AND
MR. MOTLEY.
PHILADELPHIA:
PUBLISHlED  FOR% THE  AUTHtOR.
186i.4,
- 400.       - 
C
I 
TIlE CONSTITUTION
AND
MR. MOTLEY.
TEE Essay on the CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES, which appeared in the LONDON TIMES, in
May last, under the initials J. T. M., though not,
in form, a letter, has been habitually called so, we
believe, on both sides of the water.  We  conceive
the reason to be that, coming from an American
who had gained distinction abroad as a historian, it
was felt by his countrymen to be a communication
to them, for their instruction on matters of great
moment, and within the scope of, or closely relating
to, his department of science. This has had some
influence with us, in the examination of this essay.
In this land of superficial readers and thinkers,
particularly superficial in what relates to politics,
literary reputation is confounded with literary merit;
the writings of an author have influence more in
\
i \ 
4
accordance with the weight of his name, than the
value of his words.  In order, therefore, to test the
literary execution of the letter, we shall first analyze
the three opening sentences, and then examine into
the ability of the author as a thinker. When we
have done, the reader, we hope, will be able to decide
for himself, whether the universally recognized author
of it, to judge him only by the "letter," could probably have justly entitled himself to his reputation,
either by the gracefulness of his words or the wisdom
of his thoughts. It begins thus:
"The de facto question in America has been referred,
at last, to the dread arbitrament of civil war."
Now, if the reader wishes to be sure that he has
here really taken in an idea, let him ask himself
what question of fact has been in dispute, and has,
at last, been referred to the sword. We have been
residing in this country since long before the insurrection broke out, reading newspapers not a few, and
we cannot call to mind any matter of fact, great or
small, that is in dispute giving rise to the war; and
there is none. This defacto shadow of a fancy is contrasted, a little farther on, with the de jure question,
which is called "a different one;" the real, however,
and only one, finally took the form: " Has a State the 
C)
right, peaceably, to secede?" The author, probably,
meant to say that the question of right had been
referred to the practical solution of war. The de
jure question seems to be the real subject of the letter.
We say "seems;" for it is rambling and aimless
throughout, and when we reach the end, we find it
hard to determine what exactly it has been striving
after in all its tortuous length, unless it is effect.
In the next sentence, we are told that
"Time and events must determine whether the great
Republic is to disappear from the roll of nations, or
whether it is destined to survive the storm which has
gathered over its head."
In other words, the result of the war cannot be
foreseen. But is this so remarkable a peculiarity of
the war as to require to be announced in a magnificent sentence? We think that it was not necessary to
advert to it at all; and we venture to guess, not uncharitably, as the tone of the letter will show, that
the bootless idea was introduced for the sake of the
sounding words in which it might be put forth.
The third sentence says:
"There   is, perhaps, a readiness in England to prejudge the case; a disposition not to exult in our downfall, but                     to accept the fact; for nations, as well as indi
1* 
6
viduals, may often be addressed in the pathetic language
of  the poet:'Donec eris felix, multos numerabis amicos,
Tempora cum faerint nubila, nullus erit.'
Yet the trial by the ordeal of battle has hardly commenced, and it would be presumptuous to affect to penetrate the veil of even the immediate future."
The whole sentiment of the Latin lines quoted is,
that men who are fortunate are surrounded with
friends, while they who become unfortunate are deserted; not at all, that their downfall is exulted over;
but we are willing to give it this turn. If we then
examine the sentence, we shall find there is logic in
it. We can turn it into a syllogistic form, and
ascertain its correctness as we go. Let us try.
Men are disposed to exult in the downfall of
others. Nations are like men in this respect. The
English are a nation; they think we have fallen in
some sense or other. Therefore the English are
not disposed to exult in our downfall.   Thus, a
matter of fact, which ordinary men would suppose
could only be ascertained by observation or evidence, is proved by the aid of two lines of "pathetic" poetry.  They are pathetic, we  suppose,
because they come from the Tristia, usually translated "Elegies;" but if they had come from Juvenal, 
7
would not J. T. M. have felt bound to call them sarcastic, had he happened to know that this poet was
a satirist? These "Elegies," however, as they are
called, both in French and English, are more properly satires.  They are denunciatory; and a French
critic remarks, that notwithstanding their name, they
are not saddening. Ovid, their author, uses the lines
quoted in a vehement denunciation of an ungrateful
friend.
The argument of the letter, as we have intimated,
seems intended principally to contravene the right of
peaceable secession.  It says for once truly respecting it, that "the right and the wrong may be easily
read by all who are not willfully blind." But how
is it with those who are blind against their will?
And why inflict six columns of very hard reading on
the public for the sake of convincing those who,
having the means of ascertaining the matter with
facility elsewhere, must, it should be presumed,
already be convinced? But, in giving the letter
credit for truth once, we must add, conditionally, if
we understand its meaning, which we suppose to be,
that the rightfulness or wrongfulness of the principle
of secession may be easily determined according to
the Constitution.
The right to secede is not given by the Constitu 
8
tion, and we do not understand how a principle so
inconvenient, and so inconsistent with the permanency of the Government, can be implied. And yet
Mr. Raw]e, a high-toned Federalist, announced it in
his treatise, published more than thirty-five years
ago, as part of the constitutional doctrine, although the party to which he belonged was in the
main hostile to State rights, and otherwise suspected
of monarchical tendencies.
The reader must not suppose that our man of
words has begun to reason in earnest yet; he is
only indulging in a literary prelude, drawing on his
imagination for ideas to be dressed up in phrases
according. to his taste. So he goes on to say, that
it was "often asked" in England, "why has the
'United States' Government plunged into what is
sometimes called'this wicked war'?" Very silly
people he must have associated with, to have so
foolish a question put to him "often." He continues:
"Especially it is thought amazing in England that
the President should have called for a great army
of volunteers and regulars, and that the inhabitants of
the free States should have sprung forward as one man
at his call, like men suddenly relieved from a spell."
Now, though we were not in England, we will 
9
venture to say, that it was neither thought nor felt
to be amazing that the President should have called
for "a great army," though it was to have the
uncommon property of being composed "of volunteers  and regulars."   To  come  down  to plain
phrases, they could not have been amazed, in England, that the Government, attacked with arms,
should have resisted with arms. The amazement
would have been, had it done otherwise. They
were no doubt surprised at the suddenness of the
outbreak, the strong and all-pervading excitement
of a great nation, and the rush of the vast multitudes toward Washington.
Next follows some more fine writing; during
which there is something about "a proclamation
from the American palladium," but we are not told
what that palladium is, nor how it can issue a proclamation.   Reading  on, however, a little way
farther, we find ourselves in possession of the information that attachment to the Union is "not wholly
extinguished in the nine millions of white men who
dwell in the slave States."   The statistics, here
liberally thrown in, incidentally, are as fully to
be relied on as the other statements of the letter;
but it does not account for the great increase in one
year, the census of 1860 putting the number of
. 
10
white inhabitants at a little more than five and a
haif millions.
At- length, the subject of the Constitution is
really reached, and the great constitutional teacher
informs his disciples that "the body politic, known
for seventy years as the United States of America,
is not a Confederacy, not a compact of sovereign
States, not a copartnership; it is a Commonwealth."
The body politic here spoken of has been known
by the same name as at present for eighty-three
years-the title having been conferred by the "Articles of Confederation," signed July 9, 1778. Moreover, we must suggest, that the possession of all
the qualities which are so emphatically denied to it,
would not prevent its being a "Commonwealth;"
and that the words are not so different in signification as J. T. M. appears to suppose. A Confederacy is a compact between States, usually.    A
copartnership is a compact between individuals;
and then there is the "original compact of society,"
by which men may confederate themselves into a
"Commonwealth," as we shall see.
During the Confederacy, it was customary to
designate the Union as the Federal Union, and the
Government as the Federal Government, the designating adjective being derived from the Latin
... I.,,. 
11
foedus, a compact, and meaning  "relating to a
compact," as lexicographers are all agreed. When
the Constitution was formed, the men of the day
would have ceased to use the designation if they
had thought the principle had ceased, but they did
not, and it has continued in use till the present day,
when, in the midst of an insurrection, caused by an
increasing fear of the hostile dispositions of the
General Government toward the rights of the
States, a writer makes his appearance to employ
himself in rendering that Government still more
formidable in its powers for mischief, by audacious
denials of the sovereignty of the States, and impudent allegations that they are not confederated but
consolidated; with what view will be seen. His
readers, whose rights are involved as well as his
own, in this astonishing doctrine, naturally expect
an explanation, and get it in this wise: He asserts
that enormous evils existed under the Confederacy;
that these evils were caused by the principles of
State-sovereignty and confederation; that the Constitution was framed to abolish the evils, and therefore it necessarily abolished the principles themselves. Speaking of the evils, he says:  "When the war had ceased, we sank rapidly into a
condition of utter impotence, imbecility, anarchy. * * 
* * No laws could be enforced, no insurrections suppressed, no debts collected. NTeither property nor life
was secure."
These words might be cut out and made to do
good service in a history of France of'93; but we
do not recollect to have ever before read or heard
that such a frightful state of things had existed here
during the old Confederacy, or at any other time.
Admitting it had, however, have we not as good a
right to assert that it was "the fruits" of such
"republicanism as the Confederation had established?" And then argue, like the latter, that the
framers of the Constitution must have meant to
abolish republicanism, and therefore that they did.
It is hardly worth while to contend in such argument, but in regard to the facts it may be strongly
inferred from the history of the origin of the Constitution, that the people were not so vividly
impressed with a sense of the advantages of a more
united government, as to make them rush toward it
as a refuge from the political sorrow and danger in
the midst of which they are alleged to have been
living.
The Confederation originated during the revolutionary war. It was formed with great difficulty,
some of the States refusing to join in it, notwith
12 
13
standing the outside pressure of the war, and the
obvious advantages of being united against a common enemy.  Several were brought into it only by
the aid of a sort of bribery, the promise of an
interest in certain public lands. The "Articles of
Confederation and perpetual Union" having been
agreed upon by the States, (not by the people of the
whole,) as sovereigns, and as a league among
sovereigns, each State, whether large or small,
having one vote, the provision that it should not be
altered, except by a unanimous vote of the thirteen
States, was a logical necessity. It would have been
implied though not expressed. The league was
made and the revolution was achieved; but still
there were troubles, due as much to the consequences
of the war as to any other cause. An insurrection
broke out, indeed, but it was suppressed, our author's
assertion to the contrary notwithstanding. History,
too, tell us that it grew out of the war exclusively.
In 1786 an Act of the Legislature of Virginia
was passed, proposing a Convention of the States,
to meet at Annapolis,.for the purpose of considering
the commercial interests only, of the country, and
seven delegates were appointed to represent the
State. Eight of the other States concurred in the
proposed measure, so far as to appoint delegates;
2 
14
the other four paid no attention to it. When the
Convention met, only twelve delegates appeared,
representing but five States. Of the seven delegates
appointed by Virginia, only three came, and of the
delegates appointed  by the four others, not one
attended.  This does not show much present sense
of suffering, attributable to the league, nor hope of
escape by strengthening its bands, even commercially. In fact great jealousies existed everywhere
on the subject of these very rights, which J. T. M.
thinks he can obliterate so readily, with so weak an
instrument as his pen.
The delegates at Annapolis, not being able, in
consequence of the thinness of the attendance, to
proceed in the business on which they had come,
contented themselves with an address to the Congress, advising the call of a convention for the regulation of commerce, and for other matters.
This advice being approved of, an act was passed,
recommending to the State Legislatures to send delegates to a convention for the "sole and express
purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation."
Twelve States accordingly appointed 59 delegates,
the names of only 39 of whom were in the end subscribed to the instrument to be proposed to the
States, for ratification by them respectively. 
The indifference with which the new Constitution
was received, may be well conjectured, when we
learn from the journals of Congress that, at the first
meeting, more than a month elapsed in the Senate
before a quorum, amounting to only twelve members,
could be assembled; and from a similar cause about
three weeks were lost in the other house.*
This documentary evidence goes far to show that
the people did not attribute the evils they were suffering under to the looseness of the bands by which
the States were held together, and that they were
reluctant to seek for a cure by forming a "more
perfect union" than that which they were living
under. On the face of the instrument strong jealousy is apparent, from the cautious manner in which
power is doled out, and confirmatory evidence of an
increase, rather than a diminution, of that feeling is
also made manifest by the amendments proposed at
the very first session of Congress. They all either
add new restrictions, or are restrictive explanations
of the Federal power.
All the great attributes of sovereignty were, in
fact, possessed by the Confederacy, that of levying
* Afore than two years elapsed before the Constitution was
ratified by all the thirteen States.
15 
16
money not excepted. The difference is, that it taxed
the States and not the people directly; and it could
not lay duties on importations. These were its great
defects, and the ones which caused its "revision."
The people traced the causes of most of their sufferings to the war, and truly. The statesman saw danger and calamity in the future, both at home and
abroad, unless the Constitution should be modeled
into a form better calculated for vigor, and, at the
same time, with such checks as would prevent its
becoming dangerous to the rights of the States, or
the liberties of the people.
In enumerating the evils of Confederation and
State-sovereignty, J. T. M. next blunders into the
statement: that  "For twelve years after the acknowledgment of our
independence we were mortified by the spectacle of foreign soldiers occupying a long chain of fortresses south
of the great lakes, and upon our own soil."
Forgetting that, for more than half of that time,
the new Constitution had been in force.
"We  were a Confederacy.   We  were  Sovereign
States. And these were the fruits of such a Confederacy and of such Sovereignty. It was until the immediate present, the darkest hour of our history."
Hle evidently does not reflect that the period which 
17
he represents as "the darkest hour" of our former
history, has its commencement, according to himself,
in the recognition of our independence; and that, according to his mode of reasoning, the evils existing
would be more justly attributable to that; and many
of them were so in fact. History tells us that the
loss of the commercial and other privileges of British
subjects did, at first, great injury to American interests. Our author does not care to see that the existing insurrection, which we are suffering from, may,
by similar argument, be attributable to the Constitution; nor that it is in fact due to a dread of the
self-same spirit that pervades the letter: to a fear
lest the desire to extend the prerogatives of the General Government, rightfully or wrongfully, should be
carried into practice.
The real drift of the letter is manifested by the
assertion that, under the Constitution, the "Union
alone was supreme." There is, however, no such
proviso in the instrument. There is one, that it and
"laws made in pursuance of it shall be supreme."
It then asks:
"Of what significance, then, was the title' Sovereign'
States, arrogated in latter days by communities which
had voluntarily abdicated the most vital attributes of
2* 
18
*  *  *  "But the men of those days
word'Sovereign' was a term of feudal
*  "The word Sovereign had no mean
sovereignty?"
knew that the
origin. " * *
iDg for us."
On what authority is all this said? None whatever. It is mere assertion, and was not, and is not
true.  "The men of those days" did not know that
"Sovereign" is a term of feudal origin, for it is of
Latin origin.  Then, again, the title of "Sovereign
States" was not "arrogated in latter days," for the
second line of the Articles of Confederation declares
that "each State retains its sovereignty, freedom
and independence." The instrument was formed in
the midst of the war, and "the men of those days"
who framed it, did think the word of" significance."
Some of them continued to think so ten years later.
In the address from the Convention, accompanying
the presentation of the new Constitution to Congress, (from which, by the way, the letter-writer has
made use of an extract, and perverted it,) the following passage occurs:
1
"It is obviously impracticable, in the Federal Government of these States, to secure all rights of independent
sovereignty to each, and provide for the interest and
safety of all.  Individuals entering into society must
give a share of liberty to preserve the rest." 
19
In the last sentence, it is observable, that the
language of writers on the "original compact of society" is employed, and applied to States in their
sovereignty, but treated as individuals.
And Mr. Hamilton, in the 31st number of the
Federalist, says:
"The State governments, by their original constitutions, are invested with complete sovereignty. In what
does our security consist against usurpations firom that
quarter? Doubtless in the manner of their formation,
and in a due dependence of those who are to administer
them upon the people."
And in the same number:
"Everything beyond this must be left to the prudence
and firmness of the people; who, as they will hold the
scale in their own hands, it is to be hoped, will always
take care to preserve the constitutional equilibrium between the General and the State Governments."
And again, in No. 62 of the same work, he repeats
the idea:
"In this spirit it may be remarked, that the equal vote
allowed to each State is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the
individual States, and an instrument for preserving that
residuary sovereignty."'
Kent, too, 1 Comm. 426, giving an abstract of
the great case of McCulloch v. Maryland, tells us:
I.,   i *           *
.~.  
"The power of State taxation is to be measured by
the extent of State sovereignty, and this leaves to a
State the command of all its resources, and the unimpaired power of taxing the people and property of the
State. But it places beyond the reach of State power
all those powers conferred on the government of the
Union, and all those means which are given for the purpose of carrying those powers into execution.   This
principle relieves from clashing sovereignty," etc.
We next arrive at the letter-writer's definition of
sovereignty, which is Blackstone's, in fact, but not
acknowledged, and somewhat diluted in language.
Indeed he must have been startled and perplexed
when he read of governments, that "there is and
must be in all of them a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, in which the jura
summa  inmperii, or the rights of sovereignty, reside." 1 B1. Comm. 49.  And yet the great British
commentator is treating of the laws of his own really
free country, the chief magistrate of which is recognized both at home and abroad as a sovereign. How
reconcile this language with the account, which the
same writer gives us, of the great restrictions upon the
authority of the British crown? It is explained by the
theory that Acts of Parliaments are "s omnipotent."
They are promulgated in form of edicts, as if proceeding from the king's authority, but by the advice of Par
20
1
......:.~ X. 
21
liament. Some exist which are in the king's name
alone, though passed in Parliament. But no one has
yet ventured to apply the word to an Act of Congress; even J.T. M. has not; yet he has covertly
insinuated the idea, that all State laws must yield to
an Act of Congress. Should the Government of the
United States repeal the laws of Pennsylvania relating to real estate, then, according to the spirit of
the letter, the act of repeal being supreme, would
take effect. But we have to differ from it here, and
in the assertion that the States are "shorn of all the
great attributes of sovereignty," and it will soon be
seen that we are not alone in the opinion.
Sovereigns are equals.  One cannot be supreme
over the other, or the latter ceases to be sovereign.
Wealth and power and numbers do not make incquality in point of law.  Victoria is the equal of
Soulouque, and the State sovereignty is the equal of
the Union sovereignty. The former is supreme as
to laws which conflict with its authority, just as the
latter is where a State encroaches upon its rights.
In regard to the importance of the sovereign
powers reserved by the States, Kent says:
"The judicial power of the United States is necessarily limited to national objects. The vast field of the
law of property, the very extensive head of equity juris 
diction, and the principal rights and duties which flow
fi'om our civil and domestic relations, fall within the control, and we might almost say, the exclusive cognizance,
of State governments. We look essentially to the State
courts for protection to all these momentous interests.
They touch, in their operation, every cord of human
sympathy, and control our best destinies.  It is their
province to reward and to punish.   Their blessings and
their terrors will accompany us to the fireside, and be'in
constant activity before the public eye.' The elementary
principles of the common law are the same in every State,
and equally enlighten and invigorate every part of our
country. * * * The true interests and thepermranent freedom of this country require that the jurisprudence of the individual States should be cultivated, cherished, and exalted, and the dignity and reputation of the
State authorities sustained with becoming pride." 1
KIent Corn. 445.
As to the comparative importance of the judicial
power of the States, and that of the Union, to estimate it, let any one visit the many State courts of
the City of Philadelphia alone, and then the one
Federal Court for the whole Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, embracing about one-half the State,
and he will find the latter frequently closed, and the
former crowded with suitors and overwhelmed with
business, though open almost the whole year.
To proceed with our letter. After more than a
column of verbiage, assertion, and sham reasoning,
22 
23
we come to a passage which shows us the drift of the
gabble about sovereignty.
"It was not a compact. Who ever heard of a compact to which there were no parties?"
We never did, we confess, except in a figurative
sense. But the writer evidently supposes that, if he
has proved the absence of State sovereignties, as
parties to the Constitution, there can be no compact,
because there could be  no  other parties.   Now,
though we see in the instrument itself, that it was
"Done in Convention by the unanimous consent of
the States present," we will shut our eyes for the
nonce and agree that the States are not parties.
What then? Why, it fails as a compact, for the want
of parties, he would say. But might not the individuals who composed the nation have been the parties? Did he never hear of the original contract of
society? In the very chapter of Blackstone, from
which he quotes, the following passage occurs, quite
apropos:  "But though society had not its formal beginning
from any convention of individuals, actuated by their
wants and their fears, yet it is the sense of their weakness and imperfection that keeps mankind together; that
demonstrates the necessity of this union; and that therefore is the natural and solid foundation, as well as the
consent of society. And this is what we mean by the 
24
ORIGINAL CONTRACT of society, which, though perhaps
in no instance it has ever beenfornmally expressed at
the first institution of a State, yet in nature and reason
must always be understood and implied in the very act
of associating together; namely, that the whole should
protect all its parts, and that every part should pay obedience to the will of the whole; or, in other words, that
the community should guard the rights of each individual member, and that (in return for their protection)
each individual should submit to the laws of the community, without which submission of all it was impossible
that protection should certainly be extended to any."
1 B1. Com. 48.
The lines we have italicized show that Blackstone
did not think it possible that the contract of society
could be "formally expressed at the first institution
of a State." But he wrote before our American
Constitutions were formed, and did not recollect
that a century before, the settlers of several colonies
had entered into written compacts of society before
embarking.   For instance, William Penn's "conditions and concessions," agreed upon in England between him and his colonists, are clearly a compact,
expressing the terms on which the future society was
to exist. J. T. M., then, has made a great mistake
in quoting from Blackstone, "that a compact is a
promise proceeding from us. Law is a command
directed to us;" for plainly the author quoted had 
25
not in view the distinction between law emanating
from the legislative power, and the law by which
that power itself exists-that is, the social compact
or constitution of a country. It was unnecessary for
Blackstone to distinguish between the two; for in
his country the omnipotence of the ordinary legislative power is sufficient to repeal the social compact law, by which itself exists. It may be true,
that the rule of action prescribed by the supreme
power of a State or municipal law, for it is of that
he is speaking, is not a contract, but a compact between parties; is not only a law, but is, in most instances, supreme, as one may say, over the law of
the land, when it goes into the court for adjudication. Like all writers, however, who have attempted
to define the word law, Blackstone was fully aware
of the difficulty of the task; and he qualifies immediately, by saying that a contract is "a law binding
on the conscience."
Let us now make some extracts from the Eederalist, after making one from the letter.  The new
Constitution, says the letter,
"Was strenuously supported, and bitterly opposed on
exactly the same grounds. Its friends and foes both
argued that it had put an end to the system of Con                        3 
federacy. Whether it were an advantage, or a noxious
change, all agreed that the thing had been done."
But Mr. Madison's authority will certainly be
sufficient contradiction of an assertion of J. T. M.
He says, Federalist, No. 39: that
"It appears, on the one hand, that the Constitution is
to be founded on the assent and ratification of the people
of America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose; but, on the other, that this assent and ratification
is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and
independent States to which they respectively belong. It
is to be the assent and ratification of the several States,
derived from the supreme authority in each State; the
authority of the people themselves.   The act, therefore,
establishing the Constitution will not be a national, but
afederal act.
"That it will be a federal, and not a national act, as
these terms are understood by the objectors.  The act
of the people as forming so many independent States,
not as forming one aggregate nation, is obvious from this
single consideration; that it is to result neither from the
decision of a majority of the people of the Union, nor
from that of a majority of the States.  It must result
from the unanimous consent of the several States that
are parties to it, differing no otherwise from their ordinary assent than in its being expressed, not by the legislative authority, but by that of the people themselves."
*  *  *  *  "Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body, independent of
26 
27
all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary
act. In this relation, then, the new Constitution will,
if established, be a federal, and not a national Constitution."
Then, after showing how far the Government is
national, he forms the conclusion:
"From this aspect of the Government, it appears to
be of a mixed character, presenting, at least, as many
federal as national features."  *  *  *  *  "Among
a people consolidated into one nation, this supremacy is
completely vested in the national legislature. Among
communities united for particular purposes, it is vested
partly in the general and partly in the municipal legislatures. In the former case, all local authorities are subordinate to the supreme; and may be controlled, directed,
or abolished by it at pleasure. In the latter, the local
or municipal authorities form distinct and independent
portions of the supremacy, no more subject within their
respective spheres to the general authority, than the
general authority is subject to them within its own
sphere." Federalist, No. 39.
In regard to majorities, there is a matter to which
the public mind is not sufficiently awake-namely,
that election districts may be so arranged that a
minority may elect almost the whole of the delegates
to the legislature, or to a convention; and that it
may well have happened, that a majority of the
people of the United States were opposed to the 
28
adoption of the Constitution, and yet, that the conventions in all the thirteen assented. We will exemplify; but before doing so, we may premise that
the members of the State conventions might have
been elected by general ticket, or by districts, as
the legislatures respectively thought fit. The Constitution prescribes nothing as to this.
Suppose one of the States which formed the Constitution to have had 12,000 votes, divided into 12
districts of 1000. In each of 11 districts, delegates
are elected favorable to the Constitution by a vote,
say of 510 to 490. In the twelfth, the vote against
it is unanimous. The aggregate vote of the State
for the Constitution will be 510 x 11-=5610. Against
it, 490 x 11+1000=6390.   Eleven delegates in the
convention representing the minority, and only one
the majority. This is an extreme case, but showing
a principle which is operating with more force than
is generally suspected; and it may well have happened, supposing it to have operated in several of
the States that a majority of the votes were actually
opposed to it.
In the convention, Mr. Madison advocated the
principle of State sovereignty, as it now exists. Mr.
Hamilton, on the contrary, was utterly opposed to
leaving any sovereignty in the States, and yet we 
29
have seen that he, enemy to "the system of Confederacy" as he was, admitted that the States have
"complete sovereignty;" and in another place speaks
of the new Constitution as establishing " a compound
republic, partaking both of the national and federal
character."
The reader now has to judge between J. T. M.
on one side, and Hamilton and Madison on the
other. We leave him to decide for himself, and we
turn to examine some other parts of the "letter."
Among the rigmarole at the beginning, we have
been told that this Government is "not a partnership;" but before we get to the end, we find Burke
quoted as saying-and what he says is fairly to be
understood as applying to all Governments
"A State ought not to be considered as nothing better
than a partnership, agreement in a trade of pepper and
coffee, calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern.
It is to be looked on with other reverence; because"
"it is a partnership in all science, in all art-a partnership in every virtue," etc.
So, again, J. T. M. tells us that
"The use of force-of armies and navies of whatever
force-in order to compel obedience to the civil and
constitutional authority, is not' wicked war,' is not civil
war, is not war at all!"
3* 
o0
It must be peace then. But why is the first
sentence of the letter, which tells us that it is "a
civil war, so bluntly contradicted?
We are assured, in another place, that
" It is not a compact. * * * Yet the name of no
State is mentioned in the whole document. The States
themselves are only mentioned to receive commands or
prohibitions; and' the people of the United States' is
the single party, by whom alone the instrument is executed."
We will not stop to characterize, as we feel provoked to do, the assertion that "no State is mentioned in the whole document;" but when a man
asserts a thing as a matter of fact, does not he
impliedly pledge his veracity? We will pledge ours
that, to the best of our knowledge and belief, the
Constitution is subscribed with the name of "Geo.
Washington, President and deputy from Virginia,"
and with the names of'all the States present, and
signatures of at least one deputy from each.' The
following short extracts from  3 Madison Papers,
1598, 1600, relative to the signing of the instrument, are to the purpose:
DR.  FRANKLIN  "moved that the Constitution be
signed by the members, and offered the following as a
convenient form, viz.:'Done in Convention by the 
31
unanimous consent of the States present, the seventeenth
of September, etc. In witness whereof we have hereunto subscribed our names.'"
"This ambiguous form had been drawn up by MR.
GOUVERNEUR MORRIS in order to gain the dissenting
members, and put into the hands of DR. FRANKLIN,
that it might have the better chance of success."
"On the question to agree to the Constitution, enrolled, in order to be signed, it was agreed to, all the
States answering, aye."
The italics in both the extracts are in the book
from which we copy.
J. T. M., nevertheless, has not hesitated to assert
that
"The Constitution was not drawn up by the States,
it was not promulgated in the name of the States, it
was not ratified by the States.   The  States never
acceded to it, and possess no power to secede from it."
This last position, however, is undeniable. If
they never came in, they cannot well go out.
But our letter-writer has done nothing to convince
us that the right does not exist. He, with many
others, supposes that the doctrine of the sovereignty
of the States has something to do with secession.
He, however, thinking that he cannot make mistake in decrying it, because the Southern party
have upheld it, falls unhesitatingly upon the old
I 
Confederation, because it expressly declared that
the States composing it were sovereign. But he
does not see that by its terms it was to be "perpetual," one of the qualities he claims for the
present Union, that no State could secede without
the consent of all the others, and that it has never
been repealed. Whereas the perpetuity of the new
Union is neither expressed nor implied. On the
contrary, three-fourths of the States may constitutionally and rightfully secede or dissolve the Union.
They may secede by amendment expelling the other
fourth; or they may dissolve by declaring the instrument at an end, in the manner prescribed by one of
its own clauses. We have said that the "Articles
of Confederation"  had  not been repealed.  The
new Constitution does not name them nor refer to
them, except in the most distant manner, in the
words to "form a more perfect Union."  They have
been amended, indeed, and great additions have
been made to them; but so far as they are consistent with the- present Constitution, they still
retain their force.  Constitutions and treaties are
to be construed like statutes, and the rule respecting
these is, that "old statutes must give place to new
where they are contrary, but where there is a seeming variance between two statutes, and no clause of
32 
33
non obstante [repeal] in the latter, such construc    tion shall be made that both may stand." 11 Reps.
56; Dyer, 347. And, "by repealing of a repealing
statute, the first statute is revived." Jacob's L. D.
So that if the present Constitution should be
repealed by an amendment, the old Confederacy
would revive. Suppose that it had been revived
when the present rebellion broke out. The seceding
States would then be breaking the "league" which
bound them all. They would be rebels or foreign
enemies, according as the Confederacy was more or
less of a sovereignty over a sovereignty. They
would be warred on or not, as expediency might
dictate. Practically, the result would have been the
same. Political passions, stimulated by material
interests, are  ungovernable.    War  must follow
secession, whatever the Constitution may say,
sooner or later, unless human nature should be
changed.
But the cause of the war lies much deeper than
secession, State-sovereignty, or any other of the
supposed causes to which it is publicly attributed.
The probably irremediable evil which causes our
troubles, is universal suffrage. The framers of the
Constitution well knew that, up to their days, dema     goguism had been the destroyer of all free republics, 
34
and they foresaw the dangers with which their own
work was threatened by the same agent of destruction. They feared a war of classes, and they hoped,
with doubts, that the great and sovereign powers
reserved by the States would prove a sufficient
check to the powers of the General Government.
They feared also that the greater States getting
possession of them might use them against the
smaller, and they meant to leave to these facility
for resistance. They dreamed, but hardly supposed,
that there might be a war of sections, but took little
heed. They did not foresee the sensation press;
that the day would come when the demagogue would
address the multitude, not only in the forum, but
would follow them to their firesides and accompany
them in all their daily walks. Universal suffrage,
with the sensation press grafted on it, is the real
cause of the war, and the civil war foreboded by
MJacaulay, has long anteceded the period prophesied
by him. A cheap press, almost every one would
have said, would be the best diffuser of knowledge
and defender of liberty; but extremes meet, and
the public mind has been besotted, and public
liberty, such as it is, is endangered by the very
agency which was expected to enlighten and protect. A little learning may, perhaps, not be a 
dangerous thing; but certainly the daily and hourly
inculcation of falsehoods, whether flattering vanity
or fomenting hatred, or with or without any other
fixed  object, must becloud the public mind and
impair its common  sense.   In our opinion, the
Americans have less judgment, particularly in
political matters, than any nation in Western
Europe.
The melodramatic style of the sensation article
we have been discussing prevails widely in the
American press, and is well adapted to the condition
to which it has reduced the American mind; showing, as it does, how words may be made effective in
clouding the mind, how sentiments may be boldly
set side by side with facts which utterly bely them.
Nothing more common in the newspapers than
authenticated details of the most hateful corruption;
and yet, in the very number, perhaps in the very
column, which contains it, you will find some rant
about our Government being the "purest and best
that the sun ever rose upon." Some newspapers
have had the audacity to use similar phrases even
since the exposition of the shoddy business. That,
however, was not an unusual occurrence in the
"purest government," etc., but attracted special
35 
36
attention only by reason of the excitement of the
war.
Whether the Union can be permanently reconstructed as a republic, this generation will not be
permitted to see. Whether, for the first time in
the history of mankind, a democracy is to change
into other than a monarchical despotism, lies hidden
in the dark future.
MAGNA CHARTA.
I
I