DEFENCE OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRACY AGAINST TBH
ATTACK OF JUDGE DOUGLAS-CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF THE STATES.
SPEECH
or
HON. J. P. BENJAMIN,
OF LOUISIANA.
DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, MAY 22, 180.
Mr. PRESIDENT: When we met here in December the public mind was deeply
stirred. It was stirred by an occurrence which had taken place for the first
time in our history-the invasion of one of the States of the Confederacy by a
band of fanatics for the avowed purpose of interfering with its domestic institutions and setting its slaves at liberty. The whole country was deeply stirred,
but especially stirred was the South, and this universal excitement found immediate vent in Congress. Scarcely had we met, when numerous resolutions
were placed upon our table by different Senators, which, on the 2d of February, were ordered, by a resolution of the Senate, to be printed together. The
first was a resolution submitted by the honorable Senator from Ohio, (Mr. Pusha,)
who, on the 15th of December, proposed that the Committee on Territories
" Be instructed to inquire into the expediency of repealing so much of the acts approved
Septemher 9, 1S50, for the organization of territorial governments in New Mexico and Utah,
as require that all the laws passed by the legislatures of those Territories shall be submitted
to Congress for approval or rejection."
That was offered on the 15th of December, before even the House of Representatives had been organized. To that an amendment was offered by the Senator from Iowa, (Mr. HARLAN,) which I shall not read. The next was a resolution submitted on the 16th of January by the Senator from Illinois, (Mr. DOUGLAS,) in relation to instructions to the Committee on the Judiciary to report a
bill for the protection of the States and Territories of the Union against invasion. Next, on the 18th of January, were resolutions submitted by the Senator from Mississippi, (Mr. BIOWN.) Next, were amendments to those resolution'
submitted by the Senator from Minnesota, (Mr. WILKINSON.) Next, were the
resolutions submitted by the other Senator from Mississippi, (Mr. DAVIs,) on
the 2d of February; and, finally, to those resolutions amendments were offered
by the Senator from Delaware, (Mr. SAULSBURY.)
Here, then, was a series of propositions before the Senate, seven in number,
all directed to the question of slavery in the States and Territories, and all
ordered by the Senate " to be printed together for discussion." Under these
circumstances, it became obvious that, unless some concert of action was had
by gentlemen who professed the same political principles in relation to this
vital issue now before the country, the discussion must be confused. and pointless. If every member offered his own resolutions in his own language, and if
there was no concert among those who entertained the same principles, the
time of the Senate would be needlessly exhausted, and we should come to no
practical result. Under these circumstances, a suggestion was made, from what
quarter I know not, and certainly-it is not of the slightest consequence, that
the members of the Democratic party, who were supposed generally to entertain sentiments in accordance with each other, should meet and should agree
upon the phraseology of the resolutions that they were disposed to support, and,
Printed by Lemuel Towers, at $1 50 per hundred copies.




2
after harmonizing upon that phraseology, should agree to stand by it, with a
view to get a vote of the Senate upon distinct propositions, as the principles
of the Democratic party, so far as that party was represented by the Senators
in Congress.
Now, Mr. President, these resolutions being before us, the honorable Senator
from Illinois, (Mr. DOUGLAS,) the other day-I am sorry that I do not see him
in his seat; I should have waited for him, if I had the slightest hope of seeing
him in the Senate; he was not here yesterday; he is not here to-day; and it
is impossible for any one of us to say when he will be here again-the honorable Senator from Illinois, in one of the most extraordinary speeches ever delivered in a deliberative body, and which occupies over twenty consecutive columns of the Globe, and which was followed, a day or two after, in reply to the
Senator from Mississippi, (Mr. DAVIS,) by several other columns, has undertaken
what certainly is without precedent in the history of the country-has undertaken to defend his individual claims to the Presidency of the United States;
and, in so doing, has divided out his elaborately-prepared speech into different
portions, some of which alone shall I attempt to answer; and I attempt that
answer because that Senator thought proper to arraign my State and to arraign
me, with other Democratic States and other Democratic Senators, for daring
to discuss the propositions and resolutions now before the Senate.
More than half of tfat Senator's speech was devoted to the perfectly idle and
unnecessary task of proving that those principles which he now asserts to be
the true constitutional principles under which the Territories of the United
States are governed, were advocated by him as such years and years ago; and
therefore he undertook to prove to the Senate and to the country-to which he
appealed so often-that there has been no inconsistency in his course, and that
if he and his brother Democratic Senators are at issue upon any point, it is we,
and not he, who have proved inconsistent. I shall return to that, sir, in a
moment.
The next proposition of the honorable Senator from Illinois was, that he was
the embodiment of the Democratic party, and that all who dissented from this
modest proposition were rebels. He next arraigned all his Democratic brethren in this- Chamber for daring to offer resolutions to the Senate declaratory
of constitutional principles; and he called the resolutions now before us a caucus platform, which he said the Charleston convention, which represents him,
treated with the scorn and contempt that they merited.
Next he said that seventeen Democratic States of this Union, and all his
brother Democratic Senators who did not agree with him, were disunionists,
and he arraigned them as such. He said that they were traveling on the high
road to the disunion of these States. Then, in the plenitude of his indulgence,
he told us that we were sinning through ignorance and did not know what
road we were traveling, and, with princely magnanimity, tendered his clemency
and his pardon to those who, after being enlightened by his counsel, should
tender repentance. And after having done all that-having attacked every
Democratic State in the Union, and almost every Democratic Senator in this
body, he closed with a statement that all that he had said was in self-defence;
that he attacked nobody, and that the world should know, if he ever spoke
again, it would be, as he had just then spoken, to defend himself from attack.
Now, Mr. President, lest I should be supposed to have at all exaggerated, in
this statement, what the honorable Senator from Illinois thought proper to say
in relation to resolutions involving purely constitutional and political principles, I will read here and there passages from his speech, in support of the assertion that I made. In relation to the action of his brothel? Senators, he says
this:
" Sir, let the Democratic Senators attend to their official duties, and leave the national conventions to make their platforms, and the party will be united. Where does this trouble come
from? From our own caucus chambers-a caucus of Senators dictating to the people what
sort of platform they shall have. You have been told that no less than twelve southern Senators warned you in the caucus against the consequences of trying to force senatorial caucus
platforms on the party. Sir, I do not know when the people ever put it in a Senator's commission that he is to get up platforms for the national conventions, on the supposition that
the delegates who go there have not sense enough to do it themselves.
"Although the action of the caucus was heralded to the world to be, as was generally understood, for the purpose of operating on the Charleston convention, it did not have its effect.




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The resolutions lay still. When it was proposed to postpone them here in the Senate, before
the Charleston convention, I voted against the postponement. I wanted to give a chance for
a vote on them before the party acted. I did not believe the party then would agree to the
dictation. I do not thinl they would obey the order. Sir, the Charleston convention scodrld
it, and ratified the old platform."
I appeal to the Senate whether or not this is self-defence.  I appeal to the
Senate whether or not this be, as I have stated it to be, an arraignment by the
honorable Senator from Illinois against the action of almost the entire body of
his brother Democrats-a perversion of the truth and the facts, a misrepresentation of what occured; for this, namely, that the meeting of the Senators who
adopted a series of resolutions, which they believed to be sound constitutional
doctrine, was based upon the fact that a large series of independent resolutions
had been put before the Senate, and that some concerted action of the party in
relation to those resolutions was just as necessary as the concerted action of
the parties who supported the Kansas-Nebraska bill in 1854, when the honorable Senator from Illinois called them into council every morning almost of his
life during that controversy. When that bill was pending; when amendments
were offered around the Chamber, for the purpose of concentrating action and
preventing that division of the party which might be taken advantage of by
the opponents upon the floor of the Senate, the honorable Senator from Illinois
called together those who supported the bill every morning, and asked their
opinions, and changed and modified the phraseology to suit all and to obtain
the assent of all. That was the purpose of the Democratic Senators who met
to consider resolutions that Senators all around the Chamber had offered. That
they did; and that is what has been perverted into an attempt to dictate a
party platform to a convention.
Nay, more, sir, in order that there might be no possibility of misrepresenting
those resolutions as being the dictation of a party platform, the Senate postponed the consideration of the resolutions until after the party had met and
rMade what the Senator from Illinois says is its platform; and that very postponement is brought up here as an arraignment of the intentions of the-Senators, who are now speaking on these resolutions after the platform, has been
made, as he says. It was with the view, as he now says, to affect his presidential chances. I leave that accusation for what it is worth.  I have stated the
accusation, and stated the defence.
Next, sir, I say that the honorable Senator from Illinois, not satisfied with
discussing the constitntional questions now before the Senate upon their merits,
has thought proper to arraign seventeen Democratic States of this Union as
disunionists.  ie accompanies it with the suggestion that he forgives us, because we know not what we do. I say, sir, the fact that the Senator from Illinois arraigns seventeen Democratic States, and nearly all his Demodratic
brethren here, as disunionists, I will also show, by an extract from his speech
the other day, of a few lines. He tells us that these resolutions are a Yancey
platform; and that the resolutions reported to the Charleston convention by a
majority of the States of this Union, by the almost unanimous assent of the
Democratic States of the Union, was a Yancey platform also; and that Yancey made the platform for the party, made the caucus platform, and made
the platform for the majority of the Democratic States of the Union; and that
all, together with Yancey, we are disunionists.  Here is his language, sir:
" Tile Yancey platform at Charleston, known as the majority report from the committee on
resolutions, in substance and spirit and legal effect, was the same as the Senate caucus resolutions; the same asthe resolutions now under discussionh, and upon which the Senate is
called upon to vote.
" I do not suppose that any gentleman advocating this platform in the Senate means or desires disunion. I acquit each and every man of such a purpose; but I believe, in my conscience, that such a platform of principles, insisted upon, will lead directly and inevitably to a
dissolution of the Union. This platform demands congressional intervention for slavery in
the Territories in certain events. What are these events? In. the event that the people of a
Territory do not want slavery, and will not provide by law for its introduction and protection,
and that fact shall be ascertained judicially, then Congress is to piedge itself to pass laws to
force the Territories to have it."'
So, sir, these resolutions are a "Yancey platform," a caucus platform, a disunion platform; and the purpose is, of all who support them and vote for them,
after the people of a Territory shall have decided that " they do not want alavery, and that fact has ben ascertained judicially, to get Congress to force sla



4
very on them." That is the deliberate statement, prepared and put forth to
the world, revised and corrected by the honorable Senator from Illinois. Mr.
President, my State voted for that platform. I shall vote for this caucus-Yancey platform, if that helps the Senator from Illinois. If it helps him to give
nicknames, and he thinks that an appeal to the people of the country will be
helped by accusing Democratic States and Democratic Senators of being led by
a gentleman whom he supposes to be unpopular, and calls them supporters of
a Yancey platform and of a disunion platform, let him have the benefit of such
appeal. 1, for my part, accept the responsibility, and stand by the resolutions
and the platform. But, sir, at the same time I deny that there is the slightest
approach to truth or correctness in the lineaments ascribed by the honorable
Senator from Illinois to the platform adopted by the majority of the Democratic
States at Charleston, or to the principles which are here advocated by the almost unanimous vote of the Democratic Senators.  I deny that there is the
least approach to truth in his picture. No man here has called upon Congress
toforce slavery upon an unwilling people. No man here has called upon Congress
to intervene and force slavery into the Territories. No man has asked Congress
to do what the gentleman speaks of in another part of his speech as making a
slave code for the Territories-that being another of the slang phrases which
the honorable Senator from Illinois adopts from Republican gentlemen at the
North, and parades to the American people as proof that he is sound on this
subject of the Democracy, and that we are unsound. No man has asked for
such a thing, or anything approaching to such a thing, as I shall proceed hereafter to show
Now, Mr. President, having shown to you the charges made by the honorable
Senator from Illinois against the Democratic States of this Confederacy, and
the Democratic Senators in this Hall-which charges I repel and mean to disprove to-day-I desire to read a few words which I find at the close of his
speech, for the purpose of showing how nearly and how closely his conclusions
and his speech accord with what I have just stated:
"' i am sorry to have been forced to occupy so much of the time of the Senate; but the Senate will bear me witness that I have not spoken, in the last two years, on any one of these
topicscxcept when assailed, and then in self-defence. You will never find the discussion renewed here again by me, except in self-defence. I have studiously avoided attacking any man,
because ] did not mean to give a pretext for renewing the assault onjne; and the world shall
understand that if my name is brought into this debate again, it wilube done aggressively, as
an asault on me; and if I occupy any more time, it will be only in self-defence."
Mr. President, this mode of discussing public subjects is a very convenient
one-arraigning every gentleman sitting here on this side of the Chamber, attacking them in the most offensive of all manners; spreading that attack, revised and
corrected, in the official columns of the Globe, issuing it out to the world; and
then saying that if any man should raise his voice here to repel it, it will be an
assault on him, and the world shall know that he does not speak except in selfdefence. He makes it impossible to answer his charges without attacking ris
course, and then says he is driven by self-defence to fresh assaults! I am afraid,
Mr. President, that I shall be obnoxious to the charge of assailing the honorable Senator from Illinois, if it be indeed an assault to repel a most wanton and
unprovoked attack.
More than onehalf the speech of the honorable Senator from Illinois was devoted, as I said before, to the purpose of proving his own consistency, from
some period which I do not care to go back to, down to 1854 and 1856, and the
present time. He says he is now consistent with the principles that he then
prfessed. I do not deny it. I do not know that anybody denies it. On the
contrary, that is the precise charge brought against him, as I shall proceed to
show. The precise charge is that, having agreed with us that he would abandon those principles, if they were proved tq be false, he now flies from his bargain; he now denies what he agreed to; he now refuses to be bound by that
to which he had previously given his consent; and defends himself, because, as
he says, he is now in accordance with what he was then. I do not propose to
go back beyond the year 1857; because every one here knows that, up to the
year 1857, the honorable Senator from Illinois had the cordial friendship aad
soport of all the members of the Democratic party. Every one on this floor




5
knows that, up to the year 1857, the honorable Senator from Illinois was
looked upon with pride and confidence as one of the acknowledged leaders of
the Democratic party.
Now, Mr. President, is it not a subject deserving of some inquiry; will it not
naturally suggest itself to the American people to inquire how happens it that
a gentleman, who for a long series of years possessed the confidence and admiration of his party, upon whom they looked with pride, whom they acknowledged as a leader, and for whom they reserved their choicest honors, should suddenly find himself separated from every Democratic State in the Union, and
from the whole body of his Democratic associates here and in the other House.
What magic has effected this change in the universal sentiment towards him.
What occult power has been brought to bear upon the Senator from Illinois,
that to-day he complains and whines that he is the subject of a common assault
by gentlemen who were formally with him, and who, he says, are pursuing him
with ruthless malignity  How happens it that the Senator from Illinois forgot to touch that part of the recent history of the country in his speeoh  I
propose to commend myself to the consideration of that part of the history.
When, in 1854, the Kansas-Nebraska bill was before us-I must be guilty of
some repetition; it is impossible to avoid it when a question has been worn so
threadbare-there were three distinct sentiments professed upon this floor ia
relation to the government of the Territories of the United States. The geatlemen on the other side of the Chamber professed the principle that the Congress of the United States had the power to govern the Territories, and that
there was to be found in the Constitution of the United States no prohibition
against exercising that power so as to exclude slavery; and they therefore went
for excluding slavery from the Territories by the power of Congress, which had
an admitted power to govern them. The southern members of the Democratic
party, with some of the members from the North, agreed with the Republican
party that the Congress of the United States had the undoubted power to govern the Territories; but they held that there was a limitation to that power to
be found in the Constitution of the United States, which limitation prevented
the Congress of the United States from exercising the power to exclude slavery;
but, on the contrary, imposed it as a duty upon Congress to protect property
in slaves, just as all other property. The third school had at its head, at that
time, the venerable Senator from Michigan, nlw in the Department of State.
With him were joined the honorable Senator f'om Illinois, and the honorable
Senator from Michigan then, Mr. Stuart, I think. They held that the sole
power of Congress was to institute an organic act, as they termed it; that the
sole power was to give, as it were, a constitution to the Territories by whiah
the people might be brought together in organized form, and that when the
people were thus brought together in an organized form, in a legislative capacity,
they possessed inherent sovereignty, just as a State, and had a right to do in
relation to slavery just as they pleased.
Those were the three principles advocated upon this floor. I think I state
them correctly. I try to do so, at all events. When we were discussing the
principle to be introduced into the Kansas-Nebraska bill, we all agreed that we
were opposed to the principles advocated by the Republican party. We all
agreed that whether Congress had the power or not to exclude slavery from the
Territories, it was injurious to exercise that power; that Congress ought tot to
intervene. That is what we said, and all the Senators from the South concurred with that. When we came further to determine what was to be done, after having decided that Congress should not intervere, we split. The Democrats of the South, and some of the Democrats of the North agreeing with them,
in our caucus meetings, in discussing the principles of the bill, in framing'its
provisions, in preparing it for discussion in the Senate, said: "The Territorial
Legislature has no power to exclude the people of the South, or their property,
from the Territories, because the Territories are governed by Congress as a
trustee for all the States; the Territorial Legislature can get no power but the
power that Congress gives it, and Congress itself has no power to exclude our
property from the Territories, which belong to us as well as to the free States."
The Senator from Illinois said differently. The Senator from Illinois said that
he believed the Territorial Legislature had the right, whilst the people of the




6
Territory were in a territorial organization, to exclude slavery if they pleased.
We split on that; we could not agree. I admit all that the Senator said here
the other day as to it. Ie said so then; he says now.    I complain exactly of
that consistency; because when we could not agree, he said that he would
agree with us to submit it to the courts, and if the courts decided in our favor,
he would give up and join us; and we agreed if the courts decided against us,
that we would give up and join him.     It is that very consistency that is complained of; and I shall proceed to prove it.
It is bad faith when the honorable Senator no longer worships at the shrine
of constitutional principle. Professing to agree to leave the matter to the decision of the courts, professing to respect the courts in their decisions, he has
gone astray after false gods, and is now worshiping the idols of evasion and
circumvention.   Sir,. I do not state of my own authogity the position of the
honorable Senator from Illinois, I read again from   his speech the other day.
He is speaking of the power of a Territorial Legislature to exclude slavery.
The Senator from Illinois is right in saying that his opiinion was clearly explained at the time. He asserted the power in the Territorial Legislature:
"I believe the power existed; others believed otherwise; we agreed to differ; we agreed to
refer it to the judiciary; we agreed to abide by their decision; and I, true to my agreement,
referred my colleague to the courts to find out whether the power existed or not. The fact
that I referred him to the courts has been cited as evidence that I did not think individually
that the power existed in a Territorial Legislature. After the evidences that I produced yestetYday, and the debate just read upon the Trumbull amendment, no man who was an actor in
those scenes has an excuse to be at a loss as to what my opinion was."
The Senator from Illinois is right; his opinion was clearly expressed at the
time. He asserted the power in the Territorial Legislature:
" But it was not my opinion that was to govern; it was the opinion of the court on the questi6n arising under a territorial law after the Territory should have passed a law upon the subject. Bear in mind that the report introducing the bill was that these questions touching the
right of property in slaves were referred to the local courts, to the territorial courts with a
ight of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States  When that case shall arise, and
the court shall pronounce its judgment, it will be binding on me, on you, sir, and on every
good citizen. It must be carried out in good faith; and all the power of this Government —
theArmy, the Navy, and the militia-all that we have —must be exerted to carry the decision
ifo effect in good faith, if there be resistance. )Do not bring the question back here for Congress, to review the decision of the court, nor for Congress to explain the decision of the court.
The court is competent to construe its own decisions, and issue its own decrees to carry its
decisions into effect.
" We are told that the court has already decided the question. If so, there is an end of the
controversy. You agreed to abide by it; I did. If it has decided it, let the decision go into
erect; there is an end of it; what are we quarrelling about? Will resolutions of the Sen-ate
Hve any additional authority to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States?
Does it need an endorsement by the Charleston convention to give it validity? If the decision is made, it is the law of the land, and we are all bound by it. If the decision is not made,
then what right have you to pass resolutions here. prejudging the question, with a view to influencing the views of the court? If there is a dispute as to the true interpretation and meaniag of the decision of the court, who can settle the true construction except the court itself
when it arises in another case? Can you determine by resolutions here what the decision of
the court is, or what it ought to be, or what it will be? It belongs to that tribunal. The Constitution has wisely separated the political from the judicial department of the Government.
Tie Constitution has wisely made the courts a co-ordinate branch of tihe Government; as independent of us as we are of them. Sir, you have no right to instruct that court how they
shall decide this question in dispute. You have no right to define their decision for them.
When that decision is made, they will issue the proper process for carrying it into effect; andl
the Eecutive is clothed with the Army, the Navy, and the militia, the whole power of the
Government, to execute that decree. All I ask, therefore, of you, is na)n-intervention; hands
off. In the language of the Georgia resolutions, let the subject be banished forever from the
Halls of Congress or the political arena, and referred to the Territories, with a right of appeal
to the courts; and there is an end to the controversy."
Mr. President, I have read that extract at length, that all may see the precise point at which the honorable Senator from Illinois has separated himself
from his Democratic brethren and the Democratic party.    I have him here now,
in his speech before the Senate the other day, declaring that that was the bargain; that whenever the court made the decision he would stand by it; that
he. had always intended to stand by it; that it was binding on him in good
faith; and that the whole power of the Government shoulq, with his consent,
be called into operation for the purpose of carrying out the decision. I shall
proceed presently to show  that the Senator from    Illinois, not once, but again
and again, since 1857, has been engaged, in conjunction with gentlemen of the
Black Republican party, first in endeavoring to explain away the decision that




has been made, and next that he has made the broad and open avowal in the
face of the country that, if the decision is made, it shall not go into effect.
That is the arraignment of the honorable Senator from Illinois. Let him not
go back to 1840, or 1844, or 1848, or 1852, or 1854, when he had the party
with him, nor even to 1856; but let him come down to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the spring of 1857, and let him follow me
while I pursue his devious track since that day.
Early in the year 1857 the Dred Scott decision was pronounced by the Supreme Court of the United States. If my recollection serves me, the decision
had not been printed when we adjourned. A number of us, I think, subscribed
together to obtain a number of copies from the public printer, agreeing that
he should print such a number as we believed the Senate would be willing to
have printed when it reassembled; and if the Senate declined to print it when
it assembled, we made ourselves responsible to him for the price. It was desired that the decision of the Supreme Court should go to the country. The
dissenting opinions of the two judges, who were in the minority, had been
printed. The opinion of the court was still unknown. The result of its opicion was pretty well ascertained; but in a matter of that magnitude it was
deemed of the last importance to have the very language of the court, and to
have it spread broadcast through the land. Now, Mr. President, we are told
that this decision decides nothing of what was at issue at the time; nothing of
that issue which the honorable Senator from Illinois agreed to leave to the
courts. I do not know any better way of ascertaining what a court decided
than to do as the honorable Senator from Illinois has advised us to dotake the court's own statement of what it decided. In reference to this Dred
Scott decision, it will be observed by any gentleman who chooses to refer to
the nineteenth volume of Howard's Reports, that every judge gave his opinion
seriatim; because there were numerous questions on which all did not chooseto be bound, without giving a statement of their particular views; but Mr.
Chief Justice Taney delivered the opinion of the court. The rest were mere
statements of particular views. "Mr. Chief Justice Taney," is the expression,
" delivered the opinion of the court;" and Mr. Chief Justice Taney is said to
have made a syllabus of the poin'ts which he, the organ of the court, considered
to have been decided by the court.
Now, in regard to the attempt to get rid of the authority of this decision on
the ground that the questions were not before the court, and that they were
obiter dicta, allow me to say this: it is true that when a precise point is before
a court, the judgment of the court upon thdt point is alone that which binds
the parties; but no lawyer will contradict the assertion, that those principles
which the court itself lays down as being the basis upon which it arrives at its
conclusion, are decisions by the court; they are not obiter dicta. Obiter dicta,
merely passing sayings, are such views thrown out by a judge in the course o-f
his reasoning as have no reference to the points upon which he is deciding the
case; but whenever, in order to reach a result, the court proceeds to give those
reasons for that result, and in giving those reasons for arriving at the result, it
lays down the principles upon which the result is reached, I say those principles are considered as decided by the court. If unnecessary to its decision,
they have less weight; but if the court itself declares the principles that it
lays down to be necessary to its decision, and declares that it does decide them,
then I say no lawyer can fail, when that case is brought up before thg court, to
say the court has so decided.
I do not choose to go into that at any length, nor even to read the syllablu
of the decision of the Supreme Court. But what were we divided about in
the year 1854, and what was it that the honorable Senator from Illinois agreed
to leave to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, upon a case
to be brought up from the local Legislature of Kansas? It was this: has Congress the power to govern the Territories of the United States, or is that power
in the Territorial Legislature? Has Congress the right to exclude slavery from
the Territories, or can it delegate that right to a Territorial Legislature; or has
a Territorial Legislature, in the absence of any delegation of this power by
Congress, an inherent right to exclude slavery? These are the points.
When this case was brought before the Supreme Court of the United States,




8
the question of the power of Congress arose directly-no man has ever denied
that-the power of Congress to declare that a slave should be free by being
carried into the Territories of the United States north of the Missouri compromise line. That, then, brought directly in question the power of Congress to
exclude slavery from the Territories; its power to govern them, and the limit
upon that power. What did the court say? In referring to a former decision,
it says:
"Perhaps the power of governing a Territory belonging to the United States" —
Observe this languagewhich has not, BY BECOMING A STATE, acquired the means of self-government"Taking it for granted that every man must at once admit that it is only
when it becomes a State that it has acquired the power of self-government.
"Perhaps the power of governing a Territory belonging to the United States, which has not,
by becoming a State, acquired the means of self-government, may result, necessarily, from the
facts that it is not within the jurisdiction of any particular State, and is within the power and
jurisdiction of the United States. The right to govern may be the inevitable consequence of
the right to acquire territory. Whichever may be the source from which the power is derived,
the possession of it is unquestionable."
Mr. PUGH. What is that?
Mr. BENJAMIN.      I am reading the citation from Canter's case, found in the
Dred Scott decision.   What did the court, in commenting on thatMr. PUGH.     I only want to ask the Senator whether, in the Dred Scott decision, it is not quoted for the purpose of being commented upon?
Mr. BENJAMIN. I am going on to show, if the Senator will permit me, that
the court adopted that in the Dred Scott case.     I do not think I leave quite
such an open joint as that in my argument. The court, in the Dred Scott case,
go on:
" It is thus clear, from the whole opinion on this point, that the court did not mean to decide whether the power was derived from the clause in the Constitution, or was the necessary
consequence of the right to acquire. They do decide that the power in Congress is unquestionable, and in this we entirely concur, and nothing will be found in this opinion to the
contrary. The power stands firmly on the latter alternative put by the court-that is, as' the
inevitable consequence of the right to acquire territory.'"
They entirely concurred. Is that decided in the Dred Scott case t
Mr. PUGH.     If the Senator asks me, I think the sentence he emphasized is
expressly excluded by the language of Judge Taney. He emphasized the first
paragraph; and then Judge Taney says the power stands on the last paragraph.
Mr. BENJAMIN. Well, I will give you another chance. Let us take 19
Howard, page 445, referring to that same decision in Canter's case:
" Thus it will be seen by these quotations from the opinion, that the court, after stating the
question it was about to decide in a manner too plain to be misunderstood, proceeded to decide it, and announced, as the opinion of the tribunal, that, in organizing the judicial department of the government in a Territory of the United States, Congress does not act under, and
is not restricted by, the third article of the Constitution, and is not bound, in a Territory, to
ordain and establish courts in which the judges hold their offices during good behavior, but
may exercise the discretionary power which a State exercises in establishing its judicial
department, and regulating the jurisdiction of its courts, and may authorize the Territorial
government to establish, or may itself establish, courts in which the judges hold their offices
for a term of years only; and may vest in them judicial power upon subjects confided to the
judiciary of the United States. And in doing this, Congress undoubtedly exercises the conmbined power of the General and a State Government. It exercises the discretionary power
of a State government in authorizing the establishment of a court in which the judges hold
their appointments for a term of years only, and not during good behavior; and it exercises
the power of the General Government in investing that court with admiralty jurisdiction, over
which the General Government had exclusive jurisdiction in the Territory.
" No one, we presume, will question the correctness of that opinion; nor is there anything
in conflict with it in the opinion now given."
How now?
Mr. PUGH.     I do not thinlk that helps you any.
Mr. BENJAMIN. The Congress of the United States has the discretionary
power of a State in the Territories. The Congress of the United States has the
undoubted power to govern the Territories, as they are called.
Mr. PUGH.     Tle Senator surely knows that the decision does not say that.
It says Congress has that power in the establishment of courts and conferring
admiralty jurisdiction.  That very paragraph in Canter's case was debated in
the Senate four years ago between the Senator from Illinois (Mr. TRUMBULL) and




9
the Senator from Michigan, General Cass. The court's attention. was drawnto it.
Mr. BENJAMIN.       The court's attention was evidently drawn to it,.as, the
Senator says; but will the Senator tell me that the Congress of the Uuited
States has the power to exercise the discretionary power of a State in a Territory, in organizing its judiciary, without having any power to govern the Territory?
Mr. PUGH. So far as the courts of the United States are concerned, it exercises the same power witlhin the States; for it provides for settling a controversy
between two individuals by the action of the Federal Government.
Mr. BENJAMIN. Does the Senator say that the Congress of the United
States has power to provide for establishing judges in the States- for a term of
years?
Mr. PUGIL. No, sir; because the Constitution forbids that; but I say, and
that is what the court means, that in clothing the territorial courts with admiralty jurisdiction, first in the establishment of the courts, and next in defining
their jurisdiction, they exercise powers appertaining both to the Federal' and
State Governments; but as to asserting that Congress had all the powers of a,
State Government in a Territory, it is neither in Canter's case nor in the Dred
Scott case, nor any other.
Mr. BENJAMIN.       Assuredly, the Supreme Court of the United States tells
us exactly where they stop.    They say Congress has all the powers of a State
in a Territory, except where the Constitution of the United States interferes.
That, perhaps, is also disputed.
Mr. PUGH.     Yes.
Mr. BENJAMIN. Very well; let me read the decision:
" As we have before said"speaking of this territory belonging to the United States" It was acquired by the General Government, as the representive and. trustee of the people
of the United States, and it must, therefore, be held in that character for their common and
equal benefit; for it was the people of the several States, acting through their agent and representative, the Federal Government, who in fact acquired the Territory in question, and the
Government holds it for their common use until it shall be associated with the other States
as a member of the Union.
" But until that time arrives, it is undoubtedly necessary that some government should be
established, in order to organize society, and protect the inhabitants in their'persons and proFerty; and as the people of. the United States could act in this matter only through the Government which, represented them, and through which they spoke and acted when the Terri,
tory was obtained, it was not only within the scope of its powers, but it was its duty, to pass
such laws and establish such a government as would enable those by whose authority they
acted to reap the advantages anticipated from its acquisition, and to gather there a population which would enable it to assume the position to which it was destined among the States
of the Union. The power to acquire necessarily carries with it the power to preserveand
apply to the purposes for which it was acquired. The form of government to be established
necessarily rested in the discretion of Congress. It was their duty to establish the one that
would be best:suited for. the protection and security of. the citizens of the United States, and
other inhabitants who might be authorized to take up their abode there, and that must always
depend upon the existing condition of the Territory, as to the number and character of its
inhabitants, and their situation in the Territory. In some cases a government, consisting of
persons appointed by the Federal Government, would best subserve the interests of the Territory when the inhabitants were few and scattered and new to one another. In other instances
it would be more advisable to commit the powers of self-government to the people who had
settled in the Territory, as being the most competent to determine what was best for'their
own interests. But some form of civil authority would be absolutely necessary, to organize
and preserve civilized society, and prepare it to become, a State; and what is the besti form
must always depend on the condition of the Territory at the time, and the choice of the mode
must depend upon the exercise of d discretiondry power by (t-ongress, actinh within the
scope of. its constitultional authority and not ifringing upon the rights of:perso or the
rights of property of the citizee who might go there. to residee, or for any other lawful  rpose. It was acquired by the exercise of this discretion, and it must be held and.governed
in like manner, until it isfitted to be a Stdte."
The Congress has not only the right to govern it, but the right either to govern
it by delegating persons to hold authority, or by exercising its discretion and
committing to the people the right of self-government-giving to the people
the right of self-government; by the action of Congress, not by inherent sovereignty-a grant to lbe made by Congress-to the people of a Territory, of selfgovernment through their Legislature; and yet the honorable Senator from
iilinois (Mr. DOUGLAS) tells us that although the Supreme Court of the United
States decided in thbt cane (a dlft'  oin by  liwhlth lbg agr,: o abide) latt th
2




10
Congress of the United States have the unquestioned power to govern the Territories; and although the court decided that Congress could govern them.in
any way it pleased in its discretion; and although the court decided that one
mode of governing tlem was for Congress to commit to the inhabitants there a
power of self-government; when Congress has committed that power, he says
that'the people who got it frbm Congress have more right than Congress itself;
and that the Territorial Legislature, which draws its legislative power from a
grant by-Congress, can rise higher than the powers possessed by the grantor;
or, in other words, that the stream can rise above its source.
Mr. PUGH. Does the Senator say that the court meant that Congress makes
a grant of the power of self-government to the people of a Territory?
*Mr. BENJAMIN. Clearly.
Mr. PUGH. Where does Congress get the power of self-government? The
phrase is that Congress has power of self-government over a Territory. It is
a contradiction in terms.
Mr. BENJAMIN. Who says.that? Here is the same idol-evasion.
Mr. PUGH. If I should respond to the Senator in equal.temper, I should
call his an evasion. I desire to know where he finds, in the Dred Scott case,
the proposition.
Mr. BENJAMIN. The court says that Congress may, without reference to
the action of the people of a Territory, govern it as it pleases in its discretion.
Then the court says that Congress may, instead of that, give to the people the
power of self-government.
Mr. PUGH. " Commit."
Mr. BENJAMIN. Commit to the people the power of self-government.
What is there absurd in that?
Mr. PUGH. There is nothing absurd in that; but I was about to say to the
Senator, if that phrase fitshim, I hope he-will give the explanation —
Mr. BENJAMIN. The absurdity, if any, is that of the court, not mine.
Mr. PUGH. Undoubtedly in the case of Louisiana, which the Senator from
Georgia cited yesterday, that act was simply preliminary, to get possession of
the country, and until you have a sufficient community it is all idle to talk
about self-government; but I understand that paragraph to be that, whenever
the period arrives that a community is there and Congress recognizes the community, Congress has no power of self-government to grant; it has no such
power. If there is any such power it comes from some other place, and I say
it does not come from Congress. Congress did not have it.
Mr. BENJAMIN. What is meant by Congress committing the power of selfgovernment to the people?
Mr. PUGH. Acknowledging it.
Mr. BENJAMIN.    Commit means to acknowledge?  Very well.
Mr. PUGH. In that sense. I ask the Senator how Congress can commit a
power which Congress could not by any possibility have; for it is an absurdity
in terms to say that Congress has the power of self-government in the Terrltories?
Mr. BENJAMIN. Congress has the power of government.
Mr. PUGH. Then leave the word "self" out.
Mr. BENJAMIN. Exactly, when applied to Congress. Congress has the
power of government over the Territories; but when Congress commits the
power to the people to govern themselves that is a power of self-government
in them. It seems to me so plain that language cannot make it plainer. I
cannot pursue the discussion on that point with the Senator fiom Ohio.
But, sir, the Supreme Court of the United States, in relation to this power
of Congress and of the Territorial Legislature, has not stopped where I have
just read. It has gone further, and said:
" The powers over person and property ot which we speak"that is, the power, of confiscating the slaves of the citizens of the slaveholding
States, if. they go into the Territories"are not only granted to Congress, but are in express terms denied, and they are forbidden to
exercise them. And this prohibition is not confined to the States, but the words are general,
and extend to the whole territory over which the Constitution gives it power to legislate including liosa purtftins of it remaining ilnddr territorial gdvronment; ts well ag t lit: t8'vwd




11
by States. It is a total absence of power everywhere within the dominion of the United States,
and places the citizens of a Territory, so far as these rights are concerned, on the same footing
with the citizens of the States, and guards them as firmly and plainly against any inroads
which the General Government might attempt undey the plea of implied or incidental powers,
and if Congres itself cannot do this; if it is beyond the powers conferred on the Federal Government it will be admitted, we presume, that it could not authorize a territorial governm6nt
to exercise them. It could confer no power on any local government established by, its authority to violate the provisions of the Constitution."
Congress cannot destroy the property of a citizen in his slave in a Territory.
Congress can commit to the people of a Territory the power of government
-the Senator says "' self-government" is absurd-then, let us say the power of
government; but in so committing it, the court say they presume it will be
admitted that Congress cannot authorize a territorial government to exercise
the powers which Congress itself is prohibited from exercising. Again:
"And if the Constitution recognizes the right of property of the master in a slave, and
makes no distinction between that description of property End other property owned by a citizen, no tribunal, acting under the authority of the United States "And surely the Territorial Legislature, when organized, are acting under our
authority" no tribunal, acting under the authority of the United States, whether it be legislative, executive, or judicial, has a right to draw such a distinction, or deny to it the benefit of the
provisions and guarantees which have been provided for the protection of private property
against the encroachments of the Government."
Now, Mr. President, in that connection, let me thank the honorable Senator
from Mississippi for bringing the Senator from  Illinois to the point the other
day.   We have got him   at last where we can understand him.       Again and
again the distinguished Senator fiom Mississippi called upon the Senator from
Illinois to define what he meant by squatter sovereignty.  He was asked when
and how it is that the people of a Territory acquired the right of self-government.   I have here his answer.   Well might the Senator from Mississippi say
that the more this subject was examined and discussed, the further we got apart.
What was the answer of the Senator from Illinois?     It was this. Shall 1'call
it absurd?  No, sir; senatorial courtesy will not permit it; but I state it in his
own language almost. I will read his words presently. When the people of
this country first go into the wilderness and find there no government whatever, and then exercise that inherent right of self-defence which drives men,
under the laws that God has implanted in them, to associate together in selfdefence, and organize some system of law for their own protection; then, when
it would seem to the common sense of universal mankind that no one could say
they were wrong in doing that-then it is that the Senator from Illinois says
he repudiates and opposes their power. That is the squatter sovereignty that
he objects to. But when the sovereign has come in; when the trustee of all
the States has taken possession of the common fund; when it has organized a
government that suits it in the exercise of its discretion; and when it has committed the administration of the affairs of the Territory, with certain limitations
under the Constitution of the United States, to a Territorial Legislature-then,
when the sovereign is present, then the people become invested, by some magical process, with an inherent popular sovereignty that rises superior to the author of their being. That is the position of the Senator from Illinois.
In answer to the Senator from Mississippi, he said:
"Regarding squatter sovereignty as a nick-name invented by the Senator and those with
whom he acts, which I have nevertecognized, I must leave him to define the meaning of his
own term. I have denounced squatter sovereignty where you find it setting up a government
in violation of law, as you do now at Pike's Peak. I denounced it this year. Where you find
an unauthorized legislature, in violation of law, setting up a government without the sanction
of Congress or the Constitution-that is squatter sovereignty which I oppose. Tiere is the
case in Dacota, where you have left a whole people without any law or territorial organi.
cation, with no mode of appeal from their squatter courts to the United States courts to
correct their decisions. That is squatter sovereignty in violation of the Constitution andt
laws of the United States. There is a similar government set up over a part of the State of
California, and a part of the Territory of Utah, called Nevada. It has had a delegate here
claiming that he represented it. I have denounced that as unlawful. If that is what the Senator referred to, I am against it. All I say is, that the people of a Territory, when they have
been organized under the Constitution and laws, have legislative power over all rightful subjects of legislation consistent with the Constitution of the United States."
Now, the Supreme Court of the United States says that no tribunal, legislative, executive, or judicial, acting under the authority of the United States, can




12
interfere with the right of a southern citizen to his property in the Territories.
The honorable Senator from Illinois says they cannot do it until they are organized under the authority of th eUnited States. Which is right?  Ie says
the people of a Territory do not get the power until they are organized under
the authority of the General Government. The Supreme Court of the United
States says no earthly tribunal organized under the authority of the United
States can exercise that power.
Now, Mr. President, I cannot go any further into the discussion of this case,
because, in view of my ulterior purposes in this argument, it is unnecessary.
No sooner had that decision been made than it was attacked all over the land.
It was attacked by the Republican party. The honorable Senator from New
Hampshire (Mr. HALE) was not satisfied with attacking the principles of the
decision. The Chief Justice, in order to come at the point to which he was'directing his attention, declared that he could only reach the point by taking
into consideration the history of the African race on this continent, and looking
back, in a historical point of view, to the date of the adoption of the Constitution,; and he proceeded to give that history. He stated that at that date certain principles were prevalent in the country, and amongst them, that these
unfortunate people were considered by many as having no rights which a white
man was bound to respect. The honorable Senator from New Hampshire repeated here the other day the statement that this assertion of a historical fact
was one of the points decided by the court, in defiance, I stlppose, of one
thousand corrections of the statement that had been made all over the United
States.
Again: the honorable Senator from New York, (Mr. SEWARD,) who is not now
in his seat, and whose claims upon the gratitude and confidence of his party
were so ruthlessly set aside at Chicago, undertook to get rid of the decision by
denouncing the court; and Senators around/me will remember how, again and
again, he stood up here in the Senate and insinuated, in. the face of the country,
that there had been a bargain between the Chief Justice and the President of
the United States. He saw what the decision was; he did not attempt to
evade or avoid it. I-e tried to get rid of its moral power by blackening the
character of its author. What says the honorable Senator fronr Illinois? iHe
does nqt do that. He now says that his bargain was that he would abide by
the decision of the court when it came up from a local court in a Territory.
He is not satisfied with the decision, although given by the tribunal to which
we all agreed to refer it. He says he did not agree to refer it in the Dred Scott
case; he agreed to refer it when a case should arise in a territory. Here is his
language:
" Bear in mind that the report introducing the bill was, that these questions touching the
right of property in slaves were referred to the local courts, to the territorial courts, with a
right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. When that case shall arise, and
the court shall pronounce its judgment, it will be binding on me, on you, sir, and on every
good citizen.
Mr. President, I am not satisfied with that promise; and I am not satisfied
with it because the honorable Senator from Illinois, upon several memorable
occasions'since the year 1857, has said out of the presence of the Senate that, if
the decision was made, it would not bind the people of the Territory; that the
case could not be so decided as to bind the Terpitory; that nothing that the
Supreme Court could do by decision could bind the Territory; but, by the
Kansas-Nebraska bill, he had fixed the South so that the people of the Territory, in defiance of the decisions of the court, could exclude slavery from the
Territory.
Here, Mr. President, let me come back to an explanation of that fact which
I spoke of before, and to which I asked the atlention of the Senate and the
country. Here stands the explanation of the sudden change that has been
wrought in the relations of the Senator from Illinois with the rest of the Democratic party. It was when, in the year 1858, the year following this decision,
pressed by a canvass:at home, eager to return to the Senate, he joined in canyassing the State of Illinois with the gentleman who is now the candidate of
the Black Republican party for the Presidency. pressed in different portions
of the State with this very argument, that he had agreed to leave the question to




13
the court, that the court had decided it in favor of the South, anid that,, herefore, under the Kansas-Nebraska bill, slavery was fixed in all the Territories of
the United States; finding himself going down in Illinois in that canvass, he
backed out from his promise, and directly told the ipeople of his State that,
whether it had been decided or not, and no matter what the court might decide,
the Kansas-Nebraska bill had fixed the power in the people of the North to
make every Territory in the Union free.
In that contest the two candidates for the Senate of the United States, in the
State of Illinois, went before their people. They agreed to discuss the issues;
they put questions to each other for answer; and I must say here, for I must
be just to all, that I have been surprised in the examination that I made again
within the last few days of this discussion between Mr. Lincoln and Mr. DUGcLAS, to find that on several points Mr. Lincoln is a far more conservative man,
unless he has since changed his opinions, than I had supposed him to be.
There was no doging on his part.      Mr. DOUGLAS started with his questions.
Here they are, with Mr. Lincoln's answers:
" Question 1. I desire to know whether Lincoln to-day stands, as he did in 1854, in favor of
the unconditional repeal of the fugitive slave law?
"Answer. I do not now, nor ever did, stand in favor of the unconditional repeal of the fugitive slave law.
" Question. 2. I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged to-day, as he did in
1854, against the admission of any more slave States into the Union, even if the people want
them?
" Answer. I do not now, nor ever did, stand pledged against the admission of any. more
slave States into the Union.
"Question 3. I want to know whether he stands pledged against the admission of a new
State into the Union with such a constitution as the peepie of that State may see fit to make.' Answer. I do not stand pledged against the admission of a new State into the Union with
such a constitution as the people of that State may see fit to make.
" Question 4. 1 want to know whether he stands to-day pledged to the abolition of slavery
in the District of Columbia?
" Answer. I do not stand to-day pledged to the abolition of slavery in the District of
Columbia.
Question 5. I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged to the prohibition of the
slave trade between the different States?
" Answer. I do not stand pledged to the prohibition of the slave trade between the different States.
" Question 6. T desire to know whether he stands pledged to prohibit slavery in all the Territories of the United States, north as well as south of the Missouri compromise line?
Answer. I am impliedly, if not expressedly, pledged to a belief in the r'igit and duty of
Congress to prohibit slavery in all the United States Territories.
" Question 7. I desire him to answer whether he is opposed to the acquisition of any new
territory unless slavery is first prohibited therein?
"Answer. I am not generally opposed to honest acquisitions of territory; and, in any given
case, I would or would not Oppose such acquisition, accordingly as I might think such acquisition would or would not aggravate the slavery question among ourselves."-Debates of Lincolnc and Douglas, p. 88.
It is impossible, Mr. President, however we may differ in opinion with the
man, Aot to admire the perfect candor and frankness with which these answers
were given: no equivocation-no evasion.      The Senator from  Illinois had his
questions put to him in his turn. All I propose to do now is to read his answer
to the second question:
" The next question propounded to me by Mr. Lincoln is, can the people of a Territory, in
ahy lawful way, against the wishes of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from
their limits prior to the formation of a State constitution? I answer emphatically, as Mr.
Lincoln has heard me answer a hundred times from every stump in Illinois, that, in my opinion, the people of a Territory can, by lawful means, exclude slavery from their limits prior to
the formation of a State constitution. Mr. Lincoln knew that I had answered that question
over and over again. He heard me argue the Nebraska bill on that principle all over the
State in 1854, in 1855, and in 1856, and he has no excuse for pretending to be in doubt as to my
position on that question."
All that was true; but see the art; the decision had not come yet; now the
decision has come; now    vhat?
"IT MATTERS NOT WHAT WAY THE SUPREME COURT MAY HEREAFTER DECIDE AS TO THE ABSTRACT QUESTION, WHETItER SLAVERY MAY OR MAY
NOT GO INTO A TERRITORY UNDER TIlE CONSTITUTION, THE PEOPLE HAVE
THE LAWFUL MEANS TO INTRODUCE OR EXCLUDI IT AS THEY PLEASE, for
the reason that slavery cannot exist a day or an hour anywhere unless it is supported by local
police iegulations. Those police regulations can only be established by the local Legislature;
and if the people are opposed to slavery, they will elect representatives to that body who will,
by unfriendly legislation, tffectually prevent the introduction of it into their midst. If, on the
contrary, they are for it, their legislation will favor its extension. Iteice, NO MATTER




14
WHAT THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT MAY BE ON THAT ABSTRACT
QUESTION, STILL THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE.TO MAKE A SLAVE TERRITORY
OR A FREE TERRITOLY IS PERFECT AND) COMPLETE UNDER THE NEBRASKA
BILL. I hope Mr. Lincoln deems my answer satisfactory on that point"
He told us, a few days ago, that he had agreed that that very question
should be submitted to and decided by the court. He held out to us here,
when we altogether advocated and supported the Kansas-Nebraska bill, that
we were submitting a judicial question to the courts, and that when that question was decided, the Democratic party should be a unit on the question thus
decided; but when he goes home, and is pressed in a local contest, and he sees
the glittering prize of a seat in this Chamber slipping from his grasp he turns
his back upon his promise; he repudiates his words; he tells his people, as he
says he has told them a hundred times before, that, even if the court decides
against them, he has, in the Kansas-Nebraska act, obtained for the free States
a perfect right to make a free Territory of every Territory in the Union, notwithstanding the decision of the court; and yet the honorable Senator stands
up here and arraigns his Democratic brethren; accuses them of breach of faith;
talks to them of turning him out of the party; and triumphantly appeals to
the records of 1840 to show his consistency. Now, we tell him that we will
not stand upon such promises any more. Once deceived a wise man may be;
twice deceived, by the same person and the same means, he is a dupe and a
fool. He tells us now again, "leave it to the courts," so that he may dgain go
home, and addressing his people, say to them: "Fellow-citizens of Illinois, I
have go5 the South for you. I have got them so that, no matter what the decision is, you can have a free Territory, and keep their slaves out always."
Well, sir, what occurred further in that controversy? His competitor was
shocked at the profligacy of the Senator. His competitor said to him-and
here is the argument —' everybody knows that the-Dred Scott decision has determined the principle that a citizen of the South has a right to go into the
Territory, and there, under the Constitution, his property is protected, and yet
you are telling the people here that their legislators, when they swear to support the Constitution, can violate that constitutional provision." Mr. Lincoln
held up his hands in horror at the proposition. He was bold in the assertion
of his own principles; but he told the Senator from Illinois in that discussion
that what he was saying was a gross outrage on propriety, and was breaking
the bargain he had made. But again, sir, he told the Senator from Illinois that
he did not believe in the Dred Scott decision, because, said he, if the Dred Scott
decision be true, and slavery extends in the Territories under the Constitution
of the United States, then it also exists in the States-it exists in Pennsylvania
as well as in Kansas.
The contest ended. On the popular vote the Senator from Illinois was beaten;
but according to the division of the representative and senatorial districts of
the State, lie was re-elected. The popular vote upon the election of members
of the Senate and Legislature was one hundred and twenty-one thousand in
his favor, one hundred and twenty-five thousand in favor of the Republican
candidate, and five thousand votes in favor of what he called the Danities. All
the State Republican officers were elected; but there was a majority of the
Legislature of Illinois elected in favor of the Senator from Illinois, and he came
back here in triumph.
Last spring I was forced to leave my country from an attack of a disease in
the eyes, which required attention abroad. I went to get the attention of eminent oculists abroad. For six or eight months I was debarred from reading or
writing. I came back just before the opening of this Congress; and I found
that during my absence the honorable Senator from Illinois had been engaged
in a controversy in the public journals and magazines of the country in relation
to the principles that governed the Territories of the United States, and that
he had copied in those articles the very arguments that his PRepublican opponent
in Illinois had used against him, and was then using against the Democratic
party. (Laughter.) I have got them here. First, that it may not be said that
I originated this charge, after these magazine articles were printed, and after
the Senator's opponent, Mr. Lincoln, had taxed him with want of good faith
under the Constitution for alleging the power of the local Legislature to adopt




15
this unfriendly legislation, in a subsequent speech, delivered at Columbus, Ohio,
in September, 1859, Mr. Lincoln said to the people:
" Judge DoUGLAs says, if the Constitution carries slavery into the Territories, beyond the
power of the people of the Territories to control it as other property, then it follows logically
that every one who swears to support the Constitution of the United States must give that
support to that property which it needs. And if the Constitution carries slavery into the Territories beyond the power of the people to control it as other property, then it also carries it
it were notfor my exessive modesty I would say that I told that very thing to Judge DOUGinto the States, because the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Now, gentlemen, If
LAS quite a year ago. This argtument is here in print, and if it were notfor my mnodesty,
as I said, I might call yotr attention to it. If yot wcill read it, you will find that I not
only mnade that argument but made it better than he has since."
(Laughter.)
Inow, let us look at Judge DOUGLAs's argument on this subject in Harper's
Magazine.   The Senator from Illinois, after thus deliberately violating the agreement that he made with his brother Democrats; after flying from the result of
the decision which le himself had provoked and proposed; after declaring that
no matter how many decisions might be made, he could always get clear of
them, because he had so fixed it in the Nebraska bill that the people of the Territory could always, in spite of the decisions, make free Territories, then proceeded, in his canvass for the Presidency, t6 address himself to the people of
the United States throughl a magazine; and the next trick-I am not speaking
of it in the sense of dishonor or dishonesty-the next fantastic trick of the
Senator, was to dress up a magazine article with the answers of his republican
opponent in Illinois brought forward as discoveries by himself, and claimed as
discoveries by himself, as I shall show; and he put forth to the astonished gaze
of the American republic his new theory, that the word "States," when employed in the Constitution of the United States, often means "Territories."
Let us first look at this new constitutional discovery.  In order that I may do
the Senator no injustice I will read what, I am sure, on its being read, if 1 had
not the book in my hand, would be supposed to be a caricature of the opinions
of a public man. In speaking of the clause about the surrender of fugitives
slaves, he says:
"It will be observed that the term'State' is used in this provision, as well as in various
other parts of the Constitution, in the same sense in which it was used by Mr. Jefferson, in his
plan for establishing governments for the new States in the territory ceded, and to be ceded,
to the United Stales, and by Mr. Madison, in his proposition to confer on Congress power' to
institute temporary governments for the new States arising in the unappropriated lands of
the United States' to designate the political communities, Territories as well as States, within
the dominion of.the United States."
Ilere-it is, and he goes on to prove it, as he says; and the proof is so amusing that I will relieve this rather tedious discussion by reading it for the amusement of the Senate:
" The word'States' is used in the same sense in the ordinance of the 18th of July, 1787, for
the government of the Territory northwest of the river Ohio, which was passed by the remnant of the Congress of the Confederation, sitting in New York, while its most eminent members were at Philadelphia, as delegates to the federal convention, aiding in the formation of
the Constitutidn of the United States.
" In this sense the word' States' is used in the clause providing for the rendition of fugitive
slaves, applicable to all political communities under the authority of the United States, including the Territories as well as the several States of the Union. Under any other construction, the right of the owner to recover his slave would be restricted to the States of the Union
leaving the Territories a secure place of refuge for all fugitives. The same remark is applicable to the clause of the Constitution which provides that'a person charged in any State
with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State,
shall, on the demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered
up to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime.' Unless the term State, as
used in these provisions of the Constitution, shall be construed to include every distinct political community under the jurisdiction of the United States, and to apply to Territories as
well as to the States of the Union, the Territories must become a sanctuary for all the fugitives from service and justice, for all the felons and criminals who shall escape from the several States, and seek refuge and immunity in the Territories.
"If any other illustration were necessary to show that the political communities which we
now call Territories (but which, during the whole period of the Confederation and the formation of the Constitution, were always referred to as' States' or'new States') are recognized
as' States' in some of the provisions of the Constitution, they may be found in those clauses
which declare that' no State' shall enter into any' treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant
letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make anything but gold and
silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder e,Bfd/.cta^o law*i dr law
impairing the obligation Of 6ntinrabt  r grant any title bf abllligt




16
"It must be borne in mind that in each of these cases where the power is not expressly delegated to Congress, the prohibition is'not imposed upon the Federal Governmeit, but upon
the States. There was no necessity for any such prohibition upon. Congress or. the Federal
Government, for the reason that the omission to delegate any such powers in the Constitution
was of itself a prohibition, and so declared in express terms by the tenth amendment, which
declares that' the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.'
" HENCE IT WOULD CERTAINLY BE COMPITENT FOR TIIE STATES AND TERRITORIES TO EXEHC5S
THESE POWERS BUT FOR THE PROHIBITION CONTAINED IN THOSE PRO)VISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION; AND INASMUCH AS THE PROHIBITION ONLY EXTENDS TO THE' STATES,' TIHE PEOPLE OF THE
TERRITORIES' ARE STILL AT LIBERTY TO ERERCISE TIHEI, UNLESS THE TERRITORIES ARE INCLUDED WITHIN THE TERM,' STATFS,' WITHIN THE MEANING OF THESE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES!!
[The small capitals and notes of intense admiration are mine.]
That is a constitutional argument elaborately propounded to what the honorable Senator from   Georgia yesterday said was the nonsense  of the country.
Mr. President, is it not observable, does not everybody see, that the Senator
from Illinois was driven into just that nonsense when he assumed the power of
the people of a Territory to exercise what he terms squatter or popular sovereignty?   If they be, indeed, sovereigns, he is right; there is no prohibition on
them in the Constitution of the United States, for the prohibitions are upon
States alone, and not upon territorial governments. If, therefore, they be popular sovereigns, he does not get rid of his difficulty by saying that when the
Constitution talks about States it-means Territories, because that is not so; but
he brings himself just to that reductioad absurd-um which, with his p.eculiar
perspicacity, he saw straight before him: if the Territory is sovereign, as there
is no restriction upon that sovereignty in the Constitution, because the Constitutian restricts only the sovereignty of the States and the Federal Government,
necessarily the people. of a Territory have a right to raise armies, to wage war,
to emit bills of credit, to exercise all those powers that the Constitution of the
United States prohibits the States from exercising.  In order. to get rid of- this
direct additional absurdity into which he was plunged, he saw no other remedy
than to appeal to.the.. nosense   of the.public with a statement that tile Constitution of the United States meant "Territories" when it said "States."
But, sir, I have said that the.honora le Senator from Illinois had in this
magazine taken the argument: used. by his Republican opponent in the senatorial canvass in Illinois and put them before the people of the country as arguments against his Democratic associates who differed with him in opinion.     I
have read to you what Mr. Lincoln said on that subject in his speech in September, 1859.   Here is what Mr. Lincoln said in the speech delivered by him
in reply to Mr. DOUGLAS, at Jonesboro',. on the 1f5tb of September, 1858:
"To this JUDGE DOUGLAS answered, that they (the people of a Territory) can lawfully exclude slavery from the Territory prior to the formation of a constitution. He goes on to tell
us how it can be done. As I understand him, he holds that it can be done by the Territorial
Legislature refusing to make any enactments for the protection of slavery in the Territory,
and especially by adopting unfriendly legislation to it. For the sake of clearness I will state
it again; that they can exclude slavery. from the Territory, first, by withholding what he assumes to be an indisppnsable assistance to it in the way of legislation; and,. secondly, by
unfriendly legislation. If I rightly understand him, I wish to ask your attention for a while
-to his position.'In the first place, the Supreme Court of the United States has decided that any congressional prohibition of slavery in the Territories is unconstitutional-that they have reached this
proposition as a conclusion from.their former proposition, that the Constitution of the United
States expressly recognizes property in slaves, and from that other constitutional provision,
that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law."'
Pretty straightforward propositions, one would suppose.
"Hence they reach the conclusion that, as the Constitution of the United States expressly
recognizes property in. slaves, and prohibits any person from being deprived of property without due process of law, to pass an act of Congress by which a man who owned a slave on one
side of a line would be deprived of him if he took him on the other side, is depriving him
of that property without due process of law. That. I understand to be the decision of the Supreme Court. I understand also that Judge DOUGLAS adheres most firmly to that decision;
and the difficulty is, how is it possible for any power to exclude slavery from the Territory unless in violation of that decision? That is the difficulty.
"In the Senate of the United States, in 1856, Judge TtRUMBULL, in a speech, substantially, if
not directly, put the same interrogatory to Judge DOUGLAS, as to whether the people of a Territory had the lawful power to exclude slavery prior to the formation of a constitution. Judge
DOUGLAS then answered at considerable length, and his answer will be found in the CbigreSsional GlRoe under the -daf; of June 9 1851V'




17
I have not that answer, but I have his answer of the 2d of July, 1856, which
the Senator from Georgia read yesterday, in which he says:
"My answer then was, and now is"Here is his senatorial answer in Congress here:
" My answer then was, and now is, that if the Constitution carries slavery there, let it go,
owd no pover on earth can take it away; but if the Constitution does not carry it there, no
power but the people can carry it there."
Not just what he said in Illinois.  Mr. Lincoln proceeds:
"The Judge said that whether the people could exclude slavery prior to the formation of a
constitution or not cas a question to be decided by the Supreme Court. He put that proposition, as will be seen by the Congressional Globe, in a variety of forms, all running to the
same thing in substance-that it was a question for the Supreme Court. I maintain that when
he says, after the Supreme Court have decided the question, that the people may yet exclude
slavery by any means whatever, he does virtually say that it is not a question for the Supreme
Court He shifts his ground. I appeal to you whether he did not say it was a question for the
Supreme Court. Has not the Supreme Court decided that question? When he now says the
people may exclude slavery, does he not make it a question for the people? Does he not virtually shift his ground, and say that it is not a question for the court, but for the people? This
is a very simple proposition-a very plain and naked one."  *  *  *    *   *
"Again: I will ask you my friends, if you were elected members of the Legislature what
would be the first thing you would have to do before entering upon your duties? Swear to
gspport the Constitution of the United States. Suppose you believe, as Judge Douglas does,
that the Constitution of the United States guaranties to your neighbor the right to hold slaves
in that Territory-that they are his property-how can you clear your oaths unless you give
him such legislation as is necessary to enable him to enjoy that property? What do you understand by supporting the constitution of a State or of the United States? Is it not to give
such constitutiomal helps to the rights established by that constitution as may be practically
needed? Can you, if you swear to support the Constitution, and believe that the Constitution
establishes a right, clear your oath without giving it support? Do you support the Constitution if, knowing or believing there is a right established under it which needs specific legislation, you withhold that legislation? Do you not violate and disregard your oath? I can conceive of nothing plainer in the world. There can be nothing in the words' support the Constitution' if you may run counter to it by refusing support to any right established under the
Constitution. And what I say here will hold with still more force against the Judge's doctrine
of'unfriendly legislation.' How could you, having sworn to support the Constitution, and
believing it guarantied the right to hold slaves in the Territories, assist in legislation intended
to defeat that right? That would be violating your own view of the Constitution. Not only
so, but if you were to do so, how long would it take the courts to hold your votes unconstitutional and void? Not a moment.
"Lastly, I would ask, is not Congress itself under obligation to give legislative support to
any right that is established in the United States Constitution? I repeat the question, is not
Congress itself bound to give legislative support to any right that is established in the United
States Constitution? A member of Congress swears to support the Constitution of the United
States; and if he sees a right established by that Constitution which needs specific legislative
protection, can lie clear his oath without giving that protection? Let me ask you why many
of us who are opposed to slavery upon principle, give our acquiescence to a fugitive slave law?
Why do we hold ourselves under obligation to pass such a law, and abide it when it is passed?
Because the Constitution makes provision that the owners of slaves shall have the right to reclaim them. It gives the right to reclaim slaves, and that is, as Judge DOUGLAS says, a barren
right, unless there is legislation that will enforce it."
Now, sir, let it not be said that I am reading Republican doctrines here, because these very passages from the speeches of Mr. Lincoln were introduced as
discoveries by the Senator from Illinois-these and the other passages in relation to the confusion between a State and a Territory. When the Attorney
General had replied to the magazine article of the Senator from Illinois, a rejoinder was issued, called " the rejoinder of Judge Douglas to Judge Black," in
which he says, speaking of the magazine article:
" In that article, without assailing any one'"He never assails any one" In that article, without assailing any one, or inpugning any man's motives, I demonstrated
beyond the possibility of cavil or dispute by any fair-minded man, that if the proposition were
true, as contended by Mr. Buchanan, that slavery exists in the Territories by virtue of the
Constitution, the conclusion is inevitable and irresistible, that it is the imperative duty of
Congress to pass all laws necessary for its protection; that there is and can be no exception
to the rule that a right guarantied by the Constitution must be protected by law in all cases
where legislation is essential to its enjoyment; that all who conscientiously believe that slavery exists in the Territories "Senators, listen to me now. The Senator from Illinois stood here last week,
hour after hour, and asked what was this new issue which we were trying to
force on the party, and whence its necessity. Why not stand, said he, on the




18
platform of 1856; why not take that Cincinnati platform which we agreed to
in 1856? Who is it, he says, that is forcing these new issues on the party? I
have tracked him through Illinois. What did he say in his defence of the Harper's Magazine article about the necessity of putting this very resolution in the
platform? He says he has demonstrated" That all who conscientiously believe that slavery exists in the Territories by virtue of the
Constitution are bound by their consciences and their oaths of fidelity to the Constitution to
support a congressional slave code for the Territories."
I deny that; but I want to show his view of what our duty is:
" And that no consideration of political expediency can relieve an honest man, who so belieVes, from the faithful and prompt performance of this imperative duty."
That is Judge DOUGLAS'S view of our position; and yet, hour after hour, he
stands up here and attacks us for doing that which he says our oaths and our
consciences impose upon us, as a duty so imperative that it is impossible for us,
as honest men, to avoid doing it. He says further, in the same "rejoinder:"'" I also demonstrated, in the samle paper, that the Constitution, being uniform throughout
the United States, is the same in the States as in the Territories —is the same in Pennsylvania
as in Kansas; and, consequently, if slavery exists in Kansas by virtue of the Constitution of
the United States, it must of necessity exist in Pennsylvania by virtue of the same instrument; and if it be the duty of the Federal Government to force the people of the Territory
to sustain the institution of slavery, whether they want it or not, merely because it exists there
by virtue of the Constitution, it becomes the duty of the Federal Government to do the same
thing in all the States for the same reason.
"This exposition of the question produced consternation and dismay in Vhe camp of my
assailants."
He just copied the arguments from Mr. Lincoln's dispute with him, put them
into the Harper's Magazine article, and tells us that this exposition of his of
the constitutional rights and duties of the States of this Union produced consternation and dismay amongst his assailants! Why, Mr. President, what is
there in this argument which the honorable Senator from Illinois has copied
from those Republicans who again and again have attacked the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States-that under the doctrine of the Dred Scott
decision slavery exists as well in the States as in the Territories; a sophism so
bald, a proposition so destitute of a shadow of foundation, that it never was
used by any man who believed it, but was put forth to deceive those who could
not understand the question.
What is the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States? It is this,
plainly and simply: Congress has jurisdiction over and power to govern the
Territories; the powers of Congress under the Constitution are limited; amongst
the limitations is a prohibition to destroy and impair or confiscate the property
of citizens without due process of law. Slaves are property, and therefore
Congress has no power to confiscate them, to destroy them, or to impair the
right of property in them, without due process of law. That is what the Supreme Court says. What has that to do with a State? Does Congress legislate for a State? Does Congress govern a State? Is there anything in the Constitution of the United States prohibiting a State from doing as it pleases in its
own legislation, except a certain clause in which the prohibitions are plainly
stated, and which does not include the slavery question at all. There are certain prohibitions on the States in the Constitution, and amongst them are emitting bills of credit, raising armies and navies, levying taxes or duties on imports,
on exports-all there are prohibited to the States. The States are not prohibited from legislating on slavery in their own limits; but the Supreme Court of
the United States hold that Congress is prohibited by the Constitution from
doing so in the Territories, and yet the Senator from Illinois repeats this absurd
position, that because Congress cannot destroy property in slaves in a Territory
therefore State constitutions cannot destroy it in the States!
It was, Mr. President, well known to the Senator fiom Illinois when he
penned this article, that there was nothing in it whatever. He was driven to
it. Every time he discusses the question, if he holds to the principles he has
promulgated in the Senate, and now adheres to before the' nation, he will be
driven step by step, back and back, to the Black Republican camp. Let him
beware. Let him beware of the first step outside of the intrenchments of the




19
Constitution. Let him beware lest he gets so far that return becomes impossible. He has already got to using their arguments, to adopting their principles,
and after vaunting here that he is the embodiment of the Democratic party,
and offering indulgence and quarter to all Democratic Senators and all Democratic States that disagree with him, he joins in the cry that Democratic sentiments, truly expounded, lead to disunion.
Sir, I have trespassed on the attention of the Senate rather longer than I intended. I shall be as brief as possible for the remainder of the time I shall occupy. The Senator from Illinois, the other day, went further. He has not only
evaded, avoided, and circumvented the South by the Nebraska bill, if, indeed,
it be susceptible of,he construction he gives it, and confers on the people of
the Territories the right he now alleges, but, with all his promises, the cloven
foot again sticks out. He warns us-yes, Senators, he warns us-that if the
Tennessee resolution is adopted at Baltimore he will explain away that, too.
Nothing can bind him, according to his present statements. Let me read this
Tennessee resolution, and I will ask every man within the sound of my voice
whether it does not seem to be as plain and clear as the English language can
make it?  Pass it, and he tells you, it will not bind him. He says it has a
double construction and a double meaning.    He has prepared everybody
for a double meaning to it. He asked the Senator from Ohio to read it; and
here it is.
" Mr. Pugh read, as follow:
" Resolved, That all citizens of the United States have an equal right to settle with their
property in the Territories, and that under the decision of the Supreme Court, which we recognize as an exposition of the Constitution, neither their rights of person or property can be
destroyed or impaired by congressional or territorial legislation."
I confess that I read it over and over,- and could not see a loop to hang a
doubt on. All the citizens of the United States have an equal right to settle
with their property in the Territories, and no territorial legislation can impair
it. That is the Tennessee resolution. What is the warning given to us by the
Senator from Illinois. Here it is:
" We have had predictions that the party was to be reunited by the adoption of that resolution. The only objection that I have to it is, that it is liable to two constructions."
The Cincinnati platform that he warns us to stick to-that, of course, is not
Oh, no?  But this will be liable to two constructions, and I have puzzled my
brain for an hot- to get at that other construction. I will read what the Senator said, and perhaps other Senators may be more fortunate than I have been.
I think I have got a glimpse. He says it is liable to two constructions"And certainly and inevitably will receive two, directly the opposite to each other, and each
will be maintained with equal pertinacity."
We know what the South will maintain under that resolution; and who will
maintain any other construction? Surely, the Senator from Illinois means that
he will, because he knows we will not. We can see but one meaning, and no
man imbued with constitutional principles can discover but one, and that is,
that all citizens-those who own slaves, as well as those who own horses-have
a right to go with their property into the Territories-have an equal right to
go there; and that their property shall not be impaired. But the Senator
from Illinois says there is another construction that will be maintained, and
persistently maintained. And whkt is it? He says:
"Tlie resolution contains, in my opinion, two truisms; and fairly considered, no man can
question them."
What is the fair consideration he gives it?
" They are, first, that every citizen "Not "all the citizens."  The resolution says all the citizens. Hie says every
citizen. But I will show you why he says so:
" Every citizen of the United States has an equal right in the Territories; that whatever
right the citizen of one State has may be enjoyed by the citizens of all the States."
See how he is changing it now!
" That whatever property the citizen of one State may carry there, the citizens of all the
States may carry."




20
And then they will go on with the old Republican objection, that we are all
at perfect liberty to go into the Territories without our property; that we are all
on an equal footing. The old Republican argument that was brought up here
in the discussions on the Kansas-Nebraska bill in 1854, the Senator from Illinois
tenders to us now for the canvass of 1860. He will tell us, " You are not excluded from the Territory; a northern man goes with his horses, you may go with
horses; a northern man goes with a cow, you may go with a cow; a northern
man does not go with a slave, and you shall not go with a slave;" and that is
the equality that he says it means. The Senator fiom Illinois is kind in warning us in advance this time how this proposition will be got rid of. The South
will be fools if they do not take advantage of the warning, and see if something cannot be devised which the astute and practiced ingenuity of the Senator fiom Illinois cannot get around, if the English language can hold him. Now
he says:
"And on whatever terms the citizens of one State can hold it, and have it protected, the
citizens of all States can hold it and have it protected, without deciding what the right is
which still remains for decision."
So that the Tennessee platform will leave us just where we are now. What
is his objection to it?
" I want no double dealing, or double construction."
That is his objection. He'wants things clear, plain, and straight; and then
when we ask that they shall be put down clear, plain, and straight, he abuses
us for making new tests in the party; talks about assaults on him; kept tie
Senate occupied for eight mortal hours, whilst he was attacking every man and
every State in the entire Union that would not support his pretensions for the
Presidency.
Now, Mr. President, the people have at last come to this point; the Democratic delegates of the South have come to this point. I speak not of the delegates in either House of Congress. It is the fashion to speak of congressional
dictation, in a certain class of public journals under the control of certain public men, and yet one would suppose that a seat in Congress affords at least some
prima facie probability of the possession of the confidence of the constituency,
and that the unanimous concurrence of opinion of the chosen representatives
of the Democracy, both of States and constituencies, is some primafacie proof
of what Democratic principles are. But all that is nothing. In modern slang,
this is a Yancey and caucus platform, and we are congressional dictators. I,
therefore, leaving out of view the opinions of members of Congress in both
branches of the General Assembly of the United States, now say that it has
been demonstrated by the delegates of the South, sent by the State conventions from primary meetings, that the time has come when all constitutional
rights guarantied to us under the decision of the Supreme Court-which was
taken by the Senator from Illinois and his coadjutors as the common arbiter of
our dispute-shall be acknowledged; that all that we demand shall be put
down in the bond; that there shall be no longer a doubt in relation to it.
Mr. President, when mere private rights of property are concerned, when the
question is, who owns a farm, or who owns a horse, or who is entitled to $100,
it is an old aphorism of the law, misera est servitus, ubijus aut vagum ant incerturn est-wretched and deplorable is the slavery where the law which governs
a man's right is vague or uncertain. And shall we, we who represent Democratic States and Democratic constituencies, be asked why it is that we will not
leave these rights, on which they rest for their property, which are even vital
to their existence, open to doubt and denial? Shall we be asked why it is that
we demand that the charter of these rights be written clearly, plainly, beyond
the possibility of doubt or misconstruction? Oh, no, says the Senator from
Illinois, "in 1856 we were unanimous upon the Cincinnati platform; I have
given it a construction, and the Charleston convention has backed my construction, and I am the Democratic party;" and it is his construction, and the
construction adopted by a minority at Charleston, that he presents to us here,
and asks us by what right we call for something plainer or clearer as the charter
of our constitutional privileges? Miserable and deplorable is the slavery where
the law governing the property of the individual is doubtful or uncertain. De



21
grading and dishonoring to a State is it when its sovereignty cannot ask for an
expression or acknowledgment of its sovereign rights in an assembly of equals.
The people of the South do not mean to be put off this time with any doubtful
or vague construction. The Senator from Illinois is opposed to double meanings and double constructions; he dislikes the Tennessee platform on that
ground. We share his dislike; fas est ab hoste doceri-we will be taught by
him. We will ask that everything in our platform be put down plainly and
clearly.
Mr. President, the honorable Senator from Illinois, in the plentitude of his
power, tells us that the Democratic platform has been adopted, and backs him.
He next tells us that it is glory enough for him to have been supported by a
majority of the delegates of the Democratic party at a convention; and then
with an allusion, somewhat transparent, to a course of proceeding by others
which would be agreeable to him, he says that when others got a majority he
sent word to his friends to vote for them. He does not say that he thinks
everybody ought to send word to vote for him, but he leaves it to us, if we are
generous or liberal, to draw our own conclusions. Now, Mr. President, I know
what happened at that convention only from the public records of the country,
and the report of its delegates. It is reported that, as his highest vote, upon
one or two ballots, the honorable Sena$or from Illinois received one hundred
and fifty-two and a half votes, and I think that was the highest.
Mr. PUGH. For several ballots-seven or eight.
Mr. BENJAMIN. How did he get them?       Were there one hundred and
fifty-two delegates in the convention of whom he was the choice?
Mr. PUGH. Certainly; they expressed it by their vote.
Mr. BENJAMIN. Oh, that was part of the arrangement by which those who
were not candidates for the Presidency were caught, but the truth of history
will leak out in despite of those little arrangements. (Laughter.) I had here
amongst my papers, I think, the speech of a delegate, who explains this majority.
Mr. PUGH. State the substance of it. If it was said at Charleston I shall
recollect it.
Mr. BENJAMIN. Well, sir, I will state the substance of it; I cannot find
the extract I had, and I shall have to affix it to my speech. Gentlemen have
doubtless seen it. Scarcely had the Charleston convention met, and a committee been appointed on organization, when it reported an organization of presidents, vice presidents, and secretaries, and sprung this resolution on the convention instanter-the convention had previously adopted the rules of the previous Democratic conventions-' The committee further recommend"The subject was not committed to them at all" The committee further recommend that the rules and regulations adopted by the Demooratic conventions of 1852 and 1S56 be adopted by this convention for its government; with
this additional rule:
"That any State which has not provided or directed by its State convention how its voses
may be given, the convention will recognize the right of each delegate to cast his individual
vote."
As a certain gentleman was a candidate for the Presidency-Heaven preserve
the country from candidates for the Presidency!-wherever the gentleman's
friends were in the majority, they had taken special pains, by preorganization,
to get a resolution passed at the Statb conventions instructing the delegates to
vote as a unit, and thus they fastened down every man in a minority in the
United States, and in spite of himself got his vote cast for the Senator from Illinois, although he was opposed to him. But the conventions in other States
leaving the Democratic delegates to the instincts of their own judgment; leaving in operation the time-honored traditions of the party; not tying up their
delegations by instructions, left them to act as they might think proper; and
when they got to Charleston, by forcing the votes of all the minorities that
were against Mr. DOUGLAS, and freeing the hands of all the minorities that were
in his favor, his friends had cast for him all the minorities, both those for him
and those against him, in all the United States. That is the way he got one




22
vote more than half the convention. Now, what I was looking for was this:
the distinct statement of a delegate from Massachusetts, (Mr. BUTLER,) that there
were fifteen steady, persistent votes against the Senator from Illinois from the
State of New York alone. I am telling you what Mv. Butler said.
Mr. PUGH. I read his speech last night; I think he said twelve.
Mr. BENJAMIN. I read it this morning; it said fifteen. It may have
changed since last night.
Mr. PUGH. Very well; fifteen delegates.
Mr. BENJAMIN. He says there were fifteen delegates from New York alone
who were steady, persistent opponents of Mr. DOUGLAS; yet those votes were
cast for him. There was a minority in Indiana; but those votes were cast for
him. There were minorities in other States, which I added up; and instead of
having a majority of the delegates of the Democratic party throughout the
United States in his favor, Mr. DouGcLAs was in a lean minority of but one-third
of the delegates, and that one-third exclusively fiom Republican States. The
whole Democratic party of the United States, as its Democratic electoral votes
will testify, was opposed to him unanimously. Mr. Butler says so. My friend
fiom Minnesota (Mr. RIcE) has just handed me the extract in the Constitution
of this morning; and I will read not the whole of it, but portions of it, and if
I am wrong in my memory as to fifteen, I will give up.
Mr. PUGH. I read it in the Herald last night.
Mr. BENJAMIN. Mr. Butler, in giving an account to his constituents at a
meeting called to censure him, but which approved and endorsed him after he
was through, said:
"In New York there were fifteen votes opposed to Judge DOUGLAS from first to last, yet
her thirty-five votes were cast for him on every ballot; in Ohio, six votes"
Mr. PUGH. Not one.
Mr. BENJAMIN"In Indiana, five votes; In Minnesota, two votes opposed to him, yet by that rule east for
him, so that the majority was more apparent than real."
I leave out the six votes from Ohio. The Senator from Ohio, who was a
delegate himself, must certainly know better than the delegate from Massachusetts, and I abandon the point to his superior knowledge; but here, without
counting any more, fifteen in New York, five in Indiana, two in Minnesota,
make twenty-two. Take twenty-two from one hundred and fifty-two, and
there remain one hundred and thirty, without counting a solitary vote against
him from the State of Ohio. But, sir, I will not enter into these minutin,
which ought not to be entered into in the Senate, and which I certainly never
would have thought of speaking of, but for the constant vaunt of the Senator
firom Illinois that the majority was his, and he was entitled to a nomination;
that the party had backed his prineiples, and that we were all rebels against
his high majesty. I should not have inquired into this matter but for that.
And now what does this delegate say as the sum total of what occurred 8 He
says:
" Now, with tile South opposed to Judge DOUGLAS, even to a disruption of the party; with
every Democratic free State voting against hlim; with two-thirds of the delegation of the
great State of Pennsylvania firmly against him, one-half nearly of New York hostile, New
Jersey divided, and tile only State in New England where the Democracy can have Inuch
hope (Connecticut) nearly equally balanced, what was it the part of wisdpm for-your delegate to do?"
That is the question Mr. Butler presents to his constituency. What does he
say?
"I found also that Judge DOUGLAS was in opposition to almost the entire Democratic majority of the Senate of the United States. No matter who is right or who is wrong, it is not
a pleasant position for a candidate of the Democratic party."
This is Mr. Butler's language:
" I found him opposed:Cy a very large majority of the Democratic members of the House
of Representatives."




23
We have watched him here:
"It is doubtless all wrong that this should be so, yet so it is. I have heard that the sweetest wine makes the sourest vinegar, but I never heard of vinegar sour enough to made sweet
wine. Cold apathy and violent opposition are not the prolific parent of votes. I found, worse
than all for a Democratic candidate for the Presidency, that the Clerk of the Republican
House of Representatives was openly quoted as saying that the influential paper controlled
by him would either support DOUGLAS or SEWARD, thus making himself, apparently, an unpleasant connecting link between tlem.."With these facts before me, and impressing upon me the conviction that the nomination
of Judge DOUGLAS could not be made with any hope of safety to the Democratic party, what
was I to do? I will tell you what I did do, and I am afraid it is not what I ought to have
done. Yielding to your preference, I voted seven times for Judge DOUGLAS, although my
iudgment told me that my votes were worse than useless, as they gave him an appearance of
strength in the convention which I felt he had not, in fact, in the Democratic party."
That is the gentleman who stands up here, and as the embodiment of the
Democratic party challenges the entire body of his Democratic feilow-Senators.
Now, Mr. President, all that I have said has been said somewhat in indignation. It was not in human nature not to feel indignation at the charges so
profusely scattered against me and my friends, and my State; but still, sir,
after all "more in sorrow than in anger."  Up to the years 1857 and 1858, no
man in this nation had a higher or more exalted opinion of the oharacter, the
services, and the political integrity of the Senator from Illinois than I had. I
can appeal to those who may have heard me in the last presidential canvass,
in my State, where, for months together, day and night, I was travelling in
support of the Democratic party, and helping as far as my humble abilities
would admit, to break down the Know-Nothing party, which had then a de- 
cided majority of the voters of our State inscribed in its lodges. We succeeded
in, that contest. The canvass was a successful one; and it did so happen that,
in the course of that canvass, I had again and again to appeal to my Democratic fellow-citizens of the State of Louisiana to stand by the gallant Democracy of the North who stood by us, to frown down this new organization,
whose only effect could be to injure the Democratic candidate and his success;
and then, in speaking of that bright galaxy of Democratic talent, Democratic
integrity, and Democratic statesmanship, that I now see gathered and clustered
around me. the central figure was the honored portrait of the Senator from
Illinois.
Sir, it has been with reluctance and sorrow that I have been obliged to pluck
down my idol from his place on high, and refupse to him any more support or
confidence as a member of the party. I have done so, I trust, upon no light
or unworthy ground.   I have not done so alone. The causes that have operated on me have operated on the  emnocratic party of the United States, and
have operated all effect which the whole future iifie of tile Senator will be utterly unable to obliterate.  It is impossible that confidence thus lost can be
restored.  On what ground has that confidence been forfeited, and why is it
that we now refuse him our support and fellowship? I have stated our reason
to-day. I have appealed to the record. I have not followed him back in the
false issue or the feigned traverse that he makes in relation to matters that are
not now in contest between him and the Democratic party. The question is
not what we all said or believed in 1840 or in 1856. I-ow idle was it to search
ancient precedents, and accumulate old quotations from what Senators may
have at different times said in relation to their principles and views. The precise point, the direct arraignment, the plain andt explicit allegation made
against the Senator from Illinois is not touched by him in all of his speech.
We accuse him for this, to wit: that having bargained with us upon a point
upon which we were at issue, that it should be considered a judicial point; that
he would abide the decision; that lie would act under the decision, and consider it a doctrine of the party; that having said that to us here in the Senate,
he went home, and under the stress of a local election, his knees gave way;
his whole person tremble-. His adversary stood upon principle and was
beaten; and lo! he is the candidate of a mighty party for the Presidency of
the United States. The Senator from Illinois faltered. He got the prize for
which he faltered; but lo I the grand prize of his ambition to-day slips from his
grasp because of his faltering in his former contest, and his success in the




24
canvass for the Senate, purchased for an ignoble price, has cost him the loss of
the Presidency of the United States.
Here were two men,'struggling before the people of a State on two great
sides of a political controversy that was dividing the Union, each for empire at
home. One stood on principle-was defeated. To-day, where stands he? Tlhe
other faltered-received the prize; but, to-day, where stands het Not at the
head of the Democratic party of these United States. He is a fallen star. We
have separated from him. He is right in saying we have keparated from him.
We have separated from him, not because he held principles in 1856 different
from ours. We have separated from him, not because we are intolerant of opposition from anybody, for the Senator from Ohio'(Mr. PUGH) is an honored
member of our organization. We separated from him because he has denied
the bargain that he made when he went home; because, after telling us here
in the Senate that he was willing that this whole matter should be decided by
the Supreme Court, in the face of his people, he told them that he had got us
by the bill; and that, whether the decision was for us or against us, the practical effect was to be against us; and because he shows us now again that he
is ready to make use of Black Republican arguments used against himself at
home, and to put them forth against the Democratic party in speeches here in
the Senate.
Now, Mr. President, this will be represented as an attack on the honorable
Senator from Illinois; but I finish my speech, as he did his, by saying "the
Senate will bear me witness that I have not spoken on this subject until attacked; all I have said is in self-defence I attack no man, and the world shall
know if ever I speak again, it shall be in self-defence." (Laughter.) Mr. President, the best defence is to carry the war into the enemy's country. I belong
to no school of politicians that stand on the defensive. If attacked, I strike
back, and ever shall. If the Senator from Illinois wants the world to know
that he spoke only in self-defence, let the same measure of justice be meted out
to me, and in answer to any one who can, by possibility, consider what I have
said as an attack, I reply "self-defence." (Laughter.) I wish my speech qualified just like that of the honorable Senator from Illinois. If his is an attack,
mine is; if his is "self-defence" against some unknown person, mine also is
"self-defence" against some body that has attacked me and my State, whose
name I do not know. (Laughter.) That is just my position, I state it plainly;
I am sorry the Senator is not here to hear it stated.