J »-> o c o ^ 2 = c - x _ o _ O 0 o u C j I 1 u cc IT ! j 1 j 1 □ ! i O ! THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA ENDOWED BY THE DIALECTIC AND PHILANTHROPIC SOCIETIES dk6t ,E9 1836 This book is due at the WALTER R. DAVIS LIBRARY on the last date stamped under "Date Due." If not on hold, it may be renewed by bringing it to the library. DATE DUE RETURNED DATE DUE RETURNED FEB 1 7 2 m FORM NO 513. REV. 1/84 ^ pK(>l • £9 an ON THE DESIGNS OF RUSSIA. B S LIEUT-COLONEL DE LACY EVANS. SECOND EDITION. LONDON: JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET. MDCCCXXXVI. LONDON : Printed by W. Clowes and Son Stamford-street. TO GENERAL LORD HILL, COMMANDER OF HIS MAJESTY'S MILITARY FORCES, THE FOLLOWING- ESSAY IS INSCRIBED BY THE AUTHOR, INTRODUCTION. If any useful purpose be attained, or the public service be in the slightest degree promoted, by the following pages, very little apology need be offered for the attempt I have made ; — if not, none ought to stand me in stead. My object has been to select and examine, — by means of as diligent a research as the time would admit of, — the leading facts which bear upon the matter under consideration. Whether the infer- ences to be drawn from them shall coincide with the policy intended to be pursued by his Majesty's government, is of course, beyond my humble op- portunities of knowing; — but I am by no means unsanguine in the hope, that such may, in effect, prove to be the case. With reference to the motives in which the invasion of the Turkish dominions may have ori- ginated, I would, once for all, make one obser- vation, namely — that, though territorial or political B 2 INTRODUCTION. aggrandisement shoulcl, in reality ^ have been totally foreign to the previous contemplation of the Russian cabinet, — still the question remains as to whether the consequences likely to ensue, may not be the same as if such views had been actually entertained — should the Porte be induced (from whatever cause) to provoke or give pretext for a continuance of this unequal contest. Sensible of the almost universality of the inter- ests involved in the subject, I am quite conscious of the responsibility incurred in entering upon it. SUMMARY OF EVENTS. The Grecian revolt may be regarded as the first tangible occurrence in the more recent portion of the great political drama now approaching a de- nouement in the south-east of Europe. It was prepared from within the Russian frontier, and, —there is fair ground to assume, — not without the knowledge of some of the Russian authorities. From that point, — to the installation of Count Capo d'Istria as President, — there has been a series of events, many of which will be but too fresh in the memory of the reader. The Morea, Attica, and the Archipelago, whither the insurrection quickly spread, and where alone it gained head, may average a distance of about a thousand miles from the dominions of the Autocrat. No sooner, however, were the flames of rebellion (if it can be so termed) against the Ottoman au- thority lit up within those remote territories, than occasion seems to have been conceived for aug- menting the armies of the Pruth and Dniestre. The savage outrages thenceforward so frequently - perpetrated by the Turks — the more than suspicion B 2 4 SUMMARY OF EVENTS. entertained by the Porte relative to the sinister intentions and conduct of Russia, — and the loud and peremptory tone of reclamation adopted by the latter, — now tended to exasperate more than ever the ancient and multiplied causes of discordance existing between those neighbouring- states. A general anxiety gradually arose in Europe to bring this afflicting civil war of extermination to a close. The Cabinets of France and England, readily falling in with this popular sentiment, in- terposed — ostensibly, rather on the ground of the piracies and hinderances to commerce which had ensued, — but far more probably actuated by con- siderations of the danger to be apprehended from leaving Russia to pursue an unobserved or unre- stricted course in the transaction. And this latter most indispensable precaution was, we can hardly doubt, the real originating cause both of the Pro- tocol of 1826, and the tripartite Treaty of 1827. At length, the indomitable pertinacity of the Porte, in resisting the mediation of the allies, led to the withdrawal of their ambassadors. A Manifesto, or Firman, was then circulated to the superior vassals of the Sultan, which boasts of having negotiated only to gain time, — declares the sword to be, in all likelihood, the only resort, — and SUMMARY OF EVENTS. 5 summons the whole mass of the Mussulman people to prepare to arm. Bad faith, and monstrous impolicy, are the lead- ing characteristics of this document. Neverthe- less, it contains some very grave, and — there are ample data on which to presume — not unfounded imputations against Russia; which, if dwelt on and substantiated with any tact, must have gone far to place the proceedings of the Northern Court in a very unfavourable point of view. There can be very little doubt but that the fo- menting of various conspiracies amongst the sub- jects* of the Porte, could easily have been traced : and no less so, that this procedure is not only subversive of the first principles of international law, but vitiatory of every complaint emanating from a power that could permit to itself the em- ployment of any such means. * " Being anxious, for the last fifty or sixty years, to put in execution her culpable projects," &c. — and again, " Russia did not stop there. The military reforms that had been adopted by the Sublime Porte gave umbrage to her. She felt that this organization might one day or other cause all the evils to fall back on herself, which had been prepared for Islamism. From that moment she resolved not to give any * respite to the Mussulmans," &c. It is confidently stated, that considerable incendiary supplies have been distributed to the Janissaries from the north of the Pruth. 6 SUMMARY OF EVENTS. But the Turks are themselves too obtuse on the score of justice, and too familiarly in the habit of violating every species of right, to anticipate pro- bably any advantage from unmasking an unwar- rantable or disingenuous line of conduct. Be- sides, the Hatti- Sheriff does not appear to have been addressed to Foreign Courts*. But be this as it may, never had Russia so ex- cellent a plea for an appeal to arms ; an alterna- tive for which she appears to have been most fully prepared ; since, at no former time, had the amount and organization of her armies reached to anything near so formidable a height. Credit, it appears, is claimed on account of her not having resorted to war at an earlier period, particularly in 1821 ; but there are several con- siderations that may have influenced — first — the postponement, — and, secondly, the selection of the recent period for executing this supposed long- meditated attack. For instance, the essential en- hancement of the Russian means of aggression, both financial and military, during the last six years ; — the abject condition to which Persia has been so opportunely reduced ; — but, above all, the * Since writing the above, a detailed answer to the Rus- sian Manifesto has been published by the Porte. SUMMARY OF EVENTS. 7 severe shocks and instability to which the two ca- binets^ from whom obstruction was most to be apprehended, had been just then almost coevally exposed. Having conquered, as Russia has done, the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Ottoman states, she can never be at a loss for plausible, if not unanswerable, pretexts for en- gaging in hostilities whenever it shall perfectly accord with her position to do so. These have been now elaborately imbodied, and sent forth to the world in justification of the war. But it is the consequences, not the causes, of the quarrel, which mainly concern other governments. And here it is, that the Russian Declaration ex- presses itself in by far the most vague, unex- plicit, and least satisfactory manner. The whole expenses of the war, however ex- tended in duration, — and the commercial or other losses of the Russians, for a series of years back, of whatever amount or description, — are, it is de- cisively announced, to be borne by the Sultan. The longer the contest, then, the more difficult it will be of adjustment. Nor is it to be inferred from the tenor of the passage alluded to, that the extent of this indefinite claim is to be subject to s SUMMARY OF EVENTS. the award of any impartial or neutral power: and if the sum required be a large one, how is the drained and attenuated exchequer of the Seraglio to defray it ? And what are to be the consequences of non-payment? Are the pro- vinces overrun by the Russian armies to be held till the stipulated debt of contribution be fully liquidated ? The inviolability, likewise, of the commerce of the Black Sea and of the passage of the Bosphorus, are declared to be a sine qua non ;— the recur- rence of such acts, also, as have given the Em- peror a ground of war, is to be (< for ever" pro- vided against. How is this inviolability to be established — this perpetual and unqualified security to be achieved, — while the Turks garrison the castles of the canal through which the commerce of Russia must pass,— while the revolting despotism of the Crescent goads and presses upon any por- tion of the co-religionists of the Russians ? — At least while there is no sufficiently immediate countervailing check. In short, the utmost possible latitude of con- struction clearly is reserved to the Czar. Nor is there, in regard to future pretensions of any sort. * SUMMARY OF EVENTS. 9 one word or expression to be found in those state papers, which does not bear the stamp of being guardedly undefined and unbinding : and the Emperor declares that he will not lay down his arms, till these results (whatever they may be) are obtained. Thus the matter stands — and Europe awaits with solicitude the issue. Review of Topics. If the war now actually waging on the Danube should really lead, as many seem to apprehend, to the demolition of the Turkish empire, this — in itself, and separated from all collateral conside- rations — might be a source rather of congratula- tion than anxiety. A question, however, neces- sarily arises, as to the subsequent distribution of the territories as yet subject to the Ottoman power. If they went, or were likely to do so, to the formation of a new state, this, also, might perhaps be matter for satisfaction. But nothing whatever has transpired, which can lead the pub- lic to anticipate that any project of this sort has been in contemplation. 10 REVIEW OF TOPICS. We are left, then, to infer, that, if any dismem- berment takes place, the provinces thus becoming disposable are destined to be appropriated by one or more of the surrounding states. Thus would new combinations originate, of more or less importance, and, of course, requiring the consideration of all the other governments. But even this might not be found, on due examina- tion, to solicit any peculiar interference, provided at least the states so destined to be aggrandised were of an ordinary class. Such, however, is not the actual probability. The accession of dominion, if any, appears but too likely to go to a power already too dominant ;— whose general course of policy and accumulation of the means of aggression were even previously too preponderant for the repose of other states, and of a nature to endanger, as was generally supposed, that proximate degree of security and independence, which, for the maintenance of se- parate rights and the well-being of society, must ever continue, as long as nations are accessible to each other — as long as a confederacy is deemed preferable to a single and universal do- minion — to be the just, necessary, and common object of the general preservation. REVIEW OF TOPICS. 11 The foregoing are amongst the considerations which have led to the drawing up of these pages, wherein it will chiefly be sought to ascertain, — 1. Whether, — it is not now optional with Russia to overthrow the Turkish power in Europe within even- the present year*. 2. Whether, — the feasibility of this contingency may not demand, on our parts, a more serious at- tention, because of the severe terms recently im- posed upon Persia, and the further important territorial loss f it has been obliged to submit to. * If the period, that elapses before a decisive blow be struck, shall turn out to be greater than is here supposed — this every military man knows may arise from the nature of the opera- tions adopted by the invading army, rather than from the obstacles it will have had to surmount. The season for action may be said to continue till late in autumn, — with an interval, however, of some weeks in the middle or latter end of summer, during which no arduous operations can well be carried on, especially in the valley of the Danube, without calamitous results to the health of the troops. But this was formerly felt more severely than it might now probably be, from the deplorably inefficient state in which the Russian medical department then was. t The district of Gocksca is barren and unfertile, but that of Erivan was one of the finest of the Persian empire. The former, however, was peculiarly desired because it commands a principal pass into the Shah's territories. 1*2 REVIEW OF TOPICS. 3. Whether, — if the Russians establish them- selves on the Hellespont, it may not imminently endanger, if not lead on, to the loss of British India — British maritime ascendency — and even, not impossibly,. British connexion with Ireland. 4. With reference to France : — We will suppose a space of fifteen years * to pass over, during which nothing intervenes suf- ficiently important to alter materially the political combinations arising- out of this new territorial ar- rangement. France may then have a population of about thirty-four or thirty-five millions. She will be then more commercial and industrious in her habits — she will be enabled to raise a greater revenue — but her debt, which has been as yet progressive, may very possibly reach three hun- dred millions sterling. The European population of Russia is now es- timated, on all hands, at about fifty millions f. Its * This will give Russia an interval between this and the next war. in which to prepare herself for another great onset, about similar to that which has elapsed between the opening of the present, and the termination of the past, one. ~ The French empire, in 1812, previous to the invasion of 1 Russia, counted forty-three millions of souls ; including Holland and the German departments. There were, however REVIEW OF TOPICS. 13 present annual advance is calculated at twelve hundred thousand*, which gives, in fifteen years, eighteen millions. To these add five millions for Roumelia, Bulgaria, and the Principalities, which is no more than one-fifth of the population these luxuriantly fruitful provinces are capable, at no distant period, of supporting. Thus will seventy- three millions, be then, at the lowest computation, the number of the Rus- sian people, westward of the Volga. And this supposes that the Czar has, during all the inter- mediate period, abstained from carrying his arms into Anatolia, Thessaly, or Albania ; although it is clear that, at least, a large part of Anatolia must, of necessity, be occupied, if only for defence. The Russian finances will have increased in a yet more considerable ratio than those of France, by reason of the peculiarly advantageous outlet now about to be obtained for the rich products of the southern governments of the empire, and of the great impetus to industry this may be ex- pected to afford. besides, six millions and four hundred thousand in the king dom of Italy, and one million and a half in the Illyrian provinces. * Dupin. 14 REVIEW OF TOPICS. Now, if any cause of umbrage should spring* up, and we can fancy many, — for instance, the clashing rivality of their pretensions in Spain, Italy, the Levant, Egypt, &c, — it will be for those whom it concerns to consider, while there is yet time to do so, whether the Rhine may then be counted on as a sufficient barrier against the co- lumns advancing from Warsaw on the one side, and the higher Danube, or Servia*, on the other, and corresponding in strength with the anticipated census above stated ; aided also by, or propelling the armies of thirty or forty millions of Germans, whose feeble courts, and virtually captive sove- reigns, will long previously have been thoroughly subdued to Russian influence, and chaine'd down to follow in the wake of the Russian policy? I do not pretend to state whether France may, or may not, be enabled to overthrow this combination. But it appears distinctly demonstrable that, at the period pointed out, she may have to contend against a power wielding the resources of a * In the first coalition to w hich the late autocrat acceded, the main Russian army debouched from Gallicia. With this, there co-operated two maritime armaments, which may be termed wings ; the one disembarked at Naples, the other.at Pomerania, the latter being destined to penetrate, in conjunc- tion with the Swedes and English, to Hanover, REVIEW OF TOPICS. 15 Russo-Germanic population, exceeding in amount one hundred millions. There is nothing chimeri- cal in the supposition of operations on this ex* tended scale ; similar, and yet greater, have taken place in our own time. But even granting that the semi-barbarians of the north have no relish for the enjoyments afforded by France and Italy, — that the popular feeling has been untinged by the inflated accounts of the successful soldiery, who twice so promi- nently assisted in subverting the governments of those luxurious and inviting countries, — still, it cannot be denied, that if the Russian flag waves over the towers of Constantinople, the present in- fluence of the autocrat, in the German Courts * of every class, must not only be very decisively aug- mented, but will in a little time reign paramount along the shores of the Mediterranean, reducing that of France to comparative insignificance. Toulon can never send forth the fleets that may * Already by political connexion, and by blood and mar- riage relationship, there are ample materials prepared for a Russo-Germanic Confederation, resembling that which was created by Buonaparte. The grand Duchy of Warsaw then formed the chief strength of French interest in Germany ; — that now is in the hands of Russia. 16 REVIEW OF TOPICS. be prepared in the Marmora. That sea, the Asoph, and Euxine, will then be Russian lakes, pre-eminently adapted to make good seamen whose shores, and those of the rivers that disem- bogue into them, abound in all the materials for a navy on the largest scale : the practicability of which has been already more than proved by the creation in the ports of the Crimea, under infinitely less favourable circumstances, of a considerable marine, comprising ships of one hundred and ten guns. There can be very little doubt that at Constantinople ships of war may be built f , fitted out, and provisioned, at about one-third of the expense necessary to be incurred at Toulon ; and also at a far cheaper rate than at Sevastopol and Nicolief; — the materials at present required by the Russians in the Black Sea, being chiefly brought from the Baltic : which, in the event sup- posed, need no longer be the case. But to return to the heads of topics, * " Both possess (the Black Sea and the Asoph) that which renders them invaluable as a nursery for good sea- men," &c. &c. — Jones, (Captain, R. N. ) t For more ample information on this head, the reader is referred to Pallas, Leckie, Pasley, Eton and Jones, — but on maritime affairs, especially to the latter. REVIEW OF TOPICS. If 5. Whether, — though the future means of Russia be likely, under certain favourable con- tingencies, to become almost irresistible, — she may not at present be less invulnerable in reality than in appearance. ' 6. Whether, — she has not now become propor- tionably more formidable in offensive than defen- sive warfare. 7. Whether, — the invasions by Charles and Napoleon afford sufficient data to invalidate the affirmative of these queries. 8. Whether, — it is not still perfectly competent either to France or England, separately, to exhaust her means., and effectually paralyze her operations, especially on the southern and Asiatic frontiers, and even most probably force her, at least, to recoil on her own line : — although, after she gains possession of the entrances to the Black Sea, it should, perhaps, require a very onerous series of efforts on the part of both those powers, in con- junction, to restrain the other within any reason- able limitation of its pretensions. 9. Whether, — the sanguine expectations and expensive efforts of the Russians, relative to the appropriation, in a considerable degree, of the c 18 REVIEW OF TOPICS. British Eastern trade, and the supplying the German, Italian, and other markets, with East- ern produce, by land, from the Tigris to Tre- bisond, — and by water, from the Tartarian shore of the Caspian, to Taganrog, — may not be un- likely to be realized in great part — though cer- tainly not in regard to heavy or voluminous arti- cles of merchandise. 10. Whether, — there is ground to anticipate a dismemberment of the Russian empire, within such given period as may render a reliance on it safe, eligible, and politic. 11. Whether, — if suffered to proceed in her career, and to arrange without obstruction her materials of operation, this power may not shortly acquire a degree of intercourse with India that will enable her — 1st, to disturb and disaffect the public mind of that country towards us ; 2dly, to move (say thirty thousand men*, exclusive of the maintenance of communications) from the Cas- pian and Aral as a base, and by the Oxus as a * "As to attack from abroad, the intention (says Lord Hastings) must be long previously discovered, so that India could not be found unprepared.' , On this point, I would beg to direct the attention of the reader to a detailed note on the subject at the end of the volume. REVIEW OF TOPICS. 19 principal line of communication, to the neigh- bourhood of Attock on the Indus, or into the Punjab, — there, perhaps, to -take post during a period as a rallying point for the disaffected, or as a beacon for their encouragement and direction ; — whereby India must soon become either untenable to us ; or, from the* excess of expenditure over receipts, resulting from this state of things, un- worthy of further retention. 12. Whether, — the national debt has really increased in the ratio that is generally supposed ; whether it is a full and unveiled picture of the finan- cial affairs of the country that is usually presented to the public through the medium of Parliament ; ■ — and whether the existing condition of our re- sources really presents a due obstacle to the adoption of the measures, now by so many sup- posed to be requisite for the prospective security of the national interests. The general bearing of these propositions will now be briefly entered on ; with such preliminary notices on collateral points as may seem neces- sary; 20 British Indian Possessions. Though nearly the whole of the Mogul empire, (besides several adjoining- states that were not included in that sovereignty,) together with a far more extended and confirmed authority over the subjugated people than was ever possessed by the Mogul monarchs, have, within the last seventy or eighty years, been brought by some able and heroic men, under the dominion of the British crown, — still one may occasionally hear this splen- did acquisition spoken of, as if its concerns were on a par with some petty insular or colonial dependency. Whether any one may have hitherto happened to class it with Ireland, in the degree of its importance, I am not able to say ; but a parallel may certainly be drawn in some respects. It is true, that it is more distant from the superior state, and that we ought to retain our ascendency for ages longer in the one than we can hope to do in the other. But, on the other hand, the area of British India is to that of Ireland in the proportion of twenty to one ; the BRITISH INDIAN POSSESSIONS. 21 population of fourteen to one ; and the revenue * in that of six to one : the value of commercial interchangesf is also, by several millions, greater, being, in fact, considerably beyond that of any other branch of our external commerce. The amount of property likewise (public J and private) annually transferred thence to the capital of * £24,000,000, — being far superior to the revenue of any other empire or state in the world — France and England excepted. t The imports and exports to and from the East are now thirteen millions sterling annually ; with no other country or dependency do they exceed ten millions. Besides the pecu- liarity of the former having doubled within the last ten or a dozen years ; thus affording the most brilliant prospect of a yet further and progressive extension. This circumstance could not, of course, have been known to M. Say when he pub- lished his (in a degree) depreciatory essay of British India. I The Marquess of Hastings states the average annual supplies from India to England (beyond those from England to India) between the years 1814 and 1822, to have been £1,323,814. It is usual with all Eastern governments to reserve a cash balance in the treasuries, as a preparation for emergency. By the authority of the above-quoted Governor-General, the aggregate amount of this item in the coffers of the three presidencies, after defraying the regular expenditure, was, in 1821, £12,200,000. The value of property remitted on private accounts from India to England is, of course, not easy to ascertain; but must be very considerable. 22 BRITISH INDIAN POSSESSIONS. the English wealth, not falling short probably of the sum of Irish absentee money spent in this part of the United Kingdom — with this advantage, that the one is a clear addition, while the other is but an abstraction, and, perhaps, injuriously so, from one integral part of the state to another. India enables us to keep on foot about thirty thousand British troops (King's or Company's) over and above our other forces ; besides a highly disciplined native army of two or three hundred thousand men ; both being maintained free of all expense to the home government ; — * being armed, equipped, and clothed also from England, thereby furnishing no inconsiderable item of employment to our manufacturing population. It is commonly supposed that the Indian army is only available on the Ganges, and is not directly contributive to the British European de- fence. This is erroneous with respect to the past, and will, it may be hoped, prove still more so with respect to the future. During the last war, we transported the Se- poys over distant seas, and triumphed with them at many thousand miles from their native soil — against the Dutch, for example, at Batavia — — against the French at Bourbon, Mauritius, and BRITISH INDIAN POSSESSIONS. 23 Egypt; and therefore on the borders of the Me- diterranean. And here it may be observed, that the known fact of so great and efficient a numerical force being at our disposal, cannot fail to enhance the high consideration of the British power in the opinion of mankind : — thus probably strengthening imperceptibly, though by no means unimportantly., our political weight and influence on many occa- sions^ totally unconnected with Eastern affairs. To these direct and collateral advantages, there t may be added, — what is far from immaterial to a commercial and manufacturing nation, — the un- limited control of the mercantile concerns and markets, internal and maritime, of such immense and populous countries. Finally, — as the precariousness of our tenure of India tends unavoidably to lessen its unequalled value as a possession, so — that very insecurity and sole source of depreciation are the strongest pos- sible reasons for vigilance in regard to its pro- tection. And in all such cases, there is a maxim, which can never, of course, be lost sight of with - impunity, — namely, that the defence of depend- encies, held by the sword rather than by the af- fections of the inhabitants, can only be advan- tageously made, in advance of their frontiers. 24 Present State of the Ottoman Power . To dilate on the well-known military and poli- tical infirmities of the Porte were now only a waste of time. The best, — perhaps the only, chance of safety that remained to it, as a nation, would have been to adopt without limitation the guidance of France and England. The counsels so often earnestly tendered to the * Divan by the representatives of those countries have been without avail. Whether the ill-success of these endeavours be most attributable to the extreme ignorance of the Turkish functionaries, — to the encouragement said to have been at one time held out by the Court of Vienna, — or to the intrigues and studied arrogance ascribed to the Russian envoy, Count Strogonoff, — were now a matter of unimportant inquiry. By a return said to have just issued from the Grand Vizier's office, the army of the Sultan, re- gular and irregular, for garrisons and frontiers, amounts to one hundred and seventy- seven thousand men. Of these, eighty thousand only are stated to STATE OF THE OTTOMAN POWER. 25 be in the pay of the Porte, and consist of raw levies or reformed Janissaries, whom it has been endea- voured to drill after the European system. This half-organized force might overcome troops of an inferior order, but cannot be expected to con- front, with effect, the sustained fire and combined movements of any tolerably constituted army. The ninety-seven thousand irregulars are the armed followers of the tributary Pachas ; and these, particularly the Asiatic portion, are, gene- rally speaking, a disorderly, ferocious, and intract- able banditti, who repair to the standard of the Prophet partly under the cloak of religion, and partly in the hope of plunder. By this statement, — forty-seven thousand are al- lotted for the defence of Asia ; sixty-two thousand five hundred for the Dardanelles, Bosphorus, the capital, and Adrianople ; — there would thus remain sixty-seven thousand five hundred, for the defence of the Balkan, Bulgaria, and the Danube. But this is the strength of the army on paper. And if we reduce the nominal force by at least one- third, or even one-half, we shall probably be much nearer the effective numbers. — Rapidly, too, will even this diminished strength decrease as the campaign ad- vances. 26 PRESENT STATE OF The formation of an army according to the pre- sent scientific European system, is not the work of a day, and requires elements beyond the reach of the Othman chief. The Russians have been more than a hundred years in making the one they now have ; and even yet, although the whole energy, and almost every faculty of the empire, have been directed to the perfection of that single department or ma- chine, it is deficient in an important ingredient, superior intelligence or mind. Numbers, docility, and hardiness, both as to enduring courage, and physical constitution, make up in a degree for this defect. The Portuguese of the last war were good troops under British officers ; — the Hindoos and Mussel- mauns of India are so, with the same assistance ;« — the Persians were so under Macedonian officers ; — the Italians of the late kingdom of Italy were chiefly under French officers. On the other hand, several years elapsed be- fore the energetic and indefatigable Peter could enable his devoted and brave Muscovites to with- stand the Swedes ; although, on all occasions, immensely outnumbering them, and covered to the teeth with entrenchments, — to which he was obliged to resort, even up to Pultawa. THE OTTOMAN POWER. 27 So also the Spaniards, — who are not inferior in manliness to any nation, — who are superior to most in constancy and fortitude, — and who, though ac- tuated by the strongest feelings, — were yet, up to 1814, after six or seven years' experience, scarcely capable of meeting, in the open field, the youngest conscripts of France. The Turkish cavalry, which in former times was the most brilliant and redoubtable portion of their armaments, still occasionally display a fiery indi- vidual valour; but they cannot break steadily formed squares. Their infantry was never good for much, except in skirmishing, or in the defence of walls or entrenchments. Their artillery is repre- sented as still worse. When the country attacked is not very exten- sive, — when the invading army has the means of supplying itself from without, — and there are some points and lines of imperative consequence to be held, a superior cavalry (even if that of the Otto- mans were such) will not avail against a superior infantry and artillery. The Turkish empire in Europe falls, as a matter of course, if the lines of the Danube and Hemus, the passage of the Bos- phorus, and the capital, are possessed by Russia. It is true, that the Ottomans will not probably 28 PRESENT STATE OF abandon their towns and fastnesses without a con- test. But as they have no adequate idea of the use of fire, even with small arms, much less can- non, — nor any notion of the combinations requisite for rendering a general attack either in the field or against a fortress abortive, — their bravery on the breach can have no other effect in the present instance, than the effusion of blood. When they undergo a decisive defeat, it is well known to be a very difficult matter to rally them ; and they sel- dom, afterwards, make a firm stand in the field during the remainder of the campaign. The occurrences which, during the last half cen- tury, intervened to prop the tottering fortunes of the Crescent, arose chiefly out of the mutual jealousies of the Christian powers, — and are as follow : — Between 1788 and 1792, the Austro-Russians were completely successful, and the Turks reduced to the most deplorable weakness ; — but the victo- rious armies continued to besiege and storm towns, whether necessary to their line of operations or not, — instead of investing them, and marching on to the centre of resistance. This gave time for accident, or what is called accident, and for the interposition of other cabinets. The Netherlands rebelled, — Joseph's attention THE OTTOMAN POWER. 29 was thus called off, — the Hungarians became turbulent, — Joseph died, — Potemkin, Catherine's prime minister and generalissimo, died, — England, Holland, Prussia, Hanover, Sweden, Poland, which still existed, took the alarm, and resolved to interfere in an efficient manner. England pre- pared an armament for the Baltic; — Prussia moved one hundred and fifty thousand men towards the Imperial frontiers ; — the Polish diet, instigated by Prussia, and, for the moment, under its protection, commenced the levy of a hundred thousand men ; — Sweden, instigated by France, and subsidized by the Sultan, invaded Russia from the side of Fin- land, — the Swedish cannon shook the windows of the Czarina's palace ; — St. Petersburg was com- pletely uncovered, and must unquestionably have fallen into the hands of the Swedes, were it not for the disaffection previously sown amongst them by the Empress. Catherine, thus embarrassed and pressed in other quarters, found it expedient to withdraw for a time from the South, in order to complete — (as an indis- pensable preliminary to the realization of her views in that direction) — the destruction of Poland. She was then far advanced in years, and un- avoidably much at a loss, on account of the sudden 30 PRESENT STATE OF demise of the able adviser, who had been so many years the sole depositary of her confidence. Sub- sequently, the settlement of the dismembered re- public, and the affairs of France, unavoidably engaged her attention. In three or four years, she was ready, it appears, to recommence the attack upon Turkey ; — but death, this time, interposed, and put an end to all this great woman's pro- jects. Neither was it the prowess of the Turks in 1807, as many suppose, but the victories of the French, that respited Selim : — as may be seen by the treaty of Tilsit, which stipulated for the relinquishment of the line of the Danube. At that time, the Ottomans were unable to muster thirty thousand men in the field. Under various pre- texts, however, the Russians evaded the fulfilment of this stipulation, and kept their army in the Principalities, until they renewed the war in 1810. In 1812, it was again Napoleon who saved the Crescent by advancing upon Moscow with the £t grand army," that so soon after perished in the snows. Pressed by this immense host, the Czar now was compelled to relinquish the advanced positions in Turkey, which he had so long striven, both by negotiation and war, to maintain, — but not THE OTTOMAN POWER. 31 without some equivalent, — consisting of the mouths of the Danube Bessarabia, and part of Moldavia. The recollection of recent defeats, and the inter- cessions of the British and Swedish governments, disposed the Porte to this opportune arrange- ment, — which freed the Russian army of the Da- nube, and enabled it to move against the French line of communications in the north. The Divan seeing, soon after, the desperate pre- dicament in which their enemy was placed, was dissatisfied with the treaty, and accordingly the negotiators of it lost their heads. — Until the last part of this brief war, Count Kamenskoi com- manded the Russians ; and it was generally sup- posed might have made much greater progress, having had originally one hundred and fifteen thousand men (counting recruits) under his orders. He engaged in tedious, unessential blockades or sieges ; occasionally cannonaded, skirmished, or engaged in sanguinary, but in their nature indeci- sive, affairs, about the camp of Choumla ; and, in fact, completely wasted the seasons of action, and ruined the army committed to his charge. It was * Including the fortresses of Ismael, Kilia, Khotin, and Bender. 32 PRESENT STATE OF the same officer who resigned his command, with such strange abruptness, four years before in Po- land. On the last occasion he was superseded by Kutusoff, who had scarcely enough of troops to occupy the line of the Danube. But he signally overthrew the Turks whenever they advanced, par- ticularly under the walls of Rutchuk. One corps was entirely cut off, and surrendered ; another, of sixty thousand men, was pursued for some miles, by twenty thousand Russians. The fact, however, was, that the object of the campaigns of 1810 and 1811, was in great part not of conquest, but almost exclusively to intimidate the Porte into favourable terms of peace, in order to extricate the army of the Danube, for the defence of the Niemen. The superiority of the Russians now, to what they then were, is as much perhaps in other re- spects as numerically : and at present there is no Napoleon, either at Tilsit or on the Borytesnes, with four hundred thousand men, to operate as a diversion in favour of the Sultan. Finally, in the war of 1806, the Russians brought into the field fifty-five thousand men ; in that of 1810, one hundred and fifteen thousand; — THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE. 33 this force was, however, reduced in 1812 to sixty - five thousand *. Between two and three hundred thousand are now reported to be in movement, in Asia and Europe. The Turks in Europe may amount to two or three millions, — living in the midst of four or five millions of enslaved and disaffected Greeks or non-descripts. A rising en masse, in defence of their religion, may, it is thought by some, have the effect of checking the Russians ; but, in the present advanced state of the military art, — how- ever patriotically or fanatically inspired a people may be, they make but indifferent combatants when suddenly transformed from the shop-board or plough-tail to the ranks. Nor is a popular or guerrilla warfare to be cal- culated on. The country in question is inhabited by two nations. A guerrilla war can never be carried on with effect by the minor against the greater number — especially if a foreign force comes to the aid of the more numerous: but if the minor party can maintain a regular army in the field, these desultory services may or may not be advantageous. There are eight or nine millions of Mahometans, and a million and a half of Chris - * Four divisions, out of nine, were withdrawn to the north. 34 PRESENT STATE OF tians in Asiatic Turkey : a country said to have contained,, two centuries ago, fifty millions of peo- ple. This, under the rule of the Crescent, is impro- bable. Jts area, however, is more than double that of France ; in fecundity of soil it is superior, — and in picturesque beauty and classical interest, it almost rivals Italy and Greece. Geographers continue to represent this extensive region, as appertaining to the Ottoman empire : nominally, this may almost be correct, but that is all. Large tracts of the interior are entirely in a state of anarchy, being inhabited by tribes of rapacious plunderers by profession. In other parts there are great agas, or independent lords, who maintain considerable forces, and occa- sionally levy contributions on the neighbouring towns. The greater pashaliks, especially the more dis- tant ones, yield a mock rather than a real alle- giance to the Sultan. The supplies or quotas of troops which they should furnish, are quite pre- carious, and always scanty in amount. Sometimes these distant tributaries enter into sham wars, either against each other, or some Arab chieftain, — in order to excuse themselves the more readily in disobeying the requisitions of the Porte. The THE OTTOMAN POWER. consequence of this state of things is., of course, a general devastation and frightfully increasing de- population. The funds and the regular sources of the revenue, if rapine on a large scale can be termed such, are supposed to be in a great degree dried-up. Con- fiscations and adulteration of the coin, are amongst the favorite resorts of Moslem financiers ; but these are of the class of expedients which soon defeat themselves. The exhortation* in the Hatti Sheriff, to serve without pay ; and the proposed sequestration to the public use of the property of the black eunuchs of the palace, who are usually amongst the most influential men of the empire, — are very symptomatic of the wants of the Divan. The marine, except, perhaps, that of Egypt, is and has for a long time been, virtually extinct. * " Let no one dream of a monthly pay or remuneration of any kind, — far from it, let us sacrifice both our persons and property," &c. If this be to be the case, the Sultan would do well to create without delay what never before existed with a Turkish army, — a commissariat. Hitherto they have been supplied by a bazaar, which daily opens in the camp or bivouac; and if the soldier cannot pay in this ambulatory market for his food, the merchant will not follow the troops with his rice. D 2 36 STATE OF THE OTTOMAN POWER. The mosque alone triumphs, but it is upon the ruins of the state. The Turk is unconscious that the desolating imposture of Mahomet, with which he now sanctifies his violence, was, at an earlier period, received by his own ancestors not in a very dissimilar way from the Saracen. The high martial spirit, enthusiasm, and severe discipline, which once rendered the Crescent so formidable to Christendom, are gone. Fanaticism remains, and supports by an inferior impetus, a comparative degeneracy. And this cannot be more strongly evinced than by the lingering, the protracted, and languishing war of the Morea. The opinion, however, on this subject, of one of their own chief ministers of state, will be sub- ♦ joined. Of course, if the Ottoman power is now des- tined to fall, its ambitious neighbour will be the more immediate instrumental agent in the catas- trophe. Nevertheless, this will be no more than an accelerating cause, inasmuch as others of a more inherent and remote origin exist, — namely, the unaltered character of the Islamite domination, —-its implacable prejudices, with the consequently impolitic treatment of the subjugated people, — to which may be added, an essential incapability of THE MOREA, ATTICA. 37 assimilating with Europe. A deadly and irrecon- cileable mutual hostility supervenes between the two occupants of the soil, leading, it would seem, unavoidably, (even without foreign interposition,) to the expulsion or extermination of one or the other. The Morea, Attica, &c. The advantages derivable to Russia, from the ex- isting state of the Morea, as tending, possibly, to mask ulterior objects* ; to mislead, it might even seem, the governments, and the liberal parties of Europe, by diverting attention from the progress of her real designs ; as adding to the enfeeble- ment of the Turks ; and as cutting them off from that strong and extensive Peninsula, including Macedon, Thessaly, &c, as a place of retreat for at least a part of their forces, — are all quite obvious. The de facto independence of Greece, or at least * How is this protection of a republic in Greece, to be reconciled with gratuitously leading the van of a haughty crusade against limited but legitimate monarchy in Naples, Turin, and Madrid ? Either there is an extreme inconsistency, or the [promotion of free institutions is not the true object in view. The fact is, liberalism enfeebles the Turkish power ; uliraism that of Italy, Spain, and Western Europe, generally. 38 THE MOREA, ATTICA. of the unfortunate survivors in it, which, it may be feared, are now not numerous, is evidently within the easy accomplishment of any one of the parties to the triple alliance, by the employment of a very few thousand men, in support of the native bands, and by a really strict blockade. If this be to be done at all, the sooner the better for every one concerned, Russia alone excepted. But as for the permanency of the Peloponnesian Republic, that must eventually depend upon other contingencies, as well as on the expulsion of the Egyptians. A really free, not to say republican institution, can no more endure within the vicinity of the Russian bayonets, than under the scimitar of the Turk. Supposing that the embryo Presidentiary Go- vernment gains possession of its assumed territory, and thrives for a little time, which it assuredly will do, under the generous protection or even sufferance of the allied flag : — no sooner are the Muscovites within sight of the iEgean, than their party in the republic will be revivified and insi- diously fostered. Nicholas may then play over again, at his ease, the game of the crafty Philip of antique times. Nor will there be any Demosthenes at iEgina or Napoli, to hurl an invective to the Dardanelles. WALLACHIA, MOLDAVIA. 39 Still, although all modern Europe mainly owes its civilization to the effulgent genius of this little territory, which has been now so long given up (perhaps somewhat ungratefully) to the unbridled fury of the barbarian, — it must nevertheless be acknowledged, that its emancipation is, at present, indispensably to be considered as quite of a secondary importance Wallachia, Moldavia — occupation of them, &c. The principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia rather exceed the superficial extent of England. By right of treaty, they are no more than tribu- tary to the Porte : in effect, they have been abjectly enslaved and ruinously plundered, even, it is said, to a greater extent, and in a more sys- tematically grievous manner, than any other of the Turkish territories. The staple productions of these provinces con- sist of wheat, oxen, sheep, and horses. The unconscionable agents of the Sultan reserve to themselves not only large supplies in kind, but 40 WALLA.CHIIA., MOLDAVIA. : the exclusive privilege also of purchasing any surplus quantity of those valuable commodities nearly at their own 'price, which, as may be sup- posed, is not a " remunerating-" one — a grinding system, justified on the pretence of some ancient regulation relative to the supply of the capital. Thus the population has dwindled to about nine hundred thousand ; which, under any tolera- ble species of government, might, it is stated, be at least fifteen millions *, — so rich and various are the produce. The existence of mines of a supe- rior promise along the Wallachian side of the Carpatian range, is perfectly ascertained ; but the inhabitants have hitherto carefully abstained from any attempts of exploring or working them, under a conviction that it could only furnish an additional stimulant to exactions and extortion. No one, it may be presumed, can now doubt, that it is the settled purpose of Russia to appro- priate these fine districts on the first favourable opportunity. Within a brief period, they would actually rival, in value, the whole of Russian Poland. The Danube must then become, what it is naturally calculated to be, a great commercial * Wilkinson's Wallachia, — British consul at Galatz— a very ably drawn up account. OCCUPATION OF THEM. 41 » road between Asia, the borders of the Black Sea, and those of the Rhine. When Catherine found it advisable to postpone pushing matters to extremity in the South, she resolved, as an intermediate step, to erect, if possible, Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bessarabia, into a dependent monarchy, under the present Grand Duke Constantine, or, as some state, under Potemkin. The former, as is well known, was entirely educated with a view to prepare him for the government of a Greek nation. Her Majesty represented her wishes to this effect with the concurrence of Austria. This took place about eight-and-thirty years ago. But the other courts, and especially our own, being alarmed and indignant at the proposition, denounced as totally inadmissible. But it appears the Divan of Wallachia has j ust addressed the Autocrat, conveying their wishes that he would at once formally annex them to the empire. This address was, of course, got up by the permission and sanction of the Russian pro- visional government, and probably for the distinct purpose of affording to Europe a display of His Imperial Majesty's continence in these matters. Of course the request was not complied with. 42 WALLACHIA, MOLDAVIA : This would have been most gratuitously and pre- maturely to disclose, without the slightest earthly equivalent, what it may have cost his ministers many earnest protestation and ingenious sophistries to conceal. There are several passages in the Memoires ascribed to Napoleon, tending to show that the late Alexander was unvaryingly and intently de- sirous of following up the designs of the illus- trious Catherine, There does not seem any ade- quate reason for questioning the motive of those passages. Abundant evidence, however, exists of their truth. At the interview of Erfurt, the Czar consented not only to join in an attack upon Austria, but to the elevation of Joseph Buonaparte to the throne of Spain, — on the mere condition, that the Emperor Napoleon should not oppose "la reunion definitive a l'empire Russe de la Mol- davie et de la Walachie.'' See the admissions to this effect — inadvertent perhaps — in the work of the Imperial aide-de-camp, Colonel Boutourlin, written, as is understood, under the immediate inspection and with the critical aid of the Au- tocrat. The evacuation by the Russians, stipulated for at Tilsit and Slobodsea, was not carried into OCCUPATION OF THEM. 43 effect, — because, says the same authentic writer, f Le Cabinet de Saint -Petersbourg desirait amener la Porte a consentir a la cession des provinces cis-danubiennes, sans renouveler les hostilites suspendues depuis Parmistice de Slo- bodsea ; mais la negotiation que Pon entama a ce sujet dans un congres reuni a Jassy ayant echoue, la guerre sur le Danube recommen^a avec plus de vigueur qu'auparavant." Where are the manifestations of departure from this policy by the Emperor Nicholas ? — Do they consist in words ? And if so — are these words borne out by the stupendous nature of the present invasion, both in Asia and Europe ? The Muscovite rule is not, according to our notions, of the most gentle character — but even the knout, under limitation, would be a grateful redemption from the defiling and harpy system under which the suffering Danubian people groan. — But this relief, and improvement of their condition, were purchased at too dear a rate, if the tranquillity and international relations of all the civilized nations were, in doing so, completely disarranged. Russia is in the habit of posting large armies on her frontiers. We may expect that she would 44 WALLACHIAj MOLDAVIA. in this case canton, at least, one hundred and fifty thousand men beyond the Pruth. Thus would the investment of the Austrian dominions be nearly completed^ — while the political existence of the sovereign of the Bosphorus must thence- forth hang by a mere thread; for it is totally beyond his means to keep on foot a permanent force capable of resisting any sudden advance of a considerable corps from so near a point as the Danube. But granting that the Autocrat merely insists on the independence of the Principalities, — this is precisely what was done with respect to the Crimea*. What was the result ? Briefly after- * Such was also the preliminary to the appropriation of the Kuban, and several other countries, now forming part of New Russia, — as appears by the Art. III. of the Treaty of Kainargi, 1774. " All the Tartar people, those of Crimea, of Budgiac, of the Kuban, the Edissans, Geambouiluks, and Edischkuls, shall, without any exception, be acknow- ledged by the two Empires as free nations, and entirely in- dependent of any foreign power, and shall be governed by their own sovereign of the race of Gingis-Khan, elected and raised to the throne by all the Tartar people ; who shall govern them according to their ancient laws and usages, rendering no account whatever to any foreign power ;" &c. &c. &c. These solemn guarantees were soon after found to be no better than waste paper. RUSSIA. 45 wards, the Khaun was compelled, by one means or another, humbly to lay his ostensible sovereignty at the feet of the Russian Empress. Russia. No parity, of course, exists between the disjointed Ottoman state and its portentous antagonist. The peculiar influence of the Russian court is be- coming more and more marked and perceptible in several of the continental capitals. The Czars and Czarinas have, during several reigns, ex- tended an uncommon and most gracious patronage to almost every literary or scientific foreigner who may have come under their notice. We must, therefore, be the more on our guard against flattering and exaggerated statements of the ame- liorations introduced into that country. No go- vernment has ever yet availed itself more skil- fully or constantly of the talent and ability of more advanced nations than that of Russia has done. This is a remarkable and, in its conse- quences, a most important feature of its conduct. There is no doubt that order has been established, 46 RUSSIA. that industry has been promoted, — and the powers and capabilities of the empire put, in a great de- gree, into a course of developement. But in point of political rights or personal free- dom of any kind, the Russians, with some per- fectly unimportant exceptions, are essentially in almost as profound a state of debasement as at the very first day on which the Great Peter, their reputed regenerator, ascended the throne. iC Where such a people come as conquerors," says an impartial and candid biographer of the late Czar, — " they trample on the existing civilization ; where there is none, it will cer- tainly not spring up under their feet." The occasional enfranchisement of a few hun- dred slaves which appear in the St. Petersburg Gazette, are proofs of individual generosity, but of course have no material effect whatever on this vast population. Alexander, it is understood, was at one period desirous of laying a basis for improvements of a more just and extensive nature than as yet exist ; but was dissuaded by the mag- nates and influential persons of the court. The senate is merely a salaried board of functionaries, nominated by the sovereign, removable at pleasure, and employed in the execution of details, judicial, RUSSIA. 47 fiscal, or other wise, as their services happen to be required. The whole nation consists of two distinct classes, those of the slave and the master, between whom the strongest line of demarcation is drawn. The sovereigns have evinced a desire to alleviate the condition of the former, — in which they have been obstructed by the unwillingness of the latter. The foreign policy of a state whose grandeur is founded upon conquest, must characteristically be that of conquest. It is of course in further ^ ance of this policy that the great and novel plan of " military colonization" has been devised. Eventually this, it appears, is to place at the dis- posal of government, three millions of males, — trained from the earliest age to military exercises, and to be held constantly in readiness to rein- force * the embodied army. Whether this num- ber is to be the maximum, will of course depend upon circumstances. The settlements granted to the Roman Legions were chiefly for defence, and for services per- formed. These appear to concern the future more than the past ; and are obviously calculated rather to assail than protect. The consequence, if not * Seventy thousand is the number stated to be now avail- able from this source. 48 RUSSIA. the intention, is plainly the foundation of an im- mense military caste, whose confirmed habits and separate interests must no less dispose and qualify them to rivet the chains of their own coun- trymen, than to impose an equally galling- bondage on every surrounding people. What political institution, democratic or other- wise, can be so inimical to the safety of other states, as the uncalled-for preparation of such per- manent and overwhelming means of aggression ? The number of serfs stated to belong to the crown, is fourteen millions ; with a still greater proportion of land. The individual members of the Imperial family also possess a considerable number — the remainder, with a small exception*, being the property of noble or private persons, — all being equally subject to unlimited and uncon- trolled military conscription. It cannot therefore be alleged that other governments have their re- medy by adopting a like system, because to no other government are there means of a similar amount and character available. Whether these colonies may or may not produce to the full extent what appears to * About one-eleventh of the population is the proportion, it is believed, that are free. RUSSIA. 49 have been contemplated, — is, as yet, uncertain. But the stupendous project completely discloses the animus of the government. The succession to the throne of the Russias has not unfrequently been broken, and even the occupants cut off, by conspiracies, — which have usually effected their purpose, through the aid of such portions of the army as may have been at hand. But these tragical events have, in no in- stance, wrought any essential change on the ge- neral conduct and external views of the govern- ment. Such are amongst the perils which must ever be the penalty of an injudiciously exerted despotism. In this instance, however, it is unnecessary to resort to generalities. It is perfectly true that both the father and grandfather of the present Emperor perished in this violent manner ; but it is no less so, that they were capricious and unma- nageable maniacs, — equally the objects of ridicule and terror, and in whose hands there was no safety either for public or private interests. But that there is no wanton or habitual tendency to licentiousness or regicide fairly attributable to the Russians, may further be inferred from the his- torical fact, that for about seventy out of the one E 50 RUSSIA. hundred years intervening between the death of the Czar Peter and that of the late Alexander, the empire has been prosperously governed, with scarcely any interruption by a succession of females, — some of whom were persons of a very ordinary capacity. In general, the Russians of a superior class, especially those who reside or travel much abroad, are amongst the most instructed and prepossessing people to be met with in society. But the social structure, if it can be so termed, of which they form a part, considered only in reference to its political bearing and aspect cannot be regarded with an equal complacency. This may be said to consist of the unrelenting, inexorable ambition of the Romans — unredeemed by the spirit of republicanism, — abased by the unlimited vassalage of feudal eras, — and directed by the polished finesse and calcu- lating intelligence of modern times. A military cement, a layer of soldiers, binds together, for the present, this strange admixture — these seemingly incongruous elements. Several of the nobles are wealthy* ; and like the barons of old, are surrounded by their villains. * Their wealth chiefly consists in their boors. Some possess as many as 50,000, and even 120,000. RUSSIA. 51 This produces, especially while the countenance of the court is not withheld, a corresponding weight, influence, and respect. But they have no castles, no armed followers, or personal rights or preten- sions of any sort, with which to contest a point with the Autocrat, — who is irresponsible, and may at pleasure inflict the knout, banishment, or the scaffold ; and who, in fact, is the only feudal lord in Russia. Nevertheless, as education is extend- ing in the upper ranks, the power of opinion is extending with it ; and accordingly, the desire of institutions which shall give the noble and the wealthy an aristocratical position in the govern- ment, is now strongly manifesting itself. And thus is there furnished an additional impelling reason for entering upon war, in order to turn off attention from internal affairs, and provide the more stirring spirits with the prospect of foreign commands. As for the finances of this government, all that need now be said, is, that if it has money enough to provide a powerful army*, the army is very likely to provide it with money. It has just sent in a round sum from Persia. The Cossack and * The actual pay of a Russian soldier is little more than half-a-crown a month. E 2 52 RUSSIA. the Muscovite have already tasted of considerable stipends, — voluntarily from England, compulsorily from France. They now put forth a threatening indefinite demand against Turkey : which, it is not impossible, may fall very little short of the perma- nent revenue of the Sultan. A great army will also obtain credit, as well as a great mercantile firm. Every thing depends, in these cases, on the idea of stability. If power be well ascertained, and at all likely to endure, the sordid, the timorous, and the base, will always adminster to its purposes and bow to it. The strong rarely seek in vain for allies or accomplices : accordingly, were the Czar's agents now negotiating a loan on the London Exchange, which is not unlikely to be soon the case, the re- ports, true or false, relative to the great amount of his force, could not fail to facilitate their object, and obtain from the capitalists more advantageous terms than might otherwise be conceded. Before quitting this topic, it may not be irrele- vant to remark upon the similarity of the present proceedings generally with those adopted towards Poland. In that memorable transaction, also, one of the interventional pretences, frequently advanced by the northern cabinet, was a religious one. A sixth of the Poles were of the Greek church, which RUSSIA. 53 was not the dominant one. — The Empress declared that all exclusions on account of religious belief were contrary to a " law of nature" — that " those so situated were absolved from all national allegiance, and had a right to appeal to the rest of the human race, and choose from amongst them judges, allies, and protectors. 1 ' If this be still the doctrine of the Russian court, it affords matter for consideration, and certainly great scope for its benevolence. — Where,- — in effect, it may be asked, is the country which might be exempt from the influence of so sweeping a clause, or from the interference of so universal a protector of sects ? One of the last declaratory acts preliminary to a dismemberment of Poland, after setting forth her autocratic Majesty's great love of peace, and how careful she had been to preserve it, runs thus : —