OF THE 
 
 HON. HORACE BINNEY, 
 
 ON THE QUESTION OF 
 
 THE REMOVAL OF THE DEPOSITES. 
 
 DELIVERED 
 
 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
 
 Januany, 1854. 
 
 WASHINGTON: 
 PRINTED BY GALES AND SRATON, 
 
 1834. 
 
gute 
 
 wes. 
 
SPEECH. 
 
 The House having resumed the consideration of the motion to refer to the 
 Committee of Ways and Means the reasons assigned by the Secretary of 
 the Treasury for the removal of the public deposites, with Mr. McDurr1e’s 
 motion for instructing the committee to report a bill for restoring them to 
 the Bank of the United States— 
 
 Mr. BINNEY addressed the Chair to the following effect: 
 
 Mr. Speaker: The amendment offered by the gentleman from 
 South Carolina, [Mr. McDurrie,] proposes to instruct the Committee 
 of Ways and Means “to report a joint resolution, providing that the 
 public revenue, hereafter collected, be deposited in the Bank of the 
 United States, in conformity with the public faith, pledged in the 
 charter of the said Bank.” It, therefore, presents directly the ques- 
 tion of the sufficiency of the Secretary’s reasons for removing the 
 public deposites from the Bank, and for making the future deposites 
 elsewhere; and brings up for the consideration of this House every 
 thing that can bear upon the great topics of national faith and public 
 safety that are involved in the issue. 
 
 I mean to discuss this great question, sir, as I think it becomes me 
 to discuss it, on my first entrance into this House; as it would be- 
 come any one to discuss it, having the few relations to extreme party 
 that I have, and being desirous, for the short time that he means to 
 be connected with the station, to do or omit nothing that shall be the 
 occasion of painful retrospect. I mean to discuss it as gravely and 
 temperately as I can: not, sir, because it is not a fit subject for the 
 most animated and impassioned appeals to every fear and hope that 
 a patriot can entertain for his country—for I hold, without doubt, that 
 it is so,—but because, as the defence of the measure to be examined 
 comes to this House under the name and in the guise of ‘* Reason,” 
 I deem it fit to receive it, and to try its pretensions by the standard 
 to which it appeals. I mean to examine the Secretary’s paper, as 
 the friends of the measure say it ought to be examined—to take the 
 facts as he states them, unless in the same paper, or in other papers 
 proceeding from the same authority, there are contradictions; and then 
 I must be allowed the exercise of private judgment upon the evidence— 
 to take the motives as the Secretary alleges them—to add no facts, 
 except such as are notorious or incontestable, and then to ask the 
 impartial judgment of the House upon my answer. 
 
 Sir, the effort seems to be almost unnecessary. The great practi- 
 cal answer is already given by the condition of the country. No rea- 
 soning in this House can refute it; none is necessary to sustain it. It 
 
4 
 
 comes {o us, it is hourly coming to us, in the language of truth, and 
 soberness, and bitterness, from almost every quarter of the country; 
 and, if any man is so blind to the realities around him as to consider 
 all this but as a theatrical exhibition got up by the Bank, or the friends 
 of the Bank, to terrify and deceive this nation, he will continue blind 
 to them until the catastrophe of the great drama shall make his fac- 
 ulties as uscless for the correction of the evil, as they now seem to be 
 for its apprehension. 
 
 Mr. Speaker, the change produced in this country, in the short 
 space of three months, is without example in the history of this or 
 any other nation. The past summer found the people delighted or 
 contented with the apparent adjustment of some of the most fearful 
 controversies that ever divided them. The Chief Magistrate of the 
 Union had entered upen his office for another term, and was receiv- 
 ing more than the honors of a Roman triumph from the happy peo- 
 ple of the Middle and Northern States, without distinction of party, 
 age, or sex. Nature promised to the husbandman an exuberant crop. 
 Trade was replenishing the coffers of the nation, and rew arding the 
 merchant's enterprise. The spindle, and the shuttle, and every instru- 
 ment of mechanic industry, were pursuing their busy labors w ith profit. 
 Interna! improvements were bringing down the remotest West to the 
 shores of the Atlantic, and binding and compacting the dispersed in- 
 habitants of this immense territory, as the inhabitants of a single State. 
 One universal smile beamed from the happy face of this favored 
 country. But, sir, we have had a fearful admonition, that we hold 
 all such treasures in carthen vessels; and a still more fearful one, that 
 misjudging man, either in error or in anger, may, in a moment, dash 
 them to the earth, and break into a thousand fragments the finest 
 creations of industry and intelligence. 
 
 Sir, there is one great interest inthis nation, that is, and I fear 
 will for some time continue to be, peculiarly subject to derangement; 
 and yet every other interest is intimately and inseparably involved in it: 
 1 mean the currency. We have some twenty scores of banks from 
 which this currency is derived. We have from cighiy to a hundred 
 millions of bank notes, with a metallic circulation along with it, not 
 greater, perhaps, than as one.to seven. We have, it may be, one hun- 
 dred and forty to fifty millions of bank notes, and bank deposites, per- 
 forming in part the same office, with about the same propertion of 
 specie in the banks to sustain it. [t is a system depending essentially 
 for its safety upon public confidence, and that confidence depend- 
 ing of course upon the regularity of the whole machine, which again 
 depends upon ihe control that governs the whole. When compared 
 with the currencies of England and France—in the former of which 
 the metallic circulation is estimated as nearly one-half, and in the lat- 
 ter as nine-tenths of the whole—it may be seen how much more con- 
 fidence is required here, and how much greater the liability to shock 
 and to derangement, Yet, by the regulation and control of the Na- 
 tional Bank, ever since that regulation and control have obtained, the 
 system has worked well, and it has worked well only by means of 
 them. Sir, this regulation and control have been throfvn away— 
 
 s 
 
5 
 
 thrown away wantonly and contemptuously. In an instant, sir, al- 
 most in the midst of the smiling scene I have described, without any 
 preparation of the country at large, with nothing by way of notice 
 but a menace, which no one but the Bank itself, and she only from 
 the instinct of self-preservation, seems to have respected, this most 
 delicate of all the instruments of political economy has been assault- 
 ed, deranged, and dislocated; and the whole scene of enchantment 
 has vanished, as by the command of a wizard. ‘Che State banks are 
 paralyzed—they can do, or they will do, nothing. The Bank of the 
 United States stands upon her own defence. She can do, or she will 
 do nothing, until she knows the full extent of the storm that is to fol- 
 low, and measures her own ability to meet it. Prices are falling, do- 
 mestic exchange is falling, bank notes are falling, stocks are falling, 
 and, in some instances, have fallen dead. ‘The gravitation of the 
 system is disturbed, and its loss threatened; and it ‘being the work of 
 man, and directed only by his limited trisdomi there is no La Place 
 or Bowditch that can foretell the extent or the mischiefs of the de- 
 rangement, or in what new contrivance a compensation may be found 
 for the disturbing force. 
 
 Sir, whence has come this derangement? It comes from the act 
 of the Secretary in removing the deposites, and in declaring his doe- 
 trine of an unregulated, uncontrolled, State bank paper currency. 
 It is against all true philosophy to assign more causes than are suf- 
 ficient to produce the ascertained effect. This cause is sufficient— 
 this I verily believe has produced it—and I hope for the patient at- 
 tention of the House to my humble eflorts hereafter to show that no- 
 thing else has produced it. 
 
 Sir, the Secretary of the Treasury has, in my poor judgment, 
 committed one error which is wholly inexcusable; it is, m part, the 
 error of the argument that has proceeded from the honorable member 
 from Tennessee. That error lies in supposing that there were but 
 two objects to be considered in coming to his decision upon the de- 
 posites—the Administration and the Bank. "The coun'rry has been 
 forgotten. The Administration was to vindicate its opinions. The 
 Bank was to be made to give way to them. The consequences were 
 to be left to those whom they might concern; and they are such as 
 moderate human wisdom might have foreseen, such as are now before 
 us. While the Administration is apparently strong, and the Bank un- 
 disturbed, the country lies stunned and stupefied by the blow; and it 
 is NOW for this House to say whether they will continue the error, by 
 forgetting the country here also, or will endeavor to raise her to hen 
 feet, and assist her in recovering from the shaft that was aimed at the 
 Bank, but has glanced aside and fallen on her own bosom. 
 
 Mr. Speaker, I cannot better show the extent of the derangement 
 which this act is certain to produce, unless it is corrected, than by a 
 statement of the uses which the Bank of the United States has annu- 
 ally afforded, in various ways, to the people of the United States. 
 I take the year 1832, for which the returns are complete as to the 
 item of exchanges, and the years 1832 and 1833 for some other items 
 of nearly equal moment. 
 
6 
 
 The amount of domestic bills of exchange, purchased in all parts of 
 the Union, in 1832, was. - - - - - $67,516,673 
 [The half year from December, 1832, to June, 1833, 
 was $41,312,982, showing a large increase in that 
 line during the first half of this year.] 
 The amount of domestic bills collected for others, was 42,096,062 
 The amount of drafts by Bank United States and its 
 
 offices, on each other, . - - - - 32,796,087 
 Drafts by Bank United States and its offices, on State 
 banks, - - - - - - - - 12,361,337 
 
 Notes of Bank United States and its branches, receiv- 
 ed and paid out of place, viz: at places where there 
 
 was no obligation to pay them, - - - - 39,449,527 
 Notes of State banks received by Bank United States 
 and its branches, where they were not payable, - 21,630,557 
 Transfers of funds for the United States, - ~ - 16,100,000 
 Transfers of office balances, - - - - - 9,767,667 
 Making a total of domestic exchanges, - - - 241,717,910 
 Add to which the amount of— 
 Foreign exchange purchased, - - 89,253,533 
 Do. sold, - - - 4,203,204 
 
 15,456,737 
 Making the total amount of exchanges, by means of the 
 Bank of the United States, within the year 1852, 255,174,647 
 
 The amount of premiums on domestic exchange, received by 
 the Bank for the same period, was $217,249 56, which is about 
 one-eleventh of one per cent. on the aggregate. amount of the 
 domestic operations of the Bank, say $241,717,910; and this has 
 been the whole cost of this circulation to the people of the United 
 States, by the aid of which their property of every description has 
 been passing in a copious and uniform current, from one extremity 
 of this nation to the other. To this extensive aid must be added 
 that derived from the Bank discounts, which, with the domestic bills 
 purchased, amounted, in the year 1832, to an average sum of 
 $66,871,349, and, in the year 1833, to an average of $61,746,708; 
 and that also derived from the constant circulation of her notes, 
 averaging $20,309,359 for the year 1832, and $18,495,436 for the 
 succeeding year. 
 
 Now, sir, it appears to me that I do no injustice to the Secretary 
 of the Treasury, or to any one who has directed, or authorized, or 
 superintended this act, by saying that it was the design of the removal 
 of the deposites to break up this whole machinery; that this was not 
 to be a casual, unexpected, unpremeditated result; but that the removal 
 was ordered for the very purpose of drawing the circulation of the 
 Bank of the United States out of the hands of the people into the 
 hands of the Bank; to compel her, with this view, to reduce her 
 discounts, and diminish the amount of her purchases of domestic 
 
 _ exchange; and thus to cut all the ties which united the Bank to the 
 pe as bia 
 
 4 a = 
 5 aye . 
 
2 
 
 internal trade of the country. I do no injustice by saying this, 
 ‘because, in the letter of the Secretary, if I read it right, this design 
 is there explicitly avowed and defended. But whether designed or 
 not, this will be the effect, and the necessary effect, of the measure, 
 af it shall prove successful. It must throw the whole machinery of the 
 Bank out of gear; compel her at once to begin the process which is 
 to liquidate and close her transactions; separate her from the people, 
 and the people from the Bank; and deliver over these vast concerns 
 and interests to confusion and misrule. It is by the revelation of 
 this design, and by the necessary consequences of the measure, as this 
 intelligent. people have apprehended them, that great distress has 
 already been produced, and the just anticipation of greater distress 
 hereafter. Can any one, after this view of the recent uses of the Bank, 
 and of the effects which have followed, and are to follow, their in- 
 tended or necessary interruption, ask the reason of the want of 
 ‘employment, the want of money, the stagnation of trade, which pre- 
 vails in most of our cities?’ Can he ask the cause of the syncope into 
 which this people have fallen? No, sir, no one can for a moment 
 doubt the cause of all this. It lies in the act of removing the deposites, 
 taken in connexion with its design and doctrine. It is not the mere 
 transfer from one place to another. That is a circumstance which 
 might happen, and has happened already, in the history of this Bank, 
 without producing any alarm whatever. It is not the removal of the 
 deposites simply, but the design with which that removal was made, 
 -and the effects which belong to it. ‘The alarm proceeds from looking 
 -at the necessary consequences of such a design, unless Congress shall 
 vinterpose to avert them. ° 
 
 Permit me, sir, before I come to the regular discussion of the 
 reasons adduced by the Secretary of the Treasury for removing the 
 deposites, to occupy a few moments in drawing the attention of the 
 House to some matters, which, to many gentlemen here, are no 
 doubt familiar, but which ought to be known and considered by all 
 who would form a sound judgment on the question before us. I. 
 “have said that the removal of the public deposites, if it had been 
 a mere transfer of so much money from one bank to other banks, 
 judiciously regulated as such transfers may be, would not have | 
 produced the train of consequences which we have alapay seen to 
 flow from it. There are gentlemen in this House familiar with as 
 large operations in finance, that have produced no inconvenience. 
 The effects of such a measure must depend upon the condition of 
 trade at the moment of removal, upon the continued or interrapted 
 application of the money transferred, to the same uses to which it has 
 been before applied, and upon the prosecution or discontinuance of 
 the general system of banking operations which prevailed at the mo- 
 -ment of transfer. What its effects must have been, and must continue 
 +o be, in the actual circumstances of the country, taken in connexion 
 with the imputed design, it is not difficult to show. 
 
 Sir, the Bank of the United States held of the public deposites, 
 of every description, on the Ist of August, 1833, according to the 
 ‘statement of the Secretary of the Treasury, the sum of $7,599,931;_ 
 and they were in a course of increase, whichthe Bank knew as well 
 
 Be ¥ Pa 
 4 ~ e+ ae © a 
 
8 
 
 as’ the Secretary, up to the Ist of October, 1833, when they amounted: 
 to the sum of $9,868,435; say ten millions of dollars. How was 
 this money to be paid? The Secretary of the Treasury had a right 
 to demand its payment, when, where, and in such sum or sums, as he- 
 thought fit. He had such a power to do it in point of form, that the- 
 Bank could not question its exercise in point of right. It was the 
 duty of the Bank to be prepared to pay it; and the question must be 
 answered, how was the money to be paid? 
 
 The answer given to this question, and given with a view to involve: 
 the Bank in odium and prejudice, isthis: that she ought to have paid 
 it, or whatever the Secretary chose to require of it, in specie, from. 
 her vaults, without distressing the community, by calling upon others. 
 to pay their debts to her. ‘To say nothing of the fact, sir, that the 
 Bank has always paid every one, the Treasury included, in specie, 
 unless they preferred something else, the doctrine that she was to pay 
 in specie to the Treasury, without putting herself in a condition to 
 require itfrom some one else, is a doctrine which I cannot admit. 
 It is one that will not bear examination. 
 
 . The Bank,on Ist October, 1833, had specie in all her vaults to the 
 
 extent of $10,663,441. Ifshe had been so situated at that time as 
 
 that this, or any considerable portion of it, had left her vaults, without 
 
 being brought back again, the consequences might have been of the most 
 
 pernicious character to herself and to the whole country. The Bank 
 
 had a circulation of more than eighteen millions to sustain, exclusive 
 
 of her private deposites. A new erahad opened. A new system was- 
 about to be adopted in the fiscal affairs of the Union. _ Its effects were 
 
 to be seen. The extent to which the Treasury was about to assail 
 
 her could not be known, The slightest interruption, the slightest 
 
 fear of interruption, to her promptness and punctuality, would have- 
 raised that apprehension for her. stability which has been excited 
 
 for others. Sir, to ask this Bank, under these circumstances, to: 
 empty her vaults of specie, without taking any measures of precau-- 
 tion to replenish them, would have been to ask the able directors to 
 
 throw away their whole capital of reputation, and that of the Bank 
 also. ‘They would have proved themselves unworthy of the occasion 
 
 on which they were called to act. What, sir, at the very outbreaking of 
 the storm, when no human intelligence could tell how long it was to 
 last, or what would be the fury of its violence, to ask the pilots of this bark 
 
 to keep all her sails set, and to throw her ballast overboard! No, sir; 
 
 the Bank was bound to do as she has done. She was bound to pre~ 
 pare for the trial. She was bound to strengthen her position, by di- 
 
 minishing her discounts; and she has diminished them, in my judgment, 
 
 most wisely, most discreetly, and most tenderly. And yet, sir, it is 
 from this circumstance—the mere reduction of loans and purchases. 
 of bills, without looking either to the necessity for that reduction, 
 or to the extent and effect of it—that some men of honest and 
 upright minds have been prejudiced against her. I can show, with- 
 out difficulty, that it is a mere prejudice. ae 
 
 The Bank had to pay over ten millions of public deposites, and she: 
 ought not to have exposed herself to lose any material portion of her 
 specie, without being in a condition to recall it. She had then but 
 
9 
 
 one resource, and that was, unless the interest of her debtors did of 
 
 itself produce the effect by diminishing their loans, to call upon them _ 
 
 toassist her in paying the amount. There was no other way open to her; 
 and the degree to which she must call, in order to obtain assistance to 
 a given extent, is a point in practical banking to which it is material 
 for gentlemen to advert. 
 
 In explaining this operation, so as to make it intelligible to that — 
 
 portion of the House which may not be familiar with banking, I will state 
 the argument against the Bank. It is said, sir, that whatever amount 
 she requires her debtors to pay, or withholds from other borrowers af- 
 ter it is paid, is to be set down as an actual increase of her ability to 
 meet the demand for the public deposites. ‘This is a very specious 
 but wholly unsound proposition. In the process of reduction of dis- 
 counts, with a view to increase the ability of a bank, two and two do 
 not always make four; they sometimes do not even make two. The 
 Bank not only has debtors, but she is herself a debtor to the Trea~- 
 sury for the public deposites, and to individuals for their private de- 
 posites; she is a debtor for her notes in circulation, and to other banks 
 for any balances due to them. When, therefore, she calls upon her 
 debtors to return a part of the debt they owe her, these very persons 
 may be her creditors by deposite, or may borrow from such as are, 
 and may call upon the Bank to pay what she owes to them. Thus, 
 if a person who is required by the Bank to pay a note, has at the 
 same time a deposite or credit in bank, the one may be made an 
 offset against the other; and if the two are equal, it is manifest that 
 the Bank has no more ability to pay its debt to others after this trans- 
 action than she had before. She has merely paid a debt that she owed 
 an individual, by the extinguishment of a demand which the Bank had 
 upon him. Sir, this effect is universally seen in the practical busi- 
 ness of banking, that when a Bank calls in what is owing to her, a 
 part of the demand is paid by drafts upon herself; and as her line of 
 discounts goes down, so does her line of individual deposites. 
 
 It will be easy to show, sir, the effect of this circumstance upon the 
 resources of the Bank while the reductions of August and September 
 last were being made. 
 
 In August and September the Bank loans and purchases fell, accord- 
 ing to the Secretary’s letter, 4,066,147 dollars, as follows : 
 The amount of notes and bills in August was $64,160,349 
 
 And in October following - - - 60,094,202 
 
 —__—__- =, 066,147 
 But the private deposites in August were 10,152,143 
 And in October they had fallen to - 8,008,862 
 
 Making a reduction by payment of these deposies equalto 2,143,281 
 
 And leaving the Bank the better in al to ay the public: * 
 
 only - - - picts XG} 922, 866 
 the difference having been paid away to Hie me depositors or credi- 
 tors. This result is familiar in the history of all banks. As a bank 
 calls upon her debtors to pay, they call upon her in like manner; and 
 she retains only the difference between her receipts and payments. 
 
 s ’ . 
 , . 
 one /~ _ . 
 
 ay 
 
10 
 
 Sir, while the process of reduction was going on in August and 
 September, 1833, the public deposites to be withdrawn in October were 
 increasing against the Bank, having been in October the amount be- 
 
 fore stated - - - - - - - - $9,368,435 
 While in August they stood at - - - - — 7,599,931 
 Making an increase of - - - -> 2,268,504 
 
 so that, regarding these elements alone, the increased ability of the Bank 
 to meet the public deposites was not equal to the increased demand 
 by reason of the deposites; and the process of reduction was of neces- 
 sity to be continued. So very insufficient a method is it of ascertain- 
 ing the effect of reductions either upon a bank or the community, to 
 take the amount of reductions only. 
 
 But, sir, let me carry this examinationa little further. The amount of 
 reductions from 1st August, 1833, to 1st January, 1834, was as follows: 
 Notes and bills in August, 1833, were 864,160,149 
 
 in January, 1834, they were 54,911,461 
 
 Making a diminution or reduction in five months of $9,248,688 
 The individual deposites in August, being 
 
 as before - - - - $10,152,148 
 They are in January, 1834 - - ~ 6,734,866 
 
 So that the Bank has paid those deposites to the extent of 3,417,277 
 
 And her ability so far as the reductions gave it, was 
 
 increased by the difference only - - - 5,831,411 
 But the public deposites in Oct. were as before 89,868,435 
 And in January they stand at - - 4,230,508 
 
 Showing a payment of the public deposites during this 
 
 time of — - - - - - - - - 5,637,927 
 And leaving an increased ability to pay the residue, as 
 
 compared with the Ist Aug., 1833, only to the extent 
 
 of the difference of - - - - - - $193,484 
 
 These statements, sir, show that, although reductions are necessary 
 to meet the withdrawal of deposites, they do not produce an increase 
 of ability to pay deposites in the direct ratio of their amount; and 
 therefore that the amount alone is not a test of their having been car- 
 ried to a sufficient extent. There is no doubt that the payments of 
 debts to the Bank may have produced distress; but these payments 
 have themselves been the effect of the removal of the deposites, and 
 this effect has been infinitely aggravated by the stagnation of trade 
 and the loss of confidence proceeding from the design of the removal, 
 and from the manner of the removal. 
 
 Sir, the Treasury might have pursued a course that would have 
 mitigated the evil, by diminishing the cause of alarm. Having the 
 control of this demand, they might have made known to the Bank 
 the times, proportions, and places of the intended transfers, and have 
 thus given assurance to the Bank that its reductions to meet the 
 
11 
 
 emergency need not exceed the proposed demand. But the Treasury 
 took a different course; and, if any thing could raise the embarrass- 
 ment of the Bank, and the community also, to the highest degree, it 
 was the course which the Treasury pursued. 
 
 Mr. Speaker, what was that course? Is any gentleman in this House 
 ignorant of it? The honorable member from Tennessee [Mr. Poix] 
 has read to the House a passage from a pamphlet, which he was 
 pleased to call the manifesto of the Bank; I shall, tnerefore, regard 
 that publication as authentic, and I will refer gentlemen to the cor- 
 respondence between the cashier of the Bank and the Treasurer of 
 the United States that is appended to it. They will there find what, 
 by agreement with the Bank, had been the practice of the Treasury 
 when there was no alarm in the community, when the Bank was ad- 
 mitted to be in a state of perfect security, and free from the appre- 
 hension of embarrassment. The Treasury practice was to send to 
 the Bank a daily list, specifying every draft upon the Bank from 
 the Treasury, showing the amount drawn for and the place of pay- 
 ment, but omitting the names of the persons to whom payable, to 
 guard against fraud. Another list was sent weekly, with the dates, 
 amounts, places of payment, and names of the payees. These were 
 intended not only to guard the Bank against fraud and surprise, but to 
 enable the Bank to regulate the accommodations to its customers, as 
 they were thus apprized of the points at which their funds would be 
 wanted. Nothing surely could be more natural than to continue a 
 practice like this, when the deposites were to be permanently removed. 
 It could not be doubted by any one that such a proceeding must cause 
 uneasiness in the public mind; and the very first precaution which 
 prudence would have suggested to mitigate the alarm, was the con- 
 tinuance and increase of these safeguards of the Bank; certainly not 
 that, at the very commencement of the alarm, they should be discon- 
 tinued. But such was the fact. That they were discontinued, and 
 that the Bank, misled and deceived, had to deal with the Treasury as 
 with an enemy, is an event which belongs exclusively to the present 
 day, and to the existence of personal feelings in the Department which 
 directed the Treasurer, wholly unbecoming the official transactions of 
 any Government. 
 
 Sir, if I meant to deal with my enemy as is befitting the spirit of 
 honorable contest, I would give him equality of position, of instruc- 
 tion, of knowledge, and let the issue be the result of skill and the 
 better cause; but if | meant to deprive him of all chance of defence 
 or escape, to murder him basely, what better course could I pursue, 
 than to blindfold him,. or rather to throw false lights into his eyes, that 
 he could only know the approach of the poniard by feeling it in his 
 heart? 
 
 Sir, the former practice was made an instrument of imposition upon 
 the Bank, by continuing to wear its usual appearances, while, in truth, 
 drafts, to the extent of nearly three millions of dollars, were pur- 
 posely withheld from the lists—drafts payable in unknown places, 
 at unknown times, and to unknown parties. The lists themselves be- 
 came instruments of deception, and gave false information to the Bank 
 of the state of the Treasury demand, while rumors gave out the exist 
 
12 
 
 ence of the concealed drafts in precisely that way which was most 
 likely to increase the deception. I call the attention of the House to 
 that correspondence of which I have spoken. The Treasurer says 
 that the drafts were of an unusual kind; that they depended on 
 certain contingencies—contingencies still unknown to this House and 
 nation. Was this a reason why the Bank should not have notice of 
 them? Was it calculated to quiet the apprehensions of the Bank or 
 of the community, that the presentation of these drafts, payable as 
 it now appears at sight, was suspended upon unknown contingencies? 
 Sir, every unprejudiced person who looks at this transaction, must 
 agree that the course of the Treasury, in regard to drafts for nearly 
 three millions of dollars, hovering between Philadelphia, New York, 
 and Baltimore, without an intimation to the Bank of the time and 
 place where they were to be presented, was of itself amply suf- 
 ficient to justify even’ more alarm than the Bank felt, and greater 
 reductions than the Bank required. 
 
 There is one other fact to which I will advert before I close these 
 preliminary remarks; it is of great use in explaining the influence of 
 the removal in producing the present distress. ‘The honorable mem- 
 ber from Tennessee [Mr. Poix] expressed great surprise that any dif- 
 ficulty should be apprehended from transferring deposites from one 
 side of a street to another, inasmuch as the community would 
 derive the same amount of accommodation from them ‘in one place 
 as in the other. Sir, the consequence did not follow. The same 
 amount of accommodation was not derived, and it is for those who 
 know the condition of the deposite banks to give the reason. This 
 {louse does not know what their circumstances were. Their capital 
 may have been employed in furnishing capital to Western banks, or 
 in discounting upon their own stock; or the amount of their private 
 deposites may have been lessened by the apprehension of remaining 
 in company with a public depositor and preferred creditor. There is 
 one decisive reason why the deposite State banks can never so effi- 
 ciently further the accommodation of the trading community as the 
 Bank of the United States, and that is, that the circulation of the 
 one extends over the whole Union, and never enters one of her banks 
 in its course, but it issues again to repeat the circle. But the circu- 
 Jation of a State bank is at her own door. . It cannot leave it to any 
 material extent. Contrivances to extend it are abortive. It does not 
 answer the purpose of exchange, and its excess as currency Instantly 
 returns upon the bank for something that is better than her bank notes. 
 The discounts of the State banks, on the faith of the deposites placed 
 in them, cannot have been equal to the reductions of the Bank of the 
 United States to pay them. And, in addition to this, there is an im- 
 mense mass of private capital usually loaned out on the security of 
 stock, at moderate interest, which, at a moment of danger and alarm, 
 retires from the scene. The days of exorbitant interest are not the 
 days of the capitalist, but of men who desire to make exorbitant pro- 
 fit upon small investments. ' 
 
 Stil, sir, it is not easy to account for the height of the present dis- 
 tress by the mere change of the deposites, nor by the diminished use 
 of them in the State banks, when compared with their use in the Bank 
 
13 
 
 of the United States, from which they were taken. These circum- 
 stances had an effect, but they do not stand alone. There is an 
 intense apprehension for the future connected with this operation—an 
 apprehension which springs from the ‘Treasury determination that 
 nearly the whole of the existing circulation of exchanges i is to cease; 
 and cease it must, to a great extent, if the Bank of the United States is 
 not to collect the public revenue. 
 
 The Bank of the United States, Mr. Speaker, has performed her 
 great offices to this people by the concurrence of two peculiarities, 
 which belong to her—her Structure, and her employment in the 
 collection of the public revenue. No State banks, by any combi- 
 nation, can effect the required exchanges to a considerable extent. 
 No Bank of the United States, without the aid of the public rey enue, 
 can effect them to the extent which the necessities of trade require. 
 
 Sir, the structure of the Bank of the United States contributes to 
 this operation in a way which every one may comprehend. ‘The whole 
 circulation of the United States is employed i in effecting the exchange 
 of the crops with the merchandise of the country. iti is employed 
 in transporting the crops to market, ani merchandise to the places 
 of its consumption. Now, sir, a National Bank, with branches spread 
 over the whole Union, knows, from experience, and by her means 
 of observation, where the amonnt of demand will fall and rise, 
 and at what time these changes will occur. She knows beforehand 
 where she may with safety diminish her resources, and where she 
 must enlarge them. Wherever her resources are placed for use, it 
 is the same thing to the Bank. Her profit is the same every 
 where; and this. ability to give them the position which the trade of 
 the country requires, is sustained by, and in a great degree dependent 
 upon, her employment as the depository of the public revenue. In 
 this character the Bank receives the revenue, and holds it until the 
 time of disbursement; and the knowledge which her accomplished 
 President and the Board of Directors obtain through their relations 
 to the Treasury, and by intimate acquaintance with the fiscal opera- 
 tions of the Department, enables them to reconcile all the demands 
 of the Treasury with the demands of trade, at the same time that 
 they preserve the whole currency of the country in that due  pro- 
 portion to demand which makes it, aod which alone makes it, sound 
 and invariable. 
 
 But now, sir, this revenue is to be collected against the Bank. 
 She is to assist in paying, not in receiving it. Her situation is to be 
 entirely reversed. The wants of the community are to become se- 
 condary to her own preservation; and, instead of placing her funds 
 where trade will most require them, she must place them where, from 
 the presence of rivals supported by the Government, she will require 
 them herself for her own protection. Sir, this is to be the future 
 operation of the measure taken by the Treasury Department. The 
 theory of a National Bank with branches not collecting and disbursing 
 the revenue, is an absurdity. It neyer was conceived of until the 
 present day; and even now, though complaints are made against the 
 Bank, as if her powers were not impaired, no one ean seriously regard 
 the measure of removal except as a measure of intended destruction. It 
 
14 
 
 is particularly a measure of intended destruction to all the usual opera- 
 tions of exchange. ‘The Bank cannot perform them as she has done. If 
 the State banks promise to perform them, it is all delusion. If they have 
 contracted to perform them, they will break their contract; and if they 
 do not, they will break themselves. If by possibility they could make 
 themselves a Bank of the United States and its branches, which they 
 cannot do, what would the country gain by such a contrivance but 
 a bank with the powers of the present Bank, subject to no re- 
 strictions or control by law, and dependent only on the pleasure of 
 him who controls the deposites? Sir, the whole property of the coun- 
 try, in its transfer from place to place within it, is to undergo—has 
 already undergone—a violent change. There is not a man who can 
 now take the management of a crop in the South, or of a manufac- 
 ture or importation in the North, who. is-able to foresee how he shall 
 - conduct it to its close; and the consequence is, that he will, if possible, 
 have nothing to do with either. This derangement, actual and pros- 
 pective, sir, enters materially into the present excitement and distress. 
 
 And does the honorable member from Tennessee propose, as a 
 remedy for all this, to have an inquiry into the affairs of the Bank? 
 Is it for difficulties of this description and magnitude that he demands 
 a sifting inquiry, an inquiry into the printing accounts of the Bank? 
 Is his great object to ascertain how $7,000 “of unvouched payments 
 have been distributed, and who is the owner of the National Intelli- 
 gencer? Sir, I confess my profound astonishment that gentlemen, 
 having the welfare of this great nation confided to them, will de- 
 scend to inquiries like these, will run after petty accounts with printers 
 and the concerns of the National Intelligencer, and, in the ardor of 
 pursuit, forget the country that is intrusted to them. The time has 
 come, or I greatly mistake the indications around us, when the country 
 demands that our attention be given to objects of a higher nature. 
 
 I humbly hope, then, Mr. Speaker, that this. House will. inquire 
 into nothing but the question before it, and from which we cannot 
 escape—the evil which now threatens the country, and the proper 
 remedy to be applied. An inquiry of this character is worthy of all 
 attention, and of the devotion of all our faculties and efforts. In such 
 an inquiry, no person will be more ready than myself to forget the 
 Bank, if that shall be the course of patriotism and safety. Except as 
 she ministers to the public good, I regard her as nothing, and less 
 than nothing. ‘The public good, in the preservation of the public 
 faith, in the maintenance of the public currency, and in the support 
 of the constitution—this is an object which this House should never 
 cease to regard, and to which, in my further remarks, I shall endea- 
 vor to keep my own attention fixed, without yielding it to any other. 
 
 Mr. Speaker, the immediate question before the House is, whether 
 the reasons assigned by the Secretary of the Treasury for removing 
 the public deposites are such as ought to satisfy Congress. and the 
 country; and, if not, what is the remedy which it is the duty of Con- 
 gress to apply? 
 
 The reasons assigned are remarkable, sir, in a particular which 
 cannot have escaped the general observation. The letter of the 
 Secretary consists of certain general propositions, by which he en- 
 
15 
 
 deavors to sustain his authority, and of certain particular reasons or 
 statements of fact, by which he endeavors to justify its exercise. The 
 general propositions upon which all his particular reasons depend, he 
 does not condescend to argue at all; and I have listened with all due 
 attention to the gentleman who has preceded me, the honorable mem- 
 ber from Tennessee, without being able to perceive that his course 
 has in any respect differed from that of the Secretary. The Secre- 
 tary asserts, sir, that, by the removal of the deposites, by and through 
 his absolute and unconditional power, whether the act was in itself 
 right or wrong, with or without cause, the Bank of the United States 
 is put out of court, and the nation discharged from the contract, with- 
 out any violation of faith. He further asserts, that while his own 
 power was absolute, that of Congress over the same subject was gone, 
 having been alienated to him; that the Legislature were, as to the 
 treasure deposited in the Bank of the United States, ina condition of 
 impotency and imbecility; that they had bound themselves hand and 
 foot by the charter of the Bank; and. that, while they had given un- 
 limited authority over the subject to him, they had reserved no power 
 whatever to themselves or to the people; and, consequently, that in 
 no event, not even if the deposites were unsafe, or the ultimate law 
 of all Governments—the safety of the people—should imperiously have 
 demanded the. removal of the deposites, was it in the power of Con- 
 gress to touch them, without a violation of the public faith. He 
 further asserts, that the rightful exercise of his power is not, even in 
 point of responsibility to Congress,-dependent on the safety of the 
 deposites, or on the fidelity of the Bank. in its conduct to the Govern- 
 ment; but that it was his right and duty to remove them, if the 
 removal tended in any degree to the interest and convenience of the 
 public. He finally asserts, that as it was his right to remove the 
 deposites, so it was his right, as a consequence, to select the places 
 of new deposite; and he did so. 
 
 Sir, these are startling propositions. They involve grave conse- 
 quences. ‘They deserve careful consideration, They are far from 
 being self-evident. It was worthy of the officer who asserted them, 
 and who was bound to justify the assertion to Congress, to favor 
 that body with at least an outline of the train of reasoning by which 
 he came to these remarkable conclusions. But, sir, there is no such 
 thing in the book. I have looked carefully through it, to borrow 
 some light on this subject from the mind of the Secretary, by which 
 [ might enlighten my own; but, beyond the simple dogmas which I 
 have stated, there is nothing to be found, except the causes of his 
 particular determination, which were of no sort of importance what- 
 ever, nor worthy of the least consideration, if his general propositions 
 are true. Iam compelled, therefore, from necessity, to assert the 
 contrary of all that the Secretary has asserted, and to take the burden 
 of refuting what it would seem to have been rather his duty to es- 
 tablish. These are points, sir, to which I shall especially call the 
 attention of the House, as involving principles of the highest public 
 importance—principles which, if this House shall affirm them, they 
 will affirm that all power over the Treasury is gone from Congress, 
 and that there is but a single Department in the Government. 
 
16 
 
 The first proposition is that with which the Secretary begins his 
 letter. The Secretary says— 
 
 “It has been, settled by repeated adjudications, that a charter 
 ** pranted by a State to a corporation like that of the Bank of the 
 ** United States is a contract between the sovereignty which grants 
 ** it and the stockholders. The same principle must apply to a char- 
 ** ter granted by the United States; and, consequently, the act incor- 
 tf porating | the Bank is to be regarded as a contract between the 
 * United States of the one part, and the stockholders of the other; 
 ‘* and, by the plain terms of the contract, as contained in the section 
 “ above quoted, the stockholders have agreed that the power reserved 
 “¢ to the Secretary over the deposites shall not be restricted to any par- 
 ** ticular contingencies, but be absolute and unconditional, as far as 
 ‘* their interests are involved in the removal. The order, therefore, 
 “ of the Secretary of the Treasury, directing the public money to be 
 ** deposited elsewhere, can in no event be regarded as a violation of 
 ** the contract with the stockholders, nor impair any right secured to 
 * them by the charter.”’ 
 
 ‘That the House may have before them the section to which the 
 Secretary refers, | beg their attention to it. It is the 16th section of 
 
 the Bank .C harter, ich enacts: 
 
 ‘That the deposites of the money of the United States, in places 
 “in which the said Bank or branches thereof may be established, 
 shall be made in said Bank or branches thereof, unless the Secretary 
 * of the Treasury shall at any time otherwise order and direct; a 
 “ which case, the Secretary of the Treasury shall immediately lay 
 * before Congress, if in session, and, if not, immediately after the, 
 “ commencement of the next session, the reasons eb such order or 
 ** direction.” 
 
 1 beg the House tv remark that this document proceeds from a 
 gentlemen of distinguished reputation as a jurist, trained to legal in- 
 vestigations, and fully acquainted with the legal effect and value of 
 every word which he has used. The laneuage he has adopted runs, 
 “¢ by the plain terms of the contract, as ¢ -ontained in the section above 
 quoted, the stockholders have agreed,” &c. Sir, if the Secretary had 
 said that the contract gave him this power by implication, or that he 
 possessed it by the fair interpretation of the section, or by its reason, 
 spirit, scope, or intention, my perplexity would have been less; bat 
 when he asserts that his authority is derived from the terms of the sec- 
 tion, and from its plat terms, and that by those terms it is not restricted 
 to any particular contingencies, but is absolute and unconditional, I 
 feel some doubts w hether there is that common medium of a eofnmon 
 language between the honorable Secretary and myself which is so in- 
 dispensable to profitable argument. If I rightly understand the pro- 
 position, it has no authority in the terms, nor in the reason, spirit, or 
 intention of the section; and it is as revolting to good sense, in the 
 strength of the language which the Secretary has used, as it is to the’ 
 rules of law. It asserts that, in no event, right or wrong, not even 
 in the extremest case of wilful injustice or fraud, (a case which I am far 
 from supposing to have been in the view of the Secretary, though his 
 language’ comprehends it,) could. the Bank assert the least violation of 
 
 a= 
 
- 
 
 @i7 
 
 faith, by the Secretary’s removal of the deposites. Sir, I submit to : 
 the House that the contrary’ proposition may be easily shown to be 
 true, and therefore that the Secretary’s proposition is hot true. 
 
 The right of the Bank to the deposites-is derived from contract; a 
 valuable consideration having been paid for it, in a bonus to the Trea- 
 sury, and in a stipulation for. expensive services to be performed 
 through the whole term of the charter. A right in the Secretary to 
 remoye those deposites, without good cause, during < any part of the 
 time, is not to be presumed, but that contr ary} and it should not be con- 
 ‘ceded, until it is shown to be required by the clear and plain mean- 
 ing of the whole section. ‘ “The terms of the section, instead of giving 
 to the Secretary an absolute and unconditional power to remove the 
 deposites, require that he shall have reasons for’ the removal, which be 
 reasons he shall immediately communicate to Congress. This'is tee eo 
 condition upon which the Bank submits to, the exercise of his power— , 
 that he shall have reasons, and conmitnicate them; and such is the 
 agreement ‘of the parties. The whole section is agreement, as the | 7‘ 
 whole charter is.» It‘is all contract, from the’ beginning to the end. 
 Now, if Congréss havé agreed with the Bank that the Secretary shall 
 give his reasons for’ the, act, aid, consequently, that he shall have 
 
 _reasons, the difficulty, sir, is to understand how, according to approved 
 rules of interpretation, these reasons: can Be éonsidered as of no 
 concern to the Bank, but only to Congress;\ how we can’ understand 
 that iti is of no sort of moment to the- Bank whether there are reasons | A 
 or not, when the Bank is to be affected by the removal, and Congress, ae 
 er agreed with the Bank that the reasons shall be given. Sir, i in my bat, 
 
 ment, the Secretary has directly inverted the object of the faq 
 one » aPhe “ ‘reasons concern the: Bank only, and not Congress: $+ . 
 
 or ree they concern Congress only because they concern. the 
 
 Bank. The contract for the “deposites with the Bank %s a mockery 
 
 Bd: ae other interpretation, Congress is above the reasons. Whe- 
 
 ‘ther good or bad, she can do right “and: justice to herself, whatever 
 the Secretary may argue. ‘Thre Bank, on the ‘other hand, is wholly 
 dependent upor them, and- has no other. protection from. injustice; and 
 the stipulation for comnrunicating the reasons to Congress is, there- 
 forge the plain and manifest object of giving to the Bank the bene- 
 
 siete review by Congress, upon ‘suc h priticiples as ought to govern 
 
 sucl 
 
 ies 
 
 > 
 
 contract.” . - : ; 
 Sir, the h honorable vel di from’ Tennessee seenis to me not to 
 have been fortunate i in his reference to the former head of the Trea-. % 
 
 sury, Mr. Crawford, for his doctrine on any branch of this case. , On 
 this, in particular, the opinion of Mr. Crawford was directly: avainst 
 him, as well as against the present Secretary, and in favor of that j in- 
 terpretation which I suppose to be the true one. On the 25th May, 
 1824, the select committee on the memorial of Ninian Edwards , 
 
 ported. that, in certain instances, deposites of the public money ere . ‘ , 
 made by Mr. ‘Secretary Crawford in certain State banks ee tad ‘in 4 
 places where the Bank of the United. States had branches, and thai “> 
 
 the made no such communication of his reasons to Cong as th 
 
 charter requires.‘ This omission,’ "says the committee, “isa cknow- * 
 
 ledged by the Secretary, who says i it was owing to inudteaiancel and : 
 2 : : ” 
 
 4 
 
18 
 
 that the inattention to the provision of the law was unimportant, in-- 
 asmuch’ds the provision was intended opviousty for the benefit of 
 the Bank, and the Bank had full notice.” (Reports of committees, 
 18th Congress, Ist session; document 128.) The: doctrine ‘of the 
 present . Secretary is, that the provision was not intended at all for 
 the benefit of the Bank; but that, so far as regards the Bank, his power 
 of removing the deposites is, by the plain terms. of the section, abso-~- 
 lute and unconditional. . 
 
 The honorable member from tii unesset is not more’ » fortunate in 
 the suggestion of his own reasons for supposing the ‘provision to re- 
 gard Congress and not the Bank. — I understand ‘him to have said that 
 the section required this communication fromthe Secre etary, that Con-- 
 gress might know, Ist, where the deposites;were made by the Secretary 
 after their revnoyal: and 2d, whether the Secretary was or was not liable 
 to impeachment for the act: . Now, sir, think myself entitled to ask: 
 it as a concession from the honorable member, that a’ communication: 
 of the fact where the public money is’placed, is not a communication 
 of the reasons why. it was removed. from the Bank of the United 
 States. That fact is precisely what the Secretary isnot directed to. com- 
 municate. His ¢ommunication is, by the plain terms of the section, 
 confined to the reasons for ordering and directing that the deposites 
 should not be made in the Bank or the branches thereof. As to the 
 object of impeachment, sir, it is as much i in derogation: of that prin- 
 ciple of our constitution, that no man shall be compelled: to be a wit- 
 ness against himself, as it is of the character of. the Legislature for 
 plain and honest dealing with its officer, to impute to it the design of 
 drawing the Secretary, of the Treasury into a conféssion which may’ 
 be read against him to the Senate.“ No, sir;,this was not the design 
 of Congress, nor can any course of decent reasoning sustain the enor-- 
 mous proposition of the ‘Secretary, that his power is absolute and un- . 
 conditional. It is.a power which Congress. did not, could not, give. 
 An absolute and unconditional power, derived by implication from a. 
 contract, for valuable consideration, belongs to“doctrines which a court 
 of justice would spurn from its hall. ¢ It has no countenance in our 
 institutions; it has none in our constitution, “which. was ordained to 
 establish justice, as well as to secure the Blessings’ of liberty; it has no. 
 countenance from any thing but the poverty of the ‘case, which, find- 
 ing.a, reason to be impossible, makes. it unnecessary. 
 
 ‘Sir, the interpretation of the section is, to my mind, abundantly 
 clear.’ Fhe Legislature did not see fit to part with the. absolute right 
 to the deposites, nor to: make the right of the Bank a judicial question 
 
 by defining the exceptions to it: In consequence: of. the fiscal rela- 
 tions of the Secretary of the Treasury to the Bank, and of the proba- 
 bility that whenever the proper reasons should occur ‘they would call 
 for immediate action, the parties have agreed that he shall exercise 
 a provisional power over the subject, under the stipulation that his 
 reasons shall comé immediately to Congress for their review, upon such ° 
 principles as belong to the contract; and, if, according to those prin 
 ciples, the reasons of the: Secretary are insufficient for the act, then 
 it will be an open’ ‘breach of the public faith, not merely: sanctioned, bur 
 
19. 
 
 committed- by Congress, not t to send. te deposites’ back to ‘the Bank, 
 whose right to them ds unimpaired. If, after the payment,of a ‘million 
 -anda half of money as a bonus, and the performance of costly duties to 
 ‘ this period‘of the charter; and to be continued.to the end of it, together, 
 equivalent tor an annual payment of two hundred thousand. dollars for 
 twenty years, “the - Secretary has removed the public money without 
 adequate causé, it is, possible, indeed, that an artificial argument may 
 be_miade to-sustain ‘the act; but. réfleetion i in this House, and by this: 
 people, will infallibly bring. the .question back. to the: ‘ground upoR 
 which it must-ultiniately rest—the ground, of common sense and com- 
 mon justice, upon which alone the faith, of the nation is to be defended, 
 if it can be defended atall. : 
 
 : Mr. Speaker: The | second general proposition of the Secretary 
 alfects this. House ‘asva ‘component part of the legislative power, and 
 affects: the whole. Jegislative.- ‘power. in, the ‘most critical manner, as 
 
 may, be :seen,, by. the ¢ “proposition itself. “The ‘place of deposite 
 §§ could ° not. be changed by a, legislative act, without disreg rding a. 
 
 “ pledge: ‘which “the Legislative has” given,” ‘ ‘ although | votre 
 
 *¢ should. be satisfied that the public money was: not safe in the eare 
 * of the Bank, or should be’ convinced that’ the interests. -of the peo- 
 “ple of, the Unitéd States | _mper iously,. demanded the removal.’ 
 These are the plain terms of the Secretary, and the House mist see 
 what is, their plain meaning; ‘that, whereas. the Sectetary could over- 
 throw this contract, with or without reason, right or wrong; Congress 
 could not be relieved from. it by the most imperious reasons; that as his. 
 action could under no ‘circumstances impair the contract; so the action 
 of: Congress upon, it could, in, no, event}, be otherwise than illegal: 
 
 Sir, there is one characteristic. of these propositions, for which 1 
 acknowledge. myself : to be indebted to, the,-Secretary; they are so: 
 strongly stated, that it is impossible to shistake their meaning; While 
 the Secretary, asserts every power. over the subject in himself, he 
 denies the existence of any power in: Congress over the same subject. 
 The use and: design of thie ;doctrine are, at the same time,.as clear as 
 its meaning; it is the only and the. ‘indispensable justification of the 
 Secretary’s extreme action upor, the deposites so shortly before the 
 present session of Congress; and, if this Justification fails, he is os 
 out any. : li 
 
 The. quiestion, sir, concerns the interpretation of a statute.. The 
 extent of the Secretary’s authority, and of the restriction upon that 
 of Congress, must be collected, therefore, .i in the ordinary way, fi 
 
 the fair scope and meaning of its provisions, in their ‘application to the — 
 
 subject-matter; ,and.the House must consequently feel-some- surprise 
 that the Secretary: should. have’ adopted: the’ interpretation which :he 
 asserts, in a.state of mind, that: ought ‘to have. carried him to the 
 directly opposite conclusion. His ‘letter proceeds to say: “The 
 ** power over the place of deposite for the public money. would seem 
 “f -, PRobenly to belong, to the legislative department of the Govern-. 
 
 ‘ment, and it is difficult to imagine why the authority to withdraw it 
 “ from this Bank was confided excluswely to the Executive.” I must 
 state it as an extraordinary fact, in the history of legal interpretation, 
 
20 
 
 that, when the fear nea Secretary’ a that he doutds not imagine 
 why the meaning should be what: he asserts it to be, it did not occur 
 to him that this was one of the best reasons ‘in the world. for holding. 
 that its méaning is not what he asserts it to-be.» Ifa court of justice ; 
 should be told by learned counsel-that he could not imagine why” the 
 meaning he gave to a statute should be its meaning, ‘he would probably 
 ‘be admonished to try the effect of his intagination upon: a different 
 
 construction, and it would be very likely to assist him in obtaining ‘the 
 true construction. The’ Secretary says, he cannot imagine why the 
 power was confided “exclusively to the’ Executive. “1, hold, sir, with 
 submission, that the power ‘is: uot confided to, the Exetntivg , either 
 exclusively ot at all. The position is directly: repugnant to his ‘first 
 
 » proposition, that the power'of tle Sécretary is dbsolute and uncondiz 
 
 “Tio and it is equally repugiant to the ‘lawS'and constitution, as 
 ‘they have crated and. fashioned, thé Executive department. , The 
 “Secretary is not thes agent or officer of: that department in:the per- 
 formance ‘of the trust commit tted | to” him - by the L6th’ section of the: 
 echarter} not in the performance of any of the trusts committed ‘to im 
 ‘by Congress, ‘in regard - ‘to, the control “of. the public: treasure. “Th 
 these particilars : he! is the agent and officer of that'department which 
 levies and collects’taxes; duties, and imposts;: pays. the debts ‘of the 
 nation; borrows moneys raises ‘and supports armies; provides and 
 maintains a navy; ‘makes appropriations, and Keeps ‘the public. trea- 
 sure under its’ own ‘control, tilly “in, yirtue of a legal. appropriation, it” 
 ‘js drawn out of ‘the Treasury. He is- the, agent and offie~ t of Con- 
 gress, and not.of the Executive. . ye AN: Gh 
 
 This, sir, isa a question of vast importance; nie more in- pixeles to 
 tle recent transaction, than’ ‘to the a order. of this Government, 
 ander all future’ administr ations’ of. it, It is not a point ‘now raised 
 for the first tims, though’ possibly | for “the first time made a topic of , 
 controversy. The distinction is-.coeval with the constitution. It 
 “may be traced, i in the clearest characters, through the first organiza- 
 ‘tion of the Executive department and of the’ T reasury’; ‘and, if it did 
 not lead to’ public discussi sion then, it was bécatise it challenged uni- 
 versal assent.” [t is impossible to. explain the- structure of Pag dif- 
 ferent : departments or. offices upon ‘any other theory. I ask the 
 attention of the House to the consideration of ‘this point. 
 
 The act of 27th July, 1789, entitled ** An act for establishing an 
 Executive department; ‘to be denominated the Department of F oreign 
 _ Affairs,’ enacts that the S Secretary for. that department (now the De- 
 ‘partment of State) ‘shall perform and execute such duties as shall, 
 from time to time, be enjoined, on or intrusted to him by the ‘Presi- 
 dent of the United States, agreeably to the constitution, relative to 
 correspondences, commissions, or instructions, to and with public 
 ministers or consuls from the United States, or to negotiations with 
 public ministérs from foreign ‘States or. princes, or to memorials or 
 “other applications from. foreign public ministers. or other foreigners, 
 or to such other matters respecting foreign affairs as. the Président’ 
 of the United States shail assign to the “said. ‘department: and fur- 
 thermore, that the said principal officer shall situa: the hgeencss of 
 
 > 
 
21 
 
 the said department in’ such manner as the President of the United 
 States shall, from time to time, order and direct.” 
 
 The. act of 7th August, 1789, entitled ‘* An act to establish an 
 ‘Executive department,'to be ¢ enominated the Department of War,’ 
 enacts that the Secretary “shall perform and execute such duties as 
 shall, from time to time, be enjoined on ox intrusted to him by the 
 
 President of the United States, agi eeably to the constitution, rela- 
 
 tive to military commissions, or to “the land or naval forces, ships ox 
 warlike stores of the United States, or to such other matters respect- 
 
 ing military, or naval affairs, as the President of the United States: 
 shali assign to the said department, or relative to the. granting of 
 
 Jands to, pérsons ‘entitled thereto for military services rendered to the 
 United Statés; or relative to Indian affairs: and furthermore, that the 
 
 said . principal officer shall conduct, the business of the said depart- 
 
 ment in such manner, as the President of the United § States. shai, 
 pn time .to, time, order or instruct.” 
 
 - The act of 80th April, 1798, entitled “ An act to pstahveh an 
 Bxtclitine.: department,, to -be denominated the Department of the 
 Navy,”. enacts. that it shall be the duty of the Secretary “‘ to execute 
 such orders as he shall receive from -the President of the United 
 States, relative to the. procurement of naval stores and materials, and. 
 the construction, armament, equipment, and employment of vessels 
 of-war, as well as -all gchar matters connected, with the: naval papab- 
 lishment of the United States.’? j 
 
 The provisions of these acts require no commentary. They Riser 
 ihe departments wholly under the direction of the:President, agreea- 
 
 bly to the constitution, in all that regards the exercise of his constitu 
 
 tional powers over foreign affairs, the army, and the navy. 
 
 The act of the 2d. September, 1789, for the catablishmentio he 
 “Treasury Department, pursues, a strikingly different course.. It drops 
 from the tie the denomination of Executive given to the other de- 
 
 y accident, but by design, as the word.‘* Executive” 
 
 was contantat in the title of the bill when reported by committee, 
 
 (see Journal Ist & 2d Cong. vol..1, p-57,)and, what is more material, 
 
 it enacts that it shall be the duty of the S Secretary “to digest and prepare 
 
 ‘* plans for the management and improvement of the revenue, and.for 
 ‘* the support of the public credit; to prepare and report estimates’ of the 
 ** public revenue and the public expenditures; to superintend the collee- 
 “« tion of the public revenue; to, decide on the forms of keeping andstat- 
 “ing a accounts and making returns; and to grant, under the limitations 
 ‘herein established, or to be hereafter provided, all warrants for 
 ‘* moneys to be issued from the Treasury, in pursuance of appro- 
 _‘ priations by law; .to execufe such services relative to the sale 
 * of the lands belongiig to the United. States as may be by law 
 ‘required of him; to make report ‘and give. information to ‘either 
 ‘‘ branch of the Legislature, in ‘person or in writing, as he may be 
 ** required, respecting all matters referred to him. by the Senate or 
 ** House of Representatives, or which shall appertain to his office; 
 
 ** and generally to perform all such services relative to the finances: 
 
 & as he shall be directed to panes: The. name of the President 
 
22 
 
 is not mentioned in the act, except in the 7th section, which charges 
 the assistant with the duriles of the office,in case, the. Secretary is 
 removed by the President; and the bond of the Treasurer, prescribed 
 by the 4th section, is not to be approved -by the President, oo by 
 the Secretary of the Treasury and Comptroller. 
 
 It is not meant to say, sir, that’ the Secretary of the ! Preis 
 performs, or is bound td perform, no duties of an Executive depart- 
 ment, or that, in the performance of any such’ duties, he is not sub- 
 ject to direction by the President; but it is meant to say that the 
 Treasury Department i is not,.in its control of the Treasury, an Execu- 
 ‘tive department, in the constitutional sense; and that the direction 
 which is to govern the Secretary,-is left, by the terms: of the act, to be 
 settled according to the character. of the ‘function to’, be exercised. 
 The Secretary is not the head of an. Executive department, in the 
 performance of acts which concern the custody and security , of the 
 public moneys in the Treasury. His department is not, in -this re- 
 respect, a Presidential department. To have placed the custody of: 
 the public Treasury within, the Exectitive department, would have 
 been a constitutional incongruity, a solecism, to say nothing of the 
 enormous mischiefs to result from placing the power of: the sword 
 and the purse in the same hand... It would have marred the hatmony 
 and simplicity: of the whole scheme of the constitution, by leaving to 
 Congress the duty of paying the debts and previding for the-com- 
 mon defence. and welfare, while the money collected for these ob- 
 jects was not under their control, but in the hands of a different de- 
 partment. Iv would make, and the adoption ofthe doctritie does 
 make, the power ‘of appropriation entirely futile, because ‘the public 
 money is, by force of it, as little under the control of Congress before 
 appropriation as ft is afterwards; and it gives the control of the pub- 
 lic treasure,.so far as the position. and distribution of it can give such 
 a control, toa department that-can wield the whole force of the reve- 
 nue, against the legislative department and the people. 
 
 The argument of the honorable gentleman from Tennessee here 
 cuts into ‘the shbject by means of the power of. removal from office; 
 and, with the aid of the debates in Congress, when the act: for organ- 
 ‘izing the Department of Foreign Affairs was on its passage, -he con~ 
 tends that the President, may direct the Secretary of the Treasury 
 ‘in the discharge of his dutiés of every description, because he may 
 remove him. ’ Sir, [ do not adopt his conclusion. It does not flow 
 from his premises, and a.better conclusion flows. from better premises. 
 
 The power of removal is a great question, which do not mean at 
 present to agitate. It has been allowed, by implication and usage, to 
 Ahe President of the United States, for different reasons; and the <ar- 
 gument handed downto us.on this lead is perhaps not altogether 
 as clear, consistent, and’ intelligible as the great names comnected 
 with ‘it’ would lead us to ‘expect.’ “It is probably imperfect. It is, 
 however, plain, from what remains of it, that the gentlemen who as- 
 ‘serted this power did not all do so for. the same reasons. It would 
 ‘seem to have been the opinion-of some, that the-power of removal 
 
 "vas an bilan power, or a power of the Executive department. 
 ~ 
 
“BB 
 
 ‘Others, who did not’agrée to this, thought it belonged to the appoint- 
 _ ing power, which was substantially i in the President. And some, who 
 differed. from both, deemed the most convenient and safest position of 
 the power to be in the President, who, by its immediate exercise, 
 ‘might resist the aggressions of dishonesty, or prevent the mischiefs 
 of incompetency. No one, sir, appears to have thought that the 
 power belonged to the President, because he had a right to direct all 
 officers appointed during ‘pleasure; although it is clear, from the ar- 
 gument of Mr. Madison, that the force of that principle was very 
 striking in its influence upon the questiom then directly before Con- 
 gress—the right to’ remove. ‘the Secretary’ for Foreign Affairs. That 
 eminent person:said, “It is évidently the intention of the constitution 
 ** that the. First Magistrate should be responsible for the Executive 
 ““ department. So-'far, therefore, as we do not make the officers 
 “* who are to aid him in the: duties Of the said department Tesponsi- 
 *« ble to him, he is-not responsible to his country.”. ‘This, sir, is very 
 striking, but it gdes wo further than the duties, nild responsibilities of 
 an Executive department, in its constitutional sense. If the honorable 
 gentlenran can make it out that the keeping and control of the: public 
 Treasury are duties of an Executive department in that sense, he will 
 gain a bettér support for his argument than I have yet heard. 
 ~The principle: which, it seems to me, sir, must’ govern this ques- 
 tion, and ‘that which I take the liberty of stating to the House, as the 
 only satisfactory one that has occurred to me, is this—that the right 
 of direction, whteré it exists at-all, results from-official connexion, subor- 
 dination, and responsibility, and not from tenare’ 6f office. If the duty 
 belongs:to the Executive department, ‘the right of direction is in the head 
 -of that department, ‘who is responsible for the performance of all its du- 
 ‘ties. If it belongs-to the Judicial depar tment, the right is in the heads 
 “of that department—the courts. fit belongs to the Legislative de- 
 ‘partment, the right of dire¢tioti ‘is in Congress. The direction 3 in these 
 several cases, by force of this principle, is in perfect harmony with the 
 system. . It proceeds from official responsiblity in the principal, and 
 official duty j in the subordinate: officer to follow what the principal di- 
 rects. ~The officer is bound to obey the principal, because the prin- 
 cipal is responsible for him ‘in’ the very matter directed, and his 
 direction is a justification to the, officer who obeys him. Any. other 
 principle must produce perpetual conflict’ and confusion. The attempt 
 to make a test of the removing power, fails.as soon as your apply it. 
 ‘The marshals are, as to matters of judicial cognizance, directed by 
 the courts, to whom they are responsible, and ‘for ihe proper direc- 
 tion of whom the ‘courts are: responsible; yet the courts do not ap- 
 point, and cannot remove, the marshals. *, 
 Sir, the question cannot well* arise as to ‘acts -plainly Sseteribed. 
 No one can assert an authority in the President to direct an act to be 
 -done, which the laws, or the courts, ins coiformity avitli the laws, 
 direct not to bé done; nor the contrary.’ It arises only: in regard to dis- 
 cretionary acts. But the same principle regulates duties ‘of. every 
 ‘description, and especially duties which are committed by the law to 
 ‘the discretion of an officer. For abuse of that discretion, if answerable 
 
Seu 
 
 ah 
 
 24 “s ~ 
 
 to any thing but the law, he is answerableé to the head of that depart- 
 ment to which the particular duty appertains, and by that department 
 he may be directed. The marshal is, in judicial matters, answerable 
 to the court; in legislative matters, to Congress; ,and in executive 
 matters, to the President. The Secretary of the Treasury, as it re-- 
 gards the Treasury, is answerable to. Congress. _ To ‘give the Presi- 
 dent the right of directing or controlling bis discretion in such matters, 
 is to: make the Secretary responsible to the President, who is net 
 responsible.for him. This, sir, is the position -upon which the’ doc: 
 trine I maintain may be «safely placed. ‘The President isnot ‘re- 
 sponsible for the duties which “do not appertain to his department. 
 His direction is no justificatiom to the officer to whom the law assigns 
 the duty to be performed, or to whonv it has given the discretion to 
 perform ‘the act or not; he is, therefore, not bound to obey him, nor 
 excusable for obeying him. Any other principle will give to the Pre- 
 sident the right ‘of directing and controlling the discretion of » arery 
 officer in the land éxcept +0" Judges. oe, 
 
 The answers given’ to these suggestions, sir, are ‘not ‘satisfactory. 
 It is said, the President has the undoubted right to: remove, anid may, 
 in this way, obtain.the direction. ° Certainly: the President may thus 
 obtain the direction of men who prefer their office to:theix duty; but 
 if he remoyes, to obtain a power of direction where he has not the 
 right; he violates his own uuy ‘The power of, temoval ought not tor 
 be so exercised. 
 
 It is further said, that all. powers: are lapishatives judicial or ex-- 
 ecutive. The Secrétary; s power is neither. legislative nor judicial, 
 and therefore it must be executive, and belong.to the Executive 
 department, This is a conftsion of Tanguage.: .The departments: 
 of our Government are legislative, judicial, and executive; and what@® 
 does not belong to the fitst two, belongs to the third. But there are’ 
 executiye acts, “that is to say, acts to be executed in the Judicial. and 
 Legislative departments, as well as-in the: Executive department." An 
 act to be executed in the Judicial department does not belong to the 
 Executive department. The question of the right of direction regards 
 not merely the act to be done, but the relation.in which it‘is.to be 
 done. ; : 
 
 It is' againsaid, that the ebaueinanaiel power of. the President to 
 demand the opinion, in writing, of the officers:of the Executive det. 
 partments, touching the duties’ of their respective offices, shows the 
 dependency of these officers upon the President, and his responsibility 
 for them. .'This ‘may ‘or'may not be so; but it leaves the question, what 
 is an-Exécutive department, in this sense, precisely where it found it. 
 
 Again: it is said that ‘the President is bound to take care that. the 
 laws | are? faithfully executed. This proves too much for the argu-. 
 ment, as, if it proves any thing, it proves that the President may direct 
 
 the judges ‘as well as otlier officers during pleasure. The supervisory » 
 power cannot interfere with thé exercise-of discretion in the Secretary, 
 when. the law gives it.to him,-because the faithful execution of the law - 
 consists in the exercise of his discretion; and whoever. disturbs that - 
 exercise, violates the law instead’ of executing it.’ It is a power that: 
 
25 
 
 does not enlarge the President’s authority, but. rather, declares the 
 result of other powers before given to him in the constitution. | It is 
 corrective, to put aside, where his power is adequate, both dishonesty 
 and incompétency; but it is not directory nor transcendental, to bring 
 all the officers and operations of the nation under his sway. 
 
 Finally, it is said that the power of removal is fairly applied to 
 discharge an officer who does not do his duty; and how can this be, 
 if the eons cavnot decide what is his duty, and, consequently, 
 direct its performance? Sir, the -President is responsible for the 
 use and abuse of his power. If he exercises it fairly, to remove an 
 officer who does not do his duty, it is well. But if the discharge is 
 colorably for this, but really to enforce a direction which he had no 
 right to give, he gains the power he ought not to have, by the abuse 
 of the power, he has. 
 
 These are the ‘remarks, sir, which | have supposed would show 
 the i inaccuracy of the Secretary, in that part of his letter which attri- 
 butes a power over the deposites to the Executive, or to the Secretary 
 as.an Executive officer. | by this | ‘matter. of the deposites, he is em- 
 phatically the minister or agent of Congress. He is to give reasons 
 to Congress, and they aresconsequently to be his own reasons. The 
 reasons ofthe President are not: given, and would not be.a justifica- 
 tion *to the Sécretary, if they were. The Secretary is to give them 
 to Congress, his principal, and-not to the head of the Executive de- 
 partment, to whom, in this matter, he does not sustain an official rela- 
 tion. Itisa charter authority, and to be-pursued as the charter directs. 
 Under this chartei, the President has several powers, suchas to appoint 
 cémmissioners to receive subscriptions, to appoint directors, and to 
 issue a writ’of scire. facias. The Secretary, also, has powers, as to re- 
 
 Squire transfers of public money, aid to remove the deposites, giving his 
 reasons. Itvis humbly apprehended that these are different powers in 
 relation, as Well-as in actiot, and that the President cannot assume those 
 which haye-not a relation to the departinent of which he is the head. 
 
 But how would it follow, ‘ST, if this were otherwise, that Congress 
 cannot remove the deposites’’ in any.event, as the Secretary avers? It 
 would seem as if the grant to the Executive,was set up as a less 
 startling reason. for denying: the power, to Congress, than a grant to 
 the: Secretary would bes but:the power is, inherent in Congress. © It 
 is one of which they could, not divest themselves absolutely a and un- 
 conditionally. They hold jt now, as they always must hold it, ‘subject 
 only to the right of the Bank; that j is to say, except so far as. the char- 
 ter gives the right of possession to the Bank.. his.right of the Bank 
 grows out of her covenant to afford safety and to render service. The 
 continuance. of her right depends upon the performance of her duty. 
 The covenant of. the nation, to leave the deposites with the Bank, and 
 of the Bank to, keep them secure, and to perform other duties in regard 
 to them, are mutual and dependent. covenants.. If the Bank commits 
 a breach, the covenant of the nation is either discharged or suspended, 
 aud Congress may take care of that which is the property of the nation; 
 and if the.acts imputed to the Bank were a sufficient cause of removal, 
 _ Congress were as competent to decide them to be so, at the present 
 
26 
 
 session, as the Secretary | was*before: The: technical doctrine of the 
 Secretary i is inconsistent with the spirit of the. charter, and with the 
 safety of the nation. ' It strips Congress of all power,’and lodges it 
 where there is no responsibility either to the Bank or to Congress. -It 
 asserts, that Congress could not reclaim the control of the. deposites, 
 under any circumstances, from either the Bank, or its own mibister. 
 It leads to this extraordinary consequence, that if the Bank could have 
 propitiated the Secretary to connive at the most corrupt employment 
 of the public treasure, there would have been no remedy for it. If 
 ** offence’s gilded hand” could have shoved by. the Secretary, we 
 should have seen ‘ the wicked prize itself buy out the law.” ~The 
 proposition is wholly inadmissible in.every possible interpretation of it. 
 
 Another proposition, sir, and the most “alarming, from the great 
 practical mischiefs which must flow, fromit, comes from the Secretary 
 in the following terms: “That the power reserved to the Secretary 
 “* of the Treasury. does ‘not depend for its exercise merely on.the safety 
 ** of the public money in the. hands-of the Bank, nor upon the fidelity 
 *‘ with which it has conducted itself; but-he has’ the’ right to remove 
 *t the deposites, and it is his, duty to remove them, whenever the public 
 “ interest or convenienee will be promoted by the: cha «ge."? In another 
 part of his letter, the Secretary of the. Treasury says that ‘it i8 chis 
 duty to’ remove the deposites  wheney er the “charige would in any 
 ‘degree promote thé public interest.” .. And again he says: “* The 
 ‘* safety of the deposites,, the“ability of ‘the Banik | to meet “its: engage- 
 ‘“* ments, its fidelity’in, the performance’ of: its obligations, ° are only a 
 “* part oF the considerations by: whith his judgment must bé guided. 
 “The general interest and convenience of the alg must’ regulate 
 ‘* his conduct.” . 
 
 The application of this doctriné'to ee present. power of the Sect e-) 
 tary over the deposites in the. State Danks _may bé seen from another 
 part of the letter. “The Secretary’ says? “ The law incorporating the 
 ‘ Bank has reserved to-him, in-its fullest extént, the power’ he before 
 ** possessed: . It does not confer on him anew power, but reserves to 
 ** him: his former author ity, without any’ new -limitation.”» Conse- 
 quently, it ‘is the’ Seoretary’s: apprehension that he now has the-same 
 power over the deposites 1 in the State banks, which he claims to have 
 had. over the deposites in the Bank of the United States; and it is’ ‘this 
 which makes the ‘subject worthy of the special attenuon of the House: 
 
 Sir, it is an abuse of language to call the: charter direction as to 
 the deposites, a “contract, if this be the ‘Secretary’s power. it has 
 none of the features’ or binding force of a contract. It is wholly de- 
 pendent on his mere favor, pleasures opinien; upon any thing’ short 
 of, and infeed not short’of, the most fantastic caprice. "The Bank has 
 no contract with the nation under this construction 5 and, sir, when I 
 regard the nécessary effects “of the asserted } ‘power. upon “the nation at 
 large, the interests of the Bank disappear; she ceases to be an object : 
 of the least consideration.’ .What are ‘convenience and interests? - 
 Where are they defined? - What acts promote ‘them? ‘What's any 
 degree of them?” What law has niade the Secretary of the’Treasury 
 a judge of them? This nation and this House are variously divided. 
 
at 
 
 in regard to almost all the topics of. general convenience and interest 
 that are discussed before them; and here is a challenge of the right, 
 
 by a single officer of the Government: to direct the momentum of the 
 ‘whole revenue of the United States to the support ‘of ‘what he thinks 
 fit to regard as the general interests and convenience of the people; 
 and he challenges: i it’ as the power with which his office has been clothed 
 since-its creation. A more extravagant proposition has never, in my 
 humble judgment, been asserted; and it is:as ‘unsound in reference’ to 
 the subject to which it i is applied by the Secretary, as it is dangerous to 
 the liberty and welfare of the country. ‘The question of general con- 
 venience and interest, in regard to the public deposites, was settled, 
 by Congress when. they agreed that the Bank should have them; and 
 it was settled for the whole term of thé charter. The Secretary has 
 nothing to do with. it’. The power of removal was given to him to be 
 exercised for the promotion of a particular interest, or the remedy ‘of 
 a particular mischief, and for. nothing else. General convenience and 
 interest are’ results with which Congress’ have never Meg him, or 
 meant to trust him, or ‘any -body but themselves. _ 
 
 ‘The authority given by the charter to the Secretary of the Trea- 
 sury is official, and not personal; and, by necessary implication, it is 
 limited by the’ sphere of his office. His powers and duties are fiscal, 
 and the functions-of his office are the index to the reasons for whieh, 
 and for which“alone, he ‘has- authority ‘to remove the déposites. His 
 ‘reasons must grow out, of his relations to the Bank, to the treasure in 
 its custody, and to the collection and disposition of that treasure, which 
 
 the law confides to ‘him. -If tke deposites are not safe, his. official 
 connexion with the, Bank will apprize. him of it: he has the. means of 
 ascertaining it, by the, returns made to him, and by examination of 
 the general accounts of the Bank, if he is not satisfied with the returns. 
 If the Bank-doés not’ perform its “duties to the Government, of paying 
 and transferring the public funds, the Secretary knows it, because he 
 is the officer to aivete: the service, and to watch over the performance. 
 And, beyond this, what official authority has the Secretary? .What 
 éfieiat duties dows he perforin’ that can: instruct him with reasons for 
 the remoyal of* the ‘public, deposites? Sir, he must leave his office 
 ‘before he can obtain them, and enter into departments which do not 
 belong to him: ‘lie mast take charge’ of. interests that have not been 
 confided to his office.” T have stated to the House why these reasons 
 have not been explicitly defined in.the act, and ‘that it was to continue 
 a control over the Treasury, which Congress thought might’ be impaired 
 if the conditions of its exercise were more explicitly stated. In the 
 
 eye of @ court, there ‘i is ‘discrétion, regulated by an appeal to Congress. 
 ~ In the céntemplation of Congress, there is limited power, regulated by 
 “the duties of the Treasury Department, in its relations to thé Bank. 
 Sir, it is a stain upon the Congress that incorporated this Bank—it is 
 a stain upon the first. ‘Congress that organized the Treasury Depart- 
 ment—to, say that they: placed in the power of unknown men for an 
 indefinite period, and for a period of twenty years without the right of 
 recall, the whole revenue of the United States, to be used as the Secre- 
 tary should think the general convenience and interest of the public re- 
 
28 
 
 quired. Is it so, sir? Asa will this House ie this proposition of the 
 Secretary? Let the nation look to it. If it should be the Secretary’ s 
 opinion that itis for the general convenience ‘and interest of the’ people 
 that manufactures should dec’ sline and die away, he brings a-dearth upon 
 the land—he draws the etc treasure to another quarter—and they 
 perish, If internal improvements are not to his mind—if Pennsylvania 
 wants a loan, if New. Jersey. requires funds, to assist them—if there is 
 any proposed rival interest which would be promoted by. their decline— 
 his mandate to the. State banks, in promotion of. general convenience 
 and interest, consummates the design. The currency is his, 'to regulate 
 at his pleasure, and every thing dependent onit. Sir, if this theory of 
 the Secretary be true, it. was ‘the duty of, the Bank of the United 
 States, it is the duty of the deposite banks, to submit to, his pleasure. 
 Tf his power is constitutionally and legally. what he.asserts it to be, it 
 is the duty of the banks to become his slaves, ’ If all this power over 
 the Treasury is his lawful power—if he is the arbiter of general con- 
 _ venience and interest—if the-Executive is the only head io direct and 
 control him—it is a theory of universal subserviency to the Executive, 
 for the profits that are to spring from the application. of the public 
 treasure. It never occurred. to me, sir, that meh, -treading the soil of 
 a republic, would. present such a doctrine for’ the review and sanction 
 of Congress. . ny . 
 
 It ee been said, that both Secreta a wineds and Secretary 
 Ingham have asserted a similar doctrine. Sir, without meaning the 
 least disrespect to those: officers, I may be permitted to say, that 
 arguments in favor of ‘power are not. entitled to most consideration 
 
 when they, come from those who, are ‘to’ exercise it. A "Treasury 
 argument, in favor of Treasury, power, is not quite,as‘much'to be re- 
 lied gn, as an argument for the same _ power. even from some ‘other 
 department. But, : sir, the authority is not, exactly as it is appre- 
 ‘hended to be. Tn regard to’ Mr.. Secretary Ingham, there seems to 
 have. occurred one’ or two animated passagestbetween himself: ‘and 
 the President of the Bank, in the course of which a menace was let 
 off, as to the use of the public deposites, for a certain purpose, or in 
 a certain event; but nothing to the efféct threatened occurred. Mr. . 
 Secretary Crawford. did.act, but,T do not admit that. his action sustains: 
 the present Secretary; or, if it does. toa small ,‘extent, its’ effect is 
 taken off by the opinion of a committee of this House; of whose re- 
 port a part was read the other day by the, hoiorable member from 
 Tennessee. The. Secretary of the Treasury. was invested, by the 
 joint resolution of 30th April, 1816, with the largest powers, to cause 
 the taxes and other moneys actruing, or: becoming payable to the 
 United States, to be collected: and paid i in the legal currency of the’ 
 United States. ‘He was required and. directed. to adopt such mea- 
 sures as he might deem necessary; and. there can be no doubt that 
 such an authority gave to that officer a power, which, Since the entire and 
 effectual restoration of specie payments; has ceased to exist. The history 
 of the disposition of the public moneys by Mr. Secr etary Crawford, who 
 came into office in the fall of: that year, is given in the reportof ‘the 
 committee ¥PoR the memorial’ or: address of Ninian Edwards, made 
 
 #4 
 
 rs 
 
29 
 
 to: this House in May, 1824.: There appear to have been in the 
 year 1818, and afterwards, two descriptions of acts by Mr. Crawford 
 affecting the’ public deposités. One.of them consisted in using certain 
 State banks to the West as depositories of the public money, for the 
 sake, of the reveriue itself, and becaise ‘the Bank of the United States 
 would not: receive on doposite, as cash, any. thing but t the legal cur- 
 rency of the country of its own notes, in which the large receipts of the 
 United States could hot at that time.be collected. There consequently 
 were: Cases in which the deposites could not be made in the Bank of the 
 United States, Pecause the Bank would not receive them in that form 
 alone in. which the Treasury could make them. It was not, as [ appre- 
 hend; a case of omission to deposite’ the public moneys in ‘the Bank of 
 the United States, but an-omission to deposite in that Bank moneys 
 which the Bank would riot receivé, and.was not-bound to receive as 
 moneys at.all, beeause, ‘although nominally they. were the notes of 
 specie-paying banks. , substithtially ‘they wére not such notes as the Bank 
 thought i it could convert into specie. ‘his was not a case of exercise 
 of powver under the. 16th section, ‘but ‘a case-of necessity, arising 
 from the lawful refisal of the Bank to<receive the deposités in the 
 only forin.in.whiclr the ‘Treasury could make them. The other acts 
 refetred to were of a different Kind, and they consisted of such dispo- 
 sitions of the public money, as Mr, Crawforid, in his letter of 13th Feb- 
 ruary, 1817, cited. by the present Secretary of the Treasury, says he 
 has authority, to make: :that is to’say, deposites made with State banks, 
 to sustain their credit: Upon this point, the committed explicitly say 
 that ‘this ts no legal employment of public funds; it is nothing but 
 ‘a gratuitous loan,” which, cértainly, the Secretary was not. author- 
 ized to. make, whatever was the’ practice. It was precisely of: the 
 same character as the- ‘transfer: drafts, which appear to have been 
 placed, by. direction of the present ‘Secretary , in different hands} du- 
 ring the removal of the, public. deposites: from the Bank of ihe United 
 States, and which,are liable to precisely the same criticism. The au- 
 thority of Mr. Secretary’ Crawford, therefore, does not seem compe- 
 tent for tle purpose for which it has been ¢ ited. 
 
 The fourth and last: general’ proposition of the Secretary is that 
 which asserts, that,.as’the propriety of removing ‘the deposites was 
 -evident, it was consequently his duty to select the places of present 
 deposite. Sir, on this point I do not mean to ask any considerable 
 attention of the House; for, althougli I hold the act of “the Secretary 
 to be against the law of Congress, and one from which the most. crit- 
 ical’ consequences may result, it is not altogether, as I learn, without 
 the countenance of a previous Tréasury practice, and J mean not to 
 press it to any otlier purpose’ than as a caution to be adyerted to in 
 the disposition of the general ‘subject. The authority of thé Secre- 
 tary of the Treasury, under the 16th section of the charter, is not to 
 remove the deposites, as his letter supposes, but merely to order and 
 direct that they shall not be made in the Bank of the ‘United States. 
 When the deposite. in that Bank ceases to be lawful by the order of 
 the Secretary, the general law takes up the subject; and that law-gives 
 to the Treasurer the: power which the Secretary has undertaken to 
 
 / 
 
30 
 
 exercise. The 4th section of the act of 2d September, 1789, is en- 
 tirely explicit, “that it shall be the duty of the, Treasurer to receive 
 and keep the moneys of the’ United States,’— cate submit ‘to: the 
 Secretary of the Treasury, and to, the Comptroller, or either of them, 
 the inspection of the moneys im his*hands,” and to give bond, with 
 sufficient sureties, in the* sum of- $150,000, payable “to the United 
 States, with condition, for the faithful performance. of thé duties of 
 his office, and for the fidelity of the persons to be by hitn employed. % 
 It is the Treasurer who is to.choose the place of deposite; and he is 
 the best officer i in theory; as well'as ‘the. only officer .by the law, to! 
 perform the act; because the doctrines of general’ convenience and 
 interest are 1 t so likely-'to® reach him, His: object will be ‘security, 
 and his b¢ d is the motive. fot obtaining. it. If there is a: Trea- 
 sury Paes that h has eaeeitct the Treasurer, the’ practice should:be 
 made to conform to the law, ‘or’ the law to the practice. As thé case 
 now stands , the money of: tlie United States i is not deposited where it 
 is, by direction and under the savction of the Jaw, It is placed in 
 the deposite banks by an.oflicer who has not: the’ authority so torplace 
 it; and, in case of controversy, it may possibly be found, not only ‘that 
 the bond of the ’ Treasurer is of no -ayail, but, that remedies: for’ the 
 loss or detention of the deposites, are‘not to be obtained in the. name 
 of the United States, or’ in. thé courts of the United: ‘States, but in 
 private names and in Staté courts, with all ‘the contingencies incident . 
 to litigationin this form, | Whatever. may: be the: practice, it- is not” 
 becoming, sir,, that the Treasury of the, United States.should be in 
 any predicament but that prachely an’ which. the law Ags giv en its di- 
 rection to place it.” ©.’ ane roe 
 
 These general propositions of the: Secrétary are, Nes 1 submit 
 to this House, one and all of them, unsound,.and without foundation 
 in law; and some of them are pregnant with. most alarming.’ consé-. 
 quences to the public safety and welfare, If. his particular reasons 
 are dependent on them, as, they doubtless are, they fall with their 
 foundation; and they have, moreover, peculiar defects of their own, 
 as will be seen by the details of: more interest to which, their, consi- 
 deration will give rise. hers ‘bs 
 
 Sir, the Secretary admits that the aie deposites were safe i in the 
 Bank of the United States... He admits that the Bank has faithfully , 
 performed its duty to the Government in every stipulated form. He 
 admits it, by the clearest implication, i in various: parts of his report to 
 Congress, and places the order of removal upon entirely, distinct 
 grounds. ° The only valid causes of removal are, then, in my hum- 
 ble judgment, wanting; and, if all the particular ‘causes asserted by 
 the Secretary could be sustained i in fact-and law, they would fall short 
 of a justification. mn hey" will, bseraty be found, one and all, to be 
 without support. 
 
 ‘Sir, the first and ann reason for the-order of, the Secretary i is, 
 that the present. charter of the Bank will.expire in March, 1836, and 
 that it is not to be renewed. I do not mean to detain the figuse with 
 a commentary upon the novel spectacle of a Secretary of the Trea- 
 sury instructing Congress upon the subject of his. constitutional opin- 
 
 . 
 
31 
 
 ions in regard to the charter of the Bank, pr upon what they will or 
 will not think fit themselves to do in regard to the renewal of the 
 charter. . For the purposes of this inquiry, I:grant that the charter is 
 not to be renewed. The question is, how does that circumstance 
 justify the present removal?’ 
 
 The manner in which the Secretary develops his ¥ reasoning on this 
 head is as striking as:it is plain and ‘intelligible. He begins by an 
 averment, that, if the deposites should’be left in the Bank: until the 
 ‘expiration of: the charter; it may be doubted whether the Bank will 
 have the ability to be prompt: in: paying ‘them to. the Government. 
 He proceeds to suggest that the-circulation, of the Bank, moreover, if 
 it continues out. till that time, will become a depreciated currency, 
 not merely by. the character of the- paper, but by the ‘cessation of the 
 _public guarantee; that.-the Bank. should be made to. reduce her circu- 
 ‘lation, by reducing her:discounts; that thie removal of ‘the public depo- 
 sites, will compel her to.make this teduction; and that the State banlc 
 circulation being puslicd ‘out, in. its place; by means of these deposites 
 made’ elsewhere, the notes.of the Bank of the United States will be 
 withdrawn, and a ouxbadey smonally, more’ af tt ne substituted in 
 its place. _ 
 
 Sir, whatever may.be. the, merits of this plan, there, is no. doubt that 
 itis perfectly intelligible. . It is an operation we are acquainted with. 
 We know what it means, ‘and what it is to.bring to pass. But the 
 question in this-place-is, what right had the Secretary to take the pub- 
 lic moneys ‘from the Bank.of the United States, because its charter 
 was to expire in Match, 18362 What authority did Congress mean 
 to give him over the deposites,. from the simple fact of lapse of time? 
 I confidently assert, none Whatever. .‘There was no contingency in 
 the circumstance, It was.matter of-fatal necessity. It*must occur; 
 and the Secretary. could not. be better informed that it had occurred 
 in 1833, than the ; Congress which granted the charter in “1816 were 
 then. intomada that it would occur.. Sir, it was just-as.well known in 
 1816 as it. now is, that the Ist of ‘October, 1833, was separated by 
 two years and five months from the 1st of March, 1836; and if lapse 
 of time had not been’ deemted:an inadequate cause for the removal, 
 Congress would themselves. have ordered the deposites to be renioved 
 at the time they thought proper, and have made the removal at that 
 time a matter. of positive enactment, and not of contingency. Now 
 Congress: have not only not done: this,-but they have. done the con- 
 trary. Ehty:have chartered the Bank for twenty years; they have 
 bound her to perform services‘for twenty years; and they have ordered 
 the deposites to be made in her waults, by necessary implication for 
 the whole period, subject to the contingent exercise of the power ‘of. 
 removal. . It is a’ violation-of the- charter, without. reasonable color, 
 for the Secretary to make that removal upon the ground of mere time; 
 and such is the ground his, letter OOEPICR without reference to any 
 contingency. whatsoever. 
 
 The Secretary, has wholly overlooked shi provision in, . tlie charter 
 which allows two years to the Bank for winding up its concerns, after 
 the 83d March, 1836. That provision runs:..‘‘ And notwithstanding 
 
39 
 
 “ the expiration of the term for which the said corporation is created, 
 ** it shall be lawful to use the corporate name, style, and capacity, for 
 ** the purpose of suits, for the final settlement and liquidation of the 
 “ affairs and accounts of the corporation, and for the sale and dis- 
 ** position of thejr estate, real, per sonal, and mixed; but not for any 
 “other purpose, or in any other manner Wialsoever) nor fora period 
 * exceeding two. years after the expiration of the said: term of incor- 
 “ poration.”"-—Sec. 21. . 
 ** As the act of Congress,” says the Secretary, * which: created the 
 ** corporation, limits its duration to the 3d of March, 1836, it became 
 ** my duty,’as the Seeretary of the Treasury, in executing the trust 
 ‘ confided to me under the law, to look to that period of time as ‘the 
 © termination of its corporate extstence.”. “It was incumbent on mé, 
 ‘in discharging my official duties, to act upon ‘the assumption that 
 “this corpgnaiien would not continive in being after the time above 
 *s cetier) ’ Now, sir, the’ corporate. existence-is not so limitéd as. 
 the Secretary has felt it incumbent ‘oh--him io'assume. It is to con- 
 tinue two years. more, for the very purpose of énabling it to-do that 
 which the Secret tary says shall, be done before. There is ‘no one 
 “oper ration whi¢h he wishes’ to compel the Bank now to perform, that 
 _ she cannot most appropriately perform: in the additional two. years. 
 » She may diminish or-reduce her discounts in any ratio she deems fit, 
 five pet cent. or ‘ten per centea month,-or more or less, as circum- 
 stances may require. ‘She may possibly bring m-her~ circulation, i in 
 the same proportion, though that’ depends ‘on "the pleasure of the 
 holder. She may dovevery thing she now does, ‘but expand aia 
 after having closed’ or liquidated a'transaction.. “She cannot make a 
 new loan, but ‘she may continue in force” the existing contracts, or 
 settle and liquidate them’ as she may’ deen expedient. » Sir, not’ only 
 has the Bank the right ‘to keep out her circulation, and to keep up 
 her discounts during the, whole term of the charter, which right she 
 has purchased and’paid for, but it is her duty: to do it, unless” she ‘is 
 disabled by the actof the Secretary. It was her promise in accept- 
 ing the charter., Her duty,to trade is to assist it;, to her stockholders, 
 it is to make an interest upon their capital; and, above all, her duty to the’ 
 nation is to keep withintbe limits of safety, by due control and regula- 
 tion, the very State bank paper which the Secretary desires to augment. 
 For these duties, i in addition to the greater design of securing and distri- 
 buting the public revenue, the Bank was created, and is bound to their 
 performance as long as she can perform them with’, safety fo, herself 
 and to the country. ~ phish 
 Sir, the project of the Secretary of: the Treasury alowntieelt nie— 
 it has astonished the country. It is here that we find a pregnant source 
 of the present agony—it is in the ‘clearly avowed design to’ bring a 
 second tinie upon this larid, the-cursé ‘of an unregulated, “uncontrolled, 
 State bank paper curréncy. ‘We are again to see the’ drama which 
 already, in the course’ of: the present century, has passed before us, 
 and closed in ruin» If the project shall. be successful, Wwe are again 
 to sce these paper missiles shooting in ‘every direction through’ “the 
 country—a derangement of all yalues—a depreciated cireulation—a 
 payee! of specie payments; then a further extension of the same 
 
33 
 
 detestable paper—a’still greater depreciation—with failures of traders, 
 and failures of banks, in its train—to arrive, at last, at the same 
 point from .which we departed in 1817. Suffer me to recall to the 
 recollection of the House a few of the more striking events of that 
 day. The first Bank of the United States. expired in March, 1811. 
 Between the Ist of January, 1811, and the close of the year 1814, 
 
 more than one hundred new banks were established, to supply this 
 more uniform and better currency. For ten millions of capital called 
 
 in by that Bank, twenty millions of capital, so called, were invested in 
 these. In the place of five and a half millions, about the amount of 
 circulation in notes of that bank withdrawn, twenty-two millions were 
 pushed out. Then came a suspension of specie payments, in August 
 and September, 1814. As an immediate consequence of this sus- 
 pension, the circulation of the country, in the course of fifteen months, 
 increased fifty per cent., or from forty-five to sixty-eight millions of 
 dollars; and the fruit of this more uniform currency was the failure of 
 innumerable traders, mechanics, and even farmers; of one hundred and 
 sixty-five banks, with capitals amounting to thirty millions of dollars; 
 and a loss to the United States alone, in the negotiation of her loans, 
 and in the receipt of bankrupt paper, to an amount exceeding four 
 millions of dollars. I take this summary from the treatise of Mr. 
 
 Gallatin, on the Currency and Banking System of the United States, 
 one of the most valuable contributions “that great sagacity and an en- 
 lightened spirit of research have made to the political literature of this 
 country, and which it is one of the sins of the present Bank that she 
 has endeavored to diffuse among the people. ‘This may enable us to 
 apprehend what was lost, in the item of property alone, by this better 
 currency. What it cost us in reputation, it is impossible to estimate. 
 Does Kentucky wish to see the return of those days?) Does Penn- 
 sylvania wish it? Does any man wish it, who has property, or the 
 desire to possess it, and reason to discern the causes of its decay and 
 destruction? I thank the Secretary for the disclosure of this plan. 
 I trust in God it will be defeated; that the Bank of the United States, 
 while it is in existence, may be sustained and strengthened by the 
 public opinion and interests of the people to defeat it; that the sound 
 and sober State banks of the Union may resist it, for it is their cause; 
 that the poor men and laborers in the land may resist it, for it isa 
 scheme to get from every one of them a dollar’s worth of labor for 
 fifty cents, and to make fraud the currency of the country as much 
 as paper. Sir, the Bank of the United States, in any other relation 
 than to the currency and property of the country, is as little to me 
 asto any man under heaven; but after the prime and vigor of life are 
 passed, and the power of accumulation is gone, to see the children 
 stripped, by the monstrous imposture of a paper currency, of al] that 
 the father’s industry had provided for them—this, sir, may well ex- 
 cuse the warmth that denounces this plan as the precursor of universal 
 dismay and ruin. 
 
 I have said, sir, that it is the cause of the sound and sober State 
 banks that I am defending. When the evils of such a currency pre- 
 vail, the people do not discriminate. A bank note is a bank note. 
 
 2 
 Vv 
 
34 
 
 Fear gives them all the same look to the apprehensive. If a few 
 banks suspend their specie payments, many will do it; all must do it, 
 unless they see the storm in its approach, and close their doors until 
 its fury be spent. The Bank of the United States herself may well 
 look for that day, if it comes in her time, with fear. Let her not be 
 weakened before the hour of her trial. I should regard that man, sir, 
 as one of the greatest benefactors of his country, who would devise, 
 for the use of this people, some control over the paper currency of 
 the State banks, and relieve us from the perpetual recurrence of con- 
 stitutional doubts and party contention, to which the career of a Bank 
 of the United States seems necessarily exposed. Control of some 
 kind is essential—it is indispensable; there can be no property, or, 
 what is the same thing, no security or uniformity to its value, without 
 it. Let us have a respite from the evil while the law will give it to 
 us. Let us not be turned off before the warrant of execution calls for 
 it. Let two years more be given to sober reflection by the people, that 
 there may be a locus penitentie allowed to those who are now pro- 
 posing this plan, without suggesting the means of control, or appear- 
 ang to think that they are necessary. 
 
 But, sir, the Secretary says that the deposites will not be promptly 
 paid, if they are left in the Bank until the charter expires, and it is 
 his duty, therefore, not to leave them there. What is it that it 1s ap- 
 prehended will cause this default? Does the Secretary suppose that 
 private deposites will continue in the Bank to the same time, and, by 
 their demands, interfere with the payments to the public? If indivi- 
 dual deposites do not remain, all will be admitted to be well. The 
 public deposites will be paid. then, as they are now paid, promptly. 
 If the private deposites do remain, and the bank notes continue in 
 circulation to their old amount, then, sir, let the Treasury, for once, 
 ‘trust to the instinct of self-interest in the people, and believe that what 
 all concur in doing for themselves, when they have the readiest means 
 ef doing otherwise, if they please, cannot be very dangerous to the 
 public. Sound reasoning and experience alike expose this Treasury 
 apprehension. A bank, having the resources that the Bank of the 
 United States is admitted to have, when she arrives at the term of — 
 her charter, increases, from that moment, in strength; because her ca- 
 pital is then to be returned to her, and her debtors haye been pre- 
 viously admonished that they must then be prepared to return it to 
 her. Other banks may then assist, by their expansion, the liquidation 
 of her debts, and they may do it safely, to a considerable extent, as 
 she cannot have, or, if she has, she cannot exercise, a power to dis- 
 tress them by her demands, without combining a vast force of public 
 opinion against her, that will effectually resist her. To ask of the 
 State banks what it must distress them to give, and what is not ne- 
 cessary to the United States’ Bank for operations then discontinued, 
 would be as idle in her as the apprehension of it is in others. It 
 cannot occur. There must be a reasonable arrangement between 
 the United States’ Bank and all the State banks who assist in ab- 
 sorbing her loans, to prevent or to mitigate the distress that the 
 withdrawing of a large capital would otherwise occasion. This, 
 
35 
 
 therefore, is the moment when the Bank of the United States will 
 ‘have the greatest power for her own protection, without having it for 
 the annoyance of the State banks; and, unless there is a general crash 
 which shall make deposites unsafe every where, they will be as safe 
 in the Bank of the United States as they can be any where. » 
 
 Sir, this is the result of experience, derived from an operation which 
 the Secretary of the Treasury has strangely overlooked. 
 
 The honorable member from Tennessee, in the course of his argu- 
 ment, made one remark, which, not being at all necessary in the con- 
 sideration of the present question, I may be excused for saying, was 
 a remark which I regretted. The gentleman took occasion to say, 
 that the first Bank of the United States was charged with having been 
 given over to political abuses and to the aid of the aristocracy, in 
 opposition to the Government of the country; and that, in this re- 
 -spect, the present Bank had followed in her steps. 
 
 Sir, I owe a debt to the directors of that first Bank which it would 
 ill become me not to endeavor to discharge, in part, on such an occa- 
 sion as this. I am indebted to those gentlemen for having first held 
 out their hand to me in the path of my profession. With such of 
 them as have passed away, [ lived in unbroken friendship and affec- 
 tion till their death, and the few who remain are equally worthy of 
 the sentiment. I should feel it to be an abandonment of my duty if L 
 did not deny the imputation which has been cast upon them, not by 
 the gentleman from Tennessee, but by those whom he quotes. I was 
 a director of that Bank during the last years of her charter, when I 
 was too young to govern her councils, though not to understand them; 
 and, as one of those directors, I have assisted in liquidating her con- 
 cerns, Sir, the directors of the parent Bank (I know nothing of the 
 branches,) were a body of as honorable men, as impartial, and as 
 faithful to their trust, as any men that ever lived. There was not a 
 politician at their board, nor a man who gave up himself to any 
 thing but the performance of duty to his trust. At their head was a 
 gallant soldier, who, during the war of the Revolution, was a prisoner 
 to the enemies of his country, and who, a few years since, descended 
 to his grave, esteemed and respected by all who knew him, most of 
 all for his rectitude as well as fearlessness of purpose, in the execu- 
 tion of every trust he undertook. Sir, I know the Bank was charged 
 as the gentleman states, but the charges were unjust and untrue. From 
 whom or why she received the bad name for which she was hunted 
 down, it does not concern the present question to inquire. 
 
 it is the history of the liquidation of this Bank that the Secretary 
 has overlooked, and it is the most triumphant answer to his doctrine 
 of default and depreciation. Her charter expired on the 3d March, 
 1811, when her corporate existence ceased at once and forever. 
 
 On the Ist January, 1811, her situation was as follows: 
 
 The amount of her netes discounted and loans was $17,759,001 
 Public deposites, - - - $6,474,402 
 
 Private deposites,- - - 3,855,402 . 
 
 Notes in circulation, - - 6,070,153 
 
 Specie, - - - - 5,317,885 
 
 — 
 
36 
 On the Ist March, 1811, it was as follows: 
 
 The amount of discounts and loans, - $14,587,134- 
 
 Public deposites, - - "= $2,874,833 
 
 Private deposites, - - - 3,583,596 
 
 Notes in circulation, - = 0,002,070). 
 
 Specie, - - - - 4,835,702 
 On the Ist September, 1811, it was as follows: 
 
 The amount of discounts and loans, - . $7,152,786: 
 
 Public deposites, - - - $. 322,349 
 
 Private deposites, - - - 448,112 
 
 Notes in circulation, - - 2,963,209 
 
 Specie, - - - oid 4,500,527 
 And on the Ist March, 1812, it was as follows: 
 
 The amount of discounts and loans, - - $3,792,975 
 
 Public deposites, - - - § 81,517 
 
 Private deposites, + - - 223,442 
 
 Notes in circulation, atk - 1,070,459 ’ 
 
 Specie, - - - ~ _ 6,116,776 
 
 Thus, from the 1st March, 1811, two days before the charter ex- 
 
 pired, to the 1st September, 1811, the Bank paid, as the above state- 
 ments show— 
 
 Public deposites, - - - $2,552,484 
 Private deposites, - - 3,135,484 
 Bank notes, ~ AN - 3,589,566 
 —— $9,277,534 
 
 And her specie fell only $335,175. 
 From the Ist March, 1811, tothe Ist March, 1812, she paid— 
 
 Public deposites, - - - $2, 793 316 
 Private deposites, - - 3,360,154 
 Bank notes, agi 8 - - 5,482,416 
 $11,635,886 
 
 And her specie increased from $4,116,776 to $6,116,796, being an 
 increase of $1,281,074. 
 
 Comparing her capital with that of the present Bank, which is three 
 and a half times greater, the present Bank might stand with equal 
 
 safety on the Ist of January, 1836, with the following discounts and 
 liabilities: 
 
 Notes and domestic bills, — - _ $62, 156,503 
 Notes in circulation, - ~ - 21,245,530 . 
 Public deposites, = - - 2 yy 660,407 
 Private deposites, ns) 493, 907 
 
 Whereas, on the Ist of Oxtober: 1833, the discounts ae liabilities: 
 of the present Bank were as follows: 
 Notes and domestic bills, - 
 Notes in circulation, -' - 
 Public deposites, - - 
 Private deposites,  - - 
 
 $60, 094,202 
 19, 7138,189 
 
37 
 
 In one particular, and only in one, was the provision of the first 
 Bank better, for the day of trial, than that of the present Bank. Her 
 -specie, on the Ist of January, 1811, was $5,317,585, being more than 
 equal to one-half of her capital; while that of the present Bank, on the 
 Ist of October, 1833, was $10,663,441—a little more than two-se- 
 yenths of her capital. The specie of the first Bank had been greatly 
 augmented by importations under the royal orders from the Spanish 
 colonies, which the embargo and other restrictions had prevented from 
 going abroad; but it was increased, instead of being diminished, by the 
 liquidation of her concerns. So much, sir, for the probability of default 
 ‘in paying the public deposites. _ As to depreciation of her notes, which 
 the Secretary also apprehends—if the notes are to depreciate because 
 they will be paid on presentation, because the quantity in circulation 
 will be daily diminished, because the residue outstanding will be of 
 increased value as exchange, and because, unless Congress shall pass 
 a law to the contrary, the public guarantee will continue, then, but 
 not otherwise, the Secretary’s fears may prove true. Sir, the Secre- 
 ‘tary has erred, even as to the matter of the guarantee. The letter of 
 ‘the Secretary says that ‘this obligation on the part of the United 
 ** States will cease on the 3d of March, 1836, when the charter 
 ** expires; and as soon as this happens, all the outstanding notes will 
 ** lose the peculiar value they now possess.” ‘The fourteenth section 
 -of the charter says otherwise. It says ‘ that the bills or notes of the 
 ** said corporation originally made payable, or which shall have be- 
 ** come payable on demand, shall be receivable in all payments to 
 * the United States, unless otherwise directed by an act of Con- 
 “¢ oress.”” They will be notes of the said corporation as much after 
 the charter expires as they now are. 
 
 But, sir, this apprehension of the non-payment of the public depo- 
 sites, if left in the Bank until March, 1836, will appear, from another 
 paper presented by the same Department to this House, to have been 
 -changed into an apprehension that, at that time, there would be no 
 deposites any where to be paid. ‘* Judging from the past,” the 
 Secretary’s letter says, *‘ it is highly probable they will always amount 
 to several millions.”” But a reference to the past, only, is not the 
 best way of ascertaining what, under our altered revenue system, will 
 be its amount. Accordingly, in his annual report on the state of the 
 ‘finances, made in the last month, the Secretary judges otherwise than 
 ‘by a reference to the past. I ask the attention of the House to a few 
 -extracts from this report. 
 
 ‘The balance in the Treasury on the 31st of December, 1834, is 
 -estimated to be $2,981,796 05. 
 
 The Secretary, after the statement which he deems necessary to 
 _ justify this 1 result, proceeds to say: 
 
 ‘In this view of the receipts of 1834, the income of the year will 
 ** about equal the estimated expenditure; and, with the aid of the 
 “* balance in the e Treasury on the Ist of January next, it will be suffi- 
 ‘‘ cient for all the wants of the Government, including the amount 
 ** necessary to pay off the residue of the national debt.” 
 
 He further says: “If the entire amount of appropriations pro- 
 ~** posed in the estimates for 1834 were also to be required within the 
 
38 
 
 ‘* year, there would not be money enough in the Treasury to meet. 
 ‘them, after satisfying the balances above stated, and paying off the- 
 4 public debt.” 
 
 He says further: ‘ In estimating the balance in the Treasury at 
 ** the close of 1834, I have therefore assumed that a portion of the 
 ‘* estimates of expenditures herewith submitted will not be used during 
 ** the year; and that balances of appropriations, equal to the amount 
 ** at the close ofjthe present year, will, in like manner, remain in the 
 *“* Treasury at the end of the year 1834, and go into the expenses of 
 ** the succeeding year; and it is not necessary to raise money for the 
 ‘* public use sooner than it will probably be needed. But the balance 
 ‘* stated at the end of 1834 is not to be considered as a clear surplus... 
 ** It will still be chargeable with the amount of appropriations esti- 
 ‘* mated to remain unexpended at that time. 
 
 ‘** From this state of the finances, and of the proposed appropria-- 
 * tions, it is evident that a reduction of the revenue cannot, at this 
 ‘¢ time, be made without injury to the public service. Under the act 
 ‘of the last session, the receipts of 1835 will be less than those of | 
 *¢ 1834, as a further reduction in the rate of duties will take effect on 
 “the Ist of January, 1835; and if the appropriations should be 
 ‘« kept up to the amount authorized for the present year, the charge: 
 * won the Treasury in 1835 would be more.than it could probably: 
 “‘ meet. “But the debt will then have been entirely paid; and, if a 
 * cuarded rule of appropriation is at once commenced, there will be 
 ** no difficulty in bringing down the expenditure, without injury te» 
 ** the public service. 
 
 “‘ If the revenue is not to be reduced more than the existing laws: 
 ” provide for, there seems to be no sufficient reason to open, at this 
 ** time, the vexed question of the tariff. The manner in which duties 
 “are now apportioned on different articles would be liable to insu- 
 ** perable objections, if it were to be considered as a settled and per-- 
 ‘** manent system. But the law is temporary on the face of it, and 
 ‘** was intended as a compromise between conflicting interests; and, 
 “* unless the revenue to arise under it should hereafter be mere pro- 
 “* ductive than is anticipated, it will be necessary, in two years from 
 ** this time, to impose duties on articles that are now free, in order” 
 “ 9 meet the current expenses of the Government.” 
 
 - The existence of the several millions in the Treasury in March, 1836,. 
 is therefore to depend on the future action of Congress upon the report 
 of the Committee of Ways and Means; and if. the existence of any 
 public money in any bank at that time is to depend on the future 
 action of Congress, how could that constitute a motive for removing 
 the deposites in October, 1833? 
 
 The Secretary of the Treasury presents another reason for with- 
 drawing the deposites on the Ist of October, which is very remark-- 
 able. Hf 1 understand the Secretary, he makes the removal in Octo-- 
 ber a consequence of the reductions by the Bank in August and Sep-- 
 tember. The remarkable feature of this reason is, that the very 
 effect he intended to produce by the removal, and which, if the Bank 
 did reduce, was produced by the known intention of removal, is pre-- 
 
39 
 
 ferred as the ground of complaint against the Bank, and as the justi- 
 fication of the removal. He complains of the Bank, because she 
 acted as if she meant to carry his design into effect; and he removes 
 the deposites because the Bank took measures to prevent the removal 
 from distressing her. The amount of reductions in August and 
 September, as the Secretary states them, was $4,066,146, or 
 $2,000,000 per month; and, as her discounts and bills in August were 
 $64,000,000, there is a simple rule in arithmetic by which we may 
 ascertain the monthly reduction necessary to effect the Secretary’s 
 object during the thirty-one months of the charter which then re- 
 mained. It is clear, sir, that the monthly reduction must be more 
 than two millions; and now that the deposites are removed, and we 
 are in the month of January, when the loans and bills stand at about 
 $55,000,000, the monthly reductions. of the Bank for the twenty-six 
 remaining months of the charter must be more than $2,000,000, or 
 the object which the Secretary meant to effect will not be accom- 
 plished. It is remarkable that the apparent coincidence of the Bank 
 with the design of the Secretary should be a ground of complaint 
 against the Bank. ho 
 
 ~The Secretary says, and gentlemen concur with him in saying, 
 that the Bank have reduced too rapidly. Suppose it to be so; did the 
 Secretary inform the Bank what amount of reduction he thought suf- 
 ficient?’ Did he tell them of the amounts to be from time to time re- 
 moved, and the places at which they would be required? No. He 
 says that « the nature of the inquiry at the four principal banks,” (of 
 which the Bank knew nothing,) ‘‘ showed that, the immediate with- 
 ‘¢ drawal, so as to distress the Bank, was not contemplated; and that 
 rat, any apprehensions to the contrary were felt by the Bank, an_ 
 ‘“* inquiry at the Department would no doubt have been promptly 
 ** and satisfactorily answered.”” What, sir, was the Bank to come to 
 the. Treasury Department to ask for. the suspension of a demand, 
 which she was bound to be in readiness to pay whenever made? Is 
 this to be said while the sound of the honorable member’s voice, upon 
 the subject of the three per cents, is still in our ears?’ While this 
 House has in its fresh recollection the charge against the Bank, that 
 she asked in March a suspension of the discharge of half the three per 
 cents, from July to October, 1832, ‘‘ because the Bank was not able to 
 pay them?”’ No, sir; that was sufficient warning to Mr. Biddle not to 
 approach the Department upon the subject, even had he been invited; 
 and, if he had approached it, under any circumstances, we should 
 have heard again the same changes rung upon the inability to pay the 
 deposites that we have heard in regard to the three per cents. The 
 master of the removal was in the Treasury. The time and propor- 
 tions depended upon him; and, if his concern for the country was 
 excited, if the reductions of the Bank were too rapid according to 
 the Treasury views, the remedy was in the power of the Treasury, 
 and should have been applied. 
 
 Sir, the Bank of the United States acted wisely and warily in 
 August and September. Although the removal of the deposites did 
 not take place until the Ist of October, the intention to remove was 
 
40 
 
 fully known in July. The agency to negotiate with the State banks 
 was announced in the Globe on the 25th of July; and, whatever the 
 public might think, it was not for the Bank to act in any other faith 
 than that the purpose would be immediately and relentlessly executed. 
 It was the clear duty of the Board to prepare itself without a mo- 
 ment’s delay. The position of the Bank was every where known to 
 the Treasury Department by the weekly statements. Her widely 
 dispersed branches were to be strengthened wherever they required 
 it. Her circulation was large, and she was in the practice of assist- 
 ing it by an almost universal payment at all points, without regard to 
 the tenor of the notes. The House may judge of the extent of ac- 
 commodation which the Bank was in the practice of giving, by the 
 thirty-nine millions of these notes paid, out of place, in the year 
 1832. They may know it further by the fact, that, of these branch — 
 notes, $1,540,000 were paid at the Bank of the United States in 
 Philadelphia, during the very months of August and September, 
 1833. This circulation was to be sustained and increased, to be still 
 more facilitated, as it since has been, to keep the people and the 
 Bank from feeling the consequences of the measure. All this re- 
 quired that the Bank should not sleep upon her post. The least dis- 
 honor suffered by that Bank would have produced universal disorder 
 in the country. 
 
 I understand the honorable member from Tennessee to say, that the 
 reductions by the Bank, in August and September last, were greater 
 than they ever had been in any other two months since her institution. 
 I join issue upon this allegation. They have been greater in other 
 months, and they were greater in the very same months of the pre- 
 ceding year. 
 
 In August and Some 1833, the amount reduced 
 
 was - =n s - 84,066,146 
 
 In August and Saprenben, 1832, it *wase sis - 4,315,678 
 
 being the difference between $68,008,988, the discounts and domestic 
 bills in August, 1832, and $63,693, 310, their amount in October; and 
 yet there was no ilatm whatever in 1832. There was, moreover, 
 a greater reduction, by a million and a half, from July to October, 
 1832, than there was between the same months i in the present year, 
 ‘and without any distress or alarm. 
 
 The discounts and bills in July, 1833, were - $63,369,897 
 
 The discounts and bills in October, 1833, were - 60,094,202 
 
 Reduction, - - - $3,275,695 
 The amount in July, 1832, was - ~ - $68,416,081 
 The amount in October, 1832, - - rte 63,693,310 
 Reduction, - - - _ $4,722 722 771 
 
 There was a greater State bank debt in October, 1832, than in 
 the same month, 1833, and yet there was no alarm. In October, 
 
41 
 
 1833, it was $2,285,573, and in October, 1832, it was $2,820,114. 
 The reason of the difference may possibly show to gentlemen that 
 mere reduction is an insufficient element for determining the pressure 
 in the market. In October, 1832, the payment of the three per 
 cents was to restore to the community a portion of the sums called in 
 by the Bank. In October, 1833, the deposites were to go where in- 
 dividuals must have a less beneficial use of them, and where they 
 could have no use of them, except as the State banks should choose 
 to lend upon them. 
 
 Nor did the whole reduction, from October to December, 1833, 
 cause the existing distress. It is well, sir, to present these details, 
 that the House may reflect upon them, and learn how far the Secre- 
 tary is responsible for the condition of the country. The Bank paid 
 out, in the two months of October and December, $246,766 more 
 than she received from the community. 
 
 Receipts. 
 In October, 1833, discounts and 
 bills were ~ - $60,094,202 
 In December they were, - - 54,453,104 
 —— $5,641,098 
 In October the public depo- Payments. 
 sites were - $9,868,434 
 In December they were, 5,162,259 
 $4,706,175 
 In October the private de- _ 
 posites were - $8,008,862 
 In December they were, 6,827,173 
 ————_ 1,181,689 ; 
 —— 5,887,864 
 Excess of payments over receipts, - - $246, 766 
 
 Nor was the reduction by the Bank of the Linited States, in the 
 month of December, the cause of the distress. 
 In December, 1833, the discounts and bills were $54,453,104 
 
 In January, 1834, they are, - - - 54,911,461 
 Showing an actual increase of - tach ta Ts dedsced 357 
 
 Yet, in that month, the public and vidya De pdiites were 2 paid to 
 the extent of $1,024,058. Yes, sir, in this very month, when it has 
 been said that the Bank had grasped the debtor’s throat, to compel 
 an outcry to Congress for the return of the deposites, the Bank ex- 
 tended her loans nearly half a million of dollars, while she paid more 
 than a million of her deposites. 
 
 Nor was the entire reduction in the four commercial cities, from 
 October, 1833, to January, 1834, the cause of the prevailing distress. 
 
 In October, 1833, the loans and bills in those places were as fol- 
 lows: 
 
42 
 
 Philadelphia, - - - - - $7,156,487 
 New York, - - ~ - - 6,180,883 
 Boston, - - - - - - 93,965,283 
 Baltimore, - - - - 2,033,318 
 ; $19,335,971 
 
 In January, 1834, they are as follows: 
 Philadelphia, - - ner, - - $7,979,233 
 New York, - - - - - 5,970,055 
 Boston, - - - - - - 2,316,034 
 Baltimore, - - - - - 1,954,045 
 $18,219,367 
 
 Making $1,116,604 reduction in the four cities during the three 
 preceding months. 
 
 The cause of the alarm and general paralysis are not to be foend, 
 then, in the conduct of the Bank of the United States. They are to 
 be sought for and found in the removal of the deposites; in the uni- 
 versal derangement of the money system of the country by that 
 means; in the just refusal of the United States’ Bank to extend her- 
 self to her own undoing, or to keep herself unprepared for the com- 
 ing storm, by remaining as extended as she was; in the inability of 
 the State banks to use the deposites as beneficially as they were used 
 before; and in the refusal of capitalists to lend their money and ad- 
 venture their property in the face of a project to oyerwhelm the 
 country with an uncontrollable State bank paper currency. 
 
 What, sir, does the Secretary of the Treasury expect of the Bank? 
 What measure of justice does he render to her?’ He says, the de- 
 sign of removing the deposites was to compel reduction, and he cen- 
 sures her because she reduces. He complains that she increased her 
 discounts and domestic bills, from December, 1832, to August, 1833, 
 more than two millions and a half, when this was the very season in 
 which trade requires the increase, and it was wholly in the purchase 
 of domestic bills. He complains that she reduced her discounts, in 
 August and September, 1833, four millions of dollars, when this is 
 the very season of payment, when trade does not require the means, 
 and three millions of the amount was by the payment of domestic 
 bills which had arrived at maturity. He complains of the increase 
 of loans in December, 1830, when they were $42,402,304; and 
 he complains of reductions in August, 1833, when they were 
 twenty-two millions more, viz: $64,160,349. He complains of 
 reductions in 1833, when, in the whole, from June to December, 
 they have been but $610,508 more than they were in 1832; and the 
 Bank has had also to pay the public deposites.* 
 
 * The statements which verify these positions may be more intelligibly 
 pred in a note than in the body of the argument, as they were stated to the 
 ouse. 
 __1. The variations in the increase and diminution of discounts and domestic 
 bills through the years 1832 and 1833, are shown by the following statement: 
 
43 
 
 Sir, it is clear that the Bank must abide the reproaches of the Se- 
 cretary, whatever she does. But what has she not a right to expect 
 from this House, from the People, from the solid State banks, from 
 all who are concerned in the currency, and the property it circulates? 
 Their safety depends on her pursuing the course she has traced out, 
 from which neither the reproaches of enemies, nor the entreaties of 
 friends, should divert her. For the former I have no apprehension; 
 and for the latter, although I entertain some fears, I trust that an an- 
 swer will always be found by the able Board which administers the 
 concerns of the Bank, in the superior claims of public duty. 
 
 The Secretary asserts, sir—and it seems to be a favorite assertion, 
 as it is to be found in more than one place in the letter—he asserts 
 that the Bank has violated the charter. He says, that, ‘ instead of a 
 ‘* Board constituted of at least seven directors, according to the charter, 
 ** at which those appointed by the United States have a right to be 
 *‘ present, many of the most important money transactions of the 
 ‘** Bank have been, and still are, placed under the control of a com- 
 ‘** mittee, denominated the Exchange Committee, of which no one of 
 ‘“* the public directors has been allowed to be a member since the 
 ‘** commencement of the present year. This committee is not even 
 * elected by the Board, and the public directors have no voice in 
 ** their appointment. They are chosen by the President of the Bank; 
 ** and the business of the institution, which ought to be decided on 
 ‘** by the Board of Directors, is, in many instances, transacted by this 
 ‘“* committee; and no one has a right to be present at their proceedings 
 ‘* but the President, and those whom he shall please to name as 
 ‘* members of this committee. Thus loans are made,. unknown at 
 ‘‘ the time to a majority of the Board, and paper discounted which 
 ** might probably be rejected at a regular meeting of the directors. 
 ‘* The most important operations of the Bank are sometimes resolved 
 ‘on and executed by this committee; and its measures are, it ap- 
 ** nears, designedly, and by regular system, so arranged as to conceal 
 ‘‘ from the officers of the Government transactions in which the public 
 ‘‘ interests are deeply involved. And this fact alone furnishes evi- 
 *‘ dence too strong to be resisted, that the concealment of certain 
 
 Domestic bills. Discounts. Total. 
 January, 1832, - $16,691,129 49,602,577 66,293,707 
 June, - - 22,850,769 46,712,040 69,562,809 
 December, - - 16,647,507 44,924,118 61,571,625 
 January, 1833, - 18,069,043 43,626,870 61,695,913 
 June, - - 22,427,702 40,627,094 63,054,796 
 December, - 15,672,537 38,780,567 54,453,104 
 Total reduction from June to December, 1832, - - 7,991,184 
 Total reduction from June to December, 1833,  - - 8,601,692 
 
 2. The increase of two millions and a half, from January to August, 1833, 
 was wholly in domestic bills, while the discounts were reduced. 
 
 Domestic bills. Discounts. 
 January, 1833, - - $18,069,043 $43,626,870 
 ‘August, 1833, : - 20,993,243 43,237,106 
 
 Increase, - - G 2,854,200 389,764 diminution. 
 
44 
 
 ‘““important operations of the corporation from the officers of the 
 ** Government is one of the objects which is intended to be accom- 
 ‘* plished by means of this committee. The plain words of the charter 
 ‘“* are violated, in order to deprive the people of the United States of 
 ‘* one of the principal securities which the law had provided to guard 
 ** their interest, and to render more safe the public money intrusted 
 “to the care of the Bank.” 
 
 Now, sir, the Secretary cannot have examined this matter, or he 
 would have entertained a different opinion. There is no violation 
 whatever of the charter in giving the President authority to appoint 
 the Committee of Exchange, or in authorizing that committee to 
 transact the business of exchange, or even to discount, if such a 
 power should be deemed expedient. 
 
 The Secretary appears to rely on the fourth fundamental law of 
 the corporation, which enacts, that ‘* not less than seven directors 
 ‘¢ shall constitute a Board for the transaction of business, of whom 
 ** the President shall always be one, except in case of sickness or 
 ‘* necessary absence; in which case his place may be supplied by any 
 ** other director whom he, by writing under his hand, shall depute for 
 ** that purpose. And the director so deputed may do and transact all 
 *‘ necessary business belonging to the office of the President of the 
 ‘* said corporation, during the continuance of the sickness or necessary 
 ‘** absence of the President.” By transaction of business, the Secre- 
 tary would seem to understand exclusively the execution of business; 
 the carrying of a direction, order, or law, into act and effect. But 
 this is not the restricted meaning of the word in this place, for several 
 satisfactory reasons. 1. Such a restriction upon the execution of the 
 various business of the Bank, as that not less than seven directors 
 should form a quorum to do it, would render the execution of business 
 impossible. Not a deposite could be received or paid, or the simplest 
 operation of business performed, without the presence of such a 
 quorum. 2. Accordingly, the charter, by the use of a different term, 
 in a different place, shows that this is not the meaning of the words 
 transaction of business. The tenth section gives to the directors for 
 the time being ‘ power to appoint such officers, clerks, and servants | 
 ** under them as shall be necessary for executing the business of the 
 ** said corporation, and to allow them such compensation for their 
 ‘* services, respectively, as shall be reasonable.” 3. The word, in 
 its proper sense, includes both execution and direction. 4. The 
 authority of the Board, as would naturally occur to most people, is 
 legislative; and although they can also execute and perform defini- 
 tively any business they please, it must depend upon the law which 
 they prescribe to themselves, or which is prescribed for them by the 
 charter and by-laws, what part they will perform in person, and what 
 they will commit to others, The quorum is appointed for the exercise 
 of authority as a Board—for legislation, and not for the execution of 
 the laws or directions of the Board, The body is, by the very name 
 of its office, directive and not executive. 5. This is clearly implied 
 from the provision which gives to a substituted director the power 
 to transact all the necessary business belonging to the office of Pre- 
 
45 
 
 sident, during the continuance of the President’s sickness or neces- 
 sary absence. What is the necessary business belonging to the office 
 of President? The charter does not declare it. Perhaps the only 
 business which it allots to him, expressly, is that of signing notes of a 
 certain description to give them a certain effect. Whence, then, can 
 he get it, except from the Board of Directors, or the by-laws and 
 regulations of the Bank? And if he gets it from the Board, they must 
 have power to authorize and direct, and the President, by virtue 
 thereof, must have power to execute. 
 
 Sir, the power of making by-laws and regulations for the govern- 
 ment of the Bank has been wholly overlooked by the Secretary. 
 The seventh section of the charter gives to the whole corporation, 
 the stockholders, the power to ‘‘ ordain, establish, and put in execu- 
 ‘* tion such by-laws, ordinances, and regulations, as they shall deem 
 ** necessary and convenient for the government of the said corporation, 
 ** not being contrary to the constitution thereof, or to the laws of the 
 ** United States;” and the present situation of this power is thus: It 
 has been settled for a century, that where a charter commits the 
 power of making by-laws to the whole body of the corporation, the 
 general mass of corporators, they may delegate the power to a select 
 body, who then represent the whole body in their acts of legislation. 
 The contrary of this is held to be the law when the power is given 
 by charter to a select body, for they cannot delegate their power to 
 any other body. Now, sir, the whole body of the corporation of the 
 Bank of the United States, the stockholders, at a ‘general meeting 
 held on the 6th January, 1817, did delegate their power of making 
 by-laws and regulations to the Board of Directors, after passing a 
 few by-laws not affecting the present inquiry. The act by which this 
 was done declares, “ that the directors shall have power to make 
 ‘such further rules, regulations, and by-laws, as they shall deem 
 ** necessary and convenient for the government of the Bank of the 
 ** United States, not contrary to these ordinances, nor to the act of 
 ‘* incorporation, nor to the laws of the United States.”” Consequently, 
 the directors have, since that time, possessed and exercised, and do 
 now possess and exercise, the legislative power of the corporation, 
 by the gift and delegation of the stockholders; and the laws and regu- 
 lations made by the Board of Directors, whether for the government 
 of their own body, or of the business of the Bank, not being contrary 
 to the constitution, the laws of the United States, or the by-laws 
 made by the stockholders, are good and valid, either by virtue of 
 their own charter authority as directors, or the authority delegated 
 to them by the whole corporation. 
 
 Upon what principle is it, then, that a regulation of the Board 
 authorizing the President to appoint committees, (a necessary power 
 in every legislative body,) or that authorizing a committee to take 
 order upon the purchase and sale of exchange, or to perform any 
 other act of banking which the charter does not require to be done 
 by somebody else, is denounced as a violation of the charter, and of 
 the plain words of the charter? Sir, the power exercised by the 
 Committee of Exchange is known by all who know any thing of 
 
46 
 
 practical banking, as it is now conducted in our cities, to be not only 
 usual, but almost indispensable; and, to the due management of the 
 parent Bank, entirely so. To require a quorum of seven to be pre- 
 sent at every such operation, occurring as they do every day, would 
 be to say that the Bank of the United States should not: give the 
 facilities to exchanges which the interests of trade require. The 
 question of expediency is, however, for the Board, when its legal 
 quorum is present, to decide; and they have decided it, and the 
 stockholders have never questioned the decision. As to the right, 
 though from convenience, as well as from the regular recurrence and 
 magnitude of the operations, the discounts of promissory notes are 
 directed by the Board of Directors in person, there is no legal differ- 
 ence between discounts and exchanges, or any other branch of 
 banking business, which makes them necessarily subject to different 
 rules. The Board may regulate the whole as it deems best for the 
 Bank. 
 
 But, sir, this alleged violation of the charter is connected, in the 
 mind of the Secretary, with a design to ‘‘ conceal certain important 
 operations of the corporation from the officers of the Government.” 
 The particular operations concealed are not suggested, but the con- 
 cealment is alleged as an inference from the mode of appointing and 
 instructing the committees in violation of the charter. 
 
 There are some points of fact adverted to in the Secretary’s let- 
 ter, and in the argument of the honorable member from Tennessee, 
 which it is my intention to leave to those who think that they are 
 still worthy of additional notice. Jam not of that opinion. These 
 matters regard the particular items of expense for printing and pub- 
 lication by the Bank, and the old affair of the 3 per cents, both as to 
 the suspended payment from July to October, and the contract by the 
 Bank with certain holders of that stock. If, after the volumes printed 
 by the order of this House atthe last session of Congress, upon these and 
 other kindred questions, something more is required to be said, I am 
 sure it may be said more profitably by others than by myself. So, also, 
 sir, as to the discovery which fhe honorable member from Tennessee 
 thinks he has made, of a contradiction between the amount of print- 
 ing expenses of the Bank in 1831, returned by the Bank to the Sen- 
 ate under a resolution of that body, and the amount for the same 
 year stated in the pamphlet which he is pleased to term the mani- 
 festo of the Bank—the former being, as I understand, the sum of 
 $9,775, and the latter the sum of $21,708 53. That discovery may 
 not prove to be as important as it is supposed to be, if gentlemen 
 will advert to the fact that the call of the Senate embraces only the 
 expenses paid by the Bank for printing and to editors; and the ex- 
 penses in the pamphlet are the whole amount’ paid by the Bank for 
 publications of every kind, by whomever printed, and not merely 
 the portion paid by the Bank to printers employed by itself, and to 
 editors of newspapers: 
 
 These, sir, are minor. points; but the question of concealment in- 
 volves great considerations. ‘ It would appear that the charge implies 
 a general concealment, from the omission to appoint any one of the 
 
47 
 
 Government directors upon the Committee of Exchange; and par- 
 ticular concealment, from giving to the Committee on the Offices a 
 power to modify the resolutions ‘of the Board for reducing the busi- 
 ness of the institution as they should deem expedient, and refusing 
 to order them to make a report to the Board; and, also, from refusing 
 to the Government directors a copy of the resolution indicating the 
 course of policy proper for the Bank to pursue under present circum- 
 stances, and which the Government directors thought should be 
 transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury. In regard to the Com- 
 mittee on the Offices, I find it difficult to comprehend that branch of 
 the alleged concealment, as by their letter of the 22d April, 1833, 
 to the President, it appears that one of the Goverment directors was 
 at that time a member of that committee. © Possibly, however, there 
 may have been a change, and I shall so consider it. 
 
 Sir, these questions are of great importance to all banks, and to 
 the Bank of the United States in particular. The right of the Go- 
 vernment directors to the station they aspire to, or to demand that 
 the Board should make the orders which the Board have refused to 
 make, has not the least foundation. Their right to be members of 
 any committee has no more legal support, than the right of a member 
 of this House to be upon a committee appointed by this House. It 
 depends, in this House, upon the good pleasure of the House; or, what 
 is constructively the same thing, upon the pleasure of the Speaker, 
 chosen by the House. In'the Board of Directors it depends on the 
 pleasure of the Board, either directly or indirectly, as they make the 
 appointment themselves, or give the power of appointment to the 
 President of the Board. The right to require that a committee shall 
 make a report to the Board, is the right of the Board, and not of any 
 member of it. The right to take a copy of the minutes, for any pur- 
 pose, depends on the will of the Board by whom they are made, or 
 ordered to be made, as the charter does not contain any direction 
 upon the subject. It would be the same inthis House, if the constitu- 
 tion did not require a journal to be kept by each House, and to be 
 published from time to time; though even this is subject to an excep- 
 tion, depending on the will of the House. 
 
 The questions of right being thus, let us oe sir, the ques- 
 tions of expediency and propriety. 
 
 Heretofore, in the history of the Bank, the directors appointed 
 by the President of the United States, have mingled in all the trans- 
 actions of the Bank, mutually giving and enjoying unreserved confi- 
 dence, and being in no respect whatever distinguished from the other 
 directors. Mr. Biddle himself was a director appointed by the Pre- 
 sident, for many years, and particularly in the important years of 
 1829, 1830, 1831, and 1832, as the reports of the last session show; 
 and other Government directors have, from time to time, acted upon 
 all the important committees, including the Committee of Exchange, 
 so as to give to the Bank the benefit of their peculiar qualifications, 
 for it must always have been a question of qualification, and, if a di- 
 rector was not qualified for a particular post, it is not probable, what- 
 ever was the source of his appointment, that he would be placed in 
 
48 
 
 it. But, sir, in the time of the present Government | directors, a 
 change has come upon us and upon the Bank, of a very important 
 kind, and it is not surprising that it has affe ected those directors also. 
 
 It was vehemently suspected, sir, at the time of their apxoint rent, 
 that their notions of duty and right were peculiar; that they toemed 
 themselves bound or entitled to use their posts for the purpose of 
 making representations to the President of the United States, tending 
 to excite odium against their co-directors, by impeaching their mo- 
 tives and acts, and thus to impair the credit of the Bank; that they 
 deemed themselves at, liberty, in the performance of this duty, or in 
 the exercise of this. right, to pursue objects which they did not care 
 to avow, and which they were not permitted to avow; and, finally, sir, 
 that, in some way, by some unexplained theory of their appointment, 
 they had come to the opinion that they possessed political powers in 
 the institution, which they were authorized to use for political pur- 
 poses. All this, sir, was, asI have said, most vehemently suspected; 
 and, if the suspicions were just, the propriety of placing them in posts 
 of trust and confidence in the Bank was not so clear, particularly as, if 
 they were so placed, it might have been difficult to persuade other gen- 
 tlemen to sit beside them in the occupation of those posts. I say, 
 sir, it might have been extremely difficult to persuade gentlemen of 
 character, having some feelings and reputation of their own, to sit 
 in a post of trust and confidence by the side of directors holding 
 such notions of duty and right, and carrying them out, without avow- 
 ing their objects, into measures of extreme personal. annoyance, as 
 well as of discredit to the Bank. 
 
 Sir, what was at that time, perhaps, no more than vehement sus- 
 picion, is now, and, for some time past, has been, matter of unques- 
 tionable certainty; and the certainty is derived from the best possible 
 authority—the confession of the very party. 
 
 Sir, I beg to call the attention of the House to a part of a letter 
 addressed by three of the Government directors to the President of 
 the United States on the 22d of April, 1833, which is annexed to 
 the letter of the Secretary. It is the first that has been exhibited to 
 this House, but not the first in the correspondence of which it forms 
 a part, and which has not been communicated. We know, even now, © 
 but in part. The three directors say: 
 
 ‘* Without considering any portion of our remarks as falling within 
 “the limits of those private accounts, which, as you state, the charter 
 ‘“‘has so carefully guarded, since the whole relate to the action of the 
 “ Board upon matters fully open, and discussed, before them, and ex- 
 “tend in no instance to the private debtor and creditor accounts of 
 ** individuals, yet we may be excused for expressing much gratifica- 
 ‘tion at your assurance that the information requested is for your 
 “‘own satisfaction, and that you do not wish it extended beyond our 
 “personal knowledge. We may be permitted also to add, that the 
 
 ‘‘ wishes and opinions which we took the liberty of expressing in our 
 ‘* former letter have been since more strongly confirmed, and that we 
 * should not He feel more satisfaction ourselves, but be enabled to 
 ** convey to you more full and correct information, w were we to proceed 
 
49 
 Sin an investigation, WHOSE OBJECT WAS AVOWED, and if we were 
 “strengthened by that official sanction which we suggested. is AG 
 
 Then, sir, they. were not altogether comfortable in their new 
 
 position; and I do not’ wonder at it. Then their object was not 
 Sayfa: and they were not permitted to avew it, but were compelled, 
 ‘by their own sense of distress} to ask for an official sanction, under 
 which they might avoyw it: then, further, they were practising, con- 
 cealment themselves, and trying to prosecute an investigation, with- 
 -out avowing its object, when that object is now known to, have been 
 - to inculpate the Board, and particularly the gentleman at the head of 
 it, and, by means of the odium thus excited, to justify to public pre- 
 judice an act of deadly hatred to: the Bank ‘of which they, were di- 
 rectors—the removal of the public deposites; and then, sir, I say, in 
 conclusion, that there is not an. honorable man in this. House, or in 
 this country,.who will not respond to the sentiment, that they were 
 treated at least as wellas they deserved to be, bynot being assisted 
 in the performance of these remarkable labors. With this confession 
 ‘of concealment by the’ Government ‘directors, to which. they were 
 . eoerced by the. Executive, the Secretar y. of the’ Treasury arraigns 
 the Board for concealing its operations ‘from them, He charges ‘the 
 Board with concealment, -in, violation of their charter, and in con- 
 tempt of the. Government, when the head: and front of their offence 
 is this only—that they would not consent to he the dupes of con- 
 cealment that was practised by others. * 
 
 But, sir, this is- not all. The memorial of. the Government di- 
 rectors to this House, for»the.doctrines‘of which we are, I presume, 
 indebted: to the professional gentleman whose name is at the head, 
 ‘cannot be-too much, adverted to, in connexion with both the charge 
 of concealment by the Board, and another charge, hereafter to be 
 noticed, of a graver description. ‘It is a do¢ument that may be con- 
 sidered as a_ sort of snvall snartyrology—a history. of the sufferings 
 incident to disappointed efforts and mortified pyetensions; and it con- 
 tains, as is natural, a. confession of the faith by which the sufferers 
 have been sustained at the stake where they have placed themselves. 
 I beg permission to exhibit it to the House.—‘ It has pleased, the 
 ** majority of the Board of Directors,” says the memorial, ‘ in the 
 ** document to which we refer, in order, we suppose, in some degree 
 * to-extenuate their conduct, in systematically nullifying the repre- 
 “© sentatives*of- the Government and the People,” [doubtless mean- 
 ing themselvos;] to deny that the public directors are seated at 
 * the Board in any other relation than themselves; to deny the ex- 
 * istence of any difference. in, the official character dnd duty of them- 
 ** selves and us, This,extradrdinary denial, in the face of all. experi- 
 ** ence of the familiar history of the country. 9 and of p palpable reasoning, 
 “* must rather be ascribed to the presumption whic moneyed power 
 ** is. apt to, inspire, than to. the ignorance or wilful misrepresentation 
 ‘of those who make it. .Nothing can be plainer than that the pub- 
 ** LIC DIRECTORS WERE DEVISED AS INSTRUMENTS ’ 
 to advert to ‘the felicity of the language—* were 
 ments. mye * Nothing can be Pegs than that. 
 
 * : we > 
 
 a 7 ae >” ~~ + . 
 
50 
 
 ‘* were devised as instruments for the attainment of public objects; 
 ‘* that their being insisted upon in the charter itself was in obedience 
 ‘* to the will of those who-elected the legislative body by which it was 
 ‘* passed; and that their appointment was given to the President, 
 ‘“‘ with the advice and consent of the Senate of ‘the United States, 
 “¢ (not to the mere fiscal representative,) in order to clothe them with 
 ‘ali the character of official representation, and to exaet from them 
 ‘a discharge of all the duties, public, politival, and patriotic; inci- 
 “dent to a trust so conferred. If we are mistaken in this, we ac- 
 ‘“* knowledge that our solicitude about ‘the rights and morals, the 
 ‘* practical purity and freedom of our countrymen, has misled us. 
 “ But we know that we are-not.”?> | _ ‘ 
 
 DPevised as instruments,'and -given to the Président, to exact from 
 them a discharge of ‘all’the duties, public, political, and patriotic, in- 
 cident to a trast so conferred! The sense would not have been more 
 complete, sir, though the alliteration would have been mere perfect; if 
 they had described their functions as extending to all duties, public, 
 political, patriotic, and party, incident to’a trist so conferred. 
 
 Now, sir, without at present saying whether this theory was true, 
 the other directors had-a right to ‘a,counteracting theory for them- 
 selves; and if it is, true that thé Government directors were devised 
 as instruments, and that they ate, by their creation, political direc- 
 tors, the other directors, who have not been so devised, are entitled 
 to consider themselves as anti-pdlitical directors, and not bound to 
 assist the political operations of’ the other branch, but. rather, by the 
 momentum of their. greater ‘numbers, to'keep them from moving the 
 Bank out of place. But; sir,’the heads of the memorialists’ have 
 been made dizzy by their-elevation.-. Their theory has no foundation 
 in reason, or in the charter. I deny that they were devised as in- 
 struments, whatever they may have made of themselves. There is 
 not a shadow of difference between the rights and duties, the powers, 
 or the obligations, of any of the directors; they are all directors,. 
 neither more nor less, and owing the same duties to all the interests 
 confided to them. . The directors appointed’ hy the President owe a 
 duty to the nation, and so do ‘the others, and, in my'poor judgment, 
 they have performed it.The directors elected by the stockholders 
 owe a duty’ to'the Bank, and’so do the directors appointed’ by the 
 President; but they have neither performed nor acknowledged it. They 
 are not placed there to make inquiries for the President. ‘The Pre- 
 sident has no authority to direct inquiries to be made by them. * This. 
 is a question of charter power, of* power over a.corporation, all ot 
 whose privileges are rights of property. ‘The charter gives to the 
 President no such right. Tt expressly gives to. the Secretary 6f the 
 Treasury a right of limited inquiry; by investigating such general 
 accounts, in'the books of the Bank, as’relate to the statements which 
 the Bank is bound to furnish “to the Treasury Department, but no 
 further. Congress have the power to inspect the books of the Bank, 
 and the proceedings of the corporation generally. These powers: 
 have been expressly given, and: they have been so given because 
 they would not have been derived by implication from the charter. 
 
 € 
 
 . ~ we 
 
ol 
 
 But here is a power to be implied greater than all, and .worse than 
 all—a power to be exercised secretly, and without avowal, ex parte, 
 without notice, without opportunity of. reply. or explanation being 
 given to those whom it affects, and by persons who are holding, to all 
 appearance, the relations of amity with their co-directors,’ sitting on 
 the same séats, and professing the same general objects. Sir, the 
 ‘Board did right, not to aid them; it would-have done right to . resist 
 them; and I inquire of the members of this House, and ask them to 
 follow ‘out their honorable feelings into the reply—would they con- 
 “sent to sit in committee by the side of men who professed principles 
 like these, and submitted themselves. tothe direction of another as 
 to the manner in which they should carry them into execution? This 
 question concerns al! banks, and this Bank most intimately. A hue 
 and cry is raised against the directors of this Bank, because the 
 Bank will not tell the Government directors, that they may, tell the 
 Secretary, precisely how they mean to. wind. up, if they do mean it; 
 and here is a new theory.of banking, to. place by the side of the 
 new theory of political power—that, all which the Bank intends to 
 do’ for its own defence, is t6 be told to an enemy, that, if he thinks 
 fit, he may defeat the measure; that it is not sufficient for him to con- 
 tinue to know the precise , conditionof the Bank, in point of fact, as 
 it actually is, and as he must perceive,it to be by the weekly statements, 
 but that he must also know what it is’ going to be by the operation of 
 measures of defence, that if it is in his power, and he also. thinks fit, 
 he may frustrate the purpose. Tre private directors of this Bank have 
 upon them the responsibility of taking care of all the stockholders—the 
 nation, for its seven millions, included. If others forget this duty, they 
 will not. This House, I hope, will not; nor will they join in censuring 
 these faithful men for refusing, under the challenge of political power, 
 to give up the direction of the Bank, by allowing to any department 
 an inquisition into tlieir concerns, which the charter does not warrant. 
 ' Mr. Speaker, it is in connexion with'this asserted right of inquiry 
 into the affairs of the’Bank, that the contracts, made by the Secre- 
 tary ‘with the new deposite Banks, become an, object of the deepest 
 interest. The 15th fundamental law of the Bank charter enables the 
 Secretary to require of the Bank a weekly statement of the capital 
 stock,of the corporation, debts due to the same, moneys deposited 
 theréin, notes,in circulation, and the specie in hand; and gives him a 
 right to inspect the general accounts relating to it in the books of the 
 Bank, but not the right of inspecting the account of any private in- 
 dividual. This ought to have been sufficient for the Secretary, as, 
 in the judgment of Congress, it was sufficient for the safe-keeping of 
 the public moneys. It was enough for safety, which Congress wanted, 
 ‘but not enough for interference and control of the Bank, which 
 Congress did not want. The contracts which the Secretary has 
 made with the deposite banks hold a very different language, as may 
 be seen by that with the Girard Bank. The Bank is bound, not 
 -only to make weekly returns of its entire condition, and to submit its 
 books and transactions to a critical examination by the Secretary, or 
 an agent duly authorized by him, but it is expressly provided that 
 
 gin? 
 
52 
 
 this examination may extend to all the books and-accounts, to the- 
 cash on hand, and to all the acts and concerns of the Bank, except: 
 the current accounts of individuals... Sir, I am happy to learn that 
 the stockholders of the Bank of Virginia have disavowed the act of” 
 their directors, in giving this power to the Secretary. It isa fearful 
 power, and, with the Treasury interpretation. of current accounts,, 
 (which is not the language of the charter, but’ accounts generally of 
 any private individual,) we may see the extent of control, which, 
 with the aid of the deposites, this clause of the contract will give. 
 It is an authority for universal supervision of all the operations of 
 the Bank, including its discounts, and for granting and withholding 
 accommodations at the pleasure of ‘the Secretary, I humbly submit 
 to all who feel any Ldncbied sympathies with honorable men, whether, 
 in the absence of the mandate of a judicial decision, in a case in 
 which such a decision has been avoided by the power that has a 
 right to invoke it, whether this is a fit occasion to justify the removal 
 of the deposites for violation of charter, because the directors have not 
 adopted or assisted such principles, interpretations, and aims as these? 
 
 The affair of the French bill I shall briefly notice, as I pass to the. 
 remaining topic of the Secretary’s answer.) I will take the history 
 of that bill, as ‘it is given by the honorable member from Tennessee— 
 that it was a bill bought by the Bank, refused payment by the French 
 Government, and, upon protest, the amount was paid by the agent, 
 for the honor of the Bank, to the foreign holder; that the money was 
 not used by the Treasury here; and that the Bank suffered nothing 
 but a few expenses,.which the Secretary is willing to refund. I will 
 agree that there is nothing but an old statute’of Maryland to give 
 damages on the protest, and that it does not include the sovereign 
 of the’ counuy. I cannot argue the case, because the honorable 
 meinber assumes, all the law and all the facts, and‘ the Secretary’s 
 letter gives us none. I must, therefore, agree to the case as he pre-- 
 sents it. But the thing which passes my comprehension is, that a 
 mere claim by the Bank—a claim without suit or other act—a. claim 
 which it is the privilege of the lowest and poorest to make upon the 
 highest and richest ‘in the land, without incurring either forfeiture or - 
 damage—that this should be gravely put forth as a brand of faithless- 
 ness upon the Bank, and a forfeiture of her right to the’ public depo-- 
 sites. Sir, there must be a strange perversion of mind in myself, or 
 in the honorable Secretary, in regard to this conclusion. It would 
 have been the occasion of infinite surprise to me, if the faculty of 
 being surprised had not been recently so much impaired by use, that 
 T am no longer conscious of its existence. fwd 
 
 The last reason of the Secretary for removing the deposites is, 
 that the Bank had employed her means with the view of obtaining 
 political power. ie PC 6 eee a 
 
 I beg permission of the House to say a word concerning the hum-- 
 ble individual who has the honor of addressing it. Had I been a 
 director of the Bank of the United States, during the years in which 
 it has been its misfortune not to have received the approbation of the 
 Secretary, I should have been associated with men who are an orna=- 
 
53 
 
 ment to the city in which they live, and an honor to their country— 
 men, who, from earliest youth to their present mature age, have 
 been beloved, respected, and honored by all around them, and who 
 are as much the standard of all the virtues, private, social, and pa- 
 triotic, as the coins of your mint are the standard of your currency, 
 and without any. of the base alloy which you, mingle in your coins 
 to make them fit for the use and abuse of the world. If I had been 
 called upon to'act»with such men as these, in regard to measures of 
 any kind; and had differed from them in my judgment, I should have 
 deemed it almost an act of treason against the authority of superior 
 intelligence, or of arrogance, exposing myself to. reprehension or 
 contempt. _I should have followed them fearlessly wherever (they 
 led, and with unshaken confidence that they could not lead me where 
 either wisdom or virtue would be exposed to reproach. But, sir, I 
 had not this honor.. I was not a director of the Bank in 1829, nor in 
 1830, nor in 1831; and, though chosen‘a director in 18382, I left 
 Philadelphia in January, to pass. my winter here, and met the Board 
 but once- after my return, to show respect to the Committee of In- 
 quiry appointed by,this House. Of the measures now to be adverted 
 to I was not informed, except as the public and this House have 
 been informed. I can speak of them, therefore, without the in- 
 fluence arising from either participation or privity. As to my pro- 
 fessional relations to the Bank, I am proud to belong to a profession 
 which has many distinguished members in both Houses of this Con- 
 gress—a profession which the confidence and affection of this people 
 have raised, in more than one instance, to the highest office in their 
 gift. I will not degrade this. honorable ‘profession! I will not 
 degrade my own rank in it, however humble, by condescending to 
 inquire what extent of compensation would induce an honorable 
 man to sell’his conscience, and his principles, as slaves, to his client! 
 
 Sir, the great accusation against the Bank is, that she has endeav- 
 ored to obtain political, power, and interfered with the election of the 
 President of the United States. Grant the design of the Bank, sir; 
 and what then? It has not succeeded. The letter of the Secretary 
 is an argument to show that it has not succeeded, and that the ques- 
 tion of re-charter is settled against the Bank by the voice of the Peo- 
 ple at the last election. The election of the President—the appoint- 
 ment of the Secretary—the elections for this House—were all com- 
 pleted before the deposites were removed; and these are held up to 
 show that the design imputed to the Bank has failed and fallen to the 
 ground, Then I ask, sir, what is the character of that act which has 
 removed the deposites?. Is it preventive, or is it vindictive? It is 
 vindictive, sir. -It is punishment directed against the Bank for an 
 imputed design that has wholly. failed in its execution, and the victim 
 of the infliction is not the Bank, but the country. If it is a matter 
 of grave belief that the purpose of the Bank was that which is im- 
 puted, and that the elections have given out the answer of the People 
 to it, what more triumphant refutation can be adduced of the reasons 
 that find either a ground of apprehension, or a motive of punish- 
 ment, in acts which have thus failed-of effect? If the premises be- 
 
54 
 
 long to the case, the true conclusion is, that the people are in no 
 danger from attempts to gain politieal power by the devices of the 
 Bank, and that she may go on to the conclusion of her charter, per- 
 forming her constitutional duties to the country, as she has always 
 done, with fidelity and success; leaving the question of renewing the 
 charter to settle the extent of her punishment. : 
 
 But, sir, I deny the charge. I say the design was not entertained, 
 and that not a particle of evidence has been produced to infer the 
 contrary.’ The Board have printed and published, and have assisted 
 in printing and publishing, “for the purpose of communicating to the 
 ‘** people information in regard to the nature and operations of the 
 ‘* Bank, and to remove unfounded prejudices, or repel injurious ca- 
 ‘“Jumnies on the institution intrusted to their care.” This is the 
 declared purposé of all they have done, and they stand upon the 
 sacred principle of self-defence in asserting their right to do it. That 
 there was nothing in the veto message to justify the circulation of 
 the review which the gentleman from Tennessee has noticed, is more 
 than I admit; and when the gentleman shall assert, upom his own 
 authority, that the Board have given currency to a scurrilous pam- 
 phlet against any one, he will find me ready either to deny the fact, 
 orto admit its impropriety. The constitution secures to every per- 
 son, natural and political, the right of printing and publishing, being 
 responsible for the abuse of it. It prohibits Congress from passing 
 any law abridging the freedom of the press. If the charter had in- 
 serted a provision to restrain the-Board of Directors from printing or 
 publishing, it would have been null.and void. An interpretation of 
 the charter to restrain it is equally so. They have the universal 
 right, subject to the constitutional corrective through the judicial tri+ 
 bunals of the country; but to condemn, and then to try them—to 
 punish, and then to hear—belongs not to the tribunals of .this earth, 
 nor to the constitution of this country. 
 
 Sir, the change of the deposites is an extraordinary mode of pre- 
 venting their application to the purposes of political power. Before 
 
 their removal, they were in a Bank not possessing political power,, 
 
 nor capable of using it. They are now wielded by those who possess 
 it, and who are more or less than men if they do not wish to keep it. 
 Then they were ‘in one Bank, under one direction; now they will 
 be in fifty. Then they were in a Bank which political power could 
 not lay open to its inquiries and “control; now they are in Banks that 
 have given a stipulation for submitting all their acts and concerns to 
 review, ‘Then, if these deposites sustained any action at all, it was 
 in the safest form for the People—action against power in office; 
 now its action is in support of that power, and tends to the augmen- 
 
 _ tation of what is already great enough, 
 
 I say, in conclusion upon this point, if these publications are 
 deemed by this House to have been unlawful, return the deposites till 
 the Bank has been heard. Go to the scire facias—give to the Bank 
 that trial by jury which is secured by its charter, and is the birthright 
 of all. Ask the unspotted and unsuspected tribunals of the country 
 for their instruction. Arraign the Bank upon the ground either of 
 
55 
 
 sedition, or grasping at political power. There was ample time for 
 it, and still is; and there is a great Eoocomebe for it, which I commend 
 to the consideration of this House. 
 
 Sir, in the worst days of one of the worst princes of England, (I 
 mean Charles the 2d,) the love of absolute rule induced him to 
 make an attempt upon the liberties of the city of London, whose 
 charter he desired to overthrow,. He complained that the Common 
 Council had taxed him with a delay of justice, and had possessed the 
 people with an ill opinion of him; and, by means of his ministers of 
 the law, and by infamously. packing the bench, having promoted one 
 judge, who was not satisfied on the point, and turned out another 
 who was not clear, he succeeded in obtaining a judgment, under which 
 the liberties of that ancient city were seized by the crown. But, 
 when the revolution expelled his successor, and the principles of 
 the British constitution came in with the House of Orange, an 
 early statute of William and Mary reversed the judgment’ as illegal 
 and arbitrary; and from that time it has been the opprobrum of the 
 bench, and the scorn of the profession. 
 
 The account of it which is given by Burnet, is thus:—‘‘ The 
 ** court, finding that the city of London could not be wrought on to 
 ‘ autretider their ch narter, resolved to have it condemned by. a judg- 
 ‘¢ ment in the King’s Bench. Jones had died in May; so now Pollexfen 
 ‘** and Treby were chiefly relied on by the city in this matter. Sawyer 
 *“* was the Attorney General, a dull, hot man, and forward to serve all 
 ** the designs of the court. He undertook,-by the advice of Sanders, 
 ** a learned, but very immoral man, to overthrow the charter. The 
 ** two points upon which they rested the cause were, that the Com- 
 ** mon Council had petitioned the King upon a prorogation of Par- 
 ‘ liament, that it might meet on the day to which it was prorogued, 
 “ and had taxed the prorogation as that which had occasioned a delay 
 ** of justice: this was construed to be the raising of sedition, and 
 ** the possessing the. people with an ill opinion of the King.”— 
 ‘*When the matter was brought near judgment, Sanders, who had 
 ** Jaid the whole thing, was made Chief Justice; Pemberton, who was 
 “not satisfied on the point, being removed to the Common Pleas, 
 ** on North’s advancement. Dolbin, a judge of the King’s Bench, was 
 ** found not to be clear; so he was turned out, and Wilkins came in 
 ‘his room. When sentence was to be given, Sanders was struck 
 ‘‘ with an apoplexy, upon which great reflections were made; but he 
 ‘* sent his.judgment in writing, and died a few days after.” As the 
 only precedent which the books’ present to us of forfeiture of char- 
 ter for sedition, or an interference with political power, it is not with- 
 out instruction. 
 
 Sir, these reasons of the Secretary being one and all. insufficient 
 to justify the removal of the deposites, the question of remedy is the 
 only one that remains. The state of the country requires the return; 
 but the question of return has nothing to do with the renewal of the 
 charter. If renewal were the object, 1 should say, do not put them 
 back, leave them as they are; make no provision for the future, and 
 see, at the end of two years, to what relief the people will fly. But, 
 
 . 
 
 . 
 
56 
 
 sir, let us save the country from this unnecessary suffering. Return 
 them, and the mists will clear off from the horizon, and the face of 
 nature smile as it did before. Return them, and make some provi- 
 sion for the day when the capital of this Bank is to be withdrawn from 
 the country, if it is to be withdrawn. Provide some control, some 
 regulation of your currency. The time is still sufficient for it, and 
 the country requires it. If, indeed, this Bank is not to be continued, 
 nor another to be supplied, nor a control devised to prevent the State 
 Banks from shooting out of their orbits, and bringing on confusion 
 and ruin, then, I confess that I see no benefit in putting off the evil 
 for two years longer. The storm must come, in which every one 
 must seize such plank of safety as he may out of the common wreck; 
 and it is not the part, either of true courage or of provident caution, 
 to wish it deferred for a little time longer. 
 
 Sir, I have done. I have now closed my remarks upon the ques- 
 tion of the public deposites, second in importance to none thet has 
 occurred in the course of the present administration, whether we re- 
 gard its relations to the public faith, to the currency, or to the equi- 
 poise of the différent departments of our Government. It is with 
 unfeigned satisfaction that I have raised.my feeble voice in behalf of 
 the amendment offered by the gentleman from South Carolina, whose 
 enlightened labors in this great cause, through a course of years, have 
 inseparably. connected his. name with those principles upon which the 
 security, the value, and the enjoyment of property depend; and it 
 will be sufficient reward for me if 1 shall be thought not to have im- 
 paired the effect of his’ efforts, nor to have retarded the progress 
 of those principles to their ultimate establishment. For myself, I 
 claim the advantage of saying, that, as I have not consciously uttered 
 a sentiment in the spirit of mere party-politics, so 1 trust that my 
 answers to the Secretary will not be encountered in that spirit. If 
 the great and permanent interests of the country should be ahove the 
 influence of party, so should be the discussions which involve them. 
 It ought not to be, it cannot be, that. such questions shall be decided 
 in this House as party questions.’ The question of the Bank is one 
 of public faith; that of the currency is a question of national pros- 
 perity; that of the constitutional control of the Treasury is a ques- 
 tion of national existence. It is impossible that such momentous 
 interests shall be tried and determined by those rules and -standards 
 which, in things indifferent in themselves, parties usually resort to. 
 They concern our country at home and abroad, now, and to all future 
 time; they concern the cause of freedom every where; and, if they 
 shall be settled under the influence ‘of any considerations but justice 
 and patriotism—sacred justice and enlightened patriotism—the de- 
 jected friends of freedom dispersed throughout the earth; the patriots 
 of this land, and the patriots of all lands, must finally surrender their 
 extinguished hopes to the bitter conviction that the spmrIT OF PARTY 
 Is a more deadly foe to free institutions than the sprRIT. oF DES- 
 POTISM. pee 
 
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