%
I%9"8Q
















THE
ANALOGY OF RELIGION,
NATURAL AND REVEALED,
TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE.
JOSEPH BUTLER, L. L. D.,
LATE LORD BISHIIOP OF DURHAI1.
Ejus (Analogie) hrec vis est, ut id quod dubium est ad aliquid simile, de quo non
queritur referat; ut incerta certis probet.-QumNT. INST., ORAT. 1, i, Chap. 6.
WITH AN
ANALYSIS OF TIlE WORK.
BY
REV. B. F. TEFFT, A. M., EDITOR.' i l  i   lnlati:
PUBLISHED BY POE & hITCHCOCK,
FOR TIlE METIIODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH, AT THE WESTERN BOOK CONCERN,
CORNER OF MAIN AND EIGHTH STREETS.
R. P. THOMPSON, PRINTER.
1863.




Entered according to Act of Congress in the year 1847, by L. SWORMISTEDT &
J. T. MITCHELL, ill the Clerk's Office for the Dirtrict Court of Ohio.




PREFACE.
No eulogy need be written on BUTLER's ANALOGY oF
RELIGION.  It is known to be the ablest production, of its
class, extant in any language. It is the master-piece of
one of England's greatest minds. It has ever been regarded, since its first publication, as a perfectly unanswerable
defense of Christianity against the most plausible of all its
opposers.
Butler's Analogy should be rcead by all Christians, examined critically and repeatedly by every minister, and faithfully studied by the students of our schools and colleges.
That family, which makes it a fireside reading-book, will
scarcely be troubled with doubts in religious matters, or
rear up skeptics from  its circle.  Those ministers of the
Gospel, who most frequently consult its pages, will be best
prepared to meet and master the subtil cavils of the wicked.
The pupils of that seminary of learning, where this Analogy
is made a prominent text-book, under whose influence all
must pass prior to graduation, will receive a bias to religion,
which subsequent years will serve only to strengthen.
To these three classes of readers this edition has been
carefully adapted. It is expressly intended for the use of
families, ministers, and students; and under the latter class
are included young ministers during their course of preparatory study.
The Analysis, prepared by the Editor expressly for this
edition, is to be met with in no other.  It contains the argument of every chapter, and furnishes, in every place, a key
to the author's meaning.  From  the antiquity or obsoleteness of Bishop Butler's style, much perplexity often arises
3




4                      PREFACE.
to the most patient reader.  Sometimes he can scarcely tell
what is the sense of a passage.  In all such cases, the
Analysis, it is hoped, will prove of service.  It will, also, be
very convenient to students in reviewing. Teachers, who
wish to be complete and thorough in their instruction, will
doubtless derive some aid by following the plan of it in
their questions.  In preparing it, the actual divisions and
subdivisions of the author have been preserved in his own
modes of marking them.  The figures surrounded by parentheses indicate paragraphs, and were added by the Editor
for the sake of reference and greater perspicuity.  The
Analysis, in a word, is nothing less, in design at least, than
Bishop Butler's Analogy in miniature, which, though it
might have been reduced to a mere table of contents, or
swelled to a much larger compass, was intended to meet
exactly the wants of students and of the general reader.
The text is based on the last English edition, the American reprints being generally disfigured by numerous errors.
Several typographical mistakes, detected even in the English standard, have been corrected.  The punctuation has,
also, been carefully revised and amended.
This edition is sent out without note or comment.  No
preliminary essay has been prefixed, no elaborate annotations
have been added, to give it a sectarian character.  A work
like this, as it is the common defense and boast, ought certainly to be the common property, of all Christendom.
B. F. T.




ANALYSIS
OF
BUTLER'S ANALOGY
Page.
37. INTRODUCTION.
PART I.
OF NATURAL RELIGION.
C IAPTER I.
OF A FUTURE LIFE.
P R E L I r INA R Y REMARKS It.
A Future Life shown,
49. I. From the different states of the present life.
50.. II. From the fact that death is not known to be the destruction
of our living powers, which neither the reason of the thing,
nor the analogy of nature, indicates, but which is contradicted,
53.    (1) By the oneness of our mental essence, as shown by our
perception of identity;
55.    (2) By our mental integrity after the loss of every particle
of our present bodies;
56.   (3) By several minor considerations:
1. If the soul be no larger than an atom of matter, it
may not be capable of dissolution;
2. All our members are only instruments of the soul,
and can be in part dispensed with,
3. And supplied again, without touching our sense of
personal identity.
65. III. From  our mental operations, especially reasoning and
reflecting, being independent of the body, which can be
carried on, not only as well, but even better, without than
with the aid of the senses. The analogy, so often insisted
on, between the decay of vegetables and the death of our
living powers, does not exist, and, hence, no argument can
be drawn from it against a future life.
5




ANALYSIS OF BUTLER S ANALOGY.
CHAPTER II.
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY:REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS, AND
PARTICULARLY OF THE LATTER.
Page.
The question concerning a future life of great importance to us
68. (1) Because of our capacity for happiness and misery, and, especially, as that happiness and misery may depend upon
our present conduct.
(2) But, in this life, we know that all our happiness, and a
great part of our misery, are put in our own power.
69. (3) There are many very probable reasons, why the Author of
nature should make our happiness and misery to depend on
our own actions.
70. (4) And this connection between our actions and our present
happiness and misery is certainly to bh  ascribed to the
course of nature, that is, to Him who makes nature to be
what it is.
71. (5) But we cannot infer fiom  this, that we are, therefore,
called upon to gratify every passion which may give us
present pleasure, any more than we are to see every object
capable of being beheld by our natural vision.
71. (6) But we are to conclude, from  this natural connection
between our conduct and our condition, that we are under
the government of Hlim who formed the connection.
73. (7) The true conception, then, of the Author of nature is that
of a master or governor, even prior to the consideration
of his moral attributes.
73. (8) And there is, consequently, nothing incredible in the general doctrine of religion, that God will reward and punish
men for their actions hereafter.
The doctrine of future punishment sustained.
73. (9) By our present experience, when we suffer the evil consequent upon a course of wickedness, which, in ninany
instances, is inflicted on us a long time after the wicked
actions have been performed.
77. (10) These punishments are not to be considered accidental,
because, sooner or later, they always follow our transgressions of the laws of nature.
78. (11) They sometimes break in upon us irresistibly, like armed
forces, against which there is no relief from repentance,




ANALYSIS OF BUTLER S ANALOGIr.
Page.
78. (12) Men are not always punished, in this life, in proportion to
their misbehavior, but the punishments we see inflicted
show what the constitution of nature, both here and hereafter, may admit of, and answer all objections to the doetrine of future punishments.
79. (13) Reflections of this kind are not without their terror, but it
is our business to see and state things exactly as they are.
CHAPTER III..
OF TiE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.
80. (1) The nice adaptation of pleasure and pain to virtuous and
vicious conduct, as clearly indicates an intelligent Governor of the universe, as other final causes demonstrate a
Maker of it.
80. (2) But this does not prove God to be a moral governor.
80. (3) The constitution of nature shows God to be the righteous
Ruler of the world, punishing and rewarding men according to their actions.
82. (4) But this moral government, under which we now live, is
allowed not to be perfect, and is only an earnest, that, in
another state of existence, it will be carried out and completed.
82. (5) After making allowance for every objection, it cannot be
considered doubtful, whether virtue is not more happy
than vice even in the present world, where we behold the
beginnings of the more perfect state.
83.  I If the Ruler of the world, then, governs by any settled
method, it is most natural to suppose his method to be
that of distributive justice-of rewarding and punishing
us according to our works.
84. II. The fact that God governs by fixed laws, which we are
capable of understanding, and thus foreseeing the consequences of our behavior, is a proof of a moral government.
85. III. From the natural course of things, vice is actually punished, and the punishment, foreseen by the wicked, is
dreaded, which facts show that mankind universally apprehend themselves to be under a moral government.
(1) For it cannot be objected that vice is sometimes




8             ANALYSIS OF BUTLER' S ANALOGY.
Page.
rewarded and virtue punished, because they are not
so punished and rewarded in their proper characters.
86. IV. In the natural course of things, virtue, as such, is actually
rewarded, and vice, as such, punished.
88.    (1) An instance is found in the fear with which a wicked
mal looks upon the future, contrasted with the tranquility of mind enjoyed, by a man of virtuous life, in
looking forward to another state of being.
88.    (2) All honest and good men are, also, disposed to succor
those of their own character, and to discountenance
the vicious.
89.    (3) That God has given us a moral nature, and scope for
its exercise, is a strong proof of a moral government.
90.    (4) Virtue is here rewarded by men, and vice punished,
because God has given us a moral nature, and great
influence on each other's happiness.
91.    (5) It is confessed, that happiness and misery are nol
always distributed according to merit and demerit, but
frequently by way of discipline.
92.    (6) God, then, has declared himself to be on the side of
virtue, and against vice, in the general administration
of the world, and he who falls in with this administration is rewarded by a peculiar pleasure.
93. V. Vice and virtue tend to produce more misery and happiness
than they actually do produce, and thus afford a proof, that
the moral government of God is going on to a state of perfection.
93.    (1) Virtue tends, for example, to procure superiority and a
growth of power, though it may not acquire all that it
aims at.
95.    (2) Several respects in which virtue has the advantage over
vice in society.
95.    (3) So, we have reason to conclude, the invisible world
may be either analogous to the one we see; or it may
form the conclusion of the present scheme, and be
carried on according to the same general principles.
98.    (4) But, returning to the earth, a nation of perfectly good
men, governed by absolutely wise laws, would hold a vast
advantage over other nations, and might become universal in its dominion-which shows the natural superiority of virtue, and, consequently, a moral government.




ANALYSIS OF BUTLER S ANALOGY.                   9
Page.
100.     (5) If any one should think these small considerations,
what would be thought if vice were seen to have the
above advantages!
100.     (6) Should it be objected, that, notwithstanding these
natural tendencies of virtue, it may never gain the
ascendency, the objection may be met by several prominent considerations:
1.01         1. The Author of nature is known to be on the side
of virtue.
101.         2. Should the divine Being, in the next life, actually
reward and punish virtue and vice, as such, that distributive justice will not differ in kind, but only in
degree, from what we now witness.
102.         3. We have reason to believe, that, as the natural
course of all things is to increase, so the rewards
and punishments set opposite to virtue and vice, in
this world, may, in the next, be found more perfect
both in degree and kind.
102.        4. There is sufficient ground to think so from the good
and bad tendencies of virtue and vice, their tendencies being essential and founded in the nature of
things, whereas their hinderances are only artificial.
103.    (7) The notion, then, of a moral scheme of government,
much more perfect than what is here seen, is not a fictitious, but a natural and rational notion, derived from
the visible constitution and course of things.
CIAPTER IV.
OF A STATE OF PROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL, DIFFICULTIES, AND
DANGEI.
NS5 (1) It is a doctrine of religion, that, in this life, we are in a
state of probation, having scope for both good and bad
actions, for which we are to be held accountable hereafter
105 (c) The parallel to this moral probation is seen in the natural
probation under which we are now living.
106. (3) We are to consider what constitutes these probations.
107. (4) That which constitutes this state of trial must be something, either in our nature, or in our circumstances.
108. (5) There is a close analogy between our conduct under the
natural and under the moral probation




10            ANALYSIS OF BUTLER S ANALOGY.
Page.
109. (6) The analogy is not only close but complete.
109. (7) There is a perfect analogy, also, in the influences exerted
upon vs by others under these two probations
110. (8) In both these probations, we have common difficulties,
arising from our rank in the scale of creation.
111. (9) This state of moral trial, or probation, is, therefore, rendered credible, by its being consistent with the general c induct of Providence toward us, in every thing within the
compass of our knowledge.
112. (10) This continued analogy between the natural and the moral
government of God answers all objections, drawn from
Divine benevolence, against this state of moral probation;
for, if probation is allowable in the one, it may be equally
allowable in the other.
CHAPTER V.
OF A STATE OF PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR MORAL DISCIPLINE AND
IMPROVEMENT.
113. (1) The known end why we are placed in this state of proba
tion, pressed by temptations and trials, is, that we may
work out for ourselves the requisite qualifications for a
future state of security and happiness.
(2) The early part of our present life, considered as an introductory education for the future, is evidently analogous to
this trial under which we live in reference to the next state
of being.
114.  I. In the next state of existence, as in this, there must be a
correspondence between our capacities and our condition,
or we could enjoy no happiness.
115. II. We find, also, by experience and observation, that men, as
well as other creatures, can be qualified for certain conditions, for which they were once entirely unqualified.
119 III. Without the formation of certain characters, i is evident,
men, in this life, could not fulfill the end for which they
are created.
122. IV. Now, taking into account God's moral government, and
that the character of virtue and piety is necessary for happiness in a future state, we can clearly see in what respects
the present life may be a preparation for it.




ANALYSIS OF IUTLER S ANALOGY.                  11
CHAPTER VI.
OF TilE OPINION OF NECESSITY, CONSIDERED AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE.
Page.
137. (1) Propriety of examining the doctrine of necessity.
137. (2) We should know, whether the supposed necessity, existing
in nature, is reconcilable with the natural government
of God, before we pronounce it irreconcilable with his
moral government; and if we find no fatality or foreordination which excludes free deliberation and choice il our
natural relations, we may not expect to find any thing of
this kind to hinder or limit our freewill in respect to our
moral conduct.
138. (3) Though God is said to exist by a kind of necessity, it
cannot be said that all other things exist in the same manner.
139. (4) Necessity as much demands a necessary agent, as freedom
demands a free agent, to be the former of the world, and
proves nothing against the intelligence and design manifested in creation. It supposes, then, an intelligent Designer,
who acts from choice, that is, acts freely, and virtually
destroys the idea of necessity.  In other words, the doctrine of necessity, or fatality, or fixed foreordination, is
self-destructive.
140. (5) But, if the doctrine of a supposed necessity does not destroy
the proof of there being an intelligent and free natural
Governor of the world, we are prepared to believe it may
not exclude the idea of a free and intelligent moral Governor of it.
1 10 (6) The doctrine of necessity, or of fixed foreordination, when
applied to the conduct of this life, becomes a dangerous
absurdity, leading us into summary mistakes and misery;
from which we have a right to conclude, that, applied to
our conduct in reference to a future state of being, it will
not be less fallacious.
143. (7) The doctrine of necessity proved to be untrue, because it
cannot be reasonably applied to the practice of the present
life.
143. (8) If the supposed idea of necessity does not destroy the freedom of human actions, so it may not destroy it in the
Creator and moral Governor of the universe.
144. (9) Nor does the supposed necessity destroy the proof of




1.2            ANALYSIS OF BUTLERtS ANALOGY.
Page
religion. If, in the present life, notwithstanding foreordination, or fate, our condition is known to be, in genelal,
the consequence of our conduct, it may be equally so, so
far as necessity hinders, in reference to our future state.
145. (10) But as necessity is the basis of all infidelity, it is expedient
to show that the obligations of religion are in no way
affected by it.
145, (11) The proof, from final causes, of an intelligent Author of
nature, is not affected by this notion of necessity, granting
this necessity a thing possible in itself, or reconcilable with
the constitution of things.  The existence of a moral sense
proves, that there is a distinction between wrong and right,
and that there is a rule of life, by which we must govern
our conduct, or be self-condemned.  But this moral faculty
is the gift of God, and must be regarded as an expression
of his judgment, so far as it goes, of right and wrong.
146. (12) We have, then, the utmost reason to conclude, that God
will certainly punish and reward us according to the guilt
or innocence of our life, as they are made known to us
from the discernment of this moral faculty.
148. (13) But the external evidence of the general scheme of religion, here insisted on, is worthy of consideration; and the
more so, because it is not at all affected by this notion of
necessity.  It has been professed by a great part of the
human family from  the beginning of authentic history,
and tradition carries it back even to the first ages; from
which we are naturally led to conclude, either that it lies
stamped upon the very frame-work of nature, and so comes
naturally, and easily, and universally into the human mind,
or that it was given at the first by revelation.
150. (14) We ought, however, to rest with due caution, not only on
the deductions of human reason, a faculty so liable to be
perverted, but, also, on this moral sense, equally capable of
being depraved, prejudiced, or neglected.
150. (15) If the objector still insists, that, without answering the
above arguments, it is enough to deny the consistency
between a state of trial, which implies freedom, and the
doctrine of necessity, which precludes such a state, it will
be a sufficient reply to say, that if the two things are
irreconcilable, then the doctrine of necessity must fall,
since nothing is more a matter of fact and observation,




ANALYSIS OF BUTLER'S ANALOGY.                   13
Page.
than the probatory state of man, and the freedom of will
on which it is plainly founded.
152. (1 6) The analogy of nature, therefore, shows us, that the opinion of necessity, as applicable to the present life, is a false
opinion; but which, if it does not destroy the proof of
natural religion, certainly makes no alteration in the proof
of that which is revealed.
152. (17) But, finally, the opinion of necessity, or fatality, is destructive of all religion, first, because atheistical men, by this
notion, set aside all religion, and encourage themselves in
vice; and, secondly, because it is a contradiction of the
whole constitution of nature, and of all personal consciousness of moral obligation, and thus overturns every
thing. However, if this notion of necessity, supposing it
to be well-founded, is consistent with the present constitution of things, as atheists assert, it must be equally so with
that scheme of religion revealed to us, and based on the
moral government of God, and the essential freedom of the
human mind.
CHAPTER VII.
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME, OR CONSTITUTION, IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.
154. (1) Objections may be made against the wisdom, equity, and
goodness of the moral government of God, as set forth by
revealed religion, which analogy may not be able to meet
directly. Nor is it called to defend the scheme of religion,
but to show it to be a matter of fact, the proofs of which
are so clear in nature  Yet analogy can suggest answers
which may be made to tile objections offered.
154 (2) It is, for example, easy to see from the analogy of nature,
that the moral government of God, considered as a scheme
of universal law and order, must be beyond our perfect
comprehension, so that we are unable to decide peremptorily
on its wisdom, equity, and goodness. Besides, from analogy we can show these objections to be of but little consequellnce.
155.  I. The natural universe, so vast and complex, is entirely beyond the comprehension of man, from the analogy of which




14            ANALYSIS OF BUTLER' S ANALOGY.
Page.
we are allowed to infer, that the moral world, covering
all time, and including all intelligent moral beings, is
equally incomprehensible. Nor does any man pretend to
deny this fact in the ordinary affairs of life, but only when
he argues against religion.
]59. II. From certain particular analogies, we may learn how little
weight is to be given to these objections:
1. We find, by experience, that some very desirable ends
are brought about only by the most undesirable of
means; and, in the same manner, it may be supposed,
the apparent ills of the present life are conducive to
good results in a future state.
160.    2. The world is governed by general laws, with which it
might not be either benevolent or wise to interfere; and,
if these general laws permit some irregularities to exist,
they may, nevertheless, be productive of more good than
evil in the end.
162.         But it may be objected, that this argument from ignorance would apply equally against the proofs of religion,
and that we must reason only from what we know. To
this it may be replied,
162.       1. That this objection would be good if our ignorance
were total, but not if only partial, as it is known to be.
163.       2. But were this objection valid, a sense of moral obligation would still arise from our own minds.
163.       3. The particular analogies, heretofore presented, demonstrate the fallacy of these objections against
religion; for, could we see the whole plan of God's
government, these apparent discrepances might appear to be only consistent parts of it.
164.  Lastly. We are undeniably incompetent judges of the present scheme of things-much more of that which
covers the entire scope of the world to come.
CONCLUSION.
165 (1) Recapitulation.
169. (2) Practical application of the subject.




ANALYSIS OF BUTLER:S ANALOGY.                  15
PART II.
OF REVEALED  RELIGION.
CHAPTER I.
OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY
Page.
173.  Introductory observations, going to show, that, though natural religion is the foundation and principal part of Chris
tianity, it is not, in any sense, the whole of it.
175. I. Christianity is,
(1) A republication of natural religion.
176.    (2) An authoritative republication of it.
176.    (3) There can be no objection, practically considered,
against the miracles wrought to attest the authenticity
of revelation.
177.    (4) Shown by a pertinent example.
177.    (5) Life and immortality brought to light by the Gospel,
and the doctrine of future rewards and punishments
established.
177.    (6) The Church of Christ intended to perpetuate this
work of Christianity to all ages.
179.    (7) The benefit thus derived to natural religion very obvious and important.
179.    (8) The objection, that Christianity has been corrupted,
of no value; for the ill effects of Christianity are not
natural fruits, but perversions of it.
180.    (9) The importance of Christianity seen from these considerations.
181. II. Christianity is a revelation of a system of facts and precepts beyond the reach of our reasoning and reflecting
powers.
182.    (1) Religion, both internal and external, founded on revelation, and enforced by reason.
183.    (2) The obligation to reverence the Son of God, when his
relations have been revealed, as reasonable and as much
moral as charity to mankind, or any other virtue founded on relations made known by reason itself.
184.    (3) No one can say what may follow a disregard of this
obligation in the future life.
184.    (4) A renewal of the heart, by the agency of the Holy
Spirit, a rational inference from our revealed relations to
another life, and confirmed by the analogy of thisworld.




16            ANALYSIS OF BUTLER S ANALOGY.
Page.
185.    (5) Presumptuous, then, to treat religion as a light matter
But to prevent mistake, the two following deductions
are added:
185.         1. Respecting the distinction between positive and
moral precepts.
186.        2. From this distinction is shown the reason of God's
preference for what is moral over what is merely
positive.
187.           (1) Care to be exercised in comparing them.
187.           (2) Of two conflicting precepts, the one moral, the
other positive, we are to obey the former.
188.           (3) Moral precepts are to be preferred, because written upon our hearts.
188.           (4) No great necessity, after all, for the determination of such questions.
190.           (5) We are under no less obligation to obey positive
precepts, because they yield, in importance, to
moral.
190.           (6) Every consideration enforces the duty of searching the Scriptures to see what its doctrines are,
rather than to pronounce, from reason or nature, what they should be.
CHAPTER II.
OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST A REVELATION CONSIDERED AS
MIRACULOUS.
The subject proposed, and the presumption against a revelation stated. But the answer to it is very easy:
192. I. Analogy raises no objection against Christianity, either as
a scheme not discoverable by reason, or as a scheme ipposed to it; for,
193.    1. From the vast extent of God's dominion, there must be
some things beyond our comprehension, and the Christian scheme may be one of them.
193.    2. If, in the natural world, we all the while see one thing
differing very greatly from another, it is not incredible
that there should be some difference between things
natural and things spiritual.
194. II. There is no presumption, from analogy, against some
things now called miraculous.




ANALYSIS OF BUTLER S ANALOGY.                17
Page.
196. III. But, it is again objected, that miracles are incredible after
the settlement and during the continuance of a course
of nature. This objection is invalid, because, first, we do
not know the analogy between our world and those around
us; secondly, leaving out the consideration of religion, we
are so ignorant of the character and condition of our own
world, that no inferences, against miracles, can be made
from our partial knowledge of it; lastly, miracles must not
be confounded with other common events, but with the
extraordinary phenomena of nature.
198. Concluding remark.
CHAPTER III.
OF OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING WHAT WERE TO BE EXPECTED IN A
REVELATION, AND THE CREDIBILITY FROM ANALOGY, THAT IT MUST
CONTAIN THINGS APPEARING LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.
199. (1) Numerous small objections, not to the evidence, but to the
scheme of Christianity, taken as a whole, recapitulated.
200. (2) Now, if, as is clear, we should not have supposed, before
experience, that nature would be precisely what it is; so
equally, revelation may properly declare some things,
against which we may raise objections, as being different
from what might have been expected.
202. (3) These observations, respecting the whole of Christianity,
are applicable to inspiration in particular.
203. (4) It is said, that an unwritten revelation would not have
answered God's purpose; but that depends on the kind
of purpose he had in view-a thing, possibly, beyond our
scope.
203. (5) But, if we could not have told, beforehand, what would be
most suitable for a revelation to make known, neither are
we any better able to decide, after the revelation has been
made.
204. (6) There are sonme ways of arguing, which, though applicable
to other things, are not admissible in respect to some parts
of Scripture.
205. (7) "But is it not self-evident, that internal improbabilities
of all kinds weaken external probable proof?" Of course,
but in revelation, we cannot sav what would be probabili~.es, or improbabilities.
2




18            ANALYSIS OF BUTLER S ANALOGY.
Page,
205. (8) These very objections, considering the analogy between
natural and revealed religion, were to have been expected;
for they are precisely the same as those raised against the
course of nature.
207. (9) By applying this principle to a particular instance, such as
the miraculous powers exercised by individual apostles at
the first, it will be more clearly seen how they may apply
to others of the same kind.
208. (10) There is a great resemblance between the light of nature
and of revelation, in the manner of our acquiring knowledge by them.
209. (11) The slight value of natural knowledge no objection to the
above view of the subject.
210. (12) The late appearance and partial dissemination of revelation
no objection, since the same may be brought against many
of the most valuable instructions of nature.
211. (13) It cannot be inferred, from these arguments, that reason
is not the judge of revelation in some respects; for, whatever should be said, the same could be equally alledged
against nature.
213. (14) We are not, then, to consider what objections may be
brought against the scheme, but only what can be said
against the morality of revelation.
214. (15) Finally, if a revelation have a more direct tendency to the
promotion of virtue than any scheme of mere enthusiasm
or policy, this is a high presumption of its truth
CHAPTER IV.
OF CHRISTIANITY, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME, OR CONSTITUTION, IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.
The same objections, alledged against the constitution of nature,
are preferred also against the scheme of Christianity, and are
to be answered just as they were answered.
216.  I. Christianity proved to be a scheme entirely beyond our
comprehension.
218. II. As in nature, so in Christianity, means are made use of te
accomplish ends.
218. III. The Christian dispensation has been always carried on by
general laws.
2,0. It is here objected against the entire scheme of Christianity,




A NALYSIS OF BUTLER S ANALOGY.               19
Page.
that it supposes God was reduced to the necessity of using
means to the accomplishment of certain ends. But the objection is fully met by the analogy of nature; for, in the
course of nature, we behold God employing the most intricate system of means in every thing performed.
CHAPTER V.
OF THE PARTICULAR SYSTEM OF CHRISTIANITY, THE APPOINTMENT OF A
MEDIATOR, AND THE REDEMPTION OF THE WORLD BY HIM.
Nothing in Christianity has been more objected to than the
mediation of Christ, though nothing is less liable to objection.
223.  I. The entire visible government of the world is carried on
by a system of mediation.
223. II. The moral world is under the moral government of God,
by which ends are accomplished by the intervention, or
mediation, of moral means.
225. III. There seems to have been made, in nature, a provision,
that, by certain means, the natural consequences of evil
can be avoided; and, by analogy, we should be led to
expect a similar provision in God's moral government, or
the scheme of Christianity.
227. IV. But, in the use of these natural remedies, we are constantly impelled, by our own ignorance or weakness, to
call in the aid of others; so,
229.  V. In the Christian system, we not only have reason to expect, but actually find, the piroffered services of a Mediator.
232. VI. The manner of this mediation is fully and clearly set
forth in Scripture.
The office of Christ, as mediator, treated of under three
heads:
235,     1. He was God's prophet, coming into the world to declare his will;
2. He established a "ckingdom  not of this world"-a
Church, which is to be the memorial and depository
of religion for ever;
3. He offered himself as a propitiatory sacrifice for the
sins of the world; though it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to tell precisely how it is efficacious.
237. VII. From our manifold ignorance we are incompetent judges




20           ANALYSIS OF BUTLER S ANALOGY.
Page.
of the question, whether a Mediator was necessary to obtain for us pardon, happiness, and heaven.
Lastly, We have no reason to expect to be as well informed by
revelation respecting the Divine conduct, as concerning
our own duty.
CHAPTER VI.
OF THE WANT OF UNIVERSALITY IN REVELATION, AND OF THE SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN THE PROOF OF IT.
243. (1) It is objected against Christianity, that it comes to us on
doubtful evidence, and that it has not been given to all
men equally.
(2) There is no force in either of these objections, because,
first, we all enjoy blessings not given in their highest
degree, and many have favors not granted to all others.
(3) WVe daily act upon doubtful evidence in all the common
concerns of life.
244. (4) If neither the Jewish nor the Christian revelation has ever
been universal, and if both have had different degrees of
evidence, in different ages and to different persons, this
variety is easily paralleled from the daily course of Providence.
247. (5) Nor is there any thing shocking in this arrangement, since
every one is to be judged by the light lie has had given him.
248. (e) It was, undoubtedly, by a wise and good principle, common
to both the natural and moral governments of God, that
this variety of disposition was permitted.
248. (7) A system, like that of the present world, requires great variety. But the foregoing positions may be strengthened by
a few practical reflections:
249.    1. The doubtfulness of some things in the moral government of God may be a part of the trial of the present
state.
250.    2. The very doubtfulness of religion puts us under a general state of moral probation.
253.    3. This state of doubt in which some men are placed,
should be no more a matter of complaint, than the state
of temptation into which others are thrown by Providence.




ANALYSIS OF BUTLER'S ANALOGY.                  21
Page.
255. (8) Nor is there any impropriety in supposing, that the speculative difficulties, in which the evidences of Christianity
are involved, may constitute the principal part of some
men's trial.'256 (9) But dissatisfaction with the evidences, of religion may be,
after all, the fault of the dissatisfied person; for,
256. (10) They who do not examine them, or look only at difficulties,
or only make sport over religion altogether, cannot expect
ever to see the evidences on which it is founded.
258. (11) Yet, the general proof of natural and revealed religion lies
on a level with the capacities of common men.
259. (12) A prince, or a common master, in sending directions to a
servant, if he wishes to test the motives of that servant's
conduct, might be expected to give his directions precisely
as God, the great Master, has given them to us in Scripture.
260. (13) That we are under a moral government implies that we
are also in a state of probation; and, consequently, there is
no difficulty in supposing our probation to be exactly what
it is, notwithstanding all objections.
261. (14) Some respectable men, it may be, will deem these considerations singular; but all such are requested to consider,
whether their sentiments are derived from a careful examination of the subject, or taken up without sufficient
study and reflection.
CHAPTER VII.
OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIANITY.
263. (1) Having, in the foregoing chapters, considered the objections to Christianity, both general and particular, we now
look into the evidences for it, in order to see how far they
are supported by the analogy of nature.
263 (2) There are two kinds of evidence, first, that of miracles
and prophecy; and, secondly, that of the general import
of all the circumstances attending revelation from the beginning.
264. First, The direct proof of Christianity from miracles and
prophecy, including the objections raised against them.
26C4  I. The following considerations, relating to the miracles,
seem to possess great weight




22            ANALYSIS OF BUTLER S ANALOGY.
Page.
264.    1. The Bible furnishes the same historical evidence, that
miracles were wrought by Moses, by the prophets, and
by Jesus and his apostles, as of the common civil history of the times of Moses, of the kings of Israel, or of
the closing period of Jewish history; nor are we to suppose the Bible wanting in authenticity, until it is clearly
shown to be otherwise than what it professes.
266.    2. The testimony of St. Paul, in his epistles, is to be considered by itself, and possesses great weight.
267.    3. It is acknowledged, that Christianity at first offered itself
for belief, in the very age when it was produced, on the
evidence of miracles then claimed to be wrought; and,
on this claim, it was received by multitudes of the ablest
minds then in the world, and in the face of the severest
persecutions.
270.       (1) It lies, now, upon unbelievers to show, why this
evidence is not to be admitted; but that they may
have no excuse, their main objections are here produced and answered.
(2) They assert, for example, that, in other ages, enthusiastic people have exposed themselves to persecution for the most idle follies in the world; but, admlitting this objection, it does not deny, that the
early Christians believed in the miracles as historic
facts.
271.       (3) But enthusiasm, it is said, greatly weakens the evidence of testimony even for facts, in matters relating
to religion; though this objection is of no force when
applied to great numbers of persons of the highest
respectability, testifying concerning facts seen and
witnessed by their own eyes, and facts shown to be
credible in themselves.
272.       (4) If it was not pure enthusiasm, it might have been
enthusiasm  mixed with knavery in the life of the
early witnesses to Christianity; but this objection,
though valid in many cases, is not considered good
against the natural and general honesty of human
testimony, nor can it apply to the apostles, till they
are proved to have been enthusiasts and knaves by
good authority.
9173.      (5) But the fact is, it is added, that mankind have been,




ANALYSIS OF BUTLER' S ANALOGY.                 23
often deluded by pretended  niracles; and yet not
oftener than by many other pretenses.
273.       (6) It is said, also, that many pretended miracles, apparently somewhat attested by historical evidence,
have turned out to be fabulous; but this proves nothing against the miracles related in the Bible.
274.       (7) The general honesty, therefore, of human testimony
remains, notwithstanding these objections, and, consequently, the testimony of the apostles.
275.       (8) The great importance of Christianity, also, and the
weighty obligations for veracity it imposes on its
followers, are both strong proofs of the carefulness
and honesty of the first witnesses.
275.       (9) The general conclusion, to be admitted by all reasonable skeptics, is, that the evidence for miracles is at
least considerable, if not satisfactory, which, as there
is no proof offered to rebut it, and as Christianity
is a system in itself entirely credible, must be regarded as sufficient.
276. II. The evidence from prophecy is now to be compared with
the general analogy of nature, so far as evidence of a similar character is found in it.
276.    1. The obscurity of one part of a prophecy does not at all
invalidate the proof, that another part, clearly understood, has been fulfilled.
277.    2. A long train of prophecies, seen to be plainly applicable
to known events, is a strong proof, that they were
intended to foretell them.
278.    3. Admitting, even, that the prophets may have had in
their thoughts events not now attributed to their words
by Christians, or that there may have been events,
included under their language, not thought of by themnselves, there would, even then, be no proof against the
actual fulfillment of prophecies, as maintained by the
friends of revelation. Nor is it to any purpose, that
some persons endeavor to confine the import of the
prophecies to the ages when they were written, or to
ages previous to them; though there are many, who
have neither modesty nor integrity enough to be governed by evidence of this nature.
289. Secondly, An account is to be given of the general argument




24            ANALYSIS OF BUTLER S ANALOGY.
Page.
for the truth of Christianity, as collected from a great variety of particulars; for this is precisely the course pursued in ordinary matters.
283.    (1) The thing asserted is, that God has revealed to us
natural religion, and, in that revelation, has given us
an account of a particular dispensation of Providence,
and an institution of religion founded on it, entirely
above the reach of reason.
283.    (2) This revelation may be regarded as a history of the
world from the beginning to the end of it.
285.    (3) It, therefore, offers a wide field for skeptical criticism,
which, so far from invalidating the proof of revelation,
has thus far only strengthened and confirmed it.
286.    (4) It contains a history of the whole human family, and
of one chosen nation in particular, foretelling the
coming of a Messiah, who, expected a long time before his appearance, though rejected when he did come,
spent his life in the manner foretold in setting up a
religion sanctioned by miracles, to be propagated to
the end of time by persons commissioned and endowed
for this service.
288.    (5) Should a person, ignorant entirely of the claims of
Scripture, be told,
289.    (6) In the first place, that the establishment of natural
religion is chiefly owing to this revelation; that many
whole nations acknowledge the authority of it; and
of what immense importance is religion to our present
and future well-being; the person, so informed, would
naturally declare, that such a revelation is worthy the
most careful consideration.
290.    (7) Let this person be informed, in the second place,
of the antiquity of the first part of this revelation, and of its chronological agreement with wellknown history.
291     (8) Let him next be told the remarkable history of the
Jewish nation;
292.    (9) Let him  be informed of the actual appearing of a
person, claiming to be the foretold Messiah, at the
precise time when he was universally expected, who,
by miracles, established his credit with many witnesses,
both Jews and Gentiles, at first prejudiced against




ANALYSIS OF BUTLER'S ANALOGY.                 25
Page.
him, until his doctrines finally became, in spite of opposition, the religion of the world.
293.   (10) The standing miracle of the continued dispersion of
the Jews, and of their distinctness as a people, agreeing so perfectly with the prophecies respecting them,
cannot be answered.
294.   (11) The fulfillment of certain known prophecies confirms
our confidence, that all of them will be eventually
fulfilled.
295.   (12) The argument from fulfilled prophecy, though requiring considerable historical learning to comprehend it,
is really conclusive.
295    (13) A  person, by comparing the known prophecies of
Scripture with the recorded events of history, corresponding to these prophecies, would be naturally inclined to take the one as foretelling the other.
296.   (14) All these particulars require separate and critical examination; and, when carefully studied, must be confessed to have great weight in them.
297.   (15) The truth of Christianity, like truth in ordinary matters, is to be determined by comparing all the points
for and against it; and the duty of making this comparison is enjoined on every reasonable person.
299.   (16) It is, nevertheless, easy to talk flippantly against
Christianity, and difficult to sum up the vast amount
of evidence in its favor.
299.   (17) The positive evidence for Christianity is such, that,
though it may seem to be lessened, it cannot be destroyed by any sort of opposition.
CHAPTER VIII.
O3F THE OBJECTIONS WHICn MAY BE MADE AGAINST ARGUING FROM THE
ANALOGY OF NATURE TO RELIGION.
W00. (1) If all persons, who make objections, would take the pains
to be informed respecting what they write against, the
occasion of this chapter would be, in part, superseded;
but, as it is, the following particulars require some notice:
300. (2) "It is a very unsatisfactory way," says the objector, "to
solve difficulties in revelation, by pointing out similar ones
In rature; to show the obligations of religion by proving
3




26            ANALYSIS OF BUTLER'S ANALOGY,
Page
that we have as little reason for our worldly pursuits; to
vindicate the goodness and justice of the Author of nature
by showing that similar objections lie against natural and
revealed religion-a mode of answering objections in no
way satisfactory in behalf of a religion so revolutionary
in its bearings on all the affairs and pleasures of the present
life."
301. (3) This way of speaking, though plausible, is owing to partial
views, and may be answered in the following manner:
301.    1. It is a sufficient answer to the objections raised against
revealed religion, to show that the very things objected to
are found also in the known constitution and course of
nature; for if God can permit the things objected to in
his natural government, there is no absurdity in the
belief of a moral government permitting the very same
difficulties, as there can be no contradiction in his conduct.
2. Religion is a practical thing, and, if it is shown to lie
under the same principles by which ordinary affairs of
life are governed, the objection is of no force, nor is the
doubtfulness of its proof less than that on which our
common everyday conduct is based.
304.    3. Nor is it the business of this treatise to vindicate the government of God, but to show what it is, and thus explain the obligations under which we live, though several considerations are added, by which it is entirely defended against skeptical assaults.
306.    4. It is conceded, that the treatise is not entirely conclusive
or satisfactory; but it is enough so to answer the end for
which it is intended; for it shows the evidence of religion to be sufficient to prove and discipline the virtue
which it presupposes and wishes to encourage.
308.    5. It is no objection to the evidence of religion, that men
will not be likely to yield to it in their conduct, for we
see them daily living against their best judgment in
other matters.
309.       (1) It should be observed, also, that the argument of
this treatise has been carried on from the principles of
others, and contains only that evidence for religion
left after all objections are met and answered   It
has been conducted, also, under tile i.usabilhty of




ANALYSIS OF BUTLER'S ANALOGY.                 27
Page
admitting the doctrine of necessity, and of neglecting the helps arising from the doctrine of liberty,
and moral fitness, from the latter of which great
advantages might have been derived.
311.      (2) The result of the whole treatise will be, to clear the
minds of believers of numerous objections raised
against the scheme of Christianity, and to convince
many unbelievers of the truth of it, who may
never have been so convinced before.
312.      (3) And, finally, though some may ridicule the argument
of analogy as a whole, yet it must be considered, by
all candid minds, and especially persons dissatisfied with abstract reasoning, to have some force.
CONCLUSION.
313 (1) It would seem incredible, that, in Christian nations, Christianity should be so generally neglected; for the proof of
it is so readily seen, at least of its principal doctrines, and
it has been so long and so sedulously inculcated. Nor do
skeptics, in general, pretend, that there is no weight in the
evidence for religion, but reject it as being a thing clearly
incredible in spite of all evidence, not having been sufficiently attentive to it to know what amount of force is in it.
315. (2) To such persons, in particular, this treatise is adapted, as
is shown by a recapitulation of the propositions established in the course of the argument.
320. (3) Concluding remarks, by which it is clearly shown, that
those men, who can evade the force of arguments so probable for the truth of Christianity, undoubtedly possess dispositions to evil, which would cause them to reject it, were
it based on the most absolute demonstration.
TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONS.
DISSERTATION I.
OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.
323 (1) Strange perplexities have been raised respecting the meaning of identity, as applied to the future state.
323. (2) Yet there is no difficulty in ascertaining the idea of identity.
424. (3) Consciousness, by which we discover ourselves, from tile




28            ANALYSIS OF BUTLER S ANALOGY.
Page.
to time, to be the same persons, by no means constitutes
ttiat identity.
324. (4) Though consciousness is necessary to our personality, it is
not at all necessary to our identity.
324. (5) Identity, as applied to vegetables, say a tree, is totally dif
ferent from the same term as applied to persons.
325. (6) Mr. Locke, in defining a person to be a thinking intelli.
gent being, and personal identity as the sameness of a rational
being, has furnished the ground of a perfect answer to the
objections against personal identity; for, though the acts
of consciousness, by which we successively establish our
identity, are different acts, yet they are all mentally perceived to refer to one and the same person.
326. (7) Yet Mr. Locke's observations on the subject are hasty, and
seem to have proved unsatisfactory even to himself; and
they have been pushed to a length still more extravagant
by others, who, following Mr. Locke, assert, "that personality is not a permanent but a transient thing, and consciousness itself is different at each successive step of life."
To this it is replied,
328.    1. This position is repugnant to the common sense of
mankind.
328.    2. It is not an idea, but a being, of which this identity is
predicated, and all being remains the same during its
entire existence.
329.    3. All men are conscious, that they are, at any given moment, the same persons they were at any former period
as far back as they can remember; this consciousness
includes, either directly or indirectly, the substance of
ourselves, whatever that substance may be; and it is
idle to ask, at the end of such a demonstration, whether,
after all, we may not be deceived by memory; for the
same question may be raised upon every subject, and
can be answered only by the help, one way or another,
of the very suspected faculty itself.
DISSERTATION II.
OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.
331. (1) Mankind have a moral nature, on which virtue has its basis,
and a faculty by which that virtue is approved in ourselves




ANALYSIS OF BUTLER'S ANALOGY.                 29
Page.
and others. Concerning this faculty, proved to exist by
consciousness, by observation, by the daily exercise of it
on both real and feigned objects, by language, by many
written treatises, by our sense of gratitude, and by our
distinguishing between injury, harm, and punishment, several things are to be distinctly noted:
332.    1. The object of this faculty is actions, including active or
motive principles.
333.    2. Our perception of actions, as morally good or evil,
implies in it a sense of them as of good or ill deserving.
335.    3. This perception of vice and ill desert, arises from a
comparison of actions with the nature and capacities
of the agent.
335.    4. It should be considered, whether we have more right to
make ourselves miserable without reason, than to make
others so. It is this consideration by which prudence is
seen to be a virtue.
337.    5. Benevolence, so great a part of virtue, is not the whole
of it; and benevolence to one person, rather than, or
more than to another, may be a virtue, and falsehood,
violence and injustice, vice in us, independent of either
the good or evil consequences respectively produced by
them.
339.       (1) If, now, we are endowed with such a moral faculty, the natural object of which is moral actions,
moral government must consist in rendering us
happy or unhappy, by rewarding or punishing us,
according as we follow or abandon this rule of action recorded in our nature.
339.      (2) It is, then, a great error, though committed by
many good men, to make virtue to consist merely in
promoting the greatest amount of happiness in othere, and vice in doing that which tends evidently to
an overplus of evil.
340       (3) Veracity, as a rule of life, means the use of the various methods of communication with no intention
to deceive.








THE
LIFE OF BISHOP BUTLER.
BY THE EDITOR.
IF the reader has pleasure in tracing the steps taken by
a great mind, in rising from obscurity to fame the most
exalted, he can not fail to enjoy that pleasure, in its highest
degree, in reviewing the life of Bishop Butler.
JOSEPH BUTLER was the son of Mr. Thomas Butler, a
respectable shop-keeper of Wantage, England, and the
youngest of eight children. He was born in the year 1692.
Evincing, at an early age, a genius of a superior order, he
was sent to study under the care of the Rev. Philip Barton,
a clergyman of the Church of England, and afterward at
an academy belonging to the Presbyterians at Tewksbury.
At this school, young Butler is said to have made an extraordinary progress in the study of divinity. It was during
his residence at this seminary, that he wrote the celebrated
letters to Dr. Samuel Clarke, reviewing that great man's
work in demonstration of the being and attributes of God.
The first letter is dated November 4, 1713, when its author
was in the twenty-first year of his age, and at once excited
Dr. Clarke's unqualified admiration. The Doctor, then. in
the height of his own glory, replied to the young man's
strictures, and thus encouraged him to continue them. Four
letters were successively written, which, manifesting the most
uncommon penetration, were yet couched in such proper
language, that they were immediately annexed to the great
treatise itself, and that by its author, where they have ever
since maintained their first reputation. This was a great
31




532           THE LIFE OF BISHOP BUTLER.
achievement, certainly, for a boy of twenty, and gave the
most striking evidence of future promise.
While at school, he formed a lasting attachment to young
Thomas Secker, afterward the celebrated Archbishop of
Canterbury, but then his fellow-student at Tewksbury, and a
year younger than himself. They lived together like two
brothers, reading, writing, and studying together, each
regarding the other's welfare dearer than his own. Seeker,
having studied medicine in addition to his regular course,
went to Paris with a view to his profession, where, meeting
with Edward Talbot, son of the Bishop of Durham, he was
prevailed upon by his new friend to abandon physic and
devote himself to the Church. Passing over into England,
he was soon after ordained by Bishop Talbot, received the
degree of Doctor of Laws at Oxford, and accepted the
living of' St. James', Westminster, offered him  by his
patron.  During all this time, and through the whole
course of his brilliant and successful career, he retained
the strongest affection for his old class-mate, and served
him on all occasions. It is difficult to say, whether Mr.
Butler received or gave the greater honor by this connection. They were both worthy of their distinction.
Mr. Butler, unlike his fellow-student, had always intended
to enter the ministry; but, like him, he was the son of a
Dissenter. At a mature age, when the period of decision
came, for his own satisfaction, he undertook to examine the
doctrines and discipline of the Church to the bottom. With
what ability a duty of this kind could be done by Joseph
Butler, the reader will have, in the following t-eatise, a sufficient demonstration. After the most profound investigation, he rejected Presbyterianism, and joined the Church of
England.  His father, naturally dissatisfied with the young
man's decision, called to his aid a number of dissenting
ministers; but it was impossible, as might have been foreseen, to move such a mind from its deliberate determinations.




THE LIFE OF BISHOP BUTLER.            33
About this period, Joseph was removed, by consent of
his father, to the University of Oxford, where he immediately took the highest rank in all the studies of his anticipated profession.
Edward Talbot, the gentleman before mentioned as the
patron of Mr. Seeker, must have taken great satisfaction in
giving encouragement to merit. He was the man to whom,
not only Seeker, but also Butler and Benson owed their
preferments; but he himself lived and died contented with
the small living of Hendred.  On his very death-bed, as
if he could not die without giving a fresh instance of his
generosity and kindness, he remembered Mr. Butler, and
recommended him to one of the richest settlements in England.
The first preferment, to which Mr. Butler was appointed,
was that of being preacher at the Rolls, where he produced,
in the year 1726, at the age of thirty four, fifteen very celebrated sermons. His next benefice was that of Haughton,
which was followed, soon after, by that of Stanhope. The
rectory of Haughton was given to him in 1722, and that of
Stanhope, one of the best in all England, in 1725; so that,
while preacher at the Rolls, he enjoyed no less than three
appointments procured by his benefactors, Edward Talbot,
Samuel Clarke, and Thomas Seeker. His friends, in fact,
seem to have multiplied rapidly upon him, outstripping
every thing but his merit.
While preacher at the Rolls chapel, Mr. Butler is said to
have divided his time between town and country; but, as
rector of Stanhope, he spent seven years exclusively with
his people. His time, as might be expected, was divided
between his studies and his duties as a pastor. Indeed, to
such a mind as that of Butler, every thing is a study. Not
an hour is spent in idleness. Every moment must contribute something to the one great work of his earthly mis.
sion.




34           THE LIFE OF BISHOP BUTLER.
But Joseph Butler was naturally possessed of a discon,
solate disposition. He needed the exhilarating effect of
social intercourse. He began to grow melancholy, and
spent, it was thought, many hours in gloomy meditation.
Here, again, the angel of his life, now the renowned
Thomas Seeker, who had watched, esteemed, and admired
him from the beginning, came to his relief. In conversation, one day, with Queen Caroline, he made an honorable
allusion to the name of Mr. Butler. The Queen replied,
that she supposed him to be dead; but the eulogies of
his friend assured her, that he not only lived, but lived
in the heart of a good and great man. It was Archbishop Blackburn, however, and not Mr. Secker, who made
the famous reply to her majesty, so often quoted.  The
Queen, on a certain occasion, asked the Archbishop, if
Mr. Butler were not dead?  "No, madam," responded
the benevolent but witty prelate, "but he is buried."
The Queen comprehended the ingenious reproof, and became, at once, Mr. Butler's patron. His friend, Dr. Talbot, was made Lord Chancellor, and, at the instance of
Mr. Secker, Butler became his chaplain. On his way to
London, he spent a little time at Oxford, where he received
the degree of Doctor of Laws. This occurred on the 8th
of December, 1733, in the forty-first year of Mr. Butler's
age.
But the year 1736 is one of the most memorable of his life.
Having, in addition to his other honors, received the appointment of Clerk of the Closet to Queen Caroline, he
spent his time, excepting two hours a day devoted to her
majesty, in patient study; and, as a fruit of his literary
retirement, he soon presented to her a copy of his celebrated Analogy of Religion. This great work was immediately hailed with a sort of triumph. It was glory enough
for one man to be acknowledged as its author.
Through the influence gained by this book, seconded by




THE LIFE OF BISHOP BUTLER.             35
the joint recommendation of the Queen and the Lord
Chancellor Talbot, he was at once raised to the See of
Bristol, to which he was consecrated on the 3d of December, 1738. To this honor, George II soon after-added the
deanery of St. Paul's. Next, on the death of Dr. Egerton,
Bishop of Hereford, he was appointed Clerk of the Closet
to the King. Four years after this last event, namely, on
the 16th of October, 1750, he was translated to the rich
and powerful bishopric of Durham, in which high dignity
he died.  His death took place at Bath, on the 16th of
June, 1752, when he was in the sixtieth year of his age.
It need not be said, that such a man, so honored in life, was
lamented in death by every friend of religion in the world.
The intellectual powers of Bishop Butler were of the
highest order, penetrating, profound, and comprehensive.
In examining his works, especially the Analogy, the reader
will be impressed, not with the extent of his researches, or
the subtilty of his metaphysics, so much as the depth, the
candor, and the comprehensiveness of his reasoning. He
seems to see every use, which the most ingenious opposer
might make of his expressions; and he everywhere guards
his language with a caution indicative of his perfect mastery
of his subject. Endowed with a truly wonderful insight
into the philosophy of humanity, in its broadest signification, he makes both the knowledge and the ignorance of
mankind contribute equally, and with equal facility, to the
progress and success of his great argument. His style is
always close, correct, and expressive, though never light,
easy, or beautiful.  The Analogy, the greatest of his works,
is a perfect chain of conclusive reasonings, every link of
which is forged and fitted with a skill ever to be admired.
His essays and sermons, though characterized by originality
and strength, have received only a less amount of praise.
The moral character of Bishop Butler is without a blemish. Though praised, admired, flattered, and promoted,




3:6           THE LIFE OF BISHOP BUTLER.
though the associate of every great man of his times, including statesmen, nobles, princes, and even his King and
Queen; never did the voice of envy, even, say one word
against a moral character so pure.
His religious character, however, was once impugned. In
his celebrated sermon on External Religion, he was thought
to lean too far toward outward forms of piety, and thus to
favor the suspected Papal cause. There was a story, also,
much related about the time of his decease, of his having
erected, in the manner of the Catholics, a crucifix in his
private chapel, which roused the jealousy even of his
friends.  But Thomas Secker, then the Archbishop of Canterbury, the earliest, and latest, and truest, of all of Butler's
friends, stood forth before the public, defended him triumphantly against the charge, and wiped out the only blot
ever cast upon the reputation of this illustrious man.
The good Bishop was buried in the cathedral church of
Bristol, a flat marble slab indicating the spot where he lies.
A Latin epitaph, composed by Dr. Nathaniel Forster, is
written on the stone.
But the Bishop's best monument is his immortal work,
the Analogy of Religion, which must continue to be read,
and studied, and admired to the very latest age.




INTRODUCTION.
PROBABLE evidence is essentially distinguished from  demonstrative by this, that it admits of degrees, and of all
variety of them, from the highest moral certainty, to tha
very lowest presumption.  We cannot, indeed, say a thing
is probably true upon one very slight presumption for it;
because, as there may be probabilities on both sides of the
question, there may be some against it; and though there
be not, yet a slight presumption does not beget that degree
of conviction, which is implied in saying a thing is probably
true. But that the slightest possible presumption is of the
nature of a probability, appears from hence, that such low
presumption, often repeated, will amount even to moral certainty. Thus, a man's having observed the ebb and flow of
the tide to-day, affords some sort of presumption, though
the lowest imaginable, that it may happen again to-morrow;
but the observation of this event for so many days, and
months, and ages together, as it has been observed by
mankind, gives us a full assurance that it will.
That which chiefly constitutes probability, is expressed in
the word likely; that is, like some truth,(1) or true event;
like it, in itself, in its evidence, in some more or fewer of
its circumstances.  For when we determine a thing to be
probably true, suppose that an event has or will come to
pass, it is from the mind's remarking in it a likeness to some
other event, which we have observed has come to pass.
And this observation forms, in numberless daily instances, a
presumption, opinion, or full conviction, that such event has
or will come to pass; according as the observation is, that
(1) Verisimile.
327




38                   INTRODUC''TION.
the like event has sometimes, most commonly, or always
so far as. our observation reaches, come to pass at like distances of time, or place, or upon like occasions.  Hence
arises the belief, that a child, if it live twenty years, will
grow up to the stature and strength of a man; that food
will contribute to the preservation of its life, and the want
of it for such a number of days be its certain destruction.
So, likewise, the rule and measure of our hopes and fears
concerning the success of our pursuits; our expectations
that others will act so and so in such circumstances; and
our judgment that such actions proceed from such principles; all these rely upon our having observed the like
to what we hope, fear, expect, judge; I say, upon our
having observed the like, either with respect to others or
ourselves.  And thus, whereas the prince,(l) who had
always lived in a warm climate, naturally concluded, in the
way of analogy, that there was no such thing as water's
becoming hard, because he had always observed it to be
fluid and yielding, we, on the contrary, from analogy, conclude, that there is no presumption at all against this; that
it is supposable there may be frost in England any given
day in January next; probable, that there will, on some
day of' the month; and that there is a moral certainty,
that is, ground for an expectation, without any doubt of it,
in somepart or other of the winter.
Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an imperfect kind of information, and is to be considered as relative only to beings of limited capacities. For nothing which
is the possible object of knowledge, whether past, present,
or future, can be probable to an infinite intelligence; since
it cannot but be discerned absolutely as it is in itself certainly true, or certainly false. But to us probability is the
very guide of life.
(1l) The story is told by Mr. Locke in the chapter of Probability.




INTRODUCTIONi.                  39
From these things it follows, that in questions of difficulty,
or such as are thought so, where more satisfactory evidence
cannot be had, or is not seen, if the result of examination
be, that there appears, upon the whole, any the lowest
presumption on one side, and none on the other, or a greater
presumption on one side, though in the lowest degree
greater, this determines the question, even in matters of
speculation; and, in matters of practice, will lay us under
an absolute and forma, obligation, in point of prudence and
of interest, to act upon that presumption, or low probability,
though it be so low as to leave the mind in very great
doubt which is the truth. For surely a man is as really
bound in prudence to do what upon the whole appears, according to the best of his judgment, to be for his happiness,
as what he certainly knows to be so. Nay, further, in questions of great consequence, a reasonable man will think it
concerns him to remark lower probabilities and presumptions than these; such as amount to no more than showing
one side of the question to be as supposable and credible
as the other; nay, such as but amount to much less even
than this. For numberless instances might be mentioned
respecting the common pursuits of life, where a man would
be thought, in a literal sense, distracted, who would not act,
and with great application, too, not only upon an even
chance, but upon much less, and where the probability or
chance was greatly against his succeeding.(1)
It is not my design to inquire further into the nature, the
foundation, and measure of probability; or whence it proceeds, that likeness should beget that presumption, opinion,
and full conviction, which the human mind is formed to
receive from it, and which it does necessarily produce in
every one; or to guard against the errors to which reasoning from analogy is liable. This belongs to the subject of
(1) See Part 2, Chap. vi.




40                   INTRODUCTION.
logic, and is a part of that subject which has not yet been
thoroughly considered.  Indeed, I shall not take upon me
to say, how far the extent, compass, and force of analogical
reasoning, can be reduced to general heads and rules, and
the whole be formed into a system.  But though so little
in this way has been attempted by those who have treated
of our intellectual powers, and the exercise of them, this
does not hinder but that we may be, as we unquestionably
are, assured, that analogy is of weight, in various degrees,
toward determining our judgment and our practice.  Nor
does it, in any wise, cease to be of weight in those cases,
because persons, either given to dispute, or who require
things to be stated with greater exactness than our faculties
appear to admit of in practical matters, may find other
cases, in which it is not easy to say, whether it be, or be
not, of any weight; or instances of seeming analogies,
which are really of none. It is enough to the present purpose to observe, that this general way of arguing is evidently natural, just and conclusive.  For there is no man
can make a question but that the sun will rise to-morrow,
and be seen, where it is seen at all, in the figure of a circle,
and not in that of a square.
Hence, namely from  analogical reasoning, Origen(I) has,
with singular sagacity, observed, that "he who believes the
Scripture to have proceeded fiom him who is the Author
of nature, may well expect to find the same sort of difficuities in it, as are found in the constitution of nature."  And,
in a like way of reflection, it may be added, that he who
denies the Scripture to have been from God, upon account
of these difficulties, may, for the very same reason, deny
the world to have been formed by him. On the other hand,
(1)Xp0 BAUS'rot >I ~rOv a2' xY'7L arpa4a'ov rTO; XT'LYo'vro r'Z &O'ygOY IjYO'rdurTct'r! 7'paol 5-7rgi5T$, Dora of?nodeI rn'c z'mioEoC M aroovfT ro;;io"uo ro,rpv spI ctr;?ov,,ro,,ra:C armds,rzyv d pxv. Philocal. p. 23.
Ed. Cant.




INTRODUCTIONi.                 41
if there be an analogy, or likeness, between that system of
things and dispensation of Providence, which revelation
informs us of, and that system of things and dispensation
of Providence, which experience, together with reason,
informs us of, that is, the known course of nature, this is a
presumption that they have both the same author and cause;
at least, so far as to answer objections against the former's
being from God, drawn from any thing which is analogical,
or similar to what is in the latter, which is acknowledged to
be from him; for an Author of nature is here supposed.
Forming our notions of the constitution and government
of the world upon reasoning, without foundation for the
principles which we assume, whether from the attributes of
God, or any thing else, is building a world upon hypothesis,
like Des Cartes. Forming our notions upon reasoning from
principles which are certain, but applied to cases to which
we have no ground to apply them, (like those who explain
the structure of the human body, and the nature of diseases
and medicines, from mere mathematics, without sufficient
data,) is an error much akin to the former: since what is
assumed, in order to make the reasoning applicable, is
hypothesis. But it must be allowed just, to join abstract
reasonings with the observation of facts, and argue from
such facts as are known, to others that are like them; from
that part of the Divine government over intelligent creatures, which comes under our view, to that larger and more
general government over them which is beyond it; and,
from what is present, to collect what is likely, credible, or
not incredible, will be hereafter.
This method, then, of concluding and determining being
practical, and what, if we will act at all, we cannot but act
upon in the common pursuits of life; being, evidently, conclusive in various degrees, proportionable to the degree and
exactness of the whole analogy or likeness, and having so
great authority for its introduction into the subject of
4




42                 INTRODUCTION,
religion, even revealed religion; my design is to apply it
to that subject in general, both natural and revealed, taking
for proved, that there is an intelligent Author of nature,
and natural Governor of the world. For, as there is no
presumption against this, prior to the proof of it, so it has
been often proved with accumulated evidence: from this
argument of analogy and final causes, from abstract rea.
sonings, from the most ancient tradition and testimony, and
from the general consent of mankind. Nor does it appear,
so far as I can find, to be denied by the generality of
those who profess themselves dissatisfied with the evidence
of religion.
As there are some, who, instead of thus attending to
what is, in fact, the constitution of nature, form  their
notions of God's government upon hypothesis, so there are
others, who indulge themselves in vain and idle speculations,
how the world might, possibly, have been framed otherwise than it is: and upon supposition that things might, in
imagining that they should, have been disposed and carried
on after a better model, than what appears in the present
disposition and conduct of them. Suppose, now, a person
of such a turn of mind to go on with his reveries, till he
had, at length, fixed upon some particular plan of nature,
as appearing to him the best. One shall scarce be thought
guilty of detraction against human understanding, if one
should say, even beforehand, that the plan which this speculative person would fix upon, though he were the wisest
of the sons of men, probably would not be the very best,
even according to his own notions of best; whether he
thought that to be so, which afforded occasions and motives
for the exercise of the greatest virtue, or which was
productive of the greatest happiness, or that these two
were necessarily connected, and run up into one and the
same plan. However, it may not be amiss, once for all, to
see what would be the amount of these emendations and




INTRODUCTION.               4 3
imaginary improvements upon the system of nature, or how
far they would mislead us. And, it seems, there could be
no stopping, till we came to some such conclusions as these:
that all creatures should at first be made as perfect and as
happy, as they were capable of ever being; that nothing,
to be sure, of hazard or danger should be put upon them
to do-some indolent persons would, perhaps, think nothing
at all; or certainly, that effectual care should be taken,
that they should, whether necessary or not, yet eventually
and in fact, always do what was right and most conducive
to happiness, which would be thought easy for infinite
Power to effect, either by not giving them any principles
which would endanger their going wrong, or by laying the
right motive of action, in every instance, before their minds
continually, in so strong a manner as would never fail of
inducing them to act conformably to it; and that the whole
method of government by punishments should be rejected
as absurd-as an awkward, round-about method of carrying things on —nay, as contrary to a principal purpose, for
which, it would be supposed, creatures were made, namely,
happiness.
Now, without considering what is to be said in particular
to the several parts of this train of folly and extravagance,
what has been above intimated is a full, direct, general
answer to it, namely, that we may see beforehand, that we
have not faculties for this kind of speculation. For, though
it be admitted, that, from the first principles of our nature,
we unavoidably judge or determine some ends to be absolutely in themselves preferable to others, and that the ends
now mentioned, or if they run up into one, that this one is
absolutely the best, and, consequently, that we must conclude the ultimate end designed in the constitution of
nature and conduct of Providence, is the most virtue an(d
happiness possible; yet, we are far from  being able to




44                  INTRODUCTION.
judge what particular disposition of things would be most
friendly and assistant to virtue, or what means might be
absolutely necessary to produce the most happiness in a
system of such extent as our own world may be, taking in
all that is past and to come, though we should suppose it
detached from the whole of things. Indeed, we are so far
from being able to judge of this, that we are not judges
what may be the necessary means of raising and conducting
one person to the highest perfection and happiness of his
nature. Nay, even in the little affairs of the present life,
we find men of different educations and ralnks are not competent judges of the conduct of each other. Our whole
nature leads us to ascribe all moral perfection to God, and
to deny all imperfection of him. And this will for ever be
a practical proof of his moral character, to such as will
consider what a practical proof is; because it is the voice
of God speaking in us. And from hence we conclude,
that virtue must be the happiness, and vice the misery, of
every creature; and that regularity, and order, and right,
cannot but prevail finally, in a universe under his government. But we are in no sort judges what are the necessary
means of accomplishing this end.
Let us, then, instead of that idle, and not very innocent
employment, of forming imaginary models of a world, and
schemes of governing it, turn our thoughts to what we
experience to be the conduct of Nature with respect to
intelligent creatures; which may be resolved into general
laws or rules of administration, in the same way as many
of the laws of nature, respecting inanimate matter, may be
collected from experiments. And let us compare the known
constitution and course of things, with what is said to be
the moral system of nature, the acknowledged dispensations
of Providence, or that government which we find ourselves
under, with what religion teaches us to believe and expect.




lNTRODYU.CTLON.               4b
and see whether they are not analogous and of a piece,
And, upon such a comparison it will, I think, be found that
they are very much so —that both may be traced up to the
same general laws, and resolved into the same principles
of Divine conduct.
The analogy, here proposed to be considered, is of pretty
large extent, and consists of several parts, in some more, in
others less, exact.  In some few instances, perhaps, it may
amount to a real practical proof: in others not so; yet, in
these it is a confirmation of what is proved otherwise.  It
will undeniably show, what too many want to have shown
them, that the system of religion, both natural and revealed,
considered only as a system, and prior to the proof of it,
is not a subject of ridicule, unless that of nature be so too.
And it will afford an answer to almost all objections against
the system, both of natural and of revealed religion, though
not, perhaps, an answer in so great a degree, yet in a very
considerable degree an answer, to the objections against
the evidence of it; for, objections against a proof, and
objections against what is said to be proved, the reader will
observe, are different things.
Now, the Divine government of the world, implied in the
notion of religion in general, and of Christianity, contains
in it: that mankind is appointed to live in a future state;(1)
that there every one shall be rewarded or punished;(2)
rewarded or punished respectively for all that behavior
here which we comprehend under the words, virtuous or
vicious, morally good or evil:(3) that our present life is a
probation, a state of trial,(4) and of discipline,(5) for that
future one; notwithstanding the objections which men may
fancy they have, from notions of necessity, against there
being any such moral plan as this at all;(0) and whatever objections may appear to lie against the wisdom and
(1) Ch. i. (2) Ch. ii. (3) Ch. iii. (4) Ch. iv. (5) Ch. v. (6) Ch vi




d:6                  INTRODUCTION.
goodness of it, as it stands so imperfectly made known to tus
at present:(1) that this world, being in a state of apostasy
and wickedness, and consequently of ruin, and the sense
both of their condition and duty being greatly corrupted
amongst men, this gave occasion for an additional dispensation of Providence; of the utmost importance;(2) proved
by miracles;(3) but containing in it many things appearing
to us strange, and not to have been expected;(4) a dispensation of Providence, which is a scheme or system of
things;(5) carried on by the mediation of a Divine person,
the Messiah, in order to the recovery of the world;(6)
yet not revealed to all men, nor proved with the strongest
possible evidence to all those to whom it is revealed; but
only to such a part of mankind, and with such particular
evidence, as the wisdom  of God thought fit.(7)  The
design, then, of the following treatise will be to;show,
that the several parts principally objected against in this
moral and Christian dispensation, including its scheme, its
publication, and the proof which God has afforded us of
its truth; that the particular parts principally objected
against in this whole dispensation, are analogous to what
is experienced in the constitution and course of Nature, or
Providence; that the chief objections themselves, which
are alledged against the former, are no other than what may
be alledged with like justness against the latter, where they
are found, in fact, to be inconclusive; and that this argument from  analogy is, in general, unanswerable, and, undoubtedly, of weight on the side of religion,(8) notwithstanding the objections which may seem to lie against it,
and the real ground which there may be for difference of
opinion, as to the particular degree of weight which is to be
laid upon it. This is a general account of what may be
(1) Ch. vii. (2) Part 2, ch. i. (3) Ch. ii. (4) Ch. iii. (5) Ch. iv
(6) Ch. v. (7) vi., vii. (8) Ch. viii.




INTRODUCTION.                 4 
looked for in the following treatise. And I shall begin it
with that which is the foundation of all our hopes, and of
all our fears-all our hopes and fears, which are of any
consideration-I mean a future life.








ANALOGY OF RELIGIOIN
TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE
PART I.
OF NATURAL RELIGION.
C HAPTER I.
OF A FUTURE LIFE.
STRANGE difficulties have been raised, by some, concerning personal identity, or the sameness of living agents, implied in the notion of our existing now and hereafter, or in
any two successive moments; which, whoever thinks it
worth while, may see considered in the first Dissertation at
the end of this treatise. But, without regard to any of
them here, let us consider what the analogy of nature, and
the several changes which we have undergone, and those
w:ich we know we may undergo without being destroyed,
suggest, as to the effect which death may, or may not,
have upon us; and whether it be not from thence probable,
that we may survive this change, and exist in a future state
of life and perception.
I. From our being born into the present world in the
helpless, imperfect state of infancy, and having arrived
from thence to mature age, we find it to be a general law
of nature in our own species, that the same creatures, the
same individuals, should exist in degrees of life and perception, with capacities of action, of enjoyment and suffering,
in one period of their being, greatly different from those
15                 49




50                  OF A FUTURE LIFE.              [PART 1.
appointed them  in another period of it.  And in other
creatures the same law holds.  For the difference of their
capacities and states of life at their birth (to go no higher)
and in maturity; the change of worms into flies, and the
vast enlargement of their locomotive powers by such
change; and birds and insects bursting the shell of their
habitation, and by this means entering into a new world,
furnished with new accommodations for them, and finding
a new sphere of action assigned them; these are instances
of this general law of nature. Thus, all the various and
wonderful transformations of animals are to be taken into
consideration here.  But the states of life in which we ourselves existed formerly, in the womb and in our infancy, are
almost as different from our present, in mature age, as it is
possible to conceive, any two states or degrees of life can be.
Therefore, that we are to exist hereafter in a state as different (suppose) from our present, as this is from our former,
is but according to the analogy of nature-according to a
natural order or appointment, of the very same kind with
what we have already experienced.
[I. We know we are endued with capacities of action, of
happiness and misery; for we are conscious of acting, of
enjoying pleasure, and suffering pain.  Now, that we have
these powers and capacities before death, is a presumption
that we shall retain them through and after death; indeed,
a probability of it abundantly sufficient to act upon, unless
there be some positive reason to think that death is the destruction of those living powers; because there is, in every
case, a probability that all things will continue as we experience they are, in all respects, except those in which wo
have some reason to think they will be altered.  This is
that kind(l) of presumption, or probability, from  analogy,
(1) I say kind of presumption, or probability; for I do not mean to
affirm, that there is the same degree of conviction that our living
powers will continue after death, as there is, that our substances wvill




(IHAP. I.]           OF A FUTURE LIFE.                       51
expressed in the very word continuance, which seenls our
only natural reason for believing the course of the world will
continue to-morrow, as it has done so far as our experience
or knowledge of history can carry us back.  Nay, it seems
our only reason for believing, that any one substance, now
existing, will continue to exist a moment longer, the selfexisting substance only excepted.  Thus, if men were assured that the unknown event, death, was not the destruction of our faculties of perception and of action, there would
be no apprehension that any other power or event, unconnected with this of death, would destroy these faculties just
at the instant of each creature's death; and, therefore, no
doubt but that they would remain after it: which shows
the high probability that our living powers will continue
after death, unless there be some ground to think  that
death is their destruction.(l) For, if it would be in a
manner certain that we should survive death, provided it
were certain that death would not be our destruction, it
must be highly probable that we shall survive it, if there
be no ground to think death will be our destruction.
Now, though I think it must be acknowledged, that prior
to the natural and moral proofs of a future life commonly
insisted upon, there would  arise a general confused suspicion, that, in the great shock and alteration which we shall
(1)Destruction of living powers, is a manner of expression unavoidably ambiguous; and may signify either the destruction of a
living being, so as that the same living being shall be incapable of ever
perceiving or acting again at all; or the destruction of those means and
instruments by which it is capable of its present life, of its present state
of perception and of action.  It is here used in the former sense.
When it is used in the latter, the epithet present is added. The loss
of a man's eye is a destruction of living powers in the latter sense.
But we have no reason to think the destruction of living powers in
the former sense, to be possible. We have no imore reason to think a
being, endued with living powers, ever loses them  during its whole:xm-stence, than to believe that a stone ever acquires them.




52                 OF A FUTURE LIFE.            [PART I.
undergo by death, we, that is, our living powers might be
wholly destroyed; yet even prior to those proofs, there is
really no particular distinct ground, or reason for this
apprehension at all, so far as I can find. If there be, it
must arise either from the reason of the thing, or from the
analogy of nature.
But we cannot argue from the reason of the thing, that
death is the destruction of living agents, because we know
not at all what death is in itself; but only some of its
effects, such as the dissolution of flesh, skin, and bones:
and these effects do in no wise appear to imply the destruction of a living agent. And, besides, as we are greatly in
the dark upon what the exercise of our living powers depends, so we are wholly ignorant what the powers themselves depend upon-the powers themselves, as distin.
guished, not only from their actual exercise, but also from
the present capacity of exercising them, and as opposed to
their destruction; for sleep, or, however, a swoon, shows
us, not only that these powers exist when they are not
exercised, as the passive power of motion does in inanimate
matter; but shows, also, that they exist, when there is no
present capacity of exercising them; or that the capacities
of exercising them for the present, as well as the actual
exercise of them  may be suspended, and yet the powers
themselves remain undestroyed. Since, then, we know not
at all upon what the existence of our living powers depends,
this shows further, there can no probability be collected
from  the reason of the thing, that death will be their
destruction; because their existence may depend upon
somewhat in no degree affected by death-upon  somewhat quite out of the reach of this king of terrors. So
that there is nothing more certain than that the reason of
the thing shows us no connection between death and the
destruction of living agents.  Nor can we find any thing
throughout the whole analogy of nature, to afford us  rvcn




CI-IHP. I.]       OF A FUTURE LIFE.                  53
the slightest presumption, that animals ever lose their
living powers; much less, if it were possible, that they
lose them by death; for we have no faculties wherewith to
trace any beyond or through it, so as to see what becomes
of them.  This event removes them  from  our view.  It
destroys the sensible proof, which we had before their
death, of their being possessed of living powers, but does
not appear to afford the least reason to believe, that they
are then, or by that event, deprived of them.
And our knowing, that they were possessed of these
powers, up to the very period to which we have faculties
capable of tracing them, is itself a probability of their
retaining them beyond it. And this is confirmed, and a
sensible credibility is given to it, by observing the very
great and astonishing changes which we have experienced;
so great, that our existence in another state of life, of perception, and of action, will be but according to a method of
Providential conduct, the like to which has been already exercised, even with regard to ourselves-according to a course
of nature, the like to which we have already gone through.
However, as one cannot but be greatly sensible, ho-M
difficult it is to silence imagination enough to make the
voice of reason even distinctly heard in this case; as we are
accustomed, from our youth up, to indulge that forward
delusive faculty, ever obtruding beyond its sphere-of some
assistance, indeed, to apprehension, but the author of all
error; as we plainly lose ourselves in gross and crude conceptions of things, taking for granted that we are acquainted
with what indeed we are wholly ignorant of; it may be
proper to consider the imaginary presumptions, that death
will be our destruction, arising from these kinds of early
and lasting prejudices; and to show how little they can
really amount to, even though we cannot wholly divest
ourselves of them.  And,
I. All presumption of death's being the destruction of




54                 OF A FUTURE LIFE.             LPART I
living beings, must go upon supposition that they are compounded, and so discerptible.  But, since consciousness is a
single and indivisible power, it should seem that the subject
in which it resides, must be so too.  For, were the motion
of any particle of matter absolutely one and indivisible, so
as that it should imply a contradiction to suppose part
of this motion to exist, and part not to exist, that is, part
of this matter to move, and part to be at rest; then its
power of motion would be indivisible; and so, also, would
the subject in which the power inheres, namely, the particle
of matter: for if this could be divided into two, one part
might be moved and the other at rest, which is contrary to
the supposition.  In like manner, it has been argued,(1)
and, for any thing appearing to the contrary, justly, that
since the perception, or consciousness, which we have of
our own existence is indivisible, so as that it is a contradiction to suppose one part of it should be here and the other
there, the perceptive power, or the power of consciousness,
is indivisible too; and, consequently, the subject in which it
resides, that is, the conscious being.  Now, upon supposition that living agent each man calls himself, is thus a single being, which there is, at least, no more difficulty in conceiving than in conceiving it to be a compound, and of
which there is the proof now mentioned, it follows, that
our organized bodies are no more ourselves, or part of ourselves, than any other matter around us.  And it is as easy
to conceive how matter, which is no part of ourselves, may
be appropriated to us in the manner which our present
bodies are, as how we can receive impressions firom, and
have power over any matter.  It is as easy to conceive,
that we may exist out of bodies, as in them; that we might
have animated bodies of any other organs and senses wholly
different from  these now given us, and that we may hereafter animate these same or new bodies variously moodlfied
(1.) See Dr. Clarke's Letter to Mr. Dodwell, and the defences of it.




CHAP'. I.1         OF A FUTURE LIFE.                 55
and organized, as to conceive how we can animate such
bodies as oar present.  And, lastly, the dissolution of all
these several organized bodies, supposing ourselves to have
successively animated them, would have no more conceivable tendency to destroy the living beings, ourselves, or deprive us of living faculties, the faculties of perception and
of action, than the dissolution of any foreign matter, which
we are capable of receiving impressions from, and making
use of for the common occasions of life.
Ii. The simplicity and absolute oneness of a living agent
cannot, indeed, from the nature of the thing, be properly
proved by experimental observations.  But as these fall
in with the supposition of its unity, so they plainly lead us
to concludcle certainly, that our gross organized bodies, with
which we perceive the objects of sense, and with which we
act, are no part of ourselves, and, therefore, show us, that
we have no reason to believe their destruction to be ours,
even without determining whether our living substances be
material or immaterial. For we see by experience, that
men may lose their limbs, their organs of sense, and even
the greatest part of these bodies, and yet remain the same
living agents. And persons can trace up the existence of
themselves to a time when the bulk of their bodies was extremely small, in comparison of what it is in mature age;
and we cannot but think, that they might then have lost a
considerable part of that small body, and yet have remained
the same living agents, as they may now lose great part of
their present body, and remain so. And it is certain, that
the bodies of all aniimals are in a constant flux, from that
never-ceasing attrition which there is in every part of them..Now, things of this kind unavoidably teach us to distinguish between these living agents, ourselves, and large
quantities of matter, in which we are very nearly interested: since these may be alienated, and actually are in a
daily course of succession, and changing their owners;




56                OF A FUTURE LIFE.            LPART. I,
whilst we are assured, that each living agent remains one
and the same permanent being.(1) And this general observation leads us on to the following ones.
1. That we have no way of determining by experience,
what is the certain bulk of the living being each man calls
himself; and yet, till it be determined that it is larger in
bulk than the solid elementary particles of matter, which
there is no ground to think any natural power can dissolve,
there is no sort of reason to think death to be the dissolution of it, of the living being, even though it should not be.absolutely indiscerptible.
2. From our being so nearly related to, and interested
in certain systems of matter, suppose our flesh and bones,
and afterward ceasing to be at all related to them, the living
agents, ourselves, remaining all this while undestroyed,
notwithstanding such alienation; and, consequently, these
systems of matter not being ourselves; it follows further, that we have no ground to conclude any other,
suppose internal systems of matter, to be the living agents,
ourselves; because we can have no ground to conclude this,
but from our relation to, and interest in such other systemt
of matter: and, therefore, we can have no reason to conclude, what befalls those systems of matter at death, to be
the destruction of the living agents.  We have already,
several times over, lost a great part, or perhaps the whole
of our body, according to certain common established laws
of nature; yet we remain the same living agents: when we
shall lose as great a part, or the whole, by another common
established law of nature, death, why may we not, also,
remain the same?  That the alienation has been gradual
in one case, and in the other will be more at once, does
not prove any thing to the contrary. We have passed
undestroyed through those many and greatrevolutions of
matter, so peculiarly appropriated to us ourselves: whyl
(1) See Dissertation I,.




CrAP. I,.          OF A FUTURE LIFE.                 57
should we imagine death will be so fatal to us? Nor can
it be objected, that what is thus alienated, or lost, is no part
of our original solid body, but only adventitious matter; because we may lose entire limbs, which must have contained
many solid parts and vessels of the original body: or, if
this be not admitted, we have no proof that any of these
solid parts are dissolved or alienated by death; though, by
the way, we are very nearly related to that extraneous or
adventitious matter, whilst it continues united to and distending the several parts of our solid body.  But, after all,
the relation a person bears to those parts of his body to
which he is the most nearly related, what does it appear to
amount to but this, that the living agent and those parts of
the body mutually affect each other?  And the same thing,
the same thing in kind, though not in degree, may be said
of all foreign matter, which gives us ideas, and which we
have any power over.  From these observations the whole
ground of the imagination is removed, that the dissolution
of any matter is the destruction of a living agent, from the
interest he once had in such matter.
3. If we consider our body somewhat more distinctly,
as made up of organs and instruments of perception and
of motion, it will bring us to the same conclusion. Thus,
the common optical experiments show, and even the observation how sight is assisted by glasses shows, that we see with
our eyes in the same sense as we see with glasses.  Nor
is there any reason to believe, that we see with them in any
other sense-any other, I mean, which would lead us to
think the eye itself a percipient. The like is to be said of
hearing: and our feeling distant solid matter by means of
somewhat in our hand, seems an instance of the like kind, as
to the subject we are considering. All these are instances
of foreign matter, or such as is no part of our body, being
instrumental in preparing objects for, and conveying them
to the perceiving power, in a manner similar, or like to the




58                OF A FUTURE LIFE,             [PART I.
mlanner ill which our organs of sense prepare and convey
them. Both are, in a like way, instruments of our receiving
such ideas from external objects, as the Author of nature
appointed those external objects to be the occasions of
exciting in us. However, glasses are evidently instances of
this; namely, of matter, which is no part of our body,
preparing objects for, and conveying them toward the perceiving power, in like manner as our bodily organs do.
And if we see with our eyes only in the same manner as
we do with glasses, the like may justly be concluded from
analogy, of all our other senses. It is not intended, by
any thing here said, to affirm, that the whole apparatus of
vision, or of perception by any other of our senses, can be
traced, through all its steps, quite up to the living power
of seeing, or perceiving; but that, so far as it can be traced
by experimental observations, so far it appears, that our
organs of sense prepare and convey on objects, in order to
their being perceived, in like manner as foreign matter does,
without affording any shadow  of appearance, that they
themselves perceive.  And that we have no reason to think
our organs of sense percipients, is confirmed by instances
of persons losing some of them, the living beings themselves, their former occupiers, remaining unimpaired. It is
confirmed, also, by the experience of dreams; by which we
find we are at present possessed of a latent, and what would
otherwise be an unimagined unknown power of perceiving
sensible objects, in as strong and lively a manner without
our external organs of sense, as with them.
So, also, with regard to our power of moving, or directing motion by will and choice: upon the destruction of a
limb, this active power remains, as it evidently seems,
unlessened; so as that the living being, who has suffered
this loss, would be capable of moving as before, if it had
another limb to move with.  It can walk by the help of an
artificial leg, just as it can make use of a pole or a lever, tc




IHA P. I.]         OF A FUTURE LIFE.                 59
reac]l toward itself, and to move things beyond the length
and the power of its natural arm: and this last it does in
the same manner as it reaches and moves, with its natural
arin, things nearer and of less weight.  Nor is there so
much as any appearance of our limbs being endued with a
power wa moving or directing themselves; though they are
adapted, like the several parts of a machine, to be the
instruments of motion to each other, and some parts of
the same limb, to be instruments of motion to other parts
of it.
Thus, a man determines that he will look at such an object through a microscope; or, being lame suppose, that he
will walk to such a place with a staff' a week hence.  His
eyes and his feet no more determine in these cases, than
the microscope and the staff.  Nor is there any ground to
think they any more put the determination in practice, or
that his eyes are the seers, or his feet the movers, in any
other sense than as the microscope and the staff are. Upon
the whole, then, our organs of sense and our limbs are
certainly instruments, which the living persons, ourselves,
make use of to perceive and move with. There is not any
probability, that they are any more; nor, consequently, that
we have any other kind of relation to them, than what
we have to any other foreign matter formed into instruments of perception and motion, suppose into a microscope
o:r a staff-I say, any other kind of relation, for I am not
speaking of the degree of it; nor, consequently, is there
any probability, that the alienation or dissolution of these
instruments is the destruction of the perceiving and moving
agent.
And thus our finding, that the dissolution of matter in
which living beings were most nearly interested, is not their
dissolution, and that the destruction of several of the organs
and instruments of perception and of motion belonging to
them, is not their destruction, shows, demonstratively, that




60                 OF A FUTURE LIFE.            LPART 1.
there is no ground to think, that the dissolution of any
other matter, or destruction of any other organs and instruments, will be the dissolution or destruction of living agents,
from the like kind of relation.  And we have no reason to
think we stand in any other kind of relation to any thing
which we find dissolved by death.
But, it is said, these observations are equally applicable
to brutes; and it is thought an insuperable difficulty, that
they should be immortal, and, by consequence, capable of
everlasting happiness. Now, this manner of expression is
both invidious and weak: but the thing intended by it is
really no difficulty at all, either in the way of natural or
moral consideration. For, first, suppose the invidious thing,
designed in such a manner of expression, were really implied, as it is not in the least, in the natural immortality of
brutes; namely, that they must arrive at great attainments,
and become rational and moral agents; even this would be
no difficulty, since we know not what latent powers and
capacities they may be endued with. There was once, prior
to experience, as great presumption against human creatures, as there is against the brute creatures, arriving at
that degree of understanding which we have in mature age;
for we can trace up our own existence to the same original
with theirs. And we find it to be a general law of nature,
that creatures endued with capacities of virtue and religion,
should be placed in a condition of being, in which they are
altogether without the use of them for a considerable length
of their duration, as in infancy and childhood. And great
part of the human species go out of the present world,
before they come to the exercise of these capacities in any
degree at all. But, then, secondly, the natural immortality
of brutes does not in the least imply, that they are endued
with any latent capacities of a rational or moral nature.
And the economy of the universe might require, that there
shl-uld be living creatures without any capacities of this




CHAI'. I.1         OF A FUTURE LIFE.                    61
kind. And all difficulties, as to the manner how they are
to be disposed of, are so apparently and wholly founded in
our ignorance, that it is wonderful they should be insisted
upon by any, but such as are weak enough to think they
are acquainted with the whole system of things.  There is,
then, absolutely nothing at all in this objection, which is so
rhetorically urged against the greatest part of the natural
proofs or presumptions of the immortality of human mindsI say the greatest part; for it is less applicable to the following observation, which is more peculiar to mankind:
III. That, as it is evident our -present powers and capacities of reason, memory, and affection, do not depend upon
our gross body, in the manner in which perception by our
organs of sense does, so they do not appear to depend
upon it at all in any such manner, as to give ground to think,
that the dissolution of this body will be the destruction of
these our present powers of reflection, as it will of our
powers of sensation; or to give ground to conclude, even
that it will be so much as a suspension of the former.
Human creatures exist, at present, in two states of life
and perception, greatly different from each other, each of
which has its own peculiar laws, and its own peculiar enjoyments and sufferings.  When any of our senses are affected,
or appetites gratified with the objects of them, we may be
said to exist, or live, in a state of sensation. When none
of our senses are affected, or appetites gratified, and yet we
perceive, and reason, and act, we may be said to exist, or
live, in a state of reflection.  Now, it is by no means certain, that any thing which is dissolved by death is any way
necessary to the living being, in this its state of reflection,
after ideas are gained.  For though, from our present constitution and condition of being, our external organs of
sense are necessary for conveying in ideas to our reflecting powers, as carriages, and levers, and scaffolds are in
architecture; yet, when those ideas are brought in, we are




c2                 OF A FUTURE LIFE.            [PAR'r.
capable of reflecting in the most intense degree, and of
enjoying the greatest pleasure, and feeling the greatest pain,
by means of that reflection, without any assistance from
our senses; and without any at all, which we know of,
from that body, which will be dissolved by death.  It does
not appear, then, that the relation of this gross body to the
reflecting being, is, in any degree, necessary to thinking, to
our intellectual enjoyments or sufferings; nor, consequently,
that the dissolution, or alienation of the former, by death,
will be the destruction of those present powers, which render us capable of this state of reflection.  Further, there are
instances of mortal diseases, which do not at all affect our
present intellectual powers; and this affords a presumption,
that those diseases will not destroy these present powers.
Indeed, from the observations made above,(1) it appears,
that there is no presumption, from their mutually affecting
each other, that the dissolution of the body is the destruction of the living agent. And, by the same reasoning it
must appear, too, that there is no presumption, from their
mutually affecting each other, that the dissolution of the
body is the destruction of our present reflecting powers;
but instances of their not affecting each other, afford a
presumption of the contrary. Instances of mortal diseases
not impairing our present reflecting powers, evidently turn
our thoughts even from imagining such diseases to be the
destruction of them.  Several things, indeed, greatly affect
all our living powers, and, at length, suspend the exercise
of them; as, for instance, drowsiness, increasing till it ends
in sound sleep: and from hence we might have imagined
it would destroy them, till we found, by experience, the
weakness of this way of judging. But, in the diseases
now mentioned, there is not so much as the shadow of
probability, to lead us to any such conclusion, as to the
reflecting powers which we have at present; for, in those
(1) Pages 56, 57, 58




CHAP. I.]           OF A FUTURE LIFE.                   63
diseases, persons, the moment before death, appear to be in
the highest vigor of life. They discover apprehension,
memory, reason, all entire; with the utmost force of affection; sense of a character, of shame and honor; and the
highest mental enjoyments and sufferings, even to the last
gasp: and these surely prove even greater vigor of life than
bodily strength  does.  Now, what pretense is there for
thinking, that a progressive disease, when arrived to such
a  degree —I mean  that degree which  is mortal —will
destroy those powers, which were not impaired, which
were not affected by it, during its whole progress, quite
up to that degree?  And if death, by diseases of this
kind, is not the destruction of our present reflecting
powers, it will scarce be thought that death by any other
Ineans is.
It is obvious that this general observation may be carried
on further: and there appears so little connection between
our bodily powers of sensation, and our present powers of
reflection, that there is no reason to. conclude that death,
which destroys the former, does so much as suspend the
exercise of the latter, or interrupt our continuing to exist
in the like state of reflection which we do now.  For, suspension of reason, memory, and the affections which they
excite, is no part of the idea of death, nor is implied in our
notion of it.  And our daily experiencing these powers to
be exercised, without any assistance, that we know  of
from those bodies which will be dissolved by death; and
our finding often, that the exercise of them is so lively to
the last; these things afford a sensible apprehension, that
death may not perhaps be so much as a discontinuance of
the exercise of these powers, nor of the enjoyments and
sufferings which it implies;(1) so that our posthumous life,
whatever there may be in it additional to our present, yet
(1) There are three distinct questions, relating to a future life here
considered: Whether death be the destruction of living agents?  If




64                    OF A FUTURE LIFE.                LPART I.
may not be entirely beginning anew, but going on.  Death
may, in some sort, and in some respects, answer to our
birth, which is not a suspension of the faculties which we
had before it, or a total change of the state of life in which
we existed when in the womb, but a continuation of both,
with such and such great alterations.
Nay, for aught we know of ourselves, of our present life,
and of death, death may immediately, in the natural course
of things, put us into a higher and more enlarged state of
life, as our birth does;(1) a state in which our capacities and
sphere of perception, and of action, may be much greater
than at present. For, as our relation to our external
organs of sense renders us capable of existing in our present state of sensation, so it may be the only natural binderance to our existing, immediately, and, of course, in a higher
state of reflection. The truth is, reason does not at all show
us in what state death naturally leaves us. But were we
sure, that it would suspend all our perceptive and active
powers, yet the suspension of a power, and the destruction
of it, are effects so totally different in kind, as we experience from sleep and a swoon, that we cannot in any wise
argue from one to the other; or conclude, even to the lowest
degree of probability, that the same kind of force which
not, Whether it be the destruction of their present powers of reflection, as it certainly is the destruction of their present powers of sensation?  And if not, Whether it be the suspension, or discontinuance
of the exercise of these present reflecting powers? Now, if there
be no reason to believe the last, there will be, if that were possible,
less for the next, and less still for the first.
(1)This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brahmans:
Yoxyliv   yAXV tal J;rV (i ~3v  ivw;P iy Ov, e al   v    Jd'ay'     xovuvmv Tc     {rev  i.
aVc2rtGY, 2AVYiV 2ic rGY oYrw'c /1io6, a)A  raoY e1/0lC5Vv. ros  g;CQio;ra.
Lib. xv, p. 1039. Ed. Amst. 1707. To which opinion perhaps Antoninus may allude in these words, s vWv Svi1gMiveyw, n're irtguuov hX {rNio
ocsru, ro c [XUYaX,OVU ~  p, xTo,    IsibX. a ra, I  ev ixgy 3. M   -r Jv/gl2V
out Irou i~A;oou rov rcu cVxn-eo-d-rcu. Lib. ix,Chap. 3.




CIIAP. I.]        OF A FUTURE LIFE.                 6 5
is sufficient to suspend our faculties, though it be increased
ever so much, will be sufficient to destroy them.
These observations together may be sufficient to show,
how little presumption there is that death is the destruction
of human creatures.  However, there is the shadow of an
analogy, which may lead us to imagine it is —the supposed
likeness which is observed between the decay of vegetables
and of living creatures. And this likeness is indeed sufficient to afford the poets very apt allusions to the flowers of
the field, in their pictures of the frailty of our present life.
But, in reason, the analogy is so far from holding, that
there appears no ground even for the comparison, as to the
present question; because one of the two subjects compared is wholly void of that, which is the principle and
chief thing in the other, the power of perception and of action; and which is the only thing we are inquiring about
the continuance of. So that the destruction of a vegetable
is an event not similar, or analogous, to the destruction of
a living agent.
But if, as was above intimated, leaving off the delusive
custom of substituting imagination in the room of experience, we would confine ourselves to what we do know and
understand-if we would argue only from that, and from
that form our expectations, it would appear, at first sight,
that as no probability of living beings ever ceasing to be so,
can be concluded from the reason of the thing, so none
can be collected from the analogy of nature; because we
cannot trace any living beings beyond death. But as we
are conscious that we are endued with capacities of perception and of action, and are living persons, what we are to
go upon is, that we shall continue so till we foresee some
accident, or event, which will endanger those capacities, or
be likely to destroy us; which death does in no wise appear
to be.
And thus, when we go out of this world, we may pass




66                OF A FUTUTRE LIFE.           [PART 1,
into new scenes, and a new state of life and action, just as
naturally as we came into the present. And this new state
may naturally be a social one. And the advantages of it,
advantages of every kind, may naturally be bestowed,
according to some fixed general laws of wisdom, upon
every one in proportion to the degrees of his virtue. And
though the advantages of that future natural state should
not be bestowed, as these of the present in some measure
are, by the will of the society, but entirely by His more immediate action, upon whom  the whole frame of nature
depends, yet this distribution may be just as natural, as
their being distributed here by the instrumentality of men.
And, indeed, though one were to allow any confused, undetermined sense, which people please to put upon the word
natural, it would be a shortness of thought scarce credible
to imagine, that no system or course of things can be so,
but only what we see at present;(1) especially whilst the
probability of a future life, or the natural immortality of
the soul, is admitted upon the evidence of reason; because
this is really both admitting and denying at once, a state
of being different from the present to be natural. But the
only distinct meaning of that word is stated, fixed, or setfled; since what is natural as much requires, and presupposes an intelligent agent to render it so, that is, to effect it
continually, or at stated times, as what is supernatural c r
miraculous does to effect it for once. And from hence it
must follow, that persons' notion of what is natural will be
enlarged, in proportion to their greater knowledge of the
works of God and the dispensations of his providence. Nor
is there any absurdity in supposing, that there may be beings
in the universe, whose capacities, and knowledge, and views,
may be so extensive, as that the whole Christian dispensation may to them appear natural, that is, analogous or conformable to God's dealings with other parts of his creation,
(1) See Part 2, Chap. ii; and Part 2, Chap. iv.




CHAP. I.]          OF A FUTURE LIFE.                  67T
as natural as the visible known course of things appears to
us.  For there seems scarce any other possible sense to be
put upon the word, but that only in which it is here usedsimilar, stated, or uniform.
This credibility of a future life, which has here been
insisted upon, how little soever it may satisfy our curiosity,
seems to answer all the purposes of religion, in like manner
as a demonstrative proof would. Indeed, a proof, even a
demonstrative one, of a future life, would not be a proof of
religion. For, that we are to live hereafter, is just as
reconcilable with the scheme of Atheism, and as well to be
accounted for by it, as that we are now alive is; and, therefore, nothing can be more absurd, than to argue from that
scheme, that there can be no future state. But as religion
implies a future state, any presumption against such a state
is a presumption against religion. And the foregoing observations remove all presumptions of that sort, and prove, to
a very considerable degree of probability, one fundamental
doctrine of religion; which, if believed, would greatly open
and dispose the mind seriously to attend to the general evidence of the whole.




69            OF THE GOERNIMENT OF GOD         [PAAT I.
CHAPTER II.
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS, AND PARTICULARLY OF THE LATTlER,
TIHAT which makes the question concerning a future life
to be of so great importance to us, is our capacity of happiness and misery. And that which makes the consideration of it to be of so great importance to us, is the supposition of our happiness and misery hereafter, depending
upon our actions here.  Without this, indeed, curiosity
could not but sometimes bring a subject, in which we may
be so highly interested, to our thoughts, especially upon
the mortality of others, or the near prospect of our own.
But reasonable men would not take any farther thought
about hereafter, than what should happen thus occasionally
to rise in their minds, if it were certain that our future interest no way depended upon our present behavior; whereas,
on the contrary, if there be ground, either from analogy or
any thing else, to think it does, then there is reason, also,
for the most active thought and solicitude to secure that
interest-to behave so as that we may escape that misery,
and obtain that happiness in another life, which we not
only suppose ourselves capable of, but which we apprehend,
also, is put in our own power. And whether there be
ground for this last apprehension, certainly would deserve
to be most seriously considered, were there no other proof
of a future life, and interest, than that presumptive one
which the foregoing observations amount to.
Now, in the present state, all which we enjoy, and a great
part of what we suffer, is put in our own power.  For
pleasure and pain are the consequences of our actions; and
we are endued by the Author of our nature with capacities
of foreseeing these consequences. We find, by experience,
he does not so much as preserve our lives exclusively of




ChAP. 1I.]   BY REWARtDS AND PUNISHMENTS.          69
our own care and attention to provide ourselves with, and
to make use of, that sustenance, by which he has appointed
our lives shall be preserved, and without which he has
appointed they shall not be preserved at all. And, in general, we foresee, that the external things, which are the objects of our various passions, can neither be obtained nor
enjoyed, without exerting ourselves in such and such manners; but by thus exerting ourselves, we obtain and enjoy
these objects, in which our natural good consists; or by this
means God gives us the. possession and enjoyment of them.
I know not that we have any one kind or degree of enjoyment,
but by the means of our own actions. And, by prudence
and care, we may, for the most part, pass our days in tolerable ease and quiet; or, on the contrary, we may, by rashness, ungoverned passion, willfulness, or even by negligence,
make ourselves as miserable as ever we please. And many
do please to make themselves extremely miserable, that is,
to do what they know beforehand will render them so.
They follow those ways, the fruit of which they know, by
instruction, example, experience, will be disgrace, and poverty, and sickness, and untimely death. This every one
observes to be the general course of things; though it is to
be allowed, we cannot find by experience, that all our sufferings are owing to our own follies.
Why the Author of nature does not give his creatures
promiscuously such and such perceptions, without regard to
their behavior-why he does not make them happy without
the instrumentality of their own actions, and prevent their
bringing any sufferings upon themselves, is another matter.
Perhaps there may be some impossibilities in the nature of
things, which we are unacquainted with;(l) or less happiness, it may be, would, upon the whole, be produced by
such a method of conduct, than is by the present: or, perllaps, divine goodness, with which, if I mistake not, we
(1) Part 1,Chap. vii.




70            OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD           [PART fL
maie very free in our speculations, may not be a bare single
dlslposition to produce happiness; but a disposition to make
the good, the faithful, the hlonest man happy.  Perhaps an
infinitely perfect Mind may be pleased with seeing his creatures behave suitably to the nature which he has given
them; to the relations which he has placed them in to each
other; and to that which they stand in to himself-that
relation to himself, which, during their existence, is even
necessary, and which is the most important one of all.
Perhaps, I say, an infinitely perfect Mind may be pleased
with this moral piety of moral agents, in and for itself, as
well as upon account of its being essentially conducive to
the happiness of his creation.  Or the whole end, for which
God made, and thus governs the world, may be utterly
beyond the reach of our faculties: there may be somewhat
in it as impossible for us to have any conception of, as for a
blind man to have a conception of colors. But however
this be, it is certain matter of universal experience, that the
general method of Divine administration is, forewarning us,
or giving us capacities to foresee, with more or less clearness, that if we act so and so, we shall have such enjoyments; if so and so, such sufferings; and giving us those
enjoyments, and malking us feel those sufferings, in consequence of our actions.
"But all this is to be ascribed to the general course of
nature."  True.  This is the very thing which I am observing. It is to be ascribed to the general course of nature;
that is, not surely to the words, or ideas, course of nature,
hut to Him who appointed it, and put things into it; or to a
course of operation, from  its uniformity or consistency,
called natural,(1) and which necessarily implies an operating agent.  For when men find themselves necessitated to
confess an Author of nature, or that God is the natural
governor of the world, they must not deny this again,
(l)'Pages 66, 67.




CHAP. II.1   3Y REUARYS AND PUJNISHnMENTS.          71
because his government is uniform; they must not deny
that he does things at all, because he does them  constantly; because the effects of his acting are permanent,
whether his acting be so or not; though there is no reason
to think it is not. In short, every man, in every thing he
does, naturally acts upon the forethought and apprehension
of avoiding evil, or obtaining good: and, if the natural
course of things be the appointment of God, and our
natural faculties of knowledge and experience are given us
by him, then the good and bad consequences which follow
our actions are his appointment, and our foresight of those
consequences is a warning given us by him, how we are
to act.
"Is the pleasure, then, naturally accompanying every
particular gratification of passion, intended to put us upon
gratifying ourselves in every such particular instance, and
as a reward to us for so doing? " No, certainly. Nor is it
to be said, that our eyes were naturally intended to give lus
the sight of each particular object to which they do or can
extend-objects which are destructive of them, or which,
for any other reason, it may become us to turn our eyes
from.  Yet there is no doubt, but that our eyes were
intended for us to see with. So neither is there any doubt,
but that the foreseen pleasures and pains, belonging to the
passions, were intended, in general, to induce mankind to
act in such and such manners.
Now, from this general observation, obvious to every one,
that God has given us to understand he has appointed
satisfaction and delight to be the consequence of our acting
in one manner, and pain and uneasiness of our acting in
another, and of our not acting at all; and that we find
the consequences, which we were beforehand informed of,
uniformly to follow; we may learn, that we are, at present,
actually under his government, in the strictest and most
proper sense-in such a sense, as that he rewards and




72       OF TIHE GOVERNiMENT OF GOD           [PART 1.
punishes -us for our actions. An Author of nature being
supposed, it is not so much a deduction of reason as a matter of experience, that we are thus under his government —
under his government, in the same sense as we are under
the government of civil magistrates. Because the annexing
pleasure to some actions, and pain to others, in our power
to do or forbear, and giving notice of this appointment
beforehand to those whom it concerns, is the proper formal
notion of government. Whether the pleasure or pain which
thus follows upon our behavior, be owing to the Author of
nature's acting upon us every moment which we feel it, or
to his having at once contrived and executed his own part
in the plan of the world, makes no alteration as to the
matter before us. For, if civil magistrates could make the
sanction of their laws take place, without interposing at all,
after they had passed them —without a trial and the forialities of an execution; if they were able to make their
laws execute themselves, or every offender to execute them
upon himself, we should be just in the same sense under
their government then, as we are now; but in a much
higher degree, and more perfect manner. Vain is the
ridicule with which-one foresees some persons will divert
themselves, upon finding lesser pains considered as instances
of Divine punishment. There is no possibility of answeriing
or evading the general thing here intended, without denying
all final causes. For, final causes being admitted, the
pleasures and pains now mentioned must be admitted, too,
as instances of them. And if they are-if God annexes
delight to some actions and uneasiness to others, with an
apparent design to induce us to act so and so, then he not
only dispenses happiness and misery, but, also, rewards and
punishes actions. If, for example, the pain which we feel
upon doing what tends to the destruction of our bodies,
suppose upon too near approaches to fire, or upon wounding
ourselves, be appointed by the Author of nature to prevent




CHAP. Il.]   BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS.             73
our doing what thus tends to our destruction; this is altogether as much an instance of his punishing our actions,
and consequently of our being under his government, as
declaring, by a voice from heaven, that if we acted so, he
would inflict such pain upon us, and inflicting it whether it
be greater or less.
Thus, we find, that the true notion or conception of the
Author of nature, is that of a master or governor, prior to
the consideration of his moral attributes. The fact of our
case, which we find by experience, is, that he actually
exercises dominion or government over us at present, by
rewarding and punishing us for our actions, in as strict and
proper a sense of these words, and even in the same sense,
as children, servants, subjects, are rewarded and punished
by those who govern them.
And thus, the whole analogy of nature, the whole present course of things, most fully shows, that there is nothing
incredible in the general doctrine of religion, that God will
reward and punish men for their actions, hereafter —nothing
incredible, I mean, arising out of the notion of rewarding
and punishing; for the whole course of nature is a present
instance of his exercising that government over us, which
imnplies in it rewarding and punishing.
BUT, as Divine punishment is what men chiefly object
against, and are most unwilling to allow, it may be proper
to mention some circumstances in the natural course of
punishments at present, which are analogous to what religion teaches us concerning a future state of punishment;
indeed, so analogous, that as they add a further credibility
to it, so they cannot but raise a most serious apprehension
of it in those who will attend to them.
It has been now observed, that such and such miseries
naturally follow such and such actions of imprudence and
7




74           OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD           [PART I.
willfulness, as well as actions more commonly and more distinctly considered as vicious; and that these consequences,
when they may be foreseen, are properly natural punishments annexed to such actions. For the general thing here
insisted upon is, not that we see a great deal of misery in
the world, bhut a great deal which men bring upon themselves by their own behavior, which they might have
foreseen and avoided. Now, the circumstances of these
natural punishments, particularly deserving our attention,
are such as these: that oftentimes they follow, or are
inflicted in consequence of actions which procure many
present advantages, and are accompanied with much present
pleasure; for instance, sickness and untimely death are the
consequence of intemperance, though accompanied with
the highest mirth and jollity: that these punishments are
often much greater than the advantages or pleasures obtained by the actions, of which they are the punishments or
consequences: that, though we may imagine a constitution
of nature, in which these natural punishments, which are
in fact to follow, would follow immediately upon such
actions being done, or very soon after, we find, on the
contrary, in our world, that they are often delayed a great
while, sometimes even till long after the actions occasioning
them are forgot; so that the constitution of nature is such,
that delay of punishment is no sort nor degree of presumption of final impunity: that, after such delay, these natural
punishments or miseries often come, not by degrees, but
suddenly, with violence, and at once; however, the chief
misery often does: that, as certainty of such distant misery
following such actions is never afforded persons, so, perhaps,
during the actions, they have seldom a distinct, full expectation of its following (1) and, many times, the case is only
thus,, that they see in general, or may see, the credibility
that intemperance, suppose, will bring after it disc~ases; civil
(1) See Part 2, Chap. vi.




CHAP, II.]   BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS.              7 5
crimes, civil punishments; when yet the real probability
often is, that they shall escape; but things, notwithstanding,
take their destined course, and the misery inevitably follows
at its appointed time, in very many of these cases. Thus,
also, though youth may be alledged as an excuse for rashness and folly, as being naturally thoughtless, and not
clearly foreseeing all the consequences of being untractable
and profligate; this does not hinder but that these consequences follow, and are grievously felt throughout the
whole course of mature life.  Habits contracted, even in
that age, are often utter ruin; and men's success in the
world, not only in the common sense of worldly success,
but their real happiness and misery, depends, in a great
degree, and in various ways, upon the manner in which they
pass their youth; which consequences they, for the most
part, neglect to consider, and, perhaps, seldom can properly
be said to believe beforehand. It requires, also, to be mentioned, that, in numberless cases, the natural course of
things affords us opportunities for procuring advantages to
ourselves at certain times, which we cannot procure when
we will, nor ever recall the opportunities, if we have
neglected them. Indeed, the general course of nature is an
example of this. If, during the opportunity of youth, persons are indocile and self-willed, they inevitably suffer in
their future life, for want of those acquirements which they
neglected the natural season of attaining.  If the husbandman lets his seed-time pass without sowing, the whole year
is lost to him beyond recovery. In like manner, though
after men have been guilty of folly and extravagance, up to
a certain degree, it is often in their power, for instance, to
retrieve their affairs, to recover their health and character,
at least in good measure, yet real reformation is, in many
cases, of no avail at all toward preventing the miseries,
poverty, sickness, infamy, naturally annexed to folly and
extravagance, exceeding that degree.  There is a certain




76             OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD             [PART L,
bound to imprudence and misbehavior, which, being transgressed, there remains no place for repentance in the natural
course of things.  It is, further, very much to be remarked,
that neglects from  inconsiderateness, want of attention,(1)
not looking about us to see what we have to do, are often
attended with consequences altogether as dreadful as any
active misbehavior, from  the most extravagant passion.
And, lastly, civil government being natural, the punishments
of it are so too; and some of these punishments are capital,
as the effects of a dissolute course of pleasure are often
mortal. So that many natural punishments are final (2) to
him  who incurs them, if considered only in his temporal
capacity; and seem inflicted by natural appointment, either
to remove the offender out of the way of being further
mischievous, or as an example, though frequently a disregarded one, to those who are left behind.
(1) Part 2, Chap. vi.
(2) The general consideration of a future state of punishment
most evidently belongs to the subject of natural religion. But if
any of these reflections should be thought to relate more peculiarly
to this doctrine, as taught in Scripture, the reader is desired to observe, that Gentile writers, both moralists and poets, speak of the
future punishment of the wicked, both as to the duration and degree
of it, in a like manner of expression and of description, as the Scripture does. So that all which can positively be asserted to be matter
of mere revelation, with regard to this doctrine, seems to be, that
the great distinction between the righteous and the wicked shall be
made at the end of this world-that each shall then receive according
to his deserts. Reason did, as it well might, conclude, that it should,
finally and upon the whole, be well with the righteous and ill with
the wicked; but it could not be determined, upon any principles of
reason, whether human creatures might not have been appointed to
pass through other states of life and being, before that distributive
justice should finally and effectually take place. Revelation teaches
us, that the next state of things, after the present, is appointed for
the execution of this justice; that it shall be no longer delayed; but the
mnystery of God, the great mystery of his suffering vice and confusioc
to prevail, shall then be finished; and he will take to him his great polier,
aled will reign, by rendering to every one according to his worlks.




CHAP. II.]   BY REWARDS AND PUN1ISIIME.NTS.        77
These things are not what we call accidental, or to be met
with only now and then, but they are things of every day's
experience; they proceed from general laws, very general
ones, by which God governs the world, in the natural
course of his providence. And they are so analogous to
what religion teaches us concerning the future punishment
of the wicked, so much of a piece with it, that both would
naturally be expressed in the very same words and manner
of description. In the book of Proverbs,(1) for instance,
Wisdom is introduced as frequenting the most public places
of resort, and as rejected when she offers herself as the
natural appointed guide of human life.  "How  long,"
speaking to. those who are passing through it, "how long,
ye simple ones, will ye love folly, and the scorners delight
in their scorning, and fools hate knowledge? Turn ye at
my reproof. Behold, I will pour out my spirit upon you, 1
will make known my words unto you."  But, upon being
neglected, "Because I have called, and ye refused, I have
stretched out my hand, and no man regarded; but ye have
set at naught all my counsel, and would none of my
reproof: I, also, will laugh at your calamity, I will mock
when your fear cometh; when your fear cometh as desolation, and your destruction cometh as a whirlwind; when
distress and anguish cometh upon you. Then shall they
call upon me, but I will not answer; they shall seek me
early, but they shall not find me." This passage, every one
o->i, is poetical, and some parts of it are highly figurative;
but their meaning is obvious. And the thing intended is
expressed more literally in the following words: "For that
they hated knowledge, and did not choose the fear of the
Lord, therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their own way,
and be filled with their own devices. For the security of
the simple shall slay them, and the prosperity of fools shall
destroy them."  And the whole passage is so equally
(1) Chap. i.




V 8           OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD          [PART I,
applicable to what we experience in the present world, concerning the consequences of men's actions, and to what
religion teaches us is to be expected in another, that it may
be questioned which of the two was principally intended.
Indeed, when one has been recollecting the proper proofs
of a future state of rewards and punishments, nothing, methinks, can give one so sensible an apprehension of the
latter, or representation of it to the mind, as observing, that
after the many disregarded checks, admonitions, and warnings, which people meet with in the ways of vice, and folly,
and extravagance; warnings from their very nature; from
the examples of others; from the lesser inconveniences
which they bring upon themselves; from the instructions
of wise and virtuous men: after these have been long despised, scorned, ridiculed; after the chief bad consequences,
temporal consequences, of their follies, have been delayed
for a great while, at length they break in irresistibly, like
an armed force; repentance is too late to relieve, and can
serve only to aggravate their distress: the case is become
desperate; and poverty and sickness, remorse and anguish,
infamy and death, the effects of their own doings, overwhelm them, beyond possibility of remedy or escape. This
is an account of what is, in fact, the general constitution of
nature.
It is not in any sort meant, that, according to wha
appears, at present, of the natural course of things, mei
are always uniformly punished in proportion to their misbehavior; but that there are very many instances of misbehavior punished in the several ways now mentioned, and
very dreadful instances, too, sufficient to show what the
laws of the universe may admit; and, if thoroughly considered, sufficient fully to answer all objections against the
credibility of a future state of punishments, from any
imaginations, that the frailty of our nature and external
temptations almost annihilate the guilt of human vices; as




CHAP. 11.]  BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS.              79
well as objections of another sort: from necessity; from
suppositions that the will of an infinite Being cannot be
contradicted, or that he must be incapable of offense and
provocation.(l)
Reflections of this kind are not without their terrors to
serious persons, the most free from enthusiasm, and of the
greatest strength of mind; but it is fit things be stated and
considered as they really are. And there is, in the present
age, a certain fearlessness with regard to what may be
hereafter under the government of God, which nothing but
a universally acknowledged demonstration on the side of
atheism can justify, and which makes it quite necessary that
men be reminded, and, if possible, made to feel, that there
is no sort of ground for being thus presumptuous, even
upon the most skeptical principles. For, may it not be said
of any person, upon his being born into the world, he may
behave so as to be of no service to it, but by being made
an example of the woful effects of vice and folly; that he
may, as any one may, if he will, incur an infamous execution from the hands of civil justice; or, in some other
course of extravagance, shorten his days, or bring upon
himself infamy and diseases worse than death? So that it
had been better for him, even with regard to the present
world, that he had never been born. And is there any
pretense of reason for people to think themselves secure,
and talk as if they had certain proof, that, let them act as
licentiously as they will, there can be nothing analogous to
this, with regard to a future and more general interest, under
the providence and government of the same God?
(1) See Chaps. iv and vi.




80                  OF THE MORAL               [PART L
CHAPTER  III.
OF THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.
As tile manifold appearances of design and of final
causes, in the constitution of the world, prove it to be the
work of an intelligent MAind, so the particular final causes of
pleasure and pain, distributed amongst his creatures, prove
that they are under his government-what may be called
his natural government of creatures endued with sense and
reason. This, however, implies somewhat more than seems
usually attended to, when we speak of God's natural government of the world. It implies government of the very
same kind with that which a master exercises over his servants, or a civil magistrate over his subjects. These latter
instances of final causes as really prove an intelligent Governor of the world, in the sense now mentioned, and before(1)
distinctly treated of, as any other instances of final causes
prove an intelligent Maker of it.
But this alone does not appear, at fi'st sight, to determine
any thing certainly, concerning the moral character of the
Author of nature, considered in this relation of governordoes not ascertain his government to be moral, or prove that
he is the righteous judge of the world. Moral government
consists, not barely in rewarding and punishing men for
their actions, which the most tyrannical person may do;
but in rewarding the righteous and punishing the wickedin rendering to men according to their actions, considered
as good or evil. And the perfection of moral government
consists in doing this, with regard to all intelligent creatures,
in an exact proportion to their personal merits or demerits.
Some men seem  to think the only character of the
Author of nature to be that of simple absolute benevolence. This, considered as a principle of action, and infinite
(1) Chap. ii.




CHAP. III.         GOVERNMENT OF GOD.                    81
in degree, is a disposition to produce the greatest possible
happiness, without regard to person's behavior, otherwise
than as such regard would produce higher degrees of it.
And supposing this to be the only character of God, veracity and justice in him would be nothing but benevolence
conducted by wisdom.  Now, surely this ought not to be
asserted, unless it can be proved; for we should speak with
cautious reverence upon such a subject. And whether it
can be proved or no, is not the thing here to be inquired
into; but whether, in the constitution and conduct of the
world, a righteous government be not discernibly planned
out; which necessarily implies a righteous governor. There
may, possibly, be in the creation, beings, to whom the
Author of nature manifests himself under this most amiable
of all characters, this of infinite, absolute benevolence; for
it is the most amiable, supposing it not, as, perhaps, it is
not, incompatible with justice; but he manifests himself to
us under the character of a righteous governor.  He may,
consistently with this, be simply and absolutely benevolent,
in the sense now explained; but he is, for he has given us
a proof in the constitution and conduct of the world that
he is, a governor over servants, as he rewards and punishes
us for our actions.  And in the constitution and conduct of
it, he may, also, have given, besides the reason of the thing,
anw4 the natural presages of conscience, clear and distinct
intimations, that his government is righteous or moralclear to such as think the nature of it deserving their attention; and yet not to every careless person who casts a transient reflection upon the subject.(1)
(1) The objections against religion, from the evidence of it not
being universal, nor so strong as might possibly have been, may be
urged against natural religion, as well as against revealed. And,
therefore, the consideration of them belongs to the first part of this
treatise, as well as the second. But as these objections are chiefly
urged against revealed religion, I choose to consider them in the second




82                   OF THE MORAL                LPART I.
But it is particularly to be observed, that the Divine government, which we experience ourselves under in the present state, taken alone, is allowed not to be the perfection of
moral government.  And yet this by no means hinders, but
that there may be somewhat, be it more or less, truly moral
in it.  A  righteous government may plainly appear to be
carried on to some degree-enough to give us the apprehension that it shall be completed, or carried on to that degree
of perfection which religion teaches us it shall; but which
cannot appear, till much more of the Divine administration
be seen, than can in the present life.  And the design of
this chapter is to inquire how far this is the case —how far
over and above the moral nature(l) which God has given
us, and our natural notion of him, as righteous governor of
those his creatures to whom he has given this nature;(2) I
say how far, besides this, the principles and beginnings
of a moral government over the world may be discerned
notwithstanding and amidst all the confusion and disorder
of it.
Now one might mention here, what has been often urged
with great force, that, in general, less uneasiness, and more
satisfaction, are the natural consequences(3) of a virtuous
than of a vicious course of life, in the present state, as an
instance of a moral government established in nature-an
instance of it collected from experience and present matter
of fact.  But it must be owned a thing of difficulty to
weigh and balance pleasures and uneasinesses, each amongst
themselves, and, also, against each other, so as to make an
estimate with any exactness, of the overplus of happiness
part. And the answer to them there, chap. vi, as urged against Christianity, being almost equally applicable to them as urged against the
religion of nature, to avoid repetition, the reader is referred to that
cnapter.
(1) Dissertation 2.  (2) Chap. vi.
(3) See Lord Shaftesbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue, Part 2




CHAP. III.]       GOVERNMENT OF GOD                  8b
on the side of virtue. And it is not impossible, that amidst
the infinite disorders of the world, there may be exceptions
to the happiness of virtue, even with regard to those persons whose course of life, from their youth up, has been
blameless, and more with regard to those, who have gone
on for some time in the ways of vice, and have afterward
reformed. For suppose an instance of the latter case; a
person with 1hzt passions inflamed, his natural faculty of
self-governme:,n impaired by habits of indulgence, and with
all his vices about him, like so many harpies, craving for their
accustomed gratification; who can say how long it might
be before such a person would find more satisfaction in the
reasonableness and present good consequences of virtue,
than difficulties and self-denial in the restraints of it? Experience, also, shows, that men can, to a great degree, get
over their sense of shame, so as that, by professing themselves to be without principle, and avowing even direct
villany, they can support themselves against the infamy of
it.  But as the ill actions of any one will probably be more
talked of, and oftener thrown in his way, upon his reformation, so the infamy of them will be much more felt, after
the natural sense of virtue and of honor is recovered. Uneasinesses of this kind ought indeed to be put to the account
of former vices; yet it will be said, they are, in part, the
consequences of reformation. Still I am far from allowing
it doubtful, whether virtue, upon the whole, be happier
than vice in the present world; but if it were, yet the beginnings of a righteous administration may, beyond all
question, be found in nature, if we will attentively inquire
after them. And,
I. In whatever manner the notion of God's. moral government over the world might be treated, if it did not appear whether he were, in a proper sense, our governor at all;
yet when it is certain matter of experience, that he does
manifest himself to us under the character of a governor,




84                   OF TIIE MORAL              [PART 1.
in the sense explained,(1) it must deserve to be considered,
whether there be not reason to apprehend, that he may be
an righteous or moral governor. Since it appears to be fact,
that God does govern mankind by the method of rewards
and punishments, according to some settled rules of distribution, it is surely a question to be asked, What presumption is there against his finally rewarding and punihing them according to this particular rule, namely, as they
act reasonably or unreasonably, virtuously or viciously?
since rendering men happy or miserable by this rule, certainly falls in, much more falls in, with our natural apprehensions and sense of things, than doing so by any other rule,
whatever; since rewarding and punishing actions by any
other rule, would appear much harder to be accounted for
by minds formed as he has formed ours.  Be the evidence
of religion, then, more or less clear, the expectation which
it raises in us, that the righteous shall, upon the whole, be
happy, and the wicked miserable, cannot, however, possibly
be considered as absurd or chimerical; because it is no
more than an expectation, that a method of government,
already begun, shall be carried on-the method of rewarding and punishing actions, and shall be carried on by a particular rule, which unavoidably appears to us, at first sight,
more natural than any other, the rule which we call distributive justice. Nor,
II. Ought it to be entirely passed over, that tranquility,
satisfaction, and external advantages, being the natural consequences of prudent management of ourselves and out
affairs; and rashness, profligate negligence, and willful
folly, bringing after them  many inconveniences and sufferings; these afford instances of a right constitution of nature; as the correction of children, for their own sakes and
by way of example, when they run into danger or hurt
themselves, is a part of right education.  And thus, that
(1) Chap. ii.




CHAP. tII.]      GOVERNMENT OF GOD.                   85
God governs the world by general fixed laws-that he has
endued us with capacities of reflecting upon this constitution of things, and foreseeing the good and bad consequences of our behavior, plainly implies some sort of moral
government: since fiom  such a constitution of things it
cannot but follow, that prudence and imprudence, which are
of the nature of virtue and vice,(1) must be, as they are,
respectively rewarded and punished.
III. From the natural course of things, vicious actions
are, to a great degree, actually punished as mischievous to
society; and besides punishment actually inflicted upon this
account, there is, also, the fear and apprehension of it in
those persons whose crimes have rendered them obnoxious
to it in case of a discovery; this state of fear being itself
often a very considerable punishment. The natural fear
and apprehension of it, too, which restrains from such
crimes, is a declaration of nature against them. It is
necessary to the very being of society, that vices destructive of it should be punished as being so; the vices of
falsehood, injustice, cruelty: which punishment, therefore,
is as natural as society, and so is an instance of a kind of
moral government, naturally established, and actually taking
place.  And, since the certain natural course of things is
the conduct of Providence, or the government of God,
though carried on by the instrumentality of men, the observation here made amounts to this, that mankind find themselves placed by him in such circumstances, as that they
are unavoidably accountable for their behavior, and are
often punished, and sometimes rewarded, under his government, in the view of their being mischievous or eminently
beneficial to society.
If it be objected that good actions, and such as are benefcial to society, are often punished, as in the case of persecution, and in other cases, and that ill and mischievous
(1) See Dissertation 2.




86                   O' THE MORAL               [PART I.
actions are often rewarded, it may be answered distinctly,
first, that this is in no sort necessary, and, consequently, not
natural in the sense in which it is necessary, and, therefore,
natural, that ill or mischievous actions should be punished;
and, in the next place, that good actions are never punished,
considered as beneficial to society, nor ill actions rewarded,
under the view of their being hurtful to it.  So that it
stands good, without any thing on the side of vice to be set
over against it, that the Author of nature has as truly
directed that vicious actions, considered as mischievous to
society, should be punished, and put mankind under a necessity of thus punishing them, as he has directed and necessitated us to preserve our lives by food.
IV. In the natural course of things, virtue, as such, is
actually rewarded, and vice, as such, punished; which
seems to afford an instance, or example, not only of government, but of moral government begun and establishedmoral in the strictest sense, though not in that perfection of
degree which religion teaches us to expect. In order to
see this more clearly, we must distinguish between actions
themselves, and that quality ascribed to them, which we
call virtuous or vicious.  The gratification itself of every
natural passion must be attended with delight; and acquisitions of fortune, however made, are acquisitions of the
means or materials of enjoyment. An action, then, by
which any natural passion is gratified, or fortune acquired,
procures delight or advantage, abstracted from all consideration of the morality of such action. Consequently, the
pleasure or advantage in this case is gained by the action
itself, not by the morality, the virtuousness or viciousness
of it, though it be, perhaps, virtuous or vicious. Thus, to
say such an action, or course of behavior, procured suhl
pleasure or advantage, or brought on such inconvenience
and pain, is quite a different thing from  saying, that such
good or bad effect was owing to the virtue or vice of suchl




CRAP. III.]       GOVERNMENT OF GOD.                 8 
action or behavior.  In one case, an action, abstracted
from all moral consideration, produced its effect; in the
other case, for it will appear that there are such cases, the
morality of the action, the action under a moral consideration, that is, the virtuousness or viciousness of it, produced
the effect.  Now I say, virtue, as such, naturally procures
considerable advantages to the virtuous, and vice, as such,
naturally occasions great inconvenience, and even misery to
the vicious, in very many instances. The immediate effects
of virtue and vice upon the mind and temper are to be
mentioned as instances of it.  Vice, as such, is naturally
attended with some sort of uneasiness, and not uncommonly
with great disturbance and apprehension. That inward
feeling, which, respecting lesser matters and in familiar
speech, we call being vexed with one's self, and in matters
of importance, and in more serious language, remorse, is an
uneasiness naturally arising from an action of a man's own,
reflected upon by himself as wrong, unreasonable, faulty,
that is, vicious in greater or less degrees; and this manifestly is a different feeling from that uneasiness which arises
from a sense of mere loss or harm. What is more common
than to hear a man lamenting an accident or event, and
adding, But, however, he has the satisfaction that he cannot
blame himself for it; or, on the contrary, that he has the
uneasiness of being sensible that it was his own doing?
Thus, also, the disturbance and fear which often follow upon
a man's having done an injury, arise from a sense of his
being blameworthy; otherwise there would, in many cases,
be no ground of disturbance, nor any reason to fear resentment or shame. On the other hand, inward security and
peace, and a mind open to the several gratifications of life,
are the natural attendants of innocence and virtue; to
which must be added, the complacency, satisfaction, and
even joy of heart, which accompany the exercise, the real
exercise, of gratitude, friendship, benevolence.




88                  OF THE MORAL                LPAlr T.
And here, I think, ought to be mentioned the fears of
future punishment, and peaceful hopes of a better life, in
those who fully believe or have any serious apprehension of
religion; because these hopes and fears are present uneasiness and satisfaction to the mind, and cannot be got rid of
by great part of the world, even by men who have thought
most thoroughly upon that subject of religion. And no
one can say how considerable this uneasiness and satisfaction
may be, or what, upon the whole, it may amount to.
In the next place comes in the consideration, that all
honest and good men are disposed to befriend honest good
men, as such, and to discountenance the vicious, as such,
and do so in some degree, indeed in a considerable degree;
from which favor and discouragement cannot but arise considerable advantage and inconvenience.  And, though the
generality of the world have little regard to the morality
of their own actions, and may be supposed to have less to
that of others, when they themselves are not concerned,
yet, let any one be known to be a man of virtue, somehow
or other he will be favored, and good offices will be done
him, from regard to his character, without remote views,
occasionally, and in some low degree, I think, by the generality of the world, as it happens to come in their way.
Public honors, too, and advantages, are the natural consequences-are sometimes, at least, the consequences in fact,
of virtuous actions, of eminent justice, fidelity, charity, love to
our country, considered in the view of being virtuous. And
sometimes even death itself, often infamy and external
inconveniences, are the public consequences of vice, as vice.
For instance, the sense which mankind have of tyranny,
injustice, oppression, additional to the mere feeling or fear
of misery, has, doubtless, been instrumental in bringing
about revolutions, which make a figure even in the history
of the world. For it is plain, men resent injuries as imply,
ing faultiness, and retaliate, not merely under the notion of




CIHAP. InI.]    GOVERNMENT OF GOD.                 89
having received harm, but of having received wrong; and
they have this resentment in behalf of others, as well as of
themselves. So, likewise, even the generality are, in some,
degree, grateful and disposed to return good offices, not
merely because such a one has been the occasion of good
to them, but under the view that such good offices implied
kind intention and good desert in the doer. To all this
may be added two or three particular things, which many
persons will think frivolous; but to me nothing appears so,
which at all comes in toward determining a question of
such importance, as whether there be or be not a moral
institution of government, in the strictest sense moral, visibly
established and begun in nature. The particular things are
these: that in domestic government, which is, doubtless,
natural, children, and others also, are very generally punished for falsehood, and injustice, and ill-behavior, as such,
and rewarded for the contrary; which are instances where
veracity, and justice, and right behavior, as such, are naturally enforced by rewards and punishments, whether more or
less considerable in degree: that, though civil government be
supposed to take cognizance of actions in no other view than
as prejudicial to society, without respect to the immorality
of them, yet as such actions are immoral, so the sense
which men have of the immorality of them very greatly
contributes, in different ways, to bring offenders to justice;
and that entire absence of all crime and guilt, in the moral
sense, when plainly appearing, will almost of course procure, and circumstances of aggravated guilt prevent, a
remission of the penalties annexed to civil crimes, in many
cases, though by no means in all.
Upon the whole, then, besides the good and bad effects
of virtue and vice upon men's own minds, the course of the
world does, in some measure, turn upon the approbation
and disapprobation of them, as such, in others. The sense
of well and ill-doing, the presages of conscience, the love
8l




90                   OF THE MORAL                 [PART. I.
of good characters and dislike of bad ones, honor, shame,
resentment, gratitude; all these, considered in themselves,
and in their effects, do afford manifest real instances of
virtue, as such, naturally favored, and of vice, as such,
discountenanced, more or less, in the daily course of human
life, in every age, in every relation, in every general circumstance of it.  That God has given us a moral nature,(1)
may most justly be urged as a proof of our being under
his moral government; but that he has placed us in a condition, which gives this nature, as one may speak, scope to
operate, and in which it does unavoidably operate, that is,
influence mankind to act, so as thus to favor and reward virtue, and discountenance and punish vice; this is not the same,
but a further additional proof of his moral government; for
it is an instance of it. The first is a proof that he will
finally favor and support virtue effectually; the second is
an example of his favoring and supporting it at present, in
some degree.
If a more distinct inquiry be made, whence it arises, that
virtue, as such, is often rewarded, and vice, as such, is punished, and this rule never inverted, it will be found to
proceed, in part, immediately from the moral nature itself
which God has given us; and, also, in part, from his having
given us, together with this nature, so great a power over
each other's happiness and misery. For, first, it is certain,
that peace and delight, in some degree and upon some
occasions, is the necessary and present Effect of virtuous
practice-an effect arising immediately from that constitution
of our nature. We are so made that well-doing, as such,
gives us satisfaction, at least in some instances; ill-doing, as
as such, in none. And, secondly, from our moral nature,
joined with God's having put our happiness and misery, ll
many respects, in each other's power, it cannot but be that,
vice, as such, some kinds and instances of it at least, wiii
(1) See Dissertation 2.




CHAP. III.]       GOVERNMENT OF GOD.                  91
be infamous, and men will be disposed to punish it as in
itself detestable; and the villain will, by no means, be able
always to avoid feeling that infamy, any more than he will
be able to escape this further punishment which mankind
will be disposed to inflict upon him, under the notion of his
deserving it. But there can be nothing on the side of vice
to answer this; because there is nothing in the human mind
contradictory, as the logicians speak, to virtue. For virtue
consists in a regard to what is right and reasonable, as
being so; in a regard to veracity, justice, charity, in themselves: and there is surely no such thing as a like natural
regard to falsehood, injustice, cruelty. If it be thought,
that there are instances of an approbation of rice, as such,
in itself, and for its own sake, (though it does not appear to
me that there is any such thing at all, but, supposing there
be,) it is, evidently, monstrous; as much so as the most
acknowledged perversion of any passion whatever. Such
instances of perversion, then, being left out as merely
imaginary, or, however, unnatural, it must follow, from the
frame of our nature, and from our condition, in the respects
now described, that vice cannot at all be, and virtue cannot
but be, favored, as such, by others, upon some occasions,
and happy in itself, in some degree. For what is here
insisted upon, is not the degree in which virtue and vice
are thus distinguished, but only the thing itself, that they
are so in some degree; though the whole good and bad
effect of virtue and vice, as such, is not inconsiderable in
degree.  But that they must be thus distinguished, in some
degree, is in a manner necessary; it is matter of fact, of
daily experience, even in the greatest confusion of human
affairs.
It is not pretended but that, in the natural course of
things, happiness and misery appear to be distributed by
other rules, than only the personal merit and demerit of
characters.  They may sometimes be distributed by way of




92                    OF THE MORAL                [PART I.
mere discipline.  There may be the wisest and best reasons
why the world should be governed by general laws, from
whence such promiscuous distribution, perhaps, must follow;
and, also, why our happiness and misery should be put in
each other's power, in the degree which they are. And
these things, as in general they contribute to the rewarding
virtue and punishing vice, as such, so they often contribute,
also, not to the inversion of this, which is impossible, but to
the rendering persons prosperous, though wicked; afflicted,
though righteous; and, which is worse, to the rewardin1g
some actions, though vicious, and punishing other actions,
though virtuous.  But all this cannot drown the voice of
nature in the conduct of Providence, plainly declaring itself
for virtue, by way of distinction from vice, and preference
to it.  For, our being so constituted as that virtue and vice
are thus naturally favored and discountenanced, rewarded
and punished respectively, as such, is an intuitive proof of
the intent of nature that it should be so; otherwise the
constitution of our mind, from which it thus immediately
and directly proceeds, would be absurd.  But it cannot be
said, because virtuous actions are sometimes punished, and
vicious actions rewarded, that nature intended it. For,
though this great disorder is brought about, as all actions
are done, by means of some natural passion, yet this may
be, as it undoubtedly is, brought about by the perversion of
such passion, implanted in us for other, and those very good
purposes. And, indeed, these other and good purposes,
even of every passion, may be clearly seen.
We have, then, a declaration, in some degree of present
effect, from Him who is supreme in nature, which side lie
is of or what part he takes-a declaration for virtue, and
against vice. So far, therefore, as a man is true to virtue,
to veracity and justice, to equity and charity, and the right of
the case, in whatever he is concerned, so fiar he is on the side
of the Divine administration, and co-operates with it; and




CHAP. III.]       GOVERNMENT OF GOD.                 93
from hence, to such a man, arises naturally a secret satisfaction and sense of security, and implicit hope of somewhat
further. And,
V. This hope is confirmed by the necessary tendencies
of virtue, which, though not of present effect, yet are at
present discernible in nature; and so. afford an instance of
somewhat moral in the essential constitution of it. There
is, in the nature of things, a tendency in virtue and vice to
produce the good and bad effects now mentioned, in a
greater degree than they do, in fact, produce them.  For
instance, good and bad men would be much more rewarded
and punished as such, were it not that justice is often artificially eluded, that characters are not known, and many
who would thus favor virtue and discourage vice, are hindered from doing so by accidental causes. These tendencies
of virtue and vice are obvious with regard to individuals.
But it may require more particularly to be considered, that
power in a society, by being under the direction of virtue,
naturally increases, and has a necessary tendency to prevail
over opposite power, not under the direction of it; in like
manner as power, by being under the direction of reason,
increases, and has a tendency to prevail over brute force.
There are several brute creatures of equal, and several of
superior strength, to that of men; and, possibly, the sum
of the whole strength of brutes may be greater than that
of mankind, but reason gives us the advantage and superiority over them, and thus man is the acknowledged
governing animal upon the earth. Nor is this superiority
considered by any as accidental, but as what reason has a
tendency, in the nature of the thing, to obtain.:And yet,
perhaps, difficulties may be raised about the meaning, as
well as the truth of the assertion, that virtue has the like
tendency.
To obviate these difficulties, let us see more distinctly
how the case stands with regard to reason, which is so




94                  OF THE MORAL                [PART 1.
readily acknowledged to have this advantageous tendency,
Suppose, then, two or three men, of the best and most improved understanding, in a desolate, open plain, attacked by
ten times the number of beasts of prey; would their reason
secure them the victory in this unequal combat?  Power,
then, though joined with reason and under its direction,
cannot be expected to prevail over opposite power, though
merely brutal, unless the one bears some proportion to the
other. Again, put the imaginary case, that rational and
irrational creatures were of like external shape and manner;
it is certain, before there were opportunities for the first to
distinguish each other, to separate from their adversaries,
and to form a union among themselves, they might be upon
a level, or in several respects, upon great disadvantage,
though, united, they might be vastly superior; since union
is of such efficacy, that ten men, united, might be able to
accomplish what ten thousand of the same natural strength
and understanding, wholly ununited, could not. In this
case, then, brute force might more than maintain its ground
against reason, for want of union among the rational creatures. Or suppose a number of men to land upon an island
inhabited only by wild beasts-a number of men, who, by
the regulations of civil government, the inventions of art,
and the experience of some years, could they be preserved
so long, would be really sufficient to subdue the wild beasts,
and to preserve themselves in security from them; yet, a
conjuncture of accidents might give such advantage to the
irrational animals as that they might at once overpower,
and even extirpate, the whole species of rational ones.
Length of time, then, proper scope, and opportunities for
reason to exert itself, may be absolutely necessary to its
prevailing over brute force. Further still, there are many
instances of brutes succeeding in attempts which they could
not have undertaken, had not their irrational nature rendered them  incapable of foreseeing the danger of such




CHAP. III.]       GOVERNMENT OF GOD.                  9.5
attempt, or the fury of passion hindered their attending to
it; and there are instances of reason, and real prudence,
preventing men's undertaking what, it hath appeared afterward, they might have succeeded in by a lucky rashness.
And, in certain conjunctures, ignorance and folly, weakness
and discord, may have their advantages.  So that rational
animals have not, necessarily, the superiority over irrational
ones; but, how improbable soever it may be, it is, evidently,
possible that, in some globes, the latter may be superior.
And were the former-wholly at variance and disunited, by
false self-interest and envy, by treachery and injustice, and
consequent rage and malice against each other, whilst the
latter were firmly united among themselves by instinct, this
might greatly contribute to the introducing such an inverted
order of things.  For every one would  consider it as
inverted; since reason has, in the nature of it, a tendency
to prevail over brute force, notwithstanding the possibility
it may not prevail, and the necessity which there is of many
concurring circumstances to render it prevalent.
Now, I say, virtue in a society has a like tendency to
procure superiority and additional power, whether this
power be considered as the means of security from opposite
power, or of obtaining other advantages. And it has this
tendency, by rendering public good an object and end to
every member of the society; by putting every one upon
consideration and diligence, recollection and self-government,
both in order to see what is the most effectual method, and,
also, in order to perform their proper part, for obtaining
and preserving it; by uniting a society within itself, and so
increasing its strength, and, which is particularly to be mentioned, uniting it by means of veracity and justice. For,
as these last are principal bonds of union, so benevolence, or
public spirit, undirected, unrestrained by them, is-nobody
knows what.
And, suppose the invisible world, and the invisible




{6                  OF THE MORAL                [PART I.
dispensations of Providence, to be in any sort analogous to
what appears; or, that both together make up one uniform
scheme, the two parts of which, the part which we see,
and that which is beyond our observation, are analogous to
each other; then, there must be a like natural tendency in
the derived power, throughout the universe, under the
direction of virtue, to prevail in general over that which is
not under its direction; as there is in reason, derived reason
in the universe, to prevail over brute force. But, then, in
order to the prevalence of virtue, or that it may actually
produce what it has a tendency to produce, the like concurrences are necessary, as are, to the prevalence of reason.
There must be some proportion between the natural power
or force which is, and that which is not, under the direction
of virtue. There must be sufficient length of time; for the
complete success of virtue, as of reason, cannot, from the
nature of tle thing, be otherwise than gradual: there must
be, as one may speak, a fair field of trial, a stage large and
extensive enough, proper occasions and opportunities for
the virtuous to join together, to exert themselves against
lawless force, and to reap the fruit of their united labors.
Now, indeed, it is to be hoped, that the disproportion
between the good and the bad, even here on earth, is not so
great, but that the former have natural power sufficient to
their prevailing to a considerable degree, if circumstances
would permit this power to be united.  For, much less, very
much less power, under the direction of virtue, would
prevail over much greater, not under the direction of it
However, good men over the face of the earth cannot unite,
as for other reasons, so because they cannot be sufficiently
ascertained of each other's characters.  And the known
course of human things, the scene we are now passing
tlrough, particularly the shortness of life, denies to virtue
its full scope in several other respects.  The natural tendency which we haive been considering, though real, is




CHAP. Ii.]       GOVERNMENT OF GOD.                9'7
hindered from being carried into effect in the present state;
but these hinderances may be removed in a future one.
Virtue, to borrow the Christian allusion, is militant here,
and various untoward accidents contribute to its being often
overborne; but it may combat with greater advantage hereafter, and prevail completely and enjoy its consequent
rewards, in some future states. Neglected as it is, perhaps
unknown, perhaps despised and oppressed here, there may
be scenes in eternity, lasting enough, and in every other
way adapted, to afford it a sufficient sphere of action, and
a sufficient sphere for the natural consequences of it to follow in fact. If the soul be naturally immortal, and this
state be a progress toward a future one, as childhood is
toward mature age, good men may naturally unite, not only
amongst themselves, but also with other orders of virtuous
creatures, in that future state. For virtue, from the very
nature of it, is a principle and bond of union, in some
degree, amongst all who are endued with it, and known
to each other; so as that by it a good man cannot but
recommend himself to the favor and protection of all virtuous beings, throughout the whole universe, who can be
acquainted with his character, and can any way interpose
in his behalf in any part of his duration. And one might
add, that suppose all this advantageous tendency of virtue
to become effect amongst one or more orders of creatures,
in any distant scenes and periods, and to be seen by any
orders of vicious creatures, throughout the universal kingdom of God; this happy effect of virtue would have a
tendency, by way of example, and possibly in other ways,
to amend those of them who are capable of amendment,
and being recovered to a just sense of virtue.  If our
notions of the plan of Providence were enlarged, in any
sort proportionable to what late discoveries have enlarged
our views with respect to the material world, representaLions of this kind would not appear absurd or extravagant.
9




98                  OF TIE MORAL               [PART I.
However, they are not to be taken as intended for a literal
delineation of what is, in fact, the particular scheme of the
universe, which cannot be known without revelation; for
suppositions are not to be looked upon as true, because not
incredible, but they are mentioned to show, that our finding
virtue to be hindered from procuring to itself such superiority and advantages, is no objection against its having, in
the essential nature of the thing, a tendency to procure
them. And the suppositions now mentioned do plainly
show this; for they show, that these hinderances are so far
from being necessary, that we ourselves can easily conceive
how they may be removed in future states, and full scope
be granted to virtue. And all these advantageous tendencies of it are to be considered as declarations of God in its
favor. This, however, is taking a pretty large compass;
though it is certain, that as the material woild appears to
be, in a manner, boundless and immense, there must be some
scheme of Providence vast in proportion to it.
But let us return to the earth, our habitation, and we
shall see this happy tendency of virtue, by imagining an
instance not so vast and remote; by supposing a kingdom,
or society of men, upon it, perfectly virtuous, for a succession of many ages; to which, if you please, may be given
a situation advantageous for universal monarchy. In such a
state there would be no such thing as faction, but men of
the greatest capacity would, of course, all along have the
chief direction of affairs willingly yielded to them, and they
would share it among themselves without envy. Each of
these would have the part assigned him to which his geni us
was peculiarly adapted; and others, who had not any distinguished genius, would be safe, and think themselves verv
happy, by being under the protection and guidance of those
who had. Public determinations would really be the result
of the united wisdom of the community, and they would
faithfully be executed by the united strength of it. Sorne




I-1 AP. III.]     GOVERNMENT OF GOD.                99
would, in a higher way, contribute, but all would, in some
way, contribute to the public prosperity, and in it each
would enjoy the fruits of his own virtue.  And as injustice,
whether by fraud or force, would be unknown among themselves, so they would be sufficiently secured from it in their
neighbors.  For cunning and false self-interest, confederaCies in injustice, ever slight, and accompanied with faction
and intestine treachery; these, on one hand, would be found
mere childish folly and weakness, when set in opposition
against wisdom, public spirit, union inviolable, and fidelity
on the other, allowing both a sufficient length of years to
try their force. Add the general influence which such a
kingdom would have over the face of the earth, by way of
example particularly, and the reverence which would be
paid it. It would plainly be superior to all others, and the
world must gradually come under its empire; not by means
of lawless violence, but partly by what must be allowed to
be just conquest, and partly by other kingdoms submitting
themselves voluntarily to it throughout a course of ages,
and claiming its protection, on.e after another, in successive
exigencies.  The head of it would be a universal monarch,
in another sense than any mortal has yet been, and the
eastern style would be literally applicable to him, that "all
people, nations, and languages should serve him." And
though, indeed, our knowledge of human nature, and the
whole history of mankind, show the impossibility, without
some miraculous interposition, that a number of men here on
earth should unite in one society or government, in the fear
of God and universal practice of virtue, and that such a
government should continue so united for a succession of
ages; yet, admitting or supposing this, the effect would be
as now drawn out. And thus, for instance, the wonderful
power and prosperity promised to the Jewish nation in the
Scripture, would be, in a great measure, the consequence of
what is predicted of them: that the "people should be all




100                  OF THE MORAL               [PART I.
righteous and inherit the land for ever;"(l) were we to understand the latter phrase of a long continuance only, sufficient to give things time to work.  The predictions of this
kind, for there are many of them, cannot come to pass in the
present known course of nature; but suppos.e them come
to pass, and then the dominion and pre-eminence promised
must naturally follow, to a very considerable degree.
Consider, now, the general system of religion —that the
government of the world is uniform, and one, and moral —
that virtue and right shall finally have the advantage, and
prevail over fraud and lawless force, over the deceits as well
as the violence of wickedness, under the conduct of one
supreme Governor; and from the observations above made,
it will appear, that God has, by our reason, given us to see
a peculiar connection in the several parts of this scheme,
and a tendency toward the completion of it, arising out of
the very nature of virtue; which tendency is to be considered as somewhat moral in the essential constitution of
things. If any one should think all this to be of little
importance, I desire him to consider what he would think,
if vice had, essentially and in its nature, these advantageous
tendencies, or if virtue had, essentially, the direct contrary
ones.
But it may be objected, that notwithstanding all these
natural effects, and these natural tendencies of virtue, yet
things may be now going on throughout the universe, and
may go on hereafter, in the same mixed way as here, at
present, upon earth; virtue sometimes prosperous, sometimes depressed; vice sometimes punished, sometimes successful. The answer to which is, that it is not the purpose
of this chapter, nor of this treatise, properly to prove God's
perfect moral government over the world, or the truth of
religion, but to observe what there is in the constitution and
course of nature, to confirm the proper proof of it, supposed
(1) Isa. lx, 21.




CItAP. II.1     GOVERNMENT OF COD.                101
to be known, and that the weight of the foregoing observations to this purpose may be thus distinctly proved. Pleasure and pain are, indeed, to a certain degree, say to a very
high degree, distributed amongst us, without any apparent
regard to the merit or demerit of characters. And were
there nothing else, concerning this matter, discernible in the
constitution and course of nature, there would be no ground,
from the constitution and course of nature, to hope or to
fear, that men would be rewarded or punished hereafter
according to their deserts; which, however, it is to be
remarked, implies, that even then there would be no
ground, from appearances, to think that vice, upon the
whole, would have the advantage, rather than that virtue
would. And thus the proof of a future state of retribution, would rest upon the usual known arguments for it;
which are, I think, plainly unanswerable, and would be so,
though there were no additional confirmation of them from
the things above insisted on. But these things are a very
strong confirmation of them: for,
1. They show that the Author of nature is not indifferent to virtue and vice. They amount to a declaration from
him, determinate, and not to be evaded, in favor of one, and
against the other: such a declaration as there is nothing to
be set over against, or answer, on the part of vice. So that
were a man, laying aside the proper proof of religion, to
determine from the course of nature only, whether it were
most probable that the righteous or the wicked would have
the advantage in a future life, there can be no doubt but
that he would determine the probability to be, that the former would. The course of nature, then, in the view of it
now given, furnishes us with a real practical proof of the
obligations of religion.
2. When, conformably to what religion teaches us, God
shall reward and punish virtue and vice, as such, so as that
every one shall, upon the whole, have his deserts, this dis



102                  OF TIlE MORAL              [PART I.
tributive justice will not be a thing different in kind, but
onmy in degree, from what we experience in his present government.  It will be that in effect, toward which we now see
a tendency.  It will be no more than the completion of that
moral government, the principles and beginning of which
have been shown, beyond all dispute, discernible in the
present constitution and course of nature. And from hence
it follows,
3. That as, under the natural goverment of God, our
experience of those kinds and degrees of happiness and
misery, which we do experience at present, gives just
ground to hope for and to fear higher degrees and other
kinds of both in a future state, supposing a future state admitted; so, under his moral government, our experience
that virtue and vice are, in the manners above mentioned,
actually rewarded and punished at present, in a certain
degree, gives just ground to hope and to fear that they
may be rewarded and punished in a higher degree hereafter.  It is acknowledged, indeed, that this alone is not
sufficient ground to think, that they actually will be
rewarded and punished in a higher degree, rather than in a
lower: but then,
Lastly, There is sufficient ground to think so, from the
good and bad tendencies of virtue and vice. For these tendencies are essential, and founded in the nature of things;
whereas, the hinderances, to their becoming effect are, in
numberless cases, not necessary but artificial only. Now,
it may be much more strongly argued, that these tendencies,
as well as the actual rewards and punishments of virtue
and vice, which arise directly out of the nature of things,
vill remain hereafter, than that the accidental hinderances
of them will. And if these hinderances do not remain,
those rewards and punishments cannot but be carried on
much further toward the perfection of moral government,
that is, the tendencies of virtue and vice will become effect;




CHAP. HI.]       GOVERNMENT OF GOD.                103
but when, or where, or in what particular way, cannot b)e
known at all but by revelation.
Upon the whole, there is a kind of moral government
implied in God's natural government;(1) virtue and vice are
naturally rewarded and punished as beneficial and mischievous to society,(2) and rewarded and punished directly
as virtue and vice.(3) The notion, then, of a moral scheme
of government, is not fictitious, but natural; for it is suggested to our thoughts by the constitution and course of
nature, and the execution of this scheme is actually begun,
in the instances here mentioned. And these things are to
be considered as a declaration of the Author of nature, for
virtue, and against vice; they give a credibility to the supposition of their being rewarded and punished hereafter,
and, also, ground to hope and to fear, that they may be
rewarded and punished in higher degrees than they are
here. And as all this is confirmed, so the argument for
religion, from the constitution and course of nature, is carried on farther, by observing, that there are natural tendencies, and, in innumerable cases, only artificial hinderances,
to this moral scheme's being carried on much farther toward
perfection than it is at present.(4)  The notion, then, of a
moral scheme of government, much more perfect than what
is seen, is not a fictitious, but a natural notion, for it is suggested to our thoughts by the essential tendencies of virtue
and vice. And these tendencies are to be considered as
intimations, as implicit promises and threatenings, from the
Author of nature, of much greater rewards and punishments to follow virtue and vice, than do at present. And,
indeed, every natural tendency, which is to continue, but
which is hindered from  becoming effect by only accidental
causes, affords a presumption, that such tendency will, some
time or other, become effect-a presumption in degree proportionable to the length of the duration through which
(1) Page 83. (2) Page 85. (3) Page 86, &c. (4) Page 93, &c




104       OF THE MORAL GOVERNMENTi OF GOD.  [PART L.
such  tendency will continue.  And  from  these things
together arises a real presumption, that the moral scheme
of government established in nature, shall be carried on
much farther toward perfection hereafter, and, I think, a
presumption that it will be absolutely completed.  But
from these things, joined with the moral nature which God
has given us, considered as given us by him, arises a praetical proof(l) that it will be completed-a proof from fact,
and, therefore, a distinct one from  that which is deduced
from  the eternial and unalterable relations, the fitness and
unfitness of actions.
(1) See this proof drawn out briefly, Chap 6




MHAP. IV.]       OF A STATE OF TRIAL.              105
CHAPTER IV.
OF A STATE OF PROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL, DIFFICUI
TIES, AND DANGER.
THE general doctrine of religion, that our present life is
a state of probation for a future one, comprehends under
it several particular things, distinct from each other.  But
the first and most common meaning of it seems to be, that
our future interest is now depending, and depending upon
ourselves-that we have scope and opportunities here for
that good and bad behavior, which God will reward and
punish hereafter; together with temptations to one, as well as
inducements of reason to the other. And this is, in a great
measure, the same with saying, that we are under the moral
government of God, and to give an account of our actions
to him. For the notion of a future account, and general
righteous judgment, implies some sort of temptations to
what is wrong, otherwise there would be no moral possibility of doing wrong, nor ground for judgment or discrimination. But there is this difference, that the word
probation is more distinctly and particularly expressive of
allurements to wrong, or difficulties in adhering uniformly
to what is right, and of the danger of miscarrying by such
temptations, than the words moral government.  A state of
probation, then, as thus particularly implying in it trial,
difficulties, and danger, may require to be considered distinctly by itself.
And as the moral government of God, which religion
teaches us, implies, that we are in a state of trial with
regard to a future world, so, also, his natural government
over us implies, that we are in a state of trial, in a like
sense, with regard to the present world.  Natural government, by rewards and punishments, as much implies natural
trial, as moral government does moral trial.  The natural




106              OF A STATE OF TRIAL.           [PART I.
government of God here meant,(1) consists in his annexing
pleasure to some actions, and pain to others, which are in
our power to do or forbear, and in giving us notice of such
appointment beforehand. This necessarily implies, that he
has made our happiness and misery, or our interest, to
depend in part upon ourselves. And so far as men have
temptations to any course of action, which will probably
occasion them greater temporal inconvenience and. uneasiness than satisfaction, so far their temporal interest is in
danger from themselves, or they are in a state of trial with
respect to it. Now, people often blame others, and even
themselves, for their misconduct in their temporal concerns.
And we find many are greatly wanting to themselves, and
miss of that natural happiness which they might have obtained in the present life; perhaps every one does in some
degree. But many run themselves into great inconvenience,
and into extreme distress and misery, not through incapacity
of knowing better, and doing better for themselves, which
would be nothing to the present purpose, but through their
own fault.  And these things necessarily imply temptation,
and danger of miscarrying, in a greater or less degree, with
respect to our worldly interest or happiness.  Every one,
too, without having religion in his thoughts, speaks of the
hazards which young people run upon their setting out in
the world-hazards from other causes, than merely their
ignorance, and unavoidable accidents.  And some courses
of vice, at least, being contrary to men's worldly interest
or good, temptations to these must, at the same time, be
temptations to forego our present and our future interest.
Thus, in our natural or temporal capacity, we are in a state
of trial, that is, of difficulty and danger, analogous or like
to our moral and religious trial.
This will more distinctly appear to any one, who thinks
it worth while, more distinctly, to consider what it is which
(1) Chap. it.




CIIAP. IV.]       OF A STATE OF TRIAL.                1(07
constitutes our trial in both capacities, and to observe how
mankind behave under it.
And that which constitutes this our trial, in both these
capacities, must be somewhat either in our external circumstances, or in our nature. For, on the one hand, persons
may be betrayed into wrong behavior upon surprise, or
overcome upon any other very singular and extraordinary
external occasions, who would, otherwise, have preserved
their character of prudence and of virtue; in which cases,
every one, in speaking of the wrong behavior of these
persons, would impute it to such particular external circumstances.  And, on the other hand, men who have contracted
habits of vice and folly of any kind, or have some particular
passions in excess, will seek opportunities, and, as it were,
go out of their way to gratify themselves in these respects,
at the expense of their wisdom and their virtue, led to it,
as every one would say, not by external temptations, but
by such habits and passions. And the account of this last
case is, that particular passions are no more coincident
with prudence, or that reasonable self-love, the end of which
is our worldly interest, than they are with the principle of
virtue and religion, but often draw contrary ways to one as
well as to the other; and so such particular passions are
as much temptations to act imprudently with regard to our
worldly interest, as to act viciously.(1)  However, as when
we say men are misled by external circumstances of temptation, it cannot but be understood, that there is somewhat
within themselves, to render those circumstances temptations, or to render them susceptible of impressions from
them; so, when we say, they are misled by passions, it is
always supposed, that there are occasions, circumstances,
and objects, exciting these passions, and affording means
for gratifying them.  And, therefore, temptations from
(1' See Sermons preached at the Rolls, 1726, 2d edit., p. 205, &c
Pref., p. 25, &c  Serm., p. 21, &c




108              OF A STATE OF TRIAL,          [PART. I
within, and from without, coincide, and mutually imply
each other. Now, the several external objects of the appetites, passions, and affections, being present to the senses,
or offering themselves to the mind, and so exciting emotions
suitable to their nature, not only in cases where they can
be gratified consistently with innocence and prudence, bilt,
also, in cases where they cannot, and yet can be gratified
imprudently and viciously; this as really puts them in
danger of voluntarily foregoing their present interest or
good, as their future, and as really renders self-denial necessary to secure one as the other; that is, we are in a like state
of trial with respect to both, by the very same passions,
excited by the very same means. Thus, mankind having a
temporal interest depending upon themselves, and a prudent
course of behavior being necessary to secure it, passions
inordinately excited, whether by means of example or by
any other external circumstance, toward such objects, at
such times, or in such degrees, as that they cannot be gratified consistently with worldly prudence, are temptations
dangerous, and too often successful temptations, to forego a
greater temporal good for a less; that is, to forego what is,
upon the whole, our temporal interest, for the sake of a
present gratification. This is a description of our state of
trial in our temporal capacity. Substitute now the word
future for temporal, and virtue for prudence, and it will be
just as proper a description of our state of trial in our
religious capacity, so analogous are they to each other.
If, from consideration of this our like state of trial in
both capacities, we go on to observe further, how mankind
behave under it, we shall find there are some who have so
little sense of it, that they scarce look beyond the passing
day; they are so taken up with present gratifications, as to
have, in a manner, no feeling of consequences, no regard to
their future ease or fortune in this life, any more than to
their happiness in another.  Some appear to be blinded and




CHAP. IV.]       OF A STATE OF TRIAL.                109
deceived by inordinate passion, in their worldly concerns, as
much as in religion. Others are, not deceived, but, as it
were, forcibly carried away, by the like passions, against
their better judgment, and feeble resolutions, too, of acting
better. And there are men, and truly they are not a few,
who shamelessly avow, not their interests, but their mere
will and pleasure, to be their law of life; and who, in open
defiance of every thing that is reasonable, will go on in a
course of vicious extravagance, foreseeing, with no remorse
and little fear, that it will be their temporal ruin; and some
of them, under the apprehension of the consequences of
wickedness in another state: and, to speak in the most
moderate way, human creatures are not only continually
liable to go wrong voluntarily, but we see, likewise, that
they often actually do so, with respect to their temporal
interests, as well as with respect to religion.
Thus, our difficulties and dangers, or our,trials in our
temporal and our religious capacity, as they proceed from
the same causes, and have the same effect upon men's
behavior, are evidently analogous, and of the same kind.
It may be added, that as the difficulties and dangers
of miscarrying in our religious state of trial are greatly
increased, and, one is ready to think, in a manner wholly
made, by the ill-behavior of others; by a wrong educationwrong in a moral sense, sometimes positively vicious; by
general bad example; by the dishonest artifices which are
got into business of all kinds; and, in very many parts of
the world, by religion's being corrupted into superstitions
which indulge men in their vices; so, in like manner, the
difficulties of conducting ourselves prudently in respect to
our present interest, and our danger of being led aside
from pursuing it, are greatly increased by a foolish education; and, after we come to mature age, by the extravagance
and carelessness of others, whom we have intercourse with;
and by mistaken notions, very generally prevalent, and




.10               OF A STATE OF TRIAL.          [PAR.' 1.
taken up from common opinion, concerning temporal happiness, and wherein it consists.  And persons, by their own
negligence and folly in their temporal affairs, no less than
by a course of vice, bring themselves into new difficulties,
and, by habits of indulgence, become less qualified to go
through them; and one irregularity after another embarrasses things to such a degree, that they know not whereabout they are, and often makes the path of conduct so
intricate and perplexed, that it is difficult to trace it outdifficult even to determine what is the prudent or the moral
part. Thus, for instance, wrong behavior in one stage of
life, youth-wrong, I mean, considering ourselves only in
our temporal capacity, without taking in religion; this, in
several ways, increases the difficulties of right behavior in
mature age; that is, puts us into a more disadvantageous
state of trial in our temporal capacity.
We are an inferior part of the creation of God.  There
are natural appearances of our being in a state of degradation;(1) and we certainly are in a condition which does
not seem, by any means, the most advantageous we could
imagine or desire, either in our natural or moral capacity,
for securing either our present or future interest. However,
this condition, low, and careful, and uncertain as it is, does
not afford any just ground of complaint: for, as men may
manage their temporal affairs with prudence, and so pass
their days here on earth in tolerable ease and satisfaction, by
a moderate degree of care, so, likewise, with regard to religion, there is no more required than what they are well able
to do, and what they must be greatly wanting to themselves
if they neglect.  And for persons to have that put upon
them which they are well able to go through, and no more,
we naturally consider as an equitable thing, supposing it
done by proper authority.  Nor have we any more reason
to complain of it, with regard to the Author of nature,
(1) Part 2, Chop. v.




CHAP. IV.]       OF A STATE OF TRIAL.                l l
than of his not having given us other advantages, belonging
to other orders of creatures.
But the thing here insisted upon is, that the state of trial
which religion teaches us we are in, is rendered credible,
by its being throughout uniform and of a piece with the
general conduct of Providence toward us, in all other
respects within the compass of our knowledge. Indeed, if
mankind, considered in their natural capacity as inhabitants
of this world only, found themselves, from their birth to
their death, in a settled state of security and happiness,
without any solicitude or thought of their own; or, if they
were in no danger of being brought into inconveniences and
distress by carelessness, or the folly of passion, through
bad example, the treachery of others, or the deceitful
appearances of things; were this our natural condition, then
it might seem strange, and be some presumption against
the truth of religion, that it represents our future and more
general interest, as not secure, of course, but as depending
upon our behavior, and requiring recollection and selfgovernment to obtain it. For, it might be alledged, "What
you say is our condition in one respect, is not in anywise
of a sort with what we find, by experience, our condition is
in another. Our whole present interest is secured to our
hands, without any solicitude of ours, and why should not
our future interests, if we have any such, be so too?"  But
since, on the contrary, thought and consideration, the voluntary denying ourselves many things which we desire, and a
course of behavior far from being always agreeable to us,
are absolutely necessary to our acting even a common
decent and common prudent part, so as to pass with any
satisfaction through the present world, and be received
upon any tolerable good terms in it; since this is the case,
all presumption against self-denial and attention being necessary to secure our higher interest, is removed.  Had we
not experience, it might, perhaps, speciously be urged, that
it is improbable any thing of hazard and danger should be




112              OF A STATE OF TRIAL.           [PART 1.
put upon us by an infinite Being, when every thing which
is hazard and danger in our manner of conception, and will
end in error, confusion, and misery, is now already certain in his foreknowledge.  And, indeed, why any thing of
hazard and danger should be put upon such frail creatures
as we are, may well be thought a difficulty in speculation;
and cannot but be so, till we know the whole, or, however,
much more of the case. But still, the constitution of nature is as it is. Our happiness and misery are trusted to
our conduct, and made to depend upon it. Somewhat, and,
in many circumstances, a great deal, too, is put upon us,
either to do, or to suffer, as we choose. And all the various
miseries of life, which people bring upon themselves by
negligence and folly, and might have avoided by proper
care, are instances of this; which miseries are, beforehand,
just as contingent and undetermined as their conduct, and
left to be determined by it.
These observations are an answer to the objections against
the credibility of a state of trial, as implying temptations,
and real danger of miscarrying with regard to our general
interest, under the moral government of God; and they
show, that, if we are at all to be considered in such a capacity, and as having such an interest, the general analogy of
Providence must lead us to apprehend ourselves in danger
of miscarrying, in different degrees, as to this interest, by
our neglecting to act the proper part belonging to us in
that capacity. For we have a present interest, under the
government of God which we experience here upon earth.
And this interest, as it is not forced upon us, so neither is it
offered to our acceptance, but to our acquisition; in such
sort, as that we are in danger of missing it, by means of
temptations to neglect or act contrary to it; and without
attention and self-denial, must and do miss of it.  It is,
then, perfectly credible, that this may be our case with
respect to that chief and final good which religion proposes
to us.




cHAP. V.]  01P A STATE OF MORAL DISCIPLINE.       113
C HAPTER V.
OF A STATE OF PRIOBATION, AS INTENDED FOR MORAL DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT.
FROM the consideration of our being in a probation-state,
of so much difficulty and hazard, naturally arises the question, how we came to be placed in it?  But such a general
inquiry as this would be found involved in insuperable
difficulties. For, though some of these difficulties would be
lessened by observing, that all wickedness is voluntary, as
is implied in its very notion, and that many of the miseries
of life have apparent good effects, yet when we consider
other circumstances belonging to both, and what must be
the consequence of the former in a life to come, it cannot
but be acknowledged plain folly and presumption, to pretend
to give an account of the whole reasons of this matter —the
whole reasons of our being allotted a condition, out of which
so much wickedness and misery, so circumstanced, would
in fact arise. Whether it be not beyond our faculties, not
only to find out, but even to understand, the whole account
of this, or, though we should be supposed capable of
understanding it, yet, whether it would be of service or
prejudice to us to be informed of it, is impossible to say.
But, as our present condition can in nowise be shown inconsistent with the perfect moral government of God, so religion
teaches us we were placed in it, that we might qualify ourselves, by the practice of virtue, for another state, which is
to follow it. And this, though but a partial answer, a very
partial one indeed, to the inquiry now mentioned, yet is
a more satisfactory answer to another, which is of real, and
of the utmost importance to us to have answered-the
inquiry, What is our business here?  The known end, then,
why we are placed in a state of so much affliction, hazard,
and difficulty, is, our improvement in virtue and piety, as
10




11 4                OF A STATE OF               [PART 1.
the requisite qualification for a future state of security and
happiness.
Now, the beginning of life, considered as an education
for mature age in the present world, appears plainly, at
first sight, analogous to this our trial for a future one; the
former being, in our temporal capacity, what the latter is in
our religious capacity. But some observations common to
both of them, and a more distinct consideration of each, will
more distinctly show the extent and force of the analogy
between them; and the credibility which arises from hence,
as well as from the nature of the thing, that the present
life was intended to be a state of discipline for a future one.
I. Every species of creatures is, we see, designed for a
particular way of life, to which the nature, the capacities,
temper, and qualifications of each species, are as necessary
as their external circumstances. Both come into the notion
of such state, or particular way of life, and are constituent
parts of it.  Change a man's capacities or character to the
degree in which it is conceivable they may be changed, and
he would be altogether incapable of a human course of
life and human happiness —as incapable as if, his nature
continuing unchanged, he were placed in a world where ho
had no sphere of action, nor any objects to answer his
appetites, passions, and affections of any sort. One thing
is set over against another, as an ancient writer expresses it.
Our nature corresponds to our external condition. Without
this correspondence, there would be no possibility of any
such thing as human life and human happiness; which life
and happiness are, therefore, a result from our nature and
condition jointly; meaning by human life, not living in the
literal sense, but the whole complex notion commonly understood by those words.  So that, without determining
what will be the employment and happiness, the particular life of good men hereafter, there must be some determlinate capacities, some necessary character and qualifications,




CtIA1'. V.]        MORAL DISCIPLINE.                11.5
without which persons cannot but be utterly incapable of it;
in like manner as there must be some, without which men
would be incapable of their present state of life. Now,
II. The constitution of human creatures, and, indeed, of
all creatures which come under our notice, is such, as that
they are capable of naturally becoming qualified for states
of life, for which they were once wholly unqualified. In
imagination we may, indeed, conceive of creatures, as incapable of having any of their faculties naturally enlarged, or
as being unable naturally to acquire any new qualifications;
but the faculties of every species known to us are made for
enlargement-for acquirements of experience, and habits.
We find ourselves in particular endued with capacities, not
only of perceiving ideas, and of knowledge or perceiving
truth, but, also, of storing up our ideas and knowledge by
memory. We are capable, not only of acting, and of having different momentary impressions made upon us, but of
getting a new facility in any kind of action, and of settled
alterations in our temper or character. The power of the
two last is the power of habits. But neither the perception
of ideas, nor knowledge of any sort, are habits, though
absolutely nec2ssary to the forming of them.  However,
apprehension, reason, memory, which are the capacities of
acquiring knowledge, are greatly improved by exercise.
Whether the word habit is applicable to all these improvements, and, in particular, how far the powers of memory
and of habits may be powers of the same nature, I shall
not inquire.  But that perceptions come into our nminds
readily and of course, by means of their having been there
before, seems a thing of the same sort, as readiness in any
particular kind of action, proceeding from being accustomed
to it: And aptness to recollect practical observations of
service in our conduct, is plainly habit in many cases.
There are habits of perception and habits of action. An
instance of the former, is our constant and even involuntary




116                 OF A STATE OF               [PART 1
readiness in correcting the impressions of our sight, concerning magnitudes and distances, so as to substitute judgment in the room of sensation, imperceptibly to ourselves.
And it seems as if all other associations of ideas, not
naturally connected, might be called passive habits, as
properly as our readiness in understanding languages upon
sight, or hearing of words. And our readiness in speaking
and writing them is an instance of the latter-of active
habits. For distinctness, we may consider habits as belonging to the body, or the mind, and the latter will be explained by the former. Under the former are comprehended all -bodily activities or motions, whether graceful
or unbecoming, which are owing to use; under the latter,
general habits of life and conduct, such as those of obedience and submission to authority, or to any particular
person; those of veracity, justice, and charity; those of
attention, industry, self-government, envy, revenge. And
habits of this latter kind seem produced by repeated acts,
as well as the former. And, in like manner, as habits
belonging to the body are produced by external acts, so
habits of the minds are produced by the exertion of
inward practical principles; that is, by carrying them into
act, or acting upon them, the principles of obedience, of
veracity, justice, and charity. Nor can those habits be
formed by any external course of action, otherwise than as
it proceeds from these principles; because it is only these
inward principles exerted, which are strictly acts of obedience, of veracity, of justice, and of charity. So, likewise, habits of attention, industry, self-government, are, in
the same manner, acquired by exercise; and habits of envy
and revenge by indulgence, whether in outward act or in
thought and intention, that is, inward act; for such intention
is an act. Resolutions, also, to do well are properly acts:
and endeavoring to enforce upon our own minds a practical
sense of virtue, or to beget in others that practical sense of




CHAP. v.J          MORAL DISCIPLINE.                117
it which a man really las himself, is a virtuous act. All
these, therefore, may and will contribute toward forming
good habits. But, going over the theory of virtue in one's
thoughts, talking well, and drawing fine pictures of it, this
is so far from necessarily or certainly conducing to form a
habit of it in him who thus employs himself, that it may
harden the mind in a contrary course, and render it gradually more insensible; that is, form a habit of insensibility
to all moral considerations. For, from  our very faculty
of habits, passive impressions, by being repeated, grow
weaker. Thoughts, by often passing through the mind,
are felt less sensibly; being accustomed to danger, begets
intrepidity, that is, lessens fear; to distress, lessens the
passion of pity; to instances of others' mortality, lessens
the sensible apprehension of our own. And from  these
two observations together, that practical habits are formed
and strengthened by repeated acts, and that passive-impressions grow weaker by being repeated upon us, it must
follow, that active habits may be gradually forming and
strengthening, by a course of acting upon such and such
motives and excitements, whilst these motives and excitements themselves are, by proportionable degrees, growing
less sensible; that is, are continually less and less sensibly
felt, even as the active habits strengthen. And experience
confirms this; for active principles, at the very time that
they are less lively in perception than they were, are found
to be somehow wrought more thoroughly into the temper
and character, and become more effectual in influencing our
practice. The three things just mentioned may afford
instances of it. Perception of danger is a natural excitement of passive fear and active caution; and, by being
inured to danger, habits of the latter are  gradually
wrought, at the same time that the former gradually lessens. Perception of distress in others is a natural excite.
mernt, passively to pity, and actively to relieve it; but let a




1.18               o0r A STATE OF                [PART I.
man set himself to attend  to, inquire out, and relieve
distressed persons, and he cannot but grow less and less sensibly affected with the various miseries of life, with whicll
he must become acquainted; when yet, at the same time,
benevolence, considered not as a passion, but as a practical
principle of action, will strengthen; and, whilst he passively compassionates the distressed less, he will acquire a
greater aptitude actively to assist and befriend them. So,
also, at the same time, that the daily instances of men's
dying around us give us daily a less sensible passive feeling
or apprehension of our own mortality, such instances greatly
contribute to the strengthening a practical regard to it in
serious men; that is, to forming a habit of acting with a
constant view to it.  And this seems again further to show,
that passive impressions made upon our minds by admonition, experience, example, though they may have a remote
efficacy, and a very great one, toward forming active habits,
yet can have this efficacy no otherwise than by inducing us
to such a course of action; and that it is, not being affected
so and so, but acting, which forms those habits; only it
must be always remembered, that real endeavors to enforce
good impressions upon ourselves, are a species of virtuous
action. Nor do we know how far it is possible, in the
nature of things, that effects should be wrought in us at
once equivalent to habits, that is, what is wrought by use
and exercise. However, the thing insisted upon is, not
what may be possible, but what is, in fact, the appointment
of nature, which is, that active habits are to be formed by
exercise. Their progress may be so gradual as to be imperceptible in its steps; it may be hard to explain the faculty
by which we are capable of habits, throughout its several
parts, and to trace it up to its original, so as to distinguish
it from all others in our mind; and it seems as if contrary
effects were to be ascribed to it.  But the thing in general, that our nature is formed to yield, in some ~s( h




CHAP. v.J          MORALt DSdCIPtlNEi              lif
manner as this, to use and exercise, is matter of certain
experience.
Thus, by accustoming ourselves to any course of action
we get an aptness to go on, a facility, readiness, and often
pleasure in it. The inclinations which rendered us averse
to it grow weaker; the difficulties in it, not only the imaginary, but the real ones, lessen; the reasons for it offer
themselves of course to our thoughts upon all occasions;
and the least glimpse of them  is sufficient to make us go
on in a course of action to which we have been accustomed.
And practical principles appear to grow stronger absolutely
in themselves, by exercise, as well as relatively, with regard.
to contrary principles; which, by being accustomed to submit, do so habitually, and of course.  And thus a new character, in several respects, may be formed; and many habitudes of life, not given by nature, but which nature directs
us to acquire.
III. Indeed, we may be assured, that we should never
have had these capacities of improving by experience,
acquired knowledge and habits, had they not been necessary, and intended to be made use of. And, accordingly,
we find them so necessary, and so much intended, that,
without them, we should be utterly incapable of that which
was the end, for which we were made, considered in our
temporal capacity only-the employments and satisfactions
of our mature state of life.
Nature does in nowise qualify us wholly, much less at
once, for this mature state of life. Even maturity of understanding and bodily strength are not ponly arrived to gradually, but are, also, very much owing to the continued exercise of our powers of body and mind from infancy. But if
we suppose a person brought into the world with both these
in maturity, as far as this is conceivable, he would plainly
at first be as unqualified for the human life of mature
age, as an idiot.  He would be in a manner distracted with




120                 OF A STATE OF               LPART 1.
astonishment, and apprehension, and curiosity, and suspense;
nor can one guess how long it would be before he would be
familiarized to himself, and the objects about him, enough
even to set himself to any thing. It may be questioned,
too, whether the natural information of his sight and hearing would be of any manner of use at all to him in acting, before experience.  And it seems that men would be
strangely headstrong and self-willed, and disposed to exert
themselves with an impetuosity which would render society
insupportable, and the living in it impracticable, were it not
for some acquired moderation and self-government, some
aptitude and readiness in restraining themselves, and concealing their -sense of things.  Want of every thing of this
kind which is learned, would render a man as uncapable of
society as want of language would; or as his natural ignorance of any of the particular employments of life, would
render him incapable of providing himself with the common conveniences, or supplying the necessary wants of it.
In these respects, and, probably, in many more, of which
we have no particular notion, mankind is left by nature an
unformed, unfinished creature, utterly deficient and unqualified, before the acquirement of knowledge, experience, and
habits, for that mature state of life, which was the end of
his creation, considering him as related only to this world.
But, then, as nature has endued us with the power of
supplying those deficiencies, by acquired knowledge, experience, and habits, so, likewise, we are placed in a condition, in infancy, childhood, and youth, fitted for it-fitted
for our acquiring those qualifications of all sorts, which we
stand in need of in mature age.  Hence, children, from
their very birth, are daily growing acquainted with the
objects about them, with the scene in which they are
placed, and to have a future part; and learning somewhat
or other, necessary to the performance of it. The subordinations, to which they are accustomed in domestic life,




CHAP. V.]          MORAL DISCIPLINE.                12 
teach them  self-government in common behavior abroad,
and prepare them  for subjection and obedience to civil
authority. What passes before their eyes, and daily happens to them, gives them experience, caution against treachery and deceit, together with numberless little rules of
action and conduct, which we could not live without, and
which are learned so insensibly and so perfectly, ass to be
mistaken, perhaps, for instinct; though they are the effect
of long experience and exercise: as much so as language,
or knowledge in particular business, or the qualifications
and behavior belonging to the several ranks and professions.
Thus, the beginning of our days is adapted to be, and is, a
state of education in the theory and practice of mature life.
We are much assisted in it by example, instruction, and the
care of others; but a great deal is left to ourselves to do.
And of this, as part is done easily and of course, so part
requires diligence and care, the voluntary foregoing many
things which we desire, and setting ourselves to what we
should have no inclination to, but for the necessity or expedience of it. For that labor and industry which the station
of so many absolutely requires, they would be greatly unqualified for in maturity, as those in other stations would be
for any other sorts of application, if both were not accustomed to them in their youth.  And according as persons
behave themselves, in the general education which all go
through, and in the particular ones adapted to particular
employments, their character is formed, and made appear;
they recommend themselves more or less; and are capable
of, and placed in different stations in the society of mankind.
The former part of life, then, is to be considered as an
important opportunity, which nature puts into our hands,
and which, when lost, is not to be recovered.  And our
being placed in a state of discipline throughout this life, for
another world, is a Providential disposition of things, exactly of the same kind as our being placed in a state of
11




122                 OF A STATE OF               [PART L
discipline during childhood, for mature age.  Our condition,
in both respects, is uniform and of a piece, and comprehended under one and the same general law of nature.
And if we were not able at all to discern, how or in what
way the present life could be our preparation for another,
this would be no objection against the credibility of its being
so. For we do not discern how food and sleep contribute
to the growth of the body, nor could have any thought thal
they would, before we had experience.  Nor do children at
all think, on the one hand, that the sports and exercises, to
which they are so much addicted, contribute to their health
and growth; nor, on the other, of the necessity which there
is for their being restrained in them; nor are they capable
of understanding the use of many parts of discipline, which,.
nevertheless, they must be made to go through, in order to
qualify them for the business of mature age. Were we not
able, then, to discover in what respects the present life could
form us for a future one, yet nothing would be more supposable than that it might, in some respects or other, from
the general analogy of Providence.  And this, for aught I
see, might reasonably be said, even though we should not
take in the consideration of God's moral government over
the world. But,
IV. Take in this consideration, and, consequently, that
the character of virtue and piety is a necessary qualification
for the future state, and then we may distinctly see how,
and in what respects, the present life may be a preparation
for it; since we want, and are capable of improvement in
that character, by moral and religious habits; and the present
life is fit to be a state of discipline for such imp4rovement; in
like manner as we have already observed, how, and in what
respects, infancy, childhood, and youth, are a necessary preparation, and a natural state of discipline, for mature age.
Nothing, which we at present see, would lead us to thb
thought of a solitary unactivo state hereafter; but, if we




CIIAP. V.]         MORAL DISCIPLINE.                128
judge at all from the analogy of nature, we must suppose,
according to the Scripture account of it, that it will be a
community. And there is no shadow of any thing unreasonable in conceiving, though there be no analogy for it,
that this community will be, as the Scripture represents it,
under the more immediate, or, if such an expression may
be used, the more sensible government of God. Nor is our
ignorance, what will be the employments of this happy
community, nor our consequent ignorance, what particular
scope or occasion there will be for the exercise of veracity,
justice, and charity, amongst the members of it with regard
to each other, any proof that there will be no sphere of
exercise for those virtues. MIuch less, if that were possible,
is our ignorance any proof that there will be no occasion
for that frame of mind, or character, which is formed by
the daily practice of those particular virtues here, and which
is a result from it. This, at least, must be owned in general,
that as the government established in the universe is moral,
the character of virtue and piety must, in some way or other,
be the condition of our happiness, or the qualification for it.
Now, from what is above observed concerning our natural
power of habits, it is easy to see, that we are capable of
moral improvement by discipline. And how greatly we
want it, need not be proved to any one who is acquainted
with the great wickedness of mankind, or even with those
imperfections which the best are conscious of. But it is
not, perhaps, distinctly attended to by every one, that the
occasion which human creatures have for discipline, to improve in them this character of virtue and piety, is to be
traced up higher than to excess in the passions, by indulgence and habits of vice. Mankind, and, perhaps, all finite
creatures, from the very constitution of their nature, before
habits of virtue, are deficient, and in danger of deviating
from what is right, and, therefore, stand in need of virtuous
Ilabits for a security against this danger.  For, together




124                   OF A STATE OF               [PART I.
with the general principle of moral understanding, we have
in our inward frame various affections toward particular
external objects.  These affections are naturally, and of
right, subject to the government of the moral principle, as
to the occasions upon which they may be gratified, as to the
times, degrees, and manner, in which the objects of them
may be pursued; but, then, the principle of virtue can
neither excite them, nor prevent their being excited. On
the contrary, they are naturally felt, when the objects of
them are present to the mind, not only before all consideration whether they can be obtained by lawful means, but
after it is found they cannot.  For the natural objects of
affection continue so; the necessaries, conveniences, and
pleasures of life, remain naturally desirable, though they
cannot be obtained innocently-nay, though they cannot
possibly be obtained at all. And when the objects of any
affection whatever cannot be obtained without unlawful
means, but may be obtained by them, such affection, though
its being excited, and its continuing some time in the mind,
be as innocent as it is natural and necessary, yet cannot but
be conceived to have a tendency to incline persons to venture upon such unlawful means, and, therefore, must be
conceived as putting them in some danger of it. Now,
what is the general security against this danger-against
their actually deviating from right? As the danger is, so,
also, must the security be, from  within, from the practical
principle of virtue.(1)  And the strengthening or improving
(1) It may be thought that a sense of interest would as effectually
restrain creatures from doing wrong. But if by a sense of interesi
is meant, a speculative conviction or belief that such and such indulgence would occasion them greater uneasiness, upon the whole.
than satisfaction, it is contrary to present experience to say, that
this sense of interest is sufficient to restrain them from thus indulg.ing themselves. And if by a sense of interest is meant, a practical
regard to what is upon the whole our happiness, this is not only
coincident with the principle of virtue, or moral rectitude, but is
a pait of the idea itself. And it is evident this reasonable self-iove




CHAP. V.]           MORAL DISCIPLINE.                  121'
this principle, considered as practical, or as a principle of
action, will lessen the danger or increase the security against
it. And this moral principle is capable of improvement,
by proper discipline and exercise; by recollecting the practical impressions which example and experience have made
upon us; and, instead of following humor and mere inclination, by continually attending to the equity and right of the
case, in whatever we are engaged, be it in greater or less
matters; and accustoming ourselves always to act upon it,
as being itself the just and natural motive of action; and,
as this moral course of behavior must necessarily, under
Divine government, be of final interest.  Thus, the principle
of virtue, improved into a habit, of which improvement we
are thus capable, will plainly be, in proportion to the strength
of it, a security against the danger which finite creatures are
in, from  the very nature of propension, or particular affec.
tions. This way of putting the matter supposes particular
affections to remain in a future state, which it is scarce
possible to avoid supposing. And if they do, we clearly
see, that acquired habits of virtue and self-government may
be necessary for the regulation of them.  However, though
we were not distinctly to take in this supposition, but to
speak only in general, the thing really comes to the same.
For habits of virtue, thus acquired by discipline, are improvement in virtue; and improvement in virtue must be
advancement in happiness, if the government of the universe
be moral.
From  these things we may observe, and it will farther
wants to be improved, as really as any principle in our nature. For
we daily see it over-matched, not only by the more boisterous passions, but by curiosity, shame, love of imitation, by any thing, even
indolence: especially if the interest, the temporal interest, suppose,
which is the end of such self-love, be at a distance. So greatly are
profligate men mistaken, when they affirm they are wholly governed
by interestediess and self-love: and so little cause is there for moralists to disclaim this principle. See page 108.




126                 OF A STATE OF               [PART I
show this our natural and original need of being improved
by discipline, how it comes to pass, that creatures, made
upright, fall; and that those who preserve their uprightness, by so doing, raise themselves to a more secure state
of virtue. To say that the former is accounted for by the
nature of liberty, is to say no more than that an event's
actually happening is accounted for by a mere possibility of
its happening.  But it seems distinctly conceivable from the
very nature of particular affections or propensions. For,
suppose creatures intended for such a particular state of
life, for which such propensions were necessary; suppose
them endued with such propensions, together with moral
understanding, as well including a practical sense of virtue
as a speculative conception of it; and that all these several
principles, both natural and moral, forming an inward constitution of mind, were in the most exact proportion possible,
that is, in a proportion the most exactly adapted to their
intended state of life; such creatures would be made upright, or finitely perfect. Now, particular propensions, from
their very nature, must be felt, the objects of them being
present, though they cannot be gratified at all, or not with
the allowance of the moral principle. But if they can be
gratified without its allowance, or by contradicting it, then
they must be conceived to have some tendency, in how
low a degree soever, yet some tendency, to induce persons
to such forbidden gratification. This tendency, in some one
particular propension, may be increased, by the greater
frequency of occasions naturally exciting it, than of occasions exciting others.  The least voluntary indulgence in
forbidden circumstances, though but in thought, will increase
this wrong tendency, and may increase it further, till, peculiar conjunctures, perhaps, conspiring, it becomes effect;
and danger of deviating from right, ends in actual deviation
from it-a danger necessarily arising from the very nature
of propension, and which, therefore, could not have been




CHAP. v.]          MORAL DISCIPLINE.                ]12 f
prevented, though it might have been escaped, or got innocently through. The case would be, as if we were to suppose a straight path marked out for a person, in which such
a degree of attention would keep him steady; but, if he
would not attend in this degree, any one of a thousand
objects catching his eye, might lead him out of it. Now,
hi is impossible to say, how much even the first full overt
act of irregularity might disorder the inward constitution,
unsettle the adjustments, and alter the proportions which
formed it, and in which the uprightness of its make consisted. But repetition of irregularities would produce habits,
and thus the constitution would be spoiled, and creatures,
made upright, become corrupt and depraved in their settled
character, proportionably to their repeated irregularities in
occasional acts.  But, on the contrary, these creatures might
have improved and raised themselves to a higher and more
secure state of virtue, by the contrary behavior-by steadily
following the moral principle, supposed to be one part of
their nature, and thus withstanding that unavoidable
danger of defection, which necessarily arose from propension, the other part of it. For, by thus preserving their
integrity for some time, their danger would lessen, since
propensions, by being inured to submit, would do it more
easily and of course; and their security against this lessening
danger would increase, since the moral principle would gain
additional strength by exercise; both which things are implied in the notion of virtuous habits.  Thus, then, vicious
indulgence is not only criminal in itself, but, also, depraves
the inward constitution and character. And virtuous selfgovernment is not only right in itself, but, also, improves
the inward constitution or character; and may improve it to
such a degree, that though we should suppose it impossible
for particular affections to be absolutely coincident with the
moral principle, and, consequently, should allow that such
creatures as have been above supposed would for ever remain




12A3                 OF A STATE OF              [PART 1
defectible, yet their danger of actually deviating from right
may be almost infinitely lessened, and they fully fortified
against what remains of it, if that may be called danger,
against which there is an adequate effectual security.  But
still, this their higher perfection may continue to consist in
habits of virtue formed in a state of discipline, and this
their more complete security remain to proceed from them.
And thus it is plainly conceivable, that creatures without
blemish, as they came out of the hands of God, may be in
danger of going wrong, and so may stand in need of the
security of virtuous habits, additional to the moral principle
wrought into their natures by him. That which is the
ground of their danger, or their want of security, may be
considered as a deficiency in them, to which virtuous habits
are the natural supply.  And as they are naturally capable
of being raised and improved by discipline, it may be a
thing fit and requisite, that they should be placed in circumstances with an eye to it —in circumstances peculiarly
fitted to be, to them, a state of discipline for their improvement in virtue.
But how much more strongly must this hold with respect
to those who have corrupted their natures, are fallen from
their original rectitude, and whose passions are become
excessive by repeated violations of their inward constitution?  Upright creatures may want to be improved; depraved creatures want to be renewed.  Education and discipline, which may be in all degrees and sorts of gentleness
and of severity, are expedient for those; but must be absolutely necessary for these. For these, discipline, of the
severer sort, too, and in the higher degrees of it, must be
necessary, in order to wear out vicious habits —to recover
their primitive strength of self-government, which indulgence must have weakened-to repair, as well as raise
into a habit, the moral principle, in order to their arriving
at a secure state of virtuous happiness.




CHAP. V.]          MORAL DISCIPLINE.                129
Now, whoever will consider the thing may clearly see,
that the present world is peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline for this purpose, to such as will set themselves to
mend and improve.  For, the various temptations with
which we are surrounded; our experience of the deceits of
wickedness; having been in many instances led wrong ourselves; the great viciousness of the world; the infinite disorders consequent upon it; our being made acquainted with
pain and sorrow, either from our own feeling of it, or from
the sight of it in others; these things, though some of them
may, indeed, produce wrong effects upon our minds, yet,
when duly reflected upon, have all of them a direct tendency to bring us to a settled moderation and reasonableness of temper —the contrary both to thoughtless levity,
and, also, to that unrestrained self-will, and violent bent to
follow present inclination, which may be observed in undisciplined minds.  Such experience, as the present state
affords, of the frailty of our nature, of the boundless extravagance of ungoverned passion, of the power which an
infinite Being has over us, by the various capacities of misery which he has given us; in short, that kind and degree
of experience which the present state affords us, that the
constitution of nature is such as to admit the possibility, the
danger, and the actual event of creatures losing their innocence and happiness, and becoming vicious, and wretched,
hath a tendency to give us a practical sense of things very
different from a mere speculative knowledge, that we are
liable to vice, and capable of misery. And who knows,
whether the security of creatures, in the highest and most
settled state of perfection, may not, in part, arise from their
having had such a sense of things as this, formed and
habitually fixed within them, in some state of probation?
And passing through the present world with that moral
attention which is necessary to the acting a right part in it,
tmay leave everlasting impressions of this sort upon our




130                  OF A STATE OF              LPART 1.
minds. But to be a little more distinct: allurements to
what is wrong; difficulties in the discharge of our duty;
our not being able to act a uniform right part without
some thought and care; and the opportunities which we
have, or imagine we have, of avoiding what we dislike, or
obtaining what we desire, by unlawful means, when we
either cannot do it all, or, at least, not so easily by lawful
ones; these things, that is, the snares and temptations of
vice, are what render the present world peculiarly fit to be
a state of discipline to those who will preserve their integrity;'because they render being upon our guard, resolution,
and the denial of our passions, necessary in order to that
end. And the exercise of such particular recollection,
intention of mind, and self-government, in the practice of
virtue, has, from the make of our nature, a peculiar tendency to form habits of virtue, as implying not only a real,
but, also, a more continued, and a more intense exercise of
the virtuous principle; or a more constant and a stronger
effort of virtue exerted into act. Thus, suppose a person
to know himself to be in particular danger, for some time,
of doing any thing wrong, which yet he fully resolves not
to do, continued recollection, and keeping upon his guard,
in order to make good his resolution, is a continued exerting
of that act of virtue in a high degree, which need have been,
and, perhaps, would have been, only instantaneous and tweak,
had the temptation been so. It is, indeed, ridiculous to
assert, that self-denial is essential to virtue and piety; but
it would have been nearer the truth, though not strictly the
truth itself, to have said, that it is essential to discipline
and improvement. For, though actions materially virtuous,
which have no sort of difficulty, but are perfectly agreeable
to our particular inclinations, may, possibly, be done only
from these particular inclinations, and so may not be any
exercise of the principle of virtue, that is, not be virtuous actions at all; yet, on the contrary, they may be an exercise




CHAP. V.]          MORAL DISCIPLINE.                131
of that principle, and, when they are, they have a tendency to form and fix the habit of virtue.  But when the
exercise of the virtuous principle is more continued, oftener
repeated, and more intense, as it must be in circumstances
of danger, temptation, and difficulty, of any kind, and in
any degree, this tendency is increased proportionably, and a
more confirmed habit is the consequence.
This, undoubtedly, holds to a certain length, but how far
it may hold, I know not.  Neither our intellectual powers,
nor our bodily strength, can be improved beyond such a degree; and both may be overwrought. Possibly, there may be
somewhat analogous to this, with respect to the moral character, which is scarce worth considering. And I mention it
onily, lest it should come into some persons' thoughts, not
as an exception to the foregoing observations, which, perhaps, it is, but as a confutation of them, which it is not.
And there may be several other exceptions.  Observations
of this kind cannot be supposed to hold minutely, and in
every case. It is enough that they hold in general. And
these plainly hold so far, as that from them may be seen
distinctly, which is all that is intended by them, that the
present world is peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline for
our improvement in virtue and piety; in the same sense as
some sciences, by requiring and engaging the attention, not
to be sure of such persons as will not, but of such as will,
set themselves to them, are fit to form the mind to habits
of attention.
Indeed, the present state is so far from proving, in event,
a discipline of virtue to the generality of men, that, on the
centrary, they seem to make it a discipline of vice. And
the viciousness of the world is, in different ways, the great
temptation, which renders it a state of virtuous discipline, in
the degree it is, to good men. The whole end, and the
whole occasion of mankind's being placed in such a state as
the present, is not pretended to be accounted for. That




132                 OF A STATE OF               LPART 1.
which appears amidst the general corruption is, that there
are some persons, who, having within them the principle of
amendment and recovery, attend to and follow the notices
of virtue and religion, be they more clear or more obscure,
which are afforded them; and that the present world is, not
only an exercise of virtue in these persons, but an exercise
of it in ways and degrees peculiarly apt to improve it-apt
to improve it, in some respects, even beyond what would be
by the exercise of it required in a perfectly virtuous society,
or in a society of equally imperfect virtue with themselves.
But that the present world does not actually become a state
of moral discipline to many, even to the generality, that is,
that they do not improve or grow better in it, cannot be
urged as a proof that it was not intended for moral discipline, by ally who at all observe the analogy of nature.
For of the numerous seeds of vegetables, and bodies of
animals, which are adapted and put in the way, to improve
to such a point or state of natural maturity and perfection,
we do not see, perhaps, that one in a million actually does.
Far the greatest part of them  decay before they are improved to it, and appear to be absolutely destroyed. Yet
no one, who does not deny all final causes, will deny, that
those seeds and bodies which do attain to that point of maturity and perfection, answer the end for which they were
really designed by nature; and, therefore, that nature designed them  for such perfection.  And I cannot forbear
adding, though it is not to the present purpose, that the
al2pearance of such an amazing waste in nature, with respect
to these seeds and bodies, by foreign causes, is to us as unaccountable, as, what is much more terrible, the present
and future ruin of so many moral agents by themselves,
that is, by vice.
Against this whole notion of moral discipline it may be
objected, in another way, that so far as a course of behavior, materially virtuous, proceeds from hope and fear, so




CHAP. V.]          MORAL DISCIPLINE.                 183
far it is only a discipline and strengthening of self-love.
But doing what God commands, because he commands it, is
obedience, though it proceeds from hope or fear. And a
course of such obedience will form habits of it; and a constant regard to veracity, justice, and charity, may form distinct habits of these particular virtues, and will, certainly,
form habits of self-government, and of denying our inclinations, whenever veracity, justice, or charity requires it. Nor
is there any foundation for this great nicety, with which
some affect to distinguish in this case, in order to depreciate
all religion proceeding from  hope or fear.  For veracity,
justice, and charity, regard to God's authority, and to our
own chief interest, are not only all three coincident, but
each of them is, in itself, a just and natural motive or principle of action. And he who begins a good life from any
one of them, and perseveres in it, as he is already in some
degree, so he cannot fail of becoming more and more of
that character, which is correspondent to the constitution
of nature as moral, and to the relation which God stands
in to us as moral governor of it; nor, consequently, can
he fail of obtaining that happiness, which this constitution
and relation necessarily suppose connected with that character.
These several observations, concerning the active principle of virtue and obedience to God's commands, are applicable to passive submission or resignation to his will; which
is another essential part of a right character, connected with
the former, and very much in our power to form ourselves
to. It may be imagined, that nothing but afflictions can
give occasion for or require this virtue; that it can have no
respect to, nor be any way necessary to qualify for a state
of perfect happiness; but it is not experience which can
make us think thus: prosperity itself, whilst any thing supposed desirable is not ours, begets extravagant and unbounded thoughts.  Imagination is altogether as much a




134                 OF A STATE OF                [PART I.
source of discontent as any thing in our external condition.
It is, indeed, true, that there can be no scope for patience,
when sorrow shall be no more; but there may be need of a
temper of mind, which shall have been formed by patience.
For, though self-love, considered merely as an active principle leading us to pursue our chief interest, cannot but be
uniformly coincident with the principle of obedience to God's
commands, our interest being rightly understood; because
this obedience, and the pursuit of our own chief interest,
must be, in every case, one and the same thing; yet it may
be questioned, whether self-love, considered merely as the
desire of our own interest or happiness, can, from its nature,
be thus absolutely and uniformly coincident with the will of
God, any more than particular affections can;(1) coincident
in such sort, as not to be liable to be excited upon occasions,
and in degrees, impossible to be gratified consistently with
the constitution of things, or the Divine appointments. So
that habits of resignation may, upon this account, be requisite for all creatures-habits, I say, which signify what is
formed by use.  However, in general it is obvious that
both self-love and particular affection in human creatures,
considered only as passive feelings, distort and rend the
mind, and, therefore, stand in need of discipline. Now,
denial of those particular affections, in a course of active
virtue and obedience to God's will, has a tendency to moderate them, and seems, also, to have a tendency to habituate
the mind to be easy and satisfied with that degree of happiness which is allotted us, that is, to moderate self-love.
But the proper discipline for resignation is affliction. For
a right behavior under that trial, recollecting ourselves so
as to consider it in the view in which religion teaches us to
consider it, as from  the hand of God; receiving it as what
he appoints, or thinks proper to permit, in his world and
under his government; this will habituate the mind. to a
(1) Page 123.




CHAP. V.]          MORAL DISCIPLINE.                135
dutiful submission. And such submission, together with
the active principle of obedience, make up the temper and
character in us which answers to his sovereignty, and which
absolutely belongs to the condition of our being, as dependent creatures.  Nor can it be said, that this is only breaking the mind to a submission to mere power; for mere
power may be accidental, and precarious, and usurped; but
it is forming within ourselves the temper of resignation to
his rightful authority, who is, by nature, supreme over all.
Upon the whole, such a character, and such qualifications, are necessary for a mature state of life in the present
world, as nature alone does in nowise bestow, but has put
it upon us in great part to acquire, in our progress from one
stage of life to another, from childhood to mature age-put
it upon us to acquire them, by giving us capacities of doing
it, and by placing us, in the beginning of life, in a condition
fit for it. And this is a general analogy to our condition in
the present world, as in a state of moral discipline for another.  It is in vain, then, to object against the credibility
of the present life's being intended for this purpose, that all
the trouble and the danger unavoidably accompanying such
discipline might have been saved us, by our being made at
once the creatures and the characters which we were to be.
For we experience, that what we were to be, was to be the
effect of what we would do; and that the general conduct of
nature is, not to save us trouble or danger, but to make us
capable of going through them, and to put it upon us to do
so. Acquirements of our own experience and habits, are
the natural supply to our deficiencies, and security against
our dangers; since it is as plainly natural to set ourselves to
acquire the qualifications as the external things which we
stand in need of. In particular, it is as plainly a general
law of nature, that we should, with regard to our temporal
interest, form and cultivate practical principles within us,
by attention, use, and discipline, as any thing whatever




136        OF A STATE OF MORAL DISCIPLINE.   LPART T.
is a natural law; chiefly in the beginning of life, but, also,
throughout the whole course of it.  And the alternative is
left to our choice, either to improve ourselves and better
our condition, or, in default of such improvement, to remain
deficient and wretched.  It is, therefore, perfectly credible,
from the analogy of nature, that the same may be our case,
with respect to the happiness of a future state and the qualifications necessary for it.
There is a third thing, which may seem implied in the
present world's being a state of probation; that it is a theatre
of action for the manifestation of persons' characters, with
respect to a future one; not, to be sure, to an all-knowing
Being, but to his creation, or part of it. This may, perhaps, be only a consequence of our being in a state of probation in the other senses.  However, it is not impossible, that
men's showing and making manifest what is in their heart,
what their real character is, may have respect to a future
life, in ways and manners which we are not acquainted
with; particularly it may be a means, for the Author* of
nature does not appear to do any thing without means, of
their being disposed of suitably to their characters; and of
its being known to the creation, by way of example, that
they are thus disposed of. But not to enter upon any conjectural account of this, one may just mention, that the
manifestation of persons' characters contributes very mucth,
in various ways, to the carrying on a great part of that
general course of nature respecting mankind, which comes
under our observation at present. I shall only add, that
probation, in both these senses, as well as in that treated of
in the foregoing chapter, is implied in moral government;
since by persons' behavior under it, their characters calnmet
but be manifested, and, if they behave well, improved.




UcHAP. VI.] NECESSITY AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE.      137
CHAPTER VI.
OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, CONSIDERED AS INFLUENCING
PRACTICE.
THROUGHOUT the foregoing treatise it appears, that the
condition of mankind, considered as inhabitants of this
world only, and under the government of God which we
experience, is greatly analogous to our condition, as designed
for another world, or under that farther government which
religion teaches us. If, therefore, any assert, as a fatalist
must, that the opinion of universal necessity is reconcilable
with the former, there immediately arises a question in the
way of analogy, whether he must not also own it to be
reconcilable to the latter, that is, with the system of religion
itself, and the proof of it. The reader, then, will observe,
that the question now before us, is not absolute, whether
the opinion of fate be reconcilable with religion; but hypothetical, whether, upon supposition of its being reconcilable
with the constitution of nature, it be not reconcilable with
religion also; or, what pretense a fatalist-not other persons, but a fatalist-has to conclude, from his opinion, that
there can be no such thing as religion. And as the puzzle
and obscurity, which must unavoidably arise from arguing
upon so absurd a supposition, as that of universal necessity,
will, I fear, easily be seen, it will, I hope, as easily be
excused.
But, since it has been all along taken for granted, as a
thing proved, that there is an intelligent Author of nature,
or natural Governor of the world, and, since an objection
may be made against the proof of this, from the opinion of
universal necessity, as it may be supposed that such necessity will itself account for the origin and preservation of
all things, it is requisite that this objection be distinctly
answered, or, that it be shown, that a fatality, supposed
12




138         OF THIE OPINION OF NECESSITY,    [PARlT 1
consistent with what we certainly experience, does not destroy the proof of an intelligent Author and Governor of
nature, before we proceed to consider, whether it destroys
the proof of a moral Governor of it, or of our being in a
state of religion.
Now, when it is said by a fatalist, that the whcle constitution of nature, and the actions of men, that every thing
and every mode and circumstance of every thing, is necessary, and could not possibly have been otherwise, it is to be
observed that this necessity does not exclude deliberation,
choice, preference, and acting from certain principles, and
to certain ends; because all this is matter of undoubted
experience, acknowledged by all, and what every man may,
every moment, be conscious of. And from hence it follows,
that necessity, alone and of itself, is in no sort an account
of the constitution of nature, and how things came to be and
to continue as they are; but only an account of this circumstance relating to their origin and continuance, that they
could not have been otherwise than they are and have been.
The assertion that every thing is by necessity of nature, is
not an answer to the question, whether the world came
into being as it is by an intelligent Agent forming it thus,
or not; but to quite another question, whether it came into
being as it is, in that way and manner which we call necessarily, or in that way and manner which we call freely.
For, suppose farther, that one, who was a fatalist, and one,
who kept to his natural sense of things, and believed himself a free agent, were disputing together, and vindicating
their respective opinions, and they should happen to instance
in a house, they would agree that it was built by an architect. Their difference concerning necessity and freedom,
would occasion no difference of judgment concerning this,
but only concerning another matter, whether the architect
built it necessarily or freely. Suppose, then, they should
proceed to inquire, concerning the constitution of nature; in




CItAP. VI.]    AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE.              139
a lax way of speaking, one of them might say, it was by
necessity, and the other by freedom; but, if they had any
meaning to their words, as the latter must mean a free
agent, so the former must, at length, be reduced to mean an
agent, whether he would say one or more, acting by necessity; for abstract notions can do nothing. Indeed, we
ascribe to God a necessary existence, uncaused by any
agent. For we find within ourselves the idea of infinity,
that is, immensity and eternity, impossible, even in imagination, to be removed out of being. We seem to discern
intuitively, that there must, and cannot but be, somewhat,
external to ourselves, answering this idea, or the archetype
of it.  And from hence, (for this abstract, as much as any
other, implies a concrete,) we conclude, that there is, and
cannot but be, an infinite and immense eternal Being existing
prior to all design contributing to his existence, and exclusive of it. And, from the scantiness of language, a manner
of speaking has been introduced, that necessity is the
foundation, the reason, the account of the existence of God.
But it is not alledged, nor can it be at all intended, that
every thing exists as it does by this kind of necessity-a
necessity antecedent in nature to design; it cannot, I say,
be meant, that every thing exists as it does, by this kind of
necessity, upon several accounts; and particularly, because
it is admitted, that design in the actions of men, contributes
to many alterations in nature.  For, if any deny this, I shall
not pretend to reason with them.
From  these things it follows, first, that when a fatalist
asserts that every thing is by necessity, he must mean, by an
agent acting necessarily; he must, I say, mean this, for 1
am very sensible he would not choose to mean it: and,
secondly, that the necessity, by which such anl agent is supposed to act, does not exclude intelligence and design. So
that, Twere the system of fatality admitted, it would just as
muck account for the formation of the world, as for the




140          OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY,    [PART. I,
structure of a house, and no more.  Necessity as much
requires and supposes a necessary agent, as freedom requires
and supposes a free agent to be the former of the world.
And the appearances of design and of final causes in the
constitution of nature, as really prove this acting agent to
be an intelligent designer, or to act from choice, upon the
scheme of necessity, supposed possible, as upon that of
freedom.
It appearing thus, that the notion of necessity does not
destroy the proof, that there*is an intelligent Author of
nature and natural Governor of the world, the present
question which the analogy before mentioned (1) suggests,
and which, I think, it will answer, is this: whether the
opinion of necessity, supposed consistent with possibility,
with the constitution of the world, and the natural government which we experience exercised over it, destroys all
reasonable ground of belief, that we are in a state of religion; or whether that opinion be reconcilable with religion,
with the system and the proof of it.
Suppose, then, a fatalist to educate any one, from his
youth up, in his own principles; that the child should reason
upon them, and conclude, that since he cannot possibly
behave otherwise than he does, he is not a subject of blame
or commendation, nor can deserve to be rewarded or punished: imagine him to eradicate the very perceptions of
blame and commendation out of his mind, by means of this
system; to form his temper and character, and behavior to
it; and from it to judge of the treatment he was to expect,
say, from reasonable men, upon his coming abroad into the
world; as the fatalist judges from this system, what he is
to expect from the Author of nature, and with regard to a
future state. I cannot forbear stopping here to ask, whether
any one of common sense would think fit, that a child should
be put upon these speculations, and be left to apply them
(1) Page 137.




CHAP. VI.]    AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE.            141
to practice? And a man has little pretense to reason, who
is not sensible that we are all children in speculations of
this kind. However, the child would doubtless be highly
delighted to find himself freed from the restraints of fear
and shame, with which his play-fellows were fettered and
embarrassed, and highly conceited in his superior knowledge, so far beyond his years.  But conceit and vanity
would be the least bad part of the influence which these
principles must have, when thus reasoned and acted upon,
during the course of his education. He must either be
allowed to go on, and be the plague of all about him, and
himself too, even to his own destruction, or else correction
must be continually made use of, to supply the want of
those natural perceptions of blame and commendation, which
we have supposed to be removed, and to give him a practical impression of what he had reasoned himself out of the
belief of, that he was, in fact, an accountable child, and to
be punished for doing what he was forbid. It is, therefore,
in reality impossible, but that the correction which he must
meet with, in the course of his education, must convince
him, that if the scheme he was instructed in were not false,
yet that he reasoned inconclusively upon it, and, somehow
or other, misapplied it to practice and common life; as what
the fatalist experiences of the conduct of Providence at
present, ought, in all reason, to convince him, that this
scheme is misapplied, when applied to the subject of religion.(1) But, supposing the child's temper could remain
still formed to the system, and his expectation of the treatment he was to have in the world be regulated by it, so as
to expect that no reasonable man would blame or punish
him for any thing which he should do, because he could not
help doing it; upon this supposition, it is manifest he would,
upon his coming abroad into the world, be insupportable to
society, and the treatment which he would receive from it,
(1) Page 138.




142          oF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY,          [PAl  1.,
would render it so to him; and he could not fail of doing
somewhat very soon, for which he would be delivered over
into the hands of civil justice: and thus, in the end, he would
be convinced of the obligations he was under to his wise
instructer.  Or, suppose this scheme of fatality, in any
other way, applied to practice, such practical application
of it will be found equally absurd-.equally fallacious in a
practical sense: for instance, that if a man be destined to
live such a time, he shall live to it) though he take no care
of his own preservation; or, if he be destined to die before
that time, no care can prevent It; therefore, all care about
preserving one's life is to be neglected, which is the fallacy
instanced in by the ancients.  But not, on the contrary
none of these practical absurdities can be drawn, from reasoning upon the supposition that we are free; but all such
reasoning, with regard to the common affairs of life, is
justified by experience. And, therefore, though it were
admitted that this opinion of necessity were speculatively
true, yet, with regard to practice, it is as if it were false, so
far as our experience reaches, that is, to the whole of out
present life. For, the constitution of the present world,
and the condition in which we are actually placed, is as if
we were free. And it may, perhaps, justly be concluded,
that since the whole process of action, through every step
of it, suspense, deliberation, inclining one way, determining,
and, at last, doing as we determine, is as if we were free,
therefore we are so.  But, the thing here insisted upon is,
that under the present natural government of the world, we
find we are treated and dealt with as if we were free, prior
to all consideration whether we are or not.  Were this
opinion, therefore, of necessity, admitted to be ever so true,
yet such is, in fact, our condition and the natural course of
things, that whenever we apply it to life and practice, this
application of it always misleads us, and cannot but mislead
as, in a most dreadful manner, with regard to our present




(;nAP. VI.]    AS ItMEtENCIRG PRACtIcM.             143
interest.  And how can people think themselves so very
secure, then, that the same application of the same opinion
may not mislead them, also, in some analogous manner, with
respect to a future, a more general, and more important
interest? For, religion being a practical subject, and the
analogy of nature showing us, that we have not faculties to
apply this opinion, were it a true one, to practical subjects;
whenever we do apply it to the subject of religion, and
thence conclude that we are free fionm its obligations, it is
plain this conclusion cannot be depended upon. There will
still remain just reason to think, whatever appearances are,
that we deceive ourselves; in somewhat of a like manner as
when people fancy they can draw contradictory conclusions
from the idea of infinity.
From these things together, the attentive reader will see,
it follows, that if, upon the supposition of freedom, the
evidence of religion be conclusive, it remains so, upon supposition of necessity; because the notion of necessity is not
applicable to practical subjects; that is, with respect to
them, is as if it were not true.  Nor does this contain any
reflection upon reason, but only upon what is unreasonable.
For, to pretend to act upon reason, in opposition to practical
principles which the Author of our nature gave us to act
upon, and to pretend to apply our reason to subjects with
regard to which our own short views, and even our experience, will show us it cannot be depended upon-and such,
at best, the subject of necessity must be-this is vanity,
conceit, and unreasonableness.
But this is not all.  For we find within ourselves a will,
and are conscious of a character. Now, if this, in us, be
reconcilable with fate, it-is reconcilable with it in the Author
oef nature.  And, besides, natural government and final
causes imply a character and a will in the Governor and
Designer;(1) a will concerning the creatures whom he
(1 j By will and character is meant that, which, hi speaking of men,




144           OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY,         [PART Ji
governs. The Author of nature, then, being certainly of
some character or other, notwithstanding necessity, it is evident this necessity is as reconcilable with the particular
character of benevolence, veracity, and justice, in him,
which attributes are the foundation of religion, as with any
other character; since we find this necessity no more hinders
men from being benevolent than cruel, true than faithless,
just than unjust, or, if the fatalist pleases, what we call
unjust.  For it is said, indeed, that what, upon supposition
of freedom, would be just punishment, upon supposition of
necessity, becomes manifestly unjust; because it is punishment inflicted for doing that which persons could not avoid
doing. As if the necessity, which is supposed to destroy the
injustice of murder, for instance, would not, also, destroy the
injustice of punishing it.  However, as little to the purpose
as this objection is in itself, it is very much to the purpose
to observe from it, how the notions of justice and injustice
remain, even whilst we endeavor to suppose them removed;
how they force themselves upon the mind, even whilst we
are making suppositions destructive of them: for there is
not, perhaps, a man in the world, but would be ready to
make this objection at first thought.
But though it must be evident, that universal necessity,
if it be reconcilable with any thing, is reconcilable with that
character in the Author of nature, which is the foundation
of religion, "yet, does it not plainly destroy the proof, that
he is of that character, and, consequently, the proof of
religion?"  By no means.  For we find that happiness and
misery are not our fate, in any such sense as not to be the
consequences of our behavior, but that they are the consequences of it.(1)  We find God exercises the same kind of
we should express, not only by these words, but, also, by the words
temper, taste, dispositions, practical principles; that whole frame of
mind, from whence we act in one mnanner rather than another.
(1) Chap. ii.




CHAP. vI.]      AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE.              145
government over us, with that which a father exercises over
his children, and a civil magistrate over his subjects.  Now,
whatever becomes of abstract questions concerning liberty
and necessity, it evidently appears to us, that veracity and
justice must be the natural rule and measure of exercising
this authority, or government, to a Being, who can have no
competitions, or interfering of interests, with his creatures
and his subjects.
But, as the doctrine of liberty, though we experience its
truth, may be perplexed with difficulties which run up into
the most abstruse of all speculations, and as the opinion of
necessity seems to be the very basis upon which infidelity
grounds itself, it may be of some use to offer a more particular proof of the obligations of religion, which may distinctly be shown not to be destroyed by this opinion.
The proof, from final causes, of an intelligent Author of
nature, is not affected by the opinion of necessity, supposing
necessity a thing possible in itself, and reconcilable with
the constitution of things.(1)  And it is a matter of fact,
independent on this or any other speculation, that he governs
the world by the method of rewards and punishments;(2)
and, also, that he hath given us a moral faculty, by which
we distinguish between actions, and approve some as virtuous and of good desert, and disapprove others as vicious
and of ill desert.(3) Now, this moral discernment implies,
in the notion of it, a rule of action, and a rule of a very
peculiar kind; for it carries in it authority and a right
of direction —authority in such a sense, as that we cannot
depart from it without being self-condemned.(4) And that
the dictates of this moral faculty, which are by nature a
rule to us, are, moreover, the laws of God-laws in a sense
including sanctions, may be thus proved. Consciousness of
a rule or guide of action, in creatures who are capable of
(l) Page 137, &c, (2) Chap. ii. (3) Dissertation 2. (4) Ser.
molt 2, at the Rolls.
13




146         OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY,    [PART I
considering it as given them by their Maker, not only raise:
immediately a sense of duty, but, also, a sense of security
in following it, and of danger in deviating from it. A direction of the Author of nature, given to creatures capable of
looking upon it as such, is plainly a command from him;
and a command from him necessarily includes in it, at least,
an implicit promise in case of obedience, or threatening in
case of disobedience. But then the sense of perception of
good and ill desert,(1) which is contained in the moral
discernment, renders the sanction explicit, and makes it
appear, as one may say, expressed. For, since his method
of government is to reward and punish actions, his having
annexed to some actions an inseparable sense of good desert,
and to others of ill, this surely amounts to declaring upon
whom his punishments shall be inflicted, and his rewards be
bestowed. For he must have given us this discernment and
sense of things as a presentiment of what is to be hereafter;
that is, by way of information beforehand, what we are
finally to expect in this world. There is, then, most evident
ground to think, that the government of God, upon the
whole, will be found to correspond to the nature which he
has given us; and that, in the upshot and issue of things,
happiness and misery shall, in fact and event, be made to
follow virtue and vice respectively; as he has already, in
so peculiar a manner, associated the ideas of them in our
minds. And from hence might easily be deduced the obligations of religious worship, were it only to be considered
as a means of preserving upon our minds a sense of this
moral government of God, and securing our obedience to
it; which yet is an extremely imperfect view of that most
important duty.
Now, I say, no objection from necessity can lie against
this general proof of religion: none against the proposition
reasoned upon, that we have such a moral faculty andl
(1) Dissertation 2.




'I:AP. VI.]     AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE.                 147
discernment; because this is a mere matter of fact, a thing
of experience, that human kind is thus constituted: none
against the conclusion; because it is immediate, and wholly
from  thxs fact.  For the conclusion, that God will finally
reward tile righteous and punish the wicked, is not here
drawn, from  its appearing to us fit(l) that he should, but
frem  its appearing, that he has told us he will.  And this
he has certainly told us, in the promise and threatening,
which, it hath been observed, the notion of a command
implies, and the sense of good and ill desert, which he has
given us, more distinctly expresses.  And this reasoning
from fact is confirmed, and, in some degree, even verified,
by other facts-by the natural tendencies of virtue and
of vice,(2) and by this, that God, in the natural course of
his providence, punishes vicious actions, as mischievous to
society, and, also, vicious actions, as such, in the strictest
sense.(3)  So that the general proof of religion is unanswerably real, even upon the wild supposition which we are
arguing upon.
(1) However, I am far from intending to deny, that the will of
God is determined by what is fit, by the right and reason of the
case; though one chooses to decline matters of such abstract speculation, and to speak with caution when one does speak of them.
But if it be intelligible to say, that it is fit and reasonable for every
one to consult his own happiness, then fitness of action, or the right and
reason of the case, is an intelligible manner of speaking. And it
seems as inconceivable, to suppose God to approve one course of
action, or one end, preferably to another, which yet his acting at all
from design implies that he does, without supposing somewhat prior
in that end to be the ground of the preference; as to suppose him to
discern an abstract proposition to be true, without supposing somewhat prior in it to be the ground of the discernment. It doth not,
therefore, appear, that moral right is any more relative to perception than abstract truth is; or that it is any more improper to
speak of the fitness and rightness of actions and ends, as founded
in the nature of things, than to speak of abstract truth, as thus
founded.
(2,) Page 93.                (3) Page 86, &c.




148          OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY,       [PART I.
It must, likewise, be observed farther, that natural relig.
ion hath, besides this, an external evidence, which the doctrine of necessity, if it could be true, would not affect.
For, suppose a person, by the observations and reasoning
above, or by any other, convinced of the truth of religion —
that there is a God who made the world, who is the moral
governor and judge of mankind, and will, upon the whole,
deal with every one according to his works-I say, suppose
a person convinced of this by reason, but to know nothing
at all of antiquity, or the present state of mankind, it would
be natural for such a one to be inquisitive, what was the
history of this system of doctrine; at what time, and in
what manner, it came first into the world; and whether it
were believed by any considerable part of it. And were he
upon inquiry to find, that a particular person, in a late age,
first of all proposed it as a deduction of reason, and that
mankind were before wholly ignorant of it, then, though its
evidence from reason would remain, there would be no
additional probability of its truth, from the account of its
discovery. But instead of this being the fact of the case,
on the contrary, he would find what could not but afford
him a very strong confirmation of its truth: first, that
somewhat of this system, with more or fewer additions and
alterations, hath been professed in all ages and countries of
which we have any certain information relating to this matter: secondly, that it is certain historical fact, so far as
we can trace things up, that this whole system of belief,
that there is one God, the creator and moral governor of
the world, and that mankind is in a state of religion, was
received in the first ages: and, thirdly, that as there is
no hint or intimation in history, that this system was first
reasoned out, so there is express historical or traditional
evidence, as ancient as history, that it was taught first by
revelation. Now, these things must be allowed to be of
no great weight.  The first of them, general consent, shows




CHAP. VI.]     AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE.             149
this system to be conformable to the common sense of man.
kind. The second, namely, that religion was believed in
the first ages of the world, especially as it does not appeal
that there were then any superstitious or false additions to
it, cannot but be a farther confirmation of its truth.  For
it is a proof of this alternative; either that it came into the
world by revelation, or that it is natural, obvious, and forces
itself upon the mind. The former of these is the conclusion of learned men. And whoever will consider, how
unapt for speculation rude and uncultivated minds are, will,
perhaps from hence alone, be strongly inclined to believe it
the truth. And as it is shown in the second part(1) of this
treatise, that there is nothing of such peculiar presumption
against a revelation in the beginning of the world, as there
is supposed to be against subsequent ones, a skeptic could
not, I think, give any account, which would appear more
probable even to himself, of the early pretenses to revelation, than by supposing some real original one, from whence
they were copied. And the third thing above-mentioned,
that there is express historical or traditional evidence, as
ancient as history, of the system of religion being taught
mankind by revelation; this must be admitted as some
degree of real proof, that it was so taught.  For why
should not the most ancient tradition be admitted as some
additional proof of a fact, against which there is no presumption? And this proof is mentioned here, because it
has its weight to show, that religion came into the world by
revelation prior to all consideration of the proper authority
of any book supposed to contain it; and even prior to all
consideration, whether the revelation itself be uncorruptly
handed down and related, or mixed and darkened with
fables. Thus the historical account which we have, of the
origin of religion, taking in all circumstances, is a real confirmation of its truth, no way affected by the opinion of
(1) Chap. ii.




150         OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY,    [PART 1.
necessity. And the external evidence, even of natural religion, is by no means inconsiderable.
But it is carefully to be observed, and ought to be recollected after all proofs of virtue and religion, which are only
general, that as speculative reason may be neglected, prejudiced, and deceived, so, also, may our moral understanding
be impaired and perverted, and the dictates of it not impartially attended to. This, indeed, proves nothing against the
reality of our speculative or practical faculties of percep.
tion-against their being intended by nature to inform us in
the theory of things, and instruct us how we are to behave,
and what we are to expect, in consequence of our behavior.
Yet our liableness, in the degree we are liable, to prejudice
and perversion, is a most serious admonition to us to be
upon our guard, with respect to what is of such consequence, as our determinations concerning virtue and religion; and, particularly, not to take custom, and fashion, and
slight notions of honor, or imaginations of present ease, use,
and convenience to mankind, for the only moral rule.(l)
The foregoing observations, drawn from the nature of
the thing, and the history of religion, amount, when taken
together, to a real practical proof of it, not to be confuted;
such a proof as, considering the infinite importance of the
thing, I apprehend, would be admitted fully sufficient, in
reason, to influence the actions of men, who act upon
thought and reflection; if it were admitted that there is
no proof of the contrary. But it may be said, "There are
many probabilities, which cannot, indeed, be confuted, that
is, shown to be no probabilities, and yet may be overbalanced by greater probabilities on the other side; much
more by demonstration. And there is no occasion to object against particular arguments alledged for an opinion,
when the opinion itself may be clearly shown to be false,
without meddling with such arguments at all, but leavilng
(1) Dissertation 2.




CHAP. VI.]     AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE.             151
them just as they are.(1)  Now, the method of government by rewards and punishments, and, especially, rewarding and punishing good and ill desert, as such, respectively,
must go upon supposition, that we are free and not necessary
agents. And it is incredible, that the Author of nature
should govern us upon a supposition as true, which he
knows to be false; and, therefore, absurd to think he will
reward or punish us for our actions hereafter; especially
that he will do it under the notion that they are of good or
ill desert." Here, then, the matter is brought to a point.
And the answer to all this is full, and not to be evaded;
that the whole constitution and course of things, the whole
analogy of Providence, shows, beyond possibility of doubt,
that the conclusion from this reasoning is false, wherever
the fallacy lies. The doctrine of freedom, indeed, clearly
shows where; in supposing ourselves necessary, when, in
truth, we are free agents. But, upon the supposition of
necessity, the fallacy lies in taking for granted, that it is
incredible necessary agents should be rewarded and punished.  But that, somehow or other, the conclusion now
mentioned is false, is most certain. For it is fact, that God
does govern even brute creatures by the method of rewards
and punishments, in the natural course of things.  And
men are rewarded and punished for their actions —punished
for actions mischievous to society as being so-punished for
vicious actions, as such, by the natural instrumentality of
each other, under the present conduct of Providence. Nay,
eve: the affection of gratitude, and the passion of resentment, and the rewards and punishments following from
them, which in general are to be considered as natural, that
is, from the Author of nature; these rewards and punishments, being naturally(2) annexed to actions considered as
implying good intention and good desert, ill intention and
ill desert; these natural rewards and punishments, I say,
(1) Pages 38, 41.         (2) Sermon 8, at tho Rolls.




152          OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY,        [PART L.
are as much a contradiction to the conclusion above, and
show its falsehood, as a more exact and complete rewarding
and punishing of good and ill desert, as such. So that,
if it be incredible that necessary agents should be thus
rewarded and punished, then men are not necessary, but
free, since it is matter of fact that they are thus rewarded
and punished.  But if, on the contrary, which is the supposition we have been arguing upon, it be insisted that
men are necessary agents, then there is nothing incredible
in the farther supposition of necessary agents being thus
rewarded and punished, since we ourselves are thus dealt
with.
From the whole, therefore, it must follow, that a necessity
supposed possible, and reconcilable with the constitution of
things, does in no sort prove, that the Author of nature
will not, nor destroy the proof that he will, finally and
upon the whole, in his eternal government, render his creatures happy or miserable, by some means or other, as they
behave well or ill. Or, to express this conclusion in words
conformable to the title of the chapter, the analogy of
nature shows us, that the opinion of necessity, considered
as practical, is false.  And if.necessity, upon the supposition above mentioned, doth not destroy the proof of natural
religion, it evidently makes no alteration in the proof of
revealed.
From these things, likewise, we may learn in what sense
to understand that general assertion, that the opinion of
necessity is essentially destructive of all religion.  First, in
a practical sense: that by this notion atheistical men pretend to satisfy and encourage themselves in vice, and justify
to others their disregard to all religion. And, secondly, in
the strictest sense: that it is a contradiction to the whole
constitution of nature, and to what we may every moment experience in ourselves, and so overturns every thing.
But by no means is this assertion to be understood, as if




CHAP. VI.]      AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE.      1,53
necessity, supposing it could possibly be reconciled with
the constitution of things, and with what we experience,
were not, also, reconcilable with religion; for, upon this
supposition, it demonstrably is so.




154            THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD,         LPART I.
CHAPTER VII.
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME,
OR CONSTITUTION, IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.
THOUGH it be, as it cannot but be, acknowledged, that the
analogy of nature gives a strong credibility to the general
doctrine of religion, and to the several particular things
contained in it, considered as so many matters of fact; and,
likewise, that it shows this credibility not to be destroyed
by any notions of necessity; yet still, objections may be
insisted upon against the wisdom, equity, and goodness of
the Divine government, implied in the notion of religion,
and against the method by which this government is conducted, to which objections analogy can be no direct answer.
For the credibility, or the certain truth, of a matter of fact,
does not immediately prove any thing concerning the wisdom
or goodness of it; and analogy can do no more, immediately
or directly, than show such and such things to be true or
credible considered only as matters of fact. But still, if,
upon supposition of a moral constitution of nature and a
moral government over it, analogy suggests and makes it
credible, that this government must be a scheme, system, or
constitution of government, as distinguished from a number
of single unconnected acts of distributive justice and goodness; and, likewise, that it must be a scheme, so imperfectly
comprehended, and of such a sort in other respects, as to
afford a direct general answer to all objections against the
justice and goodness of it; then analogy is, remotely, of
great service in answering those objections, both by suggesting the answer, and showing it to be a credible one.
Now this, upon inquiry, will be found to be the case.
For, first, upon supposition that God exercises a moral
government over the world, the analogy of his natural
government suggests and makes it credible, that his morm




CZIAP. VII.]   A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE.         155
government must be a scheme quite beyond our comprehension; and this affords a general answer to all objections
against the justice and goodness of it. And, secondly, a
more distinct observation of some particular things contained
in God's scheme of natural government, the like things
being supposed, by analogy, to be contained in his moral
government, will farther show how little weight is to be laid
upon these objections.
L. Upon supposition that God exercises a moral government over the world, the analogy of his natural government
suggests, and makes it credible, that his moral government
must be a scheme quite beyond our comprehension: and
this affords a general answer to all objections against the
justice and goodness of it. It is most obvious, analogy
renders it highly credible, that upon supposition of a moral
government, it must be a scheme; for the world, and the
whole natural government of it, appears to be so-to be a
scheme, system, or constitution, whose parts correspond to
each other, and to a whole, as really as any work of art, or
as any particular model of a civil constitution and government. In this great scheme of the natural world, individuals
have various peculiar relations to other individuals of their
own species. And whole species are, we find, variously
related to other species, upon this earth. Nor do we know
how  much farther these kinds of relations may extend.
And, as there is not any action, or natural event, which we
are acquainted with, so single and unconnected as not to
have a respect to some other actions and events, so, possibly,
each of them, when it has not an immediate, may yet have
a remote, natural relation to other actions and events, much
beyond the compass of this present world. There seems,
indeed, nothing from whence we can so much as make
a conjecture, whether all creatures, actions, and events
throughout the whole of nature, have relations to each
other. But, as it is obvious that all events have future




156            THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD.         [PART I.
unknown consequences, so, if we trace any, as far as we can
go, into what is connected with it, we shall find, that if
such event were not connected with somewhat farther in
nature unknown to us, somewhat both past and present,
such evehnt could not possibly have been at all. Nor can
we give the whole account of any one thing whatever; of
all its causes, ends, and necessary adjuncts; those adjuncts,
I mean, without which it could not have been. By this
most astonishing connection, these reciprocal correspondences
and mutual relations, every thing which we see in the course
of nature, is actually brought about. And things seemingly the most insignificant imaginable, are perpetually
observed to be the necessary conditions to other things of
the greatest importance; so that any one thing whatever
may, for aught we know to the contrary, be a necessary
condition to any other.  The natural world, then, and
natural government of it, being such an incomprehensible
scheme-so incomprehensible, that a man must really, in
the literal sense, know nothing at all, who is not sensible of
his ignorance in it; this immediately suggests, and strongly
shows the credibility, that the moral world and government
of it may be so too. Indeed, the natural and moral constitution and government of the world are so connected, as to
make up together but one scheme; and it is highly probable
that the first is formed and carried on merely in subserviency to the latter, as the vegetable world is for the animal,
and organized bodies for minds. But the thing intended
here is, without inquiring how far the administration of the
natural world is subordinate to that of the moral, only to
observe the credibility, that one should be analagous or
similar to the other: that, therefore, every act of Divine
justice and goodness may be supposed to look much beyond
itself and its immediate object-may have some reference
to other parts of God's moral administration, and to a general moral plan; and that every circumstance of this his




MuA.P. VII.]   A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE.           157
moral government may be adjusted beforehand with a
view to the whole of it. Thus, for example, the determined length of time, and the degrees and ways in
which virtue is to remain in a state of warfare and discipline, and in which wickedness is permitted to have its progress; the times appointed for the execution of justice; the
appointed instruments of it; the kinds of rewards and punishments, and the manners of their distribution; all particular.instances of Divine justice and goodness, and every
circumstance of them, may have such respects to each
other, as to make up altogether a whole, connected and
related in all its parts-a scheme, or system, which is as
properly one as the natural world is, and of the like kind.
And supposing this to be the case, it is most evident that
we are not competent judges of this scheme, from  the
small parts of it which come within our view in the present
life; and, therefore, no objections against any of these parts
can be insisted upon by reasonable men.
This our ignorance, and the consequence here drawn from
it, are universally acknowledged upon other occasions; and,
though scarce denied, yet are universally forgot, when persons come to argue. against religion. And it is not, perhaps, easy, even for the most reasonable men always to
bear in mind the degree of our ignorance, and make due
allowances for it. Upon these accounts, it may not be useless to go on a little farther, in order to show more distinctly, how just an answer our ignorance is, to objections
against the scheme of Providence. Suppose, then, a person boldly to assert, that the things complained of, the
origin and continuance of evil, might easily have been
prevented by repeated interpositions;(1) interpositions so
guarded and circumstanced, as would preclude all mischief
arlsing from them: or, if this were impracticable, that a
scieme of government is itself an imperfection; since more
(1) Pages 160, 161.




158            THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD,         LPART I.
good  light have been produced without any scheme, sys-.
temrn or constitution at all, by continued single unrelated acts
of distributive justice and goodness, because these would
have occasioned no irregularities: and farther than this, it
is presumed, the objections will not be carried. Yet thile
answer is obvious: that, were these assertions true, still the
observations above, concerning our ignorance in the scheme
of Divine government, and the consequence drawn from it,
would hold, in great measure, enough to vindicate religion
against all objections from  the disorders of the present
state. Were these assertions true, yet the government of
the world might be just and good notwithstanding; for, at
the most, they would infer nothing more than that it might
have been better. But, indeed, they are mere arbitrary
assertions; no man being sufficiently acquainted with the
possibilities of things, to bring any proof of them  to
the lowest degree of probability. For, however possible
what is asserted may seem, yet many instances may be
alledged. in things much less out of our reach, of -suppositions absolutely impossible and reducible to the most palpable self-contradictions, which not every one by any means
could perceive to be such, nor, perhaps, any one at first
sight suspect. From these things it is easy to see distinctly, how our ignorance, as it is the common, is really a
satisfactory answer to all objections against the justice and
goodness of Providence. If a man, contemplating any one
providential dispensation, which had no relation to any
others, should object, that he discerned in it a disregard to
justice, or a deficiency of goodness, nothing would be less
an answer to such objection, than our ignorance in other
parts of Providence, or in the possibilities of things, no
way related to what he was contemplating. But when we
know not but the parts objected against may be relative to
other parts unknown to us, and when we are unacquainted,v;th what is, in the nature of the thing, practicable in the




CHAP. VIi.]   A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE.          159
case before us, then our ignorance is a satisfactory answer;
because some unknown relation, or some unknown impossibility, may render what is objected against just and good;
nay, good in the highest practical degree.
II And how little weight is to be laid upon such objections will farther appear, by a more distinct observation of
some particular things contained in the natural government
of God, the like to which may be supposed from analogy,
to be contained in his moral government.
1. As, in the scheme of the natural world, no ends appear to be accomplished without means, so we find that
means very undesirable often conduce to bring about ends
in such a measure desirable, as greatly to overbalance the
disagreeableness of the means. And in cases where such
means are conducive to such ends, it is not reason, but experience, which shows us that they are thus conducive.
Experience, also, shows many means to be conducive and
necessary to accomplish ends, which means, before experience, we should have thought would have had even a contrary tendency. Now, from these observations relating to
the natural scheme of the world, the moral being supposed
analogous to it, arises a great credibility, that the putting
our misery in each other's power to the degree it is, and
making men liable to vice to the degree we are; and, in
general, that those things which are objected against the
moral scheme of Providence may be, upon the whole,
friendly and assistant to virtue, and productive of an overbalance of happiness; that is, the things objected against
may be means by which an overbalance of good will, in the
end, be found produced. And, from the same observations,
it appears to be no presumption against this, that we do
not, if, indeed, we do not, see those means to have any
such tendency, or that they seem to us to have a contrary one. Thus, those things which we call irregularities,
may not be so at all; because they may be means of




160           THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD,         LPART I.
accomplishing wise and good ends more considerable. And
it may be added, as above, that they may, also, be the only
means by which these wise and good ends are capable of
being accomplished.
After these observations it may be proper to add, in
order to obviate an absurd and wicked conclusion from any
of them, that though the constitution of our nature, from
whence we are capable of vice and misery, may, as it undoubtedly does, contribute to the perfection and happiness
of the world; and though the actual permission of evil
may be beneficial to it, (that is, it would have been more
mischievous, not that a wicked person had himself abstained
from his own wickedness, but that any one had forcibly prevented it, than that it was permitted,) yet, notwithstanding, it might have been much better for the world if this
very evil had never been done. Nay, it is most clearly
conceivable, that the very commission of wickedness may
be beneficial to the world, and yet, that it would be infinitely
more beneficial for men to refrain from it. For thus, in the
wise and good constitution of the natural world, there are
disorders which bring their own cures, diseases which are
themselves remedies. Many a man would have died, had it
not been for the gout or a fever; yet it would be thought
madness to assert, that sickness is a better or more perfect
state than health; though the like, with regard to the
moral world, has been asserted. But,
2. The natural government of the world is carried on by
general laws. For this there may be wise and good reasons; the wisest and best, for aught we know to the contrary. And that there are such reasons, is suggested to our
thoughts by the analogy of nature-by our being made to
experience good ends to be accomplished, as, indeed, all the
good which we enjoy is accomplished, by this means, that
the laws, by which the world is governed, are general. For
we have scarce any kind of enjoyments, but what we are,




CHAP. VII.]   A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE.           16t
in some way or other, instrumental in procuring ourselves,
by acting in a manner which, we foresee, likely to procure
them: now this foresight could not be at all, were not the
government of the world carried on by general laws. And
though, for aught we know to the contrary, every single
case may be, at length, found to have been provided for
even by these, yet to prevent all irregularities, or remedy
them  as they arise, by the wisest and best general laws,
may be impossible in the nature of things, as we see it is
absolutely impossible in civil government. But then we are
ready to think, that the constitution of nature remaining as
it is, and the course of things being permitted to go on, in
other respects, as it does, there might be interpositions to
prevent irregularities, though they could not have been
prevented or remedied by any general laws. And there
would, indeed, be reason to wish-which, by the way, is
very different from a right to claim-that all irregularities
were prevented or remedied by present interpositions, if
these interpositions would have no other effect than this.
But it is plain they would have some visible and immediate
bad effects; for instance, they would encourage idleness
and negligence, and they would render doubtful the natural
rule of life, which is ascertained by this very thing, that the
course of the world is carried on by general laws. And
farther, it is certain they would have distant effects, and
very great ones, too, by means of the wonderful connections before mentioned.(1)  So that we cannot so much as
guess, what would be the whole result of the interpositions
desired. It may be said, any bad result might be prevented
by farther interpositions, whenever there was occasion for
them; but this again is talking quite at random and in the
dark.(2) Upon the whole, then, we see wise reasons why the
course of the world should be carried on by general laws and
good ends accomplished by this means; and, for aught we
(1)Page 156, &c.                 (2) Page 158.
14




162            THE GOVERNtMENT OF GOD,          [PART I.
know, there may be the wisest reasons for it, and the best ends
accomplished by it. We have no ground to believe, tlhat
all irregularities could be remedied as they arise, or could
have been precluded by general laws. We find that interpositions would produce evil, and prevent good; and, for
aught we know, they would produce greater evil than they
would prevent, and prevent greater good than they would
produce. And if this be the case, then, the not interposing
is so far from being a ground of complaint, that it is an
instance of goodness. This is intelligible and sufficient,
and going farther seems beyond the utmost reach of our
faculties.
But it may be said, that "after all, these supposed impossibilities and relations are what we are unacquainted
with; and we must judge of religion, as of other things,
by what we do know, and look upon the rest as nothing:
or, however, that the answers here given to what is objected
against religion, may equally be made use of to invalidate
the proof of it, since their stress lies so very much upon our
ignorance." But,
1. Though total ignorance in any matter does, indeed,
equally destroy, or rather preclude, all proof concerning it,
and objections against it, yet partial ignorance does not.
For we may in any degree be convinced, that a person is of
such a character, and, consequently, will pursue such ends,
though we are greatly ignorant what is the proper way of
acting, in order the most effectually to obtain those ends;
and in this case, objections against his manner of acting, as
seemingly not conducive to obtain them, might be answered
by our ignorance, though the proof that such ends were
intended, might not at all be invalidated by it. Thus the
proof of religion is a proof of the moral character of God,
and, consequently, that his government is moral, and that
every one, upon the whole, shall receive according to his
deserts-a proof. that this is the designed end of his




CHAP. VII.]   A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE.             163
government. But we are not competent judges, what is the
proper way of acting, in order the most effectually to accomplish this end.(1) Therefore, our ignorance is an answer to
objections against the conduct of Providence, in permitting
irregularities, as seeming contradictory to this end. Now,
since it is so obvious that our ignorance may be a satisfactory answer to objections against a thing, and yet not affect
the proof of it; till it can be shown, it is frivolous to assert,
that our ignorance invalidates the proof of religion, as it
does the objections against it.
2. Suppose unknown impossibilities, and unknown relations, might justly be urged to invalidate the proof of religion, as well as to answer objections against it, and that, in
consequence of this, the proof of it were doubtful; yet
still, let the assertion be despised, or let it be ridiculed, it is
undeniably true, that moral obligations would remain certain, though it were not certain what would, upon the whole,
be the consequences of observing or violating them. For
these obligations arise immediately and necessarily from the
judgment of our own mind, unless perverted, which we
cannot violate without being self-condemned. And they
would be certain, too, from considerations of interest.  For,
though it were doubtful what will be the future consequences of virtue and vice, yet it is, however, credible, that
they may have those consequences which religion teaches
us they will; and this credibility is a certain(2) obligation
in point of prudence, to abstain from all wickedness, and to
EiYe in the conscientious practice of all that is good. But,
3. The answers above given to the objections against
religion, cannot equally be made use of to invalidate the
proof of it. For, upon suspicion that God exercises a
moral government over the world, analogy does most
strongly lead us to conclude, that this moral government
must be a scheme or constitution beyond our comprehension
(1) Pages 43, 44.   (2) Page 38, and Part 2, Chap. vi.




164  THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD INCOMPRTEHENSIBLE. [PART I,
And a thousand particular analogies show us, that parts of
such a scheme, from their relation to other parts, may conduce tc accomplish ends, which we should have thought
they had no tendency at all to accomplish; nay, ends,
which before experience, we should have thought such
parts were contradictory to, and had a tendency to prevent. And, therefore, all these analogies show, that the
way of arguing made use of in objecting against religion, is
delusive; because they show it is not at all incredible, that,
could we comprehend the whole, we should find the permission of the disorders objected against, to be consistent
with justice and goodness, and even to be instances of
them. Now this is not applicable to the proof of religion,
as it is to the objections against it;(I) and, therefore, cannot
invalidate that proof, as it does these objections.
Lastly, From the observations now made, it is easy to
see, that the answers above given to the objections against
Providence, though, in a general way of speaking, they
may be said to be taken from our ignorance, yet are by no
means taken merely from that, but from somewhat which
analogy shows us concerning it. For analogy shows us
positively, that our ignorance in the possibilities of things,
and the various relations in nature, renders us incompetent judges, and leads us to false conclusions, in cases
similar to this, in which we pretend to judge and to
object. So that the things above insisted upon, are not
mere suppositions of unknown impossibilities and relations; but they are suggested to our thoughts, and even
forced upon the observation of serious men, and rendered
credible, too, by the analogy of nature. And, therefore, to
take these things into account, is to judge by experience,
and what we do knvw; and it is not judging so, to take no
notice of them.
(1) Sermon at the Rolls, p. 312, 2d edit.




PART i.]              CONCLUSION.                   16O
CONCLUSION.
THE observations of the last chapter lead us to consider
this little scene of human life, in which we are so busily
engaged, as having reference, of some sort or other, to a
much larger plan of things. Whether we are any way
related to the more distant parts of the boundless universe
into which we are brought,-is altogether uncertain.  But it
is evident, that the course of things which comes within our
view, is connected with somewhat past, present, and future
beyond it.(1) So that we are placed, as one may speak, in
the middle of a scheme, not a fixed, but a progressive one,
every way incomprehensible-incomprehensible, in a manner, equally with respect to what has been, what now is,
and what shall be hereafter.  And this scheme cannot but
contain in it somewhat as wonderful, and as much beyond
our thought and conception,(2) as any thing in that of
religion. For, will any man in his senses say, that it is less
difficult to conceive how the world came to be, and to continue as it is, without, than with, an intelligent Author and
Governor of it? or, admitting an intelligent Governor of it,
that there is some other rule of government more natural,
and of easier conception, than that which we call moral?
Indeed, without an intelligent Author and Governor of
nature, no account at all can be given, how this universe, or
the part of it particularly in which we are concerned, came
to be, and the course of it to be carried on, as it is; nor any
of its general end and design, without a moral Governor of
it. That there is,an intelligent Author of nature and natural Governor -of the world, is a principle gone upon in
the foregoing treatise, as proved, and generally known
and confessed to be proved. And the very notion of an
intelligent Author of nature, proved by particular final
(1) Page 155, &c.           (2) See Part 2, Chap. ii,




166                  CONCLUSION.                 [PART I,
causes, implies a will and a character.(1)  Now, as oui
whole nature, the nature which he has given us, leads us
to conclude his will and character to be moral, just, and
good, so we can scarce in imagination conceive what it can
be otherwise.  However, in consequence of this his will
and  2character, whatever it be, he formed the universe
as it is, and carries on the course of it as he does, rather
than in any other manner; and has assigned to us, and
to all living creatures, a part -and a lot in it.  Irrational
creatures act this their part, and enjoy and undergo the
pleasures and the pains allotted them, without any reflection.
But one would think it impossible, that creatures endued
with reason could avoid reflecting sometimes upon all
this —reflecting, if not from whence we came, yet, at least,
whither we are going, and what the mysterious scheme,
in the midst of which we find ourselves, will, at length,
come out and produce-a scheme in which it is certain
we are highly interested, and in which we may be interested even beyond conception.  For many things prove it
palpably absurd to conclude, that we shall cease to be at
death. Particular analogies do most sensibly show us, that
there is nothing to be thought strange in our being to exist
in another state of life. And that we are now living beings,
affords a strong probability that we shall continue so; unless
there be some positive ground, and there is none from
reason or analogy, to think death will destroy us. Were a
persuasion of this kind ever so well grounded, there would,
surely, be little reason to take pleasure in it.  But, indeed,
it can have no other ground than some such imagination, as
that of our gross bodies being ourselves; which is contrary
to experience.  Experience, too, most clearly shows us the
folly of concluding, from  the body and the living agent
affecting each other mutually, that the dissolution of the
former is the destruction of the latter.  And there are
(1) Pages 143, 144.




IART i.]            CONCLUSION.                    167
remarkable instances of their not affecting each other, which
lead us to a. contrary conclusion. The supposition, then,
which in all reason we are to go upon, is, that our living
nature will continue after death. And it is infinitely unreasonable to form an institution of life, or to act upon any
other supposition. Now, all expectation of immortality,
whether more or less certain, opens an unbounded prospect
to our hopes and our fears; since we see the constitution
of nature is such as to admit of misery, as well as to be
productive of happiness, and experience ourselves to partake of both in some degree; and since we cannot but know
what higher degrees of both we are capable of.[ And there
is no presumption against believing farther, that our future
interest depends upon our present behavior: for we see our
present interest doth; and that the happiness and misery,
which are naturally annexed to our actions, very frequently
do not follow till long after the actions are done to which
they are respectively annexed.  So that, were speculation
to leave us uncertain, whether it were likely that the Author
of nature, in giving happiness and misery to his creatures,
hath regard to their actions or not; yet, since we find by
experience that he hath such regard, the whole sense of
things which he has given us, plainly leads us, at once, and
without any elaborate inquiries, to think that it may, indeed
must, be to good actions chiefly that he hath annexed happiness, and to bad actions misery; or that he will, upon the
whole, reward those who do well, and punish those who do
evil. To confirm this from the constitution of the world, it
has been observed, that some sort of moral government is
necessarily implied in that natural government of God
which we experience ourselves under; that good and bad
actions, at present, are naturally rewarded and punished,
not only as beneficial and mischievous to society, but, also,
as virtuous and vicious; and that there is, in the very nature of the thing, a tendency to their being rewarded and




168                   CONCLUSION.               [PART I.
punished in a much higher degree than they are at present.
And, though this higher degree of distributive justice,
which nature thus points out and leads toward, is prevented
for a time from taking place, it is by obstacles which the
state of this world unhappily throws in its way, and which,
therefore, are in their nature temporary. Now, as these
things, in the natural conduct of Providence, are observable
on the side of virtue, so there is nothing to be set against
them on the side of vice. A moral scheme of government,
then, is visibly established, and, in some degree, carried
into execution; and this, together with the essential tendencies of virtue and vice duly considered, naturally raise in us
an apprehension that it will be carried on farther toward
perfection in a future state, and that every one shall there
receive according to his deserts. And if this be so, then
our future and general interest, under the moral government of God, is appointed to depend upon our behavior,
notwithstanding the difficulty which this may occasion of
securing it, and the danger of losing it; just in the same
manner as our temporal interest, under his natural government, is appointed to depend upon our behavior, notwithstanding the like difficulty and danger.  For, from
our original constitution, and that of the world which we
inhabit, we are naturally trusted with ourselves, with our
own conduct and our own interest.  And, from the same
constitution of nature, especially joined with that course of
things which is owing to men, we have temptations to be
unfaithful in this trust, to forfeit this interest, to neglect it,
and run ourselves into misery and ruin. From these temptations arise the difficulties of behaving so as to secure our
temporal interest, and the hazard of behaving so as to
miscarry in it. There is, therefore, nothing incredible in
supposing, there may be the like difficulty and hazard with
regard to that chief and final good which religion lays
before us. Indeed, the whole account, how it came to pass




PART I.]            CONCLUSION.                     169
that we were placed in such a condition as this, must be
beyond our comprehension. But it is in part accounted for
by what religion teaches us, that the character of virtue
and piety must be a necessary qualification for a future state
of security and happiness, under the moral government of
God; in like manner, as some certain qualifications or other
are necessary for every particular condition of life, under
his natural government; and that the present state was
intended to be a school of discipline, for improving in
ourselves that character.  Now, this intention of nature is
rendered highly credible by observing, that we are plainly
made for improvement of all kinds; that it is a general
appointment of Providence, that we cultivate practical principles, and form within ourselves habits of action, in order
to become fit for what we were wholly unfit for before;
that, in particular, childhood and youth is naturally appointed to be a state of discipline for mature age; and that
the present world is peculiarly fitted for a state of moral
discipline. And, whereas objections are urged against the
whole notion of moral government and a probationary state,
from the opinion of necessity, it has been shown that God
has given us the evidence, as it were, of experience, that all
objections against religion on this head are vain and delusive. He has, also, in his natural government, suggested
an answer to all our short-sighted objections against the
equity and goodness of his moral government; and, in general, he has exemplified to us the latter by the former.
These things, which, it is to be remembered, are matters
of fact, ought, in all common sense, to awaken mankind, to
induce them to. consider, in earnest, their condition, and
what they have to do. It is absurd-absurd to the degree
of being ridiculous, if the subject were not of so serious a
kind, for men to think themselves secure in a vicious life, or
even in that immoral thoughtlessness which far the greatest
15




,70                  CONCLUSION.                [PART 1.
part of them are fallen into.  And the credibility of religion,
arising from experience and facts here considered, is fully
sufficient, in reason, to engage them to live in the general
practice of all virtue and piety; under the serious apprehension, though it should be mixed with some doubt,(1) of
a righteous administration established in nature, and a future
judgment in consequence of it; especially when we consider
how very questionable it is whether any thing at all can be
gained by vice;(2) how unquestionably little, as well as
precarious, the pleasures and profits of it are at the best,
and how  soon they must be parted with at the longest.
For, in the deliberations of reason, concerning what we are
to pursue and what to avoid, as temptations to any thing
from mere passion are supposed out of the case; so inducements to vice from cool expectations of pleasure and interest
so small, and uncertain, and short, are really so insignificant,
as, in the view of reason, to be almost nothing in themselves, and, in comparison with the importance of religion,
they quite disappear and are losto  Meere passion, indeed,
may be alledged, though not as a reason, yet as an excuse
for a vicious course of life.  And how sorry an excuse it is
will be manifest by observing, that we are placed in a
condition in which we are unavoidably inured to govern our
passions, by being necessitated to govern them:; and to lay
ourselves under the same kind of restraints, and as great
ones, too, from temporal regards, as virtue and piety, in the
ordinary course of things, require.  The plea of ungovernable passion, then, on the side of vice, is the poorest of all
things, for it is no reason, and but a poor excuse. But the
proper motives to religion are the proper proofs of it, from
our moral nature, from the presages of conscience, and our
natural apprehension of God, under the character of a
righteous Governor and Judge; a nature, and conscience,
(1) Part 2, Chap. vi.            (2) Pages 82, 83




PART I.]            CONCLUSION.                  171
and apprehension given us by him; and from the confirmation of the dictates of reason, by "life and immortality
brought to light by the Gospel," and "the wrath of God
revealed from heaven, against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men."








THX
ANALOGY OF RELIGION
TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE
PART II.
OF REVEALED RELIGION.
CHAPTER I.
OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.
SOME persons, upon pretense of the sufficiency of the
light of nature, avowedly reject all revelation, as, in its
very notion, incredible, and what must be fictitious. And,
indeed, it is certain no revelation would have been given,
had the light of nature been sufficient in such a sense as
to render one not wanting and useless. But no man in
seriousness and simplicity of mind, can possibly think it so,
who considers the state of religion in the heathen world
before revelation, and its present state in those places which
have borrowed no light from it; particularly, the doubtfulness of some of the greatest men concerning things of the
utmost importance, as well as the natural inattention and
ignorance of mankind in general. It is impossible to say
who would have been able to have reasoned out that whole
system, which we call natural religion, in its genuine simplicity, clear of superstition; but there is certainly no
ground to affirm that the generality could: if they could,
there is no sort of probability that they would. Admitting
there were, they would highly want a standing admonition,
to remind them of it, and inculcate it upon them. And,
173




174                OF THE IMPORTANCE              [PART IU.
farther still, were they as much disposed to attend to religion as the better sort of men are, yet, even upon this supposition, there would be various occasions for supernatural
instruction and assistance, and the greatest advantages
might be afforded by them. So that to say, revelation is a
thing superfluous, what there was no need of, and what can
be of no service, is, I think, to talk quite wildly and at
random. Nor would it be more extravagant to affirm, that
mankind is so entirely at ease in the present state, and life
so completely happy, that it is a contradiction to suppose
our condition capable of being in any respect better.
There are other persons not to be ranked with these, who
seem to be getting into a way of heglecting, and, as it were,
overlooking revelation as of small importance, provided
natural religion be kept to. With little regard, either to the
evidence of the former, or to the objections against it, and
even upon supposition of its truth, "the only design of it,"
say they, "must be to establish a belief of the moral system
of nature, and to enforce the practice of natural piety and
virtue.  The belief and practice of these things were, perhaps, much promoted by the first publication of Christianity; but whether they are believed and practiced, upon the
evidence and motives of nature or of revelation, is no great
matter."(1)  This way of considering revelation, though it
is not the same with the former, yet borders nearly upon it,
and very much, at length, runs up into it, and requires to
be particularly considered, with regard to the persons who
seem to be getting into this way. The consideraticn of it
(1) Invenis multos... propterea nolle fieri Christianos,
quia quasi sufficiunt sibi de bona vita sua. Bene vivere opus est,
ait. Quid mihi precepturus est Christus? Ut bene vivam? Jam
bene vivo. Quid mili necessarius est Christus; nullum humicidium, nullum furtum, nullam rapinam facio, res alienas non concupisco, nullo adulterio contaminor?  Nam inveniatur in vita men
aliquid quod reprehendatur, et qui reprehenderit faciat Christianuln.
Atug. in Psal. xxxi.




ca.AP. i.]          OF CHRISTIANITY.                 1'7
will, likewise, fatther show the extravagance of the former
opinion, and the truth of the observations in answer to it,
just mentioned. And an inquiry into the importance of
Christianity, cannot be an improper introduction to a treatise concerning the credibility of it.
Now, if God has given a revelation to mankind, and
commanded those things which are commanded in Christiarm~_y, it is evident, at first sight, that it cannot in anywise
be an indifferent matter, whether we obey or disobey those
commands, unless we are certainly assured, that we know
all the reasons for them, and that all those reasons are now
ceased, with regard to mankind in general, or to ourselves
in particular. And it is absolutely impossible we can be
assured of this; for our ignorance of these reasons proves
nothing in the case, since the whole analogy of nature
shows, what is, indeed, in itself evident, that there may
be infinite reasons for things, with which we are not acquainted.
But the importance of Christianity will more distinctly
appear, by considering it more distinctly: first, as a republication, and external institution, of natural or essential
religion, adapted to the present circumstances of mankind,
and intended to promote natural piety and virtue; and,
secondly, as containing an account of a dispensation of
things, not discoverable by reason, in consequence of which
several distinct precepts are enjoined us.  For, though
natural religion is the foundation and principal part of
Christianity, it is not, in any sense, the whole of it.
I. Christianity is a republication of natural religion. It
instructs mankind in the moral system of the world; that it
is the work of an infinitely perfect Being, and under his
government; that virtue is his law; and that he will finally
judge mankind in righteousness, and render to all according
to their works, in a future state.  And, which is very material, it teaches natural religion in its genuine simplicity,




176               OF THE IMPORTANCE            [PART II,
free from those superstitions with which it:was totally corrupted, and under which it was in a manner lost.
Revelation is, farther, an authoritative publication of
natural religion, and so affords the evidence of testimony
for the truth of it. Indeed, the miracles and prophecies
recorded in Scripture, were intended to prove a particular
dispensation of Providence-the redemption of the world
by the Messiah; but this does not hinder but that they
may, also, prove God's general providence over the world,
as our moral governor and judge. And they evidently do
prove it; because this character of the Author of nature is
necessarily connected with and implied in that particular
revealed dispensation of things: it is, likewise, continually
taught expressly and insisted upon, by those persons who
wrought the miracles and delivered the prophecies. So
that, indeed, natural religion seems as much proved by the
Scripture revelation, as it would have been, had the design
of revelation been nothing else than to prove it.
But it may possibly be disputed, how far miracles can
prove natural religion; and notable objections may be urged
against this proof of it, considered as a matter of speculation; but, considered as a practical thing, there can be none.
For, suppose a person to teach natural religion to a nation,
who had lived in total ignorance or forgetfulness of it, and
to declare he was commissioned by God so to do —suppose
him, in proof of his commission, to foretell things future,
which no human foresight could have guessed at, to divide
the sea with a word, feed great multitudes with bread from
heaven, cure all manner of diseases, and raise the dead,
even himself, to life, would not this give additional credibility to his teaching-a credibility beyond what that of a
common man would have, and be an authoritative publication of the law of nature, that is, a new proof of it? It
would be a practical one, of the strongest kind, perhaps,
which human creatures are capable of having givren them.




c0AAP. (.]          OF CHIRISTIANITY.              177
The law of Moses, then, and the Gospel of Christ, are authoritative publications of the religion of nature; they
afford a proof of God's general providence, as governor
of the world, as well as of his particular dispensations
of providence toward sinful creatures, revealed in the law
and the Gospel. As they are the only evidence of the
latter, so they are an additional evidence of the former.
To show this further, let us suppose a man of the greatest and most improved capacity, who had never heard of
revelation, convinced upon the whole, notwithstanding the
disorders of the world, that it was under the direction and
moral government of an infinitely perfect Being, but ready
to question, whether he were not gone beyond the reach of
his faculties-suppose him brought, by this suspicion, into
great danger of being carried away by the universal bad
example of almost every one around him, who appeared
to have no practical sense at least, of these things; and
this, perhaps, would be as advantageous a situation, with
regard to religion, as nature alone ever placed any man in.
What a confirmation now must it be to such a person, all
at once to find, that this moral system  of things was
revealed to mankind, in the name of that infinite Being
whom he had, from principles of reason, believed in; and
that the publishers of the revelation proved their commission from him, by making it appear that he had intrusted
them with a power of suspending and changing the general laws of nature.
Not must it, by any means, be omitted, for it is a thing
of the utmost importance, that life and immortality are eminently brought to light by the Gospel. The great doctrines of a future state, the danger of a course of wickedness, and the efficacy of repentance, are not only confirmed
in the Gospel, but are taught, especially the last is, with a
legree of light, to which that of nature is but darkness.
Farther, as Christianity served these ends and purposes,




178               OF TILE IMPORTANCE           LPART II.
when it was first published, by the miraculous publication
itself, so it was intended to serve the same purposes, in
future ages, by means of the settlement of a visible Church;
of a society, distinguished from common ones, and from the
rest of the world, by peculiar religious institutions; by an
instituted method of instruction, and an instituted form of
external religion.  Miraculous powers were given to the
first preachers of Christianity, in order to their introducing
it into the world: a visible Church was established, in order
to continue it, and carry it on successively throughout all
ages.  Had Moses and the prophets, Christ and his apostles,
only taught, and by miracle proved, religion to their contemporaries, the benefits of their instructions would have
reached but to a small part of mankind. Christianity must
have been, in a great degree, sunk and forgot in a very few
ages. To prevent this appears to have been one reason
why a visible Church was instituted; to be like a city upon
a hill-a standing memorial to the world of the duty which
we owe our Maker; to call men continually, both by example and instruction, to attend to it, and, by the form of
religion ever before their eyes, remind them of the reality;
to be the repository of the oracles of God; to hold up the
light of revelation in aid to that of nature, and propagate it
throughout all generations to the end of the world-the
light of revelation, considered here in no other view, than
as designed to enforce natural religion.  And, in proportion
as Christianity is professed and taught in the world, religion, natural or essential religion, is thus distinctly and
advantageously laid before mankind, and brought again and
again to their thoughts, as a matter of infinite importance.
A visible Church has, also, a farther tendency to promote
natural religion, as being an instituted method of education,
originally intended to be of more peculiar advantage to
those who would conform to it. For one end of the institution was, that, by admonition and reproof, as well as




OHAP. I.]           OF CHRISTIANITY.                 179
instruction-by a general regular discipline, and public
exercises of religion, the body of Christ, as the Scripture
speaks, should be edified; that is, trained up in piety and
virtue, for a higher and better state. This settlement, then,
appearing thus beneficial, tending, in the nature of the thing,
to answer, and in some degree actually answering, those
ends, it is to be remembered, that the very notion of it implies positive institutions; for the visibility of the Church
consists in them.  Take away every thing of this kind, and
you lose the very notion itself.  So that, if the things now
mentioned are advantages, the reason and importance of
positive institutions in general is most obvious; since, without them, these advantages could not be secured to the
world. And, it is mere idle wantonness, to insist upon
knowing the reasons why such particular ones were fixed
upon rather than others.
The benefit arising from this supernatural assistance,
which Christianity affords to natural religion, is what some
persons are very slow in apprehending; and yet, it is a thing
distinct in itself, and a very plain, obvious one. For will
any, in good earnest, really say, that the bulk of mankind
in the heathen world were in as advantageous a situation,
with regard to natural religion, as they are now amongst
us? that it was laid before them, and enforced upon them,
in a manner as distinct, and as much tending to influence
their practice?
The objections against all this, from the perversion of
Christianity, and from the supposition of its having had but
little good influence, however innocently they may be proposed, yet cannot be insisted upon as conclusive, upon any
principles but such as lead to downright atheism; because
the manifestation of the law of nature by reason, which,
upon all principles of theism, must have been from  God,
has b)een perverted and rendered ineffectual in the same
manner.  It may, indeed, I think, truly be said that the good




180               OF THE IMPORTANCE            [PART 11.
effects of Christianity have not been small; nor its supposed
ill effects, any effects at all of it, properly speaking. Perhaps, too, the things themselves done have been aggravated;
and if not, Christianity hath been often only a pretense;
and the same evils, in the main, would have been done upon
some other pretense. However, great and shocking as the
corruptions and abuses of it have really been, they cannot
be insisted upon as arguments against it, upon principles of
theism. For one cannot proceed one step in reasoning upon
natural religion, any more than upon Christianity, without laying it down as a first principle, that the dispensations of Providence are not to be judged of by their
perversions, but by their genuine tendencies-not by what
they do actually seem to effect, but by what they would
effect if mankind did their part, that part which is justly
put and left upon them.  It is altogether as much the
language of one, as of the other: "He that is unjust,
let him be unjust still; and he that is holy, let him be holy
still."(l) The light of reason does not, any more than that
of revelation, force men to submit to its authority: both
admonish them of what they ought to do and avoid, together
with the consequences of each; and, after this, leave them
at full liberty to act just as they please, till the appointed
time of judgment.  Every moment's experience shows, that
this is God's general rule of government.
To return, then: Christianity being a promulgation of
the law of nature; being, moreover, an authoritative promulgation of it, with new light and other circumstances of
peculiar advantage, adapted to the wants of mankind; these
things fully show its importance. And it is to be observed
farther, that as the nature of the case requires, so all Christians are commanded to contribute, by their profession of
Christianity, to preserve it in the world, and render it such
a promulgation and enforcement of religion. For it is the
(1) Rev. xxii, 11.




CHAP. I.]           OF CHRISTIANIT'.                181
very scheme of the Gospel, that each Christian should, in
his degree, contribute toward continuing and carrying it on;
all by uniting in the public profession, and external practice
of Christianity; some by instructing, by having the oversight, and taking care of this religious community, the
Church of God. Now, this farther shows the importance
of Christianity, and, which is what I chiefly intend, its
importance in a practical sense, or the high obligations we
are under, to take it into our most serious consideration:
and the danger there must necessarily be, not only in treating it despitefully, which I am not now speaking of, but in
disregarding and neglecting it. For this is neglecting to do
what is expressly enjoined us, for continuing those benefits
to the world, and transmitting them down to future times.
And all this holds, even though the only thing to be considered in Christianity were its subserviency to natural
religion. But,
II. Christianity is to be considered in a further view, as
containing an account of a dispensation of things, not at all
discoverable by reason, in consequence of which several
distinct precepts are enjoined us. Christianity is not only
an external institution of natural religion, and a new promulgation of God's general providence, as righteous Governor
and Judge of the world; but it contains, also, a revelation
of a particular dispensation of Providence, carrying on by
his Son and Spirit, for the recovery and salvation of mankind, who are represented, in Scripture, to be in a state of
ruin. And, in consequence of this revelation being made,
we are commanded to be "baptized," not only "in the name
of the Father," but, also, "of the Son, and of the Holy
Ghost;" and other obligations of duty, unknown before, to
the Son and the Holy Ghost, are revealed.  Now, the
importance of these duties may be judged of, by observing
that they arise, not from positive command merely, but, also,
from the offices which appear, from Scripture, to belong to




182               OF THE IMPORTANCE            LPART II.:
those Divine persons in the Gospel dispensation, or from
the relations which, we are there informed, they stand ill
to us. By reason is revealed the relation which God, the
Father, stands in to us. Hence arises the obligation of duty
which we are under to him. In Scripture are revealed the
relations which the Son and Holy Spirit stand in to us.
Hence arise the obligations of duty we are under to them.
The truth of the case, as one may speak, in each of these
three respects, being admitted, that God is the Governor of
the world, upon the evidence of reason; that Christ is the
Mediator between God and man, and the Holy Ghost our
Guide and Sanctifier, tupon the evidence of revelation-the
truth of the case, I say, in each of these respects, being
admitted, it is no more a question, why it should be commanded that we be baptized in the name of the Son and of
the Holy Ghost, than that we be baptized in the name of
the Father. This matter seems to require to be more fully
stated.(1)
Let it be remembered, then, that religion comes under
the twofold consideration of internal and external; for the
latter is as real a part of religion, of true religion, as the
former. Now, when religion is considered under the first
notion, as an inward principle, to be exerted in such and
such inward acts of the mind and heart, the essence of
natural religion may be said to consist in religious regards
to God, the Father almighty; and the essence of revealed
religion, as distinguished from natural, to consist in religious
regards to the Son, and to the Hoty Ghost. And the obligation we are under, of paying these religious regards to each
of these Divine persons respectively, arises from the respective relations which they each stand in to us. How these
relations are made known, whether by reason or revelation,
makes no alteration in the case; because the duties arise
(1) See the Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy of the Christian
Sacraments, &c., and Colliber on Revealed Religion, as there quoted




CRAP. 1.]           OF CHRISTIANITY.                1 83
out of the relations themselves, not out of the manner in
which we are informed of them. The Son and Spirit have
each his proper office in that great dispensation of Providence, the redemption of the world: the one our Mediator, the
other our Sanctifier. Does not, then, the duty of religious
regards to both these Divine persons, as immediately arise
to the view of reason, out of the very nature of these offices
and relations, as the inward good-will and kind intention,
which we owe to our fellow-creatures, arises out of the
common relations between us and them?  But, it will be
asked, "What are the inward religious regards, appearing
thus obviously due to the Son and Holy Spirit, as arising,
not merely from command in Scripture, but from the very
nature of the revealed relations which they stand in to us?"
I answer, the religious regards of reverence, honor, love,
trust, gratitude, fear, hope. In what external manner this
inward worship is to be expressed, is a matter of pure
revealed command; as, perhaps, the external manner in
which God, the Father, is to be worshiped, may be more so
than we are ready to think; but the worship, the internal
worship itself, to the Son and Holy Ghost, is no farther
matter of pure revealed command, than as the relations
they stand in to us, are matter of pure revelation; for the
relations being known, the obligations to such internal
worship are obligations of reason, arising out of those
relations themselves. In short, the history of the Gospel as
immediately shows us the reason of these obligations, as it
shows us the meaning of the words, Son and Holy Ghost.
If this account of the Christian religion be just, those
persons who can speak lightly of it, as of little consequence,
provided natural religion be kept to, plainly forget, that
Christianity, even what is peculiarly so called, as distinguished from natural religion, has yet somewhat very important, even of a moral nature. For the office of our
Lord Lbeing made known, and the relations he stands in to




1,84             OF THE IMPORTANCE            [PART II.
us, the obligation of religious regards to him is plainly
moral, as much as charity to mankind is; since this obligation arises, before external command, immediately out of
that his office and relation itself. Those persons appear to
forget, that revelation is to be considered as informing us of
somewhat new in the state of mankind, and in the government of the world; as acquainting us-with some relations
we stand in, which could not otherwise have been known
And these relations being real, (though before revelation
we could be under no obligations from them, yet upon their
being revealed,) there is no reason to think, but that neglect
of behaving suitably to them will be attended with the same
kind of consequences under God's government, as neglect.ing to behave suitably to any other relations made known
to us by reason. And ignorance, whether unavoidable or
voluntary, so far as we can possibly see, will, just as much,
and just as little, excuse in one case as in the other; the
ignorance being supposed equally unavoidable, or equally
voluntary, in both cases.
If, therefore, Christ be, indeed, the Mediator between God
and man, that is, if Christianity be true —if he be, indeed,
our Lord, our Savior, and our God, no one can say what
may follow, not only the obstinate, but the careless, disregard to him in those high relations. Nay, no one can say
what may follow such disregard, even in the way of natural
consequence.(1) For, as the natural consequences of vice
in this life are doubtless to be considered as judicial punishments inflicted by God, so likewise, for aught we know, the
judicial punishments of the future life may be, in a like
way, or a like sense, the natural consequence of vice;(2) of
men's violating or disregarding the relations which God has
placed them in here, and made known to them.
Again, if mankind are corrupted and depraved in their
moral character, and so are unfit for that state which Christ
(1) Pages 66, 67, 68.            (2) Chap. v.




CHAP. I,]           OF CHRISTIANITY.                  185
is gone to prepare for his disciples; and, if the assistance
of God's Spirit be necessary to renew their nature, in a
degree requisite to their being qualified for that state; all
which is implied in the express, though figurative, declaration, "Except a man be born of the Spirit, he cannot enter
into the kingdom of God:"(1) supposing this, is it possible
any serious person can think it a slight matter, whether or
no he makes use of the means, expressly commanded by
God, for obtaining this Divine assistance? especially since
the whole analogy of nature shows, that we are not to
expect any benefits, without making use of the appointed
means for obtaining or enjoying them. Now reason shows
us nothing of the particular immediate means of obtaining
either temporal or spiritual benefits. This, therefore, we
must learn, either from experience or revelation. And experience the present case does not admit of.
The conclusion from all this evidently is, that Christianity
being supposed either true or credible, it is unspeakable
irreverence, and really the most presumptuous rashness, to
treat it as a light matter. It can never justly be esteemed
of little consequence, till it be positively supposed false.
Nor do I know a higher and more important obligation
which we are under, than that of examining most seriously
into the evidence of it, supposing its credibility, and of embracing it, upon supposition of its truth.
The two following deductions may be proper to be added,
in order to illustrate the foregoing observations, and to prevent their being mistaken.
1. Hence we may clearly see, where lies the distinction
between what is positive, and what is moral in religion.
Moral precepts are precepts, the reasons of which we see;
positive precepts are precepts, the reasons of which we do
not see.(2) Moral duties arise out of the nature of the
(1) John iii, 5
(2) This is the distinction between moral and positive precepts,
16




186                OF THE IMPORTANCE             [PAnST It.
case itself, prior to external command.  Positive duties do
not arise out of the nature of the case, but from external
command; nor would they be duties at all, were it not for
such command received from Him, whose creatures and sub.
jects we are. But the manner in which the nature of the
case, or the fact of the relation, is made known, this doth
not denominate any duty, either positive or moral. That
we be baptized in the name of the Father, is as much a
positive duty as that we be baptized in the name of the
Son; because both arise equally from revealed command:
though the relation which we stand in to God, the Father,
is made known to us by reason; the relation we stand in to
Christ, by revelation only. On the other hand, the dispensation of the Gospel admitted, gratitude as immediately
becomes due to Christ, from his being the voluntary minister of this dispensation, as it is due to God, the Father,
from his being the fountain of all good; though the first is
made known to us by revelation only, the second by reason.
Hence, also, we may see, and, for distinctness' sake, it may
be worth mentioning, that positive institutions come under a
twofold consideration. They are either institutions founded
on natural religion, as baptism in the name of the Father;
though this has, also, a particular reference to the Gospel
dispensation, for it is. in the name of God, as the Father of
our Lord Jesus Christ; or they are external institutions
founded on revealed religion, as baptism in the name of the
Son, and of the Holy Ghost.
2. From the distinction between what is moral and what
is positive in religion, appears the ground of that peculiar
considered respectively as such. But yet, since the latter have
somewhat of a moral nature, we may see the reason of them, considered in this view. Moral and positive precepts are, in some
respects, alike; in other respects, different. So far as they are alike,
we discern the reasons of both; so far as they are different, we
discern the reasons of the former. but not of the latter. See p.
176, &c., ana p. 186, &c.




CHAP. I.]           OF CHRISTIANITY.                187
preference, which the Scripture teaches us to be due to the
former.
The reason of positive institutions in general is very obvious, though we should not see the reason why such particular ones are pitched upon, rather than others. Whoever, therefore, instead of caviling at words, will attend to
the thing itself, may clearly see, that positive institutions in
general, as distinguished from this or that particular one,
have the nature of moral commands: since the reasons of
them  appear.  Thus, for instance, the external worship of
God is a moral duty, though no particular mode of it be
so. Care, then, is to be taken, when a comparison is made
between positive and moral duties, that they be compared
no farther than as they are different-no farther than
as the former are positive, or arise out of mere external
command, the reasons of which we are not acquainted
with; and as the latter are moral, or arise out of the
apparent reason of the case, without such external command. Unless this caution be observed, we shall run into
endless confusion.
Now, this being premised, suppose two standing precepts enjoined by the same authority; that, in certain conjunctures, it is impossible to obey both; that the former is
moral, that is, a precept of which we see the reasons, and
that they hold in the particular case before us; but that
the latter is positive, that is, a precept of which we do not
see the reasons: it is indisputable that our obligations are
to obey the former, because there is an apparent reason for
this preference, and none against it.  Farther, positive institutions, I suppose all those which Christianity enjoins, are
means to a moral end; and the end must be acknowledged
more excellent than the means. Nor is observance of
these institutions any religious obedience at all, or of any
value, otherwise than as it proceeds from a moral principle.  This seems to be the strict logical way of stating




188               OF THE IMPORTANCE            [PART I.
and determining this matter; but will, perhaps, be found
less applicable to practice, than may be thought at first
sight.
And, therefore, in a more practical, though more lax way
of consideration, and taking the words, moral law and positive institutions, in the popular sense, I add, that the whole
moral law is as much matter of revealed command, as positive institutions are; for the Scripture enjoins every moral
virtue. In this respect, then, they are both upon a level.
But the moral law is, moreover, written upon our hearts,
interwoven into our very nature. And this is a plain intimation of the Author of it, which is to be preferred, when
they interfere.
But there is not altogether so much necessity for the determination of this question as some persons seem to think.
Nor are we left to reason alone to determine it. For, first,
though mankind have, in all ages, been greatly prone to
place their religion in peculiar positive rights, by way of
equivalent for obedience to moral precepts; yet, without
making any comparison at all between them, and, consequently, without determining which is to have the preference, the nature of the thing abundantly shows all notions
of that kind to be utterly subversive of true religion; as they
are, moreover, contrary to the whole general tenor of Scripture, and, likewise, to the most express, particular declarations of it, that nothing can render us accepted of God,
without moral virtue. Secondly, upon the occasion of mentioning together positive and moral duties, the Scripture
always puts the stress of religion upon the latter, and never
upon the former; which, though no sort of allowance to
neglect the former, when they do not interfere with the
latter, yet is a plain intimation, that when they do, the
latter are to be preferred.  And, farther, as mankind are
for placing the stress of their religion any where, rather
than upon virtue, lest both the reason of the thing, and the




CHIAP..]          OF CRISTIANITY.                  189
general spirit of Christianity, appearing in the intimation
now mentioned, should be ineffectual against this prevalent
folly, our Lord himself, from whose command alone the
obligation of positive institutions arises, has taken occasion
to make the comparison between them and moral precepts;
when the Pharisees censured him for "eating with publicans and sinners;" and, also, when they censured his disciples for "plucking the ears of corn on the Sabbath day."
Upon this comparison he has determined expressly, and in
form, which shall have the preference when they interfere.
And by delivering his authoritative determination in a proverbial manner of expression, he has made it general: "I
will have mercy, and not sacrifice."(1) The propriety of
the word proverbial is not the thing insisted upon, though,
I think, the manner of speaking is to be called so. But
that the manner of speaking very remarkably renders the
determination general, is surely indisputable.  For, had it,
in the latter case, been said only, that God preferred mercy
to the rigid observance of the Sabbath, even then, by parity
of reason, most, justly might we have argued, that he preferred mercy, likewise, to the observance of other ritual
institutions, and, in general, moral duties to positive ones.
And thus the determination would have been general,
though its being so were inferred, and not expressed. But
as the passage really stands in the Gospel, it is much
stronger; for the sense, and the very literal words of our
Lord's answer, are as applicable to any other instance of a
comparison, between positive and moral duties, as to this
upon which they were spoken. And if, in case of competition, mercy is to be preferred to positive institutions, it will
scarce be thought, that, justice is to give place to them.
It is remarkable, too, that, as the words are a quotation
from the Old Testament, they are introduced, on both of
the forementioned occasions, with a declaration, that the
H1) Matt. ix, 13, and xii, 7.




190               OF THE IMPORTANCE            [PART TI.
Pharisees did not understand the meaning of them. This, I
say, is very remarkable; for, since it is scarce possible for
the most ignorant person not to understand the literal sense
of the passage in the prophet,(1) and since understanding
the literal sense would not have prevented their condemning
the guiltless,(2) it can hardly be doubted, that the thing
which our Lord really intended in that declaration was,
that the Pharisees had not learnt from it, as they might,
wherein the general spirit of religion consists-that it consists in moral piety and virtue, as distinguished from forms
and ritual observances. However, it is certain we may
learn this from his divine application of the passage, in the
Gospel.
But, as it is one of the peculiar weaknesses of human
nature, when, upon a comparison of two things, one is
found to be of greater importance than the other, to consider this other as of scarce any importance at all; it is
highly necessary that we remind ourselves, how great presumption it is to make light of any institutions of Divine
appointment; that our obligations to obey all God's commands whatever, are absolute and indispensable; and that
commands merely positive, admitted to be from him, lay us
under a moral obligation to obey them-an obligation moral
in the strictest and most proper sense.
To these things I cannot forbear adding, that the account
now given of Christianity most strongly shows and enforces
upon us the obligation of searching the Scriptures, in order
to see what the scheme of revelation really is, instead of
determining beforehand, from reason,what the scheme of it
must be.(3) Indeed, if in revelation there be found any
passages, the seeming meaning of which is contrary to
natural religion, we may most certainly conclude such
seeming meaning not to be the real one. But it is not
any degree of a presumption against an interpretation of
(1) Hosea vi. (2) See Matt. xii, 7  (3) See Chap. iii.




CHAP. i.]            OF CHRISTIANITY.                  191
Scripture, that such interpretation contains a doctrine,
which the light of nature cannot discover,(1) or a precept, which the law of nature does not oblige to.
(1) Pages 193, 194.




192          OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION       EPART II,
CHAPTER II.
OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST A REVELATION,
CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS.
HAVING shown the importance of the Christian revelation, and the obligations which we are under seriously to
attend to it, upon supposition of its truth or its credibility;
the next thing in order is, to consider the supposed presumptions against revelation in general, which shall be the
subject of this chapter; and the objections against the
Christian in particular, which shall be the subject of some
following ones.(1) For it seems the most natural method
to remove the prejudices against Christianity, before we
proceed to the consideration of the positive evidence for it,
and the objections against that evidence.(2)
It is, I think, commonly supposed, that there is some peculiar presumption, from the analogy of nature, against the
Christian scheme of things, at least against miracles; so as
that stronger evidence is necessary to prove the truth and
reality of them, than would be sufficient to convince us of
other events or matters of fact. Indeed, the consideration
of this supposed presumption cannot but be thought very
insignificant by many persons; yet, as it belongs to the subject of this treatise, so it may tend to open the mind, and
remove some prejudices; however needless the consideration of it be, upon its own account.
I. I find no appearance of a presumption, from the analogy of nature, against the general scheme of Christianity,
that God created and invisibly governs the world by Jesus
Christ, and by him, also, will hereafter judge it in righteousness, that is, render to every one according to his works;
and that good men are under the secret influence of his
Spirit.  Whether these things are, or are not, to be called
(1) Chaps. iii, iv, v, vi.       (2) Chap. vii.




CHAP. II.]         aGAINST MIRACLES.                193
miraculous, is, perhaps, only a question about words; or,
however, is of no moment in the case.  If the analogy of
nature raises any presumption against this general scbeme
of Christianity, it must be, either because it is not discoverable by reason or experience, or else because it is unlike
that course of nature, which is.  But analogy raises no
presumption against the truth of this scheme, upon either
of these accounts.
1. There is no presumption, from  analogy, against the
truth of it, upon account of its not being discoverable by
reason or experience. For, suppose one who never heard
of revelation, of the most improved understanding, and
acquainted with our whole system of natural philosophy and
natural religion; such a one could not but be sensible, that
it was but a very small part of the natural and moral system
of the universe, which he was acquainted with.  He could
not but be sensible, that there must be innumerable things,
in the dispensations of Providence past, in the invisible government over the world at present carrying on, and in what
is to come, of which he was wholly ignorant,(1) and which
could not be discovered without revelation. Whether the
scheme of nature be, in the strictest sense, infinite or not, it
is evidently vast, even beyond all possible imagination.
And, doubtless, that part of it which is opened to our view,
is but as a point, in comparison of the whole plan of Providence, reaching throughout eternity, past and future; in
comparison of what is even now going on in the remote parts
of the boundless universe; nay, in comparison of the whole
scheme of this world. And, therefore, that things lie beyond the natural reach of our faculties, is no sort of presumption against the truth and reality of them; because
it is certain, there are innumerable things in the consitution and government of the universe, which are thus beyond
the natural reach of our faculties. 2. Analogy raises no
(1) Pages 154, 155
17




104          OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION    [PART 11.
presumption against any of the things contained in this general doctrine of Scripture now mentioned, upon account of
their being unlike the known course of nature. For there
is no presumption at all, from analogy, that the whole course
of things, or Divine government, naturally unknown to us,
and every thing in it, is like to any thing in that which is
known; and, therefore, no peculiar presumption against any
thing in the former, upon account of its being unlike to any
thing in the latter. And, in the constitution and natural
government of the world, as well as in the moral government of it, we see things, in a great degree, munlike one
another; and, therefore, ought not to wonder at such. unlikeness between things visible and invisible.  However, the
scheme of Christianity is, by no means, entirely unlike the
scheme of nature, as will appear in the following part of
this treatise.
The notion of a miracle, considered as a proof of a Divine
mission, has been stated with great exactness by divines,
and is, I think, sufficiently understood by every one. There
are, also, invisible miracles; the incarnation of Christ, for
instance, which, being secret, cannot be alledged as a proof
of such a mission; but require themselves to be proved by
visible miracles.  Revelation itself, too, is miraculous, and
miracles are the proof of it; and the supposed presumption
against these shall presently be considered. All which I
have been observing here is, that, whether we choose to
call every thing in the dispensations of Providence, not
discoverable without revelation, nor like the known course
of things, miraculous, and, whether the general Christian
dispensation now mentioned, is to be called so, or not, the
foregoing observations seem certainly to show, that there is
no presumption against it, from the analogy of nature.
II. There is no presumption from analogy, against some
operations which we should now call miraculous; particl-.arly, none against a revelation at the beginning of the worill,




C[[AP. II.]       AGAINST MIRACLES.                 195
nothing of such presumptions against it, as is supposed to be
implied or expressed in the word, miraculous.  For a miracle, in its very notion, is relative to a course of nature, and
implies somewhat different from it, considered as being so.
Now, either there was no course of nature at the time
which we are speaking of, or, if there were, we are not
acquainted what the course of nature is upon the first
peopling of worlds. And, therefore, the question, whether
mankind had a revelation made to them at that time, is to
be considered, not as a question concerning a miracle, but as
a common question of fact. And we have the like reason,
be it more or less, to admit the report of tradition concerning this question and concerning common matters of fact of
the same antiquity; for instance, what part of the earth
was first peopled.
Or %thus: when mankind was first placed in this state,
there was a power exerted, totally different from the present
course of nature.  Now, whether this power, thus wholly
different from the present course of nature, for we cannot
properly apply to it the word miraculous —whether this
power stopped immediately after it had made man, or went
on, and exerted itself farther in giving him a revelation, is
a question of the same kind, as whether an ordinary power
exerted itself in such a particular degree and manner,
or not.
Or, suppose the power exerted in the formation of the
world be considered as miraculous, or, rather, be called by
that name, the case will not be different; since it must be
acknowledged that such a power was exerted. For, supposing it acknowledged that our Savior spent some years in
a course of working miracles, there is no more presumption,
worth mentioning, against his having exerted this miraculous
power, in a certain degree greater, than in a certain degree
less; in one or two more instances, than in one or two fewer;
in this. than in another manner.




196         OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION         [PART ]I.
It is evident, then, that tlere can be no peculiar presumption, from the analogy of nature, against supposing a
revelation, when man was first placed upon earth.
Add, that there does not appear the least intimation in
history or tradition, that religion was first reasoned out; but
the whole of history and tradition makes for the other side,
that it came into the world by revelation. Indeed, the
state of religion in the first ages, of which we have any
account, seems to suppose and imply that this was the
original of it amongst mankind.  And these reflections
together, without taking in the peculiar authority of Scripture, amount to real and a very material degree of evidence,
that there was a revelation at the beginning of the world.
Now this, as it is a confirmation of natural religion, and,
therefore, mentioned in the former part of this- treatise,(1)
so, likewise, it has a tendency to remove any prejudices
against a subsequent revelation.
III. But still it may be objected, that there is some peculiar presumption from analogy, against miracles; particularly
against revelation, after the settlement and during the continuance of a course of nature.
Now, with regard to this supposed presumption, it is to
be observed in general, that before we can have ground for
raising what can, with any propriety, be called an argumzent
fiom analogy, for or against revelation considered as somewhat miraculous, we must be acquainted with a similar or
parallel case. But the history of some other world, seemingly in like circumstances with our own, is no more than a
parallel case; and, therefore, nothing short of this can be
so. Yet, could we come at a presumptive proof, for or
against a revelation, from being informed whether such
world had one, or not; such a proof, being drawn from one
single instance only, must be infinitely precarious. More
particularly, first of all, there is a very strong presumption
(1) Page 147, &c




CHIAP. II.J       AGAINST MIRACLES.                 197
against common speculative truths, and against the most
ordinary facts, before the proof of them, which yet is overcome by almost any proof. There is a presumption of
millions to one, against the story of Caesar, or of any other
man.  For, suppose a number of common facts so and so
circumstanced, of which one had no kind of proof, should
happen to come into one's thoughts; every one would,
without any possible doubt, conclude them  to be false.
And the like may be said of a single common fact. And
from hence, it appears, that the question of importance, as
to the matter before us, is, concerning the degree of the
peculiar presumption supposed against miracles; not whether
there be any peculiar presumption at all against them. For,
if there be the presumption of millions to one, against the
most common facts, what can a small presumption, additional to this, amount to, though it be peculiar?  It cannot
be estimated, and is as nothing. The only material question
is, whether there be any such presumption against miracles,
as to render them in any sort incredible?  Secondly, if we
leave out the consideration of religion, we are in such total
darkness, upon what causes, occasions, reasons, or circumstances, the present course of nature depends, that there
does not appear any improbability for or against supposing,
that five or six thousand years may have given scope for
causes, occasions, reasons, or circumstances, from whence
miraculous interpositions may have arisen.  And from this,
joined with the foregoing observation, it will follow that
there must be a presumption, beyond all comparison,
greater, against the particular common facts just now
instanced in, than against miracles in general; before any
evidence of either. But, thirdly, take in the consideration
of religion, or the moral system of the world, and then we
see distinct particular reasons for miracles; to afford mankind instruction additional to that of nature, and to attest
the truth of it. And this gives a real credibility to the




198        PRESUMPTION AGAINST MIRACLES.   [PART II.
supposition, that it might be part of the original plan of
things, that there should be miraculous interpositions. Then,
lastly, miracles must not be compared to common natural
events; or to events which, though uncommon, are similar
to what we daily experience; but to the extraordinary
phenomena of nature. And then the comparison will be,
between the presumption against miracles, and the presumption against such uncommon appearances, suppose, as
comets, and against there being any such powers in nature
as magnetism and electricity, so contrary to the properties
of other bodies not endued with these powers. And before
any one can determine whether there be any peculiar presumption against miracles, more than against other extraordinary things, he must consider, what, upon first hearing,
would be the presumption against the last mentioned appearances and powers, to a person acquainted only with the
daily, monthly, and annual course of nature respecting this
earth, and with those common powers of matter which we
every day see.
Upon all this I conclude, that there certainly is no such
presumption against miracles, as to render them in anywise
incredible; that, on the contrary, our being able to discern
reasons for them, gives a positive credibility to the history
of them, in cases where those reasons hold; and that it is
by no means certain, that there is any peculiar presumption
at all, from analogy, even in the lowest degree, against
miracles, as distinguished from other extraordinary phenomena; though it is not worth while to perplex the reader
with inquiries into the abstract nature of evidence, in order
to determine a question, which, without such inquiries, -we
see (1) is of no importance.
(1) Page 196.




CHAP. III.] REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.        199
CHAPTER III.
OF OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING, WHAT WERE TO BE EXPECTED IN A REVELATIONT; ANI THE CREDIBILITY FROM
ANTALOGY, THAT IT MUST CONTAIN  THINGS APPEARING
LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.
BESIDES the objections against the evidence for Christianity, many are alledged against the scheme of it-against
the whole manner in which it is put and left with the world,
as well as against several particular relations in Scripture:
objections drawn from the deficiencies of revelation; from
things in it appearing to men foolishness;(1) from its containing matters of offense, which have led, and it must
have been foreseen, would lead, into strange enthusiasm and
superstition, and be made to serve the purposes of tyranny
and wickedness; from its not being universal; and, which
is a thing of the same kind, from its evidence not being so
convincing and satisfactory as it might have been; for this
last is sometimes turned into a positive argument against its
truth.(2) It would be tedious, indeed impossible, to enumerate the several particulars comprehended under the
objections here referred to, they being so various, according
to the different fancies of men. There are persons, who
think it a strong objection against the authority of Scripture,
that it is not composed by rules of art, agreed upon by
critics, for polite and correct writing.  And the scorn is inexpressible, with which some of the prophetic parts of Scripture are treated; partly through the rashness of interpreters,
but very much, also, on account of the hieroglyphical and
figurative language in which they are left us.  Some of the
principal things of this sort shall be particularly considered
in the following chapters. But my design, at present, is to
observe, in general, with respect to this whole way of
(1) 1 Cor. i, 18.             (2) See Chap. vi.




200         THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION    [PART II.
arguing, that, upon supposition of a revelation, it is higlly
credible beforehand, we should he incompetent judges of it,
to a great degree; and that it would contain many things
appearing to us liable to great objections, in case we judge
of it otherwise than by the analogy of nature. And, therefore, though objections against the evidence of Christianity
are most seriously to be considered, yet objections against
Christianity itself are, in a great measure, frivolous-almost
all objections against it, excepting those which are alledged
against the particular proofs of its coming from God. I
express myself with caution, lest I should be mistaken to
vilify reason, which is, indeed, the only faculty we have
wherewith to judge concerning any thing, even revelation
itself; or be misunderstood to assert, that a supposed revelation cannot be proved false from internal characters. For,
it may contain clear immoralities or contradictions; and
either of these would prove it false. Nor will I take upon
me to affirm, that nothing else can possibly render any
supposed revelation incredible. Yet, still the observation
(above is, I think, true beyond doubt, that objections against
Christianity, as distinguished from  objections against its
evidence, are frivolous. To make out this, is the general
design of the present chapter. And, with regard to the
whole of it, I cannot but particularly wish, that the proofs
might be attended to, rather than the assertions caviled at,
upon account of any unacceptable consequences, whether
real or supposed, which may be drawn from them.  For,
after all, that which is true, must be admitted; though it
should show us the shortness of our faculties, and that we
are in nowise judges of many things of which we are apt
to think ourselves very competent ones. Nor will this be
any objection with reasonable men; at least, upon second
thought, it will not be any objection with such, against the
justness of the following observations.
As God governs the world, and instructs his creaturoe-,,




CIHAP. IIi.]   LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.              201
according to certain laws or rules in the known course of
nature, known by reason together with experience; so the
Scripture informs us of a scheme of Divine providence,
additional to this. It relates, that God has, by revelation,
instructed men in things concerning his government, which
they could not otherwise have known, and reminded them
of things which they might otherwise know; and attested
the truth of the whole by miracles. Now, if the natural
and the revealed dispensations of things are both from God,
if they coincide with each other, and together make up one
scheme of Providence, our being incompetent judges of
one, must render it credible that we may be incompetent
judges, also, of the other. Since, upon experience, the
acknowledged constitution and course of nature is found to
be greatly different from what, before experience, would
have been expected; and such as, men fancy, there lie
great objections against. This renders it beforehand highly
credible, that they may find the revealed dispensation likewise, if they judge of it as they do of the constitution of
nature, very different from expectations formed beforehand;
and liable, in appearance, to great objections-objections
against the scheme itself, and against the degrees and
manners of the miraculous interpositions, by which it was
attested and carried on. Thus, suppose a prince to govern
his dominions in the wisest manner possible, by common
known laws; and that, upon some exigencies, he should
suspend these laws, and govern, in several instances, in a
different manner: if one of his subjects were not a competent judge beforehand, by what common rules the government should or would be carried on, it could not be expected
that the same person would be a competent judge, in what
exigencies, or in what manner, or to what degree, those
laws commonly observed would be suspended or deviated
from. If he were not a judge of the wisdom of the ordii:ary administration, there is no reason to think he would be




202         THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION    LPART It.
a judge of the wisdom of the extraordinary. If he thought
he had objections against the former, doubtless, it is highly
supposable, he might think, also, that he had objections
against the latter. And thus, as we fall into infinite follies
and mistakes, whenever we pretend, otherwise than from
experience and analogy, to judge of the constitution and
course of nature, it is evidently supposable beforehand, that
we should fall into as great, in pretending to judge, in like
manner, concerning revelation. Nor is there any more
ground to expect that this latter should appear to us clear
of objections, than that the former should.
These observations, relating to the whole of Christianity,
are applicable to inspiration in particular. As we are in no
sort judges beforehand, by what laws or rules, in what
degree, or by what means, it were to have been expected
that God would naturally instruct us; so, upon supposition
of his affording us light and instruction by revelation, additional to what he has afforded us by reason and experience,
we are in no sort judges, by what methods, and in what
proportion, it were to be expected that this supernatural
light and instruction would be afforded us. We know not
beforehand, what degree or kind of natural information it
were to be expected God would afford men, each by his
own reason and experience; nor how far he would enable
and effectually dispose them to communicate it, whatever it
should be, to each other; nor whether the evidence of it
would be certain, highly probable, or doubtful; nor whether
it would be given with equal clearness and conviction to all.
Nor could we guess, upon any good ground I mean, whether
natural knowledge, or even the faculty itself by which we
awe capable of attaining it, reason, would be given us at
once, or gradually. In like manner, we are wholly ignorant,
what degree of new knowledge, it were to be expected, God
would give mankind by revelation, upon supposition of his
affording one; or how far, or in what way, he wouldl




CHIAP, III.]    LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.           203
interpose miraculously, to qualify them, to whom he should
originally make the revelation, for communicating the knowledge given by it; and to secure their doing it to the age in
which they should live, and to secure its being transmitted
to posterity. We are equally ignorant, whether the evidence of it would be certain, or highly probable, or doubtful;(1) or whether all who should have any degree of
instruction from it, and any degree of evidence of its truth,
would have the same; or whether the scheme would be
revealed at once, or unfolded gradually. Nay, we are not
in any sort able to judge, whether it were to have been
expected, that the revelation should have been committed
to writing, or left to be handed down, and, consequently,
corrupted, by verbal tradition, and, at length, sunk under it,
if mankind so pleased, and during such time as they are
permitted, in the degree they evidently are, to act as theywill.
But it may be said, "that a revelation in some of the
above-mentioned circumstances, one, for instance, which
was not committed to writing, and thus secured against
danger of corruption, would not have answered his purpose." I ask, what purpose? It would not have answered
all the purposes which it has now answered, and in the
same degree; but it would have answered others, or the
same in different degrees. And which of these were the
purposes of God, and best fell in with his general government, we could not at all have determined beforehand.
Now, since it has been shown, that we have no principles
of reason upon which to judge beforehand, how it were to be
expected revelation should have been left, or what was most
suitable to the Divine plan of government, in any of the
forementioned respects, it must be quite frivolous to object
afterward as to any of them, against its being left in one
way, rather than another; for this would be to object against
(1) See Chap. vi.




204         THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION    [PART II.
tllings, upon account of their being different from expectations which have been shown to be without reason.  And
thus we see, that the only question concerning the truth of
Christianity is, whether it be a real revelation; not whether
it be attended with every circumstance which we should
have looked for: and concerning the authority of Scripture,
whether it be what it claims to be; not whether it be a
book of such sort, and so promulged, as weak men are apt
to fancy a book containing a Divine revelation should. And,
therefore, neither obscurity, nor seeming inaccuracy of style,
nor various readings, nor early disputes about the authors of
particular parts, nor any other things of the like kind, though
they had been much more considerable in degree than they
are, could overthrow the authority of the Scripture; unless
the prophets, apostles, or our Lord, had promised, that the
book, containing the Divine revelation, should be secure
from those things. Nor, indeed, can any objections overthrow such a kind of revelation as the Christian claims to
be, since there are no objections against the morality of
it,(1) but such as can show, that there is no proof of miracles wrought originally in attestation of it; no appearance
of any thing miraculous in its obtaining in the world; nor
any of prophecy, that is, of events foretold, which human
sagacity could not foresee.  If it can be shown, that the
proof alledged for all these is absolutely none at all, then is
revelation overturned. But were it allowed, that the proof
of any one, or all of them, is lower than is allowed; yet
whilst any proof of them  remains, revelation will stand
upon much the same foot it does at present, as to all the
purposes of life and practice, and ought to have the like
influence upon our behavior.
From the foregoing observations, too, it will follow, and
those who will thoroughly examine into revelation will find
it worth remarking, that there are several ways of arguing,
(1) Page 211.




CHAP. III.]      LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.              205
which, though just with regard to other writings, are not
applicable to Scripture; at least, not to the prophetic parts
of it. We cannot argue, for instance, that this cannot be
the sense or intent of such a passage of Scripture; for if it
had, it would have been expressed more plainly, or have
been represented under a more apt figure or hieroglyphic;
yet we may justly argue thus, with respect to common
books. And the reason of this difference is very evident;
that in Scripture we are not competent judges, as we are in
common books, how plainly it were to have been expected,
what is the true sense should have been expressed, or
under how apt an image figured. The only question is,
what appearance there is that this is the sense; and scarce
at all, how much more determinately or accurately it might
have been expressed or figured.
"But is it not self-evident, that internal improbabilities of
all kinds, weaken external probable proof?" Doubtless.
But to what practical purpose can this be alledged here,
when it has been proved before,(1) that real internal improbabilities, which rise even to moral certainty, are overcome by the most ordinary testimony; and when it now
has been made appear, that we scarce know what are improbabilities, as to the matter we are here considering; as
it will farther appear from what follows.
For though, from the observations above made, it is manifest, that we are not in any sort competent judges, what
supernatural instruction were to have been expected; and
though it is self-evident, that the objections of an incompetnt judgment must be frivolous; yet it may be proper to
go one step farther, and observe, that if men will be regardless of these things, and pretend to judge of the Scripture
by preconceived expectations, the analogy of nature shows
beforehand, not only that it is highly credible they may, but
also probable that they will, imagine they have strong
(1) Page 195.




206         THE  CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION    [PART II.
objections against it, however really unexceptionable: for so,
prior to experience, they would think they had, against the
circumstances, and degrees, and the whole manner of that
instruction, which is afforded by the ordinary course of
nature.  Were the instruction which God affords to brute
creatures by instincts and mere propensions, and to mankind by these together with reason, matter of probable
proof, and not of certain observation, it would be rejected
as incredible, in many instances of it, only upon account
of the means by which this instruction is given, the seeming disproportions, the limitations, necessary conditions, and
circumstances of it. For instance, would it not have been
thought highly improbable, that men should have been
so much more capable of discovering, even to certainty,
the general laws of matter, and the magnitudes, paths,
and revolutions of heavenly bodies, than the occasions
and cures of distempers, and many other things, in which
human life seems so much more nearly concerned, than in
astronomy?  How capricious and irregular a way of information, would it be said, is that of invention, by means
of which nature instructs us in matters of science, and in
many things upon which the affairs of the world greatly
depend; that a man should, by this faculty, be made acquainted with the thing in an instant, when, perhaps, he is
thinking of somewhat else, which he has in vain been
searching after, it may be, for years. So, likewise, the
imperfections attending the only method by which nature
enables and directs us to communicate our thoughts to
each other, are innumerable.  Language is, in its very nature, inadequate, ambiguous, liable to infinite abuse, even
from negligence; and so liable to it from design, that evely
man can deceive and betray by it. And to mention but
one instance more, that brutes, without reason, should act,
in many respects, with a sagacity and foresight vastly
greater than what men have in those respects, would be




CHAP. III.]      LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.               207
thought impossible. Yet it is certain they do act with such
superior foresight; whether it be their own, indeed, is another question. From these things it is credible beforehand, that upon supposition God should afford men some
additional instruction by revelation, it would be with circumstances, in manners, degrees, and respects, which we
should be apt to fancy we had great objections against the
credibility of. Nor are the objections against the Scripture,
nor against Christianity in general, at all more or greater
than the analogy of nature would beforehand-not, perhaps, give ground to expect; for this analogy may not be
sufficient, in some cases, to ground an expectation upon;
but no more nor greater, than analogy would show it,
beforehand, to be supposable and credible, that there might
seem to lie against revelation.
By applying these general observations to a particular
objection, it will be more distinctly seen, how they are
applicable to others of the like kind; and, indeed, to almost
all objections against Christianity, as distinguished from
objections against its evidence. It appears from Scripture,
that as it was not unusual, in the apostolic age, for persons,
upon their conversion to Christianity, to be endued with
miraculous gifts, so, some of those persons exercised these
gifts in a strangely irregular and disorderly manner; and
this is made an objection against their being really miraculous. Now, the foregoing observations quite remove this objection, how considerable soever it may appear at first sight
For, consider' a person endued with any of these gifts, for
instance, that of tongues; it is to be supposed, that he had
the same power over this miraculous gift, as he would have
had over it, had it been the effect of habit, of study, and
use, as it ordinarily is; or the same power over it, as he
had over any other natural endowment.  Consequently, he
would use it in the same manner he did any other; either
regularly and upon proper occasions only, or irregularly




208        THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION    [P1ART U.
and upon improper ones; according to his sense of decency, and his character of prudence. Where, then, is the
objection? Why, if this miraculous power was, indeed,
given to the world to propagate Christianity and attest the
truth of it, we might, it seems, have expected that other
sort of persons should have been chosen to be invested
with it; or that' these should, at the same time, have been
endued with prudence; or that they should have been con
tinually restrained and directed in the exercise of it; that is,
that God should have miraculously interposed, if at all, in a
different manner or higher degree. But from the observations made above, it is undeniably evident, that we are not
judges in what degrees and manners it were to have been
expected he should miraculously interpose; upon supposition of his doing it in some degree and manner. Nor, in
the natural course of Providence, are superior gifts of
memory, eloquence, knowledge, and other talents of great
influence, conferred only on persons of prudence and decency, or such as are disposed to make the properest use
of them. Nor is the instruction and admonition naturally
afforded us for the conduct of life, particularly in our education, commonly given in a manner the most suited to
recommend it; but often with circumstances, apt to prejudice us against such instruction.
One might go on to add, that there is a great resemblance between the light of nature and of revelation, in
several other respects. Practical Christianity, or that faith
and behavior which renders a man a Christian, is a plain
and obvious thing; like the common rules of conduct, with
respect to our ordinary temporal affairs. The more distinct
and particular knowledge cf those things, the study of which
the apostle calls, "going on unto perfection,"(1) and of
the prophetic parts of revelation, like many parts of natur'al
and even civil knowledge, may require very exact thought
(1) Heb. vi, 1




(IHAP. III.]     LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.             200
and careful consideration. The hinderances, too, of natural
and of supernatural light and knowledge, have been of the
same kind. And as it is owned the whole scheme of Scripture is not yet understood, so, if it ever comes to be understood, before the "restitution of all things,"(1) and without
miraculous interpositions, it must be in the same way as
natural knowledge is come at; by the continuance and progress of learning and of liberty, and by particular persons,
attending to, comparing and pursuing, intimations scattered
up and down it, which are overlooked and disregarded by
the generality of the world. For this is the way in which
all improvements are made; by thoughtful men's tracing
on obscure hints, as it were, dropped us by nature accidentally, or which seem to come into our minds by chance.
Nor is it at all incredible, that a book, which has been so long
in the possession of mankind, should contain many truths as
yet undiscovered. For, all the same phenomena, and the
same faculties of investigation, from which such great discoveries in natural knowledge have been made in the present and last age, were equally in the possession of mankind
several thousand years before. And possibly it might be
intended, that events, as they come to pass, should open
and ascertain the meaning of several parts of Scripture.
It may be objected, that this analogy fails in a material respect; for that natural knowledge is of little or no
consequence. But I have been speaking of the general
instruction, which nature does or does not afford us. And
besides, some parts of natural knowledge, in the more
common restrained sense of the words, are of the greatest
consequence to the ease and convenience of life. But suppose the analogy did, as it does not, fail in this respect, yet
it might be abundantly supplied from the whole constitution
and course of nature; which shows, that God does not dispense his gifts according to our notions of the advantago
(1) Acts iii, 21.
18




210         THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION    [PART II.
and consequence they would be of to us. And this in genera], with his method of dispensing knowledge in particular,
would together make out an analogy full to the point before us.
But it may be objected still farther, and more generally:
"The Scripture represents the world as in a state of ruin,
and Christianity as an expedient to recover it, to help in
these respects where nature fails; in particular to supply
the deficiencies of natural light. Is it credible, then, that
so many ages should have been let pass, before a matter of
such a sort, of so great and so general importance, was made
known to mankind; and then that it should be made known
to so small a part of them? Is it conceivable, that this
supply should be so very deficient; should have the like
obscurity and doubtfulness; be liable to the like perversions; in short, lie open to all the like objections, as the
light of nature itself?"(1) Without determining how far
this in fact is so, I answer, it is, by no means, incredible
that it might be so, if the light of nature and of revelation
be from the same hand. Men are naturally liable to diseases; for which God, in his good providence, has provided
natural remedies.(2) But remedies existing in nature have
been unknown to mankind for many ages; are known but
to few now; probably many valuable ones are not known
yet. Great has been, and is, the obscurity and difficulty,
in the nature and application of them. Circumstances
seem often to make them very improper, where they are
absolutely necessary. It is after long labor and study, and
many unsuccessful endeavors, that they are brought to be
as useful as they are; after high contempt and absolute
rejection of the most useful we have; and after disputes
and doubts, which have seemed to be endless.  The best
remedies, too, when unskillfully, much more if dishonestly
applied, may produce new diseases; and with the rightest
(1) Chap. vi.                 (2) Chap v.




CHAP. III.]      LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.              21.1
application, the success of them is often doubtful. In
many cases, they are not at all effectual; where they are, it
is often very slowly: and the application of them, and the
necessary regimen accompanying it, is, not uncommonly, so
disagreeable, that some will not submit to them; and satisfy themselves with the excuse, that if they would, it is
not certain whether it would be successful. And many
persons, who labor under diseases, for which there are
known natural remedies, are not so happy as to be always,
if ever, in the way of them. In a word, the remedies
which nature has provided for diseases, are neither certain,
perfect, nor universal. And, indeed, the same principles
of arguing, which would lead us to conclude that they
must be so, would lead us, likewise, to conclude that there
could be no occasion for them; that is, that there could be
no diseases at all. And, therefore, our experience that
there are diseases, shows, that it is credible beforehand,
upon supposition nature has provided remedies for them,
that these remedies may be, as by experience we find they
are, not certain, nor perfect, nor universal; because it shows,
that the principles upon which we should expect the contrary, are fallacious.
And now, what is the just consequence from all these
things? Not that reason is no judge of what is offered to
us as being of Divine revelation. For this would be to
infer, that we are unable to judge of any thing, because
we are unable to judge of all things.  Reason can, and-it
ought to judge, not only of the meaning, but, also, of the
morality and the evidence of revelation. First, it is the province of reason to judge of the morality of the Scripture;
that is, not whether it contains things different from what
we should have expected from a wise, just, and good
Being; for objections from hence have been now obviated:
but whether it contains things plainly contradictory to wisdom, justice, or goodness-to what the light of nature




212         THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION    [PART I1,
teaches us of God.  And I know nothing of this sort objected against Scripture, excepting such objections as are
formed upon suppositions, which would equally conclude,
that the constitution of nature is contradictory to wisdom,
justice, or goodness; which most certainly it is not. Indeed, there are some particular precepts in Scripture, given
to particular persons, requiring actions, which would be
immoral and vicious, were it not for such precepts. But
it is easy to see, that all these are of such a kind, as that
the precept changes the whole nature of the case and of
the action; and both constitutes and shows that not to be
unjust or immoral, which, prior to the precept, must have
appeared and really have been so: which may well be,
since none of these precepts are contrary to immutable
morality. If it were commanded, to cultivate the principles, and act from  the spirit of treachery, ingratitude,
cruelty; the command vwould not alter the nature of the
case, or of the action in any of these instances.  But it is
quite otherwise in precepts which require only the doing an
external action; for instance, taking away the property or
life of any. For men have no right to either life or property, but what arises solely from the grant of God. When
this grant is revoked, they cease to have any right at all
in either; and when this revocation is made known, as
surely it is possible it may be, it must cease to be unjust to
deprive them of either. And though a course of external
acts, which, without command, would be immoral, must
make an immoral habit, yet a few detached commands have
no such natural tendency. I thought proper to say thus
much of the few Scripture precepts, which require, not
vicious actions, but actions which would have been vicious,
had it not been for such precepts; because they are sometimes weakly urged as immoral, and great weight is laid
upon objections drawn from them. But to me there seems
no difficulty at all in these precepts, but what arises from




CHAP. III.]      LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.               213
their being offenses; that is, from their being liable to be
perverted, as, indeed, they are, by wicked, designing men,
to serve the most horrid purposes, and, perhaps, to mislead
the weak and enthusiastic. And objections from this head
are not objections against revelation, but against the whole
notion of religion, as a trial; and against the general constitution of nature. Secondly, reason is able to judge, and
must, of the evidence of revelation, and of the objections
urged against that evidence; which shall be the subject
of a following chapter.(1)
But the consequence of the foregoing observations is,
that the question upon which the truth of Christianity
depends, is scarce at all, what objections there are against
its scheme, since there are none against the morality of it;
but what objections there are against its evidence; or, what
proof there remains of it, after due allowances made for the
objections against that proof: because it has been shown,
that the objections against Christianity, as distinguished
from  objections against its evidence, are frivolous.  For
surely very little weight, if any at all, is to be laid upon a
way of arguing and objecting, which, when applied to the
general constitution of nature, experience shows not to be
conclusive; and such, I think, is the whole way of objecting treated of throughout this chapter.  It is resolvable
into principles, and goes upon suppositions, which mislead
us to think, that the Author of nature would not act, as we
experience he does; or would act, in such and such cases, as
we experience he does not in like cases.  But the unreasonableness of this way of objecting will appear yet more
evidently from hence, that the chief things thus objected
against, are justified, as shall be farther shown,(2) by distinct, particular, and full analogies, in the constitution and
course of nature.
But it is to be remembered, that as frivolous as objections
(1) Chap. vii.      (2) Chap. iv, latter part, and v, vi




214      nREVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.  [PART II.
of the foregoing sort against revelation are, yet, when a
supposed revelation is more consistent with itself, and has a
more general and uniform tendency to promote virtue, than,
all circumstances considered, could have been expected, from
enthusiasm and political views; this is a presumptive proof
of its not proceeding from them, and so of its truth; because we are competent judges, what might have been expected from enthusiasm and political views.




CHAP. IV.] CHRISTIANITY IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 215
CHAPTER IV.
OF CHRISTIANITY, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME OR CONSTITUITION, IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.
IT hath been now shown,(1) that the analogy of nrature
renders it highly credible beforehand, that, supposing a
revelation to be made, it must contain many things very
different from what we should have expected, and such as
appear open to great objections; and that this observation,
in good measure, takes off the force of those objections, or,
rather, precludes them. But it may be alledged, that this
is a very partial answer to such objections, or a very unsatisfactory way of obviating them: because it doth not show
at all, that the things objected against can be wise, just,
and good; much less, that it is credible they are so. It
will, therefore, be proper to show this distinctly, by applying
to these objections against the wisdom, justice, and goodness
of Christianity, the answer above (2) given to the like objections against the constitution of nature; before we consider
the particular analogies in the latter, to the particular things
objected against in the former. Now, that which affords a
sufficient answer to objections against the wisdom, justice,
and goodness of the constitution of nature, is its being a constitution, a system or scheme, imperfectly comprehended-a
scheme, in which means are made use of to accomplish ends,
and which is carried on by general laws. For, from these
things it has been proved, not only to be possible, but, also,
to be credible, that those things which are objected against
may be consistent with wisdom, justice, and goodness; nay,
may be instances of them: and, even, that the constitution
and government of nature may be perfect in the highest
possible degree. If Christianity, then, be a scheme, and
(1) In the foregoing Chapter.
{~2) Part 1, Chap. vii, to which this all along refers.




2 16            CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME          LPART In.
of the like kind, it is evident the like objections against it
must admit of the like answer.  And,
I. Christianity is a scheme, quite beyond our comprehension. The moral government of God is exercised, by
gradually conducting things so, in the course of his Provi.
dence, that every one, at length, and upon the whole, shall
receive according to his deserts; and neither fraud nor
violence, but truth and right, shall finally prevail.  Christianity is a particular scheme under this general plan of
Providence, and a part of it, conducive to its completion, with
regard to mankind; consisting itself, also, of various parts,
and a mysterious economy, which has been carrying on from
the time the world came into its present wretched state,
and is still carrying on, for its recovery, by a Divine person,
the Messiah, "who is to gather together in one the children
of God that are scattered abroad,"(1) and establish "an
everlasting kingdom, wherein dwelleth righteousness."(2)
And in order to it, after various manifestations of things,
relating to this great and general scheme of Providence,
through a succession of many ages-" for the Spirit of
Christ, which -was in the prophets, testified beforehand his
sufferings, and the glory that should follow: unto whom it
was revealed, that not unto themselves, but unto us, they
did minister the things which are now reported unto us by
them  that have preached the Gospel; which things the
angels desire to look into" (3)-after various dispensations,
looking forward and preparatory to this final salvation, "in
the fullness of time," when Infinite wisdom thought fit, He,
"being in the form of God, made himself of no reputation,
and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made
m the likeness of men; and being found in fashion as a
man, he humbled himself, and became obedient to death.
even the death of the cross: wherefore God, also, bath
highly exalted him, and given him a name which is above
(1) John xi, 52.  (2) 2 Peter iii, 13. (3) 1 Peter i, 11, 12




CH'AP. IV.1    IMPEPFE(CTLY COMPREHENDED.    ~      1
every name; that at the name of Jesus every knee should
bow. of things in heaven, and things in the earth, and things
under the earth; and that every tongue should confess, that
Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father."(1)
Parts, likewise, of this economy, are the miraculous mission
of the Holy Ghost, and his ordinary assistances given to
good men; the invisible government which Christ at present
exercises over his Church; that which he himself refers to
in these words: "In my Father's house are many mansions;
I go to prepare a place for you;"(2) and his future return
to " judge the world in righteousness," and completely reestablish the kingdom of God.  "For the Father judgeth
no man; but hath committed all judgment unto the Son:
that all men should honor the Son, even as they honor the
Father."(3)  "All power is given unto him in heaven and in
earth."(4)  "And he must reign, till he hath put all enemies
under his feet. Then cometh the end, when he shall have
delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father; when
he shall have put down all rule, and all authority and
power.  And when all things shall be subdued unto him,
then shall the Son, also, himself be subject unto him that
put all things under him, that God may be all in all."(5)
Now little, surely, need be said to show, that this system,
or scheme of things, is but imperfectly comprehended by
us. The Scripture expressly asserts it to be so. And,
indeed, one cannot read a passage relating to this "great
mystery of godliness,"(6) but what immediately runs up
into something which shows us our ignorance in it; as every
thing in nature shows us our ignorance in the constitution
of nature. And whoever will seriously consider that part
of the Christian scheme which is revealed in Scripture, will
find so much more unrevealed, as will convince him, that, to
all the purposes of judging and objecting, we know as little
(1) Phil. ii. (2) John xiv, 2. (3) John v, 22, 23. (4) Matt
xxviii, 18. (5) 1 Cor. xv. (6) 1 Tim. iii, 16.
19




218             CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME          [PART IL.
of it, as of the constitution of nature.  Our ignorance,
therefore, is as much an answer to our objections against
the perfection of one, as against the perfection of the
other.(1)
II. It is obvious, too, that in the Christian dispensation,
as much as in the natural scheme of things, means are
made use of to accomplish ends. And the observation of
this furnishes us with the same answer to objections against
the perfection of Christianity, as to objections of the like
kind against the constitution of nature. It shows the credibility, that the things objected against, how foolish(2)
soever they appear to men, may be the very best means of
accomplishing the very best ends. And their appearing
foolishness is no presumption against this, in a scheme so
greatly beyond our comprehension.(3)
III. The credibility, that the Christian dispensation may
have been, all along, carried on by general laws,(4) no less
than the course of nature, may require to be more distinctly
made out. Consider, then, upon what ground it is we say,
that the whole common course of nature is carried on
according to general foreordained laws. We know, indeed,
several of the general laws of matter; and a great part of
the natural behavior of living agents is reducible to general
laws. But we know, in a manner, nothing, by what laws,
storms and tempests, earthquakes, famine, pestilence, become the instruments of destruction to mankind. And the
laws by which persons born into the world at such a time
and place, are of such capacities, geniuses, tempers; the
laws by which thoughts come into our mind, in a multitude
of cases; and by which innumerable things happen, of the
greatest influence upon the affairs and state of the world:
these laws are so wholly unknown to us, that we call the
events, which come to pass by them, accidental; though all
(1) Page 159, &c. (2) 1 Cor. i, 18, &c. (3) Pages 162. 163
(4) Pages 165, 166.




CHAP. IV.]   IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.              219
reasonable men know certainly, that there cannot, in reality,
be any such thing as chance, and conclude that the things
which have this appearance are the result of general laws,
and may be reduced into them. It is, then, but an exceeding little way, and in but a very few respects, that we can
trace up the natural course of things before us, to general
laws.  And it is only from analogy that we conclude the
whole of it to be capable of being reduced into them-only
fiom our seeing, that part is so.  It is from our finding that
the course of nature, in some respects and so far, goes on
by general laws, that we conclude this of the rest. And
if that be a just ground for such a conclusion, it is a just
ground, also, if not to conclude, yet to apprehend-to
render it supposable and credible, which is sufficient for
answering objections, that God's miraculous interpositions
may have been, all along, in like manner, by general laws
of wisdom. Thus, that miraculous powers should be exerted at such times, upon such occasions, in such degrees
and manners, and with regard to such persons, rather than
others; that the affairs of the world, being permitted to go
on in their natural course so far, should, just at such a
point, have a new direction given them by miraculous interpositions; that these interpositions should be exactly in
such degrees and respects only: all this may have been by
general laws.  These laws are unknown, indeed, to us; but
no more unknown, than the laws from whence it is, that
some die as soon as they are born, and others live to
extreme old age; that one man is so superior to another in
understanding; with innumerable more things, which, as
was before observed, we cannot reduce to any laws or rules
at all, though it is taken for granted, they are as much
reducible to general ones as gravitation.  Now, if the
revealed dispensations of Providence, and miraculous interpositions, be by general laws, as well as God's ordinary
~rovernment in the course of nature, made known by reason




220             CIMTISTIANITY A SCItEME        [PART IL.,
and experience; there is no more reason to expect that
every exigence, as it arises, should be provided for by these
general laws of miraculous interposition, than that every
exigence in nature should, by the general laws of nature;
yet there might be wise and good reasons, that miraculous
interpositions should be by general laws; and that these
laws should not be broken in upon, or deviated fiom, by
other miracles.
Upon the whole, then, the appearance of deficienc'es
and irregularities in nature, is owing to its being a scheme
but in part made known, and of such a certain particular
kind in other respects.  Now, we see no more reason, why
the frame and course of nature should be such a scheme,
than why Christianity should.  And that the former is such
a scheme renders it credible, that the latter, upon supposition of its truth, may be so too. And, as it is manifest that
Christianity is a scheme revealed but in part, and a scheme
in which means are made use of to accomplish ends, like to
that of nature, so the credibility that it may have been all
along carried on by general laws no less than the course of
nature, has been distinctly proved., And from all this it is
beforehand credible, that there might, I think probable that
there would, be the like appearance of deficiencies and
irregularities in Christianity as in nature; that is, that Christianity would be liable to the like objections, as the frame
of nature.  And these objections are answered by these
observations concerning Christianity; as the like objections
against the frame of nature, are answered by the like observations concerning the frame of nature.
The objections against Christianity, considered as a matter
of fact,(1) having, in general, been obviated in the preceding
(1) Page 154, &c.




CHAP. IV.]   IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.             221
chapter; and the same, considered as made against the
wisdom and goodness of it, having been obviated in this;
the next thing, according to the method proposed, is to
show, that the principal objections in particular, against
Christianity, may be answered by particular and full analogies in nature. And as one of them is made against the
whole scheme of it together, as just now described, I choose
to consider it here, rather than in a distinct chapter by
itself. The thing objected against this scheme of the Gospel is, "That it seems to suppose God was reduced to the.
necessity of a long series of intricate means, in order to
accomplish his ends, the recovery and salvation of the
world; in like sort as men, for want of understanding, or
power, not being able to come at their ends directly, are
forced to go round-about ways, and make use of many perplexed contrivances to arrive at them." Now, every thing
which we see shows the folly of this, considered as an
objection against the truth of Christianity.  For, according
to our manner of conception, God makes use of variety of
means, what we often think tedious ones, in the natural
course of Providence, for the accomplishment of all his
ends. Indeed, it is certain, there is somewhat in this matter
quite beyond our comprehension; but the mystery is as
great in nature as in Christianity. We know what we ourselves aim at, as final ends; and what courses we take,
merely as means conducing to those ends. But we are
greatly ignorant, how far things are considered by the
Author of nature, under the single notion of means and
ends; so as that it may be said, this is merely an end, and
that merely means, in his regard. And whether there be
not some peculiar absurdity in our very manner of conception concerning this matter, somewhat contradictory, arising
from our extremely imperfect views of things, it is impossible to say. However, thus much is manifest, that the
whole natural world and government of it is a scheme, or




222   CHRISTIANITY IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED, LPART II
system; not a fixed, but a progressive one: a scheme, in
which the operation of various means takes up a great
length of time, before the ends they tend to can be attained.
The change of seasons, the ripening of the fruits of the
earth, the very history of a flower, is an instance of this;
and so is human life. Thus, vegetable bodies, and those of
animals, though possibly formed at once, yet grow up by
degrees to a mature state.  And thus, rational agents, who
animate these latter bodies, are naturally directed to form,
each his own manners and character, by the gradual gaining of knowledge and experience, and by a long course of
action.  Our existence is not only successive, as it must be
of necessity, but one state of our life and being is appointed
by God to be a preparation for another; and that, to be the
means of attaining to another succeeding one: infancy to
childhood, childhood to youth, youth to mature age.  Men
are impatient, and for precipitating things; but the Author
of nature appears deliberate throughout his operations,
accomplishing his natural ends by slow successive steps.
And there is a plan of things beforehand laid out, which,
from the nature of it, requires various systems of means,
as well as length of time, in order to the carrying on its
several parts into execution.  Thus, in the daily course of
natural Providence, God operates in the very same manner
as in the dispensation of Christianity; making one thing
subservient to another; this, to somewhat farther; and so
on, through a progressive series of means, which extend,
both backward and forward, beyond our utmost view.  Of
this manner of operation, every thing we see in the course
of nature is as much an instance, as any part of the Chris.
tian dispensation.




CHAP. V.]     A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER.              228
CHAPTER V.
OF THE PARTICULAR SYSTEM  OF CHRISTIANITY; THE APPOINTMENT OF A MEDIATOR, AND THE REDEMPTION  OF
THE WORLD BY HIM.
THERE is not, I think, any thing relating to Christianity,
which has been more objected against, than the mediation
of Christ, in some or other of its parts. Yet, upon thorough
consideration, there seems nothing less justly liable to it.
For,
I. The whole analogy of nature removes all imagined
presumption against the general notion of "a Mediator between God and man."(1)  For, we find, all living creatures
are brought into the world, and their life in infancy is preserved, by the instrumentality of others; and every satisfaction of it, some way or other, is bestowed by the like means.
So that the visible government, which God exercises over
the world, is by the instrumentality and mediation of others.
And how far his invisible government be or be not so, it is
impossible to determine at all by reason. And the supposition, that part of it is so, appears, to say the least, altogether
as credible as the contrary. There is then no sort of objection, from the light of nature, against the general notion of
a mediator between God and man, considered as a doctrine
of Christianity, or as an appointment in this dispensation;
since we find, by experience, that God does appoint mediators, to be the instruments of good and evil to us, the
instruments of his justice and his mercy. And the objection
here referred to is urged, not against mediation in that high,
eminent, and peculiar sense, in which Christ is our mediator;
but absolutely against the whole notion itself of a mediator
ta all.
II. As we must suppose, that the world is under the
(1) 1 Tim. ii, 5.




224              THE APPOINTMENT OF            LPART 1I,
proper moral government of God, or in a state of religion,
before we can enter into consideration of the revealed doctrine concerning the redemption of it by Christ; so that
supposition is here to be distinctly taken notice of. lNow,
the Divine moral government which religion teaches us, imn
plies, that the consequence of vice shall be misery, in sonic
future state, by the righteous judgment of God. That such
consequent punishment shall take effect by his appointments,
is necessarily implied. But, as it is not in any sort to be
supposed, that we are made acquainted with all the ends or
reasons for which it is fit future punishment should be inflicted, or why God has appointed such and such consequent
misery should follow vice; and as we are altogether in the
dark, how or in what manner it shall follow, by what immediate occasions, or by the instrumentality of what means;
there is no absurdlty in supposing, it may follow in a way
analogous to that in which many miseries follow such and
such courses of action at present-poverty, sickness, infamy,
untimely death by diseases, death from the hands of civil
justice. There is no absurdity in supposing future punishment may follow wickedness of course, as we speak, or in the
way of natural consequence, from God's original constitution of the world; from the nature he has given us, and
fx om the condition in which he places us: or, in a like manner,
as a person rashly trifling upon a precipice, in the way of
natural consequence, falls down; in the way of natural con
sequence, breaks his limbs, suppose; in the way of naturi
consequence of this, without help, perishes.
Some good men may, perhaps, be offended, with bearing
it spoken of as a supposable thing, that the future punishments of wickedness may be in the way of natural consequence; as if this were taking the execution of justice out
of the hands of God, and giving it to nature. But they
should remember that, when things come to pass according
to the course of nature, this does not hinder them from being




CHAP. V.]     A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER.              225
his doing, who is the God of nature; and that the Scripture
ascribes those punishments to Divine justice, which are
known to be natural; and which must be called s%, when
distinguished from such as are miraculous. But, after all,
this supposition, or rather this way of speaking, is here
made use of only by way of illustration of the subject before
us. For, since it must be admitted, that the future punishment of wickedness is not a matter of arbitrary appointment,
but of reason, equity, and justice, it comes, for aught I see,
to the same thing, whether it is supposed to be inflicted in
a way analogous to that in which the temporal punishments
of vice and folly are inflicted, or in any other way. And
though there were a difference, it is allowable in the present
case to make this supposition, plainly not an incredible one,
that future punishment may follow wickedness in the way
of natural consequence, or according to some general laws
of government already established in the universe.
III. Upon this supposition, or even without it, we may
observe somewhat, much to the present purpose, in the
constitution of nature, or appointments of Providence: the
provision which is made, that all the bad natural consequences of men's actions should not always actually follow;
or, that such bad consequences, as, according to the settled
course of things, would inevitably have followed if not prevented, should, in certain degrees, be prevented.  W~e are
apt, presumptuously, to imagine, that the world might have
been so constituted, as that there would not have been any
suc: thing as misery or evil.  On the contrary, we find the
Author of nature permits it. But then, he has provided reliefs, and, in many cases, perfect remedies for it, after some
pains and difficulties-reliefs and remedies even for that evil,
which is the fruit of our own misconduct, and which, in the
course of nature, would have continued, and ended in our
destruction, but for such remedies.  And this is an instance
both of severity and of indulgence, in the constitution of




226              THE APPOINTMENT OF           [PART n,
nature. Thus, all the bad consequences, now mentioned, of
a man's trifling upon a precipice, might be prevented. And,
though all were not, yet some of them might, by proper
interposition, if not rejected; by another's coming to the
rash man's relief, with his own laying hold on that relief, in such sort as the case requires. Persons may do a
great deal themselves toward preventing the bad consequences of their follies; and more may be done by themselves, together with the assistance of others, their fellowcreatures; which assistance nature requires and prompts us
to. This is the general constitution of the world. Now,
suppose it had been so constituted, that after such actions
were done, as were foreseen naturally to draw after them
misery to the doer, it should have been no more in human
power to have prevented that naturally consequent misery,
in any instance, than it is in all; no one can say, whether
such a more severe constitution of things might not yet have
been really good. But that, on the contrary, provision is
made by nature, that we may and do, to so great degree,
prevent the bad natural effects of our follies; this may be
called mercy, or compassion, in the original constitution of
the world-compassion, as distinguished from goodness in
general. And, the whole known constitution and course of
things affording us instances of such compassion, it would be
according to the analogy of nature to hope, that, however
ruinous the natural consequences of vice might be, from the
general laws of God's government over the universe, yet
provision might be made, possibly might have been originally made, for preventing those ruinous consequences from'
inevitably following; at least, from following universally,
and in all cases.
Many, I am sensible, will wonder at finding this made a
question, or spoken of as in any degree doubtful. The
generality of mankind are so far from having that awftil
sense of things, which the present state of vice, and misery,




CtIAP. V.]    A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER.               227
and darkness, seems to make but reasonable, that they have
scarce any apprehension, or thought at all, about this matter,
any way; and some serious persons may have spoken unadvisedly concerning it. But let us observe, what we experience to be, and what, from the very constitution of nature,
cannot but be, the consequences of irregular and disorderly
behavior —even of such rashness, willfulness, neglects, as we
scarce call vicious. Now, it is natural to apprehend, that
the bad consequences of irregularity will be greater, in proportion as the irregularity is' so. And there is no comparison
between these irregularities, and the greater instances of
vice, or a dissolute profligate disregard to all religion, if
there be any thing at all in religion. For, consider what it
is for creatures, moral agents, presumptuously to introduce
that confusion and misery into the kingdom of God, which
mankind have, in fact, introduced; to blaspheme the sovereign Lord of all; to contemn his authority; to be injurious
to the degree they are, to their fellow-creatures, the creatures of God.  Add, that the effects of vice, in the present
world, are often extreme misery, irretrievable ruin, and even
death: and, upon putting all this together, it will appear,
that as no one can say, in what degree fatal the unprevented
consequences of vice may be, according to the general rule
of Divine government; so it is by no means intuitively certain, how far these consequences could possibly, in the nature
of the thing, be prevented, consistently with the eternal rule
of right, or with what is, in fact, the moral constitution of
nature.  However, there would be large ground to hope,
that the universal government was not so severely strict, but
that there was room for pardon, or for having those penal
consequences prevented. Yet,
IV. There seems no probability, that any thing we could
do, would alone, and of itself, prevent them-prevent their
following, or being inflicted. But one would think, at least, it
were impossible that the contrary should be thought certain.




228              THE APPOINTMENT OF            [PART Il.
For we aie not acquainted with the whole of the case.
We are not informed of all the reasons, which render it fit
that future punishments should be inflicted; and, therefore,
cannot know, whether any thing we could do would make
such an alteration, as to render it fit that they should be
remitted.  We do not know, what the whole natural or
appointed consequences of vice are, nor in what way they
would follow, if not prevented; and, therefore, can in no
sort say, whether we could do any thing, which would be
sufficient to prevent them. Our ignorance being thus manifest, let us recollect the analogy of nature, or Providence.
For though this may be but a slight ground to raise a positive opinion upon in this matter, yet it is sufficient to answer
a mere arbitrary assertion, without any kind of evidence,
urged by way of objection against a doctrine, the proof of
which is not reason, but revelation. Consider, then, people
ruin their fortunes by extravagance; they bring diseases
upon themselves by excess; they incur the penalties of
civil laws, and surely civil government is natural: will sorrow for these follies past, and behaving well for the future,
alone and of itself, prevent the natural consequences of
them? On the contrary, men's natural abilities of helping
themselves are often impaired; or, if not, yet they are
forced to be beholden to the assistance of others, upon
several accounts, and in different ways-assistance which
they would have had no occasion for, had it not been for
their misconduct; but which, in the disadvantageous condition they had reduced themselves to, is absolutely necessary
to their recovery, and retrieving their affairs. Now, since
this is our case, considering ourselves merely as inhabitants
of this world, and as having a temporal interest here, under
the natural government of God, which, however, has a
great deal moral in it; why is it not supposable, that this
may be our case, also, in our more important capacity,
as under his perfect moral government, and having a




CHAP. V.]     A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER.            229
more general and future interest depending?  If we have
misbehaved in this higher capacity, and rendered ourselves
obnoxious to the future punishment which God has annexed
to vice; it is plainly credible, that behaving well for the
time to come, may be-not useless, God forbid-but wholly
insufficient, alone and of itself, to prevent that punishment;
or to put us in the condition which we should have been in,
had we preserved our innocence.
And though we ought to reason with all reverence, whenever we reason concerning the Divine conduct, yet it may
be added, that it is clearly contrary to all our notions of
government, as well as to what is, in fact, the general constitution of nature, to suppose that doing well for the future.
should, in all cases, prevent all the judicial bad consequences of having done evil, or all the punishment annexed
to disobedience. And we have manifestly nothing from
whence to determine, in what degree, and in what cases,
reformation would prevent this punishment, even supposing
that it would in some. And though the efficacy of repentance itself alone, to prevent what mankind had rendered
themselves obnoxious to, and recover what they had forfeited, is now insisted upon, in opposition to Christianity;
yet, by the general prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices
over the heathen world, this notion, of repentance alone
being sufficient to expiate guilt, appears to be contrary to
the general sense of mankind.
Upon the whole, then, had the laws, the general laws of
God's government, been permitted to operate, without any
interposition in our behalf, the future punishment, for aught
we know to the contrary, or have any reason to think, must
inevitably have followed, notwithstanding any thing we could
have done to prevent it. Now,
V. In this darkness, or this light of nature, call it which
you please, revelation comes in; confirms every doubting
fear, which could enter into the heart of man, concerning




230              THE APPOINTMENT OF            [PART TTI
the future unprevented consequence of wickedness; supposes the world to be in a state of ruin-a supposition
which seems the very ground of the Christian dispensation,
and which, if not provable by reason, yet is in nowiso
contrary to it; teaches us, too, that the rules of Divine government are such, as not to admit of pardon immediately
and directly upon repentance, or by the sole efficacy of it;
but then teaches, at the same time, what nature might
justly have hoped, that the moral government of the uni.
verse was not so rigid, but that there was room for an
interposition to avert the fatal consequences of vice; which,
therefore, by this means, does admit of pardon. Revelation teaches us, that the unknown laws of God's more
general government, no less than the particular laws by
which we experience he governs us at present, are compassionate,(1) as well as good, in the more general notion
of goodness; and that he hath mercifully provided, that
there should be an interposition to prevent the destruction
of human kind, whatever that destruction unprevented
would have been.  "God so loved the world, that he gave
his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth," not, to be
sure, in a speculative, but in a practical sense, "that whosoever believeth in him should not perish;"(2) gave his Son
in the same way of goodness to the world, as he affords
particular persons the friendly assistance of their fellowcreatures, when, without it, their temporal ruin would be
the certain consequence of their follies-in the same way of
goodness, I say, though in a transcendent and infinitely
higher degree. And the Son of God "loved us, and gave
himself for us," with a love which he himself compares to
that of human friendship; though, in this case, all comparisons must fall infinitely short of the thing intended to be;llustrated by them.  He interposed in such a manner, as
was necessary and effectual to prevent that execution of
(1) Page 225, &c.              (2) John iii, 16.




CHAP. V.]      A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER.                  231
justice upon sinners, which God had appointed should
otherwise have been executed upon them; or, in such a
manner, as to prevent that punishment from actually following, which, according to the general laws of Divine government, must have followed the sins of the world, had it
not been for such interposition.(l)
If any thing here said should appear, upon first thought,
inconsistent with Divine goodness, a second, I am persuaded,
will entirely remove that appearance. For, were we to suppose the constitution of things to be such, as that the whole
creation must have perished, had it not been for somewhat,
which God had appointed should be in order to prevent that
ruin; even this supposition would not be inconsistent, in
any degree, with the most absolutely perfect goodness. But
still it may be thought, that this whole manner of treating
the subject before us, supposes mankind to be naturally in
a very strange state.  And truly so it does.  But it is not
Christianity which has put us into this state. Whoever
(1) It cannot, I suppose, be imagined, even by the most cursory
reader, that it is, in any sort, affirmed, or implied, in any thing said
in this chapter, that none call have the benefit of the general redemption, bhut such as have the advantage of being made acquainted with
it in the present life. But it may be needful to mention, that several
questions, which have been brought into the subject before us, and
determined, are not in the least entered into here-questions which
have been, I fear, rashly determined, and, perhaps, with equal rashness, contrary ways. For instance, whether God could have saved
the world by other means than the death of Christ, consistently
with the general laws of his government? And, had not Christ
come into the world, what would have been the future condition
of the better sort of men —those just persons over the face of the
earth, for whom Manasses in his prayer asserts, repentance was not
appointed? The meaning of the first of these questions is greatly
ambiguous; and neither of them can properly be answered, without
going upon that infinitely absurd supposition, that we know the
whole of the case. And, perhaps, the very inquiry, what would have
followed if God had not done as he has? may have in it some very
great impropriety; and ought not to be carried on any farther than
is necessary to help our partial and inadequate conceptions of things,




232               THE APPOINTMENT OP              [PART IL
will consider the manifold miseries, and the extreme wickedness of the world; that the best have great wrongnesses
within themselves, which they complain of, and endeavor to
amend, but, that the generality grow more profligate and
corrupt with age; that heathen moralists thought the present
state to be a state of punishment; and, what might be added,
that the earth, our habitation, has the appearances of being
a ruin; whoever, I say, will consider all these, and some
other obvious things, will think he has little reason to object
against the Scripture account, that mankind is in a state of
degradation-against this being the fact: how difficult sosoever he may think it to account for, or even to form  a
distinct conception of, the occasions and circumstances of it.
But that the crime of our first parents was the occasion of
our being placed in a more disadvantageous condition, is a
thing throughout, and particularly analogous to what we
see, in the daily course of natural Providence; as the recovery of the world, by the interposition of Christ, has been
shown to be so in general.
VI. The particular manner in which Christ interposed in
the redemption of the world, or his office as Mediator, in
the largest sense, between God and man, is thus represented
to us in the Scripture: "He is the light of the world;"(1)
the revealer of the will of God in the most eminent sense: lie
is a propitiatory sacrifice;(2) "the Lamb of God;"(3) and,
as he voluntarily offered himself up, he is styled our High
Priest.(4)  And, which seems of peculiar weight, he is
described beforehand in the Old Testament, under the same
characters of a priest and an expiatory victim.(5)  And
whereas it is objected, that all this is merely by way of
(1) John i and viii, 12.
(2) Rom. iii, 25, and v, 11; 1 Cor. v, 7; Eph. v, 2; 1 John ii, 2;
MIatt. xxvi, 28.
(3) John i, 29, 36, and throughout the book of Revelation.
(4) Throughout the Epistle to the Hebrews.
(5) Isa. liii; Dan. ix, 24; Psalm cx, 4.




CHAP.o.]     A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER.             233
allusion to the sacrifices of the Mosaic law, the apostle, on the
contrary, affirms, that the "law was a shadow of good things
to come, and not the very image of the things;"(1) and
that "the priests that offer gifts according to the law, serve
unto the example and shadow of heavenly things, as Moses
was admonished of God, when he was about to make the
tabernacle.  For see, saith he, that thou make all things
according to the pattern showed to thee in the mount;"(2)
that is, the Levitical priesthood was a shadow of the priesthood of Christ, in like manner as the tabernacle made by
Moses was according to that showed him in the mount.
The priesthood of Christ and the tabernacle in the mount,
were the originals: of the former of which the Levitical
priesthood was a type; and of the latter, the tabernacle
made by Moses was a copy. The doctrine of this epistle,
then, plainly is, that the legal sacrifices were allusions to
the great and final atonement to be made by the blood of
Christ; and not that this was an allusion to those.  Nor
can any thing be more express or determinate, than the
following passage: "It is not possible that the blood of
bulls and of goats should take away sin. Wherefore, when
he cometh into the world, he saith, sacrifice and offering,"
that is, of bulls and of goats, "thou wouldst not, but a
body hast thou prepared me. Lo, I come to do thy will, O
God. By which will we are sanctified, through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all."(3) And to
add one passage more of the like kind: "Christ was once
)ffered to bear the sins of many; and unto them that look
for him shall he appear the second time, without sin;" that
is, without bearing sin, as he did at his first coming, by
being an offering for it; without having our "iniquities"
again "laid upon him," without being any more a sin-offering: "unto them that look for him shall he appear the
(1) Heb. x, 1. (2) Heb. viii, 4, 5. (3) Heb. x, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10.
20




234               THE APPOINTMENT OF               LPART II.
second time, without sin, unto salvation."(1) Nor do the
inspired writers at all confine themselves to this manner of
speaking concerning the satisfaction of Christ, but declare an
efficacy in what he did and suffered for us, additional to, and
beyond mere instruction, example, and government, in great
variety of expression: "That Jesus should die for that nation," the Jews; "and not for that nation only, but that,
also," plainly by the efficacy of his death, " he should gather
together in one the children of God that were scattered
abroad;"(2) that "he suffered for sins, the just for the
unjust;"(3) that "he gave his life, himself, a ransom;"(4)
that "we are bought, bought with a price;"(5) that "he
redeemed us with his blood;" "redeemed us from the curse
of the law, being made a curse for us;"(6) that he is our "advocate, intercessor, and propitiation;"(7) that " he was made
perfect," or consummate, "through sufferings;" and being
thus "made perfect, he became the author of salvation;"(8)
that "God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself,
by the death of his Son, by the cross; not imputing their
trespasses unto them;"(9) and, lastly, that "through death
he destroyed him that hac the power of death." (10)
Christ, then, having thus "humbled himself, and become
obedient to death, even the death of the cross, God, also,
hath highly exalted him, and given him a name which is
above every name;" "hath given all things into his hands;"
"hath committed all judgment unto him; that all men should
honor the Son, even as they honor the Father."(11)  For,
(1) Heb. ix, 28. (2) John xi, 51, 52. (3) 1 Pet. iii, 18.
(4) Matt. xx, 28; Mark x, 45; 1 Tim. ii, 6.
(5) 2 Pet. ii, 1; Rev. xiv, 4; 1 Cor. vi, 20.
(6) 1 Pet. i, 19; Rev. v, 9; Gal. iii, 13.
(7) Heb. vii, 25; 1 John ii, 1, 2. (8) Heb. ii, 10, and v, 9.
(9) 2 Cor. v, 19; Rom. v, 10; Eph. ii, 16.
(10) Heb. ii, 14; see, also, a remarkable passage in the book of
Job, xxxiii, 24.
(11) Phil. ii, 8, 9; John iii, 35, and v, 22, 23.




CHAP. V.]     A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER.              23 v
"worthy is the Lamb that was slain, to receive power, and
riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honor, and glory, and
blessing!  And every creature which is in heaven, and on
the earth, heard I, saying, Blessing, and honor, and glory,
and power, be unto him that sitteth upon the throne, and
unto the Lamb, for ever and ever!"(l)
These passages of Scripture seem to comprehend and
express the chief parts'of Christ's office, as mediator between God and man; so far, I mean, as the nature of this,
his office, is revealed; and it is usually treated of by divines
under three heads.
1. He was, by the way of eminence, the Prophet: "that
Prophet that should come into the world,"(2) to declare the
Divine will. He published anew the law of nature, which
men had corrupted; and the very knowledge of which, to
some degree, was lost among them. He taught mankind,
taught us authoritatively, to "live soberly, righteously, and
godly in this present world," in expectation of the future
judgment of God. He confirmed the truth of this moral
system of nature, and gave us additional evidence of it-the
evidence of testimony.(3)  HIe distinctly revealed the manner in which God would be worshiped, the efficacy of
repentance, and the rewards and punishments of a future
life. Thus he was a prophet in a sense in which no other
ever was. To which is to be added, that he set us a perfect
"example, that we should follow his steps."
2. He has a "kingdom which is not of this world." He
fi'nil~ed a church, to be to mankind a standing memorial of
religion, and invitation to it; which he promised to be with
always, even to the end.  He exercises an invisible government over it himself, and by his Spirit; over that part of it
which is militant here on earth, a government of discipline,
"'for the perfecting of the saints, for the edifying of his
body; till we all come in the unity of the faith, and of the
(1) Rev. v, 12, 13.    (2) John vi, 14.    (3) Page 176, &c.




236              THE APPOINTMENT O'            LPART ITo
knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the
measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ."(1) Of this
church, all persons scattered -over the world, who live in
obedience to his laws, are members. For these, he is "gone
to prepare a place, and will come again to receive them
unto himself, that where he is, there they may be also;" and
"reign with him for ever and ever:"(2) and, likewise, "to
take vengeance on them that know not God, and obey not
his Gospel."(3)
Against these parts of Christ's office, I find no objections
but what are fully obviated in the beginning of this chapter.
Lastly, Christ offered himself a propitiatory sacrifice, and
made atonement for the sins of the world: which is mentioned last, in regard to what is objected against it. Sacrifices of expiation were commanded the Jews, and obtained
amongst most other nations, from tradition, whose original
probably was revelation. And they were continually repeated, both occasionally and at the returns of stated times;
and made up great part of the external religion of mankind.
"But now once in the end of the world Christ appeared, to
put away sin by the sacrifice of himself."(4) And this
sacrifice was in the highest degree, and with the most extensive influence, of that efficacy for obtaining pardon of sin,
which the heathens may be supposed to have thought their
sacrifices to have been, and which the Jewish sacrifices really
were in some degree, and with regard to some persons.
How, and in what particular way, it had this efficacy,
there are not wanting persons who have endeavored to explain; but I do not find that the Scripture has explained it.
We seem to be very much in the dark concerning the manner in which the ancients understood atonement to be made,
that is, pardon to be obtained, by sacrifices. And if the
Scripture has, as surely it has, left this matter of the satis(1) Eph. iv, 12, 13.  (2) John xiv, 2, 3  Rev. iii, 21, and xi. 15
(3) 2 Thess. i, 8.    (4) Heb. ix, 26.




CHAP. V.1     A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER.             23'/
faction of Christ mysterious, left somewhat in it unrevealed,
all conjectures about it must be, if not evidently absurd, yet
at least uncertain. Nor has any one reason to complain for
want of farther information, unless he can show his claim
t) it.
Some have endeavored to explain the efficacy of what
Christ has done and suffered for us, beyond what the Scripture has authorized; others, probably because they could
not explain it, have been for taking it away, and confining
his office, as Redeemer of the world, to his instruction, example, and government of the Church: whereas, the doctrine
of the Gospel appears to be, not only that he taught the
efficacy of repentance, but rendered it of the efficacy of which
it is, by what he did and suffered for us; that he obtained
for us the benefit of having our repentance accepted unto
eternal life: not only that he revealed to sinners, that they
were in a capacity of salvation, and how they might obtain
it; but, moreover, that he put them into this capacity of
salvation, by what he did and suffered for them-put us into
a capacity of escaping future punishment, and obtaining
future happiness.  And it is our wisdom thankfully to accept the benefit, by performing the conditions upon which it
is offered, on our part, without disputing how it was procured on his. For,
VII. Since we neither know by what means punishment
in a future state would have followed wickedness in this;
nor in what manner it would have been inflicted, had it not
been prevented; nor all the reasons why its infliction would
have been needful; nor the particular nature of that sta tLe
of happiness which Christ has gone to prepare for his disciples; and since we are ignorant how far any thing which
we could do, would, alone and of itself, have been effectual
to prevent that punishment to which we were obnoxious,
and recover that happiness which we had forfeited; it is
most evident we are not judges, antecedently to revelation,




038              THE APPOINTMENT OF           LPART 1].
whether a mediator was or was not necessary to obtain thoser
ends; to prevent that future punishment, and bring mankind
to the final happiness of their nature. And for the very
same reasons, upon supposition of the necessity of a mediator, we are no more judges, antecedently to revelation, of
the whole nature of his office, or the several parts of which
it consists; of what was fit and requisite to be assigned him,
in order to accomplish the ends of divine Providence in the
appointment. And from hence it follows, that to object
against the expediency or usefulness of particular things,
revealed to have been done or suffered by him, because we
do not see how they were conducive to those ends, is highly
absurd. Yet nothing is more common to be met with than
this absurdity.  But if it be acknowledged beforehand, that
we are not judges in the case, it is evident that no objection
can, with any shadow of reason, be urged against any particular part of Christ's mediatorial office revealed in Scripture.,
till it can be shown positively, not to be requisite, or conducive, to the ends proposed to be accomplished; or that it
is in itself unreasonable.
And there is one objection made against the satisfaction
of Christ, which looks to be of this positive kind; that the
doctrine of his being appointed to suffer for the sins of the.
world, represents God as being indifferent whether he punished the innocent or the guilty. Now, from the foregoing
observations, we may see the extreme slightness of all such
objections; and, (though it is most certain all who make
them do not see the consequence,) that they conclude altogether as much against God's whole original constitution of
nature, and the whole daily course of divine Providence, in
the government of the world, that is, against the whole
scheme of theism and the whole notion of religion, as against
Christianity. For the world is a constitution, or system,
whose parts have a mutual reference to each other; and
there is a scheme of things gradually carrying on, called the




CHAP. v.]     A MEDIATOR AND REDEERMER.             239
course of nature, to the carrying on of which God has appointed us, in various ways, to contribute. And when, in
the daily course of natural Providence, it is appointed that
innocent people should suffer for the faults of the guilty,
this is liable to the very same objection as the instance we
are now considering.  The infinitely greater importance of
that appointment of Christianity which is objected against,
does not hinder, but it may be, as it plainly is, an appointment of the very same kind with what the world affords us
daily examples of. Nay, if there were any force at all in
the objection, it would be stronger, in one respect, against
natural Providence, than against Christianity; because, under
the former, we are in many cases commanded, and even
necessitated, whether we will or no, to suffer for the faults
of others; whereas the sufferings of Christ were voluntary.
The world's being under the righteous government of God,
does indeed imply that, finally, and upon the whole, every
one shall receive according to his personal deserts; and the
general doctrine of the whole Scripture is, that this shall be
the completion of the Divine government.  But, during the
progress, and, for aught we know, even in order to the
completion of this moral scheme, vicarious punishments may
be fit, and absolutely necessary.  Men, by their follies, run
themselves into extreme distress; into difficulties which
would be absolutely fatal to them, were it not for the interposition and assistance of others. God commands, by the
law of nature, that we afford them this assistance, in many
cases where we cannot do it without very great pains, and
labor, and sufferings to ourselves. And we see in what
variety of ways one person's sufferings contribute to the
relief of another; and how, or by what particular meant,
this comes to pass, or follows, from the constitution and
laws of nature, which come under our notice; and being
familiarized to it, men are not shocked with it.  So that the;eason of their insisting upon objections of the foregoing




24t0              THE APPOINTMENT OF            [PART II.
kind, against the satisfaction of Christ, is, either that they
do not consider God's settled and uniform appointments as
his appointments at all, or else they forget that vicarious
punishment is a Providential appointment of every day's experience: and then, from their being unacquainted with the
more general laws of nature, or Divine government over the
world, and not seeing how the sufferings of Christ could contribute to the redemption of it, unless by arbitrary and tyrannical will, they conclude his sufferings could not contribute to
it any other way.  And yet, what has been often alledged in
justification of this doctrine, even from the apparent natural
tendency of this method of our redemption —its tendency to
vrinfdicate the authority of God's laws, and deter his creatures
fiom sin: this has never yet been answered, and is, I think,
plainly unanswerable: though I am far from thinking it an
account of the whole of the case.  But without taking this
into consideration, it abundantly appears, from the observations above made, that this objection is, not an objection
against Christianity, but against the whole general constitution of nature. And if it were to be considered as an objection against Christianity, or considering it as it is, an objection
against the constitution of nature, it amounts to no more in
conclusion than this, that a Divine appointment cannot be
necessary, or expedient, because the objector does not
discern it to be so; though he must own that the nature
of the case is such, as renders him  incapable of judging
whether it be so or not; or of seeing it to be necessary,
though it were so.
It is, indeed, a matter of great patience to reasonable
men, to find people arguing in this manner; objecting
against the credibility of such particular things revealed in
Scripture, that they do not see the necessity or expediency
of them. For, though it is highly right, and the most pious
exercise of our understanding, to inquire with due reverence
into the ends and reasons of God's dispensations; yet, when




CHAP. V.]     A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER.               241
those reasons are concealed, to argue from  our ignorance,
that such dispensations cannot be from God, is infinitely
absurd.  The presumption of this kind of objections seems
almost lost in the folly of them. And the folly of them is
yet greater, when they are urged, as usually they are,
against things in Christianity analogous, or like to those
natural dispensations of Providence, which are matter of
experience. Let reason be kept to; and, if any part of the
Scripture account of the redemption of the world by Christ
can be shown to be really contrary to it, let the Scriptures,
in the name of God, be given up: but let not such poor
creatures as we, go on objecting against an infinite scheme,
that we do not see the necessity or usefulness of all its
parts, and call this reasoning; and, which still farther
heightens the absurdity in the present case, parts which we
are not actively concerned in.  For, it may be worth mentioning,
Lastly, That not only the reason of the thing, but the
whole analogy of nature, should teach us, not to expect to
have the like information concerning the Divine conduct, as
concerning our own duty.  God instructs us by experience,
(for it is not reason, but experience, which instructs us,) what
good or bad consequences will follow from our acting in
such and such manners; and by this he directs us how we
are to behave ourselves.  But, though we are sufficiently
instructed for the common purposes of life, yet it is but an
almost infinitely small part of natural Providence which we
are at all let into. The case is the same with regard to
revelation.  The doctrine of a mediator between God and
man, against which it is objected, that the expediency of
some things in it is not understood, relates only to what was
done on God's part in the appointment, and on the Mediator's in the execution of it.  For what is required of us, in
consequence of this gracious dispensation, is another subject,
in which none can complain for want of information. The
21




242           A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER.          [PART II.
constitution of the world, and God's natural government
over it, is all mystery, as much as the Christian dispensation.
Yet, under the first, he has given men all things pertaining
to life; and under the other, all things pertaining unto godliness. And, it may be added, that there is nothing hard
to be accounted for in any of the common precepts of
Christianity; though, if there were, surely a Divine conmmand is abundantly sufficient to lay us under the strongest
obligations to obedience. But the fact is, that the reasons
of all the Christian precepts are evident. Positive institutions are manifestly necessary to keep up and propagate
religion amongst mankind.  And our duty to Christ, the
internal and external worship of him; this part of the religion of the Gospel manifestly arises out of what he has done
and suffered, his authority and dominion, and the relation
which he is revealed to stand in to us.(1)
(1) Page 179, &c.




CH&P. VI.] WANT OF UNIVERSALITY IN REVELATION.    243
CHAPTER VI.
OF' THE WANT OF UNIVERSALITY IN REVELATION; AND OF THE
SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY:IN THE PROOF OF IT.
IT has been thought, by some persons, that if the evidence of revelation appears doubtful, this itself turns into
a positive argument against it; because it cannot be supposed, that, if it were true, it would be left to subsist upon
doubtful evidence. And the objection against revelation,
from its not being universal, is often insisted upon as of
great weight.
Now, the weakness of these opinions may be shown, by
observing the suppositions on which they are founded,
which are really such as these: that it cannot be thought
God would have bestowed any favor at all upon us, unless
in the degree which, we think, he might, and which, we
imagine, would be most to our particular advantage; and,
also, that it cannot be thought he would bestow a favor
upon any, unless he bestowed the same upon all: suppositions which we find contradicted, not by a few instances in
God's natural government of the world, but by the general
analogy of nature together.
Persons who speak of the evidence of religion as doubtful,
and of this supposed doubtfulness as a positive argument
against it, should be put upon considering, what that evidence, indeed, is, which they act upon with regard to their
temporal interests. For, it is not only extremely difficult,
but, in many cases, absolutely impossible, to balance pleasure and pain, satisfaction, and uneasiness, so as to be able
to say, on which side the overplus is. There are the like
difficulties and impossibilities, in making the due allowances
for a change of temper and taste, for satiety, disgusts, illhealth; any of which render men incapable of enjoying,
after they have obtained, what -they most eagerly desired.




244           tEYVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL:       LPART If.
Numb)erless, too, are the accidents, besides that one of untimely death, which may even probably disappoint the best
concerted schemes; and strong objections are often seen to
lie against them, not to be removed or answered, but which
seem overbalanced by reasons on the other side; so as
that the certain difficulties and dangers of the pursuit
are, by every one, thought justly disregarded, upon account of the appearing greater advantages in case of success, though there be but little probability of it. Lastly,
every one observes our liableness, if we be not upon our
guard, to be deceived by the falsehood of men, and thc
false appearances of things; and this danger must be
greatly increased, if there be a strong bias within, suppose from  indulged passion, to favor the deceit.  Hence
arises that great uncertainty and doubtfulness of proof,
wherein our temporal interest really consists; what are
the most probable means of attaining it; and whether
those means will eventually be successful. And numberless instances there are, in the daily course of life, in which
all men think it reasonable to engage in pursuits, though
the probability is greatly against succeeding; and to make
such provision for themselves, as it is supposable they may
have occasion for, though the plain acknowledged probability is, that they never shall.  Then those who think the objection against revelation, from its light not being universal,
to be of weight, should observe, that the Author of nature,
in numberless instances, bestows that upon some, which he
does not upon others, who seem equally to stand in need of
it. Indeed, he appears to bestow all his gifts with the
most promiscuous variety, among creatures of the same
species; health and strength, capacities of prudence and
of knowledge, means of improvement, riches, and all external advantages.  And as there are not any two men
found of exactly like shape and features, so, it is probable there are not any two of an exactly like constitution,




HIAP. VI.]  SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF.       24b
temper, and situation, with regard to the goods and evils
of life. Yet, notwithstanding these uncertainties and varieties, God does exercise a natural government over the
world; and there is such a thing as a prudent and imprudent institution of life, with regard to our health and out
affairs, under that his natural government.
As neither the Jewish nor Christian revelation have been
universal, and as they have been afforded to a greater or
less part of the world, at different times, so, likewise, at
different times, both revelations have had different degrees
of evidence. The Jews who lived during the succession of
prophets, that is, from  Moses till after the captivity, had
higher evidence of the truth of their religion, than those
had who lived in the interval between the last-mentioned
period and the coming of Christ.  And the first Christians
had higher evidence of the miracles wrought in attestation
of Christianity than what we have now.  They had, also, a
strong presumptive proof of the truth of it, perhaps of
much greater force, in way of argument, than many think,
of which we have very little remaining; I mean, the presumptive proof of its truth from the influence which it had
upon the lives of the generality of its professors. And
we, or future ages, may possibly have a proof of it, which
they could not have, from the conformity between the prophetic history, and the state of the world, and of Christianity. And farther, if we were to suppose the evidence,
which some have of religion, to amount to little more than
seeing that it may be true, but that they remain in great
doubts and uncertainties about both its evidence and its
nature, and great perplexities concerning the rule of life;
others to have a full conviction of the truth of religion,
with a distinct knowledge of their duty; and others severally to have all the intermediate degrees of religious light
and evidence, which lie between those two; if we put the
case, that for the present it was intended revelation should




246          REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL:        LPART 11.
be no more than a small light, in the midst of a world
greatly overspread, notwithstanding it, with ignorance and
darkness; that certain glimmerings of the light should extend, and be directed, to remote distances, in such a manner as. that those who really partook of it should not discern from whence it originally came; that some, in a nearer
situation to it, should have its light obscured, and, in different ways and degrees, intercepted; and that others should
be placed within its clearer influence, and be much more
enlivened, cheered, and directed by it; but yet, that even
to these it should be no more than "a light shining in a
dark place;" all this would be perfectly uniform and of a
piece with the conduct of Providence, in the distribution of
its other blessings. If the fact of the case really were,
that some have received no light at all from the Scripture;
as many ages and countries in the heathen world: that
others, though they have, by means of it, had essential or
natural religion enforced upon their consciences, yet have
never had the genuine Scripture revelation, with its real
evidence, proposed to their consideration; and the ancient
Persians and modern Mohammedans may possibly be instances of people in a situation somewhat like to this: that
others, though they have had the Scripture laid before
them as of Divine revelation, yet have had it with the system and evidence of Christianity so interpolated, the system so corrupted, the evidence so blended with false miraccAs, as to leave the mind in the utmost doubtfulness and
uncertainty about the whole; which may be the state of
some thoughtful men in most of those nations who call
themselves Christian: and, lastly, that others have had
Christianity offered to them in its genuine simplicity, and
with its proper evidence, as persons in countries and
Churches of civil and Christian liberty; but, however,
that even these persons are left in great ignorance in -many
respects, and have by no means light afforded them enough




CHAP. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF.      247
to satisfy their curiosity, but only to regulate their life, to
teach them their duty, and encourage them in the careful
discharge of it: I say, if we were to suppose this somewhat
of a general true account of the degrees of moral and
religious light and evidence, which were intended to be
afforded mankind, and of what has actually been and is
their situation, in their moral and religious capacity, there
would be nothing in all this ignorance, doubtfulness, and
uncertainty, in all these varieties and supposed disadvantages of some in comparison of others, respecting religion,
Dut may be paralleled by manifest analogies in the natural
dispensations of Providence at present, and considering ourselves merely in our moral capacity.
Nor is there any thing slhocking in all this, or which
would seem to bear hard upon the moral administration in
nature, if we would rea. ly keep in mind, that every one
shall be dealt equitably with; instead of forgetting this,
or explaining it away, after it is acknowledged in words.
All shadow of injustice, and, indeed, all harsh appearances,
in this various economy of Providence, would be lost, if we
would keep in mind, that every merciful allowance shall
be made, and no more be required of any one, than what
might have been equitably expected of him, from the circumstances in which he was placed; and not what might
have been expected, had he been placed in other circumstances; that is, in Scripture language, that every man shall
be "accepted according to what he had, not according to
what he had not."(1)  This, however, doth not by any
means imply, that all persons' condition here is equally advantageous with respect to futurity.  And Providence's
designing to place some in greater darkness with respect to
religious knowledge, is no more reason why they should not
endeavor to get out of that darkness, and others to bring
them out of it, than why ignorant and slow people, in
(1) 2 Cor. viii, 12.




248           REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL:         [PART 2I.
matters of other knowledge, should not endeavor to learn,
or should not be instructed.
It is not unreasonable to suppose, that the same wise and
good principle, whatever it was, which disposed the Author
of nature to make different kinds and orders of creatures,
disposed him, also, to place creatures of like kinds in different situations; and that the same principle which disposed
him to make creatures of different moral capacities, disposed
him, also, to place creatures of like moral capacities in
different religious situations; and, even, the same creatures,
in different periods of their being. And the account or
reason of this, is, also, most probably the account why the
constitution of things is such, as that creatures of moral
natures or capacities, for a considerable part of that duration in which they are living agents, are not at all subjects
of morality and religion; but grow up to be so, and grow
up to be so more and more, gradually, from childhood to
mature age.
What, in particular, is the account or reason of these
things, we must be greatly in the dark, were it only that
we know so very little even of our own case. Our present
state may possibly be the consequence of somewhat past,
which we are wholly ignorant of; as it has a reference to
somewhat to come, of which we know scarce any more than
is necessary for practice.  A system  or constitution, in its
notion, implies variety; and so complicated a one as this
world, very great variety. So that were revelation universal,
yet, from men's different capacities of understanding, from
the different lengths of their lives, their different educations
and other external circumstances, and from their difference
of temper and bodily constitution, their religious situations
would be widely different, and the disadvantage of some in
comparison of others, perhaps, altogether as much as at
present. And the true account, whatever it be, why mankind, or such a part of mankind, are placed in this condition




CHAP. VI.1 SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF.         249
of ignorance, must be supposed, also, the true account of
our farther ignorance, in not knowing the reasons why, or
whence it is, that they are placed in this condition. But
the following practical reflections may deserve the serious
ccusideration of those persons, who think the circumstances
of mankind, or their own, in the forementioned respects, a
ground of complaint.
1. The evidence of religion not appearing obvious, may
constitute one particular part of some men's trial in the
religious sense; as it gives scope for a virtuous exercise, or
vicious neglect, of their understanding, in examining or not
examining into that evidence. There seems no possible reason to be given, why we may not be in a state of moral
probation, with regard to the exercise of our understanding
upon the subject of religion, as we are with regard to our
behavior in common affairs. The former is as much a thing
within our power and choice as the latter. And, I suppose,
it is to be laid down for certain, that the same character,
the same inward principle, which, after a man is convinced
of the truth of religion, renders him obedient to the precepts
of it, would, were he not thus convinced, set him  about
an examination of it, upon its system and evidence being
offered to his thoughts; and that, in the latter state, his
examination would be with an impartiality, seriousness, and
solicitude, proportionable to what his obedience is in the
former.  And as inattention, negligence, want of all serious
concern, about a matter of such a nature and importance,
when offered to men's consideration, is, before a distinct
conviction of its truth, as real immoral depravity and dissoluteness, as neglect of religious practice after such conviction; so, active solicitude about it, and fair, impartial consideration of its evidence before such conviction, is as really an
exercise of a morally right temper, as is religious practice
after. Thus, that religion is not intuitively true, but a matter
of deduction and inference; that a conviction of its truth is




250           REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL:        LPART II.
not forced upon every one, but left to be, by some, collected
with heedful attention to premises; this as much constitutes
religious probation, as much affords sphere, scope, opportunity, for right and wrong behavior, as any thing whatever does.  And their manner of treating this subject,
when laid before them, shows what is in their heart, and is
an exertion of it.
2. It appears to be a thing as evident, though it is not
so much attended to, that if, upon consideration of religion,
the evidence of it should seem to any persons doubtful in
the highest supposable degree, even this doubtful evidence
will, however, put them into a general state of probation, in
the moral and religious sense.  For, suppose a man to be
really in doubt, whether such a person had not done him
the greatest favor, or, whether his whole temporal interest
did not depend upon that person, no one, who had any
sense of gratitude and of prudence, could possibly consider
himself in the same situation, with regard to such person,
as if he had no such doubt. In truth, it is as just to say,
that certainty and doubt are the same, as to say, the situations now mentioned would leave a man as entirely at liberty, in point of gratitude or prudence, as he would be,
were he certain he had received no favor from such person,
or that he no way depended upon him.  And thus, though
the evidence of religion which is afforded to some men,
should be little more than that they are given to see the
system of Christianity, or religion in general, to be supposable and credible, this ought, in all reason, to beget a serious
practical apprehension that it may be true.  And even this
will afford matter of exercise for religious suspense and
deliberation, for moral resolution and self-government; because the apprehension that religion may be true, does as
really lay men under obligations, as a full conviction that it
is true.  It gives occasion and motives to consider fartior
the important subject; to preserve attentively upon their




(;HAP. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF.       251
minds a general implicit sense that they may be under
JDivine moral government, an awful solicitude about religion,
whether natural or revealed.  Such apprehension ought
to turn men's eyes to every degree of new light which may
be had, from whatever side it comes, and induce them to
refrain, in the mean time, from all immoralities, and live in
the conscientious practice of every common virtue.  Especially are they bound to keep at the greatest distance from
all dissolute profaneness; for this the very nature of the
case forbids; and to treat with highest reverence a matter upon which their own whole interest and being, and
the fate of nature, depend. This behavior, and an active
endeavor to maintain within themselves this temper, is the
business, the duty, and the wisdom of those persons, who
complain of the doubtfulness of religion; is what they are
under the most proper obligations to. And such behavior is
an exertion of, and has a tendency to improve in them, that
character, which the practice of all the several duties of
religion, from a full conviction of its truth, is an exertion of,
and has a tendency to improve in others-others, I say, to
whom God has afforded such conviction.  Nay, considering
the infinite importance of religion, revealed as well as natural, I think it may be said, in general, that whoever will
weigh the matter thoroughly, may see there is not near so
much difference as is commonly imagined, between what
ought in reason to be the rule of life, to those persons who
are fully convinced of its truth, and to those who have only
a serious doubting apprehension that it may be true. Their
hopes, and fears, and obligations, will be in various degrees;
but as the subject-matter of their hopes and fears is the.same, so the subject-matter of their obligations, what they
are bound to do and to refrain from, is not so very unlike.
It is to be observed farther, that from a character of understanding, or a situation of influence in the world, some
persons have it in their power to do infinitely more harm or




252          REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL:       LPART I!
good, by setting an example of profaneness, and avowed
disregard to all religion, or, on the contrary, of a serious,
though, perhaps, doubting, apprehension of its truth, and
of a reverend regard to it under this doubtfulness, than
they can do by acting well or ill in all the common intercourses amongst mankind. And, consequently, they are
most highly accountable for a behavior, which, they may
easily foresee is of such importance, and in which there is
most plainly a right and a wrong; even admitting the evidence of religion to be as doubtful as is pretended.
The ground of these observations, and that which renders them just and true, is, that doubting necessarily implies some degree of evidence for that of which we doubt.
For no person would be in doubt concerning the truth of a
number of facts so and so circumstanced, which should accidentally come into his thoughts, and of which he had no
evidence at all. And though in the case of an even chance,
and where, consequently, we were in doubt, we should in
common language say, that we had no evidence at all for
either side; yet that situation of things which renders it an
even chance, and no more, that such an event will happen,
renders this case equivalent to all others, where there is
such evidence on both sides of a question,(1) as leaves the
mind in doubt concerning the truth. Indeed, in all these
cases, there is no more evidence on one side than on the
other; but there is (what is equivalent to) much more for
either, than for the truth of a number of facts which come
into one's thoughts at random.  And thus, in all these
cases, doubt as much presupposes evidence, lower degrees
of evidence,. as belief presupposes higher, and certainty
higher still. Any one who will a little attend to the nature
of evidence, will easily carry this observation on, and see
that between no evidence at all, and that degree of it which
affords ground of doubt, there are as many intermediate
(1) Introduction




CHAP. VI.]  SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF.         253
degrees, as there are between that degree which is the
ground of doubt and demonstration.  And, though we have
not faculties to distinguish these degrees of evidence with
any sort of exactness, yet, in proportion as they are discerned,
they ought to influence our practice. For it is as real an
imperfection in the moral character, not to be influenced in
practice by a lower degree of evidence when discerned, as
it is in the understanding, not to discern it. And as, in all
sucjects which men consider, they discern the lower as well
as higher degrees of evidence, proportionably to their capacity of understanding; so, in practical subjects, they are
influenced in practice by the lower as well as higher degrees
of it, proportionably to their fairness and honesty. And as,
in proportion to defects in the understanding, men are unapt
to see lower degrees of evidence, are in danger of overlooking evidence when it is not glaring, and are easily imposed
upon in such cases; so, in proportion to the corruption of
the heart, they seem  capable of satisfying themselves with
having no regard in practice to evidence acknowledged real,
if it be not overbearing.  From these things it must follow,
that doubting concerning religion implies such a degree of
evidence for it, as, joined with the consideration of its importance, unquestionably lays men under the obligations beforementioned, to have a dutiful regard to it in all their behavior.
3. The difficulties in which the evidence of religion is
involved, which some complain of, is no more a just ground
of complaint, than the external circumstances of temptation,
which o'hers are placed in; or than difficulties in the practice of it, after a full conviction of its truth.  Temptations
render our state a more improving state of discipline(1) than
it would be otherwise; as they give occasion for a more
attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, which confirms
and strengthens it more than an easier or less attentive exercise of it could.  Now, speculative difficulties are, in this
(1) Part I, Chap. v




254          RIEVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL:         [PART 11.
respect, of the very same nature with these external temptations. For the evidence of religion not appearing obvious,
is, to some persons, a temptation to reject it, without any
consideration at all; and, therefore, requires such an attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, seriously to consider
that evidence, as there would be no occasion for, but for
such temptation.  And the supposed doubtfulness of its
evidence, after it has been in some sort considered, affords
opportunity to an unfair mind, of explaining away, and deceitfully hiding from itself, that evidence which it might
see: and, also, for men's encouraging themselves in vice,
from hopes of impunity, though they do clearly see thus
much, at least, that these hopes are uncertain: in like manner as the common temptation to many instances of folly,
which end in temporal infamy and ruin, is the ground for
hope of not being detected, and of escaping with impunity;
that is, the doubtfulness of the proof beforehand, that such
foolish behavior will thus end in infamy and ruin. On the
contrary, supposed doubtfulness in the evidence of religion
calls for a more careful and attentive exercise of the virtuous
principle, in fairly yielding themselves up to the proper
influence of any real evidence, though doubtful; and in
practicing conscientiously all virtue, though under some uncertainty, whether the government in the universe may not
possibly be such, as that vice may escape with impunity.
And, in general, temptation, meaning by this word the lesser allurements to wrong, and difficulties in the discharge of
our duty, as well as the greater ones —temptation, I say, as
such, and of every kind and degree, as it calls forth some
virtuous efforts, additional to what would otherwise have
been wanting, cannot but be an additional discipline and
improvement of virtue, as well as probation of it, in the
other senses of that word.(1)  So that the very same account is to be given, why the evidence of religion should bo
(1) Part I, Chap. iv, and pages 136, 137.




CHAP. VI.J SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN iTS PROOF.         255
left in such a manner, as to require, in some, an attentive, solicitous, perhaps painful, exercise of their understanding about
it; as why others should be placed in such circumstances as
that the practice of its common duties, after a full conviction of the truth of it, should require attention, solicitude,
and pains: or, why appearing doubtfulness should be permitted to afford matter of temptation to some; as why
external difficulties and allurements should be permitted to
afford matter of temptation to others.  The same account
also is to be given, why some should be exercised with
temptations of both these kinds, as why others should be
exercised with the latter in such very high degrees, as some
have been, particularly as the primitive Christians were.
Nor does there appear any absurdity in supposing, that
the speculative difficulties in which the evidence of religion
is involved, may make even the principal part of some persons' trial. For, as the chief temptations of the generality
of the world, are, the ordinary motives to injustice or unrestrained pleasure; or to live in the neglect of religion, from
that frame of mind, which renders many persons almost
without feeling as to any thing distant, or which is not the
object of their senses; so there are other persons without
this shallowness of temper, persons of a deeper sense as to
what is invisible and future, who not only see, but. have a
general practical feeling that what is to come will be present, and that things are not less real for their not being the
objects of sense; and who, from their natural constitution of
body and of temper, and from their external condition, may
have small temptations to behave ill, small difficulty in behaving well, in the common course of life. Now, when these
latter persons have a distinct, full conviction of the truth of
religion, without any possible doubts or difficulties, the practice of it is to them unavoidable, unless they will do a constant
violence to their own minds; and religion is scarce any more
a discipline to them, than it is to creatures in a state of per



256           REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL:        [PART Itr.
fection. Yet these persons may possibly stand in need of
moral discipline and exercise, in a higher degree, than they
would have by such an easy practice of religion.  Or it
may be requisite, for reasons unknown to us, that they
should give some further manifestation(l) what is their
moral character, to the creation of God, than such a practice of it would be. Thus, in the great variety of religious
situations in which men are placed, what constitutes, what
chiefly and peculiarly constitutes the probation, in all senses,
of some persons, may be the difficulties in which the evidence
of religion is involved; and their principal and distinguished
trial may be, how they will behave under and with respect
to these difficulties.   Circumstances in men's situation in
their temporal capacity, analogous in good measure to this,
respecting religion, are to be observed. We find some persons are placed in such a situation in the world, as that their
chief difficulty, with regard to conduct, is not the doing
what is prudent when it is known; for this, in numberless
cases, is as easy as the contrary: but to some, the principal
exercise is, recollection, and being upon their guard against
deceits-the deceits, suppose, of those about them; against
false appearances of reason and prudence.  To persons in
some situations, the principal exercise, with respect to conduct, is attention, in order to inform themselves what is proper-what is really the reasonable and prudent part to act.
But, as I have hitherto gone upon supposition, that men's
dissatisfaction with the evidence of religion, is not owing to
their neglects or prejudices, it must be added, on the other
hand, in all common reason, and as what the truth of the
case plainly requires should be added, that such dissatisfaction possibly may be owing to those, possibly may be men's
own fault. For,
If there are any persons, who never set themselves
heartily, and in earnest, to be informed in religion; if there
(1) Pages 136, 137.




CHAP. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF.         257
are any, who secretly wish it, may not prove true, and are
less attentive to evidence than to difficulties, and more to
objections than to what is said in answer to them; these
persons will scarce be thought in a likely way of seeing the
evidence of religion, though it were most certainly true, and
capable of being ever so fully proved. If any accustom
themselves to consider this subject usually in the way of
mirth and sport; if they attend to forms and representations,
and inadequate manners of expression, instead of the real
things intended by them, (for signs often can be no more than
inadequately expressive of the things signified;) or if they
substitute human errors in the room of divine truth; why
may not all, or any of these things, hinder some men from
seeing that evidence which really is seen by others; as a
like turn of mind, with respect to matters of common speculation, and practice, does, we find by experience, hinder them
from attaining that knowledge and right understanding, in
matters of common speculation and practice, which more fair
and attentive minds attain to? And the effect will be the
same, whether their neglect of seriously considering the
evidence of religion, and their indirect behavior with regard
to it, proceed from mere carelessness, or from the grosser
vices; or whether it be owing to this, that forms, and figurative manners of expression, as well as errors, administer occasions of ridicule, when the things intended, and the truth
itself, would not. Men may indulge a ludicrous turn so far,
as to lose all sense of conduct and prudence in worldly affairs, and even, as it seems, to impair their faculty of reason.
And in general, levity, carelessness, passion and prejudice,
do hinder us from being rightly informed, with respect to
common things; and they may, in like manner, and perhaps
in some farther Providential manner, with respect to moral
and religious subjects, may hinder evidence from being laid
before us, and from being seen when it is. The Scripture(l)
(1) Dan. xii, 10: see also Isa. xxix, 13, 14; Matt. vi, 23, and xi, 25,
22




258            REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL:          [PART IL
does declare, "that every one shall not understand."  And
it makes no difference by what Providential conduct this
comes to pass; whether the evidence of Christianity was,
originally and with design, put and left so, as that those
who are desirous of evading moral obligations, should not
see it, and that honest-minded persons should; or whether
it comes to pass by any other means.
Farther, the general proof of natural religion and of
Christianity, does, I think, lie level to common men; even
those, the greatest part of whose time, from childhood to
old age, is taken up with providing, for themselves and their
families, the common conveniences, perhaps necessaries of
life-those, I mean, of this rank, who ever think at all of
asking after proof, or attending to it.  Common men, were
they as much in earnest about religion as about their
temporal affairs, are capable of being convinced upon real
evidence, that there is a God who governs the world; and
they feel themselves to be of a moral nature, and accountable creatures. And as Christianity entirely falls in with
this their natural sense of things, so they are capable, not
only of being persuaded, but of being made to see, that
there is evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of it,
and many appearing completions of prophecy. But though
this proof is real and conclusive, yet it is liable to objections,
and may be run up into difficulties; which, however, persons
who are capable, not only of talking of, but of really seeing,
are capable also of seeing through; that is, not of clearing
and xiii, 11, 12; John iii, 19, and v, 44; 1 Cor. ii, 14, and 2 Cor.
iv, 4; 2 Tim. iii, 13; and that affectionate, as well as authoritative
admonition, so very many times inculcated, " He that hath ears to
hear, let him hear." Grotius saw so strongly the thing intended in
these and other passages of Scripture of the like sense, as to sav, that
the proof given us of Christianity was less than it might have been,
for this very purpose: Ut ita sermto Evangelii tanqanm la pis essif
Lydius ad quem ingenia sanabilia explorarentur. DeVer. R. C. Lib. ii,
toward the end.




CHAP. VI.]  SUPPIOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF.      259
up and answering them, so as to satisfy their curiosity, for
of such knowledge we are not capable with respect to any
one thing in nature; but capable of seeing that the proof
is not lost in these difficulties, or destroyed by these objections. But then a thorough examination into religion, with
regard to these objections, which cannot be the business of
every man, is a matter of pretty large compass, and from
the nature of it, requires some knowledge, as well as time
and attention, to see how the evidence comes out, upon balancing one thing with another, and what, upon the whole,
is the amount of it. Now, if persons who have picked up
these objections from others, and take for granted they are
of weight, upon the word of those from whom they received
them, or, by often retailing of them, come to see, or fancy
they see, them to be of weight, will not prepare themselves
for such an examination, with a competent degree of knowledge; or will not give that time and attention to the subject, which, from the nature of it, is necessary for attaining
such information: in this case, they must remain in doubtfulness, ignorance or error; in the same way as they must,
with regard to common sciences, and matters of common
life, if they neglect the necessary means of being informed
in them.
But still, perhaps, it will be objected, that if a prince or
common master were to send directions to a servant, he
would take care, that they should always bear the certain
marks who they came from, and that their sense should be
always plain; so as that there should be no possible doubt,
if he could help it, concerning the authority or meaning of
them.  Now, the proper answer to all this kind of objections is, that wherever the fallacy lies, it is even certain we
cannot argue thus with respect to Him who is the governor
of the world; and, particularly, that he does not afford us
such information, with respect to our temporal affairs and
interests, as experience abundantly shows.  However, there




260           REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL:         [PART II.
is a full answer to this objection, from the very nature of
religion.  For, the reason why a prince would give his
directions in this plain manner, is, that he absolutely desires
such an external action should be done, without concerning
himself with the motive or principle upon which it is done;
that is, he regards only the external event, or the thing's
being done, and not at all, properly speaking, the doing of
it, or the action. Whereas, the whole of morality and religion consisting merely in action itself, there is no sort of par.
allel between the cases.  But if the prince be supposed to
regard only the action, that is, only to desire to exercise,
or in any sense prove, the understanding or loyalty of a
servant, lie would not always give his orders in such a plain
mnanner.  It may be proper to add, that the will of God,
respecting morality and religion, may be considered either
as absolute, or as only conditional.  If it be absolute, it
can only be thus, that we should act virtuously in such
given circumstances; not that we should be brought to act
so, by his changing of our circumstances.  And if God's
will be thus absolute, then it is in our power, in the highest
and strictest sense, to do or to contradict his will; which is
a most weighty consideration.  Or his will may be considered only as conditional-that if we act so and so, we shall
be rewarded; if otherwise, punished: of which conditional
will of the Author of nature, the whole constitution of it
affords most certain instances.
Upon the whole, that we are in a state of religion
necessarily implies, that we are in a state of probation;
and the credibility of our being at all in such a state being
admitted, there seems no peculiar difficulty in supposing
our probation to be, just as it is, in those respects which
are above objected against.  There seems no pretense, from
the reason of' the thing, to say, that the trial cannot equitably
be any thing, but whether persons will act suitably to certain ignformation, or such as admits no room  for doubt; sO




C'IAP. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF.        26i
as that there can be no danger of miscarriage, but either
from their not attending to what they certainly know, or
from overbearing passion hurrying them on to act contrary
to it.  For, since ignorance and doubt afford scope for probati:n in all senses, as really as intuitive conviction or certainty, and since the two former are to be put to the saLme
account as difficulties in practice, men's moral probation
may, also, be, whether they will take due care to inform
themselves by impartial consideration, and, afterwards,
whether they will act as the case requires, upon the evidlence which they have, however doubtful.  And this, we
find by experience, is frequently our probation,(1) in our
temporal capacity. For the information which we want,
with regard to our worldly interests, is by no means always
given us of course, without any care of our own.  And we
are greatly liable to self-deceit from inward, secret prejudices, and, also, to the deceits of others.  So that to be able
to judge what is the prudent part, often requires much and
and difficult consideration. Then, after we have judged
the very best we can, the evidence upon which we must
act, if we will live and act at all, is perpetually doubtful to a
very high degree. And the constitution and course of the
world in fact is such, as that want of impartial consideration what we have to do, and venturing upon extravagant
courses, because it is doubtful what will be the consequence,
are often naturally, that is, Providentially, altogether as fatal,
as misconduct occasioned by heedless inattention to what we
certainly know, or disregarding it from overbearing passion.
Several of the observations here made may well seem
strange, perhaps unintelligible, to many good men.  But if
the persons for whose sake they are made, think so-persons who object as above, and throw off all regard to religion under pretense of want of evidence, I desire them to
consider again, whether their thinking so, be owing to any
(1) Pages 73, 253, &c.




262'WANT OF UNIVERSALITY IN REVELATION. [PART IT.
thing unintelligible in these observations, or to their own
not having such a sense of religion and serious solicitude
about it, as even their state of skepticism  does in all reason
require?  It ought to be forced upon the reflection of
these persons, that our nature and condition necessarily
require us, in the daily course of life, to act upon evidence
much lower than what is commonly called probable; to
guard, not only against what we fully believe will, but, also,
against what we think it supposable may happen; and to
engage in pursuits when the probability is greatly against
success, if it be credible that possibly we may succeed in
them.




cIIAP. VII.]   EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIANITY.        263
CHAPTER VII.
OF TrHN PARTICULAR EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIANITY.
TIlE presumptions against revelation, and objections against
the general scheme of Christianity, and particular things relating to it, being removed, there remains to be considered,
what positive evidence we have for the truth of it; chiefly
in order to see, what the analogy of nature suggests with
regard to that evidence, and the objections against it; or to
see what is, and is allowed to be, the plain natural rule of
judgment and of action, in our temporal concerns, in cases
where we have the same kind of evidence, and the same kind
of objections against it, that we have in the case before us.
Now, in the evidence of Christianity, there seem to be
several things of great weight, not reducible to the head,
either of miracles, or the completion of prophecy, in the
common acceptation of the words.  But these two are its
direct and fundamental proofs; and those other things,
however considerable they are, yet ought never to be urged
apart from its direct proofs, but always to be joined with
them. Thus, the evidence of Christianity will be a long
series of things, reaching, as it seems, from the beginning
of the world to the present time, of great variety and compass, taking in both the direct, and, also, the collateral
proofs, and making up, all of them together, one argument;
the conviction arising from which kind of proof may be
compared to what they call the effect in architecture or other
works of art; a result from a great number of things so
and so disposed, and taken into one view. I shall, therefore, first, make some observations relating to miracles, and
the appearing completions of prophecy; and consider what
analogy suggests, in answer to the objections brought against
this evidence.  And, secondly, I shall endeavor to give
some account of the general argument now  mentioned,




264          OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE        LPART H1
consisting both of the direct and collateral evidence, con
sidered as making up one argument; this being the kind of
proof upon which we determine most questions of difficulty
concerning common facts, alledged to have happened, or
seeming likely to happen; especially questions relating to
conduct.
First, I shall make some observations upon the direct
proof of Christianity from miracles and prophecy, and upon
the objections alledged against it.
I. Now, the following observations, relating to the historical evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity, appear to be of great weight.
1. The Old Testament affords us the same historical
evidence of the miracles of Moses and of the prophets, as
of the common civil history of Moses and the kings of
Israel; or, as of the affairs of the Jewish nation.  And the
Gospels and the Acts afford us the same historical evidence
of the miracles of Christ and the apostles, as of the common matters related in them. This, indeed, could not have
been affirmed by any reasonable man, if the authors of these
books, like many other historians, had appeared to make an
entertaining manner of writing their aim; though they had
interspersed miracles in their works, at proper distances,
and upon proper occasions. These might have animated a
dull relation, amused the reader, and engaged his attention. And the same account would naturally have been
given of them, as of the speeches and descriptions of such
authors; the same account, in a manner, as is to be given,
why the poets make use of wonders and prodigies.  But
the facts, both miraculous and natural, in Scripture, are
related in plain, unadorned narratives; and both of them
appear, in all respects, to stand upon the same foot of
historical evidence. Farther, some parts of Scripture, containing an account of miracles fully sufficient to prove the
truth of Christianity, are quoted as genuine, from the age




CIIAP. VII.]       FOR CHIRISTIANITY.                265
in which they are said to be written, down to the present:
and no other parts of them, material in the present question,
are omitted to be quoted in such manner, as to afford any
sort of proof of their not being genuine.  And, as common history, when called in question in any instance, may
uften be greatly confirmed by cotemporary or subsequent
events more known and acknowledged, and as the common
Scripture history, like many others, is thus confirmed, so, likewise, is the miraculous history of it, not only in particular instances, but in general. For, the establishment of the Jewish
and Christian religions, which were events cotemporary with
the miracles related to be wrought in attestation of both, or
subsequent to them, these events are just what we should
have expected, upon supposition such miracles were really
wrought to attest the truth of those religions. These miracles are a satisfactory account of those events; of which
no other satisfactory account can be given, nor any account
at all, but what is imaginary merely and invented. It is to
be added, that the most obvious, the most easy and direct
account of this history, how it came to be written amid to
be received in the world, as a true history, is, that it really
is so; nor can any other account of it be easy and direct.
Now, though an account, not at all obvious, but very farfetched and indirect, may indeed be, and often is, the true
account of a matter; yet, it cannot be admitted on the
authority of its being asserted.  Mere guess, supposition,
and possibility, when opposed to historical evidence, prove
nothing, but that historical evidence is not demonstrative.
Now, the just consequence from all this, I think, is, th~at
the Scripture history, in general, is to be admitted as an
authentic genuine history, till somewhat positive be alledged
sufficient to invalidate it.  But no man will deny the consequence to be, that it cannot be rejected, or thrown by as
of no authority, till it can be proved to be of none; even
thiough the evidence now mentioned for its authority were
23




266           OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE          LPART IT.
doubtful.  This evidence may be confronted by historical
evidence on the other side, if there be any; or genera]
incredibility in the things related, or inconsistence in the
general turn of the history, would prove it to be of no
authority.  But since, upon the face of the matter, upon a
first and general view, the appearance is, that it is an
authentic history, it cannot be determined to be fictitious
without some proof that it is so. And the following observations, in support of these and coincident with them, will
greatly confirm the historical evidence for the truth of
Christianity.
2. The Epistles of St. Paul, from the nature of epistolary
writing, and, moreover, from several of them  being written,
not to particular persons, but to Churches, carry in them
evidences of their being genuine, beyond what can be, in a
mere historical narrative, left to the world at large.  This
evidence, joined with that which they have in common with
the rest of the New Testament, seems not to leave so much
as any particular pretense for denying their genuineness,
considered as an ordinary matter of fact, or of criticism-I
say, 2particutlar pretense for denying it; because any single
fact, of such a kind and such antiquity, may have general
doubts raised concerning it, from the very nature of human
affairs and human testimony. There is, also, to be mentioned, a distinct and particular evidence of the genuineness
of the epistle chiefly referred to here, the first to the Corinthians, from the manner in which it is quoted by Clemens
]ogmanuls, in an epistle of his own to that Church.(1) Now,
these epistles afford a proof of Christianity, detached fiom
all others, which is, I think, a thing of weight, and, also, a
proof of a nature and kind peculiar to itself. For,
In them the author declares that he received the Gospel
in general, and the institution of the communion in particular, not from the rest of the apostles, or jointly together
(1) Clem. Rom., Ep. i, c. 47.




CHAP. VII.]         FOR CHRISTIANITY.                 267
with them, but alone from Christ himself; whom he declares,
likewise, conformably to the history in the Acts, that he
saw after his ascension.(1) So that the testimony of St.
Paul is to be considered, as detached from that of the rest
of the apostles.
And he declares farther, that he was endued with a power
of working miracles, as what was publicly known to those
very people; speaks of frequent and great variety of miraculous gifts, as then subsisting in those very Churches to
which he was writing, which he was reproving for several
irregularities, and where he had personal opposers: he
mentions these gifts incidentally, in the most easy manner,
and without effort, by way of reproof to those who had
them, for their indecent use of them, and by way of depreciating them, in comparison of moral virtues. In short, he
speaks to these Churches of these miraculous powers, in
the manner any one would speak to another of a thing,
which was as familiar, and as much known in common to
them both, as any thing in the world.(2)  And this, as bath
been observed by several persons, is surely a very considerable thing.
3. It is an acknowledged historical fact, that Christianity
offered itself to the world and demanded to be received,
upon the allegation, that is, as unbelievers would speak,
upon the pretense of miracles, publicly wrought, to attest
the truth of it, in such an age; and that it was actually
received by great numbers in that very age, and upon the
professed belief of the reality of these miracles.  And
Christianity, including the dispensation of the Old Testament, seems distinguished by this from all other religions.
I mean, that this does not appear to be the case with regard
to any other; for, surely, it will not be supposed to lie upon
(1) Gal. i; 1 Cor. xi, 23, &c.; 1 Cor. xv, 8.
(2) Rom. xv, 19; 1 Cor. xii, 8, 9, 10-28, &c., and xiii, 1, 2, 8,
and the whole of chapter xiv; 2 Cor. xii, 12, 13; Gal. iii, 2, 5.




268           OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDE NCE       [PART 11.
any person, to prove, by positive historical evidence, that it
was not.  It does in no sort appear that Mahommedanism
was first received in the world upon the foot of supposed
miracles,(1) that is, public ones: for, as revelation is itself
miraculous, all pretense to it must necessarily imply some
pretense of miracles. And it is a known fact, that it was
immediately, at the very first, propagated by other means.
And as particular institutions, whether m paganism or Popery, said to be confirmed by miracles after those institutions
had obtained, are not to the purpose, so, were there what
miglht be called historical proof, that any of them  were
introduced by a supposed Divine command, believed to be
attested by miracles, these would not be in anywise parallel.
For single things of this sort are easy to be accounted for,
after parties are formed, and have power in their hands, and
the leaders of them  are in veneration with the multitude,
and political interests are blended with religious claims and
religious distinctions.  But before any thing of this kind, for
a few persons, and those of the lowest rank, all at once to
bring over such numbers to a new religion, and get it to
be received upon the particular evidence of miracles; this
is quite another thing.  And I think it will be allowed by
any fair adversary, that the fact now mentioned, taking in
all the circumstances of it, is peculiar to the Christian religion. However, the fact itself is allowed, that Christianity
obtained, that is, was professed to be received in the world,
upon the belief of miracles, immediately in the age in which
it is said those miracles were wrought; or that this is what.
its first converts would have alledged, as. the reason for their
embracing it. Now, certainly it is not to be supposed, thati
such numbers of men, in the most distant parts of the world,
should forsake the religion of their country, in which they
had been educated; separate themselves from their friends,
particularly in their festival shows and solemnities, to which
(1) See the Koran, Chap. xiii, and Chap. xvii.




CHAP. VII.]        FOR CHRISTIANITY.               269
the common people are so greatly addicted, and which were
of a nature to engage them much more than any thing of
that sort amongst us; and embrace a religion which could
not but expose them to many inconveniences, and, indeed,
must have been a giving up the world in a great degree,
even from the very first, and before the empire engaged in
form against them; it cannot be supposed, that such numbers should make so great, and, to say the least, so inconvenient a change in their whole institution of life, unless
they were really convinced of the truth of those miracles,
upon the knowledge or belief of which they professed to
make it. And it will, I suppose, readily be acknowledged,
that the generality of the first converts to Christianity must
have believed them; that as, by becoming Christians, they
declared to the world they were satisfied of the truth of
those miracles, so this declaration was to be credited.
And this their testimony is the same kind of evidence for
those miracles, as if they had put it in writing, and these
writings had come down to us. And it is real evidence,
because it is of facts, which they had capacity and full
opportunity to inform themselves of. It is, also, distinct
from the direct or express historical evidence, though it is of
the same kind; and it would be allowed to be distinct in
all cases. For, were a fact expressly related by one or
more ancient historians, and disputed in after ages; that
this fact is acknowledged to have been believed, by great
numbers of the age in which the historian says it was done,
would be allowed an additional proof of such fact, quite
distinct from the express testimony of the historian. The
credulity of mankind is acknowledged, and the suspicions
of mankind ought to be acknowledged too, and their backwardness even to believe, and greater still to practice, what
makes against their interest. And it must particularly be
remembered, that education and prejudice, and authority,
were against Christianity, in the age I am speaking of. So




270          OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE         [PART II.
that the immediate conversion of such numbers, is a real
presumption of somewhat more than human in this matterI say, presumption, for it is alledged as a proof, alone and
by itself. Nor need any one of the things mentioned in this
chapter be considered as a proof by itself; and yet all of
them together may be one of the strongest.(1)
Upon the whole, as there is large historical evidence, both
direct and circumstantial, of miracles wrought in attestation
of Christianity, collected by those who have writ upon the
subject, it lies upon unbelievers to show why this evidence
is not to be credited. This way of speaking is, I think, just,
and what persons who write in defense of religion naturally
fall into. Yet, in a matter of such unspeakable importance,
the proper question is, not whom it lies upon, according to
the rules of argument, to maintain or confute objections;
but, whether there really are any against this evidence,
sufficient, in reason, to destroy the credit of it? However,
unbelievers seem to take upon them the part of showing
that there are.
They alledge, that numberless enthusiastic people, in different ages and countries, expose themselves to the same
difficulties which the primitive Christians did; and are ready
to give up their lives for the most idle follies imaginable.
But it is not very clear, to what purpose this objection is
brought; for every one, surely, in every case, must distinguish between opinions and facts. And though testimony
is no proof of enthusiastic opinions, or of any opinions at all;
yet, it is allowed, in all other cases, to be a proof of facts.
And a person's laying down his life in attestation of facts or
of opinions, is the strongest proof of his believing them.
And if the apostles and their cotemporaries did believe the
facts, in attestation of which they exposed themselves to
sufferings and death, this their belief, or rather knowledge,
must be a proof of those facts; for they were such as came
(1) Page 297, &c




CIHAP. VII.]       FOR CHRISTIANITY.                271
under the observation of their senses. And though it is not
of equal weight, yet it is of weight, that the martyrs of the
next age, notwithstanding they were not eye-witnesses of
those facts, as were the apostles and their cotemporaries, had,
however, full opportunity to inform  themselves, whether
they were true or not, and gave equal proof of their believing them to be true.
But enthusiasm, it is said, greatly weakens the evidence
of testimony even for facts, in matters relating to religion;
some seem to think, it totally and absolutely destroys the
evidence of testimony upon this subject.  And, indeed, the
powers of enthusiasm, and of diseases, too, which operate in
a like manner, are very wonderful in particular instances.
But if great numbers of men, not appearing in any peculiar
degree weak, nor under any peculiar suspicion of negligence,
affirm that they saw and heard such things plainly with
their eyes and their ears, and are admitted to be in earnest,
such testimony is evidence of the strongest kind we can have
for any matter of fact. Yet, possibly it may be overcome,
strong as it is, by incredibility in the things thus attested, or
by contrary testimony.  And in an instance where one
thought it was so overcome, it might be just to consider,
how far such evidence could be accounted for by enthusiasm; for it seems as if no other imaginable account were
to be given. of it. But till such incredibility be shown, or
contrary testimony produced, it cannot surely be expected,
that so far-fetched, so indirect and wonderful an account of
such testimony, as that of enthusiasm must be-an account
so strange, that the generality of mankind can scarce be
made to understand what is meant by it-it cannot, I say,
be expected, that such account will be admitted of such
evidence, when there is this direct, easy, and obvious account
of it, that people really saw and heard a thing not incredible,
which they affirm  sincerely, and with full assurance, they
did see and hear. Granting, then, that enthusiasm is not




272          OF TIIE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE       [PART II,
(strictly speaking) an absurd, but a possible account of
such testimony, it is manifest that the very mention of it
goes upon the previous supposition, that the things so attested are incredible, and, therefore, need not be considered
till they are shown to be so. Much less need it be considered, after the contrary has been proved. And I think
it has been proved, to full satisfaction, that there is no
incredibility in a revelation, in general, or in such a one as
the Christian in particular.  However, as religion is supposed peculiarly liable to enthusiasm, it may just be observed, that prejudices almost without number and without
name, romance, affectation, humor, a desire to engage
attention, or to surprise, thie party-spirit, custom, little competitions, unaccountable likings and dislikings-these influence men strongly in common matters.  And as these
prejudices are often scarce known or reflected upon by the
persons themselves who are influenced by them, they are to
be considered as influences of a like kind to enthusiasm.
Yet human testimony in common matters is naturally and
justly believed notwithstanding.
It is intimated, farthler, in a more refined way of observation, that though it should be proved, that the apostles and
first Christians could not in some respects, be deceived
themselves, and, in other respects, cannot be thought to
have intended to impose upon the world, yet, it will not
follow, that their general testimony is to be believed, though
truly handed down to us; because they might still in part,
that is, in other respects, be deceived themselves, and in
part also designedly impose upon others; which, it is added,
is a thing very credible, from that mixture of real enthusiasm,
and real knavery, to be met with in the same characters.
And, I must confess, I think the matter of fact contained in
this observation upon mankind, is not to be denied; and that
somewhat very much akin to it, is often supposed in Scripture as a very common case, and most severely reproved.




CHAP. VII.]        FOR CHRISTIANITY.               273
But it were to have been expected, that persons capable of
applying this observation as applied in the objection, might
also frequently have met with the like mixed character, in
instances where religion was quite out of the case. The
thing plainly is, that mankind are naturally endued with
reason, or a capacity of distinguishing between truth and
falsehood; and as naturally they are endued with veracity,
or a regard to truth in what they say: but from many occasions, they are liable to be prejudiced, and biased, and deceived themselves, and capable of intending to deceive others, in every different degree; insomuch that, as we are
all liable to be deceived by prejudice, so, likewise, it seems
to be not an uncommon thing, for persons, who, from their
regard to truth, would not invent a lie entirely without any
foundation at all, to propagate it with heightening circumstances, after it is once invented and set agoing. And others, though they would not plopctgate a lie, yet, which is a
lower degree of falsehood, will let it pass without contradiction.  But, notwithstanding all this, human testimony
remains still a natural ground of assent; and this assent, a
natural principle of action.
It is objected farther, that however it has happened, the
fact is, that mankind have, in different ages, been strangely
deluded with pretenses to miracles and wonders. But it is,
by no means, to be admitted, that they have been oftener,
or are at all more liable to be deceived by these pretenses,
than by others.
It is added, that there is a very considerable degree of
historical evidence for miracles, which are, on all hands, acknowledged to be fabulous. But suppose there were even tdhe
like historical evidence for these, to what there is for those
alledged in proof of Christianity, which yet is in nowise
allowed; but suppose this; the consequence would not be,
that the evidence of the latter is not to be admitted. Nor
is there a man in the world, who, in common cases, would




274          OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE       [PART HI.
conclude thus. For what would such a conclusion really
amount to but this, that evidence, confuted by contrary evidence, or any way overbalanced, destroys the credibility
of other evidence, neither confuted nor overbalanced?  To
argue, that because there is, if there were, like evidence
from  testimony, for miracles acknowledged false, as for
those in attestation of Christianity, therefore, the evidence
in the latter case is not to be credited; this is the same as
to argue, that if two men of equally good reputation had
given evidence in different cases no way connected, and
one of them had been convicted of perjury, this confuted
the testimony of the other.
Upon the whole, then, the general observation that human creatures are so liable to be deceived, from enthusiasm.
in religion, and principles equivalent to enthusiasm in common matters, and in both from negligence; and that they
are so capable of dishonestly endeavoring to deceive others;
this does, indeed, weaken the evidence of testimony in all
cases, but does not destroy it in any. And these things
will appear, to different men, to weaken the evidence of
testimony, in different degrees-in degrees proportionable
to the observations they have made, or the notions they
have any way taken up, concerning the weakness, and
negligence, and dishonesty of mankind; or concerning the
powers of enthusiasm, and prejudices equivalent to it. But
it seems to me, that people do not know what they say,
who affirm these things to destroy the evidence from testimony, which we have of the truth of Christianity.  Nothing can destroy the evidence of testimony in any case, but
a proof or probability that persons are not competent judges
of the facts to which they give testimony; or that they are
actually under some indirect influence in giving it, in such
particular case. Till this be made out, the natural laws of
human actions require, that testimony be admitted.  It can
never be sufficient to overthrow direct historical evidence,.




0HAP. VII.]        FOR CHRISTIANITY.                 275
indolently to say, that there are so many principles, from
whence men are liable to be deceived themselves and disposed to deceive others, especially in matters of religion,
that one knows not what to believe. And it is surprising
persons can help reflecting, that this very manner of speaking supposes, they are not satisfied that there is nothing in
the evidence, of which they speak thus; or that they can
avoid observing, if they do make this reflection, that it is,
on such a subject, a very material one.(1)
And over against all these objections, is to be set the importance of Christianity, as what must have engaged the
attention of its first converts, so as to have rendered them
less liable to be deceived from carelessness, than they would
in common matters; and, likewise, the strong obligations to
veracity, which their religion laid them under: so that the
first and most obvious presumption is, that they could not
be deceived themselves, nor deceive others. And this presumption, in this degree, is peculiar to the testimony we
have been considering.
In argument, assertions are nothing in themselves, and
have an air of positiveness, which sometimes is not very
easy; yet they are necessary, and necessary to be repeated,
in order to connect a discourse, and distinctly to lay before
the view of the reader what is proposed to be proved, and
what is left as proved.  Now, the conclusion from the foregoing observations is, I think, beyond all doubt, this: that
unbelievers must be forced to admit the external evidence
for Christianity, that is, the proof of miracles wrought to
attest it, to be of real weight and very considerable; though
they cannot allow it to be sufficient to convince them of the
reality of those miracles.  And as they must, in all reason,
admit this, so it seems to me, that, upon consideration, they
would, in fact, admit it; those of them, I mean, who know
any thing at all of the matter: in like manner, as persons,
(1) See the foregoing Chapter




2 7'6        OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE       [PART II,
in many cases, own, they see strong evidence from  testimony, far the truth of things, which yet they cannot be
convinced are true-cases, suppose, where there is contrary testimony, or things which they think, whether with
or without reason, to be incredible.  But there is no testimony contrary to that which we have been considering;
and it has been fully proved, that there is no incredibility in
Christianity in general, or in any part of it.
II. As to the evidence for Christianity from prophecy, I
shall only make some few general observations, which are
suggested by the analogy of nature; that is, by the acknowledged natural rules of judging in common matters,
concerning evidence of a like kind to this from prophecy.
1. The obscurity or unintelligibleness of one part of a
prophecy, does not, in any degree, invalidate the proof of
foresight, arising from the appearing completion of those
other parts which are understood.  For the case is evidently the same, as if those parts, which are not understood, were lost, or not written at all, or written in an
unknown tongue.  Whether this observation be commonly
attended to or not, it is so evident, that one can scarce
bring one's self to set down an instance in common matters,
to exemplify it. However, suppose a writing, partly in
cipher, and partly in plain words at length, and that,
in the part one understood, there appeared mention of
several known facts, it would never come into any man's
thoughts to imagine, that if he understood the whole, perhaps he might find, that those facts were not, in reality,
known by the writer. Indeed, both in this example, and
the thing intended to be exemplified by it, our not understanding the whole, (the whole, suppose, of a sentence or a
paragraph,) might sometimes occasion a doubt, whether one
understood the literal meaning of such a part; but this
comes under another consideration.
For the same reason, though a man should be incapable,




CHIAP. VII.]      FOPr CIIIISTIANITY.              2'77
for want of learning, opportunities of inquiry, or from not
having turned his studies this way, even so much as to
judge whether particular prophecies have been throughout
completely fulfilled; yet lie may see, in general, that they
have been fulfilled, to such a degree, as, upon very good
ground, to be convinced of foresight more than human in
such prophecies, and of such events being intended by
thent. For the same reason, also, though, by means of the
deficiencies in civil history, and the different accounts of
historians, the most learned should not be able to make out
to satisfaction, that such parts of the prophetic history
have been minutely and throughout fulfilled; yet a very
strong proof of foresight may arise from that general completion of them which is made out-as much proof of foresight, perhaps, as the Giver of prophecy intended should
ever be afforded by such parts of prophecy.
2. A long series of prophecy being applicable to such
and such events, is itself a proof, that it was intended of
them; as the rules, by which we naturally judge and determine, in common cases parallel to this, will show. This
observation I make in answer to the common objection
against the application of the prophecies, that, considering
each of them distinctly by itself, it does not at all appear,
that they were intended of those particular events to which
they are applied by Christians; and, therefore, it is to be supposed, that, if they meant any thing, they were intended of
other events unknown to us, and not of these at all.
Now, there are two kinds of writing, which bear a great
resemblance to prophecy, with respect to the matter before
us: the mythological and the satirical, where the satire is,
to a certain degree, concealed. And a man might be assured, that he understood what an author intended by a
fable or parable, related without any application or moral,
merely from seeing it to be easily capable of such application, and that such a moral might naturally be deduced




278          OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE         LPART I1,
fronl it.  And he might be fully assured, that such persons
and events were intended in a satirical writing, merely from
its being applicable to them. And, agreeable to the last
observation, he might be in a good measure satisfied of it,
though he were not enough informed in affairs, or in the
story of such persons, to understand half the satire. For,
his satisfaction, that he understood the meaning, the intended
meaning, of these writings, would be greater or less, in proportion as he saw the general turn of them to be capable
of such application, and in proportion to the number of
particular things capable of it. And thus, if a long series
of prophecy is applicable to the present state of the Church,
and to the political situations of the kingdoms of the world,
some thousand years after these prophecies were delivered,
and a long series of prophecy delivered before the coming
of Christ is applicable to him; these things are in themselves a proof, that the prophetic history was intended of
him, and of those events: in proportion as the general turn
of it is capable of such application, and to the number and
variety of particular prophecies capable of it. And, though
in all just way of consideration, the appearing completion
of prophecies is to be allowed to be thus explanatory of,
and to determine their meaning; yet it is to be remembered
farther, that the ancient Jews applied the prophecies to a
Messiah before his coming, in much the same manner as
Christians do now; and that the primitive Christians interpreted the prophecies respecting the state of the Church
and of the world in the last ages, in the sense which the
event seems to confirm and verify. And from these things
it may be made appear,
3. That the showing, even to a high probability, if that
could be, that the prophets thought of some other events, in
such and such predictions, and not those at all which Christians alledge to be completions of those predictions; or that
such and such prophecies are capable of being applied to




CHAP. VII.]       FOR CHRISTIANITY.               279
other events than those to which Christians apply themthat this would not confute or destroy the force of the argument from prophecy, even with regard to those very instances. For, observe how this matter really is. If one
knew such a person to be the sole author of such a book,
and was certainly assured, or satisfied to any degree, that
one knew the whole of what he intended in it, one should
be assured or- satisfied to such a degree that one knew
the whole meaning of that book; for the meaning of a
book is nothing but the meaning of the author. But if one
knew a person to have compiled a book out of memoirs,
which he received from another, of vastly superior knowledge in the subject of it, especially if it were a book full
of great intricacies and difficulties, it would in nowise follow,
that one knew the whole meaning of the book, from knowing the whole meaning of the compiler; for the original
memoirs, that is, the author of them, might have, and there
would be no degree of presumlption, in many cases, against
supposing him to have, some farther meaning than the compiler saw. To say, then, that the Scriptures and the things
contained in them can have no other or farther meaning,
than those persons thought or had, who first recited or
wrote them, is evidently saying, that those persons were
the original, proper, and sole authors of those books, that
is, that they are not inspired; which is absurd, whilst the
authority of these books is under examination, that is, till
you have determined they are of no Divine authority at all.
Till this be determined, it must in all reason be supposed,
not indeed that they have, for this is taking for granted that
they are inspired, but that they may have, some farther
meaning than what the compilers saw or understood. And,
upon this supposition, it is supposable, also, that this farther
meaning may be fulfilled. Now, events corresponding to
prophecies, interpreted in a different meaning from that in
whicah the prophets are supposed to have understood them;




280          OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE    LPART II
this affords, in a manner, the same proof that this different
sense was originally intended, as it would have afforded, if
the prophets had not understood their predictions in the
sense it is supposed they did; because there is no presumption of their sense of them being the whole sense of them.
And it has been already shown, that the apparent completions of prophecy must be allowed to be explanatory of its
meaning.  So that the question is, whether a series of
prophecy has been fulfilled, in a natural or proper, that is,
in any real sense of the words of it. For such completion
is equally a proof of foresight more than human, whether
the prophets are, or are not, supposed to have understood
it in a different sense. I say, supposed; for, though I think
it clear, that the prophets did not understand the full meaning of their predictions, it is another question, how far they
thought they did, and in what sense they understood them.
Hence may be seen, to how little purpose those persons
busy themselves, who endeavor to prove that the prophetic
history is applicable to events of the age in which it was
written, or of ages before it. Indeed, to have proved this
before there was any appearance of a farther completion
of it, might have answered some purpose; for it might
have prevented the expectation of any such farther completion.  Thus, could Porphyry have shown, that some
principal parts of the book of Daniel, for instance, the
seventh verse of the seventh chapter, which the Christians
interpreted of the latter ages, was applicable to events which
happened before or about the age of Antiochlus Epiphanes;
this might have prevented them from expecting any farther
completion of it. And unless there was then, as I think
there must have been, external evidence concerning that
book, more than is come down to us, such a discovery might
have been a stumbling-block in the way of Christianity
itself; considering the authority which our Savior has given
to the book of Daniel, and how much the general scheme




CHAP. VII.]         FOR CHRISTIANITY.                 281
of Christianity presupposes the truth of it.  But even this
discovery, had there been any such,(1) would be of very
little weight with reasonable men now; if this passage, thus
applicable to events before the age of Porphyry, appears to
be applicable, also, to events which succeeded the dissolution of the Roman empire.  I mention this, not at all as
intending to insinuate, that the division of this empire into
ten parts, for it plainly was divided into about that number,
were, alone and by itself, of any moment in verifying the
prophetic history, but only as an example of the thing I
am speaking of.  And thus, upon the whole, the matter of
inquiry evidently must be, as above put, whether the prophecies are applicable to Christ, and to the present state of
the world and of the Church-applicable in such a degree,
as to imply foresight; not whether they are capable of any
other application; though I know no pretense for saying,
the general turn of them is capable of any other.
These observations are, I think, just, and the evidence
referred to in them, real; though there may be people who
will not accept of such imperfect information from Scripture.
Some, too, have not integrity and regard enough to truth,
to attend to evidence, which keeps the mind in doubt, perhaps perplexity, and which is much of a different sort from
what they expected. And it plainly requires a degree of
modesty and fairness, beyond what every one has, for a man
to say, not to the world, but to himself, that there is a real
appearance of somewhat of great weight in this matter,
though he is not able thoroughly to satisfy himself about
it; but it shall have its influence upon him, in proportion to
(1) It appears that Porphyry did nothing worth mentioning in
this way. For Jerome on the place says: Duas posteriores bestiasin uno Macedonum regno ponit. And as to the ten kings: Decem
reges enumerat, quifuerunt sezvissimi: ipsosque reges non unius ponit
regni; verbi gratia, lMacedonie, Syriae, Asia, et ~gypti; sed de diversis
regnis unum efflicit regum ordinem.'And, in this way of interpretation, any thing many be made of any thing.
294




282          OF TIHE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE       LPART IL
its appearing reality and weight. It is much more easy,
and more falls in with the negligence, presumption, and
willfulness of the generality, to determine at once, with a
decisive air, there is nothing in it. The prejudices arising
from that absolute contempt and scorn, with which this evidence is treated in the world, I do not mention.  For what,
indeed, can be said to persons, who are weak enough in
their understandings to think this any presumption against
it; or, if they do not, are yet weak enough in their temper
to be influenced by such prejudices, upon such a subject?
I shall now, secondly, endeavor to give some account of
the general argument for the truth of Christianity, consisting
both of the direct and circumstantial evidence, considered
as making up one argument. Indeed, to state and examine
this argument fully, would be a work much beyond the
compass of this whole treatise; nor is so much as a proper
abridgment of it to be expected here. Yet, the present
subject requires to have some brief account of it given.
For it is the kind of evidence upon which most questions of
difficulty, in common practice, are determined-evidence
arising from various coincidences, which support.and confirm each other, and in this manner prove, with more or less
certainty, the point under consideration. And I choose to
do it, also, first, because it seems to be of the greatest
importance, and not duly attended to by every one, that
the proof of revelation is, not some direct and express
things only, but a great variety of circumstantial things
also; and that though each of these direct and circumstantial things is, indeed, to be considered separately, yet
they are afterwards to be joined together; for that the
pioper force of the evidence consists in the result of those
several things, considered in their respects to each other,
and united into one view: and, in the next place, because it
seems to me, that the matters of fact here set down, which
are acknowledged by unbelievers, must be acknowledged




CHAP. VII.]        FOR CHRISTIANITY.                 283
by them, also, to contain together a degree of evidence of
great weight, if they could be brought to lay these several
things before themselves distinctly, and then with attention
consider them together; instead of that cursory thought of
them, to which we are familiarized. For, being familiarized
to the cursory thought of things, as really hinders the
weight of them  from  being seen, as from  having its due
influence upon practice.
The thing asserted, and the truth of which is to be inquired into, is this: that over and above our reason and
affections, which God has given us for the information of
our judgment and the conduct of our lives, he has, also, by
external revelation, given us an account of himself and his
moral government over the world, implying a future state
of rewards and punishments; that is, hath revealed the
system of natural religion; for natural religion may be externally (1) revealed by God, as the ignorant may be taught
it by mankind, their fellow-creatures —that God, I say, has
given us the evidence of revelation, as well as the evidence
of reason, to ascertain this moral system; together with an
account of a particular dispensation of Providence, which
reason could no way have discovered, and a particular institution of religion founded on it, for the recovery of mankind
>ut of their present wretched condition, and raising them
to the perfection and final happiness of their nature.
This revelation, whether real or supposed, may be considered as wholly historical.  For prophecy is nothing but
the history of events before they come to pass: doctrines,
also, are matters of fact; and precepts come under the same
notion.  And the general design of Scripture, which contains in it this revelation, thus considered as historical, may
be said to be, to give us an account of the world, in this
one single view, as God's world; by which it appears essent.ially distinguished from  all other books, so far as I have
(1) Page 174, &c.




'284          OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE         [PART II.
found, except such as are copied from it.  It begins with
an account of God's creation of the world, in order to
ascertain and distinguish from all others, who is the object
of our worship, by what he has done; in order to ascertain
who he is, concerning whose providence, commands, promises, and threatenings, this sacred book all along treats; the
Mlaker and Proprietor of the world, he whose creatures we
are, the God of nature: in order, likewise, to distinguish
him from  the idols of the nations, which are either imaginary beings, that is, no beings at all; or else part of that
creation, tile historical relation of which is here given.  And
St. John, not improbably with an eye to this Mosaic account
of the creation, begins his Gospel with an account of our
Savior's pre-existence, and that "all things were made by
him, and without him  was not any thing made that was
made;"(1) agreeably to the doctrine of St. Paul, that " God
created all things by Jesus Christ."(2)  This being premised, the Scripture, taken together, seems to profess to
contain a kind of an abridgment of the history of the
world, in the view just now mentioned; that is, a general
account of the condition of religion and its professors,
during the continuance of that apostasy from  God, and
state of wickedness, which it everywhere supposes the world
to lie in. And this account of the state of religion carries
wvith it some brief account of the political state of things,
as religion is affected by it.  Revelation, indeed, considers
the common affairs of this world, and what is going on in
it, as a mere scene of distraction, and cannot be supposed
to concern itself with foretelling at what time Ronie, or
Babylon, or Greece, or any particular place, should be the
most conspicuous seat of that tyranny and dissoluteness,
which all places equally aspire to be-cannot, I say, be
supposed to give an account of this wild scene for its own
sake.  But it seems to contain some very general account
(1) John i, 3.                    (2) Eph. iii, 9.




CHAP. VII.]         FOR CHRISTIANITY.                 285
of the chief governments of the world, as the general state
of religion has been, is, or shall be, affected by them, from
the first transgression, and during the whole interval of the
world's continuing in its present state, to a certain future
period, spoken of both in the Old and New Testament, very
distinctly, and in great variety of expression: "The times
of the restitution of all things;"(1) when "the mystery of
God shall be finished, as he hath declared to his servants
the prophets;"(2) when " the God of heaven shall set up a
kingdom, which shall never be destroyed; and the kingdom
shall not be left to other people,"(3) as it is represented to
be during this apostasy, but "judgment shall be given to
the saints,"(4) and "they shall reign;"(5) "and the kingdom and dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom under
the whole heaven, shall be given to the people of the saints
of the Most High."(6)
Upon this general view of the Scripture, I would remark
how great a length of time the whole relation takes up, near
six thousand years of which are past: and how great a variety of things it treats of; the natural and moral system or
history of the world, including the time when it was formed,
all contained in the very first book, and evidently written in
a rude and unlearned age; and in subsequent books, the
various common and prophetic history, and the particular
dispensation of Christianity.  Now all this together gives
the largest scope for criticism; and for confutation of what
is capable of being confuted, either from reason, or from.
common history, or from  any inconsistence in its several
parts.  And it is a thing which deserves, I think, to be
mentioned, that whereas some imagine, the supposed doubtfulness of the evidence for revelation implies a positive
argument that it is not true; it appears, on the contrary, to
imply a positive argument that it is true.  For, could any
(1) Acts iii, 21.   (2) Rev. x, 7.        (3) Dan. ii, 44
(4) Dan. vii, 22.   (5) Rev. xx, 6.       (6) Dan. vii, 27




286          OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE        [PART II.
common revelation of such antiquity, extent, and variety, (foi
in these things the stress of what I am now observing lies,) be
proposed to the examination of the world; that it could not,
in any age of knowledge and liberty, be confuted, or shown
to have nothing in it, to the satisfaction of reasonable men;
this would be thought a strong presumptive proof of its
truth. And, indeed, it must be a proof of it just in proportion to the probability, that if it were false, it might be
shown to be so; and this, I think, is scarce pretended to be
shown but upon principles and in ways of arguing which
have been clearly obviated.(1) Nor does it at all appear,
that any set of men who believe natural religion, are of the
opinion, that Christianity has been thus confuted.  But, to
proceed:
Together with the moral system  of the world, the Old
Testament contains a chronological account of the beginning
of it, and from thence, an unbroken genealogy of mankind
for many ages before common history begins; and carried
on as much farther, as to make up a continued thread of
history of the length of between three and four thousand
years.  It contains an account of God's making a covenant
with a particular nation, that they should be his people, and
he would be their God, in a peculiar sense; of his often
interposing miraculously in their affairs; giving them the
promise, and, long after, the possession, of a particular
country; assuring them of the greatest national prosperity
in it, if they would worship him, in opposition to the idols
which the rest of the world worshiped, and obey his commands; and threatening them  with unexampled punishments, if they disobeyed him, and fell into the general
idolatry: insomuch, that this one nation should continue to
he the observation and the wonder of all the world. It declares, particularly, that " God would scatter them among all
people, from one end of the earth even unto the other;" but,
(1) Chap. ii, iii, &c.




CHIAP. v.j]        FOR CHRISTIANITY.                 28"
that "when they should return unto the Lord their God,"
"he would have compassion upon them, and gather them,
firom all the nations whither he had scattered them;" that
" Israel should be saved in the Lord, with an everlasting salvation, and not be. ashamed or confounded, world without
end."   And as some of these promises are conditional.
others are as absolute as any thing can be expressed: that
the time should come, when "the people should be all
righteous, and inherit the land for ever;" that, "though
God would make a full end of all nations whither he had
scattered them, yet would he not make a full end of them;"
that "he would bring again the captivity of his people Israel," " and plant them upon their land, and they should be no
more pulled up out of their land;" that " the seed of Israel
should not cease from being a nation for ever."(l)  It foretells, that God would raise them up a particular person, in
whom all his promises should finally be fulfilled; the Messiah, who should be, in a high and eminent sense, their
anointed Prince and Savior.  This was foretold in such a
manner, as raised a general expectation of such a person in
the nation, as appears from the New Testament, and is an
acknowledged fact-an expectation of his coming at such a
particular time, before any one appeared, claiming to be
that person, and when there was no ground for such an
expectation but from the prophecies; which expectation,
therefore, must, in all reason, be presumed to be explanatory
of those prophecies, if there were any doubt about their
meaning. It seems, moreover, to foretell, that this person
should be rejected by that nation, to whom le had been so
long promised, and though he was so much desired by
them.(2)  And it expressly foretells, that he should be the
Savior of the Gentiles; and even that the completion of the
(1)Deut. xxviii, 64, xxx, 2, 3; Isa. xlv, 17, Ix, 21; Jer. xxx, 11,
3xvi, 28; Amo0s ix, 14, 15; Jer. xxxi, 36.
(2 Lisa. viii, 14, 15, xlix, 5, liii; Mal. i, 10, 11, and iii



88          OE THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE         [PART U.
schemne, contained in this book, and then begun, and in its
p)rogress, should be somewhat so great, that, in comparison
with it, the restoration of the Jews alone would be but of
small account.  "It is a light thing that thou shouldst be
my servant, to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore
the preserved of Israel: I will also give thee for a light to
the Gentiles, that thou mayest be for salvation unto the end
of the earth."  And, "In the last days, the mountain of
the Lord's house shall be estsblished in the top of the
mountains, and shall be exalted above the hills; and all nations shall flow unto it;" "for out of Zion shall go forth the
law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem; and he shall
judge among the nations;" "and the Lord alone shall be
exalted in that day, and the idols he shall utterly abolish."(1)
The Scripture, farther, contains an account, that at the time
the Messiah was expected, a person rose up, in this nation,
claiming to be that Messiah, to be the person whom all the
prophecies referred to, and in whom  they should centre;
that he spent some years in a continued course of miraculous works, and endued his immediate disciples and followers
with a power of doing the same, as a proof of the truth of
that religion which he commissioned them to publish; that,
invested with this authority and power, they made numerous
converts in the remotest countries, and settled and established his religion in the world; to the end of which, the
Scripture professes to give a prophetic account of the state
of this religion amongst mankind.
Let us now suppose a person, utterly ignorant of history,
to have all this related to him out of the Scripture. Or,
suppose such a one, having the Scripture put into his
hands, to remark these things in it, not knowing but that
(3, Isa. xlix, 6, ii, xi, Ivi, 7; Mal. i, 11: to whir,ch must be added,
the other prophecies of the like kind, several in the New Testament,
and very many in the Old, which describe what shall be the coinpletion of the revrealed plan of Providentc.




frIIAP. VII.]      FOR CHRISTIANITY.                 289
the whole, even its civil history, as well as the other parts
of it, might be, from beginning to end, an entire invention;
and to ask, What truth was in it, and whether the revelation
here related was real or a fiction?  And, instead of a direct.
answer, suppose him, all at once, to be told the following
confessed facts; and then to unite them into one view.
Let him first be told, in hlow great a degree the profession
and establishment of natural religion, the belief that there is
one God to be worshiped, that virtue is his law, and that
mankind shall be rewarded and punished hereafter, as they
obey and disobey it here-in how very great a degree, I
say, the profession and establishment of this moral system
in the world, is owing to the revelation, whether real or
supposed, contained in this book-the establishment of this
moral system, even in those countries which do not acknowledge the proper authority of the Scripture.(1) Let him be
told, also, what number of nations do acknowledge its proper
authority.  Let him then take in the consideration, of what
importance religion is to mankind.  And upon these things,
lie might, I think, truly observe, that this supposed revelation's obtaining and being received in the world, with all
the circumstances and effects of it, considered together as
one event, is the most conspicuous and important event in
the history of mankind: that a book of this nature, and thus
promulged and recommended to our consideration, demands,
as if by a voice from heaven, to have its claim most seriously
examinied into; and that, before such examination, to treat
it with any kind of scoffing and ridicule, is an offense against
natural piety.  But it is to be remembered, that how much
soever the establishment of natural religion in the world is
owing to the Scripture revelation, this does not destroy the
proof of religion from reason, any more than the proof of
Euclid's Elements is destroyed, by a man's knowing or
thinking that he should never have seen the truth of the
(1) Page 246
25




290          OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE         LPART IT
several propositions contained in it, nor had those propesi
tions come into his thoughts, but for that mathematician.
Let such a person as we are speaking of, be, in the next
place, informed of the acknowledged antiquity of the first
parts of this book; and that its chronology, its account of
the time when the earth, and the several parts of it, were
first peopled with human creatures, is no way contradicted,
but is really confirmed, by the natural and civil history of
the world, collected fiom common historians, from the state
of the earth, and from the late invention of arts and sciences.
And, as the Scripture contains an unbroken thread of common and civil history, from the creation to the captivity, for
between three and four thousand years; let the person we
are speaking of be told, in the next place, that this general
history, as it is not contradicted, but is confirmed by profane history, as much as there would be reason to expect,
upon supposition of its truth, so there is nothing in the whole
history itself, to give any reasonable ground of suspicion of
its not being, in the general, a faithful and literally true
genealogy of men, and series of things.  I speak here only
of the common Scripture history, or of the course of ordinary events related in it, as distinguished from miracles, and
from the prophetic history.  In all the Scripture narrations
of this kind, following events arise out of foregoing ones, as
in all other histories.  There appears nothing related as
done in any age, not conformable to the manners of that
age; nothing in the account of a succeeding age, which,
one would say, could not be true, or was improbable, from
the account of things in the preceding one. There is nothing in the characters, which would raise a thought of their
being feigned; but all the internal marks imaginable of their
being real.  It is to be added, also, that mere genealogies,
bare narratives of the number of years, which persons called
by such and such names lived, do not carry the face of fiction; perhaps do carry some presumption of veracity; nnd




CHAP. V[I.]        FOR CHRISTIANITY.                 291
all unadorned narratives, which have nothing to surprise,
may be thought to carry somewhat of the like presumption
too. And the domestic and the political history is plainly
credible. There may be incidents in Scripture, which, taken
alone in the naked way they are told, may appear strange,
especially to persons of other manners, temper, education;
but there are, also, incidents of undoubted truth, in many
or most persons' lives, which, in the same circumstances,
would appear to the full as strange.  There may be mistakes of transcribers, there may be other real or seeming
mistakes, not easy to be particularly accounted for; but
there are certainly no more things of this kind in the Scripture, than what were to have been expected in books of
such antiquity; and nothing, in anywise, sufficient to discredit the general narrative.  Now, that a history, claiming
to commence from the creation, and extending in one continued series, through so great a length of time, and variety
of events, should have such appearances of reality and
truth in its whole contexture, is surely a very remarkable
circumstance in its favor. And as all this is applicable to
the common history of the New Testament, so there is a farther credibility, and a very high one, given to it by profane
authors; many of these writing of the same times, and confirming the truth of customs and events, which are incidentally, as well as more purposely mentioned in it. And this
credibility of the common Scripture history, gives some
credibility to its miraculous history; especially as this is
interwoven with the common, so as that they imply each
other, and both together make up one relation.
Let it, then, be more particularly observed to this person, that it is an acknowledged matter of fact, which is
indeed, implied in the foregoing observation, that there was
such a nation as the Jews, of the greatest antiquity, whose
government and general polity was founded on the law,
here related to be given them by Moses as from Heaven:




292          OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDEINCE      LPART II.
that natural religion, though with rites additional, yet no
way contrary to it, was their established religion, which
cannot be said of the Gentile world; and that their very
being, as a nation, depended upon their acknowledgment
of one God, the God of the universe. For suppose, in
their captivity in Babylon, they had gone over to the
religion of their conquerors, there would have remained no
bond of union, to keep them a distinct people. And whilst
they were under their own kings, in their own country, a
total apostasy from God would have been the dissolution
of their whole government. They, in such a sense, nationally acknowledged and worshiped the Maker of heaven and
earth, when the rest of the world were sunk in idolatry, as
rendered them, in fact, the peculiar people of God. And
this so remarkable an establishment and preservation of
natural religion amongst them, seems to add some peculiar
credibility to the historical evidence for the miracles of Moses and the prophets; because these miracles are a full satisfactory account of this event, which plainly wants to be
-accounted for, and cannot otherwise.
Let this person, supposed wholly ignorant of history, be
acquainted farther, that one claiming to be the Messiah, of
Jewish extraction, rose up at the time when this nation, from
the prophecies above mentioned, expected the Messiah; that
lie was rejected, as it seemed to have been foretold he
should, by the body of the people under the direction of
their rulers; that, in the course of a very few years, he was
believed on, and acknowledged as the promised Messiah, by
great numbers among the Gentiles, agreeably to the propho
ecies of Scripture, yet not upon the evidence of prophecy,
but of miracles,(l) of which miracles we have also strong
historical evidence; (by which I mean here no more than
must be acknowledged by unbelievers; for let pious frauds
and follies be admitted to weaken, it is absurd to say they
(1) Page 267, &c.




CHAP. VII.1        FOR CHRISTIANITY.                293
destroy, our evidence of miracles wrought in proof of Christianity;) (1) that this religion approving itself to the reason
of mankind, and carrying its own evidence with it, so far
as reason is a judge of its system, and being no way contrary to reason in those parts of it which require to be
believed upon the mere authority of its Author; that this
religion, I say, gradually spread and supported itself, for
some hundred years, not only without any assistance from
temporal power, but under constant discouragements, and
often the bitterest persecutions from it, and then became the
religion of the world; that, in the meantime, the Jewish
nation and government were destroyed in a very remarkable manner, and the people carried away captive and dispersed through the most distant countries-in which state
of dispersion they have remained fifteen hundred years;
and that they remain a numerous people, united among
themselves, and distinguished from the rest of the world, as
they were in the days of Moses, by the profession of his
law, and everywhere looked upon in a manner, which one
scarce knows how distinctly to express, but in the words of
the prophetic account of it, given so many ages before it
came to pass: "Thou shalt become an astonishment, a proverb, and a by-word, among all nations whither the Lord
shall lead thee."(2)
The appearance of a standing miracle, in the Jews
remaining a distinct people in their dispersion, and the
confirmation which this event appears to give to the truth
of revelation, may be thought to be answered, by their
re]igion's forbidding them intermarriages with those of any
other, and prescribing them  a great many peculiarities in
their food, by which they are debarred from the means of
incorporating with the people in whose countries they live.
This is not, I think, a satisfactory account of that which:It pretends to account for. But what does it pretend to
(1) Page 273 &c.            (2) Deut. xxviii, 37.




2994         OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE       LPART II
account for? The correspondence between this event and thle
prophecies; or the coincidence of both with a long dispensation of Providence, of a peculiar nature, toward that people formerly? No. It is only the event itself which is
offered to be thus accounted for; which single event taken
alone, abstracted from all such correspondence and coincidence, perhaps would not have appeared miraculous; but
that correspondence and coincidence may be so, though the
event itself be supposed not. Thus the concurrence of our
Savior's being born at Bethlehem, with a long foregoing
series of prophecy and other coincidences, is doubtless miraculous, the series of prophecy, and other coincidences,
and the event, being admitted; though the event itself,
his birth at that place, appears to have been brought
about in a natural way; of which, however, no one can be
certain.
And as several of these events seem, in some degree, expressly, to have verified the prophetic history already, so,
likewise, they may be considered farther, as having a peculiar aspect toward the full completion of it; as affording
some presumption that the whole of it shall, one time or
other, be fulfilled. Thus, that the Jews have been so wonderfully preserved in their long and wide dispersion; which
is, indeed, the direct fulfilling of some prophecies, but is
now mentioned only as looking forward to somewhat yet to
come: that natural religion came forth from Judea, and
spread in the degree it has done over the world, before lost
in idolatry: which, together with some other things, have
distinguished that very place, in like manner as the people
of it are distinguished: that this great change of religion
over the earth, was brought about under the profession and
acknowledgment, that Jesus was the promised Messiah:
things of this kind naturally turn the thoughts of serious
men toward the full completion of the prophetic history,
concerning the final restoration of that people-concerning




c'HAP. VII.]      FOR CH-IRISTIANITY.             295
the establishment of the everlasting kingdom among them,
the kingdom of the Messiah; and the future state of the
world, under this sacred government. Such circumstances
and events compared with these prophecies, though no completions of them, yet would not, I think, be spoken of as
nothing in the argument, by a person upon his first being
informed of them. They fall in with the prophetic history
of things still future, give it some additional credibility,
have the appearance of being somewhat in order to the full
completion of it.
Indeed, it requires a good degree of knowledge, and great
calmness and consideration, to be able to judge, thoroughly,
of the evidence for the truth of Christianity, from that part
of-the prophetic history which relates to the situation of
the kingdoms of the world, and to the state of the Church,
from the establishment of Christianity to the present time.
But it appears, from a general view of it, to be very material. And those persons who have thoroughly examined
it, and some of them were men of the coolest tempers,
greatest capacities, and least liable to imputations of prejudice, insist upon it as determinately conclusive.
Suppose, now, a person quite ignorant of history, first to
recollect the passages above mentioned out of Scripture,
without knowing but that the whole was a late fiction, then
to be informed of the correspondent facts now mentioned,
and to unite them all into one view: that the profession and
establishment of natural religion in the world, is greatly
owing, in different ways, to this book, and the supposed
revelation which it contains; that it is acknowledged to be
of the earliest antiquity; that its chronology and common
history are entirely credible; that this ancient nation, the
Jews, of whom it chiefly treats, appear to have been, in
fact, the people of God, in a distinguished sense; that as
there was a national expectation amongst them, raised from
the prophecies, of a Messiah to appear at such a time, so




296          OF TIHE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE      LPART II.
one at this time appeared, claiming to be that Messiah; that
he was rejected by this nation, but received by the Gentiles,
not upon the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles; that
the religion he taught supported itself under the greatest
difficulties, gained ground, and at length became the religion
of the world; that, in the mean time, the Jewish polity was
utterly destroyed, and the nation dispersed over the face of
the earth; that notwithstanding this, they have remained a
distinct numerous people for so many centuries, even to this
day; which not only appears to be the express completion
of several prophecies concerning them, but, also, renders
it, as one may speak, a visible and easy possibility, that
the promises made to them as a nation, may yet be fulfilled.
And to these acknowledged truths, let the person we have
been supposing add, as I think he ought, whether every
one will allow it or no, the obvious appearances which there
are, of the state of the world, in other respects besides
what relates to the Jews, and of the Christian Church,
having so long answered, and still answering to the prophetic history. Suppose, I say, these facts set over against
the things before mentioned out of the Scripture, and seriously compared with them; the joint view of both together,
must, I think, appear of very great weight to a considerate
reasonable person —of much greater, indeed, upon having
them first laid before him, than is easy for us, who are so
familiarized to them, to conceive, without some particular
attention for that purpose.
All these things, and the several particulars contained
under them, require to be distinctly and most thoroughly
examined into; that the weight of each may be judged of,
upon such examination, and such conclusion drawn as results
from their united force. But this has not been attempted
here.  I have gone no farther than to show, that the,
general imperfect view of them now given, the confessed
historical evidence for miracles, and the many obvious




CHAP. VII.]        FOR CHRISTIANITY.                 297
appearing completions of prophecy, together with the collat.
eral things (1) here mentioned, and there are several others
of the like sort; that all this together, which, being fact,
must be acknowledged by unbelievers, amounts to real
evidence of somewhat more than human in this matterevidence much more important than careless men, who have
been accustomed only to transient and partial views of it,
can imagine, and, indeed, abundantly sufficient to act upon.
And these things, I apprehend, must be acknowledged by
unbelievers.  For though they may say that the historical
evidence of miracles, wrought in attestation of Christianity,
is not sufficient to convince them  that such miracles were
really wrought; they cannot deny, that there is such historical evidence, it being a known matter of fact that there is.
T''hey may say, the conformity between the prophecies and
events, is by accident; but there are many instances in
which such conformity itself cannot be denied.  They may
say, with regard to such kind of collateral things as those
above mentioned, that any odd accidental events without
meaning, will have a meaning found in them by fanciful
people; and that such as are fanciful in any one certain
way, will make out a thousand coincidences, which seem to
favor their peculiar follies.  Men, I say, may talk thus; but
no one who is serious, can possibly think these things to be
nothing, if he considers the importance of collateral things,
and even of lesser circumstances, in the evidence of probability, as distinguished, in nature, from the evidence of
demonstration. In many cases, indeed, it seems to require
the truest judgment, to determine with exactness the weight
of circumstantial evidence; but it is very often altogether
as convincing, as that which is the most express and direct.
This general view of the evidence for. Christianity,
(1) All the particular things mentioned in this chapter, not reciucible to the head of certain miracles, or determinate completions of
prophecy. See page 263.




298          OF THE PARTICULARt EVIDENCE      LP-&RT II
considered as making one argument, may, also, serve to ree
ommend to serious persons, to set down every thing which
they think may be of any real weight at all in proof of it,
and particularly the many seeming completions of prophecy;
and they will find, that, judging by the natural rules, by
which we judge of probable evidence in common matters,
they amount to a much higher degree of proof, upon
such a joint review, than could be supposed upon considering them separately, at different times; how strong
soever the proof might before appear to them, upon such
separate views of it. For probable proofs, by being added,
not only increase the evidence, but multiply it. Nor should
I dissuade any one from setting down what he thought
made for the contrary side. But, then, it is to be remembered, not in order to influence his judgment, but his practice, that a mistake on one side, may be, in its consequences,
much more dangerous than a mistake on the other. And
what course is most safe, and what most dangerous, is a
consideration thought very material, when we deliberate,
not concerning events, but concerning conduct in our temporal affairs. To be influenced by this consideration in our
judgment, to believe or disbelieve upon it, is, indeed, as
much prejudice, as any thing whatever. And, like other
prejudices, it operates contrary ways in different men. For
some are inclined to believe what they hope, and others,
what they fear. And it is manifest unreasonableness, to
apply to men's passions in order to gain their assent. But,
in deliberations concerning conduct, there is nothing which
reason more requires to be taken into the account, than
the importance of it. For, suppose it doubtful, what would
be the consequence of acting in this, or in a contrary
manner; still, that taking one side could be attended with
little or no bad consequence, and taking the other might be
attended with the greatest, must appear, to unprejudiced
reason, of the highest moment toward determining how wa




CHAP. VII.]       FOR CHRISTIANITY.                299
are to act. But the truth of our religion, like the truth of
common matters, is to be judged of by all the evidence
taken together.  And unless the whole series of things
which may be alledged in this argument, and every partic
ular thing in it, can reasonably be supposed to have been
by accident, (for here the stress of the argument for Christianity lies,) then is the truth of it proved: in like manner
as if, in any common case, numerous events acknowledged,
were to be alledged in proof of any other event disputed;
the truth of the disputed event would be proved, not only
if any one of the acknowledged ones did of itself clearly
imply it, but, though no one of them singly did so, if the
whole of the acknowledged events taken together could
not in reason be supposed to have happened, unless the
disputed one were true.
It is obvious, how much advantage the nature of this
evidence gives to those persons who attack Christianity,
especially in conversation.  For it is easy to show, in a short
and lively manner, that such and such things are liable to
objection, that this and another thing is of little weight in
itself; but impossible to show, in like manner, the united
force of the whole argument in one view.
However, lastly, as it has been made appear, that there
is no presumption against a revelation as miraculous; that
the general scheme of Christianity, and the principal parts
of it, are conformable to the experienced constitution of
things, and the whole perfectly credible; so the account
now given of the positive evidence for it, shows that this
evidence is such, as, from the nature of it, cannot ]be
destroyed, though it should be lessened.




300        OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY   LPART II.
CHAPTER VIII.
OF THE OBJECTIONS WHICH MAY BE MADE AGAINST ARGUING
FROM THE ANALOGY OF NATURE TO RELIGION.
IF every one would consider, with such attention as they
are bound, even in point of morality to consider, what they
judge and give characters of, the occasion of this chapter
would be, in some good measure at least, superseded. But
since this is not to be expected; for some'we find do not concern themselves to understand even what they write against:
since, this treatise, in common with most others, lies open to
objections, which may appear very material to thoughtful
men at first sight; and, besides that, seems peculiarly liable
to the objections of such as can judge without thinking, and
of such as can censure without judging; it may not be
amiss to set down the chief of these objections which occur
to me, and consider them to their hands. And they are
such as these:
" That it is a poor thing to solve difficulties in revelation,
by saying, that there are the same in natural religion; when
what is wanting is -o clear both of them, of these their
common, as well as other their respective, difficulties: but
that it is a strange way indeed of convincing men of the
obligations of religion, to show them that they have as little
reason for their worldly pursuits; and a strange way of vindicating the justice and goodness of the Author of nature,
and of removing the objections against both, to which the
system of religion lies open, to show, that the like objections
lie against natural Providence —a way of answering objections against religion, without so much as pretending to
make out, that the system of it, or the particular things in it
objected against, are reasonable." Especially, perhaps, some
may be inattentive enough to add, "Must this be thought
strange, when it is confessed that analogy is no answer to




CIIAP. VIII.]    OF NATURE TO RELIGION.           301].
such objections; that when this sort of reasoning is carried
to the utmost length it can be imagined capable of, it will
yet leave the mind in a very unsatisfied state; and that it
must be unaccountable ignorance of mankind, to imagine
they will be prevailed with to forego their present interests
and pleasures, from regard to religion, upon doubtful evidence."
Now, as plausible as this way of talking may appear, that
appearance will be found in a great measure owing to halfviews, which show but part of an object, yet show that indistinctly, and to undeterminate language. By these means,
weak men are often deceived by others, and ludicrous
men by themselves. And even those who are serious and
considerate cannot always readily disentangle, and at once
clearly see through the perplexities in which subjects themselves are involved; and which are heightened by the deficiencies and the abuse of words. To this latter sort of
persons, the following reply to each part of this objection
severally, may be of some assistance, as it may also tend a
little to stop and silence others.
1. The thing wanted, that is, what men require, is to have
all difficulties cleared. And this is, or, at least for any thing
we know to the contrary, it may be, the same, as requiring
to comprehend the Divine nature, and the whole plan of Providence from everlasting to everlasting. But it hath always
been allowed to argue, from what is acknowledged to what
is disputed. And it is in no other sense a poor thing, to
argue from natural religion to revealed, in the manner found
fault with, than it is to argue in numberless other ways of
probable deduction and inference, in matters of conduct,
which we are continually reduced to the necessity of doing.
Indeed, the epithet poor may be applied, I fear, as properly
to great part, or the whole, of human life, as it is to the
things mentioned in the objection. Is it not a poor thing,
for a physician to have so little knowledge in the cure of




302        OBJECTIONS AGAINST TIE ANALOGY   LPART II,
diseases, as even the most eminent have?  To act upon
conjecture and guess, where the life of man is concerned?
Undoubtedly it is: but not in comparison of having no skill
at all in that useful art, and being obliged to act wholly in
the dark.
Further, since it is as unreasonable as it is common, to'urge objections against revelation, which are of equal weight
against natural religion; and those who do this, if they are
not confused themselves, deal unfailly with others, in making
it seem  that they are arguing only against revelation, or
particular doctrines of it, when in reality they are arguing
against moral Providence; it is a thing of consequence to
show, that such objections are as much leveled against
natural religion, as against revealed. And objections, which
are equally applicable to both, are, properly speaking, answered, by its being shown that they are so, provided the
former be admitted to be true.  And without taking in the
consideration how distinctly this is admitted, it is plainly
very material to observe, that as the things objected against
in natural religion are of the same kind with what is certain
matter of experience in the course of Providence, and in the
information which God affords us concerning our temporal
interest,nder his government; so the objections against the
system of Christianity and the evidence of it, are of the very
same kind with those which are made against the system
and evidence of natural religion.  However, the reader,
upon review, may see that most of the analogies insisted
upon, even in the latter part of this treatise, do not necessarily require to have more taken for granted than is in the
former; that there is an Author of nature, or natural Governor of the world; and Christianity is vindicated, not from
its analogy to natural religion, but chiefly, from  its analogy
to the experienced constitution of nature.
2. Religion is a practical thing, and consists in such'a
determinate course of life, as being what, there is reason to




CHAP. VIIi.]     OF NATURE TO RELIGION.                303
think, is commanded by the Author of nature, and will,
upon the whole, be our happiness under his government.
Now, if nen can be convinced that they have the like reason
to believe this, as to believe that taking care of their temporal affairs will be to their advantage; such conviction cannot but be an argument to them for the practice of religion.
And if there be really any reason for believing one of these,
and endeavoring to preserve life, and secure ourselves tile
necessaries and conveniences of it, then there is reason also
for believing the other, and endeavoring to secure the interest it proposes to us.  And if the interest which religion
proposes to us be infinitely greater than our whole temporal
interest, then there must be proportionably greater reason
for endeavoring to secure one, than the other: since by the
supposition, the probability of our securing one, is equal to
the probability of our securing the other.  Thllis seems
plainly unanswerable; and has a tendency to influence fair
minds, who consider what our condition really is, or upon
what evidence we are naturally appointed to act; and who
are disposed to acquiesce in the terms upon which we live,
and attend to and follow that practical instruction, whatever
it be, which is afforded us.
But the chief and proper force of the argument refer red
to in the objection, lies in another place. For it is said, that
the proof of religion is involved in such inextricable dificulties, as to render it doubtful; and that it cannot be supposed, that if it were true, it would be left upon doubtful
evidence.  H-Iere, then, over and above the force of each
particular difficulty or objection, these difficulties and objections, taken together, are turned into a positive argument
against the truth of religion, which argument would stand
thus: If religion were true, it would not be left doubtful,
and open to objections to the degree in which it is; therefore, that it, is thus left, not only renders the evidence of it
weak, and lessens its force, in proportion to the weight-of




304        OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY   LPART II.
such objections, but also shows it to be false, or is a general
presumption of its being so. Now the observation, that
from the natural constitution and course of things, we must
in our temporal concerns, almost continually, and in matters
of great consequence, act upon evidence of a like kind and
degree to the evidence of religion, is an answer to this argument; because it shows, that it is according to the conduct
and character of the Author of nature to appoint we should
act upon evidence like to that, which this argument presumes he cannot be supposed to appoint we should act
upon: it is an instance, a general one, made up of numerous
particular ones, of somewhat in his dealing with us, similar
to what is said to be incredible. And as the force of this
answer lies merely in the parallel which there is between
the evidence for religion and for our temporal conduct, the
answer is equally just and conclusive, whether the parallel
be made out, by showing the evidence of the former to be
higher, or the evidence of the latter to be lower.
3. The design of this treatise is not to vindicate the character of God, but to show the obligations of men; it is not
to justify his Providence, but to show what belongs to us
to do. These are two subjects, and ought not to be confounded. And though they may at length run up into each
other, yet observations may immediately tend to make out
the latter, which do not appear, by any immediate connec,
tion, to the purpose of the former; which is less'our concern than many seem to think. For, first, it is not neces.
sary we should justify the dispensations of Providence
against objections, any farther than to show, that the things
objected against may, for aught we know, be consistent with
justice and goodness. Suppose, then, that there are things
in the system of this world, and plan of Providence relating
to it, which, taken alone, would be unjust; yet it has been
showvn unalswerably, that if we could take in the reference
which these things may have to other things present, past,




("HAP. VIII.]    OF NATURE TO RELIGION.              305
and to come- to the whole scheme, which the things objected against are parts of; these very things might, for
aught we know, be found to be, not only consistent with
justice, but instances of it. Indeed, it has been shown, by
the analogy of what we see, not only possible that this
may be the case, but credible that it is. And thus objections, drawn from such things, are answered, and Providence is vindicated, as far as religion makes its vindication
necessary. Hence, it appears, secondly, that objections
against the Divine justice and goodness are not endeavored to be removed, by showing that the like objections,
allowed to be really conclusive, lie against natural Providence: but those objections being supposed and shown not
to be conclusive, the things objected against, considered as
matters of fact, are farther shown to be credible, firom their
conformity to the constitution of nature; for instance, that
God will reward and punish men for their actions hereafter,
from the observation that he does reward and punish them
for their actions here. And this, I apprehend, is of weight.
And I add, thirdly, it would be of weight, even though
those objections were not answered. For, there being the
proof of religion above set down, and religion implying several facts; for instance, again, the fact last mentioned, that
God will reward and punish men for their actions hereafter;
the observation that his present method of government is
by rewards and punishments, shows that future fact not to
be incredible; whatever objections men may think they have
against it, as unjust or unmerciful, according to their notions of justice and mercy; or as improbable from their belief of necessity. I say, as improbable; for it is evident no
objection against it, as unjust, can be urged from  necessity; since this notion as much destroys injustice, as it
does justice. Then, fourthly, though objections against
the reasonableness of the system of religion, cannot, indeed, be answered without entering into consideration of
26




306        0B3JECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY   [PAIT Hf.
its reasonableness, yet objections against the credibility
or truth of it may.  Because the system of it is reducible
into what is properly matter of fact; and the truth, the
probable truth, of facts, may be shown without consideration of their reasonableness. Nor is it necessary, though,
in some cases and respects, it is highly useful and proper,
yet it is not necessary, to give a proof of the reasonableness of every precept enjoined us, and of every particular
dispensation of Providence, which comes into the system of
religion.  Indeed, the more thoroughly a person of a right
disposition is convinced of the perfection of the Divine nature and conduct, the farther he will advance toward that
perfection of religion, which St. John speaks of.(1)  But
the general obligations of religion are fully made out, by
proving the reasonableness of the practice of it. And
that the practice of religion is reasonable, may be shown,
though no more could be proved, than that the system of
it may be so, for aught we know to the contrary; and even
without entering into the distinct consideration of this.
And from hence, fifthly, it is easy to see, that though the
analogy of nature is not an immediate answer to objections
against the wisdom, the justice, or goodness, of any doctrine or precept of religion; yet it may be, as it is, an immediate and direct answer to what is really intended by
such objections; which is, to show that the things objected
against are incredible.
4. It is most readily acknowledged, that the foregoing treatise is by no means satisfactory; very far, indeed,
from it; but so would any natural institution of life appear,
if reduced into a system, together with its evidence. Leaving religion out of the case, men are divided in their opinions, whether our pleasures overbalance our pains; and
whether it be, or be not, eligible to live in this world.
And were all such controversies settled, which, perhaps, ill
(1) 1 John iv, 18.




CHAP. VIII.]    OF NATURE TO RELIGION.               30'l
speculation would be found involved in great difficulties;
and were it determined, upon the evidence. of reason, as
nature has determined it to our hands, that life is to be preserved; yet still, the rules which God has been pleased to
afford us, for escaping the miseries of it, and obtaining its
satisfactions, the rules, for instance, of preserving health
and recovering it when lost, are not only fallible, and precarious, but very far from being exact. Nor are we informed by nature, in future contingencies and accidents, so
as to render it all certain, what is the best method of managing our affairs.  What will be the success of our temporal pursuits, in the common sense of the word success, is
highly doubtful.  And what will be the success of them, in
the proper sense of the word, that is, what happiness or
enjoyment we shall obtain by them, is doubtful in a much
higher degree.  Indeed, the unsatisfactory nature of the
evidence, with which we are obliged to take up, in the daily
course of life, is scarce to be expressed. Yet men do not
throw away life, or disregard the interests of it, upon account of this doubtfulness.  The evidence of religion, then,
being admitted real, those who object against it, as not satisfactory, that is, as not being what they wish it, plainly
forget the very condition of our being; for satisfaction, in
this sense, does not belong to such a creature as man.
And, which is more material, they forget, also, the very
nature of religion. For, religion presupposes, in all those
who will embrace it, a certain degree of integrity and honesty; which it was intended to try whether men have or
not, and to exercise in such as have it, in order to its improvement.  Religion presupposes this as much, and in the
same sense, as speaking to a man presupposes he understands the language in which you speak; or as warning a
man of any danger, presupposes that he hath such a regard
to himself, as that he will endeavor to avoid it,: And,
therefore, the question is not at all, whether the evidc ace




808         OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY   [PART IX.
of religion be satisfactory; but, whether it be, in reason,
sufficient to prove and discipline that virtue which it presupposes?  Now, the evidence of it is fully sufficient for all
those purposes of probation; how far soever it is frort being satisfactory, as to the purposes of curiosity, or any
other: and, indeed, it answers the purposes of the former
in several respects, which it would not do, if it were as
overbearing as is required.  One might add farther, that
whether the motives, or the evidence for any course of action, be satisfactory, meaning here, by that word, what satisfies a man, that such a course of action will in event be
for his good; this need never be, and, I think, strictly
speaking, never is, the practical question in common matters.  But the practical question in all cases, is, whether
the evidence for a course of action be such, as taking in all
circumstances, makes the faculty within us, which is the
guide and judge of conduct,(1) determine that course of
action to be prudent?  Indeed, satisfaction that it will be
for our interest or happiness, abundantly determines an action to be prudent; but evidence, almost infinitely lower
than this, determines actions to be so too, even in the
conduct of every day.
5. As to the objection concerning the influence which
this argument, or any part of it, may, or may not, be expected to have upon men, I observe, as above, that religion being intended for a trial and exercise of the morality
of every person's character, who is a subject of it; and
there being, as I have shown, such evidence for it, as is sufficient, in reason, to influence men to embrace it; to object,
that it is not to be imagined mankind will be influenced by
such evidence, is nothing to the purpose of the foregoing
treatise.  For the purpose of it is not to inquire, what sort
of creatures mankind are; but what the light and knowledge
which is afforded them, requires they should be? *to sitow
(1) See Dissertati)n c)




CHAP. VI1I.J    OF NATURE TO RELIGION.              309
how, in reason, they ought to behave; not how, in fact, they
will behave. This depends upon themselves, and is their own
concern; the personal concern of each man in particular.
And how little regard the generality have to it, experience,
indeed, does too fully show. But religion, considered as a
probation, has had its end upon all persons to whom it has
been proposed, with evidence sufficient in reason to influence
their practice; for by this means they have been put into
a state of probation; let them behave as they will in it.
And thus, not only revelation, but reason also, teaches us,
that, by the evidence of religion being laid before men, the
designs of Providence are carrying on, not only with regard
to those who will, but likewise with regard to those who
will not, be influenced by it.  However, lastly, the objection
here referred to, allows the things insisted upon in this
treatise to be of some weight; and if so, it may be hoped it
will have some influence. And if there be a probability that
it will have any at all, there is the same reason in kind,
though not in degree, to lay it before men, as there would
be if it were likely to have a greater influence.
And, farther, I desire it may be considered, with respect
to the whole of the foregoing objections, that in this treatise
I have argued upon the principles of others,(1) not my own;
and have omitted what I think true, and of the utmost importante, because by others thought unintelligible, or not true.
Thus I have argued upon the principles of the fatalists,
which I do not believe; and have omitted a thing of the
utmc&s importance, which I do believe, the moral fitness and
unfitness of actions, prior to all will whatever; which I apprellend as certainly to determine the Divine conduct, as
(1) By arguing upon the principles of others, the reader will observe
is meant, not proving any thing from those principles, but nottwithstanding them. Thus religion is proved, not firom the opinion of
necessity, which is absurd, but notwithstanding, or even though that
opinion were admitted to be true.




310        OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY   [PART II.
speculative truth and falsehood necessarily determine the
Divine judgment.  Indeed, the principle of liberty, and that
of moral fitness, so force themselves upon the mind, that
moralists,. the ancients as well as moderns, have formed their
language upon it.  And probably it may appear in mine,
though I have endeavored to avoid it: and, in order to avoid
it, have sometimes been obliged to express myself in a nmanner which will appear strange to such as do not observe the
reason for it; but the general argument here pursued does
not at all suppose, or proceed upon, these principles. Now,
these two abstract principles of liberty and moral fitness
being omitted, religion can be considered in no other view
than merely as a question of fact; and in this view it is here
considered.  It is obvious that Christianity, and the proof
of it, are both historical.  And even natural religion is,
properly, a matter of fact.  For, that there is a righteous
Governor of the world, is so; and this proposition contains
the general system  of natural religion.  But then, several
abstract truths, and in particular those two principles, are
usually taken into consideration in the proof of it; whereas,
it is here treated of only as a matter of fact. To explain
this: that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two
right ones, is an abstract truth; but that they appear so to
our mind, is only a matter of fact. And this last must have
been admitted, if any thing was, by those ancient skeptics,
who would not have admitted the former; but pretended to
doubt, "Whether. there was any such thing as truth;" or,
"Whether we could certainly depend upon our faculties of
understanding for the knowledge of it in any case."  So
likewise, that there is, in the nature of things, an original
stan(lard of right and wrong in actions, independent upon all
will, but which unalterably determines the will of God, to
exercise that moral government over the world which religion teaches, that is, finally, and upon the whole, to reward!
and punish men respectively, as they act right or wrong;




CHAP. VIII.]    OF NATURE TO RELIGION.               311
this assertion contains an abstract truth, as well as matter
of fact. But suppose, in the present state, every man, without exception, was rewarded and punished, in exact proportion as he followed or transgressed that sense of right and
wrong, which God has implanted in the nature of every manl;
this would not be at all an abstract truth, but only a matter
of fact.  And though this fact were acknowledged by every
one, yet the very same difficulties might be raised, as are
now, concerning the abstract questions of liberty and moral
fitness: and we should have a proof, even the certain one
of experience, that the government of the world was perfectly moral, without taking in the consideration of those
questions; and this proof would remain, in what way soever
they were determined. And thus, God having given mankind a moral faculty, the object of which is actions, and
which naturally approves some actions as right and of good
desert, and condemns others as wrong and of ill desert; that
he will, finally and upon the whole, reward the former and
]unish the latter, is not an assertion of an abstract truth, but
of what is as mere a fact as his doing so at present would
be. This future fact I have not indeed proved, with the
force with which it might be proved, from the principles of
liberty and moral fitness; but, without them, have given a
really conclusive practical proof of it, which is greatly
strengthened by the general analogy of nature-a proof
easily caviled at, easily shown not to be demonstrative, for
it is not offered as such; but impossible, I think, to be
evaded or answered. And thus the obligations of religion
are made out, exclusively of the questions concerning liberty
and moral fitness, which have been perplexed with difficulties and abstruse reasonings, as every thing may.
Hence, therefore, may be observed distinctly, what is the
force of this treatise. It will be, to such as are convinced
of religion, upon the proof arising out of the two last menltioned principles, an additional proof and a confirmation of




312          OBJECTIONS AGAINST ANALOGY.    LPAtt Il.
it; to such as do not admit those principles, an original
proof of it,(1) and a confirmation of that proof.  Those who
believe, will here find the scheme of Christianity cleared of
objections, and the evidence of it in a peculiar manner
strengthened: those who do not believe, will at least be
shown the absurdity of all attempts to prove Christianity
false, the plain, undoubted credibility of it, and, I hope, a
good deal more.
And thus, though some, perhaps, may seriously think,
that analogy, as here urged, has too great stress laid upon
it; and ridicule, unanswerable ridicule, may be applied, to
show the argument from it in a disadvantageous light; yet
there can be no question, but that it is a real one. For religion, both natural and revealed, implying in it numerous
facts; analogy being a confirmation of all facts to which it
can be applied, as it is the only proof of most, cannot but
be admitted by every one to be a material thing, and truly
of weight on the side of religion, both natural and revealed;
and it ought to be particularly regarded by such as profess
to follow nature, and to be less satisfied with abstract reasonings.
v]) Page 145.




PART I.]              CONCLUSION.                   313
C ONCLUS ION,
WHATEVER account may be given, of the strange inattention and disregard, in some ages and countries, to a matter
of such importance as religion, it would, before experience,
be incredible, that there should be the like disregard in
those, who have had the moral system of the world laid
before them, as it is by Christianity, and often inculcated
upon them; because this moral system carries in it a good
degree of evidence for its truth, upon its being barely
proposed to our thoughts. There is no need of abstruse
reasonings and distinctions, to convince an unprejudiced
understanding, that there is a God who made and governs
the world, and will judge it in righteousness; though they
may be necessary to answer abstruse difficulties, when
once such are raised; when the very meaning of those
words, which express most intelligibly the general doctrine
of religion, is pretended to be uncertain, and the clear truth
of the thing itself is obscured by the intricacies of speculation. But, to an unprejudiced mind, ten thousand thousand
instances of design, cannot but prove a Designer. And it
is intuitively manifest, that creatures ought to live under a
dutiful sense of their Maker; and that justice and charity
must be his laws, to creatures whom he has made social,
and placed in society.  Indeed, the truth of revealed religion, peculiarly so called, is not self-evident, but requires
external proof, in order to its being received.  Yet inattention, among us, to revealed religion, will be found to imply
the same dissolute immoral temper of mind, as inattention
to natural religion; because, when both are laid before us,
in the manner they are in Christian countries of liberty, our
obligations to inquire into both, and to embrace both upon
supposition of their truth, are obligations of the same nature. For, revelation claims to be the voice of God; and
27




314                   CONCLUSION.               [PART II.
our obligation to attend to his voice, is, surely, moral in all
cases.  And as it is insisted, that its evidence is conclusive,
upon thorough consideration of it, so it offers itself to us
with manifest obvious appearances of having something
more than human in it, and, therefore, in all reason requires
to have its claims most seriously examined into. It is to be
added, that though light and knowledge, in what manner
soever afforded us, is equally from  God; yet a miraculous
revelation has a peculiar tendency, from the first principles
of our nature, to awaken mankind, and inspire them with
reverence and awe: and this is a peculiar obligation, to
attend to what claims to be so with such appearances of
truth. It is, therefore, most certain, that our obligations to
inquire seriously into the evidence of Christianity, and, upon
supposition of its truth, to embrace it, are of the utmost
importance, and moral in the highest and most proper sense.
Let us, then, suppose, that the evidence of religion in general, and of Christianity, has been seriously inquired into
by all reasonable men among us.  Yet, we find many protessedly to reject both, upon speculative principles of infidelity.  And all of them  do not content themselves with a
bare neglect of religion, and enjoying their imaginary
freedom from its restraints.  Some go much beyond this.
They deride God's moral government over the world: they
renounce his protection, and defy his justice: they ridicule
and vilify Christianity, and blaspheme the Author of it;
and take all occasions to manifest a scorn and contempt of
revelation. This amounts to an active setting themselves
against religion-to what may be considered as a positive
principle of irreligion, which they cultivate within themselves, and, whether they intend this effect or not, render
habitual, as a good man does the contrary principle.  And
others, who are not chargeable with all this profligateness,
yet are in avowed opposition to religion, as if discovered to
be groundless.  Now admitting, which is thl  supposition




PART II.]             CONCLUSION.                    315
we go upon, that these persons act upon what they think
principles of reason, and otherwise they are not to be
argued with; it is really inconceivable, that they should
imagine they clearly see the whole evidence of it, considered
in itself, to be nothing at all; nor do they pretend this.
They are far, indeed, from having a just notion of its evidence; but they would not say its evidence was nothing, if
they thought the system of it, with all its circumstances,
were credible, like other matters of science or history. So
that their manner of treating it must proceed, either from
such kind of objections against all religion, as have been
answered or obviated in the former part of this treatise, or
else from objections and difficulties, supposed more peculiar
to Christianity. Thus, they entertain prejudices against the
whole notion of a revelation and miraculous interpositions.
They find things in Scripture, whether in incidental passages
or in the general scheme of it, which appear to them unreasonable.  They take for granted, that if Christianity
were true, the light of it must have been more general, and
the evidence of it more satisfactory, or, rather, overbearing;
that it must and would have been, in some way, otherwise
put and left, than it is.  Now, this is not imagining they
see the evidence itself to be nothing, or inconsiderable; but
quite another thing. It is being fortified against the evidence, in some degree acknowledged, by thinking they see
the system  of Christianity, or somewhat which appears to
them necessarily connected with it, to be incredible or falsefortified against that evidence, which might, otherwise, make
great impression upon them.  Or, lastly, if any of these
persons are, upon the whole, in doubt concerning the truth
of:Christianity, their behavior seems owing to their taking
for granted, through strange inattention, that such doubting
is, in a manner, the same thing as being certain against it.
To these persons, and to this state of opinion concerning
religion, the foregoing treatise is adapted. For, all the




316                  CONCLUSION.              LPART II.
general objections against the moral system of nature having been obviated, it is shown that there is not any peculiar
presumption at all against Christianity, either considered as
not discoverable by reason, or as unlike to what is so discovered; nor any worth mentioning, against it as miraculous, if
any at all: none certainly, which can render it in the least
incredible. It is shown, that upon supposition of a divine
revelation, the analogy of nature renders it beforehand
highly credible, I think probable, that many things in it
must appear liable to great objections; and that we must
be incompetent judges of it, to a great degree. This observation is, I think, unquestionably true, and of the very
utmost importance: but it is urged, as I hope it will be
understood, with great caution of not vilifying the faculty
of reason, which is "the candle of the Lord within us;"(1)
though it can afford no light, where it does not shine; nor
judge, where it has no principles to judge upon. The objections here spoken of, being first answered in the view of
objections against Christianity as a matter of fact, are, in the
next place, considered as urged more immediately against
the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the Christian dipensation. And it is fully made out, that they admit of exactly
the like answer, in every respect, to what the like objection
against the constitution of nature admit of: that, as partial
views give the appearance of wrong to things, which, upot
farther consideration and knowledge of their relations ta
other things, are found just and good; so it is perfectly
credible, that the things objected against the wisdom and
goodness of the Christian dispensation, may be rendered
instances of wisdom and goodness by their reference to
other things beyond our view: because Christianity is a
scheme as much above our comprehension, as that of nature; and, like that, a scheme in which means are made use
of to accomplish ends, and which, as is most credible, may
(1) Prov. xx, 27.




PART lI.]            CONCLUSION.                  317
he carried on by general laws. And it ought to be attended
to, that this is not an answer taken merely or chiefly from
our ignorance, but from somewhat positive, which our
observation shows us.  For, to like objections, the like
answer is experienced to be just, in numberless parallel
cases. The objections against the Christian dispensation,
and the method by which it is carried on, having been thus
obviated, in general and together; the chief of them are
considered distinctly, and the particular things objected
to are shown credible, by their perfect analogy, each apart,
to the constitution of nature. Thus, if man be fallen from
his primitive state, and to be restored, and infinite Wisdom
and Power engages in accomplishing our recovery, it were
to have been expected, it is said, that this should have been
effected at once, and not by such a long series of means,
and such a various economy of persons and things; one
dispensation preparatory to another, this to a farther one,
and so on through an indefinite number of ages, before the
end of the scheme proposed can be completely accomplished-a scheme conducted by infinite Wisdom, and executed by almighty Power. But now, on the contrary, our
finding that every thing in the constitution and course of
nature is thus carried on, shows such expectations concerning revelation to be highly unreasonable; and is a
satisfactory answer to them, when urged as objections
against the credibility, that the great scheme of Providence
in the redemption of the world, may be of this kind, and
to be accomplished in this manner. As to the particular
method of our redemption, the appointment of a Mediator
between God and man; this has been shown to be most
obviously analogous to the general conduct of nature; that
is, the God of nature, in appointing others to be the instruments of his mercy, as we experience in the daily course
of Providence.  The condition of this world which the
doctrine of our redemption by Christ presupposes, so much




318                   CONCLUSION.              [PART II.
falls in with natural appearances, that heathen moralists
inferred it from those appearances-inferred, that human
nature was fallen from its original rectitude, and, in consequence of this, degraded from its primitive happiness.  Or,
however this opinion came into the world, these appearances must have kept up the tradition, and confirmed the
belief of it. And as it was the general opinion, under the
light of nature, that repentance and reformation, alone and
by itself, was not sufficient to do away sin, and procure a full
remission of the penalties annexed to it; and as the reason
of the thing does not at all lead to any such conclusion; so
every day's experience shows us that reformation is not, in
any sort, sufficient to prevent the present disadvantages and
miseries, which, in the natural course of things, God has
annexed to folly and extravagance. Yet there may be
ground to think, that the punishments, which, by the general laws of Divine government, are annexed to vice, may
be prevented; that provision may have been even originally
made, that they should be prevented by some means or
other, though they could not by reformation alone. For
we have daily instances of such mercy, in the general conduct of nature: compassion provided for misery,(1) medicines for diseases, friends against enemies. There is provision made, in the original constitution of the world, that
much of the natural bad consequences of our follies, which
persons themselves alone cannot prevent, may be prevented
by the assistance of others-assistance, which nature enables, and disposes, and appoints them  to afford.  By a
method of goodness analogous to this, when the world lay
in wickedness, and, consequently, in ruin, " God so loved
the world, that he gave his only begotten Sony" to save it;
and "he being made perfect by suffering, became the author of eternal salvation to all them that obey him."(2)
Indeed, neither reason nor analogy would lead us to think, in
(1) Sermon at the Rolls, p. 106.  (2) John iii, 16. Heb. v, 9.




PART II.]             CONCLUSION.                    319
particular, that the interposition of Christ, in the manner in
which he did interpose, would be of that efficacy for recovery of the world, which the Scripture teaches us it was:
but neither would reason nor analogy lead us to think that
other particular means would be of the efficacy, which experience shows they are, in numberless instances. And, therefore, as the case before us does not admit of experience, so
that neither reason nor analogy can show how, or in what
particular way, the interposition of Christ, as revealed in
Scripture, is of that efficacy which it is there represented to
be; this is no kind nor degree of presumption against its
being really of that efficacy. Farther, the objections against
Christianity, from the light of it not being universal, nor its
evidence so strong as might possibly be given us, have been
answered by the general analogy of nature. That God has
made such variety of creatures, is, indeed, an answer to the
former; but that he dispenses his gifts in such variety, both
of degrees and kinds, amongst creatures of the same species, and even to the same individuals at different times, is a
more obvious and full answer to it. And it is so far from
being the method of Providence, in other cases, to afford us
such overbearing evidence as some require in proof of
Christianity, that, on the contrary, the evidence upon which
we are naturally appointed to act in common matters,
throughout a very great part of life, is doubtful in a high
degree.  And, admitting the fact, that God has afforded to
some no more than doubtful evidence of religion, the same
account may be given of it, as of difficulties and tempta.tions with regard to practice. But as it is not impossible,(1)
surely, that this alledged doubtfulness may be men's own
fault, it deserves their most serious consideration, whether it
be not so. However, it is certain that doubting implies a
degree of evidence for that of which we doubt, and that
(1) Page 256, &c




320                   CONCLUSION.               [PART 11.
this degree of evidence as really lays us under obligations
as demonstrative evidence.
The whole, then, of religion is throughout credible; nor
is there, I think, any thing relating to the revealed dispensation of things more different from the experienced constitution and course of nature, than some parts of the constitution of nature are from other parts of it. And if so, the
only question which remains is, what positive evidence can
be alledged for the truth of Christianity.  This, too, in
general, has been considered, and the objections against it
estimated. Deduct, therefore, what is to be deducted from
that evidence, upon account of any weight which may be
thought to remain in these objections, after what the analogy of nature has suggested in answer to them; and
then consider what are the practical consequences from all
this, upon the most skeptical principles one can argue upon,
(for I am writing to persons who entertain these principles:)
and, upon such consideration, it will be obvious, that immorality, as little excuse as it admits of in itself, is greatly aggravated, in persons who have been made acquainted with
Christianity, whether they believe it or not; because the
moral system  of nature, or natural religion, which Christianity lays before us, approves itself, almost intuitively, to
a reasonable mind, upon seeing it proposed.  In the next
place, with regard to Christianity it will be observed, that
there is a middle, between a full satisfaction of the truth of
it, and a satisfaction of the contrary.  The middle state
of mind between these two consists in a serious apprehension that it may be true, joined with doubt, whether it be
so. And this, upon the best judgment I am able to make,
is as far toward speculative infidelity, as any skeptic can at
all be supposed to go, who has had true Christianity, with
the proper evidence of it, laid before him, and has, in any
tolerable measure, considered them. For I would not be




PART Il.]             CONCLUSION.                   321
mistaken to comprehend all who have ever heard of it; because it seems evident, that, in many countries called Christian, neither Christianity, nor its evidence, are fairly laid before men. And in places where both are, there appear to be
some who have very little attended to either, and who reject
Christianity with a scorn proportionate to their inattention;
and yet are by no means without understanding in other
matters. Now it has been shown, that a serious apprehension that Christianity may be true, lays persons under the
strictest obligations of a serious regard to it, throughout
the whole of their life-a regard not the same exactly, but
in many respects nearly the same, with what a full conviction of its truth would lay them under.  Lastly, it will appear, that blasphemy and profaneness, I mean with regard
to Christianity, are absolutely without excuse. For there is
no temptation to it, but from the wantonness of vanity or
mirth; and these, considering the infinite importance of the
subject, are no such temptations as to afford any excuse for
it. If this be a just account of things, and yet men can
go on to vilify or disregard Christianity, which is to talk
and act as if they had a demonstration of its falsehood;
there is no reason to think they would alter their behavior
to any purpose, though there were a demonstration of its
truth.




ADVERTISEMENT.
IN the first copy of these papers, I had inserted the two following
Dissertations into the chapters, "Of a Future Life," and, "Of the
Moral Government of God;" with which they are closely connected. But as they do not directly fall under the title of the foregoing treatise, and would have kept the subject of it too long out of
eight, it seemed more proper to place them by themselves.




TWO BRIEF
DI SS ERTATIO N S.
DISSERTATION I.
OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.
WHETHIER we are to live in a future state, as it is the most
important question which can possibly be asked, so it is the
most intelligible one which can be expressed in language.
Yet strange perplexities have been raised about the meaning of that identity, or sameness of person, which is implied in the notion of our living now and hereafter, or in
any two successive moments. And the solution of these
difficulties hath been stranger than the difficulties themselves. For, personal identity has been explained so by
some, as to render the inquiry concerning a future life of no
consequence at all to us, the persons who are making it.
And though few men can be misled by such subtilties, yet
it may be proper a little to consider them.
Now, when it is asked wherein personal identity consists,
the answer should be the same as if it were asked, wherein
consists similitude or equality; that all attempts to define,
would but perplex it. Yet there is no difficulty at all in
ascertaining the idea. For as, upon two triangles being
compared or viewed together, there arises to the mind the
idea of similitude; or upon twice two and four, the idea of
equality; so, likewise, upon comparing the consciousness
of one's self, or one's own existence in any two moments,
there as immediately arises to the mind the idea of personal
identity. And as the two former comparisons not only give
the ideas of similitude and equality, but also show us, that
two triangles are alike, and twice two and four are equal; so
the latter comparison not only gives us the idea of personal




324              OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.          [DISS. I.
identity, but, also, shows us the identity of ourselves in
those two moments; the present, suppose, and that immediately past; or the present, and that a month, a year, or
twenty years past. Or, in other words, by reflecting upon
that which is myself now, and that which was myself twenty
years ago, I discern they are not two, but one and the same
self.
But though consciousness of what is past does thus ascertain our personal identity to ourselves, yet, to say that it
makes personal identity, or is necessary to our being the
same persons, is to say, that a person has not existed a
single moment, nor done one action, but what he can remember; indeed, none but what he reflects upon. And one
should really think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute,
personal identity, any more than knowledge, in any other
case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes.
This wonderful mistake may possibly have arisen from
hence, that to be endued with consciousness, is inseparable
from the idea of a person, or intelligent being. For, this
might be expressed inaccurately thus: that consciousness
makes personality; and from hence it might be concluded
to make personal identity.  But though present consciousness of what we at present do and feel, is necessary to our
being the persons we now are; yet present consciousness of
past actions, or feelings, is not necessary to our being the
same persons who performed those actions, or had those
feelings.
The inquiry, what makes vegetables the same in the common acceptation of the word, does not appear to have any
relation to this of personal identity; because the word same,
when applied to them and to person, is not only applied to
different subjects, but it is also used in different senses.
For when a man swears to the same tree, as having stood
fifty years in the same place, he means only the same as to




DISS. I.]       OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.             325
all the purposes of property and uses of common life, and
not that the tree has been all that time the same, in the
strict philosophical sense of the word. For he does not know
whether any one particle of the present tree be the same
with any one particle of the tree which stood in the same
place fifty years ago. And if they have not one common
particle of matter, they cannot be the same tree, in the
proper philosophic sense of the word same; it being evidently
a contradiction in terms, to say they are, when no part of
their substance, and no one of their properties, is the sameno part of their substance, by the supposition-no one of
their properties, because it is allowed that the same property
cannot be transferred from one substance to another. And,
therefore, when we say, the identity or sameness of a plant
consists in a continuation of the same life, communicated
under the same organization, to a number of particles of
matter, whether the same or not, the word same, when applied to life and to organization, cannot possibly be understood to signify, what it signifies in this very sentence, when
applied to matter. In a loose and popular sense, then, the
life, and the organization, and the plant, are justly said to
be the same, notwithstanding the perpetual change of the
parts. But, in a strict and philosophical manner of speech,
no man, no being, no mode of being, no any thing, can be
the same with that with which it has indeed nothing the
same. Now, sameness is used in this latter sense when
applied to persons. The identity of these, therefore, cannot
subsisrt with diversity of substance.
The thing here considered, and demonstratively, as I
think, determined, is proposed by Mr. Locke in these words,
" Whether it, that is, the same self or person, be the same
identical substance?" And he has suggested what is a
much better answer to the question than that which he gives
it in form. For he defines person, "a thinking, intelligent
being," &c., and personal identity, " the sameness of a rational




326              OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.           [DISS. I.
being."(1) The question then is, whether the same rational
being is the same substance; which needs no answer, because being and substance, in this place, stand for the same
idea.  The ground of the doubt, whether the same person
be the same substance, is said to be this; that the consciousness of our own existence in youth and in old age, or in any
two joint successive moments, is not the same individual
action,(2) that is, not the same consciousness, but different
successive consciousnesses. Now, it is strange that this
should have occasioned such perplexities. For it is surely
conceivable, that a person may have a capacity of knowing
some object or other to be the same now, which it was when
he contemplated it formerly; yet, in this case, where, by
the supposition, the object is perceived to be the same, the
perception of it in any two moments cannot be one and the
same perception. And thus, though the successive consciousnesses which we have of our own existence are not the
same, yet are they consciousnesses of one and the same
thing or object-of the same person, self, or living agent.
The person, of whose existence the consciousness is felt now,
and was felt an hour or a year ago, is discerned to be, not
two persons, but one and the same person; and, therefore,
is one and the same.
Mr. Locke's observations upon this subject appear hasty;
and he seems to profess himself dissatisfied with suppositions, which he has made relating to it.(3) But some of
those hasty observations have been carried to a strange
length by others; whose notion, when traced and examined
to the bottom, amounts, I think, to this:(4) "That personality is not a permanent, but a transient thing: that it lives
and dies, begins and ends, continually: that no one can any
(1) Locke's Works, vol. i, p. 146.
(2) Locke, p. 146, 147.           (3) Locke, p. 152.
(4) See an answer to Dr. Clarke's third defence of his letter to Mr
Dodwell, 2d edit., p. 44, 56, &c.




DISS. I.]        OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.                327
more remain one and the same person two moments together,
than two successive moments can be one and the same
moment: that our substance is indeed continually changing; but whether this be so or not, is, it seems, nothing to
the purpose; since it is not substance, but consciousness
alone, which constitutes personality; which consciousness,
being successive, cannot be the same in any two moments,
nor, consequently, the personality constituted by it." And
from hence it must follow, that it is a fallacy upon ourselves,
to charge our present selves with any thing we did, or to
imagine our present selves interested in any thing which
befell us yesterday, or that our present self will be interested
in what will befall us to-morrow; since our present self is
not, in reality, the same with the self of yesterday, but
another like self or person coming in its room, and mistaken
for it; to which another self will succeed to-morrow.  This,
I say, must follow: for if the self or person of to-day, and
that of to-morrow, are not the same, but only like persons,
the person of to-day is really no more interested in what
will befall the person of to-morrow, than in what will befall
any other person.  It may be thought, perhaps, that this is
not a just representation of the opinion we are speaking of;
because those who maintain it allow, that a person is the
same as far back as his remembrance reaches. And, indeed,
they do use the words, identity and same person.  Nor will
language permit these words to be laid aside; since if they
were, there must be, I know not what, ridiculous periphrasis
substituted in the room of them. But they cannot, consistently with themselves, mean, that the person is really the
same. For it is self-evident, that the personality cannot be
really the same, if, as they expressly assert, that in which it
consists is not the same. And as, consistently with themselves, they cannot, so I think, it appears they do not, mean,
that the person is really the same, but only that he is so in a
fictitious sense: in such a sense only as they assert; for this




328              OF rERSONAL IDENTITY.           LDISs. I.
they do assert, that any number of persons whatever may
be the same person. The bare unfolding this notion, and
laying it thus naked and open, seems the best confutation
of it. However, since great stress is said to be put upon it,
I add the following things:
1. This notion is absolutely contradictory to that certain
conviction which necessarily, and every moment, rises within
us, when we turn our thoughts upon ourselves; when we
reflect upon what is past, and look forward upon what is to
come. All imagination of a daily change of that living
agent which each man calls himself, for another, or of any
such change throughout our whole present life, is entirely
borne down by our natural sense of things.  Nor is it possible for a person in his wits to alter his conduct, with
regard to his health or affairs, from a suspicion, that though
he should live to-morrow, he should not, however, be the
same person he is to-day. And yet, if it be reasonable to
act, with respect to a future life, upon this notion, that personality is transient, it is reasonable to act upon it, with
respect to the present.  Here, then, is a notion equally
applicable to religion and to our temporal concerns, and
every one sees and feels the inexpressible absurdity of it in
the latter case.  If, therefore, any can take up with it in the
former, this cannot proceed from the reason of the thing,
but must be owing to an inward unfairness, and secret corruption of heart.
2. It is not an idea, or abstract notion, or quality, but a
being only which is capable of life and action, of happiness
and misery.  Now, all beings confessedly continue the
same, during the whole tinme of their existence. Consider,
then, a living being now existing, and which has existed
for any time alive: this living being must have done, and
suffered, and enjoyed, what it has done, and suffered, and
enjoyed formerly, (this living being, I say, and not another,) as really as it does, and suffers, and enjoys, what it




DISS. I.]         OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.               329
does, and suffers, and enjoys this instant. All these successive actions, enjoyments and sufferings, are actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, of the same living being.  And they
are so, prior to all consideration of its remembering or
forgetting; since remembering or forgetting can make no
alteration in the truth of past matter of fact. And suppose
this being endued with limited powers of knowledge and
memory, there is no more difficulty in conceiving it to have
a power of knowing itself to be the same living being which
it was some time ago, of remembering some of its actions,
sufferings, and enjoyments, and forgetting others, than in
conceiving it to know, or remember, or forget any thing
else.
3. Every person is conscious, that he is now the same
person or self he was, as far back as his remembrance
reaches; since, when any one reflects upon a past action of
his own, he is just as certain of the person who did that
action, namely, himself, the person who now reflects upon
it, as he is certain that the action was at all done. Nay,
very often a person's assurance of an action having been
done, of which he is absolutely assured, arises wholly from
the consciousness that he himself did it.  And this he, person, or self, must either be a substance, or the property of
some substance.  If he, if person, be a substance, then
consciousness that he is the same person, is consciousness
that he is the same substance. If the person, or he, be the
property of a substance, still consciousness that he is the
same property, is as certain a proof that his substance remains the same, as consciousness that he remains the same
substance would be; since the same property cannot be
transferred from one substance to another.
But, though we are thus certain that we are the same
agents, living beings, or substances, now, which we were
as far back as our remembrance reaches, yet, it is asked,
whether we may not possibly be deceived in it? And this
28




330             OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.        [DISS. I.
question may be asked at the end of any demonstration
whatever; because it is a question concerning the truth of
perception by memory. And he who can doubt, whether
perception by memory can, in this case, be depended upon,
may doubt, also, whether perception by deduction and reasoning, which, also, include memory, or, indeed, whether
intuitive perception can. Here, then, we can go no farther.
For it is ridiculous to attempt to prove the truth of those
perceptions, whose truth we can no otherwise prove than
by other perceptions of exactly the same kind with them,
and which there is just the same ground to suspect; or to
attempt to prove the truth of our faculties, which can no
otherwise be proved, than by the use or means of those
very suspected faculties themselves.




DISS. II.]      OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.                 331
DISSERTATION II.
OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.
THAT which renders beings capable of moral government,
is their having a moral nature, and moral faculties of perception and of action. Brute creatures are impressed and
actuated by various instincts and propensions: so, also, are
we. But, additional to this, we have a capacity of reflecting upon actions and characters, and making them an object
to our thought; and, on doing this, we naturally and unavoidably approve some actions, under the peculiar view of
their being virtuous and of good desert; and disapprove
others, as vicious and of ill-desert. That we have this
moral approving and disapproving (1) faculty, is certain
from our experiencing it in ourselves, and recognizing it in
each other. It appears from our exercising it unavoidably,
in the approbation and disapprobation even of feigned characters: from the words, right and wrong, odious and amiable, base and worthy, with many others of like signification
in all languages, applied to actions and characters: from
the many written systems of morals which suppose it; since
it cannot be imagined, that all these authors, throughout all
these treatises, had absolutely no meaning at all to their
(1) This way of speaking is taken from Epictetus,* and is made
use of as seeming the most full, and least liable to cavil. And th3
moral faculty may be understood to have these two epithets, dOoxi.
taCo-trtx and acdC'0t2ro,  upon a double account; because, upon a
survey of actions, whether before or after they are done, it determines them to be good or evil; and, also, because it determines
itself to be the guide of action and of life, in contradistinction from
all other faculties, or natural principles of action; in the very same
manner as speculative reason directly and naturally judges of speculative truth and falsehood; and, at the same time, is attended with a
consciousness upon 2reflection, that the natural right to judge of
them belongs to it.
* Arr. Epict., Lib. i, Cap. 1.




332             OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.          LDISS. II,
words, or a meaning merely chimerical: from our natural
sense of gratitude, which implies a distinction between
merely being the instrument of good, and intending it: from
the like distinction, every one makes, between injury and
mere harm, which Hobbes says, is peculiar to mankind; and
between injury and just punishment, a distinction plainly
natural, prior to the consideration of human laws. It is
manifest, great part (1) of common language, and of common
behavior over the world, is formed upon supposition of such
a moral faculty; whether called conscience, moral reason,
moral sense, or divine reason; whether considered as a
sentiment of the understanding, or as a perception of the
heart, or, which seems the truth, as including both. Nor is
it at all doubtful in the general, what course of action this
faculty, or practical discerning power within us, approves,
and what it disapproves. For, as much as it has been disputed wherein virtue consists, or whatever ground for doubt
there may be about particulars, yet, in general, there is in
reality a universally acknowledged standard of it.  It is
that, which all ages and all countries have made profession
of in public; it is that, which every man you meet, puts on
the show of; it is that, which the primary and fundamental
laws of all civil constitutions, over the face of the earth,
make it their business and endeavor to enforce the practice
of upon mankind; namely, justice, veracity, and regard to
common good. It being manifest, then, in general, that we
have such a faculty or discernment as this, it may be of use
to remark some things, more distinctly concerning it.
i. It ought to be observed, that the object of this faculty
is actions,(2) comprehending under that name, active or
practical principles; those principles from which men would
act, if occasions and circumstances gave them power; and
(1) Arr. Epic., Lib. i, Cap. 1.
(2) ObJd ie a'ggr'xj CI &x' —;v r'a, dxivxp?Y~iL,  M. Anton. Lib. ix.
1] 6. Virtutis laus omnisin actione consistit. Cic. Off., Lib. i, Cap. 6.




DISS. II.]    OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.            333
which, when fixed and habitual in any person, we call his
character. It does not appear that brutes have the least
reflex sense of actions, as distinguished from events; or that
will and design, which constitute the very nature of actions,
as such, are at all an object to their perception. But to
ours they are; and they are the object, and the only one,
of the approving and disapproving faculty. Acting, conduct, behavior, abstracted from  all regard to what is, in
fact and event, the consequence of it, is itself the natural
object of the moral discernment, as speculative truth and
falsehood is of speculative reason. Intention of such and
such consequences, indeed, is always included; for it is part
of the action itself; but though the intended good or bad
consequences do not follow, we have exactly the same sense
of the action as if they did. In like manner, we think well
or ill of characters, abstracted from all consideration of the
good or the evil, which persons of such characters have it
actually in their power to do. We never, in the moral way,
applaud or blame either ourselves or others, for what we
enjoy or what we suffer, or for having impressions made
upon us which we consider as altogether out of our power;
but only for what we do, or would have done, had it been
in our power; or for what we leave undone which we might
have done, or would have left undone though we could have
done it.
2. Our sense or discernment of actions, as morally good
or evil, implies in it a sense or discernment of them as of
good or ill discernment. It may be difficult to explain this
perception, so as to answer all the questions which may be
asked concerning it; but every one speaks of such and such
actions as deserving punishment; and it is not, I suppose,
pretended, that they have absolutely no meaning at all to
the expression.  Now, the meaning plainly is, not that we
conceive it for the good of society, that the doer of such
actions should be made to suffer. For if, unhappily, it were




334            OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.         [DISS. II.
resolved that a man who, by some innocent action, was
infected with the plague, should be left to perish, lest, by
other people's coming near him, the infection should spread,
no one would say he deserved this treatment. Innocence
and ill desert are inconsistent ideas. Ill desert always supposes guilt; and if one be no part of the other, yet they
are evidently and naturally connected in our mind. The
sight of a man in misery raises our compassion toward him;
and, if this misery be inflicted on him by another, our indignation against the author of it. But when we are informed
that the sufferer is a villain, and is punished only for his
treachery or cruelty, our compassion exceedingly lessens,
and, in many instances, our indignation wholly subsides.
Now, what produces this effect, is the conception of that in
the sufferer, which we call ill desert. Upon considering,
then, or viewing together, our notion of vice and that of misery, there results a third, that of ill desert.  And thus there
is in human creatures an association of the two ideas, natural
and moral evil, wickedness and punishment.  If this association were merely artificial or accidental, it were nothing;
but, being most unquestionably natural, it greatly concerns
us to attend to it, instead of endeavoring to explain it away.
It may be observed farther, concerning our perception of
good and of ill desert, that the former is very weak with
respect to common instances of virtue. One reason of
which may be, that it does not appear to a spectator, how
far such instances of virtue proceed from a virtuous principle, or in what degree this principle is prevalent; since a
very weak regard to virtue may be sufficient to make men
act well in many common instances.  And on the other
hand, our perception of ill desert in vicious actions lessens
in proportion to the temptations men are thought to have
had to such vices. For, vice in human creatures consisting
chiefly in the absence or want of the virtuous principle,
though a man be overcome, suppose, by tortures, it does




DISS. II.]    OF THE NATURE OF VIRTITE            3 3 5
not from thence appear, to what degree the virtuous principle was wanting. All that appears is, that he had it not in
such a degree, as to prevail over the temptation; but possibly he had it in a degree, which would have rendered him
proof against common temptations.
3. Our perception of vice and ill deserts arises from, and
is the result of, a comparison of actions with the nature and
capacities of the agent. For, the mere neglect of doing
what we ought to do, would, in many cases, be determined
by all men to be in the highest degree vicious. And this
determination must arise from such comparison, and be the
result of it; because such neglect would not be vicious in
creatures of other natures and capacities, as brutes. And
it is the same, also, with respect to positive vices, or such as
consist in doing what we ought not. For, every one has a
different sense of harm done by an idiot, madman, or child,
and by one of mature and common understanding; though
the action of both, including the intention, which is part of the
action, be the same: as it may be, since idiots and madmen,
as well as children, are capable, not only of doing mischief,
but, also, of intending it. Now, this difference must arise
from somewhat discerned in the nature or capacities of
one, which renders the action vicious; and the want of
which in the other, renders the same action innocent, or less
vicious; and this plainly supposes a comparison, whether
reflected upon or not, between the action and capacities of
the agent, previous to our determining an action to be
vicious. And hence, arises a proper application of the epithets, incongruous, unsuitable, disproportionate, unfit, to actions which our moral faculty determines to be vicious.
4. It deserves to be considered, whether men are more at
liberty, in point of morals, to make themselves miserable
without reason, than to make other people so; or dissolutely to neglect their own greater good, for the sake of a
present lesser gratification,. than they are to neglect the




336            OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE,         [DISS. It,
good of others, whom nature has committed to their care.
It should seem, that a due concern about our own interest
or happiness, and a reasonable endeavor to secure and promote it, which is, I think, very much the meaning of the
word prudence in our language —it should seem, that this is
virtue, and the contrary behavior faulty  and blamable;
since, in the calmest way of reflection, we approve of the
first, and condemn the other conduct, both in ourselves and
others. This approbation and disapprobation are altogether
different from mere desire of our own, or of their happiness, and from sorrow upon missing it. For the object or
occasion of this last kind of perception, is satisfaction or
uneasiness; whereas, the object of the first is active behavior. In one case, what our thoughts fix upon is our condition; in the other, our conduct.  It is true, indeed, that
nature has not given us so sensible a disapprobation of imprudence and folly, either in ourselves or others, as of falsehood, injustice, and cruelty; I suppose, because that constant habitual sense of private interest and good, which we
always carry about with us, renders such sensible disapprobation less necessary, less wanting, to keep us from imprudently neglecting our own happiness, and foolishly injuring
ourselves, than it is necessary and wanting to keep us from
injuring others, to whose good we cannot have so strong
and constant a regard; and also, because imprudence and
folly, appearing to bring its own punishment, more immediately and constantly than injurious behavior, it less needs
the additional punishment which would be inflicted upon it
by others, had they the same sensible indignation against it,
as against injustice, and fraud, and cruelty.  Besides, unhappiness being in itself the natural object of compassion,
the unhappiness which people bring upon themselves, though
it be willfully, excites in us some pity for them; and this, of
course, lessens our displeasure against them.  But still it is
matter of experience, that we are formed so as to reflect




DISS. II.]     OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.             337
very severely upon the greater instances of imprudent neglect and foolish rashness, both in ourselves and others.  In
instances of this kind, men often say of themselves with
remnorse, and of others with some indignation, that they
deserve to suffer such calamities, because they brought them
upon themselves, and would not take warning. Particularly,
when persons come to poverty and distresS, by a long course
of extravagance, and after frequent admonitions, though
without falsehood or injustice; we plainly do not regard
such people as like objects of compassion with those who
are brought into the same condition by unavoidable accidents.
From these things it appears, that prudence is a species of
virtue, and folly of vice; meaning by folly, somewhat different from  mere incapacity-a thoughtless want of that
regard and attention to our own happiness, which we had
capacity for. And this the word properly includes, and, as
it seems, in its usual acceptation; for we scarcely apply it to
brute creatures.
However, if any person be disposed to dispute the matter,
I shall very willingly give him up the words virtue and vice,
as not applicable to prudence and folly; but must beg leave
to insist, that the faculty within us, which is the judge of
actions, approves of prudent actions and disapproves imprudent ones-I say, prudent and imprudent actions as such,
and considered distinctly from the happiness or misery which
they occasion. And, by the way, this observation may help
to determine, what justness there is in that objection against
religion, that it teaches us to be interested and selfish.
5. Without inquiring how far, and in what sense, virtue is
resolvable into benevolence, and vice into the want of it, it
may be proper to observe, that benevolence, and the want
of it, singly considered, are in no sort the whole of virtue
and vice. For if this were the case, in the review of one's
own character, or that of others, our moral understanding
and moral sense would be indifferent to every thing, but the
29




388           OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.       [DISS. I].
degrees in which benevolence prevailed, and the degrees in
which it was wanting. That is, we should never approve
of benevolence to some persons rather than to others, nor
disapprove injustice and falsehood upon any other account,
than merely as an overbalance of happiness was foreseen
likely to be produced by the first, and of misery by the
second. But now, on the contrary, suppose two men competitors for any thing whatever, which would be of equal
advantage to each of them; though nothing, indeed, would
be more impertinent than for a stranger to busy himself to
get one of them preferred to the other; yet such endeavor
would be virtue, in behalf of a friend or benefactor, abstracted from all consideration of distant consequence: as
that examples of gratitude, and the cultivation of friendship,
would be of general good to the world. Again, suppose
one man should, by fraud or violence, take from another the
fruit of his labor, with intent to give it to a third, who, he
thought, would have as much pleasure from it as would
balance the pleasure which the first possessor would have
had in the enjoyment, and his vexation in the loss of it:
suppose also, that no bad consequences would follow; yet
such an action would surely be vicious. Nay, farther, were
treachery, violence, and injustice, no otherwise vicious than
as foreseen likely to produce an overbalance of misery to
society; then, if in any case a man could procure to himself
as great advantage by an act of injustice, as the whole
foreseen inconvenience, likely to be brought upon others by
it, would amount to, such a piece of injustice would not be
faulty or vicious at all; because it would be no more than,
in any other case, for a man to prefer his own satisfaction to
another's in equal degrees. The fact, then, appears to be,
that we are constituted so as to condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence, injustice, and to approve of benevolence to
some preferably to others, abstracted from all consideration
which conduct is likeliest to produce an overbalance of




a.,d. II.1    OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.             339
happiness or misery. And, therefore, were the Author of
nature to propose nothing to himself as an end but the production of happiness, were his moral character merely that
of benevolence, yet ours is not so. Upon that supposition,
indeed, the only reason of his giving us the above-mentioned
approbation of benevolence to some persons rather than
others, and disapprobation of falsehood, unprovoked violence,
and injustice, must be, that he foresaw this constitution of
our nature would produce more happiness, than forming us
with a temper of mere general benevolence. But still, since
this is our constitution, falsehood, violence, injustice, must
be vice in us, and benevolence to some preferably to others,
virtue, abstracted from all consideration of the overbalance
of evil or good which they may appear likely to produce.
Now, if human creatures are endued with such a moral
nature as we have been explaining, or with a moral faculty,
the natural object of which is actions; moral government
must consist in rendering them happy and unhappy, inl
rewarding and punishing them, as they follow, neglect, or
depart from, the moral rule of action interwoven in their
nature, or suggested and enforced by this moral faculty;(1)
in rewarding and punishing them upon account of their so
doing.
I am not sensible that I have, in this fifth observation,
contradicted what any author designed to assert. But some
of great and distinguished merit have, I think, expressed
themselves in a manner, which may occasion some danger
to careless readers, of imagining the whole of virtue to consist in singly aiming, according to the best of their judgment,
at promoting the happiness of mankind in the present state;
and the whole of vice, in doing what they foresee, or might
foresee, is likely to produce an overbalance of unhappiness in
it; than which mistakes, none can be conceived more terrible.
For it is certain that some of the most shocking instances of
(1) Page 150.




340           OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.          LDISS. 1I.
injustice, adultery, murder, perjury, and even of persecution,
may, in many supposable cases, not have the appearance
of being likely to produce an overbalance of misery in the
present state; perhaps sometimes may have the contrary
appearance. For this reflection might easily be carried on;
but I forbear. The happiness of the world is the concern
of Him who is the Lord and the proprietor of it; nor do
we know what we are about, when we endeavor to promote
the good of mankind in any ways but those which he has
directed; that is, indeed, in all ways not contrary to veracity
and justice. I speak thus upon supposition of persons really
endeavoring, in some sort, to do good without regard to
these.  But the truth seems to be, that such supposed
endeavors proceed, almost always, from ambition, the spirit
of party, or some indirect principle, concealed, perhaps, in
great measure from persons themselves. And though it is
our business and our duty to endeavor, within the bounds of
veracity and justice, to contribute to the case, convenience,
and even cheerfulness and diversion of our fellow-creatures;
yet, from our short views, it is greatly uncertain whether
this endeavor will, in particular instances, produce an overbalance of happiness upon the whole; since so many and
distant things must come into the account. And that
which makes it our duty, is, that there is some appearance
that it will, and no positive appearance sufficient to balance
this on the contrary side; and also, that such benevolent
endeavor is a cultivation of that most excellent of all virtuous principles, the active principle of benevolence.
However, though veracity, as well as justice, is to be our
rule of life, it must be added, otherwise a snare will be laid
in the way of some plain men, that the use of common forms
of speech generally understood, cannot be falsehood; and,
in general, that there can be no designed falsehood without
designing to deceive.  It must likewise be observed, that,
in numberless cases, a man may be under the strictest




DISS. II.J    OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.              341
obligations to what he foresees will deceive, without his
intending it. For it is impossible not to foresee, that the
words and actions of men in different ranks and employments, and of different educations, will perpetually be mistaken by each other; and it cannot but be so, whilst they
will judge with the utmost carelessness, as they daily do,
of what they are not, perhaps, enough informed to be comDptent judges of, even though they considered it with great
attention.
HE EXND.