PRIMEVAL MAN.
AN
EXAMINATION OF SOME RECENT SPECULATIONS.
BY
THE DUKE OF ARGYLL.
AUTHOR OF H THE REIGN OF LAW."
NEW YORK
JOHN W. LOVELL COMPANY
150 WORTH STREET, CORNER MISSION PLACE








PREFACE.
HAVING now no immediate prospect of being able to expand
or to illustrate the argument contained in the following pages,
I republish it with very little alteration from the form in
which it originally appeared in Good Words.  I am well
aware how much it requires both expansion and illustration.
But I hope that at least the main lines of that argument are
traced with sufficient clearness to enable others with more
leisure to pursue them farther, and to test the results arrived
at by our growing knowledge in the sciences which bear upon
the early condition of Mankind. The distinctions here taken
between different branches of the subject, have not, so far as
I know, been elsewhere laid down with adequate precision.
Yet all safe reasoning depends upon such distinctions being
carefully observed. If they are sound, they place an insuperable bar in the way of certain conclusions respecting Primeval
Man, which have been too hastily assumed as following from
recently discovered facts. At all events these conclusions car;
only be reached by new arguments and by new methods of
proof.
Many of the questions which are involved in the reasoning of
this Essay, are questions which fouch upon the profoundest
problems of our nature and of our history:-.on the connection,
seemingly inseparable, between all mental phenomena and physical organization; on the truthfulness of any system of classification which does not take equal cognizance of both; on the
distinction between intellectual powers and moral character; on
the distinction, again, between the mere results of accumulated
knowledge, and the working of the original faculties of Reason;
on the question how far the first use and the first direction oi
his mental powers may have been as purely instinctive in Man
as in the Bee or in the Beaver; on the relation between the




iv                      PREFACE.
two tendencies in Man to advance and to decline; on the
causes of degradation which are born with him and seem to be
inseparable from his nature; on the bearing upon the whole
argument of existing facts respecting his distribution on the
globe, and the obvious effects upon him of hardship and of
suffering to produce, or to intensify, a barbarous condition;on each and all of these questions, which enter into the reasoning of this Essay, whole volumes might be written without
exhausting what is to be said upon themn. I shall be content,
in the mean time, if this slight sketch of so great a subject
should be of any use in directing others into some well-defined
paths of thought and of investigation in regard to it.




CONTENTS.
PAGE
PART I.
INTRODUCTORY......................................
PART II.
THE ORIGIN OF MAN........................ 3
PART  III.
THE ANTIQUITY OF MAN......................25
PART IV.
MAN'S PRIMITIVE CONDITION.................. - 43








PRIMEVAL MAN.
PART 1.
INTRODUCTORY.
AT the meeting, in I867, of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, a paper was read by Sir J. Lubbock
upon " The Early Condition of Mankind." It purports to be a
reply to a lecture on the "Origin of Civilization' by Dr.
Whately, the late Archbishop of Dublin, which was published
in I854. The Archbishop's position is shortly this,-that mere
savages-that is to say, "men in the lowest degree, or even anything approaching to the lowest degree, of barbarism in which
they can possibly subsist at all-never did and never can, unaided, raise themselves into a higher condition;" that even
when they are brought into contact with superior races, it is extremely difficult to teach them the simplest arts; that they
"seem never to invent or discover anything," because even
"necessity is not the mother of invention except to those who
have some degree of thoughtfulness and intelligence; " that
whatever the natural powers of the human nmind may be, they
require to have some instruction from  without wherewith to
start. He holds it to be " a complete moral certainty that men
left unassisted in what is called a state of nature-that is, with
the faculties Man is born with not at all unfolded or exercised
by education-never did, and never can, raise themselves from
that condition."  Therefore, "according to the present course
of things, the first introducer of civilization among savages is,
and must be, man in a more improved state." But as " in the
beginning of the human race there was no mazi to effect it,"
this must have been the work of another Being. "' There must
have been, in short, something of a revelation made to the first




2                    PRIMEVAL MAN.
or to some subsequent generation of our species." The conclusion is that, as Man must have had a Divine Creator, it seems
equally certain that, to some extent also, he must have had a
Divine Instructor.
This is the argument which Sir J. Lubbock has undertaken
to refute. His conclusion is, that the " primitive condition of
mankind was one of utter barbarism;" that from this condition
certain races have independently raised themselves; and, of
course, that, instead of existing savages being the degenerate
descendants of ancestors who were more advanced, all races
now civilized are the children of men who were once in the
same low condition. A further conclusion, though not formally
asserted, is plainly indicated, viz. this,-that the " utter barbarism " of the first man was itself an advance on the condition of
some progenitor. I infer that this idea is intended to be conveyed when the "first men " are explained to mean the " first
beings worthy to be so called."
The two main lines of argument pursued by Sir J. Lubbock
connect themselves with the two following propositions which
he undertakes to prove — ist, "That there are indications of
progress even among savages; " and 2d, "That among the
most civilized nations there are traces of original barbarism."
Sir J. Lubbock's paper has confirmed an impression I have
long had, that Whately's argument, though strong at some
points, is at others open to assault; and that, as a whole, the
subject now requires to be differently handled, and regarded
from a different point of view. On the other hand, the same
paper has convinced me that the argument in favor of what
may be called the Savage-theory is very much the weaker of
the two, and rests upon a method of treatment much more inadequate and incomplete.
I propose in this, and in some following chapters, to set forth
the reasoning upon which these convictions rest.
There are, however, some preliminary considerations which
it may be well to deal with before proceeding farther.
It will be observed that both arguments are avowedly conducted irrespective of any belief in the Mosaic narrative of
Creation. They both profess to be purely scientific; that is,
founded on natural knowledge, and using for the discovery of




INTRODUCTORY.                      3
truth such facts and inferences as are ascertainable by reason.
Whately expressly says that in his argument he has not appealed to the Book of Genesis as an authority, because he
" thought it important to show, independently of that authority
and from a monument actually before our eyes-the existence,
namely, of civilized man-that there is no escaping such conclusions as agree with the Bible narrative."  The opposite argument is, of course, maintained always from the same basis of
scientific independence, and those who urge it do not generally
profess or care to reconcile the conclusion arrived at, with the
Mosaic narrative.  Sir J. Lubbock at the close of his paper
says emphatically, "These views follow, I think, from  strictly
scientific considerations."  No doubt, if the inquiry is to be
pursued at all upon this basis, it must be conducted honestly,
and the conclusions legitimately reached must be accepted with
just so much of conviction as is justified by the nature of the
data, and the nature of the reasoning employed.
The question may well arise in many minds in reference to
this subject, whether it is a legitimate subject of speculation at
all-whether it does not transcend our faculties to ascertain
the truth.
Respecting this question, there is one answer which is obvious, although it may not go far to satisfy those whose scruples
are most sincere. When men in the position of the late Archbishop of Dublin enter upon this discussion, and declare that,
independent of all authority, certain conclusions can be shown
to be unavoidable by natural reason, we cannot prohibit others
from entering upon the same ground, or from producing such
arguments as they may be able to find in support of an opposite
conclusion.  But there are some better arguments than this.
This, indeed, is enough to show that the discussion must, as a
matter of necessity, be encountered, even though it should be
deplored. But other considerations may perhaps convince us
that it ought not to be avoided.  It may be true, and I believe
it to be true, that the desire of knowledge is capable of excess.
The spirit which in the ordinary concerns of life is condemned
as idle or vicious curiosity has, surely, its counterpart in the
higher pursuits of intellect.  David seems to imply as much
when he pleads in favor of his own character and conduct be



4                    PRIMEVAL MAN.
fore God-" I do not exercise myself in things too high for me."
On the other hand, we must remember that in nothing has the
human race been more liable to the delusions of superstition
than in the conception of the matters which were to be held, or
were not to be held, as forbidden to investigation. Those physical laws of nature which are now so familiar to us as the peculiar field of observation and discovery-a field on which the
march of intellect has been so rapid and so triumphant-were
once held by the early Greek philosophers as belonging to the
most secret things of God. They thought, perhaps not unnaturally, that a region which lay, or seemed to lie, so much
nearer to themselves, even their own mind and spirit-its phenomena and its methods of procedure-must be the ground
most open to their search, and must afford results most comprehensible to the understanding. And so they plunged into
all the problems of Metaphysics. But there are no mysteries
so deep as these-none in which the human mind reaches so
soon the limit of its powers-none in which the temptation is
stronger to strain after knowledge which is shrouded in impenetrable darkness. The greatest intellects which the world has
ever seen have labored at such problems, and, in respect at
least to many of them, have left them as they found them.
The same tendency of metaphysical speculation, blending,
through the school of Alexandria, with the mysticism of the
East, infected the Theology of the early Church, and heretics
were not seldom divided from the orthodox upon questions
which were not only beyond the reach of reason, but equally
beyond the scope of Revelation. In. the Confessions of St.
Augustine there is a curious indication of this transposition
of the questions which are deemed to be the most legitimate,
and the most accessible, subjects of our research. In early
life he had been, as is well known, led away by the dangerous speculations which pass in ecclesiastical history under
the name of the Manichoean heresy. He pours out his lamentations over the subtleties which had once engrossed and
perplexed his mind-subtleties of which Christianity had revealed the folly. And among the temptations which he still
desires to overcome is the appetite of knowledge-a " vain and
curious desire hiding under the name of science " (lib. x. c. 35).




INTRODUCTORV.                    5
This is the desire which pretends, he says, to reach the inmost
secrets of nature-secrets which when discovered could have
no value, and of which men desire and expect nothing except
to know. Now, here we have an exact definition of the true
scientific spirit-a spirit which has, indeed, in its results, richly
"endowed the human family with new mercies," but which
never has had this dower in view as its only, or even as its
chief, inducement.  It is not perhaps exactly relevant to observe that the glorious facts of Astronomy are among the secrets of nature which Augustine rejoices to say he no longer
desires to know; because, in his mind, Astronomy took the
form of Astrology, to which in his youth he had been much addicted. But Augustine is right wlien he detects the same love
of mere knowledge in the instinctive arrest of his attention by
the commonest works of nature. He desires to be delivered
even from this. He has given up many pleasures of the eye
and curiosities of the mind in which he once delighted,-not
only the transits of the heavenly bodies and the response of
oracles, but even the public spectacles of the Roman world.
Still, he deplores that this wretched love of mere knowledge, —
this lust of the eyes,-is ever pursuing him as he walks and
lives. Although no longer tempted to go to the Amphitheatre
to see the race of hound and hare, he complains that the same
sight, if seen accidentally in the fields, will divert his attention
from some profound meditation. Even from the windows of his
home his eye is caught by some little lizard catching flies upon
the wall, or by some spider spreading for the capture her wondrous web. The smallness of these creatures, he confesses,
does not diminish his instinctive curiosity. True it is that he
might pass from these creatures to magnify the Creator of them
all. But he is conscious that this was not present to his
thoughts when they were arrested and fixed upon the things he
saw.
Most true! and equally true was it that this desire of knowledge was burning intensely in him when it wrung from him no
confession; or rather, when it was interwoven into the very
tissue of which his immortal Confessions are composed. In
them no more splendid passages occur than those in which he
turns the eye of his curiosity inwards upon the secrets of his




6                     PRIMEVAL MAN,
own nature, and asks a thousand unanswerable questions on
the structure and the power of Memory. What and where are
those innumerable chambers,-those vast halls,-which hold in
perpetual imagery not only all he had ever seen, but all he had
ever conceived and known? How can the immensities of Time
and Space, of earth, and sky, and ocean, be thus contained?
How can they be recalled into what seemed a lost existence?
What depths and mysteries of being! How little can we understand ourselves! Does it not seem then as if the mind were
too narrow to comprehend itself? And so, through pages of
most subtle and eloquent analysis, he revels in that faculty of
Wonder, which is the very root and principle of all curious inquiry. I do not say that these questions are wholly vain. But
they are useful only as all knowledge may be useful, in teaching us-if it be nothing else —how small that knowledge is.
St. Augustine was right in thinking that this wonderful power
of Memory lies close to the final secrets on which our very being and personality depend. An eminent philosopher of our
own time has found in Memory the only insuperable difficulty
in the way of reducing the definition of ourselves into that of
mere " Possibilities of Feeling." * But in pursuing these speculations into the most inscrutable of all subjects, St. Augustine
is but following the instincts of the same restless and curious
intellect which had once struggled with the questions, What
Matter is, and How Evil came to be? There is no inquiry in
which the human mind comes so immediately to the limit of its
powers, as in the analysis of itself. Inscrutable questions may
indeed be asked as to what Man once was. But questions
much more inscrutable may be asked, and are habitually asked,
as to what Man now is. No conclusions in respect to the original condition of our race can be more shocking to reason and
common sense, than many conclusions which metaphysicians
have pretended to establish respecting its condition now.
Another reason against declining this inquiry, is to be found
in the fact that the plea of impotence against the human understanding, is a plea which may be urged in the service of the
most irrational error, as easily as, perhaps more easily than, in
* Mr. J. S. Mill. I have discussed elsewhere the logic and the adequacy of this definition:-" The Reign of Law." Fifth Edition, Note D.




INTRODUCTORY.                      7
the service of the most certain truths. Men engrossed by some
particular theory are under immense temptation to denounce
the power of faculties whose function it is to apprehend ideas
differing fromll their own. At the present moment this is the
habitual practice of a whole school of thinkers, who have eyes
for nothing but a particular class of facts, and who therefore
very naturally resort to the assertion that all eyes with a wider
range of vision are eyes.of "phantasy."  And if this has been
sometimes the result of the anatomy of Mind, what are we to
say of the anatomy of the Body? We cannot even think of
our bodily frames without encountering at once all the facts
which connect the phenomena of Mind with the structure and
condition of Material Organs. And then our Organism as a
whole, how close it stands to that of the beasts that perish!
Are we to close these paths of investigation also, because some
minds have been led by them to a gross materialism? It is
not on one subject of inquiry, but in all, that we come speedily
to questions which cannot be answered. The result therefore
is, that we should never be jealous of research, but always jealous of presumption,-that on all subjects Reason should be
warned to keep within the limit of her powers, but from none
should Reason be warned away. Men who denounce any particular field of thought are always to be suspected. The presumption is, that valuable things which these men do not like
are to be found there. There are many forms of Priestcraft.
The same arts, and the same delusions, have been practised in
many causes. Sometimes, though perhaps not so often as is
popularly supposed, men have been warned off particular
branches of physical inquiry, in the supposed interests of Religion. But constantly and habitually, men are now warned
from many branches of inquiry, both physical and psychological, in the interests-real enough-of the Positive Philosophy!
"Whatever," says Mr. Lewes, "is inaccessible  to reason,
should be strictly interdicted to research." Here we have the
true ring of the old sacerdotal interdicts. Who is to define beforehand what is, and what is not, " inaccessible to reason? "
Are we to take such a definition on trust from the priests of
this new philosophy? They tell us that all proofs of Mind in
the order of the universe, all evidences of purpose, all concep



8                     PRIMEVAL MAN.
tions of plan or of design, in the history of Creation, are the mere
product of special "infirmities " of the human intellect.  In
opposition to these attempts-come from what quarter they
may-to limit arbitrarily the boundaries of knowledge, let us
maintain the principle that we never can certainly know what
is "inaccessible to reason" until the way of access has been
tried. In the highest interests of truth, we must resist any and
every interdict against research. The strong presumption is
that every philosophy which assumes to issue such an interdict,
must have reason to fear inquiry.
On these principles it may be affirmed generally that all subjects are legitimate subjects of reasoning in proportion as they
are accessible to research; and that the degree in which any
given subject is accessible to research cannot be known until
research has been attempted.
Within certain limits it is not open to dispute that the early
condition of Mankind is accessible to research. Contemporary
history reaches back a certain way.  Existing monuments afford
their evidence for a considerable distance farther. Tradition
has its own province still more remote; and latterly Geology
and Archeology have met upon common ground-ground in
which Man and the Mammoth have been found together.
It has not, however, been sufficiently observed that the inquiry into the Primitive Condition of Mankind resolves itself
into three separate questions,-that is to say, three questions
which, though connected with each other, can be, and indeed
must be, separately dealt with: —
ist. The Origin of Man considered simply as a Species,that is to say, the method of his creation or introduction into
the world.
2d. The Antiquity of Man, or the time in the geological history and preparation of the globe at which this creation or introduction took place.
3d. His Mental, Moral, and Intellectual Condition when first
created.
No doubt the theory as to the Origin of Man at which Sir J.
Lubbock glances when he speaks of the "first being worthy to
be called a man'" (which is obviously the theory that this first
man was born from some pre-existing creature not worthy to be




INTRODUCTORY.                      g
so called), is most naturally connected with the farther theory
that his mental condition was one of " utter barbarism." But
this is not at all a necessary consequence. The first'man, however created, may have had special knowledge conveyed to him
as well as a special material organization. Special powers of
acquiring knowledge he certainly must have had, since we know
that these are inseparably connected with the organization
which made him "worthy to be called a man."  The two questions, therefore, of the Origin of Man, and of his Primitive Condition, are clearly separable. In like manner, as regards Antiquity, the question of Time has no necessary connection either
with his Origin or his Primitive Condition.
There is another point connected with this division of the
whole subject into three separate questions, which has not perhaps been sufficiently considered, and that is the different degrees of connection which these questions have respectively
with the Mosaic narrative. I have already said that the inquiry as conducted both by Archbishop Whately and Sir J.
Lubbock is avowedly conducted on a purely scientific basis.
It is in the same light that it will be considerd here. But it
may be useful to observe in passing, that in regard to some of
these questions the Mosaic account of Creation (apart altogether from any suggestions which have been raised as to the
allegorical elements it may contain) leaves room, even according to its most literal interpretation, for a much wider latitude
of speculation than seems to be generally supposed. As regards the Origin of Man, undoubtedly, the impression conveyed
is that the Creation of Man was a special act-which indeed,
whatever may have been its method, it must in a sense have
been; but, as regards the Primitive Condition of Mankind, it
must be remembered that, according to the narrative in Genesis, there never was any generation of men which lived and
walked in the primal light. It was the first man who fell. The
second man was a murderer. The causes, therefore, of degradation are represented as having begun, so far as the race is
concerned, at once; and it is a special peculiarity of the account that those causes are said to have gone on in an accelerating ratio until the Flood. Even after that event there was no
immunity from the operation of the same causes, and existing




IO                    PRIMEVAL MAN.
races, therefore, may have passed through stages of any degree
of barbarism since the days of Adam without involving any
necessary inconsistency whatever with the Mosaic account.
It is farther to be observed that writers on the Primitive
Condition of Man are generally guilty of the oversight of forgetting to define the sense in which they use the words " civilized " and " uncivilized." This is a strange oversight on the
part of such a logician as Dr. Whately.  Sir J. Lubbock naturally enough feels himself relieved from an inconvenient obligation. But implicitly, if not explicitly, the Savage-theory and
the reasoning in support of it assume that civilization consists
mainly if not exclusively in a knowledge of the arts.  Knowledge, for example, or ignorance, of the use of metals, are, as
we shall see, characteristics on which great stress is laid.
Now, as regards this point, as Whately truly says, the narrative
of Genesis distinctly states that this kind of knowledge did not
belong to Mankind at first, but was the fruit of subsequent discovery, through the ordinary agency of those mental gifts with
which Man at his creation was endowed.  It is assumed in the
Savage-theory that the presence or absence of this knowledge
stands in close and natural connection with the presence or absence of other and higher kinds of knowledge, of which an acquaintance with the metals is but a symbol and a type. Within
certain limits this is true, and we may assume, therefore, that
in Genesis also, the intimation given on this subject implies
that so far as civilization means a command over the powers of
nature, Man was left to make his own way, through his powers
of reason, and through his instincts of research. Whately has
indeed inferred, from the description given of Cain as a tiller
of the ground, and of Abel as a keeper of flocks, that the great
economic principle of the division of labor was at the first divinely taught to Man.  But, if we are to understand this literally, not of tribes tracing their descent from  Cain and Abel,
but of the individual men who were the third and fourth human
beings upon earth, then we must suppose that the possession of
domestic animals and acquaintance with artificial cultivation
were either divinely communicated to Man, or instinctively discovered by him, at once. It may have been so, and it may be
the intention of the narrative to assert it; but, at all events, it




INTRODUCTORY.                     I I
is perfectly conceivable, that beyond a knowledge of the simplest arts which were necessary for the sustenance of life, Man's
primitive condition may have been a condition of mere childhood.
As regards the third element in the whole question-the element of Time-it is well known that all calculations in regard
to it rest upon data respecting which there has always been
much doubt and difficulty, and that similar data taken from the
three existing versions of the Old Testament,-the Hebrew,
the Samaritan, and the Septuagint,-give results which vary
from each other, not by years, or even by tens of years, but by
many centuries. - Where differences exist of such magnitude,
no confidence can be felt in any of the results.  It seems more
than questionable how far the history of Man given in the Old
Testament either is, or was intended to be, a complete history,
of more than the history of typical men and of typical generations. At all events, it would be worse than idle to deny that
this question of Time comes naturally and necessarily within
the field of scientific investigation, in so far as science can find
a firm foundation for any conclusions in regard to it.
Having already quoted St. Augustine upon the general subject of the desire of knowledge, I cannot close even this cursory reference to the relation in which the Mosaic narrative
stands to scientific research, without dwelling for a moment on
the very striking passage in which that great man deals with
the only account which the world possesses of the history of Creation. St. Augustine was not the man to be dead to all those
curious speculations and inquiries which that account excites,
and which it does not profess to satisfy. His Confessions, he
says, would not be the humble confessions he desires them to
be, were he not to confess that as regards many of those questions, he does not understand the sense in which Moses wrote.
All the more does he admire his words, "so sublime in their
humility, so rich in their reserve " (alla humizitelr, jpaitca copiose);
then follows (lib. xii. c. 3I) a passage which,-considering the
age in which it was written, considering also the vague notions
entertained by St. Augustine himself, and by all the world in his
time, on the rank and importance of the natural sciences,-is
surely one of the  most remarkable passages ever written by




12                   PRIMEVAL MAN.
Theologian or Philosopher. " For myself," he says, " I declare
boldly, and from the bottom of my heart, that if I were called
to write something which was to be invested with supreme
authority, I should desire most so to write that my words
should include the widest range of meaning, and should not be
confined to one sense alone, exclusive of all others, even of
some which should be inconsistent with my own. Far from
me, O God, be the temerity to suppose that so great a Prophet
did not receive from Thy Grace even such a favor! Yes; he
had in view and in his spirit, when he traced these words, all
that we can ever discover of the truth-even every truth which
has escaped us hitherto, or which escapes us still, but which
nevertheless may yet be discovered in them." Certain it is,
that whatever new views may now be taken of the origin and
authorship of the first chapter of Genesis, it stands alone
among the traditions of mankind in the wonderful simplicity
and grandeur of its words. Specially remarkable-miraculous
it really seems to be-is that character of reserve which leaves
open to reason all that reason may be able to attain. The
meaning of those words seems always to be a meaning ahead
of science-not because it anticipates the results of science,
but because it is independent of them, and runs, as it were,
round the outer margin of all possible discovery.
Having now cleared the ground of some preliminary difficulties which might otherwise have impeded us in a proper access
to the subject, I shall proceed in the next Part to deal with the
first of the three questions into which that subject is dividedviz. the Origin of Man considered as a Species, in so far as this
question appears to be accessible to reason.




PART II.
THE ORIGIN OF MAN.
THE Human Race has no more knowledge or recollection of
its own origin than a child has of its own birth. But a child
drinks in with its mother's milk some knowledge of the relation
in which it stands to its own parents, and as it grows up it knows
of other children being born around it. It sees one generation
going and another generation coming, so that long before the
years of childhood close the ideas of birth and death are alike
familiar. Whatever sense of mystery may, in the first dawnings
of reflection, have attached to either of these ideas, is soon lost
in the familiar experience of the world. The same experience
extends to the lower animals-they, too, are born and die. But
no such experience ever comes to us casting any light on the
Origin of our own Race, or of any other. Some varieties of
form are effected in the case of a few animals, by domestication,
and by constant care in the selection of peculiarities transmis.
sible to the young. But these variations are all within certain
limits; and wherever human care relaxes or is abandoned, the
old forms return, and the selected characters disappear. The
founding of new forms by the union of different species, even
when standing in close natural relation to each other, is absolutely forbidden by the sentence of sterility which Nature pronounces and enforces upon all hybrid offspring. And so it
results that Man has never seen the origin of any species.
Creation bv birth is the only kind of creation he has ever seen;
and from this kind of creation he has never seen a new species
come. And yet he does know (for this the science of Palaeontology has most certainly revealed), that the introduction of new
species has been a work carried on constantly and continuously
during vast but unknown periods of time. The whole face of
animated nature has been changed, not once, but frequently;
not suddenly for the most part, perhaps not suddenly in any




r14                  PRIMEVAL MAN.
case, but slowly and gradually, and yet completely.  When
once this fact is clearly apprehended-whenever we become
familiar with the idea that Creation has had a History, we are
inevitably led to the conclusion that Creation has also had a
Method. And then the further question arises, —What has this
method been? It is perfectly natural that men who have any
hopes of solving this question should take that supposition which
seems the readiest; and the readiest supposition is, that the
agency by which new species are created is the same agency
by which new individuals are born. The difficulty of conceiving any other compels men, if they are to guess at all, to guess
upon this foundation. Such is the origin and genesis of all the
theories of Development, of which Mr. Darwin's hypothesis is
only the latest form. It is not in itself inconsistent with the
Theistic argument, or with belief in the ultimate agency and
directing power of a Creative Mind. This is clear, since we
never think of any difficulty in reconciling that belief with our
knowledge of the ordinary laws of animal and vegetable reproduction. Those laws may be correctly, and can only be adequately, described in the language of religion and theology.
" He who is the alone Author and Creator of all things," says
the present Bishop of Salisbury, " does not by separate acts of
creation give being and life to those creatures which are to be
brought forth, but employs His living creatures thus to give
effect to His will and pleasure, and as His agents to be the
means of communicating life," *
The same language might be applied, without the alteration
of a word, to the origin of species, if it were indeed true that
new kinds as well as new individuals were created by being
born. The truth is, that the argument which has so often been
employed to elevate our conception of the wisdom hid in secondary causes, is an argument which only gains increasing
strength and force in proportion to the number and involution
of those causes, and to the extent and scope of their-effects. If
it does not diminish, but only augments the wonder of Organic
Life, that it has been so contrived as to be capable of propagating itself, neither would it diminish that wonder, but rather
enhance it to an infinite degree, that Organisms should be
* Charge, i867.




THE ORIGIN OF MAN.'$
gifted with the still more wonderful power of developing Forms
of Life other and higher than their own. So far, therefore, as
belief in a Personal Creator is concerned, the difficulties in the
way of accepting this hypothesis are not theological. The
difficulties are scientific. The first fundamental difficulty is
simply this,-that all the theories of Development ascribe to
known causes unknown effects-unknown as regards the times
in which we now live, and unknown so far as has hitherto been
ascertained in all the past times of which there is any record.
It is true that this record-the geological record-is imperfect.
But, as Sir Roderick Murchison has long ago proved, there are
parts of that record which are singularly complete, and in those
parts we have the proofs of Creation without any indication of
Development. The Silurian rocks, as regards Oceanic Life,
are perfect and abundant in the forms they have preserved, yet
there are no Fish. The Devonian Age followed, tranquilly,
and without a break; and in the Devonian Sea, suddenly, Fish
appear-appear in shoals, and in forms of the highest and most
perfect type. There is no trace of links or transitional forms
between the great class of Mollusca and the great class of
Fishes. There is no reason whatever to suppose that such
forms, if they had existed, can have been destroyed in deposits
which have preserved in wonderful perfection-the minutest organisms. So much for the Past.
As regards the Present, Organisms are known to reproduce
life, but always life which is like their own. And if this likeness admits of degrees of difference, the margin of variety is
not known to be ever broad enough for the foundation of a new
species. This, too, is remarkable,-that such margin of variety
as does ever exist among the offspring of the same parents becomes smaller and smaller in proportion as we rise in the scale
of Organic Life. That any organism, therefore, can ever produce another which varies from itself in any truly specific
character, is an assumption not justified by any known fact.
No organism is ever seen to exert such a power now. There
are many indications which tend to show that all organisms
have been equally incapable of modification since the earliest
monuments of Man. There is no proof that any organism ever
did fulfil such functions at any time. The hypothesis is re



T 6                  PRIMEVAL MAN.
sorted to because of the difficulty of conceiving any method of
creation except creation by birth. But this is no adequate stand
ing-ground for a scientific theory. It would be well for those
who speculate upon this subject to remember, that whenever a
new species or a new class of animal has begun to be, something must have happened which is not in the " ordinary course
of nature," as known to us. Something, therefore, must have
happened which we have a difficulty, probably an insuperable
difficulty, in conceiving. If, therefore, the theory of Development can be shown to involve difficulties of conception which
are quite as great as those which it professes to remove, then it
ceases to have any standing-ground at all. An hypothesis
which escapes from particular difficulties by encountering others
which are smaller, may be tolerated at least provisionally. But
an hypothesis which, to avoid an alternative supposed to be
inconceivable, adopts another alternative encompassed by many
difficulties quite as great, is not entitled even to provisional
acceptance. Now, the difficulties attending the theory of Development, or of creation by birth, attain their maximum in the
case of Man. Some of them are referred to in a cursory manner by Dr. Whately. Let us examine them a little nearer.
"Man's place in nature " has long been, and still is, the grand
battle-ground of anatomists and physiologists; but the points
on which they are disagreed among themselves have not really
any importance corresponding to the vehemence with which
they have been disputed. The great French anatomist, Cuvier,
was of opinion that the distinctions between Man's organism
and the organism of the highest among the beasts are of such
magnitude and importance, that the human race cannot be classified as belonging to the same " Order " with any other creature, but must be held to constitute an "Order " by itself. In
our own time Professor Owen holds the same opinion. Professor Huxley, on the other hand, has undertaken to prove that
the anatomical differences between the human frame and the
frame of the Gorilla, or Chimpanzee, are not such, either in
kind or in degree, as to justify this wide distinction. But he
specially limits this conclusion to the differences of physiology,
and confesses that, if in defining Man we are to take into account the phenomena of Mind, there is between Man and those




THE ORIGIN OF MAN.                 17
beasts which stand nearest to him in anatomy, a difference so
wide that it cannot be measured-an "enormous gulf "-" a
divergence immeasurable " and " practically infinite." But this
last conclusion is really incompatible with the first. There is
an inseparable connection between the phenomena of Mind and
the phenomena of Organization. They must be taken together,
and be interpreted together. The structure of every creature
is correlated with the functions which its several parts are fitted
to discharge; and the mental character, dispositions, and instincts of the creature are again strictly correlated with these
functions. We must accept from anatomists all the facts which
anatomy can teach; but the value to be placed on these facts is
a very different question. All classification is ideal, and depends on the relative value to be placed on facts which are in
themselves indisputable. On this question of the comparative
value of anatomical facts we have other facts to go by which do
not belong to the science of Physiology. Nature is her own
interpreter, and her evidence is clear. Whatever may be the
anatomical difference between Man and the Gorilla, that difference is the equivalent, in physical organization, of the whole
mental difference between a Gorilla and a Man. This is the
measure of value which Nature has set upon the kind and degree of divergence which separates these two Material Forms.
Any other measure of value which may be set on that divergence
must be founded on an arbitrary and partial selection among
the facts of which all sound classification must take account.
Imperfect as all existing systems of classification are, they are
not so bad in the case of any group of the lower animals as to
separate organs from the functions they discharge, and from
the mental habits which peculiarities of structure merely represent, embody, and subserve.
Although the resemblances which have been seized upon for
the purpose of grouping together a certain number of animals
into Classes, or Families, or Orders, have been for the most
part resemblances arbitrarily selected, and have borne no consistent reference to any one standard of comparison throughout
the creatures to be arranged, yet those resemblances have not
been so arbitrary nor so fallacious as to join together in one
common " Order " animals separated from each other in powers
2




I8                   PRIMEVAL MAN.
-and habits by an impassable gulf. Of the eight " Orders " (ex.
elusive of Man) into which Cuvier divided all the animals whose
young are suckled (ManmaZia), one is distinguished from the
others by the prehensile character of both feet and hands (Quadrumana); another Order is distinguished by the nature of its
food (Carnivora); the third is distinguished by peculiarities in
the production of the young (Afarszpialia)); the fourth and fifth
are distinguished by the nature of their teeth (Rodentia and
Eden/ala); the sixth are distinguished by the texture of their
skin (Pachydermata); the seventh by peculiarities of the digestive system (Ruminanzia); and the last by the fish-like form and
fish-like habitat of the Whales and Dugongs (Cetacea). Now,
although it is obvious that no one principle of classification is
consistently adhered to in this system, — although there is no
common standard to which they are all referred,-yet, as a
matter of fact, the peculiarities chosen are not only the most
salient and the most characteristic peculiarities of the animals
as a whole, but they are connected with others which run
through the whole organism, and with some corresponding similarities of instinct and disposition. But no such defence can
be offered for the system which groups Man in the same Order
with the Chimpanzee or the Ourang-outang, upon the ground
merely that the limbs of those animals are terminated by
organs which are anatomically " true feet and true hands;" or
because they have the same number of teeth; or because the
same primary divisions exist in the structure of the brain. The
difference between the hand of a monkey and the hand of a
man may seem small when they are both placed on the dissecting table, but in that difference, whatever it may be, lies the
whole difference between an organ limited to the climbing of
trees or the plucking of fruit, and an organ which is so correlated with man's inventive genius that by its aid the Earth is
weighed, and the distance of the Sun is measured.  In like
manner let us assume it to be true that the difference between
the brain of Man and the brain of the Gorilla may be reduced
to a difference of volume, to that visible difference alone, and
even as regards volume to a difference in quantity comparatively small.  " Cranial capacity" is measured by the cubic
inches of space which askull contains.  Professor Huxley tells




TIlE ORIGIN OF MAN.                  19
us,* on the authority of Professor Schaafhausen, that some
Hindu skulls have as small a capacity as 46 cubic inches,
whilst the largest Gorilla yet measured contained upwards of
35 cubic inches. This represents a difference of volume of
less than i i cubic inches. But the difference between this
Hindu skull and the largest European skull (II4 cubic inches)
amounts, according to the same authority, to no less than 68
cubic inches.  Nevertheless the significance set by the facts of
nature upon that difference of I I cubic inches between the Gorilla and the Man, is the difference between an irrational brute
confined to some one climate and to some limited area of the
globe,-which no outward conditions can modify or improve,and a Being equally adapted to the whole habitable world, with
powers, however undeveloped, of comparison, of reflection, of
judgment, of reason, with a sense of right and wrong,-and
with all these capable of accumulated acquisition, and therefore
of indefinite advance.  It is not true to affirm that these characteristics stand wholly apart-separated by an "enormous
gulf "-from his physical organization.  There is an adjustment between these peculiarities of Mind and the special peculiarities of his Frame as nice, and as obvious to sense and reason, as there is between the ferocious disposition of a Tiger and
his powerful claws, or between the retractile character of these
and his soft and stealthy tread.
When anatomists object to erect a separate " Order " for Man
on the plea that it is an attempt to reconcile two different orders of ideas,-namely, ideas of anatomical structure, and ideas
of mental power,-they are simply refusing to place that value
on anatomical differences which nature puts on them. They
find no similar difficulty as regards other animals in co-ordinating anatomical structure with mental powers and instincts.
The canine teeth of the Carnivora stand in close and consistent
relation with their dispositions. The prehensile character of
the feet or tail in monkeys is a true and adequate expression of
their arboreal habits; and the small and simple brains of the
Marsupials (Kangaroos, etc.) are strictly correlated with their
low intelligence. We may not-and we do not-understand
how these phenomena of Matter and of Mind are thus depen* Lyell's " Antiquity of Man," p. 84.




20                   PRIMEVAL MAN.
dent on each other; but as a fact we see that this dependence is
universal and the distinctions which we found on anatomical
structure have their value corroborated and confirmed by close
and inseparable correspondences of instinct and intelligence.
Man is no exception whatever to this universal law; and any
system of classification which places a value on his anatomical
peculiarities, separating by an impassable gulf between his Body
and his Mind, is a system altogether inconsistent with philosophy. The value set upon any given anatomical peculiarity, or
group of peculiarities, in a sound system of classification, ought
evidently to correspond as nearly as possible with the value assigned to those peculiarities in the system of nature. The significance of any anatomical feature hinges on the number and
variety of other peculiarities to which it stands related. Professor Owen's argument is therefore clearly sound in principle,
-that the " consequences " of any such peculiarity must be considered in estimating its systematic value. Take the case of the
differences, anatomically small, which distinguish the arms of
Man from the arms of a monkey. "The consequences," says
Professor Owen, "of the liberation of one pair of limbs from all
service in station and progression, due to the extreme modification of the other pair for the exclusive discharge of those functions, are greater and involve a superior number and quality
of powers than those resulting from the change of an'ungulate'
(hoofed, one of Cuvier's sub-class divisions) into an'unguiculate,' or claw-bearing, condition of limb, and they demand therefore an equivalent value in a zoological system."
Accordingly, Professor Owen has attempted to found a system
of classification on the degrees of cerebral development, as being the anatomical feature which on the whole stands in the
most governing relation to other peculiarities of structure.
This proposal has been vehemently contested; but the contest
seems to have turned on a point not really vital to the question.
Objectors do but aim at proving that all the leading divisions in
the brain of Man exist also in the brain of monkeys; and thus,
that the difference is reduced to one of volume or quantity
alone. But this difference of quantity, relative to the size of the
organism, even if no other can be detected by the knife, is correlated with a whole host of other anatomical peculiarities




THE ORIGIN OF MAN.                  21
which span the whole breadth of the chasm that yawns between
the brutes and Man. These peculiarities must be taken as a
whole, in their assemblage, and in their actual connection.
The size of Brain is but the index of many other differences, all
closely related to one Purpose, and contributing to one result.
It is no answer to this argument to say that an equal amount,
or even a greater amount, of difference in mere bulk is found
to exist between the lowest and the highest human brain, because the fact with which we have to deal is this, that a certain
minimum quantity of that mysterious substance is constantly
and uniformly associated with all the other anatomical peculiarities of Man. Below that minimum the whole accompanying
structure undergoes far more than a corresponding change,even the whole change between the lowest Savage and the
highest Ape. Above that minimum, all subsequent variations
in quantity are accompanied by no changes whatever in physical structure. In placing therefore a high value —a value in
classification of Order, or even of Class-upon the eleven cubic
inches of brain-space which lie between the Hindu and the Gorilla, when we place no such value on the sixty-eight cubic inches
which lie between the Hindu and Sir Isaac Newton, we are but
accepting the evidence of Nature-following where she leads,
and classifying according to her award.
The bearing of this conclusion on the Origin of Man is simply this, that in proportion as the difference between Man and
the lower animals is properly appreciated in the light of nature,
in the same proportion will the difficulty increase of conceiving
how the chasm could be passed by any process of Transmutation or Development.
This difficulty is still further increased if we advert for a moment to the direction in which the human frame diverges from
the structure of the brutes.  It diverges in the direction of
greater physical helplessness and weakness. That is to say, it
is a divergence which of all others it is most impossible to ascribe to mere "Natural Selection." The unclothed and unprotected condition of the human body, its comparative slowness of foot, the absence of teeth adapted for prehension or for
defence, the same want of power for similar purposes in the
hands and fingers, the bluntness of the sense of smell, such as




22                   PRIMEVAL MAN.
to render it useless for the detection of prey which is concealed,
-all these are features which stand in strict and harmonious
relation to the mental powers of Man. But, apart from these,
they would place him at an immense disadvantage in the struggle for existence. This, therefore, is not the direction in which
the blind forces of Natural Selection could ever work. The
creature " not worthy to be called a man," to whom Sir J. Lubbock has referred as the progenitor of Man, was, ex hypot/esi,
deficient in those mental capacities which now distinguish the
lowest of the human race. To exist at all, this creature must
have been more animal in its structure; it must have had bodily
powers and organs more like those of the beasts. The continual improvement and perfection of these would be the direction
of variation most favorable to the continuance of the species.
These could not be modified in the direction of greater weakness without inevitable destruction, until first by the gift of
reason and of mental capacities of contrivance, there had been
established an adequate preparation for the change. The loss
of speed or of climbing power which is involved in the forearms becoming useless for locomotion, could not be incurred
with safety until the brain was ready to direct a hand. The
foot could not be allowed to part with its prone or prehensile
character until the powers of reason and reflection had been
provided to justify, as it now explains, the erect position and
the upward gaze. And so through all the innumerable modifications of form which are the peculiarities of Man, and which
stand in indissoluble union with his capacities of thought. The
lowest degree of intelligence which is now possessed by the
lowest Savage, is not more than enough to compensate him for
the weakness of his frame, or to enable him to maintain successfully the struggle for existence. With many Savages it is a
hard struggle, despite senses of sight and hearing trained by
necessity so as almost to approach the instincts of the lower aninmals; despite also all those powers of reasoning which, however low, are yet peculiar to himself, and separate him, as is
confessed, by an impassable gulf from the highest of the beasts.
Many of the Aborigines of Australia could do no more at times
than support a precarious existence by scraping up roots, and
eating snakes and other reptiles. The rotten blubber of a dead




THE ORIGIN OF MAN.                 23
whale cast upon the beach was, and is often, not only a luxury
and a feast, but deliverance from actual starvation. Sir J. Lubbock's theory is, that in these Savages we see something rather
above than under the primitive condition of Mankind. But it
may be safely said that a very small diminution of mental capacity below that of an Australian Savage, would render Man's
characteristic structure incompatible with the maintenance of
his existence in most, if not in all, of the countries where he is
actually found. If that frame was once more bestial it may
have been better adapted for a bestial existence. But it is impossible to conceive how it could ever have emerged from that
existence by virtue of Natural Selection. Man must have had
human proportions of mind before he could afford to lose
bestial proportions of body. If the change in mental power
came simultaneously with the change in physical organization,
then it was all that we can ever know or understand of a new
creation. There is no ground whatever for supposing that ordinary generation has been the agency employed, seeing that
no effects similar in kind are ever produced by that agency, so
far as is known to us. The theory of Transmutation in all its
forms, even as applied to the lower animals, is exposed to many
difficulties greater than those which it professes to remove.
But as applied to Man, those difficulties are accumulated to an
incalculable degree. Most of them, too, are altogether of a
special kind, because the divergence which ordinary generation
is supposed to have produced in the case of Man is a divergence, to use Professor Huxley's words, " immeasurable-practically infinite."
It needs only to be added to this sketch, that such as Man
now is, Man, so far as we yet know, has always been. Two
skeletons at least have been found respecting which there is
strong ground for believing that they belong to the very earliest
human race which lived in Northern Europe. I defer any reference to the probable epoch of time when those skeletons
were clothed with flesh and blood. This belongs to the next
division of our subject, which is the Antiquity as distinguished
from the Origin of Man. Suffice it here to say that although
one of those skeletons indicates a coarse, perhaps even what
we should call-as we might fairly call some living specimens




24                    PRIMEVAL MAN.
of our race —a brutal man, yet even this skeleton is in all its
proportions strictly human. Its cranial capacity indicates a
volume of brain, and some peculiarities of shape not materially
different from many skulls of Savage races now living. The
other skeleton, respecting which the evidence of extreme an
tiquity is the strongest, is not only perfectly human in all its
proportions, but its skull has a cranial capacity not inferior to
that of many' modern Europeans. This most ancient of all
known human skulls is so ample in its dimensions that it might
have contained the brains of a philosopher. So conclusive is
this evidence against any change whatever in the specific char.acters of Man since the oldest Human Being yet known was
born, that Professor Huxley pronounces it to be clearly indicated " that the first traces of the primordial stock whence Man
has proceeded need no longer be sought, by those who entertain any form of the doctrine of progressive development, in
the newest tertiaries,"-(that is, in the oldest deposit yet known
to contain human remains at all.)  " But," he adds, " they may
be looked for in an epoch more distant from the age of those
tertiaries than that is from us." * So far, therefore, the evidence is on the side of the originality of Man as a species, nay,
even as a Class by himself, separated by a gulf practically immeasurable from all the creatures that are, or that are known
ever to have been, his contemporaries in the world. In possession of this ground, we can wait for such further evidence in
favor of Transmutation as may be brought to light. Meanwhile
at least we are entitled to remain incredulous, remembering, as
Professor Phillips has said, that "everywhere we are required
by the hypothesis to look somewhere else; which may fairly be
interpreted to signify that the hypothesis everywhere fails in the
first and most important step. How is it conceivable that the
second stage should be everywhere preserved, but the first nowhere?" t
* Lyell, "Antiquity of Man," p. 89.
1 " Life-the Origin and Succession," by Professor John Phillips.




PART III.
THE ANTIQUITY OF MAN.
IN passing from the subject of Man's Origin to the subject of
his Antiquity, we pass from almost total darkness to a question
which is comparatively accessible to reason and open to research. Evidence bearing upon thisiquestion may be gathered
along several different walks of science, and these are all found
tending in one direction, and pointing to one general result.
First comes the evidence of History, embracing under that
name all literature, whether it professes to record events, or
does no more than allude to them in poetry and song. Then
comes Archaeology, the evidence of Human Monuments, belonging to times or races whose voice, though not silenced, has
become inarticulate to us. Piecing on to this evidence, comes
that which Geology has recently afforded from human remains
associated with the latest physical changes on the surface and
in the climates of the globe. Then comes the evidence of Language, founded on the facts of Human Speech, and the laws
which regulate its development and growth. And lastly, there
is the evidence afforded by the existing physical structure, and
the existing geographical distribution of the various Races of
Mankind. According as we may have made one or other of
these great branches of inquiry our favorite pursuit, we may be
disposed to place a different estimate on their comparative
value. But perhaps we shall not go far wrong if we arrange
them in the order here given as the order in which they stand
relatively to the directness and certainty of the testimony they
afford.
One distinction, however, it is important to bear in mind.
Chronology is of two kinds,-first, Time measurable by years,
-and secondly, Time measurable only by an ascertained order
or succession of events. The one may be called Time-absolute,
the other Time-relative. Now, among all the sciences which




26                   PRIMEVAL MAN.
afford us evidence on the Antiquity of Man, one, and one only,
gives us any knowledge of Time-absolute; and that is History.
From all the others we can gather only the less definite information of Time-relative. They can tell us of nothing more than of
the order in which certain events took place. But~of the length of
interval between those events, neither Archmology, nor Geology,
nor Ethnology can tell us anything. Even History, that is, the
records of Written Documents, carries us back to times of which
no contemporary account remains, and the distance of which in
years from any known epoch is, and must be, a matter of conjecture. No other history than the Hebrew History even professes to go back to the Creation of Man, or to give any account
of the events which connect existing generations with the first
Progenitor of their Race. And of that History, the sole object
appears to be, to give in outline the order of such transactions
as had a special bearing on Religious Truth, and on the course
of Spiritual Belief. The intimations given in the earlier chapters
of the Book of Genesis on all matters of purely secular interest,
are incidental only, and exceedingly obscure. And yet it is not
a total silence. Enough is said to indicate how much there lay
beyond and outside of the narrative which is given. The dividing of the tribes of the Gentiles among the descendants of
Japheth,* conveys the idea of movements and operations which
probably occupied long intervals of time, and many generations
of men. The same impression must arise from the condensed
abstract given of the origin and growth of communities capable
of building such cities as Resen and Calah and Nineveh are described to be.t In the genealogy of the family of Shem, we have
a list of names, which are names and nothing more to us. It is a
genealogy which neither does, nor professes to do, more than to
trace the order of succession among a few families only out of
the mnillions then already existing in the world. Nothing but
this order of succession is given, nor is it at all certain that this
order is consecutive or complete. Nothing is told us of all thlat
lay behind that curtain of thick darkness, in front of which
these names are made to pass. And yet there are, as it were,
momentary liftings, through which we have glimpses of great
movements which were going on, and had long been going on,: Gen. x,  A,..                           t C.en'  I.  14TO




THE ANTIQUITY OF MAN.                27
beyond. No shapes are distinctly seen. Even the direction of
those movements can be only guessed. But voices are heard
which are as the voices of many nations. The very first among
the descendants of Noah whose individuality and personality is
clear to us,-the very first whose doings can be brought into
relation with events otherwise known or recognizable in the
History of Man,-is introduced in a manner which reveals the
fact that different races of the human family had then already
been long established and widely spread. The memorable and
mysterious journey which brought Terah into Haran on his way
to Canaan,+ was a journey beginning in that ancient home, Ur,
already known as " of the Chaldees." And when the great figure
of his son Abraham appears upon the scene, we find ourselves
already in the presence of the Monarchy of Egypt, and of the advanced civilization of the Pharaohs. In the same narrative, on
another side, we come into the presence of one of those great
military Kingdoms of the East which in succession occupy so
large a space in the history of the ancient world. Chedorlaomer,
with his tributary Princes, was then the ruler of nations capable
of waging wars of conquest at great distances from the seat of
their government, and the centre of their power. We see in him
therefore the Sovereign of a long-established and powerful race.
And yet these migrations and wars of Abraham stand, if not at
the very beginning of History, at least at the very beginning of
Historical Chronology. They mark the very earliest date in
the history of Man, on which, within moderate limits of discrepancy, all chronologists are agreed. That date may be fixed
at 2000 B.c. This is the boundary, in looking backwards, of
Time-absolute. All beyond, is Time-relative.
We have, indeed, other evidence of an historical character
to show that the Monarchy of Egypt had been founded long
before the time of Abraham. But how long, is a question on
which there is the widest discrepancy of opinion. The most
moderate computation, however, carries the foundation of that
Monarchy as far back as 700 years before the visit of the
Hebrew Patriarch. Some of the best German scholars hold
that there is evidence of a much longer chronology. But seven
centuries before Abraham is the estimate of Mr. R. Stuart
* Gen. xi. 31,




28                  PRIMEVAL MAN.
Poole, of the British Museum, who is one of the very highest
authorities, and certainly the most cautious, upon questions
of Egyptian chronology. This places the beginning of the
Pharaohs in the twenty-eighth century B.C. But according to
Ussher's interpretation of the Hebrew Pentateuch, the twentyeighth century B.C. would be some 400 years before the Flood.
On the other hand, a difference of 800 years is allowed by the
chronology which is founded on the Septuagint Version of the
Scriptures. But the fact of this difference tells in two ways.
A margin of variation amounting to eight centuries between two
versions of the same document, is a variation so enormous, that
it seems to cast complete doubt on the whole. system of interpretation on which such computations of time are based. And
yet it is mnore than questionable whether it is possible to reconcile the known order of events with even this larger estimate of
the number of years. It is true that, according to this larger
estimate, the Flood would be carried back about four and a
half centuries beyond the beginning of the Pharaohs. But is
this enough? The founding of a Monarchy is not the beginning of a race. The people amongst whom such Monarchies
arose must have grown and gathered during many generations.
Nor is it in regard to the peopling of Egypt alone that this
difficulty meets us in the face. The existence in the days of
Abraham of such an organized government as that of Chedorlaomer, shows that 2000 years B.C. there flourished in Elam,
beyond Mesopotamia, a nation which even now would be
ranked among "the Great Powers."  And if nations so great
had thus arisen, altogether unnoticed in the Hebrew narrative
-if we are left to gather as best we may from other sources,
all our knowledge of their origin and growth, how much more
is this true of far distant lands over which the advancing tide
of human population had rolled, or was then rolling its mysterious wave? If the most ancient and the most sacred literature
in the world tells us so little of the early history of the men
who lived and flourished on the banks of the Euphrates, the
Tigris, or the Nile, what information can we expect to find in
it respecting those who were probably already settled on the
Indus and the Ganges, or were spreading along the banks of
the Brahmaputra and of the Yellow River? What of those




THE ANTIQUITY OF MIAN.                     29
tribes who were following the Volga and the Oxus, or the
Danube and the Rhine? What of that vast Continent whose
secrets are being revealed at last only in our own day-the
Continent of Africa? When and how did that Negro Race
begin, which is both one of the most ancient and one of the most
strongly marked among the varieties of Man?  And what
again can we learn from Genesis of the peopling of the New
World? When did Man first come upon the island seas of
America, and follow the great rivers which fall into the Gulf of
Mexico?
It is not possible to suppose that some 450 years before the
foundation of the Egyptian Monarchy is a period long enough
to account even for the few facts which are implied in the
Mosaic narrative itself, respecting the dispersion  and geographical distribution of Mankind.  And to those facts must
be added others resting on evidence which is still historical.
There is another civilization which appears to have been almost as ancient as that of Egypt, and which has been far more
enduring. The authentic records of the Chinese Empire are
said to begin in the twenty-fourth century B.c. —that is, more
than 300 years before the time of Abraham.* They begin,
too, apparently with a Kingdom already established, with a
capital city, and with a settled government.t  Yet this civilization first appears at the farthest extremity of Asia, separated
by many thousands of miles, and by some of the most impassable regions of the world, from the cradle of the Human Race,
and from the country where Noah and his family were saved.
Such facts seem to point to one or other of two conclusionseither that the Flood must have happened at a period in the
history of Man vastly earlier than any that has been usually
supposed, or else that the Flood destroyed only a small portion
of the Human Family. That the Deluge affected only a small
"The Chinese 1" G. T. T. Meadows, p. 34.
t Since this passage was published I have been favored with an interesting
letter from the Rev. James Legge, who has spent many years as a missionary in
China, and has published valuable editions of the Historical works of the Chinese.
It is this gentleman's opinion that the Chinese Tribe was only beginning to grow
into a kingdom about 2000 B.C. and, that I200 years later, the kingdom did not extend nearly so far south as the Yang-tsze river. The general conclusion to which
these dates point, is not, I think, materially affected by this somewhat shortened estimate of Chinese Historical Chronology.




30                    PRIMEVAL MAN.
portion of the globe which is now habitable is almost certain.
But this is quite a different thing from supposing that the
Flood affected only a small portion of the world which was
then inhabited.  The wide, if not the universal prevalence
among the heathen nations, of a tradition preserving the memory of some such great catastrophe, has always been considered
to indicate recollection carried by descent from the surviving
few. And this tradition seems to be curiously strong and
definite among tribes which are now separated by half the circumference of the globe from the region affected by the Flood.
At all events this is clear, that the difficulty of reconciling the
narrative of Genesis with an indefinitely older date is a very
small difficulty indeed, as compared with the difficulty of reconciling it with a very limited destruction of the Human Race.
The evidence for a higher antiquity of Man is derived from
countries in comparatively close proximity with those which,
under any possible supposition as to the area of a Deluge,
must have been then submerged. On the other hand, we have
seen how utterly uncertain and how enormously different are
the chronologies which profess to be founded on the Pentateuch. They all involve suppositions as to the principle of interpretation, and as to the import of words descriptive of descent, which are in the highest degree doubtful, and which it is
evident cannot be applied consistently throughout.  Thus,
when we read * of Canaan, the grandson of Noah, that he
" begat Sidon, his first-born, and Heth," we seem to have the
names of individual men; but, when it is immediately added
that he also "begat the Jebusite, and the Amorite, and the
Girgasite, and the Hivite, and the Arkite, and the Sinite," etc.
etc., it is clear that we are dealing not with single generations,
but with a condensed abstract of the origin and growth of
Tribes. No definite information is given in such abstracts as
to the lapse of time. The chronology of changes not specially
included in the narrative, can only be gathered from the general character of the events described. And that general character is such as to fully corroborate the evidence we have from
other sources-that long before the Call of Abraham, that is to
say, long before the twentieth century B.C., the Human Race
* Gen. x. I5-I8.




THE ANTIQUITY OF MAN.                31
had been increasing and multiplying on the earth from such
ancient days that in many regions, far removed from the centre
of their dispersion, great nations had arisen, powerful and civilized governments had been established.
So far, then, we have the light of History shining with comparative clearness over a period of 2000 years before the Christian era. Beyond that we have a twilight tract of time which
may be roughly estimated at 700 years —a period of time lying
in the dawn of History, at the very beginning of which we can
dimly see that there were already Kings and Princes on the
earth. But this is the outer margin of Time-absolute. No farther, with even an approximation to the truth, can we measure
the order of events by the lapse of years.
But there is a point at which the evidence of Archaeology
begins before the evidence of History has closed. There is a
border-land where both kinds of evidence are found together,
or rather, where some testimony exists of which it is difficult to
say whether it is the testimony of written documents or of the
inarticulate monuments of Man. It was the habit of one of the
most ancient nations in the world to record all events in the
form of pictorial representation. Their domestic habits, their
foreign wars, their religious beliefs, are thus all presented to
the eye. And one of the questions on which this testimony
bears is a question of paramount importance in determining the
antiquity of the Human Family. That question is not the rise
of Kingdoms, but the origin of Races. The varieties of Man
are a great mystery. The physical differences which these
varieties involve may be indeed, and often are, much exaggerated. Yet, these differences are distinct, and we are naturally
impelled to ask When and How did they begin? These are
two separate questions; but the one bears upon the other. The
question When stands before the question How. The fundamental problem to be solved is this: Can such varieties have
descended from a single stock? And if they can, then must
not a vast and indefinite lapse of time have been occupied in
the gradual development of divergent types? On this question
we have no datum on which to reason, unless we can ascertain
how far back in Time-absolute these divergences had already
become established. Now, this is the datum which Egypt gives




32                     PRIMEVAL MAN.
us.  In one of the most perfect of the paintings which have
been preserved to us, a great Egyptian monarch is symbolically
represented as ruling with the power of life and death over subject races: and these are depicted with accurate and characteristic likeness. Conspicuous in this group is one figure, painted
to the life both in form and color, which proves that the race
which departs most widely from  the European type, had then
acquired exactly the same characters which mark it in the present day. The Negro kneels at the feet of Sethos I., in the same
attitude of bondage and submission which typifies only too faithfully the enduring servitude of his race.  The blackness of
color, the woolliness of hair, the flatness of nose, the projection
of the lips, which are so familiar to us,-all these had been
fully established and developed thus early in the known history
of the world. And this was about I400 years before the Christian era-that is to say, more than 3200 years ago. I am
informed by Professor Lepsius (through the kindness of Mr.
Poole) that there are some still earlier representations of the
Negro-referable to the "Twelfth Dynasty," or to about 900oo
B.C. In these it is curious that the Negro color is strongly
marked, but not the Negro feature. This, however, may be due
to the unskilfulness of early art, or to the fact, too often forgotten, that some African tribes-as, for example, the Nubianshave not the low flat nose or the projecting lips. Nor is this
the whole evidence afforded by the Egyptian pictures. At
periods not much later in the history, we have elaborate representations of battles with Negro nations,-representations
which go far to show that the race was then more able to maintain a contest with other races than it has ever been in recent
times. And of this a further proof is to be found in the fact,
that at a period at least 2000 years B.c.-that is about the time
of Abraham —mention is made in hieroglyphic writings of Black
or Negro troops being raised by an Egyptian king, to assist him
in the prosecution of a great war.*
Since, then, the Negro race was already, in the days of Abrahanm, just what it is now, what is the time we must allow for the
* Drawings by the skilful hand of Mr. Bonomi are given on p, 33 and p. 34 In illus
tration of the facts stated in the text. They are taken from an Egyptian temple at
Beyt-e'-Welee, in Nubia, of the reign of Rameses II., son and successor of Sethos I.




THE ANTIQUITY OF MAN.                33
development of this variety of Man, supposing it to have clescended from a common stock? We have absolutely no measurement of time by which to estimate the growth of such varieties. We know that changes of climate and of food do produce
upon Mankind some modifications of color, and of features.
But we know also that such changes are extremely slow. Color
is in all the lower animals one of the least constant -that is to
say, one of the most variable,-of external characters; and
under circumstances of domestication changes of color are
sometimes sudden, and are connected with causes altogether
unknown. But we have no evidence to show that human color,
is liable to changes of a like kind. On the contrary, all expe3




poLaTmL DMl
3 _ _




THE ANTIQUITY OF MAN.                 35
rience seems to point to the conclusion that varieties of complexion can only be established very gradually, and we have no
absolute proof that a change from white to negro blackness is
possible at all. A very able and ingenious writer, whose work
is unfortunately anonymous,* but whose opinions are endorsed
by the high authority of Mr. Poole, has assumed that this
change is not within the compass of any natural causes, and
cannot be accounted for by any lapse of time. On this as well
as on other grounds he adopts the theory that Adam was the
progenitor of the white races only; and that before the creation
of Adam, the Black Race had been established in the Continent of Africa. He maintains that in the Mosaic narrative,
contrary to the usually interpretation, there are clear indications
of the existence of pre-Adamite races. This theory undoubtedly explains one passage in Genesis, which seems otherwise
wholly unintelligible, namely, that in which mention is made of
unions between the " Sons of God " and the daughters of men.
Our author affirms that for the "Sons of God" we ought to
substitute as the true meaning in the original, " the servants of
the gods,"' or in other words the idolatrous races of the world.
In like manner the daughters of men shculd be translated, " the
daughters of the Adamite." The passage would thus refer to
intermarriages between the children of Adam and the pre-existing idolatrous nations of the world. It is true also that this
theory would remove or diminish some other difficulties attending the received interpretation. But on the other hand the
Unity of Mankind is so deeply interwoven with the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, as hitherto universally understood, that the new difficulties raised are far greater than those
which would be thus removed. No doubt it may be said that
the Unity of Mankind as a species, does not necessarily depend
upon descent from a single pair; and it is true that this Unity
is a matter of fact which cannot under any hypothesis be denied; because we know that the barrier of hybrid barrenness
which nature sets against the mixture of different species does
not impede the amalgamation of even the most diverse varieties of Man.  It is therefore certain that in this sense, which
involves the full possession of a common nature, " God hath
*" Genesis of the Earth and of Man."




36                    PRIMEVAL MAN.
made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the
face of the earth." It is of course conceivable that this full
community of nature may have been given by the Creator to
two or more original pairs. But all the evidence of science
tends to the conclusion that each well-marked species has
spread from some one centre of creation, and presumably fronm
a single pair. There is no clashing between this evidence andl
the testimony of Revelation as that testimony has hitherto beein
interpreted. Strongly marked as the varieties of Man now are,
the variation is strongest in respect to color, which in all organ.
isms is notoriously the most liable to modification and to
change. And in this feature of color it is remarkable that we
have every possible variety of tint from the fairest to the black.
est races, so that the one extreme passes into the other by
small and insensible gradations. As regards structure, the differences between different varieties of Man are comparatively
trifling, and it may safely be affirmed that all the efforts o!
anatomists and physiologists who have been most determined
to magnify every point of variation, have utterly failed to rendei
it impossible or improbable that all men have had a common
ancestor. But in exact proportion as we hold to this conclu,
sion as the only satisfactory explanation of the Unity of Man,
must we be prepared to accept the high probability, if not the
certainty, of the very great antiquity of the Race.
Next comes the science of Language, of which those who
have made it a special study affirm, that it affords the most conclusive evidence of all, that the articulate voice of Man ha,
been sounding in the world during vast though indefinite periods of time.'" The evidence of language," says Professor
Max Miiller,'6 is irrefragable, and it is the only evidence worth
listening to with regard to ante-historical periods."  And what
does this evidence go to prove? Let us take one example.'There was a time," says the same author, "when the ancestors of the Celts, the Germans, the Slavonians, the Greeks,
and Italians, the Persians and Hindus, were living together
beneath the same roof-separate from  the ancestors of the
Semitic (Hebrew) and Turanian races." * The principle on
which the evidence of language is interpreted is very simple,
*'I Chips from a German Workshop," vol. i. pp. 63, 64.




THE ANTIQUITY OF MAN.                37
The sounds or words by which men designate things are for
the most part arbitrary, and therefore conventional. The sign
and the thing signified have no natural or necessary connection. The names of a very few animals may be imitations of
their voice. No argument, for example, could be founded on
the word Cuckoo being used by the most diverse tribes to designate a bird which sounds these two syllables in its cry. But
such cases are very rare even in the names of beasts. Wherever the same thing is denoted by the same word, and where
there is no natural connection between them, there must have
been once a common understanding amongst men who dwelt
together, as to the meaning of that sound. And when this
common understanding is found to affect the nearest relationships of life, and the animals domesticated in primeval times,
the evidence of ancient consanguinity is complete. In this
case "the terms for God, for house, for father, mother, son,
daughter, for dog and cow, for heart and tears, for axe and
tree, identical in all the Indo Germanic words, are like the
watchwords of soldiers." But when was it that the fathers
of nations now so far apart as Germans and Hindus were
living together under one roof? This is a question which,
in the terms of Time-absolute, no man can answer. Only
we know that before the time of Abraham the languages
of those great leading stocks must have been nearly as far
apart as they are now. Professor Max Miiller is of opinion
that to the Hymns of the Vedas a later date cannot be assigned
than 1200 B.c. Homer and Hesiod are in all probability
referable to a later date, but not so much later as to cast any
doubt on the conclusion that both Greek and Sanskrit were
then perfectly developed. Those who have studied the growth
of languages, and the mysterious laws by which that growth is
regulated, are lost in conjecture as to the lapse of time which
may probably have been required to account for the wonderful
creations of Human Speech..
Next comes the evidence of Geology, which only in very recent years has been found to speak with any distinctness upon
the question of Man's Antiquity. Not that there is any change
in the general bearing of that evidence as it stood before.
There is none whatever. The evidence of Geology has always




38                   PRIMEVAL MAN.
been, that among all the creatures which have in succession
been formed to live upon this earth, and to enjoy it, Man is the
latest born. This great fact is still the fundamental truth in
the History of Creation: that history, as Geology has revealed
it, has been a history of successive Creations, and of successive
Destructions, —Old Forms of Life perishing, and New Forms
appearing, so that the whole face of nature has been many
times renewed. But until very lately it was supposed that
these vast cycles of change had been finally completed before
Man appeared. And as regards fresh creations this supposition is still supported by the testimony of science. So far as
we yet know, no New Form of Life has been created since the
Highest Form was made. But it now appears that since that
event many Old Forms have died. The Cycles of Creation
had closed, but not the Cycles of Destruction.  Of itself, it
might be supposed that this fact has little bearing upon the
question of Time. The extinction of some noxious animals in
particular parts of the globe, as for example in our own country, has taken place within the period of history, and some few
species of wingless birds, as the Dodo and the Great Auk,
have been destroyed in very recent times. But these have
been extinctions effected through the agency of Man. What
is now proved is that a whole group or fauna of great quadrupeds have utterly perished since Man appeared. And the
causes of this destruction seem to have been of the same kind
as the causes which in all former ages had produced similar results-viz., great changes in the climates of the globe, and great
movements affecting the configuration of its surface. In these
last circumstances lies the real stress of the evidence derived
from the new discoveries. It is conceivable that old kinds of
Elephant and Rhinoceros may have roamed over Northern
Europe when its surface and its climate were the same as they
now are. It is less probable that the small streams which now
exist in England should have harbored herds of Hippopotami.
But the position in which the remains of these great animals
are found indicates that since they flourished there have been
considerable changes in physical geography. It indicates, too,
that a great change of climate has accompanied certain
changes in the configuration of land and sea. I know  no




THE ANTIQUITY OF MAN.                39
better example of the evidence to this effect than one which is
very easily accessible in our own country. We have only to go
down to the pleasant shores of Devon, and to one of the pleasantest spots upon those shores-the south-western promontory
of Torbay. Overhanging the little harbor of Brixham, where
two hundred years ago William of Orange landed, there is a
steep limestone hill, at the foot and on the face of which the
houses of the town are built. Close to the summit a few years
ago a cavernous hollow was discovered. It extends a considerable distance through the limestone rocks, and no one who
goes through it can fail to see that it has once been the bed of
a stream. The smooth surfaces worn by the long action of
running water are perfectly preserved, and the rounded pebbles
which were found in the bed of this ancient stream are additional evidences of the fact. Now let any one stand at the entrance, or at the exit of this cavern and cast his eye on the surrounding landscape. Whence can this stream  have flowed,
and whither? The hill is now separated from all higher
ground by valleys which are at least sixty feet below the level
of the cave. It is evident at a glance that the whole physical
geography of the country must have been different, when running water channelled this limestone hill. Yet in this cave
the works of Man, flint arrow-heads and knives, were found,
along with the bones of the Elephant, the Rhinoceros, the
Bear, the Hyrena, and the Reindeer. As regards one of these
animals, the whole leg was found together, showing that the
bones had been covered with flesh when they were carried by
the stream. This is only one case out of very many which
have now been discovered in various parts of Europe.
I need not here go farther into detail as regards this kind of
evidence. Suffice it to say, that all the facts tend to these three
general conclusions: ist, that Man appeared in Northern
Europe at a time when it was covered with great quadrupeds now
wholly extinct; 2d, that the surface of the Earth has since that
period been subjected to modifications, which imply great
changes in physical geography; and 3d, that the period when
those animals flourished, and when Man co-existed with them,
was one when a colder climate prevailed. Now no one conclusion of geological science is more firmly established than this,




40                   PRIMEVAL MAN.
that there was a time, comparatively very recent, when an
Arctic climate prevailed far down into latitudes which are now
temperate; and when a great part of Northern Europe and of
our own islands was submerged under a Glacial Sea. This
sea was ploughed by floating icebergs, which as they melted
dropped their rocks and boulders upon the bottom. That bottom
has since been raised again into dry land, and these boulders
now interrupt the drainer in cultivated fields, and strew the
surface of our wildest moors. Many concurring indications go far
to prove that it was when this Glacial Period had nearly passed
away, when a milder climate was beginning to prevail over the
land which we now know, that Man also began to find his way into Northern Europe. TheIe he sought his living among herds of
animals, of which the greater number are now extinct and a few
remain only in those regions which are still Arctic. This is the
order of events as we can read it with tolerable certainty in the
language of Time-relative. But we have little means of knowing
what relation this order of events bears to Time-absolute. It is
still disputed among Geologists how far the causes of geological
change were once more intense in their action than they are
now. It is quite certain that during the passing away of a
glacial climate, the cutting power of rivers must have been in
tensified by the increasing rapidity with which ice and snows
were melted. There are also facts connected with the position
in which remains of the extinct animals are often found, which
cannot, in my opinion, be-explained, except by violent and sudden
action since or during the period of their entombment. Great
caves, packed closely from floor to roof with the bones of the
Hippopotamus and Rhinoceros; other caves, equally full of
the bones of extinct Oxen, are proofs of some diluvial action of
which Man has had no experience in historic times. But, even
allowing for the greater activity of geological causes, the time
required for such changes of climate has in all probability been
very great. And when we consider that many of these
evidences of Geology apply to the New World as well as to the
Old, we cannot fail to see that the proofs of a very high
antiquity for the Human Race are proofs of a cumulative
character, gathered along several different paths of investigation, and all tending'to one general result,




THE ANTIQUITY OF MAN.                41
That result, however, is necessarily indefinite, and cannot
be expressed in years. Of the evidence from the dispersion of
the Human Race, it may be fairly said that we do not know
how rapidly Man may have spread when the beasts of the chase
were yet unacquainted with his destructive powers, when they
probably swarmed in innumerable herds, and when from their
tameness they must have fallen an easy prey. Of the evidence
from Language it may again be said that we do not know how
rapidly the forms of human speech may have altered among
tribes wandering and unsettled, rapidly changing place, and as
rapidly accommodating themselves to new scenes and new necessities. In like manner, of the evidence from Geology it may
be said that we do not know how rapidly changes of climate
may have been effected if the agencies which determine the
distribution of Sea and Land were more active than they have
been in historic times. All these are pleas in mitigation of extremne demands in point of time, and they are pleas which may
be fairly urged. But when all due allowance has been made for
the considerations to which they point, there remains a weight
and concurrence of authority in favor of a long chronology
which grows and increases in the minds of all who have studied
each one of the separate branches of inquiry.
For my own part I see no reason to be jealous of the conclusions of science in this matter. The question is, after all, a
small one. It is a question of a few thousand years more or
less; and thousands of years are as less than seconds in the
Creative Days. The estimates of Time which have been given
us by Geology have been compared with the estimates of Space
given us by Astronomy. But there is an important difference.
There is no visible limit to Astronomical Space. The apparent magnitude of the largest of the Heavenly Bodies shows that
millions of miles are quantities inappreciable even to our eyes,
and that worlds are scattered like dust through illimitable
depths. But it is not so with Geological Time. Its periods
are indeed very long, but the beginning of them can be seen.
It is not a boundless ocean, it is only a very broad sea. On
the other side of it there rise the mountains of a Lifeless Land.
Successive.creations mark the distance between us and them,
and although we cannot say what that distance is, we can say




42                   PRIMEVAL MAN.
that it is a finite distance-that beyond a boundary which we
can see, the world was not a world such as we now live in, but a
world comparatively " without form and void." The question of
Man's Antiquity involves no attempt to measure the breadth of
this great space, but only the breadth of a little bay or creek,
close to the shores on which we are now standing. Be this
breadth greater or smaller by one, two, or three, or four, or five,
or ten thousand years, its re/ative place in the great Tracts of Creative Time undergoes no change whatever. Man is the latest
work. Recent discoveries have thrown no doubt on this, but, on
the contrary, have all tended to confirm it. I know of no one
moral or religious truth which depends on a short estimate of
Man's antiquity. On the contrary, a high estimate of that antiquity is of great value in its bearing upon another question
much more important than the question of time can ever be-viz.,
the question of the Unity of the Human Race. We must indeed
be very cautious in identifying the interests of Religion with any
interpretation (however certain we may have hitherto assumed
it to be) of the language of Scripture upon subjects which are
accessible to scientific research. We know from past experience how foolish and how futile it is to do so. But unquestionably the Unity of the Human Race, in respect to origin, is not
easily separated from some principles which are of high value in
our understanding both of moral duty and of religious truth.
And precisely in proportion as we value our belief in that Unity
ought we to be ready and willing to accept any evidence on the
question of Man's Antiquity. The older the Human Family
can be proved to be, the more possible and probable it is that
it has descended from a single pair. My own firm belief is that
all scientific evidence is in favor of this conclusion; and I regard
all new proofs of the Antiquity of Man as tending to establish it
on a firmer basis.




PART IV.
MAN' S PRIMITIVE CONDITION.
As the question of Man's Origin is different from the question
of his Antiquity, and as the Antiquity of Man is a different
question from his Primitive Condition, so again the last question
includes within itself several different matters of inquiry.
There is first the question, What consciousness had Primeval
Man of Moral Obligation, and what communion with his Creator? Next there is the question, What were his innate powers of Intellect or Understanding?  And, thirdly, there is the
question, What was his condition in respect to Knowledge,
whether as the result of intuition, or as the result of teaching?
It is a fatal fault in the discussion of this subject, as conducted
both by Archbishop Whately and by Sir J. Lubbock, that these
distinctions are either not seen or not distinctly kept in view.
Perhaps, indeed, it may be thought that the Savage-theory is
independent of such close analysis. But this is by no means
the case. The distinction between the possession of Faculties
capable of acquiring knowledge, and the possession of knowledge, actually acquired, is a fundamental distinction, Not less
fundamental is the distinction between a creature who is morally good but intellectually uninformed, and a creature who is
both ignorant and vicious. Sir J. Lubbock speaks of Primeval
Man as having been in a condition of " utter barbarism."  But
no one, speaking philosophically, has a right to use such terms
as "barbarism" and " civilization" without some definition of
their meaning. What were those Faculties which made the
first creature who possessed them "worthy to be called a Man?"
A Mind capable of reason, disposed to reason, and able to acquire, to accumulate, and to transmit knowledge,-this is the distinctive attribute of Man. The first Being " worthy to be so
called," must have had such a mind. But it could not properly
be said of such a Being, on the ground merely of his ignorance
of mechanical arts, that he was in a condition of " utter barbar



44                   PRIMEVAL MAN.
ism," if he were at the same time conscious of moral obligations
and obedient to them. It is, of course, open to a theorist to
assume that the First Man was both ignorant and bad, or that
the sense of right and wrong was rudimentary and wholly uninformed. But all I desire to point out here is, that there is no
necessary connection between a state of mere childhood in respect to knowledge, and a state of " utter barbarism "-words
which, if they have any definite meaning at all, imply the lowest moral, as well as the lowest intellectual condition. Consequently no proof, if proof there be, that Primeval Man was ignorant of the industrial arts can afford the smallest presumption
that he was also ignorant of duty or ignorant of God. This is a
fundamental objection to the whole scope of Sir J. Lubbock's
argument. It interposes an impassable gulf between his premises and his conclusion.
But there is another objection equally fundamental.  Traces
or remains of barbarism, properly so called, that is, traces of
customs savage or immoral, in the usages of civilized nations,
may be an indication of the fact that those nations, or the races
from which they sprang, have passed through a stage of barbarism. But it affords no presumption whatever that barbarism was the Primeval Condition of Man, any more than the
traces of Feudalism in the laws of modern Europe prove that
feudal principles were born with the Human Race. All such
customs may have been, and as many think, probably have been
not Primeval but Medieval, that is to say, the result of time and
of development, and that development a development of corruption. To assume that they were original, or that they were even
better or less barbarous than others which preceded them, is to
assume the whole question in dispute. Yet this assumption runs
through all Sir J. Lubbock's arguments. Wherever a brutal or
savage custom prevails it is at once assumed to be a sample of
the original condition of Mankind. And this in the teeth of
facts which prove that many of such customs not only may
have been, but must have been, the result of corruption.
Take cannibalism as one of these. Sir J. Lubbock seems to
admit that this loathsome practice was not primeval, probably
because he considers it as unnatural.*  And so it is,-that is
* Prehistoric Times," p. 37I.




MAN'S PRIMITIVE CONDITION.                45
to say, it is against the better nature of Man; but the fact of its
existence proves that within the limits of that nature there are
elements liable to perversions even so horrible as this. And so
we come upon the fact of the two natures of Man, and of the power
of the worst parts of his nature to overcome the best. It is
thus that customs the most cruel and depraved become established. But if this be the explanation, and the only possible
explanation, of cannibalism, is it not evident that this may also
be the explanation of other customs which are violent and horrible only in a less degree? —Cruel rites of worship, and savage customs as regards marriage and the relation of the sexes,
come under the same category.*  Cannibalism is only an extreme case of a general law, and it is a crucial test of the fallacy of a whole class of arguments commonly assumed by those
who support the Savage-theory respecting the Primeval Condition of Mankind.
On the other hand, I think it cannot be denied that the argument of Whately is equally defective in failing to recognize the
essential distinctions to which I have referred. His assertion,
repeated over and over again, is that mere savages "never did
and never could raise themselves, unaided, into a higher condition." Now it may be perfectly true that Man never could
" unaided " discover religious truth, or rise to any adequate idea
of the nature, or of the demands, of moral obligation; and yet
it may be wholly untrue that he is equally incompetent to discover the physical laws of nature, or to find out by mechanical
skill how to adapt them to his own use. Again, Whately admits, that " when men have once reached a certain stage in the
advance towards civilization, it is then possible for them (under
favorable circumstances) to advance further and further in the
same direction." But there is no attempt to define either what
civilization in this sense means, or to specify what kind and
what amount of preliminary instruction is the minimum from
which further advance is rendered possible, If by civilization
is meant a knowledge of the industrial arts, the doctrine that
Man never did and never could " unaided " raise himself from
* Much stress is laid on these by Sir J. Lubbock. Yet many of the customs he refers to, such as Bride-catching, although they may have arisen in very early times,
cannot possibly have been. Primeval in the strict sense of that term.




46                    PRIMEVAL MAN.
one step In mechanical invention to another, is a doctrine involving two separate assertions which require to be separately
examined.  Of these two assertions, the first, that Savages
never have " raised themselves," is an assertion which, from its
very nature, it is difficult if not impossible to prove. Whately
defies the supporter of Development to produce a single case
where this has been actually done. Sir J. Lubbock replies by
defying his opponent to show that it has not been done and
done often. He urges, and urges as it seems to me with truth,
that the great difficulty of teaching many savages the arts of
civilized life, is no proof whatever that the various degrees of
advance towards the knowledge of those arts which are actually
found among semi-barbarous nations, may not have been of
strictly indigenous growth. Thus it appears that one tribe of
Red Indians, called "Mandans," practised the art of fortifying
their towns. Surrounding tribes, although they saw the advantages derived from this art, yet never practised it, and never
learned it. Whately, fixing his eyes on the ruder tribes, says,
" See how clear it is that savages are utterly unteachable."  His
opponents, fixing their eyes on the more advanced tribes, say,
"See how clear it is that men once savage can invent and
practise useful arts." Whately says, "Prove to me, first, that
these Mandans had ever been as savage as their neighbors,
and secondly, that they had raised themselves."  Sir J. Lubbock replies that on the conditions laid down by Whately no
such proof is possible. If any record could be found of the
former condition of the Mandans, the very existence of such a
record would prove former contact with civilized peoples, and
if such contact were proved, Whately would attribute to such
contact the. improvement which is observed. On the other
hand, if the Mandans had "raised themselves" from a more
savage condition, without any teaching from more civilized
races, there could be no record of the fact. The same objection applies to the demand made by Whately as regards all
other races among whom different mechanical arts have been
found established. It is impossible by counter assertions to
settle dogmatically the origin of such arts, and the absence of
recorded cases of indigenous advance is itself rather favorable
than adverse to the theory of those who assert that such advance




MANIS PRIMITIV- CONDITION.              47
is possible, and has actually taken place. It is precisely when
this advance has been most strictly indigenous that the preservation of the fact by record would become impossible.
I do not agree, therefore, with the late Archbishop of Dublin,
that we are entitled to assume it as a fact that, as regards the
mechanical arts, no savage race has ever raised itself. The
other assertion that no such race ever could so raise itself, is
confessedly a theory, and a theory the truth of which is by no
means self-evident. In the first place, when the possibility of
progress is admitted, provided some elementary instruction is
supposed as a foundation on which to work, it is evident that
we are dealing with a proposition altogether hazy, unless there
be some clear definition of the nature and amount of this elementary instruction which is demanded. Whately says that
"the earliest generations of mankind had received only very
limited, and what may be called elementary instruction, enough
merely to enable them to make further advances afterwards by
the exercise of their natural powers." But how much was this
" enough? "  And what is meant by "instruction," as distinguished from inborn or intuitive powers of observation and of
reasoning? May not this have been the form in which the
Creator first " instructed" Man? For here it is important to
observe that indirect proportion as we assume Man's Primitive
Condition to have been such as to require elementary teaching,
in the same proportion do we suppose that his primitive condition in respect to intellect was low and weak. Accordingly,
Whately assumes as an indisputable fact, that Man has no instincts such as enable the lower animals to construct nests, and
cells, and lairs.  My own belief is, that this is an assumption
which is not only unproved, but one which in all probability is
false. As Whately himself admits, "Man is an animal" as
well as the creatures that are below him. It is true that he
has not instincts of the same kind as they have. But this is no
proof whatever that he has not, and had not originally, instincts
which stand in strict correlation with the peculiarities of his
higher physical organization. This is a department of inquiry
which has been far too much neglected both by physiologists
and by metaphysicians. There are many facts which go far to
prove that Man has, and must always have had, instincts which




48                   PRIMEVAL MAN.
afford all that is required as a starting-ground for advance in
the mechanical arts. Few persons have reflected on how much
is involved in the most purely instinctive acts, such as the
throwing of a stone, or the wielding of a stick as a weapon of
offence. Both these simple acts involve the great principle of
the use of artificial tools. Even in the most rudimentary form,
the use of an implement fashioned for a special purpose is absolutely peculiar to Man, and arises necessarily and instinctively out of the structure of his body. The bodies of the lower
animals are so constructed that such implements as they are
capable of directing are all supplied in the form of bodily organs. All effects which they desire to produce, or are capable
of producing, are effected directly by the use of those organs
under the guidance of implanted instincts. There are some
very curious cases among the lower animals of a near approach
to the principle involved in the use of tools —that is to say, the use
of natural force through artificial means. Thus the common
Gray or Hooded Crow is constantly in the habit of lifting shellfish to a certain height in the air, and then letting them fall upon
the rocks of the shore, in order to break the shells. Some species of Monkey will even use any stone which may be at hand
for the purpose of striking and breakling a nut. The Elephant
tears branches from the trees and uses them as an artificial tail
to fan himself and to keep off the flies. But between these rudiments of intellectual perception and the next step-that of
adapting and fashioning an instrument for a particular purpose,
-there is a gthlf in which lies the whole immeasurable distance
between Man and the brutes. In no case whatever do they
ever use an implement made by themselves as an intermediate
agency between their bodily organs and the work which they
desire to do. Man, on the contrary, is so constructed that in
almost everything he desires to do he must employ an agency
intermediate between his bodily organs and the effect which he
wishes to produce. But this necessity, which in one aspect is a
physical disability, is correlated with a mind capable of Invention, and with certain implanted instincts which involve all the
rudiments of mechanical skill. The man who first lifted a
stone and threw it, practised an art which not one of the lower
animals is capable of practising. This is an act which in all




MAN'S PRIMiTIVE CONDITION.              49
probability, is as strictly instinctive and natural to Man as it is
to a Dog to bite, or to a Bull to charge. Yet the act involves
the idea and the knowledge of projectile force, and of the arts
by which direction can be given to that force. The wielding
of a stick is, in all probability, an act equally of primitive intuition, and from this to the throwing of a stick, and the use of
javelins, is an easy and natural transition. Simple as these
acts are, they involve both physical and mental powers capable
of all the developments which we see in the most advanced industrial arts. These acts involve the instinctive idea of the
constancy of natural causes, and the capacity of thought which
gives men the conviction that what has happened under given
conditions will under the same conditions always happen again,
Did Dr. Whately mean that Man must have been instructed by
God how to throw a stone, or to wield a stick, or to hurl a javelin,
or to build a hut? And if so, at what point did such lessons in
mechanics stop? Is it not evident that the more perfect we
suppose the first man to have been, so far as regards at least
his powers of thought, of observation, and of reflection, the less
needful is it to suppose that the few and simple arts necessary
for the sustenance of his life were communicated to him in any
other form than that of intuitive powers of perception and discovery?
And here it is important to observe that even if savage races
be taken as the type of man's Primeval Condition, the evidence
afforded by these races is all in favor of the conclusion that as
regards his characteristic mental powers, Man has always been
Man, and nothing less.  There is quite as much ingenuity and
skill in the manufacture of a knife of flint, as in the manufacture of a knife of iron. And the skill displayed by the men
who used stone implements is not confined to that which is
involved in the selection of mineral substances suitable for the
purpose. That skill is also eminently displayed in the use
made of those stone implements after they had been fashioned.
The smaller implements of bone, or of horn, or of wood, which
the stone knives and hatchets were employed to make, are
often highly ingenious, and sometimes eminently beautiful.
The truth is that high qualities of reasoning and ready
faculties of observation are called forth in the inverse ratio of
4




50                    PRIMEVAL MAN.
the acquired knowledge with which they are provided and from
which they start.  The great ingenuity and resource shown by
many of the rudest tribes in their weapons, and the sense of
beauty evinced by them in the choice and in the invention of
ornamental forms, have hardly been sufficiently appreciated.
It is impossible, for example, to read the description given by
Sir J. Richardson of the bows and arrows of the Eskimo without being struck by the admirable skill with which their scanty
resources, and their limited command of natural material, are
turned to the very best account. The throwing-stick of the
Australian Savage is a most ingenious application of the principle of the lever. The boomerang must have been discovered,
as so many other discoveries are made among ourselves, by
pure accident-by some savage throwing a crooked branch,
and by his observing its curious and unexpected flight. But
every one of these inventions and discoveries involves and
exhibits in full operation the peculiar and characteristic gifts
of the human intellect. The same gifts and the same powers
start in the case of each new generation from a higher vantageground of inherited, and therefore of accumulated knowledge;
and it is thus that, without any change in their own nature,
and even without any increase in their own inherent strength,
they attain gradually to higher and more complicated results.
And if we are to assume with the supporters of the Savagetheory that Man has himself invented all he now knows, then
the very earliest inventions of our race must have been the
most wonderful of all, and the richest in the fruits they bore.
The men who first discovered the use of fire, and the use of
those grasses which we now know under the name of corn,
were discoverers compared with whom, as regards the value of
their ideas to the world, Faraday and Wheatstone are but the
inventors of ingenious toys.
It may possibly be true, as Whately argues, that Man never
could have discovered these things without divine instruction.
If so, it is fatal to the Savage-theory. But it is equally fatal to
that Theory if we assume the opposite position, and suppose
that the noblest discoveries ever made by Man were made by
him in primeval times.
On these, as well as on other grounds, I have Dcnt~e~r attached




MAN S PRITMITIVVF CONDITION.            5t
much importance to Whately's argument. I do not mean to say
that the conclusion to which it points may not be true, but it is
a conclusion which I look upon as incapable of positive proof.
The question of Man's Primitive Condition must therefore
be approached from another side. We can only hope to reach
the Unknown by reasoning from the Known; and, starting
from this ground, we have the indisputable fact that Man is
capable of Degradation. This is a subject which, as it appears
to me, Sir J. Lubbock deals with in the most cursory and superficial manner. In fact, as far as it is possible to do so, he
avoids it altogether.  In his work on "Prehistoric Man" a
single page exhausts all he has to say on one of the most prominent facts of History and of Nature, and this page is headed,
" No Evidence of Degradation." Yet nothing in the Natural
History of M an can be more certain than that both morally,
and intellectually, and physically he can, and he often does,
sink from a higher to a lower level. This is true of Man both
collectively and individually-of men and of societies of men.
Some regions of the world are strewn with the monuments of
civilizations which have passed away. Rude and barbarous
tribes stare with wonder on the remains of Temples, of which
they cannot conceive the purpose, and of Cities which are the
dens of beasts. It is not necessary to assume, as it has sometimes been assumed, that there is a law of decay affecting communities as certain in its operation as the law which operates
on the individual frame. It is enough to note the indisputable
fact that men are liable to degradation and decline,-and this
even as regards the knowledge and the practice of those industrial arts on which the very existence of large populations may
depend. As regards moral character the possibility and the
fact of degradation is not less certain. It is a result only too
common and familiar, both as regards individuals and societies
of men. In truth this kind of decline almost always precedes
the other. The higher elements of civilization depend on qualities of the mind. It is by moral and intellectual force that all
the triumphs of civilization are achieved. When that force declines, the agencies of degradation establish their ascendency,
and the completeness with which they have done their work is
one of the standing wonders of the world. No doubt, the an



52                   PRIMEVAL MAN.
cient civilizations which have been so utterly destroyed were in
many cases brought to a violent, and as it may be argued, to an
accidental end. They were overrun and swept away by the
rush of barbarous hordes. But these are accidents which did
not happen to civilized nations so long as their civilization was
yet undecayed. I am far, however, from denying the powerful
influence of external conditions in favoring the development of
the peaceful arts, or, on the contrary, in arresting that development, or even in destroying it when it had been long established. Nor am I disposed to keep in the background the
effects produced on ancient civilizations by the wars and the
great primeval migrations of our race. On the contrary, these
are facts which form the next step in the argument I am now
maintaining — a step which goes far to connect the possibility
of degradation with the known causes which have operated, and
in the very nature of things must have operated, in producing it.
For it matters not which of the two theories we adopt in regard to the Origin of the Human Race, whether we suppose it
to have proceeded from one or from two, or even from several
different centres of creation; it matters not whether we suppose with Sir J. Lubbock that the "first being worthy to be
called a Man " was born of some inferior creature, or whether
we believe with Whately, that he was truly human in his
powers, but required some " elementary instruction to enable
his faculties to begin their work." In any case we may safely
assume that Man must have begun his course in some one or
more of those portions of the earth which are genial in climate,
rich in natural fruits, and capable of yielding the most abundant
return to the very simplest arts. It is under such conditions
that the first establishment of the human race can be most
easily understood; nay, it is under such conditions only
that it is conceivable at all. And as these are the conditions which would favor the first establishment, and the most
rapid increase of Man, so also are these the conditions under
which knowledge would most rapidly accumulate, and the
earliest possibilities of material civilization would arise.
Now wbttt are the changes of external circumstance which
first, in the natural course of things, would bring an adverse influence to bear upon Mankind? Here again we are on firm




MAN'S PRIMITIVE CONDITION.                   53
ground, because we know one great cause which has been always operating, and we know  its natural and inevitable effects.
This cause is simply the law of increase. It is the consequence
of that law that population is always pressing upon the limits
of subsistence.  Hence the necessity of migrations, and the
force which has propelled successive generations of men farther
and farther, in ever-widening circles round the original centre
or centres of their birth. Then, as it would always be the
weaker tribes who would be driven from  the ground which had
become overstocked, and as the lands to which they went forth
were less and less hospitable in climate and productions, the
struggle for life would be always harder. And so it always
happens in the natural and necessary course of things, that the
races which were driven farthest would be the rudest- the most
engrossed in the pursuits of mere animal existence.
And now, does not this key of principle fit into and explain
all the facts? Do they not seem in the light of that explanation
to take form and order? Is it not true that the lowest and rudest tribes in the population of the globe have been found at the
farthest extremities of its great Continents, and in the distant
Islands which would be the last refuge of the victims of violence
and misfortune?  " The New World " is the Continent which
presents the most uninterrupted stretch of habitable land from
the highest northern to the lowest southern latitude. On the
extreme north we have the Eskimo,* or Inuit race, maintaining
human life under conditions of extremest hardship, even amid
the perpetual ice of the Polar Seas. And what a life it is!
Watching at the blow-hole of a seal for many hours, in a temperature of 75~ below freezing point, is the constant work of the Inuit hunter.t And when at last his prey is struck, it is his luxury
to feast upon the raw blood and blubber. To civilized Man it is
hardly possible to conceive a life so wretched, and in many respects so brutal as the life led by this race during the long lasting night of the arctic winter. Not even the most extravagant
* I have adopted the form of this name (usually spelt Esquimaux) which is adopted
as the most correct by Sir J. Richardson in his work on the Polar Seas. " Inuit " is
the native Eskimo name for their own race.
t Very curious details on Eskimo hunting, feasting, and habits generally are given
in Captain C. F. Hall's most interesting work," Life with the Esquimaux." (Sampson
Low, Son, & Marston. I864.)




54                   PRIMt-IVAL MAN.
theorists as regards the plurality of Human Origins, can suppose that there was an Eskimo Adam-that any man was originally created or developed in the icy regions round the Pole.
Here then we have a case beyond all question, of races driven
by wars and migrations, from the more temperate regions of the
globe.  So long as they were still in those regions, the ancestors of the Eskimo must have lived in another manner, and
must have had wholly different habits. They may have practised such simple agriculture as we know was practised among
the most ancient people who have left their remains in the
Swiss Lake Dwellings. They may have been nomads living
on their flocks and herds. But neither an agricultural nor a
pastoral life is possible on the borders of a frozen sea. The
rigors of the region they now  inhabit have reduced this
people to the condition in which we now see them, and whatever arts their fathers knew, suited to more genial climates,
have been, and could not fail to be, utterly forgotten.  It is a
very remarkable fact that this process, by which even the most
sterile regions of the globe have been peopled, is a process
which appears to be still in operation. Arctic voyagers have
long known that there are lands nearer the Pole than those
which they have hitherto been able to reach, and it has been
even suspected that there exists there a somewhat milder climate and a more open sea. A whaling ship, which in i867
reached a more northern point than had hitherto been attained,
has brought the curious information that a tribe wandering
near Cape Chelagskoi had recently driven another tribe before
them across the Frozen Sea to a land lying so far north that
only its mountain tops could be occasionally seen from the
Siberian Headlands.* This farther land has never yet been trodden by civilized Man; and if he ever does reach it, he will thus
probably find it occupied by men who may have forgotten how
and whence their fathers came.
And now let us pass to the other extremity of the great Continent of America-to Cape Horn, and to the Island off it,
which projects its desolate rocks into one of the most inhospitable climates in the world. The inhabitants of Tierra del
Fuego are perhaps the most degraded among the races of man* See letter in the Times of December 30, i867, from Captain Sherard Osborne.




MAN'S PRIMITIVE CONDITION.              55
kind. How could they be otherwise? "Their country," says
Mr. Darwin, " is a broken mass of wild rocks, lofty hills, and
useless forests; and these are viewed through mists and endless
storms. The habitable land is reduced to the stones of the
beach. In search of food they are compelled to wander unceasingly from spot to spot, and so steep is the coast that they
can only move about in their wretched canoes."  They are habitual cannibals, killing and eating their old women before they
kill their dogs, for the sufficient reasons, as explained by themselves-" Doggies catch otters, old women no." Of some of
these people who came round the Beagle in their canoes, the
same author says-" These were the most wretched and miserable
creatures I anywhere beheld. They were quite naked, and even
one full-grown woman was absolutely so. It was raining heavily,
and the fresh water, together with the spray, trickled down her
body. In another harbor not far distant, a woman, who was suckling a new-born child, came one day alongside the vessel and remained there out of mere curiosity, whilst the sleet fell and
thawed on her naked bosom and on the skin of her naked baby.
These poor wretches were stunted in their growth, their hideous
faces bedaubed with white paint, their skins filthy and greasy,
their hair entangled, their voices discordant, and their gestures
violent. Viewing such men, one can hardly make oneself believe that they are fellow-creatures and inhabitants of the same
world."  Well might Darwin add, " Whilst beholding these savages one asks, Whence have they come? What could have
tempted, or what change compelled, a tribe of men to leave the
fine regions of the North, to travel down the Cordillera, or
backbone of America, to invent and build canoes which are not
used by the tribes of Chili, Peru, and Brazil, and then to enter
on one of the most inhospitable countries within the limits of
the globe?"    There can be but one explanation.  Quarrels
and wars between tribe and tribe, induced by the mere increase
of numbers and the consequent pressure on the means of subsistence, have been always, ever since Man existed, driving the
weaker races farther and farther from the older settlements of
mankind. And when the ultimate points of the habitable world
are reached, the conditions of existence cause and necessitate
* Darwin's " Naturalist's Voyage," ed. 1852, p. 2i6.




56                   PRIMEVAL MAN.
a savage and degraded life. Darwin gives the true explanation
of their condition when he says, "How little can the higher
powers of the mind be brought into play i What is there for imagination to picture, for reason to compare, for judgment to decided upon? "  The case of the Fuegians is a case in which
there can be no doubt whatever of the causes of their degraded condition. On every side of them, and in proportion
as we recede from their wretched country, the surrounding
tribes are less wretched and better acquainted with the simpler arts. And it is remarkable that in the case of this people we have proof of another point of great interest and importance, viz., this-that even the most degraded savages have
all the perfect attributes of humanity, which can be and are developed the moment they are placed under favorable conditions. Captain Fitzroy had in I803carried off some of these
people to England, where they were taught the habits and
the arts of civilized life. Of one of these who was taken back
to his own country in the Beagle, Mr. Darwin tells us that his
"intellect was good," and of another that he had a " nice disposition." We see, therefore, that every fact and circumstance
connected with the Fuegians agrees with the supposition that
their " utter barbarism " was due entirely to the cruel conditions
of their life, and the wretched country into which they had been
driven. The Bushmen of South Africa are another case in
point. It seems to be clearly ascertained that they belong to
the same race as other tribes who are far less degraded, and
that they are simply the descendants of outcasts driven to the
woods and rocks.+ So, again, among the great islands of the
Pacific, the natives of Van Diemen's Land were the most utterly
degraded of all the Polynesian races.
With these facts staring us in the face, connecting themselves
in an obvious order with causes which we know to be all operating in one direction, is it not absurd to argue that the condition of these outcasts of the human family can be assumed as
representing the aboriginal condition of Man? Is it not certain that whatever advances towards civilization may have been
made among their progenitors, such advances must necessarily
have been lost under the conditions to which their children are
* Pritchard's " Natural History of Man," vol. ii.




MAN S PRIMITIVE CONDITION.             57
reduced? Sir J. Lubbock urges, in reply to Whately, that the
low condition of Australian savages affords no'proof whatever
that they could not raise themselves, because the materials of
improvement are wanting in that country, which affords no
cereals, nor animals capable of useful domestication. But Sir
J. Lubbock does not perceive that the same argument which
shows how improvement could not possibly be attained, shows
also how degradation could not possibly be avoided. If with
the few resources of the country it was impossible for savages
to rise, it follows that with those same resources it would be
impossible for a half-civilized race not to fall. And as in this
case again, unless we are to suppose a separate Adam and Eve
for Van Diemen's Land, its natives must originally have come
from one or other of the great continents where both corn and
cattle were to be had, it follows that the low condition of these
natives is much more likely to have been the result of degradation than of primeval barbarism. Man as an animal does not
belong to the Fauna of Australia. The scientific evidence,
therefore, is conclusive that he came to it from other lands.
But it is highly improbable that the circumstances of his arrival in the Islands were such as would have enabled him to
bring either corn or cattle wvith him. Whatever knowledge of
these things he had before, must necessarily have been lost.
The present condition, therefore, of the Australian Savage in
respect to these important elements of civilization, affords no
presumption whatever that it represents the condition of those
from whom he is descended. There is hardly a single fact
quoted by Sir J. Lubbock in favor of his own theory, which,
when viewed in connection with the same indisputable principles, does not tell against that theory rather than in its favor.
The facts indeed which I have hitherto quoted prove only that
forgetfulness of arts once practised and of knowledge once
possessed must inevitably have arisen among tribes driven
into inhospitable regions. But there are other facts also referred to by Sir J. Lubbock himself, which show that there are
cases in which we have proof of this process having actually
taken place. Thus in regard to the Eskimo, he quotes the case
of a tribe in Baffin's Bay who "could not be made to understand what was meant by war, nor had they any warlike weap



58                    PRIMEVAL MAN.
ons." * No wonder, poor people! They had been driven into
regions where no stronger race could desire to follow them.
But that their fathers had once known what war and violence
meant, there is no more conclusive proof -than the dwellingplace of their children. So again, Sir J. Lubbock quotes the
testimony of Cook in respect to the Tasmanians, that they had
no canoes. Yet their ancestors could not have reached the
island by walking on the sea. Some of the tribes did not
know how fire could be obtained if it were once extinguished.t
Again, of the Australians, Sir J. Lubbock reminds us that in a
cave on the north-west coast " tolerable figures of sharks, porpoises, turtles, lizards, canoes, and some quadrupeds," etc.,
were found; and yet that the present natives of the country
where they were found were utterly incapable of realizing the
most vivid artistic representations, and ascribed the drawings
in the cave to diabolical agency.? In all these cases we have
direct evidences of degradation or of forgetfulness, even since
Man first reached the shores of those distant Islands, and we
see how it could not fail to be so under the known effect of
known cause upon the condition of our race.
And now we can better estimate the value to be set on the
arguments which have been founded on the rude implements
found in the river drifts and in the caves of northern Europe,
I, for one, accept the evidence which Geology affords that these
implements are of very ancient date.  I accept too the evidence
which that science affords, that these implements were in all
probability the ice hatchets and rude knives used by tribes
which towards the close of the Glacial Age had pushed their
way to the farthest limits of the lands which were then habitable. And what follows? The inevitable conclusion is, that it
must be about as safe to argue from those implements as to
the condition of Man at that time in the countries of his Primeval Home, as it would be in our own day to argue from the
habits and arts of the Eskimo as to the state of civilization in
London or in Paris.
For here I must observe that Archoeologists are using lan.
* "Prehistoric Times' p. 410o
t Ibid. pp. 354-55.
t Ibid. p. p.3.8;




MAN'S PRIMITIVE CONDITION.              59
guage on this subject which, if not positively erroneous, requires,
at least, more rigorous definitions and limitations of meaning
than they are disposed to attend to. They talk of an Old Stone
Age (Palaeolithic), and of a Newer Stone Age (Neolithic), and of
a Bronze Age, and of an Iron Age. Now, there is no proof
whatever that such Ages ever existed in the world. It may be
true, and it probably is true, that all nations in the progress of
the Arts have passed through the stages of using stone for implements before they were acquainted with the use of metals.
But knowledge of the metals must have arisen at very different
epochs in different regions of the earth. In South Africa flint
implements have lately been discovered in abundance, but over
a large portion of that vast continent the knowledge and the
use of iron seems to have been of very ancient date; and I am
informed by Sir Samuel Baker that iron ore is so common
in Africa, and of a kind so easily reducible by heat, that its use
might well be discovered by the rudest tribes. As a matter of
fact, they are now all excellent workers in iron. Then again,
it is to be remembered that there are some countries in the
world where stone is as rare and difficult to get as metals. In
them the use of stone implements may imply even an extended
commerce. The great alluvial plains of Mesopotamia are a
case in point. Accordingly, we know from the remains of the
First Chaldaean Monarchy that a very high civilization in the
arts of agriculture and of commerce co-existed with the use of
stone implements of a very rude character.* This fact proves
that rude stone implements are not necessarily any indication
whatever of a really barbarous condition. Assuming then that
the use of stone has in all cases preceded the use of metals, it
is quite certain that the same Age which was an Age of Stone
in one part of the world was an Age of Metal in another. As
regards the Eskimo and the South-Sea Islanders we are now,
or were very recently, living in a Stone Age. And so it has
been in all past times of which any record remains. The whole
argument therefore which has been founded on flint implements,
is an argument liable to these two fundamental objections, first
that flint implements are a very uncertain index of civilization,
even among the tribes who used them; and secondly, that they
* Rawlinson's " Five Great Monarchies," vol. i. pp. xi9, 20o.




6o                    PRIMEVAL MAN.
are no index at all of the state of civilization among other tribes
who lived at the same time in other portions of the globe. The
finding of flint implements, for example, however rude, in England, or in Denmark, or in France, affords no evidence whatever of the condition of the Industrial Arts in the same age
upon the banks of the Euphrates or the Nile.
There is one argument of Sir J. Lubbock in favor of the
Savage-theory, which I observe with as much astonishment as
that which he expresses in reference to some of the arguments
of Whately. Sir J. Lubbock says that some savages have been
found who have no religion at all. Such, he argues, was probably the condition of Primeval Man, because he ": feels it difficult
to believe that any people which once possessed a religion
would ever entirely lose it." Surely, if there is one fact more
certain than another in respect to the nature of Man. it is that
he is capable of losing religious knowledge, of ceasing to believe
in religious truth, and of falling away from religious duty. If
by " religion " is meant the existence merely of some impressions
of powers invisible and " supernatural "-even this, we know,
cannot only be lost, but be scornfully disavowed by men who
are highly civilized. Nor does Sir J. Lubbock's comment upon
this subject gain by the further explanation which he gives.
He says that " Religion appeals so strongly to the hopes and
fears of men, it takes so deep a hold on most minds, it is so great
a consolation in times of sorrow and sickness, that I can hardly
think any nation would ever abandon it altogether." There are
two obvious replies to such reasoning: the first is, that many
false religions do not answer to this description so far as regards
their self-recommending and consoling power; the second is,
that neither does true religion answer this description to those
who are corrupt and vicious. Belief in a God who is " of purer
eyes than to behold iniquity " is a belief which bad men may
not have liked to cherish. As regards the first of these two
replies, Sir J. Lubbock himself bears emphatic testimony to its
force. In his work on " Prehistoric Man," speaking of the
savage, he says,* "Thus his life is one prolonged scene of selfishness and fear; even in his religion, if he has any, he creates for
himse'lfa lzew source of terror, and peoples the world with invisible
* P. 484



MAN S PRIMITIVE CONDITION.              6!
enemies." Yes, and this is mildly stated. The most cruel and
savage customs in the world are the direct effect of its "religions."  And if men could drop religions when they would, or if
they could even form the wish to get rid of those which sit like
a nightmare on their life, there would be many more nations
without a " religion" than there are found to be. But religions
can neither be put on nor cast off like garments, according to
their utility, or according to their beauty, or according to their
power of comforting. Among the causes which have determined
their form and character in different nations we must reckon the
moral corruption of human nature. I am not speaking of this
corruption in a dogmatic and theological sense; I speak of it as
an unquestionable fact, whatever be the history of its origin.
By the corruption of human nature, I mean the undeniable fact
that Man has a constant tendency to abuse his powers, to do
what according even to his own standard of right or wrong he
knows he ought not to do; to be unjust and cruel towards others,
and to fall into horrible and degrading superstitions. Human
corruption in this sense is as much a fact in the natural history
of Man as that he is a Biped without feathers.  It is entirely
independent. of any belief, or any theory as to Man's original
condition.  Sir;. Lubbock's argument implies that the tribes,
if such there be, (which, by the way, is extremely doubtful) who
are not known to have any ideas at all in respect to spiritual
beings or to another world, are in a lower condition than tribes
which have a " religion," however cruel and horrible its rites
may be. According to this theory, even devil-worship would be
a step in ascent towards " civilization " from the "utter barbarism " of Primeval Man. But this is a theory as contrary to rea_
son as it is contrary to all the evidence we have on the history
of Man. The farther we go back in that history the more clear
become the traces of some pure traditions, and the rays of some
primeval light. Such evidence as history and philosophy and
criticism afford on the course of religious knowledge is not in
favor of the doctrine of a gradual rise, but, on the contrary, of
continuous corruption and decline. " If there is one thing," says
Professor Max Miiller, " which a comparative study of religions
places in the clearest light, it is the inevitable decay to which
every religion is exposed.... Whenever we can trace back a




62                    PRIMEVAL MAN.
religion to its first beginnings, we find it free from many blemishes
that affected it in its later stages." * One of the most ancient
religions of the world is represented in its earlier form in the
Sanskirt Vedas, and the contrast between its doctrines and those
of existing Hindooism is but a sample of the working of a great
law which can be traced in every region of the world. This is
no case confined to some little corner of the earth, or to some
short period of time, or to some partial and accidental cause.
It is the case of a religion which in all its branches embraces
uncounted millions of the human race, and the history of which
extends over more than 3000 years. Nor is the sense in which
corruption and decay are predicated of this religion at all vague
or indefinite.  It has become lower, ruder, more corrupt,-in its
conceptions of the Divine Nature,-in its notions of acceptable
worship, and in the social institutions which are connected with
Belief.
The truth is, that Man's capacities of degradation stand in
close relation, and are proportionate, to his capacities of improvement. What faculty of the human mind lies nearer to
the very centre of its highest life than the faculty of Imagination? Without it we could not interpret Nature, or form any
conception of its laws, or feel their harmony, or understand
their use. Without it we could not see the Abstract or read
the Future. Without it we should be without motive to resist
Impulse, or to maintain Conviction, or to rise to Duty. We
could form no idea whatever of Religion. It would not be
possible to desire the Unknown or to hope for the Unseen.
And yet Pascal was not wrong when he placed this same faculty of Imagination at the very head of the " Deceitful Powers."  For it is, in truth, one of the most effective causes and
instruments of Degradation.  It is its function to give form
and expression to all those vague emotions which arise inevitably out of contact between the mind that is in Man and the
mind that is in Nature. These emotions are literally what the
Poet calls them-" the blank misgivings of a creature moving
about in worlds not realized." But without Knowledge given
or acquired, to guide the elements in Imagination which are
purely intellectual, and without virtue to control the elements
* " Chips from a German Workshop," vol. i., pref., xxiii.




MAN'S PRIMITIVE CONDITION.            63
which are chiefly moral, this " Superb Power," as Pascal also
most justly calls it, does terrible work indeed. It is the mother
and the nurse of all the horrible inventions of Idolatry.
Through its operation have arisen, from time to time, all the
diabolical rites which have degraded, and do still degrade, so
many tribes of men far below the level of the brutes. But irrational as the superstitions of heathen nations may appear to
be, and even inconceivable in a Being who is capable of reason,
it should never be forgotten that this is true only of the last
developments of Idolatry, and is by no means true of its first
beginnings. On the contrary, these are among the most natural of all spiritual temptations, and perhaps the most difficult
to resist. The first of the Commandments is of all others the
most difficult to obey: "Thou shalt have no other Gods before
Me."  The dependence of the human mind on outward symbols, and then its tendency to identify the symbols with the
conceptions they represent-these are the roots of all Idolatry.
The course of thought, in our own day, even among highly civilized and enlightened men, may well remind us how easy and
how natural it is to lapse into systems of belief, which in their
fundamental character are essentially Creature-worship. The
fact is, that so far from there being any difficulty in understanding how spiritual truth, once known, could be ever lost, all observation and experience prove that it is the most difficult of
all things to maintain with even tolerable purity any high standard of spiritual faith.  & thousand tendencies from within,
and from without, are perpetually at work to undermine, or to
transform it. And then the awful correlations of Human
Thought render it not only probable but inevitable that the
first departures from the knowledge and the love of Truth
must end in wider and wider divergence from it. The infinite
subtlety and ingenuity of Imagination will, when it is ignorant
and corrupt, amply account for the origin and growth of even
the most degraded superstitions. This is a subject too extensive to be pursued here; but it could be shown that even
among the South Sea Islanders, and other tribes who have
been driven farthest from the original settlements of Man,
there were many religious customs of which those who prac



64                   PRIMEVAL MAN.
tised them did not know the origin or the meaning, and which
clearly indicated their derivation from an older, a more intelligible, but a forgotten faith.
This is also eminently true of the religious rites and practices of some of the Hill tribes of India. A most curious and interesting account of human sacrifices by the Khonds, one of
the Hill Tribes of Orissa, has been published by my friend,
Major-General John Campbell, who has been mainly instrumental, under the Government of India, in the abolition of this
horrid rite. The absolute rule that the victims must be procured by purchase, stands in unmistakable relation to the only
intelligible principle in the very idea of sacrifice, namely, the
principle of self-sacrifice.
Here for the present I must leave the subject. My ohief
object has been to show how little really depends on some of
the arguments which have been put forth by both sides in this
controversy, and to indicate what seems to me to be the true
bearing of the facts which as yet have been clearly ascertained.
I set little value on the argument of Whately, that as regards
the mechanical arts Man can never have risen "unaided."
The aid which Man had from his Creator may possibly have
been nothing more than the aid of a Body and of a Mind, so
marvellously endowed, that Thought was an instinct, and Contrivance was at once a necessity and a delight. But I set still
less value on the arguments of Sir J. Lubbock, that Primeval
Man must have been born in a state of " utter barbarism," on
the ground that this is the actual condition of the outcasts of
our race, or that industrial knowledge has advanced from small
beginnings, or that there are traces of rude customs among
many nations now highly civilized. None of these arguments
afford any proof whatever, or even any reasonable presumption, in favor of the conclusion which they are employed to
support: first, because along with a complete ignorance of the
Arts it is quite possible that there may have been a higher
knowledge of God, and a closer communion with Him; secondly, because many cases of existing barbarism can be distinctly traced to adverse external circumstances, and because
it is at least possible that all real barbarism has had its origin




MAN'S PRIMITIVE CONDITION.            65
in like conditions; thirdly, because the known charact r of
Man and the indisputable facts of history prove that he has
within him at all times the elements of corruption-that even
in his most civilized condition, he is capable of degradation,
that his Knowledge may decay, and that his Religion may be
lost.








THE
REIGN OF LAW.
BY THE DUKE OF ARGYLL.
Let knowledge grow from mzore to zore,
But more of reverence in us doellZ,
That mind and soul, according 7tele,
May make one music as before,
But zvaster.
IN MEMORIAM.
NEW YORK
JOHN W. LOVELL COMPANY
150 WORTH STREET, CORNER MISSION PLACE








PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION.
IN preparing a Fifth Edition of this work, I have to acknowledge the favor-far greater than I expected-with which
it has been received. The argument which it maintains is at
variance with the philosophy of some of the most active and
popular thinkers of the time; and on a few important points it
deviates from the view commonly adopted by men with whom I
am more generally agreed. Some adverse comment was therefore not only to be expected but desired. Most sincerely do I
thank those who, in numerous Journals and Reviews, have
undertaken this duty, for the uniformly courteous and even
kindly spirit in which their criticisms have been expressed.
In this Edition no alteration has been made involving any
change of principle or opinion. Here and there words have
been added or removed according as individual passages appear
to have been misunderstood. Throughout some of the chapters substantial additions have been made in reply, direct or
indirect, to my principal opponents, whilst discussions, more
detailed than were suitable for the text, have been committed
to Notes at the end of the volume.
These additions and Notes have reference chiefly to the following articles which appeared in review of the " Reign of
Law: "
Ist. An Article, by Mr. Alfred R. Wallace, in the Quarterly
JournlaZ of Science, for October, i867. This article is in defence
and illustration of Mr. Darwin's "Theory on the Origin of Spe
cies." The eminence of Mr. Wallace as a Naturalist, the extent of his researches in some of the most remarkable Faunas
of the world, and the fact that, before the publication of Mr.
Darwin's book, he had come to kindred, if not identical conclusions,-all render him peculiarly competent to defend the " The



iv            PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION.
ory," and to present it in the strongest light. I have therefore
added to the text several passages suggested by the challenge
he makes, and by the reasoning he employs. A further discus,
sion of his paper will be found in Note A.
2d. An Article, by Mr. George H. Lewes, in the Forenihily
Review, for July, i867, dealing with the main argument and
conclusion of this work from the well-known point of view of
the " Positive Philosophy." Wherever in the text there seemed
a fitting place for doing so, I have inserted passages which deal
with the reasoning of his paper, or with the same reasoning as
it appears in a more systematic form in the Prolegomena to Mr.
Lewes's " History of Philosophy."
3d. An Article in the Dublin Review, for April, I867, which I
am permitted to attribute to the learned editor of that periodical, Dr. Ward. The more special object of his adverse comment is the view I have taken of the doctrine of Free Will-a
doctrine which Dr. Ward, with some warmth, accuses me of
having virtually abandoned whilst professing to defend it. A
slight alteration in the text may perhaps help to remove some
objections, which rest entirely upon a misunderstanding of the
sense in which particular words are used. But behind and be,
yond any misunderstanding of this kind, there lies apparently a
substantial difference in respect to which my view remains unaltered. This difference will be found discussed in Note F, at
the end of the volume.
4th. An Article in the Contemporary Review, for May, I867,
by Mr. J. P. Mahaffy. With reference to his observations, as
well as to those of some other critics, I have somewhat expanded several passages which deal with the Supernatural, and
with the various relations in which miracles have been conceived. to stand towards the "Reign of Law." I have also, in
a special Note (G), replied to a criticism in this paper, referring
to the subject of Necessity and Free Will.
Other Notes have been added in illustration or support of
various passages in the text.
As regards the intention I had at one time entertained of
adding a chapter on " Law in Christian Theology," further reflection has only confirmed me in the feeling that this is a subject which cannot be adequately dealt with in such a form. J




PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION.             V
can only again ask my readers to remember that although some
ideas which belong to this subject, or touch it at various points,
cannot be, and have not been, avoided, yet the desire and intention to postpone it, in so far as it was possible to do so has
left blanks which every careful eye must see.




PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.
SOME portions of this work have already appeared at various
times in the Edinburgh Review in Good WFords and in Addresses
to the Royal Society of Edinburgh during the years in which I
had the honor of being President of that Body. The deep interest of the matter dealt with in those Papers has induced me
to expand them, to add new chapters on other aspects of the
same subject, and to publish the whole in a connected form.
Among many other deficiencies which may be observed in
this Volume, there is one which demands explanation, lest a
serious misunderstanding should arise. I had intended to conclude with a chapter on " Law in Christian Theology." It was
natural to reserve for that chapter all direct reference to some
of the most fundamental facts of Human nature. Yet without
such reference the Reign of Law, especially in the " Realm of
Mind," cannot even be approached in some of its very highest
and most important aspects. For the present, however, I have
shrunk from entering upon questions so profound, of such critical import, and so inseparably connected with religious controversy. In the absence of any attempt to deal with this
great branch of the inquiry, as well as in many other ways, I
am painfully conscious of the narrow range of this work. I
can only offer it as a very small contribution to the discussion
of a boundless subject.




CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
PAGE
THE SUPERNATURAL....................................I 33
The term Supernatural employed in different and contradictory
senses-The Natural casting out the Supernatural-Nature, in
its widest sense, to be understood as including all causal agencies, especially Man's Mind and Will-Man's agency the most
Natural of all agencies-Man's Mind and Will regarded as belonging to the Supernatural-Relation of Man's agency to the
physical laws of Nature-" Supernatural " power-Is it Power
independent of the use of means?-Relation of God to'the rules
of His Government called " Laws "-Mansel's position, that a
Miracle is a Superhuman work-Gibbon's attempt to account
for the spread of Christianity by Natural causes-Preservation
of the Jews by means employed to effect a Divine PurposeNothing in Religion incompatible with the belief that all exercises of God's power, ordinary and extraordinary, are effected
through the instrumentality of means-Principal Tulloch's view
of Miracles-Locke's idea of Miracles-The great truth he
misses-Truths and Difficulties of Religion-their type in the
course and constitution of Nature-Guizot's argument, that
Man is the result either of Material forces or Supernatural
power-The  Development hypotheses-No  distinction  in
Scripture between Natural and Supernatural-" Silent Members" in animal frames-Perception of Correspondences as
much a fact as the sight or touch of the things in which they
appear-Fertilization  of Orchids-Intention  the one thing
which Darwin sees-Orchids in all their marvellous forms developed out of the archetypal arrangements of Threes within
Threes-Ideas of Order based on Numerical Relations meet us
at every turn in Nature-The distinction drawn between the
Natural and the Supernatural a distinction artificial, arbitrary,
and unreal-Belief in the existence of a Personal God essential
to all Religion-Decay of many Creeds and Confessions
through dissociating the doctrines of Christianity from the analogy of Nature.




Viii                        CONTENTS.
CHAPTER II.
PAGE
LAW:   ITS  DEFINITIONS..............................34-75
Reign of Law in the world around us and within us-Importance of
looking sharply on Forms of Words professing to represent
scientific truths-Religion and Science closely connected-The
Instinct which seeks for harmony in the truths of Science and
the truths of Religion a higher Instinct than the disposition
which pretends there is no relation between them-The idea
that Prayer to God is only a good way of preaching to ourselves-Essence of the belief in Prayer, that the Divine Mind
is accessible to supplication, and the Divine Will capable of
being moved thereby-Law, human and Divine, the authoritative expression of Will enforced by Power —The FIVE different Senses in which Law is habitually used:-First, as applied
to an observed Order of Facts-S&eczldly, to that Order, as involving the action of some Force, or Forces, of which nothing
more may be known-Thirdly, as applied to individual Forces,
the measure of whose operation has been more or less defined
— Fbrthly, as applied to those Combinations of Force which
have reference to the fulfilment of Purpose, or the discharge of
Function-Fifth/zly, as applied to Abstract Conceptions of the
Mind-These great leading significations circle round the
Three great questions Science asks of Nature —the What, the
How, and the Why-The Three Laws of Kepler the simplest
illustration of Law applied in the First Sense-An Observed
Order of Facts can only arise out of the action of some compelling Force-Law of Gravitation the great example of Law
in the Thzird Sense-The " Verifiable Element "-Laws in the
first three senses explain nothing, save that the order of subordinate phenomena is due to Force-Law of Gravitation the
best example of what Law is, and what it is not-Languages
grow according to rules of which the men who speak them are
unconscious-What happens around us in Nature the result of
different and opposing Forces nicely balanced-Principle of
Adjustment as the instrument and result of Purpose always
reached at last in the course of every physical inquiry-Law
in the highest Sense —Combination for the accomplishment of
Purpose-Some Philosophers say the question " Why? " should
never be asked-The facts of Adjustment and of Function
constitute not Final but Immediate Purpose-The Function of
an organ is its Purpose-Doctrine of Contrivance and Adjustment not so metaphysical as the doctrine of HomologiesImpossible in describing physical phenomena to avoid phraseology moulded on our own conscious Personality and WillUltimate fact of Astronomical Science not the Law of Gravi



CONTENTS.                           iX
PAGE
tation, brt, the Adjustment between that Law and others less
known —Revolution of the Seasons depend on a multitude of
Laws, Astronomical, Chemical, Electrical, Geological, etc.Chemical Science rich in illustration of Forces in mutual Adjustment-" Theine " and " Strychnine " differ from each other
only in the proportions in which they are combined —-How our
Wills exercise a large and increasing power over the Material
WVorld-Laws of Nature immutable only in one Sense-Laws
of Nature employed in the System of Nature in a manner precisely analogous to that in which we employ them —Examples
furnished in the Shells of Barnacles and in the Menai BridgePurpose never attained in Nature save by the enlistment of
Laws as instruments-Battery of the Torpedo compared with
Man's Electric Battery-The Purpose what we know in the Battery of the Electric Fish-We forget that Man's works, no less
than Nature's are done through the means of Law —F-fi  meaning of Law-the designation of some purely Abstract Idea, as,
for instance, the First Law of Motion in Mechanics-This Law
never operates in itself, but is complicated with other Laws,
producing a corresponding complication in result-Suggestions
of Materialism lie thickest to the eye on the surface of things
rather than below it-Physical Science cannot do more than
widen the foundation of intelligent Spiritual beliefs-The
modern idea of Law known instinctively to Man since first he
made a Tool and used it as the Instrument of Purpose-Two
great enemies to Materialism; one rooted in the Affections,
the other in the Intellect —Transcendental character of the results of Physical research-All Nature's realities are in the region of the Invisible-Life, according to Huxley and Carpenter, the Cause of Organization-Material Force, a force which
acts on Matter-Our Conceptions of Force traced to their fountain-head-Force of Gravitation regarded by Herschel as " the
direct, or indirect, result of a Consciousness, or a Will, existing
somewhere "-The idea of a Personal Will apart from the
Forces which work in Nature, is said by some men to be a
mere Projection of our own Personality into the world beyond
-A Watch the abode of a " Watch-force "-The greatest mystery of all-the analogy between Man's works and the Creator's.
CHAPTER III.
CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY ARISING OUT OF THE REIGN
OF LAW...........................................7 6-IO2
Necessity of Contrivance for the accomplishment of PurposeContrivance in the Navigation of the Air-" The Way of an




X                          CONTENTS,
PAGE
Eagle in the Air "-Force of Gravitation the principal Force in
flight-Resisting Force of the Atmosphere the next Law appealed to-Elasticity and reacting Force of the Air another
Law-Great Force of a downward Blow from a Bird's Wing
-Convex and Concave Surfaces required in Wings-The
Feathers must underlap each other-How the power of forward Motion is given to Birds-This Theory of Flight may be
tested by the eye-Experiment with a Heron's stretched Wing
-Why no Bird can fly backwards-The heavier a Bird the
greater its possible velocity-Erroneous notion of Birds having
Air-cells for the inhalation and stowage of heated Air-What
Forces the movements of flying animals are governed byBirds whose Wing is adapted for diving and flight —Wings
rather long than broad in Birds of great powers of flight —A
long Wing nothing but a long Lever-Description of the Albatross sailing or wheeling round a ship —Sharp-pointed
Wings also possessed by such Birds-What sharpness, or
roundness, of Wing depends on —On what the propelling
power of a Bird's Wing depends-How Birds can remain stationary in the Air-Usc of the Tail in Birds —How Birds turn
in flight-Humming Birds the most remarkable examples of
the machinery of flight-Adjustments to Purpose in a Wingfeather-Why Man has failed in Air Navigation.
CHAPTER IV.
APPARENT  EXCEPTIONS TO  THE  SUPREMACY  OF PURPOSE............................................ 103-123
Structures of which we cannot see the use-Mr. Darwin's curious
mistake about Green Woodpeckers-Adapted coloring in
Nature for purposes of Concealment-Only employed under
certain conditions-The Green Woodpecker does not come
under these conditions-Strongly contrasted coloring in Woodpeckers-Birds amongst whom the assimilated coloring prevails-Purpose of Concealment in the Woodcock's plumageIn the Snipe-Insects in which imitation, with a view to Concealment, extends to Color, Form, and Structure-Beauty in
Nature a Purpose, an Object, and an End-Ornament as much
an End in the Workshop of Nature as in the Jeweller's Workshop-Instance in Nature where Ornament takes the Form of
Pictorial Representation-In many Animal structures, perhaps
in all save one, there are parts the presence of which cannot
be explained-Those aborted limbs parts of a universal PlanA Plan of this kind itself a purpose-African Notion that the
Ostrich's toes correspond to Man's thumb and forefinger



CONTENTS.                           xi
PAGE
Aborted Wings of the Ostrich really correspond to the Fingers
in Man —Hlomology in Structure and Analogy in Use-Original conception of the framework of Organic Life has its last
development in Man-In Nature, Use must be interpreted as
including Actual Use, Potential Use, and Ornament.
CHAPTER V.
CREATION BY LAW................................... 124-162
Law, according to Physiology, is never absent as a Servant-A like
Order in the existing World, and in the past History of Creation —Gradual modification of Type in Animals-No knowledge of the Forces to which the phenomena of Life can be
traced-Development Theory in its earlier forms-Consequences of hiding our Ignorance of the causes of Phenomena
by declaring them the result of Law-Darwin does not profess
to trace the Origin of New Forms to any definite Law-Darwin's Theory not a Theory on " The Origin of Species "-His
Theory incurs the risk of being self-condemned-Humming
Birds as exhibiting Mysteries of Creation-Absolute Distinctiveness from all other Families of Birds —Bond that unites all
the forms of this Family-" Centres of Creation " as regards
Humming Birds-Differences generic and specific between
Humming Birds-Plan in which mere Variety has been an aim
— No connection between the Humming Bird's splendor and
any Function essential to life-" Coquette " Humming BirdsCurious example in Humming Birds of Variety for Ornament's
sake-Mere Beauty and mere Variety for their own sake"Natural Selection" does not account for the origin and
spread of Humming Birds-Each new Variety must be born
Male and Femnale-Possibility of new Births being the means
of introducing new Species-Principle of " Natural Selection "
has no bearing on the " Origin of Species "-" Correlation of
Growth"-Correlation of Growth in the Inorganic worldCorrelation of Growth having reference to Mental PurposesMr. Darwin has not pointed out clearly the distinction between
these two kinds of Correlation-Wonders of Correlation revealed by Disease and Malformation, etc.-Correlation between
the internal Structure of the Teeth in Animals and the Structure of distant portions of their frame-One Force directs the
Form and Structure of every Organism-No conception of any
Force emanating from external things, and moulding the Structture of an Organism in harmony with themselves-Forces of
Organic Growth worked under rules of close Adjustment to external conditions,-Examples of this in Ducks, Gulls, and




X11                         CONTENTS.
PAGE
Divers-More correlated Correlations. —Wing-feathers and
Auricular-feathers in Birds-New Species can be created only
by a Creative Will giving to Organic Forces a foreseen direction-Scientific men, in seeking expression for ultimate ideas
arrived at by physical research, are forced to borrow the language of mechanical invention-Mr. Darwin presenting under
one phase two Ideas radically distinct-" Adherence to Type"
and " Correlation of Growth " not in the nature of Physical
Causes but of Mental Purposes-Correlation of Growth, in the
sense of external adaptations, the most general of Nature's
Laws-The only senses in which we get a glimpse of Creation
by Law-No reason why Inheritance should produce Organisms unlike, or only very partially like, each other-Affinities
and Differences between Man and the Lower Animals-Theory of Creation by Birth clashes with the Theory of " Natural
Selection "-No fictions in Nature, and no bad jokes-Some
essential Resemblances between all forms of Life-The two
Theories of Man's Origin-We see the Purpose, not the Method
-All ultimate Truth beyond the reach of Science-The Reign
of Law —the reign of Creative Force, directed by Creative
Knowledge, worked under the control of Creative Power, and
in fulfilment of Creative Purpose.
CHAPTER VI.
THE REIGN OF LAW  IN THE REALM  OF MIND......... I63-I92
Phenomena of Mind under the Reign of Law-One Force in Nature the Source and Centre of all the rest, and all governed by
Principles of Arrangement purely Mental; we know nothing
directly of the ultimate Seat of Force in any form; the nearest
conception we can have of it is derived from our consciousness
of Vital Power-If these conclusions be true, it need not surprise us to see that Law, in the same Sense, prevails in the
phenomena both of the Material world and of the world of
Mind-The Mind not conscious of its dependence on Material
Organs-No Series of Facts more complete and conclusive
than the chain connecting the functions of the Brain with the
phenomena of Mind-Thought not to be confounded with
Brain-Phrenology mere Confusion of Thought-Physiology
can never be the basis of Psychology-Connection between
Mind and Brain a Law only in the Sense of Law as applied to
"an Observed Order of Facts "-Severe Thinking attended
with expenditure of Force-Difficulties from misconception of
what Matter is and the Forces we call Material-Large class
of phenomena connected with Mind, of which Consciousness




CONTENTS.                          Xiii
PAGE
does not inform us —Men often impelled by Motives they are
unconscious of-How we can detect the action of Forces
which have told upon our Minds-Origin of Ideas; how far
due to Experience or to Intuition-Muscular Contractions of
two kinds-Almost certain that the Mind has automatic faculties and others which work independently by Experience-Intuitive Power of numerical Computation-In discussing the
Origin of Ideas, there is great want of Definition in the use of
terms-An Idea is as it were all organic Growth:-its Materials
from the external world, its Structure from within-Intuition
in the Young of the Lower Animals, when removed from their
Parents-In Birds, which have comparatively no Infancy-Inheritance of Physical and Mental qualities-Orderly progress
of Events in the history of Nations-The aggregate of Motives,
or Forces, which move the Mind, may be called the Laws
which determine Human Action and Opinions-The Lower
Animals moved by fewer Motives than Men, and Savages by
fewer Motives than civilized Men-Difficulty of predicting Conduct proportional to the number and kind of Motives-Secret
of the boundless Difference between Man and the highest Animals below him-Man never free from relations pre-established between the Structure of his Mind and the System of
Things in which it is formed to move-Real Progress on the
question of Necessity and Free Will-Still clearer Definitions
needed-Perfect Knowledge must be perfect fibre-knowledge" Spiritual Antecedents "-Reconcilement of Freedom of Will
with the idea of Causation-Mr. Mill's contradictory positions
as to the Interference of Will-Comte on " Changeable Will "
-Stability of Character inseparably connected with a varialbe
Will-An "Arbitrary " or a " Capricious " Will-To operate
on Hluman Character we must place it under favorable outward
Conditions.
CHAPTER VII.
LAW  IN POLITICS...............................             93- 232
Direct appeals to the Reason, or the Feelings, of men, useless
when those faculties have not been placed under favorable
Conditions —How far these Conditions are Subject to the Control of Will through the Use of Means-The Collective Will
of Society operates on the Conduct of its members in two
Ways —by Authority, and by altering Conditions-True Conception of Natural Law founded on the Progress of Physical
Investigation —Plato's odious Conception of Human SocietyAristotle occasionally and almost unconsciously resorts to true




Xiv                         CONTENTS.
methods of Scientific Reasoning-Why he missed the great
Secret of modern Political Science-Necessity of groping
among little and common things a hard lesson for the Intellect
-Forces in Human Nature so constant that they affect the
great majority of men-How these are to be controlled-The
word " Natural "-Laws founded on a right exercise of Reason
are Natural Laws in the best and highest sense-The most difficult Problem in the Science of Government-Two great recent
Discoveries in this Country in the Science of Government-The
one great Error of Ancient Systems of Political PhilosophyHow opposite the doctrine of modrn. Politicians-Law of Spain,
prohibiting Gold from leaving the country-Essential idea of the
Old Commercial Policy-Of the New-Adam Smith's Denunciation of Laws restricting free Interchange in the Products of Labor and in the free Employment of Labor itself-Connection of
the work of James Watt and Adam Smith-Watt's reduction
to obedience of one of the most tremendous Forces of NatureHow Adam Smith's work Aeas harder than James Watt'sWatt's history a signal illustration of the Follies of Restriction
-Order of Progress in Mankind-Long Ages of comparative
Silence and Inaction brought to an end by shorter Periods of
almost preternatural Activity.-Illustrations-Statute of Apprenticeship in the time of Adam Smith-Spinning and Weaving in I760 —How the Survivance of the Ancient domestic In
dustries became no longer possible-Beginning of the Factory
System-System of Apprenticeship in the earlier Mills —Physical Degeneracy, Mental Ignorance, and Moral Corruption in
the Factories-The fi:-st Factory Act, introduced by the elder
Sir Robert Peel —Abandonment of the Apprenticeship System
— Exhausting and demoralizing Labor in Factories by Children
-The great Parliamentary Debate: How far it is wise or legitimate to interfere for Moral ends with the Freedom of the Individual Will —In what Sense the Children's Labor was "free "
and was " not free "-Arguments, founded on the Constancy of
Natural Laws, against Legislative Interference with the "freedom " of Individual Will-The supporters of Restriction themselves ignorant of the fundamental Principles at issue —The
true doctrine of Necessity exemplified in the Conduct of Em
ployers and Employed-Antagonism  between Natural Law
and Human Law-Results to be attained only by the higher
Faculties of our Nature imposing their Will in authoritative Expressions of Human Law-The Factory Acts the first Legislative Recognition of a great Natural Law-Double Movement
in Legislation since the First Factory Act —Principle on which
the great counter-movemefit depends-Progress in Political
Science nowhere happier than in Factory Legislation-Example how External Conditions and Mental Character canbe af



CONTENTS                            XV
PAGE
fected powerfully by positive Institution-Adjustment in the
Realm of Mind by setting one Motive to counteract anotherHow new Motives may be evoked-The Spirit of Association
-a Force in the Realm of Mind - The Law of CompetitionGood effected by Combination a higher Good than that resulting from Factory Legislation-Combination, an Appeal to the
Law of Contrivance; —the Power of Adjustment-Sources of
Error which pervert the Aims of voluntary Association —History of Combination among the Working Classes until lately a
sad history of Misdirected Effort —Difficulties of our time to
be met by unshaken Faith in great Natural Laws and in the
free Agency of Man to secure by appropriate means the working of those Laws for good-The Law of Inequality not to be
violated with impunity-Substantial economic Advantage secured wherever the I-Iours of Labor are reduced without a cor
responding Reduction in Wages-The very attempt of the
Working Classes to govern through Combination their own
Affairs is. an Education in itself-Nature a great Armory of
Weapons and Implements for the service and use of Will-As
regards the great Science of Politics, men still, as it were, only
at the break of day-We look on the Facts of Nature and
Human Life through the dulled eyes of Custom and Tradi
tional Opinion-Natural Openness and Simplicity of Mind
characteristic of the individual men who have exerted the most
powerful Influence for good on Society-Power of the Agencies which the whole Constitution and Course of things offers
to Knowledge and Contrivance-Instinct on her own narrow
path a surer Guide than Reason-Some Causes no longer in
existence which produced the Overthrow of the great historical
Nations of Antiquity —Memorable Examples, in the last and
present generations, of the Reign of Law over the course of
Political Events-Modern Civilization presents the phenomena
of Development and Growth-The most certain of all the
Laws of Man's Nature-This the Law to which Christianity
appeals-An immense satisfaction to know that the Result of
Logical Analysis but confirms the Testimony of Consciousness,
and runs parallel with the Primaeval Traditions of Belief-O)ur
Freedom a Reality-not a Name —Laws of Nature come visibly from One pervading Mind-Their Purposes best fulfilled
when made the Instruments of intelligent Will and the Servants of enlightened Conscience.
NOTES............................. 233-248
INDEX......................... 249-265




LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
PAGE
The Swift.............................,........faciang  88
Wing of Gannet.......................................     92
Wing of Golden Piover.................  94
Sparrow-Hawk-Merlin-Kestrel Hovering................  96




THE REIGN OF LAW.
CHAPTER  Io
THE SUPERNATURAL.
THE Supernatural-what is it? What do we mean by it?
How do we define it? M. Guizot 4 tells us that belief in it is
the special difficulty of our time-that denial of it is the form
taken by all modern assaults on Christian faith; and again,
that acceptance of it lies at the root, not only of Christianity,
but of all positive religion whatever. These questions, then,
concerning the Supernatural, are questions of first importance.
Yet we find them seldom distinctly put, and still more seldom
distinctly answered. This is a capital error in dealing with
any question of philosophy. Half the perplexities of men are
traceable to obscurity of thought hiding and breeding under
obscurity of language. "The Supernatural" is a term  employed often in different, and sometimes in contradictory, senses.
It is difficult to make out whether M. Guizot himself means to
identify belief in the Supernatural with belief in the existence
of a God, or with belief in a particular mode of Divine action.
But these are ideas quite separable and distinct. There may
be some men who disbelieve in the Supernatural only because
they are absolute atheists; but it is certain that there are
others who have great difficulty in believing in the Supernatural, who are not atheists. What they doubt or deny is, not
that God exists, but that He ever acts, or perhaps can act,
unless in and through what they call the "Laws of Nature."
M. Guizot, indeed, tells us that " God is the Supernatural in a
* "L'Eglise et ra Socikt6 Chretienne en i86i," ch. iv. p. 19.




2                     THE REIaN OF LAW.
Person." But this is a rhetorical figure rather than a defini,
tion. He may, indeed, contend that it is inconsistent to be.
lieve in a God, and yet to disbelieve in the Supernatural; but
he must admit, and indeed does admit, that such inconsistency
is found in fact.
Theological and philosophical writers frequently use the Supernatural as synonymous with the Superhuman. But of course
this is not the sense in which any one can have any difficulty
in believing in it. The powers and works of Nature are all
superhuman —more than Man can account for in their originmore than he can resist in their energy-more than he can understand in their effects.  This, then, cannot be the sense in
which so many minds find it hard to accept the Supernatural;
nor can it be the sense in which others cling to it as of the
very essence of their religious faith. What, then, is that other
sense in which the difficulty arises? Perhaps we shall best find
it by seeking the idea which is competing with it, and by which
it has been displaced. It is the Natural which has been casting out the Supernatural-the idea of Natural Law,-the universal reign of a fixed Order of things.  This idea is a product
of that immense development of the physical sciences which
is characteristic of our time. We cannot read a periodical, or
go into a lecture-room, without hearing it expressed. Sometimes, but rarely, it is stated with accuracy, and with due recognition of the limits within which Law can be said to comprehend the phenomena of the world. But generally it is expressed in language vague and hollow, covering inaccurate
conceptions, and confounding under common forms of expression ideas which are essentially distinct. The mere ticketing
and orderly assortment of external facts is constantly spoken
of as if it were in the nature of Explanation, and as if no higher
truth in respect to natural phenomena were to be attained oi
desired.* And herein we see both the result for which Bacoi.
labored, and the danger against which Bacon prayed. It has
* Those who have followed the course of recent speculation will recognize this
sentence as intended to describe the characteristic principle of the Positive Philosophy.
I am glad to observe that so competent a judge as Mr. George H. Lewes says of it:" Although not, perhaps, the most dignified or explicit statement of the Positive
point of view, this may be accepted as essentially correct."''-Fortnighzly Review.
July, i867.




THE SUPERNATURAL.                      3
been a glorious result of a right method in the study of Nature,
that with the increase of knowledge the "human family has
been endowed with new mercies." But every now and then,
for a time at least, from "the unlocking of the gates of sense,
and the kindling of a greater natural light, incredulity and intellectual night have arisen in our minds."*
But let us observe exactly where and how the difficulty arises.
The Reign of Law in Nature is, indeed, so far as we can observe it, universal.  But the common idea of the Supernatural
is that which is at variance with Natural Law, above it, or in
violation of it. Nothing, however wonderful, which happens
according to Natural Law, would be considered by any one as
Supernatural. The law in obedience to which a wonderful
thing happens may not be known; but this would not give it a
supernatural character, so long as we assuredly believe that it
did happen according to some law. Hence, it would appear to
follow that a man thoroughly possessed of the idea of Natural
Law as universal, never could admit anything to be supernatural; because on seeing any fact, however new, marvellous, or
incomprehensible, he would escape into the conclusion that it
was the result of some natural Law of which he had before
been ignorant. No one will deny that, in respect to the vast
majority of all new and marvellous phenomena, this would be
the true and reasonable conclusion.  It is not the conclusion
of pride, but of humility of mind.  Seeing the boundless extent of our ignorance of the natural laws which regulate so
many of the phenomena around us, and still more of so many
of the phenomena within us, nothing can be more reasonable
than to conclude, when we see something which is to us a wonder, that somehow, if we only knew how, it is "all right"all according to the constitution and course of Nature.  But
then, to justify this conclusion, we must understand Nature
in the largest sense,-as including all that is
"In the round ocean, and the living air
And the blue sky, and in the mind of mnan."
" Tintern Abbey."-WORDSWORTH.
* "This also we humbly beg, that human things may not prejudice such as are
Divine, neither that from the unlocking of the gates of sense, and the kindling of a
greater natural light, anything of incredulity or intellectual night may arise in our
minds towards Divine mysteries."-" The Student's Prayer." Bacon's Works.




4                  THE REIGN OF LAW.
We must understand it as including every agency which we see
entering, or can conceive from analogy as capable of entering,
into the causation of the world. First and foremost among
these is the agency of our own Mind and Will. Yet, strange
to say, all reference to this agency is often tacitly excluded
when we speak of the laws of Nature. One of our most distinguished living teachers of physical science, Prof. Tyndall,
began, not long ago, a course of lectures on the phenomena of
Heat by a rapid statement of the modern doctrine of the Correlation of Forces-how the one was convertible into the other
-how one arose out of the other-how none could be evolved
except from  some other as a pre-existing source. "Thus,"
said the lecturer, "we see there is no such thing as spontaneousness in Nature."  What!-not in the lecturer himself?
Was there no "spontaneousness " in his choice of wordsin his selection of materials-in his orderly arrangement
of experiments with a view to the exhibition of particular
results? It is not probable that the lecturer was intending to
deny this; it simply was that he did not think of it as within
his field of view. His own Mind and Will were then dealing
with the "laws of Nature," but they did not occur to him as
forming part of those laws, or; in the same sense, as subject
to them.
Does RMan, then, not belong to Nature? Is he above it-or
merely separate from it, or a violation of it? Is he supernatural? If so, has he any difficulty in believing in himself? Of
course not.  Self-consciousness is the one truth, in the light of
which all other truths are known.  Cogilo, ergo sum, or volo,
ergo sum —this is the one conclusion which we cannot doubt,
unless Reason disbelieves herself. Why, then, are the faculties of the human mind and body not habitually included
among the " laws of Nature? " Because a fallacy is getting
hold upon us from a want of definition in the use of terms.
"Nature" is being used in the narrow sense of physical nature.
It is conceived as containing nothing beyond the properties of
Matter. Thus the whole mental world in which we ourselves
live, and move, and have our being, is excluded from it. But
these selves of ours do belong to Nature. At all events if we
are ever to understand the difficulties in the way of believing




THE SUPERNATURALa
in the Supernatural, we must first keep clearly in view what we
intend to understand as included, in the Natural. Let us never
forget, then, that the agency of Man is of all others the most
natural-the one with which we are most familiar-the only
one, in fact, which we can be said, even in any measure, to
understand. When any wonderful event can be referred to
the contrivance or ingenuity of Man, it is thereby at once removed from the sphere of the Supernatural, as ordinarily understood.It must be remembered, however, that we are now only
seeking a clear definition of terms, and that provided this
other meaning be clearly agreed upon, the AMind and Will of
Man may be considered as separate from "'nature," and be
longing to the Supernaturalo This view is taken in an able
treatise on " Nature and the Supernatural," by Dr. Bushnell,
an American clergyman.* Dr. Bushnell says:-" That is supernatural, whatever it be, that is either not in the chain of
natural cause and effect, or which acts on the chain of cause
and effect in nature, from without the chain,"  Again:-"'II
the processes, combinations, and results of our system of
nature are interrupted or varied by the action, whether of God,
or angels, or meer, so as to bring to pass what would not come
to pass in it by its own internal action, under the laws of mere
cause and effect, such variations are in like manner supernatural."  There is no other objection to this definition of the
Supernatural, than that it rests upon a limitation of the terms
"Nature " and " natural," which is very much at variance with
the sense in which they are commonly understood. There is,
indeed, a distinction which finds its expression in common language between the works of Man and the works of Nature. A
honeycomb, for example, would be called a work of Nature,
but a stenm-engine would not, This distinction is founded on
a true perception of the fact that the Mind and Will of Man
belong to an order of existence very different from physical
laws, and very different also from the fixed and narrow instincts of the lower animalso It is a distinction bearing witness to the universal consciousness that the Mind of Man has
*' Nature and the Supernatural, as together constituting the one System of God,"
By Horace Bushnell, D.D, Edinburgh, I86o,,




6                  THE REIGN OF LAW.
within it something of a truly creative energy and force-that
we are in a sense "' fellow-workers with God," and have been
in a measure "6 made partakers of the Divine nature." Nevertheless, it would be using the word in a sense very different
from that in which it is generally accepted, were we to call the
steam-engine a supernatural work. Yet it does answer strictly
to the definition of Dr. Bushnell in being "6 the result of natural
Law varied by the action of men." It is made by'" acting on
the chain of cause and effect in nature from without the chain."
But then, be it observed, that under the same definition all the
contrivances of Nature become Supernatural the moment they
are conceived as the work of a Mind using what we call the
elements of nature for the accomplishment of its designs. If,
for example, it is open to us to conceive that such a creature
as a Bee cannot have been made out of those elements "by
their own internal action," then we must regard both this
creature and the wonderful products of its instinct as belonging to the Supernatural. The honeycomb and the steamengine would thus come under the same category-with this
only difference, that the mind which made the steam-engine,
being connected with a Body, is visibly known to us, whereas
the Mind which made the Bee is withdrawn from sight. But
both can be equally regarded as the result of Mind'" acting on
the chain of cause and effect from without the chain," Nor
can we stop here. The same process of analysis will carry us
farther in the same direction. We often speak, as Dro Bushnell does here, of the elementary forces of Nature as " acting"
by themselves. But there is no other meaning in these words
than an expression of the fact that we neither see nor understand the connection of those elementary forces and Mind.
But this ignorance of ours affords no manner of presumption
that such connection does not exist. On the contrary, though
the manner of that connection be unknown, it is much more
conceivable to us that some connection does exist than that it
does not. If therefore the distinction between the Natural
and the Supernatural be the distinction between that which is
and that which is not the work of Mind, then it becomes a
purely arbitrary distinction.  It assumes that we can distinguish between cases in which the properties of matter work




THE SUPERNATURAL,                  7
under the direction of Mind, and other cases in which they
work "of themselves."  But this is a line which we draw for
ourselves. There is no reason to suppose that it has any
reality in the constitution of things. It is not in those things,
but in the point of view from which we regard them, that the
distinction lies. We have only to change that point of view,
and the distinction vanishes. All Nature becomes Supernatural, because all her elements, both in themselves and in
their combinations, are only conceivable as first established,
and then employed by the powers of Mind.
But if this definition of the Supernatural displeases us, as
tending to confound distinctions which we had thought were
clear, let us take another definition. Let us take the Natural
in that larger and wider sense, in which it contains within it
the whole phenomena of Man's intellectual and spiritual nature, as part, and the most familiar of all parts of the visible
system of things. This is a definition more consonant with common language. In all ordinary senses of the term, Man and his
doings belong to the Natural, as distinguished from the Supernatural.
We are now from another point of view coming nearer to
some precise understanding of what the Supernatural may be
supposed to mean. But before we proceed, there is another
question which must be answered-What is the relation in which
the agency of Man stands to the physical laws of Nature? The
answer, in part at least, is plain. His power in respect to
those laws extends only, first to their discovery and ascertainment, and then to their use. He can establish none: he can
suspend none. All he can do is to guide, in a limited degree,
the mutual action and reaction of the laws amongst each other.
They are the tools with which he works-they are the instruments of his Will. In all he does or can do he must employ
them. His ability to use them is limited both by his want of
knowledge and by his want of power. The more he knows of
them, the more largely he can employ them, and make them
ministers of his purposes. This, as a general rule, is true; but
it is subject to the second limitation just pointed out. Our
power over Nature does not necessarily keep pace with our
knowledge of her Laws. Man already knows far more than he




8                  THE REIGN OF LAW.
has power to convert to use. It is a true observation of Sir
George Lewis,* that Astronomy, for example, in its higher
branches, has an interest almost purely scientific. It reveals
to our knowledge perhaps the grandest and most sublime of
the physical laws of Nature. But a much smaller amount
of knowledge would suffice for the only practical applications
which we have yet been able to make of these laws to our own
use. Still, that knowledge has a reflex influence on our knowledge of ourselves, of our powers, and of the relations which
subsist between the constitution of our own minds and the constitution of the universe. And in other spheres of inquiry, advancing knowledge of physical laws has been constantly accompanied with advancing power over the physical world. It has
enabled us to do a thousand things, any one of which, a few
generations ago, would have been considered supernatural.
Nor can it be said that this judgment of their character would
have been erroneous. These things would have been superhuman then, though they are not superhuman now. The same
lecturer who told his audience that there was nothing spontaneous in Nature proceeded, by virtue of his own knowledge of
natural laws, and by his selecting and combining power, to present a whole series of phenomena-such as ice frozen in contact
with red-hot crucibles-which certainly did not belong to the
"ordinary course of Nature."  Such an exhibition a few centuries ago would, beyond all doubt, have subjected the lecturer
on Heat to painful experience of that condition of matter.
Nevertheless the phenomena so exhibited were natural phenomena-in this sense, that they were the product of natural laws.
Only these laws were combined in action under extraordinary
conditions, and these conditions were governed by the purpose
and design of the lecturer, which design was " spontaneous,"
if there is any meaning in the word. In like manner, if the
progress of discovery is as rapid during the next four hundred
years as it has been during the last period of the same extent,
men will be able to do many things which would now appear
to be "supernatural." There is no difficulty in conceiving how
a complete knowledge of all natural laws would give, if not
complete power, at least degrees of power, immensely greater
* " Astronomy of the Ancients," p. 254.




THE SUPERNATURAL.                  9
than those which we now possess. Power of this kind, then,
however great in degree, clearly does not answer that idea of
the Supernatural which so many reject as inconceivable. What,
then, is that idea?  Have we not traced it to its den at last?
By 4' supernatural " power, do we not mean power independent
of the use of means, as distinguished from power depending
on knowledge-even infinite knowledge-of the means proper
to be employed?
This is the sense-probably the only sense-in which the
Supernatural is, to many minds, so difficult of belief. No man
can have any difficulty in believing that there are natural laws
of which he is ignorant; nor in conceiving that there may be
Beings who do know them, and can use them, even as he himself now uses the few laws with which he is acquainted. The
real difficulty lies in the idea of Will exercised without the use
of means-not in the idea of Will exercised through means
which are beyond our knowledge, or beyond our reach.
Now, have we any right to say that belief in 7i;is is essential
to all Religion? If we have not, then, it is only putting, as so
many other hasty sayings do put, additional difficulties in the
way of Religion. The relation in which God stands to those
rules of His government which are called "laws,," is, of course,
an inscrutable mystery to us. But the very idea of a Creator
involves the idea not merely of a Being by whom the properties of Matter are employed, but of a Being from whose Will
the properties of Matter are derived. This, indeed, is the
proper work of Creation, as nearly as we can form a conception of it. It is true that in forming this conception we pass
beyond the bounds of our own experience, because "we pass
from that in God of which there is an image in Man, to that
which is distinctive of God as God." But this we must do in
forming any idea of a God at all. We must conceive the Creator as first giving existence to the means, and then using them
for the accomplishment of ends. "We cannot conceive of the
original relation of this Universe to God as that of an infinite
multitude of laws to an infinite Mind, having (only) perfect
knowledge of them, and using this knowledge in turning them
to account, in accomplishing designs of infinite wisdom. We
cannot conceive of infinite nwisdom thus, as it were, finding inr




I o                     THE REIGN OF LAW.
finite resources already existing." *  All this is true.  But those
who believe that God's Will does govern the world, must believe that ordinarily, at least, He does govern it by the choice
and use of means,-which means were again pre-established by
Himself. Nor have we any certain reason to believe that He
ever acts otherwise.  Extraordinary manifestations of His Will
-signs and wonders-may be wrought, for aught we know, by
similar instrumentality-only by the selection and use of laws
of which Man knows and can know nothing, and which, if he
did know, he could not employ.t
Here, then, we come upon the question of miracles-how  we
understand them?  what we would define them  to be?   The
common idea of a miracle is, a suspension or violation of the laws
of Nature.  This is a definition which places the essence of a
miracle in  a  particular method  of operation.   But there is
another definition which passes over the question of method
altogether, and dwells only on the agency by which, and the
iurpose for which, a wonderful work is wrought. " We would
confine the word miracle," says Dr. M'Cosh,4 "to those events
which were wrought in our world as a sign or proof of God
making a supernatural interposition, or a revelation to Man."
The two most essential conditions in this view of a miracle, are
that it is a work wrought by a Divine power for a Divine purpose,
and is of a nature such as could not be wrought by merely
human contrivance. This definition of a miracle does not necessarily exclude the idea of God working by the use of means, provided they are such means as are out of human reach. Indeed,
* I am glad to be able to quote these passages from one of my earliest and most
valued friends, the Rev. J. McLeod Campbell. They occur in an Introduction to a
new edition of his work on the " Nature of the Atonement " (Macmillan and Co., i867)
-an Introduction marked by characteristic depth of thought and feeling.
t This chapter, originally published as an article in the Ediznburg Review for Oct.
i862, has been referred to in the remarkable work of Mr. Lecky on " The Rise and
Influence of Rationalism in Europe" (vol. i. ch. ii. p. 195 note), as conveying " a notion of a miracle which would not differ genericallZZy from a human act, though it
would still be strictly available for evidential purposes." I am quite satisfied with
this definition of the result. Beyond the immediate purposes of benevolence, which
were served by almost all the miracles of the New Testament, the only other purpose
which is ever assigned to them is an " evidential purpose "-that is, a purpose that
they might serve as signs of the presence of superhuman knowledge, and of the work-ng of superhuman power. They were performed-in short-to assist faith, and not
o confound reason.
t" The Supernatural in Relation to the Natural." By the Rev. James M'Cosh, LL.D,
Macmillan, Cambridge, i86i.




THE SUPERNATURAL.                     II
in an important note (p. I49), Dr. M'Cosh explains that miracles
are not to be considered " as against Nature " in any other sense
than that in which " one natural agent may be against another
-as water may counteract fire." This eminent writer has approached the subject by the right method, because he has addressed himself first to the solution of the one question which
is an essential preliminary to all subsequent discussion:-" How
much is contained in the Natural? " Not until this question is
answered, can the Supernatural be defined.  Yet the answer
given by Dr. M'Cosh shows the inherent and the insuperable
difficulty which attends the giving of any answer at all. " In
this world," he says, " there is a set of objects and agencies
which constitute a system or Cosmos which may have relations
to regions beyond, but is all the wheile a self-contained sphere,
with a space around it-an Island so far separated from  other
lands.  This system we call Nature " (p. ioI).  This definition
of the Natural is perhaps as accurate and as full as any that can
be given. It assumes, however, that the boundaries of the
Natural are known. But the essential difficulty of separating
between the Natural and the Supernatural is this-that the
boundaries of the Natural are not known-that we cannot trace
the shores of this "island "-that even if we could see any
distinct separation between them and the space around them,
we have not explored the " island" itself completely, and therefore we cannot say of any agency working therein, that it comes
from beyond the Sea.  Mr. Mansel, in his " Essay on Miracles,"
adopts the word " superhuman " as the most accurate expression
of his meaning.  He says, " A superhuman authority needs to
be substantiated by superhuman evidence; and what is siterhzuman is miraculous." *  It is important to observe that this
definition does not necessarily involve the idea of a " violation
of the laws of Nature." It does not involve the idea of the
exercise of Will apart from the use of means. It does not
imply any exception to the great law of causation. It does not
involve, therefore, that idea which appears to many so difficult
of conception.  It simply supposes, without any attempt to
* " Aids to Faith," p. 35. In another passage (p. 2I), Mr. Mansel says, that in respect to the great majorityof the miracles recorded in Scripture, " the supernatural
element appears... in the exercise of a personal power transcending the limits of
man's will. They are not so much suier;naterina as svcr/?tzlasn,"




12                   THE REIGN OF LAW.
fathom the relation in which God stands to His own " laws,"
that out of His infinite knowledge of these laws, or of His
infinite power of making them the instruments of His Will, He
may and He does use them for extraordinary indications of His
presence.*
The reluctance to admit, as belonging to the domain of
Nature, any special exertion of Divine power for special purposes, stands really in very close relationship to the converse notion, that where the operation of natural causes can be clearly
traced, there the exertion of Divine power and Will is rendered
less certain and less convincing. This is the idea which lies
at the root of Gibbon's famous chapters on the spread of
Christianity. He labors to prove that it was due to natural
causes. In proving this, he evidently thinks he is disposing of
the notion that Christianity spread by Divine power; whereas
he only succeeds in pointing out some of the means which were
employed to effect a Divine purpose. In like manner, the
preservation of the Jews as a distinct People during so many
centuries of complete dispersion, is a fact standing nearly, if not
absolutely, alone in the history of the world. It is at variance
with all other experience of the laws which govern the
amalgamation with each other of different families of the human
race. The case of the Gypsies has been referred to as somewhat
parallel. But the facts of this case are doubtful and obscure,
and such of them as we know involve conditions altogether dissimilar in kind. It is not surprising, therefore, that the preservation of the Jews, partly from the relation in which it stands
to the apparent fulfilment of Prophecy, and partly from the extraordinary nature of the fact itself, is tacitly assumed by many
persons to come strictly within the category of miraculous events.
Yet in itself it is nothing more than a striking illustration how
a departure from the " ordinary course of nature " may be effected through the instrumentality of means which are natural
and comprehensible.   An extraordinary resisting power has
* I agree with Mr. J. M. Campbell when he says, in the Introduction already quoted,
"It appears to me that we do not know enough to say, as regards anything transcending our knowledge of Law, in which way we should view it-whether as belonging to
the system of Law, but to a region of it out of our sight, or as outside of that
system, and as having the same immediate relation to God which the system of Law
ultimately has. " —P. xxxv.




THE SUPERNATURAL.                   T3
been given to the Jewish People against those dissolving and
disintegrating forces which have caused the disappearance of
every other race placed under similar conditions. They have
been torn from home and country, and removed, not in a body,
but in scattered fragments, over the world. Yet they are as
distinct from every other people now as they were in the days of
Solomon. Nevertheless this resisting power, wonderful though
it be, is the result of special laws, overruling those in ordinary
operation. It has been effected by the use of means. Those
means have been superhuman —they have been beyond human
contrivance and arrangement. But they belong to the region
of the Natural. They belong to it not the less, but all the
more, because in their concatenation and arrangement they
seem to indicate the purpose of a living Will seeking and ef.
fecting the fulfilment of its designs. This is the manner after
which our own living wills in their little sphere effect their
little objects. Is it difficult to believe that after the same manner also the Divine Will, of which ours is the image only, works
and effects its purposes?
Our own experience shows that the universal Reign of Law
is perfectly consistent with a power of making those laws subservient to design-even when the knowledge of them is but
slight, and the power over them  slighter still.  How much
more easy, how much more natural, to conceive that the same
universality is compatible with the exercise of that Supreme X11
before which all are known, and to which all are servants!
What difficulty in this view remains in the idea of the Supernatural? Is it any other than the difficulty in believing in the
existence of a Supreme Will-in a living God? If this be the
belief of which M. Guizot speaks when he says that it is essential to religion, then his proposition is unquestionably true. In
this sense the difficuity of believing in the Supernatural, and
the difficulty of believing in pure Theism, is one and the same.
But if he means that it is necessary to religion to believe in
even the occasional "violation of law,"-if he means that without such belief, signs and wonders cease to be evidences of
Divine power,-then he announces a proposition which cannot
be sustained. There is nothing in Religion incompatible with
the belief that all exercises of God's power, whether ordinary




f14                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
or extraordinary, are effected through the instrumentality of
means-that is to say, by the instrumentality of natural laws
brought out, as it were, and used for a Divine purpose. To
believe in the existence of miracles, we must indeed believe
in the Superhuman and in the Supermaterial. But both these
are familiar facts in Nature. We must believe also in a Supreme
Will and a Supreme Intelligence; but this our own Will and
our own Intelligence not only enable us to conceive of, but
compel us to recognize in the whole laws and economy of Nature.  Her whole aspect "answers intelligently to our intelligence-mind responding to mind as in a glass." * Once admit
that there is a Being who-irrespective of any theory as
to the relation in which the laws of Nature stand to His Willhas at least an infinite knowledge of those laws, and an infinite
power of putting them to use-then miracles lose every element
of inconceivability.  In respect to the greatest and highest
of all-that restoration of the breath of life which is not more
mysterious than its original gift-there is no answer to the question which Paul asks, " Why should it be thought a thing incredible by you that God should raise the dead?"
This view of miracles is well expressed by Principal Tulloch:
"The stoutest advocate of interference can mean nothing
more than that the Supreme Will has so moved the hidden
springs of nature that a new issue arises on given circumstances.
The ordinary issue is supplanted by a higher issue. The essential facts before us are a certain set of phenomena, and a
Higher Will moving them. How moving them? is a question
for human definition; but the answer to which does not and
cannot affect the Divine meaning of the change. Yet when
we reflect that this Higher Will is everywhere reason and wisdom, it seems a juster as well as a more comprehensive view to
regard it as operating by subordination and evolution rather
than by'interference' or'violation.' According to this view,
the idea of Law is so far from being contravened by the Christian miracles, that it is taken up by them and made their very
* " Beginning Life: Chapters for Young Men on Religion, Study, and Business,
Chap. iii., T'l'e,;upernatural " By John Tulloch, D.D., Principal of St. Mary's College.
St, Andrew's. Edinburgh, x86o. P. 29.




THE SUPERNATURAL.                   i 5
basis. They are the expression of a Higher Law, working out
its wise ends among the lower and ordinary sequences of life
and history.  These ordinary sequences represent naturenature, however, not as an immutable fate, but a plastic medium through which a Higher Voice and Will are ever addressing
us, and which, therefore, may be wrought into new issues when
the Voice has a new message, and the Will a special purpose
for us." *
It is well worthy of remark, that Locke, who laid great stress
on the Christian miracles, as attesting the authority of those
who wrought them, declines, nevertheless, to adopt the common
definition of that in which miraculous agency consists. "A
miracle then," he says,t " I take to be a sensible operation,
which, being above the comprehension of the spectator and, in
his opinion, contrary to the established course of nature, is
taken by him to be Divine."  And in reply to the objection, that
this makes a miracle depend on the opinions or knowledge of
the spectator, he points out that this objection cannot be avoided
by any of the definitions commonly adopted; because " it being agreed that a miracle must be that which surpasses the
force of nature in the established steady laws of cause and
effect, nothing can be taken to be a miracle but what is jdged
to exceed those laws. Now every one being able to judge of
those laws only by his own? accqfai//tan/ce Wit/h natzre, and his own
notions of its force, which are different in different men, it is
unavoidable that that should be a miracle to one man which is
not so to another." In this passage Locke recognizes the great
truth, that we can never know what is above Nature unless we
know all that is within Nature. But he misses another truth,
quite as important,-that a miracle would still be a miracle
even though we did know the laws through which it was accomplished, provided those laws, though not beyond human knowledge, were beyond human control. We might know the conditions necessary to the performance of a miracle, although
utterly unable to bring those conditions about. Yet a work'
performed by the bringing about of conditions which are out of
~ " Beginning Life,"' etc., pp. 85, 86. By John Tulloch, D.D.
t'" A Discourse on Miracles.




i[6                THE REIGN OF LAW.
human reach, would certainly be a work attesting superhuman
power.
Nevertheless so deeply ingrained in popular theology is the
idea that miracles, to be miracles at all, must be performed by
some violation or suspension of the laws of Nature, that the
opposite idea of miracles being performed by the use of means
is regarded by many with jealousy and suspicion. Strange that
it should be thought the safest course to separate as sharply
and as widely as we can between what we are called upon to
believe in Religion, and what we are able to trace or understand in Nature! With what heart can those who cherish this
frame of mind follow the great argument of Butler? All the
steps of that argument-the greatest in the whole range of
Christian philosophy-are founded on the opposite belief, that
all the truths, and not less all the difficulties of Religion, have
their type and likeness in the " constitution and course of Nature." As we follow that reasoning, so simple and so profound,
we find our eyes ever opening to some new interpretation of
familiar facts, and recognizing among the curious things of
earth, one after another of the laws which, when told us of the
spiritual world, seem so perplexing and so hard to accept or
understand. To ask how much further this argument of the
"Analogy" is capable of illustration and development, is to
ask how much more we shall know of Nature. Like all central
truths, its ramifications are infinite-as infinite as the appearance of variety, and as pervading as the sense of oneness in the
universe of God.
But what of Revelation? Are its history and doctrines incompatible with the belief that God uniformly acts through the
use of means? The narrative of Creation is given to us in abstract only, and is told in two different forms, both having apparently for their main, perhaps their exclusive object, the
presenting to our conception the personal agency of a living
God. Yet this narrative indicates, however slightly, that room
is left for the idea of a material process.  " Out of the dust of
the ground; " that is, out of the ordinary elements of Nature,
was that Body formed which is still upheld and perpetuated by
organic forces acting under the rules of Law. Nothing which
Science has discovered, or can discover, is capable of traversing




THE SUPERNATURAL.                  17
that simple narrative. On this subject M. Guizot lays great
stress, as many others do, on what he calls the Supernatural in
Creation, as distinguished from the operations now visible in
Nature. "De quelle faton et par quelle puissance le genre humain a-t-il commence sur la terre?"  In reply to this question,
he proceeds to argue that Man must have been the result either
of mere material forces, or of a supernatural power exterior to,
and superior to Matter. Spontaneous generation, he argues,
supposing it to exist at all, can give birth only to infant beings
-to the first hours, and feeblest forms of nascent life. But
Man-the human pair-must evidently have been complete
from the first; created in the full possession of their powers and
faculties. "C'est a cette condition seulement qu'en apparaissant pour la premiere fois sur la terre l'homme aurait pu y
vivre-s'y perpetuer, et y fonder le genre humain.  Evidemment l'autre origine du genre humain est seul admissible, seul
possible.  Le fait surnaturel de la creation explique seul la
premiere apparition de l'homme ici-bas."
This is a common but not a very safe argument. If the Supernatural-that is to say, the Superhuman and the Supermaterial-cannot be found nearer to us than this, it will not be
securely found at all. It is very difficult to free ourselves from
this notion that by going far enough back, we can "find out
God " in some sense in which we cannot find Him now. The
certainty not merely of one, but of many successive Creations
in the history of our Planet, and especially of a time comparatively recent, when Man did not exist, is indeed an effectual
answer to the notion, if it be now ever entertained, of "all
things having continued as they are since the Beginning." But
those who believe that the existing processes of Nature can be
accounted for by " Law," may believe that those processes were
also commenced by the same vague and mysterious agency. To
accept the primeval narrative of the Jewish Scriptures as coming from authority, and as bringing before us the personal agency
of the Creator, but without purporting to reveal the method of
His work,-this is one thing. To argue that no other origin
for the first parents of the human race is conceivable than that
they were moulded perfect, without the instrumentality of any
means,-this is quite another thing. The various hypotheses of




18                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
Development, of which Darwin's theory is only a new and
special version, whether they are probable or not, are at least
advanced as affording a possible escape from the puzzle which
M. Guizot puts. These hypotheses are indeed destitute of proof;
and in the form which they have as yet assumed, it may justly
be said that they involve such violations of, or departures from,
all that we know of the existing order of things, as to deprive
them of all scientific basis. But the close and mysterious relations between the mere animal frame of Man, and that of the
lower animals, does render the idea of a common relationship
by descent at least conceivable. Indeed, in proportion as it
seems to approach nearer to prozesses of which we have some
knowledge, it is, in a degree, more conceivable than Creation
without any process, -of which we have no knowledge and can
have no conception.
But whatever may have been the method or process of Creation, it is Creation still. If it were proved to-morrow that the
first man was "born" from some pre-existing Form of Life, it
would still be true that such a birth must have been, in every
sense of the word, a new Creation. It would still be as true that
God formed him " out of the dust of the earth," as it is true that
He has so formed every child who is now called to answer the first
question of all theologies. And we must remember that the
language of Scripture nowhere draws, or seems even conscious
of, the distinction which modern philosophy draws so sharply
between the Natural and the Supernatural. All the operations
of Nature are spoken of as operations of the Divine Mind.
Creation is the outward embodiment of a Divine idea. It is in
this sense, apparently, that the narrative of Genesis speaks of
every plant being formed "before it grew."  But the same
language is held, not less decidedly, of every ordinary birth.
"Thine eyes did see my substance, yet being imperfect. In
Thy book all my members were written, which in continuance
were fashioned, when as yet there were none of them." And
these words, spoken of the individual birth, have been applied
not less truly to the modern idea of the Genesis of all Organic
Life. Whatever may have been the physical or material relation between its successive forms, the ideal relation has been
now clearly recognized, and reduced to scientific definition.




THE SUPERNAT URAL.                 19
All the members of that frame which has received its highest interpretation in Man, had existed, with lower offices assigned to
them, in the animals which flourished before Man was born. All
theories of Development have been simply attempts to suggest
the manner in which, or the physical process by means of which
this ideal continuity of type and pattern has been preserved.
But whilst all these suggestions have been in the highest degree
uncertain, some of them violently absurd, the one thing which
is certain is the fact for which they endeavor to account.
And what is that fact? It is one which belongs to the world of
Mind, not to the world of Matter. When Professor Owen tells
us, for example, that certain jointed bones in the Whale's paddle are the same bones which in the Mole enable it to burrow,
which in the Bat enable it to fly, and in Man constitute his hand
with all its wealth of functions, he does not mean that physically
and actually they are the same bones, nor that they have the
same uses, nor that they ever have been, or ever can be, transferable from one kind of animal to another. He means that in a
purely ideal or mental conception of the plan of all Vertebrate
skeletons, these bones occupy the same relative place-relative,
that is, not to origin or use, but to the Plan or conception of
that skeleton as a whole.
Here the Supermaterial, and in this sense the Supernatural,
element,-that is to say, the ideal conformity and unity of conception, is the one unquestionable fact, in which we recognize
directly the working of a Mind with which our own has very
near relations. Here, as elsewhere, we see the Natural, in the
largest sense, including and embodying the Supernatural; the
Material, including the Supermaterial. No possible theory,
whether true or false, in respect to the physical means employed to preserve the correspondence of parts which runs
through all Creation, can affect the certainty of that mental
plan and purpose which alone makes such correspondence intelligible to us, and in which alone it may be said to exist.
It must always be remembered that the two ideas,-that of
a Phy.sical Cause and that of a Mental Purpose, —are not
antagonistic; only the one is larger and more comprehensive
than the other. Let us take a case. In many animal frames
there are what have been called "silent members " —members




20                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
which have no reference to the life or use of the animal, but only
to the general pattern on which all vertebrate skeletons have
been formed. Mr. Darwin, when he sees such a member in
any animal, concludes with certainty that this animal is the
lineal decendant by ordinary generation of some other animal
in which that member was not silent but turned to use. Professor Owen, taking a larger and wider view, would say, without pretending to explain how its presence is to be accounted
for physically, that the silent member has relation to a general
purpose or plan which can be traced from the dawn of Life, but
which did not receive its full accomplishment until Man was
born. This is certain: the other is a theory. The assumed
physical cause may be true or false. But in any case the mental purpose and design-the conformity to an abstract idea —
this is certain. The relation in which created Forms stand to
our own mind and to our understanding of their Purpose, is
the one thing which we can surely know, because it belongs to
our own consciousness. It is entirely independent of any belief we may entertain, or any knowledge we may acquire, of
the processes employed for the fulfilment of that Purpose.
And yet scientific men sometimes tell us that " we must be
fery cautious how we ascribe intention to nature. Things do fit
into each other, no doubt, as if they were designed; but all we
know about them is that these correspondences exist, and that
they seem to be the result of physical laws of development and
growth." Very likely; but how these correspondences have
arisen, and are daily arising, is not the question, and it is immaterial how that question may be answered. Do those correspondences exist, or do they not? The perception of them
by our mind is as much a fact as the sight or touch of the
things in which they appear. They may have been produced
by growth-they may have been the result of a process of development,-but it is not the less the development of a mental purpose. It is the end subserved that we absolutely know.
What alone is doubtful and obscure is precisely that which we
ire told is the only legitimate object of our research,-viz.,
the means by which that end has been attained. Take one
instance out of millions. The poison of a deadly snake-let
us for a moment consider what this is. It is a secretion of




THE SUPERNATURAL.                   2 I
definite chemical properties which have reference, not onlynot even mainly —to the organism of the animal in which it is
developed, but specially to the organism of another animal
which it is intended to destroy. Some naturalists have a
vague sort of notion that, as regards merely mechanical weapons, or organs of attack, they may be developed by use,-that
legs may become longer by fast running, teeth sharper and
longer by much biting. Be it so: this law of growth, if it exist,
is but itself an instrument whereby purpose is fulfilled. But
how will this law of growth adjust a poison in one animal with
such subtle knowledge of the organization of another that the
deadly virus shall in a few minutes curdle the blood, benumb
the nerves, and rush in upon the citadel of life? There is but
one explanation-a Mind, having minute and perfect knowledge of the structure of both, has designed the one to be capable of inflicting death upon the other. This mental purpose
arid resolve is the one thing which our intelligence perceives with
direct and intuitive recognition. The method of creation, by
means of which this purpose has been carried into effect, is
utterly unknown.
It is no answer or objection to this view that poisons exist
also in plants and minerals where no similar adjustment to
function is perceived.*  Even in these cases there are wonderful relations between our own human frame and many poisons
of the mineral and vegetable world which render them invaluable agents in the mitigation of suffering and the prevention
or removal of disease. It is impossible to believe that these
complicated relations of action and reaction between things
separated apparently from each other by the whole width of
being, have been the result of forces with which Mind and
Prevision have had no concern. But even if the use Df such
poisons were absolutely unknown-even if that use lay, which
it does not, beyond the possibility of our conception, —this
would not deduct by the value of a fraction from the certainty
of a conclusion which is founded on different conditions. The
relations of adjustment between a given number of elements
* "To what intention are we to ascribe the poisons liberally distributed through
plants and minerals? " asks Mr. G. H. Lewes in his review of this work.-Fortnighty lReviewv, July I867, p. 0oo.




22                  TIHE REIGN OF LAW.
are none the less a certain fact because similar elements may
be found elsewhere without any such adjustment being visible
to us,  It is the very fact of their not being separate but combined in the one case which justifies and compels a conclusion
different from that which arises in the other case. This is the
law of evidence on which we act and judge in other matters
with conviction which is both intuitive and capable of being
confirmed by the rules of reason. And this reply is applicable
to all objections of the same kind. Those portions of the system of Nature which are wholly dark to us do not necessarily
cast any shadow on those other portions of that system which
are luminous with inherent light. Rather the other way. The
shining tracts which thus reflect the light of Reason and of
Mind send abundant rays into all the dark places round them.
The new discoveries which Science is ever making of adjustments and combinations, of which we had no previous conceptfon, impress us with an irresistible conviction that the same
relations to Mind prevail throughout. It matters not in what
department of investigation inquiry is conducted, it matters not
what may be the Philosophy or Theology of the inquirer.
Every step he takes he finds himself face to face with facts
which he cannot describe intelligibly either to himself or
others, except by referring them to that function and power of
Mind which we know as Purpose and Design.
Perhaps no illustration more striking of this principle was
ever presented than in the curious volume published by Mr.
Darwin on the'"Fertilization of Orchids." * It appears that
the fertilization of almost all Orchids is dependent on the transport of the pollen from one flower to another by means of insects.  It appears, further, that the structure of these flowers
is elaborately contrived, so as to secure the certainty and effectiveness of this operation.  Mr. Darwin's work is devoted to
tracing in detail what these contrivances are. To a large extent they are purely mechanical, and can be traced with as
much clearness and certainty as the different parts of which a
steam-engine is composed.  The complication and ingenuity of
these contrivances almost exceed belief.  " Moth-traps and
* " On the Various Contrivances by which British and Foreign Orchids are Fertilized by Insects." By Charles Darwin, F.R,S, London, i862,




THE SUPERNATURAL.                   23
spring-guns set on these grounds," might be the motto of the
Orchids. There are baits to tempt the nectar-loving Lepidoptera, with rich odors exhaled at night, and lustrous colors to
shine by day; there are channels of approach along which they
are surely guided, so as to compel them to pass by certain
spots; there are adhesive plasters nicely adjusted to fit their probosces, or to catch their brows; there are hair triggers carefully
set in their necessary path, communicating with explosive shells,
which project the pollen-stalks with unerring aim upon their
bodies. There are, in short, an infinitude of adjustments, for
an idea of which I must refer my readers to Mr. Darwin's in.
imitable powers of observation and description-adjustments
all contrived so as to secure the accurate conveyance of the
pollen of the one flower to its precise destination in the structire of another.
Now there are two questions which present themselves when
yve examine such a mechanism as this. The first is, What is
-he use of the various parts, or their relation to each other with
reference to the purpose of the whole? The second question
is, How were those parts made, and out of what materials? It
is the first of these questions-that is to say, the use, object,
intention, or purpose of the different parts of the plant-which
Darwin sets himself instinctively to answer first; and it is this
which he does answer with precision and success. The second
question,-that is to say, how those parts came to be developed
and out of what " primordial elements " they have been derived
in their present shapes, and converted to their present usesthis is a question which Darwin does also attempt to solve, but
the solution of which is in the highest degree difficult and uncertain. It is curious to observe the language which this mos'
advanced disciple of pure naturalism instinctively uses whe.he has to describe the complicated structure of this curious
order of plants.  "Caution in ascribing intentions to nature,"
does not seem to occur to him as possible. Intention is the
one thing which he does see, and which, when he does not see,
he seeks for diligently until he finds it. He exhausts every
form of words and of illustration by which intention or mental
purpose can be described.  "Contrivance "-" curious contrivalce "-'" beautiful contrivance,"-these are expressions which




24                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
recur over and over again. Here is one sentence describing
the parts of a particular species: "The Labellum is developed
into a long nectary, in order to attract Lepidoptera, and we
shall presently give reasons for suspecting that the nectar is
purposely so lodged that it can be sucked only slowly, in order
to give time for the curious chemical quality of the viscid matter
setting hard and dry." * Nor are these words used in any sense
different from that in which they are applicable to the works
of Man's contrivance-to the instruments we use or invent for
carrying into effect our own preconceived designs. On the
contrary, human instruments are often selected as the aptest
illustrations both of the object in view, and of the means taken
to effect it. Of one particular structure, Mr. Darwin says:
"This contrivance of the guiding ridges may be compared to
the little instrument sometimes used for guiding a thread into
the eye of a needle." Again, referring to the precautions taken
to compel the insects to come to the proper spot, in order to
have the " pollinia " attached to their bodies, Mr. Darwin says:
"Thus we have the rostellum  partially closing the mouth of
the nectary, like a trap placed in a run for game,-and the trap
so complex and perfect!" t But this is not all. The idea of
special use, as the controlling principle of construction, is so
impressed on Mr. Darnwin's mind, that, in every detail of structure, however singular or obscure, he has absolute faith that
in this lies the ultimate explanation. If an organ is largely
developed, it is because some special purpose is to be fulfilled.
If it is aborted or rudimentary, it is because that purpose is no
longer to be subserved. In the case of another species whose
structure is very singular, Mr. Darwin had great difficulty in
discovering how the mechanism was meant to work, so as to
effect the purpose. At last he made it out, and of the clue
which led to the discovery he says: " The strange position of
the Labellum perched on the summit of the column, ought
to have shown me that here was the place for experiment.
I ought to have scorned the notion that the Labellum was
thus placed for no good purpose. I neglected this plain guide,
and for a long time completely failed to understand the
flower."t
P,   29.               t P. 3o.                  P, 26a.




.THE SUPERNATURAL.                     25
An attempt has, indeed, been made to explain away Mr.
Darwiil's language in such cases as " metaphorical."  But
this explanation is powerless to expel from that language the
inference it involves. Indeed, it is an explanation which only
repeats the same idea in another form. The very essence of a
metaphor is that it expresses the resemblances of things. But
it is in seeing the resemblances, and in seeing the correlative
differences of things, that all knowledge consists.  This perception is the raw material of Thought-it is the foundation of
all intellectual apprehension.  In proportion as resemblances
are complete, the language which expresses those resemblances
is the language of truth.  Such language very often carries
within it the most certain conclusions which are accessible to
reason. One mind looking at the workings of another mind
can see likeness of agency only by recognizing likeness in the
processes of thought. That likeness can only be expressed in
words which convey the idea of it to other minds. But in this
sense all language is metaphorical. The commonest words we
use to indicate ideas are essentially metaphorical, bringing
home into the world of Mind images derived from  material
force, and carrying forth again into the outward world conceptions born of that mental power which alone is capable of conceiving. In one aspect, all human speech is what the Poet
calls it, " Matter-moulded forms of speech." t  In another
aspect it is all spirit-moulded, since we can only think of Matter in the light of those impressions which it has power to make
on Mind. All language is thus but a system of signs whereby
we express the analogies-the differences and resemblances
perceived by us in those two great departments of Nature of
lhich the union and the separation are both imaged in ourselves-that is, in the union and in the difference of the Body
and the Mind.  The most absolute certainties we can ever
know are only known by the translation of ideas or conceptions
from one of these departments to the other, and the language
in which these certainties are expressed carries, and must carry,
* Quarterly Joalrnal of Science, Oct. I867. " Creation by Law," by Alfred Wallace. " Mr. Darwin has laid himself open to much misconception, and has given to
his opponents a powerful weapon by his continual use of metaphor in describing the
Wonderful coadaptations of organic beings,"' —P. 473.
1 " In Memoriam," xciv,




26                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
signs of this origin in itself. The question, therefore, in respect
to Mr. Darwin's language, is not whether it is " metaphorical"
-that is, whether it applies to material phenomena conceptions
derived from the world of Mind. This, of course, it does, and
in the nature of the case it must do. But the question is,
whether the correspondence it expresses between the order of
these material phenomena and a known order of Thought is
or is not a real correspondence, and one, therefore, indicating
the known effects of a known originating cause.
And here it is well worthy of observation, that although Purpose and Intention are, of course, involved in all mental operations, yet the conception of contrivance is not the only mental
conception which, in like manner, is recognized as constituting
the order of natural phenomena. Other conceptions equally
familiar to the mind of Man are instinctively recognized by all
Naturalists who bring high intellectual powers into that contact
with Nature which consists in close and thoughtful observation
of her facts. Other mental conceptions, such as those of Number and Proportion, are then found to emerge, and make an
ineffaceable impression on the mind which sees them.
Thus, when we come to the second part of Mr. Darwin's
work, viz., the Homology of the Orchids, we find that the inquiry divides itself into two separate questions,-first, the question what all these complicated organs are in their primitive relation to each other; and, secondly, how these successive modifications have arisen, so as to fit them for new and changing
uses. Now, it is very remarkable that of these two questions,
that which may be called the most abstract and transcendentalthe most nearly related to the Supernatural and the Supermaterial-is again precisely the one which Darwin is able to solve
most clearly. We have already seen how well he solves the
first question-What is the use and intention of these various
parts?  The next question is, What are these parts in their
primal order and conception?  The answer is, that they are
members of a numerical group, having a definite and still traceable order of symmetrical arrangement. They are expressions
of a numerical idea, as so many other things-perhaps as all
things-of beauty are. Mr. Darwin gives a diagram, showing
the primordial or archetypal arrangement of Threes within




THE SUPERNATURAL.                  27
Threes, out of which all the strange and marvellous forms of
the Orchids have been developed, and to which, by careful
counting and dissection, they can still be ideally reduced. But
when we come to the last question-By what process of natural
consequence have these elementary organs of Three within
Three been developed into so many various forms of beauty,
and made to subserve so many curious and ingenious designs?
-we find nothing but the vaguest and most unsatisfactory conjectures. Let us take one instance as an example. There is a
Madagascar Orchis-the " Angracum sesquipedale "-with an
immensely long and deep nectary.  How did such an extraordinary organ come to be developed? Mr. Darwin's explanation is this: The pollen of this flower can only be removed by
the proboscis of some very large Moth trying to get at the nectar at the bottom of the vessel. The Moths with the longest
probosces would do this most effectually; they would be rewarded for their long noses by getting the most nectar; whilst,
on the other hand, the flowers with the deepest nectaries would
be the best fertilized by the largest Moths preferring them.
Consequently, the deepest-nectaried Orchids, and the longestnosed Moths, would each confer on the other a great advantage in the " battle of life."  This would tend to their respective
perpetuation, and to the constant lengthening of nectaries and
of noses.  But the passage is so curious and characteristic,
that it is well to give Mr. Darwin's own words:"As certain Moths of Madagascar became larger, througlp
natural selection in relation to their general conditions of life,
either in the larval or mature state, or as the proboscis alone
was lengthened to obtain honey from the Angrecum, those individual plants of the Angroecum which had the longest nectaries, (and the nectary varies much in length in some Orchids,)
and which, consequently, compelled the Moths to insert their
probosces up to the very base, would be the best fertilized.
These plants would yield most seed, and the seedlings would
generally inherit longer nectaries; and so it would be in successive generations of the plant and Moth. Thus it would appear that there has been a race in gaining length between the
nectary of the Angraxcum and the proboscis of certain Moths;
out the Angreccum has triumphed, for it flourishes and abounds




28                     THtE REIGN OF LAW
in the forests of Madagascar, and still troubles each Moth to
insert its proboscis as far as possible in order to drain the last
drop of nectar.... We can thus," says Mr. Darwin, "partially understand. how the astonishing length of the nectary
may have been acquired by successive modifications."
It is indeed but a "partial" understanding.-*  How  came
this Orchis to require any exact adjustment between the length
of its nectary and the proboscis of an insect?  This is not a
general necessity even among the Orchids. " In the British
species, such as Orchis Pyramidalis, it is not necessary that
any such adjustment should exist, and thus a number of insects
of various sizes are found to carry away the pollinia, and aid in
the fertilization."t  This would obviously be the most favorable
condition for all Orchids in the battle of life.  Does not the
hypothesis, then, begin by assuming the very condition of
things for which it professes to account?  We must start with
this Madagascar Orchis already in possession of a larger nectary than other species, and with a structure already depending
on particular Moths also already existing, and already provided
with probosces of nicely adjusted length.  If the nectaries began first to lengthen, how came the Moths not to leave them
for other flowers? And if, on the contrary, they began to
shorten, how  came they not to be favored and resorted to by
other Moths of a smaller size?  Can we assume that somehow
there were always ready some Moths still larger to favor the
longer variety, and that somehow  also there were no smaller
Moths to favor the shorter? t  Why should the race in/ tisj articular species be always in the direction of nectaries getting
longer, and not rather in the direction of nectaries getting
shorter?  Obviously the same hypothesis might be so turned
as to account for either result with equal ease, and therefore it
does not account at all for one of those results as against the
*The passage which follows I have added to meet the objection taken by Mr.
Wallace, that I have "not shown what point the explanation fails to meet." A sample only of such points can be given here. See also Note A.
1 "Creation by Law." G. A. R. Wallace. JourenalofScience, October, I867, p. 475.
$ Mr. Wallace sees no difficulty whatever in making any supposition of this kind
which the Theory may require. " Now let us start," he says, " from the time when
the nectary was only half its present length, or about six inches, and was chiefly fertilized by a species of Moth zuhAich ayfeared at th tiae ofti e ofhe  ans fozering, and
whose proboscis was of t/he same length."-Ibid. p. 475.




TIHE SUPERNATURAL.                 2o
other. And then there is a larger question than any of these
which remains behind.  How came Orchids to be dependent at
all upon insects for fertilization?  It cannot be argued that
this is a necessity arising mechanically from the nature of
things, because, as we are truly told by an eminent naturalist
who warmly supports the Darwinian hypothesis, "exactly the
same end is attained in ten thousand other flowers " which do
not possess the same structure.* But what is the bearing of
this fact upon the theory?  Is it not this-that the origin of
such curious structures, and complicated relations, cannot be
accounted for on any principle of mere mechanical necessity?
Elementary forces may indeed always be detected, for they are
always present. But the manner in which they are worked irresistibly suggests some directing power, having as one of its
aims mere increase and variety in that ocean of enjoyment
which constitutes the sum of Organic Life. Some idea of this
kind, however unconsciously, however reluctantly conceded,
lurks in every form of words in which the facts of science can
be generalized to the mind. Thus we find Mr. Wallace himself saying, in the same paper in which he regrets the language
of Mr. Darwin, that thie conception he prefers is, that the "contrivances" referred to "are some of the results of those general laws which wnere so co-ordinzated at the first introduction of
Life upon the earth, as to result necessarily in the utmost possible development of varied forms." Eliminating the word
" necessarily," which, if it has any meaning, does not apply, as
we have seen, to the case of the Orchids, this language presents an intelligible idea. It satisfies the mind precisely in
proportion as it brings into view, however distant, the attributes of Mind, and gives us a glimpse of "the reason why."
The production of variety in beauty and in enjoyment is the
purpose which those words suggest. In like proportion is Mr.
Darwin's language the truest and the best. His explanations
of the mechanical methods by which a wonderful Orchis has
come to be are indeed, as he himself says, with great candor,
"partial " and partial only. How different from the clearness
and the certainty with which Mr. Darwin is able to explain to
us the use and intention of the various organs! or the primal
* " Creation by Law," p. 474.




30                 THIE REIGN OF LAW.
idea of numerical order and arrangement which governs the
whole structure of the flower! It is the same through all Nature. Purpose and intention, or ideas of order based on numerical relations, are what meet us at every turn, and are more
or less readily recognized by our own intelligence as corresponding to conceptions familiar to our own minds. We know,
too, that these purposes and ideas are not our own, but the
ideas and purposes of Anotber —of One whose manifestations
are indeed superhuman and supermaterial, but are not " supernatural," in the sense of being strange to Nature, or in violation of it.
The truth is, that there is no such distinction between what
we find in Nature, and what we are called upon to believe in
Religion, as that which men pretend to draw between the
Natural and the Supernatural. It Ls a distinction purely
artificial, arbitrary, unreal. Nature presents to our intelligence,
the more clearly the more we search her, the designs, ideas,
and intentions of some
"Living Will that shall endure,
When all that seems shall suffer shock."
Religion presents to us that same Will, not only working equally
through the use of means, but using means which are strictly
analogous-referable to the same general principles-and which
are constantly appealed to as of a sort which we ought to be able
to appreciate, because we are already familiar with the like. Religion makes no call on us to reject that idea, which is the only
idea some men can see in Nature-the idea of the universal Reign
of Law-the necessity of conforming to it-the. limitations which
in one aspect it seems to place on the exercise of Will,-the essential basis, in another aspect, which it supplies for all the
functions of Volition. On the contrary, the high regions into
which this idea is found extending, and the matters over which
it is found prevailing, is one of the deepest mysteries both of
Religion and of Nature. We feel sometimes as if we should
like to get above this rule-into some secret Presence where its
bonds are broken. But no glimpse is ever given us of anything, but " Freedom within the bounds of Law." The Will revealed to us in Religion is not —any more than the Will re



THE SUPERNATURAL.?I
vealed to us in Nature-a capricious Will, but one with which,
in this respect, " there is no variableness, neither shadow of
turning."
We return, then, to the point from which we started. M.
Guizot's affirmation that belief in the Supernatural is essential
to all Religion is true only when it is understood in a special
sense. Belief in the existence of a Living Will-of a Personal
God-is indeed a requisite condition.  Conviction "that lIe
is" must precede the conviction that "He is the rewarder of
those that diligently seek Him."  But the intellectual yoke involved in the common idea of the Supernatural is a yoke which
men impose upon themselves. Obscure thought and confused
language are the main source of difficulty.
Assuredly, whatever may be the difficulties of Christianity,
this is not one of them,-that it calls on us to believe in any
exception to the universal prevalence and power of Law. Its
leading facts and doctrines are directly connected with this belief, and directly suggestive of it. The Divine mission of Christ
on earth-does not this imply not only the use of means to an end,
but some inscrutable necessity that certain means, and these only,
should be employed in resisting and overcoming evil? What
else is the import of so many passages of Scripture implying
that certain conditions were required to bring the Saviour of
Man into a given relation with the race he was sent to save?
"It behoved Him.... to make the Captain of our Salvation perfect through suffering." " It behoved Him in all
things to be made like unto His brethren, tizal he zzmighJt be," etc.with the reason added: " for in that He Himself hath suffered
being tempted, He is able to succour them that are tempted."
Whatever more there may be in such passages, they all imply the
universal reign of Law in the moral and spiritual, as well as in
the material world: that those laws had to be-behoved to beobeyed; and that the results to be obtained are brought about
by the adaptation of means to an end, or, as it were, by way
of natural consequences from the instrumentality employed.
This, however, is an idea which systematic theology generally
regards with intense suspicion, though, in fact, all theologies involve it, and build upon it. But then they are very apt to give
explanations of that instrumentality which have no counterpart




32                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
in the material or in the moral world. Perhaps it is not too
much to say that the manifest decay which so many creeds and
confessions are now suffering, arises mainly from the degree in
which at least the popular expositions of them dissociate the
doctrines of Christianity from the analogy and course of
Nature. There is no such severance in Scripture-no shyness
of illustrating Divine things by reference to the Natural. On
the contrary, we are perpetually rerminded that the laws of the
spiritualworld are in the highest sense laws of Nature, whose
obligation, operation, and effect are all in the constitution and
course of things. Htence it is that so much was capable of being conveyed in the form of parable-the common actions and
occurrences of daily life being often chosen as the best vehicle
and illustration of the highest spiritual truths. It is not merely,
as Jeremy Taylor says, that " all things are full of such
resemblances,"-it is more than this-more than resemblance.
It is the perpetual recurrence, under infinite varieties of application, of the same rules and principles of Divine government,of the same Divine thoughts, Divine purposes, Divine affections.
Hence it is that no verbal definitions or logical forms can convey religious truth with the fulness or accuracy which belongs
to narratives taken from Nature-Man's nature and life being,
of course, included in the term:
"And so, the Word had breath, and wrought
With human hands the Creed of creeds."
" fiz Menoriam," TENNYSON.
The same idea is expressed in the passionate exclamation of
Edward Irving:-" We must speak in parables, or we must
present a wry and deceptive form of truth; of which choice the
first is to be preferred, and our Lord adopted it. Because
parable is truth veiled, not truth dismembered; and as the eye
of the understanding grows more piercing, the veil is seen
through, and the truth stands revealed." Nature is the great
Parable; and the truths which she holds within her are veiled,
out not dismembered. The pretended separation between that
which lies within Nature and that which lies beyond Nature is a
dismemberment of the truth. Let both those who find it difficult
to believe in anything which is " above " the Natural, and those




TIlE SUPERNATURAL.                  33
who insist on that belief, first determine how far the Natural
extends. Perhaps in going round these marches they will find
themselves meeting upon common ground. For indeed, long
before we have searched out all that the Natural includes, there
will remain little in the so-called Supernatural which call seem
hard of acceptance or belief —nothing which is not rather essential to our understanding of this otherwise " unintelligible
world."




CHAPTER II.
LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.
TIE Reign of Law —is this, then, the reign under which we
live?  Yes, in a sense it is. There is no denying it. The
whole world around us, and the whole world within us, are ruled
by Law. Our very spirits are subject to it-those spirits which
yet seem so spiritual, so subtle, so free. How often in the
darkness do they feel the restraining walls-bounds within
which they move-conditions out of which they cannot think!
The perception of this is growing in the consciousness of men.
It grows with the growth of knowledge; it is the delight, the
reward, the goal of Science. From Science it passes into every
domain of thought, and invades, amongst others, the Theology
of the Church. And so we see the men of Theology coming
out to parley with the men of Science,-a white flag in their
hands, and saying, " If you will let us alone we will do the same
by you. Keep to your own province, do not enter ours. The
Reign of Law which you proclaim, we admit-outside these
walls, but not within them: —let there be peace between us."
But this will never do. There can be no such treaty dividing
the domain of Truth. Every one Truth is connected with every
other Truth in this great Universe of God.'The connection
may be one of infinite subtlety, and apparent distance —running,
as it were, underground for a long way, but always asserting itself at last, somewhere, and at some time. No bargaining, no
fencing off the ground —no form of process, will avail to bar
this right of way. Blessed right, enforced by blessed power!
Every truth, which is truth indeed, is charged with its own consequences, its own analogies, its own suggestions. These will
not be kept outside any artificial boundary; they will range
over the whole Field of Thought, nor is there any corner of it
from which they can be warned away.
And therefore we must cast a sharp eye indeed on every form




LAW; —ITS DEFINITIONS.               35
of words which professes to represent a scientific truth.  If it
be really true in one department of thought, the chances are
that it will have its bearing on every other. And if it be not
true, but erroneous, its effect will be of a corresponding
character; for there is a brotherhood of Error as close as the
brotherhood of Truth. Therefore, to accept as a truth that
which is not a truth, or to fail in distinguishing the sense in
which a proposition may be true, from other senses in which it
is not true, is an evil having consequences which are indeed
incalculable. There are subjects on which one mistake of this
kind will poison all the wells of truth, and affect with fatal error
the whole circle of our thoughts.
It is against this danger that some men would erect a feeble
barrier by defending the position, that Science and Religion
may be, and ought to be, kept entirely separate;-that they
belong to wholly different spheres of thought, and that the ideas
which prevail in the one province have no relation to those
which prevail in the other. This is a doctrine offering many
temptations to many minds. It is grateful to scientific men who
are afraid of being thought hostile to Religion. It is grateful
to religious men who are afraid of being thought to be afraid of
Science. To these, and to all who are troubled to reconcile
what they have been taught to believe with what they have come
to know, this doctrine affords a natural and convenient escape.
There is but one objection to it —but that is the fatal objection
— that it is not true. The spiritual world and the intellectual
world are not separated after this fashion: and the notion that
they are so separated does but encourage men to accept in each,
ideas which will at last be found to be false in both. The truth
is, that there is no branch of human inquiry, however purely
physical, which is more than the word " branch " implies; none
which is not connected through endless ramifications with every
other,-and especially that which is the root and centre of them
all. If He who formed the mind be one with Him who is the
Orderer of all things concerning which that mind is occupied,
there can be no end to the points of contact between our different conceptions of them, of Him, and of ourselves.
The instinct which impels us to seek for harmony in the truths
of Science and the truths of Religion, is a higher instinct and a




36                  TiE RErIGN tOh LAW.
truer one than the disposition which leads us to evade the difficulty by pretending that there is no relation between them.
For, after all, it is a pretence and nothing more. No man who
thoroughly accepts a principle in the philosophy of Nature
which he feels to be inconsistent with a doctrine of Religion,
can help having his belief in that doctrine shaken and undermined. We may believe, and we must believe, both in Nature
and Religion, many things which we cannot understand; but
we cannot really believe two propositions which are felt to be
contradictory. It helps us nothing in such a difficulty, to say
that the one proposition belongs to Reason and the other proposition belongs to Faith. The endeavor to reconcile them is
a necessity of the mind. We are right in thinking that, if they
are both indeed true, they can be reconciled, and if they really
are fundamentally opposed, they cannot both be true. That is
to say, there must be some error in our manner of conception
in one or in the other, or in both, At the very best, each can
represent only some partial and imperfect aspect of the truth.
The error may lie in our Theology, or it may lie in what we are
pleased to call our Science. It may be that some dogma, derived by tradition from our fathers, is having its hollowness
betrayed by that light which sometimes shines upon the ways
of God out of a better knowledge of His works. It may be that
some proud and rash generalization of the schools is having its
falsehood proved by the violence it does to the deepest instincts
of our spiritual nature,-to
"Truths which wake to perish never;
Which neither man nor boy,
Nor all that is at enmity with joy,
Can utterly abolish or destroy."
" Ode to I.zmzoirtality," WORDSWORTH.
Such, for example, is the conclusion to which the language of
some scientific men is evidently pointing, that great general
Laws inexorable in their operation, and Causes in endless
chain of invariable sequence, are the governing powers in
Nature, and that they leave no room for any special direction
or providential ordering of events.  If this be true, it is vain to
deny its bearing on Religion. What then can be the use of




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.                37
prayer? Can Laws hear us? Can they change, or can they
suspend themselves? These questions cannot but arise, and
they require an answer. It is said of a late eminent Professor
and clergyman of the English Church, who was deeply imbued
with these opinions on the place occupied by Law in the economy of Nature, that he went on, nevertheless, preaching high
doctrinal sermons from  the pulpit until his death.  He did so
on the ground that propositions which were contrary to his reason were not necessarily beyond his faith. The inconsistencies of the human mind are indeed unfathomable: and there
are men so constituted as honestly to suppose that they can
divide themselves into two spiritual beings, one of whom is
sceptical, and the other is believing. But such men are rare —
happily for Religion, and not less happily for Science. No
healthy intellect, no earnest spirit, can rest in such self-betrayal.
Accordingly we find many men now facing the consequences to
which they have given their intellectual assent, and taking
their stand upon the ground that prayer to God has no other
value or effect than so far as it may be a good way of preaching to ourselves.  It is a useful and helpful exercise for our
own spirits, but it is nothing more. But how can they pray
who have come to this? Can it ever be useful or helpful to
believe a lie? That which has been threatened as the worst
of all spiritual evils, would then become the conscious attitude
of our "religion," the habitual condition of our worship. This
must be a bad science, as it is bad religion. It is in violation
of a law the highest known to Man-the Law which inseparably connects earnest conviction of the truth in what we do or
say, with the very fountains of all intellectual and moral
strength.  No accession of force can come to us from doing
anything in which we disbelieve.  Such a doctrine will be in-leed
"The little rift within the lute
That by and by will make the music mute,
And ever widening slowly silence all. "
"Idyls of the KCing — Vivien," TENNYSON.
If there is any helpfulness in Prayer even to the Mind itself,
that helpfulness can only be preserved by showing that the




38                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
belief on which this virtue depends is a rational belief. The
very essence of that belief is this-that the Divine Mind is accessible to supplication, and that the Divine Will is capable of
being moved thereby. No question is, or indeed can be, raised
as to the powerful effect exerted by this belief on Man's nature.
That effect is recognized as a fact. Its value is admitted; and
in order that it may not be lost, the compromise now offered by
some philosophers is this —that although the course of external
nature is unalterable, yet possibly the phenomena of Mind and
character may be changed by the Divine Agency. But will
this reasoning bear analysis? Can the distinction it assumes
be maintained? Whatever difficulties there may be in reconciling the ideas of Law and of Volition, they are difficulties
which apply equally to the Worlds of Matter and of Mind.
The Mind is as much subject to Law as the Body is. The
Reign of Law is over all; and if its dominion be really incompatible with the agency of Volition, Human or Divine, then the
Mind is as inaccessible to that agency as material things. It
would indeed be absurd to affirm that all Prayers are equally
rational or equally legitimate. Most true it is that " we know
not what we should pray for as we ought." Prayer does not
require us to believe that anything can be done without the use of
means; neither does it require us to believe that anything will
be done in violation of the Universal Order. "If it be possible," was the qualification used in the most solemn Prayer ever
uttered upon Earth. What are and what are not legitimate
objects of supplication, is a question which may well be open.
But the question now raised is a wider one than this —even the
question whether the very idea of Prayer be not in itself
absurd —whether the Reign of Law does not preclude the possibility of Will affecting the successive phenomena either of
Matter or of Mind. This is a question lying at the root of our
whole conceptions of the Universe, and of all our own powers,
both of thinking and of acting. The freedom which is denied
to God is not likely to be left to Man. We shall see, accordingly, that precisely the same denials are applied to both.
The conception of Natural Laws-of their place, of their nature, and of their office-which involves us in such questions,




LAW; -ITS DEFINITIONS.               39
and which points to such conclusions, demands surely a very
careful examination at our hands.
What, then, is this Reign of Law? What is Law, and in what
sense can it be said to reign?
Words, which should be the servants of Thought, are too often
its masters; and there are very few words which are used more
ambiguously, and therefore more injuriously, than the \worci
"Law."  It may indeed be legitimately used in several different
senses, because in all cases as applied in Science it is a metaphor,
and one which has relation to many different kinds and degrees
of likeness in the ideas which are compared. It matters little
in which of these senses it is used, provided the distinctions
between them are kept clearly in view, and provided we watch
against the fallacies which must arise when we pass insensibly
from one meaning to another. And here it may be observed,
in passing, that the metaphors which are employed in Language
are generally founded on analogies instinctively, and often unconsciously, perceived, and which would not be so perceived if
they were not both deep and true. In this case the idea which
lies at the root of Law in all its applications is evident enough.
In its primary signification, a " law " is the authoritative expression of human Will enforced by Power. The instincts of mankind finding utterance in their language, have not failed to see
that the phenomena of Nature are only really conceivable to us
as in like manner the expressions of a Will enforcing itself
with Power. But, as in many other cases, the secondary or
derivative senses of the word have supplanted the primary signification; and Law is now habitually used by men who deny
the analogy on which that use is founded, and to the truth of
which it is an abiding witness. It becomes therefore all the
more necessary to define the secondary senses with precision.
There are at least Five different senses in which Law is habittally used, and these must be carefully distinguished:First, We have Law as applied simply to an observed Order
of facts.
Secondly, To that Order as involving the action of some
Force or Forces of which nothing more may be known.
Thirdly, As applied to individual Forces the measure of whose
operation has been more or less defined or ascertained,




40'THE REIGN OF LAW.
Fourthly, As applied to those combinations of Force which
have reference to the fulfilment of Purpose, or the discharge of
Function.
Fifthly, As applied to Abstract Conceptions of the mindnot corresponding with any actual phenomena, but deduced
therefrom as axioms of thought necessary to our understanding
of them. Law, in this sense, is a reduction of the phenomena
not merely to an Order of facts, but to an Order of Thought.
These great leading significations of the word Law all circle
round the three great questions which Science asks of Nature,
the What, the How, and the Why —
(i) What are the facts in their established Order?
(2) How-that is, from what physical causes,-does that Order
come to be?
(3) Why have these causes been so combined? What relation do they bear to Purpose, to the fulfilment of intention, tc
the discharge of Function?
It is so important that these different senses of the word Lau;
should be clearly distinguished, that each of them must be
more fully considered by itself.
The First and, so to speak, the lowest sense in which Law is
applied to natural phenomena is that in which it is used to ex
press simply " an observed Order of facts "-that is to say, facts
which under the same conditions always follow each other in
the same order. In this sense the laws of Nature are simply
those facts of Nature which recur according to a rule. It is
not necessary to the legitimate application of Law in this sense
that the cause of any observed Order of facts should be at all
known, or even guessed at. The Force or Forces to which that
Order is due may be hid in total darkness.  It is sufficient that
the Order or sequence of phenomena be uniform and constant.
The neatest and simplest illustration of this, as well as of the
other senses in which Law is used, is to be found in the exact
sciences, and especially in the history of Astronomy. It is
nearly 250 years since Kepler discovered, in respect tb the distances, velocities, and orbits of the Planets, three facts, or
rather three series of facts, which, during many years* of in* The " Third Law " of Kepler was made known to the world in I619. Newton's'" Principia " appeared in 1687.




LAW;- ITS DEFINITIONS.              41
tense application to physical inquiry, remained the highest
truths known to Man on the phenomena of the Solar System.
They were known as the Three Laws of Kepler. It is not necessary to describe in detail here what these laws were. Suffice
it to say, that the most remarkable among them were facts of
constant numerical relation between the distances of the different Planets from the Sun, and the length of their periodic
times; and again, between the velocity of their motion and the
space enclosed within certain corresponding sections of their
orbit. These Laws were simply and purely an "Order of
facts " established by observation, and not connected with any
known cause. The Force of which that Order is a necessary
result had not then been ascertained. A very large proportion
of the laws of every science are laws of this kind and in this
sense. For example, in Chemistry the behavior of different
substances towards each other, in respect to combination and
affinity, is reduced to system under laws of this kind, and of
this kind only. Because, although there is a probability that
Electric or Galvanic Force is the cause or one of the causes
of the series of facts exhibited in chemical phenomena, this is
as yet no better than a probability, and the laws of Chemistry
stand no higher than facts which by observation and experiment
are found to follow certain rules.
But the ascertainment of a law in this First and lower sense
leads immediately and instinctively to the search after Law in
another sense which is higher. An observed Order of facts,
to be entitled to the rank of a Law, must be an Order so constant and uniform as to indicate necessity, and necessity can
only arise out of the action of some compelling Force. Law,
therefore, comes to indicate not merely an observed Order of
facts, but that Order as involving the action of some Force or
Forces, of which nothing more may be known than these visible effects. Every observed Order in physical phenomena
suggests irresistibly to the mind the operation of some physical
cause. We say of an observed Order of facts that it must be
due to some " law," meaning simply that all Order involves the
idea of some arranging cause, the- working of some Force or
Forces (whether they be such as we can further trace and de



42                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
fine or not) of which that Order is the index and the result,
This is the Second of the five senses specified above.
And so we pass on, by an easy and natural transition, to the
Third sense in which the word Law is used. This is the most
exact and definite of all. The mere general idea that some
Force is at the bottom of all phenomena, which are invariably
consecutive, is a very different thing from knowing what that
Force is in respect to the rule or measure of its operation. Of
Law in this sense the one great example, before and above all
others, is the Law of Gravitation, for this is a Law in the sense
not merely of a rule, but of a cause-that is, of a Force accurately
defined and ascertained according to the measure of its operation, from which Force other phenomena arise by way of necessary consequence. Force is the root-idea of Law in its scientific sense. And so the Law of Gravitation is not merely the
"observed order" in which the heavenly bodies move; neither
is it only the abstract idea of some Force to which such movements must be due, but it is that Force the exact measure of
whose operation was numerically ascertained or defined by
Newton-the Force which compels those movements and (in a
sense) explains them. Now the difference between Law in the
narrower and Law in the larger sense cannot be better illustrated than in the difference between the Three special Laws discovered by Kepler, and the One universal Law discovered by
Newton. The Three Laws of Kepler were, as we have seen,
simply and purely an observed Order of facts. They stood by
themselves-disconnected,-their cause unknown. The higher
Law, discovered by Newton, revealed their connection and their
cause. The " observed Order " which Kepler had discovered,
was simply a necessary consequence of the Force of Gravitation. In the light of this great Law the "Three Laws of Kepler " have been merged and lost.
When the operations of any material Force can be reduced
to rules so definite as those which have been discovered in respect to the Force of Gravitation, and when these rules are
capable of mathematical expression and of mathematical proof,
they are, so far as they go, in the nature of pure truth. Mr.
Lewes, in his very curious and interesting work on the " Philosophy of Aristotle," has maintained that the knowledge of Meas



LAW; —ITS DEFINiTIONS.                43
ure-or what he calls the "verifiable element" in our knowledge-is the element which determines whether any theory belongs to Science, strictly so called, or to Metaphysics; and
that any theory may be transferred from  Metaphysics to Science, or from Science to Metaphysics, simply by the addition
or withdrawal of its "'verifiable element." In illustration of
this, he says that if we withdraw, from the Law of Universal
Attraction, the formula, "inversely as the square of the distance, and directly as the mass," it becomes pure Metaphysics.
If this means that, apart from ascertained numerical relations,
our conception of Law, or our knowledge of natural phenomena,
loses all reality and distinctness, I do not agree in the position,
The idea of natural Forces is quite separate from any ascertained measure of their energy. The knowledge, for example,
that all the particles of matter exert an attractive force upon
each other, is, so far as it goes, true physical knowledge, even
though we did not know the further truth, that this force acts
according to the numerical rule ascertained by Newton. To
banish from physical Science, properly so called, and to relegate to Metaphysics, all knowledge which cannot be reduced
to numerical expression. is a dangerous abuse of language.
Force, ascertained according to some measure of its operation-this is indeed one of the definitions, but only one, of a
scientific Law. The discovery of laws in this sense is the
great quest of Science, and the finding of them is one of her
great rewards. Such laws yield to the human mind a peculiar
delight, from the satisfaction they afford to those special faculties whose function it is to recognize the beauty of numerical
relations. This satisfactiop! is so great, and in its own measure is so complete, that the mind reposes on an ascertained
law of this kind as on an ultimate truth. And ultimate it is as
regards the particular faculties which are concerned in this
kind of search. When we have observed our facts, and when
we have summed up our figures, when we have recognized the
constant numbers,-then our eyes, our ears, and our calculating faculties have done their work. But other faculties are
called into simultaneous operation, and these have other work
to do. For let it be observed that laws in the first three senses
we have now examined, cannot be said to explain anything ex



44                  THE REIGN OF LAW.
cept the Order of subordinate phenomena. They set forth that
order as due to Force. They do nothing more. Least of all
do laws, in any of these three senses, explain themselves.
They suggest a thousand questions much more curious than
the questions which they solve. The very beauty and simplicity of some laws is their deepest mystery. What can their
source be? How is their uniformity maintained? Every law
implies a Force, and all that we ever know is some numerical
rule or measure according to which some unknown Forces operate. But whence come those measures-those exact relations
to number, which never vary?  Or, if there are variations, how
comes it that these are always found to follow some other rules
as exact and as invariable as the first?
And as there can be no better example of what Law is, so
also there can be no better example of wfhat it is not —than the
Law of Gravitation. The discovery of it was probably the
highest exercise of pure intellect through which the human
mind has found its way. It is the most universal physical law
which is known to us, for it prevails, apparently, through all
space. Yet of the Force of Gravitation all we know is that it is
a force of attraction operating between all the particles of matter in the exact measure which iwas ascertained by Newton,that is-" directly as the mass, and inversely as the square of
the distance."  This is the Law.  But it affords no sort of explanation of itself. TWhalt is the cause of this Force-what is
its source-what are the media of its operation-how is the exact
uniformity of its proportions maintained? —these are questions
which it is impossible not to ask, but which it is quite as impossible to answer.  Sir John Herschel, in speaking of this
Force, has indicated in a passing sentence a few questions out
of the many which arise:-" No matter," he says, "from what
ultimate causes the power called gravitation originates-be it a
virtue lodged in the sun as its receptacle, or be it pressure from
without, or the resultant of many pressures, or solicitations of
unknown kinds, magnetic or electric, ethers or impulses," * etc.,
etc. How little we have ascertained in this Law, after all! Yet
there is an immense and an instinctive pleasure in the contemplation of it. To analyze this pleasure is as difficult as to ana* Herschel's" Outlines of Astronomy," fifth edition, p. 323.




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.                45
lyze the pleasure which the eye takes in beauty of form, or the
pleasure which the ear takes in the harmonies of sound. And
this pleasure is inexhaustible, for these laws of number and
proportion pervade all Nature, and the intellectual organs
which have been fitted to the knowledge of them have eyes
which are never satisfied with seeing, and ears which are never
full of hearing. The agitation which overpowered Sir Isaac
Nevwton as the Law of Gravitation was rising to his view in the
light of rigorous demonstration, was the homage rendered by
the great faculties of his nature to a harmony which was as new
as it was immense and wonderful. The same pleasure in its
own degree is felt by every man of science who, in any branch
of physical inquiry, traces and detects any lesser law. And it
is perfectly true that such laws are being detected everywhere.
Forces which are in their essence and their source utterly mysterious, are always being found to operate under rules which
have strict reference to measures of number,-to relations of
Space and Time. The Forces which determine chemical combination all work under rules as sharp and definite as the Force
of Gravitation. So do the Forces which operate in Light, and
Heat. and Sound. So do those which exert their energies in
Magnetism and Electricity. All the operations of Nature-the
smallest and the  greatest-are  performed under  similar
measures and restraints. Not even a drop of water can be
formed except under rules which determine its weight, its volume, and its shape, with exact reference to the density of the
fluid, to the structure of the surface on which it may be formed,
and to the pressure of the surrounding atmosphere. Then that
pressure is itself exercised under rigorous rules again. Not one
of the countless varieties of form which prevail in clouds, and
which give to the face of heaven such infinite expression, not
one of them but is ruled by Law,-woven, or braided, or torn,
or scattered, or gathered up again and folded,-by Forces which
are free only " within the bounds of Law."
And equally in those subjects of inquiry in which rules of
number and of proportion are not applicable, rules are discernible which belong to another class, but which are as certain
and as prevailing. All events, however casual or disconnected
they may at first appear to be, are found in the course of time




46                THE REIGN OF LAW.
to arrange themselves in some certain Order, the index and
exponent of Forces, of which we know nothing except their existence as evidenced in these effects. It is indeed wonderful
to find that in such a matter, for example, as the development of our Human Speech, the unconscious changes which
arise from time to time among the rudest utterances of
the rudest tribes and races of Mankind, are all found to follow rules of progress as regular as those which preside over
any of the material growths of Nature. Yet so it is; and it is
upon this fact alone that the science of Language rests-a
science in which all the facts are not yet observed, and many
of those which have been observed are not yet reduced to
order; but in which enough has been ascertained to show that
languages grow, and change from generation to generation,
according to rules of which the men who speak them are
wholly unconscious. It is the same with all other things.
And as it is now, so apparently has it been in all past time of
which we have any record. Even the work of Creation has
been and is being carried on under rules of adherence to
Typical Forms, and under limits of variation from them,
which can be dimly seen and traced, although they cannot
be defined or understood. The universal prevalence of laws
of this kind cannot therefore be denied. The discovery of
them is one of the first results of all physical inquiry. In this
sense it is true that we, and the world around us, are under the
Reign of Law.
It is true, but only a bit and fragment of the truth. For
there is another fact quite as prominent as the universal presence and prevalence of laws-and that is, the number of them
which are concerned in each single operation in Nature. No
one Law-that is to say, no one Force-determines anything
that we see happening or done around us. It is always the
result of different and opposing Forces nicely balanced against
each other. The least disturbance of the proportion in which
any one of them is allowed to tell, produces a total change in
the effect. The more we know of Nature, the more intricate
do such combinations appear to be. They can be traced very
near to the fountains of Life itself, even close up to the confines
of the last secret of all-how the Will acts upon its organs in




LAW; —-ITS DEFINITIONS.                47
the Body.  Recent investigations in Physiology seem  to favor
the hypothesis that our muscles are the seat of two opposing
Forces, each so adjusted as to counteract the other; and that
this antagonism is itself so arranged as to enable us by acting on
one of these Forces, to regulate the action of the other. One
Force-an elastic or contractile Force-is supposed to be
inherent in the muscular fibre  another Force-that of Animal
Electricity in statical condition-holds the contractile Force in
check; and the relaxed, or rather the restful, condition of the
muscle when not in use, is due to the balance so maintained.
When, through the motor nerves the Will orders the muscles into
action, that order is enforced by a discharge of the Electrical
Force, and upon this discharge the contractile Force is set free
to act, and does accordingly produce the contraction which is
desired.*
Such is, at least, one suggestion as to the means employed
to place human action under the control of human Will, in
that material frame which is so wonderfully and fearfully made.
And whether this hypothesis be accurate or not, it is certain
that some such adjustment of Force to Mechanism is involved
in every bodily movement which is subject to the Will. Even
in this high region, therefore, we see that the existence of individual laws is not the end of our physical knowledge. What
we always reach at last in the course of every physical inquiry,
is the recognition, not of individual laws, but of some definite
relation to each other, in which different laws are placed, so as
to bring about a particular result. But this is, in other words,
the principle of Adjustment, and adjustment has no meaning
except as the instrument and the result of Purpose. Force so
combined with Force as to produce certain definite and orderly
results,-this is the ultimate fact of all discovery.
And so we come upon another sense-the Fourth sense, in
which Law is habitually used in Science, and this is perhaps
the commonest and most important of all.  It is used to
designate not merely an observed Order of facts-not merely
the bare abstract idea of Force-not merely individual Forces
according to ascertained measures of operation-but a number
* This theory of muscular and nervous action is set forth with much ingenuity and
force of i!lu;o lAnton in " Lectures on Epilepsy," etc., by Charles Bland Radcliffe, M.D.




48                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
of Forces in the condition of mutual adjustment, that is to say,
as combined with each other, and fitted to each other for the
attainment of special ends. The whole science of Animal
Mechanics, for example, deals with Law in this sense-with
natural Forces as related to Purpose and subservient to the discharge of Function. And this is the highest sense of all-Law
in this sense being more perfectly intelligible to us than in any
other; because, although we know nothing of the real nature
of Force, even of that Force which is resident in ourselves, we
do know for what ends we exert it, and the principle that
governs our devices for its use. That principle is, Combination
for the accomplishment of Purpose.
Accordingly it is, when natural phenomena can be reduced
to Law, in this last sense, that we reach something which
alone is really in the nature of an explanation. For what do
we mean by an explanation? It is an unfolding or a "making plain."  But as the human mind has many faculties, so
each of these seeks a satisfaction of its own. That which is
made plain to one faculty is not necessarily made plain to
another. That which is a complete answer to the question
What, or to the question How, is no answer at all to the question Why. There are some philosophers who tell us that this
last is a question which had better never be asked, because it
is one to which Nature gives no reply. If this be so, it is
strange that Nature should have given us the faculties which
impel us to ask this question-ay, and to ask it more eagerly
than any other. It is, indeed, true that there is a point beyond
which we need not ask it, because the answer is inaccessible.
But this is equally true of the questions What, and How.
We cannot reach Final Causes any more than Final Purposes.
For every cause which we can detect, there is another cause
which lies behind; and for every purpose which we can see,
there are other purposes which lie beyond.
And so it is true that all things in Nature may either be regarded as means or as ends-for they are always both —only
that Final Ends we can never see. For, as Bishop Butler
truly says in his " Analogy," Chapter IV., "We know what we
ourselves aim at as final ends, and what courses we take merely.s means conducing to these ends. But we are greatly igno.




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.              49
rant how far things are considered by the Author of Nature
under the simple notion of means and ends,-so as that it
may be said this is merely an end, and that merely means, in
His regard. And whether there be not some peculiar absurdity
in our very manner of conception concerning this matter, somewhat contradictory, arising from an extremely imperfect view of
things, it is impossible to say." This is indeed a wise caution,
and one which has been much needed to check the abuse of
that method of reasoning which has been called the doctrine of
Final Causes. When Man makes an implement, he knows
the purpose for which he makes it —he knows the function
assigned to it in his own intention. But as in making it there
are a thousand chips and fragments of material which he casts
aside, so in its final use it often produces consequences and
results which he did not contemplate or foresee. But in Nature all this is different. Nature has no chips or fragments
which she does not put to use; and as on the way to her apparent ends there are no incidents which she did not foresee,
so beyond those ends there are no ulterior results which do
not open out into new firmaments of Design. Of nothing,
therefore, can we say with even the probability of truth that
we see its Final Cause; that is to say, its ultimate purpose.
All that we can ever see are the facts of Adjustment and of
Function, and these constitute not Final, but Immediate Purpose. But a purpose is not less a purpose, because other
purposes may lie beyond it. And not only can we detect
Purpose in natural phenomena, but, as we have already seen,
it is very often the only thing about them which is intelligible
to us. The How is very often incomprehensible, where the
Why is apparent at a glance. And be this observed, that
when Purpose is perceived, it is a "making plain" to a
higher faculty of the mind than the mere sense of Order. It
is a making plain to Reason. It is the reduction of phenomena
to that Order of Thought which is the basis of all other Order
in the works of Man, and which, he instinctively concludes,
is the basis also of all Order in the works of Nature.
And here it is important to observe, that although this general conclusion, like all other general conclusions, belongs to
the cateaorv of meltal inferences. and not to the category of




50                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
physical facts, yet each particular instance of Purpose on
which the general inference is founded, is not an inference
merely, but a fact. The function of an organ, for example,
is a matter of purely physical investigation. But the function
of an organ is not merely that which it does, but it is that
which some special construction enables it to do. It is, not
merely its work, but it is the work assigned to it as an Apparatus, and as fitted to other organs having other functions related to its own. The nature of that Apparatus, as being in
itself an adjustment for a particular purpose, is not an inference
from the facts, but it is part of the facts themselves. The very
idea of Function is inseparable from the idea of Purpose. The
Function of an organ is its Purpose; and the relation of its
parts, and of the whole to that Purpose, is as much and as
definitely a scientific fact as the relation of any other phenomenon to Space, or Time, or Number.
This distinction between Purpose as a general inference and
Purpose as a particular fact, has not been sufficiently observed.
The just condemnation pronounced by Bacon on the pursuit of
Final Causes as distorting the true Method of Physical Investigation, has been applied without discrimination to two very different conceptions. Even Philosophers who believe in the Supremacy of Purpose in Nature have been willing to banish this
conception from the Domain of Science, and to classify it as
belonging altogether to Metaphysics or Theology. Thus in the
very able Harveian Oration for i865 by Dr. H. W. Acland, he
says,-" Whether there be any Purpose, is the object of Theological and Metaphysical, but not of Physical inquiry." * And
again, " The evidence of intention is metaphysical, and depends on probabilities.  It is not positive. It is inferential
from many considerations." t I venture to dissent from these
conclusions. They involve, I think, a confounding of two separate questions. The nature and character of the intending
Mind-this is indeed a question of Theology; but not the existence of intention. Neither in any restrictive sense of the word
can it be called Metaphysical. Even as a general doctrine, the
doctrine of Contrivance and Adjustment is not so metaphysical
as the Doctrine of Homologies; and when we come to particular
* P. 6r.




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.                5 I
cases there can be no question whatever that the relation of a
given Structure to its Purpose and Function comes more uncquivocally under the class of physical facts than the relation
of that same Structure to some corresponding part in another
animal. It is less ideal, for example,-less theoretical-less
mnetaphysical —to assert of the little hooked claw which is attached to the (apparent) elbow of a Bat's wing, that it was
placed there to enable the Bat to climb and crawl, than to affirm
of that same claw that it is the " homologue " of the human
thumb. Yet who can deny that this doctrine of Homologies
iias been established as a strictly scientific truth? There is a
sense, of course, in which all Knowledge and all Science belongs to Metaphysics.  Mere classification, which is the basis
of all Science, what is it but the marshalling of physical facts
in an Ideal Order —an arrangement of them according to the
relation which they bear to the laws of Thought? But this does
not constitute as a branch of Metaphysics, the division of animals into Genera, and Families, and Orders. And what relation can physical facts ever have to Thought so directly cognizable or so susceptible of Demonstration as the relation of an
animal organ to its purpose and function in the animal economy? Whether Purpose be the basis of all natural Order or
not is a separate question. It is at least one of the facts of that
Order. Combination for the accomplishment of Purpose therefore in particular cases, such as the relation between the structure of an Organ and its function, is not merely a safe conclusion of Philosophy, but an ascertained fact of Science. (See
note B.)
This question has acquired additional importance since the
revival in our own day, and with new resources, of that old philosophy which assumes to banish from the domain of Knowledge no small part of the richest and surest acquisitions of Reason. That Philosophy must be tested by a rigid analysis of
thought and language. This is the weapon with which the assault is made, and it is by the same weapon better handled that
it can alone be met. An arbitrary limitation of the word " knowledge," to a particular kind of knowledge, can only be tolerated
on condition that the arbitrary nature of the limitation be constantly kept in view.  In like manner the word "verification "




52                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
may be confined to a particular kind of proof applicable only
to a particular class of truths.  So again, in regard to " Metaphysics," it may be considered with reference to its subjectmatter as denoting a particular branch of inquiry-such as
Psychology —or as a method of investigation which may be applied equally to all subjects which furnish the mind with the
materials of thought. But we must watch against the substitution of one of these meanings for another; and against the jugglery by which men first use Metaphysical Analysis to pull down
conceptions which they dislike, and then denounce Metaphysics
as incapable of establishing any conclusions on which we can
rely. The fact to which I have previously referred,* is a fact
of immense significance, that one of the most able supporters
of the Positive Philosophy in England relegates to Metaphysics
the great scientific fact of Physical Attraction, when it is considered apart from its numerical relations. But if this be considered Metaphysics, then let it be remembered that many of
the most certain truths we know belong to the same category.
From a similar point of view, it might be argued, and it has
actually been argued, that Number and all numerical relations
are purely abstract conceptions of the mind, having no other
reality than as there conceived. (See note C.) The same reasoning may be applied to all our most fundamental conceptions
-without which Science could not even begin her work. The
existence of Force under any form, of which the existence of
Matter is only a special case, may be regarded as a purely
metaphysical conception.  It is surely a comfort to find that, if
all ideas of Plan and of Design in the Adjustments of Organic
Life are to be condemned as Metaphysical, they stand at least
in goodly company among the necessities of Thought. Mr.
Lewes, indeed, himself confesses that " Science finds it indispensable to co-ordinate all the facts in a general concept, such
as a Plan." t But he pronounces it one of the " Infirmities of
Thought " to" realize the concept." But no accurate thinker ever
"realized" such an idea as a " Plan "-that is to say, no one
ever conceived it as existing by itself, separate from an intending Mind. Mr. Lewes complains that " Matter and Force are
* P. 42.              t " qistory of Philosophy," Prologue, p. lxxxvi.




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.                 53
mysterious enough " without a " new mystery of Architectural
Plan, shaping Matter and directing Force." ~  But, substituting here "Mind" for Plan, it may surely be argued that if
Science finds it " indispensable " to co-ordinate all the facts in
some such general concept, this is of itself a proof that the element so introduced does not add to the mystery, but helps to
remove it. Even if it be an " artifice of thought," it can only
be resorted to as rendering the facts not less but more conceivable. And this it plainly does by appealing to an agency having known power in the production of analogous phenomena.
The instinctive wisdom which lies in this "infirmity " of the
mind becomes more apparent when we turn to the efforts of an
acute intellect to cast such infirmities away. The most abstract
metaphysical conceptions are substituted for those which are
denounced: the only difference being that, whilst the old conceptions are intelligible as connecting the Phenomena by a link
of thought which the mind can feel and follow, the new conceptions are unintelligible because they try to describe facts without any reference to the ideas they involve.  No new lightnothing but denser darkness-is cast on the phenomena of
Organic Life by calling " Life the connexus of the organic activities." t  Yet meaningless words are heaped on each other
in the desperate effort to dispense with those conceptions which
can alone render the order of Nature intelligible to us.  Thus
we are told again, that " The Organism is the synthesis of diverse parts, and Life is the synthesis of their properties;" "
and again, that " Vitality is the abstract designation of certain
special properties manifested by Matter under certain special
conditions." ~  Surely there is more light in the old reading:
"Finding," says Mr. Lewes, " in an organism a certain adjustment of parts, which may be reduced to a plan, we are easily
led to conceive that this plan was made before the parts, and that
the adjustment was determined by the plan."   No doubt!
This is the easiest conception, and it is the easiest-because it is
most conformable to the laws of Thought; and that which is
the most conformable to the laws of Thought is that which makes
the nearest approach to absolute Truth attainable by the Mind.
*" History of Philosophy," p. lxxxvi.
t Ibid. -. lxxx.       { Ibid. p. lxxxiii.    ~ Ibid. p. lxxxiv.




54                       THE REIGN  OF LAW.
The universal prevalence of this idea of Purpose in Nature
is indicated by the irresistible tendency which we observe in
the language of Science to personify the Forces, and the combinations of Force by which all natural phenomena are produced. It is a great injustice to scientific men-too often committed-to suspect them of unwillingness to accept the idea of
a Personal Creator merely because they try to keep separate
the language of Science from the language of Theology.* But
it is curious to observe how this endeavor constantly breaks
down-how impossible it is in describing physical phenomena
to avoid the phraseology which identifies them  with  the phenomena of Mind, and is moulded on our own conscious Personality and Will. It is impossible to avoid this language simply
because no other language conveys the impression which innumerable structures leave upon the mind. Take, for example,
the word "contrivance."   How  could  Science do without it?
How could the great subject of Animal Mechanics be dealt
with scientifically without continual reference to Law as that by
which, and through which, special organs are formed for the
doing of special work? What is the very definition of a machine?   Machines do  not increase Force, they only adjust it.
The very idea and essence of a machine is that it is a contrivance for the distribution of Force with a view to its bearing on
special purposes. A man's arm is a machine in which the law
of leverage is supplied to the vital force for the purposes of
prehension.  We shall see presently that a bird's wing is a machine in which the same law is applied, under the most complicated conditions, for the purpose of flight. Anatomy supplies
* A remarkable instance of this injustice has been lately brought to light. Professor
Huxley, in an article in the Fobo-gzzg/zy Revietw, had used one of those vague phrases,
so common with scientific men, about the " unknown and the unknowable " being the
goal of all scientific thought, which not unnaturally suggest the notion that all idea of
a God is unattainable. A writer in the Spectator accordingly dealt with Professor
Huxley as avowing Atheism, and was rebuked by the Professor in a letter published
in the S/6ccZator of Feb. Io, i866. Professor Huxley says: " I do not know that I care
very much about popular odium, so that there is no great merit In saying that if I
really saw fit to deny the existence of a God, I should certainly do so, for the sake of
my own intellectual freedom, and be the honest Atheist you are pleased to say I am.
As it happens, however, I cannot take this position with honesty, inasmuch as it is,
and always has been, a favorite tenet of mine, that Atheism is as absurd, logically
speaking, as Polytheism." On the subject of miracles, in the same letter, Professor
Huxley says, that " denying the possibility of miracles seems to me quite as unjustifiable as speculative Atheism." The question of miracles -ens now tobe admitted on
all hands to be simply a question of evidence




LAW; —ITS DEFINITIONS.                55
an infinite number of similar examples. It is impossible to de.
scribe or explain the facts we meet with in this or in any other
branch of Science without investing the "laws " of Nature with
something of that Personality which they do actually reflect, or
without conceiving of them as partaking of those attributes of
Mind which we everywhere recognize in their working and results.
We may, again, take the Forces which determine the Planetary motions as the grandest and the simplest illustrations of
this truth of Science. Gravitation, as already said, is a Force
which prevails apparently through all space. But it does not
prevail alone. It is a Force whose function it is to balance
other Forces, of which we know nothing, except this,-that
these, again, are needed to balance the Force of Gravitation.
Each Force, if left to itself, would be destructive of the Universe. Were it not for the Force of Gravitation, the centrifugal
Forces which impel the Planets would fling them off into Space.
Were it not for these centrifugal Forces, the Force of Gravitation would dash them against the Sun. The orbits, therefore,
of the Planets, with all that depends upon them, are determined
by the nice and perfect balance which is maintained between
these two Forces; and the ultimate fact of astronomical science
is not the Law of Gravitation, but the Adjustment between this
law and others which are less known, so as to produce and
maintain the existing Solar System.
This is one example of the principle of Adjustment; but no
one example, however grand the scale may be on which it is
exhibited, can give any idea of the extent to which the principle
of Adjustment is required, and is adopted in the works of Nature. The revolution of the seasons, for example-seed-time
and harvest-depend on the Law of Gravitation in this sense,
that if that law were disturbed, or if it were inconstant, they
xould be disturbed and inconstant also.  But the seasons
equally depend on a multitude of other laws,-laws of heat,
laws of light, laws relating to fluids, and to solids, and to gases,
and to magnetic attractions and repulsions, each one of which
laws is invariable in itself, but each of which would produce utter confusion if it were allowed to operate alone, or if it were
not balanced against others in the right proportionh. It is very




56                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
difficult to form any adequate idea of the vast number of laws
which are concerned in producing the most ordinary operations
of Nature. Looking only at the combinations with which Astronomy is concerned, the adjustments are almost infinite.
Each minutest circumstance in the position, or size, or shape of
the Earth, the direction of its axis, the velocity of its motion
and of its rotation, has its own definite effect, and the slightest
change in any one of these relations would wholly alter the
world we live in. And then it is to be remembered that the
seasons, as they are now fitted to us, and as we are fitted to
them, do not depend only on the facts or the laws which Astronomy reveals. They depend quite as much on other sets of
facts, and other sets of laws, revealed by other scicnces,-such,
for example, as Chemistry, Electricity, and Geology. The motion of the Earth might be exactly what it is, every fact in respect to our Planetary position might remain unchanged, yet
the seasons would return in vain if our own atmosphere were
altered in any one of the elements of its composition, or if any
one of the laws regulating the action were other than it is.
Under a thinner air even the torrid zone might be wrapped in
eternal snow. Under a denser air, and one with different refracting powers, the Earth and all that is therein might be burnt
up. And so it is through the whole of Nature: laws everywhere-laws in themselves invariable, but so worked as to produce effects of inexhaustible variety by being pitched against
each other, and made to hold each other in restraint.
I have already referred to Chemistry as a science full of
illustrations of Law in the First and simplest sense-that is, of
facts in observed orders of recurrence.  But Chemistry is a
science not less rich in illustration of Law in the Fourth sense
-that is, of Forces in mutual adjustment.  Indeed, in Chemistry, this system of adjustment among the different properties
of matter is especially intricate and observable. Some of the
laws which regulate Chemical Combination were discovered in
our own time, and are amongst the most wonderful and the
most beautiful which have been revealed by any science.
They are laws of great exactness, having invariable relations to
number and proportion.  Each elementary substance has its
own combining proportions with other elements, so that, except




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.                57
in these proportions, no chemical union can take place at all.
And when chemical union does take place, the compounds
which result have different and even opposite powers according to the different proportions employed. Then, the relations
in which those inorganic compounds stand to the chemistry of
Life, constitute another vast series in which the principle of
adjustment has applications, infinite in number, and as infinite'n beauty. How delicate these relations are, and how tremendous are the issues depending on their management, may be
conceived from this single fact,-that the same elements combined in one proportion are sometimes a nutritious food or a
grateful stimulant, soothing and sustaining the powers of life;
whilst, combined in another proportion, they may be a deadly
ploison, paralyzing the heart and carrying agony along every
nerve and fibre of the animal frame. This is no mere theoretical possibility. It is actually the relation, for example, in which
two well-known substances stand to each other-Tea and
Strychnia.  The active principles of these two substances,
"Theine " and " Strychnine," are identical so far as their
elements are concerned, and differ from each other only in the
proportions in which they are combined.  Such is the power
of numbers in the Laboratory of Nature! What havoc in this
world, so full of Life, would be made by blind chance gambling
with such powers as these! What confusion, unless they were
governed by laws whose certainty makes them capable of fine
adjustment, and therefore subject to accurate control! How
fine these adjustments are, and how absolute is that control, is
indicated in another fact-and that is the few elements out of
which all things are made. The number of substances deemed
elementary has varied with the advance of Science; but as
compared with the variety~of their products, that number may
be considered as infinitesimally small; whilst the progress of
analysis, with glimpses of laws as yet unknown, renders it
almost certain that this number will be found to be smaller
still. Yet out of that small number of elementary substances,
having fixed rules, too, limiting their combination, all the infinite varieties of organic and inorganic matter are built up by
means of nice adjustment. As all the faculties of a powerful
mind can utter their voice in language whose elements are




58                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
reducible to twenty-four letters, so all the forms of Nature, with
all the ideas they express, are worked out from a few simple
elements having a few simple properties.
Simple! can we call them so? Yes, simple by comparison
with the exceeding complication of the uses they are made to
serve: simple also, in this sense, that they follow some simple
rule of numbers. But in themselves these laws, these forces
are incomprehensible. That which is most remarkable about
them is their unchangeableness. The whole mind and imagination of scientific men is often so impressed with this character
of material laws, that no room is left for the perception of other
aspects of their nature and of their work. We hear of rigid
and universal sequence-necessary-invariable;-of unbroken
chains of cause and effect, no link of which can, in the nature
of things, be ever broken. And this idea grows upon the
mind, until in some confused manner it is held as casting out
the idea of Purpose in creation, and inconsistent with the
element of Will. If it be so, the difficulty cannot be evaded
by denying the uniformity, any more than the universality, of
Law. It is perfectly true that every law is, in its own nature,
invariable, producing always precisely and necessarily the
same effects,-that is, provided it is worked under the same
conditions. But then, if the conditions are not the same, the
invariableness of effect gives place to capacities of change
which are almost infinite. It is by altering the conditions
under which any given law is brought to bear, and by bringing
other laws to operate upon the same subject, that our own
Wills exercise a large and increasing power over the material
world. And be it observed-to this end the uniformity of laws
is no impediment, but, on the contrary, it is an indispensable
condition.  Laws are in themselves-if not unchangeable-at
least unchanging, and if they were not unchanging, they could
not be used as the instruments of Will. If they were less
rigorous they would be less certain, and the least uncertainty
would render them incapable of any service. No adjustment,
however nice, could secure its purpose if the implements
employed were of uncertain temper.
The notion therefore that the uniformity or invariableness of
the Laws of Nature cannot be reconciled with their subordina



LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.                59
tion to the exercise of Will, is a notion contrary to our own experience. It is a confusion of thought arising very much out
of the ambiguity of language.  For let it be observed that, of
all the senses in which the word Law is used, there is only one
in which it is true that laws are immutable or invariable, and
that is the sense in which Law is used to designate an individual Force. Gravitation, for example, is immutable in this respect-that (so far as we know) it never operates according to
any other measure than " directly as the mass, and inversely
as the square of the distance." But in all the other senses in
which the word Law is used, laws are not immutable, but, on
the contrary, they are the great instruments, the unceasing
agencies, of change. When, therefore, scientific men speak,
as they often do, of all phenomena being governed by invariable laws, they use language which is ambiguous, and in most
cases they use it in a sense which covers an erroneous idea of
the facts. There are no phenomena visible to Man of which
it is true to say that they are governed by any invariable Force.
That which does govern them is always some variable combinations of invariably forces. But this makes all the difference
in reasoning on the relation of Will to Law, —this is the one
essential distinction to be admitted and observed. There is
no observed Order of facts which is not due to a combination
of Forces; and there is no combination of Forces which is invariable-none which are not capable of change in infinite degrees. In these senses-and these are the common senses in
which Law is used to express the phenomena of Nature-Law
is not rigid, it is not immutable, it is not invariable, but it is,
on the contrary, pliable, subtle, various. In the only sense in
which laws are immutable, this immutability is the very characteristic which makes them subject to guidance through endless
cycles of design. We know this in our own case. It is the
very certainty and invariableness of the laws of Nature which
alone enables us to use them, and to yoke them to our service.
Now, the laws of Nature appear to be employed in the system of Nature in a manner precisely analogous to that in which
we ourselves employ them. The difficulties and obstructions
which are presented by one law in the way of accomplishing a
given purpose, are met and overcome exactly on the same




6o                  THE REIGN OF LAW
principle on which they are met and overcome    Man-viz.,
by knowledge of other laws, and by resource in applying them,
— that is, by ingenuity in mechanical contrivance. It cannot
be too much insisted on, that this is a conclusion of pure
Science.  The relation which an organic structure bears to its
purpose in Nature can be recognized as certainly as the same
relation between a machine and its purpose in human art. It
is absurd to maintain, for example, that the purpose of the
cellular arrangement of material in combining lightness with
strength, is a purpose legitimately cognizable by Science in the
Menai Bridge, but is not as legitimately cognizable when it
is seen in Nature, actually serving the same use. The little
Barnacles which crust the rocks at low tide, and which to live
there at all must be able to resist the surf, have the building of
their shells constructed strictly with reference to this necessity.
It is a structure all hollowed and chambered on the plan which
engineers have so lately discovered as an arrangement of material by which the power of resisting strain or pressure is multiplied in an extraordinary degree. That shell is as pure a bit
of mechanics as the bridge, both being structures in which the
same arrangement is adapted to the same end.
" Small, but a work divine;
Frail, but of force to withstand,
Year upon year, the shock
Of cataract seas that snap
The three-decker's oaken spine."
"'JfauZt,'; TENNYSON.
This is but one instance out of a number which no man can
count.  So far as we know, no Law-that is, no elementary
Force-of Nature is liable to change.  But every Law of Nature is liable to counteraction; and the rule is, that laws are
habitually made to counteract each other in precisely the manner and degree which some definite result requires.
Nor is. it less remarkable that the converse of this is true:
no Purpose is ever obtained in Nature, except by the enlistment of Laws as the means and instruments of attainment,
When an extraordinary result is aimed at, it often happens
that some common law is yoked to extraordinary conditions




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.                6I
and its action is intensified by some special machinery. For
example, the Forces of Electricity are in action, probably, in
all living Organisms, but certainly in the muscular and nervous system of the higher animals. In a very few (so far as
yet known, in only a very few animals among the millions
which exist, and these all belonging to the Class of Fishes), the
electrical action has been so stored and concentrated as to
render it serviceable as a weapon of offence. Creatures which
grovel at the bottom of the sea, or in the slime of rivers, have
been gifted with the astonishing faculty of wielding at their will
the most subtle of all the powers of Nature. They have the
faculty of " shooting out lightning " against their enemies or
their prey. But this gift has not been given without an exact
fulfilment of all the laws which govern Electricity, and which
especially govern its concentration and destructive force. The
Electric Ray, or Torpedo, has been provided with a Battery
closely resembling, but greatly exceeding in the beauty and
compactness of its structure, the Batteries whereby Man has
now learned to make the laws of Electricity subservient to his
will. There are no less than 940 hexagonal columns in this
Battery like those of a bee's comb, and each of these is subdivided by a series of horizontal plates, which appear to be analogous to the plates of the Voltaic Pile. The whole is supplied with an enormous amount of nervous matter, four great
branches of which are as large as the animal's spinal cord, and
these spread out in a multitude of thread-like filaments round
the prismatic columns, and finally pass into all the cells.*
This, again, seems to suggest an analogy with the arrangement
by which an electric current, passing through a coil and round
a magnet, is used to intensify the magnetic force. A complete
knowledge of all the mysteries which have been gradually unfolded from the days of Galvani to those of Faraday, and of
many others which are still inscrutable to us, is exhibited in
this structure. The laws which are appealed to in the accomplishment of this purpose are many and very complicated; because the conditions to be satisfied refer not merely to the
generation of Electric force in the animal to which it is given,
but to its effect on the nervous system of the animals against
* Owen's " Lectures on Comp. Anat." vol. ii. (Fishes).




62                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
which it is to be employed, and to the conducting medium in
which both are moving.
When we contemplate such a structure as this, the idea is
borne in with force upon the mind, that the need of conforming to definite conditions seems as absolute a necessity in making an Electric Fish as in making an Electric Telegraph. But
the fact of these conditions existing, and requiring to be satisfied,-or, in other words, the fact of so many natural laws demanding a first obedience,-is not the ultimate fact, it is not
even the main fact, which Science apprehends in such phenomena as these. On the contrary, that which is most observable and most certain, is the manner in which these conditions
are met, complied with, and, by being complied with, are overcome. But this is, in other words, the subordination of many
laws to a difficult and curious Purpose,-a subordination which
is effected through the instrumentality of a purely mechanical
contrivance.
It is no objection to this universal truth, that the machines
thus employed in Nature are themselves constructed through
the agency of Law. They grow —or, in modern phraseology,
they are developed. But this makes no difference in the case
-or, rather, it only carries us farther back to other and yet
other illustrations of the same truth. This is precisely one of
those cases already referred to, in which Causes are unknown,
whilst Purposes are clear and certain. The Battery of an Electric Fish is both a means and an end. As respects the electric
laws which it puts in motion-that is, as respects the Force
which it concentrates-it must be regarded as a means. As
respects the organic laws by which it is itself developed it is
an end.
What we do know in this case is why the apparatus was
made; that is to say, what we do know is the Purpose. What
we do not know, and have no idea of, is,h7ow it was made; that
is to say, what we do not know is the Law, the Force or Forces,
which have been used as the instrument of that Purpose.
When Man makes a voltaic Battery, he selects materials which
have properties and relations with each other previously ascertained-metals worked out of natural ores, acids distilled
out of other natural substances; and he puts these together in




LAW;-ITS 1bEFINITIONg.               63
such fashion as he knows will generate the mysterious Force
which he desires to evoke and to employ. But how can such a
machine be made out of the tissues of a fish? Well may Mr.
Darwin say, " It is impossible to conceive by what steps these
wondrous organs have been produced." "  We see the Purpose
-that a special apparatus should be prepared, and we see that
it is effected by the production of the machine required; but
we have not the remotest notion of the means employed. Yet
we can see so much as this, that here again other laws, belonging altogether to another department of Nature-laws of organic
growth-are made subservient to a very definite and very peculiar Purpose. The paramount facts disclosed by Science, however, in this case, are these:-first, the adaptation of the animal tissues to form a battery; and, secondly, the Purpose or
function of the apparatus, when made, to discharge electric
shocks.
There is indeed one objection to this method of conception,
which would be a fatal objection if it could be consistently
maintained. But all the strength of this objection lies in the
obscure terrors which a very long word is sometimes capable of
inspiring. This word is " Anthropomorphism."  Purpose and
Design, it is said, is a human conception. Unquestionably it
is, and so is all knowledge in every form. We can never stand
outside ourselves. We can never get behind or above our own
methods of conception.  The human mind can know nothing, and can think of nothing except in terms of its own capacities of thought.  But if this be fatal to our knowledge of
any of the meanings in creation, it must be equally fatal to
our having any knowledge of the very existence of a Creator. Once grant it to be true, "that if we are to apply our
human standard to the Creator in one direction, we must apply
it in all," t-then it will follow that we cannot conceive any
Creator unless it be one as weak, and as corrupt, and as ignorant as ourselves. If this be not bad logic, as on the face of
it it clearly is, then it is not " Theology " alone which goes by
the board.  The purest and most naked Theism  is equally
destroyed.  If it can be said with truth that "the Universal
*" Origin of Species," p. I92, Ist edition.'t Mr. G. H. Lewes, ForfnigNty Reviewo, July, I867, p. 109.




F64                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
Mind is essentially other than the Human Mind," * so that no
recognizable relations can exist between them, then that Universal Mind is to us as if it were not. But those who take
objection to Anthropomorphism, are not generally prepared
to follow it to this extreme conclusion.  Mr. Lewes speaks
of the sceptical philosophy he supports as " rejecting Atheism "-of Atheism  being " an error which it has not maintained,"-of Atheism being not only rash, but " contradictory."tBut every conception of a " Mind," even though it be described
as " Universal," must be in some degree Anthropomorphic.
Our minds can think of another mind only as having sone
powers and properties which in kind are common with our owln.
Nor is this objection avoided by any of the other methods of
conception which are devised to eliminate from the Order of
Nature one of the most patent of its facts. The idea of natural forces working " by themselves" is pre-eminently Anthropomorphic.  This is undoubtedly the way in which they seem
to us to work when we employ them. The idea of those forces
having been so co-ordinated at the first as to produce " necessarily " and "by themselves " all the phenomena of Naturethis is an idea essentially formed on those higher efforts of human
ingenuity in virtue of which " self-acting" machines are made.
It is quite true, no doubt, that this is one aspect in which the
adjustments and contrivances in Nature present themselves to
us. But it does not render this idea more Anthropomorphic,
but rather less, when we add to it other conceptions-such as
the idea of a Mind which is the source of all power, and a Will
which is present in all effects. There may be other difficulties
in the way of this conception, but not the difficulty of Anthropomorphism. From neither of these conceptions, however, can
we eliminate the idea of Purpose and Design.
It is very difficult to divest ourselves of the notion, that
whatever happens by way of natural consequence is thereby
removed, at least by one degree, from being the expression of
Will and the effect of Purpose. We forget that all our own
works, not less than the works of Nature, are works done through
the means and instrumentality of Law. All that we can effect
*Mr. G. H. Lewes, Fortnightly Review, July, 1867, p, 109.
f Ibid. p. T07.




LAW;-ITS DEFiNITIONS.               65
is brought about by way of natural consequence. All our machines are simply contrivances for bringing natural Forces into
operation; and these machines themselves we are able to construct only out of the materials and by application of the laws
of Nature. The Steam-engine works by way of natural consequence; so does Mr Babbage's Calculating Machine; so does
the Electric Telegraph; so does the Solar System. It is true,
indeed, that in all human machinery we know by the evidence
of sight the ultimate agency to which the machinery is due,
whereas in the machinery of Nature the ultimate agency is concealed from  sight. But it is the very business and work of
Science to rise from the Visible to the Invisible-from what we
observe by Sense to what we know by Reason.
And this brings us to the Fifth meaning in which the word
Law is habitually used in Science,-a meaning which is indeed
well deserving of attention. In this sense, Law is used to designate, not any observed Order of facts,-not any Force to
which such Order may be due,-neither yet any combination of
Force adjusted to the discharge of function, but-some purely
Abstract Idea, which carries up to a higher point our conception of what the phenomena are and of what they do. There
may be no phenomena actually corresponding to such Idea,
and yet a clear conception of it may be essential to a right
understanding of all the phenomena around us. A good example of Law in this sense is to be found in the law which, in
the Science of Mechanics, is called the First Law of Motion.
The law is, that all Motion is in itself (that is to say, except as
affected by extraneous Forces) uniform in velocity, and rectilinear in direction. Thus according to this law a body moving, and
not subject to any extraneous Force, would go on moving forever
at the same rate of velocity, and in an exactly straight line.
Now, there is no such motion as this existing on the earth or
in the heavens. It is an Abstract Idea of Motion which no
man has ever, or can ever, see exemplified.  Yet a clear apprehension of this Abstract Idea was necessary to a right understanding and to the true explanation of all the motions which
are actually seen. It was long before this idea was arrived at;
and for want of it, the efforts of Science to explain the visible
phenomena of Motion were always taking a wrong direction.
5




66                    THE REIGN OP LAW.
There was a real difficulty in conceiving it, because not only is
there no such motion in Nature, but there is no possibility by
artificial means of producing it. It is impossible to release any
moving body from the impulses of extraneous Force. The
First Law of Motion is therefore a purely Abstract Idea. It
represents a Rule which never operates as we conceive it, by
itself, but is always complicated with other Rules which produce a corresponding complication in result. Like many other
laws of the same class, it was discovered, not by looking outwards, but by looking inwards; not by observing, but by thinking. The human mind, in the exercise of its own faculties and
powers, sometimes by careful reasoning, sometimes by the intuitions of genius unconscious of any process, is able, from time
to time, to reach now one, now another, of those purely Intellectual Conceptions which are the basis of all that is intelligi
ble to us in the Order of the Material World. We look for
an ideal order or simplicity in material Law; and the very
possibility of exact Science depends upon the fact that such
ideal order does actually prevail, and is related to the abstract
conceptions of our own intellectual nature.  It is in this way
that many of the greatest discoveries of Science have been made.
Especially have the great pioneers in new paths of discovery
been led to the opening of those paths by that fine sense for
abstract truths which is the noblest gift of genius. Copernicus,
Kepler, and Galileo were all guided in their profound interpretations of visible phenomena by those intuitions which arise in
minds finely organized, brought into close relations with the
mind of Nature, and highly trained in the exercise of speculative
thought. They guessed the truth before they proved it to be
true; and those guesses had their origin in Abstract Ideas of
the mind which turned out to be ideas really embodied in the
Order of the Universe. So constantly has this recurred in the
history of Science, that, as Dr. Whewell says, it is not to be
considered as an exception, but as the rule.*
Here again it is very instructive to observe how " Law " in
* Whewell's " History of the Inductive Sciences," 2d edition, vol. i. page 434. Speaxing of Copernicus, Dr. Whewell says, in another place: " It is manifest that in this, as
in other cases of discovery, a clear and steady possession of abstract Ideas, and an
aptitude in comprehending real Facts under these general conceptions, must have
been leading characters in the Discoverer's mind."-Vol. i. p. 389.




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.                  67
this last sense is dealt with by the Positive Philosophy. Scientific men are accustomed to reckon such Laws as the First Law
of Motion among the surest possessions of pure Intellect, and
the faculty by which they are conceived among the noblest
proofs of its energy and power. Positivism, on the contrary,
regards such laws as mere "artifices" of thought, and the
Power by which they are conceived not as a Strength, but as
an " Infirmity " of Mind.+  I *1o not deny that the process by
which these Abstractions are attained is a metaphysical process,-that is to say, they are purely mental rDnceptions. But
the process which denies " reality" to these conceptions is also
purely a metaphysical process, with this only difference, that it
is bad metaphysics instead of good. The analysis which
evolves these abstract Laws out of the phenomena of Nature is
an analysis which truly co-ordinates the order of those phenomena with an Order of Thought.  The counter Analysis
wvhich pronounces them  to be mere artifices of Thought, and
" preliminary falsifications of fact," is an attempt to make Reason disbelieve herself, and immerses us at once in the worst
kind of Metaphysics-that which has made the name almost
opprobrious —even the old Scholastic subtleties of the Nominalistic and the Realistic controversy.
And now having traced the various senses in which Law is
used, we can form  some estimate on the value of those conclusions of which some men are so boastful and of which other
men are so much afraid.  We can see how much and how
little is really meant when it is said that Law can be traced in
all things, and all things can be traced to Law. It is a great
mistake to suppose that, in establishing this conclusion, the
progress of modern investigation is in a direction tending to
Materialism. This may be and always has been the tendency
of individual minds.  There are men who would stare into the
very Burning Bush without a thought that the ground on which
they stand must be Holy Ground. It is not now of wood or
stone that men maike their Idols, but of their own abstract conceptions. Before these, borrowing for them the attributes of
* "Science is distinguished from common knowledge by its conscious employment
of artifices which our infirmity renders indispensable." Again, " Abstraction is one
of the necessary (from infirmity) artifices of research."-Lewes's " Prologue," p.
lxxxix.




68                THE REIGN OF LAW.
Personality, they bow down and worship. Nothing is more
common than to find men who may be trusted thoroughly on
the facts of their own Science, who cannot be trusted for a
moment on the place which those facts assume in the general
system  of truth. Philosophy must include Science; but
Science does not necessarily include Philosophy. There are,
and there always have been, some special misconceptions connected with the prosecution of physical research. It is, however, on the surface of things, rather than below it, that the
suggestions of Materialism  lie thickest to the eye. They
abound among the commonest facts which obtrude themselves
on our attention in Nature and in human life. When the bursting of some small duct of blood upon the Brain is seen to destroy in a moment the Mind of Man, and to break down all the
powers of his Intellect and his Will, we are in presence of a
fact whose significance cannot be increased by a million of
other facts analogous in kind.
Yet on every fresh discovery of a few more such facts, there
is generally some fresh outbreak of old delusions respecting
the forms and the Laws of Matter as the supreme realities of
the world. But when the new facts have been looked at a
little longer, it is always seen that they take their place with
others which have been long familiar, and the eternal problems
which lie behind all natural phenomena are seen to be unaffected and unchanged. Like the most distant of the Fixed
Stars, they have no parallax. The whole orbit of human
knowledge shows in them no apparent change of place. No
amount of knowledge of the kind which alone physical Science
can impart can do more than widen the foundation of intelligent spiritual beliefs. We think that Astronomy and Geology
have given to us in these latter days ideas wholly new in respect to Space and Time. Yet, after all, can we express those
ideas, or can we indicate the questions they suggest, in any
language which approaches in power to the majestic utterances
of David and of Job? We know more than they knew of the
magnitude of the Heavenly Bodies; but what more can we say
than they said of the wonder of them,-of Orion, of Arcturus,
and the Pleiades? *  We know that the earth moves, which
* Job ix. 9.




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.                69
they did not know; and we know that the rapid rotation of a
globe on its own axis is a means of maintaining the steadiness
of that axis in its course through Space. But what effect, except that of increasing its significance, has this knowledge
upon the praise which David ascribes to that ultimate Agency
w\hich has made the round world so sure "that it cannot be
moved? " 
And so of other departments of Science. Even the modern
idea of Law, of the constancy and therefore the trustworthiness of Natural Forces, has been known, not indeed scientifically but instinctively, to Mian since first he made a Tool, and
ased it as the instrument of Purpose. What has Science added
Lo this idea, except that the same rule prevails as widely as the
Universe, and is made subservient in a like manner to Knowl-?dge and to Will? In the enthusiasm awakened by the discovery of some new facts, or of some new forces, and in the,reshness with which they impress the idea of such agencies on
)ur minds, we sometimes very naturally exaggerate the length
)f way along which they carry us towards the great ultimate
)bjects of intellectual desire. We forget altogether that the:nowledge they convey is in quality and in kind identical with
i nowledge already long in our possession, and places us in no
new relation whatever to the vast background of the Eternal
and the Unseen. Thus it is that the notions of Materialism
are perpetually reviving, and are again being perpetually swept
away-swept away partly before the Intuitions of the Mind,
partly before the Conclusions of the Reason. For there are
two great enemies to Materialism,-one rooted in the Affections, the other in the Intellect.  One is the power of THINGS
HOPED FOR-a power which never dies: the other is the evidence of THINGS NOT SEEN-and this evidence abounds in all
we see.  In re-enforcing this evidence, and In adding to it,
Science is doing boundless work in the present day. It is not
the extent of our knowledge, but rather the limits of it that
physical research teaches us to see and feel the most. Of
course, in so far as its discoveries are really true, its influence
must be for good. To doubt this were to doubt that all truth
is true, and that all truth is God's.
* Ps. xciii. I,




70                 TI-IE REIGN OF LAW.
There are eddies in every stream-eddies where rubbish will
collect, and circle for a time.  But the ultimate bearing of
scientific truth cannot be mistaken. Nothing is more remarkable in the present state of physical research than what may be
called the transcendental character of its results. And what is
transcendentalism but the tendency to trace up all things to the
relation in which they stand to abstract Ideas?  And what is
this but to bring all physical phenomena nearer and nearer
into relation with the phenomena of Mind?  The old speculations of Philosophy which cut the ground from Materialism by
showing how little we know of Matter, are now being daily
re-enforced by the subtle analysis of the Physiologist, the
Chemist, and the Electrician. Under that analysis Matter dissolves and disappears, surviving only as the phenomena of
Force; which again is seen converging along all its lines to
some common centre —" sloping through darkness up to God." *
Even the writers who have incurred most reasonable suspicion
as to the drift of their teaching, give nevertheless constant witness to what may be called the purely mental quality of the
ultimate results of physical inquiry. It has been said with
perfect truth that " the fundamental ideas of modern Science are
as transcendental as any of the axioms in ancient philosophy.t
We have seen that one of the senses in which Law is habitually
used is to designate abstract ideas and doctrines of this kind.
So far from these doctrines and ideas having a tendency to
Materialism, they serve rather to bring inside the strict domain
of Science ideas which in the earlier stages of human knowledge lay wholly within the region of Faith or of Belief. For
example, the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews specially declares that it is by Faith that we understand " that the things
which are seen were not made of the things which do appear."
Yet this is now one of the most assured doctrines of Science,
-that invisible Forces are behind and above all visible phenomena, moulding them in forms of infinite variety, of all
which forms the only real knowledge we possess lies in our
perception of the Ideas they express-of their beauty, or of their
fitness,-in short, of their being all the work of "Toil co
operant to an End."
* Ttrnyson's " In Memoriam."    t Lewes's 1 Philosophy of Aristotle," p. 66.




LAW;-ITS DEFINITIONS.                 71
Every natural Force which we call a law is itself invisible —the
idea of it in the mind arising by way of necessary inference out
of an observed Order of facts. And very often, if not always,
in our conception of these Forces, we are investing them  with
the attributes of Intelligence and of Will at the very moment,
perhaps, when we are stumbling over the difficulty of seeing in
them the exponents of a Mind which is intelligent and of a
Will which is Supreme.  The deeper we go in Science, the
more certain it becomes that all the realities of Nature are in
the region of the Invisible, so that the saying is literally, and
not merely figuratively true, that the things which are seen are
temporal, and it is only the things which are not seen that are
eternal. For example, we never see the phenomena of Life dissociated from Organization. Yet the profoundest physiologists
have come to the conclusion that Organization is not the cause
of Life, but, on the contrary, that Life is the cause of Organization,-Life being something —a Force of some kind, by
whatever name we may call it-which precedes Organization,
and fashions it, and builds it up. This was the conclusion come
to by the great anatomist Hunter, and it is the conclusion en,
dorsed in our own day by such men as Dr. Carpenter and Professor Huxley,-men neither of whom have exhibited in their
philosophy any undue bias towards either theological or
metaphysical explanations. One illustration referred to by
these writers is derived from the shells-the beautiful shellsof the animals called the " Foraminifera." *  No Forms in Nature are more exquisite. Yet they are the work and the abode
of animals which are mere blobs of jelly-without parts, without organs-absolutely without visible structure of any kind. In
this jelly, nevertheless, there works a "vital Force " capable
of building up an Organism of most complicated and perfect
symmetry.
But what is a vital Force? It is something which we cannot
see, but' of whose existence we are as certain as we are of its
visible effects-nay, which our reason tells us precedes and is
superior to these. We often speak of Material Forces as if we
could identify any kind of Force with Matter. But this is only
one of the many ambiguities of language. All that we mean
" The Elements of Comparative Anatomy," (Huxley,) pp. Io, zX,




72                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
by a Material Force is a force which acts upon Matter, and
produces in Matter its own appropriate effects. We must go a
step further therefore and ask ourselves, What is Force? What
is our conception of it? What idea can we form, for example,
of the real nature of that Force, the measure of whose operation
has been so exactly ascertained-the Force of Gravitation? It
is invisible-imponderable-all our words for it are but circumlocutions to express its phenomena or effects.
There are many kinds of.force in Nature-which we distinguish after the same fashion —according to their effects or according to the forms of Matter in which they become cognizable to us. But if we trace all our conceptions on the nature
of Force to their fountain-head, we shall find that they are
formed on our own consciousness of Living Effort-of that
force which has its seat in our own vitality, and especially on
that kind of it which can be called forth at the bidding of the
Will. In saying this I do not mean to borrow from that false
philosophy which pretends by the exercise of reason to get behind all the intuitive convictions on which reason rests. It is
in this way that men have come to argue on what they call the
"reality of an external world."  Even if there were no process
of reasoning capable of defending that reality, this would not
lend a reasonable character to doubts regarding it. Reason
must start from some postulate —some primary truths which
cannot be denied.  But we need not assume the reality of an
external world to be one of these. Yet if it be not a first step),
it is a second step hardly distinguishable from the first. Selfexistence is of course the truth which may be regarded as the
first of all, but in the very idea of Self the existence of that
which is Not-Self is necessarily involved. In connecting, however, our conceptions of Force with the consciousness of Living
Effort in ourselves, we must guard against mistaking analogy
for identity, and against confounding together two items of
knowledge which are quite distinct. Correlative with'the consciousness of Living Effort in ourselves, and inseparable from
it, there is the consciousness of Force acting on us, as well as
acting in us. And this argument applies equally whether Self
be regarded as a perceiving Mind, or as a physical Organism
through which Mind perceives, Thus the knowledge of an ex



LAW; —ITS DEFINITIONS.                73
ternal world-that is to say, the knowledge of external Forcestands side by side with the knowledge of Self. Nothing can
be known except as distinguished from other things; and all
things which are distinguishable from each other, are, in a
sense, and in the measure of that distinction, known. And so
we know the existence both of internal and of external Force.
But if we come to ask ourselves farther questions, as to the nature and seat of Material Force, we can only think of it in the
terms of the Vital Force exerted by ourselves. If we can ever
know anything of the nature of any Force, it ought to be of this
one. And yet the fact is that we know nothing. If, then, we
know nothing of that kind of Force which is so near to us, and
with which our own Intelligence is in such close alliance, much
less can we know the ultimate nature of Force in its other
forms.
It is important to dwell on this, because both the aversion
with which some men regard the idea of the Reign of Law, and
the triumph with which some others hail it, are founded on a
notion that, when we have traced any given phenomena to what
are called Natural Forces, we have traced them farther than
we really have. We know nothing of the ultimate nature, or
of the ultimate seat of Force.  Science, in the modern doctrine
of the Conservation of Energy, and the Convertibility of
Forces, is already getting something like a firm hold of the idea
that all kinds of Force are but forms or manifestations of some
one Central Force issuing from some one Fountain-head of
Power.  Sir John Herschel has not hesitated to say, that " it is
but reasonable to regard the Force of Gravitation as the direct
or indirect result of a Consciousness or a Will existing somewhere." *  And even if we cannot certainly identify Force in
all its forms with the direct energies of One Omnipresent and
all-pervading Will, it is at least in the highest degree unphilosophical to assume the contrary-to speak or to think as if the
Forces of Nature were either independent of, or even separate
from, the Creator's Power.
It follows, then, from these considerations, that whatever
difficulty there may be in conceiving of a Will not exercised by
a visible Person, it is a difficulty which cannot be evaded by
*' Outlines of Astronomy," 5th edition, p. 29I.




74                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
arresting our conceptions at the point at'which they have arrived in forming the idea of Laws or Forces. That idea is
itself made up out of elements derived from our own consciousness of Personality. This fact is seen by men who do not see
the interpretation of it. They denounce as a superstition the
idea of any Personal Will separable from  the Forces which
work in Nature. They say that this idea is a mere projection
of our own Personality into the world beyond-the shadow of
our own Form cast upon the ground on which we look. And
indeed this, in a sense, is true. It is perfectly true that the
Mind does recognize in Nature a reflection of itself. But if
this be a deception, it is a deception which is not avoided by
transferring the idea of Personality to the abstract Idea of
Force, or by investing combinations of Force with the attributes
of Mind.
We need not be jealous, then, when new domains are claimed
as under the Reign of Law-an agency through which we see
working everywhere some Purpose of the Everlasting Will.
There are many things in Nature of which we do not see the
reason; and many other things of which we cannot find out the
cause; but there are none from which we exclude the idea of
Purpose by success in discovering the cause. It has been said,
with perfect truth, by a living naturalist who is of all others most
opposed to what he calls Theological explanations in Science,
that we may just as well speak of a watch as the abode of a
" watch-force," as speak of the organization of an animal as the
abode of a " vital Force." * The analogy is precise and accurate.
The Forces by which a watch moves are natural Forces.  It is
the relation of interdependence in which those Forces are placed
to each other, or, in other words, the adjustment of them to a
particular Purpose, which constitutes the " watch-force;" and
the seat of this Force-which is in fact no one Force, but a
combination of many Forces-is in the Intelligence which conceived that combination, and in the Will which gave it effect.
The mechanisms devised by Man are in this respect only an
image of the more perfect mechanism of Nature, in which the
same principle of Adjustment is always the highest result which
Science can ascertain or recognize. There is this difference,
* Lewes's " Philosophy of Aristotle," p. 87.




LAW; —ITS DEFINITIONS.             75
indeed,-that in regard to our works we see that our knowledge
of natural laws is very imperfect, and our control over them is
very feeble; whereas in the machinery of Nature there is evidence of complete knowledge and of absolute control. The
universal rule is, that everything is brought about by way of
Natural Consequence. But another rule is, that all natural
consequences meet and fit into each other in endless circles of
Harmony and of Purpose. And this can only be explained by
the fact that what we call Natural Consequence is always the
conjoint effect of an infinite number of elementary Forces,
whose action and reaction are under direction of the Will which
we see obeyed, and of the Purposes which we see actually attained.
It is, indeed, the completeness of the analogy between our
own works on a small scale, and the works of the Creator on
an infinitely large scale, which is the greatest mystery of all.
Man is under constraint to adopt the principle of Adjustment,
because the Forces of Nature are external to and independent
of his Will. They may be managed, but they cannot be disobeyed. It is impossible to suppose that they stand in the same
relation to the Will of the Supreme; yet it seems as if He took
the same method of dealing with them —never violating them,
never breaking them, but always ruling them by that which we
call Adjustment or Contrivance. Nothing gives us such an idea
of the immutability of Laws as this! nor does anything give us
such an idea of their pliability to use. How imperious they are,
yet how submissive! How they reign, yet how they serve!




CHAPTER III.
CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY ARISING OUT OF THE REIGN OF LAWEXAMPLE IN THE MACHINERY OF FLIGHT.
THE necessity of Contrivance for the accomplishment of
Purpose arises out of the immutability of Natural Forces. They
must be conformed to, and obeyed. Therefore, where they do
not serve our purpose directly, they can only be made to serve
it by ingenuity and contrivance. This necessity, then, may be
said to be the index and the measure of the power of Law.
And so, on the other hand, the certainty with which Purpose
can be accomplished by Contrivance, is the index and the measure of mental knowledge and resource. It is by wisdom and
knowledge that the Forces of Nature-even those which may
seem most adverse-are yoked to service. lThis idea of the relation in which Law stands to Will, and in which Will stands to
Law, is familiar to us in the works of Man: but it is less familiar
to us as equally holding good in the works of Nature. We feel,
sometimes, as if it were an unworthy notion of the Will'which
works in Nature, to suppose that it should never act except
through the use of means. But 6ur notions of unworthiness
are themselves often the unworthiest of all. They must be
ruled and disciplined by observation of that which is,-not
founded on gairiori conceptions of what ought to be. Nothing
is more certain than that the whole Order of Nature is one vast
system of Contrivance. And what is Contrivance but that kind
of arrangement by which the unchangeable demands of Law
are met and satisfied? It may be that all natural Forces are
resolvable into some One Force; and indeed in the modern
doctrine of the Correlation of Forces, an idea which is a near
approach to this, has already entered the domain of Science.
It may also be that this One Force, into which all others return
again, is itself but a mode of action of the Divine Will. But
we have no instruments whereby to reach this last analysis.




CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.             77
Whatever the ultimate relation may be between mental and
material Force, we can at least see clearly this,-that in Nature
there is the most elaborate machinery to accomplish Purpose
through the instrumentality of means.  It seems as if all that
is done in Nature as well as all that is done in art, were done
by knowing how to rdo it. It is curious how the language of the
great Seers of the Old Testament corresponds with this idea.
They uniformly ascribe all the operations of Nature-the greatest and the smallest-to the working of Divine Power. But
they never revolt-as so many do in these weaker days-from
the idea of this Power working by wisdom and knowledge in the
use of means; nor, in this point of view, do they ever separate
between the work of first Creation, and the work which is going
on daily in the existing world. Exactly the same language is
applied to the rarest exertions of power, and to the gentlest and
most constant of all natural operations.  Thus the saying that
" The Lord by wisdom hath founded the Earth; by understanding hath He established the Heavens,"-is coupled in the
same breath with this other saying, "' By His knowledge the
depths are broken up, and the clouds drop down the dew." *
Every instance of Contrivance which we can thoroughly follow and understand, has an intense interest-as casting light
upon this method of the Divine government, and upon the analogy between the operations of our own minds and the operations
of the Creator. Some instances will strike us more than others
-and those will strike us most which stand in some near comparison with our own human efforts of ingenuity and contrivance.
There is one such instance which I propose to consider in this
chapter-the machinery by which a great purpose has been accomplished in Nature -apurpose which Man has never been
able to accomplish in art, and that is the Navigation of the Air.
No more beautiful example can be found, even in the wide and
rich domain of Animal Mechanics-none in which we can trace
more clearly, too, the mode and method in which laws the most
rigorous and exact are used as the supple instruments of Purpose.
"The way of an Eagle in the air" was one of the things of
which Solomon said, that " he knew it not." No wonder that
* Prov. iii. I,9 20.




78                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
the Wise King reckoned it among the great mysteries of Nature!
The Force of Gravitation, though its exact measure was not as
certained till the days of Newton, has been the most familiar of
all Forces in all ages of MIankind.  How, then, in violation of
its known effects, could heavy bodies be supported upon the
thin air-and be gifted with the power of sustaining and directing movements more easy, more rapid, and more certain than
the movements of other animals upon the firm and solid earth?
No animal motion in Nature is so striking or so beautiful as the
" Scythe-like sweep of wings, that dare
The headlong plunge through eddying gulfs of air."
" Wayside Inn," LONGFELLOW.
Nor will the wonder cease when, so far as the mechanical problem is concerned, the mystery of flight is solved. If we wish
to see how material laws can be bent to purpose, we shall study
this problem.
In the first place, it is remarkable that the Force which seems
so adverse-the Force of Gravitation drawing down all bodies
to the earth-is the very Force which is the principal one concerned in flight, and without which flight would be impossible.
It is curious how completely this has been forgotten in almost
all human attempts to navigate the air. Birds are not lighter
than the air, but immensely heavier. If they were lighter than
the air they might float, but they could not fly. This is the
difference between a Bird and a Balloon. A Balloon rises
because it is lighter than the air, and floats upon it. Consequently, it is incapable of being directed, because it possesses
in itself no active Force enabling it to resist the currents of the
air in which it is immersed, and because, if it had such a force,
it would have no fulcrum, or resisting medium against which to
exert it. It becomes, as it were, part of the atmosphere, and
must go with it where it goes. No Bird is ever for an instant
of time lighter than the air in which it flies; but being, on the
contrary, always greatly heavier, it keeps possession of a Force
capable of supplying momentum, and therefore capable of overcoming any lesser Force, such as the ordinary resistance of the
atmosphere, and even of heavy gales of wind. The Law of
Gravitation, therefore, is used in the flight of Birds as one of




CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.                79
the most essential of the Forces which are available for the accomplishment of the end in view.
The next law appealed to, and pressed into the service, is
again a law which would seem an impediment in the way.
This is the resisting force of the atmosphere in opposing any
body moving through it. In this force an agent is sought and
found for supplying the requisite balance to the Force of
Gravity. But in order that the resisting force of air should be
effectual for this purpose, it must be used under very peculiar
conditions. The resisting force of fluids, and of airs or gases,
is a force acting equally in all directions, unless special means
are taken to give it predominant action in some special direction. If it is a force strong enough to prevent a body from falling, it is also a force strong enough to prevent it from advancing. In order, therefore, to solve the problem  of flight, the
resisting power of the air must be called into action as strongly
as possible in the direction opposite to the Force of Gravity,
and as little as possible in any other.  Consequently a body
capable of flight must present its maximum of surface to the
resistance of the air in the perpendicular direction, and its
minimum of surface in the horizontal direction.  Now, both
these conditions are satisfied (I) by the great breadth or
length  of surface  presented  to  the air  perpendicularly
in a Bird's expanded wings, and by (2) the narrow lines
presented in its shape horizontally, when in the act of forward
motion through the air. But something more yet is required
for flight. Great as the resisting force of air is, it is not strong
enough to balance the Force of Gravity by its mere pressure
on an expanded wing-unless that pressure is increased by an
appeal to yet other laws-and other properties of its nature.
Every sportsman must have seen cases in which a flying Bird
has been so wounded as to produce a rigid expansion of the
wings. This does not prevent the Bird from falling, although
it breaks the fall, and makes it come more or less gently to the
ground.
Yet further, therefore, to accomplish flight, another law must
be appealed to, and that is the immense elasticity of the air,
and the reacting force it exerts against compression. To enable an animal heavier than the air to support itself against the




So                  THE REIGN OF LAW.
Force of Gravity, it must be enabled to strike the air downwards with such force as to occasion a rebound upwards of
corresponding power. The wing of a flying animal must, therefore, (lo something more than barely balance Gravity.  It must
be able to strike the air with such violence as to call forth a
reaction equally violent, and in the opposite direction. This
is the function assigned to the powerful muscles by which the
wings of Birds are flapped with such velocity and strength.
We need not follow this part of the problem further, because
it does not differ in kind from the muscular action of other
animals. The connection, indeed, between the Wills of animals and the mechanism of their frame, is the last and highest
problem  of all in the mechanics of Nature; but it is merged
and hid forever in the one great mystery of Life. But so far
as this difficulty is concerned, the action of an Eagle's wing is
not more mysterious than the action of a Man's arm. There
is a greater concentration of muscular power in the organism of
Birds than in most other animal frames; because it is an essential part of the problem to be solved in flight, that the
engine which works the wings should be very strong, very comnpact, of a special form, and that, though heavier than the air, it
should not have an excessive weight. These conditions are
all met in the power, in the outline, and in the bulk of the
pectoral muscles which move the wings of Birds. Few persons
have any idea of the force expended in the action of ordinary flight. The pulsations of the wing in most Birds are so
rapid that they cannot be counted. Even the Heron seldom
flaps its wings at a rate of less than from 120 to I50 strokes in
a minute. This is counting only the downward strokes, preparatory to each one of which there must be an upward stroke
also; so that there are from 240 to 300 separate movements
per minute. Yet the Heron is remarkable for its slow and
heavy flight, and it is difficult to believe, until one has timed
the pulsations with a watch, that they have a rapidity approaching to two in a second. But this difficulty is an index to the
enormous comparative rapidity of the faster-flying Birds. Let
any one try to count the pulsations of the wing in ordinary
flight of a Pigeon, or of a Blackcock, or of a Partridge, or, still
more, of any of the diving sea-fowl. He will find that though,




CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.               8I
in the case of most of these Birds, the quickness of sight enables him to see the strokes separate from each other, it is utterly impossible to count them; whilst in some Birds, especially
in the Divers, as well as in the Pheasant and Partridge tribe,
the velocity is so great that the eye cannot follow it at all, and
the vibration of the wings leaves only a blurred impression on
the eye.
Our subject here, however, is not so much the amount of
vital force bestowed on Birds, as the mechanical laws which
are appealed to in order to make that force effective in the
accomplishment of flight. The elasticity of the air is the law
which offers itself for the counteraction of gravity.  But, in
order to make it available for this purpose, there must be some
great force of downward blow in order to evoke a corresponding rebound in the opposite, or upward direction.  Now, what
is the nature of the implement required for striking this downward blow? There are many conditions it must fulfil. First,
it must be large enough in area to compress an adequate volume of air; next, it must be light enough in substance not to
add an excess of weight to the already heavy body of the Bird;
next, it must be strong enough in frame to withstand the pressure which its own action on the air creates. The first of
these conditions is met by an exact adjustment of the size or
area of the wing to the size and weight of the Bird which it is
to lift. The second and the third conditions are both met by
the provision of a peculiar substance, feathers, which are very
light and very strong; whilst the only heavy parts of the
framework, namely, the bones in which the feathers are inserted, are limited to a very small part of the area required.
But there is another difficulty to be overcome-a difficulty
opposed by natural laws, and which can only be met by another
adjustment, if possible more ingenious and beautiful than the
rest.  It is obvious that if a Bird is to support itself by the
downward blow of its wings upon the air, it must at the end of
each downward stroke lift the wing upwards again, so as to be
ready for the next. But each upward stroke is in danger of
neutralizing the effect of the downward stroke.  It must be
made with equal velocity, and if it required equal force it must
produce equal resistance,-an equal rebound from the elas6




F82                THE REIGN OF LAW.
ticity of the air. If this difficulty were not evaded somehow,
flight would be impossible. But it is evaded by two mechanical contrivances, which, as it were, triumph over the laws of
aerial resistance by conforming to them. One of these contrivances is, that the upper surface of the wing is made convex,
whilst the under surface is concave. The enormous difference
which this makes in atmospheric resistance is familiarly known
to us by the difference between the effect of the wind on an umbrella which is exposed to it on the under or the upper side.
The air which is struck by a concave or hollow surface is gathered up, and prevented from escaping; whereas the air struck
by a convex or bulging surface escapes readily on all sides,
and comparatively little pressure or resistance is produced.
And so, from the convexity of the upper surface of a Bird's wing,
the upward stroke may be made with comparatively trifling injury to the force gained in the downward blow.
But this is only half of the provision made against a consequence which would be so fatal to the end in view. The other
half consists in this-that the feathers of a Bird's wing are
made to underlaj5 each other, so that in the downward stroke the
pressure of the air closes them upwards against each other, and
converts the whole series of them into one connected membrane, through which there is no escape; whilst in the upward
stroke the same pressure has precisely the reverse effect-it
opens the feathers, separates them from each other, and converts each pair of feathers into a self-acting valve, through
which the air rushes at every point. Thus the same implement is changed in the fraction of a second from a close and
continuous membrane which is impervious to *the air, into a series of disconnected joints through which the air passes without
the least resistance-the machine being so adjusted that when
pressure is required the maximum of pressure is produced, and,
when pressure is to be avoided, it is avoided in spite of rapid
and violent action.
This, however, exhausts but a small part of the means by which
Law is made to do the work of Will in the machinery of flight.
It might easily be that violent and rapid blows, struck downwards against the elastic air, might enable animals possessed of
such power to lift themselves from  the ground and nothing




CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITV.               83
more. There is a common toy which lifts itself in this manner
from the force exerted by the air in resisting, and reacting upon
little vanes which are set spinning by the hand. But the toy
mounts straight up, and is incapable of horizontal motion. So,
there are many structures of wing which might enable animals
to mount into the air, but which would not enable them to advance or to direct their flight.  How, then, is this essential
purpose gained? Again we find an appeal made to natural
laws, and advantage taken of their certainty and unchangeableness.
The power of forward motion is given to Birds, first oy the
direction in which the whole wing feathers are set, and next by
the structure given to each feather in itself. The wing feathers are all set backwards,-that is, in the direction opposite to
that in which the Bird moves; whilst each feather is at the
same time so constructed as to be strong and rigid toward its
base, and extremely flexible and elastic towards its end. On
the other hand, the front of the wing, along the greater part of
its length, is a stiff hard edge, wholly unelastic and unyielding
to the air. The anterior and posterior webs of each feather are
adjusted on the same principle. The consequence of this disposition of the parts as a whole, and of this construction of each
of the parts, is, that the air which is struck and compressed in
the hollow of the wing, being unable to escape throzigh the
wing, owing to the closing upwards of the feathers against each
other, and being also unable to escape forwards owing to the
rigidity of the bones and of the quills in that direction, finds its
easiest escape backwards.  In passing backwards it lifts by its
force the elastic ends of the feathers; and thus whilst effecting this escape, in obedience to the law of action and reaction.
it communicates, in its passage along the whole line of both
wings, a corresponding push forwards to the body of the Bird.
By this elaborate mechanical contrivance the same volume of
air is made to perform the double duty of yielding pressure
enough to sustain the Bird's weight against the Force of Gravity, and also of communicating to it a forward impulse. The
Bird, therefore, has nothing to do but to repeat with the requisite velocity and strength its perpendicular blows upon the air,




84                    THE REIGN OF LAW.
and by virtue of the structure of its wings the same blow both
sustains and propels it.*
The truth of this explanation  of the mechanical theory of
flight may be tested in various ways.  In the first place it is
quite visible to the eye. In many birds flying straight to us,
or straight from  us, the effect of a6rial resistance in bending
upwards the ends of the quill feathers is very conspicuous.
The flight of the common Rook affords an excellent examplewhere the Bird is seen foreshortened. In Eagles the same effect
is very marked —the wing tips forming a sharp upward curve.
I have seen it equally obvious in that splendid Bird the Gannet, or Solan Goose; and when we recollect the great weight
which those few quill feathers are thus seen sustaining, we begin to appreciate the degree in which lightness, strength, and
imperviousness to the passage of air are combined in this wonderful implement of flight.
But perhaps the simplest test of the action and reaction of
the air and the wing feathers in producing forward motion is
an actual experiment. If we take in the hand the stretched
wing of a Heron, which has been dried in that position, and
strike it quickly downwards in the air, we shall find that it is
very difficult indeed to maintain the perpendicular direction of
the stroke, requiring, in fact, much force to do so, and that if
we do not apply this force, the hand is carried irresistiblyforwzard, from the impetus in that direction which the air communicates to the wing in its escape backwards from the blow
Another test is one of reasoning and observation. If the explanation now given be correct, it must follow that since no
Bird can flap its wings in any other direction than the verticali.e., perpendicular to its own axis (which is ordinarily horizontal)-and as this motion has been shown to produce necessarily a forward motion, no Bird can ever fy backzwards.  Accordingly no Bird ever does so-no man ever saw a Bird, even for
an instant, fly tail foremost. A Bird can, of course, allow it.
self to fall backwards by merely slowbing the action of its wings
* The upward stroke has no sustaining power, but has considerable propelling
power; because some air, failing to escape between the feathers, must always pass
along the convex surface of the wing-, and, escaping backwards, must exert upon the
ends of the quills a similar reactive force to that which is exerted in the downward
strok-.




CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.               85
so as to allow its weight to overcome their sustaining power;
and this motion may sometimes give the appearance of flying
backwards,-as when a Swift drops backwards from the eaves
of a house, or when a Humming Bird allows itself to drop in
like manner from out of the large tubular petals of a flower.
But this backward motion is due to the action of gravity, and
not to the action of the Bird's wing. In short, it is falling
downwards, not flying backwards. Nay, more, if the theory of
flight here given be correct, it must equally follow that even
standing still, which is the easiest of all things to other animals, must be very difficult, if not altogether impossible, to a
Bird when flyingT. This also is true in fact. To stand still in
the air is not indeed impossible to a flying Bird, for reasons to
be presently explained, but it is one of the most difficult feats
of wingmanship,-a  feat which many Birds, not otherwise
clumsy, can never perform at all, and which is performed only
by special exertion, and generally for a very short time, by
those Birds whose structure enables them to be adepts in their
glorious art.
It cannot be too often repeated-because misconception on
this point has been the cardinal error in human attempts to
navigate the air-that in all the beautiful evolutions of birds
upon the wing, it is weight, and not buoyancy, which makes
those evolutions possible. It supplies them, so to speak, with
a store of Force which is constant, inexhaustible, inherent in
the very substance of themselves, and entirely independent of
any muscular exertion. All they have to do is to give direction to that internal Force, by acting on the external Force of
aarial currents, through the contraction and expansion of the
implements which have been given them for that purpose.
Those who have watched the flight of Birds with any care, must
have observed that when once they have attained a certain initial velocity and a certain elevation, by rapid and repeated
strokes upon the air, they are then able to fly with comparatively little exertion, and very often to pursue their course for
long distances without any flapping whatever of the wings.
The contrast between the violent efforts required for the first
acquisition of the initial velocity, and the perfect ease with which




86                   THE REIGN OF LAW.
flight is performed after it has been acquired, is a contrast described by Virgil in lines of incomparable beauty:-' Qualis spelunca subito commota columba,
Cui domus et dulces latebroso in pumice nidi,
Fertur in arva volans, plausumque exterrita pennis
Dat tecto ingentem; mox, aere lapsa quieto,
Radit iter liquidum, celeres neque commovet alas.".E~n. lib. v. 213-I7.
Still more remarkable, as showing the power and the value of
weight in flight, is the fact that Birds are able to resume rapid
and easy motion not only as the result of a previously-acquired
momentum, but after "soaring" in an almost perfectly stationary position. Nothing, for example, is more common than to
see Sea Gulls, and some large species of Hawks, " soaring "
one moment (that is, all the forces bearing on the Bird brought
to an equilibrium, and all motion brought consequently to
nearly a perfect standstill), and the next moment sailing onwards in rapid and apparently effortless progression. Now,
how is this effect produced?  If we only think of it, the question
ought rather to be, How is it ever prevented? The soaring is
a much more difficult thing to do than the going onwards. It
cannot be done at all in a perfectly still atmosphere.  It can
only be done when there is a breeze of sufficient strength. Gravity is ceaselessly acting on the Bird to pull it downwards: and
downwards it must go, unless there is a countervailing Force to
keep it up. This force is the force of the breeze striking against
the vanes of the wings. But in order to bring these two forces to
nearly a perfect balance, and so to " soar," the Bird must expand
or contract its wings exactly to the right size, and hold them
exactly at the right angle. The slightest alteration in either of
these  adjustments produces instantly an upsetting of the
balance, and of course a resulting motion. The exact direction of that motion will depend on the degree in which the
wing is contracted, and the degree in which its angle to the
wind is changed. If the wing is very much contracted, and at
the same time held off from the wind, that motion will be
steeply downwards.  Accordingly this is the action of a Hawk
when it swoops upon its prey from a great height above it. I




CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.               87
have seen a Merlin dash down from a great distance with its
wings so closed as to seem almost wholly folded. The Gannet
in diving for fish does not close its wings at all, but turning
them and the whole axis of its body into the perpendicular, and
thus allowing its great weight to act without any counteraction,
clashes itself into the sea with foam. But every variety of
forward motion is attained by different degrees of contraction
and exposure, according to the strength of the breeze with
which the Bird has to deal. The limit of its velocity is the
limit of its momentum, and the limit of its momentum is the
limit of its weight. The lightness of a Bird is therefore a
limit to its velocity. The heavier a Bird is, the greater is its
possible velocity of flight because the greater is the store of
Force-or to use the language of modern physics, the greater
is the quantity of " potential energy " which, with proper implements to act upon aerial resistance, it can always convert into
upward, or horizontal, or downward motion, according to its
own management and desires.
It will be at once seen from this view of the forces concerned
in flight, that the common explanation of Birds being assisted
by air-cells for the inhalation and storage of heated air, must
not only be erroneous, but founded on wholly false conceptions
of the fundamental mechanical principles on which flight
depends.  If a Bird could inhale enough warm air to make i'
buoyant, its power of flight would be effectually destroyed. It
would become as light as a Balloon, and consequently as helpless. If, on the other hand, it were merely to inflate itself with
a small quantity of hot air insufficient to produce buoyancy,
but sufficient to increase its bulk, the only effect would be to
expose it to increased resistance in cleaving the air. It is
true, indeed, that the bones of Birds are made more hollow and
lighter than the bones of Mammals, because Birds, though
requiring weight, must not have too much of it. It is true,
also, that the air must have access to these hollows, else they
would be unable to resist atmospheric pressure. But it is no
part whatever of the plan or intention of the structure of Birds,
or of any part of that structure, to afford balloon-space for
heated air with a view to buoyancy.
And here, indeed, we open up a new branch of the same




88                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
inquiry, showing, in new aspects, how the universality and
unchangeableness of all natural laws are essential to the use of
them as the instruments of Will, and how by being played off
against each other they are made to express every shade of
thought, and the nicest change of purpose. The movement of
all flying animals in the air is governed and determined by
Forces of muscular power, and of aerial resistance and elasticity, being brought to bear upon the Force of Gravity, whereby,
according to the universal laws of motion, a direction is given
to the animal which is the resultant, or compromise, between
all the Forces so employed. Weight, as we have seen, is one
of these Forces-absolutely essential to that result, and no flying animal can ever for a moment of time be buoyant, or lighter
than the air in which it is designed to move. But it is obvious
that, within certain limits, the proportion in which these different Forces are balanced against each other admits of immense
variety. The limits of variation can easily be specified.
Every flying animal must have muscular power great enough
to work its own size of wing: that size of wing must be large
enough to act upon a volume of air sufficient to lift the animal's
whole weight: lastly, and consequently, the weight must not
be too great, or dispersed over too large a bulk. But within
these limits there is room for great varieties of adjustments,
having reference to corresponding varieties of purpose. To
some Birds the air is almost their perpetual home-the only
region in which they find their food-a region which they never
leave, whether in storm or sunshine, except during the hours of
darkness, and the yearly days which are devoted to their nests.
Other Birds are mainly terrestrial, and never betake themselves
to flight except to escape an enemy, or to follow the seasons
and the sun. Between these extremes there is every possible
variety of habit. And all these have corresponding varieties
of structure. The Birds which seek their food in the air have
long and powerful wings, and so nice an adjustment of their
weight to that power and to that length, that the faculty of
self-command in them is perfect, and their power of direction
so accurate that they can pick up a flying gnat whilst they are
passing through the air at the rate of more than a hundred
miles an hour. Such especially are the powers of some species




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THE SWIFT.








CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.                89
of the Swallow tribe, one of which, the common Swift, is a
creature whose wonderful and unceasing evolutions seem part
of the happiness of summer and of serene and lofty skies.*
There are other Birds in which the wing has to be adapted
to the double purpose of swimming, or rather of diving, and of
flight. In this case, a large area of wing must be dispensed
with, because it would be incapable of being worked under
water. Consequently in all diving Birds the wings are reduced
to the smallest possible size which is consistent with retaining
the power of flight at all; and in a few extreme Forms, the
power of flight is sacrificed altogether, and the wing is reduced
to the size, and adapted to the function, of a powerful fin.
This is the condition of the Penguins. But in most genera of
swimming Birds, both purposes are combined, and the wing is
just so far reduced in size and stiffened in texture as to make
it workable as a fin under water, whilst it is still just large
enough to sustain the weight of the Bird in flight. And here
again we have a wonderful example of the skill with which iiiexorable mechanical laws are subordinated to special purpose.
It is a necessary consequence of the area of the wing being so
reduced, in proportion to the size of the Bird, that great muscular power must be used in working it, otherwise the Force of
Gravity could not be overcome at all. It is a farther consequence of this proportion of weight to working power, that there
must be great momentum and therefore great velocity of flight.
Accordinlgly this is the fact with all the oceanic diving Birds.
They have vast distances to go, following shoals of fish, and
moving from their summer to their winter haunts. They all fly
with immense velocity, and the wing-strokes are extremely
rapid.  But there is one quality which their flight does not possess-because it is incompatible with their structure, and because it is not required by their habits-they have no facility
in evolutions, no delicate power of steering; they cannot stop
with ease, nor can they resume their onward motion in a mo.
inent. They do not want it: the trackless fields of ocean over
which they roam are broad, and there are no obstructions in
the way.  They fly in straight lines, changing their direction
* For the form of the wing in this remarkable bird, see the beautiful drawing here
engraved from the pencil of Mr.Wolf.




90                  THE REIGN OF LAW.
only in long curves, and lighting in the sea almost with a tumble and a splash. Their rising again is a work of great effort,
and generally they have to eke out the resisting power of their
small wings, not only by the most violent exertion, but by rising
against the wind, so as to collect its force as a help and addition to their own.
And now, again, we may see all these conditions changed
where there is a change in the purpose to be served. There is
another large class of oceanic Birds whose feeding ground is
not under water, but on the surface of the sea. In this class
all those powers of flight which would be useless to the Divers
are absolutely required, and are given in the highest perfection,
by the enlistment of the same mechanical laws under different
conditions. In the Gulls, the Terns, the Petrels, and in the
Fulmars, with the Albatross as their typical Form, the mechanism of flight is carried through an ascending scale, to the highest degrees of power, both as respects endurance and facility of
evolution.
The mechanical laws which are appealed to in all these modifications of structure require adjustments of the finest kind,
and some of them are so curious and so beautiful that it is well
worth following them a little further in detail.
There are two facts observable in all Birds of great and longsustained powers of flight:-the first is, that they are always
provided with wings which are rather long than broad, sometimes extremely narrow in proportion to their length; the second is, that the wings are always sharply pointed at the ends.
Let us look at the mechanical laws which absolutely require
this structure for the purpose of powerful flight, and to meet
which it has accordingly been devised and provided.
One law appealed to in making wings rather long than broad
is simply the law of leverage. But this law has to be applied
under conditions of difficulty and complexity, which are not apparent at first sight. The body to be lifted is the very body
that must exert the lifting power. The Force of Gravity, which
has to be resisted, may be said to be sitting side by side, occupying the same particles of matter, with the Vital Force which
is to give it battle. Nay, more, the one is connected with the
other in some mysterious manner which we cannot trace or unl




CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.                     91
derstand. A dead Bird weighs as much as a living one. Nothing which our scales can measure is lost when the Vital Force
is gone.  It is The Great Imponderable.  Nevertheless, vital
forces of unusual power are always coupled with unusual mass
and volume in the matter through which they work. And so it
is that a powerful Bird must always also be comparatively a
heavy Bird.  And then it is to be remembered that the action
of gravity is constant and untiring. The Vital Force, on the
contrary, however intense it may be, is intermitting and capable of exhaustion. If, then, this Force is to be set against the
Force of Gravity, it has much need of some implement through
which it may exert itself with mechanical advantage as regards
the particular purpose to be attained. Such an implement is
the lever-and a long wing is nothing but a long lever. The
mechanical principle, or law, as is well known, is this,-that a
very small amount of motion, or motion through a very small
space, at the short end of a lever, produces a great amount of
motion, or motion through a long space, at the opposite or
longer end. This action requires indeed a very intense force
to be applied at the shorter end, but it applies that force with
immense advantage for the purpose in view: because the motion which is transmitted to the end of a long wing is a motion
acting at that point through a long space, and is therefore equivalent to a very heavy weight lifted through a short space at the
end which is attached to the body of the Bird. Now this is
precisely what is required for the purpose of flight. The body
of a Bird does not require to be much lifted by each stroke of
the wing. It only requires to be sustained; and when more
than this is needed-as when a Bird first rises from the ground
or from the sea, or when it ascends rapidly in the air-greatly
increased exertion-in many cases, very violent exertion-is required.*  And then it is to be remembered that long wings
economize the vital force in another way.  When a strong current of air strikes against the wings of a Bird, the same sustain* The Albatross, when rising from the sea, is described (" Ibis," July, i865) as" stretching out his neck, and with great exertion of his wings, running along the top of the
water for seventy or eighty yards, until at last having got sufficient impetus, he tucks
up his legs, and is once more fairly launched into the air." The contrast here described
between the violent exertion required in first rising, and the perfect ease of flight after
this first momentum has been acquired, is a striking illustration of the true mechanical principles of flight,




92                  THE REIGN- OF LAW.
ing effect is produced as when the wing strikes against the air.
Consequently Birds with very long wings have this great advantage, that with pre-acquired momentum, they can often for a
long time fly without flapping their wings at all. Under these
circumstances, a Bird is sustained very much as a boy's kite is
sustained in the air. The string which the boy holds, and by
which he pulls the kite downwards writh a certain force, performs for the kite the same offices which its own weight and
balance and momentum perform for the Bird. The great longwinged oceanic Birds often appear to float rather than to fly.
The stronger is the gale, their flight, though less rapid, is all the
more easy-so easy indeed as to appear buoyant, because the
blasts which strike against their wings are enough to sustain the
bird with comparatively little exertion of its own, except that of
holding the wing vanes stretched and exposed at proper angles
to the wind. And whenever the onward force previously acquired by flapping becomes at length exhausted, and the ceaseless inexorable Force of Gravity is beginning to overcome it,
the Bird again rises by a few easy and gentle half-strokes of the
wing. Very often the same effect is produced by allowing the
Force of Gravity to act, and when the downward momentum
has brought the Bird close to the ground or to the sea, that
force is again converted into an ascending impetus by a change
in the angle at which the wing is exposed to the wind. This Is
a constant action with all the oceanic Birds. Those who have
seen the Albatross have described themselves as never tired of
latching its glorious and triumphant motion:"Tranquil its spirit seemed, and floated slow;
Even in its very motion there was rest."
" A CloZTd," PROF. WILSON.
Rest-where there is nothing else at rest in the tremendous
turmoil of its own stormy seas! Sometimes for a whole hour
together this splendid Bird will sail or wheel round a ship in
every possible variety of direction without requiring to give a
single stroke to its pinions. Now, the Albatross has the extreme form of this kind of wing. Its wings are immensely long
-about fourteen or fifteen feet from tip to tip-and almost as




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CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.                        93
narrow in proportion as a ribbon.? Our common Gannet is an
excellent, though a more modified, example of the same kind of
structure. On the other hand, Birds of short wings, though
their flight is sometimes very fast, are never able to sustain it
very long.  The muscular exertion they require is greater, because it does not work to the same advantage.  Most of the
Gallinaceous Birds (such as the common Fowl, Pheasants, Partridges, etc.) have wings of this kind; and some of them never
fly except to  escape  an  enemy, or to  change  their feedingground.
The second fact observable in reference to Birds of easy and
powerful flight namely, that their wings are all sharply pointed
at the end-will lead us still further into the niceties of adjust
ment which are so signally displayed in the machinery of fligh
The feathers of a Bird's wing have a natural threefold division, according to the different wing-bones to which they are attached.  The quills which form  the end of the wing are called
the Primaries; those which form  the  middle of the vane  are
called the Secondaries; and those which are next the body of
the Bird are called  the Tertiaries.  The motion  of a Bird's
wing increases from its minimum at the shoulder-joint to its
maximum  at the tip.  The primary quills which form  the termination of the wing are those on which the chief burden of
flight is cast. Each feather has less and less weight to bear, and
less and less force to exert, in proportion as it lies nearer the body
of the bird; and there is nothing more beautiful in the structure of a wing than the perfect gradation in strength and stiffness, as well as in modification of form, which marks the series
from the first of the Primary quills to the last and feeblest of
the Tertiaries.t  Now, the sharpness or roundness of a wing
4* The mechanical principle involved in the sufficiency of very narrow wings has, I
believe, been adequately explained in a very ingenious paper read before the Aironcautcal Society, by Mr. F. H. Wenham, C.E. It is the same mechanical principle
which accounts for the narrow blades of a Screw Propeller having a resisting force
as great as would be exerted upon the whole area of rotation by a solid Disc. In the
case of a flat body, such as the wing of a bird, being propelled edgeways through the
air, nearly the whole resisting and sustaining force is exerted upon the first few inches
of the advancing surface.
t I owe to the accurate pencil of Mr. J. Wolf the accompanying engraving of the
wing of the Golden Plover, a Bird of powerful flight. In this wing the gradation of
the feathers is very perfect. It will be observed that the first of the Secondaries,
the eleventh feather from the tip of the wing, is marked by a slight variation in the
form of the margin.




94                   THE REIGN OF LAW.
at the tip depends on the position which is given to the longest
Primary quill. If the first, or even the second, primary is the
longest, and all that follow are considerably shorter, the wing
is necessarily a pointed wing, because the tip of a single quill
forms the end; but if the third or fourth Primary quills are the
longest, and the next again on both sides are only a little shorter,
the wing becomes a round-ended wing. Round-ended wings
are also almost always open-ended —that is to say, the tips of
the quills do not touch each other, but leave interspaces at the
end of the wing, through which, of course, a good deal of air
escapes. Since each single quill is formed on the same principle as the whole wing-that is, with the anterior margin stiff
and the posterior margin yielding-this escape is not useless
for progression; but the air acts less favorably for this purpose
than when struck by a more compact set of feathers. The common Rook and all the Crows are examples of this. The Peregrine Falcon, the common Swallow, and all Birds of very powerful flight, have been provided with the sharp-pointed structure.*
The object of this structure, and the mechanical laws to which
it appeals, will be apparent when we recollect what it is on
which the propelling po\wser, as distinct from the sustaining
power, of a Bird's wing depends.  It depends on the reaction
of the air escaping backwards-that is, in the direction exactly
opposite to that of the intended motion of the Bird. Any air
which escapes from under the wing, in any other direction, will
of course react with less advantage upon that motion, But
from under a round wing a good deal of air must necessarily
escape along the rounded end-that is, in a direction at right
angles to the line of intended flight. All the reaction produced
by this escape is a reaction which is useless for propulsion.
Accordingly, in all Birds to which great velocity of flight is
essential, this structure, which is common in other Birds, is carefully avoided.
The Hawks have been classified as "noble" or "ignoble,"
according to the length and sharpness of their wings: those
which catch their prey by velocity of flight having been uni* The illustrations of Mr. Wolf will here again be the best explanation to the reader
of the difference between the sharp and the round structure, p. 93.




I~~~~~~
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WIG0"GOLDrN pLOVIvn.








CONTRIVANCE   A NfECESSITY.            95
formly provided with the long-pointed structure. The SparrowHawk and the Merlin are excellent examples of the difference.
The Sparrow-Hawk, with its comparatively short and blunt
wings, steals along the hedgerows and pounces on its prey by
surprise; seldom chasing it, except for a short distance, and
when the victim is at a disadvantage. And well do the smaller
Birds know this habit, and the limit of his powers. Many of
them chase and "chaff " the Sparrow —Iawk, when he is seen
flying in the open, perfectly aware that he cannot catch them
by fast flying. But they never play these tricks with the Merlin.
This beautiful little Falcon hunts the open ground, giving fair
chase to its quarry by power and speed of flight. The Merlin
delights in flying at some of the fastest Birds, such as the Snipe.
The longest and most beautiful trial of wingmanship I have ever
seen was the chase of a Merlin after a Snipe in one of the Hebrides. It lasted as far as the eye could reach, andc seemed to
continue far out to sea. In the Merlin, as in all the fastest
Falcons, the second quill feather is the longest in the wing;
the others rapidly diminish; and the point of the wing looks as
sharp as a needle in the air.
There is yet one other power which it is absolutely necessary
to some Birds that their wings should enable them to exert:
and that is, the power of standing still, or remaining suspended
in the air without any forward motion. One familiar example
of this is the common Kestrel, which, from the frequent exercise of this power, is called in some counties the " Windhover."
The mechanical principles on which the machinery of flight is
adapted to this purpose, are very simple. No Bird can exercise
this power which is not provided with wings large enough, long
enough, and powerful enough to sustain its weight with ease,
and without violent exertion.  Large wings can always be diminished at the pleasure of the Bird, by being partially folded
inwards; and this contraction of the area is constantly resorted
to. But a Bird which has wings so small and scanty as to compel it to strike them always at full stretch, and with great velocity in order to fly at all, is incapable of standing still in the air.
No man ever saw a Diver or a Duck performing the evolution
which the Kestrel may be seen performing every hour over
so many English fields. The cause of this is obvious, if we re



96                   THE REIGN OF LAW.
fer to the principles which have already been explained.  We
have seen that the perpendicular stroke of a Bird's wing has
the double effect of both propelling and sustaining.  The reaction from such a stroke brings two different forces to bear upon
the Bird-one whose direction is upwards, and another whose
direction is forwards.  How can these two effects be separated
from each other?  How can the wing be so moved as to keep
up just enough of the sustaining force without allowing the propelling force to come into play?  The answer to this, although
it involves some very complicated laws connected with what
mechanicians call the " parallelogram of forces," is practically
a simple one. It can only be done by shortening the stroke
and altering the perpendicularity of its direction. Of course,
if a Bird, by altering the axis of its own body, can direct its
wing-stroke in some degreeforwards, it will have the effect of
stopping instead of promoting progression.  But in order to do
this, it must have a superabundance of sustaining force, because
some of this force is sacrificed when the stroke is off the perpendicular.  Hence it follows that Birds so heavy as to require the
whole action of their wings to sustain them  at all, can never
afford this sacrifice of the sustaining force, and, except for the
purpose of arresting their flight, can never strike except directly
downwards,-that is, directly against the opposing force of
gravity.  But Birds with superabundant sustaining -power, and
long sharp wings, have nothing to do but to diminish the length
of stroke, and direct it off the perpendicular at such an angle
as will bring all the forces bearing upon their body to an exact
balance, and they will then remain stationary at a fixed point
in the air.*
They are greatly assisted in this beautiful evolution by an
adverse current of air; and it will always be observed that the
Kestrel, when hovering, turns his /ead lo zewind, and hangs his
whole body at a greater or less angle to the plane of the horizon.  When there is no wind, or very little, the sustaining force
is kept up by a short rapid action of the pinions, and the long
tail is spread out like a fan to assist in stopping any tendency
to onward motion. When there is a strong breeze, no flapping
* Mr. Wolf's illustration of a Kestrel hovering shows accurately the position of the
bird when the action is performed in still air.




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CONTR'IVANCE A NECESSITY.               97
is required at all-the force of the wind supplying the whole
force necessary to counteract the force of gravity; and in proportion to the increasing strength of the wind, the amount of
vane which must be exposed to it becomes less and less.  I
have seen a Kestrel stand suspended in a half gale with the
wings folded close to the body, and with no visible muscular
motion whatever.  And so nice is the adjustment of position.
which is requisite to produce this exact balance of all the forces
bearing on the Bird, that the change in that position which
again instantly results in a forward motion is very often almost
insensible to the eye.  It is generally a slight expansion of the
wings, and a very slight change in the axis of the body.
And here it may be observed that the tails of Birds have not,
as is often supposed, any function analogous to the rudder of a
ship. Birds which have lost the tail are not thereby rendered
incapable of turning. If the steering function had been as.
signed to Birds' tails, the vane of the tail must have been set,
not, as it is, horizontally, but perpendicularly to the line of
flight. But a Bird's tail has in flight no lateral motion whatever. It does, indeed, materially assist the Bird in turning, because it serves to stop tIe way of a Bird when it rises or turns
in the air to take a new direction. The feathers of the tail are
also capable of being depressed unequally,-that is, more at
one side than at the other; and when the whole are spread out
like the leaves of a fan, this depression at one side is a means
whereby the Bird can exert against the air which is passing under it greater muscular pressure upon one side than upon the
other, and can thus help the turning action of the wings. With
a telescope I have seen this action of the tail very marked in
the soaring flight of the Buzzard, when the Bird is wheeling
round in spiral circles. The tail contributes also largely to the
general balance of the body, which in itself is an important
element in the facility of flight. Accordingly, almost all Birds
which depend on great ease of evolution in flight-or on the
power of stopping suddenly, have  largely developed  tails.
This is the case with all the Birds of prey-with the Kestrel in
a conspicuous degree. But there are some exceptions which
show that great powers of flight are not always dependent on
the possession of a large tail-as, for example, the Swift.
7




98                     THE REIGN OF LAW.
Another explanation has been given of the means by which
Birds are able to turn in flight, which is a curious example
how preconceived theories founded on false analogies will
v;tiate our observation of the commonest facts in nature.  I do
not know of any modern work that gives any account of the
theory of flight, which is even tolerably correct. But in most
points an admirable account is to be found in the celebrated
work of Borelli, "De Motu Animalium." On the question,
however, of steerage in flight, he gives a solution which the
most ordinary observation is sufficient to contradict.  Borelli is
quite aware that the tail in Birdcs has no such function as that
which is usually assigned to it, and he points out the true theoretical objection to the possibility of its having any guiding
power —viz., its horizontal position, and its immobility in the
lateral direction.  But the theory which he himself propounds
is  equally  erroneous.  It is this, —that Birds deflect their
course to the right or to the left, as rowers turn a row-boat-by
striking more quickly and more strongly with one wing than
with the other.* To this theory there are two objectionsfirst, that as matter of fact Birds can turn, and do turn, even to
the extent of describing complete circles in the air, without any
flapping either of one wing or the other: and secondly, that
when Birds do flap and turn at the same time, not the slightest difference in time between the two wing-strokes can ever
be detected. The beats of a Bird's two wings are always exactly synchronous. But the first of these two objections is of
itself quite sufficient to disprove the theory. No man can have
watched even for a moment the flight of the common Swallow,
and especially the flight of the Swift, without seeing it perform
complete gyrations in the air without any strokes of either wing.
The only change which can ever be detected by the eye is a
slight elevation on one side of the whole body, and a slight depression of the other. The depression is always on that side
* Referring to a boat, he says:-"' Si remi dexteri lateris celerius quam sinistri aquam
retrorsum impellant-semper prora revolvetur versus sinistrum latus; ergo eodem
modo dum avis in medio fluido aeris innatat, volando aequilibrata in centro gravitatis
ejus, si sola dextra ala deorsum sed oblique flactatur, aerem subjectum impellando
versus caudam necessario ad instar navis mox memoratwe, permovetur latus ejus dextrum, quiescente aut tardius moto sinistro latera. Ex quo fit, ut avis pars anterior
circa centrum gravitatis ejus revoluta, flectatur versum sinistrum latus."-Borellus,
" I)e Motu Animalium," Pars Prima. Propositio cxcix.




CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.                      99
towards which the Bird is turning. On the opposite side, that
from which the Bird is turning, there is of course a corresponding elevation.  Sometimes this is very obvious; but in general
it is so slight as to require close observation to detect it. In
the Albatross, when sweeping round, the wings are often
pointed in a direction nearly perpendicular to the sea.* The
effect of this, of course, is to expose the two vanes at different
angles to the aerial currents-and it must be remembered that
in flight the balance of all the forces employed is so extremely
fine that the most minute alteration in the degree in which
they bear upon each other will produce an immense change in
the result.  It is not surprising, therefore, that the muscular
movements which serve to turn the axis of a flying Bird from
one direction to another, are very often so extremely minute as
generally altogether to elude the sight. But in general terms,
it may be said that a Bird turns in flying essentially on the
same principle as that on which a Man turns in walking.  It is
done in both cases by change in the direction of muscular pressure upon a resisting medium. By an exquisite combination
of different laws, and by mechanical contrivance in the adjust
ment of them, it has been given to a Bird to find in the thin
and yielding air a medium of resistance against which its own
muscular force may act, as firm  and as effective as that which
Man finds in the solid earth.
The Humming Birds are perhaps the most remarkable examples in the world of the machinery of flight.  The power of
poising themselves in the air,-remaining absolutely stationary
whilst they search the blossoms for insects,-is a power essential to their life. It is a power accordingly which is enjoyed
by them  in the highest perfection.  When they intend progressive flight, it is effected with such velocity as to elude the eye.
The action of the wing in all these cases is far too rapid to enable the observer to detect the exact difference between that
*See a very interesting account of the flight of the Albatross by Captain T. W.
Hutton, in the " Ibis " for July, I864. Captain Hutton says: " If he wishes to turn to
tke right, he bends his head and tail slightly upwards, at the same time raising his
left side and lozwering the rigft in proportion to the sharpness of the curve he wishes
to make, the wings being kept rigid the whole time." This is the only paper I have
seen on the flight of birds in which observation of the facts is not vitiated by some
false preconceived theory on their cause. Captain Hutton has thoroughly seized thf
true mechanical principles of flight.




Too                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
kind of motion which keeps the Bird at absolute rest in the air,
and that which carries it along with such immense velocity.
But there can be no doubt that the change is one from a short
quick stroke delivered obliquely forward, to a full stroke, more
slow, but delivered perpendicularly.  This corresponds with
the account given by that most accurate ornithological observer, Mr. Gould.  He says: "When poised before any object, this action of the wing is so rapidly performed that it is
impossible for the eye to follow each stroke, and a hazy semicircle of indistinctness on each side of -the Bird is all that is
perceptible."  There is another fact mentioned by those who
have watched their movements most closely which corresponds
with the explanation already given-viz., the fact that the axis
of the Humming Bird's body when hovering is always hi/hgh/y
inclined, so much so as to appear almost perpendicular in the
air. In other words the wing-stroke, instead of being delivered
perpendicularly downwards, which would infallibly carry the
body onwards, is delivered at such an angle forwards as to
bring to an exact balance the upward, the downward, and the
forward forces which bear upon the body of the Bird. Mr.
Darwin says, " When hovering by a flower, the tail is constantly
shut and expanded like a fan, the body beinzg kept iin a nzearly
vertical positions."  Mr. Wallace, another accurate observer, describes the Humming Birds as "' balancing themselves vertically
in the air."
These are a few, and a few only, of the adjustments required
in order to the giving of the power of flight;- adjustments of
organic growth to intensity of vital force-of external structure
to external work-of shape in each separate feather to definite
shape in the series as a whole-of material to resistance —of
mass and form to required velocities; adjustments, in short, of
law to law, of force to force, and of all to Purpose.  So many
are these contrivances, so various, so fine, so intricate, that a
volume might be written without exhausting the beauty of the
method in which this one mechanical problem has been solved.
It is by knowledge of unchanging laws that these victories over
them seem to be achieved; yet not by knowledge only, except
as the guide of Power. For here as everywhere else in Nature,
we see the same mysterious need of conforming to imperative




CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY.             TOI
conditions, side by side with absolute control over the forces
through which this conformity is secured. When any given
purpose cannot be attained without the violation of some law,
unless by some new power, and some new machinery-the requisite power and mechanism are evolved generally out of old
materials, and by modifications of pre-existing forms. There
can be no better example of this than a wing-feather. It is a
production wholly unlike any other animal growth —an implement specially formed to combine strength with lightness, elasticity, and imperviousness to air. Again, the bones of a Bird's
wing are the bones of the Mammalian arm and hand, specially
modified to support the feathers. The same purpose is effected
by other means in connection with precisely the same bones in
the flying Mammalia —the Bats. In these animals the fingerbones instead of being compressed or soldered together to support feathers, are separated, attenuated, and greatly lengthened
to afford attachment to a web or flying membrane which is
stretched between them. In other ages of the world there
were also flying Lizards. But in all these cases the mechanical
principle is the same, and there has been the same ingenious
adaptation of material and of force to the universal laws of
motion.
On the earth and on the sea Maan has attained to powers of
locomotion with which, in strength, endurance, and in velocity,
no animal movement can compare. But the air is an element
on which he cannot travel-an ocean which he cannot navigate.
The Birds of heaven are still his envy, and on the paths they
tread he cannot follow. As yet! for it is not certain that this
exclusion is to be perpetual. His failure has resulted quite as
much from his ignorance of natural laws, as from his inability
to meet the conditions which they demand. All attempts to,uide bodies buoyant in the air must be fruitless. Balloons
are mere toys. No flying animal has ever been formed on the
principle of buoyancy. Birds and Bats, and Dragons, have
been all immensely heavier than the air, and their weight is one
of the forces most essential to their flight. Yet there is a real
impediment in the way of Man navigating the air-and that is
the excessive weight of the only great mechanical moving powers hitherto placed at his disposal. When Science shall have




102                       THE REIGN  OF LAW.
discovered some moving power greatly lighter than any we yet
know, in all probability the problem  will be solved.*   But of
one thing we may be sure-that if Man is ever destined to navigate the air, it will be in machines formed in strict obedience
to the mechanical laws which have been employed by the Creator for the same purpose in flying animals.t
* The men of Science in France are ahead of the men of Science in England upon
this subject. There is a society established in Paris which announces in its very title
the true fundamental principle of flight —" Societd d,Encouragement pour la Locomotion adrienne au moyen d'Appareils PLUS LOURIDS que l'Air."  The false principle of
Buoyancy is thus eliminated and banished from the question.
t I owe to my father (John, 7th Duke of Argyll) my knowledge of the Theory of
Flight which is expounded in this chapter. The retired life he led, and the dislike he
had of the work of literary composition, confined the knowledge of his views within
a comparatively narrow circle. But his love of mechanical science, and his study of
the problem during many years of investigation and experiment, made him thoroughly
master of the subject. In his devices for testing and illustrating the truth of his
Theory, he was chiefly assisted by two very ingenious men, the late Mr. John Hart,
of Glasgow, and the late Mr. Robert Bryson, of Edinburgh. The result of his investigations led him to the opinion that until a lighter moving power than steam is discovered, it will be impossible to construct successfully machines for the navigation
of the air. I shall only add, that having made ornithology a favorite pursuit, I have
been led during many years to test this theory by close observation of the flight of
Birds; and that from the manner in which it fits into, and explains all the facts, I
have been always more and more satisfied of its truth.




CHAPTER 1V.
APPARENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE SUPREMACY OF PURPOSE.
YET, as we look at Nature, the fact will force itself upon us
thlat there are structures in which we cannot recognize any use;
that there are contrivances which often fail of their effect; and
that there are others which appear to be separated from the
conditions they were intended to meet, and under which alone
their usefulness could arise. Such instances occur in many
branches of inquiry; and although in the great ma.ss of natural phenomena the supremacy of Purpose is evident enough,
such cases do frequently come across our path as cases of
exception-cases in which Law does not seem to be subservient to Will, but to be asserting a power and an endurance of
its own.
The degree of importance which may be attached to such
cases as a source of real difficulty, will vary with the character
of the individual mind, and its capacity of holding by the great
lines of evidence which run through the whole Order of Nature.
It is with these cases as with the local currents which sometimes obscure the rising and falling of the tides. When
watched from hour to hour, the greater law is clearly discernible
by well-marked effects; but when watched from  minute to
minute, that law is not distinct, and there are waves which
seem like a rebellion of the sea against the force which is
dragging it from the land. The Order of Nature is very complicated, and very partially understood.  It is to be expected
therefore that there should be a vast variety of subordinate
facts, whose relation to each other and to the whole must be a
matter of perplexity to us. It is so with the relation in which
different known laws of Nature stand to each other; much more
must it be so with the far deeper subject of the relation which
these laws bear to the Will and the intentions of the Supreme,




104                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
But as cases of intention frustrated, of structure without apparent purpose, of organs dissociated from function and from
the opportunities of use, are sometimes sources of difficulty, it
may be well to consider this subject a little nearer. Let us
look at it both in the light of abstract reasoning, and also in
the light of particular illustration.
In the first place, then, we must remember that results which
may appear as exceptions to the attainment of one Purpose
may be nothing more than fulfilments of another. This follows
from the truth which has been dealt with in a former page,*
that we are " greatly ignorant," as Bishop Butler says, how far
anything in Nature is to be regarded as a means or as an end,
and that ultimate or final purposes we can never see. The
difficulty hence arising has often been represented as a fundamental objection to the whole doctrine of Intention. But this
view is founded on a very great, although a very natural confusion of thought. The perception of Purpose and Intention
is inseparable from the perception of Adjustment and Function
as these are exhibited in Nature. As such it belongs to
Knowledge. It is the perception of a relation between those
phenomena and certain well known phenomena of Mind.  But
to perceive a relation is not necessarily to perceive all that this
relation involves.  To perceive intention is a very different
thing from perceiving all that is intended. Our own human
experience should make this distinction familiar to us. Many
things we do and many things we contrive are done and contrived with more than one intention. In the light of this expejence it is altogether irrational to regard as an exception to
the attainment of Purpose in Nature the fact, for example,
"that of fifty seeds she often brings but one to bear."  It
throws no doubt or difficulty in the way of our conviction, for
example, that one purpose of seed-bearing in Plants is the reproduction of their kind, because it appears that another purpose to which that seed-bearing is applied is the support of
animal life. The intention with which a grain of wheat is so
constituted as to be capable of producing another wheat plant,
is not the less in the nature of Purpose because it co-exists
with another intention, that the same grain should be capable
* 4 ite, p. 48,




APPARENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE SUPREMACY OF PURPOSE. I05
of sustaining the powers and the enjoyments of Life in the
Body and in the Mind of Man. On the contrary, the power
possessed by most plants, and by this plant especially, of pro,
ducing seed in a ratio far beyond that which would be required
for one purpose, is the sure indication and the proof that another purpose larger and wider was in view. Yet the seeds of
corn which, as seeds, are destroyed when they are converted
into bread, may in that aspect be represented and regarded as
" failures."  In reference to this kind of failure, it has been
actually argued that in Nature "the prodigality of waste is far
more conspicuous than the wise economy of which so much is
said."+ When applied to the case of the wheat plant the
fallacy is apparent, and would probably be admitted. But this
is only one example of a class to which an infinite number of
other examples in Nature may be referred. There may be,
indeed, and there are, innumerable examples where the meaning of like " failures " is not equally evident to us-some which
may be involved in utter and hopeless darkness-some which
may run up into the great master difficulty-that which we are
accustomed to call the "Origin of Evil."  But the same argument applies to all. It is not that Purpose and Intention solve
all difficulties. But it is that no difficulty in perceiving what
may be the purpose and intention of a particular fact can affect
the reality and truth of that perception in other cases where no
such difficulty exists. Let us now look at the same subject in
the light of particular examples.
There is one explanation which, it cannot be doubted, applies
to many cases; and this is, the simple explanation that we
often mistake the purpose of particular structures in Nature,
and connect them with intentions which are not, and never
were, the intentions really in view. The best naturalists are
liable to such mistakes.  A very curious illustration is afforded
by an observation of Mr. Darwin, in his " Origin of Species."
He says that' if green Woodpeckers alone had existed, and
we did not know that there were any black and pied kinds, I
daresay we should have thought that the green color was a
beautiful adaptation to hide this tree-frequenting bird from its
enemies." Now, this introduces us to a very curious subject,
* Mr. G. H. Lewes, Forni4,kiztly Rez'ew, July, I867, p. Ioo,




Io6                THE REIGN OF LAW.
and one as well adapted as any other to illustrate the relation
in which Law stands to Purpose in the economy of Nature.
There can be no doubt that the principle of adapted coloring
with the effect and for the purpose of concealment, prevails
extensively in various branches of the Animal Kingdom. It
arises, probably, like all other phenomena, by way of Natural
Consequence, out of some combination of forces which are the
instruments employed. We have no knowledge what these
forces are; but we can imagine them to be worked into a law
of assimilation, founded on some such principle as that which
photography has revealed.  It is true that Man has not yet discovered any process by which the tints of Nature can be transferred, as the most delicate shades of light can be transferred,
to surfaces artificially prepared to receive them. Such a process is, however, very probably within the reach even of human
chemistry, and it is one which is certainly known in the laboratory of Nature. The Chameleon is the extreme case in which
the effect of such a process is proverbially known. Many Fish
exhibit it in a remarkable degree, changing color rapidly in
harmony with the color of the water in which they swim, or of
the bottom on wMhich they lie. The law on which such changes
depend is very obscure: but it appears to be a natural process,
as constant as all other laws are-that is, constant whenever
given conditions are brought together. It is possible that the
effect may be due to a cause which is well known to be capable
of producing somewhat analogous results. Even before the
days of Jacob and of Laban, it seems to have been known that
through the eyes of the female parent color can be determined
in her young; and although this is certainly not the law which
commonly determines color-operating as it does, so far as we
know, seldom, and only in a small degree-it is quite conceivable that, under special conditions, it is capable of being
worked as a great power in Nature. But, then, these conditions are not brought together except with a view to purpose.
For now let us see how this law, whatever it may be, is regulated and applied.
One thing is certain: assimilated coloring is not applied universally; on the contrary, it is applied very partially.  Is it,
therefore, applied arbitrarily-at hap-hazard, or without refer



APPARENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE SUPREMACY OF PURPOSE. 107
ence to conditions in which we can trace a reason and a rule?
Far from it. The rule appears to be this:-adaptive coloring,
as a means of concealment, ii never applied (I) to any animal
whose habits do not expose it to special danger, or (2) to any
animal which is sufficiently endowed with other more effective
means of escape.
This is the higher Law of Purpose which governs the lesser
law, whatever it may be, by which assimilative coloring is produced. Now, no man who had observed this higher law could
ever fall into the error of supposing that the color of the Green
Woodpecker was given to it as a means of concealment. Few
Birds are so invisible as Woodpeckers, because their structure
and habits give them other methods of escaping observation,
which are most curious and effective. They have few natural
enemies but Man; and when in danger of being seen by him,
they slip and glide round the bole of a tree or bough on which
they may be climbing, with a swift, silent, and cunning motion,
and from behind that shelter, with nothing visible but their
head, they keep a close watch upon the movements of the enemy. With such sleight of feet, there is no need of lazier
methods of concealment.
Accordingly, in this family of Birds, the law of assimilation
is withheldfrom application, and the most violent and strongly
contrasted coloring prevails. Jet black, side by side with pure
white, and the most brilliant crimsons, are common in the plumage of the Woodpeckers. No birds are more conspicuous in
coloring, yet none are more seldom seen. The Green Woodpecker itself, with its yellow tints and crimson hood, contrasts
strongly with the bark on which it climbs. The purpose of concealment being effected by other means, gives way to the purpose of beauty or of adornment in the disposition of colors.
And in general the same rule applies to all Birds whose life is
led among'woods and forests. Comparatively inaccessible to
Birds of prey, they exhibit every variety of tint, and the principle of invisibility from assimilated coloring is almost unknown.
It must always be remembered, that animals of prey are as
much intended to capture their food, as their victims are intended to have some chances and facilities of escape. The
purpose here is a double purpose-a purpose not in all cases




io8                THE REIGN OF LAW.
to preserve life, but to maintain its balance and due proportion.
In order to effect this purpose, the means of aggression, and of
defence, or of escape, must bear a definite relation to each
other both in kind and in degree. When arboreal Birds leave
their sheltering trees, they are exposed to the attacks of Hawks,
but they have fair opportunities of retreating to their coverts
again; and the upward spring of the disappointed Falcon in
the air, when his quarry reaches the shelter of trees, tells how
effective such a retreat is, and how completely it ends the chase.
On the other hand, there is a great variety of Birds whose
habitat is the open plain-the desert-the unprotected shorethe treeless moor-the stony mountain-top.  These are the
favorite hunting-grounds of the Eagles, and the Falcons, and
the Hawks. There they have free scope for their great powers
of wing, and uninterrupted range for their piercing powers of
sight. And it must be remembered, that even the slowest of
the Hawks can on such ground capture with ease Birds which,
when once on the wing, could distance their pursuer by superior
speed, because the Hawk, sweeping over the ground, takes the
prey at a disadvantage, pouncing on it before it can get fairly
into the air. Birds whose habitat is thus exposed could not
maintain their existence at all without special means of concealment or escape. Accordingly it is among such Birds almost
exclusively that the law of assimilative coloring prevails. And
among them it is carried to a perfection which is wonderful indeed. Every ornithologist will recognize the truth of the observation, that this law prevails chiefly among the Grouse, the
Partridges, the Plovers, the Snipes, Woodcocks, Sandpipers,
and other kindred families, all of which inhabit open ground.
There can be no better examples than the Grouse and the
Ptarmigan of our Scottish mountains. The close imitation in
the plumage of these Birds of the general tinting and mottling
of the ground on which they lie and feed is apparent at a glance
and is best known to those who have tried to see Grouse or
Ptarmigan when sitting, and when their position is indicated
within a few feet or a few inches by the trembling nostrils and
dilated eyeballs of a steady Pointer-Dog. In the case of the
common Grouse, as the ground is nearly uniform in color
throughout the year, the coloring of the Bird is constant also.




APPARENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE SUPREMACY OP PURPOSE. 109
But in the case of the Ptarmigan, it changes with the changing
seasons. The pearly grays which in summer match so exactly
with the lichens of the mountain peaks, give place in winter to
the pure white which matches not less perfectly with the wreaths
of snow.
This is indeed a change which requires for its production the
agency of other laws than those merely of reflected light, because the substitution of one entire set of feathers. for another
of a different color, twice in every year, implies arrangements
which lie deep in the organic chemistry of the Bird. The
various genera of Sand-Grouse and Sand-Partridges which frequent the deserts and naked plains of the Asiatic continent,
are colored in exquisite harmony with the ground. Our common Woodcock is another excellent example, and is all the
more remarkable as there is one very peculiar color introduced
into the plumage of this Bird which exactly corresponds with a
particular stage in the decay of fallen leaves-I mean that in
which the browns and yellows of the Autumn rot away into
the pale ashy skeletons which lie in thousands under every
wood in winter. This color is exactly reproduced in the
feathers of the Woodcock, and so mingled with the dark
browns and warm yellows of fresher leaves, that the general
imitation of effect is perfect. And so curiously is the purpose
of concealment worked out in the plumage of the Woodcock,
that one conspicuous ornament of the bird is covered by a
special provision from the too curious gaze of those for whose
admiration it was not intended. The tail-feathers of the Woodcock can be erected and spread out at pleasure like a fan, and,
being tipped on their under surface with white of a brilliant
and silvery lustre, set off by contrast with an adjacent patch of
velvety black, they then produce a most conspicuous effect.
But the same web which on its under surface bears this beautifll but dangerous ornament, is on its upper surface dulled
down to a sombre ashy-gray, and becomes as invisible as the
rest of the plumage. These are all provisions of Natures
which stand in clear and intelligible relation to the habits of
the Bird. It rests all day upon the ground, under trees.; and
were it not for its ingeniously adapted coloring, it would be peculiarly exposed to destruction. Man is an enemy whose cun



T1                  THE REIGN OF LAW.
ning inventions overcome all such methods of protection, and
the Woodcock, when in his most rapid flight, is now an easier
prey than in older times when sitting on the ground. But before fire-arms had reached the perfection which has enabled us
to shoot flying Birds, the coloring of the Woodcock served it
in good stead, even against the Lords of the Creation. In old
times it required special skill and practice to see Woodcocks on
the ground, and the large lustrous black eye which is adapted
for night-vision was the one spot of color which enabled the
fowler of a century and a half ago to detect the bird. Thus
Hudibras has it:"For fools are known by looking wise,
As men find woodcocks by their eyes."
" Hudibras to Sidroiphel," 79, 80.
In Snipes, again, there is are markable series of straw-colored feathers introduced along the back and shoulders, which
perfectly imitate the general effect of the bleached vegetable
stalks common on the ground which the Bird frequents.
There are other animals in which the principle of imitation
with a view to concealment is carried very much farther than
the mere imitation of color, and extends also to form and
structure. There are some examples of this in the Class of
Insects, so remarkable that it is impossible to look at them
without ever fresh astonishment.  I refer to some families of
the Orthopterous order, and especially to some genera of the
Mantidce and PZhasnidce.  Many species of the genus Mantis
are wholly modelled in the form  of vegetable growths. The
legs are made to imitate leaf-stalks, the body is elongated and
notched so as to simulate a twig; the segment of the shoulders is spread out and flattened in the likeness of a seed-vessel;
and the large wings are exact imitations of a full-blown leaf,
with all its veins and skeleton complete, and all its color and
apparent texture. There is something startling and almost
horrible in the completeness of the deception-very horrible it
must be to its hapless victims. For in this case the purpose of
the imitation is a purpose of destruction, the AMantis being a
predacious insect, armed with the most terrible weapons, hid
under the peaceful forms of the vegetable world. It is the




APPARENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE SUPREMACY OF PURPOSE. I It
habit of these creatures to sit upon the leaves which they so
closely resemble, apparently motionless, but really advancing
on their prey with a slow and insensible approach. Their
structure disarms suspicion. Wonderful as this structure is,
it would be none the less, but all the more wonderful, if it should
arise by way of Natural Consequence from some law of development or of growth. It must be a law of which at present
we have no knowledge, and can hardly form any conception.
But certain it is that here, as in all other cases, the purpose
which is actually attained, is attained by a special adaptation
of ordinary structure to a special and extraordinary purpose.
No new members are given to the  anlztis; there is no departure from the plan on which all other Insects of the same Order
are designed. The body has the same number of segments,
the legs are the same in number, and are composed of the
same joints; every part of this strange creature which seems
like a bit of foliage animated with insect life, can be referred
to its corresponding part in the ordinary anatomy of its Class.
The whole effect is produced by a little elongation here, a little
swelling there, a little dwarfing of one part, a little development of another. The most striking part of the whole imitation-that of the "nervation " of the leaf-is produced by a
modification, not very violent, of a structure which belongs to
all flying Insects. Their wings are constructed of a thin filmy
material stretched upon a framework of stronger substance, as
the sails of a windmill are stretched upon a trellis-work of
spars. This framework is designed in a great variety of patterns-more elaborate and more beautiful than the tracery
of Gothic windows. In the Jalztis this tracery, instead of
being drawn in a mere pattern, is drawn in imitation of the
nervature of a leaf. And imitative coloring is added to imitative structure-so that nothing should be wanting to its completeness and success.
It must always be remembered, however, that Contrivance
in Nature can never be reduced to a single purpose, and to
that alone. Almost every example of it is connected with a
number of effects which fit into each other in endless ramifications of adjustment. For example, this imitative structure of
the AMatltide serves as well for their own protection from in



1I [2               ThIE REIGN OF LAW.
sectivorous birds as for the procuring of their food in the cap.
ture of other Insects. And this, which is perhaps the subordinate purpose in the case of the Mcaztidr, emerges as the main
purpose in another family of imitative Insects, the Phasmidce.
These last are vegetable feeders, and their imitative structure
is, if possible, even more wonderful, as it certainly is more
beautiful. In some species the wings are not only made like
leaves in form, in structure, and in general color, but they
are tinted at different seasons of the year with the varying
colors of spring, of summer, or of autumn. The fundamental
green is shaded off into browns, and reds, and yellows, with
a few of those crimson touches which are so common in the
" Pageant of the year."  There is one specimen in the British
Museum where the imitative effect is pursued, as it were, into
a region of still more minute and curious observation. The
general aspect of summer vegetation is much affected by the
ravages of insect life.  Minute larvae eat into the cuticle of
leaves, and mark them with various spots of bleached or faded
color.  Now the specimen of Phasnma I refer to has its wing
covered with spots which exactly imitate this appearance of a
larva-eaten leaf.  Can it be that this effect is itself produced
by a really similar cause-the eating of some larval parasite
into the tissue of the wing? If so, the combination of means
to the production of so wonderful an effect becomes only the
more bewildering in the endless vistas of adjustment which are
opened out. And there is another fact connected with these
Insects which is as astonishing as any other. It is this-that
the idea and purpose of imitation is carried into effect consistently and perseveringly through all the stages of the creature's
metamorphoses.  The eggs are as perfect imitations of vegetable seeds as the adult insect is of the expanded leaf.  In the
larval form they are like bits of stalk, or chips or cuttings of
leaves.
But although the laws which determine both form  and coloring are here seen to be subservient to use, we shall never
understand the phenomena of Nature unless we admit that
mere ornament or beauty is in itself a purpose, an object, and
an end. Mr. Darwin denies this; but he denies it under the
strange impression, that to admit it would be absolutely fatal to




APPARENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE SUPREMACY OF PURPOSE. 113
his own theory on the Origin of Species. So much the worse
for his theory, if this incompatibility be true. There is indeed
a difference, at least in words, between the doctrine now asserted
and the doctrine which Mr. Darwin denies. What he denies
as a purpose in nature is beauty "in the eyes of Man."  But
this evades the real point at issue. The relation in which
natural beauty stands to Man's appreciation of it, is quite a
separate question. It is certain enough that the gift of ornament in natural things has not been lavished, as it is lavished,
for the mere admiration of mankind. Ornament was as universal-applied upon a scale at once as grand and as minute as
now-during the long ages before Man was born. Some of
the most beautiful forms in Nature are the shells of the marine
Mollusca, and many of them are the richest, too, in surface
ornament. But, prodigal of beauty as the Ocean now is in the
creatures which it holds, its wealth was even greater and more
abounding in times when there was no man to gather them.
The shells and corals of the old Silurian Sea were as elaborate
and as richly carved as those which we now admire: and the
noble Ammonites of the Secondary ages must have been glorious things indeed. Even now there is abundant evidence
that although Man was intended to admire beauty, beauty was
not intended only for Man's admiration. Nowhere is ornament more richly given, nowhere is it seen more separate from
use, than in those organisms of whose countless millions the
microscope alone enables a few men for a few moments to see
a few examples. There is no better illustration of this than
a class of forms belonging to the border-land of animal and
vegetable life called the Diatomace&e, which, though invisible to
the naked eye, play an important part in the economy of Nature. They exist almost everywhere, and of their remains
whole strata, and even mountains, are in great part composed.
They have shells of pure silex, and these, each after its own
kind, are all covered with the most elaborate ornamentstriated, or fluted, or punctured, or dotted in patterns which
are mere patterns, but patterns of perfect, and sometimes of
most complex, beauty. No graving done with the graver's
tool can equal that work in gracefulness of design, or in
delicacy and strength of touch. Yet it is impossible to look at
8




11 4               THE REIGN OF LAW.
these forms-in all the variety which is often crowded under a
single lens —without recognizing instinctively that the work of the
graver is work strictly analogous,-addressed to the same perceptions,-founded on the same idea,-having for its object the same
end and aim. And as the work of the graver varies for the mere
sake of varying, so does the work on these microscopic shells.
In the same drop of moisture there may be some dozen or
twenty forms, each with its own distinctive pattern, all as constant as they are distinctive, yet having all apparently the same
habits, and without any perceptible difference of function.
It would beto doubt the evidence of our senses and of our
reason, or else to assume hypotheses of which thiere is no proof
whatever, if we were to doubt that mere ornament, mere variety, are as much an end and aim in the workshop of Nature as
they are known to be in the workshop of the goldsmith and the
jeweller. Why should they not? The love and desire of these
is universal in the mind of Man. It is seen not more distinctly
in the highest forms of civilized art than in the habits of the
rudest savage, who covers with elaborate carving the handle of
his war-club, or the prow of his canoe. Is it likely that this
universal aim and purpose of the mind of Man should be
wholly without relation to the aims and purposes of his Creator?
He that formed the eye to see beauty, shall He not see it?
He that gave the human hand its cunning to work for beauty,
shall His hand never work for it? How then, shall we account
for all the beauty of the world-for the careful provision made
for it where it is only the secondary object, not the first? Even
in those cases, for example, where concealment is the main object in view, ornament is never forgotten, but lies as it were underneath, carried into effect under the conditions and limitations imposed by the higher law and the more special purpose.
Thus the feathers of the Ptarmigan, though confined by the law
of assimilative coloring to a mixture of black and white or
gray, have those simple colors disposed in crescent bars and
mottlings of beautiful form, even as the lichens which they imitate spread in radiating lines and semi-circular ripples over the
weather-beaten stones.  It is the same with all other Birds
whose color is the color of their home. For the purpose of
concealment, their coloring would be equally effective if it












APPARENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE SUPREMACY OF PURPOSE. 115
were laid on without order or regularity of form. But this is
never done. The required tints are always disposed in patterns, each varying with the genus and the species; varying for
the mere sake of variation, and for the beauty which belongs
to ornament.  And where this purpose is not under the restraint of any other purpose controlling it and keeping it down
as it were within comparatively narrow limits, how gorgeous
are the results attained! What shall we say of flowers-those
banners of the vegetable world, which march in such various
and splendid triumph before the coming of its fruits? What
shall we say of the Humming Birds —whose feathers are made
to return the light which falls upon them, as if rekindled from
intenser fires, and colored with more than all the colors of all
the gems?
There is one instance in Nature (and, as far as I know, only
one) in which (rnament takes the form of pictorial representation. The secondary feathers in the wing of the Argus Pheasant are developed into long plumes, which the bird can erect
and spread oat like a fan, as a Peacock spreads his train.
These feathers -re decorated with a series of conspicuous spots
or "eyes," whi.h are so colored as to imitate the effect of
balls. The shadows and the " high light " are placed exactly
where an artist would place them in order to represent a sphere.*
The " eyes " of the Peacock's train are wonderful examples of
ornament; but they do not represent anything except their own
harmonies of color. The "eyes " of the Argus Pheasant are
like the "ball and socket " ornament which is common in the
decorations of human art. It is no answer to this argument in
respect to beauty, that we are constantly discovering the use of
beautiful structures in which the beauty only, and not the usefulness, had been hitherto perceived. The harmonies on which
all beauty probably depends are so minutely connected in Nature that "use" and ornament may often both arise out of the
same conditions. Thus, some of the most beautiful lines on
the surface of shells are simply the lines of their annual growth,
which growth has followed definite curves, and it is the " law "
of these curves that is beautiful in our eyes. Again, the forms
* I owe the observation of this curious fact to my friend Mr. James Nasmyth, so
well known as the inventor of the Steam Hammer, and as a distinguished astronomer,




I16               THE REIGN OF LAW.
of many Fish which are so beautiful, are also forms founded on
the lines of least resistance. The same observation applies to
the form of the bodies and of the wings of Birds. Throughout
Nature, ornament is perpetually the result of conditions and
arrangements fitted to use and contrived for the discharge of
function. But the same principle applies to human art, and
few persons are probably aware how many of the mere ornaments of architecture are the traditional representation of parts
which had their origin in essential structure. Yet who would
argue from this fact that ornament is not a special aim in the
works of Man?  When the savage carves the handle of his
war-club, the immediate purpose of his carving is to give his
own hand a firmer hold. But any shapeless scratches would be
enough for this. When he carves it in an elaborate pattern,
he does so for the love of ornament, and to satisfy the sense of
beauty.
There is, however, another department of natural phenomena
which, much more than the one we have been now considering,
does at first sight suggest to the mind the subordination of
Purpose and the supremacy of Law. Is is the department of
Comparative Anatomy. It is a fact now well known and universally accepted, that in many animal structures, perhaps in
all except one, there are parts the presence of which cannot be
explained, from their serving any immediate use, or discharging
any actual functioni.  For example, the limbs of all the Mammalia, and even of all the Lizards, terminate in five jointed
bones or fingers. But in many animals the whole five are not
needed, but only some one, or two, or three.  In such cases
the remainder are indeed dwarfed, sometimes almost extinguished; but the curious fact is that rudimentally the whole
number are always to be traced. Even in the Horse, where
one only of the five is directly used, and where this one is enlarged and developed into a hoof, parts corresponding to the
remaining four fingers can be detected in the anatomy of the
limb. Other examples of the same principle might be given
without number.  Thus there are Monkeys which have no
thumbs for use, but only thumb-bones hid beneath the skin:
the wingless Bird of New Zealand, the " Apteryx," has useless
wing-bones similarly placed; snakes destined always to creep




APPARENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE SUPREMACY OF PURPOSE. I I
" upon their belly " have nevertheless rudiments of legs, and the
common " Slowworm " has even the " blade bone" and " collar
bone " of rudimentary or aborted limbs: the Narwhal has only
one tusk, on the left side, developed for use, like the horn of
an heraldic Unicorn, but the other tusk, on the right side, is
present as a useless germ: the female Narwhal has both tusks
reduced to the same unserviceable condition: young whalebone
Whales are born with teeth which never cut the gum, and
which are afterwards absorbed as entirely useless to the creature's life.
At first sight it may appear as if these were facts not to be
reconciled with the supremacy of Purpose:-at first sight, but
at first sight only.  For as we look at them  and wonder at
them, and set ourselves to discover how many of a like nature
can be found, our eye catches sight of an Order which had not
been at first perceived. Exceptions to one narrow rule such as
we might have laid down and followed for ourselves, they are now
seen to be in strict subordination to a larger rule which it would
never have entered into our imagination to conceive. These
useless members, these rudimentary or aborted limbs which
puzzled us so much, are parts of an universal Plan. On this
plan the bony skeletons of all living animals have been put
together. The forces which have been combined for the moulding of Organic Forms have been so combined as to mould them
after certain types or patterns. And when Comparative Anatomy has revealed this fact as affecting all the animals of the
existing world, another branch of the same science comes in
to conform the generalization, and extend it over the innumerable creatures which have existed and have passed away. This
one Plan of Organic Life has never been departed from since
Time began.
When we have grasped this great fact, all the lesser facts
which are subordinate to it assume a new significance. In the
first place a Plan of this kind is in itself a Purpose. An Order
so vast as this, including within itself such variety of detail, and
maintained through such periods of Time, implies combination
and adjustment founded upon, and carrying into effect, one
vast conception. It is only as an Order of Thought that the
doctrine of Animal Homologies is intelligible at all. It is a




118                THE REIGN OF LAW.
Mental Order, and can only be mentally perceived. For what
do we mean when we say that this bone in one kind of animal
corresponds to such another bone in another kind of animal?
Corresponds-in what sense?  Not in the method of using it
-for very often limbs which are homologically the same are put
to the most diverse and opposite uses. To what standard, then,
are we referring when we say that such and such two limbs are
homologically the same? It is to the standard of an Ideal Order
-a Plan-a Type-a Pattern mentally conceived. This sounds
very recondite and metaphysical; and yet the habit of referring
physical facts to some ideal standard and order of thought is a
universal instinct in the human mind. It is one of the earliest
of our efforts in endeavoring to understand the phenomena
around us. The science of Homologies, as developed by Cuvier and Hunter and Owen and Huxley, is indeed an intricate,
almost a transcendental science. Yet Dr. Livingstone found the
natives of Africa debating a question which belongs essentially
to that science and involves the whole principle of the mental
process by which it is pursued. The debate was on thequestion
"whether the two toes of the Ostrich represent the thumb and
forefinger in Man, or the little and ring-finger."* This is
purely a question of Comparative Anatomy. It is founded
on the instinctive perception that even between two frames
so widely separated as those of an Ostrich and a Man, there is
a common Plan of structure, with reference to which plan,
parts wholly dissimilar in appearance and in use can nevertheless be identified as " representative " of each other:that is, as holding the same relative place in one Ideal Order
of arrangement.
The recognition of this idea in minds so rude is not the less
remarkable from the fact that both sides in this African debate
were wrong in their practical application of the idea to the
particular case before them. Unity of design amidst variety
of form is so conspicuous and universal in the works of Nature
that the perception of it could not possibly escape recognition
even by the rudest human mind, formed as that Mind is to see
Order, and to work for it, and to admire it. But though instinct
is enough to give us the general idea, and to trace it in a thou*" The Zambesi and its Tributaries," p. 424,




APPARENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE SUPREMACY OF PURPOSE. I 19
sand instances where it can hardly be overlooked, yet it needs
close and laborious study, and high powers of analysis and of
thought, to trace correctly the true Order and Plan through the
fine and subtle passages of Nature. It would have astonished
those poor natives of Africa to be told, as is the truth, that if
they wished to find in the Ostrich the parts corresponding to
their own middle finger, or ring-finger, or any other finger,
they must look, not to the toes of the Ostrich, but to her little
aborted wings, which, though useless for the purposes of flight,
are still retained as representing the wings of other Birds, and
the forearms of all the Mammals.
For here we come upon the interchange and crossing as it
were of two distinct ideas, which seem to stand the one as the
warp and the other as the woof in the fabrics of Organic Life.
There is the idea of Homology in Structure and the idea of
Analogy in Use. The one represents the Unity of Design, the
other represents Variety of Function. It might have been supposed that these could not easily be reconciled-that where
great differences in use and application are essential, rigid adherence to one pattern of structure would be an impediment in
the way. But it is not so. The same bones in different animals are made subservient to the widest possible diversity of
function. The same limbs are converted into paddles, and
wings, and legs, and arms. And so it is with every other part
of the skeleton and every other organ of the body. Indeed it
is difficult to say whether the law of unity in design, or the law
of variety in adaptation, is pushed to the greatest length. There
are some cases in which the adaptation of form to special function is carried so far that all appearance df common structure
is entirely lost. It is very difficult, for example, to persuade
persons ignorant of the principles of anatomy that the Whale
and the Porpoise are not Fish, that they breathe with lungs as
Man breathes, that they would be drowned if, kept long under
water, and that, as they suckle their young, they belong to the
same great Class, Mammalia. Living in the same element as
Fish, and feeding very much as fishes feed, a similar outward
form has been given to them, because that form is the best
adapted for progression through the water. But that form has
been, so to speak, piut onl round the Mammalian skeleton, and




I20                  THE REIGN OF LAW.
covers all the organs proper to the Mamnlalian Class.  Whales
and Porpoises, notwithstanding their form, and their habitat,
and their food, are as separate from Fishes as the Elephant, or
the Hippopotamus, or the Giraffe.
And when we remember that the immense variety of Organic
Forms in the existing world does not exhaust the adaptability
of their Plan, but that the still vaster varieties of all the extinct
creations have circled round the same central Types, it becomes evident that these Types have had from the first a Purpose which has been well and wonderfully fulfilled. As a matter of fact, we see that the original conception of the framework
of Organic Life has included in itself provisions for applying
the principle of adaptation in infinite degrees. Its last development is in Man. In his frame there is no abortive member.
Every part is put to its highest use:-highest, that is, in reference to the supremacy of mind.* There are stronger arms,
there are swifter limbs, there are more powerful teeth, there are
finer ears, there are sharper eyes. There are creatures which
go where he cannot go, and can live where he would die. But
all his members are co-ordinated with one power-the power of
Thought. Through this he has the dominion over all other
created things-whilst yet as regards the type and pattern of
his frame he has not a single bone or joint or organ which he
does not share with some one or other of the Beasts that perish.
It is not in any of the parts of his structure, but in their combination and adjustment, that he stands alone.
All these facts must convince us that we must enlarge our
ideas as to what is meant by Use in the Economy of Nature.
In the first place, it must be so interpreted as to include ornament; and in the second place, it must include also not merely
Actual Use, but Potential Use, or the capacity of being turned
to use in new creations. Of course this is one of the ideas
which Philosophers of the Positive School denounce as " Metaphysical."  But here again their opposition is itself based upon
metaphysics, only upon metaphysics which are bad.  " Potential existence," says Mr. Lewes,t "is ideal, not real."  "A
* "Quid reliqua descriptione omnium corporis partium, in qua nihil inane, nihil sine
causa, nihil supervacaneum est? "-Cicero, " De Nat. Deor.,," lib. i. cap. 33.
t "' History of Philosophy," Prologue, p. lxxxviil.




APPARENT EXCEPT'IONS TO THE SUPREMACY OF PURPOSE. 121
fact is not a fact until it is accomplished. Nothing exists before it exists. This truism is disregarded by those who talk of
potential existence." So it is, and it ought to be disregarded,
because it has no bearing on the question.  May not the formation of a plan or conspiracy to murder be " a fact " although the
murder is not " accomplished?" Is not the capacity in the
different pieces of a puzzle of being fitted together, a fact'even when the pieces are all huddled confusedly in a box? Is
there no potential use in the udder of a cow-calf before it can
have had any calves of its own? Is the idea of Potential use
in all these cases an idea which has no " reality?"  Are they
mere "artifices of thought," or "preliminary falsifications of
fact?"  If the metaphysics of Positivism are available to establish this conclusion, they must be equally available to condemn
knowledge in all its forms as " Ideal " and not " real."  Bad metaphysics of this kind are indeed, what Dr. Newman dreads the
human mind may be, a "universal solvent," casting doubt on
the most certain of its own conclusions, and landing itself in
universal scepticism.
We have not far to go to find the same kind of reasoning,
and the same methods of analysis, employed to establish the
converse proposition, that so far from Potentiality having no
existence, it is the only form under which the existence of anything beyond ourselves can be known to us. No less eminent
a thinker than Mr. J. S. Mill reduces Matter itself, and the very
idea of the existence of an external world, to a " Permanent
Possibility of Sensation." *  Nay, he is not sure-he only sees
some " intrinsic difficulties " in the way-whether our knowledge
of Self-existence may not be brought under the same " Potential " category-as a mere " Possibility of Sensation." t  In regard to Matter, Mr. Mill distinctly says that so far from a mere
Possibility having no real existence, it is the only reality —the
one thing which is constant and abiding behind the flux and
uncertainty of actual sensations. My own opinion is that the
metaphysical process by. which these opposite paradoxes are arrived at is nearly as worthless in the one case as in the other.
Of the two I prefer the paradox of Mr. Mill to the paradox of
Mr. Lewes-so far at least as the reality of Potential Existences
l " lill onr Hamilton," chap. xi.          t Ibid. chap. xii,




122                THE REIGN OF LAW.
is concerned. But I prefer it only in the very case to which
Mr. Mill shrinks from applying it. I can think of my own mind
or existence as a " Possibility of Sensation " (whether " permanent" or not). It is a method of conception indeed which
casts no light on anything, and it is highly artificial; but at
least it is not false. It involves no confounding of two different elements of thought. But I cannot transfer the word or
the idea of sensation from myself to the external things which
cause sensation in me. This transfer involves a fundamental
confusion of thought and of language as the instrument of
thought. (See note D.) But such paradoxes are the natural
result of one great error-the endeavor to get rid of, or to explain away, or to dissolve by analysis, such simple and elementary conceptions of the Mind as the idea of External Force and
of Causation, or the idea of Purpose and Intention. Matter
may very well be conceived as " That which produces, or has a
Possibility of producing, Sensation in Sentient beings." But
this is a definition which involves the idea of Causation. And
if this be rejected as an elementary conception, (or as a distinct
conception, whether elementary or not,) then the paradox of
Mr. Mill is the natural result. In like manner, if the idea of
Purpose and Intention be repudiated, as representing no " reality " in Nature, then the opposite paradox of Mr. Lewes is
reached along the same slippery and deceptive ways. We know
at least, as a matter of experience, that we are capable of forming plans which exist as such before they are carried into effect. We know too that one plan may be large enough to include another, and that even within the fractional limits of our
foresight we can provide for contingent as well as for actual
use. We can therefore easily conceive the existence of the
same kind of prevision in the Mind which works in Nature, and
we can easily understand how the apparent difference between
actual and contingent use should be greater in proportion as
the Plan is larger, and is designed to operate during vaster peo
riods of Time.
In this point of view rudimentary or aborted organs need no
longer puzzle us, for in respect to Purpose they may be read
either in the light of History, or in the light of Prophecy.
They may be regarded as indicating always either what had




APPARENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE SUPREMACY OF PURPOSE. 123
already been, or what was yet to be.  Why new creations
should never have been made wholly new;-why they should
have been always moulded on some pre-existing Forms;-why
one fundamental ground-plan should have been adhered to for
all Vertebrate Animals, we cannot understand. But as a matter of fact it is so. For it appears that Creative Purpose has
been effected through the instrumentality of Forces so combined as to arrange the particles of organic matter in definite
forms: which forms include many separate parts having a constant relation to each other and to the whole, but capable of
arrestment or development according as special organs are
required for the discharge of special functions. Each new
creation seems to have been a new application of these old
materials. Each new House of Life has been built on these
old foundations. Among the many wonders of Nature there
is nothing more wonderful than this-the adaptability of the
one Vertebrate Type to the infinite variety of Life to which it
serves as an organ and a home.  Its basement has been so
laid that every possible change or addition of superstructure
could be built upon it. Creatures destined to live on the earth
or in the earth, on the sea or in the sea, under every variety of
condition of existence, have all been made after that one pattern; and each of them with as close an adaptation to special
function as if the pattern had been designed for itself alone.
It is true that there are particular parts of it which are of no
use to particular animals. But there is no part of it which is
not of indispensable use to some member of the group; and
there is one Supreme Form in which all its elements receive
their highest interpretation and fulfilment. It is indeed wonderful to think that the feeble and sprawling paddles on a Newt,
the ungainly flippers of a Seal, and the long leathery wings of
a Bat, have all the same elements, bone for bone, with that human hand which is the supple instrument of Man's contrivance,
and is alive, even to the finger-tips, with the power of expressing his Intellect and his Will. Here again the Laws of Nature
are seen to be nothing but combinations of Force with a view
to Purpose: combinations which indicate complete knowledge,
not only of what is, but of what is to be, and which foresees
the End from the Beginning.




CHAPTER V.
CREATION BY LAW.
WE see, then, how the existence of Organs separated from
Function, and of structures without immediate use, find their
natural place among all the other phenomena of the world.
They do not show that " Law " is ever superior to Will, or can
ever assert, even for a moment, an independence of its own.
On the contrary, they show, as nothing else can show, the patient movements, and the incalculable years, through which
material laws have been made to follow the steps of Purpose.
But, then, let us remember this: these discoveries in Phys
iology, though they are helpless to prove that Law has ever
been present as a Master, are eminently suggestive of the idea
that Law has never been absent as a Servant,-that as, in
governing the world, so in forming it, Material Forces have
been always used as the instruments of Will.
It is no mere theory, but a fact as certain as any other fact
of Science, that Creation has had a History. It has not been a
single act, done and finished once for all, but a long series of
acts-a work continuously pursued through an inconceivable
lapse of time. It is. another fact, equally certain, respecting
this work, that as it has been pursued in Time, so also it has
been pursued by Method. There is an " observed Order of
facts " ip the history of Creation, both in the organic and in the
inorganic world. I speak here, however, of the organic world
alone, and chiefly of those higher Forms which are the seat of
Animal Life. In these, there is an observed Order in the most
rigid scientific sense-that is, phenomena in uniform connection,
and mutual relations which can be made, and are made, the basis
of systematic classification. These classifications are imperfect,
not because they are founded on ideal connections where none
exist, but only because they fail in representing adequately the
subtle and pervading Order which binds together all living things.




CREATION BV LAW.                  125
But the Order which prevails in the existing world is not the
only Order which has been recognized by science. A like
Order has prevailed through all the past history of Creation.
Nay, more; it has, I think, been clearly ascertained, not only
that relations similar to those which now exist have existed
always among all the animals of each contemporary Creation,
but that Order of a like kind has connected with each other all
the different Creations which were successively introduced. In
almost all the leading Types of Life which have existed in the
different geological ages, there is an orderly gradation connecting the Forms which were becoming extinct with the Forms
which were for the first time appearing in the world. It is still
disputed by some geologists, whether we have certain evidence
that this gradation has been the gradation of a rising scale —of
progressive Creations from lower to higher Types. But this
dispute is maintained only on the ground that we cannot safely
trust to negative evidence. It is an unquestionable fact, that
so far as this kind of evidence can go, it does testify to the
successive introduction of higher and higher Forms of Life.
Very recently a discovery has been made, to which Mr. Darwin
only a few years ago referred as " a discovery of which the
chance is very small "-viz. of fossil Organisms in beds far beneath the lowest Silurian strata. This discovery has been
made in Canada-in beds far down, near the bottom even, of
the rocks hitherto termed " Azoic."  But what are the Forms
of Life which have been found here? They belong to the very
lowest of living types-to the " Rhizopods."  So far as this discovery goes, therefore, it is in strict accordance with all the
facts previously known-that, as we go back in time, we lose,
one after another, the higher and more complex organisms:
first, the Mammalia; then the Vertebrata; and now, lastly,
even the Mollusca. It is in accordance, too, with another fact
which has been observed before, viz. that particular Forms of
Life have attained, at particular epochs, a maximutn development, both in respect to size and distribution —the favorites,
as it were, of Creation for a time. These earliest Rhizopods
seem to have been of enormous size, and developed on an enormous scale; since there is good reason to believe that beds of
immense thickness are composed of their remains. All that is




1 26               THE REIGN OF LAW.
new in this discovery is the vast extension which it gives in
Time to the same rules which had been already traced through
ages which we cannot number.
Then, there is another observed Order. For each Class of
animal some definite Type or pattern has been adhered to;
and the modifications of that Type have been gradual and
successive. In many cases the science of fossil remains enable us to trace the intermediate Forms through which existing
animals can be connected with animals long since extinct. It
must be remembered that the fact of this connection is quite a
separate thing from any theory as to its physical cause. Professor Owen pointed out some years before the publication of
Mr. Darwin's theory, the existence of fossil animals which
showed an increasing approximation to the forms of the Horse
and of the Ox; and he showed that this approximation was
related in Time, as it seemed to be in Purpose, with the coming need of them for the service and use of Man. These are
the facts on which the idea of " Creation by Law' is founded.
Let us look a little nearer what this idea is, and what it involves. It is an idea much vaunted by some men, much feared
by others. Perhaps it may be found, on closer investigation,
that they are fearing or worshipping, as the case may be, an
idol of the imagination.
It being certain that Creation exhibits an Order of facts
which can be so clearly defined and traced, it follows, that at
least in this first sense of the word, Creation has been by Law.
We are, therefore, led on to the farther question, whether Law
in any other sense can be traced or detected in the work of
Creation? Is the observed Order which prevails in the organic
world an Order of which we can even guess the physical cause?
Is it an Order which contains within itself any indications of
the Force or combination of Forces which have been concerned in producing it?
In considering this question, there is one thing to be observed at the outset. It is certain that nothing is known, or
has been even guessed at, in respect to the history and Origin
of Life, which corresponds with Law in its strictest and most
definite sense. We have no knowledge of any one or more
Forces-such as the Force of Gravitation, or of magnetic at



CR,,ATION BY LAW.               I27
traction and repulsion-to which any one of the phenomena
of Life can be traced. Far less have we any knowledge of any
laws of the like kind which can be connected with the successive creation or development of new Organisms. Professor
Huxley, in a recent work,* has indeed spoken of " that combination of natural forces which we term Life." But this language is purely rhetorical. I do not mean to say that Life may
not be defined to be a kind of Force, or a combination of
Forces. All I mean is, that we know nothing of any of these
Forces in the same sense in which we do know something of the
Force of Gravity, or of Magnetism, or of Electricity, or of
Chemical Affinity. These are all more or less known, not, indeed, in respect to their ultimate nature, but in respect to certain methods and measures of their operation. No such
knowledge exists in respect to any of the Forces which have
been concerned in the development of Life. No man has ever
pretended to get such a view of any of these as to enable him
to apply to them the instruments of his analysis, or to trace in
their working any definite relations to Space, or Time, or Number.
Since, then, laws, in this most definite sense of the word,
have not been discovered in the existing phenomena, or in the
past history of Organic Life, let us look a little closer at the
ideas which these phenomena have suggested to the mind of
those who have speculated on the Origin and Development of
Species.
There is one idea which has been common to all theories of
Development, and that is, the idea that ordinary generation
has somehow been producing, from time to time, extraordinary
effects, and that a new Species is, in fact, simply an unusual
birth. It is worthy of observation, that the earlier forms in
which the theory of Development appeared, did suggest something more nearly approaching to a Law of Creation than is
contained in the later form which that theory has assumed in
the hands of Mr. Darwin. The essential idea of the theory of
Development, in its earlier forms, was, that modifications of
structure arose somehow by way of natural consequence from
the outward circumstances or physical conditions which re" i' Elements of Comparative Anatomy," p. 2.




128               THE REIGN OF LAW.
quired them, and from the living effort of Organism sensible in
some degree of that requirement. Now, inadequate and even
grotesque though this idea may be as explaining the Origin of
new Species it cannot be denied, that it makes its appeal to a
process which, at least to a limited extent, does operate in
producing modifications of organic structure. For example,
the same species of Mollusc has often a shell comparatively weak
and thin, or a shell comparatively robust and strong, according as it lies in tranquil or in stormy water. The shell which
is much exposed needs to be stronger than the shell which is
less exposed. But it is obvious that the mere fact of the need
cannot supply the thing needed, unless by the adjustment of
some machinery for the purpose. How the vital forces of the
Mollusc can thus be made to work to order, under a change
of external conditions, we do not know. But we do know, as a
matter of fact, that the shell is thickened and strengthened,
according as it needs resisting power. This result does not
appear to arise from any difference in the amount of lime held
in solution in the water, but from some power in the secreting
organs of the animal to appropriate more or less of it according to its own need. The effects of this power are seen where
there is no difference of condition except difference of exposure. It is said that they are observable, for example, in
the shells which lie on the different sides of Plymouth Breakwater,-the sheltered side and the exposed side. The same
power of adaptation is seen in many other forms. Trees which
are most exposed to the blast are the most strongly anchored
in the soil. Limbs which are the most used are the most developed. Organs which are in constant use, are strengthened,
whilst organs in habitual disuse have a tendency to become
weaker.
All these results arise by way of natural consequence. How
shall we describe them? Shall we say that they are the result
of Law? We may safely do so, remembering only that by
Law, in this sense, we mean nothing but the co-operation of
different natural Forces, which, under certain conditions, work
together for the fulfilment of an obvious intention. Of the
nature of those Forces we know nothing; nor is it easy to
conceive how they have been so co-ordinated as to produce




CREATION BY LAW.                 129
effects fitting with such exactness into the conditions requisite
for the preservation of Organic Life. If there were any evidence
that by the same means new Forms of Life could be developed
from the old, I cannot see why there should be any reluctance
to admit the fact. It would be different from anything that we
see; but I do not know that it would be at all less wonderful,
or that it would bring us much nearer than we now stand to
the great mystery of Creation. The adaptation and arrangement of natural forces, which can compass these modifications
of animal structure, in exact proportion to the need of them, is
an adaptation and arrangement which is in the nature of Creation. It can only be due to the working of a power which is
in the nature of Creative power.
We are so accustomed to these and other similar phenomena,
and so apt to hide our own ignorance of their cause, by describing them as the result of " Law," that we forget what a
multitude of natural Forces must be concerned in their production, and what complicated adjustmemts of these amongst
each other for the accomplishment of Purpose. It is purely,
therefore, in my view a question of evidence, whether this particular law of adaptation has or has not been the means of
introducing new Forms of Life. There is no evidence that it
has. So far as we know, this power of self-adaptation, wonderful
as it is, has a comparatively limited application; when that
limit is outrun by changes in outward conditions, which are too
great or too rapid, whole Species die and disappear. Nevertheless, the introduction of new Species to take the place of
those which have passed away, is a work which has been not
only so often but so continuously repeated, that it does suggest
the idea of having been brought about through the instrumentality of some natural process. But we may say with confidence,
that it must have been a process different from any that we yet
know-a process not the same as that (obscure as that is) which
produces the lesser modifications of Organic Forms.
It has not, I think, been sufficiently observed, that the theory
of Mr. Darwin does not address itself to the same question, and
does not even profess to trace the Origin of new Forms to any
definite law. His theory gives an explanation, not of the processes by which new Forms first appear, but only of the proc9




130                THE REIGN OF LAW.
esses by which, when they have appeared, they acquire a preference over others, and thus become established in the world.
A new Species is, indeed, according to his theory, as well as
with the older theories of Development, simply an unusual
birth. The bond of connection between allied specific and
generic Forms, is in his view simply the bond of Inheritance.
But Mr. Darwin does not pretend to have discovered any lacw
or rule according to which new Forms have been born fromn
old Forms. He does not hold that outward conditions, however changed, are sufficient to account for them. Still less
does he connect them with the effort or aspirations of any Organism after new faculties and powers. He frankly confesses
that "our ignorance of the laws of variation is profound; " and
says, that in speaking of them as due to chance, he means only
"to acknowledge plainly our ignorance of the cause of each
particular variation." * Again he says-" I believe in no law
of necessary development." t
This distinction between Mr. Darwin's theory and other theories of Development, has not, I think, been sufficiently observed. His theory seeins to be far better than a mere theory
-to be an established scientific truth-in so far as it accounts,
in part at least, for the success and establishment and spread
of new Forms when they have arisen. But it does not even
suggest the law under which, or by which, or according to
which, such new Forms are introduced. Natural Selection
can do nothing except with the materials presented to its
hands. It cannot select except among the things open to selection. Natural Selection can originate nothing; it can only
pick out and choose among the things which are originated by
some other law. Strictly speaking, therefore, Mr. Darwin's
theory is not a theory on the Origin of Species at all, but only
a theory on the causes which lead to the relative success or
failure of such new Forms as may be born into the world. It
is the more important to remember this distinction, because it
seems to me that Mr. Darwin himself frequently forgets it.
Not only does he speak of Natural Selection "producing" this
and that modification of structure, but he undertakes to affirm
* " Origin of Species," p. 131 (first edition).
t Ibid. p. 35'.




CREATION BY LAW.                  T3 
of one class of changes that they can be produced, and of another class of changes that they cannot be produced by this
process.*
Now, what are the changes for the preservation of which
Natural Selection does, in some sense, account? They are
such changes, and these only, as are of some direct use to the
Organism in the " struggle for existence." Any change which
has not this direct value, is not provided for in the theory. All
structures, therefore, are unaccounted for-not only as respects
their origin, but even as respects their preservation-in which
the variations have no other value than mere beauty or variety.
Accordingly, Mr. Darwin is tempted, as I have already had occasion to observe, to deny that any such structures exist in Nature. Any theory of which this denial is really a necessary
part, is self-condemned. Yet a theory may be good as accounting for the preservation of some structures, although it fails to
account for the preservation of others. And so the fact that
Natural Selection cannot have operated on structures of mere
beauty and variety is no proof that the theory of Natural Selection is false, but only that it is incomplete. It does not account for the origin of any structure; and it accounts for the
preservation of only a certain number. Surely, then, Mr.
Darwin assigns to his "law" of Natural Selection a range far
wider than really belongs to it, when, on the strength of it, he
denies that beauty for its own sake can be an end or object in
Organic Forms. He says-" This doctrine, if true, would be
absolutely fatal to my theory." Why should this be fatal to his
theory, except on the supposition that Natural Selection gives
a complete account both of the Origin of new Forms, (of which,
in reality, it gives no account at all,) and of their preservation,
of which it does give some account, but one which is only partial? I dwell on this, because it lies at the very root of the
question, how far Mr. Darwin's theory can be said to suggest
anything in the nature of a Creative Law of a kind to explain
the Method which has been followed in the introduction of
new Forms.
We may test this question by bringing to bear upon it some
particular example of specific variation. I select for this pur*'" Origin of Species," p. 2oo (first edition).




132                THE REIGN OF LAW.
pose one example, which will illustrate the subject better than
any abstract discussion. It is the case of the Humming Birds.
This group of Birds seems to exhibit, in the most striking
form, not a few of those mysteries of Creation which at once
tempt us to speculate on the Origin of Species, and at the same
time confound every endeavor to bring it into relation with any
process which we know or can conceive. In the first place, they
are sharply defined from all other forms in that Class of the
animal kingdom to which they belong. It is most difficult to
say what is their nearest affinity, and the nearest, when it is
found, is very distant. Secondly, they are absolutely confined
to one Continent of the Globe. In the third place, the various
Species as amongst themselves are very closely united, ranging,
indeed, over a great variety of forms, but for the most part connected with each other by very nice gradations. In the fourth
place, there are, so to speak, some gaps in the scale, which suggestthat some Species have either been lost, or have not yet
been discovered. In the fifth place, each of these Species, however nearly allied to some other, appears to be absolutely fixed
and constant, there being not the slightest indication of any
mixture-of any hybrid forms. In the sixth place, there is the
most wonderful adaptation of special organs for the performance
of special functions, and for the relation of these organs to
particular structures in the vegetable kingdom. In the seventh
place, there is a development, for which, in extent and variety,
there is no parallel in the world, of structures designed apparently for mere ornament, and entirely separate from any other
knowrP or conceivable use.
A few words on some of these characters will show their
separate and joint bearing on the idea of Creation by Law.
In the first place, then, the absolute distinctiveness from all
others of this Family of Birds, coupled with its immense extent
gives the idea of some common bond, some physical cause, to
which such an identity in physical characters must be due.
This identity prevails not only in such essential matters as the
structure of the bill and tongue, in the form of the feet and of
the wings, in the habits of flight, and in the nature of the food,
but runs also into some very curious details, as, for example,
in the number of feathers in the tail and in the wings, which




CREATION BY LAW.                  I33
are constant numbers-adhered to even when some of the
feathers, not being used even for ornament, are reduced almost
to rudiments. But under degrees of development which are
very variable, the number is invariable. This identity of
structure is the more remarkable from the immense extent of
the group which it characterizes. There are now known to
science no less than about 430 different species of Humming
Bird; and it cannot be doubted that many more remain to be
discovered among the immense forests and mountain ranges of
Central America.
Now, what is the bond that unites so closely, in a common
structure, all the forms of this great Family of birds? We
think it a sufficient explanation sometimes of the likeness of
things, that they are made for a common purpose. And so it is
an explanation in one sense, but not in another. It gives the
reason why likeness should be aimed at, but not the cause or
the means through which it has been brought about. Sameness
in the purpose for which things are intended, is a reason why
those things should be made alike; but it is no explanation of
the process to which the common aspect is due. It is an explanation of the "why;" but it is no explanation of the " how."
Purpose is attained in Nature through the instrumentality of
means; and community of aspect in created things suggests
the idea of some common process in the creative work. Thus,
the likeness which is due to common parentage serves the most
important purposes; but it is not the less the result of a physical cause out of which it arises by way of natural consequence.
The likeness of the Humming Birds to each other suggests this
kind of cause. It is true that the organs which it principally
affects are specially adapted for a special habit of life. They
are fitted to enable the Bird to feed on the nectar, and the
insects which frequent the nectar of flowers, or the leaves or
bark of trees. But there are flowers and insects in abundance
in other quarters of the globe where there are no Humming
Birds.
And here we come on the curious facts of geographical distribution,-a class of facts which, as much as any other, suggest
some specific methods as having been followed in the work of
Creation, Humming Birds are absolutely confined to the great




134                THE REIGN OF LAW.
Continent of America with its adjacent islands. Within those
limits there is every range of climate, and there are particular
species of Humming Bird adapted to every region where a
flowering vegetation can subsist. It is therefore neither climate
nor food which confines the Humming Birds to the New World,
What is it, then?  The idea of "centres of Creation" is at
once suggested to the mind. It seems as if the Humming Birds
were introduced at one spot, and as if they had spread over
the whole Continent which was accessible to them from that
spot. They are absent elsewhere, simply because from that
spot the other Continents of the world were inaccessible to them.
But if these ideas are suggested to the mind by the general aspect of this family as a whole, they are strengthened by some
of the facts which we discover when we examine and compare
with each other the genera and species of which it is composed.
There is a beautiful gradation between the drfferent genera and
the different species,-so much so, that it has been found impossible to divide the Humming Birds into more than two subfamilies, from the absence of sufficiently well-marked divisions.
And yet on the other hand, they cannot be arranged in anything
like a continuous series, because some links appear to be
missing in the chain.
But these general facts terminate in nothing more definite
than a vague surmise. When we enter farther into details, we
feel at once how little they agree with any physical law which is
known or even conceivable by us. If the likeness which prevails in the whole group reminds us of the likeness which is due
to community of blood, it is equally true that the differences between the species are totally distinct, both in kind and degree,
from the variation which we ever see arising among the offspring of the same parents. Let us look at what these differences are. The generic and specific distinctions between the
Humming Birds are mainly of two kinds,-ist, Differences in
the form of essential organs, such as the bill and the wings; 2d,
Differences in those parts of the plumage which are purely ornamental. Now, of these two kinds of variation, the only one
on which the law of Natural Selection has any bearing at all is
the first. And on that kind of variation, the only bearing which
Natural Selection has is this-that if any Humming Bird were




CREATION BY LAW.                  135
born with a new form of bill, or a new form of wing, which enabled it to feed better and to range farther, then that improved
bill and wing would naturally tend to be perpetuated by ordinary generation. This is unquestionably true; but it really
does not touch the facts of the case. The bills and wings of
the different genera do not differ from each other in respect of
any comparative advantage of this kind, but simply in respect
to variety corresponding with the variety of certain vegetable
Forms. One form of bill is as good as another, but some forms
are adapted to some special class of flower. Some bills, for example, are formed of enormous length, specially adapted to obtain access to the nectar chambers of long tubular flowers, such
as the Brugmansia. Some, on the other hand, as if to show
that the same end may be attained by different means, obtain
access to the same flowers by a shorter process, and pierce the
bases of the corolla instead of seeking access by the mouth.
Some have bills bent downwards like a sickle, adapted to
searching the bark of Palm-trees for the insects hid under the
scaly covering; others have bills curved in the opposite direction, fitted, apparently, to the curious construction of some of
the great family of Orchids so immensely developed in the forests of Central America. Some have bills equally well adapted
for searching a vast variety of flowers and blossoms, and
these, accordingly, migrate with the flowering season, and, issuing from the great stronghold of the family in tropical
America, spread like our own summer Birds of passage, northwards to Canada, and southwards to Cape Horn, in the corresponding seasons of the year. In contrast with these species
of extended range, there are many species whose habitat is confined, perhaps to a single mountain, and there are a few which
never have been seen beyond the edges of some extinct volcano,
whose crater is now filled with a special flora. Many of the
great mountains of the Andes have each of them species peculiar to themselves. On Chimborazo and Cotopaxi, and other
summits, special forms of Humming Birds are found in special
zones of vegetation even close up to the limits of perpetual
snow. Again, many of the Islands have species peculiar to
themselves. The little island of Juan Fernandez, 300 miles
from the mainland, has three species peculiar to itself, of which




136                THE REIGN OF LAW.
two are so distinct from all others known, that they cannot for
a moment be confounded with any of them.*
It is impossible not to see, in such complicated facts as these,
that the creation of new Species has followed some plan in
which mere variety has been in itself an object and an aim.
The divergence of form is not a divergence which can have
arisen by way of natural consequence, merely from comparative
advantage and disadvantage in the struggle for existence.
Bills highly specialized in form are certainly not those which
would give the greatest advantage to birds which have equal
access to the abundant Flora of an immense Continent. Some
form of bill adapted to the probing or piercing of all flowers
with almost equal ease, would seem to be the form most favorable to the multiplication and spread of Humming Birds. Continued approximation to some common type would seem to be
quite as natural a change, and a much more advantageous kind
of change as regards advantage in the struggle for existence,
than endless divergence and special adaptation to limited
spheres of enjoyment. At all events, we may safely say that
mere advantage, in Mr. Darwin's sense, is not the rule which
has chiefly guided Creative Power in the Origin of these new
Species. It seems rather to have been a rule having for its object the mere multiplying of Life, and the fitting of new Forms
for new spheres of enjoyment, according as these might arise
out of corresponding changes in other departments of the organic world.
If, now, we turn to the other kind of specific distinction between Humming Birds, viz., that which consists in differences
in the mere coloring and disposition of the plumage, we shall
find the same phenomena still more remarkable. In the first
place, it is to be observed of the whole group that there is'no
connection which can be traced or conceived between the
splendor of the Humming Birds and any function essential to
their life. If there were any such connection, that splendor
could not be confined, as it almost exclusively is, to one sex.
The female Birds are of course not placed at any disadvantage
in the struggle for existence by their more sombre coloring.
Mere utility in this sense, therefore, can have had no share in
(GouI!d' " Trochilic!e,"




CREATION BY LAW.                  i37
determining one of the most remarkable of all the characteristics of this family of Birds. It is obviously beside the question
to account, as Mr. Wallace and Mr. Darwin do, for the beauty
of the Humming Birds upon the ground that the males are
thus rendered more attractive to the females. This attractiveness can only operate as between different individuals of the
same species, since no one ever heard of the females of a dullcolored species wandering in their affection from their rightful
lords to the more brilliant males of some other species. Every
animal, however little beautiful it may be in our eyes, has
sufficient attractiveness as between the sexes to secure the
great object of the continuation of its race, Utility, indeed,
in a different sense, can be quoted with probability, as accounting for the comparative plain coloring of females in this and in
almost all other genera of Birds. But then it is Utility conceived as operating by way of motive in a Creative Mind, and
not operating as a physical cause in the production of a mechanical result. And here we find Mr. Wallace instinctively
testifying to this great distinction, and employing language
which indicates the passage from one order of ideas to another.
He says, "The REASON WHY female birds are not adorned
with equally brilliant plumes is sufficiently clear; they would
be injurious by rendering their possessors too conspicuous
during incubation." *  This is, no doubt, the true explanation
of the purpose which the plain coloring of female Birds is intended to serve; but it is no explanation at all of the physical
causes by which this special protection is secured.
Those who, by special study, have laid their minds alongside
the Mind of Nature in any of her Provinces, have generally
imparted to them a true sense, so far as it goes, in the interpretation of her mysteries.  Let us then hear what Mr. Gould says
on the beauty of the Humming Birds:-" The members of most
of the genera have certain parts of their plumage fantastically
decorated; and in many instances most resplendent in color.
My own opinion is, that this gorgeous coloring of the Humming
Birds has been given for the mere purpose of ornament, and
for no other purpose of special adaptation in their mode of
life; in other words, that ornament and beauty, merely as
* ouarterly journal f Science, Oct., xr67, p. 481




138                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
such, was the end proposed." * Different parts of the plumage
have been selected in different genera as the principal subject
of ornament. In some, it is the feathers of the crown worked
into different forms of crest; in some, it is the feathers of the
throat, forming gorgets and beards of many shapes and hues,
in some, it is a special development of neck plumes, elongated
into frills and tippets of extraordinary form and beauty. In a
great number of genera the feathers of the tail are the special
subjects of decoration, and this on every variety of plan and
principle of ornament. In some, the two central feathers are
most elongated, the others decreasing in length on either side,
so as to give the whole the wedge form.  In others, the converse plan is pursued, the two lateral feathers being most developed, so that the whole is forked after the manner of the
common Swallow. In others, again, they are radiated or pointed
and sharpened like thorns. In some genera there is an extraordinary development of one or two feathers into plumes of
enormous length, with flat or spatulose terminations. Mere
ornament and variety of form, and these for their own sake, is
the only principle or rule with reference to which Creative
Power seems to have worked in these wonderful and beautiful
Birds. And if we cannot account for the differences in the
general style and plan of ornament followed in the whole group,
by referring them to any sort of use in the struggle for existence, still less is it possible to account, on this principle, for
the kind of difference which separates from each other the
different species in each of the genera. These differences are
often little more than a mere difference of color.  The radiance
of the ruby or topaz in one species, is replaced perhaps by the
radiance of the emerald or the sapphire in another. In all
other respects the different species are sometimes almost exact
counterparts of each other. As an example, let me refer to
the two species figured by Mr. Gould as the Blue-tailed and the
Green-tailed Sylphs; and also to two species of the " Comets,"
in which two different kinds of luminous reds or crimsons are
nearly all that serve to distinguish the species.
A similar principle of variation applies in other genera, where
the amount of difference is greater.  For example, one of the
* Gould's " Trochilidxae," Introduction.




CREATION BY LAW.                   139
most singular and beautiful of all the tribe is comprised within
the genus Loph/ornis, or the "Coquettes."  The principle of
ornament in this genus is, that the different species are all provided both with brilliant crests, and with frills or tippets on the
neck.  The feathers of these parts are generally of one color,
ending in spots or spangles of another; the spangles being
generally of metallic lustre. There seems to be a rule of inverse
proportion between the two kinds of ornament. The species
which have the neck plumes longest have the shortest crests
and vice versa. In the shape and structure of all essential
organs there is hardly any difference between the species.
One very curious example of variety for the sake of ornament
may be mentioned in connection with this wonderful family of
Birds. It is a law-in the sense of an observed order of facts
-regulating the ornament of Humming Birds, that where white
is introduced into the coloring of the tail feathers, it is not
applied to the central feathers, but is confined to the marginal
feathers on either side.  There is, however, one species (Urosticte Bengamini), recently discovered, which affords the only example yet known of a departure from this rule. It is a species
in which white is one of the principal ornaments of the Bird, and
is used in places where it can be placed in conspicuous contrast
with the darkest tints. Tufts and lines of purest white shine
among the greens and violets of the neck and head; whilst, in
exquisite harmony with this, the four central feathers of the tail
are alone dipped, as it were, in a solid glaze of the same white,
and the marginal feathers on either side are kept wholly dark.
Then, as if to mark with emphasis the meaning of this departure
from the ordinary rule, it is a departure confined to the ornamented sex; and the Female Form of the same species follows the ordinary law-white being introduced in the marginal
feathers, and in these alone.
Now, what explanation does the law of Natural Selection give
-I will not say of the origin, but even of the continuance and
preservation-of such specific varieties as these?  None whatever. A crest of topaz is no better in the struggle for existence
than a crest of sapphire. A frill ending in spangles of the
emerald is no better in the battle of life than a frill ending in
the spangles of the ruby. A tail is not affected for the purposes




140               THE REIGN OF LAW.
of flight, whether its marginal or its central feathers are dec.
orated with white. It is impossible to bring such varieties into
relation with any physical law known to us. It has relation,
however, to a Purpose, which stands in close analogy with our
own knowledge of Purpose in the works of Man. Mere beauty
and mere variety, for their own sake,tare objects which we
ourselves seek when we can make the Forces of Nature subordinate to the attainment of them.  There seems to be no conceivable reason why we should doubt or question, that these
are ends and aims also in the Forms given to living Organisms,
when the facts correspond with this view, and with no other.
In this sense, we can trace a creative law,-that is, we can see
that these Forms of Life do fulfil a purpose and intention, which
we can appreciate and understand.
But then it may be asked, has this purpose and intention been
attained without the use of means? Have no physical laws
been used, whereby these new forms of beauty have been evolved,
the one from the other, in a series so wonderful for its variety
in unity, and its unity in variety? I am not now seeking to
answer this question in the negative. All I say is, that the
physical laws which are made subservient to this purpose are
entirely unknown to us. That particular combination of a great
many natural laws, which Mr. Darwin groups under the name
of Natural Selection, does not in the least answer the conditions
which we seek in a law to account for either the origin or the
spread of such creatures as the various kinds of Humming Birds.
On the other hand, if I am asked whether I believe that every
separate Species has been a separate creation-not born, but
separately made-I must answer, that I do not believe it. I
think the facts do suggest to the mind the idea of the working
of some creative Law, almost as certainly as they convince us
that we know nothing of its nature, or of the conditions under
which it does its glorious work. Our experience of the existing
Order of Nature is, that the young of each species repeat the
form and the colors of their parent, and that even where
variations occur, they are inconstant, and tend to disappear.
We have no knowledge, for example, that from the eggs of the
Blue-tailed Sylph a pair of Green-tailed Sylphs can ever be produced. We have no reason to believe that a species of LZophorzlts




CREATION BY LAW.                  141
with a tippet of emerald spangles, can ever hatch out a pair of
young adorned with spangles of some other gem.  And yet we
cannot assert that such phenomena are impossible, nor can it be
denied that, as a matter of speculation, this process is natural
and easy of conception, as compared with the idea of each
Species being separately called into existence, out of the inorganic elements of which its body is composed.
Such new births-if they do take place-would perfectly fulfil, I think, the only idea we can ever form of new creations.
For example, it would appear that every variety which is to
take its place as a new Species must be born male and female;
because it is one of the facts of specific variation in the Humming Birds, that although the male and female plumage is generally entirely different, yet the female of each species is as
distinct from the female of every other, as the male is from the
male of every other. If, therefore, each new variety were not
born in couples, and if the divergence of Form were not thus
secured in the organization of both the sexes, it would fail to
be established, or would exhibit for a time the phenomena of
mixture, and terminate in reversion to the original type. Now
here again we have the emphatic declaration of Mr. Gould, that
among the thousands of specimens which have passed through
his hands, from all the genera of this great family, he has never
seen one case of mixture or hybridism between any two Species, however nearly allied. But this passage is so important,
that I quote it entire.  " It might be thought by some persons
that four hundred species of birds so diminutive in size, and of
one family, could scarcely be distinguished from each other;
but any one who studies the subject, will soon perceive that
such is not the case. Even the females, which assimilate more
closely to each other than the males, can be separated with perfect certainty; nay, even a tail-feather will be sufficient for a
person well versed in the subject to say to what genus and species the Bird from which it has been taken belongs. I mention
this fact to show that what we designate a Species has really
distinctive and constant characters; and in the whole of my
experience, with many thousands of Humming Birds passing
through my hands, I have never observed an instance of any
variation which would lead me to suppose that it was the result




142                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
of a union of two species. I write this without bias, one way
or the other, as to the question of the Origin of Species. I am
desirous of representing Nature in her wonderful ways as she
presents herself to my attention at the close of my work, after
a period of twelve years of incessant labor, and not less than
twenty years of interesting study." *
If, therefore, new Species are born from the old, it is not by
accidental mixture; it is not by the mere nursing of changes
advantageous in the battle of life; it must be from the birth of
some one couple, male and female, whose organization is subjected to new conditions corresponding with each other, and
having such force of self-continuance as to secure it against reversion. It matters not how small the difference may be from
the parent Form; if that difference be constant, and if it be
associated with some difference equally constant in the female
Form, it becomes at once a new Species. There are some cases
mentioned by Mr. Gould which may possibly be examples of
the first founding of a new Species. In the beautiful genus
Cynantnus, he tells us that there are some local varieties near
Bogota, in which the ornament is partially changing from blue
to green; and it is a curious fact that this variation appears to
be taking effect under the direction of some definite rule or
"law,"-inasmuch as it is only the eight central feathers of
the tail which are tipped with the new color. Mr. Gould
expressly says of one such variety from Ecuador, that it possesses characters so distinctive as to entitle it, in his opinion,
to the rank of a separate Species. The very discussion of
such a question shows the possibility of new births being the
means of introducing new Species. But my object here is simply to point out that Mr. Darwin's theory offers no explanation
of such births, either as respects their origin or their preservation, neither does it even approach to tracing these births to
any physical law whatever. It fails also to recognize, even if
it does not exclude, the relation which the birth of new Species
has to the mental purpose of producing mere beauty and mere
variety. Nevertheless it may be true that ordinary generation
has been the instrument employed; but if so, it must be em.
* Gould's  Trochilidae," Introduction.




CREATION BY LAW.                  T43
ployed under extraordinary conditions, and directed to extraordinary results.
It will be seen, then, that the principle of Natural Selection
has no bearing whatever on the Origin of Species, but only on
the preservation and distribution of Species when they have
arisen. I have already pointed out that Mr. Darwin does not
always keep this distinction clearly in view, because he speaks
of Natural Selection "producing " organs, or " adapting " them.
It cannot be too often repeated that Natural Selection can produce nothing whatever, except the conservation or preservation
of some variation otherwise originated. The true Origin of
Species does not consist in the adjustments which help varieties
to live and to prevail, but in those previous adjustments which
cause those varieties to be born at all. Now what are these?
Can they be traced or even guessed at? Mr. Darwin has a
whole chapter on the Laws of Variation, * and it is here, if
anywhere, that we look for any suggestion as to the physical
causes which account for the Origin as distinguished from the
mere preservation of Species. He candidly admits that his doctrine of Natural Selection takes cognizance of variations only
after they have arisen, and that it regards those variations as
purely accidental in their origin, or, in other words, as due to
chance. This, of course, he adds, is a supposition wholly incorrect, and only serves " to indicate plainly our ignorance of
the cause of each particular variation." Accordingly, the Laws
of Variation which he proceeds to indicate are merely, for the
most part, certain observed facts in respect to Variation, and do
not at all come under the category of Laws, in that higher sense
in which the word Law indicates a discovered method under
which Natural Forces are made to work. There is, however, in
this chapter, one Law which approaches to a Law in the higher
sense. Mr. Darwin, whilst candidly confessing our profound
ignorance of the cause or origin of varieties, yet groups together
a great class of facts as connected by a tie which he calls the
" Correlation of Growth."  Now what is this law-this observed
Order of facts? It is, that variation in one part of an organism
is, as a rule, accompanied with corresponding variations in other
parts, and especially in those parts which are "homologous,"
* " Origin of Species," chap. v.




1 44                THE REIGN OF LAW.
that is to say, which occupy the same relative place in the gen
eral Plan.
This, lIowever, is but a very imperfect definition of the vast
Order of mysterious facts which are covered by the words,
" Correlation of Growth." The fundamental idea which these
words express is an Idea of wider and deeper significance in
Nature, than Mr. Darwin seems to have perceived.  There is a
correlation between all natural organic growths; that is to say,
that any variation of form in a single part has a constant relation to other variations of form in some other part or parts of
the same organism.  But "relation" is. a vague word. There
are many kinds of "relation "-there are indeed an infinite variety of kinds. What is the kind of relation that we detect in
Correlated Growths? It is not until we ask ourselves this
question that we discover what a deep question it is-how endless are the avenues of thought and of inquiry which it opens
up.
First, one relation which we detect in all variations of organic
growth, is simply the relation of symmetry.  This kind and
degree of Correlation of Growth prevails even in the world which
we call Inorganic. The corresponding sides and angles of a
crystal, for example, may be said to be correlated together.
The nature of this relation is geometrical and numerical. It is
a relation having reference to invariable rules of number. As
regards its physical cause, all we can say is, that it is the result
of forces whose property it is to aggregate the particles of matter in definite forms, which forms are symmetrical-that is to
say, they are forms having an axis with equal developments on
either side. Correlation of Growth, therefore, in this sense
points to the work of Forces, one of whose essential properties
is Polarity-that is, equal and similar action in opposite directions. Now, this kind of Correlation of Growth may be traced
upwards from simple Minerals through all the infinite con.plications of the organic world. It is unquestionably the basis of
many of the Correlations of Growth prevailing in Plants and
Animals. It is seen in the symmetrical arrangement of all vegetable and of all animal Forms.  A central axis is traceable in
them all; and the Bilatttal or Radiated arrangement of their




CREATION BY LAW.                 145
subordinate parts is one of the most fundamental and univer.
sal of all the Correlations of Growth.
T'rhis is one, but it is one only, of the Correlations of Growth
which are constantly observed. It would lead us to expect
that any change of form on one side of an animal would be accompanied by an exactly corresponding change on the other
side: so that limbs on one side of the central axis, if changed at
all, would change in exact and symmetrical accordance with the
limbs on the opposite and corresponding side. This, accordingly, is one of the Correlations of Growth most constantly observed.
Now, it will be seen that Correlation of Growth, in this first
and simplest sense, runs alongside, as it were, of Correlation in
another and higher sense. The relation between two equal and
opposite growths, which is a relation; in the first place, of simple symmetry as between themselves, is always accompanied by
another relation, in the second place, of correspondence or fitness as between these growths and external conditions. An
organism which is developed unsymmetrically, unequally, would
be not only ugly in its form, but it would be maimed and imperfect in its functions. Here, then, we see one kind and one
idea of Correlation rising above another. Two growths might
be correlated as regards each other, and might yet be wanting
in any corresponding correlation of fitness and of function towards outward things. But the first of these two kinds of correlation would be useless without the last. And this last is obviously the higher and more complex Correlation of the two. It
is higher, not only in the sense of being more complex, but as
involving an idea which lifts us at once from a lower to a higher
region of thought. Growths correlated as between each other
according to mere symmetry of arrangement suggest nothing,
except the work of Forces with inherent Polarity of action.
But growths correlated with things outside the organism in
which those growths occur,-and which can exert no physical
effect upon it,-suggest at once the operation of Forces working under Adjustment with a view to Purpose.
When we see a Mineral salt crystallizing under the power of
a Voltaic Current, we see Correlation of Growth in its simplest
form, and in visible connection with its immediate cause. The
I0




i 46               THE REIGN OF LAW.
particles of salt are marshalled in a constant Order-an Order,
the principle of which is some central axis, with branches and
branchlets grouped around it in equal and exquisite arrangement.
Wonderful as this arrangement is, it suggests no other question
to the mind than that which may be asked in respect to the ultimate nature and source of Polarity in Magnetic Force. But
when we see two growths in an organism which not only are
correlated to each other with reference to a centre, but are correlated also to external things with reference to Function, ywe
see something which raises questions altogether different in
kind. We have passed at once from the region of the What,
and the How, into the region of the.XWhy. The one kind of
Correlation has reference to Physical Causes, the other kind of
correlation has reference to those Mental Purposes which
Physical Causes are made to serve. These two kinds of Correlation are perfectly distinct. They are as distinct as the cor.
relation of equal pressures which a given volume of steam exerts upon the opposite sides of a boiler is distinct from the correlation between that pressure and its conversion into the driving-force of cranks and wheels, with all their adaptations for
running on the rails, or for paddling in the sea. They are as
distinct as the correlations of force developed in a Voltaic Battery are distinct from the adjustments which convert those
forces into the means of communicating Thought.
Mr. Darwin has not pointed out this distinction clearly. Indeed, he does not seem to have had it in his view. He groups
under one name,-the Correlation of Growth,-two classes of
Phenomena, which are indeed always combined in fact, but
which are entirely separate in idea. Correlation of Growth,
in one sense, is that law of vital force which secures that
any change in the shape of one limb in an animal shall be accompanied by a corresponding change in all the other limbs.
Correlation of Growth in the other sense, is that adjustment of
vital forces to the contingencies of external circumstance, which
secures that all the changes which do take place shall be
changes adapted to the discharge of new functions-to the fulfilment bf new conditions of life-to command over new sources
of enjoyment.
Keeping, then, clearly in our view ylxe distinction between




CREATION BY LAW.                  147
these two different kinds of Correlation of Growth, let us look
at the phenomena actually presented in the aspect and history
of Organic Forms, as respects both these kinds of Correlation.
As regards the first kind of Correlation, I have referred to
the law of Bilateral Symmetry as the simplest and most obvious
illustration. It is a law which at once connects itself with the
idea of Polarity of Force. But though this be one kind of Cor
relation, almost universal, and may very probably be the foundation of every other, there are many Correlations of Growth
between which and mere Polarity there is no visible connection.
The truth is that all the parts of an organism are bound together as one whole by a pervading system of correlations as
intricate as they are obscure. When the organism is in health,
and all its parts are working in harmony, the wonder of these
correlations is not perceived. But they are brought out in a
marked degree by the phenomena of disease, and also by the
phenomena of monstrosity or malformation. The " sympathy "
which the most distant and apparently unconnected parts of an
organism show with each other, when one of them is affected
by disease, is the index of correlations whose nature is utterly
beyond the reach of our anatomy, It is the same with malformations. Mr. Darwin mentions one case of curious unintelligible correlation —viz., that a blue iris is associated in Cats
with deafness; and, again, that the tortoise-shell color of the
fur is associated with the female sex in the same animal. In
like manner the bright colors, and the more conspicuous ornaments of plumage in Birds, are correlated with the male sex.
So likewise are vocal organs with the wonderful gift of song.
In many insects the differences of form which are correlated
with the differences of sex, are far greater than the differences
which separate species and even genera. There are insects of
which the male is a fly, whilst the female is a worm. There
are many other cases of correlation between different growths
in respect to which the nature and source of the connection is
equally unknown. For example, the complex stomachs of the
Ruminant Order are uniformly associated with a particular
form of hoof. Sometimes correlations the most constant and
invariable are at the same time the most subtle and the most
secret, because they are hid under other growths which are not




148                THE REIGN OY LAW.
so correlated, and which produce total diversities of outward
aspect. One very curious class of correlations is the correlation between the internal structure of the teeth in animals, and
the structure of other very distant portions of their frame.
There lately was, for example, in the Zoological Gardens, a little animal, the Hyrax, not unlike a Rabbit in general appearance, and very like it in habit. It is the " Cony " of Scripture.
Now this little animal will be found on examination to have
limbs which do not terminate in a foot like a Rabbit, but in a
divided hoof of peculiar form. This hoof is in miniature like
the hoof of a Rhinoceros. If next we examine the teeth of the
Hyrax we shall find that the materials of these teeth are also
combined in the same manner, and after the same pattern as
the teeth of the Rhinoceros. So it is with other parts of the
same two animals. Along with the teeth and the hoofs there
are certain other shapes of bones which seem to be under the
same bond of likeness. Now these are Correlations of Growth
between different parts of the same animal, and between the
corresponding parts in two different species.
The conception, then, which we are led to form by this kind
of Correlation between organic growths, is more complex than
we had at first supposed. Mere Polarity of Force, leading to
equal and opposite arrangement of subordinate parts, is not
enough to satisfy the facts. This, indeed, may continue to be
the type to which our thoughts refer, and by which we are
helped to some more adequate idea of the facts. But the
general impression left on the mind is this-that some
One Force directs the form and structure of every organism,
so that any change in one part of it is but the index of
changes which run visibly or invisibly throughout the whole.
The growths between which we detect a correlation, are not
really separate things connected only by the few correspondences which we may be able to detect, but are part and parcel
of one operation, the result of one Force, exerting its energies
through channels which we cannot see, and according to laws
of which we can form but a distant and faint conception. The
truth is that Correlation in this sense is involved in the very
word "Growth.'" Each part of every structure which is the
result of growth must be correlated to every other part. This




CREATION BY LAW.                  149
is essential to the very idea of growth, and to the very idea of
an organism due to growth. When, therefore, Mr. Darwin says
that one of the laws on which variation of form depends is
Correlation of Growth, he simply says that variations of
Growth depend on growth- for all growths must be correlated.
But Correlation in this sense helps but a little way indeed in
conceiving the origin of a new Species. There, might be the
most minute and perfect harmony between the changes effected
in an animal newly born without those changes tending even in
the most remote degree towards the establishment of a new
Form of Life. In order to that establishment there must be another correlation, and a correlation of a higher kind. There must
be a correlation between those changes and all the outward conditions amidst which the new Form is to be placed and live.
If this correlation fails the new Form will die. Yet, so far as
we can see, this kind of correlation is without any physical
cause. It is not necessarily involved, as the other kind of correlation is, in the very idea of Growth. On the contrary, it is
not only entirely separable in thought, but, as we see in monstrosities, it is sometimes separated in fact. We have no conception of any Force emanating from external things which
shall mould the structure of an organism in harmony with themselves. Mr. Darwin freely confesses this, and says that many
considerations "incline him to lay very little weight on the direct action of the conditions of life " in producing variety of
Form. We can conceive, dimly indeed, but still we can conceive, how in the Humming Birds a special form of Wing shall
be correlated with a special form of Bill. But we have no conception whatever how a special form of Bill should be correlated
with a special form of Flower from which the Bill is to extract
its food. Mr. Darwin has. shown how an improved Bill, when
once produced, will be preserved by finding external conditions
to which it is adapted. But he has not shown, and he frankly
confesses he has no idea, how the adapted variation of Bill
comes to be born at all.
Yet it is this higher and more complex Correlation which is
the most constant and the most obvious of all the facts of Nature. In these facts we see that the forces of Organic Growth
are worked under rules of close adjustment to external con



150                THE REIGN OF LAW.
ditions; and that particular shapes which might seem inseparably associated, if we looked at one Genus or one Family alone,
are at once disjoined where different adaptations to Function
are required. Let us take another example from the great
Class of Birds. If we were to look only to the family of the
A4;tiai  (I)ucks and Geese), we might suppose that there is
a constant Correlation of Growth between webbed feet and
spoon-shaped bills.  But the real and efficient Correlation of
Growth in this case is not between the spoon-bill and the webfoot, but between both of these and certain external conditions
of life. The web-foot is correlated to an aquatic habitat: and
the spoon-bill is correlated to spoon-food. And accordingly
this association of form in foot and bill is at once dissolved
where different external functions require a separation. In the
Gulls, the Fulmars, and the Petrels, the web-foot is retained,
because action upon the element of water is still required; but
the correlated form of bill vanishes, and shapes altogether different are given,-shapes adapted, that is correlated, to different
kinds of food, and to different methods of capture.
Again, there is another great family of Birds where some of
the same forms are correlated with other forms entirely different, because of the different external Correlations which are required by Function.  In the Divers the web-foot is mounted
upon a flattened leg-bone, with the sharp edge set " fore and
aft." Now what is this Correlation of Growth? It is, first, the
Internal Correlation of those parts to each other, but secondly
and principally, it is the External Correlation of both to their
function of propelling under water. The form of the foot is
correlated to the function of opposing the largest possible area
of resistance to that medium, exactly where, for the purpose of
swimming, the maximum of resistance is required; the knifeshaped leg-bone is correlated to the function of opposing the
least possible resistance, precisely where, for the same purpose,
the minimum of resistance is required. In Australia we have,
in the Ornitkorynchus j5aradoxus, the webbed feet correlated
with the Duck-shaped Bill in an animal which does not belong
to the Class of Birds at all.
There is another case of what may be called Correlated
Correlations, which brings out very clearly the distinction which




CREATION BY LAW.                  151
is so important in the philosophy of this great subject. Feathers
are a kind of covering peculiar to the Class of Birds. Under
every variety of modification they have one fundamental plana central shaft or quill to which lateral filaments are attached.
Now there is a vast range of correlations between the different
kinds of feather and the different Families or Species, and between different parts of the body in the same Species. But
there are two Correlations of Growth in respect to feathers
which are constant. In all eases, (excepting, of course, the
Wingless Birds,) the feathers which grow from the fore-arm and
finger-bones, constituting the Wings, are comparatively long,
strong, tapering, elastic, and with thin lateral filaments, which
filaments are closely hooked together by means of minute teeth
fitting into each other, so that the whole shall form one continuous surface or web. This is a Correlation of Growth between one particular kind of feather, and one particular member
of the body, which, in all Birds capable of flight, is constant, and
amounts to a universal Law. Now let us contrast this with
another Correlation of Growth which is equally constant. On
the side of the head of all Birds, there is a patch of feathers of
peculiar structure, with fine and slender shafts, and with the
lateral filaments not hooked together as in the other case, but,
on the contrary, always separated from each other-the whole
series forming a fine and open network spread over the surface
which they cover and protect. These feathers cover the orifice
of the ear, and are called the auriculars. They are correlated
with the curious passages, the finely hung clapper-bones, and
all the elaborate mechanism of that organ. Such are the
Internal Correlations. But they are intelligible only when considered in the light shed by other correlations-which are external.
The wing feathers with close continuous webs are correlated to
the laws by which the passage of air may be prevented-the
auricular feathers, with open unconnected webs, are correlated
to the laws by which the passage of sound may be rendered easy.
The one set of feathers are adapted to the active function of
evoking and resisting atmospheric pressure by striking strong,
yet light and elastic blows, upon the air-the other set of
feathers are adapted to the passive function of allowing the free
access qf th-e waves of sound into the passages of the ear.




SZ2                THE REIGN OF LAW.
These are but a few examples out of millions. Throughout the
whole range of Nature the system of Internal Correlation is
entirely subordinate to the system of External Correlation.
Forms or growths which are inseparably joined with each other
in one group of animals, are wholly divorced from each other
in another group; whereas Forms which have correlations
adapted to external conditions, are repeated over and over again
across the widest gaps in the scale of Natural affinity.
If, then, it be true that New Species, are created out of
small variations in the form of Old Species, and this by
way of Natural Generation, there must be some bond of connection with determines those variations in a definite direction,
and keeps up the External Correlations pari passze with the
Internal Correlations.  Natural Selection can have no part in
this. Natural Selection seizes on these External Correlations
when they have come to be. But Natural Selection cannot
enter the secret chambers of the womb, and there shape the
new Fol- in harmony with modified conditions of external life.
How, then, are these external correlations provided for beforehand? There can be but one reply. It is by Utility, not acting as a Physical Cause upon organs already in existence, but
acting through Motive as a Mental Purpose in contriving organs
before they have begun to be. And where obvious utility does
result, the only connecting Bond which can be conceived as
capable of maintaining the Internal Correlations, in harmony
with the External Correlations, is the bond of Creative Will giving to Organic Forces a foreseen direction. It is, in short,
precisely the same bond which in all mechanism produces
Structure in harmony with intended Function.
Hence it is that scientific men, in seeking expression for the
ultimate ideas arrived at in the course of Physical research, find
themselves compelled to borrow the language of Mechanical
Invention. There is no other language which conveys an
impression of the facts, or of the tie by which the facts are connected with each other. In the first chapter of this work I have
had occasion to point out how true this is of Mr. Darwin's de.
scription of the Orchids, and of the curious functions of their
structure. The correlations there are all external. But the
same result appears in every other department of Science. In a




CREATION BY LAW.                  T53
remarkable paper on the " Constitution of the Universe," Pro
fessor Tyndall has occasion to speak of the non-luminous rays
of heat emitted by all incandescent bodies, rays which, though
intensely hot, are altogether insensible to the eye. Now the
Retina of the eye is a piece of mechanism whose Correlations
are essentially External. It is the expansion of a special nerve
whose function it is to be sensitive to certain particular vibrations, and to no other vibrations whatever. Light itself, therefore, is discovered to be merely a relative term-a word, in
short, denoting nothing but an external Correlation between the
Retina and vibrations of a certain kind and quality. Now what
is the language which Professor Tyndall is constrained to use
in explanation of facts so difficult of conception? It is the
language of Mechanism, of mental Purpose and Design. "It
is not," he says, " the size of a wave which determines its power
of producing light; it is, broadly speaking, he fitness of the
wave to the Retina. The ethereal pulses must follow each other
with a certain rapidity of succession before they can produce
light, and if their rapidity exceed a certain limit, they also fail
to produce light.  The Retina is attuned, if I may use the term,
to a certain ranZge of vibrations, beyond which, in both directions,
it ceases to be of use." These are ifdee i wonderful Correlations which reveal to us fittings and adjustments of which we had
no previous conception. but they give us no gliimmering, even,
of knowledge as to the physical causes which have "attuned"
a material organ so as to catch certain ethereal pulsations in
the external world, and to make these the means of conveying
to Man's Intelligence the enjoyment and the power of sight.
It will be seen, then, that when Mr. Darwin speaks of the
Law of Correlation of Growth as a Law which determines variation in organic growths, he is really presenting to us under
one phase two separate ideas which are radically distinct.
One is the idea of different growths in the same organism, corresponding with each other in respect to arrangement,-or in
respect to texture, or in respect to form,-or to some other
point of comparison. The other idea is that these growths
(each and all) correspond with the conditions of external nature in such a way as to fit them for the discharge of Function with some new adaptation, and consequently with some




1 54                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
new advantage. In one aspect the Law of Correlation of
Growth is (or at least may probably be) a Law in the strictest
sense of the word; that is to say, the result of a Force acting
according to its own definite modes and measures of operation.
But the Law of Correlation of Growth in the other aspect, is a
law only in the sense (I) of an observed order of facts; and(2)
of that Order depending on Adjustment with a view to Purpose.
Many naturalists have spoken of the facts of organic likeness as sufficiently accounted for by referring them to Adherence to Type.  Mr. Darwin complains that this phrase, as an
explanation of organic likeness, is no explanation at all, but
amounts only to a re-statement of the facts in another form of
language.  This is true; but it is equally true of his own
phrase of Correlation of Growth.*  "Adherence to Type " is
not in the nature of a Physical Cause, but in the nature of a
Mental Purpose.  It is no explanation, therefore, to those faculties of the mind which seek for Methods of operation.  In
like manner "Correlation of Growth," in the only sense in
which it is possible to connect it with the Origin of Species, is
not a Physical Cause, but a Mental Purpose. The physical
means by which that purpose is secured remain as dark as ever;
and such of them as are conceivable by us, are seen, like all
other physical forces, working to order, subject to direction,
and having that direction determined by foresight, forethought,
and contrivance.
Correlation of Growth, in the sense of external adaptations,
may be said to be the most universal of all the Laws of Nature.
But it accounts for the Origin of Organic Forms only in the
same sense in which it accounts for the origin of all other
phenomena, which in their result exhibit adaptations, or fittings
into use and service. Let us take, as an example, the origin,
nature, and capacities of Coal. That substance is correlated
in a truly wonderful manner with the needs, the powers, and the
capacities of Man. It contains within itself, in a form condensed and portable, a store of physical Force of incredible
* Mr. Wallace traces the whole Darwinian theory to six " general laws of the simplest kind-laws which," he emphatically adds, " are in most cases mere statements
of admi/ted facts." Again he says, " This series of facts or laws are mere statfe
ments of wh; -Xs t4e condition of nature."-Journal of Science, No. XVI. p. 47?.




CREATION BY LAW.                  155
amount. The particles of one pound weight of it are held
together by a Force which, when liberated and applied in the
form of heat, is capable of lifting one million times its own
weight to the height of one foot.* No other substance known
to Man is to be compared with this as a furnisher of Force.
This is its function -in the world. It is a function relating to
Man's mechanical and inventive powers, and coal has been
rendered capable of discharging this function by processes of
preparation which began millions of ages before Man was
born. But these External Correlations are a result arising by
way of natural consequence out of certain physical causes working to order, that is to say, out of Internal Correlations of
Growth between Solar Heat and Vegetable Structure, and
again between these and the causes which occasion interchange
between sea and land. No explanation so definite as this can
be given of the method in which Vital Forces are made to
evolve a new  Form  of Life. But even if, such explanation
could be given, it would render no account at all of the fittings
of that Form into the outward requirements of its life. These
are Correlations which in their very nature belong to Mind,
are the work of Mind, and are intelligible only in the light of
Mind.
I do not represent this conclusion as one necessarily adverse
to Mr. Darwin's Theory on the Origin of Species. It is a conclusion which he would probably be willing to accept. I only
desire to point out in how very limited a sense that Theory can
be said to trace Creation to a " Law " at all, and how entirely
inadequate that Theory is to account by any physical cause for
the Origin of Species.
The only senses, therefore, in which we get any glimpse of
Creation by Law are these-Ist, That the close physical connection between different Specific Forms is probably due to the
operation of some Force or Forces common to them all; 2d,
That these Forces have been employed and worked, with others
equally unknown, for the attainment of such ends as the multiplication of Life, in Forms fitted for new spheres of enjoyment,
and for the display of new kinds of beauty.
Is there anything in this conclusion to conflict with such
*"The Coal Question." W. S, Jevons, I865.




156                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
knowledge as we have from other sources of the nature and
working of Creative Power? I do not know on what authority
it is that we so often speak as if Creation were not Creation unless it work from nothing as its material, and by nothing as its
means. We know that out of the " dust of the ground "-that
is, out of the ordinary elements of Nature-are our own bodies
formed, and the bodies of all living things.  Nor is there anything which should shock us in the idea that the creation of
new Forms, any more than their propagation, has been brought
about by the use and instrumentality of means. In a theological point of view it matters nothing what those means have
been. I agree with M. Guizot, when he says that " Those only
would be serious adversaries of the doctrine of Creation who
could affirm that the universe-the earth, and Man upon ithave been from all eternity, and in all respects, just what they are
now." *  But this cannot be affirmed except in the teeth of facts
which Science has clearly ascertained.  There has been a
continual coming-to-be of new Forms of Life.t  This is Creation, no matter what have been the laws or forces employed by
Creative Power.
The truth is, that the theory which fixes upon Inheritance as
the cause of organic likeness, startles us only when it is applied
to Forms in which unlikeness is more prominent than resemblance.  The idea, for example, that the different kinds of
Pigeon, or of Humming Birds, have all descended through successive variation from some one ancestral pair, whether it be
true or not, would not startle any one.  Yet, if this be true, we
must be prepared for the same surmise extending farther. Tke
advocates of Development urge that Time is a powerful factor.
They say that if changes small, but constant enough, and definite enough, to constitute new Species, can and do arise out of
born varieties, it is impossible to fix the limits of divergence
which may be reached in the course of ages. It does not follow,
on the other hand, that there is no such limit because we cannot
fix it. It does not necessarily follow that because we admit
the idea of the Rock-dove, and the Turtle-dove, and the Ring* " M6ditations sur l'Essence de la Religion Chr6tienne," p. 49.
" We discern no evidence of a pause or intromission in the creation of coming-tobe of new plants and animals."-Instances of t4e Power of God as moanifested in His.4nimal Creation, by Professor Owet,.




CREATION tY LAW.                  157
dove being all descended from one ancestral Pigeon, we are
bound to accept the idea of the Whale, and the Antelope, and
the Monkey being all descended from some one primeval Mammal. Mr. Darwin says, truly enough, that Inheritance " is that
cause which alone, as far as we positively know, produces organisms quite like, or nearly like, each other." But this is no
reason why we should conclude that Inheritance is the only
cause which can produce Organisms quite unlike, or only very
partially like each other. We are surely not entitled to assume
that all degrees and kinds of likeness can arise only from this
single cause. Yet until this extreme proposition be proved, or
rendered probable, we have a sound scientific basis for doubting
the application of the theory, precisely in proportion to the unlikeness of the animals to which it is applied.
And this is the ground of reasoning, besides the ground of
feeling, on which we revolt from the doctrine as applied to
Man. We do so because we are conscious of an amount and
of a kind of difference between ourselves and the lower animals,
which is, in sober truth, immeasurable, in spite of the close
affinities of bodily structure. Yet the closeness of these affinities is a fact; and it may with truth be said that in contrast
with the gulf of separation in all resulting characters, these
affinities are among the profoundest mysteries of Nature.
Professor Huxley, in his work on " Man's Place in Nature,"
has endeavored to prove that, so far as mere physical structure
is concerned, "' the differences which separate him from the
Gorilla and the Chimpanzee are not so great as those which
separate the Gorilla from the lower Apes." On the frontispiece
of this work he exhibits in series the skeletons of the Anthropoid
Apes and of Man. It is a grim and grotesque procession.
The Form which leads it, however like the others in general
structural plan, is wonderfully different in those lines and
shapes of Matter which have such mysterious power of expressing the characters of Mind.  And significant as those
differences are in the skeleton, they are as nothing to the differences which emerge in the living creatures. Huxley himself
admits that these differences amount to " an enormous gulf,"to a " divergence immeasurable-practically infinite." What
more striking proof could we have than this, that Organic Forms




158                THE REIGN OF LAW.
are but as clay in the hands of the Potter, and that the " Law
of Structure is entirely subordinate to the " Law " of Purpose
and Intention under which the various parts of that structure
are combined for use?
But Science will continue to ask, even if she never gets an
answer, What is the community of physical cause which produces this community of resulting structure? The fact which
it is most difficult to disengage from the theory of Development,
or, in other words, from the theory of Creation by Birth, is the
existence of rudimentary or aborted organs; the existence of
teeth, for example, in the jaws of the Whale-teeth which never
cut the gum, and which are entirely useless to the animal. We
have an inherent conviction that this must have some use in the
future,-that is, in some organism to be born from this one,or else it must have had some use in the past,-that is, in some
organism from which this one has descended.  In either case
the power of Inheritance is suggested to the mind. We think
instinctively of the existence of some Derivative Form in which
these teeth have been, or are to be turned to use. It is only
fair towards the Theory of Creation by Birth, to admit that it
does explain the existence of useless organs in a sense in which
no other Theory explains them. It would be almost a necessary consequence of Creation by Birth, that there must be
stages in which the ultimate use of new Forms could not be yet
apparent. And if mere beauty or variety were in themselves
objects which Creative Power sets before itself, then, also, we
might expect to meet with modifications of structure having no
other apparent use. Both these explanations, however, exclude
Mr. Darwin's idea of Natural Selection; because this is a process which can never operate, except through the agency of actual use and disuse, upon organs already existing and capable
of discharging function. The only theory of Creation by Birth
which really does afford some explanation of the facts, is a theory which assumes modifications of structure to be entirely independent of the effect of actual use or disuse. Mr. Darwin
himself candidly admits that in flowers, at least, the forces of
Correlated Growth do " modify important structures independ.
ent of Utility, and therefore of Natural Selection." This admission must be extended to all organic growths. There must




CREATION BV LAW.                  I59
have been a time with all of them when they began to be; and,
therefore, a time before Natural Selection had room to play.
These considerations, however, only serve to put a higher interpretation on the Theory of Creation by Birth. They do not
condemn it.
One suggestion, indeed, has been made on this subject which
I think it is impossible to accept. When men were yet unwilling to admit the existence of life and death upon the globe so
long before the creation of Man, it used to be said that fossils
were only "sports of nature."  So in our own day, I have
heard it said that rudimentary organs are merely intended to
satisfy that condition of our finite minds in virtue of which we
are unable to conceive Creation, except in connection with some
History and Method of growth. And so, as a condescension to
this weakness, aborted members are given to suggest a History
which was never true, and a Method which was never followed!
Now of one thing we may be sure, that there are no fictions of
this kind in Nature, and no bad jokes.  Whatever natural
things really point to, they point to faithfully; and the conclusions really indicated are never false. Abortive organs mean
something, and they mean it truly.
Still, there is no proof that Inheritance is the only cause from
which such structures can arise. In the inorganic world we know
that not mere similarity, but absolute identity of form, as in
crystals, is the result of laws which have nothing to do with Inheritance, but of forces whose nature it is to aggregate the particles of matter in identic shapes. It is impossible to say how
far a similar unity of effect may have been impressed on the
forces through which vital Organisms are first started on. their
way.  There are some essential resemblances between all
Forms of Life which it is impossible even in imagination to connect with community of blood by descent. For example, the
Bilateral arrangement is common to all Organisms, down at
least to the Radiata, and in this great class we have the same
principle of Polarity developed in a circle. Again, the general
mechanism of the digestive organs by which food is in part assimilated and part rejected, is also common through a range of
equal extent. Indeed, it may be said with truth, that never in
all the changes of Time has there been any alteration throughl




i6o                THE REIGN OF LAW.
out the whole scale of Organic Life, in the fundamental principles of chemical and mechanical adjustment, on which the great
animal functions of Respiration, Circulation, and Reproduction,
have been provided for.*  These are fundamental similarities
of plan, depending probably on the very nature of Forces which
necessitate these adjustments in order to the production of the
phenomena of Life-Forces of which we know nothing, but
which we have not the slightest reason to suppose to be due to
Inheritance.  Other similarities of plan may depend on the
same laws, equally unconnected with Inheritance by descent.
Inheritance, indeed, has been suggested as the cause of organic likeness, mainly because there is a difficulty in conceiving any other. But there is at least an equal difficulty in conceiving the applicability of this cause to Man. We have
already seen t that M. Guizot lays it down as a physical impossibility that Man —the human pair-can have been introduced into the world except in complete stature-in the full
possession of all his faculties and powers.' He holds it as certain that on no other condition could Man, on his first appearance, have been able to survive and to found the human family.
Even those who question whether this argument is entitled to
the rank of a self-evident physical truth, must admit that it is
at least quite as good as the opposite assertion that any origin
except the origin of natural birth is inconceivable. Where our
ignorance is so profound, no reasoning of this kind is of much
value. There is undoubtedly much to be said in support of M.
Guizot's position. Certainly, Man as a mere animal is the
most helpless of all animals. His whole frame has relation to
his mind, and apart from that relation, it is feebler than. the
frame of any of the brutes. All its members are Correlated
amongst each other with the functions of his Brain, so that
action may follow upon Knowledge-so that embodiment may
be possible to Thought. Yet in its plan and structure his
frame is homologically, that is ideally, the same as the frame of
the brutes-organ answering to organ, and bone to bone.
The words " Adherence to Type " are words expressive of an
Idea, of a Purpose, which we see fulfilled in Organic Forms.
* Agassiz' "Geological Sketches," p. 41. London, I86o.
t Ante, page 28,




CREATION BY LAW.                  16i
But this purpose must have sought its own accomplishment by
the use of means, and the question of Science always is, what
were these means? Love of beauty is equally a Purpose which
we see fulfilled in Nature, but in the case of the Humming
Birds this has been accomplished by giving to their plumes the
structure of" Thin Plates,"-a structure which decomposes
light and flings back its prismatic colors to the eye. Fitness
and special adaptation is another of the purposes of Creation,
but this also is attained through the careful arrangement, and
pliability to use, of physical laws. In like manner, " Adherence to Type " is the expression of a fact, or the statement of a
Purpose, which, like all the other purposes fulfilled in Nature,
invites to an investigation of the instrumentality employed.
We see the Purpose, but we do not see the Method. We see
the purpose, for example, in the wonderful adaptability of the
Vertebrate Type to the infinite varieties of Life to which it
serves as an organ and a home. Science should be allowed
without suspicion or remonstrance to pursue her proper object,
which is to detect, if she can, what the method of this work has
been. There is no point, short of the last and highest, at
which Science can be satisfied. Her curiosity is insatiable. It
is a curiosity representing man's desire of knowledge. But
that desire extends into regions where the means of investigation cease, and in which the processes of Verification are of no
avail. Above and behind every Detected Method in Nature
there lies the same ultimate question as before-What is it by
which this is done?
It is the great mystery of our Being that we have powers impelling us to ask such questions on the history of Creation,
when we have no powers enabling us to solve them. Ideas
and faint suggestions of reply are ever passing across the outer
limits of the Mind, as meteors pass across the margin of the
atmosphere, but we endeavor in vain to grasp or understand
them. The faculties both of reason and of imagination fall
back with a sense of impotence upon some favorite phrase —
some form of words built up out of the materials of analogy,
and out of the experience of a Mind, which, being finite, is not
creative. We beat against the bars in vain. The only real
rest is in the confession of ignorance, and the confession, too,
Y1




162                     THE1 REIGN OP  LAW.
that all ultimate physical Truth is beyond the reach of Sciencek
It is probable that even the nearest methods of Creation,
though far short of ultimate truths, lie behind a-veil too thick
for us to penetrate. It is here surely, if it is anywhere in the
sphere of natural investigation, that the Man of Science may
lay down the weapons of his analysis, and say, " I do not exercise myself in great matters, or in things which are too high for
me." t
There is at'east one conclusion which is certain, namely, this
-that no theory in respect to the means and method employed
in the work of Creation-provided such theory takes in all the
facts-can have the slightest effect in removing that work from
the relation in which it stands to the attributes of Will.  All
such theories are, and can only be " simply questions of how
the Creator has worked." This is the confession made in respect to Mr. Darwin's theory by one of the most competent of
its supporters.t  Creation  by Law-Evolution  by Law-Development by Law, or, as including all those kindred ideas, the
Reign of Law, is nothing but the reign of Creative Force
directed by Creative Knowledge, worked under the control of
Creative Power, and in fulfilment of Creative Purpose.
*I have slightly altered this passage as it stood in the earlier editions, because,
although the c* ntext clearly indicates its reference to Physical truth, it has been
quoted by Mr. Lewes as granting all that the Positive Philosophy demands. There
is a sense of course, in v-hich it may bc said that no Truth knowable by man can be
" ultimate." That is to say, there is no'rr:,th even conceivable, respecting which we
might not ask, or desire tc; ask, farther questiors. But there is no use in appearing to
agree with those from whom in reality A so widely differ. The definition of Truth
which Mr. Lewes would consider "ultimate," and therefore unattainable, is very
different from the definition which I should give. and have given.
t Psalm cxxxi.
T Mr Wallace. -Jourxal of Sciexce, No. XVL. p. 473.




CHAPTER VI.
THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND.
WHEN we pass from the phenomena of Matter to the phenomena of Mind, we do not pass from under the Reign of Law.
Here, too, facts do range themselves in an observed Order:
here, too, there is a chain of cause and effect running throughout all events: here, too, we see around us, and feel within us,
the work of Forces which have always a certain definite tendency to produce certain definite results: here, too, it is by
combination and adjustment among these Forces that they are
mutually held in check: here, too, accordingly, special ends
can only be accomplished by the use of special means.
But then the question immediately occurs to us-can we
speak of Law, or of Force, or of "cause and effect," as applied
to the phenomena of Mind, in the same sense in which we
speak of them as applied to the phenomena of Matter? Is it
only by distant analogy, or as expressing ideas really the same,
that we use the same terms of both?
Undoubtedly the first thought which suggests itself to the
mind is, that a material Force and a moral or intellectual
Force are essentially different in kind,-not subject to conditions the same, or even similar. But are we sure of this? Are
we sure that the Forces which we call Material are not, after
all, but manifestations'of mental energy and Will?  We have
already seen that such evidence as we have is all tending the
other way. The conclusions forced upon us have been these:
-first, that the more we know of Nature the more certain it
appears that a multiplicity of separate forces does not exist,
but that all her forces pass into each other, and are but modifications of some One Force which is the source and centre of
the rest: secondly, that all of them are governed in their
mutual relations by principles of arrangement which are purely
mental: thirdly, that of the ultimate seat of Force in any form




I64                THE REIGN OF LAW.
we know nothing directly: and fourthly, that the nearest conception we can ever have of Force is derived from our own
consciousness of vital power.
If these conclusions be true, it follows that, whether as
regards that in which Force in itself consists, or as regards the
conditions under which Force is used, it need not surprise us
if in passing from the material world to the world of Mind, we
see that Law, in the same sense, prevails in the phenomena of
both. But as this is a subject of much difficulty, and of much
importance, it may be well to examine it a little nearer.
The first and most palpable form in which we see that Mind
is subject to Law, is in its connection with the Body. And
this connection is so close that we know neither where it begins
nor where it ends. The extent and nature of it can be known
only by the same kind of reasoning and observation by which
we attain to any knowledge of the external world. For indeed
our Bodies seem part of the external world to us. We see
their form as we see the form of other things, but we do not
see their structure, neither do we feel it, nor can we arrive at
it, except as a matter of obscure and difficult research.  It is
literally true that some of the most distant objects in the Universe are more accessible to our observation, and in some
respects more intelligible to our understanding, than the material frame in which we live. Man had discovered much
concerning the circulation of the Planets before he had discovered anything concerning the circulation of his own blood.*
Yet so near is the current of that blood to him, so much is it a
part of himself, that when it stops, in an instant " all his
thoughts perish." Nevertheless, the Mind is not conscious of
its own dependence on material organs. Even in respect to
those exertions of the Will which are expressed in movements
of the Body, we are conscious only of the Will, and of the WVill
being exerted with success; but we are entirely unconscious of
the machinery, which intervenes between the intention and the
accomplishment of the act intended. Such movements of the
Body appear to us as if they were direct acts of Will. Yet
nothing can be more certain than that the communication is
* Kepler and Harvey were contemporaries, but Copernicus had preceded them by
nearly a hundred years.




THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND.    I65
not direct but indirect —and even elaborately circuitous. It is
only when the ropes and pulleys are broken that we discover
how that which we call our Will can only run in appointed
channels-which channels are material, and are laid down
upon a plan, like conducting wires, as if for the conveyance of
a material Force.
Nor does it end here-this close connection between Mind
and Matter. So far from being less close, it seems to be only
closer and closer when we pass to mental operations in which
no apparent movements of the Body are concerned. In the
exercise of pure Reason, in passing from one mental conception to another, when by an effort of our Will we turn our attention to a new question, and in the twinkling of an eye pursue a
fresh train of thought,-above all, when our affections go forth
towards those who are the objects of them-in all these operations, if anywhere, we feel as if we were free from mechanismfrom " organs-" from Matter in any form. So it seems till we
are brought face to face with the terrible phenomena of disease. Then our delusion is dispelled, and we know how frail we
are. Then we find that the same stroke which paralyzes the
movement of a limb, may paralyze, not less effectually, all the
powers of Reason, of Memory, and of Will. And the Affections,-what becomes of them? These too, which seem so
purely spiritual, we find out to be dependent on material structure. Every physician knows that a frequent consequence of
cerebral disease is a total change of character. There is no
symptom of insanity more common than the growth of dislike
and aversion to those who, in health, had been the most loved
on earth. Change of every kind and degree in the character
and structure of Mind is the immediate result of corresponding
changes in the structure and substance of the Brain. The pure
may become impure, the loving may become malignant; the
simple-minded may become suspicious; the generous may become engrossed with self the strong-minded may become imbecile,-the whole man may be broken down, and may live for
years without consciousness and without emotion. How painfully does the Brain sometimes indicate its functions! What
is it in the aspect of Idiotcy, i] many of its forms, which we
instantly recognize, and never can mistake? In that low,




i66                THE REIGN OF LAW.
pinched, and retiring brow, we see instinctively that Reason
cannot hold her seat. These facts do not stand-alone. Not
only are there some parallel facts, but all the living world is full
of them. The whole range of animal creation, from Man down
to the Reptile and the Fish, testifies to the universal law of an
ascending scale of mental capacity being coincident with an
ascending degree of cerebral organization. No series of facts,
Lending to the establishment of any physical truth, is more complete or more conclusive than the chain which connects the
functions of the Brain with the phenomena of Mind.
But here, again, let us beware of the fallacies which may
arise from a failure to recognize the exact import of the words
we use. In the ears of many it sounds like Materialism to say
that Thought is a function of the Brain. But it has been already
shown in a previous chapter that Function is merely the word
by which we describe that work which any given piece of mechanism has been adjusted to perform. The Power, or Force,
which is developed by means of an " organ," is not identical
with that organ, nor with any of its parts, nor with the materials
of which it is composed, nor even with its mechanism as a whole.
It does not follow, for example, that Electricity is identical with
the tissues of a fish, because it is developed out of the battery
of a Torpedo or a Gymnotus. Yet it is true that the development and discharge of Electricity is the "function" of those
Fish-organs: —that is to say, this is the work which they have
been adjusted to perform. Still less do we confound Thought
with Brain when we acknowledge the fact that Brain in our Organism is inseparably connected with the power of thinking.
Yet inferences as false as this, and very nearly related to it,
have actually been drawn by eminent men from the facts of cerebral action. Thus it has been declared that a knowledge of
Brain, under a name which is in itself a fallacy-Phrenologyis the only sure foundation of Mental Science. This is a mere
confusion of thought, even if the phrenological mapping of the
Brain were as certainly correct as it is really doubtful. That
particular faculties of the Mind may be connected with particular portions of the Brain, is not in itself more difficult to understand or to believe than that the Mind, as a whole, is connected
with the Brain as a whole, Whether it be so or not is a ques



THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND.    I67
tion purely of observation and of fact. But this, at least, is
certain, —that the different faculties and affections of the Mind
must be discriminated from each other before it is possible to
assign to them a local habitation. The Mind must be mapped
first, and then its Organ. No additional knowledge is given to
us of any one mental faculty, by proving that it is connected
with some special bit of the mysterious substance of which that
organ is composed. Love is Love, and nothing else; Hatred
is Hatred, and nothing else; Reverence is Reverence, and notfling else; the pure, intellectual perception of a Logical Necessity is itself, and nothing else;-however clearly it may be
proved that each of these is a function of some separate region of the Brain. WVhen the phrenologist, taking in his hand
a human skull, and lifting its upper cover, tells us that the oval
of convoluted matter which is thus exposed to view " manifests
the moral sentiments," what light does he throw on these?
The moral sentiments! —what do these include? The power
of seeing Moral Beauty, and of loving Truth-the sense of
Justice, and the desire of serving in her cause —Conscience and
Benevolence, Charity and Faith-all that is best and noblest
in the human spirit-these are "manifested " in that bit of
Matter! What new information does this give us on the nature
or the office of those glorious attributes which are the joy of
Earth and Heaven? None at all. They are just what we
knew them before to be.
Phrenology is no longer popular, as it once was, among Physiologists. Its mapping of the Brain is now generally admitted
to be imaginary. But the fundamental error of the Phrenological School did not lie merely, or even mainly, in any mistake
as to the mapping of the Brain. It lay in the idea that a Science of Mind can be founded in any shape or form upon the
discoveries of anatomy. Their error lay in the notion that Physiology can ever be the basis of Psychology. And this is an
error, and a confusion of thought, which survives Phrenology.
A profound interest indeed attaches to every new fact which
connects together the parallel phenomena of Mind and of Organization. But it is the phenomena of Mind, and it is these
alone, of which we are directly cognizant, and it is from these
that we must start as the basis of all Psychological research.




i68                THE REIGN OF LAW.
This is true even of those phenomena of the mind which are
most purely animal. Sensation, for example, may be traced
with absolute demonstration to certain nerves.  This may
throw a new light on the method by which Sensation is rendered possible; but it throws no new light whatever upon what
Sensation is. It is that which we know and feel it to be, and
it is neither more nor less since the knife of the anatomist has
laid bare the channels along which it comes. Still more is this
true of the Intellectual Powers. Yet there are Philosophers
who appear to think that some new light is cast upon Sensation
when they call it an affection of the "Sensory Ganglia;" that
Thought is in some measure explained when it is called " Cerebration," and that the Laws of Intellect are reduced to scientific expression when they are described as the working of the
" Cerebral Ganglia." All this is a mere idle play on words. It
is an attempt to put that first which must be last, and that last
which must be first. The general fact of the dependence of
Mind on a Bodily organization is a fact which contains within
itself all the lesser facts of Physiological discovery. They are
not, and they cannot be, new in kind. They do not even help
us to conceive how, through any mechanism, the power of
Thought can be evolved. Still less do they give us any new
view of that which Thought, in itself, is.
This connection, therefore, between Mind and Brain, although it is a universal " law " of our being, is a law recognized
by us only in the sense in which Law is applied to " an observed
Order of facts."  But like every other Order of this kind,
it implies a Force or an arrangement of Forces out of which the
Order comes. It implies, too, that this arrangement of Forces is
necessary to the evolution and play of mental faculties in the
form in which they are possessed by us.  Consequently these
faculties are seen taking their place among all the other phenomena of the world. They are seen to be under the Reign of
Law in this largest and highest sense of all-that they depend
upon Adjustment, and that adjustment so delicate that the
slightest disturbance of it deranges the whole resulting phenomena of Mind. Mind, as developed in us, has its very existence and working dependent on imperative physical con,
ditions, which conditions are met only by elaborate, contrivance,




THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND.    I69
We have no knowledge what the Forces are which demand
this obedience, and which call for this contrivance. We have
even an insuperable difficulty in conceiving what they can be.
It almost seems as if there were a barrier in the very nature of
our minds against the possibility of conceiving how any combination of material forces can either result in Mind, or can be
necessary to the working of its powers, or can be concerned
even in giving it an abode.*  " We cannot conceive," says Dr.
Andrew  Combe, "even in the remotest manner, in what way
the Brain-a compound of water, albumen, fat, and phosphate
salts-operates in the generating of Thought."  And yet there
is one experience which brings the fact of this close connection
within the direct recognition of Consciousness. We know and
feel that the act of severe thinking is attended with the expenditure of Force. The close, steady, continuous application of
the mind to any subject requiring the exercise of our higher intellectual faculties, is well known to be "hard work." Without causing any bodily movement of which we are conscious,
it produces, nevertheless, bodily exhaustion. It occasions
the expenditure of a physical force, or at least of a force
for which we have no other name. It is not uncommon for
men of great age to be able to exert undiminished powers of
mind for one or two hours, and then to lapse into comparative
imbecility. Thus the exertion of the Brain is like the exertion
of a muscle, and is attended with the same effects. There is
fatigue; and with excessive fatigue the power of motion stops.
Yet such facts as these only puzzle us-they do not help us to
any clear idea of the nature or manner of a connection which is
indeed incomprehensible.  We know of Mind only as itself,
and as nothing else. The difference between it and all other
things seems infinite and immeasurable. No doubt this difficulty, or at least part of it, arises not from  any misconception
as to what Mind is, (for of this our knowledge is direct,) but
from a misconception as to what Matter is —and what the Forces
are which we call material. Close analysis of the phenomena
of Nature, and of our own ideas in regard to them, has already
* " Aperta simplexque mens, nulla re adjuncth quae sentire possit, fugere intelligentiae nostrae vim et notionem videtur."-Cicero, " De Nat. Deor." lib. x. c. ii.
This is true only in one sense. It is very far from being true, that the connection
between Mind and Matter is a necessity of thought.




170               THE REIGN OF LAW.
prepared us to believe, that these Forces which work in Matter
and produce in us the impressions from which we derive our
conceptions of it, are themselves immaterial, and can be traced
running up into a region where they are lost in the light of
Mind.  The Christian doctrine of the Resurrection of the
Body sanctions and involves the notion that there is some deep
connection between Spirit and Form which is essential, and
which cannot be finally sundered even in the divorce of Death.
The affections hold to this idea even more firmly than the intellect. Hence the noble and passionate exclamation of the
Poet"Eternal Form shall still divide
The Eternal Soul from all beside,
And I shall know him when we meet."
" z vMemoriam," xlvi.-TENNYSON.
But this first sense in which Mind is under the Reign of. Law
-that is, its dependence on the Body, prepares us for yet other
senses in which it lies under the same dominion. The very
fact that the Mind is itself unconscious of its dependence upon
Matter, and of the manner and conditions of its connection
with "organs," teaches us that there is a large class of phenomena connected with Mind, of which we should be entirely
ignorant if we trusted to the direct evidence of Consciousness
alone. This ought not to inspire us with any distrust of Consciousness in those matters in which it is a competent and indeed
the only witness. But there is a large class of phenomena of
which Consciousness properly so called, that is, the direct perception of the Mind of its own present workings, does not inform
us. The Mind looking in upon itself sees itself only, and does
not see either the mechanism through which it is able to work
at all, nor many of the forces which operate in it and upon
it. These, some of them at least, can only be arrived at by the
same processes of reasoning and observation which we apply
to the external world, and by which we ascertain the action and
reaction of involuntary agents.
There is nothing of which it is so difficult to persuade ourselves
as of this, In the apprehension of Consciousness the sense of
Will is so strong within us that it blinds us to the insuperable
conditions which limit both what we will and what we do. That




THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND.   7I 
our Wills, of whose freedom we are conscious, should often be
determined by influences of which we have no consciousness at
all; that our opinions should as often be the result of causes
and not of reasons; that our actions should follow a course
marked out by conditions which we fail to recognize as having
any determining effect upon them-these are conclusions against
which we are apt to rebel-as depriving us of a part of our free
and intelligent agency. Hence the indignation with which
men resent being told that they have been impelled by motives
other than the motives which are avowed, and other than the
motives which are consciously entertained. Yet the fact of
their being so impelled is often perfectly plain to those around
them. The reply, however, is always readyy: " You seem to
know my motives, and the causes of my conduct better than I
know them myself,"-as if the proposition so stated were evidently absurd. But it is, on the contrary, a proposition which
may well be true. Bystanders very often see the forces telling
upon our Will much more clearly than we see themn ourselves.
It is possible, indeed, by a vigorous effort of self-analysis to see
all that others see, and a great deal more. Those who are able
really to look in upon themselves, can often detect the influences
which have been acting on their minds, coloring their opinions,
and determining their conduct in a degree which the higher
faculties would be glad to disown and disavow. There is nothing more wonderful in the constitution of our minds than the
power we have of standing aside, as it were, for a time, from
the ordinary channel of our own thoughts, and of looking back
upon their currents coming down from the hills of Memory and
Association to join their issues in our present life. But this
sort of looking in upon-ourselves, and treating ourselves as a
subject of natural history, is to all men a difficult, and to most
men an impossible, operation. They have neither time for it
nor thought for it. The conscious energies of the Will are so
near us, and so ever present with us, that they shut out our
view of the forces which lie behind. Yet there are some facts
common in the experience of all men which may help us to a
conception of the truth. One of these is the fact of Mind
growing with the growth of years-a fact determined by the recollection of childhood, of youth, and of maturity. By compar



172                THE REIGN OF LAW.
ing ourselves with ourselves at former periods of life —by the
memory of feelings, and of opinions, and of methods of thought
which we have outgrown and left behind us, we can detect the
action of forces which have told upon our minds-traces, in
short, of the laws to which they have been subject. Some of
these laws have been nothing more than laws of physical growth
-the conceptions of the Mind undergoing a development consequent on the growth of our Material Organism.
Another fact bearing on the same question, but which is
more easily observed in others than in ourselves, is the frequent determination of mental qualities by hereditary transmission. The famous question, as to the Origin of our Ideas,
and how far they are due respectively to Experience, to Association, or to Intuition, has been discussed by Metaphysicians with
far too little reference to the organic phenomena which are so
closely related to the phenomena of Mind. It is not true, indeed, that Psychology is subordinate to Physiology, but it is
true that these two are so intimately connected, that neither is
independent of the other. Man is not a disembodied Spirit,
but a Being whose mental powers are subject to the laws of a
material organization. And so it is that almost every fact in
Physiology has an intimate bearing on some question or other
in the Philosophy of Mind. No better illustration could be
given than one which arises out of this question of the Origin
of our Ideas. In one of the many formulm of expression to
which Mr. J. S. Mill has reduced the assertion that Experience
is the source and origin of all our thoughts and actions, he is
obliged to except from the sweep of that assertion the voluntary movements of the Body. He says, " We bring about any
fact, oler titan our own muscular contractionzs, by means of some
other fact which experience has shown to be followed by it." "
Now let us observe the immense significance which attaches
to this exception. Why is Mr. Mill compelled to make it?
Because he mixes up in one assertion two propositions which
are totally distinct, one being true universally, and the other
being true only partially. The first proposition is, that all
facts which we can " bring about," must be so brought about
by the use of means. This is true universally. The second
*" Auguste Comte and Positivism," by J. S. Mill, p. 7.




THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND.    173
proposition is, that we are guided to the knowledge of those
means by Experience alone. Now, this last proposition is not
true, as Mr. Mill is obliged to confess, of the whole class of
facts which are brought about by vital effort. But the muscular contractions of the Body are no exception whatever to the
mere general affirmation that all actions must have a cause, or
in other words, must be brought about by the use of means.
Exceptions they are, however, to the affirmation that the nature
of those means is made known to us by Experience. The
sentence, in so far as it asserts the universal Law of Causation,
might have been so framed as to require no abatement or exception whatever. "We bring about any fact by means of
some other fact which we know either by experience or by
rztuizion to be followed by it."  In this form the sentence is
absolutely true, and applies to "our own muscular contractions," as well as to every other action. But philosophers who
support the doctrine of Experience do not like the word "intuition;" and though they cannot do without it altogether, they
use it as seldom as they can. They feel very naturally, and
very truly, that if Intuition be admitted in regard to the ultimate
phenomena of Volition, the idea will not easily be dispelled that
Intuition may extend also to the ultimate phenomena of
Thought. Now the muscular contractions of the Body stand
at the very fount and origin of all we do; and it is more than
probable that analogous movements of the Brain stand as near
to the origin of all we think.
The bearing of this question on the Philosophy of Mind cannot
be mistaken. The muscular contractions of the Body are of two
kinds-one kind is constant, automatic, and lasting with the duration of life itself. The other kind is intermittent, voluntary, and
capable of being destroyed whilst the Consciousness, and the
Intelligence, and the Will are still in use. Both these kinds of
action are rendered possible by the use of means: but it is
only in the case of one of them that those means are placed
at the bidding of the Will. Yet it is not Experience which
teaches us how to use those means. It is purely Instinct or
Intuition. We are not even conscious of the very existence
of the means which we employ, and the profoundest researches
of Science do not even yet give us the faintest notion what




t74               THE RMGON or LAW.
their ultimate nature is. No experience whatever is required
to teach a child how to extend its limbs or how to exert its
voice. Nevertheless, neither of these things can be done except through the use of means. The only difference between
these actions and actions of a more complicated kind is, that
the appropriate means are resorted to and employed by Intuition. The Will which moves the limbs, and moves them
through the use of a complicated machinery, is born with the
Organism. of which that machinery forms a part, and has an
instinctive knowledge how to use it. Now, it is against the
analogy of Nature to suppose that this great class of facts respecting the powers of the Body are without some corresponding
facts respecting the powers of Mind. Indeed, all vital phenomena of this kind are in themselves necessarily phenomena
both of Body and of Mind. The close connection which exists
between the two, and the inseparable analogies which unite all
their workings, render it therefore almost certain that the Mind
is to be regarded as having both kinds of movement which the
physical Organism possesses-that is, faculties which are automatic in their action-and other faculties which, though subject to direction by the Will, yet work upon the materials presented to them in a manner strictly intuitive and independent
of all experience.
And as the abnormal phenomena of disease, or of malformation, often throw an important light on the structure of the
body, so do certain abnormal intellectual phenomena give us
strange glimpses occasionally into the powers of Mind. Among
those phenomena, none are more curious than the intuitive
powers of numerical computation which a few individuals have
possessed. There are well attested cases of this power in virtue
of which the mind reaches the result of difficult calculations by
a species of Intuition-that is to say, without any consciousness
of the process by which that result is made apparent to the Mind.
This is not a proof that there is no process, but only that it is a
process gone through as a machine goes through a processthat is, according to its own pre-adjusted laws of Motion. Perhaps, indeeed, this process may not be different in kind from
the process by which the average mind reaches the most elementary of arithmetical truths. The product of one and one,




THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND.!75
or of two and tTwo, may be self-evident to all of us only in the
same way in which the product of a long series of figures may
be self-evident to minds with an abnormal gift of the arithmetical
faculty. Thus the distinction breaks down between self-evident
truths and truths which are not self-evident.   A truth may be
self-evident to one mind which is not self-evident to another,
but may require, on the contrary, a laborious process of verification. And does not this again lead us to see how entirely
dependent are the phenomena of Mind upon the power of
special Faculties, and how this power is itself dependent on the
Adjustments of Organization? In the world of Physics, we
know that we are surrounded by movements which never make
themselves sensible to us-pulsations which excite in our eyes no
sense of light-and others which excite in our ears no sense of
sound,-and all this for want of adjusted organs.  And so it
would seem as if the Mind of Man were an Instrument attuned
only to a certain range of knowledge, but as if within that range
it were capable of finer and finer adjustments to the harmonies
of Truth. These cannot make themselves heard where there is
no organ to catch the sound. Nor could that organ translate
them into Thought-into that conscious apprehension of which
an Idea essentially consists,-had it not its own preadjusted
relation to the Verities of the World.
It must be remembered, however, that in the discussion of
such questions as to the Origin of our Ideas, there has been a
great want of definition in the use of terms. Are fear, and love,
and hatred, and anger, and jealousy, and remorse, and joy,are these " ideas," or are they only conditions or powers of mind?
If by Ideas we mean those imaginings which, as the very word
implies, involve " images " of external things, it is certain that
contact with external impressions, and, in this sense, Experience,
is essential to the formation of them. But if by Ideas we mean
the elementary passions, or if we mean even those peculiarities
of thought-those special tendencies of mind which lead us to
view things in some particular light rather than in others, and
which constitute the essential distinction between the ideas of
different men-if, in short, we include in the term  anything
which belongs to the Thinking Faculty itself, or anything of the
method according to which it works up the raw material of




I76                THE REIGN OF LAW.
Thought-then it is equally certain that Ideas in this sense are
born with all of us, and that Imitation, and Experience, and
Association, do but pour their material into moulds already cast
for their reception.
But in reality here, as in many other questions, the rival disputants have each had some portion of the truth. They have
been both right and both wrong. An Idea is not a simple, but
a composite thing. It has not one origin, but a plurality of
origins. An Idea is, as it were, a fabric of which the threads
come from the spinner, and the weaving from the loom. Or it
is, as it were, an organic growth, of which the materials are
supplied from the external world, and the structure from the
world within. There are many elements in every Idea which
come, and can only come, from without.  There are other elements, and among them the Formative Power, which come, and
only can come, from within. The Mind stands in pre-established
relations to the things around it-bound to them by the infinite
adjustments which may be called External Correlations of
Growth. Out of these relations it is not itself, nor do its powers
possess the materials whereon to work. We cannot conceive a
mind having no points of contact with the external world.
From that world must come all the exciting causes of Thought
and of Emotion. But the form into which these are cast-the
tissue into which these are woven —the force by which Ideas
become a Power-all, in short, that constitutes Thought as distinguished from the things about which we think-all this comes
from, and belongs to, the Mind itself.
Among the lower animals, young ones, taken from the litter
or the nest, and brought up under conditions wholly removed
from the teaching of their parents, whether by imitation or
otherwise, will reproduce exactly all those habits of their race
which belong to their natural modes of life. Many of these
habits, perhaps it may be safely said all of them, imply Ideas
-that is to say, they imply instincts; and instincts are in the
nature of ideas-that is to say, they belong to the phenomena
of Mind. And of this there is another indication in a fact
which at first sight may seem trivial or irrelevant. It has been
often said that one great difficulty in reasoning on this subject,
is the inaccessibility to observation of the mental condition of




THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND.    I77
all infant creatures. But even if this were more true than it
really is, there are some creatures, not low in the scale of creation, of which it may be said that, comparatively, they have no
infancy at all. These are the Gallinaceous Birds in general,
and some Species in particular. They come forth from the egg
perfect miniatures of their parents, and with minds as fully
equipped with parental instincts as their bodies are provided
with feather or their wings with quills. Antecedent to all experience of injury, they exhibit fear, and not only fear, but fear
of the proper objects. They will flee when they see a hawk,
and they will carefully avoid a stinging insect. In Europe the
young of the Woodgrouse or Gelinotte are able to fly from the
moment they break the shell. In Australia, and the great
group of islands which connect Australia with the Asiatic continent, there is a still more curious example of the same fact.
There is a Family of Birds (Megapodide) of which the young
are hatched, not by the incubation of the parents, but by the
heat of fermentation generated in earthen mounds, scraped together for the purpose. From the moment the young are
hatched they feed themselves, and run, and fly, and roost on
trees, as if the world on which they have just opened their eyes
had been long familiar. It is said, indeed, that the Parent
Bird watches the Hatching Mound, and is ready to escort the
chicks upon their first appearance in the surrounding scrub.
But the recognition of the Parent by the young, and the answer
to her call, are the most remarkable of allamong these proofs
of intuitive ideas. " As a moth emerges from a Chrysalis, dries
its wings, and flies away, so the young Telegallus, when it
leaves the egg, is sufficiently perfect to be able to act independently.* Nor is this all; the curious instinct by which the Bird
prepares an artificial Incubator for its young is an instinct born
with it-an Innate Idea expressing itself in congenital habits
of body. The chick of another Species of this singular family
of Birds, the Megapode, was found in confinement to be incessantly scraping up sand and gravel into heaps, and the rapidity
and power with which it effected this operation is described
with astonishment by its captor.
These may seem far-fetched illustrations, and of slight value
* Gould's " Birds of Australia."
12




178                THE REIGN OF LAW.
in so dark a subject; but let us remember that there are no
solitary facts in Nature. There are indeed extreme cases,extreme examples of universal laws, —that is to say, of laws
whose operation is ordinarily restrained within narrower limits.
But there is no fact standing really alone-net one which is not
bound to the whole Order of Nature by deep analogies. That
any creatures should be ushered into life so completely organized and furnished as the young of the Gallinaceous Birds and
of the Megapodes, is a fact of immense significance in the phenomena of Organic Life. (See note E.)
In Man analogous facts appear, modified by his infinitely
wider range of character, and the infinite degrees in which the
different elements of Mind are capable of being mixed in him.
But although these conditions greatly complicate the result, the
general phenomena are the same. Orphans, who have never
had any opportunities of acquiring, by imitation, the peculiarities of their parents, will often, nevertheless, reproduce these
peculiarities with curious exacntess. This is a familiar fact,
and how much this fact implies! Even when the inheritance is
merely some congenital habit of body, or some trick of manner,
it may, probably, imply some resemblance deeper than appears.
For the Body and the Mind are in such close relationship, that
congenital habits of Body are sure to be connected with congenital habits of Mind. But the inheritance is very often, so
far as we can see, purely mental. How often do we recognize
the tone, character, and the very turn of thought of dead
friends, in the conversation and conduct of their children!
The innate tendency to look at things in the same point of
view, is evidenced in the reproduction of the same mental combinations, of the same images, of the same opinions, in short,
of the same ideas. Cases, more remarkable than others of this
kind, attract our attention, and we at once recognize ideas as
innate which are so obviously determined by the forces of hereditary transmission. But we forget how often these laws of
inheritance must be working invisibly where they never break
ground upon the surface. And thus it is brought home to us
how the Mind may be subject to laws of which it is unconscious-how its whole habit of thought, and the aspect in which
different questions present themselves to its apprehension, are




THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND.    I79
in a great measure determined by the mysterious forces of congenital constitution. And what is true in one measure of the
individual mind, is true, also, in other measures, of whole families and of races of Men.
But the laws of Material Organization are not the only laws
to which Mind is subject. Obscure as these laws are, there
are others which are obscurer still. What we cannot see in
detail, we can see in the gross. What we cannot recognize in
ourselves, we are able to recognize in others. We can see
that the actions and opinions of men, which are the phenomena
of Mind, do range themselves in an observed Order, upon
which Order we can found, even as we do in the material
world, very safe conclusions as to the phenomena which will
follow upon definite conditions. And when we go back to
former generations-to the history of nations, and the progress of the human race-we can detect still more clearly an
orderly progress of events. In that order the operation of
great general causes become sat once apparent.  On the
recognition of such causes the Philosophy of History depends; and upon that recognition depends not less the possibility of applying to the exigencies of our own time, and of our
own society, a wise and successful legislation.
But what are these causes, and what is the nature of those
" laws " to which voluntary agents are unconsciously obedient?
Is man's Voluntary agency a delusion, or is it, on the contrary,
just what we feel it to be, and is it only from misconception of
its nature that we puzzle over its relation to Law? We speak,
and speak truly, of our Wills being free; but free from what?
It seems to be forgotten that Freedom is not an absolute but a
relative term. There is no such thing existing as absolute freedom-that is to say, there is nothing existing in the world, or
possible even in thought, which is absolutely Alone-entirely
free from inseparable relationship to some other thing or
things. Freedom, therefore, is only intelligible as meaning the
being free from some particular kind of restraint or of inducement to which other beings are subject. From what, then, is
it that our Wills are free? Are they free from the influence of
motives? Certainly not. And what are motives? A motive
is that which moves, or tends to move, the mind in a particular




180                THE REIGN OF LAW.
direction. Like all other words which are used to describe the
phenomena of Mind, it is taken from the language applicable to
material things, and suggests the analogies which exist between
them. It belongs to the profound but unconscious metaphysics
of Human Speech. That which moves the Mind in a particular direction is best conceived of as something which exerts
a force upon it, and the aggregate of such forces may, in a general sense, be called the laws which determine human action
and opinions.
But here we come upon the great difficulty which besets every
attempt to reduce to system the laws or forces which operate on
the Mind of Man. It is the immense, the almost boundless
variety and number of them. This variety corresponds with
the variety of powers with which his Mind is gifted. For preestablished relations are necessary to the effect of every force
whether in the material or in the moral world. Special forces
operate upon special forms of matter, and except upon these,
they exert no action whatever. For no force can operate except where there are pre-established relations between its energies and the things upon which its energies are to work. The
Polar Force of magnetism acts on different metals in different
degrees, and there is a large class of substances which are almost insensible to its power. In like manner there are a thousand things that exercise an attractive power on the mind of a
civilized man, which would exercise no power whatever upon
the mind of a savage. And in this lies the only difference between subjection to Law under which the lower animals are
placed, and the subjection to law which is equally the condition
of Mankind. Free Will, in the only sense in which this expression is intelligible, has been erroneously represented as the peculiar prerogative of Man. But the Will of the lower animals
is, within their narrow spheres of action, as free as ours. A
man is not more free to go to the right hand or to the left than
the Eagle, or the Wren, or the Mole, or the Bat. The only difference is, that the Will of the lower animals is acted upon by
fewer and simpler motives. And the lower the organization of
the animal, the fewer and simpler these motives are. Hence
it is that the conduct and choice of animals-that is, the decision of their Will under given conditions-can be predicted with




THE REIGN OF LAW IN TIlE REALM OF BMIND.    I8I
almost perfect certainty. Their faculties, few in number and
limited in range, are open only to the small number of forces
which are related to them; and in the absence of higher faculties accessible to other motives, these few attractions exert a
determining effect upon their Will. (See note F.)
Accordingly we may see that, in proportion as there is an approach among the lower animals to the higher faculties of
Mind, there is, in corresponding proportion, a difficulty in predicting their conduct. Perhaps the best illustration of this is
a very homely one-it is the effect of baits and traps. Some
animals can be trapped and caught with perfect certainty;
whilst there are others upon which the motive presented by a
bait, is counteracted by the stronger motive of caution against
danger, when a higher degree of intelligence enables the animal
to detect its presence. Yet the Will of the cunning animal is
not more free than the Will of the stupid animal,-nor is the
Will of the stupid animal more subject to Law than the Will of
the cunning one. The Will of the young Rat, which yields
to the temptation of a bait, and is caught, is not more subject to Law than the Will of the old Rat, who suspects stratagem, resists the temptation and escapes. They are both subject to Law in precisely the same sense and in precisely the
same degree —that is to say, their actions are alike determined
by the forces to which their faculties are accessible. Where
these are few and simple, the resulting action is simple also;
where these are many and complicated, the resulting action has
a corresponding variety. Thus the conduct of animals is less
capable of being predicted in proportion as it is difficult or impossible to foresee the nature or number of the motive forces
which are brought to bear upon the Will. Man's Will is free
in the same sense, and in the same sense only. It is subject to
Law in the same sense, and in the same sense alone. That is
to say, it is subject to the influence of motives, and it can only
choose among those which are presented to it, or which the
mind has been given the power of presenting to itself. (See
note G.)
But in this last power we touch the secret of that boundless
difference which separates Man from the highest of the animals




182               THE REIGN OF LAW.
below him. There is such a gulf between the faculties of his
mind and those of the lower animals, that the forces acting on
the human spirit become, by comparison, innumerable, and involve motives belonging to a wholly different class and order.
He is exposed, indeed, to the lower motives in common with
the beasts. But there are others which operate largely upon
him which never can and never do operate upon them. Foremost among these are the motives which Man has the power of
bringing to bear upon himself, arising out of his power of
forming Abstract Ideas, out of his possession of Beliefs, and,
above all, out of his Sense of Right and Wrong. So strong
are these motives that they are able constantly to overpower,
and sometimes almost to destroy, the forces which are related
to his lower faculties. Again, among the motives which operate upon him, Man has a selecting power. He can, as it were,
stand out from among them, —look down from above them,compare them among each other, and bring them to the test of
Conscience. Nay, more, he can reason on his own character as
he can on the character of another Being,-estimating his own
weakness with reference to this and the other motive, as he is
conscious how each may be likely to tell upon him. When he
knows that any given motive will be too strong for him, if he
allow himself to think of it, he can shut it out from his mind by
"keeping the door of his thoughts." He can, and he often
does, refuse the thing he sees, and hold by another thing which
he cannot see. He may, and he often does, choose the Invisible in preference to the Visible. He may, and he often does,
walk by Faith and not by Sight. It is true that in doing this
he must be impelled by something which is itself only another
motive, and so it is true that our Wills can never be free from
motives, and in this sense can never be free from " Law."
But this is only saying that we can never be free from the
relations pre-established between the structure of our minds,
and the system of things in which they are formed to move.
From these, it is true indeed, that we never can be free. But
as a matter of fact, we know that these relations do not involve
compulsion. It is from compulsion that our Wills are free, and
from nothing else; and for this freedom  we have the only




THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND.    I83
evidence we can ever have for any ultimate truth respecting
the powers of Mind —the evidence of Consciousness-that is,
the evidence of observation turned in upon ourselves.
The discussions of many centuries seem to have resulted, at
last, in some real progress upon this vexed question of Necessity and Free-will. That progress lies mainly in a clearer definition of terms. The most eminent living philosopher who represents the doctrine, commonly called the Doctrine of Necessity,
repudiates that name as incorrect, expressly on the ground
that the word Necessity, as commonly applied, signifies compulsion. Undoubtedly it does; and if this meaning be repfudiated, then the word is not used in its ordinary and legitimate
sense. This, indeed, Mr. Mill confesses, whilst yet he casts
upon his opponents the blame of a misunderstanding, which
assuredly lies with those who do not employ ordinary words in
the ordinary signification.  " The truth is," he says, " that the
assailants of the doctrine (of Necessity) cannot do without the
associations engendered by the double meaning of the word
Necessity, which in this application signifies only invariability,
but, in its commion employment, comnpulsion."    He believes,
therefore, in Necessity only in the sense of Invariability. But
if the doctrine which Mr. Mill favors has suffered from one
ambiguity, it seeks to shelter itself under the protection of
another ambiguity much more deceptive. If there is a double
meaning  in the  word Necessity which  has exposed the
Necessitarian doctrine to unjust objections, it is equally true
that thex-e is a double meaning in the word Invariability
which lends to that doctrine an undue advantage.  Invariability can be predicated of mental action in this vague general
sense-that all the movements of Mind must invariably arise
from some motive. But this is a kind of " Invariability " which
admits of any amount of variation. For, as in the language
of this philosophy, Necessity does not mean compulsion, so by
Invariability, as applied to the phenomena of Mind, nothing
more is meant than that, in respect to mental action, there is
an " abstract possibility of its being foreseen."  " If," says Mr.
Mill, "necessity means more than this abstract possibility of
being foreseen; if it means any mysterious compulsion, apart
"Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy," by J. S. Mill, p. 492, note.




184                    THE REIGN OF LAW.
from simple invariability of sequence, I deny it as strenuously
as any one." *
But now let us insist, as in such subjects we are bound to do,
on still clearer definitions. We shall find, in the first place,
that the " abstract possibility of foreseeing mental action depends on nothing less than such absolute knowledge of character and of motive as can belong to God alone. We shall then
find, in the second place, that this favorite phrase, " invariability
of sequence," is as ambiguous as others of the same class. It
does not mean that any particular sequences are invariable, but
only that there must always be some sequence-that it is invariably true that everything  which happens  has proceeded
from somef//tin  as a cause, and leads to somet/zing as a consequence. But this is a proposition which evidently, when reduced to its true dimensions, has no adverse bearing whatever
on the doctrine of Free Will.  The "abstract" possibility of
foreseeing mental action depends on these two propositions:
first, that where all the conditions of that action are constant,
the resulting action will be constant also; and, secondly, that
absolute and perfect knowledge of the whole of those conditions would carry with it sure foreknowledge also of the
choice to which they lead.  But surely this is not only true,
but something very like a truism.t  There is nothing to object
to or deny in the doctrine, that if we knew everyt/ing that determines the conduct of a man, we should be able to know
what that conduct will be. That is to say, if we knew all the
motives which are brought by external agencies to bear upon
his mind, and if we knew all the other motives which that mind
evolves out of its own powers, and out of previously acquired
materials, to bear upon itself; and if we knew  the character
and disposition of that mind so perfectly as to estimate exactly
* " Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy," P. 5I7. See Note H.
t Mr. Mansel, following other philosophers on this point, reduces the modified
doctrine of Necessity to this identical proposition, " that the prevailing motive prevails." Mr. Mill's reply is altogether unsatisfactory.-Exanzination of Sir W. Hamilton's Pitilosophy, pp. 5 8, 5I9.
I cannot help adding here-although the observation has reference to another subject-that Mr. Mill appears to me to have exposed with great force and clearness the
verbal fallacies involved in Mr. Mansel's work on the " Limits of Religious Thought,"
and especially in the use he makes of such forms of expression as " The Absolute,"'The Infinite," etc -See the chapter (vii.) on " The Philosophy of the ConditionedC
as applied by Mr. Mansel to Religion," in the same work.




THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND.    185
the weight it will allow to all the different motives operating
upon it, —t/lze we should be able to predict with certainty the
resulting course of conduct,
This is true, not only as an abstract conception, but as a matter of experience in the little way towards perfect knowledge
along which we can ever travel. We can predict conduct with
almost perfect certainty when we know character with an equal
measure of assurance, and when we know the influences to which
that character will be exposed. In proportion as we are sure of
character, in the same proportion we are sure of conduct. Yet
we never think of the Will being the less free, because we can
predict its course. What we know in such cases is simply the
use which, under given conditions, will be made of freedom.
There is no certainty in the world of Physics more absolute
than some certainties in the world of Mind. We know that a
humane man will not do a uselessly cruel action. WIe know
that an honorable man will not do a base action. And if in
such cases we are deceived in the result, we know that it is because we were ignorant of some weakness or of some corruption; that is to say, we were ignorant of some elements of character. But we never doubt that if those had been known, we
could have foreseen the resulting lapse. Perfect knowledge
must therefore be perfect foreknowledge. To know the present perfectly, is to know the future certainly. To know all that
is, is to know all that will be. To know the heart of Man completely, is to know his conduct completely also; for " out of the
heart are the issues of life."  So far from this conclusion being dangerous or hostile to any part of the Christian system, it is
a conclusion which enables us, in a dim way, not merely to hold
as a Belief, but to see as a necessary truth, that there can be no
chance in this world, and how it is, and imust be, that to the
All-seeing and All-knowing the Future is as open as the Present
and the Past. But none of these ideas involve the idea of compulsion; and the absence of compulsion is all that can be
meant by Freedom.
And as by Freedom, we do not mean freedom from motives,
so neither do we mean that any of the phenomena of Mind, any
more than any of the phenomena ot Matter, can arise without
I' j1 anteclcnt,"  In this sense there is no contradiction be



i86                   THE REIGN OF LAW.
tween the doctrine of Free Will and the amended doctrine of
Necessity. Man is subject to law of Causation in this sense,
" that his volitions are not self-caused, but determined by spirit,
ual antecedents in such sort that when the antecedents are the
same, the volitions will always be the same." * But this word
" antecedent " is one of the many vague words in which metaphysicians delight. The highest antecedents which we can
ever trace as determining conduct, are to be found in the constitution of mind itself. Love is an antecedent, so is Reverence,
so is Gratitude, so is the Hunger after Knowledge, so is the Desire of Truth. So also is the action of other Spirits upon our
own. Higher than these —further up the chain of Cause and
Effect-we cannot go. And yet we need not conceive of these
as " Final Causes," nor does the doctrine of our Free Will assign to the human Mind any self-originating power.  Man has
nothing which he did not receive.  Such freedom  as his Will
possesses has been given to him, and given him, too, as we have
dimly seen, by the employment and by the device of means. It
is a power belonging to his structure, and derived from Him by
whom that structure has been devised.
": Our Wills are ours, we know not how."
The power which in health we possess of preferring one motive
to all others, whilst yet the influence of those others may be
strongly felt, is a power which, like every other, must have its
own "antecedent "-that is to say, its own cause, and its own
purpose. But these are to be found in the Adjustment from
which the power arises,-in the Mind by which that adjustment
has been contrived, and in the Purposes which it reveals. The
freedom  of Man's Will is not more mysterious, when it is exerted in directing the Mind to one motive, and averting it from
another, than when it is exerted in turning the Body to the
right hand rather than to the left.t
* " Mill on Hamilton," pp. 492, 493.
1 The whole of this passage on Necessity and Free Will has been severely criticised
in an article in the Dzb6Zlin Review for April I867, as involving a practical abandonment
of the very doctrine which I profess to defend. The argument there maintained seems
to me altogether erroneous; and I have seen no reason to alter the text in any material point. The subject, however, is so important in itself, and so interesting as regards
the history of Philosophy, that I have thought it right to deal with it in a separate
note (F) already referred to.




THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND.    187
The difficulty of reconciling, in one clear Order of Thought,
the idea of the Freedom of our own Will with the idea of Causation, is not really so great a difficulty as the use of ambitious and
ambiguous language has made it appear to be. There are two
sentences in Mr. J. S. Mill's work, on the Philosophy of Comte,
which afford the best possible illustration both of the true doctrine on the relation in which Will stands to Law, and of the
false doctrine into which it may be merged by the ambiguous
use of words. In one passage Mr. Mill defines the Positive as
distinguished from the Theological Mode of Thought to be"that all phenomena, without exception, are governed by invariable laws, with which no volitions either natural or supernatural
interfere."X  It is at least satisfactory to find in this sentence
so clear an avowal that the idea of free Divine Volition in the
region of the Supernatural, and the idea of free Human Volition
in the region of the Natural, stand on the same ground, are exposed to the same intellectual difficulties, and are both equally
denied by the new Philosophy.  But as a definition of the
Positive mode of thought it stands in curious contrast with another passage of the same work, in which Mr. Mill says that
" the Theological mode of explaining phenomena was once universal, with the exception, doubtless, of the familiar facts which being even then seen to be controllable by human Will belonged already to the Positive Mfode of Thought." t
These two sentences involve, on the face of them, contradictory positions. The one affirms that no volitions can interfere
with the laws which govern phenomena, and that the recognition of this is the very essence of the Positive Philosophy. The
other affirms that the Positive Mode of Thought is involved in
the very idea of facts being controllable by human Will.
It is not, perhaps, very important to ask which of these two
sentences gives the most accurate description of the Positive
Philosophy; but it is of much importance to ask which of these
two positions is nearest to the truth? Beyond all doubt, it is
the last. If the Positive Philosophy were content with the assertion that the power of Will over facts depends on the invaria* " Aug. Comte and Positivism," p. I2,
I, Ibid. pp. 3I, I2.




I88                THE REIGN OF LAW.
bility of Laws-that is, on the constancy of Natural Forces-it
would be sound enough. And so, the second of the two sentences I have quoted sets forth the central idea of that Philosophy in its most favorable light. But in the first of those two
sentences we have a concentration of all that is erroneous in
Positivism, and at the same time a typical example of the ambiguities and obscurities of language on which the fallacies of
that Philosophy depend. There is hardly a single word in that
sentence which is not ambiguously used.  "Phenomena" and
"facts,"  govern" and "control," and "interfere with," are all
used in ambiguous senses; whilst, as usual, the words " Law"
and " Invariable," are used not only ambiguously, but unintelligibly. In order to test these ambiguities we have only to compare the two sentences together. "Phenomena" in the one
sentence seems to correspond with " facts " in the other. Yet,
we have this result,-that " phenomena " are governed by Invariable Law, whilst "facts " are controllable by human Will. It
would appear, then, that the " phenomena " which are governed
by Law cannot be the same with the "facts," which are controllable by Will:-or else, if they be the same, then there must
be some essential distinction between "controlling" and "governing." What is this distinction? It is not defined, or even
suggested. Then, again, if no volitions can "interfere with"
Laws, how can volitions "control" facts?  If Will controls
facts, and yet can't " interfere with " Laws, how is the control
over facts exercised?  What is the relation between the Laws
which no volitions can " interfere with," and the " facts" which
volitions do actually " control? "  Can Will control facts, which
again are governed by laws, (in some sense or other) either by
interfering with those laws, or controlling them?
If it were possible to get any definite meaning out of this confusion of words, perhaps it might be said that Will can "control " Law, but cannot " interfere with " it. There is at least a
glimmering of the truth in this. But no man could gather from
those two sentences of Mr. Mill what the truth is, although,
after all, the truth is plain enough if only some care be taken
to confine definite words to some sort of definite meaning. If
by Laws are meant the elementary Forces of Nature, and if by
"interfering" with them is meant any power of altering their




THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND.    189
own essential energies-then it is true that no volitions of ours
can interfere with them. But then it cannot be too often repeated that, in this sense, phenomena are NOT governed by In
variable Laws; because phenomena are never the result of in
dividual Forces, but are always the result of the conditions un
der which several Forces are combined, and these conditions
are always variable. If, again, "interference" means or includes the power of setting Natural Forces (Laws) to work un
der new conditions, then it is the reverse of truth to affirm that
they cannot be "interfered" with. Man controls facts only because (in this sense) he can, and he does, interfere with Laws.
His volitions can, and do, govern those combinations of Force
which are the immediate cause of all phenomena.
There is no fault in philosophical discussion more pestilent
than that of using common words in some technical or artificial
sense, without any warning to the reader, (often apparently without any consciousness on the part of the writer,) that ideas fundamentally involved, in the ordinary use of the word, are eliminated and set aside. We have seen one instance of this in
the word "necessity," emptied of its meaning of compulsion.
We have another example in the use made of such words as
"changeable," and others of a like kind. Thus Mr. Mills
quotes, with approbation, a remark of Comte, that " our power
of foreseeing phenomena, and our power of controlling them,
are the two things which destroy the belief of their being governed by changeable Wills."  All through this sentence there
run the same confusions which have been pointed out in the two
sentences already quoted. But there is, in addition, another confusion which has a special bearing on the subject of this chapter. Phenomena which can be controlled are phenomena which
can be changed. There is no other meaning in the words.
The assertion, therefore, is, that the changeability of phenomena through human agency is a fact which must destroy our belief in the changeability of the human Will itself. The sentence thus rendered is, of course, either pure nonsense, or else
must be dependent for a rational sense upon some artificial
meaning being attached to the word "changeable." A Will
under the guidance of some settled principle-that is to say,
*" Auguste Comte and Positivism," p. 48.




g9o                THE REIGN OF LAW.
following habitually some prevailing motives-might, by a certain licence of language, be called an unchangeable Will. But
this has nothing to do with that kind of changeability which
can alone concern the power of altering and controlling material phenomena.  Stability of character, whether moral or
purely intellectual, is not only compatible with a variable Will,
but it is inseparably connected with it. No man can pursue
one rule of conduct under changing conditions unless he himself retains his own capacities of change. He cannot control
phenomena without changing them, and he cannot change phenomena without changing his own course of action; and a
change in the course of action is a change in the course of Will.
That which is really at the bottom of all this ambiguity of
language, is a constant endeavor to get rid altogether of an
essential element in the very idea of Will,-to reduce it to
something different from that which we all knpw and feel it to
be. The word Will is indeed retained in the Positive vocabulary, but some other word is generally inserted before it, to
prejudice the common understanding of it, or to impart some
element of meaning which can with more plausibility be denounced. Thus the Will which is denied in Nature is often described as an "arbitraryv " Will or a " capricious" Will. But
surely these qualifying epithets do but add to the confusion.
It is true, indeed, that the Will we see in Nature is not a capricious Will. But this is not the question. The question is,
whether there is, or is not, such a thing possible as caprice in
Will. If there be such a thing as caprice, then the existence
of it, and the power of it "to control phenomena," cannot be
denied. If there be no such thing, then " capricious " is of no
meaning as an epithet applied to Will. Caprice implies not
only changeableness, but, so to speak, a double degree of
changeableness-a changeableness which has no rule or reason
in its shiftings. It is a fact that there are human W;ls of this
character, and the mischief they have done in the wvorld arises
from the power they possess, in common with all other Wills,
of changing phenomena after their own unreasonable nature.
The truth is, that if the human Will can be described as unchangeable, then there is no such thing as changeability even
conceivable in thought. There is no contrast so absolute be.




THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND.    191
tween any two different forms of Matter, as there is between
two different states of the same Mind. There is no transition
in Nature from one physical condition to another so absolute
or so radical as the transition to which human character is subject when it passes under the power of new convictions. There
is no change like the change from hatred to affection, from vice
to virtue, from evil to good. And this change in Mind is the
efficient cause of a whole cycle of other changes among the
phenomena which the human Will can and does alter, regulate,
and control.
There is, then, not much real difficulty after all in disengaging the great facts of our own Free Will from the verbal confusions of the Positive Philosophy.  Nor will the same methods of solution fail us when we apply them to the further question,-How far, and in what sense, are our own volitions themselves subject to law-that is, to the influence of Adjusted
Forces? For as one great consequence of the Reign of Law
over material things is the necessity of resorting to the use of
appropriate means for the accomplishment of Purpose, so
does the same necessity arise out of the same conditions among
the phenomena of Mind. If we wish to operate upon human
action, we must go to work by presenting to the Will some
motive tending to produce the action we desire. Above all, if
we seek to operate not merely on individual actions, but upon
that which mainly determines conduct, viz. human character,
we must direct our efforts to place that character under outward conditions which we know to have a favorable effect upon
it. In the material world we should be powerless to control
any event if we did not know it to be subject to laws-that is,
to Forces which, though not liable to change in essence, are
subject to endless change in combination and in use. The
same impotency would affect us, if in the moral world also definite conditions had not always an invariable tendency to produce certain definite results. It is a mere confusion of thought
and of language which confounds the " invariability " of " Laws,"
either moral or material, with the denial of the power of Will
to vary, alter, and modify in infinite degrees the course of
things. It is the fixedness of all Forces in one sense which
constitutes their infinite pliability in another. It is the un



192               THE REIGN OF LAW.~
changing relation which they bear to those mental faculties by
which we discover them and recognize thenm, that renders them
capable of becoming the supple instruments of those other
faculties of Will, of Reason, and of Contrivance by which we
can work them for altered and better purposes.




CHAPTER VII.
LAW IN POLITICS.
AT first sight it may be thought that the means by which we
can operate on the Wills of individual men, and of communities
of men, are contained within a narrow compass, and are such
as to be all, if not within easy reach, at least within easy recognition. And it is true that some methods of operating on the
minds of men we do know instinctively, just as in the material
world we know by the first rudiments of intelligence how to accomplish a few physical results. But experience and observation teach us, although they teach us very slowly, that direct
appeals to the reason, or direct appeals to the feelings of men,
are entirely useless, when those faculties have not been placed
under conditions favorable to their' exercise in a right direction. And as in the material world, the knowledge we have
acquired of the powers of Nature, and of the methods of turning them to use, has been slowly gained in the lapse of ages,
and as all we discover does but reveal how much we have yet
to know; so in the immense world of the Mind and Character
of Man, our knowledge of the methods by which it may be well
and wisely governed, has advanced only by slow degrees.
There is a boundless field of discovery still open to those who
investigate the laws which govern the development of our nature. When we look at the high degrees of excellence which
that nature so often attains under favorable conditions for the
growth and exercise of its better powers, and when we contrast
this with its stunted and distorted growth as exhibited among
large portions of Mankind, it becomes a question of deep and
endless interest to know how far these conditions are subject
to the control of Will through the use of means. If such
means can ever be devised, it must be by knowledge, first of
the elementary forces which have a constant operation on Human Character, and secondly by contrivance in so combining
13




194               THE REIGN OF LAW.
them as to make them operate in the direction we desire. And
it is in this search that we discover the intimate blending and
inseparable connection between mental and material laws-that
is, between the forces which operate on the material frame and
the forces which operate on the Mind and Character of Man.
And here we come on a great subject-the function of Human Law as distinguished from Natural Law. Just as the Will
of the individual can operate upon itself by the use of means,
some of which are known instinctively, whilst others are found
out by reason; so can the collective Will of Society operate
upon the conduct of its members in two ways-first, directly by
authority; and secondly, indirectly by altering the conditions
out of which the most powerful motives spring. This last is a
principle of government, which has been distinctly recognized
only in modern times, and which admits of applications not yet
foreseen. The idea of founding Human Law upon the Laws
of Nature, is an idea which, though sometimes instinctively
acted upon, was never systematically entertained in the ancient
world. Indeed, the true conception of Natural Law is one
founded on the progress of physical investigation, and growing
out of the habits of scientific thought. It was long before Man
came to apprehend the prevalence of Law in the phenomena
of Matter; and it was still longer before he could even entertain the notion of Natural Law as applicable to himself. The
ancient lawgivers were always aiming at standards of Political
Society, framed according to some abstract notions of their
own as to how things ought to be, rather than upon any attempt
to investigate the constitution of human nature as it actually is.
It was a mistake in the science of Politics analogous to that
which Bacon complained of so bitterly in the science of Physics. Men were always trying to evolve out of their own minds
knowledge which could only be acquired by patient inquiry into
facts. How worse than useless this method is, received an illustration in ancient philosophy still more striking than in ancient legislation. Fortunately for mankind, no actual legislators have ever been quite so foolish as some philosophers.
Perhaps, all things considered, the most odious conceptions of
Human Society which the world has ever seen, were the conceptions of an intellect certainly among the loftiest which has




LAW IN POLITICS.                   195
ever exercised its powers in speculative thought. Plato's Republic is an Ideal State, founded on abstract conceptions of
the mind, and one of its leading ideas is the destruction of
Family Life, and the annihilation of the family affections. And
yet this result, odious and irrational as it is, was arrived at from
reasoning which is not in itself odious, but which is false,
chiefly because it takes no account of the facts of Nature. The
welfare of the State was to be the one object of desire in every
mind. All separate interests and affections were to be suppressed, and amongst these the very idea of special property in
Wife or Child. The highest type of man was to be bred by the
Republic as the highest type of dogs and horses is bred by an
intelligent owner.* Such are the humiliating results of abstract
reasoning, pursued in ignorance of the great Law, that no purpose can be attained in Nature except by legitimate use of the
means which Nature has supplied. For as in the material
world, all her Forces must be acknowledged and obeyed before
they can be made to serve, so in the Realm of Mind there can
be no success in attaining the highest moral ends until due
honor has been assigned to those motives which arise out of
the universal instincts of our race.
Accordingly it is remarkable that the system of ancient philosophy, which for so many ages continued to rule the thoughts
of men-the philosophy of Aristotle-owes  almost all the
strength it has in Politics as in other matters, to occasional and
almost unconscious resort to the true methods of scientific
reasoning and investigation. Aristotle founds his adverse criticism on Plato, where it is most successful, upon the actual
facts of what men, under specified conditions, naturally do, and
think, and feel. From these facts he argues justly as to what
they would do under the artificial restrictions of a theoretical
philosophy. When, for example he argues against communism,
and in favor of private property, upon the ground of the watchfulness and attention which self-interest produces in the conduct of business,t and when he adds, " It is unspeakable how
advantageous it is that a man   oald think he has something
* "The breeding is regulated, like that of noble horses or dogs, by an intelligent
proprietor."-Grote's " Plato," vol. iii. p. 203.
t [ aW2ov 6' 61rthnUaovatv dCf troob Gtov d arov irpoaepEiovoro.-is Aristot. PoL"
Bk. ii. c. 5.




i96                   THE REIGN OF LAW.
which he may call his own, for it is by no means to no purpose
that each person should have an affection for himself,for that
is natural," * he touches the very root idea of the modern science of Political Economy. He touches it, but he does not
grasp it. It is a line of argument which is never consistently
maintained; and though there are perpetual appeals to "nature "-to that which is " natural " —to that which nature
teaches-no definite meaning can be attached to these expressions; and dogmas are laid down as " natural " which are purely
abstract and metaphysical conceptions. Nature is called as
a witness, and then the witness she gives is condemned and put
out of court. Industry is occasionally praised, whilst the means
and the motives to industry are systematically despised.  The
exercise of any mechanical employment, or the following of
merchandise, is condemned in an Ideal Government as "ignoble and destructive to virtue."t  A maritime situation is recommended, because of its convenience in enabling a city to receive
from  others produce which its own country does not afford, and
to export those necessaries of life of which it has more than
plenty. This looks like a perception of the soundest maxims of
Commerce. But in the next breath, the whole richness and
blessing of Commerce, as an element of civilization, is repudiated and destroyed by the stupid and selfish imaxim that a city
must traffic to supply its own wants only, and not the wants
of others; "for those who make  themselves into  an open
market for every one, do it for the sake of revenue; but if a
State ought to have no part in this kind of gain, neither ought
it to furnish such a mart." $
It is surely wonderful that such a mind as that of Aristotle
should have supposed that it was either possible, or, if possible,
desirable that the benefits of traffic should all be on one side;
-et &t1 Kata rpo-pf (jov7v at6v0i8rjov ocov &tacepet Tr voydietv 6tt6v rt' tt yap
oiv yaTllv riv 7rpb aVTir  a9roC EXet q3tZiav EKcaxroq, OtX2' art  rorTo Ovottc6v
-Bk. ii. c. 5.
t oi-re /13vavaov P/3iov ovr' ayopaiov idZ rV -ro~V TroZurart alyevvkS yap o roto7ro~
pflog Kcat irpbc ape'rv'nrevavrioq.-_13. vii. c. 9. In Mr. Congreve's edition, Bk. iv.
c. 9.
t airi yap ettwroptIciv, vt29' o''o-C 2oZ aotci el dvat r2)v ro2Gtv. ol 6& rapexovTe~
aqfo ai-roi'C 7raCIv a)yopav 7rpoa60ov Xa'ptv ai3ra 7rpirrovt'0 zv rv  J pei  7ro6tv'otaivrwC Yer7Xev 7r2reoveiag, o1V6' utrr6ptov 6tS KceicriaUOat rotoirov.-Bk. vii, c. 6,




LAW IN POLITICS.                  197
nor is it less wonderful that, with his hands, as it were, upon the
spot, and touching with his very fingers the foundation-facts,
he should yet have failed to feel and to seize the great secret
of modern Political Science-the links of Natural Consequence
in which the blessedness of Commerce lies. But all this comes
of thinking that we can be wiser than Nature, and of failing to
see that every natural instinct has its own legitimate field of
operation, within which we cannot do better than let it alone.
It comes from the notion that we can arrive at that which ought
to be, without taking any note of that which actually is.
The bondage under which all true Science lies to fact-the
necessity of groping among the detail of little and common
things-this is a hard lesson for the human Intellect to learnconscious as that Intellect is of its own great powers —of its own
high aims-of its own large capacities of intuitive understanding. But it is a lesson which must be learnt. There are no
short cuts in Nature.  Her results are always attained by Method. Her purposes are always worked out by Law. So must
ours be. For our bodies and our spirits are both parts of the
great Order of Nature; and our Wills can attain no end, and
can accomplish no design, except through knowledge and
through use of the appropriate and appointed means. Nor can
those means be ascertained except by careful observation, and
as careful reasoning. It is a hard thing to know all the forces
which operate even on our own individual minds; and it is a
much harder problem to understand the forces which arise out of
the complicated conditions of human society. But the very idea
of Natural Law as affecting mankind is founded on the possibility
of tracing in human nature the existence and operation of forces
which under given conditions do actually determine the course
of human conduct in particular directions. Amongst these
forces there are a certain number which are constant, or at least
so constant that they may be calculated upon as certainly affecting the great majority of mankind. These are chiefly the motives which arise out of our physical constitution —the desires
and affections which are common to the race. To follow these
motives-to be actuated by them-is, therefore, natural. And
yet to follow these motives exclusively, may, and generally does,
lead to great evils, often to calamities? sometimes to destructioQ.




I98                THE REIGN OF LAW.
How, then, can these motives be controlled? Only by ap
pealing to other motives —to forces lying in the higher re.
gions of the mind, and placed there like the forces of external
Nature, to be at the disposal of the Intelligence and the Will.
Are, then, these higher motives not also natural?-are they
above nature?-are they supernatural? It would really seem
as if this were the idea involved in the distinction which is so
vaguely drawn between that which is said to be natural and that
which is said to be not natural-between Natural Law and
Positive Institution. Yet Reason, and Conscience, and Fancy,
and Imagination, and Belief, or whatever other faculties may
direct, wisely or unwisely, the course of legislation, are all
equally natural to Man. They are all as much parts of his mental constitution as the desires and instincts to which the term
natural is usually confined. There is no entravagance of the
individual Will-there is no folly of blind and irrational legislation which has not been the fruit of some part or another of
Man's nature. I dwell on this only because it is important here
as in other cases, to attach a definite meaning to the words we
use, and especially to a word which plays so important a part
in the language both of Philosophy and of Politics.
It appears, then, that, as applied to human conduct, we mean
by "natural " conduct that which men are prompted to pursue
rather by instinct and impulse than by calculation of consequences and by reason. Human Laws, or Positive Institutions,
as being the result of deliberation, stand contrasted with Natural
Law in this sense, and in this sense alone. For as Reason and
Reflection are natural to Man, and are as important parts of
his nature as the highest of his instincts, so Laws founded on a
right exercise of that Reason are Natural Laws in the best and
highest sense of all. Laws, however, whether in this sense
natural or not-that is, whether founded on a right or a wrong
exercise of reason-are always intended to act as restraints on
the actions of individuals, and to interfere with the motives by
which their conduct would be otherwise determined. This restraint may be said to be artificial as opposed to the natural re.
straints of the individual reason; and this, perhaps, is the distinction most generally intended when the natural conduct of
men is contrasted with their conduct under the control of Posi



LAW IN POLITICS.                  199
tive Institution. But as the motives which determine individual
conduct are not always reasonable motives, so it is clear that
what men naturally do is no sure test either of what they ought to
do, or of what they ought to be allowed to do. It is their nature,
under certain conditions, to do all that is bad and injurious to
themselves and others. Hence it is the most difficult of all problems in the Science of Government to determine when, where,
and how it is wise to interfere by the authority of Law with the
motives which are usually called the natural motives of men.
The question is no other than this: How far the abuse of
those motives can be checked and resisted by that public authority whose duty and function it is to place itself above the influences which, in individual men, overpower the voice of reason
and of conscience?
No more signal illustration has been ever given of the relation between Natural Law and Human Law-of the circumstances in which Natural Law may be trusted, and of those in
which it absolutely requires to be controlled-than the illustration afforded by the history of Legislation in our own country
within the present century.  During that period two great discoveries have been made in the Science of Government: the
one is the immense advantage of abolishing restrictions upon
Trade; the other is the absolute necessity of imposing restrictions upon Labor. The rise, the growth, and the final acceptance of these two ideas as the basis of practical Legislation, is
a history so curious, and having such close relation to the subject of this chapter, that I propose to deal with it somewhat in
detail.
Since the dissolution of the Greek and Roman Commonwealths, no nation has acted on the one great error of all the
ancient systems of political philosophy-that the natural desire
of men for the accumulation of wealth is an evil to be dreaded
and repressed. So far as this goes there is a sharp and striking contrast between the spirit of ancient and of modern policy. The great object of the ancient policy, says Dugald Stewart, "was to counteract the love of money and a taste for luxury by positive institutions, and to maintain in the great body of
the people habits of frugality and a severity of manners. The
decline of States is uniformly ascribed by philosophers and




200                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
historians, both of Greece and Rome, to the influence of riches
on national character; and the laws of Lycurgus, which, during
a course of ages, banished the precious metals from Sparta, are
proposed by many of them as the most perfect model of legislation devised by human wisdom.  How opposite to this is the
doctrine of-modern politicians! Far from considering poverty
as an advantage to a State, their great aim is to open new
sources of national opulence, and to animate the activity of all
classes of the people by a taste for the comforts and accommodations of life." *  This is true, and has been true more or less
of all the modern nations of the world.  But although they
never held the absurd doctrine that Nature was wrong when
she taught men to desire wealth, they did hold the doctrine,
hardly less mischievous that Nature was incompetent to teach
them  how best to  acquire  it.  It would be difficult to say
whether the law of ancient Sparta, prohibiting gold from ever
coming into the State, was worse than the law of modern Spain,
which prohibited gold from ever being allowed to leave it.  It
is certain that the Spanish law was at least the more irrational
of the two.  If a State wishes to be poor, it is not absurd to
prohibit the making of money.  But if a State wishes to be
rich, it is mere stupidity to prohibit the natural use of the medium of exchange. Yet this law of Spain is only an extreme
example of the system and the theories which governed, until
the other day, the legislation of all the nations of Europe, and
which still largely prevails amongst them.
It was no oratorical exaggeration, but a strict and literal
description of the truth, when Mr. Gladstone said t of the old
commercial policy that it was " a system of robbing and plun
dering ourselves."  And how was it so?  What was the es,
sence of its error?  These questions are best answered by
another. What was the central idea of the new system  which
has superseded the old one? The essential idea of these new
opinions cannot be better given than in the words of Dugald
Stewart: "The great and leading object of Adam  Smith's
speculations is to illustrate the provision made by Nature in
* " Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith," by Dugald Stewart. —" Col
lected Works of Dugald Stewart," vol. x. p. 57.
1' In his Speech at Glasgow, Oct,, 86$5,




LAW IN POLITICS.                 201
the principles of the human mind, and in the circumstances of
man's external situation, for a gradual progressive augmentation in the means of national wealth, and to demonstrate
that the most effectual plan for advancing a people to greatness is to maintain that order of things which Nature has
pointed out; by allowing every man, as long as he observes
the rules of justice, to pursue his own interest in his own way,
and to bring both his industry and his capital into the freest
competition with those of his fellow-citizens.":
Adam Smith found Positive Institutions regulating and restricting natural human action in two different directions. There
were laws restricting free interchange in the products of labor:
and there were other laws restricting the free employment of
labor itself. He denounced both. Labor was deprived of its
natural freedom by laws forbidding men from working at any
skilled labor, unless they had served an apprenticeship of a
specified time. It was also deprived of its natural freedom by
monopolies, which prevented men from working at any trade
within certain localities, unless allowed to do so by those who
had the exclusive privilege. The first mode of restriction prevented labor from passing freely from one employment to
another, even in the same place. The second mode of restriction prevented labor passing freely from place to place, even
in the same trade. Both of these restrictions were as mischievous, and as destructive of their own object, as restrictions in
the free interchange of goods. They both depended on the
same vicious principle of attempting to obtain by Legislation
results which would be more surely attained by allowing every
man to sell his goods or his labor when, where, and how he
pleased. The labor of a poor man was his capital.  He had a
natural right to employ it as he liked. And as for protecting
the community from bad or imperfect work, that would be best
secured by unrestricted competition. The natural instincts and
respective interests of producers and consumers would secure
mutual adaptation. Perfect freedom of exchange in goods, the
products of labor, and perfect freedom in the application of
labor itself-this was the rule to follow. Natural Law was the
* Account, see p. 72.




202                THE REIGN OF LAW.
best regulator of both.  Such were the doctrines of Adam
Smith, then new in the world.
It is not a little remarkable that, during the same years in
which Adam Smith was working out his memorable Inquiry,
other minds, working in a very different department of human
thought, were preparing events which were to bring to a speedy
test how far these doctrines of Natural Law were true absolutely,
or true only under limitations, which he did not foresee. When
Adam Smith was lecturing with applause in Glasgow from
the chair of Moral Philosophy, James Watt was selling mathematical instruments in an obscure shop within the precincts
of the same University. It may seem as if no two departments of human thought are more widely separated than those
in which these two men were working. One was a region purely
mental. The other was a region purely physical. The one
had reference to the Laws of Matter. The other had reference to the Laws of Mind. Yet the work of James Watt and
the work of Adam Smith were inseparably connected, not only
as involving analogous methods of investigation, but as showing in their result the blending and co-operation of mental and
material laws.
It was the labor of Watt to reduce to obedience, under the
power of Mind, one of the most tremendous Forces of Nature,
and this he did through many years of curious inquiry, and
of laborious contrivance. He found only a rude and imperfect
mechanism through which this great Force had been misdirected
and dissipated and lost. He collected it in fitter vessels; he
led it into smoother channels; he opened for it doors of passage, through which the rustling of its escape did for him what
he wanted it to do. Other forces, which before had conspired
against it, were so guided as to work along with it, not only in
perfect harmony, but in close alliance. He made, in short,
its invariable energies subject to the variable conditions of
Adjustment. And so, he governed it and controlled it, and
handed it over to the Human Family as the servant of their
Will forever.
The work of Adam Smith was not dissimilar in its relation
to the Reign of Law. It was his labor to prove that in the
rude contrivances of Legislation, due account had not been




LAW IN POLITICS.                203
taken of the natural forces with which it had to deal. He
showed that among the very elements of human character
there were instincts, and desires, and faculties of contrivance,
all of which by clumsy machinery had been impeded, and obstructed, and diverted from the channels in which they ought
to work. He could not, however, test his reasoning as the
Inventor could, by continual experiment. He had to rely on
abstract reasoning, and on such verification as could be drawn
from the complicated phenomena of tile Body Politic. In this
respect the work of Adam Smith was harder than the work of
Watt. And why it was harder is a question which it may be
well to ask. It is not surprising that the methods of applying
to our own use the Powers of external Nature, should be
matter of difficult research. But it may well seem strange
that the forces which have their seat within ourselves-in the
Mind and Character of Man-should be so unknown to us as to
require careful reasoning and observation before we know how
to use them with success for the attainment of our ends. Yet
so it is. The conscious energies of the Will are ever tempted
to march directly upon objects which can only be reached by
circuitous methods of approach. And so the Wealth of Nations, and the skill of Crafts, and the success of Trade, had
all been hindered by the measures designed for their protection. The promptings of individual interest had been checked
and thwarted and driven into channels less fruitful than those
which they would have naturally found.
On the other hand, the discovery of the Steam Engine, like
every other weapon placed at the disposal of Mind, gave a new
stimulus to the motives, and a new form to the conditions,
by which the conduct of thousands was determined. Little
did the brilliant Professor know that the discoveries of
his humble friend would yet, in their results, serve to limit
the conclusions of his own Philosophy. In the mean time,
all that he knew of Watt and of his personal history seemed
to be, and really was, a signal illustration of the follies of
restriction. For no other reason than that he had not been
born in Glasgow, Watt could not legally sell the products of
his ingenuity and labor in that City. The spirit and the laws
of corporate monopoly rigidly excluded him; and the company




204                THE REIGN OF LAW.
of " Hammermen " insisted on the exclusion being maintained,
for fear of "loss and skaith to the Burgesses and Craftsmen of Glasgow, by the intrusion of strangers." *  The working-classes themselves were among the most strenuous supporters of a system which diminished the value by restrict'ng the
area of their labor.  Fortunately the University had privileges of its own, which, within its own property, excluded the
jurisdiction of a Municipality and a Craft not more ignorant
or more selfish than their contemporaries at the time. It may
well be supposed, that Adam Smith's opinions on freedom of
labor must have been influenced by personal observation of the
working of such laws in the case of a man who, though still
obscure, was even then appreciated by those who knew him for
ingenuity and resource.
In looking at restrictions such as these, there was nothing
then to suggest to Adam Smith the consequences which might
arise from the entire freedom of labor, when that labor was
placed under new conditions. He had no knowledge, and he
could then have no conception, what these new conditions were
to be. Yet they were being silently prepared and determined in
the very years in which he spoke and wrote. His friend Watt
was a principal agent in the great impending change. But
Watt was not alone. Other minds were working at the same time
whose labors were to match with a curious fittingness into his.
Indeed, the work which was going on in those years is only
one example of a law of which many other examples may be
found. It is an order of facts observable in the progress of
Mankind, that long ages of comparative silence and inaction
are broken up, and brought to an end, by shorter periods of
almost preternatural activity. And that activity is generally
spent in paths of investigation, which, though independent, are
converging.  Different minds, pursuing different lines of
thought, find themselves meeting upon common ground.  Suchi
in respect to literature, was the period of the Revival of Learning: such, in respect to Religion, was the period of the Reformation: such, in respect to the abstract sciences, was the period
of Tycho Brahe, of Galileo, and of Kepler. Hardly less memorable than these, certainly not less powerful, as affecting the
* Smiles' " Life of Watt," p. I05.




LAW IN POLITICS.                205
condition of society, were those few years in the last quarter
of the eighteenth century, which were marked by such an extraordinary burst of Mechanical Invention. Hargreaves, and
Arkwright, and Watt, and Crompton, and Cartwright, were all
contemporaries. They were all working at the same time, and
in the same direction. Out of their inventions there arose for
the first time what is now known as the Factory system; and
out of the Factory system arose a condition of things as affecting human labor, which was entirely new in the history of the
world. The change thus effected is a signal illustration of the
relation in which Natural Law stands to Positive Institution in
the realm of Mind. Let us look for a moment at its history
and results.
The Common Law of England had placed no restrictions
upon labor. The only restrictions which existed arose either
from the special monopolies of Corporate Bodies, or from the
General Statute of Apprenticeship. This statute had been
passed in the reign of Elizabeth.  It provided that no man
should work at any craft on his own account until he had served
an apprenticeship of seven years. But the Statute of Apprenticeship being in derogation of common rights, had always been
construed strictly by the Courts of Law; and so it had come to
pass that two great rules of limitation had been applied to it.
First, it was held to apply only to such crafts of skill as were
known at the time of its being passed; and secondly, it was held
not to apply at all to rural districts, but only to market towns.
From these two rules of limitation, it resulted, first, that all
trades and employments were free which had arisen since the
commencement of the seventeenth century, and, secondly,
that even the older crafts were free also if they were prosecuted
outside the boundaries of towns.
Such was the condition of the law when the inventions of
Adam Smith's contemporaries brought into existence employments which were entirely new, and opened them to that unrestricted competition, the advantage of which he had laid down
as a universal doctrine.
Spinning and weaving were not new. They were as old as
the memory of Mankind. But the simple mechanism by which
these arts were prosecuted were almost equally old, and had




206                THE REIGN OF LAW.
undergone little change and little improvement. In I76o the
Spinning-Wheel, and the common Loom, as used by the people of Yorkshire, were little in advance of the implements for
the same purpose which had been in use beyond the reach of
History. The Spindle which is depicted on the monuments of
Egypt was, until a few years ago, familiar in the Highlands.
The essential feature of this ancient industry, so far as its effects upon social conditions are concerned, was that it was separate and not gregarious. It did not interfere with, but rather
was congenial to, Family Life, for thousands of years,
"Maids at the Wheel, the Weaver at his Loom,
Sat blithe and happy." 
But the pressure of new necessities had arisen, and these
could be met only by new inventions. Towards the middle of
the eighteenth century, the greatest difficulty was experienced
by weavers and spinners in England in maintaining their position in the markets of the world. It is curious how each new
mechanical invention gave rise to the necessities out of which
the next arose. The invention of the Fly Shuttle in weaving, so
early as I733, seems to have given the first impulse to all that
followed. By means of this invention the power of weaving
overtook the power of spinning. An adequate supply of yarn
could not be procured under the ancient methods of that most
ancient industry. New conditions gave rise to new motives,
and new motives called into play the latent energies of Mind.
The time and the cost of collecting the products of so many
scattered laborers enhanced unduly the cost of manufacture,
and even when the remuneration was reduced to the lowest
point compatible with existence, that cost was still too high.
Something was imperatively required to economize the work of
human hands-some more elaborate contrivance to make that
work go further than before. And so Hargreaves' invention
arose, not before the time.t And when his Spinning Jenny
had been invented, a still more elaborate and powerful combination of mechanical adjustments was soon perfected in the
* Wordsworth's noble sonnet" Nuns fret not at their convent's narrow room."
t 1765-67.




LAW IN POLITICS.                20o7
hands of Arkwright.* When the Spinning Frame was invented,
and when Crompton's farther invention of the Mule Jenny
speedily followed,t the new order of things had been fairly inaugurated. The great change had come, and the survivance
of the ancient domestic industries of so many centuries was no
longer possible.
And just as Hargreaves and Arkwright and Cromlpton were
inventing the new machines which were to be moved, Watt
was laboring at the new Power which was to move them. But
meanwhile, before the Steam Engine had been made available,
the Factory system had begun under the old motive-power of
Water; and here it is very curious to observe how each stage
in the progress of discovery had, by way of natural consequence, its own special effect on the conduct and the Wills of
men. Very soon the course of every mountain stream in Lancashire and Yorkshire was marked by Factories. This again
had another consequence. It was a necessity of the case that
such Factories must generally be situated at a distance from
pre-existing populations, and, therefore, from a full supply of
labor. Consequently they had to create communities for themselves. From this necessity, again, it arose that the earlier
mills were worked under a system of Apprenticeship. The
due attendance of the requisite number of "hands" was secured by engagements which bound the laborer to his work for
a dlefinite period.
And now for the first time appeared some of the consequences of gregarious labor under the working of Natural Laws,
and under no restrictions from Positive Institution. The millowners collected as Apprentices boys and girls, and youths and
men, and women, of all ages. In very many cases no provision
adequate, or even decent, was provided for their accommodation. The hours of labor were excessive. The ceaseless and
untiring agency of machines kept no reckoning of the exhaustion of human nerves. The Factory system had not been many
years in operation when its effects were seen. A whole generation were growing up under conditions of Physical degeneracy, of mental ignorance, and of moral corruption.
* 1769-7I.                                       t  787.




208 OTFHE REION OP LAW.
The first public man to bring it under the notice of Parlia
ment with a view to remedy, was, to his immortal honor, a
master manufacturer, to whom the new industry had brought
wealth, and power, and station.  In i802 the elder Sir Robert
Peel was the first to introduce a bill to interfere by law with the
natural effects of unrestricted competition in human labor. It
is characteristic of the slow progress of new ideas in the English mind and of its strong instinct to adopt no measure which
does not stand in some clear relation to pre-existing laws, that
Sir Robert Peel's bill was limited strictly to the regulation of
the labor of Apprentices. Children and young persons who were
not Apprentices might be subject to the same evils, but for
them no remedy was asked or provided. The notion was, that
as Apprentices were already under Statutory provisions, and
were subjects of a legal contract, it was permissible that their
hours of labor should be regulated by positive enactment. But
the Parliament which was familiar with restrictions on the products of labor, and with restrictions of monopoly on labor itself
-which restrictions were for the purpose of securing supposed
economic benefits, would, not listen to any proposal to regulate
" free " labor for the purpose of avoiding even the most frightful moral evils. These evils, however great they might be,
were the result of "natural laws," and were incident to the personal freedom of Employers and Employed. In the case of
Apprentices, however, it was conceded that restriction might
be tolerated. And so through this narrow door the first of the
Factory Acts was passed. It is a history which illustrates, in
the clearest light, the sense in which human conduct, both individually and collectively, is determined by Natural Law. If
Watt's Steam  Engine had been invented earlier-if mills had
not been at first erected away from the centres of population, in
order ta follow the course of streams-if consequently the evils
of the Factory system had not begun to be observable in the
labor of Apprentices, there is no saying how much longer those
evils might have been allowed to fester without even an assertion of the right to check them. The Act of I802,* though
useless in every other sense, was invaluable at least in making
this assertion.
* ~ and 4-3 Geo. III., cap, 73.




LAW IN POLITICS.                 209
Meanwhile Watt's great invention had been completed. And
now a new cycle of events began, arising by way of natural
consequence out of the Reign of Law. When the perfected
Steam Engine became applicable to mills, it was no longer always cheaper to erect them in rural districts; on the contrary,
it was often cheaper to have them in the towns, near a full supply of labor, and a cheap supply of fuel. With this change
came the abandonment of the system  of Apprenticeship.  It
was now "free " labor which more and more supplied the mills.
But this only led to the same evils in an aggravated form.
Children and women were especially valuable in the work of
mills. There were parts of the machinery which might be fed
by almost infant "hands." The earnings of children became
an irresistible temptation to the parents. They were sent to
the factory at the earliest age, and they worked during the
whole hours that the machinery was kept at work. The result
of this system was soon apparent.  In 1815, thirteen years after he had obtained the Act of I802, Sir Robert Peel came
back to Parliament and told them that the former Act had become useless-that mills were now generally worked, not by
water, but by steam-that Apprentices had been given up, but
that the same exhausting and demoralizing labor, from which
Parliament had intended to relieve Apprentices, was the lot of
thousands and thousands of the children of the free poor. In the
following year, i8i6, pressing upon the House of Commons a
new measure of restriction, he added, that unless the Legislature extended to these children the same protection which it
had intended to afford to the Apprentice class, it had come to
this-that the great mechanical inventions which were the glory
of the age would be a curse rather than a blessing to the country. These were strong words from a master manufacturer;
but they were not more strong than true.*
Thus began that great debate which in principle may be said
to be not ended yet:-the debate, how far it is legitimate or wise
in Positive Institution to interfere for moral ends with the freedom of the individual Will? Cobbett denounced the opposition to restrictive measures as a contest of " Mammon against
* " Hansard Parl. Deb." vols. xxxi. and xxxiii.-Sir Robert's Speech on Motion for
a Committee, April 3, i8i6.
I4




210                 THE RECIGN OF LAW.
Mercy."  No doubt personal interests were strong in the forming of opinion, and some indignation was natural against those
who seemed to regard the absolute neglect of a whole generation, and the total abandonment of them to the debasing effects
of excessive toil, as nothing compared with the slightest check
on the accumulations of the Warehouse.  But the opposition
was not in the main due either to selfishness or indifference.
False intellectual conceptions-false views both of-principle
and of fact-were its real foundation. Some of the ablest men
in Parliament, who were wholly unaffected by any bias of personal interest, declared that nothing would induce them to interfere with the labor which they called "free." Had not the
working classes a right to employ their children as they pleased?
Who were better able to judge than fathers and mothers of the
capacities of their children? Why interfere for the protection
of those who already had the best and most natural of all protections? Such were some of the arguments against interfering
with free labor.
Now in what sense was this labor free? It was free from
legal compulsion-that is to say, it was free from that kind of
compulsion which arises out of the public Will of the whole
community imposed by authority upon the conduct of individuals. But there was another kind of force from which this
labor was not free-the force of overpowering motive operating
on the Will of the laborers themselves.  If one parent, more
careful than others of the welfare of his children, and moved
less exclusively by the desire of gain, withdrew his children at
an earlier hour than others from Factory Work, his children
were liable to be dismissed and not employed at all.* On the
other hand, motives hardly less powerful were in constant operation on the masters. The ceaseless, and increasing, and unrestricted competition amongst themselves,-the eagerness with
which human energies rush into new openings for capital, for
enterprise, and for skill,-made them, as a class, insensible to
the frightful evils which were arising from that competition for
the means of subsistence which is the impelling motive of labor.
Nor were there wanting arguments, founded on the constancy
* This was very forcibly explained, both by Sir Robert and by his son, Mr. Peel, in
the debate of Feb. 23, i8i8.




LAW IN POLITICS.                  2 I I
of Naturai Laws, against any attempt on the part of Legislative
authority to interfere with the "freedom" of individual Will.
The competition between the possessors of capital was a competition not confined to our own country. It was also an international competition.  In Belgium  especially, and in other
countries, there was the same rush along the new paths of industry. If the children's hours of labor were curtailed, it would
involve of necessity a curtailment also of the adult labor, which
would not be available when left alone. This would be a curtailment of the working time of the whole mill; and this would
involve a corresponding reduction of the produce. No similar
reduction of produce would arise in Foreign mills. In competition with them the margin of profit was already small. The
diminution of produce from restricted labor would destroy that
margin. Capital would be driven to countries where labor was
still free from such restrictions, and the result would be more
fatal to the interest of the working classes of the English towns
than any of the results arising from the existing hours of work.
All these consequences were represented as inevitable. They
must arise out of the operation of invariable laws.
Such were the arguments-urged in every variety of form,
and supported by every kind of statistical detail-by which the
first Factory Acts were vehemently opposed.
And, indeed, in looking back at the debates of that time, we
cannot fail to see that the reasoning of those who opposed
restriction on Free Labor met with no adequate reply. Not
only were the supporters of restriction hampered by a desire to
keep their conclusions within the scope of a very limited
measure; not only were they anxious to repudiate consequences
which did legitimately follow from their own premises; but they
were themselves really ignorant of the fundamental principles
which were at issue in the strife. Their conclusions were
arrived at through instincts of the heart. The pale faces of
little children, stunted and outworn, carried them to their result across every difficulty of argument, and in defiance of the
alleged opposition of inevitable laws. And yet, if the supporters of the Factory Acts had only known it, all true abstract
argument on the subject was their own. The conclusions to




22 I 2             THE REIGN OF LAW,.
which they pointed were as true in the light of Reason, as they
felt them to be true in the light of Conscience.
The truth is, that some of the finest distinctions in Philosophy -were then for the first time emerging on the stage of
Politics. The newest debates of Parliament were circling unconsciously round one of the oldest disputations of the Schools.
A question of practical legislation had arisen which involvedone of the most difficult problems in metaphysical analysis. On
the one hand, Freedom was asserted for the Will under conditions and in a sense in which it did not exist. On the other
hand, Freedom was denied to the Will in a sense in which the
instincts of humanity testified to its presence, and to the possibility of its being exerted with effect. The true Doctrine of
Necessity was exemplified in the conduct of Employers and
Employed-that conduct being determined in a wrong direction
by the force of overpowering motives. The false Doctrine of
Necessity was exemplified in the argument, that this conduct
could not be changed under the force of higher motives asserting themselves through the Will of the Community in the form
of Law.
The antagonism which was and still is so often assumed
between Natural Law and Human Law, or in other words
between Natural Law and Positive Institution, is an antagonism
which may indeed exist, and does very often exist. But it is
also an antagonism which may be eliminated, and must be
eliminated, if Legislation is ever to be attended with permanent
success. It is, alas, a Natural Law that men should be thoughtless
and selfish, and reckless of moral consequences, when they are
bent exclusively on material results. But when the consequences
of this conduct have been brought home to their convictions by
the force of imminent danger or of actual calamity, it is a law not
less natural that they should take alarm, that they should retrace
their steps, and that by walking in another course they should
bring about conditions of a better kind. The Laws of Man
are also Laws of Nature, when founded on a true perception of
natural tendencies and a just appreciation of combined results.
On the other hand, Human Laws are at variance with, or
antagonistic to the Laws of Nature, when founded either on
the desire of attaining a wrong end, or on the attempt to reach




LAW IN POLITICS.                   213
a right end by mistaken means. In either of these cases Positive Institution and Natural Law become opposed, and thus a
bad contrivance in Legislation, like a bad contrivance in mechanics, comes always to some dead-lock at last.  Time and
Natural Consequence are great Teachers in Politics as in other
things. Our sins and our ignorances find us out. Both in conduct and in opinion Natural Law is ever working to convict
error, to reveal and to confirm the truth.*
And so it was that the sad phenomena of Factory labor were
beginning to indicate the great difference between the results
of perfect freedom of exchange in the products of labor and
the results of perfect freedom of competition in labor itself.
Perhaps that difference ought to have been foreseen, for the
cause of it is plain enough. There are certain results for the
attainment of which the natural instincts of individual men not
only may be trusted, but must be trusted as the best and indeed the only guide. There are other results of which as a
rule those instincts will take no heed whatever, and for the
attainment of which, if they are to be attained at all, the higher
faculties of our nature must impose their Will in authoritative
expressions of Human Law. In all that wide circle of operations which have for their immediate result the getting of
wealth, there is a sagacity and a cunning in the instincts of
labor and in the love of gain compared with which all legislative wisdom is ignorance and folly. But the instincts of labor,
having for their conscious purpose the acquisition of wealth,
are instincts which, under the stimulus and necessities of
modern society, are blind to all other results whatever. They
override even the love of life; they silence even the fear of
death.  Trades in which the laborers never reach beyond
middle life-trades in which the work is uniformly fatal within
a few years-trades in which those who follow them are liable
to loathsome and torturing disease-all are filled by the enlistment of an unfailing series of recruits.. If, therefore, there be
some things desirable or needful for a Community other than
the acquisition of wealth,-if mental ignorance, and physical
degeneracy, be evils dangerous to social and political pros* "Opinionum enim commenta delet dies; naturae judicia confirmat."-Cicero,
" De Nat. Deor." lib. ii. c. 3.




214                   THE REIGN OF LAW.
perity, then these results cannot and must not be trusted to the
instincts of individual men.  And why?  Because the few
motives which bear upon them, and which consequently determine their conduct, have become almost as imperious as the
motives which determine the conduct of the lower animals. Observers whose duties have called them to a close investigation of
the facts have never failed to be impressed with those facts as the
result of Laws against which the individual Will is unable to contend. Overpowering motives arise out of the conditions of society
-out of the force of habit-out of the helplessness of povertyout of the thoughtlessness of wealth-out of the eagerness of
competition-out of the very virtues even of industrial skill.
These constitute an aggregate of power tending in one direction, which make the resulting action of Mind as certain as the
action of Inanimate Force.  "Thus," says Mr. Baker, one of
the most experienced of our Factory Inspectors, "most of the
workshops of this great commercial country are found to have
fallen into the inevitable track of competitive inlzustry, when unrestricted by law,-namely, to cheapen prices by the employment of women and children in the first instance, and then to
increase production by protracted hours of work, without much
regard to age, to sex, or to physical capability."  This is the
result of Nature-of Nature, at least, such as ours now is. But
it is the result of that Nature with all its nobler powers allowed
to sleep. Power to control such evils has been given to Man,
and he is bound to use it.  "Free labor, even in a free country," as Mr. Baker says, "requires the strong arm, of the law
to protect it from  the cupidity and ignorance of parents."*
And by the " strong arm of the law" is meant nothing but the
law of Conscience and of Reason asserting itself over the lower
instincts of our nature. If under such conditions of society
higher motives are ever to prevail, they must be supplied from
without, and must be imposed in authoritative form through
the legitimate organs of Positive Institution.t
And so the Factory Acts instead of being excused as excel>
* " Reports of the Inspectors of Factories, half-year Oct. i864," p. 84.
f Bad as the consequences were of individual freedom under unrestricted competition in the case of labor in factories, the results were still more horrible in the case
of labor in mines. In i842 it was found absolutely necessary to prohibit altogether
the labor of women and young children in mines and collieries,




LAW  IN POLITICS.                       215
tional, and pleaded for as justified only under extraordinary
conditions, ought to be recognized as in truth the first Legislative recognition of a great Natural Law, quite as important as
Freedom of Trade, and which like this last, was yet destined
to claim for itself wider and wider applica'tion.
Accordingly, since the year when the first Sir Robert Peel
pleaded the cause of Factory Apprentices, there has been going on a double movement in Legislation, one a movement of
retreat, the other a movement of advance.  Step by step Legislation has retired from a Province once considered peculiarly
its own: step by step it has advanced into another Province
within which the Schools of Political Economy would have denied it a foot of ground. Since I802, there have been passed
a long series of laws removing, one after another, all restrictions which aimed at guiding the individual Will in its sharp
and sagacious pursuit of material wealth. During the same
period there have been passed another long series of Acts imposing restrictions more and more stringent on the individual
Will in its blind and reckless disregard of moral ends.* In
neither of these movements was Parliament impelled by the
light of reason, but under the blessed teaching which belongs
to the Reign of Law. False theory and mistaken conduct have
been found out by the working of Natural Consequence. The
abstract reasonings of Adam Smith had indeed long before prepared the minds of a few to perceive the true theory of unrestricted competition in the interchange of goods. But as it
needed the practical results of restriction-distress, discontent,
and the danger of civil commotion-to bring home to the
national understanding the economic error of the old commercial systems; so also as regards the grievous results of unre* It was not till I8I9 that Sir Robert Peel succeeded in passing an Act restricting
the labor of unapprenticed children. This Act (59 Geo. III. c. 66) is therefore, properly speaking, the first of the Factory Acts-the first which affirmed the principle of
restriction as legitimately applicable to " Free " Labor. But this, as well as a subsequent Act passed in i825, at the instance of Sir J. Hobhouse, were practically inoperative from defective enforcing clauses. It was thus apparent that the State must
charge itself not only with laying down the law, but also with the duty of seeing it
obeyed. It was not till this great question was taken in hand by Lord Ashley that
any effectual measure was passed. His Bill became Law in I833, as 3 and 4 Will. IV.
C. I03. Nothing but a stringent system of Government Inspection was of any avail
against the powerful combination of motives, out of which the evils of the Factory
system arose.




216                     THE REIGN  OF LAW.
stricted competition in human labor, our only effective teaching has been that of hard experience. The doctrines of Adam
Smith, when applied here, were a hindrance and not a help.
The Political Economists were, almost to a man, hostile to restrictive legislation. They did not see what would be the work.
ing of Natural Law upon the Human Will, when that Will was
exposed to overpowering motives under debased conditions of
understanding and of heart. They did not see the higher Law
which Parliament was asserting when it was driven by sheer
instinctive horror of actual results, to prohibit "free " laborers
from disposing as they pleased of the labor of their children.
To this hour the principle on which this great counter-movement rests as regards our ideas of the legitimate province of
Legislation, has never been philosophically treated. The Laws
on which it depends, and which it does but recognize, have never
been scientifically defined.  We are still in a state of tutelageadvancing with slow and reluctant steps * in the path indicated
by the teachings of Natural Consequence. The last Report
on the Employment of Children shows that evils as bad as ever
existed before the passing of the Factory Acts, prevail at this
moment among large classes of our operative population, and
demand again, as imperatively as before, an authoritative interference of Positive Institution with the freedom of the individual Will. The fact of such legislation has indeed gained a
sort of silent acquiescence, and some of the old opponents have
admitted that their fear of the results, in an economical point
of view, has proved erroneous. But there is still no clear and
well-grounded intellectual perception of the deep foundations of
* The steps here referred to are certainly becoming every year less slow and less reluctant. Since this work was published, the " Factory Acts' Extension Act " of i867
has extended the provisions of those Acts to all establishments which employ fifty persons; and the " Workshop Regulation Act" of the same year, has carried the protection of the law into the precincts'of " any room or place whatever in which any handicraft is carried on." Nay more, it extends that protection even to children who are
working, not for wages at all, but only " under a parent." The principle of " State
interference " is here carried to its utmost length. It is characteristic of the cautious
and tentative character of English Legislation that it becomes gradually committed to
great general principles, not through any perception of the truth and value of those
principles in the abstract, but gradually, and through the compulsion of particular
necessities. And to the last possible moment the general application of such principles is always resisted. But no argument can be used in favor of compulsory education, as regards children in " workshops," which is not equally applicable to all children whatever.




LAW IN POLITICS.                  2I7
principle on which it rests. Nor is there among a large section
of Politicians any adequate appreciation of the powerful influence it has had in improving the physical condition of the people, and securing their contentment with the Laws under which
they live.
When, however, we think for a moment of the frightful nature
of the evils which this Legislation has checked, and which to a
large extent it has remedied-when we recollect the inevitable
connection between suffering and political disaffection-when
we consider the great moral laws which were being trodden under foot from mere thoughtlessness and greediness —we shall
be convinced that if, during the last fifty years, it has been given
to this country to make any progress in Political Science, that
progress has been in nothing happier than in the Factory Legislation. The names of those who strove for it, and through
whose faith and perseverance it was ultimately carried, are, and
ever will be, in the history of Politics, immortal names.  No
Government and no Minister has ever done a greater-perhaps,
all things considered, none has ever done so great a service.
It was altogether a new era in Legislation-the adoption of a
new principle-the establishment of a new idea.  Nor is that
principle and that idea even now thoroughly understood. The
promptings of individual self-interest are still relied upon for the
accomplishment of good which it does not belong to them even to
suggest, and which they can never be trusted to pursue. Proposals for legislative interference with a view to arrest some of
the most frightful evils of Society, are still constantly opposed,
not by careful analysis of their tendency, but by general assertions of Natural Law as opposed to all legislation of the kind.
" You cannot make men moral by Act of Parliament "-such
is a common enunciation of Principle, which, like many others
of the same kind, is in one sense a truism, and in every other
sense a fallacy.  It is true that neither wealth, nor health, nor
knowledge, nor morality, can be given by Act of Parliament.
But it is also true that the acquisition of one and of all of these
can be impeded and prevented by bad laws, as well as aided
and encouraged by wise and appropriate legislation.
There is no doctrine in Physics more certainly true than this
doctrine in Politics-that every practice which the authority of




2I8                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
Society recognizes or supports has its own train of consequences
which, for evil or for good, can be modified or changed in
an infinite variety of degrees according as that sanction is given
or withheld. Innumerable illustrations of this truth will arise,
wherever we take the trouble to trace any social or political
phenomena through the sequences of cause and effect from
which they come.  Not unfrequently these illustrations are of a
melancholy kind, and give us much to think of respecting the
better understanding and the better management of our complicated nature. Thus, for example, there seems good reason to believe there is a direct relation between the amount of life and
property annually sacrificed by shipwreck, and the legislation
which recognizes and sanctions Insurance to the full amount
of the value of ship and cargo. The cause of this is obvious.
Care for life is less eager and less wakeful than care for property.
This is true even when men are dealing equally with their own
property, and with their own lives. It is still more true when
they are dealing not only with property which is their own, but
with lives which belong to others. The inevitable effect of such
Insurance is therefore to relax the motives of self-interest, which
are the strongest incitements to precaution.*  Similar results
appear in a thousand other cases, both of laws still existing,
and of laws which have been repealed. The conduct of men depends on the balance of motives which are brought to bear upon
them.  In supplying those motives, external conditions and
mental character act and react upon each other. Both of these
can be affected, and affected powerfully, by Positive Institution.
The restraints of Positive Institution are not, however, the
only means,-very often they are not the best means by which
to lighten the overpowering pressure of particular motives upon
the individual Will.  For as the Reason and the Conscience of
the whole Political Community can interfere by the exercise of
authority, so also may adequate remedies be found in the reason
and the conscience of Voluntary Societies. The external conditions which tell upon the individual Will are themselves very
often nothing but conditions depending on the aggregate Will
* A curious and instructive Paper upon this subject has been published by Mr. Ed.
win Chadwick, having been read before a recent meeting of the Social Science Asso
ciation.




LAW IN POLITICS.                 219
of those around us; and if upon them, by any means, new motives can be brought to bear, then the whole of those external
conditions may be changed. The language which is used in the
name of Economic Science constantly involves in this matter
the same fallacy which has already been pointed out in the language used in the name of Physical Science. It is often said
that the conduct and condition of men are governed by invariable laws; and the conclusion is that the evils which arise by
way of natural consequence out of the action of those laws, are
evils against which the struggles of the Will are hopeless. But
the facts on which this conclusion is founded, are, as usual, inaccurately stated. The conditions of human life and conduct,
like the conditions of all natural phenomena, are never governed
by those separate and individual forces which alone are invariable, but always by combinations among those forces-which
combinations are of endless variety, and of endless capability
of change. Different motives arise out of the inborn gifts of
character, and out of the conditions of external circumstance.
It is true, indeed, that there are in the mind of Man, as there
are in Nature, certain forces originally implanted, which are un.
changeable in this sense, that they have an invariable tendency
to determine conduct in a particular direction. But as in Nature we have a power of commanding her elementary forces by
the methods of adjustment, so in the Realm of Mind we can
operate on the same principle, by setting one motive to counteract another: and by combination among many motives, we
can influence in a degree, and to an extent as yet unknown,
the conduct and the condition of Mankind.
Nor are the resources of Contrivance limited to adjustment
among the motives which arise only out of existing conditions.
New motives can be evoked and put in action by the adopting
of appropriate means. The mere founding, for example, of a
Voluntary Society for any given purpose, evolves out of the
primary elements of human character a latent force of the most
powerful kind; namely, the motive-the sentiment-the feeling
-the passion as it often is, of the Spirit of Association. This
is a passion which defies analysis.  The cynic may reduce
it to a form of selfishness-and undoubtedly the identification
of the interests and the desires of Self with the Society for




220                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
which this passion is conceived, lies at its very root and is of
its very essence. It is true, also, that it is a passion so powerful as to need strong control-without which control it generates some of the very meanest emotions of the heart. Out
of it there has come, and there comes again and again from age
to age, a spirit of hatred even against good itself, when that
good is the work of any one who " followeth not us." It is a
force, nevertheless, rooted in the Nature of Man, implanted
there as part of;ts constitution, and like all others of this character, given him  for a purpose, and having its own legitimate
field of operation. Nor is that field a narrow one. The spirit
of Association is the fountain of much that is noblest in human
character, and of much that is most heroic in human conduct.
For all the desires and aspirations of Self are not selfish. The
interests of Self, justly appreciated and rightly understood, may
be, nay indeed must be, the interests also of other men-of
Society-of Country-of the Church, and of the World.
And so it is that when the aim of any given Association is a
high aim, directed to ends really good, and seeking the attainment of them by just methods of procedure, the spirit it evokes
becomes itself a new " Law "-a special force operating powerfully for good on the mind of every individual subject to its influence. Some pre-existing motives it modifies-some it neutralizes-some it suppresses altogether-some it compels to
work in new directions, But in all cases the Spirit of Association is in itself a power-a force-a Law in the Realm of Mind.
What it can do, and what it cannot do, in affecting the conditions of Society, is a problem not to be solved so easily and so
summarily as some dogmatists in political philosophy would
have us to believe. It is a question which, like so many others,
is not likely to be solved by abstract reasoning without the help
of actual experiment.  And this experiment is being tried.
The instincts of men, truer often than the conclusions of philosophy, have rebelled against the doctrine that they are the
sport of circumstances. Yet finding by hard experience that
this is often true of the individual Will when standing by
itself, they have resolved to try whether it is equally true of
the Collective Will, guided by the spirit and strengthened under the discipline of Association. Hence the phenomena of




LAW IN POLITICS.                 2 2 
Combination as a means of affecting the condition of laborphenomena so alarming to many minds, and certainly so well
deserving of attention.  Let us look for a moment at the important illustrations of the Reign of Law which these phenomena afford.
A moment's consideration will convince us that the same
necessities of labor which were found to determine so fatally
the condition of women and children, are necessities Which
apply without any abatement to the labor of adult men. They
must be subject to the same pressure of inducements.  Nay,
more, it is only through them that this pressure can reach the
women who are their wives, and the children who are their
children. If overpowering motives did not equally determine
the conduct and condition of adult men, no legislation would
have been required for the protection of their families. If a
man is placed under such conditions that he cannot save his
wife and child from exhausting labor, it is certain that the same
conditions will impose a like necessity upon himself. Nevertheless, Parliament has resolutely and wisely refused to interfere on his behalf. And why? Because the argument is that
the adult man is able, or ought to be able, to defend himself.
And so he can; but how? Only by combination. The "law"
which results in excessive labor is the law of competition-that
is, it is the attraction exerted upon the Wills of a multitude
of individual men by the rewards of labor. The pressure of
this attraction can only be lightened by bringing those Wills
under the power of counter motives, which may induce them to
postpone, to some higher interest, the immediate appetites of
gain. And this is the work which Combination does. It comes
in the place of Positive Institution. Those who are under it
" are a Law unto themselves."
Nor is it unimportant to observe that what Combination
does for the protection of labor, it does better, and with better
consequences, than Positive Institution can ever do. Men are
driven to excessive labor, because if they don't work excessively, others will. But it is the effect of Combination that
others won't. Under Positive Institution they are not allowed.
Under Combination they are determined not.  And as the
forming of an intelligent resolution, and the abiding by it, are




222                THE REIGN  OF LAW.
higher exercises of mind than the mere passive obedience
to authority, so is the good effected by Combination a higher
good than that resulting from Factory Legislation. It tends
to form  and to strengthen character.  It tends to subordinate the present to the future, and the temporary interests of
Self to the permanent welfare of a Brotherhood of men. And
this it tends to do in classes otherwise prone to follow only
the impulse of the moment, and to consider only the apparent
interests of the individual.
These considerations should disabuse our minds of the unjust and unreasonable prejudice against the principle of Combination which still betrays itself so strongly in the language of
many politicians. When the Working Classes combine for the
protection of their own labor against the effects of unrestricted
competition, they are simply taking that course which is recommended alike by reason and by experience. It is the course
which Parliament has indicated as the right course both by
what it has itself done, and by what it has declined to do. Nor
can there be any greater mistake than to suppose that this
course involves necessarily any rebellion against the laws of
economic science. Combination is an appeal to the most
fundamental of all Natural Laws —to  the law of Contrivance-to the power of Adjustment-wielding, through Reason
and Conscience, the elementary forces of Human Character.
Of the constancy and " invariability " of these no doubt or denial is involved. Rather the reverse. It is upon instinctive
trust in that constancy that all social and political Contrivance rests.  And so we need not be surprised to find that,
through the organized efforts of communities of men, the
evils which arise by way of natural consequence out of the
helplessness and thoughtlessness of the individual Will, are
evils which to a large extent can be met and overcome.
But though all this is true, universally, of the principle of
Combination, it is vary far from being true, universally, of the
particular purposes to which Combination is applied. All the
sources of error which have so long perverted Legislation, are
equally powerful in perverting the aims, and in misdirecting the
efforts of Voluntary Association. If the upper classes, with all
the advantages of leisure, and of culture, and of learning,




LAW IN POLITICS.                223
have been so unable, as we have seen them to be, to measure
the effect of the laws they made, how much more must we expect errors and misconceptions of the most grievous kind to
beset the action of those who-through poverty and ignorance,
and often through much suffering-have been able to do little
more than strike blindly against evils whose pressure they could
feel, but whose root and remedy they could neither see nor
understand?
Accordingly, the history of Combination among the Working
Classes has, until a very recent period, been a sad history of
misdirected effort-of strength put forth only in violence and
disorder, and of the virtues of Brotherhood lost in tyrannical
suppression of all individual freedom.  Its heaviest blows
have been often aimed at the most powerful agencies for good.
One of the very earliest forms of Combination has been that
which was directed against the introduction and improvements
of machinery. The Working Classes have always encountered
with jealousy and fear those triumphs of Mechanical Invention
whose function it is to economize labor and to multiply the
fruits of industry, It would be hard to blame them. What
class is there which can say with truth that they have themselves
been able always to follow with intelligent foresight the links
of Natural Consequence through the darkness into which they
so often lead? For almost every great step in the advance of
civilization plunges at first through some passage which seems
dangerous, or at least obscure. The happiest achievements of
Contrivance have their own aspects of apparent danger, and
their own real incidents of temporary evil. Every new machine
displaces and disorganizes pre-existing forms of labor; and we
have seen that, even in its ultimate effects, the advance of
Mechanical Invention developed new dangers to the Working
Classes-dangers only to be avoided by measures which were
not taken, and by precautions which were not adopted.
It would be well if, from the past convicted errors, both of
Legislation and of Combination, we could extract some conclusions of general principle capable of helping us in the
difficulties of our own time. In looking at the root of those
errors, it would seem that, in order to avoid them, two things
are necessary-first, unshaken faith in great Natural Laws;




224                THE REIGN OF LAW.
and, secondly, a faith not less assured in the free agency of
Man to secure by appropriate means the working of those laws
for good. Thus, the love of gain is an instinct implanted in
the human mind, and the endeavor to suppress it has always
been the violation of a Natural Law. In like manner, Mechanical Invention is a Law of Nature in the highest and strictest
sense. The power of it and the love of it are among the
elementary forces of human character. Each fresh exertion
of it is, and must be, according to the constitution and course
of Nature-leading to higher and higher fulfilments of the
original Purpose of Man's Creation, which was, that he should
not only inhabit the Earth, as the beasts inhabit it, but that he
should subdue it.
So also combination is natural to Man. The desire for it
and the need of it, grow with the growth of knowledge and
with the increasing complications of Society. It has now, for
the most part, emerged from the stage of rude ignorance which
led to the breaking of machinery. It is conducted, comparatively at least, with high intelligence, and aims for the most
part at legitimate objects of desire. Yet in the rebellion which
has been roused against the doctrines of Necessity, founded on
false conceptions of Invariable Law, there is a constant danger
lest the Spirit of Association should attempt to act against
Nature instead of acting with it. There is, for example, a Law
-an  observed order of facts-in respect to Man, which the
working Classes too often forget, but which can neither be
violated nor neglected with impunity. That Law is the Law of
inequality —the various degrees in which the gifts both of Body
and of Mind are shared among men. This is one of the most
fundamental facts of human nature. Nor is it difficult to see
how it should be also one of the most beneficent. But it is a
fact against which the spirit of combination is very aptto
assume an attitude of permanent insurrection. It is, of course,
the business and the function of Combination to subordinate in
some things the Individual to the Class; and the temptation is
to make that subordination exclusive and complete.  Hence
the jealousy so often shown of wages measured by the amount
of work performed. This is a jealousy of the superiority of
reward which is naturally due to superiority of power, of indus



LAW' I-4' POLITTICS.                   225
try, or of skill.  But these are things which God has joined together, and which no man or combination of men have a right
to put asunder.  It is a marriage made in the morning of the
world, and in every step of human progress we see its blessing
and its fruit. If it be stupid to break machines and to proscribe Mechanical Invention, it is not less stupid to be jealous
of this primeval adjustment between the varying energies of
human character and the varying results which they are competent to attain.
This is not the place to enter in detail on the difficult and
complicated question as to the limits within which Combinations can, and beyond which they cannot, affect the rewards of
labor. They have certainly succeeded in limiting the hours
of labor in cases where Legislation could not well have interfered; * and wherever the hours of labor are reduced without a
corresponding reduction in wages, a substantial economic advantage is unquestionably secured. Equal confidence is expressed
by many Associations, that as a matter of experience and of fact,
they have succeeded in establishing higher rates of wages than
would have accrued under the system of unrestricted competition. This may very well be true. It is a truth which casts no
doubt whatever on the invariability of Economic Laws when
these are rightly understood. They are invariable in the same
sense, and in no other, in which all other Natural Laws are invariable. That is to say, they represent tendencies in human
character determined by motives, which tendencies are constant, and may surely be relied on as producing always, under
like conditions, their own appropriate effects.  It is upon this
constancy that Combination must rely for any power it can
ever have; and it is the same constancy in the action of
specific motives which sets bounds to the power of Combination, beyond which it can never pass. The same motive which
impels the Workman to secure an adequate reward for his
* Of this the Baking Trade is a good example. The hours of adult labor in this
trade, under the effects of unrestricted competition, had come to be most injurious
and oppressive. In Glasgow and in Edinburgh this condition of things has been
effectually remedied by a Combination, whose exertions were successful, without (I
believe) resort being ever had to the extreme measure of a Strike. The Baking Trade
in London is still afflicted by the same oppressive hours of labor, because of the
difficulty which has hitherto been experienced in organizing there any Combination
equally complete
IS




226                THE REIGN OF LAW.
labor, impels the Manufacturer or the Trader to secure an
adequate reward for his capital, his knowledge, and his skill.
And although the desire of gain is not the only motive, and is
often not the strongest motive, which impels men to persevere
in enterprises once begun, yet if Combinations of Workmen
should attempt to raise wages so high as to trench upon the
minimum rate of profit which will induce men to carry on any
given trade, then by a natural consequence, not less certain than
any other, capital and enterprise and skill will be withdrawn
from that trade, and those who depend upon it will be the first
to suffer. Short, however, of this extreme result, there is
generally a margin of ground upon which Combination may
act with mnore or less effect. It may prevent arbitrary or
capricious changes; and as there are practically many impediments in the way of men moving their capital from one employment to another, Combination may compel them to submit to
lower rates of profit than would otherwise content them if those
difficulties did not exist.
But to all these possibilities of influence there is a limit in the
nature of things-in Natural Laws-that is, in the new motives
which are brought into operation by new conditions. What that
limit is, it must always be difficult to determine except by actual
experiment. It is enough here to observe that in this, as in
every other department of human conduct, men are being led
gradually to a knowledge of the truth by the teachings of Natural Consequence. It is by the experience of actual results that
we are taught both as to the objects which are legitimate objects
of desire, and as to the proper methods by which these may be
attained. The very attempt of the Working Classes to govern
through Combination their own affairs, and to determine their
own condition, is an Education in itself. On the extended scale
in which that attempt is being made, it must accustom them to
consider great general causes, and to estimate the manner and
the degree in which these can be effected by the methods of
Adjustment. Last, not least, it must lead them to study and to
recognize the moral duties which are indeed the most fundamental of all Natural Laws. For it ought to be remembered,
that the first and most important object of Combinations is one
against which there can be no opposition founded on the doc,




LAW IN POLITICS.                227
trines of Economic Science. That object is to secure for the
Working Classes those provisions against misfortune, sickness,
accident, and age, which are amongst the first duties of all organized societies of men. How far through such agency the
causes of pauperism may be successfully attacked, is a question
on which we are only entering. In like manner, the conditions
and limitations under which Combination may succeed in blending the functions and in uniting the profits of Capital and of
Labor-this also is a question to be determined by Natural
Laws, not yet fully explored or understood.  But enough is
known, and results sufficiently determinate have already been
secured, to convince us that in this great department of Natural
Law, as in every other, the Will of Man is not powerless when
its energies are directed by wisdom, and when the choice of its
methods is founded upon knowledge.
This is, indeed, the great lesson to be learnt from every in
quiry into the constitution and course of things. Nature is a
great Armory of weapons, and implements, for the service and
the use of Will.  Many of them are too ponderous for Man to
wield. He can only look with awe on the tremendous Forces
which are everywhere seen yoked under the conditions of Adjustment-on the smoothness of their motions,-on the magnitude and the minuteness, on the silence and the perfection, of
their work. But there are also many weapons hung upon the
walls which lend themselves to human hands-lesser tools which
Man can use. He cannot alter or modify them in shape or
pattern-in quality, or in power. The fashion of them and the
nature of them are fixed forever. These are, indeed, invariable.
Only if we know how to use them, then that use is ours. Then
also the lesser contrivances which we can set in motion are ever
found to work in perfect harmony with the vaster mechanisms
which are moving overhead.  And as in the material world no
effort gives so fully the sense of work achieved as the subjugation of some Natural Force under the command of Will, so in
the world of Mind no triumphs of the Spirit arc happier than
those by which some natural tendency of Humain Character is
led to the accomplishment of a purpose which is wise and good.
It is for the gaining of these triumphs that Man has been gifted
with the desire of Knowledge, and with the sense of Right,




?28               THE REIGrN OF LAW.
and with the faculties of Contrivance. In such triumphs lie the
aim and purpose of all Natural Laws-for these they were all
established-for these they all work, whether by way of encouragement, or of restraint, or of retribution.
Nothing is more striking in the history of Discovery than the
ages during which men have been blind to the suggestions of
Natural Law-suggestions which now appear so obvious that
we wonder how the interpretation of them could have been
missed so long. It is very easy to feel this wonder concerning
others; it is much more difficult to remember that the same wonder will certainly be felt concerning ourselves. Such as we now
see to have been the position of former generations in respect
to things which they failed to understand,-such, we may depend upon it, is precisely our own position in regard to innumerable phenomena now constantly passing before our eyes. We
may be sure of this; and we ought to be as glad of it as we are
sure. For the world is not so prosperous or so happy as that we
should readily or willingly believe in the exhaustion of the means
which are at our disposal for its better guidance. Especially in
the great Science of Politics, which investigates the complicated
forces whose action and reaction determine the condition of Organized Societies of men, we are still standing, as it were, only
at the break of day. Our command over the external elements
of Nature is, beyond all comparison, in advance of our command over the resources of Human Character.
Special causes retard the progress of knowledge in this department of inquiry. Many problems so difficult and intricate
that they never can be solved except by patient observation, patient thought, and yet more patient action, are as yet hardly
recognized to be problems at all. We look on the facts of Nature and of human life through the dulled eyes of Custom and
Traditional Opinion.  And when some misery worse than
others forces itself upon the acknowledgment of the world, men
are slow to discover or admit their own power over the sources
whence such miseries come to be. That which is needed to
open our eyes to such questions, is not mere intellectual power.
Rarer and finer qualities have this work to do. Among the characteristics of the individual men who have exerted the most
powerful influence for good on the condition of Society, no




LAW IN POLITICS.                 229
quality has been more remarkable than a certain natural openness and simplicity of mind. Readiness to entertain, willingness to accept, and enthusiasm to pursue, a new idea, have always been among the most fruitful gifts of genius.
Is it vain to hope that the thoughtfulness and candor which
have been the natural inheritance of a few, may yet be more
common among all educated men? The whole constitution and
course of things would receive an earlier fulfilment did we carry
about with us an habitual belief in the inexhaustible treasures
which it holds-in the power of the agencies which it offers to
Knowledge and Contrivance. For then the results of Natural
Consequence would be accepted for that which they teach, and
not simply submitted to for that which they inflict. The disorders of Society would not so often be supinely regarded as the
result of inevitable laws, but would be seen as the fruit always
of some ignorance or of some rebellion; and so the exhilarating
conviction would be ours, that those disorders are within the
reach of remedy through larger Knowledge and a better Will.
We hear much now of the " blessed light of Science," " and
if the methods and conditions of Physical inquiry were applied
in a really philosophical spirit to Spiritual Phenomena, the influence of Science for good would be more powerful than it is.
Meanwhile it is well to remember that although readiness to accept a new idea is essential to Discovery, it is equally true that
new dangers beset and surround all new aspects of the truth.
Paradoxical as it may sound to say so, this is a consequence of
the splendor of Man's endowments, of his freedom from direction,-of the swiftness and the subtlety of his mental powers.
On her own narrow path Instinct is a surer guide than Reason,
and accordingly it is often the higher faculties of the mind
which are the most misleading. The Speculative Faculty is impatient of waiting upon Knowledge, and is ever as busy and as
ingenious in finding out new paths of error as in supplying new
interpretations of the truth. Hence in Philosophy the most
extravagant errors have been constantly associated with the
happiest intuitions, and it has remained for the successors of
great men in another generation to separate their discoveries
from their delusions. Hence also in Politics the great move* See a remarkable passage in the concluding pages of " Ecce iHolQ,"




230                 THE REIGN OF LAW.
ments of Society have seldom been accomplished without rais
ing many false interpretations of the Past, and many extravagant anticipations of the Future.*  It cannot, indeed, be said
with truth that the calamities of Nations have generally arisen
from too great play being given to novel or theoretical conclusions. Rather the reverse. They have arisen, for the most
part, from too little attention being paid to the progress of opinion, and to the insensible development of new conditions.
The question has been often raised, whether there is any law
of growth, of progress, and of decay prevailing over Nations,
as over individual Organisms.  Whatever the solution of this
question may be, it is certain that some causes are no longer in
existence which produced-not indeed the corruption, but —the
final overthrow of the great historical Nations of Antiquity.
The epoch of conquering Races destroying the Governments,
and reconstructing the Populations of the World, is an epoch
whichl has passed away. Whatever causes there may be now of
political decline are causes never brought to such rough detection, and never ending in catastrophes so complete. Yet, in
modern days a condition of stagnation and decline has been
the actual condition of many Political Societies for long periods
of time. It is a condition prepared always by ignorance or
neglect of some moral or economic laws, and determined by
long-continued perseverance in a corresponding course of conduct. Then the laws which have been neglected assert themselves, and the retributions they inflict are indeed tremendous.
In the last generation, and in our own time, the Old and the
New Worlds have each afforded memorable examples of the
Reign of Law over the course of Political events. Institutions
maintained against the natural progress of Society have " foundered amidst fanatic storms." Other institutions upheld and
cherished against justice, and humanity, and conscience, have
yielded only to the scourge of War.
It is in the wake of such convulsions that reactions of opinion
so often sweep over the Htuman Mind, as hurricanes sweep
over the surface of the Sea. But whatever new forms of error
are begotten of reaction, it is a comfort to believe that there
* "Nos pares en I789 ont &t6 condamn6s a passer des perspectives du Paradis aux
scenes de l'lnfer,"-Guizot, " L'Eglise et la Societ6," o. 2,s.




LAW IN POLITICS.                  231
are always some steps gained which are never lost. No man
can look back on the history of modern civilization without seeing that it presents the phenomena of development and growth.
Nor can it be doubted, surely, that whatever may be the decline
of particular Communities, the progress of mankind, on the
whole, is a progress to higher and better things. And if this
be true, no particular exceptions should shake our faith in the
general rule that all safe progress depends on timely recognition
being given to the natural developments of Thought. They
can never be resisted in the end, and they are most liable to
take erroneous directions when they are resisted long. For
this is among the most certain of all the laws of Man's nature
-that his conduct will in the main be guided by his moral and
intellectual convictions.  "All human society IS grounded on a
system of fundamental opinions." Such is the Law arrived at
by the newest of modern Philosophies,* and it would be well if
all its discoveries were as near the truth. This is the Law to
which Christianity appeals, and in which its very roots are laid,
when it asserts, as no other Religion has ever asserted, the
power and virtue of Belief. And in this Law lies the error
which those commit who imagine they can hold by the Ethics
of Christianity, whilst regarding with comparative indifference
its History and its Creed. This, too, is the Law which lends
all their importance to the speculations of Philosophy. False
conceptions of the truth, in apparently the most distant provinces of Thought, may and do relax the most powerful springs
of action. Among these false conceptions of the truth, none
are now more prevalent than those which concern the definition, and the function and the power of "Law."  Instead of
regarding the Constancy of Nature as incompatible with the
energies of Will, we must learn to see in it the most powerful
stimulus to inquiry, and the most cheering encouragement to
exertion.
The superstition which saw in all natural phenomena the action of capricious Deities was not more irrational than the superstition which sees in them nothing but the action of Invariable Law. Men have been right and not wrong, when they saw
in the facts of Nature the Variability of Adjustment even more
t " The Positive Philosophy of Aug. Comte," by J. S. Mill, p. oI.,




232                THE REIGN OF LAW.
clearly and more surely than they saw the Constancy of Force,
They were right when they identified these phenomena with the
phenomena of Mind. They were right when they regarded
their own faculty of Contrivance as the nearest and truest analogy by which the Constitution of the Universe can be conceived
and its order understood. They were right when they regarded
its arrangements as susceptible of Change, and when they
looked upon a change of Will as the efficient cause of other
changes without number and without end. It was well to feel
this by the force of Instinct; it is better still to be sure of it in
the light of Reason. It is an immense satisfaction to know
that the result of Logical Analysis does but confirm the testimony of Consciousness, and run parallel with the primeval
Traditions of Belief. It is an unspeakable comfort that when
we come to close quarters with this vision of Invariable Law
seated on the Throne of Nature, we find it a phantom and a
dream —a mere nightmare of ill-digested  Thought, and of
"God's great gift of speech abused."  We are, after all, what
we thought ourselves to be. Our freedom is a reality, and not
a name. Our faculties have in truth the relations which they
seem to have to the Economy of Nature. Their action is a
real and substantial action on the Constitution and Course of
things. The Laws of Nature were not appointed by the great
Lawgiver to baffle His creatures in the sphere of Conduct, still
less to confound them in the region of Belief. As parts of an
Order of things too vast to be more than partly understood,
they present, indeed, some difficulties which perplex the intellect, and a few also, it cannot be denied, which wring the heart.
But, on the whole, they stand in harmonious relations with the
Human Spirit. They come visibly from One pervading Mind,
and express the authority of one enduring Kingdom. As regards the moral ends they serve, this, too, can be clearly seen,
that the- purpose of all Natural Laws is best fulfilled when they
are made, as they can be made, the instruments of intelligent
Will, and the servants of enlightened Conscience.




NOTES.
NOTE A.-PAGE 28.
THE article by Mr. Wallace in the Joutrlza[ of Science (No. XVI.) for Oct.
i867, on " Creation by Law," implies much misconception of the whole
drift and aim of the observations I have made on Mr. Darwin's " Theory
of the Origin of Species."
Two separate questions arise in respect to that Theory:Ist. Does it adequately explain the Physical Agencies by which pew
Forms have come to be?
2d. Does it, even if successful in this explanation, supplant or impair the
argument for Purpose and Design, as founded both on the results and on
the methods of Creation?
Of these questions, which are entirely distinct, the last is by far the most
important of the two: and this second question is the one which I have
chiefly dealt with in the " Reign of Law." As regards the first question,
indeed, I have indicated my opinion that the explanation of Physical
Agencies is very far from being complete, and that the hypothesis can
always be driven back to some starting point where the very condition of
things is assumed for which the theory professes to account. In this edition,
and in answer to Mr. Wallace's challenge, I have added some farther indication of the difficulties which remain unsolved, and indeed untouched.
But my main argument has been addressed to the second question, and
has been aimed chiefly at this conclusion-that even supposing the theory
to be established, so far as it can go, it cannot affect or disturb the inseparable relation which exists between the intricate adjustments of Nature
and Mental Purpose-as their sole conceivable origin and cause. In respect to this argument, Mr. Wallace virtually admits all I have maintained,
when he says, " It is simply a question of how the Creator has worked." *
I have said nothing of "incessant interference," of "continual re-arrangement of details," or of " the directaction of the Mind and Will of the Creator."
On the contrary, I have said that no purpose is ever attained in Nature
except by the enlistment of Laws as the means and instruments of
attainment; t that although Law "is never present as a master, it appears
never to have been absent as a servant," $ that we have " no certain reason
to believe that God ever works otherwise than through the use of means; "
4 Journal of Science, p. 473.  t P. Ioo.                   T P. 208.




234                            NOTES.
or, in other words, through the instrumentality of those elementary forces
or properties of matter and of mind which we call " Laws."  The idea of
"incessant interference," is one which I hold to be essentially erroneous.
It involves the idea of natural forces being agencies altogether external to,
and independent of, the Creative Mind. This is the very idea to which
Mr. Wallace himself gives expression in its extremest form, when he limits the
function of the Creator to that of so co-ordinating general laws "alt tlhe first
uiltroductior. of life upon the earth," -* as that they shall work "of necessity " and " by themselves " the results we see. This is unquestionably the
way in which they appear to us to work. It remains true that " no man hath
seen God at any time." But even this conception does not make the word
"contrivance " (to which Mr. Wallace objects) less applicable to the adjustments of nature. On the contrary, it makes it more strictly and literally
applicable than any other conception, because it likens the creative process
more closely to those methods adopted by human ingenuity, to which the
word contrivance specially refers. The highest efforts of that ingenuity are
precisely those in which natural forces are made to work "' necessarily " and
" by themselves."  Self-acting machines are the most ingenious machines of
all. The self-action of the " governor " in a Steam-engiine is the most beautiful of the contrivances by which the elementary expansive force of steam
is made to do the work of Will. Mr. Wallace thinks it " an extraordinary
idea to imagine the Creator of the Universe contrivinzg the various complicated parts of an Orchis, as a mechanic might contrive an ingenious toy orpuzzle." t But this is precisely the idea he himself supports, when he reduces the Creator's work to the first starting of the forces of organic life,
and to the foresih/zt merely of the consequences which must naturally and
necessarily arise from their first co-ordination, This is an accurate description of the method in which a mechanic contrives the most ingenious selfoperating machines. No doubt the idea of Omnipresence, which is the
distinctive idea of God's work as distinguished from Man's work, is an idea
which it is difficult for us to grasp or to keep steadily in view. I do not
deny or dispute that " self-action " is and must be the aspect in which Nature
presents herself to us. It could not be otherwise, unless the Invisible
were to become the object of sight and touch. But in proportion as we
appreciate the infinite intricacy of Natural Adjustments, in the same proportion do we estimate the impossibility of conceiving them as the result
of Mechanical Necessity, which indeed is an inadequate explanation even
of our own methods of operation upon the material world.
Mr. Wallace's article is an excellent example of the arguments used in
support of the Darwinian theory, both in their strength and in their weakness. Their strength lies in the hold they have of the idea and of the fact
that nature is one vast system of Invisible Forces in a condition of mutual
adjustment. Their weakness lies in the idea that the methods of that
adjustment can ever be explained as the result of mechanical necessity, or
of the mere elementary properties of matter working " by themselves."
* Journal of Science, p. 474.                                 t Ibid,




NOTES.                            235
NOTE B.-PAGE 51.
Although the distinction I have made between Purpose as a general inference, and Purpose as a particular fact, is a distinction which seems to
me to be clear enough when it is pointed out; yet it may be well to
give some further illustrations here which could not be conveniently added
to the text. What Positivists profess to insist upon is, that in describing a
scientific fact, we shall not import into it ideas which it does not necessarily involve, and which are in the nature of inferences from the fact.
What we, their opponents, have an equal right to insist on is this-that in
describing scientific facts, the description must not exclude any of the ideas
which the facts do involve, and that the full and adequate description of
those facts be not evaded in order to keep out an idea which the describer
may choose to call an inference. Let us take an illustration. Let us suppose that we find a tube placed anyhow in such a position that we can look
through it to the sky at night. We do so, and we see a star. The facts
may be such that this description fully exhausts them. That the tube was
intended to bear upon' that particular star, or upon any star, would be a
mere inference. But now let us suppose that, when we look again after some
considerable interval of time, we find that the tube still bears upon the
same star, and let us further suppose the same experiment repeated with
the same result during some hours, then we should not describe the fact
fully by simply stating that the tube bore upon the star. It would be necessary, in order to exhaust the facts, to say that the tube was so adjusted as
toJfizow the apparent motion of the sidereal heavens, and so to counteract
the natural effects of the earth's motion as to keep its axis always upon the
same star. Here instantly we have the language of intention, because the
idea of intention is inseparable from the facts. We might know nothing of
the method by which this adjustment is achieved-nothing more of the
Mind that had devised the method than the bare fact of the intention.
But that bare fact is an essential part of the observed phenomena.  And
the same argument applies to the mechanism-if that also were discovered
-by which the adjustment is effected between the axis of the tube and the
apparent motion of the star. That mechanism could not be fully described
unless it were described as a mechanism so contrived as to brinzg about the
adjustment which is actually effected.
Take again another case, from the organic world. A calf, or any other
young animal, discovers by smell or by accident, the fact that milk is contained inside a skin or bag, and that, by applying its mouth or its tongue
to some opening, it can get at the milk. The whole fact in this case is
exhausted when we say that the calf gets the milk. It is no part of this
fact that the calf was intended to get it. But when a calf goes for milk to
its mother's udder-when the lacteal glands of the cow are recognized as
an apparatus for secreting that milk, and the teat for delivering it,-then
the facts are not exhausted, the scientific description is not complete or
truthful, unless we use language importing this adjustment of apparatus
to Purpose in the plan by which nourishment is afforded to the young in




236                            NOTES.
all mammalia. This idea cannot be expelled from science as a mere " inference," except on the same arguments of bad metaphysics, as I hold them
to be, by which also the existence of Matter and of an External World are
referred to the same category.
NOTE C.-PAGE 52.
In illustration of the assertion in the text, that the relations of Number,
which are the very basis of all " verifiable " knowledge, may be reduced by
similar arguments to mere creations of the Mind, I may here remind the
reader of the passage which relates to this subject in the famous argument
of Berkeley: —
"That number is entirely the creature of the mind, even though the other
qualities be allowed to exist without, will be evident to whoever considers
thi, the same thing bears a different denomination of number as the mind
views it with different respects. Thus the same extension is one, or three,
or thirty-six, according as the mind considers it with reference to a yard, a
foot, or an inch. Number is so visibly relative and dependent on men's
understanding, that it is strange to think how any one should give it an
absolute existence without the mind. We say one book, one page, one line;
all these are equally units, though some contain several of the others.
And in each instance it is plain the unit relates to some particular combination of ideas arbitrarily put together by the mind."-Prin. of Hum. YKzowl.,
Part I. ~ xii.
NOTE D.-PAGE 122.
Mr. Mill, in his " System of Logic " (Book I. c. iii., ~~ 6, 7, 8) has told us
that both of Bodies and of Minds, "philosophers have at length provided
us with a definition which seems unexceptionable."  As regards body, this
definition is-" The external cause, and (according to the more reasonable
opinion) the unknown external cause, to which we refer our sensations."
This definition, though very defective, is at least not erroneous. It is necessary, however, to observe that the word " unknown " cannot be accurately
predicated of that respecting which the very terms of the definition imply
that something is known. The definition of Body is the definition of that
which is known respecting it. Three things are involved in this definition, as
known respecting Body;-these are (I) Externality, (2) Extension, and (3)
Causation-that is to say, the power of causing or exciting sensations in
sentient beings. Or perhaps these three items of knowledge may be merged
in one-the knowledge of Force acting from outside upon us, and exciting
sensations in us. But this is knowledge. When the word " unknown"
therefore is inserted in the terms of the definition given by Mr. Mill, it can
only mean that other things still remain to be known respecting the nature
and properties of Body. In this sense-that is, when translated into " partially known "-no philosopher would deny the correctness of its application. The definition of both Body and Mind is given by Mr. Mill in another




NOTES.                            237
passage, which, also, so far as it goes, is unexceptionable. "As Body is
understood to be the mysterious something which excites the mind to feel,
so Mind is the mysterious something which feels and thinks."  The same
two fundamental ideas of Externality and Causation are here also implicitly
and inextricably involved. Mr. Mill adds that the farther discussion of this
question belongs not to Logic but to Metaphysics, to which science he
leaves it.
Two chapters, accordingly, in Mr. Mill's " Examination of Hamilton"
(xi. and xii.), are devoted to a discussion of the " Psychological Theory of
the Belief in an External World," and of the question how far the same
theory may or may not be also applicable to Mind. The conclusion to
which I have referred in the text is the conclusion defended in the first of
these chapters. It is the conclusion of a Pure Idealism-an Idealism much
more extreme than the theory of Berkeley. It is true that Berkeley denied
the existence of Matter as a thing apart from Mind-not, be it observed, as
a thing apart from our minrds, but as a thing apart from somne mind. But
fhis was only because he sublimed it into the action of another Spirit upon
our own. In his system the idea of Causation was tenaciously retained.
The very essence of his argument was that our ideas must have a cause" some cause whereon they depend, and which produces them and changes
them." As this cause could not be the ideas themselves (which ideas are
all that we know of matter), " it remained that the cause of Ideas is an
incorporeal active substance or spirit." * This argument is repeated in
several forms, as again where he says,? that men were "conscious that
they were not the authors of their own sensations, which they evidently
knew were imprintedfrom without, and which therefore must have some cause
distinct from the Minds on which they were imprinted."  But the
Psychological Theory of Mr. Mill involves all the weak points of the
Berkeleian theory with none of its strength. Mr. Mill's formula is expressly
framed so as to eliminate as much as possible the idea of Causation, and to
keep out of sight the connection which exists between our sensations and
that which excites them. The attempt, indeed, is not successful, because
Mr. Mill cannot express himself through many consecutive sentences without assuming the very ideas which he is trying to account for as a mere
product of more elementary conceptions. This has been shown clearly,
and with abundant illustration, in Dr. M'Cosh's " Examination of Mr. J. S.
Mill's Philosophy." Mr. Mill pleads upon this point that he must use
common lailguage, but that the whole of this language has its own special
meaning under the Psychological Theory as well as under the common
Realistic Theory. This may be true; but there are certain words which
must have the same meaning under all theories; and, in spite of his efforts,
he is compelled to employ words which show that neither he nor any one
else can maintain consistently a purely subjective conception of Matter,that is to say, a conception which dispenses with an external agency or
force. He says, that " almost all philosophers, who have narrowly exam* "Prin. of Hum. Know." ~ xxvi.
t Ibid. ~ Ivi.




238                           NOTES.
ined the subject, have decided that Substance need only be postulated as a
support for phenomena, or as a bond of connection to hold a group or series
of otherwise unconnected phenomena together. Mr. Mill goes on with
much simplicity: " Let us only then tzhik awzry the support, and suppose
the phenomena to remain, and to be held together in the same groups and
series by some other ag-ency, or without any agency but an internal lazw-and
every consequence follows without Substance, for the sake of which Substance is assumed.* The demand here made upon us, to "thzink away "
the support of phenomena is certainly made less formidable when, in the
next breath, we are told to think it back (aoain under another form of words
as " another agency," or as an " internal law."
The same vain attempt to get behind ultimate ideas may be traced in the
word "Permanent," with which Mr. Mill qualifies Matter considered as
"A Possibility of Sensation."  The new formula is "A Permanent Possibility of Sensation."  Why permanent?  Permanent means enduring. But
what has the element of Time to do with it? The percipient minds are not
permanent, so far as the sensations of their existing organism is concerned.
In what sense, then, are the " Possibilities of Sensation " permanent? What
is it that is described as permanent? Not the sensations-not the individual sentient beings. What then? Clearly the Power or Agency which
causes, or is capable of exciting sensations in organisms that are, or that
are to be. Here, then, we have the ideas of Externality and of Causation
brought back under the covering of Time.  "What is it we mean," asks
Mr. Mill, " when we say that the object we preceive is external to us, and
not a part of our own thoughts? The reply to this question, in the first
Edition, ran as follows: We mean that there is in oar perceptions something
which exists when we are not thinking of it, which existed before we ever
thought of it, and wzeozldexist zfwe were annihilated." In the recent Edition,
this reply has been altered so as to avoid the obvious absurdity of supposing
that things which are conceived to exist only in "our perceptions," could
nevertheless continue to exist "if we were annihilated." Accordingly the
reply now runs thus: " We mean that there is concerned in our perceptions,"
etc. Yes; but how concerned? As an exciting Force or producing Cause,
and in no other way. Similar observations apply to the word " Possibility,"
as applied in Mr. Mill's Psychological Theory. Possible can only mean
Potential. A Possibility of sensation must mean a Potential cause of sensation. And here, again, we have the same fundamental ideas involved in
the very language by which it is attempted to evade them.
Mr. Mill appears to me to be equally unsuccessful in starting fairly in
this Psychological Theory-that is to say, in the definition of postulates
which steer clear of involving the very ideas for which he professes to
account. His first postulate is that the Human Mind is capable of Expec.
tation. Certainly; but what does Expectation involve? It involves acts of
Memory, and of Comparison, and of Reason. In particular, it involves,
or at least he is not entitled to deny that it may involve, the intuitive
belief that actual sensations already experienced arose from an external
* Appendix to chaps. xi. and xii. "Mill on Hamilton," 6th ed. p. 246.




NOTES.                           239
cause, and that the same cause is capable of exciting them again. My belief
is that the mind cannot place itself in the attitude of expectation without
the presence of ideas which involve the whole question in dispute.
I am disposed, therefore, to agree with Mr. Mill, that the existence of an
external material world cannot be proved;-just in the same sense, and for
the same reason, that the proposition-" Things that are equal to the same
thing are equal to one another," cannot be proved.
Mr. Mill thinks that, though the existence of an external Material
world cannot be proved, an external Immaterial world can be provedthat is to say, the existence of other minds can be proved. I think he only
succeeds in showing that our belief in this existence can be confirmed by
corroborative evidence. But such corroboration and confirmation is equally
available in support of the belief in the existence of Matter, considered as
an External Cause of sensation. The truth is, our knowledge of other
minds is only reached through our previous knowledge of Matter, and of
the impressions it makes upon us. My own mind, as well as the mind of
all the beings around me, is, or seems to be, inseparably connected with a
Material Organization, and there are no manifestations of Mind which do
not come to me directly or indirectly through material signs.
Mr. Mill has often warned us, and I accept the warning, against the system of
discussing metaphysical questions, under the threat, as it were, that the conclusions to which we are opposed are inconsistent with some one or more Theological Beliefs. We know that the Ideal Theory, in the form at least which
it took in the hands of Berkeley, was put forward in the interests of Religion.
"The existence of matter, or bodies unperceived, has not only been the
main support of Atheists and Fatalists, but on the same principle doth
Idolatry likewise, in all its various forms, depend. Did men but consider
that the sun, moon, and stars, and every other object of the senses, are only
so many sensations in their own minds, which have no other existence but
barely being perceived, doubtless they would never fall down and worship
their own Ideas, but rather address homage to that Eternal Invisible
Mind which produces and sustains all things.' *  Such wvas the animating
principle of the Bishop of Cloyne's famous speculation. I confess I have
a profound distrust of all attempts to found the teachings of Faith upon the
principles of Scepticism. I amn not tempted, in order to escape the danger
of Materialism, to deny the existence of that, which I know by my own
structure, and by the structure of all around me, to be different from Mind.
I am content to understand the world as my own faculties have been coordinated with external things to reveal those things to me. I look in my
friend's face, and I see the expression of power, and of intellect, and of
goodness. These are attributes of Mind. I do not know how these attributes can be shown forth so evidently in the colors and in the lines of flesh
and blood. But I do not try to persuade myself that his hand or his face
are the same things, either with the perceptions which they excite in me,
or with the emotions which they express in him. I do not pretend to understand the nature of the connection between these Material Forms and
* "Prin. of Hum. Knowl." ~ xciv.




240                            NOTES.
the qualities of Mind. But after their own diverse kinds and measures
they are both equally " real " to me. I will not deceive myself by verbal
quibbles-pretending to be able to stand outside myself, and to prove by
reason that the very tools with which reason works are rotten in her hands.
There is but one sentence in these two chapters of Mr. Mill's work which
conveys any really important truth. In regard to the existence of Matter,
as well as in regard to the nature of Memory and of Mind, we may indeed
well say with him: " By far the wisest thing we can do is to accept the inexplicable facts, without any theory how it takes place; and when we are
obliged to speak of them in terms which assume a theory, to use them with
a reservation as to their meaning."
NOTE E.-PAGE I78.
When I wrote this passage in the text, I had not read a curious note by
Sir W. Hamilton in his edition of Reid's Works.*  It is almost droll in
its confession of the puzzling significance of such facts, in respect to animals, as those I have referred to. " Nothing in the compass of inductive
reasoning appears more satisfactory than Berkeley's Demonstration of the
necessity and manner of our learning, by a slow process of observation in
comparison alone, the connection between the perception of vision and
touch, and, in general, all that relates to the distance and real magnitude
of external things. But although the same necessity seems in theory equally
incumbent on the lower animals as on man, yet this theory is provokingly(!)
-and that by the most manifest experience-found totally at fault with
regard to them; for we find that all the animals who possess at birth the
power of regulated motion (and these are those only through whom the
truth of the theory can be brought to the test of a decisive experiment),
possess also from birth the whole apprehension of distance, etc., which they
are ever known to exhibit. The solution of this difference by a resort to
instinct is unsatisfactory; for instinct is in fact an occult principle-a kind
of natural revelation,-and the hypothesis of instinct, therefore, only a
confession of our ignorance: and at the same time, if instinct be allowed
in the lower animals, how can we determine whether and how far instinct
may not in like manner operate to the same result in man?
Well might Sir WV. Hamilton ask this question. It is one which Philosophers will find it hard to answer. My own conviction is that more than
half the "inductive reasoning " by which men have pretended to account
for their intuitive perceptions is altogether unsound. Man, besides being
man, is also an animal-and through his animal organization the mechanics
of his mind are to a large extent regulated on the same principles which
regulate the lower Intelligences around him-that is to say, by processes
unconsciously pursued. This is the proper definition of operations which
are Instinctive; and, as Sir W. Hamilton observes, they may best be conceived as the result of " Natural revelation."
* Vol. I. p. i82, note.




NOTES.                           241
NOTE F.-PAGE 181.
In the number of the Dublin Review for April, I867, there is an article on
"Science, Prayer, Free Will and Miracles." in which some portions of this
work are criticised. With much of that criticism I have every reason to be
satisfied. The main objection taken may be stated in two sentences. I
have said that (under certain limitations as to the meaning of the words) the
"abstract predictability of human conduct" may be admitted without
involving the denial of anything essential to the doctrine of Free Will.
Dr. Ward denounces this concession as absolutely fatal to that doctrine,
and maintains that in making such a concession, as well as in other more
direct forms of statement, my view comes to be " precisely identical with
Mr. Mill's," which, nevertheless, I am "professing" to oppose. This
position he proceeds to support by an elaborate argument, which I shall
here examine with all the care due to the gravity of the question raised,
and to the duty of using no language,upon such a subject which is not
justified by as much precision of thought as is attainable in regard to it.
As Dr. Ward speaks upon this subject with some warmth of feeling, perhaps I may explain at once that he is mistaken in supposing that I am "a
Calvinist," in the sense of holding "the Necessitarian Doctrine."  I hold
the doctrine of Free Will in the only sense in which it is to me intelligible.
I set the highest value upon it; and in the result, though not in this particular argument, I believe I agree with Dr. Ward himself. I am willing to
accept without reservation the definition which he quotes from certain
Jesuit theologians: " Potentia libera est quae, positis omnibus requisitis ad
agendum, potest agere et non agere." But Dr. Ward does not seem to
observe that in this definition the whole question in dispute may be covered
under its contingent clause. Everything depends on the further definition
to be given of " all the requisites for action." Is, or is not, the condition
of th~ mind itself to be considered as one of those "requisites?"  Is
knowledge, and the possession of those motives which knowledge gives,
a "requisite " or not? Do the " requisites " intended by the Jesuit definition, refer to nothing more than the presence or absence of physical
constraint? The truth is, that such abstract definitions go very little way
in explanation of themselves. I have asserted the freedom of the Will under
several forms of statement which are much more explicit, because much
more full and more detailed. Thus, I have said, "Among the motives
which act upon mind, Man has a selecting power. He can, as it were,
stand out from among them-look down from above them-compare them
among each other, and bring them to the test of conscience." This is
freedom, if there be such a thing conceivable in thought. But Dr. Ward's
impetuous zeal in favor of Free Will blinds him to certain truths which are
perfectly compatible with this doctrine, and which not only must be admitted, but must be claimed, if we are ever to wield against Necessitarians the
weapon of analysis. The principal object of this work has been to show
that, in so far as science has successfully established in physics the idea of
the Reign of Law, that idea does not affect or traverse the Reign of Mind,
i6




2 42                           NOTEs.
and the supremacy of Purpose. In like manner, I think it can be shown
that in so far as Psychology can successfully establish the idea of Causa
tion, as applicable to Mind, that idea is perfectly compatible with the true
freedom of the Will. Dr. Ward says very truly that the Necessitarian doctrine has in all ages been embraced by many powerful minds. This indicates that, in so far as it is false at all, its falseness probably depends on
some partial aspects of truth mingled with the fallacies of definition. My
own opinion unquestionably is, that when Necessitarians have been compelled to disown and abjure the idea of compulsion, their doctrine ceases
to be the doctrine of Necessity at all in any legitimate sense of the word.
What I mean by freedom  is freedom from  compulsion, and nothing else.
When I say that the Will is free, I do not mean that its movements can be
separated from the inducements internal and external under which it moves.
But then I insist that "Motive" shall have the widest meaning-that it
shall include such motives, evolved out of the very constitution of the
mind itself, as " Love, and Reverence, and Gratitude, and Hunger after
Knowledge and Desire of Truth."  Of course this is not given as a complete list, but only a sample of the things which must be claimed as
"motives."  In this sense, not only is the determining power of Motive
inseparable from the very idea of Mind; but the higher is the quality of a
mind, the more certain and definite will be the motives of its action. By
some strange confusion of thought, Dr. Ward seems to regard with horror
the idea of the Will being regarded as part of " the constitution of the
mind."  This is a mere question of words. But if by Will, Dr. Ward
does not understand a particular power of mind, I do not know what he
means. To analyze Mind at all, we must of course consider its different
powers as separate from each other; but it does not the less remain true
that they are all parts of one whole. In this point of view, Dr. Ward's own
definition of Free Will is far from  clear. " The Will, we maintain, has a
certain power of decidingfor itself what weight it shall attach to motives."
Certainly, if the Will be understood as including the Deliberative Faculty
whose function it is to " weigh." But in coming to this decision it must be
guided by something, which something may always itself be resolved into
another " motive."
And if this appears to be a mere play on words, I grant it. It is the
very point and object of my argument to show that in so far as the Necessitarian doctrine has any apparent force, it does depend on mere ambiguities of language. For example-exclude from the word "motive" all
the influences which come upon the spirit from the mind itself-from conscience, from the action upon it of another Spirit, human or divine —confine the word " motive " (as many do, tacitly by implication, though not consciously) to that class of motives which come from external and material
things, —in short, confine it to the appetites or desires, then it absolutely
ceases to be true that the Will is determined by " motives." On the other
hand, include in the word " motive " all that can ever influence the mind,
whether from within or from without, then it ceases as absolutely to be
true that the Will can ever be " free " from such motives. But then, in this




NOTES.                             243
sense, the Necessitarian doctrine resolves itself, as Mr. Mansei says, into
the identical proposition that " the prevailing motive prevails." It becomes
perfectly harmless, because in reality perfectly unmeaning. Dr. Ward is
very indignant that I should represent my view as "a mere truism."  But
it is not my own view, but the Necessitarian doctrine, when thus reduced by
analysis to its real value, which I have represented as a mere truism.
All these fallacies and confusions of thought arise, in my opinion, from
neglect of the fact that freedom has no absolute, but only a relative meaning. Freedom can only mean "the not being bound," and bonds call only
consist in something binding. Freedom of the Will call only mean that the'Will is free from compulsion. If Necessity does not mean compulsion, it
either means nothing at all, or nothing inconsistent with freedom when
properly defined and understood.
We now come to what is called the " Abstract predictability of human
conduct."  This is the phrase into which Mr. Mill retreats, as containing
the residuum of truth which still belongs to the Necessitarian doctrine after
it has abjured the idea of compulsion.  It is not my phrase, or one which
I approve of, because it involves a great number of assumptions which lie,
as it were, concealed within it. But I adhere to the opinion that, when
strictly defined, the idea it involves is perfectly capable of being reconciled
with the freedom of the Will. The truth is, that it is capable of being
resolved into the same identical proposition as the Necessitarian doctrine
in other forms.
If by " abstract predictability " is meant that prediction would be possible under the conditions of complete, universal and perfect knowledge,
I do not see either how it can be denied, or to what purpose it can be
affirmed. The proposition is that, if ALL the conditions were known which
determine the Will in deciding for itself, or " in giving weight to motives,"
the result of that decision would thereby become also known. Of the
Necessitarian doctrine expressed in this general form, I have said, and I
repeat, that it is "very like a truism." But if it is useless as an affirmnation, it is at least not capable of denial. Dr. Ward, however, does deny it,
and supports his denial by reasoning which is clearly untenable, as an
admission made by himself will show. His idea seems to be, that no
" predictable " conduct can be " free; " that nothing which can be abstractedly
foreseen can be the result of freedom. But Dr. Ward does not, and cannot
maintain this view consistently.  He admits that, " taking any given man
at any given moment, there are certain things so good, and certain things so
bad, that we may infallibly calculate he will do neither the one nor the
other."  Would Dr. Ward then admit that as regards those "very bad," and
those "very good," deeds, this man is not " free? "  Or does he think he
escapes this difficulty, by putting the man's conduct in the negative instead
of the positive form? As regards the action of the Will, no such distinction is of any avail. The not doing one thing is the doing of another. The
not doing a very good deed which he has power to do (" positis omnibus
requisitis ad agendum "), is willing not to do it. The not doing a very bad
deed is willing to do something else. If then the conduct of the man in




244                            NOTES.
those cases "can be calculated with perfect certainty," it is so calculable
only because knoNledge of his character is convertible into knowledge of
the manner in which his Will is sure to act. Is it not then a clear violation,
both of the ordinary and of the l)hilosophical use of language, to say that
a man is not " free" to do a very bad act, because we know certainly beforehand that his character, and the motives on which he habitually acts, will
prevent him from doing it?
But then Dr. WVard proceeds to argue- that though infallible calculation
may be possible in respect to deeds very good, and very bad, it will not be
possible in regard to deeds only a little good and a little bad. But how
does this greater difficulty arise? Is it not because the number of motives
telling on the Will is greater, more nicely balanced, and therefore less
known? And is not this difference precisely the kind of difference which
would disappear, if he could pass from knowledge which is partial only, to
knowledge which is complete and absolute?  But whatever difficulty may
arise from imperfect knowledge is (as I understand the phrase) eliminated
by the word " abstract," as qualifying " predictability."  No one asserts
that prediction call be founded on partial knowledge.  But the question
raised is whether even perfect knowledge of all the elements of motive and
of character can render predictable the conduct of a really Free Agent.
The question is one involving a logical principle, which, if applicable to the
conduct of a Free Agent in any case, must be equally applicable to his
conduct in all cases. If it is abuse of terms, or a confusion of thought, to
affirm that a man's Will is not free to do or not to do very bad actions,
because we can calculate infallibly the decision of his Will in regard to
them, it must be equally fallacious to affirm that his Will would not be free
in regard to lesser degrees of vice and virtue, if in like manner, we were able
from perfect knowledge of his character to predict his conduct also in
respect to them. The doctrine of Free Will, like every other doctrine of
Mental Science can only be defended by clear definitions of what it is. Its
defenders have in my opinion established their case when they have compelled Necessitarians to discard the idea of compulsion. All attempts to
deny that the Will is determined by " motives " are futile, and only result
in giving a seeming victory to those who have in reality been defeated.
In order to illustrate what I mean, I will suppose a particular case; and
to comply with the conditions of Dr. Ward's argument, it shall be a case
where no determination, either very good or very bad, is involved. I will
suppose that in arguing with a friend on the subject of Free Will, a plate
of oranges is offered to me. My friend tells me that "he knows which of
these oranges I shall choose. " I tell him he cannot possibly know thisthat my Will is free, and therefore he cannot predict my choice. He insists upon it that he can. I then observe that one orange has a smoother
skin than the others, and is of a deeper yellow color. I then recollect that
I had once mentioned in my friend's hearing that I considered a pale color,
or a rough skin, as indications of sour or tasteless oranges; and remembering this fact, I at once perceive that my friend is calculating my conduct
from a motive which, as he knows, does habitually determine my choice of




NOTES.                           245
oranges. I am conscious also that in this particular case I should have
been so determined-if this dispute had not arisen. But in order to show
my friend that my Will is really free from this power of "motive," I determine to exert that freedom by choosing the palest, or the roughest orange
In the plate, and I accordingly do so. This is an assertion of my Free Will
-a practical denial of the doctrine that I am the slave of "motives." But
is it not clear in this case, that my conduct has been determined after all
only by another and a stronger motive than the one which usually acts with
me in the matter-even by the motive of proving to my friend that he was
wrong, and that I was right?-a motive which is strong with all men, and
is supposed to have special attractions for a Scotchnian. And is it not
equally clear, that if my friend had had more perfect knowledge of my
character, and had known that I recollected the former conversation, and
could therefore guess the grounds of his prediction, he might, and would
have been able to foresee correctly the new motive which had thus arisen to
overpower the other? And finally, is it not equally evident that, if he had
been able by this extraordinary sagacity to predict my choice correctly, the
correctness of that prediction would not have implied the existence of any
constraint on the freedom of my Will, but, on the contrary, would have been
founded on his knowledge of my freedom to pass from the old motive and
to give effect to the new one?
A thousand different examples of the same kind might be given. That
on which the Will finally determines to act may always be called, and is
always properly called, a motive. And this is observable in respect to the
whole question, that precisely in proportion to the high qualities of any
given mind-in proportion to its intellectual power and its moral strength
-in proportion to its keen insight into the causes and tendencies of things,
and its appreciation of truth and righteousness-in the same proportion
will the distinction vanish in its eyes between things "very bad," and things
only a little bad. In the same proportion, therefore, will its own conduct
be guided by definite and certain motives: in the same proportion, finally,
will that conduct become predictable, because in the exercise of its freedom
it is governed by moral laws which never change.
NOTE G.-PAGE I8I.
Mr. Mahaffy, in his article in the Contemporary Review, has taken objection to the breadth of meaning which I have given in this passage to the
word "motive."  Ile says, I have "surely fused together two opposite theories under the ambiguous meaning of mzotive."  This is precisely what I
have done, and what I meant to do. I adopt all that I consider to be true
in the so-called Necessitarian Doctrine, which, when cleared from the idea
of compulsion, is no doctrine of necessity at all. The residuum of truth is,
that the Will must always act on some motive. I have taken also all that
is of any value in the Doctrine of Free Will, which is-that among the
"motives" of the mind must be reckoned those inducements which arise
out of its higher, as well as out of its lower faculties. But Mr. Mahaffy is,




246                           NOTES.
in my opinion, clearly wrong when he objects to the word "motive " being
employed with this breadth of meaning. His objection indeed is explained
to be that the word "motive " ought not to be applied to the " action of the
Will upon itself." But I have not so applied it, because I have no notion
what "the action of the Will upon itself" means. Mr. Mahaffy gives a
farther explanation of this expression, when he speaks of the Will " creating principles of action for itself." But I deny altogether that the "creating " of anything is the function of the Will. It is by an act of Will that
we fix our attention upon any given motive, or turn, on the contrary, our
attention from it. But if we are to analyze the mind at all, if for the convenience of thought and of discussion, we are to divide its inseparable
Unity into different powers, we must make the division as logical as we can
-that is, as consistent as possible with definite ideas of distinct mental
functions. In considering the Will as a separate Power, we must strictly
confine it to what may be called the Executive of the Mind. In this light
it would be altogether incorrect to ascribe the " creation " of any motive to
the Will. Motives of all kinds, both the highest and the lowest, may rise,
and do rise unbidden in the mind. It is by an act of Will that we summon
different motives to the presence of the Deliberative Faculties, that we
cherish one and dismiss another, or determine to spend thought and time
in making our choice between motives which are conflicting. But the Will
cannot with accuracy be said to be the creator of motives. Intellectual and
moral conceptions, held together by the bonds of Memory, are the fountains from which the highest motives come. Mr. Mahaffy admits that " anything brought to bear upon the Will from without itself, even from the
intellectual part of the mind, is a motive." But according to my definition
of the Will all motives come equally from outside the Will, and assuredly
I see no ground for the distinction Mr. Mahaffy seems to draw between the
Intellectual and the Moral faculties. In denying the name of motive to
those inducements which come from the affections or from the sense of
right and wrong, he imposes a restriction on the meaning of the word which
is not less inconsistent with common usage than with philosophical accuracy. Affection and gratitude, the love of man and the love of God, are all
surely "motives " in the most proper sense of the term. Yet Mr. Mahaffy
asks, "Is it not an abuse of language to say that the man who resists
temptation by creating within his breast a strong feeling of moral responsibility is determined by motives? " To this question I reply at once (passing over the question of the " creation" of motives) that it is no abuse of
language, but, on the contrary, the employment of language in its natural
and ordinary sense. On what principle is the love of knowledge (being
intellectual) to be called a motive, if the love of God is not? On what
principle is a desire of producing physical results to be called a motive, if
the desire of attaining moral ends is denied the name? No such distinction is tenable in a philosophical point of view, and no such distinction is
known in the usual and familiar employment of the word "motive."  Mr.
Mahaffy, however, in making this objection, has put his finger upon the
point on which the whole discussion turns. Like many other metaphysical




NOTES.                              247
questions, it depends almost entirely on a definition of terms. If the word
"motive " be arbitrarily limited to mental affections of one or two particular kinds, if it be confined to the lower appetites and desires, or even if it
be extended to the higher appetites of the Intellect, whilst it is denied to
the inducements of morality, of conscience, of Religion,-then it ceases to
be true that the mind is determined by motives alone. The result is that
the so-called " Necessitarian " Doctrine, in so far as it is true at all, must
not only exclude the idea of compulsion, but it must include all that glass
of inducements, on the pre-existence of which, and on the power of choice
among them, the responsibility of the Will depends.
The view presented in the text of the great question of Necessity and
Free Will does fuse together some portions of the two opposite Theories
which have so long divided men's minds regarding it. But in this fusion I
do but follow the process pursued by Dante in a profound and beautiful
passage of his " Purgatorio" (Canto s8th). To Necessity he ascribes the
existence and the power of Motive. Motives arise out of the relations preestablished between the Human Spirit and all the Influences by which it is
surrounded.  No other account can be given of them. Dante sees no difficulty, as some modern defenders of the Free Will doctrine do, in comparing the ultimate nature and origin of all our mental desires with the nature
and origin, equally inexplicable, of the Instincts of the lower animalsHear the lines, not less musical in sense then they are in sound"Perb, 1A onde venga lo intelletto
Delle prime notizie, uomo non sape
E de' primi appetibili l'affetto;
Che sono in voi, si come studio in ape
Di far lo mele."
To Free Will he ascribes the power of Counsel-of deliberation and of
choice among the motives which thus arise from the very nature and constitution of the Mind. This power guards the " Threshold of Assent:"" Innata v'6 la virtu che consiglia,
E dell' assenso de' tener la soglia."
On this power depends the responsibility of conduct: —
"Quest''l1 principio 1d onde si piglia
Cagion di meritare in voi, secondo
Che buQni amori o rei accoglie e viglia.
The passage closes with these beautiful and striking lines: —
" Color che ragionando andaro al fondo
S'accorser d'esta innata libertate;
Perb moralit& lasciaro al mondo.
Onde pognam che di necessitate
Surga ogni amor, che dentro a voi s'accende;
Di ritenerlo e in voi la potestate."
It would be difficult to give so much philosophy in fewer words.




248                            NOTES.
NOTE H.-PAGE I84.
In the last edition of Mr. Mill's work (I867), he has made an addition to
the sentence quoted in the text, so that it now runs thus:-" I deny it as
strenuously as any one, in the case of human volitions, but I deny itjuzst as
much of all other phenomena. "  If Mr. Mill means, by this addition, to
imply that he can deny compulsion (for example) in the behavior of a
billiard-ball, when it is struck, " just as much " as he can deny it, of the
behavior of a man when he is insulted, he renders his previous explanation valueless, and restores again to the doctrine of Necessity that very
element of meaning which he professes to disclaim. Compulsion is predicable of the effects of Physical Force exerted upon Matter, in a sense in
which it is not predicable of the effects of Moral or Intellectual inducements exerted upon Mind. This is precisely the distinction which Necessi
tarians are perpetually confounding; and so long as they do confound it,
their doctrine is justly open to the objection implied in the name usually
assigned to it. Even if it be true, as Mr. Mill holds, that we have no other
idea of-Physical Causation than that of uniform and invariable sequence, —
no idea of Necessity in Causation,-still it remains true that Compulsion
is, apparently to us, involved in the effects of Physical Forces upon Matter,
in a sense in which it is not involved in the effects of " Motive" upon
Mind.




INDEX.
ABORTED Limbs in various animals, ii6;  Analogy between the operations of God
Member, no, in man, 120; Organs, to be    and the operations of men's minds, illusread either in the light of History, or    trated by every known instance of Conof Prophecy, 122; Organs, existence of,   trivance, 77.
the fact most difficult to disengage from   Analogy in Use and Homology in structthe Theory of Development, 158.          ure, ig9.
Abstract Conceptions, Law as applied to,  Ancient Lawgivers always aiming at
40; Men's Idols nowadays their own, 67.   Standards of Political Society, I94.
Acland, Dr. H. W., on "' Purpose," 50.   Andes, the, species of Humming birds
"Act of Parliament, you cannot make    peculiar to, 35.
men moral by," in what sense a truism,  A _zgraecuoz Sesqu~2zedale, 27.
in what a fallacy, 2I7.                Animal Creation, the Power of God as
Adapted coloring in the Animal Kingdom,    manifested in; Professor Owen's work
Io6, el seq.                             quoted, I56.
"Adherence to Type," in the nature of a  Animals, a definite Pattern for each class
Mental Purpose, I54; these words ex-    of, I26.
press a Purpose fulfilled in Organic  Antecedents, no phenomena, mental or
Forms, 60o.                              physical, without, i86.
Adjusted Organs, Man's want of certain,  Anthropoid Apes, skeletons of, I57.
175; Forces, how far our Volitions are  Apprenticeship, earlier mills worked unsubject to, 9I.                          der a system of, 207.
Adjustment, Principle of, no meaning  Apteryx, useless wing-bones In, ii6.
except as the result of Purpose, 47;  Archetypal arrangement in Orchids, 27.
fundamental Principles of, never al-  Argus Pheasant, II5.
tered through the whole scale of Organ-  Aristotle, Philosophy of, I95-I96.
ic Life, I59; as applied to the Mental  Arkwright, 205-207.
Faculties, i68; how Watt subjected the  Ashley, Lord, first effectual measure on
invariable energies of Steam  to the    the Factory Question passed through
variable conditions of, 202; Variability    the exertions of, 215.
of, in the facts of Nature, 23I.       Asiatic  Deserts, Sand-grouse of, their
Adjustments of Organization, phenomena    coloring. Iog.
of Mind mediately dependent on, I75.    Assimilative Coloring not extended to
Affcctions, the dependent on material    Woodpeckers, I07.
structure, i65.                        Association, conditions under which the
African Savages debating a great Homo-    spirit it evokes becomes a new " Law,"
logical Question, ii8.                   220.
Agassiz' Geological Sketches, i66.       Associations, higher rates of wages esAir, Navigation of the, a beautiful exam-    tablished under, than under unrestricted
ple of Animal Mechanics, 77; Elasticity    competition, 225.
of, the Law which, in the flight of birds,  Astronomy, according to Sir G. C. Lewis,
counteracts gravity, 79; French scien-    an interest almost puirely scientific betific men in advance of English on the    longing to, 8; Sir J. Herschel's Outsubject of locomotion in, 102.           lines of, 73.
Albatross, the mechanism of flight in, go9   Atheism, false charge of, against Profesthe flight of, described, 9I; hew it sails   sor Huxley, 54.
or wheels round a ship, 92.            Atmosphere, the, resisting force of, to a
Anmmonites, great beauty of, iI3.          body moving through it, 79,




25 C                                INDEX.
Automatic Faculties in Mind as well as  CARPENTER, DR., on Life preceding Organ
in Body, 173.                            ization, 71.'Azoic " Rocks, the Rhizopods discov-  Cartwright, 205.
ered near the very lowest of, I25.     Cats, blue iris in, associated with deafness, 147; tortoise-shell color in, assoBACKWARD flight in a bird, why mnnossi-   ciated with the female sex, 147.
ble, 84.                               Caucration of.ie World, the, agency of
Bacon quoted, 3.                           Man's Mind and Will, the first and foreBaking Trade, the, in Edinburgh and    most agency in, 4.
Glasgow, good effects of combination  Central America, Orchids in the forests
in, 225.                                 of, 135.
Bats' finger-bones, how modified, ioI.   "Cerebration," philosophers who fancy
Beauty, love of, a purpose we see fulfilled    Thought is explained by calling it,
in Nature, 161.                          i68.
Being, the great mystery of our, 161.    Cerebal Organization, ascending scale of,
Beliefs, intelligent spiritual, only~widened    coincident with ascending scale of Menby the progress of Physical Science, 68.   tat capacity, i66.
Biblical Narrative of Creation, the, room   Chadwick, Mr., on Insurance of ships and
left in it for a Material Process, i6.   cargoes as relaxing the motives of selfBilateral Arrangement of Organisms, I47.   interest, 218.
Bird, a, and a Balloon, difference be-  Chameleon, the, Io6.
tween, 78.                             Chance, no such thing as, a necessary
Birds, aerial evolutions of, made possible   truth, i85.
by weight, not buoyancy, 85; condition  " Changeable Wills," Comte's confused
of the atmosphere indispensable to the    idea of phenomena not being governed
soaring of, 86; bones of, lighter and    by, i89.
more hollow than those of mammals, 87;  Chemical Combination, laws of, amongst
stationary power of, on what it depends,   the most wonderful and beautiful, 56.
96; the Humming, furnish the most re-  Children in Factories, liable to dismissal
markable examples of the machinery of   if properly cared for by their parents,
flight, Ioo; species of, amongst which   s21o.
the law of assimilative coloring almost  Christian miracles, the idea of Law made
exclusively prevails, io8; bright colors   the very basis of, I4.
and conspicuous ornaments in male, I47.  Christianity, what lies at its root, accord"Blessed Light of Science," the, 229.     ing to M. Guizot, I; Gibbon's attempt
Bodies, our, seem part of the external   to account for the spread of, by natural
world to us, i64.                        causes, I2 2 does not require a belief in
Body,Congenital Habits of the, connected    any) exception to the universal prevawith Congenital Habits of the Mind, 178.   lence of Law, 3I.
Body Politic, the, Verification drawn by  Cicero, De Nat. Deor, I20, i69, 2I3.
Adam Smith from the complicated phe-  Circulation of the Blood not discovered
nomena of, 204.                          before the discovery of much concernBorelli's erroneous theory of steerage in   ing the circulation of the Planets, I62.
flight, 98.                            Civilization, Modern, its development
Brain, the, no additional knowledge    and growth, 231.
gained by proving the connection be-  Classification, the marshalling of physical
tween any one mental faculty and a    facts in an ideal order, the basis of
special bit of, i66; changes in the sub-    Science, 51.
stance and structure of, cause of changes  Coal, how correlated with the needs and
in the character of the Mind, i65; how   powers of man, I54; these external corThought is a Function of, i66; exer-   relations of, arise out of Internal Cortion of, like the exertion of the Mus-   relations, 155.
cle, i69.                              Cobbett, on the opposition to the restrictButler, Bishop, on our ignorance of God's   ive measures which were proposed by
notion of means and ends, 48.            Sir R. Peel the Elder, 209.
Butler's, Bishop, position, that all the  Cog'to, ergo suJmz, 4.
truths and difficulties of Religion have  Color, power in fish to change rapidly
their type in Natures, I6.                o6;j determined  in  young  animnals




INDEX.                                 251
through the eyes of the female parent,  Comte, Augusta, on " Changeable Wills,'
io6.                                     189.
Coloring, adapted, in the Animal King-  Conditions, favorable, uselessness of di.
dom, object of, io6; apparent rule un-    rect appeals to men's faculties and feelder which applied, Io6; assimilated,   ings when these have not been placed
not extended, as Mr. Darwin fancies, to    under, 193; external, which tell on the
Green Woodpeckers, I07.                 individual Will, are but conditions deCombe, Dr. A., on our ignorance of how     pending on the aggregate Will of those
the  Brain  operates  in  generating    around use, 2i8.
Thought, 169.                          " Coney " of Scripture, the, 148.
Combination and affinity in Chemistry,  Congenital Constitution, character of
laws of, 4I, 56.                         Mind determined by, I78.
Combination,-in Nature, for the accom-  Conscience, how man, unlike the lower
plishment of Purpose, 48; this an ascer-    animals, can bring his motives to the
tained fact in Science, 5I; and adjust-   test of, 182.
ment as regards the phenomena of the  Consciousness, direct evidence of, large
Mind, i63; coming in the place of Posi-   class of phenomena beyond the, I70.
tive Institution, 221; resort to, for the  Conservation of Energy, modern docprotection of labor, recommended by    trine of, 73.
reason and experience, 222; all this true  Constancy in Nature not incompatible
universally of the principle of, but not    with the energies of Will, 231.
true universally of the particular pur-  Constitution and Course of Things, the
poses to which applied, 222; its history    whole, under what conditions it would
amongst the Working Classes, until re-    receive an earlier fulfilment, 229.
cently a sad history of misdirected effort,  Constitution of the Universe, the, man's
223; desire for, and need of grows with    faculty of Contrivance, the nearest anthe growth of knowledge, and with the    alogy by which to understand, 232.
increasing  complications of society,  Contractions, muscular, two kinds of,
224; business of, in some things, to    stand near the origin of allwe do, 123;
subordinate the individual class, 224;    of the Brain, probably stand near the
what sets bounds to, 225 most impor-    origin of all we think, I73.
tant objects of, amongst the first duties  Contrivance, in Orchids, to be traced as
of organized society, 226; conditions    clearly as in the different parts of a
under which it may blend the functions,   steam-engine, 22.
and unite the profits, of Capital and  Contrivance and Adjustment, doctrine of,
Labor, a question to be determined by    not so metaphysical as the doctrine of
Natural Laws not yet explained or un-    Homologies, 50.
derstood, 227.                         Contrivance, the word, impossibility of
Combinations of Force, having reference    dispensing with it in describing physito the fulfilment of Purpose or the dis-    cal phenomena, 54; what is? 76; in Nacharge of Function, 40.                  ture, never reduced to a single purCombinations, limits of, as affecting re-    pose, i5I; happiest achievements of
wards of Labor, 225.                     the, have their own aspects of apparent
"Comet " Humming Bird, I38.                daiger, 223.
Commercial Policy, Modern, its central' Coquette " Humming Bird, the, Prinidea, 200.                              ciple of ornament in, I39.
Common Words, pestilent fault of using  Correlation of Growth, the, Mr. Darwin's
them in an artificial sense, I89.        idea of, 143; has a deeper significance
Community of Aspect in created Things,   than this, I44; in another and higher
what it suggests, I33.                   sense, I45; in its simplest form, and
Comparative Anatomy, Professor Owen    in visible connection with its immedion, 6i; Professor Huxley on, 7I.         ate cause,'45; having reference to cerCompetition, International, between Cap-   tain mental purposes, 46; two entirely
italists, arguments based on, 2I.       separate classes of phenomena grouped
Competition, the " Law " of, results in ex-    by Mr. Darwin under the name of, 246;
cessive labor, 221.                      general impression left by the observCompetitive Industry, inevitable track    ance of organic, 248; required in the
Of, 2I4.                                 establishment of a new form of Life,




2532                               INDEX.
I49; high and complex, the most con-  Custom and Traditional Opinion, on the
stant and obvious of all the facts of    facts of Nature and Human Life, as
Nature, 149; apparent, between webb-    seen through the dulled eyes of, 228.
ed feet and spoon-shaped bills, I50;  Cuvier's Science of Homologies, ii8.
real, between both these conditions and  (jnszNzsus  Humming Bird, ornament in
external conditions of Life, I50; be-   the, changing  from  blue to green,
tween a particular kind of feather and    I42.
a particular member of the body, in
all birds capable of flight, 151; in all  DI\RWVIN, MR., his conclusion as to " silent
birds, between the auricular feathers    members," 20; his work on the fcrtiland the ear-bones, I51; Internal, in   ization of Orchids, 22; answers the
Nature, entirely subordinate to Eaxtcr-    question of Intention with preoision
nal, 252; External correlation between    and  success, 23; fails to solve the
the Retina and certain vibrations, 153;   question, out of what " primordial eleas connected with Origin of Species,    ments" the parts of the Orchids were
154; Forces of, in flowers, independent,   developed, 23; idea of special use as
as Mr. Darwin admits, of Natural Se-   the controlling principle of construction
lection, 258; inference from  this ad-    never absent from his mind, 24; his
mission Concerning a time before Nat-   reduction of the forms of Orchids to
ural Selection had room to play, 259;   the archetypal arrangement of Threes
External, between the Mind and the    within Threes, 26; cannot conceive
Things around it, 176.                   how a voltaic battery can be made out
Correspondences, perception of, as much    of the tissues of a fish, 63; his curious
a fact as the sight, or touch, of the    mistake concerning Green Woodpeckthings in which they appear, 20.         ers, I05; his reference to the discovery
Cotopaxi, special forms of Humming    of "Rhizopods " near the bottom  of
birds, peculiar to, I35.                 "Azoic" Rocks, 125,  his theory of
Creation,-of Man, the, out of " the dust    Development suggests less of anything
of the ground," an indication of the    approaching to a Law in Creation than
personal agency of God, I6; the em-    did the earlier theories, I27; his theory
bodiment of a Divine Idea, S; work of,   of Development, to what extent an escarried on under rules of adherence to    tablished  scientific  truth,  30; his
Typical Forms, 46; history of, " an    theory self-condemned, 13I'; claims for
Observed Order of Facts " in, I24; by    it a wider range than belongs to it,
Law, idea of, on what founded, I26'  I3I; mere advantage, in Mr. Darwin's
adaptation and arrangement of Natural    sense, not the rule in the Origin of
Forces, in what sense of the Nature of,    New Species in Humming Birds, 136;
229; idea of centres of, suggested by    his theory does not account for the
the geographical distribution of Hum-    origin or spread of Humming Birds,
ming Birds, I34; by Law, only senses    I39' offers no explanation how  new
in which we get a glimpse of it from     Births may be the means of introducthe theory of Natural Selection, 155;    ing New  Species, 242; his theory on
spoken of as not Creation, unless it work    Natural Selection has no bearing on the
from nothing as its material, and by    Origin of Species, 143; admits that the
nothing as its means, 156; doctrine of,    doctrine of Natural Selection " takes
only. possible serious adversaries of, i56;    cognizance  of Variations only after
by Birth, how it explains the existence    they have arisen, and regards Variaof useless organs, I58; nearest methods    tion as due to chance," I43; groups unof, probably behind a veil too thick for    der the name " Correlation of Growth "
mgn to penetrate, i62.                   two classes of phenomena, entirely
Creative Power, the rule which seems to    separate in idea, I46, shows how an
have guided, in the origin of New    improved Bill, once produced, will be
Species, 136.                            preserved, I49; on the phrase "AdCreeds, decay in, resulting from  dissoci-   herence to Type," 154; on Inheritance,
ating in the popular exposition of them  what it is, 156.
the doctrines of Religion from the an-  Decaying fallen leaves, imitation of, in
alogy and course of Nature. 3I.          the Woodcock's plumage, Io9.
Crompton, 205, 207,                      Design and Mental Purpose, exhibited in




INDEX.                                 253
the Correlation of the Retina with  External Correlations provided beforecertain vibrations, I53.                 hand by Utility, I53; Elements of NaDetected Method in Nature, the Ulti-   ture, our command over the, in advance
mate  Question, above  and  behind    of our command over the resources of
every, i6i.                              Human Character, 228.
Development, hypotheses of, the, in the  " Eyes " in the wing of the Argus Pheasform which they have as yet assumed,    ant, compared to the " ball and socket"
are deprived of all scientific basis, i8;   ornament in Art, II5.
theories of, what they have simply
been, o9; theories, ideacommon to all,  FACT, Purpose not an Inference merely.
that a new species is simply an unusual    but a, 50; Purpose as a general inbirth, I27; Mr. Darwin's theory of, dif-   ference, and as a particular, distinction
ference between it and other theories    between  them  not sufficiently  obof development, I3o; of Man's Nature,    served, 50.
boundless discoveries open to those  Facts, the, of Function, constitute not
who would investigate the laws gov-    Final, but immediate Purpose, 49; Man
erning the, I93'; and growth of Modern    controls, only because he interferes
Civilization, 23I.                       with Laws, I89; Men always trying to
Di/_tomacere, II3.                         evolve out of their own minds knowlDigestive Organs, the, Mechanism of the,    edge only to be acquired by patient inextends through a long range of Cre-    quiry into, 194.
ation, I59.                            Factories, effects of " free" labor in, 209;
Discovery, outbreak of old Delusions on    Labor of children in, in what sense
every fresh, 68; the most striking thing    " free," 2I0; in what sense not " free,"
in the history of, 228.                  2Io; Owners of, powerful motives in
Disease brings out correlations not per-    operation on the, 2I0; Inspectors of,
ceived in health, I47.                  in 1864, 214.
Divine Government, Divine Thoughts,  Factory System, the, how it arose, 205;
Divine Purposes and Divine Affections,    Act of 2802, in what sense invaluable,
rules and principles of, 32.             208; Acts, false intellectual conceptions
Divine Will, the ONE FORCE, perhaps in    at the bottom  of opposition to, 2I0;
itself a mode of action of the, 76.      Acts, the, the first Legislative recogDiving Birds, Correlation in, I50.         nition of, a great Natural Law quite as
important as Freedom of Trade, 225;
ECONOMIC Error of the Old Commercial    Legislation, Progress of Political SciSystems, 2I5.                            ence in nothing happier than in, 217;
Economic Science, Combination involves    Combination effects a higher good than
no Rebellion against the Laws of, 222.   that resulting from, 22I.
Economists, Political, hostile to Restric-  Fallacies, Verbal, of Mr. Mansel exposed
tion, 2i6.                               by Mr. Mill, i84.
Electric Ray, or Torpedo, an instance of  False Theory and  mistaken  Conduct
an extraordinary result produced by a    found out by the working of Natural
common law  yoked to extraordinary       Consequence, 215.
conditions, 6i; Fish and Electric Tel-  Feather, Wing, a production wholly unegraph, absolute necessity of conform-    like any other animal growth, ioI.
ing to definite conditions in making  Feathers, of a bird's wing, three-fold dieach, 6i; Telegraph, the, Babbage's   vision of the, 93; one fundamental plan
Calculating Machine, the  Steam-En-    in, I5I.
gine, and the Solar System, all work by  Final ends not to be seen, 48.
Natural Consequence, 65.               Fish, power of many, to change color
Everlasting Will, the, some purpose of    rapidly, io6.
it to be seen working everywhere, 74.  Flight, the true theory of, may be tested
Experience, Association, or Intuition,    by the eye, 84.
origin of our ideas how far due, re-  Fly Shuttle inWeaving, invention of the,
spectively to, I72; Mr. J. S. Mill on, I72.   the impulse it gave, 206.
Explanation, the mere ticketing and or-  Flying Animal, no, lighter than the air it
derly assortment of external facts, not,    moves in, 88.
2; what it is, 48.                    Foramininfera, 71.




2 54                                INDEX.
Force, or Forces, an observed Order of    often see the, telling on our Wills,
Facts is the Index and the result of the    more clearly than we do ourselves, 171'
working of some, 4I; the  Law  of    Action of, on our minds, how to be
Gravitation is that, the exact measure   traced, 172; aggregate of what, may
of whose operation was numerically    be called the Laws which determine
ascertained by Newton, 42; each, if   human action  and opinions, I8o; or
left to itself, would be destructive of    Laws which  operate on  the Mind,
the Universe, 55; what is it? 7I; the    exceedingly difficult to reduce them in
idea of, traced to its Fountain Head,   their boundless variety to system, 8o0;
72; ONE, all natural Forces resolvable    our Volitions how far subject to adperhaps into, 76; this, perhaps, in itself   justed, i9i; the fixedness of all, in one
a mode of action of the Divine Will,   sense, constitutes their infinite pliabil76; of Gravitation, the most familiar    ity in another, I9i; of Nature, one of
of all Forces in all Ages, 78; this Force,   the most tremendous of the, reduced
chiefly that concerned in flight, 78; or    to obedience by Watt, 202; Separate
Forces, to which the phenomena of    and Individual, in Man and Nature,
Life can be traced, no knowledge of    alone invariable, 219; Combinations of
the, 126; a, emanating from External    these, of endless variety and endless
things, and moulding the structure of    capability of change, 2I9.
an organism  in harmony with them-  Foreknowledge, Perfect knowledge must
selves, no conception of, I49; Furnish-    be perfect, I85.
er of, no substance comparable as a, to  Form, of Life, new, correlation required
Coal, I55; One, the source and centre    in the establishment of a, 249; such
of the rest, i63; ultimate seat of, the,    correlation, as far as we can see, withwe know nothing directly of, i63; near-    out any Physical cause, 149; and Spirit,
est conception of this derived from our    the connection between, sanctioned by
own consciousness, i64; or Power, de-   the doctrine of the Resurrection, I70.
veloped through an organ, not identi-  Forms, Typical, work of Nature carried
cal with that organ, i66; or Forces,    on under rules of adherence to, 46; of
implied in an "Observed  Order of    Life, successive introduction of,higher
Facts," i68; Expenditure of, in severe    and higher, 225; allied, specific and
Thinking, i69.                           generic, bond of connection between
Forces, Correlation of, modern doctrine    them, I30.
of the, 4; Law as applied to individ-  Forward  Motion, the power of, how
ual, the measure of whose operation    given to birds, 83.
has been more or less defined, or ascer-  Fossil Remains, what Forms to be traced
tained, 39; Law in its most habitual   in, 225; Animals, approximating to the
sense, as Natural, related to Purpose,    Forms of the Horse and the Ox, Proand subservient to the discharge of    fessor Owen on, 126.
Function, 48; irresistible tendency in  Fossils designated " the Sports of Nathe language of Science to personify,    ture," I59.
54; no phenomena visible to man gov-  Free Agency of Man, faith required in
erned by invariable, but by variable   the, to secure the working for good of
combinzzizaz'onzs of invariable forces, 59;    great Natural Laws, 224.
Convertibility of, modern doctrine- of  Free Labor, those who opposed restric-.
the, 73; Natural, Law in what sense the    tions on, met with no adequate reply,
co-operation of, working together for    2II; advocates of Restriction on, igno
fulfilment of obvious Intention, I28;  rant of the principles at issue, 2ii.
Vital, how made to evolve a new Form   Free Will, erroneously called the peculiar
of Life, I55; all, in their mutual rela-    Prerogative of Man, 8o0; and Necestions, governed by principles of ar-   sity, progress at last on the vexed quesrangement purely Mental, i63; Mate-   tion of, 283.
rial, manifestations of mental Energy  Freedom, a relative term, not an absoand Will, 263; apparent barrier against   lute, I79.
our conceiving how any combination  Freedom of Exchange, in the products of
of, can result in mind, i69; Material,    Labor, results of, compared with the
misconception  of, i69; Immaterial,   results of perfect freedom of competiworking  in matter, 270; Bystanders   tion in Labor itself, 2I3.




IN)-eX.                                255
Freedom of Man's Will not more myste-  Growth, Correlations of; see Correlations
rious in directing the Mind to one mo-    of Growth.
tive, and diverting it from  another,  Growth, Progress and Decay, whether
than in the turning of the Body to the    any Law of, in Nations as in Individual
right hand rather than the left, i86.    Organisms, 220.
Fulmars, mechanism of flight in, go.     Guizot, M., on the Supernatural, i, Is, I3,
Function, definition of, I66; of Coal in    i8, 3I; on the only serious adversaries
the world, I54.                          of the doctrine of Creation, I56; on the
Function of an Organ, the, its Purpose, 50.   introduction of the human pair into the
world, i6o; on misconceptions of the
GALILEO, period of, 204.                   Past, and false anticipations of the FuGallinaceous Birds, sort of wings in, 93;   ture, 230.
comparatively no infancy in, I77; fact
of immense  significance  connected  HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM, examination of
with, 278.                               the Philosophy of, by Mr. J. S. Mill,
Gannet, the, diving for fish, 87.          i83, et seq.
Genesis of Organic Life, modern idea of  Hargraves, 205, 207.
the, i8.                               Hawks, classified as "noble," or "ignoGeographical distribution of Humming    ble," 94.
Birds, I33.                            Hebrides, remarkable chase of a Merlin
Gipsies, case of the, not parallel with    after a Snipe, in the, 95.
that of the Jews, I2.                  Hereditary  Transmission  of  Mental
Gladstone's, Mr., description of the old    Qualities, I72; of Innate Ideas, 278.
Commercial Policy, 200.                Heron's Wing, curious experiment with
God's Will, extraordinary manifestations    an outstretched, 84.
of, how they may be wrought, so.       Herschel, Sir John, quoted, 44, 73.
God, operations of, and of Men's Minds,  Homology, of Orchids, 26; in Structure,
light thrown on the analogy between    and Analogy in Use, ii9.
them by every known instance of Con-  Homologies, doctrine of, doctrine of
trivance, 77.                            Contrivance and Adjustment not so
Gold, laws relating to, in Ancient Sparta    metaphysical as the, 50, Science of, as
and in Modern Spain, 200.                developed by Cuvier, Hunter, Owen,
Gould, Mr., on the action of the wing in    and Huxley, an intricate, almost a
Humming Birds, Ioo; on the reason    transcendental, Science, Ii8.
for the gorgeous coloring of those  Horse, the, "silent members " in, ss6.
birds, I37; his description of ditto, i38;  Hudibras quoted, IIo.
on the absence of Hybridism between  Human Action and Opinions, aggregate
any two species of Humming Birds,    of Forces which may be called Laws
14I; on certain local varieties near Bo-    which determine, i8o.
gota, whose ornament is changing  Human  Character, elementary Forces
color, I42; his " Birds of Australia,"    having a constant operation on, I93.
I77.                                   Human  Law, function  of, as distinGovernment, Divine; see Divine Gov-    guished from Natural Law, I94; Law,
ernment.                                idea of founding it on the Laws of NaGovernment, principle of, only recog-    ture never systematically entertained
nized in modern times, I94; the Science    in the Ancient World, I94.
of, two great discoveries made in, dur-  Human Society, odious conceptions of,
ing the present century, I99.            in Plato's Republic, I94.
Gravitation, Law of, the discovery of it  Human Instincts, and faculties of Conthe highest exercise of pure intellect   trivance, impeded by clumsy machinthrough which the Human Mind has    ery, 203.
found its way, 44; the most familiar of  Human Labor, Factory System as affectall Forces in all Ages, 78; the chief   ing, 205.
Force in flight, 78.                   Human Spirit, Natural Laws in harmoniGrote's " Plato," 295.                     ous relation with the, 232.
Grouse, feathers of the, close imitation  Humming Birds, the most remarkable
in, to the tinting and mottling of the    examples of the machinery of flight,
ground on which they lie. io8,           99; peculiarities of, 132: their distinct




256                                 INDEX.
iveness  from   all other families of  Instinct, or Intuition, not Experience,
birds, I32; geographical distribution of,   teaches us unconsciously how  to use
133; divisible only into two Sub-fami-   the machinery causing Muscular Conlies, I34; generic and specific differ-   tractions, I73.
ences between these, I34; species of,  Instincts of the nature of Ideas, I76
peculiar to Cotopaxi, to Chimborazo,    Natural, v; hI n to be trusted, 213; when
Juan Fernandez, etc., I35; a curious    the Higher Flaculties must impose their
example of Ornament for Ornament's    Will on the, 213.
sake, I39; the Creation of separate  Institution, Positive, Authoritative Inspecies of, suggests the idea of some    terference of, with the freedom of the
Creative Law, of the nature and con-    Individual Will, still required in Facditions of which we know  nothing,    tories, 216.
I40.                                   Institutions, Positive, stand contrasted
Hunting Grounds of Eagles, Falcons, and    with Natural Law in one. sense only,
Hawks, io8.                              I98.
Hutton, Captain, on the flight of the  Intellect, Laws of, Philosophers who
Albatross, 99.                           fancy they are reduced to scientific exHuxley, Professor, false charge of Athe-    pression when described as the working
ism against, 54; his assertion that Life    of the " cerebral ganglia," i68.
precedes Organization, 7I; rhetorical  Intention, exhibited in the mechanism of
designation of " Life " in his "Elements    Orchids, the question Mr. Darwin sets
of Comparative Anatomy," I27; front-    himself to answer, 23; Obvious, Law
ispiece to his " Man's Place in Nature,"   in what sense meant as the co-operation
265.                                     of Natural Forces, working together
Hybridism unknown between two species    for the fulfilment of, I28; and Purpose,
of Humming Birds, I41.                   the Law of Structure entirely subordiHyrax, or " Coney," the, teeth and hoofs    nate to the Law of, I57.
of, resemble those of the Rhinoceros,  Intuition, Origin of our Ideas how far
I48.                                     due to, 172; a word not liked by supporters of the doctrine of Experience,
IDEAS, in what sense born with us, 176;    I73.
formation of, all that comes from  the  Intuitions, Copernicus,  Kepler, and
Mind itself in the, 176.                 Galileo guided in their profound conIdentic Shapes, Forces which aggregate    ceptions of visible phenomena by, 66;
particles of matter in, I59.             the most extravagant errors in PhilosoIdols, Men's, nowadays their own ab-    phy often associated with the happiest,
stract Conceptions, 67.                  229.
Immediate Purpose, Facts of Adjustment  Invariability, double meaning of, in the
and of Function constitute not Final,    Necessitarian Philosophy, i83; of Sebut, 49.                                 quence, an ambiguous phrase, i84.
Imponderable, the Great, 9i.             Invariable Law, Phenomena not governed
Incubator, Artificial, prepared  by the    by, i89; Vision of, on the Throne of
Megapode, I77.                           Nature, 232.
Individual Force, Law immutable only as  Invention, Mechanical, Scientific  Men
an, 58; Will, Laws against which, can-    forced to borrow the language of, 153;
not contend, 214; Will, the, helpless-   triumphs of, regarded often with fear
ness and thoughtlessness of, to a great    and jealousy by the Working Classes,
extent to be overcome, 222.              223; a Law of Nature in the strictest
Inductive Sciences, Whewell's History    sense, 224.
of the, 66.                            Invisible, the, all the Realities of Nature
Inequality of Men, in the sense of gifts    are in the region of, 71.
of Mind and Body, 224.
Inheritance, bond of, according to Mr.  JELLY, blobs of, without parts, or organs,
Darwin, I30; Theory of, when it star-    or visible structure, Vital Force in,
tles us, I56.                            7I.
Inorganic Compounds, relations of cer-  Jevons, Mr. W. S., on the Coal Question,
tain to the Chemistry of Life, 57.       I55.
Inspectors of Factories, Reports of, 2I4.   Jews, preservation of the, a striking il



INDEX.                                 257
lustration of departure from the ordi-    Law of Motion," 65; in what sense
nary course of Nature effected through    meant as the co-operation of Natural
Natural means, 12.                       Forces working together for the fulfilJob on the Stars, 68.                      ment of Obvious Intention, 128; differJuan Fernandez, three species of Hum-    ence between that to which the Lower
ming Birds peculiar to, I35.             Animals are subject and that to which
Man issubject, i8o.
KEFPLER, three Laws of, 42.              Laws-of Nature, Man's Mind strangely
Kestrel hovering, 9I.                      excluded by Professor Tyndall from
"Knowing how to do it," in Nature as    the, 4; if not unchangeable, could not
in Art, all done seems done by, 77.      be used as instruments of Will, 58;
Natural, unchangeableness and uniLABELLUMR in Orchids, its use, 24.         versality of, essential to their use as
Labor, Restrictions on, denounced  by    instruments of Will, 88; or Forces, the,
Adam Smith, 2o0; Children's, in Fac-    which operate on the Mind, exceedingtories, in  what  sense  "free," in   ly difficult to reduce them  to system,
what not "free," 2I; instincts of,   s80o interference with, the only way in
when blind to all results save money-    which Man  can control Facts. I89;
making, 2I3; resort to Combination for    against which Individual Will cannot
the protection  of, recommended  by    contend, 214; Economic, invariability
Reason and Experience, 222; Rewards    of, rightly understood, 225.
of, Limits within which Combinations  Lecky, Mr., on the Rise and Influence of
can, and beyond which they cannot,    Rationalism in Europe, Io.
affect the, 225.                       Legislation, Wise and successful, on the
Languages grow and change by rules of   recognition of what causes it depends,
which the men speaking them are un- I79; double movement in, ever since
conscious, 46.                          the First Factory Act, 2I5.
Law, Idea of, made the basis of the  Leverage, Law of, as applied to Wings,
Christian miracles, I4; highest, known    go.
to Man, 37; the word, in its primary  Lewes, Mr. G. H., 42, 70, 74, I2I.
signification, 39; FIVE different senses  Lewis, Sir G. C., on Astronomy, 8.
in which the word is habitually used-   Life, the Cause of Organization, 71I
first, as applied to an Observed Order    Leading Types of, in Geological ages,
of Facts; secondly, to that Order as in-    an orderly gradation in,:25; Origin of,
volving the action of some Fcrce, or    nothing known or guessed at in, correForces, of which nothing more may be    sponding with Law in its strictest sense,
known; thircdly, as applied to individ-    I26. New Forms of, if developed from
ual Forces, the measure of whose ope'-    the  Old, the  working  of Creative
ations has been more or less defined    Power, I29.
and ascertained, 390 fourt/zly, as ap-  Living Effort, our conceptions of Force
plied to Combinations of Force having    formed from our own consciousness of,
reference to the fulfilment of Purpose    72.
or the discharge of Function; /ft/Zy,  Lizards, Flying, in other Ages of the
as applied to abstract conceptions of    World, Ioi.
the Mind-these five great leading sig-  Locke. quoted, i5.
nifications of, the questions they circle  Longfellow, Professor, 78.
round, 40; neatest illustrations of used
in the first sense, to be found in Kep-  MACHINE, Idea and Essence of a, 54.
ler's Three Laws, 40; in the second  McCosh, Dr., on the Supernatural in resense, the index arnd result of the work-   lation to the Natural, II.
ing of some Force, or Forces, 41; of  Malformation, Correlations brought out
Gravitation defined, 42; in its highest    by, I47.
sense, as Natural Forces related to Pur-  Man, Is he Supernatural? 5.
pose, and subservient to the discharge  Man's agency, relation of, to the Physof Function, 48; a, only immutable as   ical Laws of Nature, I9.
an Individual Force, 58; the term, as  Man and the Lower Animals, common
used to designate an Abstract Idea,    Relationship of, by descent, at least
65; illustration of this in the' First    conceivable, i8.
17




2503                              IND1EX.
Man and Nature, works of both done    perceives with  direct and intuitive
through the means of Law, 64; and the    recognition, 21; Purposes, Correlation
Lower Animals, amount and kind of   having reference to certain, 246.
difference between, spite of close affin-  Merlin, a, swooping on its prey, 87; chase
ities of bodily structure, 156; and the    of a, after a Snipe in the Hebrides, 95.
highest Animals below him, secret of  Metaphors, the, employed in Language,
the boundless difference between, i82;   generally founded on Analogies inin what sense subject to the Law of   stinctively  and  often  unconsciously
Causation, i86; Reason, Conscience,   perceived, 79.
Imagination, Belief, as much a part of,  Method of Nature, proper object of Scias his desires and instincts, i98; Comrn    ence to detect, if she can, the, i6s.
bination natural to, 224.             Methods, some, of operating on Men's
Mankind, Combination, among many    Minds known to us instinctively, I94.
Motives, a means of influencing, to an  Mill, Mr. J. S., his admission that our
extent as yet unknown, the conduct   muscular contractions are not the reand condition of, 219; progress of, to   sult of " Experience," 172; Comments
higher and better things, 23I.         on this admission, I73, e. seq.; on the
Mansel's, Mr., " Essay on Miracles," II;   meaning of the word " Necessity," I83;
his Limits to Religious Thought, its   his use of the vague word " AnteceVerbal fallacies, exposed by Mr. J. S.   dent," s86; his definition in "Auguste
Mill, 184.                             Comte and Positivism," of the Positive
Mantis, strange imitation of Vegetable   as distinguished from the Theological
growths in the body of'the, IIo.       Mode of Thought, i87; dissection of
Marine Mollusca, beautiful shells of, II3.   these phrases, I87, I88; on "' ChangeMaterial, World, increasing power exer-   able Wills," I89.
cised over the, by Man's Will, 58; Mind and Will of Man in one sense "sepWorld, the, and the world of Mind,   arate" from " Nature" and belonging
Law in the same sense prevails in the    to the " Supernatural," 5.
phenomena of both, i63; Frame, in  Mind, Character of, expressed in lines
which we live, some of the most distant   and shapes of matter, I57; Phenomena
objects of the Universe more accessible   of, an observed Order of Facts in the,
to our observation and intelligible to    i63; the, unconscious of its dependence
us than, T64; Structure, our Affections    on the Body, i65; first to be mapped,
dependent on, i65.                     and then its Orqan, I67; and OrganiMaterialism, Suggestions of, lie thickest   zation, parallel Phenomena of, i67; and
on the surface of things, 68; two great   Brain, connection between them recogenemies to, in the heart and the intel-   nized as a Law by us only in the sense
lect, 69.                              of an " Observed Order of Facts," i68;
Matter, Immaterial Forces working in,   the, to be regarded as having, like the
I76.                                   Body, Automatic Faculties, 174; PheMeans, God governing the world by the    nomena of, words used to describe the,
choice and use of, io; and Ends, our    suggestive of analogies between Mental
ignorance of God's notions of, 49.     and Material things, 179; influences
"Measure,"  inaccurately  termed  the    which attract the Polar Force com"verifiable element'" in our knowledge,    pared to, i8o; and Character of Man,
42.                                    knowledge of, how it may be governed,
Mechanism of Orchids, Intention exhib    to be obtained only by slow degrees,
ited il the, s4; of Flight in the Alba-   I94; Human, Love of Gain an instinct
tross and in Seagulls, go.             implanted in the, 224; openness and
Megapodes, Innate Ideas in the, I77.     simplicity of, great characteristics of
Memory often paralyzed by the stroke    Men who have exercised an influence
which paralyzes a Limb, I65.           for good on Society, 228.
Men, in what sense " fellow-workers with  Mineral Salt, Crystallizing under a VolGod," and made "partakers of the Di-   taic current, Correlation of Growth in
vine Nature," 6.                       its simplest form, I45.
Mental Purpose and Physical Cause,  Miracle, a, commonly understood as a
ideas of, not antagonistic, I9  and Re-   suspension or violation of the Laws of
solve, the one thing our Intelligence    Nature, Io.




INDEX.                                259
Miracles, when they loose every element    Will, and the servants of enlightened
of inconceivability, I4; Christian, idea  Conscience, 232.
of Law made the very basis of the, I4;  " Natural Selection " can do nothing exthe idea of, performed by the use of   cept with the materials presented to it,
means, regarded by many with jealousy    130; what it accounts for and what it
and suspicion, I6.                     does not account for, I3I; the only
Modern Policy and Ancient, striking dif-   point, with reference to the Sub-Famiference between the spirit of, 200; Poli-   lies of HIumming Birds, in which it has
ticians, great aim  of, to open new    any bearing, though it does not touch
sources of national opulence, 20o; Po-   the facts of the case, I34; does not aclitical Societies, stagnation and decline    count for the origin or spread of Humthe actual condition of many, 220.     ming Birds, 140; real bearing of, 143;
Mollusca, the Vital Forces in, made to   seizes on External Correlations, but
work to order, I28.                    cannot enter the womb and shape the
Monkeys, " Silent members " in, ii6.     New Form in harmony with the modiMuscles, the seat of two opposing Forces,   fled conditions of External Life, I52;
47-                                    operates only through the agency of
Muscular Power, great concentration of,   use and disuse on organs already exin the Organism of Birds, 80.          isting, and  capable of discharging
function, 158; Selection, idea of, exNARWHAL, the Aborted Germ in, 117.       cluded by the theory of Creation by
Nasmyth, Mr. James, on the shadows    Birth, 258.
and " high light " in the " eyes " in the  Nature, Power and Works of, all Superwing of the Argus Pheasant, 115.       human, I; glorious result of a right
Nations, calamities of, their origin in the    method in the study of, 3; what, in the
insensible development of New Con-   largest sense, to be understood as inditions, 230.                          cluding, 3; in the narrow  sense of
Natural Consequence, way  of, Steam    Physical Nature, 4- and the SuperEngine and Solar System both worked    natural, Dr. Bushnell on, 5; Man's,
by, 65.                                Phenomena of, included in the term
Natural Forces, Idea of, quite separate    " Natural," 7; ord inary course of, 8; the
from the ascertained measure of their   superhuman and  the Supermaterial,
energy, 43; found to operate under   familiar facts in, I4; the Great Pararules having strict reference to Space    ble, 32; Universal Presence of comand Time, 45; must be conformed to and    binations of Force in, 46; Relation of
obeyed, 76.                            an Organic Structure to its Purpose in,
Natural Law, Common Idea of the Su-   60; comparison illustrative of this bepernatural as at variance with, above,   tween the Menai Bridge and the Shells
or in violation of, 3; True conception    of Barnacles, 60; one vast system of
of, on what founded, 94; the idea of,   Contrivance, 76; Mechanics of, highas affecting mankind, on what founded,   est problem in, 80; Purpose of particI97; in what sense contrasted with    u.ar structures in, often misconceived,
Positive Institution, 298; Law, Signal   Ios; Laboratory of, process in the, by
illustration in England this century    which natural tints can be transferred
of circumstances in which, may be   to substances prepared to receive them,
trusted, and of those in which it required    Io6; Facts of, High and Complex Corto be controlled, ig9; and Positive Insti-   relation the most constant and obvious
tution, antagonism  between, 2I2; ever   of all the, I49; no fictions or bad jokes
working to convict error and confirm    in, I59; no short cuts in, 297; a great
truth, 2I3; working on the Human    Armory for the use of Will, 227; Man's
Will while exposed to overpowering    command over the external elements of,
motives and under debased conditions   in advance of his command over the
of the understanding and the heart,   resources of Human Character, 228;
2i6.                                   Man's most certain of all the Laws, of,
Natural Laws, founded on the right ex-   232.
ercise of Reason in the highest and  "Necessity," Progress at last on the
best sense, 298; best fulfilled when    vexed  question  of, 183; Rebellion
made the instruments of intelligent   against the Doctrines of, founded on




260                                 INDEX.
false conceptions of Invariable Law,  Origin of New Forms. Darwin's Theory
224.                                     does not profess to trace to a definite
New Forms, Mr. Darwin's Theory, how       Law the, 129; of our Ideas, how far
far it suggests anything of the nature of    due respectively to Experience, AssoCreative Law to explain the introduc-    ciation, or Intuition, I72; clear definition of, I3I.                           tion of tetms greatly required in the
New  Species, a, according to Mr. Dar-    discussion of such questions as the,
win, simply an unusual birth,.30;    I75.
Creation of, has followed some plan in  Origin of Species, the true, in what it
which variety is in itself an aim,:36;   consists, I43; only sense in which we
a, must be born male and female, 141;   can get from  the Theory of the, a
of Humming Birds, if born from the    glimpse of Creation by Law, I55; New
Old, how they must be born, 142.         Species, rule which seems to have govNewton, Sir Isaac, his agitation on dis-    erned Creative Power in the, I36.
covering the Law of Gravitation, 45.    Ornament in Nature in itself a Purpose,
Numerical computation, intuitive powers    II2; was so before Man was born, 153;
of, I74; Relations, Ideas of Order based    for Ornament's sake, the rule in referon, meet us in Nature at every turn, 30.   ence to which Creative Power seems
to have worked in Humming Birds,
ORCHIS, the Madagascar, its long and    138.
deep nectary, how developed, 27.       Ornament and Use; see Use and OrnaOrchids, Fertilization of, 22; Intention    ment.
in the mechanism of, the question Mr.  OrniZh/orwyncos Paradoxus, I50.
Darwin sets himself to answer, 23;  Owen, Professor, on the Mental concepLabellum in, its use, 24; large Family of,   tion of the Plan of all Vertebrate Skelein the forests of Central America, I35.   tons, 20; on the Battery of the Electric
Observed Order of Facts, an, implies a    Ray, 6I; on Fossil Approximations to
Force, or arrangement of Forces, out   the forms of the Horse and the Ox, 126.
of which the Order comes, i68.
Order, a subtle and pervading, binding  PARABLE, why so much can be conveyed
together all Living things, 124; of Na-   in the Form of, 32.
ture, the, very complicated, the Mind  Parliament, refusing to regulate " Free
perplexed by the vast variety of sub-    Labor," 208; Combination indicated as
ordinate Facts, o03; of Thought, the    the right course by, 222.
basis of all other Order in the works of  Pauperism, in how far to be attacked
Man and of Nature, 49.                  through Combination, 227.
Organic Forms, Mr. Darwin's denial that  Peel, Sir Robert, the Elder, the first to
Beauty for its own sake can be an end    interfere by law with unrestricted comin, II2; Growth, symmetry  to  be    petition in Human Labor, 208: his Bill
detected  in all variations of, 144;   limited to the regulation of the labor of
Growths, general impression left by    Apprentices, 208; presses a new measthe observance of Correlation between,    ure of Restriction, 209.
I48; Life, never any alteration in the  Penguins, 89.
whole scale of, in those principles of  Peregrine Falcon, sharp-pointed structChemical and Mechanical adjustment    ure of wing in the, 93.
on which Respiration, Circulation, and  Perfect Knowledge, the little way we can
Reproduction have been provided for,   ever travel towards, i85.
i60.                                   Personal Agency of God, the Creation of
Organism, Parts of an, bound together    Man "out of the dust of the ground"
as one whole by a pervading system of    an indication of the, i6.
Correlations, I47.                     Personal Will, the Idea of, separable
Organisms, Inheritance the only cause    from the Forces which work in Nature,
which can produce, quite like or nearly   in a sense the projection of our own
like each other, 157; Bilateral Arrange-    Personality, 74.
ment common to all, down to the Ra-  Personality and Will, impossibility of dediata, I59; New, no knowledge of the    scribing any facts in Science without
Laws connected with the Creation or    investing the Laws of Nature with, 55.
development of, I27.                   Petrels, Mechanism of flight in, go.




INDEX.                                 261
P/iasza in the British Museum, Specimen  Political Society, Ancient Law-givers alof, with wings spotted like a larva-    ways aiming at standards Qf, 194;
eaten leaf, 112.                         Events, memorable Examples in the
Phenomena of Life, no knowledge of the    last and present generations of the
Force or Forces to which the, can be    Reign of Law over the course of, 220.
traced, 126; of Mind, the, an Observed  Positive Institution, and Natural Law,
Order of Facts, I63; Law in one sense    antagonism between, 212; Combination
prevails in the, both of the Material    coming in the place of, 221.
and Mental world, I64; never the re-  Positive Philosophy, the word Will, how
sult of individual Forces, but always    used in, I9o.
of the variable conditions under which  Positivism, a sentence the concentration
several individual Forces are combined,    of all that is erroneous in, i83..89.                                   Posterity's wonder respecting ourselves,
Philosophy of History, on the recogni-   228...on of what causes it depends, I79.   Potential Use in Nature, 120.
Ph:enological School, fundamental error  Power, Law in its primary signification,
of the, I67.                             the authoritative expression of Human
Phrenology, a name which is itself a    Will enforced by, 39; of God, Profesfal'acy, i66.                            sor Owen's Instances of the, as maniPhysical Cause and  Mental Purpose,   fested in his Animal Creation, 156.
Ideas of, not antagonistic, I9.        Prayer, real E-,sence of, 37.
Physic t1 Cause, Correlation in the estab-  Primeval Traditions of Belief, immense
lishment of a New Form of Life, so far    satisfaction to know that Logical Anas we,an see, without any, 149.         alysis confirms the testimony of ConPhysica  Forces all working to Order,   sciousness and runs parallel with the,
154.                                     232.
Physical Laws of Nature, relation of  Problem, the most difficult of all, in the
Man's  sgency to the, 7; advancing    Science of Government, i99.
knowle Ye of, accompanied with ad-  Progress of Mankind, order of facts obvancing  power  over the  Physical   servable in the, that long ages of silence
World, 8.                                and inaction are broken up and brought
Physical S,.ience, advances in, can only   to an end by shorter periods of almost
widen in. lligent Spiritual Beliefs, 68.  preternatural activity, 204.
Physics, World of, Certainties in the  Protection, a hindrance to the Wealth of
world of faind as absolute as any in the,    Nations, the skill of Crafts, and the
i85.                                     success of Trade, 203.
Physiological Discovery, the Dependence  Psychology and Physiology, neither inof Mind on Bodily Organization, a fact    dependent of the other, I72.
containing.ithin itself the lesser facts  Ptarmigan, close imitation in the Pluof, i68.                                 mage of the, to the mottling of ground,
Physiology, recent Investigations in, as   Io8.
to the Muscles, 47; every fact in, its  Purpose, the only thing we can surely
intimate bearing on some question of    know in the relation of Created Forms
tile Philosophy of Mind, 172.            to our own Minds, 20; Principle of AdPlanets, the, much discovered by man    justment no meaning except as the reconcerning the circulation of, before he    sult of, 47; Function of an Organ, its,
discovered the circulation of the blood,    50; as a general inference, and as a parI64.                                    ticular fact, distinction between them
Plants, basis of many Correlations of    not sufficiently observed, 50; in Nature
Growth in, I44.                          attained only by the enlistment of Laws
Plato's Republic, 195.                    as Means, 6o; instance of this in the
Polar Force of Magnetism, i8o.            Electric Ray, where an extraordinary
Polarity, in Magnetic Force, ultimate   result is produced by a common Law
nature anid source of, 146.              yoked to extraordinary conditions, 6;
Polarity, Principle of, developed in a    Contrivance necessary for the accomcircle in the Radiata, 59.               plishment of, 76; Contrivance in Nature
Policy, Modern  Commercial, Central    never reduced to a single, iii; of the
id~a of, 2Q,                             Oe P!ar of Organic Life, II7; how




262                                INDEX.
Material Laws follow the steps of, I24;   Advocates of, ignorant of the fundaMental, Correlation of Growth having    mental principles at issue, 2Ix.
reference to a certain, I46; Correlation  Resurrection, Connection between Spirit
of Growth in the only sense we connect   and Form  sanctioned by the doctrine
it with the Origin of Species not a Phys-   of the, 170.
ical cause but a Mental, 154; and In-  Retina, external Correlations of, I53.
tention, the Law of Structure entirely  Rhizopods of enormous size found near
subordinate to, I58; only, to be de-   the bottom of "Azoic " Rocks, I25.
tected in the adaptability of the Verte-  Rudimentary Organs, said to be intended
brate Type to the Infinite varieties of    merely to suggest a History which was
Life, i6i.                             never true, and a Method which was
never followed, 159.
RADCLIFFE'S, DR., Theory of Muscular
and Nervous Action, 47.               SAND-GROUSE of Asiatic Deserts and their
Radiata, the, I59.                       coloring, Io9.
Reason, Doctrine that things contrary to,  Sand Partridges of ditto, o09.
were not beyond his faith, held by a  Science, the great Quest of, 43; Classifilate eminent clergyman of the English    cation the basis of, 5I; Astronomical,
Church, 37; and Imagination, falling    ultimate fact of, 55, included in Phiimpotently on analogy and conjecture   losophy, 68; the "understanding by
in endeavoring to get at Nature's    Faith " mentioned by the writer of the
method, i6i; paralyzed by the same    Epistle to the Hebrews, now an assured
stroke which paralyzes a limb, i65; and    doctrine of, 70; Proper object of, to
Feelings, direct appeals to the, entirely    detect the method of nature, if she can,
useless when these faculties have not   i6I; True, bondage under which it
been placed under favorable conditions,   lies, 397; of Government, two great
I93; on what path Instinct a surer    discoveries made in the, during the
guide than, 220.                        present century, i99; of Politics, the,
Regions where means of investigation    still in its infancy, 228.
cease, and processes of Verification are  Sciences, Physical, remarkable product
of no avail, 229.                      of  the  immense  development  of
Reign of Law, the, in Nature, so far as   the, 2.
we can see it, Universal, 3; Universal,  Scientific Truth, a sharp eye to be cast
perfectly consistent with a power of   on every form of words professing to
making those laws subservient to de-   represent, 34; Men who, though trustsign, 13; the, the reign of Creative    worthy on the facts of their own sciForce, directed by Creative Knowl-   ence, are not to be trusted on the place
edge, worked under the control of   of those facts in the general system of
Creative Power, and in fulfilment of   truth, 68.
Creative Purpose, i62.                Scripture, Language of, nowhere conReligion, Nothing In, incompatible with   scious of a distinction between the
the belief that all exercises of God's    Natural and the Supernatural, I8.
Power are effected through the instru-  Seagulls, Mechanism of flight in the soarmentality of Means, I3, 30; or Nature,   ing of, 86, 9o.
the Will of the Supreme either in, one  Seasons, Revolutions of the, dependent
in which " there is no variableness,"    on a multitude of Laws, each of which
3s; and Science, Doctrine that they    would produce utter confusion if not
should be thought separate open to one    balanced against others in the right
fatal objection, 35; disastrous effect of   proportion, 56.
the belief in their separation, 36.   Seers, great, of the Old Testament, corResearch, Physical, Transcendentalchar-   respondence of their language with a
acter of the results of, 70.           great modern Scientific Idea, 77.
Restrictions on Labor, great discovery  Self-consciousness the truth in the light
of the absolute necessity of imposing,   of which all other truths are known, 4.
i99; from Trade, immense advantage  Self-evident Truths, and Truths not selfof removing, i99.                      evident, breakdown of the distinction
Restriction on Free Labor, those who op-   between, I75.
posed, met with no adequate reply, 2II;  Sensation, no new light thrown on, be



INDEX.                                 263
cause Sensation can be traced to certain  Spinning Jenny, the, coming to econo
nerves, I68.                             mize the work of human hands, 206.
"Sensory Ganglia," Philosophers who  Spinning Wheel in Yorkshire in 1760, 206,
think they cast new light on Sensation  Spontaneousness  of Nature, no such
by calling it an affection of the, i68.  thing as, according to Professor Tyn"Silent members" in Animal Frames,    dall, 4; illustration of " spontaneous"
views on the subject by Mr. Darwin,    design in the Professor's own mind, E.
20; deeper and wider views of Profes-  Statute of Apprenticeship in Watt's time,
sor Owen on, 20.                         205.
Silurian Sea, Old, richly carved shells  Steam Engine, Discovery of the. a new
and corals of the, I23.                  stimulus to the mind's motives, 203.
"Slowworm,"  the  Common, "Blade  Stewart's, Dugald, account of the Life
bone "  and  " Collar  bone"  of,-    and Writings of Adam Smith, 200.
" aborted limbs " in, II7.             "Strong Arm of the Law," what it really
Smiles' Life of Watt, 204.                 is as proposed by Mr. Baker, the FacSmith, Adam, 20o et seq.: work of, in-    tory Inspector, 2I4.
separably connected with the work of  Structure, Bodily, Affinities between the,
James Watt, 202; not dissimilar to    of Man and that of the Lower Animals,
Watt's work in its relation to the Reign    amongst the profoundest mysteries of
of Law, 202, opinions influenced by    Nature, 156.
personal observation of the ill-treat-  " Struggle for Existence," the, of Organment of Watt by the " Burgesses and    isms, 131.
Craftsmen of Glasgow," 203' doctrines  Stunted and distorted growth in large
of, where a hindrance, not a help, 2i6.  portions of mankind, in how far these
Snakes, rudiments of Legs in, II7.         conditions are subject to the control of
Snipe chased by a Merlin in the Heb-    Will through the use of Means, I93.
rides, 95.                             Superhuman, much  that was  once
Snipes, Feathers of imitating the color of   thought, not thought so now, 8.
bleached vegetable stalks, IIo.        Superhuman and the Supermaterial, the,
Society, Sanction of, given, or withheld,    familiar facts in nature, 24.
its influence for evil, or good. 2i8; de-  Supernatural, Belief in the, essential to
sire and need for Combination grows    all Religion, an assertion true only in a
with the growth of knowledge and    special sense, 32.
with the increasing complications of,  Supreme r'ill and Supreme Intelligence
224  openness and simplicity of mind    in the Laws of Nature, our own Wills
great characteristics of those men who    and Intelligence enable us to conceive
hlave exerted an influence for good on,    of a, I4.
228; disorders of, the fruit of ignorance  Swallow, Common, sharp-pointed structor rebellion, 229.                       ure of Wing in the, 94.
Solar System, the, like the Steam Engine,  Swift, the, dropping, not flying backworks by way of Natural Consequence,    wards, 85; its wonderful and unceas65.                                     ing evolutions, 89.
Space and Time, can we say more of  Sylph Humming Bird, the, I38.
their wonders than was said by David  Symmetry a relation we detect in all
and Job? 68.                            variations of Organic Growth, I44.
Spain, Modern, prohibition of gold from
leaving the State, 200.                TAILS in Birds, 97.
Sparrow Hawk chased and " chaffed'" by  Taylor, Jeremy, on Resemblances, 32.
little birds, 95.                      Teachers in Politics, Time and Natural
Sparta, Ancient, Law of, prohibiting gold    Consequence the great, I53.
from ever coming into the State, 200.  Tennyson's Idylls of the King, 37; Maud,
Species, the Preservation and Distribu-    6o; In Memoriam, 32, 70, I70.
tion of, when they have arisen, the real  Terns, Mechanism of Flight in, go.
bearing of the doctrine of Natural Se-  "Theine," and "Strychnine," identical
lection, I43.                            in elements, differ only in the proporSpindle, the, on Egyptian monuments, a    tions In which they are combined, 57.
similar instrument familiar in  the  Theology, Systematic, an idea which it
Llighlands until a few years ago, o06.   regards with suspicion, 3t.




264                                 INDEX.
"THINGS HOPED FOR," the Power of, a  VARIABILITY of Adjustment in the facts
Power which never dies, 69.              of Nature, 231.
Thought and Emotion, exciting Causes  Variable  Combinations of Invariable
of, must come from the external world,    Forces, Phenomena governed by, 59.
176.                                   Variation, Laws of, Mr. Darwin confesses
Threes within Threes, Archetypal Ar-    "our ignorance of the Laws of Variarangement of, in Orchids, 26.           tion is profound," I30; so-called Laws
Time, said to be a powerful Factor, 156.    of, for the most part simply observed
Torpedo, number of Hexagonal columns    Facts in respect to Variation, I43.
125 the battery of the, 6i.            Variety in itself an object in the creation
Trade, immense advantage of abolishing    of New Species, 136.
Restrictions on, I99; success in, hin-  Velocity of Flight, the heavier a bird the
dered by Protection, 203.                greater its possible, 87.
Triumphs, for which man has been gifted  Vertebrate Type, Purpose In the adaptawith knowledge, a sense of right, and    bility of the, to the infinite varieties of
faculties of Contrivance, 228.           Life, 123, i61.
Truth, every one, connected with every  Verities of the World, a pre-adjusted reother Truth in the Universe, 34; Ulti-   lation to the, I75.
mate, beyond the reach of Science, i62.  Virgil, quoted, I44.
Tulloch, Principal, quoted, I4.          Vital Force, the Great Imponderable, 9i
Tycho Brahe, 204.                        Vital Power, the nearest conception we
Tyndall, Professor, quoted, 4, I53.        can ever have of Force derived from
Type, or Pattern, a definite, for each    our consciousness of, i64.
class of Animal adhered to, I26.       Volitions, our, how far subject to AdTypical Forms, work of Creation carried    justed Forces, 191.
on under rules of adherence to, 46.    Voltaic Battery, Mr. Darwin cannot conceive how a, can be made out of the
ULTIMATE Question, the, What is it by    tissues of a fish, 63.
which this is done? lies above and be-  Voltaic Current, Mineral Salt crystallizhind every detected  Method in Na-   ing under a, correlation of growth in
ture, i62; Force, seat of, we know       Its simplest form, I45.
nothing directly of, I63.              Voluntary Society, the mere founding of
Unconscious  Metaphysics of Human    a, the powerful latent force it evolves,
Speech, i8o.                             2I9.
Unity of design amid Variety of Form, a
universal feature In Nature, I77.      WAGES, Economic Advantages gained
Unknown and Unknowable, the, result    when hours of labor are reduced withto Professor Huxley of using this vague    out corresponding reduction in, 225.
phrase, 54.                            Wallace, Mr., his description of Humming
Universe, question lying at the root of    Birds balancing themselves in the air,
our conceptions of the, 38, constitution    Ioo.
of the, Man's faculty of Contrivance  " Watch  Force," and "Vital Force,"
the nearest analogy by which to under-    analogy between them precise and acstand the, 232.                          curate, 74.
Unusual Birth, an, Idea common to all  Water, the Old Motive Power, Factory
Development Theories that a New          System begun under, 207.
Species is simply, I27.                Watt, James, 202, el seq.
Use and Ornament in Nature may often  Wealth, views of the accumulation of, in
arise out of the same conditions, II5.   Ancient Political Philosophy, 200; of
Useless Organs, how explained by the    Nations hindered by Protection, 203.
Theory of Creationr by Birth, I58.     Wenham, Mr. F. H., on the Mechanical
Utility, acting through Motive as a Men-    Principle involved in the sufficiency of
tal Purpose, the provider beforehand    very narrow Wings, 93.
of external Correlations, 252; Correlated  Whales, Teeth in young, which never cut
Growth in Flowers, the Forces of, ac-   the gum, 117.
cording to Mr. Darwin, modify struct-  What men naturally do, no sure test of
ures independent of Utility, and there-    what they ought, or ought to be alfore Qf Natura! Selection, I52,          lowed, to do, 9Q9,




INDEX.                                 265
Whewell, Dr., on the leading characters    free from motives, I79; free from comin the minds of great Scientific Discov-    pulsion, and from nothing else, i82.
erers, 125.                            Wilson's, Professor, Sonnet, " A Clouds"
Will, Man's, instruments of, 7; real diffi-   92.
culty in the idea of, exercised without  Wing, Bird's, pulsations in a, usually imthe use of means, 9; God's extraordi-    possible to  count; instances in  the
nary manifestations of, how they may    Partridge, Pheasant, Blackcock, Pigbe wrought by the use or Laws of    eon, and Diver 8o0 Birds, downward
which Man knows nothing, Io; God's   blow of a, indispensable to flight, Is.
seeking and effecting the fulfilment of    convex and concave surfaces of a, indesigns as our living Wills in their    dispenable to flight, 82; sort of, relittle sphere effect their little objects,    quired by Birds which seek their food
13; Human, Law in its primary signifi-   in the air, 88; peculiarity of, in Divers,
cation, the authoritative expression of,   89; peculiarity of, in Birds which feed
enforced by Power, 39; Man's increas-    on the surface of the sea, go; peculiaring power exercised by, over the Ma-   ity of, in Birds of great and long-susterial World, 58; the Everlasting, some    tained powers of flight, 90; a long, the
Purpose of it to be seen working every-    implement used by the Bird's Vital
where, 74; relation of, to Law, and    Force against the force of Gravity, 9I;
Law to Will, in Man's works and in   threefold division of the feathers of a
God's, 76; Unchangeableness and Uni-    Bird's, 93; sharpness of a, on what it
versality of the Natural Laws essential    depends, 93; a Rook's, an example of
to their use as instruments of, 86 cases    what, 94; Bones of a Bird's, the bones
in which Law does not seem subservi    of the Mammalian arm and hand, IoI.
ent to, 103; manifested  in Material  "Windhover," machinery of flight in
Forces, I63; circuitous communication    the, 95.
between direct acts of the, and move.. Wings, Bird's, Law of Leverage appealed
ments of the Body, 164; the, often    to  in, go; sort  of, in  Gallinaceous
paralyzed by the stroke which para-    Birds, 93; Birds with short, 93; Birds
lyzes a limb, I65; the, its instinctive    with short and blunt, how they catch
knowledge, how to use the Organism    their prey, 95; Humming Birds, amazborn with it, 174; in the Lovwer Ani-   ingly rapid motion of, 99.
mals, acted on by fewer and simpler  Wolf, Mr. J., his drawing of the wing of
motives than Will in Man, i8o; Men's   the Golden Plover, 94; his illustration
"' free" in one sense, and in one only,   of a Kestrel hovering, 96.
8I; a Variable, indispensable to sta-  Woodcock's Plumage, the, colored like
bility of Character, igo; the Human,    decaying  leaves, og9; Tail Feathers
if unchangeable, then no such thing    capable of forming a beautifully tinted
as changeability conceivable, i9o; of    fan, Io9; lustrous black eye betrayed
Society, collective, two ways in which it   it to the towler, I o.
operates on the conduct, 194; conscious  Woodpeckers. Law of Assimilative colorenergies of the, ever tempted to march    ing not extended to, 107.
directly on objects only to be reached  Words which should be the servants of
circuitously,  203; Individual,  Laws    Thought, too often its masters, 39.
against which it cannot contend, 214, Wordsworth on Nature, as including all
Natural Law working on Human, 2i6;   "in the Mind of Man," 3; his Ode to
Individual, Authoritative Interference    Immortality, 36.
of Positive Institution with the freedom   Working Classes, always regard with
of still required as regards Factories,   fear and jealousy those triumphs of
216; Indsvldual, external conditions    mechanical invention which tend to
which tell on, often nothing but condl-   the economizing of labor, 223; Combitions depending on the aggregate Will'ation amongst the, an Education in
of, those around us, 2i8; Energies of,   itself, 226, Men, Combination the only
Constancy of Nature not incompatible    means by which adult working, can
with the, 23I; Change of, the efficient    defend themselves, 221.
cause of numberless other changes, 232.
Wills, conclusions regarding our, against  "ZAMBESl  and  its  Tributaries," Dr,
which.wo are apt to rebel, I7I; our, not    Livingstone's work quoted, iI8.