INSULA iUEXANDEE S.Webb of t?)e (HniDetgitp of jQortI) Carolina '^1)10 book ta)a0 pttiSfmteti Mrs. Herbert Barr DATE DUE PRIhfTED IN U.S.A. Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2014 https://archive.org/details/peninsulamcclell03webb THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGNS OF THE CIVIL WAR.~\\\. THE PENINSULA -w/s McCLELLAN'S CAMPAIGN OF 1862 ^5 BY ALEXANDER S. WEBB, LL.D. PRESIDENT OF THE COLLEGE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK; ASSISTANT CHIEF OF ARTILLERY, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC ; INSPECTOR-GENERAL, FIFTH ARMY CORPS ; GENERAL COMMANDING SECOND DIVISION, SECOND corps; MAJOK-GENERAL assigned, and CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. NEW YORK CHARLES SCRIBNEJ 743 AND 745 Broad\" 1881 Copyright by CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 1881 Trow's Printing and Bookbinding Company 201-213 East \'2th Street new YORK PEEFACE. 'I ^ ■■ To be of any practical use, all history, and particularly military history, must be gradually sifted and reduced to small compass. To carry out this idea, the publishers have asked the writer to prepare for them, in a condensed form, that part of the History of the War of the Eebellion which includes the operations of the Army of the Potomac from the assumption of the command of that army by General McClellan, in July, 1861, to its arrival at Harrison's Land- ing, in July, 1862. So much has been written on this subject that it would not at first appear to be a difficult matter to condense the various accounts ; but to the writer's task has been added the special work required in comparing and collating for careful investigation the 7iew material gathered by the War Department, and now for the first time made the basis of a history of that period. The results of that labor he presents /y) in these pages. vi PREFACE. An actor himself in everything here treated of, he has in a large measure been guided in his research by his memory of scenes never to be effaced, but not by the false impres- sions of those days, with which, on most occasions, he was heartily in accord. In speaking of the " President of the United States and his advisers," he must not be understood as recalling or changing at any time his constant and repeated expressions of admiration, affection and regard for the President him- self. He appeals to the closing chapter, reviewing the whole work of the army during the twelve months covered by this volume, to prove that he is as loyal to that noble man's memory as ever he was to him in person, and is but doing the work of an honest historian in recording the sad tale of the want of unity, the want of confidence, the want of co-operation between the Administration and the General commanding the army. In this work we cannot give in extenso the most important of the better-known documents, so often printed by the writers on both sides of the questions which arose between General McClellan and the Administration, and omit every f one not absolutely necessary to a proper understanding of the narrative. "We hope, however, that the attention of thinking men will be attracted to a more thorough investi- gation of the questions not yet settled, and that this work will serve as an aid to any one who desires to seek what is PREFACE. vii the vital lesson to be derived from our failure on the Peninsula. We have been unable to do justice to many of our most gallant officers or to their commands, by giving in full the history of their achievements during this campaign. We have been limited in the space assigned to this narrative, and we have been forced to choose between repeating the well-known accounts of various battles and giving from new data the proof of the restless and daring activity of the Eebels who fought us. We have chosen the latter course, believing that there is a public demand for information of this kind. Our sketch of the campaign will, we hope, serve as a reliable introduction to a larger volume. We are under especial obligations to Secretary of War Lincoln, to Secretary of the Navy Hunt, to Colonel Eobert N. Scott, of the Bureau of Archives in the War Department, to Generals Wright, Meigs, Barnes, Humphreys, Keyes, and others, for their continued kindness in furnishing maps and documents, during the four months in which we have been engaged in the preparation of this volume. New Yobk Citt, November, 1881. OOKTEi^TTS. List of Maps, . . xi CHAPTER I. General McClellan and the Army of the Potomac, 1 CHAPTER 11. Campaign Plans, . 10 CHAPTER III. Active Operations— Siege of Yorktown, . . .85 CHAPTER IV. Forward from Yorktown- -Battle of Williamsburg, 69 CHAPTER V. To the Chickahominy — McDowell — Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley — Affair of Hanover Court House, 83 CHAPTER VI. Battle of Fair Oaks, 97 CHAPTER VIL Withdrawal to the James — The Seven Days' Battle," 118 X CONTENTS. CHAPTER VIII. PAGE Battle of Malvern Hill, 153 CHAPTER IX. Termination of the Campaign, 168 APPENDIX A. Troops of the Army of the Potomac sent to the Peninsula in March and April, 1862, . . . 191 APPENDIX B. Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia During Engagements around Richmond, Va., . 200 LIST OF MAPS. PAGE The Peninsula of Virginia, , 18 Field of Operations in Virginia, . ... 21 Washington and Its Defences, 33 Cram's Map, . 55 The Position at Yorktown, 67 Battle-Field of " Fair Oaks," 101 Battle-Field of Gaines' Mill, ..... 131 Field of the Seven Days'" Battle, . . . 149 THE PENINSULA. CHAPTEE I GENERAL McCLELLAN AND THE ARMY OP THE POTOMAC. When the Union troops returned to Washington from the disastrous field of Manassas, or the better known Bull Run, the usual results of a defeat, where the forces engaged have been raw levies led by untried and unskilled commanders, were presented to the general Government. The capital of the nation was almost within the lines of the rebellious ter- ritory. All that was most demoralized or least apt to pre- sent either a truthful or fair account of the incidents of the few past days swarmed in the streets of Washington, and through the medium of a sensitive press spread alarm on every side. From such a presentation of the situation in front, it was not to be expected that the Government, sur- rounded by every evidence of the complete discomfiture of its main army, would be found either ready to view the reverses calmly or to act with the boldness and promptitude which the sudden events then demanded. Centreville, the key-point, or point of safety, twenty miles in advance of Washington, was given up ; the reserves, under Colonel Miles, were allowed to leave it ; and the whole force of the 1 2 THE PENINSULA. nation was immediately called into action to solve the gi-eat problem — how to regain the abandoned position and finally compel the submission of the enemy. The rebels, at first no wiser than ourselves, were there tanght that, by a little attention to our general tardiness or want of prompt decision in cases of emergency, they might hold their interior lines for an indefinite period. Men on the defensive are recej)tive scholars, and we found that our adversaries had learned this great lesson still more perfectly after our bitter experience in the Peninsula campaign. On July 21st the streets of Washington were crowded with stragglers from the Army of the Potomac. On July 22d, General George B. McClellan was relieved from command of the Army of the West, and that command was given to General W. S. Rosecrans. On July 27th, General McClellan, by order of President Lincoln, assumed control of the lately defeated troops in the vicinity of the capital. Who was this new general selected to produce order and organize our armies ? George Brinton McClellan was born in Philadelphia, De- cember 3, 1826. He entered the Military Academy in June, 1842, and graduated in June, 1846. After serving under Captain A. J. Smith and Lieutenant Gustavus W. Smith, with the new engineer company of sappers and miners at West Point, he sailed for the army in Mexico in September, 1846, and served with especial distinction until the army under General Scott entered the capital, on September 14, 1847. For distinguished ser^dces and personal gallantry he was breveted first lieutenant and captain, to date from the day of the capture of that city. He served at West Point with the Engineer Comx>any; Avith Ca^Dtain Eandolph B. Marcy, Fifth Infantry, in making the explorations of the McCLELLAN AND THE POTOMAC ARMY. 3 country embraced within the basin of the upper Eed Eiver ; on the staff of General Persifer F. Smith, in Texas, as Chief Engineer ; under Governor Isaac I. Stevens, of Washington Territory, examining the lines of the forty-seventh and forty- ninth parallels of north latitude, and determining a railroad route from the head waters of the Mississippi to Puget Sound ; was detailed to select a coaling-station in the West Indies ; and employed on duties in Washington connected with the Pacific Eailroad surveys. In all these various positions he ex- hibited the largest capacity and the most commendable zeal. As a reward and as an exhibit of the special favor in which he was held by the United States Government, he was ap- pointed one of the Military Commission to Europe to observe the operations in the Crimea. With him were associated General Delafield and Major Mordecai, then majors in the regular army. At that time he was in his twenty-ninth year, and was one of the youngest captains in the United States Army. Return- ing from this duty, after hard mental labor, and after gaining a valuable experience as an officer, he served in various sta- tions until 1857, when he resigned his commission and ac- cepted the appointment of Chief Engineer of the Illinois Central Eailroad, of which corporation he was made Vice- President in a very short period. In 1860 he was chosen President of the Ohio & Mississippi Eailroad, and resided in Cincinnati until the war of the rebellion. When the rebels had taken Sumter, and the North was turning to the graduates of the military academy for assist- ance and direction in the organization of the new troops to be ordered into the field. Governor William Denison, of Ohio, naturally sought the advice and counsel of George B. McClellan, and finally appointed him Major-General of the " Militia Volunteers " of that State. His friends realized 4 THE PENINSULA. that lie liad a lieavj task before him, but his large experience and general military education rendered him equal to its requirements, and he readily organized, equipped, and put in the field the Army of the Department of the Ohio. As the result of his operations in "Western Virginia the Govern- ment of the United States received from that army the glad intelligence of the rout of Garnett and Pegram, on July 12 and 13, 1861. It was, therefore, but natural that he should have been summoned to Washington to recreate the army which was destined to defend the capital for the next three years. From July 27th to October 31st, General McClellan re- mained in command of the Army of the Potomac only, un- til, on November 1st, he assumed control of the armies of the United States in accordance with General Order No. 94. His own order of that date is noteworthy, as coming from so young an officer on assuming so vast a responsibility. His subsequent orders to General Buell, in charge of the Depart- ment of the Ohio, and General Halleck, in charge of that of the Missouri, together with his letters to General Sherman, commanding at Port Royal, and to General Butler in the Southwest, show the vigor of thought and the grasp of the man who had been called to the prosecution of a war which extended over half the continent. He perfected a gTand scheme, in which all the armies were to bear their part, and in which the Army of the Potomac had only its subordinate movements assigned to it. General McOlellan became the Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the United States through the expressed will of the people and with the approval of the veteran General Scott. No higher compliment could have been paid the new commander than that contained in the message of President Lincoln, in December, 1861, when he says, that McCLELLAN AND THE POTOMAC ARMY. 5 " the retiring chief expressed his judgment in favor of Gen- eral McClellan for the position, and in this the nation seemed to give an unanimous concurrence." Such was the man who was to command the Army of the Potomac in its campaign against Richmond. No one had then the right to complain or to protest against his appoint- ment. He was at that date our most successful general. He accepted the full responsibility devolved upon him, and the nation has much to thank him for. It was he who or- ganized, equipped, and trained, with skill, that grand body of troops which for four long years confronted the strong- est, best appointed, and most confident army in the South." Upon reaching Washington, on July 27, 1861, the General found the forces in and around the city numbering about fifty thousand infantry, less than one thousand cavalry, and six hundred and fifty artillerymen, with nine imperfect field-batteries of thirty pieces and four hundred horses. No more faithful picture of the situation there could be pre- sented than is to be found in the General's own report, as follows : " On the Virginia bank of the Potomac the brigade organ- ization of General McDowell still existed, and the troops were stationed at and in rear of Forts Corcoran, Arlington, and Fort Albany, at Fort Runyon, Eoach's Mills, Cole's Mills, and in the vicinity of Fort Ellsworth, with a detach- ment at the Theological Seminary, near Alexandria. There were no troops south of Hunting Creek, and many of the regiments were encamped on the low grounds bordering the Potomac — seldom in the best positions for defence, and en- tirely inadequate in numbers and condition to defend the long line from Fort Corcoran to Alexandria. On the Mary- * Grant to Washburne, December 23, 1861. 6 THE PENINSULA. land side of the river, upon the heights overlooking the Chain Bridge, two regiments were stationed, whose com- manders were independent of each other. There were no troops on the important Tenallytown road, or on the roads entering the city from the south. The camps were located without regard to purposes of defence or instruction ; the roads were not picketed, and there was no attempt at an organization into brigades. '^In no quarter were the dispositions for defence such as to offer a vigorous resistance to a respectable body of the enemy, either in the positions or numbers of the troops, or the number and character of the defensive works. Earth- works, in the nature of tetes-de-pont looked upon the ap- proaches to the Georgetown aqueduct and ferry, the Long Bridge, and Alexandria, by the Little Biver Turnpike, and some simple defensive arrangements were made at the Chain Bridge. With the latter exception, not a single defensive work had been constructed on the Maryland side. There was nothing to prevent the enemy from shelling the city from the opposite heights, which were within easy range, and which could have been occupied by a hostile column almost without resistance. Many soldiers had deserted, and the streets of Washington were crowded with straggling officers and men, absent from their stations without authority, whose behavior indicated the general want of discipline and organ- ization." General McClellan immediately appointed his general staff, and the work of receiving, organizing, and preparing for the field an enormous army was forthwith undertaken. On October 27, 1861, he officially reported to the Secretary of War that on that date there were present for duty 147,695 men, with an aggregate strength of 168,318. Of this num- ber, 4,268 cavalry were completely unarmed, 3,163 partially McCLELLAN AND THE POTOMAC AKMY. 7 armed, 5,979 infantry unequipped — making 13,410 unfit for the field, but leaving an effective force of 134,285. He states that he had 76,285 men disposable for an advance, but had but two hundred and twenty-eight artillery pieces ready for the field, and required one hundred and twelve more. This seems to have been a rapid increase for the army in ninety days, being an addition of 40,000 men per month. ^' Proceeding to its efficient organization, the General formed the new levies of infantry, upon their arrival in Washington, into provisional brigades, and stationed them in the sub- urbs of the city to be perfected by instruction and disci- pline. Brigadier-General F. J. Porter was at first assigned to the charge of these brigades. He was followed by Brig- adier-General A. E. Burnside, who, in turn, vras soon after relieved by Brigadier-General Silas Casey, who continued in charge of the constantly arriving regiments until the Army embarked for the Peninsula in March, 1862. The new artil- lery troops reported to Brigadier-General William F, Barry, * The following abstract from the consolidated monthly returns of the Army of the Potomac shows its strength, from November 30, 1801, to the time it took the field on the Peninsula, inclusive of troops in the Shenandoah; on the Poto- mac, and at posts in the vicinity of Washington : PRESENT FOR DUTY. PIECES OF AKTIIiliERY. Date of Returns. Officers. Men. Aggregate present and absent. November 30, 1861 December 31, 1861 January 31, 1862.. Februarv 28, 1862. March 31, 1862.... 6.867 7,653 7,842 7,862 7,760 155,870 175.854 174,831 177,556 171,602 198,238 219,781 22i,227 222,018 214,983 133 221 92 69 242 248 293 381 465 440 2 2 1 6 Records Adjutaat-Geaerars Office. 8 THE PENINSULA. the Chief of Artillery, and the cavalry to Brigadier-General George Stoneman, Chief of Cavalry. By the opening of the spring of 1862 the expectations of General McClellan appear to have been realized in the cre- ation of as noble a body of men as could have been raised, under similar circumstances, the world over. Exclusive of detachments necessary to garrison the defences of Washing- ton and Alexandria, to retain Manassas and Warrenton, to watch the Valley of the Shenandoah, and guard the Mary- land shore of the Potomac, both above and below the capi- tal, which together mustered fifty-five thousand strong, the army proper, intended by its commander to act as a solid body for field operations, represented a force, on the rolls, of 158,000 men. At the close of this volume is inserted a roster showing its final composition and organization, to which the interested reader may wish to refer. From an examination of the tables there given, we may deduce much that would seem to secure to the General-in-Chief, for his labors, the respect and admiration of his countrymen. At the same time, to have been enabled to establish a force of such proportions and efficiency within a few months, he must necessarily have received from the general Govern- ment, fi'om the governors of the several States, and from the various bureaus and offices under the War Department, the most cordial and largest assistance. Without that sujDport, and without almost superhuman efforts on their part, such an army could never have been created. It was an army, furthermore, which was thoroughl}' repre- sentative ; an army of volunteers, composing, with the armies elsewhere in the field, the nation's posse comitatus. The troops immediately under the leadership of General McClel- lan, in March, 1862 — this Army of the Potomac — were drawn, naturally, from the Eastern and Atlantic States of the Union, McCLELLAN AND THE POTOMAC ARMY. 9 as the armies operating along the lines of the Tennessee and Mississippi were recruited, in the main, from the Cen- tral States and the great Northwest. The New England States contributed a quota of some thirty-five regiments ; New York, seventy ; New Jersey, ten ; Pennsylvania, sixty ; Delaware, one ; Maryland, nine (posted chiefly along the Po- tomac) ; while Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, "Wisconsin, and Minne- sota were also in line with from one to three thousand men each. The little corps of regulars, mustering in August, 1861, only a thousand strong, had been increased by April 30, 1862, to a respectable and highly effective brigade of 4,600, rank and file, under Brigadier- General George Sykes, then Major of the Third Infantry. Irrespective of the lat- ter, the mass of . the army was composed of intelligent voters, coming from every walk in life. It represented the bone and sinew of the land, its truest homes and best industries, its humblest, its toiling, its prosperous, and its educated classes alike. They were men, the vast majority of them, who thoroughly understood the merits of the struggle, who appreciated the value of the principle at stake, who believed they were right, and were ready to sup- port their convictions and their Government with their blood. It was, indeed, a people's cause and a people's war. Bull Eun had neither dispirited nor overawed them. That defeat had served only to bring into clearer light the magnitude and desperate character of the work in hand, and they girded their loins for the emergency. They were, in a word, as they have been and always must be described, an organized collection of citizen-soldiers, who did not des- pair of the Union, and only prayed that they might be ably led against the enemy, that their services and sacrifices might contribute decisively to success. CHAPTEE n. CAMPAIGN PLAKS. NECESSAKiLy, soon after assuming his duties as Commander- in-Chief, General McClellan turned his attention to the en- tire field of operations, treating the Army of the Potomac as only one, although the most important of the several armies under his control. Already, as Department Commander, he had prepared for the President, at the latter's request, a memorandum setting forth his views as to the proper method of suppressing the rebellion, which views he still retained, and upon which, it is generally claimed by his friends, the subsequent successful campaigns were practically based. He proposed to strike at two centres. East and West — Eichmond and Nashville — moving thus into the heart of secession ; while, at the same time, expeditionary forces were to assail the principal points on the coast, and on and beyond the Mississippi. War all along the line was his purpose. While he himself marched down into Virginia, General Buell, in Eastern Kentucky, was to secure that State, relieve Eastern Tennessee, and then point to Nashville ; General Halleck was to look after the troublesome State of Missouri, and Western Kentucky, and Tennessee ; General Burnside was to occupy the coast of North Carolina ; General T. W. Sherman was to seize Savannah, but chiefly to prepare to regain Charleston ; for by the capture of that city, " the greatest moral effect would be produced," as it was the birthplace of the rebellion. CAMPAIGN PLANS. 11 and "the centre of the boasted power and courage of the rebels ; " and lastly, General Butler was to attempt the re- covery of New Orleans, by which, the eventual control of the Mississippi could be more easily established. That this extensive plan might work effectually, General McClellan aimed to deliver the meditated blows, or the principal ones, simultaneously. The responsibility, accord- ingly, devolved upon him to have everything ready every- where at the proper moment. This alone would have been a great task, especially as he claims that no general plan ex- isted before his assumption of the chief command, and that he was wholly ignorant of the "utter disorganization and want of preparation " that pervaded the Western armies. " The labor of creation and organization had to be performed there " as well as in the East, says the General ; and by Janu- ary 1, 1862, the forward movement was still delayed. Several months thus passed devoted to preparation, and the country for the most part, understanding that the inaction was necessary, quietly awaited the compensating results that were expected to follow when active movements should begin. But the trouble was that the delay was protracted too long, even for a patient people. The fall of 1861 passed, and the rebels were as strong as ever and more defiant. The fol- lowing winter also promised to be one of stagnation, espe- cially for the Army of the Potomac, and soon toward the close of 1861, and in the beginning of 1862, much curiosity and uneasiness was betrayed respecting the intentions of the new and then popular Commander-in-Chief. The latter, however, was clearly determined not to be hurried. As late as Febru- ary 3, 1862, he wrote to the President, " I have ever regarded our true policy as being that of fully preparing ourselves, and then seeking for the most decisive results ; " and it was not 12 THE PENINSULA. until a short time before that date, that he disclosed his own plan of campaign in Virginia to the Government authorities. His inaction he reported to be unavoidable. Prepara- tions for the execution of the general plan — the simultaneous movement — were incomplete. He had hoped that every- thing would have been ready to take advantage of the good weather in the previous December, but it was not. His own army even, he declared, was not yet in condition to take the field. We are still delayed," he told the President, in his February letter, and, furthermore, gave no hint as to the time when he should be completely ready. How this unfortunate situation might have been avoided — what General McClellan ought to have done during those six months his army remained around "Washington — is a specula- tive question which we do not feel called upon to consider. It will be enough to discuss the plan for action which he finally did propose, and to follow out his movements in the field when actually undertaken. That the delay, however satisfactory or unsatisfactory his own explanation and de- fence of it may be regarded, worked to his disadvantage and paved the way for future distrust of his generalship, is certain. He drew too heavily upon the faith of the public. By March 1st the nation had incurred a debt of $600,000,000 for the war ; while the results were far from commensurate with such a cost. Dissatisfaction arose, especially at Wash- ington, in Government circles, and in Congress. Criticisms were freely indulged in. The General, in addition, kept his councils to himself, consulted with but one or two favorite officers, and seemed to hold close relations with men not in political sympathy with the Administration. All this gave umbrage in high places ; and it became the more incumbent upon him to act, to act speedily, energetically, and success- fully, if he hoped to retain the confidence of the powers to CAMPAIGN PLANS. 13 wMch he was amenable, or entitle himself to the obligations of a grateful people. At length General McClellan was compelled to divulge his plans and move forward; and this brings us to some im- portant points in the history of the campaign. Among those who deeply felt the necessity of renewing the advance upon the enemy, was President Lincoln. An immense and , oppressive responsibility rested upon his shoulders. He was constantly anxious both in success and defeat ; and extremely anxious now, at the close of the year 1861. The situation was anything but satisfactory. In October previous, the disastrous affair of Ball's Bluff had occurred, in which Colonel Baker, lately of the Senate, lost his life. The rebels, also, had blocked the navigation of the Potomac by planting batteries on the Virginia side twenty or thirty miles down the river ; and their flag floated insult- ingly, from their advanced works on Munson's Hill, in sight of Washington. These untoward circumstances, and the in- activity of McClellan, seemed to have prompted the Presi- dent, as early as December 1st, to propose informally to the General, a plan of attack upon the enemy — his idea being that a column of 50,000 men should menace and hold the rebels at their Centre ville position, while 50,000 more — part going by the Potomac, and part by land — should move to Occoquan Creek below, and place themselves nearer to Eich- mond than the main body of the enemy were at Centreville. This is interesting, not only as being the first plan, so far as the writer can discover from the records, suggested for the campaign, but as emanating from Mr. Lincoln himself, who made no pretensions to military knowledge ; thus disclosing his intense desire that something should be done. Up to this time. General McClellan had given no intima- u THE PENINSULA. tion of his own plans, other than the general assertion, made in the latter part of October, that "the crushing defeat of the rebel army at Manassas," was the great object to be accom- plished; and that the advance upon it "should not be post- poned beyond November 25th." On December 10th, how- ever, he wrote a confidential note to the President, apparently in answer to the latter's proposal, in which he impliedly dis- approved of it, by stating that he believed the enemy's force to be equal to his own ; and then added, " I have now my mind actually turned toward another plan of campaign that I do not think at all anticipated by the enemy, nor by many of our own people." ^ This is the first hint we have that any plan was taking sliape in the General's mind ; and the first that foreshadowed the final move to the Peninsula. It will be observed, that here was the possibility of a seri- ous conflict of opinion. In case the President and the Gen- eral matured plans diametrically opposed to each other, which was to be followed ? What is our highest military authority ? According to the Constitution, it is the Presi- dent, Commander-in-Chief of all the land and naval forces of the United States. But if the President disclaims all military ability, as Mr. Lincoln did, it still becomes a ques- tion how far he should defer the conduct of a war to his generals commanding in the field. In the closing chapter of this work certain precedents are adduced upon this point, showing the position assumed by our Presidents during the War of 1812 and the Mexican War. They asserted their right to disapprove and interfere, and the propriety of their interference seemed to be justified. There never w^as any question in President Lincoln's case, as to his right to order and direct ; but the dilemma lay here — whose plans and ad- * See Appendix to Rfiymoncrs Life of Lincoln for this note and the Presi- dent's plan referred to. CAMPAIGN PLANS. 15 vice should he follow where it was necessary for him to ap- prove and decide, where he did not or would not trust his own judgment ? Should he lean implicitly on the general actually in command of the armies, placed there by virtue of his presumed fitness for the position, or upon other selected advisers ? We are bold to say that it was doubt and hesitation upon this point, that occasioned many of the blunders of the campaign. Instead of one mind, there were many minds influencing the management of military affairs. To one source of this influence, beyond the members of the President's Cabinet, who were by right his advisers, we must revert. This was the Joint Committee of Congress, appointed in December, 1861, to inquire into the conduct of the war. Its members were Hons. Benjamin F. Wade, of Ohio, Zachariah Chandler, of Michigan, and Andrew John- son, of Tennessee, from the Senate ; and Hons. Daniel W. Gooch, of Massachusetts, John Covode, of Pennsylvania, George W. Julian, of Indiana, and Moses F. Odell, of New York, from the House of Eepresentatives. Organizing De- cember 20th, with Senator Wade as chairman, it proceeded to summon many of the general officers of the army to ob- tain their views as to its efficiency, and the best lines of ad- vance upon the enemy. It was a strong representative com- mittee, and not only held consultations with the President and the new Secretary of War, Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, but also with the President and his entire Cabinet. No record of these interviews appears to have been preserved ; but no one can doubt their effect upon the Administration in influencing its action. Executive, Cabinet and Commit- tee, were in earnest in their wish to prosecute the war to a speedy and successful termination. In common with the President and the country at large, this Committee was entirely dissatisfied with the prolonged 16 THE PENINSULA. inactivity of the Army of the Potomac. The members were especially mortified and indignant that the rebels should have been suffered to blockade the Potomac Eiver so long, preventing free access by water to the capital of the na- tion, and thereby seriously affecting our delicate rela- tions abroad. They demanded from the Secretary of War that the blockade should be raised — the chairman, on one occasion, using " pretty strong and emphatic language " on the subject in the presence of both the Secretary and Gen- eral McClellan ; and in their report the Committee lay the blame upon the General, who, in his report, holds the navy accountable. Again, the Committee examined many officers on the subject of organizing the army into corps ; and find- ing great unanimity as to the necessity of such organization, j)ressed the matter upon the attention of the President more than once. Their last consultation with him on this subject occurred on March 5th, when he promised to take the mat- ter " into earnest and serious consideration." Three days later, on the 8th, he promulgated an order dividing the army into four army corps, to the command of which Gen- erals McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes were as- signed. The order was contrary to the wishes of McClellan, who proposed to defer the organization until after active operations had opened. The Committee, furthermore, ob- tained opinions from officers as to the best line of attack for the army to follow ; and seemed to have become impressed with the superior advantages of a direct advance upon Cen- treville. That its preferences were known to the President, can hardly be questioned. Indeed, without a particular exam- ination of the proceedings of this important Committee and a proper estimate of its influence, the action of Mr. Lincoln and his Cabinet, in certain matters affecting this campaign, cannot be fully understood. That body must be counted CAMPAIGN PLANS. 17 among the President's most influential advisers. It was a power during the war. Eeturning to the plan of the campaign, we find that Mr. Lincoln, who on December 1st had suggested operating against the enemy in front and flank, took up the matter again early in January following, by seeking the opinions of a few of the more prominent generals in the army. General McClellan had ^ had the misfortune of falling ill about the middle of December, and was confined to his house for nearly a month. Mr. Lincoln, more than ever exercised and worried over the delays, called in Generals McDowell and Franklin, and in a confidential interview inquired as to the possibility of soon commencing active operations with the Army of the Potomac. The President stated that " if some- thing was not soon done, the bottom would be out of the whole affair." * A day or two later these officers, who had consulted with Quartermaster-General Meigs and others, reported, that of the two lines of attack considered — one direct upon the enemy, the other by moving the army to another base down the Chesapeake — they advised the former, which could be undertaken in three weeks, f General McClel- lan, recovering from his illness, and finding that " excessive anxiety for an immediate movement of the Army of the Po- tomac had taken possession of the minds of the Administra- tion," finally unfolded his plan of operations to the President, which contemplated an attack upon Eichmond by the lower Chesapeake. He was not in favor of a direct attack upon * General McDoweirs memorandum in Swinton's " Army of the Potomac." t General Franklin, it seems, favored a movement by way of the Yorh Rive)% and so testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War ; but according to General McDowell's statements (in Swinton) he deferred his plan in favor of a direct attack on the enemy as the most feasible at that lime, namely, in Janu- ary, and because of the President's wish for immediate action. 2 18 THE PENINSULA. the enemy at Centre ville. But the President had now be- come confirmed in his preference for the latter plan bv the opinions of McDowell, Franklin an d Meigs ; and undoubtedly, as stated above, by the known preferences of the Committee on the Conduct of the War. We thus find the two leaders upon whom the eyes of the nation were then fixed — ^Mr. Lin- coln and General McClellan — at issue with each other at a most critical moment. It has been, and probably always will be one of the stand- ing questions of dispute in this campaign, whose plan was the soundest, the President's or the General's ? The President, certainly, was so far convinced of the advisability of adopting his own, or, as it may be called, the Administration plan, that he formally disapproved of McClellan's, and in a special war order, "No. 1," dated January 31st, directed that the Army of the Potomac, "after providing safely for the defence of Washington," should move forward, on or before February 22d, and seize and occupy a point upon the railroad south- west of Manassas Junction. The first effect of this, would be the withdrawal of the enemy from their position in front of the capital. Four days before — January 27tli — the Presi- dent had ordered a general advance of all the armies of the United States upon the same date. General McClellan, feeling that his own plan should be preferred, obtained permission from Mr. Lincoln to present his reasons therefor, in full ; and in a letter prepared under date of February 3d, he reviewed the military situation at large and discussed in particular the two different lines of advance proposed for the army of the Potomac. The " best possible plan," in his judgment, he believed to be, to descend the Potomac, enter the Eappahannock, land at Urbana for a base, and by a rapid march gain West Point at the head of the York Eiver ; and thus threaten Eichmond before John- CAMPAIGN PLANS. 19 stones army at Centreville could fall back and meet liim in condition to resist his progress. In other words, he pro- posed to outflank the enemy far on the left, and suddenly turn the tables by making the vicinity of Richmond and not Washington, the theatre of operations. This plan, he claimed, presented the shortest land route to the Con- federate capital, and struck directly at the heart of the enemy's power at the East. Explaining further, he wrote : " The total force to be thrown upon the new line would be, according to circumstances, from one hundred and ten thousand to one hundred and forty thousand. I hope to use the latter number by bringing fresh troops into Washington, and still leaving it quite safe. I fully realize that, in all projects offered, time will probably be the most valuable consideration. It is my decided opinion that in that point of view, the second plan should be adopted. It is possible — nay, highly probable, that the weather and state of the roads may be such as to delay the direct movement from Washing- ton, with its unsatisfactory results and great risks, far be- yond the time required to complete the second plan. In the first case, we can fix no definite time for an advance. The roads have gone from bad to worse. Nothing like their present condition was ever known here before ; they are impassable at present. We are entirely at the mercy of the weather. It is by no means certain that we can beat them at Manassas. On the other line I regard success as certain by all the chances of war. We demoralize the enemy by forcing him to abandon his prepared position for one which we have chosen, in which all is in our favor, and where success must produce immense results. My judgment as a general is clearly in favor of this project. Nothing is cer- * To Secretary Stanton. 20 THE PENINSULA. tain in war, but all the ckances are in favor of this move- ment. So much am I in favor of the southern line of opera- tions, that 1 would prefer the move from Forti^ess Monroe as a base, as a certain though less brilliant movement than that from Urbana, to an attack upon Manassas. I know that the President and you and I all agree in our wishes, and that these wishes are to bring this war to a close as promptly as the means in our possession will permit. I believe that the mass of the people have entire confidence in us — I am sure of it. Let us then look only to the great result to be ac- complished, and disregard everything else." The merits of the Administration plan, on the other hand, as claimed by its advocates, lay in the fact, that a direct advance upon the enemy in front, first of all, kept the army between Washington and the rebels and rendered a counter attack upon the city impossible. This was a point of the greatest conse- quence. "Washington, at all events, for sound political reasons, should be secured from insult and capture. The direct attack also involved a smaller expenditure of time and money ; and in case of disaster, retreat could be effected with less difficulty. Now, in regard to the Urbana plan, pronounced absurd by some of our best critics, we think that it was bold and not rash ; that it was general and not limited. It was proved to be possible, if carried out as at first conceived. What prin- ciple of war is violated we are not prepared to discuss, un- less we take time and space to show how little we applied such principles throughout the contest. In handling the army of the Potomac, our main principle was to secure Wash- ington and take Kichmond. The rebels' principle was to take advantage, after they had had experience, of every demonstration of distrust or doubt of our ability to do that which would have been ordinarily done in war. Field of Operations iu Virginia. 22 THE PENINSULA. This plan compreliended decided and active operations in the Shenandoah Valley ; it designed to turn Yorktown and Gloucester ; it ignored Norfolk and the use of the James ; it carried with it all the dash of spirit a good plan should require and produce. General McClellan became convinced that the enemy had 115,000 men at Manassas and on its flanks ; and upon these false data, he determined that he could not take or turn those works. He was therefore driven to other plans than those involving direct attack. He did not prepare to carry out the plan proposed and endorsed by President Lincoln. His sole object was to bring his army, as an invading army, as close to the enemy's capital as possible. He hoped to prevent unnecessary bloodshed ; he expected to demoral- ize the enemy by rapid movements, bringing his army close to Richmond, to meet the rebels near that point before their troops should be "brought w^ell in hand." There was nothing in this plan new or impossible. One of the best military authorities we have now living, General A. A. Humphreys, late Chief of Engineers, former Chief of Staff to General Meade, late Commander of the Second Army Corps in front of Eichmond, was in favor of this movement. Combined with a strong and active series of operations in the valley, it threatened Eichmond in rear and front, d^ndi protected Waslmigton; and it would have forced a sudden attempt to bring about reconciliation and a patch- work peace from the rebels then and there, if our rulers were meek enough to make such a one. Some feared they were. They proved they were not. The fears of our best counsellors were transmitted to our generals. Politics en- tered and strategy retired. The general commanding had conceived a plan which could have been carried out ; and which would have jilaced CAMPAIGN PLANS. 23 us close to the city of Eichmond in a very few days. He foresaw the trouble we afterward encountered by the direct route. He turned all the defences south of Urbana, and protected Washington, we repeat, through active operations directly upon Eichmond ; and more than all, he protected Washington by menacing the rebel communications with the West, through the operations in the valley of the Shenandoah. It was absolutely impossible for the enemy to threaten Washington, even morally, if lie were rapid and dashing in his movements. The movement to Urbana might have been the "stride of the giant." Criticisms of this plan, based upon operations conducted in countries where every stream is well known, where every road is accurately mapped, and based upon so-called prin- ciples of war, cannot apply to this movement of new troops against new levies of insurgents, in a country of which but little was known to either of the commanding generals. Finally, after many conferences, and the result of a coun- cil of war, wherein eight out of the twelve division com- manders of the army reported in favor of McClellan's route by way of the lower Chesapeake, President Lincoln yielded his preference, and on March 8th, issued the following order : * The generals favoring the Administration plan were McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Barnard, the latter, Chief of Engineers. Those favoring the Urbana movement were Keyes, Franklin, Fitz- John Porter, W. F. Smith, McCall, Blenker, Andrew Porter, and Naglee, who represented Hooker. Keyes voted wath the qualification that no change of base should be made until the Potomac was cleared of the rebel batteries. The Committee on the Conduct of the War report that they had " no evidence, either oral or documentary, of the discussions that ensued, or the arguments that were submitted to the consideration of the President, that led him to re- linquish his own line of operations, and consent to the one proposed by General McClellan, except the result of this Council of War." 24 THE PENINSULA. PRESIDENT'S GENERAL WAR ORDER, NO. 3. Executive Mansion, Washington, March 8, 1862. Ordered^ That no change of the base of operations of the Army of the Potomac shall be made without leaving in and about Washington such a force as, in the opinion of the General-in-Chief and the com- manders of army corps, shall leave said city entirely secure. That no more than two army corps (about fifty thousand troops) of said Army of the Potomac shall be moved en route for a new base of operations until the navigation of the Potomac from Washington to Chesapsake Bay shall be free from the enemy's batteries and other ob- str actions, or until the President shall hereafter give express permis- sion. That any movement as aforesaid, en route for a new base of opera* tions, which may be ordered by the General-in-Chief, and which may be intended to move upon the Chesapeake Bay, shall begin to move upon the bay as early as the 18th of March instant ; and the General-in- Chief shall be responsible that it so moves as early as that day. Ordered, That the army and navy co-operate in an immediate effort fio capture the enemy's batteries upon the Potomac, between Washing- ton and the Chesapeake Bay. ABRAHAM LINCOLN. L. Thomas, Adjutant-General. On March 9tli, the day after the issue of this order, the rebels evacuated Gentremlle. This unexpected evacuation, General McClellan claims in his testimony before the Committee of Congress, to have been induced by information which reached the enemy while he was discussing his plans with the Administration. One reason why he had been so reserved was a mistrust that secrecy was not closely observed by others with whom he was obliged to have official communications. But General Johnston, on the other side, makes no admission that his movements were guided by espionage. He shows, in his CAMPAIGN PLANS. 25 " Narrative," that the abandonment of Centreville had been contemplated for more than two weeks ; and actually begun on March 7th, or the day before the promulgation of the President's order given above. Johnston's reasons for fall- ing back and taking up a new position on the line of the Eappahannock are so fully expressed, that we quote his words : " We had to regard," he says, " four routes to Eicli- mond as practicable for the Federal army : that chosen in the previous July [via Bull Eun] ; another east of the Poto- mac to the mouth of Potomac Creek, and thence by Fred- ericksburg ; the third and fourth by water — the one to the Lower Eappahannock, the other to Fort Monroe ; and from these points respectively by direct roads. As the Confed- erate troops in Virginia were disposed, it seemed to me that invasion by the second route would be the most difficult to meet ; for as the march in Maryland would be covered by the Potomac, the Federal general might hope to conceal it from us until the passage of the river was begun, and so place himself at least two days' march nearer to Eichmond than the Army of Northern Virginia on Bull Eun. I did not doubt, therefore, that this route would be taken by Gen- eral McClellan. The opinion was first suggested by the lo- cation of a division of the United States Army [Hooker's] opposite to Dumfries. On the 5th, information from Briga- dier-General Whiting of unusal activity in the division oppo- site to him — that referred to above — suggested that the Fed- eral army was about to take the field, so I determined to move to the position already prepared for such an emergency — the south bank of the Eappahannock, strengthened by field- works, and provided with a depot of food ; for in it we should be better able to resist the Federal army advancing by Ma- nassas, and near enough to Fredericksburg to meet the enemy there, should he take that route, as well as to unite with any 26 THE PENINSULA. Confederate forces that might be sent to oppose him should he move by the Lower Eappahannock or Fort Monroe."* By the 11th the entire rebel army had moved unmolested to the south bank of the Eappahannock, where Johnston fixed his headquarters near Rappahannock Station. To but a single fact do we call attention in this connec- > tion : that during all the time that army lay at Centreville, in- solently menacing Washington and frightening our civil and military authorities into the concentration of an enormous force around the city, it never presented an effective strength of over 50,000 men. f With more than thrice that number, McClellan remained inactive for many jDrecious weeks, under the delusion that he was confronted by a force very nearly equal to his own. It is astonishing that neither the General, nor the President, nor the searching Committee of Congress, nor the exacting Secretary of War, should have been able to ascertain the truth in the case during this long period. The only sources of intelligence upon which estimates seem to have been made, were the reports of deserters, contrabands, and coun- try people who came into the lines, and underwent an ex- amination at the hands of a detective at headquarters, who ranked upon the rolls as Cliief of the Secret Service. There now again arose the question, what was to be done ? Upon hearing that the rebels had left his front, McClellan broke up his camps around the capital and marched toward Centreville, establishing himself at Fairfax Court House. * Narrative of Military Operations Directed during the Late War between the States, p. 101. By Joseph E. Johnston, General C.S.A. t The aggregate " present in camp in Johnston's army for Februarj', 1862. waa 50,392; present for duty. 47,300, JircClellan's aggregate, present for duty, for the same month was 150.000 in round numbers, excluding troops in the valley and in Maryland. CAMPAIGN PLANS. 27 No wonder the Prince de Joinville describes tlie young gen- eral as appearing anxions and disturbed when directing this movement. To follow the enemy was deemed impractica- ble ; to change the base seemed at this time to be the only plan which would give to the out-generalled army a chance to gain either reputation or increase of spirit. General McClellan had left his headquarters in Washing- ton, and might well be considered to have taken the field; and on March 11th, the President in another war order, re- lieved him of the command of all the military departments save the Department of the Potomac. Commanding from this period this army and department only, he confined his attention to active operations. To repeat — what was to be done under the changed situa- tion ? Should the Urbana plan still be carried out ? To solve this new question, a council of war assembled at Fairfax Court House, March 13th, composed of the four Corps Commanders, Generals McDowell, Sumner, Heintzel- man, and Keyes ; before whom, in what seems to have been an informal conversation. General McClellan laid the proposi- tion of moving further down the Chesapeake, and making Fort Monroe the base of operations."^ This was at last the Peninsula plan, the third that had been considered, a kind of ^'dernier ressort.''^ It had already been mentioned by McClellan, as a possible alternative, in his letter of February 3d, where he writes : " Should circumstances render it not advisable to land at Urbana, we can use Mob Jack Bay — or the worst coming to the worst, we can take Fort Monroe as a base, and operate with complete security, although with less celerity and brilliancy of results, up the Peninsula." The Urbana plan had been shorn of its merits and feasibility * This council was summoned by General McClellan, not by the President. 28 THE PENINSULA. since Jolinston's retirement to the Eappahannock. MeClel- lan now could not expect to steal a march upon him. There remained no other course but to take what the General de- scribes as the safe route between the York and the James. That it was a route which had its advantages will not be de- nied. It was expected that West Point could be speedily reached at little sacrifice of life ; and, as meditated in the TJr- bana plan, the scene of operations would thus be transferred to the immediate vicinity of Richmond. If the Urbana plan was a good one, as we thoroughly believe it to have been, there are substantial reasons for also regarding the Peninsula plan in a favorable light ; securing, as it would have done, about the same, or at least, satisfactory results. Necessarily the approval of any plan must be premised upon the ex- pected vigorous execution of it. The corps commanders at the council of the 13th, al- though three of their number (McDowell, Sumner, and Heintzelman) had, as division commanders, disapproved the Urbana plan, adopted General McClellan's final Penin- sula proposition, without dissent. Their proceedings were summed up as follows : Headquarters Army of the Potomac, Fairfax Court House, March 13, 1862. - *' A council of the generals commanding army corps, at the head- quarters of the Army of the Potomac, were of the opinion : " I. That, the enemy having retreated from Manassas to Gordonsville, behind the Rappahannock and Rapidan, it is the opinion of generals commanding army corps that the operations to be carried on will be best undertaken from Old Point Comfort, between the York and James Rivers, provided, 1st, that the enemy's vessel, Merrimac, can be neu- tralized ; 2d, that the means of transportation sufficient for an imme- diate transfer of the force to its new base can be ready at Washington and Alexandria to move down the Potomac ; and 3d, that a naval auxil- iary force can be had to silence, or aid in silencing the enemy's batter- CAMPAIGN PLANS. 29 ies on the York River ; 4th, that the force to be left to cover Washing- ton shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace. (Unanimous ) "II. If the foregoing cannot be, the army should then be moved against the enemy behind the Rappahannock at the earliest possible moment, and the means for reconstructing bridges, repairing railroads, and stocking them with materials for supplying the army should at once be collected for both the Orange and Alexandria and the Acquia and Richmond Railroads (unanimous). N. B. — That, with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on the laft bank occupied, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of twenty-five thousand men would suffice (Keyes, Heintzelman, and Mc- Dov/ell). A total of forty thousand men for the defence of the city v/ould sufiice (Sumner)." This was approved by General McClellan, and imme- diately communicated to tlie "War Department ; and on the same dav the following reply was received : "War Department, March 13, 1862. " The President, having considered the plan of operations agreed upon by yourself and the commanders of army corps, makes no ob- jection to the same, but gives the following directions as to its exe- cution : "1. Leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall make it en- tirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that situ- ation and line of communication. "2. Leave Washington entirely secure. "3. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere between there and here ; or at any event, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route. "Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War. "Major-General George B. McClellan." But the council demanded a great deal more than it was ever possible to carry out. The whole position of affairs, as presented when General McClellan made known his first 30 THE PENINSULA. plans, had been changed by the appearance of the rebel ram Merrimac, or Virginia, on March 8th. Although the navy had neutralized her power in so far as to prevent her injur- ing our new base, she still prevented us from utilizing the James Eiver, and also demanded the diversion of a large portion of the naval forces to watch her, and prevented the admiral even from considering the practicability of running by the batteries at Yorktown or co-operating with the army in the movement up the Peninsula, had he been called uipon so to do. General McClellan (page 118, Eeport) says : *'The general plan, therefore, remained undisturbed, although less promising in its details than when the James Eiver was in our control." Unfortunately, the fact was that we were now to work upon Plan No. 3, or the plan of the council, with the western flank of the Army of the Peninsula resting on the rebel gunboats, and not on the United States Navy. Here, also, let us present one fatal consequence of McClel- lan's long dwelling on the Urbana plan, and his delay in executing it. He probably, little thought he would be driven to his " dernier ressorV for a base ; and he committed a fatal error in leaving Norfolk to be turned. Admiral Goldsborough, commanding the fleet in the lower Chesapeake, Assistant Secretary of the Navy G. Y. Fox, and General J. G. Barnard had, as early as December, 1861, pointed out to General McClellan the necessity of his taking Norfolk. This rebel navy yard was in full blast, and the rebel rams and the Merrimac were growing, and threatening our navy and our transports. All that was required to se- cure to us the whole of their machinery, naval supplies, and their fleet, was a detachment of thirty or forty thousand * The doings of the Merrimac and the subsequent gallant action of the Mon- itor are omitted here to preserve the continuity of the narrative. We must refer the reader to more extended works for the naval operations. CAMPAIGN PLANS. 31 men. The capture of Norfolk would have changed every- thing. General McClellan probably believed that that place would fall through his own then contemplated move- ment ; and he did nothing to carry out these news, so ably presented by our very best naval and military advisers. Had he made the attempt and secured the success of this movement by a strong attack or feint threatening Manassas, the problem. presented to the council of corps commanders would have been very different from the one they encoun- tered at Fairfax Court House. Nothing that was proposed or ordered, which contemplated r making Fortress Monroe a base, had anything to do with General McClellan's first and only well-digested plan. At this point we defer all further consideration of the campaign plans, and the plan finally adopted, for a brief review in the closing chapter. Why the Peninsula route was at length followed, we have seen. McClellan could not bring himself to adojDt the Administration plan of a direct advance upon Centreville and the overland route to Eich- mond. Mr. Lincoln could not agree with the General in the choice of the Urbana base, but yielded his preferences ; especially before the expressed opinion of the council of division commanders. Johnston suddenly moved and de- ranged the Urbana scheme ; and McClellan and his corps commanders could fix upon nothing else than an advance upon Eichmond by way of the Peninsula. To this the Presi- dent gave his consent, under certain conditions ; and it re- mained the final plan for the campaign. When the plan had been adopted, the Secretary of War naturally required from General McClellan a detailed state- ment of his designs with regard to the employment of the 32 THE PENINSULA. Army of the Potomac ; and on March 19th the General gave to the Secretary, the following as these details : Fort Monroe was to be the base ; the line of operations, that of Yorktown and West Point upon Eichmond. A decisive battle was to be expected between West Point and Eichmond. To succeed, he wished all the available forces to be collected at once, and to reach West Point as soon as possible, in order that he might establish his main depot there. To reach West Point he stated there were two methods : First, to move directly from Fortress Monroe with the main force, and to land troops near Yorktown, driving out the troops south of that point ; then reduce Yorktown and Gloucester by a siege ; second, to make a combined naval and land attack upon Yorktown, the first object of the campaign. To do this he required a con- centration of all the most powerful batteries in the navy upon the York Eiver ; and he urged repeatedly, the necessity of the navy's throwing all its available force against York- town. Neither in this letter, nor in any communication that we can discover, did General McClellan intimate that he could carry out the orders of the Government with a smaller movable force than that he had first proposed ; that is to say, 140,000 men. Our unhappy campaign opened with a march to Centre- ville — a mere movement, calculated to rid the army of useless baggage, and fit it for embarkation for the new base. Dur- ing this month, the transports which had previously been collected at Annapolis for the Urbana movement, were rapidly accumulating at Alexandria ; but they did not assem- ble in numbers and capacity sufficient to transport, as Gen- eral McGlellan claims he w^as promised they would, 50,000 men at a time. The embarkation began March 17th. Heintzelman's corps CAMPAIGN PLANS. 33 led, Hamilton's division moving first ; on the 22d Porter's followed, and the General placed both in position on roads leading to Newport News and to Yorktown. The rest of the army embarked as best it could. General McClellan left with his headquarters on the steamer Commodore, on April 1st, and Washington and its Defences. reached Fort Monroe on the afternoon of the 2d. He re- ports that he had at Fort Monroe and its vicinity, ready to move, two divisions of the Third Corps nnder General Heintzelman ; two divisions of the Fourth, or Keyes' corps ; 3 34: THE PENINSULA. one division of the Second, or Sumner's corps ; Sykes' regu- lar infantry brigade ; Hunt's reserve artillery, and three re- giments of cavalry, in all about fifty-eight thousand men and one hundred guns. Casey's division of the Fourth Corps could not move without wagons, and Eichardson's division of the Second, and Hooker's, of the Third Corps, had not arrived. At Washington, as will be seen, there was to be left a gar- rison of about twenty thousand men, some of them raw and indifferent troops, who were expected to hold the defences against sudden attack. These defences consisted of a cordon of strong, independent forts, supporting each other, and ex- tending on the south bank of the Potomac from belov/ Alex- andria along beyond Arlington Heights to Chain Bridge, above the capital. On the Maryland side the line continued from the Potomac to the eastern branch, near Bladensburgh, and thence along the heights south of the eastern branch to a point nearly opposite Alexandria — making a circuit, or total development," as Barnard reports, of thirty-three miles. CHAPTER ni. ACTIVE OPERATIONS. —SIEGE OF YORKTOWN, In entering upon the narrative of the active operations of the campaign^ the two leading facts to be met and dealt with are : First. — That while General McClellan succeeded in reach- ing the vicinity of his objective point — the Confederate capi- tal — the results at each stage of his progress were inadequate and disappointing. Second, — That when that point seemed to be within his grasp, his army suddenly encountered reverses^ and retreated from its advanced position to the banks of the James. The history of the campaign, in short, is the history of a lamentable failure — nothing less ; and in presenting its fea- tures and incidents, the natural tendency will be to investi- gate fully and radically, so far as such a course is possible, those movements or delays upon which the failure appar- ently hinged. The point of interest must always necessarily, be, to indicate and establish the responsibility in each case ; whether that responsibility is found to rest with one indi- vidual or many, or with those unforeseen or uncontrollable agencies which are vaguely described as the "fortune of war," but which usually prove to be the superior ability or resources of the antagonist. What, then, we ask, as a proper initial inquiry, were 36 THE PENINSULA. General McClellan's intentions and immediate plan upon aiTi\'ing to take the field from Fort Monroe ? He i^roposed the prompt, direct, and vigorous offensive. Upon this point there is no obscurity. I had hoped," says the General in his report, "by ra^Did movements to drive before me or capture the enemy on the Peninsula, open the James Eiver, and iDUsh on to Richmond before he should be materially reinforced from other portions of his terri- tory." Entering into details, it will be observed that the plan contemplated the advance of the main body of the army up the Peninsula, with the co-operation of the na^w in the rivers ; while a powerful column, consisting of McDowell's First CoriDS, over 40,000 strong, was to ox)erate U23on the right, on either bank of the York, to tiu'n the enemy's posi- tions should they offer resistance on the direct route. This was but a pro^DOsal to execute one of those large flank move- ments which met with such frequent success on both sides in the after-camx3aigns of the war. Under this plan it was ex- X:)ected that the advance of the army would be continuous, or at least be only briefly delayed, until West Point should be reached, where the base of immediate oj)erations against Richmond was to be established. But McClellan had not been on the Peninsula six days, before he ex^Derienced two serious disappointments — his l^lans suffered derangement in two important respects. In the first place, he ascertained upon his arrival at Fort Monroe that the navy would be unable to co-operate with him effi- ciently ; and five days later the more sui-prising information was received, that McDowell's entire corps was detached from his command and ordered to remain in front of Wash- * Referring to the First Corps, McClellan reports : " . . . . I intended to move it in mass to its point of disemb.irkation, and to land it on either bank of the York, as might then be determined." — Report, p. 73. SIEGE OP YORKTOWN^. 37 ington. Whether General McClellan was himself at fault in the case, and made his combinations upon insufficient assur- ance that he would receive all the assistance he expected, is a question to be considered ; but the fact itself stands, that after entering upon the execution of his matured plaus, he found them unexpectedly interrupted and requiring, as he believed, material modification."^ Now, as to the failure of the navy, or rather its non-co- operation, the question of responsibility turns upon the representations made to General McClellan before he left Washington. That he confidently anticipated its aid, is clear from what he says in proposing a combined naval and land attack upon Yorktown as the preliminary operation on the Peninsula. "To accomplish this," he wrote to Secre- tary Stanton, March 19th, "the navy should at once concen- trate upon the York Eiver all their available and most pow- erful batteries ; its reduction should not in that case require many hours. A strong corps would be pushed up the York, under cover of the navy, directly upon West Point, immedi- ately upon the fall of Yorktown, and we could at once establish our new base of operations at a distance of some twenty-five miles from Richmond ; with every facility for de- veloping and bringing into play the whole of our available force on either or both banks of the James. It is impossible to urge too strongly the absolute necessity of the full co- operation of the navy as a part of this programme." So urgent was McClellan on this point, that on the same evening he telegraphed from Fairfax Court House to the Secretary as follows : * '* This army being reduced by forty-five thousand troops — some of them among the best in the service — and without the support of the navy, the plan to which we are reduced bears scarcely any resemblance to the one I voted for." — General Keyes to Senator Harris : McClellan's Report, p. 80. 38 THE PENINSULA. ' ' Please have an immediate decision upon the letter which will reach you to-morrow morning in regard to co-operation of the navy. That matter is important." Mr. Stanton replied at once : "In order to determine the precise co-operation you want with the navy, the President will go immediately to Alexandria, and desires you to meet him at the wharf." Tlie result of this interview, if it occurred, does not ap- pear ; but on that day, the 20th, McDowell w^as at Washing- ton, and wrote the following to McClellan : "Nothing decisive at the President's. " The plan seemed to find favor with all who spoke. The only question seemed to be as to the ability of the navy to do their part. I am to go again in the morning when Barnard returns. Whether the navy can or not do anything, I think it evident they cannot before you can ship another division of Heintzelman's to Old Point. I spoke to the President, and he thought this would be best, so as not to keep the means of transportation idle. I would therefore send Heintzelman's second division at once, or as soon as you can. His first arrived safe last night and was landing. The Secretary says you should have no difficulty with Wool." Three days before, on the 17th, McDowell had written this : ' ' In connection with General Barnard, I have had a long conference with the Assistant Secretary, Fox, as to naval co-operation. He prom- ises all the power of the Department shall be at our disposal. At my suggestion he has told Commodore Goldsborough to confer with Colonel Woodbury concerning the plans now in view." On the same day Mr. Welles, Secretary of the Navy, sent despatches to the commandants of the navy yards at New York and Boston, to send what gunboats they had ready " to Hampton Eoads at once." * Furthermore, General * The despatches quoted appear on file in the War and Navy Departments. SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 39 Barnard went down to Hampton Eoads, to consult Com- modore Goldsborongh, but it would appear from the latter's testimony, that the question of breaking through between Yorktown and Gloucester was not discussed. From the foregoing despatches, it is evident that McClel- lan cannot be charged with not having pressed the matter ofi* naval co-operation upon the attention of the Government. On the other hand, how did the naval authorities under- stand this plan of co-operation with the army ? If General McClellan was distinctly informed, as stated by himself, that the navy would assist him as he desired, it is impossible to assume that either the Secretary of the Navy or the officer commanding the fleet in Hampton Eoads would not have known the fact, and been impressed with his needs and ex- pectations. The naval authorities, on the contrary, claim to have re- ceived no intimation that any special co-operation, in the way of a difficult attempt, was required of them. The testimony of Mr.. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and of Admiral Goldsborough, commanding the Hampton Eoads fleet, is conclusive as to this. Mr. Fox, for instance, was asked by Mr. Gooch : (Question. — "Do you know whether or not it was expected that the navy should take the batteries of the enemy at or about Yorktown?" Answer. — "I never heard that it was." Question. — "Was that feasible?" Answer. — "Not to attack those batteries. Wooden vessels could not have attacked the batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester with any degree of success. The forts at York- town were situated too high ; were beyond the reach of naval guns ; and I understood that General McClellan never expected any attack to be made upon them by the navy. " 40 THE PENINSULA. And to a previous question he had replied in the same vein : *'So far as I know, all the vessels that General McClellan required in his operations against Yorktown, were placed at his disposal by Admiral Goldsborough. I am not aware that he ever required that we should attack Yorktown ; or that it was ever expected that we should do so." Admiral Goldsborough's testimony is still more emphatic : Question. — "What part was the navy called upon to act in the campaign of the Peninsula, as it is called?" Answer. — "With regard to that campaign, no naval au- thority whatever, to my knowledge, was ever consulted until after a considerable part of the army got down there. The whole matter was arranged here in Washington by officers in the army, as I understood. I believe they never said a word, even to the Secretary of the Navy. Certainly, noth- ing was ever said to me until the eleventh hour. Then it was that I heard that they expected the navy to co-operate with them. The Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. W^atson, came down to see me in behalf, as he said, of the Secre- tary of War and the President of the United States. He told me of the great anxiety felt in Washington in regard to the Merrimac ; that they were apprehensive she might get up the York Eiver and entirely disconcert all the move- ments of the army. I told Mr. Watson that the President might make his mind perfectly easy about the Merrimac going up Y'ork Eiver ; that she never could get there, for I had ample means to prevent that. This was in the latter part of March, 1862. The army at that time was about as= sembling at Old Point Comfort. General McClellan had not then arrived." The Admiral goes on further to declare, that he did every- thing that the General requested of him — detailing seven gunboats for his purposes, being all the former wanted ; and SIEGE OF YOKKTOWN". 41 adds tliat, upon the day of liis arrival off Fort Monroe and before going ashore, the General came on board of his ship to consult with him "as to the best mode of attacking York- town." This mode contemplated a flank attack by way of the Severn Eiver upon the Gloucester works ; on the fall of which, the gunboats could run by Yorktown and render that position untenable. These' extracts from the testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, are introduced for the single purpose of testing the charge that the navy is to be held responsible for causing the first serious derangement of McClellan's campaign plan. The navy was clearly ignorant of the scope and intent of that plan ; was not a party to it ; had not promised to join in a combined attack upon York, town, and moreover, could probably have effected nothing in such an Mempt.^ * The files of the Navy Department contain no orders in the matter. At a later date, April 17th, Secretary Welles sent the following to Admiral G-oldsborough, the tenor of which hardly warrants the inference that he had previously de- spatched more specific instructions : Sir — The attention of the whole country, as well as of the Department, is turned with intense interest at this time to the naval and army movements in Lower Virginia. I commend your determination not to be drawn into a conflict where the enemy can take you at disadvantage, and would enjoin unceasing vigi- lance at every point. It cannot be many days before the Galena, which is now receiving her armament on board, will bo with you, and will, I trust, prove an efficient acquisition to your squadron. Your determination, should the enemy shell Newport News, not to be drawn among the shoals and narrow waters there- abouts, seems to me wise and proper. '* You will actively and earnestly co-operate with Major-General McClellan, whose position and movements at Yorktown and on York River are of momentous interest and consequence to the whole country. Any and all aid that you can render him and the army you will extend at all times. It is important and ab- solutely essential that he should secure all the assistance that he may require of the navy and that it is in your power to bestow consistently with your other duties. The general objects and designs of the Government and the great interests de- pendent on the naval and army movements in the vicinity of Hampton Roads are well understood by you. *' In addition to the general facts from time to time communicated to you, the 42 THE PENINSULA. The whole explanation of the matter seems to be, that while General McClellan expressed his profound anxiety that the navy should render its aid, he expected more than the Government conld promise or the navy accomplish. If he was disappointed to find at Fort Monroe that the gun- boats were not to batter down and run by Yorktown, we must assume that it was because he had not assured himself before leaving Washington that that particular service could be and was to be performed by them. The General dis- tinctly intimated that he should depend upon them to re- duce the place, but it remains to be shown by evidence which has not come within our reach, whether he had been promised that they would. To us it appears that McClellan meant one thing by " co-operation," and that the navy, then absorbed with the Merrimac, and not impressed with the scope of his expectations, meant another. The nature of General McClellan's second disappointment — the retention of McDowell's corps — and who was there at fault, will be presently noticed in its proper connection. Compelled to forego all thought of valuable assistance from the nsivj, McClellan, depending now entirely upon his Assistant Secretary of the Navy has visited you on your station and made known the wishes of the Government in person. " Whether and to what extent you can detach any portion of your com- mand from their employment on other stations at this juncture, I am unable to decide. To your judgment these and other matters are confided with a solici- tude and anxiety I cannot express, but with a confidence that the country will not be disappointed in you. " I am, respectfully, "Your ob't servant, " GIDEON WELLES. ** Flag Officer L . M. Goldsborough, *• Command'g N. A. Block'g Squad., "Hampton Roads, Va."" [From the MS. Records, Navy Department.] SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 43 army, modified his plans to a certain extent. The modifica- tion, however, does not prove to have been radical. No im- portant change was made. He proceeded with the original idea— an advance of the main army up the Peninsula, with a flanking column on the right. The only deviation appears in the fact that whereas, before, the navy was expected to at- tack and reduce Yorktown without delay, and continue to turn all -the enemy's positions on the York, this work was now to be done somewhat more slowly by McDowell's flanking column,' moving up the left bank of that river. In other words. General McClellan's initial plan, adopted at and undertaken from Fort Monroe, was this : to move for- ward, first, in two columns with the troops already disem- barked — one column marching on the right direct to York- town, and another along the James River westward of and beyond Yorktown to the vicinity of "Williamsburg. Then, to use the General's own words, it was designed, should the works at Yorktowm and Williamsburg ofier serious resist- ance, to land the First Corps (McDowell's), reinforced if necessary, on the left bank of the York or on the Severn, to move it on Gloucester and West Point, in order to take in reverse whatever force the enemy might have on the Penin- sula, and compel him to abandon his positions." From this it will be seen, that whatever obstacles the main army met with in marching to Richmond, or the base at West Point, they were all to be turned by McDowell. Delay in carrying these positions would thus be overcome and preliminary losses avoided. The plan was based on sound military prin- ciples. The movement forward began on April 4th. The column directed against Yorktown included the Third Corps — Por- ter's and Hamilton's divisions only having arrived — Sedg- wick's division of the Second Corps, and Averill's Third 44 THE PENINSULA. Pennsylvania Cavalry, under General Heintzelman. The column on the left, commanded by General Keyes, was com- posed of tlie divisions of Smith and Couch, of the Fourth Corps, with the Fifth Eegular Cavalry temporarily attached. The transportation of Casey's division, of the Fourth, not being disembarked, it remained in camp at Newport News, from which point the left column started. The columns marched from ten to twelve miles and bivouacked at night at Young's Mills on the left, near the James, and on the right at Howard's Bridge and Cockletown beyond. The enemy showed themselves on the right ; but offered no se- rious resistance. The reserve, consisting of Hunt's artillery, Stoneman's cavalry, and Sykes' brigade of regular infantry, encamped at Big Bethel. At six o'clock on the following morning, the 5th, the march was resumed. Heintzelman received orders to advance with the Third Corps to a point two and three-fourths miles from Yorktown ; w4iile Keyes was instructed to continue on the left, by way of "Warwick Court House, to an old landmark known as the " Half-way House," between Yorktown and Williamsburg. The orders to Keyes, which will be presently noticed, were significant ; requiring him to occupy and hold " the narrow dividing ridge near the Half-way House, so as to prevent the escape of the garrison at Yorktown by land, and prevent reinforcements being thrown in." Had these orders been executed to the letter, and the left column espe- cially been able to reach and hold the point indicated, on the evening of the 5th, the Commanding General would have had the satisfaction of reporting most substantial progress made " up the Peninsula " during these first two days. But hardly had the army filed into the roads for the march of the 5th, before it encountered that series of fatalities which were to be its almost daily experience through this SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 45 dislieartening campaign. To follow the column under Keyes, whose immediate success was of most importance, we find that general sending word to headquarters just as Smith's division was moving out, "6 a.m.," that, from the best information he could obtain, a large force of the enemy was occupying a strong position, defended by three guns, at Lee's Mills, six miles beyond on the road he was following. **It is my opinion," he said, "that we shall encounter very serious resistance ; if so, we shall not be able to reach the Half-way House on the Yorktown and Williamsburg road to-day. ... I respectfully suggest that a strong reserve force be within my reach. . . . Our wagons did not arrive last night, and we shall be obliged to halt at Warwick Court House for the infantry reserve ammunition to come up. . . . It is a heavy march to the Half-way House, even without opposition." At half -past seven he added : " The roads are very bad ahead. Shall I push on to Half- way House if artillery cannot get on fast enough ? I sup- pose not, of course." And again, at 3 p.m., he reports : " I am stopped by the enemy's works at Lee's Mills, which offer a severe resistance ; the road through the woods for nearly a mile having become absolutely impassable for artillery, I am cutting a new road through. One battery is replying to the enemy, and another is nearly or quite through." The rain had been falling in torrents all the morning ; and it was not until about noon that the advance, under Keyes, struck the enemy's skirmishers. Hancock's brigade, of Smith's division, deployed on the right, Davidson's on the left, and Brooks' in reserve. Couch's division rested at Warwick Court House, with part of Peck's and Graham's brigades, extended down the Warwick Eiver. Finding the march thus seriously obstructed at Lee's Mills, the column encamped for the night in the above order. 46 THE PENINSULA. Upon the right, Heintzelman was also stopped ; but that was expected, his march being upon Yorktown. From Cockletown, Porter's division moved forward on the 5th, with Morell's brigade in advance — Berdan's Independent Eegiment of Sharpshooters taking the lead — and after a march of three miles, came nnder the fire of the enemy's works. It happened to be at the point designated by Gen- eral McClellan, where this column was to halt for further orders, and General Morell thus describes the preliminary incidents in his report to General Porter: "At seven o'clock on the morning of the 5tli, we were again in motion, the cav- alry still in the rear. The rain commenced falling at the same time, which made the road exceedingly heavy, and delayed our progress. You joined me at the saw-mill, your staff and mine forming a conspicuous group ; and at 10 a.m., as we arrived at the junction of the Warwick wdth the York- town road, we received the first shot from the enemy. It came from their works on our right near the town, and was well aimed, though a little too high. The sharpshooters, un- der Colonel Berdan, were alone in front of us." "Looming up in the mist and rain," says General Porter at the same time, "were extensive defences of the enemy, from which we were immediately saluted with the fire of artillery." Porter at once made his dispositions : Morell deploying in front and supporting Weeden's and Griffin's batteries, which opened upon the enemy's works at a distance of two thousand yards, and Martindale's brigade, at one o'clock, taking position on the left of Morell's, with Butterfield's brigade in reserve. Artillery firing and some skirmishing occurred with little loss during the afternoon ; and at night, the division en- camped on the ground fronting the works at Yorktown and those connecting on its right. The position, then, of McClellan's army, on the morning 3 SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 47 of the 6th, was not that contemplated in his orders for the 6th. Kejes, certainly, shonld have been at the Half-way House, near Williamsburg. But he had met an obstruction. His progress on the 5th was five miles — no more ; Porter's, four. Eight here begins that month's delay at Yorktown. One thing is certain : it was not strategic delay — delay for a purpose, since the General had promised rapid movements forward, and had provided flank operations to expedite the direct. What, then, caused it? Could not and ought not the delay to have been avoided ? Let us look at this care- fully and impartially. Preliminary to these questions, it should be ascertained what the enemy had been doing on the Peninsula, and what precisely was their position on the 5th, when resistance by them first proved serious. The Confederate attitude in this quarter had been, from the first, that of defence. For some time after the affair of Big Bethel, June 10, 1861, they had made Yorktown their base of observation, with posts thrown out several miles in advance. Major-General J. Bankhead Magruder, late of the United States Army, commanded. By March 1, 1862, Magruder had laid out, and partially completed, three de- fensive lines across the Peninsula, from Williamsburg down toward Fort Monroe. What he proposed and describes as his " real line of defence positions," was the one at the front, seven miles below Yorktown ; or at that point between Howard's and Young's Mills, where the setting back of the Poquosin Eiver from the York and the mouths of the Warwick and Deep Creek, on the James, contract the inter- vening solid ground to the short distance of three miles. Both flanks of this line," says Magruder, "were defended by boggy and difficult streams and swamps. In addition, the left flank was defended by elaborate fortifications at 48 THE PEmNSULA. Ship Point, connected by a broken line of redoubts crossing the heads of the various ravines emptying into York Eiver and "Wormley's Creek, and terminating at Fort Grafton, nearly in front of Yorktown. The right flank was defended by the fortifications at the mouth of "Warwick Eiver and at Mulberry Island Point, and the redoubts extending from the Warwick to James Eiver. Intervening between the two mills was a wooded country, about two miles in extent. This wooded line, forming the centre, needed the defence of in- fantry in a sufficient force to prevent any attempt on the part of the enemy to break through it. In my opinion, this advanced line, with its flank defences, might have been held by 20,000 troops. With 25,000 1 do not believe it could have been broken by any force the enemy could have brought against it. Its two flanks were protected by the Virginia (Merrimac) and the works on one side, and the fortifications at Yorktown and Gloucester Point on the other." His force being reduced by detachments sent across the James to Suffolk and Portsmouth, Magruder abandoned this advanced line about March 1st, and fell back to his second line, running from Yorktown on his left along the Warwick Eiver to Mulberry Island, and the James upon the right. The third line, to be noticed later, was that constructed in front of Williamsburg, eleven miles farther up the Penin- sula. His second, or the Yorktown position, was, in point of extent, the least defensible of the three ; but it presented the counterbalancing advantage of having its left protected by the projecting bank of the York at Gloucester, whose works, in conjunction with those at Yorktown opposite, were expected to close the river to the passage of the Union gun-boats."^ * The Count de Paris in his well known and admirable work, states that Ma- gruder persisted in holding the Yorktown position in spite of orders from Rich- mond to abandon it. I find no confirmation of this statement, but infer from SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 40 Although embracing a front of ^Hwelve miles," as Ma- grnder reports, this line had been converted by various for- tifications and devices into a considerable barrier. Around Yorktown itself, the old embankments thrown up by the British in 1781, were substantially revived ; and, at com- manding positions outside of the village, two works were constructed, known as the "red" and white" redoubts, united by long curtains. In the vicinity and to the west of these, or a mile and a half from Yorktown, the Warwick River takes its rise and flows in a southerly direction to the James. Its upper part, originally known as Beaverdam Creek, is described by Magruder as a sluggish and boggy stream," twenty or thirty yards wide in some places, and running through " a dense wood fringed by swamps." There were two mills with dams upon its banks, one — Wynne's Mill — about three miles from Yorktown ; the other — Lee's Mills — two and one-half miles below, where the James River road crosses the stream. Three additional dams were con- structed by the enemy, making five in all ; which had the effect of backing up the water and rendering its passage im- practicable for either artillery or infantry, for nearly three- fourths of the distance. So, at least, reports Magruder. Each dam was covered by artillery and earthworks ; while along the rear of the line, ran a recently opened military road. At Lee's Mills, strong fortifications had been erected, and from that point, the line presented a refused right, turn- ing across Mulberry Island to Skiff Creek. The Confed- erate force defending this position, numbered 11,000 strong at the time McClellan moved forward from Fort Monroe, 6,000 defending the flanks at Yorktown and Mulberry Island, what both Davis and Johnston say, and from Mogruder's own report, that he was expected to dispute every inch of the Peninsula — the retention of Norfolk de- pending on his position. 4 50 THE PENINSULA. and 5,000 posted at the dams and assailable points along tlie Warwick front. ^ The existence of this line, in front of whicli he was brought to a halt on April 5tli, was unknown to General McClellan. Both in the re23ort of his operations and in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the "War, he refers to the lack of precise information respecting the topogTaphy of the Peninsula, as an element of delay and con- fusion in his movements. Our maps," he testifies, " proved entirely inaccurate, and did us more harm than good, for we were constantly misled by them." Again, in his report, he observes : " The country, though known in its general fea- tures, we found to be inaccurately described in essential particulars in the only maps and geographical memoirs or papers to which access could be had. Erroneous courses to streams and roads were frequently given, and no dependence could be placed on the information thus derived. . . . Eeconnoissances, frequently under fire, proved the only trustworthy sources of information." Heintzelman, Keyes, and other officers, mention the same want ; and the inconve- nience and difficulties arising from it. * Colonel Cabell, of the Confederate artillery, reported May 10, 1862, as follows in regard to this position : ' ' Three roads led up from the Peninsula and crossed the line of our defences. The first on our right was the Warwick road, that crossed at Lee's Mills ; the second crossed at Wynne's Mill, and the third was com- manded by the reboubts (Nos, 4 and 5) near Yorktown. The crossing at Lee's Mills was naturally strong, and fortifications had been erected there and at Wynne's Mill. Below Lee's Mills the V\^arwick River, affected by the tides and in- vested by swamps on each side, formed a tolerable protection ; but the marshes could easily be made passable and the river bridged. Between Lee's and Wynne's Mills an unbroken forest extended on the right bank of the stream to a distance of about three miles. Two additional dams were constructed, the one (Dam No. 1) nearest to Wynne's Mill, and the other. Dam No, 2. A dam called the upper dam was constructed in the stream above Wynne's Mill. This detailed description of the line of defence seems necessary to explain the position of the artillery of the I*eninsula." SIEGE OF YORKTOWX. 51 But this was to have been anticipated. The Virginia Peninsula, like many portions even of the older States, was practically teri^a incognita for military purposes. Careful surveys of its entire extent had never been made, and when the topographical engineers set to work to construct maxDS for General McClelian's guidance, in view of his possible movement by that route, their results were necessarily insuf- ficiently full or precise. Major-General A. A. Humphreys, then at the head of the Topographical Corps, consulted every available authority and record bearing upon the features of that region ; and this information was used by the Command- ing General. Among other maps brought to light, were the British plans of the siege of Yorktown, in 1781, and the orig^ inal survey of the Peninsula from Fort Monroe to Williams- burg, made in 1818 by Major James Kearney, of the corps of Topographical Engineers, both of which satisfactorily es- tablished certain points. Various outlines were compiled ; but the most elaborate, so far as it went, and the one followed by General McClellan, was that furnished by Lieutenant- Colonel T. J. Cram, then serving as engineer and aid-de-camp to General Wool, at Fort Monroe, which embraced Norfolk, Suffolk, and the Peninsula as far as the Half-way House above l^orktown. And yet this map, which, in view of its source, appears to have been regarded as the most reliable, was found to be in error in several important particulars, especially in indicating the course of the Warwick ; which it represented as running nearly parallel with the road up the Peninsula, instead of running across it to the vicinity of Y^orktown. Kearney's survey, on the other hand, indicates the true direction of the stream ; but gives it no prominence as an impediment. With these maps before him, it is clear that McClellan did not expect to find the extensive line of defence which, as we have seen, Magruder had constructed 52 THE PENINSULA. and occupied. Thus, to the question asked bv the Committee on the Conduct of the War, — whether he knew of the enemy's works before he landed on the Peninsula, McClellan replied : *'No ; we did not know of the line of works along the War- wick. We knew that Yorktown itself was surrounded by a continuous line of earthworks, but we did not know of the line of the Warwick. . . . When we did advance, we found the enemy intrenched and in strong force wherever we approached. The nature and extent of his position along the Warwick Eiver was not known to us when we left Fort Monroe." How far a general may base the delay or failure of his movements on the meagreness and inaccuracy of his topo- graphical information, depends upon the given case. Gen- eral McClellan's situation in this respect, was probably but little different from that of other generals in other parts of the field. It was a war in which he who pushed and found out for himself, was the most likely to achieve results. In this particular instance, we may be permitted to quote from General Humphreys, that the information collected by his corps, in advancing up the Peninsula, " was quite as full as anything we had in the pursuit of Lee in April, 1865, after we got ten miles from Petersburg — indeed, more full, more complete." ^ But, aside from the inadequate and misleading maps — aside, in fact, from the alleged non-co-operation of the navy, an important criticism is here suggested. Was this advance from Fort Monroe toward Yorktown itself, conducted upon correct tactical principles ? Was it based upon a proper ap- preciation of the enemy's probable dispositions and fore- sight? * Letter from G-eneral Humphreys to the writer, Jane, 1881. SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 53 Two things are beyond dispute : the topographical maps presented an accurate outline of the Peninsula — that is, the lines of the James and York ; and, second, McClellan ad- vanced upon the enemy in expectation of meeting resistance at Yorktown. As to the latter point, he states in his report, that, as he had ascertained that the Confederate General Huger could readily reinforce' Magruder from Norfolk, and had already done so, and that Johnston's army could be rap- idly transferred from Manassas to Yorktown, he proposed *'to invest that town without delay." Cram's map, says McClellan, indicated " the feasibility of the design ; " and from Fort Monroe the General hurried forward to execute it before the enemy could be reinforced. This was to be the first of the promised " rapid movements " toward Kich- mond. By the courtesy of General H. G. Wright, the present Chief of the Corps of Topographical Engineers, the author is placed in possession of all the requisite official maps cov- ering this campaign, inclusive of tracings of those by Kear- ney and Cram ; and it is to be admitted, that according to the latter, Yorktown stands in a dangerously isolated situa- tion, inviting attack, being apparently fortified for no other purjDOse than to close the York Eiver in connection with the Gloucester works, and having no relation to the Peninsula as a defence against the approach of an army by land. To the uneducated eye, it seems to be a most "feasible" ma- noeuvre to march to its rear, surround and invest it, and thus repeat what Washington effected upon the same spot in 1781, or what Grant enforced at Vicksburg in 1863. That General McClellan expected, upon the strength of Cram's map, to be able to surround Yorktown, is not only evident from his report, but, as we have already noticed, his orders to Keyes on April 5th, to march and encamp at the Half-way 54 THE PENINSULA. House, six miles in the rear of Yorktown, indicate no mis- givings on liis part as to Keyes' ability to reach that point without much, if any, resistance. But General McClellan's expectations here, were clearly too sanguine. Sound military judgment would have pro- nounced at once, that Keyes could not reach the Half-way House, nor any point to the rear of Yorktown, without the most obstinate resistance ; and that, if that resistance had been overcome, the Confederates would have immediately abandoned the town. It was correctly presumed, that Ma* gruder's purpose was to delay MeOlellan's progress up the Peninsula as long as possible. But did not this require him to present a front entirely across the Peninsula ? What would it have availed to hold the road up the York and leave that along the James unguarded? Did McClellan ex- pect that Magruder would shut himself up within the " con- tinuous line of earthworks " around Yorktown, and suffer the former to throw a heavy column in his rear and thus |)revent his escape ? The moment Keyes reached the Half-way House, Magruder would be doomed. And yet it appears that the advance from Fort Monroe was based and hurried, upon this very anticipation. It will be observed, for instance, that McClellan reports himself as being surprised to learn that Keyes was checked in his march on April 5th. " Unexpect- edly,''^ he says, Keyes was brought to a halt before the ene- my's works at Lee's Mills. Now, on the contrary, just such a halt ouglit to have been expected. Nothing less than a continuous front of opposition from the York to the James should have been looked for. The existence of a strong fortified post at Yorktown, neces- sitated and implied the existence of an equally strong bar- rier at the other flank on the James, at or about Lee's Mills, with the intervening centre also defended. General Ma- SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 55 grnder, on the other side, certainly felt the necessity. " Deeming it of vital importance,^^ he reports, " to hold York- town, on York Eiver, and Mulberry Island, on James Eiver, ^ and to keep the enemy in check by an intervening line, until the authorities might take such steps as should be deemed The ♦'Cram" Map. necessary to meet a serious advance of the enemy on the Peninsula, I felt compelled to dispose my forces in such a manner as to accomplish these objects with the least risk possible, under the circumstances of great hazard which surrounded the little army I commanded." Cram's map 56 THE PEXIXSULA. erroneously places Warwick Court House on the Warwick Eiver, where Lee's Mills shonld be, the latter not being in- dicated at all, and describes it simply as a rebel military dejDot," eight or ten miles distant from Yorktown. That it is gravely misleading in its representation of the Confederate situation and the topography in that vicinity, is not to be denied. But the fact that it was acce^^ted as correct, and made the basis of operations, when obviously it was to be discredited as a compilation made ux^on uncertain and meagTe information, is open to the criticism suggested. Jl blunders were committed in the advance upon Rich- mond, this may be regarded as the first one : the failure to di- vine the iDrobable jDOsition of the enemy at the Yorktown line. The natural desire and determination to reach it before they were reinforced, was, imfortunately, unaccompanied with a light appreciation of the true method of taking advantage of their weakness. McClellan estimated the enemy's strength at about fifteen thousand ; his own, at the start, was fifty- eight thousand. He proposed to use this preponderating force immediately and with efi"ect ; and it could only have been so used, by expecting to find a long defensive line in front of the enemy, and marching with a ^iew of discovering its weakest jDoint with the least possible delay, and breaking- through it at once. But, instead, we find surprise at meet- ing with opposition — halt, and uncertainty. In advancing these criticisms, it is true, a certain modifica- tion is to be made in General McClellan's favor. His plan of campaign did not require absolutely precise information of the enemy's position at Yorktown, or anywhere else on the Peninsula, with the view of overcoming it. That plan al- ready provided for the obstacle of the Warwick. If anything like it existed, and could not readily be forced, it was to be tamed. Whatever obstruction the main force on the Penin- SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 57 STila encountered, McDowell was expected to outflank it on the other side of the York. So that, while McClellan blun- dered in his expectations of surrounding Yorktown, his gen- eral plan remained feasible^ The Warwick, in the execution of the latter, should have delayed him but a few days. Magruder would have retreated on learning of McDowell's march along the York to the White House in his rear. It is at this point that we reach McClellan's second disap- pointment in the campaign — the retention of McDowell's corps at Washington. The facts here may be briefly summarized as follows : One of the conditions on which the President approved the Pe- ninsula plan, was, that Washington should be left completely secure against attack ; and the council of corps com- manders on March 13th, had named a force of about 55,000 men as necessary for this purpose. Upon McClellan's de- parture. General Wadswofth, the Military Governor of the city, reported that he could muster scarcely 20,000 troops for its defence in case of an emergency. Apparently alarmed that so scanty a force had been left. President Lincoln di- rected, on April 3d, that either McDowell's or Sumner's Corps, which had not all embarked for the new base, should be retained in front of Washington. It was claimed that McClellan had not complied with the condition above re- ferred to, and that the retention of part of his own force was necessary for the safety of the capital. In his report the General ventures the defence, that he had left the prescribed number of troops ; but we find that he includes among them the force under Banks, in the Shenandoah — a force which he regarded as a movable column thrown out for the defence of the caiDital. The corps commanders at the council did not so regard Banks, but fixed the 55,000 men for Washington as 58 THE PENINSULA. over and above wliat the latter commanded. In tliis light it is to be admitted that McClellan had failed to comply with President Lincoln's " explicit directions " and the decision of the council ; and in view of the well-known feeling of the Government respecting the safety of the city, and the fact that the not over-friendly Committee of Congress w^atched every step he took, it is strange that the General should have given even the semblance of an opportunity to be interfered with, after once taking the field. A grave mistake it was, when he left "Washington without having the President's as- surance that all was well at least there. That the withholding of McDowell was a shock to Mc- Clellan is certain. The news reached him on the 5th, con- veyed in a brief telegram from the Adjutant-General, at the very moment when the Warwick was discovered to be a con- siderable obstruction; and when the necessity of a flank- ing column was immediately obvious. Eight in the emer- gency, that column was withheld from his control ; and we affirm, that, looking at the matter irrespective of every political bias, no matter how far McClellan's alleged disre- gard of instructions in leaving Washington unprotected, may have been true — no matter what the alarm of the com- mander of the Washington defences, or of the President's military advisers — either McClellan should have been re- lieved, or else every possible effort should have been made to keep his force, now actively engaged in the field, at the full strength with which alone he proposed to undertake his operations. Whether his own view was correct or incor- rect, in that view he was crippled. He proposed a plan with McDowell as a principal actor in it. McDowell with- drawn, the plan was radically interfered with. Writers have said that McClellan had none but himself to blame. Granted. But who shall be blamed for permit- SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 59 ting a situation which, at all hazards, should just then have been avoided? If McClellan was still retained, one duty was incumbent upon the Government : it should have suffered at least half of McDowell's corps to proceed to the Peninsula at once, and then made every effort to reinforce the capital from other points. To allow the General to remain in com- mand and then cut off the very arm with which he was about to strike, we hold to have been inexcusable and unmilitary to the last degree. Leaving this question as, perhaps, the leading point of dispute in the campaign, and one which may never be satis- factorily set at rest, there come up all those various specula- tions indulged in by critics, respecting the course McClellan ought to have pursued after losing McDowell. A general of high spirit and sensitive soul might have found in the Government's action the occasion for sending in his resigna- tion. Another, deeply earnest in the national behalf, might have suddenly roused himself to great exertions, and proved by successful strokes that he was worthy of the fullest con- fidence. General McClellan continued in command, ac- cepted the situation, and endeavored to make the best of it. What to do — was now the question. It has been claimed that the General should have immediately forced the "War- wick, and effected the capture or compelled the evacuation of Yorktown — thus opening the York Eiver and securing the White House as a base. That the Warwick line could have been readily broken within a week after the army's arrival before it, we now know. McClellan at the time was of a dif- ferent opinion ; although but a few days before he had cal- culated the relative forces at 58,000 against 15,000. In ex- planation he testified that Johnston arrived opposite to him the same evening that he reached the Yorktown front, April 60 THE PENINSULA. 5th, implying that the rebel army lately at Manassas was now again in his front. The General's information — based, by the way, on altogether insufficient, if not unreliable data — was erroneous. Johnston did not arrive in person to supersede Magruder until after the 14th ; and of his army, the advance division, under General D. H. Hill, did not arrive at Yorktown until the 10th ; the other divisions fol- lowing a few days later. For six days at least, after McClel- lan appeared in front of the "Warwick, he was fully three times stronger than the enemy in point of numbers. Eut here again, it is to be admitted that McClellan pre- sented plausible reasons — reasons already referred to — for not attempting a direct attack on Magruder's position at that time. The General, despite the retention of McDowell, still clung to his original plan (modified slightly) of flanking the enemy. It was a plan adopted after long deliberation ; and he was wholly unwilling to abandon it, though seemingly deprived of the means of its execution. Thus, when President Lincoln urged him, April 6th, to break the line of the War- wick at once, McClellan rej)lied : " Under the circumstances that have been developed since we arrived here, I feel fully impressed with the conviction, that here is to be fought the great battle that is to decide the existing contest. I shall, of course, commence the attack as soon as I can get up my siege-train, and shall do all in my power to carry the enemy's works ; but, to do this with a reasonable degree of certainty, requires, in my judgment, that I should, if possible, have at least the whole of the First Army Corps (McDowell's) to land upon York Eiver and attack Gloucester in the rear. My jDresent strength will not admit of a detachment suffi- cient for this purpose without materially impairing the effi- ciency of this column." More definitely he writes to Secre- tary Stanton on the lOtli : '^The reconnoissance to-day, SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 61 proves that it is necessary to invest and attack Gloncester Point. Give me Franklin's and McCall's divisions (of Mc- Dowell's corps), under command of Franklin, and I will at once undertake it. If circumstances of which I am not aware, make it impossible for you to send me two divisions to carry out this final plan of campaign, I will run the risk, and hold myself responsible for the results, if you will give me Franklin's division. If you still confide in my judgment, I entreat that you will grant this request. The fate of our cause depends upon it. Although willing, under the pressure of necessity, to carry this through with Franklin alone, I wish it to be distinctly understood that I think two divisions necessary. Franklin and his division are indispensable to me. General Barnard concurs in this view." And once more, on the 12th and 13th, he adds : Franklin will attack on the other side. . . ." " Our work progressing well. "We shall soon be at them, and I am sure of the result." In response to these very urgent and confident expressions on McClellan's part, the President ordered Franklin's divi- sion to report to him forthwith ; but it failed to reach the landing at Cheesman's Creek, below Yorktown, until the 20th of the month. Late as it was, preparations were begun to disembark the division on the Gloucester side, about three and a half miles below that point. A reconnoissance of the shore was made "a few days" after the arrival of the division by McClellan in person, in company with General Franklin, Captain Eodgers, of the navy, and Lieutenant- Colonel Alexander, of the Corps of Engineers. The latter officer was then instructed to devise the proper arrange- ments and superintend the landing of the troops ; but, ex- traordinary as it may seem, more than two weeks were con- sumed in the preliminaries ; and when everything was nearly ready for the disembarkation, the enemy had vanished from 62 THE PEIS^INSULA. the scene! "All these preparations," to quote from Alex- ander's report, " were about completed, and we were en- gaged in making scaling-ladders, thinking we might be called upon to assault the works at Gloucester Point, when suddenly, on the morning of May 4th, the news spread through the fleet, that the enemy had evacuated Yorktown. " How long it would have taken the whole of McDowell's corps to disembark at this rate, assuming that it was to dis- embark at the same point, the reader may judge ; and yet for days it had been General McClellan's pet project, in connec- tion with his plan of campaign, to utilize McDowell in just this manner as a flanking column. The merest novice in military- matters would assume that every preparation for its prompt disembarkation would have been attended to, and delays avoided. So much for the project on the Gloucester side — excellent in conception, necessary to swift advance, but sadly interfered with by the Government; and, as far as attempted, too sluggishly prosecuted. Surprised that he could not surround the place in the first instance, overawed by the appearance of the Warwick and its supposed defences, estimating the enemy's numbers far beyond the fact, and delayed or delaying in the attempt upon Gloucester — McClellan settled down to the scientific siege of Yorktown. Beyond noticing some of its incidents, we shall not dwell upon this final operation. It is clear that McClellan had it in contemplation, as an alternative, before he left Washington. Why take along a siege-train ? If it was meant for the investment of Eichmond, it should have come later by way of the James. It was out of place in ac- tive field movements. The Army of the Potomac had been placed in the General's hands as a drawn sword, to be wielded with rapid and sweeping effect ; not only was suc- cess looked for, but immediate success. No wonder many SIEGE OF YORKTOWK 63 hearts at the North betrayed anxiety, as time passed at Yorktown with nothing done and a siege in progress. No doubt a brilliant siege operation would have been most acceptable to the country, as it certainly was coveted by McClellan, could it have been attended by the usual results of such an operation, namely, the capture of many prisoners, or the rout and demoralization of the enemy's force ; but in this case, these results were not to be anticipated. There could be no siege in the true sense of the term. It was simply an approach to the enemy's position, which they could leave the moment they jDleased, and in good order. Under the circumstances, it could hardly be regarded as a great triumph, that we were finally enabled to follow them. Having determined thus to besiege Yorktown, McClellan appears to have given up all thought of piercing the War- wick line at any point ; but meditated instead a grand assault on the main works after damaging them sufficiently with his heavy guns. The latter plan would have resulted in seri- ous loss of life ; with results less satisfactory, probably, than would have attended an attempt to break through at the weakest point. Eeconnoissances, however, were made all along the front, and the enemy kept in anticipation of an at- tack ; but no assaulting columns were ever organized, to take advantage of any opportunity offered. The brisk affair which occurred on April 16th, in front of Smith's division on the right of Keyes' corps, which has sometimes been repre- sented as the beginning of a determined attack, had another purpose. The object of the movement," says McClellan, was to force the enemy to discontinue his work in strength- ening his batteries, to silence his fire, and gain control of the dam existing at that point." * * McClellan to Adjutant-General Thomas, April 19, 1862. This letter is not in- cluded in the former's official report. 64 THE PENINSULA. The position in question was known as Dam No. 1, on the Warwick, nearly midway between Lee's and Wynn's Mills, and in front of a clearing just in advance of Smith's di- vision, in which three burned chimneys stood — *^ Garrow's chimneys" the spot was called. On the rebel side, the crossing at the dam was covered by a one-gun battery ; near which other works were supposed to be in process of con- struction. In pursuance of instructions conveyed by McClellan himself, General William F. Smith proceeded, on the morning of the 16th, to closely reconnoitre the position, and for the purpose, advanced Brooks' Vermont Brigade, with Captain Mott's Third New York Battery, toward the dam. The troops pushed well forward, carrying on a sharp fire ; during which Smith examined the ground. ascertained from personal observation," he reports, "that the gun in the angle of the upper work had been replaced by a wooden gun, and that scarcely anybody showed above the parapet, the skirmishers from the Fourth Vermont doing good execu- tion." More important was a daring feat on the part of Lieutenant E. M. Noyes, of the Third Vermont, aid to Gen- eral Brooks, who actually crossed the Warwick below the dam, finding the water about waist-deep, and approached within fifty yards of the enemy's works undiscovered. Ke- turning, he reported his observations to General McClellan, who now, about noon, had come upon the field, and who had ordered Smith to bring up his entire division to hold or command the advanced position occupied by Brooks' brigade. Smith, however, who heard what Lieutenant Noyes reported, went farther and obtained the consent of the General Commanding to push on a strong party across the stream, ''to ascertain if the works had been sufficiently de- nuded to ena-ble a column to effect a lodgement." Four com- panies of Colonel Hyde's Third Vermont, 200 strong, under SIEGE OF YORKTOWK 65 CaiDtain F. C. Harrington, of that regiment, were accordingiv ordered to advance and cross the Warwick, to determine, as Brooks rejDorts, " the true state of affairs " on the other -side. Promptly and gallantly the troops dashed through the water, and under a close fire from the enemy gained the latter's rifle-pits; which they held for over half an hour, returning the fire with spirit. The enemy, who seem to have been surprised at this bold mancBUvre, quickly increased in strength at this point. Magruder admits that the charge of the Yermonters was "very rapid and vigorous," and that the Fifteenth North Carolina, who were throwing up a work beyond the rifle-pits for the protection of their camp, were thrown into confusion and their Colonel, McKenney, killed in attemx)ting to recover the pits. But other troops, including Anderson's Georgia brigade, under Howell Cobb, were brought ui^ and the skirmish grew in intensity. Unfortunately, Captain Harrington failed to be reinforced in time ; and receiving orders to withdi^aw, he recrossed the stream with a loss of 75 men, 22 of whom were killed. This was at about four o'clock in the afternoon. The practicability of effecting a lodgement on the other side being thus demonstrated, another effort was made a little later ; when four companies of the Sixth Vermont, under Colonel Lord, were ordered to cross at the point of Captain Harrington's advance, while Colonel Stoughton with four companies of the Fourth Vermont was directed to attempt the passage of the dam above, under the fire of the division batteries, all of which — 20 guns — were brought into position. Lord's detachment, however, was met by a heavy fire from the now watchful enemy ; and could not reach the rifle-pits. Colonel Stoughton reached the- dam and prepared to push across, when General Smith ordered his return, and Lord followed. Notwithstanding the well-directed fire of the guns 5 66 THE PENINSULA. under Captain Ayres, Division Chief of Artillery, the enemy vrem able to deliver a heavy musketry fire ; and the second attempt to cross was thus abandoned. It will be apparent," says General Smith, in his report, " that no attempt to mass the troops of the division was made for an assault upon the works, but only such troops as were absolutely necessary to cover the movements of the companies of the Third and Fourth Vermont, and to be at hand to secure to us the ene- my's works if we found them abandoned. The moment I found resistance serious, and the numbers opiDosed great, I acted in obedience to the w aiming instructions oi the General- in-Chief, and withdrew the small number of troops exposed from under fire." Eegret that the movement was not pushed is enhanced by Smith's reflection, that among the four com- l^anies of the Third Vermont, who first crossed the creek, there were " more individual acts of heroism performed " than he had ever before read of. Thus a fair opportunity to break the Warwick line was missed. Had the same effort been made when the army first reached the line, there can be little doubt that success would have attended it. Passing to the siege itself, we find that the operations were conducted with skill. Batteries were constructed un- der the supervision of Generals F. J. Porter, W. F. Barry, Chief of Artillery, and J. G. Barnard, Chief of Engineers ; the former being designated as Director of the Siege. Nearly one hundred heavy Parrott guns, mortars, and how- itzers were established opposite the town and the redoubts to its right, at ranges varying from fifteen hundred to two thousand yards. The enemy made but a slight effort to in- terfere with the work on our batteries and parallels ; and on May 1st, Battery No. 1, on the bank of the river below the Moore House, was opened on the town and its dock, as Bar- SIEGE OF YORKTOVVN. 6T nard reports, *'witli great effect." Four days later the fire was to open from all the guns and the siege pressed with vigor until the final assanlt should be deemed practicable. There was at this time a small fleet of gunboats in the river (the greater part of the naval armament being still en- gaged at Hampton Eoads watching the Merrimac), and their participation in the siege operations was expected, but how The Position at Yorktown. much their officers felt able or willing to do may be gathered from the tenor of the following letter from Commander Miss- roon, of the Wachusett, to Admiral Goldsborough, dated April 23d : ''The works of the enemy are excessively strong and powerfully armed. Their cannon are managed and served with surprising accuracy, 68 THE PENINSULA. exceeding anything I have heretofore known, and there is every indica- tion of a most determined resistance. More than fifty heavy cannon bear upon this bay, and the destruction of vessels of this class is in- evitable, if taken under such a fire, without their having the power to inflict any damage, or but trifling damage to the enemy, owing, to the superior and well-chosen position of their batteries. I believe that any number of vessels of this, or the gunboat class, will not prevail against works so located as those now before me, and that an increase of num- bers will only add to our casualties. General McClellan proposes to dis- mount some of the cannon before these vessels advance, and it is an evi- dent necessity that he should do so to a very large extent " * But the enemy were too shrewd to await our onslaught with guns and storming columns. By May 5th, they had remained long enough at the Yorktown line for their pur- IDOse. A month's time had been gained in keeping Mc- Clellan back, and early on the morning of the 5th, after an unusual cannonade of our lines during the previous night, they abandoned Yorktown and the Warwick line ; retreating up the Peninsula through Williamsburg. * Prom archives, Navy Department, CHAPTEE TV. FORWARD FROM YORKTOWN— BATTLE OF WIL- LIAMSBURG. The evacTiation of Yorktown took the Union army by sur- prise. If the somewhat tardy pursuit of the enemy be any indication, the movement was not anticipated at head-quar- ters. The troops had settled down to siege preparations, and a fixed camp life for at least a time longer. Hence, when orders came to break up and push after the rebels, several hours were consumed in having the commands prop- erly provisioned for the march. The evacuation was re- ported at dawn, and the report confirmed soon after ; it was not until noon that the cavalry and infantry were fairly off. The delay may have been immaterial ; but it was a delay which presupposed the continuation of the siege. The enemy, on their part, abandoned the place deliberately. If their retreat was a measure of safety, and so far forced upon them, it was still in accordance with a settled plan. They proposed to remain at the Warwick line only so long as prudence dictated, and for the single purpose of delaying McClellan. This they had succeeded in doing for an entire month. General Johnston is clear on this point. " It seemed to me," he reported May 19th, " that there w^ere but two ob- jects in remaining on the Peninsula. The possibility of an advance upon us by the enemy, and gaining time in which arms might be received and troops organized. I deter- 70 THE PENINSULA. mined, therefore, to hold the position as long as it t?ould be done without exposing our troops to the fire of the powerful artillery, which, I doubted not, would be brought to bear upon them. I believed that after silencing our batteries on York Eiver, the enemy would attempt to turn us by moving up to West Point by water. . . . Circumstances indi- cating that the enemy's batteries were nearly ready, I di- rected the troops to move toward Williamsburg on the night of the 3d." His narrative on this point is to the same effect ; in fact, Johnston, we have seen, did not favor the defence of the Peninsula, from the outset. On the 4th, at noon, his troops had all reached Williamsburg, whence they were or- dered to march to Eichmond, with Magruder's division lead- ing. The Union forces, once upon the road, hurried after the retreating enemy. Stoneman, with the cavalry, received orders to harass their rear, and, if possible, cut off that por- tion of it which must have taken the longer route by the Lee's Mills road. As the rebels had some twelve hours the start — the rear, certainly six — Stoneman could not have ac- complished the latter object. He caught up with Stuart's cavalry near the Half-way House, which fell back skirmish- ing as far as a line of redoubts which Magruder had thrown up long before as a possible defensive position across the Peninsula — the most westerly of the three he had partially or wholly completed. When Stoneman neared this line, of which he had but a vague, if any knowledge, he sent Gen- eral Emory to the left, to head off such rebels as might be on that road. Emory encountered a cavalry regiment and battery under Stuart himself ; but, without infantry supports, could not corner them. To the front, Stoneman pursued with General Cooke's command of the Eirst and Sixth Keg- ular Cavalry, and a battery of horse-artillery ; and soon en- FORWARD FROM YORKTOWK 71 countered the works referred to. The larger redoubt, in his immediate front, Fort Magruder, was occupied, while those to its left seemed to be empty ; but as he manoeuvred and skirmished, the enemy were seen to be reoccupying them, and he retired to await the arrival of infantry. In doing so, the enemy attacked him, though without much effect ; the one piece of artillery that was lost had to be abandoned in the mud, after the unavailing efforts of ten horses to bring it off. To follow and co-operate with Stoneman, the infantry divi- sions of Hooker, of the Third Corps, and Smith of the Fourth, were directed by McClellan, to take the lead of the columns and hasten forward — Hooker marching by the direct and shorter road on the right from Yorktown to "Williamsburg, and Smith filing from his position opposite " Dam No. 1," into the Lee's Mills road on the left. Kearney was to follow Hooker ; Couch and Casey were to follow Smith. In the afternoon of the next day, the divisions of Sedgwick and Richardson, or Sumner's corps, were also set in motion, while Franklin and Porter remained at Yorktown to go up the river in transports. The entire army was thus upon its feet again, with the eyes of the country intent upon its prog- ress. The General Commanding, not anticipating any serious" engagement during the first day or two of the pursuit, kept his headquarters near Yorktown, to superintend what he re- garded as the more important advance of Franklin by water. The direction of the divisions moving by land, was accord- ingly assigned to Sumner, second in rank to the Chief. His instructions, received at noon on the 4th, were *^to take command of the troops ordered in pursuit of the enemy " until McClellan's arrival. General Heintzelman, on the other hand, moving with his corps, confesses some surprise at finding Sumner at the front and in charge, since he re- 72 THE PENINSULA. ports tliat he bad been directed " to take control of the entire movement" himself. It is probable that Heintzel- man was expected to be in the advance sooner than Sumner, where his " control," until the latter's arrival, would be necessary. As it was, they seemed, with Keyes, the remain- ing corps commander, to act in unison during the approach- ing events ; but the tone of certain passages in Heintzelman's report and the sensitive reply of Sumner, indicate, that as betwee^i these two officers, an undercurrent of jealousy or unfriendliness existed, which, on a subsequent occasion, came near working mischief. The troops under Sumner's command, who were to be- come identified more than others with the approaching battle of Williamsburg, were Hooker's, Smith's, Kearney's and part of Couch's divisions. Hooker on the miarch was expected to be up first to support the cavalry. Smith, moving on the parallel road to the left, made greater pro- gress, but was stopped at the head of Skiff Creek, by the burning of the bridge. Between two and three o'clock, Sumner ordered him to turn to the right and into the road which Hooker was following. Smith reached it near the Half-way house just before Hooker's troops came up ; and keeping on, obliged the latter to halt for over three hours. Contrary, thus, to the original intention. Smith was in the same road with, and in advance of Hooker, scarcely six miles distant fron^ their respective starting-points ; and as Hooker now could not act as the immediate support of the cavalry, he suggested to his Corps Commander, Heintzelman, who consented, that after advancing about three miles, he in turn should cross over to the road Smith was to have followed, and where Emory's cavalry were, and pursue or attack from that direction. How far this apparent confusion and change of place on the part of the two divisions affected the jjursuit FORWARD FROM YORKTOWK 73 on tliat day may be a question, Stoneman claiming that had Smith been able to continue on the Lee's Mills road he might have assisted Emory and his cavalry in capturing Stuart's troopers ; while Hooker, with his own road clear before him, could have pushed on and taken possession of the enemy's works before they could be reoccupied. But, as a matter of fact, Stuart was in no immediate danger ; and as to the works, Smith reached the front, under Sumner, quite as soon as Hooker could have done. Smith's division — Hancock's brigade in advance — came up with the cavalry about half -past five o'clock in the afternoon. Sumner, who tells us that he felt " the importance of pressing the pursuit as fast as^ possible," encouraged by Stoneman's representations, that the infantry could accomplish what the cavalry could not, determined, late as it was, to advance at once upon the enemy. Forming his division in three lines of battle, Smith prepared for a charge through a piece of woods and beyond to the works. It was half -past six before the lines moved ; and hardly did they move before the woods were found to be " utterly impracticable." What with the close, tangled undergrowth and the increasing darkness in which the formations could not be preserved, a halt was or- dered and the troops bivouacked where they w^ere, Sumner, himself, remaining with Hancock and Brooks until dawn; whence the report arose, that he had lost his way and slept at the foot of a tree between our own and the enemy's pickets. Hooker, meanwhile, after filing to the left, marched until eleven o'clock at night, halting at about the same dis- tance from the enemy that Smith was, on the main road to his right. On the following morning the battle of Williamsburg opened, — a battle fought without a plan, with inadequate numbers, and at a serious sacrifice without compensating re- 4 74 THE PENINSULA. suit. The responsibility lias been laid by some upon the shoulders of McClellan because of his absence from the field ; and by others upon Sumner, who seems to have di- rected the movements of the day without method. What- ever may have prevented McClellan's presence with the ad- vance, one might at least expect that his senior corps com- mander should have been competent to fight a battle of moderate proportions. Hooker began the attack. He began it on the strength of the orders he had received from McClellan the previous morning, before leaving Yorktown — a noteworthy feature of the battle, in view of the fact that three corps commanders, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, were then at the front, and the former in command. Heintzelman, to whose corps Hooker belonged, thought, as we infer from his report, that Sumner should have given directions to the leading divisions on the jpreceding night, if a battle was imminent, and states that he could not be found ; but he never- theless failed himself to caution Hooker as to his move- ments, without first hearing from Sumner. So Hooker, in the position of an independent commander, moved to attack the enemy early on the morning of the 5th. There was something vigorous about his action. Despite the rain which was falling plentifully, and the thick, slij^peiy mud^ into which the artillery wheels sank deep, he pressed for- ward and soon became engaged. Fort Magruder stood in his immediate front commanding the junction of the left or Hampton road, into which he had turned, and the main Yorktown road, where Sumner, with Smith's division, was to be found. To the right and left the smaller redoubts, twelve in all, formed an irregular line nearly across the peninsula. Besting on creeks and marshes, with a belt of clearing in their front, they could have proved, if properly manned and FORWARD FROM YORKTOWK 75 supported, a formidable barrier. The approaches to the line were singularly disadvantageous for the attacking party, thick woods lining the roads, in which artillery could not operate, and the clearings being " dotted all over," a3 Hooker reports, with rifle-pits, from which a deadly firo was directed against the troops while taking up position. As early as half-past seven, the First Brigade, Grover's, was at work. " Being in pursuit of a retreating army," say3 Hooker, " I deemed it my duty to lose no time in making the disposition of my forces to attack, regardless of their number and position, except to accomplish the result with the least possible sacrifice of life. By so doing, my division, if it did not capture the army before me, would at least hold it that some others might .... and Grover was di- rected to commence the attack." The latter opened fire upon the rifle-pits from the woods to the right and left of the road, and "Webber's and Bramhall's batteries were brought into action on the right, some seven hundred yards from Fort Magruder. By nine o'clock the fort was silenced and all the enemy's troops in sight on the plain dispersed. Thi3 was satisfactory, as well as the movement of two of Grover'j regiments on the right, who were directed by Hooker to open up communication with Sumner on the Yorktown road. These regiments, the Eleventh Massachusetts and Twenty- sixth Pennsylvania, skirmished through the woods, found no enemy, communicated with Sumner's command, and the former returning, reported the fact to Hooker, who now felt that he was not fighting in an isolated position, but on the right of a general line which could be kept connected under the control of his superior. Meanwhile, the rear divisions of the enemy had halted in their retreat. The demonstration of the Union cavalry the previous afternoon, and Hooker's pressure early the next 76 THE PENINSULA. morning, compelled tliem to face about to escape being run over at will by tlieir pursuers. Johnston left Longstreet in command at Williamsburg, on tlie 5th, and that officer, in the course of the morning, put his entire division in front of Hooker. As the successive brigades went into action, it in- creased in intensity, and, at eleven o'clock, Hooker found himself warmly engaged. E. H. Anderson's and Pryor's brigades formed the right and left of the enemy's line. "Wilcox reinforced Anderson, with A. P. Hill in supporting distance, and, at ten o'clock, Pickett's brigade w^as also added. These brigades Longstreet directed against Hooker's centre and left, and endeavored to turn his position. They issued from and about the redoubts to the right of Fort Magruder into a wooded ravine, and pressed in masses upon our line. The left especially was in danger, where Patterson's Third Brigade, of New Jersey troops, was fighting manfully against superior numbers. Grover, who also felt the attack, moved part of his first brigade to Patterson's support. The line nevertheless was pushed back as far as the batteries in the road, and that of Webber was lost, and Bramhall's aban- doned but recovered again. The situation was growing serious, and Hooker called for reinforcements, or rather for a diversion in his favor. At half -past eleven he sent a note to Heintzelman, who was sup]30sed to be with Sumner. "I have had a hard contest all the morning," he wrote, "but do not desi3air of success. My men are hard at work, but a good deal exhausted. Ifc is reported to me that my com- munication with you by the Yorktown road is clear of the enemy. Batteries, cavalry, and infantry can take post by the side of mine to whip the enemy." It was this latter suggestion that should have been followed out, but Heintzel- man was not in command and did not receive the message, as he had started by a roundabout road to reach Hooker, and FORWARD FROM YORKTOWK 77 Siimner, to whom the note was handed, returned it with the single endorsement that he had opened and read it. Just before that he had sent word to Kearney to hurry to Hooker's support. Why he did not send Casey, who was much nearer, and two of whose brigades were once ordered to Hooker and then ordered back, is not perfectly clear. There was con- fusion in the instructions. Thus from seven o'clock, a.m., till about twelve, Hooker, alone on the left, had been doing all the fighting. No troops fell into line of battle on his right. No other line was engaged anywhere during the forenoon. This state of things reveals the true defect of the "Williams- burg affair. The fact is that when Hooker began his attack, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes had adopted another plan of action, irrespective of Hooker. There was no concerted movement ; hence failure. The plan these corps commanders agreed upon at an informal consultation early in the morning meditated a flank movement around the enemy's left. Neither of them seemed to know what Hooker proposed to do. They looked to another part of the field. A countryman had reported that the rebels had not occupied certain works on their left, and negroes, questioned by Keyes and others, confirmed the story. To put the matter beyond doubt, Captain Stewart, of the Engineer Corps, and four comjjanies of the Fourth Ver- mont, were sent, under General Smith's direction, to ascer- tain the topography of the country, and learn whether a road existed by which the works in question could be seized or turned, if found to be occupied. At ten o'clock Stewart reported that a redoubt, covering a stream called Cub Dam Creek, on the right, seemed to be abandoned. Sumner then directed General Hancock, who was sent for, to march with his own and part of Davidson's brigades, of Smith's division, 78 THE PENINSULA. and Cowan's New York Battery, of six guns, and take tlie redoubt. The passage of tlie dam was only practicable by tlie nar- row mill bridge across its breast, and which was about two hundred and thiity feet in length. Major Larabee with the Fifth Wisconsin and Sixth Maine in column of assault, led by Lieutenant Custer, the late cavalry general, entered the redoubt and found it unoccupied. Hancock imme- diately garrisoned it with three companies of the Thirty- third New York, as a rear guard. He then threw his skir- mishers into the open field beyond the earthwork, the remainder of his infantry in line of battle to their rear, with the artillery in the centre. At twelve o'clock, word w^as dis- patched to Smith that the redoubt and the imjDortant posi- tion at Cub Dam Creek were in possession of the Union troops, under Hancock. Here was the first advantage gained by the Federals, and it ultimately determined the re- sult. Ey this time Hooker's entire command had been pre- cipitated against the enemy on the left. This stubborn fight so engrossed the attention of the Confederate leader that Hancock's manoeuvre had been executed before its danger- ous significance became apparent. But Hancock was uneasy and readily appreciated the necessity of securing another work, two-thirds of a mile in advance, as it commanded the position he then occupied. He accordingly requested Smith to reinforce him with a brigade of infantry to protect his rear from sudden assault. Smith promised him four regiments and one battery. Acting on this assurance Hancock took quiet possession of the advance redoubt. In order to divert the heavy firing on Hooker, he (Hancock) now determined to engage the enemy and endeavor to drive them out of two works nearest to his front. His position was a strong one, having a crest FOHWARD FROM YOBKTOWK 79 and natural glacis on either flank, extending to the woods on the right and left. Advancing his skirmishers he soon drove the enemy out of the position, but declined occupying it, as the reinforcements did not arrive. A little later he deemed it prudent to fall back to a crest near the redoubt first reached. By these movements on our right, the enemy were forced to i3ay special attention to Hancock. They proposed to at- tack him. Johnston states that neither he nor Longstreet knew of the abandoned redoubts until late in the afternoon, w^hen General Early sent an officer to report the situation in that part of the field, and request permission to drive off the Union troops, which Johnston gave. D. H. Hill, senior in command on that flank, was directed to take charge of the movement. Four regiments were pushed forward. Early led the Twenty-fourth and Thirty-eighth Virginia on the left ; Hill commanded the Fifth and Twenty-third North Carolina on the right. They crossed a stream in their front, and pushed through a dense undergrowth to an open field. In this passage the line was broken, and when the brigade reached the open, the left wing was in advance, chasing the " Yankees," according to Hill, who soon found himself in a most unpleasant position. For, as the rebels emerged into easy range, Hancock, who appeared to be retiring, turned upon them — his men cheering and firing over the crest men- tioned — and dealt destruction in their ranks. The volleys of musketry were followed up with an effective charge. Early was wounded and many of his men and officers fell. Hill endeavored to support him, but his regiments could not be handled under fire, and the entire force fell back. It had suffered a bloody repulse, losing nearly 400 men. Hill's and Early's discomfited commands remained in line of battle at a distance all night, expecting to be attacked, and suffered greatly from the cold rain that fell. 80 THE PENINSULA. This conduct of Hancock and his command was the re- lieving feature of the day. " The brilliancy of the x^lan of battle," reports General Smith, "the coolness of its execu- tion, the seizing of the proper instant for changing from the defensive to the offensive, the steadiness of the troops en- gaged, and the completeness of the victory, are subjects to which I earnestly call the attention of the General-in-Chief for his just praise." Upon the left, meantime. Hooker had been fighting man- fully, but lost ground, until Kearney came to his relief about two o'clock, and threw Birney's and Berry's brigades into the action, with Jameson's forming a second line. Hooker's men fell back out of fire, exhausted and with thinned ranks. Kearney engaged the enemy vigorously, and by nightfall had recovered the field. About the same time in the afternoon, two o'clock, Couch's division appeared on the ground on the main road, and Peck's brigade was or- dered to deploy as near as possible on Hooker's right, where he also became closely engaged, but held his own. When night closed, the Union forces were still confronting the line of rebel works. The tactics of the day had proved a failure. Sumner had hoped to accomplish something by Hancock's move, but was distracted by Hooker's serious action. He proposed to reinforce Hancock with the rest of Smith's di- vision, but the heavy firing on his left warned him that the enemy might succeed in interposing themselves between Hooker and Smith, and the latter was retained near the cen- tre, or rather near the main road ; for it would be within the truth to say that up to two o'clock, when Peck arrived, there was no centre to this battle. During the forenoon at least. Hooker was fighting a battle of his own on the left and Sumner was planning to fight another on the right. At the moment the latter wished to follow up his own plan and push FORWARD FROM YORKTOWX. 81 r Hancock forward, Hooker's somewhat alarming situation, wliich had not been counted on, suddenly baffled him. In a word, neither Sumner nor any one else had the entire field under his eye and control. The battle was fought by piece- meal and ended in disajopointment. "We lost that day, 2,228 killed, wounded, and missing, and five guns. Longstreet reports the total rebel loss at 1,560. Toward five o'clock the continued cheering of troops at Sumner's front announced the arrival of General McClellan upon the field. He had hastily ridden forward on receiving the tardy intelligence, conveyed to him by two members of his staff, that matters were not going on well at the front. There he made the necessary dispositions for more united action on the following day. By this time the divisions of Hooker, Kearney, Smith, Couch, and Casey were well in hand. Sedgwick's and Bichardson's were turned back to Yorktown to follow Franklin's and Porter's to West Point by water. At night the enemy abandoned Williamsburg, and contin- ued their retreat toward Bichmond. That portion of the army that was to advance by water from Yorktown made more comfortable progress and at less sacrifice than the divisions which had been marching by land and fighting at Williamsburg. Something more was expected of it at first than simple progress. It was intended that Franklin, followed by Porter, Sedgwick, and Bichard- son, should be moved in transj)orts to West Point above, and striking across to the main roads, cut off the retreat of such bodies of the enemy as might be below. But delays, as usual, prevented. Franklin, whose troops had been so long on the boats, tiring of inaction, obtained permission the day before the evacuation of Yorktown to land his men and go 4* 82 THE PENINSULA. into camp. Ordered back again tlie next day, it was evening before all were ready to steam forward, and then, in conse- quence of tlie extreme darkness of the night, the commander of the gunboat flotilla declined to act as convoy until the following morning. So Franklin did not get off from York- town until the 6th. At one o'clock he reached Eltham Landing above West Point, disembarked his troops, and im- mediately sent the transports back for Sedgwick's division. His instructions were to wait at Eltham until further orders. No mention was made about cutting off the enemy. To make the attempt alone would have been hazardous, and the remaining divisions could not concentrate for several days. Franklin, indeed, on the 7th, was himself attacked. About nine o'clock in the morning, a large force of the enemy ap- peared in front of General Newton's brigade, which they at- tacked with vigor an hour later. Parts of Slocum's and Taylor's brigades supported Newton, and a smart action continued until three o'clock, when the enemy withdrew. Their object in attacking was twofold : first, to protect their trains, which were in an exposed position at Barhamsville, and upon which they apprehended an assault from the troops landed from the transports at West Point ; and second to drive the Union army into the river if they could, or, at least, send them back under the protection of their gunboats. The rebel force consisted of Whitney's division of G. W. Smith's command, the command of General Magruder, then under Brigadier-General Jones, and Hill and Longstreet's forces in reserve. ( CHAPTER V. TO THE CHICKAHOMINY — McDOWELL — JACKSON THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY— APE AIR OF HANOVER COURT HOUSE. Afteb Williamsburg, as from the outset, the course of advance up the peninsula lay straight toward Richmond, wifch the base of supplies either on the York or. the James. The York was followed, and within two weeks the army had again been concentrated, resting between that river, or its southern branch — the Pamunkey — and the Chicka- hominy. From "Williamsburg, the distance marched in the interval was no more than forty miles — the few and wretched roads continuing to prove serious obstacles — and the promise of a rapid pursuit failed of being made good. The troops moved on the 8th, Keyes in advance, follow^- ing Stoneman's cavalry, who opened communication with Franklin at Eltham. On the 15th, headquarters were es- tablished at Cumberland on the south bank or the Pamun- key, and on the following day at the White House, where a permanent depot was organized, the troops having marched up through Barhamsville, Roper's Church, and New Kent Court House. On the 21st the army was collected and in line once more, with its face toward Richmond, from seven to twelve miles distant. The intervening obstacles to be overcome were the ever-present enemy, and in addition, as it was to prove, the formidable Chickahominy. Franklin's 84 THE PENINSULA. newly organized corps'^ lield the right of the line three miles from New Bridge, with Porter's corps, also just formed, supporting, while Sumner occupied the centre, connecting with Kejes, who held the left near Bottom's Bridge, with Heintzelman in reserve. Stoneman and the cavalry watched the extreme right within a mile of New Bridge. The position thus occupied by the Union army is one to be noticed, since General McClellan implies in his report that it was not entirely his own choice. The reason of his being there, as explained by himself, introduces the reader to a new phase of the campaign, with McDowell reappear- ing as the aid with whom alone success could be hoped for. Soon after the Williamsburg battle McClellan resumed his calls for a larger force. Casualties and sickness had reduced his numbers considerably, and on the 14th he reported that he could not put into battle against the enemy more than 80,000 men at the utmost. Johnston, he believed, was far stronger. To the President he reported : "I have found no fighting men left in this Peninsula. All are in the ranks of the o^jposing foe ; " and then he urged that he might be re- inforced with all the disposable troops of the Government. ask for every man that the "War Department can send me," was his powerful appeal. " I will fight the enemy," he continues, whatever their force may be, with, whatever force I may have, and I firmly believe that we shall beat them, but our triumph should be made decisive and com- plete. The soldiers of this army love their Government, * The two new "Provisional" Corps, as they were called, became the Fifth and Sixth. They were organized about May 15th, by making Franklin commander o£ the former, which was composed of his own division, now Slocum's, with Smith's from Keyes" Corps, and Fitz John Porter commander of the latter, in- cluding his own division, now Morell's, and another under Sykes. The latter's brigade of regulars had been enlarged to a division by the addition of Duryea's New York Zouaves, and the Tenth New York, under Colonel Bendix. TO THE CHICKAHOMINY. 85 and will fight well in its support. You may rely upon them. They have confidence in me as their General, and in you as their President. Strong reinforcements will at least save the lives of many of them. The greater our force the more perfect will be our combinations, and the less our loss." To this pressing entreaty for more troops, President Lin- coln returned an encouraging reply. There was McDowell's corps, which had been withheld from the Peninsula Army since March, still in front of Washington. It had been guarding the city with eminent satisfaction during McClel- lan's weary progress toward Eichmond, and was to continue there for that purpose until the Government could safely spare it for more active operations. "You will consider the national capital," wrote Stanton to McDowell, April 11th, "as especially under your protection, and make no move- ment throwing your force out of position for the discharge of this primary duty." McDowell repaired first to Catlett's Station, and in the direction of Culpeper, and soon after moved down the Eappahannock ojaposite to Fredericksburg, intending to occupy that town as his advanced defensive position in front of Washington. To supply the place of Franklin's division of his corps which had joined McClellan, General Shields' division of Banks' Shenandoah force was or- dered to report to him. With his corps thus augmented and completed — his four Division Commanders being McCall, King, Ord, and Shields — General McDowell could muster, about May 20th, the very respectable army of 41,000 men, inclusive of a brigade of cavalry and 100 pieces of artillery. Opposed to him, hovering to the south of and in the vicinity of Fredericksburg, was a fluctuating force of the rebels, generally some twelve thousand strong, commanded by Brigadier-General J. E. Anderson, of the Tradegar Iron Works, Virginia. 86 THE PENINSULA. It was necessarily to McDowell's command that President Lincoln looked when he received McClellan's urgent call for reinforcements. There were no other troops to be had. On May 17th, accordingly, the former received instructions to move down the Eichmond and Fredericksburg Eailroad and co-operate" with the army under McClellan, then threat- ening the Confederate capital, as we have seen, from the line of the Pamunkey and York Eivers. It will be observed that this was not a reinforcement proper, but an independent co- operating army. The " 2^^™^iT