,~~~%Il~4
U                                                   a~~~~~~~~~~~~~ILj "E  e.




C~~~~~b 
0' '' tg d~#I  k
t~~!Qt AX>












CUBA AND THE INTERVENTION




i
I




CUBA
AND THE
INTERVENTION
BY
ALBERT G' ROBINSON..,


NEW YORK
YOUNG PEOPLE'S MISSIONARY MOVEMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
I910




COPYRIGHT, 190.5, ]BY
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
All Rights Reserved


The Plimpton Press Norwooei Mass




PREFACE
WITHIN the limits of a single volume, it is impossible to do more
than to touch in brief and general outline the incidents and experiences which I have here sought to cover. The work is therefore suggestive rather than exhaustive. Experiences whose full
recital would require a volume are necessarily dismissed with a
few pages of comment. Volumes might be filled with the story of
each year of the intervention. The first four chapters, serving as
an introduction to the major purpose, are easily capable of expansion into other volumes; while the brief review of Cuba's experience
as an independent republic dismisses in a few words an abundance
of material for still other volumes.
My information regarding the period of American intervention
in Cuba comes primarily and mainly from personal experience as a
student of the situation. My visits to the island were made in the
capacity of a newspaper correspondent and magazine writer whose
work and interest were limited to observation, investigation, and
analysis of conditions and processes, in their details and their influences.
I arrived in Havana on January 4, 1899, three days after the
transfer of Cuba to American control, and remained in the island
for four months, visiting the principal cities and making such study
as was then possible concerning the welfare of the peasantry in
rural areas. In September, 1901, I returned from a trip of sixteen
months in the Philippines and South Africa, where I was sent to
study and to report the activities of war and the initial steps of reconstruction. In November, of that year, I again went to Cuba, to
follow in detail the work of the Constitutional Convention, and to




PREFACE
note the processes and the results of American administration in
the island. I remained until May of the following year. In March,
1902, I returned for a third visit, during which I was a spectator
and student of the establishment and of the opening steps of Cuban
government. I thus saw the beginning, the middle, and the ending, of the period of intervention.
During these visits, my chief aim and object was to watch the
situation from the Cuban rather than from the American point of
view. Unlike so many who visited the island I did not limit my
observations to the view presented from the windows of the Palace
in Havana. That, through official reports and through the major
portion of the news reports, I could have had almost as well in
Washington or in New York as in Havana. Nor did I accept
official statements as necessarily accurate and final. I sought contact with Cubans to obtain their opinions, and met many Spaniards
from whom I obtained other opinions. Many in both groups, to
which I may add a third, that of the many officers of our Regular
Army stationed in administrative positions throughout the island,
were and still are among my personal friends. I count myself
fortunate in that I secured from many in these different groups a
personal trust and confidence which led them to talk with me with
entire freedom and honesty.
My correspondence for the publications which I represented, and
others to which I was an occasional contributor, was at all times
unhampered and unrestricted by any editorial or managerial policy.
I was free to tell what I saw and to make my own comments on it.
In the preparation of this book I have paid no further attention to
that published correspondence than has been desirable and necessary to refresh my memory regarding special incidents or events,
and to obtain special figures. The volume is not in any way a
compilation of that correspondence, but, with the possible exception of an occasional paragraph, consists entirely of newly written
matter, all experiences of the time being weighed in the scales of
later developments. Yet I have seen little or nothing to alter
materially the opinions and convictions formed during the immediate time.




PREFACE
I submit the work with a full realization that some of its views
and some of its statements may come perhaps as a surprise to many,
perhaps as an offence to others. To many it will, I believe, furnish the key to, and the explanation of, features in that complex
situation which they have hitherto been unable clearly to understand. If I shall have accomplished that, and if I have contributed
anything which shall make for a better and a clearer understanding of those "relations which ought to exist between Cuba and the
United States," I shall feel that my work has not been done in
vain.
ALBERT GARDNER ROBINSON.
("A. G. R.")




I
I
I
I




CONTENTS
CHAPTER                                     PAGE
I CUBAN DISCONTENT.........             1
II WAR AND ITS RESULTS.......           17
III THE REVOLUTION OF 1895....           31
IV  AMERICA'S PAST ATTITUDE....         50
V  THE YEAR OF THE WAR....       66
VI CONDITIONS ON JAN. 1, 1899....       84
VII THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION..     100
VIII THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION- Continued 119
IX  THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION... 139
X THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION - Continued 157
XI THE THIRD YEAR OF OCCUPATION...     172
XII THE END OF THE INTERVENTION...       188
XIII THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION...207
XIV  THE QUESTION OF "RELATIONS"....    224
XV  EFFECT OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT...243
XVI ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT.    258
XVII STRUGGLE FOR TARIFF CONCESSIONS...278
XVIII INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE...    294
XIX  LAW AND JUSTICE....304
XX  VARIOUS QUESTIONS....319
XXI CUBA LIBRE Y INDEPENDIENTE...        346
INDEX............. 355








CUBA AND THE INTERVENTION
CHAPTER I
CUBAN DISCONTENT
THE Island of Cuba became a Republic as an indirect
result of revolt against a system of government which was
deemed oppressive, and as a direct result of American intervention in Cuban affairs. It is probable that, without
the American intervention, Cuba's revolt of 1895 would
have failed as did its predecessors.
Contrary to a prevailing belief, Cuba has not been a land
of revolutions. Its history offers no parallel with that of
Hayti or Santo Domingo, or with that of the Central and
South American Republics. Revolts, local in character,
have played their part in Cuba's experience, but the history
of the Island shows no general or national uprising until
that of 1895. The most important and extensive of these
revolts was the Ten Years War (1868-1878), entirely an
affair of the eastern provinces. The revolt of 1895 was
nationalized by what may be called artificial conditions.
It is an important fact, though generally overlooked, that
repressive economic laws have been in every case the provoking cause of Cuban revolt. Unlike those of her neighbors in Latin America, Cuba's insurrections have never
been the outcome of purely political conditions. Nor have
they ever been the result of individual ambition.




CUBAN DISCONTENT


Spain's colonial policy was, in every instance, the cause
of Cuban revolt. In that policy, she violated a fundamental principle of government. She assumed that the
subject existed solely for the benefit of the sovereign. In
establishing her colony she sought only her own financial
advantage. Other colonizing countries learned, through
experience, the folly of such a policy. Spain never learned
it, and has now lost her insular possessions.
Three factors have contributed to Cuba's frequent protests and occasional revolts. These are:
First. Undue trade restrictions;
Second. An arbitrary and unscientific system of taxation;
Third. Retention of all government and of political patronage in the hands of Spaniards, to the exclusion of
Cubans.
To these causes may be traced a large measure of the
long-existing Cuban disaffection. To them, also, may be
attributed Cuba's failure to attain that position in the
world to which, because of her natural resources, her
people rightly aspired.
At the very beginning of Spain's colonial history, closely
restrictive laws were promulgated for the regulation of commerce with and between her colonies. In 1503, a royal
ordinance established the Casa de la Contratacion, or House
of Commerce, at Seville. This body was empowered to
grant licenses, to despatch fleets, and to regulate and control Spanish colonial trade, of which it held an exclusive
monopoly. In 1717, the institution was transferred to the
port of Cadiz. The colonial trade was thus confined to a
single Spanish port. Further restrictions prohibited both
intercolonial trade and trade with any country other than
Spain. For a period during the seventeenth century, such
trade was made an offence punishable by the death of the




CUBAN DISCONTENT


3


trader, and the confiscation of the property involved. As a
natural result, smuggling became an established institution.
For the first fifty years of Cuba's history, Santiago was
the only port on the Island through which merchandise
could be either imported or exported without violation of
the law. With the establishment of Havana as the capital
of the Island, that city became the sole port officially recognized for over-sea trade. This condition held until the
close of the eighteenth century, with the exception of the
brief term of British occupation (1762-1763), during which
Havana was made an open port. The limitation was
removed by a royal order, issued in 1801, by which the
Island ports were opened to foreign trade, subject only to
the general conditions of world commerce. This system
lasted only a few years. In 1809, foreign commerce was
again prohibited.
Much difficulty was encountered during the early years
of the nineteenth century in the enforcement of prohibitive
laws against a trade which had become fairly established,
and no little opposition was manifested by the Island people.
A new policy was then adopted, less harsh in its appearance
but almost equally restrictive in its results. It took the form
of a discriminating tariff, applied to both imports and exports. That continued, subject only to sundry modifications from time to time, until the execution, in 1891, of the
reciprocity treaty with the United States. That treaty
lasted for three years only. It proved a marked benefit to
Cuban-American commerce, though detrimental to Spanish
trade. With the termination of the treaty, in 1894, there
came a reversion to the system of discriminating, differential,
and special tariffs in favor of trade with the peninsula as
against that of all other countries.
The second of these factors in Cuban discontent was the




4


CUBAN DISCONTENT


scheme of taxation. It was an unscientific system. Contrary to a prevalent idea, the taxation of real property, had
it been honestly effected, would have given no ground for
reasonable complaint. Such property was assessed upon
its rental value, and, in normal times, a fair and honest
assessment imposed upon real property in the city of Havana,
a tax which amounted to less than $12 on the $1000 of
fee value. This included State tax, municipal tax, and
expense of collection.*
The tax upon country estates was a variable institution
depending upon the location of the property, its product,
and its facilities for marketing its product. For an average
illustration it may be said that an estate producing $100,000
worth of sugar, having fair facilities, in location and means
of transportation, for marketing its product, would bear a
tax of about $1,500 per annum. An increase or reduction
in its output, or in the market value of its output, met a
corresponding increase or reduction in the amount of the
tax. A farm producing a crop of the value of $1,000 for
*The basis was as follows:
State tax, twelve per cent on three-quarters of the rental value; municipal
tax, a sum equal to eighteen per cent of the State tax, or a little over two per
cent on three-quarters of the rental value; and five per cent of the total of
the two added to them for the expense of collection. Thus, a property
having a fee value of $10,000 would be taxed as follows:
Property  value............................  $10,000.00
Rental (say)..............................  1,000.00
Tax imposed upon (a rental).................  750.00
12 per cent on $750 (State Tax)............  90.00
18 per cent on $90 (Municipal Tax)........  16.20
5 per cent Collection Tax on $106.20......  5.31
Total Tax............................    $111.51
By special act, municipalities were permitted to impose, from time to time,
an extraordinary tax, known as the surtax, which raised the municipal rate
from eighteen per cent to twenty-three per cent of the amount of the State
tax. An exception was made in the case of so called "fincas rusticas," or
rural lands within the municipal limits. These bore a total rate of less
than two and on-half per cent of the rental value, or about one-seventh of
the sum imposed upon the fincas urbanas.




CUBAN DISCONTENT


5


the year, would be taxed in the vicinity of $20 or $25. Idle
or non-productive land paid no tax. The assessment was
made by a commission duly appointed by law under the department known as the Hacienda, practically the Treasury
Department. Justly imposed, these taxes are not to be regarded as burdensome. The notably objectionable feature
of the system lay in its unequal application. Favoritism
and bribery played active parts and led to much acrimonious controversy.
While it may be admitted that taxation upon real property
was, on the whole, fairly reasonable, no such claim can be
advanced regarding another department of direct taxation.
This laid burdens upon the individual, upon the necessary
articles of daily consumption, and upon all departments of
industry. The cedula de vecindad was a graded certificate
of citizenship, abolished at the beginning of the American
occupation. The consumo de ganado was a tax upon all
dressed meat sent out from the slaughter houses. In
Havana, this tax was fixed, by a law of 1890, at four and
one-quarter cents per kilo (about two and one-fifth lbs).
There were also taxes upon the slaughtering of cattle, which
was made a special privilege, and the exclusive right to
slaughter was sold to the highest bidder. Both tax and
bonus were, necessarily, added to the market price of the
meato
There were special taxes upon fuel and upon building
material, upon farm produce brought to market and upon
horses used for pleasure driving, upon railways and upon
country stage lines. There were professional taxes upon lawyers, doctors, and brokers, and industrial taxes upon
carpenters, shoemakers, and masons. Few were exempt
from some form of special direct taxation. In cities, there
was a tax upon all forms of public amusement, upon public




6


CUBAN DISCONTENT


balls, and upon theatrical entertainments, upon cockfighting, and upon public concerts. Specially stamped
official paper, costing from thirty-five cents to $37.50 per
sheet, was imperative for all legal documents, wills, deeds,
and papers in civil suits. The price per sheet varied according to the character of the document and the value of the
property involved.
In large measure, the system of taxation was arbitrary,
depending upon the whim of the authorities, or upon their
immediate requirements, official or personal. Abuse in
the application of these laws was flagrant, and antagonism
was inevitable. Corruption was reduced to an effective
system.
While Cubans participated to some extent in the machinery of government, such participation depended primarily upon their co-operation with or subordination to
the will and the purposes of the Governor General. In
the earlier days, the influence of the church authorities was
strongly manifest, but in the later years it became less
potent. At no time has it dominated as it has in the Philippine Islands.
The administrative system of the Island as a whole consisted of a Governor General, an appointee of Madrid;
Provincial Governors, appointed by the Governor General,
to whom they were responsible and by whom they were
subject to removal at any time; a Diputacion Provincial,
in each province, elected by popular vote and holding
office for four years; and Comisiones Permanentes, composed of five members of the Diputacion Provincial in
each province, selected by the Provincial Governor. The
municipal system has varied from the direct appointment
of the Alcalde, or mayor, by the Governor General, to a
somewhat limited elective system.




CUBAN DISCONTENT


7


From the time of the appointment of Diego Velazquez
as Governor of the Island, in 1512, until the termination of
Spanish sovereignty at noon on the 1st day of January,
1899, a period of 387 years, Cuba had 136 administrators
under their different titles of Lieutenant Governor, Governor
General, Captain General, and Provisional Governor.
This gives an average term of service of a little less than
three years. From the appointment, Nov. 14, 1859, of
Lieut. Gen. Francesco Serrano, Duke de la Torre, until
the American occupation, a period of thirty years, Cuba was
presented with no less than thirty-eight of these representatives from Spain, with an average term of service of a little
less than ten months each. Six of these, however, are given
as "Provisional."
The frequent change in the head office involved frequent
changes in the subordinate positions, and a constant disarrangement of the whole political machinery. Under
conditions of such governmental uncertainty, neither content nor due prosperity could be looked for among the people.
Lucrative posts, or posts which, under the prevailing system,
could be made lucrative, were generally held by Spaniards
who, by service or by influence, obtained recognition from
the crown. Cuba and Cuban offices were regarded as a
rich pasture into which impecunious Spaniards could be
turned for their financial fattening. It is natural that a
goodly number of Cubans should have developed an ambition to graze in the same rich pasturage, and that they
became envious and discontented.   They felt that the
grazing land was a field in which they had some proprietary
right and interest, and that the millions of pesos which were
transported to Spain by these temporary Spanish officials,
came largely, as they doubtless did, from Cuban pockets.
The whole system of Spanish Colonial Government, where



8


8CUBAN DISCONTENT


ever it has existed, has tended strongly to inspire the governed
with ambition for the spoils of office. This was inevitable,
and desire for political office is epidemic in all the lands
over which Spain has held dominion. It is no reflection
upon the patriotism of other Cubans to say that, in some
of these Cuban revolts, agitators have been concerned whose
chief motive was to do for their own pockets that which
they had seen so many Spaniards doing for theirs.
Each of these circumstances has played its part in such
revolts as are recorded in Cuba's history. But a broad
patriotism, a genuine desire for independence and a larger
political life, with broadened trade facilities, improved
educational advantages, and a more important place in the
life of the world, have been manifest in all of Cuba's petty
revolts and more extensive insurrections.
The first recorded outbreak of any moment occurred in
1717. At that time, the trade in Cuban tobacco was a
monopoly of the Spanish Crown. The government owned
warehouses, and fixed the market price of the product.
It may easily be imagined that little regard was shown for
the profit or welfare of the growers. The attempt of Captain General Roja to enforce the conditions imposed led
to an outbreak attended by rioting, and resulted in the
temporary withdrawal of Roja.
After that, a time of comparative peace and general
acquiescence followed until the beginning of the nineteenth
century. There were, during the period, some disturbances
among the blacks of Oriente, and the English occupation,
1762-1763, was not without its influence and results.
In fact, it is quite within bounds to say that few periods
in the entire history of the Island have been so fruitful of
both good and ill to Cuba and the Cubans as this short
term of English occupation. The seed then sown by Eng



CUBAN DISCONTENT


9


land, in the form of a broader trade policy, developed in
the dim light of protest and in the darkness of revolution,
until, one hundred and forty years later, Cuba determined
for herself the trade relations which she was to maintain
with the other nations of the world. On the other hand,
the opening of Cuba's commercial gates to the traffic of
the world, even for so brief a period, brought her vast resources and her valuable products to the knowledge of a
world which could make them available and give them
value. Prior to that event, Cuba's interests were almost
exclusively an affair of the colony and the mother country.
Following it, the nations of the larger world became ever
more and more actively concerned in the commercial possibilities of the Island. The struggle for the larger life was
protracted, but in that struggle lies the key to Cuban revolt.
Reforms in trade conditions were demanded from time
to time, and the demands met with varying measure of success. But the active principle of Spain's colonial policy
remained, and reform and relief were no more than nominal.
The Spanish Constitution of 1812, which followed the
Napoleonic War of 1808, granted to Spain's American
Colonies a representation in the Cortes at Madrid. In
effect, this cession of political rights was practically a dead
letter. The reopening of Cuban ports to foreign commerce,
in 1818, was followed by a brief period of commercial and
industrial activity. Spain quickly took advantage of this
condition to enforce an increase in her revenues.
The successful revolution in South America, under Simon
Bolivar, in 1823, extended its influence to the Island of
Cuba. Under the general auspices of an organization known
as the Soles de Bolivar, conspiracy extended throughout
a large part of the Island, though its centre was in Matanzas.
Its leader was Jose Francisco Lemus, and among its active




10


CUBAN DISCONTENT


members was Jose Maria Heredia, the Cuban poet. The
insurrection was suppressed, and Lemus and many others
were arrested and deported. Much bitter resentment was
aroused, and a period of disturbance ensued.
The next uprising of any note was that of 1828, known as
that of the Black Eagle (El Aguila Negra), an association
whose headquarters were in Mexico. In 1825, Ferdinand
VII issued a royal order which gave to the Governor General
of Cuba almost absolute authority in the Island. Secret
organization for political propaganda became the order of
the day, and the society of the Black Eagle was among the
more prominent of these bodies. The enlarged powers
of the local government contributed to the ready suppression
of these conspiracies, but the principle involved and the
methods pursued by the authorities served only as fresh
ground for antagonism.
About this time, there appeared in England certain political influences whose purpose was English control of Cuba.
This became a source of serious and active agitation on the
Island where it encountered a strong opposition. The incident also involved the United States in a diplomatic controversy which lasted for a number of years. It was this
incident which led, almost directly, to the enunciation of
the so-called Monroe Doctrine, though the general proposition of that doctrine had been laid down in earlier administrations.
A revolution in the Peninsula, that of La Granja, in
1836, was the occasion of disturbance in Cuba, though
the active parties were in reality the Governor General, Don
Miguel Tacon, one of the ablest and strongest men whom
Spain has ever sent to the Island, and one of his subordinates, General Lorenzo, commanding the department of
Santiago. General Lorenzo sided with the seemingly trium



CUBAN DISCONTENT


11


phant Progressistas of the homeland, and proceeded to put
into effect, without the authorization or the approval of his
superior in office, the principles of the Spanish revolutionary
party. By virtue of the supreme authority vested in the
Governor General by the order of Ferdinand, in 1825,
General Tacon at once undertook the suppression of the
movement inaugurated by General Lorenzo in the eastern
department, on the ground that it was a menace to the
peace of the Island and a danger to Spanish interests. Lorenzo lost through failure to take advantage of a critical
opportunity, and returned to Spain to seek a vindication.
Dire punishment fell upon many who had supported and
followed him. Men of wealth and position paid the penalty
of imprisonment or exile. Some went into voluntary exile.
General Tacon did much for Cuba during his administration of the affairs of the Island, but it would appear that his
course established a precedent for the absolutism of many
of his successors.
Of Cuba during the latter part of the first half of
the nineteenth century, a Cuban writer of that period said:
"In a state of agitation in the public mind, and disorder in the
government, with the political passions of Spaniards and Cubans
excited; the Island reduced from an integral part of the monarchy
to the condition of a colony, and with no other political code than
the royal order conferring unlimited power upon the chief authority;
the country bowed down under the weighty tyranny of two military
commissions established in the capitals of the eastern and western
departments; with the prisons filled with distinguished patriots;
deprived of representation in the Cortes; the ayuntamientos prohibited the right of petition; the press forbidden to express the state
of public opinion; closed the administration of General Don Miguel
Tacon in the Island of Cuba, the most calamitous, beyond a question,
that this country has suffered since its discovery by the Spaniards."




CUBAN DISCONTENT


In 1848, a conspiracy was inaugurated in the Cienfuegos
district. This was speedily crushed, and many of its leaders
punished after the customary method. Its chief leader,
Narciso Lopez, escaped to the United States where he became the central figure in a movement for the liberation of
Cuba. His supporters were, in the main, Cubans, some of
them, like himself, in exile. They were more than a little
aided by Americans and American sympathy. In 1849,
a filibustering expedition was organized, but its execution
was frustrated by the vigilance of the American authorities.
Undaunted by this experience, Lopez organized another
expedition, in 1850. This sailed from New Orleans, and
landed 650 men at Cardenas. It was claimed at the time
that the Island was ripe for general revolt, and only lacked
a leader and a central organization around which supporters
might rally. The expedition was a dire failure. The people
failed to respond, and even the filibusters deserted in numbers to the side of the Spanish forces. Lopez escaped to
Key West. He was arrested in Savannah, but was released
in response to a popular demand.
In 1851, Lopez made a third attempt. Correspondence
from the Island, and expressions of sympathy in the United
States, assured him of support. On Aug. 2, 1851, he again
sailed from New Orleans at the head of a filibustering expedition. The band numbered some four hundred poorly
armed men, many of whom were Americans, most of whom
were doubtless little other than military adventurers. A
landing was effected at Playitas, near Bahia Honda, some
fifty-five miles west of Havana. An engagement followed,
in which the invaders were greatly outnumbered, and,
though their fire was disastrously effective, they were forced
to seek refuge in flight. Colonel Crittenden, of Kentucky,
with a party of Americans under his command, was cap



CUBAN DISCONTENT


13


tured and taken to the Fortress of Atares, behind the City
of Havana. There they were shot by order of the Spanish
authorities.  Lopez pushed his way toward the interior,
but was captured and taken to Havana, where he suffered
death, by garrote.
In the initial number of the New York Times, issued on
Oct. 18, 1851, there appeared a review of the Lopez incident.
The following extracts from that article present a contemporaneous opinion of the experience:
"Our readers have undoubtedly made themselves familiar,
through the public journals, with the history and result of the late
invasion of Cuba. We shall not, therefore, repeat them.
"The issue of this attempt will probably prevent any new one,
for some years to come. Nothing can be clearer than the fact
that, for the present at least, the inhabitants of Cuba do not desire their freedom. This has been made so evident by the fearful
hostility which Lopez encountered from the inhabitants of the
Island, from the first hour when he first landed upon their coast,
that any new invader will require conclusive evidence of their
favorable disposition, before he will trust himself among them....
"The opinion has very widely prevailed that the Cubans were
grievously oppressed by their Spanish rulers, and that the severity
of their oppression alone prevented them from making some effort
to throw it off. The presence of an armed force in their midst,
however small, ready to start the battle against their tyrants, it was
supposed, would summon them by thousands to the standard of
revolt, and convert the colony into a free republic. These statements have been made upon high authority, and repeated and believed for years past. Men high in office, men who had lived in
Cuba and were supposed to be familiar with the sentiments of its
people, have uniformly represented that they were ripe for revolt,
and desired only the presence of a small military band to serve as
a nucleus for their force....
"Believing that the Cuban population would aid them, Ameri



14


CUBAN DISCONTENT


can adventurers, never too scrupulous as to the nature of the enterprises which attract their minds, enlisted and were ruined. They
found no aid. Not a Cuban joined them. They were treated as
pirates and robbers, from the first moment of their landing until
their destruction was accomplished. Nor could they, nor did
they, expect any other treatment in case of failure. Even if a
revolution had been in progress there, they would have been rebels
and would have been treated as such. They ceased to be American citizens the moment they set out, as invaders, for the shores
of Cuba. They became amenable to Spanish law, and they expected to meet its vengeance if they failed to overthrow it. As
there was no revolution there - as the people of Cuba did not
wish their aid and joined the government against them - they
were invaders, waging war, on their own responsibility, upon the
Spanish authorities. Their own government was at peace with
Spain; and their conduct was, therefore, criminal at home as well as
in Cuba. They violated American law, as well as the laws of Cuba."
But the disastrous failure of the Lopez expeditions was
not due to Cuban satisfaction with or indifference to the
existing conditions. It was probably due to a lack of confidence in either the man or his methods. Although Cuba
was ripening for revolt, the movement was premature.
Among the Cubans of that time, there was one whom the
Cubans now call the Immortal Saco. The following paragraph appears in a personal letter written by him during
the year 1846. The accuracy of its prediction falls little
short of prescience. His statement of the conditions and
results of the Ten Years' War could have been made with
no greater accuracy at the end of that struggle than it was
twenty-two years before its outbreak. The document
from which this is taken is unquestionably authentic:
"The tyranny of our mother country, to-day most acute, will
have this result - that within a period of time not very remote




CUBAN DISCONTENT


15


the Cubans will be compelled to take up arms to banish her; but I,
who see the danger of my country, would judge myself most blameworthy if I did not show it or seek to avert it as far as lies in my
power. Hither will come war and all of the Island will not respond; I hold it for certain that Havana will remain almost indifferent and with her the adjoining districts, while in the part given
over to revolution commerce will be annihilated, the country
estates will be destroyed, the smaller towns will be burned, and
assassinations will be committed in the name of military executions;
property will be confiscated, whole families will emigrate; when
all is mourning, solitude, and terror, the cities and towns of the
Occident will gain in riches, contributing much to sustain the
Spanish troops in the regions in revolt, while the Cuban army
which sacrifices itself for the country will perish, because the revolution being considered a failure abroad will not secure resources;
nakedness, hunger, and disease will induce the least robust persons
and those of the greater prestige to desire and accept whatever
terms the mother country may offer to them. So it will be for the
first, the second, and the third time, perhaps, before that support
is gained through which the Cubans will triumph in the Palmyra
of the New World. I approve revolution, but not as I show you
because thus it will result. The day in which I throw myself into
a revolution it will not be to ruin my country or to dishonor myself,
but only to secure the existence and the happiness of her sons."
Writing of Cuba, in 1854, the traveller historian, M. M.
Ballou, said: "Cuba is at present politically in a critical and
alarming condition, and the most intelligent natives and
resident foreigners live in constant dread of a terrific and
sanguinary convulsion." Then followed a period of general
unrest, discontent, and protest, in which the slavery question
played an important part. This lasted until the outbreak
of the so-called Ten Years War, in 1868. Though all of
these disturbances were, in their outward seeming, of a
political nature, their underlying cause was economic.




16              CUBAN DISCONTENT
Political revolt was the weapon with which Cuba sought
relief for her economic woes. National independence may
have been the object of a few. It was not then desired by
the great mass of the people.




CHAPTER II


WAR AND ITS RESULTS
THROUGHOUT the period which elapsed between the
conspiracy of the Soles de Bolivar, in 1823, and the outbreak of the Ten Years' War, in 1868, Cuba was in a state
of almost continual ferment with occasional local revolts.
Effort and demand for the removal of the limitations imposed upon Cuban commerce and the profits of Cuban industry by restrictive tariffs and excessive taxation, met with
little else than political jugglery, vague assurances, and
unfulfilled promises.
In 1865, a number of prominent Cubans organized a
party whose definite aim and purpose was relief from oppressive economic conditions. This, necessarily, could only
be effected through reform in political conditions. It was
a period of no little prosperity, notably in the line of Cuba's
chief industry, the production of sugar. The output was
steadily increasing, and prices for the commodity ruled
fairly high, being more than double those of the present
day. Yet the times were seriously disturbed and a spirit
of discontent was dominant in the Island.
During the same year, 1865, the Spanish queen, Isabella II,
appointed a commission for the investigation and consideration of questions concerning political reform in the Island.
Cuba was called upon to send delegates to appear before
this commission with a presentation of the grievances of
the Cuban people. The requests submitted by these dele



18


WAR AND ITS RESULTS


gates included the establishment of a constitutional insular
government, freedom of the press, the right of petition and
assembly, the right of Cubans to hold office in Cuba, and
Cuban representation in the Spanish Cortes. Many Cubans
had come into intimate contact with their great neighbor
on the north, and had imbibed the spirit of republicanism.
Spain, following her established policy, gave no heed to
these desires, and disregarded the signs which were even
then clearly visible. As Cuba held the position of "the
under dog in the fight," and because of Spain's manifest
unfairness and frequent injustice and cruelty to the people
of her colony, the sympathies of the American people were,
at that time, as they were thirty years later, decidedly with
the Cubans. But it would be to lose the true perspective
to picture the Spanish people, nationally, as a race of demons trampling upon the natural rights of a race of Cuban
saints. It is seldom that either party to such a controversy
is wholly right or wholly wrong. The situation is probably
portrayed with accuracy in a letter written some years later
by Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State in the Cabinet of President Grant, to Caleb Cushing, Minister to Spain. Referring to this period, in a letter under date of March 1, 1876,
Mr. Fish says:
"Abuses and wrongs which would not be tolerated in the Peninsula have been allowed and are perpetrated in the Island.
"The administration of law ha.s been substantially subordinated
to military force; offences against the government, whether really
committed or only suspected, have been punished at the will of
military officers or under the forms of military courts, and the
Island has been, in fact, governed, even in times of peace, by martial
law.
"Exactions by way of taxes, imposts, and contributions have
been onerous and oppressive, so much so, in fact, as to make it




WAR AND ITS RESULTS


19


often questionable whether the possession of property, with the risks
attendant upon its cultivation, would not result in loss. These
exactions have been governed by no fixed rule, are enforced by an
arbitrary power in the Island, and large proportions fail to reach the
public treasury, or to contribute in any measure to the support of
the government, but are directed to private purposes.
"Public positions are held by persons sent by Spain to the Island,
who are wanting in interest in the welfare of Cuba, and who resort
thither for the mere purpose of pecuniary profit, intending to return
to Spain as soon as their avarice is satisfied. General report and
belief speak loudly of corruption, and a large number of public
officers are charged with securing profit from their positions.
"Oppressive commercial regulations, injurious to trade, discriminating directly against Cuba, enhance the price of commodities.
Fines imposed upon vessels for trivial offences, and large exactions
by way of consular fees for clearances of vessels destined for her
ports, discourage trade and commerce and tend to place the Island
at a serious disadvantage."
The indifference of the Spanish Government to such a
situation in her most valuable colony, and her neglect to
render justice to colonists who were quite disposed to be
loyal under any rational system of government, led to an
almost inevitable result. Revolt followed.
On the 10th of October, 1868, Carlos Manuel Cespedes
and his associates raised the cry of Cuban independence at
Yara, in the Province of Puerto Principe. On the 10th of
April, 1869, there was proclaimed the constitution of the
Cuban Republic. During the intervening months, there
was considerable fighting, though it was largely in the
nature of guerilla skirmishing. The Spanish Minister of
State asserts, in a memorandum issued to Spain's representatives in other countries, under date of Feb. 3, 1876,
that at the outbreak of the insurrection Spain had 7,500
troops, all told, in the Island of Cuba. According to the




20


WAR AND ITS RESULTS


statement of General Sickles, then Minister to Spain, this
number was increased by reinforcements of 34,500 within
the first year of the war. The accuracy of this information,
however, has been questioned.
Prior to the establishment of the so-called Republic, the
affairs of the insurrection were in the hands of an Assembly
of Representatives. On Feb. 26, 1869, this body issued a
decree proclaiming the abolition of slavery throughout the
Island, and calling upon those who thus received their
freedom to "contribute their efforts to the independence
of Cuba." During the opening days of April, 1869, the
Assembly met at Guiamara. On the 10th of that month
a government was organized, with a president, vice-president, general-in-chief of the army, secretaries of departments, and a parliament or congress. Carlos Manuel Cespedes was chosen as President, and Manuel de Quesada as
General-in-Chief.  A Constitution was adopted.  Sefior
Morales Lemus was appointed as minister to the United
States, to represent the new Republic and to ask official
recognition by the American Government.
The government which the United States was asked to
recognize was a somewhat vague institution. The insurrection, or revolution, if it may be so called, at this time
consisted of a nominal central government, chiefly selforganized and self-elected, and various roving bands, probably numbering some thousands in their aggregate, of men
rudely and incompletely armed, and showing little or nothing
of military organization or method. It is probable that
the new Cuban Republic was not inaccurately described in
a letter from Sefior Lopez Roberts, the Spanish Minister
in Washington, to the Secretary of State, Mr. Fish, under
date of April 5, 1869. He said:




WAR AND ITS RESULTS


"The rebels have no communication with each other; they
occupy no place as a centre of operations; nor have they, in the
whole Island, a single town, a single village or hamlet, nor even a
point on the coast, where they might collect their forces and date
their orders and proclamations; but they fly from our troops and
never offer battle, except when forced to do so; and their only mode
of warfare is to apply the incendiary torch to estates, thus reducing
to ashes and ruins the whole wealth of the Island, if not prevented
by Spanish soldiers."
The statements of this extract are not fully supported
by facts. Like all Cuban-Spanish wars and warfare, the
destruction of property was a common procedure, and
there was much that came little short of brutal murder.
But this applies to the methods of both of the contending
parties. The reduction of the "whole wealth of the Island
to ashes and ruins" is distinctly a Spanish figure of speech.
The great wealth of the Island, then as now, lay in the
western districts. At no time during the whole term of
the war did the insurrection touch that section. It was an
affair of the eastern provinces of Santiago and Puerto Principe and the central province of Santa Clara.
Some of the methods employed for the suppression of
the insurrection were not unlike those adopted by General
Weyler in the later war. At Bayamo, on April 4, 1869,
Count Valmaseda, the Spanish Commandant of that district, issued the following proclamation:
"1. Every man, from the age of fifteen years upward, found
away from his place of habitation, who does not prove a justified
reason therefor, will be shot.
"2. Every unoccupied habitation will be burned by the troops.
"3. Every habitation from which no white flag floats, as a signal
that its occupants desire peace, will be reduced to ashes.




22


WAR AND ITS RESULTS


"4. Women who are not living at their own homes, or at the
homes of their relatives, will collect in the town of Jiguani, or at
Bayamo, where maintenance will be provided. Those who do not
so present themselves will be conducted forcibly."
But the revolution displayed a marked degree of tenacity
in its special area, and assumed such proportions that, on
June 29, 1869, Secretary Fish took the matter up with
General Sickles, who was then United States Minister to
Spain.  Under that date, Mr. Fish wrote as follows:
"The condition of the Island of Cuba excites the most serious
concern. For more than nine months a civil conflict has been
raging there that gives no promise of a speedy termination; a conflict marked with a degree of fierceness and excess on either side
rarely witnessed in later ages, and threatening, if continued, to work
the desolation and destruction of the wealth and the resources of
the Island."
The letter proceeds with a brief review of the reasons
for special interest on the part of the United States in the
affairs of Cuba, and leads up to a tender of the good offices
of the United States in effecting a termination of the war.
This was expressed as follows:
"After much consideration and a careful survey of the question
in all its relations, this Government has arrived at the conclusion
that it is its duty to exert its friendly influence to bring this unhappy
strife to a close. Duty to its own citizens and to their large property
interests, jeopardized by the continuance of the war, the necessity
of maintaining quiet within its borders now seriously disturbed by
the continued strife carried on so near its borders - our friendship
for Spain, one of the earliest and oldest of our allies, with whom no
interruption of friendly relations has occurred since our entrance
into the family of nations - our sympathy for the Cubans, who are
our neighbors - all alike impel the Government to this course.




WAR AND ITS RESULTS


23


"The President therefore directs you to offer to the Cabinet at
Madrid the good offices of the United States for the purpose of
bringing to a close the civil war now ravaging the Island of Cuba,
on the following bases:
"1. The independence of Cuba to be acknowledged by Spain.
"2. Cuba to pay to Spain a sum, within a time and in a manner
to be agreed upon by them, as an equivalent for the entire and
definite relinquishment by Spain of all her rights in that Island,
including the public property of every description. If Cuba should
not be able to pay the whole sum in cash, the future payments, by
installments, are to be adequately secured by a pledge of the export
and import customs duties under an arrangement to be agreed upon
for their collection, in trust, for the purpose of securing both the
principal and interest of those installments until their final discharge.
"3. The abolition of slavery in the Island of Cuba.
"4. An armistice pending the negotiations for the settlement
above referred to."
This letter was followed by another, under the same
date, in which there occurs the following:
"You will notice that the proposal contained in your instruction
No. 2 (that from which the above quotations are taken) is expressed
to be for the purpose of bringing to a close the civil war now ravaging
the Island. While this expression is not designed to grant any public
recognition of belligerent rights to the insurgents, it is nevertheless
used advisedly, and in recognition of a state and condition of the
contest which may not justify a much longer withholding of the
concession to the revolutionary party of the recognized rights of
belligerents. Should the expression therefore be commented upon,
you will admit what is above stated with reference to it, and may
add, in case of a protracted discussion, or the prospect of a refusal
by Spain to accept the proffered offer of the United States, that an
early recognition of belligerent rights is a logical deduction from the
present proposal, and will probably be deemed a necessity on the
part of the United States, unless the condition of the parties to the
contest shall have changed very materially."




24


WAR AND ITS RESULTS


This proposition was duly submitted through the proper
diplomatic channels, and, on August 13, General Sickles
cabled to Secretary Fish as follows:
"President of Council authorizes me to state that the good offices
of the United States are accepted. He suggests, informally, for
your information, four cardinal propositions that will be acceptable,
if offered by the United States, as the basis for a convention, the
details to be settled as soon as practicable:
"1. The insurgents to lay down their arms.
"2. Spain to grant simultaneously a full and complete amnesty.
"3. The people of Cuba to vote by universal suffrage upon the
question of their independence.
"4. The majority having declared for independence, Spain to
grant it, the Cortes consenting: Cuba paying satisfactory equivalent
guaranteed by the United States."
Special stress was laid upon the proviso that the insurgents lay down their arms. Diplomatic negotiations followed, lasting for about four weeks, when General Sickles
notified Secretary Fish that the Spanish Government held
that acceptance of the "bases proposed by the United
States was out of its power; that the mediation of any nation
in a purely domestic question was wholly incompatible
with the honor of Spain; that the permanent committee of
the Cortes, representing all shades of politics, had unanimously voted that the independence of Cuba was inadmissible as a basis of negotiation; and that, by the terms of
the Constitution, no measure could be taken without the
consent of the Cortes that might result in any alienation of
Spanish territory." On September 28, the offer of the
United States was officially withdrawn.
Meanwhile the strife continued. Large numbers of reinforcements from the Peninsula enabled Spain to confine
its activities to the eastern provinces. The commerce of




WAR AND ITS RESULTS


the Island was not greatly disturbed, for the reason that
the great producing and commercial centres lay to the westward. But within its area, the war was conducted, upon
both sides, in relentless fashion with widespread destruction.
The special need of the insurgents was arms and ammunition. This feature and the efforts to supply the need were
the occasion of protracted and complicated negotiations between the United States and Spain.
A Junta had been organized in New York. Money was
raised and filibustering expeditions were essayed with varying success. The Spanish Minister in Washington, Sefor
Lopez Roberts, filed frequent complaints which were duly
investigated and dealt with where suitable evidence was
found. A considerable number of vessels were charged,
probably with justice, with being engaged in filibustering
expeditions. The most notable case was that of the steamer
Virginius which sailed from New York in October, 1870,
with clearance papers for Curacoa, carrying a cargo of
breadstuffs, saddlery, and clothing. She appears to have
cruised between various ports in the Caribbean Sea until her
capture, on Oct. 31, 1873, upon the high seas, by the Spanish
ship Tornado. When captured, she had on board 155
people, nominally as crew and passengers. These were
taken to Santiago, where fifty-three, many of them Americans,
were summarily shot. This act led to a conference between
Secretary of State Hamilton Fish and Rear Admiral Polo
de Bernabe, the Spanish Minister. The investigation which
followed determined that the Virginius carried the American
flag in violation of the maritime laws of the United States.
It was held that, by the seizure, Spain had offered no offence
or insult to the American flag. The ship was ordered to
New York, where necessary papers for a libel suit were to
await her arrival. American naval officers and a crew




26


WAR AND ITS RESULTS


were ordered to Bahia Honda to take possession of the
vessel and proceed to New York. This was done, but the
ship and her machinery were in exceedingly bad shape,
and she foundered in a heavy gale near Cape Fear, thus
closing the incident so far as the ship was concerned.
But another feature remained. This was the question of
indemnity for that which Caleb Cushing, the American
Minister to Spain, in his letter to the Spanish authorities
denounced as "a dreadful, a savage act," "the inhuman
slaughter in cold blood of fifty-three human beings, a large
number of them citizens of the United States, shot without
lawful trial, without any valid pretension of authority,
and to the horror of the whole civilized world." Nineteen
of the victims were British subjects and England also advanced claims for indemnity. She reached her conclusion
of the matter more expeditiously than did the American
authorities. In August, 1874, Spain agreed to the demands
of England but managed to delay actual payment until
December 14. On March 2, 1875, Spain agreed to pay to
the United States "the sum of $80,000 for the purpose of
relief of the families or persons of the ship's company and
passengers" of the steamer Virginius. Meanwhile the insurrection made but little headway, and Spain was unable
to bring it to an end.
In an official letter, dated April 18, 1874, Secretary Fish
says: "It is now more than five years since the uprising,
and it has been announced, with apparent authority, that
Spain has lost upward of 80,000 men, and has expended
upward of $100,000,000, in effort to suppress it; yet the
insurrection seems to-day as active and as powerful as it
has ever been." Spain's losses among her troops were not
due so much to the casualties of war, as they were to the
ravages of disease, especially the yellow fever.




WAR AND ITS RESULTS


27


The process, in which both parties would appear to be
about equally culpable, of destroying property and taking
life when occasion offered, proceedings which are hardly to
be dignified by the name of war, continued until the beginning of 1878. General Martinez Campos was then
Governor General. Maximo Gomez was the recognized
leader of the insurgents. Between these two men, there
was effected that which is known as the Treaty of Zanjon,
on Feb. 10, 1878. The preamble to the Articles of Capitulation reads as follows:
"The people and the armed forces of the Central Department, and the armed groups from other departments, having
met in convention as the only fit means of terminating, in one
sense or another, the pending negotiations, and having considered the propositions submitted by the Commander-in-chief
of the Spanish army, determined on their part to propose
amendments to said propositions by presenting the following
Articles of Capitulation," etc., etc.
These Articles provided for: The political and administrative organization of Cuba; pardon for political offences;
freedom of persons under indictment; amnesty for deserters; the emancipation of the coolies and slaves serving
in the rebel ranks; free transportation for those desirous
of leaving the Island.
Spain claims, and with some reason, that she went beyond
the bounds of these provisions. The question of slavery
had been in active agitation for many years. A decree of
1868 provided emancipation for all children born of slave
mothers after September 17 of that year. An act of July,
1870, gave freedom to slaves who had served under the Spanish flag, those who had reached sixty years of age, and those
who belonged to the State. An act of Feb. 13, 1880, gave




28


WAR AND ITS RESULTS


freedom to others, and the decree of Oct. 17, 1886, declared
the system of slavery forever extinct in Spanish dominions.
There is a marked discrepancy between Cuban and
Spanish statements concerning the fidelity with which the
promises made at the time of the capitulation were carried
out. By a proclamation of March 24, 1878, full amnesty
was granted to all, even to Spanish deserters who served in
the insurgent army. During the years following the surrender, the municipal laws, the Constitution, and the legal
codes in force in Spain were extended to the Island.  Under
the Constitution, Cubans were granted the privilege of
"peaceable assembly." The Constitution also carries, practically, a "Bill of Rights," suffrage, freedom  of worship,
freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the right of petition, and eligibility to all public offices. Provision was
made for Cuban representation in the Spanish Cortes.
This is the Spanish claim. The notably weak point in the
concessions lies in the decree of June 9, 1878, defining the
powers and duties of the Governor General. His powers
were virtually supreme. The decree declares that:
"The Governor General is the highest official representing the
National Government in the Island of Cuba. He is the delegate
of the Ministers of the Colonies, of State, of War, and of the Navy.
He has, moreover, as vice-royal patron, the powers inherent in the
patronship of the Indies, agreeably to the papal bulls and the laws
of the Kingdom. His authority extends over all that conduces to
the maintenance of the public peace, the preservation of the territory, the execution of the laws, and the protection of life and
property.
"He is the commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the
Island, and controls the forces on land and sea, subject to the army
and navy regulations. All the other authorities of the Island are
subordinate to him."




WAR AND ITS RESULTS


29


The Cuban argument is set forth in a letter from Tomas
Estrada Palma, to Richard Olney, Secretary of State, under
date of Dec. 7,J1895. The causes of the revolution of 1895,
he gives as
"Substantially the same as those of the former revolution, lasting
from 1868 to 1878, and terminating only on the representation of
the Spanish Government that Cuba would be granted such reforms
as would remove the grounds of complaint on the part of the Cuban
people. Unfortunately the hopes thus held out have never been
realized. The representation which was to be given to the Cubans
has proved to be absolutely without character; taxes have been
levied anew on everything conceivable; the offices in the Island have
increased, but the officers are all Spaniards; the native Cubans have
been left with no public duties whatsoever to perform, except the
payment of taxes to the government and blackmail to the officials,
without privilege even to move from place to place in the Island
except on the permission of governmental authority.
"Spain has framed laws so that the natives have substantially
been deprived of the right of suffrage. The taxes levied have been
almost entirely devoted to the support of the army and navy in
Cuba, to pay interest on the debt that Spain has saddled on the
Island, and to pay the salaries of the vast number of Spanish officeholders, devoting only $746,000 for internal improvements out of
the $26,000,000 collected by tax. No public schools are within
reach of the masses for their education. All the principal industries
of the Island are hampered by excessive imposts. Her commerce
with every country but Spain has been crippled in every possible
manner, as can readily be seen by the frequent protests of shipowners and merchants.
"The Cubans have no security of person or property. The
judiciary are instruments of the military authorities. Trial by
military tribunal can be ordered at any time at the will of the
Captain General. There is, besides, no freedom of speech, press,
or religion."




30             WAR AND ITS RESULTS
Thus runs the Cuban talc, and it is evident that many
thousands of Cubans believed the facts to be as stated by
Seior Palma. So believing, and after waiting for full
development and trial of Spanish purposes, war was again
declared for the purpose of obtaining the desired freedom
in all the departments of life. It is asserted that the Ten
Years War cost Spain $700,000,000 and more than 200,000
lives. Its successor was to cost her more money, more lives.
and, at last, her insular possessions.




CHAPTER III


THE REVOLUTION OF 1895
SPAIN'S fulfilment of the condition; of the Treaty of
Zanjon was an appearance rather than a fact. It is true
that the Spanish Constitution in its entirety was extended
to Cuba, and that the Spanish law of civil procedure and the
Spanish civil code were put into effect i:l the Island. Other
reforms and improvements were also inaugurated. But
it is also true that Cuban conditions and burdens remained
with little or no real alleviation.
Another important factor appears in the Cuban experience
of this period. For a number of years, the Island had been
faced with the competition of European bountied sugars in
the marketing of her chief product. The production of
beet sugar in Europe increased from 200,000 tons, in 1850,
to 3,841,000 tons, in 1894. Prices were, greatly reduced, and
the profits of Cuban planters were heevily cut. As a general rule, the Cuban planter is a man who desires to make
money in order that he may have money to spend, rather
than that he may have money with Which to make more
money. He was called to face conditions which demanded
improvements and economies in his business. His earlier
experience had not qualified him to cope with such conditions, and a measure of economic dis;tress resulted. This
followed notwithstanding the advantages secured during
the period of reciprocity with the United States. After the
manner of his kind, in Cuba, as elsewhere, the planter




THE REVOLUTION OF 1895


looked to his government to establish political conditions
which would relieve his economic distress. He might quite
as well have looked to the moon. Spain was not in Cuba
for the purpose of encouraging either extravagance or
profits in the business of Cuban planters. The revolt
followed, chiefly, as a result of Spain's failure to do her
part in improving the economic situation in her West Indian
colony.
As has been already stated, the promises of the Treaty
of Zanjon, effected between General Martinez Campos and
General Maximo Gomez, were only nominally fulfilled,
and Cuba's condition was still far from satisfactory to the
Cuban people. A certain measure of political reform had
been conceded, but Cuba was still under the domination
of what was virtually a military autocracy.
The cancellation of the Reciprocity Treaty, in 1894, and
the consequent decrease in the price of sugar, resulted in
a further limitation of industrial prosperity, if not in a
measure of industrial distress. Had the government been
conducted with a view to the rights and the interests of the
Cuban people, both. economic distress and political unrest
might have been averted. It is difficult to realize Spain's
blindness to the situation. It is even more difficult to understand it. The great mass of the Island people were still
fairly loyal to the mother country, and desired no absolute
separation from her, All that was asked by the majority
was regard for their political rights, and consideration for
their economic welfare. Political parties had been organized whose aims were, in the main, not widely divergent,
though they failed utterly to harmonize either their interests
or their actions. Autonomy, though somewhat vaguely
defined, was the ai:in of the greater number. Had that
autonomy which was proclaimed when too late, in Novem



THE REVOLUTION OF 1895


33


ber, 1897, been proffered and effected in November, 1894,
there is every reason for belief that the subsequent history,
not only of Cuba but of the United States as well, would
have been vastly changed. The war between Spain and the
United States would have been indefinitely postponed, if
not entirely averted. But Spain persisted in her indifference
to Cuba's highest interests, and revolution followed.
During February and March, 1895, local uprisings occurred
in the eastern part of the Island. These were quickly suppressed and some of the leaders were deported to Spain's
penal colonies. The inauguration of the insurrection of
1895 was the work of a few men. Their work was effectively
accomplished, and, until the outbreak, a remarkable degree
of secrecy was maintained. The authorities believed that
a movement was on foot, but were unable to locate its centre
or to obtain sufficiently compromising evidence against
those who were suspected of being engaged in it.
Jose Marti was the animating spirit. By personal visits
and by correspondence he put himself into communication
with some of those who had been prominent in the Ten
Years' War. He visited Maximo Gomez at his home in
Santo Domingo, where that spirited old revolutionist had
betaken himself after the conclusion of the Treaty of Zanjon.
Gomez was offered, and accepted, the command of the
proposed army of liberators. Antonio Maceo, a mulatto,
the ablest and most daring of Cuban military leaders, gladly
accepted a command and held himself in readiness to return
to Cuba when summoned. The Cuban Junta, with headquarters in New York, was in charge of Estrada Palma.
An effective working organization was established.
The date set for a general uprising was the 24th of February, but the response on that date was not widespread
by reason of a lack of arms. Yet it appeared with such




34


'THE REVOLUTION OF 1895


force that, on the 27th, the Spanish authorities declared
martial law in Matanzas and Santa Clara provinces, and
a period of eight days was given for the surrender of the
insurgents with promise of pardon. Several local uprisings and skirmishes occurred prior to the arrival on the
Island of the recognized leaders of the insurrection. One
of these was at Ybarra, in Matanzas province. Others
occurred in the provinces of Santa Clara and Santiago.
These were readily suppressed by the Spanish authorities,
who then became seriously alarmed.
The insurrection made rapid headway under the leadership of local commanders, and reinforcements for the garrison in Cuba were hurried across from Spain. Martinez
Campos, who had effected the conclusion of the Ten Years'
War, was sent out as Governor and Captain General. It
was realized that an active war was imminent, and Spain
took measures to meet it.
The movement in Santiago was under the leadership of
Bartolome Maso, an influential planter in the vicinity of
Manzanillo. On April 1, Antonio Maceo, his brother
Jose, and other leaders landed at Duaba and took the field.
On April 11, Jose Marti, Maximo Gomez, and others arrived
on the Island. Engagements soon became a matter of daily
occurrence, and Campos realized that he had a formidable
opponent.
Meanwhile, the Island was alive with political movement.
Numerous political parties were in existence, representing
varying shades of political opinion and political ambition.
Out of the peace of 1878, there had grown two definite
parties, the Liberal and the Union Constitutional. Factions had broken off from these and organized as Autonomists, Liberal Autonomists, Conservatives, Reformers, and
others which had little or no importance. None of them was




THE REVOLUTION OF 1895


revolutionary. The revolutionary party was the insurrection.
Numerically, it was, at this time, probably no more than a
small minority, a focus toward which or from which those of
other parties would turn, according to the developments of
the revolt. In his able work on this period, Mr. Charles
M. Pepper says:* "Torch and machete make short work
of constitutional agitation. They are not the weapons of
political parties. When they were resorted to it was a
question whether they would convert the Autonomists into
recruits or into enemies of the faith that proclaimed its
doctrines by war." Many who sympathized with the insurrectos hesitated to become active participants in the
movement. Some were swept into it by the processes of
war. Others remained inactive though yielding such material aid as was possible for them. These became known
as the Pacificos.
At its inception, although the leadership of the revolutionary movement included among its numbers not a few
Cubans of prominent social and financial position, its rank
and file, the fighting force, was composed chiefly of a somewhat irresponsible element, largely negro and mulatto field
hands, with little or no stake in the country, and nothing
to give or lose except life. With the growth and success of
the movement, many of the better and more responsible
classes became openly identified with it, though an undue
number of these insisted upon and only served on receiving
commissions as field or line officers. Later on, a certain
number became known as Heroes of the Blockade, because
their patriotism awoke to enthusiastic activity only after
the serious fighting was over, and the Island became blockaded by American war ships. Naturally the motives which
led to participation in the movement were varied and com*" Tomorrow in Cuba," page 23.




36


THE REVOLUTION OF 1895


plex. Marti was a patriot, a poet, and a dreamer. Maximo
Gomez, once a petty officer in the Spanish army, a native
of Santo Domingo, had dreamed impracticable dreams of a
united West Indian Republic. Maceo's motive was perhaps a compound of patriotism and a love for the excitement of war, and a hatred of Spain. Among leaders and
among followers, there was genuine patriotism, love of country, desire for freedom and national independence. There
was also hatred of Spanish government and Spanish governors, personal ambition, love of war and love of the glory
which comes from war, the hope of gain, and the desire for
preferment.
Immediately upon landing, Jose Marti, the acknowledged
head of the revolutionary element, issued a call for the
selection of representatives to form a civil government.
Before this could be effected, Marti met his death, on May
19, in an engagement which occurred while he and Gomez,
with some three hundred men, were seeking to pass the
cordon established by General Campos between the provinces of Santiago and Puerto Principe. His death was a
severe blow to the Cubans, but it in no way checked the
movement. Gomez passed the cordon, and organized an
army in Puerto Principe.
The constituent assembly, summoned by Marti, met at
Jimaguayu, in Puerto Principe province, on Sept. 13, 1895.
It consisted of twenty members, representing nearly all
parts of the Island. Its purpose was the organization of a
Cuban Republic. On the 16th, it adopted a constitution,
and on the 18th elected, as President, Salvador Cisneros
Betancourt, and as Vice President, Bartolome Mas6.
Secretaries and sub-secretaries were duly chosen and all were
formally installed. Maximo Gomez was elected Generalin-chief of the Army, with Antonio Maceo as Lieutenant




THE REVOLUTION OF 1895


37


General. Tomas Estrada Palma was chosen as delegate
plenipotentiary and general agent abroad, with headquarters in New York.
Both civil and military organizations were, for a time,
crude and somewhat incoherent. It was a movement
which could only succeed by success. Arms and money
were lacking. The civil government was little else than a
necessary form. Action lay with the military and with the
Cuban Junta in the United States. The first real battle
of the war occurred at Peralojo, near Bayamo, in Santiago
Province, about the middle of July. The leaders of the
opposing forces were Antonio Maceo and Governor General
Campos, in person. The victory lay with Maceo, and
Campos barely eluded capture. The fighting continued,
with varying success, until the time of America's active interference. As it is not my purpose to write a war history, I
touch these points only in outline. The war came and its
determination is familiar to all.
Patriotism, desire for national independence, and personal ambition, were, undoubtedly, factors in the precipitation of the war. Its underlying cause, like that of its predecessors, is undoubtedly to be sought in the general discontent and unrest created by governmental action which
imposed heavy burdens upon the industries of the Island,
and at all times retarded its economic development. It is
probable, if not certain, that the desire of the great majority
was a larger economic life with greater national and individual prosperity, rather than separation from the mother
country for any political reasons.
While the insurrection was taking on a more definite
shape and increasing the area of its operations, in its beginning largely confined to the eastern end of the Island,
the country at large and the principal cities were racked




38


TIHE REVOLUTION OF 1895


with political turmoil which grew out of the movement.
The different parties charged each other with responsibility
for the insurrection, and parties divided into factions. The
Union Constitutionals supported the Spanish Government,
and forced the Autonomists into public declaration of a
similar attitude. Had this party antagonism raged less
furiously, it is certain that there would have been fewer
exiles, and self-exiles, and fewer accessions to the insurgent
ranks. Many were still so far loyal to Spain that, while
desiring reform and demanding autonomy, they had no
desire for a complete separation.
This type of lukewarm loyalty became the subject of
suspicion and the object of attack. Many were practically
driven from the country, and others were virtually forced
into participation in the insurrection, because unable longer
to halt between two defined opinions, and unwilling longer
to confide in Spain's many unfulfilled promises to her Island
colony. Some of those who remained were summarily
arrested and deported, without trial, to Spanish penal institutions. Such rigorous measures made enemies rather
than friends for the government, and resulted in further
accessions to the insurgent cause. Large numbers of such
accessions came from a more respectable element than that
which had originally formed the majority of the insurrccto
party. The weight of an iron hand might be borne, though
with many protests, so long as hope of better things remained.
The blow of the iron hand was not to be endured. But the
insurrection secured its greatest numerical strength through
other causes and as a direct result of its own operations.
The idea is attributed to Mlaximo Gomez. Hopeful or
hopeless as he may have been regarding the outcome of
active war, he declared that if Spain would not give up
Cuba to the Cubans, the Cubans would themselves render




THE REVOLUTION OF 1895


39


the Island so worthless and desolate a possession that Spain
could not afford to hold it. In furtherance of this idea,
there was issued the following:
General Headquarters of the Army of Liberation,
NAJASA, CAMAGUEY, July 1, 1895.
To the Planters and Owners of Cattle Ranches:
In accord with the great interests of the revolution for the
independence of the country and for which we are in arms:
Whereas, all exploitations of any product whatsoever are aids and
resources to the Government that we are fighting, it is resolved
by the general in chief to issue this general order throughout the
Island, that the introduction of articles of commerce, as well as
beef and cattle, into the towns occupied by the enemy, is absolutely
prohibited. The sugar plantations will stop their labors, and
those who shall attempt to grind the crop notwithstanding this
order, will have their cane burned and their buildings demolished.
The person who, disobeying this order, will try to profit from the
present situation of affairs, will show by his conduct little respect
for the rights of the revolution of redemption, and therefore shall
be considered as an enemy, treated as a traitor, and tried as such in
case of his capture.
MAXIMO GOMEZ,
The General in Chief.
Notwithstanding this preliminary warning, many continued their productive operations. This led to a more
definite step, expressed in the following terms:
Headquarters of the Army of Liberation,
TERRITORY OF SANCTI SPIRITUS, Nov. 6, 1895.
Animated by the spirit of unchangeable resolution in defence
of the rights of the revolution of redemption of this country of
colonists, humiliated and despised by Spain, and in harmony with
what has been decreed concerning the subject in the circular dated
the 1st of July, I have ordered the following:




40


THE REVOLUTION OF 1895


Article I. That all plantations shall be totally destroyed, their
cane and outbuildings burned, and railroad connections destroyed.
Article II. All laborers who shall aid the sugar factoriesthese sources of supplies that we must deprive the enemy of
shall be considered as traitors to their country.
Article III. All who are caught in the act, or whose violation
of Article II shall be proven, shall be shot. Let all chiefs of operations of the army of liberty comply with this order, determined to
unfurl triumphantly, even over ruin and ashes, the flag of the
Republic of Cuba.
In regard to the manner of waging the war, follow the private
instructions that I have already given.
For the sake of the honor of our arms and your well-known
courage and patriotism, it is expected that you will strictly comply
with the above orders.
M. GOMEZ,
General in Chief.
To the chiefs of operations: Circulate this.
Immediately upon the heels of the order, there came the
following proclamation:
Headquarters of the Army of Liberation,
SANCTI SPIRITUS, Nov. 11, 1895.
To Honest Men, Victims of the Torch:
The painful measure made necessary by the revolution of redemption drenched in innocent blood from Hatuey to our own
times by cruel and merciless Spain will plunge you in misery. As
general in chief of the army of liberation it is my duty to lead it
to victory, without permitting myself to be restrained or terrified,
by any means necessary to place Cuba in the shortest time in possession of her dearest ideal. I therefore place the responsibility
for so great a ruin on those who look on impassively and force us
to those extreme measures which they then condemn like dolts and
hypocrites that they are. After so many years of supplication,
humiliation, contumely, banishment, and death, when this people,




THE REVOLUTION OF 1895


41


of its own will, has arisen in arms, there remains no other solution
but to triumph, it matters not what means are employed to accomplish it.
This people cannot hesitate between the wealth of Spain and the
liberty of Cuba. Its greatest crime would be to stain the land with
blood without effecting its purposes because of puerile scruples
and fears which do not concur with the character of the men who
are in the field, challenging the fury of an army which is one of
the bravest in the world, but which in this war is without enthusiasm or faith, ill fed and unpaid. The war did not begin February
24; it is about to begin now.
The war had to be organized; it was necessary to calm and lead
into the proper channels the revolutionary spirit always exaggerated in the beginning by wild enthusiasm. The struggle ought
to begin in obedience to a plan and method more or less studied,
as the result of the peculiarities of this war. This has already
been done. Let Spain now send her soldiers to rivet the chains
of her slaves; the children of this land are in the field, armed with
the weapons of liberty. The struggle will be terrible, but success
will crown the revolution and efforts of the oppressed.
MAXIMO GOMEZ,
General in Chief.
Such measures are severe, but they are by no means
unusual in time of war. The step resulted in the general
suppression of Cuban industry, and in widespread devastation. Productive industry was paralyzed and thousands of producers were deprived of employment. Many
who doubtless would have remained at work had their
work continued, in their idleness and its resultant poverty,
joined the ranks of the insurgent army. Upon this feature
rests the assertion of our opening chapter, that the successes
of the revolution of 1895 were largely due to what may be
called artificial conditions. Many who joined the Cuban
army did so not so much from particular desire to join it,




THE REVOLUTION OF 1895


or from motives of special patriotism, as because the (-nditions of the war left them nothing else to do.
That which is known as Oriente, the eastern section of
the Island, was the birthplace of the revolt of 1895, as it
had been of that of 1868. An interesting feature is offered
in the fact that, to-day, many people of the central and
western districts date occurrences from  the "invasion."
Incidents or events are said to have occurred before or after
the "invasion." Inasmuch as the Spanish language is
prone to accurate definition of shades of meaning, it is interesting to note their use of this word in this connection.
If asked what was the "invasion" and who were the "invaders," they reply that it was the westward sweep of the
insurgent forces under Gomez and Maceo. The "invaders" were their fellow country-men, and the "invasion"
was the march of the army of liberation. A natural inference from this fact is that a large part of the Island was,
originally, either in ignorance of the movement, or not in
active sympathy with it. But the torch of the destroying
insurrectos became a beacon light around which many
rallied and became "invaders," or it became a brand whose
burning drove them into the ranks of the army. It is hardly
to be said that the Cuban revolt of 1895 was, in its essence,
a great national uprising, although it came to be, as a result
of the methods employed upon both sides of the line, a
widely popular movement. It had at all times more supporters than participants.
Notwithstanding an enormous reinforcement of his troops,
General Campos could make no headway against his opponents. His available force, consisting of regulars from
Spain, and of local volunteers, is said to have numbered
nearly 200,000 men at the close of 1895. The force opposed to him at any one time cannot with safety be estimated.




THE REVOLUTION OF 1895


43


The best evidence would seem to indicate that General
Gomez was the nominal commander of a regular army and
an irregular force whose numbers might have been from
30,000 to 40,000. Figures thus used are, however, somewhat deceptive.
The general situation was not greatly unlike that of the
South African war of a few years later. The larger force
was a long way from Spain, its base of supplies and reinforcement; it had cities and lines of communication to protect and defend; and it was obliged to carry with it a considerable supply train for field operations at any distance
from its central camps. It was also heavily cumbered with
a military mechanism which is ill calculated to encounter
such a force as that to which it was opposed. The smaller
force was at home; it was active, mobile, unhampered by
wagon trains; it lived on the country among a people in
more or less active sympathy with it; was burdened with no
military traditions, and with few military restrictions. It
knew the movements of its opponents, and struck or moved
away at will. With the issue doubtful, it rarely, if ever,
stood for a pitched battle. These conditions develop a
war which is to be worn out rather than fought out.
For the first time in Cuba's history, a revolution became
national. The spirit of revolt and its activities extended
from Cape Antonio on the west to Cape Maisi on the east.
Havana was in a state of political ferment. Gomez was
busily engaged in his work of rendering the Island a useless
and expensive possession which Spain could not afford to
maintain or retain. Martial law was proclaimed in the
western districts. The City of Havana was the Spanish
stronghold in the Island as well as the seat of government.
The Spanish residents, the Reformists, and the few Cubans
who remained loyal to Spain, were terrified by the presence




44


THE REVOLUTION OF 1895


of General Gomez, with an insurgent army, within ten miles
of the city. They lost confidence in General Campos and
demanded his recall. The government at Madrid accepted
his resignation, in January, 1896.
The successor of General Campos was Valeriano Weyler,
known to the Cubans as "The Butcher." He had served
in Cuba, first as Colonel and later as a Brigade Commander,
during the Ten Years' War, and his military methods were
not forgotten. Soon after his arrival, General Weyler put
into effect a system which gave him a world-wide notoriety.
He adopted the infamous system of reconcentration which,
under his supervision, became a process of direct starvation
of the Island people, men, women, and children.
The Cubans themselves really initiated the system of
concentration as well as that of destruction. To clear the
country in which the insurgents were operating, all Spaniards
and Spanish sympathizers were ordered by the Cuban commanders to betake themselves to the cities and larger towns
which were occupied by Spanish garrisons. Gomez also
sought to force the Cuban people, especially the women and
children and men who were incapable of bearing arms, into
the recesses of the hills, where they might maintain themselves without danger of attack by or interference from the
Spanish troops. Weyler retaliated and introduced a more
effective and much less humane system. The original order
of reconcentration was issued, Feb. 16, 1896, in the following terms:
"Don Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau, Marquis of Teneriffe,
Governor and Captain General of Cuba, General in Chief of the
Army, etc., desirous of warning the honest inhabitants of Cuba,
and those loyal to the Spanish cause, and in conformity to the laws,
does order and command:
Article I. All inhabitants of the district of Sancti Spiritus and




THE REVOLUTION OF 1895


45


all the provinces of Puerto Principe and Santiago de Cuba will
have to concentrate in places which are the headquarters of a
division, a brigade, a column, or a troop, and will have to be provided with documentary proof of identity, within eight days of
the publication of this proclamation in the municipalities.
Article II. To travel in the country in the radius covered by
the columns in operation, it is absolutely indispensable to have
a pass from the mayor, military commandants, or chiefs of detachments. Anyone lacking this will be detained and sent to
headquarters of divisions or brigades, and thence to Havana, at
my disposition, by the first possible means. Even if a pass is exhibited, which is suspected to be not authentic or granted by
authority to persons with known sympathy toward the rebellion,
or who show favor thereto, rigorous measures will result to those
responsible.
Article III. All owners of commercial establishments in the
country districts will vacate them, and the chiefs of columns will
take such measures as the success of their operations dictates regarding such places which, while useless for the country's wealth,
serve the enemy as hiding places in the woods and in the interior.
Article IV. All passes hitherto issued hereby become null and
void.
Article V. The military authorities will see to the immediate
publication of this order.
VALERIANO WEYLER.
In his message of December, 1897, President McKinley
said of this system: "It was not civilized warfare; it was
extermination. The only peace it could beget was that of
the wilderness and the grave." America was deluged with
tales of appalling distress and misery. An appeal was
issued for money and supplies for the relief of the suffering
and the destitute. A Cuban relief committee was organized. A generous response was made to the appeal, and
needed supplies, provisions, and medicines were forwarded




46


THE REVOLUTION OF 1895


and distributed, largely through the agency of the Red
Cross Society.
The Government of the United States carefully weighed
the question of a recognition of Cuba's right to independence,
and of her right to recognition as a belligerent. In 1875,
after seven years of war in Cuba, President Grant decided
that the recognition of the independence of Cuba was impracticable and indefensible, and that the recognition of
belligerence was not warranted by the facts according to
the tests of public law. Following this and other precedents, President McKinley, in his message of December,
1897, regarded such recognition as unwarranted and inadvisable.
Weyler failed, as had been predicted by Campos, to end
the struggle by military operations. He also failed to end
it by a policy which was denounced and condemned by the
whole civilized world. The Island was a wilderness and a
graveyard. The bohios of the pacificos and the costly villas
of wealthy planters alike shared in the general destruction.
That which the army of Gomez left standing, the soldiers
of Weyler destroyed. Industry was paralyzed. The Island
was fast becoming the worthless possession which Gomez
threatened to make it.
The assassination of the Spanish Premier, Canovas del
Castillo, led to the organization of a new ministry at Madrid
with Praxades Sagasta at its head. This was in the fall of
1897. Weyler was recalled, and Gen. Ramon Blanco, a
man of widely different type, was sent out as his successor.
One of General Blanco's first acts after his arrival was the
issuance of a proclamation which greatly modified the reconcentration order. But the baneful results of the system
were beyond palliation by official orders. Permission to
return to their homes and their labor was of little use to




THE REVOLUTION OF 1895


47


those who were too weak to walk, often too weak to move.
Blanco's motive was humane, but the work of his predecessor had been only too effectual.
A new political policy was adopted by Spain. By a
royal edict of Nov. 25, 1897, Cuba and Porto Rico were
granted autonomous government. A decree was issued
which established universal suffrage and political equality,
and which applied to the islands the electoral laws of Spain.
This step was doubtless taken as a result of the pressure
brought to bear by the administration of the United States.
But it came too late. The Autonomists welcomed it and
urged its acceptance. But the revolutionary element had
gone too far, had suffered too much, had succeeded too well,
for any withdrawal. There was also a qualifying clause,
"The supreme government of the Colony shall be exercised
by a Governor General." Self-government was only nominal with a Tacon, or a Polavieja, or a Weyler holding the
power of veto and the authority of a military chief. But a
form of autonomous government was organized. The conditions existing on the Island turned it into little other than
a travesty.
During all this time America was busy in Madrid, urging,
protesting, and diplomatically threatening. The insurgent
government demanded recognition of belligerent rights at
the hands of the United States. Though many may have
desired it and some may have expected it, it is to be noted
that the "government in the woods," as it has been called,
never asked for American intervention. That came through
other channels.
It was, at the time, and still is an open question whether
the United States was either wholly wise or entirely justified
in refusing to concede the rights of belligerents to the Cubans.
In the face of the facts of the situation, it is not to be doubted




48


THE REVOLUTION OF 1895


that a state of war existed, notwithstanding the claim of
Spain that Cuba's rebellion was no more than an insurrection. Under the date of Dec. 7, 1895, in a letter to Richard
Olney, then Secretary of State, Sefor Estrada Palma submitted the following "as the duly accredited representative"
of the Cuban government:
"In the name of the Cuban people in arms who have fought
singly and alone against the monarchy of Spain for nearly a year,
in the heart of a continent devoted to republican institutions, in the
name of justice, in the name of humanity, in the name of liberty,
petition you, and through you the government of the United States
of America, to accord the rights of belligerency to a people fighting
for their absolute independence."
Concurrent reports in the American Congress proposed the
granting of those rights, but no definite action was taken.
The United States, although filled with expressions of pity
and sympathy for the struggling and suffering Cubans,
held aloof but gave warning of possible intervention. The
American Government remained in what President Cleveland, in his message of December, 1896, called an "expectant
attitude."
There can be no doubt that ample ground existed upon
which the United States would have been warranted in
granting the Cuban petition submitted through Senor
Estrada Palma, and endorsed by the American Congress.
But the step was deemed "inexpedient," and action was
waived. While it is manifestly impossible to say just what
would have been the result of such a recognition of the
Cubans and their "government in the woods," it is of interest to note that in the report of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations (Report No 885, Fifty-fifth Congress,
Second Session) under date of April 13, 1898, there appears
the following: "It is believed that recognition of the bellig



THE REVOLUTION OF 1895                49
erency of the insurgents in Cuba, if it had been given seasonably, when it was suggested by concurrent resolutions to
that effect passed by Congress (January and February,
1896), would have insured the speedy termination of the
war without involving the United States in the contest."
Whether the attitude of the United States was right or wrong,
wise or unwise, it had at least the merit, if it be a merit under
such circumstances, of consistency.




CHAPTER IV


AMERICA'S PAST ATTITUDE
IT is quite in order at this point to review the question of
the right of the United States to intervene in the affairs of
Cuba, and the attitude of that country toward the Island in
other days.
The legal right of any country to interfere in the domestic
affairs of any other country is by no means clearly determined. Pomeroy, in his work on International Law,
states (p. 242, et seq.): "How far the right of intervention
legitimately extends, under what circumstances it may be
invoked, to what extent it may be carried, are questions
which have given rise to much discussion - questions that
have never been authoritatively settled, and perhaps never
will be settled." The proffer, through diplomatic channels,
of what is known as the "good offices " of a nation, with the
object of effecting a cessation of hostilities and the establishment of peace in another nation, is a recognized procedure.
This, however, is a very different matter from direct and
armed interference. Upon this point, authorities differ
regarding the precise line of demarkation between warranted and unwarranted intervention. Justification is recognized for a limited measure of interference for the support
of existing treaty relations and for the protection of the
person and property rights of foreign residents in countries
disturbed by war. This is instanced in the landing of
American marines on the isthmus of Panama in November,




AMERICA'S PAST ATTITUDE


51


1901, and even in the presence of the Maine in Havana
harbor at the time of her destruction. Such action does not,
however, include any right of active participation upon
either side of an existing conflict. It is only a protective
measure though it may lead to more direct action.
The eminent French statesman, M. Guizot, advanced
the opinion that only in the case of extreme need of selfpreservation is there justification in international morals for
an armed intervention. Wheaton, in his "Elements of International Law," defines the recognition of belligerent
rights by saying:
"It is certain that the state of things between the parent state
and insurgents must amount in fact to a war in the sense of international law - that is, powers and rights of war must be in actual
exercise - otherwise the recognition is falsified, for the recognition
is a fact. The tests to determine the question are various.
Among the tests are the existence of a de facto political organization
of the insurgents, sufficient in character, population, and resources,
to constitute it, if left to itself, a State among the nations, reasonably
capable of discharging the duties of a State; the actual employment
of military forces on each side, acting in accordance with the rules
and customs of war, such as the use of flags of truce, cartels, exchange of prisoners, and the treatment of captured insurgents by
the parent State as prisoners of war."
Wheaton also says:
"Until the revolution is consummated, whilst the civil war
involving a contest for the government continues, other States may
remain indifferent spectators of the controversy, still continuing to
treat the ancient government as sovereign, and the government
de facto as a society entitled to the rights of war against its enemy;
or may espouse the cause of the party which they believe to have
justice on its side. In the first case, the foreign State fulfils all its




AMERICA'S PAST ATTITUDE


obligations under the law of nations; and neither party has any
right to complain, provided it maintains an impartial neutrality.
In the latter, it becomes, of course, the enemy of the party against
whom it declares itself, and the ally of the other; and as the pristine
law of nations makes no distinction in this respect between a just
and an unjust war, the intervening State becomes entitled to all the
rights of war against the opposite party."
Vattel declares it permissible to succor a people oppressed
by its sovereign. He says (Book II, Chap. IV, p. 157): "As
to those monsters who, under the title of sovereigns, render
themselves the scourges and the horror of the human race,
they are savage beasts whom every brave man may justly
exterminate from the face of the earth." Wheaton, Bluntschli, and Mamiani, all concede the right of other nations
to aid an oppressed race.
In his message of April, 1898, Mr. McKinley took a
broader and probably more rational ground. He justifies
American intervention in Cuba upon the following grounds:
"First. In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the
barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the parties to the conflict are either unable
or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say this is all
in another country, belonging to another nation, and is therefore
none of our business. It is specially our duty, for it is right at our
door.
"Second. We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them
that protection and indemnity for life and property which no
government there can or will afford, and to that end to terminate
the conditions that deprive them of legal protection.
" Third. The right to intervene may be justified by the very
serious injury to the commerce, trade, and business of our people,
and by the wanton destruction of property and devastation of the
Island.




AMERICA'S PAST ATTITUDE


53


" Fourth, - and which is of the utmost importance. The
present condition of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our
peace, and entails upon this Government an enormous expense.
With such a conflict waged for years in an island so near us and
with which our people have such trade and business relations,
when the lives and liberty of our citizens are in constant danger
and their property destroyed and themselves ruined - where our
trading vessels are liable to seizure and are seized at our very door
by war ships of a foreign nation, the expeditions of filibustering
that we are powerless to prevent altogether, and the irritating
questions and entanglements thus arising - all these and others
that I need not mention, with the resulting strained relations, are
a constant menace to our peace, and compel us to keep on a semiwar footing with a nation with which we are at peace.
In view of these facts and of these considerations, I ask the Congress to authorize and empower the President to take measures
to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the
Government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the
Island the establishment of a stable government, capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, insuring
peace and tranquillity and the security of its citizens as well as
our own, and to use the military and naval forces of the United
States as may be necessary for these purposes."
It is of important interest to note, at this point, the fact
that this message makes no mention of Cuban independence. Three issues were possible - reform of the Spanish
system of government and the establishment of autonomy
in the Island; Cuban independence; or annexation to the
United States. No one of these was considered. The
primary ground of American intervention was the conservation and protection of American interests. The United
States had declined to recognize the government established
by the insurgents, and had waived definite action upon




54


AMERICA'S PAST ATTITUDE


their claim to recognition as belligerents. Her services as
mediator had been duly tendered to the Government at
Madrid, through diplomatic channels.
This attitude on the part of the United States was entirely consistent with the history of her past relations with
the Island of Cuba. For nearly a century the United States
had realized the possibility of a time when her active interference in Cuban affairs might become a necessity for the
defence and protection of American interests, both in the
Island and at home. Two features were prominent. One
was the ever-recurring possibility that the Island of Cuba
might pass under the control of some other power than
that of Spain; the other, the importance of Cuba in its
various relations to the United States.
Yet the existence of European colonies on this side of the
Atlantic was a fact which could never be ignored. In 1803,
Louisiana, which had passed from Spanish into French
possession, was purchased from France. In 1808, Thomas
Jefferson deprecated the transfer of Cuba from Spanish
possession to that of any other country. A year later, he
considered the possibility of American acquisition of Cuba.
For many years, England's possible acquisition of territory
in the West Indies was an active feature in American diplomatic relations. The Monroe Doctrine was anticipated
by President Madison's message to Congress on Jan. 3,
1811, in which he said that "the United States could not see
without serious inquietude any part of a neighboring territory in which they have in different respects so deep and so
just a concern pass from the hands of Spain into those of
any other foreign power."
It was the question of Cuba's future which led, almost
directly, to the enunciation of that Monroe Doctrine of
1823, which, though an unwritten law, has stood and still




AMERICA'S PAST ATTITUDE


55


stands as the dominant force in America's attitude toward
her tropical and sub-tropical neighbors. The earlier half
of the last century is notably replete with diplomatic negotiation and with expression of America's attitude toward
her Island neighbor. At the time of the effecting of the
Spanish-American treaty of 1795, Spain sought to draw
the United States, with France, then in possession of Louisiana, into a compact guaranteeing to Spain her continued
possession of her West Indian colonies. This was declined
upon the ground that the United States desired to avoid
the entanglement of its peace and prosperity in the toils of
European politics. The Latin-American disturbances of
the Monroe period elicited an enunciation of the views held
at that time. President Monroe's attitude is expressed in
that "Doctrine" which bears his name. On April 23,
1823, John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State, wrote
to Mr. Nelson, Minister to Spain:
"These islands (Cuba and Porto Rico), from their local position,
are natural appendages to the North American continent, and one
of them, Cuba, almost in sight of our shores, from a multitude of
considerations, has become an object of transcendent importance to
the commercial and political interests of our Union. Its commanding position, with reference to the Gulf of Mexico and the West
India seas; the character of its population; its situation midway
between our southern coast and the Island of St. Domingo; its safe
and capacious harbor of Havana, fronting a long line of our shores
destitute of the same advantage; the nature of its productions and
its wants, furnishing the supplies and needing the returns of a
commerce immensely profitable and mutually beneficial - give it
an importance in the sum of our national interests with which that
of no other foreign territory can be compared, and little inferior to
that which binds the different members of this Union together.
Such, indeed, are, between the interests of that Island and this




AMERICA'S PAST ATTITUDE


country, the geographical, commercial, moral, and political relations, formed by nature, gathering, in the process of time, and even
now verging to maturity, that, in looking forward to the probable
course of events, for the short period of half a century, it is scarcely
possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our
Federal Republic will be indispensable to the continuance and
integrity of the Union itself."
In the same year, Thomas Jefferson wrote:
"I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition
which could ever be made to our system of States. The control
which, with Florida Point, this Island would give us over the Gulf
of Mexico, and the countries and isthmus bordering on it, would
fill up the measure of our political well-being. Her addition to our
confederacy is exactly what is wanting to advance our power as a
nation to the point of its utmost interest."
As Secretary of State, Henry Clay wrote, in 1825:
"If the war should continue between Spain and the new republics
(of South America), and those islands (Cuba and Porto Rico) should
become the object and theatre of it, their fortunes have such a connection with the prosperity of the United States that they could not
be indifferent spectators; and the possible contingencies of such a
protracted war might bring upon the Government of the United
States duties and obligations the performance of which, however
painful it should be, they might not be at liberty to decline."
In 1829, Mr. Van Buren, as Secretary of State, wrote to
Mr. Van Ness, the American Minister to Spain:
"The Government of the United States has always looked with
the deepest interest upon the fate of those islands, but particularly
of Cuba. Its geographical position, which places it almost in sight
of our southern shores, and, as it were, gives it the command of the
Gulf of Mexico and the West India seas, its safe and capacious




AMERICA'S PAST ATTITUDE


57


harbors, its rich productions, the exchange of which, for our surplus
agricultural products and manufactures, constitutes it one of the
most extensive and valuable branches of our foreign trade, render
it of the utmost importance to the United States that no change
should take place in its condition which might injuriously affect
our political and commercial standing in that quarter."
In 1837, Mr. Stevenson, the American Minister to England, reported an interview with Lord Palmerston, in the
following terms:
"I proceeded to give a brief explanation of the geographical
relation of these islands (Cuba and Porto Rico) to the United States,
and the consequences that would be likely to follow their separation
from the dominion of Spain. That the possession of Cuba by a
great maritime power would be little else than the establishment of
a fortress at the mouth of the Mississippi, commanding both the
Gulf of Mexico and Florida, and, consequently, the whole trade of
the Western States, besides deeply affecting the interests and tranquillity of the southern portion of the Union. That, under such
circumstances, it was not to be expected that the United States
could remain indifferent to the destiny of Cuba, or its separation
from Spain.... I felt justified in saying frankly to his lordship
that it was impossible that the United States should acquiesce in
the transfer of Cuba from the dominion of Spain to any of the great
maritime powers of Europe; that of the right of the United States
to interfere in relation to these islands, I presumed there could be
little doubt; that whilst the general rule of international law which
forbids the interference of one State in the affairs of another was
fully admitted, there were yet exceptions to the rule, in relation to
the laws of defence and self-preservation, which all nations acknowledged, and that the present was precisely such a case."
In 1840, Secretary of State Forysth wrote to Mr. Vail,
representing the United States in Madrid:
"The United States have long looked with no slight degree of




58


AMERICA'S PAST ATTITUDE


solicitude to the political condition of the Island of Cuba. Its
proximity to our shores, the extent of its commerce with us, and the
similarity of its domestic institutions with those prevailing in portions of our own country, combine to forbid that we should look
with indifference upon any occurrences connected with the fate of
that Island.... Should you have any reason to suspect any design
on the part of Spain to transfer voluntarily her title to the Island,
whether of ownership or possession, and whether permanent or
temporary, to Great Britain or any other power, you will distinctly
state that the United States will prevent it at all hazards, as they
will any foreign military occupation for any pretext whatever."
Upon the basis of prevalent rumors that British influences
were at work to convert Cuba into a "black military republic" under British protection, Daniel Webster, as Secretary of State, wrote to Mr. Robert B. Campbell, United
States Consul at Iavana, under date of Jan. 14, 1843:
"The Spanish Government has long been in possession of the
policy and wishes of this Government in regard to Cuba, which have
never changed, and has been repeatedly told that the United States
never would permit the occupation of that Island by British agents
or forces upon any pretext whatsoever; and that in the event of any
attempt to wrest it from her, she might securely rely upon the whole
naval and military resources of this country, to aid her in preserving
or recovering it."
On June 17, 1848, James Buchanan, Secretary of State,
wrote to Mr. R. M. Saunders, the American representative
at Madrid, a letter of considerable length and of similar
tenor to the foregoing. The following extracts are of special
pertinence:
"In the possession of Great Britain, or any strong naval power,
it (Cuba) might prove ruinous both to our domestic and foreign
commerce, and even endanger the Union of the States. The




AMERICA'S PAST ATTITUDE


59


highest and first duty of every independent nation is to provide for
its own safety; and, acting upon this principle, we should be compelled to resist the acquisition of Cuba by any powerful maritime
State, with all the means which Providence has placed at our
command."
"If Cuba were annexed to the United States, we should not only
feel relieved from the apprehensions which we can never cease to
feel for our own safety and the security of our commerce, whilst it
shall remain in its present condition, but human foresight cannot
anticipate the beneficial consequences which would result to every
portion of our Union." "Under the Government of the United
States, Cuba would become the richest and most fertile island, of
the same extent, throughout the world." "Desirable, however, as
the possession of this Island may be to the United States, we could
not acquire it except by the free will of Spain. Any acquisition not
sanctioned.by justice and honor, would be too dearly purchased."
In a letter dated Dec. 1, 1852, Edward Everett, Secretary
of State, wrote to the Comte de Sartiges, officially:
"The opinions of American statesmen, at different times, and
under varying circumstances, have differed as to the desirableness
of the acquisition of Cuba by the United States. Territorially and
commercially it would, in our hands, be an extremely valuable
possession. Under certain contingencies it might be almost essential to our safety. Still, for domestic reasons, on which, in a communication of this kind, it might not be proper to dwell, the President
thinks that the incorporation of the Island into the Union at the
present time, although effected with the consent of Spain, would be
a hazardous measure; and he would consider its acquisition by force,
except in a just war with Spain (should an event so greatly to be
deprecated take place), as a disgrace to the civilization of the age."
In 1854, strained relations between the United States
and Spain grew out of the detention of the American steamer
Black Warrior in the harbor of Havana, and the search




60


AMERICA'S PAST ATTITUDE


of several American vessels by Spanish cruisers. This
incident was perhaps the immediate cause of that which
is historically known as the Ostend Manifesto. This incident is reported as follows, in Lawrence's Wheaton:
"In the summer of 1854 a conference was held by the ministers
of the United States accredited at London, Paris, and Madrid,
with a view to consult on the negotiations which it might be advisable to carry on simultaneously at these several courts for the satisfactory adjustment with Spain of the affairs connected with Cuba.
The joint despatch of Messrs. Buchanan, Mason, and Soule to the
Secretary of State, dated Aix-la-Chapelle, Oct. 18, 1854, after remarking that the United States had never acquired a foot of territory, not even after a successful war with Mexico, except by purchase or by the voluntary application of the people, as in the case
of Texas, thus proceeds: "Our past history forbids that we should
acquire the Island of Cuba without the consent of Spain, unless
justified by the great law of self-preservation. We must, in any
event, preserve our own conscious rectitude and our self-respect.
While pursuing this course, we can afford to disregard the censures
of the world, to which we have been so often and so unjustly exposed. After we shall have offered Spain a price for Cuba far beyond its present value, and this shall have been refused, it will
then be time to consider the question - Does Cuba, in the possession of Spain, seriously endanger our internal peace and the
existence of our cherished Union? Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then by every law, human and divine,
we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain, if we possess the
power; and this upon the very same principle that would justify
an individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor
if there were no other means of preventing the flames from destroying his own home. Under such circumstances, we ought
neither to count the cost nor regard the odds which Spain might
enlist against us. We forbear to enter into the question whether
the present condition of the Island would justify such a measure."




AMERICA'S PAST ATTITUDE


61


In 1859, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
United States Senate took favorable action upon a bill whose
purpose was "To facilitate the acquisition of the Island of
Cuba." The bill contained the following expression:
"The ultimate acquisition of Cuba may be considered a fixed
purpose of the United States- a purpose resulting from political
and geographical necessities, which have been recognized by all
parties and all administrations, and in regard to which the popular
will has been expressed with a unanimity unsurpassed on any
question of national policy that has heretofore engaged the public
mind."
When President Grant wrote his annual message in 1875,
a Cuban insurrection had lasted for seven years. The revolt led to many complications and a vast amount of diplomatic correspondence and attempted negotiation. In that
message, General Grant called attention to the situation
in Cuba, and said:
"The absence of any reasonable assurance of a near termination
of the conflict must, of necessity, soon compel the States thus suffering to consider what the interests of their own people and their duty
toward themselves may demand.... A recognition of the independence of Cuba being, in my judgment, impracticable and
indefensible, the question which next presents itself is that of the
recognition of belligerent rights in the parties to the contest....
Considered as a question of expediency, I regard the accordance of
belligerent rights still to be unwise and premature at present,
indefensible as a measure of right.... Had it been the desire of
the United States to interfere in the affairs of Cuba, repeated opportunities for so doing have been presented within the last few years;
but we have remained passive and have performed our whole duty
and all international obligations to Spain with friendship, fairness,
and fidelity, and with a spirit of patience and forbearance which




62


AMERICA'S PAST ATTITUDE


negatives every possible suggestion of desire to interfere or to add
to the difficulties with which she has been surrounded."
In January, 1896, the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations submitted majority and minority reports with
reference to the war in Cuba. The majority report, in which
the House concurred, proposed the tender of the friendly
offices of the United States to request Spain to accord belligerent rights to her Cuban opponents. The minority
report proposed that the President interpose his friendly
offices with the Spanish Government for the recognition
of the independence of Cuba. On February 5, a substitute
was reported in the place of this majority report. It proposed that the United States should accord to Cuba, as well
as to Spain, the rights of belligerents. In this the House
also concurred. During March, a communication, of undoubted authenticity, was transmitted to Secretary of State
Olney, by T. Estrada Palma, then the agent in this country
for the Republic of Cuba. This document carried the
following heading:
Republic of Cuba, Executive Headquarters,
CUBITAS MOUNTAIN, Feb. 1, 1896.
It was addressed
To the American People:
It announced the firm establishment of an organized
government and asked from the United States the recognition of belligerent rights.
In his message of December, 1896, President Cleveland,
among much else regarding Cuba, said:
"I have deemed it not amiss to remind the Congress that a time
may well arrive when a correct policy and care for our interests, as
well as a regard for the interests of other nations and their citizens,




AMERICA'S PAST ATTITUDE


63


joined by considerations of humanity and a desire to see a rich and
fertile country intimately related to us saved from complete devastation, will constrain our Government to such action as will subserve
the interests thus involved, and at the same time promise to Cuba
and its inhabitants an opportunity to enjoy the blessings of peace."
The platform of the Republican party, adopted at St. Louis,
on June 18, 1896, contains the following declaration:
"The Government of Spain having lost control of Cuba, and
being unable to protect the property or lives of resident American
citizens, or to comply with its treaty obligations, we believe that the
Government of the United States should actively use its influence
and good offices to restore peace and give independence to the
Island."
Within two years there were referred to the Committee
on Foreign Relations the following Senate resolutions:
Joint Resolution No. 2, authorizing and requesting the
President to issue a proclamation recognizing the independence of the Republic of Cuba.
Senate Resolution No. 40, instructing the Committee on
Foreign Relations to inquire what obligations the United
States have assumed toward the people of Cuba by refusing
to allow the Island to pass into other hands than those of
Spain.
Senate Resolution No. 185, declaring the sense of the
Senate that Congress should duly and promptly recognize
the independence of the Republic of Cuba.
Joint Resolution No. 133, recognizing Cuban independence
and declaring war against Spain.
Joint Resolution No. 134, recognizing Cuban independence and providing for intervention by the United States.
Joint Resolution No. 135, directing and empowering the




64


AMERICA'S PAST ATTITUDE


President, in his discretion, to intervene for the termination
of hostilities and the establishment of Cuban independence.
Joint Resolution No. 142, for the recognition of the independence of the Republic of Cuba.
Joint Resolution No. 145, authorizing the President to
take such steps as are necessary to put an end to hostilities
in Cuba and to establish a republican form of government.
These formed the subject of frequent and prolonged
debate, but no definite action was taken upon any of them.
In his message of December, 1897, President McKinley
said:
"Of the untried measures (regarding Cuba) there remain only:
Recognition of the insurgents as belligerents; recognition of the
independence of Cuba; neutral intervention to end the war by
imposing a rational compromise between the contestants, and intervention in favor of one or the other party. I speak not of forcible
annexation, for that cannot be thought of. That, by our code of
morality, would be criminal aggression."
These extracts form only a small fraction of the mass of
correspondence, reports, and other utterances dealing with
the subject of Cuba during the past century. The diplomatic negotiations at different times within that period,
called out by special incidents, form volumes in themselves.
The trend of all our relations with Spain for a hundred
years, notwithstanding frequent provocation and proposal
to act otherwise, was toward non-interference with her
affairs in Cuba except in the case of some dire emergency.
The beginning of 1898 showed that unless a change came
speedily, American intervention would become little short
of imperative.
Recognition of the Cubans as belligerents, by the United
States, would have effected a radical change in the whole




AMERICA'S PAST ATTITUDE


situation. It would have given the Cubans equal rights
and privileges in the American market for arms and supplies, and the same privileges in American ports and upon
the high seas, as those possessed by Spain. Naturally,
it would have strengthened greatly the position of the insurgents, and that in itself would, in all probability, have
been regarded by the Spanish Government as an unfriendly
act. Yet, under all established laws and precedents, the
claim to belligerency and the recognition of belligerent
rights rest upon the establishment of certain facts. Granting the existence of certain definite conditions, the claim
is warranted and the recognition justified if not actually
demanded. Those conditions did exist in Cuba at this
itime. The American refusal to recognize those conditions
)and to act in accordance with the facts, turned not upon the
recognized law governing such cases, but upon a question
jof domestic politics and expediency. The arguments advanced by the American authorities in support of their
position were answered and refuted, categorically, in an
able reply submitted by Horatio S. Rubens, Esq., the counsel of the Cuban Junta in New York. This reply has received legal recognition, and is to be found as a document of
reference in law libraries, including that of the Bar Association of New York. A review of the proceedings of the
period clearly indicates that, had it suited the purposes of
the United States, very much the same arguments would
have been used to support a recognition of Cuban belligerent
rights as those which were used to support denial of those
rights.




CHAPTER V


THE YEAR OF THE WAR
I DO not deem it important to this work to review the
story of the ill-fated Maine, or to analyze the influence of
that disaster upon the events which followed. All is still
fresh in the public mind, and full details, too long for inclusion here, are readily obtainable through other channels.
The sympathies of the American people had long been extended to the people of Cuba. Some feeling of animosity
toward Spain, who was regarded as the oppressor of our
Island neighbor, was inevitable. This was only accentuated by the disaster to an American ship of war, whose
destruction was generally charged to Spaniards if not to
Spain. The wrecked vessel still lies (1904) in the mud and
slime of the harbor of Havana, and the years have revealed
no new facts regarding the cause of her destruction.
Although a goodly number of the American people have
withheld their judgment upon so important a question
until some more conclusive proof of Spanish action in the
matter might be made available, there is no dolubt that
popular sentiment was expressed in that report of the Committee on Foreign Relations which concludes with the terms
of the Joint Resolution of April 20, 1898. That report
says:
"The event in itself, though in a certain sense a distinct occurrence, was linked with a series of precedent transactions which




THE YEAR OF THE WAR


67


cannot in reason be disconnected from it. It was the catastrophe
of a unity of events extending over more than three years of momentous history.... Considered, as it must be, with the events with
which reason and common sense must connect it, and with animus
by Spain so plainly apparent that no one can even plausibly deny
its existence, it is merely one reason for the conclusion to which the
investigating mind must come in considering the entire subject of
the relations of the United States with that government.... It is
the opinion of your committee, having considered the testimony
submitted to the board of inquiry, in connection with further testimony taken by the committee and with the relevant and established
facts presented by the events of the last three years, that the destruction of the Maine was compassed either by the official acts of the
Spanish authorities, or was made possible by a negligence on their
part so willing and gross as to be equivalent in culpability to
positive criminal action."
Be the facts what they may, this was unquestionably the
attitude and the sentiment of a great mass of the American
people during the weeks which succeeded the explosion in
the harbor of Havana. A sensational press, and equally
sensational members of Congress, clamored for immediate
war. This sentiment was resisted by President McKinley
with all the force of his high position. Washington and
Madrid were engaged in an active diplomatic correspondence, and there is now no doubt that Spain was disposed
to yield the ground upon which she had stood for so long a
time. President McKinley sought to secure an armistice
during which terms of honorable peace might be effected.
A conference at the White House resulted in the submission, on March 27, of the following demand upon Spain:
(a) An armistice until October 1, during which negotiations looking toward a permanent peace should be undertaken.




68


THE YEAR OF THE WAR


(b) The immediate revocation of the order of reconcentration, and relief measures for those in the camps.
(c) If possible, if terms of peace not satisfactorily settled
by October 1, the President of the United States to be the
final arbiter between Spain and the insurgents.
These terms were cabled to Hon. Stewart L. Woodford,
then American Minister to Spain, for submission to the
Spanish authorities. It is of interest and importance to
note that this communication contained no reference to
Cuban independence. Nor does it appear that at any
time during the negotiations of that period, the United
States officially demanded from Spain the independence
of Cuba. The statement of the Joint Resolution, that
"Cuba is and of right ought to be free and independent"
is the assertion of a fact, and not an official demand that
Spain establish the fact.
To the American proposition of March 27, Spain submitted a counter-proposition, as follows, on March 31:
(a) Arbitration concerning the Maine.
(b) Revocation of the order of reconcentration, and permission to the United States to relieve the needs of the
sufferers.
(c) Preparation for honorable and stable peace through
the insular parliament, "it being understood that the powers
reserved by the constitution to the central government are
not lessened and diminished."
(d) No truce until after the meeting of the Cuban Chambers on May 4.
These proposals were unacceptable to the authorities in
Washington. On April 9, General Woodford cabled to
Mr. Day, Secretary of State, that at the request of the Pope
and six of the leading nations of Europe, an armistice had
been proclaimed in Cuba. On the tenth, the administra



THE YEAR OF THE WAR


69


tion received a communication from the Spanish Minister
which was virtually a reply to the American proposals of
March 27. In brief, the reply was as follows:
(a) Armistice proclaimed, and in fixing the terms of it
the general-in-chief is disposed to concede all possible
facilities.
(b) Decree of reconcentration repealed, and aid of all
kinds granted and permitted to be given to the reconcentrados.
(c) The responsibility for the destruction of the Maine
to be submitted to the decision of impartial and disinterested
experts, Spain agreeing to be bound by their decision.
(d) The same full and generous measure of self-government to be accorded Cuba as Canada enjoys.
On April 11, President McKinley submitted his historic
message to Congress. In it he refers to the communication
of March 27, and to the unsatisfactory reply received on
March 31. At the close of the message, he alludes briefly
to the later communication from Spain, that of April 10,
in a few lines added to the document just before its submission. It has been charged that the Spanish communication was suppressed. No foundation appears for such a
charge. It is, however, a fact that little or no attention was
paid to the concessions then made by Spain, although in
the judgment of many, they have been deemed a sufficient
basis for an avoidance of the war which followed. As a
matter of fact, the American authorities had already decided
for war. In the tense excitement of the time, the force
of the Spanish concessions was overlooked and disregarded.
Spain did not agree to grant Cuban independence, it is true,
but the United States had made no demand that she grant
such independence.  The communication of March 27
was manifestly in the nature of an ultimatum. Spain's




7O


THE YEAR OF THE WAR


reply of April 10 not only accepted the terms of that communication, but declared as well that the conditions therein
demanded had actually been complied with.
This fact received no public attention until it appeared,
some four years later, as a side issue in a somewhat foolish
controversy concerning the respective attitudes of various
foreign powers toward the United States during the critical
days of the spring of 1898. During the month of February,
1902, wide publicity, in both Europe and the United States,
was given to the proceedings of a meeting of the foreign
ambassadors in Washington, on April 14, 1898. The result of that meeting was the submission by those officials,
to their home governments, of an expression of their opinion
that, in view of the American demand upon Spain of March
27, and Spain's reply of April 9, the immediate cause
for war had been removed. That was also the view of
some of the cooler heads in Washington to whom the facts
were fully known. Various reasons are assigned for the
disregard of the Spanish communication. Among them are
statements that the Cuban representatives refused to consider the declared armistice and that it was thus made of
no effect. It is also said that there was doubt of Spain's
good faith; that her action was only an effort to gain time.
The rainy season was coming on, and Spain hoped that
another six months would wear out the Cubans and terminate the struggle. At all events, the Spanish note of
concession, Blanco's proclaimed armistice, the full revocation of the reconcentration order, the nominal establishment of an autonomous government, and the declaration
that Spain had appropriated $600,000 for the relief of the
suffering in Cuba, had no influence upon American action.
The foregoing appear in the form of excuses rather than
as valid reasons. Doubt of the good faith of Spain was




THE YEAR OF THE WAR


71


utterly without justification. If she was not worthy of
trust, there should have been no proposals to her. The
proposals having been made, there was no excuse for a
doubt of her good faith. The Cuban attitude had no
proper place in the immediate question. Essaying the establishment of peace between contestants, the United States
had secured the acquiescence of one of the parties. Manifestly, the succeeding and logical step was the acquiescence
of the other. Should that prove impossible of attainment,
an issue lay between the peace-maker and the intractable
contestant, before war could be justly declared against
the consenting party.
The attitude of President McKinley at this time has been
endorsed by his friends, and condemned by his opponents.
For many weeks he had stood, apparently immovable,
opposed to war, and striving for a determination of the
problem along the lines of peace. At this critical juncture
he yielded, perhaps in conviction that war was inevitable,
perhaps in response to a popular clamor. The pro-peace
element has criticised his disregard of Spain's yielding
attitude and action. Others have asserted his full justification. His message of April 10 was distinctly a pro-war
argument. It had been carefully considered and thoughtfully worded. It had been submitted to his Cabinet some
days before its submission to Congress, and had been approved by some and disapproved by others in that body.
By it all responsibility for war or for peace was transferred
to the American Congress. If is useless to consider or
speculate upon what might have happened had President
McKinley seized the opportunity which many, among them
the foreign ambassadors in Washington, believed to have
been presented by Spain's concessions, and maintained a
persistent stand for a peaceful settlement. Minister Wood



THE YEAR OF THE WAR


ford, in Madrid, confidently asserted his belief in a satisfactory termination. Spain was in a yielding mood, and
appeared to be disposed, if tactfully handled, to effect an
amicable and fairly satisfactory settlement of the Cuban
problem. With the matter in the hands of Congress, the
issue was no longer doubtful.
The President's message reviewed the Cuban situation
and the earlier attitude of the United States toward Cuba.
It declared that forcible intervention was justifiable, and
stated the ground upon which such intervention might rest.
Its essential terms are quoted in the preceding chapter.
The message provided for no recognition of Cuban independence. On the contrary, it declared the inexpediency
of such recognition.
"Nor from the standpoint of expediency do I think it would be
wise or prudent for this Government to recognize at the present
time the independence of the so-called Cuban Republic. Such
recognition is not necessary in order to enable the United States to
intervene and pacify the Island. To commit this country now to
the recognition of any particular government in Cuba might subject
us to embarrassing conditions of international obligation toward
the organization so recognized. In case of intervention our conduct
would be subject to the approval or disapproval of such government.
We would be required to submit to its direction and to assume to it
the mere relation of a friendly ally.
"When it shall appear hereafter that there is within the Island
a government capable of performing the duties and discharging the
functions of a separate nation, and having, as a matter of fact, the
proper forms and attributes of nationality, such government can be
promptly and readily recognized and the relations and interests of
the United States with such nation adjusted."
Excepting its brief reference to the Spanish communication of April 9, added subsequently to the preparation of




THE YEAR OF THE WAR


73


its main body, the message concludes with those vibrant
words which came as fuel to the fire of popular enthusiasm
for American intervention and for war with Spain.
"The long trial has proved that the object for which Spain has
waged the war cannot be attained. The fire of insurrection may
flame or may smoulder with varying seasons, but it has not been
and it is plain it cannot be extinguished by present methods. The
only hope of relief and repose from a condition which can no longer
be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba. In the name of
humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered
American interests which give us the right and the duty to speak
and to act, the war in Cuba must stop.
"In view of these facts and of these considerations, I ask the
Congress to authorize and empower the President to take measures
to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the
Government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the
Island the establishment of a stable government, capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, insuring
peace and tranquillity and the security of its citizens as well as our
own, and to use the military and naval forces of the United States
as may be necessary for these purposes.
"And in the interest of humanity and to aid in preserving the
lives of the starving people of the Island I recommend that the
distribution of food and supplies be continued, and that an appropriation be made out of the public treasury to supplement the
charity of our citizens.
"The issue is now with the Congress. It is a solemn responsibility. I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable
condition of affairs which is at our doors. Prepared to execute
every obligation imposed upon me by the Constitution and the law,
I await your action."
Though this was not a declaration of war, it is not to be
doubted that it made war inevitable. A notable portion
of the press was in a state of hysteria. The people were




74


THE YEAR OF THE WAR


indignant and impatient. The temper of Congress was
warlike. Against all this, Mr. McKinley had stood immovable until this time. Whether Mr. McKinley was right
or wrong, wise or unwise, in thus yielding to what some have
regarded as a hysterical clamor, remains for determination
by the impartial historians of a later day and generation.
The die was cast. Congress declared for war and the people
voiced their approval.
On April 16, the following resolutions were adopted by
the United States Senate:
"First. That the people of the Island of Cuba are and of right
ought to be free and independent, and that the Government of the
United States hereby recognizes the Republic of Cuba as the true
and lawful Government of that Island.
"Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand,
and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that
the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and
government in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval
forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.
" Third. That the President of the United States be, and he
hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval
forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the
United States the militia of the several States, to such extent as may
be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect."
This bill was passed to the House for its consideration.
On motion of Mr. Dingley, of Maine, and after careful debate, that body decided to strike out the clause of recognition of the Cuban Republic contained in Article I. In this,
the House insisting, the Senate finally concurred, and the
now famous Joint Resolution of April 20, 1898, became
operative. By subsequent action, there was attached to
this bill the equally famous Teller Amendment, as follows:




THE YEAR OF THE WAR


75


"That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said
Island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control
of the Island to its people."
The passage of the Joint Resolution was tantamount to a
declaration of the war which followed. It is not my purpose
to rehearse the story of the fighting. Spain's naval squadrons were destroyed at Manila, on May 1, 1898, and at
Santiago on July 3. After active fighting in its vicinity,
articles of capitulation were signed at Santiago, on July 16.
American troops entered the city of Manila on August 13,
and the almost bloodless campaign in Porto Rico was
brought to an end by the signing of the protocol. The war
was over and Spain was beaten. There remained the
adjustment of the terms and conditions of peace.
Under date of July 22, 1898, the Spanish Minister of
State, Duc d'Almodovar del Rio, forwarded a communication to the President of the United States, through Mr.
Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador in Washington.
After a brief review of the causes and the conditions of the
war, the letter states:
"To end calamities already so great and to avert evils still
greater, our countries might mutually endeavor to find conditions
upon which the present struggle might be terminated otherwise than
by force of arms.... And so do we wish to learn from the President of the United States the basis upon which there might be
established a political status in Cuba, and an ending be made to the
unreasonable continuance of a strife which might be terminated by
the agreement of both Governments upon terms for the pacification
of the Island."


This was answered by President McKinley, under date




76


THE YEAR OF THE WAR


of July 30, reviewing the situation from the American standpoint, and stating terms upon which the United States would
enter upon negotiations for peace. These were:
"First. The relinquishment by Spain of all claim of sovereignty
over or title to Cuba, and her immediate evacuation of the Island.
" Second. The President, desirous of exhibiting signal generosity,
will not put forward any demand for pecuniary indemnity. Nevertheless he cannot be insensible to the losses and expenses of the
United States incident to the war or to the claims of our citizens for
injuries to their persons or their property during the late insurrection
in Cuba. He must, therefore, require the cession to the United
States and the immediate evacuation by Spain of the Island of Porto
Rico and other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain in the
West Indies, and also the cession of an island in the Ladrones, to be
selected by the United States.
"Third. On similar grounds, the United States is entitled to
occupy and will hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending
the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control,
disposition, and government of the Philippines."
These very positively stated terms were cabled to Spain,
and were answered, on August 7, by a message of apparently
unwilling acceptance of terms whose inflexibility was recognized. America's superior force was conceded, and Spain
bowed to the inevitable. Something of vagueness appearing in the statement of the terms and in the Spanish understanding of them, Secretary Day, in a letter to M. Cambon,
dated August 10, proposed a protocol, a draft of which he
submitted, stating the terms of agreement, and providing
for the appointment of commissioners to arrange the details of evacuation, and also for the appointment of commissioners to arrange the treaty of peace. The terms of
the protocol were as follows:




THE YEAR OF THE WAR


77


Article I. Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty
over or title to Cuba.
Article II. Spain will cede to the United States the Island
of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also an island in the Ladrones, to be selected by the United States.
Article III. The United States will occupy and hold
the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion
of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines.
Article IV. Spain will immediately evacuate Cuba,
Porto Rico, and other islands under Spanish sovereignty
in the West Indies; and to this end each government will,
within ten days after the signing of this protocol, appoint
commissioners, and the commissioners so appointed shall,
within thirty days after signing of this protocol, meet at
Havana for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the
details of the aforesaid evacuation of Cuba and the adjacent
Spanish islands. (The same provision also made regarding
Porto Rico.)
Article V. The United States and Spain will each appoint not more than five commissioners to treat of peace,
and the commissioners so appointed shall meet at Paris not
later than Oct. 1, 1898, and proceed to the negotiation and
conclusion of a treaty of peace, which treaty shall be subject to ratification according to the respective constitutional
forms of the two countries.
Article VI. Upon the conclusion and signing of this
protocol, hostilities between the two countries shall be suspended, and notice to that effect shall be given as soon as
possible by each government to the commanders of its
military and naval forces.
This was signed on August 12 by William R. Day, Secre



78


THE YEAR OF THE WAR


tary of State of the United States, and by Jules Cambon,
the French Ambassador, who was authorized by Spain to
sign on her account. Orders were immediately issued for
the suspension of hostilities at all points. The commission
assigned to Havana for conference with Spanish commissioners regarding evacuation of the Island of Cuba, consisted of the following: Major General Wade, U. S. A.,
Admiral Sampson, U. S. N., and Major General Butler,
U. S. V. These gentlemen proceeded to the field of their
operations and effected the arrangements which were finally
concluded by the withdrawal of the last of the Spanish
troops in the month of Februrary of the following year.
The Spanish Commissioners were General of Division
Gonzales Parrada, Rear Admiral Pastor Y Landero, and
Marquis de Montoro.
By the victory at Santiago, the American forces became
an army of occupation, by conquest, in the eastern province
of Cuba. The protocol of August 12 established the
United States as the supreme authority in that district,
pending the final adjustment of the entire question at issue
by the peace commission for which provision was made in
Article V of that instrument. Gen. Henry W. Lawton
was made commander-in-chief and military governor of
the province. He was succeeded by Gen. Leonard Wood
on September 24. By an order of the President, issued July
13, the municipal laws of the Island were continued in force
so far as they were adjustable to the new conditions.
The first important step, under the American authority
established by the protocol, was a regulation of the customs
tariff for the ports of the Santiago district. A later act,
under the authority of General Wood, was the promulgation of a Bill of Rights. This appeared to be a most important step and was highly gratifying to the American




THE YEAR OF THE WAR


79


people who regard the privileges secured by and under it
as fundamental and sacred. As a matter of fact, it was
quite superfluous. The Spanish Monarchical Constitution,
extended to the island of Cuba by royal decree in April,
1881, includes practically all of the privileges and guarantees of the Bill of Rights then promulgated, even the right
of habeas corpus. The continuance of existing laws, by
the presidential order of July 13, gave force and effect to
these constitutional rights, and rendered the American
Bill of Rights a needless institution. The step was taken
upon an assumption, based in ignorance of the facts, that
Spanish laws were bad because Spanish legal procedure
had been corrupt and inefficient.
Municipal reconstruction and sanitation were given immediate attention. Military authority was established in
the various municipalities, and American energy essayed
the task of bringing order out of the chaos which was the
inevitable result of prolonged warfare. As the commanding officer, General Wood has been accorded the credit for
the work of reform. Without any minimizing of the credit
which really belongs to that officer, a due amount of praise
should be given to those who, as district commanders, served
under him and who did in their various districts that
which he did in Santiago. Much is due to the highly intelligent and efficient work of such men as Hood and
Pettit and Ray and others, and to men of lower rank in the
line, to say nothing of the work of the staff.
In view of the fact of the subsequent development of an
active controversy in which General Wood's work in Cuba
was made a subject of somewhat severe criticism, it is pertinent here to refer to one of the principal features upon which
General Wood's reputation as a successful administrator
originally rested. Current report credited him with the




80


THE YEAR OF THE WAR


installation of a system of sewerage in the City of Santiago,
by which that place was transformed from a centre of reeking pestilence into a veritable health resort. It is true that
a system of sewer pipes was laid. But, up to the time when
this is written, no use has been made of those pipes. A
sewer system involves a water system. Without abundant
water to flush them, sewer pipes are more of a menace than
a benefit if opened to house connection. The water system
of the city, installed by the Spaniards in earlier days, was a
trivial affair, and utterly inadequate for sewerage purposes.
For more than six years after his departure from Santiago,
General Wood's famous sewer system remained a system
of useless pipes, from lack of a water supply which would
have made them effective.
On September 13, the President issued commissions to
the following gentlemen as the American Plenipotentiaries
"to negotiate and conclude a treaty of peace between the
United States and Spain, empowering them jointly and
severally to meet the commissioners appointed or to be
appointed under said protocol on behalf of Spain, and with
them to negotiate and sign a treaty of peace between the
United States and Spain, subject to the ratification of their
government." The members of the commission were
William  R. Day, formerly Secretary of State; Whitelaw
Reid, of New York; and United States Senators Cushman
K. Davis, of Minnesota, William P. Frye, of Maine, and
George Gray, of Delaware. John Bassett Moore, of New
York, was appointed as Secretary and Counsel to the Commission. The Spanish Commission consisted of Don
Eugenio Montero Rios, Don Buenaventura Abarzuza, Don
Jose de Garnica Y Diaz, Don Wenceslao Ramirez de VillaUrrutia, and Don Rafael Cerero Y Saenz.
The Commissions met in Paris on October 1, and re



THE YEAR OF THE WAR


81


mained in session until the signing of the treaty on December 10. The discussion included many points of great importance, and involved many minor issues which arose as
incidents in the main discussion. One of the questions
raised in the early days of the conference was in regard to
the technical meaning of the word "relinquish" as used in
Article I of the protocol. This was held to affect the future
of the Island.  Word splitting is a frequent and a favorite
practice with Spanish officials, and the point was raised
that if Spain "relinquished" Cuba she thereby transferred
her rights and powers in the Island to the United States, to
be held in trust for transference at the proper time to the
Cuban people. On the other hand, if the term was used
in the sense that her withdrawal from Cuba implied an
abandonment by which the Island became a political derelict and a possible prey to the first comer who might seize
and hold it, Spain's consent to such an arrangement could
not be granted. The issue was determined by the American
assurance that the relinquishment involved a temporary
American trusteeship of the Cuban Government along the
line of the declaration of the Joint Resolution.
Another and a far more important issue concerned the
matter of the so-called Cuban debt. This involved a sum
of several hundred million dollars, the larger part of which
represented obligations incurred by Spain in the course of
her efforts to suppress Cuban insurrections. These obligations Spain charged to the insular account, and the interest upon them was paid out of the insular revenues.
The contention of the Spanish Commissioners was that
the cession and relinquishment of sovereignty included
the cession and relinquishment of its obligations as well as
the rights pertaining to it. The American Commissioners
denied that the so-called Cuban debt constituted a valid




82


THE YEAR OF THE WAR


obligation. They said that "To the American Commissioners this appears to be not a proposition to 'relinquish
all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba,' but in effect
a proposition to 'transfer' to the United States and in turn
to Cuba a mass of charges and obligations which, in the
opinion of the American Commissioners, properly belonged
to Spain." Their point was more definitely stated in the
Annex to Protocol No. 5. "From      no point of view can
the debts above described be considered as local debts of
Cuba, or as debts incurred for the benefit of Cuba. They
are debts created by the Government of Spain, for its own
purposes and through its own agents, in whose creation
Cuba had no voice."
While the discussion of this issue was in progress, Commissioner Day sent the following cablegram to President
McKinley:
"At conference yesterday we again informed Spanish Commissioners that United States would not subdivide so-called Cuban
debt. Spanish Commissioners then intimated they were willing
to meet American Commissioners as to relinquishment of sovereignty
over Cuba, if some responsibility for such debt was acknowledged.
We insisted upon our position and finally asked whether they
would refuse to sign any articles unless such acknowledgment was
made. To this question the Spanish Commissioners asked time
for reply. Would you approve an article in treaty which should
provide that the United States, while not contracting any independent liability of its own, would use its good offices with any
people or government possessing sovereignty in Cuba for acknowledgment of any debts incurred by Spain for existing internal improvements of a pacific character in the islands, a mixed commission to be appointed to ascertain whether any such debts exist,
and if so, their amount? This would be a precedent for Porto
Rico, Guam, and Philippine Islands. Commission may feel inclined to make this concession on strength of precedents and state



THE YEAR OF THE WAR


8S


ments of publicists as to passing of local debts or debts incurred
specially for benefits of transferred territory."
To this Secretary Hay sent answer:
"Answering your No. 15, the President directs me to say that
under no circumstances will the Government of the United States
assume any part of what is known as the Cuban debt, which is
fully described in the memorandum of the American Commissioners
marked "E" received this morning, nor would the United States
engage to use its good offices to induce any government hereafter
to be established in Cuba to assume such debt. It is not believed
that there are any debts outstanding incurred by Spain for existing
improvements of a pacific character. It should be made clear
what is meant by such improvements and what is included. The
President regards it as most desirable that in the present negotiations you should adhere strictly to the terms of the protocol. If this
proves impossible you will ascertain as definitely as you can the
exact meaning of their suggestions as to local Cuban debt and the
evidences thereof, and report to the President with your recommendations."
While these were the essential features of the discussion,
so far as Cuba was concerned, all minor issues were duly
considered. The treaty was signed by the commissioners
on Dec. 10, 1898; signed by the President and ratified by
the Senate, on Feb. 6, 1899; signed by the Queen Regent
on March 19, and proclaimed on April 11. The SpanishAmerican war, in its direct operations, definitely terminated
on the anniversary of the issuance of President McKinley's
war message.




CHAPTER VI


CONDITIONS ON JAN. 1, 1899
AMERICAN authority was established in the eastern end
of the Island in July, 1898. During the closing months
of the year, much was accomplished in the way of reconstruction and establishment along special lines. Two
forces contributed to this end. The influence of one of
these has been emphasized in official and newspaper reports, with an undue minimizing or ignoring of the other
which was quite as potent and equally important. The
distribution of American troops throughout the district
did much for the restoration of law and order. The personal
advice and aid of local commanders were of vast importance
in the adjustment of the chaotic conditions which prevailed.
Too much cannot be said in commendation of the individual
efforts of officers of the American army. Too little has been
said regarding the contributory work of the Cubans themselves. As it became possible for them to do so, these people
returned to the site of their former homes, and, as best they
could, took up the round of quiet and peaceful life. Thousands of them were utterly destitute, without a loof to cover
them; without food to eat; and without cattle or farming
tools with which to produce the necessary sustenance for
themselves and their families.
The American people were greatly interested in knowing what was being done by their representatives  They
were little or not at all interested in what the Cubans were




CONDITIONS ON JAN. 1, 1899


85


doing for themselves. This neglect of the Cuban end of
the question did much to establish an opinion that the
Cubans did nothing, and were incapable of doing anything,
in their own behalf. For a time, the distribution of food
supplies was imperative, and this was done with a liberal
hand. Paid employment was furnished to many in general
repairs and some new construction, in the department of
sanitation and street cleaning, and in the various processes
of municipal administration. As the conditions established
by the presence of the military forces made it possible, operations were resumed on the wrecked plantations, and the
suspended mining enterprises were set in motion by the
mine owners. Gradually and steadily the life of the section resumed its normal conditions, and the 1st of January,
1899, saw a large part of the people of Cuba's eastern province orderly, peaceable, and self-maintaining. For this,
credit is due to both officers and men of the American army.
But credit is also due, though rarely given, to those who
were so largely left to work out, with such feeble resources
as they possessed, their own economic salvation.
The condition of the larger portion of the Island at the
time of the American occupation, on Jan. 1, 1899, was not
dissimilar to that of Santiago six months earlier. Nominally,
until 12 o'clock, noon, of that date, Spanish authority continued. But the duties of government were either neglected
or were performed in a wholly perfunctory manner. Many,
probably most of the various municipal and provincial
authorities, being Spaniards or of Spanish affiliation, had
resigned or deserted their positions. Their power was gone,
and it was useless to maintain the semblance of it. There
was also a feeling of personal insecurity and a fear of Cuban
reprisals.
On Nov. 26, 1898, Gen. Ramon Blanco resigned his post




86


CONDITIONS ON JAN. 1, 1899


as Governor General of Cuba, and returned to Spain.
General Castellanos succeeded him and remained the
nominal official head of affairs until the transfer to the
American authorities. On December 1, President McKinley allotted from available funds the sum of $50,000 for
expenditure in the greatly needed cleansing of the city of
Havana. Throughout the month, detachments of the army
of occupation reported for duty on the Island, and were
assigned to camps in different parts of the country, though
the main body of the army, consisting of the Seventh Army
Corps, U. S. V., under command of Gen. Fitzhugh Lee,
with two regiments, the 8th and the 10th, of the regular
army, and a force of regular artillery, was centred in and
around Havana. So far as routine processes were concerned,
the closing days of December saw everything in readiness
for the event which was to mark the opening of the new
year.
The official transfer was a brief and simple proceeding.
At 12 o'clock noon, the Spanish flag was hauled down,
and the American flag hoisted in its stead. The official
representatives of Spain and the United States met in the
Hall of State in the Governor's Palace, in Havana, where
General Castellanos, acting for his government, with a sad
and bitter heart and trembling hand, signed the paper
which transferred the sovereignty of Cuba to the American
authorities, as trustees for the Cuban people.
It is doubtful if any nation of the world ever assumed a
similar responsibility. So far as the American people in
general were concerned, and so far as individual authorities were concerned, the purposes of the Government of Intervention were straightforward and generous. Their object
was expressed in the terms of the Joint Resolution, that
the United States should occupy the Island until it was




CONDITIONS ON JAN. 1, 1899


87


pacified. When that was accomplished, American government would terminate, and all control be turned over to
the Cuban people.
While this was sufficiently definite, as an announcement
of the American intention, it was also sufficiently vague to
shelter a considerable group of American citizens whose
opinions were voiced by a distinguished American senator
who pointed to an American flag, as it floated over a Cuban
fortress, and said, "That flag will never come down in this
Island."
It is eminently unfortunate that, at the time of our assumption of control of the destinies of the Island of Cuba,
so little was really known by the American people of Cuba's
special needs and of the special characteristics of the Cubans.
It is also unfortunate that it seemed obligatory to place the
immediate administration of affairs in the hands of men
who, though of marked ability along the line of their special
training and experience, had no adequate knowledge of
civil administration, and none whatever of that Spanish
law, both civil and criminal, the establishment of which
was the first act of American occupation. With the exception of Gen. James H. Wilson and Gen. Fitzhugh Lee,
department commanders in Matanzas and Havana provinces,
all of the designated officials were distinctly military men.
All stood high in their profession, and all were of known
and tried personal integrity. Some had had wide experience
in dealing with Indian questions on our western frontier,
but the Cubans were not Indians.
For a time military methods were imperative, and military channels were those through which certain phases of
the work could best be accomplished. In the maintenance
of peace and order; in the distribution of food to the starving, and medicine and relief to the sick and the suffering;




88


CONDITIONS ON JAN. 1, 1899


in sanitary regulations; and along various other lines, the
directness and the promptness of military methods were
indispensable. The special misfortune of this time lay in
American failure to obtain a broad grasp of such important
features as the economic, the political, and the judicial.
It was work for broad statesmanship, and a competent
attention to those features would have averted many of the
ills which have followed and whose end is not yet.
Jan. 1, 1899, saw three armies in Cuba - the American,
the Spanish, and the Cuban. The army of occupation
numbered more than 40,000 men. Spain's troops were
in process of withdrawal for return to the Peninsula, and the
Cuban army had been only partially disbanded. As the
Spanish troops withdrew from the interior towns and cities,
their place was taken by the Cuban forces who maintained
order and repressed disturbance, in highly creditable manner,
until they, in their turn, were supplanted by the soldiers
of the army of occupation. The last of the Havana contingent of the Spanish army went on board transports lying
in the harbor of that city, on the morning of January 1.
The Matanzas contingent left that city on January 12, and
the Cienfuegos detachment completed the Spanish evacuation of the Island on February 6. A part of the Cuban
army remained in the field until its general disbandment
during the early sunmer months.
The condition of the greater portion of the Island, at the
time of the American occupation, was little short of appalling. Notwithstanding General Blanco's revocation of the
order of reconcentration, and the relief work which was
afterward carried on, the Island was, on Jan. 1, 1899, a
hospital and a poor-farm. Hunger stalked abroad and the
dying lay in many homes and in all public institutions.
Hundreds of children wandered homeless, unclothed, living




CONDITIONS ON JAN. 1, 1899


89


as they could, almost like wild animals. Relief from this
condition was one of the first and most important processes
of the new government. In this, they were effectively aided
and supported by those of the Island people who were not
themselves impoverished and destitute. The amount of
money expended for this purpose cannot be given, because
of the impossiblity of ascertaining the sums expended
through the channels of relief organizations and by individuals, Cuban, American, and Spanish. The financial
reports for the year show an official expenditure for hospitals and charities and for aid to the destitute, of a little short
of $1,000,000.
The report of General Brooke gives the issuance of rations to the needy during the opening months of 1899, as
By the War Department.......................... 5,493,500
Through other channels.........................  1,000,000
6,493,500
A ration represents a day's supply to the individual. A
vast work was done, in which the Cubans themselves are
entitled to a large measure of credit and commendation.
The next step in the order of importance was doubtless
that of sanitation. Neither Spain nor her colonies have at
any time been notable for their devotion to this department
of municipal and village life. In this they are by no means
unique, sharing, as they have, the experience of much the
greater portion of the world's population. Though at no
time had it ever been commendable, the condition of Cuba,
in the matter of street and house sanitation, had become
more scandalous than ever. The disturbances of a prolonged war, and the inevitable interruption of all governmental processes, had left the Island, and particularly its
chief cities, in a state which it is wholly within bounds to




90


CONDITIIONS ON JAN. 1, 1899


pronounce as horrible. All of the streets of the Island cities
were dirty; many of them were almost, and some were quite
impassable by reason of lack of repairs which had been
necessarily suspended during the war period.
Probably no public building in the Island was in a fit
state for use or occupation. The penal institutions, jails,
houses of detention, and even asylums and hospitals for
the sick and insane, were in a state of indescribable filthiness. The crowded tenement areas of the poorer classes
in the cities were most of them disgusting, some of them
nauseating. The residences of not a few of the better
classes were an offence to their occupants and a menace to
the community. Facilities for the removal of the accumulation of garbage and other offensive matter were utterly
inadequate. The work of cleansing was attacked with a
vigor which was productive of immediately visible results,
although weeks elapsed before there were even indications
of the establishment of wholesome conditions.
The American authorities found the machinery of civil
government disorganized if not demoralized. This obtained
in all departments of both national and municipal life.
Because of its importance as a source of Cuban revenue,
the Department of Customs stands preeminent in insular
administration. This department was placed under the
charge of a highly efficient officer of the United States army,
Lieut. Col. Tasker H. Bliss (now Brigadier General). In
the beginning, the charge and supervision of the Treasury
Department was also placed in his hands. In his capacity
as head of the Treasury Department, Colonel Bliss promptly
abolished that well-known institution, the Havana Lottery,
which was under the general control of that office. Of the
conditions which attended his assumption of the adminis



CONDITIONS ON JAN. 1, 1899


91


tration of the Custom House, this officer says, in his report
dated August 1, 1899:
"Upon taking charge of the Havana Custom House, I found it
almost entirely stripped of equipment for the work to be done.
The building was formerly the Convent of San Francisco, founded
shortly after the year 1574. It is situated at the foot of Teniente
Rey Street, on the harbor front, with the wharves and docks extending on either side. I found that all but the rudest furniture
had been taken away from the Custom House, that nearly all of the
important records or documents had been removed or destroyed,
and that there remained practically no facilities for transacting
public business. Had it not been for a personal appeal to my retiring
predecessor, I doubt if there would have been left on January 1 a
table at which to write or a chair on which to sit."
Colonel Bliss began business in his important department
with little else than an official building, and a tariff of duties
and taxes to be levied and collected by the Customs Service.
This tariff was issued by executive order in Washington,
on Dec. 13, 1898. The customs building itself was in a
filthy and dangerously unsanitary condition. Over 1200
cubic yards of accumulated rubbish and several tons of
fetid matter were removed from this structure alone. Of
the nominal personnel of the department, some 250 in number, nearly if not quite all of them Spaniards, a large majority resigned for various reasons, necessitating the organization of an entirely new staff. The experience of Colonel
Bliss in Havana was practically duplicated in all of the suboffices of the Island.
The Postal Department was another badly disorganized
institution. The work of organization and establishment
was placed in the hands of Mr. E. G. Rathbone. In his
report, he states that "The Spanish Government on retiring
left no records for my guidance, and not one stamp of any




92


CONDITIONS ON JAN. 1, 1899


denomination, nor a cent of money. In fact, about all
that was found was a great quantity of undelivered mail
matter, some of it dating as far back as the year 1891, a
disreputable old post-office building, in a very bad sanitary
condition, and a miserable post-office outfit." Under the
former system, mail carriers, in the cities as well as in the
country, collected fees for the delivery of letters, from those
to whom they were addressed. The old railway mail service on the Island consisted in sending bags of mail matter
to the outgoing trains and steamers, and receiving other
bags from the incoming trains and vessels. The bags for
despatch by train were not sealed, their contents being tied
up in open bundles for delivery at the stations along the
way. These bags were placed on seats, openly exposed,
in one of the cars of the train. The train conductor delivered the bundles to some recognized agent at each station,
receiving on his part such matter as might be going in his
direction. No record was made of these receipts and deliveries. The local post-office system throughout the Island
was on a par with the transportation system.
I have already referred to the distress which prevailed
throughout the Island at this time. My personal observation and experience finds ample confirmation in a letter
quoted by General Brooke in his report of Oct. 1, 1899.
The writer was a distinguished Cuban general who, during
the month of February, made a trip through the western
provinces. In his letter to General Brooke, this officer
said that "a state of desolation, starvation, and anarchy
prevailed almost everywhere. In Santa Clara, with the
exception of the municipal district of Cienfuegos, agriculture and trade had practically disappeared. The country
roads, mail service, public instruction, and local governments were in a state of almost complete abandonment.




CONDITIONS ON JAN. 1, 1899


93


Matanzas province was in a worse condition. The Province
of Havana presented a similar aspect; and in Pinar del
Rio, the war had caused its greatest havoc."
This illustrates with sufficient clearness the social and
industrial situation at the time of the American occupation.
Cuba, eminently an agricultural country, was practically
in the position of a farmer who had a piece of land and a
family, but no house for shelter, and no tools or cattle with
which to work. The force of existing economic distress
and the imperative need of affording early and ample relief was not appreciated by those in supreme authority.
Only one of the department commanders, I believe, makes
special mention of this need. General Wilson, a man of
wide experience in civil affairs, says in his report for the
first six months of 1899:
"Before there can be a complete restoration of prosperity, some
effective arrangement must be made by which oxen, cows, carts,
plows, and hoes can be supplied in reasonable quantities to such
smaller proprietors and their tenants as have been reduced to
destitution by the war.... I am so convinced of the futility of
approaching the problem of reconstruction from any other direction
that I must again urge the necessity of some action to relieve the
wants of the agricultural population, and to put agriculture on a
sound basis with the least possible delay."
The industrial rehabilitation of the Island should have
been, but was not, made a dominant feature in the work of
the new government.     A few realized the fact, though
views differed regarding the proper steps. Charity had
done its helpful work. A bridge was needed between the
domain of charity and that of reasonable prosperity as a
result of individual industry. This might have been effected
by methods suggested by General Wilson, Sefor Perfecto




94


CONDITIONS ON JAN. 1, 1899


Lacoste, and others, whereby a portion of the revenues of
the Island would have been made available as a fund from
which loans could be made to the trustworthy, and cattle
and implements brought in to be sold on an installment
plan, under due provisions for their security, to such as
needed them.
In his report of June 30, 1900, Senor Lacoste, Secretary
of the Department of Agriculture, Commerce, and Industry, says that "Up to the present time nothing has been
done toward the improvement of our agricultural situation."
In his report of Dec. 31, 1900, the same official states that
"No order of a general character has been issued during
the six months to which this report refers, in connection with;agricultural matters."  These reports cover a period of
two years of American control. An appropriation was
afterward made which permitted the importation of a
limited number of cattle for sale to the people of eastern
Cuba. The step was on too small a scale for notable benefit.
Had the matter been taken in hand upon broader lines in
the earlier days, there is much reason for belief that the
stories of widespread economic distress, so often heard
during 1901, might have been given a widely different
character.
The question of Cuba's finances at this time presented
only one feature. That was the amount of her liabilities.
There was in existence a series of obligations, issued by
the mother country and charged by her to the Island of
Cuba. The amount of these obligations is variously given
at from  $400,000,000 to $650,000,000.  The American
Commissioners, at Paris, with the full support of the President, refused to assume for the United States or for Cuba
the payment of these bonds. A portion of the sum had
been borrowed for the purpose of suppressing a previous




CONDITIONS ON JAN. 1, 1899


95


revolution in the Island, and this, with other indebtedness,
was charged to Cuba. No other national debts existed
save those which were given validity under the terms of
the Cuban Constitution adopted three years later. These
were represented by some $2,000,000 of bonds issued by
the insurgent government, and the claims of the Cuban
soldiery for payment for their services during the war. A
number of municipalities, however, carried outstanding
obligations and some bonded debt. These, aside from the
bonded indebtedness of Havana, approximately $10,000,000,
were not large even in their aggregate, probably little if at
all exceeding $3,000,000. This constituted no burden
under any approach to normal conditions. The total valid
obligations of the Island as a whole, or of its municipalities,
was a sum of comparatively insignificant amount.
A much more serious feature was presented in the condition of the laws and the methods of their application.
Of the general character and the general characteristics
of the people for whom they had become, for the time being
at least, responsible, little was known by the people of the
United States or by their representatives in the Island.
They were generally weighed, after the American fashion,
in American scales, and were found wanting. Men who
had seen no country except their own, and who knew no
other people than their own countrymen, saw the Cubans
in their deplorable and broken state. The tendency was
to pity them as one pities some suffering animal, and to
regard them as lamentably destitute of self-sufficiency. A
few weeks, often no more than a few days, was a sufficient
time for hundreds of superficial and unqualified observers
to sit in judgment, and to determine that Cuba was little
other than a land of turbulent and illiterate negroes needing
the government of a stronger race, indisposed to industry,




96


CONDITIONS ON JAN. 1, 1899


and quite unsuited for that independence for which they
had been fighting. A group of political and military leaders,
posing as the duly constituted representatives of the Cuban
people, was in session, and their proceedings were assumed
to be a type of that which might be expected in any Cuban
political body. The element which was most in evidence
was regarded by too many as typical of the mass.
The United States began its work in Cuba with little
or no knowledge of the Cubans' special needs, and with a
distinct misconception of the qualities and characteristics
of the Cuban people. That so little friction occurred,
during the term of American control, is due, in notable
measure, to the very qualities and characteristics which
were so generally ignored when that control was assumed.
The productive industries of the Island were paralyzed
to a point little short of absolute suspension. While an
inconsiderable amount of home and market gardening may
be, and was, carried on by handall extensive production
for commercial purposes is dependent upon animals for
ploughing and other necessary processes. In 1894, the year
preceding the outbreak of the revolution, Cuba had, in all
parts of the Island, some three million head of cattle. Some
of these were range cattle, but many of them were workingoxen upon which the Cuban planter, large and small, chiefly
depends in his agricultural processes. At the close of the
war, it was estimated that fully ninety per cent of these
cattle had been destroyed, largely for consumption by the
contending armies and by the hungry people. These had
found no replacement at the time of the American occupation. In 1894, there were some 600,000 horses and mules
on the Island. The reduction of this group was not so great
as in the case of the cattle. But the Cuban horse is of little
or no use for farm purposes, being small in size and light




CONDITIONS ON JAN. 1, 1899


97


in weight. Without cattle, any early resumption of the
industries of the Island was impossible.
In 1894, there were more than 350 mills for the grinding
of sugar cane and the conversion of the juice into raw sugars.
Few of these escaped all injury during the processes of the
war. About one-half of them were either totally destroyed
or so thoroughly wrecked as to render necessary their almost
complete reconstruction. That required both time and
money. In the majority of cases, the owners of these,
whether ruined in whole or in part, were without means
for their proper rehabilitation. The result of this enforced
industrial suspension, in its effect upon the people of the
Island, may be partially realized from the fact that a large
percentage of the entire population of the Island is dependent, directly or indirectly, upon sugar production.
In view of the importance of this industry in the life of
the Island, and in view of its known demoralization, it is as
much a matter of surprise as of regret that the authorities
of the intervening government did not proceed at once to
the very root of the evils which existed in Cuba at the time
of American occupation. That the point of recognition of
this special and fundamental need was urged upon the
authorities is shown in the official report (p. 12) of General
Brooke, the Military Governor. He says:
"Many requests have been made by the planters and farmers to
be assisted in the way of supplying cattle, farming implements, and
money; the latter to enable them to restore their houses. The
matter has been most carefully considered and the conclusion
reached that aid could not be given in this direction. It should be
understood that the full amount of the revenues would not be sufficient to meet all demands of this kind, even were this the only
objection to the scheme. The real solution of this question of
furnishing means to those who need this kind of aid, is through the




98


CONDITIONS ON JAN. 1, 1899


medium of banks, agricultural or others; through them and through
them alone, it is believed, means now sought from the public treasury
should be obtained. In this system of loans, which can be under
the scrutiny of the banks or associations from which loans are
secured, lies the only apparent solution of this much-talked-of source
of assistance. This system would not destroy or impair the selfrespect of the borrower; he would not be the recipient of charity,
but a self-respecting citizen working out his own financial salvation
by means of his own labor and brain. From information on the
subject, it is believed that there is enough capital lying idle in Cuba
to-day to supply all that is needed, were the capitalists assured as
to the future.
"The scheme of those who urge this system of assistance to
agriculturists by the use of revenues of the Island is that, as appears
in the papers submitted, very cumbersome and expensive governmental and other machinery must be organized to carry it out.
It is believed that the workers of farms will have obtained through
other and more satisfactory channels the assistance needed before
this system could be put to work. One feature of this particular
scheme is that it will require five years to work it out, possibly
more."
It must be admitted that the reasons here stated appear
to be entirely sound and valid.    Naturally, there were,
among the advocates of such a measure, many whose plans
were visionary, and who urged steps which could only be
regarded as unwarranted and ultra-paternal. Among those
who urged the adoption of some plan of agricultural relief
was General Wilson, Military Governor of the provinces
of Matanzas and Santa Clara.      The following is quoted
from that official's report of Sept. 7, 1898 (p. 24):
Agricultural Relief. - "The persistent call for assistance in
the various agricultural districts is based upon the fact that the
Island itself, although not deprived of capital - but having no
banks, and being left in a state of uncertainty as to the particular




CONDITIONS ON JAN. 1, 1899


99


form of government, and the particular character of administration, which are to come - is compelled to look either to the insular
treasury or to some extraneous source for such additional capital
as will enable it to establish agriculture and commerce on a sound
basis.
"In view of the foregoing facts, I have strenuously urged in
my report of February 16, pages 14 and 15, in my report of June
20, pages 13 and 14, and in a special communication to the Adjutant
General of the Army dated August 29, - that the insular treasury
should make an allotment of funds for the purchase of cattle,
agricultural implements, and seeds, to be sold to the farmers, on
long time, at a low rate of interest; and also for such loans as may
be necessary to assist them in reconstructing their homes, and in
bringing their land again into production.
"So firmly am I convinced of the wisdom, indeed, of the absolute
necessity, for some such measure as this, that I again reiterate my
recommendation, and express the hope that if the plan which I
have submitted be not regarded as feasible, some other plan, with
the same end in view, may be substituted for it."
It will be noted that General Wilson does not advocate
the loaning of large sums to holders of extensive plantations,
a point which seemed to occasion some confusion in the mind
of his ranking officer, but a measure of relief, involving no
vast outlay, to the masses who stood in such need of even
the means of subsistence.
Attention had been called to the matter of industrial reconstruction even before the date of the occupation. Mr.
Robert P. Porter, as Special Commissioner to Cuba, stated
in his report of Nov. 15, 1898, that "The only hope for
the renewal of prosperity in Cuba is first, the rehabilitation
of the sugar industry; secondly, a revival of work on tobacco
plantations; and thirdly, a full complement of men in the
mining districts.  These industries are the basis of the
prosperity of the Island."




100         CONDITIONS ON JAN. 1, 1899
In a restoration of the industries of the Island, in the
establishment of the people in a state of modest comfort as a
result of their individual industry, lay the key to the solution of the political situation. A closer attention to the
economic problem, presented in the very beginning of the
American occupation, would have averted many of the
evils, both economic and political, which fell upon the
Cuban people during the succeeding years. MJore than
that may also be said with safety. The establishment of
the small farmers of the Island in the modest homes which
content them, with a yoke of oxen and a plow, would have
filled the Island with a people whose gratitude to their benefactors would have simplified, if it did not solve, the political questions of a later date.




CHAPTER VII


THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION -1899
The first official step of American Government in Cuba
was the issuance of the following proclamation, on Jan. 1,
1899:
To the People of Cuba:
Coming among you as the representative of the President, in
furtherance and in continuation of the humane purpose with which
my country interfered to put an end to the distressing condition
in this Island, I deem it proper to say that the object of the present
Government is to give protection to the people, security to person
and property, to restore confidence, to build up waste plantations,
to resume commercial traffic, and to afford full protection in the
exercise of all civil and religious rights.
To this end, the protection of the United States Government
will be directed, and every possible provision made to carry out
these objects through the channels of civil administration, although
under military control, in the interest and for the benefit of all the
people of Cuba, and those possessed of rights and property in the
Island.
The civil and criminal code which prevailed prior to the relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty will remain in force, with such
modifications and changes as may from time to time be found
necessary in the interest of good government.
The people of Cuba, without regard to previous affiliations, are
invited and urged to co-operate in these objects by exercise of
moderation, conciliation, and good will one toward another, and a
hearty accord in our humanitarian purposes will insure kind and
beneficent government.




102


THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


The Military Governor of the Island will always be pleased
to confer with those who may desire to consult him on matters of
public interest.                  JOHN R. BROOKE,
Major General, Commanding Ditision of Cuba, and Military Governor.
The Military Government was divided into departments
corresponding to the already established provinces of the
Island, with the administration of the City of Havana as an
additional department. These, in the beginning, were
under the command and supervision of the following officers
of the United States Army:
Havana Province.........Gen. Fitzhugh Lee.
Pinar del Rio Province.... Gen. Geo.W. Davis.
City of Havana...........Gen. Wim. Ludlow.
Matanzas Province.......Gen. Jas. H. Wilson.
Santa Clara Province...... Gen. John C. Bates.
Puerto Principe Province... Gen. L. H. Carpenter.
Santiago Province........ Gen. Leonard Wood.
On January 11, provision was made for the administration of Civil Government through four departments, as
follows: Department of State and Government; Department of Finance; Department of Justice and Public Instruction; Department of Agriculture, Commerce, Industries,
and Public Works.
On January 12 these departments were established by
the following appointments:
Domingo Mendez Capote, to be Secretary of the Department of State and Government.
Pablo Desvernine, to be Secretary of the Department
of Finance.
Jose Antonio Gonzalez Lanuza, to be Secretary of the
Department of Justice and Public Instruction.
Adolfo Saenz Yafiez, to be Secretary of the I)epartment
of Agriculture, Commerce, Industries, and Public Works.




THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


103


It is not possible to present here either the complicated
functions of these departments, or the many difficulties
which confronted both the Military and the Civil Administration. For four centuries the Cuban people had lived
under the domination of an autocratic government whose
local administration was virtually a military dictatorship.
One-third of the population consisted of blacks, many of
whom had been slaves prior to the emancipation act of 1886.
From lives of subjection and subservience, political or
physical, white and black alike were now to step into the
broad field of democracy, freedom of speech, and self-government. Some of their leaders, by education and experience
in the United States and in France, were partially qualified
for such a step, but even to these there clung the influence,
strongly marked, of training under Spanish methods.
The military governors faced questions which were new
to them, a people whom they did not understand, and by
whom they were not understood. Laws and language were
equally unfamiliar. Years of maladministration of the
Spanish legal code had stamped upon the American mind
a firm belief that the laws themselves were bad. A long
period of Cuban revolt led to a belief that the Cubans were
a turbulent people, akin in their revolutionary habits to
their neighbors in Hayti, Santo Domingo, and the Central
and South American Republics. All this and more the
Americans had to unlearn. Many Cubans, in blind enthusiasm, looked for the sun of prosperity to burst at once from
the clouds of oppression and disaster. Looking back upon
those early days of Cuba's new life, they who shared in those
processes and they who stood and watched them from the
point of observers, see in them the development of a problem
whose complexities were at the time but dimly appreciated.
The first and most immediately important step was re



104


THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


lief for the suffering. To that end, the following instructions
were sent to all Department Commanders:
General:
I am directed by the Major General Commanding the Division
to invite your attention to the reported need of food by a large
number of the people of the Island. He desires that you inquire
into this matter at once and investigate fully the condition of the
people as regards the matter of food supply. In all cases where
you may find destitution, you will immediately relieve it. In this
connection, your attention is invited to the enclosed extract from
G. 0. 110, A. G. O., Washington, Aug. 1, 1898, specifying the
ration to be issued to Cuban destitutes. You will please understand that all able-bodied men needing food will be given work,
as soon as practicable, on the repair of roads and sanitary and other
public works. They will be paid fair wages in United States
money, but this cannot now be paid weekly for the reason that
the funds are not available. It is not proposed to furnish work
to those people who remain in Cuba and retain their allegiance
to Spain. Men who are offered work and refuse to work should
not be fed. On investigation of this matter you will show, by
timely estimates of funds, the necessities of your department,
remembering, however, that the funds for this and for other purposes are limited at present. You will exercise a wise discretion
in the distribution of food; it is better to make an error on the side
of humanity always. Medical attendance and medicines will
always be afforded and given where necessary. Please keep these
headquarters fully advised as to all conditions in your department
at all times, and to this end you will acquaint yourself with affairs
by an active use of the means at hand. For the present, and until
proper arrangements are made for remission of customs revenues
to Havana, or disbursement of same at port of collection, subcollectors must understand that they will be held to a strict accountability under executive order of Dec. 9, 1898, to the Collector of
Customs for the Island for all funds received by them.
Very respectfully,
ADNA R. CHAFFEE,
Major General, U. S. Volunteers, Chief of Staff.




THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


105


In the beginning, food distribution was conducted on very
liberal lines. It was better that a few unworthy should be
supplied than that any who were in actual need should suffer
or die from hunger. Unfortunate results were immediately
apparent. People who could afford to buy stood in line
with the destitute. Pauperization was the inevitable tendency. System was introduced as rapidly as possible, and
house to house inspection was instituted. The inspectors
furnished orders, upon a printed form, calling for the requisite supply in the various individual cases. These orders
were filled upon presentation at the central distributing
stations. The medical department was also given due
attention, and the sick were properly cared for.
One of the most serious features which attended the relief work lay in the fact that there were many whose physical
system was so disordered by long-continued starvation that
such food as it was possible to supply, as rations, was not
suited to their needs. Many of these cases were hopeless.
As rapidly as possible, such were taken to hospitals or to
buildings used for hospital purposes, and there nursed and
cared for until death kindly relieved them of their misery.
Few more pitiable sights are ever encountered than those
rows of hospital cots, each occupied by a doomed sufferer,
the victim of an inhuman policy. Mendicants swarmed in
the streets, and infested the stores, hotels, and cafes. A
considerable number became semi-professionals and paid
daily visits to particular patrons.
The lines of restriction and exclusion in the matter of
food distribution were drawn more closely with each passing week, and the effect was soon apparent. By the first
of April, the list of recipients in Havana had been reduced
from 20,000 to 8,000, and a similar condition prevailed
throughout the country. During the latter part of March,




106


THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


it was officially announced that, thereafter, the expense of
this charitable distribution would be charged to the insular
fund. The expenditure at the time was estimated at $280,000
per month. So effectively was the relief work accomplished
that by the month of June it was deemed advisable to suspend all general distribution of food supplies and to limit
charitable relief to cases of special need. The work had
then become so systematized that such cases were known
to those engaged in it. By that time, many had returned, or
had been aided in returning to their homes to take up as
best they could the work of self-maintenance. Thousands
had found employment in the various departments of governmental and municipal processes and operations. But it is
to the little-aided efforts of the Cubans themselves that most
of the credit belongs for the industrial rehabilitation of the
Island. Neighbor helped neighbor, and he who had an ox
or a plow or a hoe shared its use with his neighbor who
had nothing. This feature of Cuban reconstruction has
been little noted. Those who did this lived, in large proportion, away from the beaten track, unseen by all save a
few special students of Cuba's real situation.
America is prone to take credit for all that has been done
in Cuba. The truth is that, along economic lines, the Cuban,
whether planter or peasant, received little assistance from
the American Government. The planter borrowed such
money as he could for the rehabilitation of his estate; employed such hands as he could, often on a basis of wages
contingent upon his receipts for his crop. Of my own
knowledge, I can testify to the work of the peasant, the
guajiro. I have seen him scratching a shallow furrow in
the soil with a bit of bent iron barrel hoop that he might
plant a few boniatos. I have seen three Cubans slowly
and laboriously dragging a crude and cumbrous Cuban




THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


107


plow, while a fourth guided it. By such methods as these
have the Cuban people struggled for life and maintenance.
During the year, changes were made in the Military Departments. General Hasbrouck succeeded General Davis,
who was ordered to Porto Rico. During the month of April,
there was a consolidation of departments. Havana and
Pinar del Rio provinces were combined under the command
of General Lee. General Bates was ordered to the Philippines, and Santa Clara province was added to the command
of General Wilson. Puerto Principe was coupled with Santiago. With the diminution of extreme distress, and the
gradual return of the people to their various occupations,
the work of the military department lessened. A large
portion of the American troops were withdrawn. By the
end of the year, while there was still a vast amount of work
to be done by the department commanders and their staffs,
it had been sifted down into a generally systematic routine.
No disturbances or uprisings occurred, though there was
occasional friction between the two peoples, and rumors and
threats of disturbance were sometimes heard.
A notable cause of threatened disturbances occurred in
the existence of a body known as the Cuban Assembly.
This group claimed for itself the position of an established
Cuban representation. It was presumably composed of
representatives of the different corps of the Cuban army,
and paraded under the imposing title of La Asamblea de
Representantes del Ejercito Cubano, or the Assembly of Representatives of the Cuban Army. It held a series of meetings
and claimed an official recognition which was refused. Its
desire was the immediate withdrawal of the Government
of Intervention, and its object was to constitute itself the
successor of that government. It discussed the placing of a
considerable national loan, and essayed steps toward such a




108


THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


loan. It had some following among an irresponsible element, notably in the ranks of the still existent remnant of
the Cuban forces. Its deposition of Maximo Gomez as the
General in Chief of the army divided its support, as many
adhered to the side and the fortunes of their old leader. The
organization stormed itself to death and passed away to reappear in the persons of some of its members as individual
factors in the politics of a later day. At no time was the
body dangerous, but for many weeks it existed as a potential
breeder of trouble.
An interesting question arises in connection with this
body. While its experience as an organization which was
ignored by the intervening government was not notably
creditable, it remains a clear possibility that its recognition
and co-operation might have resulted in material benefit
to both Cubans and Americans. Numbered in its personnel
there were more than a few who had been leaders in the war,
who afterward appeared as members of the Cuban Constitutional Convention, and who are to-day members of
the Cuban Congress. There were others who afterward
held, and who still hold official positions. The authority
of the Asamblea was recognized by General Gomez who
accepted his deposition by them as the head of the army.
The body claimed for itself the legitimate succession to the
Constituent Assembly which met at Jimaguayu, on Sept.
13, 1895, to organize a Cuban government and to prepare a
constitution for a Cuban Republic. The United States
had distinctly refused to recognize that government, officially,
and refused to recognize the creators of it after the American
occupation. Whether the body possessed any rights which
entitled it to recognition, or whether it could be regarded as
duly representative of the Cuban people, may be matters of
opinion. It certainly did constitute an organization which




THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


109


included in its membership a notable number of Cuban
citizens of both respectability and prominence, and, whether
it was or was not the constitutional representative of the
Cuban people, it did form an association which might have
been used, under the supervision of the American authorities, as a valuable agent in the processes of the intervention.
Such a proceeding would have been entirely logical, and
much more consistent with the pledges and the assertions
of the American government than was the method adopted.
Recognized, they might well have become useful aids in
carrying out the professed policy of the United States.
Ignored and offended, they became a suspicious and disturbing element.
The truth of the matter is that at this time, notwithstanding her recorded pledges, the United States had no definite
policy regarding the Island. Vague ideas were held of
Cuban capacity, and doubts existed of Cuban fitness for
any political position save that of political dependents.
The United States, after its occupation of the Island, continued the policy which Mr. Cleveland, in his message of
December, 1896, called the "expectant attitude." It is
now no more than a matter of pure speculation, but it will
always remain a question whether many of the evils which
appeared later might not have been avoided by a judicious
combination with the Cuban Asamblea in the early months
of 1899.
A serious problem presented itself in the shape of what
was known as the Mortgage Extension question. The census of 1899 gives a valuation of the real estate of the Island
as $323,641,895. Upon this, the same authority shows an
indebtedness, represented by mortgages and censos, of
$247,915,494. The major portion of this was of some
years standing. On May 15, 1896, General Weyler issued




110


THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


a decree, in view of the financial and industrial distress resulting from the war then going on, that:
"1. Mortgages maturing or to mature from this date
onward are to be extended until April 29, 1897.
" 2. During this time (May 15, 1896, to April 30, 1897) all
legal steps regarding the payment of such claims will also
he held in suspense."
This applied to the Island at large with the exception of
Santiago and Puerto Principe Provinces where it applied
for one month only. A continuance of the period of disturbance led to a continuance of the decree until April,
1898, when it was again extended until April 1, 1899. This
lapped over into the period of American control. A vigorous
agitation was started for a still further renewal, and after a
thorough canvass an extension was granted until the spring
of 1901. The extension was a doubtful measure, beneficial
to the debtor class but seriously detrimental to the creditor
class, not a few of whom were disastrously affected by it.
It was moreover a serious infraction of a fundamental law -
that of contracts. Even to-day, it is not easy to say whether
the granted extension worked helpfully or injuriously to the
general welfare of the Island. At all events, its benefits
were not so clearly evident as to show full justification for
the proceeding.
In view of the general lack of accurate information in the
United States regarding Cuba, the Cuban people, and Cuban
affairs, and the plentiful amount of misinformation supplied
during that much tangled period, it is less surprising than it is
unfortunate that a wiser and more definite policy should not
have been formulated for the immediate and future government of the Island. The situation was further complicated
by the fact that there existed, on both sides of the straits,
a feeling that those who had fought for the independence




THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


111


of Cuba were the ones deserving of recognition rather than
those who had either opposed the war or held aloof from
it. Yet the former class included by far the greater number
of the less responsible, while the latter class included many
of the highest intelligence and the greatest property interests. These latter held back from participation, while
the others clamored for place and recognition. As in both
earlier and later days, there was illustrated the tendency
of the Cuban people to split into political factions rather
than to divide into distinct political parties.    I
Unduly magnifying that which their country had dore
for Cuba, and forgetting that American intervention in the
affairs of the Island was far from being entirely unselfish
too many Americans looked to see the Cuban people in aA
attitude of subservient gratitude, and, finding them less
voluble in their thanks than was thought to be fit and proper,
at once declared them an ungrateful race. The pity with
which the Cubans had been regarded, during their days of
struggle and suffering, largely disappeared, and its place was
filled by an uncharitable conviction of Cuban unworthiness.
Too many held an idea that to have freed the Cubans from
Spanish bondage was enough to command their submission
to and gratitude for anything which might be imposed upon
them by their alien rescuers. Unbridled comment upon
their ignorance, their indifference to sanitation, upon the
clamor of many whom the Cubans themselves knew to be
unworthy of place and preferment, and a general air of
superiority on the part of so many of the thousands of Americans who, as soldiers or civilians, were on the Island in those
early days, tended strongly to drive the Cubans into a semihostile attitude which was clearly noticeable.
A well-defined breach between the Cubans and the
Americans was apparent as early as the middle of February.




THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


The Cubans felt that they were being ignored in affairs
in which they believed they had an active concern. Military methods over-rode civil systems established by the
military authorities. Americans were irritated by Cuban
manifestation of a resentment which, in many ways, was
excusable if not justifiable. Opposition and unfriendliness
grew upon the one side, and uncharitableness developed
upon the other. Cuba's most emphatic political grievance
in earlier days had been the system of military absolutism.
America's special energies might be directed along other
lines than those followed by her predecessor, but the Cuban
saw little change in the system. No doubt, the Cubans
expected too much, and unreasonably expected political
and economic relief which could only come through a process
of time. But it is perhaps equally beyond doubt that the
Americans too frequently failed to take the Cuban and his
ambitions into a duly tactful consideration.
A problem which was among the earliest to be encountered
was presented by the condition of affairs in the various
municipalities. Under the existing system, the Island was
divided into municipal districts which practically correspond
to American counties or parishes. These districts constitute the political and administrative units of the Island.
Each municipal district is under the government of a municipal council. Each must contain not less than two thousand inhabitants, and present an area of territory fairly
proportioned to its population. They are sub-divisions of
judicial districts and provinces. At that time there were
in the division of the Island six provinces, thirty-one judicial
districts, and one hundred and thirty-two municipalities.
The municipality is divided into subdistricts and these into
wards, or barrios. The affairs of these municipalities were
found to be sorely tangled. There was confusion in the




THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


113


laws which regulated them, and dire confusion in their
administrative processes. Many of them showed outstanding liabilities with creditors seeking the settlement of accounts.
Many of the municipal governments had expired and there
were neither officials, treasury, nor revenue. On March 21,
an order was issued suspending the prosecution of all claims
against municipalities or Provincial Deputations, pending a
reorganization. As rapidly as possible, mayors were appointed to fill vacancies, and allotments made from the
insular fund to provide for their immediate needs. This
method was continued until the elections of June, 1900.
Yet, notwithstanding this provision, at the close of the year
it was found that the municipalities had incurred a debt
whose total amounted to some $300,000. This, it will be
understood, was the sum of municipal expenditure beyond
the amount locally collected and the appropriation by the
central government. This situation was due, in part, to
the influence left in the Cuban mind and custom by Spanish
methods; in part, to the inexperience of the officials; and,
in part, to the failure of the intervening power to set in
motion those processes of local taxation from which selfgoverning municipalities properly derive their revenues.
The problem of the effective reconstruction of these organizations was one of the most serious and complicated
which was presented for American consideration. Life
under a strongly centralized government, in whose processes
municipal governments were inextricably entangled, finding a confused termination, local self-government and provision for necessary revenues seemed beyond the immediate
reach of the Cuban people. The application, even in no
more than a general way, of the American system, involved
a change so radical as to encounter the disapproval of Cuba's
ablest men. The poverty of the people was urged as an




114


THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


insurmountable barrier to any system of local taxation.
In the minds of many, this was an excuse and not a reason.
Doubtless there were those who were utterly unable to pay
taxes upon real property which belonged to them. But
there were also many, notably in the larger cities, who could
pay, and they were relieved because of the poverty of the
others.
The City of Havana was especially favored in the matter
of appropriation from the insular fund. Major Ladd, the
treasurer of the Island, reported that
"From Jan. 1, 1899, to June 30, 1900, the city of Havana received
from the General Government nearly five millions of dollars, the
same being expended almost exclusively for distinctly municipal
purposes. In lesser degree the same conditions obtained in other
cities. The proper course would seem to have been some system
of local taxation by which the various municipalities bore all or at
least a large part of their expenses."
A complete revision of the system of taxation may have
been beyond the scope of the proper functions of a government which was pledged "to exercise neither sovereignty,
jurisdiction, nor control," but it is nevertheless true that
equally radical changes were effected in other departments
of insular affairs. But that was not the ground upon which
decision was made in this matter. The innovation appeared
to be unpopular, as taxation usually is, and appropriations
continued from the insular funds.
It may be said in this connection that this matter continued as a source of more or less active confusion and
irritation throughout the period of American occupation.
A committee appointed by General Wood, in January,
1900, reported adversely to the taxation of values instead
of incomes and products, although the system relieved




THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


115


from taxation many large areas and valuable properties
from which owners, often men of large wealth, were deriving no immediate income, and imposed a burden upon
many who were struggling for livelihood. There was also
gross misuse of such funds as were made available by the
system adopted. In the official report of the insular Secretary of the Treasury, Sefior Cancio, published in the fall of
1900, it was shown that the municipal revenues for the
whole Island were $1,188,333.31. Of this sum $838,968.50
was spent for official salaries and office materials, and
$349,364.81 for public improvements of all kinds. This is
a most discreditable showing for the officials, though it is
indicative of nothing so much as of the effect of Spanish
influence and political example. The problem is now being
worked out, and its full solution will be facilitated and
hastened by a reasonable measure of industrial prosperity
in the Island.
Early attention was paid to the condition of Cuba's penal
institutions. These places were not only in a condition of
disgusting and horrible filthiness, but they were as well
crowded with prisoners, some serving sentences, some
awaiting trial, and some held for no ascertainable reason.
Many of them were political prisoners. An American
officer was assigned to investigate the cases as rapidly as
possible, and for a time a very considerable jail delivery
was effected. The process continued as time was found for
investigation, and the end of the year found no great number of people in jail who did not properly belong there.
The gradual dissolution of the Cuban Army of Liberation
had been in process ever since the termination of hostilities
at Santiago. Its definite disbandment began in November, 1898. A Licencia, or furlough, was granted to all
who could obtain work or who desired to return to their




116


THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


homes. A notable part of the army, however, held together
and so remained during the opening months of 1899. This
body constituted a disturbing element in the community.
It was a menace to peace although a considerable portion
of it was definitely engaged, under American authority,
in maintaining peace, in the capacity of a Rural Guard.
As an army, its recognition was impossible, though its existence was not to be denied. Its actual dissolution, as an
organization, was highly desirable. Aside from the limited
number whose services were of advantage as a rural police,
it did no work, and it had to eat. It remained as a body
of non-producers in a land whose welfare depended upon
production. Those who should have been burden-bearers
became a burden. There was no reason why the greater
number of them should not wield a hoe in place of carrying
a gun, and there was every reason why they should
do so.
A point of personal dignity, or something of that kind,
stood in the way of an adjustment for several weeks. The
mountain would not go to Mahomet, neither would Mahomet
go to the mountain. Maximo Gomez stood upon his dignity,
and General Brooke upon his. To some of us who were in
the Island at the time, it did not appear that any special
strain of either dignity or diplomacy was required for these
two leaders to get together in furtherance of the interests
and the welfare of both countries. Gomez was the recognized leader of his people, and particularly of the Cuban
army, whose return to productive industry was most desirable.
He was in the field, near Remedios, and refused to become
a suppliant. General Brooke was in Havana, occupied with
important affairs, and declined to make any overtures to the
stubborn and somewhat erratic old gentlemen out in the
woods. No serious trouble resulted, it is true, but there




TIHE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


117


remains a possibility that much good might have resulted
from a cordial understanding between these two leaders.
An arrangement was finally effected through Mr. Robert
P. Porter, who arrived in Havana about the end of January.
Mr. Porter secured a conference with General Gomez and
obtained a verbal agreement by which the army was to be
disbanded upon the distribution of $3,000,000, a sum which
the authorities at Washington had tentatively allotted for
the purpose. There was much discussion whether this sum
constituted a gift or a loan to the Island, and the authority
for the appropriation was called in question. The sum
was a part of the remaining balance of the congressional
appropriation of $50,000,000, which was placed at the disposal of President McKinley in the earlier days of the war.
The object of the allotment was to aid the soldiers of the
Cuban Army to return to their homes, and, so far as was
possible, to resume their wonted occupations. Its return
was not required. The conditions were that the beneficiaries should prove their connection with the army, and
turn in a gun. A tedious delay followed, although the
money was sent and held on board a war-ship in the harbor
of Havana.
The "Cuban Assembly," claiming to be the qualified
representative of the army, was greatly incensed at the action
of General Gomez, and promptly deposed him from his
position as Commander-in-Chief of the Cuban forces.
This act served no purpose save the increased confusion of
an anomalous situation. The people and the army generally stood by Gomez, with whom the United States had made
the arrangement, and who would doubtless be further recognized in the distribution of the funds. To the Asamblea,
the United States had definitely and distinctly refused any
sort of recognition. But the Asamblea held the rolls of the




118


THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


army, and, for a time, declined to produce them. These
were essential in determining the service qualification.
They were at last released by the dissolution of the Asamblea.
They included the names of some 48,000 men, a number
which many competent Cuban authorities declared to be
absurdly in excess of all possible enrollment in the Cuban
army. It included the names of many who could not be
found, and failed to include many who, by other evidence,
proved the fact of service beyond any reasonable doubt.
It included the names of many who had seen no fighting
and no military service, but who had acted in some official
or clerical position in connection with the quasi Cuban
Republic.
The allotment had been made on the basis of a payment
of $100 per man to an estimated force of 30,000. Several
months were consumed in effort to adjust the matter. It
was finally determined by the elimination of officers and
those who had served only in civil or semi-civil capacities.
Seventy-five dollars per man was awarded to 33,930 men,
and the balance, $455,250, was returned to Washington.
With the exception of those who were retained as a rural
police, the Army of Liberation passed into history and into
organizations of Veterans of the Cuban Army. Some used
the money which they thus received in the commendable
fashion of home establishment. Some disposed of their
share in more expeditious but less laudable manner.




CHAPTER VIII


FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION - Continued
ONE of the interesting features of the year was the somewhat problematic position of Gen. Maximo Gomez. He
had been a notable leader in the Ten Years' War, although
he was not a Cuban. It was he who effected the termination of that war by the Treaty of Zanjon. That accomplished, he returned to his home in Santo Domingo, where
he remained until, on the personal solicitation of Jose Marti,
the idealist to whose efforts, more than to those of any other,
the revolution of 1895 was due, he returned to Cuba to assume the military leadership of the new insurrection. His
methods of fighting were those of the guerilla rather than
those of the soldier, but it was to his skill in that style of warfare, and to his tenacity of purpose, that Cuba's insurrection was brought to a practical deadlock which might have
continued almost indefinitely had it not been for the intervention of the United States. While neither Gomez nor
his companions, either in the field or in the government,
asked for that intervention, it is not to be doubted that he
looked for the time when the United States would be virtually forced to interfere in some more effective manner
than that of diplomatic negotiation.
The developments of that interference left General Gomez
on one side. Gen. Calixto Garcia was the commander of
the department of Santiago, and it was with him that the
United States transacted the necessary business which




120


THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


followed the capitulation of Santiago and the destruction
of the Spanish squadron. Gomez remained in the field in
the northern central portion of the Island, and for many
months was inactive except for a general police supervision
for the preservation of law and order. He opened no official
relations with the new authorities, and it is quite certain
that he entertained grave doubts concerning the future
course of the United States. To a man of his previous
experience and mental make-up, fidelity to national pledges
or to the terms of treaties was difficult of comprehension, and
the voluntary giving up of that which lay in the hand of a
mighty nation was a proceeding which required actual
accomplishment before it could be fully believed. He remained in camp, attended by a body-guard of his old troops,
watchfully awaiting the development of the plans and purposes of the United States.
In February he came to Havana, after making a triumphal
procession through the Island. In spite of the many enemies
he had made during the processes of two wars, it is certain
that, at this time, he was the strong man of the Island, and
the fact that he had remained aloof, semi-mysterious in his
plans and movements, instead of plunging into the disturbed
arena of the period, served only to add to his prestige. It
was known that he realized the strength of the United States,
and the ability of that country to seize and hold the Island,
and to stamp out insurrection in a manner which was beyond the range of Spanish military methods. It was known
that he had no unlimited confidence in the American Congress. Therefore he waited, and many Cubans held their
own attitude in suspense pending the action of Gomez in
either allying himself with or definitely opposing the interventores.
Following an interview with Mr. Robert P. Porter, at




TIE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


121


Remedios, and the arrangement for the payment of the army,
he started for Havana, visiting the more prominent towns
and cities on his way. The journey was a continuous ovation, and despite the poverty and distress of the country,
his arrival was signalized by triumphal arches, processions,
balls, and banquets. The result of it all was a distinct
unification of Cuban sentiment. Wherever he went, he
urged forbearance, forgiveness, and the burial of the past,
to Cuban and to Spaniard alike. He urged harmony and
unity of action, not against Americans, but for the building
of a distinct Cuban nation which should be recognized by
the American people with whom it should live in relations
of the closest amity.
In the whole history of Havana, no such reception had
ever been given to any man as that given to this idol of scores
of thousands of Cuban hearts. Never before in their history had the Cuban people been given so free a hand in a
popular demonstration. Parades, fiestas, and decorations
were sufficiently familiar, but all previous affairs had been
tinged with the red and yellow of Spain. This event was
distinctly Cuban, and Havana gave to Cuba's hero a royal
welcome. He entered the city triumphant, though not as
a conqueror, to be greeted by the plaudits of the multitude,
and to stand, in the palace of Spain's many Governors, in
the very room in which plan after plan had been formed
for his capture, his overthrow, or his death. He came to
occupy, for a time, the summer palace of the Spanish Governor-General, by the invitation of those who had made his
visit to Havana a possibility. A vast parade of military
organizations and civic societies wound through the narrow
streets of the city, bordered throughout its way by dense
masses of excited Cubans who shouted and cheered as they
never had shouted in all their previous life.




122


THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


Huge and elaborate floats formed a part of the procession.
Some were of interesting significance. Two appeared as
companions. The first pictured the Cuba of Yesterday.
It represented desolation. Dried grass indicated wasted
fields, and broken agricultural implements indicated agricultural idleness. A shackled maiden personified the Cuban
people. This was followed by the contrasting float - the
Cuba of To-morrow. Over a parquet flooring, surrounded
by festoons, flowers, and banners, there presided the bright
goddess of a free and happy people. This was a bit of
characteristic significance. It indicated a return to pleasure
on the part of a pleasure-loving people, a people to whom
work was a means to an end, rather than the return to industry on the part of an industrious people. The first float
was a wasted field. The second was a ball-room. In one
carriage three young ladies represented Cuba, Spain, and
the United States. Each carried the flag of the respective
countries. Significance lay in the fact that the Spanish
flag was not torn from the group by some hot-headed patriot,
and that, on the contrary, the combination called out abundant applause. The union of the Cuban flag and the stars
and stripes was frequent, and, in nearly every instance,
those who bore them sat with linked hands.
The immediate presence of General Gomez was undoubtedly a disturbing element. It emphasized the quarrel
which the Asamblea had made with him, and some friction
occurred between their respective followers. Difficulty
also arose from the fact of the recognition of Gomez by the
American authorities, who had persistently declined any
recognition of the Asamblea. Gomez essayed no interference
in the process of affairs, and made himself of service in
various ways. Due recognition of his place and influence
was made by liberal contributions from the insular fund for




THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


123


his pecuniary needs. This "gratuity" was only a little
less than the pay and revenue of the Military Governor.
Gomez soon ceased to be an active factor in Cuban affairs,
though, until the last, he remained an element, sometimes
helpful and sometimes disturbing, in political processes.
The Constitution made it possible for him to become the
first president of the Republic of Cuba, but his elevation to
that position by the choice of the people was at all times a
matter of no little doubt. lie had too deeply offended
many of both the political and the military leaders. He
remains and will ever remain the great and romantic figure
in the history of Cuba's struggles for national independence.
The year 1899 may be divided into three periods, although
there was, of necessity, a general overlapping. They occur
in the following order: First - The resolution of chaotic
conditions; Second - Construction and reconstruction of
governmental machinery; and Third - The operation of
that machinery. A fundamental requirement in all these
processes was the establishment of peace and order. For
this, both a city and a rural police were necessary. The
provost marshal's guard, imperative in the earlier days, was
an offensive institution to the people, as too strongly suggestive of the old Spanish military government. For a time
the Cuban army voluntarily assumed the functions of Rural
Guard and of police in the larger towns. The valuable
services of ex-Superintendent of Police John B. McCullagh,
of New York, were secured for the organization of a municipal police for the city of Havana. On March 1, a uniformed and equipped and partly drilled force of about
one thousand men was entrusted with the maintenance of
law and order in that city. With proper allowance for
faults due to lack of experience, the work of this organization has been highly creditable, though it should not be




124


THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


forgotten that the work of any Cuban police is greatly simplified by the fact that the Cubans are neither a turbulent
nor a drunken people. A local detective force was also
organized under the efficient direction of ex-sergeant Crowley,
of New York. In addition to the municipal police of the
different cities, a Rural Guard, for the maintenance of order
throughout the country areas, was organized in all of the
provinces of the Island with the exception of Matanzas.
This exception is accounted for not by any less need for
them in that province, but by the evidently justified belief
of the department commander, General Wilson, that the
system was un-American and savored too greatly of the
old Spanish method. It was that officer's opinion that
the proper course was the effective organization of the
Municipal Police, and his experience in Matanzas Province
amply endorsed his opinion. It will be remembered that
the Cuban municipality includes the rural as well as the
urban districts. The Rural Guard, as it was organized,
was composed of and officered by those who had served
in the Cuban army. It was of unquestionable service and
furnished paid employment to some twelve hundred men.
While the system is open to many objections as a system,
through the ready possibility of its misuse in the hands of
an unscrupulous central government, and while many of
these objections would have been eliminated by the institution of a municipal police, there can be no doubt that
the body was of important service in the Island.
Naturally, the retiring government left an empty insular
treasury. This was soon remedied by receipts from various
sources, and the first eight months of the year 1899 show a
revenue of some $10,000,000. The administration of the
fiscal department was simplified and rendered more effective by the appointment, on February 2, of Major Eugene




THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


125


F. Ladd as Treasurer and Disbursing Officer of Customs.
By Headquarters Order of March 18, Major Ladd was
appointed Auditor of the Island of Cuba, and, on July 1,
he was appointed as the insular Treasurer. It is to be said
of Major Ladd that not only did he make himself cordially
liked and sincerely respected by all who came into contact
with him, but, as well, that of the more than $30,000,000
which passed through his department during his incumbency, every cent was duly accounted for.
The insular financial system made its early and imperative demand for attention and regulation. The monetary
system was in itself complex. The gold in circulation consisted of both Spanish and French coins. To prevent
their exportation, an artificial value had been placed upon
them by Spanish law. Thus, the actual value of a Spanish
centen might be equivalent to $4.82 in American money.
Its value in circulation was counted at $5.30. Silver money,
in its relation to gold, showed constant and sometimes marked
fluctuation. Throughout Havana there were many small
shops and offices, known as cambios, or exchanges, which
derived a fair income from the conversion of these fluctuating mediums. Into the already complicated system, there
came American gold, paper, and silver with still other
circulating values. The order establishing an official ratio
of these various coins, for use in the custom house, postoffice, etc., had little effect on their use in general circulation, and Americans and visiting strangers found in the
system much that was perplexing and annoying.
As a natural result of disturbed conditions and a change
of government, both insular and municipal treasuries were
empty, and the entire fiscal system in a deranged condition.
During earlier days, an office, known as the Intendencia,
had been vested with almost unrestricted power of extract



126   THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


ing revenue from the Island. With the introduction of the
nominal autonomy of 1897-1898, changes were effected in
the old system. These, of brief duration and ineffective
operation, only served to pile confusion upon confusion.
Reorganization of revenue, auditing, and systems of taxation were imperative. On February 10, an order was issued
remitting " all taxes due, under Spanish laws in force in this
Island, and unpaid on Jan. 1, 1899," with the exception
of taxes on railway passengers and freight, collected and
held by the various railway companies. Various other
Spanish taxes were abolished, including, by an order of
March 25, the tax known as the Consumo de Ganado, which
added four and one quarter cents per kilo to all market
beef. By the same order -
"All taxes and imposts on articles of prime necessity, such as
food and fuel, including kindling wood, coal, and charcoal, are also
hereby abolished, with the exception of those imposed on distilled
and fermented alcoholic liquors.
"No municipality shall be allowed to place a tax on the
importation or exportation of merchandise or cattle, and all
municipal taxes now affecting those articles are hereby abolished."
Modification and regulation were effected in the taxation
of urban and rural property and in the system of industrial
taxes. The internal excise tax, on wholesale and retail sale
of alcohol, spirits, and liquors, was greatly increased and
constituted a revenue of the municipalities instead of the
State. Under the old system, fees were necessary for the
obtaining of academic or professional degrees of their various
kinds. These fees were abolished, and students could
attach letters to their names, without payment, after passing the proper examination. On April 19, all war taxes




THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


127


were abolished, and adjustment effected in other branches
of taxation. On June 14, an order provided for the return,
to actual owners, of all property, urban or rural, then held
by the State or by a municipality as a result of proceedings
for the collection of taxes, subject to certain prescribed
regulations.
A condition quite unfamiliar to Americans existed in the
church ownership of many of the cemeteries of the Island.
A few were owned by the municipalities, but the majority
were the property of the dominant church, whose officials
collected fees for burial and rental for burying ground.
Some confusion existed in the administration of the two
systems. The attempt to regulate this, upon a basis of
incomplete information, led to further entanglement until
its later settlement was effected upon a basis fairly acceptable to both parties.
The condition of the marriage laws was also productive
of confusion. The old Spanish system recognized no marriages as legal save those solemnized under the authority of
the Roman Catholic Church. A provision had been made
for the legality of the civil marriage of non-Catholic persons.
But as the Island people were, with few exceptions, of the
Roman Catholic faith, the civil marriage was unusual.
The religious marriage was imperative for all Catholics.
With the complete separation of Church and State, which
followed the expulsion of the Spanish Government, a new
order became necessary. On May 31, there was issued
Order No. 66. Its first article is as follows: - " Hereafter civil marriages only shall be legally valid. The contracting parties may conform to the precepts of whatever
religion they may profess, in addition to the formalities
necessary to contract the civil marriage."
The order also made provision for the validation of pre



128


THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


vious marriages, for proper registration, and fixed the
marriage fee at one dollar, or its equivalent, in American
money. The intention of this law was, unquestionably,
entirely worthy. Yet much confusion followed it, and its
repeal became necessary. Its author, Sefior Lanuza, the
Secretary of Justice, occupies something more than six
pages of his official report in an explanation and a defence
of the measure. It is interesting to note in the report of
General Wood, for the year 1900, that when a change was
proposed, eighty out of one hundred and seven municipalities declared for its continuance. The members of the
Supreme Court, with one exception, also favored its continuance, as did three of the six Provincial Governors and a
majority of the Judges of the First Instance. Its notable
opponent was the Roman Catholic Church, headed by the
Archbishop of Santiago and the Bishop of Havana. Their
influence prevailed, and Order No. 307 was issued on Aug.
8, 1900. This order declared that marriage "may be civil
or religious at the option of the contracting parties," and
provides the conditions under which each is to be regarded
as legally valid.
Order No. 66 was issued in all good faith, at the instance
of the Cuban Secretary of Justice, and was in no way an
American or a Protestant attempt to undermine or interfere
with the processes or position of the Roman Catholic Church.
A new law was necessary by reason of the changed relations
between the Church and the State. It is unfortunate that
the Cuban functionary should have drafted so radical a
measure, and it is equally unfortunate that General Brooke
gave it his approval. It gave needless offence to the Church,
and gave ground for no little unjust criticism.
On August 19 an important order was issued under the
authority of the United States directing the preparation




THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


129


of a census report covering the population of the Island,
its agricultural conditions and its products, and a full report
of the educational conditions. Lieut. Col. J. P. Sanger,
of the Inspector General's Department of the United States
Army, was appointed Director of the Census, with Mr.
Victor H. Olmstead as Assistant Director. Six Cubans
were appointed as supervisors. Cubans were also employed
as enumerators. Endless difficulties were encountered in
the performance of the work, but the result was the compilation and publication of a volume of great interest and
high importance. It reviews, in brief, the history and the
past government of the Island, its geography, flora, and
fauna, the character and the occupations of the people, and
their educational and sociological conditions, with full
tabulation of the industrial features. Reports at various
times from 1768 to 1887 had been made by the Spanish
authorities, but all were inaccurate and rudimentary. Many
of them were little else than general estimates. Colonel
Sanger's work was broadly and effectively accomplished.
In February, 1899, the American Congress passed a bill,
known as the Foraker law, prohibiting the granting of
franchises or concessions during the period of American
occupation. Such a law must, of necessity, produce both
beneficial and detrimental results. Viewed broadly, there
can be no question that it has been of great and lasting service to the Island and its people. Scores of promoters and
irresponsible speculators turned longing eyes toward a land
so generally destitute as Cuba was of those institutions
known as "modern improvements." Steam railways and
electric lines, telegraph systems, and all departments in
which monopoly becomes a desirable possession, were
among the special rights sought by plausible but irresponsible men who desired them that they might dispose of them




130


THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


at large figures to responsible parties who might then undertake their development. Against this tide of generally impecunious speculators, whose aim was to obtain much while
giving little or no equivalent, Cuba was guarded by the
Foraker Law. On the other hand, that law doubtless
operated to stop certain lines of important development of
the Island and its resources, which would have been of
marked advantage. These, however, were only delayed,
not improbably with some measure of advantage in the
delay, inasmuch as a better knowledge of conditions was
gained during the waiting period.
During a time of such inevitable confusion, attended by a
general lack of adequate information on the part of the new
authorities, it must be admitted that much was done that
should not have been done, and much more was not done that
might have been better done. The most serious mistake
unquestionably lay in the failure to give due attention to
that feature which is the key to peace and order in Cuba 
her economic welfare. Political entanglements and social
disorganization forced themselves into prominence and
demanded the time and attention of the insular government. The immediate distress was relieved, and much
was accomplished in the solution of the many vexing political problems. The Cuban people turned in hopeful patience to the resumption of their industries with such limited
resources as they could command.
A number of prominent Cubans urged upon the Government the necessity for assisting the agricultural classes who
constitute a large percentage of the Island people. Others
would have been glad to give their counsel and express their
views, but the step was somewhat too radical for all save
a few of a people in whose experience the tendering of
advice or suggestion to their rulers was not a customary




THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


131


proceeding. Their only resource in earlier days had been
revolt, and many of those who would gladly have spoken,
lacked the courage to do so. One incident along the line
of industrial relief may be noted. I quote from the report
of Maj. Gen. James H. Wilson, then Military Governor of
the provinces of Matanzas and Santa Clara.
"An experiment, in a small way, has been made with much
success in the tobacco region near Sagua la Grande of supplying
farmers with oxen and implements at cost price and on reasonable
terms of payment, and sending them out from the town to establish
themselves in colonies. It was desired to locate them on land
where they could eventually buy their farms at fair prices, to be
fixed beforehand. It was found, however, that the owners of large
tracts were generally unwilling to part with small pieces for fear
that they should have the remnants on their own hands. The
experiment is, however, entirely successful in its main features.
The farmers are all self-supporting and many of them will anticipate
the payments upon their cattle and implements. A similar experiment has been made and similar results obtained at Sancti Spiritus
under the supervision of Captain Fremont, 2d Infantry, aided by
Father Castillo, a worthy parish priest of that city. At the urgent
solicitation of the Civil Governor of the Province of Matanzas help
of the same sort was extended to twenty-two families in the neighborhood of the City of Matanzas, but owing to the lateness of the
season and the less advantageous situation of the farmers, the result
has not been quite so satisfactory. The cattle were young and
unbroken, but have materially improved in value, and in several
instances the purchasers will be able to anticipate payments due
upon them, but for the most part the experiment has not gone far
enough to justify the statement that it is entirely successful."
The value of work of this character was illustrated in the
comparatively rapid rehabilitation of the tobacco areas,
notably in the Vuelta Abajo district of the province of Pinar
del Rio. That district was soon put fairly upon its feet




132


THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


as a result of the commercial needs of manufacturers of and
dealers in tobacco. The plant makes a quick crop, and
agents of Havana and American merchants made cash
advances, holding the growing crops as security. This was
impossible in the larger and more important department
of sugar cultivation upon which, directly and indirectly, a
large proportion of the Island people are immediately dependent.
The closing weeks of the year saw the initial steps in a department which makes special appeal to the American
people - that of school establishment. On November 2,
a headquarters order was issued which created a new office
in the Department of Justice and Public Instruction. This
was to be known as that of Superintendent of Schools in
Cuba. Mr. Alexis E. Frye was appointed to the position.
On December 6 an order was issued which in its form and
purpose constituted a school law. This was drafted by Mr.
Frye. It provided for Boards of Education, school establishment, books, and subjects of study. Paragraph VII
provided that
"Boards of Education shall make all necessary arrangements
for opening the elementary (primary and grammar) schools by
Dec. 11, 1899, or as soon thereafter as possible, and to that end will
rent rooms or buildings, supply suitable equipment, and employ
teachers. Each of said Boards is hereby authorized to expend a
sum not exceeding fifty dollars, for furniture for each school room,
but no further purchase of school furniture shall be made without
the approval of the Secretary of Justice and Public Instruction."
Thus was begun America's work in the establishment of
a new order of educational methods in Cuba, under the
authority of General Brooke, although the credit for school
establishment has been given to his successor.
Of the work of the Cuban Cabinet it is to be said that it




THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


133


became the subject of no little adverse criticism. It is quite
probable that any other group which might have been selected
to carry on a government under an alien governor would
have been similarly criticised. In what was doubtless a
desire to give to the Cubans the fullest possible measure
of influence in their own affairs, General Brooke gave to his
Secretaries a very free hand. So much was given that it
became a common saying in the Island that "The American
Governor reigns, but the Cuban Secretaries govern." These
gentlemen were without experience in government along
the lines of the new institution. It was natural that all
their methods bore the stamp of the only government with
which they were at all familiar - that of the old Spanish
system of centralization and partisan supremacy. The result was the creation of a political machine whose lines extended throughout the Island. The continuance, by American authority, of the Spanish laws in their entirety, made
this readily possible. Perhaps its most unfortunate result
lay in the prominent recognition of the old militares element, and the practical exclusion of a large class of citizens
of intellectual capacity, social standing, and large property
interests.
Another important order of the closing year was that of
November 17, which recognized the disordered condition of
the finances of the municipalities of the Island, and provided
a monthly appropriation for the maintenance of the municipal police.
On December 20, General Brooke was relieved of his
command in Cuba, and was succeeded by Gen. Leonard
Wood, formerly Military Governor of Santiago Province.
Upon his withdrawal, General Brooke issued a proclamation from which the following may be quoted:




134   THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


"A year ago I found a country most thoroughly devastated, its
resources and commerce destroyed, its rural population gathered in
its towns without food and without shelter, dying from starvation
and exposure. The Government of the United States immediately
supplied food and work; in a short time this terrible condition
passed away, and now the country is rapidly pressing on to a prosperity hitherto unknown in its history. Look about you and see
how true this is. The various steps which led up to the present
conditions are well known to you and need not be mentioned here.
The change is truly marvellous.
"Without a semblance of civil government then, you now have
a complete organization of your municipal and provincial governments all in the hands of your own citizens, the 'Military control'
being purely advisory and supervisory; many of your laws have
been modified and changed to suit the times in which you live, as
well as in the interest of good government; your courts have been
reorganized and are in operation; peace reigns; law and order rules;
and by your own industry and a careful observance of these conditions the full restoration of your social affairs and prosperity is
assured."
It is only natural that such an experience as that of our
first year in Cuba should be open to much of both praise
and censure. To praise without limit, as some have done,
is foolish. To condemn without limit, is unjust. The
notable weakness lay in the lack of a definite and openly
declared policy. The terms of the Joint Resolution were
fresh in the public mind. The American people accepted
that as the declaration of the American policy. Yet, notwithstanding the specific statement of that resolution,
American officials, both political and military, openly asserted that the American flag would never be hauled down in
the Island of Cuba. Visitors to the Island, few of whom
possessed even a shadow of competent information, returned
to the United States with loudly voiced opinions of Cuban




TIlE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


incapacity for self-government. A doubt of the good faith
of the United States developed even within the opening days
of the American occupation. This continued up to the
very time of the transfer, in May, 1902. Apologists for our
conduct of Cuban affairs are disposed to ridicule this proposition, but it remains a fact that our attitude and our actions
in Cuba during this first year laid the foundation for a prevalent belief in the Island that the United States intended
to stay in Cuba in spite of the Teller Amendment to the
Joint Resolution.
Praise in most abundant measure is due to those subordinate officials, staff men and department men, almost
all of whom were officers in our regular army, for the faithful
performance of their duties. To commend these men by
name would involve the publication of almost the entire
roster of the American officers serving in Cuba. The work
which they did is open to little save the highest commendation. But it is to be regretted that the general policy of the
administration, as dictated by the authorities in Washington, was so vague that many of them, without dispute or
reprimand, frankly and openly declared their conviction
that their country would be recreant to its trust and false to
its pledges. American Congressmen also endorsed and
supported this opinion. There is ample ground for belief
that the President and others at Washington were widely
misled by some whose opinions were incompetent, and by
others who had special interests to foster. It was a time
of much confusion in affairs and in opinions, and the truth
of the situation was not easily obtainable. There were
those who thought that the United States, having specifically
declared its purpose, should work unswervingly toward the
accomplishment of that purpose. There were others who
upheld a policy of opportunism, and there is, unfortunately,




136   THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


little room for doubt that the administration followed the
latter plan.
The notably weak point in our relations with Cuba lay
in our failure to work directly and definitely toward the
fulfilment of our pledge as expressed in the Teller Amendment. The strong point lay in the fidelity with which individual representatives of the Government of Intervention
discharged the duties which were placed in their hands.
One fact in the work of this first year has been unduly overlooked. It has become the custom to give the credit for
our accomplishments in Cuba to the successor of General
Brooke. The fact is that the broad foundation, and no
small part of the main structure of our work in Cuba, was
laid and built during the first year of our occupation. To
the untiring energy of General Ludlow the credit is really
due for the cleansing of Havana. General Brooke began
the establishment of schools. Bliss, in the Custom House;
Ladd, in the Treasury; Greble, in the Department of Relief
Work; and a score or two of efficient men in other and in
subordinate departments in Havana and other cities, all
had their work in excellent running order at the close of
the year 1899 when General Wood succeeded General
Brooke as Military Governor of Cuba. The new incumbent reversed the system which developed under his predecessor. General Brooke's Cuban appointees made a
tool of their chief. General Wood made tools of his Cuban
appointees. General Brooke's Cabinet established an elaborate bureaucracy. General Wood essayed autocracy and
met with notable success in his effort.
A readily comprehensible statement of the finances for
the year is not easily to be made. The bookkeeping of the
first six months was not notably systematic, but there is no
ground whatever for even a suspicion of irregularity of any




THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION


137


kind. Certain measures were imperative. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of lives were at stake, and it was no time
to stand on special methods or processes. Red-tape was
cut and the needful work was done, and it was done honestly
and effectively. In the statement for the year, the "Receipts from all sources," from January 1 to August 31, are
given as $10,373,786.16. By that time, the machinery was
in better running order, and the statement for the year,
up to the date of General Brooke's retirement from the
island, December 15, stands as follows:
Receipts January 1 to August 31.................$10,373,768.16
Receipts Customs, September 1 to December 15.. 4,709,358.65
Receipts Postal Service, September 1 to December 15.  57,152.25
Receipts Internal Revenue, Sept. 1 to Dec. 15......  238,278.04
Receipts Miscellaneous, Sept. 1 to Dec. 15.........  113,302.83
Total..................................$15,491,859.93
The expenditures for the same period are given as
$13,327,380.79. Among the purposes to which this sum
was appropriated, there appear the following:
Barracks and Quarters (principally for the occupation of American troops)..................... $1,137,404.22
Sanitation..................................  3,035,404.80
(Of this sum, the City of Havana rec'd $2,020,937.85)
Rural Police and Administration................ 2,172,782.99
Public Works, Ports, etc........................  582,469.12
Charities and Hospitals and Aid to Destitute......  990,781.81
Expenses of Municipalities...................... 1,299,179.97
Quarantine...................................  119,790.41
M iscellaneous.................................  376,699.14
State and Government.........................  594,518.65
Justice and Public Instruction..................  669,332.08
Department of Finance........................  527,458.86
Department of Agriculture and Public Works......  286,578.81
Civil Government.............................  248,295.10
Census......................................  349,777.37




138      TIHE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION
After making allowance for all accounts in suspense,
General Brooke turned over to his successor in office, a
sum which, in round figures, amounted to $2,000,000.
As given by Collector of Customs Bliss, in his report for
1902 (Tables 28 and 37), the statistics of foreign trade for
the year 1899 appear as follows:
Total imports (including bullion)................$74,845,186.00
Total  exports................................  49,327,72 4.00
Of the imports, $37,188,597 came from the United
States, and $37,656,589 from all other countries. Of
the exports, $34,381,738 went to the United States, and
$14,945,986 to all other countries.




CHAPTER IX


THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION
GENERAL JOHN R. BROOKE, the first American Military
Governor of Cuba, was a soldier with a soldier's training.
He was approaching the year of his retirement, and had
grown gray in the service of his country. His only ambition was that of the true soldier - to do the work to which
he was assigned according to the best of his ability. He
had no special interests to serve and no special axes to grind.
Although often severely criticised during the year of his
incumbency, many a Cuban wished, afterward, that he were
back again. It was remembered that, whatever his failings, he never broke a promise. General Wood, his successor, was a younger man, with an ample endowment of
personal ambition.
The new Military Governor of Cuba was not in full
accord with the views expressed in the proclamation of his
retiring predecessor. In his report, after reviewing the
organization of the insular administration, General Wood
says:
"The country was, generally speaking, tranquil. There were
in certain sections small groups of bandits. General conditions
were improving throughout the Island. A large tobacco crop and
a small sugar crop were in prospect.
"A new school law, somewhat rudimentary in character but
believed sufficiently complete for immediate needs, had been published in order to permit the preliminary establishment of schools,




140  THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


the efficient operation of which would cost several hundred thousand dollars per month. The schools were practically without
school furniture and the amount of supplies and materials was
very small.
"The crowded condition of the jails, filled with untried prisoners,
indicated only too clearly an inefficient administration of justice.
Generally speaking, jails and hospitals were all in need of refitting
and repairs. In the Department of Public Works, a systematic
and well-defined plan of operation was needed in order that the
main lines of communication might be opened with as little delay
as possible.... All municipalities were in debt and without
revenues sufficient for their maintenance, necessitating monthly
allotments from the treasury of the Island."
With the opening of the new administration, the Secretaries of the former government tendered their resignations,
which were accepted. An order of Jan. 1, 1900, filled the
vacancies, as follows:
Secretary of State and Government..Diego.Tatmayo.
Secretary of Finance.............. Enrique Jose de Varona.
Secretary of Justice...............Luis Estevez.
Secretary of Agriculture...........Juan Ruis Rivera.
Secretary of Public Instruction.....Juan Bautista Barreiro.
Secretary of Public Works.........Jose Ramon Villalon.
This, by the division of two of the former departments,
established six secretaryships in place of four. Various
changes were made during the year. Sefior Rivera resigned
on May 1, and was succeeded by Perfecto Lacoste. Sefnor
Estevez resigned on the same date, and was succeeded by
Senfor Barreiro, whose place in the Department of Public
Instruction was filled by the transfer of Sefior Varona.
Leopoldo Cancio was made Secretary of Finance vice Senor
Varona. Sefior Barreiro's resignation, on August 11, made
place for Miguel Gener y Rincon. Many changes were
made in the sub-secretaryships and various minor offices.




THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


141


By these changes, an effort was made, in theory at least,
to counteract the tendency toward that governmental centralization which had marked the experience of the former
Cabinet. It can hardly be contended that the effort was
notably successful. So actively did the new incumbent
concern himself in the details of administration throughout
the Island that the change was rather one of form than of
fact. It substituted autocracy for bureaucracy and made
the bureau the instrument of the Military Governor. The
Civil Orders issued during the second year about doubled in
number those issued by General Brooke.
The special activities of General Wood were exercised in
two directions, with a third only less prominent. These
were education and sanitation, with legal reform for the
third. He became dissatisfied with the somewhat diffuse
methods of Superintendent Frye, who was establishing
schools at an amazing rate throughout the Island, but after a
method which was at least unsystematic and lacking in
proper regulation and record. For the confusion which
followed, Mr. Frye disclaims all responsibility, and alleges
interference and unfaith on the part of the Military Governor. Out of the experience there has grown a somewhat
acrimonious dispute which might be called the Wood-Frye
controversy. While the affair is somewhat complicated,
the evidence which has appeared, official and non-official,
points clearly to a conclusion that Mr. Frye was acting
under a duly promulgated school law, and that he acted
entirely within the provisions of that law. It also appears
clearly that the Military Governor failed to support him by
carrying out the further provisions of the law in departments
which did not come within the scope of Mr. Frye's duties
and responsibilities. Testifying under oath before the
Senate Committee on Military Affairs, on Dec. 9, 1903, Mr.




142  THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


Frye preferred severe charges against General Wood, and
supported them with documentary evidence. Among others,
he made the following statement:
Q. That is what you claim he was doing - destroying
the schools?
A. I do not say he was destroying them deliberately, but
the effect of his orders was to destroy them, and, personally,
I think it was simply to create the necessity for the new
school law to be published by himself, and thus throw discredit upon General Brooke.
Whether or not Mr. Frye was justified in thus assailing
General Wood's motives, two facts remain. One is that
somewhat more than ninety per cent of all the schools in
Cuba were organized and established under the Brooke
law of Dec. 6, 1899, and the other is that this law was superseded by another issued by General Wood on June 30, 1900.
This contained certain provisions which are the basis of
other charges made by Mr. Frye, and was in its turn followed
by a revision which was issued as Order No. 368, on Aug. 1,
1900. This continued as the School Law of the Island for
the remainder of the term of American occupation. It
was drafted by Lieut. Matthew E. Hanna, of the Governor
General's staff, and was based upon the laws of the State of
Ohio. To Lieutenant Hanna is due great credit for the
systematizing of the entire school work of the Island.
Monthly reports were required from every school, and an
efficient system of tabulation enabled one to see at a glance
just what was being done in each and in all.
So much stress has been laid upon the educational work
of the American Government during the years 1900 and 1901
that an incorrect impression has been left upon the public
mind. Contrary to a widely prevalent idea, a school system
existed under the Spanish Government. That it was both




THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


143


corrupt and inefficient may be admitted, but the Island was
not so benighted as to be utterly destitute of such an institution. As far back as the year 1571, there are recorded
gifts and legacies for the establishment and maintenance of
educational institutions. In 1817, there were about ninety
schools in the Island, supported by voluntary contributions.
Public instruction was instituted, for the first time in the
history of the Island, by the law of 1842.
This law appears to have been only indifferently effective.
During the succeeding decade, Captain General Concha
introduced a far more efficient system, and made school
establishment and maintenance obligatory upon the town
councils. In 1863, the public school laws of Spain were
extended to the Island, and school-teaching became a profession. Compared with our own system, the Spanish
school laws and customs were a somewhat benighted outfit.
The schools easily fell under the dominant influence of the
church establishment, and teacherships became a matter of
personal and political traffic. School-houses, as distinct
edifices erected for school purposes, were unknown. During Spanish times, schools were usually held at the residence
of the teacher. This was prohibited under the American
system, which required the renting of buildings suitable
for school purposes. There were also many private schools.
While the law of 1842, and those of later promulgation,
established public schoools, and, presumably, made provision for their maintenance, there was nothing which corresponded to our free-school system. A tuition fee was imposed upon all until December, 1880, when a law was passed
by which the children of those who were unable to pay a
fee were admitted to the elementary schools without payment.
By the same law, of December, 1880, school attendance was
made obligatory, and the general system was enlarged and




144  THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


improved. So far as school laws were concerned, Cuba,
under Spanish control, was fairly well equipped, and, notwithstanding the many and glaring crudities and irregularities of its administration, Cuba had a school system. Nor
would it appear, from a comparison of tables of statistics,
that Cuba was much worse off, in point of illiteracy, than
are some of our own Southern and Southwestern States at
the present time.
The Cuban school system on Jan. 1, 1895, is reported
by the Department of Public Instruction, as follows:
Public  Schools..............................  904
Private Schools..............................  740
C olleges....................................  70
Public School Teachers.......................  998
Public  School  Pupils........................  36,306
Private  School Pupils........................  25,384
College Pupils..............................  2,265
The cost of maintenance is reported as follows:
Public Schools.......................... $716,892.52
Provincial  Institutes....................  118,735.20
University of Havana.................... 134,350.00
Art, Normal, and Professional Schools......  45,850.00
$1,015,927.72
Two-thirds of this sum was covered by matriculation fees.
During the term of his incumbency, the time and attention of General Brooke were commanded by matters of more
immediate moment than that of school establishment. Yet,
during the year, much was done, by Department Commanders,
which paved the way for the later work, and, when the more
immediately important governmental work had become
settled into something of routine, General Brooke laid the
foundation upon which the later structure was built. To




THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


145


the period of his administration is undoubtedly due the
credit for the inception of our educational work in the Island.
In view of these facts, it is unfortunate that General Wood's
later relations with General Brooke's appointee, Mr. Alexis
E. Frye, should have led him to submit a report upon the
school question which reflects upon the work of his predecessor in office, and which tends to rob General Brooke
of the credit which is really his due. In that report, General
Wood states that "A certain number of schools had been
opened, but it was under the old system, or rather, lack of
system. There were no proper text-books, no desks, no
school materials. The children were perched on benches
without regard to size. No attempt was made to grade or
classify them, nor was there any settled procedure in the
school methods; in short, public instruction was without
organization and of little value."
While the general accuracy of this, as a statement of fact,
may not be questioned, it unduly and unjustly ignores that
which had been done and the very sound reasons for the
failure to do more.
By an order issued on Jan. 24, 1900, the new Military
Governor established a "Board of Superintendents of
Schools." The appointees of this board were Messrs.
Alexis E. Frye, Esteban Borrero Echeverria, and Lincoln
de Zayas. These gentlemen proceeded to act under the
school law issued on Dec. 6, 1899. That provided for
municipal boards of education, and for the payment of
teachers and the rental of buildings for school purposes.
It authorized the expenditure of a "sum not exceeding
$50 for furniture for each school-room." When this
became known, applications for the appropriation poured
in by hundreds. Within six months, the number of schools
rose from 635 to 3,313. So overwhelming was the applica



146  THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


tion for this allotment that, on March 3, a telegraphic order
was sent out forbidding the opening of any more schools.
Seven hundred and three were opened during the month of
January; 1788 in February. Owing to the suspension order,
only 187 were opened during the following four months.
The opening of schools created a demand for teachers.
It is also probable that the desire to draw the excellent pay
of a Cuban teacher was, in many cases, the immediate cause
of a demand for schools. The teachers of Cuba were well
paid. If measured by their special qualifications in comparison with those of the United States, they were decidedly
overpaid. Salaries in Havana ran up to $75 per month;
in smaller cities, $60; and in towns, $50. In schools in
which the average daily attendance was below thirty pupils,
the maximum was $30. These salaries were continued
during the summer vacation months provided the teacher
attended the Normal Schools established for the education
of teachers.
The sum appropriated from the insular fund for school
establishment and maintenance during the year 1900 was
$4,009,460.31. This was only a little less than one-quarter
of the total revenue of the Island.
It is open to question whether it was wise for a temporary
government to expend upon this department so large an
amount of Cuba's none too abundant revenue. For many
years Cuba had shared the general ignorance of the great
majority of the people of the world. Her special requirements at this time were along the line of industrial rehabilitation, in which department very little was done for the
Island save that which was done by the people themselves.
It was a matter of much local comment and no little criticism
that so much of their money was spent for schools and so
little for the establishment of the Island's industries. Had




THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


147


Cuba's financial and industrial condition even approximated
the normal, such an expenditure could not properly have
been called in question. The matter is, perhaps, one of
individual opinion concerning the importance of schools at a
time when the children were so generally naked or in rags,
and many of the parents were in a condition bordering on
destitution, and when demands came from all over the
Island for relief from the severity of industrial conditions.
Had a portion of the fund thus appropriated been utilized
for the industrial relief of the Cuban people, there is much
reason for belief that the land would have been quickly
placed in position to expend even a greater sum with far
less of strain upon its financial resources.
Taking the appropriation and the number of scholars
reported as in attendance (150,000), it will be seen that the
cost of education per year per pupil was about $26.50.
There are cities and towns in the United States whose outlay exceeds that rate. But the average for the entire country
is $22.50. The average for our South Atlantic and South
Central States is $8.60 per year per pupil. How far this
liberal expenditure was honestly endorsed by the majority
of the Cuban people, it is not possible to say, notwithstanding
the assertions of universal approval made by those specially
interested in the measure.
During the opening months of the year, contracts to the
amount of $587,000 were placed for school supplies, furniture, books, etc., etc. Freight charges, packing, and the
cost of distribution of these articles, increased the item to
about three-quarters of a million of dollars. During the last
half of the year, when matters were, presumably, in fair
running order, some 3,600 teachers were employed at an
average monthly cost of about $170,000, or nearly $48 per
month per teacher. Headquarters Circular No. 2, dated




148  TIlE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


Jan. 24, 1900, states that "Taking into account all salaries
paid in every department of the public schools of the United
States, the average salary for all grades is $525 a year, or
$75 less than the lowest salary paid to any primary teacher
in a complete school in Cuba." The proper economy of
the limited funds of a poverty-stricken country, as represented by this appropriation, would appear to be open to
question if not to criticism.
Another important work in the department of child-life
was accomplished during this year. It came as a sequel
to the work of the preceding year. Thousands of homes
were broken up by the war. Thousands of children were
rendered homeless, and wandered, as waifs and strays,
living as they could. During the year 1899, these were
gathered up and cared for. But such arrangements as
could then be made were, in many cases, no more than
temporary. A more permanent disposition was necessary.
The accomplishment of this stands to the credit of Major E.
St. John Greble, the head of the Department of Charities,
and his assistants in that department. Civil Order No. 271,
prepared under the immediate supervision of Major Greble,
was issued on July 7. Section 6, of that order, is as follows:
"It is hereby declared to be the general policy of the Island of
Cuba, to be carried into effect as speedily as circumstances will
permit, that destitute and delinquent children who are now, or become in the future, subjects of support from public funds, shall be
cared for by the State, and shall be committed to the guardianship
of the appropriate insular authorities. Such children shall be
cared for, according to their respective needs, in families, training
schools, or reformatories, as may from time to time be found to be
advisable."
Between the first of May and the end of the year, two
hundred and eighty-two children were placed in families,




THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


149


though the department continued, for the time, its general
supervision of their welfare. Seventeen of these were returned, for various reasons, to the asylums. Fifteen were
taken in charge by relatives. At the end of the year, seventyseven boys and one hundred and seventy-two girls were
regarded as definitely provided for in Cuban homes, though
two hundred and thirty-six were still under supervision. Two
hundred and thirty-three of these were orphans, and two
were half-orphans.
A correctional school for boys was established at Guanajay,
and an industrial school, also for boys, was established at
Santiago de las Vegas, a few miles from Havana. These
were not local in character, but were intended for the destitute and the delinquent from the entire Island. Institutions
were also opened for the shelter, the care, and, if necessary,
the reformation of girls. This work was somewhat simplified by the old Spanish institutions, known as Beneficencias. These were found in nearly all of the larger towns
of the Island. Most of them are amply endowed, and some
of them are wealthy. But inasmuch as most of their holdings were in the shape of real estate securities, the results of
a devastating war had deprived them of the major portion
of their income. Many of them had fallen into a lamentable
condition. The reistablishment of these institutions upon
an efficient basis formed a part of the work of the first year
of the intervention, and maintenance of them was a part
of the work of the succeeding years.
With the lapse of all organized municipal government,
consequent upon the disturbances of the war, it might be
said that the Island in general and the cities in particular
had fallen, through neglect, into an appallingly unsanitary
condition. During his regime, General Brooke expended
upward of $3,000,000 in this important department, two



150  THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


thirds of which was allotted to the City of Havana. A similar
amount was expended during the second year of American
administration. The primary purpose of this heavy expenditure was the stamping out of disease, notably the muchdreaded yellow fever. In this connection it is of interest
to note the comment of Chief Surgeon Havard. In his report for 1900, that gentleman says: "The part played by
dirt and filth in the breeding and propagation of the fever
was always problematical; now we know that they have
nothing to do with it except inasmuch as they may attract
and feed mosquitoes. It is certain that in Havana, in 1900,
no visible correlation could be seen between dirt and yellow
fever." Although it now appears to be clear that dirty
streets and accumulated heaps of refuse are only remotely
connected with the dissemination of yellow fever, the object
lesson taught in the department of municipal cleanliness
cannot fail to be of service in the days to come. The only
question concerning the work lies in the now useless proposition whether a better and more important use might not
have been found for the large sums expended from the
insular treasury.
The credit for American accomplishment in this department is generally accorded to General Wood. The notable
cleanliness of Havana is properly due to Gen. William
Ludlow, the Military Governor of the Department of Havana
during the first eighteen months of the American administration. That which General Wood, as Military Governor
of Santiago, during the year 1899, was doing in his department, was also being done by all Department Commanders
to such extent as was possible with the funds allotted to
them. In all of these departments, an efficient system was
inaugurated during 1899, and the close of the year saw the
Island cities cleaner than most American cities, sanitary




THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


151


and street-cleaning departments organized and in excellent
working order. General Wood, coming to the position of chief
authority in the Island, found sanitary work reduced to a
routine which called for no changes of any importance. The
methods which had been adopted were sound and efficient.
The new incumbent had little to do except to continue them.
A detailed review of the sanitary work seems unnecessary
here. Such a review is open only to general eulogium, and
detailed account of the number of carts employed, the tons
of offal and debris removed, the system of house to house
inspection, and the routine of operations. All this, in full
detail, is obtainable in special and voluminuous reports
issued by the department in Washington. Two notable
points in connection with the sanitary work call for consideration. A primary object in it all was the conservation of
American interests through the eradication of yellow fever
germs. America was deeply concerned by a belief that the
existing conditions, notably in Havana, constituted a perpetual manace to her southern ports through the introduction of the dreaded fever. This fear was warranted, although it was later determined that the special danger
centre did not lie where it was generally supposed to, namely,
in unsanitary conditions. The direct responsibility for
the dissemination of the disease was found to lie with a certain species of mosquito, which it was possible to fight effectively with inexpensive coal-oil, by the draining or the filling up of all pools of standing water, whether large or small,
and by the isolation of all foci of infection.
Much credit for this discovery belongs to a Cuban physician, Dr. Finlay. Even more is due to Surgeon Major
Walter Reed, U. S. A. It was the good fortune of both
Cuba and the United States that Major Reed was able to
present his views and the results of his study to a Military




152  THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


Governor who had received a medical training. The technical presentation of those results appealed to General Wood
as it might not have done had he been trained as a soldier
or a politician. A sum of money was appropriated from
the insular fund, and placed at the disposal of the Medical
Department for further and more exhaustive investigation.
The result of a long series of most interesting experiments
was the establishment of the fact that the notably, and perhaps exclusively, mischievous agent was the female of a certain species of mosquito. This, for both countries and for
the world as well, can only be regarded as one of the most
important and valuable results of America's work in Cuba.
The other point which arises in this connection is the
much-vexed question of the sewering and paving of the City
of Havana. In the autumn of 1898, Col. George E. Waring,
of New York, was sent to Havana to report upon this question, which was, at that time, regarded as of the utmost importance to the United States. The people of Havana
desired the proper sewering and paving of their city, but the
emphatic demand for the prosecution of the work came from
the United States. The story is long, complex, and contradictory. Its real starting point, so far as the United
States is concerned, lies in the fact that the Spanish Government had already taken steps toward the prosecution of the
work, and that the responsibility for failure to proceed with
it, up to the time of the American withdrawal, rests, almost
absolutely, with the American administration of the Island.
The history of the case may be reviewed briefly, as follows: In 1894, the authorities of the City of Havana called
for the submission of plans for sewering and paving the city.
On December 11, of the same year, the Alcalde of Havana
approved the resolution of the Ayuntamiento to authorize
an American firm, Messrs. M. J. Dady & Co., to submit




THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


153


such plans. On Oct. 30, 1895, the Ayuntamiento approved
and accepted one of eighteen projects submitted by Dady &
Co. Under the Spanish law, enterprises of this nature are
of two parts - the technical and the financial. By this act
of October 30, the technical department was covered in
the acceptance, by constituted authority, of a project duly
passed upon and approved by the official engineers. The
project was accepted, but the contract remained inchoate
until the means were provided for the payment thereof.
It was generally conceded that the owner of the accepted
project became entitled, under the Spanish law of Tanteo,
to certain rights and claims whenever, in accordance with
that law, the project was placed upon the market for bids for
its execution. At the request of General Weyler, then
Governor General, Messrs. Dady & Co. submitted a
proposition to undertake the work at a specified price, and
to accept in payment bonds of the City of Havana at ninety,
secured by a special mortgage. The matter was, in accordance with the law, referred to the Finance Committee of
the City Council for its action.
The political and military activity of the time involved
a prolonged delay. On Dec. 12, 1898, the Finance Committee approved the proposition for a bond issue. On
December 17, the corporation voted to accept the proposition. But the approval and signature of the Governor
General were needed for completion. On the day following,
General Castellanos, at the special request of the American
Evacuation Committee, issued the following order to the
Havana authorities:
"In view of the present exceptional conditions and as the only
superior authority in these moments, until the sovereignty of Spain
ceases in this Island, I have deemed it advisable to order that this




154  THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


corporation shall not make contracts of any kind referring to sewerage or other works whose execution cannot be completed in the
time which remains to this sovereignty. Also all the concessions
made since I took charge of the command of this Island, and which
are under consideration, shall remain in suspense until the new
authorities resolve what they consider proper."
Thus the case stood on Jan. 1, 1899. With any question
of the methods which may have been employed to bring the
proceedings to their stage at that time, the United States had
nothing to do. Its only consideration was the status of the
transaction at the time of American occupation. The matter
came into the department commanded by General Ludlow,
who was an experienced officer of the United States Engineer
Corps. He stated frankly his desire to proceed with the
work, under his own charge and supervision. Instead of
recognizing the claims of Messrs. Dady & Co., and endeavoring to effect an adjustment of them, or refusing to
recognize them, and leaving Dady & Co. to look for redress
through the courts, General Ludlow held the company in
suspense. After about a year of such investigation and of
the drafting of new plans upon his own lines and ideas,
General Ludlow reported that "the Department now has
final plans and estimates that can be put into effect whenever it shall be practicable to obtain the funds." Yet work
upon those plans, conducted at a cost of many thousands
of dollars, was continued for at least two years more. Experts were brought from the United States, and changes
were continually made in plans, specifications, and estimates
until the matter became an affair of no little confusion and
much wordy discussion. In a letter to the "Alcalde and
Ayuntamiento of Havana," under date of Sept. 26, 1900,
General Wood referred to those plans as "modifications"
of those presented by Dady & Co.




THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


As time went on the matter became more and more confused, and the Military Governor played fast-and-loose with
Dady & Co., who stood by their claims and insisted upon
recognition of them. Committees sat in consideration of
them only to have their findings promptly rejected by the
Engineering Department of the American Government. At
last, about the first of April, 1901, General Wood, by an
arbitrary, if not illegal proceeding, paid to Dady & Co. the
sum of $250,000 for all their rights, in law and equity, in
what were known as the Dady plans. In other words, with
funds from the insular treasury, he bought a claim, not
legally established, against the City of Havana, at a price
agreed upon by himself and the claimant. By this act,
military authority over-rode laws which military authority
had declared to be established and in force. The same
proceeding was repeated in another and only less disputed
case in which one Jose de Armas was paid $47,500 for his
claim under another inchoate contract, similarly obtained
to that of Dady & Co., to float a loan for the City of Havana.
Dady & Co. were thus removed as a disturbing element,
and plans for the sewering and paving of Havana, presumably acceptable to the Engineering Department, were the
undisputed property of the city. Notwithstanding an existing law that no public contract shall be advertised for bids
until due provision is made for the payment of the same,
General Wood instructed a duly elected and presumably
autonomous municipal government to advertise for bids
for sewering and paving the city according to the plans and
specifications provided. His attention was called to the
" irregularity" of the advertisement, whereupon he suspended
an important section of the law of the land, and brought the
law into accordance with his individual purposes. An
advertisement in the spring of 1901 brought no response




156    THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION
except a bid from Dady & Co., which the Engineering
Department, a persistent opponent of that company, rejected as excessive. The department made further alterations, and the contract was again advertised. On Nov. 10,
1901, the Ayuntamiento voted to award the contract to
Messrs. McGivney & Rokeby, who were the lowest bidders
in response to the advertisement. Before the final approval
of the acceptance, Mr. Dady appeared and entered a plea
of misunderstanding. He reduced his bid by nearly $600,000
(the original bid being $11,485,896, as against that of $10,393,
015 by Messrs. McGivney & Rokeby). Upon this, the
Ayuntamiento voted acceptance of the Dady bid. This act
failed of endorsement by the higher authorities, and acceptance rested, for the time, with the bid of McGivney &
Rokeby.
The entire proceedings were almost inextricably confused.
Charges and counter-charges of irregularity of all kinds
marked their course, and the affair presents little that is
creditable to either the American or the Cuban authorities.
The sum of the matter is that after three and a half years of
absolute control of the affairs of the Island, the American
authorities failed to consummate, or even to begin, or to
make it possible to begin, a work which had been so often
declared of supreme importance to tle United States as well
as to the Island of Cuba. It is hardly to be denied that the
whole proceeding was a distinct violation of the pledge to
exercise "neither sovereignty, jurisdiction, nor control"
over the Island "except for the pacification thereof." Moreover, there stands the fact that those processes to which, for
the sake of convenience, we give the name of sanitation,
were not sanitation, and that the only work properly deserving that title was effectively prohibited by the acts of
American officials.




CHAPTER X


THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION. - Continued
THE year 1900 saw many changes in the establishment
of the courts, in legal processes, and even in the codes themselves  While such proceedings were foreign to the declared
purposes of the United States, and have been held by some
to be a usurpation of governmental power, the idea developed
among the authorities that, the United States being in responsible control of the Island, they were justified in correcting that in all governmental processes which was deemed inadequate or unsuited to the new institution. The warrant
for this assumption of "sovereignty, jurisdiction, and control" has been called in question by many in both countries.
Supporters of these changes and so-called "reforms" in
Cuban law and law-processes rested their justification in
the mere fact that they were effected by the authority, and
presumably by the wisdom, of the United States.
The first year of occupation saw numerous changes in the
laws and in legal processes, but none which was not demanded by the exigencies of the situation. The second
year, however, saw the development of a distinct intention
to effect reforms, as such, along the general lines of American institutions. Some of these were of advantage and
benefit, and received popular approval. Others were an
unwarranted interference, with no justification save that
which lay in the supreme power of military control.
During the preceding year, General Ludlow, as Military




158  THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


Governor of the City of Havana, established a Police Court.
The step, without endorsement by an official order from the
Governor of the Island, was of doubtful legality, but the
institution served a desirable purpose and it was allowed to
stand. This became popularly known as the Court of " Ten
dollars or ten days." Official orders of February and April,
1900, gave this court a definite legal status. On July 1,
similar courts were established in other cities of the Island.
Later orders extended the powers of these Correctional,
or Police Courts, and regulated their proceedings. Various
clanges were also made in the Courts of First Instance and
in the Municipal Courts.    During the year, full or partial
pardon was granted to more than two hundred prisoners,
and action was declared ended in some four hundred other
cases. This was done under the provisions of an order
issued on January 16 which declared as follows:
"1. Total pardon is hereby granted to all persons convicted of
crimes committed before Feb. 24, 1895, and from Aug. 12, 1898,
to May 19, 1899, who may show conclusive proof that they belonged
to the Cuban Army and that their conduct has been good since
they were mustered out therefrom.
"2. Total pardon is also granted to all such persons convicted
of crimes (whether as perpetrators, accomplices, or accessories)
who were pardoned by the Decrees of Dec. 16 and 27, 1898.
"3. Total pardon is also granted to all such persons convicted
of crimes punishable with prision correccional in its minimum degree, as may have served six months of their sentence; and also all
persons convicted of crimes punishable with arresto mayor y menor
in all their degrees, as well as all persons undergoing terms of 'subsidiary punishment' for pecuniary liabilities.
"4. All persons who may have been committed for a period of
time equal to or longer than corresponds to the punishment for
the crime of which they stood accused, shall be at once set at liberty."




THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


159


Other clauses provided for the liberation of other classes.
The special object of so general a jail delivery is not clearly
apparent, though in many cases it was no more than an act
of justice. But it also released a considerable number for
whom a penal institution was a perfectly proper residence.
The step was, in fact, less an act of justice than an evidence
of weakness. The court system was one of the glaring
iniquities of Spanish government in Cuba. Inasmuch as it
was assumed that a notable feature of our mission in Cuba
was the correction of flagrant abuses, it would have been
better for us and for Cuba had we cleared her jails in some
more regular fashion. We assumed the right to establish a
Supreme Court and a system of police courts. We revoked
and amended civil and criminal laws. We created laws
and incorporated them into the established codes. If those
steps were justifiable, there was certainly warrant for any
measures, however drastic, which would have corrected
the many abuses and delays of Cuban legal procedure. As
it is, we left Cuba's so-called Department of Justice little if
any better than we found it.
The fundamental problem in this department was generally disregarded, notably in the domain of the civil courts.
That was, to establish in the Island a system under which
contentions would find at least a reasonably prompt determination in accordance with the provisions of the established code. The excuse given for the failure to do this
was that it was impossible because of the lack of suitable
material - in other words, that the whole Cuban legal institution was so steeped in the methods and the practices of
former days that reform was out of the question. It is true
that any attempt in this direction was seriously hampered by
the established methods. Spanish laws, as a legal system,
were admirable. Spanish court systems and practices were




160  THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


abominable, and justice was one of the last things to be expected from an insular court.
In his report of Oct. 31, 1900, Senor Gener, the Secretary
of Justice, said:
"The political system which had prevailed in Cuba for four
centuries, having been essentially modified, the sovereignty which
served as its foundation having been destroyed, the necessity
for the modification of legal procedure became, and continues
to be, necessary.  Cuba cannot readily and methodically make
political progress while hampered by embarrassing legal methods.
Judicial forms should not be the same in countries which are
under a colonial system, as they are in countries which have
freed themselves from the dominion of the nation which controlled them.  The judicial forms which might be good, or at
least adequate, for Cuba as a Spanish colony, could not be
equally good for a Cuba which had been emancipated from
Spanish control."
This explanation and apology for the alteration of the
existing laws holds good as a general proposition. But the
fact remained that Cuba was still, in effect, a colonial government notwithstanding its change of governors. So long as
the authority of last resort lay with an individual Military
Governor whose power dominated that of all courts and
all written laws, it was impossible for either courts or law
to perform that part in national life, which, under a republican form of government, is supposed to be their proper
function. So long as individual power remains ultimate
and supreme, judicial proceedings will rest upon that as a
basis rather than upon proclaimed and written laws. The
attitude of the Military Governor toward the insular judiciary was one of distrust of either their honesty or their
ability, or of both. His interference with legal proceedings
was a matter of frequent comment and frequent criticism.




THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


161


The admission of ex-parte testimony in the post-office trials,
by his authority, may be cited as a flagrant instance of this
nature. Under such a system, changes in laws are readily
effected, but no adequate and basic reform is possible.
According to the index of the Civil Orders issued during
1900, out of a total issue of five hundred and twenty-six,
one hundred and sixty-two appear under the heading of
"Law; Amendments, Modifications, and Repealing of."
Some one hundred and twenty-five others refer to courts,
court processes, appointment and removal of court officials,
and to other matters directly connected with this department. Thus somewhat more than the half of all the orders
issued during the year relate to the Department of Justice.
Much was done to the legal system, but very little was
done which tended to the establishment of general confidence in courts and court processes. This was notably
the case in the matter of civil proceedings. A ground for
criticism was furnished by the fact of an abortive attempt to
reform an evil whose danger was recognized and whose
seriousness was clearly perceived. It was also a misfortune
that the United States, through its representatives, had been
placed in no very creditable position by its own acts in reference to the rights of sundry Cuban citizens.
These cases are too long and too complex for analysis
here, but reference may be made to such matters as the
Vedado Water Contract, by which a concession was annulled
and property seized by the arbitrary act of an American
official who justified his act upon the dubious ground that
"public interest constitutes a higher law than any existing
legislation, which enables competent public officials, acting
in the public interest in relation to matters directly affecting
the relation of citizens to the local government, to override
contract relations affecting matters of this nature, subject




162    THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION
only to the ascertainment of damages should such be found
to exist." The law, the logic, and the grammar of this
statement are equally bad. Yet it was seventeen months
before the case was determined by the reestablishment of
the contract, and the restitution of the property.
Other cases of similar nature are the Triscornia land case,
the Nogueira case, and the Paso Caballo case. In all of
these, land was seized by the American authorities upon
the ground of "military necessity." The proposed remuneration, arbitrarily determined by agents of the government, was, in all of the cases, entirely unsatisfactory to the
owners. More than two years passed before a settlement
was effected in any of them, and the delay was not in Cuban
courts but in the American headquarters. When settlement was finally made, it was upon a basis of much greater
advantage to the owners than were the terms of the original
propositions. The delay and the inherent weakness of the
Government's position were not unnoticed by the Cubans,
whose courts and court processes the same officials were
denouncing and proposing to reform.
The broad ground in this matter is extremely simple.
If the United States was justified in the reformation of
Cuban courts and codes, beyond the point of changes necessary for the "pacification" of the Island, the work should
have been done by competent officials acting in harmony
with the best element of the Cuban bar. Legal reform is a
business for lawyers, and not for military or medical men.
Half-way measures only led to endless confusion at the
time, and left a legacy of endless confusion to the Cuban
Government.
Among the most important steps of the year were those
taken in the direction of the establishment of civil government in the Island. By Order No. 164, dated April 18,




THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


163


1900, provision was made for municipal elections to be held
on June 16, the elected candidates to assume office on July 1,
and to continue in office for one year. The qualifications
for the suffrage were:
"1. The voter must be a native male Cuban; or the son of a
native male Cuban, born while his parents were temporarily residing abroad; or a Spaniard included within the provisions of
Article 9 of the Treaty of Paris, who had not made declaration of
his decision to preserve his allegiance to the Crown of Spain, as
provided in said Article.
"2. He must be of the age of twenty-one years or upwards, on
the day preceding the day of election.
"3. He must have resided in the municipality in which he intends to vote, at least thirty days immediately preceding the first
day of registration, and, in addition to the above, he must possess
any one of the following qualifications:
"(a) Ability to read and write;
"(b) Ownership of real or personal property to the value of two
hundred and fifty dollars, American gold;
"(c) Service in the Cuban army prior to July 18, 1898, and
honorable discharge therefrom, whether a native Cuban or not.
Provision was made by this order for the processes and
machinery of election.
The decision to hold municipal elections in June was
reached during the month of February, and on the sixteenth
of that month a commission, consisting of thirteen Cubans
and two Americans, was appointed to draft an electoral
law. The Cuban members represented the various political
elements of the Island - the so-called Cuban National
party, the Republican party, and the Union Democratic.
The Cuban Nationals and the Republicans represented the
radical and the ultra-radical elements of the Island, and the
Union-Democratic stood as representative of the conservative element. Between the aims of the Nationals and the




164  THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


Republicans, there was little difference. The UnionDemocratic party was limited in its numbers and in its
organization. Its leaders were largely men who had belonged to the old Autonomist party, and the views of its
members ranged from a desire for annexation to a desire
for some form of temporary or permanent protectorate under
the United States. Before the election, the party withdrew
from the contest, alleging unfairness in the electoral laws,
and corrupt practices on the part of its opponents.
The committee submitted majority and minority reports
after a series of somewhat inharmonious meetings. The
minority report was accepted by the Governor Gencral.
The electoral law was issued, on April 18, as Civil Order
No. 164. As the election was called for June 16, this gave
two months for preparation. Many urged that the time
was too short for an honest and adequate canvass. The
ground appears to have been well taken, though it is doubtful whether, in any case, the results would have been materially changed. The officers to be chosen were, Alcaldes
(Mayors), Members of the Ayuntamiento (City Council),
Municipal Treasurers, Municipal Judges, and Judges of
the Correctional Courts. Each of the existing Ayuntamientos was authorized to appoint a Supervisor of Elections
for each barrio (or ward) within their respective jurisdictions. Under the supervision of these, Boards of Registration were chosen by the qualified electors. Ten consecutive days, May 6 to 16, were appointed as the days of
registration.
The total number registered, throughout the Island, was
150,648, or about one-half the probable number of adult
males. Into this consideration, however, there must be
taken the Spanish element of the Island. Under the Treaty
of Paris, Article IY, "Spanish subjects, natives of the




THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


165


Peninsula, residing in the territory, etc., may preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court
of record,... a declaration of their decision to preserve
such allegiance, etc." Of the 67,000 (approximately) who
made this declaration, a considerable number were adult
males. This reduced the number of possible voters in the
Island, and eliminated in large measure the Spanish element
from participation in insular affairs, notwithstanding the
fact that in the City of Havana, in particular, Spaniards
were even more concerned than were the Cubans by the
processes of municipal government. This is by reason of
their extensive property holdings as well as because of their
very considerable number.
The day of election, June 16, was, so far as peace and
order and general quiet are concerned, not greatly unlike
the ordinary Cuban Sunday. The total vote reported, for
the whole Island, was 110,816. Individual opinion of the
actual number of votes legitimately cast depends upon
which or whose statement is accepted. The City of Havana,
with a population of upward of 250,000, was reported as
casting 20,078 votes. No active contest being made, the
returns were officially approved, notwithstanding the vociferous and direct allegations of extensive frauds in the proceedings. Even the most ardent pro-Cuban will hesitate
to assert that Cuban municipal self-government, for the
first year or two of its experience, was a notable success.
Another important step of the year was the establishment and operation of a new customs tariff for the Island.
Prior to the application of this tariff, on June 15, duties had
been levied under an Executive Order issued from Washington on Dec. 9, 1898, and published by the War Department on December 13. That order merely established a
provisional tariff by modifying the Spanish tariff. Various




166  THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


changes were subsequently made to meet existing conditions
more adequately.
The new tariff took effect on June 15, 1900. Its improvement lay in its removal of many of the difficulties and ambiguities which were presented by the earlier tariff. In
the well-qualified judgment of Colonel Bliss, the Collector
of Customs, neither the old tariff nor the new were suitably
adapted to the needs of the situation. The methods employed in this department during the Spanish regime have
become a by-word for corruption and dishonesty. It was
held that the new tariff was open to the ready possibility
of similar practices.  It was also asserted that its provisions were somewhat too distinctly advantageous to
American  products.  That    various  American  food
products were given such advantage is not to be denied. The argument used in support of this provision
was the poverty of the Island and the desirability of
placing sundry necessaries of life upon the Cuban market
at the lowest possible prices.  The argument against it
was that it restricted Cuba's domestic production and sent
out of the country large sums of money which should
have been kept at home.
For instance, during the last six months of 1900, there
were imported into Cuba, a distinctly agricultural country,
breadstuffs to the value of one and a half millions of dollars,
and twelve hundred thousand dollars worth of vegetables.
There were also large quantities of beef and hog products
brought in. A tariff which would force some of the Island
people, and induce others, to engage in more extensive
production for home consumption and for the local market,
would have been much more to Cuban advantage than the
tariff established for them by the United States. It is to
be noted that very soon after the government came into




THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


167


Cuban hands, steps were taken to increase, very materially,
the duties on such imports.
The notably black spot in the history of the year occurs
in the case of the defalcations in the Havana Post-office.
This stands out with glaring distinctness because of the
general rectitude and integrity of American officials stationed
in Cuba. One of the lessons which America was to teach
Cuba was that of a high moral standard in administration.
This breach in that course of instruction is in all ways most
lamentable. That those charged with the offence could
not have been brought to speedy trial, and upon proof of
guilt sentenced to ample punishment, is only less to be
regretted. As it stands, the incident furnished another
illustration of the delay of justice in a case which, although
under the jurisdiction of the Cuban courts, was practically
under the immediate control of the Military Governor. It
is certain that that official concerned himself very directly
in the proceedings, and, notably in the case of Director
of Posts Rathbone, open charges have been made that the
Military Governor flagrantly violated the laws, and occasioned a perversion of justice by his interference. From
various causes, some of which could and some of which
could not have been controlled by the exercise of such
power as that sometimes employed by General Wood, the
Post-office cases dragged for more than a year and a half
before their final determination. Public opinion on the
island held Neely to be a deliberate criminal, while Mr.
Rathbone was generally regarded as a victim of individual
persecution on the part of the Military Governor.
The most important event of the year, and really the
most important of the entire period of intervention, was the
calling and the sessions of the Constitutional Convention.
This subject will be reviewed in separate chapters.




168  THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


The year shows an apparent improvement in economic
and industrial conditions. The production of sugar doubled
that of the preceding year. There was a consequent increase in the amount of Cuban exports. The imports
show a slight decrease. The increase in the sugar output
was of little advantage to the planters inasmuch as it had
to be sold at prices which gave no living profit on the work
of the year. The trade of the United States with the Island
showed a falling off.
The year closed upon a commercial and industrial situation which was far from encouraging. How far this is
attributable to the failure of the administration to give aid
and encouragement to those special departments, cannot
be said. There was certainly much of complaint, to which
the authorities gave no heed. The official reports declared
the Island to be prosperous and the people to be contented.
The statements of many of the Cuban people, and the assertions of the Island press, quite fail to support these reports, and the financial statements appear to endorse the
Cuban argument. The local administration rested its
claims for approval largely upon the work done in the departments of education and sanitation. But if these features were developed at the expense of the economic wellbeing of the Island, the measure of that approval must be
limited. Cuba's endless agricultural resources, and the marvellous fertility of her soil, make her readily responsive to
even a shadow of industrial encouragement. Recovery
from even devastation should be rapid, but it is not shown,
except in the increased output of sugar, during the first
two years of American occupation. Cuba's normal position had been that of a creditor nation to the extent of some
$30,000,000 a year. These two years saw her transferred
to the debtor class to an amount approximating $30,000,000




THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


169


for the term. The year 1900 saw no hunger or sore distress in the Island, but there was an increasing stress in the
field of industry.
Referring to the fiscal year ending June 30, 1900, the
Collector of Customs, Col. Tasker H. Bliss, says, in his
report dated August 6: "The economic situation of Cuba,
as indicated by the statistics of the Customs Service during
the past year, cannot be regarded as favorable. The returns of imports and exports, excluding the movement of
specie, show an excess of the former over the latter, or a
balance against the Island of $96,260,065."  The remainder
of the year showed no improvement in this condition.
Although it was not given prominence before the American people, there developed a wide-spread dissatisfaction
with the methods pursued by the local administration. The
popularity of the Military Governor was urgently asserted
in the United States. Yet a leading American Senator,
with a special interest in and a close connection with Cuban
affairs, declared in a private conversation that, so far as he
could learn, the Military Governor had hardly a friend in
the Island, Cuban or American. As early as the 14th of April,
La Discusion, a leading Cuban newspaper in Havana,
stated editorially that "In a trimestre, General Wood's
administration had worn out in a surprising manner, although it did not have to tide over the great difficulties
presented by the former one, and in spite of its having found
the way open, and of being able to avail itself of the experience and trials made by the former administration. There
are very few men of independence who feel satisfied with
the policy of the Government and the procedure adopted
at the Palace. It can also be affirmed that there is no one
in Cuba disposed to defend it except for some particular
interest."




170  THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


Much of this sort of opinion developed during the year.
It appeared from time to time in the insular press, and was a
frequent expression in private conversation. The American
people were informed, upon the authority of the Palace,
that it was only the querulous complaint of a disgruntled
element, small in numbers and of no consideration. A
personal experience covering many months led me to a decided conviction that the complaints were a genuine expression of Cuban opinion. That it was not more openly and
more emphatically stated was due largely to the fact that the
Cubans could not even then quite realize that an American
Military Governor could not send them to Cabafa, or to
Ceuta, as Spanish Governors had done, for the expression
of opinions against the administration. It is beyond question that there was a deep and strong undercurrent of such
opinions.
Regarding statements of revenue and expenditure for this
and for the succeeding years, it is necessary to say that a
marked confusion appears in the reports, although the War
Department has prepared a tabulation to which it has given
official endorsement.*  The statements officially submitted
by the different departments of the insular government entirely fail of harmony, and one is at liberty to select from
an assortment presented by various officials each of whom
is supposed to be an authority. This comment carries no
implication whatever of dishonesty, of or any irregularities
other than those of bookkeeping. The fact of discrepancy
is open in any review of the submitted reports. I use the
following as probably closely approximate rather than as
unquestionably accurate. They are for the calendar year:
Total  Revenue....................$17,154,929.00
Total Expenditure.................... 17,644,991.00
* For a fuller statement of Revenues and Expenditures, see article in
Chapter XX.




THE SECOND YEAR OF OCCUPATION


171


I take these figures from the message of the Cuban President, dated Dec. 2, 1902. Mr. Palma notes them as "Data
from the report of the Secretary of War of the United States
of America." General Brooke, at the time of his withdrawal
from the Island, turned over to his successor a treasury surplus of a little less than $2,000,000. The year 1900 shows
a deficit approximating $500,000.
Classifying some of the principal items of expenditure,
they appear, in approximate figures, as follows:
Barracks and Quarters.......................... $910,700.00
Sanitation..................................... 3,029,500.00
Police and Administration....................... 2,358,150.00
Public  Works -   Ports, etc...................... 1,786,700.00
Charities and Hospitals.......................... 1,568,500.00
Education..................................... 3,672,000.00
Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce..............  205,500.00
The statement of the amount of foreign trade, as presented
by General Bliss in his official reports may be accepted as
entirely reliable. He gives the total business for 1900 as
follows:
Exports........................... $51,363,498.00
Imports (including bullion)............. 69,887,547.00
Of the imports, $32,248,595 came from the United States,
and $37,638,952 from other countries. Of the exports,
$33,571,994 went to the United States, and $17,791,504 to
other countries.




CHAPTER XI


THE THIRD YEAR OF OCCUPATION
SOME of the more important affairs of the year 1901, such
as the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, the
Platt Amendment, and the economic movement, will be
considered in special chapters. So far as general governmental processes are concerned, it may be said that, by the
beginning of 1901, they had settled into routine. Opinions
differ widely regarding the wisdom of policies adopted, and
the success of results obtained. Americans who visited
the Island, and took their opinions from the Military Governor, returned to declare the greatness of his works and the
marvels of his administration. The few who delved more
deeply and analyzed more closely, obtaining their information from Cuban sources, were disposed to a contrary view.
That much had been done, and that much was being done,
was not denied. The difference in individual view lay in a
question whether that which was being done was being
most wisely done, and whether processes and achievements
which could be used for exhibition purposes were really
that which was most needed in the Island, and which would
best serve to establish and cement those cordial relations
which were so eminently desirable between the American
and the Cuban people.
By the opening of the year, General Wood had made himself, in fact as well as in name, the Governor of the Island,
notwithstanding the fact that this was contrary to the de



THE THIRD YEAR OF OCCUPATION


173


dared purposes of the country which he represented. He
asserted the Cuban need of government, and justified
his course by calling public attention to his achievements,
to peace and order throughout the Island, to clean streets
and reduced death-rate, and to educational establishment.
In this attitude, General Wood overlooked certain factors
which were of supreme importance. Peace and order existed because of the general peaceful and orderly character
of the people. To himself and to his Government he took
the credit for that quiet, unassuming, and patient struggle
so persistently maintained by the Cuban people themselves
for the restoration of their land and the establishment of a
new social and political order.
One of the most important and interesting processes of
the year was the energetic crusade in the City of Havana
against the fever-bearing mosquitoes. The satisfactory
demonstration of the fact, shown by the work of the preceding
year, that mosquitoes were the mischievous agent in the
spread of yellow fever, led to the organization of a systematic
campaign for their extinction. In his report for 1901, Major
Gorgas, the Chief Sanitary Officer, states his belief that at
the close of the year 1901 the number of mosquitoes in the
City of Havana was not more than one-tenth what it was at
the beginning of the year. Dr. Gorgas does not, however,
claim to have taken an accurate census of the insects.
Whether or not the eradication of mosquitoes was as general
as was estimated, the more important fact stands that the
year shows only eighteen deaths from yellow fever, as against
the following records for preceding years:
1899...............................103
1900.............................. 310
These preventive measures have been persistently main



174   THE THIRD YEAR OF OCCUPATION


tained, and up to the present time (1904) there has been no
reappearance of the disease.
Some effort was made during the year to put the government of the various municipalities upon a better and more
independent footing, but the results were far from satisfactory. The causes for this are various and not a little
complex. Under the Spanish regime, municipalities were
presumably semi-independent political units exercising a
measure of administrative independence. As a matter of
fact, they were little else than a part of a governmental
machine operated from Havana by the power and authority
of the Governor General. Of municipal autonomy and selfgovernment along the lines of that of American cities, nothing
was known to the people of Cuba. The effort to establish
the American system among an inexperienced people into
whose minds there had been effectively instilled the system
practised in earlier days, resulted only in confusion, inefficiency, and extravagance. There stood also the fact that
civic administration entails expenditure, and taxation for
necessary revenue. The people were poor, many of them
impoverished, few able to bear any taxation whatever,
especially direct taxation. This fact in itself presented an
obstacle of endless difficulty.
Another influence appears of which it is difficult to treat
by reason of the divergent views upon the matter and because it is largely speculative. That rests in the possible
error in the attitude of the Military Governor toward these
institutions. He assumed their incapacity and acted upon
that basis. It is, of course, impossible to say what would
have been the result of the provision of a wisely drawn
municipal law would have given a fuller measure of local
and individual responsibility than that which was accorded
them, while holding all, electors as well as elected, to a strict




THE THIRD YEAR OF OCCUPATION


175


accountability under the law. It has been demonstrated
repeatedly that where Cubans have been thrown upon their
own resources and forced to assume their own responsibility,
they have shown better results than have appeared where
they have been either carried or half-carried. This finds
endorsement in the fact that in no municipality of the Island
was interference by the Military Governor so direct or so
persistent as it was in Havana, and, by General Wood's
own statement, in no other municipality was incompetency
so marked. The Military Governor declares that his interference was imperative to prevent results injurious to the
city, and that the conduct of officials was, at times, scandalous. Yet these officials were elected under laws which he
promulgated, and under his own immediate supervision.
The weakness of General Wood's position in this matter
is fairly shown by a comparison of records during his administration and that of the Cubans themselves. The
following table appears in an official (Cuban) pamphlet of
general statistics relating to muncipal budgets, issued by
the Secretaria de Hacienda:
FISCAL YEAR      NUMBER OF CITIES    TOTAL DEFICIT
1901-1902            29              $106,452.66
1902-1903             19               28,233.43
FISCAL YEAR      NUMBER OF CITIES    TOTAL SURPLUS
1901-1902            53              $128,337.11
1902-1903            63               305,316.21
This shows that, left to their own devices without interference by a Military Governor, ten cities were transferred
from the "deficit" to the "surplus" group; the total deficit
reduced by $78,219.23, or about three-quarters; while the
total surplus was increased by $176,979.10.
It is probable that no small measure of the trouble in Cuban




176     THE THIRD YEAR OF OCCUPATION
municipal government, notably that of the City of Havana,
lay in General Wood's lack of tact and diplomacy, in his
distrust of Cuban ability, and in his desire to govern all
departments according to his own idea. This may have
been the result of conscientious desire for a government
upon high ideals, but it involved a somewhat conceited appreciation of his own ideals. That his attitude was resented
is quite beyond question, and it is more than probable that
much of the confusion which arose was due to a lack of
harmony between those who desired self-government, and
believed themselves capable of exercising it, and a superior
officer whose attitude clearly showed a doubt and distrust
of their capacity and ability. Although the Havana Ayuntamiento was organized as a virtually autonomous body,
elected by the citizens, General Wood repeatedly acted over
their heads in important matters relating distinctly to municipal affairs. This was notably instanced in the matter
of the Havana loan, and in the sewering and paving contract.
If the Havana officials were really so dire a menace to the
well-being of the city as General Wood assumed them to
be, it was quite within the power which he arrogated to
himself to remove them in toto, and to call for a new election
of a more reliable group, though it is doubtful if he would
thus have secured a more intelligent or more representative
organization. At all events, admitting their inexperience,
it is a fair assumption that the fault in Cuban municipal
administration did not lie exclusively with the elected officials.
During the year, new laws were issued and the existing
laws were repealed and modified according to the idea of
the Military Governor. In the index to the official report
for the year, there appear twenty-four orders amending,
repealing, or modifying laws previously issued by the Ameri



THE THIRD YEAR OF OCCUPATION


177


can authorities. The pardon of offenders, serving sentence
or under trial, was continued. General Wood's course in
the matter of pardons has never been clearly understood.
A tabulation shows that, during his incumbency, he issued
pardons to more than a thousand offenders who were either
under sentence or under trial for their offences. It is entirely probable that in some cases this executive clemency
was quite justified, and in some it may have been meritorious.
But its free indulgence was the occasion of much comment,
and a judge of one of the higher courts remarked in a private
conversation that it was useless to impose sentence upon
criminals because the Military Governor would so quickly
pardon them. The press of the Island complained of a
prevalence of crime because of these pardons. The process
was continued up to the very closing days of the Wood regime.
Within the three days preceding his departure from the
Island, General Wood issued pardons, remitted fines, or
suspended action in thirty-two cases. Among the crimes
committed by those thus relieved there appear, murder,
robbery, forgery of an official document, bribery, and misappropriation of funds.
Under date of April 5, there was issued an elaborate order
effecting the organization of the Rural Guard. This body
constituted a national police force, and, in many communities, performed all the duties which ordinarily devolve upon
a municipal force or a rural constabulary. The wisdom of
such a system may be a matter of doubt, but it was generally
approved, and the Cubans themselves, when authority came
into their hands, enlarged the organization. It is probable
however that politics had much to do with the matter. Under
date of April 10, an order was issued which effected a reorganization of the Supreme Court, and provided more
specifically for its composition and its functions. Orders




178


TIHE THIRD YEAR OF OCCUPATION


issued in 1899 and in 1900 had essayed the establishment
of laws regarding marriage. In his report for 1900, General
Wood displays no little personal satisfaction over the determination of the matter by his order of August 8 of that year.
This was superseded by a more elaborate order on MIay 28,
1901. Its general provisions were as follows:
1. Nature of contract: Marriage, in so far as its validity and
effects are concerned, continues to be a civil contract, to the making
of which the consent of legally capable parties is essential.
2. Forms of marriage: The law authorizes two equally valid
forms of marriage, civil and religious. The contracting parties
may, at their option, enter into either or both.
3. Effects of marriage ceremony: Both marriages, civil and religious, if contracted according to the provisions of this order, shall
have the same legal effect.
Order No. 173, under date of June 22, provided a comprehensive set of Custom House regulations, and prescribed
in detail the powers and the duties of customs officials.
On November 25, the following order was issued:
"Whenever the Government may deem it necessary for the publie interest, it shall order an adjustment of the railroad companies'
tariffs, whereby just and reasonable rates will be fixed, that will
insure to the railroad companies a reasonable profit on the capital
invested, after giving due consideration to the needs of the country
served by said railroad companies."
This is quoted here because of its bearing upon orders
which will be submitted in their place in another chapter.
In our own country, individual States have placed limits
upon passenger tariffs, and, by means of the Interstate
Commerce Act, the Federal Government has assumed and
exercised authority in certain departments of transportation.
But the Federal Government of the United States has never




THE THIRD YEAR OF OCCUPATION


179


laid down so sweeping a proposition regarding railway
tariffs as that laid down by its agent in the Island of Cuba.
The Constitutional Convention having framed and
adopted a Constitution for the Republic of Cuba, and having accepted, though most reluctantly, the conditions imposed by the Platt Amendment, the way was opened to the
next step - that of governmental organization by a popular
election of national officials. To that end, there was issued,
on October 14, Civil Order No. 218, which begins with the
following preamble:
HAVANA, Oct. 14, 1901.
The Military Governor of Cuba directs the publication of the
following order:
1. An election will be held throughout the Island on Dec. 31,
1901, which is hereby declared a legal holiday, at which there will
be elected Presidential and Senatorial electors; members of the
House of Representatives; Governors of Provinces and Members
of Provincial Councils, as hereinafter provided for.
2. Another election will be held throughout the Island on
Feb. 24, 1902, which is also hereby declared a legal holiday, at
which there will be elected the President, the Vice-President, and
Senators as hereinafter provided for.
The remainder of the order constituted a Provisional
Electoral Law. It specified, under its various chapters,
the terms and conditions of the elections, as follows: Electoral Right; Conditions of Eligibility; Incompatibilities and
Disabilities; Electoral Registry; Registration; Provincial
Boards; Designation of Candidates; Ballots; Electoral
Board; Elections; Scrutiny; Election of Senators; Election
of President and Vice-President of the Republic; Organization of Congress; Offences and Transgressions; and sundry
Additional Dispositions.
There were many, particularly in the United States, who




180   T'IE TIIRD YEAR OF OCCUPATION


regarded Maximo Gomez as the logical if not the inevitable
candidate for the honor of being the first President of the
new Republic. Those of better information knew him to
be an impossibility. His services in the field might well
have warranted a claim upon the position, as a reward, but
his general lack of proper qualifications for the presidency
was as clearly recognized by General Gomez himself as it
was by those who knew him and who knew the real needs
of the Island. Although it was not generally known, he had
long been tentatively if not definitely committed to the
support of Tomas Estrada Palma for the presidency. Gen.
Estrada Palma was a veteran of the Ten Years' War, in
which he had played a prominent part, even holding, at the
time of his capture by the Spaniards, the position of President of the so-called Republic. In the later war, his services, as head of the revolutionary Junta, in New York,
had rivalled those of General Gomez in the active and
efficient aid given to the cause of the insurgents.
At a meeting of Cuban political leaders, held during the
month of July, Senior Estrada Palma's eligibility was carefully canvassed. Cuba's political camps, at that time, were
divided upon the issue of endorsement of or opposition to the
acceptance of the Platt Amendment, the radical element
being anti-Plattista. Many of these believed that Senior
Palma's long residence in the United States had subjected
him to influences which would dispose him to look with
favor, or at least with tolerance, upon a measure which
was offensive to many of the Cuban people. It was rumored
that he was the candidate of the administration at Washington, and that American influences were at work in his
interest in Cuba.
During the month of August, a communication was sent
to him asking a definition of his attitude and a statement




THE THIRD YEAR OF OCCUPATION


181


of his views upon various political issues. His reply was
diplomatic and somewhat vague, but it was fairly acceptable
to the majority. It may be summarized as follows:
"The United States Government favors mutual concessions
such as would help Cuban products, especially sugar; but as Cuba
for some years will be dependent upon her income from customs,
skill will be needed in deciding what concessions she can safely offer."
Regarding finance he said:
"Cuba is a new nation and must not be extravagant. She should
adjust her expenditure to her income and resources."
Regarding the payment of the army, Seior Palma recognized the principle that the army must be paid, but added:
"The lists must be carefully examined, and the Cuban Congress
should reduce the rate of pay for officers and men which the revolutionary government allowed."
Regarding treaty relations, he said:
"The Cuban Government in making a treaty should try so to
interpret the Platt Amendment as to give it the meaning most
favorable to the interests of Cuba and to her sovereignty and independence.  She will fulfil the treaty, but expects the United
States to do likewise and to respect her independence, which is
recognized by one of the clauses of the Platt Amendment in the
most solemn manner."
These statements became the general basis for the campaign platforms of both of the leading political parties, the
National and the Republican, and it soon became a matter
of common understanding that while each would present
its own candidates for other offices, both parties would
support Sefor Palma for the presidency. It was really he,
and not General Gomez, who was the logical candidate.
No other possible candidate was any better qualified for the
post; his services had given him a strong claim upon it; and
his absence from the many wranglings of partisan politics




182   THE THIRD YEAR OF OCCUPATION


made him the man who, more than any other and better
than any other, could harmonize conflicting interests. For
his companion on the ticket, as Vice-President, Gen. Bartolome Maso was regarded as the fit and logical candidate
for very much the same reasons as those which made Sefior
Palma the most available man for the presidency. Both
had served in similar capacities in Cuba's republics of earlier
days, and both were honored and respected by the Cuban
people. For some weeks it was generally understood that
these gentlemen would be the approved candidates of both
parties. But Sefior Palma's somewhat indefinite attitude
in the matter of the Platt Amendment, and the tendency of
Cuban politicians to split upon issues of individual leadership more than upon differences of political opinion, resulted
in the organization of a movement which made Maso the
rival of Estrada Palma for the presidency.
On October 31, General Maso issued a campaign manifesto in which he declared that he had been "induced to
enter the field of presidential candidature in order to preserve
the nationalism and patriotism of the country." He asserted that the Government of Intervention had been "perverted into a military occupation approaching a conquest."
His statement is less absurd than many may suppose it to
be. He made his appeal to the generally neglected elements
in Cuban affairs - the Autonomist, the Spanish, and the
Negro, a decidedly incongruous combination. While not
a little of General Maso's attitude seemed to put him into
a position antagonistic to the United States, it is only fair
to him to say that he was ardently pro-Cuban rather than
in any way anti-American. He was, like many who lacked
his courage in saying so, opposed to the Platt Amendment,
which was made a feature in this campaign.
While the honesty and the genuine patriotism of General




THE THIRD YEAR OF OCCUPATION


183


Maso were equally beyond question, his following consisted
largely of political malcontents. The ablest political leaders
had allied themselves with one or the other of the two leading
parties, and not a few of them had been provided with
official positions in a government which was known to endorse the candidacy of General Palma. The National party
was, broadly speaking, the party of Maximo Gomez. The
Republican party was its rival for supremacy. Between
the two men, individually, there was perhaps little difference
in point of personal worth. The political issue, the only
one of any force, was essentially factitious. The Platt
Amendment was a fact to be faced and not an issue to be
fought. The place to be occupied in the new government by
the Spaniard, the Negro, and the representatives of the
former Autonomist party, necessarily remained for determination by their own attitude and political influence, and
could not be established by any declaration of a party platform.
December 31 was the day set for the election. The Maso
party gained a following which, for a short time, appeared
to be formidable, and the Palma group was stimulated to a
moderately energetic canvass. Mass meetings were held and
campaign speeches were made. Yet, notwithstanding the
fact that some of the more enthusiastic Masoists declared
their faction to be representative of sixty per cent of the
people of the Island, the party, as a party, withdrew from
the contest. Their withdrawal was based upon alleged
unfairness in election methods, and upon assertions that
they were not given proper representation on the various
Election Boards, including the Board of Scrutiny, which
was composed of Palma adherents and which was vested
with a wide measure of determining power. Charges were
brought of fraud in registration processes, and in the various




184   THE THIRD YEAR OF OCCUPATION


processes of nomination. An appeal was made for a postponement of the day of election, and for a representation
of the Maso party on the various Boards of Canvass and
Scrutiny. The appeal was refused. On December 31,
the withdrawal of the Maso party was announced. At a
meeting of the party leaders a resolution was adopted which
contained the following expression:
"The Central Board is a coalition of partisans, and General
Maso, after exhausting every means to insure impartiality, rectitude, and justice at the coming elections, has become convinced
that neither in official circles in the United States nor in Cuba
does the intention exist to see that the elections are carried out with
sufficient legality to reflect the real wish of the Cubans, who are
desirous of independence and anxious to elect freely their first
constitutional government."
The Palma faction declared that the withdrawal was due
to a recognition of weakness and the futility of a contest.
Whatever the facts may be, whether Maso's followers were
numbered by hundreds or by thousands, the entire incident
can only be regarded as a matter for regret, inasmuch as the
justice and the fairness of Cuba's first national election
must remain as an undetermined question, and a doubt must
remain of the entire good faith of the officials of the Intervention. Some weakness appears in the official argument
from the fact that, notwithstanding the Maso withdrawal,
eight pronounced Masoists were chosen out of the sixtythree candidates for the electoral college. How much this
might have been increased had the campaign been conducted upon broader lines cannot, of course, be estimated.
Charges of fraud and irregularity were brought, but the
methods proposed for hearing and decision were unacceptable to those who brought them, and the matter was dropped
as hopeless, leaving some to believe that injustice had been




THE THIRD YEAR OF OCCUPATION


185


done with the support and connivance of the Military
Governor. The Spanish press took no part in the campaign, and as it had no ardent affection for either side, its
opinions may be regarded as, to considerable extent, nonpartisan. The general tenor of the comment of the local
Spanish papers was to the effect that Estrada Palma was
regarded as the candidate of the United States and of Cuban
officialdom, and that it was therefore useless to oppose him.
It is unfortunate that any ground should have existed for
the assertions and allegations of the time, even if it be admitted that they were not warranted. America's hands in
Cuba should have been so clean that no stain could have
clung to them. Her acts should have been beyond the
possibility of impeachment.
Election day was marked with quiet and order throughout the Island, and only a light vote was polled. In his
report for 1902 (p. 3), General Wood says:
"I regret to state that a large portion of the conservative element,
composed of property owners, business and professional men, etc.,
did not take such an interest in the elections as proper regard for
the welfare of their country required, and consequently the representation of this element among the officials elected has not been
proportionately as large as the best interests of the Island demand."
Something is to be said upon the other side of this question. General Wood did not command the respect and the
confidence of this "conservative element," which saw him
surrounded and influenced by a political element in which
they had no confidence. They noted his neglect of and
general indifference to the economic interests in which they
were most deeply concerned. For these reasons, precisely
as many of our own citizens do in this country, they held
aloof from participation in insular politics.
Subject to the conditions set forth in the preceding chap



186   THE THIRD YEAR OF OCCUPATION


ter, the statement of revenue and expenditure for the year
may be given as follows:*
Total Receipts....................... $18,791,473.21
Total Expenditure.................... 19,514,603.87
Classifying the expenditures, the leading items may be
given, approximately, as follows:
Administration............................... $1,139,911.00
Agriculture...................................  172,519.00
Barracks and Quarters.........................  360,709.00
Charities and Hospitals......................... 1,589,549.00
Justice......................................  991,656.00
Education................................... 4,211,481.00
Public Works.................................  1,692,754.00
Rural Guard..................................  929,111.00
Sanitation.................................... 2,787,093.00
Custom Houses...............................   975,732.00
Public Buildings..............................  913,123.00
Jails........................................  511,232.00
Postal Service.................................  440,901.00
State and Government.........................  399,240.00
The foreign trade for the year is given by General Bliss,
Collector of Customs, as follows:
Total Imports........................ $67,751,911.00
Total Exports........................  66,502,533.00
Of the imports, $28,469,251 came from the United States,
and $39,282,660 from other countries. Of the exports,
$50,016,318 was sent to the United States, and $16,486,215
to other countries.
The deficit for the year 1901 exceeds $700,000. The deficit of this year, taken with that of the preceding year, gives
ground for a legitimate comparison. During his incumbency,
* For fuller details, see article on Revenues and Expenditures, Chapter XX.




THE THIRD YEAR OF OCCUPATION            187
General Brooke accumulated a treasury surplus of nearly
$2,000,000. General Wood, during his term, appears to have
overspent his revenues by about $1,500,000. One year after
the American withdrawal, the Cuban Treasurer reported an
available cash balance of nearly $3,000,000. This was done
in spite of an increase in the running expenses for items
which did not appear in the Wood budget, such as the payment of a congress, a larger salary and appropriation for the
executive, and the maintenance of a diplomatic corps and a
consular service. It was also done with no appreciable diminution in the efficiency of government in the departments
of law and order, education, sanitation, and public improvements. As a financier, General Wood was outclassed by
both General Brooke and Sefior Estrada Palma.




CHAPTER XII


THE END OF THE INTERVENTION
THE opening days of 1902 found the Island of Cuba upon
the threshold of a new life. The conditions under which
the United States proposed withdrawal had been accepted.
A national election had been held, and although another
election was required for full determination, the personnel
of the new government was generally known. On February
24, the second election was held, and Tomas Estrada Palma
was formally chosen as Cuba's first President, with Luis
Estevez as Vice-President. The elected Senators included
some whose names had been made familiar to American
readers by their participation in the military operations of
the revolution, and the political operations which followed
the termination of hostilities. So far as Cuba was concerned, nothing remained except the official organization
of the various elements. May 20 was announced as the date
of American withdrawal and of the definite establishment
of the Cuban Republic.
Economically and industrially, the Island was in a state
of suspense and unrest. The struggle for tariff concessions
in the United States was in active process. This will be
treated in another chapter. Notwithstanding the fact that
the generally predicted industrial disaster did not occur,
there is no doubt that the situation was seriously menacing,
and that a real ground existed for the wide-spread apprehension that was both felt and manifested. That the




THE END OF THE INTERVENTION


189


disaster did not fall is in no way due to any act of the United
States. Its aversion. was the result of other influences.
Any consideration of the proceedings of the Government
of Intervention during the year 1902 is necessarily subject
to the individual view of America's justification for the
policy which had been adopted in the matter of "sovereignty,
jurisdiction, and control" over the Island. This applies
throughout the entire experience, but especially to the
closing days. Notably from the beginning of the Wood
regime, there was shown an increasing tendency to ignore
the declaration of the Teller Amendment, and a manifest
purpose not only to administer the present affairs of the
Island, but as well to essay regulation of its fundamental
laws and governmental processes. Technically, this can
only be regarded as a flagrant violation of a national pledge.
The point was not broadly raised in the United States, and
the American people, hearing no vigorous outcry of protest, assumed Cuban acquiescence and approval from the
mere fact of Cuban silence. The Cuban point of view was
that protest was useless. They were in the hands of a
stronger power which, having adopted a certain course of
procedure, was undoubtedly disposed to stand by its actions.
The power, of course, existed. The moral or the legal right
to exercise that power is distinctly open to question.
In his report for 1902 (p. 271) General Wood says: "The
work called for and accomplished was the building up of a
republic, by Anglo-Saxons, in a Latin country where approximately seventy per cent of the people were illiterate; where
they had lived always as a military colony; where general
elections, as we understand them, were unknown;... in
short, the establishment, in a little over three years, in a
Latin military colony,... of a republic modelled closely
upon lines of our great Republic." This appears to have




190


THE END OF TIHE INTERVENTION


been General Wood's interpretation of the only authoritative policy ever announced by the United States regarding
its control of Cuban affairs, a policy declared by the American Congress in these words: " That the United States hereby
disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty,
jurisdiction, or control over said Island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is
accomplished, to leave the government and control of the
Island to its people."
There is neither statement nor intimation here that the
work called for or to be accomplished was the constitution
of a republic, "by Anglo-Saxons," for those of an alien
race, upon Anglo-Saxon lines. At no time during the preceding three years had there been manifested so definite a
purpose as that shown during the months of 1902, in the
adoption of autocratic monarchical methods for the establishment of a republic in a foreign land. In the issuance
of official orders, during the preceding period, those orders
were prefaced with the statement that "The Military Governor directs the publication of the following order." In
numerous cases, in 1902, this was changed to "I, Leonard
Wood, Military Governor, by virtue of the authority vested
in me, direct the publication of the following order." At
no previous time had interference with established laws been
so direct and flagrant.
On February 7 and on March 3, there were issued
railroad laws which instituted an entirely new order in
Cuban railway matters. The primary object of the law
of February 7 was, undoubtedly, the definite legal establishment of the new railway from Santiago to Santa Clara.
The law, in itself, has much to recommend it. It is a good
law, and its operation will in all probability make for the
general welfare of the Island. Nevertheless, the establish



THE END OF THE INTERVENTION


191


ment of such laws belonged properly to the Cuban Government which was so soon to be inaugurated. On April 28,
only three weeks before the installation of the new government, another law was issued which regulated in detail the
rates for both freight and passenger traffic on all the insular
railways. The general railway question is treated in another chapter under a special heading.
On January 24, Civil Order No. 23 abolished about onethird of the existing municipalities of the Island. This was
distinctly a matter which concerned the Cuban people and
the Cuban Government. In his report covering the period,
General Wood states that " Shortly following the publication
of the decree of suppression (of these municipalities) a considerable number of complaints and protests were received
concerning the advisability and the fairness of the distribution
as made. Some of the protests seemed to be well grounded
and the modifications suggested were embodied in subsequent orders.... Considering the number of interests
involved, political and material, the large number of persons
concerned, the gravity and the perplexity of the question,
the general acceptance of the order, with a comparatively
small number of protests, was remarkable."
This statement of the Military Governor certainly warrants an opinion that the re-districting of these municipalities
was done without due and proper consideration and investigation. Suitable opportunity should have been given for
the entry of complaints and protests before the matter was
acted upon, and the step, if to be taken at all, should have
been final. It is precisely upon such issues, and upon his
frequent retraction of previous steps and rectification of
previous errors, that General Wood made the mistake which
cost him the confidence and the esteem of the Cuban people.
It has been generally supposed that he possessed both. As




192


THE END OF THE INTERVENTION


a matter of fact, he held neither. He acted upon a supposition of his thorough comprehension of Cuban character.
The Cubans realized his failure in that respect and quietly
bided their time knowing that his control of their affairs
could be no more than temporary. General Wood misinterpreted Cuban silence. Where protest appeared, it was
his custom to denounce it as the unjustified complainings
of the disaffected. But the Cuban people had been trained
in self-repression by many years of life under Spanish military autocracy, and the influence of that training remained.
A few might protest, but the many kept silence.
An important law, of doubtful justification under the
circumstances, was issued on March 5. This related to a
question known as that of the Haciendas Comuneras. It
involved a matter of boundary lines and undivided estates.
During the earlier days of the Spanish settlement in the
Island, land grants were made by the government. These
were made in circles from some more or less well defined
central object, a tree, a rock, or a special formation of land.
Surveys were most loosely made, and there were many instances in which these circles overlapped and gave rise to
disputed ownership. Land sales, transfers, and successive
inheritance had left titles to numerous areas in a state of
utter confusion. These were determined by the law of
March 5. Properly, the determination belonged to a Cuban
government and to Cuban courts, and General Wood's
action was, in reality, a usurpation of prerogatives not
rightfully his, although the technical work was done under
the control of the Secretary of the Treasury.
On April 12, 1902, there appeared the following official
announcement:
"I, Leonard Wood, Military Governor of Cuba, by virtue of
the authority vested in me, order publication of the following:




THE END OF THE INTERVENTION


193


"The officers who are at present serving in the judicial and
public prosecution services, and those who in the future may be
appointed thereto in accordance with law, shall not be suspended
from their positions, dismissed therefrom, nor removed from said
services except for reason of a duly proven crime or other serious
cause, and never without a hearing to the interested party."
Then followed detailed specifications of the justifying
causes of removal.
This, which was known as the inamobabilidad order,
roused a vigorous and general protest. In those private
circles where Cubans gathered for discussion of their affairs,
it was openly and freely asserted that the step was taken to
reward judges and others who had served the Military
Governor by lending countenance to measures of doubtful
legality, by making their positions permanent whether the
incumbents were or were not acceptable to the incoming
government. Upon any other than that very doubtful
ground, the order was little else than preposterous, utterly
without warrant. So energetic were the protests and so
vigorous the outcry, that the sound reached Washington,
and orders were promptly sent for the revocation of the
order. In a little group of orders which was held back
until a late hour of the night of May 19, there appeared one
which, coming when it did, was quite ridiculous. It declared
that Order No. 99, that under consideration here, should be
without effect after the noon of May 20. Life tenure was thus
reduced to the life of American authority in the Island,
somewhat to the personal chagrin of the Military Governor.
During the opening months of this year, there occurred
the final trial of the notorious Post-office cases, in which
the Military Governor very actively concerned himself.
It would be of interest to review this case, but it is impossible




194


THE END OF THE INTERVENTION


to do so here because of its length and complexity. Two
features of the trial may be cited because of their bearing
upon administrative processes. Notwithstanding the American establishment of the Spanish codes as the law of the land,
it is of record that the Military Governor did definitely and
directly instruct the officers and judges of the courts in
matters pertaining to court processes in the Post-office cases.
From  Ardsley, N. Y., where he was visiting at the time,
he cabled instructions for the arrest of Major Rathbone,
and specified the amount of bail to be fixed in his case as
"at least $25,000."
He also gave instructions and information which resulted
in the use of ex parte testimony in these trials. This was in
violation of principles plainly set forth in a communication
from Washington.   This was transmitted to the court and the
following is quoted from the transmitted instructions, under
date of Nov. 15, 1901:
"The Act of Congress passed on the 6th day of June, 1900, for
the extradition of persons accused of crimes in any foreign country,
or any territory occupied by or under the control of the United
States, provides that the authorities who may have control of these
countries or territories shall guarantee to such persons a fair and
impartial trial.
"A trial in which there are used ex parte depositions given by
persons whom there is no opportunity to cross-examine, is not a
'fair and impartial trial'; and accordingly, as before stated, such
depositions cannot be used at the trial."
This laid down the broad principle applicable in such
cases. Nevertheless, upon representations made to Secretary Root, and upon instructions afterward sent to the court
by General Wood, such depositions were used, and they constituted an important part of the testimony upon which




THE END OF THE INTERVENTION


195


Major Rathbone was convicted. Neely was convicted upon
proof of guilt clearly established, and Reeves confessed his
guilt and turned State's evidence. These facts were presented
to the President of the United States, in person, with the
result that an order was issued, by his direction, making
provision for a re-hearing of the case, on appeal. But this
order was not issued until the 19th of May, the day preceding the American withdrawal, and, in the meantime,
the Cuban Congress had agreed upon a bill of amnesty to
American subjects under sentence or trial in the Island.
Neely was released and Reeves was pardoned by General
Wood for his services as State's evidence. Major Rathbone
returned to the United States to demand from the Secretary
of War, the Senate, and the President, an opportunity to
prove and establish his innocence of the crime with which
he had been charged.
During the four weeks preceding the termination of
American control, numerous orders were issued relating to
matters which were, under any conditions, for Cuban rather
than for American determination. These included Order
No. 112, dated April 23, which provided, in full, detail for
the systematizing of the financial departments of the municipalities of the Island. Order No. 116, April 28, provided
a Manual for Courts Martial and Procedure under Military
Law, for use of the Armed Forces of the Island of Cuba, a
matter in which American interference was distinctly gratuitous and uncalled for. Order No. 122, April 29, gave effect
to a comprehensive set of Quarantine Laws and Regulations
for the Island. Order No. 128, May 6, declared that the
land and buildings known as "Camp Columbia," in the
western suburbs of Havana, previously occupied by American troops as a military camp, "including all the works,




196


THE END OF THE INTERVENTION


buildings, additions, increase, and improvements, whether
now existing or to be hereafter constructed," should become
a permanent camp for the use of the "military forces" of
Cuba. This appears to have been done because, in the
opinion of the Military Governor, Cuba ought to have
military forces and a permanent camp for their use and occupation. This order was issued just two weeks before the
Cubans assumed control of their government, and, on the
day preceding its issuance, President-elect Palma had said
that there would be no war estimates in the Cuban budget,
and that " an army would be useless to the Island, and would
tend to encourage that militarism which has been the curse
of so many Latin countries."
Order No. 154, May 14, provided at great length all the
details, specifications, and regulations for the revenue
cutter service of the Island of Cuba. It declared the duties
of the service, the duties of its officers, the salaries, pay, and
uniforms of those connected with it, and even provided that
the "galley fire shall be extinguished at 8 P.l., unless
specially authorized by the commanding officer to be continued longer."  On May 15, an order declared the application to the Island of Cuba, soon to become, by the promise
and pledge of the United States, an independent Republic,
of the Immigration Laws of the United States. Truly, violation of the Teller Amendment to the Joint Resolution, and
assumption of unlimited "sovereignty, jurisdiction, and control" over a land declared by the Supreme Court of the
United States to be "foreign territory " could go no further.
On May 17, three days prior to the withdrawal, General
Wood issued an order (No. 159) for the regulation of the
sanitary affairs of the Island of Cuba. It established the
"Superior Sanitary Board," prescribed its duties, and fixed




THE END OF THE INTERVENTION


197


the pay of its members. It established local sanitary
boards, and fixed their pay and prescribed their duties.
Order No. 170, May 17, affected fourteen specific articles
in the Law of Civil Procedure. Orders No. 172 and 178,
both dated May 18, gave full pardon to eighteen criminals,
ended penal action in fourteen cases, and affected sundry
other cases.
A very pertinent question arises from any consideration
of the laws and regulations thus promulgated on the very
eve of the termination of American control of Cuba. If
these matters were deemed of vital importance to the Island,
why were they not put into effect at an earlier time? The
affairs of the Island had gone on without them so well that
the administration commented with pride and satisfaction
upon their progress and development. If the new provisions
were not imperative up to this time, it is fair to suppose
that they might have rested until the Cubans themselves
should act upon them. If the Cubans were not to be trusted
to act wisely, they were manifestly unfit for self-government.
There was no ground whatever for the issuance of such
fundamental laws as those regulating municipal finance, restricting immigration, and amending the code of civil procedure, except that of an assumption of Cuban incapacity.
Such incapacity being assumed, there was no justification for
intrusting them with self-government.
On May 5, the elected Cuban Congress assembled in
Havana, at the call of the Military Governor. They met
at the Palace to receive the following message from General
Wood:
"I have the honor, in the name of the President of the
United States of America, and as Military Governor of the
Island of Cuba, to welcome you and most earnestly wish
you every success in the great work upon which you are




198


THE END OF THE INTERVENTION


soon to enter. You have been convened solely for the
purpose expressed in paragraph II of Order No. 101, dated
Havana, April 14, 1902 (examining credentials of Congressmen and counting and rectifying vote of electoral college
for President and Vice-President), and no legislative power
will be vested in the Congress until after the formal transfer
of the government to the government-elect, which transfer
will take place at noon, May 20, 1902." Other less important information followed. Sefior Mendez Capote was
chosen by his associates to make reply, which he did in the
following words (translation):
Mr. Military Governor of the Island of Cuba:
"In the name of my companions, Senators and Representatives
of the Cuban Congress who have designated me for the mission of
giving you an affectionate reply for the speech you have just made,
I address you.
"We desire that you as Military Governor of the Island of Cuba
notify the President of the United States Government and the
American people, of our sincere gratitude for complying with the
promises which they have given to the aspirations of the Cuban
people for an independent republic.
"It is our earnest desire to comply with the mission with which
we are charged by the Cuban Constitution, as adopted by the Constitutional Assembly.
"We give you our heartiest thanks for the good wishes which
you have expressed for us in the accomplishment of the duties entrusted to us by our people."
Senators and Representatives then adjourned to the halls
which had been provided for their respective use. During
the succeeding days they effected their organization and
transacted such routine business as fell within the scope of
their then existing powers.




THE END OF THE INTERVENTION


199


President-elect Palma sailed for Cuba during the latter
part of April, and landed at Gibara, on the northeast coast
of the Island. From that point, he crossed to Santiago,
and to his old home near Bayamo, and then, partly by boat
and partly by rail, proceeded to Havana, reaching that city
on May 11. His course was a veritable triumphal procession. People of all classes, Spaniards as well as Cubans,
bade him welcome, and received him with balls, dinners,
and other forms of public entertainment. His speeches
during the trip were broadly conservative, and did much to
establish a general confidence in the future. Havana received him with great enthusiasm.
The ensuing days were spent in preparation, by the officials
and by the people, for the coming event. Elaborate arches
were erected in the streets of the city, and the morning of the
20th of May saw the streets, residences, and public buildings
radiant with bunting. Many of the leading thoroughfares
were converted into arcades of brilliant colors. The shipping in the harbor was decorated with a profusion rivalling
that of the shore. The night of the 19th was a pandemonium
of noise. Bombs and fire-crackers, large and small, banged,
boomed, and snapped throughout the night. Sleep was
evidently no object to thousands of Cuban patriots, and
was made impossible for the less enthusiastic. At midnight
some three thousand people were gathered in the Parque
Central. The other parks presented their full quota of a
noisy and excited throng. Rockets pierced the air from
many points, and Cuba's natal day was ushered in with
shouts and vivas and a terrific din of explosives. Steamers
in the bay tied their whistles wide open and screamed a
welcome to Cuba's birthday. The jubilation of the night
slackened at about 3 A.M., but was quickly renewed by the
opening of the noise of those who had reserved their energies




00oo


THE END OF THE INTERVENTION


for the day. By five o'clock, the streets were thronged
with a swarming mass bent upon noise-making and upon
seeing all that was to be seen. Only slightly moderated,
this was the experience of the nights and the days of the
20th, the 21st, and the 22d.
The ceremony of the official transfer was set for twelve
o'clock, noon, of the 20th. At that hour there gathered in
the State Apartment of the Palace, the officials of the American and the Cuban governments, the representatives of
the foreign powers, and a limited number of guests whose
position gave them claim to admission. It was in the same
apartment that Castellanos signed the abdication of Spanish
authority in the Island. The ceremony of transfer was
almost as brief and as simple as that of January 1, 1899.
General Wood read the following letter of instruction from
his superior at Washington, under date of May 10:
To the President and Congress of the Republic of Cuba.
Sirs: On the 20th of this month, the Military Governor of Cuba
will, by my direction, transfer to you the control and government of
the Island of Cuba, to be thenceforth exercised under the provisions
of the Constitution adopted by your Constitutional Convention as
on that day promulgated; and he will thereupon declare the occupation of Cuba by the United States to be at an end.
At the same time I desire to express to you the sincere friendship and good wishes of the United States, and our most earnest
hopes for the stability and success of your government, for the
blessings of peace, justice, prosperity, and ordered freedom among
your people, and for enduring friendship between the Republic of
the United States and the Republic of Cuba.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT,
President of the United States.
Sundry details of the transfer were then submitted, including the following:




THE END OF THE INTERVENTION


201


Headquarters Department of Cuba,
HAVANA, May 20, 1902.
To the President and Congress of the Republic of Cuba.
Sirs: Under the direction of the President of the United States,
I now transfer to you as the duly elected representative of the
people of Cuba the government and control of the Island; to be
held and exercised by you, under the provisions of the Constitution
of the Republic of Cuba heretofore adopted by the Constitutional
Convention and this day promulgated; and I hereby declare the
occupation of Cuba by the United States and the Military Government of the Island to be ended.
This transfer of government and control is upon the express
condition, and the Government of the United States will understand, that by the acceptance thereof you do now, pursuant to the
provisions of the said Constitution, assume and undertake, all and
several, the obligations assumed by the United States with respect
to Cuba, by the treaty between the United States of America and
Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, signed at Paris on the
10th day of December, 1898.
All money obligations of the Military Government down to this
date have been paid as far as practicable. The public civil funds
derived from the revenues of Cuba transferred to you this day,
amounting to $689,191.02, are transferred subject to such claims
and obligations properly payable out of the revenues of the Island
as may remain. The sum of $100,000 has been reserved from the
transfer of funds to defray anticipated expenses of accounting, reporting, and winding up the affairs of the Military Government,
after which any unexpended balance of said sum will be paid into
the Treasury of the Island.
The plans already devised for the sanitation of the cities of
the Island and to prevent a recurrence of epidemic and infectious
diseases, to which the Government of the United States understands that the provision of the Constitution contained in the fifth
article of the appendix applies, are as follows:
1. A plan for the paving and sewering of the City of Havana




202


THE END OF THE INTERVENTION


for which a contract has been awarded by the municipality of that
city to McGivney, Rokeby & Co.
2. A plan for waterworks to supply the City of Santiago de Cuba,
prepared by Capt. S. D. Rockenbach, in charge of the District of
Santiago, and approved by the Military Governor, providing for
taking water from the wells of San Juan Canyon and pumping the
same to reservoirs located on the heights to the east of the city.
3. A plan for the sewering of the City of Santiago de Cuba, a
contract for which was awarded to Michael J. Dady & Co. by the
Military Governor of Cuba, and now under construction.
4. The rules and regulations established by the President of the
United States on the 17th of January, 1899, for the maintenance of
quarantine against epidemic diseases at the ports of Havana,
Matanzas, Cienfuegos, and Santiago de Cuba, and thereafter at
the other ports of the Island, as extended and amended and made
applicable to future conditions by the order of the Military Governor,
dated, published in the Official Gazette of Havana on
the      day of April, 1902.
5. The sanitary rules and regulations in force in the City of
Havana (and in any other city having official rules, etc.).
(a) It is understood by the United States that the present government of the Isle of Pines will continue as a de facto government,
pending the settlement of the title to said island by treaty pursuant
to the Cuban Constitution and the Act of Congress of the United
States approved March 2, 1902.
(b) I am further charged by the President of the United States to
deliver to you the letter which I now hand you.
LEONARD WOOD, Military Governor.
To this and to its accompanying communications, President Palma replied as follows:
HAVANA, May 20, 1902.
Honorable General Leonard Wood.
Sir: As President of the Republic of Cuba, I hereby receive the
government of the Island of Cuba which you transfer to me in compliance with orders communicated to you by the President of the




THE END OF THE INTERVENTION


203


United States, and take note that by this act the military occupation of Cuba ceases.
Upon accepting this transfer I declare that the Government of
the Republic assumes, as provided for in the Constitution, each and
every one of the obligations concerning Cuba imposed upon the
United States by virtue of the treaty entered into on the 10th of
December, 1898, between the United States and Her Majesty
the Queen Regent of Spain.
I understand that, as far as possible, all pecuniary responsibilities
contracted by the Military Government up to this date have been
paid; that $100,000, or such portion thereof as may be necessary,
has been set aside to cover the expenses that may be occasioned
by the liquidation and finishing up the obligations contracted by
said government; and that there has been transferred to the Government of the Republic the sum of $689,191.02, which constitutes
the cash balance existing to-day in favor of the State.
In the belief that Article V of the amendment to the Constitution
is applicable to the matter, the Government will take pains to facilitate the execution of the works of sanitation projected by the Military Government; furthermore, it will procure, in so far as depends
upon the same and corresponds thereto in the sanitary measures for
the necessities of both countries, the observance of the system implanted by the Military Government of Cuba.
It is understood that the Isle of Pines is to continue de facto
under the jurisdiction of the Government of the Republic of Cuba,
subject to such treaty as may be entered into between the Government of the United States and that of the Cuban Republic, as
provided for in the Cuban Constitution and in the act passed by
the Congress of the United States and approved on the 2d of March,
1901.
I receive with sincere gratification the letters which President
Roosevelt addresses to the Congress of the Republic of Cuba and
to me, for the sentiments of friendship for the people of Cuba which
inspire them.
I take this solemn occasion, which marks the fulfilment of the
honored promise of the Government and people of the United




204


THE END OF THE INTERVENTION


Scales in regard to the Island of Cuba, and in which our country
is made a ruling nation, to express to you, the worthy representative of that grand people, the immense gratitude which the people
of Cuba feel toward the American nation, toward its illustrious
President, Theodore Roosevelt, and toward you for the efforts you
have put forth for the successful accomplishment of such a precious
ideal.
T. ESTRADA PALMA.
This completed the formal ceremony and was immediately
followed by the hauling down of the American flag and the
substitution of the flag of Cuba in its stead. The exchange
of flags was effected at all points where the American banner
had waved as a national emblem, and was attended by the
most enthusiastic demonstrations. This was notably the
case in the hoisting of the Cuban flag over Morro Castle at
the entrance to the harbor of Havana. Not even the hoisting of the Palace flag had such deep significance to the
Cuban mind as the elevation of their own national emblem
over that celebrated fortress. With the hoisting of the flag,
everything that was noisy burst into demonstration. Whistles
blew and cannon roared. Men shouted themselves hoarse
and women shrieked their joy. Bombs and crackers added
to the general din. This lasted for a quarter of an hour, but
the pace was too hot to hold, and there came a reaction in the
shape of still joyful but subdued sentimental feeling. The
dense throng streamed away from the Palace, which had
been for an hour the chief centre of interest, to renew its
hilarious and noisy enthusiasm in every park and street in
the city. Some followed the new officials as they attended
the American officers to the wharf from which they immediately embarked. A large audience witnessed the departure and shouted cordial farewells.




THE END OF THE INTERVENTION


205


Subject to the conditions imposed by the Platt Amendment, Cuba was Cuba Libre y Independiente. A new Republic was born, and the banner which was first displayed in
the revolution of 1868, floated throughout the Island from
Cape Antonio to Cape Maisi.
The new government was born out of sore trouble and distress, and there were many who predicted its speedy termination in failure. While this was in no way fairly warranted, there were attendant conditions which were far from
encouraging. The industrial condition of the Island was
deplorable, and the new government really started under a
handicap of immediate insolvency. There were outstanding obligations, such as the pay of the Cuban army and the
redemption of bonds issued during the revolution, which
could only be met by a national loan.
The receipts and expenditures from Jan. 1, 1902, to May
20, 1902, are given as follows:*
Receipts............................. $7,057,014.23
Expenditures.........................  7,982,615.76
The principal items of expenditure appear as follows:
Education................................... $1,716,917.61
Sanitation...................................  1,162,852.60
Public Works.................................  932,929.03
Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce.............  62,650.26
Administration..............................  481,656.03
Hospitals and Charities.........................  542,322.16
Rural Guard..................................  356,568.68
Justice......................................  427,175.06
Postal Service.................................  396,705.88
Customs Service...............................  354,132.53
* For fuller details see article on Revenues and Expenditures, Chapter XX.




206      THE END OF THE INTERVENTION
The commerce for the period is given as follows:
Total Imports........................ $25,157,300.00
Total Exports........................  23,133,719.00
Of the imports $11,217,080 came from the United States,
and $13,940,220 from other countries. Of the exports,
$16,631,002 went to the United States, and $6,502,717 to
other countries.




CHAPTER XIII


THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
HAVING reviewed in general outline the experiences of
the full term of occupation, there remains a consideration
of some of the more important features and incidents in
fuller detail. The most momentous of these was the Constitutional Convention.
During the spring of 1900, the authorities in Washington
deemed it expedient to take preliminary steps toward the
establishment of a Cuban government. The decision was
doubtless made from political considerations rather than
because of any special recognition of Cuba's immediate
readiness for the assumption of governmental control.
Suspicion of the good faith of the United States was becoming apparent, and there were many who openly expressed
their doubt of American intent to withdraw from the Island.
Some restlessness was manifest in Cuba, and there were
expressions of dissatisfaction with the existing government.
There were also numerous indications that the prompt
fulfilment of the pledge of the Joint Resolution was to be
made an active feature in the political campaign of that
year. For these, and for other reasons, it was decided to
call a Constitutional Convention.
On July 25, there was issued the now historic Order No.
301. The order read as follows:




208  THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION


No. 301
Headquarters Division of Cuba,
HAVANA, July 25, 1900.
The Military Governor of Cuba directs the publication of the
following instructions:
Whereas, the Congress of the United States by its joint resolution of April 20, 1898, declared
"That the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought
to be free and independent.
"That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said
Island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished, to leave the government and
control of the Island to its people."
And, Whereas, the people of Cuba have established municipal
governments, deriving their authority from the suffrages of the
people given under just and equal laws, and are now ready, in like
manner, to proceed to the establishment of a general government
which shall assume and exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, and control over the Island.
Therefore, it is ordered that a general election be held in the
Island of Cuba on the third Saturday of September, in the year
nineteen hundred, to elect delegates to a convention to meet in the
City of Havana, at twelve o'clock noon on the first Monday of
November, in the year nineteen hundred, to frame and adopt a
Constitution for the people of Cuba, and, as a part thereof, to provide for and agree with the Government of the United States upon
the relations to exist between that Government and the Government of Cuba, and to provide for election by the people of officers
under such Constitution and the transfer of government to the
officers so elected.
The election will be held in the several voting precincts of the
Island under and pursuant to the provisions of the electoral law
of April 18, 1900, and the amendments thereof.
The people of the several provinces will elect delegates in nurn



THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION


209


ber proportioned to their populations as determined by the census,
viz:
The people of the Province of Pinar del Rio will elect three (3)
delegates.
The people of the Province of Havana will elect eight (8) delegates.
The people of the Province of Matanzas will elect four (4)
delegates.
The people of the Province of Santa Clara will elect seven (7)
delegates.
The people of the Province of Puerto Principe will elect two (2)
delegates.
The people of the Province of Santiago de Cuba will elect seven
(7) delegates.
J. B. HICKEY,
Assistant Adjutant General.
The declaration that provision for the relations to exist
between the new government and that of the United States
was to be included in the Constitution "as a part thereof,"
called out much criticism in the United States and general
opposition in the Island. It was declared that such provision was not within the proper scope of a Constitutional
Convention. It involved a question of international treaties,
and the point was urged that the right and power to make
such treaties lay only with the duly elected officials of an
established government. Political parties refused to participate under such terms; individuals declared that they would
not go to the polls; and aspirants for election expressed
their determination, in the event of their election, to resign
from the Convention unless the terms were modified by the
excision of the objectionable point, that of the incorporation
of the matter of "relations" as an integral part of the Constitution. These protests, supported as they were by arguments and protests from American sources, became so em



210    THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
phatic that assurances were given that the terms of the
order would be modified.
Following this call, there was issued, on August 11, the
general terms and conditions of the election. This, subject
to the modifications required for an election of different
character, followed the lines of the order for municipal
elections. The qualifications for the suffrage were the
same.
The election was held on September 15. Contrary to
that which might reasonably be expected, the election excited no widespread enthusiasm. The affair was one-sided
and the vote a small one. At the time, three parties may be
said to have existed. These were the Cuban National,
composed almost entirely of the ultra-radical and military
element; the Republican, a factional offshoot from the
National and no less radical in its sentiments; and the
Union Democratic, nominally representing the conservative element. The aims of the National and the Republican
were much the same. The Union Democratic made little
showing, electing only one member, Sefior Giberga. The
others, notwithstanding their different party titles, may be
grouped as Radicals. Many assertions were made of fraud
in the election methods, but no definite charges were preferred and no action was taken in the matter. The election
resulted in the choice of the following gentlemen as members
of the Constitutional Convention.
For the Province of Pinar del Rio- Gen. Juan Ruis
Rivera; Dr. Joaquin M. Quilez; Sefor Gonzalo de Quesada;
with Messrs. Beltran, Villalon, and Manduley as substitutes.
For the Province of Havana - Generals Jose Lacret
Morlot; Alejandro Rodriguez; Emilio Nunez; Drs. Miguel
Gener; Manuel Sanguilly; Diego Tamayo; Leopoldo Berriel;
Sefior Alfredo Zayas; with Messrs. Pichardo, L. Rodriguez,




THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION


211


Vidal, Castellanos, Fonts y Sterling, Figueredo, F. Mora,
and G. Mora, as substitutes.
For the Province of Matanzas - Generals Pedro Betancourt; Mendez Capote; Sefnor Eliseo Giberga; Sefior Luis
Fortun; with Messrs. Garmendia, Lajonchere, Martinez,
and Jimenis, as substitutes.
For the Province of Puerto Principe- Messrs. Ramon
Silva and Salvador Cisneros; with Messrs. Arango and 0. F.
Cisneros as substitutes.
For the Province of Santiago de Cuba - Messrs. Eudaldo
Tamayo; Antonio Bravo; Rafael Portuondo; Juan Gualberto
Gomez; Jose Fernando de Castro; Rafael Manduley; and
Joaquin Castillo Duany; with Messrs. Garcia, Buduen,
Sanchez, Clarens, Milanes, Torres, and Ferrer, as substitutes.
The Convention assembled at two o'clock on the 5th of
November, 1900. A large and enthusiastic crowd had
gathered in and around the building. General Wood called
the assembly to order, and read the following, which was
afterward issued as Civil Order No. 455.
"Gentlemen:
"As Military Governor of the Island, representing the President
of the United States, I call this Convention to order.
"It will be your duty, first, to frame and adopt a Constitution
for Cuba, and when that has been done, to formulate what, in your
opinion, ought to be the relations between Cuba and the United
States.
"The Constitution must be adequate to secure a stable, orderly,
and free government.
"When you have formulated the relations which, in your opinion,
ought to exist between Cuba and the United States, the Government of the United States will doubtless take such action on its
part as shall lead to a final and authoritative agreement between




212  THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION


the people of the two countries to the promotion of their common
interests.
"All friends of Cuba will follow your deliberations with the
deepest interest, earnestly desiring that you shall reach just conclusions, and that, by the dignity, individual self-restraint, and wise
conservatism which shall characterize your proceedings, the
capacity of the Cuban people for representative government may
be signally illustrated.
"The fundamental distinction between true representative
government and dictatorship is that in the former every representative of the people, in whatever office, confines himself strictly within
the limits of his defined powers. Without such restaint there can
be no free constitutional government.
"Under the order pursuant to which you have been elected and
convened, you have no duty and no authority to take part in the
present government of the Island. Your powers are strictly
limited by the terms of that order."
After reading the foregoing official instructions, General
Wood made a brief personal address in which he emphasized
the two essential features of the work of the Convention. A
local paper (The Havana Post) reported this as follows:
"When Secretary Varona had concluded reading the Spanish
translation of the address, General Wood made a few more plain
remarks to the delegates. He wanted them to understand that
they had been elected to frame a Constitution for Cuba. That was
their plain duty. The matter of relations which should exist between Cuba and the United States was another matter. He
wished them success."
The terms of the official order and these remarks of the
Military Governor, speaking as the representative of the
American administration, would seem to dispose, utterly
and completely, of any ground for charges that, in omitting
from their Constitution the question of relations, the Cubans
were violating their instructions; and of all ground for any




THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION


213


just criticism for not making provision, in the body of their
Constitution, for such relations. Yet these charges were
brought again and again, and an endless amount of severe
criticism was showered upon the Convention for its failure
to violate its instructions.
Order No. 455 effected the promised modification of the
order of July 25. It distinctly provided for the omission
of the vexed question of "relations" from the body of the
Constitution. It called for no more than an expression of
"opinion" of what those relations "ought to be." The
point was emphasized by the Military Governor in his personal address to the Convention.
For some reason, this substitute order does not appear to
have received wide circulation in the United States. If it
did, it was given little attention. Its failure to receive
general recognition became the basis of a wide-spread misconception during the ensuing months - a misconception
which did much to excite unfriendliness between the people
of the two countries, and much American uncharitableness
toward the Cuban Convention. When the special issue
became prominent, namely, that of the separation of the
matter of "mutual relations" from the body of the Constitution, and the substitution of an expression of "opinion"
as an independent proceeding, the Convention was widely
denounced in this country for its failure to include in the
Constitution that which it had been expressly told to leave
out. This point is of importance from the fact that there
is every reason for a belief that, owing to a mistaken view
of the situation, many Americans assumed that the Cuban
Convention was deliberately violating its definite instructions, and became prejudiced against the Cubans as a result
of the assumption. Much carping and unkind criticism
appeared in the American press, and was expressed by




214  THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION


prominent officials. This reached Havana through news
channels, and excited a feeling of irritation and resentment.
Upon the completion of his remarks, the Military Governor withdrew from the hall, and the body proceeded to a
temporary organization. Sefior Pedro Llorente, the oldest
member of the assembly, was chosen as temporary chairman, and Sefior Enrique Villuendas, the youngest member,
was chosen as temporary secretary. The Chief Justice of
the Island then administered the following oath of office,
to which all yielded their assent:
"We, the delegates elected by the people of Cuba to the National
Constitutional Convention, swear and promise to fill our positions
faithfully. We renounce publicly and solemnly our fidelity or
contract, past, direct, or indirect, to any other State or nation;
swearing the solemnity of the freedom and independence of Cuba,
and accepting and obeying the Constitution which this Convention
adopts as well as the government thereby established."
This renunciation of allegiance to other powers was
necessitated by the fact that a number of the members of
the Convention were naturalized American citizens. The
first question raised was in regard to the rules to be adopted
for the guidance of the Convention. Tumultuous applause
followed the declaration of Sefior Aleman that no new rules
were necessary, as rules had already been adopted and used
by the Cuban Revolutionary Congress. He said, "What
was good enough for us when we were struggling in the field,
is good enough for us here." The rules were adopted. After
a brief discussion of the question of credentials and contested
seats, the session adjourned. At a later meeting, Domingo
Mendez Capote was chosen as permanent president, and
Alfredo Zayas and Enrique Villuendas as permanent secretaries.
From the very beginning of the work of the Convention,




THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION


915


there was a tacit, if not a definitely expressed understanding
that the United States and its official representatives were to
stand entirely aloof from its proceedings. Owing to the
impossibility of absolutely verifying certain rumors and
suspicions which one is obliged to accept as facts without
being able to establish them as such in the public mind by
concrete incidents, there is difficulty in making any assertions respecting the degree of strictness with which this
professed policy of non-interference was carried out. The
term "obstructionists" came to the front during the sittings,
and at least a fair number of the members of the Convention
were convinced that the so-called "obstructionists" were influenced if not controlled by the military government. A
motion to hold night sessions, as well as day sessions, was
introduced, partly for the purpose of effecting a more rapid
despatch of the work of the Convention, and partly for the
purpose of forcing all or some of the suspected "obstructionists" to declare themselves. But no direct interference appeared until the middle of Februrary, 1901.
The story of the making of Cuba's Constitution is generally
similar to the story of all deliberative and legislative bodies.
It is a story of routine; of work in committee-rooms; of
public and private sessions; of the manoeuvres of political
parties to secure party advantage and party supremacy;
and of effort to attain individual ascendency. It is a story
of tiresome discussion on trivial points, and of heated debate on important questions; of effort to secure the adoption
of this or that plan, or to prevent the acceptance of this or
that theory. Much time was consumed in effecting the
working organization of the body, and in adopting rules
for its procedure. Public sessions were practically suspended about the first of December, and the following
weeks were given mainly to reviewing, in committee-rooms,




216  THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION


the constitutions of other republics, and to the selection
from them of such elements or provisions as met with the
approval of the reviewers. Toward the end of the month,
these, together with the individual ideas and propositions
of some of the members, were assembled in a form which
constituted a working basis for amendment, addition, or
elimination. The first week in January saw the instrument
in process of revision in the committee-rooms.
Committee work and secret sessions, with an occasional
semi-public session, continued until Jan. 21, 1901. The
American Constitutional Convention of 1787 sat behind
closed doors for four months. On January 21, the Cuban
Convention sat in a session which was open to the holders
of special tickets, for a semi-public reading of the draft
which constituted a general outline of the proposed instrument. More or less concerning the nature and provisions
of the draft had become public property and little interest
was shown in this session. The Constitution, as then submitted, was a combination of compromises. The same is
to be said, with equal truth, regarding our own Constitution.
In fact, many of the tangles, great and small, presented for
the determination of the Cuban Convention, were remarkably like those which faced the United States during the
opening years of its national life. Our own confusion over
those problems, during the preparation of the American
Constitution, forbids us any criticism upon the confusion
and the little animosities which were engendered by their
consideration in the Cuban Convention, and interesting
parallels are presented in the processes of the establishment
of republican governments. Individual members threatened
to withdraw from the Cuban Convention, and there were
times when a general disruption seemed imminent. Some
members of the American Convention of 1787 did actually




THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION


217


retire, and there were the same more or less frequent indications of the dissolution of that body. Yet both, in due
time, adjusted their differences, and submitted a collection
of compromises.
The Cuban Constitution opens with the following preamble:
"We, the delegates of the people of Cuba, having met in Constitutional Convention for the purpose of preparing and adopting
the fundamental law of their organization as an independent and
sovereign people, establishing a government capable of fulfilling
its international obligations, maintaining public peace, insuring
liberty, justice, and promoting the general welfare, do hereby agree
upon and adopt the following Constitution, invoking the favor of
God."
The final clause of this preamble called out an animated
discussion, and gave rise to one of the most dramatic incidents of the Convention. Sefior Salvador Cisneros, a veteran
of both the Ten Years' War and the Revolution of 1895, an
ex-president of the so-called Republic of 1868, a man of
upward of seventy-five years of age, proposed the striking
out of the invocation of the favor of God. Sefor Manuel
Sanguilly, widely renowned among the Cubans for his
power as an orator, in a speech of considerable length set
forth his opinion that the matter was really one of little importance. There was no benefit in including the clause, and
no advantage in striking it out. It would hurt none and
might please some to have it left in. Immediately in front
of Sefor Cisneros, and facing Senor Sanguilly across the
semi-circle formed by the arrangement of the desks of the
delegates, sat Sefior Pedro Llorente, a man of small stature,
and of nervous, alert manner. He too had lived beyond
the third quarter of a century. At times, his nervous energy
made him almost grotesque. At times his absorbed earnest



218     THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
ness made him, despite his stature, a figure of commanding
dignity. Obtaining recognition from the chairman, he rose
and stood, with upraised hand, his voice tremulous with
emotion, to protest against the measure, and to declare as
one not far from the close of life, that the assembled body
did not represent an atheistic people. The Cisneros motion
was defeated, and the Convention proceeded to discuss the
Articles of the Constitution in their order. Article I is as
follows:
"The people of Cuba are hereby constituted a sovereign and
independent State, and adopt a republican form of government."
This was promptly adopted without discussion or dissenting vote. While various minor changes in the phraseology of some of the parts were effected, no really serious
difficulty was encountered until that was reached which now
stands as Article XXVI. It refers to the freedom of religious
belief and form of worship, and the relations which should
exist between Church and State. This occasioned an animated debate between the supporters of the old system of a
Church intimately associated with and, in part, financially
maintained by the State, and those of the newer school who
stood for a complete separation of the two authorities. The
discussion resulted in the adoption of the article, as it now
stands, as follows:
"The profession of all religious beliefs, as well as the practice
of all forms of religion, are free, without further restriction than
that demanded by the respect for Christian morality and public
order. The Church shall be separated from the State, which shall
in no case subsidize any religion."
The question of universal suffrage constituted another
bone of active contention. Among the total number of
Cubans of voting age, there was a considerable percentage




THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION


219


both of blacks and illiterates. There were also many who
could not qualify under a property clause. Yet, to bar
any or all of these from the right of participation in the
affairs of the new government, meant the exclusion of many
thousands whose work as soldiers in the liberating army
made the existence of that government a possibility. The
exclusion of such from the polls would have been a manifest
injustice, and would have established a government of the
many by the few, a principle inconsistent with the first article
of their Constitution. To admit all to the rights of citizenship laid the new government broadly open to all the dangers
of placing so great a power in the hands of a group which included a large percentage of the ignorant and the irresponsible. Restriction meant almost certain disorder, and
disorder meant disaster to the new institution. Universal
suffrage might contain a menace of difficulties, but it was
the safer course, and that system was adopted subject to the
usual limitations of mental and legal incapacity.
Another active controversy arose regarding qualifications
for the presidency. To limit eligibility to native-born
Cubans barred Maximo Gomez, a native of Santo Domingo,
from candidacy and election. Many of those who were
opposed to General Gomez as an aspirant for presidential
honors, felt that to close the door in his face by constitutional enactment would be an act of disgraceful ingratitude.
Gomez stood high in the esteem of the great mass of the
Island people, but he was not liked by the majority of the
political leaders. He had bitter enemies in the Convention,
and they fought the point of possible candidacy until their
final defeat by a bare majority. The discussion lasted,
in public and in private session, for a number of days, and
evoked a spirit of personal bitterness beyond that displayed
upon any other measure.




220  THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION


Other points of notable debate were:
The right of government to expel pernicious aliens.
Popular election of Senators.
The governmental powers of the provinces.
The recognition of Cuban debts.
General state control of education.
No decisions, in either public or secret sessions, were made
without careful consideration. In fact, critics were disposed to charge an undue deliberation over many points,
and there is no doubt that, at the time, there were not a few
periods when it seemed as though valuable time was being
wasted. Yet, so far as the Constitution itself is concerned,
the work of the Convention was carried out with all reasonable despatch, and the result was distinctly creditable notwithstanding the unkindly and unjust criticism passed upon
it by some whose information and courtesy were equally
limited.
As a theory, the signing of a constitution is a notable
event in a nation's history. As a fact, the signing of the
Cuban Constitution was little more than an incident in the
day's work. On Monday, February 11, the instrument
appeared in the form of a printed pamphlet. All changes,
modifications, amendments, and rearrangements in its
phraseology had been effected, except the few minor alterations which were made in its grammar and wording at the
session of that day. It was then ready to be engrossed and
signed. The 21st of February was designated as the day
for the official signature. No special effort was made to
give the event the dignity of an important ceremonial.
Tickets of admission were issued as they were to the ordinary sessions. A band was in attendance, and the foreign
consuls were given special invitations. The Military Gov



THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION


221


ernor was not present in person nor by representation.
The hall was fairly filled but not in any way crowded.
As a scene, there was little or nothing to mark the time
as an event of special note in a nation's history. The Constitution, in its final form, was read from the engrossed
copies, and the members of the Convention filed up to the
speaker's desk to affix their signatures. At the close of the
reading, the band played the Cuban national air, the audience and the members of the Convention standing during
its performance. The signing completed, President Mendez
Capote made a brief address, stating that the delegates had
put the best of their thought and judgment into the work
which was then consummated, and expressing the hope that
upon the result there might rest a free, happy, and prosperous
republic. A little hand-clapping followed until an enthusiast in the audience shouted Viva la Republica de Cuba.
Shouts, cheers, and hand-clapping lasted for perhaps half a
minute, and the ceremony was ended.
Outside the hall, the general public paid no attention to
the incident. On the streets, in clubs, cafes, and theatres,
there was no sign of any unusual occurrence. Many did not
even know what had been done. But there were many who
were quite indifferent because they doubted the good faith of
the interventors, and regarded the whole proceeding as a bit
of farcical politics, practically meaningless. It was believed
that the American Congress would sit in judgment on the
work of the Convention, and this was not a satisfactory
reflection to those whose representatives had so recently
asserted, in their name, that "The people of Cuba are hereby
constituted a sovereign and independent State." Annexationists and ultra-conservatives were in no way inclined to
jubilation over any Constitution which might be drafted.
Those whose aim and desire was independence, without limi



222  THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION


tation and supervision, were not disposed to cnthusiasm
over a Constitution which they understood must be submitted for approval or amendment by a foreign power.
As a Constitution, the Cuban production is not a perfect
instrument. Neither was the American at the time of its
adoption, and there are many who doubt its perfection even
now.   Our State constitutions have been subjected to
frequent change and even to almost complete readjustment.
As a working basis for governmental conduct, the Cuban
Constitution is unquestionably as competent and suitable an
instrument as any that could have been drawn, either by
Cubans or Americans. It was framed within an entirely
reasonable time, a little less than four months, and its production was attended by no more friction than is customary
in all constitution-making bodies.
In his annual report for 1901 (p. 45) Secretary Root comments upon the Cuban Constitution as follows:
"I do not fully agree with the wisdom of some of the provisions
of this Constitution, but it provides for a republican form of government; it was adopted after long and patient consideration and discussion; it represents the views of the delegates elected by the
people of Cuba, and it contains no features which would justify
the assertion that a government organized under it will not be one
to which the United States may properly transfer the obligations
for the protection of life and property under international law,
assumed in the Treaty of Paris."
This would appear to be the only properly justified position of the United States toward such an instrument as the
Cuban Constitution. Much trouble, for both countries,
would have been avoided had the United States stopped at
that point, recognized the work of the Convention, and proceeded to the organization of a government under the Constitution. That government organized, a satisfactory treaty




THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION           223
could have been effected under which all the rights and interests of the United States would have been duly conserved
and protected, and in which provision could and should
have been made for commercial relations between the two
countries, based upon a favorable if not a free exchange
of natural and manufactured products. The natural and
proper step at this point was the establishment of a Cuban
government, elected by the people of the Island, and the
consummation of a permanent treaty of friendship and
commerce.




CHAPTER XIV


THE QUESTION OF "RELATIONS."
THE completion of the work of framing a Constitution for
the Republic of Cuba was followed by the consideration of
the question of what, in Cuban opinion, "ought to be the
relations between Cuba and the United States." While the
matter was not definitely taken up at any time, this question
constantly intruded itself into the discussions upon the Constitution. Believing, as many did, and as they were given to
understand, that the American Congress would review and
revise the work of the Convention, and probably insist upon
the elimination of any provisions which were unacceptable to
the American authorities, there was present in the Convention, and outside of it, an undercurrent of query regarding
the manner in which this or that in the Constitution might
affect the American reviewers. There was also a realization
of the fact that the matter of "relations" would be of more
direct concern to the American Government than would the
general terms of the Constitution.
A large proportion of the American press, and many
American officials, failing to realize the definiteness of the
instructions given to the Convention at the time of its assembling, on November 5, were engaged in severe and unkindly
criticism of the Convention for its failure to include any
reference to the United States. While such reference had
no proper place in the Constitution of an independent nation,
there was, in the United States, a widely prevalent idea that




THE QUESTION OF " RELATIONS "           25
Cuba, in spite of the pledge of the Joint Resolution, was and
must be a dependency, more or less clearly defined, of that
country. An endless amount of misunderstanding and confusion followed this mistake of a notable percentage of the
American people.
On the one hand stood the assertion of the United States,
made at the beginning of the war, that " Cuba is and of right
ought to be free and independent." On the other hand
stood the Treaty of Paris by which it was generally understood that the United States assumed responsibility for
Cuba's future. There was also the fact that the United
States, having intervened in Cuban affairs for the purpose of
definitely terminating a situation which had become "intolerable," primarily to the American people, and incidentally to Cuba and to civilization in general, seemed bound to
establish an institution which should make impossible a
repetition of the previous conditions.
The latter proposition was quite untenable. Law, order,
and peace may be declared, but cannot be assured, by either
constitutional provisions or by international treaties. There
was doubt of the responsibility of the United States after its
withdrawal upon the pacification of the Island, beyond that
which existed as well without as with constitutional provisions. In the absence of such provisions, the same justification for American intervention would exist at any future
time as that which existed when the United States, through
its President, declared the situation to be intolerable, and
insisted that it be terminated. The assumption of renewed
disturbance, arising from Cuban incapacity for self-government, or from Cuban disposition to turbulence, was an hypothesis based either in a limited knowledge of insular conditions or in unjust or uncharitable indifference to those
conditions.




226


THE QUESTION OF "RELATIONS "


For their bearing upon the special issue, the provisions
of the Treaty of Paris may be repeated here. Article I of
that treaty declares that:
"Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to
Cuba. And as the Island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be
occupied by the United States, the United States will, so long as
such occupation lasts, assume and discharge the obligations that
may under international law result from the fact of its occupation,
for the protection of life and property."
Article XVI declares that:
"It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty
by the United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the time
of its occupancy thereof; but it will upon the termination of such
occupancy, advise any government established in the Island to
assume the same obligations."
While the letter of these articles would seem to limit, with
sufficient definiteness, American obligation and responsibility to the "time of its occupancy," that view of it was not
taken by the administration and its supporters. It was
their argument that responsibility existed beyond "the time
of occupancy." It may be admitted that it did so extend,
but it may be questioned whether that responsibility was in
anyway modified or affected by the imposition of terms
which were so notably offensive to so large a number of the
Cuban people.
The Cubans understood very clearly that which they were
told to do in Order No. 455, which supplanted Order No.
301. This was not understood in the land of its origin, and
there was a constant insistence there that Cuba do precisely
that which she had been definitely told not to do. The
American press of the period was filled with animated controversy. One group stood for the faithful fulfilment of




THE QUESTION OF "RELATIONS "


227


the terms of the Joint Resolution by the establishment of
an independent republic over whose acts the United States
should exercise no supervision or control beyond that involved by the expressions of the Treaty of Paris. That
treaty unquestionably placed upon the United States a measure of responsibility for Cuba's peace, and for the due protection of the life and property of all residents in the Island,
native and foreign. But it gave the United States no right
to assume that Cuba was incapable of properly conducting her
own affairs, and no right to intervene in those affairs until
Cuban incapacity had been demonstrated by some overt
act. The attitude of the other group, the anti-Cuban, was
based upon an unwarranted and uncharitable assumption
that Cuba would not, and probably could not, discharge
with due ability and fidelity the duties devolvent upon her
as an absolutely independent nation. Out of this assumption there came, later on, that which is known as the Platt
Amendment.
As the Constitution began to assume a determined shape,
the question of "relations" also began to assume definite
form in the minds of the Cubans. The first concise public
statement appeared in the press soon after the first of January, 1901. That was made in the following terms, as a
tentative proposition which fairly reflected Cuban sentiment:
"1. The Republic of Cuba regards, as a necessity for its preservation, in accordance with the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine, the
establishment of definite relations of friendship and commerce with
other nations. In order to maintain the principles of that doctrine,
she will proceed in all cases, in peace as well as in war, in common
accord with the United States.
"2. The Republic of Cuba will place at the disposal of the
United States, should the latter so desire, part of the shore of any
bay on the north coast, and of any two bays on the south coast of




228


THE QUESTION OF " RELATIONS "


Cuba; such territory conceded to be selected by the United States
and to be used for the establishment of naval and coaling stations,
the concessions to be of sufficient area to permit of proper defence
and sanitation.
"3. The Republic of Cuba will put herself on a war footing
whenever the United States shall consider her assistance necessary
to defend or protect the independence of the States which constitute
the entire American continent."
This elicited no opposition and very little of adverse criticism. Its terms included the cession of those naval and
coaling stations which, when demanded by the Platt Amendment, became a subject of general refusal and condemnation.
About the first of February there appeared another proposition. This, although attacked by some of the ultra-radicals,
met with a general approval on the part of the people. It
read as follows:
"1. That the Republic, for a period of two years after the establishment of independence, will conduct its foreign affairs through
the United States; will make no treaty with any other nation prejudicial to the United States; and will accept no compromise which
might give rise to the occupation of the Island or to intervention
in its Customs.
"2. That the United States, for a period of two years after the
establishment of independence, may occupy forts in Cuba, provided
the Cuban flag flies with the American.
"3. That Cuba will lease to the United States two coaling
stations, and will give no commercial advantages to any other
nation which are not given to the United States.
"4. That none of these concessions or promises is to be taken
to imply any cessation of the sovereignty of Cuba, or any lessening
of her complete independence."
Had the United States, at this time, adopted the policy
of non-interference, there is every reason for belief that the
confusion and ill-feeling engendered by the subsequent pro



THE QUESTION OF "RELATIONS "


229


ceedings would have been avoided. It may also be said that
there is every reason to believe that had the United States
left the Cubans to act in accordance with the instructions
given them on Nov. 5, 1900, the Convention would have submitted an "opinion as to what the relations ought to be" between the two countries which would have safeguarded
American interests quite as effectively as the Platt Amendment. As a friendly neighbor, grateful for that which the
United States had done for her, Cuba desired the establishment of intimate relations with the American people, Yet,
as an independent and sovereign nation, she was disposed
to protest against the right of the United States to demand
that which so clearly limited her independence. She wished
to exercise her right to give, as an independent nation, by
treaty with a friendly power, that which she was loth to yield
in response to a demand from a superior force. In the
one case, her act would become that of a sovereign power;
in the other, she would confess a measure of subjection inconsistent with the initial assertion of her Constitution.
But the American administration saw fit to interfere and
did so, on February 15, in a manner which offended the
Cubans and stirred their suspicions of American good faith.
Whether the step was taken upon a basis of distrust of Cuban
ability to formulate a reasonable opinion upon the subject
of relations; or from a desire to coerce the Cubans into some
acknowledgment of the rights of the United States to continue, though in another form, its guardianship of Cuban
affairs; or whether it was due to the failure of the Military
Governor to measure the situation with exact accuracy, is
not readily to be determined. The mistake lay in interference of any kind at so critical a moment, and the results
were unfortunate for both countries.
On February 9, the War Department sent the following




230


TIlE QUESTION OF " RELATIONS"


instructions to General Wood. From the amount of argument and explanation which attends the brief statement of the
American desires, it is to be inferred that explanation of
the American attitude was regarded as necessary.      The
communication was as follows:
War Department.
WASHINGTON, Feb. 9, 1901.
Sir: As the time approaches for the Cuban Constitutional Convention to consider and act upon Cuba's relations with the United
States, it seems desirable that you should be informed of the views
of the Executive Department of our Government upon that subject in a more official form than that in which they have been communicated to you hitherto. The limitations upon the power of
the Executive by the resolution of Congress of April 20, 1898, are
such that the final determination upon the whole subject may
ultimately rest in Congress, and it is impracticable now to forecast
what the action of Congress will be. In the meantime, until Congress shall have acted, the military branch of the Government
is bound to refrain from any committal, or apparent committal,
of the United States to any policy which should properly be determined upon by Congress, and, at the same time, so far as it is
called upon to act or to make suggestions bearing upon the course
of events, it must determine its own conduct by reference to the
action already taken by Congress, the established policy of the
United States, the objects of our present occupation, and the manifest interests of the two countries.
The joint resolution of Congress of April 20, 1898, which
authorized the President to expel the Spanish forces from Cuba,
declared - "that the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control
over said Island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its
determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government
and the control of the Island to its people."
The treaty of peace concluded at Paris on the 10th of Decem



TIIE QUESTION OF " RELATIONS "


231


ber, 1898, and ratified by the Senate on the 6th of February, 1899,
provides in the first article that"As the Island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied
by the United States, the United States will, so long as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obligations that may,
under international law, result from the fact of its occupation, for
the protection of life and property."
It contains numerous obligations on the part of the United
States in respect of the treatment of the inhabitants of the territory
relinquished by Spain, such as the provision of the tenth article,
that the inhabitants shall be secured in the free exercise of their
religion; of the eleventh article, that they shall be subject to the
jurisdiction of the courts, pursuant to the ordinary laws governing
the same, and of the ninth article, that they shall retain all their
rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose thereof,
and the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions.
The sixteenth article of the treaty provides that the obligations
assumed in the treaty by the United States with respect to Cuba
are limited to the time of its occupancy thereof, but that it shall,
upon the termination of such occupancy, advise any government
established in the Island to assume the same obligations.
Our occupation of Cuba has been under the binding force
both of the resolution and the treaty, and the pacification mentioned
in the resolution has necessarily been construed as co-extensive with
the occupation provided for by the treaty, during which we were to
discharge international obligations, protect the rights of the former
subjects of Spain, and cause or permit the establishment of a government to which we could, in good faith, commit the protection of
the lives and property and personal rights of those inhabitants
from whom we had compelled their former sovereign to withdraw
her protection. It is plain that the government to which we were
thus to transfer our temporary obligations should be a government
based upon the peaceful suffrages of the people of Cuba, representing the entire people and holding their power from the people, and
subject to the limitations and safeguards which the experience of
constitutional government has shown to be necessary to the preser



THE QUESTION OF "RELATIONS "


vation of individual rights. This is plain as a duty to the people
of Cuba under the resolution of April 20, 1898, and it is plain as an
obligation of good faith under the treaty of Paris. Such a government we have been persistently and with all practicable speed
building up in Cuba, and we hope to see it established and assume
control under the provisions which shall be adopted by the present
convention. It seems to me that no one familiar with the traditional
and established policy of this country in respect to Cuba can find
cause for doubt as to our remaining duty. It would be hard to
find any single statement of public policy which has been so often
officially declared by so great an array of distinguished Americans
authorized to speak for the Government of the United States, as
the proposition stated, in varying but always uncompromising and
unmistakable terms, that the United States would not under any
circumstances permit any foreign power other than Spain to acquire possession of the Island of Cuba.
Jefferson and Monroe and John Quincy Adams and Jackson
and Van Buren and Grant and Clay and Webster and Buchanan
and Everett have all agreed in regarding this as essential to the
interests and the protection of the United States. The United
States has, and will always have, the most vital interest in the
preservation of the independence which she has secured for Cuba,
and in preserving the people of that Island from the domination
and control of any foreign power whatever. The preservation of
that independence by a country so small as Cuba, so incapable,
as she must always be, to contend by force against the great powers
of the world, must depend upon the strict performance of international obligations, upon her giving due protection to the lives
and property of the citizens of all other countries within her borders,
and upon her never contracting any public debt which in the hands
of the citizens of foreign powers shall constitute an obligation she
is unable to meet. The United States has, therefore, not merely
a moral obligation arising from her destruction of Spanish authority
in Cuba, and the obligations of the treaty of Paris for the establishment of a stable and adequate government in Cuba, but it has a
substantial interest in the maintenance of such a government.




THE QUESTION OF "RELATIONS "


233


We are placed in a position where, for our own protection, we
have, by reason of expelling Spain from Cuba, become the guarantors of Cuban independence and the guarantors, of a stable and
orderly government protecting life and property in that Island.
Fortunately the condition which we deem essential for our own
interests is the condition for which Cuba has been struggling, and
which the duty we have assumed toward Cuba on Cuban grounds
and for Cuban interests requires. It would be a most lame and
impotent conclusion if, after all the expenditure of blood and treasure by the people of the United States for the freedom of Cuba, and
by the people of Cuba for the same object, we should, through the
Constitution of the new government, by inadvertence or otherwise,
be placed in a worse condition in regard to our own vital interests
than we were while Spain was in possession, and the people of
Cuba should be deprived of that protection and aid from the
United States which is necessary to the maintenance of their independence. It was, undoubtedly, in consideration of these
special relations between the United States and Cuba that the
President said in his message to Congress of the 11th of April, 1898:
"The only hope of relief and repose from a condition which
can no longer be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba. In
the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests which give us the right and the duty
to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop.
"In view of these facts and of these considerations I ask the
Congress to authorize and empower the President to take measures
to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the
Government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the
Island the establishment of a stable government, capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, insuring
peace and tranquillity and the security of its citizens as well as our
own, and to use the military and naval forces of the United States
as may be necessary for these purposes."
And in his message of Dec. 5, 1899:
"This nation has assumed before the world a grave responsibility for the future good government of Cuba. We have accepted




234


THE QUESTION OF " RELATIONS "


a trust, the fulfilment of which calls for the sternest integrity of
purpose and the exercise of the highest wisdom. The new Cuba
yet to arise from the ashes of the past must needs be bound to us
by ties of singular intimacy and strength if its enduring welfare is
to be assured. Whether those ties shall be organic or conventional,
the destinies of Cuba are in some rightful form and manner irrevocably linked with our own, but how and how far is for the future to
determine in the ripeness of events. Whatever be the outcome,
we must see to it that free Cuba be a reality, not a name, a perfect
entity, not a hasty experiment bearing within itself the elements of
failure. Our mission, to accomplish which we took up the wager
of battle, is not to be fulfilled by turning adrift any loosely framed
commonwealth to face the vicissitudes which too often attend
weaker states whose natural wealth and abundant resources are
offset by the incongruities of their political organization and the
recurring occasions for internal rivalries to sap their strength and
dissipate their energies."
And it was with a view to the proper settlement and disposition
of these necessary relations that the order for the election of delegates to the present Constitutional Convention provided that they
should frame and adopt a Constitution for the people of Cuba, and
as a part thereof provide for and agree with the Government of
the United States upon the relations to exist between that Government and the Government of Cuba.
The people of Cuba should desire to have incorporated in her
fundamental law provisions in substance as follows:
"1. That no government organized under the Constitution shall
be deemed to have authority to enter into any treaty or engagement
with any foreign power which may tend to impair or interfere with
the independence of Cuba, or to confer upon such foreign power
any special right or privilege, without the consent of the United
States.
"2. That no government organized under the Constitution shall
have authority to assume or contract any public debt in excess of
the capacity of the ordinary revenues of the Island after defraying
the current expenses of government to pay the interest.




THE QUESTION OF "RELATIONS "


235


"3. That upon the transfer of the control of Cuba to the government established under the new Constitution Cuba consents that
the United States reserve and retain the right of intervention for
the preservation of Cuban independence and the maintenance of a
stable government, adequately protecting life, property, and individual liberty, and discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba
imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States and now assumed and undertaken by the Government of Cuba.
"4. That all the acts of the Military Government, and all rights
acquired thereunder, shall be valid and shall be maintained and
protected.
"5. That to facilitate the United States in the performance of
such duties as may devolve upon her under the foregoing provisions
and for her own defence, the United States may acquire and hold
the title to land for naval stations, and maintain the same at certain
specified points."
These provisions may not, it is true, prove to be in accord with
the conclusions which Congress may ultimately reach when that
body comes to consider the subject, but as, until Congress has acted,
the Executive must necessarily within its own sphere of action be
controlled by its own judgment, you should now be guided by the
views above expressed.
It is not our purpose at this time to discuss the cost of our intervention and occupation, or advancement of money for disarmament, or our assumption under the Treaty of Paris of the claims of
our citizens against Spain for losses which they had incurred in
Cuba. These can well be the subject of later consideration.
Very respectfully,
ELIHU ROOT,
Maj. Gen. LEONARD WOOD,                 Secretary of War.
Military Governor of Cuba, Havana, Cuba.
This was the plea of an able lawyer made in support of
the case of his client. Assuming it to have been a fair expression of the views of the administration, a question arises
concerning the fairness of withholding the statement until




236


THE QUESTION OF " RELATIONS "


so critical a time. This may be answered by pleading a
supposition that the subject would be included in the Constitution, yet it is not easy to see how that could be done in
the face of the previous experience and the definite instructions of Order No. 455. The communication reached
Havana on the morning of February 15.
The Military Governor had planned a shooting trip on
that day. Instead of submitting the Washington proposals
to the Convention, beyond a doubt the proper course, he
summoned the Committee on Relations to accompany him
upon the railway portion of his expedition, and made the
communication directly to this group. Cuban courtesy
forbade these gentlemen to display the resentment which
they felt at the informal manner in which a communication
which was really of an official nature, was, in the words of
one of the committee, "pitched at" them. They were
offended both by the manner and by the fact of an interference in their proceedings which they rightly regarded as
unwarranted. An immediate change was manifest in the
sentiment of the Convention, though the incident might
have been disregarded had it not been followed, a week
later, by a second interference in which the Convention was
again officially ignored. Beyond any question, the proper
course for this, as well as for the earlier communication,
was its formal presentation to the Convention for such
action as that body might see fit to take in the matter. General
Wood forwarded it, as a personal communication, to the
chairman of the Committee on Relations, Sefor Diego
Tamayo, a member of the Military Governor's Cabinet, and
generally regarded as more than a little influenced by his
chief. The immediate result of this second communication
is fairly indicated in a report submitted by the Committee




THE QUESTION OF "RELATIONS "


237


immediately after its transmission by Sefior Tamayo to his
associates.
This was prepared at a night session on February 26 and
was accepted by the Convention at 2 A.M., of the 27th.
Extracts from that report are as follows:
(Translation.)
"The Constitutional Convention, following the orders of the
American Government, as published in the Gaceta of this Island
on the 26th of July and the 6th of November, 1900, as Civil Orders
Nos. 301 and 455, and the instructions of the Military Governor in
his speech upon opening the Convention, comply with the various
requests therein contained; namely: to frame and adopt a Constitution for the Island of Cuba; to state its opinion concerning the relations which should exist between the United States and Cuba; to
provide for the election of officers... and for the transfer of the
government of the Island to such officers.... The committee to
whom this honorable task (that of formulating the required opinion)
has been assigned believed, when it first met, that the work would
be short and easy of accomplishment. Toward the people of the
United States, all Cubans maintain sentiments of such deep gratitude for the powerful and decisive help rendered in our struggle for
separation from Spain, and to create for ourselves an independent
and sovereign state, that it seemed to all, that, in stating the desired
'opinion,' we could only declare that we thought the United States
and Cuba should forever maintain the ties of friendship most intimate and fraternal, as there exists no possibility of conflict between
their legitimate interests; neither is there room for the least difference between their rational aspirations.
"But no sooner had the Committeelon Relations been organized
than the Honorable Governor of the Island demanded a private
interview, during which he made known a communication from
the American Secretary of War, containing the terms suggested
and recommended by the American Executive, as the basis of the
opinion which it solicited. From that moment, the committee




238


THE QUESTION OF " RELATIONS "


was obliged to proceed with greater caution, as the subject had to
be considered from another point of view, inasmuch as the earlier
instructions (Orders Nos. 301 and 455) provided for the free formulation of their opinion concerning the relations which should
exist between the two countries. But the receipt of the said communication, bearing date of February 21, indicated that something
new had arisen which cannot be disregarded by the committee.
"We are the delegates of the people of Cuba. Therefore our
primary duty lies in interpreting the will and serving the necessities
of our people. It was apparent that the intimations of the American Executive contained only the expression of what, in his judgment, the people of Cuba ought to desire in the matter of future
relations.... It is clear and plain that this is sufficient reason
for our giving them (the opinions of the American Executive) a
careful consideration.... But we have a complete right to accept
or reject them, to select from them that which we think fit, to add
to them or to subtract from them, or to substitute for them others
according to the dictates of our consciences, holding always before
us our duty to reconcile all that may be a legitimate interest or a
rational proposal of the people of the United States, with our own
highest interests and sacred rights.
"The undersigned committee, while accepting the starting point
of the American Executive - which provides that the independence
of Cuba shall remain absolutely guaranteed - is of the opinion
that some of these stipulations are not acceptable, inasmuch as
they modify the independence and sovereignty of Cuba. Our
duty consists in making Cuba independent of all other nations, including the great and noble American nation; and if we bind ourselves to ask the consent of the United States to our international
treaties; if we allow them to retain the right to intervene in our
country to support or displace administrations, and to fulfil rights
which only concern the Cuban Government; and if, lastly, we concede to them the right to acquire and maintain any title over any
lands whereon they may establish naval stations, it is plain that we
should appear to be independent of the rest of the world, but surely
we should never be so with relation to the United States."




THE QUESTION OF " RELATIONS "


939


While this document was of considerable length, with
generous amplification and explanation of its propositions,
these are its essential features. It included a quotation of
the proposals of the American administration which are here
presented in company with the tentative proposals submitted in response by the Committee.


THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS.
1. That no government organized under the Constitution shall be authorized to
enter into any treaty or compact with any foreign Power
which shall restrict or limit
the independence of Cuba, or
to grant to any foreign Power
any rights or special privileges
without the consent of the
United States.
2. That no government organized under the Constitution shall have power to assume or to contract any public
debt beyond the normal capacity of the annual revenues for
the payment of current expenses, the payment of interest, and provision for the
extinguishment of the debt.
3. That in the transfer of
control of Cuba to the new
government established under
the new Constitution, it is
agreed that the United States
shall reserve and hold the
right of intervention for the


THE CUBAN PROPOSALS.
1. The Government of the
Republic of Cuba shall not
enter into any treaty or agreement with any foreign Power
or Powers which might compromise or limit the independence of Cuba, or which might,
in any way, authorize any
foreign Power or Powers to
acquire, through colonization
or for military or naval purposes, any lodgment, authority
or right over any portion of
Cuba.
2. The Government of the
Republic of Cuba will not permit its territory to be used as a
base of war operations against
the United States or any other
nation.
3. The Government of the
Republic of Cuba accepts in
its entirety the Treaty of Paris
of the 10th of December, 1898,
in that which it affirms of the
rights of the Cubans as well as
the obligations which are tac



240


THE QUESTION OF "RELATIONS "


(THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS.)
preservation of the independence of Cuba, and the maintenance of a stable government which shall duly protect
life, property, and individual
liberty, and which shall fulfil,
respecting Cuba, the obligations imposed by the Treaty
of Paris upon the United
States and now assumed by
the Government of Cuba.
4. That all of the acts of
the Military Government, and
of the rights acquired through
them, shall be regarded as
valid, and be maintained and
protected.
5. That, for the better enabling of the United States to
comply with such duties as are
imposed upon them by these
stipulations and provisions,
and for suitable defence, the
United States shall acquire and
hold title to territory for the
maintenance of naval stations
at certain specified points.


(THE CUBAN PROPOSALS.)
itly imposed, and especially
as concerns the obligations imposed by international law,
referring to the protection of
life and property, accepting for
itself the obligations assumed
by the United States in this
regard, according to Articles
I and XVI of said Treaty of
Paris.
4. The Government of the
Republic of Cuba shall recognize as legally valid the acts executed by the Military Government, during the term of its
occupation, for the good government of Cuba, as well as
the rights acquired under said
acts, and in conformity with
the Joint Resolution, and the
second section of the United
States Army Bill of 1899-1900,
known as the Foraker Bill, and
with the existing laws in force
in the country.
5. The Government of the
United States and that of the
Republic of Cuba shall regulate their commercial relations
by means of a treaty based on
reciprocity with a tendency
toward the free interchange of
their natural and manufactured products, and which will
mutually assure them ample
special advantages in their
respective markets.


Thus the whole situation was changed. Coincident with
this unfortunate step, the American press was filled with




THE QUESTION OF "RELATIONS "


241


discussion concerning an extra session of Congress for the
consideration of the Cuban question. The month of February was a time of confusion, misunderstanding, and
cross-purposes. President McKinley was insistent upon an
immediate settlement of the Cuban matter, and Congress
was anxious for a prompt termination of its session. Although the Cuban Constitution was not definitely accepted in
its final and completed form until February 15, its general outline was made public on January 21, and it was known that
it contained no reference to the future relations of the two
countries. The adjournment of Congress was due on March
4. The Cubans had been and were being criticised both
for undue haste and for unreasonable delay in their proceedings. The matter was discussed in Cabinet conferences
in Washington, and these conferences resulted in the submission of the suggestions which have been quoted in the
foregoing paragraphs. Senator Platt, of Connecticut, the
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Relations with Cuba,
expressed his opinion that Congress had no power to deal
directly with the Cuban Constitution. He said, "We can
neither approve, reject, nor in any way amend or modify
the Cuban Constitution by act of Congress.... Cuba,
being a foreign country, is privileged to establish her own
government without let or hindrance." But in the matter
of future relations, he held that, although Cuba was a foreign
country, the United States, by virtue of the grounds upon
which it intervened in Cuban affairs, possessed certain
rights and privileges in the Island, and that it was in duty
bound, in the interests of both countries, to safeguard those
rights and privileges.
From his particular standpoint, and from that of those
who supported him, there can be no question of the correctness of his views. By its own act, the United States was




242


THE QUESTION OF "RELATIONS "


pledged to the establishment of Cuban independence. It
was also virtually pledged to the establishment of a stable
government by the Cuban people. It had made itself the
guarantor of a government which should be capable of protecting life and property in the Island. It had assumed
responsibilities which could not be disregarded. Stable
government and security of life and property are not possible
of full assurance by the mere promulgation of laws or constitutions. The point upon which the whole controversy
of the time really turns is whether there was warrant and
justification for an assumption that the Cubans could not
or would not, by their own conduct, endorse and carry out
the requisite conditions.
The Cuban view of the matter was not entirely harmonious, even in the Convention. So far as demarkation is
possible, it may be said that a conservative element favored
an active and recognized American supervision with some
measure of American control. The radical element stood
for the terms of their Constitution which declared Cuba to
be "a sovereign and independent state." The numerical
strength of these respective groups was impossible of determination by estimate. A plebiscite was urged by some,
but the proposals were disregarded, and active discussion
continued. The situation was further complicated by the
knowledge, which promptly reached the Island, that the
Senate Committee on Relations with Cuba was engaged in
the preparation of a measure which, if accepted and passed
by Congress and signed by the President, was tantamount to
an ultimatum. It was known that this measure proposed
to make the withdrawal of American authority conditional
upon the acceptance of terms which the Cubans regarded
as subversive of their independence as a nation, and a direct
violation of the pledge of the Joint Resolution.




CHAPTER XV


EFFECT OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT
THE position taken at this time by the American authorities
is not readily to be understood or excused. It was distinctly inconsistent and illogical. Having instructed the
Cubans, in Order No. 301, to include in their Constitution
the terms of the future international relations; and, later,
by Order No. 455, having instructed the omission of those
terms; the matter was definitely taken out of the hands of
the Cubans by American action. This was done before the
Convention had been allowed a reasonable time for consideration of the subject.
An amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill was rushed
through both houses of the American Congress with only
an hour or two of discussion. No excuse whatever appears
for the summary despatch of a measure of such importance
as the international relations of two countries whose future,
politically and commercially, demanded the closest and
most amicable of ties. It is safe to assume that the situation
was not a little influenced by the reports and opinions of the
Military Governor, who supposed himself to be in close
touch with Cuban affairs and accurately informed regarding Cuban opinion. He was neither in harmony nor in
touch with the real Cuban sentiment.
A peculiar incident arose at this time, and was of no small
influence in determining the attitude and action of the
United States Congress. On February 26, there was an




244  EFFECT OF THE PLATT -AMENDMENT


interview at the Palace, in Havana, between General Wood
and General Maximo Gomez. The report of this interview
was given to representatives of the American press by
General Wood, and was duly telegraphed by them to the
United States. That report, as sent and published, was as
follows:
" IAVANA, February 26.  General Gomez visited Governor
General Wood this morning, and assured him that the stories of
unrest and dissatisfaction at the continuance of the United States
intervention were false, and that he had been misrepresented in
statements to the effect that he favored an immediate withdrawal
of the United States troops, and giving Cuba absolute independence.
If they withdrew now he feared bloodshed, beyond doubt. Within
sixty days, the Cubans would be fighting among themselves. General Gomez added, 'If the Americans were to withdraw to-day, I
would go with them.'... General Gomez had no objection to
the outline of the future relations between the United States and
Cuba as recommended by the United States Senate."
American legislators have stated that this message was
either a determining factor or a strong influence in their
vote upon the Platt Amendment. Lacking, admittedly, an
adequate personal familiarity with the subject, they accepted
this alleged statement of General Gomez as the expression
of a qualified Cuban opinion. Gomez was known as the
head and front of Cuba's struggle for national independence,
and it is natural that his statement should be accepted without question. The matter turns upon the accuracy of this
submitted report.
In Havana, nothing was known in regard to it until the
arrival of the American papers, on the 29th. Those contained the report from which the above extract is taken.
A copy was shown to General Gomez at his house and the
matter translated to him. In a rage of indignation, he




EFFECT OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT


245


denied having made any such statement, and declared the
expressed opinions to be entirely contrary to his views. A
local paper (La Discusion) sent a reporter to interview
General Wood. That official declared that there had been
an error in the reports of the correspondents. Yet both of
those who sent the matter obtained their information at the
Palace, and both sent practically the same statement. As
they represented rival bureaus, collusion of any kind is improbable. Gomez refused to make any statement. He
stood upon his dignity, smote his breast, and declared that
he was "Maximo Gomez. I do not need to deny such a
statement." This attitude was quite consistent with the
general character of the stubborn and somewhat irascible
old gentleman. But the matter was not, has not been, and
and probably never will be quite cleared up. That it had
the effect of influencing American votes on the Platt Amendment is decidedly more certain than the origin of the report.
The measure known as the Platt Amendment was submitted to the United States Senate, as an amendment to the
Army Appropriation bill, on February 25. The Senate
adopted it, on the 27th, by a vote of 43 to 20. The House
signified its concurrence, on March 1, by a vote of 159 to 134. 
The text of the bill is as follows:
"That, in fulfilment of the declaration contained in the Joint
Resolution, approved April 20, 1898, entitled 'For the recognition
of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the
Government of Spain relinquish its authority and government in
the Island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from
Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the
United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States
to carry these resolutions into effect,' the President is hereby authorized to leave the government and control of the Island of Cuba
to its people so soon as a government shall have been established




246  EFFECT OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT


in said Island, under a Constitution which, either as a part thereof
or in any ordinance appended thereto, shall define the future relations of the United States with Cuba, substantially as follows:
"(1) That the Government of Cuba shall never enter into any
treaty or other compact with any foreign Power or Powers which
will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any
manner authorize or permit any foreign Power or Powers to obtain
by colonization or for military or naval purposes, or otherwise,
lodgment in or control over any portion of said Island.
"(2) That said Government shall not assume or contract any
public debt, to pay the interest upon which and to make reasonable
sinking-fund provision for the ultimate discharge of which, the
ordinary revenues of the Island, after defraying the current expenses of government, shall be inadequate.
"(3) That the Government of Cuba consents that the United
States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of
Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate
for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for
discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the
Treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the Government of Cuba.
"(4) That all acts of the United States in Cuba during its military occupation thereof are ratified and validated, and all lawful
rights acquired thereunder shall be maintained and protected.
"(5) That the Government of Cuba will execute, and as far as
necessary extend, the plans already devised or other plans to be
mutually agreed upon, for the sanitation of the cities of the Island,
to the end that a recurrence of epidemic and infectious diseases
may be prevented, thereby assuring protection to the people and
commerce of Cuba, as well as to the commerce of the Southern
ports of the United States and the people residing therein.
"(6) That the Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the proposed
Constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereto left to future
adjustment by treaty.
"(7) That to enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its




EFFECT OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT


247


own defence, the Government of Cuba will sell or lease to the
United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the
United States.
"(8) That by way of further assurance the Government of Cuba
will embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent treaty with
the United States."
Notwithstanding the fact that the Cubans had every
reason to anticipate some such step, there is no question
that the adoption of this measure produced widespread dismay among them. The first impulse was submission through
sheer hopelessness of opposition to the power of the United
States. From this they soon recovered and began that
protracted struggle which ended in reluctant acceptance
by the Constitutional Convention. Nor was the struggle
and the protest which followed confined to Cuba and the
Cuban Convention. The American press was filled with a
vigorous controversy.  The originators of the bill were
forced to become its defenders, and the best that can be said
of the defence is that it was illogical. Not a few who, at
the time, asserted that the provisions of the bill were a
guarantee of Cuban independence, were obliged, later, to
admit its limitation of Cuban independence, and its establishment of an indefinite sort of American suzerainty over the
Island of Cuba. It became necessary for the defenders of
the bill to explain its meaning in terms for which its opponents could find no basis in its phraseology.
The argument of the supporters of the bill rested, in some
cases, solely in political partisanship. In others, it was
based upon a groundless belief that the peace which had
existed for nearly three years in the Island, was due to the
presence of the American troops, and that a state of anarchy
would follow the withdrawal of the United States forces.




248  EFFECT OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT


In an article in the Independent, Senator Platt stated that
"In no instance has it been necessary to call upon our troops
to repress disorder, but it has been because of their presence
there that the necessity has not existed." While it may be
admitted that the presence of an armed force was desirable
during the chaotic period of the first six months of the year
1899, the general tenor of Mr. Platt's comment is as inaccurate as it is unjust to the Cubans, who had shown no
more disposition toward turbulence or disorder than had
the people of any State in the Union.
Again, in the World's Work, Senator Platt expressed a
similar opinion. He said: "With no army to repress disorder, it is certainly within the limit of reasonable probability that the revolutionary and turbulent party may attempt the destruction or confiscation of Spanish and Cuban
property which the new government would be utterly powerless to prevent." It is most unfortunate that Senator Platt
and those who followed his line of reasoning, and supported
his bill, should have been so lacking in competent information regarding the Island and its people. To those who
knew, all this was mere bugaboo, baseless and unwarranted. There had not been for two years prior to the
period of this discussion any sign of either "revolutionary or
turbulent party," and the American authorities were doing
no little boasting with regard to the thorough efficiency of
both the municipal police and the Rural Guard of the Island.
These together made an armed force of, approximately,
2,500 men for the suppression of disorder.  The great need
of the Island was not troops to maintain order, but industrial
prosperity which would enable people to live without taking
that which was not their own, or to indulge in rioting or
strife as a result of hunger and distress. The argument of
potential menace to the peace of the Island, and the necessity




EFFECT OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT


249


for Cuban recognition of the right of the United States to, —interfere in insular affairs, was without justification, unless
the attitude of the United States toward Cuba in commercial
affairs produced a condition of distress of which anarchy
and disorder came as the legitimate children.
The argument in favor of the Platt Amendment was based
upon an hypothesis, and developed in policy and in politics.
Its opponents grounded their arguments upon a moral
principle of national righteousness and good faith. Some
of those arguments and opinions may be quoted, as follows:
"To impose any terms upon Cuba is a violation of the pledge
given to the world when the United States went to her assistance."
- Baltimore American. (Rep.)
"If this scheme, in defiant violation of our solemn national
pledge and every consideration of equity and wise public policy,
shall be successful, the United States will stand disgraced among
the nations." - Columbia (S. C.) State. (Dem.)
"Having said that the people were 'free and independent,' and
that of right they ought to be so, let us not descend to pettifogging
now. Let us not dictate to the 'free and independent' in any
particular. Let us pursue the straight and narrow path of common
honesty." - Chicago Times-Herald.
"If a nation is dishonored when it breaks faith, coolly, openly,
and for the sake of material advantage, then the United States
stands before the world dishonored." - Philadelphia North
American. (Rep.)
"The resolutions are an act of bad faith toward a weak people,
who must either yield or revolt." - Chicago Journal. (Rep.)
"It is easy enough to find excuses for breaking a national promise
when the desire to break it is strong. But there is no excuse which
could lessen the odium of broken faith." - Buffalo Express. (Rep.)
These quotations are fairly illustrative of a vast mass of
similar matter which appeared in all parts of the United
States. The outburst was confined to no particular party.




250  EFFECT OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT


Many eminent public men, of both parties, voiced regret,
indignation, and protest against the measure. Its supporters expressed their opinions with equal vigor. The
leading organs of the administration, though they asserted
the necessity for American supervision of Cuban affairs, and
insisted upon Cuba's official and constitutional acknowledgment of the right of the United States to exercise such
supervision, still insisted that the Platt Amendment in no
way modified or abridged the independence of Cuba.
The news of the passage of the Platt Amendment was
received in the Island with something of consternation and
no little of indignation. In its issue of March 2, La Patria
(Havana), the leading organ of the ultra-radicals, stated
the situation with accuracy, as follows:
"The action of the United States respecting Cuba continues to
be the theme of conversation in all circles, and there is no occasion
to hide the fact that a great majority have received it with displeasure and judge it harshly."
The so-called Conservative element, a small minority of
the population, expressed approval. Some urged its acceptance, though bitterly opposed to it, as the lesser of two
evils. The alternative of acceptance was a continuance of
the military government which was regarded as unwarrantedly autocratic and too indifferent to Cuba's greatest
welfare. Opposition to the measure strengthened with
the passing days, but there is no doubt that much of the
public manifestation of disapproval was "arranged" by
political leaders.
From all over the Island there came telegrams of indignation  and  dissatisfaction.  Mass-meetings and  parades
shouted  "Viva Independencia!"   "Abajo la Enmienda
Platt!"  ("Down with the Platt Amendment!") The in



EFFECT OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT


251


sular press was vigorous in its denunciation. Much blame
was laid upon General Wood, and there is much ground
for belief that it was merited. La Discusion, a leading
Havana daily, printed the following in its issue of March 9:
"In order to obtain a vote on the Platt Amendment, Congress
was made to believe that the Cuban Convention would accept it;
and in order to prevent the honest portion of the American people
from demanding that the Government correct the error committed,
there continues to be affirmed the statement that the Cubans are
disposed to agree to a shameful and perverted mutilation of their
independence and sovereignty. But this policy of deceit and lies
cannot be successful."
If the Wood-Gomez interview of February 26 was correctly reported, it would appear that Cuba's "grand old
man" changed his mind within two weeks. In a personal
letter to a friend in Santo Domingo, under date of March 9,
General Gomez wrote:
"This demand of Platt, thrown in the face of this heroic people
by a great and powerful nation, must cause deep moral perturbation
in the hearts of all the people of this Island, and even in America,
which, during the trying days of war, regarded us with pride, and
now regard us with covetous eyes."
Naturally and necessarily, the Constitutional Convention
recognized the complete change in the situation. Chronologically, the instructions of the United States to the Cuban
Convention, in the matter of the mutual relations of the
two countries, stand in the following order:
July 25, 1900. Definite instructions to include a plan of
those relations in the Cuban Constitution " as a part thereof."
Nov. 5 and 9, 1900. Definite instructions to exclude the
matter of relations, and, instead, to express an "opinion"
of what those relations "ought to be."




252  EFFECT OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT


Feb. 15, 1901. An official hint of what the Washington
administration would like to have included in that opinion.
Feb. 21, 1901. A suggestion of what the Washington
administration thought Cuba ought to include in the opinion.
March 2, 1901. The Platt Amendment, which ignored
the definite instructions, never officially superseded, given
to the Convention at the time of its assembly, on Nov. 5,
1900, and which took from the Cubans their right and power
of independent action by forcing acceptance of the terms
laid down in Washington, with no alternative save that of
the continuance of a military government which had already
become objectionable.
The situation was one of extreme seriousness for the
members of the Convention. More than once, the voluntary
dissolution of the body was imminent. With one exception,
the members declared their objection both to the terms of
the Platt Amendment and to the manner in which those
terms were imposed upon them for their acceptance. The
isolated exception explained his position by declaring his
belief that Cuba would best accept such measure of independence as was open to her and thus terminate the period
of military government. Even the one representative of
the Conservative Party publicly defined his position in an
exhaustive analysis of the Amendment. His analysis was
tantamount to a rejection of the terms unless subjected to
modification in some of the essential features, and unless
compensation be given to the Cubans in the form of commercial advantages in the American market.
During the month of March, the disposition of the Convention to reject the terms of the Amendment grew continually stronger. There appeared a weakening in the
imperative attitude of Washington, and there were those
who assured the Cubans that the act was neither final nor




EFFECT OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT


253


obligatory. Members of the Convention declared that they
were so informed by no less an authority than the Military
Governor. An active discussion ensued and the Convention
Committee on Relations drafted and submitted a substitute
measure. This definitely rejected the clauses referring to
the power of the United States to intervene in Cuban affairs,
to the establishment of coaling stations, and to the Isle of
Pines. Individual members, Messrs. Tamayo, Nunez,
Quilez, Giberga, and Quesada, submitted substitute proposals.
A feature of the period was the cartoons of the daily
papers. Many of these were distinctly clever in conception,
though none of them was at all complimentary either to the
United States or to its local representative. One of them,
published on Good Friday, led to the summary suppression
of the paper which issued it (La Discusion) by an arbitrary
and illegal order of the Military Governor. Its title was
"The Cuban Calvary." Upon the central cross there hung
a figure, representing Cuba, above whose head there was a
placard inscribed "Pueblo Cubano." (The Cuban people.)
Upon the crosses on either side, General Wood appeared as
Dimas, and President McKinley as Gestas. In the foreground the agonized Mary was presented as an agonized
public opinion. Senator Platt (who was presented as Senator
Thomas Platt of New York) stood as Longinus, the Roman
soldier, presenting upon a spearhead a sponge marked
"Enmienda Platt."
From the standpoint of New England orthodoxy, the
cartoon was both profane and blasphemous. But the
Spanish proverb says "En cada tierra su uso" (In each
country its customs), and the Spaniard and the Cuban do
not see such things with New England's eyes, and are not
shocked by such matters as many American people are.




254  EFFECT OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT


Such street names as Christo, Cruz del Padre, San Juan de
Dios, and Jesus Peregrino, are by no means uncommon.
Jesus del Mlonte is a ward of Havana, and Calvario is a town
in its suburbs.
The editor of the paper and the cartoonist were arrested
by the personal order of General Wood, and, by the instructions of the same authority, the offices of the paper were
closed and officially sealed by the police. There was no
appeal to law, no reference to that legal procedure established by American authority. A farcical release of the
alleged culprits followed their signature of a statement that
the cartoon was strictly political and not personal. On the
next day, Easter Sunday, the same paper produced a cartoon
of the resurrection, with a compound Wood-Weyler figure
issuing from the tomb, entitled "That which we least expected." Their point of view was that Cuba's resurrection
had been attended by an unexpected revival of Weylerism.
Another cartoon depicted the McKinley of 1898 and the
McKinley of 1901. The former was bland and benevolent.
This was inscribed "When the Joint Resolution said that
we were 'independent,' it was the noble people of Abraham
Lincoln who pronounced the sentence." The McKinley
of 1901 was a scowling, malignant individual who sat with
his feet upon his desk, and presented to a figure representing
the Cuban people a folio marked "Platt Amendment."
The inscription attached to this read, "The people who by
their force now desire to make us subjects, are the people of
McKinley (Emperor) and of Platt."
Another showed the Cuban people as Prometheus, chained
to the rock of Intervention, while the vulture of the Platt
Amendment plucked at his vitals. Another portrayed a
base-ball field. Senator Platt (always shown as the gentleman from New York) was the pitcher. General Wood




EFFECT OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT


255


figured as catcher, and President McKinley as umpire.
The home plate was the Joint Resolution. The ball - as
the Platt Amendment-had been pitched, and struck
toward the outfield by a Cuban figure wielding a bat marked
"Convention," and the batsman was shown as making a
rapid pace toward first base - Independencia. In another,
Uncle Sam, as a highwayman, with the pistol of the Platt
Amendment, "holds up" Miss Cuba, and takes from her
the Isle of Pines, coaling stations, and the Cuban Treasury,
while a long-tailed rat gnaws the torn and mutilated Joint
Resolution. Others were clever hits at special steps in the
proceedings, but many of them were unintelligible and
meaningless except to those who possessed a close acquaintance with the history of the time.
The most unfortunate immediate result of the American
official attitude, and the acceptance of the Platt Amendment
by the American Congress, was a marked increase in an
already well-defined undercurrent of Cuban bitterness toward
and distrust of the American administration. This feeling
was almost completely limited to American officialdom.
Throughout all of our dealings with the Island, the Cubans
maintained an abiding confidence in the justness and the
kindly and generous intentions of the American people. It
was President McKinley and his advisers, and General
Wood, upon whom was laid the blame for an act which the
Cubans regarded as unjust, unworthy of a great nation, a
violation of America's pledge, and a grievous wrong to the
Cuban people.
In an address delivered before the Georgia Bar Association, Lo Q. C. Lamar, Esq., an American lawyer, practising
his profession in Havana, and fully conversant with the immediate situation, summarized the Cuban objection to the
Platt Amendment as follows:




256  EFFECT OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT


"The Cubans objected to the Platt Amendment
"Because; in their opinion, under it the Cuban people were not
free and independent.
"Because; the Island, being fully 'pacified,' the United States,
in violation of the Joint Resolution, proposed to exercise 'sovereignty, jurisdiction, and control' over it, and did not purpose leaving the 'government and control of the Island to its people.'
"Because; it compelled the Government of Cuba to consent that
the United States might intervene for the determination of the
question of Cuban fidelity to the terms imposed by the Treaty of
Paris, notwithstanding the fact that, by the terms of the same treaty,
the obligations of the United States were limited to the term of its
occupancy.
"Because; the highest judicial body in the United States had
declared that the President was lawfully exercising jurisdiction in
Cuba for the purpose of assisting the inhabitants of the Island to
establish a government of their own, under which, 'as a free and
independent people they might control their own affairs without
interference by other nations.'
"Because; the same court had held that Cuba was 'foreign territory,' and that, as between the United States and Cuba, that Island
was, for the time, held in trust for the inhabitants thereof, 'to
whom it rightfully belongs, and to whose exclusive control it will
be surrendered when a stable government shall be established by
their voluntary action.'
"Because; by the terms of their Constitution, they had 'assembled in Constitutional Convention in order to frame and adopt
the fundamental law of their organization as a free and independent state.'
"Because; it was suggested by American authority and introduced as a rider to an army appropriation bill, in contravention if
not in flagrant violation of the rules of the Senate which proposed
and passed it.
"Because; it was passed hastily and without due consideration,
after only two hours of debate, and, as stated on the floor of the
Senate by one of its members, without the Congress ever having




EFFECT OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT


257


seen or read the Constitution of which the amendment was to become a part.
"Because; the Convention was called to frame and adopt a Constitution for the people of Cuba, and was expressly relieved, by the
definite instructions of the American authority, from making
provisions and agreements with the Government of the United
States upon future relations a part of their Constitution.
"Because; the functions of the Constitutional Assembly were
limited to the purposes expressed in the call to the Convention,
and did not include legislative or treaty-making powers.
"Because; it compelled them to change their Constitution by
omitting the Isle of Pines from their constitutional boundaries,
notwithstanding the fact that the said Island had been, for nearly
four hundred years, recognized by Cubans, Spaniards, Americans,
and all others alike, as part and parcel of Cuba's territory, politically and geographically."
These and other objections, expressed in similar and in
different phrases, were the Cuban answer to the Platt
Amendment.




CHAPTER XVI


ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT
THE month of March, 1901, was a time of serious political
confusion in the Island. The Cubans came slowly to a full
realization of the position in which they had been placed.
Definite terms were offered them by the Platt Amendment,
and upon their acceptance of those terms depended the
withdrawal of American authority. Acceptance meant to
them the sacrifice of that sovereign independence for which
many had given their lives and for which many others had
fought and suffered. Rejection meant the indefinite postponement of even the shadow of independence, and the indefinite continuance of a government which was growing
ever more and more objectionable.
"The declaration of the purposes of this Government in
the resolution of April 20, 1898," said President McKinley
in his inaugural address, immediately after the passage of
the Platt Amendment, "must be made good." To the Cubans, that "declaration of purposes" admitted of only one
meaning - Cuban independence. They were told that the
offensive measure did not modify their independence. On the
contrary, President McKinley, Senator Platt, and their supporters, declared that the measure was a guarantee of Cuban
independence. They asserted that coaling stations were
necessary to protect Cuba against possible foreign invasion.
The Cubans and their American supporters declared this to
be a subterfuge unworthy of a great people. They were




ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT 259


satisfied with the assurance of protection which rested in
the Monroe Doctrine. Had the Platt Amendment asked
for coaling stations on Cuba's coasts "for the protection of
the southern ports and harbors of the United States," they
would have been granted gladly and freely. No independence could exist where there was coercion to obtain coaling
stations, or the acknowledgment of the right of intervention
in Cuban affairs. Again and again, dissolution of the
Convention was imminent.
Washington became uneasy. The independent press of
the United States voiced its indignation. Men prominent
in public life declared the measure an outrage and a blot
upon the history of the country. The administration was
forced into the ignoble position of seeking, through its
mouthpieces, to explain into the measure a meaning which
its terms denied. On April 3, the Secretary of War sent the
following despatch to General Wood:
"Wood, Havana:
"You are authorized to state officially that in the view of the
President the intervention described in the third clause of the Platt
Amendment is not synonymous with intermeddling or interference
with the affairs of the Cuban Government, but the formal action
of the Government of the United States, based upon just and substantial grounds, for the preservation of Cuban independence, and
the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of
life, property, and individual liberty, and adequate for discharging
the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris
on the United States.         ELIHm ROOT,
"Secretary of War."
But the Cubans persisted in considering only the letter
of the measure, and declined to accept this explanation of
its intents and purposes. Their argument was that an agreement of such moment should mean what it said and say




>60 ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLATT AMNDENDMENT


what it meant. This message was shown to members of
the Havana press, and called out the following editorial
from La Patria, a vigorous organ of the ultra-radical element
in the Convention:
"A WORTHLESS DOCUMENT.
"The Secretary of War, the Honorable Mr. Elihu Root, has
addressed a communication to General Wood, in which he says in
substance, that having heard of the bad impression caused by the
Platt Amendment, especially the third clause of said resolution, in
which the United States ask that their right to intervene in Cuba
be recognized, he solicits General Wood to make it clear to the
delegates that it must be understood that the American Government will avail itself of that right only in very grave cases and for
very weighty and justifiable reasons.
"General Wood has attached so much importance to this declaration, that after having imparted the terms of Mr. Root's letter confidentially to several persons, he has addressed a cablegram to the
Secretary of War, asking his permission to transmit the letter as an
official communication, to the Constitutional Convention.
"We very much fear that all his pains will be in vain. Mr.
Root's interpretation cannot have more authority than the text
of the bill itself and this is unequivocal. Mr. Root can say what he
pleases; the positive fact is, that to concede to the United States
the right to intervene in Cuba, whenever the American Government
shall so determine, is a blow aimed at Cuba's independence and
sovereignty, and it would so impair the influence and authority
of the Cuban Government that would exist subject to the exercise
of this right, that it is inconceivable that any government could be
constituted under these conditions, with any degree of decorum
and efficiency. Therefore, the problem does not change in the
least, with the above-mentioned declarations of President McKinley's Secretary of War.
"On the other hand, even if that declaration modifies the Platt
Amendment - which it does not - what weight should we attach
to that letter of Mr. Root, after what we have seen with regard to




ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT 261


Order No. 455? The latter, which includes the address of General
Wood on the inaugural occasion of the Constitutional Convention,
modified Order No. 301, in the matter of the relations which should
exist between the United States and Cuba. And now, when it has
been discovered that it is not enough for the aims and purposes of
their political plans that the Convention should express its views,
with regard to said relations, it is said that Order No. 301 is the
one to be regarded as valid, and that the modification contained
in No. 455 is of no importance whatever.
"The same thing will occur with Mr. Root's letter. Even if
it changed the terms and provisions of the third clause of the Platt
Amendment -and we have already said that it does not vary
them in the least - the day the letter is invoked in support of an
interpretation which shall be favorable to Cuba's interest, it will
be said, and with reason, that a letter from the Secretary of War
cannot modify or change a law of Congress.
"And we must not forget that if documents are to be invoked
and cited it is not possible to conceive of any one more explicit
than the Joint Resolution and the memorandums of the Treaty of
Paris. In spite of all their emphatic declarations, we see how little
the American imperialists heed them.
"They interpret these documents in such a manner, that having
declared before the world that they 'would not exercise control,
dominion, or sovereignty' in Cuba, and that 'once the pacification
of Cuba having been secured, they would turn over the government
to its people,' now they demand, before they carry out their part
of the contract, that the Isle of Pines shall be given to them; that
they be given naval stations, and that the right of the United States
Government to intervene in our territory, to uphold or dislodge
governments, shall be recognized; and this is the most important
act of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and control that any nation or
people can exercise over another.
"In view of all these reasons, we believe that Mr. Root's letter
will not produce any effect whatever upon the Convention. After
having heard it, those who will vote in its favor.are precisely those
who would have voted for it anyway, even before said letter had




262 ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT


arrived; and there is not a single opponent to this measure, which
so rudely attacks Cuba's rights, who can be induced to accept it,
because of the crafty and worthless explanation of the Secretary
of War, which in nothing changes its form or spirit, and leaves it
as objectionable as it was before, to all who persist in defending
the absolute independence and sovereignty of the Island of Cuba.
"For the latter, this letter will not be considered anything else
than a worthless document; and unfortunately, an attempt has been
made to reduce other documents of far greater importance and
authority, to the same worthless state."
During the months of March and April, various officials,
among them    General Miles and Senators Proctor and
Cockrell, went to Cuba, ostensibly as private citizens travelling for their own pleasure or interest, but recognized by the
Cubans as emissaries of the Government in Washington.
Their explanations were received with the customary Cuban
courtesy, but they carried no conviction to Cuban minds.
All the forces and machinery of government were brought
into play in support of the position taken.
The Convention went into secret session. The delegates
conferred by mail, by telegraph, and in person, with their
constituents. Except in the ranks of the numerically insignificant Conservative party, there was nowhere manifest
any disposition to accept the terms. They were even declined by the only representative of that party in the Convention, Sefior Giberga, unless, in compensation for their
acceptance, concessions were made in the American tariff
on Cuban products. One member, Sefor Quilez, proposed
acceptance as the lesser of two evils. The press of the Island
denounced the bill, and public manifestations continued.
Notwithstanding all this outburst of public opinion, the
tourist-emissaries and the Military Governor persisted in
reporting to Washington and to the American people, that




ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT 263


the terms would be accepted. The warrant for these reports was nowhere evident. All save one or two of the
thirty-one members of the Convention had publicly expressed their opposition to it; with few exceptions, the press
of the Island denounced it. A part of an editorial in La
Patria, on April 9, read as follows:
"It can be said to-day that the Platt Amendment is already
practically rejected by the Convention; because, not even in the
softened form in which it appears in Dr. Tamayo's proposition;
nor with the economic reforms and explanations which Senor
Giberga has added to it; nor in the disguise in which it appears in
Sefior Quesada's proposal; nor in the paraphrase of the original
resolution which Seftor Quilez offers us, has it been able to secure
more than a very limited number of votes."
This was unquestionably a fair presentation of the state
of public opinion at the time.
The discussions in the Convention began to assume
definite form about the middle of the month. No disposition whatever was manifest to accept the Amendment. The
opposition to it was strong and intense. In doubt of its
finality, substitute measures were submitted for consideration,
and suggestions were made that a commission be sent to
Washington for conference with the administration.    On
March 17, I sent the following cablegram to the New York
Herald, in my capacity as its special correspondent. It
accurately presented the situation on that date.
"The week opens with a strong disposition on the part of a
large majority of the members of the Convention to vote immediately
for the rejection of the Platt Amendment. A question has arisen,
however, regarding the terms of the Amendment. The delegates
are not certain whether it is final and in the nature of an ultimatum,
or is open to modification by the President. Conflicting statements
have been made by the Military Governor concerning its finality.




~6 4 ACCEPTANCE OF TIlE PLATT AMENDMENT


Some members of tile Convention are disposed to submit proposals
substantially modifying the terms of the Amendment if it is not
absolute and final.
"The idea is growing that the Amendment is a violation of the
Joint Resolution, an unwarranted dictation of conditions to a free
and independent people, and an exercise cf sovereignty, jurisdiction, and control' over them. It is suggested that the question
be submitted for determination by the United States Supreme
Court. The principal question at the present time. however, regards the finality of the Platt Amendment, and the advisability of
submitting the same to President McKinley because of a lack of
confidence in General Woodo'.
On March 28, through the same channels, the situation
was summarized as follows:
"There is no reason to doubt that the present situation in Cuba
shows a stronger disposition not to accept the Platt Amendment
than has existed at any time within the last two weeks. It is quite
evident that the terms are not acceptable to the Cubans. Members
of the Convention are publicly expressing their opinion to that
effect. The impression is growing that it will be better to continue
the objectionable Military Government rather than surrender all
the advantages without compensation (through tariff concessions
on Cuban products). This opinion is extending, particularly
among the industrial and commercial classes."
April opened with stormy agitation both in Cuba and in
the United States. The New     York Sun, once an ardent
advocate of Cuban independence, was, at this time, as an
organ of the administration, urging Cuban acceptance of
the American terms under the menace of more drastic action
by the next Congress. The Cleveland Leader (Republican)
called the Cubans "ungrateful, treacherous, irresponsible,
savage, ignorant, and as yet unworthy."  The Philadelphia
Times (Democratic) declared that this "conspiracy for the
retention of Cuba is the most infamous of all that have been




ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT 265


hatched out of our new imperialism." Vigorous and often
unbridled expressions were used on both sides of the contest.
Many annexationists even joined the opposition, in the hope
that their ends would be served and annexation be precipitated by rejection of the terms.
On April 6, the Giberga compromise measure, proposing
tariff concessions in compensation for acceptance, was rejected by the Convention. On the same day, the Quilez
motion to accept the Amendment was rejected by a vote of
twenty-four to two, Quilez and Giberga voting in the affirmative. At the session of April 1, it was voted not to send a
commission to Washington. The decision was based upon
an unofficial telegram from that city that such a commission
would not be received, as the authorities had no power to
modify the conditions of the Platt Amendment. But the
proposition continued under consideration, and met with
increasing approval. The immediately disturbing problem
was whether or not the Amendment should be definitely rejected before sending such a commission. At the session
on April 9, the Convention voted to reconsider the decision
of April 1. The result was a vote of twenty to nine in favor
of a commission. A proposal that such a commission should
first confer with the Military Governor was disapproved
through fear of further misunderstanding with that official.
The next day matters went into the air again on the strength
of new despatches from Washington, asserting that it
could be stated on "unquestionable authority" that President McKinley had decided not to negotiate with a commission from the Convention on any basis outside of the
terms of the Platt Amendment, and that he would not consider any modification of that law.
On April 12, a motion was presented to send a commission
to Washington, after a categorical rejection of the Platt




266 ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT


Amendment. The proposition was somewhat confused
and some who opposed the Amendment voted against the
motion. It was carried by a vote of eighteen to ten. This
was construed by some as the equivalent of a vote of rejection of the Amendment, though it was not so intended. Its
object was a determination of the conditions under which
a commission should be sent. It was, however, indicative,
though not accurately so, of the sentiment of the Convention.
It is doubtful if more than three or four members would have
voted for an outright acceptance, but some of those who
favored rejection hesitated about committing the Convention to such an extreme measure as a definite rejection at
that time. The vote was rather one of non-acceptance than
of rejection, and was tantamount to a vote to table the
measure. On April 13, the following resolution was adopted:
"Whereas, the opinion of the Convention respecting the Platt
Amendment having been already declared, further action shall
be suspended while a committee of five members shall be sent to
Washington to indicate to the Government there the desires of the
Cuban people, and to endeavor to find a basis for the establishment
of political and commercial relations satisfactory to both countries,
the committee to make a report to the Convention for its final
action."
It will be noted that although the compromise measures
submitted by Messrs. Quesada and Giberga, both of which
proposed the inclusion of provisions for commercial relations,
were rejected by overwhelming majorities, the same idea
reappeared in the foregoing resolution. Overtures for the
inclusion of a commercial treaty as a part of or as an adjunct
to the Platt Amendment, were to form a definite part of the
mission of the representatives. At the meeting on the 15th,
the following gentlemen were appointed as members of the
commission; Sehors Mendez Capote, Diego       Tamayo,




ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT 267


Leopoldo Berriel, Pedro Gonzales Llorente, and Rafael
Portuondo. Dr. Berriel being unable to go, his place was
filled by the appointment of Gen. Pedro Betancourt. On
the day following the choice of the Convention, La Discusion
stated, editorially:
"The Assembly declines to maintain further political relations
with the American Government through the Governor whose failure
is now recognized, and who assured the President that the Assembly
would accept the Platt Amendment, which caused such firm opposition among the Cuban people, and such indignant protest from
many elements, and which was only accepted by some who favor
it unwillingly through the recognition of the fatality of superior
force."
General Wood was summoned to Washington at a time
coincident with the trip of the Commission. This was far
from gratifying to the members of the Commission and their
friends, inasmuch as it was held that the presence of the
Military Governor would tend to restrain free expression of
opinion on the part of the delegates. Both parties sailed on
April 20, though by different routes, and the scene of special
interest was transferred, for the time, to Washington. The
delegates were received with every possible courtesy by the
authorities. A number of senators and representatives had
been called to the city to meet them, not, it was thought, as a
matter of courteous attention, but for the purpose of convincing them of the hopelessness of their mission.
The Commission arrived in Washington on the 24th of
April. At noon on the 25th, accompanied by Secretary
Root and Assistant Secretary Sanger, a call was made at the
White House for a brief exchange of courtesies with the
President, who referred them to Secretary Root for all discussion of the business of their errand. On the afternoon
of the same day a long discussion was sustained with Mr.




2t68 ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT


Root, at the War Department. The conference nwas secret
and the details have never been made public, although they
have been a topic of much dispute and frequent agitation.
It is known that the Secretary urged and reiterated the
arguments which had already been advanced by the supporters of the measure. It is known that the Commission
urged, as an equivalent for acceptance, the much-needed
concessions in the American tariff on Cuban products. The
delegates remained in Washington for four days, during
which dinners, lunches, and receptions were given them.
Further discussions were held with the Secretary of War in
his capacity as the representative of the President. Directly,
Mr. McKinley had little to say upon the subject of their
errand. Even the Washington correspondents were unable
to extract from the delegates any information concerning
the results of their mission. Their lips were sealed until a
report was made to their associates in Havana. Various
assertions were published from such fragments as could be
gathered. The New York Herald probably came as near
the mark as any when it declared that the Cubans would
return to Cuba carrying the assurance of President McKinley
that, following their acceptance of the Platt Amendment and
the establishment of a government, a treaty of reciprocity
would be effected with the Island. It is certain that no
encouragement whatever was given them that the terms of
the Platt Amendment would or could be modified in any
way. They were told that changes in the tariff could only
be made by Congress, and that reciprocity treaties required
the ratification of the Senate, not then in session, and that
such a treaty could not be negotiated with Cuba until after
the establishment of a Cuban Government. They were also
told, in very positive terms, that the establishment of such
a government must be preceded by Cuba's acceptance of




ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT 269


the Platt Amendment. They took away with them an
analysis of the measure, as interpreted by Secretary Root,
but were given to understand that the ultimatum of the Platt
Amendment was a decision in which there would be no
change and from which there would be no withdrawal.
After a few days of entertainment in New York, they returned to Cuba to submit a report of their work.
Between the time of the passage of the Platt Amendment
by the American Congress, and the return of the Commission
from Washington, a considerable change had taken place
in the Cuban view of that instrument. Its first effect was a
wide-spread resentment and an outburst of indignant disapproval. But the pace of manifestation of this resentment
and disapproval was too extreme for long continuance.
The Cuban, after his first volatile outbreak has passed, is a
notable philosopher. Long years of enforced submission to
the inevitable have left their stamp upon him. Once assured that he has neither choice nor alternative, he accepts
the situation with such grace as is possible. The first
vociferous protest against the terms of the Platt Amendment gradually died away and was followed by an increasing
tendency to accept the conditions imposed upon them.
The motives for this change were many and various. But it
cannot be said that the disposition to accept rested in any
idea that the conditions were, in themselves, acceptable.
The unyielding front of the administration and its supporters
convinced many of the hopelessness of continued opposition.
The desire for the immediate withdrawal of American
authority and for Cuban assumption of the reins of government was a factor which operated in a change of view with
others. This attitude was illustrated in the case of Enrique
Villuendas, who had been one of the most uncompromising
opponents of the Amendment in the Convention. Early in




270 ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT


May, in an address to his constitutents, he said: "There is
no use in objecting to the inevitable. It is either annexation
or a Republic with the Amendment. I prefer the latter."
The hope of modified terms had been shattered by the
cabled reports of the Washington conferences, and the
delegates returned to find the Cuban people in a more submissive mood. But the general attitude was still far from
one of approval.
The month of May was spent in secret discussion in the
Convention, and in conference with constituencies throughout the country. Pressure was brought to bear upon the
Convention through the channels of the local administration.
The exact nature and form of this pressure will only be
known to historians of some later day, when those who were
involved in it or cognizant of it shall have related the story
of the time. At present there is no way of verifying the
charges and allegations that were made of assurances of
political favor and preferment, of deals made by party
leaders, and of other methods common in the ramifications
of the politics of all countries. Some of the conventionales
yielded, though with reluctance in the majority of cases,
while others remained stubborn and persistent in their
attitude of objection and protest.
To some of the articles of the Amendment there had never
been any objection. The notably objectionable features
were expressed in the clauses relating to intervention, coaling stations, and the Isle of Pines. The first article was
substantially identical with the propositions of the Committee on Relations, submitted on February 96. The second
article was regarded as superfluous because its provisions were
entirely in harmony with Articles LIX, XCIII, and CV of the
Cuban Constitution. Article III was offensive as being a contradiction of Article I, and contrary to the opening declara



ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT 271


tion of the Cuban Constitution that "the people of Cuba
are hereby constituted a sovereign and independent State."
Article IV was acceptable to some but was opposed by others,
on the ground that it was a modification of the provisions
of Article XVI of the Treaty of Paris. Article V encountered
no active opposition. Article VI was objected to because it
alienated a portion of Cuba's territory and violated the
second clause of Article I of the Cuban Constitution. Article
VII was notably objectionable as constituting, byits terms, an
American protectorate over the Island. As for Article VIII,
Cuba was quite ready to effect any treaty which might be
desired by the United States so long as such a treaty did not
affect the integrity of Cuban territory or restrict Cuba's
political sovereignty.
The discussions of the month of May were an effort to
read the objectionable clauses, especially Articles III, VI, and
VII, in the light of their interpretation in Washington. The
Commission stated to their associates that they had been
informed by Secretary Root that the United States would not
interfere in Cuban affairs except in the case of an attack by
some foreign power, or in the event of the existence of a
state of anarchy; that the United States desired three coaling
stations for the maintenance of Cuban independence as
against foreign powers, and for the protection of the southern
ports of the United States; and that there was nothing in
the Amendment which restricted the establishment of diplomatic relations with other countries. They also announced
that the President had assured them of the due consideration
of their desires for advantageous commercial relations with
the United States.
No unquestionable report has ever been published concerning the assurances of either Mr. McKinley, or of Mr.
Root as the representative of Mr. McKinley, upon this




272 ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT


matter of commercial advantages. There is no question
that the Commissioners, whether justified or not, were impressed with the belief that they were practically assured,
in Washington, that concessions would be granted them in
the American tariff on Cuban products. The disputed
point has not yet been more adequately covered, publicly,
than it was in an article, written by Senator O. H. Platt, in
the North American Review for August, 1902. He says:
"When the United States required of Cuba that her Constitution
should contain guarantees which should forever place her in a
position of intimate relations with us, it was universally understood
that we, on our part, would aid her by providing such reciprocal
commercial advantages as would enable her to be self-reliant and
self-supporting."
In this statement, the Senator would appear to be both
inaccurate and illogical. Excepting in the original call for
the Convention (Civil Order No. 301), superseded by later
instructions (Civil Order No. 455), the United States had
nowhere, not even in the Platt Amendment itself, "required
of Cuba that her Constitution should contain guarantees,
etc., etc." Nor was it "universally understood that we
should aid her by providing reciprocal commercial advantages."  It was "universally understood" that commercial
relations were to remain in abeyance, and to depend upon
the possible establishment of treaty relations with the new
government. For many months, it was "universally"
denied by the administration and its supporters that any
such inducement had been given, either directly or indirectly,
to the Cuban Commission. The fact that such relations
were denied to Cuba by the next session of the American
Congress would seem to be an effective answer to the proposition of a "universal understanding" of America's purpose




ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT 273


to effect an exchange of commercial advantages for an
acceptance of such conditions as those imposed by the Platt
Amendment. The Senator further comments upon the
incident, as follows:
"While we did not ask of Cuba in form that she should not enter
into commercial arrangements with other countries to our disadvantage, the natural currents of trade made it a practical impossibility for her to do so, and a Commission sent to us from her
Constitutional Convention returned with the just expectation that
a compliance with our desires as to her constitutional guarantees
would be followed by the establishment of mutual trade relations
which would prove to be of great economic advantage to her. The
Constitutional Convention asked, as a return for their acceptance
of the provisions which we had requested, that there should be
some promise given by the United States of the establishment of
advantageous relations with us. In the nature of things, such a
promise was impossible, but the Convention was asked to act in
the premises and to trust the United States."
If the words "demands" and "demanded" be substituted
for the words " desires " and "requested," it is probable that
the case is accurately stated in Senator Platt's article. They
were asked to "act in the premises and to trust the United
States." It is evident that their confidence in the good will
and the power of the American administration led, or misled,
them into a belief that an assurance which was tantamount
to a promise had been made to the Commission. It is unfortunate that this draft on the good faith of the United
States was not promptly honored.
The discussion of the matter in the Cuban Convention
lasted until the end of May. On the 28th of that month the
Amendment was accepted by a vote of fifteen to fourteen,
the deciding vote being cast by Mendez Capote, the President
of the Convention, who, in a public speech a few weeks be



274 ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT


fore, had declared that acceptance of the Amendment would
"make it impossible to establish in Cuba a government
stable, strong, and orderly." He also declared that if the
third article were to be accepted, there would be "born a
government resting upon a supposition of incapacity."
But the acceptance voted was in a modified form, and subject to certain "explanations." The meeting was decidedly
stormy, and one member, Sehor Tamayo, declared that
those who voted in favor of the acceptance were enemies
to their country. The Convention compelled retraction of
the statement. Juan Gualberto Gomez, one of the most
forceful members of the body, denounced as perjurers all
who voted acceptance, inasmuch as they had sworn to prepare a constitution for an independent republic.
The majority report, upon which the vote was taken, after
quoting Article I of the Treaty of Paris, the Joint Resolution,
and the terms of the Platt Amendment, proceeded with the
following "explanations":
"Inasmuch as Secretary Root, being authorized by President
McKinley, says that the Platt law has for its object the guaranteeing
of the independence of Cuba, and does not mean interference with
its government, or the exercise of a protectorate or of sovereignty,
and also that intervention will only take place when independence
is endangered by outside powers or grave interior disturbances
creating anarchy, and inasmuch as Secretary Root has said that the
naval stations will not be used for vantage points of intervention, but
only to protect Cuba against foreign powers, we report as follows:
"That, in virtue of the fact that the Platt law in its preamble
says it is a fulfilment of the Joint Resolution, and has been adopted
by Congress with the principal object of establishing independence,
we do propose to the Convention to accept the following as an appendix to the Constitution."


The first, second, fourth, and fifth clauses of the Platt




ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLAIT AMENDMENT 275


Amendment are quoted in their entirety. The third clause
has the following addition:
"It being understood that the United States have the right to
intervene to prevent the action of a foreign power or disturbances
causing a state of anarchy, and that the intervention shall always
be the act of the United States, and not of isolated agents. The
intervention shall suppose neither sovereignty nor a protectorate,
and shall last only sufficiently long to establish normal conditions.
Said intervention, it is also understood, shall not have the right to
interfere in the Government, but only the right to preserve independence."
An addition to the sixth clause says that the ownership
of the Isle of Pines shall be settled by a future treaty.
An addition to the seventh clause says:
"It shall be understood that the nava) stations do not give the
United States the right to intervene in the interior government,
but are established with the sole purpose of protecting American
waters from foreign invasion directed against Cuba or the United
States. Cuba will sell or lease the necessary land at points to be
agreed upon later."
An addition to the eighth clause says that the Government of Cuba suggests at the same time a treaty of commerce
based upon reciprocity.
The accepted report was also made to include a letter
addressed to Secretary Root by Senator Platt, a copy of
which had been given to Mendez Capote while the Commission was in Washington. The letter was as follows:
"I am in receipt of your letter of this date (April 96), in which
you say that the members of the Commission of the Cuban Constitutional Convention fear that the provisions relative to intervention,
made in the third clause of the Amendment which has come to bear
my name, may have the effect of preventing the independence of
Cuba, and in reality establish a protectorate or suzerainty by the




276 ACCEPTANCE OF TIlE PLATT AMENDMENT


United States; and you request that I express my views on the
questions raised. In reply I beg to state that the Amendment was
carefully prepared with the object of avoiding any possible idea that
by the acceptance thereof the Constitutional Convention will thereby
establish a protectorate or suzerainty, or in any manner whatsoever
compromise the independence or sovereignty of Cuba; and speaking for myself it seems impossible that such an interpretation can
be given to the clause. I believe that the Amendment should be
considered as a whole; and it ought to be clear on reading it that
its well-defined purpose is to secure and safeguard Cuban independence and set forth at once a clear idea of the friendly disposition of the United States toward the Cuban people, and the express
intention on their part to aid them if necessary in the maintenance
of said independence. These are my ideas; and although, as you
say, I cannot speak for the entire Congress, my belief is that such a
purpose was well understood by that body."
This act of the Convention encountered the disapproval
of the authorities in Washington. After several conferences
between the President, Secretary Root, and Senator O. H.
Platt and Senator Spooner, it was decided at a Cabinet
meeting to notify the Convention that its action could not
be regarded as a satisfactory compliance with the American
requirements. Instructions were therefore telegraphed to
General Wood to inform the Convention that it could not
proceed with the work of establishing a government, and
that the troops would not be withdrawn until the Platt
Amendment had been accepted without qualifications. It
was after this fashion that the United States made known
to the Cubans that to which Senator Platt refers as "desires" and "requests."
Necessarily, the matter was reopened by the Convention,
and two weeks more were spent in argument and discussion.
On June 12, a motion for unqualified acceptance was voted on,
and sixteen votes were cast in the affirmative against eleven




ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT           277
in the negative. One vote had been gained for the affirmative - Sefior Ferrer, who gave as his reason that acceptance
seemed "the best solution of the problem." Four members
absented themselves, or were unavoidably absent. The
long-disputed measure, unacceptable to the Cubans, had
been imposed upon the Convention, and, so far as their acceptance was concerned, it became morally binding upon
the new government to endorse the action.




CHAPTER XVII


STRUGGLE FOR TARIFF CONCESSIONS
IN the spring of 1901, a Commission, consisting of representative Cuban planters and merchants, was sent to Washington to present the needs of the industries of the Island,
and to request consideration of their relief through a readjustment of the commercial relations between Cuba and the
United States. Unfortunately for the enterprise, the visit
of the Commissioners was coincident with the activities of
the discussion of political relations, and their errand was
overshadowed by a question which the United States regarded
as the more important issue.
At about this same period, also, the Military Governor
publicly admitted the disastrous condition of the Island's
industries. On his arrival in Washington, April 25, it was
announced by the press that he had declared to the President,
in very positive terms, that "the conditions in the Island
demanded that something be done toward modifying the
duty imposed by the United States on Cuban imports, and
he made a formal recommendation that the duty on sugar
and tobacco be reduced. His recommendation was made
so strongly that it is said the President will urge upon Congress that some legislation be enacted looking to such reduction."
The same point of industrial stress and impending disaster
was also made a leading feature of the errand of the Commission from the Constitutional Convention, and, whether




STRUGGLE FOR TARIFF CONCESSIONS


279


justified or not in so doing, the delegates returned to Cuba
with a belief that an arrangement had been effected which
would insure immediate attention to the industrial and commercial needs of the Island.
The agitation which followed led to the inauguration of a
definite campaign whose object was to secure a more favorable entry of Cuban products, particularly sugar, into the
markets of the United States. The sugar planters as individuals, and the Cuban Planters Association (Circulo de
HIacendados) had been at work for many months in such
directions as it was possible for them to exert influence.
The tobacco interest had been urging its claims through
other channels. During the month of August, the Association of Tobacco Buyers and the Cigar Makers Union held
meetings and prepared memorials from their point of view.
The Military Governor also became actively concerned,
and, with funds appropriated from the insular treasury,
employed agents in the United States and in Cuba to carry
on an energetic propaganda. October opened with a
general exhibition of popular interest throughout the Island.
The third day of October was made a general holiday, and
people of all classes, bankers, merchants, planters, employers
and employes, united in public demonstrations. A procession numbering 15,000 men paraded the streets of Havana,
and marched to the Palace, where a committee presented a
petition to the Military Governor, requesting the reduction
of the United States tariff on sugar and tobacco. In Santiago, the Chamber of Commerce called a public meeting
at which it was reported eight thousand were present, to endorse a similar memorial. Similar meetings were held in
other cities. Telegrams were sent to Washington from cities
and towns in all parts of the Island, urging the necessity
for prompt attention to Cuba's economic condition.




280  STRUGGLE FOR TARIFF CONCESSIONS


During the months of October and November, the movement gathered strength and became more coherent. On
November 94, there gathered in Washington a group of
Cuban merchants, manufacturers, and planters. On the
26th, they called upon the President to pay their respects and
to announce officially their mission. Several days were
spent in conference with members of the Cabinet and prominent members of Congress. They were accorded a courteous
reception, but were given little or no encouragement to believe that their requests would receive any immediate
attention.
Close upon the heels of this committee, General Wood
appeared, ostensibly to discuss with the Secretary of War the
steps to be taken in the pending transfer of the Cuban
Government. Whether or not that was the actual object of
his visit, it is certain that every possible use was made of
his presence to advance the interests of the Cuban cause,
into which the President had plunged with characteristic
vigor.
The annual report of the Secretary of War appeared
during the last week in November. In that report, Mr. Root
urged the wisdom and the necessity of granting tariff concessions to the products of the Island. He rested his argument in a special manner upon the ground of moral obligation and public policy. He said:
"Aside from the moral obligation to which we committed ourselves when we drove Spain out of Cuba, and aside from the ordinary
considerations of commercial advantage involved in a reciprocity
treaty, there are the weightiest reasons of American public policy
pointing in the same direction; for the peace of Cuba is necessary
to the peace of the United States; the health of Cuba is necessary to
the health of the United States; the independence of Cuba is necessary to the safety of the United States. The same considerations




STRUGGLE FOR TARIFF CONCESSIONS


281


which led to the war with Spain now require that a commercial
arrangement be made under which Cuba can live. The condition
of the sugar and tobacco industries in Cuba is already such that
the earliest possible action by Congress upon this subject is desirable."
In his annual message to Congress at its opening session,
a few days later, President Roosevelt placed himself squarely
on the side of the Cuban claimants. His views followed
the same line as that taken by Secretary Root, and a similar
argument was used regarding moral obligations and public
policy. The President said:
"Elsewhere I have discussed the question of reciprocity. In the
case of Cuba, however, there are weighty reasons of morality and
of national interest why the policy should be held to have a peculiar
application, and I most earnestly ask your attention to the wisdom,
indeed to the vital need, of providing for a substantial reduction
in the tariff duties on Cuban imports into the United States. Cuba
has in her Constitution affirmed what we desired, that she should
stand, in international matters, in closer and more friendly relations
with us than with any other power; and we are bound by every
consideration of honor and expediency to pass commercial measures
in the interest of her material well-being."
The pro-Cuban forces were thus drawn up for the coming
struggle, and the President and the Secretary of War declared themselves allies of Cuba. Their action involved
the endorsement and the support of the administration's
following among the press.
The opposing force which appeared in greatest prominence
was the lobby organized by the beet sugar producers of the
United States. Forewarned by the agitation of the preceding months, and apprehensive of legislative action which
would affect their industry, the American beet sugar interests of the country organized, and established in Wash



282  STRUGGLE FOR TARIFF CONCESSIONS


ington one of the most aggressive and persistent lobbies
which had been seen in many years. This organization
drew to itself as allies the cane sugar producers of Louisiana
and the tobacco growers of various States. It was also
generally understood that it received strong support from
the Hawaiian sugar industry, and, at the least, a fair measure
of encouragement from various interests in other lines which
feared that a reduction of tariff rates on Cuban products
might be used as a precedent for a general attack on the tariff.
There was an early development of the fact that the
Fifty-seventh Congress, standing as its majority did for the
policy of protection to American industries, was opposed to
action in the case of Cuba. It feared that tariff concessions
or a reciprocity treaty of any kind, with Cuba or any other
country, would be a letting down of the bars through which
unnumbered industrial evils would enter. At its opening,
Congress was arrayed upon the side of Cuba's opponents,
and in opposition to the expressed views of the Chief Executive. The attitude of this opposition is fairly presented in
the following published interview with one of the leaders of
the House of Representatives. Mr. Sereno E. Payne, of
New York, Chairman of the House Committee on Ways
and Means, said:
"If we revised our tariff law to allow Cuban sugar to come in
free, or at a reduced rate, we would, by reason of the 'most favored
nation' clause, have to admit sugar at the same rate from every
nation with which we have a treaty. That would mean practically
the same reduction to all sugar-producing countries. On the other
hand, Cuba has no government with which we can make a reciprocal arrangement, and it is not to be expected that our people are
going to give her a reduction on her sugar, tobacco, and spirits
without getting something in return. But with whom are we to
treat in negotiating a reciprocity arrangement?"




STRUGGLE FOR TARIFF CONCESSIONS


283


During their interviews with the officials, the Cuban
visitors were assured that no action in their case was possible
for the Executive beyond that of earnest recommendation to
Congress. They were told that power to act rested in Congress and in Congress alone. There was no treaty-making
power in Cuba. The only government was our own, and
it was manifestly impossible to make a treaty with ourselves. The War Department doubtless had power to change
the Cuban tariff in any way it saw fit. The tariff under
which the Government of Intervention acted, was of American installation, and it had been both changed and modified.
But power to change the American tariff rested in the House
of Representatives, under the Constitution, as a measure
affecting the national revenues. General Wood returned
to Cuba at this time, leaving as a parting shot the declaration that "unless something is done at once to afford relief
to the planters, bankruptcy will befall the greater number
of them. They will not be able to pay the money they have
borrowed to make the present crop. They cannot keep
their laborers employed, and the latter will be reduced to
beggary or brigandage. The situation is already desperate.
It may become revolutionary."
The interest of General Wood in the matter was almost
vital, and his position was somewhat critical. The historian
of a few years later will measure his ability as an administrator, not by the amount of money expended for educational
purposes, nor by the number of miles of streets which were
swept each day, but by the general welfare, industrial as
well as sociological, economic as well as sanitary, of the
Cuban people.
Interest in the pending contest soon became national.
The press of the country plunged into an animated campaign
in which party lines, and even respect for party policies,




284  STRUGGLE FOR TARIFF CONCESSIONS


were generally obliterated. Republican, Democratic, and
Independent papers throughout the United States demanded
prompt and favorable action in the matter of Cuba's needs.
No more than a limited number of papers of any note or
standing in the country placed themselves in opposition.
Congress, however, before its adjournment for the holidays,
remained obdurate and persistent in its indifference. Two
points were made plain by the developments of the month
of December. One of these was that a hard and protracted
fight was impending. The other was that Congress, the
press, and the people were broadly destitute of adequate
information regarding the actual situation in the Island of
Cuba, and, as well, regarding the special lines of industry
concerned in and affected by the controversy.
As the case stood, the arguments were - for the plaintiff,
Cuba, that if concessions were not granted in the existing
tariffs on her products, the Island would be immediately
and hopelessly ruined, industrially, financially, and governmentally. The argument for the defendant, the American
beet sugar industry, was, that if such concessions were made,
a promising American enterprise would be strangled in its
infancy. Three interests were concerned:
First - Special groups of American citizens. These were
represented by producers of sugar, whether from cane or
from beet, within the established boundaries of the United
States, including Hawaii and Porto Rico.
Second - The people of Cuba, for whom the United States,
by its own act and recognition, had become sponsor in the
various departments of their social, political, and economic
life.
Third - The people of the United States as a whole.
This interest involved their opportunity to purchase sugar,
from any and all sources, at the cheapest possible price.




STRUGGLE FOR TARIFF CONCESSIONS


285


It also involved the moral obligation of these people to
create in the Island of Cuba such conditions as would make
it possible for the Cubans to establish "a stable government
capable of maintaining order, insuring peace and tranquillity, and the security of its citizens as well as our own."
Such an establishment was impossible except upon a basis
of the reasonable prosperity of the Cuban people. Unless
such a government should be established, the United States
would become responsible for failure to justify its own interference between Spain and her West Indian colony.
Upon the reassembling of Congress, on Jan. 6, 1902,
after the holiday recess, it became evident that some of the
House leaders, at least, had "heard from their constituents."
It was also evident that, although convinced that public
opinion demanded favorable action upon the Cuban matter,
these gentlemen were "of the same opinion still," and that
action, if undertaken, would be only half-hearted, and every
effort be made to protract investigation and postpone decision. The beet sugar lobby adopted and pursued the
questionable policy of threatening the defeat of various
members at the coming elections, and both sides prepared
for the coming struggle.
Questions were raised concerning the moral and legal
responsibility of the United States for the industrial welfare
of the Island. One side of the case was stated by Senator
Burrows, of Michigan, a strenuous opponent of Cuban
reciprocity. He said, with more of wit than logic, "We
rushed in there (to Cuba) and drove away the man who was
beating his wife, but we did not agree to support the children."
Senator Platt, of Connecticut, with more of logic than wit,
declared that, "No man is bound to adopt a child, as we
have adopted Cuba; but having adopted a child, he is in all
ways bound to provide for it."




286  STRUGGLE FOR TARIFF CONCESSIONS


The hearing before the Ways and Means Committee began on the fifteenth. Nine days were consumed, and the
results are published in a volume of 752 pages. The arguments and the statements of the various parties to the controversy were heard by the majority of the committee with
every evidence of indifference and boredom. Cuba had
no energetic advocate in the body, and the investigation was
largely carried on by members who sought to support an
opposition argument rather than to draw out facts. The
Cuban representation was badly organized, or rather it was
not organized at all, and their case was inadequately presented. The general attitude of the committee was partisan
and hostile rather than broad-minded and judicial.
The month of February saw a marked change in the
attitude of the House leaders. The clamor of the press
throughout the country, the expression of public and private
opinion, the gloomy reports and urgent petitions from the
Island, and the persistent pressure of the administration,
made it plain to the obstructionist leaders that favorable
action was imperative, and they effected a reluctant and
half-hearted change of front. This complicated the situation. There was no claim of change of opinion upon the
main issue. The move was made on distinctly political
grounds. The press might clamor, and the public might
demand upon the ground of general welfare and national
honor. These might have their weight, but they met with
no response until it became evident that there was serious
danger of antagonism between the House and the administration, and darkening menace of a split in the party. Then
the leaders yielded, though most ungraciously. This made
matters exceedingly awkward for those who, thus far, had
followed their leaders. Should they, sheep-like, still follow,
or should they continue to stand upon the ground which




STRUGGLE FOR TARIFF CONCESSIONS


287


they had been led to take by those who then deserted them?
It was the inevitable outcome of following narrow policies
rather than broad principles. Upon one hand, they faced
the dreaded opposition to their leaders in their newly taken
position. On the other hand, they faced the loss of their
own self-respect and the respect of their fellows.
The changed front of the leaders, several of whom were
members of the Ways and Means Committee, made it possible for that committee, by a party vote and without the
assistance of their Democratic associates, to draft a bill in
favor of a concession to Cuba. Ordinarily, the presentation
of such a bill by the majority of the committee would insure
its passage by a party vote in the House. But the complicated situation, created by the surrender of the position
previously held by the House leaders, made the fate of the
bill doubtful as a distinct party measure for which there
could be claimed the credit presumably attached to satisfactory legislation.
A campaign was instituted within the party. The Cuban
question ceased to be a question of Cuba. The Island and
its interests, the United States and its interests, the honor
of the country, and public opinion, were all submerged as
mere incidents in the larger problem of holding the party
together. The daily papers were full of stories of the struggle.
Conferences were held, influence was exerted in various
ways, members of the Senate took an unofficial hand. The
defection from the "insurgent" ranks came slowly and gradually, but it came. Meanwhile, Cuba, the original cause,
stood outside the gates in suffering expectancy; the press
poured out columns of vigorous criticism and even denunciation-Republican and Democratic press alike, regardless of
party; while all over the country there were heard individual threats to remember the incident at the next election.




288. STRUGGLE FOR TARIFF CONCESSIONS


If the system of Congressional procedure had made it
possible to submit to the House of Representatives, as a
body, the direct proposition of concessions or no concessions,
reciprocity or no reciprocity, there is hardly room for doubt
that a very considerable majority of the body would have
declared in favor of such a measure. The extent of the
concession, or the basis of a reciprocity treaty, is uncertain,
but it is probable that it would have been in the vicinity of
thirty to forty per cent. Under the methods employed,
such a vote was not to be had. The Senate, seemingly at
the time more ready to act than the House, was debarred
from active interference by the rule of Congressional courtesy.
Senators and House leaders were frequently called to the
White House for consultation. As the days passed, Cuba's
prospects darkened. Sugar prices showed a constant
downward tendency, influenced by an enormous surplus
supply of European beet sugar. The opposition became
more and more coherent, more and more stubborn and unyielding. The details of the struggle are too long and too
complex for inclusion here. The first three weeks of March
were a repetition of the month of February - endless discussion without definite results.
At a party conference on the night of March 18, action
was taken on the question of presenting to the House the
majority report of the Ways and Means Committee, known
as the Payne bill. This conference vote was not upon the
measure itself, but upon the expediency of presenting such
a measure for action in the House. The resolution was
accepted by a vote of eighty-five to thirty-one.
The next day, March 19, Chairman Payne, of the Ways
and Means Committee, introduced in the House the following bill, entitled "To provide for reciprocal trade relations
with Cuba":




STRUGGLE FOR TARIFF CONCESSIONS


289


"That for the purpose of securing reciprocal trade relations
with Cuba, the President is hereby authorized, as soon as may be
after the establishment of an independent government in Cuba,
and the enactment by said government of immigration and exclusion laws as fully restrictive of immigration as the laws of the
United States, to enter into negotiations with said government with
a view to the arrangement of a commercial agreement in which
reciprocal and equivalent concessions may be secured in favor of
the products and manufactures of the United States by rates of
duty which shall be less by an amount equivalent to at least twenty
per cent ad valorem, upon such products and manufactures, than
the rates imposed upon the like articles when imported into Cuba
from the most favored of other countries, and shall not be greater
than the rates imposed by the United States upon the like articles
imported from Cuba; and whenever the Government of Cuba shall
enact such immigration and exclusion laws, and shall enter into such
commercial agreement with the United States and shall make
such concessions in favor of the products and manufacturers thereof
as aforesaid, and which agreement, in the judgment of the President, shall be reciprocal and equivalent, he shall be authorized to
proclaim such facts, both as to the enactment of such immigration
and exclusion laws and the making of such agreement, and thereafter, until the first day of December, 1903, the imposition of the
duties now imposed by law on all articles imported from Cuba, the
products thereof, into the United States shall be suspended, and in
lieu thereof shall be levied, collected, and paid upon all such articles
imported from Cuba eighty per cent of the rate of duty now levied
upon like articles imported from foreign countries.
"The President shall have power, and it shall be his duty,
whenever he shall be satisfied that either such immigration or
exclusion laws or such agreement mentioned in this act are not
being fully executed by the Government of Cuba to notify such
government thereof, and thereafter there shall be levied, collected,
and paid upon all articles imported from Cuba the full rate of duty
provided by law upon articles imported from foreign countries."




290  STRUGGLE FOR TARIFF CONCESSIONS


This was a compromise measure, and few if any were
satisfied with it. Its meagre provision was a disappointment to the general public. It broke the policy for which
many of Cuba's opponents and half-hearted friends had
been standing, and accomplished little or nothing that
would be of material benefit to either country.
On March 31, the Payne bill was favorably reported in
the House from the Ways and Means Committee. On
April 8, it was taken up by a vote of 177 to 80.
In the main, the supporters of the movement for reciprocity
with Cuba stood upon the plane of moral obligation. In
the main, its opponents stood upon the maintenance of a
policy which they held to be a principle - the doctrine of
protection to home industries.
A vote was taken on the bill with the Sibley Amendment
providing a time limit, and the Morris Amendment providing
the abolition of the "differential." This was approved by a
vote of 247 to 52, forty-three Republicans and nine Democrats voting against it. The bill then went to the Senate
for its action.
While the matter had been under formal deliberation,
first by the Ways and Means Committee and later by the
House, it had been under an active though informal consideration by the members of the Senate. Conferences
between the President and the Senate leaders had been
frequent, and personal conferences between Senators and
Representatives had been of almost daily occurrence. There
were many throughout the country who hoped and believed
that the Senate was prepared to and would act promptly
upon the question and increase the petty twenty per cent
proposed by the House bill. In this they were disappointed.
At the time of the sending of the Cuban reciprocity bill
from the House to the Senate, the latter body was engaged




STRUGGLE FOR TARIFF CONCESSIONS


291


in an active struggle over the Philippines self-government
bill, and the Cuban measure was held pending the determination of that contest. An active controversy was also
in process regarding the Isthmian Canal, and between those
and the routine work of the Senate, the Cuban bill failed to
come up for direct consideration.
From the very beginning of the session, every possible
effort was made by certain members of Congress to befog
the issue, to delay and, if possible, to prevent action. These
men were numbered among the leaders in both Houses. In
the lower House the issue was delayed for four months, and
was endlessly tangled before the passage of a confused and
unsatisfactory measure. The Senate repeated, in effect, the
experience of the House. A group of "insurgents" fought
for delay, only too successfully, and added to the general
confusion. Before the beginning of February, there had
been urgent calls upon the President for a special message.
Two or three times, the President was reported as being on
the eve of issuing such a message, but he was induced to
withhold it. With the opening days of June, Senate action seemed so improbable that, on the thirteenth, a special
message was sent. It was little more than a routine repetition of arguments that had been thoroughly threshed out
during the campaign. Ultra-administration organs pronounced it a "ringing message," and declared that it cleared
the air by lifting the whole question to a high moral plane.
In fact, it lifted the question no higher than it had been for
months, and the political atmosphere remained quite as
murky as ever. Eighteen Republican senators, led by Senator Burrows, of Michigan, had joined the beet sugar ranks,
and stood immovable. Compromise efforts and measures
failed, and the question was raised whether there was not
on foot a definite purpose to starve Cuba into annexation.




292  STRUGGLE FOR TARIFF CONCESSIONS


On the 1st of July, the long session of the Fifty-seventh Congress adjourned without final action on the Cuban reciprocity
bill. Commenting editorially upon the matter, the Review
of Reviews ably presented the case for the public, by saying:
"Congress, in the opinion of the best intelligence and judgment
of the country, was guilty of one great sin of omission in failing
to live up to the moral obligation of the United States to do something for the economic relief of Cuba. It would have been nothing
more than decent to have admitted all Cuban crops of the present
year to the ports of the United States duty free. We had taken
control, and had spent Cuba's revenues freely in reconstructing
matters according to our own ideas. It was due to our self-respect
to give the new Cuban Government a handsome send-off. Economic
prosperity, as every one knew, was essential both to the success of
Cuba's experiment in home rule, and to the establishment of
permanently satisfactory relations between Cuba and the United
States. Certain Western agricultural interests, creditably eager to
promote the development of the American beet sugar industry,
were used as a cats-paw by a designing combination which, in
turn, had power enough in Washington to prevent any action
whatever. The situation became a very complicated and involved
one; but its outlines will be clear in due time."
The notably weak point in this comment lies in the assertion that "every one knew" that "economic prosperity was
essential both to" the success of Cuba's new government and
to the establishment of desirable relations between the two
countries. If these facts were so clearly realized, it is most
unfortunate that they should have been, for three years, so
persistently ignored. It is unfortunate that those who urged
them encountered only opposition, and sometimes obloquy,
and drew upon themselves the antagonism of the administration press, and the local administrator in Cuba. That
the economic needs of the Island were neglected from the
very beginning is shown by all the testimony of competent




STRUGGLE FOR TARIFF CONCESSIONS


293


observers, by the reports of the Cuban Secretary of Agriculture, by the comments and statements of the insular press,
and by the entire history of the period of occupation. Again
and again the Military Governor asserted that the Island
was prosperous and the people contented. The Secretary
of War visited the Island and presented the same report on
his return. The complaints of the Cuban press, printed in
Spanish, were seldom available for American readers. Visitors to the Island saw the well-swept streets of Havana, and
listened to glowing reports of educational establishment,
sanitation, and the decrease of yellow fever, and went home
to declare that all was well, without having had even a
glimpse of the real Cuba.
The congressional sin of failure to act at this juncture was
more pardonable than the sin of the administration in Cuba,
in its omission to do that which might have been done to
prevent the crisis which resulted from its neglect of Cuba's
economic needs. That sin was glaring, and inevitably rose
to threaten us. A fair measure of industrial prosperity is
the only basis for national content, the touchstone of successful administration, the very groundwork of social and
political stability. Cuba, at the close of America's rule in
the Island, was poorer, financially and industrially, than she
had been in earlier days when revolt followed revolt for the
improvement of her economic condition. We spent Cuba's
revenues with liberal hand along lines of vast importance,
but upon a scale which was not imperative, and which might
have been modified until the burden entailed by their establishment could have been easily carried by the profits of general industry. The failure of Congress to relieve a situation
for which we and our agents were so largely responsible, is
only less lamentable and only less blameworthy than our
failure to avert the situation.




CHAPTER XVIII


INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE
INDUSTRIAL prostration and commercial stagnation were
the inevitable results of warfare conducted on the ruthless
lines of the struggle between Spain and her rebellious colony.
Figures are not available upon which it is safe to base statements of trade losses, or to essay comparisons. Official
figures may be quoted, but there is no guarantee whatever
of the correctness of those figures. The methods pursued
in the custom houses of the Island, during the Spanish
regime, were such that no reliance can be placed on even
the published official reports. From all obtainable reports
and statements, only one inference is possible. That is,
that the methods of Spanish administration in Cuba's
custom houses were nothing other than well-organized corruption. No secret was made of it. By a recognized and
established collusion between the importer and the employes
and officials in the custom house, coffee, upon which the duty
was $12.15 per 100 kilos, might come in as corn as $2.40 per
100 kilos. A piano, upon which the duty was fixed at $115,
might come in as an organ, at half its proper valuation and
a lower rate of duty. Lace might come in as cotton goods,
and sheet copper, at $14 per 100 kilos, might come in as
sheet iron at $2.90. False entry and undervaluation make
it impossible to state with accuracy the precise extent of
Cuban importation in the days of Spanish control. The
same applies in only a less degree regarding exports.




INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE


295


In round figures, the exports for 1893 and 1894 may be
given as $100,000,000, and the imports as $60,000,000. It
is probable that the imports are more greatly undervalued
than the exports, but the facts in either case are impossible
of determination.
Evidence of this corruption in the custom houses lies in
the fact that under the honest administration of that department by General Bliss, there was obtained an annual
revenue of $15,000,000 to $16,000,000, whereas under the
old system and a higher rate of duty, a fairly prosperous
Cuba, making larger purchases, obtained only some
$12,000,000 from the same source of revenue. This could
only result from corruption in the Cuban custom houses
and falsified entries at the port of shipment, whether in
Europe or America.
As a result of the war, the exports of the Island fell off
about one-half for the year 1896, and the imports were reduced about one-third, yet, according to the figures given,
the balance of trade was still in favor of the Island. The
commerce for the term of American occupation is given by
the Collector of Customs, General Bliss, as follows:
IMPORTS        EXPORTS
1899.................... $74,845,186.00  $49,327,724.00
1900.................... 69,887,547.00  51,363,498.00
1901.................... 67,751,911.00  66,502,533.00
1902 (5 mos., 19 days)...... 25,157,300.00  23,133,719.00
Total............... $237,641,944.00 $190,327,474.00
This statement shows an apparent balance of trade
against the Island of $47,314,470. This should be reduced
by the sum of $3,016,542, which represents the balance in
shipments of coin and bullion. The debit balance in merchandise shipments for the period of intervention is, there



296


INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE


fore, $44,297,928. The merchandise exports and imports
were:
IMPORTS        EXPORTS
1899.................... $66,308,185.00  $44,173,280.00
1900.................... 66,464,467.00  48,925,846.00
1901....................  66,582,776.00  63,278,744.00
1902 (5 mos., 19 days)...... 24,367,192.00  23,046,822.00
Total...............$223,722,620.00 $179,424,692.00
These figures are interesting and suggestive. The importation figures, notwithstanding the dire poverty of the
Island, particularly during 1899, are above those shown
during the years of the Spanish regime. The table of exports shows an increase of nearly fifty per cent during
the occupation. This is accounted for almost exclusively
by the increased output of raw sugar. The crop of 1898 -1899 yielded 335,668 tons, while that of 1901-1902 approximated 800,000 tons. This increase was due entirely to individual initiative and enterprise, and not at all to governmental influence beyond the fact of the establishment of
peace. That January, 1900, saw the people of the Island
in better condition than they were twelve months before is
unquestionable. In January, 1899, thousands were being
cared for as objects of charity. A year later, they were
maintaining themselves as best they could by their own
labor. Gradually they pulled themselves into a position of
somewhat precarious self-maintenance. So remarkable a
change was effected within a few short months that it became customary for those who saw the rehabilitation which
Cuban industry effected, to boast of what the United States
had done toward the industrial reconstruction of the Island.
But so far as the great mass of the Cuban peasantry was
concerned, their reestablishment reached the point of mere
maintenance, and there stopped. More was impossible




INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE


297


from lack of means and facilities. Compared with their
condition in 1894, when protest against oppressive conditions
led to armed revolt, they were, in 1899, in a far more evil
state. To that great power which had relieved them from
the heavy hand of Spain they looked for the realization of
their hopes for industrial freedom and prosperity.
Sugar and tobacco have long been the great wealth-producing crops of Cuba. The production of these, notably
sugar, was seriously interrupted during the war period.
The sugar crop fell from 1,054,214 long tons for the season
of 1893-94, and 1,004,264 in 1894-95, to 225,221 in 1895-96,
and 212,051 in 1896-97, and 305,543 in 1897-98. Inasmuch as a large percentage of the cost of sugar production
is represented by labor, it is quite within bounds to say that
Cuba, with a population of little more than one and a half
millions, was a loser of more than $100,000,000, during
those three seasons, from this cause alone. Upon the same
basis of a normal average production, the following three
seasons show a further loss of nearly another $100,000,000.
These figures are given as, approximately, the sum which,
under normal conditions, would have been paid to the
people of the Island for their labor and their services in the
various departments of sugar production alone during the
war period and the three years of Intervention.
While the great mass of the Island people were prostrate,
and many of them utterly helpless, a few estates had been
able to continue their operations, and these were in the beginning of the grinding season at the time of the American
occupation. Peace conditions enabled others to essay the
cleaning up of their devastated fields and the repair of their
partially wrecked machinery. This made a call for laborers,
and in some sections the supply was a long way from sufficient.




298


INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE


This was notably the case in the mining areas of Santiago
province.
Stocks of merchandise had been greatly depleted during
the period of the blockade, and, after the signing of the
protocol, merchants generally waited the developments of
the new order of things before replenishing their shelves and
warehouses. The provision for Spanish evacuation and
American control, and the issuance, in December, 1898, of
the new tariff schedule, effecting a very considerable reduction
in the former rates, opened the door to a greatly increased
importation. Notwithstanding the general poverty and
distress on the Island, trade conditions, as such, were quite
active. The presence of a large body of American troops,
scattered throughout the Island, and of several thousand
civilians, tourists, and department clerks, made a demand
for merchandise of various kinds. The commerce of the
Island was, and still is, almost exclusively in the hands of
Spaniards. The merchants had suffered loss by interruption to their business, but it is a striking fact that there was
not a commercial failure of any note during either the war
period or the term of Intervention.
The new tariff schedule, established by virtue of military
authority, effected a material reduction in the Cuban tariff
with no small advantage to merchants and producers in
the United States. Regarding the former Spanish tariff,
Commissioner Porter stated in his report to the Secretary
of the Treasury, under date of Nov. 15, 1898:
"The Spanish tariff was made by Spaniards, for Spain, in the
interests of the Spanish. That seems to be the only principle in
it. On any other theory, it was inexplicable.... Its rates were
full of inequalities, and were not levied on any sound principle,
but on the 'heads Spain wins and tails Cuba loses' idea, which
prevails in the whole fiscal fabric."




INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE


299


The new tariff was issued, under executive order from
Washington, under date of Dec. 13, 1898. It was based
upon the result of the investigations of Mr. Porter, and while
it was admittedly faulty and unsuitable, it was without doubt
the best that could be done in the available time. By its
provisions, a material reduction was effected.
This tariff was, necessarily, merely provisional. Sundry
minor modifications were effected from time to time to meet
the exigencies of special cases. Under an order issued in
Washington on March 31, 1900, a new tariff went into
effect on June 15, 1900. Concerning the new schedule,
Colonel Bliss, Collector of Customs, in his report dated
August 6, says:
"This tariff is a modification of the one promulgated to go into
effect on the first day of January, 1899, and differs in no way from
the latter as concerns the principles of its construction. For the
most part, the changes introduced were for the purpose of obviating
difficulties which had arisen in the application of the previous
tariff, removing ambiguities, etc.
"The tariff which was prepared to go into operation at the
beginning of the military occupation of Cuba was, naturally and
properly under the circumstances, a translation of the pre-existing
Spanish tariff, with such modifications in the rates of duty as were
suggested and demanded by the existing conditions of the Island.
The principal change, therefore, consisted in a general reduction
of duties, combined with the abolition of the previous differential
in favor of Spanish trade. The classification which prevailed
under the Spanish regime was in general adhered to under the
American administration of the customs service. This course
was the proper, since the power to classify is really the power to
make a tariff, and were any other course pursued, it could be justly
charged against the customs administration that it was assuming
the power which had been intrusted to those who prepared the
tariff. But it required very little experience to show that the




300


INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE


original tariff was devised to meet conditions and to facilitate
practices and methods of business which were not supposed to be
allowed under the new administration; that the tariff of which
its successor was a literal translation was so constructed, - perhaps
inadvertently, - as to enable customs officials to defraud and
plunder importers, on the one side, and the Government on the
other. It is difficult to conceive of an engine for fraud more ingeniously constructed, and such was its use, whatever may have
been the motives which originally inspired it. It was so devised as
to permit and encourage fraud in varying degrees, by the various
officials of the Custom House, from the highest to the lowest.
This machinery, with all its possibilities of crime, was placed in
the hands of an American administration composed of an extremely
limited personnel, and upon which was imposed the responsibility
that the engine should no longer be worked as one of crime and
oppression, while at the same time many of its complicated parts
had to be operated by those who could so use it, and who could not
be altogether prevented if they so desired."
The provisions of the new schedule gave to the United
States a virtual monopoly of Cuban trade in fresh beef,
pork, eggs, flour, coal, coal oil, machinery, railroad iron,
and various other articles of important consumption in the
Island of Cuba. Upon many other lines, such as cattle,
rice, wines, salt, preserved fruits, dried beef, cottons, linens,
woolens, silk, shoes, and hats, the rates stood at points which
practically barred the United States merchants and producers from even a reasonable competition with the countries of Europe and South America. The changes which
were effected in the Cuban tariff during the term of American
occupation produced no change, properly attributable to
the tariff, either in the gross imports of the Island, or in
the gross amount of trade with the United States. The
total imports of merchandise for the years of the occupation
are given upon a preceding page in this chapter. The




INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE


301


trade with the United States, coin and bullion included, appears as follows:
EXPORT TO U. S. IMPORT FROM U. S.
1899.................... $34,381,738.00  $37,188,597.00
1900.................... 33,571,994.00  32,248,595.00
1901.................... 50,016,318.00  28,469,251.00
1902 (5 mos., 19 days).... 16,631,002.00  11,217,080.00
The duties imposed under the tariff of June, 1900, were the
equivalent of twenty-one and a half per cent on an ad valorem
basis. About the first of March, 1901, a commission was
appointed for the purpose of drafting a more suitable tariff
schedule, based upon the need of a revenue of some $15,000,000 a year from the customs service, and yet having due regard for the industrial and commercial welfare of the Island.
The report of this board was presented in September, but
it was not acted upon by the authorities. It was held that
in view of the impending transfer of governmental control
the matter should be left for determination by the Cuban
government after its establishment.
Reference has already been made to the disastrous falling off in the amount of sugar produced in the Island during
the war period. Coincident with this there was a marked
reduction in the market price of that commodity. Manipulation of the European beet sugar output, under a system
of tariffs and bounties, enabled an organization known as
the "Kartel" to place its sugars in the world's markets at a
figure which was below the actual cost of production. With
that sugar Cuba was obliged to compete. Her market
was the United States, and prices in that market were based
on Hamburg quotations of European beet sugar. This,
naturally, added to the general stringency of the conditions
of the Island. The United States was not directly responsible for the misfortunes which fell upon the Cuban sugar




302


INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE


planter as a result of artificial trade conditions on the Continent of Europe. Yet responsibility did rest with the
United States to establish, in its own interest as well as in
that of Cuba, those favorable economic conditions which
are so distinctly the basis of sound and healthy government.
It was recognized by careful observers and students that
Cuba's political difficulties would be most readily solved
through the channels of industrial activity and prosperity.
There was grave question whether they could be solved
along any other lines. The attention of the government
was frequently called to the fact. In a memorial addressed
to President McKinley, in November, 1899, by representatives of the Planters and Farmers Association of Cuba
(Circulo de Haccndados y Agricultores), there appears the
following statement:
"If the sugar industry is rehabilitated in Cuba; if the work in
tobacco plantations is revived; if the mining industry is again
manned, then and at that time, but not before, the pacification of
the Island, which, to the honor and glory of the United States,
was the purpose of the Joint Resolution of Congress, approved by
you on April 20, 1898, will be consummated.
"No student of history or close observer of contemporary events,
can ignore for a moment that at the very bottom of the troubles
between Cuba and Spain the violation by the latter of the economic
laws, as eternal and sure in their action as the laws of nature, was
always to be found as a factor of the greatest prominence."
Many presentations of a similar tenor were made during
and prior to the first year of occupation. None of them
would appear to have got beyond the point of "consideration." During the entire period of intervention there appears
to have been an almost total disregard of the difficulty of
establishing a successful and enduring government over a
poverty-stricken people. A prosperous people will endure




INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE               303
without complaint a vast amount of governmental iniquity
and oppression. A poor and hungry people will be discontented under a government which may be in all ways morally
and mechanically perfect. The contemplation of an ideal
administration is little satisfactory to a ragged citizen with
an empty stomach. In ignoring this fundamental fact,
the United States committed its most serious error in its
experience in the Island of Cuba.




CHAPTER XIX


LAW AND JUSTICE
THAT the United States had the power to effect radical
changes in the existing legal system of Cuba, is shown by
the fact that such changes were made. The legal or moral
right to interfere in any way with the established laws of a
land which our Supreme Court declared to be "foreign
territory," beyond the point of necessity for the immediate
maintenance of law and order and the protection of life and
property, has been called in question. Yet this right was
assumed, and the assumption was endorsed by the administration at Washington.
The maladministration of the laws in force in the Island,
under the Spanish regime, gave rise to a belief that the evil
lay in the laws themselves. In an address before the Ohio
Bar Association, on July 12, 1899, the Hon. William Wirt
Howe made the following statement:
"The student of Spanish jurisprudence is impressed with the
learning and the juristic ability which it displays. There is no
trouble in this respect. It is a noble system. But the contrast
between the splendid science of the system and the moral quality
of its administration in the Spanish colonies, is something very
pathetic."
The Spanish system of jurisprudence is, like all such
systems, the result of development. Walton, in his Civil
Law in Spain and Spanish America (page 22), summarizes
the history of Spanish law under six headings:




LAW AND JUSTICE


305


The Primitive Period, Sixteenth Century B.C. to 414 A.D.
The Visigoth Epoch, 414 to 687 A.D.
The Hispano-Gothic Period, 687-700 to 711 A.D.
The Saracenic Invasion, 711 to 1255 A.D.
The re-establishment of Roman Laws, 1255 to 1810.
The Modern Epoch, 1810 to 1900.
With the establishment of her vast colonial interests,
during the early years of the sixteenth century, it became
necessary for Spain to provide laws and legal processes for
the new territory which had been acquired by conquest and
by discovery.
In 1524, there was issued a royal decree of which the
following was a part:
"Considering the great benefits and advantages which, by the
grace of God, we have received, and every day do receive, from
the increase and growth of the Kingdom and dominions of our
Indies; and being well advised of the obligation and duty towards
them which this imposes upon us, we are solicitous, on our part
(with God's assistance), to devise suitable means by which such
great kingdoms and dominions may be governed and ruled in a
proper manner."
This appears as a sort of preamble to a decree establishing
a body known as the Council of the Indies. Walton's Civil
Law in Spain and Spanish America (page 520) says: "The
Council of the Indies had supreme jurisdiction over all the
colonies; all the laws and ordinances of viceroys and governors were subject to its approval; and it had power to
frame laws." Until 1661, the laws of Cuba and the Spanish
colonies in general were the laws of Spain supplemented
by an assortment of decrees, ordinances, and regulations,
issued by the Crown, by the Council, and by the Church.
In that year these were compiled and published. A better
digested edition was issued in 1681. This was known as




306


LAW AND JUSTICE


the Compilation of the Laws of the Indies. (Recopilacion
de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indies.)
This formed the basis of Cuban law until the beginning
of the nineteenth century, when the revolution of that period
established the constitutional Cortes in Spain. Constitutionalism in Spain has had a somewhat erratic career, but
its influence has marked the legal as well as the political
history of that nation and its colonies for the last century.
By the short-lived Spanish constitutions of 1812 and 1820,
Cuba was nominally granted representation in the Cortes at
Madrid. A nominal representation was also granted by
the Constitution of 1876. None of these was of any real
benefit to the Island.
Although Cuba remained a subject colony, her prolonged
agitations, her many protests, and her occasional revolts
were by no means barren of results. To those measures,
and notably to the Ten Years' War, is due the legal reform
in Cuba which has been effected during the last quarter
of a century. On May 23, 1879, the Spanish Penal Code
was extended to Cuba. The Mortgage Law was extended
May 1, 1880. To do away with certain undesirable features,
and to bring the law into fuller harmony with the provisions
of the Civil Code, this code was modified on July 14, 1893.
The Monarchical Constitution was applied to the Island
April 7, 1881. The Law of Civil Procedure followed,
Sept. 25, 1885, and on Jan. 28, 1886, the Commercial Code
was put into effect. This was followed, on Oct. 18, 1888,
by the Law of Criminal Procedure, and on July 31, 1889,
the last of the group, the Civil Code, was also extended to
the Island, and the laws of Cuba then became, in general,
the same as those of the Peninsula, with the exception of
such minor modifications as became necessary to fit them
to a Colonial instead of a Crown government.




LAW AND JUSTICE


307


By the decree of April 7, 1881, the Spanish Constitution
of 1876 was applied to Cuba. Under this, nominally, the
Cubans possessed all the rights of Spanish citizenship.
This Constitution included provisions which are practically
the equivalent of a Bill of Rights and the Habeas Corpus.
It provided that no inhabitant of Cuba might be arrested
except in the cases and in the manner prescribed by law.
Within twenty-four hours of the arrest, the prisoner must be
discharged or surrendered to the judicial authorities; thereupon a judge having jurisdiction must, within seventy-two
hours, order either the discharge of the prisoner or his
commitment to jail. Within the same limit of time, the
prisoner must be informed of the decision in his case. No
citizen could be committed except upon the warrant of a
judge having jurisdiction.  Dwelling-houses and  mails
were to be held inviolate without due process of law. Confiscation of property was prohibited, as was expropriation
for public use unless just compensation had previously been
made. Religious freedom was established, though the
Roman Catholic religion was declared the religion of the
State. Article XII provided that every Cuban, like every
Spaniard, had the right to express freely his opinions, orally
or in writing or through the press, without censorship; the
right to assemble peaceably, to form associations, to petition,
individually or in combination with others, the King, the
Cortes, and the authorities. Cubans were given right to
hold public office, according to individual merit and capacity.
The constitutional rights were guaranteed by laws passed
in support of the Constitution. The laws provided remedies,
civil and criminal, for their infringement by judges or other
authorities.
While it all appears, to the lay mind, to be greatly involved, it is nevertheless the fact that the legal structure,




308


LAW AND JUSTICE


as a whole, stands without superior in the history of jurisprudence. Spanish Law contains much which does not
favorably impress those to whom the operations of the system known as the Common Law are more familiar. But
it is to be remembered that it is a system which was familiar
to the people and to the practitioners in Cuba. To supplant
it bodily by the laws of the United States would have been
an act quite without warrant and assuredly productive of a
state of utter confusion. Of the laws of Cuba, it is probably
enough to say that, upon our assumption of the control of
the Island, we found an established code which was as well
adapted to the needs and conditions of the Island as the
Common Law of England is to that country, excepting its
need of such changes as were necessary to separate it from
the institution of Spain. Many changes have been introduced, many laws repealed, and many modified. It is an
open question among authorities whether or not there has
been either right or wisdom in a large number of these
changes. Even more severe criticism is passed upon the
manner in which these changes have been made. It will
be noted that it is only within a brief period that those laws
have been applied to the Island. Prior to that, law in Cuba
was little other than a jumble of special decrees and ordinances, subject to overrule at any time by the will or whim
of military governors. In no small measure, the period of
American occupation has been a reversion to the original
method with the exception that the existing legal system
was an immeasurable improvement upon that of twenty
years ago.
Immediately following the establishment of American
authority in Santiago province, there was issued General Order
No. 101, dated from the Executive Mansion, Washington,
July 13, 1898. A paragraph of that order reads as follows;




LAW AND JUSTICE


309


"Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and
supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of
the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory,
such as affect private rights of person and property and provide
for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force,
so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until
they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent, and
in practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals,
substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened
practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. The judges and the other officials connected with the administration of justice may, if they accept the supremacy of the
United States, continue to administer the ordinary law of the land,
as between man and man, under the supervision of the American
Commander-in-Chief. The native constabulary will, so far as
may be practicable, be preserved. The freedom of the people to
pursue their accustomed occupations will be abridged only when
it may be necessary to do so."
Upon the assumption of full control of the Island, on
Jan. 1, 1899, General Brooke issued a proclamation in
which the following paragraph appears:
"The civil and criminal code which prevailed prior to the
relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty will remain in force, with
such modifications and changes as may from time to time be found
necessary in the interests of good government."
Although not so stated, this order presumably established
all the laws then existing, subject to changes made when
change seemed necessary or desirable. Otherwise, Cuba
has had no laws except the Civil and the Criminal codes,
supplemented by the military authority of the Governor
General. The tenor of General Brooke's proclamation,
drafted by the authorities in Washington, was an endorse



310


LAW AND JUSTICE


ment and combination of the President's order of July 13,
1898.
The place occupied in all this by that autonomous government which was proclaimed in November, 1897, is somewhat indefinite. Such a government was proclaimed by
Spain, and, after a peculiar process of general elections,
was inaugurated in May, 1898. Its Constitution, if it ever
had one, was never ratified by the Cortes, as prescribed by
the Spanish Decree. But the representatives of a presumably organized autonomous government met, made speeches,
passed laws, and adjourned. No session was held after the
signing of the protocol, and General Blanco dissolved the
chambers in October, 1898. The experience of the autonomous government was manifestly irregular, and its acts
have been ignored.
During the Spanish regime, the Supreme Court of Cuba
was at Madrid. This relation terminated with the relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty in the Island. On April
14, 1899, there was issued Civil Order No. 41, whose opening paragraph is as follows:
"A Supreme Court is hereby created, which shall sit in the
capital of the Island, and which shall have and shall exercise jurisdiction throughout Cuban territory. No other court or tribunal
shall have the same title, character, or category."
Other paragraphs provided for the personnel of the court,
for its functions, and for the functions of its various officers
and for their salaries. Civil Order No. 92, dated June 26,
declares the grounds upon which appeal may be taken to
the higher court and the processes necessary in such appeal.
Civil Order No. 80, June 15, provided for the reorganization of the Audiencias, one in each of the six provinces of
the Island. These exercised civil and criminal jurisdiction




LAW AND JUSTICE


311


within the boundaries of their special territory. This was a
reistablishment of the Spanish system, with the exception
that, under that system, only the Audiencias of Havana,
Matanzas, and Santa Clara possessed jurisdiction in civil
matters; Havana having civil jurisdiction over Pinar del
Rio; Matanzas over Santa Clara; and Santiago over Puerto
Principe. The new law gave equal powers to all. The
order provided for the constitution of the courts, the
attributes, and the salaries of officials and employes.
Below the Audiencias came the Courts of First Instance.
These were regulated by Civil Order No. 205, under date
of Oct. 28, 1899. The next in order are the Municipal
Courts, and below them the Correctional or Police Courts
established in Havana, by General Ludlow, with excellent
results though without proper authority. The Correctional
Court in Havana was given legal status by General Wood,
several months after its institution by General Ludlow, and
similar courts were established in other cities.
That a fundamental change in the existing laws was considered during the earlier days of American occupation, is
indicated by the report of General Brooke, under the caption of Laws, dated Dec. 20, 1899. It is there said that:
"The difference in the system of laws found existing here and
that practised in the United States, and the difference of language,
prevented any immediate radical change.
"To have introduced the American system at once would have
produced chaos in the courts, for neither the judges nor the lawyers
could have understood or practised it. The changes, therefore,
have been made in most important matters just as rapidly as the
necessity therefor, or advantage thereof, could be made understood
by the Cuban people. The most important unfinished work in
this respect is the Writ of Habeas Corpus, which has been under
consideration for some time. It is contended by the Cuban lawyers




312


LAW AND JUSTICE


that the remedies covered by this writ are already provided for in
their laws, but under a different form - a method of appeal,
instead of by summary proceedings. It is believed, however, that
the method of procedure in this respect may yet be changed, and
that this can be done without material conflict with the existing
system. In any such change it is necessary to consider the effect
it will have upon the general system of law now in force."
The consideration of the question of radical change is
also indicated in the report, dated Sept. 30, 1899, of Lieut.Col. E. S. Dudley, Judge Advocate on the staff of the Military Governor. He there says:
"Radical changes in the law which might be made in territory
wholly subject to the United States, with a view to the introduction
of American systems of law or procedure, cannot well be made in
a country which we are holding, as a friendly territory, under
belligerent rights acquired through our war with Spain, with the
object of enabling a stable government to be established. It is
necessary to consult the views of the representatives of the people
who are to form the new government, as to such changes, and to
act in accordance with what will be for the best interest of their
future, setting aside our own personal views; for they have grown
up under an entirely different system of government from our own,
are accustomed to their own laws and methods of procedure, and
it is not easy to change the entire customs of a people, even for the
better, until they are educated to the necessity therefor and the
wisdom of doing it. It is necessary, also, before such changes are
made, to consider the effect upon the entire system of laws, as some
proposed changes, if many in number, would result in the necessity
for a complete change of the system, and for that the people are
not yet prepared.
"We must have regard to the race of men, their education, customs, conditions under which they were born and have lived, and
the ideas with which they are imbued. Thus it will be seen that
in Cuba it is better to 'make haste slowly' than to enforce laws




LAW AND JUSTICE


313


antagonistic to the people, and which they will not appreciate until
educated to it."
It would appear that the views of General Brooke and his
Judge Advocate were not fully endorsed by the succeeding
administration. It is possible that Secretary of Justice
Gener found favor in the sight of his chief by reason of his
expression of more radical views. In his report dated Oct.
31, 1900, that official says:
"With the disappearance of the secular sovereignty of Spain,
all our judicial institutions were disorganized, as they had their
roots imbedded in the said sovereignty.... The political order
of things which for four centuries prevailed in Cuba having been
essentially modified, the sovereignty that served as a foundation
having been destroyed, the necessity of modifying legal procedure
became and continues to be absolutely needed.... If here the
colonial laws should be left intact, if the old judicial regime were
adhered to, it would result that the revolution would be exclusively
limited to the expulsion of Spain from Cuba.... If this were the
case the people would not receive from the revolution all the benefits
to which they are entitled, inasmuch as in essence the laws of the
vanquished regime would continue to exist. The effects of the
Cuban revolution and of the war that the United States engaged
in against Spain,... must of necessity be felt in all parts of our
legal life, as the revolution in Cuba was not solely for the purpose
of putting one government in the place of another, one bureaucracy
in the place of another bureaucracy, but was for the purpose of
establishing some institutions in the place of other ones."
"Therefore, the undersigned Secretary believes that, without
detriment to what at the proper time the future government of
Cuba may decide upon, the one which at the present time rules
the destinies of the country should not neglect to fulfil its mission
of modifying or reforming the laws that required to be modified or
reformed."




314


LAW AND JUSTICE


While it is not to be denied that personal jealousy and
partisan politics entered into the question, there is no doubt
that the extent of the legal reform essayed by the Military
Governor and his Secretary of Justice brought on the serious
antagonism of a considerable number of the members of
the insular bar, and led to a controversy which resulted in
the issuance of Civil Order No. 500. This abolished an
association of long establishment, known as the College of
Lawyers. The suppression of this institution met with
both approval and condemnation.
The faults and the abuses of the Spanish methods of procedure were many and flagrant. Judges sat in offices at
their places of residence, and the clerk of any special judge
might live at the opposite end of the city, likewise performing the duties of his office at his residence. The system of
fees, instead of fixed salaries, to both judge and clerk, left
law and legal proceedings quite a matter of commerce, with
a judgment to plaintiff or defendant according to the amount
of the fees extractable from either or both. Commenting
upon this point, Judge Advocate Dudley says, in his report dated Sept. 30, 1899:
"Much of the corruption which existed in the courts under the
Spanish regime was due to the system of payment of municipal
judges, and the subordinate clerks or employees of all courts,
especially in criminal cases, by fees instead of salaries. The demand for fees outside of the legitimate allowances was so habitual
that it became a 'custom of the country,' and in important matters
payment thereof was necessary to secure prompt transaction of
business. The methods of collection of such illegal fees had,
through long years of use, attained the highest point of perfection,
and it was difficult to say what official was free from it. It was so
customary that the thought of moral wrong does not seem to have
attached to it, and it will probably only disappear under new




LAW AND JUSTICE


315


methods of procedure and education as to moral principles of
right and wrong in money matters. The system of government
at a distance by Spain, through officials who apparently used their
offices for personal purposes and to attain private wealth, has left
its effect on these people who have for centuries lived under it, and
it will probably take some years to completely change the wrong
ideas with which many office holders seem to have become imbued."
An important, and in many ways desirable change was
made by the issuance of the following:
Civil Order No. 523.
Headquarters Department of Cuba.
HAVANA, December 31, 1900.
The Military Governor of Cuba, upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of Justice, directs the publication of the following
order:
I. From and after the first day of February, 1901, all Court
Recorders, Officials, and Clerks in the Courts of First Instance and
Instruction of this Island, shall cease in their functions, and shall
be replaced in their respective positions by Court Recorders,
Assistant Court Recorders, and Clerks, who shall be named for the
purpose, according to the list inserted at the end of this order.
II. The salaries that shall be paid will be those specified in the
said list, and will be paid by the General Treasury of this Island.
III. The Court Recorders and Assistant Court Recorders shall
be appointed by the Department of Justice, after the examination
of presented certificates of comparative qualifications during a
period of twenty days. The clerks shall be appointed by the respective Judges upon the recommendation of the proper Court
Recorders.
IV. Candidates for the positions of Court Recorder or Assistant
Court Recorder shall present their certified petitions to the proper
Judges, who will forward them on the day following that on which
the period for receiving certificates of competitive examinations
closes, to the Department of Justice in a sealed and registered




316


LAW AND JUSTICE


envelope, together with a report as to the physical, moral, and
intellectual conditions of each candidate.
V. For the occupancy of said positions there shall be preferred
indiscriminately candidates who possess diplomas of Lawyers or
Notaries or who have performed or are still performing the duties
of Court Recorders.
VI. The provisional appointments of Court Recorders or Assistant Court Recorders shall be made by the Department of Justice
after hearing the opinion of the proper Judges, or by the latter,
after due authorization from the said Department.
VII. The Records, both civil as well as criminal, which are
to-day in charge of Court Recorders shall be distributed among
the Court Recorders that may be appointed, in the most equitable
form in accordance with the opinion of the proper Judge.
VIII. From and after the first day of February, 1901, the
Administration of Justice in all Courts of First Instance and
Instruction of this Island shall not entail the payment of any fees
whatsoever.
IX. From and after the first day of February, 1901, the "Juzgado
de Gulardia" of Havana shall consist of a special personnel exclusively dedicated to the duties thereof, appointed by the Department
of Justice according to the provisions contained in the attached
list, who shall receive the salaries specified therein and which will
be paid by the General Treasury of this Island.
X. From and after the first day of February, 1901, the four
Courts of First Instance and Instruction and that of "Guardia"
of Havana, shall be installed in one building which will be furnished
by the Government; for which installation and maintenance, including salaries of employes, the necessary amount will be allotted
in accordance with provision made in attached list.
XI. From and after the first day of February, 1901, the Judges
of First Instance and Instruction of Havana shall not receive the
sums allotted for house rent, and the Court Recorders who at the
present time have salaries assigned by the Government shall cease
enjoyment thereof.




LAW AND JUSTICE


317


XII. The Secretary of Justice is hereby authorized to secure
a building possessing the necessary conditions to install therein
the four Courts of First Instance and Instruction and that of
"Guardia," Havana, and to recommend to the Military Governor
the conditions for the lease of said building, in accordance with
the attached list, as well as the estimate of the alterations and
repairs that may have to be made thereon, the cost of which shall
not exceed four thousand dollars, consulting with the Secretary of
Public Works as to the preparation of said estimate.
XIII. This order shall go into effect from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette of Havana, and on the same day the
period granted for the presentation of certificates of qualifications
to which paragraph III refers shall also commence.
XIV. All legal rulings that may be antagonistic to the provisions
contained in this order are hereby declared to be null and void.
XV. The Department of Justice shall decide all matters of doubt
that may arise in the enforcement of this order, and will institute
the proper measures for the carrying out thereof.
H. L. SCOTT,
Adjutant General.
Yet, notwithstanding the changes effected, some of manifest and some of doubtful benefit, it must be admitted that
after three years of full American control of all such matters
so little was accomplished, in fact, that the Cuban people
were quite as reluctant as ever to take their cases to court.
In no other department of the life of the Island, excepting
the industrial, was so little really accomplished as in that of
such supreme importance as the Department of Law and
Justice.
Of change in the laws, of amplification, modification, and
of the creation of new laws, there was an abundance. Some
of these changes were effected on the ground of "military
necessity." Yet it is to be remembered that, although the
administration was nominally a military government, there




318


LAW AND JUSTICE


was no martial law, and civil law had been proclaimed as
the law of the land.
Some justification for our manipulation of Cuban laws
might have existed had the work been done under the supervision of duly competent legal minds. Presumably, the
changes were effected at the instance of the Cuban Secretary
of Justice, and such orders generally opened with the statement that they were issued upon the recommendation of
that official. In some cases, it is probable that the Secretary
was the instigator. In the majority of instances, that
official was the tool and instrument of the military administrator. If that authority disapproved an existing law, he
effected its repeal or its modification. If he desired to do
that which required a law, and none existed suitable to his
purposes, he issued the law, through the Department of
Justice, and closed its statement with the declaration that
"All provisions of codes, laws, decrees, or orders in conflict
with this order, are hereby repealed and revoked."




CHAPTER XX


VARIOUS QUESTIONS
THE ISLE OF PINES
ARTICLE VI of the Platt Amendment declares that "The
Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the boundaries of Cuba
specified in the Constitution, the title and ownership thereof
to be left to future adjustment by treaty."
The basis of America's gossamer claim to the Isle of Pines,
the ownership of which is thus to be determined, rests in a
distorted interpretation of the letter of the Treaty of Paris.
In its reference to the cession of the Philippine Islands, that
instrument defines by lines of latitude and longitude the
territory ceded. In its reference to the West Indian territory,
it is less explicit. Article I declares that " Spain relinquishes
all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba." There can
be no doubt that in the minds of the Commissioners this relinquishment included the chain of islands and keys which
almost surrounds the main Island, and which has always
been held and regarded as part and parcel of Spain's Cuban
colony. Presumably, Article I disposes of the Cuban area.
Article II refers to Porto Rico, and states that "Spain cedes
to the United States the Island of Porto Rico and other
Islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies."
So runs the instrument in its English form. In its Spanish
version, the phrase reads " Porto Rico and the other Islands."
No reasonable ground exists for any doubt that the Islands
thus referred to were Mona, Viequez, and Culebra, all of




3$0


VARIOUS QUESTIONS


them in Porto Rican waters. It is a fair supposition that if
the American Commissioners had laid claim to that which
had always been held and regarded as part and parcel of
Cuba's territory, such area would not have been surrendered
without vigorous protest and prolonged discussion. There
is no ground whatever for any belief that American ownership of the Isle of Pines even entered the minds of the Commissioners, either Spanish or American. Yet, under this
reference to the "other Islands under Spanish sovereignty
in the West Indies," interested parties set up the claim to
the Isle of Pines. Such an interpretation would also give
to the United States Cayo Romano, Cayo Coco, the Jardines
de la Reina, and all the hundreds of small islands of the
Cuban coast, a step never intended by any of the parties
to the relinquishment of Cuba and the cession of Porto Rico
and "other islands." The total area of these many small
islands is greater than that of the Isle of Pines. But they
are worthless, strategically, and practically valueless industrially. The census of 1899 gives the Isle of Pines a
population of "2,990 Cubans, 195 Spaniards, and 14 others."
A few score of Americans have since been induced to settle
there upon representations that it was American territory,
and would remain under American jurisdiction.
No alternative appears between cession and no cession
by the Treaty of Paris. That there was no such cession
is established by the Platt Amendment itself. Cession
would have made it American territory, and alienation by
such a process would have been impossible. Yet the claim
was made and, for a time, some of the authorities in Washington were disposed to stand by it. Their contention was
seriously weakened by the acts of General Wood, at the
time of the American withdrawal from Cuba. Among the
documents of the ceremony of transfer there appeared a




VARIOUS QUESTIONS


321


communication from the Secretary of War, marked "Letter
D." This contained the following passage: "It is understood by the United States that the present government
(i.e. the Military) of the Isle of Pines will continue as a de
facto government pending the settlement of the title to said
island, etc., etc."  To this, President Palma replied as
follows: "It is understood that the Isle of Pines is to continue de facto under the jurisdiction of the Government of
the Republic of Cuba, etc., etc." General Wood either
failed to notice or saw fit to disregard this definite contradiction of his instructions from Washington, and upon his departure he made no provision whatever, by local representation or otherwise, for a continuance of the American authority. The Cuban Republic proceeded to administer
the affairs of the Isle of Pines as it did the affairs of the
main Island.
Politically, geographically, and legally, by several centuries
of legal and political affiliation, the Isle of Pines belongs to
Cuba as Nantucket belongs to the United States, and as
the Isle of Wight belongs to England. It is in no way to
our credit that an attempt has been made to filch it from her.
Without the expenditure of a vast amount of money, it is
strategically worthless, and there exists neither legal nor
moral ground upon which we can lay claim to it without laying ourselves open to charges of "criminal aggression" so
vigorously reprobated by Mr. McKinley.
The island lies some fifty miles from the southern coast of
Cuba, almost directly southward from Havana. It is separated from the mainland by a stretch of shallow water dotted
with coral keys and mangrove islets. So shallow are these
intervening waters that people of the region declare that
cattle have actually crossed on foot between the island and
the mainland. Its area is given as 840 square miles. It




322


VARIOUS QUESTIONS


is, in effect, two islands connected by a marshy area. The
northern section is broken and hilly while the southern
section is a somewhat sandy level. The possible products
are similar to those of the mainland. There are mineral
springs of some medicinal virtue, and a marble quarry of
some, though probably not of great value. There are
sponge fisheries and large tracts of fertile land. The climate is delightful.
CHURCH AND CHURCH PROPERTY QUESTIONS
Among the legacies left to the Government of Intervention,
the Church property question was one of notable difficulties.
The incoming government found various buildings occupied
and used for State purposes, upon which the Church held
claims. The matter is not a little complicated, involving
as it does points of Spanish law which have no parallel in
American jurisprudence. Prior to the nineteenth century
there appears to have been no question regarding the titles
of property held by the Church. During the opening years
of that century, the property held by the monastic orders
in Spain was confiscated by the State. The order of confiscation related to Spain's peninsula territory, and not to
her insular possessions.
About the year 1837, Captain General Miguel Tacon, in
the furtherance of certain plans, raked up the Spanish confiscation act and sought to apply it to the holdings of monastic orders in Cuba. In November and December of 1841,
Valdes, then Governor of the Island, seized these properties,
and diverted them to the uses of the State. The more important of these seizures included the Convent of the Franciscans, since and now used as the Custom House in Havana;
the Convent of the Dominicans, which, at the time of the
American occupation, was used by the Institute and the




VARIOUS QUESTIONS


University of Havana; the Convent of the Augustinians,
used as the Academy of Sciences; and the Convent of San
Ysidro, used by the Spanish as a military barracks, and, at
first, as a relief station by the Americans, and later, by the
authority of General Ludlow, as a training school for orphan
girls. There were also various other real estate holdings, as
well as funds, claims, and censos.
This action was contested by the Church authorities,
through Madrid and Rome, on the ground that the order
under which the seizure was made did not apply to the
Island of Cuba. In 1845, a report of the action was submitted to Isabel II, then Queen of Spain, who is said to
have expressed great surprise and to have ordered the restoration of the property. But the order does not appear to
have been put into the form of a royal decree or law, and was
non-effective. To the royal instructions the local authorities in Cuba replied that such restoration was then impossible, for two reasons:
(1) Because a large part of the property had been sold
and had passed into the hands of third parties.
(2) Because other parts had been converted to public
uses, such as custom houses, etc., and their use for those
purposes was necessary to the State.
The matter dragged on as a subject of correspondence
for several years. In 1849 or 1850, a commission was appointed, two members of which were chosen by the Pope,
and two by the Spanish Crown. The purpose of this commission was the equitable adjustment of the claims of the
Church. In 1851, they drew up a document known as the
concordat, or agreement, upon the findings and conclusions
of which all subsequent relations have been based. This
was approved by both parties on March 7, 185e. It became,
in the nature of a treaty or contract, of legally binding force.




324


VARIOUS QUESTIONS


All subsequent legislation relating to Church property in
dispute, and to Church claims for indemnity, has rested on
this concordat. The document covered not only insular
but peninsular Church property, and included clauses having
direct reference to the property in Cuba. Among these
stands Article 38, which revokes the earlier order of confiscation, and orders the colonial authorities to restore to
the Church the property remaining unsold and not converted
to public uses, and to make valuation, according to canon
law, of the portion sold or converted to public uses, and to
issue three per cent bonds of the consolidated debt of Spain,
in satisfaction of the appraisement.
The first part of this law was duly complied with by the
restoration of the specified portion. The colonial authorities objected to the second provision on the ground that
such bonds were non-negotiable in the Island of Cuba and
that their issuance would be prejudicial to the interests of
Cuban holders. In answer to this, there was issued, on
Nov. 26, 1852, a Royal Cedula which provided, in lieu of
the issue of such bonds, an order for a valuation of the sold
and appropriated property, the valuation to be acceptable
to both parties, the Church and the State, and a separate
funded debt instituted whose income should be turned over
annually to the Bishop, for the maintenance of public worship and the support of the clergy. By this act, it was held
that the Spanish authorities had definitely and legally recognized the indebtedness of the State to the Church. All
further sale of the property was stopped, it being admitted
that such property was only held in trust, the Church to
derive an income therefrom until such time as, should it
so elect, the Government should obtain full title by the payment to the Church of the full sum of the appraisal. The
financial obligation assumed by the Government under this




VARIOUS QUESTIONS


325


provision was duly and regularly paid by the Spanish authorities up to the date of the Spanish evacuation, on Jan. 1,
1899. Naturally, under the new order, with the definite
termination of the political affiliation between Church and
State, these payments ceased with the American occupation,
although the new government, pending legal determination
of the matter, continued to hold and use the properties involved, as State buildings surrendered with other edifices
by the Government of Spain.
Such was the state of the case when the American Government took possession of the Island. The option lay for that
Government to continue the annual payments to the Bishop,
a sum amounting to $250,000 to $300,000 per annum, or to
meet the original obligation by paying to the Church a lump
sum which would represent the present value of the properties. The matter remained a subject of discussion and consideration until Aug, 15, 1900, when Civil Order No. 321
was issued, making provision for a commission of three "to
investigate, and report upon the claims of property and
property rights of every kind and nature made by the Bishopric of Havana." On October 10, another commission was
appointed for the same work in the Archbishopric of Santiago
de Cuba.
Upon this matter, as upon so many others, there arises
the question of iustification for American interference with
an affair which involved interests of importance to the
Cubans, and which was, rightfully, for Cuban determination.
It is true that the Church authorities were urgent for its
adjustment, but their special motive for this urgency lay
in their belief that they would obtain more liberal terms of
settlement from American than from Cuban authority.
The commission for the district of Havana reached its
conclusions during the year 1901, and its findings were




326


VARIOUS QUESTIONS


accepted by the Church authorities and the Military Governor. The Government paid to the Church the sum of
$868.657.81 for the discharge of censos and capellanias, for
the payment of back rent from Jan. 1, 1899, and for sundry
reimbursements. The property occupied by the State was
valued at $1,499,550, and it was agreed that the State should
pay upon this a rental at the rate of five per cent with the
option of purchasing at the appraised value within five years.
The agreement regarding the Santiago property was
reached on Jan. 11, 1902, and settlement was effected substantially upon the same basis as that provided for the
Havana district; $82,579.16 was paid in adjustment of the
various outstanding claims. The rate of interest to be paid
as rental for the property used by the Government was fixed
at three per cent instead of five per cent, as in the Havana
district. This was by reason of the lesser value and utility
of the properties involved. The valuation of these properties
was fixed at $535,000, with a five-year option of purchase at
the sums fixed as the value of the various holdings.
Two parties to these conclusions appear to have been
quite satisfied with the outcome. These were General
Wood and the Church authorities. From much that was
said after the American withdrawal there is reason for inference that some portion of the Cuban people and Cuban
leaders were less pleased, and desire was manifested in some
quarters to discover means of invalidating the contract.
This desire was defeated by Article IV of the Platt Amendment. The satisfaction of the Church is indicated by the
following extract from the Catholic News:
"That Bishop Sbarretti has been successful in this mission is
apparent from the tangible results achieved in Havana. He has
happily arranged an understanding regarding the status of the
Church in Cuba under the new order of civil affairs, at once satis



VARIOUS QUESTIONS


327


factory to religion and to the Government interests. The drastic
marriage law enacted by General Brooke, whereby a Catholic
priest was disqualified to give legal force to the bond of wedlock,
has, through the energetic and patient efforts of the Bishop, been
repealed by the Military Governor, General Wood, and a measure
that is highly satisfactory to the Church substituted.
"But a problem of still greater moment was the restoration of
property belonging to the Church, but which had been sequestered
by the Spanish during the civil war that obtained in Spain and
her colonies after the death of Ferdinand VII. The happy solution
of this intricate problem had engaged the attention of Bishop
Sbarretti from the date of his entrance upon his duties in Havana.
So forcibly and intelligently did the prelate present the claims of
the Church that President McKinley, shortly before his lamented
death, recognized the Bishop's contention and ordered justice to
be meted out to the Catholic Church in the diocese of Havana."
The attitude of the Cuban people, as a whole, has not of
late been notably cordial toward the Church as an institution. This is due in large measure to the close relations
which existed between the Church authorities and the representatives of the Spanish Government. The Bishop of
Havana was a member of the Governor General's council.
The condemnation of the acts and attitude of the representatives of the Church in Cuba, has come from Roman
Catholics themselves and not from Protestants, of whom
there were only an insignificant number in the Island. The
priests were, with few exceptions, Spaniards, without sympathy for the Cuban people and not responsive to their
aspirations. To the Cubans, they stood as the personification of ignorance, cupidity, and indifference to their holy
office. In treating of this feature of the life of the Island,
Mr. Charles M. Pepper* calls attention to the manifestation
of Cuban feeling as shown in Cuban theatres. He says:
*Tomorrow in Cuba, p. 249.




328


VARIOUS QUESTIONS


"The popular conception is shown in the theatres. In the best
of the plays the foibles of the cures or parish clergy are received by
cultivated audiences as suggestive of something grosser. In the
low variety theatres the grossness of the stage representation makes
the suggestion unnecessary. The escapades of the cures are a
stock subject.... The slanders and the insinuations of the scoffer
are ignored where holy living enforces the respect due to the holy
office. A representation of Catholic priests or of Protestant clergymen such as finds favor in Havana would be flat and dull to a
depraved American audience because of their consciousness of its
falsity. In the Havana variety theatres the sauce comes from the
truthfulness of the suggestions."
The following appeared in a Cuban newspaper, El Grito
de Yara, in December, 1898:
"Cuba, like all of Latin America, has been the refuge of the
Spanish clergy expelled from their dioceses, the filon of ambitious
prelates. Here they have come in totality, least of all to preach
the dogma, to make Catholic propaganda, to moralize. They have
shown their desire for domination. For hope, they have substituted lucre and usury; for charity, tyranny; the god of the majority
of priests has been the vile metal. In their time of power they were
not seeking to save souls or to administer the sacraments, but to
make money, to dominate, to collect dues. Not to educate, but to
prostitute."
During the war, Te Deums were sung in the churches for
Spanish victories, and Cubans openly asserted that priests
betrayed the secrets of the confessional to the prejudice of
the Cuban cause, and, in individual cases, such betrayal
was held responsible for the imprisonment and execution of
Cuban patriots. These complaints and the alleged attitude
of the priesthood find parallel in the Philippine Islands, and
as in both Cuba and the Philippines the complainants are
at least nominal adherents of the Roman Catholic faith,




VARIOUS QUESTIONS


329


some weight must be given them, and no charge of sectarian
prejudice can lie against their rehearsal.
The attitude of the Church authorities toward the Government of Intervention was diplomatic. It was not in any
way openly hostile, nor was there any manifestation of
friendliness or evidence of desire or purpose to cooperate in
the establishment of the new institution. The attitude was
rather tentative, tinged with some suspicion and an air of
watchfulness. All political and financial relations were,
of course, immediately severed.
Prior to the revolution, a few Protestant missions had
been maintained in different parts of the Island, but they
had secured no more than a very weak and limited hold
upon a very small number of the people. Coincident with
the military occupation, there appeared a number of Protestant missionaries and a fairly ready hearing was given to
some of them in the early days. This was doubtless attributable to a certain reaction and to the harmony of Protestant
church methods with the prevailing sentiment of political
republicanism. While some impetus has doubtless been
given to Protestantism by the experience, its permanence is
somewhat doubtful. The situation presents no comparison
with that of the Philippine Islands. The Filipinos, men as
well as women, are notably loyal in their adherence to the
Church as an institution, and notably faithful in their observance of its services and ceremonies. The men of Cuba
manifest a strong tendency toward agnosticism and freethought. Whether this is the result of an intellectual process
or a form of mere poll-parrotism will be determined largely
by the future course of the Church. A faithful and earnest
priesthood, commanding respect and reverence, would unquestionably win many of them back to the arms of the
Church. In the main, the Cuban women maintain their




330


VARIOUS QUESTIONS


attachment to the Church and observe its ceremonials.
The Church is by no means a defunct organism in Cuba.
Its revivification will depend primarily upon the wisdom and
the righteousness of its local representatives.
Something of Cuban opinion regarding this question at
the time of the withdrawal of American authority, is indicated in the following extract which appeared in one
Cuban paper of prominence (El Mundo, Havana), and was
copied by another (La Lucha, Havana):
"The clergy has lost in Cuba the power that it had-our
people feel a repugnance against the cassock - and the recollection
of all the evils which it committed in our country is latent. The
clergy in Cuba were guerillas, spies, informers; it tried in the
schools to teach the children to hate their parents if the latter were
Cubans, and the soil on which they were born if, born in Cuba,
they had Spanish parents. Within, their colleges are immoral;
managed by bad men who have no more knowledge than to pervert,
and who, cloaked with the sacred mantle of hypocrisy, still find
fools whom they can exploit by means of unworthy fables.
"Our people do not need the priest at all: they are all right
without him. 'Catholicism'- says La Discusion in an article
which is said to have been written by a high functionary of the
government- 'has a temple in every Cuban home,' but these are
temples without priests, temples where the most beautiful image
is virtue. In these temples the children learn their moral duties,
which the priest in the school would upset."
Some indication of the general attitude a year later lies
in the favor shown to proposals to tax Church property.
CUBAN RAILWAYS
Cuba was no laggard in the adoption of steam railways
as a means of transportation, though her system is still
small and incomplete. In 1837, Governor General Miguel




VARIOUS QUESTIONS


331


Tacon granted a concession for the Puerto Principe and
Nuevitas line. This was not opened, however, until 1851.
I am told, though I have been unable to verify the statement, that the line from Havana to Guines was in operation
before that date. The Matanzas and Sabanilla road was
opened in 1854. At the time of the American occupation,
Cuba had seventeen public lines and one hundred and seven
private lines. The latter are constructed and used for the
transportation of sugar cane in the vicinity of the large
centrales, or grinding mills. These private roads represented, on Jan. 1, 1899, an investment of $12,000,000 for
equipment and 965 miles of track. The public lines
covered 1,135 miles, with a valuation of $58,000,000.
Nine-tenths of Cuba's public railway system, on Jan. 1,
1899, was in the western half of the Island. The two great
eastern provinces, Puerto Principe and Santiago, were
destitute of railways, with the exception of four short lines
of a total length of a little more than one hundred miles.
These reached, from coast harbors, the inland cities of
Puerto Principe, Holguin, San Luis, and Guantanamo.
The military line, constructed for military purposes along
the Jucaro-Moron trocha, was of little value for commercial
purposes. The war left the railways of the Island in bad
condition, and many of the Cuban and Spanish stockholders
were ready to part with their holdings. American investors
looked the properties over, but decided that the prices asked
were entirely unreasonable, and declined to purchase. An
English company, operating as the Western Railway of
Havana, Ltd., owned the one hundred mile line from Havana
to Pinar del Rio. Another English company bought up
the system known as the United Railways of Havana, which
covers, generally, the territory for a hundred miles or so to
the eastward of Havana; and another English organization




332


VARIOUS QUESTIONS


secured the Cuba Central Railway which occupies a portion
of the field eastward of the United Railways area. These
companies did something in the way of reconstruction and
improvement, but nothing in the way of extension.
The important feature in the department of transportation, during the period of intervention, was the construction
of a line from Santa Clara, where it made connection with
the western systems, eastward to Santiago on the southeast
coast, and to Nipe Bay on the northeast coast. This enterprise was inaugurated by and was carried on under the
immediate supervision of Sir William Van Home, formerly
at the head of the Canadian Pacific Railway. The company holds a New Jersey charter. In its inception, the work
encountered the Foraker Law, which prohibited the granting
of any concessions during the term of American occupation.
It has been asserted that the work was an evasion of that
law. This is not accurately the case. The company asked
for no concession, and in all ways complied with the existing
law. The Foraker Law prohibited new public enterprises
dependent for their existence upon government or municipal
franchise. It was not and could not be operative as against
private enterprises. The Cuba Company therefore purchased a continuous strip of land some four hundred and
fifty miles in length and thirty metres in width, taking legal
titles thereto, and proceeded with the construction of a railway upon the land thus acquired. This it could do under
the laws of the Island relating to the construction of private
lines. It was the installation, though on larger scale, of a
private line under the same law as that governing the line of
the United Fruit Company, with its twenty-nine miles of track,
seven locomotives, and three hundred cars, and the system
on the Terry estate, with its sixty-five miles of road, sixteen
locomotives, and seven hundred cars. A revocable license




VARIOUS QUESTIONS


333


was obtained which gave the right to cross streams and highways, subject to modification or revocation by any succeeding government. Upon its surface, the enterprise was little
better than a gigantic speculation with a doubtful foundation.
Although this was not, perhaps, a technical violation of the
Foraker Law, there was involved a certain juggling with
that instrument, with and by the connivance of the authorities in Washington. The work was, very rightly, regarded
as of vast importance to the Island. Several millions of
dollars were put into immediate and active circulation at a
time when money was scarce, and in an area which had
suffered disastrously by the processes of the war. The law
was certainly stretched to its utmost, although it was undoubtedly stretched to the great advantage of the Island.
The existing laws gave the company no right of expropriation. Obstacles were encountered in the shape of land
owners who refused to sell except at extortionate figures.
Areas were encountered to which no owners could be found,
and other areas of doubtful and complicated title. Newspapers attacked the enterprise, some of them hoping to be
paid for silence or approval. Petty politicians essayed
similar methods. But the company proceeded with its
work, overcoming both opposition and obstacles, until it
finally won an almost unqualified support throughout the
entire length of the line. On Feb. 7, 1902, there was issued
from the headquarters of the Military Governor an order
known as No. 34. This, by virtue of the power of that
government to make or to unmake laws in what was held
to be the interest of Cuba, created a new railroad law for
the Island. The merits of the law are beyond doubt, and it
has been approved by competent authority. It was drafted
by able Cuban and American lawyers, and was passed upon
and endorsed by the Secretary of War. It is both concise




334


VARIOUS QUESTIONS


and comprehensive. It safeguards both public rights and
private interests. The objection to the creation of so important a law at a time so shortly preceding the transfer of
government is offset by the advantage accruing to the Island
under its provisions. It gave to legitimate and officially
approved railway lines, anywhere in the Island, the right of
legal expropriation, and under this provision the Cuba
Company was enabled to complete the construction of a
railway system which opened to settlement and to productive
cultivation an area, previously of little value, of twelve to
fifteen million acres, or nearly one-half of the entire Island.
There was also issued a law which established a Board of
Railway Commissioners. Its members were the Secretaries
of Public Works, of Finance, and of Agriculture. Its business was the determination of all matters relating to the
insular railways. As the result of an investigation carried
on by the Board, and upon its recommendation to that
effect, there was issued, on April 28, 1902, Civil Order No.
118. This regulated an exceedingly confused railway tariff
system by prescribing maximum rates of transportation for
freight and passengers. The freight schedule is too long
and too complex for inclusion here. Passenger rates were
established as
1ST CLASS   3D CLASS
From 1 to 75 kilometres distance..  3.64 cts.  1.82 cts.
"76 kilometres upward........  2.72 "     1.36 "
(The kilometre is practically five-eighths of a mile.)
The former rates varied widely, but their range may be
given as from seven to twelve cents per mile for first-class
passage. The new rate still left the charge at a fairly high
figure, being nearly six cents per mile for short trips and
about four and one-third cents for long runs. Naturally,
the sweeping reduction called out the protest of railway




VARIOUS QUESTIONS


335


officials. The reduction order was supplemented by the
following:
HAVANA, April 28, 1902.
I, Leonard Wood, Military Governor of Cuba, by virtue of the
authority vested in me, direct the publication of the following order:
1. That the foregoing order of the Railroad Commission of the
Island of Cuba, fixing maximum rates, shall take effect on the twelfth
day of May, 1902, and shall not be superseded or suspended by or
pending any appeal therefrom, or from any part thereof.
2. That upon an appeal under the authority of the Railroad
Law, Order No. 34, Headquarters Department of Cuba, February
7, 1902, the Supreme Court shall not be deemed to have jurisdiction
to pass upon the power of the Military Governor to enact said law,
or undo the validity of the provisions of the law itself, under which
the Railroad Commissioners have acted in fixing rates and under
which appeal is taken.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court upon such appeal is
limited to passing upon the validity and propriety of the action of
the Railroad Commissioners in the exercise of the powers conferred
upon them by the law, and does not extend to questioning the
existence of those powers.        LEONARD WOOD,
Military Governor.
The customary form for the publication of such instruments had long been "The Military Governor of Cuba
directs the publication of the following order," etc. Some
Cuban comment was made to the effect that good taste would
have suggested a continuance of that form. Nor was the
subjection of the Supreme Court to the mandate of the
Military Governor entirely overlooked. Quiet reference
was made, in private conversation, to the royal decree of
Ferdinand VII, of May 28, 1825. The managers of the
Cardenas &    Jucaro and of the Matanzas railways sent
telegrams of protest to the President of the United States,
to which the following reply was received:




336


VARIOUS QUESTIONS


Department of War.
WASHINGTON, May 15, 1902.
Sirs: Your telegram to the President of the United States, dated
May 12, 1902, has been sent to this Department. The order of
which you complain, No. 118, April 28, 1902, has been considered and approved by the Secretary of War.
It is the result of a determination which, as far as this Government
is concerned, is decisive, as the Government has exercised and will
exercise the power to regulate reasonably the tariffs of the railroads
of Cuba.
The United States does not entertain the purpose of submitting
the question as to whether this power exists or not to the Cuban
courts.
In order that it may be determined whether the law drawn up
by virtue of the exercising of this power is really reasonable, Order
118, authorizing its revision, has been published.
Of course after the establishment of the Cuban Government the
latter can take whatever decision it may choose with regard to the
confirmation and exercise of said power.
Very respectfully,    E. ROOT,
Secretary of War.
This peremptory assertion of the intention of the intervening government to stand upon its right to exercise such
"sovereignty, jurisdiction, and control" as might suit its
own purposes, notwithstanding the declaration of the Joint
Resolution, was also a subject of Cuban comment. The
regulation of railway rates was, in itself, a desirable measure,
but inasmuch as the Government of Intervention was to be
so soon withdrawn, and a Cuban government installed, it
was thought that the measure was unduly "sovereign" in
tone, and that the terms in which its endorsement was expressed were unduly curt and despotic.




VARIOUS QUESTIONS


337


JAI ALAI AND THE FORAKER LAW
A Congressional enactment, generally known as the
"Foraker Law," prohibited the granting of "any property,
franchise, or concession of any kind whatever by any military or other authority whatsoever while Cuba is under
occupation by the United States." This law, which prohibited any new franchises or concessions, should also have
prevented the recognition and completion of franchises or
concessions which remained inchoate at the time of Spanish
withdrawal. It was used as an argument for the refusal
to recognize the claims of Messrs. Dady & Co., in the matter
of the Havana sewering and paving contract, and also in the
matter of the De Armas contract for a municipal loan.
Both of these parties held inchoate concessions.
Yet in two other cases which stood in the same general
condition, as inchoate franchises or concessions in which
further action was suspended by the Foraker Law, a different course was followed. One of these cases, that known
as the Jai Alai, became, after American withdrawal, the
subject of an active controversy. The other, known as the
Castaneda concession, appeared, though much less prominently.
Because of their prominence, and because of their bearing
upon an important issue, a review of these cases is pertinent
here. The history of the Jai Alai case is as follows:
In April, 1898, one Tomas Mazzantini, a noted bullfighter, applied to the authorities of Havana for a concession
to erect in that city a fronton, or court, for the public exhibition of a Basque game of ball bearing some resemblance, in
its manner of play, to the game of racquets. The proper
title of the game is Pelota, although reference is commonly
made to it as Jai Alai, which simply means a merry-making.




338


VARIOUS QUESTIONS


The application was approved by the Ayuntamiento of
Havana, but the approval lacked the necessary ratification
of the higher authorities at the time of the American occupation. The measure was, therefore, at that time and at
the time of the passage of the Foraker Law, inchoate and
invalid. Early in 1900, Seior Basilio Zarasqueta, as
attorney for M:azzantini, made application for the ratification of the contract, or concession. This was granted by
the Municipal Council on March 16, 1900. But there was
still needed the approval of the Civil Governor of the province,
and that of the Military Governor, to give the concession a
legal effect. The Civil Governor, Sefior Emilio Nuiez,
saw no objection to it and forwarded it to the military
authorities. It was submitted to the Judge Advocate, Col.
E. S. Dudley, for his opinion on its legality. The report of
that official closes with the following paragraphs:
"It was undoubtedly the intention of the 'Foraker Amendment'
to prevent the granting of any such rights, extending over a term of
years, until such time as military government ceased and the permanent government could act. The prohibition thereof extends
to 'franchises or concessions of any kind whatever' by any military
or other authority whatever.
"The approval, therefore, of this application can not be recommended."
This was on Feb. 22, 1901. On the 26th of that month,
it was sent back to Col. Dudley bearing two endorsements
by H. L. Scott, Adjutant-General. These were signed by
Colonel Scott, "By direction of the Military Governor,"
and gave expression to a general consent and approval by
that official. Colonel Dudley returned it with his second
endorsement, as follows:
"Respectfully returned. It is not possible to recommend approval of any act which concedes the use of public property to




VARIOUS QUESTIONS


339


individual use, or use of a private corporation, whether a monopoly
or not. The concession was never completed by the ratification of
the Spanish Governor-General, as herein asked of the Military
Governor. The concession for the use of this property for ten years
still remains, notwithstanding the restrictions of the proposed
endorsement."
A slight modification was effected in the instrument,
and it was again sent to Colonel Dudley with a somewhat
urgent message of approval by the Military Governor.
But the Judge Advocate was obdurate and returned it for
the third time. His endorsement closed thus: "I find no
reason for changing my opinion given in this matter Feb.
25, 1901, and Feb. 28, 1901."
It then developed that, for some reason, the Military
Governor had made himself a special advocate in the case.
Under date of April 8, 1901, he sent a portion of the documents and a partial statement of the case to Hon. Elihu
Root, Secretary of War, as "personal enclosures," asking
that official's "personal views" in the case. Mr. Root
referred the matter to Mr. Charles E. Magoon, law officer
of the Bureau of InsularAffairs. In his report, Mr. Magoon
called the attention of the Secretary to the fact that only a
portion of the papers had been submitted. The only question referred to Washington by General Wood concerned
the right of the municipality of Havana to rent a piece of
ground belonging to the city, for the erection of a "fronton,
or hand-ball court, wherein the public are to be permitted
to play hand-ball upon payment of a fee."  To this there
was no legal objection, and upon this point only Mr. Magoon
gave his opinion in approval. In some way, Mr. Magoon
was misled, either by the phraseology of the application or
by some explanation of it, regarding the purpose of the
building. It was not, as he states, a building for "use of




340


VARIOUS QUESTIONS


the public on payment of a fee." It was a structure into
which the public was admitted on payment of a fee, for the
purpose of watching and betting on a game played by professionals. It had no other purpose whatever.
Meanwhile, it is of interest to note that before the matter
was submitted to Colonel Dudley, the building was in process
of erection, and when the question was submitted to Washington, the game had been in operation for nearly two
months, with all those attendant features which led the
Cuban Senator, Manuel Sanguilly, one of Cuba's leading
statesmen, to denounce the institution, in a speech in the
Senate, on Jan. 7, 1904, as a "social cancer, whose results
are the moral and material ruin of many persons, the cause
of commercial failures, and of the suicides of fathers of
families and youths of brilliant promise." Thus did a
distinguished Cuban Senator denounce an institution of
which an American Military Governor became the chief
promoter.
But the concessionaires were not satisfied with a verbal
statement of official approval and the establishment of the
game. They clamored for a full legal recognition. This
involved an official establishment of the inchoate concession,
and an official endorsement of a game which, although it
was a display of marvellous skill and charged with thrilling
excitement, was no more than the basis for an extensive and
ruinous gambling system. An attempt has been made to
minimize and explain away this feature by parallels with
betting on baseball and horse-racing. No such parallel lies.
The Jai Alai Company was itself the proprietor of the betting, and the beneficiary from it. It was from its commissions on the bets made, to which it held a monopoly, that its
enormous dividends were derived.
The matter dragged in suspense until April 26, 1902,




VARIOUS QUESTIONS


341


about one month before the American withdrawal. Under
that date Sefor Manuel Otaduy, the president of the Jai Alai
Company, addressed to the Military Governor a letter closing
with the following expression: "This is an act of justice
which I trust to procure at your hands." The letter was a
request for the official recognition and definite legal establishment of the Mazzantini concession. Although the
game had been going on for more than a year, the concessionaires realized that they were not legally protected
either in the exclusive concession for which they applied
or in the gambling feature which this letter declared to be
"a part of the spectacle and without which it (the game)
could have no reason to be."
This recognition and authority was given under date of
May 7, 1902, in a communication signed "By order of the
Military Governor, H. L. Scott, Adjutant-General," this
being the customary form for all official documents and
communications. This reply informed Mr. Otaduy that
the papers in the case had been examined, their provisions
and processes approved, and that "the rights acquired by
your company are protected by the laws in force."
It has been denied that this constituted an illegal grant
of a concession. Two facts have an important bearing on
this point. One is that the Jai Alai Company, advised by
lawyers fully conversant with the Spanish codes, realized,
up to April 26, 1902, that its concession was still inchoate and
invalid. Otherwise, they would not then have demanded,
" as an act of justice," its completion by official recognition.
The other is that in spite of an earnest desire to rid their
land of the pernicious institution, Cuba's legislators have
been unable to see any way by which they could suppress
it without violating Article IV of the Platt Amendment.
On Jan. 1, 1899, the Jai Alai Company held an inchoate




342


VARIOUS QUESTIONS


concession. On May 20, 1902, it held a concession which
the Military Governor declared to be "protected by the laws
in force." This, in general outline, is the story of the Jai
Alai.  The affair created  a considerable scandal, although neither the legal nor the moral issues involved were
definitely determined.
The other alleged infraction of the Foraker Law appeared
in the matter of an inchoate concession for an electric light
system in the City of Havana, bought by and assigned to
one Tiburcio Castafieda. It never attained the public
interest which attached to the Jai Alai matter, and all that
need be said about it here is that at the time of American
occupation no one would have claimed validity for either
the Giberga or the Fuentes concessions, afterward owned by
Castafeda, and for which he asked official approval. Had
they been valid concessions, reference or appeal to the
American Military Governor would have been superfluous.
On May 20, 1902, Mr. Castafieda was engaged in constructing his system. Cuban effort to stop his operations was
met and defeated by Article IV of the Platt Amendment,
which, as in the Jai Alai matter, protected vested rights
acquired under laws and orders issued by the Government of
Intervention.
REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES
For several reasons, it is to be regretted that there has not
yet been submitted a summary of total receipts and expenditures of Cuban funds which can be accepted as a precise
and accurate statement of our trusteeship. No complete
debit and credit account has been prepared which includes
all receipts and payments up to the day of American withdrawal, with a line drawn to show the exact balance transferred when the Cubans assumed control of an institution
which Secretary Root described as a "going concern."




VARIOUS QUESTIONS                        343
During the ceremonies on May 20, 1902 (See Chap. XII),
General Wood informed President Palma that "the public
civil funds, amounting to $689,191.02, are transferred subject to such claims and obligations properly payable out of
the revenues of the Island as may remain." The receipt of
this sum was acknowledged by President Palma. This
statement is open to no other inference than that the sum
mentioned represented, at least approximately, the balance
of our Cuban account, the surplus remaining in the hands
of a trustee who was surrendering his stewardship. This,
however, was far from the fact, and the statement has been
the cause of tangles which would have been avoided by a
more business-like presentation. This appears to have been
merely the sum on hand in the Treasury at Havana, and left
out entirely a sum of $1,186,775.85, afterward reported as
"in the hands of collectors and disbursing officers."
On pages 135 and 136 of the annual report of the Secretary
of War, for the year 1902, there appears the following summary of total revenue and expenditure:
REVENUES
July 18, 1898, to June 30, 1899:
Customs......................... $7,228,460.60
Postal...........................    151,585.40
Internal..........................  347,431.89
Miscellaneous....................   234,345.66
$7,961,832.55
Fiscal year 1900:
Customs......................... $16,068,035.90
Postal...........................   258,148.03
Internal..........................  884,783.29
Miscellaneous....................   175,308.15
17,386,275.37
Fiscal year 1901:
Customs.........................  $15,950,526.91
Postal...........................   367,950.60
Internal..........................  658,585.92
Miscellaneous....................   184,003.23
17,161,066.66




344


VARIOUS QUESTIONS


July 1, 1901, to May 19, 1902:
Customs.........................  $13,402,917.15
Postal...........................    335,956.61
Internal..........................  688,581.67
Miscellaneous....................  260,519.79
14,687,975.22
$57,197,140.80
EXPENDITURES
State  and  government................................  $2,780,781.16
Justice and  public instruction..........................  11,108,187.46
Finance............................................  990,586.71
Custom s  service.....................................  2,912,326.06
Postal  service.....................................  1,625,762.03
Q uarantine.........................................  694,024.81
C ensus............................................  380,393.44
A uditor............................................  312,758.42
T reasurer..........................................  581,700.10
Rural guard and administration........................  5,253,244.58
Agriculture, industry, and commerce....................  1,121,699.28
Public buildings, works, ports, and harbors..............  5,833,607.90
Jucaro and San Fernando Railroad.....................  57,338.51
Barracks and  quarters................................  2,525,483.78
Charities and  hospitals................................  4,124,986.60
Sanitation.........................................  9,706,258.20
Municipalities (other than charities and hospitals and sanitation)..........................................  4,477,177.52
M iscellaneous......................................  918,714.72
Total........................................  $55,405,031.28
Revenues..........................................  $57,197,140.80
Expenditures.......................................  55,405,031.28
Excess of revenues over expenditures................ $1,792,109.52


But even this statement is not complete. The nominal
balance of $1,792,109.52 is subject to certain debits and
credits, among them a "trust fund" of $90,533.11, of which
$80,900.14 was postal money order funds, and none of
which is properly to be included in a statement of available
assets. There is also a debit item in the form of current
liabilities, outstanding on May 20, which, so far as I have
been able to learn from authoritative sources, has never
been made up.
From all that I have been able to learn, I am disposed to




VARIOUS QUESTIONS               345
accept the figures of $57,197,140.80 as a correct statement
of total receipts. For a statement of the exact amount left
to the Cuban Government as an unencumbered cash balance
on the day when it began business on its own account,
there should be added to the $55,405,031.28 an unknown
sum which may be small or which may be considerable.
It would have been better had the account been brought to
a state which would have warranted a probate court in discharging an administrator from the duties and responsibilities devolving upon him. As trustees of the Island of Cuba,
pending a pledged transfer to a Cuban Government, we
handled more than $57,000,000. We should have rendered
an account of our stewardship to the last cent.




CHAPTER XXI


CUBA LIBRE Y INDEPENDIENTE
THIS experiment of the United States in colonial government was far from a failure, and perhaps equally far from
an unqualified success. Much was accomplished which
will be of lasting benefit to the Island of Cuba. The mistakes that were made were, in the main, individual. A
fundamental error undoubtedly lay in the manner in which
state-building was entrusted to hands untrained in the
work and imperfectly qualified for it. Yet, in spite of all
that lies open to criticism or to condemnation, it is entirely
beyond question that, when it withdrew on May 20, 1902,
the United States left in Cuba an immeasurably better and
surer foundation for a Cuban Republic than any upon which
the Cubans could have built had they succeeded, without
American aid, in expelling the Government of Spain.
This book would be incomplete without a brief comment
on the structure which the Cubans have erected on the
foundation thus laid. At the time of the withdrawal, there
were many predictions of Cuban disaster and an early return of American authority, to assume a permanent control
over a people incapable of proper conduct of their own
affairs. There were even predictions of anarchy to come
before the topmasts of the homeward-bound American
transports had sunk below the horizon line.
Of Cuba's experience during the elapsed period, now
somewhat more than two years, it may be said that it has,




CUBA LIBRE Y INDEPENDIENTE


347


in its success, surpassed the expectations of her most ardent
friends, and that it has completely refuted the arguments
of critics and doubters. The Cuban Government has not
been ideal, and there has been much in its processes which
is open to criticism and even to censure. But precisely the
same is to be said of any and all governments, past or present.
The histories of Rome, France, England, or the United
States are by no means so clean that they are unassailable.
Cuba has done well, wonderfully well, and her officials and
her people are alike deserving of high commendation.
Peace and order have prevailed in the Island with perhaps
even less of interruption than during the Intervention. This
is due in part to the fact that the Cubans are a peace-loving
and orderly people, indisposed to turbulence, and in part
to their attention to that police protection which is a necessary institution in all communities. The sanitary work
established during the Intervention has been so continued
and maintained that the mortality list rivals in its low percentage the records of the most healthful lands. The
school system, although a heavy financial burden, has
shown no decadence.
In the Department of Public Works, even American energy
has been outstripped. The report of the secretary of that
department, for Cuba's first full fiscal year, shows that the
American authorities, during the entire term of the Intervention, constructed sixty miles of new country roads.
During their first year, the Cubans built forty-nine miles,
with forty miles more in process of construction. The
Americans built thirty-nine bridges of all classes during
their occupation. During her first year, Cuba built twenty
bridges, and prepared plans for twenty-five more. The
records of the Island show that the work done has been done
more economically than similar work was done under Ameri



348


CUBA LIBRE Y INDEPENDIENTE


can direction, and that it has been done quite as effectively.
Two factors have prevented an even wider achievement.
These are lack of money, and shortage in the labor supply.
A consideration of Cuba's financial situation and policies
presents many difficulties because of seeming incongruities.
I refer above to a lack of money. Yet out of a total revenue
only a little exceeding $35,000,000, for two years, Cuba
stored up in her national cash box several millions of dollars.
Her Congress has manifested no disposition to plunge into
extravagant expenditure, and no effort has been made to
raid the Treasury. The general economy of administration,
and the treasury accumulation, are attributable in large
measure to the personal ideas and the personal opinions of
President Palma. It was his belief that Cuba's general
credit would be strengthened by a surplus on hand. He
believed also in the wisdom of a comfortable balance for
use in case of an emergency.
The national credit was a matter of moment. A considerable sum was wanted for the discharge of certain
special obligations. These were in the form of bonds
issued by the revolutionary government, and an agreement
made by that government to pay the soldiers of the revolution for their time and services. These bonds, known as
the '96 bonds, with accrued interest, represented an obligation of about $3,000,000. The obligation to her soldiery
has not yet reached a full determination.
When General Gomez decreed the industrial paralysis
of the Island, thousands of laborers were deprived of all
means of livelihood. It was then proposed and agreed that
all who joined the insurgent ranks should receive payment for
their services at a rate corresponding to the daily wage rate
for labor on the plantations. This was set at one dollar per
day. Our own experience in the various wars in which we




CUBA LIBRE Y INDEPENDIENTE


349


have been engaged leaves us in no position to reflect on the
purchased patriotism of the Cuban warriors. An agreement had been made to pay them, and they wanted their
money. Many of them were in great need of it. One of
the first matters given important consideration by the
Cuban Congress was the question of the pay of the army
from the proceeds of a national loan. But there was much
confusion regarding the number entitled to such pay, and
the amount rightfully due the claimants. The original
proposition was a total sum of about $23,000,000 which
should constitute a full and final discharge of all obligations.
A commission was appointed to review and revise the
army lists, and to determine the amount rightfully due the
individual claimants. Gen. Maximo Gomez was appointed
as the head of this commission. It can only be regarded as
a national misfortune and a most serious error that the
commission should have departed from the terms of the
original proposal to make the sum of about $23,000,000
cover all claims in full. This was generally regarded as
ample and even liberal. It had been accepted as satisfactory
by the claimants themselves. The returns, as submitted
by the Gomez commission, showed a gross indebtedness
of about $57,000,000, based on a payment of one dollar per
day to privates, and an almost extravagant payment to
officers. The claims were, moreover, computed in American
gold. This was utterly without justification. The terms
of the original agreement involved a payment in Spanish
silver, worth, at a fair estimate, seventy cents on the dollar
in American gold. Upon that basis, the value of the claims
would have approximated $39,000,000 in American gold.
Cupidity was excited, and the idea of dividing the sum
originally proposed disappeared entirely.
A national loan of $35,000,000 had been under considera



350


CUBA LIBRE Y INDEPENDIENTE


tion for many months, and taxes to meet the interest and to
provide for the gradual payment of the body of the loan were
imposed before the loan was made. It was also decided to
use the entire proceeds of the loan for the partial payment
of the soldiers' claims. On Feb. 12, 1904, the banking
house of Speyer & Co. contracted for the $35,000,000 loan,
the price paid being ninety and one half, the interest rate
being five per cent. The proceeds of this are, at the time
when this is written, in process of distribution as a partial
payment, and the method of extinguishing the unadjusted
balance is under consideration.
Cuba's financial position may be briefly summarized.
She has paid her bills; accumulated a very considerable
treasury surplus; and has incurred no national debt beyond
her power of ready provision for it.
For her economic development, it may be said that there
has been steady and gradual improvement. The key to
this is found in a comment by Sefior Rafael Montoro, Cuba's
Minister to England, in an article published over his signature in Harper's Weekly for June 20, 1903. He there said:
"The producing classes are striving zealously to overcome
adverse conditions of the market. Throughout the country
there prevails an earnest purpose to reconquer wealth despite all these adverse conditions." Cuban success in this
direction is perhaps best indicated by a table of the production of raw sugar, the most important crop of the Island.
Her largest crops, prior to the revolution, were those of
1894 and 1895. The output of those and the succeeding
years stand as follows:
TONS                       TONS
1894..........  1,054,214  1897..........  212,051
1895..........  1,004,264  1898..........  305,543
1896..........  225,221  1899..........  335,668




CUBA LIBRE Y INDEPENDIENTE


351


TONS                      TONS
1900..........  300,073  1903..........  940,000
1901..........  615,000  1904.......... 1,089,735
1902..........  850,000
While other lines of productive industry show no such
percentage of increase, there has been a general improvement. Among the causes of this improvement there may
be noted the immigration of a considerable number of
American settlers who have bought land, usually in comparatively small tracts, and in a majority of cases for the
production of fruit and vegetables. It is estimated that,
prior to the last revolution, there had been American investment in the Island to the amount of, approximately, $50,000,000. Estimates of investment during the period of intervention increase this to about $80,000,000. Later investment will not materially increase this amount, as most of
the purchases have been on a comparatively small scale.
The general condition of the market has offered no inducement to investors in sugar land and new mills, a line calling
for investment on considerable scale. No data are available
for quotation, but it is doubtful if more than a few millions
of dollars have been placed in Cuba since the American
withdrawal.
Viewing her economic situation broadly, while it cannot
be said that Cuba has yet touched that prosperity which is
rightfully hers by reason of her soil and climate, there has
been marked improvement in her condition, and a notable
brightening of her prospects for the future.
In his annual report for 1901, Mr. Root, then Secretary
of War, made use of the following expression: "The same
considerations which led to the war with Spain now require
that a commercial arrangement be made under which Cuba
can live." In his message to Congress, in December, 1901,




352


CUBA LIBRE Y INDEPENDIENTE


President Roosevelt said: "In the case of Cuba, there are
weighty reasons of morality and of national interest why
the policy (of reciprocity) should be held to have a peculiar
application, and I most earnestly ask your attention to the
wisdom, indeed to the vital need, of providing for a substantial reduction in the tariff duties on Cuban imports into
the United States." Notwithstanding this vigorous attitude
of the administration, the Fifty-seventh Congress failed to
take action in the matter of either concessions or reciprocity.
This incident has been reviewed elsewhere.
But the agitation for special commercial relations with
Cuba persisted, and President Roosevelt did not abandon a
cause to which he had definitely committed himself. A
treaty was drafted during the winter of 1902-3, and was
duly ratified by both countries. But the measure was
modified by the introduction of a clause which provided that
the treaty should not take effect until "approved by Congress." The necessary approval was not given during the
session. During the ensuing months, Mr. Roosevelt decided to call an extra session for the sole purpose of dealing
with the suspended treaty. The call was issued, Congress
convened, and, on November 10, listened to the reading of a
special message urging legislation which should give effect
to the Cuban treaty. The result was tersely summarized
in a despatch sent by the Washington correspondent of the
New York Herald, on December 16, and published in that
paper on the following day. It said:
"After two years of almost constant struggle and persistent
effort on the part of President Roosevelt and his administration,
and, at the last moment, the lashing of the party whip on the eve
of a national election, Cuba gets her small meed of justice.
"The bill putting into effect the reciprocity treaty which was




CUBA LIBRE Y INDEPENDIENTE


353


passed by the House during the extraordinary session was finally
passed by the Senate this afternoon by a vote of 57 to 18."
The treaty became effective at midnight of Dec. 27, 1903.
Anticipating, as a result of the treaty, an injurious curtailment of national revenue, Cuba's Congress was at that time
considering an increase in her tariff rates, and, on Jan. 12,
1904, a bill was passed authorizing the Cuban President to
raise the duties by an amount not exceeding thirty per cent
of the existing rates. A decree in accordance with this
act was promulgated on February 5, and became operative
on February 8. While Cuba had every possible right to
take such a step, and was entirely justified in doing so, the
action encountered a considerable criticism from an American group which was evidently disposed to a belief that Cuba
was morally bound to give attention to American interests
even in preference to her own. As a matter of fact, the tariff
increase gave additional advantages to the United States.
During 1903, the "Naval Stations Treaty," provided for
in the Platt Amendment, was concluded, and the United
States proceeded to occupy bases at Guantanamo, on the
southeast coast, and Bahia Honda, on the northwest coast.
Almost on the eve of its conclusion, a treaty regarding the
Isle of Pines, by which the island was recognized as Cuban
territory, was suspended for further investigation and consideration. Various minor treaties, of a routine nature
were concluded during 1903 and 1904.
I have thus sketched, as briefly as it seemed possible to do,
an era fraught with momentous importance to the people
of Cuba. It was also a time of no insignificant meaning to
the United States. That mistakes were made, and that
friction arose from time to time, was inevitable. But the
good that was done will live, while the ills and evils will be
dissipated and forgotten. Cuba is our near neighbor, and




354       CUBA LIBRE Y INDEPENDIENTE
the people of the Island and those of the mainland will be
drawn into even closer relations of personal and commercial
friendship with the passing years. Cuba is now our ward,
our protege. The day may come, it is my belief that it will
come, when Cuba will become politically merged under the
flag of the United States. If asked to say when I look for
that event, I reply with the familiar Spanish phrase -
Quien Sabe?
But whether that day comes soon or late, no right-thinking American can do otherwise than wish the new Republic,
toward whose establishment the United States has contributed so largely, long life and prosperity in endless measure.
Salut, Senores, y Adios.




INDEX


A
Adams, John Quincy, 55
Administrative system, 6
Agricultural relief, 131
American Congress, 63, 64
- investment in Cuba, 351
Annexation, 354
Army, Cuban, 88, 115 et seq.
- -Pay of, 349
- of Occupation, 86
- Spanish, 88
Asamblea, 108, 117, 122
Autonomy, 32, 47, 310
B
Ballou, M. M., 15
Beet sugar lobby, 282
Belligerent rights, 47, 50, 62, 64, 65
Bill of Rights, 78, 79
Black Warrior case, 59
Blanco, Gen., 46, 85
Bliss, Gen. Tasker II., 90, 91, 136,
169
Blockade, 35
Bolivar, Simon, 9
Brooke, Gen. John R., 116,133, 136,
139, 144, 145, 309, 311
Buchanan, James, 58
Burrows, Senator, 285, 291
C
Cabinet, Cuban, 132, 133, 140
Cambon, Jules, 75, 78
Campos, Gen., 34, 37, 41, 44
Cartoons, 253
Castafeda, Concession, 342


Castellanos, Gen., 86, 153
Castillo, Canovas del, 46
Cemeteries, 127
Census, 129
Cespedes, Carlos Manuel, 19, 20
Church, Attitude of 329
- Influence of, 6
Church property question, 322 et seq.
Cisneros, Salvador, 36
Clay, Henry, 56
Cleveland, President, 62
Colonial policy, Spanish, 32
Commerce, Cuban, 138, 171, 186,
206, 295 et seq. 301
- House of, 2
- Regulation of, 2
- Restrictions on, 18
Commission, Economic, 278, 280
- Evacuation, 78
- Railway, 334
- to Washington, 266, 268
Congress, Cuban, 197
Conspiracy of 1823, 9
- - Black Eagle, 10
-    1848, 12
Constituent Assembly, 36
Constitution, Cuban, 217 et seq.
- Spanish, 28, 307
Constitution of 1869, 19
-      1895, 36
-Signing of, 221
Constitutional Convention, 172, 207
et seq.
- -on "Relations," 237
Convention, Constitutional, 172, 207
et seq.




356


INDEX


Council of the Indies, 305
Crittenden, Col., Execution of, 12
Cuba, 1840-1850, 11
- Administrative system, 6
-American investment in, 351
- British occupation of, 8, 9
- Debts of, 81, 82, 83, 94, 95
- Politics in, 32
- Republic of, 36, 346 et seq.
- Spanish exploitation of, 7
Cuba Company, 332
Cuban army, 43, 88, 115 et seq.
- -Pay of, 349
-Assembly, 118
- bonds, 348
-Cabinet, 132, 133, 140
- Congress, 197
- Constitution, 217 et seq.
-finances, 94, 124, 125, 348
- Government, 347
- loan, 350
- ports opened to trade, 9
Cubans, Ambition of, 8
- Character of, 121
Custom House, 90, 91
- -regulations, 178
--— Spanish methods in, 294
Customs Tariffs, 78, 165, 166
D
Dady, M. J. & Co., 152 et seq.
Decree of 1825, 10; of 1878, 28
Dudley, Judge Advocate, 312, 314,
338
E
Economic Commission, 278, 280
— conditions, 31, 96, 97, 99, 168,
169, 188, 205, 284, 292, 293,
296, 351
Education, Board of, 132
Election, for Constitutional Convention, 210
- Municipal, 163 et seq.




Election, National, 179, 182 et seq.
English occupation, 8
Evacuation Commission, 78
Everett, Edward, 59
Expenditures, 137, 170, 171, 186
205, 342 et seq.
Exports, 138, 171, 186, 206, 295, 301
F
Ferdinand VII, Order of, 10
Filibustering, 12, 25
Finances, Cuban, 124, 125
Finlay, Dr. Carlos, 151
Fish, Secretary, Letter of, 18, 22
Foraker Law, 129, 130, 337, et seq.
Forsyth, Secretary of State, 57
Frye, Alexis E., 132, 141, 142, 145
G
Garcia, Gen. Calixto, 119
Gener, Secretary of Justice, 160, 213
Gomez, Maximo, 33, 34, 36, 38, 116,
117, 119, et seq., 180, 244, 245,
251
— policy and proclamations, 39
et seq.
Gorgas, Major William, 173
Government established, 102, 200
Governors, Spanish, 7
Grant, President, 61
Greble, Major E. St. John, 136, 148
Guiamara, Assembly at, 20
H
Haciendas Comuneras, 192
Hanna, Lt. M. E., 142
Havana, 123, 152 et seq. 175, 176
- Lottery, 90
Harvard, Surgeon Major Valery, 150
Herald, N. Y., Extract from, 63
Howe, William Wirt, 304




INDEX


I
Immigration law, 196
Imports, 138, 171, 186, 206, 295, 301
Independence, 53, 68
- not desired, 16
Intervention, United States, 22
- Opinions on, 50 et seq.
"Invasion," 42
Isle of Pines, 319 et seq.
J
Jai Alai, 337 et seq.
Jails, 159
Jefferson, Thomas, 54, 56
Jimaguayu, 36
Joint resolution, 74
Junta in New York, 33, 37
Justice, Department of, 159, 161
L
Ladd, Major Eugene F., 125, 136
La Discusion, 169
Lamar, L. Q. C., 255
La Patria, 260, 263
Laws and legal processes, 95, 157,
176, 192 et seq., 304 et seq.
Lawton, Gen. Henry W., 78
Lee, Gen. Fitzhugh, 86, 87
Lopez, Narciso, 12
- expeditions, 12
Ludlow, Gen. William, 136, 150,
154, 157
M
Maceo, Antonio, 33, 34, C6, 37
- Jose, 34
Madison, President, 54
Magoon, Charles E., 339
Maine, The, 66
Marriage laws, 127, 128, 178
Marti, Jose, 33, 36, 119
Martial law, 34, 43
Maso, Bartolome, 34, 36, 182
McCullagh, John B., 123


McGivney & Rokeby, 156
McKinley, President, 45, 64, 67, 69,
71, 74
- - on intervention, 52
- -message, 72, 73
Monetary system, 125
Monroe Doctrine, 10, 54
Mortgage Extension Act, 109, 110
Mosquitoes, 150, 173
Municipal administration, 149
- elections, 163 et seq.
-finances, 175
- government, 163, 174
- reconstruction, 79, 112 et seq.
-system, 112
Municipalities, Suppression of, 191
N
Neely, Charles F., 167
Nogueira case, 162
0
Olmstead, Victor H., 129
Olney, Secretary, 29
Ostend Manifesto, 60
P
Pacificos, 35
Palma, Tomas Estrada, 29, 33, 37,
48, 62, 180, 181, 199, 343
Pardons, 158, 177
Paris Commission, 80
- Treaty, 80, 81, 226
Paso Caballo case, 162
Payne Bill, 288 et seq.
- Sereno E., 282
Peace Commission, 80
- Treaty of, 80, 81
- Proposal for, 75
- terms proposed, 67 et seq.
Penal institutions, 115
Peralojo, Battle of, 37
Pepper, Charles M., 35, 327, 328




358


INDEX


Platt, Senator O. H., 241, 248, 272,
273, 285
-   - -Letter of, 275
- Amendment, 245
Police Courts, 158
-Havana, 123
Political agitation, 34, 38
- parties, 32, 34, 38, 163
P'omeroy on intervention, 50
'ortcr, Robert P., 99, 117, 120,
298
Postal department, 91
- service, 92
Post-office cases, 167, 193 et seq.
Proclamation of Jan. 1, 1899, 101
Protocol, 76, 77
R
Railways, Cuban, 330 et seq.
Railway law, 190, 333
- rates, 178, 334, 335
Rathbone, Estes G., 91, 167, 195
Reciprocity with United States, 3,
32, 352
Reconcentration, 44
- Results of, 88, 89
Reconstruction, 79, 84, 94, 97, 103
Reed, Surgeon Major Walter, 151
Reform, Demand for, 9
"Relations," Question of, 209, 213,
224 et seq.
Relief work, 45, 87, 89, 104, 105, 148
Republic of 1868, 20, 21
--     1895, 36
Revenues, 137, 170, 171, 186, 205,
342 et seq.
Review of Reviews, Extract from, 292
Revolt of 1717, 8
— 1836, 10
--   1895, 1, 33, 31, 35, 42, 119
Revolts, 19th century, 17
Revolt, Causes of, 1, 2, 15
- motives of participants, 36, 37
Roosevelt, President, Letter of, 200


Roosevelt, Theodore, Message of,
281, 352
Root, Secretary, 222, 267, 270, 339
-— Letter of, 230, 259, 336, 351
-- Report of, 280
Rubens, Horatio S., 65
Rural guard, 124, 177
S
Saco, Prediction by, 14
Sbarretti, Bishop, 326
Sagasta, Praxades, 46
Sanger, Lt. Col. J. P., 129
Sanitation, 80, 89, 90, 150, 151, 156,
173
Santiago, 79
School, Correctional, 149
-establishment, 132, 142, 145 et
seq.
- system, Spanish, 143
Senate committee on Cuba, 61, 62
- - on Maine, 66
Sewering and Paving, 152 et seq.
Slavery, 27
Spaniards, 165
Spanish army, 42, 88
Spanish Commission of 1865, 17
Spain, Colonial policy of, 2, 32
- transfers sovereignty, 86
Stevenson, Minister to England, 57
Sugar, 31, 168, 297, 301, 350
Supreme Court, 177, 310
T
Tacon, Gen. Miguel, 10
Tariffs, 165, 166, 299
- Cuban, 353
- Spanish, 3, 298
- Gen. Bliss on, 300
Taxation, 114, 126
- Direct, 5
- Spanish system of, 4 et seq.
Teller Amendment, 74, 75




INDEX


359


Ten Years' War, 1, 15, 19, 23 et
seq. 30
Times, New York, Extract from, 13
Trade, Spanish restriction of, 2, 3, 9
Treaty of Zanjon, 27 et seq.
Triscornia case, 162
U
United States, Attitude of, 46 et seq.
-- Blockade by, 35
- -Congress, 63, 64
--  "Good offices" of, 22, 24
-- Intervention, 22
- -Policy of, 109, 135, 189
-- Reciprocity with, 3, 32, 352
- Recognition asked, 20
V
Valmaseda proclamation, 21
Van Buren, Secretary, 56
Vedado contract, 161
Virginius affair, 25, 26


W
Walton, on Spanish law, 304, 305
War, Possible avoidance of, 69 et seq.
- with Spain, 75
- end of, 83
Ways and Means Committee, 286,
288
Webster, Daniel, 58
Weyler, Gen., 21, 44, 46
Wheaton on Intervention, 50
Wilson, Gen. James H., 87, 93, 124,
131
Wood, Gen. Leonard, 78, 133, 136,
139, 141, 142, 145, 150, 155,
167, 169, 172, 177,189,190,192,
236, 243, 244, 245, 257, 278,
280, 283, 339,343
Y
Yellow fever, 151, 173
Z
Zanjon, Treaty of, 27 et seq.


UNIV6 o0 FOIiCH1GAN~


U N 121912








The United States and Porto Rico
With Special Reference to the Problems Arising
out of our Contact with the Spanish-American
Civilization.
By LEO S. ROWE, Ph.D., Professor of Political Science in the University of Pennsylvania, President of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, Member of the Commission to Revise
and Compile the Laws of Porto Rico (I900-I90I), Chairman of the
Porto Rican Commission (190I-1902). Crown 8vo. 280 pages.
Price, $I.30 net; by mail, $1.40.
The growing responsibilities which the United States is assuming
on the American continent make necessary a better understanding
of Spanish-American     institutions.  Through the acquisition of
Porto Rico and the Philippines the relation of the Spanish-American
civilization to that of the United States has become an important
question of national policy.      In  California and New     Mexico,
Spanish-American traditions were soon overwhelmed by the flood
of immigration from the East. In Porto Rico political institutions
cannot be suddenly and radically changed; the adaptation to American standards must be gradual. Professor Rowe's book treats of
the successive steps in this process of adaptation. It contains an
analysis of the salient characteristics of the Spanish-American
civilization and a suggestive comparison with the institutions of
the United States.
".. cannot fail to prove of great value to all who have occasion to inform
themselves concerning the Spanish colonial legal system as modified since the
American occupation of the island. Dr. Rowe has also included in his volume a
very useful discussion of those problems in civil government which confronted the
American administration from the first. The reader will gain from the work a
broader conception and a fuller appreciation of the ability displayed by the
representatives of the Washington Government in approaching these new and
extremely difficult problems." -Review of Reviews.
" It is a pleasure to recommend to all students of our new territorial problems
the treatise on ' The United States and Porto Rico.'... Professor Rowe's book
is the most discerning, clear, comprehensive, and helpful treatise thus far written on
the legal and political problems that we annexed with our island dependencies." -
Record-Herald.
"... written from the standpoint of a student of political history..
Throughout the volume the legal and governmental side is emphasized, and while
some description of the people and their characteristics is found, this is always subsidiary to the main idea of showing what our government had to face in re-organizing legal and civic forms, as well as the degree of progress so far made. It is a
very valuable and suggestive book."- Chicago Evening Post.


LONiMANS, GREEN, & CO., NEW YORK




Actual Government as Applied under American
Conditions. 
By ALBERT BUSHNELL HART, LL.D., Professor of History in
Harvard University, author of " Formation of the Union," &c., &c.
With 6, Colored Maps and II other Illustrations and Diagrams;
Suggestions for Students; a Select Bibliography of American Government; General COhapter References and an Index (15 pages).
Crowvn 8vo. $2.00.
In considering the actual workings of the American government
the author of this book believes that the real kernel is to be found
in that personal interest and personal action which vitalizes government. He discusses not only the machinery but the operations of
government on the ground that functions are more important than
details of governmental organization, and lays stress upon the purpose, extent, division, exercise, and limitations of governing power.
The Theory and Practice of the English Government.
By THOMAS FRANCIS MORAN, Professor of History and Economics
in Purdue University. Crown 8vo. Net, $1.20. By mail, $1.32.
The Evolution of Modern Liberty.
By GEORGE L. SCHERGER, Ph.D., Professor of History, Armour
Institute of Technology. Crown 8vo. Net, $I.IO. By mail, $1.20.
An investigation of the origin and development of the principles
of modern liberty as contained in the Bills of Rights prefixed to
the Constitutions of the American States, and in the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, drawn up by
the Constituent Assembly in 1789. The history of such ideas as
those of the natural liberty and equality of men, the sovereignty of
the people, the compact theory, the right of resistance to oppression,
religious liberty, and others, is traced from their origin to the end
of the eighteenth century.
Political Theories of the Ancient World.
By WESTEL W. WILLOUGHBY, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Political Science in Johns Hopkins University. Crown 8vo. $2.00.
"...The author's learning and reading are very wide, and his method painstaking... as an analytic compendium the work stands by itself and will be
found useful...." - The Nation.
"In this book Professor Willoughby has made an important addition to the
literature of the history of political theories... has the real importance of both
meeting a want and at the same time creating one."- American Historical Review.
The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
By M. P. FOLLETT. With an Introduction by Albert Bushnell Hart,
Ph.D. Crown 8vo. $I.75.
Contents: I. Genesis of the Speaker's Power. II. Choice of the Speaker. III. The
Personal Element of the Speakership. IV. The Speaker's Parliamentary Prerogatives.
V. The Speaker's Vote. VI. Maintenance of Order. VII. Dealing with Obstruction.
VIII. Power through the Committee System. IX. Power through Recognition. X.
Power as a Political Leader. XI. The Speaker's Place in Our Political System.Appendices.-Index.
LONGMANS, GREEN, & CO., NEW                            YORK








I4
0


%.                                     4.




UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
3 9015 00152 5016
DO NOT REMOVE
OR
MUTILATE CARD