OCEAN STEAM NAVIGATION
AND~ THIE
OCEAN POST.
BY THOMAS RAIN EY.
NEW-YORK:
D. APPLETON & CO., 346 & 8348 BROADWAY.
TRUBNER & CO.,
PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON.
1858.




ENTERED, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1857, by
JOHN GLENN RAINEY,
In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District
of New-York.




DEDICATED,
IN TOKEN OF
RESPECT A AN D ESTEE aEM,
TO THE
HON. AARON VENABLE BROWN
POST MASTER GENERAL
OF THE
-UNITED STATES.








PREFACE.
IN' offering to the Government and the public this little volume on
Ocean Steam Navigation and the Ocean Post, I am conscious of my
inability to present any new views on a subject that has engaged the
attention of many of the most gifted statesmen and economists of this
country and Europe. There is, however, no work, so far as I am informed, in any country, which treats of Marine Steam Navigation in
its commercial, political, economic, social, and diplomatic bearings, or
discusses so far the theory and practice of navigation as to develop
the cost and difficulties attending high speed on the ocean, or the
large expense incurred in a rapid, regular, and reliable transport of
the foreign mails.
It has been repeatedly suggested to the undersigned by members
of Congress, and particularly by some of the members of the committees on the Post Office and Post Roads in the Senate and House of
Representatives, that there was no reliable statement, such as that
which I have endeavored to furnish, on the general topics connected
with trans-marine steam navigation, to which those not specially informed on the subject, could refer for the settlement of the many
disputed points brought before Congress and the Departments. It is
represented that there are many conflicting statements regarding the
capabilities of ocean steam; the cost of running vessels; the consumption of fuel; the extent and costliness of repairs; the depreciation
of vessels; the cost of navigating them; the attendant incidental expenses; the influence of ocean mails in promoting trade; the wants
of commercial communities; the adaptation of the mail vessels to the
war service; the rights of private enterprise; and the ability of ocean
steamers generally to support themselves on their own receipts.
While this is true, there is no work on this general subject to which
persons can refer for the authoritative settlement of any of these
points, either absolutely or proximately; and while a simple statement of facts, acknowledged by all steamship-men, may tend to dispel




vi                        PREFACE.
much misapprehension on this'interesting subject, it will also be not
unprofitable, I trust, to review some of the prominent arguments on
which the mail steamship system is based. That system should stand
or fall on its own merits or demerits alone; and to be permanent, it
must be based on the necessities of the community, and find its support in the common confidence of all classes. I have long considered
a wise, liberal, and extended steam mail system vitally essential to
the commerce of the country, and to the continued prosperity and
power of the American Union. Yet, I am thoroughly satisfied that
this very desirable object can never be attained by private enterprise,
or otherwise than through the direct pecuniary agency and support of
the General Government. The abandonment of our ocean steam mail
system is impossible so long as we are an active, enterprising, and
commercial people. And so far from the service becoming self-supporting, it is probable that it will never be materially less expensive
than at the present time.
It has been my constant endeavor to give the best class of authorities on all the points of engineering which I have introduced, as that
regarding the cost of steam and high mail speed; and to this end I
have recently visited England and France, and endeavored to ascertain the practice in those countries, especially in Great Britain.
I desire to return my sincere acknowledgments for many courtesies
received from MR. CHARLES ATHERTON, of London, England; ROBERT
MURRAY, Esq., Southampton; and Hon. HORATIO KING, of Washington, D. C.
THOMAS RAINEY.
NEW-YORK, December 9, 1857.




THE        ARGUMENT.
1. Assumed (SECTION I.) that steam mails upon the ocean control the
commerce and diplomacy of the world; that they are essential to
our commercial and producing country; that wte have not
established the ocean mail facilities commensurate with our
national ability and the demands of our commerce; and that we
to-day are largely dependent on, and tributary to our greatest
commercial rival, Great Britain, for the postal facilities, which
should be purely national, American, and under our own exclusive control 
2. Assumed (SECTION II.) that fast ocean mails are exceedingly
desirable for our commerce, our defenses, our diplomacy, the
management of our squadrons, our national standing, and that
they are demanded by our people at large:
3. Assumed (SECTION III.) that fast steamers alone can furnish rapid
transport to the mails; that these steamers can not rely on
freights; that sailing vessels will ever carry staple freights at a
much lower figure, and sufficiently quickly; that while steam is
eminently successful in the coasting trade, it can not possibly be
so in the transatlantic freighting business; and that the rapid
transit of the mails, and the slower and more deliberate transport
of freight is the law of nature 
4. Assumed (SECTION IV.) that high, adequate mail speed is extremely
costly, in the prime construction of vessels, their repairs, and their
more numerous employees; that the quantity of fuel consumed
is enormous, and ruinous to unaided private enterprise; and that
this is clearly proven both by theory and indisputable facts as
well as by the concurrent testimony of the ablest writers on ocean
steam navigation:
5. Assumed (SECTION V.) that ocean mail steamers can not live on
their own receipts; that neither the latest nor the anticipated improvements in steam shipping promise any change in this fact;
that self-support is not likely to be attained by increasing the size
of steamers; that the propelling power in fast steamers occupies
all of the available space not devoted to passengers and express
freight; and that steamers must be fast to do successful mail
and profitable passenger service:




Viii                    THE ARGUMENT.
6. Assumed (SECTION VI.) that sailing vessels can not successfully
transport the mails; that the propeller can not transport them as
rapidly or more cheaply than side-wheel vessels; that with any
considerable economy of fuel and other running expenses, it is but
little faster than the sailing vessel; that to patronize these slow
vessels with the mails, the Government would unjustly discriminate against sailing vessels in the transport of freights; that we
can not in any sense depend on the vessels of the Navy for the
transport of the mails; that individual enterprise can not support
fast steamers; and that not even American private enterprise can
under any conditions furnish a sufficiently rapid steam mail and
passenger marine: then,
7. Conceded (SECTION VII.) that it is the duty of the Government to
its people to establish and maintain an extensive, well-organized,
and rapid steam mail marine, for the benefit of production, commerce, diplomacy, defenses, the public character, and the general
interests of all classes; that our people appreciate the importance
of commerce, and are willing to pay for liberal postalfacilities;
that our trade has greatly suffered for the want of ocean mails;
that we have been forced to neglect many profitable branches of
industry, and many large fields of effort; and that there is
positively no means of gaining and maintaining commercial ascendency except through an ocean steam mail system:
8. Conceded (SECTION VIII.) that the Government can discharge the
clear and unquestionable duty of establishing foreign mail
facilities, only by paying liberal prices for the transport of the
mails for a long term of years, by creating and sustaining an
ocean postal system, by legislating upon it systematically, and by
abandoning our slavish dependence upon Great Britain:
9. Conceded (SECTION IX.) that the British ocean mail system attains
greater perfection and extent every year; that instead of becoming self-supporting, it costs the treasury more and more every
year; that English statesmen regard its benefits as far outweighing the losses to the treasury; that so far from abandoning, they
are regularly and systematically increasing it; that it was never
regarded by the whole British public with more favor, than at the
present time; that it is evidently one of the most enduring institutions of the country; that it necessitates a similar American system; that without it our people are denied the right andprivilege of
competition; and that we are thus far by no means adequately
prepared for that competition, or for our own development.




THE ARGUMENT.                       ix
SECTION X. notices each of the American lines, and presents many
facts corroborating the views advanced in the preceding sections.
PAPER A.
PAPER A (page 192) enumerates all the Steamers of the United States.
PAP.ER       B.
PAPER B (page 193) gives a list of all the British Ocean Mail Lines.
PAPER 0.
PAPER C ( page 198) presents Projgt of Franco-American Navigation.
PAPER D.
PAPER D   (page 199) gives the Steam Lines between Europe and
America.
PAPER E.
PAPER E (page 200) gives many extracts from eminent statesmen,
corroborating views herein advanced.
PAPER F.
PAPER F (page 219) gives the Steam Lines of the whole world.
PAPER        G.
PAPER G (page 220) American Mail Lines: Letter of Ton. Horatio
King.
PAPER H.
PAPER H (page 221) List of British, French, and American Navies.




HEADS OF ARGUMENT.
SECTION I.
PRESENT POSITION OF STEAM NAVIGATION.
THE SPLENDID TRIUMPHS OF STEAM: IT IS THE MOST EFFICIENT MEANS OF NATIONAL
PROGRESS AND DEVELOPMENT: THE FORERUNNER OF CIVILIZATION: IMPORTANT TO
THE UNITED STATES AS AN AGRICULTURAL, MANUFACTURING, AND COMMERCIAL
COUNTRY: NATURE OF OUR PEOPLE: MARITIME SPIRIT: VARIOUS COMMERCIAL
COUNTRIES: OURS MOST ADVANTAGEOUSLY SITUATED: THE DESTINY OF AMERICAN
COMMERCE: OUR COMMERCIAL RIVALS: GREAT BRITAIN: SHE RESISTS US BY STEAM
AND DIPLOMACY: OUR POSITION: MOST APPROVED INSTRUMENTS OF COMMERCIAL
SUCCESS: PORTUGAL AND HOLLAND: ENGLAND'S WISE STEAM POLICY: LIBERAL
VIEWS OF HER STATESMEN: EXTENT OF HER MAIL SERVICE: HER IMMENSE STEAM
MARINE, OF 2,161 STEAMERS: OUR CONTRAST OUR DEPENDENCE ON GREAT BRITAIN: THE UNITED STATES MAIL AND COMMERCIAL STEAM MARINE IN FULL: A
MOST UNFAVORABLE COMPARISON.
SECTION II.
NECESSITY OF RAPID STEAM MAILS.
ARE OCEAN STEAM MAILS DESIRABLE AND NECESSARY FOR A COMMERCIAL PEOPLE?
THE SPIRIT OF THE AGE DEMANDS THEM: MUTUAL DEPENDENCE OF NATIONS: FAST
MAILS NECESSARY TO CONTROL SLOW FREIGHTS: THE FOREIGN POST OF EVERY NATION IS MORE OR LESS SELFISH: IF WE NEGLECT APPROVED METHODS, WE ARE THEREBY SUBORDINATED TO THE SKILL OF OTHERS: THE WANT OF A FOREIGN POST IS A
NATIONAL CALAMITY: OTHER NATIONS CAN NOT AFFORD US DUE FACILITIES: WARS
AND ACCIDENTS FORBID: THE CRIMEA AND THE INDIES AN EXAMPLE: MANY OF OUR
FIELDS OF COMMERCE NEED A POST: BRAZIL, THE WEST-INDIES, AND PACIFIC SOUTHAMERICA: MAILS TO THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE BY THE NUMEROUS CUNARD VESSELS: CORRESPONDENCE WITH AFRICA, CHINA, THE EAST-INDIES, THE MAURITIUS,
AND AUSTRALIA: SLAVISH DEPENDENCE ON GREAT BRITAIN DESIRABLE FOR OUR
DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR SERVICE: FOR THE CONTROL OF OUR SQUADRONS:
CASES OF SUFFERING: NECESSARY FOR DEFENSE: FOR CULTIVATING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND OPENING TRADE: THE ATLANTIC TELEGRAPH WILL REQUIRE FASTER
AND HEAVIER MAILS: OUR COMMERCE REQUIRES FAST STEAMERS FOR THE RAPID
AND EASY TRANSIT OF PASSENGERS: MODES OF BENEFITING COMMERCE.




HEADS OF ARGUMENT.                         xi
SECTION III.
THE CAPABILITIES OF OCEAN STEAM.
THE COMMERCIAL CAPABILITIES OF OCEAN STEAM: STEAM MAILS ARRIVE AND DEPART
AT ABSOLUTELY FIXED PERIODS: UNCERTAINTY IS HAZARDOUS AND COSTLY: SUBSIDIZED STEAMERS GIVE A NECESSARILY HIGH SPEED TO THE MAILS: MONEY CAN
NOT AFFORD TO LIE UPON THE OCEAN FOR WEEKS: COMPARED WITH SAIL: STEAMERS TRANSPORT CERTAIN CLASSES OF FREIGHT: THE HAVRE AND THE CUNARD
LINES: THE CUNARD PROPELLERS: STEAMERS CAN AFFORD TO TRANSPORT EXPRESS
PACKAGES AND GOODS: GOODS TAKEN ONLY TO FILL UP: WHY PROPELLERS ARE
CHEAPER IN SOME CASES: STEAM IN SOME CASES CHEAPER THAN THE WIND: AN
ESTIMATE: THE PROPELLER FOR COASTING: STEAM ON ITS OWN RECEIPTS HAS NOT
SUCCEEDED ON THE OCEAN: MARINE AND FLUVIAL NAVIGATION COMPARED: MOST
FREIGHTS NOT TRANSPORTABLE BY STEAM ON ANY CONDITIONS: AUXILIARY FREIGHTING AND EMIGRANT PROPELLERS: LAWS OF TRANSPORT: RAPID MAILS AND LEISURE
TRANSPORT OP FREIGHT THE LAW OF NATURE: THE PRICE OF COALS RAPIDLY INCREASING: ANTICIPATED IMPROVEMENTS AND CHEAPENING IN MARINE PROPULSION
NOT REALIZED.
SECTION IV.
COST OF STEAM: OCEAN MAIL SPEED.
MISAPPREHENSION OF THE HIGH COST OF STEAM MARINE PROPULSION: VIEWS OF THE
NON-PROFESSIONAL: HIGH SPEED NECESSARY FOR THE DISTANCES IN OUR COUNTRY -
WHAT IS THE COST OF HIGH ADEQUATE MAIL SPEED: FAST STEAMERS REQUIRE
STRONGER PARTS IN EVERY THING: GREATER OUTLAY IN PRIME COST: MORE FREQUENT AND COSTLY REPAIRS: MORE WATCHFULNESS AND MEN: MORE COSTLY FUEL,
ENGINEERS, FIREMEN, AND COAL-PASSERS: GREAT STRENGTH OF HULL REQUIRED:
ALSO IN ENGINES, BOILERS, AND PARTS: WHY THE PRIME COST INCREASES: THEORY
OF REPAIRS: FRICTION AND BREAKAGES: BOILERS AND FURNACES BURNING OUT:
REPAIRS TWELVE TO EIGHTEEN PER CENT: DEPRECIATION: SEVERAL LINES CITED:
USES FOR MORE MEN: EXTRA FUEL, AND LESS FREIGHT-ROOM: BRITISH TRADE AND
COAL CONSUMPTION.
THE NATURAL LAWS OF RESISTANCE, POWER, AND SPEED, WITH TABLE: THE RESISTANCE VARIES AS IS THE SQUARE OF THE VELOCITY: THE POWER, OR FUEL, VARIES
AS THE CUBE OF THE VELOCITY: THE RATIONALE: AUTHORITIES CITED IN PROOF
OF THE LAW: EXAMPLES, AND THE FORMUL;E: COAL-TABLE; NO. I.: QUANTITY OF
FUEL FOR DIFFERENT SPEEDS AND DISPLACEMENTS: DEDUCTIONS FROM THE TABLE:
RATES AT WHICH INCREASED SPEED INCREASES THE CONSUMPTION OF FUEL: CONSUMPTION FOR VESSELS OF 2,500, 8,000, AND 6,000 TONS DISPLACEMENT: COAL-TABLE;
NO. II.: FREIGHT-TABLE; NO. III.: AS SPEED AND POWER INCREASE, FREIGHT AND
PASSENGER ROOM DECREASE: FREIGHT AND FARE REDUCED: SPEED OF VARIOUS
LINES: FREIGHT-COST: COAL AND CARGO; NO. IV.: MR. ATHERTON'S VIEWS OF
FREIGHT TRANSPORT.




Xli                   HEADS OF ARGUMENT.
SECTION V.
OCEAN MAIL STEAMERS CAN NOT LIVE ON
THEIR OWN RECEIPTS.
INCREASE OF BRITISH MAIL SERVICE: LAST NEW LINE AT $925,000 PER YEAR: THE
SYSTEM NOT BECOMING SELF-SUPPORTING: CONTRACT RENEWALS AT SAME OR HIGHER
PRICES: PRICE OF FUEL AND WAGES INCREASED FASTER THAN ENGINE IMPROVEMENTS: LARGE SHIPS RUN PROPORTIONALLY CHEAPER THAN SMALL: AN EXAMPLE,
WITH THE FIGURES: THE STEAMER "LEVIATHAN," 27,000 TONS: STEAMERS OF THIS
CLASS WILL NOT PAY: SHE CAN NOT TRANSPORT FREIGHT TO AUSTRALIA: REASONS
FOR THE SAME: MOTION HER NORMAL CONDITION: MUST NOT BE MADE A DOCK: DELIVERY OF FREIGHTS: MAMMOTH STEAMERS TO BRAZIL: LARGE CLIPPERS LIE IDLE:
NOT EVEN THIS LARGE CLASS OF STEAMERS CAN LIVE ON THEIR OWN RECEIPTS:
EFFICIENT MAIL STEAMERS CARRY BUT LITTLE EXCEPT PASSENGERS: SOME HEAVY
EXTRA EXPENSES IN REGULAR MAIL LINES: PACIFIC MAIL COMPANY'S LARGE EXTRA
FLEET, AND ITS EFFECTS: THE IMMENSE ACCOUNT OF ITEMS AND EXTRAS: A PARTIAL LIST: THE HAVRE AND COLLINS DOCKS: GREAT EXPENSE OF FEEDING PASSENGERS: VIEWS OF MURRAY AND ATHERTON ON THE COST OF RUNNING STEAMERS,
AND THE NECESSITY OF THE PRESENT MAIL SERVICE.
SECTION VI.
HOW CAN MAIL SPEED BE ATTAINED?
THE TRANSMARINE COMPARED WITH THE INLAND POST: OUR PAST SPASMODIC EFFORTS: NEED SOME SYSTEM: FRANCE AROUSED TO STEAM: THE SAILING-SHIP
MAIL: THE NAVAL STEAM MAIL: THE PRIVATE ENTERPRISE MAIL: ALL INADEQUATE
AND ABANDONED: GREAT BRITAIN'S EXPERIENCE IN ALL THESE METHODS: NAVAL
VESSELS CAN NOT BE ADAPTED TO THE MAIL SERVICE: WILL PROPELLERS MEET
THE WANTS OF MAIL TRANSPORT, WITH OR WITHOUT SUBSIDY? POPULAR ERRORS
REGARDING THE PROPELLER: ITS ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES: BOURNE'S
OPINION: ROBERT MURRAY: PROPELLERS TOO OFTEN ON THE DOCKS: THEY ARE
VERY DISAGREEABLE PASSENGER VESSELS: IF PROPELLERS RUN MORE CHEAPLY IT
IS BECAUSE THEY ARE SLOWER: COMPARED WITH SAIL: UNPROFITABLE STOCK:
CROSKEY'S LINE: PROPELLERS LIVE ON CHANCES AND CHARTERS: IRON IS A MATERIAL: SENDING THE MAILS BY SLOW PROPELLERS WOULD BE AN UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION AGAINST SAILING VESSELS: INDIVIDUAL ENTERPRISE CAN NOT SUPPLY MAIL
FACILITIES: THEREFORE IT IS THE DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT.




HEADS OF ARGUMENT.                       xiii
SECTION VII.
WHAT IS THE DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT
TO THE PEOPLE?
RESUMIE OF THE PREVIOUS SECTIONS AND ARGUMENTS: IT IS THE DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO FURNISH RAPID STEAM MAILS: OUR PEOPLE APPRECIATE THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMERCE, AND OF LIBERAL POSTAL FACILITIES: THE GOVERNMENT
IS ESTABLISHED FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PEOPLE: IT MUST FOSTER THEIR INTERESTS AND DEVELOP THEIR INDUSTRY: THE WANT OF SUCH MAILS HAS CAUSED THE
NEGLECT OF MANY PROFITABLE BRANCHES OF INDUSTRY: AS A CONSEQUENCE WE
HAVE LOST IMMENSE TRAFFIC: THE EUROPEAN MANUFACTURING SYSTEM AND OURS:
FIELDS OF TRADE NATURALLY PERTAINING TO US: OUR ALMOST SYSTEMATIC
NEGLECT OF THEM: WHY IS GREAT BRITAIN'S COMMERCE SO LARGE: CAUSES AND
THEIR EFFECTS: HER WEST-INDIA LINE RECEIVES A LARGER SUBSIDY THAN ALL
THE FOREIGN LINES OF THE UNITED STATES COMBINED: INDIFFERENCE SHOWN BY
CONGRESS TO MANY IMPORTANT FIELDS OF COMMERCE: INSTANCES OF MAIL FACILITIES CREATING LARGE TRADE: THE PENINSULAR AND ORIENTAL COMPANY'S TESTIMONY: THE BRITISH AND BRAZILIAN TRADE: SOME DEDUCTIONS FROM THE FIGURES:
CALIFORNIA SHORN OF HALF HER GLORY: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE NOT MISERS:
THEY WISH THEIR OWN PUBLIC TREASURE EXPENDED FOR THE BENEFIT OF THEIR
INDUSTRY: OUR COMMERCIAL CLASSES COMPLAIN THAT THEY ARE DEPRIVED OF
THE PRIVILEGE OF COMPETING WITH OTHER NATIONS.
SECTION VIII.
HOW SHALL THE GOVERNMENT DISCHARGE
THIS DUTY?
WE NEED A STEAM MAIL SYSTEM: HOW OUR LINES HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED: AMERICAN AND BRITISH POLICY CONTRASTED: SPASMODIC AND ENDURING LEGISLATION: MR. POLK'S ADMINISTRATION ENDEAVORED TO INAUGURATE A POLICY: GEN.
RUSK ENDEAVORED TO EXTEND IT: THE TERM OF SERVICE TOO SHORT: COMPANIES
SHOULD HAVE LONGER PERIODS: A LEGISLATION OF EXPEDIENTS: MUST SUBSIDIZE
PRIVATE COMPANIES FOR A LONG TERM OF YEARS: SHOULD WE GIVE TO OUR POSTAL
VESSELS THE NAVAL FEATURE: OUR MAIL LINES GAVE AN IMPULSE TO SHIP-BUILDING: LET US HAVE STEAM MAILS ON THEIR MERITS: NO NAVAL FEATURE SUBTERFUGES: THESE VESSELS HIGHLY USEFUL IN WAR: THEY LIBERALLY SUPPLY THE
NAVY WITH EXPERIENCED ENGINEERS WHEN NECESSARY: THE BRITISH MAIL PACKETS GENERALLY FIT FOR WAR SERVICE: LORD CANNING'S REPORT: EXPEDIENTS
PROPOSED FOR CARRYING THE MAILS: BY FOREIGN INSTEAD OF AMERICAN VESSELS:
DEGRADING EXPEDIENCY AND SUBSERVIENCY: WE CAN NOT SECURE MAIL SERVICE
BY GIVING THE GROSS RECEIPTS: THE GENERAL TREASURY SHOULD PAY FOR THE
TRANSMARINE POST: REQUIREMENTS FOR NEW CONTRACTS: METHOD OF MAKING
CONTRACTS: THE LOWEST BIDDER AND THE LAND SERVICE: THE OCEAN SERVICE
VERY DIFFERENT: BUT LITTLE UNDERSTOOD: LOWEST-BIDDER SYSTEM FAILURES:
SENATOR RUSK'S OPINION: INJURIOUS EFFECTS OF LOWEST BIDDER: INDIVIDUAL
EFFORTS AND RIGHTS.




Xiv                  HEADS OF ARGUMENT.
SECTION IX.
THE BRITISH SYSTEM, AND ITS RESULTS.
STEAM MAIL SYSTEM INAUGURATED AS THE PROMOTER OF WEALTH, POWER, AND
CIVILIZATION: THE EFFECT OF THE SYSTEM ON COMMERCE: THE LONG PERIOD
DESIGNATED FOR THE EXPERIMENT: NEW LINES, WHEN, HOW, AND WHY ESTABLISHED: THE WORKINGS OF THE SYSTEM: FIRST CONTRACT MADE IN 1833, LIVERPOOL
AND ISLE OF MAN: WITH ROTTERDAM IN 1834: FALMOUTH AND GIBRALTAR, 1837:
ABERDEEN, SHETLAND, AND ORKNEYS, 1840: THE "SAVANNAH," THE FIRST OCEAN
STEAMER: THE SIRIUS AND GREAT WESTERN: CUNARD CONTRACT MADE IN 1839:
EXTRA PAY "WITHIN CERTAIN LIMITS:" MALTA, ALEXANDRIA, SUEZ, EAST-INDIES,
AND CHINA IN 1840: THE PENINSULAR AND ORIENTAL COMPANY: WEST-INDIA SERVICE ESTABLISHED IN 1840: POINTS TOUCHED AT: PROVISIONAL EXTRA PAY: PANAMA AND VALPARAISO LINE ESTABLISHED IN 1845: HOLYHEAD AND KINGSTON IN 1848:
ALSO THE CHANNEL ISLANDS: WEST COAST OF AFRICA AND CAPE OF GOOD HOPE
IN 1852: CALCUTTA VIA THE CAPE IN 1852, AND ABANDONED: PLYMOUTH, SYDNEY,
AND NEW SOUTH WALES ALSO IN 1852, AND ABANDONED: INVESTIGATION OF 1851
AND 1853, AND NEW AUSTRALIAN CONTRACT IN 1856: HALIFAX, NEWFOUNDLAND,
BERMUDA, AND ST. THOMAS IN 1850: NEW-YORK AND BERMUDA SOON DISCONTINUED: COMPARISON OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN SUBSIDIES, RATES PER MILE,
TOTAL DISTANCES, AND POSTAL INCOME: THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT PAYS HIGHER
SUBSIDIES THAN THE AMERICAN: WORKINGS AND INCREASE OF THE BRITISH SERVICE: GEN. RUSK'S VIEWS: SPEECH OF HON T. B. KING: COMMITTEE OF INVESTIGATION, 1849: NEW INVESTIGATION ORDERED IN 1853, AND INSTRUCTIONS: LORD
CANNING'S REPORT AND ITS RECOMMENDATIONS: GREAT BRITAIN WILL NOT ABANDON HER MAIL SYSTEM: THE NEW AUSTRALIAN LINE: TESTIMONY OF ATHERTON
AND MURRAY: MANY EXTRACTS FROM THE REPORT: STEAM INDISPENSABLE: NOT
SELF-SUPPORTING: THE MAIL RECEIPTS WILL NOT PAY FOR IT: RESULT OF-THE
WHOLE SYSTEM: ANOTHER NEW SERVICE TO INDIA AND CHINA: SHALL WE RUN
THE POSTAL AND COMMERCIAL RACE WITH GREAT BRITAIN? CANADA AND THE
INDIES.
SECTION X.
THE MAIL LINES OF THE UNITED STATES.
THE MAIL LINES OF THE UNITED STATES: THE HAVRE AND BREMEN, THE PIONEERS:
THE BREMEN SERVICE RECENTLY GIVEN TO MR. VANDERBILT: BOTH LINES RUN ON
THE GROSS RECEIPTS: THE CALIFORNIA LINES: WONDROUS DEVELOPMENT OF OUR
PACIFIC POSSESSIONS: THE PACIFIC MAIL STEAMSHIP COMPANY: ITS HISTORY, SERVICES, LARGE MATERIEL, AND USEFULNESS: THE UNITED STATES MAIL STEAMSHIP
COMPANY: ITS RAMIFIED AND LARGE EXTRA SERVICE: EFFECT UPON THE COMMERCE OF THE GULF: ITS HEAVY LOSSES, AND NEW SHIPS: STEAMSHIP STOCKS
GENERALLY AVOIDED: CONSTANTLY FAR BELOW PAR: THE COLLINS LINE: A COMPARISON WITH THE CUNARD: ITS SOURCES OF HEAVY OUTLAY, AND ITS ENTERPRISE: THE AMERICAN MARINE DISASTERS COULD NOT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED BY
HUMAN FORESIGHT; THE VANDERBILT BREMEN LINE: THE CHARLESTON AND HAVANA LINE.




tegan Staum                    artimatihn,
AND THE
OCEAN POST.
SECTION I.
PRESENT POSITION OF STEAM NAVIGATION.
THE SPLENDID TRIUMPHS OF STEAM: IT IS THE MOST EFFICIENT
MEANS OF NATIONAL PROGRESS AND DEVELOPMENT: THE
FORERUNNER OF CIVILIZATION: IMPORTANT TO THE UNITED
STATES AS AN AGRICULTURAL, MANUFACTURING, AND COMMERCIAL COUNTRY: NATURE OF OUR PEOPLE: MARITIME
SPIRIT: VARIOUS COMMERCIAL COUNTRIES: OURS MOST ADVANTAGEOUSLY' SITUATED: THE DESTINY OF AMERICAN COMMERCE: OUR COMMERCIAL RIVALS: GREAT BRITAIN: SHE
RESISTS US BY STEAM AND DIPLOMACY: OUR POSITION: MOST
APPROVED INSTRUMENTS OF COMMERCIAL SUCCESS: PORTUGAL AND HOLLAND: ENGLAND'S WISE STEAM POLICY: LIBERAL VIEWS OF HER STATESMEN: EXTENT OF HER MAIL SERVICE: HER IMMENSE STEAM MARINE, OF 2,161 STEAMERS:
OUR CONTRAST: OUR DEPENDENCE ON GREAT BRITAIN: THE
UNITED STATES MAIL AND COMMERCIAL STEAM MARINE IN
FULL: A MOST UNFAVORABLE COMPARISON.
THE agreeable and responsible duty of developing and
regulating the most important discovery of modern times,
and the greatest material force known to men, has been
committed to the present generation. The progress of




16                 THE OCEAN POST.
Steam, from the days of its first application to lifting purposes, through all of its gradations of application to railway locomotion and steamboat and steamship propulsion
down to the present time, has been a series of splendid
and highly useful triumphs, alike creditable to the genius
of its promoters, and profitable to the nations which have
adopted it. However great the progress of the world, or
the prosperity of commercial nations prior to its introduction, it can not be doubted that it now constitutes the
largest, surest, and most easily available means of progress,
prosperity, and power known to civilized nations; or that
the development, wealth, and independence of any country
will be in the ratio of the application of steam to all of
the ordinary purposes of life. It has been canonized
among the sacred elements of national power, and commissioned as the great laborer of the age. Every civilized
nation has adopted it as the best means of interior development, and as almost the only forerunner of commerce and
communication with the outer world. It has thus become
an indispensable necessity of every day life, whether by
land or by sea, to the producer, the consumer, the merchant, the manufacturer, the artisan, the pleasure-seeker,
the statesman, and the state itself, to public liberty, and
to the peace of the world.
The existence of an agent of so great power and influence, is necessarily a fact of unusual significance to a nation
like the United States, which combines within itself in a
high degree, the three most important interests, of large
Agricultural and Mineral Productions, extensive and increasing Manufactures, and an immense Foreign Commerce and
Domestic Trade. Our country is essentially commercial in
its tastes and tendencies; our people are, as a result of
our common schools, bold, inquiring, and enterprising;
and our constitution and laws are well calculated to produce a nation of restless and vigorous merchants, traders,




POSITION OF STEAM NAVIGATION.         17
and travellers. Foreign commerce is a necessity of ou1
large and redundant agricultural production.- Our extended sea-coast, and necessarily large coasting-trade between the States, have begotten an unbounded spirit of
maritime adventure. The ample material, and other facilities for building vessels, have also contributed to this end.
As capable as any people on earth of running vessels and
conducting mercantile enterprise, we have found foreign
commerce a profitable field for the investment of labor,
intelligence, and capital.
There is scarcely any field of trade in the world which
we are not naturally better calculated to occupy than any
other country. Most of the great commercial nations
employ their ships as common carriers for other nations,
and limit their exports to manufactures alone. Great
Britain is an example of this. She exports no products of
the soil, for very obvious reasons. The exports of France partake of the same general character, domestic manufactures,
with a small portion of the products of the soil. So, also,
with the German States and Holland. The United States, to
the contrary, have an immense export trade in the products of the soil. These exports have the advantage of
embracing every production of the temperate zone, and
some few of the more profitable of those of the torrid.
These constitute a large source of wealth, and are daily
increasing in quantity, value, and importance. Combined
with the manufactured productions of the country, and the
yield of the mines, they require a large amount of shipping, which, extending to nearly all nations, opens a diversified and rich field of trade. The exchanges of production
between our own and other countries, are, consequently,
very large and general, and must continue to increase to
an indefinite extent, as the States and Territories of the
Union fill up, and as the various new and opening branches
of domestic industry develop and mature.
2




18                 THE OCEAN POST.
The extent which this trade will reach in a few generations, its aggregate value, and the influence which it will
wield over the world if judiciously and energetically promoted, and if wisely protected against encroachment from
abroad, and embarrassment at home, no human foresight
can predict or adequately imagine. With a larger field
of operations, at home and abroad, than any nation ever
possessed before, with the pacific commercial policy of the
age, and with the aids of science, the telegraph, and steam
to urge it on, American Commerce has opened before it a
glorious career and an imposing responsibility.
But the conquests of this commerce are not to be the bloodless victories of power unopposed; not the result of bold
adventure without check, or of simply American enterprise without the Government's aid. Our foe is a wary,
well-scarred, and well-tried old warrior, who has the unequalled wisdom of experience, and the patient courage
that has triumphed over many defeats. The field has been
in his hands for ten generations, and he knows every byway, every marsh, every foot of defense, and the few inassailable points to be preserved and guarded. Great Britain,
particularly, knows how essential is a large general commerce for opening a market for her manufactures. She is
dependent on those manufactures, and upon the carrying
trade of the world for a living; and she fosters and protects them not alone by the reputed and well-known individual enterprise and energy of her people, but by a wise
and forecasting policy of state, a mighty and irresistible
naval and military array, a wisely concerted, liberal, wellarranged, and long-pursued steam system, and prompt, unflinching protection of British subjects in their rights
throughout the world.
Great Britain is prepared to resist our commercial progress, as she has already done, step by step, by all the
means within her power. She has wisely brought steam




POSITION OF STEAM NAVIGATION.         19
to her aid, and now has a system of long standing at last
well matured. Her diplomacy has ever been conspicuous throughout the world, for ability and zeal, whether
in the ministerial or consular service, and for its persistent
advocacy of British rights in trade as well as for its machinations against the extension of the commerce or the
power of this country. Such action on the part of any
wise rival nation is naturally to be expected; and all that we
can object to is that, seeing this policy and its inevitable
tendency, our country should stand still and suffer her
trade to be paralyzed and wrested from her, without an
effort to relieve it, or the employment of any of those commercial agencies and facilities which experience shows to
be all-efficient in such cases. It is utter folly for us to
maintain a simply passive competition; we must either
progress or retrograde. It is wrong to be willing to occupy a secondary place, when nature and the common
wants of the world so clearly indicate that we should
occupy the first; for if, as before assumed, foreign commerce is our destiny, and if we can not accomplish our
highest capabilities except by commerce, then if we ever
attain our true dignity and station as a nation, it must be
by enlarging, liberalizing, strengthening, and encouraging
our foreign trade, by all of the proper, efficient, and honorable means within our power. It is the duty of the Government, both to itself and to its citizens. (See Section VII.)
The history of commercial nations admonishes us that
no trading people can long maintain their ascendency without using all of the most approved means of the age for prosecuting trade. Portugal was at one time the most powerful commercial nation of the globe; and at another Holland was the mistress of the seas. But while the latter is
now only a fourth-rate commercial power, the former has
sunk into obscurity, and is nearly forgotten of men. At




20                THE OCEAN POST.
that time England and France had but a limited foreign
trade and scarcely any commercial reputation. France could
more easily maintain her existence without a foreign trade,
than could England; and yet her matured manufactures
and her products of the soil became so valuable that she
sought a foreign market. England, to the contrary, had
not territory enough to remain at home, and yet be a great
power. She matured an immense manufacturing system,
and needed a market, as well as the raw material, and food
for her operatives. She began to stretch her arms to the
outer world, and had made very considerable strides in
foreign commerce side by side with France and the German States, and in the face of the steady young opposition
of the American States.
It now became a contest for supremacy. Her large navy
had enabled her to conquer important foreign territories,
which with the supremacy of the seas would make her the
mistress of the world. France was still her equal rival, and
the United States were becoming formidable common
carriers, although they had but little legitimate commerce
of their own, and none that was under their positive control. The commercial men of England finding their statesmen ready to aid them in their efforts for national progress,
wealth, and glory, directed their attention to steam as an
agent of supremacy and power, both in the Iravy and the
Commercial Marine. They indicated and proved the necessity of drawing the bonds between them and foreign
countries more closely; of shortening the distances between
them; of providing the means of rapid, safe, and comfortable transit of English merchants between their homes and
foreign lands; of regular, rapid, reliable British steam
mails to every point with which Englishmen had business,
or could create it; and of government agency as the only
means by which this desirable, this essential service could
be rendered to commerce and to the country. They readily




POSITION OF STEAM NAVIGATION.         21
saw that rapid and reliable passenger facilities, and the
rapid and regular transmission of commercial and diplomatic intelligence would give to British merchants and to
British statesmen the certain control of commerce, and the
conformation of the political destinies of many of the smaller nations of the Eastern and Western hemispheres.
It was not a difficult task to convince the British statesman that it was his duty to encourage the commerce, on
which the wealth, power, and glory of his country depended, by all the aids known to the constitution; and to uphold the hands of the merchant by the use of the money
which his traffic had brought into the public coffers. There
was no contest between North and South, East and West.
It was the whole of England which was to be benefited
directly or indirectly; and they were willing that it should
be any part rather than none. The evident advantages which
the United States possessed in her more numerous articles
of export, (seepage 16,) as well as the rapid strides which
her first clippers were making across the ocean, were reasons urgent enough for the forecasting statesmen of Britain;
and they determined to continue or to obtain the profitable
dominion of the seas, although it might cost a sum of money
far beyond the postal income. They knew that these
postal and passenger facilities were needed by every class
of community, and that there was no one in the kingdom
who would not be in some way benefited by them; and that
the sums of money paid for them, although not apparently
returned, were yet returned in a thousand indirect channels and by a variety of reflex benefits not calculable as a
transaction of exchange.
We, therefore, see to-day, as the fruit of that determination, the proudest and the most profitable postal
and mercantile steam marine that floats the seas. Several
large companies, authorized to transport the mails to all
parts of the world, were immediately organized, and paid




22                 THE OCEAN POST.
liberal allowances for their peculiar duties. Where the
practicability of the service was considered doubtful, larger
sums were paid, and a greater length of time granted for
making the experiment. The contracts were generally made
for twelve years; and when their terms expired they were
renewed for another term of twelve years, which will expire in 1862. Thus many of the lines have been in operation for the last nineteen years, and have demonstrated the
practicability, the cheapness, the utility, and the necessity
of such service. The entire foreign mail service is conducted by fifteen companies, having one hundred and
twenty-one steamers, with a gross tonnage of 235,488 tons;
the net tonnage being 141,293, assuming the engines, boilers,
fuel, etc., to be forty per cent of the whole tonnage, which
is altogether too low an estimate. The whole number of
British sea-going steamers is sixteen hundred and sixty-nine,
with an aggregate tonnage of 383,598 tons, exclusive of
engines and boilers, and of 639,330 tons gross, including
engines and boilers. (Seepaper A, page 192.)  We must
add to this list the new steamer " Great Eastern," whose
tonnage is twenty-seven thousand tons, and which will
make the entire present mercantile steam tonnage of Great
Britain 660,330 tons. The greater portion of these steamers, exclusive of those engaged in the foreign mail service,
are employed in the coasting and foreign continental trade;
while some few of them run in the American merchant service, and many others in the subsidized mail service of foreign countries, such as the lines from Hamburgh and Antwerp to Brazil, and from those cities to the United States.
Some of them are also engaged in the mail service between
Canada and England, under the patronage of the Canadian
government.   (See paper D),page 199.)  If we add to
this list the 271 war steamers, the 220 gunboats, and the
Great Eastern, we shall find that the British Mail, Mercantile, and War Marine consists of the enormous number of




POSITION OF STEAM NAVIGATION.          23
two thousand one hundred and sixty-one steamers, exclusive of the large number now building. Nearly all of these
are adapted to the ocean, or to the coasting service, and
may be classed as sea-going vessels.
It is interesting to trace this rapid progress of steam
since its first application to purposes of mail transport in
1833. An intelligent writer says, "The rise and progress
of the ocean steam mail service of Great Britain is second
in interest to no chapter in the maritime history of the
world;" and while we acknowledge a grateful pride in the
triumphs of our transatlantic brethren, we must blush with
shame at our dereliction in this great, and civilizing, and
enriching service of modern times. The steam marine of
the United States, postal, mercantile, and naval, is to-day
so insignificant in extent that we do not feel entirely certain that it is a sufficient nucleus for the growth of a respectable maritime power. The few ships that we possess
are among the fleetest and the most comfortable that traverse the ocean, and have excited the admiration of the
world wherever they have been seen. But their number
is so small, their service so limited, their field of operation
so contracted, that our large commerce and travel are dependent, in most parts of the world, on British steam mail
lines for correspondence and transport, or on the slow, irregular, and uncertain communications of sailing vessels.
The question here naturally suggests itself: Have we progressed in ocean steam navigation in a ratio commensurate
with the improvements of the age, or of our own improvement in every thing else? And has the Government of
the country afforded to the people the facilities of enterprise and commercial competition which are clearly necessary to enable them to enter the contest on equal terms
with other commercial countries? (See Section VII.)
The Ocean Mail Service of the United States, consists
of eight lines, and twenty one steamers in commission, with




24                THE OCEAN POST.
an aggregate tonnage of 48,027 tons. Three of these lines
are transatlantic; the Collins, the Havre, and the Bremen.
Two connect us with our Pacific possessions, and incidentally with Cuba and New-Granada. They are however indispensable lines of coast navigation. One connects the
ports of Charleston, in the United States, and Havana, in
Cuba, another connects New-Orleans with Vera Cruz,
and another connects Havana and New-Orleans.    Beyond these, we have a line of two steamers running between New-York and New-Orleans, touching at Havana,
and one steamer touching at the same point betweenNewYork and Mobile. Also four steamers between New-York
and Savannah, four between New-York and Charleston,
two between New-York and Norfolk, two between Philadelphia and Savannah, two between Boston and Baltimore,
four between New-Orleans and Texas, and two between
New-Orleans and Key West. All of these are coast steamers of the best quality; and some few of them have a
nominal mail pay. We have also several transient steamers which have no routes or mail contracts, and which are
consequently employed in irregular and accidental service,
or laid up. They are the Ericsson, the Washington and
the Hermann, the Star of the West, the Prometheus, the
Northern Light, the Daniel Webster, the Southerner, the
St. Louis, laid up in New-York; the Uncle Sam, the Orizaba, and the Brother Jonathan, belonging to the Nicaragua Transit Company, and the California, Panama, Oregon,
Northerner, Fremont, and the tow-boat Tobago, belonging
to the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, all lying in the
Pacific. Also the Queen of the West, Mr. Morgan's new
steamer, in New-York. These, like all other American
steamers when unemployed on mail lines, generally lie in
port for want of a remunerative trade. (See Paper A.)
The aggregate tonnage of these fifty-seven steamers is
94,795 tons. Eighteen of them, with an aggregate ton



POSITION OF STEAM NAVIGATION.        25
nage of 24,845 tons, are engaged in no service. Twentythree of them, with 24,071 tons, are engaged in our coasting
trade. Fourteen of them, with 19,813 tons, (Gov. register,) are engaged in the California, Oregon, Central American, Mexican, and Cuban mail service; while eight of them,
with 25,178 tons aggregate tonnage, are engaged in the
transatlantic mail service proper, between this country and
Europe. It is thus seen that we have in all but 57 ocean
steamers, of 94,795 aggregate tons; while Great Britain has
sixteen hundred and seventy, with 666,330 aggregate tons;
that we have twenty-two of these, of 45,001 tons, engaged
in the foreign and domestic mail service, while she has one
hundred and twenty-one, of 235,488 aggregate tonnage, engaged in the foreign mail service almost exclusively; and
that we have thirty-seven steamers engaged in the coasting
trade and lying still, while she has fifteen hundred and
forty-eight steamers engaged in her coasting trade and
merchant service. (Seepage 167, for length of British and
American mail lines, and the miles run per year.)  Comparisons are said to be odious, but it is more odious for
such comparisons as these to be possible in these days of
enlightened commercial enterprise and thrift; and especially when so greatly to the disadvantage of a country
which boldly claims an aggregate civilization, enterprise,
and prosperity equalled by those of no other country on the
globe. As regards our steam navy, it is too small to afford
adequate protection to our commerce and citizens; much
less to defend the country in time of war. We have not
steamers enough in the navy to place one at each of our
important seaports; much less to send them to foreign
stations.




26               THE OCEAN POST.
SECTION        II.
NECESSITY OF RAPID STEAM MAILS.
ARE OCEAN STEAM MAILS DESIRABLE AND NECESSARY FOR A
COMMERCIAL PEOPLE? THE SPIRIT OF THE AGE DEMANDS
THEM: MUTUAL DEPENDENCE OF NATIONS: FAST MAILS NECESSARY TO CONTROL SLOW FREIGHTS: THE FOREIGN POST
OF EVERY NATION IS MORE OR LESS SELFISH: IF WE NEGLECT
APPROVED METHODS, WE ARE THEREBY SUBORDINATED TO
THE SKILL OF OTHERS: THE WANT OF A FOREIGN POST IS A
NATIONAL CALAMITY: OTHER NATIONS CAN NOT AFFORD US
DUE FACILITIES: WARS AND ACCIDENTS FORBID: THE CRIMEA AND THE INDIES AN EXAMPLE: MANY OF OUR FIELDS
OF COMMERCE NEED A POSTr: BRAZIL, THE WEST-INDIES, AND
PACIFIC SOUTH-AMERICA: MAILS TO THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE BY TIIE NUMEROUS CUNARD VESSELS: CORRESPONDENCE WITH AFRICA, CHINA, THE EAST-INDIES, THE MAURITIUS,
AND AUSTRALIA: SLAVISH DEPENDENCE ON GREAT BRITAIN:
DESIRABLE FOR OUR DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR SERVICE:
FOR THE CONTROL OF OUR SQUADRONS: CASES OF SUFFERING:
NECESSARY FOR DEFENSE: FOR CULTIVATING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND OPENING TRADE: THE ATLANTIC TELEGRAPH
WILL REQUIRE FASTER AND HEAVIER MAILS: OUR COMMERCE
REQUIRES FAST STEAMERS FOR THE RAPID AND EASY TRANSIT OF PASSENGERS: MODES OF BENEFITING COMMERCE.
HAVING seen that the ocean steam mail service is largely
developed in some countries, especially in Great Britain,
and that the second and third commercial powers of the
world, the United States and France, have not largely employed this important agent in their commerce, the inquiry
naturally arises, whether fast ocean steam mails are desirable and necessary to the commercial prosperity of a people. Whether this question be considered in its relative




NECESSITY OF RAPID STEAM MAILS.         27
or its natural bearings, the reply is the same. Relatively
considered, a large ocean steam mail service is indispensable to a people who are largely commercial, because the
most noted commercial rivals of the world employ it, and
thus either force them to its use, or the loss of their commerce, and the gradual transference of their shipping and
trade into the hands of their rivals. Considered in its
natural bearings, in its direct influences and effects per se,
it becomes even more evidently necessary, as the means of
a ready and reliable knowledge of the condition, wants,
and movements of all those with whom a commercial nation necessarily has business, or could or should create it.
The spirit of the age demands a more intimate acquaintance and communication than we have hitherto had with
the outer world. Our knowledge of foreign lands has
pointed out innumerable wants hitherto unknown, and suggested innumerable channels of their supply. Nations
have learned to depend on each other as formerly neighbor
depended on his neighbor for any little necessary or luxury of life. The luxurious spirit of the times requires the
importation and exportation of an immense list of articles
with which foreign countries were formerly unacquainted,
but which have now become as indispensable as air, and
light, and water. And if it is not necessary that these
many articles shall be transported from land to land with
the speed of the telegraph or the fleetness of the ocean
steamer, it is at any rate necessary that the facts concerning them, their ample or scarce supply, their high or low
price, their sale or purchase, their shipment or arrival, their
loss, or seizure, or detention, should be made known with
all of the combined speed of the telegraph, the lightning
train, and the rapid ocean mail steamer. If we possess
ourselves these facilities of rapid, regular, and reliable information to an extent that no other nation does, we will
be the first to reach the foreign market with our supplies,




28                 THE OCEAN POST.
the first to bring the foreign article into the markets of the
world, and the proper recipients of the first and largest
profits of the cream of.the trade of every land.
If we neglect these precautions, and refuse to establish
these facilities, because their cost is apparent in one small
sum of expenditure, while their large returns in profits
diffused among the whole people are not so palpably apparent to the common eye; if we leave to the genius and
enterprise of the people that which private enterprise and
human skill unaided can never accomplish; in a word, if
we fail to keep up with the world around us, and to progress pari passu  with our wise, acute, and experienced
commercial rivals, then, as a matter of course, the information which we receive from the foreign world must come
through others, and those our rivals, and must be deprived
of its value by the advantage which they have already
taken of it. It is idle to suppose that any commercial nation on earth will not so arrange her foreign post as to
exclude others than her own citizens as much as possible
from its benefits., This is a paramount duty of the government to the citizen. It is therefore apparent that our
commerce must of necessity greatly suffer when its conduct is at all dependent on foreigners and competitors, and
that it is exceedingly desirable, for the avoidance of such
a calamity, that we should have independent and ample
foreign mail facilities of our own, wherever it is possible
for our people to trade and obtain wealth.
It is clearly impossible that other nations should afford these facilities, or that our people should have confidence in them if attempted, or that they could be in
any sense reliable in those many cases of exigency, national
disputes, war, and accident, which usually afford us our
best chances of speculation and profit. A dependence on
foreigners for this supply of information, which never
reaches us until it is emasculated of its virtues, is extreme



NECESSITY OF RAPID STEAM MAILS.        29
ly hazardous. It fails just at the point where it is most desirable. Foreign nations, especially the commercial European nations, are constantly at war, and are constantly interrupting their packet service. The late Crimean and the
present Indian wars are a good illustration. Our country,
isolated from the contending nations, and fortified against
continual ruptures by a policy of non-intervention, is peculiarly blessed with the privilege and ability to regularly
and unintermittingly conduct her commerce and reap her
profits, even more securely, while her rivals are temporarily
devoting their attention to war. Such being the fact, it is
wholly desirable and necessary to the end proposed that
our steam post should on all such occasions regularly come
and go, even amid the din of battle, and the conflict of
our rivals, who for the time are powerless to oppose our
peaceful and legitimate commerce, and are generally but
too glad to avail its offerings.
There are many instances of the desirableness and the
necessity of the transmarine steam post on important lines
of foreign communication where we have a large trade, and
yet no postal means of conducting it. Our immense trade
with Brazil and other portions of South-America, which if
properly fostered would increase with magic rapidity, sends
its news and its freight by the same vessel, or is compelled
to use the necessarily selfishly arranged, and circuitous, and
non-connecting lines of Great Britain. A letter destined
for Brazil, four thousand miles distant, must needs go by
England, Portugal, the Coast of Africa, Madeira, and the
Cape de Verdes, a distance of eight thousand miles, in a
British packet. One destined for the Pacific Coast of SouthAmerica must go to Panama and await the arrival of the
English packet, with London letters more recently dated,
before it can proceed on to Callao, Lima, or Valparaiso.
Letters destined to the West-Indies can go to Havana only,
by American steamers; but they must there await the




30                THE OCEAN POST.
British line which takes them to St. Thomas, and there be
distributed and forwarded to the various islands, the Spanish Main, the Guianas, Venezuela, and New-Granada by
some one of the ten different British steam packet lines
running semi-monthly from that station.
So with half of our letters which go to the Continent of
Europe: they must go by the Cunard line to England, and
thence by English steamers to the British Channel, the Baltic,
the White Sea, the Mediterranean, Egypt, Constantinople,
or the Black Sea. Those to places along the coast of Africa
and to the Cape of Good Hope are dependent on the same
English packet transit. For our communication with China,
India, Australia, the East-Indies generally, and the Islands
of the Pacific, we are entirely and slavishly dependent, as
usual, on Great Britain. Instead of sending our letters and
passengers direct from Panama or San Francisco to Honolulu,
Hong Kong, Shanghae, Macio, Calcutta, Ceylon, BombAy,
MadrAs, Sydney, Melbourne, Batavia, the Mauritius, and the
Gulf of Mozambique, by a short trunk line of our own steamers, and from its terminus only, by the British lines, they now
go first to England, as a slavish matter of course, then
across the Continent or through the Mediterranean to Egypt,
thence by land to the Red Sea, and thence to China and
the East-Indies; or from  England by her steam lines
around the Cape of Good Hope to Australia and the EastIndies; or by slow and uncertain sailing packets direct
from our own country, either around Cape Horn or the
Cape of Good Hope. It is evident to every reflecting man
who has given the subject any attention, that all of these
lines of communication would be very desirable, and very
highly profitable to our people at large; and that the latter and that along the West Coast of South-America could
be easily established by two new contracts for that purpose, or in some other way, to the great and lasting advantage of our countrymen.




NECESSITY OF RAPID STEAM MAILS.        31
The transmarine post is very desirable for the better
conduct of our foreign diplomacy and the consular service.
It is now almost impossible for our ministers and agents
abroad to hold any thing like a regular correspondence with
the State Department, unless it be those in Southern and
Western Europe. I was told last year by our Minister in
Rio de Janeiro that his dispatches from the Government at
home seldom reached him under four months; and Mr.
Gilmer, the Consul of the United States at Bahia, reports,
in the " Consular Returns" now about to be published, that
his dispatches never come to hand under four months, that
they are frequently out six months, and that many are lost
altogether. This is the experience and the reiterated complaint of nearly every foreign employee of the Government,
who has any zeal in prosecuting his country's business, and
may find it necessary to get instructions or advice from
home. Many knowing the delays, uncertainty, and irregularity of correspondence, make no attempt whatever to
communicate regularly with the Department. We frequently express great surprise that we have no intelligence
from our ministers, special ambassadors, and agents; but
do not reflect that in the majority of cases dispatches have
to be sent by irresponsible and slow-sailing vessels, or by
the steamers of Great Britain, which it may be safely asserted are in no particular hurry to deliver them to us.
Three several letters sent by me at separate times through
the British mail from Rio de Janeiro for New-York never
reached their destination.
Nor is it better with our squadrons on foreign stations.
They receive their orders in the same slow and irregular
way, and find it almost as easy to send a vessel when they
wish to communicate with the Navy Department, or await
the movements of their dull old storeships, as to attempt any other means of intercourse. It may be safely
said that they are not actually under the control of the De



32                 THE OCEAN POST.
partment, in many important cases, one time in ten. Whatever the dispute, it is left entirely at the will of the Commodore, or it remains unsettled altogether. Our recent accumulated Paraguayan difficulties is a case in point. American citizens were driven from the country, and their valuable property confiscated. They applied to the Commodore for relief, but could not obtain it. Our surveying
vessel, engaged in a permitted scientific exploration, was
fired into and had some of her men killed; and redress being demanded by the Captain from the Commodore, it was
refused. The Commodore feared transcending his instructions: he could not communicate with the home authorities
much under a year; and so the case rested, and yet rests.
These wants, papable as they are in times of peace, become
doubly pressing in time of war. Let a conflict commence
with England, or France, on whom we depend for mails, or
with their allies, and they could easily surprise and destroy
every squadron which we have upon the high seas months
before they would necessarily hear of a declaration of war,
or know why they were captured. The very contemplation of such possibilities is intolerable, and should be sufficient of itself, setting aside all considerations of commerce
and diplomacy, to arouse our nation to the adoption of the
proper means for its safety and defense.
An effective steam postal marine is unquestionably most
desirable and necessary for the defense of our country, and
for the prosecution of any foreign war. Lord Canning, the
British Post-Master General, recently said in a report to the
House of Lords, that although all of the steam mail packets
might not be able to carry an armament, or be required in
the transport service in time of war, yet the mail facilities
which they would then afford would be more important
and necessary than at any other time. He had no idea
that because engaged in a foreign war the postal service
would be useless, but to the contrary, more than ever indis



NECESSITY OF RAPID STEAM MAILS.       33
pensable. Such proved to be the fact in the late contest
in the Crimea, and such is to-day the case with regard to
the troubles in India and China. Their postal vessels have
proven a first necessity in both of these wars, not only for
transport of the troops, but for speedy intelligence also.
Without them, England could not have entered the
Crimean contest, and the French forces would have been
compelled to remain at home. Turkey would have been
overawed, and Constantinople would have fallen before
the Russian fleet. We are to-day, and always must be,
liable to a foreign war. We have a great boiling cauldron
running over with excitement all along our southern and
south-western borders. Central America, Cuba, the WestIndies, and South-America are far more foreign countries
to us than Europe or the Mediterranean to England.
Cuba will no doubt be at some day our most important
naval station and possession. Even the defense of our
own coast would require an immense transport service;
for Texas is nearly four thousand miles from Maine, and
California is seven thousand from the Atlantic seaboard.
No better proof can be given of the necessity of a large
and extra naval transport service than the late Mexican
war. But for our steamers it would have taken us years
to concentrate an army on the shores of Mexico. It was a
tedious process at the time; for our ocean mail packets
were not then in use. We could now land a larger number of men there in one month than we then did in a
wholeyear. But our transport facilities are not yet by
any means adequate.
A large postal steam marine is desirable as a means of
cultivating the sympathies and respect of foreign nations,
by bringing them into closer friendly and commercial connection with us; and for creating among them that respect
and consideration which the British statesmen so well
know to be an easy means of conducting diplomacy, and
3




34                 THE OCEAN POST.
an unfailing source of commercial advantages. It is not
necessary that we shall impose upon foreign countries in
these respects by false pretenses; but it is truly desirable,
and it would be profitable to an extent little imagined, to
let them know our real importance as a nation, and understand our pacific policy and bont fide intentions. These
are important considerations when we wish to carry any
point, establish any line of policy, remove any prejudice;
and nothing will more readily produce them, and arouse
attention to our articles of export, and induce a people
to establish a regular business with us, than these ever-present, convenient, and imposing mail steamers. Nations as
well as individuals estimate us by our appearances; and
while it is not desirable that we shall appear more than
we are, it is yet very important that foreign nations with
which we have business shall know our real merits, and
respect us for what we are intrinsically worth. There is
evidently no means of our commercial triumph over other
nations without a liberal and widely extended steam mail
service; and as this triumph is of paramount importance
to us, who have so many resources, so is the ocean steam
mail as the only means of securing it. (See views of Gen.
usk, in papers appended.)
It has recently been suggested by parties who certainly
have not thought very deeply on the subject, that the completion of the Atlantic Telegraph, which every body
reasonably expects soon to be completed, will so inaugurate
a new era in the transmission of intelligence, that one of
its effects will be the supersession of fast ocean mails, and
consequently of subsidized steamers. It is a first and palpable view of this question that much of the important
intelligence between the two countries requiring speedy
transmission will be sent through the telegraph, notwithstanding the necessarily high prices which will be charged
for dispatches. These communications will be sententious,




NECESSITY OF RAPID STEAM MAILS.         35
summary, and of great variety. The markets, prices,
important political and other events, private personal and
unelaborated intelligence will come over the wires just as
they now come over existing land lines. The line will
create extra facilities for operations on both sides, and
cause more mutual business to be done. It will thus create
the necessity for more correspondence than before, for
particulars, elaboration, items, bills of lading, exchanges,
duplicates, minute instructions, etc., to which there will be
no end. The main transaction of any business being made
more quickly, it will be essential for the papers to pass with
greater dispatch. If there were twenty telegraphic wires
working day and night, which never can be the case from
their expensiveness, they could not do in a month the correspondence and business done by one steamer's mail.
Beside this, those who got their dispatches first would
have a decided advantage over those who would be compelled from the mass of business to wait several days. It
is an advantage of the steam mails that all get their letters
and papers at the same time; and that no one has thus
the advantage of the other. It is hardly possible for one
unacquainted with the postal business to conceive how
large a mass of mail matter is deposited by each steamer;
and it is only necessary to see this to realize that the
Atlantic Telegraph will never materially interfere with
the steamers except to require of them greater speed and
heavier mails.
It is the experience on all of our land routes that the
thousands of miles of telegraph, so far from superseding
the mails, have made more mails necessary, have caused
and required them to be much faster, have necessitated
more correspondence, and induced people to live in more
mutual dependence, to have more communication with one
another, and to make the home or the business of a man
less than formerly his closed castle, which none entered,




36                 THE OCEAN POST.
and which no one had any occasion to enter. The American telegraph has now arrived at great perfection, and
sends its electric throb to every corner of the Union, save
California only. At the same time, the railroads of the
country are taxed to their highest capacity. No period
ever witnessed so many, so rapid, and so well-filled mails.
It is evident that no telegraphic system can properly do
detailed business. First, it is and must ever remain too
costly. Second, it would require about as many lines as
business men, to give them all equal chances, and no one
the profitable precedence. Next, there is nothing positively accurate and fully reliable. No signatures can pass
over the line. No transaction can be made final by it.
No bank will pay, or ought to pay, money on public telegraphic drafts. And, as in the land service, so in the
ocean. The telegraph across the ocean will simply create
far more business for the mails, and make it desirable and
indispensable that they shall be sent and received by the
most rapid conveyance known to the times. Thus, it is
evident that this new and as yet not fully established agent
of international communication, so far from obviating our
rapid transmarine service, will but the more effectually necessitate it.
Nor must it be forgotten that our commercial prosperity
largely depends on the ready and comfortable transit of
passengers. The passenger traffic has increased with astonishing rapidity during the last eighteen years. Our
smaller merchants can go abroad when mail steamers are
plenty, and make their own purchases and sales, without
paying heavy commissions and high prices to middlemen;
do their business on less capital; and thus benefit themselves and reduce the prices to our consumers. Compared
with sailing vessels, these few mail steamers become the
forerunners of trade and commerce, and create an immense
service for the sail. They enable us to save large sums of




NECESSITY OF RAPID STEAM MAILS.         37
interest or advances on merchandise consigned, and give to
us quick returns from the products which we ship abroad.
This has long been evident to Great Britain, and she has
acted liberally on the suggestion. So desirable is the
service for the general prosperity of her people, that she
expends annually for her foreign steam mails nearly six
millions of dollars, while they do not return to the treasury much above three. She regards the expenditure as she
does that for the navy and the army, a necessity for the
public preservation and prosperity.
As regards the lines that we now have, they are among
the noblest in the world. For aggregate comfort, convenience, safety, speed, and cheapness, they are not equalled
by the most famous British lines. More luxurious tables,
more neatness, cleanliness, and roominess, more general
comforts than have always been characteristic of our Havre, Liverpool, and California lines, can not be found in
the world. The only objection to them is, that the service
is not sufficient; that the trips are not frequent enough;
and that the companies are not enabled to sustain a larger
steam marine which would proportionally cheapen the
service, and accommodate more persons and a much larger
class of interests. Our experiences of the benefits of existing lines, limited as those lines are, present an unanswerable argument for the desirableness and necessity of a liberal steam postal system, and a large and judicious extension of the present service. (See views of Senate Committee, 1852, Paper E.)




38               THE OCEAN POST.
SECTION III.
THE CAPABILITIES OF OCEAN STEAM.
THE COMMERCIAL CAPABILITIES OF OCEAN STEAM: STEAM
MAILS ARRIVE AND DEPART AT ABSOLUTELY FIXED PERIODS:
UNCERTAINTY IS HAZARDOUS AND COSTLY: SUBSIDIZED
STEAMERS GIVE A NECESSARILY HIGH SPEED TO THE MAILS:
MONEY CAN NOT AFFORD TO LIE UPON THE OCEAN FOR
WEEKS: COMPARED WITH SAIL: STEAMERS TRANSPORT CERTAIN CLASSES OF FREIGHT: THE HAVRE AND THE CUNARD
LINES: THE CUNARD PROPELLERS: STEAMERS CAN AFFORD
TO TRANSPORT EXPRESS PACKAGES AND GOODS: GOODS TAKEN
ONLY TO FILL UP: WHY PROPELLERS ARE CHEAPER IN
SOME CASES: STEAM IN SOME CASES CHEAPER THAN THE
WIND: AN ESTIMATE: THE PROPELLER FOR COASTING:
STEAM ON ITS OWN RECEIPTS HAS NOT SUCCEEDED ON THE
OCEAN: MARINE AND FLUVIAL NAVIGATION COMPARED:
MOST FREIGHTS NOT TRANSPORTABLE BY STEAM ON ANY
CONDITIONS: AUXILIARY FREIGHTING AND EMIGRANT PROPELLERS: LAWS OF TRANSPORT: RAPID MAILS AND LEISURE
TRANSPORT OF FREIGHT THE LAW OF NATURE: THE PRICE
OF COALS RAPIDLY INCREASING: ANTICIPATED IMPROVEMENTS AND CHEAPENING IN MARINE PROPULSION NOT REALIZED.
BELIEVING that no further arguments or facts are necessary to show that a rapid steam mail marine is desirable
and essential to the successful government of the country,
to our foreign commerce, and to the growth of individual
interests and a general prosperity of the people, I shall
now make some few inquiries concerning the Commercial
Capabilities of steam, as the most effective agent for the
rapid transit of the ocean, and the most expensive agent
for the transport of goods. After this, it will be necessary




THE CAPABILITIES OF OCEAN STEAM.        39
to examine into the Cost of Steam, as a subject closely
allied to its general capabilities.
Whatever may be said of the wind as a cheap agent of
locomotion, this much may be safely predicated of steam
vessels for the mails; that their time of departure and
arrival has an absolute fixity which is attainable by no
other means, and which is highly conducive to the best interests of all those for whom commerce is conducted. No
reasoning is necessary to show to the man of business, or
even to the pleasure-seeker, the importance of approximate
certainty as to the time when the mail leaves and when he
can receive an answer to his dispatches. He may not be
able to give clearly philosophic reasons for it; yet he
feels the necessity in his business; and it certainly relieves
him of many painful doubts, if nothing more. Uncertainty
in commercial operations is always hazardous and costly to
the great mass of the people, who as a general thing pay
more for whatever they get, on the principle that we seldom take a venture in an uncertain thing unless it holds
out inducements of large profit, or unless we get a high
price for guarantying it. So in commercial correspondence,
which constitutes the great bulk of the ocean mails. Let
uncertainty prevail for but three or four days beyond
the time when we should have news from abroad, and
every body is in doubt, every body speculates, and in the
end every body is injured.
Nor is this certainty in the time of arrival and departure of the mails more desirable than their speed. The
common sense of the world has settled down upon the necessity of rapid mails; and all of the ingenuity of the age is
now taxed to its very highest to secure more speed in the
transmission of intelligence. Many interests demand it.
Money, which represents labor, is continually lent and borrowed in bills of exchange, acceptances, deposits, and in
actual cash sent across the seas. The length of time for




40                 THE OCEAN POST.
passing the bills and correspondence, or the specie itself,
thus becomes an exceedingly important item to those
who are to use them, and consequently to the ultimate
consumer for whom they are conducting the commercial
transaction. What community would to-day tolerate the
idea of sending three millions of dollars per week, and five
millions of credits between England and the United States
on a sailing ship of whatever quality, with the probability
of keeping it lying unproductive on the ocean for thirty
days? Extend this to weekly shipments of the same amounts,
and have at one time on the waters between the two countries twelve million dollars in specie and twenty in credits,
tossing about the ocean, unproductive and unsafe, and entailing all of the evils incident to the uncertainty as to the
time when it will arrive. But if this is not sufficient, extend the inquiry to South-America, and China, and India,
and see how enormous and useless a waste of money and interest is -incurred in the many millions which. by sailing
vessels and slow steamers is fruitlessly gilding the ocean for
months. Money is too valuable and interest too high to
keep so many millions of it locked up from the world. At
two and three per cent a month, the nation, or, what is the
same thing, its commercial and mercantile classes, as representing the producing, would soon become bankrupt.
The only avoidance of these evident evils is in a rapid
transmission of the mails, specie, and passengers. And
herein consists the chief value of the rapid ocean steamer.
It is an important case which the Telegraph, with all of its
benefits, can never reach. It can never transmit specie;
neither the evidences of debt nor of property. The voluminous mails, with all of their tedious details, upon which
such transactions depend, must go and come on steamers.
and on steamers only. They have the certainty, which
will satisfy men and prevent speculation, gambling, and
imposition; they have the speed, which shortens credit,




THE CAPABILITIES OF OCEAN STEAM.        41
keeps specie alway in active use, and enables commercial
men to know, meet, and supply the wants of the world before they become costly or crushing; and they give a rapid
and comfortable transit to passengers, who can thus look
after their business, and save much to themselves and to
the producer and consumer. Compared with sailing vessels their efficiency is really wondrous.  Foreign correspondence was formerly very limited, and the interchange
of interests, feelings, and opinions was slow and tedious.
Each nation depended solely on itself; and instead of the
brotherhood now prevailing, communicated through the
costly channels of war, by messages of the cannon, and in
powerful, hostile fleets. But the foreign correspondence
of the world is really enormous, and rapidly increasing,
since the introduction of ocean steamers; and no one will
say that they have had a small share in producing that fraternal international spirit which is now so widely manifested in Peace Congresses, Congresses of the Five Powers,
explanations, concessions, and amicable adjustments of difficulties. The peaceful influences and the civilization of
the times are but another comment on the capabilities of
steam.
There are also certain classes of freights which steam is
better calculated than sailing vessels to transport; certain
rich and costly goods which would either damage or depreciate if not brought speedily into the market. There
are many articles also, as gold and silver ware, jewelry,
diamonds, bullion, etc., and some articles of vertu as well as
use, which are costly, and have to be insured at high values
unless sent on steamers; and which consequently can pay
a rather better price. As in the. case of specie, they are
too valuable to be kept long on the ocean; but in the general traffic of the world there is so little of this class of
freight that steamers can place no reliance on it as a source
of income. These freights have abounded most between




42                THE OCEAN POST.
France and England and the United States. This is the
principal reason why the New-York and Havre line of mail
steamers has run on so unprecedentedly small a subsidy;
a sum not more than half adequate to the support of a mail
line but for that class of freights. The Cunard line has
also derived a large sum of its suppoit from the same
source. All such articles passing by that line come from
England, Ireland, and Scotland, where they are manufactured; and being shipped by British merchants, are given,
as a matter of duty, to their own steamers. Another reason for the Cunard line getting most of those more profitable freights is that a steamer leaves every week; every
Saturday; and shippers sending packages weekly are not
compelled every other week to hunt up a new line, and
open a new set of accounts, as would be the case if they
attempted to ship by the Collins semi-monthly line.
These freights have hitherto proven a profitable source
of income to that line. As there is no manufacturing done
in this country for Europe, the Cunarders and the Havre
as well as the Collins and Vanderbilt lines, have no freights
that pay the handling from the United States to Europe.
And not only has the Cunard line, by starting from home,
taken all of these profitable. freights from the Collins, but
it has run a weekly line of propellers from Havre and
taken the freight over to Liverpool free of charge for its
New-York and Boston steamers, and thereby shared the
freights and greatly reduced the income of the Havre line.
There being a great superabundance of propeller stock in
Great Britain, which can be purchased frequently at less
than half its cost, and these vessels running the short distance between Havre and Liverpool very cheaply, (See
pages 108-13,) the Cunarders have cut the Havre freights
down from forty to fifteen dollars per ton, and sometimes for months together to ten dollars per ton. As a matter of course, this price would not, pay the handling and




THE CAPABILITIES OF OCEAN STEAM.         43
care of these costly articles; but at fifteen dollars it enabled the Cunard line to fill their ships and derive some
profit; as most of them, with the exception of the Persia,
run slowly, use less coal, and have more freight room. All
of these freights are, however, small in quantity, and not
much to be relied on from year to year, as will be seen below, in consequence of the action of propellers.
There is another class of business which mail steamers
can do at renumerating prices; but which is exceedingly
limited anywhere, and not at all known on some lines. This
is in Express packages. They pay a high price; but seldom reach more than three or four tons under the most
favorable circumstances. In the early stages of the California lines, when there was a rush of travel to the gold
regions, and a hurried transit required for a thousand little
necessaries of life, the New-York and Aspinwall and the
Pacific Mail Steamship Company's lines transported a large
express freight outward at every voyage, amounting sometimes to two hundred tons; but the golden days of such
cargo have long gone by, and California is now supplied
like the rest of the world by the cheaper and more deliberate transport of sailing vessels; and the steamers are
left to their legitimate business of mails and passengers.
Taking together all of the classes of freights which steamers having mail payment are capable of transporting, they
amount at present to but an insignificant part of the income
by which these steamers can be run. During the last six
years these freights have reduced more than one hundred
per cent; and goods which were then profitable to the
steamer, are now taken only "to fill up."  And the chief
reason for this reduction arises not so much from competition between the steam-lines, which well knew that they
could not transport these freights when reduced to the present low prices, but from the introduction of a large number of propellers, some of which were originally designed




44                 THE OCEAN POST.
for this species of trade, and many others which were built
during the war in the Crimea for the transport of troops.
These ships were never prosperous anywhere, and are in
nearly all cases at the present found in second hands; the
original proprietors having lost a large share of their investment. Thus, purchased cheaply, and running with simply
an auxiliary steam power, and making the passages but
little shorter than the sailing vessels, and not even so short
as their best passages, they have but little more daily expense than the sailing vessels, with all of the deceptive advantages of being called steamers. They thus get these
better freights and a large number of immigrants, which
with small interest on prime cost enables them to live.
Paradoxical as it may seem, there are yet some cases, even
upon the ocean, in which steam can transport freight
cheaper than the winds of heaven. And this species of
trade constitutes one of the best capabilities of steam power
applied to navigation: It is not in the long voyage between Europe and America, or between the East and California, or yet in the far-off trade among the calms and
pacific seas of the East-Indies and the Pacific Islands; it is
not in the smooth, lake-like seas of the West-Indies, where
there is no freight whose transport price will pay for putting it on and taking it off the steamer; nor in the trade of
Brazil whence a bag of coffee can be transported five thousand miles to New-York nearly as cheaply as it can from
New-York to Baltimore or to Charleston; but it is in the
coasting trade of almost every country, where the voyage
is short. In the trade between New-York and Baltimore,
between Charleston and Savannah, between Boston and
Portland, or between New-Orleans and Key West, or NewOrleans and Galveston, the small sailing vessels spend one
half of their time in working in and out of the harbors.
Sometimes they are two days awaiting winds to get out of
a harbor, two days in sailing, and two days again in mak



THE CAPABILITIES OF OCEAN STEAM.       45
ing and entering their port of destination; whereas a
steamer would make the whole passage in one day to a day
and a half. Now, the distance actually to be run, and for
which the steamer will be compelled to burn coal is not very
great; but the trouble of working the vessel in and out,
against adverse winds and currents, and amid storms and
calms, is sometimes excessive, while the delay and cost are
disheartening. They have also the trouble of warping into
and out of the docks, which is not the case with steamers.
Thus, it frequently takes a week for a sailing vessel to
do the work that a steamer will readily do in twenty-four
to thirty-six hours. Say that it takes the sail four times as
long as the steamer to accomplish a given voyage. To do
as much business as the steamer would do in the same time,
would require four sailing vessels; four times as many men
as one sail requires, or probably twice as many hands in
the aggregate as the steamer would have; and would incur
at least twice the expense of the steamer in feeding them.
Now, there is also a much larger aggregate sum invested in
these four sail, and the owners pay a much larger sum of
interest on their prime investment. Or, in other words,
the steamer with but a few more men, but little greater expense in living, a small coal-bill, an engineer and firemen,
and a prime outlay of not more than double the capital,
will carry four times the freight and passengers, without
incurring probably so much as three times the expense of
one of the sail. After the prime cost the most important
item of expenditure in one of these small steamers is the
coal; but the distance run being so short, and getting into
and out of the harbor and docks being so easy, the vessel
does large execution at little expense. The two most essential benefits, however, of her short voyage are, that she is
not compelled to carry much fuel, and consequently occupies nearly all of her space with freight; and that the
prices of freight on these short voyages are much larger in




46                 THE OCEAN POST.
proportion than they are on long voyages. Sailing vessels
charge very little more for a thousand miles than they do
for five hundred; but a steamer may have to charge nearly
three times as much; especially if she run fast, consume
much fuel, and occupy her cargo-room with coal. There
are distances at which steamers, however large, can not
carry a pound of freight; but occupy all their available
space with the power that drives them. In these long
voyages sail becomes much cheaper.
It is by no means essential that these small coasting vessels shall be propellers; for to acquire the same speed they
expend the same power and have the disadvantage of being
deeper in the water, and not being able to go into all harbors with much freight. They have also the advantage of
carrying more sail, and being generally better able to stand
coast storms than a side-wheel of light draught of water.
They are'not quite so expensive in prime construction, but
generally require more repairs, and must be on the docks
much oftener. They are, however, much better suited than
side-wheel vessels to voyages where a medium speed is required, and where the steam can be used at pleasure simply as an auxiliary power. In such cases there is a profitable economy of fuel. But speed has generally been
deemed essential in this country, and the side-wheel is
everywhere used. But entirely the contrary is the case in
Great Britain and France. There the coasting business is
conducted by screws almost altogether; and the speed
does not transcend the limit of economy and commercial
capability. They distinguish between the extremely fast
carriage of mails and passengers on the one hand, and
freights on the other; and although they wish the speed
and certainty of steam, yet it is not the costly speed.
When they know that a given quantity of fuel will carry
freight eight knots per hour, they would consider it wasteful and foolish to consume twice that quantity of fuel just




THE CAPABILITIES OF OCEAN STEAM.        47
to carry it ten knots; and more especially so, when, in addition to the extra quantity of fuel, they would lose just
its bulk in paying freight room. England is thus employing most of her vast fleet of coasting ocean steamers in
her own trade, or in the foreign trade lying within a few
hundred miles of her ports. And the voyages being short,
her coals being cheap and convenient, frequently not above
three dollars per ton to the coasters, and in addition to
this, the prime cost of these vessels being smaller than in
this country, as both iron and labor are cheaper, she has
found them very profitable at home, and is insinuating
them into all the short routes wherever she can get a foothold. It was not until she attempted the same species of
self-supporting steam navigation with distant countries, that
her propeller system failed her and involved her citizens in
loss. Meanwhile it is more than probable that within the
next fifteen years we shall find five hundred propellers
scattered along the coasts of the United States.
Notwithstanding the eminent capabilities of steam when
applied to coast navigation, or to the fluvial navigation of
the interior, it has failed to make the same triumphs in the
carriage of freights and passengers upon the ocean. And
it is not alone because the voyage is long and the freights
low in price. Steamers carry freights up the Mississippi
river two thousand miles from New-Orleans, and find it
profitable. Some run even as high as three thousand miles
up that river and the Missouri; a voyage nearly as long
as to Europe, and make money by it. But the circumstances are very different. They do not leave the dock at
New-Orleans with even more than enough fuel on board
for the whole trip, as the ocean steamers do. If they did
they could carry no freight. But they stop every twelve
to eighteen hours and take on wood just as they need it,
fifty to a hundred cords at a time; and instead of occupying all of their available room with wood, they have the




48                 THE OCEAN POST.
steamer full of cargo, and have on board only fifty or sixty
tons of fuel at a time, and only half that weight on an
average. None of the best steamers on those rivers could
take enough wood on board for the whole three thousand
miles, even though they should not have a ton of freight.
And compared with ocean steamers of the same engine
power, they do not cost half of the money, I might say
generally, not one third of the money. There is no reason,
then, why these steamers should not carry large quantities
of freight and make large sums of money by it. They have
the great elements, fuel, freight capacity, and prime cost in
their favor.
There is a large class of freights which are not transportable by steam on long ocean voyages under any conditions. We will grant that under the most favorable circumstances, where rich and costly articles are transported
in small bulk, that propellers running at a low rate of
speed, or just fast enough to anticipate sailing vessels, will
make a living. But change the class of these freights into
the great average class of those filling the thousands of
sailing vessels, and deprive these screw vessels of an immense emigrant passenger traffic, and they would not pay
their running expenses by fifty per cent. This style of
freights, sailing vessels in their great competition have reduced to the lowest paying figure. The margin left for
profit is so small that our ship-owners constantly complain
that unless there are changes they must go into other business; and many of them say this honestly, as is shown by
the hundreds of ships which of late years we can always
find lying up, awaiting improvement in business. Now, let
even the slowest and cheapest running screw vessel attempt
to carry the same freights, to say nothing of fast side-wheel
mail vessels, and we shall see against what odds the screw
or other steamer has to contend. In the first place, her
engines, boilers, coal, etc., occupy at least forty per cent of




THE CAPABILITIES OF OCEAN STEAM.          49
her total registered tonnage. Grant that the additional expense of a steamer over a sail, that is, wages for engineers,
firemen, coal passers, etc., and finding the same in food and
rooms, costs even no more than the loss of an additional
ten per cent of her freight room. In other words, considering her steam machinery, fuel, extra expenses, etc., to
be equal to half of her freight room, it is evident that she
would carry only half as much freight    as a sailing vessel
of the same size, and that she would get but half as much
money for it.
It is thus clear, I think, that there is a certain class of
ocean freights which steam can not transport under any
conditions so long as there are sailing vessels on the ocean;
and in that class are comprehended all the great standard
and staple articles of the world, constituting in sum seventeen twentieths of all the freight passing upon the ocean.
This being so, it is utterly idle to suppose that steam in
any form can take the place of sail upon the ocean, even
though the present prices for the carriage of standard articles should increase three hundred per cent.
There are many considerations which affect this question.
The ordinary average passages of the ocean on long
voyages are now very rapid; and some of the clippers
have attained a speed which no freighting steamer may
ever be expected to do on the high seas. They do not
maintain this high speed as an average, but it is sufficiently
high for all of the ordinary purposes of transport in the
standard articles of commerce, and where the business of
the clipper is done by a fast mail steamer. There is no
positive necessity for the speedy transport that some have
attempted to give to articles, whose presence in the
markets, as the ordinary supplies of life, to-day, next
month, or a month later, is a matter of total indifference
to every one except the ship-owner himself. It but little
concerns the public whether a carge of cotton, or beef, or
4




50                 THE OCEAN POST.
pork, or corn is one month or forty-five days between the
United States and England, so that it is safe in the end.
It is an annual production that must have an annual transit, and however unnecessarily fast we may become, we can
not send more than one crop in the year. The world frequently becomes too fast in every thing; and crises, panics,
and bankruptcies follow as legitimate consequences. When
a fictitious value is given to every thing, and every globule
of air which one has breathed comes puffing out, a splendid bubble, a magnificent speculation, and when men have
to go so fast that they need a telegraph to ride them
through the world lest they get behind the heated times,
no wonder that the shipper can not sit quietly down in his
office and wait thirty days for a load of corn to reach England, or a load of iron to appear in the harbor in return.
And it does not matter to him that it may not be used there
in six months. He wishes to finish the " operation," to close
up the " transaction" before he goes up town in the evening.
There is a rational distinction between the necessary and
the unnecessary which we must learn to make, and a limit
which safety assigns to every operation. There are some
things which must be done rapidly, and others which may
be done at leisure. Between the freight cargo, and the
correspondence which controls it there is a great difference.
Rapid transport of letters, intelligence, and passengers,
and leisure transport of freight, is the law of nature, and
to attempt to reverse it is but to attempt that which
will never be successfully done, simply because wholly unnecessary in any permanent economic sense. And not only
is higher speed than that of clippers unnecessary in ordinary freight transport, but it is clearly impossible in any
normal condition of trade. Circumstances may, and doubtless often will exist, which will require some sluggish article
to be transported a long distance in a short time, as in the
case of the famine in Ireland, and which may insure rates at




THE CAPABILITIES OF OCEAN S TEAM.       51
which steam vessels can take small quantities of such
freights; but such occasions will ever be accidental, and
the support of vessels depending on them the questionable
support of expedients, and capricious in the extreme. It
will ever be just as impossible to hurry gross freights across
the ocean in a healthy state of commerce as it will to prevent
rapid mails, or forego the comforts of quick passenger transit.
To say nothing of a vessel which is half filled with its
own power, attempting to compete, in the ordinary freights
of the world, with one which fills every square foot with
paying cargo, it is equally important that we should look
at the question of fuel. The coals of the world are not so
plentiful or so cheap that we should consume whole pits in
a year in unnecessary and unproductive service. They are
already beginning to fail in many parts of the world, or
to the same effect, are mined and brought to market at
such increasing cost, and applied to so many new purposes
day by day, that in a few years the price will place them
entirely beyond the reach of commercial purposes upon
the ocean. It is contended, however, that the science of
engineering is also rapidly advancing, and that we shall
soon have some discovery by which we can have heat without fuel, and power without heat. But I have heard of
those imaginary engineering hopes so long that I begin to
believe them vague, and that we shall yet for a few generations measure the power applied by the number of
pounds of coal consumed. From past experiences and pre.
sent indications we can predicate nothing with more certainty of fuel than that it will indefinitely increase in price.
I am satisfied, therefore, that with all of the capabilities of
steam it can never be applied to general ocean transportation; first, because undesirable; and second, because impossible even if desirable. But to show more clearly that
it is impossible, I will now make some inquiries concerning
the cost of ocean steam, which is the cardinal point of
interest in marine propulsion.




52               THE OCEAN POST.
SECTION IV.
COST OF STEAM: OCEAN MAIL SPEED.
MISAPPREHENSION OF THE HIGH COST OF STEAM MARINE PROPULSION: VIEWS OF THE NON-PROFESSIONAL: HIGH SPEED
NECESSARY FOR THE DISTANCES IN OUR COUNTRY: WHAT IS
THE COST OF HIGH ADEQUATE MAIL SPEED: FAST STEAMERS
REQUIRE STRONGER PARTS IN EVERY THING: GREATER OUTLAY IN PRIME COST: MORE FREQUENT AND COSTLY REPAIRS: MORE WATCHFULNESS AND MEN: MORE COSTLY FUEL,
ENGINEERS, FIREMEN, AND COAL-PASSERS: GREAT STRENGTH
OF HULL REQUIRED: ALSO IN ENGINES, BOILERS, AND
PARTS: WHY THE PRIME COST INCREASES: THEORY OF REPAIRS: FRICTION AND BREAKAGES: BOILERS AND FURNACES
BURNING OUT: REPAIRS TWELVE TO EIGHTEEN PER CENT:
DEPRECIATION: SEVERAL LINES CITED; USES FOR MORE
MEN: EXTRA FUEL, AND LESS FREIGHT-ROOM: BRITISI
TRADE AND COAL CONSUMPTION:
THE NATURAL LAWS OF RESISTANCE, POWER, AND SPEED,
WITH TABLE: THE RESISTANCE VARIES AS IS THE SQUARE OF
THE VELOCITY: THE POWER, OR FUEL, VARIES AS THE CUBE
OF THE VELOCITY: THE RATIONALE: AUTHORITIES CITED IN
PROOF OF THE LAW: EXAMPLES, AND THE FORMULAE: COALTABLE; NO. I.: QUANTITY OF FUEL FOR DIFFERENT SPEEDS
AND DISPLACEMENTS: DEDUCTIONS FROM THE TABLE: RATES
AT WHICH INCREASED SPEED INCREASES THE CONSUMPTION
OF FUEL: CONSUMPTION FOR VESSELS OF 2,500, 3,000,
AND 6,000 TONS DISPLACEMENT: COAL-TABLE; NO. II.:
FREIGHT-TABLE; NO. III.: AS SPEED AND POWER INCREASE
FREIGHT AND PASSENGER ROOM DECREASE: FREIGHT AND
FARE REDUCED: SPEED OF VARIOUS LINES: FREIGHT-COST:
COAL AND CARGO; NO. IV.: MR. ATHERTON'S VIEWS OF
FREIGHT TRANSPORT.
THE foregoing arguments bring us to the conclusion that




COST OF STEAM: OCEAN MAIL SPEED.         53
steam, however desirable, can not be profitably employed
in commerce generally as an agent of transport; and that
it is best applicable to the rapid conveyance of the mails,
passengers, specie, and costly freights only. That this
fact may be presented in a clearer light, and that we may
see the almost incredibly high cost of rapid steaming, or
the attainment of a speed sufficiently high for the carriage
of important mails, it will be necessary to make some critical inquiries concerning the working cost of steam power,
under any conditions, as applied to marine propulsion.
Much misapprehension prevails on this point among nearly
all classes of the people, and even among the rulers of the
country whose action controls the destiny and uses of this
valuable power. It is hardly to be expected, however,
that gentlemen engaged actively in the all-engrossing pursuits of business or of public life, with a thousand different
sets of ideas to be matured on a thousand different subjects, such as demand the attention of Congress, and the
Departments of the Executive Government, should be
practically or even theoretically acquainted with a profession which requires years of close application and study,
and a wide field of practical, daily observation and experience. It would be as absurd for unprofessional gentlemen of any class, as well from the walks of statesmanship
and the Government as from those of quiet private life, to
assume an acquaintance with the theory and practice of
navigation, and the cost, embarrassments, and difficulties
attending steamship enterprise, as it would for any two
or three of them to enter an ocean steamer for the first
time of their lives, and essay to work the engines and navigate the ship across the seas. The skill and knowledge
requisite for such a task would require years of application; and it can not be reasonably supposed that those
entirely unacquainted with the theory and parts of an
engine, should know much about its capabilities, or the
cost attending its use.




54                THE OCEAN POST.
But there are approximate conclusions, readily applicable
to practice, at which even the unprofessional can arrive
with certainty and security on a proper presentation of the
prominent facts and theories concerned; and that these
may be given to the public in a reliable and intelligible
form, for the removal of the doubts and obscurities which
have hung around the subject, is the chief object of this
publication. This inquiry becomes the more important as
the speed of American steamers is proverbially beyond
that of any other steam vessels in the world. From the
first conception of fluvial and marine steam propulsion by
Fitch and Fulton, the public and the inventors themselves
regarded the new application of this power with the more
favor as it promised to be a means of shortening the long
distances between the different parts of our own large
country. And the same object has acted as a stimulus
ever since to that increase of speed which has placed localities all over this country, hitherto days apart, now, probably, but as many hours. The slow trip through marshes
and rivers, over hills and mountains, and by the meandering roads of the country, between New-York and Albany,
once required from four to six days; but the attainment
of twenty-five miles per hour in our fast river steamers has
at length placed that capital within six hours of the Metropolis. And, as in this instance, so has the effort been
throughout our whole country, and upon the ocean, until
we have attained, both upon the rivers and the high seas,
the highest speed yet known, notwithstanding the important fact that steamship building is a new and not fully
developed species of enterprise in this country. We have
already seen how imperatively the spirit of the age and
the genius of our people demand rapid steam mails by
both land and sea, and a rapid conveyance of passengers;
and it would be unreasonable to suppose that if we required
these for the development of our youth, they would be




COST OF STEAM: OCEAN MAIL SPEED.        55
less necessary for the fruitful uses of manhood and maturity.
It is abundantly evident that the American people are by
nature and habit a progressive and unusually hurrying people; and it is not to be supposed that they will reverse this
constitutional law of their nature in their attempts at ocean
navigation.
To answer the question, "What is the cost of high, adequate mail speed?" requires something more than an
inquiry into the quantity of fuel consumed; although this
is the principal element of its cost. We must consider that
the attainment and maintenance of high speed depend
upon the exertion of a high power; and that,
I. High speed and power require stronger parts in every
thing: in the ship's build, the machinery, the boilers, and
all of the working arrangements:
II. High speed and power require a larger outlay in
prime cost, in material and building, for the adequate resistance required by such power:
III. High speed and power require more frequent and
costly repairs:
IV. High speed and power require more watchfulness,
a more prompt action, and consequently more persons:
V. High speed and power require more fuel, more
engineers, more firemen, and more coal-stokers.
1. These propositions are nearly all self-evident to every
class of mind. That a high speed attained through the
exertion of a high power will require stronger parts in
every thing that exerts a force or resists one, is as manifest
as that a force necessary to remove one ton of weight will
have to be doubled to remove two tons. In the prime
construction of the hull this is as requisite as in any other
part. The resistance to a vessel, or the concussion against
the water, at a low rate of speed, will not be very sensibly
felt; but if that speed is considerably increased and the
concussion made quicker without a corresponding increase




56                 THE OCEAN POST.
in the strength of the frame and hull of the ship generally,
we shall find the ship creaking, straining, and yielding to
the pressure, until finally it works itself to pieces, and also
disconcerts the engines, whose stability, bracing, and keeping proper place and working order depend first and
essentially on the permanence and stability of the hull.
If the resistance to a vessel in passing through the water
increases as the square of the velocity, and if in addition to
this outward thrust against the vessel it has to support the
greater engine power within it, which has increased as the
cube of the velocity, then the strength of the vessel must
be adequate to resist without injury these two combined
forces against which it has to contend.
The same increased strength is necessary also in the
engines and boilers. It is admitted by the ablest engineers, and verified by practice, as will be shown in another
part of this SECTION, that to increase the speed of a steamer
from eight to ten knots per hour, it is necessary to double
the power, and so on in the ratio of the cubes of the velocity. Suppose that we wish to gain these two knots
advance on eight. It is evident that, if the boilers have
to generate, and the engines to use twice the power, and
exert twice the force, they must have also twice the strength.
The boiler must be twice as strong and heavy; the various
workipg parts of the engine must be twice as strong: the
shafts, the cranks, the piston and other rods, the beams,
the cylinders, the frame work, whether of wood or iron,
and even the iron wheels themselves, with every thing in
any way employed to use the power, overcome the resistance, and gain the speed. There is no working arrangement in any way connected with the propulsion of the
ship that does not partake of this increase; every pump,
every valve, every bolt connected directly or indirectly
with the engine economy of the ship.
2. In the second place, seeing that much greater strength




COST OF STEAM: OCEAN MAIL SPEED.         57
of parts is required to overcome the increased resistance, it
is equally evident that this high speed and power thus require a larger outlay in every point of the prime construction of the vessel and engines by which the speed is to be
attained. The hull's heavier timbers cost a higher price
according to size than the direct proportion of size indicates. Large and choice timbers are difficult to get, and
costly. The hull must also be strengthened to a large
extra extent by heavy iron strapping and bracing, which,
unlike the rest, cost in the ratio of the material used. So
with the engines. The shaft, which weighs twice as much,
does not cost only twice as much, but frequently three or
four or five times as much. This arises not from the weight
of the metal, as is evident; but from the difficulty of forging pieces that are so large. The persons engaged in the
forging and finishing of the immense shafts, cranks, pistons,
etc., used in our first class steamers, frequently consider
that the last and largest piece is the chef d'ouvre of the
art, and that it will never be transcended, even if equalled
again. They have expended all of their skill and ingenuity in the task, and have not succeeded sometimes until
they have forged two or three new pieces. When a great
work of this kind is done, it may be discovered in the turning, polishing, and fitting up, that it has at last a flaw, and
that it will not do for the service intended.  A s a matter
of course, it must be thrown aside and a new piece forged.
This was but recently the case with one of the shafts of the
"Leviathan," in England.   So with the shafts of the
new Collins' steamer "Adriatic." They were forged in
Reading, Pennsylvania, and in addition to their enormous
prime cost had to incur that of shipment from the interior
of Pennsylvania to the city of New-York. In all such cases
the prime cost increases immensely, and to an extent that
would hardly be credited by those not practically familiar
with the subject.




58                 THE OCEAN POST.
3. Again, high or increased power and speed require
more frequent and more costly repairs. Friction arises
from the pressure of two bodies moving in opposite directions, and pressure results from the exertion of power, and
in the ratio of the power applied. The amount of friction,
therefore, is in the ratio of the power expended and of the
extra weight of parts required for that power. But the
effects of friction require a higher ratio when the power is
greatly multiplied, as in the case of high speed. An immensely heavy shaft exerting an unusual force is certain to
greatly'heat the journals and boxes, and thus wear them
away far more rapidly. Also a rapid motion of heavy
parts of machinery, and the necessarily severe concussions
and jarrings can not fail destroying costly working parts
in the engine, and necessitating heavy and expensive repairs and substitutions. An ordinary engine working at
a slow and easy rate, will not require one tenth the repairs
necessary if it were working up to a high power and accomplishing a high speed. With any little derangement the
engines can stop and the injury can be repaired before it
reaches any magnitude. But with rapid mail packets the
engines must run on, and the derangement which at first is
small, will amount in the end, when the voyage is completed and the mails are delivered, to a sum probably ten
or twenty times as great as in the casc of the vessel that
stops and makes her repairs as she requires them. The
exertion of a high mail power causes many costly parts to
burn out from unrelieved pressure and friction, which would
not be the case under other conditions. It is also nearly
impossible for the best built engines in the world to make
fast time without breaking some important part at every
trip or two, or so cracking and injuring it from the continued strain, that a wise precaution requires its removal to
make the steamer perfectly sea-worthy. Every practical
man knows these difficulties, and every steamship owner




COST OF STEAM: OCEAN MAIL SPEED.       59
estimates their importance according to the immense bills
they occasion month by month, or the delays and losses
which they cause unless he has expended large amounts of
capital in providing other ships to take their place on such
occasions of derangement.
Nor is the burning out of heavy brass, and composition,
and steel pieces, or the breaking of large and troublesome
parts in the engine the only source of repairs on a steamship. The boiler department is particularly fruitful in
large bills of repairs, especially if it be necessary to attain
a good mail speed. It stands to reason that if the whole
ship can not be filled with boiler power, which with reasonably high fires, would give enough steam, then the
boilers which are used must be exerted to their highest
capacity, or the rapid speed can not be attained. Many
suppose that the boilers may generate twice the quantity
of steam without any appreciable difference in the wear
and tear; but this is a decided eyror. For high speed, and
what I mean by high speed is simply that which gives a
sufficiently rapid transit to the mails, the fires must be
nurtured up to their highest intensity and every pound of
coal must be burned in every corner of the furnaces which
will generate even an ounce of steam. This continued
heat becomes too powerful for the furnaces and the boilers,
and they begin to oxidize, and burn, and melt away, as
would never be the case under ordinary heat. When the
ship comes into port it is found that her furnaces must be
" overhauled," her grate bars renewed, her braces restored,
her boilers patched, sometimes all over, several of their
plates taken out, thousands of rivets removed and supplied,
and probably dozens of tubes also removed and replaced
with new ones. But this is not all. The best boilers can
not long run in this way. After six to seven years at the
utmost, they must be removed from the ship altogether, and
new ones must be put into their place. This is also a most




60                  THE OCEAN POST.
expensive operation. The boilers constitute a large share
of the cost of the engine power. To put a new set of
boilers in one of the Collins steamers will cost about one
hundred and ten thousand dollars, and this must be done
every six years. The boilers of the West-India Royal
Mail Steamers, which run very slowly, last on an average,
six years. 
But this is not all. To restore the boilers, a ship has to
be torn literally almost to pieces. All of the decks in
that part must be removed and lost; the frame of the ship
cut to pieces; large and costly timbers removed, and altogether an expense incurred that is frightful even to the
largest companies. To insure perfect safety and to gratify
the wish of the public, this is generally done long before
it is strictly necessary, and when the boilers are in a perfectly good condition for the working purposes of ordinary
speed. But precaution and safety are among the prerequisites of the public service, and must be attained at whatever cost. On slow auxiliary freighting steamers this
would be by no means necessary. But the extent and cost
of these repairs on steamers far exceed any thing that would
be imagined. They are supposed to be twelve per cent.
per annum of the prime cost of a vessel of ordinary speed,
taking the whole ship's life together at twelve years at the
utmost. Atherton in his " Marine Engine Construction and
Classification," page 32, says of the repairs of steam vessels
doing ordinary service in Great Britain, where all such
work is done much cheaper than in this country: " By the
Parliamentary evidence of the highest authorities on this
point, it appears to have been conclusively established, that
the cost of upholding steamship machinery has of late
years amounted, on the average, to about ~6 per horse
* Statement by Mr. Pitcher, builder, before the Committee of the House of Commons. Murray on the Steam Engine, p. 170, Second Edition.




COST OF STEAM: OCEAN MAIL SPEED.       61
power per annum, being about 12 per cent. per annum, on
the prime cost of the machinery, which annual outlay is
but one of the grand points of current expense in which
steamship proprietors are concerned." Now, if these were
the repairs of the slow West-India Royal mail steamers,
which ran but 200 days in the year, and that at a very
moderate speed, and in the machine shops of England,
where at that time (previous to 1852) wages were very
low, they can not be less in this country, on rapid mail
steamers, where wages and materials are very high, and
where marine engineering was then in its infancy.
There are some facts on this subject which prove the
positions here taken. The Collins steamers have been
running but six years, and yet their repairs have amounted
in all to more than the prime cost of the ships, or to about
eighteen per cent. per annum. They were as well and as
strongly built originally as any ships in the world, as appears from the report which Commodore M. C. Perry made
to the Department regarding them, and from the fine condition of their hulls at the present time. Their depreciation with all of these repairs has not been probably above
six per cent. per annum. They will, however, probably
depreciate ten per cent. during the next six years, and at
the age of twelve or fourteen years be unfit for service.
The steamers Washington and Hermann, which had strong
hulls, have been run eight years, and are now nearly worthless. Their depreciation has been at least ten per cent.
The steamers Georgia and Ohio, which Commodore Perry
and other superintending navy agents pronounced to be
well-built and powerful steamers, (See Report Sec. Navy,
1852,) ran only five years, and were laid aside, and said to
be worthless. With all of the repairs put upon these
ships, which were admitted to be capable of doing first
class war service, as intended, they depreciated probably
seventeen per cent.; as it is hardly possible that their old




62                 THE OCEAN POST.
iron would sell for more than fifteen per cent. of their prime
cost. These steamers paid much smaller repair bills than
the Collins, and were not so well constructed, or at so high
a cost. American steamers do not, upon the average,
last above ten years; but if they reach twelve or fourteen,
they will pay a sum nearly equal to twice their cost, for
repairs and substitutions. Nor is this all. The life of a
steamer ends when her adaptation to profitable service
ceases. She may not be rotten, but may be so slow, or
of so antiquated construction, or may burn so much more
fuel than more modern competitors, that she can not stand
the test of competition.
4. We thus see that not only are the requisite repairs
most extensive and costly, but of such magnitude as to
greatly reduce the earnings of any class of steam vessels.
But this is not the last costly consequence of mail speed.
It requires more cautious watchfulness of the engines, the
boilers, the deck, and of every possible department of the
navigation, even including pilotage. It requires also more
promptness and dispatch in every movement, and hence a
much larger aggregate number of men. More men are
necessary to keep up high fires; twice as many men are
necessary to pass twice as much coal; twice as many engineers as under other circumstances are necessary for the
faithful working of the engines, and any accidents and repairs which are indispensable on the ocean; and a larger
number of sailors and officers is necessary to all of the
prompt movements required of the mail steamer. The
Havre mail steamers, the "Arago" and "Fulton," never
carry less than six engineers each, although they could be
run across the ocean with three under a hard working system. But this number insures the greater safety of the
ship under ordinary circumstances, and is absolutely necessary in any case of accident and danger. It is the same
case with the firemen. When, in a heavy storm, the fire




COST OF STEAM: OCEAN MAIL SPEED.        63
department may be imperfectly manned, the ship has taken
one of the first chances for rendering the engines inefficient,
and being finally lost. And all of these extra and indispensable employees make an extra drain on the income of
the ship, and add to the extreme costliness of a high adequate mail speed.
5. It is clear, then, that an adequate mail speed requires
more fuel, more engineers, more firemen, more coal-stokers,
and more general expense.. The question of fuel is, however, alone the most important of all those affecting the
attainment of high speed, and the item whose economy has
been most desired and sought, both by those attempting to
carry freight, and those who carry the mails and passengers. The principal points of interests concerning it are,
the enormous quantity which both theory and practice
show to be necessary to fast vessels; the large sum to be
paid for it, and the steadily increasing price; and the paying freight room which its necessary carriage occupies.
In fast steaming, the supply of coal to the furnaces frequently arrives at a point where many additional tons may
be burned and yet produce no useful effect or increase of
power. The draft through the furnaces and smoke stacks
is so rapid and strong as to take off a vast volume of heat;
and this, coupled with a large quantity of heat radiated
from the various highly heated parts and surfaces, requires
a consumption of fuel truly astonishing. If we reflect that
at the twelve principal ports of Great Britain in the year
of 1855, the tonnage entered was 6,372,301, and departed
6,426,566, equal to 12,798,867 total, and this during the
war, that a large part of this was steam tonnage, and that
the total imports and exports of Great Britain for 1856
were 1,600,000,000 dollars, we can somewhat appreciate
the present and future uses of coal, and its inevitably large
increase in price. The two hundred and seventy steamers
in the British Navy, with about 50,000 aggregate horse




64                 THE OCEAN POST.
power, consumed in 1856, according to a report made to a
Committee of the " British Association for the Advancement of Science," this year, by Rear-Admiral Moorsom,
750,000 tons of coal. The difficulty and cost of mining
coal, its distance from the sea-shore, and the multifarious
new applications in its use among our rapidly increasing
population, as well as its almost universal and increasing
demand for marine purposes, all conspire to make it more
costly from year to year; while, as a propelling agent, it
is already beyond the reach of commercial ocean steam
navigation. Coal has gone up by a steady march during
the last seven years from two and a half to eight dollars
per ton, which may now be regarded as a fair average
price along our Atlantic seaboard. And that we may see
more clearly how essentially the speed and cost of steam 
marine navigation depend upon the simple question of
fuel alone,'to say nothing further of the impeding causes
heretofore mentioned, I will now present a few inquiries
concerning
THE NATURAL LAWS OF RESISTANCE, POWER, AND SPEED,
WITH TABLES OF TIHE SAME.
The resistance to bodies moving through the water increases as the square of the velocity; and the power, or
coal, necessary to produce speed varies or increases as the
cube of the velocity. This is a law founded in nature, and
verified by facts and universal experience. Its enunciation
is at first startling to those who have not reflected on the
subject, and who as a general thing suppose that, if a vessel will run 8 miles per hour on a given quantity of coal,
she ought to run 16 miles per hour on double that quantity. I think that it may be safely asserted that in all
cases of high speed, and ordinary dynamic or working
efficiency in the ship, the resistance increases more rapidly




COST OF STEAM: OCEAN MAIL SPEED.         65
than as the squares. The rationale of the law is this: the
power necessary to overcome the resistance of the water
at the vessel's bow and the friction increases as the square;
again, the power necessary to overcome the natural inertia
of the vessel and set it in motion, increases this again as
the square of the velocity, and the two together constitute
the aggregate resistance which makes it necessary that the
power for increasing a vessel's speed shall increase as the
cube of the velocity. But whatever the rationale, the law
itself is an admitted fact by all theoretical engineers, and
is proven in practice by all steamships. In evidence of
this, I will give the following opinions.
In his treatise on "The Marine Engine," Mr. Robert
Murray, who is a member of the Board of Trade in Southampton, England, says in speaking of the "Natural law
regulating the speed of a steamer," page 104: " These results chiefly depend upon the natural law that the power
expeneded in propelling a steamship through the water varies
as the cube of the velocity. This law is modified by the
retarding effect of the increased resisting surface, consequent upon the weight of the engines and fuel, so that the
horse power increases in a somewhat higher ratio than that
named."  It must be understood that when he speaks of
power, horse power, etc., it is simply another form of
representing the quantity of coal burned; as the power is
in the direct ratio of the quantity of fuel.
Bourne, the great Scotch writer upon the Screw Propeller, in his large volume published by Longmans, London,
page 145, says, in concluding a sentence on the expensiveness of vessels: " Since it is known that the resistance of
vessels increases more rapidly than the square of the velocity in the case of considerable speeds."
Again, at page 236, on " the resistance of bodies moving
through the water," he says: " In the case of very sharp
vessels, the resistance appears to increase nearly as the
5




66                 THE OCEAN POST.
square of the velocity, but in case of vessels of the ordinary amount of sharpness the resistance increases more
rapidly than the square of the velocity."
Again, on page 231, in speaking of the folly of a company attempting to run steamers sufficiently rapidly for the
mails at the price paid for them, he says: "At the same
time an increased rate of speed has to be maintained, which
is, of course, tantamount to a further reduction of the payment. In fact, their position upon the Red Sea line is now
this, that they would be better without the mails than with
them, as the mere expense of the increased quantity of fuel.
necessary to realize the increased speed which they have
undertaken to maintain, will swallow up the whole of the
Government subvention. To increase the speed of a vessel,from 8 to 10 knots it is necessary that the enginepowkr
should be doubled."  This work of Mr. Bourne is now the
standard'of authority on the subject of which he treats,
the world over.
Again, Mr. James R. Napier, of London, known as one
of the largest and most skilled engine-builders in Great
Britain, in the discussion of the dynamic efficiency of
steamships in the proceedings of the " British Association"
in 1856, page 436, says: " Thepower in similar vessels, I
here take for granted, at present varies as the cube of the
velocity." The power simply represents the coal; in fact,
it is the coal.
Mr. Charles Atherton, the able and distinguished Chief
Engineer of Her Majesty's Royal Dock Yard, at Woolwich, has published a volume, called "Steamship Capability," a smaller volume on " Marine Engine Classification,"
and several elaborate papers for the British Association,
the Society of Arts, London, the Association of Civil Engineers, and the Artisans' Journal, for the purpose of properly exposing the high cost of steam freight transport as
based on the law above noticed, and the ruinous expense




COST OF STEAM: OCEAN MAIL SPEED.        67
of running certain classes of vessels of an inferior dynamic
efficiency. When but a few weeks since in London, I
asked the Editor of the "Artisan," if any engineer in England disputed the laws relative to power, on which Mr.
Atherton based his arguments. He replied that he had never
heard of one who did. I asked Mr. Atherton myself, if
in the case of the newest and most improved steamers, with
the best possible models for speed, he had ever found any
defect in the law of, the resistance as the squares, and the
power as the cubes of the velocity. He replied that he
had not; and that he regarded the law as founded in
nature, and had everywhere seen it verified in practice in
the many experiments which it was his duty to conduct
with steam vessels in and out of the Royal Navy. I think,
therefore, that with all of these high authorities, the doctrine will be admitted as a law of power and speed, and
consequently of the consumption of coal and the high cost
of running steamers at mail speeds.
It is not my purpose here to discuss this law, or treat
generally or specially of the theory of steam navigation.
It will suffice that I point out clearly its existence and the
prominent methods of its application only, as these are
necessary to the general deduction which I propose making, that rapid steamships can not support themselves on
their own receipts. The general reader can pass over these
formulae to p. 69, and look at their results.
I. TO FIND THE CONSUMPTION OF FUEL NECESSARY TO INCREASE
THE SPEED OF A STEAMER.
Suppose that a steamer running eight miles per hour
consumes forty tons of coal per day: how much coal will
she consume per day at nine miles per hour? The calculation is as follows:
88: 9:: 40: required consumption, which is, 56.95 tons.
Here the speed has increased 121 per cent., while the quantity of fuel consumed increased 421 per cent.




68                 THE OCEAN POST.
Suppose, again, that we wish to increase the speed from
8 to 10, and from 8 to 16 miles per hour. The formula
stands the same, thus:
Miles. Miles. Tons Coal.  Tons Coal.
83: 103::  40: X, -   78.1
83: 163:: 40: X, = 320.
II. TO FIND THE SPEED CORRESPONDING TO A DIMINISHED CONSUMPTION OF FUEL.
Murray has given some convenient formulae, which I will
here adopt. Suppose a vessel of 500 horse power run 12
knots per hour on 40 tons coal per day: what will be the
speed if she burn only 30 tons per day? Thus:
40: 30:: 12: V (or cube of the required velocity,)
Or, reduced, 4: 3:: 1728: V,
Equation,   3 x 1728 = 5184 = 4 V8,
O5184
Or   441296 — 10.902 knots = V, required velocity.
Thus, we reduce the quantity of coal one fourth, but the
speed is reduced but little above one twelfth.
HI. RELATION BETWEEN THE CONSUMPTION OF FUEL, AND THE
LENGTH AND VELOCITY OF VOYAGE.
The consumption of fuel on two or more given voyages
will vary as the square of the velocity multiplied into the
distance travelled. Thus, during a voyage of 1200 miles,
average speed 10 knots, the consumption of coal is 150
tons: we wish to know the consumption for 1800 miles at
8 knots. Thus:
150 tons: C required Consumption:: 102 knots x 1200 miles: 82
Knots x 1800 miles.
Then, C x 100 x 1200 = 150 x 64 x 1800,*
Or, Cx 120,000 = 17,280,000
1'728
Reduced to C = — 1  = 144 tons consumption.
Suppose, again, that we wish to know the rate of speed
for 1800 miles, if the coals used be the same as on another
voyage of 1200 miles, with 150 tons coal, and ten knots
speed:




COST OF STEAM: OCEAN MAIL SPEED.        69
We substitute former consumption, 150 tons for C,
as in the equation above, marked *, and V2 (square of the
required velocity) for 64, and have,
150 x 100 x 1200 =-150 x V2 x 1800,
Or, 120,000 =-1800V2,
1200
Reduced, 180 = V2
And V = 4/66.66 = 8.15 knots.
From the foregoing easily intelligible formulae we can
ascertain with approximate certainty the large quantity
of coal necessary to increase speed, the large saving of coal
in reducing speed, as well as the means of accommodating
the fuel to the voyage, or the voyage to the fuel. It is not
necessary here to study very closely the economy of fuel,
as this is a question affecting the transport of freight alone.
When the mails are to be transported, economy of fuel is
not the object desired, but speed; and, consequently, we
must submit to extravagance of fuel. This large expenditure of coal is not necessary in the case of freights, as they
may be transported slowly, and, consequently, cheaply.
But one of the principal reasons for rapid transport of the
mails is that they may largely anticipate freights in their
time of arrival, and consequently control their movements.
I recently had an excellent opportunity of testing the
large quantity of fuel saved on a slight reduction of the
speed, and give it as illustrative of the law advanced. We
were on the United States Mail steamer " Fulton," Captain
Wotton, and running at 13 miles per hour. Some of the
tubes became unfit for use in one of the boilers, and the fires
were extinguished and the steam and water drawn off from
this boiler, leaving the other one, of the same size, to propel
the ship. An intelligent gentleman who happened to know
that we were using only one boiler, and consequently, but
half the power, remarked to me that it was very strange
that the ship was still going about eleven miles per hour,




70                 THE OCEAN POST.
without any sail. He said: "It is strange, sir; two boilers
of equal size drove us thirteen miles per hour; and here
now but one boiler drives us nearly eleven miles, or nearly
as fast; when common-sense teaches that the one boiler
would drive us only six and a half miles per hour. How
is that?" I then explained to him very clearly the natural
law relative to power and speed, (See R]ule II, page 68,)
which he at once comprehended and admitted, but with
the remark: "Indeed, sir, I would have testified that she
ought with one boiler to have gone at only half the
speed; or that going at six miles with one boiler, she
would go twelve with two."
As it will be interesting to the general reader to examine the details of the increased consumption of fuel at
increased rates of speed, I present the following elaborate
table recently prepared by Mr. Atherton for his new edition of " Steamship Capability," according to the formula
above noticed, and the performance of the best type of
vessel in the Royal Navy, the steamer " Rattler." Mr. A.
found a higher efficiency in this vessel per horse power
than any other in the Navy, and consequently based the
consumption of coal in the table on the assumption that
the mail and passenger vessels generally should be of as
good contractive type as "Rattler."  I shall present also
another table showing a much larger consumption of fuel
by an inferior type of vessel. I use these tables because
they are thoroughly correct, and quite as perfect as any
that I could construct on the same formula; and because
they carry with them the weight of probably the highest
authority in Great Britain.




COST OF STEAMM: OCEAN        MAIL SPEED.              71
COAL TABLE No. I.
Displacement,*      Speed, and Fuel consumed per Day, for
Mail, Passenger, and Freight Steamers, whose locomotive
performance is equal to that of the best class of ocean
steam   vessels; assuming the consumption           of fuel to be
4 Ib6s. per indicated horse power per hour, equal to 33,000
Ibs. raised one foot in     one minute.      The quantity consumed is expressed in tons per day of 24 hours..               SPEED PER HOUR.-NAUTICAL MILES.
P    6    7   8   9   10  11   12  13  14  15   16  17  18  19  20
TONS. TONS  TONS TONS TONSOS  TONS TONS TONS TONSONS TONS  TONS TONS TONS TON
100 1.04 1.652.47 3.51 4.82 6.418.32 10.613.216.3 19.7 23.7 28.1 33.0 38.5
125 1.20 1.9212.864.07 5.59 7.449.66 12.3115.3 18.922.9 27.532.638.344.7
150 1.362.16 3.23 4.60 6.31 8.40 10.9 13.9 17.3 21.3 25.9 31.036.8 43.3 50.5
175 1.51 2.40 3.58 5.10 7.00 9.31 12.115.419.2 23.6 28.7 34.440.848.056.0
200 1.65 2.62!3.915.57 7.65 10.2 13.2 16.8121.025.8131.337.644.652.461.2
250 1.92 3.044.54 6.47 8.87 11.8 15.3 19.5 24.3129.936.3 43.651.7 60.971.0
300 2.2513.445.13 7.30 10.0 13.3 17.3 22.027.533.841.049.258.468.7 80.1
350 2.403.815.688.0911.1 14.819.224.4130.537.545.554.564.776.288.8
400 2.624.16 6.21 8.85 12.1 16.2 21.0 26.733.3141.0 49.7 59.6 70.8 83.397.1
450 2.844.506.729.57 13.1 17.5 22.728.8!36.044.3153.864.576.690.1 105
500 3.0414.8317.21 10.3114.1 18.7 24.3 30.9138.6 47.5157.7169.2 82.1196.6 113: 60013.43 5.468.1411.615.9 21.227.534.943.653.7165.178.192.8 109 127
7003.81/6.059.0212.817.623.530.438.7148.459.5172.2186.6 103 121 141
8004.16!6.619.87 14.0119.3 25.633.3142.352.965.0178.994.6 112 132 154
900 4.507.1510.715.220.827.736.045.857.270.485.4 102 122 143 167
1000 4.837.6711.416.322.429.838.649.161.375.5191.6 110 130 153 179
12505.608.9013.318.926.0344.544.857.071.287.6 106 127 151 178 208
15006.3310.015.021.429.339.0150.664.480.498.9 120 144 171 201 234
1750 7.01 11.116.623.732.543.256.171.389.1 110 133 159 189 223 260
2000.7.66 12.218.2/25.935.547.361.377.997.4 120 145 174 207 243 284
250018.89114.121.1i30.041.2154.871.290.5 113 139 169 202 240 283 329
3000110.0116.0123.8133.9146.5 61.9 80.4 102 128 157 191 228 271 319 372
3500 11.117.7 26.4 37.6 51.5 68.6 89.0 113 141 174 211 253 301 354 412
4000 12.219.328..841.156.375.097.3 124 155 190 231 277 329 386 451
5000114.122.433.547.765.487.0 113 144 179 221 268 321 381 448 523
600015.9125.3137.8153.873.898.3 128 162 203 249 302 363 431 506 591
7000117.7 28.141.9 59.681.8 109 141 180 #24 1276 335 402 477 561 654
8000119.330.745.865.289.4 119 155 196 245 302 366 439 522 613 715
9000120.9 33.249.570.596.7 129 167 213 265 327 396 475 564 663 774
10000122.435.653.1 75.6 104 138 179 228 285 350 425 510 605 712 830
1250026.041.361.7/87.8 120 160 208 265 330 406 493 592 702 826 963
15000 29.446.669.699.1 136 181 235 299 373 459 557 668 793 933 1088
2000035.656.584.4 120 165 219 285 362 452 556 675 809 961 1130 1318
2500041.3'65.6 97.9 139 191 254 330 420 525 645 783 939 111513111529:
30000146.6 74.0 111 157 216 287 373 474 592 728 884 1060125814801727
* Displacement refers to the number of cubic feet of water displaced by the hull; allowing thirty-five cubic feet to the ton.




72                 THE OCEAN POST.
By the inspection of this table we can see in condensed
form the coal-cost of any speed as high as twenty miles per
hour, and for any size of vessel from one hundred tons to
thirty thousand tons. Let us find in the left hand column
a vessel of 2,500 tons displacement. Pursuing the line
along to the right we find in the second column 8.89 tons
of coal, which a steamer of this displacement would burn
in 24 hours, if running, as indicated at the head of the
column, 6 Nautical miles per hour.
In the next column, under the head of 7 Nautical miles
per hour, we find that she would burn in one day 14.1
tons; or one and a half times as much coal to gain one
sixth more speed:
Again, at 8 miles per hour she burns 21.1 tons; nearly
three times as much as at six miles:
At 9 miles she burns 30 tons: above twice as much as at
7, and nearly four times as much as at 6, although the
speed is but half doubled:
At 10 miles per hour she burns 41.2 tons; about twice
as much as at 8 miles, although the speed is increased only
one fourth. At 10 she burns 34 per cent. more than at 9,
although the increase of speed is only eleven per cent.
(See pages 67 and 68):
At 11 miles per hour she will burn 54.8 or 55 tons;
nearly three times as much as at 8 miles per hour, and six
times as much' as at 6 miles per hour:
At 12 miles per hour she will burn 71.2; about thirty
per cent. more than at eleven miles per hour, although
gaining but 9 per cent. in speed; nearly twice as much as
at ten miles per hour, three and a half times as much as at
8, five times as much as at 7, and above eight times as
much as at 6 miles per hour. It is here seen that to double
the speed the consumption of fuel has increased eight-fold,
which verifies my statements hitherto made on this subject. We have already seen that to gain two miles of




COST OF STEAM: OCEAN MAIL SPEED.       73
speed on any stated speed, it was necessary to double the
quantity of fuel used.
At 13 miles per hour she burns 90.5 tons. This is burning two and a fourth times as much coal as if she ran only
10 miles per hour. Now, at this speed, the steamer will
reach Southampton or Liverpool in 10 days and 6 hours,
which is equivalent to 10 days and 12 hours burning fuel,
allowing six hours for heating and starting, and which
would make an aggregate consumption of 950 tons of coal
for the passage of this steamer of 2,500 displacement or
probably 3,000 tons register.
At 14 miles per hour she burns 113 tons. This is
nearly three times as much as 10 miles per hour. At this
speed the steamer would reach Southampton or Liverpool
in 9 days, 12 hours, and 30 minutes, supposing the distance
to be 3,200 miles from New-York, or say 9 days 18$ hours
coal-burning time, and would consume an aggregate of
1,1041 tons. As this is but little above the distance from
New-York to Southampton, and under that from Panama
to California, and ab, it the tonnage of the steamers running, the time being vithin eleven days generally, it will
be seen how large is tl; cost of running the steamers of the
Pacific Mail Steamship Company, those on the European
routes, and also those b ~tween New-York and Aspinwall.
As the route of the Havre and Bremen steamers is much
longer, they are compelled to run slightly slower, or they
would be filled up with their own fuel and power. Taking a Collins steamer of 3,000 tons, which we find in the
line below, and we see that in running 14 miles per hour
as they have frequently done, the consumption would be 128
tons per day, or 1,252 tons for the passage. And yet, one
of those steamers could make 12 miles per hour on 80.4
tons per day, or at 11 miles per hour on 61.9, or less than
half that used at 14. But pursuing this table we see that,
At 15 miles per hour she would burn 139 tons, or three
and a half times as much as at 10 miles.




74- THE OCEAN POST.
At 16 miles per hour she would burn 169 tons, or precisely eight times as much as at 8 miles per hour. Here
again doubling the speed is found to be an enormous expense.
At 17 miles per hour she burns 202 tons per day.
At 18 miles per hour the consumption is 240 tons per
day.
At 19 miles per hour she burns 283 tons coal per day;
and
At 20 miles per hour she burns 329 tons per day. At
20 miles per hour she would run 480 miles per day, a thing
as yet wholly unheard of, and would consume on the voyage of 6 days and 16 hours, say 6 days and 22 hours,
2,276 tons of coal. It would be clearly impossible for her
to carry her own fuel; as the immense boiler and engine
power necessary to secure this speed would of itself fill a
ship of this size, to say nothing of the fuel which also
would nearly fill it. Then, we may never expect any such
ship to attain any such speed as seventeen, eighteen, or
twenty miles per hour on so long a voyage without recoaling.
Seeing thus the enormous increase in the consumption of
fuel for a moderate increase in the speed, we are enabled
the better to appreciate the large expense incurred in running ocean steamers sufficiently rapidly for successful mail
and passenger purposes. We will further pursue these inquiries by examining in this table the consumption for vessels of 6,000 tons, which would make the displacement of
the ship nearly 5,000 tons, such as the "Adriatic," the
"Vanderbilt," and the "Niagara." It appears that at 8
miles per hour they would consume 33 tons per day; at
10 miles, 65 tons; at 12 miles, 113 tons; at 13 miles, 144
tons; at 14 miles, 179 tons; at 15 miles, 221 tons; and at 16
miles, 268 tons per day. This is supposing this speed to
be maintained on an average across the ocean, in all kinds




COST OF STEAM: OCEAN       MAIL SPEED.             75
of weather, which this size of steamer could not do without more engine and boiler power than any of them have.
With such additional power the ships noticed would have
scarcely any available room for freight or any thing else.
One thing is very clear from this table, that when steamers run at very moderately slow rates of speed, their consumption of fuel is very small; and that when they leave
this low freighting speed, for that of the necessarily rapid
mails and passengers, the consumption increases to an extent and with a rapidity that would seem almost incredible
at first view.
COAL TABLE No. II.
The following coal table is constructed in all respects as th6
preceding, but for a lower type of vessels, or those whose
coefficient of Dynamic performance is inferior to that
upon which the previous table is estimated.       As a consequence, this style of vessel requires more fuel.
E X^            SPEED PER HOUR.-NAUTICAL MILES.
2    6   7   8   9  10   11 |-12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20
TOS. TONS T  ONS TONS TONS TONS TONS TONS T             ONS TONSOS
5003.95 6.28 9.3713.418.3 24.3 31.640.150.2 61.7 75.089.9 106 125 147
600 4.46 7.10 10.6 15.1 20. 62.5135.745.3 56.669.884.6 101 120 141 165
7004.957.8611.716.622.8 30.5139.550.362.977.393.8 112 134 157 183
8005.418.5912.8 18.225.133.3 43.355.068.784.5 102 123 145 171 200
9005.859.29 13.9 19.727.036.046.859.574.391.5 111 132 158 186 217
1000 6.28 9.97 14.8 21.2 29.138.'50.163.8 79.798.1 119 143 169 199 232
12507.2811.517.324.533.8 44.858.274.192.5 114 137 165 196 231 270
15008.2313.019.527.838.150.765.783.7 104 128 156 187 222 261 304
17509.1114.421.530.842.256.172.992.7 115 143 173 206 245 290 338
2000 9.95156.8 23.6 33.6 46.161.5 79.7 101 126 159 188 226 269 316 369
2500 11.518.327.4 39.053.571.2 92.5 117 147 180 219 262 312 368 427
3000 13.0 20.830.944.0160.480.4 104 132 166 204 248 296 352 414 483
350014.423.034.348.866.989.1 115 147 183 226 274 329 391 460 535
4000 15.825.137.453.473.297.5 126 161 201 247 300 360 427 501 586
5000 18.3 29.143.562.0185.0 113 147 187 232 287 348 417 495 582 679
6000 20.6 32.949.169.995.9 127 166 210 264 323 392 472 560 657 768
10000 29.146.269.098.21135 179 232 296 370 455 552 663 786 925 1079
600020.6!2.9'9.16'9:91 1               1 2 3     9 4,     5I''6




76                     THE OCEAN POST.
FREIGHT TABLE: No. III.
Showing the mutual relation of Displacement, Power, Speed,
Consumption of Coal, and capacity for Cargo of vessels
of progressively increasing magnitude up to nearly 30,000
tons of Deep-draught Displacement, employed on a passage of 3,250 nautical miles, without recoaling: showing
also the prime cost Expenses per ton of Cargo conveyed.
POWER. -          PASSAGE 3,250 N. M. DIRECT.
[      *- ^                                        Expenses
H    O | B a|^C    S - m  a -0 I              per Ton of
M;,[                           OM         a ~    Cargo.
N.. M  P. H.  P.  TONS. D. H. TONS. TONS. TONS. ~  S. D.
O    8   109  436  1109 16.22  369  1209 2684 2    1 10
~    { 9   155  620  1155 15. 1  466  1112  2733 2   7   8
-cq   10   213  852  1213 13.13  577   999 2788 2 16    11
[ 11       284 1136  1284 12. 7  699   867 2849  3  11  3
SL [12    368  1472  1368 11. 7  830  717  2915  4 14   5
8    172  688 2172 16.22   582 2537 5291 1 16     1
o   [ 9   245   980  2245 15. 1  737  2386 5368 1 19    7
10  336  1344  2336 13.13  882  2223  5441  2  4   1
|  11   448 1792  2448 12. 7 1103  2000  5551  2  13  1
12     581 2324  2581 11. 7 1311  1763  5655 3   5   1
8   276 1104 4276 16.22   934  5257 10467 1 12   3
9     388 1552 4388 15. 1 1168   5028 10584 1 13 10
~o    10   536  2144 4536 13.13 1407 4760 10703 1 16     9
11   712 2848 4712 12. 7 1753 4411 10876 2    2   1
12    928 3712 4928 11. 7 2094 4025 11047 2     9   4
0     13 1180 4720 5180 10.10 2458 3591 11229 2 19       5
14 1472 5888 5472    9.16 2848 3104 11424 3 14    3
8   436 1744  8436 16.22 1476 10826 20738 1   9   0
9     620 2480 8620 15. 1 1866 10447 20933 1    9  11
o     10   852 3408  8852 13.13 2236 10030 21118 1 11    4
o 1   11 1136 4544 9136 12. 7 2797 9466 21398 1 14       9
S    12 1472  5888  9472 11. 7 3322  8867 21661 1 19   1
0   13 1872  7488  9872 10.10 3900 8178 21950 2   4   11
1.14 2340  9360 10340  9.16 4528  7396 22264 2 13   1
Mr. Atherton gives this table, which shows the following facts:
That, as the various sized vessels named, increase in
speed from   8 to 12, or from 8 to 14 miles per hour, their
horse power, as well consequently as their coal, increases:




COST OF STEAM: OCEAN MAIL SPEED.        77
That, as the speed increases, so does the weight of the
hull and engines:
That, as the speed increases, with the consequent increased coal and engine weight, the cargo decreases: and
That, as the speed increases, with the other necessary
conditions noticed, the expense per ton of cargo also increases in a rapid ratio. In the four cross columns ships
of different sizes are considered; of 2,500, 5,000, 10,000,
and 20,000 tons. There is also given the working or indicated horse power, and the nominal horse-power, or that
of 33,000 lbs. raised a foot in a minute, which is the general basis of making contracts. It is a fact, however, that
engines generally work up to three or four times their
nominal horse power; so that the word horse power has
no positive or useful meaning. Vessels called one hundred
nominal horse-power have been known to work up to six
hundred.
Let us take a ship of 5,000 tons. We find that at 8
miles per hour the horse power is 436; but at 12 miles it
is 1,472, nearly four times as great. At 13 miles, it would
be nearly 1800 horse, and at 14 it would be above 2100.
So, also, with the weight of engines, boilers, etc. At 8
miles per hour they would weigh 1,109 tons; but at 12
they would have to weigh, to be large and strong enough,
1,368 tons. At 14 miles, they would weigh nearly 1,600
tons.
Now, see the columns "cargo" and "coal," and observe
how rapidly that of coal increases, while that of cargo decreases in the inverse ratio of the coal, the engine, the boiler,
and the hull weight combined. The cargo has come from
1,209 down to 71 tons; and if the speed were increased
to 13 or 14 miles per hour, the cargo would be so reduced
as to be unworthy of notice.
The next column shows how much greater the quantity
of water displaced as the speed increases. This extra displacement requires extra power.




78                THE OCEAN POST.
In the last column it is observable how rapidly the
speed enhances the cost price of transporting cargo. At
13 miles per hour the cost would be about six pounds sterling per ton, and at 14 knots speed it would be higher than
was ever paid a steamer in the most flush periods of even
the best qualities of freights.  Freights were about ~8
per ton on the Cunard line before the establishment of the
Collins; but they soon came down, and are not now ~3,
or $15, on an average. So with passage. The "Great
Western" charged ~45, the "British Queen" ~50; the
Cunarders, until the Collins competition, ~40, 19s. The
Collins steamers put the price down to ~35, and have
since reduced it to ~30 homeward, and ~24 outward. This
is but little above half the fare of the Great Western, and
something over two thirds of that formerly charged by the
Cunard line. The Report to the House of Commons " on
Steam  Communications with India," No. 372 of 1851,
second volume, page 395, says, that the average speed of
the Cunard line was 10.443 knots, of the Collins line 11
knots, and of the Havre and Bremen lines 9.875 knots per
hour. The Collins line had then just started, and has since
made the average passages one and a half days quicker
than those of the Cunard line. This being the case, it is
easy to estimate the gains of a steamer at such rates, when
this column shows us that Vt 12 miles speed per hour and
an average trip of 11 days, the actual prime cost of moving the freight is much above that which is received for it.
It is therefore taken in small quantities only to assist in
paying the running expenses of the steamer.
This table shows another thing very conclusively, that
large ships running the same number of miles per hour,
run cheaper and transport freight more cheaply than
smaller vessels. It presupposes, however, that they go full
both ways. The engine power and general outlay do not
increase as rapidly as the tonnage of the vessel and her




COST OF STEAM: OCEAN MAIL SPEED.       79
capacityfor carrying. While a ship 2,500tons at 12 miles
per hour on a passage of 3,250 miles would make the cost
per ton for the transportation of freight $22.75, one of
20,000 tons, under the same conditions would reduce it to
$9 per ton. Yet it is hardly probable that we shall ever
profitably employ steamers of over 10,000 tons tonnage in
the passenger, mail, and freight business.
Again, a ship of 2,500 at 12 miles, running 6,500 miles
could not transport cargo at less than $115; one of 5,000
tons would transport it at $52; one of 10,000 tons would
transport it at $33 per ton; and one of 20,000 tons burthen, as for instance the "Leviathan," would transport it
at $24 per ton. And while none of the three first named
sizes of vessels would transport it 12,500 miles, the one of
20,000 tons, running 12 miles per hour, would transport it
at $80 per ton; and running 14 miles per hours, at $430
per ton. Two things must, however, not be forgotten in
this; that the ship to do this must always run entirely full
and have no waste room; and that these prices are comparisons between different steamers, and not with sailing
vessels, which, running much more slowly and with but
little expense, transport the freight far more cheaply.
The following table will set forth very clearly in a summary view, the Time, Horse-power, Coal, and Cargo for a
steamer of good average quality running on passages of 1,000
miles, 2,000 miles, and 3,000 miles, and at a speed varying
from 6 to 18 miles per hour. It will be observed that a
steamer of 3,000 tons can not take power and coal enough
to run on a 2,000 miles passage above 17 knots per hour,
and that one of 3,000 tons also can not run on a 3,000
miles passage at a speed above 16 knots per hour. Observe the small quantity of cargo and the large quantity
of coal for a steamer of 3,000 tons on a 3,000 miles passage at 16 miles per hour.




80                       THE OCEAN POST.
COAL AND CARGO TABLE: No. IV.
Calculated for the meean Displacement of 3,000 Tons.
PASSAGE       PASSAGE        PASSAGE
m  a      1,000          2,000         3,000
M   NAUTICAL MILES. NAUTICAL MILES. NAUTICAL MILES.
0                                      5          0
P         B      E 3  v         a v     v.a v v
N. M. H. P. TONS. D. H. TONS TONS D. H. TONS TONS D. H. TONS TONS
6     52  1252  6.23   72 111 13.21  144 167520.20  2161639
7     83  1283  5.23   98 166711.22  197 161717.21  2961568
8    123  1323  5. 5  128 1612 10.10  2561548 15.15  384 1484
9    175  1375  4.15  162 1543 9. 6  324 146213.21  4861381
10    241  1441  4. 4  2001458 8. 8  401135812.12   6021257
11    320  1520  3.19  242 1358 7.14  484123711. 9  7271116
12    416  1616  3.11  2881239 6.23  577109510.10   866 950
13    529  1729  3. 5  3391100 6.10  678 931 9.15 1017 761
14    661  1861  2.23  393 942 5.23  786 745 8.22 1180 548
15    813  2013  2.19  451 761 5.13  903 535 8. 8 1355 309
16    987  2187  2.14  514 555 5. 5 1028 298 7.19 1542   41
17   1183  2383  2.11  580 327 4.22 1160  37
18   1405  2605  2. 8  650  69
19   1652  2852
20   1927  3127
I will close this long chapter, in which I have endeavored
to  give a clear, comprehensible, and faithful idea of the
cost of running ocean mail, freight, and passenger steamers,
by an extract from that very able and faithful work,
"Steamship Capability."        As a summing up of the various
laws and facts concerning the consumption of fuel, weight
and   power of engines, speed of ships, and their capacity
to do business, Mr. Atherton says, page 55:" Now suppose,
for example, that the passage be 1,000 miles, and that, for
brevity, we confine our remarks to the engine department
only; which, indeed, will be the department of expense,
chiefly affected by variations in the rate of speed. It appears that the vessel of 5,000 tons' mean displacement, if




COST OF STEAM: OCEAN MAIL SPEED.      81
fitted to run at the speed of EIGHT NAUTICAL MILES per
hour, will require 172 H.P., and a cargo of 2,738 tons will
be conveyed 1,000 miles in five days five hours; being equivalent to one day's employment of -0 H.P. per ton of
goods.
"If fitted to run at TEN NAUTICAL MILES an hour, the
vessel will require 336 H.P., the cargo will be reduced to
2,524 tons, and the time to four days four hours; being
equivalent to one day's employment of "0 H.P. per ton of
goods nearly.
"If fitted to run at TWELVE NAUTICAL MILES an hour, the
vessel will require 581 H.P., the cargo will be reduced to
2,217 tons, and the time to three days eleven hours; being
equivalent to one day's employment of " H.P. per ton of
goods.
"If fitted to run at FOURTEEN MILES an hour, the vessel
will require 923 H.P., the cargo will be reduced to 1,802
tons, and the time to two days twenty-three hours; being
equivalent to one day's employment of 1, H.P. per ton of
goods.
"If fitted to run at SIXTEEN MILES per hour, the vessel
will require 1,377 H.P., the cargo will be reduced to 1,264
tons, and the time to two days fourteen hours; being equivalent to one day's employment of 2 0 H.P. per ton of
goods.
"If fitted to run at EIGHTEEN MILES per hour, the vessel
will require 1,961 H.P., the cargo will be reduced to 585
tons, and the time to two days eight hours; being equivalent to one day's employment of 7' H.P., per ton of
goods.
"And if fitted to run at TWENTY MILES per hour, there
will be no displacement available for mercantile cargo.
"Assuming, now, that the COST per ton of goods will be
in proportion to the amount of power and tonnage
employed to do the work, it appears that the cost per ton
6




82                 THE OCEAN POST.
of goods of performing this passage of 1,000 miles, at the
respective speeds of 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, and 18 miles, will be
proportional to the numbers,,5" " 1" 5 2, and
7', which are proportional to the numbers 33, 55, 91, 152,
286, and 775, or nearly as 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, and 23.
" Hence it appears, that in the case of the ONE THOUSAND
MILES passage above referred to, the cost of freightper ton
of goods at TEN MILES per hour, will require to be nearly
the double of the rate at EIGHT MILES per hour.
" The cost per ton at TWELVE MILES per hour will require
to be three times the rate at EIGHT MILES.
"The cost per ton at FOURTEEN MILES per hour will require to be fEve times the rate at EIGHT MILES.
" The cost per ton at SIXTEEN MILES per hour will require
to be nine times the rate at EIGHT MILES.
"The cost per ton at EIGHTEEN MILES per hour will require to be twenty-three times the rate at EIGHT MILES.
"And at TWENTY MILES per hour there will be no displacement available for mercantile cargo.
"By applying the same process of calculation to a ship
of 5,000 tons' mean displacement, making a passage of
THREE THOUSAND MILES, we shall find that, at TEN MILES an
hour, the cost of freight per ton will require to be double
the rate of freight at EIGHT MILES.
"The cost per ton at TWEVE MILES will require to be
three times the rate at EIGHT MILES.
"The cost per ton at FOURTEEN MILES will require to be
six times the rate at EIGHT MILES.
"The cost per ton at SIXTEEN MILES will require to be
twenty times the rate at EIGHT MILES.
" And at EIGHTEEN MILES per hour there will be no displacement available for mercantile cargo.
" Finally, by applying the same process of calculation to
a ship of 5,000 tons' mean displacement on a passage of
6,000 miles, it will be found that the cost of freight per




COST OF STEAM: OCEAN MAIL SPEED.        83
ton at TEN MILES per hour will require to be double the rate
at EIGHT MILES.
" The cost per ton at TWELVE MILES per hour will require
to be about five times the rate at EIGHT MILES.
"The cost per ton at FOURTEEN MILES per hour will be
about sixteen times the rate at EIGHT MILES.
"And at SIXTEEN MILES per hour there will be no displacement available for mercantile cargo.
"Hence, it appears, that for voyages of 1,000 miles and
upwards, without re-coaling, the speed of ten nautical miles
\per hour would involve about double the cost per ton of
\ight miles, and may, therefore, be regarded as the extreme
ilmit that can be generally entertained for the mercantile purpose of goods' conveyance; and that the attainment on long passages of a higher rate of speed than ten
miles (though admissibly practicable) would involve obligations altogether of an exceptional character, such as the
special service of dispatches, mails, passengers, specie, and
the most valuable description of goods can only meet."




84               THE OCEAN POST.
SECTION V.
OCEAN MAIL STEAMERS CAN NOT LIVE ON THEIR OWN
RECEIPTS.
INCREASE OF BRITISH MAIL SERVICE: LAST NEW LINE AT
$925,000 PER YEAR: THE SYSTEM NOT BECOMING SELFSUPPORTING: CONTRACT RENEWALS AT SAME OR HIGHER
PRICES: PRICE OF FUEL AND WAGES INCREASED FASTER
THAN ENGINE IMPROVEMENTS: LARGE SHIPS RUN PROPORTIONALLY CHEAPER THAN SMALL: AN EXAMPLE, WITH THE
FIGURES: THE STEAMER'LEVIATHAN," 27,000 TONS:
STEAMERS OF THIS CLASS WILL NOT PAY: SHE CAN NOT TRANSPORT FREIGHT TO AUSTRALIA: REASONS FOR THE SAME:
MOTION HER NORMAL CONDITION: MUST NOT BE MADE A
DOCK: DELIVERY OF FREIGHTS: MAMMOTH STEAMERS TO
BRAZIL: LARGE CLIPPERS LIE IDLE: NOT EVEN THIS LARGE
CLASS OF STEAEMRS CAN LIVE ON THER OWN RECEIPTS: EFFICIENT MAIL STEAMERS CARRY BUT LITTLE EXCEPT PASSENGERS: SOME HEAVY EXTRA EXPENSES IN REGULAR MAIL
LINES: PACIFIC MAIL COMPANY'S LARGE EXTRA FLEET, AND
ITS EFFECTS: THE IMMENSE ACCOUNT OF ITEMS AND EXTRAS: A PARTIAL LIST: THE HAVRE AND COLLINS DOCKS:
GREAT EXPENSE OF FEEDING PASSENGERS: VIEWS OF MURRAY AND ATHERTON ON THE COST OF RUNNING STEAMERS,
AND THE NECESSITY OF THE PRESENT MAIL SERVICE.
FROM the foregoing SECTION it is evident that the cost of
running ocean steamers is enormous, and that in the chief
element of expenditure it increases as the cube of the velocity. This, although true, is certainly a startling ratio
of increase, and calculated to arouse attention to the difficulties of postal marine navigation. Seeing that ocean
speed is attainable at so high a cost, we naturally conclude




MAIL STEAMERS CAN NOT LIVE ON THEIR OWN RECEIPTS. 85
that fast mail steamers can not live on their own receipts
upon the ocean.
Since Great Britain established her first ocean steam
mail in 1833, she has gone on rapidly increasing the same
facilities, until her noble lines of communication now extend to every land and compass every sea. The last great
contract which she conceded was last year, to the "European and Australian Company," for carrying the mails on
a second line from Southampton via Suez to Sydney, in
Australia, at ~185,000, or $925,000 per year. And although her expenditures for this service have gradually
gone up to above five millions of dollars per annum, she
continues the service as a necessity to her commerce, and
a branch of facilities and accommodations with which the
people of the Kingdom will not dispense. The British
Government set out with the determination to have the
advantages of the system, whether it would pay or not.
They believed that the system would eventually become
self-supporting, by reason of the many important improvements then proposed in the steam-engine, and they have
ever since professed to believe the same thing. But their
experience points quite the other way; and while the service is daily becoming more important to them in every
sense, it is also becoming year by year more expensive.
Contracts which the Admiralty made with several large
and prominent companies in 1838 they renewed at the
same or increased subsidies, after twelve years' operations,
in 1850, for another term of twelve years. And so far
from those companies with their many ships on hand being
able to undertake the service for less, they demanded more
in almost every case, and received it from the government.
The improvements which they anticipated in the marine
engine were more than counterbalanced by the rise in the
price of fuel and wages all over the kingdom and the
world. In fact, those improvements have been very few




86                 THE OCEAN POST.
and very small. It still takes nearly as much coal to evaporate a pound of water as it then did; and the improvements which have been made were generally patents, and
costly in the prime cost of construction to a degree almost
preclusive of increased benefits to the general service. At
any rate, the latest steam adaptations and improvements
have proven unequal to the end proposed. and the cost of
the ocean service is now far heavier than it ever has been
before, simply because of the greater speed required by the
public for the mails and passage.
It had long been hoped that this difficulty of increasing
cost in running ocean steamers might finally be overcome
by another means; and the whole available engineering
and ship-building talent of Great Britain and the United
States has been directed not entirely to the engine department, but to the hulls and to the production of a large
class of ships, which are admissibly cheaper in proportion
to size and expense of running when compared with
smaller vessels, if they are always employed and have full
freights and passage. It is well established that large
steamers run proportionally cheaper than small ones.
(See Table III, page 76.)  This arises from the important
fact that the length increases far more rapidly than the
breadth and depth. Consequently the tonnage of the vessel increases much faster than the resistance. In passing
through the water the vessel cuts out a canal as large as
the largest part of its body, which is at the middle of the
ship. If the vessel be here cut in two, the width and
depth, or the beam and hold being multiplied together
will give the square contents of the midship section.
Now, when a vessel is doubled in all of its dimensions, this
midship section and consequently the size of the canal
which it cuts in the water, does not increase as rapidly as
the solid contents of the whole ship, and consequently, as
the tonnage. Hence, the resistance to the vessel in passing




MAIL STEAMERS CAN NOT LIVE ON THEIR OWN RECEIPTS. 87
through the water does not increase so rapidly as the tonnage which the vessel will carry.
To make this clearer, let us suppose a vessel of good
proportion, whose length is seven times the beam, or 280
ft. long, 40 ft. wide, and 30 feet deep. The midship section will be 40 x 30=1,200 square feet: the solid contents will be 40 x 30 x 280=336,000 solid feet. Again, let
us double these dimensions, and the ship will be 80 ft. wide,
60 ft. deep, and 560 feet long. The midship section will
be 80 x 60=4,800 square feet: the solid contents will be
80 x 60 x 560-2,688,000 solid feet. Now, comparing the
midship sections, and also the said contents in each case we
have,
Midship Section, 4,800
— =4 to 1. Increase as the squares:
Midship Section, 1,200
Solid Contents, 2,688,000
-----  =8 to 1. Increase as the cubes.
Solid Contents, 336,000
Thus, the midship resistance has increased as four to one,
or as the square, while the solid contents, representing the
tonnage, have increased as eight to one, or as the cube.
It is evident that the ship has but four times the mid-section resistance, while she has eight times the carrying capacity. Therefore the engine power, and the coal and weight
necessary to propel a ship of twice the lineal dimensions,
or eight times the capacity, would have to be only four
times that of the smaller vessel, speaking in general terms;
and as a consequence, the price of freight, considering the
vessels to run at equal speed, would be but half as much
in the larger as in the smaller vessel.
The attempt has been made to seize the evident advantages thus offered by increasing the size of the hull, until
our clippers now reach an enormous size, and our steamers
are stopping but little short of 30,000 tons. The splendid




88 -               THE OCEAN POST.
steamer "Leviathan" was built on this idea, and must
prove a splendid triumph in comparative cheapness if she
can only get business so as to run full, and keep herself
constantly employed in her legitimate business, running.
But it is hardly possible that she should be always filled
with either freight or passengers. Some of our large clipper ships have experienced this difficulty. The time necessary to load and unload is too great for short routes,
although they are well calculated for long passages. If
one of these large steamers fail to get plenty of business
the losses become exceedingly severe. The prime cost is
immense; the interest on the capital and the insurance are
very large; and the current expenses are even beyond
those necessary for the government of some cities. These
hazards all taken together more than neutralize the benefits
which arise from extra size and extra proportional cheapness; so that notwithstanding all of the hopes which some
have entertained for the cheapening of transport in this way,
they are probably doomed to disappointment in the end;
and ocean steaming continues as expensive as ever, and is
growing even more expensive than it has ever been known
since its first introduction. (See Coal Tables,pp. 71 and 5.)
It is clear that, notwithstanding all of the advantages to be
gained from increased size, steamers can not support themselves upon the ocean. Let us examine further the case
of such a ship as the "Leviathan." I can not see that
there is any normal trade in which she can run successfully. -She may transport 6,000 tons of measurement goods
to Australia; but it will be at the expense of fourteen to
sixteen thousand tons of coals if the passage is made in fair
time. If not, sailing vessels will subserve all purposes excapt travel quite as well. And certainly there is no class
of freight for Australia or any other portion of the world,
which will pay such an enormous coal-bill, and so many
other expenses, and the interest and insurance on three




MAIL STEAMERS CAN NOT LIVE ON THEIR OWN RECEIPTS. 89
and a half to four millions of dollars, just to save a few
days in so long a voyage. And if the steamer is to do a
freighting as well as passenger business, then a long voyage
is essential to her.
Running is the legitimate business of a steamer. Her
costly engines are put in her for locomotion. Her large
corps of engineers, firemen, and coal-passers, are employed
for running her, and are of no use when she is lying still,
although necessarily on full pay. Her condition is abnormal and unnatural every day that she is lying at the docks,
and taking or discharging freight; and hence, every day
that she is thus employed she is not performing her proper
functions. A sailing ship can better afford to lie still for
weeks and await a freight, or slowly receive or discharge
cargo; as she must pay only the interest on her investment, her dockage, the captain, and watchmen, and per.
haps her depreciation. The prime investment is much
less. She has no costly engines and boilers. So are her
current expenses. She has none of the costly employees
that I have named, and who can never leave a steamer for
a day. But eternal motion, flush freights, flush business,
good prices, and constant employment, are everywhere essential to the steamer.
Suppose the "Leviathan" steamer running between
Liverpool and New-York. She would be occupied ten
days at least in receiving her freight, ten days in running
and making port or docks, and ten days in discharging.
Then, she would be employed only one third of her time
in the business for which she was constructed, running;
while during two thirds of it she would be acting simply
as a pier or dock, over which freight would be handled.
Now, with her costly engines, and costly and necessarily
idle employees, she can not afford to be a dock; neither
can she afford to lie still so long. Nor can she on such
conditions get the freight necessary to her support. The




90                 THE OCEAN POST.
community on neither side of the water would wish fifteen
thousand tons of any class of freights which she could
transport dumped down upon the docks at one time.
They wish it to arrive a little and a little every day, as it
is wanted, just enough to supply the market; and will not
lie out of the money which they pay for it, and have it
nearly a month in market before they need it, just to have
it come on the "Leviathan."   It must come along in
small lots, just as they need it, and it must be shipped the
day that it is bought, and delivered as soon as the ship is
in, without being the last lot of fifteen thousand tons,
and without keeping the owners so long out of their
money. Suppose that A. puts the first lot of freight in at
London: he will be the last to receive it in New-York.
A smaller steamer taking another lot two days after, will
deliver it before the large ship gets half way over. Or,
again, the small steamer may leave London with it when
the large steamer has nearly arrived at New-York, and
deliver the lot here to the owner in advance. Beside not
wishing so large a lot at once, they do not wish it all in
one place. The double advantage of a great number of
small vessels is, that they bring cargo along as it is wanted,
and at the same time distribute it at all of the hundreds
of large and small ports, without first delivering it at some
great mammoth terminus, and then reshipping and distributing it to its final destination.
A gentleman, who is a prominent statesman, recently seriously advised me not to think of establishing a line of mail
steamers between the United States and Brazil, for the
accommodation of the hundreds of sailing vessels engaged
in that trade, but to get up a mammoth company and run
five or six thirty thousand ton steamers, like the Leviathan,
between Norfolk and Rio de Janeiro. He said that the increased size of the steamer would enable me to carry freight
cheaper than sailing vessels. The reasoning was neither




MAIL STEAMERS CAN NOT LIVE ON THEIR OWN RECEIPTS. 91
very clear nor convincing to me on behalf of the mysterious
capacities which he attributed to large steamers. I suggested that, in the first place, there was no cargo passing
either way between the United States and Brazil which
could afford to pay steam transportation under any circumstances; that so large a cargo could never be obtained
at once in Rio de Janeiro or elsewhere; that the merchants of this country did not wish it all landed at one
place; that it would cost as much to remove it from Norfolk to the place of consumption, as it would from Rio de
Janeiro to its final destination; that they did not wish it
delivered all at once, but in small lots at a time, and distributed where it was needed; and that, even if it were at
all practicable, which no business man could for a moment
believe, the people would not be willing to have a fruitful
field of industry in shipping occupied by some great overgrown company, with a great coffee monopoly, which
would surely follow. Too much has been expected of
large ships. The clipper " Great Republic" is not freighted
half of her time.  The "Leviathan" can not pay in
freighting unless she runs to Australia and the East-Indies,
and runs slowly, on very little coal. She may do very
well with a voluntary cargo, which will load and unload
itself in a hurry, such as a cargo of emigrants, and not
steaming at too a high a speed. But it would require a
dozen steamers as tenders to bring these emigrants from
Ireland, Bremen, Havre, Hamburgh, Amsterdam, and other
European cities, to her central depot in England. She
would, however, become a most useful if not indispensable transport vessel for the British Government.
If the large class of steamers can not live on their own
receipts, much less can the small. An adequate speed for
the mails leaves no available space for cargo. The ship
may carry two or three hundred tons of freight; but it
pays perhaps but little more than the handling and the




92                 THE OCEAN POST.
extra coal necessary to transport its extra weight. As a
general thing, it may be safely said that when a vessel is
well adapted to the mails and passengers she is filled with
her own power, that is, with heavy engines, large boilers,
and a large quantity of fuel, as also with her provisions
and baggage. We have already seen how the size and
weight of engines and boilers must increase, as well as the
bulk and cost of the fuel, to gain a little speed. But it is
not generally known how large a quantity of consumable
stores and baggage go in a well-supported mail packet.
The greater the postal efficiency of a steamer the less is it
able to carry freight; and the time will doubtless soon
come when the fast mail packets will take nothing except
a few express packages. The Persia now takes scarcely
any freight, and the Vanderbilt can not think of doing it
when she makes fast trips. It is very probable that the
whole system of the ocean will be materially changed;
and that while clippers and slow propellers carry the fine
freights, fast vessels filled with their own power will carry
the mails and passengers. And in doing this, they can
not, of course, support themselves; neither will they conflict with private enterprise in freight transport. It is now
the case to a large extent on most of our American lines.
While the ocean mail steamer must be fast and costly,
for the better acceleration of correspondence and the accommodation of passengers, she must also go at the appointed
hour, whether she is repaired or not, and wholly irrespective
of her freight and passenger list. There must be no delays
for a lot of freight, or for a company of fifty passengers
who have been delayed by the train. She has the mails,
and must go at the hour appointed, whatever it may cost
the company, and however large a lot of costly stores may
have to be thrown away. This punctuality, while it is the
means of securing small lots of freight, prevents also the
accommodation of the ship's day of sailing to arrangements




MAIL STEAMERS CAN NOT LIVE ON THEIR OWN RECEIPTS. 93
which might otherwise be profitable. This punctuality in
sailing always necessitates large extra expense in repairs.
It frequently happens that companies of men work through
the nights and on Sundays; getting much increased prices
for such untimely labor, and being far less efficient in the
night than in the day. If the steamer has had a long passage from whatever causes, she discharges whatever she
has and takes in her coal in a hurried and costly way, frequently at fifty per cent. advance on the cost necessary for
it if she had ample time. The only means of avoiding
these exigencies is by having spare ships, which cost as
much as any others, but which add nothing whatsoever to
the company's income. It maybe safe to say that in every
mail company it is necessary to have one spare, and consequently unproductive, ship for every three engaged in
active service. This thirty-three per cent. additional outlay would not be necessary except on a mail line, where
punctuality was positively demanded. Yet, it is one of
the heavy items of expense to be incurred by every company carrying the mails, and with which they can not in
any wise dispense, however well their ships may be built.
The "Pacific Mail Steamship Company" in running their
semi-monthly line from PanamA to California and Oregon,
keep constantly at their docks eight unemployed steamers
and one tow-boat, ready for all exigencies and accidents,
and could keep their mails going if nearly their whole
moving fleet should be sunk at once. No wonder that
they have never missed a single trip, or lost a single passenger by marine accident since they first started in 1850.
But there is another class of costs in running ocean
steamers, which amount to large sums in the aggregate, and
of which the people are generally wholly ignorant. I
allude to the items, and what may be called "odds and
ends." It is easily imaginable that a company has to pay
only the bills for wages, for fuel, and for provisions, and




94                 THE OCEAN POST.
that then the cash-drawer may be locked for the voyage.
Indeed, it is difficult for those accustomed to the marine
steam service to sit down and enumerate by memory in one
day the thousand little treasury leaks, the many wastages,
the formidable bill of extras, and the items which are necessary to keep every thing in its place, and to pay every
body for what he does. The oil-bill of a large steamer
would be astonishing to a novice, until he saw the urns and
oil-cans which cling to every journal, and jet a constant lubricating stream. The tools employed about a steamer are
legion in number, and cost cash. We hear a couple of
cannon fired two or three times as we enter and leave port,
or pass a steamer upon the ocean, and consider it all very
fine and inspiring; but we do not reflect that the guns cost
money, and that pound after pound of powder is not given
to the company by the Government or the public. The
steamer carries many fine flags and signals, which cost cash.
An anchor with the chain is lost; another costs cash. Heavy
weather may be on, and it takes some hours to get into
the dock. The extra coal and the tow-boat cost cash.
The wheel-house is torn to pieces against the corner of the
pier, and the bulwarks are carried away by heavy seas;
but no one will repair the damage for any thing short of
cash. A large number of lights are by law required to be
kept burning on the wheel-houses and in the rigging all
night; but no one reflects that it took money first to purchase them, and a constant outlay to keep them trimmed
and burning. People suppose that the captain, or steward, or some body else can take a match and set the lamp
off, and have it burn very nicely; but there are only a few
who know that it takes one man all of his time to clean,
fill, adjust, light, and keep these lamps going, as well as
have them extinguished at the proper time.
I saw to-day a case in point as regards accidental expenses. The splendid steamship Adriatic sailed at 12.




MAIL STEAMERS CAN NOT LIVE ON THEIR OWN RECEIPTS. 95
The wind was very high from the south, and almost blowing a gale. She was lying on the southern side of the dock,
while the Atlantic was lying with her stern at the end of
the dock, near where the Adriatic had to pass in going out.
At the moment of starting, three strong tow-boats were attached to her bow, and endeavored as she went out to
draw her head against the wind, down stream. But they
proved insufficient to the task. The vessel crushed down
the corner of the dock, ran into the Atlantic, and carried
away her stern bulwarks, crushed one of her own large and
costly iron life-boats, and damaged one of her wheel-houses.
Now, who of the two hundred thousand spectators that
lined the docks, would pay the two thousand dollars for
the life-boat, a thousand for repairing the dock and vessels,
and the bill for the three tug-boats for two hours each?
Moreover, we see a pilot get on the steamer at NewYork, another at Southampton, and a third at Havre; but
we seldom reflect that the steamer has to pay a large price
to each one of them, both going and coming. Take the
coasting steamers, running between New-York and Savannah, or Charleston. It appears singular that the New-York
pilot goes all the way to Savannah, that the Savannah pilot
comes all the way to New-York, and that the steamer pays
for both of these men all the time, and feeds them on board
all of the time. Yet it is so. Such is the law; and it
amounts to a good many thousands during the year. And
all this, the company must pay, as a part of those items
which take cash; but for which the company never gets
any credit from the public or the Government. Whenever a little accident occurs to the steamer, it must be
towed a few miles at a high price by a tug-boat. Whenever the Government or friends and visitors come on board,
they expect to be liberally entertained; yet the company
must pay for it, or be considered mean and unworthy of
the Government's patronage. Each ship must have an ex



96                THE OCEAN POST.
perienced surgeon, whose wages must be paid like those of
other persons employed, and an apothecary's room and outfit. The ship must be painted and varnished, and overhauled at every trip; the upholstering and furnishing must
be often renewed; stolen articles must be replaced; and
the breakages of table-wares constantly renewed. All of
this costs cash,
The steamer also has to pay light dues and port charges
wherever she goes. Many of these are exorbitant and unreasonable. In Havre the "Fulton" and "Arago" must
pay nearly twenty-four hundred dollars each on every departure, or they will not be permitted to leave the docks.
This is no small item for each steamer on every passage
that she makes. At New-York she pays wharfage again.
It is not so high, but it is a large item, and requires the
cash. Again, there is the great shore establishment which
every steam company must maintain. Large docks, and
warehouses, and coaling arrangements, staging, watchmen,
porters, and messengers, and a shore-captain equal to those on
board, must all be maintained. The Havre Company pays
to the city $4,000 per year for its dock, $1,200 for its annual repairs, and also for sheds, fixtures, etc., extra. They
keep also two watchmen at $40 each per month, and other
persons in the dock service. The Collins Company have
a necessarily very costly dock both in New-York and Liverpool. That in New-York would rent for $15,000 per annum. The one in Liverpool is far more costly. On each
they keep a large number of men, with watchmen, gatekeepers, runners, porters, and clerks, and always keep an
office open. Beside this, is the whole paraphernalia of the
office of the company. There must be offices, clerks, bookkeepers, porters, runners, etc.; a president, treasurer, and
secretary; an attorney, agents, and agencies; and newspaper advertising, and a hundred little things which no
man can mention. I do not pretend to be able to give an




MAIL STEAMERS CAN NOT LIVE ON THEIR OWN RECEIPTS. 97
adequate conception of the innumerable items which so
swell the large actual working expenses of regularly running steamers. Even the charities of a decently managed
company are large. Firemen and engineers become disabled
and must be supported; or they are killed in the service
of the ship, leaving families which no decent company can
disregard. The amount which the West-India Royal Mail
Company pays in this way, and which our noble American
lines advance to the deserving, are beyond all conception
of the mere theorist.
There is another source of loss which prevents, mail
packets especially, from paying their expenses on their
freight and passenger earnings. The table on all of our
steamships has become exceedingly expensive, as it has in
our hotels.  Perhaps there is more necessity for it on
steamers than in the hotels, as passengers are generally
sea-sick, and need every delicacy of life to keep them up.
The supplies which our fine mail packets carry for this
purpose are of almost incredible extent and costliness. No
vegetable, fruit, game, or other rarity that can be kept
fifteen days in large masses of ice, is neglected; so that
the table of every steamer is necessarily both luxurious and
expensive. Indeed, it has become so much so, and the price
of passage fare has been reduced so low on all of the prominent lines, that as a general rule the steamers are not
now making much clear money on their passengers. The
expense of keeping passengers was not half so great six
years ago, as it is now; and there appears to be no safe
means of permanent retrenchment. Nothing has been said
of Insurance. This is a most costly item. The Havre
Company pay on their two ships, which are worth about
$900,000, nine and a half per cent. per annum; and Mr.
Collins pays on his three ships, which are worth about
$2,200,000, nine per cent. per annum. On the Havre
steamers this amounts to $85,500 per year, which is nearly
7




98                THE OCEAN POST.
as much as the mail pay; and on the Collins, to $198,000
per annum. And these are among what we call the items
of mail steamship expenditure. I do not know the sums
paid by the United States Mail, or by the Pacific Mail
Companies.
I will here give the views of Messrs. Murray and Atherton on the cost of steam, as they replied to letters of inquiry, which I addressed them Sept. 14, 1857. Mr. Murray says in answer to
Query 2. "It is certainly my impression that ocean
steamers of sufficient speed to carry the mails with any
thing like regularity, will not pay upon any route with
which I am acquainted, without assistance from Government."
Query 5: Can Parliament do better in economy than in
her present mail contracts, all things considered?  Mr.
Murray replies:
"I do not see how Parliament can avoid paying the
large subsidies she does for the mail contracts under present circumstances."
Query 4: Is the steamship stock of Great Britain, subsidized or unsubsidized, paying stock, and is there much
disposition among capitalists to invest, even in the stock of
subsidized companies  He replies:
" I do not think the steamship stock of Great Britain to
be in a very flourishing condition: in fact, I know of only
one company (the Peninsular and Oriental) in which I
should like to invest money."
Mr. Atherton replies to a query regarding the cost of
running steamers as follows:
" As to whether the effective performance of high speed
mail service is compatible with ordinary mercantile service
without government subsidy, I am of opinion that the mutual relation of Speed and Cost in connection with long
sea-voyages has never yet been duly appreciated by owners,




MAIL STEAMERS CAN NOT LIVE ON THEIR OWN RECEIPTS. 99
managers, or agents in charge of steam shipping affairs.
An acceleration of steaming speed involves an increase of
cost expenses, and a decrease of mercantile earnings, as dependent onfreight per ton weight far beyond what is generally supposed."
He further says in reply to Query 9, which is as follows:
Do you know of any disposition in the Government to
cut down the ocean mail service, as an unproductive expenditure? He says:
"It is impossible to estimate the national value of an
effective mail service throughout the whole globe; the
breaking of one link, though apparently of trivial consequence, impairs the whole system. I can not imagine that
there is any disposition to impair the completeness of the
mail system."
From the foregoing considerations it is palpable that
fast ocean steamers can not live on their own receipts. And
the same will in most cases hold true of freighting and
other steamers of all classes, which depend entirely on
steam as their agent of locomotion. Propellers will hardly
form an exception to this rule. If the power and the passengers fill the hull, if the coal bill and other expenses increase as rapidly as indicated for mail packets, if engineering improvements do not advance as rapidly as the price
of coals, if larger and more cheaply running ships can not
get an adequate support in business, if there are the many
leakages and expenses indicated, and if all of the expenses
of running steamers are continually increasing from year
to year rather than diminishing, then we may never expect
to see the mail and passenger steamers of the ocean become
self-supporting, or less dependent than now, on the fostering care of the Government and the national treasury."
* Since this was written, Mr. Drayton has shown me the receipt for this year's taxes
on the Hlavre Company, which are $7,782, the two ships being valued at $500,000 only




100              THE OCEAN POST.
SECTION VI.
HOW CAN MAIL SPEED BE ATTAINED?
THE TRANSMARINE COMPARED WITH THE INLAND POST: OUR
PAST SPASMODIC EFFORTS: NEED SOME SYSTEM: FRANCE
AROUSED TO STEAM: THE SAILING-SHIP MAIL: THE NAVAL
STEAM MAIL: THE PRIVATE ENTERPRISE MAIL: ALL INADEQUATE AND ABANDONED: GREAT BRITAIN'S EXPERIENCE IN
ALL THESE METHODS: NAVAL VESSELS CAN NOT BE ADAPTED
TO THE MAIL SERVICE: WILL PROPELLERS MEET THE WANTS
OF MAIL TRANSPORT, WITH OR WITHOUT SUBSIDY: POPULAR
ERRORS REGARDING THE PROPELLER: ITS ADVANTAGES AND
DISADVANTAGES: BOURNE'S OPINION: ROBERT MURRAY:
PROPELLERS TOO OFTEN ON THE DOCKS: THEY ARE VERY
DISAGREEABLE PASSENGER VESSELS: IF PROPELLERS RUN
MORE CHEAPLY IT IS BECAUSE THEY ARE SLOWER: COMPARED
WITH SAIL: UNPROFITABLE STOCK: CROSKEY S LINE: PROPELLERS LIVE ON CHANCES AND CHARTERS: IRON AS A MATERIAL: SENDING THE MAILS BY SLOW PROPELLERS WOULD
BE AN UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION AGAINST SAILING VESSELS:
INDIVIDUAL ENTERPRISE CAN NOT SUPPLY MAIL FACILITIES:
THEREFORE IT IS THE DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT.
I HAVE endeavored to prove in the foregoing SECTION that
ocean mail steamers can not live on their own receipts.
The question now arises, how can we secure speed for the
mails and passengers upon the ocean? With so many
expenses and so small an income the fast ocean steamer can
not become profitable to even the most thoroughly organized and best administered companies. Much less can it
be successfully run by individuals and individual enterprise, which has never so many reliable resources at command as a strong, chartered company. It is true that there
are a few prominent transatlantic routes where steamrers




HOW CAN MAIL SPEED BE ATTAINED?       101
can run as auxiliary propellers; but the number of them
is small, and the speed attained will by no means prove
sufficient for postal purposes. The transmarine postal
service has been a source of constant annoyance to almost
every commercial nation. The overland mails have generally been self-supporting, and it has been a favorite idea
that those on the sea should be so also; although there is no
just reason why either should be necessarily so any more
than in the cases of the Navy and the Army; branches of
the service which entail large expenses on the Government,
and yet without a moiety of the benefits which directly
flow from the postal service to all classes of community.
No nation except Great Britain has come up to the issue
and faced this question boldly. Almost every other country, not excepting our own, has been hanging back on the
subject of the transmarine post, " waiting, like Mr. Micawber, for something to turn up," in the improvements of
ocean steam navigation, which might obviate the necessity
of paying for the ocean transit. But every hope has been
disappointed; and instead of realizing these wishes the case
has been growing worse year by year, until we are at last
compelled to move in the matter, or lose our commerce,
our ocean prestige, and sink down contented with a second
or third-rate position among commercial nations, and acknowledge ourselves tributary to the far-seeing and farreaching, and superior policy of our competitors.
The United States have indeed become galvanically
aroused now and then, as in 1847 and'8, to a self-protecting and a self-developing system; but as soon as one faint
effort has been made, we have, instead of pursuing that
effort and developing it fully, relapsed back into our old
indifference, and given the whole available talent of the
Government either to the administration, or to the everlasting discussion of petty politics. During the time that
President Buchanan was Secretary of State, some of our




102                THE OCEAN POST.
noblest efforts for the establishment of ocean mails were
made, with his fullest countenance and aid; but the policy
then inaugurated with prospects so hopeful for our commercial future, and which has operated so healthfully ever
since, is now half abandoned, or left without notice to take
care of itself; until it may be to-day said that we have no
steam policy, and run our ocean mails only by expedients.
This ever has been and ever will be unfortunate for us, and
costly. Individuals and companies build steamers for the
accidents of trade, let them lie still a year or two, then
pounce upon some disorganized trade, suck the life-blood
from it like vampires, and at last leave it, the very corpse
of commerce, lying at the public door. All such irregular
traffic is injurious to the best interests of the country, destroys all generous and manly competition, and proves
most clearly the want of a Government steam mail system. France has been awaiting the issues of time, and
under a too high expectation for the improvements of the
age, until she finds that unless she inaugurates and sustains
a liberal steam policy, and becomes less dependent on foreigners for her mails, she will have the commerce of the
world swept from her shores as by a whirlwind of enterprise. She has now become aroused, and has determined
to establish three great lines of communication, one with
the United States, one with the West-Indies, Central America, the Spanish Main, and Mexico, and one with Brazil
and La Plata. She has found that it will no longer do to
abandon her mails to fate, and that in the end it will be
far more profitable to pay even largely for good mails than
to do without them. Hence, her offer to give to the American, West-Indian, and Brazilian service named an annual
subvention of fourteen million Francs, or nearly three
million dollars, to be continued for twenty years, which
the Government deems a sufficient period for the establishment and test of a system. (See projet of Franco -A4nerican Navigation, page 198.)




HOW CAN MAIL SPEED BE ATTAINED?        103
Among the many expedients adopted for the transmission of the foreign post are those of employing ordinary
sailing vessels on the one hand, or the vessels of the war
marine on the other. Both systems have been effectually
and forever exploded and abandoned. The objections to
sailing vessels are very numerous. They are, in the first
place, too slow. They are too uncertain in their days of
sailing and arrival. They can never be placed under the
direction of the Department because they are private property, devoted to private uses, and generally accomplish
their ends by private means; one of the most prominent
of which is, to keep back all letters except those going to
their own consignees. If a merchant runs his ship for personal gain it is not to be supposed that he will carry the
letters of his commercial competitors, and thus forestall his
own speculations. Sailing vessels have no proper accommodations for the mails, and can not fairly be forced either
to transport or to deliver them. The uncertainties of cargo are such that they can not sail on fixed days with punctuality. But the great difficulty is their want of speed
and the uncertainty of their progress or arrival. Whenever they have been employed by the British Government
for postal service they have always proven themselves inefficient and unreliable. Whenever they have been superceded by steamers, the postal income, before small, has
gone up rapidly to five, ten, or twenty times the former
income. This was well illustrated in the British and Brazilian lines. The Parliamentary returns for 1842, when
postal service with Brazil and La Plata was performed by
a line of fine sailing packets, give the total income from
postages at ~5,034, 13d, 6s. Lord Canning, the British
Post Master General, stated that, in 1852, two years after
the Royal Mail Steam Packets commenced running to Brazil and La Plata, the income from postages was ~44,091,176,
or'nearly nine times as much as when the mails went by




104               THE OCEAN POST.
sailing vessels.*  Ship owners have a strong aversion to
receiving letters for the places to which their ships are
bound. As a barque was about sailing from New-York
for Demerara in 1855, I called on the owner, who was on
the dock, just before the vessel got under way, and asked
that some letters which I held in my hand, might be taken
to Georgetown. He said that he could not take them; that
he sailed his vessel to make money; and that he could not
do other people's business. As I walked away from him
rather abruptly, he called to me and wished to know to
whom the letters were addressed. I told him, to Sir Edmund Wodehouse, the Governor of the Province; and that
they related to the establishment of steam mail facilities
between this country and that Province. He at once
begged my pardon and explained; asked that I would let
him send the letters; and said, moreover, that he would at
any time be glad to give me a passage there and back on
that business.
The experiment of employing the steamers of the Navy
in the postal service has been very fully made by Great
Britain. After attempts on a considerable number of lines,
and extending over a period of ten years, this service has
been found inefficient, cumbrous, and more costly, and has
been entirely abandoned. Murray, page 172, says that
Mr. Anderson, Managing Director of the Peninsular and
Oriental Company, said before the Parliamentary Committee as follows: "The postal communication can be done
much cheaper by private contract steamers than by Government boats, because of the merchandise and passengers
carried. The steam communication between Southampton
and Alexandria, with vessels of 300 to 400 horse power,
was done for 4s 6d, per mile. From Suez to Ceylon, Cal* See Parliamentary Papers for 1852-3, postal affairs, Report of Lord Canning, July
8, 1853.




HOW CAN MAIL SPEED BE ATTAINED?        105
cutta, and Hong Kong, with vessels of 400 to 500 horse
power, for 178, ld per mile. The East-India Company's
line (of naval vessels) between Suez and Bombay with
vessels of only 250 to 300 horse power, cost 308 per mile.
Her Majesty's vessels in the Mediterranean cost about 21s
per mile." France also tried the experiment, but soon
abandoned the system, as fruitless and exceedingly annoying. It is quite a plausible idea that our mails should go
under the flag of the country, with power to protect them,
and that vessels generally supposed to be idle should be
engaged in some useful service. But this presupposes a
fact which does not exist. No vessels in the world are
more actively employed than those of the American navy,
and there are many stations on which we could employ
twice as many as we have with excellent effect on our commerce and foreign relations generally. We constantly hear
the complaint that the Secretary of the Navy has no
steamer for some immediately necessary or indispensable
service. But if he had, and if two dozen steamers were lying
all the time idle in our navy yards, they would probably
not be installed six months in the postal service until they
would be positively demanded in some way in that of the
nation, and this diversion would at once frustrate all of the
postal and commercial plans of the country.
But the difficulties in the way of this service are so
numerous as to be readily palpable to all who examine it.
No vessel that is well fitted for naval service is well
adapted to that of the post. The post requires great
speed, and hence, full-powered vessels. The navy does
not require so great speed, and hence, the steamers are
seldom more than auxiliaries. They are built heavier and
fuller, and are not so adapted to speed. Filling them
with the power necessary to drive them with sufficient
rapidity for mail packets would unfit them for the efficient
service of war. Naval vessels are, moreover, filled and




106                 THE OCEAN POST.
weighted down with guns, stores, men, and a thousand
things which would be in the way if they were employed
for the mails. They have no state-rooms, cabins, saloons,
etc.; and if they had them so as to accommodate passengers, they would be unfit for the war service. Unless so
fitted they could not accommodate passengers, as they will
not lash themselves up in hammocks under the deck, as
thick as grass, as man-of-war's men will. If they are to be
strictly naval vessels while running, they will be filled with
their own men, and could not take passengers even if they
had state-room accommodations for them. They would
thus be deprived entirely of this source of income. Again,
they could take no freight; and if a passenger mail steamer
has to depend upon both freight and'passengers for an
income to meet the large expenses, which are generally three,
five, and often even ten times the sum of subsidy received
from the Government, then the naval vessel running in the
postal service will be deprived of both these sources of
income, and must fall back on the department for all of its
expenses, which would be three, five, and even ten times
as much as the sum paid private companies for carrying
the mail.
The average round trips of the Pacific mail steamers from
Panama to San Francisco and Olympia, and back, are, beyond
doubt, enormously expensive; while they receive from
the Government only $14,500. This is, consequently, but
a small fractional part of their income. The trip of, the
"Arago," or "Fulton," to Havre and back, costs about
$45,000, while the mail pay was only $12,500, under the
old contract, and is now probably not above $7,500 per
round trip.* These estimates are made exclusive of insurance, which is 9 per cent.; repairs, 10 per cent.; and de* This line receives the total postages, ocean and inland, which in 1856 were, according to the Post Master General's report, $88,483.99, or $7,373.33 per round voyage.
(See Letter of the Hon. Horatio King, 1st Asst. Post Master General.)




HOW CAN MAIL SPEED BE ATTAINED?         107
preciation, at least five per cent. Here, again, the Government gives but a meagre part of the large sum necessary to
keep those packets running. Now, if naval vessels were
carrying the same mails, and were deprived of the income
which they receive for freight and passengers, it would
evidently cost the Government six to eight times as much
to carry the mails as it now does, saying nothing about the
income from the mails, which is trifling. But this class of
vessels never could subserve the purposes of rapid correspondence. If they could carry freight and passengers, the
difficulties would still be insuperable. It would cost twice
as much for the department to accomplish the same object
through its officers and its routine as it would for private
companies or individuals, who have but the one business
and the one purpose in running their vessels. No man,
company, or even department of the Government, can
accomplish two important and difficult ends by the same
agency at the same time. Either the one or the other
must suffer and be neglected, or both will be but imperfectly and ineffectively performed. Many structures of this
kind fall of their own superincumbent weight and clumsiness. If naval vessels thus running even had passengers
they would never be satisfied or well treated. A captain
and crew, to be agreeable and satisfactory to passengers,
must feel themselves under obligation to them for their
patronage, and would be compelled to exert themselves to
merit the best feelings of their patrons. This could never
be the case with naval gentlemen, who would be dependent for their living on the department only. It is probable that no one seriously entertains such a plan as this
for the postal service, as this must be a distinct, partly
self-supporting, unbroken, and continuous service, while
that of the Navy must also be distinct, independent, and
efficiently directed to one great cardinal object. Therefore, we can not secure postal service by this means.




108                THE OCEAN POST.
As much has been said of Propellers during the few
years past, I propose examining the question with the
view of ascertaining whether they are adapted to the mail
service, and whether we can secure from them sufficient
speed without a subsidy from the Government. It is well
known that the British are a far more steady-going people
than ourselves, and not being so rushing do not require so
much speed. They have had an easy control of the
European and foreign commerce generally around them;
and when competition aroused them to additional efforts
they did not endeavor to outstride themselves, but took
merely an additional step of progress and speed, and
adopted the propeller for their coasting business, because it
was a little faster than wind, and yet cheaper than full
steam. And because so many propellers have been built
for the peculiar short-route trade of Great Britain, many
people in this country can not see why we do not adopt
the propeller for our foreign trade. I have already shown
(See page 44) that there are some short routes on which
steam is cheaper than the wind, and that on others of
greater length steamers can not transport freight under
any conditions. (See latter part of Section IV., on the
Cost of Steam.)  I do not propose making the Screw Propeller in any way an exception to the position stated; and
shall consequently maintain that it will never be the means
of attaining a rapid and yet cheap mail speed.
There are no greater errors entertained by the public
on any subject connected with steam navigation than concerning the Screw Propeller. It is generally supposed
that it is a more economical and effective application of
power than the side-wheel, which is a mistake: it is generally
supposed that, with the same amount of power and all other
conditions equal, the propeller will not run as rapidly as
the side-wheel, which is true of steaming in a sea-way or
against a head-wind, but a mistake as regards smooth




HOW CAN MAIL SPEED BE ATTAINED?         109
water: it is generally supposed that the engines weigh
less, take up less room, and cost less, which is all a mistake.
The best authors on this subject and the most eminent
builders generally agree, that in England and Scotland,
where the propeller has attained its greatest perfection,
the difference between the side-wheel and the propeller as an application of power is very slight and hardly
appreciable; or that the same number of tons of coal will
drive two ships of the same size at the same speed in
smooth water; but that the side-wheel has greatly the
advantage in a head-sea or during rough weather generally.
Many persons who do not understand the subject, have
theorized in just the contrary direction. They say that in
rough weather the screw has the advantage, because it is
alway in the water, etc. Experience shows just the reverse; and theory will bear the practice out. If, in the
side-wheel one wheel is part of the time out, the other has,
at any rate, the whole force of the engines, and the floats
sink to and take hold on a denser, heavier, and less easily
yielding stratum of water; so that the progress is nearly
the same. The back current or opposing wave can not
materially affect it, because the float is at the extreme end
of the arm where the travel is greatest, and is always more
rapid than the wave. It is not so with the screw. The
blade which meets the wave is not placed at the end of a
long arm where the travel is very rapid and the motion
more sudden than that of the wave. This blade extends
all the way along from its extreme end, where the
motion is rapid, to the centre, or the shaft, where there is
no motion; and all intermediate parts of this blade move
so slowly, that the wave of greater rapidity counteracts it,
and checks its progress. The side-wheel applies its power
at the extreme periphery, where the travel is greatest,
while the screw applies it all along between the point
of extreme rapidity, and the stationary point in the




110                 THE OCEAN POST.
shaft. There is, moreover, much power lost as the oblique
blades of the screw rise and fall in a vertical line while
the vessel is heaving.
In the new edition (1855) of "Bourne on the Propeller," he says in the preface:
" Large vessels, we know, are both physically and commercially more advantageous than small vessels, provided
only they can be filled with cargo; but in some cases in
which small paddle vessels have been superseded by large
screw vessels, the superior result due to an increased size of
hull has been imputed to a superior efficiency of the propeller. No fact, however, is more conclusively established
than this, that the efficiency of paddles and of the screw
as propelling instruments is very nearly the same; and in
cases in which geared engines are employed to drive a screw
vessel, the machinery will take up about the same amount
of room as if paddles had been used, and the result will
be much the same as if paddles had been adopted. When
direct acting engines, however, are employed, the machinery will occupy a much less space in screw vessels than is
possible in paddle vessels, and the use of direct acting engines in screw propellers is necessary, therefore, for the
realization of the full measure of advantage, which screw
propulsion is able to afford."
Atherton says of the propeller in his "Marine Engine
Construction and Classification," page 45:
" Its operation has been critically compared with that of
the paddle-wheel, under various conditions of engine power,
and experience has shown that, under circumstances which
admit of the screw propeller being favorably applied, it is
equal to the paddle-wheel as an effective means of applying engine power to the propulsion of the vessel." Again:
I recently addressed to Mr. Atherton the following
question: "Taking two ships of the same size, displacement,
and power, or coal, the one a side-wheel, the other screw:




HOW CAN MAIL SPEED BE ATTAINED?        111
What will be their relative speed and carrying capacity in
smooth water   What in a sea-way, or in regular transatlantic navigation?" He replied under address, "Woolwich Royal Dock Yard, 14 Sept., 1857:
"It is my opinion, based on experiment, that a well-applied screw is quite equal to the paddle-wheel for giving
out the power by which it is itself driven, that is, in smooth
water. I can not say from observation or experience what
is the comparative operation at sea."
I addressed the same inquiry to Mr. Robert Murray, of
Southampton, who has written an able work, entitled,
"The Marine Engine," and who is considered excellent
authority, and have from him the following reply, dated
Southampton, 19 Sept., 1857:
"With regard to the relative efficiency of the paddle-wheel
and screw for full-powered mail steamers, I am disposed
to prefer the paddle-wheel for transatlantic steaming, in
which the vessel has to contend with so much rough weather
and heavy sea, and the screw for the Mediterranean and
the Pacific routes.
" For auxiliary steamers of any kind the screw has manifestly the advantage.
"With regard to the actual speed obtained from each
mode of propulsion in vessels of the same power and form,
and with the propeller in its best trim, I am disposed to
prefer the paddle-wheel, either in smooth water, or when
steaming head to wind, but in other conditions the screw."
What he means by " other conditions," is evidently when
the screw is running with a fair wind, which is seldom, so
as to use her sails. Bourne also states very clearly in two
places that the propeller is by no means so efficient in a
sea-way, as a side-wheel steamer, and admits that when a
vessel is steaming at eleven or twelve knots per hour, the
sail not only do not aid her, but frequently materially retard her motion. (See Bourne, page 237.)




112                THE OCEAN POST.
All of these authorities agree that the application of a
given power produces about the same effect, whether
through the side-wheel or the screw; and if so, it is evident that the screw can not attain the same speed as the
side-wheel, without burning as much fuel, and having as
costly and as heavy engines and boilers. Indeed, taking
the whole evidence together, it appears well settled by
these authorities, that the screw is equal to the side-wheel
only in smooth water, and that, as a consequence of this
distinction, it is not equal to it in general ocean navigation.
It has been seen that much of its power is lost when it
contends with head-winds and seas, and that when it has
attained a fair average mail speed, the wind will help it
very little, if any, under the most favorable circumstances.
It is, therefore, reasonable to infer that it would cost more
to attain a high average mail speed with the propeller than
with the side-wheel.  If in attaining this average mail
speed the advantages are clearly in favor of the side-wheel,
there is no hope that we shall accomplish the mail service
at cheaper rates than heretofore, as this agency can not be
introduced toward that end; for not only is the prime
cost of the steamer the same, as also the consumption of
fuel per mile, but there are other and numerous disadvantages connected with the propeller, which are wholly unknown to the side-wheel.
It is a well-known fact that propellers are compelled to
be placed upon the docks three or four times as often as
side-wheels. The screw either breaks, and must be replaced by another, or it cuts the boxes out, or works the
stern of the vessel to pieces. Any one of these requires
that the steamer shall be docked, however great the expense; and as these accidents are constantly occurring in
even the best constructed and best regulated propellers, it
follows that they must be constantly on the docks. This
species of vessel being built necessarily narrower than the




HOW CAN MAIL SPEED BE ATTAINED?        113
side-wheel, it rolls more, and is found to be an exceedingly
~disagreeable passenger vessel. Propellers have become deservedly unpopular the world over; and if it were possible
for them to be faster than the side-wheel, it is hardly probable that first-class passengers would even then go by
them, as they are known to be so exceedingly uncomfortable.
The propeller, I have before said, is erroneously supposed to run more cheaply than the side-wheel. I think
that I have shown that as a mail packet it will cost more
to run it at a given speed. But there are certain cases in
which it does run more cheaply; these are, however, only
where the speed is low, and the machinery not geared, and
where, as a consequence, sail can be used to more advantage than on a side-wheel. The economy is not the result
of the application of the power by the screw, as compared
with the side-wheel, but of the sail alone; and this economy
is more or less, just as canvas is employed more or less in
the propulsion. The screw is the better form of steamer
for using sail; and the low speed at which propellers generally run, is a means of making that sail more effective.
We have already seen, in the section on the cost of steam,
that it generally requires twice the original quantity of fuel
to increase the speed from eight to ten knots per hour in
either style of steamer. Now, it is a well-known fact that
the transatlantic propeller lines are on the average more
than two knots per hour short of the speed of the sidewheels, which makes their passages across the Atlantic
from two to six days longer than by the mail packets.
They thus save from one half to two thirds of the fuel, and
deducting its prime cost from the bill of expenses, they
add to that of receipts the freight on the cargo, which occupies the space of the coal saved. They consequently run
on much smaller expenses; but only when their speed is
less than that of the side-wheels, and far too low for effect8




114                THE OCEAN POST.
ive postal service. Economy thus purchased at the expense
of speed may do for freight, and enable propellers to de-.
rive some profits from certain cargoes; but it can never
subserve the purposes of mails and passengers. It must alway be recollected that the effective speed of the propeller is reduced just in the ratio of the greater economy as
compared with the side-wheel.
It thus appears that with any appreciable economy the
propeller must be slower than the side-wheel; and that
with any considerable economy it can be but little faster
than sail. It has, however, the advantage over sail of
being rather more reliable and punctual, and can make
arrivals and departures rather more matters of certainty.
This at the same time secures to it a better class of freights
as well as vast numbers of emigrants which together, enable it to incur the extra expense over a sailing vessel.
The cargo is less in the propeller than in the sail, as much
of the room is occupied by the engines, boilers, and fuel.
Hence, the prices must be proportionally higher to meet
the deficit arising from the smaller quantity. But there
are very few trades in which propellers can run as noticed
on so long a voyage as 3,000 to 4,000 miles; and these lie
between a few countries in Europe and the ports of the
United States. Their support arises chiefly from the emigrant trade; as without this their freights would not on
any known lines enable them to run one month. And this is
not simply an assumption of theory, but the experience of
all the European lines. I was recently told in England
and France by many persons who had no interest or desire
to deceive me, that propeller stock was invariably a burthen to every body having any thing to do with it, and
could generally be bought at sixty to seventy cents on the
dollar, while much of it would not bring half of its cost
price. They cited as an evidence the fact that no line of
propellers is permanent, unless in some way connected with




HOW CAN MAIL SPEED BE ATTAINED?       115
a subsidized company, as in the case of the Cunard screws
running between Liverpool and New-York. The Glasgow
line is also an exception, and is said to pay dividends.
The screw lines are always hunting a home and a new
trade.. (See views of Mrl. Mfurray, page 111.)
The only way in which some lines can run is by getting
their stock at half its value and thus having to pay the
interest on a smaller sum. The " General Screw Steam
shipping Company" is an example. The Company had
from the first lost money, although they had nine fine
steamers, and were compelled finally to close up and sell
out. Mr. Croskey, the United States Consul at Southampton, supposed that they might be put into a new trade
and make a living on a smaller capital stock; that is, if
the new company should get them at half their value.
The transfer was made and the "' European and American
Steamship Company" was established. Some of the vessels were put into the trade between Bremen and London,
Southampton, and New-York; some between Antwerp and
Brazil; and some between Hamburg and Brazil. None
of these lines have paid, except, perhaps, the New-York,
which has had large cargoes of emigrants; and Mr. Croskey freely acknowledges that the new Company would
have been ruined but for the Indian Revolt, which enabled him to charter five of the vessels to the Government
at good prices, for the conveyance of troops by way of the
Cape of Good Hope to India. Had the lines on which
they were running been profitable they would never have
been chartered to the Government. But like the whole
propeller service of the world, this Company took the
chances; and it may be safely asserted that but for the
opportunities which vessels of this class find for chartering
to the Government they could not live on their own enterprise three years. The number of these vessels is now
very unnecessarily large; and many of them have been




116                THE OCEAN POST.
built to supply labor to the establishments, and for taking
the chances of Government employment at high prices.
Their largest employment results from casualties rather
than from the pursuit of legitimate trade. But the business is overdone, even for the English market, when foreign war is rather the rule, and peace the exception. But
few propellers are now building; these few being small
and intended for the coasting, or the short-line Continental
trade, where they will readily pay. (Seepage 42 for propeller stock; also pages 44 and 45 for the propeller coasting
service.)
It does not materially alter the complexion of this question to say that propellers are generally constructed of
iron. There is not such a difference in their prime cost or
their stowage capacity as to enable them to take the large
receipts necessary to their support; while certainly there
is no advantage to be gained in speed from iron as a material of construction. The iron propeller can be constructed
cheaper than the wooden in Great Britain, because of the
great scarcity of timber and the large and redundant quantity of iron; and an iron vessel has some advantage in being
able to stow a larger cargo, from the fact that her sides
and bottom are not so thick as those of wooden vessels;
but these considerations do not very materially affect the
consumption of fuel, and the quantity necessary to carry a
ton of freight. Iron is probably a better material than
wood for the construction of propellers, as the part about
the stern, where the screw works, can be made stronger,
and as all iron vessels can be rather more readily divided
into water-tight compartments by bulkheads. Yet as a
material of construction it offers no transcendent advantages over the side-wheel for transatlantic navigation, while
it is not probably so safe, or so comfortable for passengers.
Yet, it will be well for us to adopt the propeller largely
in our coasting trade, and iron as the material of its construction.




HOW CAN MAIL SPEED BE ATTAINED?         117
We have thus seen that to save fuel and carry freight,
the speed of the propeller must be low; indeed very low,
if it is to live on its own receipts. It is therefore clearly
impossible that with such comparatively low speed it
should carry the mail. Neither can it support itself except
by this low speed. By running thus but a fraction faster
than the sailing vessel, it can command on a few prominent lines a large freight; but to give vessels of such speed
a subsidy for carrying the mails would be both to render
the mail service inefficient, and to enable the propeller to
compete with the sailing lines of the country at very undue advantage, which would be an unfair discrimination
against all sailing interests. Should the propeller, like the
side-wheel, run fast enough on the average trips of the year
to carry the mails, which would certainly be at the expense
and abandonment of any considerable freighting business,
then the Government might with propriety pay for the
mails, as these steamers would not injure the freighting
business of sailing vessels. The outcry by sail owners
against steamers as competitors can not be against the mail
packets; for these carry but little freight; but against
these slow screws which should be treated like all other
freighting vessels, notwithstanding the fact that some of
their owners have had the impudence to propose them for
the paid mail service and to ask a subsidy from the Government, but the better to cripple the interests of sailing
vessels. As well might Government subsidize fast clippers, because they are a little faster than regular, ordi
nary sailers. When the steamer runs with sufficient rapidity for the mails, the sailing ship has nothing to fear
from competition, and has all the benefits of the more
rapid correspondence. Thus, Government must pay only
where there is a fast mail, whether it be in a side-wheel or
propeller; otherwise it destroys individual competition and
cripples private enterprise.




118                THE OCEAN POST.
If, as we have seen from all the facts regarding the expense of running steamers, individual enterprise can not
supply adequately rapid ocean postal facilities, and if such
facilities are yet wholly indispensable to the commerce, the
people, and the Government, the only alternative presented is for the Government to pay for them, and to require, as it has of all the American lines, such a speed as
to prevent injurious competition to sailing vessels and private enterprise. Much capital is made by certain ship
owners out of what they call the undue discrimination of
subsidies against their vessels; but they can never lay this
charge at the door of the fast and very expensive mail
packets, or elsewhere than upon the slow auxiliary propellers which any of them have a right to attempt to run,
and which the Government never did and never will subsidize. This is the source and the only source of all the
vaunted injurious effects of steam on the sailing stock of
the country. It is a question with which the Government
has nothing to do, and which must be settled between propeller owners and sail owners themselves, and with reference, perhaps, to the wishes of their customers.  Mail
steamers have enough to do to get money to pay their coal,
provision, repair, and innumerable extras bills, without
wrangling over the freighting business. And, from all this
we conclude that the only means of the Government securing an adequate mail speed is by paying for it. (See remacrks of Committee on this subject, Paper E.)




THE DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO THE PEOPLE.  119
SECTION        VII.
WHAT IS THE DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO THE PEOPLE?
RESUME OF THE PREVIOUS SECTIONS AND ARGUMENTS: IT IS
THE DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO FURNISH RAPID STEAM
MAILS: OUR PEOPLE APPRECIATE THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMERCE, AND OF LIBERAL POSTAL FACILITIES: THE GOVERNMENT IS ESTABLISHED FOR THE BENEFIT Ot THE PEOPLE:
IT MUST FOSTER THEIR INTERESTS AND DEVELOP THEIR
INDUSTRY: THE WANT OF SUCH MAILS HAS CAUSED THE
NEGLECT OF MANY PROFITABLE BRANCHES OF INDUSTRY:
AS A CONSEQUENCE WE HAVE LOST IMMENSE TRAFFIC:. THE
EUROPEAN MANUFACTURING SYSTEM AND OURS: FIELDS OF
TRADE NATURALLY PERTAINING TO US: OUR ALMOST SYS-;, TEMATIC NEGLECT OF THEM: WHY IS GREAT BRITAIN'S COMMERCE SO LARGE: CAUSES AND THEIR EFFECTS: HER WESTINDIA LINE RECEIVES A LARGER SUBSIDY THAN ALL THE
FOREIGN LINES OF THE UNITED STATES COMBINED: INDIFFERENCE SHOWN BY CONGRESS TO MANY IMPORTANT FIELDS
OF COMMERCE: INSTANCES OF MAIL FACILITIES CREATING
LARGE TRADE: THE PENINSULAR AND ORIENTAL COMPANY'S
TESTIMONY: THE BRITISH AND BRAZILIAN TRADE: SOME
DEDUCTIONS FROM THE FIGURES: CALIFORNIA SHORN OF
HALF HER GLORY: THE.AMERICAN PEOPLE NOT MISERS:
THEY WISH THEIR OWN PUBLIC TREASURE EXPENDED FOR
THE BENEFIT OF THEIR INDUSTRY: OUR COMMERCIAL CLASSES
COMPLAIN THAT THEY ARE DEPRIVED OF THE PRIVILEGE OF
COMPETING WITH OTHER NATIONS.
1. Conceded (SECTION I.) that steam mails upon the ocean
control the commerce and diplomacy of the world; that
they are essential to our commercial and producing
country; that we have not established the ocean mail
facilities commensurate with our national ability and




120                 THE OCEAN POST.
the demands of our commerce; and that we to-day are
largely dependent on, and tributary to our greatest
commercial rival, Great Britain, for the postal facilities, which should be purely national, American, and
under our own exclusive control:
2. Conceded (SECTION II.) that fast ocean mails are exceedingly desirable for our commerce, our defenses, our
diplomacy, the management of our squadrons, our national standing, and that they are demanded by our
people at large:
3. Conceded (SECTION III.) that fast steamers alone can
furnish rapid transport to the mails; that these
steamers can not rely on freights; that sailing vessels
will ever carry staple freights at a much lower igure,
and sufficiently quickly; that while steam is eminently
successful in the coasting trade, it can not possibly be
so in the transatlantic freighting business; and that
the rapid transit of the mails and the slower and more
deliberate transport of freight is the law of nature:
4. Conceded (SECTION IV.) that high, adequate mail speed
is extremely costly, in the prime construction of vessels,
their repairs, and their more numerous employees;
that the quantity of fuel consumed is enormous,'and
ruinous to unaided private enterprise; and that this
is clearly proven both by theory and indisputable facts
as well as by the concurrent testimony of the ablest
writers on ocean steam navigation:
5. Conceded (SECTION V.) that ocean mail steamers can not
live on their own receipts; that neither the latest nor the
anticipated improvements in steam shipping promise
any change in this fact; that self-support is not likely
to be attained by increasing the size of steamers; that
the propelling power in fast steamers occupies all of the
available space not devoted to passengers and express
freight; and that steamers must be fast to do successful mail and profitable passenger service:




THE DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO THE PEOPLE.   121
6. Conceded (SECTION VI.) that sailing vessels can not successfully transport the mails; that the prcplledr
can not transport them as rapidly or more cheaply
than side-wheel vessels; that with any considerable economy of fuel and other running expenses, it
is but little faster than the sailing vessel; that to patronize these slow vessels with the mails the Government would unjustly discriminate against sailing vessels in the transport of freights; that we can not in
any sense depend on the vessels of the Navy for the
transport of the mails; that individual enterprise can
not support fast steamers; and that not even American
private enterprise can under any conditions furnish a
sufficiently rapid steam mail and passenger marine:
then,
The inference is clear and unavoidable, and we come
irresistibly to the conclusion, that it is the duty of the
Government to its people to establish and maintain an extensive, well-organized, and rapid steam mail marine, for
the benefit of production, commerce, diplomacy, defenses,
the character of the nation, and the public at large; and
as there is positively no other source of adequate and
effective support, to pay liberally for the same out of any
funds in the national treasury, belonging to the enterprising, liberal, and enlightened people of the Republic.
There is no clearer duty of the Legislative and Executive
Government to the industrious people of the country than
the establishment of liberal, large, and ready postal facilities, for the better and more successful conduct of that
industry, whether those facilities be upon land or upon the
sea. It is sometimes difficult to extend our vision to any
other sphere than that in which we move and have our
experiences; and thus there are many persons who, while
they would revolt at the idea that the Government should
refuse to run four-horse coaches to some little unimportant




122                THE OCEAN POST.
country town, would be wholly unable to grasp the great
commercial world and the wide oceans over which their
own products are to float, and from whose trade the Government derives the large duties which prevent these same
persons having to pay direct taxes. They do not understand the necessity of commerce, to even their own prosperity, or of the innumerable steam mail lines which must
convey the correspondence essential to the safe and proper
conduct of that commerce. But the great mass of the
American people understand these questions, understand
the reflex influences of all such facilities, and knowing how
essential they are to the proper development of enterprise
and industry in whatever channel or field, boldly claim it
as a right that easy postal communication shall be afforded
them as well upon the high seas as upon the interior land
routes.
It is generally admitted that the government of a country is established for the benefit of the people; and constitutions conflicting with this purpose are simply subversive of justice and liberty. If labor is a thing so desirable
and so noble in a people that the protection of its rewards in
the form of property becomes one of the highest attributes
of good government, then it is equally an indisputable attribute of that protecting and fostering government to
afford those facilities to labor, which experience shows that
it needs, and which the people can not attain in their individual capacity, or without the intervention of the government. It is idle for a government to say to the people
that they are free, when it denies to them the ordinarily
approved means of making and conserving wealth. The
common experience of mankind points to commerce as the
next great means to production in creating national and individual wealth. It equally shows us that foreign commerce can not flourish without liberal foreign mail facilities, and the means of ready transit of persons, papers, and




THE DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO THE PEOPLE.   123
specie. It also clearly indicates that the most successful
means of accomplishing this, is the employment of subsidized national mail steamships.  It therefore becomes
obviously the duty of a paternal government to an industrious, enterprising, producing, and trading people, to give
them the rapid ocean steam mails necessary to the profitable prosecution of their industry.
We have for many years neglected many important
fields of foreign trade, and many profitable branches of industry and art, which we could easily have nurtured into
sources of income and wealth, by adopting the foreign mail
system, so wisely introduced and extended by Great Britain.
And in the absence of such efforts on our part, a large and
remunerative traffic has been swept from us, and this
suicidal neglect has been the means of our subordination
to so many controlling foreign influences. We are at this
very hour commercially enslaved by England, France,
Brazil, and the East. How is it that the trade of the world
is in the hands of Great Britain; that she absorbs most of
every nation's raw material; and that she and France supply the world with ten thousand articles of industry, that
should furnish work to our manufacturers, and freight to
our ships? There are some who will say that it is because
of her manufacturing system. Grant it. But how did she
establish that imperious, and overshadowing, and powerful
system, and how does she keep it up? Her energetic
people have ever had the fostering care of her government. Their steam mail system has been established for
twenty-four years. It has furnished the people with the
means of easy transport, rapid correspondence, the remittance of specie, and the shipment of light manufactured
goods to every corner of the world; it has invited foreigners from every land to her shores and her markets;
and it has been the means of throwing the raw material of
the whole world into the lap of the British manufacturer




124                THE OCEAN POST.
and artisan, and enabling them thus to control the markets
in every land.
But we can get along, it is said, without such a manufacturing system and such an ubiquity of trade. This is a
mistake. The productions of our soil are not sufficiently
indispensable to the outer world to bring us all of the
money we need for importing the millions of foreign follies, to which our people have become attached. It is riot
right or best for us that while our " Lowell Drillings" stand
preeminent over the world, we should so far neglect the
Brazilian, La Platan, New-Granadian, Venezuelan, and EastIndian trade, that Manchester shall continue, as she now
does, to manufacture an inferior fabric, post it off by her
steamers, forestall the market, and cheat us out of our profits; and that, by means of the reputation which our skill
has produced. And a few more1 crises like the one through
which we have just begun to pass, will open our eyes to
the necessity of doing something ourselves to make money,
and show that foreign trade in every form, and the sale of
every species of product known to the industry of a skillful people, must be watched with jealous national and individual care, and nurtured as we would nurture a young
and tender child. There are many fields of trade which
may be said to pertain naturally to this country, and which
we have as wholly neglected and yielded to Great Britain,
as if she had a divine right to the monopoly of the entire
commerce of the world. No one can believe that the trade
of the islands which gem the Carribbean Sea and the Gulf
of Mexico, or the great Spanish Main, or the Guianas, or
the Orinoco and Amazon, or the extended coast of Brazil,
the Platan Republics, or Mexico, and the Central American States lying just at our door, belongs naturally to
Europe, or that their productions should be transported in
European ships, or that their supplies come naturally five
thousand miles across the ocean, rather than go a few hun



THE DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO THE PEOPLE.  125
dred miles from our own shores, in our own ships, and for
the benefit of our own merchants and producers. Yet,
such is the impression which our apathy of effort in those
regions would produce. We have acted as if our people
had no right of information concerning the West-Indies and
South-America, until it had gone to Europe and been
emasculated of all its virtues.
The same thing is true of the Pacific South-American, the
Chinese, and the East-Indian trade. That of the Pacific coast
is not half so far from us, as it is from Europe; that of China,
and the East-Indies, and Australia, is by many thousand miles
nearer to us; and yet the greater portion of the commerce
of all three of those great fields is triumphantly borne off
by Great Britain alone. And why is all this? Why is
her foreign trade sixteen hundred millions of dollars per
year, while ours is only seven hundred millions? Causes
can not fail to produce their effects; -and prime causes,
however little understood in their half obscure workings,
are yet made manifest as the sun at noon-day by effects so
brilliant and important as these. Here, as ever, the tree
is known by its fruits. The tree of knowledge, of British
wisdom, " whose mortal taste brought death into our world,"
our Western world of commerce, "with loss of Eden," and
many a fair paradise of enterprise and effort, has filled the
bleak little islands of Britain with the golden fruits of
every clime, and scattered broadcast among its people the
rich ambrosia of foreign commerce. When it was necessary to command the trade of the West-Indies, Central
America, and Mexico, lying at our southern door, she
established the Royal Steam Packet service with thirteen lines and twenty steamers, and paid it for the first ten
years ~240,000, and for the present twelve years ~270,000
per annum. In addition to this she pays ~25,000 per annum for continuing the same lines down the west coast of
South-America to Valparaiso, and contracts to pay the




126                THE OCEAN POST.
Royal Mail Company an annual addition of ~75,000 in the
event of coal, freight, insurance, etc., being at any time higher
than they were at the date of the contract in 1850. This
aggregate sum of ~295,000, or $1,475,000, to say nothing
of the increased allowance of ~75,000 probably now paid
to this one branch alone of the British service, is considerably greater than that paid for the entire foreign mail service of the United States.
Now, it is a very extraordinary fact that, with such a
field of commerce lying along the sunny side of our republic, and with such an array of facilities for converting it
into European channels, our Government has done literally
nothing to protect the rights of its citizens and give them
the means, which they do not now possess, of a fair competition with other countries for this rich and remunerative trade. Yet such is the fact; all of the petitions and
memorials of the seaboard cities to the contrary notwithstanding. The same is the case with the Pacific and EastIndia trade before noticed. While we have a noble chain
of communication between the Eastern States and California and Oregon, which is manifestly essential to the integrity of the Union and the continued possession of our
rich Western territory; while California is admirably situated to command the trade of those vast regions and concentrate it in the United States; while the British have
several lines to China, the Indies, Australia, and Southern
as well as Western Africa; and while our citizens have
petitioned Congress year after year for even the most limited steam mail facilities to those regions, which could be
afforded at the smallest price, it is truly astonishing that
these facts and petitions have hitherto been treated with
contempt, and almost ruled out of Congress as soon as
presented. Such has been the course of action that, instead of fostering foreign commerce and encouraging the
enterprise and industry of the people, the Government has




THE DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO THE PEOPLE.  127
really repressed that enterprise, and practically commanded the intelligent commercial classes of this country to
look upon foreign trade as forbidden fruit which it was
never intended should be grown upon our soil.
It is not to be disputed that foreign mail steamers, by
creating almost unlimited facilities for the conduct of trade,
greatly increase the commerce of the nation with the
countries to which they run. The evidences of this position are patent all around us, and too evident to need
recital. The growth of our trade with Germany, France,
Switzerland, and Great Britain since the establishment of
the Bremen, Havre, and Liverpool lines of steamers has
been unprecedented in the history of our commerce.
That with California has sprung up as by magic at the
touch of steam, and has assumed a magnitude and permanence in eight years which but for the steam mail and passenger accommodations created, could not have been developed under thirty years. The mail accommodations
have wholly transformed opr commerce with Havana and
Cuba, until they are wrested from foreign commercial dominion, as reason suggests that they must ere long be from
foreign political thraldom. As well might Europe attempt
to attach the little island of Nantucket to some of her own
dynasties as to deprive the United States of the control of
the trade of Cuba so long as her steam lines are continued
to that island.
Mr. Anderson, the Managing Director of the Peninsular
and Oriental Company, recently testified before a Committee of the House of Commons, that, "the advantages
of the communication (between England and Australia)
should not be estimated merely by the postage. After
steam communication to Constantinople and the Levant
was opened, our exports to those quarters increased by
~1,200,000 a year. The actual value of goods exported
from Southampton alone, last year, (1848-9,) by those




128               THE OCEAN POST.
steamers is nearly ~1,000,000 sterling. Greek merchants
state that the certainty and rapidity of communication enable them to turn their capital over so much quicker.
Forty new Greek establishments have been formed in
this country since steam communication was established.
The imports in that trade, fine raw materials, silk, goats'
hair, etc., came here to be manufactured. Supposing the
trade to increase one million, and wages amount to
~600,000, calculating taxes at 20 per cent., an income of
revenue of ~120,000 would result from steam communication."
I am prepared to speak from my own observation, and
from the reliable statistics of the Brazilian Government,
from the pen of the late Prime Minister, the Miarquis of
Paran6, a few facts of the same nature relative to the trade
between Great Britain and the Brazilian Empire. In a
paper which I prepared for the New-York Historical Society, and published in "Brazil and the Brazilians," Philadelphia, Childs & Peterson, I said, at page 618, in speaking of the trade of Great Britain:
"From 1840 to 1850 her total imports from Brazil made
no increase. In 1853, they had advanced one hundred
and fifty per cent. on 1848; and, in 1855, they had advanced over 1848-or the average of the ten years
noticed - about three hundred per cent.  This, however, it must be recollected, was in coffee, for reexportation; a trade which was lost to our merchants and to our
shipping. Her total exports to Brazil from 1840 to 1850
were stationary at about two and a half million pounds
sterling annually. In 1851-the first year after steam by
the Royal Mail Company-they advanced forty per cent.;
and, in 1854, they had advanced one hundred and
two per cent. on 1850. Thus, her exports have doubled
in five years, from a stationary point before the establishment of steam mail facilities; whereas ours have been




THE DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO THE PEOPLE.  129
thirteen years in making the same increase. The total
trade between Brazil and Great Britain has increased in an
unprecedented ratio. The combined British imports and
exports, up to 1850, averaged ~3,645,833 annually; but,
in 1855, these had reached ~8,162,455. Thus, the British
trade increased two hundred and twenty-five per cent. in five
years after the first line of steamers was established to
Brazil."
In the analysis of the tables presenting these facts I had
occasion to make the following deductions, page 619:
"We see, from a generalization and combination of
these tables and analyses, that our greatest advance in the
Brazilian trade has arisen from imports instead of exports;
whereas the trade of Great Britain has advanced in both;
and particularly in her exports, which were already large;
the tendency being to enrich Great Britain and to impoverish us: that until 1850 her exports were stationary,
while ours were increasing; due, doubtless, to the superiority of our clipper ships at that period, which placed us
much nearer than England to Brazil: that she is now taking the coffee-trade away from us, and giving it to her
own and other European merchants and shipping: that
she is rivalling us in the rubber-trade; wholly distancing
us in that of manufactures: and that from 1850 to 1855
she has doubled a large trade of profitable exports, and
increased her aggregate imports and exports two hundred
and twenty-five per cent.; whereas it has taken us thirteen
years to double a small trade, composed mostly of imports:
it being evident that, with equal facilities, we could outstrip Great Britain in nearly all the elements of this Brazil
trade, as we were doing for the ten years from 1840 to
1850.
"It will hardly be necessary to suggest to the wise and
reflecting merchant or statesman the evident causes producing this startling effect. It is the effect of steamship
9




130                THE OCEAN POST.
mail and passenger facilities, so well understood by the
wise and forecasting British statesmen who established the
Southampton, Brazil, and La Plata lines; not as a means
of giving revenue to the General Post-Office, but of encouraging foreign trade and stimulating British industry.
If England by steam has overtaken and neutralized our
clippers and embarrassed our trade, then we have only to
employ the same agent, and, from geographical advantages, we feel assured that we will soon surpass her as certainly, and even more effectually, than she has us. She
sweeps our seas, and we offer her no resistance or competition. Not satisfied with the Royal Mail lines, it is reported that she is making a contract with Mr. Cunard to
run another line along by the side of the Royal Mail,
from Liverpool to Aspinwall, and from Panama to the
East-Indies and China. She gains in these seas an invaluable trade, because she employs the proper means for its
attainment and promotion, while we do not. Hence, although much farther off she is practically much nearer.
Suppose that Great Britain had no steamers to the great
sea at her threshold, the Mediterranean; and we had the
enterprise to run a great trunk-line to Gibraltar and Malta,
and nine branches from these termini to all the great points
of commerce in Mediterranean Europe, Asia, and Africa.
Would we not soon command the trade of all Southern
Europe, of Western Asia, and of Africa? But we find her
wisely occupying her own territory, and that it is impossible for us to get possession. If we had been there, she
would soon have given us competition. But Great Britain
did not wait for competition to urge her to her duty to
her people. She could easily have continued the trade
already possessed; but she could enlarge and invigorate it
by steam, and she did it; not from outside pressure, but
for the advantages which it always presents per se. For
the same reason we should have established steam to the




THE DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO THE PEOPLE.  131
West-Indies, Brazil, the Spanish Main, and La Plata long
since; to foster a trade naturally ours, but practically another's. It is preeminently necessary now when steam,
under the system of Great Britain, is ruining our trade;
whereas, by a similar process, we could reestablish ours, if
not paralyze theirs. Neutrality is impossible. Indifference
to the present posture of affairs only leads to the ruin of
our interests. We must advance and contend with Great
Britain and Europe step by step, and employ the means
of which we are generally so boastful, or we will be forced
to retreat from the field, and be harassed into ignominioussubmission."
As in the case of Brazil and La Plata so is it in that of
the Pacific South-American States, and the great fields of
Australia, China, and the East-Indies generally, as before
noticed. The trade of Great Britain with those regions
has gone on at a rate of progression truly astonishing.
Ours has continued just as much behind it as the slow
and uncertain sailing vessel is behind the rapid and reliable mail steamer. Our Pacific possessions have been
shorn of half their glory and power by the refusal of those
steam aids which would by the present time have converted half the commerce of the fields mentioned into the
new channels of American enterprise and transport. The
injustice has operated equally against the people of California and Oregon, and against ourselves of the East; while
there is no good and valid reason for thus making the Pacific coast the ultima thule of civilized, steam enterprise.
The people of the United States, of whatever class, are far
from being misers. They do not desire an economy of two
or three millions of dollars per year, which would give
them great opportunities of obtaining wealth and power,
merely that the sum so economized may be squandered,
with twenty or thirty millions more, on schemes of doubtful
expediency, and of no real or pressing necessity. They




132                THE OCEAN POST.
do not, indeed, ask that these mail accommodations may be
paid for simply because much money is uselessly otherwise
spent; but because these accommodations are necessary to
themselves, to the development of their enterprise and
labor, and to the general good of all the active and industrial, and, consequently, all of the worthy classes. It is a
question of little importance to the great people of this
country, whether the Government expends forty millions
per year or eighty millions. But it would be a delightful
consolation to them to know that while they might be
paying ten, twenty, or thirty millions per year more than
strictly necessary, three or four millions of it at least were
so appropriated as to better enable them to pay the large
general tax for the aggregate sum. No one hears any
complaint regarding the sum necessary to support the
General Government, except by those in remote districts,
who have but an infinitesimal interest involved, but an
imaginary part of the sum to pay, and who, producing but
little, and having nothing to do, assume the right to
manage the affairs of those who really have something at
stake. The American people are willing and anxious that
their money shall be expended for their own benefit, for
the benefit of those who are to come after them, and for
the glory of our great country.
The many instances of our dereliction in the establishment of steam mail facilities, and the failure to establish
locomotive accommodations for our merchants and other
business classes call loudly for a change in our affairs, and
the establishment of a national steam policy in the place
of the accidental and irregular support hitherto given to
foreign steam enterprise. The nation demands the means
of competing with other nations. We have lost much of
the trade of the world without it. The commercial men
of this country complain bitterly that the Government
gives them no facilities for conducting our trade or culti



THE DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO THE PEOPLE.  133
vating the large fields of enterprise successfully which I
have named, and competing, on fair terms, with foreign
merchants. They see the West-Indies, the Spanish-American Republics, Brazil, Central America, and Mexico,
lying right at our southern door, and the whole Pacific
coast, the East-Indies, China, the Mauritius, Australia, and
the Pacific Islands but half as far from California as from
England, all much nearer to us than to Great Britain and
other European countries, and offering us a trade which
large as it necessarily is to-day, is yet destined within the
coming generation to transcend that of all other portions
of the globe combined, in extent, in richness, and in the
profits which it will yield. The capacity of these great
fields for development and expansion is indefinite and
almost boundless. There is no doubt that an American
trade could be developed in those regions within the next
thirty years whose opulence and magnificence would rival
and far surpass our entire commerce of the world at the
present time, and give to our nation a riches and a power
which would enable it to shape the destinies of the entire
civilized world.
Our commercial classes complain not so much that Great
Britain has the monopoly of this trade, which naturally
belongs to the United States; not so much that she conducts that trade by steamfacilities, to the detriment of us
who have none; not so much that she has lines of steamers by the dozen, and weekly communication, as well as
the advantage and use of all the other European lines;
but that the citizens of the United States are not permitted to enter into a fair competition for this trade. Our
people probably surpass every other people in the world
in individual and aggregate enterprise and energy. They
ask as few favors of the Government as any people on
earth; doing every thing that is practicable, and that energy and capital can accomplish, without the intervention




134                THE OCEAN POST.
of the Government. But there are some things that, with
the entire concentrated skill and ability of the nation, her.
citizens can not accomplish; and one of these is the maintenance of steamship mail lines upon the ocean. In ordinary enterprises competition necessitates improvement;
and mechanical improvement and skill, in due course of
time, enable individuals to compass ends otherwise deemed
impracticable and unattainable. These attempts have all
been made, in every form, with ocean steam navigation.
It was supposed, as elsewhere stated, that, by superior engines and great economy of fuel, a speed high enough for
all ordinary mail purposes could be attained, and yet leave
enough room for freight and passengers to enable the income from these, at rates much higher than on sailing vessels, to pay for fuel, engineering, and the great additional
cost of running a steamer; Vast engineering skill and
ability have been directed to this point both in this country and Europe; and this object has been declared the
commercial desideratum of the age. But all of these
efforts have failed in their design; so much so that there
is not, to-day, more than one permanent steam line upon
the high seas of the whole world which is not sustained by
a subsidy from some government. Many attempts have
been made by British merchants to do a freighting and
passenger business inpropellers, without any mail pay, and
depending on their receipts alone. These, too, have all
failed. No permanent line of these propellers has been established to any of our American cities, except by subsidized companies, owning side-wheel steamers also.
The only trade in which it has ever been supposed that
steamers of any description whatever could carry freight
is that between Europe and the United States, where there
are large quantities of rich, costly goods, in small and
valuable packages, which pay an extra rate of freight, as
express goods; but, even here, the steam freighting sys



THE DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO THE PEOPLE.  135
ter without governmental aid has proved a failure. There
have been one or two cases where a steamer could make
money in carrying freight and passengers alone, as between this country and California during the early part
of the gold crisis, and owing to the great distance around
the Horn, as well as an unnaturally large passenger trade.
This, however, was a state of commerce wholly abnormal
and of short duration, and such as is not likely to occur
once in a century, or last very long; or prove more than
an infinitesimal exception to the great general laws of
freighting and commercial transport.
Great Britain has learned this doctrine from experience,
and is profiting by it. Her wise merchants and statesmen
know that commerce can be accommodated only by rapid
steam mails, which have regular and reliable periods for
arrival and departure; and that, although these mails cost
the Government andthe people something more than those
slow and uncertain communications which depend on sailing vessels and overland transit, yet they are enabled, by
the facilities which they afford, to monopolize and control
the commerce of the world, and divert it from even the
most natural channels into the lap of British wealth. It
is in this view of the subject that our merchants so justly
complain that our Government, by refusing to give them
the facilities commensurate with the demands of the age,
deprives them of the power or privilege of competing with
foreign nations, and palsies their hands, simply because they
are not able, individually and by their associated capital,
to do that which the Government only can do. The reason why our mail steamers require the aid of our Government is that foreign Governments subsidize their lines;
hence our individual enterprise can not compete with
their individual enterprise and that of their Government
combined. The reason why foreign Governments thus
subsidize their mail lines is, that those lines can not depend




136                 THE OCEAN POST.
upon their own receipts for support, or run without Governmental aid. This is also the prime reason for Governmental aid in running our lines. These facts are undisputed by steamshipmen and merchants, and are verified by
the practice of the whole world, and the great number of
failures in attempting to sustain steamers, from year to
year, on regular lines, by their receipts alone.
Being thus unable to compete with other countries under
our present limited steam arrangements, and considering
the startling expenses which attend the running of steamers, such as their fuel, their extra prime cost, their large
repairs, their depreciation, their wages, their insurance,
their dock charges and light dues, their shore establishments, and the long list which comes under the head of
items and accidents, it is unquestionably the duty of the
Government to meet this question in a frank and resolute
manner, and afford to the people all those necessary facili.
ties which they can get in no other way.




HOW SHALL THE GOVERNMENT DISCHARGE THIS DUTY? 137
SECTION VIII.
HOW SHALL TIE GOVERNMENT DISCHARGE THIS DUTY?
WE NEED A STEAN MAIL SYSTEM: HOW OUR LINES HAVE BEEN
ESTABLISHED: AMERICAN AND BRITISH POLICY CONTRASTED:
SPASMODIC AND ENDURING LEGISLATION: MR. POLK S ADMINISTRATION ENDEAVORED TO INAUGURATE A POLICY: GEN.
RUSK ENDEAVORED TO EXTEND IT: THE TERM OF SERVICE
TOO SHORT: COMPANIES SHOULD HAVE LONGER PERIODS: A
LEGISLATION OF EXPEDIENTS: MUST SUBSIDIZE PRIVATE
COMPANIES FOR A LONG TERM OF YEARS: SHOULD WE GIVE
TO OUR POSTAL VESSELS THE NAVAL FEATURE: OUR MAIL
LINES GAVE AN IMPULSE TO SHIP-BUILDING: LET US HAVE
STEAM MAILS ON THEIR MERITS: NO NAVAL FEATURE SUBTERFUGES: THESE VESSELS HIGHLY USEFUL IN WAR: THEY
LIBERALLY SUPPLY THE NAVY WITH EXPERIENCED ENGINEERS WHEN NECESSARY: THE BRITISH MAIL PACKETS GENERALLY FIT FOR WAR SERVICE: LORD CANNING'S REPORT:
EXPEDIENTS PROPOSED FOR CARRYING THE MAILS: BY FOREIGN INSTEAD OF AMERICAN VESSELS: DEGRADING EXPEDIENCY AND SUBSERVIENCY: WE CAN NOT SECURE MAIL
SERVICE BY GIVING THE GROSS RECEIPTS: THE GENERAL
TREASURY SHOULD PAY FOR THE TRANSMARINE POST: REQUIREMENTS FOR NEW CONTRACTS: METHOD OF MBAKING
CONTRACTS: THE LOWEST BIDDER AND THE LAND SERVICE:
THE OCEAN SERVICE VERY DIFFERENT: BUT LITTLE UNDERSTOOD: LOWEST-BIDDER SYSTEM FAILURES: SENATOR RUSK'S
OPINION: INJURIOUS EFFECTS OF LOWEST BIDDER: INDIVIDUAL EFFORTS AND RIGHTS.
As it will scarcely be denied that the Government should
furnish ample and liberal mail facilities, as well foreign as
domestic, to its people, in view of the well-established fact
that these facilities can not be attained in any other way, the




138                 THE OCEAN POST.
question naturally arises, how shall the Government discharge this clear and unquestionable duty to the citizen?
I trust that it will be admitted that we can not rely on the
Sailing-ship mail, or the Naval steam mail, or the Private
Enterprise mail; while it is equally evident that we can
not depend on the Foreigner's mail, or should not if we
could.
A first step toward this important end, and one which
every interest of the country demands, is the establishment
of a governmental steam mail system, a fixed steam policy,
based upon common-sense, and guided by the dictates of
justice to the enterprising citizen, at the same time that it
is productive of certain efficiency toward the people. It
can not be denied that our legislation on this subject has
hitherto been that of expedients, and merely temporary arrangement. We have had no wise, immutable purpose, no
great fixed rule of action. We have laid no broad foundations for a system which should extend itself wherever our
trade extended, and work equitably with all of the large
interests of the American people. When, by a spasmodic
effort, we opened communication in one direction, and found
that we had a few steamers running, we became self-complacently satisfied with our action, shut our ears.to all
other equally urgent claims and appeals, forgot that we
had simply commenced instead of having finished, and contented ourselves with the appearance of a mail system
rather than its realization. When we established the two
lines to Europe, which were positively necessary to commerce, it was not so much because those were the only necessary lines, but because they were urged by parties who
stood ready to build the ships, and run them in the service.
The California lines were established because the people
would not longer tolerate the neglect of our large and important interests in the Pacific. But there were several
other lines which were of the greatest importance to our




HOW SHALL THE GOVERNMENT DISCHARGE THIS DUTY? 139
commerce and manufactures, extending to fields where we
could have established the richest trade, but which never
enlisted the attention of Congress, simply because there
was no one who made it his special business to press them.
This of itself manifested great want of a matured steam
mail system, which should operate equally on all of the
great interests of the country, and extend its facilities
wherever American industry and enterprise could find a
footing.
We need not only a steam system, but a fixed steam policy that shall extend from generation to generation, and
operate equally, as well at all times and in all fields of American enterprise, as upon all classes. No such system can
be built up in one year or in ten years; much less by one
spasmodic steam effort, even in the right direction, followed
by an eternal sleep, or a total indifference. It is the work
of ages. It is not a system which, if set in motion, will
work on perpetually of itself, without assistance. It needs
constant care and fostering; and its results prove it worthy
of all the care and attention that can be expended on it.
The mature system of Great Britain has not grown up in a
day. It has been constantly before the British public
during twenty-four years, and has never been neglected for
an hour. There has been no hiatus in it; for this would
have disrupted the system, broken the chain, and resulted
in disastrous failure. Neither has the one great purpose
been changed every few years to suit the caprice of some
new cabinet. It was a great cardinal idea, founded in reason and justice, that has gone on maturing from year to
year; and none had the hardihood to touch it, or trifle
with the people's purpose in establishing it; not even so
far as to make it a passing text for demagoguery. It composed and yet composes a part of the far-reaching and controlling policy of the British crown; a purpose limited not
to the visions of to-day, or the financial crises and panics of




140                THE OCEAN POST.
to-morrow, or to some new field of British effort, to be developed in a year or two; but limited to that time only,
when men shall cease the strife of commerce, abandon the
pursuit of wealth, yield the palm of enterprise, and unlearn
the love of money and its power. There has been nothing
spasmodic in this; nothing fitful, alluring, and evanescent;
nothing that held out a hope to the enterprising man, and
deceived him in all the essential conditions of its fulfillment in the end. It was founded in reason, founded in necessity; and it was well determined that it should endure.
It is creditable to the administration of President Polk,
that there was one effort made in this country to found a
similar judicious and fruitful system. We had until that
time taken no notice whatever of marine steam navigation;
and British steamers swarmed around our coast north and
south, thick as cruisers in a blockade. (See Paper E.) Indeed, it was a veritable blockade of our commerce, and
told most disastrously upon our enterprise and independence.
The Cabinet of Mr. Polk, headed by our present venerable
Chief Magistrate of the Nation, determined to reverse this
system, and did it as effectually as any thing can be accomplished in a country, where a given policy, however wisely
inaugurated, has no guaranty or safeguard against the revolutionary changes of new administrations. They established
a basis of action, and inaugurated three steam lines under
contracts which placed them beyond the attacks of the
capricious; well knowing that if the system had merits,
they would be manifested to the country within ten years
by the fruits of these lines. The period was shorter than
that designated by Great Britain; yet with the immensely
rapid development of our people it inwrought itself into
the affections of the public so effectually, even in this short
time, that none will dare risk his reputation by attacking
it boldly, or by other means than an indirect and harassing guerrilla warfare. But here the effort ended, and the




HOW SHALL THE GOVERNMENT DISCHARGE THIS DUTY? 141
system, deprived of the aids and new lines which Congress
should have extended it, and of that continued development which was necessary to its perfection and usefulness,
has been left to work itself out and die, until it may be
resurrected by another great demonstration of public sentiment, and by an administration bold enough and far-seeing enough to grasp the interests of the whole country,
and do itself and the people justice. It is due, however,
to the reputation of a lamented and departed statesman,
the large-minded and noble Gen. Rusk, of Texas, to say
that he made a manly and systematic effort in 1852, after
seeing the fruitful workings of the three lines noticed, to
extend, enlarge, and fortify the good beginnings of President Polk and Secretary Buchanan, by inaugurating several new lines, and establishing a permanent and recognized
basis of action. But in all this he was thwarted by the
machinations of narrow-minded men, who deemed it a
higher effort to agitate the country and endeavor to separate the Northand the South, than establish and secure
those mighty aids to industry which should give development, wealth, strength, and security to the whole American Union, and check the fratricidal blow of the disunionist.
It is essential that we shall have in this country a policy
on this subject, which shall remain untouched under the
changes of administrations, just as standard commercial
laws and regulations remain untouched. No system of
such magnitude can mature or cheapen when but a few
years are assigned to it, and when there is no certainty
that it will survive the life of a single ship. Companies
undertaking the mail service under such circumstances
must be paid larger sums for their general establishment,
that they may be enabled to meet the exigencies and caprices of irregular legislation, which may at the close of
their contracts suddenly throw a dozen good ships out of




142                THE OCEAN POST.
employment. Every well-regulated and efficient company
necessarily builds new steamers through all the stages of
its existence; and when the term of its service expires,
necessarily has several partially new ships. If the term of
service is to be short, and if there is no rule by which
those who do good service on a line are to have, in renewing contracts, the preference of new and untried parties,
then it is reasonable to infer that they can not themselves
incur the expense of so large an establishment of new and
useless vessels, and that their service is either to be inefficient and unreliable, or that the department must pay a
larger price than necessary under a judicious and fixed
system. The want of a reliable system operates injuriously both on the department and on the contractors.
It subjects us to expedients, and to all of the evils of constant lobbying and legislation on the subject. And one
of the first wants of this system is an extension of the term
of contracts. The period hitherto assigned has not been
long enough for the proper development of the service.
The short term is a constant premium for building an
inferior class of vessels, which shall have become worthless
by the time that the contract expires, so as not to entail
loss upon the company. Such vessels are ever unfit for
the mails or passengers. Short terms also keep the subject continually before Congress and the Executive Government, and foster that extensive and depraved lobbying
which has wrought so injuriously on our legislation. Moreover, there is no reason why the term of service should
not be extended, when it will certainly simplify and
cheapen it, if, as I have assumed, the progress of engineering is not such as to throw well-built ships out of use
within twelve years, or in any way introduce improvements by which the Government could get the service at
lower rates. Nor have we any reliable hope for the
future. We wait until commerce has been perverted into




HOW SHALL THE GOVERNMENT DISCHARGE THIS DUTY? 143
unnatural channels, and then become suddenly and galvanically aroused, when it is too late to effect a change until
two or three years have expired in building ships. We
thus find ourselves in the midst of the difficulty without
having foreseen it, and without being prepared for it.
The wise man planned the campaign before others had
even contemplated any disturbance of the peace. As a
matter of course he controlled the battle, and brought up
the victory in his own way.
The only effectual means of accomplishing the foreign
mail service in this country is by liberally subsidizing private companies for a long term of years, such as will induce them to provide first-class ships, run them rapidly,
and fit them for the most comfortable conveyance of passengers. Lord Canning in his Report to both houses of
Parliament on the contract packet system in 1853, says,
after showing that the naval vessels have been abandoned
for the mail service: There is no peculiarity in this branch
of business which renders it an exception to the general
rule, that work is done more cheaply by contract than by
Government agency." But when the idea of performing
the mail service by naval vessels was wholly abandoned in
1837, another question of equal importance arose, as to
how far the mail steam packets might be made efficient as
vessels of war in times of emergency. As a consequence
of the discussion nearly all of the mail contracts made
from that day until this by Great Britain contained stipulations requiring the vessels to be capable of carrying an
armament, in addition to the requirements of speed and
punctuality. The same thing was done in this country in
1846-7  and one of the principal means of carrying the
Collins bill through Congress was the self-deception of
making the steamers equivalent to vessels of war. It was
a plea to which statesmen and enterprising business men
resorted, and was used as a means of securing those com



144                THE OCEAN POST.
mercial facilities which constitutional quibblers would not
vote for directly, but which they would afford if allowed
the subterfuge of " defenses" as a means of protecting them
against a certain set of constituencies who foolishly opposed
the extension of commerce.  Many of these would not
grant one dollar for the aid of that commerce on which
the revenues of the country and their own real prosperity
and wealth depended; but they were willing to suffer long
and bleed freely at the old and just, though unrenewable
war-cry: "The British and the Hessians." Our case
was rather different from  that of Great Britain which
had a large steam navy while we had neither naval nor
commercial steamers. There was, consequently, and there
yet is, more propriety in demanding a capacity for the
naval service in our vessels than in the case of Great
Britain.
In obedience to this very proper spirit we produced
some of the noblest vessels that ever floated. Stronger
vessels than the Collins, Aspinwall, and Pacific Mail Steamers were never built in any country. And although we
have fortunately not been compelled to test their capacity
in naval transport or in action, yet there is no doubt that
they would do honorable and efficient service in both, and
by no means sully the glory of the American colors. The
establishment of these and the Havre and Bremen lines,
certainly gave an impulse to shipbuilding and the manufacture of steam machinery in this country which could
have been given in no other way, and which in a few short
years has demonstrated that we are behind no people on
earth in capacity for these noble and difficult arts. And
although we are yet but in our infancy in experience, as
compared, especially with Great Britain, yet the increasing
demand for mail facilities, the necessity for a large war
marine, and the rapidly increasing coast steam service, all
indicate that we shall require a large amount of this class




HOW SHALL THE GOVERNMENT DISCHARGE THIS DUTY? 145
of work and a mechanical skill to which our ingenious
countrymen have thus proven themselves entirely adequate. And although it is certainly indispensable that we
shall ever be provided adequately against all the exigencies of foreign war, yet it is to be trusted that bold and
fearless statesmen will support and extend our steam mail
service on the tenable grounds of its necessity to commerce
and our citizens at large, and that its productive services
will not be obscured by or subordinated to the subterfuges
and deceits of the war marine feature. Let us have steam
mail facilities on high and independent grounds, and for
their benefits per se. The system is abundantly tenable
on this ground alone; on this only ground that it Will
probably ever practically occupy. Let us also have our
war marine, efficiently separate, as it should be. Let both
systems be perfect, both independent, both mutually conducive to the prosperity and the defense of the country.
But there is no doubt that these vessels would do excellent service in a conflict. They could swarm any particular coast with troops in a few days. They could easily
run away from dangerous vessels, or pursue and overtake
others when necessary. They are alway needed for transport, while the time will probably never again come when
mail steamers will not be even more necessary during war
than in times of peace. But this is not all. They fit and
train a large number of marine engineers who are ever
ready at a day's warning to enter efficiently on the naval
service. This is a point of greater importance than is
generally supposed. Engineers, however skilled in the
shops, are wholly unfit for the service at sea until they have
had months of experience, and become accustomed to
sea-sickness.  When one of our first American mail
steamers sailed for Europe, no practised marine engineer
could be found to work her engines. They took a firstclass engineer and corps of assistants from one of the North
10




146                     THE OCEAN POST.
River packets; but as soon as the ship got to sea, and
heavy weather came on, all the engineers and firemen were
taken deadly sick, and for three days it was constantly
expected that the ship would be lost.
It is abundantly evident from all of the testimony, that
most of the mail packets are capable of carrying a handsome armament. Mr. Atherton says to me in his letter:
" Many of our ocean steamers are fit for naval service of
every description; and they are generally fit for all transport
service." The Report of Lord Canning, the British Post
Master General, to which       I have referred, was made in
1853, in obedience to a Treasury Minute issued by the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, who directed the Post Master General to form a committee, and report to both houses,
on the propriety of continuing and extending the mail
steam packet system; as there had been suggestions that
the sum expended for the mail service was large. These
gentlemen after a lengthy investigation of several months,
the examination of a great number of witnesses, and the
record of their testimony in shorthand, made their report,
accompanied by the evidence in a large volume. At page
5 of the report, in speaking of the requirements for naval
efficiency, they say:
"In arranging the terms of these contracts, the Government seized the opportunity of requiring that the vessels should be constructed in a manner that
would render them as serviceable for national defense in war as steam-packets
belonging to the Crown would have been if employed in their stead. A provision to this effect was first inserted in the contract with the Royal Mail Company in 1840; and in most of the existing contracts stipulations are to be found
requiring that the vessel should be of a construction and strength fit to carry
such an armament as the Admiralty may think proper. In several cases they
must be built of wood and not of iron; and there are some contracts which
confer on the Admiralty the right of taking the ships at a valuation when it may
be thought desirable to do so.
" Generally speaking, these stipulations have been fulfilled, as appears from a
return which has been laid before us by the Surveyor of the Navy, showing the
number, tonnage, and power of the vessels constructed by the various companies
under contract with the Admiralty for the conveyance of the mails, distinguish



HOW SHALL THE GOVERNMENT DISCHARGE THIS DUTY? 147
ing those built of wood from those built of iron, and stating whether the companies have in any cases violated the terms of the contracts, and if so, whether any
authority has been given by the Board of Admiralty for the deviation. It results
from this return that out of 98 vessels which had been surveyed by the Government officers, one only (the' Australian') has been reported as incapable of
carrying guns if required, and two iron vessels (the'Levantine' and the' Petrel') have been accepted instead of wooden vessels, on Mr. Cunard's Halifax
and Bermuda line. Two other vessels-one belonging to the Australian Royal
Mail Company, and the other to Mr. Macgregor Laird's West Coast of Africa
line-had also been accepted (temporarily) by Admiralty authority, although of
less tonnage and power than the contracts prescribed.
"The Surveyor's report upon most of these vessels, as regards their fitness
for war purposes, is in the following terms:'Not fitted for armament, but capable of carrying guns when so fitted.' This report accords with the opinion
expressed by the Committee of Naval and Artillery officers upon the vessels
which have come under their notice. It appears, however, from the statements
of that Committee, that although the packets they have examined are for the
most part of sufficient strength to carry and fire a certain number of guns, the
expense of the alterations which would be necessary before they could be got
ready for service would be very considerable, and that even when such alterations had been made, the efficiency of the vessels would be very small in proportion to their size, and that they could not encounter hostile vessels of equal
to:nage without endangering the honor of the British flag.
"With reference to future contracts, we are decidedly of opinion that no expense should be incurred for the sake of imposing conditions for giving a military character to the postal vessels. We believe the imposition of such conditions to be a measure of false economy. Should a war suddenly break out, the
immediate demandfor mail steamers ooz ld probably be greater than ever, and it
might be exceedingly inconvenient to withdraw them at such a time from their
legitimate use for the purpose of arming them for battle. Moreover,' the high
charge for the packet service has been borne with the greater readiness, because
it has been supposed by some to include a provision of large but unknown
amount, for the defense of the country; while on the other hand the Naval Estimates have sometimes been complained of as excessive, on the ground that the
force provided for was in addition to the large reserve of postal war steamers.
We accordingly recommend that for the future the contracts for the conveyance
of the mails should be wholly free from stipulations of the nature we have been
describing, though it may be desirable in some cases to retain the power in the
Government to take possession of the vessels in the event of national emergency.",
Again, in the reumne, after considering each of the British lines separately, the committee say:
"An erroneous impression appears to have prevailed among the public as to
the efficiency of our postal steamers for direct purposes of warfare. We do not
believe that those who are charged with the direction of the military affairs of




148                    THE OCEAN POST.
the country have ever regarded them as likely to be of any great service in an
engagement; but their advantages as an auxiliary force will be very considerable. They will be available, in the event of the breaking out of hostilities, for
the rapid conveyance of dispatches, of specie, and, to a certain extent, of troops
and stores. Their speed will be such as probably to secure them from the risk
of capture, and will render them highly valuable for procuring intelligence of
hostile movements. They may also be expected to furnish the Queen's ships
with men trained to steam-navigation, and possessing an amount of local knowledge which can not fail to be valuable in several ways."
We have arrived at about the same conclusions in this
country as those presented by the British Post Master
General to Parliament in 1853, on this subject.      And yet,
with our small havy we may at any time need all of our
steam packets for actual service, and the Government
should always have the right to demand them for transport
service. We have abundant evidence that our mail packets
are well fitted for carrying an armament, and being highly
efficient in war duty.  The testimony of Commodore M. C.
Perry, Mr. Cunningham, and others, as published in the
Special Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1852, is conclusive on this point. They found that they were built with
extraordinary strength and of good materials.
Many expedients have been proposed for the transmission of our- foreign mails.     It is said that the late Post
Master General entertained the purpose of paying some
of the foreign screw lines to carry the mails, if Congress
would permit it; but however all parties disapprove of
the contracted policy proposed by that gentleman, I can
not believe that he entertained any purpose so unpatriotic,
and so subversive of American shipping interests. It is
true, however, that, as he frequently said, he would prefer
returning to the old packet system, and carrying the mails
by sail, if private enterprise could not carry them across
the ocean without a subsidy. But it is a consoling reflec
tion that these singular views of that worthy gentleman
never anywhere took root in Congress. Certainly there is




HOW SHALL THE GOVERNMENT DISCHARGE THIS DUTY? 149
no reason why this great, and rich, and proud nation should
resort, like some little seventh rate power, to expedients
in the carriage of our ocean mails. We are not so poor as
to have to live by practices; not so degraded as to be
willing to catch at any little thing that may pass along for
resources. We have a teeming prosperity, an abundant
wealth, unending resources, and a people everywhere clamorous for liberal expenditures for adequate mails. Why
shall we degrade ourselves by depending upon others for
our mail facilities? It alway humbles and mortifies me
to see one human being lick the hand of another; one who
acknowledges himself a stupid drone that must needs have
a master to direct and protect him. And so with our nation when she stoops to subserviency and begging, for even
so much as the postal charities of other enterprising and
commanding nations.
It has been suggested that the Government could secure
the transit of the mails on the receipts, taking both ocean
and inland postage; and indeed a temporary arrangement
was made with two of our contending companies running
to Europe, to transport them on these terms; but such arrangements are temporary only, and can not be made the
basis of regular action. They would operate most unequally on different lines. While on the European lines
they would pay probably one half the sum of subsidy required, on many other, and especially on new and untried
lines, they would not at first pay probably one tenth.
And granting that on a given line, the receipts during fifteen years would amount to as much as the whole subsidy
required for that time; yet no company could live on
them, as for the first few years the receipts from the mail
would be very small, while the general income of the line
from passengers and freight would also be smaller than at
any other time. Moreover, almost every steam company has
to borrow money largely during its first years, in anticipa



150                THE OCEAN POST.
tion of the larger income from increased trade during the
last years of its existence. Thus, while the system of the
receipts would operate most unequally, the same aggregate
sum given in the form of a regular annual subsidy operates
as an assurance for the company and keeps it alive. But
the postal receipts are not adequate to the support of any
ocean line. In the report before cited, the Committee say,
at page 5, that the sum of subsidy then paid was ~822,390
per annum, whereas the postal receipts were only ~443,782,
or but a fraction over one half. There is probably no regular
service in the world where the postal receipts would
pay for the transport, especially where competition existed.
In making our contracts common-sense must dictate the
lines necessary, and the general treasury should pay for
them. There is no good reason why the sums of subsidy
to be paid for mail transportation should be chargeable on
the Post Office Department. Nor is it really of much conquence where the account is settled, as the general treasury must after all meet the bills. It may create some misapprehension as to the services on which the sums annually
voted are bestowed. But the service, whether sea or
inland, is alike incapable of sustaining itself, and is alike
beneficial to every citizen of the Republic. And as this
service so greatly benefits commerce, it is well that it should
be paid from the general revenues of the country; from the
duties which it creates. At any rate, almost every Post
Master General will feel better disposed to subsidize ocean
mail steamers adequately if the bills are payable by the
treasury department, and not chargeable upon his own.
It would be well in all new contracts that the law of
Congress authorizing them should require strength of vessel, a fair dynamic efficiency of performance, water-tight
bulkheads for the safety both of the vessel, and passengers and mails, and all those other safeguards compatible
with speed and mail efficiency. But the most essential




HOW SHALL THE GOVERNMENT DISCHARGE THIS DUTY? 151
point is the mode of making the contracts. We have pursued two system in this country, that of the lowest bidder,
and that of Congressional contracts. Some have supposed
that as the land mails are submitted to the lowest bidder,
so those of the ocean ought to be also. But the cases are
very unlike. The land service is a familiar thing, which
every farmer understands, because running a wagon is
one of the first things in life that he learns. Every body
is familiar with the land service, and every body has more
or less experimented in it, or in something very similar to
it. But it is far otherwise with that of the ocean. Steamshipping is a comparatively new, a very difficult, and a
very little understood science. But few who know its difficulties will undertake its hazards. Steam power and its
expenses are by no means understood by the people; and
the first mistake made by those unacquainted with it is in
supposing it much cheaper than it really is. This mistake
leads to fatal consequences in bidding for the ocean service,
as most of those unacquainted with the business would
engage to perform a given service for less than the actual
price that it would cost them, and certainly for much less
than practical, experienced men w6uld. And herein consists one of the evils of the lowest bidder system, that inexperienced persons taking such contracts either perform
them inefficiently, or appeal constantly to Congress for
relief, or for increase of their pay. Such cases are exceedingly numerous. Post Master General Campbell said that
the lowest bidder system was " a nuisance." Senator Mallory declared in a debate about the close of the last Congress, that it was a system which never wrought efficiently,
which never gave final satisfaction, and which generally
brought in a set of adventurers. The department and
members of Congress had experienced the annoyance and
inefficiency of the system in the contract for carrying the
mails between Key West and New-Orleans through the




152                      THE OCEAN      POST.
Gulf. It was several times given to the lowest bidder, and
as often fell through; being finally awarded by private
arrangement to other parties, at more than double the
prices of the lowest bidders.
In the elaborate Report made in 1852 to the Senate by
Gen. Rusk, as Chairman of the Committee on the Post
Office and Post Roads, of which Messrs. Soule, Hamlin,
Upham, and Morton were members, in speaking on this
subject the Committee said:
" Contracts to carry the ocean mail should, like all other contracts made by
the Government, be the subjects of a fair competition, and granted with reference to the public good, due regard being had to the excellence of the proposals
made, under all the circumstances of the cases which may present themselves.
Your committee are aware that it has been too much the practice to regard
the lowest as the cheapest bid; but experience has taught them that lowness of
price and cheapness in the end, are not convertible terms, as the daily applications, from low bidders, to Congress for indemnity against losses incurred in the
public service, will amply demonstrate. For examples of the kind the committee would respectfully refer to the numerous applications for remuneration, in
connection with the public printing, which have for years past occupied the
time and attention of Congress, and threaten to continue to do so to a most
alarming extent, involving, in the end, an accumulation of expense infinitely
beyond the cost that would have attended the performance of the work, at a fair
and liberal compensation. This may be, by some, called economy, but it is the
very worst sort of economy. It excludes the honest workman, who knows the
real value of the service to be performed, and is unwilling to undertake to do his
duty well, at the expense of himself and family; while it lets in the needy and
greedy speculator who, having nothing to lose in point of character or money,
will readily undertake what he can not perform, and become dependent upon
the magnanimity of Congress for remuneration for his losses, real or fictitious.
An honest and fair liberality should characterize the dealings between the Government and individuals, just as much as those between private citizens; and,
when contracts are made, they should be entered into in the spirit of good faith,
and with a full knowledge of the risks to be run, and the expenses to be incurred."
It is claimed on the other hand that in contracts made
by Congress the two Committees have every opportunity
of testing   the value of the service to         be performed, of
ascertaining the sum of subsidy really necessary to its support, of giving to every applicant a fair and impartial hear



HOW SHALL THE GOVERNMENT DISCHARGE THIS DUTY? 153
ing, and of presenting to Congress any case of doubt and
difficulty, or of contested right. When the committees
take any line into consideration it is in effect inviting
competition and proposals from every one else than the
projector who supposes that he has better claims to it, or
can perform the service at cheaper rates. Such proceedings are always open and advertised to the world for
months and sometimes for years. And there are many
persons who will come forward and make a low bid for a
service after some one else has brought it to the attention
of the Government and labored it through Congress, who
would not turn their fingers over, or risk a dollar in bringing it before the nation, and securing for it a due consideration. These are the adventurers who never produce
any thing themselves by a legitimate and honest effort,
but who alway stand back to take the chances of wresting
from some enterprising, more far-seeing, and more industrious person the fruits of the toil perhaps of years. There
are many enterprises in which the public have taken no
interest because ignorant of the facts. Some enterprising
individual goes zealously to work, travels thousands and
tens of thousands of miles, ascertains all of the facts bearing upon the question, determines its feasibility or its
impracticability, spends years of time and toil, and many
thousands of dollars of money, indoctrinates the people of
his country with the new and interesting facts, travels,
writes, labors day and night for years, finally secures the
attention of the Government and Congress, and asks a fair
and reasonable compensation for the necessary service
which he proposes performing for the public. He has contended with every species of opposition, overcome unwonted
embarrassments, foiled the machinations of selfish, interested parties who would through all time mislead the
public if they could but continue a monopoly of trade, and
finally succeeded in getting a bill through Congress for the
establishment of the long-sought line.




154                THE OCEAN POST.
This done, he supposes that he is of course to be rewarded for the effort, the toil, and the expenditure of years,
and that he will have an opportunity of indemnifying himself for his losses and sacrifices. He hears many beautiful
apostrophes to the principles of equal justice and right
which are said to characterize the legislatioi of his country, and control the action of the Government; but he is
not prepared to hear that some adventurer has carried off
his prize simply because by chance or by concert he has
made his bid one thousand or ten thousand dollars lower
than the prime projector. He becomes disheartened;
finds that the country neither appreciates nor desires honorable effort and enterprise; that it will not reward the
citizen in his self-sacrificing attempts to benefit the country
and himself together; and that it will look on with careless indifference while his almost vested, his equitably
vested rights, are neglected or stricken down. This is
certainly one of the practical and demoralizing effects of
the lowest bidder system, which respects no rights, however sacred, simply because based upon a dogma which is
technically true. The system of the lowest bidder is technically correct, but practically wrong. It can not be carried out in practice without abandoning equity and honest
rights under the plea of technicalities and the action of
chances. It is in reality but a species of gambling, a miserable lottery, in which those who are most honest and
truthful are invariably sacrificed. It is proper, then that
Congress should not only establish the postal routes, but
also determine either specifically or proximately the compensation to be paid; or leave this entirely to the discretion and the largest liberty of action of the Post Master
General. Responsibility must attach somewhere if justice
is obtained. With the lowest bidder system it rests and
operates nowhere; and the most important operations of
the Government are taken out of the hands of a wise pub



HOW SHALL THE GOVERNMENT DISCHARGE THIS DUTY? 155
lic functionary and the intelligent legislators of the country, and put into a great wheel of fortune, where the proper person has, probably, but one chance in a hundred.
This although true in every case of contract, is eminently
so in cases of untried lines, where the experiment is to be
made, and where it is generally necessary that an individual shall have spent years in bringing it to light.
I come to the conclusion, therefore, that the Government
can discharge the clear and unquestionable duty of affording liberal mail facilities to the people, only by establishing all of the lines which the commerce and convenience
of the country and the Government require; by maintaining them as a fixed policy of the country from generation
to generation; by encouraging enterprising companies to
continue well-performed services, and enterprising citizens
to open new avenues of trade and wealth; and by paying
for the same from the general treasury of the people, and
from the revenues which these. postal facilities, more than
any other series of influences, conspire to produce and to
conserve. (See Report of Lord Oanning, Section IX.:
also Report of Gen. Rzusk, Paper E: also remarks of Hon.
Edwin Croswell, Paper E.)




156               THE OCEAN POST.
SECTION       IX.
THE BRITISH SYSTEM, AND ITS RESULTS.
STEAM MAIL SYSTEM INAUGURATED AS THE PROMOTER OF
WEALTH, POWER, AND CIVILIZATION: THE EFFECT OF THE
SYSTEM ON COMMERCE: THE LONG PERIOD DESIGNATED FOR
THE EXPERIMENT: NEW LINES, WHEN, HOW, AND WHY ESTABLISHED: THE WORKINGS OF THE SYSTEM: FIRST CONTRACT
MADE IN 1833, LIVERPOOL AND ISLE OF MAN: WITH ROTTERDAM IN 1834: FALMOUTH AND GIBRALTAR, 1837:
ABERDEEN, SHETLAND, AND ORKNEYS, 1840: THE "SAVANNAH," THE FIRST OCEAN STEAMER: THE SIRIUS AND
GREAT WESTERN: CUNARD CONTRACT MADE   IN 1839:
EXTRA PAY " WITHIN CERTAIN LIMITS:" MALTA, ALEXANDRIA,
SUEZ, EAST-INDIES, AND CHINA IN 1840: THE PENINSULAR
AND ORIENTAL COMPANY: WEST-INDIA SERVICE ESTABLISHED
IN 1840: POINTS TOUCHED AT: PROVISIONAL EXTRA PAY:
PANAMA AND VALPARAISO LINE ESTABLISHED IN 1845:
HOLYHEAD AND KINGSTON IN 1848: ALSO THE CHANNEL
ISLANDS: WEST COAST OF AFRICA AND CAPE OF GOOD HOPE
IN 1852: CALCUTTA VIA THE CAPE IN 1852, AND ABANDONED: PLYMOUTH, SYDNEY, AND NEW SOUTH WALES ALSO
IN 1852, AND ABANDONED: INVESTIGATION OF 1851 AND
1853, AND NEW AUSTRALIAN CONTRACT IN 1856: HALIFAX,
NEWFOUNDLAND, BERMUDA, AND ST. THOMAS IN 1850:
NEW-YORK AND BERMUDA SOON DISCONTINUED: COMPARISON
OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN SUBSIDIES, RATES PER MILE, TOTAL DISTANCES, AND POSTAL INCOME: THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT PAYS HIGHER SUBSIDIES THAN THE AMERICAN: WORKINGS AND INCREASE OF THE BRITISH SERVICE: GEN. RUSK'S
VIEWS: SPEECH OF HON. T. B. KING: COMMITTEE OF INVESTIGATION, 1849: NEW INVESTIGATION ORDERED IN 1853,
AND INSTRUCTIONS: LORD CANNING'S REPORT AND ITS RECOMMENDATIONS: GREAT BRITAIN WILL NOT ABANDON




THE BRITISH SYSTEM, AND ITS RESULTS.  157
HER MAIL SYSTEM: THE NEW AUSTRALIAN LINE: TESTIMONY
OF ATHERTON AND MURRAY: MANY EXTRACTS FROM THE
REPORT: STEAM INDISPENSABLE: NOT SELF-SUPPORTING:
THE MAIL RECEIPTS WILL NOT PAY FOR IT: RESULT OF THE
WHOLE SYSTEM: ANOTHER NEW SERVICE TO INDIA AND
CHINA: SHALL WE RUN THE POSTAL AND COMMERCIAL RACE
WITH GREAT BRITAIN? CANADA AND THE INDIES.
IT is admitted that it is the clear and unquestionable duty
of the Government to establish ample foreign mail facilities for the nation, and that the only means of accomplishing this is by guaranteeing a liberal allowance for a long
term of years for the transport of the mails, and paying
for the same from the general treasury of the country.
We will, therefore, now examine the British ocean steam
mail system, and shall see that the practice of that great
nation fully corroborates and sustains the views which
have been advanced in the preceding chapters.
The steamship policy of that nation has not been treated
as a matter of slight or secondary importance. British
statesmen from the earliest days of the development of
marine steam power saw the influence which it was likely
to exert in the revolutions of commerce and the control of
the nations of the world, and determined, with the sagacious
foresight and the firm, fixed purpose for which they are distinguished, that it should be at once inaugurated as the great
instrument of individual wealth and national power. They
properly conceived that the nation which used this transforming agent most freely in commerce, defenses and diplomacy would unquestionably exert a high controlling influence over the nations of the earth, and make every land
tributary to its wealth and power. The end justifies the
effort, and the few temporary sacrifices and insignificant
expenditures which have been made. The British nation
launched at once into an extended foreign mail system




158                TE OCEAN POST.
which has been twenty years maturing and untouched, and
which, on a small annual expenditure, has given it the profitable control of every trade and every market on the face
of the globe. It was wisely conceded that a long period
would be necessary to make the great experiment of marine steam mails, and that term was granted in the outset.
When the first term of twelve years had ended, the contracts were renewed for another term of twelve years, in
every instance with the companies first authorized, and the
sums of subsidy were in every case increased. Not only
thus. New lines were established all along the course of
these experiments, in a quiet executive way, without agitation, without lobbying, without corruption, just as the Post
Master General would put some short and necessary land
route into operation. The last of these lines established
was that in 1856, between Southampton and Australia for
seven years, at an annual subsidy of ~185,000, or $925,000.
And this line was established, not because there was no
postal communication; for the Government already had a
semi-monthly line to China, India, and Australia, and
another around Africa; but because the increased demands of British trade, and convenience to the British
public, made it necessary.
During all of this time the system has operated with unbroken regularity. Established on a great general principle, as well as the highest possible expediency, it has
been regarded as a fixed policy of the Government and the
people, and has been suffered to do its excellent work quietly and undisturbed. The legislation introducing it was not
an accident. It was not a spasm of generosity to the people; but it was a fixed purpose of the British public; the
wise and only adequate means adapted to accomplish an
important, an indispensable end. The first contract for
carrying the mails in steamers, was made by the Post Master General in 1833, with the " Mona Isle Steam Company,"




THE BRITISH SYSTEM, AND ITS RESULTS.  159
to run semi-weekly between Liverpool and the Isle of Man
at ~850 per annum. This Company has run the line ever
since, a period of twenty-four years, and at the same price
per annum. Afterthis, a contract was made in 1834 with
the " General Steam Navigation Company," for the semiweekly conveyance of the mails between London and Rotterdam, and London and Hamburg, at ~17,000 per year.
The contract was not annulled until 1853, nineteen years,
when it was found best to send the mail by a new
route; that is, to Ostend, and over the railways of Belgium. The first contract for a long voyage was made with
Richard Bourne, in 1837, to convey the mails weekly from
Falmouth to Vigo, O Porto, Lisbon, Cadiz, and Gibraltar,
for ~29,600 per annum. The contract was transferred in
1843 to the " Peninsular and Oriental Company," Southampton was substituted for Falmouth, the weekly trips
were changed to three per month, and the subsidy was reduced accordingly, or to ~20,500 per annum. The service
has been performed on these terms ever since. The Aberdeen and Shetland contract was made in 1840, at ~900 per
year, after a failure to run on ~600, by a previous arrangement. It now continues as then made.
It is known that the first passage across the Atlantic
was made in the American steamer " Savannah," which left
Savannah, Georgia, on the 25th May, 1819, and at the end
of twenty-two days arrived in Liverpool, steaming only
fourteen days of the time. The Savannah was only 350
tons tonnage, and had an engine of ninety horses' power.
Captain Moses Rogers was her commander. The "Sirius"
arrived in New-York, on the 23d of April, 1838. The
steamer " Great Western" next followed, in the same year.
And although this was only nineteen years ago, it is instructive to notice the observations which the London
Times made at that day. That journal said, March 31,
1838:




160               THE OCEAN POST.
"There is really no mistake in this long-talked of project of navigating the Atlantic ocean by steam. There is
no doubt of the intention to make the attempt, and to give
the experiment, as such, a fair trial. The Sirius is actually
getting under way for America."
On the 4th of July, 1839, the British Government entered into a contract with Samuel Cunard of Halifax for a
semi-monthly mail line between Liverpool, and Halifax,
and Boston, at the sum of ~60,000 or $300,000 per annum.
That contract inaugurated a new era in our American
commerce with the old world, and gave an impulse tothose
international interests and those commercial amities which
have bound Great Britain and the United States in the
bonds of enduring friendship and mutual, neighborly dependence. Boston soon proved inadequate to the support
of the entire line, and half of the steamers were sent to
New-York; and thus they continue to run to this day. It
is a singular fact that since that contract was made, eighteen years ago, there has never been one transatlantic
steamer except those of Mr. Cunard running to or from
that port. This contract was renewed with Mr. Cunard in
1850, when weekly trips were required for the greater
portion of the year, and the subsidy was advanced, not in
the ratio of the service, which was only doubled, but as
three to one, from ~60,000 to ~1'73,340, or from $300,000
to $866,700. The experience of twelve years had demonstrated both the necessity of continuing the line, and of
increasing the subsidy which the Government paid, to such
a sum as would secure good steamers, regularity of trips,
and efficiency of service. The Company now has nine
steamers, with 18,406 tons aggregate tonnage, and 6,418
horses' power. The contract, which is to continue for
twelve years, until 1862, was so altered in 1852 as to provide for a weekly service as well in winter as in summer;
and it will continue in force from 1862 until twelve months




THE BRITISH SYSTEM, AND ITS RESULTS.    161
after notice may be given for the discontinuance of the
line. The compensation for the same is at the rate of 11l
4i d per mile. Lord Canning's Report to Parliament in
1853, before noticed, in particularizing on this line, said:
"An additional allowance, within certain limits, is to
be made to the contractors in the event of an increase in
the rate of insurance on steam vessels, or in the freight or
insurance of coals, as compared with the rates payable at
the date of the contract, if proved to the satisfaction of
the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty."
Thus, instead of abandoning this line after an experiment of twelve years, and finding that it could never be selfsupporting, the British Government wisely determined to
let their policy produce its full fruits, and continued it for
another similar term of years, with three times the former
subsidy, for only twice the old service. (See Collins and
-Ctnard Lines, Sec. X.)
A contract was made in 1840 for steam to Malta, Corfu,
and Alexandria, and the service was extended in 1845 to
Suez, BombAy, Ceyl6n, Calcutta, Hong Kong, and Shanghae. It was renewed again in 1853, terminable in 1862,
or after twelve months' notice, with a service between Sydney and Singapore, with the "Peninsular and Oriental
Company;" and the subsidy for the whole service was
increased from  ~199,600 or $998,000 per annum, to
$1,224,000 per annum. The Company have thirty-nine
vessels of 48,835 tons, and 12,850 horses' power, and run
796,637 annually, at 68 11 d per mile. The steamers run
the whole service of 796,637 miles annually, at this low
rate because much of the service is confined to the Mediterranean, as for example, their line from Southampton to
Vigo, O Porto, Lisbon, Cadiz, and Gibraltar; and also
that between Marseilles and Malta. This is but like the
coasting trade at the utmost, and is not ocean navigation
proper. Before the contract was renewed the same com11




162               THE OCEAN POST.
pany got for the service between Hong Kong and Ceylon,
128 7d per mile, and for that between Suez and Calcutta,
~1, 08 lid per mile.
The contract with the " West-India Royal Mail Packet
Company" was made in 1840 for a semi-monthly service to
the West-Indies, Central America, and Mexico, at ~240,000,
and for 547,296 nautical miles per annum. The contract
was renewed on the same terms in 1846, and again in 1850,
when the Brazil service was added, and the subsidy increased to -~270,000 or $1,350,000 per annum, for twelve
years, or until 1862, and one year after notice shall have
been given. The length of the routes now run by the
Company is 37,000 nautical miles, with thirty-four stopping places. The West-India service of 393,432 miles, is
performed at the rate of 108 10d per mile, under special
contract; no advertisement ever having been made for
tenders. The Brazilian portion of the service embraces
153,864 miles annually. Pay per mile for the whole Royal
Mail service is 9s 10d per mile. This Company has
twenty steamers, of 29,454 tons, and 9,308 horses' power.
On the Brazil portion of the service the touches are at
Lisbon, Madeira, Teneriffe, St. Vincent, Pernambuco, Bahia, Rio de Janiero, Monte Video, and Buenos Ayres. On
the West-India division, St. Thomas is the central depot,
after touching at the Azores. Ten branch lines radiate
from St. Thomas to Antigua, Barbados, Blewfields, Carriacou, Carthagena, Aspinwall, (which they call Colon,) Demartra, Dominica, GrenAda, Greytown, Gaudaloupe, Havanna, Honduras, Jacmel, Jamaica, Martinique, Porto Rico,
St. Kitt's, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Santa Martha, Tampico,
Tobago, Trinidad, and Vera Cruz. Lord Canning says:
( It is stipulated that if at any time, from causes recognized by the Lords of the Treasury as being of a' distinctly public and national character,' the insurance on
steam vessels shall rise above 616s per cent., the freight of




THE BRITISH SYSTEM, AND ITS RESULTS.   163
coals above 11 2.s 6d per ton, and the insurance on coals
above 21 2s per cent., the Company shall receive an additional sum, to be settled by arbitration, but not to exceed
75,0001 a year in the whole."
The special contract for the West Coast of South-America, with the "Pacific Steam Navigation Company," for
three round trips per month between Panama and Valparaiso, touching at Buenaventura, Guayaquil, Payta, Lambayeque, Huanchaco, Santa, Pisco, Islay, Arica, Iquique,
Cobija, CopiApo, Huasco, and Coquimbo, was made in
1845, at ~20,000, or $100,000 per annum, for five years.
It was renewed in 1850 for ten years; and hence, expires
in 1860, if notice may be given to that effect; the trips
being only semi-monthly, and the subsidy increased to
~25,000 per annum. The Company has seven steamers,
of 5,719 tons, and 2,396 horses' power. (See List of British Mail Lines, Paper B, page 193.)
The contract for running fast packets between Holyhead and Kingston, in Ireland, was made in 1848 with the
" City of Dublin Steam Packet Company," for ~25,000 per
annum, and is terminable at twelve months' notice after
1860. The line is run twice every day. The service to
the Channel islands, from  Southampton to Jersey and
Guernsey, was established in 1848, at ~4,000 per annum,
for three trips per week. That of the West Coast of Africa was established in 1852, at ~21,250 per annum.
Leaving Plymouth, the steamers touch at Madeira, Teneriffe, Goree, Bathurst, Sierra Leone, Monrovia, Cape Coast
Castle, Accra, Whydah, Badagry, Lagos, Bonny, Old Calab&r, Cameroon, and Fernando Po. This contract was
made with the "African Steamship Company," for a
monthly service, and terminates in 1862 if twelve months'
notice be given. There must be three steamers of T00
tons each, and the pay is, for 149,880 miles annually, at
2s 6d per mile. The contract with the " General Screw




164               THE OCEAN POST.
Steamshipping Company," for service semi-monthly from
Plymouth to the Cape of Good Hope and Calcutta, touching on the return voyage at St. Vincent, Ascension, Cape
of Good Hope, Mauritius, Point de Galle, MadrAs, and St.
Helena, for ~50,000 per year, to be reduced after two
years to ~40,000 annually, and that to the Cape of Good
Hope and Port Nattl, touching at Mossel and Algoa bays,
Buffalo, and Port Francis, for ~3,000 per annum, with the
same Company, were both made in 1852; but the service
was found impracticable on the terms, and was abandoned.
That from Plymouth every two months to Sydney and
New South Wales, with the "Australian Royal Mail Steam
Navigation Co.," for ~26,000 per annum, and touching at
St. Vincent, Simon's Bay, or Table Bay, Cape of Good
Hope, King George Sound, Port Philip, and St. Helena,
was made also in 1852; but was likewise soon abandoned,
as the subsidy in each case was too small.
About this time the Chancellor of the Exchequer requested a thorough investigation into the foreign steam
packet system. This was made in the most searching
manner in 1853; and such was the effect that it was determined not only to sustain all of the existing lines in all
of their integrity, but.to extend the system and afford additional facilities to British commerce and the British people. Accordingly, a new contract was made last year,
1856, with the "European and Australian Mail Steam
Packet Company" for a monthly service between Southampton, Marseilles, Malta, Alexandria, Suez, and Sydney, at
an annual subsidy of ~185,000, or $925,000. The Company has seven steamers of 13,410 tons, and 3,290 horses'
power. They run 336,000 miles per annum, and receive
11 per mile from the Government. It must be borne in
mind, too, that w'hen this line was established there were
already two lines to the East-Indies and China, and one to
Australia. This makes two to Australia, and three to the
East generally.




THE BRITISH SYSTEM, AND ITS RESULTS.   165
There is also a contract, made in 1850 with Mr. Cunard,
for running monthly between Halifax and Newfoundland,
and Halifax, Bermuda, and New-York, as well as between
New-York and Bermuda and St. Thomas. New-York was
soon dropped from the list, doubtless because the British
steamers yielded us more advantage than was gained by the
mother country or the Provinces, and the line is now continued, at the original compensation, ~14,700, or $T3,500,
between Halifax and Newfoundland, and Halifax, Bermuda, and St. Thomas, connecting with the Cunard
steamers. The steamers are small coasters, and run at the
rate of 3.s per mile. Hence, they make 98,000 miles per
annum.
The ocean mail steamers of Great Britain run 2,532,231
miles per year, at a total cost to the Admiralty of
~1,062,797, or $5,333,985. The ocean mail steamers of
the United States run 735,732 miles per year, at a total
charge on the Post Office Department of $1,329,733. The
British steamers run three and a half times as many miles
as ours do, and receive for it a sum more than four times as
large. The average price paid to their principal companies,
as the West-India Royal Mail, the Cunard, the Australian,
and the Peninsular and Oriental, including its Meditdrranean coasting service, is 98 7d, or $2.39 per mile; while
the average price paid by us, or for the Collins, Havre,
Bremen, Aspinwall, and PanamA, San Francisco and
Oregon, is $1.801 per mile.  The highest sum paid per
mile by the British Government is ls9 41d, or $2.8 3, to
the Cunard Company, $2.75 to the Australian, and $2.46
to the West-India; and ithe lowest, 6s 1sd, or $1.531 to
the Peninsular and Oriental, much of whose service is
coasting. This is saying nothing of the Pacific and the
African coasting lines. The highest sum which we pay is
to the Collins line, $3.10| per mile; and the lowest to the
Havre, $1.009 per mile; while the sums paid to all of the




166                THE OCEAN POST.
other companies range but little above the last figures.
The lowest rate per mile paid to any of the lines under
the contract, was to the Pacific Mail, $1.70. It must not
be forgotten that the low rates per mile of the Havre and
Bremen result from those lines taking the postages, since
their contracts expired; a sum by no means adjusted to the
service done. They had ships that they could not let lie
idle. Under their regular contracts the pay per mile of
the Bremen line was $2.08, and of the Havre $176'.
While the British Government pays to four of her principal transmarine services an average of $2.39 per mile,
we pay to five of ours an average of $1.80 only, or but
about two thirds as much as she does. While our total
annual expenditure for foreign mails is $1,329,733, a sum
by $20,267 less than that paid to the single service of the
West-India Royal Mail Company, that of Great Britain is
$5,333,985.  And, while our total income from transmarine postages is $1,035,740, a sum but little short of
that paid in subsidy, taking the present Bremen and Havre
services at the estimates of last year for sea and inland
postages combined, the income from   the whole transmarine service of Great Britain, including ocean and inland postage, was, when the last report was made in 1853,
~591,573, or $2,957,865; but little above half the sum
paid in subsidy, and including the French, Belgian, and
Dutch routes, where the postal yield was much greater
than from the ocean lines. The estimates which I present
below have been made with great care from distances and
subsidies furnished me by the reliable First Assistant Post
Master General, Hon. Horatio King, from the last report
of the late Post Master General, and from the report of
the British Post Master General, Lord Canning, before
noticed. Every item is consequently authentic.




THE BRITISH SYSTEM, AND ITS RESULTS.                                167
AMERICAN.
Line.         Trips. Distances. Subsidy.  Gross Postage. TotalMiles Pay per Mile.
Collins,.............   20    8,100   $885,000      $415,867    124,000      $8.10i
Bremen.................  13   3,700     128,987      128,987     96,000       1.34
Eavre,.................  18   3,270      88,484       88,484     85,020       1.001
Aspinwall,............. 24    8,200     290,000      189,610    153,600       1.88t
Pacific.................  24   4,20       48,250      183,28     201,600       1.70
Havana................  24     669       60,000       6,288      82,112       1.861
Vera Cruz,..............  24    900      29,062       5,960      48,200.67,_______________-______$1,329,788 $1,085,740 725,732 $1.801 Average.
Total average per mile, $1.801.    Average of five principal lines, $1.80j.
BRITISH.
Line.         Trips. Distances. Subsidy.  Gross Postage. TotalMiles Pay per Mile.
Canard,................. 85,100         ~173,840  ~143,667.10a   804,000  118 4d   $2.388
Royal Mail..............  24   11,402    270,000    106,905.00   547,296   9810    $2.46
Pen. and Oriental,.......  24            244,000    178,186.11   796,637   6s 1f   $1.538
Australian............... 12  14,000    185,000     33,281.12   336,000  11s00    $2.75
Bermuda and St. Thomas   24     2,042     14,700                  98,000   3800    $0.75
Panama and Valparaiso,.  24     2,718     25,000     5,715.00    130,434   8810    $0.96
West Coast Africa,......  12    6,245     28,250     3,196.02    149,880   28 6    $0.621
French, Belgian,
and Dutch Postage.
Channel Islands,........ 156     182                74,480.08    41,184
Holyhead and Kingston,.. 780      64                86,158.09     93,440
Liv. and Isle of Man,.... 112     70                10,082.15     14,560
Shetland and Orkneys,...  52     200                              20,800
[                            1____________________ ~,062,797 ~591,573.078 2,532,231 9s7d $2.89
Total Average per Mile, $2.10*.     Average of four principal lines, $2.39.
It would hadly be expected that the lines of this country should run at cheaper rates than those of Great Britain, as the prime cost of ships and their repairs, fuel, wages,
insurance, etc., are much cheaper there, and as they have
more paying freights, in their manufactured goods. It only
explains to us, what has alway seemed a mystery; that
while the regular companies in England were making
money, nearly all of those in the United States not only
had not made money, but were embarrassed more or less,
and were selling their sWks at sixty to eighty cents on
the dollar.
* The Peninsular and Oriental Company run twice per month between Southampton
and Alexandria, and between Suez and Calcutta and Hong Kong; twice per month between Marseilles and Malta; between Singapore and Sydney every two months; and
three times per month between Southampton and Gibraltar, touching at Vigo, 0 Porto,
Lisbon, and Cadiz.




168                     THE OCEAN    POST.
It is pleasing and instructive to examine the steam mail
service of Great Britain, and see the gradual, unfaltering
progress that she has made from year to year, since 1833;
increasing the mail facilities and the sums paid for them
by constant accretion based on system, rather than by any
spasmodic legislation, or the ruling caprices of the moment.
These improvements have not come all in a mass, or in
any one year. Neither have they been abandoned at times
of financial embarrassment, or commercial depression. At
such periods they have been as regularly fostered as in the
times of the most flush prosperity; and have ever been
properly considered one of the prime agents and necessities for restoring commerce to its normal condition and a
safe equilibrium.    The transmarine service, which cost but
~583,793, or $2,918,965, per annum until 1850,* now costs
~1,062,797, or $5,333,985; within a fraction of double
the sum. While the increase has not been slow, it has
been steady and systematic, just as it was necessary to
meet the wants of British commerce throughout the world.
The language of the Hon. Senator Rusk on this subject,
in his Report made to the Senate, Sep. 18th, 1850, found
in Senate Ex. Doc. No. 50, 1st Session of 32d Congress, in
Special Rep. Secretary of the Navy, 1852, is forcible and
worthy of remembrance. He says:
" The importance of the steam mail service, when considered with reference
to the convenience which it affords to the social intercourse of the country, is as
nothing when compared with its vast bearing upon the commerce of the world.
Wherever facilities of rapid travel exist, trade will be found with its attendant
wealth. Of the truth of this proposition, no country, perhaps, affords a more
forcible illustration than Great Britain, as none has ever availed itself, to so
great an extent, of the benefits of easy aualapid intercommunication between
the various portions of her almost boundless empire. The commercial history
of England has shown that mail facilities have uniformly gone hand in hand with
the extension of trade; and wherever British subjects are found forming communities, there do we find the hand of the government busy in supplying the
means of easy and safe communication with the mother country. With a view
* See Second Report, Steam Communication with India, 1851. Appendix, page 419.




THE BRITISH SYSTEM, AND ITS RESULTS.                169
to this, we have beheld England increasing her steam marine at an enormous
expense, and sustaining packet lines connecting with every quarter of the globe,
even in cases where any immediate and direct remuneration was out of the
question. The great object in view was, to draw together the portions of an
empire upon which the sun never sets, and the martial airs of which encircle
the globe, and to make British subjects who dwell in Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and even Oceanica, all feel alike that they are Britons."
The Hon. Thomas Butler King, formerly Chairman of
the Naval Committee, in a speech in the House, 19th July,
1848, said on this subject:
" In the year 1840 a contract was made bythe Admiralty with the Royal Mail
Steam Packet Company, at two hundred and forty thousand pounds sterling, or
one million two hundred thousand dollars per annum, for fourteen steamers to
carry the mails from Southampton to the West-Indies, the ports of Mexico in
the Gulf, and to New-Orleans, Mobile, Savannah, and Charleston. These ships
are of the largest class, and are to conform in all respects, concerning size and
adaptation to the purposes of war, to the conditions prescribed in the Cunard
contracts. They are to make twenty-four voyages or forty-eight trips a year,
leaving and returning to Southampton semi-monthly.
~iAnother contract has recently been entered into, as I am informed, for two
ships to run between Bermuda and New-York. The West-India line, in consequence of some disasters during the first years of its service, was relieved from
touching at the ports of the United States; but in the spring of last year it was
required to resume its communication with New-Orleans, and is at any time
liable to be required to touch at the other ports on our coast which I have
named. Thus it will be perceived that this system of mail steam-packet service
is so arranged as not only to communicate with Canada and the West-Indies, the
ports on the Spanish Main and the Gulf coast of Mexico, but also to touch at
every important port in the United States, from Boston to New-Orleans.
"These three lines employ twenty-five steamers of the largest and most efficient description, where familiarity with our seaports and the whole extent of
our coast would render them the most formidable enemies in time of war. It is
scarcely possible to imagine a system more skillfully devised to bring down upon
us, at any given point, and at any unexpected moment, the whole force of British power. More especially is this true with respect to our southern coast,
where the great number of accessible and unprotected harbors, both on the Atlantic and the Gulf, would render such incursions comparatively safe to them,
and terrible to us. And when we reflect that the design of this system is, that
it shall draw the means of its support from our own commerce and intercourse,
we should surely have been wanting in the duty we owed to ourselves and to our
country, if we had failed to adopt measures towards the establishment of such
an American system of Atlantic steam navigation as would compete successfully
with it."
Previous to the renewal of the several foreign mail con



170               THE OCEAN POST.
tracts, in 1850, the Treasury ordered, 26th April, 1849,
the formation of a Committee in these words: " Ordered,
that a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the
CONTRACT PACKET SERVICE." That Committee was composed of Sir James Hogg, Mr. Cardwell, Sir Wm. Clay,
Mr. Cowper, Mr. Alderman Thompson, Mr. Fitz Roy, Mr.
Hastie, Mr. Mangles, Mr. Thomas Baring, Mr. Bankes, Mr.
William Brown, Mr. Childers, Mr. Wilcox, Mr. Crogan,
and Mr. Henley. Mr. Elliot was added in the place of
Mr. Baring. The Committee sat seventeen days, and examined fifteen witnesses under oath, many of these being
commanders in the Navy, Secretaries, Presidents, and engineers of the Companies, and other eminent men in steam.
Mr. Cunard was among the witnesses. After taking evidence and papers extending over about seven hundred and
eighty-three octavo pages, they said in their report, after
recommending that great care should be exercised in making all future contracts:
"1. That so far as the Committee are able to judge,
from the evidence they have taken, it appears that the
mails are conveyed at a less cost by Hired Packets than
by Her Majesty's Vessels.
" 2. That some of the existing Contracts have been put
up to public tender, and some arranged by private negotiation; and that a very large sum beyond what is received from postage is paid on some of the lines; but considering that at the time these contracts were arranged
the success of these large undertakings was uncertain,'Your Committee see no reason to think that better terms
could have been obtained for the public."
This investigation was made to enable the Government
to proceed intelligently with the many contracts which
were to expire in 1850; and its immediate consequence
was, not only the renewal of all the old contracts with the
same parties at the same or larger pay, but the establishment of several new services.




THE BRITISH SYSTEM, AND ITS RESULTS.                 171
The British     system   had   operated to     the very highest
satisfaction of the public and the Government for twenty
years, until 1853, as it has done ever since; but at that time
it was put to a second and very severe test. It had been
suggested, probably by the Lords of the Admiralty, who
had to pay the bills from      the Naval fund, that the packet
system was too costly, and should be remodelled, and perhaps reduced. Complaint was thus made to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who, in a Treasury Minute, dated
March 1, 1853, says:
"Important as it is to secure rapid and certain communication with the remote dependencies of this country, and with other distant states, for national
purposes, it is doubtless, under all common circumstances, from commercial
considerations that such facility of correspondence derives its highest value."
" Her Majesty's Government conceive the time to have arrived when the entire charge of the packet service should be deliberately examined and reviewed,
with joint reference to the questions-how far the purposes with which the
present system was begun have been accomplished-how far the total amount
of service rendered to the State is adequate to the total annual expense-how
far there may be cause for a more than commonly jealous and scrupulous consideration of such further schemes of extension of the system as particular interests or parties may press, or even such as public objects may recommend from
time to time; lastly, how far, on account of the early period at which certain
of the contracts are terminable, or on account of requisitions put in by the contractors themselves for the modification of the terms, or for any other reason, it
may be prudent to entertain the question of any revision of those terms, or of
laying down any prospective rules with regard to them; such only, of course,
as may comport with the equitable as well as the legal rights of the parties, and
may avoid any disappointment to the just expectations of those classes who may
have felt a peculiar interest in the establishment and extension of these great
lines of communication."
After remarking that some of the vessels of some few
Companies were unfit for purposes of war, the "Minute of
the Treasury," in instructing the Committee, further says:
"At the same time, it is not to be conceived that, on account of this failure
in a portion of the design, the country has cause to regret having paid a larger
price than was intended to be paid simply for the establishment of these noble
chains of communication, which well nigh embrace the world. The organization of a complete postal system upon the ocean, with absolute fixity of departures, and a general approach to certainty in arrivals, was a great problem, of
high interest and benefit, not to England only, but to all civilized countries;




172                 THE OCEAN POST.
and this problem may now be said to have been solved by England, for the advantage of mankind at large. It was to all appearance altogether beyond the
reach of merely commercial enterprise; and if the price paid has been high, the
object has been worthy, and the success for all essential purposes complete."
As a consequence of this " Minute," the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury appointed a Committee,
consisting of Viscount Canning, Post Master General of
Great Britain, as President; Hon. Wm. Cowper, on behalf of the Board of Admiralty; Sir Stafford H. Northcote, Bart.; and Mr. R. Madox Bromley, Secretary to the
Board of Audit. The Committee organized, examined the
Evidence and Report of the Committee of 1849, also the
three large volumes of Evidence and Report taken by the
Committee in 1851 on "Steam Communication with India
and Australia," and the many elaborate documents of this
class published by the Admiralty. After discussing thoroughly all of the political, financial, commercial, ethical, and
social questions connected with rapid steam mail communication, they made an elaborate and detailed examination of all
the contracts existing with the Government, and of the
affairs of the various companies, with a view to deciding
whether the ocean mail service should be abridged, or continued, or extended. They reported to both Houses of
Parliament, July 8th, 1853. The conclusion of the Committee was, not only that the present service was demanded
by every interest of the country and should be sustained,
but that it should be judiciously extended, so as to meet
all of the wants of the British public of whatever class.
As elsewhere remarked, the new line established last year
to Australia and India, at a cost of $925,000 per annum,
for seven years, was a legitimate result of that test and that
report, made in the most searching manner by the very
ablest men of the kingdom; and this, notwithstanding the
reports purposely circulated in this country every few
years that Great Britain intends abandoning her steam
mail system. She will abandon that system, as her prac



THE BRITISH SYSTEM, AND ITS RESULTS.                173
tice plainly indicates, only when her people shall have discovered some means of making and preserving wealth
without effort, enterprise, commerce, or manufactures. (See
page 99, Mr. Atherton's Reply.)          The Report says:
( Before the application of steam to the propulsion of ships, the contracts were
often made for short periods, the Government being able to find, among the
vessels already employed in trade, some of speed sufficient for the purpose; but
when it became requisite to dispatch the mails by steam, the ordinary supply
of trading vessels would no longer suffice, and the Government had to call into
existence a new class of packets.
"The postal service between England and the adjacent shores of Ireland,
France, and Belgium, was at first performed by steam packets belonging to the
Crown; but for the longer voyages it was thought better to induce commercial
companies to build steamers; and with that view the contracts were at first
made for periods which, unless previously terminated by failure to fulfill their
engagements, would secure to the company the full benefit of their original outlay, by continuing the employment of their vessels until they might be expected
to require extensive repairs, or to become unfit for continued service. In 1837
steam communication was created with Portugal and Gibraltar; in 1840 with
9gypt, with the West-Indies, and with North-America.
"When the public interest requires the establishment of a postal line on
which the ordinary traffic would not be remunerative for steamers, the subsidy
to be allowed in the contract may be ascertained either by the test of public
competition, or by calculating the amount which, on an estimate of the probable
receipts and expenditure, will cover the deficiency of receipts, or by comparing
it with the cost of war vessels if employed for the same purpose."
"The objects which appear to have led to the formation of these contracts,
and to the large expenditure involved, were-to afford a rapid, frequent, and
punctual communication with those distant ports which feed the main arteries
of British commerce, and with the most important of our foreign possessions;
to foster maritime enterprise; and to encourage the production of a superior
class of vessels which would promote the convenience and wealth of the country
in time of peace, and assist in defending its shores against hostile aggression.
"These expectations have not been disappointed. The ocean has been traversed with a precision and regularity hitherto deemed impossible-commerce
and civilization have been extended-the colonies have been brought more
closely into connection with the Home Government-and steamships have been
constructed of a size and power that, without Government aid, could hardly, at
least for many years, have been produced.
"It is not easy to estimate the pecuniary value of these results, but there
is no reason to suppose that they could have been attained at that time at less
cost."
After noticing the objects of the postal contracts, the
Report says, in speaking of their results:




174                      THE OCEAN     POST.
" To show what the system is capable of accomplishing, it will be sufficient
that we should call attention to the two great lines of communication which
have been opened, the one between this country and India, the other between
this country and America. The mails are dispatched twice a month in the one
case, and once a week in the other, and are conveyed to their destination with a
regularity and rapidity which leaves nothing to be desired. The time occupied
in the voyage to and fro between England and Bombay, which, before the establishment of the Overland Route, averaged about 224 days, is now no more than
87 days; and the time occupied in the voyage to and fro between England and
the United States, which before 1840 varied from 45 to 105 days, is now reduced to an average period of 24 days. Nor is the service simply rapid, it is
also regular; and the mercantile community can reckon with the utmost certainty on the punctual departure of the mails at the appointed times, and can
also calculate with great precision the times of their arrival.
"The same results have not been so conspicuous on some other postal lines;
but, taking the service as a whole, it has undoubtedly been brought to a high
state of excellence, and its value to the country, both politically and commercially, is very considerable."
In speaking further of the objects of the Government
postal service, after inquiring whether the foreign mail
service should be extended any further, it says:
"The object of the Government in undertaking the transmarine postal service,
whether by packets or by the system of ship letters, is to provide frequent, rapid,
and regular communication between this country and other states, and between
different parts of the British Empire. The reasons for desiring such communication are partly commercial and partly political. In cases where the interests
concerned are chiefly those of commerce, it is generally more important that the
postal service should be regular, than that it should be extremely rapid, though
of course rapidity of communication, where it can be obtained without sacrificing other objects, is of great advantage. It would clearly be the interest of
persons engaged in an important trade, provided there were no legal impediment in the way, to establish a regular postal communication in connection with
it, even without aid from the state. This, however, would not extend to many
cases in which there are political reasons for maintaining such services, while
the commercial interests involved are of less magnitude. Nor is it probable that
private communications would be nearly so rapid as those directed by the Govcrnment; for a high rate of speed can only be obtained at a great expense, which
will generally be found to be disproportionate to the beneits directly received
from it, unless under peculiar circumstances of passenger traffic. Lastly, it is
to be considered that there are several services which, if they were not carried
on by the British Government, would probably be undertaken by the Governments of foreign states, and that it is not likely that private individuals or associations would in such cases enter into competition with them.
"From these considerations we infer that, even upon the lines in the main



THE BRITISH SYSTEM, AND ITS RESULTS.                175
tenance of which the greatest commercial interests are involved, private enterprise can not be depended upon for providing a complete substitute for Government agency; while it is clear that in others, where regular communications are
desired solely or chiefly for political purposes, such ageney is absolutely indispensable. It is, however, obvious, that to establish a Government system in some
cases, and to leave others wholly to private persons, would cause much inconvenience. The conclusion therefore follows, that it is right that the Government
should have the management of the whole of the transmarine postal communication, as it also has that of the communication within the country.
" In undertaking this duty, the Government will in the first place have regard
to the national interests, whether political, social, or commercial, involved in the
establishment and Inaintenance of each particular line. Care must, however,
be taken, in cases where the communication is desired chiefly for commercial
purposes, to guard against an undue expenditure of public money for the benefit of private merchants. The extension of commerce is undoubtedly a national
advantage, and it is quite reasonable that Parliamentary grants should occasionally be employed for the sake of affording fresh openings for it, by establishing
new lines of communication, or introducing new methods of conveyance, the expense of which, after the first outlay has been incurred, may be expected to be
borne by the parties availing themselves of the facilities offered them. But this
having once been done, and sufficient time having been allowed for the experiment, the further continuance of the service, unless required for political reasons
of adequate importance, should be made to depend upon the extent to which the
parties chiefly interested avail themselves of it, and upon its tendency to become
self-supporting."
Noticing the greater or less sums at which private companies may be induced to undertake short line postal service, and stating that the line is both benefited            and  injured by the necessity of punctual sailing hours, the Report states the reason why subsidies are required, thus:
" The vessels now under contract with the Government are, however, for the
most part, required to maintain high rates of speed. The contractors are also
subject to a variety of conditions, designed partly to secure the efficiency of
the postal service, and partly to render their vessels available for other national
purposes wholly unconnected with that service. In return, they are in the receipt of subsidies largely in excess of the amount of revenue derived from the
mails they carry, and those subsidies are guaranteed to them for terms of years
varying from four to twelve, most of which have at the present time not less
than seven or eight years to run. An Estimate printed in the Appendix, will
show that while the amount of the subsidies to foreign and colonial lines, as
contracted for in the past year, was no less than ~822,390, the sums received
for postage upon these lines can not be estimated at more than ~443,782."
The Report further says, as to the mode by which postal




176                      THE   OCEAN    POST.
communication       can   be  procured, "where        frequent and
rapid communication already exists, it is only necessary
for the Government to secure from time to time the services of vessels already engaged in private traffic." But
as there are no such cases in the transmarine routes, and
as private enterprise supplies the demand of steam lines
only on the short routes, like the inter-island           service of
Great Britain, or that to the Continent, or the service of
the  Sound, the     North    River, short coast routes, etc., in
the United States, the Report goes on to say:
" There still remain, however, some cases in which there exists no private
communication sufficient to render such a mode of proceeding practicable.
Where this is so, and where a communication has to be created, it will be necessary that contracts of longer duration should be made, for it is unreasonable
to expect that any person or association of persons should incur the expense and
risk of building vessels, forming costly establishments, and opening a new line of
communication at a heavy outlay of capital, without some security that they
will be allowed to continue the service long enough to reap some benefit from their
undertaking. It must be borne in mind, that the expensive vessels built for the
conveyance of the mails at a high rate of speed are not in demand for the purposes of
ordinary traffic, and can not therefore be withdrawn and applied to another service
at short notice. It is, then, fair, that on the first opening of a new line, contracts
should be made for such a length of time as may encourage the building of ships
for the purpose, by affording a prospect of their employment for a considerable
number of years. But we see no sufficient reason for continually renewing such
contracts for periods equally long, after the object has once been attained."
(For the views of the Committee on the adaptation of the
mail packets to naval service, see pages 146 and 147.)
The Committee in summing up, presents the result of the
investigation and the fruits of the service in the following
impressive light:
"The value of the services thus rendered to the State can not, we think, be measured by a mere reference to the amount of the postal revenue, or even by the
commercial advantages accruing from it. It is undoubtedly startling, at first
sight, to perceive that the immediate pecuniary result of the Packet System is
a loss to the Revenue of about ~325,000 a year; but, although this circumstance shows the necessity for a careful revision of the service, and although we
believe that much may be done to make that service self-supporting, we do not
consider that the money thus expended is to be regarded, even from a fiscal
point of view, as a national loss."




THE BRITISH SYSTEM, AND ITS RESULTS.             177
It has never been a favorite idea with British statesmen
that the packet service should be self-sustaining; nor have
they had any evidence to believe that steam companies
could live on the postal receipts. It is evident from the
following that the packet system is sustained without any
reference whatever to the postal income, and for commercial, political, and social purposes alone; only using the
income so far as it goes as a part of the contributions by
the people to the general treasury. It says:
" Your Lordships have seen from our Report that in framing these contracts
various objects have entered into the consideration of the Government, the
cost of which ought not in our opinion to be charged upon the revenues of
the General Post Office. A simple comparison of the receipts and expenditure
upon some of the lines is in itself sufficient to prove this. If the Post Office is
to be considered as a department producing revenue, it is not to be supposed
that a line of vessels which costs the State ~240,000 a year, and brings in no
more than ~56,062, (as is the case with the West-Indian packets,) or one for
which ~25,000 is annually paid, and which returns little more than one fifth of
that sum, (as the Pacific line,) can be maintained as a part of its machinery;
and, in fact, the contracts for many of the services have been made without reference to any estimate or opinion on the part of the Post Master General of their
probable value as postal lines,"
It thus becomes abundantly evident from the Reports
of Parliamentary Committees, from        the "Acts of Parliament," and from     the practice of the Admiralty and Post
Office Departments, as well as from the unvarying experiences of twenty-four years, that the steam mail packet system of Great Britain was primarily adopted, and ever since
sustained as the choicest means of giving to that nation
the irresistible control of the world. Watching this system from the germ to its present maturity, we have seen
the overshadowing tree reach higher and higher, and the
circle of each year's growth expand more and more, until
the outer ring now embraces the whole civilized and savage
world. An additional evidence of this arrives this very day.
The Atlantic brings intelligence (New - York papers, Nov.
22d) that Great Britain has just completed another mail contract, by which the Peninsular and Oriental Company are
12




178               THE OCEAN POST.
to run a third semi-monthly service to India and China;
so that the Government and people of Great Britain shall
have a weekly communication with those regions, while we
have none except through them, although we are many
thousand miles nearer to those countries.
It has been said that we should not attempt to run
the postal and commercial race with Great Britain.
Why not? Because she has many colonies, and must
needs keep up communication with them. And why have
steam instead of sail to them? Because steam is the means
of more readily controlling them. Grant it; and for the
very same reason we wish steam with all the world; not that
we may control the world, for this is costly and unremunerative, as Great Britain finds; but to conform it, and
especially to control its commerce. Great Britain has possessions in the West-Indies; but they are of the most
insignificant importance when compared with the trade of
the many islands and countries near them, which she does
not possess, and with the Central American, Californian,
Mexican, Peruvian, Chilian, New-Granadian, Venezuelan,
and Spanish markets, which she controls and uses. So
with India and the Mauritius. It is a matter of sore satisfaction that she is compelled to govern them as a means of
reaching their rich trade, which; however rich, isfar less important than that of China for which she so strives. So
also with Canada. She was told some years since that, if
she wished to secede from the Kingdom, because the Government would not assist in building a certain railroad, she
might go, and carry peace, also, with her. The Government would scout the idea of running the Cunard line to
Canada alone, and would not touch even at Halifax, except that the ships are compelled to go in sight of the
place; as the "great circle" on which they sail nearly cuts
the city. Great Britain runs that line because her trade
with the United States requires it. That trade is worth




THE MAIL LINES OF THE UNITED STATES.  179
to her every year twenty of her Canadas, as that of the
West-Indies is worth a dozen of all the possessions which
she has there. As to running the race of commerce with
her, it is simply a sine qua non, on which there is no
difference of opinion among Americans who love their
country.
SECTION X.
TIHE MAIL LINES OF THE UNITED STATES.
THE MAIL LINES OF THE UNITED STATES: THE HAVRE AND
BREMEN, THE PIONEERS: THE BREMEN SERVICE RECENTLY
GIVEN TO MR. VANDERBILT: BOTH LINES RUN ON THE GROSS
RECEIPTS: THE CALIFORNIA LINES: WONDROUS DEVELOPMENT OF OUR PACIFIC POSSESSIONS: THE PACIFIC MAIL
STEAMSHIP COMPANY: ITS HISTORY, SERVICES, LARGE MATERIEL, AND USEFULNESS: THE UNITED STATES MAIL STEAMSHIP COMPANY: ITS RAMIFIED AND LARGE EXTRA SERVICE:
EFFECT UPON THE COMMERCE OF THE GULF: ITS HEAVY
LOSSES, AND NEW SHIPS: STEAMSHIP STOCKS GENERALLY
AVOIDED: CONSTANTLY FAR BELOW PAR: THE COLLINS LINE:
a COMPARISON WITH THE CUNARD: ITS SOURCES OF HEAVY
OUTLAY, AND ITS ENTERPRISE: THE AMERICAN MARINE DISASTERS COULD NOT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED BY HUMAN
FORESIGHT: THE VANDERBILT BREMEN LINE.
IT is not my intention to notice the various lines in detail, or in any wise become their apologist, eulogist, or
prosecutor. As a general thing they have discharged their
obligations to the Government and the people in the most
creditable manner; in a much better manner than could
have been expected of them, considering the novelty of




180                THE OCEAN POST.
such enterprises in this country and our total want of experience either in steamship building or ocean steam navigation. It is a cause of great gratulation and satisfaction
that springing into the great arena of the mail and passenger strife at a single bound, our steamers at once took the
lead in the race, and have ever since distanced those of the
whole world in speed, comfort, general accommodations,
and cheap transit. This may be asserted as a rule without
a single exception. The Collins steamers and the steamer
" Vanderbilt" have beaten the Cunarders by nearly a day
and a half on the average voyages; the Havre and Bremen
steamers make just the same time as the Cunarders; and
the California steamers of both lines have signally beaten
those of all the English lines in the West-Indies, the Mediterranean, and the Pacific and Indian oceans. Indeed the
triumphs of our steamers generally and specially have
been so decided in every valuable point that we have great
reason to be proud of the attainments to which the legislation of 1846 and'4T led. We have nothing to record
to the credit of our legislation since that period.
The Havre and Bremen services were the first established in the United States; and as the pioneers in our
mail steamshipping they have both proven themselves
valuable to the country. The Bremen line went into the
hands of Mr. Vanderbilt during the present year, on the
expiration of the old contract; the " Ocean Steam Navigation Company" being unwilling to attempt the performance of the service on the small mail pay of the gross
ocean and inland postages, even with their old ships. Mr.
Vanderbilt having three ships wholly out of employment,
determined to try the service, How far it will prove remunerative we shall not be able to determine until the
steamers shall have run through one or two winters as well
as summers.
The Havre service was continued in the old hands. Mr.




THE MAIL LINES OF THE UNITED STATES.   181
Livingston had two fine new ships, which had been running
but little over one year, and which, adapted specially to
the mail, passenger, and transport trade of France, could
not easily be withdrawn from the business for which they
were built; while it would have been quite impossible to
find for them employment in any other trade. He, consequently, made a temporary arrangement with the Department for one year, agreeing to transport the mails, as during the old contract, for the gross ocean and inland postages. With this small remuneration the Havre line gets
a smaller pay than any other running; but one dollar per
mile. The Company have deserved well of the Government for their untiring efforts to perform their contract;
one of the greatest sacrifices being the necessity of building
two costly new steamers just as their contract was about
to expire. They suffered most severely from disaster.
Both of their fine and fast steamers, the "Franklin" and
the " Humboldt," were lost; and they were compelled to
supply their places by chartering at exorbitantly high
prices, until they built the two excellent vessels now running, the " Arago" and " Fulton."  These two steamers run
probably more cheaply than any ever built in any country;
otherwise, being as large as they are, about twenty-six
hundred tons each, they could by no means live on the
small mail pay now given them. It may be that both these
and the Vanderbilt Bremen steamers are losing money;
although the latter vessels are much smaller, and have the
advantage of an immense emigrant trade. I have no means
of knowing the position of affairs in either company.
But no loss to the Havre Company has ever been so
great as that of its late President, Mr. Mortimer Livingston. An honorable and just man in his dealings, both
with individuals and the Government, he eschewed every
attempt by which some sought to pervert and deprave
the legislation of the country, and presented all of his




182                 THE OCEAN POST.
views in steamshipping on -high, honorable, and tenable
grounds. He pursued the profession in an enlarged spirit
of enterprise, and was not unmindful of his duties to his
country, while he endeavored to establish legitimate trade
and preserve a profitable private business which had been
well founded long before the introduction of ocean steam.
He was a worthy and most honorable gentleman, and is a
loss to the whole public.
Prominent among the steamship enterprises of the country stand the two lines which connect the Atlantic and
Gulf seaboard with our large and rich possessions in the Pacific, California, and Oregon. Established at a time when
California was held by military government, and when
Oregon was a wild untamed wilderness, these lines became
the means of developing the richest portion of the American continent, and binding the far distant western world
in close connection with the old confederacy, notwithstanding the mighty Cordilleras and Rocky Mountains which
rose like forbidding barriers between them. Important as
these possessions were, naturally and geographically, they
acquired a new interest about the time that the Pacific and
the Aspinwall Steamship Companies were established.
The contracts which were made with these comlanies
would certainly have ruined them but for the discovery of
gold in California. This opened a new and brilliant field
of effort, and the opportunities offered by these companies
soon determined tens of thousands of our hardy and enterprising countrymen to enter and develop it.
It is pleasing in this connection to trace the almost mysterious progress of our Pacific territory during the past
eight years, and the agencies producing it. Among these
agencies none have been so effectual as the Pacific Mail
Steamship Company. That Company was compelled to
form an establishment of the most effective character four
to five thousand miles away from home, and as it was at




THE MAIL LINES OF THE UNITED STATES.   183
the time, thirteen thousand miles distant. The country
was wholly new, so much so that it was, in most parts of the
field which it had to occupy, extremely difficult to procure
ordinary food for their operatives. Their ships had to
make a voyage more than half of that around the world
before they arrived at their point of service; and they
found themselves without a home when there. The steamer
"California," which left New-York on the 6th October,
1848, was the first to bear the American flag to the Pacific
ocean, and the first to salute with a new life the solitudes of
that rich and untrodden territory. She was soon followed
by the "Panama" and "Oregon," and in due course of
time by the "Tennessee," the " Golden Gate," the "Columbia," the "John L. Stephens," the "Sonora," the "Republic," the " Northerner," the " Fremont," the " Tobago," the
" St. Louis," and the " Golden Age." From a small beginning that Company now has the finest steam fleet in the
United States, although the difficulties in forming it were
probably much greater than any of our other companies
had to contend with.
These steamers found nothing ready to receive them in
the Pacific. The Company was compelled to construct large
workshops and foundries for their repair, and now have
at Benicia a large and excellent establishment where they
can easily construct a marine engine. They had also to
build their own Dry Dock; for that of the Government at
Mare Island was not ready until 1854. Theirs has ever been
most useful to the United States, as it furnished the only
accommodations of that class in the Pacific. They had also
to make shore establishments at Panama, San Francisco,
and Astoria, which, with coal dep6ts, etc., were extremely costly, owing to materials having to be transported so
far, and labor at the time being so high. The price of labor in California at all times depends on the profits which
can be made by digging gold, and the prices paid for this




184                THE OCEAN POST.
species of labor have ever been enormous. Beyond this
most unusual price of labor along the Pacific seaboard,
the coals which they have used, whether from the Eastern
States or from England, have been invariably shipped
around Cape Horn, and have never cost less than twenty dollars per ton. For a large portion of the time the Company
had to pay thirty dollars per ton for coal, and in one instance fifty dollars. Coal, like all other provisions of the
steamers, has generally been purchased from those who
sent it out on speculation, and took all the advantages of
the peculiar market. Twelve dollars per ton is a low price
for freight to California or Panama. In addition to this, the
cost price of the coal, the handling, the wastage, and the insurance, will amount to about eight dollars per ton, making
it never less than twenty dollars delivered. I have frequently seen coals sell even in Rio de Janeiro, which is but
about one third of the distance fromus, at eighteen to twentyfour dollars per ton. The nine steamers running consume
about 35,000 tons of coal annually. If the vessels transporting it be of 1,000 tons each, it will employ something near
thirty-five of these vessels at profitable rates, in this one
item of their business alone. Such expenditures are not
necessary to any other steam company in the world. The
British lines in the Indian Ocean and the China Seas are
supplied with domestic coal which comes at very reasonable prices, and is shipped but a short distance.
Yet this Company performs this distant and difficult
service with great regularity and at a low price. They
have never lost a trip, a mail-bag, or a passenger by marine
disaster during the eight years that they have been running
in the Pacific. This results from the fact of the Company
having thirteen steamers. If all of the steamers now in
commission were sunk, they could supply their place from
their reserve fleet and have no hiatus in their service.
Such a spare fleet is an enormous expense; but it is posi



THE MAIL LINES OF THE UNITED STATES.   185
tively indispensable to regular and highly efficient service.
It is singular that under these circumstances they can perform the service at $1.70 cents per mile. It is a notorious
fact that these steamers could not have supported themselves in 1854-55 without the aid which they obtained from
the Government for the services which they performed.
They never have transported much freight, as it would not
bear the transhipment at Panama. The small quantity
which they had was during the first years after the discovery of gold, and then only. They have never at any
time brought any eastward. The Panama Railroad was a
splendid consummation of which the world had dreamed for
years, and toward whose completion this Company was
highly instrumental. Yet it did not enable the steamers to
transport freight, and it never will.
These steamers run the 3,300 miles between PanamA
and San Francisco by a time-table. They arrive at either
end within a very few hours of thirteen and a half days,
including all of the stoppages, which are also made at specified hours. Thus the average speed of the steamers is
about 254 miles per day. They touch at Acapulco and
Mazanilla, and supply San Diego, Monterey, San Pedro,
Santa Barbara, San Luis, and Obispo, ports of California,
from PanamA by a branch line. This is an extra service,
and is not taken into account in calculating the mileage
paid the Company.
The steamers have carried probably 175,000 passengers
to California, and have brought back about $200,000,000
in gold. They have also by their semi-monthly line from
San Francisco to Oregon assisted in populating that rich
and beautiful agricultural district, and making it available
for useful purposes as a part of the United States. They
have converted the wilderness of California into a smiling
garden, and will ere long produce the same effect on Oregon. With that coast comparatively unprotected, and




186               THE OCEAN POST.
with the small standing army sustained in this country,
they become very important as a ready means of concentrating on the Pacific coast a large army in a few days.
They also afford a ready transit for the changing crews of
our national vessels, which, when once around the Horn,
may remain there several years; having to change their
crews only.
The large property of this Company in the Pacific can
be made available for no other purpose than that for
which it was created. Any company to be thoroughly
effective there, must create its own stock, and support
works on the same general plan as those created by the
British East-India Company. Their success in building
up this large establishment on the Pacific was simply an
accident; and that accident the discovery of gold. But
for this the Company would have failed in two years, or
gone back pleading to Congress for relief. But the gold
crisis saved it, and the enterprise was very remunerative
for the first few years; but since 1853 the profits have
been limited, while for one or two years the Company have
sustained actual loss. They calculated too largely on the
prospective business with California, and have too large a
sum invested to make much for the future. And yet, with
a smaller investment they could not perform the service,
except in that dangerous, cheap, indecent way, of innumerable wants and deprivations, which the American people
have begun to despise. They have had some few disasters,
but none of those of a fatal character in the Pacific. The
"Winfield Scott" was lost in entering the harbor of Acapulco; the "Tennessee" in entering that of San Francisco
in a dense fog. The "San Francisco" was lost, as will be
remembered, on this side, near our coast, as she sailed with
troops for the Pacific. The Nicaragua Transit Company
fared much worse with their steamers in the Pacific. They
lost the " North America," the " Independence," the "S. S.




THE MAIL LINES OF THE UNITED STATES.   187
Lewis," the "Pioneer," and the "Yankee Blade." Mr.
Wmi. Brown also lost his steamer "America," which he
was running between San Francisco and Oregon. She
was burned.
Their dividends for four years have been but twelve per
cent. And should they be at any time thrown out of the
service, more than half of their property would be irretrievably lost. This percentage of dividend would be large
enough but for such possibilities as these, which may soon
reduce it to a deficit and a loss. Thus it is that steam
stock should declare three times the dividend of other
stocks, to be eventually equal to them. And hence it is
that, with the clear record of this Company before the
Government, and with an investment of between three and
four millions of, dollars, being at the same time free from
debt, the stock of the Company is selling at thirty-three
per cent. below par. This is a good exemplification of my
views in the preceding SEcIoNs regarding the costs, and
hazards, and low values of ocean steam stocks generally.
Nor are the stocks of this Company kept from the public.
They are advertised and sold at public auction at these
reduced rates every day in the year in this city; and no
one of the five hundred and four stockholders, among
whom these interests are diffused, seems anxious to put
"his all" in the enterprise. And yet there are some people who: call such companies a monopoly. If a monopoly,
why do they not come forward, buy the stocks, keep them
in their own hands, and profit by them; especially as a
monopoly must be doubly good when it can be bought for
two thirds the cash originally paid for it!
I have noticed this Company thus fully, because its extent of stock, and large field of operation, make it a fit
illustration of the views which I have advanced throughout this work. I have no desire to depreciate the stock,
or in any other way injure the Company, as my own enterprise gives me quite enough to do.




188                THE OCEAN POST.
Many of the views advanced with regard to the Pacific
Mail Company will apply to the United States Mail Steamship Company. That Company, at the outset, built very
fine steamers, and ran them incessantly, until they were
unfit for duty. They have constantly supplied their place,
and have at all times, by building and by chartering at
the highest prices, kept up a large and costly fleet for
their ramified service. The service contemplated in their
original contract, at $1.88' cents per mile, is but about two
thirds of that actually performed. The contract required
them to run 3,200 miles semi-monthly, but they actually
perform semi-monthly 5,200. (See Mr. King's Letter, Paper
G.) The actual service has required nearly twice the number
of steamers necessary to do that for which they contractedalthough a part of it is in the coasting trade. Consequently
the steamers have been rapidly worn out, from too heavy
duty, and the stock of the Company has never paid as well
as it should. The Company have, morever, suffered severely
from disaster. The "Crescent City" was lost on the Bahama Banks, in 1855; all hands saved. The "Cherokee"
was burned when in active service, in 1853; and the
" George Law," or a Central America," but recently foundered at sea in a terrible gale. They were all good ships;
but like those other excellent ships, the "Arctic" and " Pacific," they could not defy the powers of pure accident. In
the same gale the " Empire City" was dismantled, having
all of her upper works swept off, while the "Illinois" was
injured by being on the Colorado Reef. They have both
been undergoing most costly repairs for several weeks.
While writing this, the "Philadelphia" is also in the shop.
She recently broke her shaft and her cross-tail, and had to
put into Charleston. All of these repairs cost an immense sum of money, and are calculated, with the
severe losses which the Company has sustained, to dishearten the most hopeful and enterprising. Yet, since




THE MAIL LINES OF THE UNITED STATES.    189
these disasters, and the completion of the " Moses Taylor,"
the Company are about laying the keel of another fine
ship. This is another verification of my statement that
the mail companies are in nearly every instance compelled
to build new steamers in the very last years of their contracted service. The new " Adriatic" attests the same fact
on the part of the Collins Company. (See pages 141 and
142.)
The Company have had at various times the "Falcon,"
"Ohio," "Georgia," "Crescent City," "El Dorado," "Cherokee," " Empire City," "Illinois," and "Philadelphia," and
now have the three last-named ships, the "Granada,"
the "Star of the West," and the new steamer "Moses
Taylor." The benefits conferred by the Company's lines
on the trade of the country generally, and especially on
our southern seaboard and Gulf connections, have been
almost incalculable. They found all of these ports in the
undisputed possession of the British, whose steamers furnished the only mail and locomotive facilities of the times.
By their superior speed and accommodations the "Georgia" and the "Ohio" soon drove those enterprising
steamers from our coast, and confined them to the foreign
countries of the Gulf and the Carribean Sea, where they yet
rule triumphant in news, transport, and commerce. Our
southern harbors are no longer filled with British cruisers,
while in their stead we have built up a noble war marine,
inured thousands of Americans to the ocean steam service,
and made one most effective movement in the direction of
successful defenses. (See Letter of Hon. Edwin Croswell,
Paper E, page 200.)
Of the Collins Company it is hardly necessary that I
should speak. They have received much the largest subsidy from the Government; but they have had a most
difficult task to perform. Their ships have never been
surpassed in any country, whether as to the excellent style




190                THE OCEAN POST.
of their prime construction, their large size, or their very
unusual speed. They have literally been engaged in a
continual race across the ocean for seven years, determined at whatever cost and hazard to far excel those of
the Cunard line. And this they have done most signally
in all points of accommodation and speed. They have
gained one and a half days the advantage over the Cunard
line on their average voyages for the seven years. And
this was no small achievement. By reference to SECTION IV.
it will be seen how great is the cost of attaining and maintaining such speed with a steamer. The Collins ships, being so much larger than the Cunarders, the four present
an agregate tonnage nearly equal to the eight by which
they run their weekly line. It is, moreover, not proportionally so expensive to maintain seven or eight ships on a
line as four. The prime cost and repairs are by no means
so great when engines are duplicated, or two sets built
from the same patterns. Again, the general outlay in
docks, shore establishment, offices, company paraphernalia,
advertising, and innumerable items, is as great for a small
as for a large fleet of steamers. The Collins line has to
contend against all this. It also found the Cunard line
long and well established, and inwrought into the public
favor. It had the business, and most important of all, it
monopolized the only freights passing between the two
countries; those from England to America, which British
shippers gave of course to British ships. They have had
also to pay much larger prices for construction, repairs,
wages, etc., than the Cunard Company; and not having
so large a service and so large a fleet, they have not had
so many reserve ships to fall back upon; but have been
compelled frequently to send their ships off but half repaired, which of itself entailed immensely heavy expenses
in ultimate repairs. There is very much to be said in
favor of this Company, which has endeavored to build the




THE MAIL LINES OF THE UNITED STATES.   191
finest ships in the world, and navigate them the most
rapidly. If they have prominently failed in any thing it
is in building larger ships, running them faster, and being
far more enterprising with them than was required of the
Company by the contract with the Government. Their
disasters have been saddening and severe; and yet they
have resulted from nothing which could have been controlled by human foresight. There is a great error in supposing that there are more marine disasters among American than among British ships. Such is not the case, as
a careful examination of the lists will show.
Of the mail line belonging to Mr. Vanderbilt, between
New-York and Bremen, via Southampton, it is impossible
now to say any thing. The steamers "North Star" and
"Ariel," the one of 1,86700 tons, and the other of 1,295 —
tons, have but recently commenced the service, on the
gross mail receipts. Whether Mr. Vanderbilt desires to
make the service permanent or not, I am not advised.
The service of the Charleston and Havana line has been
performed with great regularity; and although the return
from it in the form of postages has been small, yet it has
been of essential service to the South, in opening communications toward the Gulf, and in establishing much needed
travelling facilities between Charleston, Savannah, and
Key West.




192                       THE OCEAN POST.
PAPER A.
LIST OF AMERICAN       OCEAN STEAMERS.
THE mail service has 8 lines, and 21 steamers in commission, of 48,027 registered tonnage. Much of this tonnage
belongs to supply ships, as for instance those of the Pacific
Mail Steamship Company. (See Section.)
Collins Line, 8 steamers, 9,727 tons.
Adriatic, 4,1449  tons:  Atlantic, 2,8496 tons:  Baltic, 2,733k tons.
Havre Line, 2 steamers, 4,548 tons.
Arago, 2,240 tons:                               Fulton, 2,308 tons.
Vanderbilt Bremen Line, 3 steamers, 6,523 tons.
North Star, 1,867- tons:  Ariel, 1,295|2 tons:  Vanderbilt*, 3,360 4 tons.
United States Mail Steamship Company, 6 steamers, 8,544 tons.
Illinois, 2,123-. tons: Empire City, 1,7512- tons: Philadelphia, 1,238gf tons:
Granada, 1,058S tons: Moses Taylor, 1,200 tons: Star of the West, chartered,
1,172., (contracting for a new ship.)
Pacific Mail Steamship Company, 13 steamers, 16,421 tons.
Golden Gate, 2,06735 tons: Golden Age, 2,280 tons: J. L. Stephens, 2,189
tons: Sonora, 1,616 tons: St. Louis, 1,621 tons: Panama, 1,0873- tons: California, 1,085 4 tons: Oregon, 1,099; tons: Columbia, 7772i tons: Republic,
850 tons: Northerner, 1,010 tons: Fremont, 576 tons: Tobago, 189 tons.
Charleston, Savannah, Key West, and Havana, 1 steamer, the Isabel, 1,115
tons.
Ne5w-Orleans and Mexico, 1 steamer, the Tennessee, 1,1491 tons.
The Coasting Service has 8 lines, and 23 steamers, of
24,071 tons registered tonnage.
Neew-York, Havana, and Ne2w-Orleans, 2. The Black Warrior, 1,556^ tons:
Cahawba, 1,6438 tons-3,199 tons.
New- York, Havana, and Mobile, 1. The Quaker City, 1,4283 tons.
New-York and Savannah, 4. Alabama, 1,261} tons; Florida, 1,261}~ tons:
Augusta, 1,310~~ tons; Star of the South, (propeller,) 960k tons-=4,793 tons.
Neow-York and Charleston, 4. Columbia, 1,347 tons: Nashville, 1,220 tons:
James Adger, 1,151 tons; Marion, 962 tons=4,680 tons.
Neew-York and Virginia, 2. Roanoke, 1,071 tons: Jamestown, 1,300 tons
-2,371 tons.
Philadelphia and Savannah, 2. Key Stone State and State of Georgia, each
about 1,300 tons=-2,600 tons.
Boston and Baltimore, 2. Joseph Whitney, 800 tons: Unknown, 800 tons
=1,600 tons.
* Independent, running between New-York, Southampton, and Havre, in connection
with the Bremen steamers.




PAPER B.    TABLE OF MR. PLINY MILES.               193
New-Orleans and Texas. The Charles Morgan, Texas, Mexico, and Atlantic,
averaging 600 tons each=2,400 tons.
New- Orleans and Key West. The General Rusk, 600 tons, and the Calhoun,
400 tons=-,000 tons.
There are also several propellers running: between New-York and Charleston, New-York and Portland, and between Philadelphia and the South. They
are all, however, small, and irregular in their trade. The Calhoun is not a regular steamship.
Steamers lying up, 18. Registered tonnage, 24,845 tons.
Queen of the Pacific,  2,80192 tons. Uncle Sam,           1,43344 tons.
Washington,           1,640~- tons. California,           1,058  tons.
Prometheus,           1,207^- tons. Northerner,           1,012  tons.
St. Louis,            1,621'4 tons. Ericsson,             1,902- tons.
Brother Jonathan,     1,359"f tons. Star of the West,     1,172 - tons.
Oregon,               1,0041] tons. Daniel Webster,       1,035  tons.
Southerner,             900  tons. Orizaba,               1,450gj tons.
Herman,               1,7344 tons. Panama,                1,087  tons.
Northern Light,       1,7471~ tons. Fremont,               576   tons.
The registered tonnage of these vessels was furnished me by Mr. S. P. Ingraham, of the New-York Custom-House.
PAPER B.
THE following paper, prepared by Mr. Pliny Miles from
the reports to which we have alluded, presents the British steam mail service in full detail
" The following tabular statement gives the particulars of the ocean mail service of Great Britain, now carried on almost exclusively by steamships. The
numbers in the margin, running from 1 to 15, will point out the different lines
in the recapitulation at the close.
LINE OF COMMUNICATION, CONTRACTORS,        PLACES CONNECTED.
AND CONTRACT PRICE.
1.-Liverpool and Isle of Man. Mona Liverpool and Douglas, Isle of Man.
Isle Steam Co. Twice a week.
$4,250 per annum.
2. —England and Ireland.  City of Holyhead and Kingstown, near DubDublin Steam Paciket Co. Twice a   lin.
day. $125,000 a year.
3.-Scotland and Shetland. Aberdeen, Aberdeen, Wick, Kirkwall, (Orkney,)
Leith  and  Clyde Shipping  Co.    and Lerwick, (Shetland.)
Weekly, $6,000 a year.
4.-England, Spain, and Gibraltar. Southampton, Vigo, Oporto, Lisbon,
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Na-  Cadiz, and Gibraltar.
vigation Co. Three times a month.
$102,500.
5.-Mediterranean, India, and China. Southampton, Malta, Alexandria, Suez,
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Na-  Aden, Bombay, Calcutta, Singapore,
vigation Co. Twice a month to In-  Hong Kong, and Shanghae.
dia-monthly to China. $1,121,500.
13




194                     THE OCEAN     POST.
6.-England and UnitedStates. Sam. Liverpool, Halifax, and Boston; and
Cunard. Weekly. $866,700.          Liverpool and New-York.
7.-North America, (Colonial.) Sam. Halifax, Newfoundland, Bermuda, and
Cunard. Monthly. $73,500.          St. Thomas.
8.-West-Indies, Mexico and South- Southampton, Kingston, (Jamaica,) St.
America. Royal Mail Steam Packet   Thomas, Vera Cruz and Aspinwall;
Co. Semi-monthly to the West-In-   Southampton, Lisbon, Madeira, Tedies and Gulf of Mexico, and month-  neriffe, St. Vincent, Pernambuco,
ly to Brazil. $1,350,000.          Bahia, Rio Janeiro, Monte Video,
Buenos Ayres, and St. Thomas.
9.-England, France, and Belgium. Dover and Calais. Dover and Ostend.
Jenkings and Churchward.  Daily
to Calais; thrice a week to Ostend.
$77,500.
10.-Channel Islands.  South-western  Southampton, Jersey, and Guernsey.
Railway Company. Thrice a week.
$20,000.
11.-West Coast of South-America. Panama, Callao, and Valparaiso. AlPacific Steam Navigation Co. Twice  lowed to touch at Buenaventura,
a month. $125,000.                 Guayaquil,  Peyta,  Lambayeque,
Huanchaco,Santa, Pisco, Islay,Arica,
Iquique, Cobija, Copiapo, Huasco,
and Coquimbo.
12.-ScotlandandOrkney. John Stan- FromScrabster Pier (Thurso) to Stromger, Esq., of Stromness.  Daily in  ness, (Orkney.)
summer; every other day in winter.
$6,500.
13.-West Coast of Africa. African  Plymouth to Madeira, Teneriffe, Goree,
Steamship Co. Monthly. $106,250.   Bathurst, Sierra Leone, Monrovia,
Cape Coast Castle, Accra, Whydah,
Badagry, Lagos, Bonny, Old Calabar,
Cameroon and Fernando Po; omitting Cameroon, Calabar, and Bonny
on return.
14.-South-Africa, Mauritius, and Cal- Dartmouth to Cape of Good Hope,
cutta. Adam Duncan Dundas, Esq.    Mauritius and Calcutta.
Monthly. $205,000.
15.-England and Australia.  The Eu- Southampton, Marseilles, Malta, Alexropean and Australian Mail Steam   andria, Suez, and Sydney.
Packet Co. Monthly. $925,000.
The following are the names of the steamers in service in each line, with the
amount of tonnage, the horse power of each, the draught of water, the number
of the officers and crew attached to each one, and, when it could be obtained,
the date that each vessel was surveyed and approved for the service. Where
the date of survey of a vessel is unknown, it is placed as near as possible with
others surveyed at the same time, the vessels in each line being arranged in
chronological order:
1. LIVERPOOL AND ISLE OF MAN.
ame, Class, etc.    Horse            Draftof   Crew.  Date of Surame, ass, etc   ower     nnage.  Water.              Vey.
F.  I.
Kingr Orry,........    190      429     0 0       22    Dec., 1845
Tynwald,........ iron,  260      657     8 9       29    Oct., 1846
Benmy Chree,........    130      295     6   6     18    June, 1847
Mona's Queen,... iron,  220      508     8 6       22    M'ch, 1853
Total, 4 vessels.....  790   2,089               91




PAPER B.     TABLE OF MR. PLINY       MILES.            195
2. ENGLAND AND IRELAND.
Nme, a, etc.    /  THorse  Ton e.Draft of      e     Date of SurName, Class, etc.    Power.              Water.                vey.
F. I.
Prince Arthur,... iron,  220       418       8  8      26     July, 1852
Llewellyn...... iron,    342      654       9  6       29    Oct., 1852
Eblana,..........iron,   372       685       8 11       31    Jan., 1853
St. Columba,..... iron,   350      650       8 10       29    Sept., 1853
Total, 4 vessels,.....  1,284   2,407                115
3. SCOTLAND AND SHETLAND.
Fairy,..............    120       350                  18        -
Duke of Richmond,...     180       500                 24 
Total, 2 vessels,.....  300      850                 42
4. ENGLAND, SPAIN, AND GIBRALTAR.
Sultan.......... iron,   420     1,001     14  0       67    Jan., 1853
Madrid,....... iron,   133      448      10  2       40    Feb., 1853
Tagus,..............     280      691      14  8       41    Jan., 1854
Alhambra,...........     140      642      13  7       52    July, 1855
Total, 4 vessels,.....  973     2,782                200
5. MEDITERRANEAN, INDIA, AND CHINA.
Lady Mary Wood,...       270       619       0  0       40    Feb., 1842
Precursor...........     520     1,783     18  0      121    July, 1844
Pekin,...........iron,    415     1,003     14  0       78    Jan., 1847
Oriental,...........     420     1,427     13  0      78     M'ch, 1848
Achilles..........        430      823      16  0       59    June, 1849
Malta,..........iron,   460      1,222      0  0       82    Sept., 1848
Hindostan,...........    500     1,595     16 10      53     July, 1849
Singapore,.......iron,    465     1,189     12  6      96     M'ch, 1851
Ganges,......... iron,   465      1,189     14  7       69    June, 1851
Pottinger,......iron,    450     1,275     17  6       82    April, 1852
Formosa, screw,..iron,  177       658      13  6       60    Aug., 1852
Chusan, screw,... iron,  100       765      11  3      45     Aug., 1852
Haddington,.....iron,'450    1,303      17  7     105     Nov., 1852 
Vectis,.............     400      900       0  0      51 
Shanghae, screw,..iron,   90       825       0  0      60 
Manila,..............    60       646      0   0      60
Bentinck,......  520     1,973     19   3      83     Nov., 1852
Euxine,..........iron,   430     1,071      15  6      72     Jan., 1853
Bengal, screw,........   465     2,185      17  6     115     Feb., 1853
Valetta,.............   400       984      12  2      51     July, 1853
Norna, screw,........    230     1,040       0  0      80     Nov., 1853
Colombo, screw,......    450     1,808       0  0     118     Dec., 1853
Ripon,..........iron,    445     1,400      14  9      94     Dec., 1853
Douro, screw,........    230       903      13  3      63     Dec., 1853
Bombay.............      280     1,240      0  0      84 
Madras,.............     288     1,217      0  0      82 
Indus,...........iron,   450      1,302     17  9       88    Jan., 1854
Candia, screw,....iron,   450     2,212     18  9     115     June, 1854
Nubia,...........        450     2,095     21  0      122          1855
Pera, screw,......iron,   450     2,013     19  0      129    Jan., 1856
Ava, screw,......iron,   320     1,372      17  0      94     Feb., 1856




196                        THE   OCEAN    POST.
Name, Class, etc.    Horse             D1raft of   Crew.   Date of SurPower.   ToWnage.     ater.               vey.
F.  I.
Alma, screw,.....iron,   450      2,164     20  0      124    M'ch, 1856
Aden, screw,.....iron,    210      507      18  9       40    Aug., 1856
Delta, screw,........    210      985       0  0       64     -    1856
Delhi, screw,.........  450      2,400      0  0      125     -    1856
Unknown, 4 vessels.
Total, 39 vessels,.... 12,850  46,053              2,877
6. ENGLAND AND UNITED STATES.
Europa.............     650      1,777     15  6       88    July, 1848
Canada,.............    680     1,774      19  6       88    Nov., 1848
Niagara,.............    630     1,774     19  6       88    Dec., 1849
America,............     630     1,729     15  3       88    Jan., 1850
Asia,...............     800     2,073     19  0      105    May, 1850
Africa,..............    800     2,050      0  0      105    Oct., 1850
Arabia,..............    870     2,328     16  7      105    Dec., 1852
Persia,..............    858     3,587     21  0      165    Feb., 1856
Total, 8 vessels,.....   5,918  17,092              922
7. NORTH AMERICA, (Colonial.)
Merlin,..............   120       451       0  0      26     May, 1850
Delta, screw,.....iron,  180      700      12 10      34     June, 1852
Total, 2 vessels,....  300     1,151                 60
8. WEST-INDIES, MEXICO, AND SOUTH-AMERICA.
Dee,...........    410     1,269     18  0       87    May, 1846
Trent,...............   450      1,293     17  7       87    April, 1848
Eagle,...............  263    496      11 10       57    July, 1849
Derwent............   280      708      15  0       66    July, 1850
Magdalena,.......  760    2,250      19  0     108     May, 1852
Medway,.........         420     1,305     17  6       72    May, 1852
La Plata,.......        939     2,404     21 10      114    Aug., 1852
Conway,.............     270      827      12 10       55    Sept., 1852
Orinoco,.........       800     2,245      20 11     108     Oct., 1852
Avon,...........    450     2,069     17  0       94    M'ch, 1853
Teviot,..........    450     1,258      18  1      97     April, 1853
Parana,.........     800     2,222     21  2     120     May, 1853
Clyde,.........       430     1,335     19   1      87     June, 1853
Thames,.........         413     1,285      18  3      72     Aug., 1853
Solent,..............   420     1805       14 11      88     Oct., 1853
Camilia,.........iron,   213       640       9  0      34     Oct., 1853
Wye, screw,.....iron,   180       818      14  0      45     Feb., 1854
Atrato,..... iron,    758    2,906      20  6     127     M'ch, 1854
Tamar,..............     400     1,873     18  7       93    June, 1854
Prince............... 200    446       8  8       35    July, 1854
Total, 20 vessels,...  9,306   29,454              1,667
9. ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND BELGIUM.
Alliance,.............   120      300       7  3       16
Vivid,...............     120      300       7  0       16        --
Violet,............      120      800       7  0       16
Empress,............    100       308       6  6      16




PAPER B.     TABLE OF MR. PLINY MILES.                 197
Name, Class, etc.    Horse    Tonnage. Draft of   Crew.    Date of Sur
rame, 0ass, ete.        Tonnage.  D^        Cre..      ^     ^
Power.              Water.                Vey.
F. I.
Queen,..............    100       307      6   6      16 
Ondine,.............     80       250       6  0      16        -
Total, 6 vessels,.....  640    1,765                 96
10. CHANNEL ISLANDS.
Atalanta,..........      120       240      8  4       21    Oct., 1846
Wonder,.........iron,    150       449       0  0      22    Feb., 1853
Courier,.........iron,   184       440      7   0      18    April, 1853
Dispatch,........iron,  183       443      7   6      22    Aug., 1853
Express.........iron,    160       380      7   4      24    Nov., 1853
Total, 5 vessels....  797     1,852                107
11. WEST COAST OF SOUTH-AMERICA.
New-Granada,.... iron,   210       600      13 00      41     Nov., 1846
Bolivia,..........iron,  252       705       0  0      41     Oct., 1849
Inca,............iron,   370      549      13  0      55     Aug., 1851
Lima...........iron,     370     1,122     10   8      55    Nov., 1851
Bogota,..........iron,   394     1,122     13   6      61    April, 1852
Valdivia, screw,...iron,  480      782     13   2      41    Nov., 1853
Valparaiso...... iron,  320       839     13   6      84 
Total, 7 vessels,..... 2,396   5,719                377
12. SCOTLAND AND ORKNEY.
(Unknown,)..........      60       250      6  0       16
13. WEST COAST OF AFRICA.
Hope,........iron,    120      833      15  0      46 
Charity,......  iron    120     1,007     15   6      52 
Ethiope.............  120     674       0  0      42 
Candace,..........      120       900      0   0      46 
Retriever,.........   120       900      0   0      46 
Niger,...............  120       900      0   0      46        -
Gambia..............    130       637     14  0       42 
Total, 7 vessels,.....  850    5,951               320
14. SOUTH-AMERICA, MAURITIUS, AND CALCUTTA.
Five screw steamers,
Total, 5 vessels,..... 2,000   8,000       -       570
15. ENGLAND AND AUSTRALIA.
Oneida,..............   400     1,600     15  6       84 
Simla...............    630     2,510     17  2       88 
European...........     530     2,200     18  9      115 
Columbian,..........    530     2,300     17  6      120 
Unknown,)..........      400     1,600      0  0      88 
(Unknown,).....    400     1,600      0  0       88 
(Unknown,)..........     400     1,600      0  0       88 
Total, 7 vessels,..... 3,290  13,410                671




198                       THE   OCEAN    POST.
RECAPITULATION.
Iat        I s              11 aii               t ag
q11'                    II                               Z -I
1    4      790    2,089     91     1833    2 a  week        $4,250
2    4    1,284    2,408    115     1850    2 a   day       125,000
3    2      800     850      42     1840    1 a  week         6,000
4    4      973    2,782    200     1852    3 a month       102,500
5   35   12,850   46,053   2,877    1853    2 a month     1,121,500
6    9    6,418   18,406    922     1850    1 a  week       866,700
7    2     300     1,151     60     1854    1 a month        73,500
8   20    9,308   29,454   1,667    1851    3 a month     1,850,000
9    6      640    1,765     96     1854    1 a   day        77,500
10    5      797    1,852    107     1848    3 a  week        20,000
11    7    2,396    5,719    378     1852    2 a month       125,000
12    1       60      250     16     1856    1 a   day         6,500
13    7      850    5,951    820     1852    1 a month       106,250
14    5    2,000    8,000    575     1856    1 a month       205,000
15    7    3,290   13,410    671     1857    1 a month       925,000
Total, 121 42,254  140,139 | 8,137                         $5,114,700*
* There are some lines not here noticed, which swell the sum to $5,333 985.-T. R.
PAPER C.
PROJET OF FRANCO-AMERICAN            NAVIGATION.
MR. Wm. Iselin, of Havre, kindly furnished me the following:
"The French Government has offered the following contracts:
" Havre to New-York, 26 voyages a year, fr.3,100,000, or $620,000.
" Bordeaux to Rio Janeiro, touching at Lisbon, Goree, Bahia, or Pernambfuco,
and a branch line from Rio Janeiro to Montevideo and Buenos Ayres, 24 voyages
a year, fr.4,700,000, or $940,000. The Government now requires 13 departures
from Bordeaux and 13 from Marseilles at the same price.
"Nantes to St. Thomas, thence to Guadalupe, and thence to Martinique,
with the following branch lines:
"No. 1. St. Thomas to St. Martha or Carthagena, and thence to Aspinwall.
"No. 2. St. Thomas to Porto Rico, thence to Havana, Vera Cruz, and Tampico.
"No. 3. From Martinique to Cayenne.
"The subvention offered is fr.6,200,000, or $1,400,000.
"The total amount of subvention offered for the 3 lines is therefore 14 millions
of francs per annum, or $2,800,000.
"The Messageries Imperiales have given a tender for the Brazil lines.
"William Iselin of Havre, in connection with Mr. Calley St. Paul, for the
Havre and New-York line; the necessary capital of $3,200,000 is subscribed;
their intention is to have a weekly departure from Havre to New-York, by mak



PAPER D.    LINES BETWEEN EUROPE AND AMERICA.             199
ing the fortnightly departures of the French boats alternate with American
Havre and Bremen boats.
" For the line from Nantes to the West-Indies the Company Gautier is said
to have given a tender; but it is doubtful if they can make up their capital."
The Messageries Imperiales is one of the largest and strongest companies in
all Europe. They have the following different lines: the Italian, the Constantinople direct, the Levant, the Egyptian, the Syrian, that of the Archipelago,
the Anatolia, the Thessalian, the Danubian, the Trebizond, the Algiers, the
Oran, and the Tunis lines, and forty-seven sea-steamers. They have already obtained the Brazilian service.
Mr. Iselin and others have proposed for the United States line, and will
doubtless get it.
The Company Gautier may not get the West-India service, it is said. They
had the line from Havre to New-York, with the steamers Alma, Cadis, Barcecelona, Franc-Contois, Vigo, and the Lyonnaise, and without subvention. They
found it impossible to run it without subsidy, and hence, sought a new home
for their steamers. They attempted to run from Havre to New-Orleans; but
this again failed, after four voyages. They had also the 1,800 ton ether ships,
" Francois Arago," and "Jacquart," which broke down. These ether engines
were built on the principle of De Tremblay; but the Company are now substituting steam for the ether engines. Thus, the experience of this Company
proves two important positions which I have taken; that ocean mail steamers
can not run on their receipts, and that many of the gazetted improvements on
steam propulsion and the ordinary methods are valueless.
The Compagnie Gautier have a contract with Spain, for semi-monthly voyages
between Cadiz and Havana, and receive $25,000 per round voyage for each
steamer. They are all English built, iron vessels, of about 1,800 tons each.
Lyons is the home of the Company.
PAPER D.
STEAM   LINES BETWEEN EUROPE AND AMERICA.
COLLINS, steamers Adriatic, Atlantic, and Baltic; (running:)
HAVRE, steamers Arago, and Fulton;             "
BREMEN, steamers North Star, and Ariel;        "
HAVRE, in connection with the Bremen. Steamer Vanderbilt; (laid up:)
CUNARD, steamers Persia, Arabia, Asia, Africa, Canada, America, Niagara,
and Europa; (running:)
CUNARD, screw-steamers Etna, Jura, Emue, Lebanon, and Cambria, (sidewheel; all running:)
GLASGOW, screw-steamers Glasgow, Edinburgh, and New-York; (running:)
BREMEN, steamer Ericsson; run temporarily by Mr. Sands; (laid up:)
LIVERPOOL AND PORTLAND, screw-steamers Khersonese and Circassian, Genneral Williams and Antelope; the two latter about 1,500 each, running via St.
John's, N. F., the two former chartered for the East-Indies:




200                      THE   OCEAN    POST.
LONDON AND MONTREAL, screw-steamers; (names not known:)
LIVERPOOL AND QUEBEC, screw-steamers;    "   "    "
LIVERPOOL AND NEW-YORK, screw-steamers City of Manchester, City of
Baltimore, City of Washington, and Kangaroo, (running;) (line ran to Philadelphia and was withdrawn:)
HAMBURG AND NEW-YORK, screw-steamers Borussia and Hammonia; building two more steamers, each 2,000 tons, in the Clyde, for same line; (running:)
ANTWERP AND NEW-YORK, screw-steamers Belgique, Constitution, Leopold I., Duc de Brabant, and Congress.  Taken off and chartered to British
Governmentfor transporting troops. Names altered:
LONDON, CORK AND NEW-YORK, screw-steamers Minna and Brenda; (laid up:)
HAVRE AND NEW-YORK, screw-steamers Barcelona, Jacquart, Alma, and
Francois Arago, withdrawn, and running from Spain to Cuba. (See Paper C.)
BREMEN AND NEW-YORK. The North Dutch Lloyds are building four screwsteamers in the Clyde, of near 3,000 each, to run between Bremen and NewYork:
THE CONTINENT, SOUTHAMPTON AND NEW-YORK. Croskey's line consists of
the following screws, of about 2,300 tons each: the Argo, Calcutta, Queen of
the South, Lady Jocelyn, Hydaspes, Indiana, Jason, and Golden Fleece. (Most
of these steamers have been withdrawn from the route, and five of them are chartered for troops for India.)
PAPER E.
THE following numerous extracts from the Senate Reports of 1850 and 1852, and also from the letter of Judge
Collamer, then Post Master General, as well as from a
letter by the Hon. Edwin Croswell, will present in detail
a strong corroboration of the views which I have taken in
the preceding SECTIONS. I copy first from the Report of
1852. The Committee was composed of Hon. Thomas J.
Rusk, Chairman, and Messrs. Soule, Hamlin, Upham, and
Morton. The Report says:
" Your Committee desire to have it understood at the outset, that, regarding
the ocean mail service as the offspring of the wants of all of the producing
classes of the country, they have not felt at liberty to consider the propositions
which have been presented to them, in any other point of view than as connected with and subservient to the general policy of the government, which
embraces alike every section of the country, and can not know nor recognize
any personal or local influence.
"The system of ocean steam navigation was adopted by the Government for
the joint purpose of extending and advancing the commercial and other great
interests of the country, and, at the same time, providing a marine force which
might be easily made available for the protection of American rights, in the
event of a collision with foreign powers. The attainment of this double object
was the motive which, in the opinion of Congress, justified the advance of pub



PAPER E.    GEN. RUSK'S REPORT.                  201
lie funds in aid of private enterprise, inasmuch as it was calculated to insure to
the country the acquisition of a powerful means of maritime defense, with little
or no expense, eventually, as the money so advanced was to be reimbursed in
money or in mail service at the option of the parties concerned, while commerce
and the arts would be promoted during the time of peace.
"At the time when this system was commenced, the ocean mails along our
whole Southern coast were in the hands of foreign carriers, sustained and encouraged by the British Government, under the forms of contracts to carry the
British mails; while the Cunard line between Liverpool and Boston, via Halifax, constituted the only medium of regular steam mail communication between
the United States and Europe. In this way the commercial interests of the
United States were, on the one hand, entirely at the mercy of British steamers
which plied along our Southern coast, entering our ports at pleasure, and thereby acquiring an intimate knowledge of the soundings and other peculiarities of
our harbors-a knowledge which might prove infinitely injurious to us in the
event of a war with Great Britain; and on the other, of a foreign line of ocean
mail steamers, which, under the liberal patronage of the British Government,
monopolized the steam mail postage and freights between the two countries.
Under such a state of things, it became necessary to choose whether American
commerce should continue to be thus tributary to British maritime supremacy,
or an American medium of communication should be established through the
intervention of the Federal Government, in the form of advances of pecuniary
means in aid of individual enterprise. It had been found to be impossible for
our merchants to contend successfully, single handed, against the joint efforts
of the British Government and British commercial influence. Our noble lines
of packet ships which had far outstripped the sailing vessels of all other nations,
in point of beauty and swiftness, had been superseded by the introduction of
steamers, the power and capacity of which recommended them, as the best
means of inter-communication by mail, and of transportation for lighter and
more profitable freights, and American interests were becoming every day more
and more tributary to British ascendency on the ocean.
"Under the circumstances above stated, it was impossible for Congress to
hesitate for a moment which course to pursue, and it was determined to adopt
a policy which, while it would be in strict accordance with the spirit of our
free institutions, should place the country in its proper attitude, and render
its commerce and postal arrangements independent of all foreign or rival
agencies.
"Of the correctness of this determination, experience has furnished the most
ample evidences in the results which thus far have attended the prosecution of
the system. The line between New-York and Chagres tia New-Orleans and its
auxiliaries, have, by their superiority in point of swiftness and accommodation,
already superseded the British steamers which had previously plied along our
Southern maritime frontier, and the United States mails for Mexico, SouthAmerica, and our possessions on the Pacific are no longer in the hands of foreign carriers, but are transported in American steamers of the first class, convertible, at a very small expense, into war steamers, should occasion require,
which have commanded the admiration of the world by their fleetness and the
dlegance of their accommodations for the travelling public. Our Southern ports
are, consequently, no longer frequented by British steamers, commanded by officers of the British crown, whose legitimate business it is to collect intelligence
respecting the approaches to and defenses of the harbors which they visit, to
be made available for their own purposes, in the event of the existence of hostile relations.
"A similar result has, to a certain extent, attended the establishment of the
American, or Collins line, between New-York and Liverpool. Previously to
the commencement of this line, the transportation of the United States mail
matter, as well as the finer and more destructible descriptions of merchandise,
requiring rapidity of transmission to and from Europe, had been monopolized
by the British Cunard line; and the British Government had, within the short




202                      THE OCEAN POST.
space of six years, from the postage on this route alone, derived a clear income
of no less than five million two hundred and eighty thousand eight hundred
dollars, after deducting tlte amount paid to the concern under the contract to
carry the mails.
"Since the establishment of the Collins line, notwithstanding the combined
efforts of the British Government and commercial interests to confine their
freights and postages to the Cunard line, the revenue to the Post Office Department of the United States has amounted to several hundreds of thousands of
dollars per annum, whilst a large proportion of the money for freights has been
received by American citizens. The effects of this measure have, it is true,
thus far been but partial, because the trips of this line have been but twice a
month, while those of its rival have, for a considerable portion of the time
been weekly. During the intervals between the trips of the American line, the
postages and freights must, of necessity, enure to the advantage of the British,
and, consequently, the evil referred to has been but partially remedied."
Speaking of the large steamers built, the Report says:
"It is not to be supposed that engines of such vast dimensions could have
been constructed in a country where there were, as yet, no workshops adapted
to the purpose and where labor is very high, as cheaply as in a country where
every appliance of the kind already existed and where the prices of labor are
proverbially low. Nor can it be reasonably imagined that vessels of this description could have been navigated on as good terms, by men taken from this
country, where there was little or no competition in this peculiar branch of
maritime service, as by those who were easily to be found in a country in which
the density of population and consequent competition for employment, caused
the wages to be small.
"An attempt seems to have been made, in certain quarters, to create an impression that the aid heretofore extended by the Government to the individuals
engaged under contracts to carry the ocean mail, has been induced by feelings
of personal friendship, on the part of members of Congress. Such is not the
case. The friends of the system of ocean mail steam navigation, have, so far
as your Committee are advised, considered this important subject as a matter
of great national concern and independently of the very secondary motive of
individual interest. The question presented to their minds has not been whether
A, B, or C should have a privilege extended to him, but whether the commerce,
manufactures, and agriculture of the country would be benefited by the performance of a public service through the instrumentality of individual enterprise, under proper conditions and restrictions. As matters stood at the period
when the system was adopted, Great Britain was exerting herself, successfully,
to make the United States, in common with the rest of the world, tributary to
her maritime supremacy. She possessed the monopoly of steam connection
between the United States and Europe, the West-Indies and South-America.
There was not a letter sent by ocean steam conveyance, in these quarters, which
did not pay its tribute to the British crown, and not a passenger nor parcel of
merchandise transported, by the agency of steam, upon the ocean, which did
not furnish profit to the British capitalist. Great Britain asserted her right to
be the' queen of the ocean,' and, as such, she levied her imposts upon the
industry and intelligence of all of the nations that frequented that highway of
the world.
"In this condition of affairs, the law instituting the system of American
ocean mail steam transportation in its present form was enacted, as the best, if
not the only means of correcting a great evil, and, at the same time, building
up a naval force which should be available for national defense in the event of a
war. The system so instituted was deemed to be not only calculated to draw
forth and reward the enterprise of American citizens, but it avoided the difficulty of keeping upon hand, in time of peace, a large and, for the moment at
least, useless military marine, which could only be preserved in a condition for
effective service by a vast annual outlay of the public money.




PAPER E.    GEN. RUSK'S REPORT.                  203
"It was right and proper, then, in the opinion of your Committee, that these
ocean steam facilities should exist, through the intervention of the Government,
more especially as they were, in all probability, beyond the reach of private
means.
"The transportation of the ocean mails, with the greatest possible advantage
to the important interests of the country at large, is an object of paramount
importance; but which, however desirable, can only be effected at great expense. It is a matter of comparatively small moment at what precise time this
expense is to be paid, provided that the end in view can be attained with certainty. The temporary loan of a part of the means required, under proper
securities for reimbursement, appears to be the readiest mode by which the
purpose can be effected. How is this security to be acquired? Simply, by taking due care that the funds advanced shall be faithfully and honestly applied to
the object for which they are intended, and then holding a lien upon the ships,
for the construction of which they are appropriated, in such a manner as to
insure the reimbursement of the sums advanced in the form of mail service or
money; or, should circumstances require, of ships suitable for national purposes, as war steamers. This has been done. In all cases the contractors for
the transportation of the ocean mails, have been required to cause their ships to
be built and equipped under the immediate superintendence of experienced naval
officers and under the direction of naval constructors, appointed by the Government, in such manner as to be convertible, at the smallest possible expense, into
war steamers of the first class.
" Nor has experience caused any regret, on the part of the friends of the system, further than that in some cases, owing to the increase in the tonnage and
power of the ships and other circumstances, the expenses incurred by the contractors have outrun the receipts, and they have incurred heavy losses, which
might even prove ruinous, if they were forced to sell the property acquired in
this form. It should always be borne in mind, however, that in these cases, the
increase of expenditure thus incurred has been caused by a laudable ambition
on the part of the proprietors of these lines to do even more than they were
required to do under their contracts, with a view to secure the confidence of
the Government and the public. It should also be remembered that in thus
increasing the cost and consequent value of their ships, these companies have
enlarged the security of the Government for the money loaned, and promoted
the safety and comfort of passengers. It has, in no instance, been charged that
the companies referred to have, in any way, misapplied the aid extended to
them, or given to it an improper direction. The products of their expenditures,
even admitting them to have been greater than they might have been, show for
themselves, in placing the American steam mail service, as far as it has gone,
at the head of all others, in point of accommodation, elegance, strength, and
swiftness. Nor is this all. The establishment of these lines is not to be regarded merely with reference to the immediate profits arising from the system,
in connection with the transportation of the mails. Millions of money have
been saved to American citizens, which, in the absence of these ocean steam
lines, would have gone to fill foreign coffers. The Committee will refer to one
fact in illustration of the truth of this proposition. Before the Collins line was
established, the Cunard line was receiving ~7 10s sterling per ton for freights;
at present (1852) the rate is about A~4 sterling. By whom were these ~7 10s
sterling paid? By the American consumer, in most instances, upon articles of
British manufacture brought to this country by a British line. At present the
American consumer pays but ~4 sterling per ton; and, presuming that the
American, merchant makes his importations in the American line, this freight is
paid to our own people and goes to swell the sum of our national wealth. Thus,
it will be seen that, formerly, the American consumer paid very nearly twice as
muchfor the service, and enriched the British capitalist; whereas, at present, he
not only saves one half of the former cost of freight to himself but, in paying
the remaining half, benefits his fellow citizen, who in return aids in consuming
perhaps the very merchandise which he has imported.
"Under these circumstances, can any reasonable man doubt the propriety,
even in a pecuniary point of view, of sustaining the present system, which, at




204                      THE OCEAN     POST.
its very commencement, has given such ample proofs of its usefulness? Your
Committee think not, and do not hesitate to give it as their opinion that, merely
as a matter of dollars and cents, the service in question should be liberally sustained by Congress, and will in the end make ample returns.
"But your Committee regard this proposition as one, the mere money feature
of which is of minor consequence, when brought into comparison with other
more important considerations. The question is no longer whether certain individuals shall be saved from loss or enabled to make fortunes, but whether the
American shall succumb to the British lines, and Great Britain be again permitted to monopolize ocean mail steam transportation, not only between Europe
and America, but throughout the world. We are aspiring to the first place
among the nations of the earth, in a commercial point of view-a place which
belongs to us as a matter of right-and are we to suffer ourselves to be overp
come by British commercial capitalists under the auspices of the British crown?
Shall it be said that, at the very moment when our steamships are admitted to
excel those of any other people on the face of the globe, our enterprising citizens have been forced to relinquish the proud position they have attained, for
the want of a few thousands of dollars, when the national treasury is full to
overflowing? Let this end be attained and our great commercial rival will have
postages and freights all her own way, while we shall be compelled to contri:
bute, as heretofore, to her undisputed supremacy.
" With a view to a full and fair understanding of this important subject, your
Committee have communicated, through their Chairman, with the Executive
Departments of the Government and the presidents of the various companies
engaged in carrying the ocean mail by steam, and will now proceed to lay before
the Senate the results of their careful inquiries. It may not be improper here
again to note, by way of illustration, the benefits to be derived from ocean
steam mail transportation, when in successful operation, as manifested in the case
of the British Cunard line, under the auspices of the British Government.
During the first six years of its existence, the line above named received from
the Government no less than $2,550,000, while the Government received from
the Company, in the form of postages, the enormous sum of $7,836,800, or
$5,826,800 net revenue.
" The Government has paid to the line, (the Collins,) for mail service, in the
two years, $770,000, and has received from the line $513,546.80. If the receipts
be deducted from the outlay, the balance against the Government is $256,453.20
for the whole time, or $128,226.60 per annum.
"Thus it appears, that from a fair statement of the account current between
the line and the Government, the latter is out of pocket, at the end of the two
first years of the undertaking and under circumstances the most disadvantageous to the line, $256,453.20, or in other words, has paid $128,226.60 per
annum, for carrying the ocean mail by steam over about six thousand miles of
the greatest commercial thoroughfare in the world, for which, as yet, it has received nothing in return. But your Committee would ask, what has the country received in return for this $256,453.20? They will furnish the answer.
The country has received through the proprietors of this line, in the form of
freights and passage money, a no less amount than $1,979,760.85, in cash; and,
if the reduction in the prices of freight formerly paid to the British line be
taken into account, nearly as much more, by saving the difference in freights
and passage money, to say nothing of the general advantages derived by all of
our producing interests from the existence of this American line, which, as
your Committee believe, are incalculable. The money account will then stand
as follows: Government debtor to $256,453.80; Country creditor to $1,979,760.85
in cash; and if the former be deducted from the latter, the balance in favor of
the country will stand $1,723,307.05, in cash alone, leaving out of view the
duties on increased importations caused by the establishment of the American
line.'1
Speaking of the Pacific Mail Steam Company, the Report says:




PAPER E.    GEN. RUSK'S REPORT.                  205
"It will be seen from the above, that the total cost of the six vessels which
have been accepted by the officers whose duty it was to supervise them and decide whether they had been built in accordance with the requisitions of the law
and terms of the contract, and whose decision is presumed, by your Committee,
to be conclusive in the premises, has been $1,555,069, and that their aggregate
tonnage is 7,365 tons, instead of 5,200 tons, the amount agreed for. In addition to these ships, as your Committee are informed, the company has in the
Pacific seven steamers, with an aggregate tonnage of five thousand tons, not
yet accepted by the Government. The additional steamers are, and have been,
always kept ready to replace the mail steamers in the event of detention. The
cost of these additional steamers has been, it is stated, about two thirds of that
of the accepted steamers of the same class, say about $1,036,712, making in all
an outlay for steamships alone, of $2,518,337.
"It appears that the whole number of passengers, of all classes, transported
by the Pacific Mail Ship Company, the line in question, previously to December
31, 1851, from Panama northward, has been 17,016, and from Oregon southward, 13,332. The prices of passage have constantly fluctuated, but, on the
date above named, the 31st of December, 1851, the average rates were, for the
first cabin, two hundred and twenty-two dollars; second cabin, one hundred
and sixty dollars, and steerage, one hundred and seven dollars, between Panama and San Francisco. In the early stages of emigration the prices were increased in consequence of the enormous prices of labor and supplies on that
comparatively unsettled coast, but were subsequently reduced. At the commencement of the undertaking, the Company incurred, of necessity, vast expenses in the selection of proper harbors for taking in provisions, water, coal,
etc., and in the construction of depOts; and even at present, coal and supplies
of every description are sent to the Pacific vit Cape Horn, a distance of from
thirteen thousand to fifteen thousand miles.
"The freights from Panama northward, have been small in amount, and confined to the lighter descriptions of articles sent by express, while the mails have
been very large, amounting in some instances to one hundred and fifty bags,
each, and, together with coal, water, etc., occupying all of the space not required for passengers. From California, the freights southward, have consisted
of treasure, amounting, it is supposed, to the value of seventy millions of dollars, but it is extremely difficult to compute the worth accurately, as a large
portion of the gold, etc., sent has been in the'possession of passengers, and the
value does not appear in the manifests."
In noticing the Panama Railroad and the California lines,
the Report says:
" Nearly two millions of dollars have already, as your Committee are informed,
been expended on this important work, by a company possessed of ample
means, and the completion of it can not fail to open the way for a vast commerce, between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and at the same time cause our
fellow-citizens in California and Oregon no longer to be regarded as exiles.
This road being once opened, the passage of the Isthmus, now so much dreaded,
will be effected with perfect ease and comfort in a couple of hours, instead of two
or three days, as at present, and families, instead of individuals, will be enabled
to seek homes in the fertile valleys of our possessions on the Pacific coast. The
value of the lines of ocean steamers, of which your Committee have been speaking, to the commercial and other great interests of our country and the world
at large, can not well be estimated until this road shall have been finished and
put into full operation. When such shall be the case, the trade between California and Oregon, as well as that of China and the islands of the Pacific and
Indian oceans and the Atlantic States and Europe, which now passes around
Cape Horn, a distance of some fifteen thousand miles, will be enabled to take a
direct course across the Isthmus of Panama, the passage of which will require
but two or three hours. The United States mail, from San Francisco to New
York, has already been transported within the space of twenty-five days and
eighteen hours, a day less than the time claimed to have been taken by any




206                      THE   OCEAN    POST.
other route, at a period, too, when there were but seven or eight miles of the
road in operation. On a late occasion, five hundred government troops were
sent to California by this route, and were placed at the point of their destination
in a little more than thirty-five days, without any serious desertion or accident
of any kind. A similar operation by the way of Cape Horn would have occupied six months at least. The store-ship Lexington, which sailed from NewYork for San Francisco, during the last year, arrived at the latter place on the
last day of February, 1852, after a passage of seven months and one day. In a
country the military establishment of which is so small as that of the United
States, facilities of concentrating troops at points distant from each other, in a
short time, are of incalculable value, and may be said to add manifold to the efficiency of the military force.
"From what has been already said, it will be seen that the Pacific Mail
Steamship Company, independently of the associate line on this side of the Isthmus, and without taking into view the cost of the railroad, has expended in the
construction of mail steamers alone $2,518,337; and if to this be added
$2,606,440.45, the expense incurred for a similar purpose by the Company on
the Atlantic side of the Isthmus, the entire cost of steamships, to the two companies engaged in the transportation of the California and Oregon mails, has
been $5,124,777.
"It is no more than sheer justice that your Committee should state that the
California lines, east as well as west of the Isthmus of Panama, have proved
themselves worthy in all respects of the confidence of the country. In no single instance has an accident occurred involving loss of life or serious injury in
any way to the travelling public. Such is the strength of the vessels employed,
that on two several occasion when, owing to dense fogs and under-currents, cooperating with the defectiveness of the charts of the Pacific coast, one of the
ships of the Aspinwall line struck, at one time, upon a soft bottom, and, at another, upon a hard sandy bar, she was steamed off, after thumping, without
the slightest injury whatever. Facts such as these are the more important, inasmuch as several steamers have lately been lost on the same coast with a great
sacrifice of human life, evidently owing to a want of the strength necessary to
resist, effectually, the force of the winds and waves. In the opinion of your
Committee, the security afforded to travellers by the strong fastenings and
heavy timbers of the ocean mail steamers, built as they are, under the supervision of naval officers, who are selected on account of their thorough acquaintance with and experience in such matters, and made capable of sustaining
heavy armaments, is a matter of the greatest moment. Experience has shown
that, in the race after gain, our countrymen are, perhaps, more regardless of
risk to human life than the people of any other country in the world. Scarcely
a day passes without fresh evidences of the truth of this proposition. The
river, as well as the sea-going steamers, are generally built with reference to
speed and lightness, coupled with smallness of draft of water, and hence, in
case of touching the ground, or of violent storms, it is found that if one portion
of the frame gives way, the breaking up of the entire structure follows with a
rapidity that is but too well calculated to show the slight manner in which
these vessels are constructed. Your Committee think that the additional expenditure of a few hundreds of thousands of dollars is a matter not worthy ot
consideration, when brought into comparison with the loss of life, and would
rather see even millions devoted to the construction of strong steamers, than
witness the sudden and heart-rending ruptures of the dearest ties of our nature,
caused by the accidents that so frequently occur. Such is their feeling of stern
disapprobation of the reckless indifference respecting the safety of passengers,
daily manifested by some of the proprietors and officers of steam lines, that they
are resolved, so far at least as they are concerned, not in any way to countenance, directly or indirectly, such a course of proceeding. In the extension of
the system of ocean mail transportation which they propose to recommend, care
will be taken, that the steamers which carry the Government mails shall be regarded as national ships, to a certain extent, and as such, under the charge of the
law-making power, and be so built as to secure safety to travellers; and that, in
all contracts, this consideration shall be regarded as one of paramount importance."




PAPER E.    GEN. RUSK'S REPORT.                 207
Regarding a few sailing-ship       owners in New-York         and
Boston, who had memorialized Congress against the Collins and other lines, the Report says:
"The memorialists are loud in their complaints respecting the alleged improper interference of the Government with matters that should be left, as they
say, entirely to individual enterprise, which in their opinion becomes paralyzed
under the effects of Government patronage bestowed upon some to the exclusion
of others. If the authors of this memorial will take a fair and dispassionate
view of the matter, they will, as your Committee think, be convinced that they
are wrong in their supposition, and that the Government has not gratuitously
meddled in concerns with which it should have nothing to do. The merchants
and ship-owners referred to seem to forget, in the first place, that the system of
ocean steam mail navigation is intended to secure adequate protection for our
commerce from foreign aggression in the event of war; and in the second, that
it was instituted at a moment when the fine packet ships, to which the memorialists refer with such becoming pride, had in fact been driven from the ocean
to a certain extent by the overwhelming power of a British mail steam line,
sustained by the British Government, which had monopolized ocean mail and
passenger steam transportation, as well as the freights of lighter and more perishable descriptions of merchandise. If, as these gentlemen have stated, the
sailing ships have been made to succumb, it has been under the force of an
agency more certain and not less powerful than the one named by themwielded by foreign capitalists and directed by a foreign government claiming for
itself the supremacy of the ocean. The Cunard line of ocean steamers had
been in possession of a monopoly of freights, letter postage, and passage money
for years, in despite of the attempts of the memorialists to resist, successfully,
before the Government of the United States, seeing that American interests
were made tributary to foreign capital, aided by a foreign government, adopted
the wise course of correcting the evil by kindred means, and placing, at least,
to a certain extent, American interests under the auspices of American intelligence and enterprise. What would have been the condition of the New-York
lines and other ships had not the Government of the United States thought
proper to extend its aid to the establishment of the Collins line? Would it
have been any better than at present? or rather would it not have been infinitely worse? Had the Cunard line continued to prosper, as it must have done
in the natural course of things, would it not in all probability have increased
its number of ships until it would have monopolized every description of ocean
transportation? Would not the trade with the United States have been entirely
carried on in British steamers, navigated at small expense, and therefore able
to do the carrying trade at low prices? Again, what would have been the
condition of the Southern coasting business, so far as mails, passengers, and
light freights, at least, are concerned, had the fourteen British steamers then
employed been permitted to operate, unchecked by the American line of mail
steamers, between New-York and Chagres? Would it not have been entirely
at the mercy of the commissioned agents of the British crown, who so well
know how to avail themselves of opportunities to promote their own interests,by advancing those of their government? To carry the inquiry further, what
would have been the condition of our possessions on the Pacific coast, visited
as they would have been by British steamers-for where is the spot on the
inhabited or inhabitable globe to which they do not bear the union jack of old
England-had not the Aspinwall line been established? Such is the universal
pervasion of the money power in British hands, that at present, as is well
known, the Cunard line has extended a branch to Havre, to transport goods to
England almost free of cost, with a view to appropriate to itself the freights
from that quarter, and thus not only crush the American line of steamers to
Havre, but be enabled to underbid the Collins line, and, if possible, again monopolize the trade with the United States over that route. Would all this have




208                      THE OCEAN     POST.
raised the prices of freights in American sailing vessels, and given an advantage
to the memorialists in question, who had at one time monopolized to themselves
the freights, postage, and passage money in sailing ships? or would not, on the
contrary, such a state of things have operated so to give a British tendency to
trade everywhere, and to furnish freights to British ships, at prices at which the
American ship owners could not afford to navigate their vessels?
"What, the Committee would ask, has the Government of the United States
done in the premises? Having under its charge the control and direction of the
United States mails upon land and sea, it has thought proper to say that it
would pay for the transportation of the mails in American steamers, which can,
if necessary, be converted, at a small expense, into war steamers, and adopted,
if need be, into the navy proper, at an appraised value, and thereby become
efficient protectors of American commerce in the event of a war. This is the
head and front of the Government's offending, and has, forsooth, aroused the
ire of the commercial monopolists of New-York, Boston, and elsewhere, because
they can not any longer enjoy the gains which, for more than a quarter of a
century, they had wrested from the mass of consumers throughout the land,
north, south, east, and west. Your Committee must say that, in their opinion,
such complaints come with a bad grace from such quarters, and it is to be
feared that victorious steam will ere long, without the aid of the Federal Government, supersede the sailing ships of the memorialists, through the instrumentality of the discoveries daily in progress, whereby the navigation of vessels propelled by that power will be made a natter of comparatively small cost."
Speaking    of steam    communication with       ParA and Rio
de Janeiro, the Report further says:
" When the almost unbounded capacity for trade of the basins of the La
Plata and Amazon is taken into view, embracing as it does a great variety of
useful products which- may be advantageously exchanged for the manufactures
and agricultural productions of our own country, the mind is at a loss what
limit to assign to the trade to which civilization and the extension of commercial facilities must eventually give rise. Nor are the advantages of this great
prospective commerce to be confined to the immediate intercourse between this
country and the regions to which we refer. While the prevalence of certain
winds, and the form of the coast of South-America, are favorable to a direct
trade with the continent of North-America, they are such as to compel the
commerce with Europe to pass along our shores, and thus constitute our Atlantic seaports so many stopping places at which the ships of the old world may
touch in their voyages to and fro. Heretofore the policy of the governments
which occupy the regions watered by the La Plata and the Amazon, and their
respective tributaries, has been so exclusive in its character as to trammel, if
not entirely prevent, their intercourse with distant nations. The different
sovereignties which have sprung into existence since South-America became
independent of European control, have been so jealous of each other that they
have appeared to try which should be most succesful in expelling foreign commerce, lest it might bring to some one of them benefits which others did not
and could not possess. A wiser policy, however, appears to be about to prevail
since the fall of Rosas, and there is good reason to believe that, hereafter, the
commerce of those communities with the rest of the world, will be placed upon
a more liberal foundation. Should such be the case, Rio de Janeiro can not fail
to become the great centre of a largely increased trade in the southern hemisphere."
"Should it be preferred to limit the extent of the American line to Para, at
the mouth of the Amazon, the largest river in the world, there is at present a
Brazilian line between that point and Rio de Janeiro, which, with the lines
between Rio and the mouth of the La Plata, will render the connection complete.' Of the Amazon, it is proper to state that it is navigable by the largest ves



PAPER E.    GEN. RUSK'S REPORT.                 209
sels, and presents a line of shore of not less than six thousand miles, abounding
in every description of product, with climates of all temperatures and soils
adapted to all sorts of vegetable growth. As the regions through which this
vast river passes are peopled by communities to which manufacturing is unknown, it will at once be seen what an immense market will be opened to American industry in the various departments of the useful arts. The proposed
connection would, together with the intercourse by steam, which will inevitably
be established on the Amazon, draw to that river the trade of the interior,
which at present passes over the Andes on the backs of sheep and mules to the
Pacific ocean, and constitutes a large portion of the commodities that are transported around Cape Horn. With a view to this river navigation, Brazil has
already entered into a boundary treaty with Peru, by which she has engaged to
establish steamboat navigation on the Peruvian tributaries of the Amazon, and
is preparing to put seven steamers upon the river, where none have heretofore
been.
"The experience of the world has shown that nations do not become com
mercial or manufacturing, so long as the products of the soil are sufficiently
abundant to yield them wealth; and, hence, it may be reasonably inferred that
the carrying trade to and from South-America will, if proper measures be
taken, fall into the hands of American ship-owners. By way of ascertaining
what the extent of this trade will be, if reference be had to the interior or back
country as the standard of the commercial resources furnished by rivers, it will
be found that the total area drained by the rivers of the world is as follows:
Sq. Miles.
Europe, emptying into the Atlantic,..                       532,940
Africa, emptying into the Mediterranean,.     198,630
Total Old World,...                    1,731,570
Asia, emptying into the Pacific,......,767,280
Asia, emptying into the Indian ocean,....   1,661,760
Total Asiatic,.                               3,429,040
North-America, including St. Lawrence and Mississippi emptying
into the Atlantic,.....   1,476,809
South-America, emptying into the AtlanticAmazon and its confluents,.....    2,048,480
La Plata and all others,.... 1,329,490
Total South-American,.....    3,377,970
Total American to the Atlantic,.... 4,854,770
"From the above statement it will be seen that the proposed line of steam
communication will bring within thirty days of each other, the commercial outlets of navigable streams which drain a back country greater in extent than that
which is drained by all of the navigable streams which empty themselves into
the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Indian oceans, from those portions of Europe,
Asia, and Africa, which are accessible to American commerce. Settlement and
cultivation will, in the course of time, make these American river basins as rich
in products as those of the old world.
"The question next arises, who are to be the carriers of the trade which is
hereafter to spring out of these American river basins, the English or the Americans? If Great Britain be suffered to monopolize commerce as she has heretofore done by her steam navigation, her people will enjoy this great boon i but
if, on the contrary, the United States take advantage of circumstances as they
should, the prize will be won by Americans."
"Your Committee would remark, in concluding this Report, that, regarding
14




210                      THE   OCEAN    POST.
as they do the existence and rapid extension of the system of ocean mail steam
navigation, as absolutely essential to the dignity and permanent prosperity of
the country, and as the only means, consistent with the genius and policy of
our free institutions, of acquiring a maritime strength, which, by keeping pace
with the improvements of the age, shall place us upon an equal footing with
other civilized countries of the world, without the necessity of an overgrown
and expensive naval establishment proper, in time of peace, they would feel
themselves derelict in the performance of their duties, did they not recommend
the measure, with the earnestness which its importance demands.
" Circumstances indicate, with a clearness not to be misunderstood, that in
any future struggle for superiority on the ocean, the contest will be decided by
the power of steam. With a view to this result, England has applied herself
with even more than her wonted energy to the construction of a regular steam
navy which shall be superior to all others. The number of ships which Great
Britain has of this kind, is at present two hundred and seventy-one, and there
are no less than nine royal war steamers in progress of construction, to say
nothing of the mail and other steamers which are being built. The course thus
pursued by the great commercial rival of the United States, renders a corresponding energy and activity on our part absolutely necessary, in a national
point of view; a steam navy must be provided for future emergencies in the
way proposed by the Committee, or war steamers must be built at an enormous
outlay of public money and kept ready in the navy yards, or in commission, at
an expense which is appalling to every lover of judicious economy, or the
stripes and stars of our country, which have heretofore floated so triumphantly
on every sea, must grow dim, not only before the'meteor flag of England,' but
the standards of the secondary powers of Europe. If members of Congress
are prepared to adopt either of these latter two alternatives, let them say so,
and let a system which promises, under an honest and faithful discharge of duty
on the part of the executive branch of the Government, to realize the most sanguine expectations of its friends, be at once abandoned. Let Great Britain be
again the guardian of our commercial interests and the beneficiary of American
trade. Let the Liverpool, Bremen, Havre, California, and other lines, which
have furnished twenty-four as noble sea steamers as ever floated, be abandoned
to their fate, and let the Cunard line and other British steam mail lines and
royal steamers supply their places on the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and our
Southern seas.
"Your Committee would again repeat that the question to be considered is
not one of mere dollars and cents, or whether certain individuals are to be sustained, or not, but one of infinitely greater consequence-whether this proud
republic shall now and hereafter exist as a power competent to maintain her
rights upon the ocean. The present condition of political affairs in Europe is
such as, in the opinion of many, to threaten a general war among the nations
of that quarter of the globe, and the United States should stand ready, and
able too, to protect the rights of her citizens upon the ocean, in such an event.
Were such a crisis to take place to-morrow, or the next year, or within the
next five years, is the country prepared for it? The steam navy proper amounts
to sixteen steamers of all classes, which, together with the twenty-four ocean
mail steamers in the employ of the Post Office Department, would give us a
steam naval force not exceeding forty in all. Is this the position we should
occupy, while Great Britain has at command upwards of three hundred war
and mail steamers? France has, it is believed, upwards of a hundred, and the
secondary powers of Europe have naval steam armaments in proportion, most
of them exceeding our own. This question will be decided by the continuation
or rejection of the system under consideration, which, with all the difficulties
attendant upon new enterprises and under the most embarrassing circumstances,
has gone very far to sustain itself, and promises, at no distant period, to become
a source of large revenue to the Government, and incalculable commercial
advantages, pecuniarily and otherwise, to the country."




PAPER E.    GEN. RUSK'S REPORT.                  211
The following is copied from the Report made by Mr.
Rusk in 1850, and published in Special Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1852. Speaking of the services of the
mail steamers in our system of defenses, the Report says:
"The truth is, that, in the opinion of your Committee, the temper of the
times requires that we shall keep pace with the rapid improvements of other
nations in their commercial and military marine, and that the only choice is,
whether it is to be done by constructing vessels for the packet service, at a
boundless expense to the Government, or by aiding private enterprise, and thus
not only eventually avoiding expense, but adding largely to the revenues of the
country. It will be seen from the above extract from Mr. King's speech, that,
in the course of five years, the balance in favor of the Government from the
Cunard line alone was $5,280,000. The New-York and Liverpool and Bremen
lines will come in for a large, if not by far the greater, share of the postage and
freightage heretofore enjoyed by the Cunard line; and the line to Chagres, for
the advantages that have, up to the time of its partial commencement, been in
the exclusive possession of the British packet establishment in that direction.
Nor are the freightage and postage moneys the only sources of profit. In proportion to the increase of these facilities will be the extension of trade, and consequently the Government will receive the duties payable upon all foreign merchandise brought into the country. Besides, persons in transitu will leave
much money in our cities and along their routes, to say nothing of the porterage and costs of transportation of goods. To benefit our people is to benefit our
Government; as the more we enrich the former, the more able are they to contribute to the support of the latter.
"To construct ships and keep them in our navy-yards, subject to the injuries
of time and casualties, does not consist with the notions of the American people,
on the score of economy; nor is it in accordance with received opinions in regard to the propriety of placing excessive patronage in the hands of the General
Government. At the same time, it is in perfect unison with the spirit of our
free institutions that the arts of peace shall be made tributary to the purposes
of defense, and the same energies which extend the commerce and manufactures
of our country shall, in the event of necessity, be capable of being made use
of for our protection. While the crowned heads of the Old World keep in constant pay vast armies and navies sustained by the heart's blood of the oppressed
people, for the protection and preservation'of their unhallowed power, it is the
proud boast of our country that our soldiers are our citizens, and the sailors,
who, in time of peace, spread the canvas of our commercial marine throughout
the world, are the men who, in time of war, have heretofore directed, and will
continue to direct, our cannon against our foes."
" The simple fact that the ships employed in it [the mail service] may hereafter,
if the Government thinks proper, be purchased and commissioned as regular war
steamers, to be officered and manned as ships of war, should not and can not
prevent the construction of steam or sailing vessels for ordinary naval purposes.
Your Committee are of opinion that, so far from being an impediment to the
proper increase of the Navy, the prosperity of the ocean steam packet service
must operate in favor of an enlargement of the naval force, the necessity for
which is increased in proportion to the extension of our commercial relations
with foreign countries. The routes upon which lines of steam packets can be
sustained and made profitable to the owners are comparatively few, when we
take into view the infinitely diversified ramifications of trade. Great Britain,
with her vast colonial and general commerce, had, in 1848, but fifteen lines in
which national or contract vessels were employed, including the home stations,
as they are called, or points of connection between the British islands. Nor
has the ocean steam packet system hindered, in the slightest degree, her progress in the construction of steam or sailing vessels for the naval service. In




212                       THE  OCEAN    POST.
speaking of steam vessels available for naval service, Captain W. H. Hall, of the
British Navy, in the course of his examination before the special Committee of
the House of Commons, hereinbefore referred to, says:'I some time ago sent
to the Admiralty a plan for making the whole of the merchant steamers available in case of need; and if there were an Act of Parliament that these ships
should be strengthened forward and aft to carry guns, it might be then done
vwith a very trifling expense; that would give this country more power than
any other country in the world. We have nearly one thousand steam vessels,
half of which, at least, might be made available in case Government required
their services. Our mercantile steamers are some of the finest in the world,
and five hundred of them might be turned to account. They should all be
numbered and classed, so that Government would merely have to ask for the
number of vessels they wanted, when they might go to Woolwich, or other
places, and put the guns on board, and then they would be ready for service.'
"Here is the opinion of a captain in the British Navy with reference to the
availability of steam vessels for national defense; and what a lesson does it
teach to us in America, where steam navigation is found penetrating every portion of the Union, and spreading itself on our maritime and lake frontier in
every direction! Here is found no expression of apprehension lest the mercantile steamers might interfere with the growth or efficiency of the Navy to
which the witness belonged. This opinion, moreover, is expressed in a country where, according to the testimony before the Committee already named,
there were, in 1848, 174 war steamers, with an aggregate horse-power of 44,480
horses; and where Mr. Alexander Gordon states, in a letter addressed to the
same Committee, the Steam Navy had then cost the country ~6,000,000 sterling, or $30,000,000,'exclusive of all reinstatements and expenses during commission;' the same gentleman also alleging that the annual repairs amounted
to.......      ~108,000
Annual cost for coals,......       110,000
Depreciation at a moderate allowance,...              600,000
Making the total amount of annual cost,..     ~818,000
Or......    $4,094,000
" The regular employment of the best engineers on board of contract vessels,
and the great experience they would acquire from being constantly on active
duty, would furnish to the naval service, in the event of a war, a corps that
would be invaluable. In speaking of the superiority of the engineers on board
of contract vessels in the employ of the British Government over those on
board of the Queen's ships, a witness before the select Committee of the House
of Commons says:' Last year there was a universal complaint of the inferiority
of the engineers and all persons connected with steam employed in her Majesty's service. It was explained, and very easily explained, by the superior
advantages in the merchant service, and particularly the high wages paid. In
all contract steam packets, they have men on board the vessels who are competent to superintend any alterations or repairs in the machinery which may
be required."'
Secretary Graham said on this subject to the Senate
Committee, 20 March, 1853:
"While their discussions [mail steamers] justify the conclusion that vessels
of this description can not be relied on to supersede those modelled and built
only for purposes of war, it is respectfully suggested that a limited number of
them, employed in time of peace in the transportation of the mails, would be
found a most useful resource of the Government on the breaking out of war.
" If conforming to the standards required by these contracts, their readiness
to be used at the shortest notice, their capacity as transports for troops and
munitions of war, and their great celerity of motion, enabling them to over



PAPER E.    GEN. RUSK'S REPORT.                  213
haul merchantmen, and at the same time escape cruisers, would render them
terrible as guerrillas of the ocean, if fitted with such armaments as could be
readily put upon them in their present condition."
Post Master General Collamer also said on this subject,
June 27, 1850:
"There are three modes which have been mentioned of transporting the mail.
The first is by naval steamships, conducted by the Navy, as a national service.
This will occasion so enormous an expense that it is not probable the project
will be entertained.
"The next mode suggested is the sending the mails, from time to time, by
the fastest steamers which are first going. This has one advantage: it gives
occasional aid to the enterprising; but there are many and great objections
to it:
"1st. It is entirely inconsistent with fixed periods of departure and arrival.
" 2d. It makes all connections on or with the route uncertain.
"3d. A price must be fixed, to prevent undue exactions of the Government;
and yet no one would be under obligation to take the mail at the price, so that
it would be uncertain of going at all.
"4th. It would be impracticable to send agents with all those mails, to take
care of them and make distributions, except at an enormous cost.
" 5th. There would be constant difficulty with slow and unsafe boats.
"6th. The great object of obtaining steamships, so constructed, under the
inspection of the Navy Department, as to be suitable for war vessels, and subjpct to exclusive appropriation and use as such, would be sacrificed.
"The third project is the making of contracts, for a stated term of years, upon
proposals advertised for in the ordinary method adopted for mail-coach service.
This would not answer for ocean steam service, unless provision were made for
security, in the strength, capacity, and adaptation of the vessels, with their
machinery, etc."
Regarding our steam service in the Gulf, and in reviewing the contract made by the United States Mail Steamship Company, the Hon. Edwin Croswell, and associates,
in a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Postal Committee, presented the following important reflections:
"As early as the year 1835, the attention of the British Government was
directed to the plan of changing the mode of conveying the mails by the ships
of the East-India Company and the Government, and adopting the contract system with individuals and companies, with a view to combining the essential
properties of a naval and commercial steam marine.
"In consequence of the Report of the Commissioners appointed by Parliament to inquire into the management of the English Post Office Department in
1836, the mail steam packet service was transferred to the Admiralty. The
Report stated the conviction of the Commissioners of Inquiry that'the advantages which a system of contract must generally secure to the public over
one of the establishment, however well conducted, were such that they wish
they could have felt justified in recommending that it should be universally and
immediately adopted.'
"The Secretary of the Admiralty stated that,'in acting upon this opinion,
the Admiralty entered into contracts for conveying the mails by steam vessels
to and from Spain and Portugal, and subsequently between Alexandria and
England, with the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company. Contracts were also entered into for the conveyance of the mails between England




214                      THE   OCEAN   POST.
and North-America, and England and the West-Indies and Mexico.' That'the
execution of all these contracts, with the exception of the latter, had given
general satisfaction. But for this exception, the extent and complication of the
plan at its commencement afforded some apology.' That'the spirit in which
the steam contractors had generally executed their contracts merited notice, as
they had in almost every instance exceeded the horse-power stipulated in their
agreements, and thus insured an accuracy in the delivery of mails which experience has shown, if the letter of the contract had been adhered to by them,
would not have been the case.' And that' the contract system had been generally satisfactory to the Admiralty and the public, and had tended largely to
increase the steam tonnage of this country, (England,) to encourage private
enterprise in scientific discovery, and the regulation and economical management of steam.'
" Such, certainly, were among the valuable results of the system; but these
were not the only considerations that led to its adoption. The English Government, with the forecast for which that far-reaching power is distinguished,
saw the advantages which an extended steam marine would give to its commerce over that of every other nation in the world. It saw also the value of
connecting this great branch of the national service with the commercial and
practical skill of the country. It soon formed and matured its plan, embracing
within its scope nearly the entire commercial world. Steam lines, as stated in
the preceding extract from the Admiralty Report, were established, radiating
from England to all the prominent European ports, to the Mediterranean, to
Egypt, the East-Indies and China, the West-India Islands, South-America and
Mexico, the ports in the Gulf of Mexico and Havana, the United States and the
English colonial possessions in North-America, and to the islands and ports in
the Pacific ocean. This vast chain of intercourse was not only completely
established, but it became a matter of national policy to enlarge, strengthen,
and maintain it. By it much of the commerce of the world by steam, and
nearly all the letter-carrying by steam between this continent and the European
ports, and even the distant parts of our own territory, were engrossed by
British ships."
" Important national considerations, aside from the design to engross for British bottoms and British capital the trade and intercourse of the commercial
world, and especially with the American continent and islands, entered into the
Government plan. It was ascertained to be a far less expensive mode of maintaining a naval steam force adapted to the purposes of Government, and to any
emergency that might require these ships for other than mail purposes, than to
build, equip, and keep in service national steamships of war. The experiment
has proved its adequacy to the intended object; and it continues not only to
receive the approval of the Admiralty and Government of England, but to be
continually undergoing enlargement and expansion."
" The West-India mail steam line was proposed to the British Government in
April, 1839, by sundry merchants of London. A charter was granted to the
contractors in that year, under the title of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company. It embraced the following routes:
"1. Outward Atlantic Route.-From   Southampton to Madeira, Barbados
and Grenada-steamer, every 15 days.
"2. Trinidad Route.-From Grenada to Trinidad and Barbados-steamer,
every 15 days.
"3. Demarara Route.-From Grenada to Courland Bay, (Tobago)-steamer,
every 15 days.
"4. Northern Islands Route.-From Grenada to St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Martinique, Dominique, Guadalupe, Antigua, Montserrat, Nevis, St. Kitt's, Tortola,
St. Thomas, and St. John's, (Porto Rico)-steamer, every 15 days.
"5. Jamaica and Mexican Route.-From     Grenada to Jacmel, (Hayti,)
Kingston, Havana, Vera Cruz, and Tampico-steamer, every 30 days.
"6. Jamaica and St. lago de Cuba Route.-From Grenada to Jacmel, Kingston, St. Iago de Cuba, St. Juan's, (Porto Rico,) and St. Thomas-steamer,
every 30 days.




PAPER E.    GEN. RUSK'S REPORT.                 215
" 7. Bermuda, Havana, and Jamaica Route.-From St. Thomas to Bermuda,
Nassau, Havana, Kingston, Jacmel, St. Juan's, and St. Thomas-steamer, every
30 days.
"8. Homeward Fayal Route.-From St. Thomas to Southampton-steamer,
every 30 days.
"9. Laguayra Route.-From Grenada to Laguayra, Porto Cabello, and St.
Thomas-steamer, every 30 days.
"10. Panama and St. Iago de Guba Route.-From Kingston (Jamaica) to
Santa Martha, Carthagena, Chagres, and St. Juan de Nicaragua-steamer, every
30 days.
"11. Honduras Route. -From    Havana to Balize, (Honduras) - sailing
schooner, every 30 days."
"The contract system, combining the efficient features of an extended commercial and Government steam marine, was thus adopted after full investigation
on the subject by the Board of Admiralty, the Treasury, and the different Government Departments, including the Post Master General. The merits and
benefits of this system have been tested by England. That Government was
the first to engage in it, and, as we have already stated, fully approve, and are
constantly extending it. The Committee of Inquiry of Parliament, as we have
already quoted, say truly that it'had tended largely to increase the steam tonnage of that country, to encourage private enterprise in scientific discovery,
and the regulation and economical management of steam.' After an examination
of it in the most scientific and practical manner, that Government regards it as
altogether more economical for the nation, and for the general public interests,
than the exclusive employment of Government vessels. The ships built by the
contract companies have far exceeded in speed and other essential qualities the
ships constructed by Government. A far greater amount of service was obtained, at a cost much.less than would be incurred by Government in building,
equipping, manning, and running national vessels for even a partial performance
of the same service. Individual and associated skill, enterprise, and capital
were called into requisition, and, aided by Government means, contributed to
enlarge, extend, and fortify the naval and commercial power of England.
" The practical operation of this great system of steam lines was to place
within the reach of English vessels, of a semi-national character, and ready
to be converted into ships of war, our entire Southern coast and harbors, besides
yielding to them the foreign trade, commerce, and letter-carrying, by steam, to
and from all parts of our country. To meet and counteract this state of things,
became the object and duty of the American Congress and Government. It
was the more obvious at that time particularly, engaged as we were in a war
with Mexico, and our only means of coast defense of any force being a single
steamer, and she not capable of entering the Southern harbors, while English steam
fleets literally filled and occupied our waters. To counteract, so far as was demanded by the requirements of our own commerce, and the defense of our
coast, a monopoly so formidable, which had grown up under the direct and
liberal cooperation of the English Government, and the supposed superiority of
English machinery, required the aid of Congress; for it was evident that unaided American enterprise and capital could not cope with it. Accordingly, at the
close of the session of 1847, the Congress of the United States passed an act
authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to contract with sundry parties and
different steam lines for the construction of ocean steamships, as part of the
plan of a combined naval and commercial steam marine, in connection with the
mail service.
After enumerating the various lines established by Congress, he further says:
" These (with the previously authorized line from New-York to Bremen) were
the various parts of a complete and important plan adapted to the growing
wants of the public service, and for providing an adequate steam marine, when



216.                     THE OCEAN POST.
ever the exigencies of the country might require it, and for facilitating intercourse and the transmission of the mails between remote parts of our own country and other nations. For the due performance of it in all its ramifications, it
required a large aggregate of capital, skill, and intelligent enterprise. After a
lapse of nearly three years, portions of the undertaking have gone into efficient
operation; and already the fruits of it-its utility, and its advantages and benefits to the American government and people-have been demonstrated. When
the various parts shall be completed, and the plan in all its features shall be in
full operation, its immediate practical results, aside from its prospective effectiveness in furnishing a class of war steamers for any ultimate purpose of the
American Government, will be found fully to justify the action of Congress and
the participation and favor of the Government, and confirm the public confidence
in its great utility and value."
"When it came to the knowledge of the English government that Congress
had entered into contracts establishing steam lines to Chagres, Havana, and NewOrleans, its first movement to counteract or discourage the proposed American
line in that direction was to run branches of the Royal West-India mail line
from Bermuda to New-York, and from Jamaica to New-Orleans and Mobile.
Now that the American line to Chagres has gone into full operation, and the
news from the Pacific comes by this line to New-York, and thence to Liverpool,
some fifteen days sooner than the same news brought by the British line,* the
English government has revised, enlarged, and extended its West-India line.
It has entered into a new contract with the Royal Mail Steam-Packet Company,
a material feature of which is to run a mail line direct from Southampton to St.
Thomas, and thence to Chagres and back, twice a month, with steamers of
larger capacity and power, and with a proposed speed of from twelve to fourteen
miles per hour. For this line, five or six new steamships are, under the contract, to be built, while the old vessels are to form branches from this main line
or trunk to other of the routes of this great and extended plan of steam intercourse and letter-carrying; at the same time that government will withdraw its
branches to the Balize, Mobile, and New-York, extend its line to Rio de Janeiro,
and enlarge its line in the Pacific, from Panama to Valparaiso, converting it
from a monthly to a semi-monthly route. These movements show not only the
immediate results of American enterprise in ocean steamships, and the important consequences, aside from any purposes of coast and harbor defense, to which it
has already led, but the strong public reasons on the part of our Government to
foster, continue, and encourage it. It has already counteracted the best efforts of
the large and long-established English steam lines, and transferred the commerce
and letter-carrying so long exclusively enjoyed by them to American ships. If
promoted and favored by the Congress of the United States, it will still meet and
counteract the new efforts of the English Government to recover the ground
which American skill, enterprise, and capital, aided by the Government, have
won from them.
" In relation to the comparative cost to the two governments by which these
lines of ocean steamers, in connection with the naval and mail service, are maintained, it will be seen that the British Government pays as much for its single
West-India and Chagres line as the American Government pays for all its lines
-Liverpool and New-York, New-York and Bremen, New-York and Havre,
New-York, Havana, New-Orleans, and Chagres, and Panama and San Francisco.
The entire annual payments by the British Government amount [This was in
1850.-T. R.] to $3,180,000. Those by the American Government, when all
its lines shall be in full service, will be $1,215,000. The British-West India
Mail Steam-Packet Company are paid $3.08 per mile for mail service: the
United States Mail Steamship Company, $1.88 per mile."
"* By the contract of 1846 with the West-India Royal Mail Steam-Packet Company,
the voyage from Chagres to Southampton is performed in 38 days. By the United
States Mail Steamship Company the voyage from Chagres to New-York, and thence to
Liverpool, is performed in 22 days.




PAPER E.     GEN.- RUSEKS REPORT.                 217
The Committee presented some few queries to Commodore
M. C. Perry on the capabilities of the postal steamers for
war purposes, to which he replies thus:
" I now proceed to reply to the first division of the inquiry, as follows:
"Question first:'Whether the steamships employed in the transportation
of the United States mail, under contract with the Navy Department, or any
other steamships employed in the transportation of our foreign mails, are, in all
respects, suitable for immediate conversion into steamers for war purposes, capable of carrying the armament or battery appropriate to the class specified in the
contract?'
"In answer to the foregoing (first) question, I am of opinion that they are not' in all respects suitable.'
" Question second:'And if not suitable for such immediate conversion,
Whether they could be altered so as tomake them efficient war steamers?'
"Answer: The following named Atlantic steamers maybe converted, by
slight alteration, into war steamers of the first class:
" Of Collins's line. The Atlantic, Pacific, Arctic, and Baltic.
"  f Law's line. The Ohio, Georgia, and Illinois.
" Of Mortimer Livingston's line. The Humboldt and Franklin.
" Pacifc steamers-of Aspinwall's line. First class, the Golden Gate. Second class, the Panama, Oregon, California, and Columbia.
"The foregoing vessels of the respective contracts are variously constructed as
to materials, fastening, strength, and model.
i"Question third:'And if so, what alterations would be necessary to be
made, and at what expense, to make them war steamers of the first class?'
J" Answer: If these vessels had been originally constructed comformably to the
spirit (though it was not called for by the letter) of the contracts, as they
should have been, and all English mail steamers now are, in anticipation of
their possible conversion into war vessels, the cost of converting them would be
much less.
"Most of them were completed before I was ordered to their supervision; but
I lost no time, after entering upon the duty, in calling the attention of the contractors to this important consideration, an observance of which would not
have added more than one per cent upon the cost of construction.
"In altering these vessels so as to make them available for war purposes, the
most simple, expeditious, and economical plan would be to razee them, or cut
off their upper decks and cabins forward and abaft the wheel-houses; not by
tearing them to pieces and defacing the costly ornamental work, which, though
of no value to the Government, still need not be destroyed.
"The razeeing should be effected by sawing the top timbers, and cutting off
by sections the whole of the upper deck, excepting the space between the wheelhouses, thus leaving the greater part of the main deck exposed and for the accommodation of the armament, and enough of the sides above that deck to
answer for bulwarks and side-ports.
"Below, it would only be necessary to remove the state-rooms not wanted for
the accommodation of the officers, and convert the after-hold and fore and main
orlops into magazines, store-rooms, shot and shell lockers, etc., etc.
"According to my calculation, the cost of the conversion of either of the before mentioned vessels, exclusive of armaments, repair of machinery and ordinary repair, would not, or certainly ought not, exceed, for steamers of the
first class, $20,000, and for those of the second class, $15,000; and it could be
readily done for this at any of our navy yards, provided that useless alterations
were not made.
" It should be taken into view that those mail steamers, if called into service
as war vessels, would be considered as forming an auxiliary force to the regularIy constructed ships, and hence the impolicy of expending much money on
taem. The requisites of sound hulls and powerful engines, with efficient arma



218                      THE OCEAN POST.
ments, should alone be considered, leaving superfluous ornament out of the
question.
" The armaments of the respective vessels would, of course, be a separate cost;
and to arrange the guns on the upper deck, it would only be required to close
up three or four of the hatches or sky-lights; to strengthen the deck by additional beams and stanchions; to cut ports, and construct the pivot and other
carriages; probably it might be desirable to shift the capstan and cables.
" With respect to the description and weight of the respective armaments, I
am clearly of opinion that the first-class steamers already named could easily
carry each four 10-inch Paixhan guns on pivots, two forward and two aft, of
the weight of those in the Mississippi; ten 8-inch Paixhans, as side-guns,
ditto.
" The second-class steamers could with equal ease carry each two 8-inch Paixhans on pivots, one forward and one aft, and six 6-inch ditto, as side-guns.
" With the additional strengthening recommended, I am perfectly satisfied
that the armaments suggested would not, in the least, incommode the vessels.
Indeed, the weight of armament would be actually less than that which would
be taken away by the removal of the upper decks and cabins, and the miscellaneous articles usually stowed on one or the other of two decks-such, for instance,
as ice, of which not less than forty tons is generally packed in one mass; nor
would the munitions and provisions required for the war vessel be of greater
weight than the goods now carried as freight, saying nothing of the provisions
and stores carried by the steamers for an average of 150 to 250 souls, including
crew and passengers.
" It may again be remarked, that steamers thus brought into service would be
far inferior to regularly constructed and appointed war vessels; yet in the
general operations of a maritime war, they would render good service, and
especially would they be useful, from their great speed, as dispatch vessels, and
for the transportation of troops, always being capable of attack and defense, and
of overhauling or escaping from an enemy."
Captain Skiddy, the Special Naval Constructor appointed by the Government to superintend the building of all
the mail packets, says in a letter to Corn. Perry:
"In reply I will commence with the first-class ships, which are the'Atlantic,'
"Pacific,''Baltic,' and'Arctic,' of Collins' Liverpool line; the' Franklin' and
Humboldt' of Mortimer Livingston's Havre line.
"These ships, although equal in strength, probably, to any steamships afloat,
are not suitable for immediate war purposes, but can be made efficient in
four or six weeks, capable of carrying the armament or battery of a first-class
frigate-say four ten-inch guns and twelve eight-inch guns. These alterations
would consist of a removal of the deck-houses, spar or upper deck, forward and
abaft the paddle-wheel boxes, fitting the after and forward bulwarks in sections,
cutting port-holes, fitting hammock cloths or nettings, putting in extra beams
and knees, and stanchions, moving the windlass below, building magazines,
shell-rooms, officers' rooms, etc., etc. The cost of all these alterations and fixtures would not exceed ($15,000 or $20,000) twenty thousand dollars each ship.
These ships would then be relieved of about one hundred and fifty tons weight,
or nearly double the weight of guns and carriages, with less resistance to water
and wind, adding an increase to their already great speed."
In the case of all these steamers, that is, of the Havre and
Bremen, the Collins, the Aspinwall, and the Pacific lines,
Commodore Perry reported that they " were capable of being easily converted into war steamers of the frst class."




PAPER. F. OCEAN STEAM LINES OF THE WORLD.                                       219
PAPER F.
OCEAN STEAM LINES OF THE WORLD.
LINE.                                  SERVICE..Q  Tonnage
Canard, Paddle-wheel,............... Liverpool, New-York, Boston, and Halifax,...   8   12,000
"      Screw....................                                              4    4,800
North Atlantic Steamship Co.,....... St. John's and Portland......................       4,800
European and American S.. Co.,.... Bremen, Antwerp, Southampton, & New-York,       4   10,000,,,,,'....fi  ",'             "       to Brazil,....  4    9,000
London and Canada.............       London and Montreal,.......................   2    1,870
Liverpool and Canadian,............ Liverpool and Quebec......................     4    5,000
Liv., Philadelphia, and New-York,...     "      "  New-York,....................    4    8,700
Glasgow and New-York,............ Glasgow and New-York,.....................       8    6,200
Belgian Transatlantic...............ntwerp and New-York...........4     8,800
i.................   "     Brazil..........................  5     6,500
Hamburg and American............. Hamburg and New-York,....................        4    7,800
" *     Brazilian,*............ Hamburg and Rio de Janeiro,..............    2    4,500
Genoa and Brazilian....Geno,     ".............                      4    8,000
Royal Mail Co.,................... Southampton, West-Indies, Central America,
South-America,.............. 18     21,510
"      "......................  "     Per., Rio, Bahia, and La Plata,..  4   6,820
Pacific Steam Navigation Co......... Panama to Valparaiso and intermediate,...... 7     5,719
Peninsular and Oriental Co.......... Portugal, Spain, Malta, Alexandria, East-Indies,
China, and Australia,..................... 89    49,416
Europ. and Australian Royal Mail Co., Southampton, Alexandria, Suez, and Sydney,..  7   15,500
Australian Royal Mail Co.,...........Transport and other,.........................  4    7,800
Rotterdam and Mediterranean,....... Rotterdam, Leghorn, and Trieste,.............   4    1,900
North of Europe Steam Navigation Co., African....................................  4    8,200
Mclver's,.........................   Liverpool and Mediterranean................ 10     9,000
"..........................      "      " Havre,....................       2    2,000
Bibby's,........................... Liverpool and Mediterranean,................ 11    11700
Fowler's...........................    ('......         6    7,500
Dixon's.........................      "              "................    4    8,800
Liverpool and Australian,............          and Australia,.....................  2    7,000
London        "......... London and       ".....................   4    7,500
African............................    "    Liverpool, and Africa,...............  5    5,000
Union Screw Co.,.................. Southampton and Cape Good Hope,..........        8    1,800
Luzo-Brazileira..................... Lisbon and Brazil............................  4   8,000
Austrian Lloyds,................... Very large Mediterranean service........           Unkno'n
Messageries Imperiales.............. Mediterranean, Black Sea, Levant,............ 50 
W. Hartlepool Steam Navigation Co.,. Hartlepool, Hamburg, and St. Petersburg..      6.    L
Danube Steam Navigation Co.,....... Vienna, Galatz, and Constantinople,..........  6 
Hamburg and Spanish.............. Hamburg, Southampton, and all Spanish ports,      2    2,000
East-India Company,................ Suez and India, and the Bombay Mail lines,..   12   11,471
Spanish and Cuban................. Cadiz, Havana, and Mexico,.................     5    9,000
Companhia Brazileira,............... Rio de Janeiro to the Amazon and La Plata,..   7    5,500
Collins Company,.................... New-York and Liverpool,..................  8  9,727
Havre Steam Navigation Co..........            Southampton, and Havre.........  2   4,548
Cornelius Vanderbilt.................                        " "  Bremen,........  8    6,523
United States Mail Steamship Co.,.... New-York, Havana, Aspinwall,&New-Orleans,     6    8,544
Pacific Mail Steamship Co.,.......... Panama, California, and Oregon.............. 13  16,421
New-York and New-Orleans,........ New-York, Havana, and New-Orleans,........       2    3,198
New-York and Alabama,............... "              "         Mobile,..........       1,300
Charleston and Havana,....,...   Charleston, Key West, and Havana,..........        1,115
Savannah Steamship Co.,........... New-York and Savannah....................       4    4,793
New-York and Charleston St. S. Co.,.       "     "  Charleston........      4    4,680
"      "  Virginia.............      "    Norfolk, and Richmond,..........    2    2,871
Philadelphia and Savannah,.......... Philadelphia and Savannah,.............    2    2,600
Boston and Baltimore,............... Boston and Baltimore,......................   2    1,600
Texas Steamship Co.................. New-Orleans and Galveston,.................   4    2,400
Southern Steamship Co,.............   *           "  Key West..................    2    1,000
Mexican Steamship Co.,...........          "      Tampico and Vera Cruz........     1      960
There are several other lines of ocean steamers in Europe; but it is almost
impossible to ascertain any thing definite about them. The list above embraces
all of the most important companies of the world. The lines are continually
changing, while the vessels are passing into new hands almost every week.
* Building another steamer of 2,500 tons for the Brazil line.
t These vessels average about 250 horses' power each.          Their tonnage is large, probably 1,200 tons each.




220                      THE OCEAN POST.
PAPER G.
THE following official letter from     Hon. Horatio King explains itself.
POST-OFFICE DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, NOV. 12, 1857. 
SIR: In answer to your letter of 10th inst., I have to inform you, that the ocean
mail steamship lines now under contract with the Government for the conveyance
of mails, are as follows, namely:
1. The New-York and Liverpool (Collins) Line, performing twenty round trips
per annum, at an annual compensation of $385,000. Length of route, 3,100
miles.
2. The New-York and Bremen Line, rid Southampton, performing thirteen
round trips per annum, for the gross amount of United States postages, (sea and
inland.) Length of route, 3,700 miles.
3. The New-York and Havre Line, svi Southampton, performing thirteen
round trips per annum for the gross amount of United States postages, (sea and
inland.) Length of route, 3,270 miles.
4. The New-York, Havana, New-Orleans, and Aspinwall Line, performing
twenty-four round trips per annum, at an annual compensation of $290,000.
Length of routes 2,000 miles from New-York to Aspinwall direct; 2,000 miles
from New-York to New-Orleans via Havana; and 1,200 miles from Havana to
Aspinwall; making in all, 5,200 miles.
5. The Astoria, San Francisco, and Panama Line, performing twenty-four
round trips per annum, at an annual compensation of $348,250. Length of
route, 4,200 miles.
6. The Charleston, Savannah, Key West, and Havana Line, performing
twenty-four round trips per annum, at an annual compensation of $60,000.
Length of route, 669 miles.
~7. The New-Orleans and Vera Cruz Line, performing twenty-four round trips
per annum, at $1,210.93 the round trip. Length of route, 900 miles.
The contracts on these lines expire as follows, namely:
New-York and Liverpool (Collins) Line,            27th April, 1860.
New-York and Bremen Line,                         1st June, 1858.
New-York and Havre Line,                          1st June, 1858.
New-York, New-Orleans, and Aspinwall Line,        1st Oct., 1859.
Astoria and Panama Line,                          1st Oct., 1858.
Charleston and Havana Line,                       30th June, 1859.
New-Orleans and Vera Cruz Line,                   30th June, 1858.
I am very respectfully your obedient servant,
To DR. THOMAS RAINEY.                              HORATIO KING.
PAPER H.
THE FRENCH, ENGLISH, AND AMERICAN NAVIES.
THE following list is kindly furnished me by Hon. Wm. A.
Harris, of Washington.       The French list is taken from      the'Tableau General des Batiments a Voiles et a Vapeur cornposant les Flottes de la Marine Imnperiale Francaie."




PAPER H.     THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH NAVIES.              221
SAILING        VESSELS.
SHIPS OF 120 GUNS.-Ocean, Friedland, Ville de Paris, Valmy.
SHIPS OF 100 GUNS.-Hercule, Temmasses, Tage Turenne.
SHIPS OF 90 GUNS.-Jena, Suffren, Bayard, Breslau, Hector, Achille, Eole,
Santi-Petri, Tilsitt, Sceptic, Castiglione.
SHIPS OF 86 GUNS.-Diademe, Neptune, Jupiter.
SHIPS OF 82 GUNS.-Marengo, Trident, Ville de Marsailles, Alger, Triton, Duperre, Genereux, Latour d'Auvergne, Saint-Louis.
FRIGATES OF 60 GUNS.-Iphigenie, Independante, Didon, Uranie, Belle-Poulle,
Surveillante, Andromaque, Forte, Minerve, Melpomene, Perseverante, Renomme,
Vengeance, Etrepienante, Victoire, Semiramis, Guerrierre, Pallas, Semillante.
FRIGATES OF 52 GUNS.-Alceste, Calypso, Sirene, Atlante, Andromede, Nereide,
Zenobie, Sybille.
FRIGATES OF 50 GUNS.-Reine Blanche, Cleopatre, Danae, Virginie, Poursuivante, Pandore, Nemesis, Bellonne, Amazone, Astree, Junon, Hermione, Dryade,
Circe, Flore.
FRIGATES OF 46 GUNS.-Thetis, Armide, Grigone, Margicienne, Africane, Penelope, Medee.
FRIGATES OF 40 GUNS.-Constitution, Psyche, Clorinde, Heliopolis, Jeanne
d'Arc, Algerie, Resolue, Tiris, Ceres, Armorique.
CORVETTES OF 30 GUNS.-Ariane, Thisbe, Heroine, Alemene, Embuscade, Sabine, Aventure, Favorite, Jeanne-Hochette, Corneline, Circe, Cybele.
CORVETTES OF 28 GUNS.-Arethuse, Bayonnaise, Arthemise, Galatee, Serieuse,
Eurydice, Capricieuse, Constantine.
CORVETTES OF 24 GUNS.-Brillante, Naide, Creole, Danaide, Triomphante.
CORVETTES OF 20 GUNS.-Camille, Bergere, Iguala, Coquette, Echo.
CORVETTES OF 16 GUNS.-Diligente, Cornelie, Egle, Perle, Oritie.
CORVETTES OF 14 GUNS.-Astrolabe, Zelee, Prevoyante, Expeditive, Recherche,
Active, Indienne, Sarcelle, Prudente, Indefatigable, Emulation.
BRIGS OF 20 GUNS.-Ducouedic, Palinure, Cygene, Alcibiade, Adonis, Hussard,
Chasseur, Griffon, d'Hassar, Meleagre, Acteon, Bisson, Lapeirousse, Cassard,
Oreste, Pylade, Nisus, Euryale, Beaumanvir, Chevert, Droupot, Alacryti, Voltigeur.
BRIGS OF 18 GUNS.-Mercure, Dragon, Faune, Genie, Faucon, Grenadier, Entreprenant, Fanfaron, Janus, Victor, Olivier, Zebre, Obligardo, Alerte, Cuirassier.
BRIGS OF 10 GUNS.-Volage, Surprise, Fleche, Alcyon, Comete, Sylphe, Dupetit-Lhouars, Bougainville, Argus, Fabert, Lutin, Cerf, Messaeer, Papillon,
Rossignol, Agile, Geyer, Inconstant, Zephir, Railleur, Russee, Lynx.
BRIGS OF 8 GUNS.-Allouette, Alsacienne, Malouine, Tactique, Virgie, Eglantine, Panthere.
CORVETTES DE CHARGE 32 GUNS, 800 HORSE POWER.-Proserpine, Adour, Abondante, Oise, Caravane, Allier, Agathe, Fortune, Aube, Egerie, Rhin, Somme,
Meurthe, Mosselle.
SLOOPS OF 28 GUNS, 600 TONS.-Perdrix, Loire, Provencale, Marsouin.
SLOOPS OF 20 GUNS, 550 TONS.-Robuste, Giraffe, Chandernagor, Cormoran.
SLOOPS OF 16 GUNS, 300 TONS.-Hecla, Dore, Cyclope, Vulcain, Lamproie,
Volcan, Bucephale, Licome, Lezard, Mahe, Lionne.
SLOOPS OF 12 GUNS, 200 TONS.-Anna, Pintade, Menagere.
SLOOPS OF 8 GUNS, 150 TONS.-Pourvoyeur, Seudre.
SLOOPS OF 6 GUNS, 90 TONS.-Vigilant, Pilote, Ile d'Oleron, Mayottais.
SCHOONERS OF 6 GUNS.-Merange, Estafete, Gazelle, Hirondelle, Topaze, Beaucir, Euroquoise, Decidee, Jouvencelle, Tonguille, Amaranthe, Fauvette, Legere,
Encelade, Etoile, Fine, Doris, Brestoise, Mouche, Bella Helene, Eugenie, Tafne,
Parisienne, Gentille, Ibir, Mignonne, Souris, Egle, Iris, Papeiti, Sultan, Agathe,
Touronnaise, Daphne, Levrette, Bose, Dorade.
CUTTERS OF 4 GUNS.-Rodeur, Furet, Moustique, Espeigle, Moutin, Favori,
Levrier, Eperlan, Renard, Eclair, Goelund, Chamois, Emeraude, Esperance, Cu



222                       THE OCEAN POST.
pidon, Orglae, Aigle d'Or, Colibi, Antilope, Seybouse, Pluvier, Ecureuil, No. 1,
Ecureuil, No. 2, Mirmidon, Capelan, Corvril, Boberach, Palmer, Belette, Colombe,
Cigorle, Tafnal, Amiral, Papillon.
SAILING SHIPS CHANGED INTO STEAMSHIPS.
SHIPS OF 120 GUNS.-Montibello 650, Souverain 650, Desaix 650, Louis XIV.
650, Bretagne 960.
SHIPS OF 100 GUNS.-Fleurus 650, Ulm 650, Dugay-Etains 650, Annibal 650,
Eyleau 650, Prince Jerome 650, Navarin 650, Austerlitz 650, Wagram 650, Massena 650.
SHIPS OF 90 GUNS.-Inflexible 450, Dugueschin 450, Donnawerth 600, Fontenoy, 600, Charlemagne 450, Duquesne 450, Tourville 450, Alexandre 600, JeanBart 450.
STEAM VESSELS.
SHIPS OF 90 GUNS, 960 HORSE POWER.-Napoleon, Imperiel, Algesiras.
FRIGATES OF 650 HORSE POWER.-Mogador, Isly.
FRIGATES OF 540 HORSE POWER.-Descartes, Vauban.
FRIGATES OF 450 HORSE POWER.-Gomer, Asmodee, Labrador, Magellan, Montezuma, Cacique, Panama, Eldorado, Pomone, Albatros, Sane, Orenoque, Ch.
Columb, Canada, Ulloa, Darien, Caffarelli.
MIXED FRIGATES-(New Construction.)
800 HORSE POWER, 50 GUNS.-Imperatrice Eugenie, Indomitable, Foudre, Audacieuse.
CORVETTES OF 400 HORSE POWER.-Infernal, Reine Hortense, Bertholet, Catinat,
Rolland, Phlegeton, Laplace, Primaugnet, Dassas.
CORVETTES OF 320 HORSE POWER.-Prony, Caton, Colbert.
CORVETTES OF 300 HORSE POWER. - Patriote, Eumenide, Gorgone, Tanger,
Coligny, Tisiphone.
CORVETTES OF 220 HORSE POWER.-Espadon, Veloce, Lavoisier, Cameleon, Gassendi, Pluton, Archimede, Duchayla, Phoque, Elan, Caiman, Titan, Cassini,
Chaptal, Newton.
ADVICE VESSELS.
OF 200 HORSE POWER.-Monette, Heron, Laborieux, Eclaireur, Phenix, Lucifer,
Biche, Goeland, Promethee, Souffleur, Milan, Aigle, Megere, Sentinelle.
OF 180 HORSE POWER.-Petrel, Reguin, Epervier, Dauphin.
OF 160 HORSE POWER.-Ardent, Crocodile, Phare, Fulton, Meteore, Chimere,
Vantour, Styx, Acheron, Cerbere, Tartare, Phaeton, Cocyte, Tonnerre, Gregois,
Grondeur, Euphrate, Tenare, Australie, Narval, Bruddon, Solon, Etna, Sesostris.
OF 120 HORSE POWER.-Castor, Brazier, Flambeau, Vedette, Passe-Partout,
Pelican, Ramier, Salamandre, Ariel, Daim, Flambart, Marceau.
OF 100 HORSE POWER.-Anacreon, Averne, Tantale, Galilee.
OF 80 HORSE POWER.-Galibi, Voyageur, Marabout, Alecton, Rubis, Eperlan.
OF 60 HORSE POWER.-Antilope, Chacul, Liamone, Var.
OF 40 HORSE POWER.-Grand-Bassam, Ebrie.
OF 30 HORSE POWER.-Basilic, Serpent, Pinogouin, Guet n'Dar.
OF 20 HORSE POWER.-Oyapock, Acbar.
FLOATING BATTERIES.
Devastation, Lave, Tonnate, Foudroyante.
GUN BOATS.
Stridente, Mitraille, Etincelle, Bombe, Eclair, Flamme, Alarme, Coulevaine,
Doilleuse, Alerte, Meurtriere, Bourasque, Raffale, Fusee, Foudre, Fleche, Grenade,
Mutine, Tourmente.




PAPER H.     THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH NAVIES.                223
MIXED TRANSPORTS.
Ariege, Adour, Durance, Loiret, Gironde, Marne, Aube, Rhin, Charente,
Nievre, Rhone, Tarn, Mosselle, Yonne, Saone, Loire, Isere, Dordogne, Allier,
Meurthe, Finestere, Meuse, Oise, Somme, Garone
GENERAL RECAPITULATION.
SAILING VESSELS.
Guns.
31 ships of all sizes, mounting an aggregate of......................2,866
61 frigates           do          do...................        3,028
49 corvettes          do          do........1,024
57 brigs              do          do..................1,006
14 corvettes de charge do         do.                               448
28 sloops             do          do............................. 444
28 sloops             do          do                                444
38  schooners         do          do.............................  228
33  cutters           do          do.............................   132
317 sailing vessels, carrying a grand aggregate of......................9,176
STEAM VESSELS.
27 ships of all sizes, mounting an aggregate of..2,680
21 frigates    do      do          do.................       336
4 frigates, (new construction,)   do.                              200
34 corvettes of all sizes          do......          939
76 advice boats   do               do........................... 456
4 floating batteries             do............................    64
19 gun boats                       do......................   76
25 mixed transports                do............................  150
220 steam vessels, mounting an aggregate of..........................4,901
ORDINARY CLASSIFICATION OF NAVAL OFFICERS.
2 admirals in time of peace, and 3 in time of war; 13 vice admirals; 22 rear
admirals; 113 captains of ships of the 1st and 2d classes; 235 captains of frigates;
679 lieutenants of ships of the 1st and 2d classes; 550 ensigns of ships; 109 midshipmen of 1st class; 165 midshipmen of the 2d class.
With respect to the classes of midshipmen, the admiral minister of marine
regulates yearly the number of young gentlemen who may be received in the
service.
According to the navy list for 1856, (July,) the effective force of the navy of
Great Britain was at that period:
Guns.
Sailing vessels,.......269, carrying an aggregate of 9,362
Steam vessels,....................258     do           do      4,518
Total,......................527    do           do     13,880
The classification of officers was:
In service.  On half pay.  Retired.       Total.
Admirals,..............  21     15          -36
Vice-admirals,...........  27          19          -46
Rear-admirals,....  51           55          129           235
Captains of ships,........ 396         60         318            774
Commanders,........... 551            64         286            901
Lieutenants,............1,139    668         -            1,807




224.THE OCEAN POST.
NAVY OF THE UNITED STATES.
Name.          Rate.   Where built.                Name.          ate.    Where built...                                               ~._
SHIPS OF THE                                         SCHOONER.
LINE, (10.)
Pennsylvania,.........120 Philadelphia,..... 1837 Fenimore Cooper,....        Purchased,....... 1852
Columbus.........      80 Washington,...... 1819
Ohio,..............    84 New-York......1820          STEAMERS.
North-Carolina,......84 Philadelphia,..... 182(
Delaware,.........     84 Norfolk,......... 1820 Screw Steamers, 1st
Alabama,.........................          class.
Virginia..........     84...............
Vermont,............. 84 Boston,.......... 1848 Franklin,............. 50.....................
New-York................     errimack,.......... 40 Boston.......... 1855
New-Orleans,.....      84.............      Wabash,.............. 40 Philadelphia,..... 1855
Minnesota,.........     40 Washington,..... 1855
Roanoke,......... 40 Norfolk,....1855
Colorado,.....................................
FRIGATES, (18.)                                  Niagara,..................................
Independence,.......   56 Boston,.......... 1814    Screr Steamer, 2d
United States,.... 50 Philadelphia,..... 1797             class.
Constitution..........     Boston...         1797
Potomac............. 50 Washington,..... 1821 San Jacinto,...........18 New-York,......1850
Brandywine,.           50.......do........182
Columbia...........     50.......do........ 186 Screw Steamers, 8d
Congress............    0 Portsmouth, N. H. 1841          class.
Cumberland,........     50 Boston.......... 1842
Savannah,..........    50 New-York...... 1842 Massachusetts,........      9 Transferred from
Raritan............. 50 Philadelphia,..... 184                                  Wr Dep't.
Santee,...............  50............. Princeton,............ 10 Rebuilt, Norfolk,. 1851
Sabine...............  50.................
St. Lawrence...... 50 Norfolk......... 1847 Side-wheel Steamers,
1st class.
Mississippi...........10 Philadelphia,..... 1841
SLOOPS OF WAR,                                    Susquehanna,            1..............1.. 850
(19.)                                     Powhatan,............    9 Norfolk,....... 1850
Constellation,.........22 Rebuilt, Norfolk,. 1854 ide-wheel     Steamer,
Macedonian,.......... 22......do.........18             2d class.
Portsmouth..........22 Portsmouth, N.H. 1848
Plymouth,........      22 Boston...........1848 Saranac,..............   6 Portsmouth, N.H. 1848
St. Mary's............ 22 Washington,.       1844
Jamestown........... 22 Norfolk,.........      1844 Sde-wheel Steamers,
Germantown,........     22 Philadelphia,..... 1846         d class.
Saratoga,............ 20 Portsmouth, N.H. 1842
John Adams..........20 Rebuilt, Norfolk,. 1881 Michigan,.............      1 Erie, Pa.,........ 1844
Vincennes,...........   20 New-York,......1826     ulton,...............  5 New-York,.          1837
Falmouth,............20 Boston........      1827 Alleghany,............ 10 Pittsburgh, Pa,.. 1847
Vandalia,.............20 Philadelphia..... 1828 Water Witch,.........    2 Wasington,.....1845
St. Louis.............20 Washington.... 1828 ohn Hancock........         2 Boston,..         180
Cyane.............. 20 Boston,..........1887
Levant,............. 20 New-York,...... 1887 STEAM TENDERS.
Decatur,..........      16......do......... 183
Marion...............   16 Boston,........18      Despatch................ Purchased,...... 1855
Dale,...........        16 Philadelphia,..... 18   Engineer,.......d..............
Preble,................ 16 Portsmouth, N. H. 1839 Arctic,.........................do.    1855
STORE-SHIPS.
Supply.............      4 Purchased.......1846
Bainbridge,...........   6 Boston..........1842 Warren...............         Boston........   1826
Perry...............     6 Norfolk.......... 1843 Fredonia,.........        4 Purchased,......1846
Dolphin..............    4 New-York,.......1836 Release,.                   2......do.....1855
The United States Navy has 64 Captains, 96 Commanders, 311 Lieutenants,
69 Surgeons, 43 Passed Assistant Surgeons, 37 Assistant Surgeons, 64 Pursers,
24 Chaplains, 12 Mathematicians, 24 Masters, 24 Passed Midshipmen, 30 Midshipmen, and 145 Probationary Midshipmen and Students. —Taken from the
Navy Register of 1857.