I...              I-,,-.    I
FEDERAHLISM UNMASKED:I AT
OR THE RIGHTS OF THE STATES, THE CONGRESS, THE EXECUTIVE, AND
THE PEOPLE, VINDICATED AGAINST THE ENCROACHMENTS OF THE
JUDICIARY, PROMPTED BY THE MODERN APOSTATE DEMOCRACY.
BEING A COMPILATION FROMl THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF THE
LEADERS OF THE OLD JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICAN PARTY. 
BY  DANIEL  R. GOODLOE.
The following are the authorities quoted:
John Bacon of Masachusetts -
John J. Crittenden of Kentucky
James Barbour of Virginia       -
Mahlon Dickerson of New Jersey
Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky
Andrew Jackson of Tennessee
The Legislature of Georgia
The Supreme Court of Georgia- -
The Legislature of -Virginia
The Supreme Court of Virginia -
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Thomas Jefferson                                 -                           - 
James Madison                                      - -
John Taylor of Caroline          -   - 
Mr. Jackson ef Georgia   -                                                   -   -
Stephens Thompson Mason of Virginia
Mr. Cocke of Tennessee                                                       - -1
Thomas T. Davis of Kentucky -      -
William B. Giles of Virginia  -   -
Robert Williams of North Carolina  -
John Randolph of Roanoke    -   -
Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina  -
Joseph H. Nicholson of Maryland   -
ciary is the last resort inrelation to the other & partmcnta of the Government, but not in relation
to the  rights of the parties to the compact under
which the Judiciary is ddrived."  If this opinion
be sound, then, indeed, is our Constitution  a
complete felo de se. For, intending to establish
three departments, co-ordinate and independent,
that they might check and balance one another,
it has given, according to this opinion, to one of
them alone the right to prescribe rules for the
government of the others; and to that one, too,
which is unelected by a  nd independent  of  the
nation.
*  * a     The Constitution, on this hypothesis, is  a mere     thing of wax, in the hands of the
Judiciary, which they  may  t wist    and shape  into
any f or m they please.   It should  be remembered,
as an axiom of eternal truth in politics, that
whatever power in any Government is independent, is absolute also; in theory only at first,
while the spirit of the people is up, but in practice as fast as that relaxes. Independence can be
trusted nowhere but with the people in mass.
They are inherently independent of all but
moral law. My construction of the Constitution
is very different from that you quote. It is, that
each department is truly independent of the
others, and has an equal right to decide for it;
self what is the meaning of the Constitution in
the cases submitted to its action, and especially
THOMAS JEFFERSON.
These extracts from Jefferson's writings can
be verified by reference to the index to his com plete works, published under the patronage of
Congress.  The reader is referred to the names 
of the persons to whom the letters are addressed.  t
In a letter to Mr. Adams, dated September 11,
1804, he says:
You seemed to think that it devolved on the
,judges to decide on the validity of the sedition
law.  But nothing in the Constitution has given
them a right to decide for the Executive, more
than the Executive to decide for them.  Both
magistrates are equally independent in the sphere                      i
of action assigned to them.'The judges, believ- 
ing the law constitutional, had a right to pass a 
sentence6 --  o  d imprisonment; because the
power was placed in their hands by the Constitution.  But the Executive, believing the law to'
be unconstitutional, were bound to remit the execution of it; because that power had been confided to them by the Constitution.
Extract of a lettr to rudge Roane, dated Poplar
Forest, September 6, 1819.
In denying the right they usurp of exclusively
explaining the Constitution, I go further than
you do, if I understand rightly your quotation
from the Federalist, of au opinion that " the Judi
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whewe It is to act ultimately amd without appeal.
I will explain myself by examples, which, aving
occurred while I was in office, are better known
to me, and the principles which governed them.
Extract from a letter to MAr. Jarvis, dated Monticello,
September 28, 1820. 
*   *   *  You seem, in pages 84 and 148, to
consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of
all constitutional questions-a very dangerous
doctrine indeed, and one which would place us
under the despotism of an oligarchy. Our judges
are as honest as other men, and not more so.
They have, with others, the same passions for
party, for power, and the privilege of their corps.
Their maxim is, "boni judicis est ampliare jurisdictionem," and their power the more dangerous.
as they are in office for life, and not responsible,
as the other functionaries are, to the elective control.  The Constitution has erected no such sin gle tribunal, knowing that, to whatevr  uatl
confided,-with the corruptions of time and party,
its members would become despots. It has more
wisely made all the departments co-equal and
co-severeign within themselves.  If the Legisla ture fails to pass laws for a census, for paying
the judges and other officers of the Government,
for establishing a militia, for naturalization, as
prescribed by the Constitution, or if they fail to
meet in congress, the judges cannot issue their
mandamus to them; if the President fails to sup ply the place of a judge, to appoint other civil or
military officers, to issue requisite commissions,
the judges cannot force him.  They can issue
their mandamus or distringas to no executive or
legislative officer, to enforce the fulfilment of
their official duties, any more than the President or Legislature may issue orders to the judges or
their officers.
.&tract from a letter to Thomas Ritchie, dated   ofnt
ticelo, December 25, 1820.
*  *  *  The Judiciary of the United States
is the subtle corps of sappers and miners con  stantly working under ground to undermine the
foundations of our confederated fabric.  They
are construing our Constitution from a co-ordina  tion of a general and special government to a
general and supreme one alone.
zxtrct from a letter to Archibald Thweat, dated
Monticello, January 19, 1821.
The Legislative and Executive branches may
sometimes err, but elections and dependence will
bring them to rights.  The Judiciary branch is
the instrument which, working like gravity,
without intermission, is to press us at last into
one consolidated mass.  Against this I know no
one who equally with Judge Roane himself pos   sesses the power and the courage to make re   sisance; and to him I look,and have long looked,
as our strongest bulwark.  If Congress fails to
shield the States from dangers so palpaple and
so imminent, the States must shield themselves,
and meet the invader foot to foot. This is already
half done by Colonel Taylor's book, because a.
conviction that we are right accomplishes half
the difficulty of correcting wrong.  This book is
the most effectual retraction of our Government
to its original principles which has ever yet
Wn Hat by Heatn %o our aid.,,, Eriory htt
i th* inpnaaoues8d ad.give8,a torl  tof-r va  meterC. m da
they elect, as a standing instruction, and ours
should set the example.   Accept, with  Mrs.
Thweat, the assurance of my  affectionats  and
respectful attichb2ent.
FRe ract from a letter to sfr..    a. ammond, dated
M  Jfonticello, August 18, 1821. 
It has long, however, been iny opinion,: and I
have never shrunk from its expressioni Though
I do not choose to put it into a newspaper, nor,
like a Priam in armor, offer myself its champion,) that the  germ of dissolution of  our Federal Goverrment is in the constitution of  the Fed eral Judiciary —an irresponsible body, (for im peachment is scarcely a scarecrow,) working
like gravity by night and by day, gaining a little
to-day and a little to-morrow, and advancing its
noiseless step, like a thief, over the field of
Jurisdiction, until all shall be- usurped from the
States, and the Government of all be consoli dated into one. To this I am opposed; because,
when all government, domestic and foreign, in
little as in great thifigs, shall be drawn to WaSh ington as the centre of all power, it will render
powerless the checks provided of one Govern ment on another, and will become as venal and
oppressive as the Government from which we
separated. It will be as in Europe, where every
man must be either pike or gudgeon, hammer or
anvil. Our functionaries and theirs are wares
from the same workshop, made of the same ma  terials, and by the same hand.   If the States
look with apathy on this ailent descent of, their
Government into the gulf which is to swallow
-sl,- we have only to weep over the human char  acter, formed uncontrollable but by a rod of
iron, and the blasphemers of man, as incapable
of self-government, become his true historians.
zract from a  letter to William T.  Bal, dao d
Mfonticello, July 2, 1822.
SIR: Your favor of the 15th of June is re  ceived, and I am very thankful for the kindness 95
of its expressions respecting myself.  But it as-,.
cribes to me merits which I do not claim. I wasjE
only of a band devoted to the cause of Independ-; X
once, all of whom exerted equally their best en-;
deavors for its success, and have a common rigbht:
to the merits of its acquisition. So, also, is the
civil revolution of 1801. Very many an'd very
meritorious ware the worthy patriots who assist   ed in bringing back our Government to its Re   publican tack. To preserve it in that, will re-'
quire unremitting vigilance.   Whether the -Ur   render of our opponents, their reception into our
camp, their assumption of our name, and apparent
accesion to our objects, may strengthen or weaken
the genuine principiles of Republicanisn, may be a
good or an evil, is yet to be seen. I consider the
party division of Whig and Tory the most whole   some which can exist in any Government, and:
well worthy of being nourished, to-keep out
those of a more dangerous character. We al   ready see the power, installed for life, responsi    ble to no authority, (for impeachment isnot even
a scarecrow,) advancing with a noiseless and
steady pace to the'gmat object of consolidation. 
Ad A
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The foundations are already deeply laid, by their
decisions, for the annihilation of constitutional
State rights, and the removal of every check,
every counterpoise, to the engulphing power of
which themselves are to mae a sovereign part
If ever this vast country is brought under a sin   gle Government, it will be one of the most ex   tensive corruption, indifferent and incapable of
a wholesome care over so wide a spread of sur   face.  This will not be borne, and you will have
to choose between reformation and revolution.
If I know the spirit of this country, the one or
the other is inevitable.  Before the canker is be  come inveterate, before its venom has reached
so much of the body politic as to get beyond con  trol, remedy should be applied.  Let"'the future
appointments of judges be for four or six years,
and renewable by the President and Senate.
This will bring their condn.;t, at regular periods,
under revision and probation, and may keep
them in equipoise between the general and spe  cial Governments.  We have erred in this point,
by copying England, where certainly it is a good
thing to have the judges independent of the
King.  But we have omitted to copy their cau tion, also, which makes a judge removable on
the address of both legislative houses.  That
there should be public functionaries independ ent of the nation, whatever may be their demerit,
is a solecism, in a Republic, of the first order of
absurdity and inconsistency.
Extract fromn a letter to Judge Johnson, dated Jfon              ticello, March 4, 1823.
I cannot lay down my pen without recurring
to one of the subjects of my former letter, for, in
truth, there is no danger I apprehend so much
as the consolidation of our Government by the
noiseless, and therefore unalarming, instrument ality of the Supreme Court.  This is the form
in which Federalism now arrays itself; and con solidation is the present principle of distinction
between Republicans and pseudo-Republicans,
but real Federalists. I must comfort myself with
the hope that the judges will see the importance
and the duty of giving their country the only
evidence they can give of fidelity to its Constitution, and integrity in the administration of its
laws; that is to say, by every one's giving his
opinion seriatim and publicly on the cases he decides.  Let him prove by his reasoning that he
has read the papers; that he has considered the
case; that, in the application of the law to it, he
uses his own judgment independently, and unbiassed by party views and personal favor or
disfavor.  Throw himself in every case on God
and his country; both will excuse him for error,
and value him for his honesty. The very idea
of cooking up opinions in conclave, begets suspicions that something passes which fears the
public ear; and this, spreading, by degrees must
produce at some time abridgment of tenure, fahditc of  removal, or some         o ther modilc'ation
which may promise a remedy. For, in truth,
there is at this time more hostilityr to the Federal Judiciary than to any other organ of the Government. 
I should greatly prefer, as you do, four judges
to anty greater number. Great lawyers are not
over-abundant, and the multiplication   of judges
only enable the weak to out-vote the wise; and
three concurrent opinions,  ou    t       of f our, gives a
strong p resumption of righ t.
Extractfrom a letter to Judge Johnson, dated Mon.
. ticello, June 12, 1823.,
The practice of Judge Marshall, of travelling
out  of his  case to prescribe what    t he law would
be in a   moot case not be fore  the court, is very
irregular and very censurable. I recollect an  other  instance, and th oe more particularly, perhaps,
because it in some meas ure  bo e    on myself.
Among  the midnight appointme nts    of Mr. Adams
were commissions to some Federal justices of the
peace for Alexandria. These were signed and
sealed by him, but not delivered. I found them
on the table of the Department of State, on my
entrance into office, and I forbade their delivery.
Marbury, named in one of them, applied to the
Supreme Court for a mandamus to the Secretary
of State, (Mr. Madison,) to deliver the commission
intended for him. The court determined at once,
that being an original process, they had no cog  nizance of it; and, therefore, the question before
them was ended.  But the Chief Justice went  om
to lay down what the law would be, had they
jurisdiction of the case, to wit: that they should
command the delivery. The object was clearly to
instruct any other court, having the jurisdiction,
what they should do, if Marbury should apply to
them. Besides the impropriety of this gratuitous
interference, could anything exceed the perver sion of law? For if there is any principle of law
never Ayt:o.tradicted, it is, that delivery is one
of the essentials to the validity of a deed. Al though signed and sealed, yet as long as it re mained in the hands of the party himself, it is in
fieri only-it is not a deed, and can be made so
only by its delivery. In the hands of a third per son, it may be made an escrow. But whatever is
in the Executive offir,es is certainly deemed to be in
the hands of the President; and in this case was
actually in my hands, because, when I counter manded them, there was as yet no Secretary of
State. Yet this case of Marbury and Madison is
* continually cited by bench and bar, as if it were
settled law, without any animadversion on its
being merely an obiter dissertation of the Chief
Justice. * * *
But the Chief Justice says, " there must be au
ultimate arbiter somewhere." True, there must;
but does that prove it is either party? The ultimate arbiter is the people of the Union, assembled by their deputies in Convention, at the call
of Congress, or of two-thirds of the States. Let
them decide to which they mean to give an authority claimed by two of their organs. And it
has been the peculiar wisdom and felicity of our
Constitution to have provided this peaceable
appeal, where that of other nations is at once to
force.
Esxtracfrom a lette to Edward ~ivingsto, Fef~.,
dated Mlonticello, atrch 25, 1825.
I have attended to so mxuch of flour work as
has been heretofore laid before the public, and
have looked with some attention also into what
you have now sent me. It will certainly arrange
your nam with the sages of antiquity. Time 
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nate authorities.  It may be said that contradictory decisions may arise in such case, and
p roduce inconvenience.  This is possible, and is
a necessary failing in all human proceeding,
yet the prudence of the public functionaries
and authority of public opinion will generally
produce accommodation.
In vol. 9, page 464, I find a' series of resoltutions, which the editor thinks were the original
of the famous Kentucky resolutions relative to
the alien and sedition lawsv:
1. Resolved, That the several States comprising
the United States of America are not united on
the principle of unlimited submission to their
General Government, but that, by a compact
under the style and title of a Constitution for
the United States, and of amendments thereto,
they constituted a General Government for special purposes-delegated to that Government
certain definite powers, reserving, each State to
itself, the residuary mass of right to their own
self-government; and that whensoever the General Government assumes undelegated powers,
its acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no
force; that to this compact each State acceded
as a State, and is an integral party, its co-States
forming, as to i self, the other party; that the
Government created by this compact was not
made the exclusive or final judge of the extent
of the powers delegated to itself, since that would
have made its discretion, and not the Constitu tion, the measure of its powers; but that, as in
all other cases of compact among powers having
no common judge, each party has an equal right
to judge for itself, as well of infractions, as of
the measure and mode of redress.
8. Raeolved, * * * That in cases of an
abuse-of the delegated powers, the members of
the General Government being chosen by the
people, a chango by the people would be the
constitutional remedy; but where powers are as sumed which  havenot been delegated,  a  null i fi cation of the act is the rightful remedy; that
every State has a natural right, in cases not
within the compact, (casus non fcdleris,) to nul lify, of their own. authority, all assumptions of
power by others within their limits; that with out this right they would be under the domin ion, absolute and unlimited, of whosoever might
exercise this right of judgment for them; that,
nevertheless, this Commonwealth, from motives
of regard and respect for its co-States, has wished
to communicate with them on the subject; that
with them alone it is proper to communicate,
they alone being parties to the compact, and
solely authorized to judge, in the last resort, of
the powers exercised under it, Congress being
not a party, but merely the creature of the com  pact, and subject, as to its assumptions of power,
.to the final judgment of those by whom, and for
whose use, itself and its powers were all created
and modified. —Pape 469.
RESOLUTIONS OF 1798, DRAW'N BY MADI                        SON.
In the ~irgina House of Delegates, Friday,
December 21st, 1798:
and chanm e s in the                                         acondition and constitution of
s      ociety may require occasional and cor responding
modifications. One single object, if your provisi on           attains it,         will entitle you  to the endless
gratitude of society-that of restraining judges
from usurping legislation. And with no body
of men is this restraint more wanting than with
the judges of what is commonly called our
General Government, but what I call our foreign
department.  They are practicing onthe Constitution by inferences, analogies, and  sophisms,
as they would on an ordinary law.  They do
no           t  seem aware   that       it is not even a Constitution
formed  by a single authority, and              subject to a
singl e  superi nte     ndence and control, but that it
is        a           c ompac t of many independent powers, every
single one of which claims an equal right to understand it and to require                    i ts  observance. However
strong the  co rd      of compact may be, there           is              a
poin    t      of te nsi on at  whic h   it will break.  A few
such doctrinal decisions as  bar efaced as that of
the Cohens, happen      ing       to        bear   immediately  on
tw     o            o     r        three   of the large States, may induce
them to joi      n in  arresting  the  march  of Gov ernmenlt, and      in arousing th e co-States                to pay  some
a     ttention to               w ha t is passing,        to bring back the
compact    to its oriin al principles or to   a modify
it legitimately    by th      e         express  consent of the
parties      themselves, and  not by the usurpation                  of
their created agents. They imagine they can
lead us into a consolidated Government, while
the     i     r ro ad lea ds directly to its dissolution. This
m       emb   er        of the Govern ment was at first consid ered as the      mo st    harml  e      ss and helpless of  all its
orga ns.  But       it has p roved that t he power of
declaring what the law is, ad liuitum, by sapping
and mining, slily and without a     larm,  the found ations o      f      the C onstitution, can do w hat  open
force would      n      ot dare to attempt.
Extract from a letter to flir. W. H. Torrance, dated
Monticello, June 11, 1815.
The second question, whether the judges are
invested with exclusive authority to decide on
the constitutionality of a law, has been hereto fore a subject of consideration with me in the
exercise of official duties. Certainly there is not
a word in the Constitution which has given that
power to them more than to the Executive or
Legislative branches. Questions of property, of
character, and of crime, being ascribed to the
judges through a definite course of legal pro ceeding, laws involving such question. belong,
of course, to them; and as they decide'on them
ultimately, and without appeal, they, of-.course,
decide for themselves. The constitutional validity
of the law or laws again prescribing executive
action, and to be administered by that branch
ultimately, and without appeal, the Executive
must decide for themselves, also, whether, under
the Constitution, they are valid or not. So also,
as to laws governing the proceedings of the Leg islature, that body must judge f itself the con stitutionality of the law, and equally without
appeal or control from its co-ordinate branches.
And, in general, the branch which is to act ulti mately, and without appeal, on any law, is the
n'ghtful expositor of the validity of the law, un controlled by the opinions of the other co-ordi 
5
ject was thoroughly considered; and the solemn
preference of the federal form demonstrates that
no construction by which the preference will be
frustratd can be just.  Its basis was State  sojv
ereignty, compatible with  a federal limited   Gov.
ernment buet incompatible with a supreme Na  tional Government. Hence State sovereignty
was  de nied  by  the gentlemen who  proposed a
National Government. This sovereignty is the
found ation of ail the  powers reserved to the
St         ates. Unless    they are sustainedy it, the
are  base less.  State legislative, e xecutive, and
judical powers, must all or none flow from this
source.  All are necessary to sustain the State
republican  Governments.  Subject either to  a
master, and the others become subject to the
same master. If the State judicial power, as
flowing from State sovereignty, is not indeppnd  ent, State legislative and executive power can.
not be independent, because all rest upon tho
same foundation; and because, if a supreme
federal Judiciary caa control State courts, it can
also control State Legislatures and Executives.
Thus a federal form of government would be re jected, though it was established, and a National
Government would be established, though it was
rejected.  *  *  *
The second section of the article we are con sidering begins with the following words: " The
judicial power shall extend."  The  word extend,
far from meaning supremacy, implies the reverse.
The distinction is expressed in the first article.
The legislation of Congress is not extended to
the tea miles square, but made supreme over
that District, in order to abolish a State concur rency of power within it. The powers of Con grews are extended to specified objects; but, as
these extensions did not imply supremacy, the
powers bestowed are concurrent, except when
attended by positive prohibitions upon the
States.-See page 130.
No legislative, executive, or judicial power, is
given to the States, for enabling them to exercise their reserved rights, because they were (dorived from thein anterior sovereignty. Frum
this source, and- the special delegations, arose
many cases of a.cancurrency in State and Feds
eral legislation, such as that of taxation; and
this concurrency would have extended to all the
delegated powers, except for the prohibitions of
the tenth section of the first article.  Thoee in
relation to war, troops, and imports and exports,
would have been useless, except that the States,
in virtue of their sovereignty, would have retained an absolute power as to these objects,
had no such prohibitions been inserted in the
Constitution. They might have declared war,
raised armies, and,imposed duties, though Congress might have done it also, upon the same
ground that both the State and Federal Governments may tax. Now, if an extension of some
sovereign powers of the States to Congress did
not, without a special prohibition, take from the
States their right to exercise the same powers,
the Constitution itself furnishes us with a construction of the judicial article. As the extension of legislative Federal power to taxation did
not destroyr the sovereign power of the States to
Resoiution 3. That this Assembly doth ex  plicitly and peremptorily declare, that it views
the powers of the Federal Government, as result  ing from the compact to which the States are
parties, as limited by the plain sense and inten  tion of the instrument constituting that compact,
as no farther valid than they are authorized by
the grants enumerated in that compact; and that
in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous
exercise of other powrs not granted by the said
compact, the States, who are parties thereto,
have the right, and are in duty bound, to inter  pose, for arresting the progress of the evil, an d
for maintaining within their respective limits the
authorities, rights, and liberties, appertaining to
them.
Resolution 5. That the General Assembly doth
particularly protest against the palpable and
alarming infractions of the Constitution in the
two late cases of the "alien and sedition acts,"
passed at tbe last session of Congress; the first
of which exercises a power nowhere  delegated
to the Federal Government, and which, by uni ting legislative and jadicial powers to those of
executive, subverts the general principles of free
government, as well as the particular organiza tion and positive provisions of the Federal Con stitution; and the other of which actsexercises,
in like manner. a power not delegated by the
Constitution, but on the contrary expressly and
positively forbidden by one of the amendments
thereto-a power which, more than any other,
ought to produce universal alarm, because it is
levelled against the right of freely examining
public characters and measures, and of free com munication among the people thereon, which has
ever  been justly deemed  the  only effectual
guardian of every other right.
Resolution 7. That the good people of this
Commonwealth, having ever felt, and continuing
to feel, the most  sincere  affection for their
brethren of the other States, the truest anxiety
for establishing and perpetuating the Union of
a!l, and the most scrupulous fidelity to that
Constitution which is the  pledge  of mutual
friendship and the instrument of mutual happiness, the General Assembly doth solemnly ap-'
peal to the like dispositions in the other States,
in confidence that they wiJl concur with this
Commonwealth in declaring, as it does hereby
declare, that the aats aforesaid are unconstitutional;  and that the  nezessary  and  proper
measures will be taken by each for co-operating
with this State, in maintaining, unimpaired, the
authorities, rights, and liberties, reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.
1798, December 24. Agreed to by the Senate.
JOHN TAYLOR OF CAROLINE.
John Taylor of Caroline, Va., was the Cato of
the old Republican party, and his writings possessed almost oracular authority among the followers of Jefferson:n
Eztractsfrom "New  Views of the Constitution,"
by John  avyto                               r of   taroltes. Virtinia.
The perseverance of the gentlemen in favor
of- a National G}overnxment proves that the sub
1. i —,4
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6
enforcing the legal character of the (Constitution,
and not as an instrument for altering its organic
or its contracting characters.  The Constitution,
as a law, would produce cases in law and equity.
To such cases only, and not to the principles of
the compact, nor to the mechanism  of our system, the judicial power of the United States is
extended.  The State courts may also try cases
in law and equity, but this gives them no power
to alter the mechanism or principles of Constitulions, or to determine the controversies of political departments.  Authorities might be cited,
in great numbers, to prove that such powers
have never been considered as annexed  to a
jurisdiction in cases of law and equity,-but only
a Federal and State c6nstructios  is adduced.
Congress have given to the courts of Columbia
a,power to try all cases in law and equity.  Do
these words convey a power to regulate the political departments or principles by which the
District is governed? The States gave to the
Federal courts the same power.  Do the same
words convey a power to regulate the political
departments or principles by which the States
are governed, and not those by which Columbia
is governed?  The State of Ohio gave a jurisdiction to one suprene court and infe,ior courts,
in c(tles of law and equity.  Did this create a
jurisdiction able to regulate the powers of political departments created by its Constitution?Pages 138, 139.
The legal feature of the Constitution, in relation to judges, is expressed in the-sixth article:
'The Constitution is the supreme law of the land,
and the judges in every State are to be bound
thereby."  Can the judgments of the Federal
court be a supreme law over this supreme law?
Is there no difference between the supremacy of
a Federal court over inferior Federal courts, and
the scupremacy of the Constitution over all courts?
The supremacy of the Constitution is a guaranty
of the independent powers, within their respective spheres, allo~wed by the Federalist to the
State and Federal Governments. A supremacy
in the court might abridge or alter these spheres.
The State judges- are bound by the Constitution
and by an oath to obey the supremacy of the
Constitution, and not even required to obey the
supremacy of the Federal court.  Why  are all
the departments of the State and Federal Governments equally bound to obey the supremacy
of the Constitution?  Because  the State and
Federal Governments were considered as checkin g or balancing departments.  Had either been
considered as subordinate to a supremacy in the
other, it would have been tyrannical to require
it by an oath to suitport the supremacy of the
Constitution, and also to break that oath  by
yielding to the usurped supremacy of the other.
The oath requires loyalty to State and Federal
powers; judgments might require disloyalty to
both.  The answer to this dilemma is, that as
the Federal, in its mechanism, is a perfect Government, because it somewhat resembles the
British, the States are bound to consider whatever  it does  asionstitutional; and that th e refore the oath, though taken ie fact to:support
the Constitution, virtually binds the swearer tO
tax, nor invest Congress with a supreme power
to annul State laws for that purpose, so the extension o f the Federal  judi       cial power to cases ino
law and equity, arising under the Federal Constitution   and laws, d id not d ep r i      ve the States
of the inher      ent       attribut e  of sovereignty to dispense. jus         tic e  to  their people in            these cases, nor
expose their decisions in cases of law a nd e quity
t o b       e          annulled by the   Federal Judiciary. A concurrency of jurisdiction arose from t       he   extension
of judicial Federal power, upon  the same  principles which produced a concurrency of legislation
between the Federal and State                                   Governments.
Origin al sovereigntie  s w ere not  i               n either case surrendered to    ha delegated participation. It is owing
to a concurrency of jurisdiction in the Federal
and State Govern men             ts, that the judges           of both
a    re  requi re          da                        e  a              oat to take an oath to support the Constitution; and this concurrency is distinctly admitted by the F          ede ral          judges in  revising State
judgments, and affirming them, if right; whereas,
if the State courts        had no jurisdiction in cased
of law and equity arising under the Federal Constitution and laws, all their judgments would
have been cotam nonjudice, and void.  Their juris diction i s          thus admitted,                 and    the only questi on  i       s, whether Congress can emp ower               the Federal court to annul it.-Pages 131, 132.
Controversies may arise under the Constitution between political departments, in relation
to their powers; between the legislative and
treaty-making departments; between the Senate
and the House of Representatives; between the
President and the Senate, or between the State
and Federal departments; but they would not
be cases in law and equity, nor is any power to
decide them given to the Federal Judiciary. One
species of controversy relates to the fbrm of
government; the other flows from its operation.
Tihe power by which a Government i. formed or
altered is not the power by which the lawsuits
of individuals are tried; and therefore a power
tz try suits in law and equity was never supposed to comprise the former powers.
Among the cases to which the Federal jurisd;etion is extended, not one is to be found recogwsing a power to decide controversies between
any of these political departments.  It is inconceivable that a jurisdiction, transcending beyond
comparison the jurisdiction cautiously bpecified,
should have been tacitly given without any
specification.-Seepages 134, 135.
The third article of the Constitution is both
organic and legal-organic, in establishing a
Federal Judiciary; legal, in creating several new
individual legal rights; but its legal character, to
be discerned in this and other articles) is addressed
to all individuals, and of course to all tribunals.
The mechanism of a supreme and inferior courts
does no more create a supreme national judicial
power, than the mechanism of Congress can create
a supreme national legislative power. -None of
these' wheels or pullies, were intended to den
stroy the State Governments, or their republi~
can forms, or the reservation by which only life
is infused into those forms. Hence the mechanism of the Federal courts into supreme and inferior' was only intended as an auxiliary towards 
support both the laws of the Federal Govern-'
ment and the judgments of its Supreme Courts
But since the State Governments, by their organization and by the guaranty, axe considered
as perfect Governments also in relation to their
reserved powers, I do not see why the Federal
Government is n9t, by the same virtual interpretation of the oath, bound to support State laws
and judgments.  Is it not as obvious, by endowing the Federal Government or either of its departments with this virtual' supremacy over the
State Governments, deduced, not from the principles of the compact,' but from the form of its
organization, that a consolidated National Government.and a destruction of the State Governments would-ensue, as by endowing the State
Governments, upon the same grounds, with an
unexpressed supremacy over the Federal Government, a dissolution of the Union would be
the  consequence?  The fact is, that both are
perfect Governments, in relation to                         their respective powers, subject in one csse to three.fourths
of the States, and in the other to the people of
each State; and that neither this species of perfection, nor the mechanism of either, invests one
with any species of supremacy over the other.Seepages 140, 141.
Have we  not heard judges  crying out, th ro   ugh
the land, sedition l and asking those whose duty
it was to inquire, is there no sedition -here? It
is true, the sedition laiw had expired with the
last Achniinistration, and he trusted it would not
exist, or at least be acted on, under the virtuous
Jefferson. But hereafter, if it should eXist, your
judges, under the cry of sedition and political
heresy, may place half your citizens in irons.See Annals of ConFress, 1801-'2, page 47.
STEVENS THOMPSON MASON, OF VIRGINIA.
During the same discussion, Mr. Mason, of Virginia, said:
The- objects of courts of law, as I understand
them, are to settle questions of right between
suitors, to enforce obedience to. the laws, and
to protect the citizens against the oppressive use
of power in the Executive offices. Not to protect them against the Legislature, for that I think
I have show,# to be impossible, with the powers
which the Legislature may safely use and exercise, and because the people have retained in
their own hands the power of controlling and
directing the Legislature, by their immediate
and mediate elections of President, Senate, and
House of Representatives.-See ib., page 73.
On Remodelng the J-uioiary.
Near the close of the Administration of the
elder Adams,:viz: on the 13th February, 1801,
the judiciary system was remodelled, by which a
largernumber of circuit judgeships were created,
and  the Sup      reme Court mad     e simply a court of
appeal -fro m the inferior jurisdiction s. But a
revolution had taken plac        e  in the politics of the
country. Mr. Jefferson had been elected President, and hi s Republican fiends had a majority
in                              both branches of the succeeding Cong ress.
Earl y in  the session, Mr. Brekinridge, of Kentuckyo,  introdu   ced a r   esol ution      into the Senate,
propo sing   the   repe al of the judiciary act above
referred to, which, after protracted debate in both
branches  of C         ongress, was carried.
MR. JACKSON, OF GEORGIA.
On the   12th January,  M   fr. J  ackson, of Georgia,
said:
We bake been asked if we am afraid of having
an army of judges?'For myself,: Iam more afrid
of     an a rmy  of judges, under                the patronage of the
President, than of an army of soldiers. The
former can do Us more harm. They may deprive
Us of our liberties, if attached to the Executive,
from their decid's; and from the tenure of office
con      tend ed for, we  cannot remove them; while
the soldier, however heresy      act, is enlisted or i          f
not enlis-ted,ly-subsisted for two years; whilst
the jadge is eimed'for life,.for hissgalar can,
't~be taken from binL-a -12tiA dev/on, 8  sec.,
lI 0 rt., C,onitn n, o.
—',i t it X * -the-.se evils will not, pen)
But that Aaferity have we' for W   truth of M
dedloatien? thve a ea,m:sedion lewa:?,
MR. COCKE, OF TENNESSEE..
Mr. Cocke, of Tennessee, on the same subject,
said:
We have been told that f. e nation is to look
up to these immaculate ju,dges to protect their
liberties; to protect the people against them selves. This was novel, and what result did it
lead to?  He shuddered to think of it. Were
there nofie of these judges ready to plunge their
swords in the American heart?'He did-not
think it proper to be alarmed by the terrors held
out.-Ib., page 75.
-THOMAS T. DAVIS, OF ENRTUCKY.
In the House of Representatives, Mr. Davis, of
Kentucky, said:
I found my opinion of the expediency of repealing the Judiciary; law on another'.'reason in
addition to that of the courts being unnecesary;
I mean the power they declare they have, in be
langgage of Judge Patterson, to "declare a law
null and void."  Never can I subscribe to that
opinion. Never can I believe the Judiciary paramount  to both branches  of the Legislature; if i    t
is, I have yet to learn it i there is an end to, leg-'
islation; a knave or a fool can make void your
best and moSt wholesome laws. * * * I
am willing to admit the Judiciary to he oo,
oydinate with the Legislature ia this respect, ta
wit: that judges, thinking a law uncoustittUtipn.
al, are not bou   to. exepute it; but a -. to do,
clave it null and'ysky.:That power res~ #lone
with the Legislatufe, -But we are told this Judiciary it necessry tQ ohecig this H9480 p and.the
Sews, and, -to protect th~ people agaln$t their
~w rst enemies  -  iia i flying to the.people,
you are incapable of governing yourselves; your
repr~oeseativse4incap.9 ~aJ  of doing it; iing..st
il
0       -,.)  v  -, 
8
r  gress, to whom. the business oflegislation is con3 ti ded.  This Congress is to consist of a House of
1  Representatives, to be'chosen by the people i m*   mediately, and responsible to them at the end of
every two years; and a $enate to be chosen by
. the Legislatures of the different States, who a're
chosen by the people-one-third'of the Senators
a  to be chosen every two years, and responsible
at the end of every six years.  The Executive
poweris vested in a      President, who is chosen by
electors, who are chosen for the express purpose
- by the people, and responsible at the end of every
four years. * * *
Thus,, then, are formed two  departments, their
powers specified and defined, the'times for ex  tending their powers fixed, and, indeed, a comn  plete organization for the execution'of their re spective powers, without the intervention of any
law for that purpose.  A third department, to
wit: the Judiciary department, is still wanting.
Is that formed by the Constitution?  How is that'
to be formed?  It is not firmed by the Constitu tion. It is only declared that there shall be such
a  department; and it is directed to be forg'ed by
the other two departments, who owe a responsi bility to the people.  Here there arises an im portant difference of opinion bptween the differ ent sides o-Q'f this House.  It is -contended on one
side that the Judiciary department is formed by
the Constitution itself.  It is contended on the
other side that the Constitution  does no more
than to declare that there shall be a Judiciay
department, and directs that it shall be formed
by the other two departments,  under certain
modifications.  Article third, section first, of the
Constitution, has these  words:  "The judicial
powerof the United States shall be vested in one
Supreme Court, and in.,such inferior corwt as.
Congress shall from time to time ordain and establish."'  Here, then, the power to ordain and
establish inferior courts.it given to Congress in the most unqualified terms and also to ordaer
and establish "one Supreme Court."  The ony
limitation upon the power of   Co ngr ess in thia
clause consists in the number of Supreme. Court
to be established; "the limitation is to th'e num-:
ber of one, although that is -an affirmative and
not a negative expression. The number of judges,
the assignation of duties, the fixing compensations, the fixing of times when, snd places where,
the courts shall exercise their functions, &c,r-are
left to the entire discretion of:Congres. the
spirit as well as the wordes of the -Constitution
are completely  satisfied, provided one Supreme
Court be established.  Hence, when all these
essential pointa in the organization and formation
of courts is intrusted to the Unlimited discretio~
of Congress,.it cannot be said ~!,; the couirt are
formed by the Constitution. *  *   *
The Legislature has no more Sntrol over'ar
officer who holds an exeentive commi   ssio xL dut
ring the pleasure of the Presiderot, than ote~;
,judici&il officer. holding. his offiew during g004
Fbehaviour the remedy given. by thle Cgnstitu?
tionl being the: flame in bot!~ cows to writ:s imnpeahment. Not is there any. reason wha t]b3e
officee of the one'.should be lelm~subj~t- to the'
discretion of the Legislature than the officee of
Judiciary alone you find a safe deposit for you
liberties; and saying, also, that the Judicigry -i
the vitals of the nation, wherein all power, al
safety dwells; that the Legislature is subordi
note  thereto, and a mere nominal thing, s
shadow without substance, its acts perfectly
within the control of the Judiciary. I tremble
at such ideas.  The sooner we put men out oe
power, who we find determined to act in this
manner, the better; by doing so, we preserve the
power of the Legislature, and save our nation
from the ravages of an uncontrolled Judiciary.lb., page 558.
WILLIAM B. GILES, OF VIRGINIA.    On the saome subject, in the House of R     epre  sentatives, Mr. Giles,                           of Virginia, said:
The general disquietude which  manifested
itself in                       consequence  of these enterprising'teas ures, in th    e year 1800, induced the F ederal par ty to apprehend            that   they had push&, their prin ciples too far, and they  began to enterjin doubts
of the result of the Presidential  election, which
was  approaching.  In       this state  of things, it      w      as
natural for them to look out for some depart me                   n    t ofth Gerc the Government in whih they could en trenc       h     themselves  in       the event of an unsuccess ful issuent  in      the e le ctio n,  an d cont inue  t   o    support
those fav orit    e         pri nci   ples of irresponsibility which
they   could never                 consent   to abandon.
The Judiciary depart         ment,  of course, presented
itself as best fitted for their object, not only be cause it was alreadv filled with men who had
manifested      th e  most  indecorous zeal i'n'  fav or of
thei      r principl es, but becau se they held their offi ces b    y  indefinite     tenures, and  of course  w     ere
further.    rem ov ed fro m  any              responsibility to the
people than      either of the other departments. * *
Although the gentleman from New York (Mr.
T. Mo rr   i s) y    est erday observed   that the Presi dent had commenced a system'of persecution, so
i         gnorant, he said,  he was, o f  the  exis tence of such
a       syst em,  that   h       e could not conceive to        what  the
g entl em    a      n alluded.  It is some  time, Mr. Chairman, since a member of this House, and sun[ry
printers throughout the United States, have been
amerced'and imprisoned-to appease the vengeance of an unconstitutional sedition act, for
merely publishing their own sentiments, Which
happened to be unpalatable to the then existing
Administration l It is some time, sir, since we
have seen judges, who ought to have been independent, converted into political partisans,,and,
like Executive missionaries, pronouncing politicil harangues throughout the United States! It
is some time, sir, since we have seen the zealous
judge stoop from the bench to look out for more
victims for judicial vengeance! It is some time
since we have seen the same judicial imapetuosity
drive from the bar the most respectable coUnSel,
who humanely proposed to interpose between a
friendless and unprotected man'and the judicial
vengeance to which he' was doomedi.It is
some time, air, since we have seen thie same- judicial seal extending the provisions of the sedii
tion act, by discovering that it had jurisdiction
of the/,knn ve,ista, or common law.  ~  *
The first clause declares there shall be a Con
) 4?
v I /li
I 
'9
written in express words in the body of the in   strument. * * *
But the most important consequence from this
doctrine is, that it erects the judges into a body
politic and corporate, in perpetual  succession,
with censorial and controlling powers over the
other departments.   And for what  purpose?
The gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Hen  derson) has informed us, "to protect the people
against their worst enemies-'themselves 1" This
is the real exposition of the object, in very few
but emphatical words. * * *
Very shortly after the establishment of courts,
the judges decided that they had jurisdiction
over the States in their sovereign capacity. Did
this, in the judges, seem unambitious?  The
States thought it did not.'*  *  *
The judges have determined that  they are
judges, in the last resort, upon the constitution  a'ty of your laws.  He'proposed not to discuss
this question, because he did not think it perti  nent to the question before us. He only men tioned it to show their unlimited claims to power.
The judges have determined that their jurisdic tion extends to the lex non  scripta, or rather to
the tex non descripta, or common law.  Does this,
in the judges, seem unambitious?  This  law
pervades the whole municipal regulations of the
country.  It is unlimited in its object, and indef inite in its character.  Legalize this unassuming
claim of jurisdiction by the judges, and they
have before them every object of legislation.
They have sent a mandatory process, or process
leading to a mandamus, into the Executive Cab inet, to examine its concerns.  Does this, in the
judges, seem unambitious?  Now, sir, examine
and combine the extraordinary pretensions to
power-; legalize them, and you have precisely
that body politic and corporate which gentlemen
deem so important in the United  States, "So
protect the people from their worst enemiesthemselves!" He should Rot revert so frequently
to this expression, but that he did consider it as
the candid and correct exposition of the object
of gentlemen opposed to the repeal.  It was the
doctrine of irresponsibility against the doctrine
of responsibility. The latter, he had endeavored
to show, characterized the Constitution of the
United States. It was the doctrine of despotism,
in opposition to the representative system.  It
was an express  avowal that the people were
incompetent to govern themselves.-'lb., pages
581 —596.
the other; and it seems to be universally agreed,
that although the Legislature cannot deprive an
ExecutiVe of fic e   r of his office in an y  o ther way
than by-impeachment, during the continuance of
such office, yet the office  its elf is always s   ubjec t
to be abolis hed.  The samereasoning   will hold
with equalforce respecti ng a  judge a nd a judicial
office.   The. reason why          the Ex ec utive  is pro   scribed from the removal of a judge, is to secure
to the judge a complete independence of the
President who is not           responsible forthe discharge
of                 judicial duties; but the removal is perfectly
correct in the case of an Executive officer, be   cause the President is highly responsible for the
due discharge of Executive duties. The Legisla   ture is not responsible for either, and, of course,
stands in the same constitutional relation to
b                               oth.                                         - * 
And in this part of the sentence, the correct
phraseology of the Constitution is worthy of ob  servation. In speaking of the Executive attri  bute, to wit: the appointing and commissioning
officers, the term good behaviour is used.   In
speaking of the legislative attribute, to wit: the
creation of the offices, and fixing compensations,
the term during their coTntinuance in office is used.
The reason for this variation of expression is
obvi6us. It was known that the office might be
discontinued, and the judge contuinue to behave
well; the limitation was therefore applied to the
office, and not to the good behaviour, because if
the office should be discontinued, which is clearly
implied in this expression, it was not the,intention
of the Constitution that the compensation shoild
be received, no service in that event being to be
rendered.
Can so much inattention and folly be attrib utel to the framers of the Constitution as would
result from the supposition that if it was their
intention that a law growing out of the specified
powers, in contradistinction to all others, should
be irrepealable when once passed, that so extra ordinary a principle would be left to mere impli cation? Such a supposition would bethe high est injustice to the superior intelligence and pa triotism of those gentlemen, manifested in every
other part of the instrument.   No, sir; they
would have made notes of admiration; they
would have used every mark, adopted every caution, to have arrested and fixed the -attention of
the Legislature to -s0 extraordinary a principle.
They would have said, Legislators, be circumspect! Be cautious I Be calm I Be deliberate I
Be wise I Be wise, not only for the present, but
be wise for posterity l You are now about to
tread upon holy ground. The law you are now
abo-ut to pass is irrepealable I irrevocable I We
are so enamored with the salutary and practi.
cal independence of the English judiciary system, that, in infusing its principle into our Con..
stitution, we have stamped it with the proverbial
folly of the Medes and Persians I If this princi
ple had been introduced into the Constitution in
express words, it would have formed an uanfortunate contrast to all other parts of the!i~stturenut;yet gentlemen make no difficulty'iuitr0,
ducing that principle by construction,~ which
would'have appeared so stupid and abo'ur~.if
ROBERT WILLIAMS.
Robert Williams, of North Carolina, said:,
That there must be some place where the trne
meaning of the'Oonstitution must be determined,
all would agree. Where, then, is it? In what
department?'The people have Constituted two
departments of authority-the Executive and
Legislative, emanating directly from the peopleand have directed thetm to form another, farther
removed from the people.  Are we, then, toAbe
told there  is move safety in confiding this important power to the last department, so far redpoved from the people, than in departments
flowingg directly from the  people, responsible to,
I  I
I t?
I 
10
of compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his defence; the courts, in their extreme humility, cannot fint authority for granting it;;.but
touch one cent of their salaries, abolish one sinecure office which the judges hold, and they are
immediately arrayed against the laws, as the
champions of the Constitution.  Lay your hands
ot  the liberties of the people, they are torpid,
utterly insensible; but affect their peculiar interest, and they are all nerve.  They are said to be
harmless, unaspiring men. Their humble pretensions extend only to a complete exemption
from legislative control, to the exercise. of an inquisitorial authority over the Cabinet of the
Executive, and the veto of the Roman Tribunate
upon all your laws, together with the establishin g any body of laws which they may choose to
declare a part of the Constitution.  *  *  *  In
their inquisitorial capacity, the Supreme Court,
relieved from the tedious labor of investigating
judicial points by the law of the last session, may
easily direct the Executive, by mandamus, in what
mode it is their pleasure that he should execute
his functions.  They will also have more leisure
to attend to the Legislature, and forestall, by inflammatory pamphlets, their decisions on all important questions; whilst, for the amusement of
the public, we shall retain the right of deb' ting,
but not of voting.-lb.,pages 661, 662.
NATHANIEL  MACON.
Nathaniel Macon, of North Carolina, sad:
We have heard much about the judge, andthe
necessity of their independence. I will state one
fact, to show that they have power as well as
independence. Soon after the establishment of
the Federal courts, they issued a writ-not being a professional man, I shall not undertake to
give its name-to the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, directing a case then depending in the
State court to be brought into the Federal court.
Thee State judges refused to obey the.,u nos,
and laid the whole proceedings before th:.Lle gislature, who approved their conduct, aud, a& well
as I remember,'uneWimously; and this in Att day
was not called disorganizing.-Ib., page 7.1;1
JOSEPH I H. NICHOLSON.
Joseph H. Nicholson,'of Maryland, said:
This Judiciary, however, the gentleman  from
Delaware has said, in that same spirit of Chris tion meeknesT which appears to have charac terized him throughout, he never considered a
sanctuary, because he knew that nothing was
sacred in the eyes of infidels.  *  *  * if the
entire rejection of the odious principle, that the
reins of Government  are  to  be placed in the
hands, of a set of m.na who are independent of
and beyond the control of the. people, afford any
e'dence of infidelity,, then do I       avow my self'a$
much an infieloasany man living.  *  *  *
':Have the people of this country ever'consented
to ves the judges with this extensive discretion-'
ary pgwer? Have they ever sandtioned the
prinicl~te.that the judges ShouldI makle Plow for
them instead of their Representatives'?. f.t.: not
i~ giiat&~P, to all intends and purpiae~, w"hen
and returning at short o                    inte rvals into, the mass
of the people? * * *
If this doctrine is to extend to the length gentlemen contend, then is the sovereignty of the
Government to be swallowed up in the vortex of
the Judiciary. Whatever the other departments
of the Government may do, they can undo. You
may pass a law, but they can annul it. Will not
the people be astonished to hear that their laws
depend upon the will of the judges, who are
themselves independent of all law?-lb., pages
531, 532.
JOHN RANDOLPH.
John Randolph,                      of Roanoke, said:
But, asir, if you pass the law, the judges are to
put            their v e to upon it by declaring it unconstitutional. Here  is a new power, of a dangerous
and unc ontrolla      ble nature, contended for. The
d       ecision of a             constitutional question must rest
Lomewhere.  Sha ll it       be c   onfidede to men immediately       teCponsible tothe       e people, or to  those who
are         i rre sponsible?   for the   responsibility by im.
peachment is little less than a name. SFrom
whom  is a          c orrup t d ecis ion mos t    to be feared?
To  m e i   t appears that  the p ower which has the
righ t  of p  assing, wi  thout appeal, on                 the validity
of your laws, is your sov ereign   *     *  *  But,
sir, are we not as deeply       in         te     rested in      the true
exposition                                 of the Constitution  as the judges can
be?  With all the deference t o   their           talents, is
not            Congre s    s as capaple of forming a correct
opinion as the y are?  Are not its members actingunder a responsibility        to public opinion, which
can and                  w      ill  c heck their aberrations from duty?
Let a case, not an     ima gin          ary one, be  s tated: Congress v      iol  ates    the  Constitution by fettering the
p ress;        the judici al corrective is applied to; far
from protect      ing t he  liberty of  t he   citizen, or the
lester of the Constitution, you find                them outdoing
the Legislature in zeal; pressing the   common law
of England            to their service where the sedition
l     aw         did not apply.  Suppos e your r eliance  had
been  altogether on this broken staff,  and not on
tho elective principle? Your press might have
be  en echained till doomsday, your citizens incareerated f       or l if e, and where is your  remedy? But
if the construction of the Constitution  is             left with
us, there are no longer limits to our power; and
this would be true, if an appeal did not lie through
the elections, from us to the nation, to whom
alone, and not a few privileged individuals, it
belongs to decide, in the last resort, on the Constitution. Gentlemen tell us that our doctrine
will carry the people to the gallows, if they suffer
themselves to be misled into the belief that the
judges are not the expositors of the Constitution.
Their practice has carried the people to infamous
punishment, to fine and imprisonment; and had
they affixed the penalty of death to their unconstitutional laws, judges would not have been
wranting to conduct them to the-gibbet. * * *
No, air, you may invade the p~ess; the courts will
support you, will outstrip you in zeal to further
this great object; your citizens may be imprisoned
and amerced, the courts will take core to &ee it
executed; the helpless foreigner may, contrary to
theexpress letter ofyour Constitution, be deprived
.4   y
I 
11'
that, but of some other department or body of
men.  The  Constitution, and  the laws made
pursuant thereto, are the  only rule by which
the Judiciary, in their official capacity,  are to
regalate their conduct.  The same is the case
with other departments.  The Judiciary have no
more right to prescribe, direct, or control, the
acts of the other departments of the Govern   ment, than the other departments of the Gov  ernment hate to prescribe or direct those of the
Judiciary.-lb,page 983.
THE SEDITION LAW-MATTHEW LYON'S
CASE.
Matthew Lyon, of the State of Vermont, was
convicted under  the sedition act, in 1798, sen  tenced to several months' imprisonment, and the
payment of a thousand dollars fine. He subse  quently removed to Kentucky,  and petitioned
Congress more than once for indemnity, on the
ground that the law under which he  suffered was
unconstitutional, as well a s  in     consequence of
irregularity in the p ro ceedin gs  of the  court
against him. On Tuesday, December 8, 1818,
the memorial being under consideration in the
United States Senate    The Hon. JoHN'J. CRITTENDEN, of Kentucky,
said:
He Considered the sedition act as having been
unconstitutional, not only from a defect of power
in Congress to pass such a law, but because its
passage was expressly forbidden by the Consti tution. The sense of the nation had unques tionably pronounced it unconstitutional; and
that opinion; being  generally entertained,  it
ought to be solemnly pronounced by the Legis lature, that history and the records of the coun try may not hand it down  tb posterity as a pre cedent for aets of Similar usurpation.  If a re vision of the proceedings in that case was im portant in a public point of view, it was certain ly so as it related to the individuals who became
the subjects of prosecution under that act. To
each of them, and to every citizen of the United
States, the Constitution of the United States
had guarantied certain rights, which had been
violated by that law. This guaranty entitled
them to indemnity in cases wherein those rights
were violated; of this indemnity, the decision of
courts ought not to deprive them. If they did,
he said, there is no redeeming spirit in the Con stitution. Legal sanctions cannot vitiate consti.
tutional provisions. The Judiciary is -a valuable
part of the Government, and ought to be highly
respected; but is not infallible. The Constitu tiou is our guidei-our supreme  law.  B]ind
l homage can never be'rendered by freemen to
any power.  Is all cases of alleged violations
of the Constitution, it was for Congress to makes
a just discrimination. In doubtful cases, he
said,'he would not interfere; but when the C~onstitetit forbade a law, he would:not hesitate
to inter pose for the relief of those-Who suffered
by its infiitions. —/cnton's Abridgme^t vol. 6,
pagje 1'84...
your judges  are ao thorize  d to   intoduce. at
pleasure  th    e  l aws  of a foreign   country, to arm
themselves with  power? Th   e Americ an p eople
never  dreamed of such a                             principle in the Con   stitution,     and      never will submi to iL  They
never ought to submit to iL It is giving to
t    he judges             a power infinitely more transcend  ent than that v ested  in any o      ther bra nch                    of the
Government. The Legislature cannot recognise
any principle of    the c ommon  law ha ving a
m onarchical              tendency; yet  this        principle     the
judges may recognise if you leave it to their
disc       retion to    introduce any part of the  common
l     aw which they may think proper.  *  *  *
B y wha        t authority are the judg es to be raised
above  the  law and above   the Constitution?
W        here is the charter which places the sover  eignty of this country in their hands? Give
them       the pow ers  and   the i   ndependence  now
con    tend ed for, and   they will  require     n         othing
more; for your Government becomes                           a despot  ism,  and    they be        come your rulers.  They  are to
decide  upon the lives, the liberties, and  the
property, of your citizens; they have an absolute
veto          upon your laws, by decl ar   ing          them       n ull
an vd void  at  pleasu re; they   are t    o i ntroduce at
will the laws of a foreign country, differing
es sentially with us upon the   great principles of
governmen t;        and, aft  e    r      being clothed with      this
arbitrar y power,  th ey a   re beyond the  control of
t    he nation, as they are nobt                    to be affected by any
laws which    the p   eopl   e  by         their representatives
can pas   s. If all      this   be true, if this doctrine be
established in the  extent which is now contend ed for, the  Constitution i s not worth       bhe         time
we are now spending upon it.  It is, as it has
been called by its enemies, mere parchment; for
these judge      s, thus re        nd ered omnipotent, may
overleap  the Constitution, and  trample on  pur
Laws.;tm   uh they m ay laugh  the Leg islature to scorn,
and set t he             nation           at defi ance.
T     o m e,        i  t is a matter  of indifference by what
name you call them; I care not whether it be
k ings   or j  adges. Arm                      them with power, and
th      e danger is th    e same. For myself, I               have no
hesitation   in declaring    th    at I Would rather be
subject to the absolute sw       ay of  one tyrant, than
to that of thirty;                             as I would prefer  the mild
despotism of Chin  a to the  hated  aristocracy                of
Venice, where        the vilest                   w retch  was encouraged
as a sec ret informer, and                    the lion's mouth was
ever gaping for accusation.-lb., page 805-824.
JOHN          BACON.
John Bacon, of Massachusetts, said:
We have heard much of late about the peculiar and absolute independence of the Judiciary.
Although this is a term unknown in the Constitution as applying particularly to the Judiciary
department of the Government, yet it may and
ought to be admitted to be, in a certairl sense,
and in some respects, true. The Judiciary are
so far independent of the Legislative and Executive ~lepartments of the Governpenut, that them,
neither jointly or separately, have A rifht to preScribe, direct, or control, its decisldhS. It must
judge for itself; otherwise the: decisions made
in that department would not be thodeisione of
i I 46  
i    (. le"                2
quently referred to, as sovereign  and conclusive
of the question. 
: The committee entertain a high respect for the
purity and intelligence of the Judiciary.  But it
is a rational respect, limited by a knowledge of
the frailty of human nature, and the theory of
the Constitution, which declares, not only that
judges  may err in opinion, but also may commit crimes, and hence has provided a tribunal
for the trial of offenders.,
In times of violent party excitement, agitating
the'whole nation, to expect that judges will be
entirely exempt from its influence, argues a profound ignorance of mankind.  Although clothed
with the ermine, they are still men, and carry
into the judgment seat the passions and motives
common to their kind.  Their decisions on party
questions reflect their individual opinions, which
frequently betray them unconsciously into error.
To balance the judgment of a whole people by
that of two or three men, no matter what may
be their official elevation, is to exalt the creature
of the Constitution above  its creator, and to
assail the foundation of our political frabric;
which is, that the decision of the people is infallible, from which there is no appeal  but to
Heaven.-S-c Benton'8 Abridgment, vol. 6, pa"
660, 661.
MAHLOt;DICKERSON, of New Jersey, said:
But I must beg leave to differ from the honorable gentleman (Mr. Walker, of Georgia) when
he   informs us that our independent Judiciary is
the bulwark of the liberties of the people.  By
which he must mean, defenders of the people
against the oppressions ofthe Government. From
what I witnessed in the years  1798, 1799, and
1800, X never shall, I never can, consider our
Judiciary as the bulwark of the liberties of the
pedple.  The people must look out for other bulowarks for their liberties.  I have the most profound respect for the learning, talents, and integrity, of the H'i6norable judges who fill the
Federal bench. But if those who carried into
effect the sedition act are to be called the people's defenders, it must be for nearly the same
reason that the Fates were called Parcce-quia
non parcebant.  It would be a subject of curious
investigation, how far the Judiciary, from the
eat d iest times  to the present, have been the defenders of the people's liberties against the oppressions of'Government; how much their zeal
has been increased or diminished  by the certainty or uncertainty in the tenure of office; how
far by an increase or diminution of salary; how
much it has been affected by a fear of loss of
office or salary on one side, or the hope of further promotion or increase of salary on the other.
But such speculations at present are unnecee sary..-e-ib, page 701.
NAT'IEL MAcon, of North Carolina, on the
same day, said:
According to some gentlemen, we were to regard the Judiciary more than the law, and both
more than the Constitution.  It was a misfortuue the judges were not equal in infallibility to
the God who made them. The truth was, if
the judge was a party man out of power, he
would be a party man in.  The office would not
change human nature. He had no dotqbt that
the sedition law, and the proceedings uhder it,
had more  effect i n revolutionizing  the   Governm    e nt         than all its o ther acts.  He well rememberedof the language of the times-pay your taxes,
but don't speak against Government. The gentleman from Massachusetts admits the inexpediency of the law, but not its unconstitutionality. This was of itself a great concession.
Would he, or the gentleman from South Caroli-.
na, put his finger on the clause of the Constitution which authorized that law? He would not
impute evil motives-he had nothing to do with
them, but with acts. He would have preferred
a silent vote; but, being referred to in the petition, he could not be silent. Money is paid back
daily from the Treasury to individuals, without
its being called revising the decision of the
judges. HIe did not agree with the gentleman
from Massachusetts (Mr. Otis) about the powers
of the Government. That gentleman thought it
might do any act necessary to its preservation.
He (Mr. M.) believed it could not go beyond the
Constitution. We have in the country two Governments. The Constitution defines the powers
of the General Government, and leaves the State
Governments untouched. He thought the position clear, that if there was no constitutional
power to pass the law, the money was taken
wrongfully, and ought to be restored.  ~fr. Macon was sorry the names of judges had been introduced. We ought to pass lightly over the
ashes of the dead. Let them sleep quietly with
their fathers. He would not disturb them. —
Ib. page 187.
Extract from a report made to the United
States Senate, December 5, 1820, on the petition
of Matthew Lyon, by the Hon. JAMES BARBOUR, of
Virginia, in behalf of a committee of that body
to whom the petition was referred:
The claim of the petitioner      to redle. **       r              rests on
the  facts,     that he w as convicted under the law
commonly called the sedition act, and suffered
in his body a long and loathsome confinement
in jail, and in his estate, by the payment of a
large fine.  *  *  *  A majority of the committee, after the severest investigation, have decided that the petitioner is entitled to relief. *
The first question that naturally presents itself
in the investigation is, was the law constitutional! The committee have no hesitation ia-pronouncing, in their opinions, itwas not  * *  *
The committee are aware tfiat, in opposition
to this view of the subject, the decision of some
of the judges of the Sopreme Court, sustaining
the constitutionality of the law, has been fre
GEORGIA.
In the case of Paddelford, Fay, & Company,
m. the Mayor and Aldermen of the city of Satannab, Judge Benning, in delivering the opinion of the'ourt, recited two or three cases  in
which the Stite of Georgia had acted in disre
12 
13
Reesolved, That the State of-Georgia will never
, so far compromit her sovereignty, as an independent State, as to become a party to the case
sought to be made before the Supreme Court of
the United States, by the writ in question.
Resolved, That his Excellency the Governor be,
and he and every other officer of this State is
hereby, requested and enjoined to disregard any
and every mandate and  process that has been
or shall be served on him or them, purporting
to proceed from the Chief Justice or any Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, for the purpose of arresting the execution
of any of the criminal laws of this State.
Similar resolutions were passed, as to the case
of Graves, by the Legislature of 1834.
PENNSYLVANIA.
The Supreme  Court of Pennsylvania, in the
case of the Commonwealth vs. Cobbett, gave  a
unanimous opinion in 1788, from which the following is an extract:
If a State should differ with the United States
about the construction of them, there is no common umpire but the people, who should  adjust
the affair by making amendments in the constitutional way, or suffer from the defect.   In such
a    case, the Constitution of the United States is
federal; it is a league or treaty made by the
individual States as one party, and all the States
as another party.  When two nations differ about
the meaning of any clause, sentence, or word, in
a treaty, neither has an exclusive right to decide
it; they endeavor to adjust the matter by negotiation; but if it cannot be thus accomplished,
each has a right to retain its own interpretation,
until a  erference  be had to the mediation  of othe r
nations, and arbitration, or the  fate of war.
There is no provision in the Constitution that
in such a case the judges of the Supreme Court
of the United States shall control and be conclusive; neither can the Congress by a law confer
that power.-Respublica vs.  Cobbett, 3  Dallas's
Reports, page 475.
g.drd of the decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States.  In                the cas e of Chisholm, executo r, against G    eorgi a, the Supreme Court                of
the United States    Ordered,   th at u      nless    the said  State shall
either in due form appear, or show cause to the
contrary, in this court, by the first day of next
term, judgment by default shall be entered
agai nst the said State.
The reporter adds, in a note, that, 9 in Februa                ry tern, 1794,  judgment was rendered for      the
plaintiff, and a writ of inquiry awarded.   The
writ, however, was no t sued out and  execut                           ed;
so      that this cause, and all of the                             other suits
a             gainst States, were swept at  once from                   the
records of  the court,  by      the amendment  of  the
Fed     eral C   on       st         itution."
Georgia treated the court with contempt in
respect to this case.  Her position: wa,  that the
court  h    ad no jurisdiction of her as              a party.-.
Georgia  Reports, vol. 14, poe 479.
The Judge proceeds to say, that " in this position Georgia t riumphe d," and  that the judgment against her "' fell dead."
The  Judge  next cites the case ofWo rcester a nd
Butler, who had settled on the Cherokee lands
in G          eorgia, co ntrary to the laws        of the State,
and for which offence they were sent to the penitentiary. On A writ of error, the Supreme Court
of the United States annulled the judgment in
the State court, and issued a mandate to the
Superior Court of Georgia, to carry its judgment
of reversal into execution. Judge Benning proceeds:
Now, what did Georgia do on receipt of this
special mandate? Through every department
of her Government, she treated the mandate and
the writ of error with contempt the most profound. She did not even protest against jurisdiction, as she had done in the case of Chisholm's executors; but she kept Worcester and
Butler in the penitentiary, and she executed, in
the Creek nation, the laws, for violating which
they had been put in the penitentiary. * * *
Judge Benning, in delivering his opinion, says,
further:
VIRGINIA.
The Court of Appeals of Virginia, in 1814, in
the case of IHunter vs. Martin, devisee of Fairfax,
entered the following unanimous opinion, after
full argument:
The court is unanimously of opinion that the
appellate power of the Supreme Court of the
United States does not extend to this court, under a sound construction of the Constitution of
the United States; that so much of the twentyfifth section of the act of Congress to establish
the judicial courts of the  United States asextends the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to this court is not in pursuancwof the
Con stitution of the Unit ed  Statoi; that  the wri t
of error in this case was improvidently allowed
under the authority of that act; that the proceedings thereon in the Supreme Court were
coram non judice in relation to this court; and
that obedience to its mandate be declined by this
court.
It was not only in this case that Georgia occupied this position; she did it in two other
cases, and those, cases of life and death: the
c      a      s      e        of Tassels, and that of Graves. On e of
these happened before those of Worcester and
Butler, namely, in 1830; the other afterwards,
in 1834.  The Supreme Court had issued writs
of error in each of these cases, on the application of the defendants to the State of Georgia;
but, as thle cases are not reported, it is to be
presumed that these writs never got back to the
Supreme Court; or that, if they ever did, it was
too late.  It is certain that Georgia hung the applicants for the writ.
In th e Tasse ls case, the  Le gisl ature passed
these, among other resolutions:
i t.6 
14
of difference might be multiplied to a tedious extent; but enough has been said to show that
judges, who, like other men, are subject to the
frailties, the passions, the partialities, and an- x
tipathies, incident to human nature, should not
b e    exempted from responsibility on account of
their superior integrity, learning, and capacity;
or that their decisions should be subject to revision by some competent tribunal, responsible
to the people. It is believed that this is the
opinion of that great and good man who penned
the Declaration of Independence, and who now
enjoys, in the shades of Monticello, the blessings
of the principles which it contains. * *
It was the judgment of a court that doomed
the immortal Socrates to drink the hemlock,
When the Roman tyrant could no longer use a
hired soldiery to immolate  the victims of his
jealousy, he resorted to courts of law.  When
Henry VII1, of England, would exercise cruel
despotism under the forms of a free Constitution,
the army, the court, and the Parliament, were
the potent engines that sustained him.  When
.Ilary, his daughter, compelled the Protestants to
seal their testimony at the stake, the court gave
sanction to the murderous deeds.  Her sister and
successor, Elizabeth, created the Court of High
rCommission, and formally invested it with inquisitorial power.;he also supported the arbi tray.y edicts of the Star Chamber. The Puritans,
because obnoxioua to the free exercise of the prerogatives of the Crown, were  imprisoned and
dispersed by process of law, and the judges were
the supporters of her despotic power.  When
she would destroy her unfortunate kinswoman,
the Queen of Scots, the judges were instructed
to condemn her, and by their sentence she came
to the block.  This horrid deed was covered by
the cloak of judicial proce edings. When Charles
I determined to change the religion of Scotland,
he made use   of  the  Court  of High  Commission to
effect th e  object.  By th e s ae   judicial  power,
the  advocat es  fo r the          d octrines of the Reformation have so often been divested of their religious privileges, and  doomed t  o seal with
their blood t hat religion which bor e them triumphant ly th r ough    the v ale   of d eath.
These facts are not exhibited to derogate from
the' character of the  Judiciary, but to show th at
no truth is more  universally  established in  history, th at  no proposition  can  be  more plainly
demonstrated than this, that judges may  oppress
the people- that  p o w   er cannot be safely confided a nywher e  without  the guara nty  o f re spen -
sibility. * * *
But has thi s  ch ange in   the judicial  term, from
te nancy at wi ll to that of life, essentially change d
the  character of   dec is io ns in Great Britain? History records the  mournful fact,  that since  the
banis hment and d eath o       wt many  of th e    rost distinguished of the friends of liberty will confirm the
declaration.  The honored names of Muir, Gerald, hiargarot, and Emmet t, wit       h many other
that time cannot bury in oblivion, must remain
p   the monument of this independence of tho British
RICHARD M. JOHNSON, OF KENTUCKY.
Mr. Johnson, who was elected Vice President
of the United S tate s by the   De   m ocra tic  party,
rep       re     sented Kentucky in           the United  States Senate in822.    I   find in Benton's Abridgment of
the Debates of CongreSs, vol. 7, page 145, an
el       aborate speech  of Mr. Johnson upon  a resolution off    ered by him, proposin                   g an amendment  of
the Co nstitution. Hi          s proposition was                      to amend
the Constitution by referring all cases in which
a               S tate may  be    a party  to       the final adjudication
of                the Senate.  In            the course of his remarks, he
says:
At this time there is, unfortunately, a want
of co     nfidence in t he Fe deral Judiciary,  in c as          es
tha    t      involve po          litical power; and  this distrust
may be    carried t        o other cases, such as                  the lawyers call meum et tuum. It is the opinion of many
eminent-statesmen that there is a manifest disposition, on the par t  of thle Federal Judiciary,
to           enlarge, to the utmost stretch of constitutional
construction, the powers of the General Government, at least in that branch, and by consequience to abridge the jurisdiction of the State
tribunals. I do not assert this to be the fact;
but, if it is not, we should adopt some method,
if practicable, to remove these ill-founded suspicions. * *
Judges, like other men, have their political
views. One may be friendly to consolidation;
another.may err on the opposite extreme; and a
third may prefer that happy mediocrity, which
is always safe, and generally salutary. When
these are associated upon the bench, and
each under the influence of his own partiality,
there will inevitably be as different conclusions
among them, where State sovereignty is involved,
or the extent of Federal jurisdiction is called
in question, as if they were members of a legislative body. Why, then, should they be considered any more infallible, or their decisions any
less subject to investigation and reversion? Besides the differences arising from political prepossessions, the various structures of the human
mind will produce a variety of opinion.   One
may take an expansive view of a subject, and
base his decision upon truth and justice; another may be what is sometimes called a technical judge; and, though of equal integrity, may
conceive it his duty to stick to the bark of the
case, and confine himself, in all decisions, to the
forms of judicial proceedings. This difference
in the organization of the mind must necessarily
result in a difference of conclusion. Courts also,
like cities and villages, or like legislative bodies,
will sometimes have their leaders: and it may
happen, that a single individual will be the prime
cause i a decision to overturn the deliberate act
of a whole State, or of the U~nited States; yet,
we are admonished to receive their opinions as
the ancients did the responses of the Delphic
oracle, or the Jews, with more propriety, the
commu nications fTom tteavren,: delivered by Urim
and l'humminh to the High Priest of God's chosen
people, from the sanctunm sanctorum. Other causes
I! - -1
I/ 
15
Judiciary, which we are so proud to imitate.  In
controversies betwixt                               individuals,  the effects of
the change may have been salutary; but he who
has depended upon the Judiciary to protect him
from royal malediction, has leaned upon a broken
reed. * * *
I know of no clause in the Federal,Constitution that gives the power to the Judiciary of declaring the laws and Constitution of a State repugnant to the Constitution of the United States,
and therefore null and void. No express grant
nor fair construction contains it; and I presume
every gentleman in and out of Congress will
agree with me, that the States never designed so
to impair their sovereignty as to delegate this
power to the Federal Judiciary. * * *
GIN, JACKSON.
The following is an extract from his message
vetoing the bill for rechartering the Bank of the
United States.  It fmay be found on page 438 of
the Senate Journal for the first session of the
Twenty-second Congress, and is in these words:
If the opinion of the Supreme Court covered
the  whole ground of this  act,  i t ough t not to control the  co-ordinate auth oritie s o f th is Gover nment. The  Congress,  t he Exe cut ive, a nd the
Court, must each for itself be guided by its own
opinion of the Constitution. Each public officer,
who takes an oath to suppo rt the  Constitution,
swears that he will support it as he understands
it, and not as it is under sto od by  others.  It is
as much the duty of the House of Representatives, of the Senate, and of the President, to
decide upon the constitutionality of any bill or
resolution which may be presented to them for
passage or approval, as it is of the supreme
judges, when it may be brought before them for
judicial decision.  The opinion of the judges has
no more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress over the judges; and, on that
point, the President is independent of both. The
authority of the Supreme Court must not, therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the
Executive when acting in their legislative capacities, but to have only such influence M the
force of their reasoning may deserve.
General Jackson was aware that he had taken
a strong position in that case; and he closes,
most solemnly, with an appeal to his Creator.
He says:
I have now done my duty to my country. If
sustained by my fellow-citizens, I shall be grateful and happy; if not, I shall find, in the motives
which impel me, ample grounds for contentment
and peace.
T he  sh       ort  thoug          h splendid history      of this Government furnishes nothing that c         an induce   us                                      to
lo ok with a very favorable eye                    to the Federal
Judiciary as a safe depository of our liberties.
When a law was enacted in violation of a vital
princip     le of  the C   onstitution, that which was
designed t       o secure  the f reedom of speech and of
the pre     s s, the victims of its operation looked      in
vain   to   the judge   s  to         arrest    th e progress of
ursurpation. If t         his power could ever be exercised to    any   good purpos e,   it wou ld b e, on  such
occasions, to declare the law unconstitutional
w      hich  aims  a  deadly             b    low at the vital principles
of freedom; but, so far as the transactions of
that day are detailed in our public records, it
appears that the Judiciary was a willing instrument of Federal usurpation. That law was
executed in all the rigor of the spirit which
dictated it. The turbulence of faction found no
moderation there; and the people found relief
only in their own power. The exercise of their
elective franchise removed the evil, and this is
their only safe dependence.
'e, - 
.) Ce
0 
PRESIDENTI'CAMPAIGN OF 1860.
REPUBLICAN EXECUTIVE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEIE.
HON. PRESTON KING, N.Y., Chairman.     IfON1. JOHN COVODE, PENN., Treaurer.
J. W. GRIMES, IOWA.                 "  E. G. SPAULDING, N. Y.
"  L. F. S. FOSTER, CONN.             "  J. B. ALLEY, MASS.
On the part of the Senate.  "  DAVID KILGORE, INDIANA.
"J. L. N. STRATTON, N.J.
"  E. B. WASHBURNE, ILLINOIS.                  On the part of lthe Houe of Reps.
The Committee are prepared to furnish the following Speeches and Documents: 
EIGHT PAGES.                      Hon. H. Wilson, Mass.: Territorial Slave Code.
Hon. W. H. Seward: State of the Country.            "  John P. Hale, N. H.
"  W. H. Seward:  "Irrepressible Conflict"    "  J. J. Perry, Me.: "Posting the Books be       Speech.                                           tween the North and the South."
G. A. Grow, Penn.: Free Homes for Free    "  J. R. Doolittle, Wis.: The Calhoun Rrvo       Men.                                              lution-Its Basis and its Progress.
"  James Harlan, Iowa: Shall the Territories    "  C. B. Sedgwick, N. Y.: The Republican
be Africanized?                                   Party the Result of Southern Aggresgion
"  John Hickman, Penn.: Who have Violated            M.J.Parrott,Kansas:Admission fasa
Compromises.                              Federalismis  Unmasked:  Or the Rights of the
"  B. F. Wade, Ohio:  Invasion of Harper's            States, the Congress, the Executite, and
Ferry.                                            the People, Vindicated against the En  "  G. W. Scranton and J. E. Campbell, Penn.:           croachments of the Judiciary, prompted
The Speakership.                                  by  the  Modern  Apostate Democracy.
"  F. P. Blair, Mo., Address at Cincinnati:           Being a Compilation from the Writings
Colonization and Commerce.                        and Speeches of the Leadersof the OldI
"  Orris S. Ferry, Conn.                               Jeffersonian Republican Party.  By Dan   "  Abraham Lincoln. Ill.: The Demands of              iel R. Goodloe.
the South-The Republican Party Vin-                  TWENTY-FOUR PAGES.
dicated.                                  Hon. Jacob Collamer, Vermont.
"  William Windom, Minn.: The Homestead
Bill-Its Friends and its Foes.                       THIRTY-TWO PAGES.
"  Owen Lovejoy, of Illinois: The Barbarism  Hon. Thomas Corwin, of Olio.
of Slavery.
"  Henry L. Dawes, Mass.: The New Dogma                            GERMAN.
of the South-" Slavery a Blessing."                       EIGHT  PAGES.
"  R. H. Duell, N.Y.: The Position of Parties.  Hon. G. A. Grow,.Penn.: Free Homes for Free
"  M. S. Wilkinson, Minn.: The Homestead                Men.
Bill.                                       "  James Harlan, Iowa: Shall the Territories
"  D. W. Gooch, Masq.: Polygamy in Utah.                be Africaiiized?
Carl Schurz, Wig.: Douglas a4I Popular Sover-    "  John Hickman, Penn.: Who Have Violated
eighty.                                          Compromises.
Lands for the Landless —A Tract. ItCmrmss
Lands for the LandlessA Tract.        "  William Windom, Minn.: The Homestead
The Poor Whites of the South-The Injury done              Bill-Its Friends and its Foes.
them by Slavery-A Tract.                    "  H. Winter Davis, Md.: Election of Speaker.
"   ~    ~~~      Carl Schurz, Wis.: Douglas and Popular Sover             SIXTEEN PAGES.                             eiguty.
Hon. Lyman Trumbull, Ill.: Seizure of the Ar-                   SIXTEEN PAGES.
senals at Harper's Ferry, Va. and Liberty,  Hon. Lyman Trumbull, Ill.: Seizure of the Arse       Mo., and in Vindication of the Republi-           nals at Harper's Ferry, Va., and Liberty,
can Party.                                        Mo., and in Vindication of the Republi  "  B. F. Wade, Ohio: Property in the Terri-             can Party.
tories.                                     "  W. H. Seward, N. Y.: The State of the
C. H. Van Wyck, N.Y.: True Democracy-                Country.
History Vindicated.                       Lands for the Landless-A Tract.
*     ~And all the leading Republican Speeches as delivered.
During the Presidential Campaign, Speeches and Documents will be supplied at the following
reduced prices: per 100-8 pages 50 cents, 16 pages $1, and larger documents in proportion.
Address either of the above Committee.
GEORGE HARRINGTON,,.c,etary.
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