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HALT OF ROMAN KNIGHTS._~~.I




/ CAPTAINS
OF T HE OLD WORLD;
AS COMIPARED WTITH
THE GREAT MODERN STRATEGISTS,
THEIR
CAMPAIGNS, CHARACTERS AND CONDUCT, FROM THE
PERSIAN, TO THE PUNIC WARS.
BY
HENRY WILLIAM  HERBERT.
NEW YORK:
CHARLES SCRIBNER, 145 NASSAU STREET.
1852.




Entered according to Act of Congiess in tile year 1851, by
C I-T RA  L E S S C R I B N ER,
in the Clerk's Office of the DIistrict Court of the United States for the Southern
District of New York.
C. AW. BENEDIC T,
STEiEOTYlPER  AND  PRINTE
201 W:illiam Street.




TO
ok  ok C Ilt I,
REGENT OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
&c., &c., &ec.
IN MEMORY
OF MANY PLEASANT HOURS HERETOFORE SPENT TOGETIIER,
AND HOPE OF MORE SUCH HEREAFTER,
NOR LESS IN TOKEN
OF CORDIAL REGARD FOR HIMSELF,
AND SINCERE RESPECt FOR HIS TALENTS AND ATTAINMENTS)
THIS VOLUME
IS DEDICATED, BY HIS FRIEND,
TIHE AUTHOR.








LIST  OF  EMBELLISHMEN1TS,
DESIGNED BY THE AUTHOB,
AFTER THE BEST AUTHORITIES.
PAGE
HALT OF ROMAN KNIGHTS,                       Frontispiece
CHARGE OF THE ROMAN LEGION,....            48
MARCH OF A GREEK ARMY,.... 172
ONSET OF NUMIDIAN HORSE,'...
ALEXANDER AND RHEOMITHRES,.,.   Vignette Title
GREEK, ROMAN AND PERSIAN SPEARS,.. Final Vignette








PREFACE.
Mr DEA1R FELTON:
IT is generally the custom, and a custom, I think,
like comparatively few others, more honored in the
observance than the breach, that an author should say
a few words for himself preparatory to his book; not as
an apology for writing, since if that written be so impertinent as to require an apology, it had better never
have been writ at all, but as an explanation of his
motives and object in writing it.
This is, perhaps, more than usually necessary, when
he selects a subject, as I have done, from the annals
of those ancient classic times, the vein of which
is, in the opinion of many, already worn out and exhausted; while it is too apparent to you, that I should
need to point it out, that the rich and pregnant soil
is scarcely stirred as yet, much less the treasures
brought to light from its unfathomed and almost
unfathomable mines of wealth.
Until the beginning of the present century, I may




V111                 PREFACE,
almost say that to a few secluded and solitary scholars,
only was a glimpse revealed of the inner life of the
mlen, and the true history of the nations of antiquity;
while to the rest of mankind, nothing was disclosed by
the weak, drivelling compilers, who called themselvesH-Ieaven save the mark!-historians, but the crudities,
the absurdities, the fables, and the falsehoods of the
old annalists, presented to them in one crude and undigested mass.
2MIuch, indeed, has been done of late days in this
branch; and had Arnold and Niebuhr survived to
accomplish their immortal histories of Rome; and
should Grote be spared to finish his labors on the
fertile field of Hlellas, little mlore would be left to
desire, so far as those two great nations, perhaps the
two greatest of all time, are regarded. But still, as no
one is better aware than yourself, we are all taught in
our youth, at our primary schools, and in all, save our
very best colleges, the old crambe repetita of Romulus
and Remus and the she-wolf, of the golden fleece of
Theseus, and the dragon teeth of Kadmos, not as beautiful myths and poetic legends of the old time when
poetry was half the life of the young untarnished earth;
but as facts just as authentical as the burning of
Moscow, the victory of Trafalgar, or the battle of
Bunker's Hill; thus spending half our lives in learning
what, if we desire to follow literature with any profit,
we must spend the other half of it in unlearning.
Nor would it, I believe, be too much to state that, to




PREFACE.                  1X
this very day, nine-tenths of the readers of England
and America, who know a little of such things,
imagining that they know a good deal, possessing
neither means nor inclination to make such things the
study and business of their lives, regard the sieges of
Troy and Veii, just as veritable events as those of
Syracuse or Carthage; and Camillus and Kodros just
as authentic persons as Julius Caesar and Epaminondas.
Anything, therefore, that tends to popularize history,
and to bring matters, generally too abstruse, too dry,
and embodied in works too formidable and too
voluminous to be largely popular; into such a form
as shall be acceptable to the masses, is in my opinion
something gained, and, at all events, involves no waste
of time or labor.
This little volume does not pretend, therefore, to be
either exactly history, or historical disquisition; least
of all, does it desire to be classed with that most contemptible species of book-making, usually termed
popularized history; which consists, for the most part,
either in conveying good matter in a low and vulgar
manner, or in compiling all the gossiping trash and
verbiage of twaddling chroniclers, with a careful
avoidance of everything solid, salutary, or permanent
of ancient or modern literature.
Such is not the course I have adopted in this work,
in which it has been my object to produce authentic
details concerning the great generals of antiquity, with
the particulars of their campaigns and conduct, more




X                   PREFACE.
elaborate and fuller than the pages of general history
will spare from other matters of graver import, perhaps
not of less engrossing interest; to elucidate their feats
and exploits by comparisoni with the rules and principles of modern warfare; to illustrate them by keeping
up a parallel of modern geography-so that they can
be verified by the aid of any common map; to give
them life and reality by accurate accounts of dress,
scenery, and habits; and to ascertain their real merits
and comparative degrees of skill and excellence, by
comparison with the greatest strategists and tacticians
of the latter ages.
I have not, of course, dreamed of including, in my
list of captains, all the men who set battalions in the
field, or fought gallantly, whether for patriotism or
ambition; but have selected those only who were, in
my opinion, really eminent, really worthy of continued
remembrance, really entitled to be enrolled in the
annals of all time as great generals.
That which I have looked to most in thus estimating
their value as soldiers, and ranking them in the order
of merit, is the development of warfare into a science,
the originating new principles of strategy or tactics,
and the producing great effects and lasting influences
on the progress, rise, and fall of nations, and on the
comparative growth and disappearance of various races
of mankind.
None, who do not comply with one or other of these
propositions, are mentioned in this volume; and this




PREFACE.                   xi
may account, to my readers, for the omission of several
great and heroic names of Greek history, such as
Leonidas, Lysander, Phormion, Chabrias, Iphikrates,
Agesilaos, Pyrrhos of Epiros, and others;  who,
although good soldiers and gallant officers, were distinguished by hardihood and valor-qualities common
and natural to most men, and all animals, when
aroused by adequate causes-rather than by skill and
science; or operated on too small a scale, and with
results too limited, to be considered in the light of
great generals.
There is another class, much more worthy of remark
than these, as possessing abilities equal, if not superior,
to most of those herein cited, who are also excluded
from this volume; as, though not inferior to many in
military talent, they yet owe their celebrity to statesmanship, more than to soldiership; and attained greatness
rather by the extent of their forecast and the prudence
of their councils, than by their prowess in the tented
field.  Such men I mean, as Alkibiades, Perikles,
Philip of Makedon, and many other great and shining
characters, to whom I propose, hereafter, to introduce
my readers in another volume, or series of volumes,
each in itself complete and unconnected with its predecessor or successor. The next of them will be the
Captains of Rome, from the Punic wars to the division
of the empires; for it will be remarked, doubtless,
that no Roman makes his appearance on the stage
during this period; for the simple reason, that, aside




X1i                PREFACE.
from the meagreness and falsehood of the Roman
legends and the absence of all contemporaneous
history, Rome was, at the period to which only this
volume comes down, barely emerging from barbarism;
and, although she had produced scores and hundreds
of brave soldiers, had sent forth no general, until the
days of Scipio Africanus. tie just falls within the
cycle comprised in this volume, which, indeed, he
might have terminated; but that I preferred, for the
sake of uniformity, to defer him till he can appear in
what seems to me his more appropriate place among
the greatest men-Niebuhr says, THE GREATEST-Of
his own great country.
The other volumes of the contemplated series, to
which I have alluded, should the time be spared to
me, and popular favor not prove too niggard of encouragement, will be the Captains of the Eastern Empire; The Captains of Barbarians, including all Paganism and Heathenism; the Captains of the Middle
Ages, and the Statesmen and Orators of each of these
periods in succession; to which may be added the
IIero Kings and the Tyrants of Greece. Of course, no
promise of these is intended; nor is such a promise
necessary; for as every volume will be complete, and
will comprise a period in itself, wherever the series
may terminate, it will in no respect be an unfinished
work.
Only on two points farther, have I to weary your
attention. The first, you will perceive at once, as you




PREFACE.                    Xiii
peruse the work, to be the orthography of the Greek
names, which are given invariably and consistently in
all respects as they were spelt, and, I am satisfied, pronounced by the Greeks; though the forms may look
quaint and the sounds of some familiar names ring
strangely at first in a modern ear. I have, as you
know, since we have often spoken on this head, always
deemed it an utter absurdity to adopt the Latin namnes
of Greek gods, who were not synonymous, or the same
in the two mythologies; and the Latin spelling of
Greek names. The practice is no more defensible,
than it would be to write Italian or Spanish names in
Russian or Magyar orthography, and it should not be
tolerated in this age when Greek is as familiar to all
well educated scholars as Latin was in the days of
Pope, or more so; and when truth is, or ought to be,
the token of all research. You will find, therefore,
that I have adopted the hard Greek k instead of
the soft Roman c; the Greek termination os and e
and A, instead of the Latin  ts, a; and, to conclude,
the Greek diphthongs ai and oi, instead of the Latin
e and cu, as approximating at least to the nomenclature by which, in their own days, those herein
named knew, and were known to, one another.* I
have done this from no love of innovation or of neo* The reader will, I regret to say, perceive in this introduction and
the life of Miltiades, a few variations from this rule have occurred
through inadvertence, and the natural tendency to hang unconsciously to
antiquated, even if improper usages.




Xiv                PREFACE.
logy, much less from any affectation of doing something new; but from a real conviction that a reform in
this faulty habit is needed, and fiom a confidence that
it will be generally adopted, since it is sanctioned and
used by a scholar so ripe and rare as Grote, the last
and best historian of Hellas.
Farther than this, I have only to add, that whatever
else you may find in this volume, and whether you
regard it as a defect or a merit, you will find no dish
warmed up from the cold meat of other English writers; no facts assumed, no dates quoted on the authority of others, who have themselves investigated, borrowed, quoted; not a description selected, or an opinion adopted from any English or American author,
unless it be a few thoughts from my favorite Arnold
in the case of HIannibal, for which due credit is given.
Right or wrong, my facts are deduced, my arguments
drawn, my translations made, my dates verified, and
my conclusions adopted, from a careful and dispassionate examination of the contemporaneous writers whose
names will be found in the ample references I have
made at the foot of my pages, to enable others, who
may think it worth the while, to verify my facts or
my opinions; for the former of which, I can at least
assure you, I have not drawn on my imagination, more
than for the latter on my memory.
Should you approve the tenor and spirit of this volume in general, though I may hardly hope that you
will coincide with all its opinions in particular, I shall




PREFACE.                   XV
feel more sanguine than I do now of meeting some
meed of popular approbation.
If I succeed in inducing a few of those who have
hitherto confined themselves to lighter studies, and the
more ephemeral fictions of the day, to turn to the
deeper and purer well of history, which is truth, science,
and experience, with as much pleasure as profit to be
derived from it, all in one, I shall have gone far to
have attained my highest object. If I merely succeed
in averting a weary hour, soothing a sleepless night,
or occupying the restless ear of pain, my time will not
have been lost, nor wholly ill employed-for I am
secure, at least, that there is not a line here written
adverse to morality or truth; nor one which may not
be read aloud in the domestic circle before the purest
ears, without one moment's hesitation, or the fear of
calling up one blush on the cheek of chariest virtue.
Pray, believe me, my dear Felton,
Ever and most faithfully yours,
HIENRY WILLIAM HERBERT.
THE CEDARS, Sept 16, 1851.








CONTENTS.
INTRODUCTORY.
PAGE
The Three Great Wars-Identity of Tactics —Greek Mercenaries-Greek Patriotism —Homeric Armies-Greek Hoplitai-Their Arms-The Phalanxs-Tho
Targeteers-Greek Cavalry-Artillery-The Phalanxs-Charge of the Phalanx
-The Oblique Formation —Dotbling the File-The Gymuetes —Rhodian
Slingers-Charge in Column-The Legion —The Ancient Roman Legion — The
Later Roman Legion-The Roman Tactic.       -                           13
IIMILTIADES, THE SON  OF CIMON.
Ilis Love of Freedom —State of Europe-The Clersonese-Story ofthe DoloneiThe Son of Cimon-Returns to Athens-Persian Shipwrecks —Demand of Earth
and Water-The Ten Generals-Phidippides the REunner-The Vision of the
God Pan-The Plain of Marathon —The Athenian Force-Reasons for Fighting
-His Responsibility-The Field of Marathonl-Absence of Persian Horse —The
Army of Datis-The Charge —Reversed Order-Aid from Sparta —Reward and
Punishment.                                - -..                   52




Xviii                           CONTENTS.
III.
THEMISTOKLES.
PAGE
Inconsistency of Attic Genius-His Parentage and Youth-Peculiarity of his
Intellect-Fleet and Army of Xerxes-First Movement of the Greeks-Fleet
of the Greeks-Leonidas at Thermopylai-Bribe of the Euboians-The Storm
-First Stratagem-Attack on Delphi-The Straits of Salamis-The Second
Stratagem-Numbers of the Persians-Sea Fight at Salamis-The PersiansThe Third Stratagem-His Character..               - 97
IV.
PAUSANIAS, THE SPARTAN.
Fire'Signals-Answer of the Athenians-Retreat of the Persians-The Field of
Battle-Cavalry Action -Death of IMasistios-Steadiness of the Greeks-Second
Position of the Greeks-Persians Resolve to Attack-The Greek RetreatThe Thebans Charge on the Left-Death of MIardonios-His Soldiership-His
Treason.                                                            -137
V.
XENOPHON, THE  ATHENIAN.
His early Years —Obscurity of his Early Years-Affairs of Persia —Kyros and
Artoxerxes-His Mercenaries-Number of the Greeks-Disappearance of
Orontes-Conduct of Kyros-The Melee-Victory of the Greeks-The OathOriental Treachery-The Generals-Choice of New Leaders-Losses of the
Rear Guard-Affairs of Light Troops-Storm of a IHill-Pass-Situation of the
Greeks-Turning the Right —]irection of Retreat-Sources of the TigrisLosses in the Snow —The Sea, the Sea-A  Picture-Arrival at the Greek
Colonies -Strife and Dissensions-I-is Character.       -     -      - 172




CONTENTS.                              XIX
VI.
EPAMINONDAS, THE THEBAN.
PAGE
His Youth-Changes of Greek Policy-Re-Capture of the Kadmeia-Passes of
the Kithairon-Third Invasion-Error of Agesilaos-Vain Attempts at a
General Peace-War Renewed-The Leulktridai-The Yellow Haired Virgin
-The Oblique Formation-The Sacred Band-Affair of Cavalry-Infantry Fight
at Leuktra-Retreat of the Spartans-The Peloponnesos again invaded-Fortune in War-Battle of Mantineia —Death of Epaminondas... 226
VII.
ALEXANDER OF MAKEDON.
His Youth —Chaironeia-State of Greece-Attacks Thebes-Destruction of
Thebes-Fate of Thebes-To the Hellespont-Through Asia Minor-Prepares
for Action-Passage of the Granikos-Constitution of Armies-Cavalry Service
-Siege of Halikarnassos-Ilis Marches in Asia Minor-March to Issos-Asia
Minor-Countermarches before Issos-Movements of the Phalanx-Line of
battle at Issos-Alexander's Charge-Flight of Darios-The Captive Queens -
Darios' Family-Siege of Gaza-False Movements-Before Arbela-The Field
of Arbela-The Array at Arbela -The Attack at Arbela-Storm of the CampThe Pursuit-His Strategy-Summary of His Character.    -     -     - 265
VIII.
HANNIBAL.
HIs Oath-Parallel with Napoleon-Alleged Cruelty-March to the AlpsPassage of the Alps-The Conflict-Battle of the Trebia-March through
Northern Italy-Lake Thrasymenus-Enters Samnium-Care for His Cavalry
-Array at Canne —The Carnage-Fortune of War Changes. -      -       335








INTRODUCTORY.
I.
THE MILITARY ART AMONG TIIE GREEKS AND ROMANS; BEING AN
EXAMUIATION OF THE SERVICES, ARMATURE, ARRAY AND
TACTICS OF THEIR ARMIES; AS COMPARED BETWEEN THEMSELVES, AND WITH THOSE OF MODERN NATIONS.
CONSIDERING  the vast influence which the wair of the
two great nations of antiquity have exercised over the present
condition, it would scarcely be incorrect to say over the actual
fate, of modern Europe, and through her of the world at large,
it will be neither an unpleasant nor an unprofitable mode of
passing an hour, even to those who care not to prosecute deep
and dry historical researches, to inquire a little into the military
means by which the two powers produced results so incalculably
great and important. It cannot, I think, have escaped the observation of the most superficial reader, that, while some wars,
although long, bloody, well contested and conducted with equal
courage and ability, have in no wise affected the condition or
permanent interests of humanity, because waged between identi



14                THE THREE GREAT WARS.
cal or kindred races and -tending only to the extension of power
and territory on the one side or the other-there have been other
wars of conquest and extermination, by the decision of which the
fate not only of empires, but of races, but of humanity itself, has
been determined.
Of these, the first, and scarcely the least important, was the attempt on the part of the oriental nations, under the great Persian
kings, to subjugate and enslave all Western Europe; a conclusion
averted, under Providence, in the first instance by the repulse of
the invaders at Marathon, Plataia, Salamis, and Thermopylae, and
finally rendered impossible by the retaliatory expedition of Alexander, and the domination of the Eastern peoples by Greek arms
and Western dynasties.
The second is to be found in the famous struggle of the Punic
wars, between Rome and Carthage; the termination of which
set the question at rest whether the dominion of the civilized
world should belong to the Caucasian or the Semitic Race; whether
Greek arts and Latin arms should be the inheritance of Europe
and America, or the corruption, idolatry and cruelty of Canaanitish Carthage.
The third and last and greatest contest of this nature, as regards
Europe and European civilization-for China, India, and the
Eastern isles, have undergone many such —is the long-protracted
warfare between the Saracenic Mahommedans, and the nations
of Christendom; which may be said to have commenced with
the destruction of a Saracen host at Tours, in the heart of France,
by the battle-axe of Charles Martel in 732; to have continued
throughout the crusades of the middle ages; and to have been
determined only by the artillery of Don John of Austria at
Lepanto, and the lances of John Sobieski before the walls of
Vienna, so lately as the years, respectively, of 1571, and 1683.
Of these three great struggles, it is impossible not to see, that
the decisions, had they been reverled, must necessarily have




THIE THREE GREAT WARSo                 15
altered so completely the whole constitution of human polity,
society, and morals, that no sagacity can conjecture what, in that
event, would have been the present aspect of Europe or America.
From the circumstances of other similarly situated regions we
may however suppose, that had Greece succumbed before the
countless myriads of Darius, Xerxes, and their successors, the
civilization and society of Europe to-day would have nearly resembled those of Hindostan, before the erection of the AngloIndian empire; and that had Carthage prevailed over the Eagles
of the Republic, a bloody superstition, a corrupt commercial
tyranny, an illiterate, voluptuous, unenlightened society, such as
we know to have existed in Tyre and Sidon, would have stood
mn stead of the pure religion, the liberal polity, and the elevated
social condition which have gradually eliminated themselves from
the institutions of Rome, and through her of the elder Hellas.
That the question, determined by the Saracenic and European
strife, is simply whether the faith of the world should ultimately
be that of Mahomet or Christ, it requires no sagacity or acumen
to discover; and I, for one, certainly, shall not descend to argue
whether event were for the greatest good of humanity at large.
Of these three great wars, by which, as I have, I think, shown,
the fate of the human race has been thrice severally decided, the
first two were won for posterity by the valor and virtue, the
arms and the military arts, of the Greeks, and of the Romans, and
it is thence especially that the histories of these two great nations
are so full to us of interest, and that they can never be examined
without entertainment and advantage.
That Greece-when her mission of checking the irruption and
bridling the power of the eastern hordes, of giving a form and
body to imaginative beauty, of crea~tg the magic of letters, and
making for the dreams of genius a real and immortal presence
in the birth of art —should be accomplished, must succumb to the
more vital and durable energies of Rome, was clearly in the




10 6                     IDENTITY
design of Providence; for she lacked in herself the practical and
legislative wisdom, which born in the Latin republic has in its
maturity filled the world, and formed in a greater or less degree
the base of every modern constitution. The means by which
she overcame the barbarian myriads, and by which she was
herself overcome in turn, were purely natural and physical; and
the results were such as must, to an almost mathematical certainty, have followed from the employment of those means.
What these were, and wherefore and how successful, it is my
purpose now to investigate. Nor will it be unimportant or uninstructive to see how little the real principles of strategy and
tactics have been altered fiom the earliest ages to the latest
times; and how continually, in spite of all the changes and
improvements in the methods and instruments of warfare, in
spite of the  invention of gunpowder and the  consequent
substitution of scientific combinations for individual prowess,
the same military principles have been attended with the
same success; the same exercises and mlanoeuvres have been
crowned with the same victory; whether the arms of the combatants were the pike and shield of the Hellenic phalanx, the
sword and buckler of the Roman legion, the bows and bills of
the English foot, the lance and battle-axe of the Norman chivalry
resistless in the thundering charge of their barbed horse, or the
death-dealing musketry and ordnance, almost annihilating distance, of the men of the nineteenth century.
For the rest, we must believe that, in despite of all the efforts
of peace societies and peace lecturers, wars will continue so long
as the human race shall endure; and we know, that-inasmuch
as war and its attendant circumstances, while they display
humanity in many of its -;o'rst and most repulsive lights, at the
same time call forth many of its noblest and grandest characteristics; give occasions for its most heroic efforts both of doing
and suffering; and present its most touching sacrifices, its most




OF TACTICS.                    17
admirable exemplars-the history and the romance of warfare
will never grow dull to the ear, or dead to the heart of auditors,
who must from the very nature of their constitutions glow with
admiration and thrill with sympathy for the glorious and the
good; must exult at the virtues and triumph at the victories, as
they must mourn over the weaknesses and weep at the downfall,
of the virtuous and the valiant of humanity; for though triumph
and defeat are but things of the hour, and the man but the sport
of the moment, still the pains and the passions of the heart are
immortal, and its sympathies with the noble, and its hatred of the
base, the same, yesterday and to-day and to-morrow and forever.
And now, without further apology or preamble, coming at
once to the armature and array of the Greeks, we shall find that
fiom the earliest period of recorded historic warfare, the mode of
arming and arraying the masses was identical, or nearly so, with
all the Hellenic tribes or nations. These, although using different
dialects, affecting different customs and forms of polity, often at
war with each other, and claiming various descents from divers
demigods, were still of common origin and language, and in
truth, howsoever subdivided, still constituted one homogeneous
population, actuated for the most part by a common spirit of
independence and liberty, of dislike to personal and hereditary
dominion; imbued with a common love of arms and admiration
of heroism and individual prowess and adventure, and capable
at times of great common efforts against a common enemy.
That this love of arms and adventure, at a later period of
Grecian history, led to condottierism, and the formation of mercenary bands of Greek adventurers, serving under almost every
banner in the known world, must not be ascribed to any defect
in the Gieek character, or want of patriotism in individuals, but
to the subdivision of the whole country into numerous small
hostile communities; and to the multiplication of political
offences, in their turbulent and fierce democracies or persecuting
2




18                 GREEK MEItCEN ARIES.
oligarchies, which rendered the expatriation of the best statesmen and bravest leaders rather the rule than the exception, and
annually cast out hundreds of valiant and adventurous soldiers
on the world with no other resource than the employment of
their swords in foreign service.  Indeed it is greatly to the
credit of the Greek mercenaries, or political exiles, for the terms
are nearly synonymous, that they rarely if ever were induced to
bear arms against their native states, or to serve the barbarian,
who was their usual employer, against the Grecian name.
A similar state of things in the later Italian Republics of the
middle ages led to a similar growth and diffusion of mercenary
Italian forces serving under every standard, and with far less of
honorable scruples than their Hellenic prototypes; since they
rarely hesitated to lead or follow either against Italy in general
or their own states in particular, and that even in behalf of the
Turk or the Algerine.
That examples of common efforts of combined Hellenic states
against homogeneous foreign enemies are less frequent, must be
ascribed to the sectional and individual jealousies, ambitions, and
divided interests which will arise between petty independent
states, united by no common league or constitution, and existing
under every different shade of government, fiom the wildest
pantisocracy, through the intermediate forms of representative
federacy, to the closest oligarchical corporation, as of Lacedaemon;
and to autocratic monarchy, as of Sicily and Macedon.  What
would be the consequence of such a state of things, one may conjecture, by imagining the United States, as connected by no
constitutional bonds, and linked together by no prevailing tie of
general republicanism; but each several state self-governed as it
might be, one with the limited monarchy and powerful aristocracy
of England, another with the autocracy and serfdom of Russia;
a third with the imbecile legitimacy of Spain or Naples; a fourth
with the insane and visionary socialism of France; a fifth under




GREEK PATRIOTISM.                  19
the existing system of New York or Massachusetts-then throw
in, apart from sectional interests and monetary jealousies, jarring
national religions, conflicting social prejudices and distinctions,
and the absence of one general national language; and it would
soon appear how difficult of creation, and how short of duration,
would be any alliance for common purposes, of states or nations
having in truth no common cause.  It is probable that nothing
short of the invasion of foreign hosts bent on the general extermination or subjugation of the race could unite such nations even
for a time, and that the defeat of those hosts would be the disruption of the union.
To the Athenian Attica was Greece, as to the Laconian Sparta,
or to the Boeotian Thebes; and it was only when in reference to
the Barbarian, meaning almost invariably the Persian king, that
Hellas was considered as a whole, even by the purest of the
Hellenies. In latter days even the imminence of Roman conquest could not subsist national combination; and the Achaian
league was dissolved through intestine divisions, before the
stranger had become the master of their fortunes and their land;
for it must be remembered that the Roman came not as an
exterminator to abolish, but rather as a colonist to adopt, the arts,
the literature, nay but the very Gods, of Greece. Themselves
half of a kindred race they differed less from many of the Greeks,
than did the Greeks from one another, and therefore terror of
their arms could lead to no strenuous or durable federation.
Still, although in a national sense there never was any such
actual or acknowledged existence as Greece, there was a most
distinct and real existence in the shape of Greek strategy, which
word I now use in its broadest sense as embracing the whole
theory and practice of the art military, from the smallest detail
of individual armature and discipline, to the largest combination
of men and measures.  For throughout all the states of Greece,
though this or that might excel in one or another arm of the




20                   HOMERIC ARMIES.
service, the system was identical, and the force of the Greekso- iXkkev1xov —an unity.
The force and system we first find described, in its rude and
unimproved form, before the invention of the trumpet or any
other martial music, and previous to the use of mounted cavalry
in warfare, in the Iliad, as operating against Ilion, or Troy, a
city of Asia Minor, apparently of Grecian origin.  Without
entering at all into the question of the truth or fallacy of the
myth of Troy divine, or arguing on the probability or improbability of such a confederation of kings as Homer describes, it is
desirable to point out that the personal equipment of the Greek
warrior of the Iliad differs but slightly from that of the Hoplites, or heavy-armed foot-soldiers of the authentic historical
period; and that-although the maintenance of the battle, and
the ultimate successes are invariably attributed to the individual
prowess of the hero kings who fought, before the battles, hurling
their spears, javelin-like, from  two-horse chariots, or leaping
down to engage in single combat with antagonists of equal rank
and daring-the peculiar serried order of the Greek phalanx even
then prevailed; and that the determination of the fight, when
came the tug of war, was owing to the sturdy charge of the
ponderous infantry, and to the push of the formidable pike.
The following lines, which are a very literal rendering of one
of Homer's most spirited battles, would, with the substitution of
true historic names, furnish as accurate a picture of the Macedonian army at "that dishonest fight of Chaironeia fatal to
liberty," or of the deep Boeotian column that broke sheer through
the Spartan centre at Mantineia, as of any fabulous encounter
before the fated walls of Ilion the divine.
"Thus speaking the earth-shaker lent the Achaians better cheer,
And made the bands to rally, that were scattered far and near.
About the two Ajaces right steady with the spear;




HOMERIC ARMIES.                       21
That neither mighty Mars could blame their order, as they stood,
Nor Pallas queen of hosts. For all, that gallant were and good,
Stood steadfastly the Trojan shock and Hector's might divine.
Spear clashed with spear, and shield with shield, in stiff and stubborn
line;
Targe beat on targe, rang helm with helm, met hero hero then,
And nodding crests right rankly pressed above the press of men.
So closely were the hosts arrayed with lances brandished high,
By gallant hands, by noble hearts, that each would each outvie
Right forward charging manfully. But first with onset dread
The Trojans charged the serried mass, great Hector at their head.
Even as a block of massy stone leaps down, with reeling crash,
When wintry floods have mined its base, and rains with ceaseless plash
Its earthfast hold have loosened on the mountain's summit hoar.
Down thunders it; the tortured woods resound its mighty roar;
But unsubdued, with speed renewed, from each succeeding steep
Into the plain it rolls amain. and there forgets to leap.
Thus Hector, who so lately swore, with high and haughty boast,
Into the sea victoriously to drive the Achaian host,
Thus far drave furiously; but now was stopped in mid career,
Where that great band, so firmly manned, stood fast with shield and
spear.
For sturdily with sword and pike the Achaians smote and slew,
And bore him back in his bloody track for all that he could do."
Thus it would appear that, from the first, the main trust of
the Greek armies was in the heavy infantry clad in complete
panoply, armed as the principal instrument of offence with the
long pike, the sarissa of the Macedonians, by whose warlike
kings the phalanx was undoubtedly carried to its perfection; and
depending on the single steady and sustained charge of the deep
solid column, which, in most cases, especially on smooth and
level ground, carried all before it. At first this phalanx was
probably little more than a dense body of soldiers, with a
tolerably regular front, and a depth varying according to circumstances, the best and bravest men voluntarily pressing to the van,
leaving the weaker and lower spirited to form the mass behind,




22                    GREEK IIOPLITAI.
lending the impetus of their forward pressure to the advance,
and opposing the vis inertie of their dead weight to the retrogression of the front.  In after ages it had its regular divisions
and subdivisions, with duly constituted numbers of rank and
file, and officers with their appointed places on the march and in
action, and orderly appropriate manceuvres, by the tact and
timing of which the action was very often decided.  In all ages,
however, from the times of the Homeric myth to the defeat of
Perseus at Cynocephalce, the individual dress and equipment of
the men was nearly identical.
This dress, or uniform, consisted, at the period of which
Xenophon writes, when the Greek army was in its most perfect
and elaborate efficiency, both as regards armature and tactics, of
a chiton, or shirt of woollen stuff without sleeves, and reaching
barely to the knee. This was invariably of a bright crimson
color, and the writer, whom I have last named, frequently
alludes to the splendor of its contrast with the helmets, breastplates, and greaves of polished bronze in strong and vivid
language; for he states, in one place, of the army of Agesilaus
that "it appeared all bronze and scarlet;" and in another passage, speaking of the ten thousand, whose retreat he himself conducted with such admirable skill, he says that, "when they all
wore casques of bronze and blood-red chitons, with brightly burnished greaves and shields, the whole plain bloomed with crimson, and lightened with bronze." The shield, which was the
peculiar and characteristic arm of the Greek hoplites, as was the
oblong buckler that of the Roman legionary, was, like the casque,
of bronze, ponderous and unwieldy, of a perfectly circular form,
with a boss in the centre, covering the whole body of the
soldier, from above the shoulder to below the knee, and was certainly not less than three and a half or four feet in diameter.
Indeed, so great was the incumbrance of this great piece of
defensive armor, that every heavy-armed soldier was allowed a




THEIR ARMS.                      23
servant to carry it on the march, and take care of it when not in
action; who, when the army was engaged, served either with
the baggage-guard, or as a skirmisher. The technical name of
this shield was Aspis; and by the number of these the effective
force of the heavy Greek foot present under arms, was estimated,
the men being reckoned by shields, as in modern warfare by
bayonets and sabres. In addition to this, which was, however,
his principal defence, the Greek soldier wore a breast-plate, or
cuirass, likewise of bronze, reaching to the.,hips, sometimes above
a buff coat, stolas; and greaves of the same metal, protecting
the forepart of his legs, from the instep to a short distance above
the knee.  His offensive weapons were the formidable pike, or
Macedonian Sarissa, which was twenty feet in length, and when
levelled to the charge, projected fourteen feet in front of the
line; so that, when the phalanx was engaged, the spear points
of the five foremost ranks, at least, were directly serviceable, and
were actually opposed to every front-rank man of the enemy.
Besides the pike, he also carried a short stabbing sword, scarcely
superior in length to a large knife or dagger, a most ineffective
weapon; and perhaps left as such, not unintentionally; since upon
reliance on the pike, and on the tactic consequent on its use, the
whole efficiency of the phalanx depended; if it should once disclose its serried order, it was necessarily at the mercy of any
assailant, and the hand to hand single-combat fighting of the
Romans was as abhorrent to its system, as it was congenial
to that of the legion.  The order of the phalanx was invariably
a close column varying in depth from twelve to fifty men, according to the nature of the ground and pleasure of the leader. Its
smallest subdivision of men was the Enomoty, or as the name
implies, sworn-band, which seems to have consisted originally and
properly of twenty-four men beside the enomotarck, or leader of
the band; yet Thucyclides states distinctly that, in the first battle
of Mantineia, fought between the Lacedvemonians and Argives, the




24                    THE PHALANX.
enomoty* of the former was drawn up four front and eight deep,
making it contain thirty-two men beside the leader, instead of
twenty-four; while we have the authority of Xenophont that at
the battle of Leuctra the Spartan enomoty of Cleombrotus fought
in three files which he says gave them a depth of twelve, while
the Theban files opposed to them contained not less than fifty
shields.  From this it is obvious that the number of men in the
enomoty, as indeed the number of enomoties in the next larger;
division, was variable; though from the name of this division, which
was pentecostys, signifying a company of fifty men, led by a
pentecoster or captain of fifty, we arrive at the regularly estimated
number of men in the original enomoty; two of which formed a
pentecostys, two of these again forming a lochus, and four of the
latter a mora, or division.  So that the mora with its polemarch
or general, and all its subordinate officers must, as originally
constituted, have consisted of 429 men of all ranks. The number of men, however, in the divisions is unimportant, unless where
it is desirable to calculate the numerical force of antagonistic
armies; for the modes of-manoeuvring and fighting are all clearly
laid down and comprehensible enough, apart from the consideration of numbers, although I should be inclined to set down
sixteen ranks as the ordinary depth of the latter, or Macedonian,
phalanx.
It must not be, however, by any means supposed that, because
the main dependence of the Greek armies was placed in the
phalanx of their heavy infantry, they lacked the other arms of
service.  Light infantry, or skirmishers, and horse in a smaller
proportion, but of excellent quality, they seem to have possessed
from an early period; and after the peace of Antalcidas,4
Iphicrates introduced a new species of force, intermediate between
* Thucydides, 416, IV. c. 68.
f Xenophon Hellenics, Lib. VI. c. 4. Xen. Rep. Lac. XI. 4
1 Olymp. 98. II. BC. 387. Polybius 16. Diodorus XV. 51.




THE TARGETEERS.                      25
the heavy foot and mere skirmishers, which afterward became of
very great importance under the name of Peltastce, which is well
rendered as Targeteers. - The arms of this. new force, which
appears never to have been composed of citizens of any of the
elder Greek republics, but of Thessalians, (Etolians, Acarnanians,
Epirots, and perhaps at first of barbarian prisoners and manumitted slaves,* wore a brazenl casque, and a target, Pelta,
usually of a crescent or semilunar shape, much  smaller and
lighter than the great shield of the Hoplites, together with a
quilted linen jacket instead of the bronze cuirass.  The offensive
weaponsq' of the targeteer, as improved by Iphicrates, were a
sword double the length of that of the heavy foot and adapted
for cutting as well as stabbing, together with a spear lengthened
nearly in the same proportion. On this latter point all the
authorities agree, but it is evident to me, as the targeteers are
generally described as javelineers and not pikemen, that the
spear alluded to must have been the akontion or light dart of the
skirmishers. and not the sarissa of the phalanx, which being
already twenty feett long and stout in proportion could not have
been used in its existing state as a missile, and if increased to
forty feet must have been utterly unmanageable.  We shall hear
much of these targeteers in Xenophon's masterly retreat, and in
the fine battles of Pyrrhus and Epaminondas.
Thi light-armed troops were variously equipped as archers,
slingers, and javelineers, wearing merely a helmet and light
shield; but as the continental Greeks never excelled either in
archery or the use of the sling, and as the javelin which was their
usual weapon was at best a very inferior missile, as deficient both
in range and certainty, they were soon found to be so much
inferior to the oriental skirmishers, that they appear to have been
discarded so soon as warfare became a science, and armies were
* Xen. Anab. IV. 8. t Diodorus XV. 44. t Some say twenty-four.




26                   GREEK CAVALRY.
composed of regulars, and no longer of mere armed levies of
citizens. After this period, we find Rhodian slingers, Cretan and
even Scythian bowmen, and horse-archery from Thrace, employed
in the Greek armies, as were the natives of the Balearic Isles, and
the Numidians in those of Carthage.
The face of the country throughout Greece proper, especially
the Peloponnesus and Attica, being of an exceedingly rough and
craggy if not mountainous character, was of course very ill
adapted for equestrian exercise or for the use of cavalry; and we
find, of consequence, that, although horsemanship was much
encouraged, and a valuable breed of animals maintained at a great
expense, particularly for the Olympic contests, the cavalry of the
original Greek cities was weak in numbers; and that of Sparta
in particular singularly inefficient. The Thebans were the first
power which attained to any great proficiency in this arm of the
service, in consequence of their finding the want of it in their
wars with their neighbors, the people of Orchomenos and Thespis;
but afterward as the more northern nations of Greece gradually
rose in the scale of ascendency, and the plains of Thessaly, Thrace,
and Macedonia began to furnish their contingents, the cavalry
became a favorite arm, the rather that it was much called for in
the contests with the kings of Persia, which were now transferred
from the broken country, hills and defiles, of Greece to the vast
open plains and champaigns, swarming with admirable native
horse, on the banks of the Euphrates, the Tigris and the Indus.
On the proper armament and service of the horse we have a very
fine and elaborate treatise from the pen of Xenophon the Athenian, by which we learn that the Greek cavalry were the most
completely equipped with defensive armor of any branch of the
service. The men wore, above a coat of buff, a heavy cuirass of
bronze, fitted above with a sort of rim or frill of the same metal,
which was at once, according to the author,* an ornament, and a
* Xenophon de re equestri XIII-Anabasis III. 3.




GREEK CAVALRY.                     27
perfect protection to the neck and face of the rider so far as to
the nose. It must have resembled, in a considerable degree, that
smgular piece of defensive armor-known in the reign of Edward
IV. of England as the volant piece, which may be seen to this
day in the suit attributed to that prince in the Horse-armory of
the Tower of London. The head of the rider was protected by
a Bceotian casque, covering the whole face down to the tips of
the ears and the nostrils, but leaving apertures by which to see
and breathe without difficulty.  On the left arm was worn no
shield, but a complicated piece of armor, known by a word
answering to our gauntlet, but in reality corresponding to the
whole defence of the arm as worn by a knight of the fourteenth
century; for it is said to have protected the shoulder, the elbow,
the forearm, and the hand while grasping the reins, as well as the
armpit, which was justly regarded as one of the most vital parts,
and the most exposed in a horseman. As the right arm must
frequently be raised whether in the act of striking, or of casting
the spear, it was necessary that the corslet should be cut away
above and below in order to give full sway to the muscles, and
the defence was therefore made good by side-plates hinged on to
the breastplate so as to give and return again with every motion
of the wearer, the fore arm  being guarded by plates of metal
strapped upon the limb, but not attached to the panoply. The.
loins, flanks and abdomen were in like manner protected by
jointed plates accommodating themselves to the movement of the
body, the thighs by cuishes, and the feet and shins by boots of
heavy leather.  The horses moreover were fully caparisoned with
frontlets on the head, poitrels on the chest, and bardings protect.
ing the loins, croupe, and thighs; so that in fact the Greek
cavalry were completely harnessed cuirassiers, as fully accoutred
as the steel-clad chivalry of the middle ages, and as impenetrable
to the weapons of ordinary assailants.
The offensive instruments of these ponderous cavaliers were




28                       ARTILLERY.
two spears of cornel wood, or wild cherry, which was esteemed
the best adapted to that purpose by the ancients, and is especially
recommended as superior to all others and especially to the reed,
which was generally used for lance shafts, by the writer so often
named above. One of these spears was to be hurled at the
enemy while advancing, in order to check his onset and disarrange his charging line; the other was to be couched, as the
knightly lance, and charged in close encounter. Besides this a
sabre, or cutting sword, of Greek manufacture, and probably of a
crooked form, was carried in lieu of tile short stabbing blade
carried by the infantry, which was from its very form inefficient
for mounted men.
Of artillery for the casting of darts of vast size, sometimes
wrapped with tow and kindled with Greek fire, and for hurling
stones, whether into the walls of beleaguered cities, or from the
walls into the lines of the besiegers, the Hellenic nations had long
been in possession; but it was not until above a century after the
death of Alexander the Great, that any thing like the use of
artillery is mentioned as opposed to movable bodies of men in
the field;* when Machanidas the tyrant of the Lacedxemonians
endeavored to break the order of Philopoemen's Achaian
phalanx by discharges of heavy missiles.
Having now described the armature of a whole Greek army,
in its several arms of service, I shall proceed briefly to point out
what was its ordinary mode, what the defects, and what the advantages of its array; and how it. is that, invariably victorious as
opposed to the orientals, even when overmatched in the ratio of
ten to one, the whole system was found utterly defective when
opposed to an enemy equally brave and strong, but using a different tactic.
The phalanx, being the nucleus of every Hellenic force, and the
key of its tactic, was generally thus manceuvred. Drawn up in
* Polybius, XI., Frag. III. XI. 3. XI[. 4.




THE PHALANX.                       29
files varying from eight to fifty shields in depth, the average and
usual mode being sixteen, with the best man, and officer of the
smallest subdivision, in front as file leader, and a good veteran as
rear rank man, it formed a great oblong column, serried so closely,
when in battle order, that the shields of the men touched. Accord
ing to its numbers it was formed in one or more sections; but, if
the full force of a Macedonian phalanx was in the field, sixteen
thousand strong, it usually formed three divisions, one in the
centre of eight thousand, and one on either hand of four thousand, with intervals between for the convenience of manceuvring.
The skirmishers were thrown forward in front, at first; but as
their weapons were exhausted and the enemy drove them in,
they fell back as best they might, either by the flanks, or by the
intervals between the sections of the phalanx, where and in the
rear they rallied, until they should be wanted to pursue and cut
up a defeated and flying enemy.  The cavalry was always on the
flanks, and it was with this arm usually that the action commenced.
Then came the formidable charge of the phalanx, not rapid or
dashing, but steady, solid, and, as long as it kept its order and
was assailed in front only, almost irresistible.  Against the
weaker orientals, as in the battles of Marathon,* Platsea,t Mycale,t Cynaxa,~ and the victories of Alexander, it was clearly
demonstrated, that the shock of the Macedonian Sarissa was surely
and necessarily victorious, since the weaker frame and feebler
morale of the Asiatic was never able to encounter the European
hand to hand with a chance of success, nor was the rush of that
solid body less formidable, so long as its flanks were protected, to
any troops armed only with short weapons or missiles; as the
Romans found to their cost in their first battles with Pyrrhus the
Epirot at the fords of the Silis,1 and again on the field of Ascu* Herod. VI. 109.   t Herod. IX. 102.   t Herod. IX. 62. 63
j Xenoph. Anab. I. 8. 18.  11 Plutarch. Vit. Pyrrhi, XVI.




30              CHARGE OF THE PHALANX.
lum,* in both of which encounters, long and desperately contested as they were by Roman valor, the hedge of spears presented by the phalanx could be no more hewed down by the
swords of the legionaries, than they could be wrested at Plataea
from the hands of the Hoplites by the naked grasp of the Persian
infantry. " When Greek met Greek, then came the tug of war,"
and then so often as phalanx charged phalanx, front to front,
accident or individual prowess decided the strife, if it were
decided; and this unquestionably led to the improvements in
tactics, and the strategetical inventions, for which the Hellenic
leaders soon became famous. For finding that direct onslaughts
were of little avail, on bodies nearly equal in physical force,
and physical courage, and exactly equal in arms and organization,
they early had recourse to flank attacks, oblique movements, and
withdrawals of one or the other wing, long before any form of
battle was thought of by. the- Italian captains, beyond that of
setting their armies face to face with the foe, and then fighting it
out to the last manfully.
These then, which have been thus slightly touched upon, were
the advantages of the Greek formation and tactic; the force of
their charge directly forward, like that of a bull, or, to which
Xenophon likens Epaminondas' onset at Mantinea, of a galley
under full headway, was hard to resist, if not irresistible. But
once their flanks uncovered by the defeat of their horse, the
absence of their skirmishers, the accidents of the ground, or the
like, the whole mass was vulnerable to the very heart; and if
once disordered the length and unwieldiness of their weapon, and
the desuetude of the men to any thing like single combat
rendered them an easy prey to any active and movable assaillant.  They were moreover the most inert and immovable
column that can be conceived; for their system of mranoeuvring
entirely on the single file, so as to bring the same file-leader
Plutarch. Ibid. XXI.




THE OBLIQUE FORMATION.                  31
always in the front of the battle, and the same rear rank man
always in the rear, compelled every moment to be performed by
a countermarching of all the files; so that if the phalanx were
surprised or menaced with a sudden attack on the rear or either
flank, instead of simply facing the men right, left, or about, as the
necessity of the case might indicate, it was necessary to countermarch every file down the interval between itself and its next
neighboring file, including the expansion of the front to nearly or
quite double its original extent, in order to allow space for the
passage of the men, and the corresponding contraction, so soon as
the front rank should have reached the rear, and so have inverted
their order of battle-a slow and perilous manceuvre to execute
under the eyes of a vigilant and active enemy, eager to strike a
blow and knowing where to plant it.
This was its grand and sovereign defect, and consequently we
find that, when the phalanx was once formed to act in any one
direction, any movement of the enemy, compelling a rapid change
of disposition, while in action, was almost necessarily victorious.
Such was the result of the masterly movement of Epaninondas at
Leuctra,* when by the withdrawal of his own left wing, he induced the Lacedaemonians to extend their right, and charging
their centre while in confusion, first with the sacred band of
Pelopidas, and then with the force of his own right wing, fifty
shields in file, cut them in two and annihilated them with such
slaughter as had never before fallen upon a Spartan army. Such
again was the oblique charge upon the centre of Agesilaus, by the
same great captain, at Mantineiat; by which in like manner he
broke through the whole Spartan phalanx, and would have unquestionably slaughtered them as at Leuctra, had he not himself
fallen in the arms of victory, leaving no officer in his army of
sufficient ability to finish the work which he had so gloriously
commenced.
* Diod. XV. 55 Xen. Hell. VI. 4. t Diod. XV. 86. Xen. Hell. VII. 5.




32                DOUBLING THE FILES.
Of the like nature again was the victory by Flaminius over
the Macedonian phalanx of Philip at Cynoscephalae;* where the
Macedonian king, having beaten the Roman left with his own
right on the level ground, and finding his own left somewhat
shaken by the broken surface of the knolls among which it was
engaged, endeavored to double the depth of his files while actively
engaged with the legionaries ifn front; and thus disordered them
so much that the Romans broke up their front, and getting within
the points of their long pikes slaughtered them at pleasure with
their stout stabbing swords. Again, at the final overthrow of the
Greek power under Perseus by the legions of lzEmilius Paulust
at Pydna, the battle was all but won by the charge of the phalanx,
whose spears, locked in the shields of the hastati and principes
of the Romans, bristled like an unbroken row of palisades,
keeping an even front, and bearing down all before them; when
a happy inspiration, or instinct, suggested to the consul the idea
of withdrawing his alternate maniples and charging home with
his reserves at different intervals, so as to render the pressure on
the great column irregular and uneven. The consequence was as
sudden as the idea; the even front of Macedonian pikes was bent
into a sinuous line, the unopposed portions of the phalanx pressing
forward into the intervals between the maniples, while the ranks
which were attacked, either retrograded, or, at best, were held
stationary; so that the Roman swordsmen found gaps, and exposed flanks, into which they broke with their short weapons, and
decided the fate of Greece at a blow, when scarce an hour before
their leader held himself already half defeated.
This then was the great and principal objection to the Greek
Tactic; and this was the principal cause of its defeat, so soon as
they came in contact with men neither personally braver, nor physically stronger than themselves, but differently armed, and more
effectively arrayed. There was, however, another defect inherent
* Plut. Flamin. VIII.             t Plut. AEnil. c. XX.




THE GYMNETES.                      33
to the very nature and composition of this force; and this was
its incapacity to cover its own retreat, or do any thing for its
own defence if once broken; and its equal and sirmilar incapacity
to destroy, or even follow up with any adequate or close pursuit,
a disordered and flying enemy.
According to the composition of Greek armies, in which the
heavy armed foot consisted of the flower of the middle classes,
while the light troops were of the lowest order of citizens, too poor
to be able to arm themselves efficiently, and serving in some sort
as the varlets or servants of the.Hoplites-in the Spartan armies,
being Helots, they were literally their slaves-very little dependence could be placed on the Gymnetes, as they were termed
from their want of defensive armor, in case of the ranks being
once broken; nor were they likely to risk themselves very far
from  the support of their solid columns in pursuing an enemy,
especially if there were any likelihood of his rallying to resist.
The cavalry were again such mere handfuls of men that no real
or efficient service could be expected of them.
It is mentioned that the victory of Marathon* was admired of
all men, and regarded as especially wonderful and distinguished,
from the fact that the Athenians, without either horse or archery,
should have charged, routed, and destroyed a host so greatly
superior to themselves in numbers as the Persian army, and that
they should have driven the fugitives quite to the ships and
captured some of these also.  This I think, however, proves little
or nothing, more than that the distance was short; the Medes
and Persians, accustomed to conquer the inferior races of barbarians, were utterly astounded by the fierce Greek onset; while
the king's army, from some unknown reason, made no use of the
cavalry in which arm it was so superior.
What is much more to the point is the opinion of Xenophon
himself, as given at the council of war subsequent to the death
* Herod. VI. 109, 116.




'34                RHODIAN SLINGERS.
of Cyrus, and the commencement of the retreat of the ten
thousand, with regard to the inefficiency of the unsupported
phalanx.
On the evening of the first day of their retreat, when being
hard beset by the Persian Archery, Xenophon had charged and
pursued the enemy with the Hoplites and targeteers of the rear
guard, at some risk of being cut off from the main body, Cheirisophus and some of the elder leaders blamed Xenophon for incuraing such risk, to whom  that leader, frankly admitting his
error, and acknowledging the danger he had run, gave the following statement as his defence, and as cause for different future
arrangements.  "As it now is, the enemy outshoot and outsling us so far that the Cretan archers and our javelineers cannot
reach them.  But in case we pursue, it is not safe to do so, to
any distance from the supporting columns; and in a short
distance even swift footmen cannot overtake footmen with a bowshot start. If, therefore, we would prevent their harassing attacks,
we must fit ourselves immediately with cavalry and slingers;
and, in fact, I understand that we have in our army Rhodian
slingers who can send their shot to twice the distance of the
Persians, since the latter cast stones large enough to fill the hand
from their slings, while the Rhodians use leaden bullets, the range
of which is infinitely greater."*
In consequence of this recommendation, it appears that measures were taken, and light troops created, by whom the Persian
skirmishers were ultimately defeated and kept at a distance; so
that the leaders were at length relieved from the apprehension,
which they had at fiest with so much reason entertained; namely
that, "since they were now left to themselves without either
horse or allies, they must evidently be cut off to the last man if
worsted in action; while, if victorious, it was impossible for them
to do execution on the routed enemy."t
*Xenoph. Anab. III. 4. 13.     t Ibid. Lib. IIl. 11.




CHARGE IN COLUMN.                  35
Such and so great were the errors and defects of that system,
which, in spite of all, produced effects so permanent and important, when directed by such heads and hearts as those of
Miltiades, Epaminondas, Philip, Alexander the Great, and last,
not least, Pyrrhus the Epirot; and which was destined only to
be overthrown, and proved useless, when brought into contact
with the improved Roman strategy; which is that shown by all
experience, up to the present day, to be founded on the true
scientific principle, and whenever put into practice under like
circumstances of equality between the opposing masses, to be
certain of success.
The principle is this, that whenever great solid columns with
long vulnerable flanks, are launched against troops in line, the
column must necessarily be enveloped, overlapped by the converging wings of the enemy; overwhelmed with missiles to which
they can make no reply, whether the missiles be javelins, arrows,
and bullets from the Rhodian and Balearic sling, or musketry
and grape, rockets and shells and shrapnels, and all the terrible
devices of modern European warfare; and finally ravaged and
torn asunder by the hand-to-hand encounter with short weapons,
and trampled underfoot by the thundering charge of the exterminating horse.
Such has been ever, and such will be ever, the final fate of
every army which ventures to rush, blind and headlong as the
charging bison, in close and solid column into the centre of lines
which do not lack the courage to receive, and the obstinate
steadiness to sustain, the impetus of its first onset. With effeminate dastards, or unskilled barbarians, the method may succeed;
but when men are met by men, in any degree their equals, it
must be fatal to the assailants.
All nations, in all ages, have at some time or other attempted
this form of strategy; all have at some time or other, it is probable, succeeded with it; all when matched by their equals in deter



36                     THE LEGION.
mination have succumbed, through no want of valor, but
through the viciousness of the very principle itself.
That the Greeks so long succeeded with it, is owing to the
fact that they were opposed always, either to effeminate orientals
who could not endure their steady charge, nor face the triumphant paeans and the clash and clang of the spearpoints on the
brazen shields, which formed the prelude to their formidable
onset; or to their own countrymen, who met them with equal arms
and the same manceuvres, and left it, therefore, to valor, or the
devices of individual genius, to decide the fate of battles.
The Romans charged in column at Cannse into the centre of
the Carthaginian lines, bore all before them for a while, and were
annihilated by the convergence of the lines-the same fate had
previously befallen the Epirot Pyrrhus at Beneventum, though his
charge had been previously checked by his own elephants, which,
maddened by the missiles of the enemy, rushed into his own lines
scattering dismay and death.  Similar were the routes of Philip
at Cynoscephalhe, and of Perseus at Pydna, by enemies to whom
the phalanx had at first seemed so terrible.
Precisely similar the route of the confederate peers by PhilipAugustus at Bovines; of the French chivalry at Cressy and
Poitiers; and in more modern days, and with weapons and warfare far different, precisely similar the discomfiture of the great
English square at Fontenoy, of the invincible column of Lannes
at Aspern, and, last and most memorable of all, of Napoleon's
young guard at Waterloo.
And now we arrive in due course at the formation, armature,
and tactic of the Roman legion, which succeeding to and prevailing over the columnar tactic of the phalanx, conquered in
point of fact the whole ancient world, and so long as Romnans
continued to be Romans was never excelled or equalled by infantry. As the Western empire gradually decayed, and the
manners of the Eastern became more and more orientalized,




THE ANCIENT ROMAN LEGION.               37
mercenary troops supplied the place of the indomitable Romans,
and cavalry became in consequence the great arm of the service,
and the great engine of medileval warfare; and so indeed, until the
invention of gunpowder, and its first thoroughly victorious application, on the field of Pavia, when the gallant Francis lost to his
imperial rival " all save honor," it continued to be. Nor can it
be said that, between the extinction of the Roman legionary
tactic and the commencement of the modern strategy with
musketry and ordnance, with the exception of the Swiss confederates at Granson, Nanci, and Morat, victorious over the mailclad
lancers of Burgundy, and the English bills and bows fatal to
France's noble chivalry at Cressy and Poictiers and Agincourt,
there was anything worthy of the name of infantry in Europe, or
anything that could pretend to brook the levelled lances and
barded destriers of the feudal cavalry.
With these, however, we have at present nothing to do,
beyond the passing remark, that as a general rule the tactic of
these bodies, the Swiss halberdiers and English bill-men, was
akin to that of the Romans, as using short against long weapons,
and affecting the formation of long ranks with shallow files, as
opposed to columns of comparatively small front compensated by
depth giving weight and impetus to the forward onset.
To resume, however, it would appear that the constitution of
the ancient and original Roman legion, as regulated, it is said, by
Servius Tullius, was framed in accordance to the means of the
citizens who composed the various classes, from which the forces
of the year were raised.  The wealthier and better armed, for
the terms were synonymous, forming the heavy armed infantry,
fighting in the front and bearing the brunt of battle, the poorer
and more feebly equipped bringing up the rear, and those who
possessed nothing skirmishing in fiont with light and slender
javelins until the shock of real war began, and then retreating by
the flanks to rally in the rear of the battalia.




38             THE ANCIENT ROMAN LEGION.
At this period, it is on many accounts evident that the early
Roman battle, so long as the Servian constitution was in existence, coincided with that of the Greeks; that their formation
was the column, the better armed burghers in the front, and the
lighter and feebler, down to the naked supernumeraries, intended
to assume the arms and fill the places of the fallen, holding
themselves aloof from the shock of spears, and adding only the
impetus of their dead weight in the rear to the force of the
attack. At this time also the arms of the iastati and Principes
were the round shield, the long pike, and short stabbing sword,
and their order of fighting, as is expressly stated by Livy, that of
the Macedonian phalanx, while those of the second class, answering to the triari, were the oblong shield, the heavy javelin, and
larger sword: and at this period the front ranks of the legion
were known as antepilani, or ranks before the javelineers.
The formation of the legion under the Servian constitution,
which seems to have prevailed until nearly the termination of the
Latin wars, was of this nature. All those citizens who possessed
a capital of one hundred thousand asses, or pounds, of brass
money and upward, formed the first class, divided into eighty
centuries, forty of young, forty of elder men, who were appointed
to bear as their arms defensive, the helmet, circular shield, greaves
and breastplate, all of bronze, and as weapons the pike and sword.
These two divisions of the first class corresponding to the divisions
known later as the hastati and principes.  To this class were
added two centuries of mechanics, who bore no arms, but served at
working the military engines. The second class consisted of those
citizens possessing above seventy-five, and below a hundred,
thousand asses, and they bore helmet and greaves without breastplate, the square buckler instead of the shield, the spear and
sword.  The third class rating at fifty thousand and upward
were armed as the last, with the exception of the greaves which
in their case were laid aside. The fourth, who were held at five




THE ANCIENT ROMAN LEGION.                39
and twenty thousand, wore no defensive armor and carried only
a pike and javelin, acting as mere skirmishers; together with the
fifth class of proletarians, who were destitute of property, subsisted by their own labor, and fought merely with slings and
stones, hovering on the outskirts of the action and never coming
up to the close encounter. To these were added a cavalry composed of six centuries of equites, a sort of half nobility, to whom
horses were provided at the public expense; and this was the
composition of the original Roman army, and in many points,
even to the last when the arms of the classes and mode of
fighting were altered, the foundation of the later system.
It is remarkable enough that, although we have Livy's express declaration that the original tactic of the Romans was the
Macedonian phalanx, which is moreover self-evident from the
nature of the weapons which they carried, and from the regular
declension in the quality of their offensive arms in proportion as
the ranks were farther removed firom the front of battle, still all
the actions which he has described so vividly and with such
minute particulars, ascribe to the legions from the first the tactic
of the manipule and the use of the sword and buckler.  This
discrepancy, however, only goes to show the imaginative character of the writer and his carelessness in adherence to facts, which
he admitted, when not carried away by the enthusiasm and glow
of composition.
It is, however, more singular that it is nowhere distinctly
stated at what time the change of armature and tactic was
adopted, nor why, nor from whom it was borrowed. Livy,*
indeed, states generally, that the " Romans formerly used round
shields, clypei, but that after they received regular pay, or
became stipendiaries, they adopted oblong bucklers, scuta, in the
place of shields"-and Saliust in his conspiracy of Catiline makes
Julius Caesar declaref that the Romans "borrowed their arms
* Liv. VIII. 8.               t Sallust, Catil. 51.




40            THE ANCIENT ROMAN LEGION.
offensive and defensive of the Samnites, the insignia of their
magistracies from the Tuscans"-and farther the account given
by Livy of the splendid armor and weapons of the Samnite host,
which was defeated by the Dictator Papirius Cursor beyond the
Ciminian hills, corresponds very closely with what we know
from contemporaneous authorities to have been the armature of
the later legion.  " There were two bands,"* says he," the bucklers of- the one were embossed with silver; the other with gold.
The form was that of the buckler, scutum. But it was broader
at the top, where the breast and shoulders were to be protected,
with the top line level, or even, and wedge fashioned below, for
the advantage which that form gave in handiness." It must have
been fashioned therefore much like the heart-shaped, or as it is
technically called heater-shaped shield, which was suspended
round the necks of the knights and men-at-arms of the middle
ages." " Their breasts were protected by sponge, and their left
leg by a greave. Their casques were high-crested, which added
to the appearance of the soldiers' stature." All that follows this
lively picture shows that both armies fought in open order, and
that a series of single combats with the buckler and stabbing
sword prevailed along the whole front of the lines, proving that
at this time the troops of the two nations were identical in
weaponing and discipline, which of the two borrowed from the
other, or whether either, not appearing.
On the contrary, Diodorus asserts, "that the Romans originally had quadrangular bucklers for warfare; but afterward,
seeing that the Tyrrhenians made use of round brazen shields,
conquered these by adopting the like armature."t  In this statement, however, as the first assertion that the quadrangular
buckler was laid aside for the round shield is manifestly incorrect,
much stress I think need not be laid on the second, in relation to
the suggestion being borrowed from the Tuscans. It is, even,
* Liv. IX. 40.       t Diod. XXIII. Eclog. 3. 501.




THE ANCIENT ROMAN LEGION.               41
doubtful in my opinion whether there was any direct borrowing
in the case from any foreign country. All that we know, for
certain, is that at the commencement of the Punic wars, throughout the terrible struggle on Italian soil, which shook Rome to
her very foundations, with the unconquerable Hannibal; through
the fierce civil wars of Sylla and Marius, Caesar and Pompey, and
that mad Triumvir who "lost a world for a woman," through all
the series of years which led to the subjugation of the whole terra
cognita-the weapons, the order of fighting, the castrametation,
the field equipage and the discipline of the later Roman legion,
was that which we have accurately and minutely laid down for
us by the contemporaneous pen of Polybius, the friend and tentcompanion of Lvlius and the greater Scipio.
According to my judgment, the alterations and improvements
in the art military, adopted by the Romans some time, more or
less, previous to the commencement of the first Punic war, and in
full practice at the time of the invasion of Pyrrhus, B.C. 280, are
far more likely to have originated, as did the similar emendations
of the Greek tactic and armature by Iphicrates at an earlier date,
B.C. 387, in a perception of the defects of the columnar system
of the phalanx, of its unwieldiness, and its liability to disarrangement and destruction by the flank attacks of a lighter and more
active enemy. In the same manner we are told almost in the
same breath that the Romans learned their method of castrametation from Pyrrhus of Epirus; and again, that, being out with
a reconnoitring party on the eve of his first encounter with these
very Romans, the same Pyrrhus exclaimed on seeing their encampment, " The tactic,* O Megacles, of these barbarians, is in
no wise barbarical, and we shall learn their prowess."  Two
stories in themselves so discrepant, as, like the celebrated cats of
Kilkenny, to annihilate one another nor leave a wreck behind.
But to come at once to the later legion, that I mean which we
3    Plut. Vit. Pyr. 26.
3




42              THE LATER ROMAN LEGION.
find in full operation and efficiency in the fifth century of Rome
and the third before the Christian era, we discover that of the
legion according to the Servian constitution this much only has survived, namely-that the whole Roman cavalry were composed of
a separate and superior order of the state, superior to the mere
burghers but inferior to the great Patrician houses, for a portion
of whom, at least, chargers and one mounted attendant to each
were found at the expense of the republic; and that the heavy
armed foot, that is to say the hastati, principes, and triarii, constituting the force of the legions, were levied from the wealthy
middle classes, possessing the same original qualification of property, although there was, with one slight exception, no pro rata distinction in their armature, and none whatever in their place in the
various divisions, which had reference solely to age, the younger
men composing the ranks of the hastati, those in the flower of
age the principes, while the triarii, who were differently equipped, were formed of the tried and experienced veterans of many
wars, on whom it fell, if the day was going adversely, to restore
the shaken ranks, and if it hung balanced to decide the victory
by their fresh and formidable onset. The young men of the
poorer classes were mustered as light-armed troops, not however
acting as servants to the heavy foot, which was the practice in the
Greek armies, but serving like them as independent citizens and
soldiers.  These are the men, known among the Romans as
velites, rorarii, or ferentarii, names equivalent to the modern
voltigeur or skirmisher, and to the Greek writers as grosphomachi,
or javelineers, from the weapon which they used in action, the
bow and sling being both ineffective if not unused by the Latin
nations and the Greeks of Italy, although the natives of many
neighboring isles were famous for their skill in archery and
slinging.
These light-armed-* troops wore plain casques on their heads,
*Polybius, Milit. Rom. VI. 22.




THE LATER ROMAN -LEGION.                43
covered with wolf skins, or the spoils of other animals, both for
defence and distinction, as between their several subdivisions.
They had no cuirass or defence for the body or limbs beyond a
light buckler, parma, of three feet in diameter, made of osier
covered with leather. Their weapons were a cutlass, and several
javelins, which appear to have been known as the veru or spit
by the Romans, but which are accurately described as grosphi
by Polybius.  These were darts, the wood of which was about
three feet in length by an inch in diameter, with a point of a span
in length so tapering and sharp, whence its Latin name of spit,
that it would bend and become useless after a single blow; and
this was done intentionally, in order to prevent the same weapon
from being returned with effect by the enemy.
Their duty was to skirmish in front, and cover the advance or
conceal the manceuvres of the legions, until driven in by the
approach or sustained resistance of heavier troops, when they fell
back upon their supports, and ultimately retreated, through the
intervals of the manipules, which have yet to be described, into
the rear, whence as occasion offered they continued to annoy the
enemy with their missiles.  The light troops were divided into
small bodies, each attached to a manipule of heavy foot of each
of the three divisions, and could either act independently in force,
or with the troops with whom  they were brigaded and encamped.,
The Hastati, Principes, and Triarii, forming the three divisions
of heavy foot, wore the full panoply of the day,* consisting in the
first place of the buckler, scutum, which was quadrangular and
rectilinear, two feet and a half in width by four in height, not flat
but curved on its shortest edge so as to assimilate to the shape
of the body. It was composed of double plank, strongly glued
together, lined with linen, covered on the exterior surface with
calf-skin, bound with a strong iron verge, as a defence against
* Ibid, VI. 23.




44              THE LATER ROMAN LEGION.
sabre cuts, and provided with a strong iron boss in the centre, to
ward off pike-thrusts or the blows of heavy stones. Together
with this, and next in importance to it, was worn the short massive, two-edged, sharp-pointed, stabbing sword, the principal and
most effective weapon of the legionary; it was hung on the right
thigh and was known as the Iberian sword, whether that the
blades were of Spanish temper which was then already famous,
or that the weapon itself had been borrowed from the Spanish
foot, who certainly in HIannibal's army did make use of the same
deadly instrument.  The legionary also carried two javelins, the
well-known and formidable pila, one of which was essentially a
javelin, being described as exactly similar to a slight well-balanced
boar-spear; the other a ponderous and massive spear which
could either be hurled at a short distance, from forty to sixty
paces, with tremendous effect, or could be used in hand-to-hand
encounter, especially to repel horse, as it was by Cxesar's veterans
at Pharsalia with decided advantage against the high-born
equites of Pompey's patrician army. The formation of thesi
weapons is so singular as to deserve a more minute notice, as it
is not easy to comprehend how instruments so ponderous could
be so efficient, as we know that they were, whether cast from the
hand or charged as the modern bayonet.  The shafts* were of
wood, four and a half feet long, and either round or quadrangular
in shape, in the former instance having the diameter, in the latter
the flat side, of no less than a palm, or three Greek inches, being
a fraction more than three of our measure-a thickness which it
would not be easy, and certainly very far from convenient, to grasp.
These ponderous shafts were again adapted to barbed steel
heads of a length equal to themselves, the lower half of which
formed a hollow socket into which one half of the shaft was
received and fastened with many clasps or bands, so that the
weapon could not be rendered useless except by the breaking
* Polyb. VI. 23.




THE LATER ROMAN LEGI'ON.              -45
the steel, which was half an inch thick at the point of junction
with the wood.  The whole weapon was therefore six foot three
inches in length, about eighteen of which was a strong triangular
steel head. Their farther defensive weapons were an open helmet of bronze, with a projecting peak and cheekpieces, decked
with a crest of plumes, and three upright feathers of black or
crimson about two feet and a half in height, adding greatly to the
splendor and apparent size of the soldier, and a plate of brass
about a span in breadth both ways, attached upon the breast and
called a heart-defender. Instead of this defence, those who were
rated at above ten thousand drachmae wore shirts of chainmail, The Triarii, or reserve, who were all chosen veterans, were
armed and weaponed exactly as the hastati and principes, except
that in lieu of the pila they carried pikes fitted for charging
hand-to-hand, although these were not so ponderous but that
they could on occasion be hurled as javelins.  Indeed, after the
account given of the pila, it would be difficult to imagine what
should be too ponderous for that purpose.
To complete the Roman force, we must not pass the equites, or
cavalry, three hundred of whom were attached to every legion,
four of which, two forming a regular consular army, constituted
the regular peace establishment, as we may call it, of the Roman
republic. The armature of these high-born horsemen, although
they often did good service when matched against the similarly
armed Latin or Samnite horse, and although they fought with
stubborn gallantry when fearfully overmatched by the Greek
cuirassiers of Pyrrhus, was ludicrously inefficient; and they
proved wholly unable to sustain the shock of the Greek or Carthagcinian horse, or even the impetuous onset of the wild Numidians, with their unbridled horses, long lances, and wild desert
horsemanship.
They wore casques indeed, of bronze ornate of crest and plumes,
but they had neither corslet, thigh-pieces, nor greaves, under the




46              THE LATER ROMAN LEGION.
idea that such would impede their agility in leaping on their
horses or dismounting. Their shields were of simple ox-hide, with
neither boss nor binding; their spears were of brittle reeds, which
shivered to the grasp at the first thrust; and their short Iberian
swords, the same as those so deadly in the hands of the foot
soldier, were as useless in those of the mounted cavalier, who requires, if any one, a long sabre, capable of dealing sweeping
blows and doing service with either edge or point, against an
enemy without arm's length.
The 1egionaries being thus armed and thus divided, their array
and order of battle were as follows. Of each division, hastati,
principes, and triarii, there were ten manipules, consisting each
of two centuries under their proper centurions, subordinate again
to a tribune, who led the manipule.  Of the two first divisions,
however, the hastati and principes, each manipule contained one
hundred and twenty men, while each of the triarii contained but
sixty. Of the skirmishers, an equal proportion was attached man
for man to every manipule, forty-eight to each of the hastati and
principes, twenty-four to each of the triarii. The legion consisted, therefore, of three thousand heavy armed, and twelve
hundred light-armed infantry, with a detachment of three
hundred horse belonging to it, the whole under the order of an
officer termed legatus in the Roman, preefectus in the allied
Latin legions, which were similar in all respects to them except
that they had double the number of horse. A regular consular
army consisted of two Roman and two allied legions, making an
aggregate of sixteen thousand eight hundred foot and eighteen
hundred horse. At a subsequent period the rank and file of the
legion were increased from four thousand two hundred, to five
thousand two hundred, raising the whole force to twenty-two
thousand six hundred men. Upon the whole, about twenty
thousand men may be generally computed as the effective force




THE LATER ROMAN LEGION.                 47
of the consular army, though according to circumstances it might
exceed or fall short of that complement.
This force, when the day of battle came, was drawn up in
three lines of alternate squares; for each manipule in itself, when
in battle order, formed a sort of loose square, although the whole
of each division was a long line pierced with equal gaps at equal
distances.
Each manipule, as I have said, contained one hundred and
twenty men, I speak of the two first divisions, and these were
drawn up ten deep, consequently with a front of twelve soldiers,
to every one of whom a space of five feet was allowed for freedom
of play with the sword and buckler, and hurling the heavy pilum.
Thus every manipule would occupy a space of sixty feet rank and
fifty feet file, and, the intervals between each manipule being
equal to the whole front of the manipule, each division of a
Roman legion would form a line of eleven hundred and forty
feet front, really occupied by only one hundred and twenty men.
lit must be observed, again, that in each manipule the men did.
not cover their file-leaders, but the intervals between them, and in
like manner the several manipules of the principes did not cover
the manipules of the hastati, but their intervals, and so again the
triarii of the principes.  So that in fact the whole Roman legion,
when in battle order, exactly resembled the arrangement of three
lines of a chess board, each containing ten squares of men, and
nine square intervals.
There was, however, a longitudinal lane between each of the
three divisions, equal in width to the transverse lanes between
the manipules.  So that the depth of the whole legion would be
two hundred and fifteen feet, since the manipules of the triarii
preserving the same front or nearly so with those of the other
divisions, would be necessarily but three deep; and a whole consular army of four legions would form a treble line, independent
of the cavalry who were stationed on the wings, of four thousand




48                  THE ROMAN TACTIC.
seven hundred and ten feet front, by one hundred and fifteen
feet depth.
The consequence is, that when in action with an equal force of
men drawn up in the Greek phalanx, directed against their
centre, the Roman legionary army would overflank them at each
extremity of the line by at least a thousand feet, so that by
retiring its own centre manipules, or advancing those of its own
wings, it must necessarily envelope and overlap them, finally involving them in such and so fatal a catastrophe as those of
(aanne, Fontenoy, Aspern, and Waterloo.
It must at once be apparent that the individual fighting of a
Roman legion, dependent as it was on the personal prowess,
strength, and skill with his weapons of the individual soldier, must
have been singularly fine, manful, and exciting.
We will suppose the red flag hoisted on the Proatorium, or
great pavilion of the general, being the signal for delivering
battle, the three divisions of the heavy infantry, steady as insulated towers, mutually supporting one another, with their glittering brazen casques and erect black and crimson plumes, their
long shields advancing all in line, their tremendous pila brandished in the air. The trumpet gives the signal and out flies
a cloud of nimble skirmishers, covering the onset of the manipules and disturbing the approach of the enemy, by the arrowy
hail of their keen javelins. Meanwhile the tramp of charging
horse and the clang of close battle peal from either wing, showing that the cavalry are at work already, and now the skirmishers,
driven in by the solid advance of heavy troops, fall back by the
intervals and rally, each squad in the rear of its own particular
manipule.  Then with their well-known shout and the long stern
trumpet blast," which bids the Romans close," in rush the stout
nastati, sending their fearful pila hurtling through the air, rending the strongest shields, piercing the best made corslets as though
they were but paper, and then, before they have recovered from




i-S~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~i~
CIHARGE OF THE ROMAN LEGION.48.b~~~~~~~~~~~ 8








THE ROMAN TACTIC.                    49
that deadly volley, upon them with the sword and buckler —'till
the whole firont is one series of hand-to-hand encounters.  If the
hastati overmatched retire before the weight of the enemy, the
principes receive them in the intervals between their fresh manipules, the line is restored and is now solid and continuous, and if
it be a phalanx which they are engaging, the onset of the triarii,
with their long pikes wheeling in upon either flank, decides the
victory, and almost before it is a victory, lo! it is a rout, an
extermination.
Such for the most part was the Roman tactic; at times it was
altered in adaptation to circumstances, as at Zama, where Scipio
covered the manipules of his hastati by those of his principes,
and those again by his triarii, purposely leaving avenues directly
through his lines, down which his skirmishers were instructed to
provoke the formidable elephants to pursue them. The manoeuvre was successful, the terrible monsters were disposed of,
and the long contested battle was determined, the hastati and
principes having been both successively driven in, by the decisive and overwhelming charge of the reserved triarii.  But of
this more anon.
Sometimes the tactic was abandoned, and always fatally; as
at Thrasymene where Flaminius blindly rushed in column into
the broken defiles, where his flank was exposed to the terrible
claymores of the Gauls, and the mad charge of the wild Numidian lances, while his van was fighting stubbornly against the
African and Spanish foot, who barred their onward way.  The
result was that of an army, at night-fall not a man lived, save as
a captive to the merciless Carthaginian.  As again at Canine,
where for some inconceivable reason the Romans fought without
intervals between their manipules or between their three several
divisions, but rushed in one vast wedge-like column into the
centre of the enemy, carrying all bodily before them, until the
Punic wings, strengthened by their great leader to that very end,




50                  THE ROMAN TACTIC.
broke in on both their naked flanks, while Maharbal, with his
victorious horse, thundered upon their rear, and the carnage of
Waterloo was anticipated by above two thousand years.
And now I have briefly, and I hope clearly sketched out, the
precise nature of the tactics of these two great powers; I have
endeavored to show that the success of the one and defeats of the
other system were the consequence of necessary causes, still
existing unaltered even by the alterations of modern warfare, and
proving I hope to the satisfaction of my readers that of troops
equal in courage and manhood, equal or nearly equal in numerical force, and equally well led, the direct attack in column upon
line must to an almost mathematical certainty prove destructive,
even to extermination, to the assailing column. A truth which
is, I think, beginning to be generally perceived and admitted,
whether in terrestrial or naval warfare; so much so that I believe
the famous manceuvre of breaking the line at sea by a perpendicular attack, will never again be resorted to by any officer, and
that if it be, it will be to his ruin.  There can be little doubt
that, if the circumstances of Trafalgar had been reversed, so that
the French had borne down in double column of perpendicular
attack into the midst of an English receiving semicircle, the
action would have been decided in a quarter of the time, and
would have been guiltless of the blood of Nelson. Nor is there
much more doubt, that if-which heaven forefend —an English and
American fleet should come into action together, and one or the
other should attack a line on a perpendicular, as that great seaman did at Trafalgar, the attacking fleet would never open its fire,
but be annihilated, or ere it should come along side, while its
leader would lose together his fleet, his life and his reputation.
Hereafter, a review of the lives of the great captains of old
will give space for a fuller examination, and more interesting and
graphic description of their great actions; and will, I think,
establish the fact that strategy has been, and will be, in all ages,




HOMERIC ARMIES.                   51
one and the same; that we are but fighting in these latter days
the very battles that were fought ages before the Christian era,
and winning them by the self-same manoeuvres that won them
for the nations, to whom, if we were known at all, we were known
but as the most remote and barbarous of barbarians-that
strategy, in a word, is a direct an( simple science, and therefore
like truth must be the same foi ever, and all its principles immortal.




II.
MILTIADES,
THE SON OF CIMON.
HIS BATTLE OF MARATHON, CAMPAIGNS, CHARACTER, AND
CONDUCT.
A tyrant  But our tyrants then
Were still, at least, our countrymen.
The tyrant of the Chersonese
Was freedom's best and dearest friend;
That tyrant was Miltiades.-THE ISLES OF GREECE.
THUS sang, in his resonant and harmonious verse, and in the
fulness of his enthusiasm for that fair land of Hellas, in whose
behalf it was his lot to die, "as those whom the gods love die,"
young, Lord Byron, first martyr for her new-born freedom. But
so assuredly, had not his eyes, dazzled by the splendor of his
great fame whom he celebrates, refused to look into the obscurer
portions of his career, would he not have sung. Nor does he so
sing truly. For whatsoever else of greatness or of grandeur may
be ascribed to the life of Miltiades, it certainly is not as to a fast
and consistent friend of freedom, that his altar will be erected in
the shrine of national honor; and, though he did fight once the
good fight in her cause, it was as a Hellene earnest to die for
Hellas, an Athenian careless to survive Athens, not as a fiee



HIS LOVE OF FREEDOM.                  53
man sincere in his love of liberty, not as a man devoted to the
emancipation of mankind. Indeed, it would be scarcely less absurd to heap praises on the Emperor of Russia, and the Austrian
C~esar, as sure friends of freedom, because they broke the chains
of Europe under the walls of Leipsic and on the heights of Montmartre, than to do the like of Miltiades, because he preserved
the liberty of Greece upon the plain of Marathon. Not to desire
to be a slave himself, and to be a friend of freedom, are in a
man, as it were, moral antipodes. And so it was with Miltiades.
But of this anon; inasmuch as my first concern is with his mili.
tary genius, not with his moral character; and it comes as much
within my plan to commemorate the strategetic skill of " a Borgia or a Catiline," as of a Tell or an Epaminondas.
It will be necessary, however, before coming direct to the campaigns and career of my hero, with his one almost inimitable
battle, to take a brief glance at the position of affairs, and the
state of nations in Europe at the period of the Persian wars, as
well as at the parentage and condition of Miltiades himself, in
order to avoid interruptions of the narrative when once begun,
and those retrospective episodes, which are so annoying to the
reader.
At the commencement of these celebrated wars, which was
in fact the commencement of the long struggle for existence and
supremacy between the religion and polity of the Eastern and
Western races, scarcely terminated until within two centuries of
the present day, the kingdom of Persia was the most extensive,
the most wealthy, the most powerful, and, probably as a whole,
the most civilized empire in the world.  It comprehended all
the countries between the Indus and the Mediterranean, between
the Euxine and Caspian Seas and the Indian Ocean; and of all
these countries the population were the subjects, "he hereditary
or appointed princes the slaves, of the great king.  From the
Punjaub and the banks of the Scinde to the Levantine Sea and




5 4                     MILTIADES.
the broad rush of the fertilizing Nile; from the pearl-freighted
waters of the Persian Gulf to the wild and inhospitable waves of
the Black Sea, every tribe and nation, every nomad horde and
civilized kingdom, poured lavish tribute of its wealth into his
central treasuries, sent myriads and tens of myriads to perish
under the banners, and at the slightest nod of that most sovereign
monarch.
Tyre and Sidon were his marts and naval depots, Egypt his
granary, and the wild steppes of Northern Asia his horse pastures, and nurseries for innumerable cavalries, indomitable hordes
of archery.  And, at that moment, the throne of this gigantic
kingdom was occupied by a prince, the greatest of his race, capable of developing and employing his vast resources to their
fullest extent, eager in ambition, fierce lover of glory, covetous
to enlarge dominions, which already embraced seven-tenths of the
known world. This was the first Darius, son of Hystaspes; who,
having already added the Punjaub to the dominions of the Persian, which Hardinge and Gough have the other day attached to
those of the British crown —and having previously met with his
first reverse in his remarkable Scythian campaign, wherein, after
crossing the Danube and penetrating so far, according to some
geographers, as the Volga, without bringing his nomadic and
active enemy to action, he lost nearly all his host by thirst,
fatigue and famine, and felt himself thrice happy to find the bridge
of boats, whereby he might recross the Hellespont, unbrokennow determined on reducing all Greece, but Attica especially,
into a Persian province. At this period, then-with the exception of Persia-Greece, Sicily, Italy, and Carthage were the only
free and civilized states of Europe; for the Greek cities of Asia
Minor and of Eastern Europe, along the borders of the Hellespont, and most of the Eastern isles of the Archipelago, though
highly refined, flourishing, and wealthy, were, like Tyre and
Sidon, Egypt, and even Ethiopia, dependents on the Persian




STATE OF EUROPE.                    55
empire, and as such bound to pay their tributes in peace, and to
furnish their contingents in time of war. Greece, in the prime
of her literary splendor, and wanting but a few years of the era
of her greatest artistic glory, consisted of a few antagonistic and
jealous republics, rich in arts, in valor, and in glory, but poor in
the numbers of her men, poorer yet in moneys; and relied only
on the patriotism, the heroism, the inimitable discipline, and unlimited resources of the Hellenic mind. She extended no farther
north than Mount Olympus and the mouth of the river Peneus,
had no states of any great importance, with the exception of
Thebes and Athens-for Thessaly and Macedonia were still but
barbarous regions-beyond the Peloponnesus, or as we should
say north of the isthmus of Corinth, and could not compare in
magnitude with the smallest Asiatic province, or in united opulence with several of the tributary cities of the Persian empire.
Sicily, which was rich and powerful, was too much occupied
in contesting the commercial enterprise and wealth of the Italian
cities of Magna Grsecia, as the south-eastern extremity of Italy
was then called, and with the territorial and maritime encroachments of Carthage, to intermeddle at all in the affairs of the
East, or of Eastern Europe.  The eyes of Carthage, selfish and
undeviating worshipper of Mammon and of Moloch, capable of
no generous sentiment, no intellectual impulse, were turned already westward; westward, beyond Abyla and Calpe, pillars of
Hercules, far into the great unknown ocean, southward to the
fortunate isles, the soft Canaries and the Cape di Verds, and
northward to the stormy Cassiterides, the wave-lashed crags of
Cornwall.  No thought had she, at the farthest, to carry her
arms eastward of the Adriatic, and little cared she what fell out,
so long as her galleys might sweep the Mediterranean unmolested,
rich with the gold and silver of the Spanish Tarshish, rich with
the tin and copper of the barbarous Britons.  Rome, to complete th.e tale, can scarcely as yet be said to have fallen within




56                       MILTIADES.
the pale of civilization. Her history, so far as this, is still pur.ely3r
fabulous, though no longer wholly mythical.  She counted two
hundred and sixty-three years of existence from her foundation
by the sons of Mars Quirinus and the Latin priestess Ilia; nineteen of liberty, from the expulsion of the Tarquins by Brutus,
the son of Marcus Junius.  Her consuls* were Marcus Minucius
Ligurinus, and Aulus Sempronius Atratinus.  Thus far the
annalists. The facts, however, show that, although in Italy proper
Rome was beginning to make herself known and in some sort
respected, though she had even, nineteen years before this date,
ratified a treatyt relative to navigation and commerce with the
Carthaginians, she was utterly unknown, as a power, to the
world at large; and was sufficiently engaged at home in struggling for national existence, with her neighbors the Etruscans
and the Latins, to be utterly unwilling to take any share in foreign affairs; even if, by what would have been scarce less than
a miracle, any rumor of the great armament of the Persian king
against the liberties of Greece should have penetrated through
the morasses and forests of central Italy, to the ears of the Quirites, busy as they were, establishing on sure foundations, their
o )n new-conquered freedom.
It is true, that some time before the planning of this invasion,
the Athenians had afforded a pretext to Darius for interfering
with them; when, Miletus having revolted from  the Persian
rule, and Aristagoras, its tyrant, having required their aid, they
lent twenty of their own galleys, to which the Eretrians added
five more; and, not content with succoring Miletus, invaded
Asia, and burned Sardis, an important city of Lydia, and seat
of the Satrap's government. This, it is true, was an unprovoked
breach of a treaty, and was in itself a very sufficient cause of war.
It cannot, however, I think, be doubted, that, between the lust
of territorial aggrandizement on the part of the Oriental
* Dionysius Kal., VII. 20.      f Polybius III., 22.




THE CRIE!SONi 2SE.                 57
monarchs, and the sturdy love of liberty, and determination to
assist freemen when fighting for freedom at all hazards, on that
of the Athenians, the war must have come on sooner or later,
and the invasion, which might have been delayed awhile, was
but precipitated by this act of imprudent interference.
Such, then, was the state of the world, in general, at this
eventful moment; and such that of Greece, Athens, and Sparta,
with Thebes, as an inferior third, being greatly, in all respects,
the superior powers of Hellas, and each, singly, superior to
several of the smaller, but still independent states, which lent
manful contribution to the general cause. Nor, if Attica was
thus, in some sort, already mixed up in the desultory hostilities
which had been going on, almost from time immemorial, between
some of the iHelienic tribes, the Ionians. more especially, and the
Oriental empire, was Miltiades, to whom her fate or her fortune
gave the leading of her phalanx on the eventful day of Marathon, less remarkably involved in almost personal, although
hereditary hostilities with the king of Persia.
It fell out in this wise, and that not many yeatrs previous to
the occurrences which are to be related hereafter.  The tale in
itself is somewhat singular and romantic; and, as it explains
how a man could be at one time tyrant of the Thracian Chersonese-as was then called the narrow peninsula lying between
the gulf of Saros and the Dardanelles, or IHellespont, of which
it forms the northern or European shore-and a citizen of
Athens, besides throwing some light on the character of " freedom's best and dearest friend," I shall not pause, but introduce
it, no less, I hope, for the instruction, than for the amusement of
my readers.
Nor will it be absurd in this place to say a few words on the
meaning of the term  tyrant, as one which will occur frequently
throughout this volume, and which has, with the Greeks, an
absolute and positive meaning, from which it never wanders,




58                       MILTIADES.
bearing no relation whatever to the moral qualities of the man,
or the manner in which he administered his authority, but to
the means only by which he attained it.  The mildest and most
moderate, the wisest and most beneficent of men, might easily
bear, under the Greek interpretation of the term, the name of
tyrant; and such was actually the case of Gelo, and the second
Hiero of Syracuse, as of many others, on whom we need not
dwell.  Again, it is not true, as some have asserted, that the
Greeks held the office and very name of king in such abhorrence, that they gave to all kings the opprobrious name of tyrant.
So far from this, to the end of their polity the Spartan republic
was administered by two kings, basileis, hereditary, from two
royal houses, though their power was restricted by the privileges
and authority of the ephori and senate; while the Epirots, Macedonians and other northern nations, were governed by hereditary
princes, who ruled with sovereignty and state not less than that
of Louis the Fourteenth of France.  Lastly, in no one instance
-is the king of Persia, whom they did most detest, as they had
the most reason to detest him, styled tyrant but invariably king,
with the emphatic accent preceding it, so as to signify the king,
as equivalent to the great king.  The fact is, that the Greek
Tyrant, rupavvos, signifies one who raised himself, or was raised
by others, even the people themselves, to a power which did not
belong to him, or which was not recognized by the state in which
it existed.  Our term usurper is the nearest to it, but is scarcely
so extended in its sense. For if a democratic state became weary
of its own democracy, and elected a man as its sovereign, he
would be a tyrant; and so also, if in a country ruled by a
dynasty of kings, a foreign and victorious power should overthrow one line, and erect another in its stead, the princes of the
intrusive line would be tyrants. The latter was a common case;
as the Spartans, themselves strictly oligarchical, were constantly
setting up in conquereI cities individual rulers, as in the case of




STORY OF THE DOLONCI,                  59
the thirty tyrants at Athens; and the king of Persia did little
more, in the subject Ionian cities, than set individual Greek
rulers over them, abolishing republican forms, and imposing a
moderate tribute.  Sometimes the aristocratic and democratic
tendencies of a state were so nearly balanced, that it were difficult to say which form the people really preferred. Still the
prince was a tyrant.  Sometimes the prince revolted, on behalf
of his own people, against the power which had made him their
lord, and was sustained by them. Still he was a tyrant.
The more general meaning of the term, however, is one who
holds regal office, where such does not legally exist, or where it
belongs to another, supporting himself, contrary to the will of
the citizens, by aid of foreign mercenary forces; and such a
tyrant was Miltiades.
How he became so, as I have observed above, is a curious
story, and singularly characteristic of those wild early times, in
which the highest refinement in literature and the arts was
blended with simplicity of manners almost patriarchal; and thus
it runs.
In the latter part of the reign of Cyrus, the Dolonci, a Thracian tribe, who occupied the Thracian Chersonese, being hard
pressed by their mainland neighbors, the Apsinthians, sent their
kings* to consult the oracle at Delphi, by what means they
should sustain themselves. To them the oracle made answer:
" Who first shall receive you as his guests into his house, returning homeward fiom this temple, him take along with you, to be
your general." So they turned home again, and they traversed
Phocis, traversed Bmeotia, and none offered them hospitality,
none received them.  And, late on an evening, they entered
Athens travel-stained and weary. Now, at this time, Pisistratus
held rule in Attica, not of right, nor of the popular choice, but
* Herodotus, Erato, VI., 32.




60                       MILTIADES.
self-imposed, a tyrant; and of the first citizens in the state, was
Miltiades, the son of Cypselus, of noble race, descended from.4zacus and zEgina, of a house famous for its chariot victories at
Olympia, and himself a four-horse victor; and he was ill disposed
towards the ruler of the state. But he, happening to sit in the
portico of his house as the ambassadors of the Dolonci passed,
observing their outlandish dresses and the strange fashion of
their spear-heads, shouted after them, and, when they returned,
proffered them lodging and guest-rites; and they, mindful of the
oracle, accepting, entered in; and, choosing their time, told him
all their errand, and begged him to go with them and be their
general. And he, in no wise indisposed, inclined to their will;
and, after consulting the oracle upon it, sailed with them, accompanied by many Athenian volunteers; and so, by the choice of
the people, became the tyrant of the Chersonese. How he conquered their old enemies, the Apsinthians, and how, warring
against Lampsacus, he fell into an ambush and wats captured,
and how he owed his release to the good offices of his friend
Crtesus, king of Lydia, may be read elsewhere; for it is not with
him  that I have to do, but with his nephew, Miltiades the
son of Cimon.
Being rescued thus, Miltiades returned again to his Chersonese,
and died there soon after, much beloved of his Dolonci, childless,
leaving his place and power to his brother Cimon's son, Stesagoras. Miltiades, the son of Cypselus, might be termed friend
of freedom, since freely chosen by a free people, he ruled them
by their own laws, and freed them from their enemies.
Stesagoras in his own turn died also, knocked on the head
with an axe by a man of Lampsacus, in seeming a deserter, but
indeed a most active enemy, he too childless, and intestate.
There was no tyrant now  of the Dolonci.  But the sons of
Pisistratus, Hiippias and Hipparchus, who now held, not filled,
their father's place in Athens, partly, it may be thought, from a




THE SON OF CIMON.                   e1
desire of supporting tyrannies in the abstract, more from the
wish to get rid of a dangerous citizen, lent a trireme with its
crew to Stesagoras' brother, Miltiades the son of Cimon, and sent
him to try his fortune with the Dolonci. He, by a rare mixture
of force and fraud, succeeded, and became tyrant of the Chersonese, holding it with a force of five hundred foreign mercenaries,
and marrying a daughter of Olorus, king of the Thracians, thereby strengthening himself in his usurped authority.  Assuredly
a deep and crafty statesman, as he afterward approved himself a
brave and able soldier, but, to my mind, in no respect a friend of
fireedom.
Thereafter his career was adventurous and full of vicissitudes.
For, since the arrival of the Dolonci, seeking a general in Athens,
great changes had occurred the world over.  Not only Miltiades,
the son of Cypselus, was dead, and Stesagoras his nephew and
successor, but his friend Cresus, no longer king of Lydia, conquered of Cyrus, and Cyrus too his conqueror, and Cambyses son
of Cyrus, and Smerdis the Magian, who usurped the throne of
Persia; and now Darius, son of Hystaspes, had become THE
KING, and, being set to conquer the European Scythians, who
were in all probability the Huns of later ages, he summoned the
contingents of all the Greek cities, and of the Chersonese among
the rest; and then passing over the Bosphorus into Europe, by
a bridge of boats, marched onward into the Northern deserts
with a host of seven hundred thousand Asiatics.  The guardianship of the second bridge of boats, on which he crossed the
Danube, between Ismail, it is said, and the Pruth, he entrusted
to the Ionian leaders of the fleet by which it was composed, and
among them to Miltiades the son of Cirnon, and Histiaeus, tyrant
of- Miletus. But the march of Darius and his seven hundred
thousand was the very prototype of the march of a far greatel
than Darius, into the same inhospitable regions, though from
a different quarter.   The Scythiang would not fight him,




62                       MILTIADES.
or fought him only, Parthian-like, retreating; until the country and the climate, and disease and weariness and want had
conquered the great host, that it turned, desperate, to retreat. Then
Cossack-like they hung upon his rear, never seen till they werefelt, invisible, yet ever present, and slaughtered the weary Asiatics, unresisted and unsparing.  And they sent *secret word to
the Ionians, who had guard of the bridge, that they should break
it and get them home; and, had they done the bidding of the
Scythians, the Danube had been an earlier Beresina; and there
had been no Marathon nor Salamis, nor perhaps any wars for
ever more of Greece and Persia.  And Miltiades was very urgent
with the confederates, that they should break the bridge, for that
the Persian was the natural enemy of all Greeks, and that the
Ionians owed him neither fealty nor faith, but followed him as
tributaries only on compulsion.  But Histiveus of Miletus, and
the tyrants of the other Ionian cities, declared against Miltiades;
saying that if Darius were the enemy of Greeks, he was the
fiiend of tyrants; and that, he dead, all they should lose their
cities and hold tyrannies no longer. And they prevailed over
Miltiades, and the bridge was maintained.  So Darius returned
to Asia to execute conquest of the Punjaub, to meditate conquest
of Greece.  Nor had not Miltiades, thereafter, his reward at the
king's hands for his treason; for, in the third year of his sovereignty, the Nomadic Scythians, at instigation of Darius, broke
into the Chersonese and over-ran it, hoping to take him for the
king, who had him at feud on account of the bridge over the
Danube.  But he escaped and absented himself from his dominions until, the Scythians retiring, the Dolonci brought him
back again, showing thereby that although an usurper, he was
by no means, in our sense of the word, a tyrant, but had in some
sort gained the good will of his subjects.  Not now, however,
was it his fate long to reign over them; for learning that a
Phoenician fleet was stationed at Tenedos, and hovering otf his




RETURNS TO ATHENS.                 63
coasts, with what intent he knew but too well, he put his property on board five triremes, and setting sail from  the city of
Kardia on the gulf of Melas, now the gulf of Saros, took leave of
the Chersonese for ever, and steered for Athens, whence his
enemies Hippias and Hipparchus had been expelled by IHarmodius and Aristogeiton. Meanwhile his ill-fortune followed him.
The Phcenicians, whom he had hoped to elude, gave chase, and
took'one of his ships, commanded by his eldest son, Metiochus,
born of a previous marriage, not of the Thracian princess. Him,
the Phoenicians handed over to Darius, that he might work his
will on him in revenge for the treason of the bridge. But Darius
did him no ill, but good; and gave him a house and lands and a
Persian woman to his wife, of whom he had children that were
altogether Persians.
With the four other ships, hard pressed, Miltiades got into
port, at Imbros, and difficultly thence to Athens. Nor here did
the spite of fortune leave him; for the laws of Attica were so
strenuous against tyrants, that, although he had been sent out in
an Athenian vessel, under Athenian orders, to do precisely as he
did, he was put on his trial for his life, and was acquitted by
popular favor, not because he had not made himself tyrant of the
Dolonci, but because when their.tyrant he had not, like the other
Ionian princes, made common cause with Darius, but had remained a Greek at heart, although a tyrant, and had even
preferred the common good of Greece, to the maintenance of his
usurped authority.
Heartily sick was he probably, of his tyranny of the Chersonese, and heartily glad to escape its consequences, for in truth he
had played but a poor figure in the part; and, had his career
ended with it little would the world have ever heard of Miltiades
the tyrant of the Chersonese.
But now a greater contest was at hand, a wider field was
open for the display of military genius, for the gratification of




64                     MILTIADES.
" vaulting ambition that overleaps itself and falls on the other
side," and of all others Miltiades was the man to grasp the golden
opportunity.
I have stated above, that there had been a deep-set animosity
long kindled in the heart of Darius against the Athenians, who
had presumed, daring and insolent republicans, to assist his
rebels of Miletus, and burn his royal city of Sardis. And now,
his time was fully come; his own dominions were composed in
the deep tranquillity of servitude, the vast conquests of Cyrus
and Cambyses thoroughly consolidated, and, by his own late victories in the Punjaub, the utmost portions of his enormous empire were guaranteed from the incursions, for a while at least, of
the fierce and unruly Indians.
There was now no need any longer, that, as the king sat
down to meat with his assembled nobles, his criers should make
proclamation thrice, as had been the usage ever since the conflagration of Sardis, "Master, remember the Athenians"-for
already he had remembered them.
The conduct of the war was entrusted to Mardonius, the son
of Gobryas, who had lately espoused the king's daughter Artozostra, and the preparations were made on the scale ind which
oriental warfare has in all ages been conducted. I am aware
that it has been the fashion to doubt and deny the numbers of
the Persian armies, as related by the Greek authors; but when
we look to the facts, which have been clearly ascertained within
the last half century, concerning the enormous numerical force
which Eastern armies, and even European armies fighting in the
East, are compelled by the necessities of the climate to bring into
the field, counting the mere camp followers and baggage drivers
by hundreds, the elephants and camels by tens, of thousands, till
the united numbers nearly swell to millionfs, I see no cause to
doubt the accounts given to us of the hordes urged forward by
the will of a despot, unlimited in resources either of men or




PERSIAN SHIPWRECKS.                  65
moneys, for the accomplishment of the dearest object of his ambition.
A fleet sailed from the Hellespont, with orders to reduce the
Ionian cities of the coast and the Gi'eek islands, and thereafter to
rendezvous at the isle of Thasos, where it would meet, and act in
communication with the land forces of five hundred thousand
men, which crossing the Dardanelles, should march through
Thrace upon Macedonia; nor until reaching its frontiers did they
look to encounter enemies. In the first instance, the movements
of the fleet were entirely successful, the Ionian cities submitting
to receive tyrants in lieu of their own democratic governments,
and the islands of the Archipelago surrendering without a blow.
The fleet reached Thasos, loaded with booty, flushed with success, and confident of future victory-confidence soon to be
changed to despair. For as they attempted to round Mount
Athos, now the Monte Santo, the huge and towering head
land of the easternmost of those three long protruding promontories which formed the Macedonian district of Chalcidice,
separated from the mainland of Greece by the Thermaic
Bay, now the Gulf of Salonica, a violent north wind, with a
heavy broken sea, drove them upon the craggy shores of the
promontory, where above three hundred war-ships were wrecked
and twenty thousand men perished. On a first glance at the
map, this account would appear preposterous, and the catastrophe
impossible, as connected with a north wind blowing at the time;
since the true course which to steer from Thasos to clear the
headland is south, about three points westerly; so that a north
wind instead of setting them upon Athos would have carried
them clear off it, and the first land they would have made, running dead before it, would have been the isle of Scyros, about
two degrees distant. As is, however, in such instances very often
the case, the very discrepancy, as it seems, proves the fact; for
if, instead of steering broad out into the open sea and stretching
4




66                      MILTIADES.
away straight for the headland, they had crept close in shore,
following all the sinuosities of the coast, round the Gulf of Contessa, Sinus Strymonicus, they would ultimately find themselves
embayed directly to the northward of the stern and rock-bound
coast; and that they did so is certain, as it is stated by ierodotus,* that they anchored for the night at Akanthos, the modern
Hieriso, which is situated at the southern extremity of such a
bay, and weighing thence encountered the gale which destroyed
them, as it necessarily must do, since to work out thence and
round the headland they must needs lay a northeast course.
The fleet being destroyed thus and its crews lost, some dashed
upon the rocks, some perishing of cold, and some devoured, as
Herodotus informs us, by the monsters which abound in those
most prolific seas, scarcely a relique was saved to tell of the disaster. Nor was Mardonius much more successful with his land
forces than he had been by sea; for having reached the confines
of Macedonia, the Brygian tribe of Scythians beat up his quarters at night, and, forcing his defences, handled him so severely
that, although he was subsequently able to chastise them, 1,nd
even to reduce them to permanent subjection, he was so much
weakened by their first onslaught and by the subsequent operations, that he perceived the utter hopelessness of prosecuting any
schemes of conquest, when unsupported by a fleet, drew off his
shattered forces and returned home, disgracefully beaten, even
to humiliation.
For two or three years subsequent to this disaster, Darius
employed himself in humbling his own immediate tributaries,
especially the Thasians, in whose island there were exceeding rich
gold mines, of which he made himself master; not neglecting,
however, to make preparations for a fresh attack on Greece,
which to subdue, his very reverses had but the more obstinately
determined him. In the opening of the third season, he sent
* Herod. Erato. VI., 44.




DEMAND OF EARTH AND WATER.              67
ambassadors to demand earth and water, implying unconditional
surrender, by land and sea, of all the Hellenic states. On the
main land this concession was made by all the semi-barbarous
kingdoms of Thessaly, Macedonia, and Epirus, and even by the
civilized and powerful confederacy of Boeotia —in the islands it
was denied by none of whom it was demanded; and thence
arose a fierce naval warfare between Athens and the iEginetans,
who had submitted, inhabiting an island almost within bowshot
of the coasts of Attica. This war was strenuously insisted on by
Themistocles, the wisest of Greek statesmen, and undeniably a
great commander; who, foreseeing the tempest which was about
to break over Athens, from a point far remote and unsuspected
by the many, and knowing the restless impatience of his countrymen under taxation, except when under the impulse of any
immediate excitement, made use of this trivial quarrel as a pretext for an increase of the navy wholly disproportionate to the
present object, to which in the end the preservation of Greece
itself from the barbarian yoke has been ascribed, and not I think
without sufficient reason.*
But now the decisive moment had arrived. In the beginning
of the year 490, before the Christian era, being the 19th of the
Roman republic, and the 4th of the 72d Olympiad, Darius,
constantly whetted to action by the instigation of IIippias-the
fagitive tyrant of Athens, who, disappointed of Spartan aid to
avenge him on his native land., had fled to Persia-and smarting
under his late defeat, raised a new force under Datis, the Mede,
and his brother's son, Artaphernes. To these he gave six hundred triremes, each carrying two hundred men, besides horsetransports, with orders to destroy Athens and Eretria, that not
one stone should stand upon other, and to bring away all the
population in chains, to be sold as bond-slaves; and sent the
* Plutarch. Themist. 5.




68                      MILTIADES.
traitor Hippias, to whom, of all infamies, this last was only want
ing, to guide them and reveal the weak points of his country.
These leaders justly dreading the stormy cape of Athos,
marched down their forces by land, through Asia Minor, emn
barked them at the isle of Samos, and steered their course through
the islands of the Archipelago, taking Naxos which had not
surrendered the previous year, right upon Euboea, the Negropont, there to obey their master's commands, in reference to the
city of Eretria. There the inhabitants were panic-stricken, and
wavering between three minds, whether to desert the city and
take refuge among the craggy fortresses of the island, whether to
accept the assistance of four thousand Hoplitai from the colonists
of Chalciclice, or lastly whether to submit themselves to the
mercy of the Persians. Naturally, as ever is the case with
waverers, they determined on nothing; some fled to the hills for
shelter from the tempest, and escaped it; some took refuge in
Oropus, on the mainland of Bceotia; and a few made fruitless
resistance on the walls, which were stormed after an assault of
six days, when four hundred prisoners only, ten of the number
being women, were taken and transported to Asia, according to
Darius' orders; where they were entreated kindly and settled in
the district of Crissa.
In the meantime, the Athenians, not unmindful of their peril,
nor unmindful either of their past deeds and present glory, made
preparation for a stern resistance, being resolved as gallant men,
and who can resolve more, to deserve at least, if they might not
command, success.
They raised men, heavy-armed foot all, the prime of their best
citizens, to the number of nine thousand, for so many, only in
such an emergency, could the first city of Hellas muster, to
defend her national existence; and to command this handful, for
such it was as compared to the vast array of the orientals, which
embraced the contingents of no less than six and forty nations,




THE TEN GENERALS.                   69
they elected ten generals, the last chosen of whom was Miltiades
the son of Cimon, who should command on alternate days, in
addition to the Polemarch, or second Archon of the year, whose
office it was at this time, although at a later period he
seems to have performed the duties rather of war-minister than
warrior, to command the right wing of the army. A disposition
more subversive of all true military principles cannot possibly be
imagined than this; for, however well it might succeed, as
regards the mere tactics on the day of action in the face of the
enemy, it must of course prevent and nullify any long series of
combined strategetical movements, unless in the case of unanimity, a thing hardly to be expected; since a single malcontent
could, on the return of his day for commanding, disarrange and
frustrate all the movements of the past nine days, and bring on
or decline action on his own individual responsibility.  It is
singular enough, considering that in strategy, above all other
sciences, promptitude in determining, decision in acting, and pertinacity in adhering to a course of action once taken, are emphatically the qualities most essential, and that these can only be
attained- by unity of counsel, combined with unity of command,
how many nations have erred by insisting, almost unto their own
destruction, on this subdivision of responsibility, and partition of
command. It would seem to have been, in most cases, prompted
by a jealousy of entrusting too much power to the hands of a
single individual; since it is always in the most ultra republics
that we observe this strange fallacy most predominant. By the
Athenians, it was far more consistently acted upon, than by
any other nation; yet we find it showing itself, at times, even
among the wise and politic Romans; as in the case of Terentius
Varro, and ~Emilius Paullus, whose alternate command led to
the fatal defeat of Cannae; and again in that of Fabius and
Minucius, where a similar result was prevented only by the
celerity, most unusual in him, and genius of the old dictator. It




70                       MILTIADES.
was a regular principle with the Venetians, to send with e very
fleet and army, a citizen proveditore, or overlooker, whose
province it was to command the commander, hamper him in all
his movements, and dictate to him in his own profession. The
detestable demagogues of the French directory introduced the
same invention, attaching to all their expeditions a representative,
as he was called, of the French people. The object of the directory was, however, different, being in fact the procuring of
fresh and illustrious victims for the guillotine; as the duty of the
representative was merely that of spy and informer. These
gentlemen did, however, less harm than would have been expected, as they invariably ran away at the first shot; like citizen
Jean Bon St. Andre, representative on board the French flag
ship, on the fourth of June, who at the first broadside of the
Queen Charlotte, dived into the cockpit, and was seen no more
until the firing ceased. It is more remarkable than this, that the
cold autocratic Austria, so lately as the last great European war,
should have hampered the movements, and frustrated the successes of her greatest leader, the Arch-duke Charles, by the slow
and stupid intervention of her Aulic council. In all ages, by
whatever polity or form of government it has been adopted, it
has been, and it ever will be, impolitic, disastrous, and well if it be
not fatal. Better two pilots in a ship, battling with the tempest
amid reefs and breakers, than two leaders, equal in authority,
upon a day of battle.
Such had well nigh been the case at Marathon, and such it
would have been, but for the prudence, wisdom, and moderation
of one man-one man very great, because he was so very good;
for beyond this, the closest examination of history shows us
nothing conspicuously striking in the character or conduct of
Aristides.  Nowhere do we discover any brilliant talents, much
less any genius, in his serene and even course of action. He was
no orator, he was not a great strategist; but he was something




PHIDIPPIDES THE RUNNER.                 71
better, he was a man of such sterling probity, such unquestionable
truth, candor, justice, and integrity, that men greater and abler,
and far mlore brilliant in themselves than he, submitted themselves to his guidance, and surrendered even their own convictions
to the certainty that his judgment, founded on his integrity, must
needs be sound and solid; and so indeed it was.
But I must not anticipate, nor indeed is there occasion, for the
crisis is even now at hand, and the struggle imminent.  The first
question which arose between the numerous commanders turned
on the method of defence to be adopted; a majority in the first
instance wishing to remain within the city, and risk an assault;
the insanity of such a plan being obvious on its face, when the
overwhelming numbers of the Persian would enable them to
attack on all points at the same moment, or if they should prefer
blockading, to carry out lines of circumvallation in the least given
space of time.  On this AMiltiades insisting strenuously, and
defending his insistency by good and soldierly reasons, for it was
founded on a true principle of warfare, that to stand a siege when
there is no hope of relief from without is an absurdity, he prevailed so far that his colleagues consented to march out, and fortify a camp at a few miles distance from the city.  Before leavin(g the walls, however, a herald, of that class called {isgg0s0ioi.,
men who can run through an entire day, was despatched to
Sparta, to inform the Lacedzemonians, how Eretria was taken and
all its inhabitants carried into bondage, in what present peril
Athens stood, and to implore their present aid and succor. The
name of this runner was Phidippides.  Now as this runner, full
of enthusiasm and of high thoughts concerning his country, and
her ancient glories, and her ancient gods, sped onward, having
long passed the Corinthian isthmus, and entered the mountainous
and forest-mantled country of Arkadia, and passed beneath the
dark and solemn heights of Mount Parthenios, near the city of
Tegea, he imagined-for imagination it must have been, unless




'72                     MILTIADES.
we are prepared to believe that evil spirits actually were the gods
of the old time, which I at least am not-that a strange voice,
greater than human, shouted to him from the hill-side, " Phidippides, Phidippides"-and that as he turned him round, the wood
god Pan stood manifest before him, and bade him  tell the
Athenians " that they should take no fear of him, since he was
friendly to the Athenians, and oftentimes had aided them before,
and so would now, and again in the times to come."
Such tales as these are curious; not that we must do aught
but discard them altogether as matters of every day fact; and
yet they were indeed the cause of facts and great ones. There
was a freshness in the world in those days, a freshness and sincerity and youth in the heart of man such as we find rarely nowa-days; and then only in some earnest, shy, and world-secluded
student; in some half precocious, half dull-witted child; or perhaps in some remote mountaineer, from the wildest and most
solitary district.
The earth, with all its unshorn garniture of woodlands, its
sacred fountains, its mysterious tarns and umbrageous mnountains; was full of poetry; and from it poetry had welled up into
the heart of every man, in a greater or less degree; and whether
the poetry had engendered the religion, or the religion created
the poetry, there they were, two in one, self-existent in every
heart; so that to dream and muse, until the mortal senses
became conscious as it were of their real presence, of white
nymphs sporting round their crystal waterfalls, or wood-gods
wakling wild melodies from reedy pipes, or huge heroic shades
brooding in giant majesty over their lonely barrows, was a thing
usual and common; and neither the seer nor the hearer doubted,
for an instant, the absolute reality of such creations of the fantastical and teeming brain, or hesitated to place implicit confidence
in their reported revelations. For I dismiss, at once, as mere
pedantic efforts to explain away, in a matter of fact counting



THE VISION OF THIE GOD PAN.             73
house style, things which cannot be explained at all, the attempts
of a certain school of would-be classical authorities and expositors, who are, however, daily becoming rarer and less intrusively
absurd, to represent such messages and apparitions, as this, as
being devices and inventions of this or that leader, for the encouragement of his own people or the discomfiture of his enemy.
Indeed it is as plain as anything can be, that the leaders believed
themselves-believed, and often trembled, as much as the meanest of their people. It is a well-known fact, that of uncultivated
men, the inhabitants of forest and mountain lands are far more
imaginative and even superstitious, if you will, than those of the
broad valley or the open plain. The inexplicable phenomena of
light and shade, of atmospheric and perhaps subterranean, even
volcanic, influences, producing sounds and sights for which no
science of theirs can account, are to them voices from  the
past or tidings of the future, manifestations of demigods and
demons, perhaps revelations from the great gods themselves.
Just such a land was Greece, so framed, so modelled, with unseen subterranean torrents, whose murmurs struggled upward
oppressed to the doubting ear, and twilight passes through the
cragols, and glades and gorges full of strange accidents of light,
suggesting strange imaginations. And when to this the bent and
inclination of the national mind, the almost universal prevalence
of poetry, and the direct tendency of the national religion were
added, strengthening every half-doubted fancy, and giving ear to
every wildest mythos, how shall we doubt-we who know that
even to this day of Christian illumination and mid-day blaze of
almost skeptical science, doubting all things, denying all things,
that are not mathematically proven, the Scottish belief in the
Taishatr or second sight is absolute in many a highland glen and
corrie-how shall we doubt, I say, that the intellectual, dreaming, sensuous Greek, five hundred years before the birth of
Christ, nourished the conviction of his real intercourse with
4




'74                     MILTIADES.
Dryad and Nereid, Pan and Sylvan, as we cherish the most
lovely doctrines of our own pure religion.
Therefore, I say that to Phidippides the god Pan did appear,
and that he did speak thus-for to Phidippides and to the auditors of Phidippides, whether it was a scathed pine tree blackening
in the forest amid the silver moonlight, or a mist wreath glittering through the shadows, it was the great god Pan. And it
was the voice of that god Pan, whether that voice were the
night wind howling through the pine-tops, or the torrent bellowing through the ravine, which bade them be of good cheer
and conquer; and they were of good cheer, and they did
conquer.
The power of faith, as stated in holy writ, even if applied to
mortal matters and to mere physical efforts, is scarcely overrated.
He who has faith that he can accomplish anything rarely fails,
even if he task his strength almost beyond the utmost, to acconmplish it. He, who doubts his own powers, surely fails to execute
that which he could have performed with ease, had his heart
been high of cheer and courage.
Therefore, to the Athenians, to those who fought at Marathon,
Pan, who appeared to Phidippides on Mount Parthenios, near
Tegea, was a fact, and a true fact. And it helped the runner on
his way doubtless, for on the second day from Athens he stood
before the Ephori in Sparta, and said what the time required.
And the Spartans were much moved, and eager to rush to the
rescue; and they promised speedy reinforcement, but not yet;
for it was now the ninth day of the month, and between the
ninth day and the full of the moon it was forbidden to the Spartans to set on foot any expedition, to go forth in arms beyond
the city gates. And this they said, not seeking pretexts, nor
wishing to defer their succor until they might withhold it altogether; for they perceived the urgency of the common peril, and
perceived, too, that should Athens perish, the brunt must fall on




THE PLAIN OF MIARATHON.                 75
themselves the next, with none at hand to succor them.  But it
was their religion and their law that they must await the full of
the moon. And the religion must not be despised, nor the law
broken. So they awaited the full of the moon; and Phiclippides
returned home, full of the vision which he had seen, and elated
by the thought that instead of mortal aid, he brought back to
his countrymen the tidings of an immortal alliance.
When he returned, the Athenians-having been joined by the
little city of Plataia, their subordinate ally, which with a rare
fidelity had turned out, in this desperate emergency, mindful of
past benefits, not of present peril, with every man that she could
muster capable of bearing arms, to the number of a thousand
shields all of Hoplitai-had marched out and sat down in a fortified camp at the opening of the valley of Marathon, now Vrana,
where its torrent issues from the hills to discharge itself across
the plain into the Gulf of Eghina.
The mountains look on Marathon,
And Marathon looks on the seasays Byron —than whom there are few more accurate observers
or vivid describers of natural scenery; and accordingly we find
from other authorities that the scene of this celebrated battle is
an elevated plain of about two miles and a half in width, hemmed
in at either extremity by difficult craggy heights, and bounded to
the southeast by the sea. At the northwestern extremity of the
plain a deep gorge-like valley, in the upper part of which the village of Vrana is situated, opens into the plain, discharging
across it a torrent which falls into the middle of the Bay of
Marathon by three shallow channels.  The northern boundary
of the bay is a narrow  rocky point, close to which is a salt
stream connected with a shallow lake and a large extent of marsh
land. Such to this day are the features of this great natural
battle-field, with scarce an exception, the only ground in Attica




'76                     MILTIADES.
fit for a charge of cavalry, and, as such, selected for his place of
debarkation by the traitor renegado Hippias. To complete the
picture, as it meets the modern eye, towards the middle of the
plain stands a large tumulus or barrow, about twenty-five feet
high, resembling those on the plain of Troy, says the traveller
whom I quote, and I will add closely resembling those scattered
through many of the western states, beneath which sleeps undisturbed all that is mortal of those high spirits, whom Demosthenes was wont to adjure-swearing " By those who died at
Marathon!" It is said, also, that the remains of marble monuments and trophies may be seen still on the salt marsh. But on
that day there was no mound, no monument, no trophies; only
the long, dry, bent grass, tossing in the gentle sea-breeze over
the smooth plain, and the broom and heather waving upon the
craggy sides of the gray hills, whither the bees came often from
iymetos to recruit their stores.
In the mouth of the glen, between the village and the sea, lay
the Athenian army in its lines, ten thousand shields of heavy
infantry, full armed, without taking into account their servants,
who are not indeed numbered in any of the accounts of the battle
extant, but whom I confidently set down at ten thousand more;
since it was the invariable practice with Hellenic armies, and
expressly so stated by Herodotus* of the battle of Plataia, that
every heavy armed soldier had one citizen of a lower class to
carry his shield on the march, and otherwise attend on his person-these men forming the light troops in action, and generally
known as gymnetes, or naked men, from their carrying no offensive armor beyond a light casque and buckler.  The Spartans
proper, when in the field, were attended each by no less than
seven helots; so that the Spartan shield represented eight fighting men, as the term lance in the middle ages was understood
to embrace five persons, the man-at-arms himself and four var* Herod. IX. 29.




THE ATHENIAN FORCE.                   77
lets. The whole fighting force of the Athenians at Marathon
may therefore be set down, unhesitatingly, at twenty thousand
men; only ten thousand of whom, however, were capable of
breasting the brunt of battle; although the rest might do good
service with their javelins, skirmishing in the van until driven in,
and in cutting up and routing a beaten enemy.  To this lastemployment their duties on this occasion must have been limited,
since the circumstances of the action, to which I shall come forthwith, precluded the possibility of skirmishing. Amorg other
great deficiencies of the Athenians, the greatest of which was
being inferior to their enemy in the ratio of something more than
one to five, was their total lack of either horse or archers, in the
presence of an army which was incomparably the best in the
world in those services.  VWith none of the continental Greeks
was the bow a favorite weapon, but with the Athenians it was
regarded as slavish and degrading to the hands of a freeman.
The absence of their cavalry at Marathon must be ascribed; I
suppose, to their prudently holding it back as utterly useless, consisting at this time of not above two hundred young men of the
noblest families, who could only have been literally trampled
under foot by the overwhelming charge of ten thousand Oriental
horse.
In the mean time, while the Athenian force lay encamped
near to the mouth of the valley of Marathon, within the con.secrated ground and grove of the Herakleion, or temple of Herakles, at the distance of about fifteen English miles from the
Acropolis, Hippias, who appears from the arrival of the armament upon the shores of Greece to have succeeded to the chief
command, landed the captives whom they had secured at Eretria,
on the small island of REgileia; and then bringing to his vessels
in the bay of Marathon, disembarked all his power, and arrayed
it, as for battle, in the plain, between the sea and the Athenian
encampment.




C78                    IMILTIADES.
On that night, a council of war was held in the camp of the
Greeks; and, as invariably is the case with councils of war, even
when composed of men individually the most daring and even
rash, the decision was not to fight; for where there can be no
individual censure or responsibility, every one shelters himself
under the impunity of the whole, and easily admits or advises
actions, which if personally and solely accountable, he would be
ashamed to adopt, much more to recommend. Indeed, as it has
become a proverb everywhere that corporations have no conscience, so might it be urged, and with even more justice, that
councils of war have no courage.  Another palpable argument
against the subdivision of military command.
The ten generals were divided; five voted to give battle, five
insisted that their numbers were so desperately inadequate, until
the Spartans should arrive, that to fight was merely to die
without aiding' their country or advancing the cause of freedom.
The names of the voters are not given by Herodotus, who merely
states the fact that Miltiades urgently but vainly insisted on delivering battle, the ten generals being divided; and that he prevailed by
inducing Callimachus the Polernnrch, who, according to the Athenian law, had an equal vote with each of the generals, to throw
his casting vote in favor of fighting.  Plutarch asserts, however,
that the change in the ultimate decision of the council was greatly
attributable to the efforts of that noble man Aristidcles, who,,s
well as Themistocles, was a general on that occasion, and with
him commanded the centre, in the action which enslued.
The arguments produced by Miltiades can easily be imagined.
If not to fight for what were they sent thither? for what purpose, indeed, had an army been  raised at all? The ground, if
favorable to the Persian horse, was no less favorable to the phalanx, which could not mnancuvre with effect in brolen ground,
and required a level and unbroken surface to make its charge
effective.  If not there-there, at Marathon, where were they to




REASONS FOR FIGHTING.        7~
give battle? In broken ground and among craggy eminences
the missiles and short weapons of the Orientals would be superior to their long and unwieldy pikes.  Lastly-this he urged
on Callimachus, it is said, in private-it could not be doubted,
if the army lay in the presence of the enemy long inactive, that
a revolution would take place in the minds of the Athenian democracy, and that the state would in all probability surrender,
and accept Median usages, and a Median governor. Besides
this, he expressed a full conviction in their power of winning the
battle, in spite of all the superiority of the enemy in numbers,
horse, and archery; a conviction arising doubtless fiom his long
acquaintance with oriental armies-having seen them in the field,
and having learned how, by fighting on their side, to fight
against them with effect; a conviction, which proved, as it is by
the event, to have been founded on no vainglorious over-estimate
of himself, or of the men under his command, on no weak and
unsoldierly contempt of his antagonist, is in itself an evidence
of his possessing the genius of a great and veritable captain. All
his decisions-so far as we know them-were correct; all his
perceptions lucid; all his conclusions just. His first determination to leave the walls and deliver battle in the field, was soldierly; and not soldierly only, but politically sound and wise.
Soldierly, for he knew, that men will fight better alwvays, as the
black Douglas wont to say, where they can hear the lark sing
than the mouse squeak —that to give men courage and confidence before the enemy, their general must show that he has
confidence in them-politically wise, because to show Hellas
that Athens despaired neither of Athens nor of Hellas, was the
only hope to kindle anything of general or impulsive al:dor in the
hearts of Greeks; was the surest mode of bringing Sparta in
arms to the rescue. His second, to deliver battle then and
there, was no less sound and masterly judgment; since he had
nothing on which to retreat except the city, from which he had




80                       MILTIADES.
just marched out; when to retreat on that would have crowned
the spirits of the Persian hordes, and their traitor general Hippias, with the certainty of triumph, and depressed those of his
countrymen, it is most like, as he predicted, even to the point of
instant submission.
Fortunately Kallimachos the Polemarch, on whom, as having
the casting vote, something of personal responsibility now rested,
was a man both of nerve and judgment, and he decided instantly
for battle. And thereupon arose one of those strange and sudden conversions, which are not, after all, so unnatural as they at
first appear, among the very men who had so strenuously opposed Miltiades but a moment, as it were, before.  They now, on
the motion of Aristides, determined, each one on the day when
his turn of command should come about, to resign it to Miltiades,
virtually constituting him sole general and commander in chief,
as his right, in behalf of superior military genius.
I have said that this was not so wonderful as it would seem at
first sight-for it was not that those generals lacked patriotism,
9r judgment, or perception of what was right, or generosity, or, least of all, courage.  It was that they shunned-as
ninety-nine men in a hundred do and ever will shun-responsibility, when it may be shuffled off without disgrace; and,
although they were defeated in their argument, and the counter
opinion had prevailed, it was, not improbably, with something
of gratitude, that they regarded the man who had relieved them
of that onerous burthen.
Nor, be it observed, was it an unnatural thing for the bravest
to shrink from assuming, or even from involuntarily incurring,
responsibility to the people of Athens-for with all their splendid intellectual capacities, all their brilliancy and wit, all their
fiery courage, and impulsive appreciation of the good and great,
there was nothing in them of that stern and perdurable resolution, that constancy not elevated by success nor prostrated by




HIS RESPONSIBILITY.                 81
reverse, which in truth belongs not to democracies-such as
that I mean which prompted the Roman Senate to thank the
fugitive Varro, escaped with a mere handful from the field of
Cainne, all but fatal to the state, " for that he had not despaired
of the republic."
With the Athenians, to be entrusted with command, and to
bring home defeat instead of victory, ruin instead of glory, was
in nine cases out of ten, to die a criminal. As to defeated
general of the French Republic was the guillotine, so to the
Attic captain, unsuccessful, was the draught of hemlock; and
such it may be held, with little doubt, would have been the
fate of Miltiades, if, having overborne the scruples of his colleagues, fighting, he had lost his army, and so returned to the
Acropolis.
But of such things, it is clear, he never thought; never, probably, contemplated the possibility of defeat.  He knew, what
probably no other man upon the field, of either armyr, knew, the
men of whom he was himself the leader, and the men against
whom he was about to lead them. A soldier almost by profession; a soldier, almost an adventurer; the wearer of a sword
prompt to leap from its scabbard —not literally for hire, but in
any cause where renown and riches were to win-a soldier as
opposed to an armed citizen, Miltiades had of course studied
strategy as a science; and, as a most important part of that science, had observed the characters of men and nations. He was
acquainted with the arms, the mode of fighting, the tactics, the
very mental characteristics of every different nation, tribe, or nomad horde, which was to be marshalled against him under the
banners of the Persian monarch.  He had partaken their war
against the Scythians, and seen its miserable and disgraceful termination.  He knew, too, his countrymen, their perfect discipline, their fiery yet manageable valor, the compact array of their
impenetrable phalanx, and the effect of its tremendous onset.




82                       JMILTIADES.
[ie knew all this, and, knowin g it, was serene in the security of
his conviction.
Fifty years afterwards, what Miltiades did, winning thereby
renown immortal, would have been done by any leader whom
chance placed at the head of a Greek phalanx; for it was then
an established fact that the bravest of the orientals could not
stand for an instant the pcans and the pikes of the Hellenic
column, which cut through them  as the war-ship cuts the billows, and scarce feels that they resist her passage.
But now, this was not so; the trial had not yet been made,
much less decision had; and so far as the prestige went, it was
in favor of the Medes and Persians, and agogainst the Europeans.
Within a few years the former, from being a small inland state
of Asia, had raised themselves under three successive monarchs
-I say successive, for the reign of Smerdis the Magian was a
mere interlude —Cyrus, Cambyses, and the present king, to the
mastery of the whole Eastern continent, and that by mere force
of arms and courage.  TNo enemy had yet been found to oppose
them with equality, much less with success.  For if Cambyses
lost a host in the Egyptian deserts, it was the fatal simoom, and
the shifting sand-pillars, not the hand of man that smote him.
And if Darius left the bones of nations to whiten on the steppes
of Scythia, it was that the roving tribes let the elements and the
country do their battle for them, not that they met the invaders
beard to beard, and beat them back by valiant opposition. And
of this very battle, Herodotus observes,* that " the Athenians at
Marathon, were the first men who endured the sight of the AMedian garb, and resisted men so clad, for that at this time it was a
terror to the Greeks, only to hear the name of the Medians."
The greatness of Miltiades' genius, therefore, is evident in this;
that he, from observation, drew a conclusion directly opposite to
that of all the men of his day, amounting to a perfect conviction
* Herod. VI. 112.




THE FIELD OF MARATHON.                83
of success; which conviction, success proved sound and true.
That, from theory and principle, he himself devised and invented
a mode of attack on these dreaded antagonistics, which waes not
only overwhelmingly successful, but which was ever after the
mode of Greek attack on orientals, by the best generals, never
improved upon, and invariably crowned with complete triumph,
even in the days of Alexander, who found nothing to innovate
on the charge of'Marathon.
Being thus appointed commander-in-chief, and that too by the
voluntary cession of his colleagues, and having accepted the
appointment, it is somewhat remarkable that Miltiades did not at
once put his own plans in force, and give battle on the instant.
For some reason, however, which we cannot now fully ascertain,
he did not do so until his own proper day of command came
round.  That he was not waiting the arrival of Lacedemonian
succors is certain; for the day on which they would leave Sparta,
was accurately known, and the time which it would require to
bring them on the field, could be judged to a nicety; yet he did
deliver battle before their arrival, and that only by a single day.
That he could be actuated by any mere vanity as to fighting on
his own proper day of command, is out of the question; and,
although it is possible that he might have been deterred from
using a day ceded to him by some other leader, through the apprehension tfhat he might attempt to interfere, or re-assume the chief
command; there are yet strong reasons for believing that there
was a deeper cause, for his not delivering battle until the moment
when he did so. Marathon, as I have stated, lies on the eastern
coast upon the straits of Egripo, EEr'ipus, at about fifteen miles
distance from Athens, midway between that city and Carystus
now Castel Rosso, in Bceotia, something to the southward of
Eretria, which had just been captured. It had been selected
probably by the Athenian commander, as his post, from  the
facilities of observation it gave him; since, at whatever point of




84                      MILTIADES.
Attica, the enemy might land, he must be within striking distance, while in those narrow seas, the fleet could not make a
movement without being seen by a thousand eyes; while Hippias had chosen it as his point of debarcation, from its being the
spot of all Attica, most adapted to the manceuvres of his numerous and powerful cavalry. The Athenians, as we have seen,
were encamped in the gorge of a valley, opening from the northwest upon this plain, which runs from northeast along the coast,
southwesterly. They were, therefore, interposed directly between
the Persians and the city.  Now, it is clear that it was in
the power of the Persians, either to attack Miltiades in his
lines, or to turn either of his flanks by the rough ground, and
march upon the city. The first of these, Ilippias probably dared
not do, on account of the strength of the position, and of the
lines themselves, which were fortified, according to Cornelius
Nepos,* by an abattis of felled timber-although he ascribes a
purpose to it, which the circumstances of the battle by no means
bear out.  The second, which would unquestionably have been
the true movement, especially against such a force as the phalanx,
unable either to manceuvre or fight advantageously in uneven
ground, and still more so when he could have observed them,
and masked his own operations, by his clouds of horse, he was
probably deterred from doing by the peril of leaving such a force
in his rear, as that under Miltiades.
For several days, therefore, and it would seem to have been
ten, from the fact that Miltiades is stated to have been tenth
chosen, the two armies lay face to face, with about one mile
intervening; Hippias not daring to attack the Athenian camp,
Miltiades not choosing, although eager to deliver battle on the
first chance, for some unknown reason, to attack the Persians.
Now there is an obscure story or tradition, connected, by some
persons, with the account of the abattis of trees described by
* Miltiades, Chap. V.




ABSENCE OF PERSIAN HORSE.               85
Nepos, which appears to me to explain the whole. "In the
explanation of the proverb xwol1;  neLt;"* —I quote from Professor Anthon's classical dictionary, not having an opportunity
of referring to the original-" we read that when Datis invaded
Attica, the Ionians got upon the trees (?) and made signals to the
Athenians, that the cavalry had gone away, 5- eLve  2o I6&
lr7retg, and that Miltiades upon learning its retreat, joined battle
and gained the victory."
The Ionians alluded to, are of course the Asiatic or Island
Greeks, in the host of Datis and Artaphernes; the trees Professor Anthon conceives to be an allusion to the abattis named
above.  This does not however appear to me probable or
requisite to the solution of the case.
The Asiatic army consisted, according to Nepos, of one hundred thousand foot and ten thousand horse, present under arms,
besides a hundred thousand camp followers and non-combatants;
and this number agrees consistently and well with the numerical
force of the fleet, six hundred galleys, beside horse transports, as
stated by Herodotus, who elsewhere assigns two hundred fighting
men to each Persian trireme.
Now it is self-evident that the daily consumption of food by
such a host, in an enemy's country, unprovided with magazines,
and compelled to make war support war, must be enormous;
and that in a poor and sterile country like Attica supplies could
only have been procured, even for a few days, by sweeping the
country to a very considerable distance; for which purpose horse
would of necessity be employed. Again, although we are distinctly informed that Hippias selected Marathon as his point of
debarcation for the sake of employing his horse, yet in the battle
itself not only are no horse mentioned, but it is pretty clear that
none could have been there; since such a pursuit and slaughter
as occurred could not have taken place in the teeth of cavalry
over an open plain.
* Suidas, Ant. 14, 73. —Scholt.




86                       MILTIADES.
All this would necessarily be seen and anticipated by such a
general as Miltiades approved himself to be; and I cannot doubt
that, perceiving the unwillingness of Ilippias to attempt his lines,
and foreseeing the time when he must send off his horse to forage at a distance, he waited patiently until the moment should
arrive, as it did on his own proper day of command; when he
at once gave the signal and joined battle.
The plain of Marathon must have presented a singular and
gorgeous sight upon that summer morning.  The magnificent
array of the Cyprian and Phcenician galleys, drawn upon along
the beach, and covering the narrow straits of the Euripus; the
gorgeous tents of the Asiatics, glittering in barbaric splendor, of
gold and purple and embroidery, toward the green marge of
the salt marsh; and all along the plain, between the mountains
and the sea, the countless multitudes of the barbarian army. It
was the boast of the Athenians, when ten years later, on the
field of PIatea, they contended with the Tegeatans of Arcadia
for the leading of the right wing of the combined Hellenic forces,
that they had conquered forty-six nations at Marathon; and it
is not a little remarkable that this is the precise number of tribes
whose names and arms are given by Herodotus, in his description
of the muster made by Xerxes of his army before crossing the
Hellespont, on his most calamitous expedition.  Moreover, to
this day flint-headed zEthiopian arrows are found on Marathon,
proving that one at least of the tribes enumerated, and that
tribe the most remote of the Persian empire, was present in that
bloody battle.
In the centre, therefore, of the barbarian lines might be seen
the Persians, with their high straight tiaras, their many-colored
tunics of gay needlework, their brigantines glittering with fishlike scales of steel, their quivers swinging at their left sides, their
long bows and straight daggers on the right; and next to these
the Medes, in similar array; Assyrians, with brazen casques and




THE ARMY OF DATIS.                   87
steel-shod war clubs and Egyptian daggers; Sacians, with lofty
caps recurved, trowsers, and brazen shields and battle-axes; Indians, in dresses wrought of palm  leaves, with bows and steeltipped shafts of reeds, fiom the Oxus or the Ganges; Bactrians,
Chorasmians, Parthians, each in their native garb, with bows
and javelins; Caspians, in shaggy goat skins; Sarangians, in
long many-colored garments, flowing to their heels; Arabians,
with high-turbaned brows and doubly-bended bows; /Ethiopians, wrapped in panther skins and lion hides, with bows and
obsidian-headed arrows, and spears pointed with staghorn, and
huge war-clubs, black as night, some of them woolly-headedthe woolliest-headed of mankind* —their bodies painted, half
white with gypsum, half red with vermillion; the first negroes
probably who ever trod on European soil. Then, there were
Libyans, clad in leather, with spears fire-hardened; and Paphlagonians, with chain-mail hoods of brass, small bucklers, and
high buskins, armed with spears, javelins and daggers; Bithynians, with their foxskin casques, and variegated robes and buckskin leggins; Thracians, with shields of raw bull-hides, and each
two wolf-spears in his hand, and helmnets on their heads, with
horns and ears of oxen wrought in brass, and towering crests
over all; there were *Moschians and Mosynmecians, Tibarenians,
and Macrones with little bucklers and long pikes; Colchians, in
wooden head-pieces, with shields of bull-hide and long-crooked
scymetars; and Alarodians and Saspoerians, armed like the Colchians; and Lydians, clad like the Greeks in panoply-and
twice as many more, wild strangers from the utmost ends of the
earth, staring with eyes of savage -'onder on the new world
that met their gaze for the first time, in Europe.
And to confront this army and armament of nations, Miltiades drew out his handful, his ten tribes of Attica, his brave
Platmans, and, as light troops, the slavest —on that day, for the
*Herod. VII., 70.  + Pausan. Attic. 1, 32,




88                      MILTIADES.
first time, trusted with arms in Attica. Steadily, but without
delay, he formed his army, which he was compelled to extend,
even to the weakening of his centre-where fought Themistocles
and Aristides, with the tribes Leontis and Antiochis-in order
to avoid being surrounded by the enemy, who overflanked him
on both sides; to counteract which peril he had reinforced his
wings with double files. Kallimachos, by virtue of his office, led
the right wing; the brave Plateeans held the next post of honor,
in acknowledgment of their prompt rescue, on the left.  His little band thus marshalled, the sacrifices proved propitious; and,
in a few brief words, he spoke to them as soldiers should be
spoken to. His words are not recorded, nor, were they, should
I quote them; for it is well known that in ancient history the
speeches introduced embody only the author's understanding of
the leader's motives-but we may confidently feel how an
Athenian must have spoken, when the sacred earth of his country was polluted by such a scum of all barbarous nations; when
he was leading forth from the consecrated grove of Herakles;
when he was almost under the eyes of Athene on the Acropolis.
Nor could he have failed to point out to the sensuous and superstitious Greeks, that, within sight of the battle-field selected by
the enemy himself, was the cave of the god Pan, a little higher
up the plain, and his baths, and the scattered stones, goat-shaped,
which had from immemorial time been known and honored as
his flock-the god Pan, who had announced himself their sure
ally, and promised them his succor.
Then, without further pause, he gave the word, and contrary
to all previous usage, led them at a run against the enemy,
although the distance intervening was eight stadia, a little short
of an English mile. The pace could not, of course, have been
rapid; since it was absolutely necessary to the very existence of
the phalanx that it should come in with all its large round
shields close serried, and all its pike points in a row; neither




THE CHARGE.                      89
could the men, after running a mile at speed, have been in breath
to maintain a close struggle.  The  g6yuo; of the Greeks, which
is rendered run, was probably somewhat analogous to the French
pas de charge, or our double quick time, hurried undoubtedly,'within the last few yards, to a headlong and overwhelming rush.
The object of this movement was threefold; first to precipitate
the Athenians into action as rapidly as possible, without giving
them time to consider the numbers, or calculate the odds against
them; second, to dismay and surprise the barbarians by attacking, instead of waiting to be attacked; lastly, to get hand-tohand at the earliest, and to avoid the storm  of javelins and
arrows, which must have been shot and hurled into their ranks
like hail; since they had neither horse to make a diversion in their
favor, nor archery to cover their advance.
Down they came, closing their ranks still as they rushed on,
and quickening their pace at every stride, "a long array of helmets bright, a long array of spears," shouting their paeans, and
hymning Enyalios, the war god-for to the Greeks, as to our
Anglo-Norman race, the same shout was the charging cry of
battle, and the cheer for victory-shouting their paeans, till the
craggy heights of Brilessos sent back the prophetic clamor; and
clashing their spear-heads against their shields of bronze, till the
whole air was alive with the brazen clangor.
The Persians saw them come, and joyously stood forth to meet
them. For, as they saw them charging, as men never charged
before, with flanks unguarded either by archery or horse, they
believed that some madness, and most destructive madness too,
had fallen upon the Greeks, and that the gods had given them
into their hands. Thus thought the barbarians, and shot, and
slung, and darted, and received them front to fiont, manfully.
What Hippias, the renegade and ex-tyrant, thought, what felt,
when he heard those pealing paeans, prophetical of triumph, and
saw those serried shields come down abreast, with the bright
5




90                     MILTIADES.
spear points all advanced, in swift unbroken order, history has
not told us, could not tell us-but he well knew what was that
madness, which swelled the Attic war note.
"When the Athenians broke down upon the barbarians, in
close order," says Hlerodotus, "they fought worthily of mention.
But a long time elapsed while they were engaged hand-to-hand."
There is no greater error than to fancy, because they were
perpetually beaten by numbers so far inferior, that the Asiatics
were pusillanimous or dastards. Inferior in physical strength to
the Europeans, to the Greeks, trained athletes all, they were
undoubtedly; and in arms, weapons, discipline, most hopelessly
behind them. But, in all instances, they fought worthily of their
ancient renown, even to striving to break with their bare hands,
or wrest from the grasp of the Greek Hoplitai, the formidable
pikes, whose bristling lines they could not penetrate, and now, in
the centre, where fought the Persians proper, and the Sacians,
they actually forced back the weak lines of the attenuated
phalanx, and drove them in confusion toward the upland, broken
but still resisting and retreating with their faces to the foe. In
the meantime, however, on both wings, where the files were
doubled, the Attic charge had been irresistible; and, though the
enemy fought well, falling where they stood, rank after rank, and
giving way only when bodily borne down by the brunt of the
unbroken spears, they were now routed utterly and fled toward
the sea. Such a resistance only can account for the length of
time consumed in an action, which was decided by one charge,
without much subsequent manoeuvring.
Still at this moment, the battle so far from being won, might,
like Marengo by the Austrians, have been lost right easily by a
single error. Had Miltiades chased with his wings, as was
Rupert's wont, his centre would have been annihilated before his
return; the barbarians would have renewed the battle on the
following day; and, the Greeks disheartened, numbers would




REVERSED ORDER.                     91
probably have carried it.  But the Greek captain was too able
so to err. Halting both wings simultaneously, and wheeling
both inward, this to the spear, that to the shield, he closed them
both into a compact body, in an inverse direction to that in which
they fought before, with their backs now to the sea, and their
faces to the mountains.
One charge more full on the rear of the victorious Persian
centre, Themistokles and Aristides, rallying their men stoutly
in their front, and the last enemy was broken; and, all but the
after slaughter, the day won.
The Persians fled, not to their camp-that they left with all
its pomp and treasures, striking no blow to defend it-but to their
ships, slaughtered mercilessly now, not by the phalanx only, but
by the light-armed slaves, who butchered them at pleasure.
About the ships the fight again waxed hot and furious; and here
it was a melee, each man fighting for himself, so that the Greeks
had less advantage either of discipline or weapons. And here
was slain the Polemarch Kallimachos, a man of great note on that
day; and here, Stesileos, son of Thrasyleos, one of the ten
generals; and -here, with many other notable Athenians,
Kynegeiros, son of Euphorion, but more remarkable as brother
of the poet Aischylos, his arm lopped off with a battle-axe, as he
grasped the stern-decoration of a Phoenician galley.
The Greeks took seven triremes, and won gold and silver in
heaps,* and wealth, in plate and garments, unspeakable.  But
they won more than this-they won their liberty, and fame immortal, fame, even to this time unforgotten; that men who fight
to-day for freedom,
"Still point to Greece, and turn to tread,
So sanctioned, on the tyrant's head."
Of the barbarians there had fallen about six thousand and
* Plutarch, Aristides, V.




92                      MILTIADES.
four hundred men; of the Athenians one hundred and ninetytwo. Brt severe as had been the defeat, and total the discomfiture of the Oriental army, still the actual loss of six thousand,
out of one hundred and twenty thousand men, was a mere
nothing toward crippling them or putting an end to farther
operations; unless so far as the moral effect of the rout is to
be considered.
Accordingly, so soon as the fleet was under way, it steered
straight for the headland of Sunion, now known as Cape
Colonna, with wind and tide both favoring it, and, some of the
ships pausing to take on board the Eretrian captives from the
isle of AEgileia, doubled the promontory, and made all sail for
Athens, hoping to surprise it, empty of its defenders; it is said,
also, having secret information from the Alkmaionidai; which
last is not credible, since it was they who expelled Hippias. Nor
can it be doubted, that the appearance of the fleet at that juncture, before the arrival of news from the army, might have produced a fatal result, as the Athenians would naturally have
supposed their forces to be annihilated, and, if they had not surrendered, would have probably made but a weak defence. Miltiades, however, and the noble troops he commanded were equal
to the emergency; as they stood, reeking from that wonderful
and glorious battle, without staying to rest themselves, or to
break bread, with their heavy panoply and great shields, they
made a forced march, with nine tribes of the ten, and the Plataians, at their utmost speed-for with tide and wind favoring,
plying sail and oar, the fleet might reasonably be off the Phalerum, then the port of Athens,* in six hours, and they had more
than fifteen miles to march ere they could reach it-and arrived
there that same evening,f and encamped on the hill of Kynosarges, without the city, and, what was remarked at the time as
* Herod. VI., 116.   t Plutarch, Aristides, V.




AID FROM SPARTA.                  93
singular, again in a Herakleion, consecrated ground of IHerakles.
The Persians made land shortly after their arrival, and cast
anchor in the roadstead, but, seeing themselves anticipated,
weighed again and made sail for Asia. One tribe alone, the
tribe Antiochis, was left to guard the ground, the captives, and
the treasure. If Athens had but one captain who could deliver
such a battle as that of Marathon, she had but one man who
could guard such a booty, and that was Aristides.
On the following day, true to their word, for they had
marched so soon as the moon was full, and with such speed that
they performed within three days a distance of a hundred and
fifty miles, came the Lacedvemonians, with two thousand shields,
to the rescue; and, though they came too late, wishing to see
the Medes, they marched to Marathon. One can conceive the
joy, the pride, the pomp of that procession-all Athens pouring
forth her youth, her manhood, and her beauty, to escort those
brave auxiliaries, to that field of unexampled glory. One can
imagine how they were entranced by the barbaric splendor of
the camp, the tents, the spoils, the captured galleys; with what
wonder, blended with disgust, they surveyed, now for the first
time, the flat faces, and thick lips, and woolly heads, of the black
AEthiopians, cold and stark in their lion hides and war paint;
with what curiosity they turned over the ox-eared and ox-horned
helmets of the Asiatic Thracians; how they proved the gleaming scale armor of the Persians; how they balanced the battleaxes of the Sacians, and tried the edges of the Colchian scymetars. One cannot doubt how they were feasted in the Akropolis,
how the temples rang with triumphant Peans, how the city
smoked with incense. Then greatly praising the Athenians, and
giving them great glory for that which they had done, they
returned home secure and rejoicing.
Here ended Marathon; and would that here had ended, also,
the career of its conqueror.




94                      MILTIADES.
Miltiades was now the first man in Athens; his influence was
immense, his popularity unbounded. Athens was, in those days,
poor and incorrupt; barbaric wealth had not yet invaded, barbaric
luxury not vitiated, Hellas; so for his great reward the Athenians,
in the picture, which they caused to be painted of Marathon and
suspended in the portico called Poikile, the beauteously adorned,
he and Kallimachos were depicted, apart from the rest, in the
foreground. Pausanias saw that very picture, in the days probably of the Antonines, with the battle shown there, as it raged
hand to hand, the Plataiaus and Athenians, side by side; and a
little farther off the Persians flying and entangled in the salt
marsh, and the Greeks slaying them; and conspicuous above all
the combatants Kallimachos and Miltiades, and the hero Echetlos, whose terrible eidolon the soldiers saw in the thickest of the
fray, with his beard overshadowing all his buckler; and in the
distance the Phcenician galleys.
But to return to the hero of this wonderful day, who should
either have reposed here on his glory, or gone on to things yet
greater, if greater there might be-for there is no battle known
which in every point reflects more credit on its winner, than this
of Marathon on Miltiades.
But history must be written, if history it is to be, truly; no
place for partiality, no room for prejudice.
Availing himself of his unbounded popularity and weight, he
now asked the Athenians for seventy galleys, with a land force
to correspond, and a military chest proportionate; telling them
-nothing of his intents, but that he would enrich them beyond all
their hopes, by this expedition. And they, confiding in him
absolutely, and supposing that he was about to foray on the
maritime cities of the king, granted him all he asked, unquestioning. Then he sailed straight to'Paros, under the pretext of
exacting punishment or ransom from them, because they had
served the Persians against Greece; but in reality to avenge a




REWARD AND PUNISHMENT.                  95
private injury done to him by one of their citizens, Tisagoras,
who had accused him to iydarnes the Persian, in the original
matter, it is to be supposed, of the bridge over the Danube. Be
that as it may, he demanded of them a hundred talents, equal to
about twenty-five thousand pounds sterling, which they refnsed
to pay, and thereafter resisted him so strenuously, that, after
being himself severely wounded, he was obliged to draw off his
army, and return to Athens, disgraced and defeated.
Here he was at once impeached for malversation, and tried
for his life. Making no defence himself, on the plea of illness,
he was brought into court, wounded, in his litter, and his brother
being present pled his cause strenuously with the people-so
strenuously, that, although he was convicted, in pity for his fallen
greatness, and in gratitude for the great deeds he had wrought
in the deliverance of Athens, the capital condemnation was
remitted; and he was only cast, as in a civil suit, for the expenses
of the expedition, which he had diverted from the public service
to the prosecution of his own private animosities, and the furtherance of his own individual interests.  As great a crime, certainly, as any of which the public servant, however high in station or renown, of a free state, can well be guilty, and meriting
as severe and ignominious punishment.
Those expenses, amounting to some fifty talents, half the sum
which he had endeavored unjustly to extort from the Parians, he
was unable to pay on the moment; and, being thrown into
prison, he chanced there to die of his wound, which probably
would have proved fatal anywhere.
It was a sad fate, truly, for such a man, for such a captain.
But it is far sadder, that a man who was capable of exploits so
noble, should also be capable of crimes so base, as to render
such a fate less, not gre';r, than his desert.
Much obloquy has been.heaped on Athens on his account;
much ink has been spilt; and much fine writing wasted there



96                       MILTIADES.
anent, concerning the ingratitude of that state in particular, and
of' democracies in general. Myself, I have little faith in the gratitude of governments at all; unless gratitude be, as defined by
the witty Frenchman, a keen sense of benefits to come; and I
believe that democracies are more liable to vehement and strenuous impulses, than to persistency in anything, whether good or
evil; but all the outcry in this case is futile, unjust, and absurd.
Miltiades was a successful and victorious soldier; he was
rewarded, according to the laws of his state, to the utmost-he
was the first man in Athens.  He was a bad citizen, almost a
traitor, and all the severity and disgrace of his punishment
was remitted in memory of his great deeds past. Is this ingratitude?
His character is summed up in ten lines.
As a captain, in genius, resource, conception, execution, soundness of principle, rapidity of coup d'ceil, brilliancy and suddenness of action, he never had a superior; perhaps, as an originator, never an equal. So long as the Greek tactic endured, his
system  was never improved, never altered-it was invariably
used; invariably victorious.
As a man-it must be said-he was flawed.  Wholly unfitted to be a citizen of a free state, he might command others, but
he could not command himself.
It is not a little strange, though true, that the man who
fought perhaps the best fight the world ever saw for freedom,
should be in his heart a tyrant. But so it was; and gallant soldier
as he was, I cannot doubt that the tyrant of the Chersonese
would have been no wise loth, had occasion offered, to write him
self tyrant of Hellas also.




III.
THEMISTOKLES,
HIS SEA-FIGHT OFF SALAMIS, HIS CAMPAIGNS, CHARACTER, AND
CONDUCT.
A king sat on the rocky brow,
That looks o'er sea-born Salamis;
And ships by thousands lay below,
And men by nations-all were his.
He counted them at break of (lay,
And when the sun set, where were they?-THE ISLES OF GREECE.
IT cannot, one would imagine, have failed to strike every
thoughtful reader of the history of Greece, that there is something entirely peculiar, original, and different from the ordinary
stamp of human nature, in the character of almost every one of
the distinguished citizens of Athens-that marvellous state and
city which, with a territory inferiors in dimensions to a modern
county of America or England, and within a period of a century
and a half,f performed more.extraordinary actions, gave birth to
* The territory of Attica extends from N. E. to S.W., about 80 miles,
with an average breadth of 40.
t The battle of Marathon, whence dates Athens' greatness, was fought
B.C. 490. That of Chaironeia, which destroyed her independence, B.C.
338.




98                     THEMISTOKLES.
more extraordinary men, and produced more extraordinary impressions on moral and intellectual humanity, than any other
nation of the universe, in as many generations as she counted
years of existence.
Think of her citizens.  What men!  Generals, statesmen,
orators, historians, buffoons, tragedians, sculptors, rhetoricians,
pedants, philosophers, patriots, incendiaries, all in their line, the
greatest; unequalled in the splendor of their genius and their
virtues, inimitable in the depth of their infamy and baseness;
various, as nature herself, in genius, character, conduct, conception, principle, it yet seems to me that in one point only all were
closely similar; that in them, the seeds of vice and virtue,
nobleness and dishonor, innocence and infamy, patriotism and
disloyalty were sown more rankly intermingled, and shot up more
inextricably blended, than in any other race of men who ever
lived; unless it be the French, whom they most resemble,
during the brief fury of the first revolution.
Where else, in the history of the whole world, shall we look
for such prodigies, for instance, of versatility and genius, of public capacity and domestic worthlessness, of political wisdom and
private folly, of honor and disgrace, as Miltiades, as Themistokles,
as Kimon, as Alkibiades, as anly one of half a dozen others who
successively, and more or less successfully also, swayed the fortunes of this strange republic. England, in her whole long career
of centuries, has produced one Sheridan; but these Athenians, in
wit and wildness, in eloquence and eccentricity, in the glory of
their genius and the grossness of their debaucheries, were all
Sheridans. France-nay, but the world! since Athens ceased
to be-has given birth to but a single Airabeau; and it is to be
hoped that, when she generated him, she destroyed the monstermaking matrix; but what were all these, in the versatility both of
their vices and their virtues, in the pollution of their lives and
the perfection of their policy, in the facility and indifference with




INCONSISTENCY OF ATTIC GENIUS.             99
which they could soar into the empyrean of glory, or sink into
the abyss of infamy-what were all these, but so many earlier
Mirabeaus?
In that singular and splendid state, we can discern everything,
-save, with a single exception, one-for Aristides was a consistent, single-minded, honest, rational, straightforward man and
citizen; and it is forl this reason that he stands out in such bold
and positive relief, from the glittering back-ground of splendid
Charlatans and glorious Mountebanks, by whom  he was surrounded. Aristides might, in strength, solidity, steadiness, and
sincerity of mind, judgment, purpose and performance, have been
an Englishman or an American-he alone of all his people.
And I know scarce another of the age, for I do not regard the
immortal Demosthenes as belonging to that period, though his
career actually commenced within it; I know scarce, I say,
another of the age, however brilliant his exploits, however splendid the services rendered to his country, who did not taint those
exploits, and tarnish those services, by some trickiness and indirection of his whole career, by some crowning act of political
baseness and tergiversation, or by some habit of daily and
familiar infamy, which in any other country would have consigned him to utter exclusion from society, much more from the
head of affairs, if indeed it had not subjected him to the direct
censure and judgment of the laws.
To this fact, indeed, far more than to the generally alleged
1lvity, inconsistency and ingratitude of the Athenian democracy,
is it to be attributed that so many of the leading generals and
statesmen, so many of what are generally regarded as the greatest
benefactors of Athens, died in exile, died as suicides, died by the
hands of the common executioner; and that so few escaped, at
some period of their career, the penalties of criminal jurisdiction.
I do not write thus from any prejudice in favor either of the
people or the policy of Attica; since I regard the former, as in




1 00                   THEMISTOKLES.
the main, a turbulent, instable, and impulsive rabble; and the
latter as the worst form of government ever devised by the
human mind, and scarcely worthy even to be called a government; but simply because I believe that there was a distinct
peculiarity in the Attic mind, from  the highest to the lowest
order, both of the rulers and the ruled, which rendered them all
indisposed to take, if not incapable of taking, the direct road to
any object; which led them to prefer and select, as if of set purpose, the most tortuous and intricate paths of intrigue, where
the beaten highroad of common sense and honesty would have
led them to the very point they desired to gain, with no sacrifice
of character or credit.
Treachery and chicanery appear, in a word, to have been two
requisites almost indispensable to the composition of an Athenian statesman, and although Kimon and Perikles are clearer
than most others on this point, though both deeply tainted in
their private lives with that moral filth in which even the philosophers of Athens were not ashamed to wallow, still there is
enough of obliquity and corruption in the methods which they
adopted to conciliate or secure popularity and public favor, to
justify the generalness of the charge.
And this appears to have been peculiarly an Attic characteristic; for, although we find traitors in other Hellenic states, and
unscrupulousness of various kinds and degrees prevailing in the
policy of each and all, we no where else find the same systematic
hypocrisy, duplicity and falsehood, as in the conduct of Athenian generals and ministers; and that too recorded by their own
writers, without a blush, as traits of laudable finesse and statesmanship, worthy of invitation.
Nor of any one is this more true than of Themistokles; who
but for this almost inexplicable passion for the indirect, must
have ranked as one of the greatest men, not merely generals or
politicians, of the world.




HIS PARENTAGE AND YOUTH.               101
Every thing was in his favor, nothing was adverse to his ambition, wild as it might be. Although not properly a full freeborn Athenian citizen-for although Neokles, his father, was of
the tribe of Leontis and the demus Phrearion, yet he not a man
of much distinction, his mother was an alien, some say from
Thrake, others from Akarnania, and others yet again a Lydian
fiom Halikarnassos-he began at a very early age to intermingle
in public affairs, constantly frequenting the forum and the courts,
and, applying himself with the most remarkable diligence to all
sorts of practical science and civil knowledge, while he wholly
discarded the lighter arts and accomplishments then generally
studied, displayed so much ability and earnestness, that he
speedily drew on himself general attention, the first step toward
notoriety and celebrity.
The rivalry which existed throughout life between himself and
Aristides, had commenced already, sharpened, it is said, while
they were yet mere youths, into something partaking strongly of
personal animosity by antagonism in love affairs, and still more,
it is not to be doubted, by the contempt which a man of Aristides' solid and sterling character must naturally feel for the
tortuous trickery of Themistokles' entire career, and which his
candor as certainly would not permit him to conceal.
So early as the first invasion of Greece by Datis and Artaphernes for Darios, the two rivals were of the number of the ten
generals who fought at Marathon; and they two had command
of the Athenian centre, which was very severely handled, and
indeed broken, by the Persians after a stubborn resistance, each
at the head of his own tribe.
Both, of course, shared the credit and the honors of the
victory, and obtained a degree. of favor with their citizens; but
so far was this from satisfying the fierce and ardent ambition of
the young politician, that he is reported to have exclaimed constantly, " that the trophies of Miltiades would not suffer him to




102                    THEMI;STOKLES.
sleep of nights;* and foreseeing fresh troubles and wars with
the Asiatics, he kept himself, as it were, constantly anointed and
in training for the contest, in which he already anticipated that
he should occupy the prominent position.
At this period, we have the first instance of that peculiar
obliquity of dealing to the charge of which his whole career is
obnoxious. Previous to the invasion of Darios and the battle of
Marathon, a war already existed between the Athenians and the
people of Aigina, the former desirous of inflicting punishment on
these for submitting to the Persian by the rendition of earth and
water to his ambassadors.  The rapid and disastrous termination
of that formidable invasion, and the immense influence and
authority, as well as fame, which it gave to the Athenians
throughout Hellas, by no means induced them to seek for
reconciliation, or to discontinue the war. On the contrary, they
felt better disposed than ever, to take ample vengeance of all
who had been untrue to the general cause of Greece.
And to this Themistokles urged and incited them  with all his
exquisite plausibility, all his shrewd, pointed and persuasive eloquence.  Not that he valued Aigina, her alliance, or her disaffection, at a pin's fee, but that he saw in her, as being then the
most powerful state of Greece in maritime force, and in fact the
mistress of the seas, an instrument for the exciting and maintaining a war spirit among the Athenians, for compelling them
to establish and keep up a sufficient navy, and to support a large
force, at all times in readiness against any emergency.
It seems, that he had already determined it to be the true
policy of Athens to constitute herself a maritime power-which
was in all probability the case, as the extent of her territory and
the character and avocations of her inhabitants were not such as
to enable her to cojpe either with her Peloponnesian or continental neighbors, in the number and efficiency of'ler land ser* Plutarch. Themist. 4.




PECULIARITY OF HIS INTELLECT.           103
vice, which was defective in material, both for light troops,
archers more especially, and cavalry; notwithstanding that the
quality of her heavy foot was not to be surpassed by any, as had
been proved already on the glorious plain of Marathon, and as
was shown thereafter in many a sanguinary conflict both on
European and Asiatic soil.
All other politicians at this period, it would seem, considered
that the danger of Oriental invasion was completely at an endthe courage of the Persians having, as they argued, been thoroughly broken, and their hopes of success permanently overthrown, by the check they had encountered from Miltiades. Not
so Themistokles. He was by far too good a judge of human
nature in general, and of the vainglorious, heaven-reaching ambition of the Persian kings in particular, to believe that the defeat
of Marathon would have any other effect than to convert what
had been, in the first instance, but a passing scheme of ambition and aggrandizement, into a settled purpose of hatred and
revenge.
It would not, however, have been Themistokles to stand forth
manfully and boldly on the turret-top, like the mariner, who,
from the mast-head, peers with eager eyes into the gathering
gloom of the horizon, where his experienced eye can presage,
and his alone, the brooding of the tempest that shall burst anon
in wreck and devastation, and cry to all the city, " Sleep no
more! Gird up your loins, and belt your swords upon your
thighs, and keep your watch fires burning; for lo! in the hour
that you think not the Persian cometh." No! had he been certain that his words would have found ears to hear him and
hearts to leap at his warning, that course he would not have
taken. To convince men to their good, seemed to his acute,
subtle, and casuistical intellect a poor, homely, and unscientific
way of coming to his end. In order to be satisfactory to him,
the result, whatever it was, at issue, must be gained by skill, by




104                  THEMISTOKLES.
craft, by playing a deep artificial game. All men, whether
friends or foes, must be tricked and cheated-his friends and
countrymen cheated to their own good; his antagonists and enemies cheated to their ruin.
And thus it was, throughout his whole career; he was perpetually playing games of political chess with whomsoever he
came in contact; and it was his highest satisfaction, his most
exquisite delight, when he could see them squirming and writhing
impotently to avoid his imminent checkmate.
Thus he induced the impulsive and improvident populacQ to
raise their navy to two hundred admirable triremes, which were
the finest class of war-ships then in use, thoroughly manned, in
the most effective state of equipment, and with crews in rigid
discipline through constant practice. Nay! he even obtained a
decree, setting aside the whole revenue of the silver mines on
the promontory of Laurion for the expenses of the navy, and for
the annual building of twenty new galleys. And all this, without one word concerning Asia, one hint at the danger approaching from Persia, Darios, or Xerxes. There was the crowning
rapture! One can fancy, when the Persian actually came, and
instead of empty dockyards, an impoverished treasury, a navy to
be hastily knocked together and manned with slaves and merchant sailors, the wily statesman found himself with the finest
and best manned fleet on earth in his command, with ample supplies, and with all the sinews of war strung, and as it were casehardened-one can fancy, not how he rejoiced with a noble and
statesmanlike exultation-this is my doing; I it was who forewarned my people of this peril, when it was yet afar off and
invisible, and.they believed me, and lo! here we are prepared to
beat the peril back-oh no! But how he grinned, and chuckled, and crowed in the secret places of his cunning heart, that he
had checkmated his rash and headstrong fellow-citizens-tricked
them, sorely against their own will, to their own advantage.




FLEET AND ARMY OF XERXES.               105
And so it was. And so he played many political chess-games
in his life; and checkmated all who played against him. But,
like all men of his stamp, he played one game too many, and
checkmated himself at last. For when all was done, there was
no man living who could cheat Themistokles, except Themistokles.
It was precisely ten years after the first unfortunate invasion of
Darios, and the decisive battle of Marathon, that Xerxes, who
had succeeded his father on the Persian throne, though without
either the fortune or ability of his father-after spending four
whole years in the collection of forces and preparation for their
armature and commissariat, as well as in cutting a navigable
canal across the isthmus of Mount Athos, by means of which to
avoid the peril of doubling that formidable headland, and the
chance of such a disaster as had befallen the great fleet of Darios
-set on foot the gigantic expedition, which must have appeared
even to minds less arrogant and sanguine than his own, sufficient
to overrun every territory and overturn every government of
Hellas, almost without an effort.
His fleet consisted of twelve hundred* and seven galleys,
manned by above five hundred thousand souls; his land array,
according to Herodotos,f amounted to one million seven hundred
thousand fighting men-camp-followers, and non-combatants,
who were equal probably in numbers to the whole force enumerated, not included; and added to these eighty thousand admirable horse, exclusive of Sagartian and Arabian camel-squadrons,
and charioteers from Libya and India, rated at twenty thousand
more. With such a multitude of combatants, both by land and
sea, the Persian king set forth, in the early spring of the fifth year
of his reign, which corresponds, according to the synchronism
of Diodorus Siculus,I to the first year of the seventy-fifth Olym* Herod. VII., 89. Aischylos, Persae, 34.
t Herod. VII.. 60.          $ Diod. XI. I.




106                    THEMISTOKLES.
piad, archonship at Athens of Kalliades; to the two hundred
and seventy-third year of Rome, twenty-ninth year of the republic, consulship of Spurius Cassius, and Proculus Virginius; and
to the year four hundred and eighty before the Christian era.
Thus prepared, he marched boldly and successfully onward;
and, with no losses beyond the ordinary casualties of so great a
multitude of men and so long a route, traversed the wide regions
of Thrace, and entered the territories of Continental Greece,
receiving on his way southward the submission, and in most
instances the alliances of the Thessalians, Dolopians, Ainianians,
Perrhabians-these  being at this period  hardly considered
Greeks-and of the Lokrians, Aagnesians, Melians, Achaians of
Phthiotis, Thebans, and indeed all the Boiotians with the exception of the Thespians and Plataians, who were held firm in their
allegiance to the cause of Hellas, by their gratitude to Athens,
their protectress, and their inveterate hatred of the Thebans.
To meet this very deluge of war-ships and warriors, the
Greeks, divided among themselves by selfishness, jealousy, and
something of feudal animosity, had none on whom they could
rely but the kingdoms within the Peloponnesos, or Morea; and,
without, Athens, with her allies of Thespiai and Plataia, and two
or three small communities on the western side of the continent,
bordering on the Adriatic.  Nor, even among these, the only
staunch defenders of liberty, was there that perfect unanimity
and mutual confidence, which is the only safe and effectual bond
of strength and security between allied bodies* —idcm velle atque
idem  nolle, ea demum  firma amicitia est-for the Athenians
and other Greeks to the northward of the Isthmus of Corinth,
which was in process of fortification, suspected, and as the event
showed, not wholly without reason, that the Peloponnesians felt
little inclination to risk the delivering battle without their own
guarded confines, and might easily be determined, if they were
* Sallust. Catilina, 20.




FIRST MOVEMENT OF THE GREEKS.           107
not so already, to abandon them and their countries to the first
furious irruption of the barbaric hordes, whose brunt, at all
events, they must encounter foremost. Indeed, so well satisfied
was Themistocles, even earlier than this, of the impossibility of
defending Attika, or even the city of Athens, by land, that, taking
advantage of two oracles rendered from Delphi-the one foretelling the capture and conflagration of the city, the other declaring that, when all their other strongholds should be taken, their
wooden walls would hold out, to the preservation of their children
and themselves-he persuaded the people, with great difficulty,
to abandon their fortifications, desert their homes, remove their
seat of government to the isle of Salamis, entrust their women,
children, and non-combatants to the kind offices and good faith
of the Troizenians and their Peloponnesian neighbors, and
embark all their fighting men on board the two hundred excellent triremes, which he had induced them to build, on the pretext of the war with the Aiginetans.
The first movement of the combined Greek allies was to send
an army of Lakedaimonian and Athenian heavy-infantry, ten
thousand strong, respectively commanded by Evainetus, the son
of Karenus and Themistokles, by sea to the city of Alos, in Thessaly, at the head of the Sinus Pagasaeus, now the gulf of Volo,
with instructions to march northward to the valley of Tempe,
and the outlet of the river Peneios, now Salambria, and occupy
the defiles through which the great road winds down from
Makedonia, between the mountains of Olympus and Ossa, into
the plains of Thessaly; where with the assistance of the Thessalian cavalry, then the best in Greece, it was expected that they
would be able to make an effective stand against the Persian
host. After remaining there encamped a few days, on receiving
intelligence from Alexander, the son of Amyntas, advising them
that the embouchure of the Peneios was not defensible, and farther
that the position could be turned by the pass of Gonni, some ten




108                   THEMISTOKLES.
or twelve miles to the southwestward, they broke up fiom their
position, and returning to their ships, made the best of their way
to the Hetlenic head-quarters, on the Isthmus. And, thereupon,
the Thessalians, having indeed no alternative, as thus abandoned
by their allies, submitted to the Persians, and adopting their
alliance, heartily and in good earnest, proved themselves right
serviceable men in action.
Thereafter, it was determined by the Greeks to defend the
narrow pass of Thermopylai, lying between the precipitous crags
of Mount Oita, on the left, and the waters to the right of the
Sinus Maliacus, or Gulf of Zituni; a pass, which scarcely admitting the transit of a single chariot, at two different points of
the defile, at that time-for the ground has been greatly altered
in the lapse of ages, by the deposit of the river Spercheios, and
the consequent encroachment of the land on the sea-was
tenable by a mere handful against a host. Thither, then, an
advanced-guard consisting of three hundred Spartans, a thousand
Tegeatians and Mantineans, eleven hundred and twenty Arka
dians, four hundred Korinthians, two hundred and eighty
Mykenaians and Phliuntians, seven hundred Thespians and four
hundred Thebans, the last unwilling as secretly friends to the
Persians and under compulsion; in all four thousand four hundred hoplitai of Peloponnesians, with a thousand Lokrians,
Opuntians, and Phokians, inhabitants of that district, were thrown
forward to hold the enemy in check, and to give courage to the
allies by demonstrating the good faith of the Greeks within the
Isthmus.
It appears that the Persian armament had even outstripped
the anticipation of the Hellenes, for it was by no means intended
that this small band should be opposed to the vast hordes of
Xerxes; on the contrary the whole Peloponnesian force was
destined to support them, so soon as the religious festival of the
Karneia at Sparta and the Olympic games, then both in process




FLEET OF THE GREEKS.                109
of celebration, should permit the marching of the reinforcements.
What is more singular than this miscalculation is, that to no one
of all the assembled nations, gathered in council of war, at the
Isthmus, was the existence known of a practicable route through
an elevated valley to the west of Thermopylai, by which the
position of the defenders might be easily turned by the left flank,
and themselves attacked in the rear.
At the same time, with this advanced guard, the Hellenic
fleet, consisting of one hundred and twenty-seven Attic triremes,
manned by Athenian citizens, and twenty more with Chalcidean
crews, with a hundred and twenty-four others furnished by the
Peloponnesian confederates, forty of which were Korinthians, and
the remainder made up by the small contingents of inferior states,
amounting in all to two hundred and seventy-one sail of warships, besides twelve penteconters, or long single-banked vessels,
pulled by fifty oars on one range, took post at Artemision, the
northern promontory of the Island of Euboia, now Egripo, at the
mouth of the strait dividing it from the mainland, lying over
against the gulf of Volo, to the northward, and nearly opposite
to the station of the land forces at Thermopylai, toward the
southwest.
There, almost as soon as they arrived, they encountered Xerxes
and his host, the land forces occupying the plains beyond the
pass, about the rivers Melas and Asopos, and the fleet twelve
hurdred and seven galleys strong, anchored off Aphetai or
Trixhiri, the eastern headland at the mouth of the gulf of Volo.
And, here, so strenuously and with such stern and steady
resolution did Leonidas, the Spartan king, defend the defiles,
that had the confederates from the Isthmus come up in time
with reinforcements, enabling him to occupy the upper pass of
Anopaia with a sufficient body of Peloponnesians, there can be
little doubt that Xerxes would have been arrested at this pointL
and have returned foiled and disappointed into Asia.




110                    THIEMISIOKLES.
I am not writing the life of Leonidas, nor have I anything to
do with the battle of Thermopylai, otherwise than as it is necessarily connected with the events which followed it; for, although
as a soldier and a hero, the Spartan king is unsurpassed if not
unequalled through all time, and as a display of valor and selfdevotion the struggle in the pass is inimitable, yet neither had
the chieftain an opportunity of exerting any strategetical talents
which lie might possess, nor was the action remarkable for any
thing, but the immovable courage and constancy of the Greeks.
The result is known to the world. A Melian traitor, Ephialtes
by name, betrayed the upper pass of Anopaia to Xerxes, and
guided Hydarnes with the ten thousand Persian immortals by
the ravines Oita, round their left flank to the rear of the Greeks;
this movement being known to Leonidas' he dismissed all his
forces, except his own three hundred Spartans, who had all
devoted themselves with him to death, the four hundred Thebans
whom he had detained unwilling hostages, and seven hundred
Thespians, who refused to leave their captain, preferring such a
death to ignoble safety. The Phokians, who had been detached
to defend the upper pass, failed of their duty, the Imrortals
forced the defile, the Spartans and Thespians were slain to a man,
the Thebans laying down their arms at the first onset, and the
pass of Thermopylai was carried; but with such terrible carnage
of the Orientals as rendered their success more similar to defeat
than to victory.  It were useless to debate the utility or moral
propriety of such a sacrifice at the present day; inasmuch as
modern ideas, both of expediency and duty, are utterly at
variance with those of the ancients, and more especaiiy with
those of the Spartans. It cannot, however, be doubted, that in
very many instances the desperate defence of untenable posts by
self-devoted handfuls, has proved the preservation of armies,
nay, even of nations, by giving time for the bringing up of reinforcements; for the maturing of plans, and for the organizing of




LEONIDAS AT TIIERMOPYLAI.              111
large and general operations.  These could not, however, have
been the principles on which, in this case, Leonidas acted; for
he well knew, before dismissing the main body of his forces, that
no reinforcement was on the way, or could by any chance come
up in season to make good or recover the disputed pass.
This notion of duty, then, was founded partly on the princi..
ple of obedience to the Spartan laws, which declared flight from
the field to be the last disgrace, as death upon it was the highest
glory, of the citizen; partly, on the necessity of setting a great
example of constancy and devotedness to the hesitating and terror-stricken nations of Hellas; and partly, on the desire of winning immortal glory for himself and his companions in arms.
And, if it were so, his object was gained from point to pointthe obedience to the laws was granted, even by his rigid countrymen, to be perfect as it was marvellous; the example was followed implicitly so long as a Persian stood on the sacred soil of
Greece; the glory has been so far immortal, that now, after the
lapse of well nigh four and twenty centuries, the memory of
Leonidas lives as fieshly, and his bays flourish as greenly, the
wide world over, as they did then through the brief confines of
narrow Hellas.
Two monuments were erected over their ashes, buried on the
spot where they fell-monuments nobler than trophies, even as
their defeat and death were grander than any victory-one, to
the memory of those who died fighting, their flank not yet
turned, in the hope of victory; the other above those who
remained to die, when not a hope was left save of an honorable
death.  Their epitaphs run thus,* preserved by Herodotus, who
was himself almost their contemporary, rendered literally from
the Greek Hexameter and Pentameter into the heroic coupletof the first,
4* Herod. II., 228.




112                    THEMISTOKLES.
"Here did we fight with Persian millions three,
Peloponnesians, twice two thousand, we."
And of the second, sacred to the three hundred only,
"Go tell the Spartans, friend, that here we lie,
Obedient to their laws, which bade us die."
And this latter one, it is to be presumed, gives us as nearly as
possible, the true sentiment and spirit of those true self-sacrificing
heroes. There is yet another splendid tribute to their memory,
in the form of a brief elegy by the poet Simonides, so beautiful in
phraseology, and withal so terse and pointed, that I would fain
here embody it, but that my limits, as well as the strict observance of my proper subject, admonish me to abstain.
In the meantime, the Greek and Persian fleets had encountered thrice; and, after some hard fighting, had been thrice separated by nightfall, with no very decided advantage to either party.
In the first place, indeed, beholding the Straits and the whole
surface of the Gulf of Volo covered, so far as the eye could reach,
with the tall and splendid triremes of the Phoinikians and Sidonians, crowded with fighting men, and bearing down on them to
offer action, the Greeks, as was in no wise wonderful, were dismayed and confounded at sight of the desperate odds which they
had to meet, in seas, too, so open in their idea, though the straits
were not above ten miles in width; and had almost determined
on retreating to the isthmus, where they might take advantage of
narrower waters, in which they might better cope with the vast
navy of the Asiatics.  And, here, was first brought into play,
during the actual imminence of warfare, the singular obliquity
of mind, and proneness to deceit and stratagems of all kinds,
which I have mentioned as the leading characteristic of the Athenian commander.
The Euboians, it seems, had discovered the purpose of the
Greek captains to withdraw their fleet, from the waters of Euboia,




BRIBE OF THE EUBOIANS.             113
within Cape Sunion and into the Saronic gulf; and, dreading
the consequences of being thus abandoned to the fury of the
Persian, besought Eurybiades the Lakedaimonian, who had been
appointed commander-in-chief at the instance of the allies-who
were fiom jealousy reluctant to serve under the Athenians-that
he would at least tarry until they could place their children and
families in security. On his refusal, they bribed Themistokles
the leader of the Athenians, with the great sum of thirty talents
— in round numbers thirty-five thousand dollars-to await the
enemy, and deliver battle off the coast of Euboia. He, receiving
the money nothing loth, set himself forthwith to gratify the
Euboians; for indeed he was from the first well inclined to fight,
had he not been over-ruled; and this he effected by purchasing
the opinion of Eurybiades at the price of five, and that of
Adeimantos the Korinthian, of three talents, which he gave as
presents on his own account, and which his colleagues believed
to be furnished to that end by the Athenians.  They tarried,
therefore, and gave battle, Themistokles quietly pocketing the
remainder of the enormous prize, and probably consoling himself
in the idea that his conduct was unimpeachable, inasmuch as he
had only accepted money for doing that which he had previously
resolved to do, if possible, as most to the advantage of his own
country; perhaps he went so far, in his self-justification, as to
convince himself that it was by means of the bribe alone that he
was enabled so to serve his country, and that the taking of it
was, therefore, not excusable only, but highly virtuous and patriotic. Nor do I well know why he should not have succeeded
in so convincing himself; since such is the argument, neither
more nor less, which a brilliant and plausible historian* of our
own day adduces in defence of Algernon Sidney; who took bribes
from Louis the Fourteenth of France, in order to carry on
* Macaulay, Hist. of England. Charles II.
6




114            -       THEMISTOKLES.
in'rigue3 against the ministry, and to embarrass and frustrate
the policy of his own government.
As afterwards at Salamis, so now, the Persians, seeing that the
Greeks would abide them, and eager in their confidence of triumph near at hand, sent off two hundred triremes, with orders
to round the island of Skiathos to the northward, to circumnavigate Euboia, and to interpose themselves between the Grecian fleet and its harbors, with a view of cutting it off in its anticipated flight-not intending themselves to fight until signals
should be made them that their own galleys were in the enemy's
rear. But in this they were frustrated, again, by the judgment
of Themistokles; who had, not without difficulty, persuaded the
Hellenic leaders, almost unanimous before to receive the enemy's
onslaught, that it were wiser to sail out and assume the offensive
without delay.
There is little doubt that thiswily and accomplished leader
was perfectly acquainted with the extraordinary and unaccountable changes and seasons of the tide-or current rather, since the
Mediterranean is all but tideless-as they prevail in those narrow waters; and that he so chose his hour of attack that the
rush of water " which changes its direction many times a day
like the wind," as Livy expresses it, " from one point to another,
and is hurried along like a torrent tumbling from a steep mountain," should be adverse to the manceuvres of the lofty and
unmanageable vessels of the Persian. In the first onset, the
Greeks took and sunk thirty sail of the enemy, and made prisoner Philaon the son of Chersis, nephew of Gorgos, king of the
Kyprian Salamis-a man of considerable repute-but when the
fleets joined in close action, and the encounter was hand to hand,
both parties suffered heavy mutual loss, and fighting sturdily,
with no thought of flight, were separated only by night, "that
common comforter of weary and dismantled armies."
That live-long night, the thunder roared over the whole vault




THE STORM.                     115
of heaven, which was alive with lightnings flashing from the top
of Pelion; and the rains descended insatiate, and the winds
lashed the sea into fury, fighting for the Athenians, even as the
tempest and the ocean fought for England, on that Christmas
night when EIoche's armament was dispersed, never to be combined again, which had anchored at sunset in Bantry bay,
already in their hopes victorious. The triremes, which had been
sent round on the outside of Euboia, were caught helpless by the
tempest, hard-jammed upon a lee-shore, were driven in upon the
breakers and the craggy coast, where they perished with their
crews, almost to a man; while the corpses and the fragments of
the wrecks were drifted into the Persian anchorage off Aphetai,
where they whirled in the eddies about the prows, and hampered
the oar-blades of the barbarians, filling their minds with present
awe, and presages of future ruin. On the following day the
Greeks were reinforced by fifty-three new Athenian galleys; and
cheered by this accession to their strength, as well as encouraged
by previous successes, they again stood out from Artemision, at
the same season of the tide, and falling on the Kilikian squadron,
which they handled pretty roughly, but still without accomplishing any thing decisive, fought until it was quite dark, when they
returned once again to their moorings off the promontory. On
the third day, indignant at finding themselves held in check so
long, and by so mere a handful, and dreading the wrath of
Xerxes, the Persians no longer awaited the attack of the Greeks,
but weighing all at once, bore down on them in a vast semicircle,
with its wings thrust forward so as to turn both their flanks and
envelope them. But, at the same instant, the Athenians met
them midway, and the battle waxed furious, and was maintained
with dogged obstinacy until nightfall, the loss being very great
and nearly equal on both sides; for the very size and numbers
of the enemy embarrassed them, falling on board each other and




116                    THEMISTOKLES.
giving rise to confusion worse confounded, so that they derived
no advantage friom their superiority.
On these three very days, the conflict was raging by land also
in the defiles of Thermopylai, with the same object, and for a
while with the same result; the Persians in either position
striving to force the passes by dint of superior numbers, the
Greeks resisting and debarring their further ingress, and at first
with absolute success.  But that same evening tidings were
brought to the leaders of the fleet, how that the Persians had
turned the position of Thermopylai, by the left, and how dismissing the allies, Leonidas had fallen worthily of his royal
parentage, and of his warlike country; and, their own position
being in like manner turned and rendered untenable by the
advance of the barbarians, whom there was now no possibility of
checking to the northward of the Isthmus, they fell back in good
order to Salamis, where they were again in communication with
their land-forces, and in readiness to act in concert with them for
the defence of the Peloponnesos. Before he retreated, however,
Themistokles, still as ever intent on stratagem, ran in with the
best sailers of his squadron, to the mouths of the rivers in search
of drinking water; and landing there, caused inscriptions to be
carved on various stones, which were left scattered here and there
for the purpose of being found by the enemy on their advance.
These were addressed to the Ionians in the Persian service,
exhorting them to remember their Hellenic parentage, and to
make common cause with their natural friends and kinsinen,
against the common enemy of Greeks and Ionians; or, should
that prove impossible, at least to misconduct themselves in action,
bearing it in mind that the Athenians had first incurred the
resentment of the king, in consequence of their friendly aid,
freely rendered to the Ionians of Miletos.
And in this stratagem there was a double craft, a sharpness
cutting, as it were, on both edges; first. if it might be, and




FIRST STRATAGEM.                  11 7
chiefly, to prevail upon the Karians and Ionians to revolt from
the king, which he was well-assured they had good will to do,
were they not enforced to obedience; secondly, if that device
should be useless, to render them suspect to Xerxes, and so
throw the germs of jealousy and discord into the camp of the
enemy.
On this, finding himself master, both by sea and land, of the
long contested straits, though at a fearful cost of life, for at
Thermopylai, twenty thousand men lay dead in the bloody
defiles, and between shipwreck and slaughter not less than fifty
thousand more had fallen around Artemision, Xerxes prepared
to advance into the interior. But first, after performing a deed
so unworthy as the mutilation of the corpse vf the hero Leonidas,
by cutting of his right hand and head, as it was the Persian
custom to do with rebels, he concealed the evidences of the heavy
loss he had sustained, burying all his dead, with the exception
of a thousand, whom he left on the plain, together with the
bodies of the slaughtered Greeks, until they should be seen by
the crews of the fleet, whom he caused to land and survey
the scene of his recent triumph. Yet the stratagem availed him
nothing; for, although he had ordered the earth firom the pits
and trenches to be cast into the sea, that their whereabouts should
not be betrayed by the mounds above them, and the disturbance
of the soil to be masked by heaps of dead leaves scattered on the
surface, the deceit was too palpable even for oriental credulity;
when they saw the thousand Persian corpses lying, as they had
fallen, scattered here and there about the little plain of Anthela,
just without the pass, while the Greeks,* to the number of four
thousand, all lay piled together in one heap of carnage, for
there were many helots among them, who were readily distinguished from the citizens of Thespia and Plataia, being in all but
a thousand men. And this fact would seem to show that at
* Herod. VIII. 25.




118                   THEMISTOKLES.
Thermopylai, there was even a larger proportion of these lightarmed slaves, than subsequently at Plataia, where seven were
allotted to each Spartan; for it is probable that, in the three
consecutive days of victory, the number slain of the Greek
Hoplitai must have been entirely inconsiderable, not exceeding,
to take the average of their losses as against the light-armed
orientals, fifty or a hundred men; and this would require nearly
three thousand helots to make up the tale of the Hellenic dead.
During that day the fleet was deserted, all crowding to glut
their eyes with the bloody spectacle, but on the following morn
ing, the mariners returned to Histaia, a city of Euboia, situate a
little to the west of Artemision, where the Persian navy had
fixed its head-quarters after the retreat of the Greeks to the
Isthmus; and the land-forces broke up from their encampment,
and poured down on the lower country, like a deluge, devastating
and laying waste all the lands, and burning all the temples,
villages, and cities, far and near, except within the territory of the
Boiotians, who, fiom  hatred to the Athenians, had joined the
barbarian to a man.  One division, conducted and urged on by
the Thessalians, who had an old grudge against the Phokians,
broke through the gorge of the Asopus, into the valley of the
Kephisus, burning every town they entered, but finding no inhabitants, on whom to wreak their vengeance. All had fled, old
and young, male and female, to the wild and cloud-capped summits of Parnassos.  A second band marched direct on Delphi,
with especial orders from the king to plunder the rich treasury
of all its hoarded stores, its golden ingots, vases, statues, tripods,
consecrated to the God through ages. But when these were
involved in the dim and twilight passes of the mountain, among
the solemn gloom of pine forests and thickets of wild bay, with
the strange din of subterranean waters and headlong cataracts
thundering around them, and the superstitious awe of the dreadful sanctity of the spot, the dark religio loci, overshadowing their




ATTACK ON DELPHI.                119
souls, a fearful tempest burst above them with continuous bellowing of thunders, reverberated from the craggy summits, and
vivid flashes, and fiery balls shooting above their heads; while,
to complete their consternation, an earthquake-no rare occurrence in that limestone region, though now attributed to the
immediate action of Apollo-shook the hills, that two mighty
fragments, severed from the twin summits of Parnass s, came
crashing down, among the riven and roaring forests, and plunged
into their serried masses, crushing and maiming many, and turning
all to panic-stricken and disordered flight. Then dreadful voices,
and shouts mightier than human, pealed forth from the Korykian
cave with a clang as of immortal arms-for in that haunted
grotto, and the pathless woods and crags around it, the whole
population of Delphi lay concealed, with the exception of sixty
men who abided in the temple with the Prophet. And when
these saw the terrified barbarians, into what an ecstacy of terror
they had fallen, they rushed down upon them from the mountain, rolling great stones and trunks of trees from the precipices,
and hurling shafts and javelins into their ranks, amid the storm
and lightnings, until the Persians, in the abject terror of their
hearts, swore that they saw two gigantic heroes, armed in proof,
pursuing them with ruthless slaughter.  And these the Delphians said were the phantasms of Autonoos and Phylakos, indigenous heroes of the place, who had their shrines, this by the
Kastalian fountain under the summit Hyampeia of Parnassus,
that by the roadside, above the temple of Athene Proneie. The
third division, which was in truth the main body, under the command of Xerxes in person, passed through Boiotia, sparing the
country as being received by the inhabitants with submission and
proffered alliance, destroying only Thespia and Plataia, into
Attika, which they devastated from end to end, cutting down the
olive trees and vineyards, killing the cattle even to the smallest
domestic animals, and burning all fiom the private villa, and the




smallest hamlet, to the city itself, with the Acropolis, which he
took by a coup-de-main, after a long siege, with the handful of
men who defended it, the only citizens of Attika, who fell
into his power. The rest, either before the battle of Artemision,
or after the return of the fleet to Salamis, had taken refuge, some
in the island of Agine, some in the smaller isle of Salamis, and
some in Troizene of the Peloponnesos, where they were received
hospitably, a daily allowance of provision-money being assigned
to them with public lodgings, and permission to gather of the
vintage at their pleasure.
Salamis is a small rocky island, now called Colouri, situate at
the inmost extremity of the Saronic gulf, now the gulf of Eghina,
which it nearly bars from each side, leaving only two narrow straits
between either extremity and the main land of Attika and
Megara, communicating with an interior bay, completely landlocked, about ten miles in breadth by half that length inland.
The isle itself is rugged of surface, in the form of an irregular
narrow horse-shoe, its outer circumference being about eighteen
miles, and its width varving from three to five.  It contained at
this period three cities, the principal of which was of the same
name with the island; and some of its ruins, with traces of walls
four miles in circumference, and remains of a temple, supposed
to be that of Aias, exist to the present day.; but all the more
elevated portions of it were clothed to the very top of its rugged
and craggy hills, with a luxuriant growth of pine trees-whence
its ancient name Pityusa. Thus shaped, it lay close off the
coast of Attika, opposite to Eleusis, and due west from the triple
harbor of Pirceus, Munychia and Phaleron, at about six miles
distant, and having Megara about equi-distant to the eastward.
The isle of Aigina lay to the south, in the middle of the bay,
within ten miles, its splendid temple of Jupiter Panhellenios and
the towering cliffs of the tall mountain behind it, in view.
Here, then, in that small and sheltered bay the confederate




THE STRAITS OF SALAMIS.               121
Greeks still lay, having put in thither on their return from Artemision, for the purpose of taking off those of the Athenians who
had been left within the city; and here, it was at once clear to
the mind of the Athenian leader, that battle could be delivered
by the Greeks with the most advantage, since the advantage of
numbers on the part of the Persians would be so far neutralized
by the narrowness of the scene of action that they would be
enabled to bring up no more ships in line at once than could
be met prow to prow by the Hellenic fleet. Not such, however, was the opinion of the other leaders, especially of Eurybiades, the commander-in-chief, and Adeimantos the Corinthian
captain. These argued that to give battle in the bay or the
straits, Attika being already in the hands of the enemy, would
be in the last degree impolitic, since, in the event of a defeat,
they had no retreat except the isle of Salamis, on which they
could be easily blockaded, and forced to unconditional surrender.
They proposed, therefore, to remove to the Isthmus, on which
their land forces were already collected, and which they were
rapidly fortifying, and there to fight, having, in the worst view
of affairs, the whole of the Peloponnesos on which to fall back.
Themistokles well knew, however, that if once they retired to
the isthmus, the confederates would rapidly disperse to their
respective cities, and that all regular and organized resistance to
the Persian would at once be at an end. He argued, therefore,
earnestly, vehemently, and eloquently-for he was a powerful
speaker, and the best and strongest feelings of his nature were
aroused. Delicacy was needful also, for he dared not allude to
his distrust of the Peloponnesian confederates, and his argument
was necessarily limited to the military advantages of the one
station, and disadvantages of the other; since, by fighting at the
Isthmus, they would be compelled to engage in the open sea,
where they might be surrounded by the enemy's ships, and
overwhelmed by numbers, the rather that they were duller sail6




122                   THETMISTOKLES.
ers — *a qg rla t-than the Phoinikian and Sidonian war-ships
of the king.
Eurybiades appears to have been a cold, cautious, calculating
leader, but top-full of that overweening pride and assumption,
which was characteristic of the Lakedaimonians-to him, therefore, Themistokles was obliged to preserve an air of deference
and almost of humility, by which he in a great degree conciliated his good will; but when Adeimantos the Corinthian
taunted him, that "he, a man without a city, should presume to
advise men of free states"-for Athens was in the hands of
Xerxes, and the ruins of the Akropolis were still smoking in
plain view of the fleet-his natural impetuosity burst out, and
he exclaimed proudly and fiercely, that the Athenians had a city,
and the best city of all Hellas, too, for the present service, their
good two hundred galleys, with which they were present there,
to fight the battle of all Greece; and in which, should the
Greeks desert them, they would embark all the citizens, their
families, and treasures, and sail away to Siris, in Italy, which
had belonged to them of old, and where they would plant a colony that should be to them a new Athens. And this threat for
a while decided them. But when the great armament of
Xerxes came into view, augmented by the accession of the
Malian, Dorian, Lokrian, and Boiotian contingents, and by reinforcements from Karystos, Andros, Tenos, and other of the Greek
islands, so that it was more numerous than that which had
fought at Artemision, consternation again fell upon the Greeks,
and, after a long and stormy debate, they determined to weigh
in the morning, and sail by the western strait along the coast of
Megara for the Isthmus, leaving the Athenians only with the
Megarenses and Aiginetans to defend Salamis and Megara.
Then it was that Themistokles had recourse to his famous stratagem, by which, in the event, he saved Greece, though he might
$ Herodotus VIII., 60.




THE SECOND STRATAGEM.                  123
almost as readily have lost it by the same device. HIe had a
Persian in his service, by name Sikinnos, as tutor to his children,
and as usual a slave. By this man he sent a message across the
straits to Xerxes, who lay at the Phaleron, coming from himself,
as if he were disaffected to his country, and desirous of serving the
king-to the effect that the Greeks were about to fly to the Isthmus, and that if he desired to crush them at a blow, for
they were all in a state of panic and confusion, and incapable of
resistance, he would do well to surround the passes of the island,
and prevent their egress. Xerxes believed, and so promptly did
he act-for contrary to the prudent advice of Artemisia, he had
determined to deliver battle-that he caused all his ships to put
out at once, although it was already night, and blockaded both
the straits, and landed a strong Persian force on the little islet of
Psittaleia, on which he expected that many wrecks of the enemy
would be driven. And all this was accomplished with such
celerity, that, while the council was yet in session, news of the
movement was brought to Themistokles by his personal and
political enemy, Aristides, whose ostracism he had procured of
old, but who had now returned to serve his ungrateful country
in her extremity, and in the greatness of his noble nature set
aside all individual feelings, and co-operated heart and hand with
his gallant antagonist and rival. To him Themistokles commnunicated his stratagem, and on meeting his approbation, requested
him to carry the intelligence to the assembled leaders, for that
they would not believe himself, but would suppose it to be a ruse
for the prevention of their departure,  But still there was doubt
and dismay among the Greeks-for the greater part of the leaders were incredulous, until a Tenian ship came in; a deserter
from the Persian fleet, confirming the tidings which Aristides
brought, he having only escaped capture with difficulty, as he
came in a row-boat from Aigina.
It cannot well be doubted that this strange trick of Themis



124                    THEMISTOKLES.
tokles was played in good faith to his country, and this is established by his confession of it to Aristides; yet it is not easy to
believe, especially when we consider the habitual double-dealing
of the man, and the termination of his career, that it was not in
some degree actuated by the desire of obtaining Xerxes' good
will and favor, in the event of an unfavorable issue.
The next morning, however, terminated all discussion, for with
the early dawn, the Persian navy sailed in through the straits,
bore down upon the Greeks, who were drawn up in line to
receive them, the Athenians on the right toward Eleusis, and the
Peloponnesians on the left, towards Phaleron.
The number of the Greek triremes, according to Herodotus,
amounted to three hundred and eighty, including the Tenian
ship, and another a Samian, which had deserted at Artemision,
although in his enumeration of the different nations who were
engaged, he does not come up to that amount of galleys.
Aischylos, on the other hand, who was himself present in the
action, and who greatly distinguished himself, asserts that the
whole force of the Hellenes was three hundred, with ten of
superior swiftness added; while that of Xerxes was one thousand,
with two hundred and seven of unusual speed, and selected for
that quality from the rest, agreeing in this precisely with Herodotus, who states expressly that this was the number which sailed
from Persia, in the first instance, and that after the shipwrecks and
losses at Artemisium, it was furnished to the original number by
the accession of the Greeks who had medized, as the phrase went,
or those who had joined the party of the invaders. This coincidence on one point, renders the difference on the other more
striking, and although Herodotus is a most correct and veracious
historian, I incline in this instance to give more credit to the
Tragedian, as having been present under arms on the occasion,
and as giving all the details of the battle, modestly and truth.
tHerodotus, VII. 89. VIII. 46.  t MEschylus Persae, 340.




NUMBERS OF THE PERSIANS.                 125
fully with no poetical inflation, or partizan exaggeration. The
following are his words, which although attributed in the tragedy
to a Persian messenger, seem to bear something of a personal
character:
This, then, know surely. The barbaric host'In force of ships prevailed. For of the Greeks
Ten thirties were the sum, and ten beside
Select. But Xerxes, for I know it well,
A thousand ships commanded, and yet more,
In swiftness all surpassing, hundreds twain
And seven. So runs the tale.
In any event, the superiority of the Persian in numbers was
so extraordinary, that the boldest might well have despaired, and
that every advantage of position became necessary to equalize
the conflict. At the first, as the Persians entered the bay and
bore down upon the Greeks, the latter retreated toward the shoal
waters at the head of the bay, expecting to gain something by
the change which is not easily discernible at present; but it may
have been done in order to cause the Orientals, rowing rashly
onward as if in triumphant pursuit, to break their order, if they
had any, and to attack one by one in hurry and confusion. If
this were the design it was decidedly successful, for the barbaric
triremes kept no array or order of battle, nor sailed or fought, as
Herodotus has it, on any principle, or with any show of intellect
and reason; yet they fought better far and inore stubbornly
than on the three previous days at Artemisium, for shame and
emulation spurred them on, and tbo these powerful incitements
the fear of punishment was added, for upon a spur of the mountain Aigaleos, projecting into the sea opposite to Salamis, sat
Xerxes on his golden throne, with a royal canopy above him,
scribes crouching around him with their books wherein to inscribe
the names, t]:e countries and the cities of the trierarchs or captains of galleys who should distinguish themselves in the engage



1 2f                   THEMISTOKLES.,
ment, and if he were like to prove a munificent rewarder of merit
and valor, it was no less certain that he would mercilessly visit
on the heads of delinquents, the penalty of failure, as if it were
necessarily the consequence of misconduct and poltroonery-and
all along the mountain ridges of the mainland, spectators from
the Akropolis, from the rocky brow of thePnyx, from the heights of
the Areopagos, the far-famed hill of Mars, westward so far as to
Eleusis, glittered the gorgeous masses of the army, with all their
bravery of many colored banners fluttering in the sea-breeze,
with the rich magnificence of oriental garments, and the gleam
of gilded armature, beholding every incident of the encounter, as
if from the rows of an amphitheatre, acknowledging every deed
of valor by shouts that seemed to rend the very skies, and sympathising even to tears with the disasters of their countrymen.
It is stated by Plutarch, that Themistokles avoided engaging
until the hour arrived when a brisk sea-breeze was always wont to
blow, bringing in through the straits a heavy and broken surge,
which embarrassed the tall Persian vessels, with their castellated
sterns and elevated decks, driving them on board one and another,
and drifting them so as to expose their defenceless sides and
quarters to the beaks of the Hellenic triremes; and this may
perhaps explain the temporary retreat of the Greek squadronl.
How the battle commenced is not perfectly clear, since the Aiginitans assert that one of their ships first turned upon the enemy;
while the Athenians claim that honor in behalf of Ameinias, the
brother of the poet Aischylos, who at the close of the day
obtained the prize proclaimed for the mrost valiant; and this
appears the more probable, as we find him repeatedly named
by Herodotus and Plutarch; while his brother, in the Persians,
ascribes the first attack to an Athenian ship on a Phoinikian,
which coincides precisely with the account of Herodotus, who
states that Ameinias, of the tribe of Pallene-Plutarch says of
Dekeleia-went about, and, running on board an enemy's ship,




SEA FIGHT AT SALAMIS.               12 7
got foul of her so that the rest of the fleet were compelled to
bring to, and come to close action, in order to relieve him. It is
certain that the Athenians and Aiginetans, on the extreme right
of the Greek fleet, came into action first; which can only be explained by supposing the Phoinikian galleys opposed to them
to have greatly outsailed the other Orientals; since the left wing,
consisting of the Peloponnesians, extending eastward toward the
Piraios and the strait between Salamis and Attika-by which it
would seem probable that the Persians entered from the Phaleron
— would have been much nearer to the enemy; unless, indeed, the
Phoinikians had been detached to guard the bay of Megara, and
so entered by the western strait, rounding the headland of Nisaia,
and came at once in contact with the right wing and the Athenians. It was not long, however, before the Lakedaimonians
were closely engaged, also, with the Ionians, who attacked on
the side of the Piraios, and the action was carried on with the
utmost spirit on both sides. It was then that Amenias and
Sosides at the same moment ran into the opposite broadsides of
the great ship of the Persian admiral, Ariamenes* or Ariabignes —for authorities differ as to his name-the best and bravest
of the brothers of Xerxes, from which the archers and javelineers
shot and darted as from a lofty fortress; and these two driving
their brazen beaks into its ribs, boarded it, fighting hand to hand
with their long spears, and bore the admiral himself overboard
into the sea, where he was drowned; so that his body was
swept along with fragments of wreck, and being recognized by
Artemisia, was carried to Xerxes, after the close of that
bloody day.
This was not, however, the mode of fighting generally adopted
j the Greeks, whose triremes for the most part were manned
only with eighteen fighting  men, four of whom were archers,
and the rest hoplitai, so that it was not for their advantage to
* Phil. Themist. X[V.     f.Herod. VIII. 39.




128                  THEMIST OKLES.
come to close quarters. They depended, therefore, on their superior seamanship'and the rapidity of their evolutions, shattering
the unwieldy ships of the enemy with the violent onset of their
sharp beaks, and throwing them into confusion and disorderly
flight.
Some of the Peloponnesians, however, purposely behaved
amiss from ill will to the Athenians and Themistokles, but not
many; and not a few of the Persians conducted themselves with
honorable spirit and valor, even to the capturing or sinking several of the Greek triremes, the crews of which for the most part,
except those who were killed or wounded in the conflict, escaped,
by swimming to the shores of Salamis. Among these Theomestor, son of Androdamas, and Phylakos, the son of Jlistiaios,
Samians, both captured the ships opposed to them; the former
of whom was made tyrant of Samos, for his deeds on that day,
and the latter was entitled benefactor of the king, in the Persian
tongue Orosanges, and endowed with large territories. Artemisia also, queen of ilalikarnassos and the island of Kos, so conducted herself that she extorted from Xerxes the exclamation,
that their women on that day were men, and their men, women;
and this by a singular and somewhat treasonable stratagem; for
being so closely pursued by Ameinias that she had no chance of
escape, a reward of ten thousand drachmT having been offered
for her head by the Athenians, and so thickly crowded the fugitives ahead of her, she put up her helm and run her beak
directly amidships into the trireme of Damasithumos, king of
the Kalynaians, which went down at once with all its crew, not
one of whom escaped to tell the tale. Ameinias seeing this,
supposed her ship to be either a Greek or a deserter from the
king, and so bore up and discontinued his pursuit; while Xerxes,
on the other hand, believing the sunken vessel to be a Greek,
gave her great praise and honor for the deed. In the midst of
the conflict, again, a Samothrakian vessei ran down and sank an




SEA FIGHT AT bALAMIS.               120
Athenian ship, and was herself, iu turn, run down by an Aigin
etan,-when the Samothrakian crew, being javelineers and bowmen, vastly superior in numbers to the Greek fighting men, overwhelmed them with missiles, and making themselves masters of
the vessel which had destroyed their own, came off scatheless.
The greater number, however, of the Greek ships, captured or
disabled, were retaken by their countrymen; as was the case of
the Aiginetan guardship of the isle of Skiathos, which being
taken by a Sidonian vessel, was with her captor, jointly pursued
by Themistokles, in his flag-ship, and by Polykritos, the son of
Krios; and was recovered by the latter, who thus saved the life
of Pytheas, the son of Ischenor, her commander, who was prisoner to the Persians, and by them condemned to a cruel death,
in vengeance for his resolute resistance.
After a fierce conflict between the leading squadrons of the
Asiatics and the Greek triremes, in which, though they fought
long and stubbornly, the former were completely outmanceuvred,
shattered, and dismantled by the sharp onslaughts of the brazen
beaks, the Persians turned to fly; and from that instant all was
lost, all was over, but the wild confusion and the ruthless carnage.
For as the leading ranks of the van turned to fly, the rear had
come rushing up through the narrow straits, before a fiesh breeze
and following sea, and in those narrow passes they fell prow to
prow into their own retiring galleys; so that they shattered one
another, and were ultimately wedged together into one helpless
weltering mass, upon which their swift and active enemy did
fearful execution.  The vessels of the Aiginetans had, moreover,
taken advantage of the blind and reeling fury of the tumult to
get below the enemy, and taking post in the throat of the straits
toward Phaleron, were ready to intercept them, when they should
turn to flight; and thus the Athenians, shattering with their beaks,
the prows of those who still resisted, and thundering down upon




130                     THEMISTOKLES.
the sterns of those who fled, and the Aiginetans cutting them off
as they strove to escape, the defeat and slaughter were signal
and decisive.
How decisive, is evident from the fact, that Xerxes, although
his land-forces were entire, unbroken, encouraged by victory, and
fierce for renewed action; and his fleet, terribly beaten and
shattered as it had been, still probably superior in numbers to
the whole Hellenic power; perceiving how completely all his forces
of both services were demoralized and spirit-broken by the result
of that disastrous day, gave up all thoughts of proceeding with
his design of conquest, and gave order for immediate retreat,
fearing that the Greeks might anticipate him and break the
bridges of the Hellespont, by which alone he could make good
his escape into Asia. As it may be agreeable to my readers to
compare the prose account of this remarkable and splendid seafight, which in its magnitude, completeness, and greatness of
ulterior consequence, is in no respect inferior to Actium, Lepanto,
or Trafalgar, with the poetical narrative of the great tragedian,
who was an eye-witness and participator in the glories of the
day, I have thought well to subjoin a translation of the following fine passage from the Persians of Aischylos.
What time the morning with her steeds of light
Had climbed the sky and filled with radiance clear
The universal earth, a cheering shout
Of bold defiance from the Greeks arose,
Hymning their battle anthems; and the voice
Of answering echo from the island rock
Sent back the thrilling clamor. Deep dismay
Fell on the Persians in their hopes deceived;
For not as flying did the Hellenes chaunt
Their solemn paeans, but with souls afire
Fierce rushing to the fight. The trumpets' breath
Inflamed all hearts to glory, and their oars
Cleft the rough billows with harmonious sweep.
Nor long the pause,'ere seer distinct and clear




THE PERSIANS.                        131
Their squadrons hove in view-the right wing first,
With serried ranks well marshalled, and hard after
On came the fleet. Then loud and long upwent
The mighty clamor, " Sons of the Greeks, arise i
" Strike for your country's freedom, for your wives,
"Your children, for the temples of your Gods,
"The graves of your forefathers! now strike home!
" The contest is for all." Nor pealed the while
In fainter accents from the Persian host
Their roar of battle. Doubt was not, nor fear.
But ship to ship with shock of brazen beaks
Was urged incessant —first a Greek trireme
Razed the tall bulwarks and the carven pride
Of a Phoinikian ship; then through the hosts
Each against other drave his trireme strong;
And first the mighty flood o' the Persia:, fleet
Sustained the onset, but anon the throng.
Of their own numbers, in the strait confused,
Wrought tumult to themselves and disarray.
Nor each his neighbor aided; but the beaks
And arrowy prows of brass their groaning sides
Ungovernably smote, and brake their oars.
Meantime the Hellenic ships with constant charge
Thundered around them, that the foamy surge
Was covered by the broken hulls o'erset
Of sinking galleys, not a wave to see
For drifting wrack and weltering warriors slain.
The sea-beat shores, the reefs were piled aloft
With armed carcases. The barbarous host
No longer strove, but in disordered flight
Rowed wildly onward, while the avenging foe
Slew them, like tunnies in the meshy toils
Enveloped, and with broken oars and spars
Of shattered vessels, beat the flyers down;
And smote and slaughtered. Havoc, and despair,
And lamentation o'er the deep prevailed,'Till night's dim eye closed o'er the glooming sea.
And this, I doubt not, is as true a picture of the scene as eveni




132                  THEMISTOKLE S.
was drawn by the pen of poet. And yet it would seem, from
other accounts, that the strife was over at an earlier hour. Since
the Athenians had time to land a body of hoplitai, under Aristides, on the island of Psittaleia, and cut off to a man the Persians who had been landed on it, in view of a widely different
termination; and after that, to secure such of the wrecks as
floated toward Salamis, where they anchored and repaired
damages, so that they were perfectly ready to renew the action,
if as they hoped, the king would again offer battle.
Xerxes, moreover, even in the midst of his vexation and distress, found opportunity to make such demonstration of intending
to prosecute the war, as prevented the Athenians from takingr
measures to intercept his escape, and actually began making
preparations to throw a mole across the strait to Salamis, though
he had indeed no thought but to fly on the instant, and that
with all speed.
But when, at dawn of the following day, the Greeks saw that
the army still held its ground about Athens, they rejoiced, as
thinking to find the fleet off the Phaleron, and sailed out at
once in order, eager to deliver battle. But the ships were gone,
Xerxes having entrusted his children to the charge of the brave
queen Artemisia; and though the Greeks chased so far as to the
isle of Andros, they never got sight of a sail. And here, indeed,
the campaign, and the military career also of Themistokles,
terminated; for when he proposed that the confederates should
at once sail to the Hellespont, and break the bridges, so that, as
he expressed himself, they might capture Asia in Europe, the
other Greeks overpowered his opinion, on the ground that it was
dangerous to reduce an enemy yet so powerful to the necessity
of finding valor in despair, and fighting not for conquest but
existence.  And he again had recourse to his characteristic
trickery, sending Sikinnos once again to Xerxes, with a message
to the effect?-a. h.e, Themistokles, had prevailed with the Gre-ks




THE THIRD STRATAGEM.                 138
not to break the bridges, as wishing well to the king, and advised
him to make the best of his way back to Asia, or ere he should
be pursued in force; and this, as he represented, to get rid of him
the quicker.
After this, on the return of the fleet of the Isthmus, Xerxes
having already fled with the bulk of his forces, nearly the whole
of whom perished before reaching the Hellespont, of fatigue,
pestilence and famine, leaving Mardonios only with three hundred
thousand men, rather, as Herodotus conceives, to cover his
retreat than to effect any thing real toward the subjugation of
Greece; the prizes of valor were ascribed, among the states, to
the Aiginetans; among the men to Polykritos of iEgina, and to
Ameinias of Pallene, and Eumenes of Anagyrasis, both Athenians. But to Themistokles, of the leaders, the highest honors
were assigned by general consent; and afterwards, on his visiting
Sparta, by invitation, an olive wreath was presented to him as
the wisest of captains; and, on his departure, he received a gift
of the finest chariot in Lakedaimon, and was escorted over the
frontiers by a guard of honor of three hundred Spartan nobles,
mounted in war array-a tribute of merit never paid before or
after to any citizen by that stern and rigid people.
It would be well, if the life of Themistokles had terminated
here; for, though all the remainder of it was marked by talent
and sagacity, not inferior to what he had already displayed, it
was all tainted with deceit, trickery, and baseness, and closed,
I fear, in treason. His first course, was under the pretext of
punishing the islanders who had Medized to, and of levying a
fund for the maintenance of future wars against the Persians, to
enrich himself by pillage and extortion, the most barefaced and
atrocious; and he did this to such an extent, that, after his exile
and the transference of the greater part of his property to Asia,
there were still found and confiscated above eighty talents, equal
to about eighty-five thousand dollars, when before the war he




134                   THEMISTOKLES.
had possessed barely three thousand. It is true, he prevented
the iniquitous attempt of the Lakedaimonians, to keep Athens in
a subordinate, if not subject state, by opposing the rebuilding the
fortifications demolished by Xerxes; but this was effected by a
degree of chicanery and falsehood, which, though it may in
some sort be palliated by the necessity of the case, and the illfaith of Lace&demon, in no light redounds to the credit of the
tricky diplomatist who planned it.
Shortly thereafter, his open corruption and overbearing arrogance of demeanor, as if assuming the whole merit of Xerxes'
defeat, together with the growth of the opposite faction in the
state, led to his ostracism, or temporary banishment; during
which he remained at Argos; until the manifest treason of Pausanias being discovered at Sparta, and himself implicated in it,
as appeared from the private papers of the Spartan leader, he
was pursued both by the Lakedaimonians and Athenians with
such rancor, that he escaped, not without difficulty, to the Asiatic continent; where he was received with the warmest and
most honorable welcome by the king, who indeed used him as a
private and familiar friend and associate, and allotted to him the
revenues of three royal cities for his maintenance.  Here he
resided several years in luxury and ease, till Artaxerxes planning
a new expedition for the conquest of Greece, and summoning
Themistokles to advise with him, and aid him in his enterprise,
the wise and wily Greek died, just in time to spare his memory
the charge of overt and armed treason; as Herodotus writes, by
poison, self-administered; but as Thucydides believes, to whom
I attach more faith-not as more honest, but as less credulousof disease engendered by the disappointment of his vanity, the
frustration of his ambition, and the shame he must needs have
felt at the thought of having once been the best citizen and
savior, and being now the worst enemy of Athens.
In regard to his character as a statesman and strategist, there




HIS CHARACTER.                    135
can be but one opinion-in both departments he was unsurpassed, if not unsurpassable. To him alone may be ascribed
the preservation of the liberties of Greece, and the continued
Europeanism of Europe. His strategy was of that class which
relates rather to the management and manoeuvring of forces out
of the enemy's sight, than to their disposition or conduct in
action. But his foresight of events, his selection of times and
places, his calculation of results, seem to have been almost infallible, while his coup d'ceil was certain, and his resources inexhaustible.
For his individual and moral character no one can have the
slightest respect, or hold with him the slightest sympathy.  To
enemies and friends, whether it was actually traitorous or not,
his course was invariably indirect and tortuous.  And, even if it
be granted, that, in view of the benefits conferred on his country,
his ostracism was unjust and harsh; that his complicity in the
manifest treason of Pausanias was unproved; that in the then
state of the Hellenic mind he could have had no fair trial; and,
that he had no other recourse for safety than flight to the Asiatic
-still, when we look to his continual tampering with the kings of
Persia, to his transference of his ill-gotten gains to Asia, previous
to his own flight, and to the open manifestations of gratitude
due to him from Artaxerxes, and paid even to excess of interest,
I fear we must, impartially judging from the evidence, pronounce
him a traitor, even as we have pronounced Miltiades an enemy,
to freedom; even though it were the lot of both to save their
country, and to win, perhaps, the two greatest victories on record
in behalf of liberty.
At all events, a career so bright and glorious in its commencement, should never have been so dark, so doubtful, and so desperate, in its close; and if one were innocent, he would do better
far to die nobly like Sokrates and Phokion, victims to calumny




136                    TtIEMISTOKLES.
and ingratitude, than to live basely, a self-constituted object of
suspicion, an exile in a hostile land, and the creature of a
foreign tyrant, like Themistokles, the great, but alas! not good,
Athenian.




IV.
PAUSANIAS,
THE SPARTAN.
HIS BATTLE OF PLATAIA; HIS CAMPAIGNS, CHARACTER, AND
CONDUCT.
IT is not a little remarkable, that of the greatest Hellenic captains, several, and those not the least distinguished of the early
times, were what the Greeks termed povod6aXot, or single fighters, not in the usual sense of single combatants or gladiators, but
men distinguished for their conduct in a single battle. Of this
class were Miltiades, Themistokles, Pausanias, the subject of the
present notice, Kimon, and others scarcely inferior to these inl
celebrity. This great and fortunate leader was of the royal blood
of Sparta, though not himself a king, being the son of Kleomnbrotos, and so descended directly from iyllos, son of Herakles;
but, as cousin german and next of kin to Pleistarchos, son of
Leonides, who had succeeded to his father's dignity although a
minor, he was appointed to be his guardian, and to command the
confederate land forces, after the battle of Salamis and the flight
of Xerxes. His colleague Leotychides, the other king of Lakedaimon, was absent with the fleet which he commanded, and
7




138                   PAUSANIAS.
which was now employed in liberating the Ionians of the islands
and observing the Persian squadrons in the Hellespont and on
the coasts, of Asia Minor.
We have seen above* that the battle of Thermopylai occurred
during the celebration of the Karnean festival at Sparta, and the
Olympic games at Elis-the coincidence of which shows that it
took place in the beginning of the Athenian month Metageitnion, corresponding to the end of our August and the beginning
of our September. The sea-fight of Salamis ensued in the October of the same year, and the flight of Xerxes with the main
body of his host followed without an interval. Mardonios, however, was left behind with three hundred thousand picked troops,
independent of camp-followers, composed of the Persian Immortals and horse-cuirassiers, all the Medes, Sakians, Bactrians, and
Indians, both horse and foot, together with the best men of the
other national. contingents. These troops had all wintered in
Makedonia and Thessaly, where all the Greeks had Medized, and
where the fertile and extensive plains afforded grain for his men
and forage for his numerous cavalry, which he could not have
procured in the barren and limited territory of Attika, already
devastated by the circumstances of the last campaign. Sixty
thousand men, however, under Artabazos, having been detached
as an escort to the king, had been employed during three mnoths
of the winter in the reduction of Potidaia and Pallene, which
had revolted, had lost great numbers of their force by a violent
and unexampled irruption of the sea, and had now rejoined
Mardonios, greatly diminished in strength; though this loss was
more than compensated by the alliance of the Medizing Greel s
Thessalians, Boiotians, and Phokians, the latter of whom fought
reluctantly and on compulsion. These Hellenic allies are computed vaguely by IIerodotus at fifty thousand, in round numbers, though he states that they were never enumerated; and he
* Miltiades.




FIRE SIGNALS.                     123
farther estimates the Persians at full thirty myriads, which can,
of course, be considered merely as an approximation, since that
is the exact force said to have been originally left by Xerxes,
without any allowance for the heavy losses of Artabazos, or the
unavoidable casualties of so large a body of men encamped in a
foreign country.
The following campaign appears to have opened early by a
descent on Attika, in force, made contrary to the advice of the
Medizing Greeks, who strongly urged it on Mardonios to remain
in a state of "masterly inactivity," trusting to the international
jealousies and selfishness of the confederated Greeks, and to the
influence of his bribery, for which he had unbounded means, in
plate, coin, bullion, rich raiment, and the like; by which he
might disperse the allied forces gathering at the Isthmus, and so
reduce the enemy in detail. And such, it can hardly be doubted,
would have been the result, had that sound advice been followed; but Mardonios, influenced partly by a puerile vanity, and
partly by the desire of conveying to his king tidings of the reoccupation of Athens, by fire-signals through the islands, insisted
on active operations; and, re-taking Attika, proceeded to destroy
and lay waste all that had escaped the ravages of the preceding
year. It is stated, by that enlightened traveller, Colonel Leake,
to whose topographical researches I am largely indebted, that for
the transmission of such fire-signals the following stations would
have sufficed: Mount Hymettos, the isles of Tia, Syra, Myconos,
Nicaria, and Samos, across the Aigean, and mounts Gallesos and
Tmolus, in Asia Minor. It is not a little curious to contrast with
this route, drawn up from actual survey by an intelligent and
experienced geographer, the long line of fire telegraphs, described
by Aischylos, in his Agamemnon,* over the same country, with
* It need not be premised that in the poetic narrative of Aischylos,
the line of route, instead of following down the shore of Asia Minor to
the narrowest part of the Archipelago, where the islands lie the thickest,




140                        PAUSANIAS.
this exception only, that the one line runs from Troy to Argos,
the other from Athens to Sardis; the starting places and terminations being respectively within a hundred miles one of the
other.
Previous, however, to entering Attika, Mardonios sent Alexander of Makedon to treat with the Athenians, in the hope of inducing them to Medize; and so greatly were the Peloponnesians,
then engaged in fortifying the Isthmus, alarmed at the prospect
of their defection, that they also sent ambassadors, to promise
aid and confirm  their resolution.  But there was no occasion
crosses directly to the European side, and descends the long indented
coast of Thessaly and Upper Greece, the stations being so far apart,
above sixty miles on the average, as to render the transmission of news
by any ordinary system of lights impossible. The lines are. however,
so spirited, and it seems so probable that the idea was suggested to
Aischylos by this device of Alardonios, that I have not scrupled to introduce them here, from my own version of the noble tragedy named
above. The Choreutes asks Klytaimnestra, what messenger could have
conveyed to her, so speedily, the tidings of the fall of Troy, and she
makes answerHephaistos, forth from Ida sending light.
Thence beacon thitherward did beacon speed
From that fire-signal. Ida to the steep
Of Hermes' hill in Lemnos; from the isle
Zeus' height of Athos did in turn receive
The third great ball of flame. The vigorous glare
Of the fast-journeying pine-torch flared aloft,
Joy's harbinger to skim the ridgy sea,
Sending its golden beams, even as the sun,
Up to Makistos' watch towers. Nothing loth
Did he, nor basely overcome by sleep,
Perform his herald part. Afar the ray
Burst on Euripos' stream, its beaconed news
Telling.the watchers on Mesapion high.
They blazed in turn, and sent the tidings on,
Kindling with ruddy flame the heather gray.




ANSWER OF THE ATHENIANS.                141
why they should have doubted that generous and high-spirited
people, who with their open villages in ruins, their capital yet
smoking, their sacred Akropolis and the holiest temples of their
gods in ashes, their women and children safe in the Peloponnesos,
and their government beyond the reach of the enemy, in Salamis,
were little likely now to yield to an enemy who had wreaked on
them the extreme bitterness of his fury, and could injure them
no farther. And if they did doubt, the noble answer of the
Athenians to Alexander and to their own delegates must needs
have reassured them. " Go tell Mardonios," they replied, "that
the Athenians,'so long as the sun travels the same path which
he now  follows, never will submit to Xerxes; but, trusting
to the gods and heroes, our allies-whose temples and whose
statues, respecting none of them, he burnt with fire-we will go
out in arms, and fight him to extremity"-and to the Greeks" There is not gold enough on the face of the whole earth, nor
any region so excellent in virtue and beauty, that to receive it
we would Medize, and be the means of enslaving Hellas."  And
Thence, nought obscured, went up the mighty glow,
And, like the smiling moon, Asopos' plain
O'erleaped, and on Kithairon's head awoke
Another pile of telegraphic fire.
Nor did the watchmen there, with niggard hand,
Deny the torch that blazed most bright of all.
Athwart the lake Gorgopis shot the gleam,
Stirring the guards on Aigiplanctos hill,
Lest it should fail to shine the appointed blaze.
Kindled with generous zeal, they sent aloft
The mighty beard of flame that streamed so high,
To flash beyond the towering heights which guard
The gulf Saronic. Thence it shot-it reached
Arachnes' cliff, the station next our town,
Down-darting thence to the Atreides' roofChild of that fire which dawned on Ida's hill.
AGAMEMNON. 331.




142                     PAUSANIAS.
again-" Know, therefore, this, if you knew it not before, that so
long as one Athenian shall survive, we never will submit to
Xerxes." Such is the way in which men should speak, and so
spoke the Athenians-and as they spoke they acted.  But to
the shame of the Peloponnesians, it must be recorded, that their
noble confidence in their own valor and the good faith of their
allies, elicited no corresponding generosity from the cold Peloponnesians.  They promised, indeed, to send their full force to
the rescue, and in conjunction with the Athenians, to deliver
battle in the Thriasian plain before Eleusis, on the frontiers of
Attika; but when Mardonios poured down his hundreds of
thousands, through the passes of Mount Kithairon, into Attika,
and re-occupied the Akropolis, and swept all the Megaris with his
superb cavalry, their hearts failed them, or their selfishness prevailed-for the Isthmus was now fortified from sea to sea, with
a strong wall and a system of redoubts-and not a man issued
from their lines to succor Athens, in this her second calamity.
Nor was it until a deputation came from Salamis, reproaching
them severely with their bad faith and cowardly tergiversation,
and informing them that if unassisted they had no option left
but to Medize, and so escape extermination as a state, that the
Peloponnesians perceived how surely, in spite of all their walls
and fortresses, they must fall, should Athens join with the invader to attack.  Then at length, nor then until after fresh delays
on the old plea of sacred festivals-for it was now the Hyacinthia
-they did bestir themselves, and sent out from the Lakedaimon,
five thousand Spartans, the very flower of their fighting men,
accompanied each Spartan by seven light-armed Helots, in all
forty thousand combatants, and these were speedily followed by
five thousand Lakonians of the surrounding country, each with a
single attendant, and in rapid succession by the contingents of
the other confederated cities.
Intelligence of this movement was conveyed to Mardonios, by




RETREAT OF THE PERSIANS.              143
the Argives, who from hatred of Sparta had Medized, though
they dared not openly join the enemy, and he began to fall back
deiiberately on the friendly territory of Boiotia.  Suddenly
learning, however, that an advanced-guard of one thousand
Lakedaimonians were already in the Megaris, he wheeled upon
them in the hope of cutting them off before the arrival of their
supports, and launched his horse over the open country to intercept and isolate them. In these movements it is stated by
Herodotus,* that the Persian army reached the farthest western
point it ever attained in Hellas-an error well corrected by Col.
Leake,J' for they had attempted Delphi, the preceding year,
which lies at least forty miles to the westward, though almost as
many north, of the Megaris. Had he said southern instead of
western point, he would have hit the mark, but even the most
accurate of the ancient writers have little idea of the comparative
bearings even of places well known to them; and little reliance
can be placed on their geography.
It was not long before the Persian commander learned that
the whole Peloponnesian force had arrived at the Isthmus, when
he called off his cavalry and retreated upon Thebes, at about six
miles in front of which, on the northern or right bank of the
river Asopos, and on the edge of the plain of the Platais, he
established himself in an entrenched camp, containing something
above a square mile of ground, palisaded and fortified with lofty
wooden towers.
Here he was joined for the first time by the Phokians, to the
number of a thousand hoplitai, who had as yet made no active
movement in his favor; and so little was he satisfied with their
tardy aid that he made a formidable demonstration of attacking
them with his cavalry, which seems indeed to have been prevented from becoming something more serious than a demonstra* Herod. IX. 14.
f Travels in Northern Greece, Vol. II. 339. Chap. XVI.




144                     PAUSANIAS.
tion only by the bold front maintained by the Phokian foot, who
formed, what is termed the synaspismos, an order of battle in
which only a foot and a half each way was occupied by every
soldier, so that their large shields were in close contact, and their
bristling spears were as close as quills upon the fretful porcupine.
After this trial, however, they were amicably treated, and admitted to form a portion of the army.
The plain of the Platais, so named from the city of Plataia,
situated on a lofty spur of Mount Kithairon, now Elatia, on its
south-eastern verge, lies to the north of the main ridge of that
mountain, which is four thousand three hundred feet in height,
descending very steeply to the walls of the town, and an inferior
branch of the same mountain, extending eastward to Mount
Parnes, parted from it by a gorge called Dryoskephalai, the oakheads, in which are some of the sources both of the Asopus and
the Orope, and through which wind two different roads from
Megara, and the Isthmus northward.
In front of Plataia are a number of low spurs and ridges, the
principal of which, at about a mile and a half eastward of the
city, is the water shed between the straits of Euripos and the
Korinthian gulfs, sending off the head waters of the Asopos, eastward to the former, and those of the Odrope, south-westward to
the latter, their fountains which are large and numerous being
nearly intermingled.
At about two miles distant, north-eastward of the city, lie the
ruins iysiai, and nearly at the same distance and on the same
line, those of Erythrai, both on the Parnes ridge of Kithairon,
eastward of the pass of Dryoskephalai, and the latter one mile
due south of the main river Asopos, now the Vuriendi, which
here runs nearly east and west, receiving the tributary from the
oak-heads falling into it almost at right angles to the principal
channel. To the west of this tributary, and directly in front of
Plataia, with the temple of Here at the extreme northern point




THE FIELD OF BATTLE.                 145
of the city overlooking it, lies what is termed in Herodotus, the
Island; but it is no island, but a low flat meadow, intersected
and luxuriantly watered by half a dozen rivulets, which form
the river Oerope.  Midway between Plataia and the oak-heads
to the eastward, is the ridge Argiopios, of very inconsiderable
elevation, with the shrine or Heroum of Androcrates, and the
fountain of Vergutiani, supposed to be that in which Actaion
saw Diana bathing, at its northern and southern extremities, and
again nearly midway between the Argiopios and the tributary
of the Asopos, alluded to above, is the fountain of Gargraphia,
often alluded to in the account of the great action which ensued.
Farther than this I have only to add that the plain of the Platais, measured to the northward from the pass of Dryoskephalai
to the Asopos, is four miles in width, intersected by many
rivulets and low hills, but every where suitable for cavalry
operations. Beyond the Asopos, northward yet, the ground
slopes upward very gradually in open downs, perfectly adapted
to military manceuvres to the walls of Thebes, six miles distant.
In length, from the ruins of Erythrai, to the western extremity
of the island, the measure does not fall short of six miles. It
must be observed, that all the positions and all the fighting in
Pausanias' great battle was to the southward of the Asopos,
although the Persian camp lay to the northward of it opposite
Erythrai, and extending westward until nearly over against
Hysiai. A careful reading and correct understanding of this
geographical account is almost indispensable to a clear comprehension of what follows, as the manceuvres are as complicated as
those of any ancient battle.  I shall merely add, previous to
entering on the details of the battle, that it is the opinion of
Colonel Leake, which is of, the greatest military authority as a
distinguished officer of rank, that there is no reason, as has been
repeatedly asserted there is, for disputing the number of the
troops, as given by Herodotus, who were engaged on that day
7




146                      PAUSANIAS.
on the score of the incapacity of the Platais to contain them.
Assuming the number of the Greek force at ninety thousand
men at the very smallest, he says " for such an army the space
was amply sufficient in each of the three positions which they
occupied. In the first and second, the front was about three
miles in length, with an indefinite space in the rear.  On the
day of battle the hoplitai formed three separate bodies, two of
these had each a mile for their front, and there was nearly a
square league of ground to contain all the light troops, together
with those hoplitai, -who had formed the centre of the Greek
line in their second position, and who in the third were in the
rear near the I-Ierlum."  Again speaking of the Persian host,
he observes, "even on the supposition that they were three to
one, there was sufficient space for them in the Platais, as none
but the choicest infantry were immediately opposed to the Greeks,
and the cavalry, as well as the light-armed, on both sides may
have been spread over a space of twelve or fourteen square miles.
Even in modern warfare, in which the range of missiles has
created an order of battle much less deep than that of the
Ancients, examples might be found of fields of battle as small in
proportion to the numbers as that of Plataea," and in a note he
adds-" "at Borodino, two hundred and fifteen thousand men
fought for fifteen hours, within the space of little more than
a square league."*
This may be received in my opinion as perfectly conclusive
whether we regard it as that of a clear sighted and intelligent eyewitness, or as that of a distinguished artillery officer whose
judgment on matters of military science, range and distance,
must be superior to that of the ablest civilian. And now, without farther preamble I shall proceed at once to the details and
incidents of this most important and decisive action.
Mardonios then was encamped in his entrenched position,
* Travels in Northern Greece, Vol. II. 355.




CAVALRY ACTION.                   147
north of the main Asopos, at the eastern extremity of the
Platais opposite to the small town of Erythrai, on the spurs of
the Parnes ridge of Kithairon, and his force, only approximated
by Herodotus in his rating it at three hundred and fifty thousand,
cannot reasonably be computed at less than three hundred
thousand, account being taken both of Artabazos' losses, and of
the accession of Greek auxiliaries.
To meet these the Peloponnesians marched out under Pausanias, the son of Kleombrotos, from the Isthmus, and were joined
at Eleusis by the Athenians, who had crossed over from Salamis,
led by Aristidles, when being well informed of the enemy's position on the Asopos, they advanced by the pass of the Oak-heads,
and bearing to the north eastward of the large southern tributary
of the river, formed line of battle on the left bank, opposite to the
Persian camp, from which their centre was about fifteen hundred
yards distant, their right somewhat advanced in front of Erythrai,
and their left in about the same degree retired before Hysiai, and
a large walled fount still extant.  The whole of this position is
on the lower spur of the Parnes branch of Kithairon, so often
mentioned, and was in general nearly inaccessible to cavalry, of
which they were themselves entirely destitute, not having even
wherewithal to protect their convoys coming up from the
Isthmus, or to cover the approach of reinforcements which were
continually pouring in from the rear.
Seeing that. the Greeks were resolved by no means to descend
into the plain, Mardonios at once determined to launch his cavalry against them, which he did under the leading of Masistios,
who was esteemed the second best man in the army. This
splendid arm of the Persian service, which cannot, according to
the usual proportion of horse and foot in Oriental armies, be
computed at less than sixty or eighty thousand, came dashing up
the steep and rugged banks, in all the pride and pomp of Eastern war, with barbaric music sounding-cymbals, and gongs,




148                      PAUSANIAS.
and kettle-drumns-and hundreds of bright banners waving, and
their full-blooded barbs literally shaking the earth beneath the
thick-redoubled clatter of their furious gallop, and the clash and
clang of the mail-coats of their riders, and kindling the very air
with their furious neighings.  On front and flank, at once, they
charged almost upon the serried spears of the solid phalanxes,
which met them everywhere, unmoved, on the brink of the stony
heights, and hurled their sharp-barbed javelins, and shot their
hail of arrows into the solid ranks; and wheeled, as if to fly, but
in flying still shot and darted their clouds of missiles, and again
charged home, and wheeled again, flitting and circling to and
fro like clouds of sea-fowls; making no impression, it is true, on
the firm array, but wholly unmolested by them; for the light
infantry of the Greeks-never, until after the creation of targeteers by Iphicrates, a favored arml of the Hellenic service-was at
this time especially deficient, for they had scarcely any archerfy,
and it seems that aim was uncertain with the javelin, and the
range short and ineffective.  At length the Megarensians, to the
number of three thousand, who were posted in a situation far
more accessible to cavalry, and nearly on level ground, were so
hard pressed by the horse, who rode in resolutely to their very
spear points, threatening literally to tramplet hem  under foot
by their desperate and incessant charges, and so severely galled
by the clouds of projectiles which fell on them in all directions,
that they sent, still preserving their order and sustaining the
attack with stubborn resolution, to the general for reinforcement. It is not stated by any of the historians in what part of
the line the Megarensians were stationed, nor is it easy to discover this, as the lower spurs of the hill on which the Greek
was posted, in a very obtuse angle, with the apex toward the
enemy, are, apparently, nearly continuous and equally abrupt at
all points; but on a close examination of the map, I am inclined
* Herod. IX., 21. Plutarch, Aristides, XIV.




DEATH OF MASISTIOS.                149
to believe that they must have stood exactly in the centre, where
the valley of a rivulet flowing northward to the Asopos, nearly
bisects the position, and probably has some level ground on its
banks, which would favor a charge of horse. If it be so, the attack
was doubly formidable, and the danger imminent; for it would
appear, that if the Megarensians should give way, the army
would be cut in two, and the enemy's horse might have passed
up the ravine, and so gained the rear of the whole army, which
would then have been, of course, assailed in front by the infantry
of the Immortals, and other picked troops of the enemy. At all
events, the hazard seemed so great that volunteers were called
for, and three hundred of the Athenian hoplitai, under Olympiodoros, the most active and eager of the captains, were detached,
having bowmen mingled with their files, to their succor; and
these, who had been on the advanced guard before Erythrai,.
rushed forward, cheering loudly, with so much impetuosity, and
with so well sustained a flight of arrows, that the battle was
restored. Still, however, the Persian horse fought undauntedly,
and made charge after charge, as if resolute to break in upon
the pikes of the phalanx; but, at length, the Greek archers
shooting singly, and with deliberate aim, as the cavalry dashed
in upon them rank after rank, the charger on which Masistios
rode was pierced through the flank by an arrow, and, on the
anguish of the wound, reared bolt upright, and unseated his gallant master. Then before he could recover his feet, being overloaded by the weight of his panoply-for he was armed not only
on the head and breast but on all his limbs,* with gold, and
brass, and steel-the Athenians rushed upon him, and captured
his charger, which was bedecked with bits and necklaces of gold,
and in the end slew him, resisting desperately, and well defended
by a corselett of gold scale armor, above which he wore a crimson tunic. For so well tempered was the armor that it turned
* Plut. Aristides, XIV.   f Herod. IX. 22.




150                    PAUSANIAS.
all their blows and thrusts, and he remained unwounded, until
he was stabbed at length with the reverse point of a javelin,
through an opening of his helmet and his eye, into the brain.
He was the tallest man, it is said, and the handsomest, in the
Persian army; and was held both by the Persians and the
king as their most considerable personage after Mardonios. At
first the Barbarians, who had not seen what had befallen him in
the tumult, wheeled off and began to retire; but when they
learned that Masistios had fallen, they brought all their horses
round unanimously end charged, no longer in successive squadrons, but all abreast, in one great solid mass. Then the three
hundred Athenians, seeing themselves completely overwhelmed
by numbers, and finding themselves borne back, in spite of all
their resistance, and compelled to abandon the body, shouted
aloud for reinforcement to the army; and, the heavy hoplitai
rushing in from all quarters to the rescue, the horse were no
longer able to endure their onset with the pike, or to carry off
the dead, but wheeling off on all sides, and rallying at about two
stadia* distance, held council, what they were to do in this emergency.  Then, after a while, they fell off, and retreated to Mardonios, as being now without a leader-leaving the honors of
the day and the body of their commander as a trophy to the
Greeks.
And the, lamentation and mourning for Masistios was great in
the Persian camp; for they not only wailed and howled for the
slain, till all Boiotia was filled with the echo of their lamentations, but the men shaved off their beards and eyebrows, and
cut off the manes and tails of their mules and horses, such was
the mode and measure of their sorrow for Masistios.
And the Greeks only becamn- acquainted with the greatness of
the exploit by the emphatic grief of the enemy, for beside the
leader they had slain but a few of the horse. Yet they exulted
* A quarter of a mile English measure.




STEADINESS OF THE GREEKS.               151
greatly and prided themselves on their success in beating off
such a cavalry.  Nor did they so without good cause-for no
horse on earth-not the Mamelukes against Napoleon's firebreathing infantry at the Pyramids-not Milhaud's cuirassiers
against the immovable British squares at Waterloo, could have
behaved better than did the Persian cavalry, on the first day of
Plataia. They charged home, not once, but repeatedly, on the
pike-points of the phalanx, and no men can do more; for if the
triple lines of a modern square, armed only with the short
musket and bayonet, can fearlessly defy the onset of horse so
long as they preserve their equal order, what must have been the
effect of files eight deep, and sarissve twenty-four feet in length,
in resisting a similar attack. At the same time, we must remember that the Greeks had every reason to be proud of their
steadiness on this memorable occasion; for if it is to this day
held the most trying duty of infantry, and the highest proof of
their soldierly qualities, to resist charging horse, even while the
musketry of their rear rank is decimating their assailants with
an incessant roll of fire; much more difficult and trying must it
have been to troops, who, themselves harassed and cut up by
the missiles of the cavalry, had no projectiles, and could offer
only a passive resistance to an enemy, thus to them invulnerable.
This action is further memorable, as one of the very few occasions
in the ages of classic warfare, on which horses attempted to
charge unbroken infantry front to front; and as the first
instance on record of infantry charging cavalry in line, with the
pike, and that too successfully; for such was the movement by
which, after a repulse, they recovered the body of Masistios from
his countrymen.
The consequences were important, though the loss on either
side was inconsiderable, so far as numbers were concerned; for
the Greeks were so greatly encouraged by their success in beating off the formidable horse of the Persians, that they now




152                     PAUSANIAS.
ventured to change their position, which was disadvantageous
owing to the scarcity of water; there being but one small
fountain, to the north east of Hysiai, in the rear of their extreme
left, wherefrom to water the whole army, the right of which was
at least two and a half miles distant. On the very afternoon of
this sharp affair, therefore, after parading the armed body of
Masistios in a chariot through their ranks, they countermarched,
by the road from Athens through Phyle to Plataia, passing
through Hysiai, and by several springs, where the modern
village of Kriakuki now stands, at the opening of the Gorge of
Dryoskephalai into the plain.
This circuitous route, in taking which they must have appeared
to be in full retreat, they chose, because it lay along the steeper
spurs of Mount Kithairon, and when it descended into the low
ground, left both the river Asopos and its largest tributary
between them and the enemy.  On reaching the springs, they
turned northward by the road to Thebes, and took up a new
position, partly in the plain, partly on a series of low ridges
divided by many rivulets falling into the Asopos.
It was at this stage of the proceedings, probably, that a
dispute arose between the men of Attika and the Tegeatans for
the post of honor on the left wing, which the Spartans at once
decided in favor of the Athenians, as the conquerors of Marathon;
for immediately afterward they formed line of battle by nations,
in the following order.
The Lakedaimonians, holding the right wing, advanced from
the Theban road, and formed line, in an obtuse angle, its apex
pointing due east, and its upper limb facing the south-western
corner of the fortified camp of the Persians.  Its lower limb
occupied a line of heights forming the west bank of the large
tributary stream so often mentioned, having the fountain Gargaphia in the rear of its right, while the left rested on a strong




SECOND POSITION OF TIHE GREEKS.          153
stream  running due north, close, and nearly parallel, to the
Theban road.
The Spartans, Laconians, and Tegeatans, who composed this
division, were eleven thousand five hundred strong of hoplitai,
ten thousand of whom were from Lakedaimon; with them fought
forty-one thousand five hundred light troops-seven helots to
each of the five thousand Spartans, and one to every other shield
-raising the full force of the division to fifty thousand soldiers
The centre, which lay on a line nearly at right angles to the
general direction of the right, facing the Asopus and the north,
was composed of five thousand Korinthians, three hundred
Potidaians, and six hundred Arkadians of Orchomenos; Sikyonians, three thousand; Troizenians, one thousand; Epidaurians,
eight hundred; and Lepreans, two hundred. From Mykenai
and Tiryns came four hundred; Philius sent a thousand;
Eretria, Styris, and Chalkis of Euboia, a thousand more; Ambroia, Anactorium, and Leukas thirteen hundred; Kephallenia
contributed two hundred; Aigina, five hundred; Megara, three
thousand; and, to conclude, Plataia gave six hundred.  The
centre was composed, therefore, of nineteen thousand two hundred hoplitai, with an equal number of light armed soldiers; or
in all, of thirty-eight thousand four hundred fighting men. The
left wing, consisting of the Athenians, eight thousand strong in
shields, with as many more light-armed, were formed again in
another obtuse angle, a little in advance of the left of the centre,
with their own left resting on the north-westerly road to Thebes,
and pushed forward to withiln a hundred paces of the Asopos.
This division, therefore, contained sixteen thousand men of all
arms; but to these must be added, I presume, eighteen hundred
Thespians, who, according to Herodotus, were in the camp as
supernumeraries, and these not hoplitai. The addition of these
Thespians would raise the force of the left wing to seventeen
thousand eight hundred men, and that of' the whole army to




154                      PAUSANIAS.
one hundred and nine thousand two hundred soldiers, of whom
thirty-eight thousand were completely armed hoplitai, and
seventy thousand five hundred light armed skirmishers.*
The-whole position which they now occupied, the two wings
Forming obtuse angles in different directions, like bastions, with
a horizontal centre, like a flat curtain, between them included a
selnicircuiar space of ground surrounded on three sides, as by a
wet d:tch, by the Asopos and its tributaries.  It was well supplied with water, by the fountain Gargaphia in the right rear of
the right wing, by four large rivulets passing through the posi* Herod, IX., 28, 29, 30. The above enumeration is made up from
Herodotus, who singularly enough has made an error in his summing
up, which all his successors, even Colonel Leake, have followed, not
having troubled themselves to verify his numeration. The following
are his facts-10,000 Lakedaimonians, half Spartans, and 1,500 Tegeatans=11,500. Allied Greeks of the centre, 19,200. Athenians, 8000.That is-11,500+19,200+8,000=38,700. And so he correctly states it.
Then add for the 5,000 Spaltans-seven Helots to each=35,000; add for
every other Hoplites-for this 38,700 Hoplitai-5000 Spartans=33,700,
one man each-33,700. Again, 38,700 X35,000 K33,700=-107,400. Then
add 1800 light-armed Thespians, whom he mentions subsequently, and
we have 107,400+1800 —109,200 men. This is precisely as he states it;
for after enumerating the hoplitai at 38,700 shields, 5000 of whom were
Spartans, he adds the following words: " But the force of the lightarmed was as follows; to the Spartan band, 35,000 men, as being seven
to each man, and of these every one was equipped for war; but to the
Lakonians and the other Greeks, thirty-four thousand five hundred being
one to every man." The error, it is true, amounts only to 800 men,
and is scarcely worth altering, as it would be quite fair to reckon a force
of 109,200 men, in round terms, at 110,000, particularly where the
numeration, as in Greek, is made by so many ten-thousands pvptdegs;
but when the particulars are so closely laid down, and the error lies
merely in a miscalculation by the original writer; it is curious to observe how that error is perpetuated, and it proves how necessary it is to
verify every quotation by actual examination, instead of taking it on the
faith of any modern historian, how accurate soever he may be.




SECOND POSITION.                155
tion, two through the right, the others through the centre,
besides the Asopus itself in the front and a considerable brook
on the left of the Athenians.
The Lakedaimonians, who with their light auxiliaries formed
nearly half the army, were the most securely posted on a series
of moderate heights; the combined Greeks of the centre, and
the Athenians on the left were in the open plain. On the whole
it was a good one and well chosen, covering the pass of the Oakheads by which their reinforcements and supplies would come
up, covering the two principal roads through that pass to Athens,
and having a retreat first on what was called the island among
the rivulets and sources of the O0roe, and- thence to the strong
heights around the walls of Plataia and the abrupt spurs of the
true Kithairon.    a
In this second position the Greeks remained eight days inactive, their soothsayers promising them victory in case they
should act purely on the defensive, besides which their leader
must have been aware that without horse to cover his flanks, he
could not advantageously advance the phalanx to attack across
an open plain. Why Mardonios made no movement of any
kind for so long a time is less evidentf though it is stated that
he also was advised by the Greek prophets in his army to
remain on the defensive; but it is probable that the severity
with which his cavalry had been handled and repulsed in the
first affair, led him to adopt their counsels. On the eighth day,
however, at the instance of Timegenides, a Theban, he sent off
his horse across the Asopos, and probably along the same road
by which the Greeks had countermarched to take their new position, turning their right flank, with orders to take post in the
pass of the Oakheads, and to cut off the supplies and reinforcements which were continually coming up fiom Attika and
the Peloponnessos. This movement, which he ought evidently
to have made much earlier, was very successful, as the horse




156                     PAUSANIAS.
immediately intercepted a train of five hundred head of cattle,
bringing up grain for the army from the isthmus, with all their
drivers and followers.  All these fell into their hands; and, till
they were wearied out with slaughtering, they spared neither
men nor animals.  The result of this was soon visible in the
straitening the Greeks of their provisions; yet their numbers
still increased, and they remained so firm in their position, that
Mardonios still felt unwilling to assail them in it; though he
had already a powerful detachment of cavalry in their rear
with which he mnight have created a most effective diversion in
that quarter, by charging them from the higher ground while he
himself attacked in fiont with his main force.  It is remarkable,
that neither does Mardonios appear to have been at all aware
of the advantage he had obtained in thus turning their whole
position with his formidable horse-the best arm in his servicenor did Pausanias at first discover the peril to which he was
exposed by the establishment of such a power in his rear; at
least he made no more attempts to dislodge it, though he might
have been conscious of inability to do so, than did his antagonist
to avail himself of it. The Persians never indeed appear to have
profited at all by the superiority of their numbers or of their cavalry; as, had they possessed any strategetical ability, they might in
almost every instance have made demonstrations at once, on
every part of the enemies' lines, any or all of which might have
been converted into true attacks, simultaneous on front, flanks,
and rear. Yet they always appear to have trusted to direct
attacks on the front; and what is more remarkable rarely with
more than one arm at once, either attacking with their foot and
holding their cavalry in reserve, or vice versa.  The Greeks had,
it would seem, no option, since they were at this time entirely
destitute of cavalry, not having even a squadron to protect their
convoys; and their light troops being singularly ineffective as
compared with the admirable quality of their heavy foot. At




PERSIANS RESOLVE TO ATTACK.             15 7
this crisis of the manceuvres it is evident to me that the Greeks
had the worst of it; as is shown by the great difficulty they had
in maintaining a strong position on the first day when Masistios
was slain, and by the fact that that accident terminated that affair;
and I am inclined to believe that, if on that occasion, when the
Megarensians wavered before the horse alone, Mardonios had
ordered an immediate advance and attacked with all his forces
along the whole line, he might well have been victorious; since
the Athenians could in that case have sent no reinforcement to
the weak point of their centre; and, had that once given way,
the cavalry would have at once cut their position in two, and
could scarcely have failed to destroy them. At this juncture,
Artabazos and the Thebans also, since they too were falling short
of supplies, pressed Mardonios to fall back on the fortified
position of Thebes; and there lie at ease, feeding his host from
the rich plains of Thessaly and Macedonia, contenting himself
with straitening the Greeks in their position, whence they could
scarce retreat with his troopers in their rear, and trying the
effects of bribery, added to their natural jealousies and to their
weariness of protracted and ineffective warfare, to bring about
the dissolution of the confederacy.  This was sound counsel,
founded on sure and soldierly principles; for so long as his
great force occupied the heart of Greece, unbroken, there was
nothing to be gained by fighting, and the scheme of Artabazos
was certain of ultimate success.  But Mardonios was too arrogant and too confident of his numbers to brook the idea of
retreat, and being aware that want of supplies must compel a
movement of some kind, he determined to neglect the omens of
the Greek soothsayers, and, abiding by the Persian customs, to
cross the Asopos, and delivei battle on the plain. It was on the
tenth day from the death of Masistios, that Mardonios took this
determination, and on that same night Alexander I., of Macedon
-who must not be confounded with Alexander the Great



158                   PAUSANIAS.
came alone on horseback to the outposts of the Athenians, on
the extreme left, and informed them of the design of the Persians. These at once communicated the intelligence to the
Spartans, when it was resolved to fight; but Pausanias requested
the Athenians, on the passing of the watchword at daybreak,
to countermarch from the left to the right wing, thus changing
places with the Spartans; in order that, being accustomed since
Marathon to the Oriental mode of fighting, they might be. opposed to the Persian Immortals, the Medes and Sakians, while
the Lakedaimonians should meet the Greeks in the tug of war.
it is stated* that, at this juncture, the other Attic generals
objected to being ordered hither and thither by the Spartans, as
though they were Helots; but that they were reconciled to it
by Aristides, who showed them that when contending for the
post of honor they had been contented with the left wing; and,
that it was now scarcely consistent to refuse the right, when
offered to them voluntarily.
As soon as the day broke, this manceuvre was executed, by
the rear of the centre, and was first discovered by the Medizing
Boiotians, who were posted opposite to the Athenians, as these
were advanced more closely on the Asopos, than the centre and
right; for, when the Greeks broke up from  their position at
Erythrai, the Persians had quitted their entrenched camp, and
followed along the right bank of the river, which divided the
outposts of the two armies. They at once communicated the
fact to Mardonios, who forthwith executed a similar movement,
bringing his Orientals again to face the Lakedaimonians; and,
thereupon, Pausanias again countermarched, returning to his old
post on the right. Mardonios again followed him; and, as they
once more stood as in the first instance, sent a Herald to the
Spartans with an insulting message, challenging them  to do
battle with the Persians, in equal numbers man to man, and so
* Herod. XI., 46. Plutarch, Aristides, XVI.




PERSIANS RESOLVE TO ATTACK.              159
to decide the quarrel in behalf of all Hellas. No reply was made
to this defiance, and Mardonios was greatly elated, as if he had
gained a bloodless victory. This narrative is remarkable, as it
distinctly proves that the terror of the Medes and Persians, which
Herodotus describes as universal before the battle of Marathon,
had not yet subsided, in spite of their several defeats; and that
they were still regarded as more dangerous antagonists than their
Greek allies, both by those allies and by their enemies.
What is more singular, is this, that the Athenians were evidently held in greater awe, not only by the Orientals-as would
be natural, since they had repeatedly beaten them-but l  the
Hellenic auxiliaries also, although the right wing in battle and
the commandership of the fleet was given to the Spartans without dispute on the part of Attica, as if in acknowledgment of
their superiority. Yet there is no other way of explaining the
reluctance of both nations to sustain the attack of the Athenians,
especially after the Spartans h.cd shown their unwillingness to
engage the Persians.
But now Mardonios delayed no longer, but launched all his
cavalry against them, still without any infantry supports, and
harassed them dreadfully, for many of his cavalry were horsearchers, Persians, Sakians, and Parthians; all of them, but the
latter especially, the best bowmen in the world, and the rest
strong and skilful javelineers, to whom the Greeks had no arm
which to oppose, nor any means of repaying them  the injuries
which they inflicted. They kept their ranks indeed, unbroken,
and lost no ground, though they were ravaged by the fierce hail
of missiles, which wounded many and killed not a few; but all
the left and centre of the army was deprived of the means of
watering, for they were cut off from the Asopus by the intervening cavalry; and, to make affairs darker and more hopeless, the
horse had taken possession of and blocked up the fountain of
Gargaphia in the rear of the extreme Lakedaimonian right. By




160                     PAtSANIAS.
what forces this was accomplished, it is not stated; nor is it easy
to discover how or by whom it was effected, unless it were by
the horse detached for'the blockade of the Dryoscephalai, which
pass lay little more than a mile to the south of the fountain,
with no covering force between.  It is clear, on the other hand,
by all the accounts, that the Oriental cavalry did not penetrate
and break through the Greek position; nor can it be easily
believed that they tulned both flanks, or either of them; since
to do so a detour of five or six miles would be necessary; and,
if such a manceuvre had been effected, as it must probably have
been by the Athenian left,* the Greeks would have been so
completely surrounded, that the dullest enemy must have perceived the certain success of a simultaneous attack; nor even,
if that were not attempted, could the manceuvres which ensued
have been possible to the Greeks. In any event, whether we
believe that the troops blockading the Oak-heads came down
direct on the Spartafn rear, and took possession in undeniable
force of the spring, within half a mile of their right and directly
behind it, or that the Persian right turned the Athenian left,
and traversed the whole length of their position to the extreme
right, with the same result, the fatuity is inconceivable, which
could have induced them there to remain idle and inactive when
a few vigorous charges must have obliged the Greeks to form a
fiesh front to the rear in order to oppose them, and must, if
seconded by their infantry from the Asopos, have taken them
between two fires, and could have hardly failed to annihilate.
them.
It is remarkable that Diodorus Siculus makes no mention of
this second equestrian action, noi of the subsequent retreat of the
* According to Col. Leake's plan of the Plataiis, horse could scarcely
have forced their way between the Spartan right, drawn up on steep
hillocks, and the large tributary of the Asopos, as they must have
done to turn the Greek right.




THE GREEKS RETREAT.                 161
Greeks, but represents the latter as attacking, and on ground
which compelled the Persians to fight in serried order, thus
depriving them of the advantage of their superior numbers.*
No authority of this writer can however invalidate that of Herodotus, who wrote within twenty years of the event; besides
which, examination of the ground and other circumstances
confirm his description of the affair.
It is evident, therefore, that the attack not only occurred, but
that the Greeks were very severely pressed, and looked forward
with dismal forebodings to the giving of the signal for general
action, at this moment, by Mardonios.  Why he did not give it,
can never now be known; but that he should have done so,
according to every principle of military science, is undoubted;
nor can I imagine, even with all allowance for the superiority of
the Hellenes in discipline and armature, how in that case he
could have failed of victory. It was at this juncture, while the
skirmish was still raging all along their front and in the rear of
their right, that a council of war was held in the quarters of Pausanias; when it was determined, that should the Persians defer
the attack to the next day, they would retreat to the island, as it
is called, immediately below the steep slope from the walls of
Plataia, where they could neither be cut off from the water, nor be
taken in flank, from the nature of the ground; while they would
present a much smaller front to the enemy. This new, or third
position,t lay ten stadiat to the west of the Lakedaimonian position and the fountain of Gargaphia, and about twice as far from
the Athenians on the left; and, in order to reach it, the Greeks
should have marched by converging lines, the Athenians almost
due south by the westernmost road from Thebes, the confederates
of the centre south-westward, and the Spartans almost due west;
since their second position occupied ground, though its faces were
*3 Diod. Sic. XI. 30. 31.      f Herod. IX., 51.
l Ten stadia, an English mile and a quarter.
8




162                    PAUSANIAS.
angular, in the form of an irregular arc, the centre of which lay
in the island.*
During that whole day, the Greeks had unabating toil and
distress, the attacks of the horse never being for a moment intermitted; and with such eyes of eagerness, as the Duke of Wellington is reported to have watched for night or the Prussians,
rejoicing, as hour after hour lagged away, and still his weary
squares held out impregnable against the thundering charges of
Milhaud's iron cuirassiers, at Waterloo, must the outnumbered
Greeks have watched for night, and exulted, as hour after hour
passed away, and signal was not given for a general assault. In
several respects, indeed, this battle of Plataia was not dissimilar to
that of Waterloo; for in likd manner as the Anglo allies, so did
the Greeks hold a semi-circular position, with its front to the
enemy; in like manner, as Napoleon sacrificed and wore out his
inimitable cavalry, against infantry on which he never made the
least impression, so did Mardonios launch his unsupported horsemen against the Hellenic pikes; and, in like manner, were both
battles won by a general charge of foot, and converted into unexampled routs by the want of cavalry to cover the retreat of the
broken armies. Pausanias and Wellington both fought the
waiting fight, and when the time at length arrived struck the
decisive blow, which there was nothing left to parry. At nightfall, when it came, and when darkness set in thick and moonless,
the confederates of the centre broke up, instantly, glad to get out
of reach of the terrible horse-who, by the way, must have
again fallen back, either to the Oak-heads or to the camp beyond
the Asopos; since, had they still held Gargaphia, they must
have perceived and prevented any movement-and marched, at
their best speed, across the island, not halting according to order,
but ascending the heights to the Heraion or temple'of Here,
* Leake's Plan of the Plataiis; Travels in N. W. Greece, vol. ii. Herod. IX., 51.




THIE RETREAT.                   163
beyond Plataia, and to the eastward of it, where they piled their
arms, weary and hungry-for their supplies by the Dryoscephalai had been cut off-and had no share in the business of the
morrow. Pausanias, seeing  that the centre had  marched,
ordered his own troops to take up their arms and follow; but
Amompharetos, the leader of the Pitanatean lochos, resolutely
refused to move, insisting that it was disgraceftl and infamous
in Spartans to retreat before an enemy, and declaring that he
and his lochos would stand their' ground and die, although all
the rest should desert them. Meantime, a messenger came over
from the Athenians, who had not yet moved until they should
know what the Lakedaimonians were about; for they had no
great confidence in their adhering to their word,* and found
them halted, in some confusion, their leaders wrangling one with
another; when Pausanias bade the herald to go tell the Athenians what was passing, and request them to join him there, and
co-operate with him in the retreat. But while they were debating
day broke; and then Pausanias concluding that, when it came
to the crisis, Amompharetos would follow the rest of the army,
led the remainder, with the Tegeatans, by his own right, among
the hillocks and on the lower spurs of the Kithairon, toward the
position he had chosen, occupied a line of heights on a plateau
called the Argiopion, having a temple of the Eleusinian Demeter
in his front, and the fountain of Artemis, at the modern village of
Vergutiam, the scene of Actaion's misadventure with the goddess, at his extreme right; and here Amompharetos soon
rejoined him, but not until he was closely pressed by the Persian
horse, who seeing the retreat, rode hard upon his traces. In the
meanwhile the Athenians, who had nearly twice as far to march
as the Lakedaimonians, in order to gain their post, fell back across
the open plain, there being no elevations in that quarter of the
field, except a high, solitary mound, on which stands the modern
*Herod. IX., 55. Plut. Arist. 17.




164                     PAUSANIAS.
village of Platani, concealing them both from the Persians
beyond the Asopos, and from their own allies on the Argiopion;
but before reaching their proper station, they were overtaken
and obliged to form in the low grounds, and prepare to resist
the Medizing Greeks, who were marching upon them, near fifty
thousand strong.
Mardonios, seeing the position of the Greeks vacant when the
day broke, and supposing that all the Hellenes had lost heart
and were in full flight, immediately crossed the Asopos at all
points, and pursued with all his host, shouting as if already victorious, in loose and disorderly array; leading the chase himself
on his conspicuous white horse of the Nisaian breed, at the head
of the thousand chosen Persian cuirassiers of the Immortals, who
bore gold balls on the reverse of theii lances-whence their name
of apple-bearers, unX;60opoy,-and who were the best and most
perfectly armed of all the Oriental troops.  With these he made
so terrible an onslaught on the Lakedaimonians and Tegeatans,
who fought with them, numbering eleven thousand five hundred
shields of heavy foot, with forty-one thousand five hundred light
armed troops, that Pausanias sent a mounted officer to gallop for
life to the Athenians, and entreat them to reinforce him with
their Archery.  This shows that little or no service was to be
expected in action from the Helots, whom  the Spartans were in
ordinary times afraid to trust with arms, and who had neither
discipline nor skill in the use of weapons. The Athenian light
troops, on the contrary, were citizens of the poorer classes; but it
is, I imagine, the Thespian skirmishers, who composed the whole
contingent of that city, and were, therefore, probably of a very
superior character to the ordinary light armed men, that did such
good service on the first day against Masistios, and were now
looked for by Pausanias, to repeat the duty of repulsing that
terrible horse.
Aristides at once gave orders to his whole force, consisting of




THE THEBANS CHARGE ON THE LEFT..165
about seventeen thousand men-for the Plataians had joined them
fiom the left centre, too brave to fly with the confederates-to
march at once at double quick time to the relief of the Spartans.
The Medizing Greeks, on seeing this, advanced on them, in a
force traditionally stated, for they were never numbered, at fifty
thousand, including a considerable body of Theban cavalry.
Aristides thereupon,* stood forth beyond the lines, shouting to
them vehemently, and calling all the Hellenic gods to witIess,
that they should give way, nor hinder those who would peril
their lives for Hellas.
But when this availed nothing, but they still came on in
array of battle, he lowered his pikes and charged in close
column, compelled to give up his design of relieving the right
wing. As he charged, the Lokrian, Phokian, and other Medizing
Greeks gave way, as unwilling to encounter their countrymen in
behalf of the barbarian; but the Boiotians, and Thebans more
especially, volunteer traitors, instigated by hatred of Athens,
shouted and charged home, shield to shield; and the tug of war
was for a time difficult and desperate between them.
At this time the Lakedaimonians, on whom the brunt of this
bloody battle fell, were suffering severely-for their sacrifices were
ominous of ill, and forbade their fighting on pain of total defeat.
They stood, therefore, immovable, covering themselves' as best
they might, kneeling under shelter of their great shields, while
the Persian cavalry wheeled round and round them, pouring in
their deadly hail of missiles, till many fell dead in their lines, and
few but were wounded. Encouraged, too, by the inactivity of
the Greeks, which they could not comprehend, the Persian
infantry came up to within half bow-shot, and, piling their
square wicker bucklers in an extemporaneous breastwork, shot
from behind it their volleyed arrows with terrible precision and
fatal execution. Again victims were slain, and again the signs
* Plut. Aristid., 18.




166                     PAUSANIAS.
were unfavorable; until Pausanias, turning his head to the ternple of Here, on the heights above his left, which he could see
over the ruined ramparts of Plataia, burned the preceding year
by Xerxes, implored the aid of the goddess with outstretched
arms and flowing tears.  Then, it is said, the sacrifices at once
became propitious; and then, with the deep and solemn conclamation of their paeans, at length released from their unwilling
inactivity, down from the upper ground, down, came the Spartans with their stout allies, in serried phalanx, eight shields deep;
and forth to meet them, casting aside their bows, rushed manfully the Persians; and about the rampart of bucklers, and on
the consecrated ground of Ceres, the conflict was severe and
stubborn; nor were the Orientals inferior to the Greeks in spirit
or in strength, but in their light harness, and short weapons,
they were as naked* men against men clad in proof. But the
Greeks keeping their order of linked shields, synaspismos, beat
down the wall of bucklers, and thrusting their long pikes into
the faces and chests of the Persians, bore them down by sheer
force, but not without spirited resistance; for-they strove hard to
break the pikes with their bare hands, and did break many; and
came in, hand to hand, with scymetar and dagger, and tearing
away the shields of the Hoplitai, held the fight dubious for a
long time and the victory in suspense. Then, as they began to
give way and scatter before the irresistible pikes, Mardonios with
the horse of the Immortals once again charged home, and was
already making some impression, as he had done all day,
wherever he charged in person, and the infantry rallied fast,
favored by his diversion, when the Spartan Acimnestos, like
Aias and Aineias, and other heroes of the epic ages, seized <
huge stone, and hurled it with such violence and precision, that
striking him in his face, it slew that gallant chief outright; and
as all beheld him fall in the first ranks, disorderly flight and a
* Herod. IX., 67.    t Plut. Aristides 18.




DEATH OF MARDONIOS.                1B67
total rout ensued. For Artabazos, who had fought reluctantly
from the first, and with disaffection to Mardonios, being now
chief in command, made no effort to rally the men or retrieve
the day; made no effort to defend the fortified camp, or even
the Theban wall, but gallopped off the field with forty thousand
fresh horse-all that were left of the gigantic cavalry, which had
commenced the action with such a clang and clatter, and were
still sufficient, if well led, to have trampled the Greek army into
dust, and taking the road west of Platai, by Leuctra, Thespiai,
and the edge of lake K6phisis, over the plain of Chaironeia,
made good his escape into Phokis, and thence by Thessaly and
Thrace to the Hellespont.
In the meantime, the Athenians, in spite of the superior numbers and hard-fighting of the Thebans, had broken them, with
considerable loss, killing three hundred of their best men, and
were driving them off the field by the direct road to Thebes
though held somewhat in check by their horse, when a messenger came up from Pausanias, informing them of the decisive victory he had gained on his wing, and requiring their aid, if they
could give it, in storming the entrenched camp; for the Athenians were the most skilful of all the Hellenes at wall-fighting,
and the storming of fortified places.
The Boiotians had by this time been beaten to their hearts'
content, and as they showed no signs of rallying, as the Athenians relaxed their pursuit, but were already over the Asopos in
full flight, Aristides led his forces over the site of the last night's
position of Mardonios, down the right bank of the Asopos, and
reached the encampment, just as the Lakedaimonians and Tegeatans were in check and wavering, so strenuous was the defence
of the walls and the towers.
And now the Boiotian cavalry was retreating across the field
whereon the Athenians had repulsed their countrymen, in order
to rejoin them; when, having already done good service, in pro



163                     PA US.ANIIA S.
tecting the routed Persians, they fell in with the Megarensians
and Phliasians in the plain-who, not having struck a blow in the
action, now seeing the victory won, were rushing down disorderly
to share the spoil-and charging them pell-mell, cut them to
pieces, killing above six hundred; and, after chasing the rest to
Kithairon, made good their own retreat to Thebes. Then, by
the fierceness and alacrity of the Athenians the walls were forced
and a great breach made, by which the whole Greek force burst in,
and such a slaughter followed, as history nowhere else records;
for, their walls once forced, the miserable Persians thought no
more of resistance; and the Greeks, if they felt compassion, dared
not display it, so much did the vanquished enemy still outnumber their whole army; So they butchered them, literally, like
sheep; and it is confidently asserted that, of three hundred thousand Orientals, to speak in round numbers, only the forty
thousand who fled early in the day with Artabazos, and three
thousand who escaped from  the camp, and were subsequently
slain by Perdikkas in Makedonia, got off with their lives from
that truly disastrous day.
Of the Lakedaimonians, who confessedly did the best that day,
although the Athenians and Tegeatans fought undeniably, ninetyone fell; of the Tegeatans sixteen; of the Athenians fifty-twoso small was their loss, owing to their unbroken ranks and perfect panoply.*  Plutarch complains of the silence of Ilerodotust
as to the other Greeks, and charges him with unfairness; as he
alleges that of the Greeks, in all, there fell one thousand and
thirty-six.  But it must be remembered that Plutarch was
a Boiotian, hostile both to Sparta and Athens; that he did not
write until the fourth century after the battle, and that he states
the dead of the Lakedaimonians, Tegeatans and Athenians,
at the same number with'his predecessor.  The frankness,
moreover, with which Herodotos, who was an Ionian, and no
* Herod. IX. 70.   t Plut. Aristides, 19.




HIS SOLDIERSHIP.                  169
admirer in general of the Lakedaimonians, ascribes the
glory of the day to them  and to Pausanias, amply confirms
his veracity, if confirmation were required. But the charge is
false; for he does mention the fall of six hundred Megarensians
and Phthiasians, though not in the battle; and it is notorious that
the ancients never were wont to enumerate the loss of any,
except hoplitai; wherefore, if it be a fact that a thousand and
thirty-six Greeks fell, the number either includes all who fell in
all the three days' fighting, or the light armed and Helots of the
last day.
Thus terminated this most memorable and most important
day.*  Most memorable, because no equally well authenticated
battle even approximates it in carnage, and because on it the
Persian fleet and army at Mykale was utterly destroyed almost at
the same hour.  Most important, for it turned the whole tide
of battle, and changed the scene of the Persian wars fiom
European to Asiatic soil, so that when we again find Hellenes and
Orientals in action, we shall see the former as invaders, and
the latter struggling in vain to defend their soil against the
western spear.
The conduct of Pausanias was, indeed, admirable throughout
those three most trying and most desperate days; his resources are
shown to have been extraordinary; his coulp d'eil prodigious;
and the manner in which he manoeuvred infantry over open
country, in the teeth of a vast and admirable cavalry, without
losing a man, or having a rank broken; and kept them together
under circumstances almost hopeless; and steady, undor harassing attacks to which they could make no reply, reflect the high..
est lustre on his generalship, and on the immnovable steadiness:
of the men he commanded.  On two occasions-when the Per* According to Plutarch, it was the 16th of the Attic month Maimacterion, corresponding to the end of November and beginning of December, 2d year, of 7Sth Olym., 479 B. C.
8




170(                    PAUSANIAS.
si an horse were established in his rear on the second day, and
when the cowardly withdrawal of his centre, in the last and decisive action, left his two wings separated by a gap of nearly a
mile, by pouring their whole army into which, and so cutting
his position in two, the Persians might have attacked him in
detail-he ought to have been beaten, and that by no possible
fault of his own; while it was by his own constancy and conduct,
only, that he turned even disasters to his own advantage, and
won a battle unequalled perhaps in any age of recorded history.
The spoil taken was enormous; the brazen manger of Mardonios was seized by the Tegeatans; his dagger, or acinaces,* and
silver-footed throne, by the Athenians; the whole army was
enriched with booty, and for years afterwards Persian Darics of
gold became the ordinary currency of Greece. Of all the spoil,
women, horses, coined and uncoined gold, furniture, dress,
camels, all, one-tenth was given to Pausanias-and, alas! proved
his ruin.
For, like Miltiades, like Themnistokles, like so many other great
and gallant Greeks, the luxury and wealth, added to his
unbounded vanity and ambition, corrupted him, even to the
degree of assuming the manners and dress of the Persians, and
of traitorously corresponding with the king. At length, this
splendid soldier, this superb commander, the greatest benefactor
of his countrymen, who might have reigned immortal in the
hearts of his fellow citizens, could he but have limited his overweening pride and vaulting ambition to the first magistracy of a
frugal and poor republic-convicted of manifest treason-died
miserably, a dishonest, and deplorable, if undeplored, death.
Taking sanctuary in the temple of Athene, "of the brazen
house," fronm which the awful religion of the spot prevented his
removal, the door was walled up-his own mother laying the
first stone-the roof torn off, and guards stationed around; till
* Pausanias, Attica, 27.




HIS TREASON.                     171
the most famous soldier and wealthiest man of all Hellas, died
wretchedly, on the bare earth, of cold and famine.
It is not a picture to be dwelt upon; for, though it has a sad
moral of the inconstancy of human things, even of human virtue
it is one of so constant occurrence in the early republics of Hellas, that we are half induced to suspect some natural ill inherent
to their constitutions, which rendered inevitable, if it might not
palliate, these constantly recurring instances of the noblest patriotism, polluted by the basest treason, in the person of a single individual. Heaven be praised, if such acts of devotion are rare of
occurrence in these latter days-such treasons are impossible




V.
XENOPHON,
TIT{E ATTHENIAN;
H[IS RDETREAT OF TH. E TEN THOUSAND; HIIS CAMPAIC-NS7 CHIARACTER2 AND CONDUCT.
BoaN an.Athenian, in the borough of Ercheian of the tribe
Aigeis, this distinguished. man camne upon the stage of life at a
busy and eventful period, -both for his native city, and for the
world at large —-for it was in. the second year of the eighty-third
Olympiad, corresponding to four hundred and forty-five B.C.,
in the Archonship of Timarchides-the same year in which,
after all the district of Attika had been devastated by' the Lakedaimonians, and the city of Chaironeia fruitlessly captured by
their own general Tolmides, who was afterwards defeated with
the loss of his whole army, and himself slain at Koroneia, the
Athenians were compelled to liberate all the cities they had
gained in Boiotia, in order to procure tile release of their own
prisoners from the hands of the Thebans —that he first saw thoe
light.  His father's name was Gryllos; but little is known either
of his family, or of his early years; beyond this, that while a
very young man his personal beauty recommendedl him to Soc-rates, of whom  h.e became perhaps the most favorite and
distinguished pupil, certainly one of the very few, Who neither




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MARCH 0! 4 GREEK aRMY.                                                                                   p} 1~2








HIS EARLY YEARS.                   173
disgraced the name and tenets of their preceptor by the grossness
and immorality of their private lives, nor turned the profession
of philosophy into sordid money-making charlatanry; for he,
at least, used it rather as the daily guide and measure of an
honorable, upright, and useful life, than as the means of dishonest
profit, or the badge of vanity and arrogance.
A truce of thirty years was signed, on the year of Xenophon's
birth, between the Athenians and Lakedaimonians; and so much
were the former depressed by the results of the battle of
Koroneia, that they moved but little in the public affairs of
Greece for a considerable space of time; until, in the first year
of the eighty-seventh Olympiad,* they became involved in a
quarrel between the Korinthians and Kerkuraians, in the course
of which they soon came to actual hostilities with the former
people, at the siege of Potidaia, an Attik dependency which had
been seduced from its allegiance by the joint influence of Korinth
and Perdikkas of Makedonia, who was at this period actively
revolutionizing all the Athenian colonies and conquests in Chalkidike.
Their blockade of Potidaia, by that able leader Phormion, was
instantly seized as a pretext against Athens, by the Spartans and
other Peloponnesians, who were anxiously seeking cause of war;
and, after a mock examination at the isthmus, and the farce of
sending evidently untenable demands and inadmissible propositions, they declared the truce to be broken by the Athenians,
and so declared war upon them.  In the following year, the
Thebans commenced hostilities by the seizure of Plataia, the
devastation of its territories, and the wholesale carnage of its
rural population.  This led to retaliation, and thence to the
Peloponnesian war, which raged for twenty-seven years through
every part of Greece, and at its close left Athens stripped of
* Diod. Sic. XII. 37. In the Archonship of Pythodoros, and the administration of Perikles.




174                     XE NOPHON.
power and almost of independence; and all the other states of
southern Hellas, so thoroughly divided and exhausted, that they
fell at once under the control of the absolute tyrannies of Epiros,
Makedonia, and Thessaly; and ultimately sunk an easy prey to
Rome, the very calmness of whose equable but iron despotism
was received as a boon, and regarded almost as liberty and
peace, by states worn out with the excitement of incessant warfare, wearied by the continuous succession of victory and defeat
alike unavailing, and wishing above all things for repose, even if
it were the repose of national and political annihilation. At this
period Xenophon was in his fifteenth year, and from the early
age at which the Greeks were wont to enter upon political life,
as also from the energy and activity of his subsequent career, we
should expect soon after this to hear of him in public; but it is
not till eight years later, at the defeat of the Athenians by the
Boiotians, under Pagondas, before the walls of Delion, that we
find any mention of him, and that only in the shape of a vague
and unauthenticated rumor, that fighting desperately he was
struck down and would have been slain, but for the prompt
rescue of his preceptor Sokrates. The same story is also told,
however, with the name of Alkibiades introduced for that of
Xenophon, in relation to the same battle, so that little reliance
can be placed upon it; though there is something more of
probability in another tradition of his being captured not long
afterward in another battle, the name of which has not, nor
indeed any other traces of it, been preserved in history; and of
his being long detained a captive in Thebes, where he is said, by
Philostratos, in his life of Sokrates,* to have studied philosophy
with Prodikos of Kos, and where he perhaps formed that
intimacy with Proxenos the Boiotian, which induced him to join
in the expedition of Kyros against Artoxerxes.  It is, indeed, not
a little remarkable that, with the exception of these two uncer* Anthon's Bibliotheca Classica; art., Xenophon.




OBS-CURITY'T OF 11. EARLY YEARS.
tain notices, both of which in some degree lack confirmation,
nothing definite or certain should be known of the way in which
the youth and early manhood were spent of one, who was
destined afterward, when his maturity had somewhat passed its
prime, to come forth as it were self-made, and blaze up at once,
without visible experience, a thorough and consummate general.
For seven and twenty years, as I have already stated, beginning
when he had already completed his fifteenth year, war, continuous and unmitigated, raged  through  the Peloponnesos,
through Attika, Boiotia, through all the seas circumadjacent,
through many of the neighboring isles of Greece, Sicily, the
richest and the most remote, not excluded; his native country
was devastated five times, far and near, by Peloponnesian armies,
the flames kindled by whom could be seen from the very walls
of Athens; was decimated by the most fearful pestilence recorded, unless it be perhaps the great plague of London; underwent all vicissitudes fiom the most splendid glory, to the most
abject gloom; and was, in the first year of the ninety-fourth
Olympiad,* compelled to surrender to the Spartans, under Lysander, who razed her long walls to the earth and put an end
to her supremacy for ever. Of the first twenty years of this war,
we have, complete to this day, the finest specimen of contemporaneous history that ever flowed from a vigorous, eloquent, and
impartial pen; I mean of course that of Thukydides-of the
remainder, Xenophon himself has left us the narrative; but in
neither of these works, nor in that of Diodoros, is there the
slightest allusion to any military services, or any exploit of
Xenophon himself. That a man of his parts, energy, intellect
and courage could possibly have been engaged in warlike duties
for twenty years, without attaining any command, or performing
anything worthy even of a passing notice, would indeed seem
impossible; and it is not to be imagined that he would have
* 404 B.C,




176                    XENOPHON.
remained, even had he been permitted to do so, quiet and inactive, while it was debated in the most desperate strife whether his
own country was " to be or not to be," and almost decided in
the negative. Nor does he again appear in history, until he
joined the expedition against Persia, in the year after his return,
commanded with so much ability by his friend Agesilaos.  Even
in this, we know not what part he played or what rank he bore;
and in the like obscurity rests his conduct at Coroneia, although
the fact that he served there, and by that service lost the favor
of his countrymen, is patent.
It avails nothing, however, to inquire or examine, where and
how Xenophon acquired that military skill, which lie afterward
displayed in so eminent a degree. How he became so much
attached to the polity, and such an admirer of the character of
the Spartans-how such an intimate with Agesilaos, an active
enemy of Athens, must ever remain an insoluble mystery: and we
can only marvel where the military wisdom had its school, which
conducted the most remarkable retreat, and in its line the greatest military achievement, recorded on any page of any history.
To return, however, a little, in order to throw some light on
the state of affairs in Persia, which led to the expedition of Kyros,
in the last year of the eighty-eighth Olympiad, corresponding to
four hundred and twenty-five, B. C., died Artoxerxes, surnamed
Longimanus, the son of Xerxes, and to him succeeded Xerxes II.;
who was murdered within a few months by his own natural brother,
Sogdianos. He in his turn was again deposed and put to death
by a third illegitimate brotherl, Darios IT., who had previously
been known as Ochos, the two reigns falling within the space of
a little over a single year. Darios II. reigned nineteen years,
during which there was but little stir in the affairs of Asia, with
the exception of some unimportant victories gained by Kyros, his
younger son. He dying in the year four hundred and four, the
same which saw the termination of the Peloponnesian war, was




AFFAIRS OF PERSIA.                177
succeeded by his eldest son Artoxerxes II., who had previously
been named Arsakes, being born before his father's accession to
the throne, and at a time when that event seemed wholly improbable; but Darios left a younger son also, Kyros, who had
already obtained not a little military distinction, and who was full
of ambitious aspirations himself to assume the imperial tiara,
Nor was he entirely without some sort of pretext for aspiring to
it; since, although the usages of Persia favored primogeniture, it
was well known that Xerxes I., son of Darios Hystaspes, had
been preferred to his elder brother Artabanos, partly through the
influence of his mother Atossa, partly on the same plea that
Artabanos, born while his father was a private individual, was
not the son of a king, nor heir to the kingly title. Such a
quibble would really appear almost too transparent; but conscious that he had his mother Parysatis, whose favorite he was,
on his side, Kyros, even before his father's death, had entertained
hopes of obtaining the succession by his father's bequest. Nor
is it altogether improbable that he would have obtained it, had
he been on the spot in time. For, when he felt himself to be on
his death-bed, Darios summoned Kyros, Artoxerxes the elder
being present, to come up from his satrapy of Asia Minor, which
he had bestowed on him with the command of all the Greek
and other forces assembled in the plain of Kastolos; and though
he came up with all speed, carrying with him as his near friend,
Tissaphernes, and escorted by three hundred Greek hoplitai,
commanded by Xenias the Parrhasian, he arrived only to find
his father in the death agony, and to be a witness of his brother's
inauguration. At this juncture, Tissaphernes, who, whenever he
appears on the page of Xenophon's most interesting narrative, is
marked with some peculiar brand of falsehood, treachery and
cowardice, accused Kyros to his brother of compassing his death;
on which the prince was arrested, condemned to death, and only
not executed, owing to his mother's tears and obsecrations, which




l7s                      XENOPHON.
prevailed not only to obtain his pardon, but to preserve to him
his satrapy,* whither he was commanded forthwith to retire.
The fuller particulars state that it was the usage for Persian
monarchs, at their investiture, to visit the temple of the goddess
of war, corresponding to the Greek Athene, and having there
partaken of a solemn repast, consisting of a kind of marmalade
of figs, preserved nuts of the terebinth, and sour milk, to assume
the royal garb, and with it the authority of king.  WVhile Artoxerxes was making ready, with his brother, for this ceremonial, Tissaphernes introduced one of the inferior priests of the temple who
had given information of an ambush, which Kyros, he said, had
prepared for the king, in order to slay him so soon as he should
put on the robe of state.t Some insinuation has been made to
the effect that the priest was suborned; but the probability is
the other way. The affections among relatives, born in the precincts of the harem, are to a proverb as frail and transitory, as
their jealousies and animosities are vindictive and enduring; nor
are brothers, in oriental dynasties, even to this day, particularly
scrupulous in th~ use of the drugged bowl or the assassin's knife,
for the removal of a tenant of the throne.
The subsequent conduct of Kyros, especially in the battle of
Kynaxa, shows something more than the unscrupulous intent
to wade even through fratricide to empire, for it was marked by
a savage animosity, and a sanguinary determination to slay with
his own hand.  The shrewdness and sagacity, moreover, with
which he had long courted the Spartans in preference to the
Athenians, as always the more ready to traffic with the barbarian; and the secresy with which he had been collecting and
maintaining small bodies of Peloponnesian mercenaries at various
points under the pretext of an intended expedition against the
barbarians of Pisidia, so that when he required it he was at the
head of a Hellenic power at a moment's notice, all go to prove
* Xen. Anab. 1.           f Plut. Vit. Artox. 4.




KYROS AND ARTOXERXES.                179
that he was resolved, long before these events, to throw for
empire at the risk of life.  There is little reason, therefore, to
doubt the willingness of Kyros to have recourse to stratagem
and a single dagger's stroke, instead of trying the chances of
war, and affronting the proverbial fickleness of military fortune.
And this the rather that, in Asia, there was no such sanctity in
the bond of brotherhood, as to render the crime of fiatricide the
most appalling of atrocities, or the intermarriage with a sister
the most shocking of incests; both being matters of every day
occurrence, and the former-the latter being the rule, rather than
the exception-being regarded pretty much as the taking off
any other dangerous, political antagonist, or formidable rival.
Both these young princes appear to have been naturally
amiable, rather than the reverse; and the younger unquestionably possessed in a very high degree that most princely power
of conciliating all affections, and of fascinating all who came
within his sphere.
He had by far the greater talents also, for he was not only
generally accomplished and a rare proficient in the use of arms,
but was a general, not unjustly, of considerable pretensions.
Artoxerxes, on the contrary, was weak, wavering and undecided, in his character, though not deficient in personal courage;
and lacked the practical commonplace wisdom, which should
have induced him  either to conciliate his brother by a total
avoidance of all show of suspicion, and a complete and generous
confidence founded on oblivion of the past; or by strong measures and deprivation of all power political, and military
authority, to have rendered him for the future incapable of open
rebellion, if not of secret sedition. Instead of doing this, while
he so far pardoned him as to dismiss himr unhurt and with an
almost independent command, to his own satrapy, he yet treated
him with such coolness, and with marks of displeasure and
suspicion so strong, that it was natural enough for Kyros to




180                     XENOPHON.
deem himself one marked out for future jealousies, perhaps
destined for present destruction-since then as now, in the East,
it was an usual method when kings apprehended the disloyalty, or dreaded the exuberant power, of their most puissant
satellites, rather to let them be taken off while on the route to
their distant provinces-a casualty which might well be ascribed
to chance indisposition-than to summon them to open trial; and
so give them an opportunity of resorting to open resistance.
Whether Artoxerxes entertained such designs or no, cannot
now be discovered, but that Kyros was filled with doubt, dismay
and animosity combined, was stung almost to madness by the
sense of merited or unmerited disgrace, and was now if not
earlier, resolved on striking for empire, is evident from the preparations which he began at once to make with equal energy of
purpose, and shrewdness in avoiding suspicion.
We find, for instance, that, in order doubtless to lull his
brother's suspicions to sleep, he condescended to solicit favors at
his hands through the intercession of his mother Parysatis, and
succeeded in obtaining the government of several wealthy cities
in Asia Minor, for which his old enemy Tissaphernes was a rival
applicant; while at the same time, he was diligently collecting
the materials for an auxiliary force of Hellenic mercenaries, whom
he levied, maintained, and employed in various places and under
various leaders, apparently unconnected with himself and with
each other-until the time should arise for exhibiting himself
in his true colors, and taking the initiative in offensive operations.
He was moreover in secret treaty with the Lakedaimonians,
whose ephori had promised him active aid, so soon as he should
be ready to strike, a promise which they failed not to keep; since
it was their constant and true policy to hold the hands of the
Persian monarchs full at home, whereby to deprive them  of
leisure for intermeddling in the affairs of Greece; nor were they
at all so scrupulous as to be troubled about the morality or




HIS MERCENARIES.                   181
justice of any expedition which should subdivide the power of
the king, and disturb the integrity of his dominion.
The first pretext of Kyros was the quasi war with Tissaphernes, which ensued on the king making over to his brother
the Ionian cities of the coast, which had formerly belonged to
that satrap, and in which he had been for some time exciting
revolutionary movements to the detriment of the prince's authority. As if to counteract these movements, he now collected a
force of iellenic mercenaries, and at once laid siege to Miletos,
being careful to pay over regularly to the king the tributes of all
those disputed cities; so that, until his plans were entirely matured, no suspicions of his motive seem to have arisen.
Besides this force he had already a considerable power of
Peloponnesian mercenaries on foot, under the command of Klearchos, a political exile fiom Sparta, and Aristippos of Thessalia,
to whom  he had advanced payment for the levy and maintenance of four thousand men for six months, who were under
arms across the straits in the Thrakian Chersonesos, as if warring
on their own account, there and in Thessaly.  Now, moreover, he
summoned Proxenos of Boiotia, to levy Greeks, as if for the subjugation of the Pisidians, a semi-barbarous tribe in the mountains
toward Upper Asia, while he employed Sophainetos the Stymphalian, and Sokrates the Achaian, in besieging Miletos, which was
occupied by the allies of Tissaphernes.
It would appear that some three years were consumed in the
preparation of these forces, and in other preliminary arrangements; for it was not until the 4th year of the 94th Olympiad,
in the archonship of Exainetos, and the military tribuneship of
Publius Cornelius, Caius Fabius, Spurius Nautius, Caius Valerius,
Manlius Sergius, and Junius Lycurgus, corresponding to B. C.
401,* that the expedition actually commenced.
For this end, in the spring of that year, Kyros marched from
* Diod. Sic. XIV., 19. Arnold's Rome, vol. I., 346.




182                     XENSOPI-ION.
Sardis, the capital of his Satrapy, with Xenias the Arlkadian,
commanding four thousand shields of heavy foot, the garrisons
of the maritime cities; Proxenos the Boiotian, with whom came
Xenophon-not as a general, nor captain of a band, nor private* at the head of fifteen hundred shields and five hundred
light infantry; Sophainetos of Stymphalos,t at the head of a
thousand shields; Sokrates the Achaian, having five hundred
shields; and Pasion of Megara, leading three hundred hoplitai
and five hundred targeteers, a new arm of the service, intermediate between the heavy infantry and the gymnetai, recently
introduced by Iphikrates of Athens, and used by him with effect
and execution.
At the end of four days' march he arrived at Kolossoi, a
large city of Lydia, where he halted seven days, and was joined
there by Menon the Thessalian, leading a thousand shields of
heavy foot and five hundred Ainianian, Dolopian, and Olynthian
targeteers. Thence he marched three days' journey further to
Kelainai, a city on the junction of the Maiander and Marsyas
rivers, where he abode thirty days, awaiting Klearchos, who
came up here, together with Sosis the Achaian, and Sophainetos
the Arkadian, leading in all two thousand three hundred heavy
infantry, eight hundred Thrakian targeteers, and two hundred
Kretan bowmen. And this completed the whole of his Greek
contingents which he reviewed here, and found them to amount
in all to eleven thousand shields of heavy foot, and about two
thousand targeteers and archers.1 The actual forces, as enumerated above, amount to ten thousand six hundred shields, and
two thousand three hundred light troops, part of whom were
* Xen. Anab. III., 1, 4.
t This chief must not be confounded with Sophainetos the Arkadian,
mentioned hereafter; for Stymphalos, though an Arcadian city, seems at
this time to have belonged to Argolis.
t Xen. Anab. I.-11, 9.




NUMBER OF THE GREEKS.                 183
probably equipped as hoplitai during the march, in order to
equalize the numbers of the phalanx, There is, however, some
discrepancy in the numbers, throughout; for although Kyros was
farther strengthened by the junction of Cheirisophos the Lakedaimonian, at Issos, within the Kilikian gates, bringing up seven
hundred* Spartan infantry sent by the Ephori, we find that in
the battle of Kynaxa, the shields were but ten thousand'I four
hundred, while the targeteers amounted to twenty-five hundred
-the only loss recorded being that of two lochi of Menon's
ment, who were either cut to pieces while plundering, or deserted,
to the number of a hundred shields.  The march into Upper
Asia occupied, it seems, above six months; and it is not improbable that over and above the ordinary casualties of so long an
expedition, many of the Greeks were corrupted by the luxuries
of the Oriental cities in which they halted, and so became lost to
the army.  Even for ordinary losses, however, the difference is
not excessive, amounting only to six hundred deaths, or desertions, over and above the recorded loss of lMenon's men, in a
march of ninety-three days, halts not included, and of two thousand: miles.
When they reached Tarsos, at the pass between the mountains
and the sea into Upper Asia, Kyros was again compelled to halt
for twenty days, since the Hellenic bands began to be refractory,
and showed much disinclination to proceed farther into the
country, suspecting that they were to be employed against the
king.  At the end of these days, however, they were brought
over by Klearchos, who was the only leader fully in the confidence of Kyros, and by the representations of the prince himself,
that he was only about to march against Abrokomas, a personal
enemy of his own, who lay on the Euphrates, some twelve
marches distant. Persuaded by these considerations, and by an
* Xen. Anab. I., iv. 3.   t Anab. I., vii 10. 10.   Anab. I., ii. 25.
Anab. II., ii. 6.




184                      X ENOPHTON.
increase of pay, they marched onward five days farther to Issos,
where, as above stated, the army was joined by Cheirisophos,
sent thither with the Spartan fleet. And here Xenias the Arkadian, and Pasion of Megara, took ship and deserted, through
resentment at the defection of many of their men to Klearchos.
during the last halt; but it does not appear that any, beyond
their personal attendants, if even these, joined them in their disaffection. From this point they marched quietly to the rich city
of Thapsakos, twelve days farther-no one positively aware, even
yet, what was the object of the expedition, says Xenophon;* yet
it is scarcely possible to doubt, especially when we perceive how
immediately all their scruples vanished before the exhibition of
increased pay, that not only the generals, but the soldiers of all
ranks, must have been absolutely certain, if only from the secresy
with which it was conducted, what was the real object of their
march. At Thapsakos, however, all their doubts, if they entertained any, must have terminated; for here Kyros himself
explained all his purpose to the leaders, and they, calling an
assembly of the army, to the soldiers.  But these affected great
indignation at their own officers, as if they had been deceived by
them; but on receiving the promise of a bonas of five silver
mina —equal to about twenty pounds sterling,  or a hundred
dollars, to speak in round numbers-to every man, in addition
to his full pay, from their departure until their return into Ionia,
so soonl as they should arrive at Babylon, they relented as usual,
and proceeded without further hesitation, across the Euphrates,
and along its eastern bank, to the city of Karmanda. There they
fell in with the first signs of the enemy, in the trail of about two
thousand horse, preceding them  and devastating the country;
there, too, Orontes, one of Kyros's most trusty chiefs, was convicted of manifest treason, in endeavoring to carry the cavalry
over to the king, and was led away as if to execution; from
* Xen. Anab. I. iii. 16.




DISAPPEARANCE OF ORONTES.             185
which time, alive or dead, he was never seen of men, nor the
place of his sepulture. Thence entering Babylonia, they marched
yet three days, when at midnight Kyros reviewed his whole force
on the plain, and arranged his order of battle; for he expected
his brother to deliver battle on the morrow; and to Klearchos
he gave the leading of the right wing; to Menon that of the
Greek left, and to himself he reserved the command of his
Orientals, one hundred thousand strong, with all his cavalry,
which appears to have been unusually feeble, and twenty scythed
chariots. But while the review was yet in process, deserters
fiom the king arrived, announcing the approach of the royal
army, rated at one million and two hundred thousand combatants, besides six thousand cuirassielrs of the Immortals, led by
Artagerses, and two hundred scythe-armed chariots. Of these,
however, but nine hundred thousand were present under arms,
being three out of the four equal divisions, each three hundred
thousand strong, commanded by Tissaphernes, Gobryas, Arbakes,
and Abrokomas-the last of whom did not come up until the
fifth day after the decision of the campaign by the battle of
Kynkka.* All that day the army marched in battle order, until
they arrived at a vast recent trench, five fathoms wide and three
deep, running twelve parasangs, or nearly fifty English miles up
the country, till it reached the Median wall, where it met all the
canals, four in number, about four miles apart, and a hundred feet
in width, well bridged, which were constructed for the passage of
the corn-ships from the Tigris into the Euphrates. The trench
could be passed at one point only, on a causeway, twenty feet
wide, along the bank of the Euphrates; and it was so evident
that the king had originally intended to fight here, but that his
heart had failed him, that, having thus far advanced in array of
battle, no sooner had they entered this formidable line of defences,
than the army relaxed its discipline; Kyros himself riding in his
* Xen. Anab. I., vii. 11, 12.
9




1856-                  XENOPHON.
chariot, and the Greek hoplitai advancing in loose order, with
their shields borne for the most part in the baggage wagons, or
on the backs of the beasts of burthen.
Thus they continued all the next day; but on the third,
Pateguas, a Persian, confidant of Kyros, came panting in from
the van, announcing the royal army close at hand. This was
about the hour of full market, or fiom nine to eleven o'clock,
A.M.; and then all was bustle. Kyros leaped from his car, and
armed himself, with his javelins in his hand, and mounting his
charger ordered his people hastily. To the Greeks he gave the
right wing of the whole army; to Ariaios, with the Lydians and
Phrygians, and a thousand horse, the left; and to himself, as
before, he reserved the centre with ten thousand Persian infantry,
and six hundred chosen horsemen, armed cap-a-pie with corslets, casques and thigh-pieces and Grecian sabres, and ridinghorses accoutred with chafrons on their heads and poitrels on
their chests, whom he led in person, armed like the rest, but
wearing on his head a tiara only, as seems to have been the
usage with the Persian kings.
Of the Greek right wing, which he rightly esteemed the
flower of his whole force, and to which he looked for the best
service, Klearchos had the extreme right, along the river bank,
which he occupied with all the targeteers, and a thousand Paphlagonian cavalry attached to his command by Kyros. Next to
Klearchos, fought Proxenos the Boiotian, with whom served
Xenophon as a volunteer; then the rest of the Hellenic infantry,
and on the left, next to the barbaric centre, Menon the Thessalian, with his men.* And it was now mid-day, but no enemy
were yet in sight.
It is remarkable that, up to this time, Xenophon, the able
narrator of this expedition, and afterward its main stay, has not
* Xen. Anab. I. viii. 1-6. Diod. Sic. XIX. 21-22. Pint. Vit. Artox.
IX.




CONDUCT OF KYROS.                  187
made his appearance on the scene; and it is only by one
casual expression of his own that we learn whether he bore any
part at all in the action, in which he seems to have acted as a
sort of aid-de-camp to his friend Proxenos, serving on horseback.
It was already afternoon, when "there appeared dust like a
white cloud, and not long afterward black shadowy masses
covering the whole plain.  But when they were come nigher the
flashes of the polished bronze were visible; and then the lines of
spears and the ranks came into sight. And there were, on the
enemy's left horse, with white corslets, said to be Tissaphernes'
men; and next to these Persians with wicker targets; and next
to these, again, heavy foot with wooden shields covering them
to the feet-and it was said that these were LEgyptians; and
beyond these other horse again, and again other archers and in
fiont of all a continuous line of war-chariots with scythes projecting from the naves and underneath the axles. Kyros, indeed,
when he had previously harangued the Greeks, told them that
they must endure the shouts and wild war cries of the barbarians, but he erred in this, for they came not on with a shout, but
as silently and quietly as possible, at a slow pace, and with an
even front. But now Kyros gallopped along the front with
Pigres the interpreter, and three or four others, and shouted to
Klearchos that he should oblique to the left, and charge, with his
whole force of Greeks, full on the enemy's centre, for that the
king fought there;'and if,' he cried,'we may conquer there,
we shall have conquered everywhere."'  But when Klearchos
observed the density of the Persian centre, and learned that the
left wing of the royal army overflanked the whole Greek power,
while the extreme left of Kyros' entire army was still to the
right of the king's centre, he did not deem it advisable to leave
a gap between his own right and the river, through which the
masses of the enemy's left could have broken in force and gained
his rear.  Wherefore he contented himself by replying that he




188                    XENOPHON.
would arrange all for the best. And, at this time, the army was
advancing orderly and evenly, when, Kyros careering along the
front surveyed both hosts, of his friends and enemies, whereupon,
Xenophon, the Athenian, gallopped out and inquired if he had
any orders; and he reining up desired him to inform all men
that the sacrifices were favorable and the omens propitious.
While he was yet speaking, a great clamor ran along the
Hellenic ranks, that he inquired what meant the clamor, when
Klearchos replied that the watchword was passing now the
second time; and he, surprised at this, asked again what was
the watchword, and Klearchos answered, " Zeus the Savior and
Victory." Thereupon, Kyros replied,' I accept the omen and so
may it be,' and gallopped away to his own station. At this
time the armies were about three stadia apart, when the Greeks
raised the Poeon, and levelling their pikes to the charge, rushed
forward. Then, as part of the Phalanx hurried its step with
overboiling ardor, so that the front was a little shaken, those who
were left behind charged on at double quick time to equalize
their advance, and catching ardor each from other, and influenced
by their own rapid motion, all shouted at once the battle cry of
Enyalios, and bore down with a fiery rush, clashing their spears
against their brazen shields to terrify the cavalry.  And, long'
before they were within bowshot, the Persians broke and fled in
confusion, the Greeks pursuing them  as rapidly as they could,
without breaking their own ranks, and in fact chasing them too
far off the field before wheeling on the rear of the royal centre.
The charge of the scythed chariots, as usual, proved fruitless, for
many were driven back on their own masses, many rushed through
the Greek ranks, which opened to give them  passage, empty
and overset, without harming any one; and in fact thus far thc
victory was bloodless, for of all the Greeks, one man fell only,:hot with an arrow in the left wing. Of the Persians, Tissaphernes alone did not fly, but charged through the targeteers and




TIE MELEE.                     189
Paijhiagonl;tun horse, along the river, bank on the extreme right
of the Greek lines, and gained the rear where he united with the,oyal right which had wheeled round the left of Kyros' whole
array, and broke into the camp which they sacked mercilessly,
regardless of the fortunes of the main battle. None of the targcteers had fallen in the headlong charge of Tissaphernes, for
they had opened their lines and suffered the cavalry to - s
through, galling them so terribly with their long weapons that
they had no inclination to renew the conflict, but swept away
uselessly to the rear, while the Greek light troops hurried on and
overtook their victorious comrades.  At this moment the field
was in utter confusion. Each army had outflanked and turned
one wing of the other, and gained its rear, while their two
centres were still reeling in desperate and balanced fight.  For
Kyros, when he saw the Greeks victorious and in full pursuit on
his right, and Ariaios gradually winning his way with the left,
esteemed himself victorious, and being already hailed as king,
charged headlong on the Immortals of the king's centre, with
his own picked horse, killed Artagerses with his own hand, and
by that single onslaught must have decided the whole battle had
*'e kept his own men together, or had the victorious Greeks
rheeled to their own left in due season. But neither of these
things fell out*-the Hellenic allies were in full chase; the
prince's body-guard got scattered in the mel6e, and fought in
little knots of ten or twelve wherever they could overtake a flying
foe or find one resisting; while Kyros himself, riding a fiery
and hard-mouthed horse, drove pell-mell through the broken
enemy, till he recognized his brother, and was recognized by him
simultaneously. Then they both charged, spear to spear, and
Kyros wounded Artoxerxes sorely in the breast, and unhorsed
him, so that his followers believed him dead, and, taking him up
* Xenoph. Anab. I. viii. 24-29. Plut. Vit. Artox. XII. Diod. Sic.
XIV. 23.




190                    XENOPHON.
severely hurt, bore him away to a neighboring hillock where he
slowly recovered his senses, all his men flying hither and thither
in confusion. Still separated from his own people, Kyros rode up
and down exulting in his victory and saluted king by many of
the enemy, even by some of the king's eunuchs, till at last, his
tiara falling off, he was wounded near the eye with a javelin by
one Mithradates, a Persian youth, ignorant of his person; and
a stone soon afterward striking him down, he was killed by a
spearthrust at the hands of some ignorant camp followers. His
body was at last casually recognized by Artasuras, called the king's
eye, and carried to the presence; whereon, his head and right
hand being cut off, and the news proclaimed, the royal horse
began to rally, and seventy thousand men were soon collected
about the person of Artoxerxes, who had of late so nearly lost both
life and kingdom.
By this time Ariaios, who until now had been fighting well,
learned the death of the prince, and drawing off his own troops
by a route far to the left of the camp which the enemy were
plundering, made his way back unpursued to the post which he
had occupied on that very morning, a day's march in the rear.
And now Klearchos and his phalanx returned from their pursuit, expecting that all was over; and as they traversed the
ground on which the centre and left of the king had stood, until
routed by their own charge and that of Kyros, they discovered that
their camp was in the hands of the enemy, and advanced to
recover it. But Tissaphernes, and they who had taken it, avoided
an engagement, and passing to the Greek left along the river,
over the ground held by Klearchos in the morning, hurried to
the hillock occupied by the king; where they again showed front
as if to receive battle. But when the Greeks once more cheered
lnd charged, both armies being now in the same relative positions
as inl the morning, though nearer to Babylon than in the first
action, the Barbarians again fled, and the hillock, on which were




no..IV> Y OF THE GREEKS.            191
the Greeks and the king's banner, with a golden eagle flying, was
deserted by the enemy, and the whole plain abandoned to
the Greeks, who weary, hungry and supperless, for their encampment had been thoroughly sacked, remained masters of the bloody
field, wondering whither the prince could have gone, and
anxiously looking for his return.
The battle itself was ill-bught on both sides, and displays
nothing but the indisputable valor of the Greeks, and their grleat
superiority to the Orientals, both in armature and discipline.
Plutarch insists that it was lost by the disobedience of Klearchos
to the prince's orders, to oblique upon the enemy's centre; not
by the rashness of Kyros; and on that text bitterly censures the
Lakedaimonian leader. Possibly, had Klearchos so charged, he
might have won the battle; for the fall of the king and the
breaking the centre often, with Oriental armies, decides everything.
Still to have made an oblique movement to such a length, ex
posing his own column to a flank attack, and leaving the whole
right wing of the army open and unguarded, in the teeth of an
admirable cavalry, would have been to the last degree an unsoldierly and unscientific movement; for executing which, even if
successfully, he would have deserved not praise but censure.
His determination to cling to the river with his right was just
and sound, and his charge in itself masterly. His error, and it
was a gross one, lay in chasing to the rear, instead of wheeling
leftward on the centre; which could have decided the battle in
season and placed the crown on the head of Kyros. In like
manner, had that prince, on the fall of Artagerses, and the dispersal of the immortals, rallied his body-guard and held them
in hand; or had he even fallen back alone on Ariaios, after unhorsing the king, and as he probably believed killing him, he
would have been found master of the field by Klearchos, on his
return, and his entire success would have been the consequence.
The loss of the battle-for by the death of Kyros it was




XENOPHONPU,
virtually lost —ought then to be ascribed rather to the want of
concert, which naturally occurs in combined armies, acting without unity of command, than to any lack of individual judgment,
courage, or conduct.
On the following morning the Greek leaders received intelligence
of what had occurred, and of his own whereabouts, from Ariaios,
with an invitation to join him, and retreat together by a different
route into Ionia.  This plan at first displeased the Hellenic
troops, who regarding themselves as victors offered the crown to
Ariaios, and halted where they were, breakfasting, as best they
might, on the beasts of burthen which they slew, cooked on the
wooden shields and missiles of the enemy, which they used as
fuel.  While thus engaged, they received a summons firom the
king commanding them  to lay down their arms, when in the
spirit of Leonidas they bade him  " come and take them."  And
shortly after the dismissal of the heralds, the reply of Ariaios
reached them, declining the crown and urging them strenuously
to join him and commence their retreat forthwith. This they did,
entering his camp on that same night, when they piled their
arms, and, the generals and captains of bands entering in to
Ariaios, a treaty was sworn between the Greeks and the Barbaric followers of Kyros, that they should be true friends and
allies, neither betraying the other, and the Persians promising
farther, that they would guide them  truly home into Ionia.
And this oath they ratified, slaying an ox, a wolf, a boar, and a
ranm, upon a shield, and dipping into the blood, the Greeks, their
sword blades, and the Persians, their spear heads; a ceremony
so solemn, so ancient, and supposed of such awful and appalling
sanctity, that Aischylos* in his fine tragedy of the " Seven against
Thebes" has ascribed it to the Argive leaders, in verse so striking,
and terms so similar to the above, that it may be agreeable to
* Aischylos.'ETrra sr, Onfars.




THE OATH.                        193
my readers to compare it with this passage of history, even
through the imperfect medium of an English version.
For heroes seven, impetuous champions strong,
Bull-slaughtering on a black-bound brazen shield,
And dipping in that carnage-cup their hands,
By Mars, Enyo, and blood-loving Dread,
Have sworn, these ramparts violently ta'en,
Either to sack the Kadmian town to earth,
Or dying here to glut this soil with gore.
Then for their parents on Adrastos' car,
With those same hands memorial gifts they crowned,
Weeping, but in their faces ruth was not.
For like to lions who spy the front of Mars,
Their souls were iron, hot with manly rage.
Such was the ndture, and such the fearful obligation, of the
oath to which both the Greeks and the Asiatics swore, whom
community of friendship for the dead Kyros, and community of
past toils, and present perils, should have linked together, without oaths, in permanent and true alliance.  With the Barbarians
however, the oaths were a mere pretext; and, as has been invariably the case in all compacts between men of European and
Oriental origin, wherever it was for the interest of the latter to
break them, the Greeks were sacrificed, blind victims to their own
good faith, and the inveterate treachery of the Asiatics. This
treaty concluded, they marched together, on the following morning, having the sun on their right hand, in the hope of reaching
the Babylonian villages at nightfall. But as twilight was
closinog in, they saw what at first they took to be cavalry, which
turnled out, however, to be herds of horses grazing; and, so soon
as darkness fell, the whole was explained, for the villages all
around were full of watch-fires, and it was evident that they
were close to the encampment of the royal army. On that night
there was a panic in the Greek camp, which was appeased by
9




194                     XENOPHON.
the presence of mind of Klearchos; and on the following day
messengers came from the king with proposals for a treaty.
After this, the Greeks and their Persian allies awaited Tissaphernes, about three-and-twenty days, while nominally he was
consulting the king as to terms and conditions; and at the end
of this period Tissaphernes returned, with Orontes-both at the
head of their contingents, as if bound homewards-when a
treaty was concluded, and regularly sworn to, with plighted
hands and solemn sacrifices, that the Persians should guide and
convoy the Greeks in safety through the country, furnishing them
with an open market, where they might buy supplies; but that,
the market failing, the Greeks should be free to forage for themselves; and this on the bare condition that the mercenaries
should travel through the country peacefully, and do no evil to
the inhabitants, or injury to the crops, or cattle of the several
districts. The Pelsians of the king also, and the Pelsians who
had fought with Kyros were reconciled, and thenceforth they
encamped with Tissaphernes and Orontes, by themselves, and
the Hellenes by themselves also, at about a parasang or something less apart; both mounting guards, each against the other,
and both apparently suspecting the good faith of the other.
From this simple narrative, as well as from what follows-for
Xenophon states distinctly, that from this day forth the fiiendship
of Ariaios declined visibly-it can hardly be doubted that the Persians, who had fought side by side with them, were false to their
late allies from the beginning; and that the very first march,
leading them into the very camp of the king instead of away
from it, was the first step of a treason, which iwas intended tc
involve the massacre of the whole force.
Notwithstanding these suspicions, however, the Greeks marched
nineteen days' journey —ninety-six parasangs, or about three hundred and sixty miles-in company with the Persians of Tissap1heranes and Orontes, until they reached the river Zapatas, where




ORIENTAL TREACHERY.                195
they halted three days. And at this place the mutual distrust
and dissensions became so alarming, that Klearchos apprehended
an open rupture; whereupon he went manfully, and in good
faith, to Tissaphernes, hoping to obtain an explanation, and bring
about a perfect understanding.  Availing himself of this, the
wily Barbarian induced the honest Spartan to bring the leaders
of the expedition, and the captains of the lochi, to his tent in the
morning, promising to inform them who it was that had belied
the Greeks to him, and to surrender the persou to their
vengeance.
Klearchos doubting nothing, and violently suspecting Menon
the Thessalian of ill-faith, would have taken all the generals and
captains of bands with him; but some of the private soldiers
interposed, and insisted that all their officers should not go, as
they had no faith in the barbarians.
And here it is worthy of notice, that in all cases where European officers have been induced to capitulate, trusting in the
honor of Orientals, the privates have clearly discerned the treason
which escaped the more acuminated vision of their superiors, and
have always implored them to put trust in their arms only.
Such was the case when a British regiment in Ceylon laid down
their arms to the Kandyan savages, aind were massacred to a
man. Such, when in the fatal campaign of Ghizni, the English
officers were induced to confer with the Affghan leaders in their
tent, and were incontinently murdered by the hands of their
hosts-and such, in the instance now before me, was the result.
In the end, Klearchos prevailed with four of the generals, and
twenty of the captains of bands, to accompany him; the former
being, in addition to himself, Proxenos the Boiotian, Menon the
Thessalian, Agias the Arkadian, and Sokrates the Achaian; and
in addition to these about two hundred of the soldiers escorted
them to the Persian camp, unarmed, with a view of attending
the market. The generals were at once admitted to the tent of




196                    XENOPHON.
Tissaphernes, while the captains were detained without; until, on
a given signal, those within were arrested, and those at the doors
cut to pieces; while the cavalry made a wide sweep over the
plain, after killing all who had, entered the camp, and cut down
every one whom  they encountered, whether slave or freeman.
The Greeks looked on, at first, in amazement, not imagining what
this display of careering cavalry should mean; till one Nikarchos, an Arkadian, came in grievously wounded in the abdomen,
and carrying his bowels in his hands. Then they all ran tumultuously to arms, expecting to be attacked immediately; but in a
little while Mithradates, Artaozos, and Ariaios, all late friends of
Kyros, rode up, and once more endeavored to persuade the
Greeks to lay down their arms; telling them that Klearchos had
been convicted of perjury and intent to break the treaties, wherefore he had been slain; but that Proxenos, Menon, and the rest,
were in high favor with the king. This device was, however, too
transparent to deceive, and was answered by Xenophon-who
received the delegates, in the absence of Cheirisophos, he being
out with a foraging party, together with Kleanor the Orchomenian, and Sophainetos the Stymphalian —by a demand for the
instant release of Proxenos and Menon-" to vhich," said he,
"there can be no objection; since, as you aver, they are in favor
with the king."
To this, there was no reply; and after debating long among
themselves, the treacherous barbarians rode away, fiustrate of
their end, and disappointed. The generals had, of course, ail
perished-Klearchos, Proxenos, Agias, and Sokrates-beheaded
as overt enemies to the king; of whom Xenophon has left elaborate characters, and many interesting anecdotes, which I regret
that my limits will not permit me to extract. They were all
good and practised soldiers and strategists, " whose valor and
conduct no enemy ever laughed at in battle, no friend ever found




THE GENERALS.                   197
insufficient;"* but Klearchos, especially was a soldier, by habit,
by choice, and by profession; seeking out every opportunity of
active service, at home and abroad; a strict disciplinarian, an
enthusiastic lover of arms, and in all respects a great captain and
an honest, though stern and hard-visaged, man. Menon, on the
contrary, was not allowed the luxury of a speedy or honorable
death, but was consumed by slow tortures, which were protracted
through the space of a whole year; though on what account he
was punished by Artoxerxes, it is somewhat difficult to understand; since Xenophon more than hints that he was false to the
Greeks; and if false to them, he must, at least, have endeavored
to serve the king.
That night, when they knew that their leaders were taken off,
the Greeks were in the greatest consternation and despair, nor
that without good cause; " considering that they were almost at
the palace doors of the great king, with numerous nations and
cities surrounding them on every side, all hostile, with no one
who should guide them on their way, no one who should furnish
them with a market of supplies; and they above ten thousand
stadia distant from Greece, with many vast and formidable rivers
between, alone, betrayed by the barbarians who had marched up
with them under Kyros, and unprovided with cavalry, so that if
victorious in any action, they would be unable to follow up the
success, if beaten they must needs be annihilated.  When they
thought over these things within themselves, they were utterly
disheartened, and few of them tasted food that evening; and
few kindled any fires, and there were many who did not muster
at the shields that night, but laid them down, each where he
chanced to be, unable to sleep from grief of spirit, and desire of
their countries, their parents, their wives, their children, whom
they never thought to look upon again.
So great indeed was the confusion and so complete the dis* Xen. Anab. II., vi. 30. Diodorns denies his death, xiv. 21.




198                    XENOPHON.
Organization of the whole Greek army, that if the Persian cavalry
had fallen in upon them there and then, they would have encountered little if any resistance, and must have cut the Greeks
to pieces. Even on the morrow, they would have gained an
easy victory, but for the ready wit, stirring eloquence, and exuberant resource of one man, who from that day was the soul of
the army, and who approved himself, wherever or however he
learned the rudiments, a thorough master of the art of war in its
most difficult details.  For to him  alone, and his over-boiling
bravery, undaunted decision, and never flagging spirit, is it due
that the bones of the ten thousand did not whiten the deserts
of central Asia. That man was Xenophon-having fallen at
length, like his comrades, into a slumber which yet was not sleep,
so great was the perturbation of his spirit, he was startled by a
strange, and as he imagined supernatural dream; and so soon as
he was awake, musing deeply on their affairs, he saw that their
only hope lay in energy, promptitude, and bold reliance on their
own arms and valor; and forthwith rising from his bed, he
called up the captains of Proxenos' division, to all of whom he
was personally known, and addressed them with such convincing
power of truth and common sense, and with such passionate
soldierly heat, as is best suited to persuade soldiers. And when
they had heard him out, they all clamored to be led forward,
except one Apollonides, who spoke the broad Boiotian dialect,
and who had voted at the first to give up their arms to Artoxerxes. Iiim they degraded speedily, from the captain of a band
to be a btaggage-bearer, for while Xenophon was displaying some
choice powers of invective at his expense, the soldiers observed
that his ears were bored as if.for ear rings, and hooted him from
the ranks as a Medized Greek. And this little incident, which
otherwise I should scarce have recounted, proves what a change
his words had produced, and how new and keen a spirit they
* Xen. Anab. III. I. 1.




CHOICE OF NEW LEADERS.              199
must have diffused into those hearts late so dejected, that they
could already descend to notice individual eccentricities, and jest
with hearty soldiers' glee at such a moment.
And now these men-it was by this time about the middle of
the night —went through the ranks, and called up every general,
and when the generals were slain,- then every second in command, and all the captains of the bands, to council —and all the
generals came, and captains about a hundred. And Hieronymos
of Elis, the eldest of Proxenos' lochagoi, addressed them, and
told them wherefore they had thus assembled, and called them
to co-operation, and then bade Xenophon, " Speak thou to these,
as thou hast spoken unto us." And he spoke to them even so;
and so convinced them, that Cheirisophos the Lakedaimonianand Lakedaimonians were not over wont to give even due credit
to Athenians —cried out, "lHitherto, O, Xenophon, I have known
this much of thee only, that I heard thou wert an Athenian;*
but now I praise thee much for what thou hast said, and done,
and I would that there were more like to thee; for it would be
for the common good." And he proceeded at once to collect all
the soldiers, that they might elect leaders in place of those who
were slain, and stand at once to their arms. Then were chosen
in the place of Klearchos, Timasion the Dardanian; and of
Sokrates, Xanthikles the Achaian; and of Agias, Kleanor the
Arkadian; and of Menon, Philesios the Achaian; and of Proxenos, Xenophon the Athenian-and this latter election is remarkable for this, that in allnost all the other instances a chief
was chosen of the same nation with him who had fallen, or with
the majority of the troops he commanded. But Xenophon was
an Athenian, chosen by Boiotians, who of all men were most
inveterately hostile to Attika.  To his merits only, was his
election to be attributed; and, whether there was need of action
or of counsel, he still proved the choice to be wise and just,
* I am by no means certain that this was not intended as a half sneer.




1200                    XENOPHON.
which had fallen on him; for, in truth, he was thenceforth the
head and front of the whole campaign, whether strategetics or
tactics were the question, and whether the vanguard or the rear
guard was assailed, there shall we find Xenophon, ever detached
to meet the enemy.
Then Cheirisophos first addressed the soldiers, and as he concluded, Xenophon arose, full-armed for battle and decorated in
all martial bravery, and spoke to them words of fire, lending
them cheer and courage; so that when Cheirisophos put it to
the vote, all shouted unanimously " let us march-let us march
without delay."  On Xenophon's proposal, therefore, it was
resolved to proceed in an oblong hollow square, with the camp followers and baggage in the centre; and to Cheirisophos, as being a
Lakedaimonian, he attributed the leading of the van, two of the
eldest generals commanding the flank battalions of the square,
while, with Timasion, he took to himself, as they the youngest,
the rear guard, which in retreat is the post of danger as it is of
honor.  This all determined, the soldiers burned their tents and
wagons, and all the superfluous baggage which they could not
conveniently carry, and then cooked and  3iled their arms for
breakfast.  While they were thus engaged Mithridates came up
with about thirty horse, pretending good will, but evidently sent
to reconnoitre and gain information. To him Cheirisophos replied
once for all, that if permitted to do so, it was their intent to
march quietly through the country, doing no wrong to any; but
that, if hindered on the way, they would fight to the uttermost."
As soon as they had breakfasted, they stood to their arms, and,
fording the Zapatas,* marched in order, with their baggage and
beasts of burthen in the centre; not far had they gone, however,
* The great Zab, a large river of Kardonchia, now K(urdistan, flowing
in a great semicircle northerly, westerly and then almost southerly,
from the mountains below lake Urrnia, now Oroumi, into the Tigris,
about forty miies below Mosul.




LOSSES OF THIE REAR GUARD.            201
before Mithridates again made his appearance with about two
hundred horse, and four hundred bowmen and slingers, lightly
equipped, active and fleet runners. At first they approached as
friends, but, so soon as they got near enough, both horse and foot
deployed on a sudden, and began to shoot and sling, into the
closely ordered ranks of the Iellenes, with terrible execution.
And the rear guard were cruelly cut up and harassed, and very
many wounded, for the Kretans could not shoot half so far as the
Persians; and were moreover so slightly armed that they were
obliged to keep within the ranks of the hoplitai; nor could the
javelineers hurl a spear so far as to hit the slingers, who whirled
their missiles into them as fast and furious as a hail storm, though
with far more fatal execution.  Then perceiving how much confidence the enemy gained, and how severely his own people were
suffering, Xenophon charged with a portion of the rear guard,
both hoplitai and targeteers, and endeavored to pursue the
enemy, who did not attempt to resist his onset, but fled, still
shooting and slinging as they retreated. So that, after a time,
having slain or captured no one, the Greeks were compelled to
fall back in turn, and fight their way, not without loss of brave
men, aid much difficulty, to the main body which they would
hardly have accomplished, had it not halted until they regained
their station. That day they scarcely made three miles on their
way, since there was a perpetual skirmish from dawn till it was
dark; and at first Cheirisophos and his colleagues were inclined
to blame Xenophon for his charge, as if he had rashly risked
himself andc his command without injuring the enemy or bettering the condition of the army. But he admitting the rashness
of his zeal, showed them clearly that, circumstanced as they
were, the army must be lost, since they could not disperse an
enemy superior in light-armed troops, nor forage, nor even cover
their own retreat if broken; and then, with sound and clear capacity, indicated a remedy in the creation of cavalry, and a more




202                     XENOPHON.
efficient army for skirmishing, all which he accomplished satisfactorily from so small means, as at once showed the quickness
of his resource-one of the greatest qualities of a leader.  His
suggestions of that night were carried out on the next day,
during which they halted, by drafting all the Rhodians who
chanced to be in the army, to the number of two hundred, to
form a band of slingers-for the Rhodians at this time were what
the Balearic islanders were in the latter days, all slingers from
their childhood using leaden bullets instead of ragged and clumsy
pebbles-and by mounting on the spare chargers of the officers,
on some horses left by Klearchos at his death, and some, his own
private property, and yet others which had been taken in action
and were now used as beasts of burthen, fifty picked men, who
were equipped with breastplates, buff-coats, and all the other
harness of well-appointed troopers, and to whom Lykios, the son
of Polystratos, was named commander. On the next day, they
again marched early, having a deep and difficult ravine to pass,
at which they anticipated an attack from the bowmen and cavalry
of the Persians, but they had crossed the gorge, and were about
a mile distant on the plain, when Mithridates again made his
appearance with a thousand horse and four thousand slingersand it is -said, that he had promised Tissaphernes with that
power to compel the Greeks to surrender on that very day. But
he found the Greeks now well ordered to receive himn, for a
certain force of targeteers had been ordered to follow up the
slingers, and of hoplitai again to support the targeteers. And, so
soon as Mithridates deployed in their rear and about their flanks,
and sling-shot and arrows began to fall in the ranks, the Hellenic trumpets sounded, the Rhodians wheeled into line and
dispersed the archery in an instant with their deadly missiles,
the cavalry charged home, the Persian horse scattering before
their unexpected onset and flying headlong to the broken banks
of the ravine for safety; but fast and fierce the targeteers fell on,




AFFAIR OF LIGHT TROOPS.                203
and the great shields of the heavy infantry came on like a wall
in support; and, confident in their near aid, the Rhodian
slingers ran at their utmost speed and slung into the mass of
fugitives, and the troopers spurred hard upon their horse; and
very many of the barbarian foot fell unavenged that day, and in
the gulley of the torrent eighteen of their cavalry were taken
alive by the Greek troopers.
That was a memorable skirmish, though the gain and the loss
were actually but small. It gave the prestige of a first success
to their newly levied troops, converted in one night from heavy
foot into cavalry and slingers, which they never lost during the
retreat.  It established the superiority of the Hellenes in these,
as in the more solid arms, of the service. It taught a lesson to
the enemy, who had before considered their light troops, and
above all their splendid horse almost invincible, from which they
never entirely recovered; and it was, so far as we know from
history, the first display of Xenophon's various and almost unrivalled resources and. capacities as a great and genuine soldier.
During the whole of that day, they met no farther annoyance
fiom the enemy; but as they marched onward they found that
their order of march in a hollow oblong column was inconvenient, in as much as at times in passing bridges or defiles, the
hoplitai were so closely pressed together as to be useless, and
again at times when the wings extended the centre was unduly
weakened. This again was remedied by the appointment of six
bands, or lochi, of a hundred each, with the proper officers, who,
when the column was pressed together on the march fell into
the rear, and again marched up on the outside the wings; and
on the other hand, when the:wings were extended, and the centre
opened, filled up the spaces, forming a front of single, double or
quadruple files as the nature of the case determined. After
marching nearly all day thus, they entered some broken and
hilly ground, when the enemy again showed himself in force in




204                     XENOPHON.
the rear, and as the Greeks descended from the summit of one
knoll into the hollow, before mounting another, the light troops
crowned that which they had just quitted, and galled them so
severely that the Peltasts were again rendered useless and shut
up within the heavy columns. These knolls were, it seems, the
spurs of a lofty ridge bn their right hand, as they marched
northerly, with the Tigris on their left, running down to that
river; and the difficulty was soon overcome by detaching all the
peltasts from the right flank of the column to the heights above,
by which means the enemy, fearing to be cut ofW, kept at a prudent distance, and during the rest of that day the column marching over the hillocks, and the light troops moving along the
mountain side on their right and a little in their rear, they
arrived unmolested at certain villages, where they halted several
days to care for their wounded, of whom there were very many,
and to recruit their men and horses with the food and fodder
prepared for the royal army.  From  this time, moreover, they
adopted a new plan; for so soon as the enemy appeared in pursuit, they halted at the first convenient village, and did not
attempt to fight him on the march; but keeping a sufficient force
under arms to repulse and pursue him, should he attempt to
skirmish, passed the day at their ease with refreshment; and
then, when the shades of night began to fall, while the enemy
were yet hovering about them, sounded "boot and saddle." For
experience had taught them that the enemy dared not encamp
nearer to them than six or seven miles, for fear of a night attack;
since, as Xenophon observes, an Oriental army is of all others
the most liable to a panic, and to what is worse, that peculiar
sort of panic, known on our prairies as a stampede, affecting
hobbled or tethered horses; so that to them a night-surprise is
almost a sure defeat. Then, when they were assured that they
were once fairly off, they yoked their baggage-cattle and marched
so far forward as the enemy had fallen back; so that it was not




STORM OF A HILL-PASS.              205
until the third day that they were again molested by them, and
then but slightly. On that night, however, a party of the barbarians slipped past them in the dark, and occupied a very
strong rocky hold on the summit of a mountain, below which
their road lay. But in the morning, when Cheirisophos in full
march discovered them, he halted the heads of the column, and
ordered up Xenophon with his targeteels from the rear. Xenophon rode up at once, but did not bring up the troops, since the
rear was also threatened by all the horse and archbery of Tissaphernes, who led them in person; and no sooner had he arrived
than he perceived not only the evil but its cure; for there was
yet another and loftier height above that occupied by the enemy,
which taken, they would be forced to retire. Hereupon, Cheirisophos giving him his choice, whether to lead the van to the
assault, or to remain with the main body, he at once chose the
forlner, and was supplied with a thousand targeteers from the
van and centre, since his own men could not be spared from the
rear-guard, and with three hundred more, picked soldiers of
Cheirisophos' own body guard.
Then, at once, he set off at such speed as he was assured he
could maintain; and the barbarians on the hills, seeing his
object, set off likewise for the upper summit, hoping to anticipate
him; and there was a wild and panting race, up those dizzy
heights, between them, for the mastery-each army cheering its
own detachment, till all the crags re-echoed with the stirring
clamor. And Xenophon, gallopping beside his men, cheered
them to breast the hill, as it needs a soldier to cheer soldiers.
"Men," he cried, "Men, remember that the race is now for Hellas, now for your wives and children! —that striving now for a
short space stoutly, we shall march henceforth at our ease!"
Then one Soterides of Sikyon, made answer, "We are not on
one footing, you and I, O Xenophon; for you are carried easily
on your charger, I toil wearily with my heavy shield." Then




206                    XENOPHON,
Xenophon sprang from his horse, and pushed him from the
ranks, snatching his shield from him, and led faster than before,
though he was armed in heavy horseman's panoply, so that he
was overburthened by the shield-cheering the foremost to press
on, and the rear to close up; so that it was hard for them to
follow. Then the soldiers abused Soterides, and struck and
pelted him, till they forced him to resume his shield and his
place in the ranks; and Xenophon, mounting again, rode so far
as the ground would admit of riding, and then led on foot, and
of course, won the heights; for what soldier would not follow so
game and soldierly a leader. The winning of the pass, of
need won the passage bloodlessly; for the barbarians leaped
down the rocks, save themselves who could! and Tissaphernes
drew off his men in the rear, and the Greeks descended into the
plain near the Tigris, which was full of rich villages. In the
evening, the horse again made their appearance in the low
grounds, and cutting off a few foragers, began to fire the villages;
but the Greeks, seeing that the villages were the king's, not their
own, began to fire them likewise; so that the Persians, seeing
themselves the losers at that game, desisted, and withdrew for
the night.
On the following day there was much doubt and dismay in
the host; for in front their way was barred by precipices which
they could not scale, and on their right was the Tigris-in the
hope to turn which they had journeyed hither —unfordable, nor
to be sounded by their longest spears. In this predicament,
they turned back toward Babylonia, ravaging and burning the
country far and near, while the enemy looked on in amazement,
without daring to attack them. Then, after questioning their
captives concerning the nature and inhabitants of the districts
around them, they learned that the mountains directly to their
north were inhabited by various Kardouchian tribes, savage,
independent, and, though often assailed, never conquered by the




SITUATION OF THE GREEKS.              207
king, who had often invaded them to no purpose, a hundred
and twenty thousand strong. Beyond these again, they were
informed, lay the rich and fertile plains of Armenia, where they
might either turn or ford the sources of the Tigris; and yet a
little farther off were the head-waters of the Euphrates, in like
manner passable by the army.
Now it must be remembered, that on their way up from Sardis, they had crossed the Euphrates by a deep ford at Thapsakos, said, and probably with justice, to be the only place where
it was fordable, about midway between their point of departure
and the termination of their expedition on the field of Kynaxa —
that, after. the battle, while yet friendly to Ariaios, they had been
informed-and it is not to be doubted, again, justly —that the
country wasted by their up-march could, by no possibility, support them on their return; and that, while under safe-conduct
from Tissaphernes, they had crossed the Tigris at Sittake, on a
bridge of thirty-six boats, to the right or eastern bank, by which,
they had been led to believe, lay their best homeward route.
This, doubtless, was a piece of Persian treachery, followed up by
the murder of the Greek generals on the banks of the great Zab.
After this event it was that the Greeks resolved to persevere in'their northern route, principally induced by the consideration
that they had no means of crossing those two great rivers in the
face of the enemy; the rather that the country afforded no timber for bridge or boat building, even had other means been
abundant.  Under these circumstances, the generals had no
choice but to persevere, since the Tigris to the left or westward
was impassable, while to return southward was to rush back into
the lion's mouth, at Babylon; and, to march eastward, to turn
their backs absolutely on their own country. The road northward led to the sources of the rivers, which they must head,
since they could not cross them, and thence with victory and
safety home.




208                      XEN OPHON.
I have thought it well to point out these facts here, since I
have recently met with a critique on this retreat, attributing it as
a fault to the leaders, that they held their course too directly
northward, and attributed to the Pontos Euxeinos, or Black Sea,
a situation too far to the eastward. Now it is clear, first, that
they could not march further west of the north than they did at
this point; and secondly, that they did not miscalculate the
bearings of the Black Sea, since they stluck it without material
deviation from their line, at Trebizonde, above a hundred miles
westward of its eastern extremity. It should be remembered
also, that instruments, maps, compasses, were not in those days;
that the Greeks were in a hostile land, where no European foot
had ever trod; had no guides but captive enemies, no pilots but
the eternal signs of heaven, and the wonder is that they accomplished at all a retreat, which has nothing comparable to it in
the military history of all ages, and which is a prouder trophy
of true generalship, than the most brilliant campaign ever won by
mortal genius. They plunged at once into the rugged wilderness of craggy rocks, pathless ravines, and torrent-beds, unknown
even to this hour, which forms the modern district of Kurdistan,
and the Turkish Pachalic of Van, to the south of the great lake
of the same name, and forced their way through it-having
destroyed all their superfluous baggage and released all their
captives, with the exception of the female hetairai, who followed
them in great numbers-by desperate and incessant fighting, bi
the space of seven days.  At first they suffered terribly, for the
weather was dreadful, and the inhabitants had all fled to the hilltops, and thence galled the rear-guard with the most fearful
archery they had yet encountered; for they fought with six-foot
bows and cloth-yard arrows, which no casque or corslet could
withstand; so that Xenophon lost two of his best hoplitai-Kleonymus, a Lakedaimonian, shot clear through shield, buff-coat,
corslet and body; and Basias, an Arkadian, through the head.




TURNING THE RIGHT.                 209
This was in some sort the fault of Cheirisophos, who, deceived
by the guide into the belief that there was no other pass,
attempted to make his way forward by dint of sheer fighting,
and left his rear-guard to shift for itself; so that the march of
Xenophon was, in his own words, all but a flight. At the council which followed, the latter chief, who well knew the greatest
secret of mountain warfare, that there is no position which may
not be turned somewhere-and whose constant motto, through
this fearful time of trial, was, that the greatest object here is not
to win with the greatest glory, but to come off with the least
loss —insisted on this plan for the future campaign. Then he
extorted from one of two captive guides, though not till the other
was slain before his face, the admission that he knew a higher
defile, as is ever the case in hill-fighting, by the occupation of
which the position of the defenders would be rendered at once
untenable, and the passage of the army easy.
Volunteers were detached that very night to occupy the topmost hill of all, taking with them the guide in chains, with orders
to blow their trumpets at dawn, should they succeed in their mission; while Xenophon, to distract the attention of the enemy,
advanced as if to enter the usual passes, but they were impregnable, the enemy rolling down rocks upon them  as large in
diameter as wagon wheels; and when it became quite dark he
drew off the rear guard to supper, for they had tasted no food
that day. But in the mean time the volunteers, favored by the
darkness and a timely fog, carried the height unseen, owing to
the night, and at daybreak sounding their trumpets, charged and
cleared the way.  Then Cheirisophos with the main-guard
forced the regular passes without difficulty, and Xenophon with
the rear, followed the new path, domineered by the hill which the
volunteers had taken. He soon, however, reached another peak,
which he was compelled to storm in deep narrow fronted columns,
sometimes, I believe, in Indian file; having carried this, and
10




210                     XENOPHON.
seeing another yet in front, he left a guard on it, lest it should be
retaken, carried the second, and discovered yet beyond, a third
peak, loftier than that forced by the volunteers, occupied by the
enemy, who fled, however, on the instant, leaving it to be taken
by Xenophon in person, with a few of the younger men only.
For he had ordered the rest to halt, until the rear should rejoin
them, and then proceeding down the slope, to pile arms in the plain
at the bottom.  Before this could be done, however, the savages
had overpowered the post left on the first hill, so that but
few escaped leaping headlong down the rocks, and then encouraged by this success, followed up so closely, that, as the rest
descended the last hillock into the level land, they rolled down
rocks upon them, and did some damage. In the plain, at the
foot, they found villages with comfortable dwellings, and good
provision, and much wine; but in order to recover their dead,
which was a point of the most awful religion with the Greeks,
they were compelled to treat with the Barbarians and to release
their guide. The next day they marched again, with no one to
direct them, but by adopting Xenophon's plan, they gained
more ground and with less loss either of time or life. For when
the way of Cheirisophos with the van was obstructed in any
defile, Xenophon turned it by the mountains, and so cleared the
route; and when Xenophon's men thus converted into the van,
were brought to a stand, Cheirisophos in the like manner manauvred by the upper ground to open the road in his turn. Still
there was hard-fighting, for the same terrible archers met them,
who drew their bowstrings not to their breasts as the Greeks, but
bearing their weight on the left foot pulled the cords downward
to the left ear, exactly as the English archery, so formidable in
the middle ages, and like them pierced the strongest shields and
breastplates out of ordinary bow-shot.  The whole of this great
passage was conducted on true military principles, every successive post of the enemy being carried by the main body without




DIRECTION OF RETREAr.               211
loss, after being turned on the right, whre the ground was
higher, by the rear guard.  Whether the whole movement might
have been performed more easily and with less loss, by a constant
advance with the right wing thrust very far ahead, so as to turn
all the positions in succession, is doubtful; but probably, considering the very limited range of ancient missiles, and the corresponding diminution in value of dominant heights, which could
command only within the range of arrow-shot, and taking into
account the nature of the enemy who, turned or not, would
have fought till the missiles fell among them, Xenophon's passage of the mountains of Kurdistan, could be little improved upon,
even at the present day; and, as in the late desperate battles in
Affghanistan, not very far removed from the same scene of action,
every defile must have been forced, or turned in succession.
At length they descended into the open plains on the bank 6f the
Kentrites, now the Khabour, which was at that time the boundary
between Armenia, the king's province, and the independent
tribes of Kardouchia. It would appear that the point at which
they left the Tigris and entered the hill country could not have
been far from the modern city of Mosul; as ruins, supposed to
be those of Mespila, described in the Anabasis,* exist there
still; that they passed near the site of the present Amadieh, and
came down on the upper waters of the Khabour, to the eastward
of the site of Tigranocerta, now Sered, at about fifty miles distance
west' of the southern end of lake Van; for it is quite clear that
they were never in sight of that great sheet of water which
Xenophon, so singularly exact and minute in his details, could
not have failed to mention, had he seen or even heard of it;
while it is even more certain that they could not have gone east
of it, since in that case they would have crossed neither the
Kentrites, nor the Tigris, if they did cross the latter at all, which
I hold doubtful,  The never mentioning of this Palus Arsissa, or
* Anab. iii. iv. 9.




'212                     XENOPHON.
Lake Van, is in fact one of the most remarkable things connected
with the expedition, as it is probably the largest lake he or any
other Greek had ever seen, being about sixty miles in length by
half the breadth, and as their route must have lain for several
days across a level country, within a few miles of its southern and
western shores.  Here, once more, they beheld their old enemy
in the shape of the shonwy and well-accoutred cavalry of the Persians; being Armenian, Chaldaian, and AMardonian mercenarlies,
with the Satraps, Orontes and Artouchos, arrayed in all the pomp
and pride of oriental war, and ready to prevent their passage of
the river; while in their rear, covering the slopes and sides of the
craggy hills they had passed so laboriously, swarmed the fierce
hordes of the Kardouchian archers. Never were the Greeks in a
worse predicament, as it appeared, than now; for the only ford
they had discovered was more than breast high, and the stream
ran like a torrent over large slippery stones, utterly impassable
to men carrying arms, especially when opposed to an active
enemy.  A  second ford was, however, accidentally discovered
above, and by some very skilful manceuvering, Xelaophon kept
the Persians on the farthelr shore, in doubt as to which ford they
intended to use, until Cheirisophos was well over it; and then,
distracting them  by a feint of crossing below and surrounding
them, put them to flight without striking a blow.  Then rapidly
movingI up to the practicable ford, he formed firont to the Kar'douchians, who had corme down into the plain, and covered the
passagne of the baggage and camp followers, until these were well
over also.  That accomplished by a feigned charg'e with pecans
and clash of spear and shield, he drove the Bclrbarians back to
their hills, and wheelingl at a preconcerted signal of trumpets,
which lent wings to the terror of the savages, carried all his rear
guard safely over without the loss of a man, a few only who had
pursued too hastily coming in wounded.
There is no finer record of a river passed by a coup de main



SOURCES OF THE TIGRIS.                 213
and all through excellent manceuvering, with a superior force of
cavalry in front defending the fords, and an inveterate pursuer,
imminent, and intent on destroying the rear-than this of the
Kentrites; and it is clear that, fiom the discovery of the ford by
his foragers, to his own passage, almost the last mal, the merit is
all Xenophon's own. To increase their pleasure Lykios, with his
handful of cavalry, had overtaken the Persian baggage-guard, and
gained rich booty of garments and gold and silver plate.  Thence
they marched twenty miles over a fair and level plain —for there
were no hamlets nearer the river through dread of the Kardouchians-and passed the night at their ease, billeted in convenient
dwellings, at a large village near the Satrap's palace, where they
had all necessaries in abundance. Some sixty miles thence they
thought they crossed the sources of the Tigris, but the true
sources lie considerably to the west of their route, although two
or three considerable tributaries of that river do in fact arise in
the plains to the west of Lake Van, which the Greeks were
probably led to believe the true head-waters of that river.  This
was in the district of western Armenia,* and in the Satrapy of
Tiribazos —now the southern verge of the Pachalic of Erzeroum
— who now approached them with a splendid array of horse, and
sent interpreters, offering them  a safe passage, and liberty to
forage, so they would abstain from  plundering.   And the
generals agreed, and a truce was concluded and ratified by libations.  As seems to be the fate, however, of all such truces, this
also was immediately broken by the Barbarians; for on the
third or fourth night thereafter, during a fearful snow storm
which drove the men to cover in some hamlets near their
bivouac, an alarm arose that fires were seen burning on the hills
as of a great army; so that the leaders withdrew the soldiers
from  their comfortable quarters into the open air again.  The
snow, however, fell to such a depth, and the cold became so
Xen. Anab. IV. 4. 4.




214                    XENOPHON.
terrible that they were forced to seek shelter a second time, when
they sent out Democrates of Temenis, who had at various times
before approved himself an active and trustworthy scout, with
men under his orders, to examine the hills where the fires were
reported to be seen; and, on his return, he stated that he found
no fires; but he brought in a prisoner, armed with a Persian
bow and arrows, and an Amazonian battle-axe, who admitted
himself to be one of Tiribazos' army, which he said lay in the
mountains, at the only defiles by which the Greeks could pass,
and consisted of the Satrap's regular power, besides Chalybian
and Taochian mercenaries, levied of very purpose to set on them
in the gorges. As soon as it was light, therefore, the generals
marched with their best troops, intending to anticipate the
Persians, and occupy the pass, leaving Sophainetos the Stymphalian in command at the camp, and taking their prisoner with
themn as a guide.  Then, when the targeteers had crossed the
mountains, they perceived the barbarian camp below them on
the other side, and without awaiting the arrival of the hoplitai
charged down at once with their battle-cry, the enemy flying on
all sides without a blow, though some of their men were slain,
and twenty horses taken in the pursuit. The camp afforded rich
booty, and Tiribazos' own tent was captured, with his silver
footed couches and golden goblets, and his cup bearers and
carvers, proving the truth of their captive's narrative. Notwithstanding this brilliant success, however, they tarried not to enjoy
their spoils, but marched back that same day, to their own
people, determined to break up at once, and pass the defiles
without giving the enemy time to collect his forces. And on the
next day they did so with success, halted for the night in the
deserted camp of Tiribazos, and after marching three days' journey over a desert country, forded the Euphrates, waist-deep, its
sources being reported to them as not far distant. The mountains
here spoken of are evidently.those running due west from the




LOSSES I'THE SNhOW.              215
north-western extremity of Lake Van, which divide the head
waters of the Tigris from those of the Euphrates; the former
rising in their own western slope, the latter from the southern
spurs of Mount Ararat, two hundred miles to the north-eastward.
The river, which the Greeks here forded, as the Euphrates, is the
Arsanias, now called the Morad, its greatest southern branch,
and as I should judge the true river, though the sources of that
noble stream are usually ascribed to the nortthern branch rising
near A1rze, the modern Erzeroum in the Pachalic of that name.
It is remarkable that both of this and its sister river the Tigris,
Xenophon names the south-eastern branches as the true streams;
and, to judge from the comparative size on the maps, his nomenclature, at least in the former case, appears to be more correct.
Up to this moment, the general direction of the retreat is as
true as if it had been made by compass for Trebizonde, then
Trapezos, a Greek colony on the Black Sea; and had that direction been produced it would have passed through Arze, even then
a considerable town, on the true Tigris, and would have struck
the Euxine within a few miles of their mark. From this point,
however, for some reason which we cannot decide, they bore
away to  the north-eastward, and-having suffered dreadful
extremities from cold, losing more men in those vast marshy
plains, now covered five feet deep with snow, than in all
their previous skirmishes and marches, and being saved from
total destruction only by the energy of Xenophon, who stayed
by the sufferers, protected them, and brought them safely
in, when Cheirisophos, with the van, had hurried forward recklessly, leaving the men to fall asleep and die where they fell,
as in the disastrous retreat of Moscow-at length struck a
stream, which Xenophon calis the Phasis, as he does the tribes
dwelling on it, the Phasians; but which is in fact the ancient
Araxes, or modern Aras, a principal tributary of the great river
Kur, which falls into the Caspian Sea, south of the Volga.  It




216                     XENOPHON.
would be agreeable here to pause and consider the details of
their long and hospitable entertainment by the Armenians, who,
alone of the nations and tribes, through whom  they marched,
entreated them with kindness; but neither these nor any of the
truly interesting accounts of the countries through which the
ten thousand passed, their natural products, curiosities or inhabitants, will the design or limits of this little work admit; and for
all such I must refer my reader to the admirable work of Xenophon, a work abounding with all the interest of the wildest
romance, the fascination of the most graphic travels, and the truth
of the gravest contemporary history, the whole clothed in a style
never surpassed for ease, elegance, simplicity or grace.
Soon after crossing the Aras, on coming to the ascent of the
mountains from the plain-here they must have discovered the
error of their course in having too much northing, and turned
short westward, for no where else do the hills approach so
nearly to the course of the Araxes-they found the slopes occupied by a hostile array of Chalybes, Taochoi, and Phasianoi, who
offered a desperate resistance.  Here again the passage was
forced by the same manceuvre as before, turning the enemy's
position by night, and gaining the upper ground; and by the
same captains Aristonymos of Methydra and Agasias the Stymphalian; but in this case, there was some hard fighting on the
upper hill, and it was necessary for the Targeteers to charge,
supported by the heavy foot, before they could clear their way.
Soon afterward they fell short of food, for the Taochoi retreated
with their wives and children and all their supplies, to inaccessible
hill fastnesses, a few of which were carried rather by desperate
personal valor and emulation among the captains of Lochi,
especially those named above, than by much skill or science.
Still it appears that Xenophon again suggested the movement by
which the most difficult was taken. The desperate character of
* Anab. IV. v 24-36.




THE SE,I THE SEA.                217
these people was evinced by their casting down their wives and
children, and leaping themselves headlong from the rocks when
they saw their hill fGrts carried-as did the Chimariots when
Suli was stormed by Ali Pacha —rather than submit to enemies,
who, to their eternal honor be it spoken, never had recourse to a
single act of cruelty or wanton devastation during this long and
desperate retreat, when provoked to the utmost by the treachery
of the unrelenting foe, who appeared set on hunting them to destruction. Thence, they entered the Chalybian country, the men
being very bold and hardy, fighting with the Greeks hand to
hand, armed with pikes twenty feet in length, and cutlasses like
the Lakonian swords, and wearing linen corslets, with head
pieces and greaves.  From these people they could win no food
or foraoe, but were supported by what they had taken from the
Taochoi, until, reaching the Skythinian district, they halted for
three days and foraged unmolested. The next tribe, occupying
a large, populous and wealthy city, sent a guide who promised to
bring them within five days, through an enemy's country which
he begged them to burn and devastate, to a mountain from
which they should perceive the sea, and that he was willing to
die in case of failure. And on the fifth day, he brou2ght them to
the hill, which is called Theke,* according to Xenophon, while
Diodorus makes it Chenion.t
I am not aware that this hill has ever been identified by personal observation, but it is clearly one of the northern spurs of
the ridge of mountains in which the Euphrates rises, and which
Strabot designates as the northern branch of the Taurus; and
it is not a little remarkable that at the foot of such a spur, immediately above Trebizonde, anld on the stream which forms the
harbor of that once famous city, there is to this day a village of
~ Anab. IV. vii 21.    t Diod. Sic. XIV. 29.
f Anthon's Class Diet. Art. Euphrates.
10




218                    XENOPHON.
Tekeh which may well retain a vestige of Xenophon's appellation Theke.
On reaching this point, the rapture of these men, home-sick,
travel-worn, and heart-weary, can be imagined better than described, but of all descriptions, his must needs be the best, who
saw the welcome sight, and shared the rapture which he
witnessed. " When the first men," he says, " reached the summit and beheld the sea, a great shout arose; and when Xenophon
and the rear-guard heard it, they supposed that a fresh enemy
had attacked the head of the column; for at this time they
were pursued hotly by men from the country they had
wasted; and the rear-guard had killed some and taken others
alive, of the enemy, in an ambush, besides capturing about
twenty shaggy bucklers of raw bull-hide.  But when the clamor
constantly increased and became nigher, and when all who approached rushed up the hill at full speed, and joined those who
were still shouting, and swelled the shout themselves, till it waxed
very mighty, Xenophon conceived that it was something of
greater import; and mounting his charger he galloped up, leading Lykios and the cavalry, as if to the rescue; and soon they
heard the soldiers shouting " The sea! The sea!" and plighting
their vows to heaven. Then all the rear-guard rushed up the
hill, and the cavalry in full career, and even the beasts of burthen.
And when all were at the summit, they embraced one another,
and their generals, and the captains of their bands, weeping and
speechless; and suddenly, as if to perform the vow of some one,
the soldiers brought together stones and built a vast column, and
hung upon it bull-hides, and their staves, and the shields of the
enemy, which they had taken."*
How could any scene have been more striking or at the same
time more affecting; indeed, so enthusiastic and contagious were
their transports, that the barbarian guide, whom they afterward
t Anab. IV. vii. 21. and 26.




A PICTURE.                     219
dismissed splendidly rewarded, partook their joy, and himself
helped to erect the trophy, and cut the shields, and called upon
the others to do likewise.
Never, I think, to borrow the noble words of Aiskylos,* was" The land seen of men
Shipwrecked and hopeless on the deep, the morn
Breaking resplendent from a night of storms,
The crystal fountain in a burning waste
To the lone wayfarer,?7
a spectacle so blessed and joyous as that far glimpse of those
wvild and inhospitable waters, heaving to the blasts of the fierce
north wind which had dealt with them heretofore so roughly,
but which they were now ready to adore, since every sweeping
gust should bear them back to happiness, to home, to
-Hellas.
To me that simple and brief narrative of Xenophon, with that
electric and electrifying shout " the sea! the sea!" has been, as
Chllevy Chase was to Sir Philip Sydney, such, that I might say
with him, "I never heard it, that I found not my heart moved
more than with a trumpet;" and at this day a picture of the
scene, which I saw years ago, when I was a mere boy-I think,
by Etty-is distinct before my eyes, with every detail, as when
I saw it. The artist had chosen the moment when Xenophon!u:aches the summit, on his panting horse, and the whole scene is
before him, the whole tale told at a glance. Some shouting, weepinlg, clasping hands, embracing, vowing- but all straining their
eves, all pointing their arms to that far blue misty line, which
instinct ratherthan eyesight told them was the sea! The painter,
too, had caught one incident, which the great penman has forgotten to insert —for it must have happened, since there were
mnany hetairai in camp; some who had followed, doubtless, from
unforgotten Greece; some captives only, but all now loved by
* Agamemnon, 983; Herbert's Translation.




220                      xiENOPIOSN.
their lords, if only fiom community of hopes and fears, and pains
and perils-a soldier, the most prominent figure in the piece,
lifting his mistress high in the air, that she too might behold the
Sea! the Sea! and catch fiom it one inspiration from loved and
lovely Hellas.  To each one of them all, that sea was*
"As a friendly hand
Stretched out from his native land,
Filling his heart with memories sweet and endless."
To each one of them all it seemed, doubtless, that all his toils
were ended, all his perils over, the port already gained, the home
of his youth before him-for Xenophon tells us elsewhere that
these men were not mere hireling soldiers, but men of character,
with property, homes, chilcdren, parents, wives; men who had
followed Kyros partly from  admiration of his great renown,
partly from love of glory, partly from love of adventure, least of
all from love of lucre; and the truth of what he tells is evident
by the fury with which they turned on their leaders, whenever
they suspected them of an intent to detain them  in Asia-and
yet how few of them ever saw home or country-how few
ever filled a Grecian grave, which perhaps above all things all
desired.
But not to anticipate-although their way was now not long
to Trapezos, there were still difficulties to be surmounted; for
after the Makrones had given them a free passage —owing to the
curious fact that one of Xenophon's targeteers, who had been a
slave at Athens, was originally a captive from  that tribe, and
still spoke their language —the Kolchians delfeInded their hills
with desperation, and were only conquered, after some sharp
fighting, by Xenophon's favorite movement, of dividing the
phalanx into columns of the several lochi, each a hundred strong,
* Longfellow-Building of the Ship.




ARRIVAL AT THE GREEK COLONIES.          221
with a front probably of four shields, and a depth of twenty-four,
as more flexible and less liable to be broken and clubbed by difficulties of broken ground. In eight days they reached the sea
near Trapezos, now Trebizonde, a Greek city, the easternmost on
the Black Sea, and a colony of Sinope, the most powerful place
and indeed the metropolis of all the Hellenic colonies on the
Euxine. Here they were hospitably received, and rested awhile
from their toils, and celebrated their return in safety, to what
doubtless appeared to them Greece, by sacred games and
festivals.
Thence Cheirisophos took ship for IHerakleia, where he hoped
to find vessels whereby to transport all the men home together;
and the rest, meanwhile, were compelled by necessity to sell
their swords to the colonists against their barbarous enemies, on
whom they foraged, having neither markets sufficient to supply
food for so many, nor means to purchase, had there been markets. And here they had some desperate fighting with the Kolchian enemies of the Trapezuntians, and lost many good men,
but won much booty, which they sold to their entertainers, and
from the profits furnished themselves with supplies, and with
shipping for the sick and the soldiers, above forty years, the
women, the children, and the baggage, whom they sent by sea,
under the command of Sophainetos and Philesios, the oldest of
the generals, to Kerasous, now Kerezoun, a sister colony from
Sinope-whither the remainder of the army marched by land.
Here they halted three days, and numbered the troops at a
review under arms, when -they were found to be eight thousand
six hundred men-survivors, as Xenophon states, from about ten
thousand-the rest having perished by the hands of the enemy,
and in the snow, and some few by disease. In this enumeration
there is clearly some confusion, since at the midnight review
before Kynaxa, in whiclh battle only one man fell, the number
of hoplitai alone amountted to ten thousand four hundred shields




222                     XENOPHON.
of heavy foot, and twenty-five hundred light troops in addition; and again, at a much later period of the retreat, after
heavy fighting with the Mosynoikians, when the army broke into
three divisions, it is stated to have consisted of eight thousand
six hundred and forty men. It is possible that in this place
hoplitai alone are intended; but I consider it more probable that
Xenophon has anticipated, and stated here the full force which
passed over the Bosphorus, all losses included. Another difficulty is in this, that on the heavy infantry-better defended and
less exposed, in hill-fighting, than the targeteers-the heaviest
actual loss fell; they having lost three thousand men, for fifteen
hundred of the others; but this may probably be explained by
their greater sufferings in the snow.  These discrepancies cannot, however, be explained-many, perhaps, are owing to errors
in transcription of the manuscripts; and in no point of these do
more mistakes occur, even in this age of printing, than in the
articles; nor in any other are authors, especially the ancients,
more careless; sometimes stating round numbers generally, as if
they were intended to be accurate, and again exact numbers so
loosely that they are taken to mean round ones.
The whole distance of their march from Babylonia and the
battle-ground to Kotyora, their next halting place after Kerasous,
he states at one hundred and twenty-two posts, or days' marchsix hundred and twenty parasangs-eighteen thousand six hundred stadia; these distances by various measures agreeing nearly
enough to prove their correctness, since eight stadia are a little
more than one mile English, and one parasang a little less
than four. The time consumed was eight months.
And here practically, and in a military point of view, this
grand retreat may be said to have terminated-and that in
safety and success.
With the miserable dissensions which followed, the ambition
and treachery of the leaders, the base tergiversation of the Lake



STRIFE AND DISSENSIONS.            223
daimonian admiral, the jealousies of the Greek colonies of the
Black Sea, Xenophon had nothing to do, save that he nearly
fell a victim to them; nor dd they properly belong to the history
of the retreat, which was in truth ended, so soon as the ten
thousand had fought their way through all their barbarous
enemies, had reached their. countrymen of the Greek colonies,
and the sea by which they might have obtained transportation to
their native shores.
Still it may be well to trace his connection with the ten
thousand to its close, for we find him in many and strange vicissitudes, owing to that connection. We find him arraigned before
his own soldiers and acquitted honorably and by acclamation;
we find him implored to accept the sole command, and resolutely
declining it; we find him deposed from the station he had held
since the death of Proxenos; reduced to his own small separate
command; rescuing the very men who had deposed him; raised
to the sole command involuntarily; carrying the army over the
Bosphoros in safety, quitting them when all seemed well with
them, returning to them when in distress; at one time well
nigh stoned to death, because he desired to found a colony at
Kalpe in Bithynia; at another offered the supreme government
of Byzantium  and declining it; but always playing the part of
a good soldier, a good general, a good man, and what is more
an honest, religious, conscientious, and consistent man, if ever
there lived one in ancient or modern history.
In the end, he delivered over his men to Thibron, the Spartan
General in Asia Minor; and they were amalgamated with the
Greek  force fighting against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos,
under his orlersl, from which time forth they had no separate
existence, as an army.
Xenophon himself returned in the following year to Asia with
his friend Agesilaos, but of what he did or what station he held
we know nothing.  Subsequently he was engaged in Greece,




224                     XENOPHON.
under the same general, against the Boiotians at the battle of
Coroneia; and this so displeased his countrymen, the Athenians,
that they banished him; but to be banished was to any Athenian
a matter of too common occurrence to be much dreaded or deplored; and to one who had been so great a wanderer surely no
extreme punishment. Still he appears ever to have felt kindly to
to his country, and to have rejoiced and gloried in the name
Athenian, though he was indebted to the Lakedaimonians for his
beautiful home, and rich estates at Skilluns, in Elis, where he
lived the remainder of his days, happy and peaceful, in the
practice of philosophy and piety, in the possession of easy affluence and literary leisure, in the society of his sons and his wife
Phitesia, up to the advanced age of ninety-three years; when he
died as calmly as though half his life had not been spent in the
most tumultuous of tempests-that of human warfare. WAere I
asked to sum up his character in a few words, I should say that
so far as we know or can learn of him, he lacked no quality
which a soldier, general, or man should have, nor possessed any
which they should not have. As a general I should rate him not
lower than the third of all the old world ever saw; Hannibal
being first beyond compare, and perhaps Epaminondas second,
though between Xenophon and him I doubt.  If it be objected,
that he did little by which to hold so high a place in arms, I
would reply that there was much, if not all of strategy, in that
little; that it is qualities, not opportunities, which make the
general; and that, judging fiom all that he did, I can conceive
nothing' which he could nothave done.
As a philosopher he is the only Greek, unless it be, perhaps,
Plato, for whom I have any considerable degrlee of respect; most
of their private lives were filthy, infamous and odious; most of
their p-retensions to philosophy were nelre cant, mere dogmatismn,
and mere, humbu g- most of themselves —might I not say all so
taintel, not exe.luding So-lrates himself, with qlaclker,'y, bufollnery,




HIS CHARACTER.                   225
and charlatanry, that we scarce know whether to loathe them as
Tartuffe, laugh at them as Grimaldi, or scorn them as any one of
fifty humbugs of our own day.
In one word, and to conclude, I fear that as a man in moral
duties, and-so far as light was vouchsafed to him-lin pious faith
and practice, also, many a professed Christian might look foir an
example in the/heathen Xenophon.




VI.
EPAMINONDAS,
THE THEBAN.
HIS CAMPAIGNS, BATTLES OF LEUKTRA AND MANTINEIA,
CHARACTER, AND CONDUCT.
WITH the life and career of no one man, in the ages of authentic history, were the prosperity and pre-eminence of his native
city ever so exactly contemporary and co-existent, as those
of Thebes with those of her best and greatest son, Epaminondas. For, previous to his coming upon the stage, and taking
the lead in the administration of her affairs, she had never
aspired to more than a secondary position among the independent states of Hellas, little indeed, if at all, superior to that
of Korinth, Arkadia, and Argolis, nor dreamed of contesting the
supremacy with Attika, or Lakedaimon.  Yet, so soon as this
great man rose to the head of her affairs, she sprang at once to
the leading and mastery of the Greek states, which she wrested
from the iron hands of Sparta, then at her loftiest pitch of power;
and still maintained it, sometimes at the head of her allies,
oftener single-handed, so long as his political wisdom and mode
ration ruled her councils; so long as his military science fought
her battles.
In what year he was born does not appear distinctly, but we
know that, with his friend and brother in arms, Pelopidas, he
was of one among the noblest of the Boiotian families. It is




HIIS YOUTH.                       227
to be regretted, that of this highly interesting period, and this
its most interesting personage, we possess fewer and far less
authentic documents than of the events and characters immediately preceding and succeeding it. Of Plutarch's lives, Epaminondas is one of the missing; and. as the biographer was a
fellow countryman of the general, and himself by no means destitute of patriotic and party spirit, it is not to be doubted that he
had laid himself out on the career and character of this, the
greatest soldier and statesman of his nation. We may therefore
esteem this a real loss; although, in general, Plutarch's lives are
to be regarded rather as gossipping collections of stray anecdotes,
and pleasant compilations, than as authentic histories.  And it
is to be regretted, the rather, because the magnificent and most
veracious history of Thukydides closes before his career began,
unless it was in the first fight at Mantineia that he drew his
maiden sword; and because Xenophon, who continued that great
work in his Hellenika, has, from partiality to his friend Agesilaos,
described the campaigns and battles of his rival with a brevity
and lack of appreciation so different from the minute and graphic
details, the energy and life, which we meet in every page of the
Anabasis, that we recognize neither the author, nor the glorious
actor, whom he deals with, I regret to say, almost in a spirit of
detraction.
It was in the second year of the ninetieth Olympiad, B. C.
419,* if we may believe Plutarch, that the Thebans, being then
* Plut. Pelopid. IV. Such is the narrative of Plutarch. I must,
however, regard it as apocryphal; since this battle of Mantineia
being fought B. C. 419, that of Leuctra in 371, and the second battle of
Mantineia, when Epaminondas fell, in 363, allowing the friends to have
been but fifteen, at this period, Epaminondas, at his death, must have been
at least seventy-one years old; whereas there is no hint to be found in
history that he was at all advanced in years; but, on the oontrary, a general report, that he was young at Leuktra, and that he died, cut off in
his mid career.




228                     EPAMINONSDAS.
in close alliance with the Lakedaimonians, and sending an auxiliary force to serve with them, Epaminondas and Pelopidas
fought side by side in that first fierce battle of Mantineia, in
which Agesipolis defeated, with so terrible a slaughter, the comLined forces of the Argives, Mantineians, Arkadians and Athenians. In the shock of that dreadful encounter, the chosen band
of Argive youths a thousand strong, broke the left wing, in
which the Thebans fought, and drove a large portion of it clear
off the field; but the two friends, as he asserts, with some comrades, linking their shields, resisted desperately, when all around
them  were in full flight; and, when Pelopidas fell, with seven
wounds all in front, Epaminondas stood over him, though he
believed him to be dead, defending him and his armor, until he
too had received a spear-thrust in the breast and a sword-cut in
the axm, when they were rescued, timely, by the arrival of Agesipolis from the right, where he had carried all before him, who
now came up, restored, and won the battle.  From  this time
forth, we are told, the young men were inseparable friends; for
they both recovered from their wounds, to do their country better service; although it was not until after the lapse of several
years that we find them again acting together, as it were, with
one hand and a single spirit.
This I have inserted as a pleasing story, illustrative both of the
times and of the character of the men of whom it is narrated;
as popular traditions, if they are apt to err, like this, in preserving exact synchronism, are wont to adhere very closely to the veri
similitude of things and the individuality of characters; and this
it is, which renders it at times difficult to discriminate between
them and authentic history.
In the first year of the ninety-fourth Olympiad, B. C. 404, theo
Peloponnesian war, which for the space of twenty-seven years
had raged incessant throughout Greece, was closed by the survender of Athens at discretion, the demolition of h!er walls, and




CiIANSES OF GREEK POLICY.              229
the subversion of her constitution by Lysander-thirty tyrants
and an oligarchical form of government being imposed on her,
in lieu of her fierce, untamed democracy. From that day her
supremacy in politics was at an end-although she recovered her
independence-and Sparta was, in her stead, the dominant power
of Hellas.
From this time, for several years, the changes of polity and
intermutations of alliances are intricate and incessant, so as
almost to defy unravelling, among the Hlellenic states; for, within
a year or two, the Thebans assisted Thrasybulus and the Athenians in banishing the thirty, and re-establishing their ancient
government; so that when the Boiotic war arose, between Thebes
and Phokis-Sparta taking part with the former-Athens and
the Argives espoused the cause of the Thebans, and the tide of
war began again to turn; the walls of Athens having been
rebuilt by Konon, then serving as Persian Admiral for Teribazos,
mith the aid of the Boiotians.  Thus matters continued, with
continuous versatility, continuous war and slaughter, for seven
and twenty years, though with no decisive effect nor any unity
of purpose, except on the part of Sparta; which persisted in
winning her way steadfastly, and in spite of all opposition, to
universal dominion-so far, at least, as Greece was concernedthe other states offering, no concerted resistance to her ambitious
plans, but fighting now for her, now against her, as the whim of
the hour might dictate. But at the end of this period, in the
third year of the ninety-eiohth Olympiad, B. C. 386, Phoibidas
the Lakedaimonian general, while marching through the Boiotian territory, then at peace with it, treacherously surprised the
Kadmeia, or citadel of Thebes, which he occupied with an armed
garrison, and banished about three hundred of the most eminent
citizens of the democratic and patriotic party, who found hospitality and protection in Athens. So ill was this act of treacherous aggression taken by Greece at large, that Lakedaimon, not




230                   EPAMINONDAS.
so completely absolute but that she had some fear of popular
opinion, went through the farce of fining Phoibidas in a large
sum of money, for his conduct; while they by no means forgot
to retain the Kadmeia with a powerful Spartan detachment, and
to enforce the edict of banishment against all'he patriots.
Among these was Pelopidas, but Epaminondas was suffered
to remain in the place-for in some sort they despised him, as a
philosopher, and yet more, they regarded him as powerless, from
his want of means. Plutarch records this capture of the Kadmeia, and banishment of Pelopidas, as immediately consecutive
to the first battle of Mantineia; yet thirty-three years had intervened; so that had these men then distinguished themselves, as
he relates, they must have now been between fifty and sixty
years of age, when the whole context of the narrative points
to them as young, active, and enthusiastic men; and when,
to complete the absurdity, Plutarch names Epaminondas as
among the youngest of the exiles. During this time, mindful of
the countenance which the Boiotians had shown them during
their own time of trouble with the thirty tyrants, Athens refused
resolutely, in answer to all the expostulations of Sparta, either to
expel or injure the exiles; and when, after awaiting their opportunity, they at length determined on striking a blow, they aided
them with arms, and sent them  forth with their good wishes,
promising armed assistance, should their stratagem prove successful.
It was in the fourth year after the capture of the Kadmeia,
that Pelopidas, with twelve confederates, entered the gates of
Thebes by night with hounds, and hunting nets, and boar-spears;
and, having contrived to remain in the city all the next day,
undiscovered-partly by means of their disguises, and partly
under favor of a wild gale and snow-storm-the next evening
broke in upon the tyrants Archias, Leontidas, Hiyphates, and
Philippos, while they were feasting, with song and dance, clad




RE-CAPTURE OF TlHE KADMEIA.             231
in feminine attire, and slew them without mercy. As soon as
the deed was done, Epaminondas and Gorgidas, who had been
mustering the youth of Thebes, came to their support with a
considerable power; and, as soon as the news of it could reach
them, the main body of che confederates, who had awaited the
result of the conspiracy in the Thriasian plain, on the confines of
Attika and Boiotia, marched into the gates in full armor, and
summoned the people to assemble, which they did, with shouts
of joy and triumph; receiving the men as their benefactors and
deliverers.  Thereupon Pelopidas being elected one of the Boiotarchai,* with Mellon and Charon, proceeded at once to raise
counterworks against the citadel, and to threaten it with assault;
on seeing which the Lakedaimonian garrison, no less than fifteen
hundred strong, surrendered, on condition of being allowed to
march out with their arms and with military honors. This was
a wise and well-judged act of moderation on the part of the confederates, on the principle of building a bridge of gold for a flying
enemy; for, although they knew it not, there was already a great
power afoot under the command of Kleombrotos, the Spartan
king, marching upon Thebes, and so near as the frontiers of
Attika and the Megaris.  Had they refused terms to the garrison of the Kadmeia, it is probable, at least, that they would have
stood a long siege, and supported themselves until the arrival of
reinforcements; so at least argued the Lakedaimonians, for they
put to death two out of the three harmostai, or colonial governors, who were in the citadel, Herippidas and Arkesos, and banished Lysanoridas, the third, from the Peloponnesus, after making
him pay a heavy fine.
That was a bold and dashing exploit of Pelopidas and his
friends; and, although it may be thought to. verge too narrowly
* The military leaders of. all the independent confederated states of
Boiotia, one elected by each subordinate city, two or three by Thebes,
were called Boiotarchai.




232P EPAI'Ix O-UD.xS.
upon individual assassination, to meet the unqualified praise of
this more enlightened age, yet the slaughter of the tyrants was
so immediately connected with an armed military expedition, and
that was again so enthusiastically hailed by a unanimous and
universal popular rising against the foreign force which alone
opposed it, that the irregularity of the proceedings may be overlooked in consideration of the obvious necessity of the case, and
unequivocal absence of any private animosities against the persons sacrificed to the common weal.  It is said, that Epaminondas, with a sense of delicacy and perception of true right and
wrong almost too nice and too correct for that age, refused absolutely to be a participator in the bloodshedding of fellow citizens,
however great their political error, however flagrant their criminality against the state; but that he willingly took up arms
against the foreign oppressors, who held their power by no right,
except that of might. But this I believe to be one of those rhetorical inventions with which such writers as Nepos and Plutarch
abound, and to which less credit is due than even to those traditional anachronisms of which I have spoken above, since they,
unlike the former, are inconsistent with the spirit of the times,
and therefore, not with the veracity only, but with the verisimilitude of history.  What is perfectly true, however, of this daring
and successful enterprise, is the fact, that from that night forward Sparta began to decline; that the prestige of her moral
superiority was counteracted; and that her ascendency was never
again perfectly established as the ruler both by sea and land;
but that she gradually sunk into a secondary state, while Thebes
grew up in her stead to be the arbiter of Greece, until all the
nations fell at once into the shadow of one vast and consolidated
power, which could be resisted by no casual combination, but
only by a unity of force equal to its own.
This truth was proved without delay, by the defection of many
of the Spartan allies, as the Chians, Byzantines, and Rhodians,




PASSES OF THE KITHAIRON.             233
and their instituting a senate at Athens, to act in behalf of all
the confederates;* nor was the matter allowed to rest long in
words and councils only, for Sphodriades, the Spartan admiral,
at the suggestion of Kleombrotos, making an attempt on the Peiraios, at the head of ten thousand men, which was repulsed, and
being subsequently acquitted, the Athenians declared the truce
with Sparta broken, and at once selected their three best men,
Timotheos, Iphikrates, and Chabrias, generals, with a force of
twenty thousand foot, five hundred horse and two hundred
war-ships.
The Spartans, however, were determined not to yield without
a blow, but sent Kleombrotos, with a considerable force, to support their interests in Boiotia, although it was in the depth of winter; intending to cross the ridge of Kithairon by the pass of Eleutherai, which was occupied strongly by Chabrias, with the Athenian targeteers. On perceiving this, Kleombrotos made his way
by Aigosthena, between the sea and the western slope of Mount
Elateia, across the river Oroe, near Kreusis, and thence by P lataia
to Thespiai, and thence to Kynoskephalai, where he encamped
within a mile of Thebes, and remained there sixteen days, expecting, probably, that there would be some rising of the oligarchical
party in Boiotia, of which he might take advantage. Nothing,
however, of the kind occurring, he fell back again to Thespiai,
where he left Sphodrias at the head of a thfid part of the allied
forces-with instructions to raise mercenaries, and prosecute the
war-and then retreated by the road he had come, by way of
Kreusis and the western passes of the Kithairon, where he lost
some of his men and many of his baggage-train, by a storm so
terrible that it blew the shieldst out of the soldiers' hands, and
cast the loaded animals headlong from the precipices. But
shortly afterward Agesilaos was sent from Sparta to replace Kleombrotos; and, entering by the same pass of Kithairon as his
* Diod. Sic. XV. 28.    t Xenophon, Hellenika, V. iv. 18.
11




234                   EPAMIXONDAS.
predecessor, advanced to Thespiai, where he found all the plain
fortified with field works, mounds, palisades, and trenches, with
narrow openings, from which the Theban light troops and cavalry sallied out and galled him not a little; on his attempting
to bring on a general action, Chabrias thwarted him, it is said,
by a new arrangement of his men, whom  he caused to kneel
with their shields grounded and pikes presented, much, it is to
be presumed, as modern infantry receive cavalry in square; but,
in spite of all this, Agesilaos forced them in the end to evacuate
their positions and devastated the country up to the very walls
of Thebes. Notwithstanding this success, however, the royal
leader,was able'to produce no great or permanent result, but
retired, loaded with booty, into the Megaris; where he dismissed
his army to its respective countries.
The details of a warfare so petty and unprofitable as this are
tedious and uninteresting alike to the writer and the reader; yet
it is in such small fields that the first exercise is often passed,
and the first experience gained, by which are made great
generals. Such is not often the case in modern times, or as
relates to modern armies; for at the present day the art of war is
too perfectly and purely a science, that any man without patient
study and stern discipline can become a great strategist-once a
partizan always a partizan, would seem to be an inevitable law
now-a-days, yet suc] was far from  being the case in the times
of which I write, and there is the strongest reason to believe that
it was in this paltry skirmishing that the first ideas of generalship, the first rudiments of military science dawned upon the
wiuthful genius* of Epaminondas. No sooner had Agesilaos
and his great army-the second great army which had invaded
the Thebais in the course of a single year-retired ineffectual,
than the Theban leaders, choosing their time, fell upon Phoibidas'
out-posts, and cut off two hundred of them, when that chief,
* Plut. Vit. Pelop.




THIRD INVASION.                  235
rushing out of Thespiai, where he had a good garrison, attacked
the enemy on his return, who, turning on him suddenly,
destroyed no less than five hundred of his men, himself falling*
gallantly as he fought hand to hand with the foe, perhaps
unwilling to survive the defeat he had undergone; the rather
that he had experienced already the justice of the Lakedaimonians, being condemned to pay a fine as the reward of his
success in capturing the Kadmea. On the news of this disaster
reaching Lakedaimon, Agesilaos was again put at the head of a
sufficient force, and for the third time in that one year the
Spartans invaded Boiotia, for though it was early in the following
spring, twelve months had not fully elapsed since the first
irruption of Kleombrotos. At first the Spartan king manceuvred
as if he would have entered the Thebais from the Plataiis by
way of Thespiai, as before, but so soon as he perceived that the
enemy were concentrating their forces on the Southern passes of
Kithairon, he countermarched suddenly in the opposite direction,
by Erythrai, making two days' marches in one, passed the
entrenchment which had been thrown up before Skolos, without
giving the enemy time to occupy it, and devastated all the
eastern part of the Thebais, so far as to the frontiers of Tanagra,
which was at this time occupied by his friends. Thence he
marched upon Thebes, which, however, he did not attempt, but
passed it to the northward, having the walls on his left hand,
and thence proceeded up the valley of the Schoinos, now the
Kanavari, to a difficult position called the Graias-stethos, or the
old woman's breast, which the Thebans had fortified with a
trench and palisade as if against an enemy descending the same
valley from Thespiai. In front of this position they were now so
strongly posted that Agesilaos did not judge it wise to assail
them, but alarmed them by a clever movement by his. left flank
towards the city, which, it seems, had been left defenceless, so
* Diod. Sic. xv. 34.




236                    EPAMINONDAS.
that they quitted their position, and hurried at their utmost
speed along the road through Potniai to Thebes, closely pressed
in the rear by the cavalry, and Skiritai, or royal body guard of
the Spartans. There was some sharp but indecisive skirmishing
along this line, in the course of which one of the Spartan
Polemarchs was slain by the Theban javelineers, and afterward
some few of the Theban real were cut up by the enemy's horse.
As the former, however, faced about and offered battle under
their walls, while the Skiritai retreated at double-quick time,
they claimed the victory and erected a trophy, though it should
seem with but little reason; since, in fact, Agesilaos had succeeded in his object, having dislodged the enemy's force, in the
presence of which he did not dare to scatter his troops on their
work of devastation, and shut it up in the city.  On the following night he occupied the camp at Graias-stethos, which they
had evacuated, and thence retreating at his leisure, laying waste
the country as he went, upon Thespiai, he returned through the
passes of the Kithairon upon Megara, where he dismissed the
allies, leading the native force back to Sparta. These three consecutive expeditions appear to have been singularly ineffective
and unworthy of the reputation of Agesilaos as a great warrior;
for it would certainly appear from the context that he had a fair
opportunity of carrying Thebes itself by a coup de main in the
absence of its defenders, and thus terminating the war at a blow.
But it must be remembered that the Lakedaimonians were never
either very skilful or very successful in the attack of walled
places; and this is probably the true cause of their not attacking
a town when unprovided with defenders and unprepared for
defence, which had so little real strength of fortifications which
to defend, that Alexander, a few- years later, carried the walls by
assault, and then stormed the citadel, within the space of a few
hours only, although he was met by a stern and vigorous
resistance.  Agesilaos, however, though rash to a fault in the




ERROR OF AGESILAOS.                  237
councils which preceded and often induced the hazards of a
dangerous and destructive war, appears to me, on a careful
review of his principal campaigns, to have been a cautious, wary,
and perhaps slow general in the field, preferring long and certain
operations with distant results, and a cold and dilatory policy, to
sudden and decisive blows. Such was the whole line of his
clever and successful campaigns in Asia, in the course of which,
without delivering  any general battle, or fighting any one
remarkable action, he separated nearly the whole of Asia, Minor
from the Archipelago up to the Kilikian Gates from  the empire
of the king, and reduced it to the condition of a Hellenik province.
In the present instance, though he missed the opportunity of
planting a fatal and decisive blow, he reduced the Thebans to
very serious straits fiom the scarcity of grain and provision, their
whole district having been twice ravaged with fire and steel in
the course of a single twelvemonth, and two seed-times and
harvests thus rendered absolutely fruitless. This last time, indeed,
the work of havoc had been most systematically and thoroughly
performed throughout all her confines, from the borders of the
Tanagrice on the north and east, to that of the Plataiis and
Megaris to the westward and southward; so that, had the
Spartans tarried in the Thebais, it appears to me that the
Thebans must have come out and delivered battle in the open
plain, which the Spartans at this time, confident in their as yet
unconquered infantry, most desired.
So far as these campaigns are concerned, it is clear that the
generalship of the Theban leaders was on the whole superior to
that of the Spartan king, since by gaining time they were exercising and disciplining their raw levies into soldiers, and were preparing their state for the glorious career of victories which it was
shortly destined to enter upon; while he by neglecting to strike
when he might have crushed-as I hold it certain that he
might-gave them the opportunity to prolong the war and re



238                   EPAMINONDAS.
trieve its fortunes, as they did disastrously for Lakedaimon on
the terrible fields of Leuktra and Mantinnia.
In the following spring a Peloponnesian army marched as before; but Agesilaos, who was lame of one leg from his birth, was
suddenly afflicted with a severe aneurism in the other, while ascending from the temple of Aphrodite to the council chamber in
Megara, whither he had advanced with the power under his
command.  The swelling became inordinately great, and the
pain intolerable, whereupon a Syrakusan surgeon opened the
artery near the ancle and he all but bled to death, after which
he continued ill during all the summer, and far into the winter.
In his lieu, therefore, Kleombrotos was again sent out, and attempting, as before, to cross the Kithairon, with his targeteers in
the van, was repulsed, with the loss of about forty men, by the
Thebans and Athenians, who had anticipated them, and occupied
the summits in advance. Upon this he gave up the attempt in
despair, and dismissed the allied contingents, retreating homeward, as if the passage of the Kithairon was impracticable against
defenders.  These clumsy and insufficient proceedings created
considerable indignation among the allies, when it was determined
to blockade the port of Athens, and having compelled her by
famine to surrender, to transport their forces into the Thebais
either through the Phokian country or by way of Kreusis, the
harbor of Thespiai.  This plan, however, though it was tried,
proved abortive, since the Athenians under Chabrias defeated
Pollis the Lakedaimonian, with his sixty blockading galleys,
opened the port, and brought in their corn-ships safely; after
which, when the enemy would have attempted the Theban coast,
they sent so powerful a squadron around the coasts of the Peloponnesos, as succeeded in capturing the large island of Kerkyra,
now Corfu, and effectually prevented the Spartans from attempting anything beyond the isthmus.
In the autumn of that year, which was the second after the




VAIN ATTEMPTS AT A GENERAL PEACE.         23 9
accident of Agesilaos, Timotheos again beat the Lakedaimonian
fleet under Nikolochos, and set up a trophy for the victory; and
in the meantime the Thebans,* having been free from internal
troubles, had conquered and reduced all the neighboring cities of
Boiotia, which had been held by Spartan garrisons, as Thespiai,
Plataia, and the wealthy city of Orchomenos, and were now as
strong in territorial power, and stronger in moral and physical
military strength  than at any previous period of the war.
During this time, several efforts had been made by Artoxerxes,
king of Persia, to bring about a reconciliation and general peace
among the Greek states; for he was now busily occupied in
making war on Egypt, which had revolted from his authority,
and thought to prosecute it with greater effect, by employing
Greek mercenaries, whom he hoped to attract to his standards in
great force, should universal peace be proclaimed throughout
Greece.
Many of the states were well enough disposed to this end, for,
of the leading powers, Sparta was disgusted by her continued
want of success, and har really serious losses; and Athens was
discontented with the conduct of her Theban allies, between
whom and herself no true cordiality ever existed, and who were
now elated by their unwonted victories over the armies of Lakedaimon, hitherto deemed' invincible. But for a time circumstances
rendered such a reconciliation impossible; for in the first
place the pride of Agesilaos and the Spartans induced them to
insist on the restoration of independence to all the Boiotian cities
by Thebes, as a condition of peace, while naturally the Thebans
felt that being victorious it was for them to dictate conditions
rather than submit to them; and in the second an accidental
collision between the fleets caused the Spartans to suspect Athens
of foul play, and in consequence, the war was further protracted.
Two years more of disasters and naval defeats on the part of
* Xen. Hellenika, V. 4. 66.




240                    EPAMINONDAS.
Lakedaimon, and of increasing disgusts on that of Athens, to
whom her old and steady allies of Thespiai and Plataia had appealed for aid against the vengeance of Thebes, put an end to
such difficulties, and peace was concluded, ambassadors from all
the states being assembled at Sparta.  Here, Epaminondas appeared on the behalf of Thebes-a man, says Plutarch,* of great
philosophy and learning, but one who had as yet displayed no
military genius-for it appears that hitherto the confederated
forces had been commanded in chief by an Athenian, either
Iphikrates or Chabrias, the Boiotian leaders holding subordinate
rank only.  Of him Agesilaos, it seems, inquired whether he
esteemed it right and just that the cities of Boiotia should be firee
and independent-in reply to which he asked quickly and boldly,
while all the other ambassadors cowed before the haughty
Spartan, whether he esteemed it right that the Lakonian cities
should be free and independent. Hereupon Agesilaos leaped up
in a rage and demanded a categorical answer, would he declare
Boiotia independent? and Epaminondas replied as curtly and
as haughtily, " If you will declare Lakonia independent, aye!"
This terminated the conferences, for a general peace was at once
ratified, Thebes alone being excluded from its operation, and all
her allies at once deserting her, either to join in open hostilities
against hel, or at best to maintain a doubtful and suspicious
neutrality.
At this period there was a Peloponnesian army in Phokis
on the borders of Boiotia under tKleombrotos which had been
sent thither, the preceding year, to check the invasion of that
coulntry by the Thebans, who had fallen back before it and contented themselves with guarding the avenues to their own
country.  To this army orders were now sent to invade Boiotia
at once, and compel the Thebans to declare all the Boiotian
cities independent and restore Thespiai and Plataia, which tl ey had
* Plut. Vita Agesilai, xxvii.  t Xen. Hellen. VI. iv. 2>.




WAR RENEWED.                     241
destroyed; and when the Thebans positively refused to listen to
any such terms, it marched with ten* thousand shields of heavy
infantry and a thousand horset to Koroneia, a town of Boiotia
situated between the streams of Phalaros and Kyralios to the
southward of the lake Kephissis, just where the northernmost
spurs of Mt. ielikon subside into the plain. Two gorgest open
from the hills below the city sending down each a torrent to
unite and form the the Kyralios, the one running southeasterly,
and giving direct access to the plain of Thebes through Zagara,
Askra, and Thespiai; the other trending due south, through the
heart of the Helikonian ridge, to Thisbe, and thence to Kreusis the
port of Thespiai on the Oeroe, from which there was a direct road
by Plataia into the Thebais.  This city was already famous to
the Lakedaimonians and consequently infamous to the Boiotians,
for the single victory which Agesilaos had there gained over the
confederates, by which indeed the pride of Thebes had been for
many years humbled and her power broken.
This fact, perhaps, tended to increase the dismay which seems
at this time to have prevailed in that city, which was now entirely
deserted by her allies, and pitted single-handed against the most
puissant of all the Hellenik states. They did not quail, however,
in the emergency, but electing Epaminondas as their Boiotarches,
and giving him five others as councillors and subordinates, besides Pelopidas, the captain of the sacred band, sent him out
with about six thousand heavy infantry, and a cavalry greatly
superior in quality and composition, if not in numbers, to that of ~
the allies. As they passed the gates of Thebes, the army encountered a herald bringing in a blind man, a Ijfugitive either
from servitude or from justice, which for some reason or other
* Plut. Vit. Pelopid. xx. t Diod. Sic. xv. 52.
t Leakers Northern Greece, Maps, vol. I. & II.
~ Xen. Hellen. VI. vi. 10.' 11 Diod. Sic. XV. 53.
11




242                   EPAMINONDAS.
was esteemed as an omen of most evil import; so that the veterans
all cried out that it portended ill to the expedition, while the
younger men fearing that such words on their part would be construed into signs of cowardice, held their peace; and then it was
that Epaminondas shewed himself nobly superior to the superstitions and prejudices of his day, for he cried out in a loud voice,
borrowing the noble sentiment ascribed by Homer to the patriotic
Hector —E[f Idtsovg' a'pta7ro  dvveOat iTrepi 7ra1rpq1 —
The fairest omen is your country to defend. *
He led on, undeterred by that, or the more calamitous auguries
which succeeded to it, and took post in an exceeding strong
position within the mouth of the gorge leading from Koroneia
by way of Askra to the city, through which it was expected that
Kleombrotos would advance into the Thebais.
Kleombrotos, it would seem, was at this juncture almost compelled to give battle, for he had been suspected-not of what
might have been fitly laid to his charge, want of moral courage,
energy, and that decision which strengthens men to meet the
risk of responsibility-but of a treasonable inclination to favor
the Boiotians,* because in the year of his first invasion he had
not devastated the Thebais, when encamped at Kynoskephalai,
and because subsequently he had retreated from the passes of
the Kithairon after a very slight check of his vanguard by the
targeteers of Chabrias.
On this account he felt, probably, that not to fight at all, and
to fail in fighting, would be to him nearly equal-the preference,
if any, pointing to the latter alternative. This consideration it
must have been which caused him to hurry his movements, and
to deliver battle, without awaiting the arrival of Archidamos, the
son of Agesilaos, who was already on his way to join him,
* Xen. Hellen. VI. iv. 5.




THE LEUKTRIDAI.                    243
with reinforcements so powerful as to have rendered victory
almost certain.* It was necessarily the object of the Thebans to
anticipate the cominig of these succors, and as they had no allies
whom to expect, a victory only could prevent an armed coalition
against them. Both armies, therefore, desired battle, and yet,
owing to the great natural strength of the Theban position,
which they did not choose, and that very wisely, to quit, in order
to attack or offer battle in the plain, the engagement was yet
farther deferred.  For Kleombrotos, not daring to engage himself in the passes so formidably defended, broke up fiom his post
at Koroneia, and making a series of forced countermarches
through the gorges of Mount Helikon, upon Thisbe, surprised the
harbor of Kreusis, now Livadhostro, near the mouth of the Oroe,
on the gulf of Korintb, and took twelve Theban triremes, with their
crews. Thence, wheeling short to his own left, he ascended the
course of the Olmeios, and entering the plain of Thebes above the
head waters of the Asopos, now the Vurienda, found the Boiotian
force, which had made a corresponding movement to frustrate
his manceuvre, encamped on the heights of Leuktra, still between
himself and the city, where there was a monument to the daughters of Skedasos, who were known throughout this region as the
Leuktridai. These it is said were certain damsels of the country,
to whom  violence had been offered by Spartan envoys,t very
long ago, probably in the heroic ages, who had refused to survivt
their dishonor, and on whose tomb, in this place, their father failing to obtain justice at Sparta, had slain himself, with awful imprecations on the country of the violators.  From  this cause
*Xen. Hellen. VI. iv. 26. Diodorus Siculus states-xv. 54-that
Archidamos had come up with succors previously to the action, and that
his arrival caused Kleombrotos to break a treaty, made with the Thebans, at the suggestion of Jason of Thessaly. Xenophon, however, was
a cotemporary, and I prefer his account.
t Plut. Pelop. XX. Diod. Sic. XV., 54.




244                    EPAMINONDAS.
there had been given forth to the Spartans an oracle, awful from
remote antiquity, that they should beware the divine wrath at
Leuktra; but the meaning of this oracle had escaped the Lakedaimonians, since there were two other places of the same name,
one a Lakonian fortress on the sea-shore, and the other in Arkadia, near Megalopolis; the Boiotians, however, had kept the
religion of the spot, and now crowned the monument with
wreaths. A further tale concerning this tomb is recited by Plutarch, to which I give place, as singularly characteristic of the
times, and as showing the alacrity with which the leaders caught
at anything that might avert the evil omens which had accompanied their march from the city, and the pains they took to
cheer the spirits of their soldiers, shaken by such disastrous
auspices.
Pelopidas, thus runs the story, while sleeping in his tent, with
the enemy before him, dreamed that he saw the girls, weeping
and uttering imprecations on the Spartans, and Skedasos commanding him to scrifice a yellow-haired virgin, upon the tomb
of the damsels, if they would conquer the Spartans. And concerning this dream a great strife arose; for although the custom
of human sacrifices had in a great degree fallen into disuse, yet
instances were not wanting of such horrors, even in recent time;
and the ill-success of Agesilaos was attributed by many to his
disobedience in not sacrificing his daughter, as Agamemnon had
done in the heroic ages, to the goddess Artemis. The priests,
therefore, were urgent that the dream should be followed to the
letter; and the chiefs were discussing the question eagerly, and
Pelopidas was greatly troubled, when suddenly a beautiful Lay
filly foal came careering up from a herd of horses in the vicinity,
and gallopping through the lines, halted as if she had reached
her goal; and all were struck by the peculiar and brilliant glitter of her glossy yellow coat, and the pride of all her motions,
and the bold tones of her voice; and on seeing her, Theokritos




THE YELLOW HAIRED VIRGIN.             245
the seer cried out to Pelopidas, " Fortunate man, your victim
has arrived, wherefore let us await no other virgin, but thankfully receive the omen and the offering which the gods have given
you." Then they crowned the filly with sacrificial wreaths, and
leading her to the tomb of the virgins, slew her, with votive
prayers, rejoicingly. And the news of Pelopidas, his vision, and
his offering, went abroad through the army; and in the breasts
of all the men was enkindled a confidence that they should gain
that day a mighty victory, by the giving of the gods. And
what such confidence avails an army on the day of battle, when
it is not blindly shared by the generals, to the neglect of discipline or strategetics, every soldier knows. It was this confidence
which rendered the followers of Mahomet invincible, while the
creed was yet young, and the only choice vouchsafed to their
enemies that between the Koran and the sword. It was this,
more than their coats of plate, that rendered Cromwell's ironsides impregnable to the charge of the high-couraged cavaliers.
It was this that carried the veterans of Napoleon unscathed over
half the world, earnest believers in the doctrine of the soldier's
star, "the sun of Austerlitz."  And this confidence it was, in no
small degree, which conduced to this great victory, one of the
most fatal that ever was won from the Lakedaimonians-one of
the most bloody ever gained by Hellenes from Hellenes, in all
the history of Greece.
The field of Leuktra is well marked to the present day, " by a
turnulus and some artificial ground on the summit of the ridge
which borders the southern side of the valley of Thespiai; this
position being exactly in the line between Thespiai and Plataia,
as Strabo intimates Leuktra to have been."*  This isolated ridge
was, beyond doubt, the position of Kleombrotos, and the barrow
or tumulus on its brow is the Polyandrion, or general sepulchre
of the Lakedaimonians who fell in the action. The height, on
* Strabo, p. 414, quoted by Leake, Northern Greece, XIX.




246                   EPAMINONDAS.
which the Thebans were encamped, was evidently a spur of the
ridge of hills forming the southern wall of the valley of the Schoinos, or Kanavari river, which it separates from the plain of Leukcra, on which the battle was fought, and containing, some four
miles to the northward, between itself and the river, the strong
position of Graias-stethos, already mentioned. On the southern
declivity of this slope, and to the eastward, probably, of Kleombrotos' camp, as so interposing between him and Thebes, lay
Epaminondas, awaiting eagerly an opportunity to deliver battle.
The plain between these ridges does not exceed a mile in width
from north to south, except at the eastern end, where there occurs a
gap between the ridge of Leuktra and the foot of the downs, on
the summit of which stands the city of Thebes, by which it
extends southerly nearly thrice that distance, to the upper waters
of the Asopos, or Vurienda; and by these alone it is divided from
the Plataiis-the scene of that other yet more memorable battle,
of Plataia, whereby Pausanias decided, for the last time on the
soil of Greece, the question of Hellenik or Persian superiority in
arms-fiom  east to west it runs nearly five miles, and is an
admirably chosen spot for a pitched battle, since the face of the
country is perfectly open, without rock, wood, or water, to
impede the shock of combatants, and the hills are wide sheepwalks to the top, of no very great altitude-that of Leuktra more
especially-and perfectly adapted to military movements, though
perhaps scarcely accessible to charging cavalry.
So soon, therefore, as Epaminondas saw Kleombrotos preparing to descend into the plain, as if to offer battle, he advanced
with alacrity, and met him half way, confident in the spirit of
his men, and relying much on the undeniable superiority of his
Theban and Thessalian horse.
Epaminondas, however, was not the man to rest content with
such advantage, or to neglect any precaution which might
ensure the victory against an enemy so formidable as a Lake



TIHE OBLIQUE FORMATION.             247
daimonian army, numbering in their ranks no less than seven
hundred Spartans; he therefore devised a new and excellent
scheme of tactics,* says Diodoros, and won through his own
peculiar strategy that very famous battle.  This scheme of
tactics, which is no other than the celebrated oblique formation,
of which, before this day, no trace is to be discovered in history,
was unquestionably the invention of Epaminondas; that unrivalled Greek commander, whom Plutarch from some favoritism,
the cause of which has escaped us, describes as second in military
genius to Pelopidas, at best but a brilliant and daring subaltern,
and whose splendid achievements Xenophon in his affection for
Agesilaos, and his admiration of the Spartans, has related with
such brevity and. lack of detail, that in his conqueror of Leuktra
and Mantineia, we recognise anything rather than the originator
of a new military system, which has endured to this day still
unaltered and unimproved, to which one of the greatest judges
of the art of modern warfare, Frederick the Great of Prussia,
was so much attached that he considered it irresistible, being
wont to say, after his splendid victories, that he had only been
fighting over again Epaminondas' battle of Leuktra; a system
which, if adhered to by the Duke of Brunswick, as he at first
intended, would almost certainly have converted the doubtful
cannonade of Valmy into a French disaster; which, if adopted
on the heights of Landgraefenberg, might have given a different
result, despite the colossal genius and wonderful resources of
Napoleon, to the dreadful field of Jena.
On the fifth day of the month Hecatomboion, in the second
year of the one hundred and second Olympiad, corresponding
nearly to  the  twentieth of July, B. C. 371, Kleombrotos
descended into the plain with his cavalry in front of his hoplitai,
who were drawn up in line, each enomoty having three shields
* Diod. Sic. xv. 55.




248                  EPAMINONDAS.
in rank and twelve in file, the king himself having command
with the Spartans about his person, on the right wing.
Perceiving this disposition, and knowing, from the immovable
valor and perduracy of a Lakedaimonian army, that a general
attack along the front would only lead to a measuring of personal strength between the files opposed to each other, and
would probably result in the defeat of his own men as numerically much the inferior body, Epaminondas formed his men on an
entirely new principle. Selecting all his best warriors, and especially his best file-leaders, he drew them  to the extreme left,
where he arranged them-considerablyin advance of the centre
and right, which he purposely withdrew-under his own command, no less than fifty shields in depth, intending by this extraordinary weight of his column, to bear down and cut in two the
Lakedaimonian right, and to crush at a blow the king himself
and his hitherto unconquerable body-guard of Spartans. His
own right and centre were drawn up in much shallower order,
probably not exceeding the usual depth of eight shields, for it
was his object, if possible, to induce the enemy to extend their
own left unduly, and being actually inferior in numbers, while
he had reduced his general strength yet farther by the extraordinary concentration of his masses on the left, he was obliged
to make his right shallow, even to feebleness, in order to keep up
the semblance of an even front. The details which have come
down to us of this action are, as I have observed, but brief and
indistinct, yet it appears from Plutarch's statemQnt, who gives
the whole glory of this battle to Pelopidas, even while he ascribes
the oblique formation, the value of which he did not comprehend,
to Epaminondas, that the general had strengthened his centre, so
as in some degree to compensate for its numerical weakness, by
the three hundred known as the sacred band, who were never
beaten until they fell to a man with all their wounds in front
* Plut. Vit. Pelop. 23.




THE SACRED BAND.                 249
"on that dishonest field of Chaironeia, fatal to liberty," and lay
as they fell
"With their backs to the field and their feet to the foe,
And leaving in battle no blot on their name,
Looked proudly to heaven from the death-bed of fame."
But that day of disaster had not yet arrived; and in this
furious hand to hand encounter, they with their gallant leader
did their duty well, and merited so much of the honors of the
victory as belongs of right to those who are intrusted with an
office of the highest faith and moment, and who do not disappoint the trust reposed in them-they were, in fact, as the
strong hands which execute that which the wiser head has
planned; and, although they have every right to share, have
none to claim, much less to monopolize, the honors of a victory,
which, but for the strange and new formation in which they
fought, must almost to a certainty have been a terrible defeat.
From that day forth, this oblique method was the constant, and
almost constantly successful array and order of the Thebans,
until at Chaironeia it was turned against themselves by Philip
of Makedon to their total discomfiture, and thenceforward was
one of the favorite manceuvres of his heroic son Alexander.
To return to the battle before us, however; no sooner were
the two armies in the plain, the Thebans with their left advanced
so as almost to feel the enemy's right, while their own right was
so far retired as to be very distant from the Lakedaimonian left
the cavalry trumpets sounded, and the horse on both sides
encountered between the main bodies in full career.
At this period the Theban cavalry was in admirable condition,
on account of the wars which they had been so long carrying on
against Thespiai and Orchomenos, as well as the auxiliary Thessalian horse of Jason, which were the most celebrated of all the
Greek cavaliers. The Lakedaimonians were at this time, and




2 50                   EPAAMITONNDAS.
indeed generally, if not always, miserably deficient in this arm
of the service; for none but the richest men of the state kept
horses, and these did not serve on horseback, but when the
troops were called out, a certain number were allotted to this
service, and arms and horses were assigned to them; so that
neither the- riders were accustomed to their chargers, nor the
chargers to their riders, which is of all things the sine qud
non to the efficiency of a cavalry force; while the possibility
of drill or discipline was entirely out of the question, if indeed
these were ever insisted upon, which appears to me very doubtful, by the Hellenic nations, among whom —previously, at least,
to the age of Alexander and Philopoimen, both of whom made
great use of their cavalry-this arm  was exceedingly weak and
inefficient. In addition to all these disadvantages, it may be
added, that in the Lakedaimonian armies, the choicest of the
levies being reserved for the ranks of the hoplitai, the weakest
and least spirited of the soldiery were mounted on those chanceselected horses, and served as troopers.*  The consequence of
this difference in the nature of their cavalry services, was the
almost instantaneous defeat and scattering of the Lakedaimonian
horse before the Thebans, and their falling back into the lines of
their own hoplitai, which they threw somewhat into disorder
before the encounter of the main battles. This must have
occurred, I imagine, toward the Theban right, where the interval was the widest between the opposing armies, and the space
between the hills the narrowest. For since the signal for the
onset of the infantry seems to have been given as soon as the
cavalry were no longer interposed, if the Spartan right, which
first came into contact with the Boiotians, had been much
shaken-as they must have been, had their broken horse disordered them in that quarter-they could never have made such
a resistance as they did to the terrible onset of Epaminondas,
* Xen. Hellen. VI., iv. 11.




AFFAIR OF CAVALRY.                  251
with his column of fifty shields. The cavalry on both sides,
therefore, of which we hear no more during the action-as is by no
means unusual in narratives of ancient battles-must have swept
away, I conjecture, the Lakedaimonians in full flight, and the
Thebans in reckless and inconsiderate pursuit, down the plain
toward Thespiai eastward, and no portion of either, it is probable, re-appeared on the field until the victory was decided.
In no respect, indeed, do the ancients appear to have been so
far inferior to the moderns —nay, but even the Greeks to the
Orientals-as in their ignorance of the true use of cavalry and
of its proper tactics. In nine cases out of ten, there were in
every general battle two several independent actions-one of the
horse, which had for the most part no influence on the result of
the whole, and one of the infantry, which was decisive.  The
battle of Delion was indeed won by Pagondas, who brought up
reserves of cavalry which deterred the Athenians from prosecuting
a half-won victory, and ultimately converted it into a defeat;
but even this appears to have been the result of chance rather
than of design, and it has scarcely a parallel in the annals of
ancient warfare, until the days of Alexander in Greece and Hannibal in Italy, with both of whom horse was a favorite and effective arm.
The holding a reserve of horse in hand, whether to complete
an impression made on an enemy's battle, to turn his undefended
flank, to surround and charge his rear, or to cover the retreat of
its own infantry, was a thing, it would seem, never thought of.
Horse, indeed, rarely charged home at all, merely skirmishing as
javelineers;* and it is very doubtful to me, whether they were
ever trained to come in all abreast with an even front; whether
they had any regular number of files or order of working; and
whether they were aware of the most obvious rules of cavalry
exercise, such as the leading of the charge at the pace of the
* Xen. de Re Equestri, passim.




252                   EPAMINONDAS.
slowest horse, the never suffering themselves to be charged
except in the act of charging, and the like —now axioms understood by the dullest subaltern of the worst horse service in the
world. At least it is certain that Xenophon in his elaborate treatises on horsemanship and cavalry service, hints at nothing of the
kind, but directs all his precepts toward the making of individual
or partizan troopers.
To compensate for this, their infantry tactics were almost perfect-perhaps, as regards troops fighting entirely with the standing pike and sword, and using no missiles except as a distinct
arm of service never employed in the actual crisis-actually so.
Nor was this ever more distinctly shown than in the present
instance, for the Lakedaimonians exceeded the Thebans by nearly
one half in numbers, and I presume nearly as much in individual
strength and prowess; for their very best men fought here, and
man to man, Spartans appear to the last to have been all but
invincible.
So soon as the trumpets sounded, the Lakedaimonians led
forth at charging pace along the whole front; their left hurrying
their advance, in order to close with the Theban right, which
rather fell back than advanced, though still preserving their connection with the left, which met the Spartan right with levelled
pikes and their battle cry, at a full run. There the battle raged
fiercely, hand to hand, and was for a long time stationary, since
there Epaminondas met the chosen Spartans, with Deinon, Sphodrias, and Kleombrotos their king, who would not yield a step,
nor turn, but sustained the shock of his deep column with their
synaspismos of linked shields, until their spears were broken,
and it came to the closest single combat, with their short stabbing swords. In the meantime their left, which had been disordered somewhat by its own flying horse, and shaken by the
rapidity of its own advance, endeavored to extend still farther to
the left, in order to outflank and surround the Theban right,




INFANTRY FIGHT AT LEUKTRA.              253
with which it was not yet fairly engaged. All manoeuvring with
so heavy and unwieldy a body as the phalanx, in the face of an
enemy, was difficult; and if attacked when in the act of deploying or changing its front, that array, at other times so formidable, was the most defenceless and helpless of masses; and at precisely such a moment, and in the middle of such a movement,
Pelopidas rushed headlong with his three hundred of the sacred
band, serried in the closest combination, upon their centre, giving
them time neither to extend as they desired, nor to contract their
files in order to meet his shock, so that they wavered visibly,
and though they still fought stoutly, were momentarily falling
into confusion.
By this time, however, the extraordinary depth, and consequent weight and impetus, of the terrible column of Epaminondas began to tell; the pressure of the rearmost files bearing the
foremost bodily onward, and if the front men fell, others succeeding to their places, almost as it seemed ad infinitum. And now
Sphodrias was down, and Deinon; and Kleombrotos had fallen,
fighting worthily of his Herakleidan blood, and all the adjutants
and four hundred of the seven hundred Spartans; and as the head
of the assailing column met less resistance, it fell in with wilder
shouts and a more fiery impetus, and broke the Spartan right
into shattered and defenceless fragments, outflanking it, moreover, and thereby turning the right of the whole array.  But no
sooner did the Lakedaimonian centre, already shaken, and their
left, which had scarcely felt the enemy, see the defeat of their
right wing, than they turned also; and the forces opposed to
them assuming the offensive, no time was given them to rally,
and the confusion and route became general along the whole
front; except where in a knot the surviving Spartans fought so
desperately around the body of their king, that Epaminondas
judged it wiser to suffer them to withdraw it, as their point of
honor, than to risk a renewal of the action with an enemy ever




254                    EPAMINONDAS.
formidable, now rendered desperate.  The loss of the Lakedaimonians was prodigious, considering that there was no long
flight, or fierce pursuit, with execution of the flying —no onslaught
of horse, plying them with their bloody sabres, but only a short
stern retreat, up tile height on which they had encamped, until
they had crossed the ditch which guarded their camp, when they
faced about with presented arms and serried shields; and even
held debate among themselves, whether they should not rather
risk a second conflict than suffer the Thebans to erect a trophy,
so high and valorous were their yet unbroken spirits.
Prudent councils, however, prevailed; for above a thousand
Lakedaimonians, four hundred of whom were Spartans,* lay dead
on the plain below them, without enumerating the slain of the
light troops, who were not included in the order of battle, or
those, I presume, of the allies, who are said to have been greatly
dispirited by the action. Diodoros states the whole loss of the Lakedaimonians at four thousand, and that of the Boiotians at about
three hundred; but these numbers cannot be exactly relied on,
although if the light-armed Helots and the allies be included, the
number cannot be regarded as excessive as compared to the loss
of the native hoplitai. At all events, it was the severest defeat
ever as yet inflicted by one Hellenic nation on another, and
the most notable victory won by Greeks from  Greeks.  The
Thebans restored the Lakedaimonian dead under treaty, who
were buried in the polyandrion mentioned above, as still visible
on the heights of Leuktra, and permitted them  to retire peacefully homeward. But they, trusting to secrecy and promptitude,
rather than to the faith of treaties, for their safety, marched that
same night through the passes of the Kithairon to Kreusis, and
thence to the fortress of Aigosthena, in the Megaris, along the
* I am clear that this is the meaning of the text-Xen. Hellen. VI., iv.
I5-although Mitford understands it to mean a thousand and four hundred; Plutarch agrees w.ith this view. Vit. Ages. XXVII.




RETREAT OF THE SPARTANS.              255
same wild and perilous path over the southern cliffs of Mount
Elateia, above the Korinthian Gulf, in which Kleombrotos had
suffered so severely from a tempest seven years before the battle
which put an end to his career. His death was that of a hero,
and sufficiently disproved the charges which had been unjustly
brought against him of personal cowardice, or of disaffection to
his country.  It was moral decision, not individual valor, that he
lacked; and if he failed in generalship against Epaminondas, it
were a reproach to few tacticians who have ever lived, to say. of any
one of them that, so matched, he was* imrpar congressus Achilli.
Immediately after the battle, a herald was sent crowned with
bays to Athens, to demand the aid of the people and announce
the result of the action, but he was very coldly received and dismissed without a reply, in regard to the assistance requested, so
that it was evident that they had no friendship to expect in that
quarter. The Lakedaimonians having escaped unmolested into
the Megaris encountered there the  powerful reinforcements
sent from Sparta, under Archidamos the son of Agesilaos; but
not feeling themselves equal to any farther operations, re-entered
the isthmus, dismissed their allies, and returned to Sparta, never
again to recover from the moral consequences of that overwhelming defeat, or to recover their station among the Hellenic nations,
although they still made a stout struggle for pre-eminence, and
long maintained their independence. Without losing a moment's
time or suffering the prestige of victory to pass into oblivion, the
Thebans took possession of Orchomenos, the inhabitants of which
they were half disposed to sell as slaves until persuaded to milder
counsels by Epaminondas, and made preparations to prosecute the
war within the isthmus, having been-joined by the Phokians,
Aitolians and Arkadians, who had recently defeated the Spartans
under the walls of the Mantineian Orchomenos. In the following
* A proverbial phrase of any one overmatched, taken from the corn
bat of Hector with Achilles, in the Iliad.




256                   EPAMINONDIAS.
year, Eparninondas entered the isthmus with no less than fifty
thousand men, and burst into the Peloponnesos in four several
columns of attack, devastating the country of their enemies in all
directions, having appointed a general rendezvous at Sellasia a
city of Lakonia, northeast of Sparta,* situate in a valley between
two hills, known as Euas and Olympos, commanding the road
down the valley of the Oinous, running direct to Sparta.  At
this town they all arrived in due season, having met with little
opposition except that offered to the division of Arkadians by
Ischolas, who rather chose to die like a second Leonidas in defence of the post entrusted to him, than to return dishonored
home. Thence they entered Lakonia, cutting down all the fruit
trees, burning the country far and wide, driving the cattle and
destroying the crops up to the very suburbs of Sparta, whose
boast it had always been that her women had never seen the smoke
of a hostile fire, and that no enemy had ever been beaten back
*from her unwalled and unfortified metropolis.  Now, however,
her boast stood as nought, for not only were the flames of conflagration seen reddening the horizon in every quarter, but the
enemy with Epaminondas at their head were in full view endeavoring to ford the snow-swollen torrent of the Eurotas;and
they came so near to taking the city, that a revolution was attempted within the place itself, afid the cries of frantic women
and all the tumult and terror prevailed, which is wont to occur in
a town won by storm. In the end, however, the allies were
roughly repulsed, and did not judge it expedient to renew the
attack, but retired leisurely with an enormous booty into Arkadia, where Epaminondas restored the state and city of Messenia,
which had been destroyed, and its people dispersed by the Lakedlaimonians above two centuries before-a stroke of masterly
policy by which he planted a perpetual thorn in the side of
Sparta, thus establishing a domestic enemy, as it were, close to
* Polyb. Bellum Cleom. II. 65-8.




THE PELOPONNESES AGAIN INVADED.           25'7
her very confines-this restoration occurred in the fourth year of
the one hundred and second Olympiad B. C., and was celebrated
with great solemnity, and the performance of sacred games.
This done Epaminondas drew off his forces and returned into
Boiotia, having inflicted the severest blow on Sparta that had
ever yet befallen her; and having been brought to trial for retaining his rank of Boiotarch, in defiance of the law, beyond the
expiration of the year to which his rank and military command
were limited, was unanimously acquitted in consideration of his
great services and the obvious necessity of the case.
In the mean time an alliance offensive and defensive having
been entered into by the Athenians and Lakedaimonians, to the
detriment of Elis, Argos and Arkadia, those nations solicited the
aid of the Boiotians, who again took the field, when they found
the isthmus fortified by a great trench and palisade from Kenchreai on the Gulf of Eghina, to Lechaion on the Gulf of Korinth,
and defended by three times their own force of Peloponnesians,
with their Attic and insular allies. In spite of this, after reconnoitering the works carefully, Epaminondas assailed the Lakedaimonian defences, which were the weakest, cut their guards to
pieces, and, breaking through the lines, again entered the Peloponnesos, having thus accomplished an exploit inferior to none
of his previous victories. On this occasion he was not, however,
so successful as before; for, although he took Sikyon and Phlius,
he suffered a heavy repulse fiom the walls of Korinth, at the
hands of Chabrias, who defended it masterly with a garrison of
Athenians; and a peace being again negociated by Artoxerxesto
be general through all the states of Greece, except the Thebans
only, he again returned home as rich as ever in military glory,
but with no trophies or spoils of victory to display before his
countrymen.
In consequence of this he fell, incomparable soldier as he was,
unsurpassed by any then alive, into disgrace with his fellow12




258                   EPAMIN-ONDAS.
citizens, was deposed from his command and sentenced to serve
as a private soldier, under Pelopidas and Ismenias his colleague,
in an expedition into Thessaly against Alexander of Pherai, and
well for them it was that he served in any capacity. For the
army being forced to retreat, and reduced to the greatest ex'
tremities by the superior cavalry of the Thessalians, he was reinstated in his command by the unanimous voice of his soldiers,
and reconstructing his rear guard, beat back the pursuers with
loss, and brought off his own power scatheless.
His return was followed by his immediate reappointment to
command, and the infliction of a heavy fine on the other Boiotarchai, so entirely futile are all Plutarch's efforts to make him
out inferior to Pelopidas, who, however excellent an officer he
might be as second in command, never evinced any genifis as a
leader, which should constitute him even a general of the second
or third order: while Epaminondas is allowed by such critics as
Frederick the Great and Napoleon, to have been a genius of firstrate splendor, and surpassed by no one, perhaps of any day, in
— what both those giants in military science esteemed the
greatest principle of war-the concentration of the greatest
possible force, on a single point, in the smallest possible available
compass.
Not long after this, in the third year of the one hundred and
third Olympiad, in the Archonship of Kephisodoro%, peace was
at length established between Thebes and Sparta through the
intervention, now for the third time of the Persian Artoxerxes;
and a general peace prevailed for a few months throughout all
Greece, from North to South, and fiom sea to sea, until in the
course of the year next succeeding difficulties arising between
Elis and Arkadia, paved the way for a fresh war in Greece.  In
the following summer worse troubles broke out between Elis and
Pisa, concerning the Olympian games. Thebes, at the instigation
of Epaminondas, turned her attention to gaining predominance




FORTUNE IN WAR.                  259
by sea as well as by land, inflicted severe chastisement on the
city of Orchomenos, which had rebelled from her authority, and
utterly defeated Alexander, the tyrant of Pherai, though with
the heavy loss of a good patriot and gallant soldier, Pelopidas,
who died in the arms of victory.
But now the difficulty between Elis and Pisa inflamed all the
elements of hostility, and involved Greece anew in a general and
destructive war; for all sides armed at once, the people of Tegea
and those of Mantineia, both Arkadian cities, acting as principals,
the Boiotians assuming the alliance of the former, and the Lakedaimonians and Athenians of the latter city. Agesilaos with the
Spartans being nearest to the scene of action, was necessarily the
first in the field, and marching without a moment's delay, was
engaged in the devastation of the territories of Tegea, when Epaminondas entering the isthmus with the whole available force of
the Boiotians and many Euboian and Thessalian auxiliaries rallied
to his standard, met within the Peloponnesos, the Argive, Messenian, and Arkadian allies of the Tegeatans. Here he learned that
the Athenians had decided to send no troops overland, but by
sea to Lakedaimon, and thence to send succor to the Arkadians,
and that Agesilaos was in force in the neighborhood of
Mantineia; and on this intelligence he caused his men to rest in
their camps under the walls of Tegea* and then led directly, by
forced marches, upon Sparta. And here it is seen at once, how
much fortune has to do at all times in the affairs of war, and how
little without her can be effected by the most consummate skill,
prudence, and valor. Napier observes in his great work on the
Peninsular war, the finest military history in existence, that the
discovery of an unsuspected ditch, ten feet in width, has been
known to prostrate the most scientific combinations, and overthrow the most perfect calculations; and in this instance the casual
speed of a Kretan hemerodromos, or all-day runner, saved
* Xen. Hellen. vii. v.




260                   EPAMINONDAS.
Sparta; for Agesilaos warned the citizens by a horse-courier, that
they should stand resolutely to their arms, for he would be with
them not long behind the Thebans. And in fact he entered the
city almost at the same instant from one quarter, that Epaminondas forded the Eurotas, and assaulted it on the other. The
fight in the avenues and about the suburbs of the town was long
and desperate; but the Spartans were doing battle for all that is
dear to man, within the sight of their women and their children,
around the hearths where even themselves had played when
babes, among the graves of their fathers, before the temples of
the Gods, and they were invincible. The feats of Archidamos,
and of Isadas* the son of Phoibidas, who rushing from the baths
with a spear suddenly caught up in one hand, and a sword in
the other, fought in the -fiont ranks, naked as he was, until the
enemy retired, wounding and slaying many, but himself unwounded-must be read elsewhere, for my limits forbid that I
should dwell on them.
After a furious conflict Epaminondas drew off his troops,
leaving it to Agesilaos to erect a trophy, for it was not in his
fortune or his fate to carry Sparta with the sword, though to him
alone of living men it had been given twice to devastate Lakonia
up to the very suburbs, twice to pass the Eurotas, and listen to
the panic-stricken women, wailing through the city. It was his
fortune alone that failed him; for even Xenophon, who gives him
no undeserved or lavish praise, admits that, but for the speed of
the Kretan runner, which was so extraordinary, that he ascribes
it to divine intervention, he must have taken Sparta like a young
bird in its nest, deserted of all who could defend it.
In no wise daunted, however, or disheartened by the failure
of operations on which he had, and that of right, counted as
almost certain, he retraced his steps with a celerity and decision
so marvellous, that they remind us of the prodigious marches and
* Plutarch, Agesilaos, 42.




BATTLE OF MANTINEIA.                261
countermarches, and thunderstrokes dealt in every direction,
of Napoleon during his Dresden campaign, and that final struggle in the heart of France. Fixing his head-quarters once more
at Tegea he at once launched his cavalry against Mantineia,
which he calculated on finding, as it indeed was, deserted by its
defenders, who had marched with every man that they could
mfster to the rescue of Sparta. This blow again like the last
appeared certain; and like that was defeated by an accident, for
the Athenian horse had just come up from the isthmus as the
Thebans entered the plain of Mantineia, and charging instantly
preserved the territory of their allies from devastation, if not
their city itself fiom capture. The loss was great on both sides,
for they fought sharply hand to hand, and in so close a melee
that there was no weapon so short that it was not used on either
side. And the Athenians lost none of their own dead, but permitted the burial of the enemy's under a flag of truce.
But Epaminondas angry at the two repulses he had met resolved to deliver battle; and, having enrolled a thousand Arkadian clubmen he caused his cavalry to burnish their helmets, and
all to grind their spear heads and sword blades, and furbish up
their shields in readiness for instant action.
The scene was a plain at about thirty stadia, or four English
miles' distance from Mantineia.
The action as usual commenced by a charge of the cavalry on
each side, which was mutually arrayed on either wing of the
hosts, the Thebans as usual holding the left wing of their own
army opposite the Mantineians on the enemy's right supported
by the Lakedaimonians, Eleans and Argives, with the Athenians
on their extreme left.
In the cavalry skirmish, the Theban horse, who were mixed
with a powerful body of Thessalian slingers and engineers, easily
broke the Athenians, who all fled together to the left of their
own infantry, without disordering it; but speedily rallying, fell




262                  EPAMINONDAS.
violently on the Euboians, who had been sent with a body of
mercenaries to occupy certain heights in that direction, and cut
them off to a man. The victorious Thebans did not pursue the
fugitives, but charged home on the flank of the Athenian foot,
striving desperately to break into their phalanx, and had already
thrown them into confusion, when the commander of the Elean
horse, who had been placed in reserve with the rear-guard,
charged in turn, and repulsing the Boiotians, restored the battle
in this quarter.
And this, in my judgment, is the best, or rather the only good
cavalry fighting that occurred during the Peloponnesian war;
for in this instance they had evidently the true aim and object
of war in view, beyond the mere breaking and chasing off the
ground the horse directly opposed to them.
On the left wing the action was more decisive, for the superiority of the Theban and Thessalian squadrons was so manifest,
that the Mantineian troopers were driven almost immediately,
for shelter, to the rear of their phalanx. Then, with a mighty
shout, the two main bodies charged along the whole front, and
never, says Diodoros,* where Greeks met Greeks, were there such
equal numbers opposed face to face on one field; nor ever were such
leaders mated in renown and worth; nor ever were such soldiers
set together. And where the Lakedaimonians and Boiotians came
together, no man spared his own life, so he might take his enemy's; and first they thrust and strove at push of pike till thei'
shafts were broken, and then fought it out with their swords and
cutlasses, until their bodies were exhausted with wounds and
loss of blood, but their spirits were inexhaustible. The battle
long hung balanced thus, the whole air ringing with the clash
and clang of blades on shield and helmet, for the combatants
lacked breath to shout withal; when, seeing that the moment had
arrived, Epaminondas, with his favorite tactic, obliqued from the
* Diod. Sic. XV., 86




DEATH OF EPAMINONDAS.               263
left wing in deep and serried column, full upon the Lakedaimonian centre, and cut the phalanx in two on the instant; for even
the Spartans could not endure the weight of that tremendous
concentrated charge, but retreated in confusion, with the Boiotians pressing on their rear, and slaughtering them in heaps.
At this moment a rush was made against Epaminondas by some
of the bravest of the Spartans, who rallied and set upon him all
at once; so that after a vigorous and heroical defence, one
against many, he was struck down with a mortal lance-thrust
through his corslet, from the hand, it is said, of Gryllos, the son
of Xenophon, though it is by no means evident what he should
be doing in the ranks of the Spartans, when his own countrymen
were engaged in a different part of the field. Over his body the
conflict again raged fierce and furious, but the Thebans, at length
and with difficulty, prevailed, by dint of bodily strength alone,
and having chased them  a little way, returned sad and tearful,
from their disastrous victory, to tend the body of their illustrious
dead. The victory was in itself complete, yet it was unimproved,
and followed up neither with carnage of the enemy nor advantage to themselves-for they had no general left who could
pursue it, as he would have done, who had fallen in the arms of
immortal glory.
He had fallen childless, it is true, as his weeping comrades
exclaimed in their sorrow, but leaving behind him, as he cried
himself, with his parting breath, two daughters to immortalize
his memory-his twin victories at Leuktra and Mantineia.
And they did immortalize him, for to this day they survive,
two of the most purely scientific battles ever won, and won by
superior tactics only.
His greatest praise rests on the facts, that the state, Lakedaimonia, against which his greatest efforts were directed, never
recovered the pride of place from which he struck her down,
when at her topmost pitch; and that his native country, which,




264                    EPAMINONDAS.
with his rise, rose from obscurity, sunk into it again at his
decease, never to shine again among nations. To add weight to
the judgment of the critics I have quoted on his strategy or tactics, were impertinent as absurd; but were I to assign a place to
Epaminondas among generals, it would be-as to an originator
of a great system, ever opposed to the best troops in the then
known world, and never beaten by them in the field-above
Pausanias, above Alexander, above Scipio, above Julius Caesar,
above even Xenophon, and inferior only, of all masters in the art
of war, to Hannibal, Wellington, and Napoleon, who are in my
estimation the first men of the first class, unapproached, if not
unapproachable.
As a man and as a patriot he was not to be excelled; for in
either quality his character was as pure, as disinterested, and as
spotless, as that of Washington himself.
Happy the state which can boast the production of an Epaminondas; and the possession of such a general as he, such a
poet as Pindar, may well compensate for greater dulness of
intellect than their enemies were wont to attribute to the breather
of the fat atmosphere of Boiotia.




VII.
ALEXANDER OF MAKEDON.
HIS BATTLES OF THE GRANIKOS, ISSOS, AND ARBELA; HIS CA]IPAIGNS, CHARACTER, AND CONDUCT.
THREE years only, after the battle of Mantineia, which put an
end for ever to the supremacy of Sparta, and left Thebes the
principal of the Hellenic cities, Philip, the son of Amyntas,
succeeded to the throne of Makedonia, a& vast district in the
northern part of Greece, beyond the mountain chain of Oita,
which, up to this period, had hardly been admitted by the pure
Hellenes to be a Hellenic state, but had rather been considered,
with the adjoining countries of Thessalia, Aitolia, Epiros, and
more particularly Thrake, as semi-barbarous.
The kings of Makedonia, however, had, from the beginning,
claimed descent from the heroic princes of the purest Hellenic
blood; had been acknowledged as heirs of the Peleidan branch
of the great Aiakidai, through Neoptolemos, the son of Achilles;
and, till a very late day, they retained in their family the ancestral names of their race. From time almost immemorial, these
princes had ruled with nearly absolute sway over the pastoral
and hunter tribes who peopled their extensive plains, and who,
to the days of which I write, had learned none of those democratic ideas, had acquired none of that thirst for freedom and
jealousy of individual authority, which were the most striking
12




266               ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
characteristics of the southern Greeks. They maintained their
courts with a sort of semi-barbarous pomp, not differing much,
except that the heroic simplicity was gone, from the style of
which we read in Homer; their government and many of their
habits, that of polygamy especially, still savored strongly of patriarchal times, and were preserved long after they came to be considered pure Greeks, and were indeed the only independent
sovereigns left in Hellas.
Hitherto they and their neighbors had meddled little with the
affairs of southern or republican Greece; by whom, indeed, they
were so nearly ignored, that, until the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, we scarcely find them mentioned in the page of
history.
The time had now arrived, and the man, when and by whom
they were to be brought into notice, and, in an incredibly short
space of time-with little warfare, little bloodshedding, and one
great battle only-to be placed at the helm of affairs in Greece;
no part of which should ever be again, save nominally, independent.  Of a truth, he was a very great man, this semi-barbarous
Philip, son of Amyntas; a greater man by far, in my estimation,
than his more famous son Alexander, and worthy of a place in
this work, except that, like several others similarly omitted, I
regard him rather as a statesman than a general; and in that
light shall probably treat of him hereafter. He was a very great
man, I say, and, with some vicious habits, which point particularly to the barbarian, and which Alexander shared with him, I
allude chiefly to habitual excess in wine and fierce orgies of
drunkenness-never a Greek, or indeed a southern, vice-he possessed many great qualities, far less apparent in the more showy
but less solid character of his son; such as natural love of justice,
constitutional dislike to bloodshedding, and willingness to hear
even unpalatable truths, which, when added to his extraordinary
political sagacity and great military shrewdness, eminently




HIS YOUTH.                     26 7
adapted him for the part he was destined to play, as the consolidator of an empire, and the pacificator of all Greece.
In the first year of the one hundred and fourth Olympiad,
B. C. 360, he ascended the throne of Makedon; and, in four
years afterward, there was born to him at the city of Pella in
Thessaly-already famous as the birth-place of Achilles-of
Olympias, his first wife, and daughter of Neoptolemos king of
Epiros, Alexander, thereafter called the Great.
Of his youth and childhood I shall say nothing, as my portion
of him is his military conduct and career; and as I never have
believed that prodigious children necessarily make great men, or
that great men were of necessity once prodigious children; but
for those who adhere to such time-honored rubbish with the
reverence ever attributed to nursery tales, I will indicate his life
by good gossipping old Plutarch, who will sup them to satiety
on anecdotes of his precocious growth and premature development.
All that it imports us to know, is, that he grew up much as
any absolute young prince, under the care of an arrogant, masculine, imperious mother, and the tuition of an obsequious, adulating pedagogue, indulged in every whim, and taught all things
save obedience, either to God or man, would naturally grow up;
imperious, arrogant, self-willed, capricious; vain; impotent to
restrain his passions, yet full of a fickle nobleness and fantastic
generosity.  Brave and high-spirited, he was by nature, even to
excess; good-natured and merciful, when not crossed-for then
he was a madman-and always liable to ingenuous and noble
impulses, which never, unfortunately for his friends and himself,
hardened into permanent impressions.
All that was good in him came of God's giving; all that was
bad, of man's teaching. For it is probable that he never was
instructed to question one impulse, to curb one emotion, to refrain
from one action; and I seriously d -ubt whether, from the filst




268               ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
day of his public career to the last of his life, he ever controlled
one passion, resisted one temptation, considered the consequences
of one action, or withheld his hand from the doing of one deed,
once meditated, how bitterly soever he afterward might rue the
doing of it.
When he was eighteen years of age, he first appears on the
stage of public life at the battle of Chaironeia-three years older
than Edward the Black Prince, when he won his spurs at Cressy;
three younger than William Pitt, when he accepted the reins of
government as prime minister of England. Nothing as yet,
one may say, wonderful or premature; but not say so long;
for thenceforth he blazed out into a sudden and splendid
manhood.
Previously to this celebrated action, by a rare union of diplomatic sagacity and craft, with civil audacity and military skill,
Philip had made himself master of Epiros, Thessaly, and all
Thrake up to the Hellespont, as a tributary province; by mingling himself adroitly with the sacred war, he had annexed Phokis to his government, and had procured himself to be nominated
general-in-chief of the Greeks, in the war undertaken to avenge
the spoliation of Delphoi. This conflict having terminated in a
general Hellenic peace, Philip suddenly broke it by declaring
war on the Athenians, with scarce a pretext beyond the manifest cravings of his ambition for universal Greek dominion, which
Athens had constantly and consistently resisted. Athens called
upon Thebes for aid; and, once more for the last time, the two
ancient enemies stood in the field, not now front to front, but
shoulder to shoulder; contending not now for power or pride of
dominion, but for their common liberty and independence stood
as allies on the field of Chaironcia. But Iphikrates was no
more, nor Chabrias, nor Timotheos; and only Chares the Athenian* was alive, superior in no respect of strategetic energy or
* Diod. Sic. XVI., 85.




CHAIRONEIA.                    269
counsel, to any of the private soldiers he commanded; and he
led them-to slaughter.
Of Epaminondas, the great name alone survived; the tactics,
by which he had so often conquered, had fallen into disuse, or,
worse yet! had been adopted by the enemy; the veterans, whom
he had taught to regard battle and victory as the same, slept with
him the last cold sleep of oblivion. Of Pelopidas remained the
memory-remained the Sacred Band, which he had instituted,
and which alone did its duty on the day of "that dishonest
victory."
In everything Philip was the superior, in strategy, in numbers,
in the quality of his troops, and in the confidence, which, most of
all things, tends to victory. In the action which ensued, he gave
the command of one wing of his army to Alexander, whom he
fortified with his best and oldest generals; and it is said that the
crisis of the battle was his charge upon the sacred band of the
Thebans, every one of whom lay dead where he fell, with his
wounds all in front, worthy to the last of the name they had
won under abler leaders; and in the days of Plutarch* —about
66 A.D., or three hundred years later-the oak-tree was shown
on the banks of the Kephisos, beneath which his tent was pitched
and hard by it, the polyandrion, or general tomb of the Makedonians, who fell in the engagement.
The details of this battle are nowhere very clearly stated, and
even Plutarch gives the facts in relation to his hero as a rumoi
only; but the results prove how decisive was the victory, and
that Alexander did here achieve high Jistinction, may be received
as a historic truth.
In the following year all Greece having sunk into apathy and
virtually submitted itself to his authority after the battle, Philip
met the assembled delegates of all the Hellenic states at the
isthmus, where he easily prevailed on them to declare war on Pers.a
* Plut. Vit. ix.




270               ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
under the old pretext of revenging the desecration of the temples
of Greece by the elder Darios, and was forthwith elected the
autocratic general of the forces, in behalf of all iellas. After
this he set on foot great preparations for the invasion of Persia;
appointed to every state the contingent which it should send;
and returned to his own court to complete his armament.
There, surrounded by the din of martial preparation, and by
grand pomps, processions, and games, in honor of the Gods who
had given him what, though really indefinite and susceptible of
two meanings, he chose to accept as a* favorable response from
Delphoi, having already sent forward his lieutenants, Attalus and
Parmenion, with part of his forces, to liberate the Ionian cities
of Asia Minor, he was murdered by one Pausanias, as he
went into the theatre; as some believed at the instigation of his
repudiated wife, Olympias; and not, it is also hinted, without
the connivance of Alexander.
It is pleasant, however, to be able at once to acquit the young
man, and probably his mother also, of all participation in an act
so atrocious, which may be attributed, on the concurrence of all
trustworthy authorities, to private and personal motives on the
part of the murderer, who was slain on the spot by some of the
king's body-guard.
It was toward the latter end, therefore, of the first year of the
hundred and first Olympiad, B. C., 336, that Alexander ascended the throne of his father; but his accession was surround
ed with troubles and difficulties, and his throne was shared by a
hateful participant-Attalos, the brother of Kleiopatra, the young
wife of Philip, in behalf of whom he had repudiated Olympias,
and who, either a few days before, or a few days after, the king's
death-for authorities differ on the point-had borne him a son;
so that, his own mother being repudiated, it was not unlikely that
his succession would be disputed.
* Diod. Sic. XVI. 91.




STATE OF GREECE.                  2f71
Attalos, moreover, was in command of the veteran army sent
into Ionia by the late king; and it. soon became certain that he
had shaken the allegiance of the troops, and was treating with the
Athenians for the restoration of Greek independence-probably
with a view only to his own interest and ambition. In other
parts of Greece, a spirit of revolt was clearly manifest, the states
believing themselves able to vindicate their liberty against a mere
youth, new in office, and unskilled in judgment, and the arts of
government.
The youth speedily undeceived them. In the second year both
of that Olympiad and of his own reign, having taken vengeance
of his father's murderers, he sent one Hekataios, his own confidential friend, with a few trusty soldiers to Asia, with orders
either to bring Attalos, without delay, alive to Makedonia, or to
take him off privately-the latter of which designs was speedily
performed-and the army brought back to loyalty.
That was a bloody and a bad commencement of a reign. The
act was a murder, and the manner of it scarce less exceptionable than the act. Yet it must be observed, in justice to
Alexander, that in semi-barbarous royal families like his, tainted
with all the corruptions of polygamous unions, and haremlike
concubinage, and the co-ordinate curse of spurious relationships
and kindred animosities, fraud and even murder appear almost
of necessity to prevail; and that not to kill is in most cases to
be killed by the heir apparent to the throne. More, therefore, of
this his first crime may be ascribed to the morals, the manners, the
necessities indeed, of his tribe, country, and station, than to any defect in his own temper or character.  And it is very probable, that
neither by himself nor by any one of his confederates was this
deed ever regarded as a crime, but as an act of self-defence, and a
legitimate assertion of just authority. And thus it is, to maintain
true historic justice, that the characters of men must be meted,
weighed, and judged of, by the measures, with the balance, ac



272              ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
cording to the lights, which they had and used, not with others
that they knew not of. Thus, therefore, 1, in this case, would
judge Alexander-almost innocent.
In the meantime the Athenians had heard of Philip's death
with joy, and invited by their great orator and patriot Demosthenes, were ready to deny that they had ever yielded the
supremacy of Greece to Makedon; the Aitolians passed a decree
to recall the exiles of Philip from Akarnania; the Ambrakiots
had cast out the Makedonian garrison; the Thebans had voted
to expel Philip's guards from the Kadmeia; the Arkadians had
never submitted to Philip, nor now submitted to his son; and of
the other Peloponnesians, the Argives, the Eleans, and the Lakedaimonians were all bent on the recovery of their independence,
now that fortune appeared to favor an effort.
Then, at once, Alexander showed both of what race he came,
and of what stuff he was made; for, without giving the revolutionists time to mature their plans, he speedily effected a reconciliation with the Thessalians and Ambrakiots; and then, marching down with his Makedonian troops in full array of battle, entered the pass of Thermopylai, and persuaded the Amphictyonik
council, there in session, to confer on him the leading of the
Greeks by a unanimous vote. Thence he entered Boiotia, and
encamping close to the Kadmeia, held the city of Thebes in
immediate terror of an assault, until the Athenians, perceiving
that their opinion of this young man was entirely contradicted
by the decision, energy, and rapid enterprise, which they now
perceived to be his characteristics, repented of their inconsiderate
haste, and atoned for it by decreeing him General-in-Chief, and
empowering him to make war on the Persians until they should
have made atonement to Greece, for all the wrong they had done
her. Content with this, he led back his power into Makedonia,
and striking without notice or delay at the Thrakian malcontents,
he reduced with unheard of celerity the revolted tribes of




ATTACKS TIIEBES.                 2 73
Paionians, Illyrians, and other barbarians conterminous with
them, to obedience; and, this scarcely accomplished, hearing
that the Thebans were again mutinous and in arms, he bestirred
himself with such rapidity that he actually sat down before the
city, while the inhabitants were beleaguering the Makedonian
garrison in the citadel, or Kadmeia, and before they were aware
that he had a force on foot within the defiles of Thermopylai.
Some of those who had instigated the revolt insisted for a while
that the Makedonian army had come with Antipater, insisting
that Alexander was dead; or, that, if any Alexander were present, it was the son of Abropos, and not the king of Makedon.
On the day following his sudden appearance on the heights
above Onchestos, near the Copaic lake, he descended to the
sacred territory of Iolaos, where he again encamped, willing to
give time to the Thebans to repent of their misdeeds; but so
little desirous were they of conciliating, or even accepting his
clemency, that they sallied with their light troops and cavalry,
and advancing to his outposts, skirmished with themn sharply
and killed several of the Makedonians, until Alexander detached
some targeteers and archery, who easily drove them back to their
gates. Still, however, he would not attack them hastily, for he
preferred conciliating to destroying them; and proceeded leisurely to encamp, a third time, close before the gates leading by
Eleutherai to Athens, in order to be at hand to reinforce the
garrison of the Kadmeia, which was blockaded by the Thebans
with double lines of circum and contra vallation.  But, in spite
of the advice of their wisest and best citizens, the refugees and
others, who believed that no mercy was to be had at the hands
of Alexander, induced the Thebans to march out and offer battle. And even then Alexander would not attack the city; but,
according to Ptolemy* the son of Lagos, Perdikkas, who com* Arrian. Anab. I. viii. Quoted by Arrian, I. viii.




274              AL EXANDER THE GREAT.
manded the advanced guard of the army, not far from the palisades around the Kadmeia, assaulted and tore them up without
awaiting orders, and fell upon the blockading force of the Thebans; being at once supported by Amyntas, the son of Andromenes, who was associated with him in the command of the outposts.  Seeing this, Alexander led out his army to prevent their
being cut off, and ordered the archery and Agrianians to charge
and force their way into the palisades; but held the phalanx of
Aypaspistai, who were afterward called argyrasI;ides or silver
shields, and the foot life-guards, in hand without the works.
Perdikkas, in endeavoring to force the second palisade, fell desperately wounded, and was carried to the rear; but his men
together with the archers forced the Thebans into a hollow way
le ling to the IIerakleion, and drove them up it, in confusion, to
the temple; there, however, they rallied, and facing round with
a great shout, broke the Makedonians in turn, killing Eurybotas, the captain of the Kretan archers, and about seventy of
his men, and drove them back upon the lifeguards and the royal
hypaspistai.  In following up their advantage, however, they
pursued too far, and disordered their own ranks, when Alexander
seizing the occasion, charged with his phalanx, bore the enemy
bodily back into the gates, which they had not time to close,
and entering pell-mell with the fugitives, made himself master
of the Kadmeia at a blow.  The rest of the army perceiving
that the ramparts were scantily defended, owing to the descent
of their forces into the plain, scaled them at all points, and
eushed in from all quarters toward the market-place; while the
garrison of the Kadmeia breaking out at the same moment by
an unguarded postern, after a short resistance at the Ampheion,
completed the confusion of the enemy and the capture of the
city. The Theban cavalry made their escape into the plain how
best they might, and such of the infantry as could follow their
example did so; but on all the rest, without regard to age, sex,




DESTRUCTION OF THEBES.              275
or condition, resistance or submission, execution was dorne mercilessly; not so much by the Makedonian soldiery of Alexander, as
by the Phokians, Plataians, and the other Boiotians, who had the
fury of civil hatred and private vengeance to excite them. All perished by the sword's edge, whom on that day they encountered.
The terror and consternation spread abroad with the tidings
of that terrible disaster and retribution, exceeds all description.
Never before, within the memory of man, within the range of
recorded history, had such a catastrophe, such an overwhelming destruction, befallen any Hellenic city. For the calamities
of the Athenians at Syracuse and at Aigospotamos had befallen
their armies only, but had left them a people, a city, and a
state. The crushing defeats of the Lakedaimonians at Leuktra
and Mantineia had deprived them of no foot of soil, nor robbed
them of one political right; and, if the destruction of Plataia had
been total during the Peloponnesian war, the smallness of the
city.and the scant numbers of the sufferers detracted from. the
magnitude of the occurrence and the horror it excited.
But here was a city, second to none in all Hellas, but rather
the mistress and most powerful of them all-which alone, but the
other day, as it were, had braved the united war of Attika and
the Peloponnese; which, alone, had carried fire and sword to the
banks of Eurotas and the inviolate gates of Sparta-on which
destruction had descended like a thunderbolt, almost or ere the
offence was committed, which had been expiated by so terrible a
vengeance.
At dawn of day Thebes was a fair city, with green groves and
verdant gardens, and fair sloping meadows, the greenest and the
grassiest of all Greece, watered by sacred rivers, pure and perennial, Dirke, and Knopos, and Ismenos, crowned with cloudcapped towers and solemn temples, filled with glad homes and
happy hearths. At dawn of day she was a powerful and independent state; she had a numerous and gallant army, that




2 76               ALEXANDER TIHE GREAT.
deemed itself invincible; she had a large and prosperous population, linked together by all fond ties of kindred, love, and country; and when the sun set she was-nothing.
The green fields scathed by the torch, the green groves felled
by the axe, of the pitiless avenger; the pure waters of the sacred
rivers crimsoned with the gore, and choked with the corpses, of
a nation.  Her state political dissolved for ever, her army slaughtered or dispersed never to be present under arms again as Thebans; her population butchered in their streets, about their
hearths, in the secresy of their chambers, before the sanctity of
their altars. Nothing had availed them, why they should not
perish. And the dread decree of the auxiliaries had gone forthfor to them had the king committed the fate of Thebes-that the
city should be razed to the very earth, and the territories divided
among the confederates; that all the survivors of the inhabitants-men, women and children-all, should be sold as slaves,
save the priests and priestesses of the Gods; and that, from the
spoils of Thebes, Plataia and Orchomenos should be restored
and fortified. The men of Plataia had not forgotten their own
fate fifty years before; nor those of Orchomenos their own more
recent, if less barbarous overthrow.
Terrible was the decree, but more terrible the execution, for it
was carried out to the utmost letter; except only that
"The Great _Amathian conqueror bade spare
The house of Pindarus, when town and tower
Went to the ground"and that the relatives of the poet were exempted from the sentence which delivered over all their countrymen to hopeless
servitude.*
The shifting of this deed of cold political vengeance-for it
* Arrian I., ix.




FATE OF THEBES.                 277
was in fact nothing more; performed merely to intimidate
Athens and the Peloponnesian cities -f:om  his own hands to
that of the confederated Boiotians, who, he was well assured,
would be ruthless, as the once persecuted enemies of the fallen
city, was but an empty and unsuccessful attempt to shift the
responsibility from his own head also. But the awful eyes even
of human justice will not be cheated; and the reproach, as the
guilt, of this wholesale massacre and ruin, has clung ever, like a
blight, to the renown of the great conqueror, not to be redeemed
by fifty such capricious and personal shows of sympathy and
tenderness, as the honors he paid to the captive ladies of Darios'
house, or the tears he shed, too late, over the bleeding corpse of
his royal victim.
To my mind, this extermination of the Thebans, and annihilation of their city, is the worst, and least to be palliated of all
his evil actions-it was not a violent act of overboiling passion;
it was not even an outrage suggested by fierce fanaticism, a cruelty prompted by the stinging sense of personal injury or the
thirst of vengeance. The crime of the unhappy Thebans was a
slight, was a most natural one, if indeed-which Americans will
be little apt to grant-it were one at all. They had been
recently conquered, deprived of independence, bitted with a
foreign garrison in their own citadel; and, when the opportunity
offered, they endeavored to liberate themselves from  a yoke
which it does not seem that they ever accepted. They were
alarmed once into the relinquishment of their project, though it
is not recorded that any treaties were exchanged or promises
made for the future; occasion again offered, and again they
accepted the occasion; yet even then they had scarcely proceeded beyond the premeditation.and inception of an enterprise,
which, if successful, must have been deemed proud and meritorious.               i
Time had not rendered her dependence prescriptive, nor had




2 78             ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
she kissed the rod which smote her, or once accepted her sub
jugation to the yoke of Makedon. It is not even clear that, in
her attempt to vindicate her rights, she had spilled the blood of a
single Makedonian.
No more can be said of it, than this, that an independent city,
for asserting her own independence, Thebes suffered at the hands
of a fellow Greek, what no Greek city had ever before suffered,
even at the hands of the Barbarian.  The deed has, to my
memory, but one parallel in history, and that parallel is the
deepest blot upon the memory of a very great, and otherwise not
cruel or unscrupulous man. I mean the massacre which followed the storming of Drogheda by Cromwell-like this, an act of
accurst cold-blooded policy-not an act of punishment-not an
act of vengeance-but an act, deeply calculated and done of
malice aforethought, of pure intimidation.
Cromwell massacred the population, and hung the priests of
Drogheda, in order to prevent the other Catholic cities of Ire
land from resisting, and costing him men, time, and money.
Alexander razed Thebes to the plough-share, in order that
Athens, and Sparta and all the Peloponnesian cities might fear
to raise the standard of revolt; which had they done in unison,
not all his splendid military genius, not all the forces he could
possibly command. could have compelled them to submission;
but he must have returned to the semi-barbaric, semi-patriarchal
pomp of his native kingdom, and given up for ever his ambitious
dreams of Oriental conquest.
In this terrible affair the number of the Thebans slaughtered
was not less than six thousand, while those sold into servitude
exceeded thirty thousand persons; the plunder taken was immense, and more Makedonians fell than in any one of his
great battles against Darios in after days,* for he buried no
* Diod. Sic. xvii. 14.




TO THE HELLESPONT.                 279
less than five hundred in the polyandrion, which was still to be
seen in Pausanias' time, before the gates of the city called
Electrai.
After this awful example, the Athenians tendered the most
abject submission, and by the intervention of Democles were permitted to retain the Theban fugitives whom they had admitted,
and whom the king had demanded of them; as well as the ten
orators and statesmen, including Demosthenes, whom he had
required to be delivered up as guilty of the rising before Chaironeia, and of the late revolt of Thebes; with the exception of
Charidemos on whose banishment he insisted.. The other states
which had risen, as the Arkadians, Eleans and Aitolians, vied
with each other in humiliating themselves before him; and
Sparta alone standing sullenly aloof, all Greece now joined in
the expedition against Persia, so that Alexander was at liberty
to return to Makedonia, where he made all preparations for his
departure.
In the spring of the third year of the one hundred and eleventh
Olympiad, in the Archonship of Ktesikles and the consulship of
Caius Sulpicius and Lucius Papirius, B. C., 334,* having left
Antipater regent of Lakedaimonia, and governor of Greece in his
absence, he set forth on the great expedition which, from that
time forth, for above eight centuries, settled the question of
Oriental invasion, much more, subjugation of Europe.
He marched by land over Thrake, crossing the Strymon and
Pangaion hill, to Abdera and Maroneia, Greek colonies on the
sea-shore, the latter of which still exists under the name of
Marogna;t thence eastward across the Heros, now the Maritza,
and the Melas, or modern Kavatza, at the head of the deep
gulf of Saros, into what was then called the Thrakian Chersonese,
where he took ship from Sestos to Abydos, near the entrance
of the Propontis, or sea of Marmora, and transported his whole
* Diod. Sic. xvii. 17.        t Arrian. I. xi.




280               ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
armament without loss or opposition to Asia Minor, although
the Persian Satraps were at that very moment in command of a
superior squadron in those waters.  But the celerity of his
motions had in fact taken them  by surprise, and they were but
now awakening, as if from a stupid sleep, to the sense of present
danger. From Abydos he marched without delay southerly to
the plain of Troy, where he performed funeral games in honor
of his ancestor Achilles, and sacrifices to Priam, which should
avert his wrath against the descendant of his slayer, Neoptolemos;
as well as to the indigenous Gods of the place, Athene of the
Ilias, and Zeus Herkeios, or the defender of walled cities. And
here he made a muster and enumeration of the forces, with which
he had come to attack a mighty empire, and a king, who, it was
well known, could bring into the field above a million of men at
a time Of Makedonian infantry, the flower of his whole army,
these were found to be twelve thousand, of allies seven, and of
Greek mercenaries five thousand; with five thousand Odrysian,
Triballian and Illyrian targeteers and skirmishers, and one
thousand Agrianian bow-men; of horse there were fifteen
hundred Makedonians, led by Philotas, son of Parmenion, as
many more Thessalians under Kalas the son of Hanpaios, six
hundred other Hellenic cavalry, under Erigyios, and a corps of
nine hundred Thrakian and Paionian guides commanded by
Kassander.  Besides these there were left in Europe with Antipater twelve thousand infantry, and eleven thousand five hundred
horse.* I have chosen this enumeration, as it appears to be the
most precise and elaborate, though the authorities differ but
little; Arrian stating the forces at not much more than thirty
thousand foot, and above four thousand horse;t while Plutarch
says that the largest accountT makes them thirty-four thousand
foot and four thousand horse, the lowest thirty and five thousand
* Diod. Sic. xvii. 17.      t Arrian, xi. xii.
$ Plut. Vit. Alex. xv.




THROUGH ASIA MINOR.              281
So little discrepancy is rarely found among ancient authors,
especially in regard of numbers, concerning which they are for
the most part loose and incorrect.
With  this apparently trivial force, he marched at once
through an enemy's country, having few or no supplies on which
to depend, and of course making war support war, except in so
far as he was assisted by the Ionian cities, which would not seem
to have been to any great extent, inasmuch as we do not hear
of his being joined by any auxiliaries until after the battle of the
Granikos. Their allegiance, however, appears to have sat very
lightly on the provincial subjects of the Persian king, since we
never hear of any resistance offered to any one of the various
Greek invaders of the empire, unless by the organized forces of
the different Satrapies; and if they lent no aid, at least they
offered no opposition to an advance, or obstruction to a retreat.
From the plain of Troy he now proceeded northward to Arisbt,
and thence to Percote, now Bergaz, on the Dardanelles; at the
former of which places, according to Arrian, his army had been
encamped during his visit to the Ilias; and it certainly seems far
more probable that such should be the case, than that he should
have marched thirty-five thousand men, a distance of over
fifty miles, only to march them back again. With all the
splendor of genius, however, Alexander possessed at least all its
eccentricity; and it is by no means inconsistent with the known
character, and subsequent pranks of the man, such as his march
to the Oasis of Ammon, that he should have resolved to make
his whole army participators in his sacrifices to the names of the
ancestor whom it was his rage to imitate. No question, however, is involved unless it be whether the muster of the men was
held at Arisba, or on the plain of Troy-a matter of no earthly
import. From Percote he proceeded, still northward, to Lamp.
sakos, nt the issue of the Dardanelles from the sea of Marmora;
and thence easterly along the sea-shore to the town of KolonaL
13




282              ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
and the river Hermotas, near which he had learned that the
Persians were encamped, and here he sent out a scouting party,
consisting of the Apollonian squadron of the Royal companions,
or horse life-guard, whose captain was Sokrates the son of
Sath6n, and four troops of the guides, the whole under the command of Amyntas, the son of Arrhabaios.  From these he soon
learned that the Persian generals, Rheomithres and Petines, and
Niphates, and with them Spithridates Satrap of Lydia and Ionia,
and Arsites governor of Phrygia on the Hellespont, lay encamped
with all the Persian cavelry, and the Hellenic mercenaries, at
the city of Zeleia, of which no traces have survived.
Here, it is said, when they held council what it was best to do
-the arrival of Alexander being known-Memnon the Rhodian
advised them to incur no danger in fighting there since the
enemy were vastly superior in infantry, and animated by the.presence of their king, while Darios was absent from his armybut, to devastate the country and retire, burning all the cities
before the enemy; or, as Diodoros says-to take ship at once,
embark all the troops, and transfer the war at once into Makedonia. Either counsel was sound and soldierly, but the latter-if,
which I confess I doubt, it was ever given-would stamp Memnon the Rhodian as one of the first strategists of any day, as it
would have been a diversion of the very highest order. Still I
do not believe, according to my estimate of Alexander's character, that it would have produced the desired effect; since Antipater had a great power afoot, and it is certain that a renewal
of Persian invasion would have produced a general Hellenik
rising to the rescue.
It is almost to be regretted that it was not attempted, for we
should then have had more certain proof, than we even now possess, of the real claims of Alexander to be considered, not only a
great conqueror, but one of the world's greatest generals.
Whatever his advice was, at all events it was not taken; for,




PREPARES FOR ACTION.                283
deeming it unworthy of Persians to retreat before an enemy, the
chiefs determined to risk a battle in defence of the fords of the
Granikos, a mountain torrent rising in the chain of Ida, and running across the Adrastean plain to the Propontis, into which it
falls northward of Ryzikos. Anthon decides, on the authority
of Chishull's travels in Turkey, that the Granikos is the modern
Demotiko, and not, as is generally supposed, the larger river
known as the Ousvola.
On hearing these tidings, Alexander drew up his infantry in a
double phalanx, with his horse on his flanks and his baggage in
the rear, detaching Hegelochos with a reconnoitering party in
the van consisting of the horse called sarissophoroi, and five
hundred light infantry.  The armature of the sarissophoroi is
not described anywhere that I can discover; but the sarissa was
the famous pike of the Makedonian phalanx, from eighteen
to twenty-four feet in length; a weapon which assuredly could
not be hurled as a javelin, whence I conclude, that the cavalry
armed with these must have charged them in rest like the men
at arms of the middle ages, and have so ridden bodily in upon
the enemy. These men soon gallopped back, reporting that the
enemy were in force on the farther bank of the river, and apparently resolute to defend it; when Parmenion proposed to
encamp at once, without attempting to force the passage, since,
he said, and probably with truth, a Persian army would never
dare to pass the night so near to a Greek encampment; proving,
by his advice, that he was acquainted with the events of Xenophon's retreat, and had profited by the knowledge.  But Alexander replied, that he had not crossed the Hellespont to be stopped by a paltry stream like the Granikos, and forthwith set his
troops in battle order. And he did rightly in so doing; for his
all was set upon a cast, and he well knew that he must carry
every thing before him at a rush, or fail altogether. The prestige of a first victory was absolutely necessary to him. both for




284               ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
the confidence of his own men and the intimidation of the
enemy. The least hesitancy on his part would have reversed
the effect. There are cases in which seeming rashness is the
surest prudence, and this was one of them.
The leading of the left he gave to Parmenion; retaining the
right himself, in front* of which he set Philotas the son of Parmenion, with the royal companions of the life-guard, the archers,
and the Agrianian javelineers; and to these he attached Amyntas with the sarissophoroi, or lancers, and the Paionian guides,
with Socrates' squadron of the life-guard-all these on his
extreme right, somewhat in advance.  Next to these were
ordered the IHypaspistai of the foot-guard, led by Nikanor son
of Parmenion; and after these in regular succession, the phalanxes of Perdikkas son of Orontes, of Koinos son of Polemokrates, of Krateros son of Alexandros, of Amyntas son of Andromenes, and of Philip son of Amyntas.  The first of the left
wing, to the leftward, were the Thessalian horse, led by Kalas
son of Harpalos; then the allied cavalry, under Philip son of
Menelaos; and the Thrakians, whose leader was Agathon; and
after these the infantry of Krateros, Meleager, and Philip, in
phalanx, extending to the centre of the whole array.
The cavalry of the Persians were twenty thousand strong, and
the Greek mercenaries little short of the same number; the
former drawn up in fiont in a long phalanx upon the river banks,
with the others in the rear; for the ground rose steep and commanding from the bank. But when they perceived Alexanderwhom they easily recognized by the splendor of his arms, and
the attention of those about him —advancing against their left,
they strengthened that part of their line with many squadrons
of horse. But when they were face to face on the adverse
banks, the two armies stood still for a little space, in the awe and
apprehension of that which was to follow; and there was solemn
* Anthon, Class. Dic., Art. Granicus. t Arrian, I., xiv.




PASSAGE OF THE GRANIKOS.               28.5
silence on both sides. For the Persians awaited the descent of
the Makedonians into the river, that they might attack them as
they issued from it on the further verge. Then Alexander
leaped upon his horse, and calling to those about his person to
follow, and show themselves good men that day, he desired
Amyntas son of Arrhabaios to lead into the river with the
guides anI Paionians and one division of foot; and yet in
advance of these Ptolemy the son of Philip, with Sokrates'
squadron of the royal companions, to whose fortune it fell to
lead all the cavalry on that day. Then himself, at the head of
the right wing, he plunged into the stream, amid the blare of
trumpets and the shout alale for Enyalios, obliquing continually
down the course of the river, that is to say toward the left; for
marching from the west eastward, the Greek right was toward
the mountains, whence the stream flows northerly to the seaso that the Persians should not have it in their power to attack
him in flank, as he ascended on the farther side, but that he
might close as speedily as possible with their phalanx.
There is some difficulty in this passage, which is rendered
almost word for word, with the exception of the parenthesis,
from the Greek of Arrian; since, presuming the course of the
river to be from south northwardly, as its general direction lies,
and that of the Greek army from west eastwardly, and that the
two armies stood face to face, as we are expressly told they did,
to oblique from the right, down stream, or to the left, would be
to do precisely what Arrian states the movement was intended
to avoid. From this dilemma there is no escape, unless we
understand the phrase " so that the Persians," &c., to have reference to the whole previous description, and not to the last clause
relative to the obliquity of Alexander's own course.
The meaning would then be that he caused Ptolemy, with
the life-guard, and Amyntas with the guides and others, who
* Arrian I., xv.




286               ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
were in the advance, to charge perpendicularly on the Persian
left, while he in person obliqued from  their rear upon the
centre, so that the attack of his van should cover his own flank,
while crossing the torrent.  This reading is also confirmed by
what follows, since it is evident that Amyntas and Sokrates were
in action' long before the rest; the whole constituting a very
fine specimen of an attack by the oblique method to the left;
which, as I have previously observed, was first invented by
Epaminondas, though in both his grand victories he operated
contrariwise, or from the left to the right.
As Amyntas and Sokrates approached the bank, a great
shower of javelins fell among them from the Persians above;
and as they scaled it a fierce crush and concourse of horses followed, these forcing their way up, those pressing them bodily
backward; and still the Persian missiles pelted them with
arrowy hail, while the Greeks fought with charged lances. At
first the Greeks suffered severely, for they were much inferior in
numbers, and were fighting from lower ground, and the slippery
river bed, and the whirling current; and, moreover, the best of
the enemy were mustered there, Memnon himself, with his sons
and followers. And the first of the Greeks who came hand to
hand with the Persians, were cut to pieces, fighting gallantly,
all but a few who fell back on Alexander.
For he was now close at hand, with the whole right wing,
and he dashed, himself foremost of all, into the thick of the
enemy's horse, where all their leaders fought, and the melee
around him raged fast and furious; while one by one the other
divisions of the Makedonians passed over with no further difficulty. It was now a cavalry action altogether, and yet it resembled rather the shock of infantry. For it was a complete melee,
horses and men all closely wedged together, with room to strike
and stab, but scant room to parry, the Greeks still bearing up to
win the plain, the Persians struggling haid to force them down




PASSAGE OF THE GRANIKOS.               287
into the torrent. Great feats of arms were done that day, and
the affair more resembled a passage of arms in the fourteenth
century than a Greek cavalry affair; even as Alexander himself,
in many respects, partook more of the character of a Norman
Paladin than of a Hellenic general.
But still the Greeks won their way foot by foot, owing to their
greater personal strength, and to their fighting with lances of
cornel wood instead of javelins. Here it fell out that Alexander's spear was splintered to the grasp, and he called on Aretis,
the royal equerry, to give him  another, but his spear was
shivered also and he was fighting brilliantly with the truncheon,
which he held aloft, and bade the king ask another, when
Demarates, a Korinthian, one of the Companions, lent him his
own.  With this, seeing Mithridates, Darios' son-in-law, fighting
in the front, he rode at him, and striking him  in the face
unhorsed him. At the same instant Rhoisakes cut Alexander
through the crest of his helmet, shearing away one of his long
white plumes, quite down to the hair with his scymetar, but
without injuring his head; him too, the king rode down, charging him with his lance through the corslet into the breastbone;
but, as he did so, Spithridates was behind him with his seymetar
uplifted to strike him through the broken casque, when Kleitos,
the son of Dropidas, surnamed the Black, anticipated the blow,
smiting the Persian on the shoulder with such a swordsweep,
that his right arm fell to the earth, hewn asunder, with the hilt
still grasped in the quivering fingers.
But other horsemen now came up apace, and the strife was
equalized; and, as the cavalry was intermingled with light
infantry which galled the Persians very severely, finding themselves unable to bear the brunt of the western lances, they gave
way in the centre, where Alexander fought in person, and fled
at speed, followed by both their wings. About a thousand of
the horse fell, for Alexander would not pursue them far; but




288              ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
wheeled upon the phalanx of the Greek mercenaries, who had
not moved from the place where they stood, rather through
wonder at the fuiry of the onslaught, than from any resolute
determination. And against these he brought up his own
phalanx, and, at the same time, charging them with his cavalry
on all points at once, cut them in two, as nearly as possible, in
the centre, so that not a man of them escaped, unless it was one
by chance who lay concealed among the slain; and of them
there were taken but two thousand. Of the generals fell Niphates and Petines, and Spithridates, Satrap of Lydia, and the
governor of Kappadokia, Mithrobarzanes, and  Mithridates,
Darios' son-in-law, and Arboupales, son of Darios, son of Artoxerxes, and Pharnakes, brother of Darios' wife, and Omlares, leader
of the mercenaries. But Arsites escaped from the mel6e, and
fled into Phrygia, where he died by his own hand, fancying himself to be the cause of the overthrow of the Persian army. The
Makedonians lost in all about one hundred and twenty men, of
whom twenty-five were royal companions slain in the first onset,
and sixty of the others cavalry, the infantry having been but
partially engaged, and that only at the close of the action.
In this battle there are several things worthy of note; first-that
it is the earliest battle on record, which was decided by cavalry,
and more particularly by Greek cavalry, which were in general
nearly as inefficient an arm of service as the Roman horse; and
secondly-which is not generally understood in considering Alexander's victories, that beside the Persian cavalry he was opposed
by a Greek force, unquestionably Peloponnesians, for they
furnished nine-tenths of the mercenaries, nearly equal to the whole
of his own infantry in number and not much inferior in quality,
yet so ill were they led that their resistance was scarce worthy of
notice.
But the fact is simply this that now, for the first time, war
had so far advanced as to be, among the Greeks at least, a




CONSTITUTION OF ARMIES.               289
science; among the Romans it scarcely became one two centuries
later. To be the bravest of the brave was no longer sufficient,
nor to set men face to face in the field, and see who would bear
the brunt the longest, the general aspiling only to be the hardest
hitter, the height of strategy. Among the Greeks, as is the case
in all free nations? every man was brave, and when the tug of
war came between them, leading was everything.
In consequence of this, armies were properly constituted, and
with a due proportion of cavalry to infantry, a point which never
before had been attended to in Greece, and never was in Rome
to the latest day of her existence. The army with which Alexander entered Persia was in fact formed nearly on the same
principles and in the same proportions with Napoleon's divisions
or rather corps d' armnee, each of which, complete in every arm
of the service, consisted as nearly as possible of twenty thousand
foot to four thousand horse, being in the rates of one mounted
trooper to every five infantry soldiers, while in the legions even
of the best period of Rome under Marius, Sylla, and Czesar, there
were but three hundred horse to six thousand foot, or in the
ratio of one to twenty.
Under Alexander, also, artillery first -came into general use,
borrowed as it would seem from the Sicilian Greeks, who in that
arm  were never surpassed or even equalled.  Sieges were no
longer carried on by the slow and lingering operations of blockade, with walls of countervallation and circumvallation, but the
ramparts were shaken by the ram, which operating on the
principle, not of direct force, but of continuous vibration, produced
effects almost equal to that of cannon shot; the parapets were
demolished by stones of several tons weight, hurled from  the
potent machines, and the defenders swept from the battlements, by greater javelins than could be sent from  any human
arm, slung from the mighty catapults.  A few years later than
this field artillery was first employed by Machanidas, the tyrant
13




290               ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
of Sparta, in his battle against Philopoimen, but it was then
proved unsuccessful, and never came into general use.
It is worthy of remark here that Alexander, like Hannibal
and Napoleon, placed the greatest reliance in his horse, the
former leading his own in person against horse or foot indiscriIninately, contrary to the usual custom of his times, and both the
latter almost invariably deciding the crisis of every action by a
crushing charge of cuirassiers.  The last and greatest of the
three never hesitated to express his conviction that equal
numbers of horse, equally well led, must overpower infantrty, and
certainly his splendid cavalry as led by Excelmans, Milhaud, and
first in excellence though last in place, Murat, went far to justify
the assertion; and the battle of Fere Champenoise, in which
twenty thousand Russian horse, with horse artillery, annihilated
an equal force of veteran French infantry duly provided with
heavy guns, seems to place his opinion almost beyond dispute.
The contrary idea, which has so generally prevailed since the
origin of fire-arms and the decline of chivalry, seems to arise from
the fact that the expense of keeping up large cavallry forces is so
enormous that none but Nomnadic tribes, the whole population
of which are cavaliers from their cradle, or despotic governments
can sustain it.  The more democratic the governments, and the
more impatient of taxation, the less powerful are they in cavalry;
and to this reason is it that England and the United States, the
people of both which countries are unquestionably and immeasurably superior as individual horsemen, to the French, have never
been famous for this arm of service, and probably never will be
so. During the whole peninsular war the British army accomnplished little with their horse, and what they did chiefly by the
Hanoverians of the King's German legion; and though at Waterloo the splendid exploit of Ponsonby's division which destroyed
a column of five thousand foot and rendered eighty guns unserviceable for the day, and the splendid final charge of the heavy




CAVALRY SERVTCE.                   291
horse of the household brigade, are worthily distinguished among
great cavalry affairs, still they are the exceptions to the rule
which centuries have proved true fiom the days of Cressi and
Poictiers to those of Alliwal and Sobiaon, that it is on the
infantry of England that her military power principally rests.
To this it is that the true cause must be attributed of the small
use made by Lord Wellington of this arm, which has led to the
belief that he undervalues its utility and dislikes it in actionthat he never possessed it in sufficient number to launch it
effectually against the overwhelming superiority of his enemy;
and precisely the same is the case with the United States, the
dragoons of which alone of their troops, with the single exception
of May's charge at Resaca de la Palma, achieved little distinction, simply because they had no opportunity of doing so, in consequence of their being so cruelly outnumbered; and even now,
when it is obvious to every military eye, that one horse regiment
on the frontiers of Mexico, and in the newly conquered provinces,
is equal for real action, duty and utility, to three of foot, and that
the equestrian Indians can never be put down effectually, without
mounted rifles, and probably lancers also, so great is the senseless
and absurd jealousy of expense in this vital matter, that instead
of augmenting this valuable arm  the recent legislatures have
diminished it; and for a climax of absurdity have dismounted
the superb horse-artillery, which was second to that of no other
country, and which really won every pitched battle in Mexico,
with the exception perhaps of Cherubusco.
After burying his own dead, to return to the field of the
Granikos, with the most distinguished honors, and granting the
rites of sepulture even to the bodies of the mercenary Greeks,
whose prisoners were sent in chains, to be kept at hard labor in
Makedonia, as traitors to the cause and name of Greeks, Alexander showed equal prudence and sagacity in his conduct both
to the conquered country and to the indepelndent nations of




292              ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
Greece, treating the former with singular lenity and grace, and
paying the greatest attention to those of the latter, whom he the
most suspected of disaffection. For he did not attempt to alter
the forms of their ancient polity, or even the time-honored names
of their governmental officers, but contented himself merely with
appointing friends of his own, in many instances native Asiatics,
to the vacant Satrapies, and causing the same amount of tribute
formerly paid to Darios to be paid into his own treasury. To
this it is to be ascribed that in no instance was he troubled with
anything like guerilla warfare, and that he never to the end
of his career met any considerable inconvenience or detriment
from the insubordination or rising of the provinces which had
readily submitted to his arms, and which accustomed to be slaves,
cared little whether they were called the slaves of Alexander or
of Darios, no personal penalty or suffering being attached to
either condition. In this respect he showed himself much wiser
and more politic than his great successor, and only equal in the
extent of conquest-Napoleon, concerning whom it has been
justly observed that, the intolerable insolence and overbearing of
the French prefects and officials who made every individual
personally feel the degradation of his people, did more to
alienate the minds of the conquered, especially of the Spaniards
and Germans, than all the real grievances he inflicted on their
countries, than all the deprivation of liberty and independence.
To the Athenians he sent three hundred Persian Panoplies,
which he directed to be offered to Athene in the Akropolis, with
the inscription, "Alexander and the other Greeks, the Lakedaimonians excepted, these firom  the barbarians who dwell in
Asia."
These things ordered, he marched southerly to Sardis, which
being delivered to him on conditions, he suffered to retain its
independence, though he garrisoned its Acropolis, which was a
very strong place, and on which he erected a temple to Zeus




SIEGE OF HALIKARNASSOS.              293
Olympios, with Maledonians, under Pausanias, one of the royal
companions. The people of Magnesia and Tralles voluntarily
surrendered their cities, and after sending out Parmenion and
Antimachos the son of Agathocles, to reduce the Aiolian and
Ionian cities, which were still subject to the Persians, under
orders to subvert the oligarchies and establish democracies, under
their own laws, and with the same tribute to himself which they
had formerly paid to the Persians, he marched himself, by way
of Ephesus, on the town of Miletos, now Palatska, which he
took after a sharp resistance, enlisting the Greek mercenaries who
had defended it, in his own army, and restoring their liberty to
all the citizens who had not fallen in the storming of the city.
There he disbanded his naval forces, and destroyed his ships,
finding them overmatched by the Persian fleet, which he now
resolved to put down by occupying all their maritime cities, so
that they should have no place whence to draw their supplies or
to procure sailors; and with this intent he marched through
Karia to Halikarnassos, now Boudroun, on the gulf of Stanca,
where he had learned that a large force of Persians and mercenaries was collected, taking all the cities on his route, and then
laid siege to that important fortress and seaport. During the
siege he attempted the neighboring stronghold of Myndos by a
forced night march and sudden onslaught, but was repulsed;
whereupon he resolved to waste no time on it, but turning on
ialikarnassos, sat down in form before it. The defence was very
long and resolute; for the garrison made constant and daring sorties, in order to destroy the works and machines of the enemy,
and several times partially succeeded; and wherever the walls
and towers were shaken by the rams, they built up stone curtains
within, before the outer defences fell or the breaches became
passable. Once they sallied in force at several points at once,
and kindled such a blaze among the machinery as compelled
Alexander to charge in person, when a terrible slaughter fol



294              ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
lowed, and they were at length dri jen in, the drawbridge breaking down under the weight of the combatants, and the gates
being all but carried by the Makedonians, who would have
entered pell-mell with the fugitives, had not the portals been
closed prematurely, to the exclusion of many of the men, who
were slaughtered under the walls in great numbers. It appears
that the city might have been carried at this time had not Alexander called off his army, not desiring to take it by storm, could
he gain possession of it on conditions. But Orondclobates and
Memnon, the Persian leaders, finding that they could in no sort
hold out much longer, fired the city and fell back into the citadel, when the Makedonians entered through the breaches made
by the flames, cut the incendiaries to pieces, and took those to
quarter whom they found in their own houses. Not choosing
to waste time in reducing the heights, Alexander now razed the
city to the ground, and passed onward, leaving Ptolemais, with
three thousand foot and two thousand horse, all mercenaries, to
keep Phrygia in subjection; and appointed Ada, the daughter of
lekatomnos and the widow of Hydrieus, who had given up to
him her town of Alinda, and named her son Alexander after
him, to rule over the whole satrapy of Karia.  From IHalikarnassos he sent home all the newly matrried men of the Makedonians, to winter with their wives in their own country, under
the conmmand of officers who were themselves in the same condition, whom he entrusted with the charge of bringing back the
men, and of levying a fresh force both of horse and foot, as large
as they should find it possible, in that region. Thence h1
proceeded in person through Lydia and Pamphylia; taking all
the seaport towns, so as to render the navy of the Persians useless. On reaching Phaselis, where he lay encarmped for a few
days, he discovered a conspiracy against himself, at the head of
which was Alexandros the commander of the Thesealian horse,
who was brother of IHeraomees and Arrhhabaios, who had been




HIS MATRCIIES IN ASIA MINOR.           295
participants in th3 murder of Philip, which was speedily suppressed, when he proceeded, by way of Perge, a short distance
inland to Side, on the coast, and thence up the Eurymedon to
Aspendos, a city the ruins of which have never been identified,
though the river is well known as the Kapri Sou. From Aspendos he countermarched inland through the province of Pisidla
and the passes of Mount Tauros to the city of Kelainai, on the
Marsyas, a tributary of the Maiander, where stood of old the
palace of the younger Kyros, encountering a stout resistance and
somesharp fighting from the barbarian mountain, so far north
as Gordion, a town on the river Sangaris, now Sakaria, flowing
through Bithynia into the Black Sea, which stood probably not
very far from the modern city of Eskiebecher, within sixty miles
of the northern coast. Here he solved the oracle by cutting the
famous Gordian knot, and met the men who had been absent on
furlough, and who now returned, true to their time, with reinforcements of three thousand Makedonian foot, and seven hundred and fifty horse, of Makedon, Thessaly and Elis. While at
this place he also received an Athenian embassy, praying for the
liberation of the Athenian mercenaries captured at the Granikos;
but though he treated the envoys with great courtesy, he denied
their request, judging it imprudent, while the war with Persia
was still at its height, to pardon Hellenes taken in arms against
Hellas.*  Thus ended the first year of the war; and imnmediately on the opening of spring, in the fourth year of the hundred
and first Olympiad, B. C. 333, he broke up from Gordion, and
proceeded south-eastward to Ankura in Galatea, now Angura, a
large city and pashalick of Anatolia, to Mazaka in Kappadokia,
now Kaisariah in Karaman, a fine town on the Halys, now Kizil
Irmak or red river, flowillg northerly into the Black Sea, and
dividing Anatolia from  Roum. From  Mazaka, learning that
Darios had now raised a great army, and was in full march to
* Arrian, I., xxx.




296              ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
meet him somewhere about the passes between the Mount
Amanos, Almadag of the modern geographies, and the gulf of
Scanderoon or Aiasso, with a view to deliver battle without the
confines of Upper Asia, he struck a direct southern course by
Tyana, supposed to be the modern Ketch Hissar, at the foot of the
central Tauros chain; and from thence, still in the same direction, to Tarsos, famous in later days as the birth-place of the
great Apostle Paul, upon the river Kydnos-then a powerful
stream, but now a mere rivulet, scarcely navigable even by small
boats —being anxious to anticipate the Greeks, and occupy that
noble city. Here he was detained several days by a severe illness contracted by bathing when over-heated in the ice-cold
waters of that mountain torrent, down which three centuries later
Kleiopatra sailed in her golden galley in such pompous state to
meet the bold triumvir Antony. It was during this attack that
he displayed one of those splendid gleams of magnanimous
generosity which are the redeeming features of his variable and
inconsistent character; for being warned by Parmenion that
Philip his Akarnanian physician had been bribed to poison him,
he calmly quaffed his potion while the astonished leech was
reading the inculpatory letter. An act of generosity and confidence equally creditable to both parties, and justified by the
result.
Between the Mount Amanos and the sea are two narrow
defiles, with a plain between them, much broken itself by ridges
of knolls and hillocks, and intersected by torrents flowing from
the mountains. Of these the westernmost, just without Tarsos, is
known as the Kilikian gates, the easternmost, near the town of
Issus, now Aiasso, as the Assyrian gates, the word gates, pylai,
being constantly used, as in the famous instance of Thermopylai,
to signify a narrow gorge or defile between two mountains,
or one mountain and the sea. To the second of these he
despatched Parmenion to guard the passes, with all the allied




MARCH TO ISSOS.                   297
and  mercenaryv foot, the  Thrakians  of  Sitalkes, and  the
Thessalian horse, and himself, so soon as he was sufficiently
recovered from his illness, he advanced from Tarsos, which,
though now  merely a wretched Turkish villag'e, retains its
ancient name, to Anchialos, a city which being ill situated and
without a harbor, has entirely disappeared from history.  IHere
he saw the monument of Sardanapalos, with a statue of that
prince in the act of clapping his hands, and an epigram  in
Assyrian verse, which is thus adlirably rendered by Byron in
his fine tragedy named from the royal voluptuary, whom he has
chosen as his hero;
Sardanapalos,
The king, and son of Anacyndaraxes,
In one day built Anchialos and Tarsos.
Eat, drink, and play. The rest's not worth a fillip.
Leaving Anchialos he came to Soli, where he celebrated
solemn games with musical and gymnastic exercises, and torch
races, and a grand procession of all his forces under arms, in
honor of Asklepios, and thence to Magarsis, where he sacrificed
to the Magarsian Athene.  Leaving Magarsis he again halted
at Mallos, now Cape Malo, which was said to be an Argive
colony, and to which he therefore remitted the tribute formerly
paid by them to Darios.  While he tarried at this place, tidings
reached him that the king of Persia was close at hand with all
his forces, at a place called Soki, said to be two days' march, fifty
or sixty miles from the Assyrian gates, on hearing which he at
once collected his army and marched past Issos, and through the
defile to Myriandros, a flourishing town and seaport on the gulf
of Scanderoon, the modern site of which is undefined, where he
arrived on the second day after the receipt of the tidings, and
where he was detained in his camp all the third by a violent
storm of rain accompanied by a violent tornado.




298              ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
And  here, before detailing the second  great battle of
Alexander, it will not be amiss to pause a moment and observe
with how consummate an union of military skill and political
shrewdness the young Makedonian prince had proceeded.  No
rash impulse of inconsiderate valor, no greed of rapid and
continuous victory, no undue thirst of present glory at the risk
of future disaster, had tempted him to dash on in pursuit of his
immediate object, the overthrow of the great king, until the
whole country in his rear had been subverted, pacified, restored,
~ and reinvigorated by just and merciful measures, and left in the
secure and permanent occupation of a sufficient force of foreign
Greeks to render any hope of counter revolution, particularly
when backed by the contingents of the liberated Ionic and
Aiolic cities, vain and impracticable.
All the western coast, from opposite Byzantion, or Constantinople, to the Levantine sea, all the southern coast, from Rhodes
to the Syrian fiontier, had been first taken into secure possession,
thence by skilful marches and countermarches inland, the whole
interior of Asia Minor, from the Dardanelles and Archipelago to
the Kizil Irmak, or Red River, and the Syrian defiles had been
conquered, and reduced to perfect obedience in the space of a
single campaign.  This tract of land, including the entire
districts of Anatolia, Karamania, and a portion of Roum, or ninetenths of the whole Peninsula, if it may be so called, between
the Black Sea, the Archipelago, and the Levant, above five
hundred miles in length by above three hundred in width,
exceeded by at least one half the whole area of Greece, from
the northern confines of Alexander's own dominions to the
southern extremity of the Peloponnesos or Morea. It was
occupied by a powerful, civilized, and highly cultivated race of
men, was thickly strewn with the wealthiest and most magnificent
cities and seaports in the then known world, and probably
contributed the largest portion of the entire revenues of his




ASIA MINOR.':9
empire to the treasury of Xerxes. This splendid territory he
had not cursorily vanquished by the terror of his arms, to rise
against him so soon as his back was turned, or take arms against
his retreat if defeated; nor had he alienated the temper of the
inhabitants by cruelty or wanton depredation; but by clemency,
justice, and the imposition of moderate tributes, had converted it
into his own property  and his fast friend, a rich granary,
storehouse, and treasury, from which to derive supplies of all
kinds, a firm basis for future military operations, and a ready
way for retreat should disaster overtake him.
How different from the wanton rapacity and savage pillage of
the French marshals of Napoleon in Spain, by which they
rendered every peasant in the land the mortal foe of France,
ready to catch at the sound of the first passing bell as a war
tocsin, and all athirst for vengeance till Guerra al Cuchillo, war
to the knife, became alike their watchword and their battle cry!
How  different from  the mad advance of the great Corsican
himself, into the hostile heart of devastated but unconquered
Russia, leaving Germany subdued, not pacified, in his rear,
Hungary refractory, Poland  unsatisfied, without a base of
operations, without magazines, supplies, friends, in the country
he had traversed, leaving to himself no alternative but complete
victory or utter ruin, no retreat, but a flight through fifteen
hundred miles of ravaged and exhausted country, with every city
ready to become a Moscow, every river a Beresina, in his route.
The object of this great work he had accomplished at a loss of
men certainly not exceeding three hundred, of all arms, in
actual fighting, so that it is probable that after taking into
consideration all the garrisons he had left behind him, and
all.the deaths of men whether under arms or by casualties, as
well as the reinforcements he had received from Greece, and the
enlistment of Greek mercenaries brought over to his own side
from  the adverse party, his army was increased rather than




300              ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
diminished, and that the force with which he stood prepared to
dispute the diadem of Asia with Darios, was numerically larger
than that with which he forced the passage of the Granikos, and
now much stronger in that confidence in themselves, that proud
and positive morale, which so often is the giver of victory.
Darios up to this time had determined, according to the
advice of his best counsellors, to await Alexander's issue from the
defiles, and give him battle in the open champaign country of
Assyria, where the vast plains x ould allow him to deploy his
almost innumerable hordes, al!d perhaps to overflank and
surround the enemy, while the whole region would be favorable
to the manceuvres of his powerful and splendid cavalry. And
he was strongly urged by Amyntas, the son of Antiochos, who
had deserted to him from Alexander, by no means to move from
that district, and at first he took counsel and waited, though
impatiently.  But the tardiness of Alexander's movements,
caused by his illness at Tarsos, his pomps and processions
at Soli, and the sending out of an expedition against the Kilikian
mountaineers, shook his resolve; and, with the characteristic
arrogance of a vain barbarian, he came to the belief that
Alexander was afraid of him, and would not advance.against
him, if he were not already in full flight.  He determined,
therefore, in spite of the reasoning and assurance of Amynta3,
who insisted that Alexander was eager to meet not to avoid
him, to march into the passes, where he was neither able to avail
himself of his superiority in archers and javelineers, by deploying
them in open order, nor to make use of his splendid horse, but
gave himself, as it were, shackled into the hands of an enemy
who certainly was not one ilito whose way one would willingly
cast unnecessary advantages.
He entered, therefore, the defiles of Mount Amanos, known as
the Assyrian gates, while Alexander was actually at Myriandros,
to the southeast of the passes, and interposed between him and his




COUNTERMARCHES BENORE ISSOS.            301
capital, and marched to Issos, now Aiasso, having thus accidentally got into the rear of the Greek army. So soon as the
Makedonian heard this intelligence, which at first he was inclined
to doubt, as scarcely able to credit such an excess of good fortune,
he embarked a few of the Royal Companions in a thirty-oared
galley, and sent them by sea to reconnoitre, which could be done
so, much more readily than by land, since the coast line here is
much indented by deep bays and gulfs, fiom headland to headland of which it is but a brief sail. These soon returning with
information that Darios was already, as it were, in the hollow of
his hand, he was vehemently rejoiced and collecting all his
officers harangued them on the nature of the contest which was
now imminent, and encouraged them by the enumerated advantages he possessed, especially as compared with the deficiency
of Xenophon's army in spite of which that gallant partizan had
resisted all dispiriting influences, and conquered the Asiatics in
every encounter, although he had no Thessalian, nor Boiotian,
nor Peloponnesian, nor Makedonian horse, nor Thrakians, nor in
fact any cavalry worthy of consideration, nor any archery or
slingers, with the exception of a handful of Rhodians and
Kretans.
Then having caused his men to dine and having sent forward
a few horse and bowmen to reconnoitre the road, he retraced his
steps with his whole army as soon as it became dark, and entering the defiles at midnight posted his sentinels on the cliffs and
halted until morning, to give his men some repose before the
terrible struggle to which he looked forward in the calm confidence of certain victory.
And now the time had arrived when the two royal rivals
should meet in the field face to face, for as soon as it was daylight Alexander led his men, with his heavy foot in front, his
cavalry following these and his baggage in the rear of all, through
the defiles;',first, where the pass was very narrow, in an ex



302               ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
ceedingly deep narrow-fronted column, as the nature of the
ground compelled him  to do; and gradually, as the gorge expanded, extending his front both to the right and left, by bringing
up his rearward files, each by each, on the outside of either flank
till the phalanx had acquired its due proportion both of rank and
file. At this period, the usual depth of the phalanx, as constituted by Philip, was sixteen men in file; and it does not appeal that any deviation ever took place from this formation, the
old tactic by subdivision into enomoties, pentecostyes and lochoi,
having been entirely discontinued, and remodelled in the recent
or Makedonian phalanx.  Kallisthenes, the sophist, who was
present at this battle, states that in the first instance, the phalanx
in  defiling through these gorges was drawn  up thirty-two
deep, then sixteen, and lastly eight; but Polybios* has demonstrated, by measurement of the ground and comparison of
numbers, that the whole of his description is an absurdity. He
was himself no soldier, and of course wrote fiom hearsay.  It is,
moreover, evident that the phalanx could not be manceuvwed in
this manner; since the number of shields in file was invariably
the same, and not that only, but the same men were invariably
file-leaders and-rear rankmen; consequently, when it was
necessayv  to contract the front, so many files as occasion required
halted on either flank, while the rest marched onward, and then
obliquing inward from the left and right, formed a second column,
with as many shields in file as the first, and so on ad infinitum;
and again, when it was desirable to extend the front, the second
column obliqued to the left and right from  the centre and
marched up, on the outside, to their original places on the flanks,
and so on with third, fourth, and fifth columns in succession to the
end, till the proper fiont and formation was again recovered.
Thus the depth of the phalanx was never really altered; though
in passing bridges, defiles, or the like, it could be formed in
*Polyb. xii. 17.




MOVEMENTS OF THE PHALANX.,203
column of any number of sub-divisions, each consisting of any
given number of shields in rank, but immutably of the same
number in file. I do not mean that the depth of all phalanxes
was the same, since we have already seen them varying from
eight shields of Athenians at Marathon, to fifty of Thebans at
Leuktra, but that on whatever number of men in files it was
resolved to fight, on that they invariably manceuvred.
For it must be observed that pivot movements were unknown
to the Greeks, and that they never marched, as we say, by the
flank, and bringing up this or that shoulder, wheeled into line to
the front, owing to their method of hand to hand engaging,
which made it absolutely necessary that the best man and
steadiest soldier should be the leader, and the second best the
rear rank-man of every file, whether on the march or in action.
The field of battle it appears was about fourteen stadia in width
from the sea on the, left, to the mountains on the right, and according to Polybios,* one stadium will contain sixteen hundred
men arrayed sixteen deep, when in open marching order-six
feet being allowed to each soldier-or twice that number with
their shields touching in the synaspismos, or close battle older.
The number of men requisite to form the true Makedonian
phalanx was sixteen thousand men, or a thousand shields in rank
by sixteen in file, although any number exceeding thirty-two
and divisible by four could be formed on the principle of the
phalanx. I conceive it probable, therefore, that, assuming the
number of forty-two thousand assigned to Alexander's infantry
as correct, the number of heavy foot was thirty-two thousand,
or a double phalanx, the remaining ten thousand being archery,
slingers, and javelineers, who did not fight in line. These men
would in battle array have occupied ten stadia, leaving four more
for the archery and horse.
these latter formed eight deep, which Polybios states to be
* Polyb xii. 17, &c., de Callisthenis lmperitia, Arrian, II. viii.




304               ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
their true tactics, occupied a stadium to each eight hundred
men in marching order, or half that distance in array of battle,
leaving the necessary intervals for their manceuvres and countermarchings. The whole force of cavalry would have required
therefore about three stadia for their front, leaving one stadium,
or something over, for the advance and retreat of the light
troops to the van and rear, independent of the regular intervals.
I think, therefore, that we may assume this to have been
Alexander's disposition in the battle of Issos. To himself, as
usual, he retained the command of the right wing, giving to
Parmenion the leading of the left, along the sea shore; for it
must be remembered, that by the descent of Darios by the
defiles of Mount Amanos into his rear, the natural position of the
almies was reversed, so that the Greeks were fighting with their
faces to the west and their backs to Babylonia, and the Persians
vice versa.
First on the right toward the mountains, the horse not having
as yet deployed from the rear, he placed the companions of the
foot-guard, and the hypaspistai under Nikanor son of Parmenion,
next to these the band of Koinos, and next-forming the left of
the right, and centre of the whole army-that of Perdikkas..On
the extreme left was the band of Amyntas, then that of Ptolemaios; and last, touching Perdikkas' men in the centre, that of
Meleagros. The infantry of the left, generally, were under the
direction of Krateros, as the whole wing was under that of Parmenion, whose orders were on no account to leave an interval
between himself and the sea shore, as it was certain that Darios
would endeavor to profit by it, in his vast numerical superiority,
to turn and envelop both flanks of the Greeks.
So soon as the pass opened out into a species of small plain,
intersected by the mountain torrent Pinaros, now the Deli Son,
Alexander brought up the royal companions of the life-guard,
with the Thessalian and Makedonian horse, from the rear to his




LINE OF BATTLE AT ISSOS.            305
extreme iight, and ordered all the Peloponnesian and allied cavalry to form on Parmenion's left along the sea. In the meanwhile Darios learning the approach of Alexander, pushed twenty
thousand foot and thirty thousand horse across the river, using
them as a screen wherewith to mask his movements and cover
his army, while he was arraying it in line. And first he drew
up his Greek mercenaries, thirty thousand strong, opposite to the
phalanx of the Makedonians, and next to these on either hand
sixty thousand Kardakians, who, like the Greeks, were armed
as heavy infantry-for the ground on which they were marshalled sufficed for the formation of this number of men in single
phalanx-and on his own left he pushed forward twenty thousand men along the crest of the mountains,'who turned Alexander's left, and, as he marched onward, actually threatened his
rear; but all the remainder of his innumerable multitudes, said
to amount to six hundred thousand fighting men, archers, javelineers, and slingers, were drawn up in a huge, useless mass, in
the rear of the Greeks and of those barbarians, who were formed
in phalanx. This done, he recalled the thirty thousand horse
who had cloaked his movements, and drew the greater part of
them up in front of his right, where the ground was most suitable to cavalry movements, as being level along the sea, retaining
a few squadrons on his own left, near the mountains, until finding the nature of the ground to be impracticable to cavalry, he
detached them also to his right.
Immediately, on perceiving the immense force of cavalry to
which Parmenion was now affronted, fearing that his left would
be broken, he detached all the Thessalians to his support, causing
them to ride around by the rear, instead of crossing his front;
so that the movement might be unsuspected by Darios; in front
of his own horse, on the right, he drew up the guides under Pro
tomachos, and the Paionians led by Ariston, and the archery of
Antiochos; but the Agrianians of Attalos, with some cavalry
14




306              ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
and archers, he sent against the enemy who had passed along
the hills and occupied a projecting spur', completely in the rear
of his right; so that his left wing was formed in two lines, one
facing westward against the Persians beyond the river, and the
others eastward, against the barbarians on the hills. He added
also to his left the Kretan archery, and the Thrakians of Sitalkes;
and behind the whole line he ordered the foreign mercenaries.
But finding that his own phalanx was not sufficiently solid, he
ordered up two regiments of the companions-that called the
Anthemousian, commanded by Persidas the son of Menestheus,
and that called the Leugaian, under Pantordanos son of Kleander, from the centre to the right, countermarching them secretly
by the rear.
But now when the barbarians on the hill made no effort to
descend upon his rear, he caused them to be charged by the
Agrianians and some archery, which broke them with ease, and
drove them up to the very summit of the cliffs, completely out
of arrow shot of the army; after which he contented himself by
observing them with a body of three hundred horse, which sufficed to hold them in check all day; and withdrawing the archers
and Agrianians, supported by some of his Greek mercenaries, he
pushed them forward on his right, in order to outflank the
Persians.
Darios did not lead forward to the attack, but remained on the
defensive along the steep and rocky banks of the river, which he
had in some places protected by palisades; and observing this,
Alexander galloped along his front, calling upon the men to
show their valor, and addressing not only all the leaders, but the
captains of squadrons and battalions, even of the mercenaries and
foreigners, by name, when any one was conspicuous for peculiar
courage or merit; and loud shouts went up on all sides, as they
called to him not to delay, but to fall on at once.
Then he advanced, but very gradually, restraining the ardor




ALEXANDER S CHARGE.                307
of his troops, and keeping them at a slow march, lest the front
of the phalanx should be disordered by a more rapid movement;
but soon as he came within the range of missiles, he led in person
with his right wing at an impetuous and fiery charge, in order to
come quicker hand to hand, and so to evade the shot of javelins and
arrows, and he crossed the river in one headlong rush, and scattered the Persians of the left as with a thunderbolt. But the
Greek mercenaries of Darios charged home against the Makedonian phalanx, where it was left uncovered, in consequence of
being separated from the right, which had charged so furiously
with Alexander that it could not keep abreast of them, owing to
the pace of its advance, which was of necessity more leisurely,
and the broken and rocky nature of part of the ground which it
had to traverse; and the conflict here was both furious and stubborn, for the mercenaries of Darios fought desperately to prevent
the Makedonians from ascending the river banks, and to retrieve
the victory, jeopardized by the flight of their left wing. The
Makedonians, on the other hand, were inspired by a desire to
emulate the splendor of Alexander's onslaught on the left, and
by the pride of maintaining their reputation, as hitherto unconquered and unconquerable in the field. Besides this, moreover,
there had always been a rivalry of races, between the Makedonians and the pure Hellenic races. And the struggle between
them was long and desperately maintained at push of pike, with
the bronze bucklers clanging in the shock of the close conflict,
and the loud paeans echoing in the Greek tongue on both sides,
and the wild battle clamor, alale, and great mutual slaughter.
And there fell Ptolemaios son of Seleukos, and many others,
most valiant and distinguished men of the Makedonians, to the
number of a hundred and twenty; nor did the Greeks yield a
foot, much less turn to fly, until the victorious right of Alexander
having pushed their left bodily off the field, so that their whole
flank was exposed, wheeled upon them, seeing that its own




308               ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
centre was hard pressed, and charging home full on their shield
arms, cut them to pieces with a frightful carnage.
Up to this time the Persian horse opposed to Alexander's left
had fought with exceeding gallantry, for not waiting the advance
of the Greeks, they had dashed forward, crossed the river in full
career, where it rushed over a shallow bed near the sea, and
charged manfully upon the squadrons of the Thessalians.  These
in like manner charged, and to the shock of spears succeeded a
close and terrible mel6e, with broadsword, scymetar, and battleaxe, until, Darios having already fled, and the Greek mercenaries
been cut to pieces on their left, they too turned rein, and fled headlong, in the utmost rout and confusion. The roads were had,
as after the heavy rains which had lately fallen they were all
poached up and trampled into mire by the march of the myriads
who had passed over them; and the horses, oppressed by the
weight of their own ponderous armature, and the burthen of their
riders, armed all cap-a-pie, labored fearfully in the flight.  And
the fierce Thessalians pressed on them  savagely-for they had
suffered in the battle, and now had vengeance, which they
worked out with bloody execution-and as it was no retreat, but
an entire rout, the Persians were disorganized, and as many died
trampled to death by their own comrades as fell beneath the
bloody spears of the Thessalian lancers. Darios himself did not
his duty on that day as a general, a soldier, or a man-for so
soon as his left wing was broken by Alexander's headlong charge,
long before the best portion of his forces were beaten; almost,
indeed, before they were in action-he turned his chariot, and
fled in it, so long as the ground was level, at the utmost speed
of his horses; but, so soon as he got into broken ground, on a
led horse; leaving his shield, his bow, and his royal robe behind
him; and what is far more discreditable to his name and character-since even the weakest and most cowardly of animals will
fight to the death in defence of their females-abandoning his




FLIGHT OF DARIOS.                  309
mother, wife, and daughters, who, according to the Persian habit,
had followed him in the campaign, and were taken with his
treasures in the forsaken camp.
Alexander pursued him hotly with his cavalry until it was
dark night, but was unable to overtake him; for his pursuit had
been delayed by the sturdy resistance of the Greek force and of
the Persian cavalry-for with sound judgment and soldierly
coolness, he did not withdraw a man from the immediate front
of battle until the whole force was broken and destroyed.
In the conflict and the carnage which followed it, there fell of
the Persians, Arsames, and Rheomithres, and Artizues, the leaders of the cavalry at the Granikos; and Sabakes the satrap of
Egypt, and Boubakes, a Persian of high distinction; and besides
these, it is said, of common men not less than a hundred thousand, of whom ten thousand were of the brave horse. So that
Ptolemaios the son of Lagos, who pursued in person with Alexander, states that a ravine, across which they had to follow, was so
completely bridged by the dead that they charged over it as on
level ground.
Such was the battle of Issos, fought in the month of Maimakterion,* corresponding to the latter part of November and the
first of December, in the Archonship of Nikostratos, at Athens,
in the fourth year of the one hundred and first Olympiad, B. C.
333. It was fought on the oblique method, like that of the
Granikos; the Greek left and centre being partially retired, until
Alexander had forced back the Persian left with singular advantage, which put it in his power to take all the other divisions of
the barbarian army successively in flank, and so to destroy them
absolutely. It was won almost entirely by the tactics of the
general, since it is perfectly evident that even his Thessalian
cavalry on the left, with the single exception of the royal colmpanions, his best horse, had gained nothing, and were barely able
* Polybios xvii. 29.




310               ALEXANDER TIlE GREAT.
to maintain their ground against the spirited exertions of the
Oriental cavalry, while the Makedonian phalanx, having the disadvantage of the ground against them, if anything had the worst
of it in their conflict with the Greek mercenaries of Darlos-all
Peloponnesian republicans and soldiers of the first order-until
the thundering charge of Alexander with the guides and lifeguards upon their naked flank, pierced that gallant band through
and through,* and made such a carnage in their broken ranks,
that scarce two thousand of them  rallied on the following day
about the person of the fugitive king.
In the meantime the camp of Darios had been captured, with
its vast treasures in plate, garments, armors, furniture, coined and
uncoined gold, and all the profuse and lavish luxuries of Oriental royalty; and, in addition to all this, the mother, wife and sister of Darios, together with two grown-up daughters and an
infant son, were made prisoners, beside a few other Persian ladies
of rank, but not many, since most of the nobles of Darios' court
had sent their women to Damaskos, whither the most part of
Darios' treasury had been sent likewise.
It has been made the most of, as a very great and noble trait
of Alexander's character, that he offered no indignity or violence
to these captive beauties; I cannot, however, but regard these
as mere rhetorical flourishes; since, although it certainly was the
custom of the time to sell whole communities into slavery, the
capture of the families of sovereign princes, or even generals of
high rank, was a most unusual occurrence; and I cannot but
believe, arguing from the habits of that day, not from the higher
morality of our own, that to have subjected ladies of that quality
to any disgrace or dishonor, particularly in cold-blood, after they
had escaped unscathed from the tumult and terrors of the sack,
would have reflected infinite reproach and shame upon the conqueror. Indeed, it is my conviction, that acts of licentious vio*Arrian II., xiii.




THE CAPTIVE QUEENS.               311
lence on the part of generals or otheis in high command toward
female prisoners were as rare, and would, if committed, have
been esteemed as infamous, as in our own times.
Alexander detained these ladies, however, in captivity,
although he caused them to be served by their own attendants,
and with all the luxury due to their birth and title as queens and
princesses, which he allowed them to retain; he even carried them
about with him in all his marches, and in one of the latest, before
the fatal battle of Arbela, the unhappy wife and mother died in
durance, leaving her marriageable daughters in durance, and the
heir to his father's throne at the victor's mercy. It is evident
enough that his object in this was to intimidate Darios, by work
ing on his feelings in behalf of those helpless treasures, into early
and absolute submission. Surely, there was little magnanimity
or generosity in this; nor did his practice in this instance accord
well with the principle of which he constantly boasted, that he
waged war not on women but on warriors; and on Darios himself, not as enemy on enemy but as rival against rival, for
national and individual glory, and for the honor rather than the
possession of empire.
It is evident that the distinction is not a difference, for to subject women of the highest rank to the penalties of war, by detaining them close prisoners, is in effect to make war on them;
and to have done them farther wrong would have overthrown at
once all his pretensions to a sort of chivalry, which though fickle
and fantastic, does appear in some sort to have regulated his
conduct. To conclude, I fear we must attribute what there was
of generosity in his conduct toward these unhappy ladies to his
love of appearances and vain thirst of glory, while all that was
stern and selfish must be assigned to his natural temper and
disposition.
On the day following the battle he decorated those of his'officers and men who had distinguished themselves, and added




312              ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
large gifts of money. Balakros the son of Nicanor, he appointed
Satrap of Kilikia, and filled his post in the body-guards by
Euenes the son of Dionysios, and to the command of Ptolemaios
son of Seleukos he promoted Polyperchon son of Simmias.
Then without a moment's delay he sent Parmenion forward with
a sufficient force to make himself master of Damaskos, where the
amount of wealth taken was so prodigious that the relation of
it almost exceeds the limits of credibility, for the amount of coined
money is said to have been two thousand six hundred talents,
nearly a million sterling, besides five hundred pounds weight of
wrought silver, and other booty beyond calculation, in tents,
chariots, tapestries, house furniture, vases, statues, and goblets,
of gold.*  The loss of the Makedonians, by which this decisive
victory was won, seems to have been three hundred hoplitai, on
whom in this action the hardest fighting fell and a hundred and
fifty horse,+ by whose efforts in the battle and the flight which
followed it, at least a hundred thousand of the enemy were slain.
Of Darios' Greek mercenaries, about eight thousand men under
Amyntas the son of Antiochos, Thymondas the son of Mentor,
Aristomedes of Pherai, and Bianor the Akarnanian, all deserters
from Alexander, fled the moment the action commenced and
made their way through the mountains to Tripolis in Phoinikia,
where they made themselves masters of shipping and escaped
first to Kypros and thence to Egypt, where Amyntas was shortly
afterward put to death by the natives.
At Damaskos were taken several revolutionary agents, sent
from the Greek cities as envoys to Darios, but all these Alexander
prudently and politically, not in my apprehension mercifully,:
pardoned; for his victories had now placed him above all fear of
danger from them, and he felt that after the cruel blow he had
stricken against fallen Thebes, conciliation rather than intimidation
was his game.  An embassy from Darios soon after reached
* Quintus Curtius, iii. 34.   t Polybios, xvii. 36.   t Arrian. II. xv.




DAI)TOS' FAMILY.                  313
iiln, l)prayilg for the liberation of his family, and offering him
splendid conditions of peace, but to them he returned a stern
refusal, couched in savage and imperious language, forbidding
him to presume again, to treat with him as equal with equals
king with king, but as a slave with his lord and master.
It has ever, I confess, been a marvel and a mystery to me, in
what part of this man's conduct or character it is, that his
eulogists discover anything magnanimous, generous, or chivalrous; unless it be in a sort of mad-headed, inconsiderate courage
which prompted him ever to be the first where blows were going,
often'to the serious detriment of the service, and endangering of
the army; and which seems to have arisen rathei from the fiery
excitability of his temper and his constitutional insensibility to
danger, than from  anything rational or moral, without which
nothing can be in truth heroical.
In the meantime Darios, who had made his way with the
relies of his power through the passes of Mt. Amanos into the
open plains beyond, fled with the utmost speed to Thapsakos,
where he lost no time in interposing the broad and powerful
stream of the Euphrates between himself and his enemy, although
the precaution seems to have been needless, inasmuch as Alexander showed no willingness to interrupt or even hurry his flight;
since immediately on hearing of the capture of Damaskos with its
imperial treasuries, he turned in a diametrically opposite
direction, marching down due south along the shores of the
Levant, where he laid siege to the powerful and wealthy city of
Tyre, which had refused him admission within its walls, and had
gone so far as to murder the heralds, whom he had sent to require their submission. The cities of Byblos and Sidon surrendered at his approach, but Tyre being strongly situated on an
island, powerfully fortified and protected on the sea-side by a
great flight, made a most desperate and stubborn resistance.
Alexander's first attempt was to build a mole across the channel
14




314               ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
from the continent to the island, so as to bring his engines to play
upon the walls, but his mole was constantly impeded, and once
actually destroyed by the fierce sallies and counter-engines of the
besieged, assisted by storms and adverse weather, of which they
took the utmost advantage.  Machinery and military engineering was brought into play to a greater extent than had ever
before been attempted, and in no respect can any other sieges be
compared to it, in antique history, but those of Syracuse defended by Archimedes against Marcellus, and of Jerusalem
against that most odious and cold-blooded of all Roman butchers,
Titus the son of Vespasian.                          e
For seven long months it foiled all the efforts of the Makedonian to reduce it, nor is it in the least degree probable that he
ever would have taken it, had he not again collected a naval force
with which he ultimately stormed it in the eighth month after
assailing it. From this time forth, whatever there had been before of good or tolerable in the character of Alexander, disappears
altogether, and unless it be in the capricious and unavailing tears
which he is said to have shed over the ashes of Darios, we find
nothing in his nature that is not hateful, disgusting, and almost
superhumanly revolting and atrocious.  Of the Tyrians, eight
thousand men fell in the assault and the carnage which followed
it, and of this slaughter we may in some degree acquit the king,
as it is probable that, if he had endeavored to check or pacify his
soldiery, maddened by the losses they had undergone and the
unexampled severity, and length of the defence, he would scarce
have succeeded; but it is not to be denied that in cold-blood he
sold all the old men, women, and children, except such as were
stealthily saved by their neighbors, the Sidonians, into hopeless
slavery, and crucified two thousand of the youth around the
walls of the place.  Thence, insatiate of blood and unglutted
with gore and booty, he pursued his path of devastation to the
frontiers of Egypt, where he again met stern resistance at the




SIEGE OF GAZA                    315
walls of Gaza, that city of Gaza, the gates of which had been
borne away in ages gone, by the giant strength of Samson.  The
siege of this place again cost him time, and human life, and his
own blood-for he was dangerously wounded here, as he had
been twice before Tyre, and, in  the carrying the two cities,
incurred a greater loss of men than his two great pitched battles
cost him. The capture of this second stronghold he took advantage of, whereby to disgrace himself immortally by the base
and barbarous murder of Boitis, the gallant governor of the place,
who, guilty of no crime but the brave maintenance of the liberties
of his native place, was brought before him covered with wounds
and loaded with chains, was insulted brutally by the unkingly
and unmanly conqueror, and then by his orders dragged by the
heels, perforated and secured with thongs, behind a chariot's
wheels around the walls, yet living, while Alexander, it is said,
exulted openly over his success in imitating his great ancestor,
Achilles, in his vengeance on his enemies. On this paltry plea
it is useless to comment. The very existence of Achilles is hypothetical, and this brutal deed ascribed to him  by Homer is related as an act of signal individual vengeance taken for the death
of his brother in arms Patroklos, and in direct contrast to his
ordinary demeanor which  is represented as kind, generous,
courteous and placable, alike to friend and foe, so soon as the
rage of battle had subsided in his bosom.
Whether this base and felon deed was committed in a fiantic
emulation of the hero of the Iliad, or-which is far more probable-in cold, calculating, merciless policy, to deter other
governors of towns from a like pertinacity of defence, it is equally
detestable and accursed-after that, overlooking all his jealous
slaughters of his best and bravest generals in fits of tyrannical
suspicion, or in orgies of bestial drunkenness, I regard it almost a
crime in the Historian who dares apply to this capricious, jealous,
cruel and fantastical despot, the degraded title of a hero.  Brave




316               ALEXANDE[U THIE GREAT.
he unquestionably was, as every bull-dog is, and as ninety-nine
of every hundred men —for of all others, this much admired and
over-rated gift of mere physical courage, is the commonest and
cheapest; and it is owing to the extreme rarity of cowardice,
no less than to its loathsomeness, that men regard a coward as
a monster, rather than a man-and with that one exception of
bravery, I can see no other quality that he possessed which
should preserve him from the utter execration of mankind.
From Gaza he passed downward into Egypt, which, never a
willing vassal to the Persian kings, surrendered voluntarily to
his arms, and after founding Alexandria-which must, I think,
be regarded, in connection with the other details of this portion
of his expedition, rather as an act of regal ostentation than of
policy or patriotic foresight —rushed away, dragging his army
after him, through wastes of burning  sand, in search of the temple of Hammon, whose venal priests he easily induced to proclaim him the son of the god, and himself a divine king, and one
to be approached, not with human reverence, but with sacrifice
and adoration.
The battle of Issos was delivered, as I have stated above, in
the beginning of the winter B.C. 333.'yre and Gaza were
carried in the following year, in the month Hecatombaion, corresponding to the latter part of July and the beginning of
August, in the archonship of Aniketos,* according to Arrianor, as Diodoros says, of Nikeratos;t and it was not until the
month of Pyanepsion, corresponding to the end of October and
commencement of November, in the second year of the one hundred and twelfth Olympiad, B. C. 331,in the archonship of Aristophanes,} after a lapse of two years, that he returned from this
absurd, if not insane, career of superstitious folly and childlike
vanity, to follow up his advantages, and decide the contest fo,
* Arrian II., xxiv.    t Diodoros xvii. 40.
Arrian III., xvi. Diod. xvii. 49.




FALSE MOVEMENTS.                   317
the crown of Persia on the plains of Arbela.  A graver military
error than this diversion from his true course and true purpose I
cannot conceive, or one that casts a greater doubt upon the
reality of Alexander's ability as a strategist.  As a mere tactician and fighter in the field he was certainly of the first strength;
but, judging from this movement, undertaken for no'conceivable
reason, and from which no possible benefit was derived, I consider him liable to the charge, not only of want of fixity of purpose and. soundness of judgment, but of serious strategetical
incapacity.
It is idle to speak of the danger of leaving such places as
Tyre and Gaza in his rear, or of suffering such a granary and
store-house as Egypt to continue in his possession; for in the
first place, their geographical position, separated by leagues and
hundreds of leagues of barren and burning deserts from the
regions into which Dafios had betaken himself, rendered it
impossible that either those cities or that province could have
made any effectual diversion in his favor, even if they had desired to do so. And secondly, none of the tributary cities or
remote dependencies of the Persian kings ever served them voluatarily, or, if they did so at all, from loyalty; and Egypt, as the result
showed, was far better disposed to revolt herself fiom the arms
of Darios than to strengthen him against his enemies.
The consequence of this faulty and umneaning movement to
the southward, when he ought to have been following Darios
up with the utmost promptitude and perseverance-which had
he done, that unfortunate prince must have lost his capital, and,
probably, his whole empire, without the possibility of raising an
army to strike another blow for it, and that long before Tyre had
fallen-the consequence, I say, of that absurd movement and
expedition was his being compelled, almost two years afterward,
to fight a third and most unnecessary battle against a much
larger army than he had yet encounltered, in ground exceedingly




318               ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
adverse to himself, and as advantageous to the Orientals, who
had gained experience from disaster-and, in fact, to risk the
defeat which he very narrowly escaped-his left wing being very
nearly defeated, his rear turned, and his encampment actually
sacked by the barbarians, at Arbela.
No one, however ignorant of military affairs, but must perceive that an army of a million of men cannot be brought
together, armed and embodied, in a moment; and, in fact, we
find that it was not until after Alexander's return from the great
oasis in the African desert, above two thousand miles distant, and
after a lapse of two entire years, that he was enabled to take the
field against him.  We have seen that his forces were completely dispersed; that on his arriving at Thapsakos, after the
battle, the Persian king could muster only four thousand men
under his standard; so that a vigorous pursuit, even had it
failed to capture him, could not have failed to drive him into the
extreme north-eastern provinces-to which he fled after Arbelaand to leave his capital, and all the wealth and power of his
empire in the hands of the conquerors. His communications
were all safe with Makedonia and Greece at large, through Asia
Minor, which afforded him  an admirable base of operations
against Lower Asia, governed as it was by his own officers, and
secured him a safe retreat, should the worst have occurred. But
when we consider, in war above all things, the immense advantage of dealing successive blows, each after each, before the stunning effect of the last has passed away; the importance of acting
against a people demoralized and dispirited by defeat, and
despairing even of safety by arms, rather than of giving them
time to recover courage, growing out of the assailant's tardiness
and want of energy; and last of all, the great influence which
the fall of their capital produces on any nation-but more especially upon the Orientals-we cannot fail to see that Alexander
threw away a chance, if not a certainty, of terminating the war




BEFORE ARBELA.                  319
at a blow; and so far from gaining any adequate advantage by
the delay, weakened his own army, exposed it to needless toils
and perils, and alienated the people of Syria by his ruthless cruelty, with no possible object that I can discover, unless it were
the spoils of the proud and wealthy Tyre, so long the mistress
of the seas.
It was early spring of the year 331, when Alexander took his
departure from Memphis, and returned, through Phoinikia, by
the same way he had come, receiving congratulatory embassies
from all the Greek states, regulating the tributes, and accepting
the submission of the conquered provinces, as he passed; but he
did not reach Thapsakos and the fords of the Euphrates, which
Darios had crossed a few days after the battle of Issos, until
the month Hecatombaion-the same in which, on the previous year, he had taken Tyre. Here he found Mazaios, with
three thousand horse and two thousand Greek mercenaries,
appointed to defend the passage of the river, but they made no
offer at defence, flying without drawing a bowstring, leaving
the Makedonians to cross the stream unmolested. Hence he
marched up the Euphrates, keeping the river on his left, through
Mesopotamia, in a northerly direction, with his back toward
Babylon, having learned from some scattered prisoners of
Darios' army who were taken on the march, that his rival
was encamped on the Tigris, with a much larger army than
he had in Kilikia, and intended to make a stand there, to
obstruct his passage. Thither then he followed with all speed,
as if to make up for the time he had wasted during the two past
seasons; but when he reached the banks of the river, he found
neither Darios nor any forces left to confront him, and crossed
the Tigris, without any opposition from the enemy, but with
great difficulty, owing to the strength and rapidity of the
current.
On the following day a few horse showed themselves on the




320               ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
plain, when Alexander instantly charged with the body-guard,
and one squadron of the Companions, and the guides, and though
they fled without striking a blow he pursued them so sharply
that he killed a few and made several prisoners, fiom whom he
learned where Darios lay, and of what troops his army was composed. For he had now called in all the wild and barbarous
tribes from the shores of Kaspian to the Persian gulf, Indians and
Baktrians, and Sogdianians, under their Satrap Bessos, and
Sakians of the Skythian race, horse archers, serving not as subjects of Darios, but as allies of Darios; and Barsaentes their
Satrap had brought the Arachosians and the hill-tribes of India,
and Satibarzanes brought the Arkians.  The Parthians, and
Ilyrcanians, and Tapuroi all cavalry, were then under Pbrataphernes.  Atropates led the Medes, and with the Medes were
enrolled the Kadusians, the Albanians, the Sakesinai; but the tribes
from the Persian gulf were commanded by Orondobates, and
Ariobarzanes, and Otanes.  The Uxians and Susians followed
Oxathres, the son of Abulitos. Bupares led the Babylonians,
and the scattered tribe of Karians and Sitakinians, mustered with
the Babylonians.  Mithraustes and Orontes commanded the
Armenians, Ararakes the Kappadokians, and Mazaios the troops
of Koilesyria., and Syria between the rivers.  Their whole force
amounted to forty thousand horse, a million foot, two hundred
scythed chariots, and fifteen elephants, which had been brought
thither by the Indians proper from beyond the Indos.  And with
this enormous armament, Darios was awaiting his approach in
the plains of Gaugamela on the river Bunmodos about seventy
miles distant fiom the city of Arbela, now Erbil, in a country
perfectly level and free from the slightest inequality of surface;
for Darios had been advised that his defeat on the Issos was
caused by his wanting the room  to disp!lay his forces, and by:ug'oedIness of the surface hindering the action of his cavally, and
believinlg this-as it was indeed in good part true-had em




TIlE FIELD OF ARBELA.              821
ployed his numbers in cutting away every hillock, and filling up
every hollow, so that the whole field was practicable for his
chariots, and for the charge of his admirable horse.
On gaining this intelligence Alexander halted his army, and
remained where he was four days, which he spent in fortifying
an entrenched camp with a fosse and a palisade, within which
he determined to leave all his baggage and supernumeraries, and
all the soldiers who chanced to be hors de comnbat, while he
would advance himself with the fighting men, carrying nothing
but their arms, and deliver battle on the spot. The armies were
at this time about eight miles asunder; but there was a range
of low hillocks between them which intercepted their view, nor
until Alexander had marched half the intervening distance and
ascended the hills, did he discover the countless multitudes of
the enemy filling the plains almost beyond the reach of eyesight
with all the gorgeous glitter and barbaric pomp of Asiatic warfare. And here, it is said, Parmenion advised him to attack the
enemy by night in his camps, and that Alexander refused, saying
that he came to fight battles not to steal them.
He decided well, although that unquestionably was not his
reason; though it was well too that he should give it as such,
since it was likely to encourage the soldiers, who were not, it
should seem, in such high spirits as usual, having fallen into a
panic once, when no enemy was within miles of them, as they
marched through Mesopotamia, and having been again so much
disordered in fording the Tigris that had they been attacked by
Mazaios they would surely have been defeated. But Alexander
well knew that in a night attack, the least disorder or want of
combined action must be fatal, and that the risk must be greater
to a small force like his own, the only chance of which was perfect unity of movement, and intelligent concert.  He deferred
the battle, therefore, to the next morning, and spent the afternoon in carefully reconnoitring the ground, which he suspected




322               ALEXANDER T'IIE GREAT.
to be perforated with pitfalls, and strewn with calthrops and
crowsfeet, to lame his horses. It is said that in the morning of
the battle he slept so late and so soundly that Parmenion had
hard work to arouse him, so anxious had he been of late, lest the
enemy should persist in refusing action, and devastating the
country behind him as he retreated.
And well he might be anxious, and self-reproachful, for it was
entirely his own fault that Darios had an army there at all, to
encounter him; for not one man of all the myriads there assembled came from the regions which he had traversed, but had
been brought up at vast labor and expense of time and money
from the extreme regions of the east, the north, and the south,
almost from the limits of the frigid to those of the torrid zone.
Doubtless he now felt and acknowledged to himself that for the
idiotic vanity of being styled the son of Hammon, he had lost
the opportunity of being actually king of Asia, and that he had
in consequence all his battles to fight over again here at Arbela,
and that except in being so far advanced into the bowels of the
land, and having in his favor the prestige of victory, he was not
one iota the better, than he was on the eve of the Granikos.
Had Napoleon won the battle of Issos in November, he would
have been crowned in Babylon before the new year. Nothing
in war is of so much consequence as time, and the best judge and
economist of time is the greatest general.  But now Alexander
was in the field, and there, as is admitted, he had few superiors
-he had desperate valor, he possessed the full confidence of his
men, he was in command of as fine an army as ever marched to
victory, and, last not least, his fortune never failed him, though
certainly he tried it to the utmost. The army of Darios was thus
arrayed, for the plan of his battle was taken in the original draft
as Aristokelos states. On the left were the Baktrian cavalry, the
Daai, and the Arachosians, and next to these the Persians, horse
and foot commingled.  Then counting fiom the right the




THE ARRAY AT ARBELA.               323
Susians and to the right of these the Kaduiians up to the
centre of the whole array. To the extreme right of the line the
Medes were ranked with the men from Koile Syria, and Mesopotamia; the Parthians and Sakians, the Hyrcanians and Tapiroi,
fhe Albanians and Sakesinai closed up with the centre, where
Darios fought in person, with the corps known as the Kinsmen
of the king, and the Persian immortals having golden balls on
the reverse of their spears, and the Indians and the Karian exiles
and Mardian archery.  The Uxians, Babylonians, Sitakinians
and nations from the Persian gulf were drawn up in deep masses
behind the centre. On the left, opposed to Alexander's right
were the Skythian cavalry, with about a thousand Baktrians, and
a hundred war chariots; the elephants were opposed to the bodyguard with fifty chariots, and on the extreme right of the Persians
stood the Armenian and Kappadokian horse with the last fifty of
the scythed cars; but the Greek mercenaries, who could alone
hope to withstand the shock of the Makedonians, were stationed
in the centre, on either hand of Darios and his Persian bodyguard.
Against this formidable array Alexander ordered his men thus.
On the right of his line were the Royal companions of the horse
life-guard, the first of whom were the squadron of body-guards,
commanded by Kleitos son of Dropidas, then the squadrons of
Glaukias, of Ariston, of Sopis son of HIerrnodoros, of Herakleides
son of Antiochos, of Denetrios son of Athamenes, of Meleager,
and, last of the royal squadrons, of Hegesilochos son of Hippostratos. But Philotas the son of Parmenion commanded the
whole body of the household cavalry.  Next to the horse was
the royal foot guard of the hypaspistai, and then the remainder
of those troops. After them, who were under the command of
Nikanor, a second son of Parmenion, stood the regiments of
Koinos, Perdikkas, Meleager son of Neoptolemos of Polyperchon
of Amyntas under command of Sinmias, that day-for Amyntas




32 4              ALEXANDER TItE GREAT.
was on recruiting service in Makedonia; and lastly, to the left of
the whole phalanx, of Krateros son of Alexandros, who commanded all the infantry of the left.
Next to the phalanx were the allied horse, under Eriguios son
of Larekos, and the Thessalians of Philip son of Menelaos; and
Parlmenion had the leading of all the cavalry of the left, and kept
about his own person the best of the Pharsalian horse and most
of the Thessalians. Such was the array of the front line, but in
the rear of these he had formed a second line, whose leaders had
orders to form front to the rear, in case of the enemy's turning
their flanks and attacking them in reverse.  On the right, supporting the royal squadron, were half the Agrianians, led by
Attalos, the Makedlnian bowmen under Brison, and what were
called the old bands of mercenaries under Kleander. In the van
of these were the guides, and Paionian horse, led by Aretes and
Ariston; and again, in the van of these the allied cavalry under
Menidas.  But, in advance of the royal squadron, and the other
Companions, were the rest of the Agrianians and the archery,
and the javelineers of Balakros opposed to the scythed chariots;
and Menidas had orders, in case the enemy should turn that
flank, to take them in flank with a flying charge as they wheeled;
so was the right wing ordered. But in the rear of the left, to
guard against a flank attack, were the Thrakians of Sitalkes, the
allied cavalry, of Koiranos, the Odrysians under Agathon son of
Turimrna, and, in the van of all these, the mercenary troopers
commanded by Andromachos the son of Hiero. With the baggage guard, the Thrakian infantry were posted in reserve; the
whole of Alexander's forces amounting to forty thousand foot,
and seven thousand horse-a small force, indeed, as it would
seem, to contend in the open field against a million of men. But
in truth, as all these Oriental battles show, the Greek soldiers
were only actually opposed to so many men as could be brought
to bear upon them at one instant; for the moment the first




THE ATTACK AT ARBELA.                325
struggle was over the battles were ended, since the Orientals
could never be made to act in succession as reserves, but
when those who were exposed to the first brunt turned their
backs, all fled in headlong rout and irretrievable confusion.  So
that in reality the vast numbers of these Asiatic hordes rather
swelled the carnage of their own ranks, and enhanced the glory
of the Greeks, than increased their difficulties or added to their
danger.
So soon as the armies were fairly fiont to front, Alexander as
usual charged first with the cavalry of his right wing, and the
Persians met him in full career, greatly outflanking him to the
right, and the Skythians, who were wheeling round his flanks,
were engaged with the troops set to oppose them; and still
Alexander led at full gallop to the spear-hand, and was almost
beyond that part of the plain which was levelled, when Darios
fearing that his chariots would be rendered useless, directed all
the advanced cavalry of his left to turn Alexander's right, and
prevent his farther progress to that hand.  And, as they did so,
Alexander launched Menidos with the mercenaries against them;
but the Skythian and Baktrian horse charged Menidos home, and
broke his squadrons by the vast superiority of their numbers,
when Alexander brought up Ariston's Paionians, and the allies,
who broke the barbarians in turn.  These again were supported
by fresh squadrons of Baktrians, and rallying on their supports,
fougfit hand to hand furiously with the Greeks, and Alexander's
men fell fast-for they were sorely overmatched, and the Skythians were better accoutred with defensive axmor-still the
Makedonians could not be forced off their ground, and charging
constantly in open column of squadrons, at last bore the enemy
bodily out of their lines. Then the barbarians launched their
chariots, hoping to dislocate the phalanx, and cut it to pieces
with the formidable scythes. But in this they were sorely disappointed, for the Agrianians and the javelineers of Balakros, who




326              ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
were in front of the royal companions, received them with a
shower of missiles, which they could not brook, and seized the
reins; dragging the drivers down, and surrounding the horses,
cut them to pieces. Some few passed through the ranks, which
opened to receive them; and these ran away, doing no damage,
to the rear, where they were mastered by the grooms and horseboys of Alexander's army.
But as Darios now advanced along his whlole front, Alexander ordered Aretes to charge the horse who were wheeling
round his right; and as this charge succeeded to perfection, and
separated the cavalry from the barbarian phalanx on the right,
Alexander himself charged with all his cavalry of the Royal Companions and his phalanx full into the gap, at a tremendous pace
and with the terrible battle-cry. For a short space the strife
was stubborn and hand to hand; but, as Alexander and the
life-guard charged in, irresistibly, plunging their spears into the
faces of the Persians, and riding them down with the sheer weight
of their horses, and as the Makedonian phalanx fell in upon them,
solid as a wall, and bristling with the terrible sarissai, the Asiatics could endure it no longer, and Darios himself was the first
man to turn and fly. And at the same moment the Skythian
horse gave way before the onset of Aretas, and in that quarter
of the field all was utter ruin and carnage among the Persians;
for the Makedonians trampled them under foot and slaughtered
them at pleasure.
But Simmias, with his regiment and those to his left, was
unable to join in the pursuit, but halted his phalanx, and maintained a standing fight; for intelligence had reached him that
the Makedonian left was worsted. And thus the front being
opened, some of the Indian and Persian horse broke through the
centre and cut their way to the camp and the baggage-gualrd; and
there was desperate fighting there, for the barbarian prisoners of
war rose on their captors, and, taking up arms, made a great




STORM OF THE CAMP.                327
slaughter of the unarmed camp followers; and the cry went
through the tents that victory was with the Persians, and the
hearts of Sisygambis the mother of Darios, and her captive
granddaughters, beat high between hope and terror. But the
hope was soon ended, for the troops who were drawn up for that
purpose in the rear of the front line, wheeled instantly, and forming face to the rear, took the plunderers of the camp in reverse,
and making a fearful slaughter of them, recovered all that was
lost in that quarter.
But in the mean time, the Persian right, ignorant of the flight
of Darios, had completely turned the left of Parmenion; so that,
far from being able to assist Alexander or to press the flying foe,
he was unable to hold his own ground, but sent to the king for
aid. He, having no enemy in his part of the field who was not
already in headlong flight, turned most unwillingly from his pursuit, for he had strong hopes of capturing Darios and terminating
the war with a thunderstroke.  He knew, however, too well the
consequence of leaving a field half won, and wheeling hard to
his own left, with all the cavalry of the Royal Companions,
charged, as hard as they could spur their horses to the shock, on
the right of the barbarians. The first whom they encountered
were the worsted Parthians and Indians, and the bravest of the
Persian horse, retreating from the Greek camp, and this was the
heaviest and fiercest conflict of the day; for finding themselves
cut off, and seeing no hope of safety unless by dint of sheer blows,
they charged up face to face against Alexander, without hurling
a javelin or turning a charger, but struck each man at the man
opposed to him, and slashed and hewed, and were slashed at
and hewn down, unsparing and unspared. In the end, however,
Alexander and the Greek valor prevailed, though sixty of the
Companions were killed outright in that short melee, and
IHephaistion and Koinos and Menidas were wounded.
And now Alexander was on the point of attacking the Extreme




328               ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
right wing of the enemy, having swept their whole front from
the extreme left, when he perceived that his work was done to
his hand by the gallantry of his Thessalians, who never failed
him, so that he was enabled to return to the pursuit of Darioswhom  he followed on the spur so long as there was light to
see-but when he had crossed the Lykos or Great Zab, not far
fiom the spot where the Greek leaders were murdered in the
expedition of Kyros, he halted for a few hours at midnight, to
recruit his men and horses; and on the following morning
resumed the chase as far as to Arbela, seventy miles distant from
the field of battle, hoping there to take Darios; but he had again
escaped-perhaps unfortunate that he did so, for be might have
found the compassion of his enemy a surer stay than the loyalty
of his false friends. Of Alexander's personal attendants there fell
in the conflict and the pursuit a hundred men and above a
thousand horses, half of them belonging to the Royal Companions,
between wounds and weariness; the entire loss of the Makedonian army being about five hundred, while that of the enemy
was counted at three hundred thousand killed, and more prisoners than slain, with all the elephants and camels, and all the
wealth and treasures of the camp.
And this action, in fact, terminated the war; for from Arbela
Alexander marched straight to Babylon, which sent out a deputation of the priests and chief men of the city to meet him, with
gifts and the keys of the city, acknowledging him conqueror and
king.  Thence, after a short pause, which he spent in ordering
the government, appointing officers, regulating tributes, and
establishing everything on a solid foundation, he marched. in
twenty days to Susa, the royal city and seat of government,
where he became master of all the treasures accumulated by the.
Persian kings for ages-including all the spoils carried away from
Greece by Xerxes, and fifty thousand talents of silver-equal to
fifteen inillions sterling-and virtually king of Asia. From Suza




THE PURSUIT.                    329
he pressed hard on the traces of Darios, through India, and,
sending out his generals in all directions to complete the subjugation of the country, pursued himself day and night, with his
light troops and horse —chasing the more earnestly when he
knew that Darios was in peril from the treachery of Bessoskilling horses and wearing out men, but himself indefatigable;
until at length, when he had but five hundred soldiers left about
him, he found his hapless rival breathing his last, pierced with
numerous wounds, and having endured, as the climax of all agonies, that of expiring by the treacherous hands of false friends,
without a friendly hand to wipe the death sweat from his brow
or to close his dying eyes.
His enemy and conqueror, they say, wept over him; certainly
he buried him with all the honors due to a king, and in a kingly
sepulchre; but not till after he had robbed him of all that makes
life valuable-family, friends, station, country, life-for if it was
not by his hands or by his orders, it was by his instrumentality,
that he died.
So after making him  a widower, fatherless, and a beggar, he
wept over him, and buried him as a king.  The king's tears and
the kingly burial availed the senseless clay about the same.
But they were in truth offered to the vainglory of the living,
not to the memory of the dead, and so their purpose was
answered.
The death of Darios occurred in the third year of the one
hundred and twelfth Olympiad, 330 B.C.; so that four years
only had elapsed between his passage of the Hellespont and his
succession to the undisputed throne of Asia, which, had he used
ordinary foresight and energy after the battle of Issos, he might
have grasped two years sooner.
And here I leave Alexander-for it is not his life nor his character that I am relating, but his military and strategetical
career, which I regard as terminated here; so far, at least, as to
15




330               ALEXANDER TIlE GREAT.
enable us to focnm a judgment of his qualities, merits, and defects,
as a strategist.
It is true that his life lasted four years longer, and that those
four years were passed in almost incessant warfare; that he overrun the countries, shedding human blood like water, from the
shores of the Kaspian Sea, which he looked upon the first
of Greeks, perhaps of Europeans —to the baiks of the Indus,
down which his galleys sailed triumphant to the Persian Gulf,
and thence ascended the Red Sea to his Egyptian provincethat he gained fruitless victories, barren of all but slaughter,
whithersoever he went, and founded cities, the very names of
which have perished; that he risked his own life and that of his
followers as recklessly in the storming of some paltry Indian
village, as when all was at stake on the fields of the Issos or
Gaugamela.
But beyond desperate fool-hardy courage and the admirable
discipline of his unrivalled troops, there is little to observe and
Wothing to admire in the details of his latter campaigns.  His
cruelties, his debaucheries, his capricious jealousy, and almost
insane tyranny, are so well known that I need not dwell on them
as a counterblast to the dazzling splendor of his glorious career,
as it is called, of victory and renown.
He died, as it has generally been stated by historians and
almost universally received, of the consequences of a more
frantic orgy of drunkenness than was usual even for bimbut as it is now pretty satisfactorily ascertained, of one of those
devouring and fatal fevers peculiar to the Punjaub and the
banks of the Scinde, whither he had pushed his frantical
pursuit of glory. So that the drunkenness was the consequence
of the burning thirst which accompanies that peculiar fever, not
the fever the consequence of the drunkenness. So he died, but
not with him died the evils he had done, for he bequeathed his
empire on his death bed to the bravest —he might as well have




HIS STRATEGY.                   331
said with Pyrrhos of Epiros, to the sharpest sword, for that was
the arbiter -appealed to through many an age of blood and
barbarism among his successors.
His career has been compared, in my opinion most unjustly,
to that of Napoleon-there being but two points of resemblance
between them, the extent of the territories they overran and
devastated, alike without consolidating an empire, or founding a
dynasty-and the oceans of blood they shed to gratify, not
satiate, their boundless ambition.  As a general, Alexander
cannot for a moment stand in juxtaposition with the mighty
Corsican, who never took a leaf out of any man's book of
strategy whereby to win a battle; but where the difficulties
waxed the greatest and the dangers, thence drew the most
splendid inspirations, thence produced his most marvellous resources. The history of his battles is as various as the battles
themselves are numerous, and each is a study and a lesson in
itself. Alexander's battles were all cast in the same mould, all
won on the same principle, and that principle not his own, but
the oblique method of Epaminondas; overpowering the enemy's
left by his own personal attack, with his centre and left withdrawn, and then wheeling to his own left and enfilading the
ranks opposed to him by a flank attack. Nor did he do this as
Epaminondas did-by a concentration of force on a single point,
so that his onset must to a mathematical certainty succeed-but
by reliance on the prestige of his great name and the vehemence
of his personal onslaught. In any one of his battles, had the
enemy been able to make head against him for half an hour
longer than he did, the Makedonian army would have been
beaten to a certainty. Never was a won battle nearer lost,
unless we except Marengo, which was not one but two battles
fought in one day,-than that of Arbela, for the day was lost on
the left, more than doubtful on the right, and the camp taken in
the rear, when Alexander's personal rush upon the centre carried




332              ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
all before it, and the flight of Darios gave him a victory which
might even then have been long contested, if not won, by
Persia. His own death while leading would at any moment
have lost all, for it was his own fiery courage and the terror that
attached to his name, not his plans or his tactics, that conquered.
As a daring soldier and superb cavalry officer he was undeniably great, and with but two rivals, one of the middle ages, one
of these latter days-Cceur de Lion, and Joachim Murat, whom
in very much of his military character he most resembles.
As a man, he stands so immeasurably below Napoleon that I
am almost ashamed to mention them  together, for Napoleon,
though stern, inflexible, and careless of human life where policy
required its taking off, was as far removed as possible from
cruelty, while Alexander was barbarous beyond Henry VIII.
and Nero, in his fits of frenzy, sacrificing like the former his
nearest friends to his moods of tyrannical suspicion, and rejoicing
like the latter in strange, unusual, and hideous tortures of his
victims.
For the rest, he has left no Simplon and no Code Napoleon to
stand up perdurable monuments of beneficent genius above his
sea of bloodshed be has literally left nothing beyond
A name at which the world grew pale,
To point a moral and adorn a tale.
He was, however, a great and appointed instrument, as I
believe all the world's great conquerors have been, in the hands
of the Almighty, either for the preservation or for the punishment of nations.
I believe that to him mainly it is due thliat Europe was not
enslaved by the Asiatics; for the Grecek, divided as they were by
intestine feuds, could have offered no resistance to their combined
power, except when themselves combined-as they could only
be by the iron hand of a military despotism. The Romans had




SUMMARY OF HIIS CHARACTER.              333
not yet emerged from their small Italian struggles, nor attained
such national weight or military science in those days, as could
have enabled them to turn the scale, had Asia, once possessed of
Hellas as she was of the Ionian cities, and added to her Tyrian,
Sidonian, and Carthaginian fleets-for in such a war Carthage
would have gone hand in hand with Persia-the terrors of the
Makedonian Phalanx, the Peloponnesian  Hoplitai, and the
invincible triremes of Attika.
Therefore, in some sort, we owe gratitude to the wild
conqueror, and it may be that we are in some sort indebted for
the language we speak, and the liberty we enjoy, in a hemisphere he never dreamed of, to the victories of Alexander of
Makedon.
It may be thought that the judgment I have expressed in this
instance, is over severe; for so our nature appears to be constituted, that the eclat and splendor of great personal valor, the
extent of mighty countries overrun and subdued, produces such
wonderful effects on the minds of men, that the gorgeousness
and glitter of feats of arms and the palms of victory efface all
considerations of mortal suffering on the battle field, in the
dungeon or on the scaffold, and live forever conferring a false and
fitful immortality, long after the groans and sorrows of the
victims have sunk into the silence of oblivion and the tomb.
Yet, if we consider calmly the atrocities committed by his ordeiis
and under his authority at Thebes, at Tyre, at Gaza, and the
barbarous torments inflicted in cold-blooded policy, alike on the
good and gallant Britis and on the brutal and bloodthirsty
Bessos-if we remember the unrelenting, if not undeserved,
slaughter of the high-spirited and brave Parmenion, the ruthless
slaughter of the hardy Klutos, who had saved his own life in
the desperate melee of Issos-if we recount the woes inflicted
on the brave population of a loyal country, fighting in defence
of their own liberties, the fearful waste of blood in his reckless




334              ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
and fruitless battles, we shall have no reason, I think, to doubt
the correctness of the verdict which condemns him as the
rashest of conquerors, and the cruellest of all who have laid
claim to the much misapplied title of hero.








--- - -------
ee                                                                 7~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I-_~  1_ —--  _ —'~~`:i __,= — — _r —-  
-77
N S E:T  OF  ~U:,MIDI^N  HOUSE:.                                                           p. 334




VIII.
HANNIBAL,
HIS BATTLES OF THE TICINUS, TREBBIA, THRASYMENE, AND CANN'e.
HIS CAMPAIGNS, CONDUCT, AND CHARACTER.
IT cannot fail, at first sight, to strike even the most unobservant reader of ancient history with something of wonder, that
we know so little distinctly, and, if I may so express myself,
individually, of this man, the greatest captain, beyond all question, of antiquity; perhaps-his means and the then state of military science considered-the greatest of all aoes.
The causes of this general ignorance are manifold; but the
most important are the entire absence of any Carthaginian narrative of the circumstances of the Punic wars; and the ignorance
or favoritism of the Greek and Roman writers on the subjectPolybius having been a personal fiiend of Scipio and Lcelius;
and Livy, writing so long after the occurrence of the facts which
he describes, that it was not much easier for him, than it is for
us, to arrive at the real truths of what he received as history, or
its materials; the legends, namely, of the illustrious Roman
houses, and the funeral orations of consulars and senators, which,
for the most part, contained as many falsehoods as they counted
lines.
It is more remarkable, however, that, until the Colossus Niebuhr came upon the stage, no modern historian was clear-sighted




336                      HANNIBAL.
enough to discern, tnrough the thick mists which prejudice,
blind error, or intentional falsehood, have accumulated over the
ages of Roman republicanism, even a glimpse of the transcendant
genius, unrivalled military foresight and resource, unwearied perseverance, and indomitable patriotism, of this great captain, this
great politician, and, in spite of some defects, which were those
of his age rather than his own, this great man.
Niebuhr, it is true, lived not to bring down the history of that
wondrous nation, on whose early ages he first poured the light
of intelligence, to the days of the hero, whom I shall endeavor
briefly to set before my readers in his true light; but from one
passage in his third volume it is clear that, had he lived to write
of the second Punic war, he would have done justice to the
incomparable greatness and genius of this much-belied and unappreciated leader. In that passage he speaks of " Scipio as towering above his nation, as much as Hannibal above all nations,"
and to any person who has carefully studied the career of the
great Carthaginian, in the graphic pages of Arnold's magnificent
history-alas! like Niebuhr's, left incomplete, by the untimely
death of the author-it will be evident that in this phrase there
is nothing of hyperbole.
Professing, myself, to adduce no new fact, scarce even
theory, concerning this remarkable soldier, it strikes me that a
short digest of his campaigns, divested of the dry details which
render historical studies displeasing to the superficial reader, and
combined with some comparisons of his deeds with those of other
greatest soldiers, may prove neither unpalatable nor unuseful to
the perusers of ephemeral literature; while it may tend to clear
the memory of a much misrepresented hero, from the prejudiced
opinions naturally instilled into us by our school readings of
IIorace's immortal odes, and " Livy's pictured page."
Hannibal was, it would seem, born a general-his father,
Iamnilcar, was the greatest of his nation and his day; to him




HIS OATH.                    337
succeeded HIasdrubal his son-in-law, to him Hannibal, the greatest
of his race, supported by his brothers, Hasdrubal, the younger,
and Mago, both generals of extraordinary ability, and with the
exception of Scipio alone, both superior in coup d' ceil, resource,
and strategy, to any Roman leader. Never did one family produce such a galaxy of military splendor. It must not be understood, however, that they were merely born, for they were constantly bred, soldiers; the camp was their home from their early
childhood; the clang of arms and the din of martial music, was
the lullaby of their almost cradled sleep; and, when they came
to the years of adolescence, the battle field was alike their playground and their school, and their great father their tutor in the
rudiments of strategy, which none could better teach.  Hannibal
was but nine years old, when he accompanied his father to Spain,
that father having first made him swear upon the altar that he
would never be the friend of Romans. " Hannibal* swore, and
to his latest hour never forgot his vow." The boy swore ignorantly at the time, though he forgot not; but it must not be
supposed that the father dictated that vow ignorantly, nor even
in the bitterness of blind hatred, or the darkness of political prejudice and passion. The man probably, even then, discovered
dimly the future greatness of the child; the patriot assuredly had
discoved the inherent and eternal antagonism of Rome and his
country, the immutable necessity that one of those two must fall
and leave the other the world's mistress.
Rome had just come off conqueror, and humbled Carthage to
almost the lowest degradation, after a long and doubtful strife of
two-and-twenty years, waged upon sea and land with changeful
fortunes. Carthage had lost her wealthiest colonies, and above all
the dominion of the seas; for the time she could maintain the conflict no longer, but the genius of IHamilcar saw where her vital
energies might be renovated, and whence a mortal blow might
* Arnold, II. 257.




338                    HANNIBAL.
be dealt against her now triumphantt To Spain he sailed, and
in Spain he laid the plans, and began the system, which his far
greater son carried out, and by which he shook Rome to its
foundation.
For two-and-twenty years peace lasted between the rival
states; and during those two-and-twenty years, thanks to the
absence of Carthaginian and the paucity of Roman annals, we
know but little of the individual progress of the great Punic
family, except that they had conquered and consolidated a vast
and wealthy Carthaginian empire, including almost the whole of
Spain south of the Ebro, abounding in rich mines of gold and
silver, and swarming with a martial population which formed the
very flower of the Punic armies. On the death of lHamilcar he
was worthily succeeded by Hasdrubal, his son-in-law, whose progress in farther consolidating the Punic power in Spain, and
whose eminent abilities displayed in the foundation of New Carthage, at that time the Gibraltar of the Mediterranean by its commanding and central position, so far alarmed the Romans that
even then they' would have renewed the war with Carthage, had
they not been deterred by the terrors of a Gaulish invasion.
Three years had elapsed, when HIasdrubal was assassinated in
his tent, and by the common voice of the army, ratified by the
decree of the Senate, the youthful Hannibal was chosen in his
place.
Up to this time we know nothing of the future hero, except
his parentage and vow; for the next twenty years he filled the
world with his renown, and had his fortunes matched his greatness
and his glory, the world to-day would be. no more like that it is,
than it would, had the Saracens over-run and subjugated Europe
in the day of Charles Martel.
Scarce any one at all familiar with history can have failed to
observe the extraordinary parallelism between the campaigns,
the military conduct, and the fortunes of Hannibal and Napoleon.




PARALLEL WITH NAPOLEON.                339
That parallelism  is thus strikingly touched upon by Arnold.
"Twice," he says, "in history has there been witnessed the
struggle of the highest individual genius against the resources
and institutions of a great nation; and in both cases the nation
has been victorious. For seventeen years Hannibal strove against
Rome; for sixteen years Napoleon Bonaparte strove against England; the efforts of the first ended in Zama, those of the second
in Waterloo." The extraordinary similitude of the genius, conduct, and military character of these two giants in arms, is
far from  ending with this general resemblance.  Almost from
point to point, their destinies are similar. At the age of twentysix, Hannibal was elected to the supreme command of the
Carthaginian armies, and thenceforth to the close of the war he
disposed at his will the resources, and held in the hollow of his
hand the councils of his country. At the age of twenty-six,
Napoleon assumed the command of the army of Italy, and from
thence his fortunes and his will were those of France. The scenes
of the glory of both were the Alps and Italy. Both had the faculty
of seeing at a glance where the blow must be planted, which
should cripple the enemy; both delivered that blow instantaneously and irresistibly. Both had the same reliance on their
cavalry as an arm of service; Hannibal winning by it all his
greatest victories, and Napoleon insisting to the last, that cavalry
in equal force, equally led, must conquer infantry. Both vanquished every leader in the field, whom he, personally encountered, save the very last; and there is probably no one so prejudiced
as to assert at this day that either Hannibal or Napoleon found
in his conqueror a superior in strategy or in military genius.
Nor does the similarity end even here; for both found their final
vanquishers in generals made in Spain by conflicts with their
own lieutenants, who were in no wise superior to other eminent
leaders of their enemy; and both ultimately perished miserably,




340                     HI NNIDXAL.
in exile, victims to the countries which they had kept so long in
awe and perturbation.
In a military point of view, the correctness of their coup
d'oeil; the lightning speed with which they followed up conception by execution; the power of concentration, by which constantly inferior on the whole, in force, they were ever superior at
the point of action; the marvellous foresight, by which they
showed seeming rashness to be real prudence; the thunderous
crash with which, when they delivered battles, they annihilated,
not conquered, their antagonists; nay, the unerring certainty
with which they threw themselves on the communications of
their enemy, and defeated at a blow the most skilful combinations, were identical in these two mighty captains-none other,
in my opinion, ever have possessed the same qualities, or used
them with the same effect.  Both were the makers of their own
systems, the founders of their own schools; but on the whole, I
must consider Hannibal as the greater strategist of the two;
because, in the first place, he was the prime originator and
inventor, while his great eulogist, and in some points imitator,
had the benefit of his example, as well as that of other mighty
conquerors; and in the second place, because with means infinitely inferior, against obstacles infinitely greater, and without
the aid of modern science, he accomplished, what may be
held to have been, in the then condition of the world, results
nearly equal.
As men of genuine greatness-I shall observe only, that no
single act of Hannibal's life ever subserved to any selfish motive
or ministered to his own aggrandizement; and that no single
act of Napoleon's did not so.  The consideration of self would
seem never to have occurred to the one; to have been ever present to the other. Both were fanatics for glory; the one because
his own was his country's; the other, because his country's was
his own. Both were accused by their enemies of great moral




ALLEGED CRIMINALITY.               341
crimes and turpitude; and both, in the main, unjustly.  It is
one of the sad truths concerning warfare, but no less a truth;
that, in playing the game of war, with nations for playthings
and the world for a field, expediency must be in a great degree
the moral rule; and that, if the game is to be played at all, the
sufferings or the lives of individuals, even if those individuals be
counted by thousands, must not be considered, where the sufferings or the lives of millions are in question. The sin lies in the
playing the game at all, not in the details or the practice of the
play. Both these great men were stern and unrelenting in carrying out the lines which they held it true policy to lay down;
neither, so far as history shows, was tainted in the least degree
by anything resembling personal cruelty. Both have been
accused of faithlessness-a charge never in any case to be much
regarded, as brought between nations; for nations are ever
prompt to reclaim loudly, when the losers, against deeds, the
like of which themselves commit readily, when the winners. In
the case of Hannibal, the Romans had all the history-writing to
themselves; thence, Punic faith is to this day the proverb for
entire faithlessness.  Had the French writers alone made the
world's annals of the late great struggle, "perfidious Albion "
had gone down a byeword to all ages. Had the English held
the like station, the utter faithlessness of Napoleon would have
become proverbial with posterity.
But to return, from this striking parallel, to our immediate
hero, we find that he devoted the two first years of his chief
command, to completing the subjugation and pacification of
Spain; and the third to the conquest of Saguntum, a city allied
to the Romans, situate on the river Ebro; a city, therefore,
which the Carthaginians were bound by treaties not to disturb;
a river which they had no just right to cross. Hence, the sole
cause of the charge of perfidy against Hannibal. A treaty was
unquestionably violated by Hannibal; as the Romans had vio



342                    HANNIBAL.
lated another treaty far more flagrantly, at the close of the first
Punic War; and as they would unquestionably have violated
any that existed now, had it been to their interest to do so. The
truth is simply this, that the two nations had been at peace as
long as either deemed it very essential to be at peace. Both
were preparing for war; Hannibal was ready the first, and
therefore struck the first blow. He wished to serve his country;
his country deemed that he was serving her, and therefore sustained him; and so well, in truth, did he serve her, that had the
genius and character of Carthage borne any relation to those of
Rome, such as the genius and character of Hannibal bore to
those of the ablest Romans, Rome must have succumbed in the
unequal contest; and the world to this day would probably, if
not certainly, have been Semitic or Phoenician, and Asiatic,
not Roman and European, in its language, its civilization, its
religion.
But of this Hannibal thought not; nor, had he thought,
would have cared anything. His business was to provoke a war
with Rome, and then to deal her one home-stricken blow, that
should paralyze her at once and forever. This was his business,
as he saw it; and he was one to do that which he saw his
business, as thoroughly as Cromwell or Napoleon.
Hannibal's plans were now fully laid, and without further
delay he put them into execution. It was already late in May,
when he set out from Carthagena for the Ebro, having to cross
five degrees and a half of latitude before reaching the Pyrenees,
and to conquer the whole half-Romanized territory north of that
river, before entering Gaul-then an unknown, unexplored, and
barbarous, though highly warlike country, the geography of
which was less familiar to the Roman or Carthaginian of those
days, than is that of Central Africa to us at this period. His
force, on crossing the Ebro, was ninety thousand foot and twelve
thousand horse, besides elephants, which was reduced by detach



MARCH TO THE ALPS.                  343
ments and losses in the field to fifty thousand foot and nine
thousand horse, before he crossed the Pyrenees. In those days,
field artillery there was none, nor its equivalent; but engines for
casting huge stones and beams into beleaguered cities-as effective, perhaps, against the imperfect fortifications of those days as
our battering artilley —did exist; and of these Hannibal was
unable to carry any with him, if he had any in Spain, or even if
the Carthaginians knew the use of them, which seems to be
doubtful; and to his weakness in this arm, the failure of his ultimate attempts against Rome is, I believe, wholly to be attributed.
It is a proof of his wonderful power of adapting himself to circumstances, and of his tact in dealing with barbarians, that he
actually traversed the whole of France, from the Pyrenees to the
Rhone-a tract of vast forests and difficult morasses, swarming with fierce and warlike savages-with little loss and no
serious opposition. So rapid had been his motions, and so
incredulous were the Romans, though forewarned, of the possibility of such a march, that, although the consular armies had
time to have disputed the passes of the Pyrenees with him, he
had actually crossed the Rhone, and gained three days' march
toward the Alps, after a slight skirmish with the Roman lighthorse, before the Consul Scipio was aware of his arrival in Gaul.
That general, finding himself anticipated, did good service to his
country, and acted on sound military principles, sending his consular army on to Spain by sea, under his lieutenant, while he
himself took ship for Pisa, crossed the Appenines, and, having
command of the Praetorian armies of twenty-five thousand men,
between Placentia and Cremona, before Hannibal had descended
from the mountains, was in readiness to receive him, on his appearance in the plains.
Hannibal, in the meantime, had plunged into the passes of
the Alps, in so far as we can judge, by the valley of the Isere,
with thirty-seven elephants, in addition to the force of infantry




344 4                    ANNIBAL.
and cavalry as specified above. Now, it appears to me, that to
compare Napoleon's passage of the Alps with that of Hannibal,
is much as it would be to compare the voyage of Columbus to
the passage of an Atlantic steamer-the former travelled over
roads, difficult indeed and dangerous, but still roads, with
bridges, depots of provisions, and friendly inhabitants, through
a country perfectly known, thoroughly explored, and accurately
surveyed for his own purposes by his own incomparable engineers..The latter forced his way through unknown passes, over
bridgeless ravines, with no aid of modern science, no pontoons or
devices of engineering, no provisions or forage save what he carried with him, fighting his way, inch by inch, through hordes
of hostile barbarians, and that with men and animals firom the
almost tropical climate of Africa, who perished, in thousands, by
the inclemency of weather unendurable to southern constitutions.
Add to this, that it is an undoubted fact, that the limits of eternal
snow lay far lower down the mountain sides in those days than
now, and that much of the great Carthaginian's line of march lay
within and above those limits.  Napoleon's celebrated passage
was made at the expense, to use his own words, " of a few accidents"-liannibal's at the cost of thirty-three thousand men out
of fifty-nine thousand, and all the elephants but eleven. The
terrible disparity of loss shows the disparity both of difficulty
and audacity. The merit of tile conception rests incontestably
with Hannibal; who did what no man had ever dreamed of
doing before him, and which it might not be possible to do at
all. Napoleon did, with splendid ability, certainly, and prodigious celerity, what he well knew had been done before, and
could therefore, unquestionably, be done again.
The results, in both instances, were precisely similar. It is
now nearly certain that Hannibal crossed the Isere, followed the
upward course of the Rhone, surmounted the Alps by the pass
of the little St. Bernard, descended the Val d'Aosta, and thence




PASSAGE OF THI  ALPS.                345
marched eastward into the country of the Insubrians, where he
expected to find allies, and to raise the Cisalpine Gauls against
their old enemies the Romans.  Their country lies north of the
river Po, in the neighborhood of Placentia and Cremona-Roman
colonies on that great river-and it was on the banks of the
Tesino, a northern tributary of that stream, that the two rival
nations first came into contact. This affair of cavalry has been
magnified into a battle, though it was but a skirmish, except in
the prestige of success, and in the proof it gave of the superiority, never again doubtful during the whole war, of the Afiican to the Roman cavalry.  The Numidians were the Cossacks
of that age, mounted on incomparable barbs and Arabs, unequalled as horsemen and lancers; the heavy-armed Carthaginian
horse were complete cuirassiers, fighting with charged lances and
long cutting sabres. The Roman cavalry, never a favorite or
successful arm of their service, wore no cuirasses, and, for weapons,
carried weak, ifefficient javelins, and the short stabbing sword of
the infantry, which was entirely inefficient as a trooper's weapon.
In this affair of the Ticinus, the heavy Carthaginians met the
Roman horse in front with a steady charge, while the wild
Numidians broke in upon both their flanks, and routed them in
an instant. The country was entirely open and favorable to the
movements of cavalry; the Romans, therefore, crippled in that
arm, were forced to retreat; re-crossed the Tesino, breaking the
bridge behind them; crossed the Po also, and posted themselves
under the walls of Placentia. Hannibal, without pursuing,
passed the Po higher up, by a bridge of boats, and being rapturously received by the Gauls, descended the right bank of the
river, and offered battle to the Romans. But they expecting
reinforcement by the other consular army, of Sempronius, declined it; and in a few days afterward retreated several miles
southward, up the valley of the Trebbia, and encamped among
the first spurs of the Appenines, where they were comparatively




346                    HANNIBAL.
safe from Hannibal's tremendous cavalry, which they had already
learned to dread. The Carthaginian had, in the first instance,
taken post to the eastward, in order to intercept the expected
approach of Sempronius from Rimini, on the Adriatic; but now,
learning, perhaps, that this consul had given, or anticipating that
he would give him, the slip, by turning aside into the hillcountry to the southward, far below Cremona, he threw himself
at once upon the main communications of the Romans, placing
himself directly between them and the magazines, on which they
were subsisted, at Placentia and on the Upper Po, precisely as
Napoleon did by the Austrians at Marengo; thus straitening
them of supplies in their camp, while his own cavalry swept the
plains in every direction, keeping all his communications open,
and the friendly Gauls abundantly supplied him with provision,
as he lay on the right bank of the Trebbia.
Meantime, the junction between the two consular armies was
effected, and by this means the effective force of the Romans was
raised to above forty thousand men; while that of Hannibal had
been so much swelled by the accession of Gaulish recruits, that
he was anxious to deliver battle almost on any terms; the rather,
that the subsistence of his army had weighed heavily on the
Gauls; who, fickle and treacherous, even beyond the wont of
barbarians, were showing symptoms of impatience at his protracted sojourn among them. His great superiority of cavalry,
moreover, both as regards quality and numbers, rendered him
confident of success in the extensive plains of the Po. Sempronius was now in command of the whole Roman forces, Scipio
being still hors de combat from a wound received in the affair of
cavalry on the Tesino; and as this general had no taste as yet
of Hannibal's quality, and found himself cut off from his magazines, which the Carthaginians were now beginning to master,
and insulted in his very camp, on his own side of the river, by
the Numidian horse and Balearic slingers, he merits no reproach




BATTLE OF THE TREBBIA.               347
for having determined to give battle on fair ground; for with
such a force as he commanded, purely homogeneous and Roman;
such a force, in a word, as had never within a century encountered an equal foe, he was justified in expecting victory over any
troops in the known world. He was falling short of provisions,
moreover, and there was great danger of a general Gallic rising,
in case the population should be encouraged by the protracted
inactivity of the Romans.
To deliver battle, under such circumstances, was therefore soldierly and justifiable on all sound military principles; to do
so rashly, however, and hastily, and that, too, on ground and at
time of the enemy's choosing-such an enemy too, and so superior in horse-was unpardonable. Yet, just this thing did Sempronius.
It was now mid-winter, for neither of the belligerents had
thought of going into winter quarters-Hannibal, from  the
imminent necessity of striking quickly and decisively, and the
Romans, from the impossibility of suffering him to keep the field
unwatched. Even now, the climate of the plains at the foot of
the Alps, included in the districts of Lombardy and Piedmont, is
severe and inclement in the winter season; but in those times,
when the country lay in great part uncleared and covered with
primitive forest, it was far more tempestuous and cold than at
present.
The Trebbia swollen with snow-water, ice-cold from the frozen
Appenines, ran now a breast-high torrent, though in the summer droughts its pebbly bed might be crossed almost dry-shod.
Across this paralyzing stream Sempronius suffered Hannibal to
allure him, on a wild morning, with flying sleet storms and' snow
gusts, by a false attack and feigned retreat, to his own side of
the river; and that too without allowing his men to breakfast;
while the Carthaginians, expectant of what was to come, had fed
heartily, and armed themselves in their tents by blazing fires.




348                     HANNIBAL.
In addition to this advantage, an ambuscade of two thousand
horse and foot had been concealed, under Mago's command, in
an old watercourse covered with brushwood and coppice, which
Sempronius, negligently or disdainfully, left in his rear, as he
hurried on to attack the enemy, who had drawn out from
their camp, and formed line of battle, facing the river, to oppose
him.
The order of battle was simple, and on both sides the same;
indeed, it was the only order then in use, the centre being
formed of the heavy infantry, covered by their light troops and
skirmishers, with the cavalry on either flank.  So far as I can
observe, this form was rarely deviated from by the ancient
military nations; the cavalry were invariably directed against
cavalry; and, after an equestrian combat which generally
terminated in the chase of one party, for miles, perhaps leagues,
from the field by the other, a secord engagement followed between the solid infantry which often led to the occurrence of
drawn battle. The same defect of strategy is observable in all
Prince Rupert's fighting, during the English civil-war, who, in
four or five different pitched battles, had he wheeled on the
flanks and real of the Parliamentarian foot, after scattering their
horse by his headlong charge, would have terminated the war
at a blow. Hannibal, who made more use of his cavalry arm
than any other general of antiquity, never appears to have attacked infantry in front with horse, or even in flank, until the
enemy's cavalry were in flight; and yet the Roman foot-as
foot the best undoubtedly in the world-were from their armature
of heavy missile javelins and short stabbing swords, not differing
much from the larger bowie knife, peculiarly unfitted to resist th~J
charge of cavalry, which their loose and open order was calculated to invite.
The result of this battle was as must be foreseen from thA
preceding events which led to it.  In the fight itself there waQ




THE CONFLICT.                    349
little strategy; the great abilities of Hannibal had been displayed
in the manceuvres by which he compelled the enemy to deliver
battle, and then induced him to deliver it, at disadvantage, and
on ground selected by his enemy.  The rest he left to his
soldiers, confident that they would do their work to his satisfaction; nor was his confidence disappointed. He was, moreover,
in the open field greatly superior to his enemy, even without
taking the exhaustion and ill-plight of the legionaries into consideration, who fought wet to the skin, chilled, and fasting,
against men full-fed, fiesh, and warm, from their recent campfires. His cavalry, ten thousand strong, six thousand of whom
were incomparable African cuirassiers and Numidians, could not
be checked by the feeble legionary cavalry of four thousand, for
a single instant. The Balearian slingers and African archery
were as much superior to the Roman light troops, who fought
only with slender javelins; the Italians never having been famous
for the use of the bow. The velites of Sempronius, therefore,
were driven in upon the legionaries at the first onset, and passed
through the intervals of the Manipules to the rear, while the
cavalry were scattered, as by a thunderbolt, on both wings
simultaneously, by the Carthaginian elephants and horsemen.
The soldierly qualities of the Roman foot did not fail them in
this emergency-in fact never did fail them throughout the war,
for when opposed to foot they were never beaten-for they
maintained the fight, exhausted as they were, with advantage,
until Maharbal, whom  Arnold styles not unjustly  " the best
cavalry officer of the first cavalry service in the world," leaving
the pursuit of the flying horse to his Numidians, unequalled in
such operations, thundered on both their flanks with his elephants
and cuirassiers, and to complete the whole Mago, bursting from his
ambush, broke down upon their rear, horse and foot, pell-mell,
and pierced them through and through. The legions of the
centre, still undismayed and unbroken, cut their way straight




360                      HANNIBAL,
through the African foot before them, and reached Placentia
in safety, though the whole Carthaginian army was interposed;
the rest were slaughtered ruthlessly and unremittingly, according
to the uisages of ancient warefare, until the ice-cold waters of the
Trebbia checked the pursuit of the victors, and saved the residue
from slaughter. During the same night Scipio with the shattered
relies of the army, re-crossed the Trebbia and joined his colleague
in Placentia; whence in a few days they retreated separately,
Scipio on Rimini, Sempronius  across  the  Appenines into
Etruria, leaving Hannibal at the close of his first short campaign
the master of all Cisalpine Gaul, or, in other words, of all Italy,
north of the Appenines.
Hannibal, politic ever, and fearing to distress his new and
fickle allies, by wintering among them, and so compelling them
to subsist his troops, made an effort to cross the Appenines, but
the cold was too severe, and the passes were impracticable to his
hot-blooded southern cattle, so that he was forced in his own
despite, after losing all his elephants but one, to return and winter
among the reluctant and faithless Gauls, from whom he appears
to have apprehended even assassination.
In the following year, new consuls having been chosen at
Rome, Caius Flaminius and Cneius Servilius Geminius, soldiers
were levied very vigorously and an immense force set on foot;
two several consular armies, each consisting of four Roman
legions, or about twenty-four thousand men, besides an equal
force of allies of the Latin name, were opposed to Hannibal,
covering the two'different roads which led to Rome, the Flaminian by the Adriatic coast, and the Emilian through Tuscany.
Servilius took the command in lieu of Scipio at Rimini, on the
Adriatic, and Flaminius that of Sempronius, at Arezzo, a town of
Tuscany, situated among the Appenines on the confines of the
states of the church, about a hundred and twenty miles due
north of Rome. So that apparently Hannibal could not advance




MARCH THROUGH NORTHERN ITALY.           351
upon Rome, without encountering the one or other of these two
powerful hosts. Many reasons had induced both parties to open
this campaign at an early season, and in fact Flaminius was in
the field so soon as the 15th of March. Hannibal, however, had
no idea of affronting the might of Rome in her own central Latin
territory, much less of attacking her walls, when he had no means
adequate to the storming of such petty garrison towns as
Placentia, Cremona, and the other Roman colonies planted in
the half subjugated districts of Cisalpine Gaul. His game was
to rekindle the ancient feuds of Samnium and Campania, against
their haughty mistress, and, subsisted on the wealth of the rich
plains of La Puglia and the Terra di Lavoro, to wear Qut the
patience of the Roman allies by devastating their territories,
until he should be able to raise all Southern Italy in one common
league against their common mistress; and then, and not until
then, to strike a home blow, which should be at once irresistible
and decisive. Skilfully avoiding, therefore, both the main roads
he marched almost due south, down the valley of the Serchio,
through a tract of almost impassable morasses, among which his
army suffered severely, upon the Valdarno, which he- entered
some twenty miles westward of Florence, and plundered it with
extreme severity, compensating his men for their previous toils by
the enjoyment of those rich districts.  Thence, finding that
Flaminius moved not from  his post at Arezzo, he advanced
rapidly through Tuscany, turning that Consul's left to the west
and southward, and passing onward, with Cortona's mountain
citadel unmolested on his own left, direct upon the Lake of
Perugia-better known as the fatal Thrasymene-which he approached on its northern side, as if it were his intention to strike
the waters of the upper Tiber, and so enter the very heart of the
Latin country, and descend on Rome itself, leaving both her
consular armies far to rearward. To effect this he had made a
long and circuitous flank march close under the position of a con



352                     HANNIBAL.
centrated enemy; a ihanceuvre singularly hazardous if executed
in the face of an alert and active foe.  It was such a manceuvre which lost Austerlitz to the Russians, and Salamanca
to Marmont; but Hannibal's superior cavalry enabled him to execute it in the plains without fear of molestation from an enemy
whom he had now completely outwitted.
Satisfied by this that Hannibal desired to avoid him, Flaminius broke up from Arezzo, and pursued, in hot haste, fearing
only that his fugitive enemy, as he vainly imagined him, would
have already entered the basin of the Tiber, and commenced the
devastation of the especial territory of the city. But Hannibal
had foreseen the movement, and prepared a trap, more terrible
than that even of the Caudine forks, for his unwary pursuer.
The road, which passes to the northward of the lake Thrasymene, or Perugia, into the Latin country, traverses at first a narrow defile between steep cliffs and the deep waters of the lake,
and then turns abruptly to the north, crossing a little lap of land
between low hills to the left and right. Within this gorge Hannibal had paused, and crouched like a lion, for his spring. With
his Africans and Spaniards he barred the road in front, on the
crest of the ridge, where the road wound upward from the lake.
His Gauls he posted with his cavalry on the left of the pass,
among the low hills; his archery and slingers on the right, while
he garnished the tops of the cliffs, above the pass, with light
troops and the Gaulish auxiliaries.  Fortune and the weather
favored him, no less than the ground.  Flaminius arrived late,
after a forced march, at Passignano, just without the passes;
encamped, and before daybreak entered the defiles, without
reconnoitering or sending forward an advanced guard; thinking
only how best he might overtake his flying enemy. A thick
mist from the lake covered all the low grounds and defiles, while
the heights above were bright in the clear atmosphere; still
onward marched the doomed column, crowded in dense array,




LA:NE TIInASYMENUS.                353
and marching at their fastest pace, emulous to fall on the rear of
the enemy.  Not a sound was heard, not a bowstring was
drawn, until the head of the column was ascending the last
height, whereon the Africans and Spaniards were posted, and
the rear was entangled in the defiles, and overlooked by the
Gallic auxiliaries.  Then at once, before, behind, and on both
flanks, broke on their ears the slogan of the Gauls, the clang and
clatter of the Numidian horse, and the fatal whistle of the bullets, slung like hail into their ranks by the fierce barbarians.
The van alone cut its way clear through the troops that opposed
them, and escaped for a while, six thousand strong, to one of
the neighboring villages.  They alone-for of the centre and the
rear of that doomed army not one man escaped to tell the tale
of the disaster. The thirsty lance of the Numidian, the claymore of the Gaul, and the deadly missiles of the Balearians did
their work thoroughly. Flaminius died like a soldier, in the
field which he had lost, and although Hannibal sought for his
body, to which he would have given honorable sepulture, it
never was discovered whether it was engulfed in the deep waters
of the lake, or was confused in some pile of mangled corpses.
He slept soundly, and his countrymen forgave his rashness for
his valor. It is said, that an earthquake made the soil to reel,
unheeded, under the feet of the combatants, so deadly and
despairing, on both sides, was the conflict.
Before the sun set, the six thousand men, who had escaped,
were prisoners to Maharbal and his indefatigable horse. Of fifty
thousand men, fifteen thousand only were left alive, and these
prisoners; of whom the Italians were discharged, free and without ransom, while the Romans were kept in strict custody, to be
sold as slaves or slain, according to the pleasure of their captors;
so ran the laws of antique warfare.
There was no force between the conqueror and Rome; but no
rash impulse, no overweening confidence induced that wise
16




354                     HANNIBAL.
leader to deviate fiom his preconcerted plan, or to enter the
Latin country, in which he well knew that he should find a bare
and devastated country, a deadly enemy in every male inhabitant,
an impregnable fortress in every Latin town. Even on the day
succeeding the defeat, the little borough of Spoleto shut its gates
against his horsemen, and he had neither the means nor the
inclination to assault it. IHe devastated, however, the whole rich
plain from the Tiber to Perugia and Spoleto; and then, leisurely
crossing the Apennines in the direction of Ancona, descended
the shores of the Adriatic, through the country of the Abruzzi,
into La Puglia, even to the Gulf of Manfredonia; possessing the
whole country, fiom  the Apennines eastward to the Gulf of
Venice; and from Ancona southward to the Ofanto, in what is
now the kingdom of Naples. During this long excursion, he
put to the sword every Latin and Roman who was taken; a
policy bloody indeed and cruel, but of which the Romans could
not at least complain, since their own practice was the massacre
of every living thing, even to domestic animals, in captured cities.
Living with his troops on the fat of the land, he recruited his
invaluable cavalry with rich herbage of the fertile plains of the
south, and so made war feed war, at the greatest cost to the
enemy.  Still no state joined him; no city opened its gates; nor
had he the means of forcing, either by storm or blockade, even
the meanest of the Roman colonies:-this is sufficient answer to
those empty declaimers who would censure so consummate a
master of the art of war, as Hannibal, for want of energy in not
storming Rome itself.
At this time, though the Romans had no individual man who
could be compared for a moment with Hannibal, the spirit of the
people was admirable and heroic to the utmost. Not a word
was spoken of surrender; not a soldier was withdrawn from any
foreign station; only a Dictator was appointed, fresh levies were
drawn together, Rome herself was put in a state of defence, and




ENTERS SAMNIUM.                  355
the whole country was ordered to be devastated, the corn destroyed, and every house and hamlet burned to the ground,
wherever he should turn his march.
This doubtless, as well as the hope of driving the allies into
revolt against Rome, so soon as they should find Rome helpless
to protect them, induced him to avoid the Latin country, and to
bide his time patiently and with stern perseverance.  The people
of La Puglia would not join him; therefore, he crossed the
Apennines again, into the Samnite country, a hundred years before
so deadly hostile to the Romans. But Benevento, its capital,
was now a Latin colony, and like all its sister towns, steadily shut
its gates against him.  Laying its territories waste on every
side the terrible invader rolled the tide of devastation onward,
ascended the Voltorno till he found it fordable, then crossed it,
and rushed down like a torrent of lava, sweeping all before him
with pitiless conflagration into the very garden of Italy, the
glorious Falernian plain, the pride of Campania. Summer had
scarce yet commenced; a long campaign was still before. him;
Fabius the Dictator was in the field watching him from the hills
where Hannibal could not assail him; for unaided by their invincible horse, the Carthaginian foot could not cope with the
legionaries-the rawest levies beating them  with ease, when
fighting from behind intrenchments. Hannibal, it must be remembered, had no base of operations, no fortified garrisons, no
guarded magazines, no hope of reinforcements from the rear; his
hospitals, his magazines, were necessarily in his camp; his
granaries and store-houses were in the fields of his enemy and her
allies. Thence it became a trial of patience between Fabius, the
Delayer, as he delighted to be termed, and Hannibal, who, perhaps, deserved the title better, for prompt as he was to strike
when a blow was to be stricken, he never once struck a blow untimely. Hannibal waited patiently the time when the allies
should desert Rome as unable to defend them; or when Rome,




356                     HANNIBAL.
conscious of their near defection, should descend to fight in a
fair field, in order to defend their loyalty.  Fabius waited
patiently the time when Hannibal should expose -,weak point
to an attack, or should attack at a disadvantage-but that time
never came.
Once Fabius thought that he had taken his great antagonist
as in a net, and that he could not escape one more example of
the Caudine Forks; but by a simple stratagem  his wily enemy
baffled his deep laid schemes; extricated himself from the toils,
without the loss of one man; and returned into his old quarters,
east of the Pyrenees, loaded with plunder, to pass the autumn and
winter at his ease, leaving the Dictator and his system, a
stumbling-block to his friends, and a laughing-stock to his
enemies. So discontented indeed were the people, that a bill
was passed at Rome, giving equal power to the master of the
horse, Minutius, and the Dictator, and dividing the armies
between them; but it soon became apparent that if the system
of delaying was ineffective, the system  of delivering battle to
Hannibal was fatal.  For Minutius, venturing to do so, was very
severely handled; and a second routd of the Trebbia was prevented only by the timely rescue of the slow Dictator.
No farther action marked that autumn; Hannibal went into
winter quarters, well assured that one of two things must occur
in the ensuing campaign-either the Romans must deliver battle
to retain the fealty of the allies, when he looked forward confidently to an overwhelming rout of their forces, which itself would
induce defection of the allies-or they must again abandon them
yet another season to plunder and devastation; when they would
assuredly rise in revolts unsolicited.
The steadiness with which this great captain adhered to his
first system, is worthy of all praise, as a quality of the highest
strategetical ability; and scarcely second to it, the military
observer must rate the care with which he nurtured, cherished,




CARE FOR. HIS CAVALRY.                357
and preserved his great resource, his invaluable cavalry, never to
be replaced if once lost. Nor will the tactician fail to remark, in
this connexion, the difference between the conduct of the Carthaginian, and that of the great French Emperor; who, by recklessly sacrificing in the morning of the 18th of June, his incomparable cuirassiers and dragoons against the immovable English
squares, suffered that to be converted into an utter rout, which
might have been only a severe check, had his retreating columns
been covered at night by the fourteen thousand unrivalled
cavalry, the bulk of whom were uselessly expended in vain
charges on an impenetrable infantry, and lay cold on the red clay
of Waterloo.
At Rome, in the mean time, there was discontent from within
and clamor from without. The hot spirits within cried Shame,
that Roman armies should avoid any enemy in the field; the
cold spirits without cried Shame, that Rome should see her allies
suffer the extremities of war, without striking one blow to aid or
deliver them.  The crisis, for which Hannibal had been so long
waiting, had arrived.
The consuls of the year were elected with a direct reference to
the question of giving battle, or no; and the choice decided the
question in the affirmative. The consular armies had lain during
the winter at Canusium, a small town to the south of the Ofanto,
deriving their support from  a large magazine, which they had
established at Canme.
In this campaign Hannibal took the initiative, and again
threw himself suddenly on the communications of the enemy,
getting unexpectedly' into their rear, and surprising their magazines at Cannxe; in the citadel of which, as a place of some
strength, he established himself. The campaign had not opened
so early as usual in this season, for the corn was already ripening; yet the consuls had not yet reached the camp at Canusium,




to3 8                   HANNIBAL.
when the proconsuls sent for instructions from the senate how to
act, after their supplies had been thus cut off.
The answer was the arrival of the consuls, Terentius Varro, of
plebeian, and Lucius Aimilius Paullus, of the highest patrician
blood, with reinforcements-raising the Roman force to about
ninety thousand men-and orders to risk a battle. On their arrival, they marched upon Hannibal, and found him encamped on
the left bank of the Ofanto, at about nine miles distant fiom the
sea, on very open ground, highly advantageous to cavalry operations. Perceiving this, the Consul  LEmilins was desirous to
retreat farther from the sea, into the hill country, where the Carthaginian cavalry would be less efficient, and whither he supposed Hannibal would be compelled to follow him, so soon as the
crop on the seaboard should be exhausted.  Varro, however, of
a bolder and more sanguine temperament, when his day for
command arrived, took steps which must needs bring on an
action, by interposing himself between Hannibal and the sea,
with his left on the river and his right on the town of Salapia.
HIannibal at once marched down upon the Roman camp, and
offered battle, which  gmilius, in his turn being in command,
declined. Some unimportant manoeuvring followed, in which
the Romans were somewhat the sufferers. A few days elapsed,
when Varro forded the river and drew out in battle array, on
the right bank, upon which his right flank now rested.  Hannibal immediately followed his example, and crossing the Ofanto
at two points, drew out opposite to him.
This battle is the most worthy, of ahy in ancient Ihistory, unless
perhaps it be that of Leuctra, of the attention of both the scholar
and the tactician; for it is the prototype, and very counterpart,
in its arrangement and results, of those of the greatest pitched
battles the world has ever witnessed-Fontenoy, Aspern, and
Waterloo.  And, if I do not err, the result must ever be the
same, where, of two armies, equally matched for courage arid




ARRAY AT CANNY.,.                3593
strength, and equally well led, the one rushes in solid column of
attack into the centre of the other; which, if steady enough to
fight in line, must envelop and overwhelm it. Such was the fate
of the all but victorious square of the Highlanders at Fbntenoy;
such of the terrible column of Lannes at Aspern; such of the
terrific final onslaught of Ney with the young guard on the
heights of Mount St. Jean; and such, even more markedly, was
the result of the battle now under consideration.
For some inexplicable reason, the Roman army, which was
infinitely superior in numbers and quality of infantry, and the
habit of which was to fight ever in line, was crowded into deep,
narrow columns, on this occasion.
On the extreme right of the Roman line, next to the river,
were the Roman knights, and next to these the legions; on their
left the allied infantry, and on the left again the cavalry of the
Latin name.
Opposing these in order, stood, next to the river, the Gaulish
and Spanish horse; then half the African foot, armed like the
legionaries; then the Gaulish and Spanish foot, and to their left
the remainder of the Africans, with their left covered by the
Numidian horse.
Thus far all was even; but Hannibal had purposely arrayed
the Carthaginian army, precisely as the English army was drawn
up at Waterloo, owing, in the latter instance, to the formation of
the ground; that is to say, in a great convex line, with the apex
toward the enemy.
On the signal being given, the cavalry charged on both sides;
and, although the Roman knights fought stubbornly, they could
not resist the onslaught of Hasdrubal, who chased them up the
river bank, slaughtering them unsparingly, till seeing them
utterly dispersed and broken, he wheeled across the whole rear
of the Roman host, and falling on the Latin horse, who still held
their own against the Numidian skirmishers, scattered them




360                     HANNIBAL.
like a thunderbolt.  Meanwhile, the Roman legions, seeing the
Carthaginian infantry advancing in a wedge-instead of withdrawing their own centre, as they should have done-rushed in
toward the centre fiom the flanks, till they were all crowded into
a vast dense single column, which forced its way onward by the
weight and fury of its own desperate charge. Thus, the Gauls
and Spaniards in the centre of the Punic line were pushed back
bodily into the rear, so that the Africans on the wings, who had
been originally withdrawn, were now in advance; and the whole
Carthaginian army, from being a convex, had become a concave
line, overlapping and tearing to pieces the flanks of the long
unwieldy Roman column, with their assailing wings.
Precisely similar to this catastrophe, was that of the British
column at Fontenoy, where the French and English. forces
reversed their usual mode of fighting-the latter attacking in
column, the former resisting in line. Precisely similar was the
check and overthrow  of Lannes' terrible column at Aspern.
And, with but one exception, precisely similar even to the smnallest details, were the whole tactics of the last decisive charge at
Waterloo.  The exception is this, that whereas the Punic line
of battle at Cannae became concave, from convex, by the retrogression of the centre; the British line at Waterloo underwent
the same change by the advance of its flanks. In both actions
the attacking column plunged into a concave line, carrying all
before it; until its head was checked by the steadiness of the
resisting centre, its flanks ravaged by the onslaught of the wings,
and, to complete the parallel, in both cases, its rear torn to
pieces by a charge of cavalry, its own cavalry having been long
before expended-for at the close of the bloody day of Cannae,
Hasdrubal, returned from the slaughter of the Latin horse, broke
in upon the rear of the still struggling legionaries, and closed
the conflict by such a butchery as history but seldom has
recorded.




THE CARNAGE.                     361
Strange results followed this catastrophe. All the Southern
allies deserted from Rome's authority, except the Latin name;
and, even -of these, twelve colonies refused their contingents.
Still Rome disdained to treat; and Hannibal, unable, for want of
artillery or of sufficient disciplined and steady infantry, to attack
her walls, was compelled to maintain the war in the Southern
provinces. From that day forth the Romans fought no more
pitched battles; and, having regular supplies, while Hannibal
was compelled to forage for his subsistence, they could rarely
be forced into action. Whenever he did so, indeed, his superiority of resource and ability inevitably told; but the war was
hencef6rth changed into a war of sieges; and in these Hannibal
fought at disadvantage, for his cavalry could not be brought to
bear, and his infantry were, as I have before observed, inferior
to the legions. Still, never were the talents of the great Carthaginian so conspicuous as in these later campaigns, when the
Romans selected none but soldiers of proof, and those soldiers
had learned strategy even through being beaten by Hannibal.
His manceuvres about Tarentum; his marches to and fro, dealing tremendous blows on all hands; his presence seeming almost
ubiquitous, cannot fail to remind the reader of Napoleon's finest
campaign, in my opinion, which terminated with the abdication
of Fontainbleau.
His reappearance before the walls of Capua, when confident
that he was leagues distant before Tarentum, the Romans, by a
vast combined movement, had surrounded that city, and already
exulted in the sure prospect of its fall, only to vanish like morning
shadows before the mere splendor of his presence, seen on the
distant summit of Tifata, surrounded by his veteran invincibles,
is so complete an antecedent to Napoleon's similar reappearance
at Dresden, and the scattering of the allies, that if the names and
geography were changed one narrative might do for either.
When on his removal to the south, the Romans gathered




362                      HANNIBAL,
again about the fated walls of Capua, and fortified themselves in
their leaguer with lines of circumvallation and countervallation
which mocked his army's strength, what decision could be
sounder, what conception grander, what execution more masterly
than that of his forced march upon Rome itself, in the hope of
drawing them from their half-won prey?  What more romantic
than his actually hurling his javelin over the Colline gates of
Rome, and wasting the immediate territory of the city with the
sword and fire before the very eyes of her Senators? It is true
the Romans did not raise the siege, and that to his great regret
they did take Capua; but that in no wise detracts from the correctness of his military principles, or the magnificence of his
military achievements.
This was in the sixth year of the war; for five years more he
struggled on with varying success, but unvarying courage and
conduct; in the eleventh year Hasdrubal, his brother, followed
in his footsteps from New Carthage to the Alps, passed them,
and entered Italy with powerful reinforcements, which might
well have changed the fortunes, would certainly have protracted
the duration, of the war.  But he was intercepted by vastly
superior forces, concentrated against him  by means of Claudius
Nero's splendid forced march from one to the other end of the
Peninsula, utterly defeated and killed.
This was the great, the one great Roman achievement of the
war; and it was disgraced by a deed of the foulest atrocity.
Hannibal's first information of his brother's defeat, was that
brother's pale and bloody head cast over the entrenchments of his
camp. Yet he had sought for Flaminius' body to give it honorable burial; and when Marcellus was slain he buried his remains
with all honor, and sent his inurned ashes to his son..
The defeat of Hasdrubal was the real downfall of all Hannibal's
prospects of success; for it had long been evident that his single
army could not effect the destruction of the Roman Republic;




FORTUNE OF WAR CHANGES.               363
and Carthage, with Spain now wrested from her grasp, could
offer him no aid. Indeed she was, ere long, to be so hard
pressed at home, as to require his all-powerful arm, alas! no longer
powerful to preserve her. All he could now do, was to act on the
defensive; and he did that as brilliantly and effectively, as he
had before assumed the offensive. Before he was recalled to
fight at home for the very existence of Carthage, he had maintained himself for seventeen years in the heart of an enemy's
country, without reinforcements, supplies, or moneys except what
he took from the enemy; he had traversed and retraversed every
portion of the peninsula, from the Po to the Gulf of Tarentum,
wasting it with fire and sword at his own will; he had won three
pitched battles, which are to this day the admiration of all
strategists; he had beaten every force that ever met him in the
field; he had never suffered a defeat; and when he withdrew
fiom the shores of Italy, he did so, not that the Romans drove
him thence, but that Carthage needed him elsewhere.  At Zama
he was overpowered, not vanquished; for the Romans were
superior, in both numbers and quality, of both horse and foot.
And the Numidians, to whose irresistible onset and impetuous
horsemanship Hannibal had, in great part, owed his previous
successes over the Romans-for with their thundering charge
he terminated the crisis of almost every battle, crushing their
indomitable infantry under foot, after having broken and exterminated their weak cavalry-were now arrayed under the
savage and revengeful veteran Massinissos on the side of Scipio.
There was little manmeuvring in this action, but much hard
fighting; and it was won in the end by the stubborn hardihood
of the Roman reserve of Triarii brought fresh into action with
their long spears, after all the forces of the Carthaginians had
been successively wearied out and cut to pieces.
Scipio gained no laurels by that victory beyond the barren




364                      r1 A.N-3BA L.
honor of being styled the conqueror of Hannibal, whom all men
of all countries knew to be his better.
And Rome earned eternal disgrace by her persecution, even
unto the death, of the aged, friendless, helpless exile, during
whose life-time she could not but tremble.
Take him for all in all, not looking for virtues incompatible
with the times, the country, and the state of society in which he
flourished; weighing what he did against the means with which
he did it; judging his acts by his motives, and his character by
his conduct; I think we shall not err in pronouncing him, one of
the purest patriots, and THE GREATEST CAPTAIN, without exception, whom this world has yet seen, or perhaps will see for ever.




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" He seems to have made good use of his means, for the book is full of incidents, told in
a rather lively manner, and with due sensibility to the romanltic scenery as well as to the
romantic history of Spain "-N. Y. Evening Post.
"The author is a man of unquestionable talent and keen observation. Hle paints with
great power, and sketches manners and men with the hand of a master. There is an intenseness alnd earnestness throughtlout the entire book remarkable in these days of literary
foppishness and superficiality." —Oneidac MIerald7.
THE FALL O7 POLANd,    Containing an Analytical and Philosophical Account of
the Causes which conspired in the Ruin of that Nation-Together with a HIistory of
tJle Country from  its Origin. By L. C. SAXTroN. 2 volS. 12mo. With Illustrations.
Price, $2 50.
"The entire work is no hasty utterance of crude opinions, for the anther has evidently
fitted lilmself for the task lie has undertaken, by a stu(ly of history genierally, and partica.
larly by a careful collation of those awriters that bear spoin the subject.  In order to be
more complete, the valiots topics are arranged under different heads: as Religion, Governmcent, Great AMen, Civilization, Society, &c., thus enabling the student to refer directly
to the sulbject which he may desire to see. anld fittiln it, w-ith its appropriate index, ti  make
a valuable work for the library."- gewsacmia  Daily Adcvertiser.
"It is the product of great thonght and research, and presents a complete and accurate
view of tle history, governlment, laws, religiol, popular cllaracter, and in short everythiir,
connected with Poland that can have  an inter est for the scholar or tile statesman. It is l
solid, snymmetrical, and glowing incorporation of all the great points of interest of one oi
the most interesting nations of inmodern tim-es, and deserves to be placed aunolg the endurr
ing ornaments of American literatllre " —N. Y Comv o ier' & Eszqeii'ei'.
"He lihs gone into his subject with thoroughness -havinc been many years in gathe*.
ing his materials, and giving them slsymimetry and form. — otostois T'manscsipt.'The author has set himself to thle task with great zeal, and with quite an exteDsive
knoiledlge of the accessories (-,f his subject." —tinecisnati Daly.




LIFE OF ALGERNON SIDNEY, with sketches of some of his contemporaries aidl
extracts from his Correspondsnce and Political Writings. By G. Van Santvoord'
1 vol. 12mo.
"The style of this work is clear, precise, always forcible, and at times eloquent, we ask
our readers to purchase, and go through with one chapter, they will read the rest without our asking "-Pousghkeepsie American.
" -fr. Van Santvoord has drawn his character and related the incidents of his life with
a warm appreciation; and he has thrown in some admirable short sketches of some of his
compatriots. We recommend his book warmly." —American Review.
"A volume of manly strength, bringing under review the most exciting scenes and
noblest deeds, and presenting characters of some of the greatest men who have figured in
British History."-N. Y. Observer.
" This Work is graphic, vigorous, and accurate. It necessarily combines sketches of
other leading characters-such as Vane, Bradshaw, Cromwell, and Milton.  There are
more interesting facts condensed in a small volume than we have met in any similar production."-American Artisan.
New  and  Elegant Juvenile Books.
TAL5 OFi 2itIM   DLAYS AND Wi;NTh ER NIGITS,
A GRANDMOTHERFS  RECOLLECTIONS.  By Ella Rodman, with six tinted
Illustrations. I vol. 16mo. cloth.
"This is a simple narrative of household reminiscences, more pleasing than many a
book of far greater pretensions."-Cotbrier and Enquirer.
"This book is filled with entertaining and instructive matters."-Chron. and Atlas.
" It tends to throw a mild and attractive light over home, and to minister to those
gentler feelings, which find their best soil in the quiet and purity of the sanctuary of childhood."'-  Veekly Sun.
"The style of the book is simple, lively, and attractive; it must become one of the
favorites of the day, especially among young readers."-Southern Literary Gazette.
BRAGGADOCIO, A book for Boys and Girls. By Mrs. L. C. Tuthill-with six
tinted illustrations. 1 vol., 16mo. cloth.
G U LL I VER JO I;  his Three Voyages, being an Account of his Marvellous Adventure
in Kailoo, Hydrogenia, and Ejario. By Elbert Perce. 1 vol., 16mo. with six tinted
Illustrations, cloth.
THE YOUNG EMIGRANTS-Madelaine Tube-the Crystal Palace-in 1 vol. 16mo,
with Illustrations, cloth.
UNCLE FRANKIS HOME STORIES.
A beautiful Series of Juveniles-entirely new. By F. C. Woodworth, in 6 vols. uniform
style/with eight tinted engravings in each volume.
1. A BUDGET OF WILLOW  LANE STORIES.
2. A PEEP AT OUR NEIGHBORS.
8. THE MILLER OF OUR VILLAGE, AND SOME OF HIS TOLLS.
4. THE STRAWBERRY GIRL, OR HOW  TO RISE IN THE WORLD.
5. THE BOY'S AND GIRL'S COUNTRY BOOK.
6. THE LITTLE MISCHIEF-MAKER.
This Series, by one of the most popular writers in America, in the department of Juvenile
Literature, is confidently recommended by the Publisher, as unequalled in respect to its
mechanical beauty and literary interest, by any similar publication.




LEOTURES ON ART-AND P?07_MS. By WASHINGTON ALLSTON. Jt...
Richard lHenry Dana, Jr.  Contents-Lectures on Art, pages 3-167-Aphorisms, 6,tences written by Mr. Allston on the walls of his Studio, pages 167-179-The Hypoclhondriac, pages 179-199-Poems, pages 199-317. 1 vol. 1'nio. Price, $1 25.
"There is a store of intellectual wealth in this handsome volume. It is a book of
thought. Its contents are the rich and tasteful productions of the scholar and artist, who
had mind to perceive and skill to portray much that is unseen by ordinary minds, as well
as intelligence ancl power to exhibit whatever is grand and beautiful both in the physical
and moral world."-C/ristiaCs  Obse'rver.
"These are the records of one of the purest spirits and most exalted geniuses of which
this country can boast. The intense love of the beautifiul, the purity, grace and gentleness
which mlade him  incomparably the finest artist of the age, lend their charm  and their
power to these productions of his pen. *  *  *  There are in his poems feeling, delicacy,
taste, and the keenest sense of harmuony which render them faultless." —V. Y; Evassgelist.
" As a writer we know of no one who in his writings has exhibited such an appreciation
of what constitutes beauty in art, correctness in form, or the true principles of coDmposition."-PIrovidelece Journal.
"1 We commend them  to the intellectual and the thoughtful, for we know that no one
can read them without being wiser, and we believe the better."-Albaczy Stcate Register.
"'l'ile productiosn of a most ethereal spirit instinctively awake to all the harmonies of
creation. —Albley Ar'guls.
"The exquisi.tely pure and lofty character of the author of these lectures and poetic
fragments is well expressed in them. It gave their structure a freshness and calmness,
anc their tone a p)urity that remain to chalrm us, and that are equally adrmirable and deligh tful."-ThLe ezcdlepeseden dt.
"' His lectures possess great attractions for every one aiming at cultivation of mind and
refinement of taste, while his poems, which elicited so high praise when published singly,
are sure to receive it wshen as now eimbodied in a mlore classic form.'-VtcAse.; (ou, ier.
" The lovers of American literature and art will rejoice in the possession of these matured fiuits of the genius which seemed alike skilled in the use of the pen and pencil."-,ezwark l)aily Advertiser.
POEMS ANDD PROOE WRI TINGS. By ErICIAED  I-xtsr DANA. 2 vols 12mo.
Price, $2 50.
"Mr. Dana's writings are addressed to readers of thoughlt, sensibility and experience.
By tenderness, by force, in purity, thle poet paints the world, treading in safety tile (lizziest
verge of passion, through all things, llnolrable to all men; the just style resolvinr  all perplexities, a rich instruction and solace in these voluemaos to the young and old who are to
come hereafter."-lZite'actgy  Wor'ld.
I" Mr. Dana is evidcently a close observer of nature, and therefore his thoughllts are original and fresh."-True Desccrsat.
"In addition to the Poems and Prose Writings included in the former edition of his
workis, they contain sollle shlort, practical pieces, and a number of reviews and essay-s contributed to different periodicals, some of them  as -lmuch as thirty Sears silene, andl now republished for tile first tilne-as the expression of the inmost soul, these writings bear a
strollng stalnp of origi-aity. —.NV.  Y. 2'Dsilbae.




-I hE EPOCH OF CREATION. The Scripture Doctrine Contrasted with tee
Geological Theory. By ELEAZER LORD, with an Introduction by Rev. R. W. Dickinson, D.D. 1 vol. 12mo. Price, $1 00.
"We have here a work for the study of the intellectual man of the world as well as the
Christian mall of God. The subject is discussed with masterly ability and with a force of
-lgic which will impress conviction upon many doubting minds." —Teoy Budget.
"We arc heartily glad to see this book. We ask Christian scholars to read the volume,
thinking learned men will find something here to think of. It is no child's book, it is not
a bigot's book. It is a masterly defence of God's ancient word against modern theory, and
demands attention."-N  Y. Observer.
INCIDENTS IN THE LIFE OF A PASTOR. By Rev. WAr. WISNER, D.D. 1
vol. 12mo., 3d edition. Price, $1 00.                      9
"The writer is a shrewd, sensible, practical, and eminently experienced divine, in early
life alawyer, and all his life a thinking, earnest man."-N-; Y. Observer.
"It is not a book of controversy, or extended stories; it tells its truth unaffectedly and
forcibly, and in so doing utters volumes of theology. A more suggestive work we have
seldom seen. Its solemn facts seize upon the conscience and heart with a power that surpasses all the force of rhetoric "-N-_  Y. Evangelist.
INDICATIONS  OF THE  CREATOR; Or, the Natural Evidences of Final
Causes. By GEORGrE TAYLOR. I vol. 12mo. Price, $1 00.
"A careful review of the discoveries in Astronomy, Geology, Comparative Physiology,
and the other Practical Sciences, for the purpose of showing the natural evidences of the
existence of the Creator. He holds firmly to the truth of Revelation, and does not seek
to make the lighlt of nature sufficient for human guidance. The work is clearly written,
and is marked by great thoughtfulness and candor."-N; Y. Commercial.
THE LIFE AND TRIALS OF A YOUTHFUL CHRISTIAN IN PURSUIT
F F HEALTH, as developed in the Biography of,Nathaniel Cheever, M.D. By
Rev. HENRY T. CHEEvER, with an Introduction by Rev. George B. Cheever, D.D. 1
vol. 12mo. Price. $1 00.
"Two brothers thus uniting in Memorials of a third, will present a volume of great intevest. We knew the subject of the fraternal work, and loved him for his gentleness and
worth, which will be-fitly commemorated in these pages."-1-   Y: Observer.
PRIMITIVE CHURCH  OFFICcS. From the Princeton Review. Uniform with
Alexander on the Psalms. 1 vol. Price, 63 cts.
"These essays are reprinted from t. e Princeton Review, with corrections and additions
by their author, whose trenchant pen will be recognized wherever he makes his mark."N. Y. Obses'ver.
"The views they present are sound, scriptural, and discriminating, and worthy of the
attention of the Christian public."-Christian Observer.




" No one, we predict, will ever lay down the volume with that common exclamation
on his lips-' I can't get interested in it,' for it grapples to the reader with hooks of silver,
which hold him quite as fast as if they were made of steel." —Boston Gqzette.
FRESH GLEANING S or a New Sheaf from the Oll Field o Contirental Europe. By
IK. MIARVEL. 1 vol., 12mo.
"This book should be read by all who can appreciate a style fall. of grace, in a composit,ion replete with original and striking thoughts."-Boston Journal.
"Agreeable, quaint, humorous, philosophical, pathetic, charming, glorious Ik. MNarvel!
It is as refreshing to the mind, wearied with the thrice-told insipidities of continental
travel to dip into his fresh sparkling pages, as a plunge, this hot weather, into the cold,
diamond, deer-haunted waters of some mountain lake. We have turned over his soft,
thick, dainty pages, and our eye has glided along the stream of his bright descriptions,
pleasant thoughts, humorous expressions, and characters painted with a iew light touches,
like daguerreotype portraits —very Sterne-like and exceedingly fine —until arriving at the
end we are startled at the rapidity with which the liset of Time, flower-muffled, have trodden."- -Albasly Atlas.
"A series of the liveliest, newest, most taking and most graphic sketches of out of the
way scenes, character and incidents, that were ever done up between a pair of bookbinder's
covers."-C'oc lcnercial Advertiser.
"' This is decidedly the most agreeable book of the season. It reminds one by an occasional association of ideas, rather than resemblance, of imitation of Sterine's Sentimental
Journey, and some of Longfsllow's transatlantic sketches; but its freshness, its variety,
graphic descriptive power, and genial sympathies, are all its own." —Bzftdo, Advertiser.
THE BATTLE SUIMMER. Being Transcripts f.om Personal Observation in Paris
during the year 1845. By Ix. MIARVEL. With Illustrations by DArLEY. 1 vol., 12mo
" It is a series of pictures-sketches of scenes which passed under the author's eye. It
is most ably done, and shows the hand of one gifted with genius and destined to make his
mark on the literature of his country." —; Y. Coerier and Enaqcuirer
"The book is filled with a series of pictures and sketches more graphic it would be diffi
cult to find."'-New  York Recorder.
"Like a talented and enthusiastic artist, he placed himself in the best positions, and
caught the lineaments of each scene to be transferred to his canvas. * * * Iu truth, he
has furnished a gallery of portraits which are very life like."-Presbyterian.
"An elaborate history would fail to convey so vivid and truthfal a conception o0 the
rise, progress and manner of the'second reign of terror' as is to be obtained from this work.'
— ortlandc Transcript.
"It is by far the most able and inost impressive account of the scenes in Paris, and
reveals a power of description that will give the author a  ame."V-N. Y. Evangelist.
THE  LORGNETTE5 or Studies of the Town. By an Opera-Goer(Ix. MARVEL)
2 vol., I2mo. Set off with DARLEY'S Design.
DREAM  LIFE.  By I:.MARVEL.  1 vol.,12mo.




RURAL HOMES; OR, SKETCHES OF HOUSES suited to American Country Life.
With over TO70 Original Plans, Designs, &c. By GERVASE WHEELER. 1 voL 12mo.
Price, $1,'5.
It commences with the first foot-tread upon the spot chosen for the house; details the
considerations that should weigh in selecting the site; gives models of buildings differing
in character, extent, and cost; shows hlowr to hlarmonize the building with the surrounding
scenery; teaches how healthfully to wgrm and ventilate; assists in selecting furniture and
the innumerable articles of utility and ornament used in constructing and finishing, and
concludes with final practical directions, giving Ameful limits as to drawing up written descriptions, specifications and contracts.
"In this neat and tasteful volume, Mr. Wheeler has condensed the results of an accomplished training in his art, and the liberal professional practice of it.
" VWe can confidently recommend this elaborate production to the attention of gentlemen who are about building or renovating their country houses, to professional architects,
and to all readers of discrimination, who wish to know what is truly eloquent in this beautiful art, and to cultivate a taste worthy to cope with "judgment of wisest censure."
"The cost of such establishments is carefully considered, no less than the comforts they
should afford, the display they can (honestly) pretend to, and all the adjuncts that go to
complete the ideal of a convenient and elegant mansion." —; Y. tfirror.
"It is extremely practical, containing such simple and comprehensive directions for all
wishing at any time to build, being in fact the sum of the author's study and experience as
an architect for many years."-Albany Spectator.
"M5r. Wheeler's remarks convey much practical and useful information, evince good
taste and a proper appreciation of the beautiful, and no one should build a rural house
without first hearing what ihe has to recommend."-Phitladelphiac Presbyterian.
"Important in its subject, careful and ample in its details, and charmingly attractive in
its style. It gives all the information that would be desired as to the selection of sitesthe choice of appropriate styles, the particulars of plans, materi:ls, fences, gateways, furniture, warming, ventilation, specifications, contracts, &c., concluding with a chapter on the
intellectual and moral effect of rural architecture."-Lartiforctd Religiosus lleruald.
"A book very much needed, for it teaches people how to build comfortable, sensible,
beautiful country houses. Its conformity to common sense, as well as to the sense of
beauty, cannot be too much commended." —V. Y. Coursier & Eszqtirer.
"No person can read this book without gaining much useful knowvledge. and it will be a
great aid to those who intend to build houses for their own use. It is scientific without
being so interlarded with techllnical terms as to confuse the reader, and contains all the information necessary to build a house from the cellar to the ridge pole. It is a parlor book,
or a book for the workshop, and will be valuable in either place."-Bi-tlo Comsumerciat.
"This work should be in the hands of every one who contemplates building for himself
a home. It is filled with beautifully executed elevations and plans of country houses from
the most unpretending cottage to the villa. Its contents are simple and comprehensive,
embracing every variety of house usually needed."-L-osell Coutrier.
"To all who desire a delightful rural retreat of " lively cottagely" of getting a fair equivalent of comfort and tastefulness, for a moderate outlay, we commend the Ilural Homes of
Ifr.. Wheeler.'" —G.  IY Ecveiny Post.




THE FRUIT GARDEN. SECOND EDTTION. A Treatise intended to Illustral
and explain the Physiology of Fruit Trees, the Theory and Practice of all
operations connected with the Propagation, Transplanting, Pruning and Training of
Orchard and Garden Trees, as Standards, Dwarfs, Pyramids, Espaliers, &c., the laying
out and arranging different kinds of Orchards and Gardens, the selection of
suitable varieties for different purposes and localities, gathering and preserving Fruits, Treatment of Disease, Destruction of Insects.  Descriptions and Uses
of Implements, &c., illustrated with upward of ene hundred and fifty figures, representing different parts of Trees, all Practical Operations, Forms of Trees, Designs for
Plantations, Implements, &c. By P. Barry, of the Mount IIope Nurseries, Rochester,
New York. 1 vol. 12mo.
"It is one of the most thorough works of the kind we have ever seen, dealing in particular
as well as generalities, and imparting many valuable hints relative to soil, manures, pruning
and transplanting."-Boston Gazette.
"A mass of useful information is collected, which will give the work a value even to
those who possess the best works on the cultivation of fruit yet published." —Eveiting
Post.
"llis work is one of the completest, and, as we have every reason for believing, most
accurate to be obtained on the subject."-V. Y. Ecln~cel'ist.
A concise Manual of the ikind here presenterl  has long been wanted, and we will
vellture to say that, should this volume be carefully studied and acted upon by our industrious farmers, the quantity of fruit in the State would be doubled in five years, and the
quality, too, greatly improved.  iTere may be found advice suited to all emergencies, and
the gentleman farmer may find direction for the simplest matters, as well as those which
trouble older heads.  The boolk, we think, will be found valuable."-Newarsk Dailg
Ac.vlertiser.
"It is full of directions as to the management of trees, and buds, and fruits, and is a
valuable and pleasant liook." —AlbauZy Eveirbg Jozrnstl.
"The work is prepared with grleat judgment, and founded on the practical experience
of the Authlor-is of far greater valsle to the cultivator than most of the popular compilations on the sllbject.' —N-.. Tribuene.
This Book supplies a place in fruit culture, and that is saying a great deal, while we
have the popular works of Downing, Thomas, and Cole.  Mr. Barry has then a field to
himlself which lie occupies witil decided skill and ability.-Prairie FcFarmer.
A DOMESTIC HISTORY OF THE REVOLUTION by Mrs. E. F ELLUET. 1
vol. 12mo. cloth, $1 00.
This is a new work, entirely different fiom the Women of the Revolution, by the samo
authl'. It embraces a comlplete outline of the Ilistory of the Amserican Ilevolution, but
illustrates Imnore particular y the Domestic History of that eventful period. In this respect it is absolutely an original contribution to American Ilistory, and will be found to
be interesting as a book for general reading, suited for private and public libraries, and as
a class book for reading in schools.