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 By Duncan Rose. 
 
 With Opinions by 
 
 LIEUT. GEN. STEPHEN D. LEE, C. S. A. 
 LIEUT. GEN. JOSEPH WHEELER, C. S. A. 
 BRIG. GEN. E. P. ALEXANDER, C. S. A. 
 MAJ. GEN. E. M. LAW, C. S. A. 
 MAJ. GEN. DON CARLOS BUELL, U. S. A. 
 MAJ. GEN. O. O. HOWARD, U. S. A. AND 
 MAJ. GEN. JACOB D. COX, U. S. A. 
 
 Republished at Courtesy of the Century Magazine. 
 
 The @ape Fear fress, 
 
 Fayetteville N. C 
 
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 By Duncan Rose, 
 
 With Opinions by 
 
 LIEUT. GEN. STEPHEN D. LEE, C. S. A 
 LIEUT. GEN. JOSEPFJ WHEELER, C. S. A 
 BRIG. GEN. E. P. ALEXANDER, C. S. A. 
 MAJ. GEN. E. M. LAW, C. S. A. 
 MAJ. GEN. DON CARLOS BUELL, U. S. A. 
 MAJ. GEN. 0. 0. HOWARD, U. S. A. AND 
 MAJ. GEN. JACOB D. COX, U. S. A. 
 
 
 Re-published by Courtesy of the Century Magazine;. 
 Fayetteville N. C. 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2013 
 
 http://archive.org/details/whyconfederacyfaOOrose 
 
lagazine, Nov. 1896. 
 
 
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 Q^ ^ET — THE POLICY 
 
 ' THE CAVALRY. 
 
 r hy did the seceding states 
 161-65?" the chances are 
 is likely that he will say 
 >uld win; that America 
 • one great nation; that 
 r natural boundaries, but 
 ffort to divide it, not be- 
 ot make such an answer 
 specially if he is a South- 
 by the superior numbers 
 ■st of these answers is not 
 ided to happen. If the 
 :ort to separate from the 
 selves, it could have been 
 I to be so. As to the one- 
 are also a part of this one 
 separated from us by im- 
 
 
 vjv 
 
 
 ~ P aches that in a war for in- 
 not count. For instance, 
 nded by hostile kingdoms 
 ce upward of six hundred 
 pet it has, and has always 
 le principality of Montene- 
 he fall of Constantinople, 
 
 The Dutch republic, Scot- 
 
 land under Wallace and Bruce, Prussia under Frederick II in the 
 Seven Years' War, and America in the Revolution, all succeeded 
 with greater odds of numbers against them than were opposed to 
 the seceding States. And to day, Cuba, with only a million and a 
 half of populatioh seems to be successfully fighting Spain with her 
 
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 buu mo\j 
 
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 3 dOd 03Sfl 3S AVI1 MOH3B 3DVda 3HJ.5 
 
f From the Century Magazine, Nov. 1896. 
 
 WHY THE CONFEDERACY FAILED. 
 
 THE EXCESSIVE ISSUE OF PAPER MONET — THE POLICY CF 
 DISEER8ION — THE NEGLECT OF THE CA.VALRY. 
 
 H^ a person be a9ked the question "Why did the seceding states 
 fail to win independence in the war of 1861- Go?" the chances are 
 that he will make one of two answers. It is likely that he will say 
 that it was never intended that they should win; that America 
 was designed by Almighty Providence tor one great nation; that 
 it is not divided by interior seas and other natural boundaries, but 
 is essentially one country; and that any tffort to divide it, not be- 
 ing a good cause, must fail. If he does not make such an answer 
 as this, it is probable that he will say — especially if he is a South* 
 erner — that the South was overpowered by the superior numbers 
 and resources of the North. Now, the first of these answers is not 
 satisfying. Whatever happens is intended to happen. If the 
 Southern States had succeded in their effort to separate from the 
 North and set up a government for themselves, it could have been 
 said with equal truth that it was intended to be so. As to the one- 
 ness of the country, Canada and MexiGo are also a part of this one 
 country; for hundreds of miles they are separated from us by im- 
 aginary lines only. 
 
 As to the other answer, all history teaches that in a war for in- 
 dependence superiority in numbers does not count. For instance, 
 the little republic of Switzerland, surrounded by hostile kingdoms 
 and empires in arms, won its independence upward of six hundred 
 years ago, and it is independent to day, yet it has, and has always 
 had, only an army of militia. The little principality of Montene- 
 gro has been fighting the Turks since the fall of Constantinople, 
 even before the discovery of America. The Dutch republic, Scot- 
 land under Wallace and Bruce, Prussia under Frederick II in the 
 Seven Years' War, and America in the Revolution, all succeeded 
 with greater odds of numbers against them than were opposed to 
 the seceding States. And to day, Cuba, with only a million and a 
 half of populatioh seems to be successfully fighting Spain with her 
 
Why Ths BonfQ&micy Failed, 
 
 nearly twenty millions. No, in a war for independence mere num- 
 bers do not count, and it has not often happened in the history of 
 the world that a people who have fought wiih such desperate valor 
 as the Confederates displayed have failed to win independence. 
 
 As to material resources, there is no region under the sun more 
 blessed in natural resources for waging war than the territory of 
 the eleven seceding States. Within their own borders was to be 
 found everything necessary for arming, equipping, feeding and 
 clothing their armies. Ihe history of the industrial development. 
 of the South during the war has never yet been written. It is even 
 more wonderful than that of its armies in the field, and is the most 
 striking proof of that versatility and ingenuity which are peculiar 
 to the American people. Before the war it was purely an agricul- 
 tural people; there were no shipyards, dockyards, factories, or ma> 
 chine-shops, to speak of. Within a few months after hostilities be- 
 gan these farmers and planters were building ironclads, marine 
 boilers and engines, torpedoes and torpedo-boats. When Sumter 
 was fired upon there was not a powder factory in all the land; soon 
 almost every village had its piles of refuse for making saltpeter, and 
 before the war ended the factories in Georgia and North Carolina 
 could have supplied all the armies iu the field with gunpowder. 
 Cotton factories had also been built, and were all at work making 
 cloth for the soldiers. And there was plenty of food in the South, 
 though the soldiers failed to get their share of it, for corn had taken 
 the place of cotton in the fields, and there was abundance of cattle 
 and hogs. In the last year of the war Sherman's army marched 
 through the South, living upcn the fat of the land, while Lee's 
 men were starving in the trenches before Petersburg. No; there 
 was no lack of men and warlike resources in the South; tLe 
 causes of failure must be looked for elsewhere. 
 
 A few have intimated that the cause of failure was that the 
 hearts of the Southern people were not really in the war, and there- 
 fore they did not persevere and support the government as other- 
 wise they would have done. There was never a greater slander 
 cast upon a brave people. It was the people's war. The party 
 tor the Union disappeared when the conflict began. The people 
 proved that their hearts were in the struggle by their sacrifices and 
 sufferings; and if further proof were necessary their conduct to- 
 ward the survivors of the Confederate army and the dead of the 
 Lost Cause would be sufficient. 
 
 Then, if the South had the men and the warlike resources, and 
 they were in earnest, how came it to pass that, unlike other brave 
 peoples, they failed to win independence? How came their efforts 
 to be so misdirected? 
 
 Three principal causes contributed to the fall of the Confederacy: 
 
Whtj The Gtmfz&et&cy Failed. 
 
 1. THE EXCESSIVE ISSUE OF PAPER MONET. 
 
 JJ, THE POLICY OF DISPERSION. 
 
 3. THE NEGLECT OF THE CAVALRY. 
 
 1. The Confederate government was smothered and strangled 
 to death with its own irredeemable paper money. 
 
 It has been proved beyond shadow of doubt and cavil that war 
 cannot be waged with paper money. Our forefathers proved it in 
 the war of the Revolution, and had not the French and Dutch come 
 to their rescue with real money, the American government, under 
 its flood of continental bills, would have been strangled like the 
 Confederacy, and would likewise have "died aborning." However 
 well or ill paper bills may answer for money in time of peace, in 
 time of war they will not do. The "sinews of wai" mean specie 
 and nothing but specie, And to get specie, and those things which 
 specie alone will buy, there mu3t be taxe3, taxes, and taxes. A 
 people who are unwilling to be taxed have no business to engage in 
 war. The Southern people knew that war meant taxes, and they 
 were willing to be taxed to carry on the war. The sacrifices they 
 made, the eagerness with which they loaned their money to the 
 government, bought its bonds, and took its paper money showed 
 that they were willing to be taxed. 
 
 But the Southern people were not fighting for independence only. 
 They were contending as well for a certain theory of government. 
 In ordar to be consistent with this theory — as their leaders con- 
 ceived it — it was necessary, in framing a constitution, to render it 
 unlawful for the government to tax the lands and goods of the peo- 
 ple, except under conditions which made all taxation of property by 
 the general government impossible. According to this theory, as 
 they interpreted it, the government might lawfully order a man to 
 shoulder his gun and march to the front to be shot at with ritle and 
 cannon, but could not levy a tax upon his property to feed and 
 clothe him while fighting for his country ! 
 
 So, taxation of property being forbidden by fundamental law, and 
 tariff or customs taxation of no avail because of blockaded ports, 
 there was really nothing that the Confederate government could do 
 to raise money except issue bonds and paper bills. Of these, before 
 the war ended, between one and two thou -and million of dollars — 
 nominal value — were emitted, the paper bills amounting to nearly 
 one billion, or over one half of the whole. Nor does this include the 
 millions of paper bills issued by state authority and by banks, of 
 which it would be hard to give even an approximate estimate. 
 During the same time — to the end of 18 64 — there was raised by 
 taxation only the sum of forty-eight millions of dollars,, and that in 
 paper money. It too might just as well have been printed, for then 
 the cost of collection would haze been saved. What more need be 
 
8, 
 
 Wuj The Gcxxifed&xncy Failed. 
 
 • 
 
 faid to show why the Confederacy failed? 
 
 Ah, those beautiful paper bills, so nice and clean and pretty, bat 
 every one as deadly a foe to the South as an armed enemy ! And 
 how the people ran to get them ! And how those printing-presses 
 rumbled — all a-printing paper money ! They shook the earth, and 
 almost drowned the noise of the cannon wheels rolling to the front. 
 A Southerner should hate tin sight of one of those paper bills. 
 Every one of them represents blood fruitlessly spilled, treasure 
 wastsd, and hopes blasted. 
 
 But in the beginning of the struggle no one seemed to suspect an 
 enemy in that beautiful mouey. The government, at least, acted 
 upon the theory that all it bad to do to raise money was to print it. 
 They did not seem to realize that, being the largest purchaser in the 
 market, it was necessary for the government to keep down prices as 
 much as possible; that every issue of bills must inevitably raise pri- 
 ces, and render a new issue necessary; and that every rise in prices 
 must be followed by a new issue, until the bubble must collapse of 
 its own expansion and redundancy. 
 
 At last the lesson was learned that a printing-press cannot take 
 the place of a tax-collector in providing the sinews of war, but it 
 was then too late; the giant was already prostrate and helpless. 
 When it had come to pass that the armies of the Confederacy were 
 starving and freezing in camps and trenches, the government having 
 not the means to buy them food and clothing; when it had come to 
 pass that the War Department was compelled to pay a thousand of 
 those paper dollars for a pair cf army boots; when it bad come to 
 pass that a raonths pay of soldier would not buy him a single ration 
 of bread and meat, the lesson was then learned; but it was too late. 
 In the last gasp of the struggle the government attempted to aban- 
 don and throw oS its make-believe money; but it was already buri- 
 ed, smothering and strangling under an avalanche, a mountain of 
 paper dollars. 
 
 2. THE POLICY OF DISPERSION. 
 
 The frontiers ol the Conftderacy extended over many thousands 
 of miles. The policy which the government adopted in the begin- 
 ning of the war and upheld to the end was that every foot of that 
 frontier must be defended. To this end, the whole Confederacy 
 wa3 divided into military districts, and to each general there was 
 given "a definite geographical command", as the President of the 
 Confederacy himself stated it. So the defense of the Confederacy 
 was made a question of geography. Each general of a district 
 was expected to drive back all enemies crossing his frontier, without 
 much regard to what was going on in the other districts. 
 
 The better to carry out this idea, the capital was removed from 
 Montgomery in the interior to Richmond, near the frontier "where 
 
Why The ^onfefleraetj Failed. 
 
 it was expected that most of the fighting would take place". And 
 the defense of the shallow sounds of North Carolina in the rear of 
 Richmond was deemed of more importance than that of the passes 
 of the Appalachians. 
 
 A policy more fatal to success could not have been adopted. 
 The armies of the Confederacy were wrecked and wasted in the vain 
 effort to defend its capital and the extended, indefensible frontier. 
 Every great pitched battle of the war, unless Chicamauga be an ex- 
 ception, was fought within a day's march of the frontier, or of nav- 
 igable water, which was in effect the frontier, because the Federals 
 with their gunboats held all the navigable waters. Wherever the 
 Federals chose to throw down the gauntlet of battle, the Confede- 
 rates immediately picked it up. The fighting was glorious, magnif- 
 icent there has never been any better fighting in all the history of 
 the world. But the Federals were always well fed and clothed, 
 and never lacked for ammunition and army supplies, becasue the 
 Confederates were willing to do the fighting within gunshot of the 
 Federal gunboats and transports. 
 
 And so the great advantage which the Confederates might have 
 had in the contest — that of ''fighting from a center" — was delibe- 
 rately thrown away. It never seemed to occur to those in author- 
 ity that the battles for the Confederacy should be fought, not upon 
 the tidal waters of Virginia, or the banks of the Mississippi — "that 
 great inland sea" — and its navigable tributaries, but with concen- 
 trated armies upon the flanks of the Appalachians. 
 
 When Bragg was sent through Cumberland Gap to occupy 
 eastern Kentucky, the purpose was not to change the seat of the 
 war, but to make a "diversion", and to "relieve the pressure on the 
 Mississippi". But what could poor Bragg do, invading the rich 
 and powerful North with his little army of thirty thousand men? 
 And yet he has been blamed because he did not capture Cincinnati. 
 He did very well, considering bis opportunities. And even at the 
 very time while Bragg was making his "diversion" in Kentucky, 
 twice as many men as he had in all his army were scattered in 
 garrisons along the Gulf coast, absolutely doing nothing. But the 
 frontiers must be defended, and the capital too, if it took the last 
 drop of Confederate blood ! — Such was the policy of dispersion. 
 
 A lesson might have been learned from the war of the Revolu- 
 tion; for in that war the capital of the country was changed no 
 fewer than nine limes, and the British armies marched from one end 
 of the thirteen colonies to the other; yet America was not conquered: 
 or from that greatest defensive war of ancient or modern times, 
 wherein Frederick II of Prussia maintained the independence of his 
 country against combined contiaental Europe. With the Austrian 
 armies in his front, the French on his flanks, and the Russians and 
 
10 
 
 Why The Confederacy Failed. 
 
 Swedes pillaging his capital in bis rear, not a battalion of bis army 
 would he risk merely to hold territory. For six of these seven 
 bloody years he did not even see bis capital. '"Let the frontiers 
 and the capital take care of themselves; the heart of Prussia is her 
 array ! " And so, attacking and retreating, marching and counter- 
 marching, delivering terrible blows whenever he could strike to ad- 
 vantage, always keeping his men together and preventing his ene- 
 mies from concentrating, he fought on, furionsly, desperately, un- 
 til the fortune of war changed, and the last armed foe was driven 
 from his country. For himself he won the well- deserved title of 
 "the Great", Prussia be saved from the fate of Poland, and for all 
 succeeding ages he showed bow a defensive war against superior 
 numbers ought to be fought. — Such were ihe results of the policy 
 of concentration- 
 It would have been better for tbe Confederscy if the government 
 had thought that the "heart of the Confederacy was her army", for 
 territory may be abandoned and yet re-occupied, and a city may 
 fall and yet be re-captured, but an array once lost is gone forever, 
 a soldier once dead cannot be brought back to life. 
 
 According to the policy of dispersion, however, it was not the ar- 
 my that was to be protected, but the territory and capital of the 
 Confederacy. And so fifteen thousand men were lost at l^ort Don- 
 elson in the effort to defend the frontier of Tennessee; thirty-two 
 thousand men were lost at Vicksburg in the effort to defend the 
 frontier tf Mississippi; and thousands of brave men, untold and un- 
 numbered, were lost in those terrible battles to defend Richmond, 
 which was of no more value to tbe Confederacy tban Norfolk, or 
 any other city upon tide-water. If every city upon the seaboard 
 had been evacuated at the beginning of the war, the Confederates 
 would have been tbe stronger and their enemies the weaker just to 
 the extent of tbe garrisons which were necessary to hold them. In 
 the war of the Revolution tbe British, at one time or another, occu- 
 pied e7ery Anerican seaport from Maine to tbe Florida line; the 
 only effect of it was to relieve the Americans of the trouble and ex- 
 pense of defending them. 
 
 From first to last tbe armies of tbe Confederacy were never con- 
 centrated. Of all the six hundred thousand men in arms there were 
 never got together upon a single battlefield more than seventy thou- 
 sand available men. -The scattered armies wasted away, and were 
 destroyed and captured, piecemeal, while trying to defend tbe fron- 
 tiers, so that when Sherman was ready to march into the interior 
 through Georgia and the Carolinas, there was no army to oppose 
 him, and there were no frontiers to defend- The cause of the Con- 
 federacy was already lost. The blocd of its best and bravest bad been 
 spilled in vain. — Such were the results of the policy of dispersion. 
 
11 
 Wh# The Gotife&tt&cy Failed* 
 
 3. THE NEGLECT OF THE CAVALRY. 
 
 it is a fact worthy of remembrance that all the greatest generals of 
 ancient and modern times have put their greatest faith in their cav- 
 alry. It was his 6uperb cavalry, and not the Macedonian phalanx, 
 with which Alexander charged the Persian center at Arbela, and 
 won the crown of Asia. It was Hannibal's Numidian horse that 
 slaughtered those eighty thousand Romans at Cannae, and carried 
 the war to the very gates of Rome. It was Napoleon's powerful 
 cavalry reserve at Austerlitz that enabled him to finish off that 
 great victory with the capture of forty-three thousand Russian and 
 Austrian prisoners, and a hundred pieces of artillery. And it is un- 
 doubtedly true, as that great captain himself stated it to be, that 
 his success at Dresden did not avail to save his throne because the 
 horses with which he had conquered Europe had perished in the 
 the snows of the Russian steppes. 
 
 The Prussians are the greatest soldiers of modern times, and they 
 have never made the mistake of underrating cavalry. It was Blu- 
 cher's terrible cavalry which changed the drawn battle of Waterloo 
 into that dreadful rout, and which pursued the dying French all 
 that awful night after Waterloo, until, when the next day broke, 
 there was not an organized body remaining of those with whom 
 Napoleon marched out to fight. And in her last war it was the 
 Prussian uhlans that made German victories so effective, and made 
 possible Sedan with its two hundred thousand prisoners. 
 
 And so it it has come to be considered axiomatic, that however 
 authorities may differ as to the relative value of the different arms 
 of the service in battle, no great decisive and conclusive victory 
 can be won without sufficient cavalry to press the pursuit; that the 
 fruits of victory cannot be gathered, the harvest cannot be reaped 
 without sufficient fresh men on horseback to pursue the retreating 
 enemy — and this for the simple reason that pursuing infantry can- 
 not overtake a retreating enemy. 
 
 It might be expected that as the Southerners were natural born 
 horsemen, "eavaliers from the cradle", the mounted arm of the ser- 
 vice would have been the strongest and the most esteemed and cher- 
 ished; but, strange as it seems, the contrary, the very contradicto- 
 ry was true. From the beginning the cavalry was relatively the 
 weakest, was underrated and neglected, and even ridiculed and de- 
 rided. In jocularity rewards were offered for "a dead man with 
 spurs on*' — such a poor opinion had they of a soldier on horseback ! 
 
 At the first great battle of the war, on the plateau of Manassas, 
 the mounted men did not even fight as an organized body, but were 
 divided, detailed, and attached two companies to each brigade, in 
 imitation, perhaps, of the old Roman legion, a method of arranging 
 mounted men in battle which was abandoned before the Christian 
 
12 
 
 Why The Confederacy Failed, 
 
 era. And yet Johnston has been blamed because he did cot capture 
 McDowell's array and the city of Washington. And at all times 
 after that the little band of horsemen never seemed to be considered 
 a constituent part of the fighting army. Nearly always they were 
 separated from it on detached duty. At Gettysburg the Confederate 
 cavalry was miles away when the fight began. It was net even & 
 factor in the great fight until the last day. If Lee had won, and 
 bad captured the heights of Gettysburg, it could not have been in 
 effect more than a drawn battle, because he had not sufficient caval- 
 ry with which to press the pursuit. 
 
 And so, from the begining to the end, either because the govern- 
 ment could not learn the value of mounted troop?, or was incapa? 
 ble of changing a policy once adopted, or for some inexplicable rea- 
 son, the cavalry was underrated and neglected. The excuse cannot 
 be offered that there were not sufficient horses in the Confederacy. 
 A glance at the census of 1860 will show one that there were 
 horses enough in Texas, Georgia, and North Carolina to have 
 mounted all the Confederate armies iu the field, leaving enough to 
 make the crops. And surely if the government may lawfully "con- 
 script" a man into the army, it may also conscript bis horse, or 
 his neighbor's horse. Almost at the very time when the General 
 of the army of Tennessee was begging for horses to draw his can- 
 non, a Federal army was capturing nearly two thousand horses 
 from the farmers in the valley of Virginia. 
 
 Nor can the excuse be made that "the country in which the ar- 
 mies generally operated was so densely wooded, broken, and diffi- 
 cult that cavalry could not be used to advantage" — by "cavalry" 
 meaning not Only those who usually fought on horseback, cavalry 
 properly speaking, in the European sense, but all mounted troops, 
 as the Americans understand it. This was not true even in the 
 War of the Revolution, when there were no roads at all, and noth- 
 ing but grass to feed the horses. The little army with which 
 Greene retreated so skilfully before Cornwallis along the Piedmont 
 was nearly all cavalry, and Shelby's "back mountain men", some of 
 them even from Tennessee, beyond the Alleghanies, with which be 
 rode over the Blue Ridge to fall upon Ferguson at King's Moun- 
 tain, were all mounted men, and Ferguson's army was captured to 
 the last man. 
 
 The splendid work which Forrest did in the West was sufficient 
 to show what might have been done had the cavalry branch of the 
 Confederate service been organized. But neither Forrest nor his 
 services were valued at their true worth. For a time he was even 
 removed from bis command, and at all times he was left to shift for 
 himself to provide horses, arms, and equipments for his men. 
 
 If the country was too difficult for cavalry operations, how came it 
 
13 
 
 Why The Confederacy Failed* 
 
 that the very men whom Jackson, in 18G2, led victorious and tri- 
 umphant up and down the valley of the Shenandoah — how came it 
 that these same men, in 186 4, when once defeated, were to be seen 
 throwing away their guns and haversacks, and fleeing for their lives 
 to the woods and the mountain-? It was not all Early's fault. It 
 was "Sheridan's terrible cavalry" tbat did it, as Early said. For 
 the Federal government bad at la«t learned what could be done with 
 men on horseback. And so Sheridan was sent to join Grant, and 
 Appomattox speedily followed. 
 
 Who, then, can doubt tbat if Lee had been provided with a re- 
 serve of twenty thousand fresh cavalry, under such a leader as For- 
 rest, at Gaines's Mill, or the second Manassas, or Chancellorsville, 
 the Army of the Potomac would not have survived to fight another 
 battk? For, unless Sheridan be exceptad, there was no cavalry 
 general on either side in the war that could equal Forrest in the 
 pursuit of a defeated army. Lord Wolseley has said, in bis sketch 
 of Forrest, that ''Forrest's sixty mile pursuit of Sturgis after their 
 battle was a most remarkable achievement, and well worth attention 
 by military students." 
 
 But no; it was not to be. Perhaps, as has been said, it was not 
 "intended" to be. A fatality seemed to attend the cause. At these 
 battles, yes, and at Shiloh, at Chicamauga, at Malvern Hill, and at 
 Fredericksburg, which are claimed aa great victories for the Confed- 
 eracy, what was tin gain? A Federal army destroyed or captured? 
 No. A hundred pieces of artillery, with ammunition and equip- 
 ments taken? No. Then what? The field of battle I "The Con- 
 federates fought gloriously, and won the field of battle." And that 
 was all they ever won with all their fighting. Always on the next 
 day, or within a few days afterward, the Federal army which they 
 had defeated so "gloriously" was to be found drawn up in line of 
 battle, and all the fighting had to be done over again. And so it 
 was even to the end. The Confederates won many bloody fields of 
 battle thickly strewn with the bodies or their own dead and wound- 
 ed, as well as with those of their enemies, but from first to last they 
 never gained a great victory, and the reason was because they were 
 weak in cavalry. 
 
 But it is asked, "What doth it profit u3 to inquire into this? 
 Anybody can criticize. Hindsights are better than foresights. 'Tis 
 not so easy to do as to know what had been good to do. Wherefore, 
 then, seek to know why the Confederacy failed ?" 
 
 All of which is very true. The study of the past would be profit- 
 less if it were indulged in only for the pleasure of finding fault. But 
 we must keep in mind that it is history only that can furnish us a 
 guide to the future, and tbat it i3 only by the study of the mistakes 
 and successes of others who have gone before us that we can know 
 
14 
 
 Wh^ The @onfe4etactj Failed, 
 
 how we should act under like circumstances. 
 
 Is not, then, the first cause of the failure of the Confederacy 
 brought immediately home to us when we remember that the pro- 
 vision of the Confederate constitution which made it impossible for 
 that government to raise money by taxation of property was copied 
 word for word from the constitution of the United States, under 
 which we are living to day? In case of a war with a great, first- 
 class naval power the United States would be just as helpless to 
 raise money necessary to wage such a war, except by issuing bonds 
 and paper bills, as was the Confederacy when its ports were block- 
 aded from Norfolk to Galveston. For it is very certain that the 
 sinews of war cannot be raised by a tax upon whiskey, tobacco, and 
 oleomargarine. It is property that must bear the brunt of a great 
 war; and that is the first lesson that we may learn from the failure 
 of the Confederacy. 
 
 No doubt the United States are strong enough to defend them- 
 selves, even though our generals should adopt a "policy of disper- 
 sion", but surely we can learn another lesson from the failure of 
 the Confederacy. 
 
 The Confederate leaders were nearly all educated at West Point. 
 Was it not at West Point that they learned to depreciate the cav- 
 alry? Is it not the tradition, the fashion today, at West Point to 
 underrate the cavalry ? Are not the "honor men", the distinguish- 
 ed men of the classes, assigned to the engineers and the artillery, 
 while the dullards go to the cavalry ? 
 
 Discussing the possibilities of a war with England, and the 
 strength of the United States militia or national guard, some of our 
 newspapers lately boasted that an army of a hundred thousand men 
 could be thrown into Canada within a tew weeks. If true, how 
 many of them would be mounted on horseback ? This a very per- 
 tinent inquiry, for it requires from three to six months' training to 
 make a cavalryman, and some of the states which furnish large 
 contingents to the national guard have not a single troop of horse. 
 If there is any lesson that the failure of the Confederacy can teach 
 us, it is this: that an invasion of Canada — and I do not mean that 
 such a thing Is, in the least degree, probable or desirable — made 
 without sufficient cavalry would be as barren of permanent results 
 as it would be if made with an army of crosebowmen. 
 
 Duncan Rose. 
 
15 
 
 Why The $orjfe4eraeij Failed, 
 
 From the Century Magazine, Nov. 1896. 
 
 Editorial Comment. 
 CHEAP MONEY IN TWO WARS- 
 
 In the very striking paper which we publish in this number of 
 The Century on "Why the Confederacy Failed" there is a les- 
 son in national finance which is none the lfss impressive because it 
 is so familiar. It is the same lesson that bas been taught at fre- 
 quent intervals during the past four hundred years by every nation 
 that has bad the short-sightedness to tamper with its standard of 
 value. "The Confederate government", says the waiter, "was 
 smothered and strangled to death with its owu irredeemable paper 
 money." He does not say that this was the sole cause of the failure 
 of the Southern rebellion, but he places it among the three causes 
 which he enumerates. His argument in support of his views speaks 
 for itself. There may be a difference of opinion on his second and 
 third causes, but on his first there is likely to be none among men 
 whose opinion is best worth having. No cause, however deserving, 
 could have succeeded on such a financial basis as that on which the 
 war of secession was conducted. The war of the revolution, as Mr. 
 Rose points out, would have failed had not the French and Dutch 
 come to the rescue of Washington and his army with real money. 
 
 On this point Washington's own words are conclusive. The cri- 
 sis came in the spring of 1781, the seventh year of the war. The 
 continental money had then become so worthless as to make useless 
 further employment of it as a means of defraying the expenses of 
 tbe war. John Laurens, one of Washington's aides-de-camp, was 
 selected to go to Paris, to press upon the French government the 
 needs of the army, and raise a new loan. Washington wrote to him 
 on the eve of his departure: "Be assured, my dear Laurens, day 
 does not follow night more certainly than it brings with it some 
 additional proof of the impracticability of carrying on the war with- 
 out the aids you are directed to solicit In a word, we are at the 
 
 end of our tether, and now or never our deliverance must come." 
 About this time Hamilton wrote to General Greene that public cred- 
 it was so totally lost that nobody would furnish aid even in the face 
 of impending ruin. To the appeals of Laurens France responded 
 with a loan of four millions of livres; the French King granted 
 
16 
 
 Why The ®tmfz&zmcy Failed, 
 
 six millions more as a free gift, and also guaranteed in Holland a 
 loan of ten millions more, making in all twenty million livres, or 
 about five million dollars. This real money put such new life into 
 the American army that Cornwallis was forced to surrender a few 
 months later, and independence was won. 
 
 It is the opinion of most financial authorities that the greenbacks, 
 instead of bt-ing a help to the North during the war of the rebellion, 
 were a hindrance, and that we won in spite of them rather than be- 
 cause of tnem. Certain it is that they added enormously to the cost 
 of the war. Mr. Henry C. Adams, in his work on "Public Debts", 
 shows that the war cost us over $800,000,000 more than it 
 would had we n.ot issued greenbacks and thus gone of? the gold 
 standard. If the government had relied on increased taxation for 
 funds to prosecute the war, it would have remained on the gold ba- 
 sis, and would have bought all its supplies on the same basis. At 
 the same time it would have maintained its credit unimpaired, 
 and would have been able to borrow all the additional money it 
 needed, at much better rates than it actually paid. As it was it 
 paid an average premium of fifty per cent on all its purchases for 
 three years and a halt. r lhe total expenditure of the four years of 
 the war was over three billion, three hundred and fifty million dol- 
 lars, of which Mr. Adams estimates that two and one half billion 
 dollars consisted of purchases in the open market, where the green- 
 back dollar bought only sixty- six cents worth of goods. In other 
 words, we spent two and a half billion dollars, and got in return on- 
 ly one billion, six hundred and thirty million dollars worth of pro- 
 perty. The difference, eight hundred and seventy million dollars, 
 was the unnecessary cost to the taxpayers which the greenback 
 entailed 
 
17 
 
 Wh# The BtxnfQ&Mixcy Failed. 
 
 From the Century Magazine, Feb. 1897. 
 
 OPINIONS OF GENERALS S. D. LEE, JOS. WHEELER, 
 
 E. P. ALEXANDER, E. M. LAW, DON CARLOS BUELL, 
 
 O. 0. HOWARD, AND JACOB. D. COX. 
 
 The communications which follow from distinguished general 
 officers who were engaged in the War of Secession have been 
 received in reply to our request for frank comment upon the 
 points raised in the article in The Century for November, en- 
 titled "Why the Confederacy Failed", written by Mr. 
 Duncan Rose, — Editor Century. 
 
 FROM 8TEPHEN D. LEE, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL, C. S. A. 
 
 I am asked to give my frank opinion of the correctness of Mr. 
 Rose's article. The writer gives three main causes ot failure: 
 "1. The excessive issue of paper money, 2. the policy of dispersion, 
 3. the neglect of the cavalry", and remarks "The 'sinews of war' 
 mean specie, and nothing but specie". 
 
 History tells us that nearly all great wars have been waged on 
 currency that greatly depreciated in value, aud yet with peace and 
 success came full restoration of credit. This has been the case with 
 England, France, Germany, and Russia. Finances always go 
 wrong in failures. la our Revolution success could not even rescue 
 the worthless money of our fathers from repudiation and oblivion. 
 Alexander H. Stevens says that in the great war between the States 
 "both sides relied for the means of support upon issues of paper 
 money and upon loans secured by bonds." Nearly all currency is- 
 sued by countries in great wars is to a certain extent "fiat money" 
 and depends for its redemption mainly upon the success of the issu- 
 ing country. Federal greenbacks had only the faith of the govern- 
 ment behind them, while the bills and bonds of the Confederacy 
 had enormous quantities of cotton and tobacco, received as tithes 
 and purchased with bonds, that were assets against its liabilities. 
 Had the Confederacy succeeded, its ability to meet its obligations 
 would have been recognized by financiers. 
 
 Mr. Rose says that the Confederacy provided little for taxation, 
 and during the war "there was raised by taxation only the sum of 
 $48,000,000, and that all paper money." Certainly the people of 
 the Confederacy were taxed when they gave their specie [all they 
 
18 
 
 Wh# The BbnfG&et&cy Failed. 
 
 bad] for bonds, and by law one tentb of all their crops and of all 
 the proceeds of their labor in every industry. This latter was better 
 than money. It was a tithe, which, although money fluctuated, 
 did not fluctuate, but furnished food, cotton, tobacco, clothing, 
 and supplies generally in kind, and was pretty abundant even to the 
 close of the war in the limited area not occupied by hostile armies. 
 The trouble was that the few lines of railroad were in a worn-out 
 condition, and were overtaxed by transportation. I do not think 
 the statement as to the first main cause is sustained. 
 
 I shall treat the second and third main causes together. Strateg- 
 ically, the Confederacy was virtually exposed to combined land and 
 naval attack. *No country could have been more fully exposed tc 
 perfectly crushing blows, both on its land and water sides." This 
 exposure was caused by the Mississippi River cutting it in twain, 
 thus enabling the great fleets of Karragut from the ocean, and Foote 
 from the North, to give valuable aid to Grant and Sherman, virtu- 
 ally cutting of? Texas, Arkansas, and most of Louisiana, even be- 
 fore the fall of Vicksburg, July 4, 1868; and by the Cumberland 
 and Tennessee rivers, each reaching from the Ohio River with a 
 deep southward bend into the very heart of the country, enabling 
 the fleets to transport Grant's army to Fort Henry, and be his 
 flank at Donelson. The control of these rivers, and others frcm 
 Atlantic and Gulf coasts, was of vital moment, and neither men nor 
 means should have been spared to maintain control of these water 
 highways. Certainly to do so was not dispersion. 
 
 The Confederacy had no navy worth mentioning, and when it 
 lost control of these rivers it lost Texas, Arkansas, most of Louisi- 
 ana, and most of Tennessee, for troops from the trans-Mississippi 
 refused to cross the river after 1862; nor had it vessels to protect 
 the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, or to prevent blockade. The Confed- 
 eracy for the last two years, and on the territory where the issue 
 was decided, was composed of the States of Virginia, North Carolina, 
 South Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi — seven 
 States — and was a narrow strip from the Potomac to the Mississip- 
 pi River, open to combined land and naval attack along its entire 
 fronts — north, south, east, and west. There were really only two 
 main armies — Lee's in Virginia, and Johnston's in Georgia. The 
 Mississippi army had been merged in the Army of Tennessee. This 
 does not appear to be dispersion. 
 
 Dispersion, mainly in cavalry, was a political necessity. The 
 battle of States' rights and local self-government was being fought. 
 The States that furnished troops and supplies demanded protection 
 from invasion, desolation, and pillage; and this was reasonable when 
 we consider the character of the war as shown by Sherman's raid 
 in Mississippi and through Georgia, and Sheridan's campaign in 
 
19 
 
 Wh# Th& Ganfe&ex&cy Failed, 
 
 the ^ciieyandin other places, the official letters and reports of 
 these officers, and their spirit, not representing one half of the real 
 character of their work. Why send troops to help Virginia and 
 George, and leave other States to desolation and pillage ? Cer- 
 tainly this question is pertinent when we consider how the country 
 was laid waste. 
 
 The cavalry, when not with the two great armies, was protecting 
 vast granaries needed to feed troops, and defending arsenals and 
 depots which in the narrow belt were open to attack and destruction 
 everywhere, owing to tbe great odds, and the fleets holding the 
 ocean, gulf, and rivers. The charge of dispersion does not hold good. 
 
 The writer speaks of cavalry as it existed in the days of Napo- 
 leon and the Revolution. Times had greatly changed. Tbe rifled 
 cannon and the Springfield and repeating rifles, arms of precision 
 wiih long range, had relegated to the past the dashing cavalry 
 charge against infantry or artillery supported by infantry. Such 
 handling of cavalry then would have been slaughter and death to 
 man and horse. Any Fplendid brigade of infantry in either array 
 felt secure against tbe attack of charging cavalry. Besides our 
 country was more wooded than Europe. No general could watch 
 and plan on his tower as Napoleon did. What could cavalry do in 
 charges on the battlefield of the Wilderness, or at Chicamauga, 
 where the fields were mere patches ? Cavalry was nothing more 
 than mounted infantry, and fought on foot even in most cases a- 
 gainst cavalry. This arm played as important a part as it ever did 
 in war. It covered the front, rear, and flanks of armies. By celer- 
 ity of movement it met and overcame or checked isolated columns of 
 troops. It played on lines of transportation; it overlapped armies 
 in battle, and destroyed their trains; and in great battles even mov- 
 edup along with infantry. It protected extended territory when oth- 
 troops were concentrated in tbe great armies. No class of troops 
 was mere ably commanded or did better service in either army. 
 The Confederate cavalry was well mounted till near the close of the 
 war. They conld not take all the horses from a people who had 
 made so many sacrifices, as the Federals did from the people of the 
 South. [See Sherman's report of his march to the sea.] The cav- 
 alry was as well equipped and armed as the circumstances permitted. 
 
 I am one of those who, like my great namesake, said: "I will not 
 speculate on the causes of the failure, as I have seen abundant cau- 
 ses for it in the tremendous odds brought against us"; "the South 
 was overpowered by the superior numbers and resources of tbe 
 North". If we conpare the two parts of the country, we find the 
 North outnumbering the South four to one in arms-bearing popula- 
 tion, incomparably better prepared for war, having an organized 
 government, an organized army and navy, with arsenals, dock. 
 
20 
 
 Why The ®&nfe&&tnc# Failed* 
 
 yards, and machine-shops, and having free intercourse with the 
 world from which to get supplies and men; while every port was 
 sealed against help from the outside world to the Confederacy, 
 which had to organize its government, and improvise everything for 
 the unequal struggle from an agricultural population. 
 
 The official records show that the North had two million, six 
 hundred thousand men from first to last; after October, 1861, nev- 
 er less than eight hundred thousand, and often exceeding one mil. 
 lion men. One million and fifty thousand men in round numbers 
 were mustered out at the close of the war. 
 
 The Confederates, who, by the most reliable records and author- 
 ity, had six hundred thousand from first to last, surrendered one 
 hundred and fifty thousand men. The effective force in the field 
 never exceeded two hundred thousand men at any one time. This 
 army came mainly from the eleven seceding States, having a popula- 
 tion of six million whites [three million males]. It was about all 
 that the population could do in soldiers. "The Union armies out- 
 numbered those of the Confederacy in all cases as two, commonly 
 as three, and during the entire time in which Grant was in com- 
 mand as four, to one". When we consider that in nearly all im- 
 portant battles the forces did not differ very much, the charge of 
 dispersion might be lodged against the Union commanders rather 
 than against the Confederate, and, considering the relative odds in 
 enlistments, does not indicate dispersion on the part of the Confede- 
 rates. 
 
 In addition to the land forces, the navy of the United States con- 
 sisted of seven hundred vessels of war, manned by 105,000 sailors, 
 with a fleet of transports, steamers, barges, and coal-floats almost 
 innumerable, which in 1862, on the Mississippi River and its tribu- 
 taries, alone numbered over 2200 vessels — a great help to General 
 Grant and other generals in operating against Vicksburg and Port 
 Hudson. 
 
 It was not known what was the number of vessels chartered on 
 the Atlantic and Gulf coasts in moving the large armies to Port 
 Royal, the North Carolina coast, Florida Mobile, and Louisiana. 
 The navy in its help was as decisive in results as the great armies 
 in the field. Without its aid the armies of the Union might not 
 have been successful. It blockaded the coast from the Potomac to 
 the Rio Grande. It cut up the Confederacy by her rivers, in occu- 
 pying these with gunboats; in establishing many depots and points 
 of departure from the line of coasts and from the river banks, for 
 armies to invade, overrun, and destroy supplies in new territory; 
 in transporting armies around territory they could not cross; and 
 in saving armies when defeated. Coupled with the navy, I men- 
 tion the great trunk railways converging in and skirting Confede- 
 
21 
 
 Whg The Gxmfederacg Failed, 
 
 rate territory, connecting with powerful States fall of supplies to 
 support armies, and able to transport them in any emergency to any 
 point. 
 
 I feel that General Lee's quotation is a good one, and none other 
 need be sought as a cause of failure. 
 
 S. D. Lee. 
 
 BT JOSEPH WHEELER, LIEUTENANT GENERAL C, S. A.. 
 
 History will attribute the failure of the Confederate cause to the 
 great preponderance of men and resources with which it was con- 
 fronted. 
 
 In commenting upon Mr. Rose's article, I would say: 
 
 1. That the financial system might have been better no one will 
 deny; but when we consider that a new-born nation equipped, fur- 
 nished with ammunition, fed, clothed, and paid an army which for 
 four years engaged a force 600,000 strong, it must be admitted that 
 there was much in our financial management to commend. 
 
 2. I think the author goes to extremes in condemning the mili- 
 tary policy which he terms one of dispersion. 
 
 The force with which we defended Charleston was less by far 
 than that with which it was attacked. The surrender of 13,000 
 men at Fort Donelson was unnecessary. It was quite possible to 
 have withdrawn the army after it had become apparent that the po- 
 sition was untenable. And it is certain that we should never have 
 allowed 30,000 men to become penned up at Vicksburg. But these 
 disasters cannot properly be attributed to the policy which Mr. 
 Rose condemns. 
 
 The author is mistaken in the assertion that "if every city upon 
 the seaboard had been evacuated at the beginning of the war the 
 Confederates would have been the stronger". He is also mistaken 
 in his suggestion that we "should have learned a lesson from the 
 war of the Revolution, whose capital was changed nine times, and 
 the British allowed to march from one end of the thirteen colonies 
 to the other". In that war, and in Frederick's Seven Years' War 
 to which he also refers, the conditions were very different frcm 
 those in our conflict. We were more dependent upon arsenals and 
 depots and lines of communication, and we had political as well as 
 military conditions to consider. The breaking of our railroads by 
 which supplies were carried from our Southern granaries wouid 
 have made it impossible for us to hold Richmond, and the retreat ot 
 Lee's army into the Carolines or Georgia would have been the be- 
 ginning of the end. 
 
22 
 
 Why Th£ G&nfe&M&cy Failed. 
 
 3. The tendency in European armies during the last thirty years 
 has been to increase the cavalry as compared with the other arms, 
 and it is true that a large proportion of cavalry generally adds to 
 the efficiency and power of an army. Especially would this apply 
 to a country like the South, where so many were trained horsemen; 
 nevertheless, after careful consideration, the policy adopted by the 
 Confederate army commanders was to encourage an increase of 
 their infantry, and to discourage and even prohibit enlistments in 
 the cavalry. In European wars it often occurred that the weaker 
 of two contending armies became disordered, and in this condition a 
 charge by a large body of cavalry completed the discomfiture; but, 
 with rare exceptions, matters were very different during the Civil 
 War. 
 
 The first battle of Manassas and the battle of Shiloh might, how- 
 ever, be well cited to sustain the position taken by Mr. Rose. An 
 organized cavalry force under a good commander at Manassas could 
 have overtaken and captured much of McDowell's army in its re- 
 treat to Washington, and such a force at Shiloh could have inter- 
 cepted much of Grant's army in its retreat to the Tennessee River; 
 but after this the improved organization, discipline, and equipment 
 of the Federal army, together with its numerical preponderance, 
 gave it such strength that very few opportunities were offered for 
 cavalry to charge upon a fljing foe. At Perryville the Federal 
 corps and divisions which became seriously engaged were defeated 
 and driven in disorder, but night came on and ended the conflict. 
 Our cavalry was occupied with large forces which extended beyond 
 our flanks, and it charged upon them and captured many prisoners; 
 but the complete rout of 70,000 men under Buell by less than one 
 third of that number was not possible. When Murfreesboro' wa3 
 fought, the cavalry division of Forrest was in western Tennessee, 
 and that of Morgan in Kentucky. The remaining cavalry did val- 
 iant service, going around the Federal rear, and charging with 
 good effect upon the disordered Federal right. At Chicamauga our 
 cavalry pursued and captured a number of the retreating enemy, 
 but darkness and barricades stopped their advance, and the next 
 day Rosecrans' army was behind breastworks and fortifications in- 
 vulnerable to attacks from cavalry. During the last year or eigh- 
 teen months of the war we did not have an army strong enough to 
 defeat and disperse the army by which it was opposed, and chances 
 for cavalry to pursue and complete their discomfiture did not arise. 
 
 In General Sherman's campaign in 1864, his force was more 
 than double that cmmanded by General Johnston. Sherman's ar- 
 my was thoroughly organizrd, well equipped, well officered and dis- 
 ciplined. It is true that on many occasions we gained a decided 
 \ictcry at the point of attack, and in July 1864 the Confederate 
 
23 
 
 Wh# The Btxtitetetficy Failed* 
 
 cavalry defeated and dispersed 10,000 cavalry under Stoneman, 
 Garrard, and McCook; but these Confederate successes in no wise 
 disordered the Federal troops which did not engage us, and there 
 was very seldom any flying foe for such cavalry operations as are 
 referred to by Mr. Rose. 
 
 The important service performed by this arm was to fight dis- 
 mounted as infantry, keep close up to the enemy, keep informed of 
 their movements, cover our flanks and prevent their being turned, 
 and frequently to raid upon the enemy's communications. Its bus- 
 iness was also to fight the numerous cavalry of the opposing army. 
 With rare exceptions, all these duties were well performed. 
 
 What has been said in regard to the opposing armies of Sherman 
 and Johnston also applies to the armies under Grant and Lee. No 
 one will controvert the fact that an increased cavalry force would 
 have been of great service to the Confederacy; but if that increase 
 had been obtained by taking from the infantry, it can hardly be 
 contended that it would have added to our strength. Every thought- 
 ful man will admit that the life of the Confederate government de- 
 pended upon our maintaining the army under Lee in Virginia, 
 and the Army of the West, commanded at different times by the 
 Johnstons, Beauregard, Bragg, and Hood. It was evident during 
 the entire conflict that so long as these armies were sustained with- 
 out serious disaster the Confederacy would live; but that if either 
 was disabled by defeat in battle, or by loss of resources, so as to be 
 unable to present a firm front to the opposing army, the almost im- 
 mediate fall of the government would be the inevitable result. 
 
 Joseph Wheeler. 
 
 BY E. P ALEXANDER, BRIGADIER GENERAL OF ARTILLERY C. S. A. 
 
 I concur in Mr. Rose's belief that the success of the Confederacy 
 was, for a time, not impossible; but I think it is as difficult to assign 
 brief and general reasons for its failure as it would be to say why A 
 has beaten B in a long and closely contested game of chess. Prob- 
 ably during forty moves B might have won by different play, and 
 each move of the forty might be called the fatal one. But I do not 
 think at all that Mr. Rose has made out his case for any one of the 
 three moves, or causes which he assigns. 
 
 Without discussing how or whether the issue of Confederate cur- 
 rency could have been avoided, it is enough to say that it answered 
 its purpose; and the credit of the Confederacy was good enough, 
 both at home and abroad, when its last chance in the field was gone. 
 This date, I think, can be exactly fixed as June 15, 1864, the rea- 
 sons therefor being another story. Up to that date the Confederacy 
 
24 
 
 Whtj The Sonfederaetj Failed. 
 
 could buy anything in the world, from an ironclad in France to a 
 horseshoe in Richmond. The trouble lay in blockades and other ob- 
 stacles to getting needed articles from places where they could be pro- 
 cured to places where they were needed. Times were often raid in the 
 field and camp, but this cut little figure when the trial of battle was 
 on, and we never lost a field that I know of for lack of food, ammu- 
 nition, clothes, or anything that money might have bought. Mr. 
 Rose's deduc:ions as to the principles of national taxation are 
 sound enough, and there are inde»d mary other \aluable lessons to 
 be learned from the history of Confederate monej, some of them 
 apropos, too, to the present time; but it is not fair to hold its issue 
 responsible for the loss of any battle having any irfluence upon the 
 final result. 
 
 2. I cannot agree at all with Mr. Rose's statement that the Con- 
 federate government attempted to hold unnecessary frontier. It 
 was bound to hold large and undisturbed agricultural districts in 
 order to raise food for its armies and it was bound to guard, even 
 against bridge • burning raids, the leng railroad arteries which 
 brought up supplies to the armies; and it was bound to maintain 
 somewhere very large arsenals and machine shops and warehouses, 
 and to protect them when once located. Richmond, for instance, 
 was defended to the death, not for its being the capital, but for con- 
 taining the Tredegar Ironworks, without which, it has been said, 
 our armies could not have kept in the field two years. The capital 
 could be moved, but the ironworks could not. These necessities 
 seem to me to justify the defense of every foot of territory which 
 was held after the war was once fairly joined. But had all the Con- 
 federate armies been concentrated, as Mr. Rose suggests, on the 
 flanks of the Appalachians, or anywhere else, abandoning their arse- 
 nals and sources of supply, they would soon have been out of am- 
 munition, and would have been starved into surrender. 
 
 Had Mr. Rose, however, criticized the neglect of the Confederate 
 government to utilize the advantage it possessed in having what is 
 technically called "the interior lines" by transferring heavy rein- 
 forcements rapidly back and forth between the East and West, he 
 would have made the most severe criticism which I think can be 
 justly made upon Confederate strategy. This was attempted only 
 once — in September 1863 — and then, though under difficulties pre- 
 venting attainment of the best results, Chicamauga was made a sort 
 of victory, instead of a disastrous defeat. 
 
 The greatest opportunity ever offered for such strategy was prob- 
 ably in May 1863, after Hooker's defeat at Chancellorsville. It 
 was discussed at that timp, but not adopted. Vigorously executed, 
 it might have forestalled both the Vicksburg and the Gettysburg 
 campaigns. 
 
25 
 
 Why The GbnUtemcy Failed. 
 
 3. As to the alleged "neglect of cavalry", Mr. Rose greatly under- 
 estimates the difficulty of supplying horses, and he entirely ignores 
 that of getting men. Men couM have been had only by diminish- 
 ing the number of our infantry man for man. Considering our in- 
 feriority in numbers, and the topography of our average battlefields, 
 I think no competent military critic would have advised in any of 
 our armies exchanging any material number of our infantry for cav- 
 alry. Indeed, the general tendency, as the war went on, was to 
 convert our cavalry into mounted infantry. For the day of decis- 
 ive cavalry charges passed away with the advent of long range 
 small arms, breech loaders, and improved artillery. Even at Wa- 
 terloo, had half or more of Napoleon's cavalry been infantry or ar- 
 tillery, his chances would have been improved; for their first charge 
 left a rampart of dead horses which broke up all renewed efforts. 
 We may see in future armies large developments of mounted infan- 
 try, possibly two men to a horse sometimes, but cavalry, in the old 
 sense of the term, will cut little figure in the future. 
 
 It is surely very shallow to charge West Point with depreciation 
 of the cavalry because officers selected for branches of the service 
 requiring the most skilled application of higher mathematics are 
 chosen from among those who, other things being equal, are most 
 proficient in mathematics. Any other principle of selection would 
 be absurd. 
 
 Most of Mr. Rose's arguments and illustrations are drawn from 
 events that happened on a different planet from the one now occu- 
 pying our orbit. The old one, on which Numidians, Macedonians, 
 Napoleon, Frederick, George III, and our forefathers adjusted their 
 various difficulties, was not fitted up either by land or by sea with 
 steam and electrical appliances. Virtually the only way to go any- 
 where in force was to walk on land or to take small and inferior 
 sailing-craft by sea. Consequently there were many cases where 
 small nations got the better of large ones because the big fellow 
 could not get at the little one. But in our case the big fellow was all 
 about the little one from the very start, leaving him no resources 
 but Providence and his own pluck. Which failed him, it would be 
 invidious to inquire. 
 
 E. P. Alexander. 
 
 BT E. M. LAW, MAJOR GENERAL, C. S. A. 
 
 I am loath to criticize so thoughtful and interesting a paper as 
 that of Mr. Duncan Rose in the November number of the centu- 
 ry on the question "Why the Confederacy Failed", especially as it 
 opens a field of investigation the cultivation of which may bring to 
 
26 
 
 Why The Gxmfederaetj Failed, 
 
 light much interesting and as yet unwritten history. But I cannot 
 entirely agree with his conclusion that "in a war for independence 
 numbers do not count". The history of Poland and tbat of Hunga- 
 ry are conspicuous refutations of the statement. "The little republic 
 of Switzerland" which he cites, "won its independence" by reason 
 of the very fact that the kingdoms and empires by which she was 
 surrounded were "in arms" as often against one another as against 
 her, as well as because of the impregnability of her mountain fast- 
 nesses when properly defended. If we are to credit history, Fred- 
 erick tha Great was "at the last gasp" during the Seven Years' War 
 and Prussia would probably have shared the fate which overtook 
 Poland a few years later had not the opportune death of the Em- 
 press Elizabeth and the accession of Peter III converted Russia, 
 his most powerful foe, into a friend and ally. And, however much 
 national pride may rebel at the admission, the unbiassed student of 
 our own Revolutionary history must confess that the American 
 cause was well-nigh hopeless when the powerful intervention of 
 France, and the complications of England with Spain and Holland, 
 turned the scale in our favor. Besides the moral effect of the re- 
 cognition of our independence, the fleets of France broke the strict 
 blockade of the American Ports, and provided the colonies with eup- 
 plies which were of far more value to them than the few troops fur- 
 nished by their ally. Had a like good fortune attended the Confed- 
 rate States, had some friendly nation powerful enough to enfoice its 
 decrees recognized their independence and opened their ports, their 
 subjugation would have been impossible, even if we admit the full 
 force of all the reasons assigned for failure. 
 
 Our ports being closed, however, and the Confederacy being de- 
 pendent entirely upon its internal resources and credit, Mr. Rose's 
 criticism of its financial system is unanswerable. The free use of 
 the taxing power, to which as a war measure the pec pie would have 
 submitted as patiently as they did to the conscription, was all that 
 could have saved its finances from the ruin tbat speedily overtook 
 them through the continued issue of irredeemable paper money. 
 
 "The policy of dispersion", which Mr. Rose assigns as another 
 cause of failure, was from a military point of view the gravest mis- 
 take that could have been made. It prolonged the struggle, no 
 doubt, but continued adherence to it under the conditions tbat exist- 
 ed meant certain failure in the end. Some Confederate officers, no- 
 tably General Joseph E Johnston, realized this early in the war; 
 but their views were overruled by the Richmond government, which 
 seemed to dread nothing so much as a loss of territory, and adhered 
 to the end, with fatal pertinacity, to the policy of holding positions 
 the defense of which could result only in disaster to the defenders. 
 Whether the Confederate cause would have been won by pursuing 
 
27 
 
 Whg The Gonfederactj Failed* 
 
 an opposite course we cannot know; but a policy of concentration 
 and bard blows, with the decisive results that must have followed, 
 would at least have had the merit of deciding the struggle quickly, 
 and saving the country the prolonged agony and wasting effects of 
 a four years' war. 
 
 For the third cause of failure assigned by Mr. Rose, namely, "the 
 neglect of the cavalry", I would substitute "the dispersion of the 
 cavalry." I think the records will show that the Confederacy had 
 cavalry enough in proportion to the other arms of the service, and 
 of a quality superior, man for man, to their antagonists. Had it 
 been concentrated in large bodies in the vicinity of our great armies 
 under such leaders as Stuart, Forrest, Van Dorn, and Hampton, in- 
 stead of being scattered by companies, regiments, and brigades all 
 over the country, the many great victories won by those armies 
 might have been as fruitful as they were in fact barren of results. 
 
 The causes that contributed to Confederate failure were many, 
 but among them all none can be compared in potency and far-reach- 
 ing influence to the failure to provide an adequate navy as well as 
 an army; and that far sighted statemanship in the beginning of the 
 struggle could have done this there is little doubt. With open ports, 
 foreign trade would have given the Confederate finances impregna- 
 ble strength, the armies would not have suffered the deprivation of 
 many things necessary to the efficiency of soldiers in the field, and 
 the rivers of the South would not have been free waterways for 
 Federal gunboats. But despite all the errors of statemanship, finan- 
 ciering, and generalship, in spite of resources rendered unavailable 
 by reason of blockaded ports, and in the face of greatly superior 
 numbers, the valor and devotion of the Confederate soldier came 
 "perilously near" winning the fight. On two occasions, at least, the 
 cause was well-nigh won, but lost again in such a way as almost to 
 compel belief in the direct interposition of Providence. 
 
 E. M. Law. 
 
 BY DON CAELOS BCELL, MAJOR GENERAL, U. S. A. 
 
 Why did the Confederacy fail ? The comprehensive answer is that 
 it failed for lack of ability to succeed. To say that the effort was one 
 of the most heroic that ever miscarried is only to emphasize the for- 
 midableness of the obstacles that opposed it. 
 
 When we look into the particulars, we ficd, in comparison with 
 the government which it strove to throw off, that it was deficient in 
 every element that could affect the result of such an enterprise but 
 courage; indeed, we shall be amazed that four years of gigantic ef- 
 fort were required for its overthrow, if we lose sight of the vigor of 
 the resistance, and the inherent difficulty of overcoming any organ- 
 
28 
 
 Why The G(xxifQ&Qt&c$ Failed. 
 
 iz =.d revolt of such proportions. We find it completely shut in from 
 foreign intercourse; we find it relatively deficient in men and mon- 
 ey and resources of every sort, in military equipment, in facilities 
 for interior communication, in mechanical appliances, in the me- 
 chanical skill which so much aided the armies of its adversary, in 
 that material development which occupies so important a place in 
 modern civilization, in foreign confidence and sympathy, in internal 
 confidence as well, and in that profound popular impulse 'which 
 continually strengthened the armies of its opponent, and threw the 
 whole energy of the North into the contest. 
 
 Certainly the early stage of the war was marked by great enthu- 
 siasm and bitterness on the part of the South, especially among the 
 upper classes, and the losing cause was followed with fidelity to the 
 end. The Union sentiment in the North was as strong, as enthusi- 
 astic, and more general; and there was besides, in an already domi- 
 nating and growing element, a motive that was stronger and more 
 enduring than enthusiasm — an implacable antagonism which acted 
 side by side with the cause of the Union as a perpetual impelling 
 force against the social conditions of the South, controlling the 
 counsels of the government, cadencing the maich of its armies to 
 the chorus: 
 
 "John Brown's body lies mouldering in the grave, 
 But his soul is marching on." 
 
 There was Irom the first but one reasonable chance for the survi- 
 val of the Confederacy, and that lay in foreign intervention. Recog- 
 nition alone would not have availed. How long the contest would 
 have been protracted by such interference, and what might have 
 been the ultimate consequences, are questions which it is not pleas- 
 ant for an American and a lover of civil liberty to contemplate. 
 
 In a conflict of such magnitude as our Civil War, it followed nat- 
 urally that economic and military policies should exert an impor- 
 tant influence. Mere promissory money would be apt to cause em- 
 barassment, but not fatally so in the isolated condition of the Con- 
 federacy so long as it satisfied the conditions' of interior trade. In- 
 trinsically the greenbacks of the North were no better than the pa- 
 per promises of the South; yet they constituted virtually the sole 
 circulating medium, were received with confidence, and the coun- 
 try was commercially prosperous during the war. In the North the 
 use of such money was a policy or device. In the South it was a 
 necessity; for, unable to borrow money abroad, if direct taxation 
 could have been resorted to it would have been futile: the country did 
 not possess wealth enough in an available form for the emergency. 
 
 The failure of the financial expedient thus adopted by the South 
 from necessity, without any foundation of material value, became 
 inevitable as soon as it lost the confidence of the public. If there 
 
39 
 
 Wh# Tto ®(xntetetncy Failed. 
 
 was at the time no other symptom of a distrust of their cause, the 
 rejection of the money of the Confederacy by the people was a suf- 
 ficient sign of a lack of faith. The bad money was a consequence, 
 not a cause. 
 
 The policy of dispersion, as it is called, in the military opera* 
 tions has been criticized on both sides, but not with convincing ar- 
 gument. The conflict was not of a nature to be decided by a single 
 campaign, or on purely strategic grounds. The mission of the Fed- 
 eral government was to invade, put down armed opposition, and 
 restore its authority; and the largeness of the force called to the 
 task permitted, indeed required, its employment in different fields of 
 operation at the same time. Correspondingly all the circumstances 
 of the occasion imposed upon the Confederates the general plan of 
 a popular defensive war. Apart from the necessity of securing the 
 resources of every portion of their territory, by just so far as the 
 Confederate forces consolidated might by superior skill cope success- 
 fully with the superior numbers of their opponent, by so far within 
 judicious limits might their successes be multiplied by division a- 
 gainst their divided adversary. 
 
 There is no reason to suppose that a more extensive or a different 
 use of cavalry would have changed the result of the war. The Con- 
 federacy was no better able to secure supremacy in that arm than 
 in any other. The probability is strongly to the contrary, and the 
 South had most to apprehend from rivalry in that direction. 
 
 But no explanation of the triumph of the Union cause could be 
 more superficial and erroneous than that which would ascribe the 
 result to military leadership, however meritorious, rather than to 
 the immense momentum of popular will and intelligence which ani- 
 mated and directed the population of the North. That power found 
 an efficient preliminary organizer in the State governments — that 
 peculiar feature of "imperium in imperio" in our political system, 
 which, however it may tend to preserve the liberties of the citizen, 
 may in some future crisis prove as powerful an agent for evil to the 
 nation as in this instance it was fruitful of good to both. It did not 
 contribute as much to the Confederate cause in the South as it did 
 to the cause of the Union in the North. 
 
 In these brief notes upon the chances of the Confederacy I make 
 no reference to the so-called teachings of history, which often fail to 
 elucidate satisfactorily the questions to which we apply them. Mere- 
 over the conditions of the civilization of the present day — especially 
 in their bearing upon military science and the mission of civil gov. 
 ernment — are too unlike those of even a hundred years ago to 
 make it safe to draw comparisons of action without the most care- 
 ful analysis. 
 
 D. C. Bueil. 
 
30 
 
 Whg The QcmUfotucy Faited. 
 
 BT O. O. HOWARD, MAJOR GENERAL, U. S. A. RETIRED. 
 
 While I do not agree with a number of Mr. Rose's postulates, bis 
 article presents a number of important points worthy of study and 
 thought. 
 
 It was long my favorite theory, born of my deepest conviction, 
 and expressed in a letter to the "New York Times" at the very be- 
 ginning of the war, that the Union arms would never be successful 
 until the government aimed directly and indirectly with all its pow- 
 er at the extinction of human slavery. With reference to the in- 
 trinsic wrong in slavery, I believe the whole nation participated in 
 its perpetuation, and that this fact affected the morale of our peo- 
 ple and our armies. When, after terrible chastisement, our morale 
 followed the divine leading, success became continuous and finally 
 complete. 
 
 In fervor, devotion to a cause, and persistency, there was doubt- 
 less little difference between the governments, peoples, and soldiers 
 of the South and North. 
 
 1. The Confederate government promised to pay dollars [gold or 
 silver] six months after recognition of the Confederacy by the Uni- 
 ted States. These promises, used as currency, naturally depreciated 
 as their volume increased and the likelihood of success lessened. 
 But all peoples subjected to extraordinary expenses are wont to 
 throw part of the cost upon the future. The Union government did 
 the same in the Civil War. It was hardly possible for the Confed- 
 eracy to avoid the issue of these promises. Their reckless issue to- 
 ward the end was like the straw at which the drowning man catch- 
 es; it was an endeavor to keep the Confederate armies together for 
 a little space while the government looked and prayed for Euro- 
 pean help. 
 
 At last the South was fairly exhausted. The worthless paper 
 money was only an incident. In some localities, at every period of 
 the war there was much baled cotton; and though it commanded a 
 high price anywhere outside the blockading squadron, within the 
 Confederacy it was of little value, as it could be neither eaten nor 
 shot at the enemy. 
 
 2. "The policy of dispersion" referred to I deem a necessity; for 
 as soon as any portions of the seceded States were held by the 
 Union army they contributed nothing to the Confederacy, but, on 
 the other hand, furnished supplies to the United States. As men 
 understood the art of war in 1861, the military administration of 
 the South could hardly have been excelled. It is true that the ar- 
 mies under Lee and Johnston were hampered at times by a weak 
 government; but all governments are human, and liable to weak- 
 ness in organization and mistakes in operation. 
 
31 
 
 Why Ths GanUtetficy Failed. 
 
 Following a reaction against Napoleon's system, the war in the 
 Crimea, as well as our own in its earlier stages, made much of strat- 
 egic positions. After General Grant's series of demonstrations in 
 battle, we now clearly see that the objective should have been the 
 enemy's active army. The danger to the respective capitals was 
 indeed a great bugbear; for as long as either side had a well-equip- 
 ped army, the capture of either capital would have been only an ad- 
 vantage, not a conclusive victory. Certainly the strategic theory 
 or the political situation caused the shedding of much blood and the 
 expenditure of much treasure, which from a purely military point 
 of view was a sad waste. The endeavor should have been to de- 
 stroy the opposing army. 
 
 S. It takes long training to make effective cavalry, even if raw 
 recruits can ride. The use of horses to transport troops rapidly 
 from point to point for the purpose of fighting on foot was develop- 
 ed during the war. Confederate generals found that such cavalry 
 as they could raise was very expensive and hard to keep efficient. 
 As soon as they bad had a little experience in battle, it was 
 not the nature of our armies to become so demoralized after defeat 
 that cavalry could overrun and destroy them. Shiloh, Chicamauga, 
 and Malvern Hill were hardly victories for the Confederacy, and 
 even Fredericksburg became so only because the Union army failed 
 to carry a position. It withdrew without loss of organization. The 
 reason the Confederates did not gain in these more decisive advan- 
 tage was not because they were weak in cavalry, but because of the 
 stamina of the withdrawing troops. Union victories, so called, were 
 many, but were not decisive, except in a few instances, because of 
 the stamina of the Confederate soldiers. 
 
 During the Rebellion we lived under a constitution which some- 
 what checked our raising money. These provisions were copied in- 
 to the Confederate constitution. Doubtless there was some disabil- 
 ity here, but now we could constitutionally increase our income from 
 the internal-revenue taxes by adding other articles to the list suf- 
 ficiently to carry on a foreign war — that is if public opinion would 
 permit. Still, should war come, part of its expenses would doubt- 
 less be thrown over to the future by the government borrowing 
 money. In reference to losses from the "policy of dispersion", our 
 principal sea-coast cities must be defended as naval depots; after 
 that, the objective should always be the destruction of any hostile 
 army landing on our shores or entering our country from the North 
 or the South. 
 
 Mr. Rose is mistaken in the matter of the assignment of West 
 Point graduates. No "dullard" is graduated at West Point. Clas- 
 ses which begin with more than a hundred usually graduate less 
 than fifty. Of these fifty, not more than five go into the engineers. 
 
32 
 
 Wh# The GtmU&et&cy Failed. 
 
 The other graduates are always allowed a choice of arms according 
 to their class standing. The cavalry vacancies are generally all fil- 
 led before the members of a lower half of a class have bad a chance 
 to select. 
 
 Again, I should say that an invasion of Canada, even without an 
 extraordinary cavalry force, could be made an effective military op- 
 eration, though a good cavalry force is, of course, always desirable. 
 Its efficiency under Sheridan, however, [and it would be more so 
 now] was not so much from the old cavalry impact, as from the ad- 
 vantage gained by transferring men with good arms from point to 
 point with rapidity. Surely the writer undervalues General J. E. 
 B. Stuart as a cavalry leader. His view probably arises from his 
 partiality for the energy and enterprise of General Forrest. 
 
 Oliver 0. Howard. 
 
 BT JACOB D. COX, MAJOR-GENERAL C. S. V. 
 
 In all great historical events the causes co-operating to produce the 
 result are sure to be numerous — so numerous that it would hardly 
 be wrong to call them numberless. The student of history gets so 
 accustomed to crises in which a slight change of circumstance or con- 
 duct would, apparently, have given a wholly different trend to af- 
 fairs, that he gives up the problem of the "might have beens" as 
 one impossible of solution. Yet there is so much that is fascinatng 
 in such speculations that we may be sure many another Southerner 
 besides Mr. Rose has spent long hours of wistful thought upon his 
 question, though not many have so persuasively presented an an- 
 swer. 
 
 Yet when he dismisses the answer that it was contrary to the will 
 of Providence that the South should win, does he not miss some of 
 the reasons contained in that solution of the matter ? Many an 
 earnest Southern man now sees and acknowledges that "all has 
 turned out for the best", which is only another way of saying that 
 a superior wisdom and a more potent will than theirs was ruling 
 the world; and they find consolation in the thought. Then we 
 must remember that this view does not imply a mere arbitrary fiat. 
 Under a reign of law it means a supremely wise adaptation of 
 means to ends and causes to effects, if we are only able to trace 
 them. 
 
 For instance, except for the fact that the system of slavery was 
 in conflict with the public opinion of the civilized world, there would 
 seem to be little doubt that both France and England would have 
 intervened actively in behalf of the Confederacy. When we read 
 the evidence of the embarassment of the statesmen of those coun- 
 
33 
 
 Wh# The Gbtite&etficy Failed. 
 
 tries in the presence of the necessity of deciding whether they would 
 join in a war to establish a new nation on the basis of African slav- 
 ery, we are made to feel strongly that a moral force was at work 
 here that was great enough to account for the difference between 
 success or failure in even so gigantic a struggle. The summary of 
 facts bearing on this point which Mr. Rhodes has given in the fif- 
 teenth and sixteenth chapters of bis "History of the United States" 
 is very instructive. But this nonintervention made possible the 
 great blockade of two thousand miles of sea-coast, depriving the 
 Confederacy of a foreign commerce which was a vital factor both in 
 marketing her own products and in procuring munitions of war. 
 
 Mr. Rose has sketched with no little power the mischiefs which 
 resulted from unlimited issues of irredeemable paper money; but 
 can we call it a principal cause of the Confederate failure? France 
 did not fail in her struggle with Europe because of the worthless- 
 ness of her assignats. They were swept into her dust-bins, and 
 she began again on a sounder financial basis, and carried her ea- 
 gles across the continent. We of the North also suffered from pa- 
 per issued on doubtful credit, and even the statesman who issued it 
 lived to declare, as Chief Justice, with noble frankness, that the 
 constitutional powers of the government had been strained in doing 
 so, and that the desperate resort to war powers must end, at least, 
 when peace was achieved. 
 
 It is easy for us now to argue that the Confederate notes as well 
 our own were bad finance; but the true reason for their issue was 
 that the statesmen in power on both sides did not believe that the 
 people would stand the enormous taxation required to "pay as you 
 go". They looked for refusal to support war measures and war ad- 
 ministrations when the burden of taxation should be oppressively felt. 
 They may have been wrong, but they were able politicians, and we 
 must not be too confident that they misjudged the situation. 
 
 To examine the causes of success and failure on both sides is too 
 large a task for condensation into a page, and one can only suggest 
 that Mr. Rose, in bis contention that the Confederate armies fought 
 without necessity on "indefensible frontiers", seems to use the term 
 in a questionable way. The frontier in the West was virtually the 
 Ohio River. Fort Donelson, Murfreesboro', Sbilob, Vicksburg, 
 Chattanooga, Atlanta made a line of interior positions in the very 
 heart of the country from which the Confederate government must 
 draw its resources till Sherman completed the dissevering by the 
 march to the sea, and thence north to the capital of North Carolina. 
 
 A similar brief suggestion as to the advantage of cavalry must 
 limit what I can say. The cavalry which Mr. Rose advocates are 
 the horsemen of European armies, trained by years of severe drill 
 and instruction of both man and beast to produce effects by the 
 
34 
 
 l&hg Thje Q&nfe&Qt&cy Failed* 
 
 "shock" of galloping thousands using the lance or saber. It was 
 well known that there was neither time nor opportunity to produce 
 such cavalry in our Civil War, and most men of military experi- 
 rience still think the character of the country would have made 
 their use in large bodies impracticable. Our use of hofses was only 
 to carry men quickly to the desired position, when they dismounted 
 and fought on foot with carbines much inferior in range and caliber 
 to the infantry weapons. General Forrest openly discarded sabers, 
 and was the most pronounced advocate of dependence on the car- 
 bine and revolver in such country as our Western and Southern 
 States. 
 
 Is it not reasonable then to conclude that the heavier battalions 
 of the Northern army, persistently advancing into the Confederate 
 States, and aided by the moral causes first-mentioned, secured re- 
 suits which are consistent at once with military principles and with 
 the purposes of Providence in regard to America ? 
 
 Jacob D. Cox. 
 

 
 
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