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 ON THE 
 
 Surrender of Johnston's Army, 
 
 WITH THE "MEMORANDUM" THEREON AS PRE- 
 SENTED BY THE EXECUTIVE. 
 
 -— 
 
 The public papers which defend General Sherman against 
 the attacks made on him for his transaction with Johnston, 
 including the capture and surrender of the rebel army, gener- 
 ally assume it as a foregone conclusion that he made & mistake, 
 yet no one has shown us wherein the mistake consisted, and I 
 venture to say that no one can show anything in the matter, 
 either in principle or in detail, inception or result, to which the 
 most punctilious can object. I refer, as a matter of course, to 
 what he in fact did, not to what is assumed for him, or falsely 
 imputed to him. The actual facts, plainly told, are these : — 
 
 On the 18th of April Sherman had Johnston so hemmed in 
 that he must either fight 01 surrender. On that day, in this 
 condition of things, the two Generals met and discussed not 
 only the surrender of the army under Johnston, but the other 
 Rebel forces in the South and West, in the expressed hope that 
 they might save further effusion of blood. As the proposed ac- 
 tion, except as far as concerned forces under the command of 
 each was beyond their power, they agreed t© a suspension of 
 hostilities, their armies remaining in statu quo, until each could 
 consult with and obtain the instructions of those in power, 
 Sherman, of course, that of the President of the United States 
 and his Cabinet. He reported at once, and received instruc- 
 tions to confine himself to the mere military surrender of the 
 rebel troops in his power. He accordingly received the sur- 
 render of Johnston with his 27,000 men with their arms and 
 munitions of war, precisely what he would have done had the 
 Cabinet directed him not to negotiate, but without any attempt 
 to excite a public clamor. This is all Sherman did and all he 
 proposed to do until he should receive instructions from the 
 Department. He held Johnston and his army firmly, he lost, 
 no advantage which he could have gained bad he attacked 
 Johnston immediately without negotiating, but saved no doubt 
 the effusion of blood. 
 
 Now I am at a loss to find the mistake. Was it in the pro- 
 positions which were sent to the President and Cabinet? They 
 are greatly misrepresented in the Secretary s Bulletin. But 
 
 ft 
 
 & ■ 
 
it is no matter what they were, they came without authority. 
 Sherman assumed none, but simply sent the proposition to be 
 passed upon by the Cabinet. "Sigma," a very able writer in 
 the Commercial, and one who represents the case fairly, is of 
 opinion that the propositions were themselves the best practic- 
 al. It may be so and probably is, but a year's experience will 
 show us. 
 
 But in this matter General Sherman could hardly be charg- 
 ed with thinking for himself. The propositions submitted 
 were conceived in the spirit of Mr. Lincoln's last speech, while 
 General Sherman no doubt had seen as it was in all the public 
 prints — and there is no proof and indeed no pretence that he 
 had seen Mr. Lincoln's instructions to General Grant, with 
 which the propositions are so elaborately contrasted in the 
 Secretary's Bulletin. The propositions may be the best, of the 
 worst possible, but in either case I have yet to learn that there 
 was a mistake in making them known to the President. 
 
 T. EWING. 
 
 From the New York Leader. 
 SHERMAN'S ARMISTICE. 
 
 How much truth there may be, or whether there be an} 7 truth 
 at all, in the current statements that Secretary Stanton has or- 
 ganized a crusade against Sherman we do not know. The 
 World says that such. a crusade is being attempted; the Herald 
 says that it is not; the l^imes appears to join in the attack, and 
 the Tribune, which might have been expected to treat Sherman- 
 cavalierly, steps promptly forward as his defender. In this 
 muddle, only one thing seems to be certain, and that is the 
 exceeding bad taste and bad temper or Secretary Stanton'* 
 telegrams upon the Sherman armistice. 
 
 if those telegrams have provoked any illifeel'ing towards Gen- 
 eral Sherman in the popular mind w? have yet to see evidences- 
 t)f such a feeling. So far as we can learn, the ill-feeling is all 
 against Stanton for the ungenerous manner in which he has- 
 presented the case. It would havo been amply sufficient had 
 lie simply telegraphed to Major-General Dix, for publication, 
 that Sherman had exceeded his orders- and made an unsatis- 
 factory agreement with Johnston; and that the agreement was- 
 disapproved by Grant, who had gone to North Carolina to 
 resume hostilities. This statement embraces all the facts; but 
 Secretary Stanton could not be content with it. Ho must 
 gum the case up in advance, and get judgment before Sher- 
 man could bo heard. In trying to do so he has demonstra- 
 ted his own weakness and Sherman's strength. 
 
 TVe do not by any means impugn Secretary Stanton's mo- 
 tives. He may be Sherman's personal friend, for all we know. 
 It is his style which is bad, although his motives may be as 
 
 ■ 3 
 
3 
 
 pure as Sherman's patriotism. Hot-headed and impulsive, he 
 rushed quickly to the conclusion that Sherman had made a 
 blunder, and at once set to work to prove this conclusion cor- 
 rect. He would have been wiser had he considered his proof's 
 first and reached his conclusion logically. Being a lawyer, he 
 must form his theories and twist his evidence even in such an 
 important State affair as the condemnation of one of our best 
 and most popular generals. But the public must remember 
 that Sherman is quite as shrewd and able a man as Stanton, 
 and that his side of the case has yet to be heard. We object 
 to these snap-judgments about anybody or anything. Let 
 Sherman give the reasons for his course before people pro- 
 nounce him a fool. And let those ultra Bepublican journals 
 be very careful of their facts before they again insinuate that 
 he is a knave. 
 
 Having attentively perused all the documents in regard to 
 the armistice which have been officially published, we can dis- 
 cover no good grounds for Secretary Stanton's aggrieved tone, 
 nor for the extraordinary instructions he has issued to sub- 
 ordinate officers not to obey Sherman's orders. When Sher- 
 man hears of those instructions he will undoubtedly hand his 
 resignation to President Johnston, and either he or Stanton 
 must retire. No matter how wrong General Sherman may 
 have been, Secretary Stanton had no right to forward such in- 
 structions to his subordinates, except through Sherman him- 
 self. Two wrongs never make a right. If General Sherman 
 has exceeded his. authority, Secretary Stanton has violated 
 military etiquette. He could have removed Sherman, but he 
 could not properly instruct his subordinates to disobey him. — 
 In his eagerness to put Sherman in the wrong, Mr. Stanton 
 has placed himself in a peculiarly perplexing position. The 
 spectacle of a Secretary of War bursting, lrke a mad bull, 
 through the well-known rules of the service, is not particular- 
 ly edifying to soldiers or civilians. 
 
 General Sherman and the Rebel General Johnston had sev- 
 eral meetings and agreed upon terms which completely demol- 
 ished the Rebellion. It is a mistaken idea that Johnston only 
 surrendered his own army to Sherman, as Lee surrendered 
 his to Grant. Johnston surrendered the entire Rebellion. — ■ 
 There was no reservation, Jeff Davis himself was not except- 
 ed. It may have appeared right to General Sherman to exceed 
 his authority a little in order to accomplish this immense vie 
 tory. That he may have overstepped his orders is granted ' 
 but it was in permitting an armistice, not in arranging am 
 agreement. to be sent to Washington for approval. This poini 
 — the only one at which Sherman is vulnerable — Mr. Stanton 
 has overlooked altogether. He had the right to make a basis 
 for peace; but perhaps he had no right to suspend hostilities. — 
 The armistice, not the agreement, was an act which may have 
 
called for censure. All Stanton's rigmarole about the presence 
 of Mr. Lincoln at the capitol on the night of March 3d, and the 
 note which he penned with his own hand, does not touch the- 
 real issue. Sherman's error was in declaring a truce; but for 
 that he may have had satisfactory reasons. 
 
 The note of President Lincoln refers purely to ''political 
 questions." The surrender of all the Eebels in arms Was a 
 military question, and Sherman treated it like a military man. 
 When the terms presented by the Rebels were found to em- 
 brace political questions, he neither accepted nor rejected them 
 — he at once referred them to Washington. Why this should 
 have aroused Secretary Stanton's wrath we are unable to per- 
 ceive. Nor is the statement of Stanton's telegram — a state- 
 ment since disproved — that Sherman's recall of Stoneman's 
 cavalry opened the road to Mexico to Jeff. Davis and his treas- 
 ures any more pertinent. Jeff Davis was with Johnston. He 
 was included in the surrender. This fact vitiates Stanton's 
 absurd rhetoric and suggests that, instead of quoting Lincoln's 
 letter and a bit of Richmond gossip, the Secretary of War 
 would have occupied his time better had he shown that Sher- 
 man was ever ordered not to agree to an armistice, not to sus- 
 pend hostilities, not to cease fighting when the only Rebel 
 General in the field offered to give up the whole Confederacy, 
 dismiss all the Rebel armies and restore all the seceded States 
 to the Union. Secretary Stanton does not refer to any such 
 orders in his telegram, and he has not yet produced them. 
 
 Now, having cleared away all the preliminaries of* this af- 
 fair, and demonstrated that Sherman was in the right in hold- 
 ing conferences with Johnston, and that no evidence has yet 
 been presented proving him in the wrong in granting an ar- 
 mistice, let us examine the objections offered to his memoran- 
 dum of agreement, and see how far they are valid. 
 
 The first objection is that u it was an exercise of authority 
 not vested in General Sherman and on its face shows that both 
 he and Johnston knew that he had no authority to enter into 
 any such arrangement." Yery good ; but unfortunately not 
 original. General Sherman had stated these facts to Johnston 
 and they appear in the memorandum. Sherman says, "''Not 
 being fully empowered by my principal to fulfill these terms, I 
 individually and officially pledge myself to promptly obtain 
 the necessary authority." Why, that was precisely the reason 
 why he sent the memorandum to Washington. He knew he 
 had not the authorit}*, and he asked the President to rati?? His 
 agreement. The first objection is therefore silly. The second 
 objection is that ''it was a practical acknowledgment of the 
 Rebel Government." Well, Sherman acknowledged the Rebel 
 Government only far enough to accept the surrender of the 
 whole concern. It seems to us that every body would have 
 been satisfied with such an acknowledgment. The Confedera- 
 
5 
 
 ■ey would not have gained much by it. On the whole, we fear 
 that this objection is as silly as the first. 
 
 Thirdly, "it undertook to establish the Eebel State 'Gov- 
 ernment'' and '-placed arms and munitions of war in the hands 
 of the Eebels at their respective capitals." Will Secretary 
 Stanton please to recollect that there would have, been no 
 Eebels had Sherman's terms been approved? The members of 
 the seceded State governments were "to take the oath pre- 
 scribed by the Constitution of the United States," thus placing 
 themselves in the Union and under our laws. The "arms and 
 munitions of war" were to be "subject to future action of the 
 Congress of the United States," so that Congress could have 
 removed them from the State capitals immediately. This ob- 
 jection is as invalid as the others. The fourth objection is that 
 the Eebels "would be enabled to re-establish slavery." But 
 the South can re-establish it in any event if the Constitutional 
 Amendment be not adopted by the States, and if the Supreme 
 Court does not decide the Emancipation Proclamation consti- 
 tutional. But, on the other hand, if the Amendment be adopt- 
 ed, or the Proclamation pronounced Constitutional, then slave- 
 ry cannot be established, even if there were anything in the 
 terms of agreement — which say nothing about slavery — to re- 
 establish it. Objection number four consequently fails. 
 
 Fifth, "if might furnish a ground of responsibility to pay the 
 Eebel debt." Here is an objection based on a "might," to 
 which we only reply that "it might not." But "it certainly 
 subjects loyal citizens of the rebel States to the debt contracted 
 by the Eebels in the name of the State." It seems to us that 
 the Eebel debt would be repudiated by the terms of re-union, 
 so that no one would have anything to pay. But if the debt 
 is to hold good on the State, we should like to know how loyal 
 citizens can escape their share of it, since everybody would 
 claim to be loyal so soon as a special tax were decreed. It is a 
 new idea that our Secretary of War should recognize and urge 
 the payment of the Eebel war debt. He must have been hard 
 pushed for objections when he selected number five. Objection 
 sixth is that "it puts in dispute the existence of loyal State 
 governments, and the new State of Western Yirginia, which 
 had been recognized by every department of the United States 
 government." What loyal State governments? That of Louis- 
 iana, for instance, which Wade and Winter Davis pronounce 
 without actual existence? And how does it put them in dis- 
 pute? Simply by "submitting them to the Supreme Court." — 
 Cannot they stand this test? Has Stanton no confidence in 
 Chase? As for Western Yirginia, what has she to fear when 
 she "has been recognized by every department of the United 
 States Government?" Objection the sixth is very, very feeble. 
 Seventh, "it practically abolishes the Confiscation law and re- 
 lieve Eebels of every degree from all pains and penalties." — 
 
This is an untrue assertion. The Confiscation laws were passed 
 by Congress, and the "degree" of Eebels to be pardoned is 
 fixed by Congress. The agreement promises an amnesty "bo 
 far as the Executive power ot the United States can command." 
 As the Executive cannot disobey or reverse the laws of Con- 
 gress, the confiscation laws would remain in full force, and 
 v, the pains and penalties" could be applied to rebels above a 
 certain rank, as provided by Congress in the authority given 
 to the President to freely pardon all Eebels under a certain 
 rank. The seventh objection is consequently false and void. 
 The eighth objection is that President Lincoln "deliberately, 
 repeatedly and solemnly rejected" the same terms — which, if 
 true, does President Lincoln no credit, and, if false, is an insult 
 to his memory — "and gives the Eebels better terms than they 
 had ever asked in their most prosperous condition" — which wo 
 know to be untrue, for the Eebels asked the recognition of 
 their Confederacy. Objection eight falls for these reasons. 
 The ninth and last objection is that it "leaves the Eebels in 
 condition to renew their effort to overthrow the United States 
 Government whenever their strength is recruited and any op- 
 portunity offers." Not more than any other peace would. — 
 Not so much as Grant's agreement with Lee does. On the 
 contrary, the terms of Sherman would have taken the rebell- 
 ious heart out of the Eebels, and given us the quickest, surest, 
 and most lasting peace. 
 
 The Rebel Johnston has since surrendered on Grant's terms 
 to Lee,' and Stanton will undoubtedly claim this as a great, vic- 
 tory, and exult accordingly. Put it is not so great a victory as- 
 Sherman would have gained. It merely secures to us John- 
 ston's command, while Sherman would have given us the 
 whole Confederacy. It settles nothing for the future, while 
 Sherman's plan provided for reconstruction. Secretary Stan- 
 ton ma}' tcdegraph as he pleases, and flourish in dispatches as 
 each little squad of Eebels follow Johnsion's example: but this 
 prolonged sorrender is not so decisive as the immediate, com- 
 plete and comprehensive surrender which General Sherman 
 had arranged, It is better to bo right than to have all the 
 bluster on our side. Sherman, grasping all the issues, con- 
 cluded to do at once that which is now to be done in detail. — 
 No sound objections were offered to his plan; the objections 
 which were offered seem extremely foolish, and the manner in 
 which they were prefaced, and the temper in which the}' were 
 stated, imply less of hostility to the Eebellion than of anger to a 
 General who has presumed to do something unexpected. But 
 Sherman has always done unexpected things. 3Ie is a genius 
 and hi^ mind grapples and solves the most perplexing pro!» 
 lems. We can imagine the mingled indignation and astonish- 
 ment with which he must have received the arrogant telegrams 
 of Air. Stanton, and we shared his indignation and his aston- 
 
ishment alike. Whether he be popular or unpopular, honored 
 or disgraced, We insist that General Sherman's plan of paci- 
 fication was a good one, that it practically assured to us all 
 for which we have been fighting, and that all intellight peo- 
 ple will so regard it when this great and patriotic General is 
 heard in his own defence. 
 
 From the Cincinnati Commercial. 
 A WOED FOE SHEEMAN.— No. 1. 
 
 This gallani soldier has bewi denounced in no measured 
 terms; his great services are ignored, and for one error all the 
 past is forgotten. He is again called a madman in one breath, 
 and a political s'chemer in the next. A cruel ingenuity per- 
 verts his attempt to restore peace to the low ambition of a po- 
 litical demagogue, seeking personal advantage by the sacrifice 
 of the great cause in which he has so often risked his life and 
 gained his laurels. The cause of justice requires that we give 
 a fair consideration for this one act for which he is so unmerci- 
 fully denounced. Let us not too readily follow the lead Of 
 those who are so ready to destroy such a man, and to impute to 
 him motives for that act wholly at variance with his character 
 and antecedents. 
 
 On the 18th inst. General Sherman and General Johnston 
 signed a "memorandum or basis of agreement." It consists of 
 seven articles, all of which except the first, are left, certainly, 
 so far as Sherman is concerned, for the consideration of his 
 superiors, to be ratified, modified or totally rejected as may seem 
 best. The only point which Sherman undertakes to settle him- 
 self, is the armistice, the temporary suspension of hostilities to 
 continue only until the decision is made upon the other articles 
 by the proper authorities, and then to cease upon forty-eight 
 hours notice, if the terms are rejected. This I repeat, is the 
 only point which Sherman agrees to in the sense of a binding 
 stipulation, or as within his own just authority. 
 
 Certainly no one can doubt the power of a commanding offi- 
 cer, where two armies confront each other, upon a sudden emer- 
 gency, to agree to an armistice between their forces. The 
 most usual exercise of this power is to bury the dead. The 
 common right of humanity requires such an authority. So, too, 
 touching the living as well as the dead, if there is a proposi- 
 tion which will stop the further effusion of blood, and which 
 involves points beyond the authority of the General in com- 
 mand, and which he deems to be worthy of consideration, it is 
 not only within his power, but it is his duty to entertain them, 
 and to 6top further slaughter until the matter can be submitted 
 to those functions it is to decide. 
 
 Now let us treat Sherman fairly, for we are now considering 
 his motives. The articles contained in the memorandum may 
 
8 
 
 not recommend themselves to us, but what warrant have we 
 to say that they did not recommend themselves to Sherman?— 
 I am one of those w'ho believe that there is not a man in the 
 Republic, in the field or in civil life, more frank, more earnest, 
 more devoted to the cause, and more unselfish. Furthermore, 
 now that Abraham Lincoln is gone, it is difficult to find a man 
 whose views are more comprehensive of the whole character ot 
 the great struggle through which we are passing. 
 
 Certainly, he was among the first—if not the very first — to 
 comprehend it m the beginning. He was flippantly written 
 down as insane for the prophetic declaration then made. He 
 was altogether right then; he may be altogether wrong now. — 
 Perhaps not. The future may undeceive him; probably it may 
 undeceive us. . 
 
 Next, let us see for ourselves what this "memorandum" 
 really signifies; and, in this connection, let us carry along the 
 strictures upon it that are said to come from the Cabinet. 
 
 The first article provides that the contending armies com- 
 manded by Sherman and Johnston respectively, are to remain 
 in statu quo, until the decision is made. This, as I have said, 
 is the only article which Sherman claims to settle on his own 
 authority. 
 
 It holds Johnston and his army fastened to the spot. It 
 gives them no opportunity to retreat. It is a pledge that 
 they will not escape. If a single brigade attempts a flight, the 
 armistice is broken, and Sherman, who is there to watch, is 
 also there to pursue. 
 
 The second article provides for the disbanding not only of 
 Johnston's army but of all the Confederate armies then "in ex- 
 istence." Every one of these armies is to be broken up, and its 
 soldiers are to be conducted in detached bodies to the capitals 
 of their respective States, and there deposit their arms in the 
 State arsenals. 
 
 Observe, there is no article which looks to the disbanding of 
 any of our armies — not one loyal soldier is to be disarmed. — 
 Wherever we have an army, a military post, or a camp; wher- 
 ever we occupy a fortress or a city, our rightful position there 
 is not changed or disturbed, and our eoldiers are to remain un- 
 til we see fit to recall them*. 
 
 Observe now, that the arms are to be deposited in the arse- 
 nals of each State, at the "State capitals." Pray, into whose 
 custody do they come? Nearly all their State capitals are in 
 our possession; every person and everything they contain is in 
 our power. If there is any State capital not yet in our pos- 
 session, we have the right to send our soldiers there the mo- 
 ment these articles come into force; for at the same moment the 
 Federal authority is acknowledged all over the South, and the 
 Government, through the War Department, may order our 
 
■soldiers to any place in the South, by the same authority it has 
 to order them to any place in the North. 
 
 Tho objection taken to this article at Washington is, that it 
 places "the arms and munitions of war in the hands of the rebels, 
 at their respective capitals, which might be used as soon as 
 the armies of the United States were disbanded, and used 
 to conquer and subdue the loyal States." 
 
 Bui, if these consequences are to follow, whose fault will it 
 be? Certainly not Sherman's. If these arms "might be used 
 as soon as our armies are disbanded,'' or as soon as we with- 
 draw the force necessary to their safe keeping, we will know 
 where to fix the responsibility. Sherman certainly has not 
 disbanded our armies ; he has not withdrawn our custody over 
 those arms, but exactly the contrary, he stipulates that they 
 shall come right under our own guns, and be subject to our 
 military vigilance. If these same arms might be used after 
 the men who carried them are dispersed, if they are such dan- 
 gerous articles when in our power, it seems to me they are a 
 little more dangerous when they are in the hands of a veteran 
 army. 
 
 There is a provision with respect to this deposit of arms that 
 does not seem to be understood. It is that, until Congress 
 otherwise provides, they are to remain at their places of de- 
 posit "to be used solely to maintain peace aad order within the 
 borders of the States respectively.'' This is one of the ordina- 
 ry safeguards provided in every State for its own tranquility. 
 I do not know of one which has not this protection against 
 domestic insurrection. It is of such vital importance that it is 
 secured to every State by express constitutional provision. — 
 Certainly all over these Southern States there is danger of "do- 
 mestic violence" contemplated by the Constitution. There is 
 no safety there if the white population is disarmed. Allow 
 them means of defense against a terrible danger, but see to it 
 that they use these arms, as the memorandum has it, only to 
 maintain order. 
 
 I think we have gone far enough with this memorandum to 
 reach, at least, one safe conclusion, and that is, that it effectu- 
 ally destroys the military power of the confederacy. It puts 
 an end to the war without shedding another drop of blood. — 
 We can afford to pay a high price for such a consummation. 
 If there is a calamity to ensue, equal or greater than the one 
 which it removes; if the price is out of all proportion with the 
 benefit; if the bad outweighs the good; if the mischiefs of 
 peace that is to come are greater than the war now waged; if 
 this certain deliverance is no more certain than a future and 
 better deliverance, why then, let the war go on. It is a 
 grave question to consider, and an awful responsibility must 
 attend its decision. SICiM*. 
 
10 
 A WOED FOE SHEEMAN— NO. 2. 
 
 In a former communication I considered the first and second 
 articles of the '; Memorandum. " The next four articles provide 
 for the state of things which is to ensue when the rebels have 
 laid down their arms and have submitted themselves to Feder- 
 al authority. 
 
 The first inquiry that arises here is this : "Why did Sherman 
 entertain or receive any proposition, beyond that of the sur- 
 render of Johnston's army ? Why did he not follow exactly 
 the precedent between Grant and Lee? 
 
 A moment's reflection will show us that the matter in treaty 
 between Sherman and Johnston was altogether different from 
 that between Grant and Lee. Lee only proposed to surrender 
 the army then in the field under his immediate command. — 
 Johnston proposed to disband all the armies in the Confedera- 
 cy. Lee did not propose to put au end to the war. Johnston 
 did. Lee asked and obtained terms for every soldier and offi- 
 cer embraced in his surrender, for he compromised no others. 
 Johnston asked for terms for every officer and soldier, and for 
 every citizen or rebel, embraced in his surrender, for he com- 
 promised every one of them. If it was proper for Lee to ask 
 for terms for his soldiers, it was quite as proper for Johnston 
 to ask for terms for all the rebels, armed and unarmed, soldiers 
 and civilians, for he surrenders them all. 
 
 This explains Sherman's course. It appears that a proposi- 
 tion lor surrender came from Johnston, and that Sherman, at 
 first understanding it only to cover Johnston's army, promptly 
 replied that he would give the same terms as Grant had given 
 Lee. But when Sherman came to understand that the propo- 
 sition was of a very different and vastly more important char- 
 acter, the precedent did not appl} 7 . Other interests were in- 
 volved besides those of the army of Johnston, and it was proper 
 to consider them. 
 
 Now, to show that Sherman had jurisdiction (if I may ex- 
 press myself as a lawyer,) to entertain terms beyond the mere 
 surrender of Johnston's army, put the case that the terms of- 
 fered by Johnston wero that the rebel armies should be disban- 
 ded, and that the mass of the people, excluding the leaders, 
 should not be punished, would Sherman have been justified in 
 saying, " I can not entertain such terms, for they provide for a 
 partial amnesty, and for others besides the soldiers of your 
 army?" Sherman, therefore, did not go beyond his proper 
 limits in receiving and considering terms more comprehensive 
 th vn those fixed in the precedent of Grant and Lee. 
 
 Now, next, what are these terms ? No one was bound by 
 them. They are now abrogated. More strictty speaking, they 
 never came in force. We don't know haw they were received 
 by Johnston's "principles," but we do know how they were 
 
11 
 
 received bj r Sherman's "principals." They were rejected in 
 toto; not modified in a single particular, nor, as far, as we 
 hear, was any counter-proposition sent back, not even on the 
 basis fixed by Mr. Lincoln, and made known to the rebel com- 
 missioners before Richmond, as the terms to which he would 
 agree. Not a word as to an amnesty, general or special. Not 
 an intimation whether the States in rebellion should be allow- 
 ed to come back, either with slavery or without slavery. Not 
 a hope held out that the policy of the dead President was to be 
 the policy of his successor. 
 
 But, again, what are the terms? A general amnesty is one 
 of them. Upon this feature of the memorandum, the official 
 commentary is in these words : "It practically abolishes the 
 confiscation laws, and relieves the rebels of every degree, who 
 had slaughtered our people, from all the pains and penalties of 
 their crimes." 
 
 There is not a word in the memorandum that abolishes prac- 
 tically, or otherwise, a single law of the United States. It 
 leaves the confiscation law untouched. But it does provide 
 for a general amnesty. Did Sherman commit an error in en- 
 tertaining that policy? If so he fell into the error by follow- 
 ing the lead of Mr. Lincoln, for that was his policy. That was 
 one of the terms of settlement which Mr. Lincoln was ready to 
 offer. 
 
 It seems, however, that it is not the policy of the present ad- 
 ministration, and that just now itis not a popular policy. It is 
 announced that there shall be an amnesty for the people, but 
 not for the leaders. They are to be tried and hung. Let us 
 bring this policy to the test of common sense. 
 
 1. Who are the leaders? Who is to designate them ? Who 
 is to mark this man for punishment, and that man for deliver- 
 ance ? Who is this political censor with the issues of life and 
 death in his hands? 
 
 2. We have delioerately recognized these rebels as belliger- 
 ents — and we have entered into cartels with them for exchange 
 ot prisoners — for the exchange of all prisoners, of all grades — ■ 
 without one exception. Suppose we capture Davis himself — i 
 or that he voluntarily surrenders himself as a prisoner; pray 
 what can we do with him ? Can we punish him? Can we try 
 him bj r a Military Court, or any other court, for the offense of 
 levying war against the LTnited States? Not at all. We are 
 bound to treat him as a prisoner of war. If the war continues, 
 he is to be exchanged; if It ceases, he is to be discharged from 
 custody, We must protect him as a prisoner of war; we must 
 save him from mob violence, and £;ive him safe conduct, if he 
 require it, when the proper time comes for his release. These 
 are sacred duties which we have imposed on ourselves, yielding 
 to an inevitable necessity when this rebellion took the form of 
 a mighty war between millions of belligerents. 
 
12 
 
 Bat, some say, the military offense can not be punished, but 
 the civil offense remains, and is hot provided for or condoned 
 by the cartel. We admit we can not punish the soldier, as a 
 soldier, though taken red-handed in levying war upon us. Wo 
 must treat him a3 a prisoner of war — feed, clothe, protect, and 
 give him safe-conduct beyond our lines. We admit all that, 
 but if, after the war is over, we can again capture him, then, 
 for the same offense, we can hang him. It does not strike ono 
 that this is safe ground to rest upon ; but suppose we admit it 
 to be sound. What are we to do with the new . captives ? — 
 Take Davis, for instance. If we abide by the cartel and dis- 
 charge him as a prisoner of war, and, after he is quite beyond 
 our power, he sees proper to place himself again without our 
 reach, and we arrest him for the civil offense, how are we to 
 punish him. lie must be tried for treason, but where? In 
 Massachusetts? Can we select the place most favorable for a 
 conviction ? Xo; he must bo tried in Richmond, or, perhaps 
 in Alabama, but, at least, in some State where he committed 
 some overt act of treason ; in other words, somewhere in one of 
 the rebellious States Davis must be tried. He must be tried as 
 all other criminals are tried, by a jury of the State or judical 
 district in which his trial is had. He must be tried, if at all, 
 by an impartial jury; by a jury of twelve men, not one of 
 whom has formed or expressed an opinion as to his guilt or in- 
 nocence. 
 
 When we come to look the matter square in the face, the 
 idea of applying the common rules and forms of criminal pro- 
 ceedings to all, to an undefined part or to a single individual 
 engaged in the same gigantic war, which reckons its criminals 
 by millions, seems flatly absurd. 
 
 Say what we may, not a man, great or small, leader or fol- 
 lower, will be hung, shot or beheaded, for the crime of levying 
 war against the United States, as a party in this rebellion. If 
 he was a spy he might be shot; if he conspired or took a part 
 in the assassination of our President, the cartel would not pro- 
 tect him, for that was not war or protected by the rules of war; 
 but if he only levied war in the same open and regulated mode 
 in which the two or three millions of his associates levied and 
 carried it on, the same defense that protects them must protect 
 him. 
 
 So much for the general amnesty feature of the memoran- 
 dum. In another number we will follow up the subject. 
 
 SIGMA. 
 
 A WORD FOR SHERMAN--K0. 3. 
 
 The circumstances of the times are not favorable to calm discussion. The public 
 mind is in a state of excitement. At such a juncture we are apt to rush with great una- 
 nimity to a eonclusron which a sober, second thought obliges us to reverse. Becollect 
 the Trent affair. 
 
 Shermmdoe* not forret, for a moment, that he ha* a superior. He is careful to 
 name that superior no less than five times in the "memoraudum." Every thing, ex- 
 
IP 
 
 ■ceptihe temporary truew, is to await the decision of the "Executive of the United States - ' 
 Jormston,ioo, recognizes the fact that iie is a subordinate — that he, too, has a superior; 
 but vrho his superior is does not appear any where in the "Memorandum." "We may 
 guess, and not be witleof the mark, that his "principal" was Davis, either as the chief 
 executive officer, or as his Commander-in-chief. One thing, however, is certain — Sher 
 man would not allow that principal or even the "confederate States," to be so much 
 as named in that paper ; and Johnston submits to the humiliation. It appears that 
 Breckinridge took a part, no doubt an active part, in the negotiation — whether as a civil 
 officer, or in a military capacity, ie not shown, but his name does not appear in the pa- 
 per, nor is he allowed to sign it. 
 
 The official eommentupun the form of this negotiation isthus stated: "It wasaprac- 
 tieal acknowledgment of the rebel Government." In other words, whoever enters into 
 any conference withany agent, civil or mili'ary, of that rebel Government, to fix upon 
 the terms of its dissolution, practically recognizes it. Whoever entertains any proposi- 
 tion coming through an. agent of thai government, for its surrender, abdication and 
 destruction, gives it thereby a title ol legitimacy. It that is so, what are we to say of 
 Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward? What are we to .-"ay of that conference in which our 
 President and our Secretary of State met il e.ssrs, Campbell, Hunter and Stephens, the 
 last named second in official rank to JJavit himself '! 
 
 Undoubtedly there is a punctilio to be observed in that sort of left-handed diplomatic 
 intercourse. Sherman understood this perfectly well, and, therefore, in the matter of 
 form, the "mwnoraiiduia"' is unexceptionable. 
 
 Proceeding with the terms of the "memorandum" we come to the third article, which I 
 •quote in full: 
 
 ••The recognition by the Executive of the United States of the several State Govern- 
 ments, on their officers and Legislatures taking the oath prescribed by the Constitution 
 of the United States; and where conflicting State Governments have resulted from the 
 war, the legitimacy 01 all shall Le sol iuitud to the supieme Court of the United 
 States." 
 
 As the latter clause of this article is made the subject of special criticism in the of- 
 ficial commentary, 1 will consilient fh.-t in ureter. That c rnmentary is as lollows: "It 
 put in dispute tlte existence ot the loyal state Government, and the new State of West 
 Virginia, whichhaa been recognize-d by every department of the United States Govern- 
 ment." 
 
 This is new to me. If that department of our Federal Government called the Supreme 
 Court of the United States has yet recognized, in the only way in which a Court can rec- 
 ognize, thai is by a decision, the lawful existence of West Virginia, I, for one, have failed 
 to see or hearot the decision. No decision would give me more satislaclion. 1 consid- 
 er that the legal status of West Virginia is, and must be, fixed by the recognition of the 
 Executive and the sanction of Congress. But the final arbiter has not yet so decided. — 
 It is an open question, and there is no power in the land to withdraw that question from 
 the ( ognizanje or jurisdiction of that high tribunal. It must go there when the proper 
 ease arises. Virginia and West Virginia — the two governments contending for legiti- 
 macy over that territory — must go before the same court that settled the question of 
 legitimacy between the" charter government and .Dorr's government, in Rhode Is- 
 land. 
 
 if Sherman had signed a memorandum to refer the question to foreign arbitration — 
 say to Maximilian or Louis ISapoIeon — he would have done a very silly thing. Or if he 
 in. I opened a question fully set at rest, he would have cione a very unwise thing. He 
 lias done neither. He has simply recognized the inevitable fact that the ultimate de- 
 cision must be made by the Supreme Court. There he was willing to have it, and so 
 am I; but willing, or unwilling, there the question must go. 
 
 We now come to the stipulation which provides tor the recognition by our Executive 
 of the. several state Governments. This recognition is one of the consequences which 
 is to follow the ratification of the memorandum, but it is not an immediate consequence. 
 Fir.-t of all, the power called the edntederacy, its armies, its officers and its subjects, 
 disappear- Federal laws and Federal Courts'come into place. Every officer of every 
 Mare, every member of each State Legislature, is fast to take an oath to support the 
 Constitution of the United states. Then, and not until then, they are to be recognized. 
 A iid by whom ? By the executive authority. Observe there is not one word in the mem- 
 orandum that applies to any recognition by Congress, ithappens that at the time (;on- 
 gresi.S'is not in session. This conlederate government is to surrender at once, but the 
 states remain, the people remain, and lor the time bemgi at least, for the interim, 
 between the surrender and the next meeting of Congress, some provision is to lie made 
 by the only authority capable to net in the emergency, and that is the executive au- 
 thority. 
 
 This is the first and the necessary step to be taken in order to get these States fully 
 clear of all disloyal relations. The recognition is to be mutual. These States first 
 recognize our President as their President, Iliev abjure the -Government and the' Ex- 
 ecutive which they had adhered to for four years, and ask to reestablish the old rela- 
 tions, and to come at once under the power "and under the protection of the Executive 
 authority. All they ask is present protection— protection to life and property and 
 Tiv.i.chises. just so iar as our President, under tfteUtfik, can afford protection. ^Tiepnan 
 knew well, .and so did Breckinridge, that a recognition by the Executive, and protect- 
 ion to property and franchises, meant only such '"recognition, and such protection, as 
 the CWMft'rtVrwri and Law* ofiki'I'iiiUyl Srortei allowed the Executive to give. There is not 
 a .1 old in that, ■■memorandum' 1 that stipulates for a change beyond the just power of the 
 President. On the contrary, it contemplates nothing to be done by rhePresidonl be \ ond 
 his h'.wiid anthoiitj- — or as it is worded in one place, so far as the Executive can" — and 
 
14 
 
 in tne summary, "so far as the Executive power of the United States can command.'' 
 It leaves the proclamation of freedom, and the various acts of Congress declaring email* 
 oipationin the rebel States, wholly untouched. It leaves the great question 01 recon- 
 struction — a matter beyond the Executive authority — wholly untouched- It settles no- 
 thing but recognition of loyalty, and present protection, until the rightful authority shall 
 decide the great questions which remain in abeyance. SIGMA. 
 
 A WOED FOR SHEKMAN— NO. 4. 
 
 I have called attention to that article in the " Memorandum " which provides for the 
 recognition of the States— by the Executive — the recognition of the organized body 
 which constitutes the State, made up of citizens arid officers, civil, judicial and legisla- 
 tive, after all of them have done, everything in their power to cut loose from their dis- 
 loyal relations. 1 have said it provides for Executive recognition alone; for a recogni- 
 tion ad interim,; for just such a recognition as the Executive may be authorized to 
 make. So too, in the fifth article, as to the individual righ.s. it is declared : 
 
 " People and inhabitants of all states to be guaranteed, so far as the Executive can, 
 their political rights and franchises, as well as their rights of person and property, as 
 defined by the Constitution of the United States and the States respectively." 
 
 The official commentary on these articles is a-* follows : "By the restoration of the 
 Rebel authority in their respective States, they would be enabled to re-establish sla- 
 very." Undoubtedly if this ■•Memorandum" provides for the restoration ot rebel au- 
 thority, if all the provisions for breaking up the military power of.the rebellion, and lor 
 abjuring allegiance to it, if the disbanding of their soldiers, the surrendering of their 
 armSjtiie annihilation of that sp'.-ctorof a government known as the Confederate States, 
 if all these articles mean oniy that the rebel authority is to be restored, if tins is the 
 fair and rational construction of this "program me," then let us accept the official glosj 
 as its true interpretation. 
 
 But it does not follow, because the official objection is unsound, that there is no other 
 or sounder objection. There is much in these articles to challenge attention, and to 
 produce an unfavorably first impression. It is not a paper that, he who runs may read, 
 and be sure that, he reads aright. There is a sententious brevity about it, characteristic 
 of Sherman. Very much taken for granted ; no long verbal expletives ; no exclusions 
 of all possible misunderstandings; no skillful word-weighing, alter the manner of a di- 
 plomatist: no careful conditions, provisos, and exceptions, after the manner of a lawyer. 
 It is the woik of a soldier, going to the point at once, written with port-folio on knee, 
 and struck oti with the rapidity of an older or a dispatch. 1 wish some friend had been 
 present to call Sherrhan's attention to certain language that might be misunderstood, 
 or to the propriety of adding expressly what was left to interence. It was all clear 
 enough to Sheriireu as it stood, lie understood perfectly well its whole scope and just 
 meaning, and therefore it was that he sent it to Washington with perfect confidence that 
 it would be ratified. 
 
 I can see, in every word of that document, that Sherman felt he was following the 
 lead of Mr. Lincoln, and initiating the very state of tilings which Mr. Lincoln hadiorc- 
 H had owed. 
 
 There is iu it the provision for a general amnesty. That, certainly, was Mr. Lincoln's 
 policy, and that, at least, was lully wit-inn the Executive control. By the act of Congress 
 10 suppress insurrection, passed July 1/, ii'yi, the whole power oi pardon and amnesty 
 "' to persons who may have participated iu the existing rebellion," is given to the 
 President. The act makes no exceptional :o leaders — not even as to the chief of trait- 
 ors himself. 
 
 There is a provision in the " Memorandum " which applies to Legislatures in the 
 Southern States, as bodies which may be recognized by tne President. Is that strange.' 
 Is that anew idea? W.is notSherman perfectly. well advised of thu recent fact that the 
 President, had given his consent to the reassembling of the Virginia Legislature? What 
 a fatal mistake our great chief must have made, if the convocation of .hat Legislature 
 would have restored •' the robel authority" in Virginia, and would have enabled that 
 State " to re-establish slavery. " 
 
 There is perhaps no part of the Memorandum which has been so much misunderstood 
 and perverted as that winch provides tor a guarantee by the Executive, -so far as he 
 can," to I lie people of the States, "oftheir political rights and franchises, as well as their 
 rights of person and property." Some imagine that by adopting this provision, our 
 E-ceoutive would restore the old state of things as before the war, and set aside all the 
 laws of Congress, and all the proclamations which have been made. 
 
 It is said that under this guarantee, Davis and Toombs, and all the leaders in the re- 
 bellion, would be restored to all their personal rights and franchises, and made compe- 
 tent to sit in Congress, and to regain all their property, including their slaves emanci- 
 pated by the laws and proclamations which have been passed and made. 
 
 Xothiruj could be further from the truth. The President can not repeal a Into, dot on,; of 
 thru men could taile a seat in either House of Congress. Then «re disqualified by laic. The 
 President could not guarantee to one of them the right to become a member ot either 
 House, for thaft power belongs exclusively to Congress. 
 
 Each House is '-the judge "of the qualifications of its own members." So that it these 
 traitors ever get into Congress again, it will not be the fault ot Sherman, but ot Con- 
 gress. . 
 
 Tm-n, as to slavery and the rights of property in slaves— and the rights of property in 
 estates or things eoniscated or subject to confiscation. The '-memorandum" leave* all 
 
15 
 
 these subjects precisely where they stand. If the proclamation has emancipated the 
 slaves in the rebellious States their status is fixed beyond recall. No new proclama- 
 tion can make a slave of a man now free. 
 
 So, too, if the various acts of Congress have been effectual to destroy the relation of 
 the slave to his rebel master, no act of the Executive, no guarantee of the President, 
 and no act of Congress can testore that relation. If, after all this, the slave is not eman- 
 cipated, then there is but one remedy;lett — the most effectual of all— and that is the. 
 amendment of the Constitution. That is sure to come, and it will cut up by the root 
 every vestige of Slavery, even in loyal States, yet untouched by proclamaiion or act of 
 Congress. 
 
 We have now reached a point at which, in the consideration of these articles, Sher- 
 man, as the immediate party, must drop out of consideration, forhereare foreshadowed 
 the elements of a political contest in which we must all take a part. No matter in what 
 way, or at what time, whether now, by surrender unconditional, or hereafter, by sur- 
 render under terms agreeable to the Executive, this rebellion may cease, a question of 
 profound importance will arise, a question beyond Executive" control, a question for 
 the people, and to be settled by the people. 
 
 That question is, what shall be our policy as to those States once in rebellion, and as 
 to the people which inhabit them. 
 
 The great leader we have lost indicated what policy he deemed the wisest. It was. 
 quite evident that kks policy was not accepted in certain quarters, and that the materials 
 uf opposition to him were gathering head, and had made a demonstration in the Lou- 
 isiana ease. 
 
 His policy was amnesty, and tr# restoration of States once in rebellion to their proper 
 relation to the Union. In the first clause of his great proclamation he declares "that 
 hereafter, as heretofore, the war will be prosecuted for the object of practically reslor- 
 ing the constitutional relations between the United States and each of the States and 
 people thereof, in which States that relation is, or may be, suspended." 
 
 According to Mr. Lincoln the States remain as States, and the inhabitants are citizens 
 of the States, oniy out of their proper constitutional relation. 
 
 His policy v/as'not to dissolve all the elements which constitute a State, and turn each 
 political community called a State adrift, without local laws, or local government. His 
 policy (mark it, offer the war,) was not to abolish State Courts, State Executives, State 
 Legislatures, and to leave the people without law .without Sheriffs, without jails, without 
 franchises. 
 
 His policy was not to hold them as people within the Union — native born, too, and 
 yet stripped of the suffrage, degraded to some anomalous condition — neither citizens of 
 States nor Territories, with no security for life or property. He could not be brought 
 to look upon tbein as a conquered people, and upon thetritates as destroyed by war. — 
 No, Mr. Lincoln never lost sight of the States. He intended to recognize them, after 
 the war, a* /States, with all the franchises and rights, public and private, that, under the 
 existing laws and proclamations, the war had lelt to them. 
 
 So at least, for one, 1 understood Mr. Lincoln. That is the policy of the "memoran- 
 dum." Though it is a matter ol little consequence to any one but myself, yet I must say 
 that. for one, 1 prefer Mr. Lincoln's views to those ot Mr. Sumner, or any one of thai 
 tdase. SIGMA. 
 
UNIVERSITY OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL 
 
 00032727149 
 
 FOR USE ONLY IN 
 THE NORTH CAROLINA COLLECTION 
 

 ■ 
 
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