the Bolsheviki government.
The American Red Cross mission did not leave Moscow until the 5th
of October and Petrograd on the lI tli of October in the full protection
of the Bolsheviki government, somre seven months after Mr. Sisson had
fled in terror with his panic from reading some propaganda pamphlets
and papers which were the amusement and contempt of honest and
informed men.
When last I addressed the Senate uponl tlhis subject I asked
certain questions of the Government. It is unfortunate that
there is no method by which our Government, may be interrogated and no means, except that of a majority vote here, by
which. information may be l    t    d obtaind for our people. I wish it
were possible so to amend our system        thatt upon this floor
the appropriate official could be asked legitimate questions
and compelled to respond. No answer has been made, of course,
to the questions that I askhe, because the implication in every
questioln is known by the departmlent to be true.     Men are in
this country to-day who can establish every single tact suggested, and if this body, or the Foreign Relations Committee,
really desire information, if they wish to tell the mothers and
the fathers and the wives of the men who are freezing in
Russia to-day justwt      th   facts are, they have at their dis102630-19232




19
posal the evidence, and it can be brought before them upon
the briefest notice.
Russia, Mr. President, is a marvelous country. It contains
one-sixth of the earth's surface, with fertility of soil and wealth
in mineral resources surpassing those of any other part of the
earth. This Soviet government to which our President for us
spoke so kindly, begged us for economic aid and wished to make
us the most-favored Nation. We, in the rigidity of our virtue,
though asking the aid of the anarchists in our midst, with the
BolshevIki over there, and though publicly proclaiming our
friendship and our love, would 'not accept the proffer. Weak
and vacillating, stupid, and ignorant has been our policy with
Russia. We solemnly promised we would not intervene, and
then, prating of our love for the Russian people, we did
intervene. Prating about guarding stores at Archangel, we
aldvanced from 100 to 300 miles from that port, took and burned
little Russian towns, and upset little Soviet governments. In
the name of p)rotecting military supplies, which were offered to
us again, and again, and again, and which we could have had
for the asking, we shot down Russian peasants, and our boys
are shot dow-n by them. The Senator from Nebraska insists
our only purpose in landing at Archangel was to protect the
stores. Our only advance beyond Archangel was to prepare
military bases. He is wrong. We were marching down from
Archangel-and the facts will demonstrate it-that we migrlt
make conjunction with the Omsk Government and might perfect the ring of steel which we had thrown arolund interior
Russia, and which was starving innocent women and children.
The Senator from Virginia gravely speaks of the German
menace. What Gerlman menace since November 11? Are our
people children to be lulled into repose by such stuff as tllis?
The very learned and logical Senator from Colorado tells us
that we are not making war upon Russia; that Russia is making
war upon us. Apparently his argument seems to be that if the
Russians had not resisted when w e advanced into their territory
there would have been no conflict and no killing. What a
strange and fantastic doctrine is this! If an army landed in
102030-19232




20
New York, marched to Buffalo, and the people in central New
York resisted and fought them, by that fact, then, New York
was making war upon the invading army and. the invading army
was innocent of wrong. The French are under no illusions in
this matter.
They are for intervention, and they believe they are intervening upon a small scale, too small, as they put it, now. They
make no pretense, that they wish supplies guarded. They wish
Russians killed and another government set up. What hypocrisy
upon our part to say to our people, and to the Russiants, in our
pronunciamento last year when we commenced our intervention,
that we contemplated~ " no interferenqe with the political sovereignty of Russia, no intervention in her internal affairs, not
even in the local affairs of the limited areas which her military
force may be obliged to occupy, and no impairment of her territorial integrity, either now or hereafter." No sooner had we
landed at Archangel than we shot the Soviet government there
existing out of town and set up a government of our own. No
sooner did we go into the interior than everywhere we found a
local soviet we shot it to death and set up our own mode of
government. Then we tell our people that we intend no interference with the internal or local affairs of Russia!
What a commentary it is upon the power of this body and upon
the power of our people that the State Department and the
Government: can not and will not answer concerning our troops
in Rutssia. How the iron must enter the souls of those who have
relatives there; of the mothers and ers a rs and thers   wives of men
who were drafted to fight Germany, and then, when the war with
Germany was ended, were forced to fight a war with Russia.
Our Government can not answer concerning our troops, although
the great preponderance of the forces at Archangel are American. Of necessity it must respond in indefinite and general
terms. These troops are now under English command, and the
Americans who are in the vicinity of Archangel, like good soldiers, are obeying their English commanders. I venture the
assertion that in Washington., in the departments here, they
know no more about what military action is contemplated or
102630-19232




21
what our troops are about to do than the veriest novice upon the
floor of the Senate. The American troops are under English
command. Perhaps justly so, and I have no doubt well comlmanded; but it is because of that fact that no answer can be
made as to the position of these troops or their military activities. An occasional belated story is given to us, the last of
which we read on January 25, as follows:
We have reports from Archangel," said.Gen. March, "which were
received here on January 24, and have been decoded. We had at
Shenkursk a force which, at last reports, consisted of a detachment of
British, two American companies, and two Russian companies. Manifestly this force has had out in that vicinity small patrols at times.
The towns mentioned in the report are so small that we can not find
them on our largest maps. The force at Shenkursk was attacked on
three sides, and the report which was received at Archangel that day
stated that they were forced to evacuate.
"The troops at a place called Ust-Pedenga, which I can not find on
the map, were also compelled to evacuate under attacks by strong
Bolshevist forces.  Our troops took up a position midway between
Shenkursk and Ust-Pedenga. Under attacks of 1,000 of enemy troops
we retreated from Tania to a point 10 miles away therefrom. Tania
is 18 miles west of Shenkursk.
" Under an attack from 200 of the enemy forces we retreated from
Kodema, which is 25 miles from Shenkursk, to a point within 13
miles of that town. The enemy has strong patrols from Shegovari to
Tania.  Shegovari is 20 miles north of Tanla, and to the right of
Shenkursk.
"The Americans lost 10 enlisted men killed in action, 17 wounded,:nd 11 missing in the retirement. Near Ust-Pedenga, and later at
Shegovari an enemy attack on the west was repulsed."
"Do we plan," was asked, "to reinforce the American unit in
lRussia in view of the fact that it seems to be retiring?"
" Shenkursk," replied Gen. March, "a s scaled on the map, is apparently 190 miles from Archangel, and the allied forces representing
four Governments, and the Russians, five Governments, have up there
a force large enough to reinforce those men or have them fall back
on them and hold the situation.
Gen. March was asked whether any recommendation had been
received concerning the withdrawal of the American forces
from tlhe Archangel front.
The force now at ArchangelHe saidwas put in there by the allied Governments on the recommendation of
Marshal Foch, and the military handling of that unit was thereupon
turned over to the supreme commander; and whatever is done concerhing reinforcing the unit will be done by him. The allies agreed
upon a British commander in chief, and at the last reports he was in
the front lines inspecting his troopA, and I assume that the military
part of it is in hand.
102630-19232




22


From. this, apparently, all the roseate stories of the campalign
in Russia may be discounted. Our brave boys had to retreat
many miles through the ice and the snow and the rigors of an
Arctic winter. They had to fight during this period in weather
that few are accustomed to and none understand.
And what has been the result of it all? It is true we have
a ring of steel that prevents food getting into Russia. It is
true that we are starving women and children to-day in Russia,
and that hands are lifted in supplication to God and in cursing
this country for its activities. But is it not obvious to you that
when we compel people in Russia to starve. who will starve?
It will not be first the horrible Bolsheviki. It will not be your
Lenines and your Trotskys. It will be the intellectuals and the
bourgeois. It will be those whom we are pleased to term the
very best people in Russia. As you contract this ring now, and
as you prevent the natural flow of food from the granary of
Russia, and you blockade her ports with gunboats, you are first
starving the very people you do not wish to starve, and you are
starving those who ought not to starve. If it had not been for
this criminal policy of intervention, and this ring of steel that
prevented food getting into internal Russia, Lenine and Trotsky,
in my opinion, long ago would have fallen and the Bolsheviki
would have been at an end. But by this foreign interference
every base passion has been appealed to, every prejudice
aroused, and even patriotism invoked. And the very act of intervention has enabled this grotesque government to last far
beyond its allotted time, and to exercise its despotic sway in
the name of public safety. How much have we contributed to
the terror, to the rapine, plunder, slaughter, and massacre?
There is a heavy reckoning some day for those who have been
responsible for this wicked and this useless course in Russia.
And the heaviest responsibility, the wrong which can never be
atoned, is the shedding of American blood in Russia. It is to
this phase I desire to arouse the Congress and to which, if I
had the power and my voice would carry, I would arouse the
people of the Nation. It is of American boys and American
blood I am thinking. I would not give one American life in
102630-19232




23
IRussia for all the bolsihevii spawned by centuries of tyranny
and mad  with the lust of a ruthless ephemeral power.
What I ask by this resolution is that our Government, which
shrouds itself in mystery and which will not tell us or the
people its intentions or its policies, may know our opinion that
our troops should be withdrawn from Russia. I do not care how
you view the situation, whether you favor armed intervention
or whether you do not. If you favor armed intervention it is
obvious that the scale upon which it has been undertaken is
too small to accomplish lasting results. It lias become painfully
clear in the last few (lays that by the present intervention we
merely hazard the lives of our men. It is equally clear that the
people of England, and our own people, will not tolerate intervention upon a larger scale. Therefore, even if you favor lintervention you should, for the protection of, the lives of our soldiers,
insist that those there, few in number and their position courting disaster, be immediately withdrawn. If you favor intervention, why do you not upon this floor, by resolution or otherwise,
say so? If you believe in war with Iussia, why not introduce tn
appropriate resolution and permit Congress to vote upon it in
accordance with the Constitution, and permit our people to
discuss it?  Upon what theory can you justify war, without
affirmative action by Congress? And that we are in an actual
state of war at present in Russia the recent ominous news from
there demonstrates only too plainly.
What a sorry spectacle we present! The distinguished chair1m1an of the Foreign Relations Committee endeavors to make
explanations of our policy with Russia, but hastens to assert
that he does not speak officially or authoritatively. The chairman
of the Committee on Naval Affairs gravely gives his views but
prefaces them with the statement that he speaks neither officially nor authoritatively. Both of these gentlemen say we are
simply protecting supplies. I reiterate that England is under no
illusion respecting our purpose in Russia, and that France
frankly proclaims it. The court organ, the New York World,
says we are in Russia for the purpose of maintaining order.
The variosus Rusians swho have showered us with pamplhlets of
late understand the situation full well. The most recent of the
102630-19232




-24
propaganda which has come to mle is from     a certain Col.
Vladimir I. Lebedeff, who says:
Just at this time, the allied armies being at Vologda, the allies
advised the officers' organizations to revolt simultaneously against the
bolsheviki in Ribinsk, Vladimir, Yaroslavl, and Murom, so as to encircle Moscow as with an iron ring.
In the declaration published by the State Department of our
intervention it was stated " whether from Vladivostok or from
Murmansk and Archangel, the only present object for which
American troops will be employed will be to guard military
stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and
to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the
organization of their own self-defense." The charming naivete
of this must have appealed to the Bolsheviki. We were landing
troops for the sole purpose of guarding military stores which
subsequently we would deliver to the Russians themselves. Of
course, the intention of this utterance was to fool the people
of the United States into believing American bayonets were
necessary to protect Archangel stores from the Germans. It is
never for an instant indicated nor is the language susceptible of
any such meaning that these stores were to be protected from
any kind of Russians who were not acting with the Germans.
Our advance constantly into the interior, of course, makes it
obvious that the guarding of supplies for Russians themselves
was the veriest kind of pretense. In all of the months prior
to our intervention daily the subject of intervention was hotly
discussed.
In all these discussions there never was a question about
protecting supplies except in the instance where the soviet government, in conjunction with the English and the French, at the
very moment of the German advance in February and March,
protected supplies at Murmansk. The distinguished chairman
of the Foreign Relations Committee scoffs at the idea that any
war exists in Russia now, or that we are there participating
in war with the Russians. I take it what he means is that
it is just a little war, and because it is such a little war, it
ought to be disregarded. It is a little war. It involves the lives
of something over 5,000 American boys only. It touches the
hearts Of perhaps three times that number of anxious relatives in
102630-19232




25
the United States. It is true, perhaps, that it is such a little
war it involves only a few hundred lives, a few hundred maimed,
a few hundred American graves on Russian soil, but to me, sir,
one of those lives in Russia and one of these hearts bowed in
anguish in America are more precious than all of the pretense
of diplomacy or the protection of any government from   the
just wrath of a righteous public opinion.
Opinion upon this subject has crystallized in England. You
may have observed recently a delegation of soldiers called
upon Lloyd-George and expressed their fear that they might be
sent to Russia. He assured them they would not be. I have
been interested in following the discussion which has been going
on in England, and a portion of it I wish to bring to your
attention. Indeed, as evidentiary matter, I have selected two
newspapers, one British the other American, because of their
high standing and the accuracy of their statements. I have
taken the Manchester Guardian, one of the few great independent newspapers in the world. It certainly will not be accused
of Bolshevism or sympathy with men like Lenine and Trotsky.
I have taken as well from   the sedate precincts of the Old
Bay State the Springfield Republican with its i - ent reviews
of the Russian situation, and, withouatat length reading either,
I desire to refer to a few excerpts.
Perhaps, Mr. President, I would serve no good purpose in
reading these excerpts, and, if the privilege will be accorded to
me, I should like to put into the REconD, as a part of my remarks, various articles from the Manchester Guardian, dated
December 6, December 19, December 24, and December 27, 1918,
and two articles from the Springfield Republican, one of them
dated January 5 and the other dated January 12, 1919.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GAY in the chair). Without objection, it will be so ordered.
The articles referred to are as follows:
[From the Manchester Guardian, Dec. 6, 1918.]
THE RUSSIAN SCANDAL.
Our present relations with Russia are about as indefensible as can
be imagined. The foreign office, or those who control the policy of
the foreign office can hardly be ignorant of that-how should they
be?-but, so far as appears, are preparing to cover one error with
a greater error and to make bad worse. In the midst of the preocc102630-19232
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i.::::!I.::!  0:: fff 0;  00; I:I::::;1:  0 00:'~':I':::i~-~ l~'~h:~:'  ~~~




26
pation of a great war the little war with Russia has received comparatively little attention, and it is hardly realized that, though the
great war is over, the little war goes on, and, moreover, that if it
is not stopped now or soon it is likely to become a very much larger
war and a more and more intolerable and indefensible one, so intolcrable and indefensible, indeed, that it is capable of producing grave
reactions here, extending to the overthrow of a government.    We
originally embarked on this Russian adventure under wholly different
circumstances, and for reasons, so far as reasons were given, which
have no present application whatever.    After the intervention by
Germany in the civil war between the Reds and Whites in Finland and
her virtual occupation of the country there was a real, if somewhat
remote, danger that she might strike through Finland at the narrow
strip of Russian territory which divides the north of Finland from
the Arctic Ocean and establish for herself a naval station on the
Murmansk coast, giving her access to the Arctic and a new outlet
for her submarines. At a moment when the submarine war was at
its height and Russia lay helpless and subservient there was reason,
if not very urgent reason, since the district was extremely inaccessible and a long line of railway would have had to be built, for guarding against this peril. That was the extent of the danger and the
extent of the need for our occupation.  Its extension to Archangel,
which is not ice free, and to a large stretch of country inland had
no such justification.  The occupation of Vladivostok, Russia's icefree port in the Pacific, 5,000 miles away, followed by the advance
with the cooperation of Japan westward into Siberia was, as a military  measure, equally unjustified.  Both these extensions of the
original intervention were defended on quite other grounds. It was
said that Russia had become the mere tool of Germany and that it
was necessary, first, to prevent the further extension of Germany's
influence and her increasing exploitation of Russian resources, and,
secondly, to "reconstitute the eastern front." In this connection the
happy discovery was made of scattered bands of Czecho-Slovak prisoners who, it was urged, must, in the first place, be rescued, and, in
the second place, utilized in this process of reconstituting the eastern
front.
So matters stood at the time of the collapse of Germany and the conclusion of the armistice. Obviously, every reason hitherto alleged,
whether for the original occupation of the Murmansk coast or for the
subsequent expedition to Archangel and Siberia had now disappeared.
They were all in the nature of defenses.against the attack of Germany,
and there was no longer any attack or possibility of attack from Germany. Germany as a military power was dead; but were the defensive
measures, the counter-attacks, dead also?  Not at all; they continue in
full force. There is quite a prospect that they may be largely extended. For the moment, of course, there is a pause. Winter is no
respector of persons or of policies. Very soon Archangel will be frozen
up and out army of occupation there will be frozen up also. In the
east the Japanese have steadily and very sensibly refused to advance a
mile further. They have reached Lake Baikal, and beyond Lake
Baikal they decline to go. So if we desire to extend our operations in
this direction we shall have to do it ourselves, for America will certainly not assist us and will prudently follow the Japanese example.
But there are other possible fields of operation. We have recently obtained access to the Black Sea. We are therefore now in a position to
reipat in the extreme south of Russia our performances in the extreme
rbrlth, and, as a matter of fact, It Is credibly reported that the war,
office is now engaged in making a survey of the country. The Ukraine,
A0260O-19232




27
under German and Austrian control, has become the refuge or dumping ground of a whole collection of Russian reactionaries of various
sorts and sizes, and the same is true to a less extent of the Don country
and other districts to the east. It would be easy to play 'into the
hands of these gentry, as we have played into the hands of others of
the same description in eastern Siberia,-where a purely' reactionary
party has 'now dismissed the local popular '(not Bolshevik) government
and: established a military government of its own.
But what conceivable justification, it may be asked, is there for any
such proceedings?  And how is it possible that any British Government
should embark on so wanton and criminal an interference in the affairs
Of another nation? Such questions may, indeed, well be asked, but it
is doubtful if they will receive any presentable answer; for the fact is
that the real, though unavowed, reason for our previous interference is
entirely different from the avowed reasons, and it is a little awkward,
now that the avowed reasons have disappeared, to produce the real
one-the more so as this is not a very nice reason or one which is
likely to commend itself to reasonable people in this country or to our
working class.' That reason, of course, is that the war against Russia
has from the first really been a war against that particular form of
socialistic theory known as Bolshevism.
We are noo admirers of that theory. Applied to any western European
country, we believe it would be disastrously subversive.    Even in
Russia we may doubt its permanence. But there it is; it has established itself; it has existed for more than a year. It is not weakening
in power; all trustworthy information goes to show that it is gaining
in power; that it has established order; that it meets with general
support from some 80,000,000 people, whom it controls; that it is
grappling successfully with the food problem; that it is promoting
the popular arts, music, and the drama, and is preparing a great scheme
of popular education-that, in 'fact, it is performing most of the pormal
functions of a government, and performing them with increasing success. These are the facts, but they do not suit the policy-the policy
at least hitherto pursued-of our freedom-loving Government. The
telegrams of the few British correspondents, including our own, who
are still in a position to give authentic information, are ruthlessly
censored or suppressed, and the Government goes on in its blind and
foolish way, a way that can, if persisted in, lead only to discredit and
disaster. This is the situation as we understand it. Bolshevism is
to be suppressed by armed force, and in order to prepare people's
minds for it and to lend it some color of justification, not only is
truth as to the condition of Russia suppressed but currency is given
to all kinds of wild statements and palpable exaggerations.     The
Bolsheviks are not angels from heaven. They have, like most revolutionaries, executed a good number of their enemies, but these executions have mostly taken place since the intervention of the' allies
gave encouragement to the counter-revolutionaries and made them
more formidable. Mr. Litvinoff, who is an honest man and a Tolstoyai
before he is a Bolshevik, puts the total number of executions since
the Bolsheviks came into power at 400, half of them of ordinary criminals. That is probably an underestimate. If information were allowed
to come through from other sources, we might get nearer the truth.
This, then, so far as there is a policy, appears to be the policy. It
has got to be changed. Perhaps the Government are already awakening
to the fact, but find it difficult to get out of the mess they have themselves created. Let them take heart. It is easier now than it will be
later. Every week, every month, that they stay in Russia and wage
a war on Russia. which has lost every shred of avowable reason and
102630-19232




28
has no Justification, will make it more difficult to escape. If with the
coming of spring they should see fit to resume or extend their military
operations, it is well they should understand that it will not be tolerated
in this country. The workers here are not going to send their sons
to slaughter and be slaughtered against the workers of another country,
against which we have never even declared war, and for the purpose
of destroying a form of social economy with which some of them,
at least, are in sympathy. If it is sought to check the progress of
Bolshevism and prevent its spread to this country, that is precisely
the way to defeat the object. We prefer not to consider the possible
further consequences of such reckless folly.
[From the Manchester Guardian, Dec. 19, 1918.]
ADMIRAL KOLTCHAK AND LORD MILNEL.
The campaign of Admiral Koltchak. the Siberian " dictator," against
his old comrades in arms is developing. Ie has arrested another 27
of them, including M. Tchnernoff, one of the foremost of the antiBolshevik socialists, and 12 other members of the constituent assembly.
Their crime is that they do not accept him as dictator and that they
proclaim him a sheer reactionary, a charge which has that sharpest
of all stings-truth. The admiral's campaign against the Bolsheviks,
however, is not moving equally prosperously. The chief Czech generals
have resigned rather than do his work for him, and the whole Czech
army is threatening to abandon the front and go home. That would
mean the end of Admiral Koltchak's "dictatorship" and the whole
miserable Siberian adventure. The admiral, however, expects the
allies to induce the Czechs to stay on as his mercenaries (paid, of
course, not by him but by the allies), to replace them, if and when
they depart, by allied conscripts (thus doing their bit to make democracy safe), and to provide him liberally with the sinews of war. The
finance of the "dictator" is characteristic.  It will be remembered
that the late Czar gained much credit at the beginning of the war by
suppressing vodka  Vodka is the dictator's local financial stand-by. It
brought In 1,000,000 rubles in August and 10,000,000 rubles in Noovem
ber, and its potentialities are "limitless," for there are a thousand
million rubles of the stuff in stock. Thus, faithful to tradition, vodka
is to be the rock on which the "dictator's " Russia is to be builded,
just as it was of the Czar's Russia. Vodka and loans-for the "dictator's" foreign friends are to do most of the paying, though we
should like somebody to tell us who is calling the tune.  Koltchak is
asking the allies to provide 60,000,000 rubles a month to keep him
going. There is a further point. Many parts of Russia are starving.
How many people realize that it is partly the allies who are responsible
for starving Russia? We are blockading Russia so that no raw materials or machinery can enter the country or produce leave it. We are
sustaining the blockade of Russia by the revolted provinces who used
to supply her with most of her food and fuel. To what end this martyrl4"ig of the Russian people? To what end this pouring out of British blood and British money?
To these questions, at long last, a British minister, Lord Milner,
attempts a reply. Lord Milner does not say the Bolsheviks are German hirelings. He is not quite so ready as his colleagues to adopt,
on the strength of forged documents, a theory which no competent authority sincerely believes. He says we went to Russia for two chief
reasons-because the action of the Bolshevik  s as assisting our enemies
by releasing hosts of German troops and bringing Roumania down, and
because we were under a moral obligation to save the Czecho-Slovaks.
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We are afraid that these reasons ignore a great many factS. We provided the Ukraine with money and arms to break away from Russia
before the Bolsheviks made peace with Germany; indeed, our action
was an important, perhaps the most important, factor in precipitating
the treaty of Brest. Again, the Bolsheviks repeatedly expressed their
willingness and their anxiety to let the Czecho-Slovaks leave Russia,
and they cofitend that it was the allies who inspired them to stop in
the hope of "reconstituting the eastern front."  That, indeed, was
the favorite argument for the expeditions to Russia-tha t    it wlld
bring Russia back into the war, whether the Russian people like it or
not. We venture the assertion, in despite of Lord Milner, that the
military adventures of the allies in Russia did nothing to bring defeat to Germany, but were in a military sense pure waste, to say nothing of the political loss. But be Lord Milner's reasons for intervention as good as they are bad, they no longer exist. The war with Germany is over. The Czecho-Slovaks can go home as soon as they like,
or rather as soon as we let them, for it is the allies who are keeping
them in Siberia when they want to go home. What then is our reason
for maintaining war against Russia? Lord Milner says that we have
induced some thousands of Russians-a very few thousand, in" factto light on our side and we can not abandon them to "the unspeakable
horrors of Bolsheviki rule" until they can train, arm, and defend
themselves. As the Bolsheviks have a large army and the antiBolsheviki parties are better at fighting one another than at fighting
the Bolsheviks, it looks as though we shall be at war with Russia forever, on Lord Milner's principle. Would it not be cheaper to come to
terms with the Bolsheviks, safeguarding the lives of our Russian
friends, which would be perfectly easy? The Bolsheviks are begging
for an armistice, but we will not condescend to listen to them. Why?
The true reason peeps out at the end of Lord Milner's letter when he
speaks of our duty to prevent ".barbarism" spreading all over Russia.
In Russia we are fighting neither against the Germans nor for 'the
Czecho-Slovaks nor for the Russian anti-Bolsheviks. We are.fighting
against a form of the State and a conception of property which we
dislike, and which we have good reason to dislike, but which it is not
our business to overthrow by force of arms in another country. That
is why we are in Russia.
[From the Manchester Guardian, Dec. 24, 1919.1
THEI OUTLOOKU THIS CHRISTMAS.
The fifth Christmas since the war began is not yet the Christmas of
peace. Fighting has been suspended between the original, belligerents,
nor is there any prospect of its being resunied. Turkey; Austria, Bulgaria, and Germany have neither the will nor the means to take,up
arms again before the final peace is ratified. All this is an immense
boon, but we should not forget that the old war has either actually
given place or is in danger: of giving place to a new war. The allies
are directing or sustaining several campaigns against the Moscow government, and the fragmentary States of the disrupted Russian and
Austrian Empires are engaged in a conflict with one another, which is
not the less ferocious because it is obscure. These, perhaps it will be
said, are but small dark patches on an otherwise brilliant prospect.
Nobody, however, knows what dimensions the war against Russia may
take on, just as nobody knows what this war is about. Still more disturbing, nobody can foretell what vast explpsive forces may be released and transmitted throughout the world by such a reckless enterprise. Old Europe was light of heart when it set out to extirpate
102630-19232:!:'




30
revolution in France, and the end of it all was that old Europe collapsed in blood and fire under the blows of Napoleon. Of course, history may not repeat itself, but the statesman who stakes much on the
chance that causes will not produce their probable consequences is not
exactly prudent. All the miserable conflict in eastern and southeastern
Europe between nation and nation has a very direct relation to events
in Russia. Russia is girded round with primitive race passions, the
fierce tyranny of intolerant pride and aggressive exuberance.  That
constitutes an immense mass of inflammable material.   A cautious
statesmanship would hasten to extinguish the war with Russia before
it extends and consumes great part perhaps of Europe. When we see
European statesmanship, on the contrary, planning to develop, instead of ending, hostilities against Russia, we can not think the outlook
too comforting.
The moral flaw thus revealed is as unfavorable to excessive optimism
as the intellectual flaw. The war against Russia has the two characteristic defects of the pre-1914 system-the secrecy of its inception,
its conduct, and its aims, and the conviction that force is the best of
arguments and can be trusted to prevail.
[From the Manchester Guardian, Dec. 27, 1918.]
THE ALLIES AND RUSSIA.
The allies, according to M.P'ichon, are desirous of extirpating Bolshevism in Russia, but they are not going to expand their military intervention. If the allies were united in extirpating poverty outside Russia, it
would please the allied peoples and benefit them much more. Bolshevism
inside Russia is the concern of the Russian people, not of the allied
governments.  We can not imagine anything more reckless than an
adventure of this kind at a time like this. Some perception of this fact
seems to have dawned upon the allied governments, perhaps with the
help of President Wilson. That explains, presumably, the decision to
resist the pressure of the Russian exiles anxious for an unlimited allied
expedition. But the policy of a limited military commitment is a worthless compromise. No man knows where it will end, no man knows what
result it will produce, no man can safely predict of it anything except
that it will prolong civil war in Russia indefinitely, and delay indefinitely
the ending of the starving of the Russian people by the blockade and the
restoration of tolerable conditions. The allies can either have war
with Russia or be at peace with Russia. There is nothing between.
The allied governments must choose the one or the other. They would
be wise to choose peace quickly.
[Frioo the Springfield Republican, Jan. 5t, 1919.]
FRENCII AND RUSSIAN SITUATION.
It now seems settled that France, at least, intends to persist in the
unhappy half-way course which has worked such disaster in Russia.
Last week mention was made of the reported abandonment of the great
project-of sending armies into Russia to overthrow the Lenine government.   But apparently while the allies could not agree on this
"thorough"* method of dealing with bolshevism by attacking it at its
supposed source, France can not make up its mind either to abandon
intervention, Foreign Minister Piehon last Sunday flatly contradicted
the inference of a Socialist deputy that this was what he had meant,
and made the further statement that while intervention was inevitable
Its purpose " was not offensive for the time being but defensive.'  Lfater
an offensive might be necessary to destroy Bolshevism, but such an
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31
operation must be carried out by Russian troops, of whom there were at
the present time, he said, 100,000 at Odessa.
iBy " defensive" operations he meant, of course, not defending French
territory, but preventing the spread of Bolshevism that is to-day preventing the extension of the Lenine government's power over those parts
of the former Russian Empire, which it does not yet control. Yet this
professed purpose hardly covers the case of the present intervention of
the French; apparently without the cooperation of their allies in the
Ukraine. For the Republican forces, which the French seem after soiie
hesitation to haye decided to attack are not pro-Lenine, and it is doubtful
if they can be called Bolshevist except in the extended sense in which
that term of opprobrium is coming to be applied to revolutionists in
general. It will be recalled that a fortnight ago we had word of the
sweeping progress of the Republican forces under the popular leader,
Petulra. They took Odessa and other Black Sea ports and also occupied
Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine. Apparently it was they and 'not, as
an earlier muddled or censored dispatch indicated, the white army of
Gen. Denilin that overthrew the Cossack hetman, Gen. Skoropadkin,
who with German support had carried on a counter-revolution in the
Ukraine. On the contrary, Skoropadkin appears to have gone over
to the allies after the collapse of Germany, and to have acted upon their
advice in declaring for a reunion of the Ukraine under the government
which he was to set up, with the Russian governments organized by the
reactionary dictators, Gen. Denikin and Admiral Kolshak.
This was wholly contrary to the will of the people of the Ukraine,
but a Pole of high rank, who lately escaped from Kiev, is probably mistaken in attributing the popular revolt which followed to this declaration for union. A much more probable cause is that Skoropadkin, Denlkin, and Kolchak all represent the propertied interests and aim at undoing the work of the revolution, especially in regard to the distribution
of the land. In the Ukraine, wlich takes in mhost of the famous "blackearth" belt, in which the great landlords stuck tighter to their vast
estates than in northern Russia, the agrarian questiono is specially acute,
and this issue seems-to have united the peasantry and the lower andmiddle classes of the cities to a degree not found in Russia proper. The
movement headed by Petlura, in short, has all the marks of,i genuine
popular movement, awnl the way in which it burst out ebverywheie all at'
once shows that it had gainedl much headway before the censors allowed
mention of it.
When the new tidal wave of revolution swept down on Odessa and
the other seaports the French, who had no adequate forces on hand,
contented themselves with protecting the docks and wharves with their
naval vessels, and later landing a force were said to have regained about
a third of the city. Now we are told that a French army is to operate
from Odessa, and that another army, under French command, but presumably in the main Roumanian, is marching from Roumania to attack
Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine.
Of the military side of these operations it would be premature to
speak, because so little is known of the force involved. But politically
it can at once be said that the adventure inspires serious misgivings,
if only because the French foreign office, in some ways the most reactionary now left in Europe, has shown such unlimited capacity for
blundering in its dealings with the revolution. It is now supporting a
reactionary "unionist" government, yet last year the 'Ukraine had
hardly declared its independence when the French recognized its Gov-,ernment, lent it $35,000,000 (surely the worst bet ever made), and sent
a military mission. The theory was that since the Ukraine was against
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32
the Bolsheviki, and since the Bolsheviki were pacifists and pro-Germans,
the Ukraine nmut be proally and eager to go on fighting for the entente.
But that military mission got to Kiev just in time to see the Ukraine
broak faith with the lolsheviki and negotiate a soeparate treaty with the
enemy. M. Piclion has a reason to feel sore about that $35,000,000,
but it should be noted that the hasty advance of cash to a Governmeiit
simply becaluse it was revolting from  the Bblsheviki showed a t66
rigid and fallacious logic. In real life things do not arrange themiselves as this or that; they may be something else, and Ukraine was
the something else. It may be added in extenuation that French policy
in Russia has from  the beginning of the revolution been under ihconceivable pressure from the half-crazed investor. For people whose
hard-earned savings ar2 meinaced by a social cataclysm in a remote couhtry the utmost sympathy may be felt, but there is no worse influence
for a statesman than a panic over investments.
It is in France, for this reason, that we must look for the bitterest
hostility toward the revolution, and strange as this imay seem in viewi
of the preeminence of France in revolution.  Of exceptional interest,
now that France bas drifted into war with Russia, is the frank accoutit
given by the historian, Ernest Lavisse, when the revolution was but
two months old, of the friction between the two co'tuitries:
' If we have misunderstood the- Russian revolution, the revolutionaries, on their side, have not been fair to us. We looked for soilme
expression of warm sympathy toward France, wh6 first proclaimed the
rights of man, and wthose successive revolutions have contributed so
much in the downfall of the old regime in Europe. Bi t the Russian
revolutionaries have greeted us with black. looks. They reproach our
Republic with having made too easy a pact with czarism and with
having permitted and even supported the very equivocal activities of
the Russian police in France. On this last point they are only too well
justified. But they don't appreciate in a spirit of fairness the reasons
for the alliance between the French Republic and the Russian Czar.
France lived under perpetual threat of a Germa/n attack.  *   *  *
Certainly this alliance was repugnant to our traditions, but sheer
necessity forced it on us."
lHadly less serious thanl the situation in Ukrainie is that in western
Siberia, where a new danger is revealed in a dispatch from Carl Ackermann, who has been at Omsk, in which he states on November 24 the
Czech soldiers "voted against an ofensive     ais   the Iolsheviki
which had been planned and ordered."   This is striking in the first
place because it shows the Czechs, whose prowess and good conduct
have won admiration, as having absorbed in Russia the Bolshevist
idea of the referendum to the army of the orders issued by the high
command. This detail gives point to What has been said of the infectiousness of Bolshevism and its infltence upon all the armies that
are sent to fight the Bolsheviki.
But for the Czechs there is the justifiication that they feel, says Mr.
Ackermann, that they have been betrayed by the allies. Their feeling
may be unjust, but at all events the allies exploited the accidental
presence of the Czechs in Russia withoult having worked out a plan
or even having agreed on a general policy, and the Czechs, like the
Roumanians and the Serbians, have been left in the lurch. When the
lecision to have th(m- stay in Russia was announced attention was
called   the   reviews to ths rviws  e danger of making so immensely important a decision as Invading Russia, a matter to be determined on broad
lines, turn on the fmere accident that a small force of foreign soldiers
was occupying a good strategic position thousands of miles into the
interior of the empire. There were 60,000 Czechs getting on very well
M102  0-19232




33
in a land of 160,000,000 people, because there was no serious hostility;
they were Russia's allies leaving Russia. Why should there be hostility? Here and there German agents stirred up trouble, but it is
now tolerably clear that there would have been no difficulty in getting
the Czechs out of Russia, if that had been desired. Even the treacherous hostility of Trotsky seems to have been due to the threats of
intervention and his belief that if the Czechs got to Vladivostok they
would join the invading entente armies.
Of the part played by the United States Government in this sorry
affair it is too soon to speak, but it is certain that its action was taken
in the supposed interest of the Russian people. But the fear that its
action would be misunderstood in Ru.ssia has been borne out by the
result, and is illustrated in a telegram sent by the president of the
soviets of central Siberia, which Mr. Ackermann quotes:
"From   Russia to Vladivostok are moving 60 echelons of CzechoSlovak troops at the disposal of America, ostensibly on their way to
France. In view of the hostile attitude of international imperialism and
the threats of a foreign landing at Vladivostok the central executive
committee of the Siberian soviets considers a concentration there of
forces dangerous and inadmissible."
The American official shares in commitments which the allies did not
in fact carry out is shown in a dispatch from Consul General Poole at
Moscow to the Czechs at Samara:
"You may inform the Czeeho-Slovak leaders that pending further
notice the allies will be glad, from the political point of view, to have
them hold their present positions. On the other hand, they should not
be hampered in meeting the military exigencies of the situation. It is
desirable, first of all, that they should obtain control of the TransSiberian Railroad, and, secondly, if this is assumed, at the same time,
if possible, retain control over the territory they now dominate."
Is not this a curious dispatch to send-from Moscow? Has the Lenine
government had altogether a square deal, to say nothing of the Czechs?
Their vote against another offensive fits with all that we have had
from  Siberia and helps to explain the hostility toward them shown
by the London Times correspondent, who was specially angry at them
for protecting the members of the constituent assembly from arrest by
the new dictator, Kolchak. By their aid the delegates were able 'to
escape to Ufa, in European Russia, where the all-Russian government
had its capital before it went to join the Siberian government at Omsk.
At Ufa, said the correspondent of the Times, they "continue to fulminate against the Omsk government," though their power for mis
chief there was limited by lack of the support of the Czechs. But this
week the Moscow government claims the capture of Ufa. Was it a
military victory, or have the leaders there abandoned the allies because
of the Kolehak coup d'etat and gone over to Lenine? If the allies
have not been fair to the Czechs, have they been fair, either, to the
Russian moderates who have been willing to cooperate in restoring
Russia? There is. much excuse for them if, after narrowly escaping
arrest by a czarist military dictator,, they have finally joined forces
with the Bolsheviki; but why should the allies have let them be forced
into that dilemma?
The refusal of the Czechs to attack the Bolsheviki also helps to interpret the announcement made to the French Chamber of Deputies by
M. Pinchon last Sunday that Perm had been captured by an antiBolshevik army of Russians. It may be so; and it may even be that
it was, as he declared, a tremendous victory, with 16,000 Bolsheviki
killed or captured, though all news from Russia has to be scaled down.
The victory, it Is true, was suspiciously timely with a new adventure
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34
in the Ukraine being floated against protest, and M. Pinchon has not
shown as an authority on events in Russia. But for the present we
have no evidence one way or another. Vladivostok doubles the number of prisoners, but is a remote source. The point of interest is that
the French foreign secretary made a virtue of the Russians acting alone
and hid from the French Parliament the news, undoubtedly barred in
Prance by the censorship, that the Czechs had been disgusted by the
setting up of a dictatorship and had refused to fight for it. When the
people of the entente countries learn how they have been tricked we
must expect a strong revulsion of feeling, not in favor of the Bolsheviki,
but in favor of stopping stupid interference of this sort and letting
Russia settle for itself what its people want.
One of the unfortunate consequences of the French Government to
continue. to harass the Bolsheviki with minor military operations is
that-it givesexcuse for a continuance of the censorship which has made
possible the blundering policy of the allies. In our own country, now
that the war has been won, we may look for a quick return to the pubicity that Americans like. The only possible reason for secrecy, would
be that the allies were managing things badly and antagonizing the
Russian people, and if this be true the fact should not be hidden, but
set right. If the Bolsheviki are too strong to be overthrown, the question will arise how they are to be treated. Are they hto be declared
outlaws or recognized as representing Russia. or put on the waiting list?
These are questions, depending on facts, and the democracies of France,
Great Britain, and the United States are perfectly competent to decide when a foreign government has earned recognition. The public
approved of the refusal to make a commercial treaty with the Czar
while the passports of American Jews were dishonored; it can be
trusted to judge Russia fairly if the facts are fully and impartially
presented. We may confidently expect the administration soon to take
measures to that end.,
It was suggested last week that to get a coherent policy the allies
would have to decide whether the menace of Bolshevism was a matter
of force or of ideas. Confusion upon this point has been growing since
then, for, the reason that as soon as the rumor got about that the
allies bad decided not:to invade Russia the interventionists began to
"play; up" the dire peril of a Russian invasion.-' While they still hoped
for intervention Trotaky's army was derided as fit only for Falstaff;
as soon as-the allies deeided that it was indiscreet to attack the Bolsheviki! the opposite tactics were adopted; the scare-crow Red Guard
became overnight a superb army, millions strong, officered by German
generals, and setting out unprovoked to conquer Germany and France
by sheer force. One day Trotzky was packing Up and a corporal's guard
of allies, one might think) would do to take Moscow and save civilizatioq; the next day the allies were invited to beat back countless Muscovite hordes, warlike, disciplined, well armed, well clothed, fanatically
devoted to the propaganda of Bolshevism.  -
For this mystery it Is hard to find a parallel except in Russian
finance. Financial history contains anothingg more entertaining than
the theory that the inexplicable strength of the Boisheviki is due to
German gold and that they are now using this ill-got wealth to bribe
Gemany in turn, a financial operation equaled only in the town where
the people lived by taking in each other's washing. But the past week
has seen a diverting addendum to this theory in the explanation that
the strength of the Bolsheviki is due to their control of the printing
press. With that remarkable engine, t seems, they can produce money
in unlimited quantities, whereas Mctator Kolehak at Omsk is repinng becaue m    y ales of paper money, neatly printed in America, are
1*0260 -1-9232




held up at Vladivostok pending developments. Apparently, then, the
only hope of the anti-Bolsheviki is that the printing press at Moscow
may break down from overstrain. For, while that operates, they are
able to bribe all Russia and to maintain a huge army by paying In
paper rubles, to be sure, fantastic wages to private soldiers, with surplus enough to bribe Germany, too.
No labored explanation of the hold of the Bolsheviki on Ruissia is
needed, however, if we assume (1) that despite denials it has steadily
been growing in strength, and (2) that the allies by a wrong policy
have played into the hands of the Lenine government. Of the actual
facts we as yet know little, but by inference from known conditions
we may correct some of the wildest distortions of the truth. We may
conclude off-hand that as an offensive force the Boisheviki are not
formidable. They have small arms enough, but no such equipment of
artillery,and other elaborate apparatus as would nowadays be required for such a crusading war as the French Revolution waged when
goaded into it by attacks very much like those which the French are
now making. Nor have the Russians, who got thoroughly weary of the
war,:shown an aggressive spirit. Whatever the danger of Bolshevism
may be, it is not at present the danger of a march to the Rhine. -
It is to be assumed, too, that Russia is weak" because it is a tightly
blockaded country. It can produce food enough and can manufacture
certain articles, but it is industrially backward and has long been cut
off from foreign trade. It must therefore be progressively impoverished
and the less capable of attacking the right and 'well-equiPped nations
of the west, even if the Russians should be seized with a warlike
spirit, which at present they fortunately do not show.
The military peril, then, may be dismissed except as it affects Russia
itself, including, of course, Siberia and the territories which the enemy
seized and are now evacuating. Of these the chief is Ukraine, and
there, as we have seen, the French are combatlng a separate revolution, which is at present anti-Bolshevist, though iunder- attaek by
foreign armies supporting the dictator, Deniklns,: it nmight' in selfdefense join forces with the- Lenine. government.
Next in importance to Ukraine come the Baltic Provinces, from whlich
the German armies are retreating, followed by a wave of Bolshevism.
This is not wholly Russian in chai'acter,' however, because the Bolshevist
movement in Russia has found no stronger supporters than the great
number of revolutionists, specially Letts, who were driven out of these
Provinces by the Government, and having no home or job in Russia,
very naturally entered the,red guard; to suppose them to. be mere
mercenaries, as has been allegedi is part of the bribery myth already
referred to. They are, in -fact, ardent revolutionists, and it is to- be
presumed that they make the main force of the armies which- are
recapturing their countries as the Germans retire,
The case of Lithuania is specially interesting, because the issue there
is complicated by Polish imperialism. Poland in its grand days held
Lithuania in a manner curiously like that in which the Austrian Empire held the old kingdom of Bohemia, and great Russiab the Ukrlane,
a union for defense was perverted by successive encroachments into
subjugation. Now that the Poles have won their own freedom, at which
we are all delighted, they are seeking also to reclaim their lost empire,
and their plea for invading Lithuania is the necessity of defending it
against the Bolshevlki. It Is a convenient plea, but the Russian doctrine of self-determination has got so strong a hold in eastern Europe
that a Polish invasion of non-Polish territory Is sure to make mischief.
Moreover, we are beginning to hear that the Poles, too, are being
"infected..
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36
This infection of all the armies, not excluding the Czechs, which
have fought the Bolsheviki, is a very curious phenomenon, yet not
inexplicable. It can be understood if we assume (1) that the common people in all countries are averse to further slaughter for imperialistic ends, and (2) that the allied Governments by their intense secrecy
as to what they are up to have left the people at the mercy of Bolshevist propaganda.  For the Bolshevikli have a very definite propaganda. They assert that the Germans and the allies are two of a
kind, that both have been fighting for conquests, for annexations, for
indemnities.  They have, moreover, certain documentary evidence in
the shape of the treaties found in the Czar's archives. This sort of
propaganda, taken with the predilection of the allied diplomats for
supporting Czarist and reactionary Russions, is very unsettling to the
average soldier, so long as his own Government keeps him in the dark.
It is the issue of imperialism, therefore, which at present makes Bolshevism a menace. The menace would be greatly reduced by a just
peace.
[From the Springfield Republican, Jan. 12, 1919.]
The feeling grows that the whole probler, in fact, of dealing with
the revolution has been badly handled, and no great surprise was
caused by the announcement Tuesday of the decision of the British
Government against further military intervention in Russia. Assurance
was given that there was no purpose of sending more troops, and that
steps had been taken' toward recalling part of the 20,000 men already
in Russia. No statement of the reasons for this change of policy or
as to the course to be followed in the future has yet been made. To
some extent the decision may have resulted from the discussions held
while Mr. Wilson was in London, for Russia was uppermost at that
time, and it was understood that the general question of intervention
was to be among the first topics to come up. But weight must also
be given to the strong feeling in Great Britain against a protraction of
the war; victory has been non and 'the people want peace. in particllar the men who were conscripted to fight Germany are clamorlag
for demobilization.  They do rot want to police the contin6ent indefinitely, and still less do they want to be ordered abroad for a
war against Russia, which is what intervention means at the present
t-ime. We need not overstress reports that fear of the spread of Bolshevism in Eigland led to the decision, but unquestionably it is now
realized that intervention as the allies have actually applied it has
been a potent means of fanning the flames of revolution-fanning them,
be it noted, toward the west.
What might, perhaps, have been accomplished by really adequate intervetio1- there has been no occasion to discuss in these reviews, because tit no time have the allies had resources and facilities for adequate ntetention. 'While the war:lasted they were restricted to
roundabout roues of access, and when victory opened the Black Sea
and the Baltic revolution had spread s widely as to make what might
happen at Moscow or Petrograd an affair of minor moment.       At
present, with the temper of Europe what it is, even a strong International campaign against the Russian soviets might involve more risk
than a statesman would care to run.    Even France, where feeling
is most bitter against the new rEgime in Russia, there is no willingness to send an army to Moscow, though the French Government persists in its fatuous course of fighting the revolution in Ukraine.
To say that intervention has failed Is not to say that the Bolsheviki
hae won. Their goverm.?nt may collapse any day; and though unverified, the report is not incredible that Lenine has been arrested by
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Trotsky on the charge of readiness to compromise.    Of the two
Trotsky appears to be the more violent and the more vindictive; there
seems to be some ground for the assertion from Russian sources that
the savage reprisals for the attempt on Lenine's life would not have
been made if he had not been laid u p with his wound. Lenine is, extreme enough in his theories, but seems less energetic In action than
Trotsky, upon whom has devolved a great part of the executive side
of the revolution, including the organization of the new army. Control
of that would give him an obvious advantage over his colleagule if
there has been, as rumored, a clash between them. In any case.;tle
fall of the Lenine government is more likely if the allies leave it
alone than if by invading Russia they rally millions of ignorant pieple
to support against a foreign foe.
When a bad military policy has decisively failed it is well to go
back and examine freshly the reasons assigned for undertaking it. 'ior
the Russian campaigns no better statement can be found than:in an
article by the Russian, Paul Vinogradoff, resident in London, which
was published last June, and which not improbably had a decisive andil
unfortunate effect upon entente policy. He argued:;
"The first requirement is to create a basis for operations by establishing points d'appul for military stores and opening up lines of' cntact with the Russian people. Convenient centers are indicated (by
geography and are partly equipped even now. I mean, primarily, the
Murman line and Archangel; in a lesser degree Vladivostok andi the
Manchurian railway -in the future possibly the Persian front. As the
Germans are taking advantage of their proximity to Russia by foraging freely in the cornfields of the south, Great Britain and her allies
should take advantage of the command of the sea to establisa military
centers in the Murman and in Archangel: nor could there be any suspicion of selfish encroachment if the Japanese acted in contjnction
with the Americans and British on the Siberian front *'I*.; * it
would certainly be a grievous mistake on the part of the allies if they
did not use the short summer season to create a strong base in north
ern Russia  *  * *. If Great Britain and France are able to spare
men and material for Salonica, surely they ought to be able to send
a few thousand volunteers to secure and develop their line in contact
with Russia."
Two months later the allies seized Archangel by force, and the test
of these theories began. It can now clearly be seen, and was suspected by close students of the w. at the time, that the theories on
which intervention was based were unsound in every particular.
To get at Germany the allies had to get through  Russia. To get
through Russia they had either to work through the de facto govern
ment or set up another; they refused to work through the de facto
government, even had that been possible, therefore they could not get
at the Germans until they had set up a new government in Russia.
But this meant a new Russian revolution, simply as a preliminary to a
new campaign against Germany, and while one may disturb an enemy
by starting a revolt in his country, it is not so easy to get help from
an ally by starting a civil war as a preliminary. But this was precisely what the allies undertook to do in Russia. Whether it was a
legitimate thing to do or not is beside the point; it failed, because it
was based on false assumptions. Not even the censorship could long
hide the fact that conditions in Russia were not in the least a they
were depicted in the international press, and that instead of raising
Russian armies to fight Germany, the allies were rapidly drifting Into
war with the Russian people. That insane adventure is well abandoned,
peace just now is the greatest need.
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Mr. JOHNSON of California. Mr. President, the chairman
of the Foreign Relations Committee in hot resentment recently
replied to the strictures of the Senator from Iowa upon the
corporation termed the " War Trade Board of the United States
Russian Bureau." I listened with interest to his remarks then.
The organization was incorporated November 6, 1918, for the
purpose of accomplishing, as the Senator from Nebraska said:
The economic penetration of Russia for the purpose of bringing relief
to a country that was fairly weltering in distiess and misery, many of
whose social and political crimes were growing out of that misery.
Five million dollars was put aside for the purpose described
byr the Senator from Nebraska asFriendly penetration, by the sending of American products into Russia
and the bringing of Russian products out of Russia in exchange for
them, to promote trade and create a prosperity that could not comec
about from natural causes.
All efforts ceased with the signing of the armistice, because, as
the Senator from Nebraska said:
We have coieL to the end of the war substantially.
What a marvelous situation! We prepared in the early days
of November last to supply Russia with what she needed and to
take from her what she could sell-a friendly economic penetration-and to aid the Russian people, How could it be done
except in conjunction with the very peQple who were in control of Russia? We see,.therefore, an elaborate scheme initiated
b our Governiment, without coisultation at all, apparently, for
economic cooperation xith Russia; and yet, when the offers in
writing for econolic cooperation were made again, and again,
during 1918, by the very people with whom we would have to
deal in Noveumber, our Government, apparently, would not respond or reply or have aught to do with the offers, because of
the  ickedness of their authors; and then, after repulsing these
offers with contemptuous silence, prepares itself with $5,000,000
to do the very same thing. It ceased its efforts with the armistice. Just think of it! On the thi day of November, 1918, in
the language of the Senator from Nebraska, we had started on
the enterprise with Russia of "bringing them slloes and food
and clotes and the thingsthey were without." Five days later
e:ceased our efforts and brought the RussianIninstead star1026 0-019232




39
vation and bullets and bayonets. Our efforts at charity and
benevolence ended, because, as the Senator said:
We have come to the end of the war substantially,
and -I presume, for the same reason, because we had comte to
the end of the war substantially, and would not deal in friend
liness and charity, we began to invade and to shoot and -to
starve and to kill. We "had comle to the end of, the war substantially," and we could not, therefore, economically penetrate
Russia, but we could shoot Russians after we "had come to the
end of the war substantially."
Mr. President, no one has less sympathy than I with the 3olsheviki of Russia, who there ruthlessly control with a hideols
class tyranny. None will more scornfully reject their grotesque
doctrine. But I will not permit lmy feelings for the men or their
formulae to blind me to our own wrongdoing, nor will I cloak
our wrong with hypocritical denunciation. During the war it
became fashionable to call all who disagreed with any governmental policy pro-German. Now the fashion has changed; and
any man who will not accept the wrongful edict of intrenched
power is by that token a Bolsheviki. In making the world safe
for democracy we have put our intellects in chains; aiid one of
our first tasks with ourselves is to unlock the prisons in wlhicl
we have confined our brains. I read of great statesmen of ours
saying "Shoot tthenm down" and others " Hang them.' You
can not shoot or lhang a state of mind. When it becomes by open
expression treasonable, under the law of the land you may
punish it. But if miel in lhigh places imagine by invoking lawlessness against lawlessness they can make the world better, all
history denies them; I think too well of lly country to believe
for one instant the doctrine of Bolsheviki Russia can ever find
foothold here. My faith in the Republic and in our people, in
our democracy, will not permit me to be frightened by the fanltasy of madmen elsewhere. I think I can with equanimity observe the servile part of the press apply to me for this speech
the now familiar epithet of Bolsheviki. Its indiscriminate application is illustrated by a New York administration paper
designating prohibitionists as the Bolsheviki of America. My
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appeal to-day will find no response with those newspapers and
great mene who preach anarchy when tley demand killing and
hanging out of hand; but it will have its answering approval
with the inarticulate mass who asl but justice and tl1e same
honesty in governments as in men, it will find its echo in the
hearts of the common folks whose sons and husbands in frozen
Russia are paying the price of our Government's wrong and
broken faith, and I am content.
Why did we enter Russia? I answer, for no very good reason;
and we have remained for no reason at all.
What is our pollicy toward Russia?  I answer we:l have no
poli y:. We have engaged in a miserable misadventture, stl;tifying t ar professions, and setting at naught our promises. We
have puin;hled no guilty; we have but brought misery and starvatii anddeath to the innocent. We have garnered none of the
fruits of the victory of war, but suffer the odium and infaimy of
undeclared warfare. We have sacrificed our own blood to.i
purpose, and into American homes have brought sorrow andt
angu"h and suffering.
Bring the American boys holme frol; Russia.
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