Cfce Ultirarp of tf)e ainfoergitp of J!3ort& Carolina r- ”**v W&i& fiooK toag pregmteti &p Mrs. T^ichrnood Pe^rsoo THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL ENDOWED BY THE DIALECTIC AND PHILANTHROPIC SOCIETIES JK1U1 1836 V. 3 UNIVERSITY OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL 00009078721 This book is due at the LOUIS R. WILSON LIBRARY on the last date stamped under “Date Due.” If not on hold it may be renewed by bringing it to the library. _ DATE DEE RET. I PB 9* _ OCT 2 8 19S6 2*83 DATE DEE RET. wmnms mm i *1 V A M\Y 4'87 it' *-■£=3 iL# 4-j £ji 11 -0h HOV it ■* 1898 DLC 19 & -r- _ NOV 0 3198 8 1 DEC 1 5 j m •««*»**«• ,. r , ism** 5 90 ‘ **"*”'"'* a-w l i . . , Jj j HOV J 5 199S P -ni\ 2 '93* Form No. 513 DEBATES OF THE STATE CONVENTIONS « OW THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. ■M ■ .. THE 'i'. D EBATES IN THE SEVERAL if , I STATE CONVENTIONS, OX THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BT THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IX 17 8 7 , TOGETHEB WITH THE JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, LUTHER MARTIN’S LETTER, YATES’ MINUTES, CONGRESSIONAL OPINIONS,VIRGINIA h KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS OF ’98-’99, AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. IN FOUR VOL U ME S—VOLUME III. SECOND EDITION, WITH CON SI I)EB ABLE ADDITIONS. PUBLISHED UNDER THE COLLECTED AND REVISED FROM BY JONATHAN EL ON THE PENNSYLVANIA X'EN \ / 7 f 5U. 7 v.3 Entered according to Act of Congress in the year one thousand eight hundred and thirty-six, By Jonathan Elliot, In the Clerk’s Office of the District Court of the District of Columbia. it k ■t S"> ' Obmrf« Unflr. of North Lxwhn* CONTENTS— Vol. 3. CONVENTION of Virginia . Page . 33 to 587 Resolutions—proposed Ratification . 588 The Question—Ayes and Noes, 588-89-90 Ratification—Form.591 Bill of Rights. 592-93 Amendments proposed . . . 594-95-96 The Question—Ayes and Noes . . 597 Ml * * / v ;,r # . *>' - AV. . INDEX BY SPEAKER’S NAMES. VIRGINIA. JOHN BECKLEY appointed Secretary EDMUND PENDLETON, President ORGANIZATION Fage. 35 35 37 Mr CORBIN—Introductory expression “We the People,” 123, West India Trade—Debts—Requisitions, 124. Reference to His- c y tory, 125. Confederate Government best for an extensive Country, 126. Representation .... 12S Power over the Militia by the States .... 387 Treatymaking not exceptionable in the Constitution, 466. Leg¬ islative interference secured .... 467 Mr CLAY—Insurrection—opposition to the Laws . . .378 Mr DAWSON—Defects of the Confederation—fears a Consolidated Government—most exceptionable—leading Parts, 549.— Treaties-^-their operation may hurt the Southern States—the Press—War—Antique Governments not suited to the pre¬ sent day ....... 553 Mr GRAYSON—Judiciary not improved, 266. Dutch Loans—Spain friendly, 267. Barbary Powers, 268. Portugal—Western Lands—Commutation, 268. Regulation of Commence, etc. 270 State influence—Imperfections of the ConstitutionT271J Opr poses the ratio of Representation—1500 legislators annually throughout the Union, exclusive of 160 Senators, 271. Car¬ rying and producing States—Ireland—Corruption of the Scotch members * . * • * • 275 viii / Mr GRAYSON-—continued Co-ordinate authorities a political absurdity, 274. Taxes should be uniform, 275. Requisitions—Loans, 276 Necessity of a full Representation in Congress. America not in a situation to have a fleet, from it's limited population. $78. Parties in Holland, 279. Paper emissions—Danger of mercantile pri- vileges within the Ten Miles Square, 284. Mississippi— new States, etc. . . . . . Page 281 Spanish Claims on Georgia and Kentucky, 322. Spanish hego> tiation, 394. Fisheries and Mississippi, 324. Orleans a de¬ posit—Treaties paramount, 336. Maine Lands redifced to one dollar an acre, to prevent emigration to the West . 331 Importance of the Mississippi question .... 363 British Parliament receive no pay—most of the great officers have been taken out of Congress .... 348 Thirst for public office, 351. Objects that the Senate propose or concur on money bills ..... 352 State Governments at the mercy of the generality—Militia . 388 Navy, its maintenance at present dangerous—European maritime powers—Cost of a Navy in America arid Europe compared, 398 Northern States most interested in a fleet—Privateers issue chieflv thence ...... 39S Anticipated privileges of the Ten Miles Square . . . 399 The Capital, fear of aggrandizement there—delivery of fugitives 401 “Ten Miles ” not subject to the Slates .... 402 Reserved Rights—Restrictions .... Presidency, a minority may elect . . . . 451 . Mississippi navigation 459—Mississippi giving up the navigation . 462 Judicial Powers, may interfere with the same power in the States Judges, etc. . . . . . . .512 Effect of Decisions on a foreign State .... 515 Control over the Ventie . . . . . .516 Explanation on Treaties,553. Late Convention to amend,not alter. Resources of Virginia rich and flourishing—Ten Miles Square may be near Alexandria, etc. .... £555/ Mr HARRISON Recapitulates the disproportion of the States on the adoption of the Constitution—Amendments . . ^ 56 7-J Report on Elections, < . . . . 38 64 Mr PATRICK HENRY moved the reading of the^confederation, . 40 Public mind uneasy at the proposed change, 52. The Constitu¬ tion a consolidated Gov’t. Denies the right of the convention to say “ We the People ” instead of “ We the States ” Object of the Convention extended only to amend the old system. 54 IX Air PATRICK HENRY—continued Phraseology : Taxes, 241. Federal Constitution contains a British Bill of Rights k . . . . . 243 —- “General Welfare” limited—no new grant of Power—Extent, &c. 409 Bill of R ights—its omission no Defect .... 416 Obligation of Contracts—Claims under the Confederation . 437 Continental Money—Contracts—Public Debts . . . 439 Tobacco—Taxes _ . . . . . . 443 Treaties, Parallel between American and British . . 463 British, more Independent than Federal, 5kc. . . . 526 Mr WILSON NICHOLAS—Qualifications of Electors—their Num¬ ber—continuance in Office. Powers, Responsibility, . 41 to 51 Confederation defective—Collectors—Taxes, 119. Defence of the Constitution ...... 121 Rights of the Mississippi better secured under the Constitution, that! the Confederation, 335. Formation of Treaties, 337. N. Jersey Instructions to vote against ceding the Mississippi. Dread of Recall might impair Senators usefulness—Ken¬ tucky Interests rely on the new Constitution • . 339 Inadequacy of the Militia System, 363. Defence of the caprice of the State Governments—Martial Law, &c. . . 564 Militia, may quell Slave Insurrections, 396. FourthArt. introduced wholly for ihe benefit of the States . . . 397 Seat of Government still subject to State Regulations . . 402 Restriction on Slave Importation and Compromise with the South —Local Slave Tax 421 XV Hfr PENDLETON objects to the reading of the papers of the Con¬ federation . . . . . . Page 40 Situation before the Convention—no cause of alarm—“We the the People,” 66. Imbecility of the Confederation, 67. Ne¬ cessity of the Constitution, 68. Taxes, 69. Relative political weight of Virginia and Delaware . . . . 70 Nature of a free government, 283. The “ well born ” 284. Re-, gular Government essential to liberty* 284. Education from the “ public purle ” not strictly just—Suffrage in Europe, 285 People the fountain of power, 286. Difference between State and Federal Constitution, 287. Replies to Mr Monroe, 288 Kentucky, Mississippi, 289. Amendments, 290. Cites Jef- terson’s authority for previous Amendments . . 292 Ten Miles Square—Power of Congress in legislation and local - police, 406. Militia 405 Judiciary—Supreme and inferior Courts—independence of Judges as to tenure and salary subjects—classification, . • 473 Appeals—Criminal cases—Jury trials, 497* Jurisdiction, etc. . 49? Gov. RANDOLPH (a member of the Federal Convention) discloses his motives why he refused to sign the Constitution, 56. For previous and not subsequent Amendments—Inefficacy of the Confederation discovered when danger w'as over, 57. Sate in the Convention at Annapolis—its doings, 57, Rhode Island —Replies to the inquiries relative to “ We the People ” . 59 Picture of the Country, 91. Case of Josiah Phillips. 91. Adopt¬ ing States, 92. Union necessary to Virginia—British debts, 97 Mississippi—Bordering States—Paper Money—Public Cre¬ dit, 100—want of a Navy, 100—local Confederacy—Object of a Confederacy, 103. State of the country, &c. . . 104 Powers necessary to be given to the General Government . 132 Requisitions, loans, taxes. See. ..... 136 Energetic Government necessary, 194. Historical Reference corrected 195. Bill of Rights in England, 196. Six or seven States here have none, 195. Negroes numerous, 197. Ports, Potomac and Maryland, 198. Josiah Phillips . 198 Previous or subsequent Amendments—Presidential Responsibil¬ ity, 198. Vermont, admission into the Union, 200. Scotland benefitted by Union—Spanish apprehensions about Mexico and Peru, 201. Separate Confederacy fatal, 202. Tribute to Jefferson, 203. Concurrehce of the Senate, fke. 205. Re¬ ligion 207, Judiciary, taxes, militia—“sweeping clause,” 209 French Ambassador in 1781, declared America had no right to the Mississippi,but the United States will never relinquish it, 340 Militia to be governed by Congress only when in the service of the United States ...... 373 Impeachment—Responsibility—standing Army . . .373 Sweeping clause—Incidental Powers—difference between the State and Federal Constitution—negative Restrictions, 427. Bill of Rights, 429, Excessive bail, fines, kc. 430. Jury trial. Press, Religion, 431, Common Law 432 svi Gov. RANDOLPH (a Member of the Federal Convention)—contin’d President, his re-election proper, 445. Restrained from receiv ing foreign Emolument, 445. Treaties—State Rights, or pro¬ perty not affected by them, 461. Federal Judiciary, its merits, 517. Fairfax’s case of quit-rents, 521. Secession may create anarchy, &o. 540. Replies to the idea of Aboli- tion of Slavery, &c. 541. Takesa general glance at the Con¬ stitution, and the proposed amendments, J>45. Motives for refusing to subscribe to the Constitution, again repeated, Page 587 Mr STEPHEN—For a judicious mixture of the three different kinds of Goyernment—Apostrophe to the Genius of America, &c. 579 - Mr TYLER—Opposed to the Slave Traffic and exclusive Legislation in the ‘‘Ten Miles” . . . Principles on which he disapproves . . Defects dangerous to Liberty ..... Mr WYTHE—Previous Amendments—for subsequent, 531. Pro¬ posed Ratification ...... 419 574 578 532 RESOLUTIONS submitU'J after the Committee had gone through the Constitution, ayes, 80, Noes 88. . . . 587 Yeas and Nays on the main Question, Ayes 89, Nays 79 . 589 Ratification—form agreed to . . . .591 Reported Amendments for the consideration of Congress • 592 AMENDMENTS proposed to the Constitution . . 594 to 596 The QUESTION, Ayes 65, Noes 85. . . . 596, 597 AMENDMENTS ordered to be engrossed .... 597 RATIFICATION—a fair engrossed Copy of the FederaJ Constitution with Amendments to be madg and printed . .589 ADJOURNMENT, sine die . . . . .598 VIRGINIA. THE DEBATES in the CONVENTION of the COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,, on THE ADOPTION of the FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. In convention , Richmond, Monday, June 2d, 1788. This being - the clay recommended by the legislature for the meet*, ing of the convention, to take into consideration the proposed plan : of federal government, a majority of the gentlemen delegated thereto, assembled at the public buildings, in Richmond—whereupon they proceeded to the choice of a secretary, when John Beckley was appointed, to that office. The honorable EDMUND PENDLETON was nominated, and, unanimously elected president: who being seated in the chair, thanked the convention for the honor conferred on him, and strong-.. Vy recommended' to the members to use the utmost moderation and temper in their deliberations on the great and important subject now before them. On the recommendation of Mr Paul Carrington, the Rev. Abner Waugh was unanimously elected Chaplain, to attend every morn*, mg, to read'prayers, immediately arter the bell shall be rang for callino- theconvention. O The convention then appointed William Drinkard,. sen. and Wm. Drinkard, jun. door-keepers. On motion— Ordered , That a committee or privileges and elections be appointed, and a committee was appointed of— Mr Benjamin Harrison, Mr George Mason, Gov. Randolph, Mr George Nicholas, Mr John Marshal, Mr Paul Carrington, Mr Tyler Mr Alexander White, Mr Blair, Mr Bland, Mr Grayson, Mr Fisher, Mr Matthews, Mr John Jones, Mr Wythe, Mr William Cabell, Mr James Taylor, [of Caroline,] Mr Gabriel Jones, Mr. Corbin Mr Innps Mr Monroe. Mr Henry Lee, Mr Bullitt. 36 DEBATES. Ordered, That the committee of privileges and elections do examine and report the returns for electing delegates to serve in this conven* tion ; and, that in cases where no returns are made, it be an instruc¬ tion to the said committee, to receive such evidence as the sitting member snail produce of his election, and report the same to the convention. On motion— Ordered , That Mr Edmund Pendleton, jun. be appointed clerk to the committee of privileges and elections. Mr P. CARRINGTON presented a petition of Thomas Stith, of the county of Brunswick, complaining of the undue election and return of Binnas Jones, one of the delegates return to serve in this convention, for the said county of Brunswick ; which was ordered to be referred to the committee of privileges and elections. On motion of Mr CORBIN— Ordered , That Mr Augustine Davis be appointed printer to the convention, and that he cause to be printed, forthwith, two hundred copies of the plan of federal government—also two hundred copies of the resolutions of the general assembly, of the 25th of October last, to be distributed among the members of this convention. On motion of Mr GEORGE MASON— Ordered , That the convention be adjourned until to-morrow morn¬ ing, eleven o’clock, then meet at the New Academy, on Shock® Hill, in this city. Tuesday. June 3d, 1788. The convention met at the New' Academy, on Shock® Hill, pur¬ suant to adjournment. Mr LEE presented a petition of Richard Morris, of the county of Louisa, complaining of an undue election and return of William W r h ite, as one of the delegates to serve in this convention, for the said county of Louisa ; which was ordered to be referred to the committee of privileges and elections. On motion of Mr HARRISON— Ordered, Mr William Pierce, be appointed serjeant at arms to the convention. On motion of Mr JOHN JONES— Ordered , That Daniel Hicks, be appointed door-keeper to the convention. Mr HARRISON moved, that all the papers relative to the con¬ stitution should be read. Mr TYLER observed, that before any papers were read, certain rules and regulations should be established to o-overn the conven- tion in their deliberations ; which being necessary on all occasions, a:e more particularly so, on this great and important one. Gov. RANDOLPH said, that he was fully convinced of the ne¬ cessity of establishing rules—but as this was on a subject which VIRGINIA. 37 might involve the convention in a debate which would take up con¬ siderable time, he recommended that the rules of the house of dele¬ gates, as far they were applicable, should be observed. Mr TYLER replied, that he had considered what the honorable gentleman had said, and the objection to the mode recommended by him. Upon which, the convention came to the following resolution— Resolved , That the rules and orders for conducting business in the house of delegates, so far as the same may be applicable to the convention, be observed therein. On motion— The resolution of congress of the 28th of September last, together with the report of the federal convention lately held in Philadelphia; the resolut ions of the general assembly, of the 25th of October last," and the act of the general assembly, entitled, “An act concerning the convention to be held in June next,” were read— Whereupon, Mr MASON addressed the President as follows : Mr President, I hope, and trust, sir, that this convention, appointed by the people, on this great and important occasion, for securing, as far as possible, to the latest generation, the happiness and liberty of the people, will freely and fully investigate this important sub¬ ject. For this purpose, I humbly conceive, the fullest and clearest investigation indispensably necessary, and that we ought not to be bound by any general rules whatsoever. The curse denounced by the divine vengeance will be small, compared to what will justly fall upon us, if from any sinister views we obstruct the fullest inqui¬ ry. This subject, therefore, ought to obtain the freest discussion, clause by clause, before any general previous question be put, nor ought it to be precluded by any other question. Mr TYLER moved, that the convention should resolve itself into a committee of the whole convention, to-morrow, to take into con¬ sideration the proposed plan of government, in order to have a fair¬ er opportunity of examining its merits. Mr MASON, after recapitulating his former reasons for having urged a full discussion, clause by clause, concluded, by agreeing with Mr Tyler, that a committee of the whole convention was the most proper mode of proceeding— Mr MADISON concurred with the honorable gentleman, in going into a full and free investigation of the subject before them, and said he had no objection to the plan proposed. Mr MASON then moved the following resolution, which was a- greed to by the convention, unanimously : Resolved , That no question, general or particular, shall be pro¬ pounded in this convention, upon the proposed constitution ot gov¬ ernment for the United States, or upon any clause or article thereot, '33 DEBATES. '■until the said constitution shall have been discussed, clause by clause, through all its parts. Mr TYLER said, he should renew his motion for the convention to resolve itself into a committee of the whole convention, the next day, to take under consideration the proposed plan of government. Mr LEE strongly urged the necessity and propriety of imme¬ diately entering into the discussion. Mr MASON.—Mr President, no man in this convention is more averse to take up the time of the convention than I am ; but I am equally against hurrying 'them precipitately into any measure. I humbly conceive, sir, that the members onght to have time to con¬ sider the subject. Precious as time is, We ought not to run into the discussion before we have the proper means. Mr HARRISON urged as a reason for beferring the discussicn till tc-morrow, that many of the members had not yet arrived, and that it would be improper -to enter into tlie business until they should arrive. Mr LEE answered the two objections against entering immed¬ iately into the business—he begged gentlemen to consider that they were limited in point of time; that if they did not complete their business on the 22d day of the month, they should be compelled to adjourn, as the legislature Was to meet the 23d.—He also begged gentlemen to consider the consequences of such an adjournment : that the constitution he believed, was very fully understood by every gentleman present, having been the subject of public and private coiu sideiation of most persons on the continent, and of the peculiar med¬ itation of those who were deputed to the convention. The convention then came to the following resolution— Resolved , That this convention will, to-morrow, resolve itself into a committee of the whole convention, to take into consideration the proposed constitution of government for the United States. And then the convention adjourned until to-morrow eleven o’clock Wednesday , the 4th of June 1788. Mr HARRISON reported from the committee of privileges and elections, that the committee had according to order, examined the returns for electing delegates to serve in this convention, and had come to a resolution thereupon, which he read in his place, and after¬ wards delivered in at the clerk’s table, where the same was again twice read, and agreed to by the house, as followeth— Resolved , that it is the opinion of tlus committee , That the returns for electing delegates to serve in this convention for the counties of Albermarle, Amelia, Amherst, Bedford, Botetourt, Brunswick, Buck¬ ingham; Caroline, Charlotte, Charles-City, Chesterfield, Culpeper, Cumberland, Dinwbddie, Elizabeth-City, Fauquier, Fairfax, Fay¬ ette, Fluvanna, Frederick, Gloucester, Goochland, Greenbrier, VIRGINIA. 39 Greenesville, Halifax, Hampshire, Hardy, Harrison, Hanover, Hen¬ rico, Henry, James-City, Jefferson, Isle-of-Wight, King George, King and Queen, King William, Lancaster, Lincoln, Loudon, Loui¬ sa, Lunenberg, Madison, Mecklenburgh, Mercer, Middlesex, Monongalia, Montgomery, Nansemond* New-Kent, Nelson, Norfolk, Northampton, Northumberland, Ohio, Orange, Pittsylvania, Prin- cess-anne, Prince-George, Prince-William, Prince-Edward, Powha¬ tan, Randolph, Richmond, Rockbridge, Rockingham, Russell, Shen¬ andoah, Southampton, Syottsylvania, Stafford, Surry, Sussex, War¬ wick, Washington, York, and of a delegate for the borough of Nor¬ folk, and City of Williamsburg, are satisfactory. Mr HARRISON reported from the committee of privileges and elections— That the committee had enquired into the elections of delegates for the counties of Accomack and Franklin, and had agreed to are- port, and come to several resolutions thereupon, which he read in his place, and afterwaids delivered in at the clerk’s table, where the same were again twice read, and agreed to by the house, as follow- eth: It appears to your 'committee, that no "returns have been made of of the election of delegates to serve in this convention, for the coun¬ ties of Accomack and Franklin: that as to the election of delegates for the said county of Accomack, it appears from the information of Nathaniel Darby and Littleton Eyre, esquires, that they were at the election of delegates for the said county of Accomack, in March last, and that George Parker, and Edmund Custis, esquires, (the sit¬ ting members) were proclaimed by the sheriff, at the close of the poll, as duly elected delegates to represent the said county in this convention. That as to the election of delegates for the said county of Franklin it appears to your committee, from the information of Robert Will¬ iams, esquire, that he “Was at the election of delegates for the said county of Franklin, in March fast, and that John Early and Thomas Arthurs, esquires, (the sitting members) were proclaimed by the Sheriff at the close of the poll, as duly elected delegates to represent the said county of Accomack iR this convention. Resolved , that it is the opin’on of this committee, That John Early and Thomas Arthurs, esquires, were elected delegates to represent the said county of Franklin in this convention. Resolved , that it is the opinion of this committee, That Edmund Custis, and George Parker, esquires, were elected delegates to represent the said county of Accomack in this convention. Ordered , That Mr Madison and Mr Lawson be added to the com¬ mittee of privileges and elections. Mr ARCHIBALD STUART, presented a petition of Samuel Anderson, of the county of Cumberland, setting forth— That Thomas H. Drew, esquire, one of the delegates returned lor the said county to serve in this convention, was not, at the time ot his election, a freeholder in this commonwealth; and praying that the - election of the said Thomas H. Drew, may be set aside, and another election directed to supply his place: which was read, and ordered to be referred to the committee of .privileges and elections. 40 DEBATES- The convention, according to the order of the day, resolved itself into a committee of the whole convention, to take into consideration the proposed plan of government, Mr Wythe in the chair. Mr HENRY moved— That the act of assembly appointing deputies to meet at Annapolis to consult with those from some other states, on the situation of the commerce of the United States—the act of assembly appointing deputies to meet at Philadelphia, to revise the articles of confedera¬ tion—and other public papers relative thereto—should be read. Mr PENDLETON, then spoke to the following efiect: Mr Chairman, we are not to consider whether the federal convention exceeded their powers. It strikes my mind, that this ought not to influence our deliberations. This constitution was transmitted to congress by that convention: by the congress transmitted to our legislature : by them recommended to the people : the people have sent us hither to determine whether this government be a proper one or not. I did not expect these papers would have been brought forth. Although those gentlemen were only directed to consider the defects of the old system, and not devise a new one, if they found it so thoroughly defective as not to admit a revising, and submitted a a new system to our consideration, which the people have deputed us to investigate, I cannot find any degree of propriety in reading those papers. Mr HENRY then withdrew his motion— The clerk proceeded to read the preamble, and the two first sections of the first article. PREAMBLE. We, the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this constitution for the United States. House of Representatives. Art. 1. —Sect. 1 — All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a congress of the United States, which shall consist of a senate and house of representatives. Sect. 2.— The house of representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several states, and the electors in each state shall have the qualifications for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature. No person shall be a representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabi¬ tant of that state in which he shall be chosen. Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included within this union, according- to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to ser- Nichslas.] VIRGINIA. 41 vice for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three- fifths of all other persons. The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the congress of the United States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct. The number of repre¬ sentatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each state shall have at least one representative , and until such enume¬ ration shall be made, the state of New Hampshire shall be entitled to choose three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.. When vacancies happen in the representation from any state, the executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies. The house of representatives shall choose their speaker and other officers: and shall have the sole power of impeachment. Mr. NICHOLAS. Mr. Chairman, the time being now come when this state is to decide on this important question, of rejecting or re¬ ceiving this plan of government, it gave me great pleasure yesterday, when the convention determined to proceed with the fullest delibe¬ ration on the subject; as every gentleman will, in the course of the discussion, have an opportunity to urge every objection that may arise in his mind against this system, I beg gentlemen to offer all their objections here, and that none may be insisted on elsewhere ; and I hope nothing urged without these walls, will influence the the mind of any one. If this part of the plan now under conside¬ ration be materially defective, I will readily agree it ought to be wholly rejected, because representation is the corner stone on which the whole depends ; but if on investigation it should be found to be otherwise, the highest gratitude should be shewn to those gentlemen who framed it—although some small defects may appear in it, yet its merits I hope will amply cover those detects. I shall take it into consideration, first, as it affects the qualifica¬ tions of the electors : 2dly, as its affects the qualifications of the elected ; 3dly, as to their number; 4thly, the time of their contin¬ uance in office , 5thly, their powers ; and Gthty, whether this pow¬ er be sufficient to enable them to discharge their duty, without di¬ minishing the security of the people—or in other words, their re¬ sponsibility. I will consider it first, then, as to the qualifications of the elec¬ tors—the best writers on government agree, that a republic those laws which fix the right of suffrage are fundamental ; if therefore, by the proposed plan it is left uncertain in whom the right of suf¬ frage is to rest or if it has placed that right in improper hands, I shall admit that it is a radical defect; but in this plan there is afixed rule for determining the qualifications of electors ; and that rule the most judicious that could possibly have been devised; because'A *42 DEBATES [Nicholas. • r refers to a criterion which cannot be changed. A qualification gives a right to elect representatives for the state legislatures, gives also by this constitution a right to choose representatives for thfe general government. As the qualifications of electors are different in the different States, no particular qualifications uniform through the states would have been politic, as it would have caused a great inequality in the electors, resulting from the situation and circum¬ stances of the respective states. Uniformity of qualifications would grearly affect the yeomanry in the states, as it would either exclude from this inherent right some W'ho are entitled to it by the laws of some states at present : or be extended so universally as to defeat the admirable end of the institution of representation. Secondly—As it respects the qualifications of the elected. It has ever been considered a great security to liberty, that very few should be excluded from the right of being chosen to the legislature. This constitution has amply attended to this idea. We find no qualifica¬ tions required except those of age and residence, which create a certainty of their judgement being matured, and of being attached to their state.—It has been objected, that they ought to be posses¬ sed of landed estates; but, sir, when we reflect that most of the electors are landed men, vve must Suppose they will fix on those who are in a similar situation with themselves. We find there is a decided majority attached to the landed interest, consequently the landed interest must prevail in the choice. Shoudl the state be di¬ vided into districts, in no one can the mercantile interest by any means have an equal weight in the elections—therefore the former will be more fully represented in thq congress; and men of eminent Abilities are not excluded for the want of landed property. There is another objection which has been echoed from one end of the continent to the other; that congress may alter the time, place and manner of holding elections; that they may direct the place of elec¬ tions to be where it will be impossible for those who haVe a right to vote, to attend : for instance, that they may order the freeholders of Albemarle to Vote in the county of Princess Ann, or vice versa; or regulate elections otherwise in such a manner as totally to defeat their purpose, and lay them entirely under the influence of congress-. I flatter myself that from an attentive consideration of this power, it will clearly appear, that it was essentially necessary to give it to congress, as without it, there could have been no security for the general government against the state legislatures. What, Mr. Chairman, is the danger apprehended in this case? If I understand it right, it must be, that congress might cause the elections to be held in the most inconvenient places, and at so inconvenient a time* 'and in such a manner, as to give them the most undue influence ovei Nicholas.] VIRGINIA. 4§ v • . ... the choice, nay, even to prevent the elections from being held at all, in order to perpetuate themselves. But what would be the conse¬ quence of this measure! It would be this, sir, that congress would cease to exist; it would destroy the congress itself; it would abso¬ lutely be an-act of suicide ; and therefore, it can never be expected. This alteration, so much apprehended must be made by law ; that is, with the concurrence of both branches of the legislature. •Will the house of representatives, the members of which are chosen only for two years, and who depend on the people for their I’e-election, agree to such an alteration! It is unreasonable to suppose it. But let us admit for a moment, that they will: what wrnuld be the consequence of passing such a law! It would be, sir, that after the expiration of the two years, at the next election they would either choose such men as would alter the law, or they wrnuld re¬ sist the government. An enlightened people will never suffer what was established for their security, to be perverted to an act of tyr¬ anny. It may be said, perhaps, that resistance would then become vain: congressarevestedwit.il the power of raising an army ; to which I say, that if ever congress shall have an army sufficient for their purpose, and disposed to execute their unlawful commands, be’ fore they would act under this disguise, they would pull off the mask, and declare themselves absolute. I ask, Mr Chairman, is it a novelty in our government? Has wot our sthte legislature the power of fixing the time, places, and manner of holding elections? The possible abuse here complained of, never can happen as long as the people cf the United States are virtuous. As long as they con¬ tinue to have sentiments of freedom, and independence, should the congress be w’icked enough to harbor so absurd an idea, as this ob- jection supposes, the people will defeat their attempt, by choosing other representatives, who will alter the law. If the state legisla¬ ture, by accident, design, or any other cause, would not appoint a place for holding elections then there might be no election till the time was passed for which they were to have been chosen ; and as this would eventually put an end to the union, it ought to be guard¬ ed against, and it could only be guarded against by giving this dis¬ cretionary power to the congress, of altering the time, place, and manner cf holding the elections. It is absurd to think that congress will exert this power, or change the time, place, and manner estab¬ lished by the stales, if the states will regulate them properly, or so as not to defeat the purposes of the Union. It is urged, that the state legislatures ought to be fully and exclusively possessed of this power. .Were this the case, it might certainly defeat the go¬ vernment. As the powers vested by this plan in congress, are taken from the state legislatures, they would be prompted to throw every debates. 4 4 [Nicholas. obstacle in the way of the general government. It was then neces-- sary that congress should have this power. Another strong argument for the necessity of this power is, that if it was left solely to the states, there might have been as many times of choosing as there are states. States having solely the power of altering or establishing the time of election, it might hap¬ pen that there should be no congress ; not only by omitting to fix a time, bnt also by the elections in the states being at thirteen diffe¬ rent times, such intervals might elapse between the first and last election, as to prevent there being a sufficient number to form a house ; and this might happen at a time when the most urgent bus¬ iness rendered their session necessary ; and by this power, this great part of the representation will be always kept full, which will be a security for a due attention to the interest of the community ; and also the power of congress to make the times of elections uni¬ form in all the states, will destroy the continuance of any cabal, as the whole body of representatives will go out of office at once. I come now, sir, to consider that part of the constitution which fixes the number of representatives. It is first necessary for us to establish what the number of representatives is to be. At present it only consists of sixty-five; but let us consider that it is only to continue at that number till the actual enumeration shall be made ; which is to be within three years after the first meeting of congress and that the number of representatives will be ascertained, and the proportion of taxes fixed within every subsequent term of ten years. Till this enumeration be made, congress will have no power to lay direct taxes: as there is no provision for this purpose, congress cannot impose it; as direct taxation and representation are to be regulated by the enumeration there directed ; therefore they have no power of laying direct taxes till the enumeration be actually made. I conceive no apportionment can be made before this enumeration, there being no certain data to go on. When the enumeration shall be made, what will be the consequence? I conceive there will be always one for every thirty thousand. Many reasons concur to lead me to this conclusion. By the constitution, the allotment now made, will only continue till the enumeration be made ; and as a new enumeration will take place every ten years, I take it for grant¬ ed that the number of representatives will be increased according to the progressive increase of population, at every respective enu¬ meration ; and one for every thirty thousand will amount to one hundred representatives, if we compute the number of inhabitants to be only three millions in the United States, which is a very mod¬ erate calculation. The first intention was only to have one for every forty-thousand, which was afterwards estimated to be too Nicholas.] VIRGINIA. 45 few, and according to this proportion, the present temporary num¬ ber is fixed; but as it now stands, we readily see that the propor¬ tion of representatives is sufficiently numerous to answer every pur- pese of federal legislation, and even soon to gratify those who wish for the greatest number. I take it, that the number of representa¬ tives will be proportioned to the highest number we are entitled to; and that it never will be less than one for every thirty thousand* I formed this conclusion from the situation of those who will be our representatives. They are all chosen for two years ; at the end of which term they are to depend on the people for their re-election. This dependence will lead them to a due and faithful discharge of their duty to their constituents: the augmentation of their number will conciliate the affections of the people at large ; for the more the representatives increase in number, the greater the influence of the people in the government, and the greater the chance of re-elec¬ tion to the representatives* But, it has been said, that the senate will not agree to any aug¬ mentation of the number of representatives. The constitution will entitle the house of representatives to demand it. Would the Se¬ nate venture to stand out against them! I think they would not, sir. Were they ready to recede from the evident sense of the con¬ stitution, and grasp at power not thereby given them, they would be compelled to desist. But, that 1 may not be charged with ur¬ ging suppositions, let us see what ground this stands upon, and whether there be any real danger to be apprehended. The first ob¬ jection that I shall consider is, that by paucity of numbers, they will be more liable to depart from their duty, and more subject to influence. I apprehend that the fewer the number of representa¬ tives, the freer the choice, and the greater the number of electors, the less liable to the unworthy acts of the candidates will they be ; and thus their suffrage being free, will probably fall on men of the most merit. The practice of that country, which is situated more like America than any other country in the world, will justify this supposition. The British house of commons consists, I believe, of five hundred and fifty-eight members, yet the greater number of these are supposed to be under the undue influence of the crown- A single fact from the British history illustrates these observations, viz : that thore is scarcely an instance, for a century past, of the crown’s exercising its undoubted prerogative, of rejecting a bill sent up to it, by the two houses of parliament: it is no answer to say, that the king’s iufluence is sufficient to prevent any obnoxious bills passing the two houses : there are many instances in that period* not only of bills passing the two houses, but even receiving the royal assent, contrary to the private wish an inclination of the DEBATES.. 4t5 [Ts’jCHOL'AS^,. It is objected, however, as a defect in the constitution, that it; does not prohibit the house of representatives from giving 1 their powers, particularly that respecting the support, &c. of armies, out; of their hands for a longer term than two years. Here, I think, the* enemies to the plan reason unfairly; they first 1 supposed that con¬ gress, from a love of power natural to all, will; in general, abuse' that with which they are invested , and when they would make us ap— prehend that the house of representatives, notwithstanding their love or power (and it must be supposed as great in a branch of congress as in tile whole) will give out of their hands the only check', which* can ensure to them the continuance of the participation of the pow¬ ers lodged in congress in general. In England there is no restraint, of this kind on the parliament ; and yet there is no instance of a money bill being passed for a longer term than one year: the pro¬ posed'plan,, therefore; when it 1 declares that no appropriation for the support of an army, shall be made fdr albnger term than two years, introduces a check unknown to the English constitution ; and one* which will 1 be found very powerful 1 when we reflect, that if the- house of representatives could be prevailed on to make an appropri¬ ation for an army for two years, at the end of that time, tliere will be a new choice of representatives. Thus I insist, that security does not depend on the number of representatives 1 : the experience of that country also shows, that many of their counties and cities contain a great number of souls, than will be entitled to a repre¬ sentation in America, and’yet the representatives chosen in those places have been the most strenuous advocates of liberty, and have exerted themselves in the defence of it, even in opposition.to those* chosen by much smaller numbers. Many of the senatorial districts: in Virginia, also contain a greater number of souls-, and yet I sup¬ pose no gentleman within these walls will pay the senators chosen < by them so poor a compliment as to attribute less wisdom and virtue * to them, than to the delegates chosen from single counties : and as there is greater probability that the electors in a large district will! be more independent, so I' think the representatives chosen in such districts will be more so too ; for those who have sold themselves- to their representative will have no right to complain, if they, in- their turn, barter away their rights and'liberties; but those who . h-ave not themselves been bought, will never consent to be sold., Another objection made to the small number of representatives, is, that admitting they were sufficient to secure their integrity, yet,they cannot be acquainted'with- the local situation and circumstances- of their constituents. When we attend'to the object of their judisdic- tion we find this objection insupportable. Congress will superin¬ tend the great national interests of the union, Jmcal concerns aro VIRGINIA. 47 : Nicholas.] left to the state legislatures. When the members compare and com¬ municate to one another their knowledge of their respective districts and states their collective intelligence will sufficiently enable them to perform the objects of their cognizance. They cannot extend their influence or agency to any objects but those of a general na- tuie ; the representati ves will, therefore, be sufficiently acquainted with the interests of their states, although chosen by large districts. As long as the people remain virtuous and uncorrupted, so long, we may fairly conclude, will their representatives, even at their present number guard their interests, and discharge their duty- with fidelity and •zeal: when they become otherwise, no government can possibly secure their freedom. I now consider the time of their continuance in office.—-A shorts continuance in office, and a return of the officers to the mass of the people, there to depend solely on their former good conduct for their re-election, is of the highest security to public liberty. Let the' power of the person elected be what it may, they are only the trus- - tees and not the masters of the people—yet the time ought not to be so short that they could not discharge their duty with ability. Considering this, a term of two years is short enough in this case. Many will have a considerble distance to travel from,the places of their abode, to the seat of the general government. They must take time to consider the situation of the union, make themselves acquainted with the circumstances of our finances, and the relative situation of, and our connections with, foreign nations, and a variety of other objections, of importance. Would it not be the height of impolicy, that they should go out of their office, just as they began to know something of the nature of their duty! Were this the case, the interest of their constituents could never be sufficiently attended to. Our representatives for the state legislature are chosen for one year, and it has never been thought too long a term. If one year be not too long to elect a state representative, give me leave to say,, that two years ought not to be considered as too long for the election of the members of the general legislature. The objects of the for-^ mer are narrow, and limited to state and local affairs—the objects ol the latter are co-extensive with the continent. In England, at the time they were most jealous of the prerogative of the king, triennial elec¬ tions was their most ardent wish—they would have thought them¬ selves perfectly happy in this acquisitionrr-tior did they think of a shorter term of elections.—Let gentlemen recollect that it is to sep^ tennial elections, we owe our liberties, The elections were for seven years in most of the states before the late revolution. I now consider their weight and power, and whether they will |>p sufficient to give them, as the representatives of the people, their DEBATES. 4S [Nicholas. due weight in the government. By the constitution, they are one entire branch of the legislature, without whose consent no law can be passed ; all money bills are to originate in their house;—* they are to have the sole power of impeachment;—their consent is necessary to all acts or resolutions for the appropriation of the pub¬ lic money ;—to all acts for laying and collecting duties, imposts, and excises;—for borrowing money on the credit of the United States ; —for creating all officers, and fixing their salaries;—for coining money ;—for raising and supporting armies ;—for raising and maintaining a navy;—and, for establishing rules for the gov¬ ernment of the land and naval forces : these are the powers which will be fixed in the house of representatives. Hence it appears our representatives have more comparative po- w r er in the scale of government, than the commons of England, and yet, in that country, the commons, possessing less powers, opposed with success much greater powers than our representatives have to encounter. In that country, the king is one entire branch of the legislature, and an hereditary monarch; can prorogue or dissolve, call or dismiss, the two houses at his pleasure ; besides his judicial influence, he is head of the church, fountain of honor, generalissimo of the forces, by sea or land, may raise what fleets and armies he pleases, is rendered personally sacred, by the constitutional maxim, that he can do no wrong; and besides several other great powers has a grand revenue settled on him, sufficient to answer the ordinary ends of government; it being established as a custom, at the acces¬ sion of every new king, to settle such a revenue on him for life ; and can increase the house of lords at any time, and thereby extend his legislative influence: notwithstanding the enormity of these powers, it has been found that the house of commons, with powers greatly inferior to those of our representatives, is a match for both the king and the nobles. This superiority resulted from their hav¬ ing the power of witholding or granting supplies. What will put this in a still clearer point of view, is, that the house of commons were not originally possessed of these powers. The history of the English parliament will shew, that the great degree of power which they now possess was acquired from beginnings so small, that no¬ thing but the innate weight of the power of the people, when lodged with their representatives, could have effected it. In the reign of Edward the first, in the year 1295, the house of commons were first called by legal authority; they were then confined to giving their assent barely to supplies to the crown. In the reign of Edward the second, they first annexed petitions to the bills, by which they granted subsidies. Under Edward, the third, they declared they would not in future acknowledge any law, to which they had not Nicholas.] VIRGINIA. 43' consented : in the same reign, they impeached and brought to pun¬ ishment, some of the ministers of the crown. Under Henry, the fourth, they refused supplies until an answer had been given to their petitions ; and have increased their powers in succeeding reigns, to such a degree, that they entirely control the operation of government, even in those cases, where the king’s prerogative gave him, nominally, the sole direction. Let us here consider the causes to which this uncommon weight and influence may be assigned. The government being divided into branches, executive, and legislative, in all contests between them, the people have divided into the favorers of one or the other; from their dread of the executive, and affection to their representa¬ tives, they have always sided with the legislature ; this has rend^ ered the legislature successful. The house of commons have sue- ceeded also by witholding supplies ; they can by this power, put a stop to the operations of government,, which they have been able to direct as they pleased. This power has enabled them to triumph over all obstacles; it is so important that it will in the end swallow up all others. Any branch of government that depends on the will of another for supplies of money, must be in. a state subordinate de¬ pendence, let. it have what other powers it may. Our representa¬ tives, in this case, will be perfectly independent, being vested with this power fully. Another source of superiority is the power of im¬ peachment.. In England, very few ministers have dared to bring on themselves an accusation by the representatives of the people, by pursuing means contrary to their rights and liberties. Few minis¬ ters will ever run the risk of being impeached, when they know the king cannot protect them by a pardon. This power must have much greater force in America, where the president himself, is per¬ sonally amenable for his ma 1-administration ; the power of impeach¬ ment, must be a sufficient check on the president’s power of par¬ doning before conviction. I think we may fairly conclude, that if the house of commons in England have been able to oppose with success, a powerful hereditary nobility, and an hereditary monarch, with all the appendages of royalty, and immense powers and reve¬ nues, our federal house of representatives will be able to oppose with success, all attempts by a president, only chosen for four years by the people, with a small revenue, and limited powers, sufficient only for his own support; and a senate chosen only for six years, one third of whom vacate their seats every two years, accountable to the state legislatures, and having no separate interest from them, or the people. I now come to consider their responsibility to the people at large. The probability of their consulting most scrupulously the interests* VOL, 3, 4 50 DEBATES. [Nicholas. of their constituents must be self evident; this probability will re¬ sult from their biennial elections, whether they wish to be re-elected or not. If they wish to be re-elected, they will know that on their good conduct alone, their re-election will depend. If they wish not to be le-elected, they will not enter into a fixed combination against the people, because they return to the mass of the people, where they will participate in the disadvantages of bad laws; by the publica¬ tion of the yeas and nays, the votes of the individual members will be known; they will act, therefore, as if under the eyes of their constituents : the state legislatures, also, will be a powerful check on them. ^Every new power given to congress, is taken from the state legislatures, they will be, therefore, very watchful over them ; for should they exercise any power not vested in them, it will he an usurpation of the rights of the different state legislatures, who would sound the alarm to the people. Upon such an appeal from the states to the people, nothing but the propriety of their conduct would ensure the congress any chance of success. Should a strug¬ gle actually ensue, it would terminate to the disadvantage of the general government, as congress would be the object of the fears, and the state legislature the object of the affections of the people: One hundred and sixty members chosen in this state legislature, must on any dispute between congress and the state legislature, have more influence than ten members ofcongress. One representative to congress will be chosen by eight or ten counties ; his influence and chance of re-election will be very small when opposed by twenty men of the best interests in the district; when we add to this the influence of the w'hole body of the state officers, I think I may venture to affirm, that every measure of congress will be suc¬ cessfully opposed by the states. The experience of this state legis¬ lature, hath fully satisfied me that this reasoning is just. The members of our senate have never ventured to oppose any measure of the house of delegates ; and if they had, their chance of being re¬ elected, when opposed by the delegates of the different counties, would be small. But what demonstrates that there is sufficient responsibility in the representatives to the people, and what must satisfy the committee, is this, that it will be their own interest to attend to that of the people at large. They can pass no law, but what will equally affect their own persons, their families and prop¬ erty. This will be an additional influence to prevail with them to attend to their duty—and more effectually watch and check the executive. Their consequence as members will be another induce¬ ment. If they will individually signalize themselves in support of their constituents, and in curbing the usurpations of the executive, it will best recommend them to the people, secure their re-election, VIRGINIA. Nicholas.] 51 and enhance their consequence. They therefore will become watch* ful guardians of the interests of the people. The constitution has wisely interposed another check, to wit; That no person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be a member of either house during his continuance in office. No powers ought to be vested in the hand of any one who are not representatives of the people, and amenable to them. A review of the history of those countries with which I am acquainted* will shew, that, for want of representation and responsibility, power has been exercised with an intention to advance the interest of a few, and not to remove the grievances of the many. At the time the Romans expelled their kings, the executive authority was given to consuls, and the people did not gain by the change; for the plebeian interest declined, while that of the patricians rapidly advanced, till the oppressions of the latter caused the former to re¬ tire to the sacred mount; and even this struggle terminated only in the creation of the tribunes of the people. Another struggle, produ¬ ced only the advantage of their admission to the consular dignity, and permission to intermarry into patrician families ; so that every success on the side of the people, only produced a change in their tyrants. Under Louis the Xlth in France, a war took place between the king and his barons, professedly for the public good only; and they being successful, a treaty w r as made for the securing that pub¬ lic good ; but it contained stipulations on!] 7 in favor of a few lords, —not a word in favor of the people. But in England where the people had delegated all their power to a few representatives, all contests have terminated in favor of the people. One contest pro¬ duced magna charta, containing stipulations for the good of the whole. This great charter was renewed, enlarged, and confirmed, by several succeeding kings : the habeas corpus under Charles the II., and declaration of rights under William and Mary—the latter limited the prerogative of the crown, the former establishing the personal liberty of the subject, were also in favor of the whole body of the people. Every revolution terminated differently in Rome and in England ; in the first they only caused a change in their masters, in the second they ended in a confirmation of their liberties. The powerful influence of the people in gaining an extension of their liberties will appear more forcibly, and our confidence in our house of representatives must be increased, when w r e come to consider the manner in which the house of commons in Eng land are elected. They consist of 553 members, 200 of whom are chosen by about 7000 freeholders in the counties, cut of eight millions of people: the rest are chosen by towns, several of which, though small, ' g / 4 Jfr five members, and even there are instances of two represen 1 / Wf . 4^ • f 53 DEBATES. [Henrt.- being chosen by one elector. The most baneful elections procure, seats ; one half of the candidates purphase them : yet the people ia England have ever prevailed when they persisted in any particular purpose. If then they have prevailed there when opposed by two- other powerful branches of the legislature, and when elected so un¬ duly, what may we not expect from our house of representatives fairly chosen by the people! If the people there prevail with septen¬ nial electtons, what- may we not expect from our representatives chosen only for two years, and who only have to encounter the fee¬ ble power of the president, and a senate; whose interest will lead them to do their duty! The opposers of this plan of government dread the exercise of the most necessary, the most indispensible powers, and exercised by their own representatives. Magna charta, and declaration of rights, only say, that such powers shall not be exercised but with consent of parliament; and experience has proved, that the making their consent necessary has sufficiently secured a proper exercise of those powers. The best writers also agree that such powers may always be lodged with representatives. We have all the security which a people sensible and jealous of their liberties can wish for. Experience has evinced that mankind can trust those who have similar rights with themselves. Power lodged in the hands of representatives, chosen as ours must be, can¬ not be abused. The truth of this cannot but strike every gentleman in the committee: and still the peopl e can when they please, change the government, being possessed of the supremp power. Mr Nich¬ olas then quoted a passage from the celebrated Dr Price, # who w T as so strenuous a friend to America, proving that as long as representa¬ tion and responsibility existed in any country, liberty could not be endangered ;—and concluded, by saying he conceived the constitu¬ tion founded on the strictest principles of true policy and liberty, and that he was willing to trust his own happiness, and that of his posterity, to the operation of that system. Mr HENRY. Mr Chairman, the public mind, as well as my own, is extremely uneasy at the proposed change of government. Give me leave to form one of the number of those who wish to be thoroughly acquainted with the reasons of this perilous and uneasy situation—and why we are brought hither to decide on this great national question. I consider myself as the servant of the people of this commonwealth, as a sentinel over their rights, liberty, and happiness. I represent their feelings when 1 say, that they are ex¬ ceedingly uneasy, being brought from that state of full security, which they enjoyed, to the present delusive appearance of things. A year ago, the minds of our citizens were at perfect repose. Before the meeting of the late federal convention at Philadelphia, a general ^Observations on Civil Liberty. 53 taRY.] VIRGINIA. j^eace, and an universal tranquility prevailed in this country; but since that period, they are exceedingly uneasy and disquieted. When I wished for an appointment to this convention, my mind was extremely agitated for the situation of public affairs. I conceive the republic to be in extreme danger. If our situation be thus uneasy, whence has arisen this fearful jeopardy? It arises from this fatal system—it arises from a proposal to change our government—a pro¬ posal that goes to the utter annihilation of the most solemn engage¬ ments of the states; a proposal of establishing nine states into a confederacy, to the eventual exclusion of four states. It goes to the annihilation of those solemn treaties we have formed with foreign \ rations. The present circumstances of France—the good offices rendered us by that kingdom, require our most faithful and most punctual adherence to our treaty with her. We are in alliance with the Span* iards, the Dutch, the Prussians ; those treaties bound us as thirteen states, confederated together. Yet here is a proposal to sever that confederacy. Is it possible that we shall abandon all our treaties and national engagefrients?—and for what? I expected to have heard the reasons for an event so unexpected to my mind, and ma¬ ny others. Was our civil polity, or public justice, endangered or sapped : Was the real existence of the country threatened—or was this preceded by a mournful progression of events? This proposal of altering our federal government is of a most alarming nature . make the best of this new government—-say it is composed by any thing but inspiration—you ought to be extremely cautious, watchful, jeal¬ ous of your liberty ; for instead of securing your rights, you may lose them forever. If a wrong step be now made, the republic may be lost forever. If this new government will not come lip to the ex¬ pectation of the people, and they shall be disappointed—their liber¬ ty will be lost, and tyranny must and will arise. I repeat it again- and 1 beg gentlemen to consider, that a Wrong step made now, will plunge us into misery, and our republic will be lost. It will be necessary for this convention to have a faithful historical detail the facts, that preceded the session of the lederal convention, and the reasons that actuated its members in proposing an entire altera¬ tion of government—and to demonstrate the dangers that awaited us : if they were of such awful magnitude, as to warrant a proposal so extremely perilous as this, I must, assert, that this convention has an absolute right to a thCrough discovery of every circumstance relative to this great event. And here I would make this enquiry of those worthy characters Who composed a part of the late federal convention. I am sure they were fully impressed with the neces¬ sity of forming a great consolidated government, instead of a con- DEBATES. 54 [Randolph. federation. That this is a consolidated government is demonstrably clear; and the danger of such a government is, to my my mind very striking. I have the highest veneration for those gentlemen ; but, sir, give me leave to demand, what right had they to say, We the people] My political curiosity, exclusive of my anxious solici¬ tude for the public welfare, leads me to ask, who authorized them to speak the language of, We the people, instead of, We the states? States are the characteristics, and the soul of a confederation. If the states be not the agents of this compact, it must be one great consolidated national government, of the people of all the states. I have the highest respect for those gen/lemen who formed the con¬ vention, and were some of them not here, I would express some tes¬ timonial of esteem for them. Ameiica had on a former occasion put the utmost confidence in them ; a confidence which was well placed : and I am sure, sir, I would give up any thing to them ; I would cheerfully confide in them as my representatives. But, sir, on this great occasion, I would demand the cause of their conduct. Even from that illustrious man, who saved us by his valor, I would have a reason for his conduct—that liberty which he has given us by his valor, tells me to ask this reason—and sure I am, were he here, he would give us that reason : but there are other gentlemen here^ who can give us this information. The people gave them no power to use their name. That they exceeded their power is perfectly clear. It is not mere curiosity that actuates me—I wish to hear the real, actual, existing danger, which should lead us to take those steps, so dangerous in my conception. Disorders have arisen in other parts of America, but here, sir, no dangers, no insurrection of tumult has happened—every thing has been calm and tranquil. But notwithstanding this, we are wandering on the great ocean of human affairs. I see no land mark to guide us. We are running we know not whither. Difference of opinion has gone to a degree of infiam- natory resentment in different parts of the country—which has been occasioned by this perilous innovation. The federal convention ought to have amended the old system—for this purpose they were solely delegated : the object of their mission extended to no other consideration. You must, therefore, forgive the solicitation of one unworthy member, to know what danger could have arisen under the present confederation, and what are the causes of this proposal t'O change our government. Governor RANDOLPH. Mr. Chairman, had the most enlight¬ ened statesman, whom America has yet seen, foretold but a year ago, the crisis which, has now called us together, he would have been confronted by the universal testimony of history; for never was it yet known, that in so short a space, by the peaceable working of Randolph.] VIRGINIA. 55 events, without a war, or even the menace of the smallest force, a nation has been brought to agitate a question, an error in the issue of which, may blast their happiness. It is, therefore, to be feared lest to this trying exigency, the best wisdom should be unequal, and here, (if it were allowable to lament any ordinance of nature) might it he deplored, that in proportion to the magnitude of a subject, is the mind intemperate. Religion, the dearest of all interests, has too often sought proselytes by fire, rather than by reason; and poli¬ tics, the next in rank, is too often nourished by passion, at the ex¬ pense of the understanding. Pardon me, however, for expecting one exception to the tendency of mankind—from the dignity of this convention, a mutual toleration, and a persuasion that no man has a right to impose his opinion on others. Pardon me too, sir, if I am particularly sanguine in my expectations from the chair—it well knows what is order, how to command obedience, and that politi¬ cal opinions may be as honest on one side as on the other. Before I press into the body of the argument, I must take the liberty of mentioning the part I have already borne in this great question: but let me not here be misunderstood. I come not to apologise to any individual within these walls, to the convention as a body, or even to my fellow citizens at large. Having obeyed the impulse of duty, having satisfied my conscience, and I trust, my God, I shall appeal to no other tribunal ; nor do I come a candidate for popularity : mj' manner of life has never yet betrayed such a desire. The highest honors and emoluments of this commonwealth, are a poor comped, sation for the surrender of personal independence. The history of England, from the revolution, and that of Virginia, for more than twenty years past, shew the vanity of a hope, that general favor should ever follow the man, who, without partiality or prejudice, praises or disapproves the opinions of friends or of foes: nay, I might enlarge the field, and declare, from the great volume of hu¬ man nature itself, that to be moderate in politics, forbids an ascent to the summit of political fame. But, come hither, regardless of al¬ lurements, to continue as I have begun, to repeat my earnest endea¬ vors for a firm energetic government, to enforce my objectious to the constitution and to concur in any practical scheme of amendments; but I never will assent to any scheme that will operate a dissolution of the union, or any measure which may lead to it. This conduct may possibly be upbraided as injurious to my own views ; if it be so it is at least, the natural offspring of my judgment. I refused to sign, and if the same were to return, again would I re¬ fuse. Wholly to adopt or wholly to reject, as proposed by the con¬ vention, seemed too hard an alternative to the citizens of America, whose servants we were, and whose pretentions amply to discuss 56 [Randolph* DEBATES. \ the means of their happiness were undeniable. Even if adopted under the terror of impending anarchy,the governmentmust have been without the safest bulwark, the hearts of the people—and if rejected because the chance for amendments was cut off, the union would have been irredeemably lost. This seems to have been verified by the event in Massachusetts ; but our assembly have removed these inconveniences, by propounding the constitution to our full and free enquiry. When I withheld my subscription, I had not even the glimpse of the genius of America, relative to the principles of the new constitution. Who, arguing from the preceding history of Virginia could have divined that she was prepared for the important change'? In former times indeed, she transcended every colony in professions and practices of loyalty ; but she opened a perilous war, under a de- mocracy almost as pure as representation would admit: she supported it under a constitution which subjects all rule, authority and power, to the legislature ; every attempt to alter it had been baffled : the in¬ crease ofcongresssional power, had always excited an alarm, I there¬ fore would not bind myself to uphold the new constitution, before I had tried it by the true touchstone ; especially too, when 1 foresaw, that even the members of the general convention, might be instruct¬ ed by the comments, of these who were without doors. But, I had moreover objections to the constitution, the most material of which, too lengthy in detail, I have as yet barely stated to the public, but shall explain when we arrive at the proper points. Amendments were consequently my wish ; these were the grounds of my repug¬ nance to subscribe,and were perfectly reconcileable with my unaltera¬ ble resolution, to be regulated by the spirit of America, if after our best efforts for amendments, they could not be removed. I freely in¬ dulge those who may think this declaration too candid, in believing, that I hereby depart from the concealment belonging to the character of a statesman. Their censure would be more reasonable, were it not for an unquestionable fact, that the spirit of America depends upon a combination of circumstances, which no individual can con¬ trol, and arises not from the prospect of advantages which may be gained by the arts of negotiation, but from deeper and more honest causes. As with me the only question has ever been, between previous and subsequent amendments, so will I express my apprehensions, that the postponement of this convention, to so late a day, has extin¬ guished the probability of the former without inevitable ruin to the union, and the union is the anchor of our political salvation ; and I will assent to the lopping of this limb (meaning his arm) before I a ssent to the dissolution of the union. I shall now follow the hon.gen¬ tleman (Mr. Henry) in his enquiry. Before the meeting of the fed- Hxndolph.] VIRGINIA. 57 sral convention, says the hon. gentleman, we rested in peace ; a miracle it was, that we were so : miraculous must it appear to those who consider the distresses of the war, and the no less afflicting ca¬ lamities, which we suffered in the succeeding peace.—Be so good ns to recollect how we fared under the confederation. I am ready to pour forth sentiments of the fullest gratitude to those gentlemen who framed that system. I believe they had the most enlightened heads in this western hemisphere :—notwithstanding their intelligence, and earnest solicitude, for the good of their country, this system prov¬ ed totally inadequate to the purpose, for which it was devised ; hut, sir, this was no disgrace to them ; the subject of confederations was then new, and the necessity of speedily forming some government for the states, to defend them against the pressing dangers, prevented perhaps, those able statesmen from making that system as perfect as more leisure and deliberation might have enabled them to do : lean- not otherwise conceive how they could have formed a system, that provided no means of enforcing the powers which were nominally given it. Was it not a political farce, to pretend to vest powers, without accompanying them with the means of putting them in ex¬ ecution? This want of energy was not a greater solecism than the blending together, and vesting in one body, all the branches of gov* ernment. The utter inefficacy of this -system was discovered the moment the danger was over, by the introduction of peace ; the ao cumulated public misfortunes, that resulted from its inefficacy ren¬ dered an alteration necessary : this necessity was obvious to all America: attempts have accordingly been made for thispupose. I have been a witness to this business from its earliest begining, I was honored with a seat in the small convention held at Annapo¬ lis. The members of that convention thought unanimously that the control of commerce should be given to congress, and recommended to their states to extend the improvement to the whole system. The members of the general convention were particularly deputed to me¬ liorate the confederation. On a thorough contemplation of the sub¬ ject, they found it impossible to amend that system : what was to be done? The danger of America, which will be shewn at another time by particular enumeration, suggested the expedient of forming a new plan ; the confederation has done a great deal for us, we all allow, but it was the danger of a powerful enemy, and thespirit of America* sir, and not any energy in that system that carried us through that perilous war: for what were its best arms? The greatest exertions were made, when the danger was most eminent. This system was not signed till March, 1781 ; Maryland having not acceded to it be¬ fore; yet the military achievements and other exertions of America, previous to that period, were as brilliant, effectual, and successtul, 58 DEBATES. [Randolph. as they could have been under the most energetic government. This clearly shews, that our perilous situation was the cement of our union. How different the scene when this peril vanished, and peace was restored! The demands of congress were treated with neglect. One state complained that another had not paid its quotas as well as itself—Public credit gone—for I believe were it not for the pri¬ vate credit of individuals we should have been ruined long before that time. Commerce languishing—produce falling in value, and justice trampled under foot. We became contemptible in the eye3 of foreign nations ; they discarded us as little wanton bees who had played for liberty, but had no sufficient solidity or wisdom to secure it on a permanent basis, and were therefore unworthy of their regard. It was found that congress could not even enforce the observance of treaties. That treaty under which we enjoy our present tranquility was disregarded. Making no difference between the justice of pay¬ ing debts due to people here, and that of paying those due to people on the other side of the Atlantic, I wished to see the treaty complied with, by the payment of the British debts, but have not been able to know why has it been neglected. What was the reply to the demands and requisitions of congress'?—You are too contempti¬ ble, we will dispise and disregard you. I shall endeavor to satisfy the gentleman’s political curiosity. Did not our compliance with any demand of congress depend on our own free will?—if we refused, I know of no coercive force to compel a compliance: after meeting in convention, the deputies from the states communicated their information to one another ; on a review of our critical situation, and of the impossibility of intro¬ ducing any degree of improvement into the old system, what ought they to have done? Would it not have been treason to return with¬ out proposing some scheme to relieve their distressed country? The honorable gentleman asks, why we should adopt a system, that shall annihilate and destroy our treaties with France and other na¬ tions? I think, the misfortune is, that these treaties are violated already, under the honorable gentleman’s favorite system. I con¬ ceive that our engagements with foreign nations are not at all affec¬ ted by this system; for the sixth article expressly provides, that “ all debts contracted, and engagements entered into before the a- doption of this constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this constitution, as under the confederation.” Does this system, then, cancel debts due to or from the continent? Is it not a well known maxim that no change of situation can alter an obligation once rightly entered into? He also objects because nine states are sufficient to put the government in motion: what number of states ought we to have said? Ought we to have required the Mason.] VIRGINIA. 59 concurrence of all the thirteen? Rhode-Island, in rebellion against integrity : Rhode-Island plundered all the world by her paper mon¬ ey, and notorious for her uniform opposition to every federal duty, would then have it in her power to defeat the union, and may we not judge with absolute certainty from her past conduct, that she would do so? Therefore, to have required the ratification of all the thir¬ teen states would have been tantamount to returning without having done any thing. What other number would have been proper? Twelve? The same spirit that has actuated me in the whole pro¬ gress of the business, would have prevented me from leaving it in the power of any one state to dissolve the union : for would it not be lamentable, that nothing could be done for the defection of one state? A majority of the whole would have been too few. Nine states therefore seem to be a mosi proper number. The gentleman then proceeds, and inquires, why we assumed the language of “ We the people?” I ask why not? The government is for the people ; and the misfortune was, that the people had no agency in the government before. The congress had no power to make peace and war, under the old confederation. Granting pass¬ ports, by the law, of nations, is annexed to this power ; yet congress was reduced to the humiliating condition of being obliged to send deputies to Virginia to solicit a passport. Notwithstanding the ex¬ clusive power of war, given to congress, the second article of the confederation was interpreted to forbid that body to grant a pass¬ port for tobacco, which during the war, and in pursuance of engage¬ ments made at Little York, was to have been sent into New-York. What harm is there in consulting the people, on the construction of a government by w T hich they are to be bound? Is it unfair? Is it unjust? If the government is to be binding on the people, are not the people the proper persons to examine its merits or defects? 1 take this to be one of the least and most trivial objections that will be made to the constitution—it carries the answer with itself. In the whole of this business, I have acted in the strictest obedience to the dictates of my conscience, in discharging what I conceive to be my duty to my country. I refused my signature, and if the same reasons operated on my mind, I w r ould still refuse; but as I think that those eight states which have adopted the constitution will not recede, I am a friend to the union. Mr GEORGE MASON.—Mr Chairman, whether the constitu¬ tion be good or bad, the present clause clearly discovers, that it is a national government, and no longer a confederation. I mean that clause which gives the first hint of the general government laying direct taxes. The assumption of this power of laying direct taxes,, does of itself, entirely change the confederation of the states into DEBATES. SO [Mason. one consolidated government. This power being at discretion, un¬ confined, and without any kind of control, must carry every thing before it. The very idea of converting what was formerly a confed¬ eration, to a consolidated government, is totally subversive of every principle which has hitherto governed us. This power is calculated to annihilate totally the state governments. Will the people of this great community submit to be individually taxed by two different and distinct powers ? Will they suffer themselves to be doubly harrassed ? These two concurrent powers cannot exist long togeth¬ er ; the one will destroy the other: the general government being paramount to, and in every respect more powerful than the state go¬ vernments, the latter must give way to the former. Is it to be sup¬ posed that one national government will suit so extensive a country, embracing so many climates, and containing inhabitants, so very different in manners, habits, and customs ? It is ascertained by his¬ tory, that there never was a government, over a very extensive coun¬ try, without destroying the liberties of the people : history also, sup¬ ported by the opinions of the best writers, shews us, that monarchy may suit a large territory, and despotic, governments eVer so exten¬ sive a country: but that popular governments can only exist in small territories. Is there a single example, on the face of the earth, to support a contrary opinion! Where is there one exception to this general rule? Was there ever an instance of a general national go¬ vernment extending over so extensive a country, abounding in such a variety of climates, &c> where the people retained their liberty? I solemnly declare, that no man is a greater friend to a fitm union of the American states than 1 am : but, sir, if this great end can be ob¬ tained without hazarding the rights of the people, why should we recur to such dangerous principles? Requisitions have been often refused, sometimes from an impossibility of complying With them ; often from that great variety of circumstances which retard the col¬ lection of monies, and perhaps, sometimes from a wilful design of procrastinating. But why shall We give up to the national govern¬ ment this power, so dangerous in its nature, and for which its mem¬ bers will not have sufficient information? Is it not well known, that what would be a proper tax in one state, would be grevious in an¬ other. The gentleman who hath favored us with an eulogium in favor of this system, must, after all the encomiums he has been pleased to bestow upon it, acknowledge, that our federal representa¬ tives must be unacquainted with the situation of their constituents : sixty-five members cannot possibly know the situation and circum¬ stances of all the inhabitants of this immense continent: when a Certain sum comes to be taxed, and the mode of levying to be fixed, 4hey will lay the tax on that article which will on most productive, Mason, y VIRGINIA. and easiest in the collection, without consulting the real circunw stances or convenience of a country, with which, in fact, they can¬ not be sufficiently acquainted. The mode of levying taxes is of the utmost consequence, and yet here It is to be determined by those who have neither knowledge of our situation, nor a common interest with us, nor a fellow feeling for us;—the subjects of taxation differ in three-fourths ; nay, I might say with truth, in four-fifths of the state:—if we trust the national government with an effectual way of raising the necessary sums, it is sufficient: every thing we do further is trusting the happiness and rights of the people : why then should we give up this dangerous- power of individual taxation] Why leave the manner of laving, taxes to those, who in the nature of things, cannot b t e acquainted with the situation of those on wh()m they are-to impose them, when it can be done by those who are well acquainted with it ! If instead of giving this, oppressive power, we give them such an effectual alternative as will answer the purpose, without encountering the evil and danger that might arise from it, then I would cheerfully acquiesce : and would it not be far more eligible! I candidly ac¬ knowledge the inefficacy of the confederation, but requisitions have been made,, which were impossible to be complied,with: requisitions, for more gold and silver than were in the United States. If we give the general government the power of demanding their quotas of the states, with an alternative of laying direct taxes, in case of non-, compliance, then the mischief would be avoided ; and the certainty of this conditional pow T er would, in all human probability, prevent the application, and the sums necessary for the union would be then laid by the states, by those who know how it can best be raised, by those who have a fellow feeling for us. Give me leave to say, that the sum raised one way with convenience and ease, would be very oppressive another way: why then not leave this power to be exer-^ cised by those who knew the mode most convenient for the inhabi¬ tants, and not by those who must necessarily apportion it in such manner as shall be oppressive. 2 With respect to the representation so much applauded, I cannot think it such a full and free one as it is represented ; but I must candidly acknowledge that this defect results from the very nature of the government. It would be im¬ possible to have a full and adequate repres entation in the general government; it would be too expensive and too unwieldy : we are then under the necessity of having this a very inadequate represen¬ tation ; is this general representation to be compared with the real actual, substantial representation of the state legislatures'? It can¬ not bear a comparison. To make representation real and actual, the number of representatives ought to be adequate they ought to mix m DEBATES. [Mason”. with the people, think as they think, feel as they feel, ought to be perfectly amenable to them, and thoroughly acquainted with their interest and condition : now the great ingredients are, either not at all, or in a small degree, to be found in our federal representatives, that we have no real, actual, substantial representation : but I acknowledge it results from the nature of the government: the necessity of this inconvenience may appear a sufficient reason not to argue against it: but, sir, it clearly shews, that we ought to give power with a sparing hand to a government thus imperfectly con- _ structed. To a government which, in the nature of things, cannot but be defective, no powers ought to be given, but such as are ab¬ solutely necessary : there is one thing in it which I conceive to be extremely dangerous. Gentlemen may talk of public virtue and confidence ; we shall be told that the house of representatives will consist of the most virtuous men on the continent, and that in their hands we may trust our dearest rights. This, like all other assem¬ blies, will be composed of some bad and some good men; and con¬ sidering the natural lust of power so inherent in man, I fear the thirst of power will prevail to oppress the people:—what I conceive to be so dangerous, is the provision with respect to the num¬ ber of representatives : it does not expressly provide that we shall have one for every 30,000, but that the number shall not ex¬ ceed that proportion. The utmost that we can exepct (and perhaps that is too much).is, that the present number shall be continued to us:—“the number of representatives shall not exceed one for every 30,000.” now will not this be complied with, although the present number should never be increased; nay, although' it should be decreased 1 Suppose congress should say that we should have one for every 20,000, will not the constitution be complied with 1 For one for every 20,000 does not exceed one for every 30,000: There is a want of proportion that ought to be strictly guarded against; the worthy gentleman tells us that we have no reason to fear ; but I always fear for the rights of the people, I do not pretend to inspir¬ ation, but I think it is apparent as the day, that the members will attend to local partial interests to prevent an augmentation of their number: I know not how they will be chosen, but whatever be the mode of choosing, our present number will be ten ; and suppose our state is laid off in ten districts, those gentlemen who shall be sent from those districts will lessen their own power and influence, in their respective districts if they increase their number, for the greater the number of men among whom any given quantum of power is divided, the less the power of each individual. Thus they will have a local interest to prevent the increase of, and perhaps Mason.] VIRGINIA. 63 they will lessen their own number: this is evident on the face of the constitution, so loose an expression ought to be guarded against, for congress will be clearly within the requisition of the constitu¬ tion, although the number of representatives should always continue what it is now, and the population of the country should increase to an immensb number. Nay, they may reduce the number from 65, to one from each state, without violating the constitution; and thus the number which is now too small, would then be infinitely too much so: but my principal objection is, that the confederation is converted to one general consolidated government, which, from my best judgrpent of it (and which perhaps will be shewn in the course of this discussion, to be really well founded) is one of the worst curses that can possibly befal a nation. Does any man suppose, that one general national government can exist in so extensive a country as this! I hope that a goverment may be framed which may suit us, by drawing a line between the general and state go¬ vernments, and prevent that dangerous clashing of interest and power, which must, as it now stands, terminate in the destruction of one or the other. When we come to the judiciary, we shall be more convinced, that this government will terminate in the annihil¬ ation of the state governments : the question then will be, whether a consolidated government can preserve the freedom, and secure the rights of the people. If such amendments be introduced as shall exclude danger, I shall most gladly put my hand to it. When such amendments, as shall, from the best information, secure the great essential rights of the people, shall be agreed to by gentlemen, I shall most heartily make the greatest concessions, and concur in any reasonable meas¬ ure to obtain the desirable end of conciliation and unanimity. An indispensable amendment in this case, is, that congress shall not exercise the power of raising direct taxes till the states shall have refused to comply with the requisitions of congress. On this con¬ dition it may be granted, but I see no rqason to grant it uncondition¬ ally ; as the states can raise the taxes with more ease and lay them on the inhabitants with more propriety, than it is possible for the general government to do. If congress hath this power without control, the taxes will be laid by those who have no fellow-feeling or acquaintance with the people. This is my objection to the arti¬ cle now under consideration. It is a very great and important one. I therefore, beg gentlemen to consider it. Should this power be re¬ strained, I shall withdraw my objections to this part of the constitu¬ tion : but as it stands, it is an objection so strong in my mind, tha f its amendment is with me, a sine qua non, of its adoption. I wish for such amendments and such, only, as are necessary to secure the dearest rights of the people. DEBATES. [Mad i soi?.. $? Mr. MADISON_Mr. Chairman, it would give me great pleas¬ ure to concur with my honorable colleague in any conciliatory plan.. The clause to which the worthy member alludes, is only explanato¬ ry of the proportion which representation and taxation shall respec¬ tively bear to one another : the power of laying direct taxes will be more properly discussed, when we come to that part of the constitu¬ tion which vests that power in congress. At present I must endeavor to reconcile our proceedings to the resolution we have taken, by post¬ poning the examination of this power till we come properly to it. With respect to converting the confederation to a complete consoli¬ dation, I think no such consequence will follow from the constitu¬ tion ; and that with more attention we will see that he is mistaken : and with respect to the number of representatives, I reconcile it to my mind, when I consider, that it may be increased to the proportion fixed, and that as it may be so increased, it shall, because it is the interest of those who alone can prevent it, who are oar representa¬ tives, and who depend on their good behaviour for their re-election. Let me observe also, that as far as the number of representatives may seem to be adequate to discharge their duty, they will have sufficient information from the laws of particular states, from the state legislatures, from their own experience, and from a great num¬ ber of individuals : and as to our security against them, I conceive, sir, that the general limitation of their poweis, and the general watchfulness of the states, will be a sufficient guard. As it is now late, I shall defer any further investigation till a more convenient time* ' The committee then rose—and on motion— Resolved , That this convention will, to morrow, again resolve it¬ self into a committee of the whole convention, to take into farther consideration, the proposed constitution of government. And then the convention adjourned until to-morrow morning, eleven o’clock. Thursday, the 5th of June , 178S. Mr. HARRISON reported from the committee of privileges and elections, that the committee had, according to order, had under their consideration, the petition of Samuel Anderson to them refer¬ red, and had come to a resolution thereupon, which he read in his place, and afterwards delivered in at the clerk’s table, where the same was again twice read, and agreed to by the house, as follow- eth: Resolved, that it is the opinion of thi s committee,. That the petition of the said Samuel' Anderson, praying that the'election of Mr. Thom¬ as H. Drew, a member returned to serve in this convention for the county of Cumberland, may be set. aside and a new election had to supply his plafee, be rejected Harrison;] VIRGINIA. €5 Mr. HARRISON reported from the committee of privileges and elections, that the committee had, according to order, examined the Teturns of the election of delegates to serve in this convention for the county of Westmoreland, and had come to a resolution there¬ upon, which he read in this place, and afterwards delivered in at 7 . the clerk’s table, where the same was again twice read, and agreed to by the house, as followeth-: Resolved , that it is the opinion of this committee , That the return of the election of delegates to serve in this convention, for the said county of Westmoreland, is satisfactory. The convention, according to the order of the day, resolved itself into a committee of the whole convention, to take into farthe r con¬ sideration, the proposed £lan of govern/ment. Mr. Wythe in the chair. The first and second sections, still under consideration. Mr. PENDLETON. Mr< Chairman, my worthy friend (Mr Hen¬ ry) has expressed great uneasiness in his mind, and informed us that a great many of our citizens are also extremely uneasy, at the pro¬ posal of Jchanging our government; but that a year ago, before this fatal system was thought of, the public mind was at perfect repose . it is necessary to inquire, whether the public mind was at ease on the subject, and if it be since disturbed, what was the cause? What , was the situation of this country, before the meeting of the federal convention? Our general government was totally inadequate to the purpose of its institution ; our commerce decayed; our finances deranged; public and private credit destroyed: these and many other national evils, rendered necessary the meeting of that conven¬ tion. If the public mind was then at ease, it did not result from a conviction of being in a happy and easy situation : it must have been an inactive unaccountable stupor. The federal'convention devised the paper on your table, as a remedy to remove our political diseases. What has created the public uneasiness since? Not public reports, which are net to be depended upon ; but mistaken apprehensions of danger drawn from observations on governments which do not apply to us. When we come to inquire into the origin of most govern¬ ments of the world, we shall find, that they are generally dictated by a conqueror at the point of the sword, or are the offspring of con¬ fusion, when a great popular leader taking advantage of circumstan¬ ces, if not producing them, restores order at the expense of liberty, and becomes the tyrant over the people. It may well be supposed* that in forming a government of this sort, it will not be favourable to liberty: the conqueror will take care of his own emoluments, and have little concern for the interest of the people. In either case, Abe interest and ambition of despot, and not the good of the people^ vol. 3, 5 DEBATES. &&■ [Pendleton, have given the tone to the governmnnt. A government thus formed,} must necessarily create a continual war between the governors and. governed. Writers consider the two parties (the people and tyrants) as in a state of perpetual warfare, and sounded' the alarm to the people. But what is our easel We are perfectly free from sedition and war: we are not yet in confusion : we are left to consider our real happi¬ ness and security : we want to secure these objects: we know they cannot be attained without government. Is there a single man in this committee of a contrary opinion 1 What was it that brought us from a state of nature to society, but to secure happiness! And can society be formed without government! Personify government: apply to it as a friend to assist you, and it will grant your request. This is the only government founded in real compact. There is no quarrel between government and liberty j the former is the shielci and protector of the latter. The war is between government and licentiousness, faction, turbulence, and other violations of the rules of society, to preserve liberty. Where is the cause of alarm! W e, the people, possessing all power, form a government, such as we think will secure happiness : and suppose in adopting this plan, we should be mistaken in the end ; where is the cause of alarm.on that quarter! In the same plan we point out an easy and quiet method of reforming what may be found amiss. No, but, say gentlemen, we have put the introduction of that method in the hands of our servants, who will interrupt it from motives of self-interest. W hat then! We will resist, did my friend say! conveying an idea ot force. Who shall dare to resist the people! No, we will assemble in convention; wholly recall our delegated powers, or reform them so as to prevent such abuse; and punish those servants, who have perverted powers designed for opr happiness, to their own emolu¬ ment. We ought to be extremely cautious not to be drawn into dis¬ pute with regular government, by faction and turbulence, its natural enemies. Here then, sir, there is no cause of alarm on this side but on the other side, rejecting of government and dissolving of the union, produce contusion and despotism. But an objection is made to the fbrm; the expression, We the people, is thought improper. Permit me to ask the gentlemen, who made this objection, who but the people can delegate powers! Who but the people have a right to form government! The expression is a common one, and a favorite one with me ; the yepresentatives of the people, by their authority, is a mode wholly inessential. If the objection be, that the union ought to be not of the people, but of the state governments, then I think the choice of the former, very hap-, py and ptoper. What have the state governments to do \yi\k Pendleton.] VIRGINIA. 67 Were they to determine, the people would not, in that case, be the judges upon what terms it was adopted. But the power of the convention is doubted. What is the power? To propose not to determine. This power of proposing was very broad ; it extended to remove all defects in government: the mem¬ bers of that convention were to consider all the defects in our gen¬ eral government were not confined to any particular plan. Were they deceived? This is the proper question here. Suppose the paper on your table dropt from one of the planets ; the people found it, and sent us here to consider whether it was proper for their adop¬ tion ; must we not obey them? Then the question, must be, be¬ tween this government and the confederation. The latter is no gov¬ ernment at all. It has been said that it has carried us through a dangerous war to a happy issue. Not that confederation, but com¬ mon danger and the spirit of America, were bonds of our union : union and unanimity, and not that insignificant paper, carried us throuoh that dangerous war, “ United, we stand—divided, we © i © p * fall!” echoed and re-echoed through America, from congress to the drunken carpenter; was effectual, and procured the end of our wishes, though now forgot by gentlemen, if such there he, who in¬ cline to let go this strong hold, to catch at feathers ; for all such substituted projects may prove. This spirit had nearly reached the end of its power when relieved by peace. It was the spirit of America, and not the confederation, that carried us through the war : thus I prove it. The moment of peace showed the imbecility of the federal government: congiess was empowered to make war and peace, a peace they made, giving us the great object independence, and yielding us a territory that ex-, ceeded my most sanguine expectations. Unfortunately a single disagreeable clause, not the object of the war, has retarded the per¬ formance of the treaty on our part. 'Congress could only recom¬ mend its performance, not enforce it; our last assembly (to their honor be it said) put this on its proper ground—>on honorable grounds—it was as much as they ought to have done. This single Instance shews the imbecility of the confederation ; the debts con¬ tracted by the war were unpaid ; demands were made on congress; all that congress was able to do, was to make an estimate of the debts, and proportion it among the several states, they sent on the requisitions from time to time, to the states for their respective quotas. Tnese were either complied with partially, or not at all; repeated demands on congress distressed that honorable body ; but they were unable to fulfil those engagements which they so earnest¬ ly wished. What was the idea of other nations respecting Ameri¬ ca? What was the idea entertained of us by those nations to whorq DEBATES. 68 [Pendleton. we were so much indebted] The inefficacy of the general govern¬ ment warranted an idea that we had no government at all. Improve¬ ments were proposed and agreed to by twelve states, but were in¬ terrupted, because the little state of Rhode Island refused to accede to them; this was a further proof of the imbecility of that government; need I multiply instances to show that it is wholly ineffectual for the purposes of its institution] Its whole progress, since the peace proves it. Shall we then, sir, continue under such a government, or shall we introduce that kind of government which shall produce the real hap¬ piness and security of the people] When gentlemen say, that we ought not to introduce this new government, but strengthen the hands of congress, they ought to be explicit; in what manner shall this be done] If the union of the states be necessary, gov¬ ernment must be equally so; for without the latter, the former can¬ not be effected. Government must then have its complete powers, or be ineffectual ; legislate to fix rules, impose sanctions, and point out the punishment of the transgressors of these rules—an executive to watch over officers and bring them to punishment—a judiciary to guard the innocent, and fix the guilty, by a fair trial: without an execntive, offenders would not be brought to punishment, without a judiciary, any man might be taken up, convicted, and punished with¬ out a trial. Hence the necessity of having these three branches. Would any gentlemen in this committee, agree to vest these three powers in one body, Congress! No. Hence the necessity of a new or¬ ganization and distribution of those powers. If there be any feature in this government, which is not republican, it would be exceptionable : from all the public servants, responsibility is secured, by their being representatives, meditate or immediate, for short terms, and their powers defined. It is, on the whole complexion of it, a government of laws, not of men. But it is represented to be a consolidated government, annihilating that of the states; a consolidated government, which so extensive a territory as the United States cannot admit of, without terminating in despotism: if this be such a government, I will confess with my worthy friend, that it is inadmissible, over such a territory as this country. Let us consider whether it be such a government or not: I should understand a consolidated government to be that which should have the sole and exclusive power, legislative, executive, and judicial, without any limitation: is this such a government] Or can it be changed to such a one ! It only extends to the genera] purposes of the union. It does not intermeddle with the local par¬ ticular affairs ot the states. Can congress legislate for the state of Virginia! Can they make a law altering the form of transferring VIRGINIA. 69 Pendleton.] property, or the rale of descents in Virginia!—In one word, can they make a single law for the individual exclusive purpose of any one state! It is the interest of the federal to preserve the state go¬ vernments; upon the latter, the existence of the former depends : the senate derives its existence immediately from the state legislatures ; and the representatives and president are elected under their direc¬ tion and control; they also preserve order among the citizens of their respective states, and without order and peace, no society can possibly exist. Unless, therefore, there be state legislatures to con¬ tinue the existence of congress, and preserve ordej and peace among the inhabitants, this general government, which gentlemen suppose will annihilate the state governments, must itself be destroyed ; when, therefore, the federal government is in so many respects, so absolutely dependent on the state governments, I wonder how any gentleman, reflecting on the subject, could have conceived an idea of a possibility of the former destroying the latter. But the power of laying direct taxes is objected to. Government must be sup¬ ported ; this cannot be done without a revenue : if a sufficient re¬ venue be not otherwise raised, recurrence must be had to direct taxation ; gentlemen admit this, but insist on the propriety of first applying to the state legislatures. Let us consider the consequence that would result from this : in the first place, time would be lost by it: congress would make re¬ quisitions in December; our legislature do not meet till October; here would be a considerable loss of time, admitting the requisitions to be fully complied with ; but suppose the requisitions to be refused would it not be dangerous to send a collector, to collect the con¬ gressional taxes, after the state legislature had absolutely refused comply with the demands of congress! Would not resistance to collectors be the probable consequence! Would not this resistance terminate in confusion, and a dissolution of the union! The con¬ current power of two different bodies laying direct taxes, is objec¬ ted to: these taxes are for two different purposes, and cannot inter¬ fere with one another; I can see no danger resulting from this; and we must suppose, that a very small sum more than the impost would be sufficient; but the representation is supposed too small. I con¬ fess, I think with the gentleman who opened the debate, (Mr. Nich¬ olas )on this subject: and I think he gave a very satisfactory answer to this objection, when he observed, that though the number might be insufficient to convey information of necessary local interests to a state legislature, yet it was sufficient for the federal legislature, who ate to act only on general subjects, in which this state is concerned in common with other states*. The apportionment of representation and taxation by the same scale is just; it removes the objection, that 70 DEBATES* [Leej while Virginia paid one-sixth part of the expenses of the union, she had no more weight in public counsels than Delaware, which paid but a very small portion ; by this just apportionment she is put on a footing with the small states, in point of representation and influence in councils* I cannot imagine a more judicious principle than is here fixed by the constitution—the number shall not exceed one for every 30,000. Bat it is objected that the number may be less. If Virginia sends in that proportion, I ask, where is the power in con¬ gress to reject them! States might incline to send too many, they are therefore restrained : but can it be doubted, that they will send the number they are entitled to! We may be therefore sure, from this principle unequivocally fixed in the constitution, that the num¬ ber of our representatives shall be in proportion to the increase or decrease of our population. I can truly say, that I am of no party, nor actuated by any influence; but the true interest and real happi¬ ness of those whom I represent; and my age and situation, 1 trust, will sufficiently demonstrate the truth of this assertion. I cannot conclude, without adding, that I am perfectly satisfied with this part of the system. Mr. LEE, (of Westmoreland.)—Mr Chairman. I feel every pow¬ er of my mind moved by the language of the honorable gentleman yesterday. The eclat and brilliancy which have distinguished that gentleman, the honors with which he has been dignified, and the brilliant talents which he has so often displayed, have attracted my respect and attention.—On so important an occasion, and before so respectable a body-, I expected a new display of his powers of ora¬ tory ; but instead of proceeding to investigate the merits of the new plan of government, the worthy character informed us of horrors which he felt, of apprehensions to his mind, which made him trem¬ blingly fearful of the fate of the commonwealth. Mr. Chairman was it proper to appeal to the fears of this house! The question be¬ fore us belongs to the judgment of this house—I trust he is come to judge, and not to alarm, I trust that he, and every other gentleman in this house, come with a firm resolution coolly and calmly to ex¬ amine, and fairly and impartially to determine. He was pleased to pass an eulogium on that character who is the pride of peace and support of war ; and-declared that even from him he would require the reason of proposing such a system. 1 cannot see the propriety 'of mentioning that illustrious character on this occasion; we must be all fully impressed with a conviction of his extreme rectitude of conduet. But, Sir, this system is to be examined by its own merit. He then adverted to the style of government, and asked what au¬ thority they had to use the expression “ We the people,” and not We the states! This expression was introduced into that paper with VIRGINIA, great propriety. This system is submitted to the people for their consideration, because on them it is to operate, if adopted. It is now binding on the people until it becomes their act. It is now submitted to the people of Virginia. If we do not adopt it, it will be always null and void as to us. Suppose it was found proper for our adoption, and becoming the government of the people of Virginia, by what style should ft be done? Ought we not to make use of the name' of the people? No other style would be proper. He then spoke of the characters of the gentlemen who framed it; this was in¬ applicable, strange, and unexpected : it Was a mofe / proper inquiry whether such evils existed as Tendered necessary a change of go^ ernment. , t This necessity is evidenced by the concurrent testimony of almost all America. The legislative acts of different states avow it'. It is acknowledged by the acts of this state; under such an act we are here now assembled. If reference to the acts of the assemblies will not sufficiently convince him of this necessity, let him go to our sea ports—let him see our commerce languishing—not an American bottom to be seen—let him ask the price of land, and of produce in different parts of the country, to what cause Shall we ascribe the very low prices of these? To what "cause are we to attribute the de¬ crease of population and industry? And the impossibility of em¬ ploying our tradesmen and mechanics? To what cause will the gen¬ tleman impute these and a thousand other misfortunes ohr peoplela- bor under? These, sir, are owing to the imbecility of the confede¬ ration ; to that defective system which never can make us happy at home nor respectable abroad. The gentleman sat down as he began, leaving us to ruminate on the horrors which he opened \vith. Al¬ though I could trust to the argument of the gentleman who spoke yesterday in favor of the plan, permit me to make ohe observation on the weight of our representatives in the government. If the house of commons in England, possessing less poWer, are how able to withstand the power of the crown; if that house of* Commons which has been undeTmined by corruption in every age, and contaminated by bribery eV'eh in this enlightened age, with far less powers than etur representatives possess, is still able to contend with the execu¬ tive of that country, What danger hdve we to fear that our represen¬ tatives cannot successfully oppose the encroachments of the other branches of the government? Let it be remembered that in the year 1782, the East India bill was brought into the house of commons : although the members of that house are only elected in part by the landed interest, yet in spite of rriinisterial influence, that bill was carried in that house by a majority of one hundred and thirty, and the king was obliged to dissolve the parliament to prevent it£ 72L DEBATES. [Henryv effect.. If then the house of commons was so powerful, no danger can be apprehended that o,ur house of representatives is not amply able to protect our liberties. I trust that this representation is suffi¬ cient to secure our happiness, and that we may fairly congratulate ourselves on the superiority of our government to that I just re¬ ferred to. Mr HENRY. Mr Chairman,.I am, much obliged to the very worthy gentleman for his encomium. I wish I was possessed with talents or possessed of any thing that might enable me to eluci¬ date this great subject. I am not free from suspicion : I am apt to entertain doubts: I rose yesterday to ask a question, which arose in my own mind. When I asked that question, I thought the meaning of my interrogation was-obvious : the fate of this question and of America may depend on this. Have they said, We the States'? Have they made a proposal of a compact between states? If they had, this would be a confederation: It is otherwise most clearly a consolidated government. The question turns, sir, on that poor little thing—the expression, We, the people, instead of the states of America. I need not take much pains to show r , that the principles of this system are extremely pernicious, impolitic, and dangerous. Is this a monarchy like England—a compact between prince and people, with checks on the former to secure the liberty of the latter'? Is this a confederacy like Holland—an association of' a number of independent States, each of which retains its individual sovereignty'? It is not a democracy,, wherein the people retain all their rights securely.. Had these principles been adhered to, we should not have been brought to this alarming transition, from a confederacy to a consolidated government. We have no detail of these great considerations, which, in my opinion, ought to have abounded before we should recur to a government of this kind* Here is a resolution as radical as that which separated us from Great Britain. It is radical in this transition, our rights and priv¬ ileges are endangered, and the sovereignty of the states will be relin¬ quished : and cannot we plainly see, that this is actually the case? The rights of conscience, trial by jury, liberty of the press, all your communities and franchises, all pretentions to human rights and privileges, are rendered insecure, if not lost, by this change so loud¬ ly talked of by some, and inconsiderately by others. Is this tame relinquishment of rights worthy of freemen? Is it worthy of that manly fortitude that ought to characterize republicans? It is said eight states have adopted this plan. I declare that if twelve States and an half had adopted it, I w T ould with manly firmness, and in spite of an erring world, reject it. You are not to inquire how your trade may be increased, nor how you are to become a great ami Henrv.] VIRGINIA. 73 powerful people, but how your liberties can be secured; for liberty ought to be the direct end of your government. Having premised these things, I shall, with the aid of my judgment and information, which I confess, are not extensive, go into the discussion of this system more minutely. Is it necessary for your liberty, that you should abandon those great rights by the adoption of this system! Is the relinquishment of the trial by jury and the liberty of the press, necessary for your liberty! Will the abandonment of your most sacred rights tend to the security of your liberty! Liberty, the greatset of all earthly blessings—give us that precious jewel, and you may take every thing e\se\ But I am fearful I have lived long enough to become an old fashioned fellow. Perhaps an invincible attachment to the dearest rights- of man, may, in these refined enlightened days, be deemed old fashioned ; if so, I am contented to be so : I say the time has been, when every pulse of my heart beat for American liberty, and which, I believe, had a counterpart in the breast of every true American ; but suspicions have gone forth—suspicions of my integrity—publicly reported that my professions are not real—twenty three years ago was I supposed a traitor to my country: I was then said to be the bane of sedition,be¬ cause I supported the rights of my country ; I may be thought sus¬ picious when I say our privileges and rights are in danger. But sir, a number of the people of this country are weak enough to think these things are too true. I am happy to find that the gentle¬ man on the other side, declares they are groundless. But, sir, sus¬ picion is a virtue, as long as its object is the preservation of the pub¬ lic good, and as long as it stays within proper bounds : should it fall on me, I am contented : conscious rectitude is a powerful cousola- tion. 1 trust there are many who think my professions for the pub¬ lic good to he real. Let your suspicion look to both sides : there are many on the other side, who possibly may have been persuaded to the necessity of these measures, which I conceive to he danger¬ ous to your liberty. Guard with jealous attention the public liber¬ ty. Suspect every one who approaches that jew T el. Unfortunately nothing will preserve it, but downright force. Whenever you give up that force, you are inevitably ruined. I am answered by gentle¬ men, that though I might speak of terrors, yet the fact was, that we were surrounded by none of the dangers I apprehended. I conceive this new government to be one of those dangers : it has produced those horrors, which distress many of our best citizens. We are come hither to preserve the poor commonwealth of Virginia, if it can be possibly done ; something must be done to preserve your liberty and mine. The confederation, this same despised government,, merits, in my opinion, the highest encomium : it carried ust hrough DEBATES. [Henrv. a long and dangerous war: it rendered us victorious in that bloody conflict with a powerful nation, it has secured us a territory greater than any European monarch possesses: and shall a government which has been thus strong and vigorous, be accused of imbecility and abandoned for want of energy? Consider what you are about to do before you part with the government. Take longer time in reckoning things; revolutions like this have happened in almost every country in Europe; similar examples are to be found in an¬ cient Greece and ancient Rome : instances of the people losing their liberty by their own carelessness and the ambition of a few. We are cautioned by the honorable gentleman who presides against fac¬ tion and turbulence : I acknowledge that licenciousness is danger¬ ous, and that it ought to be provided against: I acknowledge also the new form of government may effectually prevent it: yet, there is another thing it will, as effectually do : it will oppress and ruin the people. There are sufficient guards placed against sedition and licentious¬ ness : for when power is given to this government to suppress these* or, for any other purpose, the language it assumes is clear, express, and unequivocal ; but when this constitution speaks of privileges* there is an ambiguity, sir, a fatal ambiguity—an ambiguity which is very astonishing. In the clause under consideration, there is the strangest language that I can Conceive. I mean, when it says, that there shall not be more representatives, than one for every 30,000. Now, sir, how easy is it to evade this privilege? “The number shall not exceed one for every SO,000.” This may be satisfied by one representative from each state. Let our numbers be ever so great, this immense continent, may, by this artful expression, be reduced to have but thirteen representatives : I confess this construction is not natural ; but the ambiguity of the expression lays a good ground for a quarrel. Why was it not clearly and unequivocally expressed, that they should be entitled to have one for every 30,000! This would have obviated all disputes ;and was this difficult to be done? What is the inference? When population increases, and a state shall send representatives in this proportion, congreses may remand them because the right of having one for every 30,000 is not clearly ex¬ pressed-: this possibility of reducing the number to one for each state approximates to probability by that other expression ; But each state shall at least have one representative/’ Now is it not clear that from the first expression the number might be reduced so much that some states should have no representatives at all, were it not for the insertion of this last expression? And as this is the only re¬ striction upon them, we may fairly conclude that they may restrain the number to one from each state Perhaps the same horrors may VIRGINIA. Henry.] V5 hang over my mind again. I shall be told I am continually afraid: but, sir. I have strong cause of apprehension. In some parts of the* plan before you, the great rights of freemen are endangered, in other parts absolutely taken away.j| How does your trial by jury stand? In civil cases gone—-not sufficiently secured in criminal—this best privilege is gone : but we are told that we need not fear, because those in power being our representatives, will not abuse the powers we put in their hands : I am not Well versed in history, but I will submit to your recollection, whether liberty has been destroyed most often by the licentiousness of the people, or by the tyranny of rulers? ^ imagine, sir, you will find the balance on the side of tyranny. Hap¬ py will you be if you miss the fate of those nations, who omitting to resist their oppressors, or negligently suffering their liberty to be wrested from them, have groaned under intolerable despotism! Most of the human race are now in this deplorable condition. And those nations who have gone in search of grandeur,power, and splendor, have also fallen a sacrifice, and been the victims of their own folly. While they acquired those visionary blessings, they lost their freedom. My great objection to this government is that it does not leave us the means of defending our rights; or of waging war against tyrants. It is urged by some gentlemen, that this new plan will bring us an ac¬ quisition of strength, an army, and the militia of the states. This is an idea extremely ridiculous : gentlemen cannot be earnest r I'his acquisition will trample on our fallen liberty. Let my beloved Ameri¬ cans guard against that fatal lethargy that has pervaded the universe. Have we the means of resisting disciplined armies, when our only de¬ fence, the militia, is put into the hands of congress? The honorable gentleman said, that great danger would ensue if the convention rose 'without adopting this system. I ask, where is that danger? 1 see none. Other gentlemen have told us within these walls, that the union is gone; or that the union will be gone. Is not this trifling with the judgment of their fellow-citizens? Till they tell us the grounds of their fears, I will consider them as imaginary. I rose to to make enquiry where those dangers were ; they could make no an¬ swer : I believe I never shall have that answer. Is there a disposi¬ tion in the people of this country to revolt against the dominion of laws? Has there been a single tumult in Virginia? Have not the people of Virginia, when laboring under the severest pressure of ac¬ cumulated distresses, manifested the most cordial acquiescence in the execution of the laws? What could be more awful than their unanimous acquiescence under general distresses? Is there any revo¬ lution in Virginia? Whither is the spirit of America gone? Whith- is thft genius of America fled? It was but yesterday, when our ene¬ mies marched in triumph through our country. Yet the people of DEBATES. 7S £Henryv this country could not be appalled by their pompous armaments: they "stopped their career, and victoriously captured them : where is the' peril now compared to that! Some minds are agitated by foreign alarms. Happily for us, there is no j^al danger from Europe; that country is, engaged in more arduous business ; from that quarter there is no cause of fear: you may sleep in safety forever for them. Where is the danger! If, sir, there was any, I would recur to the American spirit to defend us ; that spirit which has enabled us to surmount the greatest difficulties : to that illustrious spirit I address my most fervent prayer to prevent our adopting a system destructive to liberty. Let not gentlemen be told, that it is not safe to reject this government. Wherefore is it not safe! We are told there are dangers, but those dangers are ideal; they cannot be demonstrated. To encourage us to adopt it, they tell us, that there is a plain easy way of getting amendments. When I come to contemplate this part, I suppose that I am mad, or that my countrymen are so. The way to amendment, is in my conception, shut. Let us consider this plain easy way. “ The congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amend¬ ments, which in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purpo¬ ses, as part of this constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several states, or by the conventions in three- fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the congress. Provided, that no amendment which may be made prior to the year 1808 , shall in any manner affeet the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article ; and that no state without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suf¬ frage in the senate.” Hence it appears that three-fourths of the states must ultimately agree to any amendments that may be necessary. Let us consider the consequence of this. However uncharitable it may appear, yet I must tell my opinion, that the most unworthy characters may get into power and prevent the introduction of amendments. Let us suppose, for the case is supposeable, possible, and probable, that you happen to deal those powers to unworthy hands, will they re¬ linquish powers already in their possession, or agree to amend¬ ments! Two-thirds of the congress, or of the state legislatures, are necessary even to propose amendments. If one-third of these be unworthy men, they may prevent the application for amendments; but what is destructive and mischievous, is, that three fourths of the state legislatures, or of the state conventions, must concur in the amendments when proposed : in such numerous bodies, there must Henry.] VIRGINIA. 77 necessarily be some designing bad men. To suppose that so large a number as three-fourths of the states will concur, is to suppose that they will possess genius, intelligence and integrity, approaching to miraculous. It would indeed be miraculous that they should concur in the same amendnfents, or even in such as would bear some likeness to one another. For four of the smallest states, that “do not collectively contain one tenth part of the population of the United States, may obstruct the most salutary and necessary amendments. Nay, in these four states, six-tenths of the people may reject these amendments^ and suppose, that amendments shall be opposed to amendments, which is highly probable, is it possible, that three fourths can ever agree to the same amendments? A bare majority in these four small states may hinder the adoption amendments. Nay, in these four states, six tenths of the people may reject these amendments; and suppose, that amendments shall be opposed to amendments, which is highly probable, is it possible that three fourths can ever agree to the same amendments? A bare majority in these four small states, may hinder the adoption of amendments ; so that we may fairly and justly conclude, that one twentieth part of the American people, may prevent the removal of the most grievous inconveniences and oppression, by refusing to accede to amendments. A trifling minority may reject the most salutary amendments. Is this an easy mode of securing the pub¬ lic liberty? It is, sir, a most fearful situation, when the most con¬ temptible minority can prevent the alteration of the most oppressive government; for it may in many respeets prove to be such. Is this the spirit of republicanism? What, sir, is the genius of democracy? Let me read that clause of the bill of rights of Virginia whtch relates to this : 3d cl. That government is or ought to be instituted for the common benefit, pro¬ tection, and security of the people, nation, or community; of all the various modes and forms of government, that is best, which is ca¬ pable of producing the greatest degree of happiness and safety, and is most effectually secured against the danger of maladministration, and that whenever any government shall be found inadequate, or contrary to those purposes, a majority of the community hath an indubitable unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal. This sir, is the language of democracy, that a majority of the community have a right to alter government when found to be op¬ pressive : but how different is the genius of your new constitution from this ? How different from the sentiments of freemen, that a contemptible minority can prevent the good of the majority ? If then DEBATES. T8- [Henry, gentlemen standing on this ground, are come to that point, thet they are willing to bind themselves and their posterity to be oppressed* lam amazed and inexpressibly astonished. If this be the opinion of the majority, I must submit; but to me, sir, it appears perilous and destructive : I cannot helpthinkihg so : perhaps it may be the result of my age, these may be feelings natural to a man ol my years,, when the American spirit has left him, and his mental powers, like the members of the body are decayed. If, sir, amendments are left to the twentieth, or tenth part of the people of America, your liberty is gone forever. We have heard that there is a great deal of brib¬ ery practised in the house of commons in England : and that many of the members raised themselves to preferments by selling the rights of the whole of the people. But, sir* the tenth part of that body cannot continue oppressions on the rest of the people. Eng-- lish liberty is in this case, on a firmer foundation than American liberty. It will be easily contrived to procure the oppositions! one tenth of the people, to any alteration, however judicious. The honorable gentleman who presides, told us, that to prevent abuses in our government, we will assemble in convention, recal our dele¬ gated powers, and punish our servants, for abusing the trust reposed in them. Oh, sir, we should have fine times, indeed, if to punish tyrants, it were only suffieicent-to assemble the people ! Your arms wherewith you could defend yourselves are gone ; and you have no longer an aristocratical, no longer a democratical spirit. Did you ever read of any revolution in a nation, brought,-about by the punish¬ ment of thosein power,inflicted by those whohadpo power at all'? Y ou read of a riot act in a country which is called one of the freest in the world, where a few neighbors cannot assemble without the risk of being shot by a hired soldiery, the engines of despotism,. We may see such an act in America. A standing army we shall have also, to execute the execrable commands of tyranny, and how are you to punish them? Will you order them to be punished? Who shall obey these orders? Will your mace-bearer, be a match for a disciplined regiment ? In what situation are we to be ? The clause before you gives a power of direct taxation, unbounded and unlimited . exclusive power of legis¬ lation in all cases whatsoever, for ten miles square: and over all, places purchased for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-, yards, &c. What resistance could be made ? The attempt would’ be madness? You will find all the strength of this' country in. the hands of your enemies : their garrisons will naturally be the strongest places in the country. Your militia is given up to con¬ gress also in another part of this plan : they will therefore act as> they think proper: all power will be in their own possession, yog Henry.] VIRGINIA. cannot force them to receive their punishment; of what service would militia be to you, when most probably you will not have a single musket in the state?—For as arms are to be provided by congress, they may or may not furnish them.- Let me here call your attention to, that part which gives the congress power “ To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplin¬ ing the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United^ States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia, according to the discipline prescribed by con¬ gress.” By this, sir, you see that their control over our last and best defence, is unlimited. If they neglect or refuse to discipline or arm our militia, they will be useless: the states can do neither— this power being exclusively given to congress : the power.of ap¬ pointing officers over men not disciplined or armed, is ridiculous, so that this pretended little remains of power left to the states, may at the pleasure of congress, be rendered nugatory, Our situation will be deplorable indeed: nor can w;e ever expect to get this govern¬ ment amended, since I have already shown, that a very small mi¬ nority may prevent it and that small minority interested in the con¬ tinuance of the oppression. Will the oppressor let go the oppress¬ ed? Was there ever an instance? Can the annals of mankind ex-, hibit one single example, where rulers overcharged with power, wil-. lingly let go the oppressed, though solicited and requested most earnestly? The application for amendments will therefore be fruit¬ less. Sometimes the oppressed have got loose by one of those bloody struggles that desolate a country. But a willing relinquishment of power is one of those things which human nature never was, nor ever will be, capable of. The honorable gentleman’s observations respecting the people’s right of being the agents in the formation of this government, are not accurate in my humble conception. The distinction between a national government and a confederacy is not sufficiently discerned. Had the delegates, who were sent to Philadelphia, a power to pro¬ pose a consolidated government instead of a confederacy? Were they not deputed by states, and not by the people? The assent of the people in their collective capacity is not necessary to the formation of a federal government. The people have no right to enter into leagues, alliances, or confederations : they are not the proper agents for this purpose : states and foreign powers are the only proper agents for this kind of government: show me an instance where the people have exercised this business : has it not always gone through the legislatures? I refer you to the treaties with France, * • .,lland, and other nations : how were they made ? Were they not so DEBATES. [Henry* made by the states ? Are the people therefore in their aggregate ca- pacity, the proper persons to form a confederacy ! This, therefore, ought to depend on the consent of the legislatures ; the people hav¬ ing never sent delegates to make any proposition of changing the government. Yet I must say, at the same time, that it was made on grounds the most pure; and perhaps I might have been brought to consent to it so far as to the change of government; but there is one thing in it which I never would acquiesce in. I mean the chang¬ ing it into a consolidated government; which is so abhorrent to my mind. [The honorable gentleman then went on to the figure we make with foreign nations; the contemptible one we make in France, and Holland ; which according to the substance of the notes he attributes to the present feeble government.] An opinion has gone forth, we find, that we are contemptible people : the time has been when we were thought otherwise. Under the same despised government, we commanded the respect of all Europe: wherefore are we mow reckoned otherwise! The American spirit has fled from hencer it has gone to regions, where it has never been expected ; it has gone to the people of France in search of a splendid govern¬ ment—a strong energetic government. Shall we imitate the exam¬ ple of those nations who have gone from a simple to a splendid go- ernment! Are those nations more worthy of our imitation ? "What can make an adequate satisfaction to them for the loss they have -suffered in attaining such a government for the loss of their liberty! If we admit this consolidated government, it will be because we like a great splendid one. Some way or other we must be a great and mighty empire; we must have an army, and a navy, and a number of things. When the American spirit was in its youth, the language of America was different: liberty, Sir, was then the prima¬ ry object. We are descended from a people whose government was founded on liberty : our glorious forefathers of Great Britian made liberty the foundation of every thing The country is become a great, mighty, and splendid nation; not because their government is strong and energetic ; but, sir, because liberty is its direct end and foundation. We drew the spirit of liberty from our British an¬ cestors : by that spirit we have triumphed over every difficulty. But now, sir, the American spirit, assisted by the ropes and chains of consolidation; is about to convert this country into a powerful and mighty empire : if you make the citizens of this country agree to become the subjects of one great consolidated empire of Ameri¬ ca, jour government will not have sufficient energy to keep them to¬ gether: such a government is incompatible with the genius of re¬ publicanism. There will be no checks, no real balances, in this government. What can avail your specious, imaginary balances, Henry.] VIRGINIA. 81 your rope-dancing, chain-rattling, ridiculous ideal checks and contri¬ vances'? But, sir, we are not feared by foreigners; we do not make nations tremble. Would this constitute happiness, or secure liber¬ ty? I trust, sir, our political hemisphere will ever direct their opera¬ tions to the security of those objects. Consider our situation, sir : go to the poor man, and ask him what he does ? he will inform you that he enjoys the fruits of his labor, under his own fig tree, with his wife and children around him, in peace and security. Go to every other member of society, you will .find the same tranquil ease and content; you will find no alarms or ■disturbances. Why then tell us of danger to terrify us in^oan adop¬ tion of this new form of government? And yet who knows the dangers that this new system may produce? They are out of the • It sight of the common people : they cannot foresee latent consequen¬ ces. I dread the operation of it on the middling and lower classes of people : it is for them I fear the adoption of this system.-1 fear I tire the patience of the committee, but I beg to be indulged with a few more observations. When I thus profess myself an advocate for the liberty of the people, I shall be told, I am a designing man, that I am to be a great man, that I am to be a demagogue; and many similar illiberal insinuations will be thrown out; but, sir, con¬ scious rectitude outweighs those things with me. I see great jeop¬ ardy in this new government. I see none from our present onp. I hope some gentleman or other will bring forth, in full array, those dangers, if there be any, that we may see and touch them. I have said that I thought this a consolidated government: I will now prove it. Will the great rights of the people be secured by this go- g vernment? Suppose it should prove oppressive, how can it be al¬ tered? .Our bill of rights declares, “ That a majority of the commu¬ nity hath an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right, to re¬ form alter or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most con¬ ducive to the public weal.” I have just proved that one tenth, or less, of the people of Amer¬ ica, a most despicable minority, may prevent this reform or altera¬ tion. Suppose the people of Virginia should wish to alter their go¬ vernment, can a majority of them do it? No, because they are con¬ nected with other men , or, in other words, consolidated with other states : when the people of Virginia at a future day shall wish to alter their government though they should be unanimous in this de¬ sire, yet they may he prevented therefrom by a despicable minority at the extremity of the United States. The founders of your own constitution made your government changeable : biit the power of changing it is gone from you. Whither is it gone? It is placed in the same hands that hold the rights of twelve other states; and vvu 3. 6 32 DEBATES. [ Henry*. those who hold those rights, have right and power to keep them. It is not the particular government of Virginia, one of the lead¬ ing features of that government is, that a majority can alter it, when necessary, for the public good. This government is not a Virginian, but an American government. Is it not, therefore a con¬ solidated government? The sixth clause of your bill of rights tells you, “ That elections of members to serve as representatives of the people in assembly, ought to be free, and that all men having suf¬ ficient evidence of permanent common interest with, and attach¬ ment to the community, have the right of suffrage, and cannot be taxed or deprived of their property for public uses, without their own consent, or that of their representatives so elected, nor bound by any law to which they have not in like manner assented for the public , good.” But what does this constitution say? The clause under consideration gives an unlimited and unbounded power of taxation. Suppose every delegate from Virginia opposes a law lay¬ ing a tax, what will it avail? They are opposed by a majority; eleven members can destroy their efforts : those feeble ten cannot prevent the passing the most oppressive tax law. So that in direct opposition to the spirit and express language of your declaration of rights, you are taxed, not by your own consent, but by people who have no connexion with you. The next clause of the bill of rights tells you, t; That all power of suspending law, or the execution of laws, by any authority with¬ out the consent of the representatives of the people, is injurious.to their rights, and ought not to be exercised.” This tells us that there can be no suspension of government or laws, without our own consent; yet this constitution can counteract and suspend any of our laws, that contravene its oppressive operation ; for they have the power of direct taxation, which suspends our bill of rights: and it is expressly provided, that they can make all laws necessary for carrying their powers into execution ; and it is declared paramount to the laws and constitutions of the states. Consider how the only- remaining defence we have left is destroyed in this manner. Be¬ sides the expenses of maintaining the senate and other house in as much splendor as they please, there is to be a great and mighty pre¬ sident, with very extensive powers—the powers of a king. He is to be supported in extravagant magnificence : so that the whole of our property may be taken by this American government, by laying what taxes they please, giving themselves what salaries they please, and suspending our law r s at their pleasure. I might be thought too inquisitive, but I believe I should take up very little of your time in enumerating the little power that is left to the government of Virgin¬ ia; for this power is reduced to little or nothing: their garrisons, mag- Henry.] VIRGINIA. 83 azines, arsenals, and forts, which will be situated in the strongest places within the states: their ten miles square, with all the fine ornaments of human life, added to their powers, and taken from the states, will reduce the power of the latter to nothing. The voice of tradition, I trust, will inform posterity of our Strug" gles for freedom : if our descendants be worthy the name of Amer icans, they will preserve, and hand down to their latest posterity, the transactions of the present times ; and though, I confess my ex¬ clamations are not 'worthy the hearing, they will see that I have done my utmost to preserve their liberty : for I never w]ll give up the power of direct taxation, but for a scourge: I am willing to give it conditionally ; that is, after non-compliance with requisitions: I will do more. Sir, and what I hope will convince the most seep- tical man, that I am a lover of the American union; that in case Virginia shall not make punctual payment, the control of our cus¬ tom-houses, and the whole regulation of trade, shall be given to congress, and that Virginia shall depend on congress, even for pass¬ ports, till Virginia shall have paid the last farthing, and furnished the last soldier. Nay, Sir, there is another alternative to which I would consent: even that they should strike us out of the union, and take away from us all federal privileges till we comply with federal requisitions, but let it depend upon our own pleasure to pay our money in the most easy manner for our people. Were all the states more terrible than tho mother country, to join against us, I hope Virginia could defend herself; but: Sir, the dissolution of the union is most abhorrent to my mind : the first thing I have at heart is American liberty ; the second thing is American union; and i hope the people of Virginia will endeavor to preserve that union The increasing population of the southern states is far greater than that of New-England : consequently, in a short time, they will be fat more numerous than the people of that country : consider this, and you will find this state more particularly interested to support American liberty, and not bind our posterity by an improvident re¬ linquishment of our rights. I would give the best security for a punctual compliance with requisitions ; but I beseech gentlemen, at all hazards, not to give up this unlimitted power of taxation : the honorable gentleman has told us that these powers given to con¬ gress, are accompanied by a judiciary which will correct all—on examination you will find this very judiciary oppressively construc¬ ted ; your jury-trial destroyed, and the judges dependent on con¬ gress. In this scheme of energetic government, the people will find two sets of tax-gatherers; the state and the federal sheriffs. This it $eems to me will produce such dreadful oppression as the people DEBATES. Si [Henrv. cannot possibly bear : the federal sheriff may commit what oppres¬ sion, make what distresses he pleases, and ruin you with impunity; for how are you to tie his hands'? Have you any sufficient decided means of preventing- him from sucking- your blood by speculations, commissions and fees? Thus thousands of your people will be most shamefully robbed : our state-sheriffs, those unfeeling blood-suckers, have, under the watchful eye of our legislature, committed the most horrid and barbarous ravages on our people: it has required the most constant vigilance of the legislature to keep them from totally ruining the people: a repeated succession of laws has been made to suppress their iniquitous speculations and cruel extortions; and as often has their nefarious ingenuity devised methods of evading the force of those laws: in the struggle they have generally trium¬ phed over the legislature. It is a fact that lands have been sold for five shillings, which were worth one hundred pounds: if sheriffs thus immediately under the eye of our state legislature and judiciary, have dared to commit these outrages, what would they not have done if their masters had been at Philadelphia or New York? If they perpetrate the most unwar¬ rantable outrage on your persons or property, you cannot get redress on this side of Philadelphia or New York: and how can you get it there? If your domestic avocations could permit you to go thither, there you must appeal to judges sworn to support this constitution, in opposition to that of any state, and who may aloo be inclined 10 favor their own officeis. When these harpies are aided by exercise- men, who may search at any time your houses and most secret re¬ cesses, will the people bear it? If you think so, you differ from me: where I thought there was a possibility of such mischiefs, I would grant power with a niggardly hand : and here there is a strong pro¬ bability that these oppressions shall actually happen. I may be told that it is safe to err on that side ; because such regulations may be made by congress, as shall restrain these officers, and because laws are made by our representatives, and judged by righteous judges : but, sir, as these regulations may be made, so they may not; and many reasons there are to induce a belief that they will not, I shall therefore be an infidel on that point till the day of my death. This constitution is said to have beautiful features , but when I come ^examine these features, sir, they appear to me horribly fright¬ ful : among other deformities, it has an awful squinting ; it squints fowards monarchy : and does not this raise indignation in the breast of every true American? Your president may easily become king; your senate is so imperfectly constructed that your dearest rights may be sacrificed by wha , ..ay be a small minority: and a very small minority may contim h rever unchangeably this government, VIRGINIA. 85 Henry. J although horridly defective; where are your checks in this govern¬ ment'? Your strong holds will be in the hands of your enemies : it is on a supposition that your American governors shall be honest, that all the good qualities of this governmrnt are founded ; but its defec- tive, and imperfect construction, puts it in their power to perpetrate the worst of mischiefs, should they be bad men : and, sir, would not all the world, from the eastern to the western hemisphere, blame our distracted folly in resting our rights upon the contingency of our ru¬ lers being good or bad? Shew me that age and country where the rights and liberties of the people were placed on the sole ^hance of their rulers being good men, without a consequent loss of liberty? I say that the loss of that dearest privilege has ever followed, with ab¬ solute certainty, every such mad attempt. If your American chief, be a man of ambition, and abilities, how easy is it for him to render himself absolute? The army, is in his hands, and if he be a man of address, it will be attached to him, and it will be the subject of long meditation with him to seize the first auspicious moment to accomplish his design ; and, sir, will the American spirit solely relieve you when this happens? I would Tather infinitely, and I am sure most of this convention are of the same opinion, have a king, lords, and commons, than a government, so replete with such insupportable evils. If we make a king, we may prescribe the rules by which he shall rule his people, and in terpose such checks as shall prevent him from infringing them ; but the president in the field at the head of his army can prescribe the terms on which he shall reign master, so far that it will puzzle any American ever to get his neck fiom under the galling yoke. I can¬ not with patience think of this idea. If ever he violates the laws, one of two things will happen: he will come at the head of his army to carry every thing before him ; or he will give bail, or do what Mr Chief Justice will order him. If he be guilty, will not the rec¬ ollection of his crimes teach him to make one bold push for the American throne? Will not the immense difference between being master of every thing, and being ignominiously tried and punished, powerfully excite him to make this bold push? But, sir, where is the existing force to punish him? Can he not at the head of his army beat down every opposition? Away with your president: we shall have a k ing : the army will salute him monarch ; your militia will leave you and assist in making him king, and fight against you: and what have you to oppose this force? What will then become of you and yonr rights ? Will not absolute despotism ensue ?- [Here Mr HENRY strongly and pathetically expatiated on the probability of the president’s enslaving America, and the horrid, consequences that must result.] 36 DEBATES. [Henry-. -What can be more defective than the clause concerning the elections'? The control given to congress over the time, place, and manner of holding elections, will totally destroy the end of suffrage. The elections may be held at one place, and the most inconvenient in the state; or they may be at remote distances from those who have a right of suffrage : hence nine out of ten must either not vote at all, or vote for strangers : for the most influential characters will be applied to, to know who are the most proper to be chosen. I repeat that the control of congress over the manner , &c. of electing, well warrants this idea. The natural consequence will be, that this democratic branch, will possess none of the public confidence, the people will be prejudiced against representatives chosen in such an injudicious manner. The proceedings in the northern conclave will be hidden from the yeomanry of this country : we are told that the yeas and nays shall be taken and entered on the journals : this, sir, will avail nothing: it may be locked up in their chests, and concealed forever from the people ; for they are not to publish what parts they thinly require secrecy : they may think, and will think , the whole requires it. Another beautiful feature of this constitution is, the publication from time to time of the receipts and expenditures of the public money. This expression, from time to time, is very indefinite and indeter¬ minate : it may extend to a century. Grant that any of them are wdcked, they may squander the public money so as to ruin you, and yet this expression will give you no redress. I say, they may ruin you : for where, sir, is the responsibility. They yeas and nays will shew you nothing, unless they be fools as well as knaves : for after having wickedly trampled on the rights of the people, they would act like fools indeed, were they to publish and divulge their iniquity, when ihey have it equally in their power to suppress and conceal it. Where is the responsibility—that leading principle in the British government? In that government a punishment certain and inevitable is provided : but in this, there is no real, actual pun¬ ishment for the grossest mal-administration. They may go without punishment, though they commit the most outrageous violation on our immunities. That paper may tell me they will be punished. I ask, by what law? They must make the law—for there is no exist¬ ing law to do it. What—will they make a law to punish themselves? This, sir, is my great objection to the constitution, that there is no true responsibility—and that the preservation of our liberty depends on the single chance of men being virtuous enough to make law r s to punish themselves. In the country from which we are descended, they have real and not imaginary responsibility—for their mal-administration has Henry.] VIRGINIA. 87 •cost their heads to some of the most saucy geniuses that ever were. The senate, by making treaties, may destroy your liberty and laws for want of responsibility. Two-thirds of those that shall hap¬ pen to be present, can, with the president, make treaties, that shall be the supreme law of the land : they may make the most ruinous treaties ; and yet there-is no punishment for them. Whoever shows me a punishment provided for them will oblige me. So, sir, not¬ withstanding there are eight pillars, they want another. Where will they make another! I trust, sir, the exclusion of the evils wherewith this system is replete, in its present form, will be made a Condition preceded to its adoption, by this or any ofher state. The transition from a general unqualified admission to offices, to a consolidation of government, seems easy, for though the American states are dissimilar in their structure, this will assimilate them : this, sir, is itself a strong consolidating feature, and is not one of the least dangerous in that system. Nine states are sufficient to es¬ tablish this o-overnment over those nine: imagine that nine have come into it. Virginia has certain scruples. Suppose she will, consequently, refuse to join with those states—may not they still continue in friendship and union with them? If she sends her an¬ nual requisitions in dollars, do you think their stomachs will be so squeamish as to refuse her dollars? Will they not accept her regi¬ ments? They would intimidate you into an inconsiderate adoption, and frightenyou with ideal evils, and that the union shall be dis¬ solved. ‘Tis a bugbear, sir:—the fact is, sir, that the eight adop¬ ting states can hardly stand on their own legs. Public fame tells us, that the adopting states have already heart-burnings and animosity, and repent their precipitate hurry : this, sir, may occasion exceeding great mischief. When I reflect on these and many other circum¬ stances, I must think those states will be found to be in confederacy with us. If we pay our quota of money annually, and furnish our rateable number of men, when necessary, I can see no danger from a rejection. The history of Switzerland clearly proves, that we might be in ami* cable alliance with those states without adopting this constitution. Switzerland is a confederacy, consisting of dissimilar governments. This is an example which proves that governments of dissimilar structures may be confederated ; that confederate republic has stood upwards of 400 years; and although several of the individual re¬ publics are democratic, and the rest aristocratic, no evil has resul¬ ted from this dissimilarity, for they have braved all the power of France and Germany during that long period. The Swiss spirit, sir, has kept them together; they have encountered and overcome immense difficulties with patience and fortitude. In the vicinity oi # t DEBATES. .88 [Henrv^ powerful and ambitious monarchs, they have retained their indepen¬ dence, republican simplicity, and valor. [Here he makes a com¬ parison of the people of that country, and those of France, and ' makes a quotation from Addison, illustrating the subject.] Look at the peasants of that country and of France ; and mark the difference.. You will find the condition of the former far more desirable and com¬ fortable. No matter whether the people be great, splendid and powerful, if they enjoy freedom. The Turkish Grand Seignior* alongside of our President, would put us to disgracebut we should be as abundantly consoled for this disgrace, when our citizens have been put in contrast with the Turkish slave. The most valu¬ able end of government, is the liberty of the inhabitants. No pos¬ sible advantages can compensate for the loss of this privilege. Show me the reason why the American union is to be dissolved.. Who are those eight adopting states'? Aie they averse to give us a little time to consider, before we conclude? Would such a disposi¬ tion render a junction with them eligible : or is it the genius of that kind of government, to precipitate people hastily into measures of the utmost importance, and grant no indulgence? If it be, sir, is it lor us to accede to such a government? We have aright to have time to consider—we shall theiefore insist upon it : Unless the govern¬ ment be amended, we can never accept it. The adopting states will doubtless accept our money and our regiments—and what is to be the consequence, if we are disunited? I believe it is yet doubtful, whether it is not proper to stand by a while, and see the effect of its adoption in other states. In forming a government, the utmost care should be taken to prevent its becoming oppressive; and this government is of such an intricate and complicated a nature, that no man on this earth can know its real operation. The other states have no reason to think, from the antecedent conduct of Virginia, that she has any intention of seceding from the union, or of being less active to support the general welfare? Would they not, there¬ fore, acquiesce in our taking time to deliberate—deliberate whether the measure be not perilous, not only for us, but the adopting states? Permit me, sir, to say, that a great majority of the people even in the adopting states, are averse to this government. I believe I would be right to say, that they have been egregiously misled. Pennsylvania has , perhaps, been tricked into it. If the other states who have adopted it, have not been tricked, still they were too much hurried into its adoption. There were very respectable minorities in several of them; and if reports be true, a clear majority of the people are averse to it. If we also accede, and it should prove grievous, the peace and prosperity of our country, which we all love, will be destroyed. This government has not the affection of Randolph.] VIRGINIA. 89 the people, at preseat. Should it be oppressive, their affection will be totally estranged from it—and, sir, you know that a government, without their affections, can neither be durable nor happy. I speak as one poor individual—but when I speak, I speak the language of thousands. But, sir, I mean not to breath the spirit nor utter the language of secession. O O • I have trespassed so long on your patience, I am really concerned that I have something yet to say. The honorable member has said we shall be properly represented. Remember, sir, that the number of our representatives is but ten, whereof six is a majority. Will those men be possessed of sufficient information! A Articular knowledge of particular districts, will not suffice. They must be well acquainted with agriculture, commerce, and a great variety of other matters throughout the continent: they must know not only the actual state of nations in Europe and America, the situations of their farmers, cottagers, and mechanics, but also the relative situa¬ tions and intercourse of those nations. Virginia is as laige as En¬ gland. Our proportion of representatives is but ten men. In En¬ gland they have 558. The house of commons, in England, nume¬ rous as they are, we are told, is bribed, and have bartered away the rights of their constituents : what then shall become of us! Will these few protect our rights! Will they be incorruptible! You say they will be better men than the English commoners. I say they will be infinitely worse men, because they are to be chosen blind¬ folded : their election (the t6rm, as applied to their appointment, is inaccurate) will be an involuntary nomination, and a not choice. I have, I fear, fatigued the committee, yet I have not said the one hundred thousandth part of what I have on my mind, and wish to impait. On this occasion, I conceived myself bound to attend strictly to the interest of the state ; and I thought her dearest rights at stake . having lived so long—been so much honored—my efforts though small, are due to my country. I have found my mind hur¬ ried on from subject to subject, on this very great occasion. We have been all out of order, from the gentleman who opened to-day, to myself. I did not come prepared to speak on so multifarious a subject, in so general a manner. I trust you will indulge me another time. Before you abandon the present system, I hope you will con¬ sider not only its defects, most maturely, but likewise those of that which you are to substitute to it. May you be fully apprised of the dangers of the latter, not by fatal experience; but by some abler advocate than I. Gov. RANDOLPH. Mr. Chairman, if we go on in this irregu¬ lar manner, contrary to our resolution, instead or three or six weeks,, it will lake us six months, to decide this question. I shall endeav- [Randolph. 90 DEBATES. or to make the committee sensible of the necessity of establishing a national government: in the course of my argument, I shall show the inefficacy of the confederation. It is too late to enter into the subject now, but I shall take the first opportunity for that purpose. I mention this, to shew that I had not answered him fully, nor in a general way yesterda}^. Friday, &6lh of June, 1788. The convention, according to the order of the day, again re¬ solved itself into a committee of the whole convention,- to take into farther consideration, the proposed plan of government. Mr. Wythe in the chair. [The first and second sections still under consideration.] Gov. RANDOLPH. Mr. Chairman, I am a child of the revolu¬ tion. My country very early indeed took me under its protection, at a time when I most wanted it; and by a succession of favors and honors, gratified even my most ardent wishes. I feel the high¬ est gratitude and attachment to my country ; her felicity is the most fervent prayer of my heart. Conscious of having exerted my fac¬ ulties to the utmost in her behalf, if I have not succeeded in secur¬ ing the esteem of m 3 7 - countrymen, I shall reap abundant consolation from the rectitude of my intentions : honors, when compared to the satisfaction accruing from a conscious independence and rectitude of conduct, are no equivalent. The unwearied study of my life, shall be to promote her happiness. As a citizen, ambition and pop¬ ularity are no objects with me. 1 expect in the course of a year to retire to that private station which I most sincerely and cordially prefer to all others. The security of public justice, sir, is what I most fervently wish ; as I consider that object to be the primary "step to the attainment of public happiness. I can declare to the whole world, that in the part I take in this very important question, I am actuated by a regard for what I conceive, to be our true inter¬ est. I can also with equal sincerity, declare, that I would join heart and hand in rejecting this system, did I conceive it would promote our happiness : but having a strong conviction on my mind, at this time, that by a disunion we shall throw away all those blessings we have so earnestly fought for, and that a rejection of the constitu¬ tion will operate disunion, pardon me if I discharge the obligation j owe to my country by voting for its adoption. We are told that the report of dangers is false. The cry of peace, sir, is false : say peace, when there is peace ; it is but a sudden calm. The tempest growls over you ; look round, wheresoever you look, you see dan¬ ger. Where there are so many witnesses in many parts of America, that justice is suffocated, shall peace and happiness still be said to •reign? Candor, sir, requires an undisguised representation of our •situation. Candor, sir, demands a faithful exposition of facts. Randolph.] VIRGINIA. 91 iVIany citizens have found justice strangled and trampled under foot, through the course of jurisprudence in this country. Are those who have debts due to them satisfied with your government! Are not creditors wearied with the tedious procrastination of your legal pro¬ cess—a process obscured by' legislative mists! Cast your eyes to your seaports, see how commerce languishes; this country, so blessed by nature, with every advantage that can render commerce profitable, through defective legislation, is deprived of-all the bene¬ fits and emoluments she might otherwise reap from it. We hear many complaints on the subject of located lands; a variety of com¬ petitors claiming the same lands under legislative acts, pfiblic faith prostrated, aud private confidence 1 destroyed. I ask ycu if your -*v law's are reverenced! In every well regulated community the laws command respect. Are yours entitled to reverence! We not only see violations of the constitution, but of national principles in re¬ peated instances. How is the fact! The history of the violations of the constitution extends from the year 1776 , to this present time ■; violations made by formal acts of the legislature : every thing has been drawn within the legislative vortex. There is one example of this violation in Virginia, of a most striking and shocking nature ; an example, so horrid, that if I con¬ ceived my country would passively permit a repetition of it, dear as it is to me, I would seek means of expatriating myself from it. A man who was then a citizen ;was deprived of his life, thus : from a mere reliance on general reports, a gentleman in the house of del* egates informed the house, that a certain man (Josiah Philips) had committed several crimes, and was running at large, perpetrating other crimes ; he therefore moved for leave to attaint him ; he ob¬ tained that leave instantly : no sooner did he obtain it, than he drew from his pocket a bill ready written for that effect; it was read three times in one day, and carried to the senate. 1 will not say that it passed the same day through the senate : but he was at¬ tainted very speedily and precipitately, without any proof, better than vague reports! Without being confronted with his accusers and witnesses: without the privilege of calling for evidence in his behalf, he was sentenced to death, and was afterwards actually ex¬ ecuted. Was this arbitrary deprivation of life, the dearest gift of God to man, consistent with the genius of a republican government! Is this compatible with the spirit of freedom! This, sir, has made the deepest impression in my heart, and I cannot contemplate it without horror. There are still a multiplicity of complaints of the debility of the laws. Justice in many instances is so unattainable that commerce may in fact be said to be stopped entirely. There is no peace, sir, in this land : can peace exist with injustice, licem 92 DEBATES. [Randolph. tiousness, insecurity, and oppression 1 ? These considerations, inde¬ pendent of many others which I have not yet enumerated, would be a sufficient reason for the adoption of this constitution, because it secures the liberty of the citizen, his person, and property, and will invigorate and restore commerce and industry. An additional rea¬ son to induce us to adopt it is, that excessive licentiousness, which has resulted from the relaxation of our laws, and which will be checked by this government. Let us judge from the fate of more ancient nations : licentiousness has produced tyranny among many of them : it has contributed as much (if not more) as any other cause whatsoever, to the loss of their liberties. I have respect for the integrity of our legislators. I believe them to be virtuous : but as long as the defects of the constitution exist, so long will laws be imperfect. The honorable gentleman went on further, and said that the acces¬ sion of eight states is not a reason for our adoption; many other things have been alledged out of order, instead of discussing the system regularly, a variety of points are promiscuously debated in order to make temporary impressions on the members. Sir, were I convinced of the validity of their arguments, I would join them heart and hand. Were I convinced that the accession of eight states did not render our accession also necessary to preserve the union, I would not accede to it, till it should be previously amend¬ ed : but, sir, I am convinced that the union will be lost by our re¬ jection. Massachusetts has adopted it; she has recommended sub¬ sequent amendments; her influence must be very considerable to obtain them. I trust my countrymen have sufficient wisdom and virtue to entitle them to equal respect. Is it urged that being wiser, we ought to prescribe amendments to the other states? I have con¬ sidered this subject deliberately ; wearied myself in endeavoring to find a possibility of preserving the union, without our unconditional ratification ; but, sir, in vain, I find no other means. I ask myself a variety of questions applicable to the adopting states, and I con¬ clude, will they repent of what they have done? Will they ac¬ knowledge themselves in an error? Or, will they recede to gratify Virginia? My prediction is, that they will not. Shall we stand by ourselves, and be severed from the union, if amendments cannot be had? I have every reason for determining within myself, that our rejection must dissolve the union ; and that that dissolution will de¬ stroy our political happiness. The honorable gentleman was pleas¬ ed to draw out several other arguments out of order : that this go¬ vernment would destroy the state governments, the trial by jury, &c. &c. and concluded by an illustration of his opinion, by a reference to the confederacy of the Swiss. Let us argue with unprejudiced 93 Randolph.] VIRGINIA. minds : they say that the trial by jury is gone—is this so? AR though I have declared my determination to give my vote for it, yet I shall freely censure those parts which appear to me reprehensible. The trial by jury in criminal cases is secured—in civil cases it is not so expressly secured as I should wish it; but it does not follow, that congress has the power of taking away thia privilege which is secured by the constitution of each state, and not given away by this constitution—I have no fear on this subject—congress must regulate it so as to suit every state. I will risk my property on the cer¬ tainty, that they will institute the trial by jury in such manner as shall accommodate the conveniences of the inhabitants in every state; the difficulty of ascertaining this accommodation, was the principal cause of its not being provided for. It will be the interest of the individuals composing congress to put it on this convenient footing. Shall we not choose men respectable for their good qualities? Or can we suppose that men tainted with the worst vices will get into congress? I beg leave to differ from the honorable gentleman, in an¬ other point. He dreads that great inconveniences will ensue from the federal court: that our citizens will be harrassed by being car. ried thither. I cannot think that this power of the federal judiciary will necessarity be abused, the inconvenience here suggested being of a general nature, affecting most of the states, will, by genera! consent of the states, be removed; and, I trust, such regulations shall be made in this case, as will accommodate the people in every state. The honorable gentleman instanced the Swiss cantons, a* an example, to shew us the possibility, if not expediency, of being in amicable alliance with the other states, without adopting this system. Sir, references to history will be fatal in political reasons unless well guarded. Our mental ability is often too contracted, and powers of investigation so limited, that sometimes we adduce as an example in our favor, what in fact militates against us. Ex¬ amine the situation of that country comparatively to us : the ex¬ tent and situation of that country is totally different from ours, their country is surrounded by powerful, ambitious, and reciprocally jealous nations : their territory small and soil not very fertile. The peculiarity, sir of their situation, has kept them together, and not that system of alliance, to which the gentleman seems to attribute the durability and felicity of their connection. [Here his excellency quoted some passages from Stanyard, illus¬ trating his argument, and largely commented upon it. The effect of which was, that the narrow confines of that country rendered it very possible for a system of confederacy to accommodate those cantons, that would not suit the UnitedStates, that it was the fear of the ambitious and warlike nations that surrounded them, and the re¬ ciprocal jealousy of the other European powers that rendered their 94- DEBATES. Randolph. union so durable; and that notwithstanding these circumstances., and their being a hardy race of people, yet such was the injudi¬ cious construction of their confederacy, that very considerable broils interrupted their harmony sometimes.] His excellency then continued—I have produced this example to show that we ought not to be amused with the historical references, which have no kind of analogy to the points under our considera¬ tion. We ought to confine ourselves to those points solely, which have an immediate and_ strict similitude, to the subject of our dis¬ cussion. The reference made by the honorable gentleman over the way, is extremely inapplicable to us. Are the Swiss cantons circum¬ stanced as we are? Are we surrounded by formidable nations! Or are we situated'in any manner like them] We are not, sir. Then it naturally results that no such friendly intercourse as he flattered himself with, could take place, in a ^ase of a dissolution of our union : we are remotely situated from powerful nations, the dread of whose attack might impel us to unite firmly with one another r nor are we situated in an inaccessible strong position : we have to fear much from one another. We must soon ff.el the fatal effects of an imperfect system of union. The honorable gentleman attacks the constitution as he thinks it is contrary to our bill of rights? Do we not appeal to the people by whose authority all governments is made] That bill of rights is of no validity, because, I conceive, it is not formed on due authority. It is not a part of our constitution ; it has never secured us against any danger ; it has been repeatedly disregarded and violated. But we must not discard the confedera- tion, for the remembrance of its past services, i am attached to old servants, I have regard and tenderness for this old servant; but when reasons tell us, that it can no longer be retained, without throwing away all it has gained us, and running the risk of loosing every thing dear to us, must we still continue our attachment? Rea¬ son and my duty tells me not. Other gentlemen may think other¬ wise. But, sir, is it not possible that men may differ in sentiments, and still be honest? We have an inquisition within ourselves, that leads us not to offend so much against charity. The gentlemen ex¬ presses a necessity of being suspicious of those who govern : I will agree wflth him'in the necessity of political jealousy to a certain extent; but we ought to examine how far this political jealousy ought to be carried ; I confess that a certain degree of it is highly necessary to the preservation of liberty ; but it ought net to be ex¬ tended'to a degree W'hich is degrading and humiliating to human nature; to a degree of restlessness, and active disquietude, suffi¬ cient to disturb a community, or preclude the possibility of political. Randolph.] VIRGINIA. m happiness and contentment, Confidence ought also to be equally limited. Wisdom shrinks from extremes, and fixes on a medium as her choice. Experience and history, the least fallible judges, teach us, that in forming a government, the powers to be given must be commensurate to the object. A less degree will defeat the intention, and a greater will subject the people to the depravity of ru¬ lers, who, though they are bat the agents of the people, pervert their powers to their emolument, and ambitious views. Mr Chairman, I am sorry to be obliged to detain the house; but the relation of a variety of matters, renders it now unavoidable. J informed the house yesterday before rising, that I intended to shew the necessity of having a national government in preference to the confederation ; also to show the necessity of conceding the power of taxation and distinguish between its objects ; and I am the more happy that I possess materials of information for that purpose. My intention then is to satisfy the gentlemen of this committee, that a national government is absolutely indispensable, and that a confed¬ eracy is not eligible, in our present situation : the introductory step to this will be, to endeavour to convince the house of the necessity of the union, and that the present confederation is actually inade¬ quate and unamcndable. The extent of the country is objected by the gentleman over the way, as an insurmountable obstacle to the establishing a national government in the United States. It is a very strange and inconsistent doctrine to admit the necessity of the union, and yet urge this last objection, which I think goes radically to the existence of the union itself. If the extent of the country be a conclusive argument against a national government, it is equally so against a union with the other states. Instead of entering large¬ ly into a discussion of the nature and effect of the different kinds of government, or into an enquiry into the particular extent of country, that may suit the genius of this or that government, I ask this question—Is this government necessary for the safety of Virginia? Is the union indispensable for our happiness? I confess it is im¬ prudent for any nation to form alliance with another, whose situa¬ tion and construction of Government are dissimilar with its own. It is impolitic and improper for men of opulence to join their inte¬ rest with men of indigence and chance. Rut we are now enquiring particularly, whether Virginia, as contradistinguished from the other states, can exist without the union. A hard question, per¬ haps, after what has been said. I will venture, however to say, she cannot. I shall not rest contented with asserting—I shall en- O deavor to prove. Look at the most powerful nations, on earth. England and France have had recourse to this expedient: those countries found DEBATES. 96 [Randolph. It necessary to unite with their immediate neighbors, and this union has prevented the most lamentable mischiefs. What divine pre¬ eminence is Virginia possessed of above other states'? Can Vir¬ ginia send her navy and thunder to bid defiance to foreign nations? And can she exist without an union with her neighbors, when the most potent nations have found such an union necessary, not only to their political felicity, but their national existence'? Let us ex¬ amine her ability : although it be impossible to determine with ac- curacjrwhat degree of internal strength a nation ought to possess, to enable it to stand by itself, yet there are certain sure facts and circumstances which demonstrate that a particular nation cannot stand singly. I have spoken with freedom, and, I trust I have done it with decency; but I must also speak the truth. If Virginia can exist without the union, she must derive that ability from one or other of these sources, viz: from her natural situation, or because she has no reason to fear from other nations. What is her situa¬ tion? She is not inaccessible : she is not a petty republic, like that of St Marino, surrounded by rocks and mountains, with a soil not very fertile, nor worthy the envy of surrounding nations : were this, sir, her situation, she might like that petty state subsist, separated from all the world. On the contrary, she is very accessible: the large capacious bay of Chesapeake, which is but too excellently adapted for the admission of enemies, renders her very vulnerable I am informed, and I believe rightly, because I derive my infor¬ mation from those whose knowledge is most respectable, that Vir* giiiia is in a very unhappy position with respect to the access of foes by sea, though happily situated for commerce. This being her sit¬ uation by sea, let us look at land. She has frontiers adjoining the states of Pennsylvania, Maryland and North Carolina; two of those states have declared themselves members of the union : will she be inaccessible to the inhabitants of those states? Cast your eyes to the western country, that is inhabited by cruel savages, your natu¬ ral enemies; besides their natural propensity to barbarity, they may be excited by the gold of foreign enemies to commit the most hor¬ rid ravages on your people? Our great increasing population is one remedy to this evil, but being scattered thinly over so extensive a country, how difficult is it to collect their strength, or defend the country? This is one point of weakness. I wish for the honor of my countrymen that it was the only one. There is another circum¬ stance which renders us more vulnerable. Are we not weakened by the population of those whom we hold in slavery? The day may come when they may make impression upon us. Gentlemen who have been long accustomed to the contemplation of the subject, think there is a cause of alarm in this case : the number of those people, Randolph.] VIRGINIA. 97 compared to that of the whites, is an immense proportion : their number amounts to 236,000—that of the whites, only to 352,000. Will the American spirit, so much spoken of, repel an invading- en¬ emy, or enable you to obtain an advantageous peace! Manufactures and military stores may afford relief to a country exposed : have we these at present! Attempts have been made to have these here. If we shall be separated from the union, shall our chance of having these be greater. Or will not the want of these be more deplorable! We shall be told of the exertions of Virginia under the confede¬ ration—her achievements when she had no commerce: these, sir*, were necessary for her immediate safety, nor would these have availed, without the aid of the other states. Those states, then our friends, brothers and supporters, will, if disunited from us, be our bit¬ terest enemies. If then, sir, Virginia, from her situation, is not inac¬ cessible or invulnerable, let us consider if she be protected by hav¬ ing no cause to fear from other nations : has she no cause to fear! You will have cause to fear as a nation, if disunited ; you will not only have this cause to fear from yourselves, from that species of population I before mentioned, and your once sister states, but from the arms of other nations ; have you no cause of fear from Spain, whose dominions border on your country! Every nation, every peo¬ ple, in our circumstances, have already had abundant cause to fear. Let us see the danger to be apprehended from France ; let us suppose Virginia separated from the other states ; as part of the former con¬ federated states, she will owe France a very considerable sum— France will be as magnanimous as ever. France, by the law of nations, will have a right to demand the whole of her, or of the others. If France were to demand it, what could become of the pro¬ perty of America! Could she not destroy what little commerce we have! Could she not seize our ships and cairy havoc and destruc¬ tion before her on our shores! The most lamentable desolation would take place. We owe a debt to Spain also , do we expect in¬ dulgence from that quarter! That nation has a right to demand the debt due to it, and power to enforce that right. Will the Dutch be silent about the debt due to them! Is there any one pretends, that any of these nations will be patient! The debts due the British are also very considerable ; these debts have been withheld contrary to treaty ; if Great Britain will demand the payment of these debts pre- remptorily, what will be the consequence! Can we pay them if de¬ manded! Will no danger result from a refusal! Will the British nation suffer their subjects to be stripped of their property! Is not that nation amply able to do its subjects' justice! Will the resent¬ ment of that powerful and supercilious nation sleep forever! If we become one sole nation, uniting with our sister* states, our means vcL. 3. 7 '98 DEBATES. [Randolph. of defence will be greater; the indulgence for the payment of those debts will be greater, and the danger of an attack less probable. Moreover vast quantities of lands have been sold by citizens of this country to Europeans, and these lands cannot be found. Will this fraud be countenanced or endured! Among so many causes of dan¬ ger, shall we be secure, separated from our sister states'? Weak¬ ness itself, sir, will invite some attack upon your country. Contem¬ plate our situation deliberatly, and consult history; it will inform you that people in our circumstance have ever been attacked, and successfully: open any page, and you will there find our danger truly depicted. If such a people had any thing, was it not taken? The fate which will befal us, I fear, sir, will be, that we shall be made a partition of. How will these, our troubles, be removed? Can we have any dependence oncommerce? Can we make any com¬ putation on this subject? Where will our flag appear? So high is the spirit of commercial nations, that they will spend five times the val¬ ue of the object, to exclude their rivals from a participation in com¬ mercial profits; they seldom regard any expenses. If we should be divided from the rest of the states, upon what footing would our navigation in the Mississippi be? What would be the probable conduct of France and Spain? Every gentleman may imagine, in his own mind, the natural consequences. To these considerations, I might add many others of a similar nature. Were I to say that the boundary between us and North Carolina is not yet settled, I should be told, that Virginia and that state go together. But what, sir, will be the consequence of the dispute that may arise between us and Maryland on the subject of Potomac river. It is thought Virginia has a right to an eqnal navigation with them in that river. If ever it should be decided on grounds of prior right, their charter will in¬ evitably determine it in their favor. The country called the North¬ ern Neck, will probably be severed from Virginia: there is not a doubt but the inhabitants of that part will annex themselves to Ma¬ ryland, if Virginia refuse to accede to the union. The recent ex¬ ample of those regulations lately made respecting that territory will illustrate that probability. Virginia will also be in danger of a conflict with Pennsylvania, on the subject of boundaries. I know that some gentlemen are thoroughly persuaded that we have a right to those disputed boundaries.: if we have such a right I know not where it is to be found. Are we not borderers on states that will be separated from us? Call to mind the history of every part of the world, where nations bordered on one another, and consider the consequences of our sep¬ aration from the union. Peruse those histories, and you find such countries to have ever been almost a perpetual scene of bloodshed and Randolph/] VIRGINIA. 99 slaughter. The inhabitants of one escaping from punishment into the other-—protection given vthem—consequent pursuit—robbery, cruelty, and murder. A numerous standing army, that dangerous expedient, would be necessary, but not sufficient, for the defence of such borders. Every gentleman will amplify the scene in his own mind. If you wish to know the extent of such a scene, look at the his¬ tory of England and Scotland before the union, you will see their borderers continually committing depredations, and cruelties of the most calamitous and deplorable nature on one another. Mr Chair^ man, were we struck off from the union, and disputes of the back- lands should be renewed, which are Of the most alarming nature, and which must produce uncommon mischiefs, can you inform me how this great subject would be settled! Virginia has a large un¬ settled country : she has at last quieted it. But there are great doubts whether she has taken the best way to effect it. If she has not, disagreeable consequences may ensue. I have before hinted at some other causes of quarrel between the other states and us : particularly the hatred that would be generated by commercial com¬ petitions. I will only add, on that subject, that controversies may arise concerning the fisheries, which may terminate in wars. Pa¬ per money may also be an additional source of disputes. Rhode Island has been in one continued train of opposition to national du¬ ties and integrity ; they have defrauded their creditors by their pa¬ per money. Other states have also had emissions of paper money, to the ruin of credit and commerce. May not Virginia, at a future day also recur to the same expedient? Has Virginia no affection for paper money, or>disposition to violate contracts? I fear she is as. \fond of these measures as most other states in the union. The in¬ habitants of the adjacent states would be affected by the deprecia¬ tion of paper money, which would assuredly produce a dispute with those states. This danger is taken away by the present constitu¬ tion, as it provides, “That no state shall emit bills of credit.” Ma¬ ryland has counteracted the policy of this state frequently, and may be meditating examples of this kind again. Before the revolution, there was a contest about those backlands, in which even govern¬ ment was a party; it was put an end to by the war. Pennsylvania was ready to enter into a war with us, for the disputed lands near the boundaries, and nothing but the superior prudence of the man who was at the head of affairs in Virginia, could have prevented it. I beg leave to remind you of the strength of Massachusetts, and other states to the north, and what would -their conduct be to as if disunited from them : in case of a conflict between us and Mary¬ land or Pennsylvania, they would be aided by the whole strength DEBATES. [Randolph. W) of the more northern states; in short, by that of the adopting states. For these reasons, I conceive, that if Virginia supposes she has no cause of apprehension, she will find herself ip a fatal error. Suppose the American spirit in the fullest vigor in Virginia, what military preparations and exertions is she capable of making!' The other states have upwards of 330,000 men capable of bearing arms : this will be a good army, or they can very easily raise a good army out of so great a number. Our militia amounts to 50,000 ; even stretching it to the improbable amount (urged by some) of 60,000—in case of an attack; what defence can we make! Who are militia! Can we depend solely upon these! I will pay the last tribute of gratitude to the militia of my country: they performed 3 ome of the most gallant feats during the last war and acted nobly as men inured toother avocations could be expected to do; but sir, it is dangerous to look to them as our sole protectors. Did ever militia defend a country? Those of Pennsylvania were said to dif¬ fer very little from regulars, yet these, sir, were insufficient for the defence of that state.' The militia of our country will be wanted for agriculture ; on this noblest of arts depends the virtue and the very existence of a country; if it be neglected, every thing else must be in a state of ruin and decay. It must be neglected if those hands which ought to attend to it are occasionally called forth on military expeditions. Some also will be necessary for manufactu¬ rers, and those mechanic arts which are necessary for the aid of the farmer and planter. If we had men sufficient in number to defend ourselves, it could not avail without other requisites. We must have a navy, to be supported in time of peace as well as war, to guard our coasts and defend us against invasions. The impossibili¬ ty of building and equiping a fleet in short time constitutes the ne¬ cessity of having a certain number of ships of war always ready in time of peace: the maintaining a navy will require money—and where, sir, can we get money for this and other purposes? How shall we raise it? Review the enormity of the debts due by this country: the amount of the debt we owe to the continent, for bills of credit, rating at forty for one, will amount to between 6 or 700,000 pounds. There is also due the continent, the balance of re¬ quisitions due by us, and in addition to this proportion of the old continental debt, there are the foreign, domestic, state, military, and loan-office debts; to which when you add the British debt, where is the possibility of finding money to raise an army or navy? Re¬ view then your real ability. Shall we recur to loans? Nothing can- be more impolitic ; they impoverish a nation. We, sir, have noth¬ in'* to repay them, nor, sir, can we procure them. Our numbers are daily increasing by emigration, but this, sir, will not relieve us„ "Randolph.] VIRGINIA. 101 when our credit is gone, and it is impossible to borrow money. If the imposts and duties in Virginia, even on the present footing, be very unproductive, and not equal to our necessity, what would it be if we were separated from the union? From the first of September, to the first of June, the amount put into the treasury is only 5059,000, or a little more. But, sir, if smuggling be introduced in conse¬ quence of high duties, or otherwise, and the Potomac should be lost, what hope is there of getting money there? Shall we be asked if the impost should be bettered by the union? I answer that it will, sir. Credit beino- restored and confidence diffused in the coun- try, merchants and men of wealth will be induced to come among us, emigration will increase, and commerce will flourish ; the im¬ post will therefore be more sure and productive. Under these circumstances, nan you find men to defend you? If not men, where can you have a navy? It is an old observation, that he who commands the sea, will command the land ; and it is justi¬ fied by modern experience in war.—The sea can only be command¬ ed by commercial nations. The United States have every means by nature to enable them to distribute supplies mutually among one another, to supply other nations with many articles, and to carry for other nations. Our commerce would not be kindly received for foreigners, if transacted solely by ourselves; as it is the spirit of commercial nations to engross as much as possible the carrying trade, this makes it necessary to defend our commerce : but how shall we encompass this end? England has arisen to the greatest height, in modern times, by her navigation act, and other excellent regulations. The same means would produce the same effects. We have inland navigation. Our last exports did not exceed 501,000,000. Our export trade is entirely in the hands of foreigners. We have no manufactures—depend for supples on other nations, and so far are we from having any carrying-trade, that as I have already said, our exports are in the hands of foreigners. Besides the profit that might be made by our natural materials, much greater gains would accure from their being first wrought before they were ex¬ ported. England has reaped immense profits by this, nay even by purchasing and working up those materials which their country did not afford : her success in commerce is. generally ascribed to her navigation act. Virginia would not, incumbered as she is, agree to have such an act. Thus for the want of a navy, are we deprived of 'the multifaious advantages of our natural situation, nor is it possi¬ ble, that if the union if dissolved, we ever should have a navy suf¬ ficient either for cur defence or the extension of our trade. I beg gentlemen to consider these things—our inability to raise and man a navy, and the -dreadful consequences of the DEBATES 102 [Randolph. dissolution of the union. I will close this catalogue of the- evils of the dissolution of the union, by recalling'to your mind what passed in the year 1781. Such was the situation of our affairs then,, that the powers of dictator was given to the commander-in-chief to save us from destruction. This shews the situation of the country i • to have been such as to make it ready to embrace an actual dictator. At some future period, wiILnot T our distresses impel'us to do what the Dutch have done—throw all power into the hands of a stadt- holder? How infinitely more wise and eligible than this desperate alternative is-an union with our American brethern? I feel myself so abhorrent to any thing that will dissolve our union, that I cannot prevail with myself to assent to it directly or indirectly. If the union is to be dissolved* what step is to be taken? Shall we form a partial confederacy ? Or, is it expected that we shall successfully apply to foreign alliance for military aid ? This last measure, sir,, has ruined almost every nation that used it: so dreadful an example ought to be most cautiously avoided ; for seldom has a nation re¬ curred to the expedient of foreign succor, without being ultimately crushed by that succor. We may lose our liberty and independence by an injudicious scheme of policy; admitting it to be a scheme replete with safety, what nation shall we solicit?—France ? She will disdain a connection with the people in our predicament. I would trust every thing to the magnanimity of that nation—but she would despise a people who had like us, so imprudently separated from their brethren; and, sir, were she to accede to our proposal, with what facility could she become mistress of our country ? To what nation then shall we apply? To Great Britain ? Nobody has as yet trusted that idea. An application to any other must be either fruit¬ less or dangerous: to those who advocate local confederacies, and at the same time preach up for republican liberty, I answer that their conduct is inconsistent: the defence of such< partial confederacies will require such a degree of force and expense, as will destroy every feature of republicanism. Give me leave to say, that I see nought but destruction in a local confederacy. With what state can we confederate but North Carolina? North Carolina situated worse than ourselves. Consult your own reason ; I beseech gentlemen most seriously to reflect on the consequences of such a confederacy: I beseech them to consider, whether Virginia and North Carolina, both oppressed with debts and slaves, can defend themselves exter¬ nally, or make their people happy internally. North Carolina having no strength but militia, and Virginia in the same situation, will make, I fear, but a despicable figure in history. Thus, sir, I hope that I have satisfied you, that we are unsafe without an union* —and that in union alone safety consists. Randolph.] VIRGINIA. 102 I come now, sir, to the great enquiry, whether the confederation be such a government as we ought to continue under, whether it be such a government as can secure the felicity of any free people. Did I believe the confederation was a good thread, which might be broken without destroying its utility entirely, I might be induced to concur in putting it together; but I am so thoroughly convinced of its incapacity to be mended or spliced, that 1 would sooner recur to any other expedient. When I spoke last, I endeavored to express my sentiments con¬ cerning that system, and to apologize (ifan apology was necessary) for the conduct of its framers ; that it was hastily devised to enable us to repel a powerful enemy, that the subject was novel, and that its inefficacy was not discovered till requisitions came to be made by congress. In the then situation of America, a speedy remedy was necessary to W'ard off the danger, and this sufficiently answered that purpose, but so universally is its imbecility now known, that it is useless for me to exhibit it at this time. Has not Virginia, as well as every other state acknowledged its debility, by sending delegates to the general convention ? The confederation is, of all things, the most unsafe, not only to trust to in its present form, but even to amend. The object of a federal government is to remedy and strengthen the weakness ol its individual branches, whether that weakness arises from situation or from any external cause. With respect to the first, is it not a miracle that the confederation carried us through the last warl It was our unanimity, sir, that carried us through it. That system was not ultimately concluded till the year 1781. Al¬ though the greatest exertions were made before that time: when came requisitions for men and money; its defects then were imme¬ diately discovered : the quotas of men were readily sent; not so those of money. One state feigned inability, another would not com¬ ply till the rest did ; and various excuses were offered ; so that no money was sent into the treasury, not a requisition was fully com¬ plied with. Loans were the next measure fallen upon : upwards of 80,000,000 of dollars were wanting, beside the emissions of dollars, forty for one. These things shew the impossibility of relying on requisitions. [Here his excellency enumerates the different delinquencies of different states, and the consequent distresses of congress.] If the American spirit is to be depended upon, I call him to awake, to see how his Americans have been disgraced : but I have no hopes that things will be better hereafter. I fully expect things will be as they have been, and that the same derangement will produce similar mis¬ carriages, Will the American spirit produce money or credit, unless 104 DEBATES. [Randolph.- we alter our system] Are we not in- a contemptible situation] Are we not the jests of other nations] But, it is insinuated by the honorable gentleman, that we want to be a grand, splendid, and magnificent, people : we wish not to be¬ come so : the magnificence of a royal court is not our object. We want a government, sir—a government that will have stability, and give us security: for our present government is destitute of the one and incapable of producing the other. It cannot, perhaps with propriety, be denominated a government, being void of that energy requisite to enforce sanctions. I wish my country not to be con¬ temptible in the eyes of foreign nations. A well regulated commit* nity is always respected. It is the internal situation, the defects of government, that attracts foreign contempt—that contempt, sir, is too often followed by subjugation. Advert to the contemptous manner in which a shrewd politician speaks of our government. [Here his excellency quoted a passage from lord Sheffield, the purport of which was, that Great Britain might engross our trade on her own terms : that the imbecility and inefficacy of our general gov* eminent were such, that it was impossible we could counteract her policy, however rigid or illiberal towards us, her commercial regula¬ tions might be.] Reflect but a moment on our situation. Docs it not invite real hostility] The conduct of the British ministry to us, is the natural effect of our‘unnerved government. Consider the commercial regu¬ lations between us and Maryland. Is it not known to gentle* men, that the state have been making reprisals on each other, to obviate a repetition of which, in some degree, these regulations have been made: can we not see from this circumstance, the jealousy, ri- valship, and hatred that would subsist between them, in case this state was out of the Union] They are importing states, and impor¬ ting states will ever be competitors and rivals. Rhode Island and Connecticut have been on the point of war, on the subject of their paper money ; congress'did not attempt to interpose. When Massa¬ chusetts was distressed by [the late insurrection, congress could not relieve her. Who headed that insurrection] Recollect the facility with which it was raised, and the very little ability of the ringlea¬ der, and you cannot but deplore the extreme debility of our merely nominal government : we are too despicable to be regarded by for¬ eign nations. The defects of the confederation consisted principally in the want of power. It bad nominally powers—powers on paper, which it could not use. The power of making peace and war is ex¬ pressly delegated to congress ; yet the power of granting passports though within that of making peace and war, was considered by Vir¬ ginia as belonging to herself. Without adequate powers vested U\ Randolph.] VIRGINIA. fo& Congress, America cannot be respectable in the eyes of other nations'? Congress, sir, ought to be fully vested with power to support, the union—protect the interest of the United States, maintain their com¬ merce, and defend them from external invasions and insults, and in¬ ternal insurrections ; to maintain justice, and promote harmony and public tranquility among the states. A government not vested with these powers will ever be found unable to make us happy or respectable ; how far the confederation is different from such a governmeut, is known to all America. Instead of being able to cherish and protect the states, it has been unable to defend itself against the encroachments made upon it by the states ; every one of them has conspired against it. Virginia as much as any. This fact could be proved by reference to actual history. I might quote the observations of an able modern author, not because he is decorated with the name of author, but because his sentiments are drawn from human nature, to prove the dangerous impolicy of with¬ holding necessary powers from congress ; but I shall not at this time fatigue the house, as little as possible. What are the powers of congress? They have full authority to recommend what they please; this recommendatory power reduces them to the condition of poor supplicants. Consider the dignified language of the members of the American congress. May it please your high mightiness of Virginia to pay your just proportionate quota of our national debt: we humbly supplicate, that it may please you to comply with your federal duties? We implore, we beg your obedience! Is not this sir, a fair represen¬ tation of the powers of congress? Their operations are of no validi¬ ty when counteracted by the states. Their authority to recommend is a mere mockery of government. But the amendabilityof the con¬ federation seems to have great weight on the minds of some gentle¬ men. To what point will the amendments go? What part makes the most important figure? What part deserves to be retained? In it one body has the legislative, executive, and judicial powers ; but the want of efficient powers has prevented the dangers naturally conse¬ quent on the union of these. Is this union consistent with an aug¬ mentation of their power! Will you then amend it by taking away one of these three powers? Suppose, for instance, you only vested it with the legislative and executive powers, without any control on the judiciary, what must be the result! Are we not taught by reason, experience and governmental history, that tyranny is the natural and certain consequences of uniting these two powers, or the legislative and judicial powers, exclusively, in the same body! If any one de¬ nies it, I shall pass by him, as an infidel not to be reclaimed. When¬ ever any two of these three powers are vested in one single body, they must at one time or other terminate in the destruction of liberty. DEBATES. [Randolph. In the most important cases, the assent of nine states is necessary to pass a law ; this is too great a restriction, and whatever good conse¬ quences it may, in some cases, produce, yet it will prevent energy in many other cases : it will prevent energy, which is most necessa¬ ry on some emergencies, even in cases wherein the existence of the community depends on vigor and expedition. It is incompatible with that secrecy, which is the life of execution and dispatch. Did ever thirty or forty men retain a secret? Without secrecy no gov¬ ernment can carry on its operations on great occasions ; this is what gives that superiority in action to the government of one. If any thing were wanting to complete this farce, it would be, that a resolu¬ tion of the assembly of Virginia, and the other legislatures, should be necessary to confirm and render of any validity the congressional acts; this would openly discover the debility of the general government to all the world. But in fact its imbecility is now nearly the same, as if such acts were formally requisite. An act otthe assembly of Virginia, controverting a resolution of congress,would certainly prevail. I there¬ fore conclude that the confederation is too defective to deserve cor¬ rection. Let us take farewell of it, with reverential respect, as an old benefactor. It is gone, whether this house says so, or not. It is gone, sir, by its own weakness. I am afraid I have tired the patience of this house ; but I trust you will pardon me, as I was urged by the importunity of the gentleman in calling for the reasons of laying the ground work of this plan. It is objected by the honorable gentleman over the way (Mr. George Mason) that a republican government is impracticable in an exten¬ sive territory, and the extent of the United States is urged^as a reason for the rejection of this constitution. Let us consider the definition of a republican government, as laid down by a man who is highly es¬ teemed. Montesquieu, so celebrated among politicians, says, “ that a republican government is that in which the body, or only a part of the people, is possessed of the supreme power ; amonarchial, that in what a single person governs by fixed and established laws ; a des¬ potic government, that in which a single person, without law, and without rule directs every thing by his own will and caprice. This author has not distinguished a republican government from a mon¬ archy, by the extent of its boundaries, but by the nature of its prin¬ ciples. He, in another place, contradistinguishes it, as a govern¬ ment of laws, in opposition to others, which he denominates a gov¬ ernment of men. The empire or government of laws, according to that phrase, is that in which the laws are made with the free will of the people; hence then, if laws be made by the assent of the people, the govern¬ ment may be deemed free. When laws are made with integrity. Randolph.] VIRGINIA. 107 and executed with wisdom, the question is, whether a great extent of country will tend to abridge the liberty of the people. If defen¬ sive force be necessary in proportion to the extent of country, I con¬ ceive that in a judiciously constructed government, be the country ever so extensive, its inhabitants will be proportionably numerous and able to defend it. Extent of country, in my conception, ought to be no bar for the adoption of a good government. No extent on. earth seems to be too great, provided the laws be wisely made, and executed. The principles of representation and responsibility, may pervade a large as well as small territory ; and tyranny is as easi¬ ly introduced into a small as into a large district. If it be answer¬ ed, that some of the most illustrious and distinguiseed authors, are of a contrary opinion, I reply, that authority has no weight with me till I am convinced—that not the dignity of names, but the force of reasoning, gains my assent. I intended to have shown the nature of the powers which ought i to have been given to the general government, and the reason of in¬ vesting it with the power of taxation ; but this would require more time than my strength or the patience of the committee would now admit of. I shall conclude with a few observations which come from m} T heart. I have labored for the continuance of the union—the rock of our salvation. I believe, that as sure as there is a God in Heaven, our safety, our political happiness and existence depend on the union of the states ; and that without this union, the people of this, and the other states, will undergo the unspeakable calamities^ which discord, faction, turbulence, war, and bloodshed, have prodiT- eed in other countries. The American spirit ought to be mixed with American pride, to see the union magnificiently triumph. Let that glorious pride, which once defied the British thunder, reanimate you again. Let it not be recorded of Americans, that after having per¬ formed the most gallant exploits—after having overcome the most as¬ tonishing difficulties—and after having gained the admiration of the world by their incomparable valor and policy, they lost their ac¬ quired reputation, their national consequence and happiness, by their own indiscretion. Let no future historian inform posterity, that they wanted wisdom and virtue to concur in any regular efficient govern¬ ment. Should any writer, doomed to so disagreeable a task, feel the indignation of an honest historian, he would reprehend and re¬ criminate our folly, with equal severity and 1 justice. Catch the present moment —seize it with avidity and' eagerness—for it may be lost—never to be regained. If the union be now lost, I fear it will remain so forever.. I believe gentlemen are sincere in their op¬ position and actuated by pure motives ; but when I maturely weigh the advantages- of the union,, and, dreadful consequence of this dis. 103 DEBATES. [Madison. solution, when I see safety on my right, and destruction on my left, when I behold respectability and happiness acquired by the one, but annihilated by the other, I cannot hesitate to decide in favor of the former. I hope my weakness, from speaking so long, will apologize for my leaving this subject in so mutilated a condition. If a further explanation be desired, I shall take the liberty to enter into it more fully another time. Mr. MADISON then arose'—[but he spoke so low that his exor¬ dium could not be heard distinctly.] I shall not attempt to make impressions by any ardent professions of zeal for the public welfare ; we know the principles of every man will, and ought to be judged, not by his professions and declarations, but by his conduct; by that criterion I mean in common with every other member to be judged ; and should it prove unfavorable to my reputation; yet, it is a crite¬ rion, from which I will by no mean3 depart. Comparisons have been made between the friends of this constitution, and those who op¬ pose it: although I disapprove of such comparisons, I trust that, in points of truth, honor, candor, and rectitude of motives, the friends of this system, here, and in other states, are not inferior to its oppo¬ nents. But, professions of attachment to the public good, and com¬ parisons of parties, ought not to govern or influence us now. We ought, sir, to examine the constitution on its own merits solely : we are to enquire whether it will promote the public happiness : its aptitude to'produce this desirable object, ought to be the exclusive subject of our present researches. In this pursuit, we ought not to address our arguments to the feelings and passions, but to those un¬ derstandings and judgments which were selected by the people ot this country, to decide this great questfcon, by a calm and rational investigation. I hope that gentlemen, in displaying their abilities, on this occasion, instead of giving opinions, and making assertions, will condescend to prove and demonstrate, by a fair and regular dis eussion. It gives me pain to hear gentlemen continually distorting the natural construction of language ; for it is sufficient if any hu¬ man production can stand a fair discussion. Before I proceed to make some additions to the reasons which have been adduced by my honorable friend over the way, I must take the liberty to make some observations on what was said by another gentleman, (Mr. Henry.) He told us, that this constitution ought to be rejected, be¬ cause it endangered the public liberty, in his opinion, in many in¬ stances. Give me leave to make one answer to that observation, let the dangers which this system is supposed to be replete with, be clearly pointed out; if any dangerous and unnecessary powers be giv¬ en to the general legislature, let them be plainly demonstrated, and pet us not rest satisfied with general assertions of dangers, without ex- Madison,] VIRGINIA. 109 animation. If powers be necessary, apparent danger is not a sufficient reason against conceding them. He has suggested, that licentious¬ ness, has seldom produced the loss of liberty ; but that the tyranny of rulers has almost always effected it. Since the general civiliza¬ tion of mankind, I believe there are more instances of the abridg¬ ment of the freedom of the people, by gradual and silent encroach¬ ments of those in power, than by violent and sudden usurpations ; but, on a candid examination of history, we shall find that turbu¬ lence, violence, and abuse of power, by the majority trampling on the rights of the minority have produced factions and commotions, which, in republics, have more frequently than any other cause, pro¬ duced despotism. If we go over the whole history of ancient and modern republics, we shall find their destruction to have generally resulted from those causes. If we consider the peculiar situation of the United States, and what are the sources of that diversity of sen¬ timent which pervades its inhabitants, we shall find great danger to fear, that the same causes may terminate here, in the same fatal effects, which they produced in those republics. This danger ought to be wisely guarded against. Perhaps, in the progress of this dis¬ cussion, it will appear, that the only possible remedy for those evils and means of preserving and protecting the principles of republic¬ anism, will be found in that very system which is now exclaimed against as the parent of oppression. I must confess, I have not been able to find his usual consistency, in the gentleman’s argument on this occasion: he informs us that the people of the country are at perfect repose, that is every man enjoys the fruits of his labor, peaceably and securely, and that ev¬ ery thing is in perfect tranquility and safety. I wish sincerely, sir, this were true. If this be their happy situation, why has every state acknowledged the contraryWhy were deputies from all the states sent to the general convention'? Why have complaints of na¬ tional and individual distresses been eoched and re-eoched through¬ out the continent? Why has our general government been so shame¬ fully disgraced, and our constitution violated? Wherefore has laws been made to authorize a change, and wherefore are we now assem¬ bled here? A federal government is formed for the protection of its individual members. Ours has attacked itself with impunity. Its authority has been disobeyed and despised. I think I perceive a glaring inconsistency in another of his arguments. He complains of this constitution, because it requires the consent of at least three- fourths of the states to introduce amendments which shall be ne¬ cessary for the happiness of the people. Tho assent of so many, he urges as too great an obstacle, to the admission of salutary amendments, which he strongly insists, ought to be at tho will of no DEBATES. [Madison. a bare majority—we hear this argument, at the very moment we are called upon to assign reasons for proposing a constitution, which puts it in the power of nine states to abolish the present inade¬ quate, unsafe, and pernicious confederation! In the first case, he asserts, that a majority ought to have the power of altering the go¬ vernment, when found to be inadequate to the security of public happiness. In the last case, he affirms that even three-fourths of the commu¬ nity have not a right to alter a government, which experience has proved to be subversive of national felicity! Nay, that the most ne¬ cessary and urgent alterations, cannot be made without the abso¬ lute unanimity of all the states. Does not the thirteenth article of the confederation expressly require, that no alteration shall be made without the unanimous consent of all the states'? Could any thing in theory, be more perniciously improvident and injudicious, than this submission of the will of the majority to the most trifling mi¬ nority? Have not experience and practice actually manifested this theoretical inconvenience to be extremely impolitic? Let me men¬ tion one fact, which 1 conceive must carry conviction to the mind of any one—the smallest state in the union has obstructed every at¬ tempt to reform the government—that like member has repeatedly disobeyed end counteracted the general authority; nay, has even supplied the enemies of its country with provisions. Twelveetates had agreed to certain improvements which were proposed, being thought absolutely necessary to preserve the existence of the gene¬ ral government: but as these improvements, though really indis¬ pensable, could not by the confederation be introduced into it with¬ out the consent of, every state, the refractory dissent of that little state prevented their adoption. The inconveniences resulting from this requisition, of unanimous concurrence in alterations in the con¬ federation, must be known to every member in this convention, it is therefore needless to remind them of them. Is it not self-evident, that a trifling minority ought not to bind the majority? Would not foreign influence be exerted with facility over a small minority? Would the h onorable gentleman agree to continue the mo3t radical defects inf he old system, because the petty state of Rhode Island would not agree to remove them. He next objects to the exclusive legislation over the district \vhere ?the seat of government may be fixed. Would'he submit that the representatives of this state should carry on their deliberations un¬ der the control of any one member of the union? If any state had the power of legislation over the place where congress should fix the general government, this would impair the dignity, and hazard •the safety of congress. If the safety of the union were under the Madison.] VIRGINIA. Ill 'control of any particular state, would not foreign corruption proba¬ bly prevail in such a state, to induce it to exert its controling influ¬ ence over the members of the general government 1 ? Gentlemen can¬ not have forgotten the disgraceful insult which congress received some years ago. When we also reflect, that the previous cession of particular states is necessary, before congress can legislate ex¬ clusively any where, we must, instead of being alarmed at this part, heartily approve of it. But, the honorable member sees great danger in the provision cencerning the militia : this, I conceive, to be an additional secu¬ rity to our liberty, without diminishing the power of the states, in any considerable degree ; it appears to me so highly expedient, that I should imagine it would have found advocates even in the warmest friends of the present system : the authority of training the militia, and appointing the officers, is reserved to the states. Con¬ gress ought to have the power of establishing ari uniform discipline throughout the states ; and to provide for the execution of the laws, suppress insurrections and repel invasions ; these are the only ca¬ ses wherein they can interfere with the militia; and the obvious ne¬ cessity of their having power over them in these cases, must con¬ vince any reflecting mind. Without uniformity of discipline, mili¬ tary bodies would be incapable of action : without a general con¬ trolling power to call forth the strength of the union, to repel inva¬ sions, the country might be over-run, and conquered by foreign ene¬ mies. Without such a power to suppress insurrections, our liber¬ ties might be destroyed by domestic faction, and domestic tyranny be established. The honorable member then told us, that there was no instance of power once transferred, being voluntaiily renounced. Not to pro¬ duce European examples, which may probably be done before the rising of this convention, have we not seen already in seven states (and probably in an eighth state) legislatures surrendering some of the most important powers they possessed? But, Sir, by this govern¬ ment, powers are not given to any particular set of men, they are in the hands of the people ; delegated to their representatives cho¬ sen for short terms ; to representatives responsible to the people, and whose situation is perfectly similar to their our own; as long as this is the case we have no danger to apprehend. When the gentleman called our recollection to the usual effects of the conces¬ sion of powers, and imputed the loss of liberty generally to open tyranny I wish he had gone on farther. Upon his review of histo¬ ry he would have found, that the loss of liberty very often resulted fiom factions and divisions; from local considerations, which eter¬ nally lead to quarrels, be would have found internal dissentions to DEBATES. 112 [Madison. have more”frequently demolished civil liberty, than a tenacious dis¬ position in rulers, to retain any stipulated powers. [Here Mr Madison enumerated the various means whereby na¬ tions had lost their liberties.] The power of raising and supporting armies is exclaimed against, as dangerous and unnecessary. I wish there were no necessity of vesting this power in the general government. But, suppose a foreign nation to declare war against the United States, must not the general legislature have the power of defending the United States 1 Ought it to be known to foreign nations, that the general government of the United States of America has no power to raise and support an army, even in the utmost danger, when attacked by external enemies 1 Would not their knowledge of such a circum¬ stance stimulate them to fall upon us I If, sir, congress be not in¬ vested with this power, any powerful nation, prompted by ambition or avarice, will be invited, by our weakness, to attack us; and such an attack, by disciplined veterans, would certainly be attended with success, when only opposed by irregular, undisciplined militia. Whoever considers the peculiar situation of this country, the multi¬ plicity of its excellent inlets and harbours, and the uncommon facil¬ ity of attacking it, however much he may regiet the necessity of such a power, cannot hesitate a moment in granting it. One fact may elucidate this argument. In the course of the late war, when the weak parts of the union were exposed, and many states were in the most deplorable situation, by the enemy’s ravages, the assistance of foreign nations was thought so urgently necessary for our protec¬ tion, that the relinquishment of territorial advantages, was not deemed too great a sacrifice for the acquisition of one ally. This expedient was admitted with great reluctance, even by those states who expected advantages from it. The crisis however at length airived when it was judged necessary for the salvation of this coun¬ try, to make certain cessions to Spain; whether wisely, or otherwise, is not for me to say ; but the fact was, that instructions were sent to our representative at the court of Spain, to empower him to enter into negotiations for that purpose.—How it terminated is well known. This fact shews the extremities to which nations will go in cases of imminent danger, and demonstrates the necessity of making ourselves more respectable,. The necessity of making dangerous cessions, and of applying to foreign aid, ought to be ex¬ cluded. The honorable member then told us, that there are heart-burnings in the adopting states, and that Virginia may, if she does not como into the measure, continue in amicable confederacy with the adopt*, ting states. I wish as seldom as possible to contradict the assertions Madison.] VIRGINIA. 113 of gentlemen, but I can venture to affirm, without danger of being in an error, that there is the most satisfactory evidence, that the satis¬ faction of those states is increasing every day, and that, in that state, where it was adopted only by a majority of nineteen, there is not one-fifth of the people dissatisfied. There are some reasons which induce us to conclude, that the grounds of proselytism extend every where ; its principles begin to be better understood ; and the inflam¬ matory violence, wherewith it was opposed by designing, illiberal, and unthinking minds, begins to subside. I will not enumerate the causes from which, in my conception, the heart-burnings of a major- it} r of its opposers have originated. Suffice it to say, that in all they were founded on a misconception of its nature and tendency. Had it been candidly examined and fairly- discussed, I believe, sir, that but a very inconsiderable minority of the people of the United States would have opposed it. With respect to the Swiss, which the honorable gentleman lias proposed for our example, as far as historical authority may be relied on, we shall find their,government quite unworthy of our imitation. I am sure if the honorable gentle¬ man had adverted to their history and government, he never would have quoted their example here; he would have found that instead of respecting their rights of mankind, their government (at least of several of their cantons) is one of the vilest aristocracies that ever was instituted : the peasants of some of their cantons are more oppressed and degraded than the subjects ofany monarch in Europe: nay, almost as much so, as those of any eastern despot. It is a novelty in politics, that from the worst of systems the happiest con, sequences should ensue. Their aristocratical rigor, and the peculi¬ arity of their situation, have so long supported their union: without the closest alliance and amity, dismemberment might follow, their powerful and ambitious neighbors would immediately avail them¬ selves of their least jarrings. As we are not circumstanced like them, no conclusive precedent can be drawn from their situation. ? trust, the gentleman does not carry his idea so far as to recommend •a separation from the adopting states. This government may secure our happiness ; this is at least as probable, as that it shall be op¬ pressive. If eight states have, from a persuasion of its policy and utility, adopted it, shall Virginia shrink from it, without a full con¬ viction of its danger and inutility? I hope she will never shrink from any duty: I trust she will not determine without the most serious reflection and deliberation. 1 confess to you, sir, were uniformity of religion to be introduced by this system, it would, in rny opini m, be ineligible; but I have no reason to conclude, that uniformity of government will produce that ol religion. This subject is, for the honor of America, perfectly von, 3. 8 DEBATES. 1 n [Madison. free and unshackled. The government has no jurisdiction over it— the least reflection will convince us, there is no danger to be feared An this ground. But we are flattered with the probability of obtaining previous amendments. This calls for the most serious attention of this house. If amendments are to be proposed by one state, other states have the same right, and will also propose alterations. These cannot but be dissimilar, and opposite in their nature. I beg leave to remark, that the governments of the different states, are in many respects dissimilar, in their structure; their legislative bodies are not similar —their executive are more different. In several of the states the first magistrate is elected by the people at large—in others, by joint ballot of the members of both branches of the legislature—and in others, in other different manners. This dissimilarity has occasioned a diversity of opinion on the theory of government, which will, with¬ out many reciprocal concessions, render a concurrence impossible. Although the appointment of an executive magistrate, has not been thought destructive to the principles of democracy in many of the states, yet, in the course of the debate, we find objections made to the federal executive : it is urged that the president will degenerate into a tyrant. I intended, in compliance with the call of the honor¬ able member, to explain the reasons of proposing this constitution, and develope its principles ; but I shall postpone my remarks, till we hear the supplement which he has informed us, he intends to add to what he has already said. Give me leave-to say something of the nature of the government, and to show that it is safe and just to vest it with the power of tax¬ ation. There are a number of opinions ; but the principal question is, whether it be a federal or consolidated government: in order to judge properly of the question before us, we must consider it mi¬ nutely in its principal parts. I conceive myself that it is of a mixed nature ; it is in a manner unprecedented ; we cannot find one ex¬ press example in the experience of the world. It stands by itself. In some respeots it is a government of a federal nature; in others it is of a consolidated nature. Even if we attend to the manner in which the constitution is investigated, ratified and made the act of the people of America, I can say, notwithstanding what the ho¬ norable gentleman has alleged, that this government is not com¬ pletely consolidated, nor is it entirely federal. Who are parties to it! The people—but not the people as composing one great body ; but the people as composing thirteen sovereignties : "were it as the gentleman asserts, a consolidated government, the assent of a ma¬ jority of the people would be sufficient for its establishment, and as a majority, have adopted it already, the remaining states would be VIRGINIA. Madison f] 1T5 bound by the act of the majority, even if they unanimously repro¬ bated it: were it such a government as it is suggested, it would he now binding on the people of this state, without having had the privilege of deliberating upon it; but, sir, no state is bound by it, as it is, without its own consent. Should all the states adopt it, it will be 'then a government established by the thirteen states of America, not through the intervention of the legislatures, but by the people at large. In this particular respect the distinction between the existing and proposed governments is very material. The exis¬ ting system has been derived from the dependent derivative author¬ ity of the legislatures of -the states , whereas this is derived from the superior power of the people. If we look at the manner in which alterations are to be made in it, the same idea is in some de¬ gree attended to. By the new system a majority of the states can¬ not introduce amendments; nor are all the states required for that purpose ; three-fourths of them must concur in alterations : in this there is a departure from the federal idea. The members to the national house of representatives are to be chosen by the people at large, in proportion to the r numbers in the respective districts. When we come to the senate, its members are elected by the states in their equal and political capacity ; but had the government been completely consolidated, the senate would have been chosen by the people in their individual capacity, in the same manner as the mem¬ bers of the other house. Thus it is of a> complicated nature, and this complication, I trust, will be found to exclude the evils of abso¬ lute consolidation, as .well as of a mere confederacy. If Virginia was separated from all the states, her power and authority would extend to all cases : in like manner were all powers vested in the general government, it would be a consolidated government; but the powers of the federal government are enumerated ; it can only operate in certain cases ; it has legislative powers on defined and limited objects, beyond which it cannot extend its jurisdiction. But the honorable member has satirised with peculiar acrimony, the powers given to the general government, by this constitution. I conceive that the first question on this subject is, whether these powers be necessary ; if they be, we are reduced to the dilemma of either submitting to the inconvenience, or losing the union. Let us .consider the most important of these .reprobated powers ; that of di¬ rect taxation is most generally objected to. With 'respect to the exigencies of government, there is no question but the most easy mode ol pro viding.for them will be adopted. When, therefore, di¬ rect taxes aie not necessary, they will not be recurred to. It can he of little advantage to those in power, to .raise money, in a man¬ ner oppressive to the people. To cousult the conveniences of the 116 DEBATES. [Madison* people, will cost them nothing, and in many respects will be ad¬ vantageous to them. Direct taxes will only be recurred to for great purposes. What has brought on other nations those immense debts, under the pressure of which many of them labor! Not the expenses of their governments, but war. If this country should be engaged in war, and I conceive we ought to provide for the possi¬ bility of such a case, how would it be carried on! By the usual means provided from year to year! As our imports will be neces¬ sary for the expenses of government and other common exigencies, how are we to carry on the means of defence! How is it possible a war could be supported without money or credit! And w r ould it be possible for a government to have credit without having the pow¬ er of raising money! No, it wohld be impossible for any govern¬ ment, in such a case, to defend itself. Then, 1 say, sir, that it is necessary to establish funds for extraordinary exigencies, and give this power to the general government—for the utter inutility of pre¬ vious requisitions on the states is too well known. Would it be possible for those countries, whose finances and revenues are car¬ ried to the highest perfection, to carry on the operations of Govern¬ ment on great emergencies, such as the maintenance of a war, with¬ out an uncontrolled power of raising money! Has it not been ne¬ cessary for Great Britain, notwithstanding the facility of the collec¬ tion of her taxes, to have recourse very often to this and other ex¬ traordinary methods of procuring money! Would not her public credit have been ruined, if it was known that her power to raise mo¬ ney was limited! Has not France been obliged, on great occa¬ sions, to use unusual means to raise funds! It has been the case in many countries, and no government can exist, unless its powers extend to make provisions for every contingency. If we were ac¬ tually attacked by a powerful nation, and our general government had not the power of raising money, but depended solely on requi¬ sitions, our condition would be truly deplorable—if the revenue of this commonwealth were to depend on twenty distinct authorities, it would be impossible for it to carry on its operations. This must, be obvious to every member here : I think therefore, that it is neces¬ sary for the preservation of the union, that this power shall be given to the general government. But it is urged, that its consolidated nature, joined to the power of direct taxation, will give it a tendency to destroy all subordinate' authority ; that its increasing influence will speedily enable it to ab¬ sorb the state governments. I cannot think this will be the case. If the general government were wholly independent of the go¬ vernments ot the particular states, then indeed, usurpation might be exptu * to the fullest extent: but, sir, on whom does this rrene- O Madison.] VIRGINIA. 117 ?ral government depend? It derives its authority from these govern- .ments, and from the same sources from which their authority is de¬ rived. The members of the federal government are taken from the same men from whom those of the state legislatures are taken. If we consider the mode in which the federal representatives will be chosen, w r e shall be convinced, that the general, will never destroy the individual, governments ; and this conviction must be strength¬ ened by an attention to the construction of the senate. The repre¬ sentatives will be chosen probably under the influence of the mem¬ bers of the state legislatures : but there is not the least probability that the election of the latter will be influenced by the former. One hundred and sixty members represent this commonwealth in one branch of the legislature, are drawn from the people at large, and must ever possess more influence than the few men who will be elected to the general legislature. The reasons offered on this subject, by a gentleman on the same side (Mr. Nicholas) were unanswerable, and have been so full, that I shall add but little more on the subject. Those who wish to be¬ come federal representative^, must depend on their credit with that class of men who will be the rncfst popular in their counties, who generally represent the people in the state governments ; they can, therefore, never succeed in any measure contrary to the wishes of those on whom they depend. It is almost certain, therefore, that the deliberations of the members of the federal house of representatives, will be directed to the interest of the people of America. As to the other branch, the senators will be appointed by the legislatures, and though elected for six years, I do not conceive they will so soon for¬ get the source from whence they derive their political existence. This election of one branch of the federal,by the state legislatures, secures., an absolute dependence of the former on the latter. The biennial ex¬ clusion of one third, will lessen the facility of a combination, and may put a stop to intrigues. I appeal to our past experience, wheth¬ er they will attend to the interests of their constituent states. Have not those gentlemen w T ho have been honored with seats in congress, often signalized themselves by their attachment to their seats? I wish this government may answer the expectation of its friends, and foil the apprehension of its enemies. I hope the patriotism of the peo¬ ple will continue, and be a sufficient guard to their liberties. I be¬ lieve its tendency will be, that the state governments will counter¬ act the general interest, and ultimately prevail. The number of the representatives is yet sufficient for our safety, and will gradually in*- crease—and if we consider their different sources of information, the number will not appear too small. 4 118 DEBATES. [Nicholas... Mr. NICHOLAS.—Mr. Chairman, if the resolution taken by the house of going regularly through the system, clause by clause, had been followed, I should confine myself to one particular paragraph ; but as, to my surprise, the debates have taken a different turn, I shall endeavor to go through the principal parts of the argument made use of, by the gentlemen in opposition to the proposed plan of govern¬ ment. The worthy gentleman entertained us very largely on the im¬ propriety and dangers of the powers given by this plan to the gene¬ ral government; but this argument appears to me inconclusive and in¬ accurate ; it amounts to this, that the powers given to any govern¬ ment ought to be small. I believe this, sir, is a new idea in politics’ —powers being given for some certain purpose, ought to be propor¬ tionate to that purpose, or else the end for which they are delegated, will not be answered. It is necessary to give powers to a certain ex¬ tent, to any government. If a due medium be not observed' in the delegation of such powers, one of two things must happen : if they be too small, the government must moulder and decay away ; if too ex¬ tensive, the people must be oppressed. As there can be no liberty without government, it must be as dangerous to make powers too limited, as too great. He tells us, that the constitution annihilates the confederation. Did he not prove, that every people had a right to change their government, when it should be deemed inadequate to their happiness? The confederation being found utterly defective, will he deny our right to alter or abolish it? But he objects to the expression “ We the people,” and demands the reason, why they had not said “ We the United States of America? In my opinion the expression is highly proper: it is submitted to the people, because' on them it is to operate—till adopted, it is but a dead letter, and not binding on any one ; when adopted, it becomes binding on the peo¬ ple who adopt it. It is proper on another account. We are under great obligations to the federal convention, for recurring to the peo¬ ple, the source of all power. The gentleman’s argument militates against himself: he says, that persons in power never relinquish their powers willingly. If then the state legislatures would not re¬ linquish part of the powers they now possess, to enable a general go- vernmentto support the union, reference to the people is necessary. We are in the next place frightened' by two sets of collectors, who lie tells us, will oppress us with impunity. The amount of the sums to be raised of the people is the same, whether the state legislatures lay the taxes for themselves, or for the general government; wheth¬ er each of them lays and collects taxes for its own exclusive purpo¬ ses, the manner of raising it is only different. So far as the amount of the imposts may exceed that of the present collections, so much will the burdens of the people be less.. Money cannot be raised ina 119 Nicholas.] VIRGINIA. more judicious manner, than by imposts ; it. is not felt by the people —it is a mode which is practised by many nations : nine-tenths of the revenues of Great Britain and France, are raised by indirect taxes; and were they raised by direct taxes, they would be exceedingly oppressive. At present, the reverse of this proposition holds in this country ; for very little is raised by indirect taxes. The public treasuries are supplied by means of direct taxes, which are not so easy for the people. But the people will be bene¬ fited by this change. Suppose the imposts will only operate a re¬ duction of one-fifth of the public burdens ; then, sir, out of every ten shillings we have now to pay, we shall only have to pay eight shil¬ lings, and suppose this to be apportioned so that we pay four shil¬ lings to the federal, and four shillings to the state collector, what in¬ convenience or oppression can atise from if? Would this be as op¬ pressive as the payment of ten shillings to the state collector'? Our constituents do not suspect our delegates to the state legislature, but we suspect the members of the future congress. But, sir, they tell us this power of direct taxation ought not to be entrusted to the general government, because its members cannot be acquainted with the local situation of the people ; where do the mem¬ bers of the state legislatures get their information'? It is by their own experience, and intercourse with the people. Cannot those of the general government derive information from every source from which the state representatives get theirs, so as to enable them to impose taxes judiciously'? We have the best security we can wish for: if they impose taxes on the people, which are oppressive, they subject themselves and their friends to the same inconvenience, and to the cer¬ tainty of never being Confided in again. And what will be the con¬ sequence of laying taxes on improper objects? Will the funds be increased by it? By no means : I may venture to say, the amount of the taxes will diminish in proportion to the difficulty and improprie¬ ty of the mode of levying them. What advantages then would it be to the members of congress, to render the collection of taxes oppres¬ sive to the people? They would be certainly out of their senses to oppress the people without any prospect of emolument to themselves. But another objection is made, which I never heard of before.—- The gentleman has told us, that the number of representatives may be reduced to one for every state. Is this a just surmise, even sup¬ pose it to have only said, that the number should not exceed one for every 30,000? Had it stopped there, any state, by his doctrine might have no representative at all. Is it possible, that this inter¬ pretation could ever be thought of? For the worthy gentleman al¬ lowed it was not a natural construction. But, the constitution says, that representation and taxation should be in proportion to the num- 120 DEBATES, [Nicholas* ber of the people, and that each state should have at least one repre¬ sentative. What will be the consequence of this 1 Each state must pay its proportion of taxes ; and its representation is to be equal to its taxes. I ask gentlemen if this be not a safe mode of representa¬ tion. The gentleman then told us, the representatives would never wish their number to be increased. But, sir, the increase of their number, will increase iheir importance ; how will it affect their interest in elections 1 The greater their number, the greater their chance of re-election. It is a natural supposition, that every cne of them will have the greatest interests with the people, in that part of his district where he resides; the more their number, the more districts will there be, and the greater certainty of their being re¬ elected, as it -will be easier for them to have influence in small, than in large districts. But this power of direct taxes is not to be got over; the gentleman will try every thing in alternative. What will be the consequence of these alternatives 1 ft will lead congress to have a contest with particular states ; after refusal and opposicion what is to be done ? Must force be used for the purpose 1 How is it to be procured 1 It would, in a little time, expend more money than the sum which it was intended to procure, and the fatal consequence of such a scheme, provided it were practicable, are self evident. I am astonished that gentlemen should wish to put it on this footing; for the consequences would assuredly be, in the first place, a disap¬ pointment to congress. Would this previous alternative diminish, or retrench the powers of congress, if ultimately they are to have recourse to this power 1 One thing will he the certain consequence ; congress, in making requisitions, must reckon on a disappointment, and will therefore increase them according to the expeeted disap¬ pointment: by these means, the burdens of the people must be en¬ larged. He then wonders that gentlemen cculd come to so sudden a resolution of adopting it; as to the'time, it will require as much to reject as to adopt it, and if a deliberate discussion be the most rational mode of proceeding, a precipitate rejection will, at least, he as imprudent as a sudden, adoption. He declares, that he would in despite of an erring world reject it, and wishes this state to continue in opposition. Were our country separated by nature from the other states, we might be safe without the union; but as we are- bordered on the adopting states, security can be found in union only. Consider the consequences of disunion : attend to the situation of those citizens who are contiguous to Maryland ; look at the country called the Northern Neck ; if we reject the constitution, will not its inhabitants shake off their dependence on us 1 But, sir, the worthy member has declared as a reason, for not changing our government that no terrors had been experienced, that no insurrections had hap- Nicholas.] VIRGINIA, 1 21 pened among us. It was indeed a wonder that this was the ease* considering the relaxation of the laws. Tumults have happened in other states. Had it been attempted here by an enterprising adven¬ turer, I believe he could hardly have been prevented by the laws: for I believe every citizen in this country has complained of their want of energy. The worthy member has exclaimed, with uncom¬ mon vehemence, against the mode provided for securing amendments. He thinks amendments can never be obtained, because so great a number is required to concur. Had it rested solely with congress there might have been danger. The committee will see that there is another mode provided, besides that which originates with congress. On the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several states, a convention is to be called to propose amendments, which shall be a part of the constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof. It is natural to conclude that these states who will apply for calling the convention, will concur in the ratifications of the proposed amendments. • . There are strong and cogent reasons operating on my mind, that the amendments, which shall be agreed to by those states, will be sooner ratified by the rest, than any other that can be proposed.— The conventions which shall be so called, will have their delibera¬ tions confined to a few points ; no local interest to divert their atten¬ tion ; nothing but the necessary alterations. They will have many advantages over the last convention. No' experiments to devise: the general and fundamental regulations being already laid down. He makes another objection, that contrary to the articles of our bill of rights, we may be taxed without our own consent. That tax¬ es may be imposed, although every member from A 7 irginia should oppose the measure. The argument is not accurate. A tax impo¬ sed on the people of this state, by our legislature, may be imposed by the members from the county of iVlbemarle, without being repu¬ gnant to our bill of rights ; because Albemarle is represented, and the act of the majority is binding on the minority. In like manner, our privilege of representation in the federal government, will pre¬ vent any of the general laws from being unconstitutional, although contrary to the individual opinions of our representatives. Rut it is complained, that they may suspend our laws. The sus¬ pension of the writ of liabacs corpus is only to take place in cases of rebellion or invasion ; This is necessary in those cases, in every other case, congress is restrained from suspending it. In no other case can they suspend our laws, and this is a most estimable secu¬ rity. But the influence of New England, and the other northern states is dreaded, there are apprehensions of their combining against DEBATES. 122 [Nicholas, us. Not to advert to the improbability and iliiberaiity of this idea it must be supposed,that our population,will in a short period, exceed theirs, as their country is well settled, and we have very extensive, uncultivated tracts. We shall soon out-number them in as great a degree as they do us at this time : therefore this government, which I trust will last to the remotest ages, will be very shortly in our favor. Treason consists in levying war against the United States, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. The punishment of this well defined crime, is to be declared by congress,no oppression, therefore can arise on this ground. This security does away the objection, that the most grievous oppressions might hap¬ pen under color of punishing crimes against the general government. The limitation of the forfeiture to the life of the criminal is also an additional privilege. We are next told that there is wanting in this government, that responsibility which has been the salvation of Great Britian, al¬ though one half of the house of commons purchase their seats. It has been already shewn, that we have much greater security from our federal representatives, than the people in England can boast. But the worthy member has found out a way of solving our difficul¬ ties. He tells us, that we have nothing to fear, if separated from the adopting states, but to send on our money and men to congress, In that case can we receive the benefits of the union! If we fur^ nish money at all, it will be our proportionate share. The conse¬ quence will be, that we shall pay our share, without the privilege of being represented. So that to avoid the inconvenience of not hav¬ ing a sufficient number, of representatives, he would advise us to relinquish the number we are entitled to, and have none at all. I believe, sir, there is a great and decided majority of the people in favor of the system ; it is so in that part of the country wherein I reside. It is true, sir, that many of the people have declared against a government, which they w^ere told destroyed the trial by jury : against a government, sir, which established a standing army; against a government, which abridged the liberty of the press; against a government, which would tax all their property from them; against a government, which infringed the rights of conscience ; and against, a government, sir, which should banish them to France to be com¬ mon soldiers, and which would eventually destroy alL their rights and privileges. This, sir, is the government of which they have given their disapprobation t still, sir, a majority have considered this government in a different light and have given their opproba- tion of it. I believe, sir, that on a fair and candid investigation very few would oppose it. Those who think that the evils I have enumerated will result from it, exceed me in one point of credulity. Corbin.] VIRGINIA. 123 Saturday , the 1th of June , 1788. [The first and second sections still under consideration.] Mr. CORBIN.—Mr. Chairman, permit me to make a few observa¬ tions on this great question. It is with great difficulty I prevail on myself to enter into the debate, when I consider the great abilities of those gentlemen who have already spoken on the subject. But as I am urged by my duty to my constituents, and as I conceive that the different manner of treating the subject, may make different im¬ pressions, I shall offer my observations with diffident respect, but with firmness and independence. I will promise my acknowledge¬ ments to those honorable gentlemen, who were in the federal conven¬ tion, for the able and satisfactory manner in which'they discharged their duty to their country. The introductory expression of “ We the people,” has been thought improper by the honorable gentle¬ man—I expected no such objection as this. Ought not the people r sir, to judge of that government, whereby they are to be ruled! We are, sir, deliberating on a question of great consequence to the peo¬ ple of America, and to the world in general. We ought, therefore, to decide with extreme caution and circumspection it is incumbent upon us to proceed without prejudice or prepossession. No mem¬ ber of the committee entertains a greater regard than myself for the gentleman on the other side, who has placed himself in the front of opposition (Mr. Henry.) No man admires more than I do, his declamatory talents ; but, I trust, that neither declamation nor ele¬ gance of periods, will mislead the judgment of any member here, and that nothing but the force of reasoning will operate conviction. He has asked with an air of triumph, whether the confederation was not adequate to the purposes of the federal government: permit me to say, No. If, sir, perfection existed in that system why was the federal convention called! Why did every state except Rhode-Is- land, send deputies to that convention! Was it not from a persuasion oP'its inefficacy! If this be not suf¬ ficient to convince him, let me call the recollection of the honorable gentleman to other circumstances : let him go into the interior parts of the country, and enquire into the situation of the farmers. He will be told, that Tobacco, and other produce, are miserably low r , merchandise dear, and taxes high. Let him go through the United States, he will perceive appearances of ruin and decay every where. Let him visit the sea coast—go to our ports and inlets. In those ports, sir, where we had every reason to see the fleets of all nations,, he will behold but a few trifling little boats—he will every where see commerce languish—the disconsolate merchant,, with his arms folded, ruminating in despair, on the wretched ruins of his fortune, and deploring the impossibility of retrieving it.. The West-Indies,, 124 DEBATES. [Corbin. ^re blocked up against us. Not the British only, but other nations, exclude us from those islands—our fur trade gone to Canada—Brit¬ ish centinels within oar own territories—our posts withheld : to these distresses we may add the derangement of our finances. Yet the honorable gentleman tells us, they are not sufficient to justify so radical a change. Does he know the consequences of deranged fi¬ nances'? What confusions, disorders, and even revolutions, have resulted from this cause in many nations? Look at France at this time—that kingdom is almost convulsed—ministers of state, and first princes of the blood, banished—manufacturers and merchants become bankrupt, and the people discontented : all owing to the de¬ rangement of their finances. o The honorable gentleman must be well acquainted with the debts due by the United States, and how much is due to foreign nations. Has not the payment of these been shamefully withheld? How long, •sir, shall we be able, by fair promises, to satisfy those creditors? How long can we amuse, by idle WQrds, those who are amply pos¬ sessed of the means of doing themselves justice? No part of the principal is paid to those nations-—nor has even the interest been paid as honorably and punctually as it ought. Nay, we were obliged to borrow money last year to pay the interest. What? Borrow money to discharge the interest of what was borrowed, and contin¬ ually augment the amount of the public debt! Such a plan, would •destroy the richest country on earth. What is to be done? Com¬ pel the delinquent state to pay requisitions to congress? How are they to be compelled? By the instrumentality of such a scheme as was proposed to be introduced in the year 1784?* Is this cruel mode of compulsion eligible? Is it consistent with the spirit of re¬ publicanism? This savage mode, which could be made use of un¬ der the confederation, leads directly to civil war and destruction. How different is this from the genius of the proposed constitution? By this proposed plan, the public money is to be collected by mild and gentle means ; by a peaceable and friendly application to the individuals of the community. Whereas, by the other scheme, the public treasury must be supplied through the medium of the sword, by desolation and murder—by the blood of the citizens. Yet we are told that there is too much energy in this system. Coercion is necessary in every government. Justice, sir, cannot be done with¬ out it. It is more necessary in federal governments than any other because of the natural imbecility of such governments. The honorable gentleman is possessed of much historical knowl¬ edge. I appeal to that knowledge therefore.—Will he not agree, * Alluding to a motion made in the house of delegates in the year 1784, to enable congress to compel the delinquent states to pay their l’espe clive quotas •by means of an armed torce. CORBIN.] VIRGINIA. I2& that there was a coercive power in the federal government of the Amphyctionics? The coercive power of the Amphyctionic council was so great, as to enable it to punish disobedience and refractory behaviour in the most severe manner. Is there not an instance of its carrying fire and sword through the territories, and levelling to the * ground the towns of those who disobeyed if? [Here Mr. Corbin mentions particular instances.] Is there no coercion in Germanic body? This body, though composed of 300 different component sovereignties, principalities and cities, and divided into nine circles? is controled by one superintending power, the emperor. Is there no coercive power in the confederate government of the Swiss? In the alliance between them and France there is a provision, whereby the latter is to interpose and settle differences that may arise among them, and this interposition has been more than once used. Is there none in Holland? What is the stadholder? This power is necessa¬ ry in all governments ; a superintending coercive power is absolute¬ ly indispensable. This does not exist under the present articles of confederation. To vest it with such a power, on its present con¬ struction, without any alteration, would be extremely dangerous, and might lead to civil war. Gentlemen must, befoie this, have been convinced of the necessity of an alteration. Our state-vessel has sprung a leak—we must embark in a new bottom or sink into per¬ dition. * The honorable gentleman has objected to the constitution, on the old worn-out idea, that a republican government is best calculated for a small territory. If a republic, sir, cannot be accommodated to an extensive country, let me ask, how small must a country be to suit the genius of republicanism? In what particular extent of country can a republican government exist? If contracted into as small a compass as you please, it must labor under many disadvan¬ tages. Too small an extent will render a republic weak, vulnerable, and contemptible. Liberty, in such a petty state, must be on a pre¬ carious footing; its existence must depend on the philanthrophy and good nature of its neighbors. Too large an extent, it is said, will produce confusion and tyranny. What has been so often dep¬ recated will be removed by this plan. The extent of the United States cannot render this government oppressive. The powers of the general government are only of a general nature, and their ob¬ ject is to piotect., defend, and strengthen the United States ; but the internal administration of government is left to the state legisla¬ tures, who exclusively retain such powers as will give the states the advantages of small republics, without the danger commonly attended on the weakness of such governments. There are controversias even about the name of this government. 1126 DEBATES. [Oorbijj. It is denominated by some a federal, by others, a consolidated government. The definition given of it by my honorable friend (Mr. Madison) is, in my opinion, accurate. Let me however, call it by another name, a representative federal republic, as contradi¬ stinguished from a confederacy. The former is more wisely con¬ structed than the latter: it places the remedy in the hands which feel the disorder ; the other places the remedy in those hands, which cause the disorder. The evils that aie most complained of in such governments (and with justice) are faction, dissention, and conse¬ quent subjection of the minority, to the caprice and arbitrary decis¬ ions of the majority, who, instead of consulting the interest of the whole community collectively, attend sometimes to partial and local advantages. To avoid this evil is .perhaps the great desiderata of .republican wisdom-; it may be termed the philosopher’s stone. Yet, sir, this evil will be avoided by this constitution: faction will be removed by the system now under consideration, because all the causes which are generally productive of faction are removed. This evil does not take its flight entirely : for were jealousies and divisions entirely at an end, it might produce such lethargy, as would ultimately terminate in the destruction of liberty, to the pre¬ servation of w T hich, watchfulness is absolutely necessary. It is transferred from the state legislatures to congress, where it will be more easily controled. Faction will decrease in proportion to the diminution of counsellors. It is much easier to control it in small, than in large bodies. Our state legislature consists of upwards of 160, which is a greater number than congress will consist of, at first* Will not more concord and unanimity .exist in one, that in thirteen such bodies'? Faction will more probably decrease, or be entirely removed, if the interest of a nation be entirely concentrated, than if en¬ tirely diversified. If thirteen men agree, there will be no faction. Yet if opposite, and of heterogenous dispositions, it is impossible that a majority of such clashing minds can ever concur to oppress the minority. It is impossible that this government, which will make us one people, will have a tendency to assimilate our situations^ and is admirably calculated to produce harmony and unanimity, can ever admit of an oppressive combination by one part of the unio-i against the other. A confederate government is, of all others, best calculated for an extensive country. Its component individual governments are, of all others, best calculated for an extensive country. Its component individual governments administer and afford all the local conveni¬ ences, that the most compact governments can do; and the strength and energy of the confederacy may be equal to those of any govern¬ ment. A government o.flhis kind may extend to all the wester# 'Corbin/] VIRGINIA. 1S7 world : nay, I may say, ad infinitum. But it is needless to dwell any longer on this subject, for the objection that an extensive teri- tory is repugnant to a republican government, applies against this and every state in the union, except Delaware and Rhode-Island. Were the objection well founded, a republican government could •exist in none of the states, except those two. Such an argument goes to the dissolution of the union, and its absurdity is demonstra¬ ted by our own experience. But an objection is urged against this government, because of its power of laying direct taxes. Let me ask the honorable gentleman who opposes it on this ground, if he reflects whether this power be indispensible or not! Sir, if it be not vested with the power of commanding all the resources of the state when necessary,* it will be trifling. Wars are as much (and more] carried on by the length of the purse, as by that of the sword. They cannot be carried on without money. Unless this power be given to congress, foreign nations may crush you. The concession of this power is necessary to do Virginia justice, by compelling the delinquent states to pay as well as her: while she paid he'r quotas, and her citizens were much distressed to pay their taxes, other states most shameful¬ ly neglected, or refused to pay their proportions. I trust gentlemen need not be alarmed on the subject of taxation, nor intimidated by the idea of double collectors, who they tell us will oppress and ruin the people. From our attention to our situation we shall see, that this mode of levying money, though indispensably necessary, on great emergencies; will be but seldom recurred to. Let us attend to the finances of this country. Mr CORBIN then stated the probable annual amount of duties on imported articles, throughout the continent, including West India produce, which, he said, from the best calculation he could procure, would exceed the annual expenses of the administration of the general government, including the civil list, contingent charges, and the interest of the foreign and domestic debts, by 80 or 90,000 pounds ; that, he said, would enable the United States to discharge in a few years, the principal debts due to foreign nations: that in the course o‘f thirty years that surplus would enable the United States to perform the most splendid'enterprises. He then concluded that no danger was to be apprehended from the power of direct taxa¬ tion, since there was every reason to believe it would be very sel¬ dom used. He then madernn estimate of the state debt, and clearly proved, that with economical regulations, all the demands of the internal administration of government would be paid with facility and ease from the different resources of the state: and that there would also be a considerable surplus, which with prudence and economy might answer many valuable purposes. . 128 DEBATES. [Corbin. Mr Corbin then continued as follows—the honorable gentleman declared in the most solemn manner, that if he could see one single trait in that government to secure liberty, he would not object to it. I meet him on this ground. Liberty is secured, sir, by the limita¬ tion of its powers ; which are clearly and unequivocally defined, and which are to be exercised by our own representatives freely chosen. What power is given that will endanger liberty ] I consider all the traits of this system, as having a tendency to the security of our liberty. I consider all its powers necessary, and only given to avoid greater evils, and if this conclusion of mine be well founded, let me ask, if public liberty is not secured by bars aud adamantine bolts—secured by the strongest guards and checks, which human •ingenuity can invent. Will this dread power of taxation render liberty insecure 1 Sir, without this power, other powers will answer no purpose. Government cannot exist without the means of procu¬ ring money. My honorable friend told us, he considered this clause as the vitals of the constitution. I will change the phrase, and say, that I consider this part, as the lungs of the constitution. If it be sick, the whole system is consumptive, and must soon decay; and this power can never be dangerous if the principles of equal and free representation be fully attended to. While the right of suffrage is secured, we have little to fear. This government, sir, fully se¬ cures us this noble privilege, on the purest and simplest principles of equality. That number which in any one part of the country, has a right to send a representative, has the same right in another part. What does the constitution say] That 30,000 shall have one representative—no matter where. If this be not equal representa¬ tion, what, in the name of God, is equal representation] But, says the honorable gentleman, the constitution may be satisfied by one from each state. I conceive there is no fear of this. There is not a power to diminish the number. Does it not say, that representa¬ tives shall be apportioned according to the number of the people, and that direct taxes shall be regulated by the same rules] Virginia, in the first instance, will have ten times as many as Delaware, and afterwards in proportion to their numbers. What is the criterion of representation ] Do the people wish land only to be represented ] They have their wish : for the qualifications which the laws of the states require to entitle a man to vote for a state representative, are the qualifications required by this plan, to vote for a repiesentative to emigres ; and in this state, and most of the others, the possession of a freehold is necessary to entitle a man to the privilege of a vote. Do they wish persons to be represented] Here also they are indul¬ ged : for the number of representatives is determined by the number of people : this idea is so well attended to, that even three-fifths of CoRBlNc] VIRGINIA. m those who aie not free, are included among those of whom 30,000 shall have a right to elect one representative; so that in either pom of view their wish is gratified. Is not liberty secured on this foun¬ dation? If it be not secured by one or the other mode, or by both, I am totally without reason. Liberty seems entrenched on this ground. But the gentleman objects that the number is not sufficient. My opinion, with deference to that gentleman, and others who may be of different opinion from me, is, that it is fully sufficient. Being dele¬ gated solely for general purposes, a few intelligent men will suffice, at least one for every 30,000, aided by the senate, seem sufficient. Are combinations, or factions, so oftened formed in small as in nu¬ merous bodies? are laws better irrde in large, than in small assem¬ blies? Is not the influence of popular declaimers less in small, than in great bodies? Would not a more numerous representation be very expensive? Is economy of no consideration? W T e ought, sir, to at¬ tend to the situation of the people ; and our measures should be as economical as possible, without extending, however, our parsimony to a dangerous length. Objections should be founded on just and real grounds, and ought not to be urged out of a mere obstinacy. Besides, it is by no means certain that a very numerous body is more independent, or upright, than a small one. Why should the number of our representatives be greater, Mr. Chairman? The county of Middlesex, in England, which includes the cities of London and Westminister, contains upwards of 990,000 souls, and yet sends to parliament no more than eight members. Among all the clamors of the people there, it never entered into the brain of any of them, that those eight were not enough. They complain that the boroughs of Old Sarum, Newton, and Gotten, and other such places, should send «ach two members to parliament, although without houses or inhabi¬ tants, while the richest, city sends but four. They also complain of the influence of the ianded interest in some cases; that the county of Cornwall sends 40 members to parliament, although it pays but 10 parts out of 513, to the subsidy and land-tax, when the county of Middlesex, which is calculated to pay 250 parts out of 513, sends but eight members. In that country it has been uniformly found, that those members, who are chosen by numerous respectable electors, make the greatest opposition to oppression and corruption, and sig¬ nalize themselves for. the preservation cf liberty. The collective body of the commons there have generally exerted themselves in the defence of freedom, and have been successful in their exertions, not¬ withstanding the inequality of their election. Our representatives are chosen in the fairest manner, their election is founded in abso¬ lute equality. Is the American spirit so degenerated, notwithstanding these advantages, that the love of liberty is more predominant and vol. 3. . 9 DEBATES. 130 [CoRBiir, warm in the breast of a Briton, than in that of an American'? When liberty is on a more solid foundation here that in Britain, will Ame¬ ricans be less ready to maintain and defend it than Britons'? No, sir—the spirit of liberty and independence of the people of this coun¬ try, at present, is such that they could not be enslaved under any go¬ vernment that could be described. What danger is there then to be apprehended from a government, which is theoretically perfect, and the possible blemishes of which can only be demonstrated by actual experience? The honorable gentleman then urges an objection respecting the militia, who he tells us, will be made the instruments of tyranny to deprive us of our liberty. Your militia, says he, will fight against you. W T ho are the militia? Are we not militia? Shall we fight against ourselves? No, sir, the idea is absurd. W.e are also terrifi¬ ed by the dread of a standing army. It cannot be denied that we ought to have the means of defence, and be able to repel an attack. If some of the community are exclusively inured to its defence, and the rest attend to agriculture, the consequence will be, that the arts of war and defence, and of cultivating the soil, will be under¬ stood. Agriculture will flourish, and military discipline will be per¬ fect. If, on the contrary, our defence be solely entrusted to militia ignorance of arms, and negligence of farming, will ensue : the former plan is, in every respect, more to the interest of the state. By it we shall have'good farmers and soldiers : by the latter, we shall have neither. If the inhabitants be called out on sudden emergencies of war, their crops the means of their subsistence, may be destroyed by it. If we are called in the time of sowing seed, or of harvest, the means of subsistence might be lost: and the loss of one year’s crop might have been prevented by a trivial expense, if appropriated to the purpose of supporting a part of the community, exclusively occu¬ pied in the defence of the whole. I conceive that this idea, if it be a new one, is yet founded on solid and very substantial reasons. But sir, we are told of the expediency and propriety of previous amend¬ ments. W T hat end would it answer to attempt it? Will the states which have adopted the constitution, rescind their adopting resolu¬ tions? Had we adopted it, would we recede from it to please the caprice of any other state? Pride, sir, revolts at the idea. Admit¬ ting this state proposes amendments previous to her adoption, must there not be another federal convention? Must there not be also a ■convention in each state? Suppose some of our proposed conditions to be rejected, will not our exclusion out of the union be the conse¬ quence? Or would other conventions again be called? And would be eternally revolving and devising expedients, without coming to a final decision? The loss of the union, sir, must be the result of a VIRGINIA. 131 Randolph.] pertinacious demand of precedent conditions. My idea is, that we should go hand in hand with Massachusetts ; adopt it first, and then propose amendments of a general nature, for local ones cannot be ex¬ pected. Consider the situation ot Massachusetts, commanding the north ; and the importance and respectability of Virginia to the south these, sir, are the two most populous, wealthy, and powerful states in the union. Is it not very probable that their influence would have very great weight in carrying any amendments'? Would any gen¬ tleman turn a deaf ear to their solicitations'? By union alone can we exist : by no other means can we be happy. Union must be the ob¬ ject of every gentlemen here. I never yet have heard any gentleman so wild and frantic in his opposition, as to avow an attachment to partial confederacies. By previous adoption, the union will be pre- % served : by insisting on alterations previous to our adoption, the uni¬ on may be lost, and our political happiness destroyed by internal dis- sentions. I trust, therefore, that this convention after deliberate dis¬ cussion, will not hesitate to determine on a previous ratification, ofa system, which, even in its present form, seems competent to the per¬ petual preservation of our security and happiness. Mr. HENRY then arose, and expressed a desire that the honora¬ ble gentleman on the other side (Governor Randolph) should contin¬ ue his observations on the subject he had left unfinished the day be¬ fore ; that he had before, and would now give him a more patient hearing, as he wished to be informed of every thing that gentlemen could urge in defence of that system, which appeared to him so de¬ fective. Gov. RANDOLPH.—Mr. Chairman, as the gentleman who ■was last up, has given us an opportunity of continuing our observa¬ tions, I shall, in resuming the'subject, endeavor to put this que¬ stion in a more correct and accurate point of view, than it has yet been put in. I took the liberty yesterday, of declaring to the house the neces¬ sity of a national rather than a federal government, and that the union was necessary for Virginia for many powerful reasons—that this necessity arose from the certainty of her being involved in dis¬ putes and war, with the adjoining states, and the probability of an attack by foreign nations ; particularly by those nations to which she is greatly in debt, and which she is unable to pay—from her in¬ ability to raise an army to protect her citizens from internal sedi¬ tions and external attacks—and her inability to raise a navy to pro¬ tect her trade, and her coasts against descents and invasions. I also, in the course ot my argument on this occasion, showed the imbecil¬ ity of the present system, in order to obviate and detect the sophis¬ try of that truly delusive opinion, which has taken possession of the 132 DEBATES. [Randolph minds of some gentlemen, that this shipwrecked vessel is sufficient¬ ly strong and safe for us to embark in. Whether I have succeeded or not, I have given the full effusions of my soul, in my attempt to prove the futility of that opinion. Permit me now to pursue the ob ? ject of my enquiry respecting the powers necessary to he given to the general government. I shall discard general considerations at present, as 1 wish to be as brief as possible, and take up the partic¬ ular idea of direct taxation. Is it necessary that the leg islative power of the United States should be authorized to levy taxes? A strange question to be agitated in this house, after hearing the de¬ linquency of other states, and even of Virginia herself! Money is the nerves—the life and soul of a government. It is the utmost fol- !y to say, that a government could be cairied on without this,great agent of human affairs- Wars cannot be carried on without a full and uncontrolled discretionary power to raise money in an eligible manner. May, sir, government cannot be administered in time of peace without this power. For how is it to be done? It is needless to impress any faither on the minds of the gentlemen who hear mo the necessity of this power in governments. If so, ought the gene¬ ral government to be more circumscribed in the power of providing for its own safety and existence than any other government? Ought it to depend for the means of its preservation on ether bodies? This is actually 0 e case with the confederation. The power of raising money Was nominally vested in that system. In March, 1781, even Maryland, the most backward state then, conceded that congress should have the power of receiving and demanding their proportion¬ ate quotas of the states. This was an acknowledgment of the ne¬ cessity ot vesting a power in congress, to raise such sums as emer¬ gencies might require ; but the means which were proposed have been found inadequate to encompass the end : the propriety of the means is alone disputed. No doubt it is the universal opinion of the people of this commonwealth, that its legislature should have ■the nower of raising money at its own will and pleasure. There are two ways whereby this may be effected—by requisitions, or taxation—there is no other manner-—for it surpasses the ingenuity of man to devise any other mode of raising money, than by one of these two methods. If the alternative of requisitions be deter¬ mined upon, as more eligible, it will not avail without coercion. If hat of taxation be preferred, it will be sufficient without any coer¬ cion. If our legislature were to depend on requisitions tor money ro answer the ends of government, then, sir, the absurdity and so¬ phistry of the arguments urged in defence of such a mode of procu¬ re. money, would strike the weak est intellect. If the mere plea¬ ts* of individuals were alcne to be consulted : if it were left to the 133 Randolph.] VIRGINIA. choice of your people to pay or not, jmur treasury would be much poorer than it is; and the advocates of this pernicious policy would perhaps be ashamed of their pertinacity. Suppose for a moment the only existing mode of raising a revenue in Virginia, to be that of requisitions, suppose your requisitions sent on to every county— say, that money is wanted—assume the most pressing language. We earnestly entreat you. We humbly supplicate and solicit you would turnish us with one thousand or one hundred pounds, to defray the necessary charges of our government! What would be the result of such applications for voluntary contributions'? You would be laughed at for your folly, for thinking human nature could be thus operated upon ; from my knowledge of human nature, and of my countrymen, I am perfectly certain this would be the case. The argument will be found good in all cases, it will admit of any extension. I ask any gentleman in this house, if states would com¬ ply with what even if a few individuals would refuse? Would not the requisitions of congress meet a similar fate? This, sir, has as often happened as it has been the pleasure of the states to withhold the quotas. Not a shilling has been put into the continental trea¬ sury, but by the utmost reluctance. The probable delinquency ©f other states, has been the pretext of non-compliance with every state. It has been thought hard, that our general assembly should pay, when congress ordered us. Our representatives have been supposed careless of our interest in paying the demands of con¬ gress, while delinquencies happened in other states. Punctuality, sir, instead of being held in that estimation, which it really merits, has been looked upon as an improvident expenditure of the sub¬ stance of the people, and a subjection of the inhabitants to griev¬ ances and burthens, to which the people of delinquent states were not exposed. This idea has been held in many states, and would bold again. Whosoever depends on the mere right to demand their lespective proportions of the states, shews a total ignorance of hu¬ man actions, and betrays an tmacquaintance with the principles of sure policy. The principal ends of all political institutions are the happiness and safety of the community ; but a reliance on congress¬ ional requisitions would leave the country exposed and open to those who should choose to invade us, or lead to such sedition and con¬ fusion among ourselves, as must subvert and destroy every object of human society. If requisitions be not faithfully complied with, military coercion seems necessary; coercion, judiciously and mode¬ rately used is proper, but if severely and cruelly inflicted, begets ■unconquerable aversion and hatred. If the spirit of resentment ac¬ tuates individuals, will not states be equally vindictive? What spe¬ cs of military coercion could the general government adopt for the 134 DEBATES. [Randolph.. enforcement of obedience to its demands'? Either an army sent into the heart of a delinquent state : or blocking up its ports. Have we lived to this then, that in order to suppress and exclude tyranny, it is necessary to render the most affectionate friends the most bitter enemies : set the father against the son, and make the brother slay the brother? Is this the happy expedient that is to preserve liberty? Will it not destroy it: If an army be once introduced to force us, if once marched into Virginia, figure to yourself what the dreadful consequence will be: the most lamentable civil war must ensue. Have we any troops but militia to confront those disciplined bands that would be sent to force our compliance with requisitions. The m«st virulent railings are vented against the federal executive. We are told that the president can fix himself in the chair of state—es¬ tablish himself as a monarch—and destroy the liberties of the peo¬ ple. It has too often happened, that powers delegated for the purpose of promoting the happiness of a community, have been perverted to the advancement of the personal emoluments of the agents of the peo¬ ple ; but the powers of the president are too well guarded and checked to warrant this illiberal aspersion. Let us candidly consid¬ er the consequences of the favorite plan of requisitions, and see whether instead of imaginary or problematical, there be not real pal¬ pable dangers. To compel your obedience, a rapacious army will penetrate into the bosom of your country, carrying destruction and desolation before it. The commander of such an army will be lia¬ ble to the corruptions and passions incident to other men. If he be possessed of military genius, address, and ambition, he may pro¬ cure this army to proclaim him king Who can tell the result? Who can oppose him with success? Who can say to Him, Sir, you shall not be a despot? The reasoning however inconclusive or illogical it may appear to some, is, in my estimation, more accurate than ar¬ guments drawn from the possibility of a president’s becoming a ty¬ rant. Mr. Chairman, I should object to the so mueh admired alterna¬ tive of gentlemen, were there no other reason than the danger of an army to enforce requisitions, and the danger of its general becoming our master. I will not mention those nations that might be applied to for aid in such a case: it could easily be procured, but the reme¬ dy would be worse than the disease. I speak with respect to Vir¬ ginia alone. Suppose our trade was tc be taken into the hands of congress, they would find little to satisfy their demands. If per¬ mitted by other nations, the compensation they could derive from the exclusive control of our trade would be but trival. Great Brit¬ ain, France, and Holland are intimately concerned to carry on trade Randolph.] VIRGINIA. 135 with us : those nations would disapprove of the measure; and such ■evasions would be practiced on such an occasion as would render it totally ineffectual. If congress were then to block up our ports, or “Send an army into our country, Virginia would be in such a horrid situation as would induce her to call for the aid of foreign nations, they have their eyes fixed on us; they watch every opportunity to avail themselves of our divisions. It is their interest we should be weak and divided. Any of them would readily engage in our dis- sentions ; none of.them would be displeased at our distractions. But what would be their object in assisting us! On what principles have auxiliaries ever been sent to the aid of a country! Shew me an instance (except the conduct of France to America) where auxilia¬ ries have not either attempted, or actually made themselves masters of those they assisted! With fespect to France, her magnanimity to America, is almost unprecedented. She has displayed a degree of disinterestedness and generosity, not often exemplified in the annals of mankind. Till France joined us, our troops were not able to withstand the enemy. Yet the fate of many other nations ought to convince us, that the assistance of foreigners is the most dangerous, and the last experiment that ought to be recuired to. Yet the pre¬ diction for retaining the power of direct taxation is not to be over¬ come. An expedient, proposed by a gentleman whom I do not now see in the house [Mr. George Mason] is, that this power shall be only given to the general government, as an alternative after requisitions shall have been refused. The most positive requisitions will be unavailable, and failure will produce war. A formal refusal, or negligent non-ccmpliance with the demands of congress, under a knowledge of the existence of this execrated alternative, would be a prelude to active opposition. I consider this expedient very little better than the ineffectual mode of simple requisitions. The only difference is, that it gives a little more time to a refractory state to provide itself with arms and foreign alliance, to enable it to oppose the operation of this alternative, and resist federal collectors, as was observed by the honorable gentleman in the chair.—The proper time will be picked for the commencement of opposition, and for putting the bayonet to the breasts of their fellow-citizens. Suppose a re¬ quisition to be made on Virginia for 200,000 pounds: she fails to comply: taxes are then to be collected in the common manner. Is it not probable that the aversion to the exercise of this power by the general government will incite discontended minds to oppose it! Then, sir, the dogs of war are to be let loose, and inconceivable mischief to ensue. If the inability of the people requires an exten¬ sion of the time of payment; let them be indulged as far as may 138 DEBATES. [Randolph be consistent with a regard for the public exigencies : but let ns not be so infatuated as to choose an expedient, which must either be in¬ adequate to the destined purpose, or eventuate in bloodshed and> %var. Requisitions, sir, however modified, must come within this- description; they strike me with horror and disgust. I would as soon see a separation from the union, and trust to the genius, pa¬ triotism, vigilance, and activity, to the morals and natural upright¬ ness of the people, as to ask a government with no other powers than those whereof our present system is possessed. This is art improvement on that system; and if we reject it we are ruined. Our credit is depressed and irretrievably gone, without a change of that system which has caused its depression. It is humiliating and disgraceful, to recur to loans,, situated as we are. It is ruinous- on any condition, on which our credit could be competent to obtain, them; though under a regular judicious system of administration, they may be very salutary and beneficial. If some accounts be be¬ lieved, your ambassador has received from the king of France thosesy stipends which have supported him.. Is this honorable! Is it safe for America?—Safety, sir, forbids so dishonorable and despicable a conduct as to leave our representatives in a state of absolute depen¬ dence on another power. Will not this situation be freely and for¬ cibly represented to him? Remembef, sir, the bread you eattc~mor~ row, depends on the bounty of the Count de Verge lines! Is it possi¬ ble that in our present circumstances, we can inspire any one with confidence in our engagements? Where, in the hour of distress and calamity, shall congress be able'to borrow money? The present rev¬ enues are appropriated to different purposes, and are from the in¬ competency of requisitions, inadequate to the public exigencies.. Admitting the impost will be sufficiently productive to enable qon- gress to discharge its engagements, and answer all the demands of government, in case of a war, will not necessity and the fear of dan¬ ger render it necessary for the general government to divert the rew- • enues from the usual appropriations, to the defence of the union ?• The necessity of such a diversion, does not lessen the certainty, that* the public credit would be destroyed by it. The interest on the pub¬ lic debt could not be paid—foreign and domestic creditors would be disappointed and irritated, and the displeasure of the former mights lead to the most serious consequences. What could the general go¬ vernment do in such a situation, without the power of providing money by taxation? Requisitions would be fruitless and ineffectual; nor could a government which depended on such a slender and in¬ efficient force, meet with credulity enough any where to trust it. Will you expose the continental congress to such a critical distress'? Do you consult public liberty by reducing it to an extremity, where- Randolph.] VIRGINIA. 137 of none can with certainty foretell the dangerous consequences? Is it not laying a train by which liberty is to be blown up 1 * By with¬ holding a necessary power, you may unwarily lay the foundation of usurpation itself. I conclude with my firm belief, that I shew my friendship for Virginia more steadfastly by discarding these requisitions, than by any proposition I could suggest. The benefits arising from loans, are innumerable. Every nation, even the most wealthy, and the oldest nations, have found it neces¬ sary to recur to loans in time of war. This country has found it so even in time of peace: but on a supposition of war, we must bor¬ row money. It will be inevitable. How can congress have credit to borrow any sum to a considerable amount, on any reasonable con¬ ditions, unless it have full scope, and complete command over the resources of the union? Whatever may be the visionary and fanci¬ ful conclusions of political sceptics, the credit of a nation will be found to be co-exiensive with its ability. If congress have an uncon¬ trolled power to raise monejr, as contingencies may render it necessa¬ ry it can borrow with ease : but if it have not this power, it is not pos¬ sible that any confidence can be put in it. The difficulty of justly apportioning the taxes among the statds under the present system, has been complained of; the rule of ap¬ portionment being the value of all lands and improvements within the states : the inequality between the rich lands of James river and the barrens of Massachusetts, has been thought to mitigate against Virginia. If taxes could be laid according to the real value, no inconvenience could follow; but from a variety of reasons this value was very difficult to be ascertained : and an error in the esti¬ mation must necessarily have been oppressive to a part of the com¬ munity. But in this new constitution, there is a more just and equitable rule fixed ; a limitation beyond which they cannot go. Representatives and taxes go hand in hand : according to the one will the other be regulated. The number of representatives are de¬ termined by the number of inhabitants—they have nothing to do but to lay taxes accordingly. I will illustrate it by a familiar example. At present before the actually numbered, the number of representa¬ tives is sixty-five : of this number, Virginia, has a right to send ten ; consequently she will to pay ten parts out of sixty-five parts, of any sum that may be necessary to be raised by congress: this, sir, is the line.—Can congress go beyond the bounds prescribed in the constitution?—Has congress a power to say, that she shall pay fif¬ teen parts out of sixty-five parts? Were they to assume such a power, it would be an usurpation so glaring, that rebellion would be the immediate consequence.—Congress is only to say on what DEBATES. 138 [Randolph. subject the tax is to be laid. It is a matter of very little consequence* how it will be imposed, since it must be clearly laid on the most productive article in each particular state. I am surprised that such strong objections should have been made to, and such fears and alarms excited by this power of direct taxation ; since experience shews daily, that, it is neither inconvenient nor oppressive. A col¬ lector goes to a man’s house ; the man pays him with freedom, or makes an apology for his inability to do it then: at a future day, if payment be not made, distress is made, and acquiesced in it by the party. What difference is there between this and a tax imposed by congress? Is it not done by lawful authority? The distinction is between a Virginian and continental authority. Yet, in both cases, it is imposed by ourselves, through the medium of our representatives. When a tax will come to be laid by con¬ gress, the collector will apply in like manner, and in the same man¬ ner receives payment, or an apology ; at a future day, likewise, the same consequences will result from a failure. I presume, sir, there is a manifest similarity between the two cases. When gentlemen complain of the novelty, they ought to advert to the singular one that must be the consequence of the requisitions; an army sent into your country to force you to comply. Will not this be the dissolu¬ tion of the union, if ever it takes effect? Let us be candid on this subject: let us see if the criterion here fixed, be not equal and just. Were the tax laid on one uniform article through the union, its ope¬ ration would be oppressive on a considerable part of the people. When any sum is necessary for the general government, every state will immediately know its exact proportion of it, from the num¬ ber of their people and representatives; nor can it be doubted that the tax will be laid on each state, in the manner that will best ac¬ commodate t‘>e people of such state, as thereby it will be raised with more facility; for an oppressive mode can never be so produc¬ tive as the most easy for the people. The system under consideration is objected to as unconnected and irregular manner: detached parts are attacked without considering the whole: this, sir, is disingenuous and unreasonable. Ask if the powers be unnecessary? If the end proposed can be obtained by any other means, the powers may be unnecessary? Infallibility was not arrogated by the convention : they included in the system those powers they thought necessary. If you do not think those powers indis- pensible, never give them up. But, I trust, this power of imposing direct taxes has been proved to be essential to the very existence of the union. The advocates for the national grovemment, circumstan- o ced as they are, with the accession of so many states, never will give their assent to leave it in their power of the states to sacrifice Randolph.] VIRGINIA. 13$* the union. It has been observed by an honorable gentleman over the way (Mr. George Mason) that there could not be a fellow-feel¬ ing between the national representatives and their constituents, and that oppression must be inseparable from their exercise of the pow¬ er of imposing taxes. I beg leave to remind you of a similar com-* plaint made on a similar occasion. I allude to the Scotch Union*. If gentlemen cast their eyes to that period, they will find there an, instructive similitude between our circumstances and the situation; of those people. The advocates for an union with England, de¬ clared that it would be a foundation of lasting peace ; remove all jealousies between them: increase their strength and riches; and enable them to resist more effectually, the efforts of the Pretender* These were irresistible arguments, one would be inclined to be¬ lieve ; arguments, a priori , which challenge conviction, and which appear perfectively conclusive, since now verified by actual events* Yet the opposers to that union, declaimed, that the independence of Scotland was gone; that the peerage of Scotland was degraded that the people of England would alone be gainers, and that the people of Scotland would be the losers. IIow are the facts'? Both kingdoms have deiived great benefits from that union, and the pre¬ dictions of the advocates for that union have been fully verified* The arguments used on that occasion, apply with more cogency to our situation. The people of Rhode Island may say, their independence will be lost by an union with the other states ; that they will be degraded their consequence lost, and their liberties endangered. Many such spacious and plausible arguments may be urged by their great men, who would no longer retain the importance, which their paper money, and other causes give them in a single state: yet the topo¬ graphical situation of that state renders union more essential to its existence, than to that of any ether state. It is urged that the in¬ dependence of Virginia will be gone, by the union? "Will not alii the happy effects of the union I have just mentioned, and more, re¬ dound to Virginia from this union? But our representatives arc suspected. On a further inspection of the system before you, this objection must vanish. Ten representatives will have no fellow- feeling for their constituents! Will not the people choose men of integrity, and with similar circumstances with themselves, to repre¬ sent them? What laws can they make that will not operate on themselves and friends, as well as on the rest on the people? Will the people re-elect the same men to repeat oppressive legislation? Will the people commit suicide against themselves, and discard all those maxims and principles of interest and self-preservatk>n which actuate mankind in all their transactions? Will the ten miles 140 DEBATES. [Randolph. square transform our representatives into brutes and tyrants'? I see no grounds to distrust them : but suppose they will be inclined to do us mischief, how can they effect it 1 ? Tf the federal necessities call for the sum of 65,000 pounds, our proportion of that surmis 10- 000 pounds. If, instead of this just proportion, they should require a greater sum a conflict would ensue. What steps could they take to enforce the payment of the unjust and tyrannical demand? They must summon up all the genius of better men : but in case of actual violence, they could not raise the thousandth part of ten thousand pounds. In case of a struggle, sir, the people would be irresistible. If they should be so liable to lapse from Virtue, yet would not one man be found out of a multitude to guard the interests of the people? Not one man to hold up his head to discover the tyrannical projects of a corrupt and depraved majority? Suppose the house of representatives all equally infatuated and determined on so wicked an intention as to infringe the rights of the people, they have not the whole authority in their own hands. There are twenty-six senators, distinguished for their wisdom, not u elevated by popular favor, but choseh by a select body of intelligent men: will they also be corrupt? Will their honor and virtue be contaminated and disgraced in one instant? Sixty-five representa¬ tives and twenty-six senators are then to be suddnely changed from upright men to monsters : ninety-one persons selected for superior qualities are to compose this Pandemonium of iniquity. The sup¬ position of their degenerating to such a degree is unwarrantable, and inconsistent with an admission of their being freely chosen, by a people capable of discerning merit: and should a majority ever be so forgetful of their duty, as to wish to trample on the immunities of their people, there is no reason to doubt, that some of them will be so far inspired with a zeal for liberty, as to warn their country of any dangerous combinations against their privileges. The people, to heighten their security, may send those to the general govern¬ ment who have been signalized for their wisdom and virtue. What security have the people of Virginia against the possible abuses of their legislature, that is not here? But their number is objected to, as being too small. I should reluctantly assent to this representa¬ tive body, did I conceive it consisted of too few. It is an established maxim, that such a body ought to be nume¬ rous enough to be well acquainted with the interest of the people, to prevent corruption, and give a chance to men of merit to be elec¬ ted. If the number be not sufficient for these purposes, I confess it to be a defect. The number is sixty-five, of which ten represent this state. Cannot they inform themselves of the situation of America? I appeal to those who hear me, if they could not rely on the Randolph.] VIRGINIA, 141 intelligence of ten men they could fix upon, sooner than upon any crowd they could have? I do not reflect on my countrymen, but there is a certain listlessness and inattention to the interest of the community—and indecision or faction in numerous bodies, that I would rather depend on the virtue and knowledge^ of some few men, than on ever so many. The mode of their election must induce us to believe, that they will be men of experience and information. The state will be laid off and divided into ten districts : from each of these a man is to be elected. Be must be really the choice of the people : not the man who can distribute the most gold : for tho riches of Croesus would not avail. The qualifications of the elec¬ tors being Randolph.] renders it more politic to vest the power of executing the laws to one man, than in any number of men. How is the president elec¬ ted? By the people—on the same day throughout the United States —by those whom the people please. There can be no concert be¬ tween the electors. The votes are sent sealed to congress. What are his powers? To see the laws executed. Every executive in A- merica has that power. He is also to command the array—this power also is enjoyed by the executives of the different states.—He can handle no part of the public money except what is given him by law. At the end of four years he may be turned outj>f his office. If he misbehaves he may be impeached, and in this case he will nev¬ er be re-elected. I cannot conceive how his powers can be called formidable. Both houses are a check upon him. He can do no im¬ portant act without the concurrence ofthe senate. In England, the sword and purse are in different hands. The king has the power of the sword—and the purse is in the hands of the people alone. Take a comparison between this and the government of England. It will prove in favor of the American principle. In England the king declares war. In America, congress must be consulted. In England, parliament gives money. In America, congress does it. There are consequently more powers in the hands of the people, and greater checks upon the executive here, than in England. Let him pardon me, when I say he is mistaken in passing an eulogium on the English government to the prejudice of this plan. Those checks which he says are to be found in the English Government, are als* to be found here. Our government is founded upon real checks. He ought to shew there are no checks in it. Is this the case? Who are your representatives? They are chosen by the people for two years. Who are your senators? They are chosen by the legisla¬ tures, and a third of them go out of the senate at the end of every second year. They may also be impeached. There are no better ehecks upon earth. Are there better checks in the government of Virginia? There is not a check in the one that is not in the other. The difference consists in the length of time, and in the nature of the objects. Any man may be impeached here—so he may there* If the people of Virginia can remove their delegates for misbehavior, by electing other men at the end of the year; so in like manner, the federal representatives may be removed at the end of two, and the senators at the end of six years. The honorable gentleman has praised the Virginia government. We can prove that the federal constitution is equally excellent. The legislature of Virginia may conceal their transactions as well as the general government. There is no clause in the constitution of Vir¬ ginia to oblige its legislature to publish its proceedings at any period. 906 DEBATES. [Randolph. Theclausein this constitution which provides for a periodical publi¬ cation, and which the honorable gentleman reprobates so much, ren¬ ders the federal constitution superior to that of Virginia in this res¬ pect. The expression, from time to time, renders us sufficiently se¬ cure—it will compel them to publish their proceedings as often as it can-conveniently and safely be done; and must satisfy every mind, without an illiberal-perversion of its meaning. His bright ideas are very much obscured, by torturing the explication of words. His in¬ terpretation ofelections must be founded on a misapprehension. The constitution says, that “ the times, places and manner of holding elec¬ tions for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by ihe legislature thereof; but-the congress may at anytime, by law, make or alter such regulation, except as to the place ofchu- sing senators.” It says, in another place, “ that the electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature.” Who would have con¬ ceived it possible to deduce from these clauses, that the power of election was thrown into the hands of the r-ich! As the electors of the federal representatives are to have the same qualifications with those of the representative of this state legislature, or-in other words, as the electors of the one are -to be electois of the other, this sugges¬ tion is unwarrantable, unless he carries his supposition farther, and says, that Virginia will .agree to herown suicide, by modifying elec¬ tions in such manner as to throw them into the hands of the rich. The honorable gentleman has not given us a fair object to be attack¬ ed, he has not given us any thing substantial to be examined. It is also objected,-that.the trial by jury, the writ ofhabeas corpus and the liberty of the press, are insecure. But I contend that the ha¬ beas corpus is at least on as secure and good a footing as it is in England. In that country it depends on the will of the legislature. That privilege is secured here by the constitution, and is only to be suspended in cases of extreme emergency. In this not a fair footing! After agreeingtnat the government of England secures liberty, how- do we distrust this government! W'h} 7 distrust ourselves! The lib¬ erty of the press is supposed to be in danger. If this were the case, it would produce extreme repugnancy in my mind. If it over will be suppressed in this country, the liberty of the people will not be far irom being sacrificed. Where is the danger of it! He says that every .power is given to the general government, that is not reserved to the states. Pardon me if I say the reverse of the proposition is true. I defy any one to prove the contrary. Every power not given it by this-system, is left with the states. This being the principle, from what part, of the constitution can the liberty of the press be said to b# in danger! VIRGINIA. 207 Randolph.] [Here 1 his excellency read the eighth section of the first article, containing all the powers given to congress.] Go through these powers, examine every one, and tell me if the most exalted genius can prove that the liberty of the press is in dan¬ ger. The trial by jury is supposed to be in danger also. It is secured in criminal cases—but supposed to be taken away in civil cases. It is not relinquished by the constitution—it is only not provided for. Look at the interest of congress to suppress it. Can it be in any manner advantageous for them to suppress it? In equitable cases it ought not prevail, nor with respect to admiralty causes ; be cause there will be an undue leaning against those characters, of whose business courts of admiralty will have cognizance, I will rest myself secure under this reflection, that it is impossible for the most suspicious or malignant mind, to shew that it islhe interest of congress to infringe on this trial by jury. Freedom of religion is said to be in danger. I will candidly say, I once thought that it was, and felt great repugnance to the constitu¬ tion for that, reason. I am willing to acknowledge my apprehensions removed—and ! will inform you by what process of reasoning Ldid remove them. The ^constitution provides, that “ the senators und •representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to support this constitution; but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States.” It has been said, that if the exclusion of the religious test were an exception from the general power of congres* the power over religion would remain. I inform those who are of thin opinion, that no power is given expressly to congress over religion. The senators and representatives, members of the state legislatures, and executive and judicial officers, are bound by oath or affirmation, to support this constitution. This only binds them to support it in the exercise of the powers constitutionally given it. The exclusion of religious tests.is an exception from this general provision, with res¬ pect to oaths or affirmations. Although officers, &c. are to swear that they will support this constitution, yet they are not bound to sup¬ port one mode of worship, or to adhere to one particular sect. It puts all sects on the same footing. A man of abilities and character of any sect whatever, may be admitted to any office or public-trus under the United States. I am a friend to a variety of sects because they keep one another in order. How many different sects are w® composed of thorought the United States? How many different sects will be in congress? We cannot enumerate the sects that may be in ‘Congress- And there are now so many in the United States, that ) 208 DEBATES. [Randolph. they will prevent the establishment of any one sect in prejudice, to the rest, and will forever oppose all attempts to infringe religious liberty. If such an attempt be made, will not the alarm be sounded throughout America? If congress be as wicked as we are foretold they will, they would not run the risk of exciting the resentment of all, or most, of the religious sects in America. The judiciary is drawn up in terror—here 1 have an objection of a different nature. I object to the appellate jurisdiction as the greatest evil in it. But I look at the union—the object which guides me. When I look at the Union, objects of less consideration vanish, and I hope that the inconvenience will be redressed, and that con¬ gress will prohibit the appeal with respect to matters of fact. When it respects only matters of law, no danger can possibly aiise from it. Can congress have any interest in continuing appeals of fact? If Pennsylvania has an interest in continuing it, will not Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, New York, and the east¬ ern states, have an interest in discontinuing it? What advantage will its continuance be to Maryland, New Jersey, or Delaware? Ia there not unanimity against it in congress almost? Kentucky will be equally opposed to it? Thus, sir, all these will be opposed to one state. If congress wish to aggrandize themselves by oppressing the people, the judiciary must first be corrupted—no man says any thing against them—they are more independent than in Englaud. But they say, that the adoption of this system will occasion an augmentation of taxes. To object to it on this ground, is as much to say—no Union—stand by yourselves! An increase of taxes ia a terror that no friend to the union ought to be alarmed at. The im¬ post must produce a great sum. The contrary cannot be supposed. I conceive the particular expense of particular states will be dimin¬ ished, and that diminution will, to a certain extent, support the onion. Either disunion, or separate confederacies, will enhance the expence. An union of all the states will be, even on economical principles, more to the interest of the people of Virginia, then either separate confederacies or disunion. Had the states complied with the obligations, imposed upon them by the confederation, thb at¬ tempt would never have been made. The unequivocal experience we have had of their inefficacy, renders this change necessary. If union be nececsary for our safety, we ought not to address the ava¬ rice of this house. I am confident that not a single member of this committee would be moved by such unworthy considerations. We are told that the people do not understand this government. I ain persuaded that they do not—-not for the want of more time to under¬ stand it, but to correct the misrepresentations of it. When I medi* stated an opposition to previous amendments, I marked the number Haxbolph.] VIRGINIA. 909 «f what appeared to me to be errors, and which I wish to be subse¬ quently removed. But its real errors have been exaggerated-—it has not met with a fair decision. It must be candily acknowledged, that there are some evils in it which ought to be removed. But I am confident that such gross misrepresentations have been made of it, that if carried before any intelligent men, they would wonder at such glaring attempts to mislead, or at such absolute misapprehen¬ sion of the subject. Though it be not perfect, any government is better than the risk which gentlemen wish us to run. Another construction he gives, is, that it is exclusively in the power of congress to arm the militia, and that the states could not do it, if congress thought proper to neglect it. I am astonished how (this idea could enter into the gentleman’s mind, whose acuteness no man doubts. How can this be fairly deduced from the following elausel “To provide for the organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employ¬ ed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respec¬ tively, the appointment of the officers and the authority of trsiinin^ the militia, according to the discipline prescribed by congress,** He complains much of implication, hut in this case he has mack use of ithimsrlf: for this construction of his clause cannot possi¬ bly be supported without it. It is clear and self-evident that the pretended danger cannot result from the clause. Should congres|| neglect to arm or discipline the militia, the states are fully possess* * #f the power of doing it; for they are restrained from it by part of the constitution. The sweeping clause, as it is called, is much dreaded. I fitn4 that I differ from several gentlemen on this point. This formidah||^ clause does not in the least increase the powers of congress. It is -only inserted for greater caution, and to prevent the possibility gjf encroaching upon the powers of congress. No sophistry will I* permitted to be used to explain away any of those powers---nor pan. they possibly assume any other power, but what is contained in the constitution, without absolute usurpation. Another security is, that if they attempt such an usurpation, the influence of the state go¬ vernments, will nip it in the bud of hope. I know this government will be cautiously watched. The smallest assumption of power will be sounded in alarm to the people, and followed by bold and active opposition. I hope that my countrymen will keep guard against eveiy arrogation of power. I shall take notice of what the honorable gentleman said, with respect to the power to provide for the general welfare. The meaning of this clause has been perverted to alarm our apprehensions. The whole clause has not been read together. It enables congress “ to lay and collect taxes, durieSi iaa- VOL- 3, 14 219 DEBATES; [Monros* posts and excises; to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United States.” The plain and obvious meaning of this,- is that no more duties, tax¬ es, imposts and excises shall be laid, than are sufficient to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States. If you mean to have a general government at all, ought it not to be empowered to raise money to pay the debts, and advance fhfi prosperity of the United States in the manner that congress shall think most eligible'? What is the consequence of the contrary? You give it power by one hand, and take it away from it by the other. If it be defective in some parts, } T et we ought to give due credit to those parts which are acknowledged to be good. Does not the prohibition of paper money merit our approbation? I approve of it because it prohibits tender laws, secures the widows and or¬ phans, and prevents the states from impairing contracts. I admire that part which forces Virginia to pay her debts. If we recur to to the bills of rights, which the honorable gentleman speaks so much of, we will find that it recommends justice. Had not this power been given, my affection for it would not have been so great.— When it obliges us to tread in the path of virtue—when it takes away from the most influential man, the power of directing our pass¬ ions to his own emolument, and of trampling upon justice, I hope to be excused when I say, that were it more objectionable that it is, I would vote for the union. Mr MONROE.—Mr Chairman, I cannot avoid expressing the great anxiety which I feel upon the present occasion, an anxiety that pro¬ ceeds not only from an high sense of the importance of the subject, but from a profound respect for this august and venerable assembly. When we contemplate the fate that has befallen other nations, whe¬ ther we cast our eyes back into the remotest ages of antiquity, or derive instruction from those examples which modern times have presented to our view, and observe how prone all human institutions have been to decay; how subject the best formed and wisely organised governments have been to lose their checks and totally dissolve; how difficult it has been for mankind in all ages and countries, to preserve their dearest rights and best privileges, impelled as it were by an irresistible fate of despotism: if we look forward to those prospects that sooner or later await our country, unless we shall be exempted from the fate of other nations, even to a mind, the most sanguine and benevolent, some gloomy apprehensions must necessarily crowd upon it. This consideration is sufficient to teach us the limited ca_ pacify of the human mind, how subject the wisest men have been to VIRGINIA. 211 Monroe.3 error. For my own part, sir, I come forward here, not as the parti- zan of this or that side of the question ; to commend where the sub¬ ject appears to me to deserve commendation; to suggest my doubts where I'have any—to hear with candor the explanation of others; and in the ultimate result, to act shall as appear for the best advan- tage of our c cmmon country. The American states exhibit at present a new and interesting spec¬ tacle to the eyes ofmankind. Modern Europe, for more than twelve centuries past, has presented to view one of a very different kind. In all the nations of that quarter of the globe, there hatlTheen a con¬ stant effort on the part of the people, to extricate themselves from the oppression of their rollers; but with us the object is of a very different nature—to establish the dominion of law over licentiousness—to in¬ crease the powers of the national government to such exteat, and or¬ ganize it in such manner, as to enable it to discharge its duties and manage the affairs ofthe states to the best advantage. There are two circumstances remarkable in our colonial settlement; 1st, the exclu¬ sive monopoly of our trade. 2d, That it was settled by the commons of England only. The revolution, in having emancipated us from the shackles of Great Britain, has put the entire government in the hands of one order of people only—freemen; not of nobles and free¬ men. This is a peculiar trait in the character of this revolution. That this sacred deposit may be always retained there, is my most >earnest wish and fervent prayer. That union is the first object for the security of our political happiness, in. the hands of gracious prov¬ idence,’is well understood and universally admitted through all the United States. From New-Hampshire to Georgia, (Rhode-Island excepted) the people have uniformily manifested a strong attachment to the union. This attachment has resulted from a persuasion of its utility and necessity. In short, this is a point so well known, tha t it is needless to trespass on your patience any longer about it. A recurrence has been had to history. Ancient and modern leagues have, been mentioned to make impressions. Will they admit of any analogy with our situation? The same principles will produce the same effects. Permit me to take a review of those leagues which the honorable gentleman has mentioned, which are, 1st. the AmphyctL onic council—2d. the Achaean league—3d. the Germanic system—4th Swiss cantons—5th. United Netherlands—and 6th. tjfre New-Eng- Iand confederacy. .Before I develope the principles of these leagues, permit me to speak of.what must influence the happiness and dura¬ tion of leagues.—These principally depe.nd on the following circum¬ stances: 1st. the happy construction of the government of the mem¬ bers of the union—2d. the security from.foreign danger. For instance, ^monarchies united would separate sooi); aristocracies would preserve DEBATES. 319 [NfojfRoa,- their union longer; but democracies,unless separated by some extra-¬ ordinary circumstance, would last forever. The causes of half the wars that have thinned the ranks of mankind, and depopulated nati¬ ons, are caprice, folly, and ambition: these belong to the higher orders of governments, where the passions of one, or of a few indiv¬ iduals, direct the fate of the rest of the community. But it is other¬ wise with democracies, where there is an equality among the citi¬ zens—and a foreign and powerful enemy, especially a monarch, may crush weaker neighbors. Let us see how far these positions are supported by the history of these leagues, and how far they apply to us. The Amphyctionic council consisted of three members, Sparta, Thebes, and Athens. What was the construction of these stateeT Sparta was a monarchy more analagous to the constitution of Eng- land, than any 1 have heard of in modern times. Thebes was a democracy, but on different principles from modern democracies. Representation was not known then. This is the acquirement of modern times. Athens like Thebes wa3 generally democratic, but sometimes changed. In these two states the people transacted theif business in person, consequently they could not be of any great extent. There was a perpetual variance between the members of this confederacy, and its ultimate dissolution was attributed to this defect* The weakest were obliged to call for foreign aid, and this precipi¬ tated the min of this confederacy. The Achaean league had more an¬ alogy to ours, and gives me great hopes that the apprehensions of gentlemen with respect to our confederacy are groundless. They were all democratic and firmly united. What was the effect! The most perfect harmony and friendship subsisted between them, and they were very active in guarding their liberties. The history of that confederacy does not present us with those coufiisions and inter¬ nal convulsions,whlch gentlemen ascribe to all governments of a con¬ federate kind. The most respectable historians prove this confeder¬ acy to have been exempt from those defects. [Here Mr Monroe read several passages in Polybius, tending to el** eidate andprove the excellent structure of theAchsan league,and the consequent happy effects of this excellency.] He then continued—This league was founded on democratiea! prio* ciples, and from the wisdom of its structure continued a far greater length of time than any other. Its members, like our states, by oar confederation, retained their individual sovereignty, and enjoyed s perfect equality. What destroyed it? Not internal dissentione. They were surrounded by great and powerful nations—the Lacede¬ monians, Macedonians, and iEtolians. The jEtolians and La cede ■womuw malting war on them, they solicited the assistance of Mae* Monroe,"] VIRGINIA. 213 ’©don, who no sooner granted it than she became their oppressor. To ffree themselves from the tyranny of the Macedonians, they prayed 'Suceour from the Romans, who after relieving them from their op¬ pressors, soon totally enslaved them, The Germanic body is a league of independent principalities* It has no analogy to our system. It is very injudiciously organized. Its members are kept together by the fear of danger from one anoth¬ er, and from foreign powers, and by the influence of the emperor. The Swiss cantons have been instanced also, as a proof of the natural imbecility of federal governments. Their league has sus¬ tained a variety of changes, and notwithstanding the many causes that tend to disunite them, they still stand firm. We have not the same causes of disunion or internal variance that they have. The individual cantons composing the league, are chiefly aristocratic.-*- What an opportunity does this offer to foreign powers to disturb them r by bribing and corrupting their aristocrats'? . It ia well known that their services have been frequently purchased by foreign nations.— Their difference of religion has been a source of divisions and ani¬ mosity between them, and tended to disunite them. This tendency has been considerably increased by the interference of foreign nati¬ ons, the contiguity of their position to those nations rendering such interference easy. They have been kept together by the fear of those nations, and the nature of their association; the leading features of which are a principle of equality between the cantons, and the reten¬ tion of individual sovereignty. The same reasoning applies nearly to the United Netherlands. The other confederacy which has been mentioned, has no kind of analogy to our situation. From a review of these leagues, we find the causes of the misfor¬ tunes of those which have been dissolved, to have been a dissimilar¬ ity of structure in the individual members, the facility of foreign in¬ terference, and -recurrence to foreign aid. After this review of those • leagues, if we consider our comparative situation, we shall find that -nothing can be adduced from any of them, to warrant a departure from a confederacy to a consolidation, on the principle of inefficacy in the former to secure our happiness. The causes which with other nations rendered leagues ineffectual and inadequate to the security and happiness of the people do not exist here. What is the form of our state governments? They are all similar in their structure— perfectly democratic. The freedom of mankind has found an asylum here, which it-could -find no where else. 'Freedom of conscience is •enjoyed here in the fullest degree. Our states are not disturbed by a contrariety of religious opinions and other causes of quarrels which •other nations have. They have no causes of internal variance.-^ 'Causes of war between the states have been represented in all those DEBATES. 214 [Monroe.- terrors, which splendid genius and brilliant imagination can so well depict. But, sir, I conceive they are imaginary—mere creatures of fan¬ cy. I will admit that there was a contrariety of sentiments; a con¬ test in which 1 was a witness, in some respects, a contest res¬ pecting the western unsettled lands. Every state having a charter for the lands within its colonial limits, had its claims to such lands confirmed by the war. The other states contended that those lands belonged not to a part of the states, but to all: that it was highly reasonable and equitable, that all should participate in what had been acquired by the efforts of all. The progress of this dispute gave 1 uneasiness to the true friends of America: but territorial claims may now be said to be adjusted. Have not Virginia, North Carolina, and other states, ceded their claims to congress? The dis¬ putes between Virginia and Maryland are also settled ; nor is there an existing controversy between any of the states at present. Thus, sir, this great source of public calamity has been terminated with¬ out the adoption of this government. Have we any danger to fear from the European countries? Per¬ mit me to consider our relative situation with regard to them, and to answer what has been suggested on the subject. Our situation is relatively the same to all foreign powers. View the distance be¬ tween us and them—the wide Atlantic—an ocean 3000 miles across,. lies between us. If there be any danger to these states, to be ap¬ prehended from any of those countries, it must be Great Britain and Spain,whose colonies are contiguous to our country. Has there been any thing on the part of Great Britain since the peace, that indicated a hostile intention towards us? Was there a complaint of a violation of treaty ? She committed the first breach. Virginia instructed her delegation to demand a reparation for the negroes which had been carried away contrary to treaty. Being in congress, I know the facts. The other states were willing to get some com¬ pensation for their losses as well as Virginia. New York wished to get possession of the western posts situated within her territory. We wished to establish an amicable correspondence with that coun¬ try, and to adjust all differences. The United States sent an ambas¬ sador for this purpose. The answer sent was, that a compliance with the treaty on our part must precede it on theirs. These tran¬ sactions are well known in every state, and need hardly be mention¬ ed. Certain it is, that Great Britain is desirous of peace, and that it is her true interest to be in friendship with us ; it is also so with Spain. Another circumstance which has been dwelt upon, is, the necessity of the protection of commerce. What does our commerce require? Does it want extension and protection? Will treaties answer these- ends? Treaties, sir, will not extend your commerce.. VIRGINIA. 215 MoifftOE.] Our object is the regulation of commerce, and not treaties. Our treaties with Holland, Prussia, and other powers, are of no conse¬ quence. It is not to the advantage of the United States, to make any compact with any nation with respect to trade. Our trade is engrossed by a country with which we have no commercial treaty. That country is Great Britain. That monopoly is the result of the want of a judicious regulation on our part. It is as valuable and advantageous to them, on its present footing, nay more so, than it could be by any treaty. It is the interest of the United States to invite all nations to trade with them. To open their ports to all, and grant no exclusive privilege to any, in preference to others. I apprehend no treaty that could be made, can be of any advantage to us. If those nations opened any of their ports to us in the East or West Indies, it would be of advantage to us ; but there is no proba¬ bility of this. France and Holland have been said to be threatening for the payment of the debts due to them. I understood that Hol¬ land has added to her favors to us, by lending us other sums lately. This is a proof that she has no hostile intent against us, and that she is willing to indulge us, France has made no pressing demand. Our country has received from that kingdom the highest proof of favors which a magnanimous power can shew. Nor are there any grounds to suspect a diminution of its friendship. Having examined the a- nalogy between the ancient leagues and our confederacy, and shewn that we have no danger to apprehend fiom Europe, I conclude, that we are in no danger of immediate disunion, but that we may calmly and dispassionately examine the defects of our government, and apply such remedies as we shall find necessary. I proceed now to the examination of the confederation, and to tak© a comparative view of this constitution. In examining either—a division into two heads is proper, viz : 1st, the form ; and 2d, the powers of the government. I consider the existing system defec¬ tive in both respects. Is the confederation a band of union suffici¬ ently strong to bind the states together! Is it possessed of sufficient power to enable it to manage the affairs of the union! Is it well or¬ ganized, safe and proper! I confess, that in all these instances, I con¬ sider it as defective—I consider it to be void of energy, and badly organized. What are the pow T ers which the federal government ought to have! I will draw the line between the powers necessary to be given to the federal, and those which ought to be left to the state govern¬ ments. To the former 1 would give control over the national affairs: to the latter I would leave the care of local interests. Neither the confederation, nor this constitution, answers this discrimination. To make the first a proper federal government, I would add to it on* DEBATES. $16 great power—I would give it an absolute control over commerce* To render the system under consideration safe and proper, I wosles take from it one power only—I mean that of direct taxation. I con¬ ceive its other powers are sufficient without this. My objections this power, are that I conceive it not necessary, impracticable under a democracy, if exercised, as tending to anarchy, or the subversion of liberty, and probably the latter* In the first place, it is unneces¬ sary, because exigencies will not require it. The demands and ne¬ cessities of government are now greater than they will be hereafter* because of the expenses of the war in which we were engaged* which cost us the blood of our best citizens, and which ended gloriously* There is no danger of war, as I have already said. Our necessi¬ ties will therefore in a short time be greatly diminished. What are the resources of the United States? How are requisitions to be com¬ plied with? I know the government ought to be so organized, aa to be competent to discharge its engagements and secure the public happiness. To enable it to do these things, I would give it the pow¬ er of laying an impost, which is amply sufficient with its other means. The impost, at an early period, was calculated at nearly a million of dollars. If this calculation was well founded—if it wa* so much at five per centum, what will it not amount to, when the absolute control of commerce will be in the hands of congress? May we not suppose that when the general government will lay what du¬ ties it may think proper, that the amount will be very considerable? There are other resources. r lhe back lands have already been look¬ ed upon as a very important resource. When we view the western extensive territory, and contemplate the fertility of the soil, the no¬ ble rivers which penetrate it, and the excellent navigation which may be had there, may we not depend on this as a very substantial resource? In the third place, we have the resource of loans. This is a re¬ source which is necessary and proper, and has been recurred to by all nations. The credit of our other resources will enable us to pro¬ cure, by loans, any sums we may want. We have also in the fourth place, requisitions, which are so much despised. These, sir, have been often productive. As the demands on the states will be but for trivial sums, after congress shall be possessed of its other great .resources, is it to be presumed, that its application will be despised? If the government be well administered, or possess any part of the confidence of the people, is it presumed, that requisitions, for trivial gums, will be refused? I conclude, Sir, that they will be readily toomplied with; and that they, with the imposts, back lands, and loans, will be abundantly sufficient for all the exigencies of the union. VIRGINIA. Monro*.] In the next p.ace, it appears to roe, that the exercise of the power of direct taxation, is impracticable in this country under a demo¬ cracy. Consider the territory lying between the Atlantic ocean and thu Mississippi. Its extent far exceeds that of the German empire. It is larger than any territory that ever was under any one free govern* ment. It is too extensive to be governed, but by a despotic mon¬ archy. Taxes cannot be laid justly and equally in such a territory. What are the objects of direct taxation? Will the taxes bp laid on land? One gentleman has said that the United States would select out a particular object, or objects, and leave the rest to the states- Suppose land to be the object selected by congress: examine its consequences. The land-holder alone would suffer by such a selec¬ tion. A very considerable part of the community would escape. Those who pursue commerce and arts would escape. It could not possibly fee estimated equally. Will the taxes be laid on polls on¬ ly? Would not the land-holder escape in that case? How then will it fee laid? On all property? Consider the consequences. Is it possible to make a law that shall operate alike in all the states? Is it possible that there should be sufficient intelligence for the men of Georgia, to know the situation of the men of New Hampshire? Is there a precise similitude of situation in each state? Compare ths situation of the citizens in different states. Are there not a thousand circumstances shewing clearly, that there can be no law, that can be uniform in its operation throughout the United States? Another gentleman said, that information would be had from the state laws. Is not this reversing the principles of good policy? Can this substitution of one body to thirteen assem¬ blies, in a matter that requires the most minute and extensive local information, be politic or just? They cannot know what taxes can be least oppressive to the people. The tax that may be convenient in one state, may be oppressive in another. If they vary the ob¬ jects of taxation in different states, the operation must be unequal and unjust. If congress should fix the tax on some mischievous ob¬ jects, what will be the tendency? It is to be presumed, that all go¬ vernments will, some time or other, exercise their powers, or else, why should they possess them? Enquire into the badness of thi» government. What is the extent of the power of laying and col¬ lecting direct taxes? Does it not give to the United States all the resources of the individual states? Does it not give an absolute con¬ trol over the resources of all the states? If you give the resources of the several states to the general government, in what situation are the states left? I therefore think the general government will preponderate. [Monnoe. m DEBATES.. Besides its possession of all the resources of the country, there are other circumstances that will enable it to triumph in the conflict with the states. Gentlemen of influence and character, men of dis-^ tinguished talents, of eminent virtue, and great endowments, will compose the general government. In what a situation will the dif¬ ferent states Be, when all the talents and abilities of the country will be against them? Another circumstance will operate in its favor, in case of a con¬ test. The oath that is to be taken to support it, will aid it most powerfully. The influence which the sanction of oaths has on men is irresistable. The religious authority of divine revelation, will be quoted to prove the propriety of adhering to it, and will have great influence in disposing men’s minds to maintain it. It will also be strongly supported by the last clause in the eighth section of the first article, which vests it with the power of making all laws necessary to carry its powers into effect. The correspon¬ dent judicial powers will be an additional aid,. There is yet another circumstance, which will throw the balance in the scale of the gene¬ ral government.—A disposition in its favor, has shewn itself in all parts of the continent and will certainly become more and more pre¬ dominant. Is it not to be presumed, that if a contest between the state legislatures and the general government should arise, the latter would preponderate? The confederation has been deservedly rep¬ robated, for its inadequacy to promote the public welfare. But this change is, in my opinion, very dangerous.—It contemplates objects with which a federal government ought never to interfere. The con¬ current interfering power, of laying taxes on the people, will occa¬ sion a perpetual conflict between the general and individual govern¬ ments ; which, for the reasons I have already mentioned, must ter¬ minate to the disadvantage, if not in the annihilation of the latter. Can it be presumed, that the people of America can patiently bear such a double oppression? Is it not to be presumed, that they will en¬ deavor to get rid of one of the oppressors? I fear, sir, that it will ulti¬ mately end in the establishment of a monarchial government. The people, in order to be delivered from one species of tyranny, may submit to another. I am strongly impressed with the necessity of having a firm’national government]; but I am|decidedly against giving it the power of direct taxation ; because I think it endangers our liber¬ ties. My attachment to the union and an energetic government, is such, that I would consent to give the general government every power contained in that plan, except that of taxation. As it will operate on all states and individuals, powers given it generally should be qualified. It may be attributed to the prejudice of my education, but I am a decided and warm friend to a billot Monroe. J VIRGINIA. Sl$ rights—-the polar star, and great support of American liberty ;.and I am clearly of opinion, that the general powers conceded by that plan such as the impost, &c. should be guarded and checked by a bill of rights. Permit me to examine the reasoning that admits, that all powers not given up are reserved. Apply this. If you give [to the United States the power of direct taxation—in making all laws necessary to give it operation (which is a power given by the last clause, in the eighth section, of the first article) suppose they should be of opinion that the right of the trial by jury was not one of the requisitesto carry it into effect ; there is no check on this constitution to prevent the formal abolition of it. There is a general power given to them, to make all laws that will enable them to carry tlieir powers into effect. There are no limits pointed out. They are not restrained or con¬ trolled from making any law, however oppressive in its operation, which they may think necessary to carry their powers into effect. By this general unqualified power, they may infringe not on the trial by jury, but the liberty of the press, and every right that is not expressly secured orexcepted, from that general[power. I conceive that such general powers are very dangerous. Our great unaliena¬ ble rights ought to be secured from being destroyed by such unlimi¬ ted powers, either by a bill of rights, or by an express provision in the body of the constitution. It is immaterial in which of these two modes rights are secured. I fear I have tired the patience of the committee ; I beg, however the indulgence of making a few more observations. TJiere is a dis¬ tinction between this government, and ancient and modern ones. The division of power in ancient governments, or in any government at present in the world, was founded on diffeient principles from those of this government. What was the object of the distribution of power in Rome? It will not be controverted, that there was a composition or mixture of aristocracy, democracy, and monarchy, each of which had a repellent quality, which enabled it to preserve itself from being destroyed by the other two—so that the balance was continually maintained. This is the case in the English gov¬ ernment, which has the most similitude to our own. There they have distinct orders in the government, which possess real efficient repel¬ lent qualities. Let us illustrate it. If the commons prevail, may they not vote the king useless?' If the king prevails, will not the commons lose their liberties? Without the interposition of a check, without a balance, the one would destroy the other. The lords, the third branch, keep up this balance. The wisdom of the English constitution has given a share of legislation to each of the three branches, which enables it effectually to defend itself, and which preserves the liberty of the people of that country. $20 DEBATES. [Momrob. What is the object of the division of power in America! Why is the government divided into different branches! For a more faithful and regular administration. Where is there a check! We have more to apprehend from the union of these branches, than from the subver¬ sion of any ; and this union will destroy the rights of the people. There is nothing to prevent this coalition. But the contest which will probably subsist between the general government and the indi¬ vidual governments, will tend to produce it. There is a division of sovereignty between the national and state governments. How laT then will they coalesce together! Is it not to be supposed that there will be a conflict between them! If so, will not the members of (he former combine together! Where then will be the check to prevent encroachments on the rights of the people! There is not a third es¬ sentially distinct branch to preserve a just equilibrium, or to prevent such encroachments. In, developing this plan of government, w© nought to attend to the necessity of having checks. I can see no real checks in it. » Let us first enquire into the probability of harmony between the •general and individual governments ;and in the next place, into the responsibility of the general government, either to tfee people at large or to the state legislatures. As to the harmony between the gov¬ ernments, communion of powers, legislative and judicial forbids it. I have never yet heard, or read in the history of mankind, of a con¬ current exercise of power by two parties, without producing a strug¬ gle between them. Consult the human heart. Does it not prove, that where two parties, or bodies, seek the same object, there must be a stuggle? Now, sir, as to the responsibility—let us begin with the House of Representatives, which is the most democratic part. The representatives are elected by the people—but what is the tesponsibility! At the expiration of the time for which they arc elected, the people may discontinue them, but if they commit high crimes, how are they to be punished! I apprehend the general go¬ vernment cannot punish them, because it would be a subversion of the rights of the people. The state legislatures cannot punish them, because they have no control over them in any one instance. In the next, consider the responsibility of the senators. To whom ar® they amenable! I apprehend to none. They are punishable, neither by the general government, nor by the state legislatures; The latter may call them to an account, but they have no power to punish them. Let us now consider the responsibility of the president. He is elected for four years, and not excluded from re-election. Suppose he violates the laws and constitution, or commit high crimes, by whom is he to be tried! By his own council—by those who advis# VIRGINIA. Monroe.] £31 him to commit such violations and crimes! This subverts the prin~ eipl es of justice, as it secures him from punishment. He commands the army of the United states till he is condemned. Will not this be an inducement to foreign nations to use their arts and intrigue® to corrupt his counsellors! If he and his counsellors can escape punishment with so much facility, what a delightful prospect must it be for a foreign nation, which may be desirous of gaining territori¬ al or commercial advantages over us, to practice on them! The cer¬ tainty of success would be equal to the impunity. How is he elec¬ ted! By electors appointed according to the directions of^the state legislatures. Does the plan of government contemplate any other mode! A combination between the electors might easily happen, which would fix on a man in every respect improper. Contemplate- this in all its consequences. Is it not the object of foreign courts to have such a man possessed of this power, as would be inclined to promote their interests! What an advantageous prospect for France and Great Britain to secure the favor and attachment of the president, bv exerting their power and influence to continue him in the office! Foreign nations may, by their intrigues, have great in¬ fluence in each state, in the election of the president, and I have no doubt but their efforts will be tried to the utmost. Will not the in¬ fluence of the president himself have great weight in his re-election! The variety of the offices at his disposal, will acquire him the fa¬ vor and attachment of those who aspire after them, and of the offi¬ cers, and their friends. He will have some connexion with tha members of the different branches of government. They will ee- teem him, because they will be acquainted with him, live in the tame town with him, and often dine with him. This familiar and frequent intercourse will secure him great influence. I presume that when once he is elected, he may be elected forever. Beside* his Influence in the town where he will reside, he will have very consid¬ erable weight in the different states. Those who are acquainted with the human mind in all its operations, can clearly foresee thie. Powerful men in different states will form a friendship with him* For these reasons, I conceive, the same president may always be continued, and be in fact elected by congress, instead of indepen¬ dent and intelligent electors. It is a misfortune, more than once ex¬ perienced, that the representatives of the states do not pursue the particular interest of their own state. When we take a more aeea» mte view of the principles of the senate, we shall have grounds to fear that the interest of our state may be totally neglected— nay, feat our legislative influence will be, as if we were actually expelled er banished out of congress. The senators are amenable to and ap¬ pointed by the state*. They have a negative on all iaw#, maf wig- 222 DEBATES. [Marshall. inate any except money bills, and direct the affairs of the executive* Seven states are a majority, and can in most cases bind the rest; from which reason, the interest of certain states alone will be con¬ sulted. Although the house of representatives is calculated on na¬ tional principles, and should they attend contrary to my expecta¬ tions, to the general interests of the union, yet the dangerous exclu¬ sive powers given to the senate, will, in my opinion, counterbalance their exertions. 'Consider the connection of the senate with the executive. Has it not an authority over all the acts of the execu¬ tive? What are the acts which the president can do without them? What number is requisite to make treaties? A very small numSIr. Two thirds of those wbo may happen to be present, may, with the president, make treaties that shall sacrifice the dearest interests of the southern states—which may relinquish part of our territories— which may dismember the United states. There is no check to pre¬ vent this—there is no responsibility, or power to punish it. He is to nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the senate^ to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, judges of the supreme court, and all other officers of the United States. The concurrence of a bare majority of those who may be present, will enable him to do these important acts. It does not require the consent of two thirds, even of those who may be present. Thus, I conceive the government is put entirely into the hands of seven states ; indeed into the hands of two-thirds of a majority. The ex¬ ecutive branch is under their protection, and yet they are freed from a direct charge of combination. Upon reviewing this government, I must say, under my present impression, I think it a dangerous' government, and calculated to secure neither the interests, nor the rights of our countrymen. Un¬ der such an one, I shall be averse to embark the best hopes and pros¬ pects of a free people. We have struggled long to bring about this revolution, by which we enjoy our present freedom and security. Why then this haste—this wild precipitation? I have fatigued the committee, but as I have not yet said all that I wish upon the subject, I trust I shall be indulged another day. Mr. JOHN 'MARSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I conceive that the object of the discussion now before us, is, whether democracy or despotism, be most eligible. I am sure that those who framed the system submitted to our investigation, aird those who now support it, intend the establishment and security of the former. The sup¬ porters of the constitution claim the title of being firm friends of the liberty and the rights of mankind. They say, that they consider it ;as,the best means of protecting liberty. We, sir, idolize democrat tcy, Those Who opposeit have‘bestowed -culngiums on monarchy. Marshall.] VIRGINIA. 223 'We prefer this system to any monarchy, because we are convinced th&t it has a greater tendency to secure our liberty and promote our "happiness. We admire it, because we think it a well regulated de¬ mocracy. It is recommended to the good people of this country— they are, through ns, to declare whether it be such a plan of govern¬ ment, as will establish and secure their freedom. Permit me attend to what the honorable gentleman (Mr Henry) has said. He has expatiated on the necessity of a due attention to certain maxims—to certain fundamental principles, from which a free people ought never to depart. I concur with him in-the propri* e^of the observance of such maxims. They are necessary in any government, but more essential to a democracy than to any other. What are the favorite maxims of democracy? A strict observance of justice and public faith, and a steady adherance to virtue. These, Sir, are the principles of a good government. No mischief—no misfortune ought to deter us from a strict observance of justice and jpublic faith. Would to Heaven that these principles had been ob¬ served under the present government! Had this been the case, the friends of liberty would not be so willing'now to part with it. Can we boast that our government is founded on these maxims? Can we ^pretend to the enjoyment of political freedom or security, when we are told, that a man has been, by an act of assembly, struck out of existence, without a trial by jury, without examination, without be¬ ing confronted with his accusers and witnesses—without the bene¬ fits of the law of the land? Where is our safety, when we are told, that this act was justifiable, because the person was not a Socrates^ What has become of the worthy member’s maxims? Is this one of them? Shall it be a maxim, that a man shall be deprived of his life without the benefit of law? Shall such a deprivation of life be jus¬ tified by answering, that the man’s life was not taken secundum ar- tem , because he was a bad man? Shall it be a maxim, that govern¬ ment ought not to he empowered to protect virtue? The honorable member, after attempting to vindicate that tyranni¬ cal legislative act to.which I have been alluding, proceeded to take a view of the dangers to which this country is exposed. He told us, that the principle danger arose, from a government, which if adopted, would give away the Mississippi. I intended to proceed regularly, by attending to the clause under debate, but I must reply to some observations which were dwelt upon, to make impressions on our minds, unfavorable to the plan upon the table. Have we no navigation in, or do we derive no benefit from, the ‘Mississippi? How shall we retain it? By retaining that weak government wliioh. has hitherto kept it from us? Is it thus that we shall secure that navigation? Give the government the power of retaining it, and 324 DEBATES. [Marshall* then we may hope to derive actual advantages from it. Till we do this, we cannot expect that a government which hitherto has not been able to protect it, will have the power to do it hereafter. Have we attended too long to consider whether this government would be able to protect us? Shall we wait for further proofs of its inefficacy? If on mature consideration, the constitution will be found to be per¬ fectly right on the subject of treaties, and containing no danger of loosing that navigation, will he still object? Will he object because eight states are unwilling to part with it? This is no good ground of objection. He then stated the necessity and probability of obtaining am^* ments. This we ought to postpone until we come to that clause, and make up our minds, whether there be any thing unsafe in this system. He conceived it impossible to obtain amendments after adopting it. If he was right, does not his own argument prove, that in his own conception, previous amendments cannot be had f for, Sir, if subsequent amendments cannot be obtained, shall we get amendments before we ratify? The reasons against the latter do no^ apply against the former. There are in this state, and in every state in the union, many who are decided enemies of the union. Refleet «n the probable conduct of such men. What will they do? They will bring amendments which are local in their nature, and which they know will not be accepted. W*hat security have we, that oth¬ er states will not do the same? We are told that many in the states were violently opposed to it. They are more mindful of local inter¬ ests. They will never propose such amendments, as they think would be obtained. Disunion will be their object. This will be attained by the proposal of unreasonable amendments. This, Sir, though a strong cause, is not the only one that will militate against previous amendments. Look at the comparative temper of this •ountry now, and when the late federal convention met. We had to idea then of any particular system. The formation of the most perfect plan was our object and wish. It was imagined that the states would accede to, and be pleased with the proposition that would be made them. Consider the violence of opinions, the pre¬ judices and animosities which have been since imbibed. Will not 1 these greatly operate against mutual concessions, or a friendly coo- •urrence? This will, however, be taken up more properly at anothwr time. He eays, we wish to have a strong, energetic, powerful go¬ vernment. We contend for a well regulated democracy.—He insist nates, that the power of the government has been enlarged by the •onveniion, and that we may apprehend it will be enlarged by oth¬ ers. The convention did not in fact assume any power. They have proposed to our consideration a scheme of governgtenf Marshall.] VIRGINIA. 225 'which they thought adviseable. We are not bound to adopt it, if we disapprove of it. Had not every individual in this community a right to tender that scheme which he thought most conducive to the welfare of his country'? Have not several gentlemen already de¬ monstrated, that the convention did not exceed their powers? But the congress have the power of making bad laws, it seems. The senate, with the president, he informs us, may make a treaty which shall be disadvantageous to us—and that if they be not good men, it will not be a good constitution. I shall ask the worthy piember only, if the people at large, and then only ought to makeTaws and tre^^s? Has any man this in contemplation? You cannot exercise the powers of government personally yourselves. You must trust agents. If so, will you dispute giving them the power of acting for you, from an existing possibility that they may abuse it 1 * As long as it is impossible for you to transact your business in person, if you repose no confidence in delegates, because there is a possibility of their abusiug it, you can have no government; for the power of do¬ ing good is inseparable from that of doing some evil. W T e may derive from Holland, lessons very beneficial to ourselves. Happy that country which can avail itself of the misfortunes of ethers—which can gain knowledge from that source without fatal experience! What has produced the late disturbances in that coun¬ try? The want of such a government as is on your table, and having in some measure such a one as you are about to part with. The want of proper powers in the government—the consequent deranged and relaxed administration—the violence of contending parties, and inviting foreign powers to interpose in their disputes, have subjected them to all the mischiefs which have interrupted their harmony. I cannot express my astonishment at his high colored eulogium on | such a government. Can any thing be more dissimilar than the re¬ lation between the British government, and the colonies, and the re¬ lation between congress and the states? We were not represented in parliament. Here we are represented. Arguments which prove ithe impropriety of being taxed by Britain, do not hold against the exercise of taxation by congress. Let me pay attention to the observation of the gentleman who was test up, that the power of taxation ought not to be given to congress. This subject requires the undivided attention of this house. This I power I think essentially necessary, for without it, there will be no I efficiency in the government. W'e have had a sufficient demonstra¬ tion of the vanity of depending on requisitions. How then can the gen¬ eral government exist without this power? The possibility of its being abused, is urged as an argument against its expediency. To I very little purpose did Virginia discover the defects in the old sys- VOL. 3. 15 V 226 DEBATES. [Marshall. tern—to little purpose indeed did she propose improvements—and to no purpose is this plan constructed for the promotion of our hap¬ piness, if we refuse it now, because it is possible that it may be abused. The confederation has nominal powers, but no means to carry them into effect. If a system of government were devised by more than human intelligence, it would not be effectual if the means were not adequate to the power. All delegated powers are liable to be abused. Arguments drawn from this source go in direct opposi¬ tion to the government, and in recommendation of anarchy; The friends of the constitution are as tenacious of liberty as its enemies. They wish to give no power that will endanger it. They ^}h to give the government powers to secure and protect it. Our enqui¬ ry here must be, whether the power of taxation be necessary to per¬ form the objects of the constitution, and whether it be safe and as well guarded as human wisdom can do' it. W hat are the objects of the national goverment? To protect the United States, and to pro¬ mote the general welfare. Protection, in time of war, is one of its principal objects. Until mankind shall cease to have ambition and avarice, wars will arise. The prosperity and happiness of the people depend on the per¬ formance of these great and important duties of the general govern¬ ment. Can these duties be performed by one state? Can one state protect us, and promote our happiness? The honorable gentleman who has gone before me (Governor Randolph) has shewn that \ ir- ginia cannot do these things. How then can they be done? By the national government only. Shall we refuse to give it power to do them? W~e are answered, that the powers may be abused : That though the congress may promote our happiness, yet they may prostitute their powers to destroy our liberties. This goes to the destruction of all confidence in agents. W T ould you believe that men who had merited your highest confidence, would deceive you? Would you trust them again after one deception? W hy then hesi¬ tate to trust the general government? The object of our enquiry is -—Is the power necessary—and is it guarded? There must be men pkand money to protect us.. How are 'armies to be raised* Must we Lrnot have money for that purpose? But the honorable gentleman says, that we need not be afraid of war. Look at history, which lias been so often quoted. Look at the great volume of human nature. They will foretell you, that a defenceless country cannot be secure. The nature of man forbids us to conclude, that we are in no danger from war. The passion of men stimulate them to avail themselves of the weakness of others. The powers of Europe are jealous of us. It is our interest to watch their conduct, and guard against rthera. They must be pleased with our disunion. If we invite them " Marshall.] VIRGINIA. 227 by our weakness to attack us, will they not do it? If we add debil¬ ity to our present situation, a partition of America may take place* It is then necessary to give the government that power in time of peace which the necessity of war will render indispensable, or else we shall be attacked unprepared. The experience ot the world, a knowledge of human nature, and our own particular experience, will confirm this truth. When danger will come upon us, may we not do what we were on the point of doing once already—that is, ap¬ point a dictator? Were those who are now friends to thisyJonstitui¬ tion. less active in the defence of liberty on that trying occasion, than those who oppose it? When foreign dangers come, may not the fear of immediate destruction by foreign enemies, impel us to take a most dangerous step? Where then will be our safety? We may now regulate apd frame a plan that will enable us to repel at¬ tacks, and render a recurrence to dangerous expedients unnecessary. If we be' prepared to defend ourselves, there will be little induce¬ ment to attack us. But if we defer giving the necessary power to the general government, till the moment of danger arrives, we shall give it then, and with an unsparing hand. America, like other na¬ tions, may be exposed to war. The propriety of giving this power will be proved by the history of the world, and particularly of mod¬ ern republics. I defy you to produce a single instance where requi¬ sition's on several individual states composing a confederacy, have been honestly complied with. Bid gentlemen expect to see such punctuality complied with, in America? If they did, our own ex¬ perience shews the contrary. We are told, that the confederation carried us through the war. Had not the enthusiasm of liberty inspired us with unanimity, that system would never have carried us through it. It would have been much sooner terminated had that government been possessed of due energy. The inability of congress,' and the failure of states to comply with the constitutional requisitions, rendered our resistance less efficient than it might have been The weakness of that p-overn- ment caused troops to be against us which ought to have been on our side, and prevented all resources of the community from being called at once into action. The extreme readiness of the people to make their utmost exertions toward off solely the pressing danger,sup¬ plied the place of requisitions. When they came solely to be depen¬ ded on, their inutility was fully discovered. A bare sense of duty, or a regard to propriety, is too feeble to induce men to comply with obli¬ gations. We deceive oursel ves if we expect any efficacy from these. If requisitions will not avail, the government must have the sinews of war some other way. Requisitions cannot be effectual. They Trill be productive Qf delay, and will uhijnately be inefficient. 223 DEBATES. Marshall.! By direct taxation, the necessities of the government will be sup¬ plied in a peaceable manner, without irritating the minds of the peo¬ ple. But requisitions cannot be rendered efficient without a civil war—without great expense of money, and the blood of our citizens. Are there any other means'? Yes, that congress shall apportion the respective quotas previously, and if not complied with by the states, that then this dreaded power shall be exercised. The operation of this has been described by the gentleman who opened the debate. He cannot be answered.—This great objection to that system re¬ mains unanswered. Is there no other argument which ought to have weight with us on this subject? Delay is a strong and pointed ob¬ jection to it. We are told by the gentleman who spokeiast, that direct taxation is unnecessary, because we are not involved in war. I his admits the propriety of recurring to direct taxation if we w’ere engaged in. war. It has not been proved, that we have no dangers to apprehend on this point. What will be the consequence of the system propo¬ sed by the worthy gentleman? Suppose the states should reluse? The worthy gentleman who is so pointedly opposed to the consti¬ tution, proposes remonstrances. Is it a time for congress to remon¬ strate, or compel a compliance with requisitions, when the whole wisdom of the union, and the power of congress are opposed to a fo¬ reign enemy? Another alternative is, that if the states shall appropri¬ ate certain funds for the use of congress, that congress, shall not lay direct taxes ; suppose the funds appropriated by the state for the use «f congress should be,inadequate, it will not be determined whether *hey be insufficient till after tbe time at which the quota ought to kave been pa : d, and then after so long a delay, the means of procu¬ ring money, which ought to have been employed in the first instance snust be recurred to. May they not be amused by such ineffectual and temporising alternatives, from year to year, until America shall be enslaved? The failure in one state, will authorise a failure in an¬ other. The calculation in some states that others will fail to pro¬ duce general failures. This will also be attended with all the ex¬ penses which we are anxious to avoid. What are the advantages te induce us to embrace this system? If they mean that requisitions should be complied with, it will be the same as if congress had the power of direct taxation. The same amount will be paid by the It is objected, that congress will not know how to lay taxes so ae to be easy and convenient for tbe people at large. Let us pay strict attention to this objection If it appears to be totally without feue- dation, the necessit} r oi levying direct taxes will obviate what ge«- * tiifioi: nor will there be any color for refusing to grant the p< - Marshall.] VIRGINIA. 229 wer. The objects of direct taxes are well understood—they are but few —what are they? Lands, slaves, stock of all kinds, and a few other articles of domestic property. Can you believe that ten men selec¬ ted from all parts of the state, chosen because they know the situa¬ tion of the people, will be unable to determine so as to make the tax equal on, and convenient for the people at large? Does any man be¬ lieve, that they would lay the tax without the aid of other informa¬ tion, besides their own knowledge, when they know that the very object for which they are elected is to lay the taxes in ^judicious and convenient manner? If they wish to retain the affection of the people at large, will they not inform themselves of every circum¬ stance that can throw light on the subject? Have they but one source of information? Besides their own experience—-their knowledge of what will suit their constituents, they will have the benefit of the knowledge and experience of the state legislature. They will see in what manner the legislature of Virginia collects its taxes. Will they be unable to follow their example? The gentlemen who shall be delegated to congress will have every source of information that the legislatures of the states can have, and can lay the tax as equal¬ ly on the people and with as little oppression as they can. If then it be admitted, that they can understand how to lay them equally, and conveniently, are we to admit that they will not do it ; but that in violation of every principle that ought to govern men, they will lay them so as to oppress us? What benefit will they have by it? Will it be promotive of their re-election? Will it be by wantonly imposing hardships and difficulties on the people at large, that they will promote their own interest, and secure their re-election? To me it appears introvertible, that they will settle them in such a manner, as to be easy for the people. Is the system so organized as to make taxation dangerous? I shall not go to the various checks of the gov¬ ernment, but examine whether the imme • iate representation of the people be well constructed. I conceive its organization -to be suffi¬ ciently satisfactory to the warmest friend of freedom. No tax can be laid without the consent of the house of representatives. If there be no impropriety in the mode of electing the representatives, can any danger be apprehended? They are elected by those, who can elect representatives in the state legislature. How can the votes of the electors be influenced? By nothing but the character and con¬ duct of the man they vote for. What object can influence them when about choosing him? They have nothing to direct them in the choice but their own good. Have you not as pointed and strong a security as you can possibly have? It is a mode that secures an impossibility ol being corrupted. If they are to be chosen for their wisdom, virtue and integrity, what inducementkave they to infringe on our freedom? 230 DEBATES. [.Marshall, • We are told that they may abuse their power. Are there strong mo-- tives to prompt them to abuse it 1 ? Will not such abuse militate against their own interest] Will not they and their friends feel the effects of iniquitous measures'? Does the representative remain in of¬ fice for life? Does he transmit his title Qf representative to his son] Is he secured from the burthen imposed on the community] To pro¬ cure their re-election, it will be necessary for them to confer with the people at large and convince them that the taxes laid are for their good. I am able to judge on the subject, the power of taxation now before us is wisely conceded, and the representatives are wisely elected. The honorable gentleman said, that a government should ever de¬ pend on the affections of the people. It must be so. It is the best support it can have. This government merits the confidence of the peo¬ ple, and I make no doubt will have it. Then he informed us again, of the disposition of Spain with respect to, the Mississippi, and the conduct of the government with regard to it. To the debility of the confederation alone, may justly be imputed every cause of complaint on this subject. Whenever gentlemen will bring forward their ob¬ jections, I trust we can prove, that no danger to the navigation of that river can arise, from the adoption of this constitution. I beg those gentlemen who may be affected by it, to suspend their judg¬ ment till they hear it discussed. Will, says he, the adoption of this constitution pay our debts! It will compel the states to pay their quotas. Without this, Virginia Will be unable to pay. Unless all the states pry, she cannot. Though the states will not coin money, (as we are told) yet this government will bring forth and proportion all the strength of the union. That economy and industry are essen¬ tial to our happiness will be denied by no man. But the present government will not add to our industry. It takes away the incite¬ ments to industry, by rendering property insecure and unprotected. It is the paper on your table that will promote and encourage indus¬ try. New Hampshire and Rhode Island have rejected it, he tells us, New Hampshire, if my information be right, will certainly adopt it. The report spread in this country, of which I have heard, is that the representatives of that state having, on meeting, found they were instructed to vote against it, returned to their constituents without determining the question, to convince them of their being mistaken, and of the propriety of adopting it. The extent of the country is urged as another objection as being* too great for a republican government'. This objection has been handed from author, to author,, and has been certainly misunder¬ stood and misapplied. To what does it owe its source! To obser¬ vations and criticisms on governments, where representation did not VIRGINIA. 231 Marshall.] exist. As to the legislative power, was it"ever supposed inadequate to any extent? Extent of country may render it difficult to execute the laws, but not to legislate. Extent of country does not extend, the power. What will be sufficiently energetic and operative in a small territory, will be feeble when extended over a wide extended country. The gentleman tells us, there are no checks in this plan. What has become of his enthusiastic eulogium on the American spirit? We should find a check and control when oppressed, from that source. In this country, there is no exclusive personal stock of interest. The interest of the community is blended ancf insepara¬ bly connected with that of the individual. When he promotes his own, he promotes that of the community. When we consult the common good, we consult our own. When he desires such checks as these, he will find them abundantly here. They are the best checks. What has become of his eulogium on the Virginia consti¬ tution? Do the checks in this plan appear less excellent than those of the constitution of Virginia? If the checks in the constitution be compared to the checks in the Virginia constitution, he will find the best security in the former. The temple of liberty was complete, said he, when the people of England said to their king, that he was their servant. What axe we to learn from this? Shall we embrace such a system as that? Is not liberty secure with us, w'here the people hold all powers in their own hands, and delegate them cautiously, for short periods, to their servants, who are accountable for the smallest maladministration? Where is the nation that can boast greater security that we do? We want only a system like the paper before you, to strengthen and per¬ petuate this security. t The honorable gentleman has asked, If there be any safety or freedom, when we give away the sword and the purse? Shall the people at large hold the sword and the purse without the interposi¬ tion of their representatives? Can the whole aggregate community act personally? I apprehend that every gentleman will see the im¬ possibility of this. Must they then not trust them to others? To whom are they to trust them but to their representatives, who are accountable for their conduct? He represents secrecy as unnecessa¬ ry, and produces the British government as a proof of its inutility. Is there no secrecy there? When deliberating on the propriety of de¬ claring war, or on military arrangements, do they deliberate in the open fields? No, Sir. The British government affords secrecy when necessary, and so ought every government. In this plan, secrecy is only used when it would be fatal and pernicious to publish the schemes of government. We are threatened with the loss of our liberties by the possible abuse of power, notwithstanding the DEBATES. Marshall. m maxim,that those who give may take away. It is the people that giv^ power, and can take it back. What shall restrain them? They are the masters who give it, and of whom their servants hold it. He then argues against the system, because it does not resemble the British government, in this, that the same power that declares war has not the means of carrying it on. Are the people of En¬ gland more secure, if the commons haVe no voice in declaring war* or are we less secure by having tlm senate joined with the presi¬ dent? It is an absurdity* says the worthy member, that the same man should obey two masters—that the same collector should gath¬ er taxes for the general government and the states legislature. Are they not both the servants of the people? Are not congress and the state legislatures the agents of the people, and are they not to con¬ sult the good of the people? May not this be effected by giving the sama officer the collection of both taxes? He tells you, that it is ar» absurdity to adopt before you amend. Is the object of your adop¬ tion to mend solely? The objects of your adoption are union, and safety against foreign enemies—protection against faction—against what has been the destruction of all republics. These impel you to its adoption. If you adopt it, whpt shall restrain you from amend¬ ing it, if in trying it, amendments shall be found necessary? The government is not supported by force, but depending on our free will. When experience shall shew us any inconveniences, we cars then correct it. But until we have experience on the subject* amendments as well as the constitution itself, are to try. Let ug try it, and keep our hands free to change it when recessary. If it fee necessary to change government, let us change that government which has been found to be defective.—The difficulty we find in amending the confederation, will not be found in amending this con-, titution. Any amendments, in the system before you, will not go to a radical change—a plain way is pointed out for the purpose. All will be interested to change it, and therefore all exert themselve in getting the change. There is such a diversity of sentiment in human minds, that it is impossible we shall ever concur in one System, till we try it. The power given to the general govern¬ ment over the time; place, and manner of election, is also strongly objected to. When we come to that clause, we can prove it is highly necessary, and not dangerous. The worthy member has concluded his observations by many eu- logiums on the British constitution. It matters not to us whether it be a wise one or not. I think that for America at least, the go¬ vernment on your table is very much superior to it, I ask you, if your house of representatives would be better than it is, if a hun¬ dredth part of the people were to elect a majority of them? If yosw VIRGINIA. Marshall.] 2 & •enators were for life, would they be more agreeable to you? If your president were not accountable to you for his conduct, if it were a constitutional maxim, that he could do no wrong, would you be saf- «r than you are now? If you can answer, Yes, to these questions, then adopt the British constitution. If not, then good as that go'- vernment may be, this is better. The worthy gentleman who was last up, said the confederacies of ancient and modern times were not similar to ours, and that consequently reasons which applied against them, could not be urged against it. Do they not hold out one lesson very useful to us? However unlike in otherYespects, they resemble it in its total inefficacy. They warn us to shun their calamities, and place in our government, those necessary powers, the want of which destroyed them. I hope we shall avail ourselves «f their misfortunes, without experiencing them. There was some¬ thing peculiar in one observation he made. He said, that those who governed the cantons of Switzerland were purchased by foreign pow¬ ers, which was the cause of their uneasiness and trouble. How does this apply to. us? If we adopt such a government a* theirs, will it not be subject to the same inconvenience. 2 Will not the same cause produce the same effect. 2 What shall protect us from it. 2 What is our security? He then proceeded to say, the causes of war are removed from us-^-that we are separated by the sea from the powers of Europe, and need not be alarmed. Sir, the sea makes them neighbors to us. Though an immense ocean divides us, w@ may speedily see them with us. What dangers may we not appre¬ hend to our commerce. 2 Does not our naval weakness invite an at¬ tack on our commerce. 2 May not the Algerines seize our vessels? Cannot they, and every other predatory or maritime nation, pillage our ships and destroy our commerce, without subjecting themselves to any inconvenience? He would, he said, give the general govern¬ ment all necessary powers. If any thing be necessary, it must be so, to call forth the strength of the union, when we may be attack¬ ed, or when the general purposes of America require it. The wor¬ thy gentleman then proceeded to shew* that our present exigencies are greater than they will ever be again. Who can penetrate into futurity. 2 How can any man pretend to say, that our future exigencies will be less than our present. 2 The exigencies of nations have been generally commensurate to their' resources. It would be the utmost impolicy to trust to a mere pos¬ sibility of not being attacked, or obliged to exert the strength of the community. He then spoke of a selection of particular objects by ■congress, which he says must necessarily be oppressive. That con¬ gress, for instance, might select taxes, and that all but land-holders would escape. Cannot congress regulate the taxes so as to be equal 234 DEBATES, [Nicholas, on all parts of the community? Where is the absurdity of having thirteen revenues? Will they clash with, or injure, each other! If not, why cannot congress make thirteen distinct laws, and impose the taxes on the general objects of taxation in each state, so as that all persons of the society shall pay equally as they ought! He then told you, that your continental government will call forth the virtue and-talents of America. This being the case, will they incroach on the power of the state governments! Will our most vir¬ tuous and able citizens wantonly attempt to destroy the liberty of the people! Will the most virtuous act the most wickedly! I dif¬ fer in opinion from the worthy gentleman. 1 think the virtue and talents of the members of the general government will tend to the security, instead of the destruction of our liberty. I think that the power of direct taxation is essential to the existence of the general government, and that it is safe to grant it. If this power be not ne¬ cessary, and as safe from abuse as any delegated power can possi¬ bly be, then I say, that the plan before you is unnecessary; for it imports not what system we have, unless it have the power of pro¬ tecting us in time of peace and war. Mr HARRISON then addressed the chair, but spoke so low that he could not be distinctly heard. He observed, that the accusation of the general assembly, with respect to Josiah Philips, was very unjust. That he was a man, who by the laws of nations, was enti¬ tled to no privilege of trial, &c. That the assembly had uniformly been lenient and moderate in their measures, and that as the debates of this convention would probably be published, he thought it very unwarrantable to utter expressions here which might induce the world to believe that the assembly of Virginia had committed mur¬ der. He added some observations on the plan of government—that it certainly would operate an intringement of the rights and liber¬ ties of the people—that he was amazed that gentleman should at¬ tempt to misrepresent facts, to persuade the convention to adopt such a system; and that he trusted they would not ratify it as it then stood. Mr GEORGE NICHOLAS in reply to Mr Harrison, observed, that the turpitude of a.-man’s character was not a sufficient reason to deprive him of his life without a trial. That such a doctrine as that, was a subversion of every shadow of freemen. That a fair trial was necessary to determine whether accusations against men’s characters were well founded or not, and that no person would be safe, were it once adopted as a maxim, that a man might be con¬ demned without a trial. Mr Nicholas then proceeded—although we have sat eight days, so little has been done, that we have hard¬ ly begun to discuss the question regularly* The rule of the house Nicholas.] VIRGINIA. 235 to proceed, clause by clause, has been violated. Instead of doing this, gentleman alarm us by declamations without reason or argu¬ ment—by bold assertions, that we are going to sacrifice our liber¬ ties. It is a fact, known to many members within my hearing, that several members have tried their interest without doors to induce others to oppose this system. Every local interest that could ef¬ fect their minds, has been operated upon. Can it be supposed, that gentleman elected for their ability and integrity, to represent the people of Virginia, in this convention, to determine on this important question, whether or not we^hall be connected with the other states in the union—can it be thought, I say, that gentleman in a situation like this, will be influenced by motives like these] An answer which has been given, is, that if this constitution be adopted, the western countries will be lost. It is better that a few countries should be lost, than all America. But, Sir, no such consequence can follow from its adoption. They will be much more secure than they are at present. This constitution,- Sir, will secure the equal liberty and happiness of all. It will do immortal honor to the, gentlemen who formed it. I shall shew the inconsistency of the gentleman who entertained us so long, (Mr. Henrv.) He insisted that subsequent amendments would go to a dissolution of the union—that Massachusetts was opposed to it in its present state, Massachusetts has absolutely ratified it; and has gone further, and said, that such and such amendments shall be proposed by their representatives. But such was the attachment of that respectable state to the union, that even at that early period, she ratified it unconditionally, and depended on the probability of obtaining amendments hereaf¬ ter. Can this be a dissolution of the union] Does this indicate an aversion to the union on the part of that state , or, can an imitation of her conduct injure us] He tells us, that our present government is strong. How can that government be strong, which depends on humble supplications for its support] Does a government which is dependent for its existence on others, and which is unable to afford protection to the people, deserve to be continued] But the honora¬ ble gentleman has no objections to see little storms in republics— they may be useful in the political, as well in the natural world. Every thing the gieat creator has ordained in the natural world, is founded on consumnate wisdom : but let him tell us what advanta¬ ges, convulsions, dissentions, and bloodshed, it will produce in the political world] Can disunion be the means of securing the happi¬ ness of the people in this political hemisphere] The worthy mem¬ ber has enlarged on our bill of rights.. Let us see whether his encomiums on tire bill of rights be con- DEBATES. * » $36 [Nicholas,- sistent with his other arguments. Our declaration of rights says, that all men are by nature equally free and independent. How comes the gentleman to reconcile himself~to a government wherein there are a hereditary monarch and nobility'? He objects to this change although our present federal system is totally without ener¬ gy. He objects to this system, because he says it will prostrate your bill of rights. Does not the bill of rights tell you, that a ma¬ jority of the community have an indubitable right to alter any go¬ vernment, which shall be found inadequate to the security of the public happiness? Does it not say, “ that no free government, or the blessings of liberty can be preserved to any people, but by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue, and by frequent recurrence to fundamental principles?” Have not the inadequacy of the present system, and repeated flagrant vio¬ lations of justice, and the other principles recommended by the bill of rights, been amply proved? As this plan of government will promote our happiness and establish justice, will not its adoption be justified by the very principles of your bill of rights? But he has touched on a string which will have great effect. The western country is not safe if this plan be adopted. What do they stand in need of? Do they want protection from enemies? The present weak government cannot protect them. But the exercise of the congressional powers, proposed by ibis constitution, will af¬ ford them ample security, because the general government can com¬ mand the whole strength of the union, to protect any particular part. There is another point wherein this government will set them right. I mean the western posts. This is a subject with which every gen¬ tleman here is acquainted. They have been withheld from us since the peace by the British. The violation of the treaty on our part, authorises this detension in some degree. The answer of the Brit- ish minister to our demand of surrendering the posts, was, that as soon as America should shew a disposition to comply with the ■treaty on her part, that Great Britain should do the same. By this ^constitution treaties will be the supreme law of the land. The adoption of it therefore is the only chance we have of getting the western posts. As to the navigation of the Mississippi, it is one of the most un¬ alienable rights of the people, and which ought to be relinquished on no consideration. The strength of the western people is not ade¬ quate to its retention and enjoyment. They can receive no aid from the confederation. This navigation can only be secured by one of two ways : by force or by treaty. As to force, I apprehend that the new government will be much more likely to hold it than the old. It will be also more likely to retain it by means of trca* 1 Nicholas.] VIRGINIA. •37 lies; because, as it will be more powerful and respectable, it will be more feared : and as they will have more power to injure Spain. Spain will be more inclined to do them justice, by yielding-it, or by giving them an adequate compensation. It was said that France and Spain would not be pleased to see the United States united in one great empire. Shall we remain feeble and contemptible to please them 1 Shall we reject our own interest to protect theirs? We shall be more able to discharge our engagements. This maybe agreeabje to them. Thereaje many strong reasons to expect that the adoption of this systemTvill be beneficial to the back country, and that their interest will be much better attended to under the new than under the old government. There are checks in this constitution which will render the naviga¬ tion of the Mississippi safer than it was under the confederation. There is a clause which in my opinion, will prohibit the general go¬ vernment from relinquishing that navigation. The fifth clause of the nip.th section, of the first article, provides, “That no prefer¬ ence shall be given by any regulation of commerce, or revenue, to •the ports of one state, over those of another.” If congress be ex¬ pressly prohibited to give preference to the ports of one state over those of another, there is a strong implication, that they cannot give preference to the ports of any foreign nation over those of a state. This will render it unconstitutional to give Spain a preference t® the western country in the navigation of that river. They may say that this is a constrained construction, but it appears to me a ration¬ al. It would be a violation of true policy to give such a prefer¬ ence. It would be a departure from natural construction to sup¬ pose, that an advantage withheld from the states should be given to a foreign nation. Under the confederation, congress connot make a treaty without the c onsent of nine states. Congress, by the proposed plan, can¬ not make a treaty without the consent of two-thirds of the sena¬ tors present, and of the president. Two-thirds will amount to nine states, if the senators from all the states be present. Can it be candidly and fairly supposed, that they will not all, or nearly all, be present when so important a subject as a treaty is to be agi¬ tated? The consent of the president is a very great security. He is elected by the people at large. He will not have the local in¬ terests which the members of congress may have. If he deviates from bis duty he is responsible to his constituents. l He will be de¬ graded, and will bring on his head the accusation of the representa¬ tive* of the people—an accusation which has ever been, and always vri.ll be, very formidable. He will be absolutely disqualified to hold **y place of profit, honor, or trust, and liable to further punish- I im DEBATES. {Nicholas. ment, if he has committed such high crimes, as are punishable at common law.—From the summit of honor and esteem, he will be precipitated to the lowest infamy and disgrace. Although the rep¬ resentatives have no immediate agency in treaties, yet from their influence in the government, they will direct every thing. They will be a considerable check on the senate and president. Those from small states will be particularly attentive, to prevent a sacri¬ fice of territory. The people of New England have lately purchased great quanti¬ ties of lands in the western country. Great numbers of them have moved thither. Every one has left his friends, relations and ac¬ quaintances, behind him. This will pi event those states from adop¬ ting a measure, that would so greatly tend to the injmy of their friends. Has not Virginia, in the most explicit terms, asserted her right to that navigation! Can she ever enjoy it under so feeble a government as the present? This is one reason why she should assent to ratify this system? A strong argument offered by the gen¬ tleman last up, against the concession of direct taxation, is, that the hack lands and impost will be sufficient for all the exigencies of government, and calculates the impost as a considerable amount. The impost will be affected by this business. The navigation of that river wll encrease the impost. Are not the United States as much interested as the people of Kentucky, to retain that naviga¬ tion? Congress will have as much interest in it, as any inhabitant of that country, and must exert themselves for it. Kentucky will have taxes to pay. How can they pay them without navigation? It will be to their interest to have it in their power to navigate the Mississippi, and raise money by imposts. It will be to the interest of all the states, a3 it will increase the general resources of the united community. Considering Kentucky as an independent state, she will under the present system, and without the navigation of that river, be furnish¬ ed with the articles of her consumption, through the medium of the importing states. She will, therefore, be taxed by every im¬ porting state. If the new constitution takes place, the amounts of • t duties on imported articles will go into the general treasury, by which means Kentucky will participate an equal advantage with -the importing states. It will then be clearly to the advantage of the inhabitants of that country that it should take place. He tells us, that he prays for union. What kind of Anion? An union of the whole, I suppose, if it could be got on his terms. If on such terms, he will adopt it. If not, he will recur to partial confederacies. He will attempt amendments. If he cannot obtain them—then he ;$sfU choose a partial confederacy! Now I beg every gentleman \ft VIRGINIA. 239 Nicholas.] this committee, who would not sacrifice the union, to attend to the situation in which they are about to place themselves. I beg gentlemen seriously to reflect on this important business. They say amendments may be previously obtained, but acknowl¬ edged to be difficult. Will you join in an opposition that so direct¬ ly tends to disunion? Can any member here think of disunion, or a partial confederacy, without horror? Yet both are expressly pre¬ ferred to union, unless this system be amended previously. But, says the worthy member, why should not previous amendments be obtained? Will they not be agreed to, ah the eight adopting states are friends to the union? But what follows? If they are so, they will agree to subsequent amendments. If you recommend altera¬ tions after ratifying, the friendship of the adopting states to the union, and the desires of several of them to have amendments, will lead them to gratify every reasonable proposal. By this means you secure the goveinment and union. But if you reject the constitu¬ tion, and say, you must have alterations as the previous condition of adoption, you sacrifice the union, and all the valuable parts of it. % Can we trust, says he, our liberty to the president—to the senate —to the house of representatives? We do not trust our liberty to a particular branch: one branch has not the whole power. One branch is a check on the other. The representatives have a control- %ng power over the whole. He then told us, that republican bor¬ derers are not disposed to quarrels. This controverts the uniform evidence of history. I refer the gentleman to the history of Greece,. Were not the republics of that country, which bordered on one another, almost perpetually at war? Their confederated republics, as long as they were united, w r ere continually torn by domestic factions. This was the case w T ith the Amphyctions. They called to their assistance the Macedonian monarch, and were subjected themselves by that very prince. This was the fate of the other Grecian republics. Dissent.ions among themselves rendered it ne¬ cessary for them to call for foreign aid, and this expedient ultimate¬ ly ended in their own subjugation. This proves the absolute ne¬ cessity of the union. There is a country w r hich affords strong examples, which may bs of great utility to us : I mean Great Britain. England, before it was united to Scotland, was almost constantly at war with that part of the island. The inhabitants of the north and south parts of the same island were more bitter enemies to one, another than to the na¬ tions on the continent. England and Scotland were more bitter en¬ emies before the union, than Eno-land and France have ever been, before or since. Their hatred and animosities were stimulated by DEBATES. [Nicholas. tie interference of other nations. Since the union, both countries have enjoyed domestic tranquility the greatest part of the time, and both countries have been greatly benefitted by it. This is a con¬ vincing proof that union is necessary for America, and that partial confederacies would be productive of endless dissentions, and un¬ ceasing hostilities between the different parts. The gentleman relies much on the force of requisitions. I shall mention two examples which will shew their inutility. They are fruitless without the coercion of arn s. ]f large states refuse, a complete civil war, or dissolution of the confederacy will result. If small states refuse, they will be destroyed, or obliged to comply. From the history of the United Netherlands,, the inutility of requi¬ sitions, without recurring to force, may be proved. The small pro¬ vinces refused to comply. Holland, the most powerful, marched into their territories with an army, and compelled them to pay. The other example, is from the New-England confederacy. Mas¬ sachusetts, the most wealthy and populous state, refused to contri¬ bute her share. The rest were enabled to compel her, and the league was dissolved. Attend to a resolution of the assembly of Virginia in the year 1784.— * [Here Mr Nicholas read a resolution of that year, to enable con¬ gress to compel a compliance with re,quisiti6ns.] I am sure that the gentleman recognizes his child. Is not this a conclusive evidence of the utter inefficacv of requisitions! This expedient of coercion is a dreadful alternative. It confounds those who are innocent, and willing to pay, with those who refuse. How are they to be discriminated, if a state is to be attacked for the re¬ fusal of its legislature! I am sure there is not a man in the com- mittee who does not see the impolicy and danger of such an expe¬ dient. We are next terrified with the thought of excises. In some •ountries excises are terrible. In others, they are not only harm¬ less, but useful. In our sister states they are excised without any inconvenience. They are a kind of tax on manufactures. Our manufactures are few in proportion to those of other states. We may be assured, that congress shall make such regulations as will make excises convenient and easy -for the people. Another argument made use of, is, that ours is the largest state, and must pay in proportion to the other states. How does that ap- •ai! The proportion of taxes are fixed by the number of inhabi¬ tants, and not regulated by the extent of territory, or fertility of »»il. if we be wealthier in proportion, than other states, it will fall lighter upon us than upon poorer state*. They must fix the taxe* ■Nicholas.] VIRGINIA. 241 •so that the pooiest states can pay, and Virginia being richer will bear it easier. The honorable gentleman says, that the first collections are to go to congress, and that the state'legislatures must bear all deficien¬ cies. How does this appear"? Does he prove it? Nothing of it appears in the plan itself. The congress and the state'legislatures v have concurrent jurisdictions in laying and collecting taxes. There is no rule that shews that congress -Shall have'the first collections. Each is independent of the other. Another argument against this disingenuous construction iVdrawn from that clause which regulates representation, which is conclu¬ sive from the words themselves: “ Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included within this union, according to their respective numbers.” Each state will know, from its population, its proportion of any general tax. As it was justly observed by the gentleman over the way, (Mr. Randolph) they cannot possibly exceed that proportion : they are limited and restrained expressly'to it. The state legisla¬ tures have no check of this kind. Their power is uncontrolled. This excludes the 'danger of interference. Each collects its own taxes, and bears its own deficiencies ; and officers are accountable to each government or the different collections. I deny, on my part, what he says with respect to the general welfare. He tells you, that under pretence of providing for-the general welfare, that may lay the most enormous taxes. There is nothing in the clause which warrants this suggestion. It provides, “ that congress shall have the power to lay and col¬ lect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States.” The debts of the union ought to be paid. Ought not the common defence to be provided for? . Is fit mot necessary to provide for the general welfare? It has been fully proved, that this power could not be given to another body. The amounts to be raised are confined to these purposes solely. "Will oppressive burthens be warranted by this clause? They are not to raise money for any other purpose. It is a power which is drawn from his favorite con¬ federation, the eighth article of which provides, “ That all charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defence or general welfare, and allowed by the United States, in congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury which shall be supplied by the several states, in proportion to the value of all lands within each state, granted to, or-surveyed for any person, as such land, and the building and improvement thereon shall be estimated, according to such mode as the United States, ia .congress assembled, shall, from time to time direct and appoint. jol. 3. 16 242 DEBATES. [Nicholas'- The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid and levied by the authority and direction of the legislatures of the several states* within the time agreed upon by the United States in congress as¬ sembled.” Now, Sir, by a comparison of this article, with th® clause in the constitution, we shall find them lo be nearly the same. The common defence and general welfare are the objects expressly mentioned to be provided for, in both systems. The power in the confederation to secure and provide for these objects was constitu¬ tionally unlimited. The requisitions of congress are binding on the states, though from the imbecility of their nature they cannot be en¬ forced. The same power is intended by the constitution. The only difference between them is, that congress is by this plan to impose the taxes on the people, whereas, by the confederation, they are laid by the states. The amount to be raised, and the power given to raise it is the same in principle. The mode of raising is only different* and this difference is founded on the necessity of giving the go¬ vernment. that energy, without which, it cannot exist. The power has not been reprobated in the confederation. It ought not to bo blamed in the proposed plan of government. The gentleman has adverted to what he calls the sweeping clause, &c. and represents it, as replete with great dangers. This dreaded clause runs in the following words. “To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the forego¬ ing powers ; and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.” The committee will perceive, that the constitution had enumerated all the powers which the general government should have; but did not say how they were to be exercised. It therefore in this clause tells how they shall be exercised. Does this give any new power! I say not. Suppose it had been inserted at the end of every power, that they should have power to make laws to carry that power into execution : would this have increased their powers 1 If therefore, it could not have increased their powers, if placed at the end of each power, it cannot increase them at the end of all. This clause only enables them to carry into execution tho powers given to them, but gives them no additional power. But it is objected to for want of a bill of rights, It is a principle universally agreed upon, that all powers not given arc retained.— Where by the constitution, the general government has general pow¬ ers, for any purpose, its powers are absolute. Where it has powers with some exceptions, they are absolute, only as to those excep¬ tions. In either case, the people retain what is not conferred on tho Apncia govern in‘uu, as it is by their Positive grant that it h ss Nicholas.] VIRGINIA. 243 of its powers. In England, in all disputes between the king and people, recurrence is had to the enumerated rights of the people to determine. Are the rights in dispute secured—are they included in Magna Charta, Bill of Rights, &c.! If not, they are, generally speaking, within the king’s prerogative. In disputes between con¬ gress and the people, the reverse of the proposition holds. Is the disputed right enumerated! If not, congress cannot meddle with it. Which is the most safe! The people of America know wW they have relinquished for certain purposes. They also know that they retain every thing else, and have a right to resume what they have given up, if it be perverted from its intended object. The king’s prerogative is general, with certain exceptions. The people are, therefore, less secure than 'we are. Magna Charta, Bill of Rights, &c. secure their liberty. Our constitution itself contains an English Bill of Rights. The English Bill of Rights declares, that parlia¬ ments shall be held frequently. Our constitution says, that congress shall sit annually. The English declaration of rights provides, that no laws shall be suspended. The constitution provides, that no laws shall be suspended, except one, and that in time of rebellion or invasion, which is the writ of habeas corpus. The declaration of rights says, that there should be no army in time of peace without the consent of parliament. Here we cannot have an army even in time of war, with the approbation of our representatives for more than two years. The liberty of the press is secured. What secures it in England! is it secured by magna charta, the declaration of rights or by any other express provision! It is not. They have no express security for the liberty of the press. They have a reliance on parliament for its protection and security. In the time of king William, there pas¬ sed an act for licensing the press. That was repealed. Since that time it has been looked upon as safe. The people have depended on their representatives. They will not consent to pass an act to infringe it because such an act would irritate the nation. It is equal¬ ly secure with us. As to the trial by jury, consider in what situa¬ tion it is by the state constitution. It is not on a better footing. It is by implication under the control of the legislature; because it has left particular cases to be decided by the legislature. Here it is se¬ cured in criminal cases, and left to the legislatures in civil cases. One instance will prove the evil tendency of fixing it in the consti¬ tution. It will extend to all cases. Causes in chancery, which, strictly speaking, never are, nor can be well tried by a jury, would then be tried by that mode, and cculd not be altered, though found, I 1 t •' 5 V r ': V n! It!. DEBATES. 244 [Madison.- But taxes are to be increased, we are told. I think they will" not. I am clearly of opinion, that the deduction in the civil list of the states, will be equal to the increase of that of the general go¬ vernment. Then the increase ot custom-house officers is dreaded, The present custom-house officers will be sufficient in the hands of congress. So that as much as economy will take place, so far the revenues will be increased. Mr Nicholas concluded by making a few observations on the general structure of the government, and its probable happy operation. He said that it was a government calcu¬ lated to suit almost any extent of territory. He then quoted the opinion of the celebrated Montesquieu, from vol. 1st, book ix, where that writer speaks of a confederate republic as the only safe means of extending the sphere of a republican government to any consid¬ erable degree. Wednesday, June 11, 1788. [The first and second sections still under consideration.} Mr MADISON.—Mr Chairman, it was my purpose to resume befoie now, what I had left unfinished, concerning the necessity of a radical change of our system. The intermission which has taken place discontinued the progress of the argument, and has given op¬ portunity to others to advance arguments on different parts of the plan. I hope we shall steer our course iu a different manner from what we have hitherto done. 1 presume that vague discourses and mere sports of fancy, not relative to the subject at all, are very im¬ proper on this interesting occasion. I hope these will be no longer attempted, but that we shall come to the point. I trust we shall not go out of order, but confine ourselves to the clause under considera¬ tion. I beg gentlemen would observe this rule. I shall endeavor not to depart from it myself. The subject ot direct taxation is perhaps one of the most impor¬ tant that can possibly engage our attention, or that can be involved in the discussion of this question. If it be to be judged by the com¬ ments made upon it, by the opposers and favorers of the proposed system, it requires a most clear and critical investigation. The ob¬ jections against the exercise of this power by the general govern¬ ment as far as I am able to comprehend them, are founded upon the supposition of its being unnecessary, impracticable, unsafe and ac¬ cumulative of expense. I shall therefore consider, 1st, how far it may be necessary ; 2d, how far it may be practicable ; 3dly, how far it may be safe, as well with respect to the public liberty at large, as to the state legislatures ; and 4thly, with respect to economy. First then, is it necessary? I must acknowledge that I concur in opinion with those gentlemen w’ho told you that this branch of levenue was • essential to the salvation of the union. It appears to me necessary. VIRGINIA. 245 Madison.] In order to secure that punctuality which is necessary in revenue matters. Without punctuality individuals will give it no confidence, without which it cannot get resources. I beg gentlemen to con¬ sider the situation of this country, if unhappily the government were to be deprived of this power. Let us suppose for a moment that one of those powers which may be unfriendly to us, should take advantage of our weakness, which they will be more ready to do when they know the want of this resource in our government. Suppose it should attack us, what forces could we oppc^to it? Could we find safety in such forces as we could call out! Could we call forth a sufficient number, either by draughts, or any other way, to repel a powerful enemy! The inability of the government to raise and support regular troops, would compel us to depend on militia. It would be then necessary to give this power to the government, or run the risk of national annihilation. It is my firm belief, that if a hostile attack were made this moment on the United States, it would flash conviction on the minds of the citizens of the United States, of the necessity of vesting the government with this power, which alone can enable it to protect the community. I do not wish to frighten the members into a concession of this power, but to bring to their minds those considerations which demonstrate its necessity. If we were secured from the possibility, or probability of danger, it might be unnecessary. I shall not review that concourse of dan¬ gers which may probably arise at remote periods of futurity, nor all those which have immediately to apprehend, for this would lead me beyond the bounds which I prescribed myself. But I will men¬ tion one single consideration, drawn from fact itself. I hope to have your attention. By the treaty between the United States and his most Christian majesty, among other things it is stipulated, that the great principle on which the armed neutrality in Europe was founded, should pre¬ vail in case of future wars. The principle is this, that free ships shall make free goods, and that vessels and goods shall be both free from condemnation. Great Britain did not recognize it. While all Europe was against her, she held out without acting to it. It has been considered for sometime past, that the flames of war al¬ ready kindled, would spread, and that France and England were likely to draw those swords which were so recently put up. This is judged probable. We should not be surprised in a short time, to consider ourselves as a neuteral nation—France on one side, and Great Britain on the other. What is the situation of America! She Is remote from Europe, and ought not to engage in her politics or wars. The American vessels, if they can do it with advantage, DEBATES. 246 [Madisoh* may carry on the commerce of the contending nations* It is a source of wealth which we ought not to deny to our citizens. But, Sir, is there not infinite danger, that in despite of all our caution we shall be drawn into the war? If American vessels have French property on board, Great Britain will seize them. By this means we shall be obliged to relinquish the advantage of a neutral nation, or be en- gaged in a war. A neutral nation ought to be respectable, or else it will be insult¬ ed and attacked. America in her present impotent situation would run the risk of being drawn in as a party in the war, and lose the advantage of being neutral. Should it happen that the British fleet should be superior, have we not reason to conclude, from the spirit displayed by that nation to us and to all the world, that we should be insulted in our own ports, and our vessels seized? But if we be in a respectable situation—if it be known that our government can ■command the whole resources of the union, we shall be suffered to enjoy the great advatages of carrying on the commerce of the nations at war: for none of them would be willing to add us to the number of their enemies. I shall say no more on this point, there being others which merit your consideration. The expedient proposed by the gentlemen opposed to this clause. Is, that requisitions shall be made, and if not complied with in a certain time, that then taxation shall be recurred to. 1 1 am clearly convinced,that whenever requisitions shall be made, they will disap¬ point those who put their trust in them. One reason to prevent the concurrent exertions of all the states, will arise from the suspicion, in some states, of delinquency in others. States will be governed by the motives that actuate individuals. When a tax is in operation in a particular state, every citizen, if he knows of the energy of the laws to enforce payment, and that every other citizen is performing his duty, will cheerfully discharge his duty; but were it known that the citizens of cne district were not performing their duty, and that it was left to the policy of the govern¬ ment to make them come up with it, the other districts would be very supine and careless in making provisions for payment. Our own experience makes the illustration more natural. If requisitions be made on thirteen different states, when one deliberates on the subject, she will know that all the rest will deliberate upon it also. This, Sir, has been a principal cause ot the inefficacy of requisitions heretofore, and will hereafter produce the same evil. If the legisla¬ tures are to deliberate on this subject, (and the honorable gentleman opposed to this clause, thinks their deliberation necessary) is it not presumable, that they will consider peculiar local circumstances? In the general council, on the contrary, the sense of all America Madison.] VIRGINIA. 247 would be drawn to a single point. The collective interest of the union at large, will be known and pursued. No local views will be permitted to operate against the general welfare. But when propositions would come before a particular state, there is every rea¬ son to believe, that qualifications of the requisitions would be propo¬ sed—compliance might be promised, and some instant remittances might be made. This will cause delays, which in the first instance will produce disappointment, This also will make failures every where else. This I hope will be considered with the attention it deserves. The public creditors will be disappointed, and more pressing. Requisitions will be made for purposes equally pervading all America; but the exertions to make compliances, will probably be not uniform in the states. If requisitions be made for future occa¬ sions, for putting the states in a state of military defence, or to repel an invasion, will the exertions be uniform and equal in all the states! Some parts of the United States are moie exposed than others. Will the least exposed states exert themselves equally! We know that the most exposed will be more immediately interested, and will make less sacrifices in making exertions. I beg gentlemen to con¬ sider that this argument will apply with most effect to the states which are most defenceless and exposed. The southern states are most exposed, whether we consider their situation, or the smallness of their population. And there are other circumstances which render them still more vulnerable, which do not apply to the northern states. They are therefore more interested in givingthe government a pow¬ er to command the whole strength of the union in cases of emergen¬ cy. Do not gentlemen conceive this mode of obtaining supplies from the states, will keep alive animosities between the general go¬ vernment and particular states! Where the chances of failures are -so numerous as thirteen, by the thirteen states, disappointment in the first place, and consequent animosity must inevitably take place. Let us consider the alternatives proposed by gentlemen, instead of the power of laying direct taxes. After the states shall have re” fused to comply, weigh the consequences of the exercise ofthispow' *er by congress. When it comes in the form of a punishment, great clamours will be raised among the people against the government * hatred will be excited against it. It will be considered as an iarncT minious stigma on the state. It will be considered at least in this light by the state where the failure is made, and these sentiments will no doubt be diffused through the other states. Now let us consider the effect, if collectors are sent where the state governments refuse to comply with requisitions. It is too much the disposition of man¬ kind not’to stop at one violation of duty. I conceive that every re. 248 DEBATES. [Madisonv- quisition that will be' made on my part of America, will kindle a con¬ tention between the delinquent member, and the general government. Is there no reason to suppose divisions in the government (for seldom does any thing pass with unanimity) on the subject of requisitions? The parts least exposed will oppose those measures which may be adopted for the defence of the weakest parts. Is there no reason to presume, that the representatives from the delinquent state will be more likely to foster disobedience to the requisitions-of the govern¬ ment, than study to reeommend them to the public? There is in my opinion, another point of view in which this alter¬ native will produce great evil; 1 will suppose, what is very prob¬ able, that partial compliances will be made. A difficulty here arises which- fully demonstrates its impolicy. If a part be paid, and the rest withheld, how is the general government to proceed? They are to impose a tax, but how shall it be done in this case? Are they to impose it by- way of punishment, on those who have paid, as well as- those who have not? All these considerations taken into view (for they are not visionary or fanciful speculations) will, perhaps, produce this consequence. The general government to avoid these disap¬ pointments which I first described, and to avoid the contentions and embarassments which I last described, will in all probability, throw the public burdens on those branches of revenue which will be more in their power. They will be continually necessitated to augment the imposts. If we throw a disproportion of the burdens on that side, shall we not discourage commerce; and suffer many political' evils? Shall we not increase that disproportion on the southern states., which for sometime will operate against us?. The southern states, from having fewer manufactures, will import and consume more... They will therefore pay more of the imposts. The more commerce is. burdened, the more the disproportion, will operate against them. If direct taxation be mixed with other taxes, it will be in the powe of the general government to lessen that inequality. But this in, equality will be increased to the utmost extent, if the general govern¬ ment have not this power. There is another point of view in which this subject affords us instruction.. The imports will decrease in time of war. The hon¬ orable gentleman who spoke yesterday,.said, that the imposts would be so productive, that there would be no occasion of laying taxes. I will submit two observations to him and the committee. First: in time of war the imposts will be less, and as I hope we are con¬ sidering a government for a perpetual duration, we ought to provide for every future contingency. At present our importations bear a full proportion to the full amount of our sales, and to the number cf our inhabitants ; but when we have inhabitants enough, ou.r imposts will. Madison.]; VIRGINIA.. 24 # *. # decrease ; and as the national demands will increase with our popu¬ lation, our resources will increase as our wants increase. The oth er consideration which I will submit on this part of the subject is this :—I believe that it will be found in practice, that those who fix the public burdens, will feel a greater degree of responsibility when they are to impose them, on the citizens immediately, than if they were to say what sum should be paid by the states.. If, they exceed the limits of propriety, universal discontent and clamour will arise. Let us suppose they were to collect the taxes from- the citizens of America—would they not consider their circumstances'! Would they not attentively consider what could be done by the citizens at large! Wer.e they to exceed in their demands, what were reasona¬ ble burdens, the people would impute it to the right source, and look on the imposers as odious. When I consider the nature of the various objections brought against this clause; I should be led to think, that the difficulties were such, that gentlemen would not be able to get over, them, and that the power, as defined in the plan of the convention, was impractica¬ ble. I shall trouble them with a few observations on that point: It has been said that ten men deputed from this state, and others in proportion from other states, will not be able to adjust direct tax¬ es, so as to accommodate the various citizens in thirteen states. I confess Ido not see the force of this observation. Could not ten intelligent men, chosen from ten districts from this state, lay di¬ rect taxes on a few objects in the most judicious manner! It is to be conceived, that they would be acquainted with the situation of different citizens of this country. Can, any one divide' this state into ten districts so as not to contain men of sufficient information!’ Could not one man of knowledge be found in a district! When, thus selected, will they not be able to carry t/heir knowledge into the general council! I may say with great propriety, that the experi¬ ence of our own legislature demonstrate the competency of congress to lay taxes wisely. O.ur assembly consists of considerably more than a hundred ; yet from the nature of the business, it devolves on a much smaller number. It is through their sanction, approved of by all the others. It will be found that there are seldom more than ten men who rise to high information on this subject.. Our federal representatives, as has-been said by the gentleman (Mr. Marshall) who entered into the subject with a great deal of ability, wil>] get information from the state governments. They will be pesfostly w«ll informed of the circumstances of the people of the different states, and the mode of taxation that would he most convenient for them, from the laws of the states. In laying taxes, they may evea, rofer to the state system of taxation. Let it not be forgotten., that DEBATES. 250 [Madisok there is a probability, that that ignorance which is complained of in some parts of America, will be continually diminishing. Let ua compare the degree of knowledge which the people had in time past to their present information. Does not our own experience teach us, that the people are better informed than they were a few years ago! The citizen of Georgia knows more now of the affairs of New Hamp¬ shire, than he did before the revolution, of those of South Carolina. When the representatives from the different states are collected to¬ gether, to consider this subject, they will interchange their know¬ ledge with one another, and will have the laws of each state on the table. Besides this, the intercourse of the states will be continual¬ ly increasing. It is now much greater than before the revolution. My honorable friend,'over the way (Mr. Monroe) yesterday, seemed to conceive, as an insurperable objection, that if land were made the particular object of taxation, it would be unjust, as it would ex¬ onerate the commercial part of the community—that if it were laid on trade, it would be unjust in discharging the landholders; and that any exclusive selection would be unequal and unfair. If the general government were tied down to one object, I confess the ob¬ jection would have some force in it. But if this be not the case, it -can have no weight. If it should have a general power of taxation, dhey could select the most proper objects, and distribute the taxes in such a manner, as that they should fall in a due degree on every member of the community, They will be limited to fix the propor¬ tion of each state, and they must raise it in the most convenient and satisfactory manner to the public. The honorable member considered it as another insuperable ob¬ jection, that uniform laws could not be made for thirteen states, and that dissonance would produce inconvenience and oppression. Per¬ haps it may not be found, on due enquiry, to be so impracticable as he-supposes. But were it so, where is the evil of different states, to raise money for the general government! Where is the evil of such laws! There are instances in other countries, of different laws operating in different parts of the country, without producing any kind of opposition. The revenue laws are different in England and Scotland in several respects. Their laws relating to customs exci¬ ses and trade, are similar; but those respecting direct taxation are dissimilar. There is aland tax in England, and a land tax in Scot- land, but the laws concerning them are not the same. It is much heavier in proportion in the former than in the latter. The mode of collection is different—yet this is not productive of any national in¬ convenience. Were we to conclude from the objections against the proposed plan, this dissimilarity, in that point alone, would have involved those kingdoms in difficulties. In England itself, there is Virginia. $[jLt>iaON.] a variety of different laws operating differently in different places. I will make another observation on the objection of my honorable friend. He seemed to conclude, that concurrent collections under different authorities, were not reducible to practice. I agree that were they independent of the people, the argument would be good. But they must serve one common master. They must act in con¬ cert, or the defaulting party must bring on itself the resentment of the people. If the general government be so constructed, that it will not dare to impose such burdens, as will distress the people, where is the evil of its having a power ot taxation concurrent with the states? The people would not support it, were it to impose op¬ pressive burdens. Let me make one more comparison of the state governments, to this plan. Do not the states impose taxes for lo¬ cal purposes? Does the concurrent collection of taxes, imposed by the legislatures for general purposes, and of levies laid by the coun¬ ties for parochial and county purposes, produce any inconvenience or oppression? The collection of these taxes is perfectly practica¬ ble, and consistent with the views of both parties. The people at large are the common superior of the state governments, and the gen¬ eral government. It is reasonable to conclude, that they will avoid interferences for two causes—to avoid public oppression, and to ren¬ der the collections more productive. I conceive they will be more likely to produce disputes, in rendering it convenient for the people, than run into interfering regulations. In the third place I shall consider, whether the power of taxation to be given the general government be safe : and first, whether it be safe as to the public liberty in general. It would be sufficient to re¬ mark, that they are, because I conceive, the point has been clearly established by more than one gentleman who has spoken on th« same side of the question. In the decision of this question, it is of importance to examine, whether elections of representatives by great districts of freeholders be favorable to fidelity in representatives. The greatest degree of treachery in representatives, is to be appre¬ hended where they are chosen by the least number of electors; be¬ cause there is a greater facility of using undue influence, and because the electors must be less independent. This position is verified in the most unanswerable manner, in that country to which appeals ai« so often made, and sometimes instructively. Who are the most corrupt members 7 in parliament? Are they not the inhabitants of small towns and districts? The supporters of hefty are from the great counties. Have we not seen that the rep¬ resentatives of the city of London, who are chosen by such thous¬ ands of voters, have continually studied and supported the liberties of the people, and opposed the corruption of the crown? We have DEBATES. 252 [Madtsost. seen continually that most of the members in the ministerial major¬ ity are drawn from small circumscribed districts. We may there¬ for conclude, that our representatives being choosen by such exten¬ sive districts, will be upright and independent. In proportion as we have security against corruption in representatives we have se¬ curity against corruption from every other quarter whatsoever. I shall take a view of certain subjects which will lead to some reflections, to quiet the minds of those gentlemen who think that the individual governments will be swallowed up by the general go¬ vernment. In order to effect this, it is proper to compare the state governments to the general government, with respect to reciprocal dependence, and with respect to the means they have of supporting themselves, or of encroaching on one another. At the first compar¬ ison we must be struck with these remarkable facts. The general government has not the appointment of a single branch of the indi¬ vidual governments, or of any officers within the states, to: execute their laws. Are not the states integral parts of the general govern¬ ment? Is not the president choosen under the influence of the state legislatures? May we not suppose that he will be complaisant to those from whom he has his oppointment, and from whom he must have his re-appointment? The senators are appointed altogether by the legislatures. My honorable friend apprehended a coalition between the presi¬ dent, senate, and house of representatives, against the states. This eould be supposed only from a similarity of the component parts. A coalition is not likely to take place, because its component parts are heterogeneous in their nature. The house of representatives is not chosen by the state governments, but under the influence of those who compose state the legislature. Let us suppose ten men appointed to carry the government into effect, there is every degree of certainty, that they would be indebted for their re-election to the members of the legislatures. T f they derive their appointment from them, will they not execute their duty to them? Besides this, will not the people (whose predominant inteiest will ultimately prevail) feel great attachment to the state legislatures? They have the care of all local interests—those familiar domestic objects, for which men have the strongest predilection. The general government on the contrary, has the preservation of the aggregate interest of the union—objects, which being less familiar, and more remote from men’s notice have a less powerful influence on their minds. Do we not see great and natural attachments arising from local considera¬ tions? This will be the case in a much stronger degree in the state governments, than in the general government. The people will be attached to their state legislatures from a thousand causes; and into. Madison.] VIRGINIA. 253 whatever scale the people at large will throw themselves, that scale will preponderate. Did we not perceive, in the early stages of the war, when con¬ gress was the idol of America-, and when in pursuit of the object most dear to America, that they Were attached to their states'? Af¬ terwards the whole current of their affection was to the states, and would be still the case, we’re it not for the alarming situation of America. \ At one period of the congressional history, they had the power to trample on the states. When they had that fund of paper money in their hands, and could carry on all their measures without any de¬ pendence 'on the states, was there any disposition to debase the state governments'? All that municipal authority which was neces- saryto carry on the administration of the government, they still re¬ tained unimpaired. There was no attempt to diminish it. I am led by what fell from my honorable friend yesterday to take this supposed combination in another view. Is it supposed, that the influence of the general government will facilitate a combination between the members'? Is it supposed, that it will preponderate against that of the state governments? The means of influence con¬ sist in having the disposal of gifts and emoluments, and in the num¬ ber of persons employed by, and dependent upon a government. Will any gentleman compare the number of persons, which will be employed in the general government, with the number of those which -will be in the state governments? The number of dependants upon the state governments will be infinitely greater than those on the general government? I may say with truth, that there never was amore economical government in any age or country, nor which will require fewer hands, or give less influence. Let us compare the members composing the legislative, executive and judicial powers in the general government, with these in the states, and let us take into view the vast number of persons em¬ ployed in the states ; from the chief officers to the lowest, we will find the scale preponderating so much in favor of the states, that while so many persons are attached to them, it will be impossible to turn the balance ao-ainst them. There will be an irresistable bias towards the state governments. Consider the number of militia officers, the number justices of the peace, the number of the members of the legislatures, and all the various officers for districts, towns and corporations, all intermixing with, and residing among the people at large. While this part of the community retains their affection to the state governments, I con¬ ceive that the fact will be, that the state governments, and not the gen¬ eral government, will preponderate. It cannot be contradicted that DEBATES. ■254 [Madison. they have more extensive means of influence. I have my fears as well as the honorable gentleman—but my fearsareon the other side* Experience, I think, will prove (though there be no infallible proof of it here) that, the powerful and prevailing influence of the states, will produce such attention to local considerations, as will be incon¬ sistent with the advancement of the interest of the union. But I choose rather to indulge my hopes than fears, because 1 flatter my¬ self, if inconveniences should result from it, that the clause which provides amendments, will remedy them. The combination of pow¬ ers vested in those persons, would seem conclusive in favor of tho states. The powers of the general government relate to external objects, and are but few. But the power in the states relate to those great objects which immediately concern the prosperity of the people. Let us observe also, that the powers in the general government are those which will be exercised mostly in time of war, while those of the state governments will be exercised in time of peace. But I hope the time of war will be little, compared to that of peace. I should not complete the view which ought to be taken of this subject* without making this additional remark, that the powers vested in the proposed government, are not so much an augmentation of powers in the general government, as a change rendered ne¬ cessary, for the purpose of giving efficacy to those which were vested in it before. It cannot escape any gentleman, that this pow¬ er in theory, exists in the confederation as fully as in this constitu¬ tion. The only difference is this, that now they tax states, and by this plan they will tax individuals. There is no theoretic difference between the two. But in practice there will be an infinite difference between them. The one is an ineffectual power : the other is ade¬ quate to the purpose for which it is given. This change was neces¬ sary for the public safety. Let us suppose, for a moment, that the acts of congress requiring money from the states, had been as effectual as the paper on the ta¬ ble—suppose all the laws of congress had complete compliance, will any gentleman say, that as far as we can judge from past experience* that the state governments would have been debased, and all consol¬ idated and incorporated in one system] My imagination cannot reach it. I conceive, that had those acts that effect which all lavra ought to have, tne states would have retained their sovereignty. It seems to be supposed, that it will introduce new expenses and burdens on the people. I believe it i 3 not necessary hero to make a ■comparison between thcexpences of the present and of the proposed government. All agree that the general government ovmht to hav® VIRGINIA. *255 # ADISON.] power for the regulation of commerce. I will venture to say, that very great improvements, and very economical regulations will be made. It will be a principal object to guard against smuggling, and such other attacks on the revenue as other nations are subject to. We are now obliged to defend against those lawless attempts, but from the interfering regulations of different states, with little suc¬ cess. There are regulations in different states which are unfavora¬ ble to the inhabitants of other states, and which militate against the revenue. New York levies money from New Jersey by her im¬ posts. In New Jersey, instead of co-operating with New Ydrk, the legislature favors violations on her regulations. This will not be the case when uniform regulations will be made. Requisitions, though ineffectual, are unfriendly to economy. When requisitions are submitted to the states, there are near 2,500 or 3,000 persons deliberating on the mode of payment. All these, during their deliberation, receive public pay. A great proportion of every session, in every state, is employed to consider whether they will pay at all, and in what mode. Let us suppose 1500 per¬ sons are deliberating on this subject. Let any one make a calcula¬ tion—it will be found that a very few days of their deliberation will consume more of the public money, than one year of that general legislature. This is not all, Mr. Chairman. When general powers will be vested in the general government, there w'ill be less of that mutability which is seen in the legislation of the states. The con¬ sequence will be a great saving of expense and time. There is another great advantage which I will but barely mention. The greatest calamity to which the United States can be subject, is a vi¬ cissitude of laws, and continual shifting and changing from one ob¬ ject to another, which must expose the people to various inconve¬ niences. This has a certain effect, of which sagacious men always have, and always will make an advantage. From whom is advan¬ tage made? From the industrious farmers and tradesman who are ignorant of the means of making such advantages. The people will not be exposed to these inconveniences under an uniform and steady course of legislation. But they have been so heretofore. The history of taxation of this country is so fully and well known to ev¬ ery member of this committee, that I shall say no more of it. We have hitherto discussed the subject very irregularly. I dare not dictate to any gentleman, but I hope we shall pursue that mode oi going through the business, which the house resolved. With veapect to a great variety of arguments made use of, I mean to take notice of them when we come to those parts of the constitution to which they apply. If we exchange this mode, for the regular way of proceed in wf ‘ cnn it better in one week then one mrsth. •2^6 DEBATES. [Madison^ A desultory conversation arose concerning the mode of discussion* Mr. HENRY declared it as his opinion, that the best mode was to discuss it at large : that'the gentlemen on the other side had done so, as well as those of his side; and he-hopedthat every gentleman would consider himself at liberty to go intV) the subject fully, because he thought it is the best way to elucidated. Mr. MADISON wished not to exclude any light that could be cast on the subject. He declared that he would be the last man that would object to the fullest investigation; but at the same time he thought it would be more elucidated by a regular progressive dis¬ cussion, than by that unconnected irregular method which they had hitherto pursued. Mr GEORGE MASON.—Mr Chairman, gentlemen will be plea¬ sed to consider, that on so important a subject as this, it is impossi¬ ble in the nature of tilings, to avoid arguing more at large than is usual. Y ou will allow that I have hot taken up a great part of your time. But as gentlemen have indulged themselves in entering at large into the subject, I hope to bepermitted to follow them, and an¬ swer their observations. The worthy Member (Mr Nicholas) at a very early day gave us an accurate detail ef the representation of the people in Britain, and of the rights of the king of Britain ; and illustrated his observations by a quotation from Dr. Price. Gentlemen will please to take no¬ tice, that those arguments relate to a single government, and that they are not applicable to this case. However applicable they may be to such a government as that of-Great Britain, it will be entirely inapplicable to such a government as ours. The gentleman in drawing a comparison between the representation of the people in the house of commons in England, and the representation in the government now proposed to us, has been pleased to express his approbation in favor of the American government. Let us examine. I think that there are about 550 members in the English house of 1 commons. The people of Britain have a representation in parlia¬ ment of 550 members, who intimately mingle with all classes of the people, feeling and knowing their circumstances. In the pro¬ posed American government—in a country perhaps ten times more ■ extensive, we are to have a representation of 65, who from the na¬ ture of the government, cannot possibly be > ingled with the differ¬ ent classes of the people, nor have a fellow-feeling 6 them. They must form an aristocracy, and will rot regart the ir. the people. Experience tells us, that men pa r . whose rank and situation are similar to their . u ih«» < ? -• the investigation, the gentleman mentioned the f ry >rrU p- on of parliament, and drew a conclusion, the v» cverse of what VIRGINIA. 257 JAilOX.] I should have formed on the subject. He said, if I recollect Tightly that the American representation is more secured against bribery and corruption, than the English parliament. Are 65 better than 550? Bribery and corruption, in my opinion, will be practised in Ameri¬ ca more than in England, in proportion as 550 exceed 65; and there will be less integrity and probity in proportion of 65 is less than 550. From what source is the bribery practised in the British par¬ liament derived? I think the principal source i3 the distribution of places, offices, and posts. Will any gentleman deny this? Giye me leave on this occasion to recur to that clause of the constitution, which speaks of restraint, and has the appearance of restraining from corruption, &c. hut which, when examined will be found to he no restraint at all. The clause runs thus: “No senator or rep¬ resentative, shall during the time for which he was elected, be ap¬ pointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States, which shall have been created; or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no persons holding any offiee under the United States, shall be a member of either house during his continuance in office.” This appears to me to be no re¬ straint at all. It is to be observed, that this restraint only extends to civil offices. But I will not examine whether it be a proper distinction or not. What is the restraint as to civil offices? Only that they shall not be appointed to offices which shall have been created, or the emolu¬ ments whereof shall have been increased, during the time for which they shall have been elected. They may be appointed to existing ♦ffices, if the emoluments be not increased during the time for which they were elected. [Here Mr Mason spoke too low to be heard.] Thus after the government is set in motion, the restraint will be gone. They may appoint what number of officers they please. They may send ambassadors to every part of Europe. Here is, jSir\, I think, as wide a door for corruption as in any government in Europe—there is the same inducement for corruption—there is the same room for it in this government, which they have in the British government, and in proportion as the number is smaller, corruption will be greater. That unconditional power of taxation which is given to that go¬ vernment cannot hut oppress the people. If instead of this, a con¬ ditional power of taxation bo given, in case of refusal to comply with requisitions, the sarne end will be answered with convenience o the people. This will not lessen the power of congress. We do sot want to lessen the pevt’or of congress unnecessarily. This will j produce moderation in the demand, and will prevent the ruinous ex- TOL, 3. 17 S3 8 DEBATES. [Masc£. ercise of that power by those who know not our situation. We shall then have that mode of taxation which is the most easy, and least oppressive to the people* because it will be exercised by those who are acquainted with their condition anti circumstances. This, Sir, is the great object we wish to secure that our people should be tax¬ ed by those who have a fellow-feeling for them. I think I can ven¬ ture to assert, that the general government will lay such taxes a» are the easiest and the most productive in the collection. This is natural and probable. For example, they may lay a poll tax. This is simply and easily collected, but is of all taxes the most grevious—why the most gre- vousl Because it falls light on the rich, and heavy on the poor. It is most oppressive, for if the rich man is taxed, he can only retrench his superfluities; but the consequence to the poor man is, that it in¬ creases his miseries. That they will lay the most simple taxes, and such as are easist. to collect, is highly probable, nay, almost absolutely certain. I shall take the liberty on this occasion, to read you a letter w'hich will show, at least as far as opinion goes, what sort of taxes will be most probably laid on us, if we adopt this con¬ stitution. It was the opinion of a gentleman of information. It will in some degree establish the fallacy of those reports which have been circulated through the country, and which induced a great many poor ignorant people to believe that the taxes were to be les¬ sened by the adoption of the proposed government. [Here Mr. Mason read a letter from Mr Robert Morris, financier of the United States, to congress, wherein he spoke of the proprie¬ ty of laying the following taxes for the use of the United States; viz. six shillings on every hundred acres of land six shillings per poll, and nine pence per g-’llon on all spirituous liquors distilled in the country. Mr. Mason declared, that he did not mean to make the smallest reflection on Mr Morris, but introduced his letter to shew what taxes would probably be laid.] He then continued : This will at least shew that such taxes W’er* in agitation, and were strongly advocated by a considerable pa.i of congress. 1 have read this letter to shew that they will Ip -,v es most easy to be collected, without any regard " o . :C'uvenience so that instead of amusing ourselves with a diminuti n .four < :es, ^.^e may rest assured that they will be incr 1. iUl ., IV principal reason for introducing it.was, to show tha! be laid by those who are not acquainted with our sitaati . , ai d that the agents of the collection may be consulted upc the most productive and simple mode oi taxation. The gentlem who wrote this letter had more information on this subject than v. e ha, - o ■ hut this will shew gentlemen that we are not to be eased oi ta;ves. Any of these taxes which have been pointed out by this financier as the most eligible* Mason.] VIRGINIA. 259 will be ruinous and unequal, and will be particularly oppressive on the poorest part of the people. As to a poll tax, I have already spokenof its iniquitous operation, and need not say much of it, because it is so generally disliked in this state, that we were obliged to abolish it last year. As to a land .tax—it will operate most unequally. The man -who has 100 acres of the richest land will pay as little as a man who has 100 acres of the poorest land. Near Philadelphia, or Boston, an acre of land is worth one hundred pounds, yet the possessor of it will pay rte-more than the man with us whose land is hardly worth 20 shillings an acre. Some land-holders in this state will have to pay 20 times as much as will be paid for all the land on which Philadelphia stands. And as to excises—this will carry the exciseman to every farmer’s house who distills.a little brandy where he may search and ransack as he pleases. These I mention as specimens of the kind of tax which is to be laid upon us by those who have no information of our situation, and by a government where the wealthy are only represen¬ ted. It is urged, that no new power is given up to the general gov¬ ernment, and that the confederation had those powers before. That system derived ,its power from the state governments—When the people of Virginia formed their government, they reserved certain great powers in,the bill of rights. They would not trust their own citizens, who had a similarity of interest with themselves, and who had frequent and intimate communication with them. They would not trust their own fellow-citizens, X say, with the exercise of those great powers reserved, in the bill of rights. Do we not by this sys¬ tem give up a great part of the rights, reserved by the bill of rights, to those who have no fellow-feeling for the people—to a government where the representatives will have no communication with the peo- ,pie. 2 I say then there are great and important powers which w T ere not transferred to the state government, given.up by the general go¬ vernment by this .constitution. Let us advert to the Cth article. It expressly declares that, “This “ constitution and the laws of the United States wdiich shall be made “ in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made “ under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law “ of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby :* “ any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary “ notwithstanding.” Now, Sir, if the laws and constitution of the general government, as expressly said, be paramount to those of any state, are not those rights w r ith which we were afraid to trust our own citizens annulled and given np to the general government'? The bill of rights is a part of our own constitution. The judges are obliged ,to take notice of the laws of the general government, consequently 260 DEBATES. [Ma80J& the rights secured by our bill of rights are given up. If they are* not given up, where are they secured 1 ? By implication? Let gen¬ tlemen shew that they are secured in a plain, direct unequivocal man¬ ner. It is not in their power. Then where is the security? Where is the barrier drawn between the government, and the rights of the citizens, as secured in our own state government? These rights are given up in that paper, but I trust that this convention will never give them up, but will take pains to secure them to the latest posterity. If a check be necessary in our own state government, it is much more so in a government where our representatives are to be at the distance of 1000 miles from us, without any responsibility. I said the other day, that they could not have sufficient informa¬ tion. I was asked how the legislature of Virginia got their informa¬ tion. The answer is easy and obvious. They get it from 160 rep¬ resentatives dispersed through all parts of the country. In this go¬ vernment how do they get it? Instead of 160, there are but 10—cho¬ sen, if not wholly, yet mostly from the higher order of the people—- from the great, the wealthy—the well-born —the well-born —Mr. Chair man, that aristocratic idol—that flattering idea—that exotc plant which been lately imported from the ports of Great Britain, and planted in the luxurious soil of this country. In the course of the investigation, much praise has been lavished upon the article which fixes the number of representatives. It only *ays, that the proportion shall not exceed one for every 30,000. The worthy gentleman says that the nnmber must be increased be¬ cause representation and taxation are in proportion, and that one can¬ not be increased without increasing the other, nor decreased without decreasing the other. Let us examine the weight of this argument. If the proportion of each state equally and rateably diminishes, th* words of the constitntion will be as much satisfied as if it had been increased in the same manner, without any reduction of the taxes. Let us illustrate it familiarly. Virginia has ten representatives— Maryland has six. Virginia will have to pay a sum in proportion greater than Maryland, as ten to six. Suppose Virginia reduced t# five and Maryland to three. The relative proportion of money, paid by each, will be the same as before: and yet the honorable gentle¬ man said, that if this did not convince us he would give Hp. I am one of those unhappy men who cennot be amused with assertions. A man from the dead might frighten me, but I am sure that he could not convince me without using better arguments than I have yo heard. The same gentleman shewed us, that though the northern state* had a most det ided majority against us, yet the increase of popula- ton among us would in the course of years change it in our favw. Mason.] VIRGINIA. 261 A very sound argument indeed, that we should cheerfully bum our- serves to death in hopes of a joyful and happy resurrection ! The very worthy gentleman who presides, was pleased to tell us that there was no interference between the legislation of the general government and that of the state legislatures. Pardon me, if I shew the contrary. In the important instance of taxation there is a palp¬ able interference. Suppose a poll-tax—the general government can $ay a poll-tax—the state legislatures can do the same: can lay it on the same man, and at the same time, and yet it is said there can be «o interference. v Xs ^ My honorable colleague, in the late federal convention, in answer 4o another gentleman who had said, that the annals of mankind could afford no instance of rulers giving up power, has told us that eight «tates had adopted the constitution, and that this was a relinquish¬ ment of power. Ought this example have any weight with us! If sthat relinquishment was imprudent, shall we imitate it? I will ven- 4ure to assert, that out of a thousand instances where the people precipitately and unguardedly relinquished their power, there ha« not been one instance of a voluntary surrender of it back by rulers. He afterwards said, that freedom at home and respectability abroad would be the consequence of the adoption of this government, and that we cannot exist without its adoption. Highly as I esteem that •gentleman, highly as I esteem his historical knowledge, I am obliged to deny his assertions. , > If this government will endanger our liberties in its present state its adoption will not promote oux happiness at home. The people of this country are as independent, happy, and respectable, as those of any country. France is the most powerful and respectable nation on ■earth ; would the planters of this country change their shoes for the wooden shoes of the peasants of France? Perhaps Russia is the next greatest power in Europe. Would we change situation with the peo¬ ple of Russia . 2 We have heard a great deal of Holland. Some have called its government a democracy—others have called it an aristoc¬ racy. It is well known to be a republic. It has arisen to uncommon powerand wealth. Compared toits neighboring countries its fortune® has been surprising. (Here Mr. Mason made a quotation, shewing the comparative flourishing condition of the inhabitants of Holland, even a few years after they had shaken off the Spanish yoke. That plenty and con¬ tentment were to be every where seen—the peasants well clothed— provisions plenty—their furniture and domestic utensils in abundance —and their lands well stocked. That on the contrary, the peope of Spain were in a poor and miserable condition; in want of every thing of which the people of Holland enjoyed the greatest abundance.) Mr. Mason then continued—As this was within a few years after 262 DEBATES. [Masonv the Spanish revolution, this striking contrast could be owing to no other cause than the liberty which they enjoyed under their govern-- ment.—Here behold the difference between a powerful great consoli¬ dation and a confederacy. They tell us, that if we be powerful and respectable abroad, we shall have liberty and happiness at 1 home. Let us secure that liberty—that happiness first, and we shall then be respectable. I have some acqjuaintance with a great many characters who favor t this government, their connexions, their conduct, their political prin¬ ciples, and a number of other circumstances. There are a great many wise and good men among them. But when I look round the number of my acquaintance in Virginia, the country wherein I was born, and have lived so many years, and observe who are the warmest and the most zealous friends to this new government, it makes me think of the story of the cat transformed into a fine lady—forgetting her trans¬ formation and happening, to see a rat, she could not restrain herself*, but sprung upon it out of the chair.. He (Gov. Randolph) dwelt largely on the necessity of the union. —A great many others have enlarged on this subject. Foreigners would suppose, from the declamation about union, that there was a great dislike in America to any general American government. I have never in my whole life heard one single man deny the necessity and propriety of the union. This necessity is deeply impressed on every America mind'. There can be no danger of any object being lost when the mind of every man in the country is strongly attached, to it.. But I hope that it is not to the name, but to the blessings of union that we are attached. Those gentlemen who are loudest in their praises of the name, are not more attached to the reality than I am. The se¬ curity of our liberty and happiness is the object w r e ought to have in view in wishing to establish the union. If instead of securing these, we endanger them, the name of union will be but a trivial consola¬ tion. If the objections be removed—if those parts which are clearly subversive of our rights be altered, no man will go farther than I will to advance the union. We are told in strong language, of dangers to which we will be exposed unless we adopt this constitution. Among fhe rest, domestic safety is said to be in danger. This government does not intend our domestic safety. It authorises the importation of slaves for twenty odd years, and thus continues upon us, that ne¬ farious trade. Instead of securing and protecting us, the continua¬ tion of this detestable trade adds daily to our weakness. Though this evil is increasing, there is no clause in the constitution that will prevent the northern and eastern states from meddling with our whole property of that kind. There is a clause to prohibit the importation of slaves after twenty years,, but there is no provision made for se- Mason.] VIRGINIA. 263 euring to the southern states those they now possess. It is far from being a desirable property. But it will involve us in great difficulties and infecility to be now deprived of them. There ought to be a clause in the constitution to secure us that property, which we have acquir¬ ed under our former laws, and the loss of which would bring ruin on a great many people. > Maryland and the Potomac have been mentioned .1 have had some little means of being acquainted with that subject, having been one of the commissioners who made the compact with Maryland. There is no cause of fear on that ground. Maryland, says the gentleman, has a right to the navigation of the Potomac. This is a right which *he never exercised. Maryland was pleased with what she had in return for a right which she never exercised. Every ship which comes within the state of Maryland, except some small boats, must come within our country. Maryland was very glad to get what she got by this compact, for she considered it as next to getting it without any compensation on her part. She considered it, at least as next to a quid pro quo. * The back lands, he says, is another source of danger. Another day will shew, that if that constitution is adopted without amendments, there are twenty thousand families of good citizens in the North West District, between the Alleghany mountains and the Blue Ridge who will run the risk of being driven from their lands. They will be ousted from them by the Indiana company—by the survivors, al¬ though their right and titles have been confirmed by the assembly of •ur own state. I will pursue it no further now, but take an oppor¬ tunity to consider it another time. The alarming magnitude of our debts is urged as a reason for our adoption. And shall we, because involved in debts, take less care of our rights and liberties? Shall we abandon them, because we owe money which we cannot immediately pay? Will this system enable us to pay our debts and lessen our difficulties? Perhaps the new go¬ vernment possesses some secret, some powerful means of turning every thing to gold. It has been called by one gentleman the philo¬ sopher's tone. The comparison was a pointed one at least in this, that on the subject of producting gold they will be both equally de¬ lusive and fallacious. The one will be as inapplicable as the other. The dissolution of the union, the dangers of separate confederacies, and the quarrels of borderers, have been enlarged upon to persuade as to embrace this government. My honorable colleague in the late convention, seems to raise phantoms, and to shew a singular skill in exorcisms, to terrify and compel us to take the new government with all its sins and dangers.^ 1 know that he once saw as great danger irWk* honorable gentleman last up. He has endeavored to draw our atten¬ tion from the merits of the question, by jocose observations and satirical allusions. He ought to know that ridicule is not the test of truth. Does he imagine, that he who can raise the loudest laugh Is the soundest reasoner? Sir, the judgments, and not the risibility of gentlemen, are to be consulted. Had the gentleman followed that rule which he himself proposed, he vrould not have shown the let¬ ter of a private gentleman, who in times of difficulty, had offered hif” opinion respecting the mode in which it would be most expedient te N raise the public funds. Does it follow that since a private individ¬ ual proposed such a scheme of taxation, that the new government will adopt itl But the same principle has also governed the gen¬ tleman when he mentions the expressions of another private gentle¬ man— the well horn —that our federal representatives are to be chos^ from the higher orders of the people—from the well horn . Is there * single expression like this in the constitution? Every man who is entitled to vote for a member of our own state legislature, will havtTar right to vote for a member in the house of representatives in the gen¬ eral government. In both cases the confidence of the people alone can procure an election. This insinuation is totally unwarrantable. Is it proper that the constitution should be thus attacked with the opinions of every private gentleman? I hope we shall hear no more of such groundless aspersions. Raising a laugh, sir, will not prove the merits, nor expose the defects of this system. The honorable gentleman abominates it, because it does not pro¬ hibit the importation of slaves, and because it does not secure the continuance of the existing slavery! Is it not obviously inconsist¬ ent to criminate it for two contradictory reasons? I submit it to the consideration of the gentlemen, whether, if it be reprehensible in the one case, it can be censurable in the other? Mr. Lee then con¬ cluded by earnestly recommending to the committee to proceed reg¬ ularly. Mr. GRAYSON. Mr. Chairman, I must make a few observation* on this subject, and if my arguments are desultory, 1 hope 1 shall itand justified by the bad example which has been set me, and the necessity l am under of following my opponents through all theif various recesses. I do not in the smallest degree blame the conduct of the gentlemen who represented this state in the general convention. I believe that they endeavored to do all the good to this common¬ wealth which was in their power, and that all the members wh® formed that convention did every thing within the compass of their abilities to procure the best terms for their particular states. That they did not do more for the general good of America, is perhaps * I *66 DEBATES. [GRAYSOJf. misfortune. They are entitled, however, to our thanks and those of the people. Although I do not approve of the result of their delib- rations I do not crim'nate or suspect the principles on which they acted. I desire that what I may say may not be improperly applied. I make no allusions to any gentleman whatever. I do not pretend to say that the present confederation is not defec¬ tive. Its defects have been actually experienced. But I am afraid that they cannot be removed. It has defects arising from reasons which are inseparable from the nature of such governments, and which cannot be removed but by death. All such governments, that ever existed have uniformly produced this consequence—that par¬ ticular interests have been consulted, and the general good, to which all wishes ought to be directed, has been neglected. But the partic¬ ular disorders of Virginia ought not to be attributed to the confed¬ eration. I was concerned to hear the local affairs of Virginia men- ^>ned. If these make impressions on the minds of the gentlemen, why did not the convention provide for the removing the evils of the government of Virginia? If I am right, the states, with respect to their internal affairs, are leftjprecisely as before except, in a few instances. Of course, the judiciary, should this government be adopted, would not be improved; the state government wmuld be ia this respect nearly the same, and the assembly may, without judge or jury, hang as many men as they may think proper to sacrifice to the good of the public Our judiciary has been certainly improved in some respects since the revolution. The proceedings of our courts are not at least, as rapid as they were under the royal government. [Here Mr. Grayston mentioned a particular cause which had been thirty-one years on the docket.] The adoption of this government will not meliorate our own particu¬ lar system. I beg leave to consider the circumstances of the union antecedent to the meeting of the convention at Philadelphia. We * have been told of phantoms and ideal dangers to lead us into measures which will, in my opinion, be the ruin of our country. If the exist¬ ence of those dangers cannot be proved—if there be no apprehension of wars—if there be no rumors of wars, it w ill place the subject in a different light, and plainly evince to the world, there cannot be any reason for adopting measures which we apprehend to be ruinous and destructive. When this state proposed, that the general government should be improved, Massachusetts was just recovered from a rebel¬ lion which had brought the republic to the brink ofdestruction; from a rebellion which was crushed by that federal government, which is mow so much contemned and abhorred : a vote of that august body for 1500 men, aided by the exertions of the state, silenced all oppo¬ sition, and shortly restored the public tranquility. Massachusetts, VIRGINIA. 367 Grayson.] was satisfied that these internal commotions were so happily settled and was so unwilling- to risk any similar distresses by theoretic ex¬ periments! Were the eastern states willing to enter into this mea¬ sure 1 ? Were they willing to accede to the proposal of Virginia? In- what manner was it received? Connecticut revolted at the idea. The eastern states, sir, were unwilling to recommend a meeting of a con¬ vention, They were well aware of the dangers of revolutions and changes. W"hy was every effort used, and such uncommon pains taken to bring it about? This would have been unnecessary, had it I been approved of by the people. Was Pennsylvania dispos^djor j the reception of this project of reformation? No, sir. She was even unwilling to amend her revenue laws so as to make the five per cen- i tarn operative. She was satisfied with things as they were. There was no complaint that ever I heard of from any other part of the union except Virginia. This being the case among ourselves, what dan¬ gers were there to be apprehended from foreign nations. It will b & easily shewn that dangers from that quarter were absolutely ^agi¬ nary. W'as not France friendly? Unequivocal ly so. She was de¬ vising new regulations of commerce for Uur advantage. Did she harrass us with applications for her money? Is it likely that France will quarrel with us? Is it not reasonable to suppose, that she will He more desirous than ever to cling, after loosing the Dutch republic, her best ally? How are the Dutch? We owe them money it is true;, and are thej not willing that we should owe them more? Mr. Adam® applied to them for a new loan to the poor despised confederation.. They readily granted it. The Dutch have a fellow feeling for us. They were in the same situation with ourselves. I believe that the money which the Dutch borrowed of Henry the IVth is not yet paid. How did they pass queen Elizabeth’s loan? At a very considerable discount. They took advantage of the weak¬ ness and necessities of James the first, and made their own terms with that contemptible monarch. Loans from nations are not like loans from private men. Nations lend money and grant assistance to on* another from views of national interest. France was willing to pluck the fairest feather out. of the British crown. This was her object in aiding us. She will not quarrel with us on pecuniary considerations. Congress considered it in this point of view, for when a proposition was made to make it a debt of private persons, it was rejected with¬ out hesitation. That respectable body wisely considered, that whil* we remained their debtors in so considerable a degree, they would not be inattentive to our interest. With respect to Spain she is friendly in a high degree. I wish to know by whose interposition was the treaty with Morocco made? Was it not by that of the king of Spain?. Several predatory nations' S68 DEBATES, [Gratsok. disturbed us,on going into the Med iterranean.the influence of Charles the third at the Barbary court, and i64,000, procured' as pood a treaty with Morocco as could be expected. But I acknowledge it is not of any consequence, since the Algerines and people of 'Tunis have not entered into similar measures. We have nothing to fear from Spain i and were she hostile, she could never be formidable to this country. Her strength is so scattered, that she never can be dangerous to us either in peace or war. As to Portugal, we have a treaty with her, which may be very advantageous, though it be not yet ratified. The domestic debt is diminished by considerable sales of wester* lands, to Cutler, Sergeant and Company, to Simms, and of Royal, Flint and Company. The board of treasury is authorized to sell ifi Europe, or any where else, the residue of those lands. 4 An act of congress has passed to adjust the public debts, betweeft file individual states and the United States. Was our trade in a despicable situation? I shall say nothing of what did not come under my own observation. When I was in con¬ gress sixteen vessels had had sea letters in the East-India trade, and two hundred vessels entered and cleared out, in the French West- India Islands, in one year. I must confess that public credit has suffered, and that our publie creditors have been ill-used. This was owing to a fault at the head quarters, to congress themselves, in not apportioning the debts on th* different states, and in not selling the western lands at an earlier pe¬ riod. If requisitions have not been complied with it must be owing to congress, who might have put the unpopular debts on the back lands. Commutation is abhorrent to New England ideas. Specula¬ tion is abhorrent to the eastern states. Those inconveniences hav# resulted from the bad policy of congress. There are certain modes of governingthe people, which will suc¬ ceed. There are others whieh will not. The idea of consolidation 0 is abhorrent to the people of this country. How were the sentiment! of the people before the meeting of the convention at Philadelphia! They had only one object in view. Their ideas reached no farther than to give the general government the five per centum impost, and the regulation of trade. When it was agitated in congress, in a com¬ mittee of the whole, this was all that it asked, or was deemed neces¬ sary. Since that period their views have extended much farther. Horrors have been greatly magnified since the rising of the convei*- &on. We are now told by the honorable gontleman (Governor Ran¬ dolph) that we shall have wars and rumours of wars, that every ca¬ lamity is to attend us, and that we shall be ruined and disunited ChuYMK.j VIRGINIA. 269 forever, unless we adopt this constitution. Pennsylvania and Mar ryland are to fall upon us from the north, like the Goths and Van¬ dals of old-—the Algerines, whose flat sided vessels never came fur¬ ther than Maderia, are to fill the Chesapeake with mighty fleets, and to attack us on our front. The Indians are to invade us with numerous armies on our rear, in order to convert our cleared land* into hunting grounds—-and the Carolinians from the south, mounted on alligators, I presume, are to come and destroy our corn fields, and eat up our little children! These, sir, are the mighty dangers which await us if we reject—Dangers which are merely imaginary, and ludicrous in the extreme' Are we to be destroyed by Mary¬ land and Pennsylvania! What will democratic states make war for, and how long since have they imbibed a hostile spirit! But the generality are to attack us. Will they attack us after violating their faith iu the first union! Will they not violate their faith, if they do not take us into their confederacy! Have they not agreed by the old confederation, that the union shall be perpetual; tad that no alteration should take place without the consent of con¬ gress and the confirmation of the legislatures of every state! I can¬ not think that there is such depravity in mankind as that, after vio¬ lating pnblic faith so flagrantly, they should make war, upon us silso, for not following their example. The large states have divided the back lands among themselves, and have given as much as they thought proper to the generality. For the fear of disunion we are told, that we oughtfto take measures which we otherwise should not. Disunion is impossible. The eastern states hold the fisheries, which are their corn fields, by a hair. Thev have a dispute with the British government about their limits this moment. Is not a general and strong government ne¬ cessary for their interest! If ever nations had inducements to peace >he eastern states now have. New York and Pennsylvania anx¬ iously look forward for the fur trade. How can they obtain it but^ by union! Can the western posts be got or retained without union! How are the little states inclined! They are not likely to disunite. Their weakness will prevent them from quarelling. Little men are seldom fond of quarrelling among giants. Is theie not a strong in¬ ducement to union, while the British are on one side and the Span- aids on the other? Thank heaven, we have a Carthage of our own! But we are told, that if we do not embrace the present moment* we are lost forever. Is there no difleience between productive states and carrying states? If we bold out, will not the tobacco trade en¬ able us to make terms with the cariying states? Is there nothing in a similarly of laws, religion, language, and manners? Do^no DEBATES. £70 [Grayson. these and the intercourse and intermarriage, between the people of the different states, invite them in the strongest manner to union? But what would I do on the present occasion to remedy the exis¬ ting defects of the present confederation? There are two opinions prevailing in the world : the one, that mankind can only be govern¬ ed by force : the other, that ihey are capable of freedom and a good government. Under a supposition that mankind can govern them¬ selves, I would recommend that the present confederation should be amended. Give congress the regulation of commerce. Infuse new strength and spirit into the state governments : for when the compo* nent parts are strong it will give energy to the government, al¬ though it be otherwise weak. This may be proved by the union of Utrecht. Apportion the public debts in such a manner as to throw the un¬ popular ones on the back lands. Call only for requisitions for the foreign interest, and aid them by loans. Keep on so, till the Amer¬ ican character be marked with some certain features. We are yet too young to know what w 7 e are fit for. The continual migration of people from Europe, und the settlement of new countries, on our western frontiers, are strong arguments against making new experi¬ ments now in government. When these things are removed, we can with greater prospect of success devise changes. We ought to con¬ sider, as Montesquieu says, whether the construction of the govern¬ ment be suitable to the genius and disposition of the people, as well as a variety of other circumstances. But if this position be not true, and men can only be governed by force—then be as gentle as possible. What then would I do? I would not take the British monarchy for my model. We have not materials for such a government in this country, although I will be bold to say, that it is one of the governments in the world by which liberty and property are best secured. But 1 would adopt the following govern nr ent, I would have a presideut for life, choos- ing his successor at the same time—a senate for life, with the pow¬ ers of the house of lords,—and a triennial house of representatives, with the powers of the house of commons in England. By having such a president, we should have more independence and energy in the executive, and not be incumbered with the ex¬ pense, &c. of a court and an hereditary prince and family. By such a senate we should have more stability in the laws, without having an odious hereditary aristocracy. By the other branch we should be fully and fairly represented. If, Sir, we are to be con¬ solidated at all, we ougnt to be fully represented and governed with sufficient energy, according to numbers in both houses. 1 admit that coercion is necessary in every government in some Grayson.] VIRGINIA, 271 degree, that it it is manifestly wanting in our present government, and that the want of it has ruined many nations. But I should be glad to know what great degree of coercion is in this constitution, more than in the old government, if the states will refuse to comply with requisitions, and they can only be compelled by means of an army. Snppose the people will not pay, the taxes, is not the sword to be then employed ? The difference is this, that by this constitu¬ tion the sword is employed against individuals, by the other it is employed against the states, which is more honorable. Suppose a general resistance to pay taxes in such a state as Massachusetts, will it not be precisely the same thing as a non-compliance with re¬ quisitions. Will this constitution remedy the fatal inconveniences of the clashing state interests'? Will not every member that goes from Virginia be actuated by state influence] So they will also from every other state. Will the liberty and property of this country be secure under such a government! What, Sir, is the present con¬ stitution! A republican government founded on the principles of monarchy, with the three estates. Is it like the model of Tacitus or Mostesquieu! Are there checks in it, as in the British monar¬ chy! There is an executive fetter in some parts, and as unlimi¬ ted in others as a Roman diGtator. A democratic branch marked with the strong features of aristocracy—and an aristocratic branch with all the impurities and imperfections of the British house of commons, arising from the inequality of representation and want of responsibility. There will be plenty of old Sarums, if the new con¬ stitution should be adopted. Do we love the British so well as to imitate their imperfections? We could not effect it more, than in that particular instance. Are not all defects and corruption found¬ ed on an inequality of representation and want of responsibility? How is the executive! Conlrary to the opinion of all the best wri¬ ters, blended with the legislative. We have asked for bread, and they have given us a stone. I am willing to give the government the regulation of trade. It will be serviceable in regulating, the wade among the states. But I believe that it will not be attended with the advantages generally expected. As to direct taxation—given up this, and you give up every thing as it is the highest act of sovereignty : surrender up this inestimable jewel, and you throw away a pearl, richer than all your tribe. But it has been said by an honorable gentleman (Mr Pendleton) as well as I Tecollect, that there could be no such thing as an interference between the two legislatures, either in point of direct taxation, or in any other case whatsoever. An honorable gentleman (Mr. Mason) has applied that they might interfere in the case of a poll-tax. I will go farther. 272 DEBATES. [Gravsoh, ind say that the ca3e may happen in the judiciary. Suppose 2 state execution and a federal execution issued against the same man, and the state officer and federal officer seize him at the same moment —would they divide the man in two, as Solomon directed the child to be divided who was claimed by two woman? I suppose the gene¬ ral government, as being paramount, would prevail. How arc two legislatures to coincide with powers transcendent, supreme and om¬ nipotent, for such is the definition of a legislature? There must be an external interference, not only in the collection of taxes, but in tho judiciary. Was there ever such a thing in any country before? Great Britain never went so far in the stamp act. Poyning’s law—the ab¬ horrence of the Irish never went so far. 1 never neard of two su¬ preme co-ordinate powers in one and the same country before, I can¬ not conceive how it can happen. It surpasses every thing that I have read of concerning other governments, or that I can conceive by the utmost exertion of my faculties. But, Sir, as a cure for every thing, the democratic branch is elect¬ ed by the people. What security is there in that, as has aiready been demanded? Their number is too small. Is not a small number more easy to be corrupted than a large one? Were not the tribunes at Rome the choice of the people? Were not the decernviii chosen by them? Was not Caesar himself thechoice of the people? Did this se¬ cure them from oppression and slavery? Did this render these agent# so chosen by the people upright? If 560 members are coirupted in the British house of commons, will it not be easier to corrupt 91 members of the new constitution? But the British house cfcommons are corrupted from the same cause that our representatives will be— I mean ,from the old Sarums among them, from the inequality of the representation. How many are legislating in this country yearly? It is thought neeessary to have 1500 representatives for the great pur¬ poses of legislation throughout the union, exclusive of 160 senators, which form a proportion of about one for every 1500 persons. By the present constitution, these extensive powers are to be exercised by the small number of 91 persons, a proportion almost 20 times less than the other. It must be degrading indeed to think that so small a number should be equal to so many! Such a preferential dis¬ tinction must pre-suppose the happiest selection. They must havs something divine in their composition to merit such a pre-eminence But my greatest objection is, that it will, in its operation, be found unequal, grievous and oppressive. If it have any efficacy at all, it must be by a faction—a faction of one part of the union against the other. I think that it has a great natural imbecility within itself, too weak for a consolidated and too strong for a confederate govern¬ ment. But if it be called into action by a combination of seven states VIRGINIA. 273 AJrayson.] t will beterrible indeed. We need be at no loss to determine how this combination will be formed. There is a great difference of circum¬ stances between the states. The interest of the carrying states is strikingly different from that of the productive states. I mean not to give offence to any part of America, but mankind are governed by nterest. The carrying states will assuredly unite, and our situation will be then wretched indeed. Our commodities will be transported on their own terms and every measure will have for its object their particular interest. Xet ill fated Ireland be ever present to oimyiew. We ought to be wise enough to guard against the abuse of such a government. Republics, in fact, oppress more than monarchies. If we advert to the page of history, we wjll find this disposition too of¬ ten manifested in republican governments. The Romans in ancient and the Dutch in modern times oppressed their provinces in are- markable degree. I hope that my fears are groundless, but I believe it as I do my creed, that this government will operate as a faction of seven states to oppress the rest of the union. But it may be said, that w T e are represented, and cannot therefore be injured—a poor representation it will be! The British would have been glad to take America into the union like the Scotch, by giving us a small representation. The Irish might be indulged with the same favor by aking for it. Will that lessen our misfortunes! A small representation gives a pre¬ tence to injure and destroy. But, Sir, the Scotch union is introdu¬ ced by an honorable gentleman,as an argument in favor of adoption. Would he wish his country to be on the same foundation as Scot¬ land! They have but 45 members in the house of commons, and 16 in the house of lords. These go up regularly in order to be bribed. The smallness o their number puts it out of their power to carry any measure. And this unhappy nation exhibits the only instance perhaps in the wrnrld where corruption becomes a virtue. I devoutly pray, that this de¬ scription of Scotland may not be picturesque of the southern states, n three years from this time! The committee being tired as well as myself, I will take another time to give my opinion more fully on this great and important subject. Mr. Monroe, seconded by Mr Henry, moved that the committee should rise, that Mi Grayson might have an opportunity of contin¬ uing his argument next day. Mr Madison insisted on going through the business regularly, according to the resolution of the house. 'Thursday, the 12 th of June, 1788. [The fir3t and second sections still under consideration.] 'dr. GRAYSON. Mr. Chairman, I asserted yesterday that there VOL. 3. 18 274 DEBATES. [Graysok- were two opinions in the world—the one that mankind were capable of governing themselves, the other, that it required actual force to govern them. On the principle that the first position was true, and which is consonant to the rights of humanity, the house will recol¬ lect that it was my opinion to amend the present confederation, and infuse a new portion of health and strength into the state govern¬ ments ; to apportion the public debts in such a manner as to throw the unpopular ones on the back lands—to divide the rest of the do¬ mestic debt among the different states, and to call for requisitions only for the interest of the foreign debt. If contrary to this maxim, force is necessary to govern men, I then did propose as an alterna¬ tive, not a monarchy like that of Great Britain, but a milder govern¬ ment, one which under the idea of a general corruption of manners and the consequent necessity 'of force, should be as gentle as possi¬ ble. I shewed, in as strong a manner as 1 could, some of the princi¬ pal defects in the constitution. The greatest defect is the opposition of the componont parts to the interests of the whole. For let gen¬ tlemen ascribe its defects to as many causes as their imagination may suggest, this is the principal and radical one. I urged, that to remedy the evils which must result from this government, a more equal representation in the legislature and proper checks against abuse, were iudispensably necessary. I do not pretend to propose for your adoption, the plan of government which I mentioned as an alternative to a monarchy, in case mankind were incapable of go¬ verning themselves. I only meant that if it were once established, that force was necessary to govern men, that such a plan wopld be more eligible for a free people than the introduction of crowned heads and nobles. Having promised this much to obviate miscon¬ struction, I shall proceed to the clause before us with this observa¬ tion, that I prefer a complete consolidation to a partial one, but a federal government to either. In my opinion, the states which give np the power of taxation has nothing more to give. The people o' 1 that state, which suffer any power but her own immediate govern¬ ment, to interfere with the sovereign right of taxation, are gone for¬ ever. Giving the right of taxation, is giving a right to increase the miseries of the people. Is it not a political absurdity to suppose that there can be two concurrent legislatures, each possessing the supreme power of direct taxation? If two powers come in contact must not the one prevail over the ether? Must it not strike every man’s mind, that two unlimited, co-equal, co ordinate authorities, sver the same objects, cannot exist together? But we are told that there is one instance of co-existing powers in cases of petty cor¬ porations, 29 well here as in other parts of,the worid. Thecas® Chur son.] VIRGINIA.. 275 «f petty corporations does not prove the propriety or possibility of two co-equal transcendent powers over the same object. Although these have the power of taxation, it on!)* extends to certain degrees and for certain purposes. The powers of corporations are defined, and operate on limited objects. Their power originates by the au¬ thority of the legislature, and can be destroyed by the same authori¬ ty, Persons carrying on the powers of a petty corporation may be punished for interfering with the power of the legislature. Their acts are entirely ^nugatory, if they contravene those ot the legisla¬ ture. Scotland is also introduced to show, that two different bodies may, with convenience, exercise power of taxation in the same country. How is the land tax there 1 ? There is a fixed appor¬ tionment. When England pays four shillings in the pound, Scot¬ land only pays £15,000. This proportion cannot be departed frem, whatever augmentation may take place. There are stannary courts, and a variety of other inferior private courts in England. But when they pass the bounds of their jurisdiction, the supreme courts in Westminister Hall may, on appeal, correct the abuse of their pow¬ er. Is there any connection between the federal courts and state courts? What power is there to keep them in order? Where is there any authority to terminate disputes between these two contending powers? An observation came from an honorable gentleman (Mr. Mason) when speaking of the propriety of the general government exercising this power, that according to the rules and doctrine of representation, the thing was entirely impracticable. I agreed with him in sentiments. 1 waited to hear the answer from the admirers of the new constitution. What was the answer? Gentlemen were obliged to give up the point with respect to general uniform taxes. They have the candor to acknowledge that taxes on slaves would not affect the eastern sta'es, and that taxes on fish or pot-ash would not affect the southern states. They are then reduced to this dilem¬ ma. In order to support this part of the system, they are obliged o controvert the first maxims of representation. The best writers on this subject lay it down as a fundamental principle, that he who lays a tax, should bear his proportion of paying it. A tax that with propriety be laid, and with ease collected in Delaware, might be highly improper in Virginia. The taxes cannot be uniform throughout the states without being oppressive to some. If they be not uniform, some of the members will lay taxes, in the payment of which they will bear no proportion. The members of Delaware will assist in laying a tax on our slaves, of which they will pay no part whatever. The members of Delaware do not return to Virgi¬ nia to give an account of their conduct. This total want of respon¬ sibility and fellow feeling, vi ill destroy the benefits of rfpre;;en‘aUo*>. 276 DEBATES. [Gra.ysonv in order to obviate this objection, the gentleman has said that the same evil existed, in some degree, in the present confederation. To which 1 answer, that the present confederation has nothing to do but to say how such money is necessary, and to fix the proportion to be paid by each state. They cannot say in what manner the money shall be raised.—This is left to the state legislatures. But, says the honorable gentleman (Mr. Madison) if we were in danger, we should be convinced of the necessity of the clause. Are - we to be terrified into a belief of its necessity 1 ? It is proposed by the opposition to amend it in the following manner—that requisitions shall be first made, and if not paid, that, direct taxas shall be laid by -way of punishment. If this ultimate right be in congress, will it not be in their power to raise money on any emergency'? Wilt not their credit be competent to procure any sum they may want? Gentlemen agree that it w r ould be proper to imitate the conduct of <*iher countries, and Great Britain particularly, in borrowing money and establishing funds for the payment of the interest on the loans ; that, when the government is properly organized, and its competent cy to raise money made known, public and private confidence will be the result, and men will readily lend it any sums it may stand in need of. If this should be a fact, and the reasoning well founded,- it will clearly follow that it will be practicable to borrow money in Cases of great difficulty and danger, on the principles contended for by the opposition, and this observation must supercede the necessity of granting them the powers of direct taxation in the first instance^ provided the right is secured in the second. As to the idea of making extensive loans for extinguishing the present domestic debt, it is what I have not by any means in con¬ templation; I think it would be unnecessary, unjust and impolitic. This country is differently situated and circumstanced from all other countries in the world* It is now thinly inhabited, but daily increa¬ sing in numbers. It Would not be politic to lay grievous taxes and burdens at present. If our numbers double in 25 years, as is gen¬ erally believed, we ought to spare the present race, because there will be double the number of persous to pay in that period of time. So that were our matter so arranged that the interest could be paid regularly, and that any might get his money when he thought pro¬ per, as is the case now in England, it would be all that public faith would require. Place the subject, however, in every point of view, whether as it relates to raising money for the immediate exigencies of the state, or for the extinction of the foreign or the domestic debt, still it must be obvious that if a proper confidence is place 1 in the acknowledgement of the right, of taxation in the second instance, that every purpose can be answered. ; all, the peasant as well as others—give to society the real bless¬ ings of learning. I have seen learning used both ways—but have had pleasure in observing, that lately the latter fruits only have generally appeared, which I attribute to the influence of republican principles, and a regard for true liberty. Am I still suspected of want of attach¬ ment for my -worthy fellow-citizens, whom the gentleman calls peasants and cottagers? Let me add one mote observation: I can¬ not leave them in the state in which he has placed them—in the parallel between them and those of Switzerland—the United Ne¬ therlands and Great Britain. The peasants of the Swiss cantons trade in war—trained in arms, they become the mercenaries of the best bidder, to carry on the destruction of mankind as an occupation where they have not even resentment.. Are these a fit people for a comparison with our worthy planters and farmers—in their drawing food and raiment, and even wealth, by honest labour from the bow¬ els of the earth, where an inexhaustible store is placed by a bounti¬ ful creator? The citizens of the United Netherlands have no right of suffrage. —There they lost that distinguished badge of freedom. Their rep¬ resentation to their state assemblies is of towns and cities, and not of the people at large. v The people of Britain have the right of suffrage, but sell it for a mess of pottage. The happiness of the people is the object erf this government and the people are therefore made the fountain of all power. The> cannot act personally and must delegate powers. Here the worthy gentleman who spoke last, and I, travelling not together indeed, but n sight, are placed at an immeasurable distance—as far as the poles asunder. He recommends a government more energetic and strong, than this—abundantly too strong ever to receive my approbation. A first Magistrate borrowed from Britain, to whom you are to make a *286 DEBATES. [Pbndleto#* surrender of your liberty and you give him a separate interest from yours. You intrench that interest by powers and prerogatives un¬ defined—implant in him self-love, from the influence of which he is to do, what—to promote your interest in opposition to his own! An operation of self-love, which is new! Having done this, you accept from him a charter of the right you have parted with— pre¬ sent him a bill of rights—telling him. Thus far shall you op¬ press us, and no farther. It still depends on him whether he will give you that charter, or allow the operation of the bill of rights. He will do it as long as he cannot do otherwise, but no longer. Did ever any free people in the world, not dictated to, by the sword of a eonquetor, or by cir¬ cumstances into which licentiousness may have plunged them, place themselves in so degrading a situation, or rrake so disgraceful a sacrifice of their liberty! If they did, sure I am that the example will not be followed by this convention. This is not all : we are 10 look some where for the chosen few to go into the ten miles square, with extensive powers for life, and thereby destroy every degree of true responsibility. Is there no medium, or shall we re¬ cur to extremes! As a republican, Sir, I think that the security of the liberty and happiness of the people from the highest to the low¬ est, being the object of government, the people are consequently the fountain of all power. They must however delegate it to agents, because from their number, dispersed situation, and many other cir¬ cumstances, they cannot exercise it in person. They must there¬ fore by frequent and certain elections choose representatives to whom they trust it. Is there any distinction in the exercise of this delegation of pow¬ er! The man who possesses twenty-five acres of land, has an equa right of voting for a representative, with the man who has twenty five thousand acres. This equality of suffrage secures the people in their property. While we are in pursuit of checks and balances, and proper security in the delegation of power, we ought never to lose sight of the representative character. By this we preserve th« great principle of the primary right of power in the people, and should deviations happen from our interest, the spirit of liberty, in future elections, will correct it: a security I esteem far superior to paper-bills ot rights. When the bands of our former society were dissolved, and wn were under the necessity of forming a new government, we estab¬ lished a constitution founded on the principle ot representation, pre¬ serving therein frequency of elections, and guarding against inequal¬ ity of suffrage. I am one of those who are pleased with that con- because it is built on that foundation. I believe that if th ,3 Peh&leton.] VIRGINIA. 287 confederation had the principles and efficacy of that constitution, we should have found that peace and happiness which we are all in search of. ,In this state constitution, to the executive you commit the sword—to the legislative you commit the purse, and every thing else without any limitation. In both cases the representative char¬ acter is in full effect, and thereby responsibility is secured. The judiciary is separate and distinct from both the other branches, has nothing to do with either the purse or sword, and for obvious reasons, the judges hold their offices during good behaviour. There will be deviations even in our state legislatures thus con¬ stituted. 1 say (and 1 hope to give no offence when 1 do) there have been some. 1 believe every gentleman will see that it is unconsti¬ tutional to condemn any man without a fair trial. Such a condemna¬ tion is repugnant to the principles of justice. It is contrary to the constitution, and the spirit of the common law. Look at the bill of rights. You find there, that no man shall be condemned without being confronted with his accusers and witnesses—that every mao. has a right to call for evidence in his favor, and above all, to a spee¬ dy trial by an in.partial jury of the vicinage, without whose unani¬ mous consent he cannot be found guilty. These principles have not been attended to. An instance has_been mentioned already, where they have been in some degree violated. £Here Mr Pendleton spoke so very low that he could not be heard.] •My brethern in that department (the judicial) felt great uneasiness n their minds, to violate the constitution by such a law. They have prevented the operation of some unconstitutional acts. Notwith¬ standing those violations, I rely upon the piinciples of the govern¬ ment—that it will produce its own reform, by the responsibility re¬ sulting from frequent elections. W e are finally safe while we preserve the representative character. 1 made these observations as introduc¬ tory to the consideration of the paper on your table. I conceive that in those respects where our state constitution has not been disap¬ proved of, objections will not apply against that on our table: when we were formino our state constitution we were confined to local circum- o stances. In forming a government for the union, we must consider our situation as connected with our neighboring states. We have seen the advantages and blessings of the union. Every intelligent and patriotic mind must be convincedthat it is essential to our hap¬ piness. God grant we may never see the disadvantages of disunions To come to the great object of direct taxation, more immmediate- iy under consideration—it we find it our interest to be intimately connected with the o:her 12 states, to establish one common govern¬ ment, and Lind i i one ligament the strength of 1-3 states, we will DEBATES. [Pendleton. ^88 find it necessary to delegate powers proportionate to that end; for the delegation of adaquate powers in this government is no less ne¬ cessary than in our state government. To whom do we delegate these powers'? To our own representatives. Why should we fear so much greater dangers from our representatives there, than from hose we have here? Wliy make so great a distinction between our representatives here, and in the federal government, where every branch is formed on the same principle—preserving throughout, the representative responsible character? W’e have trusted our lives and every thing to our state representatives. W*e have particuarly com¬ mitted our purse to them with unlimited confidence. I never heard any objection to it—I am sure I make none. We ought to contribute our share of fixing the principles of the government. Here the rep¬ resentative character is still preserved. We are to have an equal share in the representation of the general government, should we rat¬ ify this constitution. We have hitherto paid more than our share of taxes for the support of the government, &c. But by this system we are to pay our equal ratable share only. Where is the danger of confiding in our federal representatives? W r e must choose those in who we can put the greatest confidence. They are only to remain two years in office. W T ill they in that time lose all regard for the principles of honor, and their character, and become abandoned prostitutes of our rights? I have no such fear. When power is in the hands of my representatives, I care not whether they meet here or 100 miles off. A gentleman (Mr. Monroe) has said, that the power of direct tax¬ ation was unnecessary, because the imposts and back lands would be abundantly sufficient to answer all federal purposes—if so, what are we disputing about? I ask the gentleman who made the obser¬ vation, and this committee, if they believe that congress will ever lay direct taxes if the other funds are sufficient? It will then re¬ main a harmless power upon paper, and do no injury. If it should be necessary, will gentlemen run the risk of the union by withhol¬ ding it? I was sorry to hear the subjects of requisitions and taxation misinterpreted. The latter has been compared to taxation by Great Britain without our ow r n consent. The two cases are by no means similar. The king of Great Britain has not the purse, though he holds the sword. He has no means of using the sword but by re¬ quisitions on them who hold the purse. He applied to the British parliament; and they were pleased to trust him with our mone 3 r We declared, as we had a right, that we ought to be taxed by our own representatives, and that therefore their disposing of our mo¬ ney without our consent was unjust. Here requisitions are to be made by one body of our representatives to another. Why should Pendleton.] VIRGINIA. 299 *his be the case, when they are both possessed of our equal confi¬ dence; both chosen in the same manner, and equally responsible to us? But we are told, that there will be a war between the two bo¬ dies equally our representatives, and that the state government will be destroyed and consolidated into the general government. I sta¬ ted before, that this could not be so. The two governments act in different manners, and for different purposes—the general govern¬ ment in great national concerns, in which we are interested in com¬ mon with other members of the union—the state legislature in our mere local concerns Is it true, or merely imaginary, that the state legislatures will be confined to the care of bridges and roads'? I think that they are still possessed of the highest powers—^our dear¬ est rights—life, liberty and property, as Virginians, are still in the hands,of our state legislature. If they prove too feeble to protect us, we resort to the aid of the general government for security. The true distinction is, that the two governments are established for different purposes and act on different objects. So that notwithstan¬ ding what the worthy gentleman said I believe I am still correct, and insist that if each power is confined within its proper bounds, and to its proper objects, an interference can never happen. Being for two different purposes, as long as they are limited to the differ¬ ent objects, they can no more clash, than two parallel lines can meet. Both lay taxes, but for different purposes. The same officers may be used by both governments which will prevent a number of incon¬ veniences. If an invasion or insurrection, or other misfortune, shoulu make it necessary for the general government to interpose, this will be for the general purposes of the union, and for fhe manifest inter¬ est of the states. I mentioned formerly that it would never be the interest of the general government, to destroy the state governments. From these it will derive great strength, for if they be possessed of power, they will assist it. If they become feeole, or decay, the general govern¬ ment must likewise become weak, or moulder away. But we are alarmed on account of Kentucky. We are told, that the Mississippi is taken away. When gentlemen say, that seven states are now disposed to give it up, and that it will he given up by the operation of this government, are they correct? It must be sup¬ posed that on occasions of great moment, the senators from all the •states will attend—if they do, there will be no difference between this constitution and the confederation in this point. When they are all present, two-thirds of them will consist of the senators from nine states, which is the number required by the existing system to form treaties. The consent of the president, who is the representa¬ tive of the union, is also necessary. The right to that river must vol. 3. 19 debates, 390 [ P K 3f DL KTOlf «- be settled by the sword or negotiation. I understood that the pur¬ pose of that negotiation which has been on foot, was, that Spain should have the navigation of that river for twenty-five years, alter which we were peaceably to retain it forever. This, I was told, was all that Spain required. If so, the gentleman who differed in opin¬ ion from others, in wishing to gratify Spain must have been actua¬ ted by a conviction, that it would be better to have the right fixed in that manner, than trust to uncertainty. I think the inhabitants of that country, as well as of every other part of the union, will be better pro¬ tected by an efficient firm government, than by the present feeble one. We shall have also a much better chance for a favorable negotiation, if our government be respectable, than we have now. It is also sug¬ gested, that the citizens of the western district run the risk of losing their lands, if this constitution be adopted I am not acquainted with the circumstances of the title set up to those lands. But this I know, that it is founded, not upon any claim commenced during the revolution, but on some latent claim that existed before that period. It was brought before our assembly and rejected, I suppose, because they thought it would at this late period, involve the just and unjust, indiscriminately, in distress. I am bold to say, that no assistance can be given by the constitution to the claimants. The federal le¬ gislature is not authorized to pass any law affecting claims that ex¬ isted before. If the claim is brought forth, it must be before the court of the state, on the ground on which it now stands, and must depend on the same principles on which it now depends. Whether this constitution be adopted or not, will not affect the parties in this case. It will make no difference, as to the principles on which the decision will be made, whether it will come before the state court or the federal court. They will be both equally independent, and ready to decide in strict conformity to justice. I believe the federal courts will be as independent as the state courts. I should no more hesi¬ tate to trust my liberty and property to the one, than the other. Whenever, in any country in the world, the judges are independent, property is secure. The existence of Great Britain depends on that purity with which justice is administered. When gentlemen will therefore find that the federal legislature cannot affect pre-existing claims by their legislation, and the federal courts are on the same ground with the s f ates courts, I hope there will be no ground of alarm. Permit me to deliver a few sentiments on the great and important subject of previous and subsequent amendments. When I sat down to read that paper, I did not read it with an expectation that it was perfect, and that no man would object to it. I had learned, sir, that .an expectation of such perfection in any institute devised by man. Pendleton.] VIRGINIA. 291 was as vain as the search for the philosopher’s stone. 1 discovered objections—I thought I saw there some sown seeds of disunion—not in the immediate operation of the government, but which might hap¬ pen in some future time. I wish amendments to remove these. But these remote possible errors may be eradicated by the amendatory clause in the constitution. I see no danger in making the experi¬ ment, since the system itself points out an easy mode of removing any errors which shall have been experienced. In. this view then, I think we may safely trust in the government. With respect to the eight states who have already acceded to it, do gentlemen be¬ lieve, that, should we propose amendments, as the sine qua non of our adoption, they would listen to our proposals'? I conceive-, sir, that they would not retract. They would tell us— No gentlemen, we cannot accept of your conditions. You put yourselves upon the gi'ounds of opposition. Your amendments are dictated by local considerations . IVc, in our adoption have been influenced by considerations of general utility to the union. We cannot abandon principles , like these , to grat¬ ify you. Thus, sir, by previous amendments, we present a hostile countenance. If, on the contrary, we imitate the conduct of those states, our language will be conciliatory and friendly. Gentleman, we put ourselves on the same ground that you are on. We are not ac¬ tuated by local consideiations, but by such as affect the people of America in general. This conduct will give our amendments full weight. I wa6 surprised, when I heard introduced, the opinion of a gentle¬ man (Mr. Jefferson) whom I highly respect. I know the great abil¬ ities of that gentleman. Providence has, tor the good of mankind, accompanied those extensive abilities, with a disposition to make use of them for the good of his fellow beings : and I wish with all my heart that he was here to assist, us on this interesting occasion. As to his letter, impressed as I am with the force of his authority, [ think it was improper to introduce it on this occasion. The opinion of a private individual, however enlightened, ought not to influence oar decision. But admitting that this opinion ought to be conclusive with us, it strikes me in a different manner from the honorable gen¬ tleman. I have seen the letter in which this gentleman has written his opinion upon this subject—it appears that he is possessed of v that constitution, and has in his mind the idea of amending it—he has in his mind the very question of subsequent or previous amendments, which is now under consideration. His sentiments on this subject are as follows. “ I wish, with all my soul, that the nine first con¬ ventions may accept the new constitution, because it will secure to us the goo® it contains, which I think great and important. I wish the four latest which ever they be, may refuse to accede to it, ti]l DEBATES, [Pendleton* 4017 <1 amendments are secured.” He then enumerates the amendments* which he wishes to be secured, and adds, “ We must take care, how¬ ever, that neither this, nor any other objection to the form, produce a schism in our union. That would be an incurable evil; because friends falling out never cordially reunite.” Are these sentiments* in favor of those who wish to prevent its adoption by previous a- menaments? He wishes the first nine states to adopt it. What arc his reasons'? Because he thinks it will secure to us the good it con¬ tains, which he thinks great and important , and he wishes the other four may refuse it, because he thinks it may tend to obtain necessa¬ ry amendments. But he would not wish that a schism should take place in the union on any consideration. If then w y e are to be influ¬ enced by his opinion at all, w r e will ratify it, and secure thereby? the good it contains. The constitution points out a plain and ordinary method of reform without any disturbance or convulsions whatever,. I therefore think that we ought to ratify it in order to secure the uhion, and trust to this method for removing those inconveniences- which experience shall point out. pMr Pendleton added several other observations, but spoke too low to be heard.] Mr MADISON.—Mr Chairman, finding, Sir, that the clause more immediately under consideration $till meets with the disappro¬ bation of the honorable gentleman over the way (Mr Grayson) and finding that the reasons of the opposition as farther developed, are not satisfactory to myself and others who are in favor of the clause, I wish that it may meet with the most thorough and complete in¬ vestigation. I beg the attention of the committee, in order to ob¬ viate what fell from the honorable gentleman. He set forth, that by giving up the power of taxation, we should give up every thing, and still insist on requisitions being made on the states, and then, if they be not complied with, congress shall lay direct taxes, by way of penalty. Let us consider the dilemma which arises from this doctrine. Either requisitions will be efficacious or they will not. If they will be efficacious, then I say, Sir, we gave up every thing as much as by direct taxation. The same amount will be paid by the people as by direct taxes. If they be not efficacious, where is the advantage of this plan? In w hat respect will it relieve us from the inconveniences which we have experienced from requisitions? The power of laying direct tuxes by the general government is supposed by the honorable gen¬ tleman to be chimerical and impracticable. What is the conse¬ quence of the alternative he proposes? We are to rely upon this power to be ultimately used as a penalty to compel the states to comply. If i be chimerical and impracticable, in the first instance. $93 Pendleton.] VIRGINIA. it will be equally so when it will be exercised as a penalty. A re¬ ference was made to concurrent executions as an instance of the possibility of interference between the two governments. [Here Mr Madison spoke so low that he could not be distinctly heard.] This has been experienced under the state governments without involving any inconvenience. But it may be answered, that under the state governments, concurrent executions cannot produce the inconvenience here dreaded, because they are executed by the same officer. It is not in the power of the general government to employ the state officers? Is nothing to be left to future legislation^ or must every thing be immutably fixed in the constitution? Where exclusive power is given to the union, there can be no interference. Where the general and state legislatures have concurrent power, such regulations will be made, as shall be found necessary to ex¬ clude interferences and other inconveniences. It will be their inter¬ est to make regulations. It has been said, that there is no similarity between petty corpo¬ rations and independent states. I admit that in many points of view there is a great dissimilarity, but in others, there is a striking simi¬ larity between them, which illustrates what is before us. Have we not seen in our own country (as has been already suggested in the course of the debates) concurrent collections of taxes going on at once, without producing any inconvenience? We have seen three distinct collection of taxes, for three distinct purposes. Has it not been possible for collections of taxes, for parochial, and county state purposes, to go on at the same time? Every gentleman must know, that this is now the case, and though there be a subordination in these cases which will not be in the general government, yet in practice it has been found, that these different collections have been concurrently carried on, with convenience to the people, without clashing with one another, and without deriving their harmony from .the circumstance of being subordinate to one legislative body. The taxes will be laid for different purposes. The members of the one government as well as of the other, are the agents of, and subordi¬ nate to, the people. I conceive that the collections of the taxes of' the one will net impede those of the other, and that there can he no interference. This concurrent collection appears to me neither chi¬ merical nor impracticable. He compares resistance of the people to collectors, to refusal of requisitions. This goes against all government. It is as much as to urge, that there should be no legislature. The gentleman who favored us with their observations on this subject, seemed to have reasoned on a supposition, that the general government was confin 294 DEBATES. [Madisoit ed by the paper on your table to lay general uniform taxes. Is it necessary that there should be a tax on any given article through¬ out the United States'? ft is represented to be oppressive, that the states who have slaves and make tobacco, should pay taxes on these for federal wants, when other states who have them not, would es¬ cape. But does the constitution on the table admit of this? On the contrary, there is a proportion to be laid on each state according to its population. The most proper articles will be selected in each state. If one article in any state should be deficient, it will be laid on another article. Our state is secured on this foundation. Its proportion will be commensurate to its population. This is a con¬ stitutional scale, which is an insuperable bar against disproportion, and ought to satisfy all reasonable minds. If the taxes be not uni¬ form, and the representatives of some states contribute to lay a tax of which they bear no proportion, is not this principle reciprocal? Does not the same principle hold in our state government in some degree? It has been found inconvenient to fix on uniform objects of taxation in this state, as the back parts are; not circumstanced like the lower parts of the country. In both cases the reciprocity of the principle will prevent a disposition in one part to oppress the other. My honorable friend seems to suppose that congress, by the possession of this ultimate power as a penalty, will have as ihuch credit and will be as able to procure any sums, on any emer¬ gency, as if they were possessed of it in the' first instance, and that the votes of congress will be as competent to procure loans, as the votes of the British commons. Would the votes of the British house of commons have that credit which they now have, if they were liable to be retarded on their operation, and perhaps, rendered ultimately nugatory, as those of congress must be by the proposed alternative? When their vote passes, it usually receives the con¬ currence of the other branch, and it is known that there is sufficient energy in the government, to carry it into effect. But here the votes of congress are in the first place dependent on the compliance of thirteen different bodies, and after non-compli¬ ance, are liable to be opposed and defeated, by the jealousy of the states against the exercise of this power, and by the opposition of the people which may be expected, if this power be exercised by congress after partial compliances. These circumstances being known, congress could not command one shilling. My honorable friend seems to think that we ought to spare the present generation and throw our burdens, upon posterity. I will not contest the equity of this reasoning, but I must say that good policy as well as views of economy, strongly urge us even to distress ourselves to comply with our most selemn engagements. We must take effec- Madison.] VIRGINIA. 295 tual provision for the payment of the interest of our public debts. In order to do justice to our creditors, and support our credit and reputation, we must lodge power some where or other for this pur¬ pose. As yet the United States have not been able by any energy contained in the old system, to accomplish this end. Our creditors have a right to demand the principal, but would be satisfied with a punctual payment of the interest. If we have been unable to pay the interest, much less shall we be able to dis¬ charge the principal. It appears to me that the whole reasoning used on this occasion shews, that we ought to adopt this system to enable us to throw our burdens on posterity. The honorable mem¬ ber spoke of the decemviri at Rome as having some similitude to the ten representatives who are to be appointed by this state. I can see no point of similitude here, to enable us to draw any conclusion.. For what purpose were the decemviri appointed! They were inves¬ ted with a plenipotentiary commission to make a code of laws. By whom were they appointed? By the people at large? My memory is not infallible, but it tells me they were appointed by the senate. I believe in the name of the people. If they were appointed by the senate, and composed of the most influential characters among the nobles, can any thing be inferred from that against our federal representatives? Who made a discrimination between the nobles and the people? The senate. Those men totally perverted the powers which were given them for the purpose above specified, to the subversion of the public liber¬ ty. Can we suppose that a similar usurpation might be made, by men appointed in a totally different manner? As their circumstances were totally dissimilar, I conceive that no arguments drawn from that source, can apply to this government. I do not thoroughly comprehend the reasoning of my honorable friend, when he tells us, that the federal government will predominate, and that the state interest will be lost, when at the same time he tells us, that it will be a faction of seven states. If seven states will prevail, as states. I conceive that state influence will prevail. If state influence under tire present feeble government has prevailed, I think that a remedy ought to be introduced, by giving the general government power to suppress it. He supposed that my argument with respect to a future war be¬ tween Great Britain and France was fallacious.. The other nations of Europe have acceded to that neutrality, while Great Britain op¬ posed it. We need not expect in case of such a war, that we should be suffered to participate in the profitable emoluments of the carry¬ ing trade, unless we were in a respectable situation. Recollect the last war. Was there ever a war in which the British nation stood DEBATES. $96 [Madisow. opposed to so many nations? All the belligerent nations in Europe with nearly one half of the British empire, were united against it. Yet that nation, though defeated, and humbled beyond any previous* example, stood out against this. From her firmness and spirit in such desperate circumstances, we may divine what her future con¬ duct may be. I did not contend that it was necessary for the United States to establish a navy for that sole purpose, but instanced it as one rea¬ son, out of several, for rendering ourselves respectable. I am no friend to naval or land armaments in time of peace, but if they be necessary, the calamity must be submitted to. Weakness will in¬ vite insults. A respectable government will not only entitle us to a participation of the advantages which are enjoyed by other nations but will be a security against attacks and insults. It is to avoid the calamity of being obliged to have large armaments that, we should establish this government. The best way to avoid danger, is to be in a capacity to withstand it. The impost, we are told, will not diminish, because the emigra¬ tions to the westward will prevent the Increase of population. He has reasoned on this subject justly to a certain degree. I admit that the imposts will increase, till population becomes so great, a# to compel us to recur to manufactures. The period cannot be very far distant, when the unsettled parts of America will be inhabited. At the expiration of twenty five years hence, I conceive that in every part of the United States, there will be as great a population as there is now in the settled parts. "We see already, that in the most populous parts of the union, and where there is but a medium, man¬ ufactures are beginning to be established. W T here this is the case the amount of importation will begin to diminish. Although the impost may even increase during the term of twenty-five years, yet, when we are preparing a government for perpetuity, we ought to found it on permanent principles, and not on those of a temporary nature. Holland is a favorite quotation with honorable members on the other side of the question. Had not their sentiments been discov¬ ered by other circumstances, I should have coneludod from their reasonings on this occasion, that they were friends of the constitu¬ tion. I should suppose that they had forgotten which side of the question they were on. Holland has been called a republic, and a government friendly to liberty. Though it may be greatly superior to some other governments in Europe, still it is not a republic, or a democracy. Their legislature consists in some degree of men who legislate for life. Their councils consists of men who hold their offices for life, who fill up offices and appoint their salaries them- Madison.] VIRGINIA. 297 selves. The people have no agency mediate or immediate in the government. If we look at their history we shall find, that every mischief which has befallen them, has resulted from the existing confederacy. If the stadtholder has been productive of mischiefs— if we ought to guard against such a magistrate more than any evil, let me beseech the honorable gentleman to take notice of what pro¬ duced that, and those troubles which have interrupted their tran¬ quility from time to time. The weakness of their confederacy pro¬ duced both. When the French arms were ready to overpower their republic, and were feeble in the means of defence, which was principally owing to the violence of parties, they then appointed a stadtholder, who sustained them. If we look at more recent events, we shall have a more pointed demonstration that their political infelicity arises from the inbecility of their government. In the late disorders the states were almost equally divided, three provinces on one side, three on the other, and the other divided. One party inclined to the Prus¬ sians, and the other to the French. The situation of France did not admit of their interposing immediately in their disputes by an army, that of the Prussians did. A powerful and large army marched into Holland and compelled the other party to surrender. We know the distressing consequences to the people. What produced those dis¬ putes and the necessity of foreign interference, but the debility of their confederacy'? We may be warned by their example, and shun their fate, by removing the causes which produced their misfortunes. My honorable friend has referred to the transaction of the federal council, with respect to the navigation of the Mississippi. 1 wish it was consistent with delicacy and prudence to lay a complete view of the whole matter before this committee. The history of it is singu¬ lar and curious, and perhaps its origin ought to be taken into consid¬ eration. I will touch on some circumstances, and introduce nearly the sub¬ stance of most of the facts relative to it, that I may not seem to shrink from explanation. It was soon perceived, sir, after the com¬ mencement of ihe war with Britain, that among the various objects that would affect the happiness cf the people of America, the navi¬ gation of the Mississippi was one. Throughout the whole history of foreign negotiation, great stress was laid on its preservation. In the time of our greatest distresses, and particularly when the south¬ ern states were the scene of war, the southern states cast their eyes around to be relieved from their misfortunes. It was supposed that assistance might be obtained forthe relinquishment of that nav¬ igation. It was thought that for so substantial a consideration, Bpain might be induced to afford decisive succour. It was opposed DEBATES. m [Madison by the northern and eastern states. They were sensible that it might be dangerous to surrender this [important right, particularly to the inhabitants of the western country. But so it was, that the south¬ ern states were for it, and the eastern states opposed to it. Since obtaining that happy peace, which secures to us all our claims, this subject has been taken again into consideration, and deliberated upon in the federal government. A temporary relinquishment has been ag¬ itated. Several members from the different states, but particularly from the northern, were for a temporary surrender, because it would terminate disputes, and at the end of the short period for which it was to be given, the right would revert, of course, to those who had given it up. And for this temporary surrender some commercial ad¬ vantages were offered. For my part, I consider this measure, though fouaded on considerations plausible and honorable, was yet not just¬ ifiable, but on grounds of inevitable necessity. I must declare in justice to many characters who were in congress, that they declared that they never would enter into the measure, unless the situation of the United States was such as could not prevent it. I suppose that the adoption of this government will be favorable, to the preservation of the right to that navigation. Emigration will be made from those parts of the United States which are settled, to those parts which are unsettled. If we afford protection to the west¬ ern country,,we will see it rapidly peopled. Emigrations from some of the northern states have been lately increased. We may con¬ clude, as has been said, by a gentleman on the same side, (Mr. Nich¬ olas, that those who emigrate to that country, will leave behind them all their friends and connections as advocates for this right. What was the cause of those states being the champions of this right when the southern states were disposed to surrender if* The preservation of this right will be for the general interest of the union. The western country will be settled from the north as well as the south, and its prosperity will add to the strength and security of ihe union, I am not able to recollect all those circumstances which would be necesary to give gentleman a full view of the subject. I can only add, that I conceive that the establishment of the new go¬ vernment will be the best possible means of securing our rights as well in the western parts, as elsewhere. I. will not sit down till I make one more observation on what fell from my honorable friend. He says, that the true difference between the states lies in this cir¬ cumstance—that some are carrying states, and others productive, and that the operation of the new government will be, that there will be a plurality of the former to combine against the interest of the latter, and that consequently it will be dangerous to put it in their power to do so. I would join with him in sentiments, if this were the case. Were VIRGINIA. Henry.] this within the bounds of probability, I should be equally alarmed, but I think that those states, which are contradistinguished as carry¬ ing states, from the non-importating states, will be but few. I sup¬ pose the southern states will be considered by all, as under the lat¬ ter description. Some other states have been mentioned by an honora¬ ble member on the same side, which are not considered as carrying states. New Jersey and Connecticut can by no means be enumera¬ ted among the carrying states. They receive their supplies through New York. Here then is a plurality of non-importating states. I ceuld add another, if necessary. Delaware though situated upon the. water, is upon the list of non-carrying states. I might say that a great part of New Hampshire is so. I believe a majority of the people of that state receive their supplies from Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. Might I not add all those spates which will be admitted hereafter into the union! These will be non-car- r}dng states, and will support Virginia in case the carrying states will attempt to combine against the rest. This objection must there¬ fore fall to the ground. My honorable friend has made several oth¬ er remarks, but I will defer saying any more till we come to those parts to whieh his objections refer. Mr. HENRY. Mr. Chairman,-once more I find it necessary to trespass on your patience. An honorable, gentleman several days ago observed, that the great object of this government, was justice. We were told before, that the greater consideration was union. However, the consideration of justice seems to have been what in¬ fluenced his mind when he made strictures on the proceedings of the Virginia Assembly. I thought the reasons of that transaction had been sufficiently explained. It is exceedingly painful to me to be objecting, but I must make a few observations. I shall not again review the catalogue of dan¬ gers which the honorable gentleman entertained us with. They ap¬ pear to me absolutely imaginary. They have, in my conception, been proved to be such. But sure I am, that the dangers of this system are real, whenthose who have no similar interests with the people of this country, are to legislate for us—when our dearest interests are left in the power of those whose advantage it may be to infringe them. How will the quotas of troops be furnished! Hated as- requisitions are, your fede¬ ral officers cannot collect troops, like dollars, and carry them i» their pockets. You must make those abominable requisitions for them, and the scale will be in proportion to the number of your blacks,, as well as your whites, unless they violate the constiutional rule oi apportionment. This is not calculated to rouse the fears of the peo¬ ple. It is founded in truth. How oppressive and dangerous musi. |h)0 DEBATES. [Henby. 1 this be to the southern states who alone have slaves? This will render their proportion infinitely greater than that of the northern states. It has been openly avowed that this shall be the rule. I will appeal to the judgments of the committees, whether there be danger. '1 he honorable gentleman said, that there was no prece¬ dent for this American revolution. We have precedents in- abun¬ dance. They have been drawn from Great Britain. Tyranny has arisen there, in the same, manner in which it was introduced among theDutch. The tyranny of Philadelphia, maybe like the tyranny «f George the III. I believe this similitude will be incontestibly proved before we conclude. The honorable gentleman has endeavored to explain the opinion of Mr Jefferson, our common friend, into an advice to adopt this new government. Wliat are his sentiments? He wishes nine states to adopt, and that four states may be found somewhere to reject it. Now, Sir, I say, if we pursue his advice, what are we to do* To prefer form to substance? For, give me leave to ask what is the substan¬ tial part of his counsel? It is, Sir, that four states should reject* They tell us, that from the most authentic accounts, New Hampshire will adopt it. When I denied this, gentlemen said they were abso¬ lutely certain of it. Where then will four states be found to reject, if we adopt it? If we do, the counsel of this enlightened and wor¬ thy countryman of ours, will be thrown away, and for what? He wishes to secure amendments and a bill of rights, if I am not mista- ken. 1 speak from the best information, atid if wrong, 1 beg to be put right. His amendments go to that despised thing, called a bill of rights , and all the rights which are dear to human nature—trial by jury, the liberty of religion, and the press, &c. Do not gentle¬ men see, that if we adopt, under the idea of following Mr. Jefferson’s opinion, we amuse ourselves with the shadow, while the substance is given away? If Virginia be for adoption, what states will be left of sufficient respectability and importance, to secure amendments by their rejection? As to North Carolina, it is a poor despised place. Itg dissent will not have influence to introduce any amendments. Where is the American spiiit of liberty? Where will you find at¬ tachment to the rights of mankind, when Massachusetts, the great northen state, Pennsylvania the great middle state, and Virginia, the great southern state, shall have adopted this government? Where will you find magnanimity enough to reject it? Should the remain¬ ing states have this magnanimity, thpy will not have sufficient weight, to have the government altered.—Tnis state has weight and impor* lance. Her example will have powerful influence—her rejection treaties should, when un¬ finished, be exposed; but it should be known after they were conclu¬ ded, who hud advised them to be made, in order to secure some d»- 302 DEBATES. [Hsnrt. gree of certainty that the public interest shall be consulted in their formation. We are told that all powers, not given, are reserved. I am sorry to bring forth hacknejred observations. But, Sir, important truth lose nothing of their validity or weight, by frequency of repetition. The English history is frequently recurred to by gentlemen. Let us advert to the conduct of the people of that country. The people of England lived without a declaration of rights, till the war in the time of Charles 1. That king made usurpations upon the rights of the people. Those rights were in a great measure before that time undefined. Power and privilege then depended on implication and logical discussion. Though the declaration of rights was obtained from that king, his usurpations cost him his life. The limits be¬ tween the liberty of the people, and the prerogative of the king,were still not clearly defined. The rights of the people continued tp be, violated till the Stuart family was banished in the year 1688. The people of England magnanimously defended their rights, banished the tyrant, and pre¬ scribed to William prince of Orange, by the bill of rights, on what terms he should reign. And this bill of rights put an end to all con¬ struction and implication. Before this, sir, the situation of the pub¬ lic liberty of England was dreadful. For upwards of a century the nation was involved in every kind of calamity, till the bill of rights put an end to all, by defining the rights of the people, and lim¬ iting the king’s prerogative. Give me leave to add (if I can add any thing to so splendid an example) the conduct of the American people. They, sir, thought a bill of rights necessary. It is al- legded that several states, in the formation of their government omitted a bill of rights. To this I answer, that they had the sub¬ stance of a bill of rights contained in their constitutions, which is the same thing. I believe that Connecticut has preserved by her constitution her royal charter, which clearly defines and secures the great rights of mankind—secures to us the great important rights of humanity, and I care not in what form it is done. Of what a r ivantage is it to the American congress to take away this great and general security] I ask of what advantage is it t® the public or to congress, to drag an unhappy debtor, not for the sake of justice, but to gratify the malice of the plaintiff, with his witnes¬ ses to the federal court, from a great distance! What was the prin¬ ciple that actuated the convention in proposing to put such danger¬ ous powers in the hands of any one? Why is the trial by jury ta¬ ken away? All the learned Arguments that have been used on this occasion do not prove that it is secured. Even the advocates for the .plan do not,all concur in the certainty of its security. Wherefore is Henry.] VIRGINIA. 303 religious liberty not secured? One honorable gentleman, who favors adoption, said that he had had his fears on the subject. If I can well recollect, he informed us that he was perfectly satisfied by the powers of reasoning (with which he is so happily endowed) that those fears were not well grounded.—There is many a religious man who knows nothing of argumentative reasoning; there are many of our most worthy citizens, who cannot go through all the labyrinths of syllogistic argumentative deductions, when they think that the rights of conscience are invaded. This sacred right ought not to depend on constructive logical reasoning. When we see men of such talents and learning, compelled to use their utmost abililies to convince themselves that there is no danger, is it not sufficient to make us tremble? Is it not sufficient to fill the minds of the ignorant part of men with fear? If gentlemen believe that the apprehensions of men will be quieted, they are mistaken : since our best informed men are in doubt with respect to the securi¬ ty of our rights. Those who are not so well informed will spurn at the government. When our common citizens, who are not posses¬ sed with such extensive knowledge and abilities, are called upon to change their bill of rights, (which in plain unequivocal terms, se¬ cures their most valuable rights and privileges) for construction and implication, will they implicitly acquiesce? Our declaration of rights tells us, “ That all men are by nature free and independent, &c.” (Here Mr. Henry read the declaration of rights.) Will they ex¬ change these rights for local reasons? If you had a thousand acres of land, dependent on this, would you be satisfied with logical con¬ struction? Would you depend upon a title of so disputable a nature? The present opinions of individuals will be buried iu entire oblivion when those rights will be thought of. That sacred and lovely thing religion, ought not to rest on the ingenuity of local deduction. Ho¬ ly religion, sir, will be prostituted to the lowest purposes of human policy. What has been more productive of mischief among mankind than religious disputes? Then here, sir, is a foundation for such dis¬ putes, when it requires learning and logical deduction to perceive that religious liberty is secure. The honorable member told us that he had doubts with respeot to the judiciary department. I hope those doubts will be explained. He told us that his*object was union. I admit that the reality of union and not the name, is the object which most merits the atten¬ tion of every friend to his country. He told you that you should hear many great sounding words on our side of the question. We have heard the words Union from him. 1 have heard no word so often pronounced in this house as he did this. I admit that the American union is dear to every man-—I admit that every man who has three DEBATES. [Hemhy*. grains of information, must know and think that union is the bestof ail thing's. But as I said before, we must not mistake the end for the means. If he can shew that the lights of the union are secure? we will consent. It has been sufficiently demonstrated that they are not spcured. It sounds mighty prettily to gentlemen to curse paper money and honestly pay debts. But apply to the situation of Amer¬ ica, and you v/ill find there are thousands and thousands of contracts? whereof equity forbids an exact literal performance. Pass that go¬ vernment, and you will be bound hand and foot. There was an im¬ mense quantity of depreciated continental paper money in circula¬ tion at the conclusion of the war. This money is in the hands of individuals to this day. The holders of this money may call for the nominal value, il this government be adopted. This state may be compelled to pay her proportion of that currency pound for pound. Pass this government and you will be carried to the federal court (if I understand that paper right) and you will be compelled to pay shil¬ ling for shilling. I doubt on the subject, at least as a public man, 1 ought to have doubts. A state may be sued in the federal court by the paper on your table. It appears to me then, that the holder of the paper money may require shilling for shilling. If there be any latent remedy to prevent this, l hope it will be discovered. The precedent, with respect to the union between England and Scotland, does not hold. The union of Scotland speaks in plain and direct terms. Their privileges were particularly secured. It was expressly provided, that they should retain their own particular laws. Their nobles have a right to choose representatives to the number of sixteen. 1 might thus go on and specify particulais, but it will suf¬ fice to observe generally, that their rights and privileges were ex¬ pressly and unequivocally reserved. The power of direct taxation was not given up by the Scotch people. There is no trait in that union which will maintain their arguments. In order to do this, they ought to have proved that Scotland united without securing their rights, and afterwards got that security by subsequent amendments. Did the people of Scotland do this! No, sir, like a sensible people they trusted nothing to hazard. If they have but forty-five mem¬ bers, and those be often corrupted, these defects will be great¬ er here. The number will be smaller, and they will be consequent¬ ly the more easily corrupted. Another honorable gentleman advises us to give this power, in order to exclude the necessity of going to war. He wishes to establish national credit I presume—and imag¬ ines that if a nation has public faith, and shews a disposition to comply with her engagements, she is safe among ten thousand dan¬ gers* If the honorable gentleman can prove that this paper is cal- tulatod to give us public faith, I will be satisfied. But if you be in Hknbt.] VIRGINIA. 305 ■constant preparation for war, on such airy and imaginary grounds as the mere possibility of danger, your government must be milita- Ty, which will be inconsistent with the enjoyment of liberty. But, Sir, we must become formidable, and have a strong govern¬ ment to protect us from the British nation. Will the paper on the table prevent the attacks of the British navy, or enable us to raise fleet equal to the British fleet ? The British have the strongest fleet in Europe, and can strike any where. It is the utmost folly to •conceive that the paper can have such an operation. It will be no less so to attempt to raise a powerful fleet. With respect to requi¬ sitions, I beseech gentlemen to consider the importance of the sub¬ ject. We who are for amendments propose, (as has been frequently mentioned) that a requisition shall be made for d62OO,0OO, for instance, instead of direct taxation, and that if it be complied with, then it shall he raised by direct taxes. We do not wish to have strength to refuse to pay them, but to possess the power of raising the taxes in the most easy mode for the people. But, says he, you may delay us by this mode. Let us see if there be not sufficient to counterbalance this evil. The oppression arising from taxation is not from the amount, but from the mode—a thorough acquaintance with the condition of the people, is-necessary to a just distribution of taxes. The whole wisdom of the science of government, with respect to taxation consistsin selecting that mode of collection which wll best accommodate the convenience of the people. When you come to tax a great country, you will find that ten men are too few to set tie the manner of collection. One capital advantage, which will result from the proposed alternative, is this, that there will be ne¬ cessary communications between your ten members in congress, and your 170 representatives here. If it goes through the hands of the latter, they will knew how much the citizens can pay, and by look- ingat the paper on your table, they will know how much they ought to pay. No man is possessed of sufficient information to know ho much we can or ought to pay. We might also remonstrate, if by mistake or design, they should call for a greater sum than our proportion. After a remonstrance, and a free investigation between our representatives here, and those in congress, the error would be removed. Another valuable thing, which it will produce, is, that the people will pay the taxes'cheerfully. It is supposed, that this would oc¬ casion a wasto of limp, and be an injury to public credit. This would only happen if requisitions should not be complied with. In this ease the delay would be compensated by the payment of inter¬ est, which with the addition of the credit of the stats to that cf the general government, would in a great measure obvia'ethis objection. DEBATES. 306 [Henry. But if it had all the force which it is supposed to have, it would not he adequate to the evils of direct taxation. But there is every prob¬ ability that requisitions would be then complied with. Would it not then be our interest, as well as duty, to comply! After non- compliance, there would be a general acquiescence in the exercise of this power. We are fond of giving power, at least power which is constitutional. Here is an option to pay according to your own mode or otherwise. If you give probability fair play, you must conclude that they would be complied with. Would the assembly of Virginia by refusal, destroy the country and plunge the people in miseries and distress! If you give your reasoning faculty fair play, you cannot but know, that payment must be made, when the conse¬ quence of a refusal, would be an accumulation of inconveniences to the people. Then they say, that if requisitions be not complied with, in case of a war, the destruction of the country may be the consequence; that therefore, we ought to give the power of taxation to the government to enable it to protect us. Would not this be another reason for complying with requisitions, to prevent the coun¬ try from being destroyed! You tell us, that unless requisitions be complied with, your commerce is gone. The prevention of this also, will be an additional reason to comply. He tells us, that responsibility is secured by direct taxation. Responsibility instead of being inereased, will be lost forever by it. In our state government, our repiesentatives may be severally in¬ structed by their constituents. There are no persons to counteract their operations. They can have no excuse for deviating from our instructions. In the general government other men have power over the business. When oppressions may take place, our repre¬ sentatives may tell us, We contended for your interest, but we could not carry our point, because the representatives from Massa¬ chusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut, &c. were against us. Thus, Sir, you may see there is no real responsibility. He further said, that there was such a contrariety of interests, as to hinder a consolidation. I will only make one remark—there is a variety of interests—some of the stales owe a great deal on account of paper money—others very little—some of the northern states have collec¬ ted and barrelled up paper money. Virginia has sent thither her cash long ago. There is little or none of the continental paper mo¬ ney retained in this state. Is it not their business to appreciate this money! Yes, and it will be your business to prevent it. But there will be a majority against you, and you will be obliged to pay your share of this money, in its nominal value. It has been said by several gentlemen, that the freeness of elections would be promoted by throwing the country into large districts. I contend, Sir, that it ) Henr >'-1 VIRGINIA. 307 will have a contrary effect. It will destroy that connection that ought to subsist between the electors and the elected. If your elec¬ tions be by districts, instead of counties, the people will not be ac¬ quainted with the candidates. They must,therefore, be directed in the elections by those who know them. So that, instead of a confidential connection between the electors and the elected, they will be absolute¬ ly unacquainted with each other. A common man must ask a man of influence how I 16 is to proceed, and for whom he must vote. The elec¬ ted, therefore, wall be careless of the interest of the electors. It will be a common job to extort the suffrages of the common people for the most influential characters. The same men may be repeat¬ edly elected by these means. This, Sir, instead of promoting the freedom of elections, leads us to an aristocracy. Consider the mode ■of elections in England. Behold the progress of an election in an English shire. A man of an enormous fortune will spend £30,000 or £40,000 to get himself elected. This is frequently the case. Will the honorable gentleman say, that a poor man, as enlightened as tny man in the Island, lias an equal chance with a rich man to be elected? lie will stand no chance, though he may have the finest understanding of any man in the shire. It will be so here, Where is the chance that a poor man can come forward with the rich? The honorable gentleman will find that instead of supporting democrati- cal principles, it goes absolutely to destroy them. The state governments, says he, will possess greater advantages than the general government, and will consequently prevail. His opinion and mine are diamatrically opposite. Bring forth the federal allurements, and compare them with the poot contemptible things that the state legislatures can bring forth. On the part of the state legislatures, there are justices of the peace and militia officers-—and even these justices and officers, are bound by oath in favor of the constitution. A constable is the only man who is not obliged to swear paramount, in allegiance to this beloved congress. On the other hand, there are rich, fat federal emoluments—your rich, snug fine, fat federal offices—the number of collectors of taxes and ex¬ cises, will out number any thing from the states. Who can cope with the excisemen and taxmen? There are none in this country who can cope, with this class of men alone. But, Sir, is this the only danger . 2 Would to Heaven that it were. If we are to ask which will last the longest—the state or the general government, ,you must take an army and a navy into the account. Lay these things together, and add to the enumeration the superior abilities of those who manage the general government. Can then the state goveinments look it in the face? You dan? not look it in the face now, when it is but in embryo. The infip- * .103 DEBATES. [Henry*. ©nee of this government will be such, that yon never can got’amend- nienls; for if you propose alterations you will affront them. Let the honorable gentleman consider all these things and say, whether the state governments will last as long as the federal government. With respect to excises, I can never endure them. They have been productive of the most intolerable oppressions every where. Make a probable calculation of the expense attending the legislative, exe¬ cutive* and judiciary. You will find that there must bean immense increase of taxes. We are,the same mass of people we were before. In the same circumstances—the same pockets afe to pay—the ex* penses are to be increased—what will enable us to bear this aug¬ mentation of taxes? The mere form of government will not do it. A plain understanding cannot conceive how the taxes can be dimin¬ ished, when our expenses are augmented, and the means of paying them not increased. With respect to our tax-laws, we have purchased a little know¬ ledge by sad experience upon the subject. Reiterated experiments have taught us what can alleviate the distresses and suit the conve¬ nience of the people. But we are now to throw away that system, by which we have acquired this knowledge, and send ten men to legislate for us. The honorable gentleman was pleased to say, that the representa¬ tion of the people was the vital principle of this government. I will readily agree that it ought to be so. But I contend that this principle is only nominally, and not substantially to be found there. We contended with the British about representation, they offered us such a representation as congress now does. They called it a virtual representation. If you look at that paper you will find it so there. Is there but a virtual representation in the upper house? The states are represented as states , by two senators each. This is virtual, not actual. They encounter you with Rhode Island and Delaware. This is not an actual representation. What does the term representation signify? It means that a certain district—a cer¬ tain association of men should be represented in the government, for certain ends. These ends ought not to be impeded or obstructed in any manner. Here, Sir, this populous state has not an adequate a-hare of legislative influence. The two petty states of Rhode Island and Delaware, which together are infinitely inferior to this state, in extent and population, have double her weight and can counteract her interest. 1 say that the representation in the senate, as appli¬ cable to slates, is not actual. Representation is not therefore the vital principle of this government. So far it is wrong. Rulcyr.s are the servants and agents of the people—the people arc heir masters—does the new constitution acknowledge this prinet- ) Henry.] VIRGINIA. 309 pie? Trial by jury is the best appendage of freedom. Does it se¬ cure this? Does it secure the other great rights of mankind? Our own constitution preserves these principles. The honorable gentle¬ man contributed to form that constitution: the applauses so justly due to it should, in my opinion, go to the condemnation of they paper. With respect to the failures and errcis ol our government, they might have happened in any government. I do not justify what me¬ rits censure, but I shall not degrade my country. As to deviations from justice, I hope they will be attributed to the errors of the head, and not to those of the heart. The honorable gentleman did our judictary honor in saying that they had firmness to counteract the legislature in some cases. Yes, Sir, our judges opposed the acts of the legislature. We have this land-mark to guide us. They had fortitude to declare that they were the judiciary, and would oppose unconstitutional acts, ^re you sure that your federal judiciary will act thus? Is that judiciary so well constructed and so independent of the other branches, as our state judiciary? Where are your land-marks in this govern¬ ment? I will be bold to say you cannot find any in it. I take it as the highest encomium on this country, that the acts of the legisla¬ ture, if unconstitutional, are liable to be opposed by the judiciary. Then the honorable gentleman said, that the two judiciaries and legislatures, would go in a parallel line and never interfere—that as long as each was confined to its proper objects, that there would be no danger of interference—that like two parallel lines as long as they continued in their parallel direction they never would meet. With submission to the honorable gentleman’s opinion, I assert that there is danger of interference, because no line is drawn between O 1 the powers of the two governments in many instances : and, where there is a line, there is no check to prevent the one from encroach^ log upon the powers or the other. I therefore contend that they must interfere, and that this inter¬ ference must subvert the state government, as being less powerful. Unless your government have checks, it must inevitably terminate iu the destruction of your privileges. I will be bold to say, that the British government has real checks. I was attacked by gentle- tlemen, as if I had said that I loved the British government better than our own. I never said so. 1 said that if I were obliged to relin¬ quish a republican government, I would choose the British monar¬ chy. I never gave the preference to the British or any other go¬ vernment, when compaied to that which the honorable gentleman assisted to form. I was constrained to say what I said. When two disagreeable objects present themselves to the mirid, we choose that which has the least deformity. 310 DEBATES. [Henrx^ As to the western country, nowithstanding our representation in congress, and notwithstanding any regulation that may be made by congress, it may be lost. The seven northern states are determined to give up the Mississippi. We are told that in older to secure the navigation of that river, it was necessary to give it up for twenty- five years to the Spaniards, and that thereafter we should enjoy it forever without any interruption from them. This argument resem¬ bles that which recommends adopting first and then amending. I think the reverse of What the honorable gentleman said on the sub¬ ject. Those seven states are decidedly against it. He tells us, that it is the policy of the whole union to retain it. If men were wise, virtuous, and honest, we might depend on an adherence to this policy. Did we not know of the fallability of human nature, we might rely on the present structure of this government. We might depend that the rules of propriety, and the geheral interest of the union, would ho observed. But the depraved nature of man is well known. He has a natural bias towards his own interest, which will prevail over every consideration, unless it be checked-. It is the interest and in¬ clination of the seven northern states to relinquish this river. If you enable them to do so, will the mere propriety of consulting the in¬ terest of the other six states, refrain them from it? Is it imagined, that Spain will, after a peaceable possession of it for thirty years,, give it up to you again. 2 Can credulity itself hope that the Span¬ iards, who wish to have it for that period, wish to clear the river for you? What is it they wish?—To clear the river? For whom? Amer¬ ica saw the time when she had the reputation of common sense at least! Do you suppose they will restore it to you after thirty years? If you do, you depart from that rule. Common observation tells you that it must be the policy of Spain to get it first, and then retain it forever. If you give it up, in my poor estimation, they will never voluntarily restore it. Where is the man who will believe that after clearing the river, strengthening themselves, and increasing the means of retaining it, the Spaniards will tamely surrender it? With respect to the concurrent collections of parochial, county, and state taxes, which the honorable gentleman has instanced as a proof of the practicability of the concurrent collection of taxes by the general and state governments, the comparison will not stand exam¬ ination. As my honorable triend has said, these concurrent collec¬ tions come from one power. They irradiate from the same centre. They are not co-equal or co-extensive. There is no clashing of pow¬ er between them. Each is limited to its own particular objects, and all subordinate to one supreme controlling power—the legislature. The county courts have power over the county and parish collections, and can constantly redress any injuries or oppressions committed by ) Henry.] VIRGINIA. 311 the collectors. Will this be the case in the federal courts? I hope they will not have federal courts in every county. If they will, the state courts will be debased and stripped of their cognizance, and utterly abolished. Yet, if there be no power in the country to call them to account, they will more flagrantly trample on your rights. Does the honorable gentleman mean that the thirteen states will have thirteen different tax laws? Is this the expedient which is to he substituted to the unequal and unjust one of uniform taxes? If so, many horrors present themselves to my mind.—They may be imagi¬ nary, but it appears to my mind to be the most abominable system that could be imagined. It will destroy every principle of Respon¬ sibility. It will be destructive of that fellow feeling, and consequent confidence,which ought to subsist between the representatives and the represented. We shall then be taxed b}r those who bear no part in the taxes themselves, and who consequently will be regardless of our in¬ terest in imposing them upon us. The efforts of our ten men will avail very little when opposed by the northern majority. If our ten men be disposed to sacrifice our interest, we cannot detect them. Under the colour of being out-numbered by the northern representatives, they can always screen themselves. When they go to the general go- ernment, they may make a bargain with the northern delegates. They may agree to tax our citizens in any manner which may be proposed by the northern members; in consideration of which the latter may make them some favorite concessions.* The noithern states will never assent to regulations promotive of the southern ag¬ grandizement. Notwithstanding what gentlemen say of the proba¬ ble virtue of our representatives, I dread the depravity of human na¬ ture. I wish to guard against it by proper checks, and trust nothing to accident or chance. I will never depend on so slender a protec¬ tion as the possibility of being represented by virtuous men. Will not thirteen different objects of taxation in the thirteen differ¬ ent states, involve us in an infinite number of inconveniences and absolute confusion? There is a striking difference, and great contra¬ riety of interests between the states. They are naturally divided into carrying and productive states. This is an actual existing distinc¬ tion which cannot be altered. The former are more numerous, and must prevail. What then will be the consequence of their conten¬ ding interests, if the taxation of America is to go on in thirteen dif¬ ferent shapes? This government subjects every thing to the north¬ ern majority. Is there not then a settled purpose to check the sou th¬ em interest? We thus put unbounded power over our property in hands not having a common interest with us. How can the south- ern members prevent the adoption of the most oppressive mode of taxation in the southern states, as there is a majority in favor of the 312 DEBATES. [Madisoit.. northern states? Sir, this is a picture so horrid, so wretched, so dreadful, that I need no longer dwell upon it. Mr. Henry then con¬ cluded by remarking, that he dreaded the most iniquitous specula¬ tion and stock-jobbing, from the operation of such a system. Mr. MADISON. Mr. Chairman, pardon me for making a few remarks on what fell from the honorable gentleman last lip. I am 1 sorry to follow the example of gentlemen in deviating from the rule of the house.—But as they have taken the utmost latitude in their oh- jections, it. is neeessary that those who favor the government should answer them. But I wish as soon as possible to take up the subject regularly. I will therefore take the liberty to answer some obser¬ vations which have been irregularly made, though they might be more properly answered when we come to discuss those parts of the* constitution to which they respectively refer. I will, however, post¬ pone answering some others till then. If there be that terror in di¬ rect taxation, that the states would comply with requisitions to guard against the federal legislature ; and if, as gentlemen say, this state will always have it in her power to make her collections speedily and fully, the people will be compelled to pay the same amount as quickly and punctually as if raised by the general government. It has been amply proved, that the general government can lay taxes as conveniently to the people as the state governments, by imitating the state systems of taxation. If the general government have not the power of collecting-its own revenues, in the first in stance, it will he still dependent on the state governments in some measure : and the exercise of this power, after refusal, will be ine¬ vitably productive of injustice and confusion, if partial compliances be made before it is driven to assume it. Thus, Sir, without reliev¬ ing the people in the smallest degree, alternative proposed will im¬ pair the efficacy of the government, and will perpetually endange? the tranquillity of the union. The honorable member’s objection with respect to requisitions of troops will be fully obviated at another time. Let it suffice now to say, that it is altogether unwarrantable, and founded upon a mis¬ conception of the paper hefore you. But the honorable member, in order to influence our decision, has mentioned the opinion of a citi¬ zen who is an ornament to this state. When the name of this dis¬ tinguished character was introduced, I was much surprised. 16 it come to this then, that we are not to follow our own reason? Is it proper to introduce the opinions of respectable men, not within thes® walls? If the opinion of an important character were to weigh on this occasion, could we not adduce a character equally great on our side? Are we, who (in the honorable gentleman’s opinion) are not to be governed by an erring world, now to submit to the opinion of 1 Madison.] VIRGINIA. 312 a citizen beyond the Atlantic? I believe, that were that gentleman now on this floor, he would be for the adoption of this constitution. I wish his name had never been mentioned. I wish every thing spoken here, relative to his opinion, maybe suppressed if our de¬ bates should be published. I know that the delicacy of his feelings will be wounded, when he will see in print what has and may be said, concerning him on this occasion. I am, in some measure, ac¬ quainted with his sentiments on this subject. It is not right forme to unfold what he has informed me. But I will venture to assert, that the clause now discussed, is not objected to by Mr Jefferson. He approves of it, because it enables the government to carry, on its operations.—He admires several parts of it, which have been repro¬ bated with vehemence in this hopse. He is captivated with the equality of suffrage in the senate, which the honorable gentleman (Mr Henry) calls the rotten part of this constitution. But, what¬ ever be the opinion of that illustrious citizen, considerations of per¬ sonal delicacy should dissuade us from introducing it here. The honorable member has introduced the subject of religion. Religion is not guarded—there is no bill of rights declaring that re- ligion should be secure. Is a bill of rights a security for religion? Would the bill of rights, in this state, exempt the people from pay¬ ing for the support of one particular sect, if such sect were exclu¬ sively established by law? If there were a majority of one sect, a bill of rights would be a poor protection for liberty Happily for the states, they enjoy the utmost freedom of religion. This free¬ dom arises from that multiplicity of sects, which pervades America, and which is the best and only security for religious liberty in any society. For where there is such a variety of sects, there cannot be a majority of any one sect to oppress and persecute the rest. Fortunately for this commonwealth, a majority of the people are de¬ cidedly against any exclusive establishment—I believe it to be so in the other states. There is not a shadow of right in the general go¬ vernment to intermeddle with religion. Its least interference with it, would be a most flagrant usurpation. I can appeal to my uniform conduct on this subject, that 1 have warmly supported religious freedom. It is better that this security should be depended upon from the general legislature, than from one particular state. A par¬ ticular state might concur in one religious project. But the United Btates abound in such a variety of sects, that it is a strong security against religious persecution, and it is sufficient to authorise a con¬ clusion, that no one sect will ever be able to out number or depress the rest. I will not travel over that extensive tract, which the honorable member has traversed. I shall not now take notice of al| his de¬ sultory objections. As occasions arise, I shall answer thorn. 314 DEBATES. [Madisonv It is worthy of observation, on this occasion, that the honorable gentleman himself, seldom fails to contract the arguments of gen¬ tlemen on that side of the question. For example, he strongly com¬ plains that the federal government, from the number of its members* will make an addition to the public expense, too formidable to be borne, and yet he and other gentleman on the same side, object that the number of representatives is too small, though ten men are more than we are entitled to under the existing system! How can these contradictions be reconciled? If we are to adopt any efficient go¬ vernment at all, how can we discover or establish such a system, if it be thus attacked? Will it be possible to form a rational conclu¬ sion upon contradictory principles? If arguments of a contradictory nature were to be brought against the wisest and most admirable system to the formation of which human intelligence is competent it never could stand them. He has acrimoniously inveighed against the government, because such transactions as congress think require secrecy, may be con¬ cealed; and particularly those which relate to treaties. He admits that when a treaty is forming, secrecy is proper ; but urges that when actually made, the public ought to be made acquainted with every circumstance relative to it. The policy of not divulging the most important transactions, and negociations of nations, such as those which relate to warlike arrangements and treaties, is univer¬ sally admitted. The congressional proceedings are to be occasion¬ ally published, including all receipts and expenditures of public mo¬ ney, of which no part can be used, but in consequence of appropria¬ tions made by law. This is a security which we do not enjoy un¬ der the existing system. That part which authorises the govern¬ ment to withhold from the public knowledge what in their judge¬ ment rnay require secrecy, is imitated from the confederation ;• that very system which the gentleman advocates. * No treaty has been formed, and I will undertake to say, that none will be formed under the old system, which will secure to us the actual enjoyment of the navigation of the Mississippi. Our weak¬ ness precludes us from it. We are entitled to it. But it is not un¬ der an inefficient government that we shall be able to avail our¬ selves fully of that right. I most conscientiously believe, that it will be far better secured under the new government, than the old, as we will be more able to enforce our right. The people of Ken¬ tucky will have an additional safeguard from the change of system. The strength and respectability of the union will secure them in tho enjoyment of that right, till that country becomes sufficiently popu¬ lous. When this happens, they will be able to retain it in spite of every opposition. ) Nicholas.] VIRGINIA. 315 I can never admit that seven states are disposed to surrender that navigation. Indeed it never was the case. Some of^ their most distinguished characters are decidedly opposed to its relinquishment. When its cession was proposed by the southern states, the northern states opposed it. They still oppose it. New Jersey directed her delegates to oppose it, and is strenuously against it. The same sentiments pervade Pennsylvania: at least I am warranted to say so from the best information which I have. Those states, added to the. southern states, would be a majority against it. The honorable gentleman, to obviate the force of my observations with respect to concurrent collection of taxes under different author¬ ities, said, that there was no interference between the concurrent collections of parochial, county, and state taxes, because they all irradiated from the same centre, but that this was not the case with the general government. To make use of the gentleman’s own terms, the concurrent collections undei; the authorities of the general go¬ vernment and state governments, all irradiate from the people at large. The people is their common superior. The sense of the people at large, is to be the predominating spring of their actions. This is a sufficient security against interference. Our attention was called to our commercial interest, and at the same time the landed interest was said to be in danger. If those ten men who were to be chosen, be elected by landed men, and have land themselves, can the electors have any thing to apprehend? If the commercial interests be in dauger, why are we alarmed about tire carrying trade? Why is it said, that the carrying states will preponderate, if commerce be in danger? W ith respect to specula¬ tion, I will remark that stock-jobbing has prevailed more or less in all countries, and ever will, in some degree, notwithstanding any exertions to prevent it. If you judge from what has happened under •the existing system, any change would render a melioration prob¬ able. Friday , the 13 th of June, 1788. Mr NICHOLAS urged that the convention should either proceed according to the original determination, clause by clause, or rescind that order, and go into the constitution at large. Mr HENRY opposed the motion as to taking up the subject clause by clause. He thought it ought to be considered at large. Ho observed, that among a great variety of subjects, the business of the Mississippi had taken up a great deal of time. He wished that be¬ fore they should take leave of that subject, that the transactions of congress relative to the navigation of that river, should be communi¬ cated to the convention, in order that they might draw their conclu- 316 DEBATES, [Mokboc, sion from the best source. For this purpose, he hoped that those gentlemen who had been then in congress, and the present members of congress who were in convention, would communicate what they knew on the subject. He declared that he did not wish to hurt th© feelings of the gentlemen who had been in congress, or to reflect on. any private character: but that for the information of the convention, he was desirous of having the most authentic account and faithful account of facts. Mr NICHOLAS had no objection to Mr Henry’s proposal. Mr MADISON then declared that if the honorable gentleman thought that he had given an incorrect account of the transactions relative to the Mississippi, he would, on a thorough and complete investigation, find himself mistaken. That he had his information from his own knowledge and from a perusal of the documents and papers which related to those transactions: that it had always been his opinion, that the poiicy which had for its object the relinquish¬ ment of that river, was unwise, and the mode of conducting it, was etill more exceptionable. He added, that he had no objection to have every light on the subject that could tend to elucidate it. Mr NICHOLAS hoped, that after the information should be given respecting that river, they would confine themselves to the order of the house. The convention then resolved itself into a committee of the whole convention, to take into farther consideration, the proposed constitu¬ tion, and more particularly for the purpose of receiving information concerning the transactions of congress relativs to the Mississippi.— Mr Wythe in the chair. On motion, the acts and resolutions of Assembly relative to the Mississippi were read. Mr LEE, of Westmoreland, then, in a short speech, related sev¬ eral congressional transactions respecting that river, and strongly as¬ serted that it was the inflexible and determined resolution of congress never to give it up. That the secretary of foreign affairs, who was authorized to form a treaty with Gardoqui, the Spanish ambassadors had positive directions not to assent to give up that navigation, and that it never had been their intention or wish to relinquish it. Thai on the contrary, they earnestly wished to adopt the best plan of se¬ curing it. Alter some desultory conversation, Mr. MONROE spoke as fol¬ lows: Mr. Chairman, my conduct respecting the transactions of con¬ gress, upon this interesting subject, since my return to the state, has been well known to many worthy gentlemen here. I have often been called upon before this, in a public line, and particularly in tha last assembly, whilst I was present, for information of these transae- VIRGINIA. 317 Monroe.] lions; but have heretafore declined it, and for reasons that were held satisfactory. Being 1 amenable upon the principles of the federal compact, to the legislature for my conduct in congress, it cannot be doubted, if required, it were my duty to obey their directions; but that honorable body thought it best to dispense with such demand. The right in the assembly is unquestionably more complete, having powers paramount to that; but even here I could wish it had not been exerted as I understand it to be, by going into committee for that purpose. Before, however, I enter into this subject, I cannot but observe it has given me pain to hear it by honorable gentlemen in a manner that has appeared not altogether free from exception. For they have not gone into it fully, and given a proper view of the trans¬ actions in every part, but of those only which preceded and were subsequent to that, which has been the particular object of enquiry a conduct that has seemed so mucdi calculated to make an impression favorable to the wishes in the present instance.. But in making this observation, I owe it to those gentlemen to declare, that it is in my opinion such omission has proceeded not from intention, but their having forgotten facts, or to some cause not obvious to me, and which I make no doubt they will readily explain. The policy of this state respecting this river has always been the same. It has contemplated but one object, the opening it for the use of the inhabitants, whose interest depended on it—-and in this she has, in my opinion, shewn her wisdom and magnanimity. I may, I believe with propriety say, that all the measures that have at any time been taken by congress for that purpose, were adopted at th« instance of this state. There was a time, it is true, sir, when even this state, in some measure abandoned the object, by authorising this cession to the court of Spain. But let us take all circumstances into view, as they were at that time, and I am persuaded it will by no means shew a departure from this liberal and enlightened system of policy, although it may manifest an accommodation to the exi¬ gencies which pressed on us at the time. The southern states were overrun and in possession of the enemy. The governments of South Carolina and Georgia were prostrate, and opposition there at an end. North Carolina made but a feeble resistance ; and Virginia herself was greatly hariassed by the enemy in force at that time in the heart of the country, and by impressments for her m\ n arjcl the defence of the southern states, in addition to this, the finances of the United States were in a deplorable condition, if not totally exhausted ; and France, our ally, seemed anxious for peace, and as the means cf bringing the war tf a more happy and speedy conclusion, the object of this cession was the hopes of uniting Spain in it vvith all her forces. If 1 recollect aright Mo at thii moment, the mini-ter of the 318 DEBATES. [Monroe. United States at the court of Madrid, informed congress of the diffi¬ culty he found in prevailing upon that court to acknowledge our in-t dependence, or take any measure in our favor, suggested the jealou¬ sy with which it viewed our settlements in'the western country, and the probability of better success, provided we would cede the navi¬ gation of this river, as the consideration. The latter circumstances were made known to the legislature, and they had their weight. _ All the inferior objects must yield to the safety of the society itself. A resolution passed to that effect. An act of congress likewise passed, and the minister of the United States had full authority to relinquish this valuable right to that court, upon the condition above stated. But what was the issue of this proposition'? Was any treaty mads with Spain that obtained an acknowledgement of our independence, although at war with Great Britain, and such acknowledgement would have cost her nothing? Was a loan of money accomplished? In short does it appear that even Spain herself thought it an object any importance? So soon as the war ended, this resolution was re¬ scinded. The power to make such a treaty was revoked. So that this system cf policy was departed from only for a short time, for the most important object that can be conceived, and resumed again as soon as it possibly could be. After the peace, it became the business of congress to investigate the relation of these states to the different powers of the earth, in a more extensive view than they had hitherto done, and particularly in the commercial line, and to make arrangements for entering into treaties with them on such terms as might be mutually beneficial for each party. As the result of the deliberations of that day, it was re¬ solved, “ That commercial treaties be formed, if possible, with said powers, those of Europe in particular, Spain included, upon similar principles, and three commissioners, Mr. Adams, Mr. Franklin, and Mr. Jefferson be appointed lor that purpose.” So that an arrange¬ ment for a treaty of commerce with Spain had already been taken. Whilst these powers were in force, a representative from Spain ar¬ rived, authorized to treat with the United States, on the interfering claims of the two nations, respecting the Mississippi, and the boun¬ daries and other concerns, wherein they were respectively interest¬ ed. A similar commission was given to the honorable the secretary of foreign affairs, on the part of the United States, with these ulti¬ mata : “ That he enter into no treaty, compact, or convention what¬ ever, with the said representative of Spain, which did not stipulate our light to the navigation of the Mississippi, and the boundaries as established in our treaty with Great Britain.” And thus the late negociation commenced, and under auspices, as I supposed, very fa- yorable to the ^vishes of the United States; for Spain had becvj&i Monroe.] VIRGINIA. 319 sensible of the propriety of cultivating the friendship of the states. Knowing our claim to the navigation of this river, she had sent a minister hither principally to treat on that point—and the time would not be remote when under the increasing population of that country, the inhabitants would be able to open it without our assistance, or her consent. These circumstances being considered, was it not pre¬ sumable she intended to make a merit of her concession to our wish¬ es, and to agree to an accommodation upon that subject, that would not only be satisfactory, but highly pleasing to the United States'? But what was the issue of this negociation? How was it termina- ted? Has it forwarded the particular object in view, or otherwise promoted the interest and the harmony of the states, or any oUthem? Eight or ten months elapsed without any communications of its pro¬ gress to congress : at length a letter was received from the secreta¬ ry stating that difficulties had arisen in his negociation with the representative of Spain, which in his opinion, should be so managed, as that even their existence should remain a secret for the present, and proposing that a committee be appointed with full power to di¬ rect and instruct him in every case relative to the proposed treaty. As the only ultimata in his instructions respected the Missisippi and the boundaries, it readily occurred that these occasioned the difficul¬ ties alluded to, and were those he wished to remove. And for many • i t , , reasons this appeared at least to me an extraordinary proposition. By the articles of confederation, nine states are necessary to enter into treaties. The instruction is the foundation of the treaty ; for if it is formed agreeable thereto, good faith requires that it be ratified. The practice of congress hath also been always, I believe, in conform¬ ity to this idea. The instiuctions under which our commercial trea¬ ties have been made were carried by nine states. Those under which the secretary now acted were passed by nine states. The proposition then would be, that the powers which under the consti¬ tution nine states only were competent to, should be transferred to a committee, and the object thereby to disengage himself from the ul¬ timata already mentioned in his existing instructions. In this light the subject was taken up, and on these principles discussed. The secretary, Mr. Jay, being at length called before congress to ex¬ plain the difficulties mentioned in his letter, presented to theis view the project of a treaty of commerce, containing as he supposed, ad¬ vantageous stipulations in our favour, in that line ; in consideration for which we were to contract to forbear the use of the navigation of the river Mississippi, for the term of twenty-five or thirty years and earnestly advised our adopting it. The subject now took a decided form—there was no further am* higuity in it—and w.e were surprised, for reasons that have been 320 DEBATES.] [MoRfiO&t already given, that he had taken up the subject of commerce at all. We were greatly surprised it should form the principal object, of the project, and that a partial or temporary sacrifice of that interest for the advancement of which the negotiation was set on foot, should be the consideration proposed to be given for it. But the honorable secretary urged that it was necessary to stand well with Spain; that the commercial project was a beneficial one, and should not be ne¬ glected ; that a stipulation to forbear the use contained an acknowl¬ edgement, on her part, of the right in the United States ; that we were in no condition to tal<;e the river, and therefore gave nothing for it, with other reasons which perhaps I have forgotten; for the subject ifi detail has nearly escaped my memory. We differed with the honorable secretary, almost in every respect. We admitted in¬ deed the propriety of standing well with Spain, but supposed wo might accomplish that end at least on equal terms. We considered the stipulation to forbear the use as u species of barter, that should never be countenanced in the councils of the American states, since it might tend to the destruction of the society itself; for a ferbear- ance of the use of one river, might lead unto more extensive conse¬ quences—to the Chesapeake, the Potomac, or any other of the riv¬ ers that emptied into it. In short, that the councils of the confeder¬ acy should be conducted with more magnanimity and candour, they should contemplate the benefit of all parts upon common principles, and not the sacrifice of one part for that of another. There appeared to us a material difference between stipulating by treaty to forbear the use, and not being able to open the river : the former would be considered by the inhabitants of the western dountry as an act of hostility; the latter might be justified by our inability. And with respect to the commercial part of the project, we really thought it an ill-advised one, on its own merits solely. Thus was this project, brought before congress, and so far as I recollect, in this form, and upon these principles. It was the sub¬ ject of tedious and lengthy discussion in that honorable bod}^. Ev¬ ery distinct measure that was taken I do not remember, nor do I suppose it of consequence. I have shewn the outlines of the trans¬ action, which is, if I apprehend rightly, all that the committee wish to possess. The communications of the secretary were referred to a committee of the whole house. The delegates of the seven eas¬ ternmost states, voted that the ultimatum in the secretary’s instruc¬ tions be repealed : which was reported to the house, and entered on the journal by the secretary of congress, that the question was carried. Upon this entry, a constitutional question arose to this ef¬ fect : “ Nine states being necessary, by the federal constitution, to give an instruction, and seven having repealed a part of an instru-c- "MONROE.] VIRGINIA, 321 tion so given, for the formation of a treaty with a foreign power, so as to alter its import, and authorise, under the remaining part there¬ of, the formation of a treaty, on principles altogether different from what the said instruction originally contemplated—can such re¬ maining part be considered as in force and constitutionally obligato¬ ry?” We pressed on congress for a decision on this point often, but without effect. Notwithstanding this, I understood it was the intention of the secretary to proceed and conclude a treaty, in conformity to his pro¬ ject, with the minister of Spain. In this situation I left congress. What I have since heard belongs not to me to discover. Other gentlemen have more complete information of this business, in the course it has taken, than I can possibly have been able to obtain : for having done my duty whilst there, I left it for others who suc¬ ceeded me to perform theirs, and I have made but little further em quiry respecting it. The animated pursuit that was made of this object, required, and I believed received, as firm an opposition. The southern states were on their guard, and warmly opposed it. For my part, I thought it my duty to use every effort in congress for the interest of the southern states. But so far as depended on me, with my official character, it ceased. With many of those gen¬ tlemen, to whom I always considered it as my particular misfortune to be opposed, I am now in habits of correspondence and friendship, and I am concerned for the necessity which has given birth to this relation. Whether the delegates of those states spoke the language of their constituents : whether it may be considered as the permanent interest of such states to depress the growth and increasing popula¬ tion of the western country, are points, which 1 cannot pretend to determine. I must observe, however, that I always supposed it would, for a variety of reasons, prove injurious to every part of the confederacy. These are well understood, and need not be dilated on here. If, however, such should be the interest of seven states, let gentlemen contemplate the consequences in the operation of the government, as it applies to this subject. .1 have always been of opinion, Sir, that the American states as to all national objects., had in every respect a common interest. Few persons would be willino- to bind them together by a stronger or more indissoluble bond, or give the national government more powers than myself. I only wish to prevent it from doing harm, either to states or individ¬ uals ; and the rights and interests of both, in a variety of instances, in which they are now left unprotected, might, in my opinion, be better guarded. If I have mistaken any facts, honorable gentlemen VOL . 3 2 1 DEBATES [Gravsox* 3&S will correct me. If I omitted any, as it has not been intentional so I shall be happy with their assistance to supply the defect. Mr Monroe added several other observations, the purport of which was, that the interest of the western country would not be as secure under the proposed constitution, as under the confederation ; because under the latter system, the Mississippi could not be relin¬ quished without the consent of nine states, whereas by the former, ]je said, a majority, or seven states, could yield it. His own opin¬ ion was, that it would be given up by a majority of the senators pre-> sent in the senate, with the president, which would put it in the power of less than seven states to surrender it: that the northern states were inclined to yield it: that it was their interest to prevent an augmentation of the southern influence and power: and that as mankind in general, and states in particular, were governed by in¬ terest, the northern states would not fail of availing themselves of the opportunity given them by the constitution, of relinquishing that river, in order to depress the western country, and prevent the southern interest from, preponderating. Mr. GRAYSON.—Mr. Chairman, the honorable gentleman was mistaken when he supposed that I said seven states had absolutely voted to surrender the navigation of the Mississippi. 1 only spoke of the general disposition of the states, which I alledged to be actu¬ ated by interest. That consequently the carrying states were neces¬ sarily inclined against the extension of the interest and influence of the productive States, and that therefore they would not favor any measure to extend the settlements to the westward. I wished not to enter into this discussion, for the reasons mentions ed by my honorable friend. Secrecy was required on this subject, I told congress, that imposing secrecy, on such a great occasion, was unwarrantable. However, as it was not given up, I conceived my¬ self under some restraint. But since it has come before the com¬ mittee, and they desire to develope the subject, I shall stand excused for mentioning what I know of it. My honorable friend gave a very jgust account of it, when he said that the southern states were on their guard, and opposed every measure tending to relinquish or waive that valuable right. They would not agree to negotiate, but on condition, that no proposition whatever should be made to sur¬ render that great right. There was a dispute between this country and Spain, who claimed one half of Georgia, and one half of Ken¬ tucky, or if not that proportion, a very considerable part, as well as the absolute and exclusive navigation of the Mississippi. The south¬ ern states thought that the navigation of the Mississippi should not he trusted to any hands, but those in which the confederation had placed the right of making treaties. That system required the con¬ sent of nine stataA for that purpose. The secretary for Foreign Af* Graxson.] VIRGINIA. 323 fairs was empowered to adjust the interfering claims of Spain and the United States, with the Spanish Minister, but as my honorable friend said, with an express prohibition of entering into any negoci- ation that would lead to the surrender of that river. Affairs contin¬ ued in this state for some time. At length a proposition was made to congress, not directly, but by a side wind. The [first proposal was to take off the fetters of the Secretary. When the whole came out, it was found to be a proposal to cede the Mississippi to Spain for twenty-five or thirty years, (for it was in the disjunctive) in con¬ sideration of certain commercial stipulations. In support of this pro¬ posal, it was urged, that the right was in him who surrendered, and that their acceptance of a cotemporary relinquishment, was an ac* knowledgment of our right, which would revert to us at the expira¬ tion of that period, that we could not take by war; that the thing was useless to us, and that it would be wise and politic to give it up, as we were to receive a beneficial compensation for that temporary ces¬ sion. Congress, after a great deal of animosity, come to a resolu¬ tion, which, in my opinion, violated the confederation. It was re¬ solved by seven states, that the prohibition in the secretary’s instruc¬ tions should be repealed; whereby the unrepealed part of his in¬ structions authorized him to make a treaty, yielding that inestimable navigation, although by the confederation , nine states were necessary to concur in the formation of a treaty! How then could seven states constitutionally adopt any measure, to which, by the constitution, nine states were only competent! It was entered on the journals, and transmitted to the secretary of foreign affairs, for his direction in his negotiation with the Spanish Minister. If I recollect rightly, by the law of nations, if a negotiator makes a treaty, in consequence of a power received from a sovereign au¬ thority, non-complianc e with his stipulations is a just cause of war. The opposition suggested, (whether wrong or not let this house de¬ termine) that this was the case, that the proceedings were repugnant to the principles, amd express letter of the constitution, and that if the compact which the secretary might form with the Spanish minis¬ ter should not he complied with, it would be giving Spain a just cause of quarr el. So that we should be reduced to the dilemma of cither violati ng the constitution by a compliance, or involving us in a war by a. non-compliance. The opposition remonstrated against fne.se tran sactions (and their remonstrance was entered on the jour¬ nal) and. took every step for securing this great national right, In the course of the debates in congress on thjs subject, which were warm and animated, it was urged that congress, by the law of na¬ tions, had no right, even with the consent of nine states, to dismem¬ ber the empire, or relinquish any part of the territory appertaining to 324 DEBATED [Grayson*. the aggregate society, to any foreign power. Territorial dismem¬ berment, or the relinquishment of any other privilege, is the highest act of a sovereign power. The right of territory has ever been con¬ sidered as most sacred, and ought to be guarded in the most particu¬ lar and cautious manner. Whether that navigation be secure on this principle, by the new constitution, I will not pretend to determine*. I will, however, say one thing. It is not well guarded under the old system. A majority of seven states are disposed to yield it. B speak not of any particular characters. I have the charity to suppose that all mankind act on the best motives. Suffice it for me to tell direct and plain facts, and leave the conclusion with this honorable house. It has been urged by my honorable friend on the other side (Mr. Madison) that the eastern states were averse to surrender it during the war, and that the southern states proposod it themselves, and wished to yield it. My honorable friend last up, has well accounted for this disgraceful offer, and I will account for the refusal of the eastern states to surrender it. Mr. Chairman, it is no new thing to you to discover these reasons. It is well known, that the Newfoundland fisheries and the Missis¬ sippi, are balances for one another ; that the possession of one tends to the preservation of the other. This accounts for the eastern poli¬ cy. They thought that if the Mississippi was given up, the south¬ ern states would give us the right of the fishery, on which their ve¬ ry existence depends. It is not extraordinary therefore, while these great rights of the fishery depends on such a variety of circumstan¬ ces, the issue of war, the success of negociations, and numerous other causes, that they should wish to preserve this great counter¬ balance. What has been their conduct since the peace? When re¬ lieved from the apprehensions of losing that great advantage, they solicitous of securing a superiority of influence in the national coun¬ cils. They look at the true interest of nations. Their language has been—“ Let us prevent any new states from rising in the west¬ ern world, or they will out vote us-*-we will lose our importance, and become as nothing in the scale of nations. If we do not pre¬ vent it, our countrymen will remove to those places, instead of going to sea and we will receive no particular tribute or advantage from them.” This, sir,has been the language and spirit of their policy, and I sup¬ pose ever will. The Mississippi is not secured under the old con¬ federation ; but it is better secured by that system than by the new con¬ stitution. By the existing system, nine states are necessary to yield it. A few states can give it away by the paper on your table. But I hope it will never be put in the power of a less number than nine states. Jersey, we are told., changed her temper on that great occa- VIRGINIA. Monroe.] 325 sion. I believe that that mutability depended on characters. But We have lost another state—Maryland. For, from fortuitous cir¬ cumstances, those states deviated from their natural character—Jer¬ sey in not giving up the right of the Mississippi, and Maryland in giving it up. Whatever be their object, ehch departed from her nat¬ ural disposition. It is with great reluctance I have said any thing on the subject, and if I have misrepresented facts, I wish to be cor¬ rected. Mr HENRY then arose, and requested that the honorable gentle¬ man [Mr Monroe] would discover the rest of the project, and what Spain was to do on her part, as an equivalent for the cession of the Mississippi. Mr. MONROE.—Mr Chairman, I do not thoroughly recollect every circumstance relative to this project. But there was to be a commercial intercourse between the United States and Spain. We ere to be allowed to carry our produce to the ports of Spain, and the Spaniards to have an equal right of trading hither. It was stipula¬ ted, that there should be a reciprocity of commercial intercourse and benefits between the subjects of Spain, and the citizens of the Uni¬ ted States. The manufactures of Spain were to be freely imported and vended in this country, and our manufactures to be Carried to “Spain, &c. without obstruction, and both parties were to have mu¬ tual privileges in point of commercial intercourse and connection. This, Sir, is the amount of the project of Spain, which was looked upon as advantageous to us. I thought myself, that it was not. 1 considered Spain as being without manufactures—as the most slow in the progress ot arts, and the most unwise with respect to com¬ merce, of all nations under the sun, (in which respect I thought Great Britain the wisest.) Their gentleman and nobles look on commerce with contempt. No man of character among them will undertake it. They make little discrimination with any nation. Their character is to shut out all nations, and exclude every inter¬ course with them, and this would be the case with respect to us. Nothing is given to us by this project, but what is given to all oth¬ er nations. It is bad policy and unjustifiable on such terms to yield that valuable right. Their merchants have great stocks in trade. It is not so with our merchants. Our people require encouragement. Mariners must be encouraged. On a review of these circumstances I thought the project unwise and impolitic. Mr, MADISON.—Mr Chairman, it is extremely disagreeable to me to enter into this discussion, as it is foreign to the object of our deliberations here, and may in the opinion of some, lead to sully the teputation of our^ublic councils. As far as my memory will ena¬ ble me, I will develope the subject. We will not differ with one 326 DEBATES, [Madisox. another with respect to facts : perhaps we may differ with respect to principles. I will take the liberty to observe, that I was led be¬ fore to make some observations, which had no relation to the sub¬ ject under consideration, as relative to the western country, to obvi¬ ate suggestions of gentlemen, which seemed to me to be groundless, I stated that there was a period when the southern states were advo¬ cates for the alienation or suspension of the right to the Mississippi, (I will not say which) and the eastern states were against both. I mention this to shew, that there was no disposition in that pa7t, to surrender that right or dispose of that country. I do suppose that the fishery had its influence on those states. No doubt it was the case. For that, and other reasons, they still continue against the aliena¬ tion. For it might lessen the security of retaining the fishery. From the hest information, it never was the sense of the people at large, or the prevailing characters of the eastern states, to approve of the measure. If interest, Sir, should continue to operate on them, I humbly conceive, that they will derive more advantage from hold¬ ing the Mississippi, than even the southern states. For if the car¬ rying business be their natural province, how can it be so much ex¬ tended and advanced, as by giving the encouragement to- agriculture in the western country, and having the emolument of carrying their produce to market? The carrying trade must depend on agriculture for its support in a great measure. In what place is agriculture so capable of improvement and great extension, as in the western country? But whatever considerations may prevail in that quarter or any other, respecting their interest, I think we may fairLy sup<~ pose that the consideration which the honorable member mentioned, and which has been repeated, I mean the emigrations which are go¬ ing on to the westward, must produce the same effect as to them, which it may produce with respect to us. Emigrations are now go¬ ing on from that quarter as well as from this state. I readily confess that neither the old confederation, nor the new constitution, involves a right to give the navigation of the Mississip¬ pi. It is repugnant to. the law of nations. I have always though* and said so. Although the right be denied, there may be emergen^ eies which will make it necessary to make a sacrifice. But there is a material difference between emergencies of safety in time of war, and those which may relate in mere commercial regulations* \ on might on solid grounds deny in peace, what you give up in war. I do not conceive, however, that there is that extreme aver¬ sion in the minds ot the people of the eastern states, to emigrate to the westward, which was insinuated by my honorable friend. Par¬ ticular citizens, it cannot he doubted* may be-averse to if. But it: Madison.] VIRGINIA. 327 is the sense of the people at large, which will direct the public measures. We find, from late arrangements made between Massa¬ chusetts and New York, that a very considerable country to the westward of New York, was disposed of to Massachusetts, and by Massachusetts, to some individuals, to conduct emigrants to that country. 0 There were seven states who thought it right to give up the naviga¬ tion of the Mississippi for twenty five years, for several reasons which have been mentioned. As far as I can recollect, it was near¬ ly as my honorable friend said. But they had no idea of absolutely alienating it. I think one material consideration whieh governed them was, that there were grounds of serious negotiation between Great Britain and Spain, which might bring on a coalition between those nations, which might enable them to bind us on different sides, permanently withhold that navigation from us, and injure us in other respects materially. The temporary cession, it was sup¬ posed, would fix the permanent right in our favor, and prevent that dangerous coalition. It is but justice to myself to say, that how¬ ever plausible the reasons .urged for its temporary cession may have been, they never convinced me of its utility. I have uniform- 1 y disapproved of it, and do now. With respect to the secretary of foreign affairs, I am intimately connected with him. I shall say nothing of his abilities and at¬ tachment to his country. His character is established in both re¬ spects. lie has given a train of reasoning which governed him in his project. If he was mistaken, his integrity and probity, more than compensate for the error. I am led to think there is no set¬ tled disposition in seven states to give up that object, because New Jersey, on a further consideration of the subject, actually gave in¬ structions to her delegates to oppose it. And what was the ground of this? I do not know the extent and particular reasons of her in¬ structions. But I recollect, that a material consideration was, that the cession of that river, would diminish the value of the western country, which was a common fund for the United States, and would consequently, tend to impoverish their public treasury. These Sir, were rational grounds. Give me leave, Sir, as I am upon this subject, and as the honor¬ able gentlemen has raised a question, whether it be not more secure un¬ der the old than the new constitution—to differ from him. I shall enter into the reasoning which, in my mind, renders it more secure under the new system. Two thirds of the senators present, (which) will be nine states, if all attend to their duty) and the president must concur in every treaty which can be made. Here are two dis. linct and independent branches, which must agree to every treaty un- 328 DEBATES. f Madison. der the existing- system, two thirds of the states must concur to form a treaty. But it is but one body. Gentlemen may reason and conclude differently on this subject. I own that as far as 1 have any rights, which are but trivial, I \Vould rather trust them to the new, than the old government. Besides, let me observe, that the house of representatives will have a material influence on the' government, and will be additional security in this respect: but there is one thing which he mentioned, which merits attention. If commercial policy be a source of great danger, it will have less in¬ fluence in the new system, than in the old. For, in the house of representatives, it will have little or no influence. They are drawn from the landed interest; taken from the states at large, and many of them from the western country. Whereas the present members of congress have been taken from the Atlantic side of the continent. When we calculate the dangers that may arise in any case, we judge from the rules of proportion and chances of numbers. The people at large choose those who elect the president. The weight of pop¬ ulation will be to the southward, if we include the western country. There will then be a majority of the people in favor of this right. As the president must be influenced by the sense and interest of his- electors, as far as it depends on him (and his agency in making treaties is equal to that of the senate) he will oppose the cession of that navigation. As far as the influence of the representative goes, it will also operate in favor of this right.—The power of treaties is not lodged in the senators of particular states. Every state has an equal weight. If ten senators can make a treaty, ten senators,, can prevent one from being made. It is from a supposition, that all the southern delegates will be absent, that ten senators or two thirds of a majority, can give up this river. The possibility of ab¬ sence operates equally as much against the northern states. If one fifth of the members present think the measure enoneous the votes of the states are to be taken upon it, and entered on the journals. Every gentlemen here ought to recollect, that this is some security, as the people will thereby know those who advocate iniquitous measures. If we consider the number of changes in the members tjf the government, we will find it another security! But after all, Sir, what will this policy signify, which tends to surrender the nav¬ igation ol Mississippi? Resolutions of congress to retain it, may he repeated, and re-echoed from every part of the United States. It is not resolutions of this sort, which the people of this country wish for. They want an actual possession of the right, and protection in its enjoyment. Similar resolutions have been taken under the exis¬ ting system, on many occasions. But they have been, heretofore, and will be hereafter, in my opinion, nugatory and fruitless unless a MADrSON.J VIRGINIA. change takes place, which will give energy to the acts of the go¬ vernment. I will take the liberty to touch once more on the several consider¬ ations which produced the question, because perhaps the commit¬ tee may not yet thoroughly comprehend it. In justice to those gen¬ tlemen who concluded in favor of the temporary cession, I mention *heir reasons, although I think the measure wrono*. The reasons for so doing under the old system, will be done away by the new system. We could not, without national dishonor, assert our right to the Mississippi, and suffer any other nation to deprive us of it. This consideration, with others before mentioned, influenced them. I admit it was wrong. But it is sufficient to prove that they acted on principles of integrity. Will they not be bound by honor and conscience, when we are able to enjoy and retain our right, not to give it up, or suffer it to be interrupted! A weak system produced this project. A strong system will remove the inducement. For may we not suppose it will be reversed by a change of system! I was called up to say, what was its present situation. There are some circumstances within my knowledge, which I am not at liber¬ ty to communicate to this house, i will not go farther than to an¬ swer the objections pf gentlemen. I wish to conceal no circum¬ stance, which I can relate consistently with mjr duty. As to mat¬ ters of fact, I have advanced nothing which I presume will be con¬ tradicted. On matters of opinion, we may differ. Were I at liber¬ ty, I could develope some circumstances, which would convince this house, that this project will never be revived in congress, and that therefore no danger is to be apprehended. Mr. GRAYSON.—Mr Chairman, the honorable gentleman last tip, concluded, by leaving impressions, that there were some cir¬ cumstances, which, were he at liberty to communicate, would in¬ duce this house' to believe that the matter would never be revived. W ere we to exclude from facts and opinions, or were we to appeal to the resolutions of congress, a very different conclusion would re¬ sult. When I was in congress last, there was a resolution to apolo¬ gize to his Catholic Majesty, for not making the treaty, and inti¬ mating that when the situation of things were altered, it might be done. Had it not been tor one particular circumstance, it would have been concluded on the terms my honorable friend mentioned. When I was last in congress, the project was not given over. Its friends thought it would be renewed. With respect to the Mississippi and back lands, the eastern states are willing to relinquish that great and essential right. For they consider the consequences of governing the union, as of more im¬ portance than these considerations which he mentioned should in¬ duce them to favor it. 330 DEBATES. [Grayson. But, says the honorable gentleman, there is a great difference be¬ tween actually given it up altogether, and a temporary cession. If the right was given up for twenty live years, wonld this country be able to avail herself of her right, and resume it at the expiration of that period? If ever the house of Bourbon should be at war with all Europe, then would be the golden opportunity of regaining it. Without this, we never could wrest it from the house of Bourbon, the branches of which always support each other. If things continue as they are now, emigrations will continue to that country. The hope that this great national right will be retain¬ ed, will induce them to go thither. But take away that hope, by giving up the Mississippi for twenty-five years, and the emigrations will cease. As interest actuates mankind, will they go thither when they know they cannot enjoy the privilege of navigating that river, or find a ready market for their produce? There is a majority of states, which look forward with anxiety to the benefits of the commercial project with Spain. In the course of the Spanish nego¬ tiation, our delegation thought of a project which would be accom¬ modated to their particular interest. It was proposed, by way of compromise, as being suitable to the interest of all the states, that the Spanish crown should make New Orleans a general depository, and that the growth of the American states should be sent down for the use of the Spanish troops ; Spain being obliged to foreign na¬ tions for provisions. This was throwing out a lure to the eastern states to carry the produce of that whole country. But this temp¬ tation did not succeed. It was thought no object in their view, when greater objects presented themselves. It was alleged that the emigration from the eastern states will have the same effect, as emigration from this country. I know eve¬ ry step will be taken to prevent emigration from thence, as it will be transfering their population to the southern states. They will coincide in no measure that will tend to increase the weight or influ¬ ence of the southern states. There is, therefore, a wide line of dis¬ tinction between migrations from thence and from hence. But we are told,, in order to make- that paper acceptable to the Ken¬ tucky people, thatthis high act of authority cannot, by the law of na¬ tions, be warrantable, and that this great right cannot be given up. I think so also. But how will the doctrine apply to America? Af¬ ter it is actually given away, can it be reclaimed? If nine states give it away, what will the Kentucky people do? Will Grotius and Puffendorff relieve them? If we reason what was done—if seven states attempted to do what nine states ought to have done, you may judge of the attention which will be paid to the law of nations. Should congress make a treaty to yield the Mississippi, that people will find no redress in the law of nations. Hen*t-] VIRGINIA. 33.1 But, says he, Massachusetts is willing to protect emigration. When the act of congress passed, respecting the settlement of the western country, and establishing a state there, it passed in a lucky moment.—I was told that that state was extremely uneasy about it, and that in order to retain her inhabitants, lands, in the province of Maine, were lowered to the price of one dollar per acre. As to the tract of country conveyed by New York to Massachusetts, neither of them had a right to it. Perhaps that great line of policy/of keep¬ ing the population on that side of the continent, in contradistinc¬ tion to the emigration to the westward of us, actuated Massachusetts in that transaction. There is no communication between that coun¬ try and the Mississippi. The two great northern communications are by the North river, and by the river St. Lawrance, to the Mis¬ sissippi. But there is no communication between that country where the people of Massachusetts emigrate, and the Mississippi; nor do I believe that there ever will be one traveller from it thither. I have a great regard for the secretary of foreign affairs. In my opinion, all America is under great obligations to him. But I dif¬ fered in opinion with him. But the Mississippi is said to be more secure under the new, than the old government. It is infinitely more secure under the latter than the former. How is the fact? Seven states wished to pass ail affirmative act ceding it. They repealed part of the instructions given the secretary, to enable him to conclude a compact for its ces¬ sion, and wished to get nine states to agree to it. Nine states, by the confederation, must concur in the formation of treaties. This saved it. Only seven states were willing to yield it. But, by this constitution, two-thirds of the senators present, with the president, can make any treaty. A quorum is fourteen—two-thirds of which; are ten. We find then, that ten members can, at any time, surrender that great and valuable right. As seven states are willing to yield it now, how the gentleman can reason in the manner he dees, I can¬ not conceive. Mr. HENRY. Mr. Chairman, I hope, sir, that as the honorable- gentleman on my left, set the example of debating the merits, that, whatever may result as consequences of that example, may not be attributed to me. I hope that 1 shall be indulged in offering a few words in addition to what has been said. Gentlemen may do what they will. Their reflections will have no influence on me. It is, said that we are scuffling for Kentucky votes, and attending to local, circumstances.—But if you consider the interests of this country;* you will find that the interest of Virginia and Kentucky are most in-- timately and vitally connected. When I see the great rights of the community in real danger, the ideal dangers which gentleman speak DBEATUS. [HENRt^ m of, dissipate. An union with our western brethern,is highly desira¬ ble, almost on any terms ; an union with them alone can lessen or annihilate the dangers arising from that species of population, of which we have been reminded in the catalogue of dangers which were dwelt upon. They are at present but few in number, but may be very numerous hereafter. If that fatal policy shall take place, you throw them into the arms of Spain. If congress should, for a base purpose, give away this dearest right of the people, your west¬ ern brethern will be ruined. We ought to secure to them that nav¬ igation which is necessary to their very existence. If we do not they will look upon us as betrayers of their interest. Shall We appear to care less for their interest, than for that of distant people. When gentlemen tell us that the change of system will render our western brethern more secure, and that this system will not betray them, they ought to prove it. When a matter which respects the great nation¬ al interests of America is concerned, we expect the most decided proofs. Have they given any! Unless you keep open the Missis¬ sippi, you never can increase in number. Although your popular tion should go on to an infl n ite degree, you will be in the minority in congress ; and although ^ou should have a right to be the major¬ ity, yet so unhappily is this system of politics constituted, that you will ever be a contemptible minority. To preserve the balance of American power, it is essentially necessary that the right of the Mississippi should be secured. But, said the honorable gentleman, the eastern states will wish to secure their fishery, and will, therefore, favor this right. How does he draw the inference! Is it possible that they can act on that principle! The principle which led the southern states to admit of the cession, was to avoid the most dreadful perils of war. But their difficulties are now ended by peace. Is there any thing like this that can influence the minds of the people of the north! Since the peace, those states have discovered a determined resolution to give it away. There was no similar danger to compel them to yield it. No, sir, they wished to relinquish it. Without any kind of neces¬ sity, they actedin conformity to their natural disposition, with res¬ pect to emigrations going on in that quarter. This, though improb¬ able, may be so. But to say, that because some settlements are going on in New York, Massachusetts will form a connection with the Mississippi, is to my mind most wonderful indeed. The great balance will be in the southern parts of America. There is the most extensive and fertile territory. There is the happiest geographi¬ cal position, situated contiguously to that valuable and inestimable river. But the settlement of that country will not be warranted by the new constitution, if it will not be forbidden by it. Henry.J VIRGINIA 333 No constitution under heaven, founded on principles of justice, can warrant the relinquishment of the most sacred rights of the society, to promote the interest of one part of it. Do you not see the danger into which you are going, to throw away one of your dearest and most valuable rights'? The people of that country now receive great and valuable emoluments from that right being protec* ted by the existing government. But they must now abandon them. For is there any actual security ? Shew me any clause in that paper which secures that great right. What was the calculation which told you that they would be safer under the new than under the old government? In my mind, it was erroneous. The honorable gen¬ tleman told you that there were two bodies or branches which must concur to make a treaty. Sir, the president as distinguished from the senate, is nothing. They will combine, and be as one. My honorable friend said that ten men, the senators of five states, could give it up. The present system requires the consent of nine states. Consequently their security will be much diminished. The people of Kentucky though weak now, will not let the president and sen¬ ate take away this right. Look right, and see this abominable poli¬ cy—consider seriously its fatal and pernicious tendency! Have we -not that right guaranteed to us by the-most respectable power in Europe? France has guaranteed to us our sovereignty and all its appendages. What are its appendages? Are not the rivers and wa¬ ters that wash the shores of the country appendages, inseparable from our right of sovereignty? France has guaranteed this right to us in the most full and extensive manner. What would have been the consequences had this project with Spain been completed and agreed to? France would have told you, “ you have given it up yourselves—you have put it on a different footing, and if your bad policy has done this, it is your own folly. You have drawn it on your own heads, and as you have bartered away this valuable right, neither policy nor justice will call on me to guarantee what you gave up yourselves.” This language would satisfy the most sanguine American. Is there an opinion, that any future projects will better secure you? If this strong government, contended for, be adopted, seven states will give it up forever. For a temporary cession, is, in mv opinion perfectly the same thing. The thing is so obviously big with danger, that the blind man himself might see it. As to the American Secretary, the goodness of his private charac¬ ter is not doubted. x It is public conduct which we are to inspect. The public conduct of this secretary goes against the express au¬ thority of nine states. Although he maybe endowed with the most brilliant talents, I have a right to consider his politics as abandoned- 334 DEBATES. [Henry. Yet his private virtues may merit applause. You see many attempts made, which, when brought into actual experiment, ate found to re¬ sult from abandoned principles. The states are geographically sit¬ uated so and so. Their circumstances are Well known. It is sug¬ gested this expedient was only to temporize till a more favorable op¬ portunity. Will any gentleman tell me, that the business was taken up hastily, when that vote was taken in congress'? When you con¬ sider the ability of the gentlemen who voted in congress on that question, you must be persuaded that they knew what they were about. American interest was fully understood. New Jersey called her delegates from congress for having voted against this right.. Delegates may be called and instructed under the present system, but not by the new constitution. The measure of the Jersey dele¬ gates was averse to the interest of that state, and they were recalled for their conduct. The honorable gentleman has said, that the house of representa¬ tives would give some curb to this business of treaties respecting the Mississippi. This is to me incomprehensible. He will excuse me if I tell him, he is exercising his imagination and ingenuity. Will the honorable gentleman say, that the house of representatives will break through their balances and checks, and break into the bu¬ siness of treaties'? He is obliged to support this opinion of his, by supposing, that the’checks and balances of this constitution are to be an impenetrable wall for some purposes and a mere cobweb for some other purposes. What kind of constitution then can this be? I leave gentlemen to draw the inference. I may have misunderstood the gentleman, but my notes tell me, that he said the house of rep¬ resentatives might interfere and prevent the Mississippi from being given away. They have no power to do this by the constitution. There will be a majority against it there also. Can you find on the* journals, the names of those who sacrifice your interest? Will they act so imprudently as to discover their own nefarious project? At pres¬ ent you may appeal to the voice of the people, and send men to con¬ gress postively instructed to obey your instructions. You can recall them it their system of policy be ruinous. But can you in this govern¬ ment. recal your senators? Or can you instruct them. You cannot re¬ call them. You may instruct them, and offer your opinions ; but if they think them improper, they may disregard them. If they give away or sacrifice your most valuable rights, can you impeach or punish them' 1 If you should see the Spanish ambassador bribing one of your senators with gold, can you punish him? Yes—you can impeach him before the senate. A majority of the senate may be sharers in the bribe. Will they pronounce him guilty who is in the same predicament with themselves? Where then is the security? Madiso*?.] VIRGINIA. 335 I ask not this out of triumph, but anxiously to know if there be any real security. The gentleman here observed, what I would not give a single pin for. The doctrine of chances it seems, will operate in our favor. This ideal figurative doctrine will satisfy no rational people. I have said enough to answer the gentleman as to retaining the navigation. Give me leave to tell you that when the great branch of the house of Bourbon has guaranteed to us this right, I wish not\ to lean on American strength, which may be employed to sacrifice it. This pres¬ ent despised system alone has reserved it. It rests on strong grounds, on the arms of France. The honorable member then told us, that he thought the project would not be revived. Here again the doctrine of chances is introduced. I will admit that the honor¬ able gentleman can calculate as to future events. But it is too much for him to say that it will not be taken up again. The same dispo¬ sition may again revive that nefarious project. I can inform him of this, that the American ambassador advises, to let it rest for the pres¬ ent, which insinuates that it will be resumed at a more favorable op¬ portunity. If this be the language or spirit which causes its sus¬ pension this nefarious, abominable project will be again introduced the first favorable opportunity. We cannot fortify the Atlantic ocean. The utmost we can do, is to become formidable to the west¬ ward. This will be prevented, if this abominable project be adop¬ ted. Mr. Henry then added, that, in treating the subject, at large he followed the example of other gentlemen, and that he trusted he should be permitted to consider it generally again. Mr. MADISON arose and observed, that the particular ground, on which the abandonment of that project was founded, was, that it was repugnant to the wishes of a great part of America. This rea¬ son, says he, becomes stronger and stronger every day, and the sense of America will be more and more known, and more and more understood. The project, therefore, will, in all probability, never be revived. He added some other observations which could not be heard. Mr. NICHOLAS. Mr. Chairman, the arguments used to day, on this occasion, astonish me exceedingly. The most valuable right of a part of the community has been invaded. By whom. 2 By con¬ gress, under the existing system—the worthy member’s favorite con¬ federation. Is this an argument to continue that confederation! Does it not prove that that confederation is not sufficient for the purpo¬ ses for which it was instituted! It was doubted what proportion had a right on that occasion, to repeal the prohibitory part of the secreta¬ ry’s instructions. The confederation which makes it a doubt, wh'eth- er they had a right to sacrifice this right—whether seven states 336 DEBATES. {Nicholas. and not nine, had aright to make the temporary cession, is the sys- tern which merits censure. Yet by an ingenious and subtle devia¬ tion, this instance is brought against this constitution. We have been alarmed about the loss of the Mississippi, in and out of doors. What does it all amount to 1 ? It amounts to an attempt under the present confederation to yield it up, W T hy have we been told of the great importance of this valuable right? Every man knows it. No man has a greater regard for it than I have. But what is the ques¬ tion which the honorable gentleman ought to ask himself? Is this right better secured under the present confederation , than the new go * vernment ? This is the sole question. I beg leave to draw the atten¬ tion of the committee to this subject. It is objected by my friend to my left, that two-thirds of the senate present may advise the pre¬ sident to give up this right by a treaty, by which five states may re¬ linquish it. It is provided in the first article, that a majority of each house shall constitute a quorum, to do business : and then in the second article, that the president, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall have power to make treaties. What part of the senate? It adds, “ Provided two thirds of the senators concur.” W T hat is the inference? That there must be a quorum, and two4hirds of the whole must agree. I shall be told perhaps, that this construction is not natural, not the positive construction of the clause. If the right construction be, that two-thirds of a quorum, or ten senators, may, with the president, make a treaty—to justify the conclusion, that the Mississippi may be given away by five states, two most improbable things must concur: first, that on the important occasion of treaties, ten senators will neglect to attend ; and in the next place that the senators whose states, are most interested in be¬ ing fully represented, will be those who will fail to attend. I mean those from the southern states. How natural this supposition is, I refer to the candour of the committee. But we are told, that we have every thing to fear from the northern states, because they will prevent an accession of states to the south. The policy of states will sometimes change. This is the case with those states, if indeed they were enemies to the right. And therefore, as I am informed, by very good authority, congress has admitted Kentucky, as a state, into the union. Then the law of nations will secure it to them, as the deprivation of territorial rights is obviously repugnant to that law. But we are told, that we may not trust them because self interest will govern them. To that interest I will appeal. You have been told, that there was a difference between the states—that they were naturally divided into carrying and non-carrying states. It is not seasonable to presume, that the advancement of population and agri- VIRGINIA, Nicholas.] 337 culture in the western country, will mostly operate in favor of those states, who from their situation are best calculated to carry the pro¬ duce of America to foreign markets. Besides, as members of the union, they will be materially affected by the sale of the back lands, which will be greatly diminished in case of the relinquishment of that right. The same reason which induced them tq erect states there, will also actuate them on every future occasion. But congress has violated the confederation. Shall we continue then under a go¬ vernment which warrants, or cannot prevent violations'? Shall we hesitate to embrace a government which will check them? But, says Jne honorable gentleman over the way (Mr. Grayson) the eastern states were interested during the war in retaining the Mississippi. But now they have nothing to fear. Will war not return? A trreat part of his argument turns upon that supposition. TVe will always have peace, and need make no provision against wars. Is not this de¬ ceiving ourselves? Is it not fallacious? Did there ever exist a na¬ tion which at some period or other was not exposed to war. As there is no security against future wars, the New r England states w'iil be as much interested in the possession of the Mississippi here¬ after, as they were during the w T ar. But, says he, the confederation affords greater security to the western country, than the new go¬ vernment. Consider it maturely, and you will find the contrary to be a fact. The security arising from the confedration is said to be this, that nine states must concur in the formation of a treaty. If then hereafter thirty states should come into the union, yet nine states will still be able to make a treaty. Where then is your boasted se¬ curity, if nine states can make a treaty, although ever so many states should come into the union? On the other hand, how is this guarded under the new constitution? No certain limited number of States is required to form a treaty. As the number of states will be in¬ creasing into the union, the security will be increased. Every new state will bring an accession of security, because two-thirds of the senators must concur. Let the number of states increase ever so much, two-thirds of the senators must concur. According to the present system, nine states may make a treaty. It will therefore take five states to prevent a treaty from being made. If five states oppose a treaty, it cannot be made. Let us see how it is in the new constitution. Two-thirds of the senators must agree. Ken¬ tucky, added to the other states, will make fourteen states. Twenty- eight senators will be the representation of the states, two-thirds of which will be nineteen , and if nine members concur in opposition, the senate can do no act. Five states you are told, have concurred in opposing the relinquishment of that right. Kentucky has come into the union. She will oppose it naturally. It may be naturally vol. 3. 22 338 DEBATES. [Nicholas, concluded then ; that there will be at least twelve members in the se-^ nate against it. So that there will be several persons in the senate more than will be sufficient prevent the alienation or suspension of that river. From this true representation it will at least be as se¬ cure under the new, as under the old government. But, says he, the concurrence of the president to the formation of treaties will be no security. Why so? Will he not injure himself, if he injures the states, by concurring in an injudicious treaty? How is he elected? Where will the majority of the people be? He told you that the great weight of population will be in the southern part of the United States. Their numbers will weigh in choosing the president, as he is elected by electors chosen by the people in proportion to their numbers. If the southern states be interested in having the Mississippi; and have weight in choosing the president, will he not be a great check in favor of this right? Another thing is treated with great contempt* The hohse of representatives, it seems, can have no influence in making treaties. What is the house of representatives? Where, says he, are your checks and balances, your iope dancers, &e.? How is this business done in his favorite government? The King of Great Britain can make what treaties he^ pleases. But, sir, do not the house of commons influence them? Will he make a treaty manifestly repugnant to their interest?-—Will they not tell him, he is mistaken in that respect as in many others? Will they not bring the minister, who advises a bad treaty, to punish¬ ment? This gives them such influence that they can dictate in what manner they shall be made. But the worthy member says, that this strong government is such a one, as Kentucky ought to dread. Is this just, Mr. Chairman? Is it just by general assertions, without aiguments or proofs, to cast aspersions on it? What is the situation of that country? If she has a right, and is in possession of the river, I ask thegentlemen why she does not en¬ joy the fruits of her right? I wish if she has the river, she would give the people passports to navigate it. What do they want? They want a government which will force from Spain the navigation of that river. I trust, sir, that let the situation, government, and politics of America, be what they may, 1 shall live to see the time when the inhabitants of that country will wrest from that nation, that right which she is so justly entitled to. If we have that government which we ought to have, they will have ability to enforce their right. But he treats with ridicule the situation of the territory settled by Massachusetts. They can have no connection with the Mississippi. Sir, they aie materially affected by the navigation of that river. The facility of disposing of their produce, and intercourse with oth,-, er people, are essential interests. Nicholas.] DEBATES. 339 Bat, sir, we have the guarantee of France under the existing sys¬ tem. W hat avails this guaranty? If dependence be put upon it, why did they not put us in possession, and enable us to derive ben¬ efits from it? Our possession of it is such, that we dare not use it. But the opinion and characteis of private men ought to have nothing to do in our discussion. I wish gentleman had always thought so. If he had, these debates would not have been thus lengthened. But we are not to calculate any thing on New Jersey. Vbu are told she gave instructions to her delegates to vote against the cession of that right. Will not the same principles continue to operate on the minds of the people of that state? We cannot recall our senators. We can give them instructions, and if they manifestly neglect our interest, we have sufficient se¬ curity against them. The dread of being recalled would impair their independence and firmness. 1 think that Kentucky has nothing to expect from any one state alone in America. She can expect support and succour alone from a strong efficient government, which can command the resources of the union when necessary. She can receive no support from the old confederation. Consider the present state of that country. Declared independent of Virginia, to whom is she to look up for succour? No sister state can help her. She may call on the present general government, but whatever may be the wish of congress, they can give them no relief. That country contains all my wishes and pros¬ pects. There is my property, and there I intend to reside. I should be averse to the establishment of any system which would be inju¬ rious to it. 1 Hatter myself that this government will secure their happiness and liberty, Governor RANDOLPH. Since I have seen so many attempts made, and so many wrong inducements offered, to influence the del- gation from Kentucky, I must, from a regard to justice and truth, give my opinion on the subject. If 1 have no interest in that coun-. try, I hope they will consider what I have to say, as proceeding from an impartial mind.-=-That the people of Kentucky have an unequiv¬ ocal right to the navigation of the Mississippi, by the law of nature and nations, is clear and undoubted ; though to my own knowledge, a question has arisen, whether the former connection of America with Great Britain, has not taken it away from them. There was a dispute respecting the Tight of Great Britain to that river, and the. United States only have the same right which the original possessor had, from whom it was transferred. I am willing to declare that the right is complete; but where is the danger of losing it by the operation of the new government? The honorable gentleman tells us, that Fiance has guaranteed to us the possession of that river, VIRGINIA^ [RaNDOLHHu 340 JVt need not trouble ourselves about it. France, he supposes, will do evety thing for us. Does this pretended security enable us to- make use of it? Is there any reasonable motive to induce the vernment to give it up? If it be not given up, if the guarantee of France be any security now, it will be so then. I wish an honora¬ ble gentleman over the way had known certain facts. If he had* they must have operated on his mind to refrain from making such observations. [Here his excellency read the treaty of peace with Great Britain, defining the boundaries of the United States.] He then declared, that from the most liberal interpretation, it would never give the inhabitants a right to pass through the middle of New Orleans. 1 appeal to what the French ambassador said, in 1781, in congress, that America had no right to the Mississippi. If the opinion of the ambassador of his most Christian majesty, and the treaty, have any influence, why are we told such things? There is not a greater or less degree of power, given by this constitution, than is necessary to be given ; but whether the power of treaties be improper to be given or not to the general government, I only now ask, whether there be any real danger of losing this right? How many senators are there? Twenty-six,supposing the United States re¬ main as they are. We are told, that there never were more than seven states whiling to give it up. So that theie was six states against it* There can be little danger then of the loss of that navigation? Penn¬ sylvania is interested to maintain the Mississippi. Her interest will stimulate her to do it. She has settlements near Fort Pitt, on the Ohio, which must be affected greatly by that cession. If his own arguments be credited, New Jersey is against it. There is no dan¬ ger of her voting the alienation of that right, as she instructed her delegates to oppose it. The southern states are naturally opposed to it. There will, therefore, be a majority in favor of the Mississippi; a majority that does not depend on the doctrine of chances. There will be fourteen senators against twelve, admitting the states to re¬ main as they are. It will, moreover, be contrary to the law of na¬ tions, to relinquish territorial rights. To make a treaty to alienate any part of the United States, will amount to a declaration of war against the inhabitants of the alienated part, and a general absolu¬ tion from allegiance. They will never abandon this great right. Are not the states interested in the back lands, as has been repeat¬ edly observed? Will net the connexion between the emigrants and © o y ^ tliGiDj serve to strengthen opposition to it ? The gentleman wishes us to shew him a clause which shall preclude congress from giving away this right. It is first incumbent upon him to shew where the right is given up. There is a prohibition nat¬ urally resulting from the nature of things, it being contradictory and Randolph.] DEBATES, 341 repugnent to reason, and the law of nature and nations, to yield the most valuable right of a community, for the exclusive benefit of one particular part of it. But there is an expression which clearly precludes the general government from ceding the navigation of this river. In the 2d clause of the 3d section, of the 4th article, congress is empowered, ** to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respec¬ ting the territory or other property belonging to the (United .States.” But it goes on and provides, that, “nothing in this constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or any particular state.” Is this a claim of the particular state of Vir¬ ginia? If it be, there is no authority in the constitution to prejudice it. If it be not, then we need not be told ot it. This is a sufficient limitation and restraint. But it has been said, that there is no re¬ striction with respect to making treaties. The various contingencies vehich may form the object of treaties, are, in the nature of things, incapable of definition. The government ought to have power to provide for every contingency. The territorial rights of the states, are sufficiently guarded by the provisions just recited. If you say, that, notwithstanding the most express restriction, they may sacri¬ fice the rights of the states, then you establish another doctrine, that the creature can destroy the creator, which is the most absurd an^l ridiculous of all doctrines. The honorable gentleman has warned us from taking rash meas¬ ures that may endanger the rights of that country. Sir, if this nav¬ igation be given up, the country adjacent, will also be given up to Spain ; for the possession of the one must be inseparable from that of the other.—Will not this be a sufficient check on the general go- vernment? This you will admit to be true, unless you carry your suspicion to such an unlimited length, as to imagine that they will, among their iniquitous acts destroy and dismember the union. As to the objection of my friend over the way, (Mr. Monroe) that so few states could by treaty yield that navigation, it has been suffi¬ ciently answered, and its futility fully detected by the gentleman who spoke last. Another mistake, which my friend over the way has committed, is, that the temporary forbearance of the use of the Mississippi might lead to the absolute cession of the Chesepeake. The gentle¬ man has a mind to make up his climax of imaginary objections, or he never would have suffered such an idea to obtrude on his mind. W r ere the Mississippi, as he says, in danger of being ceded, which I deny, yet it could not be a precedent for the relinquishment of the Chesapeake. It never can be putin such a jeopardy. All the Atlantic states will oppose a measure of this soft, lest it should destroy their commerce. I 342 VIRGINIA. [Randolph. The consanguinity between the western people and the inhabitants of the other states, would alone have a powerful operation to pre¬ vent any measures injurious to them, trom being adopted. Let me, in a few words, endeavor to obviate the strong observa¬ tions made to the gentlemen from that country. I contend that there is no power given to the general government, to surrender that navigation. There is a positive prohibition in the words I have al¬ ready mentioned, against it. I consider that the policy of the states, and disposition of the people, make it impossible, and I couclude that their safety is at least as great under the new as under the old go¬ vernment. Let me intreat those gentlemen, whose votes will be scuffled for, to consider in what character they are here. For what have they come hither? To deliberate on a constitution, which some have said will secure the liberty and happiness of America, and which others repiesent as not calculated for that purpose. They are to decide on a constitution for the collective society of the Uni¬ ted States. Will they, as honest men, not disdain all applications made to them from local interests? Have they not far more valua¬ ble rights to secure? The present general government has much higher powers than that which has been so long contested. We air low them to make war, and requisitions without any limitation. That paper contains much higher powers. Let it not be said, that we have been actuated from local interests. I wish it may not be said, that partial considerations governed any gentleman here, when we are investigating a system for the general utility and happiness of America. I know such narrow views will not influence the gen¬ tlemen from that country, because I know their characters. I hope this subject is sufficiently discussed, and that we shall proceed reg- . tilarly. Mr. CORBIN. Mr. Chairman, all attempts made to bias the opinion of any gentleman on this great occasion, are, in my opinion, very reprehensible. No member of this committee can be a more zealous supporter of the right of navigating the Mississippi, and the other rights of the aggregate community, than I am. But that right, sir, is in no danger. This has been proven with much ability by my friend to the left, and other gentlemen. We are told, that five states may make a treaty. I say, that five states can prevent a trea¬ ty from being made. Will not my argument be of equal force with theirs? How can live states make a treaty? This presupposes that the members from every othet state will be absent when the important subject of trea¬ ties will be on the carpet. Is this plausable? Or does it not amount to an impossibility? He says that the house of representa¬ tives, can have no influence in, the formation of treaties. I say they Grayson.] DEBATES. 34$ can. Treaties are generally of a commercial nature, being a fegu- iation of commercial intercourse between different nations. In all commercial treaties it will be necessary to obtain the consent of the representatives. [Here a storm arose, which was so violent as to compel Mr Cor¬ bin to desist, and the committee to rise.] Saturday , the 14 th of June, 1788. N A letter from the honoiable the president to the convention was read, stating his inability to attend his duty in the house to-day. Whereupon the honorable John Tyler was unanimously elected vice-president, to preside during the inability of the president. Mr. CORBIN thought the Mississippi subject had been amply discussed. He hoped that the committee would enter into the dis¬ cussion of the proposed constitution regularly—but that if any gen¬ tleman would continue the inquiry relative to that river, he would answer him. He moved that they should debate it clause by clause. Mr. GRAYSON.—Mr. Chairman, Iconceive the investigation of this subject, which materially concerns the welfare of this country, ought not to wound the feelings of any gentleman. I look upon this as a contest for empire. Our country is equally affected with Kentucky. The southern states are deeply interested in this sub¬ ject. If the Mississippi be shut up, emigrations will be stopped entirely. There will be no new states formed on the western wa¬ ters. This will be a government of seven states. T^his contest of the Mississippi involves this great national contest: That is, whether one part of the continent shall govern the other. The northern states have the majority, and will endeavor to retain it. This is, therefore, a contest for dominion—for empire. I apprehend that God and nature have intended, from the extent of territory and fertility of soil, that the weight of population should be on this side of the continent. At present, for various reasons, it is on the other -side. This dispute concerns every part of Kentucky. A particular investigation ought to offend no gentleman. o O O ^ [Mr Grayson then declared, he hoped the subject would be further continued.] Mr ALEXANDER WHITE wished the further discussion of that subject to be postponed till they came to that part which ena¬ bles the senate to make treaties. He seconded Mr Corbin’s motion, to proceed clause by clause. [The 3d sect. art. 1. was then read.] Mr TYLER hoped, that when amendments should be brought forward, they should be at liberty to take a general view *of the 344 VIRGINIA. [Madisgjt# whole constitution. He thought that the power of trying impeach¬ ments, added to that of making treaties, was something enormous, and rendered the senate too dangerous. Mr MADISON answered, that it was not possible to form any system to which objections might not be made,- that the junction of these powers might be in some degree objectionable, but that it could not be amended. He agreed with the gentleman, that when amendments were brought on, a collective view of the whole sys¬ tem might be taken. [The 4th and 5th sect, were then read.] Mr MONROE wished that the honorable gentleman, who had been in the federal convention, would give information respecting the clause concerning elections. He wished to know why congress had an ultimate control over the time, place, and manner of elec¬ tions of representatives, and the time and manner of that of senators and also, why there was an exception as to the place of electing senators. Mr MADISON.—Mr Chairman, the reason of the exception was, that if congress could fix the place of choosing the senators, it might compel the state legislatures to elect them in a different place from that of their usual sessions, which would produce some incon¬ venience, and was not necessary for the object of regulating the elections. But it was necessary to give the general government a control over the time and manner of choosing the senators, to prevent its own dissolution. With respect to the other point, it was thought that the regula¬ tion of time place and manner, of electing the representatives, should be uniform throughout the continent. Some states might regulate the elections on the principles of equality, and others might regulate them otherwise. This diversity would be obviously unjust. Elec¬ tions are regulated now unequally in some states, particularly South Carolina, with respect to Charleston, which is represented by thirty members. Should the people of any state, by any means be depriv¬ ed of the right of suffrage, it was judged proper that it should be remedied by the general government. It was found impossible to fix the time, place, and manner, of the election of representatives in the constitution. It was found necessary to leave the regulation of these, in the first place, to the state governments, as being best ac¬ quainted with the situation of the people, subject to the control of the general government, in order to enable it to produce uniformity, and prevent its own dissolution. And considering the state govern¬ ments and general governments as distinct bodies, acting in differ¬ ent and independent capacities far the people, it was thought the Madison.] DEBATES. 345 particular regulations should be submitted to the former, and the general regulations to the latter. Were they exclusively under the control of the state governments, the general government might easily be dissolved. But if they be regulated properly by the state legislatures, the congressional control will very probably never be exercised. The power appears to me satisfactory, and as unlikely to be abused as any part of the constitution. Mr MONROE wished to hear an explanation of the ^lause which prohibits either house, during the session of congress, from adjourn¬ ing for more than three days without the consent of the other. He asked if it was proper or right, that the members of the lower house should be dependent on the senate! He considered that it rendered them in some respect dependent on the senators, as it prevented them from returning home, or adjourning, without their consent, and a3 this might increase their influence unduly, he thought it im~- proper. Mr MADISON wondered that this clause should meet with a shadow of objection. It was possible, he observed, that the two branches might not agree concerning the time of adjournment, and that this possibility suggested the power given the president of ad¬ journing both houses to such time as he should think proper, in case of their disagreement. That it would be very exceptionable to allow the senators, or even the representatives, to adjourn without the consent of the other house, at any season whatsoever, without any regard to the situation of public exigencies. That it was pos¬ sible, in the nature of things, that some inconvenience might result from it; but that it was as well secured as possible. Gov. RANDOLPH observed, that the constitution of Massachu¬ setts was produced as an example, in the grand convention, in fa¬ vor of this power given to the president. If, said his excelleecy, he be honest, he will do what is right. If dishonest, the representa¬ tives of the people will have the power of impeaching him. [The 6th sect, was then read.] Mr HENRY.—Mr Chairman, our burden should, if possible, be rendered more light. I was in hopes some other gentleman would have objected to this part. The pay of the members is by the con¬ stitution, to be fixed by themselves, without limitation or restraint. They may therefore indulge themselves in the fullest extent. They may make their compensations as high as they please. I suppose, if they be good men, their own delicacy will lead them to be satis¬ fied with moderate salaries. But there is no security for this, should they be otherwise inclined. I really believe that if the state legislatures were to fix their pay, ncjjj^^j^enience would result VIRGINIA. 346 {Madison* from it, and the public mind would be better satisfied. But in the same section there is a defect of a much greater consequence. There is no restraint on corruption. They may be appointed to of* flees without any material restriction, and the principle source of corruption in representatives, is the hopes and expectations of of¬ fices and emoluments. After the first organization of offices and the government is put in motion, they may be appointed to any ex* isting offices which become vacant, and they may create a multipli¬ city of offices,'in order thereafter to be appointed to them. What says the clause'? “ No senator or representative, shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office un¬ der the authority of the United States, which shall have been crea¬ ted, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased, during Such time.” This is an idea strangely expressed. He shall not accept of any office created during the time he is elected for, or to any office whereof the emoluments have been in¬ creased in that time. Does not this plainly say, that if an office be not created during the time for which he is elected, or if its emolu¬ ments be not increased during such time, that he may accept of it 1 ? I can see it in no other light. If we wish to preclude the entice¬ ment to getting offices, there is a clear way of expressing it. If it be better that congress should go out of their representative offices, by accepting other offices, then it ought to be so. If not we require an amendment in the clause, that it shall not be so. I may be wrong. Perhaps the honorable member may be able to give a satisfactory answer on this subject. Mr MADISON.—Mr Chairman, I most sincerely wish to give a proper explanation on this subject, in such a manner as may be to the satisfaction of every one. I shall suggest such considerations as led the convention to approve of this clause. With respect to the right of ascertaining their own pay, I will acknowledge, that their compensations, if practicable, should be fixed in the constitu¬ tion itself, so as not to be dependent on congress itself, or on the state legislatures. The various vicissitudes, or rather the gradual diminution of the value of all coins and circulating medium, is one reason against ascertaining them immutably, as what may be now •an adequate compensation, might by the progressive reduction of the value of our circulating medium, be extremely inadequate at a pe¬ riod not far distant. It was thought improper to leave it to the state legislatures, be¬ cause it is improper that one government should be dependent on another: and the great i nconv eniences experienced under the old con¬ federation, shew thesyl^nKmld be operated upon by local conside¬ rations, as from general and national interests. debates. Tyler.] Experience shews us, that they have been governed by such here¬ tofore, and reason instructs us, that they would be influenced by them again. This theoretic inconvenience of leaving to congress the fixing their compensations is more than counterbalanced by this in the confederation; that the state legislatures had a right to deter¬ mine the pay of the members of congress, which enabled the states to destroy the general government. There is no instance where this power has been abused. In America, legislative bodies have reduced their own wages lower rather than augmented them. This is a power which cannot be abused without rousing universal attention and indignation. What would be the consequence of the Virginian legislature raising their pay to four or five pounds each per day! The universal indignation of the people. Should the general congress annex wages disproportionate to their service, or repugnant to the sense of the community, they would be universally execrated. The certainty of incurring the general detestation of the people will pre¬ vent abuse. It was conceived that the great danger was in creatinn- new offices, which would increase the burdens of the people : and not in an uniform admission of all meritorious characters to serve their country in the old offices. There is no instance of any state constitution which goes as far as this. It was thought to be a mean between two extremes. It guards against abuse by taking away the inducement to create new offices, or increase the emolument of old offices. And it gives them an opportunity of enjoying, in common with other citizens, any of the existing offices which they may be capable of executing. To have precluded them from this, would have been to exclude them from a common privilege to which every citizen is entitled and to prevent those who had served their country with the greatest fidelity and ability from being on a par with their fellow-citizens. 1 think it as well guarded as reason requires: More so than the constitution of any other nation. Mr. NICHOLAS thought it sufficiently guarded, as it prevented the members of the general government from holding offices which they created themselves, or of which they increased the emolu¬ ments ; and as they could not enjoy any office during their continu¬ ance in congress, to admit them to old offices when they left con¬ gress, was giving them no exclusive privilege, but such as every citizen had an equal right to. Mr. TYLER was afraid, that as their compensations were not fixed in the constitution, congress might fix them so low, that none but rich men could go; by which the government might terminate in an aristocracy. The states m||j|| choose men noted for their wealth and influence, and that stateTHBuence would govern the sen- 348 VIRGINIA. [Tkler. ate. This, though not the most capital objection, he thought was considerable, when joined to others of greater magnitude. He thought, the gentleman’s account of it, was by no means satisfactory. A parallel had been drawn between this power in congress, of fixing their compensations, and that of our assembly fixing the quantum of their salaries. He was of opinion, the comparison, did not.apply, as there was less responsibility in the former than in the latter case. He dreaded that great corruption would take place, and wished to have it amended so as to prevent it. Mr. GRAYSON.—Mr. Chairman, it strikes me that they may fix their wages very low. From what has happened in Great Brit¬ ain, I am warranted to draw this conclusion. I think every mem¬ ber of the house of commons formerly had a right to receive twenty shillings, or a guinea, a day. But I believe that this salary is taken away since the days of corruption. The members of the house of commons, if I recollect rightly, get nothing for their services as such. But there are some noble emoluments to be derived from the minister, and some other advantages to be obtained Those who go to parliament form an idea of emoluments. They expect some- tiling besides wages. They go in with the wishes and expectations of getting offices. This, Sir, may be the case in this govern¬ ment. My fears are increased from the inconveniences experienced under the confederation. Most of the great officers have been taken out of congress, such as ambassadors to foreign courts, &c. A number of offices have been unnecessarily created, and ambassadors h^ve been unnecessa¬ rily sent to foreign countries—to countries with which we have nothing to do. If the present congress exceeded the limits of pro¬ priety, though extremely limited with respect to power in the crea¬ tion of offices, what may not the future congress do when they have by this system a full scope of creating what offices, and annexing what salaries they please?—There are but few members in the sen¬ ate and lower house. They may all get offices at different times, as they are not excluded from being appointed to existing offices for the time for which they shall have been elected. Considering the corruption of human nature, and the general tendency of mankind to promote their own interest, I think there is great danger. I am confirmed in my opinion from what I have seen already in congress and among other nations. I wish this part, therefore, to be amend¬ ed, by prohibiting any senator or representative, from being appoint¬ ed to any office during the time for which he was elected, and by fixing their emoluments. Though I would not object to the consti¬ tution on this account soleljflilliere there no other defect. Midisoh] DEBATES. 349 Mr MADISON—Mr Chairman, let me ask those who oppose this part of the system, whether any alteration would not make it equal¬ ly, or more liable to objections? Would it be better to fix their compensations? Would not this produce inconveniences? What authorises us to conclude, that the value of coins will continue al¬ ways the same? Would it be prudent to make them dependent on the state governments for their salaries—on those who watch them with jealous eyes, and who consider them as encroaching, not on the people, but on themselves? But the worthy member supposes, that congress will fix their wages so low, that only the rich can fill the offices of senators and representatives. Who are to appoint them? The rich? No, sir, the people are to choose them. If the members of the general government were to reduce their compensa¬ tions to a trifle, before the evil suggested could happen, the people could elect other members in their stead, who would alter that regulation. The people do not choose them for their wealth. If the state legislatures choose such men as senators, it does not influ¬ ence the people at large in their election of representatives.—They can choose those who have the most merit and least wealth. If congress reduce their wages to a trifle, what shall prevent the states from giving a man of merit, so mucin-as will be an adequate com¬ pensation? I think the evil very remote, and if it were now to happen, the remedy is in our own hands, and may, by ourselves, be applied. Another gentleman seems to apprehend infinite mischief from a possibility that any member of congress may be appointed to an of¬ fice, although he ceases to be a member the moment he accepts it. What will be the consequence of precluding them from being so appointed? If you have in your country, one man whom you could in time of danger trust above all others, with an office of high im¬ portance, he cannot undertake it till two years expire if he be a rep¬ resentative ; or till the six years elapse, if a senator. Suppose America was engaged in war, and the man of the greatest military talents and approved fidelity, was a member of either house—would it be right that this man, who could lead us to conquer, and who could save his country from destruction, could not be made general till the term of his election expired? Before that time, we might be conquered by our enemies. This will apply to civil as well as military officers. It is impolitic to exclude from the service of his country, in any office, the man who may be most capable of dis¬ charging its duties, when they are most wanting. The honorable gentleman, said, that those who go to congress, will look forward to offices as a compensation for their services, rather than salaries. Does he recollect that they shall not fill offices 350 VIRGINIA. [Madison, created by themselves! When they go to congress, the old offices will be filled,—They cannot make any probable calculation that the men in office will die, or forfeit, their offices. As they cannot get any new offices, one of those contingencies must happen, before they can get any office at all. The chance of getting an office is, there¬ fore, so remote, and so very distant, that it cannot be considered as a sufficient reason to operate on their minds, to deviate from, their duty. Let any man calculate in his own mind, the improbability of a member of the general government getting into an office, when he cannot fill any office newly created, and when he finds all the old offices filled at the time he enters into congrees. Let him view the danger and impolicy of precluding a member of congress from hold¬ ing existing offices, and the danger of making one government de^ pendent on another, and he will find that both clauses deserve ap¬ plause. The observations made by several honorable members, illustrate my opinion, that it is impossible to devise any system agreeable to all—When objections so contradictory are brought against it, how shall we decide! Some gentlemen object to it, because they may make their wages too high—-others object to it, because they may them make too low. If it is to be perpetually attacked by principles so repugnant, we may cease to discuss. For what is the object of our discussion! Truth, sir.. To draw a true and just conclusion. Can this be done without rational premises, and syllogistic reasoning? As to the British parliament, it is nearly as he says. But how- does it apply to this case! Suppose their compensations bad beer: appointed by the state governments, or fixed in the constitution— would it be a safe government for the union, if its members depen-: ded on receiving their salaries from other political bodies at a dis¬ tance, and fully competent to withhold them! Its existence would, at best, be but precarious. If they were fixed in, the constitution,., they might become extremely inadequate, and produce the very evil which gentlemen seem to fear.—For then a man of the highest mer-- it could not act unless he were wealthy. This is the most delicate part in the organization of a republican government.. It is the most difficult to establish on unexceptionable grounds. It appears to me most eligible as it is. The constitution has taken a medium between the two extremes, and perhaps with more wisdom than either the British or the state governments, with respect to their eligibility to, offices. They can fill no new offices created by themselves, nor old ones of which they encreased the salaries. If they were excluded altogether, it is possible that other disadvantages might accrue from- It, besides the impolicy and injustice of depriving them of a com* DEBATES. Grayson,] 351 mon privilege. They will not relinquish their legislative, in order to accept other offices. They will more probably, confer them on their friends and connexions. If this be an inconvenience, it is in¬ cident to all governments. After having heard a vaiiety of piinci- pies developed, I thought that on which it is established, the least exceptionable, and it appears to me sufficiently well guarded. Mr.. GRAYSON. Mr. Chairman, I acknowledge that the honor¬ able gentleman has represented the clause rightly as\o their ex¬ clusion from new offices: but is there any clause to hinder them from giving offices to uncles,, nephews, brotheis, and other relations and friends? I imagine most of the offices will be created the first year, and then gentlemen will be tempted to carry on this accommo¬ dation. , A worthy membe! has said, what had been often said before, that, suppose a war took place, and the most experienced and able man was unfortunately in either house, he could not be made general, if the proposed amendment was adopted. Had he read the clause, he would have discovered that it did not extend to piilitary offices, and that the restriction extends to civil offices only. No case can exist with respect to civil offices, that would occasion a loss to the public,, if the members of both houses were precluded from holding any of¬ fice during the time for which they were elected. The old confede¬ ration is so defective in point of power, that no danger can result, from creating offices under it; because those who hold them cannot he paid. The power of making paper money will not be exercised. This country is so thoroughly sensible of the impropriety of it, that no attempt will be made to make any more. &o that no danger can arise, as they have not power to pay, if they appoint officers. Why not make this system as secure as that, in this respect? A great number of offices will be created to satisfy the wants of those who shall be elected. The worthy member says, the electors can alter them. But have the people the power of making honest men be elected? If he be- an honest man, and his wages so low that lie could not pay for his expenses, he could not serve them if elected. But there are many thirsting after offices, more than public good.. Political adventurers go up to congress solely to advance their own particular emoluments. It is so in the British house of commons. There are two sets always in that house. One, the landed interest, the most patriotic and respectable., The other, a set of dependents and fortune hunters, who are elected for their own particular interest, and are willing to sell the interest of their constituents to the crown. The same division may happen among our representatives. This clause might as well not be guarded at all, as in this flimsy manner. They cannot be elected to offices for the terms for which they were VIRGINIA. 35S [Madison, ©iected, and continue to be members of congress. But as they ear* create as many offices as they please, for the paiticular accommoda¬ tion of their friends, it might as well not be guarded at all. Upon the whole, I consider it entirely imperfect. [The 7th section read.] Mr. GRAYSON objected to the power of the senate to propose or concur with amendments to money bills. He looked upon the pow¬ er of proposing amendments, to be equal in principle to that of orig¬ inating, and that they were, in fact, the same. As this was, in his opinion a departure from that great principle which required that the immediate representatives of the people only should interfere with money bills, he wished to know the reasons on which it was foun¬ ded. The lords in England had never been allowed to intermeddle with money bills. He knew not why the senate should. In the lower house, said he, the people are represented according to their numbers. In the upper house, the states are represented in their po¬ litical capacities. Delaware or Rhode Island has as many represen¬ tatives here as Massabhusetts* Why should the senate have a right to intermeddle with money, when the representation is neither equal or just. Mr. MADISON. Mr. Chairman, the criticism made by the hon¬ orable member, is, that there is an ambiguity in the words, and that it is not clearly ascertained where the origination of money bills may take place I suppose the first part of the clause is sufficiently expressed to exclude all doubts. The gentlemen who composed the convention divided in opinion, concerning the utility of confining this to any particular branch. Whatever it be in Great Britain, there is a sufficient difference between us and them to render it in¬ applicable to this country. It has always appeared to me, to be a matter of no great consequence, whether the senate had a right of originating, or proposing amendments to money bills or not. To withhold it from them would create disagreeable disputes. Some American constitutions make no difference. Virginia and South Car¬ olina, are, I think, the only states, where this power is restrained. In Massachusetts, and other states, the power of proposing amend¬ ments is vested, unquestionably, in their senates. No inconve¬ nience has resulted from it. On the contrary, with respect to South Carolina, this clause is continually a source of disputes. Vv hen a bill comes from the other house, the senate entirely rejects it, and this causes contentions. When you send a bill to the senate, without the power of making any alteration, you force then to reject the bill altogether, when it would be necessary and advantageous that it should pass. The power of proposing alterations, removes this inconvenience Madison,] DEBATES. 353 have already been clearly refuted, and which therefore will pass over. With respect to responsibility, still the honorable member thinks that the house of representatives and senate will suffer by s, a com¬ parison with the British parliament. I will not repeat the contrast made before, which he has mentioned.. He tells us what may be done by our representatives with respect to the admission to offices, and insinuates that less may be done in Great Britain by the mem¬ bers of parliament. In this country, by this system, no new office can be taken by a member of the government, and if he takes an old one, he loses his seat. If the emoluments of any existing office be increased, he cannot take it. How is it in Great Britain? Any mem¬ ber may have any place. For parliament may create any new of¬ fices they please, or increase the emoluments of existing offices, and yet the members may accept any such places.. Any member may accept any office whatever, and go again into parliament. Does this comparison militate against this system/ 1 He tells us the affairs of our country are not alarming., I wish this assertion was well foun¬ ded. I concur with him in rejoicing to see the people enlightened and vigilant. I should be happy to see the people paying respect to the laws and magistracy. But is respect paid to our laws? Ev¬ ery man’s experience will tell him more perhaps than any thing I could say. Public and private confidence daily and rapidly decrease Experiments must be made, and in that form in which we must find most to the interest of our country. Gov. RANDOLPH.—Mr. Chairman, our attention is summoned to this clause respecting the militia, and alarms are thrown, out to persuade us, that it involves a multiplicity of danger. It is suppo¬ sed by the honorable gentleman lately up, and another gentleman, that the elause for calling forth the militia to suppress insurrections,, repel evasions, and execute the laws of the union, implies, that in¬ stead of using civil' force in the first instance, the militia are to be called forth to arrest petty offenders against the laws. Ought not common sense to be the rule of interpreting this constitution? Is there an exclusion of the civil power? Does it provide that the laws are to be inforced by military coercion in all cases? No, sir. All that we are to-infer, is, that when the civil power is not sufficient, the militia must be drawn out. Who are they? He says (and I cheerfully acquiesce in the rectitude of the assertion) that they are the bulwarks "Randolph.] VIRGINIA. 373 of our liberties. Shall we be afraid that the people-, this bulwark of freedom, shall turn instruments of slavery! The officers are to be appointed by the states. Will you admit that they will act so crim¬ inally as to turn against their country? The officers of the general government are attached to it, because they derive their appointment from it. Admitting the militia officers to be corrupt, what is to make them be in favor of the general government? Will not the same rea- son attach them to the state governments? Rut it is feared that the militia are to be subjected to martial law when not in service. They are only to be called out in three cases , and only to be governed by the authority of congress when in the actual service of the United States ; so that their articles of war can no longer operate upon them, than when in the actual service of the union. Can it be presumed that you can vest the supreme power of the United States with 1 the power of defence, and yet take away this nat¬ ural defence from them? You risk the general defence by withold¬ ing this power. The honorable gentleman, speaking of responsibility 'has mista¬ ken facts. He says the king cannot pardon offenders found guilty on impeachment. The king can pardon after impeachment, though not before. He says further, that in America every thing is con¬ cealed, whereas in England the operations hf the government axe openly transacted. In England those subjects which produce im¬ peachments are not opinions. No man never thought of impeaching a man for an opinion. It would be impossible to discover whether the error in opinion resulted from a willful mistake of the heart, or an involuntary fault of the head. What are the occasions of im¬ peachments most commonly? Treaties. Are these previously known? No. Till after they are presented to the public eye, they not known. Those who advised a treaty are nett known till then. There ought not to be a publication on the subject of negotiations till they are concluded. So that when he thinks there is a greater notoriety in this case in England than here, I say he is mistaken. There will be as much notoriety in America as in England, The spir¬ it of the nation occasions the notoriety of their political operations, and not any constitutional requisition. The spirit of liberty will no^ be less predominant m America, I hope, than there. With respect to a standing army, I believe the.Te was not a member in the federal convention, who did not feel indignation at such an institution. What remedy then could be provided?—Leave the country defence¬ less? In order to provide for our defence, and exclude the dangers of a standing army, the general defence is left to those who are the objects of defence. It is left to the militia who will suffer if they become the instruments of tyranny. The general government must $74 debates. [Mason'. nave power to call them forth when the general defence requires it. In order to produce greater security, the state governments are to appoint the officers. The president who commands them when in actual service of the union, is appointed secondarily by the people. This is a further security. Is it not incredible, that men who are in- terested in the happiness of their country, whose friends, relations, and connections, must be involved in the fate of their country, should turn against their countty? I appeal to every man, whether, if any of our own officers were called upon to destroy the liberty of their country, he believes they would assent to such an act of suicide! The state governments having the power of appointing them, may elect men who are the most remarkable for their virtue of attachment to their country. Mr GEORGE MASON, after having read the clause which gives congress power to provide for arming, organizing, and discip¬ lining the militia and governing those in actual service of the union —declared it as his firm belief, that it included the power of annex¬ ing punishments, and establishing necessary discipline, more espe¬ cially as the construction of this, and every other part of the consti¬ tution, was left to those who were to govern. If so, he asked, if congress could not inflict the most ignominious punishments on the most worthy citizens of the community? "Would freemen submit to such indignant treatment? It might be thought a strained con¬ struction, but it was no more than congress might put upon it He thought such severities might be exercised on the militia, as would make them wish the use of the militia to be utterly abolished, and assent to the establishment of a standing army. He then adverted to the representation, and said it was not sufficiently full to take into consideration the feelings and sentiments of all the citizens. He admitted that the nature of the country rendered a full representa¬ tion impracticable. But he strongly urged that impracticability as a conclusive reason for granting no powers to the government, but such as were absolutely indispensable, and these to be most cau¬ tiously guarded. He then recurred to the power of impeachment. On this subject he entertained great suspicions. 1 He apoligized for being suspici¬ ous. He entered into the world with as few suspicions as any man. Young men, he said, were apt to think well of every one,till time and experience taught them better. After a treaty manifestly repugnant to the interests of the country was made, he asked, how they were to be punished? Suppose it had been made by the means of bribery and corruption. Suppose they had received 100,000 guineas, o? louis d’ors, from a foreign nation, for consenting to a treaty, how was the truth to be come at? Corruption and bribery of that kind Mason.] VIRGINIA. 375 had happened in other governments, and might in this. The house of representatives were to impeach them. The senators were to try themselves. 1 If a majority of them were guilty of the crime, would they pronounce themselves guilty! Yet, says he, this is called re¬ sponsibility. He wished to know in what court the members of the government were to be tried for the commission of indictable of¬ fences, or injuries to individuals? He acknowledged himself to be no lawyer; but he thought he could see, that they could neither be tried in the state nor federal courts. The only means therefore of bringing them to punishment must be by a court appointed by law: and the law to punish them must also be made by themselves By whom is it to be made, demanded he? By the very men who are in¬ terested in not inflicting punishment. Yet, says he, though they make the law, and fix the punishment to be inflicted on themselves, it is called responsibility. If the senators do not agree to the law, it will not be made, and thus they will escape altogether. [Mr Mason then animadverted on the ultimate control of congress over the elections ; and was proceeding to prove that it was danger¬ ous : when he was called to order by Mr Nicholas, for departing from the clause under consideration. A desultory conversation en¬ sued and Mr Mason was permitted to proceed. He was of opinion, that the control over elections tended to destroy responsibility. He declared he had endeavored to discover whether this power was real¬ ly necessary, or what was the necessity of vesting it in the govern¬ ment, but he could find no good reason for giving it. That the reasons suggested were, that in case the states should refuse or ne¬ glect to make regulations, or in case they should be prevented from making regulations by rebellion or invasion, then the general go¬ vernment should interpose.] Mr Mason then proceeded thus—If there be any other cases I would be glad to know them; for I know them not. If there be no other, why not confine them to these cases? But the power here as in a thousand other instances, is without reason. I have no pow¬ er, which any other person can take from me. I have no right of representation, if they can take it from me. 1 say, therefore, that congress may, by this claim, take away the right of representation or render it nugatory, despicable or oppressive. It is at least argu¬ mentative, that what may be done w r ill be done, and that a favorite point will be done by those who can. Suppose the state of Virginia should adopt such regulations as gentlemen say (and in which I accord with all my heart) and divide the state into ten districts. Suppose then that congress should order instead of this, that the elections should be held in the borough of Norfolk.—Will any man say, that an) man in Frederick or Berkely county, would have any share in this representation, if the members where chosen in Norfolk? Nay, I might go further and say, that DEBATES. 37$ [Mason. the elections foT all the states might be had in New York, and theh we should have to go So far that the privilege would be lost alto¬ gether; for but few gentlemen could afford to go thither. Some of the best friends of the constitution have advocated that the elections should be in one place. This power is not necessary, and is capa¬ ble of great abuse. It ought tc be confined to the particular cases in which they assert it to be necessary. Whatever gentleman may think of the opposition, I will never agree to give any power which I conceive to be dangerous. I have doubts on another point. The fifth section, of the first ar¬ ticle, provides, “that each house shall keep a journal of its pro¬ ceedings, and from time t6 time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment, require secrecy.” This enables them to keep the negociations about treaties secret. Under this veil they may conceal any thing and every thing. Why not insert words that would exclude ambiguity and danger! The words of the confederation, that defective system, are in this Tespect, more eligible. What are they! In the last clause of the ninth article it provides, “ that congress shall publish the journal of their proceed¬ ings monthly, except such parts thereof relating to treaties, alliances cm* military operations, as i'h their judgement require secrecy.” The proceedings, by that system, are to be published monthly, except certain exceptions. These are proper guards. It is not so here, On the contrary, they may conceal what they please. Instead of giving information, they will produce suspicion. You can not discover the advocates of their iniquitous acts. This is an additional defect of responsibility. Neither house can adjourn with¬ out the consent of the other for moYe than three days. This is no parliamentary rule. It is untrodden ground, and it appears to me liable to much exception. The senators are chosen for six years. They are not recallable for those six years; and are re-eligible at the end of the six yearsi It stands on a very different ground from the confederation. By that sy stehi they'Were only elected for one year, might be recalled and were incapable of re-election. But in the new constitution, instead of being elected for one, they are chosen for six years. They can¬ not be recalled in all that tiihe for any misconduct, and at the end of that long term may again be elected. What will be the operation of this ! Is it not probable, that those gentlemen who will be elected senators will fix themselees in the federal town, and become citizens of that town more than of our state! They will purchase a good seat in or near the town, aud become inhabitants of that place. Will it not be then in the power of the senate to worry the house of rep¬ resentatives into any thing! They will be a continually existing VIRGINIA iLKE.j body. They ‘will exercise those machinations and contrivances, which the many have always to fear from the few. The house of representatives is the only check on the senate, with their enormous powers. But, by that clause, you give them the power of worrying the house of representatives into a compliance with any measure. The senators living on the spot will feel no inconvenience from long sessions, as they Will vote themselves handsome pay, without in¬ curring any additional expenses. Your representatives are on a different ground, from their shorter'continuance in office. The gem tlemen from Georgia are six or seven hundred miles from home, aud wish to go home. The senate taking advantage of this, by stopping the other house from adjourning, may worry them into any thing. These are my doubts, and I think the provision not consis¬ tent with the usual parliamentary modes. Mr. LEE, of Westmoreland.—Mr. Chairman, I am anxious to know the truth on this great occasion. 1 was in hopes of receiving true information, but have been disappointed. I have heard suspi¬ cions against possibility, and not against probability. As to the dis¬ tinction which lies between the gentlemen for and against the con¬ stitution : In the first place, most of the arguments the latter use, pay no regard to the necessity of the union, which is our object. In the next place they use contradictory arguments. It may be re¬ membered, that we were told there was great danger of an aristoc* racy governing this country ; for that their wages would be so low, that the rich alone could serve. And what does another gentleman say? That the price will be so high, that they will fix themselves* comfortably in office, and by their power and extravagant emolu¬ ments ruin us. Ought we adduce arguments like these, which inw ply a palpable contradiction? We ought to use arguments capable of discussion. I beg leave to make some reply to what the honorable gentleman over the way said. He rose with great triumph and exultation, saying, that we had conceded, that the government was national. The honorable gentleman is so little used to triumph on the grounds of reasoning, that he suffers himself to be quite captivated by the least appearance of victory. What reason had he to say, that we admitted it to be a national government? We agree that the sword and the purse are in the hands of the general government for dif¬ ferent designated purposes. What had the honorable member con* ceded ? That the objects of the government were general, as de¬ signated in that system, equally affecting the interests of the people of every state. This was the sole concession, and which by no means warrants his conclusion. Then why did the honorable gen¬ tleman seize it as a victory ? Does he mean to object to the consti* S78 DEBATES. [Lee, tution by putting words into our mouths which we never uttered? Did that gentleman say, that the happiness of the people depended on the private virtues of the members of the government, and not on its construction? Did any gentleman admit this, as he insinuated? No, Sir, we never admitted such a conclusion. Why then take up the time of this house in declaiming on words we never said ? We say, that it will secure our liberty and happiness, and that it is so constructed and organized, that we need apprehend no danger. But, says he, the creature destroys the creator. How has he proved it ? By his bare assertion. By ascribing infinitude to powers clearly limited and defined, for certain designated purposes, I shall not repeat the arguments which have fully refuted this idea of the honorable gentleman. But gentlemen say, that we must apply to the militia to execute the constitutional laws,without the interposition of the civil poweT,and that a military officer is to be substituted to the sheriff in all cases. This unwarrantable objection is urged, like many others, to produce the rejection of this government, though contrary to reason. What is the meaning of the clause under debate? Does not, their expla¬ nation violate the natural meaning of language ? Is it to be inferred, that "when the laws are not opposed, judgements must be executed by the militia? Is this the right and liberal way of discussing the general national objects ? I am astonished that gentlemen should attempt to impose so absurd a construction upon us.. The honorable gentleman last up says, that organizing the militia gives congress power to punish them when not in the actual ser¬ vice of the government. The gentleman is mistaken in the mean¬ ing of the word organization, to explain which would unnecessarily take up time. Suffice it to say, it does not include the infliction of punishments. The militia will be subject to the common regula¬ tions of war when in actual service. But not in time of peace. But the honorable gentleman said, there is danger of an abuse of the power, and attempted to exemplify. And delegated power may be abused. It would be civil and candid in those gentlemen who inveigh against this constitution with such malignity, to shew in what manner adequate powers can be given without a possibility of being abused. It appears to me to be as well secured as it can be, and that the alterations he proposes would involve many disadvan¬ tages. I cannot then but conclude that this government will, in my opinion, secure our liberty and happiness, without any alteration. Mr. CLAY made several remarks, but he spoke too low. He admitted that he might be mistaken with respect to the exclusion of the civil power in executing the laws. As it was insinuated that he was not under the influence of common sense in making the obje^. Madison.] VIRGINIA. 379 tion, his error might result from his deficiency in that respect. But he thought that another gentleman was as deficient in common de¬ cency, as he was in common sense. He was not, however, con¬ vinced that the civil power would be employed. If it was meant that, the militia should not be called out to execute the laws in all cases, why were they not satisfied with the words, “repel invasions, 3 suppress insurrections!” He thought the word insurrection in¬ cluded every opposition to the laws; and if so, it would be suffi¬ cient to call them forth to suppress insurrections, without mention¬ ing that they were to execute the laws of the union. He added, that although the militia officers were appointed by the state govern¬ ments, yet as they were sworn to obey the superior power of con¬ gress, no check or security would result from their nomination of them. Mr MADISON.—Mr Chairman, I cannot think that the explana¬ tion of the gentleman last up, is founded in reason. It does not say that the militia shall be called out in all cases, but in certain cases. There are cases in which the execution of the laws may require the operation of militia, which cannot be said to be an invasion 01 in¬ surrection. There may be a resistance to the laws which cannot be termed an insurrection. My honorable friend over the way has opened a new source of ar¬ gument. He has introduced the assertions of gentlemen out of doors. If we thus depart from regularity, we will never be able to •come to a decision. If there be any gentleman who is a friend to the government, and •says, that the elections may, or ought to be held in one place, he is an enemy to it on that ground. With respect to the time, place, and manner of elections, I cannot think, notwithstanding the apprehen¬ sions of the honorable gentleman, that there is any danger, or if abuse should take place, that there is not sufficient security. If all the people, of the United States should be directed to go to elect in one place, the members of the government would be execrated for the infamous, regulation. Many would go to trample them under foot for their conduct—and they would be succeeded by men who would remove it. They would, not dare to meet the universal ha¬ tred and detestation of the people, and run the risk of the certain dreadful consequences. We must keep within the compass of hu¬ man probability. If a possibility be the cause of objection, we must object to every government in America. But the honorable gentlemen may say, that better guards maybe provided. Let us consider the objection. The power of regulating the time, place,, and manner of elections, must be vested some where. It could no* be fixed in the constitution without involving great inconveniences. DEBATES. ; 380 [Madisok. They could then have no authority to adjust the regulation to the changes of circumstances. The question then is, whether it ought to be fixed unalterably in the state governments, or subject to the control of the general government. Is it not Obvious, that the gen* eral government would be destroyed without this control? It has already been demonstrated that it will produce many conveniences. Have we not sufficient security against abuse? Consider fully the principles of the government. The sum of the powers given up by the people of Virginia is divided into two classes : One to the federal and the other to the state government. Each is subdivided into three branches. These may be kept independent of each other in the one as well as the other. In this system they are as distinct as is consistent with good policy. This, in my opinion, instead of diminishing, increases the security of liberty more than any govern¬ ment that ever was. For the powers of government which in eve* ry other country are given to one body, are here given to two; and are favorable to public liberty. With respect to secrecy, if every thing in which it is necessary, destroy Jhemselves.. Monday * the WtTi of June,. 1788., The convention, according to the order of the day, again.resolved itself into a committee of the whole convention to take into further consideration the proposed plan of government., Mr. Wythe in the chair. [The eighth section still under consideration* See page 258.] ; Mr HENRY thought it necessary and proper that they should lake a collective view of this whole section, and revert again to the 1 irst clause. He adverted to the clause which-: gives congress the uower of raising armies, and proceeded as follows : To me this ap. I»earsa very alarming power, when unlimited. They are not only j o raise, but to support armies ; and this support is to go to the ut». nost abilities of the United States.. If congress shall say, that the general welfare requires it, they may keep armies continually on oot. There is no control on congress in raising or stationing them. They may billet them on the people at pleasure. This unlimited authority is a most dangerous power: its principles are despotic.. If t be unbounded, it must lead to despotism. For the power of a. >eople in a free government, is supposed to be paramount, to the jixisting power. We shall be told, that in England, the king, lords, and commons, jiave this power—that armies can be raised by the prince alone without the consent of the people. How does this apply here? Is his government to place us in the situation of the English'? Should we suppose this government to resemble king, lords, and commons, I ve of this state should be like an English county. An English ! :ounty cannot control, the government, Virginia cannot control the M Bates. [Henrx, government of congress ho more than the county of Kent can con¬ trol that of England. Advert to the power thoroughly. One of our first complaints under the former government, was the quartering of troops upon us. This \vas one of the principal reasons for dissolv¬ ing the connexion With Gaeat Britain. Here we may have troops in time of pea6e. They may be billetted in arry manner—to tyran¬ nise, oppress, and crush us. We are told, we are afraid to trust ourselves. That our own rep¬ resentatives—congress, will not exercise their powers oppressively. That we will not enslave ourselves—that the militia cannot enslave themselves, &c. Who has enslaved, France, Spain, Germany,. Turkey, and other countries, which groan under tyranny? The} 7 Iiave been enslaved by the hands of their own people. If it will be so in America, it will be only as it has been every where else. I am still persuaded that the power of calling forth the militia to exe¬ cute the laws of the union, &c. is dangerous. We requested the gentleman to shew the cases where the militia would be wanting to execute the laws. Have we received a satisfactory answer? When we consider this part, and compare it to other parts, which declare that congress may declare war, and that the president shall command the regular troops, militia, and navy, we will find great danger. Under the order of congress, they shall suppress insurrec¬ tions. Under the order of congress, they shall be called to execute the laws. It will result of course, that this is to be a government of force. Look at the part which speaks of excises, and you will' Tecollect, that those who are to collect excises and duties, are to be aided by military force. They have power to call them out, and to provide for arming, organizing, disciplining them. Consequently- they are to make militia laws for this state. The honorable gentleman said, that the militia should be called' forth to quell riots. Have we not seen this business go on verv well to-day -without military force? It is a long established princi¬ ple-of the common law of England, that civil force is sufficient to quell riots. To what length may it not be carried? A law may be made, that if twelve men assemble, if they do not disperse, they may be fired upon.—I think it so in England. Does not this part of the paper bear a strong aspect? r riie honorable gentleman, from, his knowledge, w T as called upon to shew the instances, and he told us the militia may be called out to quell riots. They may make the militia travel, and act under a colonel, or perhaps under a constable.. Who are to determine whether it be a riot or not? Those who are to execute the la ws of the union? If they have powcir to execute their laws in this manner, in what situation are we vk.ced.? Ypur VIRGINIA. 383 * nen w h° to congress are not restrained by a bill of rights. They are not restrained from inflicting unusual and severe punish¬ ments; though the bill of rights of Virginia forbids it. What will be the consequence! They may inflict the most cruel and ignomin¬ ious punishments on the militia, and they will tell you that it is ne¬ cessary for their discipline. Give me leave to ask another thing. Suppose an exciseman will demand leave to enter your cellar or house, by virtue of his office ; perhaps he may call on the militia to enable him to go. If congress oe informed of it, will they give you redress'? They will tell you, that he is executing the laws under the authority of the continent at large, which must be obeyed, for that the government cannot be car¬ ried on without exercising severity. If, without any reservation of rights, or control, you are contented to give up your rights, I am not. There is no principle to guide the legislature to restrain them trom inflicting the utmost severity of punishment. Will gentlemen voluntarily give up their liberty! With respect to calling the mi¬ litia to execute every execution indiscriminately, it is unprecedented- Have we ever seen it done in any free country! Was it ever so in the mother country? It never was so in any well regulated country. It is a government of force, and the genius of despotism expressly. It is not proved that this power is necessary, and if it be unnecessary,, shall we give it up? Mr MADISON—Mr Chairman, I will endeavor to follow the rule of the house; but must pay due attention to the observations which fell from the gentleman. I should conclude, from abstracted rea¬ soning, that they were ill founded. I should think, that if there were any object, which the general government ought to command,, it would be the direction of the national forces. And as the force which lies in militia is most safe, the direction of that part ought to be submitted to, in order to render another force unnecessary. The power objected to is necessary, because it is to be employed for na¬ tional purposes. It is necessary to be given to every government. This is not opinion, but fact. The highest authority may be given that the want of such authority in the government, protracted the late war, and prolonged its calamities. He says, that one ground of complaint at the beginning of the rev¬ olution, was, that a standing army was quartered upon us. This was not the whole complaint. We complained because it was done without the local authority of this country—without the consent of the people of America. As to the exclusion of standing armies in the bill of rights of the states, we shall find that though in one or two of them, there is something like a prohibition, yet in most of 384' DEBATES. them it is onJy provided,, that no armies shall be kept without the legislative authority ; that is, without the consent of the community itself. Where is the impropriety of saying that we shall have an army, if necessary 1 ? Does not the notoriety of this constitute secu¬ rity 1 ? If inimical nations were to fall upon us when defenceless, what would be the consequence 1 ?* Would it be wise to say, that we should have no defence 1 ? Give me leave to say that the only possible way to provide for, standing armies, is to make them unne¬ cessary. The way to do this, is to organize and discipline our militia,, so as to render them capable of defending the country against ex¬ ternal invasions, and internal insurrections. But it is urged, that abuses may happen. How is it possible to answer objections against, possibility of abuses? It must strike every logical reasoner, that these cannot be entirely provided against. Ideally thought that the objection in the militia was,at an end. Whs there ever a ; constitu¬ tion, in which, if authority was vested, it must not have been execu-. ted by force, if resisted? Was it not in the contemplation of this, state, when contemptuous proceedings were expected, to recur to something of this kind? How is impossible to have a more proper resource than this?* That the laws or every country ought to be ex¬ ecuted, cannot be denied. That force must used be if necessary, can¬ not be denied. Can any government be established", that will an¬ swer any purpose whatever, unless force be provided for, executing its laws? The constitution does not say that a standing army shall be called out ta execute the laws. Is not this, is a more proper way? The militia ought to be called forth to suppress smugglers. Will this be denied? The case actually happened at Alexandria. There were a number of smugglers, who were too formidable for the civil power to overcome. The military quelled the sailers, who, other¬ wise would have perpetrated their intentions. Should a number of smugglers have a number of ships, the militia ought to be called torth to quell them. We de not know but what there may be com¬ bination of smuggers in Virginia hereafter. We all know the use made of the Isle of Man. It was a general depository of contraband goods. The parliament found the evil so great, as to render it ne¬ cessary to wrest it out the hands of its possessor. The honorable gentleman says that it is a government of force.. If he means military force, the clause under consideration proves the contrary. There never was a government without force. What is the meaning of government? An institution to make people do their duty. A government leaving it to a man to do his duty, or not as pleases, would be a new species of government, or rather no govern¬ ment aj all. The ingenuity of the gentleman is remarkable, in in- Mason.] VIRGINIA. 385 troducing the riot act of Great Britain. That act has no connection, or analogy, to any regulation of the militia ; nor is there any thing in the constitution t6 warrant the- creneral government to make such an act. It never was a complaint in Great Britain, that the militia could be called forth. If riots should happen, the militia are propeV to quel! it, to prevent a resort to another mode. As to the infliction of ignominious punishments, we have no ground of alarm, if we consider the circumstances of the people at large. There will be no punishments so ignominious as have been inflicted already. The militia law of every state to the north of Maryland, is less rigorous than the particular law of this state. If a change be necessary to be made by the general government, it will be in our favor. I think that the people of those states would not agree to be subjected to a more harsh punishment than their own militia laws inflict. An ob¬ servation fell from a gentleman on the same side with myself, which deserves to be attended to. If we be dissatisfied with the national government, if we should choose to renounce it, this is an additional safe guard to our defence. [ conceive that we are peculiarly inter¬ ested in given the general government as extensive means as possi¬ ble to protect us. If there be a particular discrimination between places in America, the southern states are, from their situation and circumstances, most interested in giving the national governmentthe' power of protecting its members. f [Here Mr Madison made some other observations ; but spoke so very low, that his meaning could not be comprehended.] An act passed a few years ago in this state, to enable the govern-’ merit to call forth the militia to enforce the laws when a powerful’ combination should take place to oppose them. This is the same power which the constitution is to have. There is a great deal of difference between calling forth the militia, when a combination is formed to prevent the execution of the laws, which the sheriff or constable carrying with him a body of militia to execute them in the first instance ; which is a construction not warranted by the Clause. There is an act also ill this state, empowering $ie officers of the cus¬ toms to summon any persons to assist them when they meet, with obstruction in executing their duty. This shews the necessity of giving the government power to call forth the militia when the laws are resisted. It is a power vested in every legislature in the union, and which is necessary to every government. He then moved, that the clerk should read those acts—which were accordingly lead. Mr GEORGE MASON asked to what purpose the laws were read? The objection was that too much power was given to con¬ gress—power that would finally destroy the state governments, more .effectually by insidious underhanded means, than such as could b© yqi,. 3. 25 386 DEBATES* [Ma»0?T* • / openly practised* This, said he, is the opinion of many worthy men, not ouly in this convention, but in all parts of America. These laws could only shew, that the legislature of this state could pass such acts. He thought they militated against the cession of this pow¬ er to congress, because the state governments could call forth the mili¬ tia when necessary, so as to compel a submission to the laws; and as they were competent to it, congress ought not to have the power* The meeting of three or four persons might be called an insurrection; and the militia might be called out to disperse them. He was not satisfied with the explanation of the word organization, by the gen¬ tleman in the military line, (Mr Lee.) He thought they were not confined to the technical explanation. But that congress could inflict severe and ignominious punishments on the militia, as a necessary incident to the power of organizing and disciplining them. The gentleman had said there was no dan¬ ger, because the laws respecting the militia were less rigid in the other states than this,. This was no conclusive argument. His fears, as he had before expressed, were, that grievous punishments would be indicted in order to render the service disagreeable to the militia themselves ; and induce them to wish its abolition, which would af¬ ford a pretence for establishing a standing army. He was convinc¬ ed the state governments ought to have the control of the militia, except when they were absolutely necessary for general purposes. The gentleman had said, that they would be only subject to martial law, when in actual service. He demanded what was to hinder congress from inflicting it always, and making a general law for the purpose] If so, said he, it must finally produce, most infallibly, the annihilation of the state governments. These were his apprehen¬ sions but he prayed God they might be groundless. Mr. MADISON replied, that the obvious explanation was, that the states were to appoint the officers, and govern all the militia ex¬ cept that part which was called into the actual service of the United States. He asked, if powers were given to the general government, if we must not give it executive power to use it] The vice of the old system was, that congress could not execute the powers nomi¬ nally vested in them. If the contested clause were expunged, this system would have nearly the same defect. Mr. HENRY wished to know what authority the state govern¬ ment;- had over the militia I Mr. MADISON answered, that the state governments might do what they thought proper with the militia, when they were not in the actual service of the United States. They might make use of thorn to suppress insurrections, quell riots, &c. and call on the genera! government for the militia af any other state to aid them, if lii'C. SaVTi tf. Corbin.] VIRGINIA. 387 Mr. HENRY replied, that as the clause expressly vested the general government with power to call them out to suppress insur¬ rections, &c. it appeared to him most decidedly, that the power of suppressing insurrections was exclusively given to congress. If it remained in the states, it was by implication. Mr. CORBIN, after a short address to the chair, in which he ex¬ pressed extreme reluctance to get up, said, that all contentions on this subject might be ended, by adverting to the fourth section of the fourth article, which provides, “that the United States shall guar¬ antee to every state in the union, a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion ; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against, domestic violence.” He thought this section gave the states power to use their own militia , and call on congress for the militia of other states. He observed, that our representa¬ tives were to return every second year to mingle with their fellow citizens. He asked then, how in the name of God, they would make laws to destroy themselves? The gentleman had told us that nothing could be more humiliating, than that the state governments eould not control the general government. He thought the gentleman might as well have complained, that one county could not control the state at large. Mr Corbin then said that all confederate govern¬ ments had the care of national defence, and that congress ought to have it. Animadverting on Mr Henry’s observations, that the French had been the instruments of their own slavery, that the Germans had enslaved the Germans, and that the Spaniards the Spaniards, &c, he asked if those nations knew any thing of representation? The want of this knowledge was the principal cause of their bon¬ dage. Fie concluded by observing, that the general government had no power but such as the state government had, and that argu¬ ments against the one held against the other. Mr GRAYSON, in reply to Mr Corbin, said he was mistaken when he produced the fourth section of the fourth article, to prove that the state governments had a right to intermeddle with the mili¬ tia, He was of opinion, that a previous application must be made to the fedeial head, by the legislature when in session, or otherwise by the executive of any state, before they could interfere with the militia. In his opinion, no instance could be adduced, where the states could employ the militia. For in all the cases wherein they could be employed, congress had the exclusive direction and control of them. Disputes, he observed, had happened in many countries? where this power should be lodged. In England there was a dis¬ pute between the parliament and king Charles, who should have power over the militia. Were this governnent well organized, he 388 DEBATES, [URAYSOST, would not object to giving it power over the militia. But as it ap¬ peared to him to be without checks, and to tend to the formation of i an aristocratic body, he could not agree to it. Thus organized, his imagination did not reach so far as to know where this power should be lodged. He conceived the state governments to be at the mercy of the generality. He wished to be open to conviction, but he could see no case where the states could command the militia. He did not believe that it corresponded with the intentions of those who ormed it, and it was altogether without an equilibrium. He humbly apprehended that the power of providing for orgariizing and disciplin¬ ing the militia, enabled the government to make laws for regulating them, and inflicting punishments for disobedience, neglect, &c. Whether it would be the spirit of the generality to lay unusual pun¬ ishments, he knew not, but he thought they had the power, if they thought proper to exercisp it. He thought that if there was a con¬ structive implied power left in the stafes, yet as the line was not clearly marked between the two governments, it would create differ¬ ences. He complained of the uncertainty of the-expression, and wished it to be so clearly expressed that the people might see where the states could interfere. As the exclusive power of arming, organizing, &c..was given to congress, they might entirely neglect them: or they might be armed in one part of the union, and totally neglected in another. This he apprehended to be a probably circumstance. In this he might be thought suspicious: but he was justified by what had happened in other countries. He wished to know what attention had been paid to the militia of Scotland and Irelapd, since the union; and what laws had been made to regulate them? There is, says Mr Grayson, an excellent militia law in England; and such as I wish to be estab¬ lished by the general government. They have 30,000 select militia in England. But the militia of Scotland and Ireland are neglected.. I see the necessity of the concentration of the forces of the union. I acknowledge that militia are the best means of quelling insurrec¬ tions, and that we have an advantage over the English government. For their regular forces answer the purposp. But I object to the want of checlqs, and a line of discrimination between the state governments and the generality. Mr JOHN MARSHALL asked, if gentlemen were serious when they asserted that if the State governments had power to interfere with the militia, it was by implication? If they were, he asked the committee, whether the least attention would not shew that they were mistaken? The state governments did not derive their powers from the general government. But each government derived its .powers from the people, and each was to act according to the powers ■Marshall.] VIRGINIA. 389 given it. Would any gentleman deny this? He demanded if powers not given, were retained by implication? Could any man say so? Could any man say, that this power was not retained by the states, as they had not given it away? For, says he, does not a power remain till it is given away? The state legislatures had power to command and govern their militia before, and have it still, undeniably, unless there be something in this constitution that takes it away. For continental purposes congress may call forth the militia, as to suppress insurrections and repel invasions. But the power given to the states by the people is not taken away : for the constitution does not say so. In the confederation congress had this power. But the state legislatures had it also. The power of legislating given them within the ten miles square is exclusive of the states, because it is expressed to be exclusive. The truth is, that when power is given to the general legislature, if it was in the state legis¬ lature before, both shall exercise it; unless there be an incompati¬ bility in the exercise by one, to that by the other : or negative words precluding the state governments from it. But there are no nega¬ tive words here. It rests therefore with the states. To me it ap¬ pears then unquestionable, that the state governments can call forth the militia, in case the constitution'should be adopted, in the same manner as they could have done, before its adoption. Gentlemen have said, that the states cannot defend themselves without an ap¬ plication to congress, because congress can interpose! Does not every man feel a refutation of the argument in his own breast? I will show, that there could not be a combination between those who formed the constitution, to take away this power. All the restraints intended to be laid on the state governments (besides where an ex¬ clusive power is expressly given to congress) are contained in the tenth seetion, of the first article. This power is not included in the restrictions in that section. But what excludes every possibility of doubt, is the last part of it. That “ no state shall engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not ad¬ mit of delay.” When invaded, they can engage in war, as also when in imminent danger. This clearly proves, that the states can use the militia when they find it necessary. The worthy member last up, objects to the continental government possessing the pow¬ er of disciplining the militia, because, though all its branches be derived from the people, he says, they will form an aristocratic go¬ vernment, unsafe and unfit to be trusted. Mr GRAYSON answ'ered, that he only said it was so constructed as to form a great aristocratic body. Mr. MARSHALL replied, that he was not certain whether he un- 390 DEBATES. [Marshall,. derstood him. But he thought he had said so. He conceived that as the government was drawn from the people, the feelings and in¬ terests of the people would be attended to, and that we would be safe in granting them power to regulate the militia. When the go¬ vernment is drawn from the people, continued Mr. Marshall, and de¬ pending on the people for its continuance, oppressive measures will not be attempted, as they will certainly draw on their authors the re¬ sentment of those on whom they depend. On this- government, thus depending on ourselves for its existence, I will rest my safety, not¬ withstanding the danger depicted by the honorable gentleman. I cannot help being surprised that the worthy member thought this power so dangerous. What government is able to protect you in time of war"? Will any state depend on its own exertions? The consequence of such dependence and withholding this power from congress will be, that state will fall after state, and be a sacrifice to the want of power in the general government .—United weave strong , divided we fall. Will you prevent the general government from drawing the militia of one state to another, when the consequence would be, that every state must depend on itself? The enemy pos¬ sessing the water, can quickly go from one state to another. No state will spare to anothei its militia, which it conceives necessary for itself. It requires a superintending power, in order to call forth the resources of all to protect all. If ibis be not done, each state will fall a sacrifice.—This system merits the highest applause in this respect. The honorable gentleman said, that a general regula¬ tion may be made to inflict punishments. Does he imagine that a militia law is to be engrafted on the scheme of government, so as to render it incapable of being changed? The idea of the worthy mem¬ ber supposes, that men renounce their own interests. This would produce general inconveniences throughout the union, and would be equally opposed by all the states. But the worthy member fears, that in one part of the union they will be regulated and disciplined, and in another neglected. This danger is enhanced, by leaving this- power to each state ; for some states may attend to their militia, and others may neglect them. If congress neglept our militia, we can arm them ourselves. Cannot Virginia import arms.,—Cannot she put them into the hands of her militiamen? He then concluded by observing, that the power of governing the militia, was not vested in the states by implication, because being possessed of it antecedent to the adoption of the government, and not being divested of it, by any grant or restriction in the constitu¬ tion, they must necessarily be as fully possessed of it as ever they had been. And it could not be said, that the states derived any powers from that system, but retained them, though not acknowled¬ ged in any part of it. Henry.] VIRGINIA. 391 Mr GRAYSON acknowledged that all power was drawn from the people. But he could see none of these checks in which ought to characteristise a free government. It had not such checks as even the British government had. He thought it so organized as to form an aristocratic body. If we looked at the democratic branch and the great extent of country, he said, it must be considered in a great degree to be an aristocratic representation. As they w’ere elected with craven appetites, and wishing for emoluments, they might unite with the other two branches. They might give reciprocally good offices to one another, and mutually protect each other. For he con¬ sidered them all as united in interest, and as but one branch. That there was no check to prevent such a combination, or in cases of concurrent powers, was there a line drawn to prevent interference i between the state governments and the generality, Mr HENRY still retained his opinion, that the states had no right to call forth the militia to suppress insurrections, &c. But the right interpretation (and such as the nations of the earth had put upon the concession of power) was, that when power was given, it was given exclusively. He appealed to the committee, if power was not confined in the hands of a few in almost all countries of the world. He referred to their candour, if the construction of conceded power, was not an exclusive concession in nineteen-twentieth parts of the world. The nations which retained their liberty, were comparatively few. America would add to the number of the oppressed nations, if she depended on constructive rights, and argumentative implica¬ tion : That the powers given to congress wereYxclusively given, was very obvious to him. The rights which the states had, must be founded on the restrictions on congress. He asked, if the doctrine which had been so often circulated, that rights not given were re¬ tained, was true, why there were negative clauses to restrain con¬ gress'? He told gentlemen, that these clauses were sufficient to shake all their implication. For, says he, if congress had no power but was given to them, why restrict them by negative words? Is not the clear implication this—that if these restrictions were not in¬ serted, they could have performed what they prohibit? The worthy member had said, that congress ought to have power to protect all, and had given this system the highest encomium. But insisted that the power over the militia was concurrent. To obviate the futility of this doctrine, Mr Henry alledged, that it was not reducible to practice. Examine it, says he—reduce it to practice. Suppose an insurrection in Virginia, and suppose there be danger apprehended of an insurrection in another state, from the exercise of the government; or suppose a national war, and there be discon¬ tents among the people of this state, that produces or threatens an VIRGINIA. 39*2 [IlEKRt> insurrection ; suppose congress in either case, demands a number of militia, will they not be obliged to go ! Where are your reserved.' rights, when your militia go to a neighboring state! Which call is to be obeyed, the congressional call, or the call of the state legisla¬ ture ! The call of congress must be obeyed. I need not remind this committee that the sweeping clause .will cause their demands to be submitted to. This clause enables them “ to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry into execution all the powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.” Mr Chairman, I will turn to another clause which relates to the same subject, and tends to shew the fallacy of their argument. The tenth section, of the first article, to which reference was made by the worthy member, militates against himself. It says, that “ no .state shall engage in war, unless actually invaded.” If you give this clause a fair construction, what is the true meaning of it! What, does this relate to! Not domestic insurrections, but war. If the country be invaded, a state may go to war ; but cannot sup¬ press insurrections. If there should happen an insurrection of slaves, the country cannot be said to be invaded. They .cannot, therefore suppress it without the interposition of congress. The fourth section of the fourth article, expressly directs, that in case of domestic violence,congress shallprotecp the states on application of the legislature or executive; and the eighth section of ihe first article gives congress power- to call forth the militia to quell insurrections : there cannot, therefore, be a concurrent power. The state legislatures ought to have power to call forth the efforts of the militia,, when necessary. Occasions for calling them out ma}?' be urgent, pressing,, and instantaneous. The states ( cannot now call them, let an insur¬ rection be ever so perilous, without an application to cbngress.— So long p, delay may be fatal. There are three clauses, which prove beyond the possibility of doubt, that congress, andxowgtm only ,can call forth the militia. The clause giving congress power to call them out to suppress insurrec¬ tions, &c. that which restrains a state from engaging in war, except when actually invaded—and that which requires congress to protect the states against domestic violence, render it impossible that a state can have power to intermeddle with them. Will not congress fmd refuge for their actions in these clauses! With respect to the concurrent jurisdiction, it is a political monster of absurdity. We have passed that clause which gives congress an unlimited authority over the national wealth; and here is an unbounded control ove the national strength. Notwithstanding this clear unequivocal telinquishment of the power of controlling the militia, you say th v HffNRY.j DEBATES. 393 states retain it for the very purposes given to congress. Is it fair to say that you gave the power of arming the militia, and at the same time you sajr you reserve it ? This great national govern¬ ment ought not to be left in this condition. If it be, it will termin¬ ate in the destruction of our liberties. Mr MADISON. Mr Chairman, let me ask this committee, and the honorable member last up, w T hat we are to understand from this reasoning? The power must be vested in congress, or in the state governments? or there must be a division or concurrence. He is against division—It is a political monster. He will not give it to congress, for fear of oppression. Is it to be vested in the state go¬ vernments. If so, where is the provision for general defence ? I ever America should be attacked, the states would fall successively It will prevent them from' giving aid to their sister states. For as each state will expect to be attacked, and wish to guard against it each will retain its own militia for its own defence. Where is this power to be deposited then, unless in the general government^ if it be dangerous to the public safety to give it exclusively to the states. If it must be divided, let him shew a better manner of doing it than that which is in thfe constitution.^ I cannot agree with the other honorable gentleman, that there is no check. There is a powerful check in that paper. The state governments are to govern the militia, when not called forth for general national purposes ; and congress is to govern such, part only as may be in the actual service of the union. Nothing can be more certain and positive than this. It ex¬ pressly empowers congress to govern them when in the service of the United States. It is then clear, tpat'the states govern them when they are not. With respect to supressing insurrections, I say that those clauses which were mentioned by the honorable gentleman, are compatible with a concurrence of the power. By the first, con¬ gress is to call them forth to suppress insurrections and repel inva¬ sions of foreign'powers. A concurrence in the former case, is neces¬ sary, because a whole state may be in insurrection against the union. What has passed, may perhaps justify this apprehension. The safety of the union and particular states, requires that the general government -should have power to repel foreign invasions. The fourth section of the fourth article, is perfectly consistent with the exercise of the power by the states. The w r ords are, “ The United States shall gnarantee to evefy state in this union, a republican form of government and shall protect each of them against invasion ; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive, (when th e legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence.” The word invasion here, after power had been given in the former clause to repel invasions may be thought tautologous, but it has a different meaning from the other. This clause speaks of a particular state. DEBATES, 394 [Mason. It means that it shall be protected from invasion by other states. A republican government is to be guaranteed to each state, and they are to be protected from invasion from other states, as well as from foreign powers : And on application by the legislature or executive as the case may be, the militia of the other states are to be called to suppress domestic insurrections. Does this bar the states from calling forth their own militia? No ; but it gives them a sup¬ plementary security to suppress insurrections and domestic violence. The other clause runs in these words, “No state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any duty on tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, un¬ less actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.” They are restrained from making war, unless invaded, or in imminent danger. When in such danger, they are not restrained. I can perceive no competition in these clauses. They cannot be said to be repugnant to a concurrence of the power. If we object to the constitution in this manner, and consume our time in verbal criticism, we shall never put an end to the business. Mr GEORGE MASON.'—Mr Chairman, a worthy member has asked, who are the militia, if they be not the people of this country, and if we are not to be protected from the fate of the Germans, Prussians, &c. by our representation? I ask who are the militia? They consist now of the whole people, except a few public officers. But 1 cannot say who will be the militia of the future day. If that pa¬ per on the table gets no alteration, the militia of the future day may not consist of all classes, high and low, and rich and poor, but they may be confined to the lower and middle classes of the people, granting exclusion to the higher classes of the people. If we should ever see that day, the most ignominious punishments and heavy fines may be expected. Under the present government, all ranks of people are subject to militia duty. Under such a full and equal representation as ours, there can be no ignominious punishment in¬ flicted. But under this national, or rather consolidated government, the case will be different. The representation being so small and inadequate, they will have no fellow-feeling for the people. They may discriminate people in their owrf predicament, and exempt from duty all the officers and lowest creatures of the national govern¬ ment. If there were a more particular definition of their powers, and a clause exempting the militia from martial law except when in actual service, and from fines and punishments of an unusual na¬ ture, then we might expect that the militia would be what they are. But if this be not the case, we cannot say how long all classes of people will be included in the militia. There will not be the same reason to expect it, because the government will be administered Nicholas.] VIRGINIA. 39B by different people. We know what they are now, but know not how soon they may be altered. Mr GEORGE NICHOLAS.—Mr Chairman, I feel apprehen¬ sions lest the subject of our debates should be misunderstood. Every one wishes to know the true meaning of the system; but I fear those who hear us will think we are captiously quibbling on words. We have been told in the course of this business, that th« government will operate like a screw. Give me leave to say, that the exertions of the opposition are like that instrument. They catch at every thing, and take it into their vortex. The worthy member says, that this government is defective, because it comes from the people. Its greatest recommendation with me, is putting the power in the hands of the people. He disapproves of it because it does not say in what particular instances the militia shall be called out to execute the laws. This is a power of the constitution, and par¬ ticular instances must be defined by the legislature. But, says the worthy member, those laws which have been read, are arguments against the constitution, because they shew that the states are now in possession of the power, and competent to its execution. Would you leave this power in the states, and by that means deprive the general government of a power which will be necessary for its ex¬ istence! If the state governments find this power necessary, ought not the general government to have a similar power! But, Sir, there is no state check in this business. The gentleman near me has shewn that there is a veiy important check. Another worthy member says, there is no power in the states to quell an insurrection of slaves. Have they it now! If they have, does the constitution take it away! If it does, it must be in one of the three clauses which have been mentioned by the worthy mem¬ ber. The first clause gives the general government power to call them out when necessary. Hoes this take it away from the state#! No. But it gives an additional security: for, besides the power in the state governments to use their own militia, it will be the duty of the general government to aid them with the strength of the union when called for. No part of this constitution can shew that this power is taken away. But an argument is drawn from that clause, which says, “ that no state shall engage in war unless actually invaded, or in such immi¬ nent danger as will not admit of delay.” What does this prohibi¬ tion amount to! It must be a war with a foreign enemy, that the states are prohibited from making: for the exception to the restric¬ tion proves it. The restriction includes only offensive hostility, they are at liberty to engage in war when invaded, or in imminent danger. They are therefore not restiained from quelling domestic 396 DEBATES. [Nicholas^ insurrrctions, which are totally different from making war with a foreign power. But the great thing to be dreaded, is, that during an insurrection, the militia will be called out from the state. This is his kind of argument. Is it possible that at such a time the general government would order the militia to be called? It is a groundless objection to work on gentlemen’s apprehensions within these walls. As to the fourth article, it was introduced wholly for the particular aid of the states. A republican form of government is guaranteed, and protection is secured against invasion and domes¬ tic violence on application. Is not this a guard as strong as possi¬ ble? Does it not exclude the unnecessary interference of congress, in business of this sort? The gentleman over the way, cannot tell who will be the militia at a future day, arid enumerates dangers of select militia. Let me attend to the nature of gentlemen’s objections. One objects because there will be select militia; another objects because there will be no select militia; and yet both oppose it on these contradictory princi¬ ples. If you deny the general government the power of calling out the militia, there must be a recurrence to a standing army. If you are really jealous of your liberties, confide in congress. Mr MASON rose, and said, that he was totally misunderstood. The contrast between his friend’s objection and his was improper. His friend had mentioned the propriety of having select militia, like those of Great Britain, who should be more thoroughly exercised than the militia at large could possibly be. But he, himself, had not spoken of a selection of militia, but of the exemption of the highest classes of the people from militia service; which would jus¬ tify apprehensions of severe and ignominious punishments. Mr NICHOLAS wished to know whether the representatives of the people would consent to such exemptions, as every man who had twenty-five acres of laqd, could vote for a federal representative? Mr GRAYSON—Mi- Chairman, I conceive that the power of providing and maintaining a navy is at present dangerous, however warmly it may be urged by gentlemen, that America ought to be¬ come a maritime power. If we once give such power, w T e put it in the hands of men whose interest it will be to oppress us. It will also irritate the nations of Europe against us. Let us consider the situation of the. maritime powers of Europe : they are separated from us by the Atlantic ocean. The riches of all those countries come by sea. Commerce and navigation are the principal sources of their wealth. If we become a maritime power, we shall be able to participate of their most beneficial business. Will they suffer us to put ourselves in a condition to rival them? I believe the first step of any consequence, which will be made towards it, will bring VIRGINIA. 397 f ‘GRAY SON. ] war u P on us. Their ambition and avarice, most powerfully impel ihem to prevent our becoming- a naval station. We should on this occasion consult our ability. Is there any gentleman here who can say, that America can support a navy? The riches of America are not sufficient to bear the enormous expense it must certainly occa¬ sion. I may be supposed to exaggerate, but I leave it to the com¬ mittee to judge whether my information be right or not. It is, said, that shipwrights can be had on better terms in America than in Europe; but necessary materials are so much dearer in A" ■ aerica than in Europe, that the aggregate sum would be greater. A seventy-four gun ship will cost you ninety-eight thousand pounds, including guns, tackle, &c. According to the usual calculation in England, it will cost you the farther sum of forty-eight thousand pounds to man it, furnish provisions, and pay officers and men. You must pay men more here than in Europe, because their governments being arbitrary, then can command the services of their subjects* without an adequate compensation ; so that, in all, the expenses of such a vessel would be one hundred and forty thousand pounds in' one year. Let gentlemen consider them, the extreme difficulty of sup¬ porting- a navy, and they will eoncurwvith me, that America cannot do it. I have po objection to such a navy as will not excite the jeal¬ ousy or the European countries. But I would have the constitu¬ tion to say, that no greater number of ships should be had, than would be sufficient to protect our -trade. Such a fleet would not probably offend the Europeans. I am not of a jealous disposition ; but when I consider that the welfare and happiness of my country are in dan¬ ger,,! beg to be excused for expressing my apprehensions. Let us consider how this navy shall be raised. Wh^t would be the conse¬ quence under those general words, “to provide and maintain a na¬ vy?” All the vessels of the intended fleet, would be built and equip¬ ped in the northern states, where they have every necessary materi al and convenience for the purpose. Will any gentleman say, that any ship of war can be raised to the south of Cape Charles? The consequence will be, that the southern states will be in the power of the northern states. We should be called upon for our share of the expenses, without having equal emoluments. Can it be supposed, when this question comes to be agitated in congress,- that, the northern states will not take such measures as will throw as much circulating money among them as possible, without any consideration to the other states? If I know the nature of man, and I believe I do, they will have no con¬ sideration for us,. But supposing it were not so, America has noth¬ ing at all to do with a fleet. Let us .remain for some time in obscu- 393 DEBATES. [Grayson. srity, and rise by degrees* Let us not precipitately provoke the re¬ sentment of the maritime powers of Europe. A well regulated mi¬ litia ought to be the defence of this country. In some of our con¬ stitutions it is said so. This constitution should have inculated the principle. Congress ought to be under some restraint in this re¬ spect. Mr Grayson then added, that the northern states would be principally benefitted by having a fleet. That a majority of the states could vote the raising a great navy, or enter into any commercial regulation very detrimental to the other states. In the United Ne¬ therlands there was much greater security, as the commercial inter¬ est of no state could be sacrificed without its own consent. The raising a fleet was the daily and favorite subject of conversation in the northern states. He apprehended, that if attempted, it would draw us into a war with Great Britain or France. As the American fleet would not be competent to the defence of all the states, the southern states would be most exposed. He referred to the experi¬ ence of the late war, as a proof of what he said. At the period the southern states were most distressed, the northern states, he said, were most happy. They have privateers in abundance, whereas we had but few. Upon the whole, he thought we should depend on our troops on shore, and that it was very impolitic to give this pow¬ er to congress, without any limitation. Mr NICHOLAS remarked, that the gentleman last up had made two observations—the one, that we ought not to give congress pow¬ er to raise a navy; and the other, that we had not the means of supporting it. Mr Nicholas thought it a false doctrine. Congress, says he, has a discretionary power to do it when necessary. They are not bound to do it in five or ten years, or at any particular time. It is presumable therefore, they will postpone it until it be proper. Mi GRAYSON had no objection to giving congress power of raising such a fleet as suited the circumstances of Jhe country. But he^could not agree to give that unlimited power which was delineat¬ ed in that paper. Adverting to the clause investing congress with the power of ex¬ clusive legislation in a district, not exceeding ten miles square ; he said, he had before expressed his doubts, that this district would be the favorite of the generality, any that it would be possible for them to give exclusive privileges of commerce to those residing within it. He had illustrated what he said by Europeans examples. It might be a said to be impracticable to exercise this power, in this manner. Among the various laws and customs which pervaded Europe, there were exclusive privileges and immunities enjoyed in many places. [Graxson. VIRGINIA. 399 He thought that this ought to be guarded against: for should such exclusive privileges be granted to merchants residing within the ten miles square, it would be highly injurious to the inhabitants of other states. Mr GEORGE MASON thought that there were few clauses in the constitution, so dangerous as that which gave congress exclu¬ sive power of legislation, within ten miles square. Implication, he observed, was capable of any extension, and would probably be ex¬ tended to augment the congressional powers. But here there was no need of implication. This clause gave them an unlimited au¬ thority in every possible case within that district. This ten miles square, says Mr Mason, may set at defiance the laws of the surround¬ ing states, and may, like the custom of the superstitious days of our ancestors, become the sanctuary of the blackest crimes. Here the federal courts are to sit. We have heard a good deal said of justice. It has been doubted whether jury trial be secured in civil cases* But I will suppose, that we shall have juries in civil cases. What 3ort of a jury shall we have within the ten miles square! The im¬ mediate creatures of the government. What chance will poor men get, where congress have power of legislating in all cases whatever, and wffiere judges and juries may be under their influence, and bound to support their operations! Even with juries the chance of justice may here be very small, as congress have unlimited authority, leg¬ islative, executive, and judicial. Lest this power should not be sufficient, they have it in^every case. Now, sir, if an attempt'should be made to establish tyranny over the people, here are ten miles square, where the greatest offender may meet protection. If any of their officers, or creatures, should attempt to oppress the people, or should actually perpetrate the blackest deed, he has nothing to do, but get into the ten miles square. Why was this dangerous pow r er given! Felons may receive an asylum there, and in their strong holds. Gentlemen have said that it was dangerous to argue against possible abuse, because there could be no power delegated but might be abused. It is an incontrovertible axiom, that when the dan¬ gers that may arise from the abuse , are greater than the benefits that may result from the use, the power ought to be withheld. I do not conceive that this power is at all necessary, though capable of being greatly abused. We are told by the honorable gentleman, that Holland has its Hague. I confess I am at a loss to know wffiat inference he could C? draw from that observation. This is the place where the deputies of the United Provinces meet to transact the public business. But 400 DEBATES. [Madison* I do not recollect that they have any exclusive jurisdiction whatever in that place, but are subject to the laws of the province in which the Hague is. To what purpose the gentleman mentioned that Hol¬ land has its Hague, I cannot see. j Mr MASON then observed, that he would willingly give them ex¬ clusive power, as far as respected the police and good government of the place, but he would give them no more, because he thought it unnecessary. He was very willing to give them in this as^well as in all other cases, those powers which he thought indispensably ne¬ cessary. Mr MADISON.—Mr Chairman, I did Conceive, sir, that the clause under consideration, was one of'those parts which would speak its own praise. It is hardly necessaty to say any thing con¬ cerning it. Strike it out of the system, *and let me a‘sk, whether there would not be much larger scope for those dangers! I cannot comprehend that the power of legislating over a small district, which cannot exceed ten miles square, and may not be more than one mile, will involve tiie dangers which he apprehends. If there be any knowledge in my mind, of the nature of man, I should think it would be the last thing that would enter into the mind of any man, to grant exclusive advantages in a very circumscribed district to the preju¬ dice of the community at large. We make suppositions, and after¬ wards deduce conclusions from them, as if they Were established axi¬ oms. But after all, bring home this question^to ourselves. It is probable that the members from Georgia, New Hampshire, &c., will concur to sacrifice the privileges of their friends! I believe, that whatever state mav become the seat of the meneral government, it will come the object of jealousy, and of the envy of the other states. Let me remark, if not already remarked, that there must be a par- cession by particular states, of the district to congress, and that the states may settle the terms'of the cession. The states may make what stipulation they please in it, and if they apprehend any dan¬ ger, they may refuse it altogether. How could the general govern¬ ment be guarded from the undue influence of particular states, or from insults, without such exclusive power! If it were at the pleasure of a particular state to control the cession and deliberations of congress, would they be secure from insults, or the influence of such state! If this commonwealth depended lor the freedom of de¬ liberation, or the laws of any state where it might be necessary to sit, would it not be liable to attacks of that nature (and with more indignity) which has been already offered to congress! With re¬ spect to the government of Holland, I believe the states general have no jurisdiction over the Hague. But I have heard that mentioned a circumstance which gave undue influence to Holland over the M 4.DIS0V.] VIRGINIA. 401 rest. We mast limit our apprehensions to certain degrees of proba- ilitv. The evils which they urge must result from this clause, are extremely improbable: nay, almost impossible. Mr GRAYSON—Mr Chairman, one answer which has been gi¬ ven, is the improbability of the evil—that it will never be attempted and that it is almost impossible. This will not satisfy ns, when we consider the great attachments men have to a great and magni¬ ficent capital. It would be the interest of the citizens of that dis¬ trict, to aggrandize themselves by every possible means in their power, to the great injury of the other states. If we travel all over the world, we will find that people have aggrandized their own cap¬ itals. Look at Russia and Prussia. Every step has been taken to aggrandize their capitals. In what light are we to consider the ten miles square! It is not to be a fourteenth state. The inhabitants will, in no respect whatever, be amenable to the laws of any state. A clause in the fourth article, highly extolled for its wisdom, will be rendered nugatory by this exclusive legislation. This clause runs thus, “no person held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on the claim of the party to whom such la¬ bor or service may be due.” Unless you consider the ten miles square as a state, persons bound to labor who shall escape thither, will not be given up. For they are only to be delivered up after they shall have escaped into a state. As my honorable friend men¬ tioned felons, who shall have fled from justice, to the ten miles square, cannot be apprehended. The executive of a state is to ap¬ ply to that of another, for the delivery of a felon. He cannot apply to the ten miles square. It was often in contemplation of congress to have power of regulating the police of the seat of government; hut they never had an idea of exclusive legislation in all cases. The power of regulating the police and good government of it will secure congress against insults. What originated the idea of the exclusive legislation was, some insurrection in Pennsylvania, whereby con¬ gress was insulted, on account of which it is supposed they left the state. It is answered, that the consent of the state must be required, or , e lse they cannot have such a district, or places for the erecting of forts, &c. But how much is already given them? Look at the great country to the north west of the Ohio, extendiug to and commanding the lakes. , .. Lbok at the other end of the Ohio, towards South Carolina, ex¬ pending to the Mississippi. See what these, in process of time, vol. 3* I 402 Virginia. (Uh, msty amount to. They may grant Exclusive privileges to any par¬ ticular part of which they have the possession. But it may he ob¬ served, that those extensive countries shall be formed into indepen¬ dent states, and that their consent will be necessary. To this I an¬ swer that they may still grant such privileges, as in that country is already granted to congress by the states. The grants of Virginia, South Carolina, and other states, will be subservient to congress in this respect. Of course it results from the whole, that requiring the consent, of the states will be no guard against this abuse of power. A desultory conversation ensued. Mr NICHOLAS insisted that as the state within which the ten miles square might be, could prescribe the terms on which congreea should hold it, no danger could arise, as no state would consent to injure itself. There was the same security with respect to tlio places purchased for the erection of forts, magazines, &c. and as to the territory of the United States, the power of congress only ex-^ tended to make needful rules and regulations concerning it, without prejudicing the claim of any particular state; the right of territory not being given up. That the grant of those lands to the United States, was for the general benefit of all the states, and not to be per¬ verted to their prejudice. That consequently whether that country were formed into new states or not, the danger apprehended could not take place. That*the seat of government was to be still a part of the state, and as to general regulations was to be considered as such. Mr GRAYSON, on the other hand, contended that the ten miles square could not he viewed as a state; and that the state within which it might he, would have no pow r er of legislating over it, and that consequently persons bound to labour, and felons, might receive protection there; and that exclusive emoluments might be granted to those residing within it. That the territory of the United States, being a part of no state or states, might be appropriated to what use congress pleased, without the consent of any state or states, and that consequently such exclusive privileges and exemptions might be granted, and such protection afforded to fugitives, within such places as congress should think proper. That after mature consid¬ eration, he could not find that the ten miles square was to be looked upon even as a part of a state, but to be totally independent of all, and subject to the exclusive legislation of congress. Mr LEL strongly expatiated on the impossibility of securing nay human institution fsom possible abuse. He thought the powers conceded in the paper on the table not so liable to be abused as the powers of the state governments. Gentlemen had suggested that the seat of government would become a sanctuary for state Til— lains. and that in a short time ten miles square would subjugate a ttlNRT.] VIRGINIA. 403 country of eight hundred miles square. This appeared to him a most improbable possibility; nay, he might call it impossibility. Were the place crowded with rogues, lie asked, if it would be an agreeable place of residence to the members of the general govern¬ ment, who were freely chosen by the people and the state govern¬ ments'? Would the people be so lost to honor and virtue, as to se¬ lect men who would willingly associate with the most abandoned characters? lie thought the honorable gentleman’s objections against remote possibility of abuse, went to prove, that government of no sort was eligible, but that a state of nature was preferable to n state of civilization. He apprehended no danger, and thought that persons bound to labour, and felons, could not take refugein the ten miles square, or other places exclusively governed by congress, because it would be contrary to the constitution, and a palpable usurpation to protect them. Mr HENRY entertained strong suspicions that great dangers must result from the clause under consideration. They were not removed, but rather confirmed by the remarks of the honorable gen¬ tleman, in saying, that it was extremely improbable that the mem¬ bers from New Hampshire and Georgia, would go and legislate ex¬ clusively in the ten miles square. If it was so improbable, why ask the power? Why demand a power which was not to be exer¬ cised? Compare this power, says he, to the next clause, which gives them power to make all laws which shall be necessary to carry their laws into execution. By this they have a right to pass uny law that may facilitate the execution of'their acts. They have a right by this clause to make a law that such a district shall be set apart for any purpose they please, and that any man who shall act contrary to their commands, within certain ten miles square, or any place they may select, and strong holds, shall be hanged without benefit of clergy. If they think any law necessary for their personal safety, after perpetrating the most tyrannical and oppressive deeds, cannot they make it by this sweeping clause? If it benecessary to provide, not only for this, but for any department or officer of con¬ gress, does not this clause enable them to make a law for the pur¬ pose? And will not these laws, made for those purposes, be para¬ mount to the laws of the states? Will not this clause give them a right to keep a powerful army continually on foot, if they think it necessary to aid the execution of their laws? Is there any act, how¬ ever atrocious, which they cannot do by virtue of this clause? Look at the use which has been made in all parts of the world of that human thing called power. Look at the predominant thirst of do¬ minion which has invariably and uniformly prompted rulers to abuse i heir powers. Can you say, that you will be safe when you give 404 DEBATES. [Henrt^ euch unlimited powers, without any real responsibility? Will you be safe when you trust men at Philadelphia with power to make any law that will enable them to carry their acts into execution? Will not the members of congress have the same passions which other rulers have had? They will not be superior to the frailties of human nature. However cautious you may be in the selection of your re¬ presentatives, it will be dangerous to trust them with such unbound¬ ed powers. Shall we be told, when about to grant such illimitable authority, that it shall never be exercised! I conjure you once more to remember the admonition of that sage man who told you that when you give power, you know not what you give. I know the absolute necessity of an energetic govern¬ ment. But is it consistent with any principle of prudence or good policy, to grant unlimited, unbounded authority, which is so totally unnecessary, that gentlemen say it will never be exercised? But gentlemen say, that we must make experiments. A wonderful and unheard of experiment it will be, to give unlimited power unneces¬ sarily! I admit my inferiority in point of historical knowledge: but I believe no man can produce an instance of an unnecessary and unlimited power, given to a body independent of the legislature, within a particular district. Let any man in this convention shew me an instance of such separate and different powers of legislation in the same country—shew me an instance, where a part of the community was independent of the whole. The people within that place, and the strong holds, may be ex¬ cused from all the burdens imposed on the rest of the society ; and may enjoy exclusive emoluments, to the great injury of the rest of the people. But gentlemen say, that the power will not be abused. They ought to shew that it is necessary. All their powers may be fully carried into execution, without this exclusive authority in the ten miles square. The sweeping clause will fully enable them to do what they please. What could the most extravagant and bound¬ less imagination ask, but power to do every thing? I have reason to suspect ambitious grasps at power. The experience of the world teaches me the jeopardy of giving enormous power. Strike this clause out of the form of the government, and how will it stand? Congress will still have power, by the sweeping clause, to make laws within that place, and the strong holds, independently of the local authority of the state. I ask you if this clause be strtick out whether the sweeping clause will not enable them to protect them¬ selves from insult? If you grant them these powers you destroy every degree of responsibility. They will fully screen them from justice, and preclude the possibility of punishing them. No instance Madison.] VIRGINIA. 405 «an be given of such a wanton grasp of power—as an exclusive leg gislation in all cases whatever. Mr MADISON—Mr Chairman, I am astonished that the honora¬ ble member should launch out into such strong descriptions without any occasion, Was there ever a legislature in existence that held their sessions at a place where they had not jurisdiction! 1 do not mean such a legislature as they have in Holland ; for it desrves not the name.—Their powers are such as congress have now; which we find not reducible to practice. If you be satisfied with the shad¬ ow and form instead of the substance, you will render them depen¬ dent on the local authority. Suppose the legislature of this country should sit in Richmond, while the exclusive jurisdiction of the place was in some particular country, would this country think it safc- that the general good should be subject to the paramount authority of a part of the community! The honorable member asks, why ask for this power, and if the subsequent clause be not fully competent for the same purpose! If so what new terrors can arise from this particular clause! It is only a superfluity. If that latitude ojf construction which he contends for, were to take place with respect to the sweeping clause, there would be room for those horrors. But it gives no supplementary power : It only enables them to execute the delegated powers. If the delegation of their powers be safe, no possible inconvenience can arise from this clause. It is at most but explanatory. For when any power is given, its delegation necessarily involves authority to make laws to execute it. Were it possible to delineate on paper, all those particular cases and circumstances in which legislation by the general legislature would be necessary and leave to the states all the other powers, I imagine no gentleman would object to it. But this is not within the limits of human capacity. The particular powers which are found necssary to be given, are therefore delega¬ ted generally, and particular and minute specification is left to the legislature. [Here Mr Madison spoke of the distinction between regulation of police and legislation; but so low he could not be heard.] When the honorable member objects to giving the general go- ernment jurisdiction over the place of their session, does he mean that it should be under the control- of any particular state, that might at a critical moment seize it! I should have thought that this clause would have met with the most cordial approbation. As the con¬ sent of the state in which it may be, must be obtained, and as it may stipulate the terms of the grant, should they violate the partic¬ ular stipulations, it would be an usurpation : So that if the mem- 406 DEBATES. [Madison. bers of congress were to be guided by the laws of their country, none of those dangers could arise. [Mr Madison made several other remarks, which could not be heard.] Mr HENRY replied, that if congress -were vested with supreme power of legislation, paramount to the constitution and laws of the states, the dangers he had described might happen ; for that con¬ gress would not be confined to the enumerated powers. This con¬ struction was warranted, in this opinion, by the addition of the word department at the end of the clause; and that they could make any laws which they might think necessary to execute the powers of any department, or officer, of the government. Mr PENDLETON—Mr Chairman—This clause does not give congress power to impede the operation of any part of the constitu¬ tion, or to make any regulation that may affect the interests of the citizens of the union at large. But it gives them power over the lo¬ cal police of the place, so as to be secured from any interruption in their proceedings. Notwithstanding the violent attack upon it, I believe, Sir, this is the fair construction of the clause. It give# ■them power of exclusive legislation to any case within that district. What is the meaning of this? What is it opposed to? It is oppos¬ ed to the general powers of the federal legislature, or to those of the state legislatures? I understand it as opposed to the legislstivo power of that state where it shall be.—What then is the power? It is that congress shall exclusively legislate there, in order to preserve the police of the place, and their own personal independence; that they may not be overawed or insulted ; and of course to preserve them in opposition to any attempt by the state where it shall be. This is the fair construction. Can we suppose, that in order to ef¬ fect these salutary ends, congress will make it an asylum for vil¬ lains and the vilest characters from all parts of the world? Will it not degrade their own dignity to make it a sanctuary for villains? I hope that no man that will ever compose that congress, will associ¬ ate with the most profligate characters. Why oppose this power? Suppose they were contrary to the sense of their constituents, to grant exclusive privileges to citizens residing within that place ; the effect would be directly in opposi¬ tion to what he says. It could have no operation without the limits of that district.—Were congress to make a law granting them an exclusive privilege of trading to the East Indies, it could have no effect the moment it would go without that place. For their exclu¬ sive power is confined to that district. Were they to pass such a law, it would be nugatory, and every member of the community at large, could trade to the East Indies as well as the citizens of tkal Madison.] VIRGINIA. *0? district. This exclusive power is limited to that place solely, for their own preservation, which all gentlemen allow to be necessary. Will you pardon me when I observe, that their construction of the preceding clause, does not appear to me to be natural, or war- tanted by the words. They say that the state governments have no power at all over the militia. The power of the general government to provide for tinning and organizing the militia, is to introduce an uniform system of discipline to pervade the United States of America. But the power of governing the militia, so far as it is in congress, extends only to such parts of them as may be employed in the service of the United States. When not in their service, congress has no power to govern them. The states then have the sole government of them. And though congress may provide for arming them, and prescribe the mode of discipline, yet the states have the authority of training them according to the uniform discipline prescribed by congress. But there is nothing to preclude them from arming and disciplining them, should congress neglect to do it. As to calling the militia to execute the laws of the union, I thjnk the fair construction is directly opposite to what the honorable member says. The fourth section of the fourth article contains nothing to warrant the supposition, that the states cannot call them forth to suppress domestic insurrec¬ tions. \Herc he read the section.'] All the restraint here contained, is, that congress may at their pleasure, on application of the state legislature, or (in vacation) of the executive, protect each of the states against domestic violence. This is a restraint on the general government not to interpose. The state is in full possession of the power of using its own militia to protect itself against domestic violence; and the power in the general government cannot be exer¬ cised, or interposed, without the- application of the state itself. This appears to me to be the obvious and fair construction. With respect to the necessity of the ten miles square being su-r nerseded by the subsequent clause, which gives them power to make all laws which shall he necessary and proper for carrying into exe¬ cution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any de¬ partment or officer thereof, I understand that clause as not going a single step beyond the delegated powers. What can it act upon? Some power given by this constitution. If they should be about to pass a law in consequence of this clause, they must pursue some of the delegated powers; but can by no means depart from them, or arrogate any new powers. For the plain language of the clause, is to give them power to pass laws in order to give effect to the dele-, gated powers. 403 DEBATES. [Mason- Mr GEORGE MASON.—Mr Chairman, gentlemen say there is- no new power given by this clause. Is there any thing in this con¬ stitution which secures to the states the powers which are said to be retained? Will powers remain to the states which are not ex¬ pressly guarded and reserved? I will suppose a case. Gentlemen may call it an impossible case, and suppose that congress will act with wisdom and integrity. Among the enumerated powers, con¬ gress are to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, and to pay the debts, and to provide for the general welfare, and com¬ mon defence; and by that clause (so often called the sweeping clause) they are to make all laws necessary to-execute those laws. Now suppose oppressions should arise under this government, and any writer should dare to stand forth and expose to the community at large, the abuses of those powers, could not congress, under the idea of providing for the general welfare, and under their own construction, say, that this was destroying the general peace, en¬ couraging sedition, and poisoning the minds of the people? And could they not, in order to provide against this, lay a dangerous re¬ striction on the press? Might they not even bring th4 trial of this restriction within the ten miles square, when there is no prohibition against it? Might they not thus destroy the trial by jury? W'ould they not extend their implication? It appears to me that they may and will. And will the support of our rights depend on the bounty of men whose interest it may be to oppress us? That congress- should have power to provide for the general welfare of the union, I grant. But I wish a clause in the constitution with respect to all powers which are not granted, that they are retained by the states. Otherwise the power of providing lor the general welfare may be perverted to its destruction. Many gentlemen whom I respect, take different sides of this ques¬ tion. We wish this amendment to be introduced to remove our ap¬ prehensions. There was a clause in the confederation reserving to the states respectively, every power, jurisdiction, and right, not ex¬ pressly delegated to the United States. This clause has never been complained of, but approved by all. Why not then have a similar clause in this constitution, in which it is the more indispensably necessary than in the confederation, because of the great augmenta¬ tion of power vested in the former? In my humble apprehension, unless there be some such clear and finite expression, this clause now under consideration will go to any thing our rulers may think proper. Unless there be some express declaration, that every thing not given is retained, it will be carried, to any power congress may please. VIRGINIA. 409 Nicholas.] Mr HENRY moved to read from the eighth to the thirteenth ar¬ ticle* of the declaration of rights, which was done. Mr GEORGE NICHOLAS, in reply to the gentlemen opposed to the clause under debate, went over the same grounds, and devel¬ oped the same principles, which Mr Pendleton and Mr Madison had done. The opposers of the clause which gave the power of providing for the general welfare, supposed its dangers to result from its connection with, and extension of, the powers granted in the other clauses. He endeavored to shew the committee, that it only empowered congress to make such laws as would be necessary to enable them to pay the public debts, and provide for the common defence. That this general welfare was united, not to the general power of legislation, but to the particular power of laying and col¬ lecting taxes, imposts, and excises, for the purposes of paying the debts and providing for the common defence. That is, that they could raise as much money as would pay the debts and provide for the common defence, in consequence of this power. The clause which was affectedly called the sweeping clause, contained no new grant of pow r er. To illustrate this position, he observed, that if it had been added at the end of every one of the enumerated powers, instead of beino- inserted at the end of all, it would be obvious to any one, that it was no augmentation of power. As, for instance, if at the end of the clause granting power to lay and collect taxes, it had been added, that they should have power to make necessary and proper laws to lay and collect taxes, who could suspect it to be an addition of power? As it would grant no new power, it inserted at the end of each clause, it could not when subjoined to the whole. He then proceeded thus: But, says he, who is to determine the extent of such powers'? I say, the same power which in all well regulated communities determines the extent of legislative pow r ers. If they exceed these powers, the judiciary will declare it void. If not the people will have a right to declare it void. Is this de¬ pending on any man? But, says, the gentleman, it may go to any thing. It may destroy the trial by jury; and they may say it is ne¬ cessary for providing lor the general defence. The power of pro¬ viding for the general defence only extends to raise any sum of money they may think necessary, by taxes, imposts, &c. But, aays he, our only defence against oppressive laws, consists in tbo virtue of our representatives. This was misrepresented. If I un¬ derstand it right, no new power can be exercised. As to those which are actually granted, we trust to the fellow-feelings of our re¬ presentatives, and if we are deceived, we then trust to altering our government. It appears to me, however, that we can confide in their discharging their powers rightly, from the peculiarity of their 410 DEBATES. [Heart situation, and connection with us. If, Sir, the powers of the former congress were very inconsiderable, that body did not deserve to have great powers. It was so constructed that it would be dangerous to invest it with such. But, why were the articles of the bill of rights read! Let him shew us that those rights are given up by the constitution. Let him prove them to be violated, He tells us, that the most worth) characters of the country differ as to the necessity of a bill of rights. It is a simple and plain proposition. It is agreed upon by all, that the people have all power. If they part with any of it, it is neces¬ sary to declare that they retain the rest. Liken it to any similar case. If I have one thousand acres of land, and I grant five hundred acres of it, must I declare that I retain the other five hundred! Do I grant the whole thousand acres when I grant five hundred, unless I declare that the five hundred I do not give, belongs to me still! It is so in this case! After granting some powers, the rest must rest with the people. 1 Gov. RANDOLPH observed, that he had some objections to the clause. He was persuaded, that the construction put upon it by tho gentlemen, on both sides, was erroneous ; but he thought any con¬ struction better than go into anarchy. Mr GEORGE MASON still thought that there ought to be some ■express declaration in the constitution, asserting that rights not gi¬ ven to the general government, were retained by the states. He apprehended that unless this was done, many valuable and impor¬ tant rights would be concluded to be given up by implication. All governments were drawn from the people, though many were perver¬ ted to their oppression. The government of Virginia, he remarked, was drawn from the people ; yet there were certain great and impor¬ tant rights which the people by their bill of rights declared to be paramount to the power of the legislature. He asked, why should it not be so in this constitution! Was it because we were more sub¬ stantially represented in it, than in the state government? If in tho state government, where the people were substantially and fully represented, it was necessary that the great rights of human nature should he secure from the encroachments of the legislature, he ask- *sd, if it was not more necessary in this government, where they were but inadequately represented? He declared, that aitful so¬ phistry and evasions could not satisfy him. He could see no clear .distinction between rights relinquished by a positive grant, and lost Jby implication. Unless there were a bill of rights, implication might swallow up all our rights. Mr HENRY—Mr Chairman, the necessity of a bill of rights ap*- Henry.] VIRGINIA. 411 pears tome to be greater in this government,"than ever it was in any government, before. ] observed already, that the sense of the Eu¬ ropean nations, and particularly Great Britain, is against the con¬ struction of rights being retained, which are not expressly relin¬ quished. I repeat, that all nations have adopted this construction— that all rights not expressly and unequivocally reserved to the peo¬ ple, are impliedly and incidentally relinquished to rulers ; as ne¬ cessarily inseparable from the delegated powers. It is so in Great Britain ; for every possible right which is not reserved to the peo¬ ple by some express provision or compact, is within the lung’s pre¬ rogative. It is so in that county which is said to be in such full possession of freedom. It is so in Spain, Gehnany, and other parts of the world. Let us consider the sentiments which have been en¬ tertained by the people of America on this subject. At the revolu¬ tion it must be admitted, that it was their sense to put down those great rights which ought in all countries to be held inviolable and -sacred. Virginia did so, we all remember. She made a compact to reserve, expressly, certain rights. When fortified with full, adequate and abundant, representation, was she satisfied with that representation! No. She most cau¬ tiously and guardedly reserved and secure.l those invaluable, inesti¬ mable rights and privileges, which no people, inspired with the least glow of the patriotic liberty, ever did inspire or ever can, abandon. She is called upon now to abandon them, and dissolve that compact which secured them to her. She is called upon to accede to anoth¬ er compact which most infallibly supercedes and annihilates her present one. Will she do it! .This is the question. If you intend to reserve your unalienable rights, you must have the most express stipulation. For if implication be allowed, you are ousted of those rights. If the people do not think it necessary to reserve them they will be supposed to be given up. IIow were the congressional rights defined when the people of America united by a confederacy to defend their liberties and rights against the tyrannical attempts of Great Britain! The states w r ere not then contented with implied ■reservation. No, Mr Chairman. It was expressly declared in our •confederation that every right was retained by the states respective¬ ly, which was not given up to the government of the United tStates. But there is no such thing here. You therefore, by a natural and unavoidable implication, give up your rights to the general govern¬ ment. Your own example furnishes an argument against it. If you give .up these powers, without a hill of rights, you will exhibit the most absurd thing to mankind that ever the world saw—a government that has abandoned ail its powers—the powers of a direct taxation* 412 DEBATES. [Henbx » the sword and the purse. You have disposed of them to congress, without a bill of rights—without check, limitation, or control. And still you have checks and guards—still you keep barriers—pointed where? Pointed againstyour weakened, prostrated, enervated state government! You have a bill of rights to defend you against the state government, which is bereaved of all power; and yet you have none against congress, though in full and exclusive possession of all power! You arm yourselves against the weak and defenceless, and expose yourselves naked to the armed and powerful. Is not this a conduct of unexampled absurdity? What barriers have you to oppose to this most strong energetic government? To that go¬ vernment, you have nothing to oppose. All your defence is given up. This is a real actual defect.. It must strike the mind of every gentleman. When our government was first instituted in Vir¬ ginia, we declared the common law of England to be in force. That system of law which has been admired, a.nd has protected us and our ancestors is excluded by that system. Added to this, we adopted a bill of rights. By this constitution, some of the best barriers of human rights are thrown away. Is there not an addi¬ tional reason to have a bill of rights? By the ancient common law, the trial of all facts is decided by a jury of impartial men from the immediate vicinage. This paper speaks of different juries from the common law, in criminal cases; and in civil controversies excludes trial by jury altogether,—There is therefore more occasion for the supplementary check of a bill of rights now, than then. Congress from their general powers may fully go into business of human legis¬ lation. They may legislate in criminal cases from treason to the lowest offence, petty larceny. They may define crimes and pre¬ scribe punishments. In the definition of crimes, I trust they will be directed by what wise representatives ought to be governed by. But when w r e come to punishments, no latitude ought to be left, nor dependence put on the virtue of representatives. What says our bill of rights? “That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflic¬ ted.” Are you not therefore now calling on those gentlemen who are to compose congress, to prescribe trials and define punishments without this control? Will they find sentiments there similar to this bill of rights? You let them loose—you do more—you depart from the genius of your country. That paper tells you, that the trial of crimes shall be by jury, and held in the state where the crime shall have been committed. Under this extensive provision, they may proceed in a manner extremely dangerous to liberty—per¬ sons accused may be carried from one extremity of the state to ano» Henry.] VIRGIN A. 413 ther, and be tried, not by an impartial jury of the vicinage, acquain¬ ted with his character, and the circumstances of the fact, but by a jury unacquainted with both, and who may be biassed against him. Is not this sufficient to alarm men?—How different is this from the immemorial practice of your British ancestors, and your own! I need not tell you, that by the common law a number of hundredorB were required on a jury, and that afterwards it was sufficient if the jurors came from the same county. With less than this, the people of England have never been satisfied. That paper ought to have declared the common law in force. In this business of legislation, your members of congress will loose the restriction of not imposing excessive fines, demanding ex¬ cessive bail, and inflicting cruel and unusual punishments. These are prohibited by your declaration of rights. What has distinguish¬ ed our ancestors'?—That they would not admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishment. But congress may introduce the prac¬ tice of the civil law, in preference to that of the common law. They may introduce the practice of France, Spain, and Germany—ot tor¬ turing to extort a confession of the crime. They will say that they might as well draw examples from'those countries as from Great Britain, and they will tell you, that there is such a necessity of strenghtening the arm of government, that they must have a crimi¬ nal equity, and extort confession by torture, in order to punish with still more relentless severity. We are then lost and undone. And can any man think it troublesome, when we can by a small interfer¬ ence prevent our rights from being lost?—If you will, like the Vir¬ ginian government, give them knowledge of the extent of the rights retained by the people, and the powers themselves, they will, if they be honest men, thank you for it. Will they not wish to go on sure grounds?—But if you leave them otherwise, they will not know how to proceed ; and being in a state of uncertainty, they will as- sumerather than give up powers by implication. A bill of rights may be summed up in a few words. What do they tell us?—That our rights are reserved. W’hy not say so? Is it because it will consume too much paper? Gentlemen’s reason¬ ing against a bill of rights, do rot satisfy me. Without saying which has the light side, it remains doubtful. A bill of rights is a favorite thing with the Virginians, and the people of the other states likewise. It may be their prejudice, but the government ought to suit their geniuses, otherrwise its operation will be unhappy. A bill of rights, even if it3 necessity be doubtful, will exclude the possi¬ bility of dispute ; and with great submission, 1 think the best way Is to have no dispute. In the present constitution, they are restrained 414 DEBATES. HENfctV from issuing general warrants to search suspected pi ace 3 , or seizes persons not named, without evidence of the commission of a fact, &c. There was certainly some celestial influence governing those whir deliberated on that constitution.—For they have with the most cau¬ tious and enlightened circumspection, guarded those indefeasible rights, which ought ever to be held sacred. The officers of congress may come upon you, fortified with all the terrors of paramount fed¬ eral authority. Excisemen may come in multitudes.—For the lim¬ itation of their numbers no man knows. They may, unless the gen¬ eral government be restrained by a bill of rights, or some similar restriction, go into your cellars and rooms, and search, ransack and measure, every thing you eat, drink and wear. They ought to be restrained within proper bounds. 4 With respect to the freedom of the press, I need say nothing; for it is hoped that the gentlemenwho shail composec ongress, will take care as little as possible to infringe the rights of human nature. This will result from Iheir integrity. They should from prudence, abstain from violating the rights of their constituents. r Ihey are not however expressly restrained. But whether they will intermeddle with that palladium of our liberties or net, I leave yoTi to determine. Mr GRAYSON thought it questionable, whether rights not giv¬ en up were reserved. A majority of the states, he observed, had ex¬ pressly reserved certain important rights by bills of rights, and that in the confederation there was a clause, declaring expressly, that every power and right not given up, was retained by the states. It was the general sense of America, that such a clause was necessary; otherwise why did they introduce a clause which was totally unne¬ cessary? It had been insisted, he said, in many parts of America, that a bill of rights, was only necessary between a prince and peo¬ ple, and not in such a government as this, which was a compact be¬ tween the people themselves. This did not satisfy his mind ; for so extensive was the power of legislation, in his estimation, that he doubted, whether when it was once given up ,any thing was retained. He further remarked, that there were some negative clauses in the constitution, which refuted the doctrine contended for by the other siue : for instance, the second clause of the ninth section, of the first article, provided, that “ the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or inva¬ sion, the public safety may require it.”—And by the last clause of the same section 44 no title of nobility shall be granted by the Uni¬ ted States.” Now if these restrictions had not been here inserted, he asked, whethe^congress would not most clearly have had a right So suspend that great and valuable right,and to grant titles of nobil- VIRGINIA. 41 $ Nicholas.] hy? When, in addition to these considerations, he saw they had an indefinite power to provide for the general welfare, he thought there were great reasons to apprehend great dangers. He thought there¬ fore, that there ought to be a bill of rights. Mr GEORGE NICHOLAS, in answer to the two gentlemen last up, observed, that though there was a declaration of rights in the government of Virginia, it was no conclusive reason that there should be one in this constitution. For, if it was unnecessary in the former, its omission in the latter could be no defect. They oughi therefore to prove, that it was essentially necessary to be inserted in the constitution of Virginia: that there were five or six states in the union, which had no bill of rights, separately and distinctly as such. But they annexed the substance of a bill of rights of their respective constitutions. These states, he further observed, were ns free as this state, and their liberties as secure as ours. If so, gentlemen’s arguments from the precedent w£re not good. In Vir¬ ginia, all powers were given to the government without any excep¬ tion. It was different in the general government, to which certain special powers were delegated for certain purposes. He asked, which was the more safe? Was it safer to grant general powers, than certain limited powers? This much as to the theory, continued he. What is the practice of this invaluable government? Have your citizens been bound by it? They have not, Sir. You have violated that maxim, “that no man shall be condemned without a fair trial.” That man who was killed, not secundum artem , was de¬ prived of his life, without the benefit of law, and in express viola¬ tion of this declaration of rights, which they confide in so much. But, Sir, this bill of rights was no security. It is but a paper check. It has been violated in many other instances. Therefore from theory and practice, it may be concluded, that this government with epecial powers, without any express exceptions, is better than a government with general powers, and special exceptions. But the practice of England is against us. The rights there reserved to the people, are to limit and check the king’s prerogative. It is easier to enumerate the exceptions to his prerogative, than to mention all the cases to which it extends. Besides, these reservations being only formed in acts of the legislature, may be altered by the repro sentatives of the people, when they think proper. No comparison can be made of this, with the other governments he mentioned. There is no stipulation between the king and people. The former is possessed of absolute unlimited authority. But, Sir, this constitution is defective, because the common law is not declared to be in force. What would have been the conse¬ quences if it had? It would be immutable. But new it can ba- 416 DEBATES. [Nicholas. changed or modified as the legisaltive body may find necessary for the community. But the common law is not excluded. There is nothing in that paper to warrant the assertion. As to the exclusion of a jury from the vicinage, he has mistaken the fact. The legisla¬ ture may direct a jury to come from the vicinage. But the gentle¬ man says, that by this constitution, they have power to make laws to define crimes, and prescribe punishments; and that consequently we are not free from torture. Treason against the United States is defined in the constitution, and the forfeiture limited to the life of the person attainted. Congress have power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the laws of nations; but they cannot define or prescribe the punishment of any other crime whatever, without violating the con¬ stitution. If we had no security against torture, but our declaration of rights, we might be tortured to-morrow; for it has been repeatedly infringed and disregarded. A bill of rights is only an acknowledg¬ ment of the pre-existing claim to rights in the people. They belong to us, as much as if they had been inserted in the constitution. But it is said, that if it be doubtful, the possibility of dispute ought to be precluded. Admitting it was proper for the convention to have inserted a bill of rights, it is not proper here to propose it, as the condition of our accession to the union. Would you reject this government for its omission, dissolve the union, and bring miseries on yourselves and posterity! I hope the gentleman does not oppose it on this ground solely. Is there another reason! He said, that it is not only the general wish of this state, but all the states, to hava a bill of rights. If it be so, where is the difficulty of having this $ done by way of subsequent amendments! We shall find the other states willing to accord with their own favorite wish. The gentle¬ man last up says, that the power of legislation includes every thing. A general power of legislation does. But this is a special power of legislation. Therefore it does not contain that plenitude of power which he imagines. They cannot legislate in any case but those particularly enumerated. No gentleman, who is a friend to the government, ought to withhold his assent from it for this reason. Mr GEORGE MASON replied, that the worthy gentleman was mistaken in his assertion, that the bill of rights did not prohibit tor¬ ture. For, that one clause expressly provided, that no man can give evidence against himself, and that the worthy gentleman must know, that in those countries where torture is used, evidence was ex¬ torted from the criminal himself. Another clause of the bill of rights provided, that no cruel and unusual punishments shall be inflicted; therefore torture was included in the prohibition. DEBATES. 417 Madison.] Mr NICHOLAS acknowledged the bill of rights to contain that prohibition, and that the gentleman was right with respect to tho practice of extorting confession from the criminal in those countries, where torture is used; but still he saw no security arising from tho bill of rights as separate from the constitution, for that it had been frequently violated with impunity. Tuesday , the 15 ih of June , 1788. Mr GEORGE MASON—Mr Chairman, this is a fatal section, which has created more dangers than any other. The first clause allows the importation of slaves for twenty years. Under the royal government, this evil was looked upon as a great oppression, and many attempts were made to prevent it; but the interest of the Afri¬ can merchants prevented its prohibition. No sooner did the revo¬ lution take place than it was thought of. It was one of the great causes of our separation from Great Britain. Its’exclusion has been a principal object of this state, and most of the states in the union. The augmentation of slaves, weakens the states ; and such a trade is diabolical in itself, and disgraceful to mankind. Yet, by this constitution, it is continued for twbnty years. As much as I value an union of all the.states, I would not admit the southern states into the union, unless they agree to the discontinuance of this disgrace¬ ful trade, because it would bring weakness and not strength to the union. And though this infamous traffic be continued, we have no fiecurity for the property of that kind which we have already. There is no clause in this constitution to secure it, for they may lay such tax as will amount to manumission. And should the government be amended, still this detestable kind of commerce cannot be dis¬ continued till after the expiration of twenty years. For the fifth article which provides foramendmenls, expressly excepts this clause. 1 have ever looked upon this as a most disgraceful thing to America. I cannot express my detestation of it. Yet they have not secured us the property of the slaves we have already. So that “they have done what they ought not to have done, and have left undone what they ought to have done.” Mr MADISON—-Mr Chairman, I should conceive this clause to be impolitic, if it were one of those things which could be excluded without encountering greater evils. The southern states would not have entered into the union of America, without the temporary per¬ mission of that trade. And if they were excluded from the union, the consequences might be dreadful to them and to us. We are not in a worse situation than before. That traffic is prohibited by vol. 3 27 418 VIRGINIA [Mabisoj^ our laws, and we may continue the prohibition. 1 The union in ge¬ neral is not in a worse situation. Under the articles of confedera¬ tion, it might be continued forever : but by this clause an end may be put to it after twenty years. There is, therefore, an amelioration of our circumstances. A tax may be laid in the meantime, but it is limited, otherwise congress might lay such a tax as would amount, to a prohibition. From the mode of representation and taxation, congress cannot lay such a tax on slaves as will amount to manu¬ mission. Another clause secures us that property which we now possess. At present, if any slave elopes to any of those states where slaves are tree, he becomes emancipated by their laws. For the laws of the states are uncharitable to one another in this respect. But in this constitution, “no person held to service, or labor, in one state, under the,laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in conse¬ quence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor; but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.” This clause was ex¬ pressly inserted to enable owners of slaves to reclaim them. This is a better security than any that now exists. No power is given to the general government to interpose with respect to the pro¬ perty in slaves now held by the states. The taxation of this state being equal only to its representation, such a tax cannot be laid as - he supposes. They cannot prevent the importation oi slaves for twenty years ; but after that period they can. The gentlemen from South Carolina and Georgia argued in this manner: “We have now liberty to import this species of property, and much of the pro¬ perty now possessed, had been pnrchased, or otherwise acquired, in contemplation of improving it by the assistance of imported slaves. What would be the consequence of hindering us from if? The slaves of Virginia would rise in value, and we would be obliged to go to your markets. I need not expiate on this subject. Great as the evil js, a dismemberment of the union, would be worse. If those states should disunite from the other states, for not indulging them in the temporary continuance of this traffic, they might solicit and obtain aid from foreign powers. Mr TYLER warmly enlarged on the impolicy, iniquity, and dis¬ gracefulness of this wicked traffic. He thought the reasons urged by gentlemen jn defence of it, were inconclusive, and ill founded. It was one cause of the complaints against British tyranny, that this trade was permitted. The revolution had put a period to it, but now it was to be revived. He thought nothing could justify it. his temporary restriction on coligress militated, in his opinion. Madison.] DEBATES. 419 against the'arguments of gentlemen on the other side, that what was not given up, was retained by the states; for that if this restriction had not been inserted, congress could have prohibited the African trade. . The power of prohibiting it was not expressly delegated to them; yet they would have had it by implication, if this restraint had not been provided. This seemed to him to demonstrate most clearly the necessity of restraining them, by a bill of rights, from in¬ fringing our unalienable rights. It was immateiial whether the bill-of rights was.by itself, or included in the constitution. But he contended for it one way or the other. It would be justified by our own example, and that of England. His earnest desire was, that it should be handed doAvn to posterity that he had opposed this wicked clause. He then adverted to the clauses which enabled congress, -to legislate exclusively in the ten miles square, and other places purchased for forts, magazines, &c. To provide for the ge¬ neral welfare, to raise a standing army, and to make any law that may be necessary to carry their laws into execution-. From the combined operation of these unlimited powers he dreaded the most fatal consequences. If any acts of violence should be committed' on persons or property, the perpetrators of such acts might take refuge in the sanctuary of the ten miles square, and the strongholds. They would thus escape with impunity, as the states had no power to punish them. He called to the recollection of the committee the history of the Athenian, who from small beginnings,- had enslaved his country. He begged them to remember, that Csesar, who pros, trated the liberties of his country, did not possess a powerful army at first. Suppose, says he, that the time should come, that a king should be proposed by congress. 'Will they not be able, by the sweeping clause to call in foreign assistance, and raise troops, and do whatever they think proper to carry this proposition into effect! He then concluded, that unless this clause were expunged, he would vote against the constitution. Mr MADISON was surprised, that any gentleman should return to the clauses which had already been discussed. He begged the gentleman to read the clauses, which gave the powbr of exclusive legislation, and he might see that nothing could be done without tfie consent of the states. With respect to the supposed operation of what was denominated the sweeping clause, the gentleman, he said, was mistaken ; for it only extended to the enumerated powers. Should congress attempt to extend it to any power not enumerated, it would not be warranted by the clause. As to the restriction in the clause under consideration, it was a restraint on the exercise of a power expressly delegated to congress, namely, that of regulating commerce with foreign nations, 490 DEBATES [Nicholas* Mr HENRY insisted, that the insertion of these restrictions on congress, was a plain demonstration, that congress could exercise powers by implication. The gentleman had admitted that congress could have interdicted the African trade, were it not foi* this restric¬ tion. If so, the power not having been expressly delegated, must be obtained by implication. He demanded, where then was their doctrine of reserved rights'? He wished for negative clauses to pre¬ vent them from assuming any powers hut those expressly given. Ho asked, why it was omitted to secure us that property in slaves, which he held now? He fea/ed its omission was done with design. They might lay such heavy taxes on slaves, as would amount to emanci¬ pation ; and then the southern states would be the only sufferers. His opinion was confirmed by the mode of levying money. Con¬ gress, he observed, had power to lay and collect taxes, impost, and excises. Impost (or duties) and excises, were to be uniform. But this uniformity did not extend to taxes. This might compel the southern states to liberate their negroes. He wished this property therefore to be guarded. He considered the clause which had been adduced by the gentleman as a security for this property, as no se~ curity at all. It was no more than this—that a runaway negro could be taken up in Maryland or New York. This could not prevent congress from interfering with that-property by laying a grievous and enormous tax on it, so as to compel owners to emancipate their slaves rather then pay the tax. He apprehended it would be pro** ductive of much stock-jobbing, and that they would play into one another’s hands in such a manner as that this property would be lost to the country. Mr GEORGE NICHOLAS wondered that gentlemen who were ngaiRat slavery, would be opposed to this clause; as after that pe¬ riod the slave trade would be done away. He asked, if gentlemen did not see the inconsistency of.their arguments? They object, says he, to the constitution, because the slave trade is laid open for twenty odd years; and yet they tell you, that by some latent operation of it, the slaves who are so now, will be manumitted. At the same mo¬ ment it is opposed for being promotive and destructive of slavery. He contended that it was advantageous to Virginia, that it should be in the power of congress to prevent the importation of slaves after twenty years, as it would then put a period to the evil com¬ plained of. As the southern states Would net confederate without this clause, ho asked, if gentlemen would rather dissolve the confederacy than to suffer this temporary inconvenience, admitting it to be such? Virginia might continue the prohibition of such importation during the ki termed iate period, and would be benefitted by it, as a tax of Henrt.] VIRGINIA. 421 ten dollars, on each slave might be laid, of which she would receive a share. He endeavored to, obviate the objection of gentlemen, that the restriction on congress was a proof that they would have power given not given them, by remarking, that they would only have had a general superintendency of trade, if the restriction had not been inserted. But the southern states insisted on this exception to that general superintendency for twenty years. It could not there¬ fore have been a power by implication, as the restriction was an ex¬ ception from a delegated power. The taxes could not, as had been suggested, be laid so high on negroes as to amount to emancipation; because taxation and representation were fixed according to the cen¬ sus established in the constitution. The exception of taxes, from the uniformity annexed to duties and excises, could not have the op¬ eration contended for by the gentleman ; because other clauses had clearly and postively fixed the census. Had taxes been uniform, it would have been universally objected to, for no one object could be selected without involving great inconveniences and oppressions. But, says Mr Nicholas, is it from the general government we are to fear emancipation? Gentlemen will recollect what 1 said in another house, and what other gentlemen have said that advocated emanci¬ pation. Give me leave to say, that clause is a great security for our slave tax. 1 can tell the committee, that the people of our country are reduced to beggary by the taxes on negroes. Had this constitu¬ tion been adopted, it would not have been the case. The taxes were laid on all our negroes. By this system two-fifths are exempted. He then added, that he had imagined gentlemen would support here -what they opposed in another place. Mr HENRY replied, that though the proportion of each was to be fixed by the census, and three-fifths of the slaves only were in¬ cluded in the enumeration, yet the proportion of Virginia being once fixed, might be laid on blacks and blacks qnly. For the mode of raising the proportion of each state, being to be directed by congress, they might make slaves thejsole object to raise it of. Personalities he wished to take leave of: they had nothing to do with the question, which was solely whether that paper was wrong or not. Mr NICHOLAS replied, that negroes must be considered as per¬ sons or property. If, as property, the proportion of taxes to be laid on them was fixed in the constitution. If he apprehended a poll tax on negroes, the constitution had prevented it. For, by the cen¬ sus, where a w T hite man paid ten shillings, a negro paid but six shillings. For the exemption of two-fifths of them reduced it to that proportion. The second, third and fourth clauses, were then read. 422 DEBATES. [Madison Mr GEORGE MASON said, that gentlemen might think them¬ selves secured by the restriction in the fourth clause, that no capita¬ tion or other direct tax should be laid, but in proportion to the cen¬ sus before directed to be taken. But that when maturely considered it would be found to be no security whatsoever. It was nothing but a direct assertion, or mere confirmation of the clause which fixed the ratio of taxes and representation. It only meant that the 'quantum to be raised of each state should be in proportion to their numbers- in the manner therein directed. But the general government was not precluded from laying the proportion Of any particular state on any one species of properly they-might think proper. For instance, if five hundred thousand dollar's were to be raised, they might lay the whole of the proportion, of the southern states on the blacks, or any one species of property: so that by layingHaxes' too heavily on slaves, they might totally annihilate that -kind of property. No redl security'could arise from the clause which pro¬ vides, that persons held to labour in one state, escaping into an¬ other.-shall be delivered up. This only meant, that runaway slaves should not be protected in other states. As to the exclusion of ex post- faisio laws, it could not hn said to create any security in this case. For laying a tax on slaves would not be ex post facto. Mr. MADISON replied, that*even the southern states, who were most affected, were perfectly satisfied with this provision, and dreaded no danger to the property they now hqld. It appeared to him, that the general government would not intermeddle with that property for twenty years, but to lay a tax on every slave imported, not exceeding ten dollars; and that after the expiration of that pe¬ riod, they might prohibit the traffic altogether. The census in the constitution was intended to introduce equality in the burdehs to be laid on the community. No gentleman objected to laying duties, imposts, and excises, uniformly. Buf ifrffformity of taxes would be subversive to the^principles of equality: for that it was not possible to select any article which would be easy for one state, but what would be heavy for another. That the proportion of each state be¬ ing ascertained, it would be raised by the general government in the most convenient manner for the people, and not by the selection of any one particular'object. That there must be some degree of confidence put in agents, or else we must reject a state of civil so¬ ciety altogether. Another great security to this property, which lie mentioned, was, that five states were greatly interested in that species ol property; and there were other states which had some slaves, and had made no attempt, or taken any step to take them from the people. There were a few slaves in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut: these states would, probably, oppose any Mason.] VIRGINIA. 423 attempts to annihilate this species of property. He concluded, by observing, that he would be glad to leave the decision of this to the committee. The fifth and sixth clauses were then read. Mr. GEORGE MASON apprehended the loose expression of publication from time to time,” was applicable to any time. It was equally applicable to monthly and septennial periods. It might be extended ever so much. The reasons urged in favour of this ambiguous expression, was, that there might be some matters which require secrecy. In matters relative to military operations, and foreign negotiations, secrecy was necessary sometimes. But he did not conceive that the receipts and expenditures of the public money ought ever to be concealed. The people, he affirmed, had a right to know the expenditures of their moQ-ey. But that this expression was so loose, it might [he concealed forever from them, and might afford opportunities of misapplying the public rhoney, and sheltering those who-did it. He concluded it to be as exceptionable as any clause, in so few words, could be. Mr. LEE (of VfestmoFeland) thought such trivial argument as that just used by the honorable gentleman, would have no weight with the committee. He conceived the expression to be sufficiently r * v explicit and satisfactory. It must be supposed to mean, in the com¬ mon acceptation of language, short,, convenient periods. It was as well as if it had said one year, or a shorter temp. Those who would neglect this provision, would disobey the most pointed directions. As the assembly was to meet next wdek, he hoped gentlemen would confine themselves to the investigation of the principal parts of the constitution. L / * Mr. MASON begged to he permitted to use that mode of arguing to which he had been accustomed. However desirous he was of pleasing that worthy gentleman, his duty Would give way to that pleasure. Mr. GEORGE NICHOLAS said, it was abetter direction'and •security than was in the state government. No appropriation shall be made of the public money but by law. There could not be any misapplication of it. Therefor^, he thought, instead of censure, it •merited applause; being a dautious provision, which few constitu¬ tions, or none, had ever adopted. — •* 1 Mr. CORBIN concurred in the sentiments of Mr. Nicholas on this subject. ' * ,* Mr. MADISON thought it much better than if it had mentioned -any specified period; because, if the accounts of the public receipts and expenditures were to be published at short stated periods, they would not be so full and connected as would be necessary for a DEBATES. 434 [HtNIY. thorough comprehension of them, and detection of any errors. But by giving them an opportunity of publishing them from time to time, as might be found easy and convenient, they would be more full and satisfactory to the public, and would be sufficiently frequent. He thought, after all, that this provision went farther than the con¬ stitution of any state in the union, or perhaps in the worlds Mr. MASON replied, that in the confederation, the public pro¬ ceedings were to be published monthly, whifch was infinitely better than depending on men’s virtue to publish them or not, as they might please. If there was tio such provision in the constitution of Virginia, gentlemen ought to consider the difference between euch a full representation, dipersed and mingled with every part of the community, as the state representation was, and such an inade* quate representation as this was. One might be safely trusted, but not the other. * • Mr. MADISON ieplibd, that the inconveniences which had been experienced from the confederation in that respect, had their weight with him in recommending this in preference to it; for that it was impossible, in such short intervals, to adjust the public accounts in any satisfactory manner. The seventh clause was then read, Mr.'HENBY.—Mr. Chairman, we have now come to the ninth * section, and I consider myself at liberty to take a short view of the whole. I wish to do it very briefly. Give me leave to remark, that there is a bill of rights in that government. There are express restrictions which are in the shape of a bill of rights, but they bear the name of the ninth section, The design of 4 he negative expressions in this section, is to prescribe limits beyond which the powers of congress shall not go. These are the sole bounds intended by the American government. Whereabouts do we stand with respect to a bill of rights! Examine it and compare it to the idea manifested by the Virginian bill of rights* or that of the other states. The restraints in this congressional bill of rights, are so feeble and few, that it would have been infinitely better, to have said nothing about iti The fair implication is, that they can do every thing they are not forbidden to do. What will be the re¬ sult if congress, in the course of their legislation, should do a thing not restrained by this ninth section! It will fall as an incidental power to congress, not being prohibited expressly in the constitu¬ tion. The first prohibition is, that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, but when in case of rebellion, or inva¬ sion, the public safety may require it. It results clearly, that if it had not said so, they could suspend it in all cases whatsoever. It reverses the position of the friends of this constitution, that every H**nv.] VIRGINIA. 425 thing is retained which is not given up. For instead of this, every thing is given up, which is not expressly reserved. It does not ffpeak affirmatively, and say that it shall be suspended in those ca¬ ses. But that it shall not be suspended but in certain cases; go¬ ing on a supposition that every thing which is not negatived, shall remain with congress. If the powers remains with the people, how can'congress supply the want of an affirmative grant! They can- - npt do it but by implication, which destroys their doctrine. The Virginia bill of rights interdicts the relinquishment of the sword and purse without control. That bill of rights secures the great and principal rights of mankind. But this bill of rights extends to bur very few cases, and is destructive of the doctrine advanced by the friends of that paper. If ex post facto laws had not been interdicted, they might also have been extended by implication at pleasure. Let us consider whether this restriction be founded in wisdom or good policy. If no ex post facto laws be made, what is to become of the old continental paper dollars'? Will not this country be forced to pay it in gold and sil¬ ver, shilling for shilling? Gentlemen may think that this does not deserve an answer ; But it is an all important question. Because the property of this country is not commensurate to the enormous demand. Our own government triumphs with infinite superiority when put in contrast with that paper. The want of a bill of right# will render all their laws, however oppressive, constitutional. If the government of Virginia passes a law, in contradiction to our bill of rights, it is nugatory. By that paper the national wealth Is to be disposed of under the veil of secrecy : for the publication from time to time, will amount to nothing ; and they may conceal what they may think requires secrecy. How different it is in your own government? Have not the people seen the journals of our le¬ gislature every day during every session? Is not the lobby full of people every day? Yet, gentleman say, that the publication from time to time is a security unknown in our state government! Such a regulation would be nugatory and vain, or at least needless, as tho people see the journals of our legislature, and hear their debates every day. If this be not more secure than what is in that paper, I will give up that I have totally misconceived the principles of tho government. You are told, that your rights are secured in this new government. They are guarded in no other part, but this ninth sec¬ tion. The few restrictions in that section are your own safeguards. They may control your actions, and your every words, without be¬ ing repugnant to that paper. The existence of your dearest privir DEBATES. 426 [Randolph. 1 t A leges will be depend on the consent of congress, for there are not within the restrictions of the ninth section. If gentlemen think that securing the slave trade is a capital ob- ject, that the privilege of the habeas corpus is sufficiently secured ; that the exclusion of ex post facto laws will produce no inconveni¬ ence ; that the publication from time to time will secure their pro¬ perty, in one word, that this section alone will sufficiently secure their liberties, I have spoken in vain. Every word of mine, and my worthy coadjutor, is lost. I trust that gentlemen, on this occa¬ sion, will see the great objects of religion, liberty of the press, trial by jury, interdiction of cruel punishments, and every other sacred right secured, before they agree to that paper. These most impor¬ tant human rights are not protected by that section, which is the only safeguard in the constitution. My mind will not be quieted till I see something substantial come forth in the shape of a bill of rights. - “ » . Gov. RANDOLPH—Mr Chairman, the general review which the gentleman has taken of the ninth section is so inconsistent, that in order to answer him, I must with your permission, who is the cus- tos of order here, depart from the rule’tof the housed in some degree. I declared some days ago that I would give my suffrage for this constitution, not because I considered it without blemish, but be- cause the critical situation of our country demanded it. I invite those who think with me to vote for the constitution. But where things occur, in it which I disapprove cf, I shall be ’candid in ex¬ posing my objections. Permit me to return to that clause, which is called by gentlemen the sweeping clause. I observed yesterday, that I conceived the con¬ struction which had been put on this clause by the advocates of the constitution was too narrow; anrj that the construction put upon it by the other party, was extravagant. The immediate explanation appears to me most rational. The former contend, that it gives no supplementary power, but only enables them to make laws to execute the delegated powers, or in other words, that it only involves the powers incidental to those expressly delegated. By incidental pow¬ ers they mean those which are necessary for the principal thing. That the incident is inseparable from the principal, is a maxim in the construction of laws. A constitution differs from a law. For a law only embraces one thing—but a constitution embraces a num her ot things, and is to have a more liberal construction. I need no_ recar to the constitutions of Europe for a precedent to direct my ex¬ plication of this clause, because in Europe there is no constitution wholly in writing. The European constitutions sometimes consist . I Randolph.] VIRGINIA. 427 in detached statutes or ordinances.-—Sometimes they are on record, and sometimes they depend on immemorial tradition. The Ameri¬ can constitutions are singular, and their construction ought to be liberal. On this principle what should be said of the clause under consideration (Jhe sweeping clause ). If incidental powers be those only which are necessary for the principal thing, the clause would be superfluous. * • ' . Let us take an example of a single department: for instance, that of the president, who has certain things annexed to his office. Does it not reasonably* follow, that he must have some incidental powers? The principle of incidental powers extends to all parts of the sys¬ tem. If you then say, that the president has incidental powers, you reduce it to tautology. t I cannot conceive that the v fair inter¬ pretation of these words is, as the honorable member says. Let me say, that, in my opinion, the adversaries of the consti¬ tution wander equally from the true meaning. If it would not fatigue thehotfsetoo far, I would go back to the question of reserved rights. The gentleman supposes, that complete and unlimited legis¬ lation is vested in the congress of the United States. This suppo- * . 1 r sition is founded on false reasoning. What is the present situation of this state? She has .possession'of all rights of sovereignty, ex¬ cept those given to the co/ifederation. She must delegate powers to the confederate government. It is nece’ssary for her public happiness. Her weakness compels her to confederate with the twelve other governments. She trusts certain.powers to fhe general government in order to support, protect, and defend the union. Now is there not a demonstrable difference between the principle of the state government, and the general government? There is not a word said in the state government of the powers given to if, because they are general. But. in the general constitution, its powers are enumerated. Is it not then fairly deducible, that it has no power but what is ex¬ pressly ‘given it? For if its powers were to be general, an enume¬ ration’wofild bpjieedless. * • , But the insertion of the negative restrictions has given cause of triumph, it seems, to gentlemen. They suppose, that it demonstrates that congress are to have powers by implication. I will meet them on that ground. I persuade myself, that every exception here men¬ tioned, is an exception not from general powers, but from the par¬ ticular powers therein vested. To what power in the general government is the exception made, respecting the importation of negroes' 1 Not from a general power, but from a particular power expressly enumerated. This is an exception from the power given them of regulating commerce. lie asks, where is the power to which the prohibition of suspending the habeas corpus is an excep- DEBATES. 428 [Randolph. tiont 1 contend that by virtue of the power given to congress to regulate courts, they could suspend the writ of habeas corpus. This is therefore an exception to that .power. The third restriction is, that “no bill of attainder, or ex post facto law shall be passed.” This is a manifest exception to another power. We know well that attainders, and ex post facto laws, have always been the engines of criminal jurisprudence. This is there¬ fore an exception to the criminal jurisdiction vested in that body. % The fourth restriction is, that no capitation, or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census before directed to be taken. Our debates shew from what power this is an exception. The restrictions in the fifth clause are an exception to the power of regulating commerce. The restriction of the sixth clause, that no money should be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law, is an exception to the power of paying the debts.of the United States; for the power of drawing money from the treasury is conse¬ quential of that, of paying the public debts. The next restriction is, that no titles.of nobility shall be granted by the United States. If we cast our eyes to the manner in which titles of nobility first originated, we shall find this restriction founded on the same principles. These sprung from military and civil offices. Both are put in the hands of the United States, and therefore I pre¬ sume it to be an exception to that power. The last restriction restrains any persons in office from accepting of any present or emolument, title, or office, from any foreign prince or state. It. must have been observed before, that though the con¬ federation had restricted congress from exercising any powers not given them, yet they inserted it, not fiom any apprehension of usurpation, but for greater security. This restriction is provided to prevent corruption. All men have a natural inherent right of re¬ ceiving emoluments from any one, unless they be restrained by the regulations of the community. An accident which actually happened operated in producing the restristion. A box was presented to our ambassador, by the king of our allies. It was thought proper, in order to exclude corruption and foreign influence, to prohibit any one in office from receiving or holding any emoluments from foreign states. I believe, that if at that moment, when we were in harmony with the king of France, we had supposed that he was corrupting our ambassador, it might have disturbed that confidence, and dimi¬ nished that mutual friendship, which contributed to carry us through the war. The honorable gentlemen observe, that congress might define punishments, from petty larceny to high treason. This is an unfox- Randolph.] VIRGINIA. 429 tunate quotation for the gentleman, because treason is expressly de¬ fined in the third section of the third article, and they can add no feature to it. They have not cognizance over any other crime, ex¬ cept piracies, felonies committed on the high seas, and offerees against the law of nations. But the rhetoric of the gentleman has highly colored the dangers of giving the general government an indefinite power of providing for the general welfare. I contend that no such power is given. They have power 1 “to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and ex¬ cises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence, and general welfare of the United States.” Is this an independent, se¬ parate, substantive power, to provide for the general welfare of th© United States! No, Sir. They can lay and collect taxes, &c. For what? To pay the debts and provide for the general welfare. Wera not this the case, the following part of the clause would be absurd. It would have been treason against common language. Take it al- together, and let rne ask if the plain interpretation be not this: a power to lay and collect taxes, &c. in order to provide for the gene¬ ral welfare, and pay debts. On the subject of a bill of rights, the want df which has been complained of, I will observe that it has been sanctified by such reverend authority, that I feel some difficulty in going against it. I shall not, however, be deterred from giving my opinion on this oc¬ casion, let the consequence be what it may. At the beginning of the war we had no certain bill of rights; for our charter cannot b© considered as a bill of rights. It is nothing more than an investi¬ ture in the hands of the Virginia citizens, of those rights which be¬ longed to the British subjects. When the British thought propeT to infringe our rights, was it not necessary to mention in our con¬ stitution, those rights which ought to be paramount to the power of the legislature! W'hy is the bill of rights distinct from the consti¬ tution! I consider bills of rights in this view, that the government should use them when there is a departure from its fundamental principles, in order to restore them. This is the true sense of a bill of rights. If it be consistent with the constitution, or contains additional rights, why not put it in the constitution! If it be repugnant to the constitution, here will be a perpetual scene of warfare between them. The honorable gentle^ man has praised the bill of rights of Virginia, and called it his guar, dian angel, and villified this constitution for not having it. Give me leave to make a distinction between the representatives of the people of a particular country, who are appointed as the ordinary legislature, having no limitation to their powers, and another body arising from a compact and certain delineated powers. Were a bill 430 DEBATES. [RANDOLrH. of rights necessary in the former, it would not in the latter ; for the best security that can be in the latter, is the express enumeration of its powers. But let me ask the gentleman where his favorite rights are # violated.? They are not violated by the tenth section, which contains restrictions on the states. Are the} 7 ' violated by the enume¬ rated powers? [Here his excellency read from the eighth to the twelfth article of the bill of rights-] Is there not provision made in this constitution for the trial by jury in criminal cases.? Does not the third article provide, that the trial of all crimes shall be by jury, and held where the said crimes shall have been committed.? Does it not follow, that the cause and nature of the accusation must be produced, because otherwise they cannot proceed on the cause? Every one knows, that the witnesses must be brought before the ju¬ ry, or else the prisoner will be discharged. Calling of evidence in his favor is co-incident to his trial. There is no suspicion that less than twelve jurors will be thought sufficient. The only defect- is, that there is no speedy trial. Consider how this could have been amended. We have heard complaints against it, because it is sup¬ posed the jury is to come from the state at large. It will be in their power to have juries from the vicinage. And would not the com¬ plaints have been louder if they had appointed a federal court to be had in every county in the state? Criminals are brought in this state from every part of the country to the general court, and jurors from the vincinacre are summoned to the trials. There can be no O reason to prevent the general government from adopting a similar regulation. As to the exclusion of excessive bail and fines, and cruel and un. usual punishments, this would follow of itself without a bill of right, Observations have been made about watchfulness over those in pow¬ er, which deserve our attention. There must be a combination, we must presume corruption in the house of representatives, senate, and president, before we can suppose that excessive fines can be imposed or cruel punishments inflicted. Their number is the highest securi¬ ty. Numbers are the highest security in our own constitution,, which has attracted so many eulogiums from the gentlemen. Here we have launched into a sea of suspicions. How shall we check power.? By their numbers. Before these cruel punishments can be inflicted, laws must be passed, and judges must judge contrary to justice. This would excite universal discontent, and detestation of the members of the government. They might involve their friends in the calamities resulting from it, and could be removed from office. I never desire a greater security than this which I believe to be ab¬ solutely sufficient. VIRGINIA. 431 Randolph.] That general warrants are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted, I full} admit. I heartily concur in expressing my detestation of them. But we have sufficient security here also. We do not rely on the integrity of any one particular person or body ; but on the number and different orders of the members of the government: some of them having necessarily the same feelings with ourselves. Can it be believed, that the federal judiciary would not be indepen¬ dent enough to prevent such oppressive practices 1 If they will not do justice to persons injured, may they not go to our own state ju¬ diciaries- and obtain it ! Gentlemen have been misled to a certain degree, by a general de¬ claration, that the trial by j“ury was gone. We see that in the most valuable cases, it is reserved. Is it abolished in civil cases! Let him put his finger on the part where it is abolished. The constitution is silent on it. What expression would you wish the constitution to use, to establish it ! Remember we were not making a constitu¬ tion for Virginia alone, or we might have taken Virginia for our directory. But we were forming a constitution for thirteen states. The trial by jury is different in different states. In some states it is excluded in cases in which it is admitted in others. In admiialty causes it is not used. Would you have a jury to determine the case of a capture! The Virginian legislature thought proper to make an exception of that case. These depend on the law of nations, and no twelve men that could he picked up could be equal to the decision of such a matter. Then, Sir, the freedom of the press is said to be insecure. God forbid that I should give my voice against the freedom of the press. But I ask (and with confidence that it cannot be answered,) where is the page where it is restrained ! If there had been any regulation about it, leaving it insecure, then there might have been reason for clamors. But this is not the case. If it be, I again ask for the particular clause which gives liberty to destroy the freedom of the press! He has added religion to the objects endangered in his conception. Is there any power given over it! Let it be pointedout. Will he not be contented with the answer that has been frequently given to that objection ! The variety of sects which abounds in the United States is the best security for the freedom of religion. No part of the con¬ stitution, even if strictly construed, will justify a conclusion, that the general government can take away, or impair the freedom of religion. The gentleman asks, with triumph, shall we be deprived of these valuable rights ! Had there been an exception, or an express in- /;,i; gement of .those rights, he might object. But I conceive every DEBATES. 432 [Randolph. fair reasoner will agree, that there is Do just cause to suspect that they will be violated. But he objects, that the common law is not established by the constitution. The Wisdom of the convention is displayed by its omission; because the common law ought not to be immutably fixed. Is it established in our own constitution, or the bill of rights, which has been resounded through the house? It is established only by an act of the legislature, and can therefore be changed a3 circumstances may require it. Let the honorable gentleman consi¬ der what would be the destructive consequences, of its establishment in the constitution. Even in England, where the firmest opposi¬ tion has been made to encroachments upon it, it has been frequently changed. What would have been our dilemma if it had been es¬ tablished? Virginia has declared, that children shall have equal portions of the real estate of their intestate parents, and it is cod- 6istant to the principles of a republican government. The immutable establishment of the common law, would have been repugnant to that regulation. It would in many respects bo destructive to republican principles, and productive of great incon¬ veniences. I might indulge myself, by shewing many parts of tho common law which would have this effect. I hope I shall not bo; thought to speak ludicriously, "when I say, the writ of burning here¬ tics, would have been revived by it. It would tend to throw real property in fewhands, and prevent the introduction of many salutary regulations. Thus, were the common law adopted in that system, il would destroy the principles of republican government. But this is not excluded. It may be established by an act of legislature. Its defective parts may be altered, and it may be changed and modified us the convenience of the'public may require it. I said when I opened my observations, that I thought the friends of the constitution were mistaken, when they supposed the powers granted by the last clause of the eighth section, to be merely inciden¬ tal; and that its enemies were equally mistaken when they put such an extravagant construction upon it. My objection is, that the clause is ambiguous, and that that ambi¬ guity may injure the states. My fear is, that it will by gradual ac¬ cessions gather to a dangerous length. This is my apprehension, and I disdain to disown it. I will praise it where it deserves it, and censure it where it appears defective. But, sir, are we to reject it, because it is ambiguous in some particular instances? I cast my eyes to the actual situation of America; I see the dreadful tempest, to which the pr6sent calm is a prelude, if disunion takes place. 1 see the anarchy which must happen, if no energetic government b® established. In this situation, I would take the constitution, were Henry.] VIRGINIA. 433 it more objectionable than it is. For if anarchy and confusion fol¬ low disunion, an enterprising man may enter into the American tin one. I conceive there is no danger. The representatives are 'chosen by and from among the people. They will have a fellow- feeling for the farmers and planters. The twenty-six senators, re¬ presentatives of the states, will not be those desperadoes and horrid adventurers which they are represented to be. The state legislatures, I trust, ill not forget the duty they owe to their country so far, as to choose such men to manage their federal interests. 1 I trust that the members of congress themselves will explain the ambiguous parts . and if not, the states can combine in order to insist on amen¬ ding the ambiguities. I would depend on the present actual feeling of the people of America, to introduce any amendment which may be necessary. I repeat it again, though I do not reverence the con¬ stitution, that its adoption is necessary to avoid the storm which is hanging over America, and that no greater curse can befal her, than the dissolution of the political connection between the states. Whether we shall propose previous or subsequent amendments, is new the only dispute.—It is supererogation to repeat again the argu¬ ments in support of each. But I ask gentlemen, whether, as eight states have adopted it, it be not safer to adopt it, and rely on the probability of obtaining amendments, than by a rejection to hazard a breach of the union! I hope to be excused for the breach of order which I have committed. Mr HENRY lamented, thathecould not see with that perspicuity which other gentlemen were blessed with. But the ninth section struck his mind still in an unfavorable light. He hoped, as the gen¬ tleman had been indulged in speaking of the constitution in gen¬ eral, that he would be allowed to answer him before they adopted or rejected it. The first clause of the tenth section was next read. Mr HENRY apologized for repeatedly troubling the committee with his fears. But he apprehended the most serious consequences- from these restrictions on the states. As they could not emit bills of credit, make any thing bpt gold and silver coin a tender in pay¬ ment of debts, pass ex post facto laws, or impair the obligation of contracts; though these restrictions were founded on good princi¬ ples, yet he feared they would have this effect,. That this state would be obliged to pay for her share of the continental money, shilling for shilling. He asked gentlemen who had been in high authority, whether there were not some state speculations on this matter! He had been informed that some states had acquired vast quantities of that money, which they would be able fc> recover in its nominal value of the other states., VOL. 3. 28 434 DEBATES. [Masox. Mr MADISON admitted there might be some speculations on the subject. He believed the old continental money was settled in a very disproportionate manner. It appeared to him, however, that it was unnecessary to say any thing on this point, for there was a clause in the constitution which cleared it up. The first clause of the sixth article, provides, that “ All debts contracted, and engagements en¬ tered into before the adoption of this constitution, shall Be as valid against the United States, under this constitution, as under the con¬ federation.” He affirmed, that it was meant there should be no change with respect to claims by this political alteration; and that the public would stand, with respect to their creditors, as before. He thought that the validity of claims ought not to diminish by the adoption of the constitution. But, however, it could not increase the demands on the public. Mr GEORGE MASON declared, he had been informed that some states had speculated most enormously in this matter. Many individuals had speculated so as to make great fortunes on the ruin of their fellow-citizens. The clause which has been read as a suffi¬ cient security, seemed to him to be satisfactory as far as it went. That is, that the continental money ought to stand on the same ground as it did previously, or that the claim should not be impaired. Uuder the confederation there were means of settling the old paper money, either in congress or in the state legislatures. The money had at last depreciated to a thousand for one. The intention of state speculation, as well as individual speculation, was to get as much as possible of that money, in older to recover its nominal value.. The means, says he, of settling this money were in the hands of the old congress. They could discharge it at its depreciated value Is there that means here! No, sir, we must pay it shilling for shill¬ ing, or at least at the rate of one for forty. The amount will sur¬ pass the value of the property of the United States. Neither the state legislatures nor congiess can make an ex post facto law. The nominal value must therefore be paid. Where is the power in the new government, to settle this money so as to prevent the country from being ruined! When they prohibit the making ex post facto laws, they will have no authority to prevent our being ruined by paying that money at its nominal value. Without some security against it, we shall be compelled to pay it to the last particle of our property. Shall we ruin our people by taxation, from generation to generation, to pay that money? Should any ex post facto law be made to relieve us from such payments, it will not be regarded, because ex post facto laws are interdicted in the constitution. We may be taxed for centuries, to give advantage to a few particular states in the unioh, and a number of rapacious speculators. If there be any real security against this misfortune, VIRGINIA. 435 Henrx.] let gentlemen shew it. I can see none. The clause under consid¬ eration does away the pretended security in the clause which was ^adduced by the honorable gentleman. This enormous mass of worthless money, which has been offered at a thousand for one, must be paid in actual gold and silver at the the nominal value. Mr MADISON. Mr Chairman—It appears to me immaterial, who holds those great quantities of paper money, which were in circulation before the peace, or at what value they acquired it, for it will not be affected by this constitution. What would satisfy gentlemen more than that the new constitution would place us in the same situation with the old? In this respect it has done so. The claims against the United States are declared to be as valid as lhey were, but not more so. Would they have a particular specifica¬ tion of these matters? Where can there be any danger? Is there any reason to believe that the new rulers., one branch of which will be drawn from the mass of the people, will neglect or violate our interests more than the old?—It rests on the obligation of public faith only in the articles of confederation. It will be so in this con¬ stitution should it be adopted. If the new rulers should wish to enhance its value, in order to gratify its holders, how can they compel the states to pay it if the letter of the constitution be obser¬ ved? Do gentlemen wish the public creditors should be put in a worse situation? Would the people at large wish tosatisfy creditors in such a manner us to ruin them? Thefe cannot be a majority of the people of America that would wish to defraud their public cred¬ itors. I considerthis as well guarded as possible. It rests on plain and honest principles. J cannot conceive how it could be more honorable or safe.—[Mr Madison made -some other observations which could not be heard.] Mr HENRY. Mr Chairman—I am convinced, and I see clearly that this paper money must be discharged, shilling for shilling. The honorable gentleman must see better than I can, from his par¬ ticular situation and judgment, but this has certainly escaped his attention. The question arisingon the clause before you, is, whether an act of the legislature of this state, for scaling money, will be of sufficient validity to exonerate you from paying the nominal value, when such a law, called ex post facto, and impairing the obligation of contracts, are expressly interdicted by it ? Your hands are tied up by this clause, and you must pay shilling for shilling; and, in the last section, there is a clause that prohibits the general legisla¬ ture from passing any ex post facto law—so that the hands oi conoress are tied up, as well as the hands of the state legislatures. How will this thing operate, when ten or twenty millions are demanded as the quota of this state? You will cry out that specie 436 DEBATES. [Henryv lators have got it at one for a thousand, and that they ought to be r paid so. Will you then have recourse for relief, to legislative inter¬ ference ? They cannot relieve you because of that clause. The expression includes public contracts, as well as private contracts between individuals. Notwithstanding the sagacity of the gentle¬ man, he cannot prove its exclusive relation to private contracts. Here is an enormous demand, which your children to the tenth- generation will not be able to pay. Should we ask, if there be any obligation in justice to pay more than the depreciated value, we shall be told that contracts must not be impaired. Justice may make a demand of millions, but the people cannot pay them. I remember the clamors and public uneasiness concerning the payments of British debts, put into the treasury. Was not the alarm great and general lest these pa3^ments should be laid on the people at large ? Did not the legislature interfere and pass a law 10 prevent it 1 ? Was it not re-echoed evety where, that the people of this country ought not to pay the debts of their great ones? And though some urged their patriotism, and merits in putting money on the faith of the public into the treasury, yet. the outcry was so great, that it required legislative interference. Should those enor¬ mous demands be made upon us, would not legislative interference be more necessary than it was in that case? Let us not run the risk of being charged with carelessness, and neglect of the interests of our constituents and posterity. I would ask the number of millions \ It is without exaggeration, immense. I ask gentlemen if they can pay one hundred millions, or two hundred millions? Where have they the means of paying it ? Still they would make us proceed to tie the hands of the states and of congress. A gentleman has said with great force, that there is a contest for empire. There is also a contest for money. The states of the north wish to secure a superiority of interest and influence. In one part their deliberation is marked with wisdom, and in the other with the most liberal generosity. When we have paid all the gold and silver we could to replenish the congressional coffers, here they ask for confidence. Their hands will be tied up. They cannot merit confidence. Here is a transfer from the old to the new government* without the means of relieving the greatest distresses which can befall the people. This money might he scalej, sir, but the exclu¬ sion of ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, steps nr and prevents it. Tiiese were admitted by the old confederation. There is a contest for moneyas well as empire,, as I have said before. The eastern states have speculated chiefly in ibis money. /is there can be no congressional scale, their specula- wsO fee *»ux.#mely profitable. Not satisfied with a majorit Nicholas.] VIRGINIA. 437 in the legislative councils, they must have all our property. 1 wish the southern genius of America had been more watchful. Phis state may be sued in the federal court, for those enormous demands; and judgment may be obtained, unless ex post facia laws be passed. To benefit whom are we to run this risk ! I have heard there were vast quantities of that money packed up in barrels_those formidable millions are deposited in the northern states, and whether in public or private hands, makes no odds. They have acquired it for the most inconsiderable trifle. If you accord to this part, you are bound hand and foot. Judgment must be rendered against you for the whole. Throw all pride out of the question, this is a most nefarious business. Your property will be taken from you to satisfy thi 3 most infamous speculation. It will destroy your public peace, and establish the ruin of your citizens. Only general resistance will remedy. You will shut the door against every ray of hope, if you allow the holders of this money, by this clause, to recover their formidable demands. I hope gentlemen will see the absolute neces¬ sity of amending it, by enabling the state legislatures to relieve their people from such nefarious oppressions. Mr GEORGE NICHOLAS—Mr chairman, I beg gentlemen to consider most attentively the clause under consideration, and the objections against it. He says there exists the most dangerous prospect. Has the legislature of Virginia any right to make a law or regulation to interfere with the continental debts! Have they a right to make ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts for that purpose! No, Sir. If his fears proceed from this clause, they are without foundation. This clause does not hin¬ der them from doing it because the state never could do it—the jurisdiction of such general objects being exclusively vested in congress. © Rut, says he, this clause will hinder the general government from preventing the nominal value of those millions from being paid. On what footing does this business stand, it the constitution be adopted? By it all contracts will be valid, and only as valid, as under the old confederation, The new government will give the holders the same power of recovery as the old one. There is no law under the existing system which gives power to any tribunal to enforce the payment of such claims. On the will of congress alone the pay¬ ment depends. The constitution expressly says, that they shall be only as binding as under the present confederation. Cannot they decide according to real equity! Those who have this money must make application to congress for payment. Some positive regulation must be made to redeem it. It cannot be said, that they have power of passing a law to enhance its value. They cannot make a law that that money shall no longer be bijt one for one.-** 438 DEBATES. [Nicholas. For though they have power to pay the debts of the United States, they can only pay the real debts, and this is no farther a debt than it was before. Application must, thorefore, be made by the holders of that money, to congress, who will make the most proper regula¬ tion to discharge its real and equitable, and not its nominal, value. We are told of the act passed to exonerate the public from the payments of the British debts put into the treasury. Thfs has no analogy to this, those payments were opposed, because they were unjust. But he supposes that congress may be sued by those specu¬ lators. Where is the clause that gives that power? It gives no such power. This, according to my idea, is inconsistent. Can the the supreme legislature be sued in their own subordinate courts, by their own citizens, in cases where they are not a party? They may be plaintiffs, but not defendants. But the individual states perhaps may be sued? Pennsylvania or Virginia may be sued. How is this? Do I owe the man in New England any thing? Does Virginia owe any thing to the Pennsylvanian holder of such money? Who pro¬ mised to pay it. ? Congress, Sir. Congress are answerable to the individual holders of this money, and individuals are answerable over to congress. Therefore, no individual can call on any state. But the northern states struggle for money as well as for empire. _Congress cannot make such a regulation as they please at pre¬ sent. If the northern states wish to injure us, why do they not do it now? What greater dangers are there to be dreaded from the new government, since there is no alteration? If they have a major¬ ity in the one case, they have in the other. The interests of those states would be as dangerous for us, under the old, as under the new government, which leaves this business where it stands, be¬ cause the conclusion says, that all debts contracted, or engage¬ ments entered into, shall be only as valid in the one case as the other. r Gov RANDOLPH—Mr Chairman, this clause, in spite of the invective of the gentleman, is a great favorite of mine, because it is essential to justice. I shall reserve my answer respecting the safe¬ ty of the people, till the objection be urged, but I must make a tew observations. He says, this clause will be injurious, and that no scale can be made, because there is a prohibition on congress of passing ex post facto laws. If the gentleman did not make such strong objections to logical reasoning, I could prove by such reason¬ ing, that there is no danger. Ex post facto laws, if taken techni¬ cally, relate solely to criminal cases; and my honorable colleague tells you, it was so interpreted in convention. What greater secu¬ rity can we have against arbitrary proceedings in criminal jurispru¬ dence than this? In addition to the interpretation of the convention ;£Ra??dolph. VIRGINIA. 439 let me shew him still greater authority. The same clause provides* that no bill of attainder shall be passed. It shews that the atten¬ tion of the convention was drawn to criminal matters alone. Shall it be complained against this government, that it prohibits the pas¬ sing of a law annexing a punishment to an act which was lawful at the time of committing it! With regard to retrospective laws there is no restraint. Let us examine the cause of the clamours which are made with regard to the continental money. A friend has mentioned a clause which shews there is no danger from the new congress. Does it not manifestly appear, that they are precisely in the same predica¬ ment as under the old confederation! And do gentlemen wish that this shonld be put in a worse condition! If they have equity under the old confederation they have equity still. There is no tribunal to recur to by the old government. There is none in the new for that purpose. If the old congress can scale that money, they have this power still. But he says not, because the states cannot impair the obligation of contracts. What is to be done by the states with regard to it! Congress, and not they, have contracted to pay it. It is not affected by this clause at all. I am still a warm friend to the prohibition, because it must be promotive of virtue and justice, and preventive of injustice and fraud. If we take a review of the ca¬ lamities which have befallen our reputation as a people, we will find they have been produced by frequent interferences of the state legislatures with private contracts. If you inspect the great corner stone of republicanism, you will find it to be justice and honor. I come now to what will be agitated by the judiciary* They are to enforce the performance of private contracts. The British debts, which are withheld contrary to treaty, ought to be paid. Not only the law of nations, but justice and honor require that they be punc¬ tually discharged. I fear their payment may press on my country, blit we must retrench our seperfluities, and profuse and idle extrava¬ gance, and become more economical and industrious. Let me not be suspected of being interested in this respect, for without a sad reverse of my fortune, I shall never be in a situation to be benefitted by it. I am confident the honest convention of Virginia will not oppose it. Can any soeiety exist without a firm adherence to jus¬ tice and virtue! The federal judiciary cannot intermeddle with those public claims without violating the letter of the constitution. Why then such opposition to the clause! His excellency then con¬ cluded, that he would, if necessary, display his feelings more fully -on the subject another time. 440 DEBATES. [Maswc, Mr GEORGE MASON.—Mr Chairman, the debt is transferred to congress, but not the means of paying it. They cannot pay it any other way than according to the nominal value : for they are prohibited from making ex post facto laws; and it would be ex post facto to all intent and purposes, to pay off creditors with less than the nominal sum, which they were originally promised. But the honorable gentleman has called to his aid technical definitions. He says, that ex post facto laws relate solely to criminal matters. I beg leave to differ from him. Whatever it may be at the bar, or in a professional line, I conceive, that according to the common ac¬ ceptation of the word, ex post facto laws, and retrospective laws, are synonimous terms. Are we to trust business of this sort to technical definition? The contrary is he plain meaning of the words. Congress has no power to scale this money. The states are equally precluded. The debt is transferred without the means of discharging it. Implication will not do. The means of pay¬ ing it are expressly withheld. When this matter comes before the federal judiciary, they must determine according to this constitution. It says expressly, that they shall not make ex post facto laws. Whatever may be the professional meaning, yet the general mean¬ ing of ex post facto law, is an act having a retrospective operation. This construction is agreeable to its primary etymology. Will it not be the duty of the federal court to say, that such laws are pro¬ hibited? This goes to the destruction and annihilation of all the citizens of the United States, to enrich a few. Are we to part with every shilling of our property, and be reduced to the lowest insig¬ nification, to aggrandize a few speculators? Let me mention a re¬ markable effcet this constitution will have. How stood our taxes before this constitution was introduced? Requisitions were made on the state legislatures, and if they were unjust, they could be re¬ fused. If we were called upon to pay twenty millions, shilling for shilling, or at the rate of one for forty, our legislature could refuse it, and remonstrate against the injustice of the demand. But now this could not be done; for direct taxation is brought home to us. The federal officer collects immediately of the planters. When it withholds the only possible means of discharging those debts, and by direct taxation prevents any opposition to the most enormous and unjust demand, where are you? Is there a ray of hope? As the law has never been in my possession, if I err, I hope to be excused. I spoke from the general sense of the word. The worthy gentle¬ man has told you, that the United States can be plaintiffs, but never defendants. If so, it stands on very unjust grounds. The United States cannot become at for any thing they may owe, but may get what is due to them. There is therefore no reciprocity. The thing Madison.] VIRGINIA. 441 is so incomprehensible, that it cannot be explained. As an express power is given to the federal court to take cognizance of such con¬ troversies, and to declare null all ex post facto laws, I think gentle¬ men must see there is danger, and that it ought to be guarded against. Mr MADIbON.—Mr Chairman, I did expect from the earnest¬ ness he has expressed, that he would cast some light upon it. But the ingenuity of the honorable member could make nothing of this objection. He argues from a supposition that the state legislatures individually, might have passed laws to effect the value of the con¬ tinental debt. I believe he did not well consider this, before he hazarded his observations. He says, that the United States being restrained in this case, will be obliged to pay at an unjust rate. It has been so clearly explained by the honorable gentleman over the way, that there could be no danger, that it is unnecessary to say more on the subject. The validity of these claims will neither be increased nor diminished by this change. There must be a law made by congress respecting their redemption. The states cannot interfere. Congress will make such a regulation as will be just. There is, in my opinion, but one way of scaling improperly and un¬ justly, and that is, by acceding to the favorite mode of the honora¬ ble gentleman—by requisitions. Is it to be presumed, any change can be made in the system inconsistent with reason or equity? Strike the clause out of the constitution—what will it be then? The debt will be as valid only, as it was before the adoption. Gentle¬ men will not say, that obligations are varied. This is merely a declaratory clause, that things are to exist in the same manner as before. But I fear the very extensive assertions of the gentleman, may have misled the committee. The whole of that continental money amounted to but little more than one hundred millions. A consid¬ erable quantity of it has been destroyed. At the time when r.o share of it had been destroyed, the quota of this state did not amount to more than twenty-six millions. At forty for one, this is but five hundred thousand dollars at most. In every point of view it ap¬ pears to me that it cannot be on a more reasonable, equitable, or honorable footing than it is. Do gentlemen suppose, that they will agree to any system or alteration, that will place them in a worse situation than before? Let us suppose, this commonwealth was oossessed of the same money that the northern states have ; and suppose an objection was made by them to its redemption at its real value—what would be the consequence? We should pronounce them to be unreasonable, and on good grounds. This case is so ex- 442 DEBATES. [Nicholas. tremely plain, that it was unnecessary to say as much as has been said. Mr MASON was still convinced of the rectitude of his former opinion. He thought it might be put on a safer footing, by three words. By continuing the restriction of ex post facto laws to crimes, it would then stand under the new government as it did under the old. Governor RANDOLPH could not coincide with the construction put by the honorable gentleman on ex post facto laws. The tech¬ nical meaning which confined such laws solely to criminal cases, was followed in the interpretation of treaties between nations, and was concurred in by all civilians. The prohibition of bills of at¬ tainder, he thought, a sufficient proof, that ex post facto laws related to criminal cases only, and that such was the idea of the convention. The next clause of the tenth section was read. Mr. GEORGE MASON.—Mr. Chairman, if gentlemen attend to this clause, they will see we cannot make any inspection law but what is subject to the control and revision of congress. Hence gen¬ tlemen, who know nothing of the business, will make rules concern¬ ing it, which may be detrimental to our interests. For forty years we have laid duties on tobacco, to defray the expenses of the in¬ spection, and to raise an incidental revenue for the state. Under this clause, that incidental revenue, which is calculated to pay for the inspection, and to defray contingent charges, is to be put into the federal treasury. But if any tobacco house is burnt, we cannot make up the loss. I conceive this to be unjust and unreasonable. When any profit arises from it, it goes into the federal treasury. But when there is any loss or deficiency from damage, it cannot be made up. Congress are to make regulations for our tobacco. Are men in the states where no tobacco is made, proper judges of this business? They may perhaps judge as well, but surely no better than our own immediate legislature, who are accustomed and fami¬ liar with this business. This is one of the most wanton powers of the general government. I would concede any power that was es¬ sentially necessary for the interests of the union; but this, instead of being necessary, will be extremely oppressive. Mr. GEORGE NICHOLAS.—Mr. Chairman, I consider this clause as a good regulation. It will be agreed to, that they will impose duties in the most impartial manner, and not throw the bur¬ dens on a part of the community. Everyman who is acquainted with our laws, must know that the duties on tobacco were as high as sixteen shillings a hogshead. The consequence was, that the tobacco-makers have paid upwards of 20,000 pounds, annually, more than the other citizens; because they paid every other kind of Madison.] VIRGINIA. 443 tax, as well as the rest of the community. We have every reason to believe that this clause will prevent injustice and partiality. To¬ bacco-makers will be benefited by it. But the gentleman says, that our tobacco regulations will be subject to the control of congress, who will be unacquainted with the subject. The clause says, that all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of congress. What laws are meant by this! It means laws imposing duties on the exports of tobacco. But it does not follow, that laws made for the regulation of the inspection shall be subject to the revision of congress. He may say, that the laws for imposing duties on the exports of tobacco, and laws regulating the inspection, must be blended in the same acts. Give me leave to say, that they need not be. so; for the duties on exports might be in one law, and the regulation of the inspection in another. The states may easily make them separately. But, he says, we shall lose the profit. We shall then find equity in our legislature, which we have not found hereto¬ fore; for, as they will lay it not for their own exclusive advantages, but partly for the benefit of others, they will not be interested in laying it partially. As to the effect of ware-houses being burnt, I differ from him. A tax may be laid to make up this loss. Though the amount of the duties go into the federal treasury, yet a tax may be laid for that purpose. Is it not necessary and just, if the inspec¬ tion law obliges the planter to carry his tobacco to a certain place that he should receive a compensation for the loss, if it be destroy¬ ed! The legislature must defray the expenses and contingent charges by laying a tax for that purpose; for such a tax is not pro¬ hibited. The net amounts only go into the federal treasury, after paying the expenses. Gentlemen must be pleased with this part, especially those who are tobacco makers. Mr. GEORGE MASON replied, that the state legislatures could make no law but what would come within the general control given to congress; and that the regulation of the inspection and the impo¬ sition of duties, must be inseparably blended together. Mr. MADISON.—Mr. Chairman, let us take a view of the rela¬ tive situation of the states. Some states export the produce of other states. Virginia exports the produce of North Carolina; Pennsyl¬ vania those of New Jersey and Delaware, and Rhode Island those of Connecticut and Massachusetts. The exporting states wished to retain the power of laying duties on exports, to enable them to pay the expenses incurred. The states whose produce is exported by other states, were extremely jealous, lest a contribution should be raised of them by the exporting states, by laying heavy duties on their commodities. If this this clause be fully considered, it will be found to be more consistent with justice and equity than any other 444 DEBATES. [Mason. practicable mode; for if the states had the exclusive imposition of duties on exports, they might raise a heavy contribution of the other states, for their own exclusive emoluments. The honorable member who spoke in defence of the clause, has fairly represented it. As to the reimbursement of the loss that may be sustained by individuals, a tax may be laid on tobacco when brought to the warehouses, for that purpose. The sum arising therefrom may be appropriated to it consistently with the clause; for it only says, that “ the nett produce of all duties and impost, laid by any state on imports or exports, shall be for the use ot the treasury of the United States,” which necessarily implies, that all contingent charges shall have been pre¬ viously paid. The first section of the second article was then read. Mr. GEORGE MASON.—Mr. Chairman, there is not a more important article in the constitution than this. The great funda¬ mental principle of responsibility in republicanism is here sapped. The president is elected without rotation. It may be said that a new election may remove him, and place another in his stead. If we judge from the experience of all other countries, and even our own, ■we may conclude, that as the president of the United States may be re-elected, so he will. How is it in every government where rota¬ tion is not required! Is there a single instance of a great man not being re-elected! Our governor is obliged to return, after a given period, to a private station. It is so in most of the states. This president will be elected time after time: he will be continued iri office for life. If we wish to change him, the great powers in Europe will notallow us. The honorable gentleman, my colleague in the late federal con¬ vention, mentions with applause, those parts of which he had ex¬ pressed his disapprobation, he says not a word. If I am mistaken, let me be put right. I shall not make use qf his name; but in the course of this investigation, I shall use the arguments of that gentleman against it. Will not the great powers of Europe, as France and Great Britain, be interested in having a friend in the president of the United States; and will they not be more interested in his election, than in that of the king of Poland 1 * The people of Poland have a right to displace their king. But do they ever do it! No. Prussia and Russia, and other European powers, would not suffer it. This clause will open a door to the dangers and misfortunes, which the people of Poland undergo. The powers of Europe will interpose, and we shall have a civil war in the bowels of our country, and be subject to all the horrors and calamities of an elective monarchy. This very execu¬ tive officer may, by consent of congress, receive a stated pension Randolph.] VIRGINIA. 445 from European potentates. This is an idea altogether new in America. It is not many years ago, since the revolution, that a foreign power offered emoluments to persons holding offices under our government. It will, moreover, be difficult to know, whether he receives emoluments from foreign powers or not. The electors, who are to meet in each state to vote for him, may be easily influ¬ enced. To prevent the certain evils of attempting to elect a new president, it will be necessary to continue the old one. The only way to alter this, would be to render him ineligible after a certain number of years, and then no foreign nation would interfere to keep in a man who was utterly ineligible. Nothing is so essential to the preservation of a republican government, as a periodical rotation. Nothing so strongly impels a man to regard the interest of his con¬ stituents, as the certainty of returning to the general mass of the people, from whence he was taken, where he must participate their burdens. It is a great defect in the senate, that they are not ineli¬ gible at the end of six years. The biennial exclusion of one-third of them, will have no effect, as they can be re-elected. Some stated time ought to be fixed, when the president ought to be reduced to a private station. I should be contented that he might be elected for eight years; but I would wish him to be capable of holding the- office only eight years, out of twelve or sixteen years. But as it now stands, he may continue in office for life; or in other words, it will be an elective monarchy. Gov. RANDOLPH.—Mr. Chairman, the honorable gentleman last up says, that I do not mention the parts to which I object. I have hitherto mentioned my objections with freedom and candour. But, Sir, I considered that our critical situation rendered adoption necessary, were it even more defective than it is. I observed, that if opinions ought to lead the committee on one side, they ought on the other. Every gentleman who has turned his thoughts to the subject of politics, and has considered of the most eligible mode of republican government, agrees that the greatest difficulty arises from the executive, as to the time of his election, mode of his elec¬ tion, quantum of power, &c. I will acknowledge, that at one stage of this business, I had embraced the idea of the honorable gentle¬ man, that the re-eligibility of the president was improper. But I will acknowledge, that on a further consideration of the subject, ami attention to the lights which were thrown upon it by others, I altered in ; opinion of the limitation of his eligibility. When we consider the advantages arising to os from it, we cannot object to it. That which has produced my opinion against the limitation of his eligibility, is this—that it renders him more independent in his place, and more solicitous of promoting the interest of his constitei- 446 DEBATES. [Mason. ents; for, unless you put it in his power to be re-elected, instead of being - attentive to their interests, he will lean to the augmentation of his private emoluments. This subject will admit of high colour¬ ing and plausible arguments; but on considering it attentively and coolly, I believe it will be found less exceptionable than any other mode. The mode of election here excludes that faction which is productive of those hostilities and confusion in Poland. It renders it unnecessary and impossible to foreign force or aid to interpose. The electors must be elected by the people at large. To procure his re-election, his influence must be co-extensive with the continent. And there can be no combination between they electors, as they elect him on the same day in every state. When this is the case, how can foreign influence or intrigues enter! There is no reason to con¬ clude, from the experience of these states, that he will be continu¬ ally re-elected. There have been several instances where officers have been displaced, where they were re-eligible. This has been the case with the executive of Massachusetts, and I believe of New Hampshire. It happens from the mutation of sentiments, though the officers be good. ^There is another provision against the danger mentioned by the honorable member, of the president receiving emoluments from foreign powers. If discovered, he may be impeached. If he be not impeached, he may be displaced at the end of the four years. By the ninth section of the first article, “ No person holding an office of profit or trust, shall accept of any present or emolument whatever, from any foreign power, without the consent of the representatives of the people;” and by the first section of the second article, his compensation is neither to be increased or diminished, during the time for which he shall have been elected; and he shall not, during that period, receive any emolument from the United States or any of them. I consider, therefore, that he is restrained from receiving any present or emoluments whatever. It is impossible to guard better against corruption. The honorable member seems to think, that he may hold his office without being re-elected. He cannot hold it over four years, unless he be re-elected, any more than if he were prohibited. As to forwarding and transmitting the certificates of the electors, I think the regulation as good as could be provided. Mr GEORGE MASON.—Mr. Chairman, the vice president ap¬ pears to me to be not only an unnecessary but dangerous officer. He is, contrary, to the usual course of parliamentary proceedings, to be president of the senate. The state from which he comes may have two votes, when the others will have but one. Besides the legisla¬ tive and executive are hereby mixed and incorporated together. I cannot at this distance of time foresee the consequences; but 1 Madison.] VIRGINIA. 447 think, that in the course of human affairs, he will be made a tool of in order to bring about his own interest, and aid in overturning the liberties of his country.—There is another part which I disapprove of, but which perhaps I do not understand. “ In case of removal cf the president from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the vice president, and the congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation, or inability both ot the president and vice president, declaring what officer shall then act as president, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disabili¬ ty be removed, or a president shall be elected.” The power of Congress is right and proper so far as it enables them to provide what officer shall act, in case both the president and vice-president be dead or disabled. But gentlemen ought to take notice that the elction of this officer is only for four years. There is no provision for a speedy election for another president, when the former is dead or removed. The influence of the vice president, may prevent the election of the president. But perhaps I may be mistaken. Mr MADISON.—Mr Chairman, I think there are some peculi¬ ar advantages incident to this office, which recommend it to us. There is in the first place a great probability this officer will be ta¬ ken from one of the largest states, and if so, the circumstance of his having an eventual vote will be so far favorable. The consideration which recommends it to me,is, that he will be the choice of the peo¬ ple at large.—There are to be ninety-one electors, each of whom has two votes: if he have one fourth of the whole number of votes, he is elected vice-president. There is much more propriety in giving this office to a person chosen by the people at large, than to one of the senate who is only the choice of the legislature of one state.— His eventual vote is an advantage too obvious to comment upon. I differ from the honorable member in the case which enables con¬ gress to make a temporary appointment. When the president and vice-president die, the election of another president will immediate¬ ly take place, and suppose it would not, all that congress could do, woold be to make an appointment between the expiration of the four years and the last election, and to continue only to such expi¬ ration. This can rarely happen. This power continues the gov¬ ernment in motion, and is well guarded. Wednesday, the 18 th of June , 1788. The first Section, second Art. still under consideration. Mr. MONROE, after a brief exordium, in which he insisted, that on the judicious organization of the executive power, the security of onr interest and happiness greatly depended; that in the construction of this part of the government we should be cautious in avoiding 448 DEBATES. [Monro e «. the defects of other governments, and that our circumspection should be commensurate to the extent of the powers delegated,proceeded as follows:—The president ought to act under the strongest impulses of rewards and punishments which are the strongest incentives to human actions. There are two ways of securing this point. He ought to depend on the people of America for his appointment and continuance in office: he ought also to be responsible in an equal de¬ gree to all the states; and to be tried by dispassionate judges; his responsibility ought further to be direct and immediate. Let us consider in the first place then, how far he is dependent on the peo¬ ple of America. He is to be elected by electors, in a manner per¬ fectly dissatisfactory to my mind. I believe that he will owe his election, in fact, to the state governments, and not to the peopie at large. It is to be observed, that congress have it in their power to appoint the time of choosing the electors, and of electing the president. Is it not presumable they will appoint the times of cho- sing the electors, and electing the president, at a considerable dis¬ tance from each other, so as to give an opportunity to the electors to forma combination! If they know that such a man as they wish, for instance, the actual president, cannot possibly be elected by a majority of the whole number of electors appointed, yet if they can prevent the election, by such majority, of any one they disapprove of, and if they can procure such a number of votes as will be suffi¬ cient to make their favorite one of the five highest on the list, they may ultimately carry the election into the general congress, where the votes in choosing him shall be taken by states,each state having one vote. Let us see howTar this is compatible with the security of republicanism. Although this state is to have ten, and Massa¬ chusetts eight representatives, and Delaware and Rhode Island are to have but one each, yet the vote are to be by states only. The conseqence will be, thet a majority of the states, and these consist¬ ing of the smallest, may elect him; this will give an advantage to the small states. He will depend, therefore, on the states for his ie-election and continuance in office, and not on the people. Doe s it not bear the complexion of the late confederation! He will con. duct himself in accommodation to them, since by them he is chosen, and may be again. If he accommodates himself to the interest of particular states, will they not be obliged by state policy to support him afterwards ! Let me enquire into his responsibility if he does not depend on the people. To whom is he responsible ! To the senate, his own council. If he makes a treaty, bartering the inter¬ ests of his country, by whom is he to be tried! By the very persons who advised him to perpetrate the act. Is this any security! I am persuaded that the gentleman who will be the first elected, may continue in the office for life. Geayson.] VIRGINIA. 449 The situation of the United States, as it applies to the European states demands attention. We may hold the balance among - those states*—-Their western territories are contiguous to us. What we may do without any offensive operations, may have considerable in¬ fluence. Will they not then endeavor to influence his general coun¬ cils'? May we not suppose that they will endeavor to attach him to their interest, and support him, in order to make him.serve their pur¬ poses'? If this be the case, does not. the mode of election present ■a favorite opportunity to continue in office the person that shall be president? I am persuaded they may, by theirpower and intrigues, influence his re-election. There being nothing to prevent his cor¬ ruption, but his virtue, which is but precarious, we have not suffi¬ cient security. If there be a propriety in giving him a right of making leagues, he ought not to be connected with the senate. If the senate have a right to make leagues, there ought to be a majori¬ ty of the states. The Vice President is an unnecessary officer. I can see no rea¬ son for such an officer. The senate might of their own body electa president, who would have no dangerous influence. He is to suc¬ ceed the president, in case of removal, disability, &c., and is to have the casting vote in the senate. This gives an undue advan- tage to the state he comes from, and will render foreign powers de¬ sirous of securing his favor, to obtain which they will exert them¬ selves in his behalf. I am persuaded that the advantage of his in¬ formation will not counterbalance the disadvantages attending his office. The president might be elected by the people, dependent upon them, and responsible for mal-administration. As this is not the ease, I must disapprove of this clause in its present form. Mr GRAYSON.—Mr Chairman, one great objection with me is this. If we advert to this democratical, anstocratical, or executive branch, we will And their powers are perpetually varying and fluc¬ tuating throughout the whole. Perhaps the democratic branch would be well constructed were it not for this defect. The execu¬ tive is still worse, in this respect, than the democratic branch. He is to be elected by a number of. electors in the country; but the principle is changed, when no person has a majorittr of the whole number of electors appointed, or when more than one have such a majority, and have an equal number of votes, for then the lower house is to vote by states. It is thus changing throughout the whole. It seems rather founded on accident, than any principle of govern¬ ment I ever heard of. We know that there scarcely ever vras an election of such an officer, without the interposition ci foreign pow¬ ers. Two causes prevail to make them iutermetlchc.in such DEBATES. [Grayson.- v 450 one i9 to preserve the balance of power, the other to preserve their trade. These causes have produced interferences of foreign po wers in the election of the king of Poland. All the great powers of Eu- rope have interfered in an election which took place not very long ago, and would not let the people choose for themselves. W e know how much the powers of Europe have interfered with Sweden. Since the death of Charles the Xllth, that country has been a re¬ publican government. Some powers were willing it should be so : some were willing her imbecility should continue : others wished the contrary: and at length the court of France brought about a revolution, which converted it into an absolute government. Car? America be free from these interferences'? France, after losing Hol¬ land, will wish to make America entirely her own. Great Britain will wish to increase her influence by a still closer connection. It is the interest of Spain, from the contiguity of her possessions in the western hemisphere t.o the United States, to be in an intimate con¬ nection with them, and influence their deliberations, if possible. I hink we have every thing to apprehend from such interferences. It is highly probable the president will be continued in office for life. To gain his favor they will support him. Consider the means of importance he will have by creating officers. If he has a good understanding with the senate, they will join to prevent a discovery of his misdeeds. Whence comes this extreme confidence, that we disregard the ex¬ ample of ancient and modern nations'? We find that aristocracies never invested their offices with such immense powers. Rome had not only an aristocratical, but also a demoeratical branch ; yet the consuls were in office only two years. This quadrennial power cannot be justified by ancient history. There is hardly an instance where a republic trusted its executive so long with much power, nor is it warranted by modern republics. The delegation of power is in most of them only for one year. When you have a strong demoeratical and a strong aristocratical branch, you may have a strong executive. But when those are weak, the balance will not be preserved, if you give the executive extensive powers for so long a time. As this government is organ¬ ized, it w r ould be dangerous to trust the president with such powers. How will you punish him if he abuse his power? Will you call him before the senate? They are his councellors and partners in crimes. Where are your checks? We ought to be extremely cau¬ tious in this country. If ever the government.be changed, it will probably be into a despotism. The first object in England \va9 to destroy the monarchy : but the aristocratic branch restored him, and of course the government was organized on its ancient principles. Grayson.] VIRGINIA. 451* Bat were a revolution to happen here, there would be no means of restoring the government to its former organization. This is a cau¬ tion to us not to trust extensive powers. I have an extreme objec¬ tion to the mode of his election. I presume the seven eastern states will always elect him. As he is vested with the power of making treaties, and as there is a material distinction between carrying and productive states, the former will be disposed to have him them¬ selves. He will accommodate himself to their interests in forming treaties, and they will continue him perpetually in office. Thus mutual interest will lead them reciprocally to support one another. It will be a government of a faction, and this observation will ap¬ ply to every part of it. For, having a majority, they may do what they please. I have made an estimate which shews what facility they will be able to re-elect him. The number of electors is equal to the number of representatives and senators, viz: ninety-one. They are to vote for two persons. They give therefore one hundred and eighty-two votes. Let there be forty-five votes for four differ¬ ent candidates, and two for the president. He is one of the five highest, if he have but two votes, which he may easily purchase. 2 n this ease, by the third clause, of the first section, of the second - article, the election is to be by the representatives, according to states: Let New Hampshire be for him, a majority of its 3 representatives is -2 Rhode Island, .- * 1 - - - - 1 Connecticut, r - 5 ^ - *■ -3 New Jersey, - 4 r *' - Delaware, - I Georgia, * - 3 j* • * North Carolina, - - 5 *■ - 3 - I - 2 * 3 A majority of seven states is - - I 3 Thus the majority of seven states is but 15, while the minority amounts to 50. The total number of voices, 91 electors, and 65 representatives, is 15fi. . Voices in favor of the president, are two state electors, and 15 representatives, which 17 are in all » 3 9" So that the president may be re-elected by the voices of 17againstl39, It may be said, that this is an extravagant case, and will never happen. In my opinion, it will often happen, A person who is a favorite of .congress, if lie gets but two votes of electors, may, by the subsequent choice of 15 representatives, be elected president. Surely the possibility of such a case ought to be excluded, I shall postpone mentioning in what manner he ought to be elected, till vv§ come to offer amendments, DEBATES, [Masox, •f 52 Mr GEORGE MASON contented, that this inode of election was a mere deception—a mere ignus fatuu's on the American people, and thrown out to make them believe they were to choose him ; whereas it would not be once out of fifty that he would be chosen by them in the first instance, because a majority of the whole num¬ ber of votes was required. If the localties of the states were con¬ sidered, and the probable diversity of the opinions of the people at¬ tended to, he thought it would be found that so many persons wbuld be voted for, that there seldom or never could be a majority in favor of one, except one great name, who he believed would be unani¬ mously elected. He then continued thus.—A majority of the whole number of electors is necessary to elect the president.. It is not the greatest number of votes that is required, but a majority of the whole number of electors, [f there be more than one having such ma¬ jority, and an equal number, one of them is to be chosen by ballot ot the house of representatives. But if no one have a majority of the actual number of electors appointed, how is he to- be chosen? From the five highest on the list, by ballot of the lower house, and the votes to be taken by states. I conceive he ought to be chosen from the two highest on the list. This would be simple and easy; then indeed the people would have some agency in the election. But when it is extended to the five highest, a person having a very, small number of votes may be elected. This will almost constantly happen. The states may choose the man in whom they have mo9? confidence. This, in my opinion, is a very considerable defect. The people will in reality have no hand in the election. It has been wittily observed, that the constitution has married the president and senate—has made them man and wife. I believe the consequence that generally results from marriage will happen here. They will be continually supporting and aiding each other: they will always consider their interest as united. We know the advan¬ tage the few have over the many. They can with facility act in concert, and on an uniform system : they may join, scheme, and plot, against the people without any chance of detection. The se¬ nate and president will form a combination that cannot be prevent¬ ed by the representatives. The executive and legislative powers thus connected, will destroy all balances: this would have been prevented by a constitutional council to aid the president in the dis¬ charge of his office, vesting the senate at the same time with power of impeaching them. Then we should have real responsibility. In its present form, the guilty try themselves. The president is triedi by his counsellors. He is not removed from office during his trial. When he is arrainged for treason he has the command of the army and navy, and may surround the senate with 30,000 troops. It Mason.] V IRGIN A. brings to my recollection the remarkable trial of Milo at Rome. We may expect to see similar instances here. But, I suppose, that the cure for all evils—the virtue and integrity of our representatives, will be thought a sufficient security. On this great and important subject, I am one of those (and ever shall be) who object to it. Mr MADISON—Mr Chairman, I will take the liberty of making a few observations, which may place this in such a light as may ob¬ viate objections. It is observed, that none of the honorable mem' bers oojecting to this, have pointed out the right mode of election* It was lound difficult in the convention, and will be found so by any gentleman who wil take the liberty of delineating a mode of elect¬ ing the president, that would exclude those inconveniences w r hich they apprehend. I would not contend against some of the principles laid down by some gentlemen if the interests of some states only were to be consulted. But there is a great diversity of interests. The choice of the people ought to be attended to. I have found no better way of selecting the man in whom they place the highest confidence, than that delineated in the plan of the convention—nor has the gentleman told us. Perhaps it will be found impracticable to elect him by the immediate suffrages of the people. Difficulties would arise from the extent and population of the states. Instead of this, the people chose the electors. This can be done with ease and convenience, and will render the choice more judicious. As to the eventual voting by states, it has my approbation. The lesser states, and some large states, will be generally pleased by that mode. The deputies from the small states argued, (and there is some force in their reasoning) that when the people voted, the large states evidently had the advantage over the rest, and without varying the mode, the interest of the little states might be neglected or sacrificed. Here is a compromise.— For in the eventual election, the small states will have the advan¬ tage. In so extensive a country, it is probable that many persons will be voted for, and the lowest of the five highest on the list may not be so inconsiderable as he supposes. With respect to the pos¬ sibility, that a small number of votes may decide his election, I do not know how, nor do I think that a bare calculation of possibility ought to govern us.—One honorable gentleman has said, that the eastern states may, in the eventual election, chose him. But in the extravagant calculation he has made, he has been obliged to associ¬ ate North Carolina and Georgia, with the five smallest northern States. There can be no union of interest or sentiments between states so differently situated. The honorable member last up has committed a mistake in saying DEBATES. [Mason. 454 there must be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed. A majority of votes, equal to a majority of the electors appointed,, will be sufficient. Forty-six is a majority of ninety one, and will suffice to elect the president. Mr MASON arose, and insisted that the person having the greatest number of votes would not be elected, unless such majority consisted of the whole number of electors appointed : that it would rarely happen that any one would have such a majority, and as he was then to be chosen from the five highest on the list, his election was entirely taken from the people. Mr MADISON expressed astonishment at the construction of the honorable member, and insisted, that nothing was necessary but a number of votes equal to a majority of the electors, which was forty- six. For the clause expressly said, that “the person having the greatest nnmber of votes shall be president, if such a number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed.” Each had two votes, because one vote was intended for the Vice-President. I am surprised, continued Mr Madison, that the honorable member has not pointed out a more proper mode, since he objects to this. But the honorable gentleman tells us, that the president and sen¬ ate will be in alliance against the representatives, and that from the advantage of the few over the many, they may seduce, or ovei-rule the representatives. But if this be the case,how can he contend for the augmentation of the number of the latter! For the more you increase their number, the more danger in the disproportion. The diversity of circumstances, situation and extent of the different states, will render previous combination, with respect to the election of the president, impossible. The first clause of the second section, was read. Mr GEORGE MASON, animadverting on the magnitude of the powers of the president, was alarmed at the additional power of commanding the army in person. He admitted the propriety of his being commander in chief, so far as to give orders and have a gen¬ eral superintendency : but he thought it would be dangerous to let him command in person without any restraint, as he might make a bad use of it. He was then clearly of opinion, that the consent of a majority of both houses of congress should be required before ho could take the command in person. If at any time it should be necessary that he should take the personal command, either on ac¬ count of his superior abilities, or other cause, then congress would agree to it: and all dangers would be obviated by requiring their eonsent. He called to gentlemen’s recollection, the extent of what the late commander in chief might have done, from his great abili- VIRGINIA. Nicholas.] 455 9 ties, and the strong attachment of both officers and soldiers towards him, if, instead of being disinterested, he had been an ambitious man. So disinterested and amiable a character as General Washing¬ ton might never command again. The possibility of danger ought to be guarded against. Although he did not disapprove of the president’s consultation with the principal executive officers, yet he objected to the want of an executive council, which he conceived to be neeessaiy tOTany regular free government. There being none such, he apprehended a council would arise out of the senate, which, for want of real responsibility, he thought dangerous. You will please, says he, to recollect that removal from offices, and future disqualifications to hold any offices, are the only consequences of conviction on impeachment. Now I conceive that the president ought not to have the power of pardoning, because he may frequent ly pardon crimes which were advised by himself. It may happen at some future day, that he will establish a monarchy, and destroy the republic. If he has the power of granting pardons before in¬ dictment, or conviction, may he not stop enquiry and prevent detec¬ tion? The case of treason ought at least to be excepted. This is a weighty objection with me. Mr LEE reminded his honorable friend, that it did follow of •necessity, that the president should command in person. That he was to command as a civil officer, and might only take the command when he was a man of military talents, and the public safety re¬ quired it. He thought the power of pardoning, as delineated in the constitution, could be no where so well placed as in the president. It was so in the government of New York, and had been found safe and convenient. Mr MASON replied, that he did not mean that the president was of necessity to command, hut he might if he pleased ; and if he was an ambitious man, he might made a dangerous use of it. Mr GEORGE NICHOLAS hoped the committee would not ad¬ vert to this—that the army and navy were to be raised by congress, and not the president. It was on the same footing with our state government: for the governor with the council, were to embody the militia, but when actually embodied, they were under the sole com¬ mand of the governor. The instance adduced was not similar. General Washington was not a president. As to possible danger, any commander might attempt to pervert what was intended for the common defence of the community, to its destruction. The presi¬ dent at the end of four years, was to relinquish all his offices. But if any other person was to have the command, the time would not be- limited, Mr MASON answered, that it did not resemble the state consti- DEBATES. f Madisoi^. hm 45G tution, because the governor did not possess such extensive powers as the president, and had no influence over the navy. The liberty of the people had been destroyed by those who were military com¬ manders only. The danger here was greater hy the junction of great civil powers to the command of the army and fleet. Although congress are to raise the army, said he, no security arises from that: for in time of war, they must and ought to raise an army, which will be numerous, or otherwise, according to the; nature of the war, and then the president is to command without any control. Mr MADISON, adverting to Mr Mason’s objection to the presi¬ dent’s power of pardoning, said, it would be extremely improper to vest it in the house of representatives, and not much less so to place it in the senate; because numerous bodies were actuated more or less by passion, and might in the moment of vengeance forget humanity. It was an established practice in Massachusetts for the legislature to determine in such cases, It was found, says he, that two different sessions, before each of which the question came, with respect to pardoning the delinquents of the rebellion, were governed precisely by different sentiments, the one would execute with uni- * versal vengeance, and the other would extend general mercy. There is one security in this case to which gentlemen may not have adverted : if the president be connected in any suspicious man¬ ner with any person, and there be grounds to believe he will shelter himself, the house of representatives can impeach him : they can remove him if found guilty: they can suspend him when suspected,, and the power will devolve on the vice president. Should he bo- suspected also, he may likewise be suspended till he be impeached,, and removed, and the legislature may make a temporary appoint¬ ment. This a great security. Mr MASON vindicated the conduct of the assemblies mentioned by the gentleman last up. He insisted they were both right. For in the first instance when such ideas of severity prevailed, a rebel¬ lion was in existence : in such circumstance, it was right to be rigid. But after it was over, it would be wrong to exercise unne¬ cessary severity. Mr MADISON replied, that the honorable member had misunder¬ stood the fact: for the first assembly was after the rebellion was over. The decision must have been improper in one or the other case. It marks this important truth, says he, that numerous bodies of men are improper to exeupise this power. The universal experience of mankind proves it. The second clause of the second section was then read. Mr GEORGE MASON thought this a most dangerous clause, as thereby five states might make a treaty ; ten senaters, the represen- Madison.] VIRGINIA. 457 tativos of five states, being two thirds of a quorum. These ten might come from the five smallest states. By the confederation nine states were necessary to concur in a treaty. This secured justice and moderation. His principal fear, however, was not that five, but that seven, states—a bare majority would make treaties to bind the union. Mr GEORGE NICHOLAS, in answer to Mr Mason, insisted that we were on a mere safe footing in this constitution than in the confederation. The possibility of five states making treaties, w r as founded on a susposition of the non-attendance of the senators from the other statee. This non-attendance, he observed, mio-ht be re- ciprocated. It was presumable, that on such important occasions they would attend from all the states, and then there must be a con¬ currence of nine states. From the approbation of the president, who had no local views, being elected by no particular state, but the people at large, was an additional security. Mr MASON differed widely from the gentleman. He conceived, that the contiguity of some states, and remoteness of others, would prevent that reciprocity which he had mentioned. Some states were near the seat of government—Others far from it: For instance, Georgia was eight, or nine hundred miles from it. Suppose, says he, a partial treaty 13 made by the president, and is to be ratified by the senate. They do not always sit. Who is to convene them? The president. Is it presumable that he would call distant states to make the ratification, or those states whose interest he knew to be injured by the treaty he had proposed? This, I conceive, will have a contrary effect from what the gentleman says. A desultory conversation took place. Mr NICHOLAS asked, if it was presumable that the president, who depended on the people for its political existence, wonld sac¬ rifice the interest of the eight largest states, to accommodate the five smallest? The gentleman had said once, that the senate w r ould be always sitting, and yet five states were now' to effect the business, because the rest w r ere away. Mr LEE compared the possibility of non-attendance of the sena¬ tors to that in our state legislature. It consisted of one hundred and seventy members: a majority of these was forty-four, which were competent to pass any law. He demanded if all our laws were bad, because forty-four might pass them? The case was similar. Although two-thirds of the senators present could form a treaty, it was not presumable it could often liappeu, that there should be but a bare quorum present on so important an occasion, when the conse¬ quence of non-attendance was so well known. Mr MADISON thought it astonishing that gentlemen should 458 DEBATES. [Madison. think, that a treaty could be got with surprise, or that foreign nations should be solicitous to get a treaty only ratified by the senators of a few states. Were the president to commit any thing so artrocious as to summon only a few states, he would be impeached and con¬ victed, as a majority of the stales would be affected by his misde¬ meanor. Mr HENRY begged gentlemen to consider the condition of this country would be in, if two-thirds of a quorum should be empow* ered to make a treaty—they might relinquish and alienate territorial rights, and our most valuable commercial advantages. In short, if any thing should be left us, it would be because the piesident and senators were pleased to admit it. The power of making treaties, by this constitution, ill-guarded as it is, extended farther than it did, in any country in the world.—Treaties were to have more force here than in any part of Christendom. For he defied any gentleman to show any thing so extensive in any strong energetic government in Europe. Treaties rest, says he, on the laws and usages of nations. To say that they are municipal, is, to me, a doctrine totally novel. To make them paramount to the constitution, and laws of the states, is unprecedented. I would give them the same force and obligation they have in Great Britain, or any other country in Europe. Gen¬ tlemen are going on in a fatal career: but I hope they will stop be¬ fore the concede this power unguarded and unaltered. Mr MADISON, instead of being alarmed, had no doubt but the constitution would increase, rather than decrease, the security of ter¬ ritorial rights and commercial advantages, as it would augment the strength and respectability of the country. The honorable gentle¬ men, says he, has said we are making great innovations in extend¬ ing the force of treaties. Are not treaties the law of the land in England! I will refer you to a book, which is in every man’s hand, Blackstone’s Commentaries. It will inform you that the treaties made by the king are to be the supreme law of the land. If they are to have any efficacy, they must be the law of the land: they are so in every country. He thinks that by the power of making treaties, the empire may be dismembered in time of peace. The king of Great Britain has the power of making peace, but he has no power of dismembering the empire, or alienating any part of it. Nay, the king of France, has no right of alienating part of his do¬ minions, to any power whatsoever. The power of making treaties does not involve a right of dismembering the union. Mr HENRY asked, how the power of the king of Great Britain with respect to dismembering the empire, would stand, if the con¬ stitution had declared, that treaties would be effectual, notwith¬ standing any thing in the constitution or laws of the country! He Nicholas.] VIRGINIA. 459 would confess his error, if the gentleman could prove that the power of the king of Great Britain, and that of congress, as making treaties, were similar. Mr MADISON conceived, that as far as the king of Great Britain had a constitutional power of making a treaty, such a treaty was binding. He did not say that his power was unlimited. One exception was, that he could not dismember the empire. Mr GRAYSON, after discriminating the difference of what was called the law of nations in different countries, and its different operations, said he was exceedingly alarmed about this clause. His apprehensions were increased from what he had seen. He went over the grounds which had been before developed, of the dangers to which the right of navigating the Mississippi would be exposed, if two-thirds of the senators present had a right to make a treaty to bind the union. Seven states had already discovered a determined resolution of yielding it to Spain. There was every reason, in his opinion, to believe they would avail themselves of the power as soon as it was given them. The prevention of emigrations to the westward, and consequent superiority of the southern power and influence, would be a powerful motive to impel them to relinquish that river. He warmly expatiated on the utility of that navigation, and the impolicy of surrendering it up. The consent of the president is con¬ sidered as a trivial check, if indeed it was any. For the election would be so managed, that he would always come from a particular place, and he would pursue the interest of such place. Gentlemen had said, that the senators would attend from all the states. This, says he, is impracticable, if they be not nailed to the floor. If the senators of the southern states be gone but one hour, a treaty may be made by the rest, yielding that inestimable right. This paper will be called the law of nations in America: it will be the great charter of America: it will be paramount to every thing. After having once consented to it, we cannot recede from it. Such is my repugnance to the alienation of a right which I esteem so important to the happiness of my country, that I would object to this consti¬ tution, if it contained no other defect. Mr NICHOLAS, in answer to the observations of the gentleman last up, on the law of nations, said he thought it was dictated by no particular nation—that there was no such thing as a particular law of nations; but that the law of nations was permanent and general; it was superior to any act or law of any nation. It implied the consent of all, and was mutually binding on all, being acquiesced in for the common benefit of all. Gentlemen recurred to their favor¬ ite business again, their scuffle for Kentucky votes. He compared the king of England’s power to make treaties, to that given by this 460 debates. [Hekef. clause. He insisted they resembled each other. If a treaty was to e tie supreme law of the land here, it was so in England. The power was as unlimited in England, as it was here. Let gentlemen, 'T b"’ Sh ,h' V " e ,! at tHe ldn “ C3n g ° S ° far ’ and 1,0 further; and I show them a like limitation in America. But, say they, the president has no check. The worthy member says, the weight of power oug t to be in this part of the continent, because the number of inhabitants will be greater here. If so, every freeholder havimr a right to vote for the president, by the interposition of electors, will a.tend to their interests. This is a sufficient check. Mr HENRY, Mr Chairman, gentlemen say, that the kino of Great Britain has the same right of making treaties that cur presi¬ dent has here. I will have no objection to this, if you make your president a king. But I will adduce a difference between an Amer¬ ican treaty, and an English treaty. Recollect the case of the Russian ambassador : lie was arrested contrary to the rights of his mas er. ihe Russian emperor demanded the man at whose instance his ambassador was a,rested, to be given up to him, to be put to in¬ stant death. What did the queen say? She wrote him, that that was something paramount to what she could dothat it exceeded her power to comply with his demanij, because it was contrary to the constitution and laws. But how is it here ? Treaties are binding wit islanding our laws and constitutions. Let us illustrate this fatal instance. Suppose the case of the Russian ambassador to appen ere. The president can settle it by a treaty, and have the man arrested, and punished according to Ihe Russian manner. The constitutions of these states may be most flagrantly violated without medy. And still will gentlemen compare the two cases? So grea was the anxiety of Queen Anne, that she wrote a letter to the ussian prince with her own hand, .apologizing for her inability to omp y wit I his demands. The parliament was consulted, and a aw ma e to prevent such arrests for the future. I say again, that -Z, C0nsent to this power, you depend on the justice and equity in ,1°? m p0Wer * We ma y be to5d > that we shall find ample refuse G , aW ofnatlons - When you yourselves have you neck so low, \ o president may dispose of your rights as he pleases, the law ns cannot be applied to relieve you. Sure I am if treaties e, infringing our liberties, it will be too late to say that our utional rights are violated. We are in contact with two P , , TS * . redt ® r * ta * n and Spain. They may claim our most valu- a 6 terntories > aad treaties may be made to yield them. It is easy on our part to define our unalienable rights, and expressly secure t em, so as to pievent future claims and disputes. Suppose you be arraigned as offenders and violators of a treaty made by this go- VIRGINIA. 461 Randolph.] vernmentv Will you have that fair trial which offenders are entitled to in your own government! Will you plead a right to the trial by jury! You will have no right to appeal to your own constitution. You must appeal to your continental constitution. A treaty may be made giving away your rights, and inflicting unusual punishments on its violators. It is contended, that if the king of Great Britain makes a treaty with the line of his prerogative, it is the law of the land. I agree that this is proper, and if I could see the same checks in that paper, which I see in the British government, I would con¬ sent to it. Can the English Monarch make a treaty which shall subvert the common law of England, and the constitution! Dare lie make a treaty that shall violate magna c'narta, or the bill of rights! Dare he do any thing derogatory to the honor, or subversive of the great privileges of his people! No, Sir. If he did, it would be nuga¬ tory, and the attempt would endanger his existence. The king of France calls his parliament to give him power to make what regulations with regard to treaties, they may think con¬ ducive to the interest of the nation. In the time ot Henry the 5th, a treaty with Sigismund, king of Poland, was ratified by the par¬ liament. You have not even as much security as that. You pros¬ trate your rights to the president and senate. This power is there¬ fore dangerous and destructive. Gov. RANDOLPH.—Mr. Chairman, I conceive that neither the life nor property of any citizen, nor the particular right of any state, can be affected by a treaty. The lives and properties of European subjects are not affected by treaties, which are binding on the ag¬ gregate community in ifs political social capacity. The honorable gentleman says, that if you place treaties on the same footing here, as they are in England, he will consent to the power; because the king is restrained in making treaties. Will not the president and senate Ire restrained^ Being creatures of that constitution, can they destroy it! Can any particular body, insti¬ tuted for a particular purpose, destroy the existence of the society for whose benefit it is created! It is said, there is no limitation of treaties. I defy the wisdom of that gentleman to snew how they ought to be limited. W hen the constitution marks out the powers to be exercised by particular departments, I say no innovation can take place. An honorable gentleman says, that this is the great charter of America. If so, will not the last clause of the fourth ar¬ ticle of the constitution, secure against dismemberment! It pu- vides, that “nothing in this constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the, United States, or of any particular state. And if this did not constitute security, it follows from the nature of civil association, that no pajucular part shall sacrifice the whole. 462 DEBATES. [Gray son. Wednesday , the \$th of June , 1788* Mr. GRAYSON, after recapitulating the dangers of losing the Mississippi, if the power of making treaties as delineated in the constitution were granted, insisted most strenuously, that the clause which the honorable gentleman had cited as a security against a dismemberment of the empire, was no real security; because it re¬ lated solely to the back lands claimed by the United States, and different states. This clause was inserted for the purpose of ena¬ bling congress to dispose of and make all needful rules and regula¬ tions respecting the territory, or other property, belonging to the United States, and to ascertain clearly that the claims of particular states respecting territory, should not be prejudiced by the alteration of government; but be on the same footing as before. That it could not be construed to be a limitation of the power of making treaties. Its sole intention was to obviate all the doubts and disputes which existed under the confederation concerning the western territory, and other places in controversy in the United States. He defended his former position with respect to a particular law of nations. I insist, says he, that the law of nations is founded on particular laws of different nations. I have mentioned some instances: I will men¬ tion some more. It is the part of the laws of several oriental na> tions, to receive no ambassadors, and to burn their prisoners. It is- a custom with the grand seignor to receive, but not to send ambas¬ sadors. It is a particular custom with him In time of war with Russia, to put the Russian ambassador in, fhe seven towers. But, the worthy member said, that it was odd; there should be a particu-. lar law of nations. I beg leave to tell him that the United States States are entering into a particular law of nations now. I do not deny the existence of a general law of nations; but I contend, that in different nations, them are certain laws or customs regulating their conduct towards other nations, which are as permanently and immutably observed as the general law of nations. Ojf course there was a law of nations incident to the confederation,, Any person may renounce a right secured to him by any particular law or cus¬ tom of a nation. If congress have no right by the law of nations to give away a part of the empire, yet by this compact they may give it up. I look on that eompact to be a part of the law of na¬ tions. The treat^Kof Munster formed a great part or the law of na¬ tions. How is the Scheldt given up? By that treaty, though con¬ trary to the law of nations. Cannot congress give the Mississippi also by treaty, though such cession would deprive us of a right to which, by the law of nations, we aTe inalienably and indefeasibly entitled? I lay it down as a principle, that nations can, as well a? Virginia. 4G3 Nicholas.] individuals, renounce any particular right. Nations who inhabit on the sources of rivers have a right to navigate them, and go down as * well as the waters themselves. Mr. GEORGE NICHOLAS again drew a parallel between the power ot the king of Great Britain, and that of congress, with re¬ spect to making treaties. He contended, they were on the same foundation, and that every possible security which existed in the one instance, was to be found in the other. To prove that there was no' constitutional limits to the king’s power of making treaties, and that treaties when once by him made, were the supreme law of the land, he quoted the following lines in Blackstone’s Commentaries, vol. 1, page 257. “It is also the king’s prerogative to make treaties, leagues, and alliances, with foreign states and princes. For it is,by the law of nations, essential to the goodness of a league, that it be made by the sovereign power; and then it is binding upon the whole community; and in England the sovereign power quoad hoc r is vested in the person of the king. Whatever contracts therefore he engages in, no other power in the kingdom can legally delay, resist, or annul.” A further proof, says Mr. Nicholas, that there is no limitation in this respect, is afforded by what he adds. “ And yet, lest this plenitude of authority should be abused, to the detri¬ ment of the public, the constitution has interposed a check by the means of parliamentary impeachment, for the punishment of such ministers as from criminal motives advise or conclude any treaty, which shall afterwards be judged to derogate from the honor and interest of the nation.” How does this apply to this constitution? r l he president and seriate have the same power of making treaties; and when made they are to have the same force and validity. They are to be the supreme law of the land here-~this book shews us they are so in England. Have we not seen in America that treaties were violated, though they are in all countries considered as the supreme law of the land! Was it not therefore necessary to declare in explicit terms, that they should be so here! How then is this constitution on a different footing with the government of Britain? The worthy member says* they can make a treaty relinquishing our rights, and inflicting pun¬ ishments ; because all treaties are declared paramount to the consti¬ tutions and laws of the states. An attentive consideration of this will shew the committee, that they can do no such thing. Tha provision of the sixth article, is that this constitution and laws of the United states, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all the treaties made or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land. They can by this make no treaty which shall be Tepngnantto the spirit of the 464 DEBATES. [Mason. constitution, or inconsistent with the delegated powers. The treat¬ ies they make must be under the authority of the United States, to he within their province. It is sufficiently secured, because it only declares that in pursuance of the powers given they shall he the su- pieme law of the land, notwithstanding any thing in the constitution or laws of particular states. I he fact which he has adduced from the English history, respect- mg the Russian ambassador, does not apply to this part of the con¬ stitution. The arrest of that ambassador was an offence against, the law of nations. There was no tribunal to punish it before. An act was therefore made to prevent such offences for the future; appoint¬ ing a court to try offenders against it, and pointing out their punish¬ ment. That act acknowledges the arrest to have been a violation of the law of the nations, and that it was a defect in their laws, that no remedy had been provided against such violations before. I think it must appear to the satisfaction of the committee, that this power is similar to what it is in England. Mr GEORGE MASON—Mr Chairman, it is true that this is one of the greatest acts of sovereignty, and therefore, ought to be mos strongly guarded. The cession of such a power' without such checks and guards cannot be justified ; yet I acknowledge such a power must rest somewhere. It is so in all governments. If in the course of an unsuccessful war we should he compelled to give up part of our territories, or undergo subjugation if the general govern¬ ment could not make a treaty to give up such a part for the preser¬ vation of the residue, the government itself, and consequently the rights of the people, must fall.—Such a power must, therefore, rest somewhere. For my own part I never heard it denied, that such a power must be vested in the government. Our complaint is, that it is not sufficiently guarded, and that it requires much more solem¬ nity and caution, than are delineated in that system. It is more*- guarded in England. Will any gentleman undertake to say, that the king, by his prerogative, can dismember the British empire! Could the king give Portsmouth to France? He could not do this without an express act of parliament —without the consent of the legislature in all its branches. There are other things which the king cannot do—which may be done by the president and senate in this case. Could the king, by his prerogative, enable foreign sub¬ jects to purchase lands/and have an hereditary indefeasible title? This would require an express act of parliament. Though the king can make treaties, yet he cannot make a treaty contrary to the constitution of his country. Where did their con¬ stitution originate? It is founded on a number of maxims, which Mason. J VIRGINIA. 465 by long time, are rendered sacred and inviolable. Where are there such maxims in the American constitution? In that country, which we called formerly our mother country, they have had for many cen¬ turies certain fundamental maxims, which have secured their per¬ sons and properties, and prevented a dismemberment of their country. The common law, Sir, has prevented the power of the crown from destroying the immunities of the people. We are placed in a still better condition—in a more Favorable situation than perhaps any people ever were before. We have it in our power to secure our liberties and happiness on the most unshaken, firm and permanent basis. We can establish what government we please. But by that paper we are consolidating the United States into one great go¬ vernment, and trusting to constructive security. You will find no such thing in the English government. The common law of En¬ gland is not the common law of these states. I conceive, therefore that there is nothing in that constitution to hinder a dismemberment of the emoire. i Will any gentleman say, that they may not make a treaty, where¬ by the subjects of France, England, and other powers may buy what lands they please in this country? This would violate those principles which we have received from the mother country. The indiscriminate admission of all foreigners to the first rights of citi¬ zenship, without, any permanent security for their attachment to the country, is repugnant to every principle of prudence and good poli¬ cy. The president and senate can make any treaty whatsoever.—> We wish not to refuse, but to guard this power as it is done in En¬ gland. The empire there cannot be dismembered, without the con¬ sent. of the national parliament. We wish an express and explicit declaration in that paper, that the power which can make other treaties, cannot, without the consent of the national parliament—the national legislature, dismember the empire. The senate alone ought not to have this power* much less ought a few states to have it. No treaty to dismember the empire, ought to be made without the con¬ sent of three-fourths of the legislature in all its branches. Nor ought such a treaty to be made, but in case of the most urgent and una¬ voidable necessity. When such necessity exists, there is no doubt hut there will be a general and uniform vote of the continental par¬ liament. Mr CORBIN largely expatiated on the propriety of vesting this power in the general government, in the manner proposed by the plan of the convention. He also contended, that the empire could not be dismembered without the consent of the part dismembered. To obviate the force of the observations made by an honorable gen¬ tleman respecting the relinquishment of the Scheldt, he adduced the vol, 3. DEBATES 466 {C0RBI3T, late complaints and efforts of the Emperor of Germany, respecting' that river. He insisted that no part of the constitution was less ex- ceptionable than this. If, says he, there be any sound part in thl» constitution it is in. this clause. The representatives are excluded' from interposing in making treaties, because large popular assem¬ blies are very improper to transact such business, from the impossi— bility of their acting with sufficient secrecy, despatch and decision, which can only be found in small bodies—and because such numer¬ ous bodies are ever subject to factions and party animosities. It would be ;dangerous to give this power to the president alone—as the concession of such power to one individual, is repugnant to re¬ publican principles. It is, therefore, given to the president and the senate (who represent the states in their individual capacities) con¬ jointly. In this it differs from every government we know. It steers with admirable dexterity between the two extremes—neither leaving it to the executive, as in most other governments, not to the legislative, which would too much retard such negociation. The honorable gentleman said that treaties are not. the supremo* law of the land in England. My honorable friend proved the con¬ trary by the commentaries of Blackstone. Let me confirm it by &> circumstance fresh in the memory of every body. When the treaty was made by us with England, it was disapproved ofby the En¬ glish parliament, and the administration was turned out: yet the treaty was good. Does not this prove that it was binding on the nation, and that the king has such a power 1 What other proof do gentlemen wish ? In England it is a maxim that the king can do no wrong,yet they have sufficient responsibility,as the ministry can do no wrong: for if they advise him to make a treaty, derogatory to tho- honor and interest of the nation, they do it at the risk of their heads.. If the king were to make such a treaty himself, contrary to the advice of his ministry, an honest or prudent minister would resign. The president of the United States is responsible in person himself, at well as the senators. But say gentlemen, all treaties made under this constitution, ar»* to be the supreme law of nations: that is, in their way of construc¬ tion, paramount to the constitution itself, and the laws of congress*- It is as clear, as that two and two make four, that the treaties made are to be binding on- the states only. Is it net necessary that they should be binding on the states? Fatal experience has proved, that treaties would never be complied with, if their observance depended on the will of the states, and the consequences would be constant war. For if any one state could counteract any treaty, how could •the United States avoid hostility with foreign nations? Do not ^gentlemen see the infinite dangers that would result from it, if a. VIRGINIA. 467 CoRRIN.] ssmall part of the community could drag the whole confederacy into war? The honorable gentleman on the other side, tells us, that this doctrine is not found, because in England it is declared that the consent of parliament is necessary. Had the honorable gentleman used his usual discernment and penetration, he would see the differ** ence betweeen a commercial treaty and other treaties. A commer¬ cial treaty must be submitted to the consideration of parliament; because such treaties will render it necessary to alter some laws, add new clauses to some, and repeal others. If this be not done the treaty is void, quoad hoc. The Mississippi cannot be dismem- bered, but two ways—by a common treaty, or a commercial treaty. If the interest, of congress will lead them to yield it by the first, the law of nations would justify the people of Kentucky to resist, and the cession would be nugatory. It cannot then be surrendered by a common treat) 7 . Can it be done by a commercial treaty. Ifit should, the consent of the House of Representatives would be requi¬ site ; because of the correspondent alterations that must be made in the laws. [Here Mr Corbin illustrated his position by reading the last clause of the treaty with France, which gives certain commercial privileges to the subjects of France; to give full effect to which, certain correspondent alterations were necessary in the commercial regulations.] This, continues he, secures legislative interference. Some of the most extraordinary calculations that ever were made, have been adduced, to prpve, that the navigation of the Mississippi is on a worse ground than it was before. We are told that five states can make a treaty. This is on a supposition, that the senators from the other states will be absent, which is wild and extravagant. On this ground three states can prevent it; and if Kentucky become a state, two other states with it can prevent the making such a treaty. I wish not to assert, but to prove. Suppose there be fourteen mem¬ bers, and the members from Kentucky be of the number. Two- thirds, which are ten, are necessary to make a treaty. Three mem¬ bers, together with the two members from Kentucky, will be sufli- ' © cient to prevent its being made. But suppose all the other states to be present (which is the fair conclusion, for it is fair to conclude that men will be attentive to their own interest) what would be.t'h# consequence?—There would be tw r enty-eight. Two-thirds of which are nineteen, which is one member more than the senators of nine states ; so -that in such a case ten states must concur in the treaty whereas by the old confederation, only nine states were necessary,, I defy any man to confute this doctrine. The argument of gentle- gpen is therefore disingenuous. I am more forcibly red to thiscoa? DEBATES. 468 [Henr elusion, when I hear gentlemen go to barbarous nations to addu< proofs of the requisites of a social government. Mr HENRY. Mr Chairman, this great national concern handled in a manner quite new to me. When arguments are use which are calculated in their nature to mislead men—when I refie on the subject, I dread that our rights are about to be given awa though I may possibly be mistaken. I said yesterday, and n without thinking much on the subject, that my mind would be ease were we on the same grounds in this respect, as the Englis are. Gentlemen think that Great Britain was adduced by me this instance, unfoitunately for myself, because the learned Jud^ Blackstone says, that treaties are binding on the nation, and tl king can make treaties. That learned Judge says, there is one thin which operates as a guard. That thing we have not in this paper-- it is responsibility. He tells you, that the minister who will saerr fice the interest of the nation, is subject to parliamentary impeach ment. This has been ever found to be effectual. But I beg gentl men to consider the American impeachment. What is it ? It is mere sham—a mere farce. When they do any thing derogatory I the honor or interest of their country, they are to try themselve i Is it so in England? The history of that country, shews that the i have blocks and gibbets. The violators of the public interest hav been tried justly and impartially, and perished by those nece; ■ sary instruments of justice. Can there be any security whei: offenders mutually try one another? I hope gentlemen will considi i the necessity of amendment in this clause. We are told that the state rights are preserved. Suppose th 3 state right to territory be preserved, I ask and demand how do th) rights oi persons stand, when they have power to make any treat], and that treaty is paramount to constitutions, laws,and every thing* When a person shall be treated in the most horrid manner, anl most cruelly and inhumanly tortured, will the security territory I rights grant him redress? Suppose an unusual punishment in coi" sequence of an arrest similar to that of the Russian ambassador- ■ can it be said to be contrary to the state rights? 1 might go on in this discrimination, but it is too obvious that th security of territory is no security of individual safety. I ask, hot are the state rights, individual rights, and national rights secured Not as in England; for the authority quoted from Blackstone would it stated right, prove in a thousand instances, that if the king c England attempted to take away the rights of individuals, the lav would stand against him. The acts of parliament would stand ii his way. The bill and declaration of rights would be against him The common law is fortified by the bill of rights. The rights c' ’Madison.] VIRGINIA. 469 the people cannot be destroyed, even by the paramount operation of the law of nations, as the case of the Russian ambassador evinces. If you look for a similar security in the paper on your table, you look in vain. That paper is defective without such a declaration of rights. It is unbounded without such restrictions. If the constitu¬ tion be paramount, how are the constitutions and laws of the states to stand? Their operation will be totally controlled by it. For it 18 paramount tocvery thing, unless you can shew some guard against it. The rights of persons are exposed as it stands now. The calculation of the honorable gentleman (Mr. Corbin) was wrong. I am sure he spoke from the best of his recollection, when he referred to our treaty of peace with Great Britain, and said, that it was binding on the nation, though disapproved of by parliament. Did not an act of parliament pass, acknowledging the independence •of America? If the king of England wished to dismember the em¬ pire, would he dare to attempt it without the advice of parliament? The most hardy minister would not dare to advise him to attempt it without a previous consultation of parliament. No cession of territory is binding on the nation unless it be foitilled by an act of * parliament. Will it be so in your American government? No. They will tell >ou that they are omnipotent as to this point. We are so used to speak of enormity of powers, that w r e are fa¬ miliarized with it. To me this power appears still destructive; for they can make any treaty. If congress forbears to exercise it, you .may thank them; but they may exercise it if they please, and as they please. They have a right, from the paramount power given them, to do so. Will the gentleman say, that this power is para¬ mount to the state laws only? Is it not paramount to the constitu¬ tion, and every thing? Can any thing be paramount to what is paramount? Will not the laws of congress be binding on congress, as well as on any particular state? Will they not be bound by their own acts? The worthy gentleman must see the impropriety of his assertion. To render this safe, I conceive we must adopt my honor¬ able friend’s amendment. The component part of this supreme power are the president, senators, and house of representatives. The latter is the most material part. They ought to interpose in the formation of treaties. When their consent is necessary, there will be a certaintjr of attending to the public interests. Mr. Henry then contended, that there was real responsibility in the British government, and sufficient security arising from the com¬ mon law, declaration of rights, &c.; whereas, in this government, there was no barrier to stop their mad career. He hoped to obtain the amendments which his honorable friend had proposed. Mr. MADISON.—Mr. Chairman,! am persuaded that when this debates. 470 [Madisoj^ power comes to be thoioughly and candidly veiwed, it will bo fonn. right and pioper. As to its extent, perhaps it will be satisfactory t the committee, that the power is precisely in the new constitution, a it is in the confederation. In the existing confederacy, congres; are authorized indefinitely to make treaties. Many of ihe states havi recognised the treaties of congress to be the supreme law of th. land. Acts have passed within a year, declaring this to be the case I have seen many of them. Does it follow, because this power l giren to congress, that it is absolute and unlimited! I do not con ceive that power is given to the president and senate to dismembe the empire, or to alienate any great essential right. I do not think the whole legislative authority have this power. The exercise o. the power must be consistent with the object of the delegation. One objection against the amendment proposed, is this; that by Implication, it would give power to the legislative authority to dis¬ member the empire—a power that ought not to be given, but by the necessity that would force assent from every man. I think it restai on the safest foundation as it is. The object of treaties is the regu¬ lation of intercourse with foreign nations, and is external. I do not think it possible to enumerate all the cases in which such external regulations would be necessary. Would it be right to define all the cases in which congress could exercise this authority! The defini¬ tion might, and probably would be defective. They might he re¬ strained by such a definition, from exercising the authority where it would be essential to the interest and safety of the community. It is most safe, therefore, tc leave it to be exercised as contingencies may arise. It is to be presumed, that in transactions with foreign countries, those who regulate them, will feel the whole force of national at¬ tachment to their country. The contrast being between their own nation and a foreign nation, is it not presumable they will, as far as- possible, advance the interest of thoir own country! Would it not be considered as a dangerous principle in the British government, were the king to have the same power in internal regulations, as he has in the external business of treaties? Yet, as among other iea- tons, it is natural to suppose he will prefer the interest of his own, to that of another country, it is thought proper to give him this ex¬ ternal power cf making treaties. This distinction is well worthy the consideration of gentlemen. I think the argument of the gentle¬ man who restrained the supremacy of these to the laws of particu¬ lar states, and not to congress, is rational. Here the supremacy of « treat)' is contrasted with the supremacy of the laws of the states. It cannot be otherwise supreme. If it does not supersede their ex¬ isting laws, as far as they contravene its operation,, it cannot be af UimtoN.] VIRGINIA. 471 any effect. To counteract it by the supremacy of the state laws would bring- on the union the just charge of national perfidy, and involve us in war. Suppose the king of Great Britain should make a treaty with France, where he had a constitutional right; if the treaty should re¬ quire an internal regulation, and the parliament should make a law to that effect, that law would be binding on the one, though not on the other nation. Suppose there should be a violation of right by the exercise of this power by the president and senate; if there was apparent merit in it, it would be binding on the people: for where there is a power for any particular purpose, it must supersede what may oppose it, or else it can be no power. For instance, where there )• a power of declaring war, that power as to declaring war super¬ sedes every thing. This would be an unfortunate case, should it happen; but should it happen, there is a remedy; and there being a remedy, they will be restrained against abuses. But let us compare the responsibility in this government to that of the British government. If there be an abuse of this royal peroga- tive, the minister who advises him, is liable to impeachment. This is the only restraint on the sovereign. Now, Sir, is not the minis¬ ter of the United States under restraint? Who is the minister?— The president himself, who is liable to impeachment.. He is res¬ ponsible in person. But for the abuse of the power of the king, tha responsibility is in his advisers. Suppose the constitution had said, that this minister alone could make treaties, and when he violated the interest of the nation, he would be impeached by the senate; then the comparison would hold good between the two governments. But is there not an additional security by adding to him the representa¬ tives and guardians of the political interest of the states? Ifheshoul •educe a part of the senate to a participation in his crimes, thos* who were not seduced would pronounce sentence against him; and there is this supplementary security, that he may be convicted and punished afterwards, when other members come in the senate, on* third being excluded every second year. So that there is a two-fold •ecurity. The security of impeachment and conviction by thos® •enators that they may be innocent, should no more than one.tbiid be engaged with the president in the plot; and should there be mor* of them engaged in it, he may be tried and convicted by the suc¬ ceeding senators, and the upright senators who were in the senat® before. As to the case of the Russian ambassador, I shall say nothing. It ig as inapplicable as many other quotations made by the gentle¬ man. I conceive that as far as the bills of rights in the states, do sot express any thing foreign to the nature of such things, and «&- DEBATES. [Pendleton. press fundamental principles essentual to liberty, and those privi¬ leges which are declared necessary to all free people, these rights are not encroached on by this government. [Mr. Madison added other remarks which could not be heard.] Mr. CORBIN begged leave to explain what he had said. He acknowledged that an act of parliament passed, acknowledging the independence of America: but though there was nothing in that act respecting the Newfoundland fishery, and we were by the treaty to enjojr a right te that fishery unmolested, yet that part of the treaty was binding on the nation. After some desultory conversation, concerning the mode of con¬ sidering the judiciary. The 1st and 2d sections, of the third article, were read Mr PENDLETON.—Mr Chairman, on a former occasion when I was considering the Government at larn-e, I mentioned the necessi- ty of making a judiciary an essentual part of the government. It is necessary in order to arrest the executive arm, prevent arbitral pun¬ ishments, and give a fair trial, that the innocent may be guarded, and the guilty brought to just punishment and that honesty and indus¬ try be protected, and injustice and fraud be prevented. Taking it for granted then, that a judiciary is necessary, the power of that ju¬ diciary must be co-extensive with the legislative power, and reach to all parts of the society intended to be governed. They must be so arranged, that there must be some court which shall be the cen¬ tral point of their operations; and because all the business cannot be done in that part, there must be inferior courts to carry it on. The first clause contains an arrangement of the courts—one supreme, and such inferior as congress may ordain and establish. This seems to me to be proper. Congress must be the judges, and may find rea¬ sons to change and vary them as experience shall dictate. It is therefore not onty improper but exceedingly inconvenient to fix the arrangement in the constitution itself, and not leave it to laws which may be changed according to circumstances. I think it highly prob¬ able that their first experiment will be, to appoint the state courts to have the inferior federal jurisdiction; because it would be best calculated to give general satisfaction, answer economical purposes; since a small additional salary may in that case suffice, instead of competent prevision for the judges. But even this eligible mode experience may furnish powerful reasons for changing, and a power to make such changes ought to rest with congress. This clause al¬ so secures an important point—the independency of the judges, both as to tenure of office and fixing of salary. 1 wish the restraint had been applied to increase as well as diminution. VIRGINIA. 473 Pendleton.] The second section points out the subjects of their jurisdiction: 1. Cases arising under the constitution. 2* under the laws of the federal legislature. ^ 3. treaties made by them. 4. AH cases affecting ambassadors, ministers, and consuls. o. All cases of maritime or admiralty jurisdiction. 6 . Controversies wherein the United States shall be party. 7. ' between two or more states. , 8* between a state and citizens of anothei state. 9* between citizens of different states. 20. between citizens of the same state, claiming lands under grants of different states. II* between a state, or its citizens, and foreign states, citizens or subjects. Without entering into a distinction of all its parts, I believe it will be found that they are all cases of general and not local concerns. The necessity and propriet}^ of a federal jurisdiction, in all such ca¬ ses, must strike every gentleman. \ The next clause settles the original jurisdiction of the supreme court confining it two cases—that of ambassadors, ministers, and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. It excludes its original jurisdiction in all other cases. But it appears to me, that it will not restrain congress from regulating even these so as to permit foreign ambassadors to sue in the inferior courts, or even to compel them to do so, where their causes may be trivial,or they havo no reason to expect a partial trial. Notwithstanding this jurisdic¬ tion is given to the supreme court, yet congress may go farther by their laws, so as to exclude its original jurisdiction by limiting the cases wherein it shall be exercised. They may require seme sat¬ isfactory evidence, that the party could not expect a fair trial in the inferior court. I am struck with this view from considering, that the legislature is not excluded by the general jurisdiction in the con¬ stitution, from regulating it to accommodate the convenience of the people. Yet the legislature cannot extend its original jurisdiction, which is limited to these cases only The next branch brings me to the appellate jurisdiction. And first, I say it is proper and necessary in all free governments, to al¬ low appeals under certain restrictions, in order to prevent injustice by correcting the erroneous decisions of local subordinate tribunals, and introduce uniformity in decision. The appellate jurisdiction is, therefore, undoubtedly proper, and would not have been objected to if they had not introduced, unfortunately in this clause the words, “ both as to law and fact.” Though I dread no danger, I wish these words had been buried in oblivion. If they had, it would have si¬ lenced the greatest objections against the section, I will give my iree and candid sentiments on it. Wfefind them followed by words DEBATES. m ^PeNDL 8T Olfr which remove a great deal of doubt. With such exceptions, and tinder such regulations, as congress shall make.” So that congress may make such regulations as they may think conducive to the pub¬ lic convenience. Let us consider the appellate jurisdiction if these words had been left out. The general jurisdiction must embrace decrees in chancery and admiralty, and judgements in courts of common law, in the or¬ dinary practice of this appellate jurisdiction. W hen there is an ap¬ peal from the inferior court to the court of chancery, the appellate jurisdiction goes to law and fact; because the whole testimony ap¬ pears in the record. The court proceeds to consider the circum¬ stances of both law and fact blended together, and then decreeB ac¬ cording to equity. This must be unexceptionable to every body. How is itjn appeals from the admiralty? That court, except in tome cases, proceeds as a court of chancery. In some cases they have trials by jury. But in most cases they proceed as in chancery. They consider all the circumstances, and determine as well what the fact, as what the law, is. When this goes to the superior court It is determined the same way. Appeals from the common law courts, involve the consideration of focts by the superior court, when there is a special verdict. They consider the fact and law together, and decide accordingly. But they cannot introduce new testimony. When a jury proceeds to try a cause in an inferior court, a question may arise on the competency of a witness, or some other testimony. The inferior courts decides that question—they either admit or reject that evidence. The party intending to object, states the matter in a bill of exceptions. The jury then proceeds to try the cause, according to the judgment of the inferior court; and on appeal, the superior court determines up¬ on the judgment of the inferior court. They do not touch the testi¬ mony. If they determine that the evidence was either ^improperly admitted or rejected, they set aside the judgment, and send back tho cause to be tried again by a jury in the same court. These are the only eases in appeals fron/inferior courts of common law, where the superior court can even consider facts incidentally I fell the danger as much as any gentleman in this committee of carrying a party to the federal court, to have a trial there. But it appears to me that it will not be the case, if that be the practice which I have now stated and that-ie. the practice must be admitted. The appeals may b® limited to c certain sum. I make no doubt it will be so. You can¬ not protent appeals without great inconvenience*, kut eongreaacan prevent that dreadful oppression which would enable many men to Uave e trial in the federal court, which is ruinous. TheTe iy a powee Pctdmeton.] VIRGINIA. which may be considered as a great security—the power of mating what regulations and exceptions in appeals they may think proper, may be so contrived as to render appeals as to law and fact proper and perfectly inoffensive. How will this power be exercised! If I thought there was a possibility of danger, 1 would be alarmed. But when I consider who this congress are—that they are thb representatives of thirteen states, (which may become fourteen or fifteen, or a much greater number of states) who cannot be interest¬ ed in the most remote degree, to subject their citizens to oppression* of that dangerous kind, but will feel the same inclination to guard their citizens from them, I am not alarmed. I consider them as se¬ cured from it, by the arrangement of these courts by congress. To carry the citizens a great distance from their respective states can be of no advantage, but a great hardship to every state, except that wherein the seat of government may be. I conceive it probable, that they will, as far as they may consistently with the national good, confine these cases. But when I cast my eyes to the southern and eastern states, every one of which are at a greater distance than w& are, I cannot entertain a doubt, but what this point will be perfectly •ecure.—Every state being concerned almost equally, we have suf¬ ficient security that when they come to organize the supreme court r they will regulate it, so as to exclude this danger. The fourth branch secures two important points in criminal cases. 1st.—That the trial shall be by jury, *2d—That it shall b# in the state where the offence is committed. I does not point eat where it shall be within the state, or the more minute minuti® re¬ specting it: but laws will be made by which it will b* regulated' fully and minutely, I cannot conceive what motives they eaa have in forming these trials, to render them oppressive. We have this security—that our citizens shall not bo carried out of the state and that no other trial can be substituted to that by jury.. [Mr Pendleton made many other remarks but he spoke too low to be comprehended distinctly.] Mr GEORGE MASON.—Mr Chairman I had some hopes thst tho candour and reason of the warmest friends of this constitution would have led them to point out objections so important. They must occur, more or less, to the mind of every one. It is with great reluctance I speak of this department, as it lies out of my lin®. I *hould not tell my sentiments upon it, did I not conceive it ft) be bo constructed as to destroy the dearest rights cf the community. Af¬ ter having read the first section, Mr Mason asked what id th©r«> left to the state courts? Will any gentlemen be pleaded, candidly, fair¬ ly, and without sophistry, to shew us what remains? TherfeU ttsf 4176 DEBATES. [Masois. limitation. It goes to every thing.—The inferior courts are to be as numerous as congress may think proper. They are to be of whatever nature they please. Read the second section, and contem¬ plate attentively the extent of the jurisdiction of these courts, and consider if there be any limits to it. I am greatly mistaken if there be any limitation whatsoever, with respect to the nature or jurisdiction of these courts. If there be any limits, they must be contained in one of the clauses of this section; and I believe, on a dispassionate discussion, it will be found that there is none of any check. All the laws of the United States are paramount to the laws and constitution of any single state. “The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity, arising under this constitution.” What objects will not this expression ex¬ tend to? Such laws may be formed, as will go to every object of private property. When we consider the nature of these courts, we must conclude, that their effect and operation will be utterly to de¬ stroy the state governments. For they will be the judges how far their laws will opetate. They are to modify their own courts, and you can make no state law to counteract them. The discrimination between their judicial power, and that of the states, exists, there¬ fore, but in name. To what disgraceful and dangerous length does the principal of this go? For if your state judiciaries are not to be trusted with the administration of common justice, and decision of disputes respecting property between man and man, much less ought the state governments to be trusted with power of legislation. The principle itself goes to the destruction of the legislation of the states, whether or not it was intended. As to my own opinion, I most reli¬ giously and conscentiously believe, that it was intended, though I am not absolutely certain. But I think it will destroy the state go¬ vernments, whatever may have been the intention. There are many gentlemen in the United Ststes who think it right, that we should have one great national consolidated government, and that it was better to bring it about slowly and imperceptibly, rather than all at once. This is no reflection on any man, for I mean none. To those who think that one national consolidated government be best for America, this extensive judicial authority will be agreeable ; but 1 hope there are many in this convention of a different opinion, and who see their political happiness resting on their state governments. I know, from my own knowledge, many worthy gentlemen of the former opinion. [Here Mr Madison interrupted Mr Mason, and demanded an une¬ quivocal explanation. As these insinuations might create a belief, that every member of the late federal convention was of that opin¬ ion, he wished him to tell who the gentlemen were to whom he al¬ luded.] VIRGINIA. 477 Mason.] Mr MASON then leplied, I shall never refuse to explain myself* It is notorious that tht3 is a prevailing principle. It was at least the opinion of many gentlemen in convention, and many in the United States. I do not know what explanation the honorable gentleman asks. I can say with great truth, that the honorable gentleman, in private conversation with me, expressed himself against it: neither did I ever hear any of the delegates from this state advocate it. Mr MADISON declared himself satisfied with this, unless the committee thought themselves entitled to ask a further explanation. After some desultory remarks, Mr Mason continued. I have heard that opinion advocated by gentlemen, for whose abilities, judg- ment, and knowledge, I have the highest reverence and respect. I say that the general description of the judiciary involves the most extensive jurisdiction. Its cognizance in all cases arisingundei the system, and the laws of congress, may be said to be unlimited. In the next place it extends to treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority. This is one of the powers whidh ought to be given them. I also admit that they ought to have judicial cogni- zance in all cases affecting ambassadors, foreign ministers, and con¬ suls, as well in cases of maratime jurisdiction. There is an addi¬ tional reason now to give them this last power: because congress be¬ sides the general powers, are about to get that of regulating com¬ merce of foreign nations. This is a power which existed before, and is a proper subject of federal jurisdiction. The next power of the judiciary is also necessary under some restrictions. Though the decision of controversies to which the United States shall be a party, may at first view seem proper, it may without restraint, be extended to a dangerously oppressive length. The next, with re¬ spect to disputes between two or more states, is right. I cannot see ihe propriety of the next power, in disputes between a state and the citizens of another state. As to controversies between citizens of different states, their power is improper and inadmissible. In dis¬ putes between citizens of the same state, claiming lands under the grants of different states, the power is proper. It is the only case in which the federal judiciary ought to have appellate cognizance of disputes between private citizens. Unless this was the case, the suit must be brought and decided in one, or the other state, under whose grant the lands are claimed, which would be injurious, as the decision must be consistent with the grant. The last clause is still more improper. To give them cognizance in disputes between a state and the citizens thereof, is utterly incon¬ sistent with reason or good policy. Here Mr NICHOLAS arose, and informed Mr Mason, that his interpretation of this part was not warranted by the words. **78 DEBATES. [Mascwjv Mr MASON replied, that if he recollected rightly, the propriety ~©f the power as explained by him, had been contended for, bat that as his memory had never been good, and was now impaired much from his age, he would not insist on that interpretation. He then proceeded:—Give me leave to advert to the operation of this judicial power. Its jurisdiction in the first case will extend to all cases affecting revenue, excise, and custom house officers. If I am mista¬ ken I will retract. “ All cases in law and equity arising under thia constitution, and the laws of the United states, take in all the offi¬ cers of the government. They comprehend all those who act a* collectors of taxes, excisemen, &c. It will take in of course what others do to them, and what is done by them to others. In what predicament will our citizens then be? We know the difficulty w» are put in by our own courts, and how hard it is to bring officers to justice even in them. If any of the federal officers should be guilty of the greatest oppressions, or behave with the most insolent and wanton brutality to a man’s wife or daughter, where is this man to get relief?* If you suppose in the inferior courts, they are not ap¬ pointed by the states. They are not men in whom the community -can place confidence. It will be decided by federal judges. Even suppose the poor man should be able to obtain judgment in the in¬ ferior court, for the greatest injury, what justice can he get on ap* peal? Can he go 400 or 500 miles? Can he stand the expenco at** tending it? On this occasion they are to judge of fact as well as law. He must bring his witnesses where he is not known, where a new evidence may be brought against him, of w r hich he never heard before, and which he cannot contradict. The honorable gentleman, who presides here, has told us, that the supreme court of appeals must embrace every object of maritime, chancery, and common law controversy. In the two first, the indis¬ criminate appellate jurisdiction as to fact, must be generally grant¬ ed; because otherwise it could exclude appeals in those cases. But why not discriminate as to matters of fact as to common law coo- troversies? The honorable gentleman has allowed that it was dan¬ gerous, but hopes regulations will be made to suit the convenience confidence in them, and expect nothing 1 but the most exalted integri¬ ty and sublime virtue. But I go on this great republican principle, that the people will have virtue and intelligence to seleet men of virtue and wisdom. Is there no virtue among us? If there be not, we are in a wretched situation. No theoretical checks—no form of government can render us secure. To suppose that any form of gov¬ ernment will secure liberty or happiness without any virtue in the people, is a chimerical idea. If there be sufficient virtue and intelli¬ gence in the community, it will be exercised in the selection of these men. So that we do not depend on their virtue, or put confi¬ dence in our rulers, but in the people who are to choose them. Having taken this general View on the subject, I will now advert to what has fallen from the honorable gentleman who presides. His criticism is, that the judiciary has not been guarded from ail increase of the salary of the judges. I wished riiyself, to insert a restraint on the augmentation, as well as diminution, of their compensation: and supported it in the convention. But I was over ruled. Imust state the reasons which were urged. They had great weight. The business must increase. If their was no power to inciease their pay, according to the increase of business, during the life of the judges, it might happen that there would be such an accumulation of busi¬ ness; as would reduce the pay to a most trivial consideration. This reason does not hold as to the president. For in the short period which he presides, this cannot happen. His salary ought not, there¬ fore, to be increased. It was objected yesterday, that there was no provision for a jury from the vicinage. If it could have been done with safety, it would not have been opposed. It might so happen, that a trial would be impractible in the country. Suppose a rebel¬ lion in a whole district, would it not be impossible to get a jury? The trial by jury is held as sacred in England as in America.— There are deviations of it inEngland; yet greater deviations have hap¬ pened here since we established our independence, than have taken place there for a long time, though it be left to the legislative discre¬ tion. It is a misfortune in any case that this trial should be departed from, yet in some cases it is necessary. It must be, therefore, left to the discretion of the legislature to modify it according to circumstan¬ ces. This is a complete and' satisfactory answer. It was objected, that this jurisdiction would extend to all cases; and annihilate the state courts, At this moment of time it mighthap- pen, that there are many disputes between citizens of different states. But in the ordinary state of, things, I believe that any gentlemen will think that the far greater number of causes—ninety-nine out of an hundred, will remain with the state judiciaries. All controver¬ sies directly between citizen and citizen, will still remain with th» 490 DEBATES. [HENRY. local courts. The number of cases within the jurisdiction' of these courts are very small when compared to those in which the local tribunals will have cognizance. No accurate calculation can be made but I think that any gentleman who will contemplate the subject at all, must be struck with this truth. [Here Mr Madison spoke toa low to be understood,] As to vexatious appeals, they can be remedied by congress. It would seldom happen that mere wantonness would produce such an appeal, or induce a man to sue unjust!). If the courts were on a good footing in the states, what can induce them to take so much trou¬ ble! I have frequently, in the discussion of this subject, been struck with one remark. It has been urged, that this would be oppressive to those who by imprudence, or otherwise, under the denomination of debtors. I know not how this can be conceived. I will venture one observation. If this system should have the effect of establish¬ ing universal justice, and accelerating it throughout America, it will be one of the most fortunate cir cumstances that could happen for those men. With respect to that class ofcitzens, compassionis their due To those, however, who are involved in such incumbrances, relief eannot be granted. Industry and economy are the only resources.— It is vain to wait for money, or temporise. The great desiderata are public and private confidence. No country in the world can do without them. Let the influx of money be ever so great, if there be no confidence, property will sink in value, and there will be no in¬ ducements or emulation to industry. The circulation of confidence is better than the circulation of money. Compare the situations of nations in Europe, where the justice is administered with celerity* to that of those where it is refused, or administered tardily. Con¬ fidence produces the best effects in the former. The establishment of confidence will raise the value of property, and relieve those who are so unhappy as to be involved in debts. If this be maturely con¬ sidered, I ihink it will be found that as far as it will establish uni¬ formity of justice, it will be of rear advantage to such persons. I will not enter into those considerations which the honorable gentle¬ man added. I hope some other gentleman will undertake to an¬ swer. Mr HENRY—-Mr Chairman, I have already expressed painful sensations at the surrender of our great rights, and I am again driven to the mournful recollection. The purse is gone; the sword is gone; and here is the oily thing of any importance that is to remain with us. As I think this is a more fatal defect than any we have yet con- sideied, forgive me, if I attempt to refute the observations made by he honorable member in the chair, and last up. It appears to me, Henry.] VIRGINIA. 491 that the powers in the section before you, are either impractible, or if reducible to practice, dangerous in the extreme. The honorable gentlemen began in a manner which surprised me; It was observed, that our state judges might be contented to be fede¬ ral judges and state judges also. If we are to be deprived of that class of men, and if they are to combine against us with the gener¬ al government we are gone. I consider the Virginia judiciary as one of the best barriers against strides of power ; against that power, which we are told by the honorable gentleman, has threatened the destruction of liberty. Pardon me, for expressing my extreme regret., that it is in their power to take away that barrier. Gentlemen will not say, that any danger can be expected from the state legislatures. So small are the barriers against the encroachments and usurpations of congress, that when I see this last barrier, the independency of the judges impaired, I am persuaded I see the prostration of all our rights. In what a situation will your judges be in, when they are sworn to preserve the constitution of the state, and of the general govern¬ ment 1 If there be a concurrent dispute between them, which will prevail 1 They cannot serve twoi masters struggling for the same object. The laws of congress being paramount to those of the states and to their constitutions also, whenever they come in competition, the judges must decide in favor of the former. This, instead of relieving or aiding me, deprives me of my only comfort, the indepen¬ dency of the judges. The judiciary are the sole protection against a tyrannical execution of the laws. But if by this system we lose our judiciary, and they cannot help ns, we must set down quietly, and be oppressed. , The appellate jurisdiction as to law and fact, notwithstanding the ingenuity of gentlemen, still to me, carries those terrors which my honorable friend described. This does not include law in the com¬ mon acceptation of it, but goes to equity and admiralty, leaving what we commonly understandby common law, out altogether.— We are told of technical terms, and that we must put a liberal con¬ struction on it. We must judge by the common understanding of common men. Do the expressions “ fact and law,” relate to cases of admiralty and chancery jurisdiction only ? No, Sir, the least attention will convince us, that they extend to common law cases. Three cases are contradistinguished from the rest. In all cases, affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party, the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the supreme court shall have appellate juiisdiction, both as to law and fact.” Now, Sir, what are we to understand by these words? DEBATES. Henrt. m What are the cases before mentioned ? Cases of common law, as well as of equity and admiralty. I confess I was surprised to hear such an explanation from an understanding more penetrating and acute than mine. We are told, that the cognizance of law and fact, is satisfied by cases of admiralty and chancery. The words are expressly against it. Nothing can be more clear and incontestible. This will, in its operation, destroy the trial by jury. The verdict of an impartial jury will be reversed by judges unacquainted with the circumstances. But we are told, that congress, are to make re¬ gulations to remedy this. I may be told, that I am bold, but I think myself, and I hope to be able to prove to others, that congress cannot, by any act of theirs, alter this jurisdiction as established.— It appears to me, that no law of congress can alter or arrange it.— It is subject to be regulated, but is it subject to be abolished ? If congress alter this part, they will rppeal the constitution. Does it give them power to repeal itself? What is meant by such words in common parlance ? If you are obliged to do certain business, you are to do it under such modifications as were originally designed.— Can gentlemen support their argument by regular or logical con¬ clusions ? When congress by virtue of this sweeping clanse, will organize these courts, they cannot depart from the constitution ; and their laws in opposition to the constitution, would be void. If con¬ gress, under the specious pretence of pursuing this clause, altered it, and prohibited appeals as t© fact, the federal judges, if they spoke the sentiments of independent men, would'declare their prohibition nugatory and void. In every point of view, it seems to me, that it will continue in as full force as it is now, notwithstanding any regu¬ lations they may attempt to make. What then, Mr Chairman ?— We are told, that if this does not satisfy every mind, they will yield. It is not satisfactory to my mind, whatever it may be to others. The honorable gentleman has told us, that our representatives will mend every defect. 1 do not know how often we have recurred to that source, but I can find no consolation in it. Who are they ? Our¬ selves. What is their duty ? To alter the spirit of the constitution —to new model it. ? Is that their duty, or ours ? It is our duty to rest our rights on a certain foundation, and not trust to future con¬ tingencies. We are told of certain difficulties. I acknowledge it is difficult to form a constitution. But I have seen difficulties conquered, which were as unconquerable as this. We are told, that trial by jury i 3 difficult to be had in certain cases. Do we not know the meaning of the term ? We are also told, it is a technical term. I see one thing in this constitution; I made the observation before, and I am still of the same opinion, that every thing with respect to privileges, 495 HtWRT.] VIRGINIA. i* so involved in darkness, it makes me suspiciouS i —not of thoRa gentlemen who formed it, but of its operations in its present form. Could not precise terms have been used I You find by the observa¬ tions of the gentleman last up, that when there is a plenitude of po- wei, there is no difficulty : but when you come to a plain thing, understood by all America, there are contradictions, ambiguities, difficulties and what not. Trial by jury, is attended, it seems, with insuperable difficulties, and therefore, omitted altogether in civil cases. But an idea’is held out, that it is secured in criminal cases. I had rather it had been left out altogether, than have it so vaguely and equivocally provided for. Poor peopledo not understand tech¬ nical terms. Their rights ought to be secured in lanoruaa , e of which they know the meaning. As they do not know the meaning of such terms, they may be injured with impunity. If they dare oppose the hands of tyrannical power, you will see what has been practised elsewhere. They may be tried by the most partial powers, by their most implacable enemies, and be sentenced and put to death, with all the forms of a fair trial. I would rather be -deft to the judge*. An abandoned juror would not dread the loss of character like a judge. From these, and a thousand other considerations, I would rather the trial byvjury were struck out altogether. There is no right of challenging partial jurors. There is no common law of America (as has been said) nor constitution, but that on your table. If there be neithor common law nor constitution, there can be no right to challenge partial jurors. Yet the-right is as valuable as th* * trial by jury itself. My honorable friend’s remarks were right, with respect to incar¬ cerating a state. It would ease my mind, if the honorable gentle¬ man would tell me the manner in which money should be paid, if in a suit between a state and individuals, the state were cast. The honorable gentleman perhaps does not mean to use coercion, but some gentle caution. I shall give my voice for the federal cog¬ nizance only w T here it will be for the public liberty and safety. Its jurisdictions in disputes between citizens of different states, will bs productive of the most serious inconveniences. The citizens of bordering states have frequent intercourse with one another. From the proximity of the states to each other, a multiplicity of thes* suits will be instituted. I beg gentlemen to inform me of this—in ' what courts are they to go, und by what law are they to be tried? Is it by a law of Pennsylvania or Virginia? Those judges must b« acquainted with all the laws of the different states. I see arising out of that paper, a tribunal, that is to be recurred to in all cases, vwhen the destruction of the state judiciaries shall happen;-and from 494 DEBATES. [Henry. the extensive jurisdiction of these paramount courts, the state courts must soon be annihilated. It may be remarked, that here is presented to us, that which is execrated in some parts of the states. I mean a retrospective law. This with respect to property, is as odious as an ex post facto\ aw is with respect to persons. I look upon them as one and the same thing. The jurisdiction of controversies between citizens, and foreign subjects and citizens, v/ill operate retrospectively. Every thing with respect to the treaty with Great Britain and other nations wall be involved by it. Every man who owes any thing to a sub¬ ject of Great Britain, or any other‘nation, is subject to a tribunal that he knew not when he made the contract. Apply this to our citizens. If ever a suit be instituted by a British creditor for a sum which the defendant does not in fact owe, he had better pay it than appeal to the federal supreme court. Will gentlemen venture to ruin their own citizens'? Foreigners may ruin every man in this state by unjust and vexatious suits and appeals. I need only touch it, to remind every gentleman of the danger. No objection is made to their cognizance of disputes between citizens of the same state, claiming lands under grants of different states. As to controversies between a state and the citizens of another state, his construction of it is to me perfectly incomprehensible. He says it will seldom happen, that a state has such demands on individuals. There is. nothing to warrant such an assertion. But, he says, that the state may be plaintiff only. If gentlemen pervert the most clear expressions, and the usual meaning of the language of the people, there is an end of all argument. What says the paper? That it shall have cognizance of controversies between a state, and citizens of another state, without disciminating between plaintiff and defendant. What says the honorable gentleman? The contrary—that the state can only be plaintiff. When the state is debtor, there is no reciprocity. It seems to me that gentlemen maw put what construction they please on it! What!—Is justice to be done to one party, and not to the other? If gentlemen take this liberty now, what will they not do when our rights and liberties are in their power? He said it was necessary to provide a tribunal when the case happened, though it would happen but seldom. The power is necessary, because New York could not before the war collect monty from Connecticut! The state judiciaries are so degraded that, they cannot be trusted. This is a dangerous power, which is thus instituted. For what? For things which will seldom happen; and yet, because there is a possibility that the strong, energetic govern¬ ment mav want it, it shall be produced and thrown in the general Henrx*] Virginia. 495 scale of power. I confess I think it dangerous. Is it not the first time, among civilized mankind, that there was a tribunal to try dis¬ putes betrween the aggregate society, and foreign nations'? Is them any precedent for a tribunal to try disputes between foreign nations, and the states of America? The honorable gentleman said, that the consent of the parties was necessary: I say that a previous consent might leave it to arbitration. It is but a kind of arbitration at best. To hear gentlemen of such penetration make use of such argu¬ ments, to persuade us to part with that trial by jury, is very asto¬ nishing. We are told, that we are to part with that trial by jury which our ancestors secured their lives and property with, and we are to build castles in the air, and substitute visionary modes of de¬ cision to that noble palladium. I hope we shall never be induced by such arguments, to part- with that excellent mode of trial. No appeal can now be made as to fact in common law suits. The una** nimous verdict of twelve impartial men cannot be reversed. I shall take the liberty of reading to the committee the sentiments of the learned judge Blackstone, so often quoted, on the subject. [Here Mr. Henry read the eulogium of that writer, on this trial. Blackstoneks Commentaries, III. 319.] The opinion of this learned writer is more forcible and cogent than any thing I could say. Notwithstanding the transeendant ex¬ cellency of this trial, its essentiality to the preservation of liberty, and the extreme danger of substituting any other mode, yet we are now about to alienate it. But on this occasion, as on all others, wo are admonished to rely on the wisdom and virtue of our rulers. We are told, that the members from Georgia, and New Hampshire, &c. will not dare to infringe this privilege, that as It would excite the indignation of the people, they would not attempt it. That is, the enormity of the offence is urged as a security against its commis¬ sion. It is so abominable, that congress will not exercise it. Shall we listen to arguments like these, when trial by jury is about to be ■relinquished? I beseech you to consider before you decide, I ask you, what is the value of that privilege? When congress, in all the plenitude of their arrogance, magnificence, and power, can take it from you, will you be satisfied? Are we to go so far as to concede •every thing to the virtue of congress? Throw yourselves at once on their mercy—be no longer free than their virtue will predomi¬ nate—if this will satisfy republican minds, there is an end of every thing. I disdain to hold any thing of any man. We ought to •cherish that disdain. America viewed withj indignation the idea of holding her rights of England. The parliament gave you the most solemn assurances, that they would not exercise this pother. Were 496 DEBATES. [Hemtl, you satisfied with their promises? No. Did you trust any man on earth? No—you answered, that you disdained to hold your innate indefeasible rights of any one. Now you are called uponvto give an exorbitant and most alarming power. The genius of my country¬ men is the sanae now that it was then. They have the same feel¬ ings. They are equally martial and bold. Will not their answer therefore be the same? I hope that gentlemen will, on a ,fair inve*- ■ ligation, be candid, and not on every occasion recur to the virtue of i our representatives. When deliberating on the relinquishment of the sword and purse, we have a right to some other reason than the possible virtue of our ^rulers. We are informed, that the strength and energy of the government call for the surrender of this right. Are we ?to make rour country strong by giving up our .privileges? 1 tell you, that if you judge from reason, or the experienee of other nations,-you will find that your country will be great and respectable, according as you will preserve this great privilege. It is prostrated by that pa¬ per. Juries from the vicinage being not secured, this right is in reality sacrificed. All is gone—and why? Because aiiebellion may arise—Resistance will come from certain.countries, and juries • will come from the same countries. 1 trust ihe honorable gentleman, on a better recollection, will be sorry for this observation. *Why do we love this trial by jury.* Because it prevents the hand of oppression from cutting you off. They may call any thing rebellion, and deprive you of a fair trial by an impartial jury of their neighbors. Has not your mother country magnanimously preserved this noble privilege upwards of a thou¬ sand years. 2 Did she relinquish a jury of the vicinage, because there was a possibility of resistance to oppression ? She has been magnanimous enough to resist every attempt to take away this privilege. She has had magnanimity enough to rebel when her lights were infringed. That country had juries of hundredors for many generations. And shall Americans give up that which no¬ thing could induce the English people to relinquish ? The idea is abhorrent to my mind. There was a time, when we should have spurned at .it. This gives me comfort, that as long as I have ex¬ istence my neighbors will protect me. Old as I am, it is probable I may yet have the appellation of rebel. I trust that I shall see congressional oppression crashed in embryo. As this government stands, 1 despise and abhor it. Gentlemen demand it, though it takes away the trial by jury in civil cases, and does worse than take it away in criminal cases. It is gone unless you preserve it now. 1 beg pardon for speaking so long. Many more observations will t present,themselves to the minds of gentlemen when they analy$« fcNDLET'ON. j| VIRGINIA. 497 / 'this part. We find ent/iigh from what has been said to come to this 'conclusion, that it w^s not intended to have jury trials at all. Be¬ cause difficult as it was, the name was known, and it might have been inserted. Seeing that appeals are given in matters of fact to the supreme court, we are led to believe, that you must carry your witnesses an immense distance to the seat of government, or decide appeals according to the Roman law. I shall add no more, but that I hope, that gentlemen will recollect what they are about to do, and consider that they tre going to give up this last and best privilege. Mr. PENDLij ION.—Mr Chairman, before I enter upon the ob¬ jections made to this part, I will observe, that I should suppose if there were any person in this audience who had not read this con- ■stitution, or who had not heard what has been said, and should have been told that the trial by jury was intended to be taken away, he would be surprised to find on examination, that there was no ex¬ clusion of it in/civil cases, and that it was expressly provided for in criminal ease;!. I never could see such intention, or any tendency towards it. I have not heard any arguments of that kind used in 'favor of the constitution. If there were any words in it., which said, that trial by jury should not be used, it would be dangerous, 1 find it secured in criminal cases, and that the trial is to be had in the •3tate where the crime shall have been committed. It is strongly insisted, that the privilege of challenging, or excepting to the jury j s not secured. When the constitution says, that the trial shall be hy jury, does it not say, that every incident will go along with it? I think the honorable gentleman was mistaken yesterday in his lea- sorning m the propriety of a jury from the vicinage. He supposed that a jury from the neighbourhood is had from this -•view—that they should be acquainted with the personal character of the person accused. I thought it was with another view, that the jury should have some personal knowledge of the fact, and ac¬ quaintance with the witnesses, who will come from the neighbour¬ hood. How is it understood in this state? Suppose a man who live! in Winchester, commits a crime at Norfolk, the jury to try him muit come, not from Winchester, but from the neighbourhood of Ncrfolk. Trial by thejury is seemed by this system in criminal cases, •;as*are all the incidental circumstances relative to it. The honora¬ ble gentleman yesterday made an objection to that clause which says, that the judicial power shall be vested in one supreme court, and such inferior courts, as congress may ordain and establish. He objects that there is an unlimited power of appointing inferior courts. 1 refer to that gentleman, whether it would have been proper to limit this power. Could 'those gentleman who framed that instrument, hare extended their ideas to all the necessities of the United States tol. 3. 33 DEBATES. |[PEHt>i.rn)fKr > 438 and see every case in which it would be necessary to have an infe- tior tribunal? By the regulations of congress, they may be accom¬ modated to public convenience and utility. V^e may expect that there will be an inferior court in each state—Each state will insist on it; and each for that reason will agree to it. To shew the impropriety of fixing the number of inferior courts, suppose our constitution had confined the legislature to any particu¬ lar number of inferior jurisdictions there it would remain, nor could it be increased or diminished as circumstances would render it ne¬ cessary. But as it is the legislature can by laws change it from time to time as circumstances will require. What woul d have been the consequences to the western district, if the legislature had been restrained in this particular? The emigrations to that country ren¬ dered it necessary to establish a jurisdiction there, ei$ial in rank to the general court in this part of the state. This was convenient to dhem, and could be no inconvenience to us. At the same time the ’legislature did not loose sight of making every part o ? the society 'Subject to the supreme tribunal. An appeal was allowed to the court of appeals here. This was necessary. Has it pi educed any inconvenience? I have not seen any appeal from that court. lu organization has produced no inconvenience whatever. 1 Iris proves that it is better to leave them unsettled, than fixed in the constitu. tion. With respect to the subjects of its jurisdiction, 1 consider them as being of a general, and not local natuie, and therftfore as proper subjects of a federal court. I shall not enter into an exami¬ nation of each part, but make some reply to the observations-of the- honorable gentleman. His next objection was, to the two first clauses. Cases arising under the constitution, and laws made in pursuance thereof. Are you to refer these to the state courts? Must not the judicial po wer a extend to enforce the federal laws, govern its own officers, and con¬ iine them to the line of their duty? Must it not protect them in the proper exercise of duty, against all opposition, whether from in di- 'viduals, or state laws? No, say gentlemen, because the legislature «nay make oppressive laws, or partial judges may give them a pa dial interpretation. This is carrying suspicion to an extreme, whic V itends to prove there should he no legislative or judiciary at all - ‘The fair inference is, that oppressive laws will not be warranted by’ the constitution ; nor attempted by our representatives, who are selected for their ability and integrity ; and that honest indepen¬ dent judges will never admit an oppressive constiuction. But then we are alarmed with the idea of itsffieinfT a consolidated o government. It i« so, say gentlemen, in the executive and legisla¬ tive, and must be m in the judiciary. I never conceived it to be \ Pendleton.] VIRGINIA. 483 Of the two objects of judicial cognizance, one is general and national and the other, local. The former is given to the general judiciary, and the latter left for the local tribunals. They act in co-operation to secure our liberty. For the sake of economy, the appointment of 4hese courts, might be in the state courts. 1 rely on an honest in¬ terpretation from independent judges. An honest man would not ♦serve otherwise, because it would be to serve a dishonest purpose- To give execution to prbper laws, in a proper manner, is their pecu¬ liar province. There is no inconsistency, impropriety, or danger, in giving the state judges the federal cognizance. Every gentle¬ man who beholds my situation, my infirmity, and various other considerations, will hardly suppose I carry my view to an accumu¬ lation of power. Ever since I had any power, I was more anxious to discharge my duty, than to increase my power. The impossibility of calling a sovereign state before the jurisdic¬ tion of another sovereign state, shews the propriety and neressity of vestino- this tribunal with the decision of controversies to which a o state shall be a party. But the principal objection of that honorable gentleman was, that jurisdiction was given it i’< disputes between citizens of different states. I think in general those decisions might be left to the state tribunals ; e.5pecialh r as citizens of one state, are declared to be citizens of all. I think it will in general be so left by the regula¬ tions of congress. But may no case happen in which it may be 'proper to give the federal courts jurisdiction in such a dispute! Suppose a bond given by a citizen of Rhode Island to one of our citi¬ zens. The regulations of that state beingunfavorable to the claims of the other states, if he is obliged to go to Rhode Island to recover it, he will be obliged to accept payment ef one third, or less, of hie money. He cannot sue in the supreme court, but he may sue in the federal inferior court; and on judgment to be paid one for ten, he may get justice by appeal. Is it an eligible situation ? Is it just that a mps should run the risk of losing nine-tenths of his claim ! Ought he not to be able to carry it to that court where unworthy principles do not prevail? Paper money and tender laws may be passed in other states, in opposition to the federal principle, and restriction of this constitution, and will need jurisdiction in th& federal judiciary to stop its pernicious effects. Where is the danger in the case put, bf malice producing an assignment of a bond to a citizen of a neighboring state, Maryland? I have before supposed, that there would be an inferior federal court i i n every state. Now this citizen of Maryland, to whom this bond is lassigned, cannot sue out of process from the supreme federal court to carry his debtor thither. He cannot carry him to Maryland, llemrast sue him iu the inferior federal court in Virginia. He can DEBATES. 51 o [MAaoir., consolidated government, so as to involve the interest of all America- only go further by appeal. The creditor cannot appeal. He gets a judgment. An appeal can be had only on application of the de¬ fendant, who thus gains a privilege instead of an injury ; so that the observation of the honorable gentleman is not well founded. Tt was said by the honorable gentleman to day, that no regulation congress would make, could prevent from applying to common law cases, matters of law and fact. In the construction of general word-s of this sort, they will apply concurrently to different purpo¬ ses. We give them that distributive interpretation, and liberal explication, which will not make them mischievous: and if this can be done by a court, surely it pan by a legislature. When it appears the interpretation made by legislative bodies in carrying acts into execution, is thus liberal and distributive, there is no danger here. The honorable gentleman was mistaken when he supposed that I said, in cases where the competency of evidence is questioned, the fact was to he changed in the superior court. I said, the fact, was not all to he affected. I described how the superior court was to proceed, and when it settled that point, if another trial was neces¬ sary, they sent the cause back, and then it was tried again in the inferior court. The honorable gentleman has proposed an amendment, which he supposes would remove those inconveniences. I attended to it, and it gave great force to my opinion, that it is better to leave it to he amended by the regulations of congress. What is to he done in cases where juries have been done introduced in the admiralty and chancery? In the admiralty, juries sometimes decide facts. Some¬ times in chancery, when the judges are dissatisfied from the want of testimony, or other cause, they send it to he tried by a jury. When the jury determines, they settle it. Let the gentleman re¬ view his amendment. It strikes me forcibly, that it would he better to leave it to congress, than to introduce amendments which would not answer. I mentioned yesterday, that from the situation of the states, appeals could not be abused. The honorable gentleman to day, said, it was putting too much confidence in our agents and Tillers. I leave it to all mankind, whether it be not a reasonable confidence. Will the representatives of any twelve states sacrifice their own interest, and that of their citizens, to answer no purpose? But suppose we should happen to be deceived, have we no security? So great, is the spirit of America, that it was found sufficient to oppose the greatest power in the world. Will not the America;* spirit protect us against any danger from our own representatives? It being new late I shall add no more. Mr GEORGE MASON.—Mr Chairman, the objection I rssysctjng tbo assignment of a bond from a citizen of this stato, to:* VIRGINIA. Marshall.] 501 citizen of another state, remains still in force. The honorable gen¬ tleman has said that there can be no danger, in the first instance, because it is not within the original jurisdiction of the supreme court; but that the suit must be brought in the inferior federal court in Virginia. He supposes, there can never be an appeal in this case, by the plaintiff, because begets a judgment on his bond ; and that the defendant alone can appeal, who therefore instead of being injured, obtains a privilege. Permit me to examine the force cf this. By means of a suit, on a real or fictitious claim, the citizens of the most distant states may be brought to the supreme federal court. Suppose a man has my bonAf °r £100, and a great part of it has been paid, and in order fraudulently to oppress me, he assigns it to a gentleman in Carolina or Maryland. He then carries me to the inferior federal court: I produce my witness, and judgment is given in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appeals and carries me to the superior court, a thousand miles, and my ex- pences amount to more than the bond. The honorable gentleman lecommends to me to alter my proposed amendment. I would as soon, take the advice of that gentleman, as any other, and though the regard which 1 have for him be great, I cannot assent on this great occasion. There are not many instances of decisions by juries in the admi¬ ralty or chancery, because the facts are generally proved by deposi¬ tions, When that is done, the fact being ascertained, goes upTo the superior court as part of the record: so that there will be no occa¬ sion to revise that part. Mr JOHN MARSHALL.—Mr Chairman, this part of the plan before us, is a great improvement on that system from which we are now departing. Here are tribunals appointed for the decision of con¬ troversies, which were before, either not at all, or improperly provided for, That many benefits will result from this to the members of the collective society, every one confesses. Unless its organization be defective, and so constructed as to injure, instead of accommodating the convenience of the people, it merits our approbation. After such a candid and fail discussion by those gentlemen who support jt_after the very able manner in which they have investigated and examined it, I conceived it would be no longer considered as so very defective, and that those who opposed it, would be convinced of the impropriety of some of their objections. But 1 perceive they still continue the same opposition. Gentlemen have gone on an idea, that the federal courts will not determine the causes which may come before them, with the same fairness and impartiality, with which other courts decide. What are the reasons of this supposi¬ tion? Do they draw them from the manner in which the judges are DEBATES. [Marshall,. 532 chosen, or the tenure of their office? What is it that makes us trust our judges? Their independence in office, and manner of appoint- merit. Are not the judges of the federal court chosen with as much? wisdom, as the judges of the state governments. Are they not equal¬ ly if not more independent? If so, shall we not conclude that they will decide with equal impartiality and candor? If there be as much wisdom and knowledge in the United States, as in a particular state*, shall we conclude that the wisdom and knowledge will not be equal¬ ly exercised in the selection of judges? The principle on which they ohjpct to the federal jurisdiction, seems to me te be founded on a belief, that there will not he a fair trial had in those courts. If this committee will consider it fully r they will find it has no foundation, and that we are as secure there as any where else. What mischief results from some causes being tried there? Is there not the utmost reason to conclude that judges,, wisely appointed, and independent in their officp, will never counte- nance any unfair trial? What are the subjects of its jurisdiction?’ Let us examine them with an expectation that causes will be as can¬ didly tried there, as elsewhere, and then determine. The objec¬ tion, which was made by the honorable member who was first up yesterday (Mr Mason) has been so fully refuted that it is not worth white to notice it. He objected to congress having power to create a number of inferior courts according to the necessity of public cir¬ cumstances. I had an apprehension that those gentlemen who placed no confidence in congress, would object that there might be no inferior courts. I own that I thought, those gentlemen would think there would be no inferior courts, as it depended on the will of congress, hut that we should be dragged to the centre of the union. But I did not conceive, that the power of increasing the number of courts Could be objected to by any gentleman, as it would remove the inconvenience of beinnr draernred to the centre of United States. I own that the power of creating a number of courts, is in my estimation, so far from being a defect, that it seems necessary to the perfection of this system. After having objected to the num¬ ber and mode, he objected to the subject matter of their cognizance. (Here Mr Marshall read the second section.) These, sir, are the points of federal jurisdiction to whidh he ob¬ jects, with a few exceptions. Let us examine each of them with a supposition, that the same impartiality will be observed there, as in other courts, and then see if any mischief will result from them. With respect to its cognizance in all cases arising under the consti¬ tution and the laws of the United States, he says, that the laws of the United States being paramount to the laws of the particular sitates; there is no case but what this will extend to. Has the ^Marshall.] VIRGINIA. 50$ ▼eminent of the United States power to make laws on every sub¬ ject? Boos he understand k sol Can they make laws affecting the mode of transferring property, or contracts, or claims, between citizens of the same stated Ofin they go beyond the delegated pow¬ ers! If they were to make a law not warranted by any of the pow¬ ers enumerated, it would be considered by the judges as an infringe¬ ment of the constitution which they are to guard: they would not consider such a law as coming under their jurisdiction. They would declare it void. It will annihilate the state courts, says the honora¬ ble gentleman. Does not every gentleman here know, that the causes in our courts are more numerous than they can decide, ac¬ cording to their present construction! Look at the dockets. Yon will find them crowded with suits, which the life of man will not see determined. If some of these suits be carried to other courts will it be wrong! They will still have business enough. Then there is no danger, that particular subjects, small in propor¬ tion, being taken out of the jurisdiction of the state judiciaiies, will render them useless and of no effect. Does the gentleman think that the state courts will have no cognizance of cases not mentioned here! Aro there any words in this constitution which excludes the courts of the states from those cases which they now possess! Does the gentleman imagine this to be the case? Will any gentle¬ man believe it? Are not controversies respecting lands claimed un¬ der the grants of different states, the only controversies between citizens of the same state, which the federal judiciary can take cog¬ nisance of? The case is so clear, that to prove it would be an use¬ less waste of time. The state courts will not loose the jurisdiction of the causes they now decide. They have a concurrence of juris¬ diction with the federal courfs in those cases, in which the latter have cognizance. How disgraceful is it that the state courts cannot be trusted, says the honorable gentleman! What is the language of the constitution? Does it take way their jurisdiction! Is it not necessary that the federal -courts should have cognizance of cases arising under the constitution, and the laws of the Uoited States? What is the ser¬ vice or Durpcce of a judiciary, but to execute the laws in a peace¬ able, orderly manner, without shedding blood, or creating a contest or availing yourselves of force? If this be the case, where can its jurisdiction be more necessary than here? To what quarter will you look for protection from an infringement on the constitution, if you will not give the power the judiciary? There is no other body that can afford such a protection. But the honorable member objects to it, because, he says, that the officers af the government will be screened frqui merited punishment by .thft 504 DEBATES. [Marshals, ; federal judiciary. The federal sheriff, says he, will go into a poor man’s house and beat him, or abuse Us family, and the federal court will protect him; Does any gentleman believe this 1 Is it neces¬ sary that the officers will commit a trespass on the property or per¬ sons of those with whom they are ttransact business l Will such great insults on the people of this country be allowable I Were a law made to authorize them, it would be void. The injured man; would trust to a tribunal in his neighborhood. To such a tribunal he would apply for redress, and get it. There is no reason to fear that he would not meet that justice there, which his country will he ever willing to maintain. But, on appeal , says the honorable gen¬ tleman, what chance is there to obtain, justice'? This is founded on an idea, that they will not be impartial. There is nc clause in the? constitution which bars the individual member injured, from apply¬ ing to the state courts to give him redress. He says that there is no* instance of appeals as to fact in common law cases. The contrary is well known to you, Mr. Chairman,, to be the casein this common¬ wealth. With respect to mills, roads, and other cases, appeals lie- from the inferior to the superior court, as to factas well as law. Is it a clear case, that there can be no case in common law, in which an appeal as to fact might be proper and necessary 1 Can you not conceive a case where it would lie productive of advantages to the people at large, to submit to that tribunal the final determination*, in¬ volving facts as well as law 1 Suppose it should be deemed for the- convenience of the citizens, tnat those things which concerned foreign ministers, should be tried in the inferior courts—if justice- would be done, the decision would satisfy all. But if an appeal in matters of fact could not be earried- to the superior court, then it would result, that such cases could not be tried before the inferior courts, for fear of injurious and partial decisions. But, sir, where is the necessity of discriminating between the three cases of chancery, admiralty, and common law! W T hy not leave it to congress'? Will it enlarge their powers'? Is it necessa¬ ry for them wantonly to infringe youi rights'? Have you any thing lo apprehend, when they can in no case abuse their power without rendering themselves hateful to the people at large”? When this is the case, something may be left to the legislature freely chosen by ourselves, from among ourse/ves, who are to share the burdens im¬ posed upon the community, and who can be changed at our, pleasure* Where power may be trusted, and there is no motive to abuse it, k seems to me to be as well to leave it undetermined, as to fix it in the constitution. With respect to disputes between a state , and the citizens of ano¬ ther state } its jurisdiction has been decried with usual vehemence* VIRGINIA. 501 Marshall.] ( I hope that no gentleman will think that a state will be called at the ibar of the federal court. Is there no such case at present! Are there not many cases in which the legislature of Virginia is a party, and yet the state is not sued! It is not rational to suppose, that the sovereign power shall be dragged before a court. The intent is, to enable states to recoverclaims of individuals residing in other states I contend this construction is warranted by the words. But, say they, there will be partiality in it if a state cannot be defendant—if, an individual cannot proceed to obtain judgment against a state, though he may be sued by a state. It is necessary to be so, and can¬ not be avoided. I see a difficulty in making a state defendant, which does not prevent its being plaintiff. If this be only what cannot he avoided, why object to the system on that account! If an individual has a just claim against any particular state, is it to be presumed that on application to its legislature, he will not obtain satisfaction? But how could a state recover any claim from a citizen of another state, without the establishment of these tribunals! The honorable member objects to suits being instituted in the federal courts by the citizens of one state, against the citizens of a- nother state. Were I to contend, that this was necessary in all cases, and that the government without it would be defective, I should not use my own judgment. But are not the objections to it carried too far! Though it may not in general be absolutely necessary, a case may happen, as has been observed, in which a citizen of one state ought to be able to recur to this tribunal, to recover a claim from the citizen of another state. What is the evil which this can pro¬ duce! Will he get more than justice there! The independence of the judges forbids it. What has he to get? Justice. Shall we ob¬ ject to this, because the citizen of another state can obtain justice without applying to our state courts? It may be necessary with re¬ spect to the laws and regulations of commerce, which congress may make. It may be necessary in cases of debt, and some other con¬ troversies. In claims for land it is not necessary, but it is not dan¬ gerous. In the court of which state will it be instituted? said the honorable gentleman. It will be instituted in the court of the state where the defendant resides, where the law can come at him, and no where else. By the laws of which state will it be determined? said he. By the laws of the state where the contract was made. Ac¬ cording to those laws, and those only, can it be decided. Is this a novelty? No, it is a principle in the jurisprudence of thiscommon- wealth. If a man contracted a debt in the East-Indies, and it was sued for here, the decision must be consonant to the laws of that country. Supposo a contract made in Maryland, where the annual interest is at six per centum, and a suit instituted for in Virginia— 506 DEBATES. [Marshall. what interest would be given now, without any federal aid? The in¬ terest of Maiyland most certainty; and if the contract had been made in Virginia, and suit brought in Maryland, the interest of Virginia^ must be given, without doubt.. It is now to be governed by the laws of that state where the contract was made. The laws which govern¬ ed the contract at its formation govern it in its decision. To pre¬ serve the pence of the union only, its jurisdiction in this case ought to be recurred to. Let us consider that when citizens of one state carry on trade in another state, much must be due to the one from the other, as is the case between North Carolina and Virginia. Would not the refusal of justice to our citizens, from the courts of North Carolina, produce disputes between the states'? Would the federal judiciary swerve from their duty in order to give partial and unjust decisions? The objection respecting the assignment of a bond to a citizen of another state, has been fully answered. But suppose it were to be tried as lie says, what would be given more than was actually due in the case he mentioned ? It is possible , in cur courts as they now stand, to obtain a judgment for more than justice. But the court of chancery grants relief. Would it not be so in the federal court? Would not depositions be laken to prove the payments, and if proved would not the decision of the court he accordingly? Hft objects in the next place to its jurisdiction in controversies between a state and a foreign state. Sunpnse, says he, in such a suit, a foreign sta‘e is cast, will slip be hound by the decision? If a foreign state brought a suit against the commonwealth of Virginia, would she not he barred from the claim if the federal judiciary thought it unjust? The previous consent of the parties is necessary. And, as the federal judiciary will decide, each party will acquiesce, It will be the means of preventing disputes with foreign nations. On an attentive consideration of these points, I trust every part will -appear satisfactory to the committee. The exclusion of trial by jury in this case, he urged to prostrate our rights. Does the word coutt only mean the judges? Does not the determination of a jury necessarily lead to the judgment of tho court? Is there any thing here which gives the judges exclusive jurisdiction of matters of fact? What is the object of a jury trial? To inform the court of the facts. When a court has cognizance of facts, does it not follow, that they can make inquiry by a jury? It is impossible to he otherwise. I hope that in this country, where impartiality is so much admired, the laws will direct facts to bo ascertained by a jury. But, says the honorable gentleman, the juries in the ten miles square will be mere tools of parties, with which he would not tru3t his person or property; which, he says, Marshall.] VIRGINIA. 50 7 he would rather leave to the court. Because the government may have a district of ten miles square, will no man stay there but the tools and officers of the government! Will nobody else be found there! Is it so in any other part of the world, where a government has legislative power! Are there none but. officers and tools of the government of Virginia, in Richmond! Will there not be indepen¬ dent merchants, and respectable gentlemen of fortune, within the ten miles square! Will there not be worthy farmers and mechanics! Will not a good jury be found there, as well as any where else! Will the officers of the government become improper to be on a jury! What is it to the government, whether this man or that man succeeds! It is all one thing. Does the constitution say, that juries shall con¬ sist of officers, or that the supreme court shall be held in the ten miles square! It was acknowledged by the honorable member, that it was secure in England. What makes it secure there! Is it their constitution! What part of their constitution is there, that the parliament cannot change! As the preservation of this right is in the hands of parliament, and it has ever been held sacred by them, will the government of America be less honest than that of Great Britain! Here a restriction is to be" found. The jury is not to be brought out of the state. There is no such restriction in that govern¬ ment; for the laws of parliament decide every thing respecting it. Yet gentlemen tell us, that there is safety there, and nothing hero but danger. It seems to me, that t he laws of the United States will generally secure trials by a jury of the vicinage, or in such manner as will be most safe and convenient for the people. But it seems that the right of challenging the jurors is not secured in this constitution. Is this done by our own constitution, or by any provision of the English government] Is it done by their magna charta, or bill of rights! This privilege is founded on their laws, [f so, why should it be objected to the American constitution, that it is not inserted in it? If we are secure in Virginia, without men¬ tioning it in our constitution, why should not this security be found in the federal court! The honorable gentleman said much about the quit-rents in the Northern Neck. I will refer it to the honorable gentleman himself. Has he not acknowledged, that there was no complete title? Was he not satisfied, that the right of the legal representatives of the proprietor did not exist at the time he mentioned? If so, it cannot exist now. I will leave it to those gentlemen who come from ttiaf' quarter. I trust they will not be intimated on this account, in voting on this question. A law passed in 1782, which secures this. Ho says that many poor men may be harassed and injured by the repre^ seniatives of Lord Fairfax. If he has no right, this cannot be done. ^08 DEBATES. [Marshall* If he has this right, and comes to Virginia, what laws will his claims be determined by? By those of this state. By what tribu^ nals will they be determined? By our state courts. Would not the poor man, who was oppressed by an unjust prosecution, be abun¬ dantly protected and satisfied by the temper of his neighbors, and would he not find ample justice? What reason has the honorable member to apprehend partiality or injustice? He supposes that if the judges be judges of both the federal and state courts, they will incline in favor ot one government. If such contests should arise, who could more properly decide them, than those who are to swear to do justice? If we can expect a fair decision any where, may we not expect justice to be done by the judges of both the federal and state governments' 1 But, says the honorable member, laws may be executed tyrannically. Where is the independency of your judges? If a Jaw be exercised tyrannically in Virginia, to what can you trust* To your judiciary. What security have you for justice? Their independence. Will it not be so in the federal court? Gentlemen ask, what is meant by law cases, and if they be not distinct from facts? Is there no law arising on cases of equity and admiralty? Look at the acts of assembly. Have you not many cases, where law and fact are blended? Does not the jurisdiction in point of law as well as tact, find himself completely satisfied in law and fact? The honorable gentlemen says, that no law' of con« gress can make any exception to the federal appellate jurisdiction of lacts as well as law. He has frequently spoken of technical terms, and the meaning of them. W T hat is the meaning of the term excep¬ tion? Does it not mean an alteration and diminution? Confess is © empowered to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction, as to law and fact, of the supreme court. These exceptions certainly go as far as the legislature may think proper, for the interest and liberty of the people. Who can understand this word, exception, to ex¬ tend to one case as well as the other? I am persuaded, that a re¬ consideration of this case will convince the gentleman that he w r as mistaken. This may go to the cure of the mischief apprehended. Gentlemen must be satisfied, that this power will not be so much abused as they have said. The honorable member says, that he derives no consolation from the w’isdom and integrity of the legislature, because we call them to rectify defects which it is our duty to remove. We ought well to w r eigh the good and evil before we determine. We ought to be well convinced, that the evil will be really produced before we de¬ cide against it. If we be convinced that the good greatly prepon¬ derates, though there be small defects in it, shall we give up that which is really good, when we can remove the little mischief it Marshall.] VIRGINIA. 509 may contain, in the plain, easy method pointed out in the system itself? I was astonished when I have heard the honorable gentleman say, that he wished the trial hy jury to be struck out entirely. Is there, no justice to be expected by a jury of our fellow-citizens? Will any man prefer to be tried by a court, when the jury is to be of his countrymen, and probably of his vicinage? We have reason to believe the regulations with respect to juries will be such as shall be satisfactory. Because it does not contain all, does it not contain nothing? But I conceive that this committee will see there is safety in the case, and that there is no mischief to be apprehended. He states a case, that a man may be carried from a federal to an antifederal corner, (and vice versa ) where men are ready to destroy him. Is this probable? Is it presumable that they will make a law to punish men who are of different opinions in politics from themselves? Is it presumable, that they will do it in one single case, unless it be such a case as must satisfy the people at large? The good opinion of the people at large must be consulted by their representatives, otherwise mischiefs would be produced, which would shake the crovernment to its foundation. As it is late, I shall o not mention all the gentleman’s argument, but some parts of it are so glaring, that I cannot pass them over in silence. He-says that the establishment of these tribunals, and more particularly in their jurisdiction of controversies between citizens of these states, and foreign citizens and subjects, is like a retrospective law. Is there no difference between a tribunal which shall give justice and effect to an existing right, and creating a right that did not exist before? The debt or claim is created by the individual. He has bound him¬ self to comply with it. Does the creation of a new court amount ta a retrospective law? We are satisfied with the provision made in this country on tho subject of trial by jury. Does our constitution direct trials to be by jury? It is required in our bill of rights, which is not a part of the constitution. Does any security arise from henee? Have you a jury when a judgment is obtained on a replevin bond, or by default? Have you a jury when a motion is made for the commonwealth, against an individual; or when a motion is made by one joint obli¬ gor against another, to recover sums paid as security? Our courts decide in all these cases, without, the intervention of a jury yet they are all civil cases. The hill of rights is merely recommendatory. Were it otherwise, the consequence' would be that many laws whioh are found convenient, would be unconstitutional. What doe* l,he government before you say? Does it exclude the legislature 510 DEBATES. [PenBleto*. ‘from giving a trial by jury in civil cases! If it does not forbid its exclusion, it is on the same footing on which your state govern* ment stands now. The legislature of Virginia does not give a trial by jury where it is not necessary; but gives it wherever it is thought 'expedient. The federal legislature will do it so too as it is formed on the same principles. The honorable gentleman says, that unjust claims will be made, and the defendant bad better*'pay them man go to the supreme court. Can you suppose such a disposition in cne of your citizens, as that to oppress another, man he wiil incur great expenses'? What will he gain by an unjust demand! Does a claim establish a right! He must bring his witnesses to prove his claim. If he does not bring his witnesses; the expenses must fall upon him. Will he go on a calculation that the defendant will not defend it, or cannot produce a witness! Will he incur a great deal of expense, from a depend- ance on such a chance? Those Who khoW human nature, black as it is, must know, that mankind are too well attached to their inter¬ est to run such a risk. I conceive, that this power is absolutely no- 'cessary, and not dangerous; that should it be attended by little in¬ conveniences, they will be altered, and that they can have no inter¬ est in not altering them. Is there any real danger! When I com¬ pare it to the exercise of the same power in the government of Vir¬ ginia, I am persuaded there is not. The federal government has no other motive, and has every reason of doing right, which the mem¬ bers of our state legislature have. Will a man on the Eastern shore be sent to be tried in Kentucky, or a man from Kentucky be brought to the Eastern shore, to have his trial! A government by doing this, would destroy itself. I am convinced, the trial by jury will be regulated in the manner most advantageous to the com- rnunity. Gov. RANDOLPH declared, that the faults which he once saw iin this system, he still perceived. It was his purpose, he said to 1 it form the committee, in what his objections to this part consisted. He confessed some of the objections against the judiciary wer6 ^merely chimerical, but some of them were real, which his inten¬ sion of voting in favor of adoption, would not prevent him from •developing. Saturday the 21 st of June 1788>. Mr HARRISON reported from the committee oh privileges and elections, that the committe had, according to order, had under their farther consideiation, the petition of Mr Richard Morris, complain¬ ing of an undue election and return of William White, as a delegat* serve in this convention for the county of Louisa, and had agreed Pendlctox.] VIRGINIA. fill tipon a report and come to several resolutions thereupon, resulting os follows—on motion. Ordered, That the committee of privilege* and elections be discharged from further proceeding ort the petition of Ricliard Morris and that the petitioner have leave to withdraw the same. The first arid Second sections of the 3d article still under consid ciation. Mr GRAYSON.—Mr Chairman, it seems to have been a rule with the gentlemen on the other side, to argue from the excellency Of human nature, in order to induce us to grant away (if I may be allowed the expression) the rights and liberties of our country. I make no doubt the same arguments were used on a variety of occa¬ sions. I suppose, sir, that this argument was used when Cromwell Was invested with power. The same argument was used to gain 'our assent to the stampt act. I have no douot it has been invaria¬ bly the argument in all countries, when the concession of power has been in agitation. Bat power ought to have such checks and limi¬ tations, as to prevent bad men from abusing it. It ought to b* granted on a supposition that men will be bad; for it may be even¬ tually so. With respect to the judiciary, my grand objection is that it will interfere with the state judiciaries, in the same manner as the exercise of the power of direct taxation, will interfere with same power in the state governments: there being no superintend¬ ing central power to keep in order these two contending jurisdic¬ tions.—This is an objection which is unanswerable in its nature. In England they have great courts, which have great and inter¬ fering powers. But the controling power of parliament, which is a •centralfocus, corrects them. But here each party is to shift for itself; There is no arbiter, or power to correct their interference. Recur¬ rence can be only had to the sword. I shall endeavor to demon¬ strate the pernicious consequences of this interference. It was men¬ tioned as one reason, why these great powers might harmonize, that the judges of the state courts might be federal judges. The idea was approbated, in my opinion, with a great deal ot justice. They rue the best check we have. They secure us from encroachments on our privileges. They are the principal defence of the states. How improper would it be to deprive the state of its only defensive armour? I hope the states will never part with it. There is some¬ thing extremely disgraceful in the idea. How will it apply in the practice? The independent judges of Virginia, are to be subordi¬ nate to the federal judiciary. Our judges in chancery are to judges in the inferior federal tribunals. Something has been said of the independency of the federal judges. I will only observe, *bat it is on as corrupt a basis as the art of man can place it. it* DEBATES. 513 [Grayson. mlarles of the judges may be augmented. Augmentation of salary i« the only method that can be taken to corrupt a judge. It has been a thing desired by the people of England for many years, that the judges should be independent. This independency never was obtained till the second or third year of the reign of George the Illd. It was omitted at the revolution by inattention.— Their compensation is now fixed, and they hold their offices during good behavior. But I say, that our federal judges are placed in a situation as liable to corruption as they could possibly be. How are judges to be operated upon? By the hopes of reward and not the fear of a diminution of compensation. Common decency woujd prevent lessening the salary of a judge. Throughout the whole page of history, you will find the corruption of judges to have always arisen for that principle, the hope of reward. This is left open here. The flimsy argument brought by my friend, not as his own, but as supported by others, will not hold. It would be rather hoped, that the judges should get too much, than too little, and that they should be perfectly independent.—What if you give d^GGO; or dGl,000 annually, to a judge? It is but a trifling object, when by that little money, you purchase the most invaluable blessing that any country can enjoy. There is to be one supreme court —for chancery, admiralty, com¬ mon pleas, and exchequer, (which great cases are left in England to four great courts) to which are added, criminal jurisdiction, and all cases depending on the law of nations; a most extensive jurist diction. This court has more power than any court under heaven. One set of judges ought not to have this power—and judges partic-. ularly who have temptatien always before their eyes. The court thus organized, are to execute laws made by thirteen nations, dis¬ similar in their customs, manners, laws, and interests. If we ad¬ vert to the customs of theso different sovereignties, we shall find them repugnentand dissimilar. Yet they are all forced to unite and concur in making these laws. They are to form them on one prin¬ ciple, and on one idea; whether the civil law, common law, or law of nations. The gentleman was driven the other day to the expe¬ dient of acknowledging the necessity of having thirteen different tax laws. This destroys the principle, that he who lays a tax, should feel it and bear his proportion of it. This has not been an¬ swered: it vl ill involve consequences so absured, that I presume, they will not attempt to make thirteen different codes. They will be obliged to make one code. IIow will they make one cond', with¬ out being contradictory to some of the laws of the different states? It is said there is to be a court of equity. There is no such thing in Pennsylvania, or in some other states in tie union. A nation in GrAYSON.] VIRGINIA. 513 making' a law, ought not to make it repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution, or the genius of the people. This rule cannot he ob¬ served in forming a general code. I wish to know how the people of Connecticut would agree with the lordly pride of your Virginia no¬ bility. Its operation will be as repugnant and contradictory, in this vase, as in the establishment of a court of equity.—They may inflict punishments where the state governments will give Tewards. This Is not probable: but still it is possible. It would be a droll sight, to see a man on one side of the street punished for a breach ol the fed¬ eral law, and on the other side another man rewarded by the state legislature, for the same act. Or suppose it were the same person, that should be thus rewarded and punished atone time, for the same act, it would be a droll sight to see a man laughing on one side of his face, and crying on the other. I wish only to put this matter in a clear point of view; and I think that if thirteen states, differ¬ ent in every thing, shall have to make laws for the government of the whole, they cannot harmonize, or suit the genius of the people; there being no such thing as a spirit of laws, or a pervading princi¬ ple, applying to every state individually. The only promise, in this respect, is, that there shall be a republican government in each state. But it does not say whether it is to be aristocratical or democrat! cal. My next objection to the'] federal judiciary- is, that it is not ex¬ pressed in a definite manner. The jurisdiction of all cases arising 'under the constitution, and the laws of the union, is of stupendous magnitude. it) It is impossible for human nature to trace its extent. It is so vaguely aud indefinitely expressed, that its latitude cannot be as¬ certained. Citizens or subjects of foreign states may sue citizens of the different states in the federal courts. It is extremely impol¬ itic to place foreigners in a better situation than our own citizens. This was never the policy of other nations. It was the policy in England, to put foreigners on a secure footing. The statute mer¬ chant, and statute staple, were favorable to them. But in no coun¬ try are the laws more favorable to foreigners than the citizens. If they be equally so, it is surely sufficient. Our own state merchants would be ruined by it, because they cannot recover debts so soon in the state courts as foreign merchants can recover of them in the federal courts. The consequence would be inevitable ruin to com¬ merce. It will induce foreigners to decline becoming citizen®. There is no reciprocity in it. How will this apply to British creditors I I have ever been an ad-vocate for paying the British creditors, both in congress and fctse- <*•-) j.'p.i-y fr> rwr own ciriopus. It is a maxim , w.: rj f .f I •• rn 514 DEBATES. [Grayson. in law, that debts should be on the same original foundation they were on, when contracted. I presume when the contracts were made, the creditors had an idea of the state judiciaries only. The procrastination and delays of our courts were probably in contem¬ plation by both parties. They could have no idea of the establish¬ ment of new tribunals to affect them. Trial by jury must have been in the contemplation of both parties, and the venue was in favor of the defendant. From these premises it is clearly discernible, that it would be wrong to change the nature of the contracts. Whether they will make a law other than the state laws, I cannot determine. But we are told, that it is wise, politic, and preventative of con¬ troversies with foreign nations. The treaty of peace with Great Britain does not require that creditors should be put in abetter sit¬ uation than they were, but there should be ho hindrance to the col¬ lection of debts. It is therefore unwise and impolitic, to give those creditors such an advantage over the debtors. But the citizens ot different states are to sue each other in these courts. No reliance is to be put on the state judiciaries. The fear of unjust regulations and decisions in the states, is urged as the reason of this jurisdic¬ tion. Paper money in Rhode Island has been instanced by gentle¬ men. There is one clause in the constitution which prevents the issuing of paper money. If this clause should pass, (and it is un¬ animously wished by every one, that it should not be objected to) I apprehend an execution in Rhode Island would be as good anct effective as in any state in the union. A state may sue a foreign state, or a foreign state may sue one of our states. This may form a new American law of nations. Whence the idea could have oiiginated, I cannot determine, unless from the idea that predominated in the time of Henry the IVth. and Queen Elizabeth. They took it into their heads to consolidate all the states in the world into one great political body. Many ridiculous projects were imagined to reduce that absurd idea into practice* but they were all given up at last. My honorable friend, whom I much respect, said that the consent of the parties must be previous¬ ly obtained. I agree that the consent of foreign nations must be had before they become parties: but it is not so with our states. It. is fixed in the constitution that they shall become parties. This ia not reciprocal. If the congress cannot make a law against the constitution, I apprehend they cannot make a law to abridge iU The judges are to defend it. They can neither abridge nor extend it. There is no reciprocit}' in this, that a foreign state should have a rioht. to sue one of our states, whereas a foreign state cannot b» sued without its own consent. The idea to me is monstrous and extravagant. It cannot be reduced to practice. Gravson.] VIRGINIA. 516 Suppose one of our states object to the decision, arms must be rcc] r. ed to. How can a foreign state be compelled to submit to a decision ? Pennsylvania and Connecticut had like once to have fallen together concerning their contested boundaries. I was convinced, that the mode provided in the confederation, for the decision of such disputes, would not answer. The success which attended it with respect to settling bounds, have proved to me in some degree, that it would not answer in any other case whatever. The same difficulty must attend this mode in the execution. This high court has not a very extensive original jurisdiction. It is not material. But its appellate jurisdiction is of immense magnitude—and what has it in view, un¬ less to subvert the state governments'? The honorable gentleman who presides, has introduced the high court of appeals. I wish the federal appellate court was on the same foundation. If we investi¬ gate the subject, we shall find this jurisdiction perfectly unnecessary. It is said, that its object is to prevent subordinate tribunals from making unjust decisions to defraud creditors. I grant the suspicion is in some degree just. But would not an appeal to the state courts ot appeal, or supreme tribunals., correct the decisions of inferior courts? Would not this put every thing right. Then there would be no inference of jurisdiction. But a gentleman (Mr Marshall) says, we ought certainly to give this power to congress, because our state courts have more business than they can possibly do. A gentleman was once asked to give up his estate because he had ton much, but he did not comply. Have we not established district courts, which have for their object the full administration of justice? Our court of chancery might by our legislature be put in a good situation, so that there is nothing in this observation. ' - , But the same honorable gentleman says, that trial by jury is preserved by implication. I think this was the idea. I beg leave to consider that, as well as other observations of the honorable gen¬ tleman. After enumerating the subjects of its jurisdiction, end *coiifmino- its original ceomizance to cases affecting ambassadors and other public ministers, and those in which a state shall be a party, it expressly says, that “in all other cases before mentioned, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fad .” I would be« the honorable gentleman to turn his attention to the word appeal, which I think comprehends chancery, admiralty,, common law, and every thing. But this is with such exceptions* and under such regulations, as congress shall make; This we are told will be an ample security. Congress tiiay please to make these exceptions and regulations, but they may not also. I lay it down as a principle, that trial by jury is given up to the .discretion 516 DEBATES. f Grayscsv of congress. If they take it away, will it be a breach of this constr- tKtion? I apprehend not; for as they have an absolute appellate- jurisdiction of facts, they may alter them as they may think proper. It is possible that congress may regulate it properly : but still it is at their discretion to do it, or not. There has been so much said of the excellency of the trial by jury, that I need not enlarge upon it. The want of trial by jury in the Roman republic obliged them to establish the regulation of patron and client. 1 think this must be the case in every country where this trial does not exist. The poor people were obliged to be defended by their patron*. It may be laid down as a rule, that where the governing power possesses an unlimited controul over the venue , no man’s life is in safety. How is it in this system? “The trial of all crimes shall he by jury, except in cases of impeachment, and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed.’*' He has said, that when the power of a court is given, all its ap- pendages and concomitants are given. Allowing this to be the case by implication, how is it? Does it apply by counties? No, Sir. The idea is, that the states are to the general government, as coun¬ ties are to our state legislatures. What sort of a vicinage is given by congress? The idea which I call a true vicinage is, that a man shall be tried by his neighbors. But the idea here is, that he may be tried in any part of the state. Were the venue to be established according to the federal districts, it would not come up to the true idea of vicinage. Delaware sends but one member : it would then extend to that whole state. This state sends ten members, and has* ten districts: but this is far from the true idea of vicinage. The al¬ lusion another gentleman has made to this trial as practised in En¬ gland, is improper. It does not justify this regulation. The jury may come from any part of the state. They possess an absolute un- controlable power over the venue. The conclusion then is, that they can hang any one they please, by having a jury to suit their purpose. They might, on particular extraordinary occasions, suspend th& privilege. The Romans did it on creating a dictator. The British government docs it, when the habeas corpus is to be suspended; when the solus populi is affected. I never will consent to it unless it ba j'fopCity ti aimed. Another gen damn i lias said, that trial byJ..ry not been so sa¬ cred a thing am mg our ancestors, and that in Eugiaud ii if.ay be destroyed by an a cl of parliament. I believe the gentleman is mis¬ taken. I believe it is secured by magna charta, and the bill uldights. ) believe"no act of parliament can affect it, if this principle be true, that a law is not paramount to the constitution. I believe whatever IT- a » I). ’ i. ! v. t : O - li- - - * • v , * > * • I ;, s. i , . 0 > Li * 1 : l -' * * q. *. !■ r Randolph.] VIRGINIA. 517 fixed constitution, that it is generally thought by Englishmen, that it is so sacred, that no act of parliament can affect it. The interference of the federal judiciary and the state courts will Involve the most serious, and even ludicrous consequences. Both courts are to act on the same persons and things, and cannot possi¬ bly avoid interference. As to connexion or coalition, it would be incestuous. How could they avoid it, on an execution from each court, either against the body or effects'? How will it be with re¬ spect to mortgaged property! Suppose the same lands or slaves mortgaged to two different persons, and the mortgages foreclosed, one in the federal, and another in the state court—will there be no interference in this case! It will be impossible to avoid inter¬ ference in a million of cases. I would wish to know how it can be avoided; for it is an insuperable objection in my mind. I shall no longer fatigue the committee, but shall beg leave to make some ob¬ servations another time. t* Gov. RANDOLPH.—Mr Chairman, I shall state to the com¬ mittee in what cases the federal judiciary appears to me to deserve applause, and where it merits dispraise. It has notyet been denied, that a federal judiciary is necessary to a certain extent. Every go¬ vernment necessarily involves a judiciary as a constituent part. If then a federal judiciary be necessary, what are the characters of its powers! That it shall be an auxiliary to the federal government, support and maintain harmony between the United States and foreign powers, and between different states, and prevent a failure of justice in cases to which particular state courts are incompetent. If this judiciary be reviewed as relative to these purposes, I think it will be found, that nothing is granted, which does not belong to a federal judiciary. Self defence is its first object. Has not the con¬ stitution said, that the states shall not use such and such powers, and given exclusive powers to congress! If the state judiciaries They will, therefore, have no feeling of your interests. It has been repeatedly said here, that the great object of a national govern¬ ment, was national defence. That power which is said to be intended for security and safety, maybe rendered detestable and op¬ pressive. If they give power to the general government, to pro¬ vide for the general defence , the means must be commensurate to the end. All the means in the possession of the people must be given to the government which is entrusted with the public defence.— In this state there are 236,000 blacks, and there are many in several other states. But there are few or none in the northern states, and yet if the northern states shall be of opinion, that our number, are numberless, they may call forth every national resource. May congress not say, That ev(ry black man mutt fight.? Did we see a little of this last war? We were not so hard pushed, as to make emancipation general. But acts of assembly passed, that every slave who would go to the army should be free. Another thing will contribute to bring this event about—slavery is detested.—> We feel its fatal effects—we deplore it with all the pity of human¬ ity. Let all these considerations, at some future period, press with full force on the minds of congress. Let that urbanity, which I trust will distinguish America,and the necessity of national defence, let all these things operate on their minds, they will search that paper, and see if they have power of manumission? And have they not, Sir? Have they not power to provide for the general de¬ fence and welfare ? May they not think that these call for the aboli¬ tion of slavery ? May they not pronounce all slaves, free, and will they not be warranted by that power ? There is no ambiguous im¬ plication or logical deduction. The paper speaks to the point: they have the power in clear unequivocal terms, and will clearly and cer¬ tainly execise it. As much as I deplore slavery, I see that prudence forbids its abolition. I deny that the general government ought to set them free, because a decided majority of the states have not the ties of sympathy and follow-feeling for those whose interest would be affected by their emancipation. The majority of congress is to the north, and the slaves are to the south. t - ' In this situation, I see a great deal of the property of the people of Virginia, in jeopardy, and their peace and tranquillity gone.— I repeat it again, that it would x rejoice my very soul that every one of my fellow beings was emancipated. As we ought with gratitude VIRGINIA. Hbnrv.]] to admire that decree of heaven which lias numbered us among the free, we ought to lament and deplore tlie necessity pf holding our fellow-men in bondage. Rut is it practicable by any human means to liberate them, without producing the most dreadful and ruinous consequences'? We ought to possess them, in the manner we inherited them from our ancestors,as their manumission is incompatible with the felicity of our country. But we ought to soften, as much as possi¬ ble, the rigor of their unhappy fate. I know that in a variety of of particular instances, the legislature listening to complaints* have admitted their emancipation. Let me not dwell on this subject. I will only add that this, as well as eveiy other property of the peo¬ ple of Virginia, is in jeopardy,and put in the hands of those who have no similarity of situation with us. This is a local matter and I can see no propriety in subjecting it to congress. With respect to subsequent amendments, proposed by the worthy member, I am distressed whed I hear the expression. It is a new one altogether, and such a one as stands against every idea of for¬ titude and manliness in the states, or any one else. Evils admitted in order to be removed subsequently, and tyranny submitted to, in order to be excluded by a subsequent alteration, are things totally new to me. But I am sure the gentleman meant nothing but to amuse the committee. I know his candor. His proposal is an idea dreadful to me. I ask, does experience warrant such a thing from the beginning of the world, to this day ? Do you enter into a compact first, and afterwards settle the terms of the of government? It is admitted by every one, that this is a compact. Although the confederation be lost, it is a compact con¬ stitution, or something of that nature. I confess I never heard of such an idea before. It is most abhorrent to my mind? You en¬ danger the tranuqillity of your country; you stab its repose, if you accept this government unaltered. How are you to allay animosi¬ ties ? For such there are, great and fatal. He flatters me and tells me,, that I could influence the people, and reconcile them to it. Sir, their sentiments are as firm and steady as they are patriotic. Were I to ask them to apostatize from their native religion, they would despise me. They are not to be shak¬ en in their opinions, with respect to the propriety of preserving their rights. You never can persuade them that it is necessary to relinquish them. Were I to attempt to persuade them to abandon their patriotic sentiments, 1 should look on myself as the most infa* mous of men. I believe it to be a fact, that the great body of yeomanry are in decided opposition to it. I may say with confidence, that for nine¬ teen counties adjacent to each other, nine-tenths of the people are .conscientiously opposed to it. I may be mistaken, but I give you DEBATES [Hzkbt* it as my opinion: and my opinion is founded on personal knowledge in some measure, nnd other good authority. I have not hunted popularity by declaiming to injuro this government. Though pub¬ lic fame might say so, it was not owing to me that this flame of opposition has been kindled and spread. These men never will part with their political opinions. If they should see their political happiness secured to the latest posterity, then indeed they may agree to it. Subsequent amendments will not do for men of this cast. Do j 7 ou consult the union in proposing them? You may amuse them as long as you please, but they will never like it. You have not solid reality, the hearts and hands of the men who are to be governed. Have gentlemen no respect to the actual dispositions of the peo¬ ple in the adopting states'? Look at Pennsylvania and Massachu¬ setts. These two great states have raised as great objections to that government as we do. There was a majority of only nineteen in Massachusetts. We arc told, that only 10,000 were represented in Pennsylvania, although 70,000 had a right to be represented. Is not this a serious thing ? Is it not worth while to turn your eyes for a moment from subsequent amendments to the situation of your country? Can you have a lasting union in these circumstances? It will be in vain to expect it. But if you agree to previous amend ¬ ments, you shall have union, firm and solid. I cannot conclude without saying, that I shall have nothing to do with it, if subsequent amendments be determined upon. Oppres¬ sions will bo carried on as radically by the majority when adjust¬ ments and accommodations will be held up. I say,I conceive it my duty, if this government is adopted before it is amended, to go home- I shall act as I think my duty requires. Every other gentleman will do the same. Previous amendments, in my opinion, are ne¬ cessary to procure peace and tranquillity. I fear, if they be not agreed to, every movement and operation of government will cease, and how long that baneful thing, civil discord, will stay from this country, God only knows. When men are free from restraint, how long will you suspend their fury? The interval between this and bloodshed, is but a moment. The licentious and wicked of the com¬ munity will seize with avidity every thing you hold. In this un¬ happy situation, what is to be done? It surpasses my stock of wisdom. If you will, in the language of freemen, stipulate, that there are rights which no man under heaven can take from you, you shall have me going along with } r ou : not otherwise. [Here Mr Henry informed the committee, that he had a resolution prepared, to refer a declaration of rights, with certain amendments to the most exceptionable parts of the constitution, to the other Henry.] VIRG1NA. S37 states in the confederacy, for their consideration, previous to its ratification. Tne clerk then read the resolution, the declaration of rights, and amendments, which weie nearly the same as those ulti¬ mately proposed by the convention, which sec at the conclusion.] Mr HENRY then resumed the subject. I have thus candidly sub¬ mitted to yon, Mr Chaiman, and this cornu ittee. what occurred to me as proper amendments to the cbnstilulion, and a declaration of rights containing those fundamental unalienable privileges, which I conceive to be essential to liberty and happiness. I believe, that oa a review of these amendments it will still he found, that the arm of power will be sufficiently strong for national purposes, when these restrictions shall be a part of the government. I believe no gentle¬ man who opposes me in sentiments, will be able to discover that any one feature of a strong government is altered, and at the same time your unalienable rights are secured by them. The go¬ vernment unaltered may be terrible to America; but can never ba loved, till it be amended. You find all the resources of the contin¬ ent may be drawn to a point. In danger, ike president may concen¬ tre to a point every effioit of the continent. If the government bo constructed to satisfy the people, and remove their apprehensions, the wealth and the strength cf the continent will go where public utility shall direct. This government, with these restrictions, will be a strong government, united with the privileges of the people. In my weak judgment, a government is strong when it applies to the most important end cf all governments—the rights and privilege® cfth8 people. In the honorable member’s proposal, jury trial, the press and religion, and other essential rights, are not to be given up. Other essential rights, what are they? The world will say, that you intended to give them up. When you go into an enumeration of your rights, and stop that enumeration, the inevitable conclu¬ sion is, that what is omitted is intended to be surrendered. Anxious S3 I am to be as little troublesome as possible, I cannot leave this part of the subject, without adverting to one remark of the honorable gentleman. He says, that rather than bring th» union into danger, he will adopt it with its imperfections. A great deal is said about disunion, and consequent dangers. I have no claim to a gieater share of fortitude than others, but lean see no kind of danger. I form my judgment on a single fact alone—that we are at peace with all the world, nor is lhere any apparent causa of a rupture with any nation in the world. Is it among the Ameri¬ can states that the cause of disunion is to be feared ? Are not th» states using all their efforfs for the promotion of union? New En¬ gland sacrifices local prejudices for the purposes of union. We bear the necessity of the union, and predilection for the union, is- $58 DEBATES. [Henry. echoed from all parts of the continent; and all at once disunion is to follow! If gentlemen dread disunion, the very thing they advocate will inevitably produce it. A previous ratification will raise insur¬ mountable obstacles to union. New York is an insurmountable obstacle to it, and North Carolina also. They will never accede to it, till it be amended. A great part of Virginia is opposed most decidedly to it, as it stands. This very spirit which will govern us in these three states, will find a kindred spirit in the adopting states, Give me leave to say, that it is very problematical, that the adopting states can stand on their own legs. I hear only on one side, but as far as my information goes, there are heart-burnings and animosities among them. Will these animosities be cured by subsequent amendments'? Turn away from America, and consider European politics. The nations there which can trouble us are, France, England,and Spain. But at present vve know for a certainty, that those nations are en¬ gaged in very different pursuits from American conquests. We are told by our intelligent ambassador, that there is no such danger as has been apprehended. Give me leave then to say, that dangers from beyond the Atlantic are imaginary. From these premises then, it may be concluded, that from the creation of the world, to this time, there never was a more fair and proper opportunity than we have at this day to establish such a go¬ vernment, as will permanently establish the most transcendant po- litical felicity. 1 Since the] revolution there has not been so much experience.—Since then, the general interests of America have not been better understood, nor the union more ardently loved, than at .this present moment. I acknowledge the weakness of the old con¬ federation. Every man says, that something must be done. Where is the moment more favorable than this! During the war when ten thousand dangers surrounded us fl America was magnanimous. What was the language of the little state of Maryland! *• I will have time to consider. I will hold out three years. Let what may come I will have time to reflect.” Magnanimity appeared every where. What was=the upshot! America triumphed. Is there any thing to forbid us to offer these amendments to the other states! If this moment goes away unimproved, we shall never see its return. We now act under a happy system, which says, that a majority may alter the government when necessary. But by the paper pro¬ posed a majority will forever endeavor in vain to alter it. Three- fourths may. Is not this the most promising time for securing the necessary alteration! Will you go into that government, where it is a principle, that a contemptible minority may prevent an altera¬ tion! What will be the language of the majority! Change the go- Henry.] VIRGINIA. 539 vernment!—Nay, seven-eights of the people of America may wish the change; but the minority may come with a Roman veto, and object to the alteration. The language of a magnanimous country and of freemen is, till you remove the defects we will not accede. It would be in vain for me to shew, that there is no danger to pre¬ vent our obtaining those amendments, it you are not convinced al¬ ready. If the other states will not agree to them, it is not an in¬ ducement to union. The language of this paper is not dictatorial, but merely a proposition for amendments. The proposition of Vir¬ ginia met with a favorable reception before. We proposed that con¬ vention which met at Annapolis. It was not called dictatorial. We proposed that at Philadelphia. Was Virginia thought dictato¬ rial 1 ? But Virginia is now to lose her pre-eminence. Those rights of equality to which the meanest individual in the community is entitled, is to bring us down infinitely below the Delaware people. Have we not a right to say, Hear our propositions! Why, sir, your slaves have a right to make their humble requests.—Those who are in the meanest occupations of human life, have a right to complain. What do we require 1 * Not pre-eminence, but safety: That our citizens may be able to sit down in peace and security under their own fig trees. Iam confident that sentiments, like these, will meet with unison in every state. For they will wish to banish dis¬ cord from the American soil. I am certain that the warmest friend of the constitution, wishes to have fewer enemies—fewer of those who pester and plague him with opposition. I could not withhold from my fellow-citizens any thing so reasonable. I fear you will have no union, unless you remove the cause of opposition. Will you sit down contended with the name of union, without any solid foundation? Mr Henry then concluded, by expressing his hopes, that his resolution would be adopted, ar.d added, that if the committee should disapprove of any of his amendments, others might be sub¬ stituted. Gov. RANDOLPH.—Mr Chairman, once more, sir, I address you, and perhaps it will be the last time I shall speak concerning this constitution, unless I be urged by the observations of some gen¬ tlemen. Although this is not the first time that my mind has been brought to contemplate this awful period, yet I acknowledge it is not rendered less awful by familiarity with it. Did I persuade myself, that those fair days were present, which the honorable gentle¬ man descrihed, could I bring my mind to believe, that there were peace and tranquility in this land, and that there was no storm gath¬ ering which would burst, and that previous amendments could be retained, I would concur with the honorable gentleman. For noth- uo DEBATES. [Randolph. inglbut the fear of inevitable destruction, would lend me to vote for the constitution in spite of the objections I have to it. But, sir, what have I heard to day] I sympathised most warmly with what other gentlemen said yesterday, that let the contest be what it may the minority should submit to the majority. With satisfaction and joy I heard what he then said—that lie would submit, and that there should be peace if his power could procure it. What a sad reverse to day! Are we net told, by way of counterpart to language that did him honor, that he would secede] I hope he will pardon, and correct me if I misrecite him, but if not corrected, my interpreta¬ tion is, that secession by him will be the consequence of adoption without previous amendments, [Here Mr HENRY explained himself, and denied having said any thing of secession, but that he said, he would have no hand in subsequent amendments; that he would lemain and vote, and after¬ wards he would have no business here.] I sec, continued his excellency, that I am not mistaken in my thoughts. The honorable gentleman says, he will remain and vot on the question, but after that he has no business here, and that ho will go home. I beg to make a few remarks on the subject of se¬ cession. If there be in this house, members who have in contem¬ plation to secede from the majority, let me conjure them, by all tho ties of honor and duty, to consider what they are about to do. Somo of them have more property than 1 have, and all of them are equal to me in personal rights. Such an idea of refusing to submit to the decision of the majority is destructive of every republican principle. It will kindle a civil war, and reduce every thing to an¬ archy, and confusion. To avoid a calamity so lamentable, I would submit to it, if it contained greater evils than it dees: What are they to say to their constituents when they go home] ** We come here to tell you that liberty is in danger, and though the majority is in favor cf it, you ought not to submit.” Can any man consider, without shuddering with horror, the awful consequeces of such desperate conduct] I entreat men to consider and ponder what good citizenship requires of them. I conjure them to con¬ template the consequences as to themselves, as well as others. They themselves will be overwhelmed in the general disorder. I did not think that the proposition of the honorable gentleman near me, (Mr White) could have met with the treatment it has. The honorable gentleman says, there are only three rights stipulated in it. I thought this error might have been accounted for at first, but after lie read it, the continuance of the mistake has astonished me. He has wandered from the point. [Here he read Mr White’s proposition,] Where in this paper do you discover that the people of Virginia'are tenacious cf three lights only] It declares, that Randolph.] VIRGINIA. 641 all power cones from the people, and whatever is not granted by them, remains with them. That among other things, remaining with them, are liberiy of the press, right of conscience, and somo other essential rights. Could you devise any express form of words, by which the rights contained in the bill of rights of Virginia could be better secured or more fully comprehended! What is the paper which he offers in the form of a bill of rights! Will that better secure our rights, than a declaration like this! All rights are therein declared to be completely vested in the people, unless expressly given away. Can there be a mere pointed or positive reservation! That honorable gentleman, and some others, have insisted that the abolition of slavery will result from it, and at the same lima have complained that it encourngvs its continuation.< The incon¬ sistency proves, m some degree, the futility of their arguments. But if it be not conclusive, to satisfy the committee that there is no danger of enfranchisement taking place, I beg leave to refer them to the paper itself. I hope that there is none here, who, considering the subject in the calm light of philosophy, will advance an objec¬ tion dishonorable to Virginia; that at the moment they are securing the lights of their citizens, an objection is started that there is a spark of hope that those unfortunate men now held in bondage, may, by the operation of the general government, be made free. But if any gentleman be terrified by this apprehension, let him read the system. I ask, and I will ask again and again, till I be answered (not by declamation) where is the part that has a tendency to ike abolition of slavery? Is it the clause which says, that “ the migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by congress prior te the year 1303!” This is an exception from the power of regu¬ lating commerce, and the restriction is only to continue till 1808. Then congress can, by the exercise of that power, prevent future importations; but does it affect the existing state cf slavery! Wero it light here to mention what passed in convention on the occasion, 1 miirht tell you, that the Southern Slates, even South Carolina herself conceived this 'property to he secure hy these words # I believe, whatever wo may think here, that there was not a member of the Virginia delegation who had the smallest suspicion cf the abolition of thvery. Go to their meaning. Point out the clause where this formidable power of emancipation is inserted. But another clause of the constitution proves the absurdity of the supposition. The words of the clause arc, “no person held to service or labor in one stale, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, b<* discharged- from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up ea 542 DEBATES. [Randolph. claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due ” Every one knows that slaves are held to service and labor. And when authority is given to owners of slaves to vindicate their pro¬ perty, can it be supposed they can be deprived of it] If a citizen of this state, in consequence of this clause, can take his runaway slave in Maryland, can it be seriously thought, that after taking him and bringing him home, he could be made free! I observed that the honorable gentleman's proposition come in a truly questionable shape, and is still more extraordinary and unac¬ countable for another consideration: that although we went article by article through the constitution, and although we did not expect a general review of the. subject, (as a most comprehensive view had been taken of it, before it was regularly debated,) yet we are carried back to the clause giving that dreadful power, for the gene¬ ral welfare. Pardon me, if I remind you of the true state of that business. I appeal to the candor of the honorable gentleman, and if he thinks it an improper appeal, I ask the gentlemen here, whether there be a general , indefinite, power of providing for the general wel¬ fare! The power is, “to lay and collect taxes, duties, impost, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare.” So that thejr can only raise money by these means, in order to provide for the general welfare. No man who reads it can say it is general, as the honorable gentleman represents it. You must violate every rule of construction and common sense, if you sever it frem the power of raising money and annex it to any thing else, in order to make it that formidable power which it is represented to be. The honorable gentleman says, there is no restraint on the power of issuing general warrants. If I be tedious in asking where is that power, you will ascribe it to him who has put me to the necessity of asking. They have no such power given them: if they have, where is it! Again he recurs to standing armies , and asks if congress cannot raise such. Look at the bill of rights provided by the honorable gentleman himself, and tell me if there he no great security by ad¬ mitting it when necessary! It says, that standing armies should be avoided in time of peace. It does not absolutely prohibit them. Is there any clause in it, or in the confederation, which prevents con¬ gress from raising an army! No—it is left to the discretion of con¬ gress, It ought to be in the power of congress to raise armies, as the existence of the society might at some future period depend upon it. But it should be recommended to them to use the power only when necessary. I humbly conceive, that you have as great security as you could desire from that clause in tho constitution. Randolph.] VIRGINIA. 543 which directs that money for supporting armies will be voted for every two years; as by thi3 means, the representatives who will have appropriated money unnecessarily, or imprudently, to that pur¬ pose, may be removed, and a new regulation made. Review the practice of the favourite nation of the honorable gentleman. In their bill of rights, there is no prohibition of a standing army; but only that it ought not to be maintained without the consent of the legis¬ lature. Can it be done here without the consent of the democratic branch! Their consent is necessary to every bill, and money bill* can originate with them only. Can an army then be raised or sup* ported without their approbation! [His excellency then went over all the articles of Mr Henry’s proposed declaration of rights, and endeavoured to prove, that the rights intended to be thereby secured, were either provided for in the constitution itsell, or could not be infringed by the general government, as being unwarranted by any of the powers which were delegated therein; for that it was in vain to provide against the ex¬ ercise of a power which did not exist.] He then proceeded to examine the nature of some of the amend¬ ments proposed by the honorable gentleman. As to the reservation of rights not expressly given away, he repeated what he had before observed, of the second article of the confederation, that it was interpreted to prohibit congress from gianting passports, although such a power was necessarily incident to that of making war. Did not this, says he, shew the vanity of all the federal authority! Gen* tlemen have displayed great wisdom in the use they make of th^ experience of the defects in the old confederation. When we see the defect of that article, are we to repeat it! Are those gentleman zealous friends to the union, who profess to be so here, and yet in¬ sist on a repetition of measures which have been found destructive to it! I believe their professions, but they must pardon me when I say their arguments are not true. [His excellency then read the second amendment proposed, respecting the number of representatives.'] What better security have you under these words, than under the clause in the paper before you! This puts it in the power of your representatives to continue the number of it is in that paper. They may always find a pretext to justify their regulations concerning it. They may continue the number at two hundred, when an augmenta¬ tion would be necessary. As to the amendment respecting direct taxation, the subject ha« been so fully handled, and is so extensive in its nature, that it is needless to say any thing of it. The 4th amendment goes on the wide field of indiscriminate sus¬ picion, that every one grasps after offices, and that congress will 544 DEBATES. [Randolph. create them unnecessarily. Perhaps it will exclude the most proper from offices of great importance to the community. [Here he read the 5th amendment.]—I beg the honorable gentle¬ man to tell me on what subject congress wilj exercise this power improperly. If there be any treachery in their view, the words in this amendment are broad enough to allow it. It is as good a se¬ curity in this constitution, as human ingenuity can devise: for if they intend any treachery, they will not let you see it. [Here he read the 7th and 8th amendments.]—I have never hesi¬ tated to acknowledge, that I wished the regulation of commerce had been put in the hands of a greater body than ii is in the sense of the constitution. But I appeal to my colleagues in the federal conven¬ tion, whether this was not a slr^e qua non of the union. Of all the amendments, this is the most destructive, which requires the con¬ sent of three-fourths pf both houses to treaties ceding or restraining territorial rights. This is priding in the Virginia sovereignty in op¬ position to the majority. This suspected congress, these corrupt 05 and corrupt 26, are brought so low they cannot be trusted, lest they should have it in their power to lepofif part of Virginia, cede it, so as that it should become a colony to some foreign state. There is no power in the constitution to cede any part of the territories of the United States. The whole number of congress, being unanimous, have no power to suspend or cede territorial, rights. But this amendment admits, in the fullest latitude, that congress have a rightto dismem¬ ber the empire. His amendment respecting the miiitia is unnecessary. The same powers rest in the states by the constitution. Gentlemen were re¬ peatedly called upon to shew where the power of the states over the militia was taken away, but they could not point it out. [He read the 12th amendment.]—Will this be a melioration of the constitution? I w ish to know what is meant by the words police and good government? These words may lead to complete tyranny in congress. Perhaps some gentlemen think that these words relate to particular objects, and that they will diminish and confine their power.—'They are most extensive in their significations, and will stretch and dilate it., and all the imaginary horrors of the honorable gentleman will be included in this amendment. [He read the 13th amendment.]—1 was of this opinion myself— but I informed you before why 1 changed it. [He read the 14th amendment.]—if I were to propose an amend¬ ment on this subject, it would be to limit the word arising. I would not discard it altogether, but define its extent. The jurisdiction of she judiciary in cases arising under the system, I should wish to be «Ufmed, so as to prevent its being extended unnecessarily; I would Randolph.] VIRGINIA. 545 restrain the appellate cognizance as to fact, and prevent oppressive and vexatious appeals. {He read the 15th amendment.]—The right of challenging and excepting, I hope, has clearly appeared to the committee to be a ne¬ cessary appendage of the trial by jury itself. Permit me now to make a few remarks on the proposal of these amendments, previous to our ratification. The first objection arises from the paper itself. Can you conceive, or does any man believe, that there are twelve, or even nine states in the whole union, that would subscribe to this paper?—A paper fraught with perhaps, more defects than the con¬ stitution itself. What are we about to do? To make this the con¬ dition of our coming into this government. I hope gentlemen will never agree to this. If we declare that these amendments, and a bill of rights containing twenty articles, must be incorporated into the constitution,.before we assent to it, I ask you, whether you may not bid a long farewell to the union? It will produce that deplora¬ ble thing—the dissolution of the union, which no man yet has dared openly to advocate? No, say the gentlemen, because Maryland kept off three years from the confederacy, and no injury happened. This very argument carries its own refutation with it. The war kept us together, in spite of the discordance of the states. There is no war now. All the nations of Europe have their eyes fixed on America, and some of them perhaps cast wistful looks at you. Their gold may be tried to sow disunion among us. Thename ban¬ dage which kept us before together, does not now exist. Let gen¬ tlemen seriously ponder the calamitous consequences of dissolving the union in our present situation I appeal to the great searcher of hearts on this occasion, that behold the greatest danger that ever hap¬ pened, hanging over us. Fcr previous amendments are but another name for rejection. They will throw Virginia out of the union, and cause heart aches to many of those gentleman who may vote for them. But let us consider things calmly. Reflect on the facility of obtaining amendments if you adopt, and weigh the danger if you do not. Recollect that many other states have adopted it, who wish for many amendments. I ask you, if it be not bettor to adopt and run the.chance of amending it hereafter, than run the risk of endan¬ gering the union? The confederation is gone: it has no authority.. If in this situation wc reject the constitution, the union will be dis¬ solved, the dogs of war will break loose, and anarchy and discord will complete the ruin of this country. Previous .adoption will pre¬ vent these deplorable mischiefs. The union of sentiments with us in the adopting states, will render subsequent amendments easy. I therefore rest my happiness with perfect confidence on this subject. VOL. 3. 35 546 DEBATES. [Dawson Mr GEORG'E MASON.—Mr Chairman, with respect to com-» merce and navigation, he has given it as his opinion, that their regu-' lation, as it now stands, was a sine qua non of the union, and that without it, the states in convention would never concur. I differ from him. It never was, nor in my opinion ever will be, a sine qua non of the union. f I will give you, to the best of my recollection, the history of that affair. This business was discussed at Philadelphia for four months, during which time the subject of commerce and navigation was oft¬ en under consideration and I assert, that eight states out of twelve, for more than three months, voted for requiring two-thirds of the members present in each house to pass commercial and navigation laws. True it is, that afterwards it was carried by a majority, as it Stands. If I arh right, there was a great majority for requiring two- thirds of the stales in this business, till a compromise took place be¬ tween the northern and southern states; the northern states agreeing te the temporary importation of slaves, and the southern states con¬ ceding,in return,that navigation and commercial laws should be on the footing which they now stand. If! am mistaken, let me be put right. Those are my reasons for saying that this was not a sine qua non of their c oncurrence. The Newfoundland fisheries will require that kind of security which we are now in want of. The eastern states therefore agreed at length, that treaties should require the consent of two thirds of the members present in the senate. Mr DAWSON. Mr Chairman, when a nation is about to make at change in its political character, it behoves it to summon the experi¬ ence of ages which have passed, to collect the wisdom of the present day, to ascertain cleaily those great priciples of equal liberty, which Secure the rights, liberties and properties of the people. Such is the situation of the United States at this moment, we are about to make such a change. The constitution proposed for the government of the United States, has been a subject of general discussion; while many able and konorable gentlemen within these walls, have, in the develope- ment of the various parts, delivered their sentiments with that freedom which will ever mark the citizens of an independent state, and with that ability which will prove to the world their eminent talents, I, Sir, although urged by my feelings, have fore¬ bore to say any thing on my part, from a satisfactory impression of the inferiority of my talents, and from a wish to acquire every information which might assist my judgment, in forming 2 decision on a question of such magnitude.-—But, Sir, as it in¬ volves in its late, the interest of so extensive a country, Dawson.] VIRGINIA, 547 every sentiment which can be offered, deserves its proportion of public attention. I shall therefore avoid any apology for now rising; although uncommon propriety might justify it, and rather trust to the candor of those who hear me. Indeed I am induced to come for¬ ward,not from any apprehension that my opinion will have weight, bnt in order to discharge that duty which I owe to myself, and to those I have the honor to represent. The defects of the articles by which we are at present confedera- ted, have been echoed and re-echoed, not only from every quarter of this house, but from every part of the continent. At the framing of those articles, a common interest excited us to unite for the com¬ mon good. But no sooner did this principle cease to operate, than the defects of the system were sensibly felt. Since then the seeds of civil dissention have been gradually opening, and political confu¬ sion has pervaded the states. During the short time of my political life, having been fully impressed with the truth of these observa¬ tions, when a proposition was made by Virginia to invite the sister states to a general convention, at Philadelphia, to amend these defects , I readily gave my assent; and when I considered the very respect¬ able characters who formed that bod}’’—when I reflected that they were, most of them, those sages and patriots, under whose banners and hv whose councils, it had been rescued from impending danger, and placed among the nations of the earth—when I also turned my attention to that illustrious character, to immortalize memory, Fame shall blow her trump to the latest ages, I say, when I weighed all these considerations, I was almost persuaded to declare in favor of the proposed plan, and to exert my slender abilities in its favor.— But when I came to'investigate it impartially, on the immutable principles of government, and to exercise that reason, with which the God of nature hath endowed me, and which I will ever freely use, I was convinced of this important, though melancholy truth, that the greatest men may err, and that their errors are sometimes of the greatest magnitude, I was persuaded that, although the pro¬ posed plan contains many things excellent, yet by the adoption of it ;;s it now stands, the liberties of America in general, the property of Virginia in particular, would be endangered. These being my sentiments—sentiments which I offer with the diffidence of a young politician, but with the firmness of a republi¬ can, which I am ready to change when I am convinced they are founded in error, but which I will support until that conviction—I ahould be a traitor to my country, and unworthy that freedom, for which I trust I shall ever remain an advocate, was I to declare my entire approbation of the plan, as it now stands, or assent to its rati- Ication without previous amendments. 548 DEBATES. LDaWSOK' During the deliberations of this convention, several gentlemen of eminent talents, having exerted themselves to prove the necessity of the union, by presenting to our view the relative situation of Vir¬ ginia to the other states, the melancholy representation made to day, and frequently before, by an honorable gentleman, (Gov. Randolph,) of our state, reduced, in his estimation, to the lowest degree of de¬ gradation, must now haunt the recollection of many gentlemen in this committee, how far he has drawn the picture to the life, or where it is too highly colored, rests with them to determine. To gentlemen, however, sir, of their abilities, the task was easy, and perhaps I may add unnecessary. It is a truth admitted on all sides, and I presume there is not a gentleman, who hears me, who is not a friend to a union of the thirteen states. But, sir, an opinion has gone abroad (from whence it originated, or by whom it is supported, I will not venture to say) that the op¬ ponents to the paper on your table, are enemies to the union; it may not therefore, be improper for me to declare, that I am a warm friend to a firm, federal, energetic government; that I consider a confedera¬ tion of the states, on republican principles, as a security to their mutual interests, and a disunion as injurious to the whole: but I shall lament exceedingly, when a confederation of independent states shall be converted into a consolidated government; for when that event shall happen, I shall consider the history of American liberty as short as it has been brilliant, and we shall afford one more proof to the favorite maxim of tyrants, “that mankind cannot govern themselves.” An honorable gentleman (Col. H. Lee) come forward some days since, with all the powers of eloquence, and all the warmth of en¬ thusiasm; after descanting on some military operations to the south, of which he was a spectator, and pronouncing sentence of condemn¬ ation on a Mr Shays, to the north; as a military character, he boldly throws the gauntlet, and defies the warmest friend to the opposition to come forth and say that the friends to the system on your table, are not also friends to the republican liberty. Arguments, Sir, in this house, should ever be addressed to the reason, and should be applied to the system itself, and not to those who either support or oppose it. I, however, dare come forth, and tell that honorable gentleman, not with the military warmth of a young soldier, but with the firmness of a republican, that in my humble opinion, had the paper now on your table, and which is so ably supported, been presented to cur view ten years ago (when the American spirit shone forth in the meridian of glory, and rendered us the wonder of an admiring world) it would have been considered Dawson.] VIRGINIA. 543 ^8 containing principles incompatible with republican liberty, and therefore doomed to infamy. Having, Sir, made these loose observations, and having proved, I flatter myself, to this honorable convention, the motives from which my opposition to the proposed system originated, may I now be per¬ mitted to turn my attention, for a very few moments, to the system itself,and to point out some of the leading parts most exceptionable in my estimation, and to which my original objections have not been re¬ moved, by the debate, but rather confirmed. If we grant to congress the power of direct taxation, if we yield to them the sword, and if we also invest them with the judicial au¬ thority, two questions of the utmost importance, immediately pre sent themselves to our inquiries; whether these powers will not be oppressive in their operations, and, aided by other parts of the sys¬ tem, convert the thirteen confederated states into one consolidated government; and whether any country, as extensive as North Amer¬ ica, and where climates, dispositions, and interests, are so essential¬ ly different, can be governed under one consolidated plan; except by the introduction of despotic principles. The warmest friends, Sir, to the government, some of those who formed, signed, and have recommended it, some of those who have enthusiastically supported it in every quarter of this continent, have answered my first query in the affirmative: they have admitted that it possesses few federal features and will ultimately end in a con¬ solidated government; a truth, which in my opinion, they would have denied in vain; for every article, every section, every clause, and almost every line, prove that it will have this tendency: and if this position has, during the course of the long and learned debates on this head, been established to the satisfaction of the convention, I apprehend that the authority of all eminent writers on the subject, and the experience of all ages, cannot be controverted, and that it will be admitted that no government formed on the principles of freedom, can pervade all North America. This, sir, is my great objection, an objection general in its nature, because it operates on the whole system; an objection which I ear¬ ly formed, which 1 flattered myself would have been removed, but which hath obliged me to say,has been confirmed by the observations which have been made by many learned gentlemen, and which would be tedious for me now to recapitulate. That the legislative, executive, and judicial powers; should be separate and distinct, in all free governments, is a political fact, so well established, that I presume I shall not be thought arrogant, when I affirm that no country ever did, or ever can, long remain 550 DEBATES. [Dawson# free, where thsy are blended. All the states have been in this sen¬ timent, when they formed their state constitutions, and therefore have guarded against the danger; and every school hoy in politics must be convinced of the propriety of the observation—and yet by the proposed plan, the legislative and executive powers are closely united; the senate who compose one part of the legislature, are also as council to the president, the supreme head, and are concerned ia passing laws, which they themselves are to execute. The wisdom, Sir, of many nations, has induced them to enlarge the powers of their rulers, but there are very few instances of the relinquishment of power or the abridgement of authority, on the part of the governors. The very first clause of the eighth section of the first article, which gives to congress the power “ to lay and collect axes, duties, imposts, excises, &c. &c.” appears to me to be big with unnecessary danger, and to reduce human nature, to which I would willingly pay a compliment did not the experience of all ages rise up against me, to too great a test. The arguments. Sir, which have been urged by some gentlemen that the impost will defray all expenses, in my estimation, cannot be supported, and common sense will never assent to the assertions which have been made, that the government will not be an additional expense to this country. Will not the support of an army and navy—will not the establishment of a multiplicity of offices in the legislative, executive, and particular¬ ly the judiciary departments, most of which will be of a national character, and must be supported with a superior degree of dignity and credit, be prodigious additions to the national expense? And* Sir, if the states are to retain even a shadow of sovereignty, the ex¬ pence thence arising must also be defrayed, and will be very con¬ siderable. I come now, Sir, to speak of a clause, to which our attention has. been frequently called, and on which many gentleman have already delivered their sentiments; a clause, in the estimation of some, of little consequence, and which rather serves as a pretext for scuf¬ fling for votes, but which, in my opinion, is one of the most impor¬ tant contained in the system and to which there are many and weighty objections. I refer to the clause empowering the presi¬ dent by and with the consent of two thirds of the senators present, to make treaties. If, Sir, the dismemberment of the empire—if the privation of the most essential national rights, and the very exist¬ ence of a people, depend on this clause, surely, Sir, it merits the mo 3 t thorough investigation and if, on that investigation, it appears that those great rights are endangered, it highly behoves us to a- mend it in such a manner as will prevent the evils which may arise from it as it now stands. My objections to it do not arise from a Bawsok.] VIRGINIA. 551 view of the particular situation of the western part of this state, al¬ though certainly we are bound by every principle, to attend to the interest of our fellow citizens in that quarter, but from an apprehen¬ sion that the principle pervades all America, and that in its opera¬ tion, it will be found highly injurious to the southern states. It will, I presume, be readily admitted, that the dismemberment of empire is the highest act of soveieign authority, the exercise of which can be authorized only by absolute authority,exclusive then, sir, of any consideration which arises from the particular system of American politics, the guard established against the exercise of this power, is by far too slender. The president with the concurrence of two-thirds of the senate present, may make a treaty, by which any territory may be ceded, or the navigation of any river surrendered; thereby granting to five states the exercise of a right acknowledged to be the highest act of sovereignty—to fifteen men, not the representatives of the country to be ceded, but as has already happened, men whose interest and policy it may be to make such surrender. Admitting for a moment, that this point is as well guarded by the proposed plan, as by the old articles of confederation, to which, however, common sense cap never assent, have we not already had cause to tremble, and ought we not to guard against the accomplishment of a scheme, to which nothing but an inattention to the general interest of America, and a selfish regard to the interest of particular states, could have given Tise. Surely, sir, we ought; and since we have already seen a dia¬ bolical attempt made to surrender the navigation of a river, the source of which is as yet unknown, and on which depends impor¬ tance of the southern part of America—since we have every reason to believe that the same principle which at first dictated this meas¬ ure, still exists, and will forevei operate, it is our duty, a duty which we owe to ourselves, which we owe to the southern part of Ameri¬ ca, and which we owe to the natural rights of mankind, to guard against it in such manner, as will forever prevent its accomplish¬ ment. This, sir, is not done by the clause, nor will it rest on that sure footing which I wish, and which the importance of the subject demands, until the concurrence of three fourths of all the senators , shall be requisite to ratify a treaty respecting the cession of terri¬ tory; the surrender of the navigation of rivers, or the use of all the American seas. That sacred palladium of liberty, the freedom of the press, the Influence of which is so great, that it is the opinion of the ablest writers, that no country can remain long in slavery -where it is re¬ strained, has not been expressed, nor are the liberties of the people ascertained and protected by any declaration of rights—that inesti- 553 DEBATES. [Dawson. mable privilege, the most important which freemen can enjoy, the’ trial by jury in all civil cases has not been guarded by the system— and while they have been inattentive to these all important consid¬ erations, they have made provision for the introduction of standing armies in time of peace—these, sir, ever have been used as the grand machines to suppres s the liberties of the people, and will ever awaken the jealousy of republicans, so Jong as liberty is dear, and tyranny odious to mankind. Congress, sir, have the power to “ to declare war,” and also to raise and support armies, and if we suppose them to be a represen¬ tation of the states, the nexus imperu of the British constitution is here lost—there the king has the power of declaring war, and the parliament that of raising money to support it. Governments ought not to depend on an army for their support,- but ought to be so formed as to have the confidence, respect, and affection of the citizens. Some degree of virtue, sir, must exist, or freedom cannot live. A standing army will introduce idleness and extravagance, which will be followed by their sure concomitant vices. In a country, exten¬ sive like ours, the power of the sword is more sensibly felt, than in a small community. The advantages, sir, of military science and discipline cannot be exerted unless a proper number of soldiers are united in one bod y, and actuated by one soul. The tyrant of a sin¬ gle town, or a small district, would soon discover that an hundred armed soldiers were a weak defence against ten thousand peasants or citizens: but ten thousand well discipline soldiers will command, with despotic sway, millions of subjects, and will strike terror into the most numerous populace. It was this, sir, which enabled the Pmtorean bands of Rome, whose number scarcely amounted to ten thousand, after having violated the sanctity of the throne, by the attrocious murder of a most excellent emperor, to dishonor the ma¬ jesty of it, by proclaiming that the Roman empire-—the mistress of the world—was to be disposed of to the highest bidder, at public auction;—and to their licentious frenzy may be attributed the first cause of the decline and fall of that mighty empire. We ought therefore strictly to guard against the establishment of an army, whosy only occupation would be idleness, whose only effort the in¬ troduction of vice and dissipation, and who would, at some future day deprive us of our liberties, as a reward for past favors, by the introduction of some military despot. I had it in contemplation, to have made some observations on the disposition of the judicial powers, but as my knowledge in that line is confined, and as the subjects has been so ably handled by other gentlemen, and the defects clearly developed, and as their arguments remain unanswered, I shall say nothing on that head;—the want of I VIRGINIA. IDawsoJc.] 553 responsibility to the people from their representatives, would furnish matter of ample discussion, bull pass it over in silence, only obser¬ ving thatit is a grand, and indeed a dating fault, and on© which sanc¬ tions with security the most tyrannic edicts, of a despotic ruler. The ambiguous terms in which all rights are secured to the people, and the clear and comprehensive language used, when power is granted to congress, also affords matter for suspicions and objec¬ tions, out the able manner in which, my very worthy, my very elo¬ quent, and truly patriotic friend and coadjutor, whose name shall ever be hallowed in the temple of liberty, has handled this subject, would render any observations from me, tedious and unnecessary. Permit me then to conclude by reminding gentlemen who appeal to history to prove the excellence of the proposed plan, that their mode of comparison is unjust—“ wealth and extent of territory,’’ says the great Montesquieu, “ have a relation to government, and the manners and customs of the people are closely connected with it.” The same system of policy which might have been excellent in the governments of antiquity, would not probably suit us at the present day—the question therefore which should be agitated, ia not whether the proposed constitution is better or worse than those which have from time to time existed, but whether it is calculated to secure our liberties and happiness at the present stage of the world. For my own part, after an impartial investigation of it, and after a close attention, and candid consideration of the arguments which have been used, I arn impressed with an opinion, that it is not—I. am persuaded, that by adoptingit, and then proposing amendments, that unfortunate traveller liberty is more endangered than the union of the states will be by first proposing these amendments. I am so far an enthusiast in favor of liberty, that I never will trust the sacred deposit to other hands, nor will 1 exchange it for any earthly con¬ sideration—and I have such a fixed aversion to the bitter cup of slavery, that in my estimation a draught is not sweetened, whether administered by the hand of a Turk, a Briton, or anAmerican. Impressed then, sir, with theso sentiments, and governed by these principles, I shall decidedly give my vote in favor of pieviou* amendments; but, sir, should the question be decided contrary to my wishes, the first wish of my heart is,, that the decision may promote the happiness and prosperity of the country so dear to us all. Mr GRAYSON.—Mr Chairman, gentlemen have misrepresented, what I said on the subject of treaties * On this ground let us appeal to the law of nations. How does it stand? Thus—that without the consent of the national legislature dismemberment cannot be made. This is a subject in? which Virginia is deeply interested* 554 DEBATES. [Grayson. and ought to be well understood. It ought to be expressly provided, that no dismemberment should take place without the consent of the legislature. On this occasion I beg leave to introduce an instance mentioned on the floor of congress. Francis, king of France, was taken by the Spaniards at the battle of Pavia. He stipulated to give up certain territories to be liberated. Yet the stipulation was not complied with, because it was alledged that it was not made by the sovereign power. Let us apply this. Congress has a right to dismember the empire. The president may do it, and the legislature may confirm it. Let gentlemen contradict it if they can. This is one of the highest acts of sovereignty, and I think it of the utmost importance that it should be placed on a proper footing. There is an absolute necessity for the existence of the power. It may pre¬ vent the annihilation of the society by procuring a peace. It must be lodged somewhere. The opposition wish it to be put in the hands of three-fourths of the members of both houses of congress. It would be then secure. It is not so now. The dangers of disunion were painted in strong colours. How is the fact! It is this—that if Virginia thinks proper to insist on pre¬ vious amendments, joined by New-York and North Carolina, sho can procure what amendments she pleases. What is the geogra¬ phical position of these states'? New-York commands the ocean. Virginia and North Carolina join the Spanish dominions. What would be the situation then of the other states'? They would be topographically separated, though politically connected with one another. There would be no communication between the centre and the component parts. While those states were thus separated, of what advantage would commercial regulations be to them? Yet will gentlemen pretend to say that we must adopt first, and then beg for amendments? I see no reason in it. We undervalue our own importance. Consider the vast consequence and importance of Virginia and North Carolina. What kind of connection would the rest of the states form? They v onld be carrying states, without having any thing to carry. They could have no communication with the other southern states. I therefore insist, that if you are not satisfied with the paper as it stands, it is as clear to me as that the sun shines, that by joining these two states, you may command such amendments as you may think necessary for the happiness of the people. The late convention were not empowered totally to alter the pre¬ sent confederatiou. The idea was to amend. If they laid before us a thing quite different, we are not bound to accept it. There is no¬ thing dictatorial in refusing it: we wish to remove the spirit of party. In all parts of the world there is a reciprocity in contracts Gbatsoi?.] VIRGINIA 55§ and compacts. If one man makes a proposition to another, is he bound to accept if? Six or seven states have agreed to it. As it is not their interest to stand by themaelves, will they not with open arms receive us? Tobacco will always make our peace with them. 1 hope then that the honorable gentleman will find, on a reconsideration, that we are not at all in that dangerous situation he represented. In my opinion, the idea of subsequent amendments is preposterous. They are words without meaning. The little states will not agree to an alter¬ ation. When they find themselves on an equal footing with the other states in the senate, and all power vested in them—the execu¬ tive mixed with the legislative, they will never assent. Why are euch extensive powers given to the senate? Because the little states gained their point. In every light I consider subsequent amend¬ ments as unwise and impolitic. Considering the situation of the continent, this is not a time for changing our government. I do not think we stand so secure with respect to other nations as to change our government. The nations of Europe look with watchful eyes on us, and with reason—for the West India islands depend on our motions. When we have strength, importance and union, they will have reason to tremble for their islands. Almost all the governments of the world have been formed by accident. We are now in time of peace, without any real cause, changing our government. We ought to be cool and temperate, and not act like the people of Denmark, who gave up their liberties, irt a transport of passion, to the crown. Let us therefore be cau¬ tious and deliberate before we determine. W T hat is the situation of Virginia? She is rich when her resources are compared with those of others. Is it right for a rich nation to consolidate with a poor one? By no means. It was right for Scot¬ land to unite with England, as experience has shewn. Scotland only pays ^648,000, when England pays four shillings in the pound, which amounts to £2, 000,000. In all unions where a rich state is joined with a poor one, it will be found, that the rich one will pay in that disproportion. An union between such nations ought never to take place, except in peculiar circumstances, and on very parti¬ cular conditions. How is it with Virginia? It is politic for her to unite, but not on any terms. She will pay more than her natural proportion, and the present state of the national debt renders it an object. She will also lose her importance. She is now put in the same situation as a state forty times smaller. Does she gain any advantage from her central situation, by acced¬ ing to that paper? Within ten miles of Alexandria the centre of the states is said to be. It has not said that the ten miles square will 556 DEBATES. [Madisow , be there. In a monarchy the seat of government must be where the monarch pleases. How ought it to be in a republic like ours? Now in one part, and at another time in another, or where it will best suit the convenience of the people. Then I lay it down as a political right, that the seat of government ought to be fixed by the constitu¬ tion, so as to suit the public convenience. Has Virginia any gain from her riches and commerce? What does she get in return? I can see what she gives up, which is im¬ mense. The little states gain in proportion as we lose. Every dis¬ proportion is against us. If the effects of such a contrariety of interests be happy, it must be extraordinary and wonderful. From the very nature of the paper, one part, whose interest is different from the other, is to govern it. What will be our situation? The northern states are carrying states. We are considered as productive states. They will consequently carry for us. Are manufactures favorable to us? If they reciprocate the act of Charles the Second, and say that no produce of America will be carried in any foreign bottom, what will be the consequence? This—that all the produce of the southern states will be carried by the northern states on their own terms, which must be very high. Though this government has the power of taxation and the most important subject of the legislation, there is no responsibility any where. The members of Delaware do not return to Virginia to give an account of their conduct. Yet they legislate for us. In addition to this, it will be productive of great expences. Virginia has assu¬ med an immense weight of private debt, and her imports and exports are taken away. Judge then how such an accumulation of expenses will accommodate us. I think that were it not for one great char¬ acter in America, so many men would not be for this government We have one ray of hope. We do not fear while he lives : but we can only expect his fame to be immortal. We wish to know, who besides him, can concentrate the confidence and affections of all America ? He then concluded by expressing hopes that the proposition of his honorable friend would be acceded to. Mr MADISON.—Mr Uh airman, nothing has excited more admir¬ ation in the world, than the manner in which free governments have been established in America. For it was the first instance from the creation of the world to the American revolution, that free inhabitants have been seen deliberating on a form of government, and selecting such of their citizens as possessed their confidence, to determine upon, and give effect to it. But why has this excited so much wonder and applause? Because it is of so much magnitude, and because it is liable to be frustrated by so many accidents. If it has excited Madison.] VIRGINIA. 557 so much wonder, that the United States have in the middle of war and confusion, formed free systems of government, how much more as¬ tonishment and admiration will be excited, should they be able, peaceably, freely and satisfactorily, to establish one general govern* ment, when there is such a diversity ofopinions, and interests, when not cemented or stimulated by any common danger! How vast must be the difficulty of concentrating in one government, the inte¬ rests, and conciliating the opinions of so many different heterogeneous bodies'? How have the confederacies of ancient and modern times been formed! As far as ancient history describes the former to us, they were brought about by the wisdom of some eminent sage. How was the imperfect union of the Swiss Cantons formed! By danger. How was the confederacy of the United Netherlands formed? By the same. They are surrounded by dangers. By these and one in¬ fluential character, they were stimulated to unite. How was the Germanic system formed? By danger in some degree, but principal¬ ly by the overruling influence of individuals. When we consider this government, we ought to make great al¬ lowances. We must calculate the impossibility that every state should be gratified in its wishes, and much less that every individ¬ ual should receive this gratification. It has never been denied by the friends of the paper on the table, that it has effects. But they do not think that it contains any real danger. They conceive that they will in all probability be removed, when experience will shew it to be necessary. I beg that gentleman in deliberating on this subject, would consider the alternative. Either nine states shall have ratified it or they will not. If nine states will adopt it, can it be rea¬ sonably presumed or required, that nine states having freely and ful¬ ly considered the subject, and come to an affirmative decision, will, upon the demand of a single state, agree that they acted wrong, and could not see its defect—tread back the steps which they have taken and come forward and reduce it to uncertainty, whether a general system shall be adopted or not? Virginia has always heretofore spoken the language of respect to the other states, and she has al¬ ways been attended to. Will it be that language, to call on a great majority of the states to acknowledge that they have done wrong? It is the lanfmao-e of confidence to say, that we do not believe that amendments for the preservation of the common liberty and general interests of the state, will he consented to by them? This is neith¬ er the language of confidence nor respect. Virginia when she speaks respectfully, will be as much attended to, as she has hitherto been when speaking this language. It is a most awful thing that depends on our decision—no less than 55S DEBATES. [Madison whether the thirteen states shall unite freely, peaceably, and unani¬ mously, for security of their common happiness and liberty, or whe¬ ther every thing 1 is to be put in confusion and disorder. Are we te embark in this dangerous enterprise, uniting various opinions to con¬ trary interests, with the vain hope of coming to an amicable concur¬ rence? It is worthy of our consideration, that those who prepared the pa¬ per on the table, found difficulties not to be described, in its forma¬ tion—mutual deferance and concession were absolutely necessary. Had they been inflexibly tenacious of their individual opinions: they would never have concurred. Under what circumstances was it formed? When no party was formed, or particular proposition made, and men’s minds were calm and dispassionate. Yet under these circumstances, it was difficult, extremely difficult, to agree to any general system. Suppose eight states only should ratify, and Virginia should pro¬ pose certain alterations, as the previous condition of her accession^ If they should be disposed to accede to her proposition, which is the most favorable conclusion, the difficulty attending it will be im¬ mense. Every state, which has decided it, must take up the sub¬ ject again. They must not only have the mortification of acknowl¬ edging that they had done wrong, but the difficulty of having a re¬ consideration of it among the people, and appointing new conven¬ tions to deliberate upon it. They must attend to all the amendments, which may be dictated by as great a diversity of political opinions, as there are local attachments. W T hen brought together in one as- sembiy, they must go through, and accede to every one of the amendments. The gentlemen who, within this house, have thought proper to propose previous amendments, have brought no less than forty amendments—as bill of rights which contains twenty amend¬ ments, and twenty ether alterations, some of which are improper and inadmissable. W 1 !I not every state think herself equally enti¬ tled to propose as many amendments'* And suppose them to be contradictory, I lea ,r e it to this convention, whether it be probable that they can agree, or agree to any thing, but the plan on the ta¬ ble; or whether greater difficulties will not be encountered, than were experienced in the progress of the formation of the constitu¬ tion. I have said that there wa3 a great contrariety of opinions among the gentlemen in the opposition. It has been heard in every stage of their opposition. I can sf from their amendments, that very great sacrifices have been made by some of them. Some gentlemen think that it contains too much state influence: others, that it is a complete consolidation, and a variety ol other things. Some of them think VIRGINIA. 559 Madison.] that the equality in the senate, if not a defect; others, that it is the bane of all good governments. 1 might, if there were time, show a variety of other cases, where their opinions are contradictory. If there be this contrariety of opinions in this house, what contrariety may not be expected, when we take into view, thirteen conventions equally or more numerous'? Besides, it is notorious from the de¬ bates which have been published, that there is no sort of uniformity in the grounds of the opposition. The state of New York han been adduced. Many in that state are opposed to it from local views. The two who opposed it in the general convention from that state, are in the state convention. Every step of this system was opposed by those two gentlemen. They were unwilling to part with the old confederation. Can it be presumed then, sir, that gentlemen in this state, who admit the necessity of changing, should ever be able to unite in sentiments with those who are totally averse to any change. I have revolved this question in my mind, with as much serious attention, and called to my aid as much information as I could, yet I can see no reason for the apprehensions of gentlemen, but I think that and if Virginia will agree to ratify this system, I shall look upon it the most happy effects forthis country would result from adoption as one of the most fortanate events that ever happened for human nature. I cannot, therefore, without, the most excruciating appre¬ hensions, see a possibility of losing its blessings. It gives me infin¬ ite pain to reflect, that all the earnest endeavors of the warmest friends of their country, to introduce a system promoti^e of our happiness, may be blasted by a rejection, for which I think with my honorable friend, that previous amendments are but another name. The gen¬ tlemen in opposition seem to insist on those amendments, as if they were all necessary for the liberty and happiness of the people. Were I to hazard an opinion on the subject, I would declare it infl- nitelv more safe in its present form, than it would be after introdu¬ cing into it that long train of alterations, which they call amend¬ ments. With respect to the proposition of the honorable gentlemen lo my left (Mr Wythe) gentlemen apprehend, that by enumerating three rights, it implied there were no more. The observations made by a gentleman lately up, on that subject, correspond precisely with my opinion. That resolution declares, that the powers granted by the proposed constitution, are the gift of the people, and may be resumed bv them when perverted to their oppression, and every power not granted thereby, remains with the people, and at their will. It adds likewise, that no right of any denomination, can be cancelled, abridged, restrained or modified, by the general government, or any 560 DEBATES. [Madisoh, of its officers, except in those instances in which power is given by the constitution for these purposes. There cannot be a more posi* tive and unequivocal declaration of the principles of the adoption, that every thing not granted, is reserved. This is obviously and self-evidently the case, without the declaration.—Can the general government exercise anv power not delegated? If an enumeration be made of our rights, will it not be implied, that every thing omit¬ ted, is given to the general government? Has not the honorable gentleman himself, admitted, that an imperfect enumeration is dan¬ gerous? Does the constitution say that they shall not alter the law of descents, or do those things which would subvert the whole sys- tern of the state laws? If he did, what was not excepted, would be granted. Does it follow from the omission of such restrictions, that they can exercise powers not delegated? The reveise of the proposition holds. The delegation alone warrants the exercise of any power, With respect to the amendments , proposed by the honorable gen¬ tleman, it ought to be considered how far they are good. As far as they are palpably and insuperably objectionable, they oughUo be op¬ posed. One amendment he proposes is, that any army which shall be necessary, shall be raised by the consent of two-thirds of the •states. I most devoutly wish, that there may never be an occasion or having a single regiment. There can be'no harm in declaring, that standing armies in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and ought to'be avoided, as far as it may be consistent with the protection of the community. But when we come to say, that the national se¬ curity shall depend noton a majojity of the people of America, but ■that it may be frustrated by less than one-third of the people of America. I ask if this be a safe or proper mode? What part of the United States are most likely to stand in need of this protection? The weak parts, which are the southern states, Will it be safe to leave the United States at the mercy of one-third of the states, a number, which may comprise a very small proportion of the Arnerb ■can people? They may all be in that part of America which is least exposed to danger. As far as a remote situation from danger, would render exertions for public defence less active, so far the south¬ ern states would be endangered. The regulation of commerce , he further proposed, should depend •on two-lhirds of both houses. I wish I could recollect, the history of this matter; but I cannot call it to mind with sufficient exactness. But I well recollect the reasoning of some gentlemen*on that sub¬ ject. It was said, and I believe with truth, that every part of Amer* ica, does not stand in equal need of security. It was observed, that ihe northern states were most competent to their own safety. W 7 as Hadison.] VIRGINIA. 561 Why was nothing of this sort aimed at before? I believe such an idea never entered into any American breast, nor do 1 believe it ever will enter into the heads of those gentlemen who substitute unsup¬ ported suspicions for reasons. 1 am persuaded that the gentlemen who contend for previous amendments are not aware of the dangers which must result. Vir¬ ginia, after having made opposition, will' be obliged to recede from it. Might not the nine states say with a great deal of propriety—. It is not proper, decent, or right in you, to demand that we should reverse what we have done. D-o as we have done—place confidence ib us, as we have done in one another—and then we shall freely, fairlyand dispassionately consider and investigate your propositions, aftd endeavour to gratify your wishes; but if you do mot do this, it more reasonable that you should yield to us, than we to you. You cannot exist without us—you must be a member of the union.” The case of Maryland, instanced by the gentleman, does not hold. She would not agree to confederate, because the other states would not assent to her claims of the western lands. Was she gratified? No—she put herself like the rest. Nor has she since been gratified. The lands are in the common stock of the union. As far as his amendments are not objectionable, or unsafe, so far they may be subsequently recommended. Not becaus-e they are vol. 3 36 m DEBATES. [Hekbt. necessary, bat because they can produce no possible danger, and* may gratify some gentlemen’s wishes. But I never can consent to his previous amendments, because they are pregnant with dreadful dangers. Mr HENRY.—Mr. Chairman, the honorable gentleman who was up 6ome time ago, exhorts us not to fall into a repetition of the de¬ fects of the confederation. He said we ought not to declare that each state retains every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not expressly delegated, because experience has proved the insertion of such a restriction to be destructive, and menlioned an instance t<^ prove it. That case, Mr Chairman, appears to me to militate against himself. Passports would not be given by congress—and why? Because there was a clause in the confederation which denied them implied powers. And, says he, shall we repeat the error? Ho asked me where was the power of emancipating slaves? I say it will be implied, unless implication be prohibited. He admits, that the power of granting passports will be in the new congress without the insertion of this restriction—yet he can show me nothing lUrer tuch a power granted in that constitution; Notwithstanding he ad- mits their right to this power by implication, he says that I am un¬ fair and uncandid in my deduction, that they can emancipate our slaves, though the word emancipation is not mentioned in it. They can exercise power by implication in one instance, as well as is another. Thus by the gentleman’s own argument, they can exercise the power though it be not delegated. We were then told that the power of treaties and commerce was the sine qua non of the union. That the little states would not con¬ federate otherwise. There is a thing not present to human view. We have seen great concessions from the large states to the little states. But little concession from the little states to the great states will be refused. He concedes that great concessions were made in the greatxonvention, Now when we speak of rights, and not of emoluments, these little states would not have been affected. What boon did we ask? We demanded only rights, which ought to be unalienable and sacred. We have nothing local to ask. We ask rights which concern the general happiness. Must not justice brings them into the concession of these? The honorable gentleman waw pleased to say, that the new government in this police will be equals to what the present is. If so, that amendment will not injure that part. He then mentioned the danger that would arise from foreign gold. We may be bribed by foreign powers if we ask for amendments, to secure our own happiness. Are we to be bribed to forget our owe interests'? 1 will ask if foreign gold be likely to operate, where, will SIemut*] VIRGINIA. 563 n be? la the seat of government, or in those little channels in which the state authority will flow? It will be at the fountain of power, where bribery will not be detected. He speaks of war and blood¬ shed. Whence do this war and bloodshed come? I fear it, but not from the source he speaks of. I fear it, sir, from the operation and friends of the federal government. He speaks with contempt of this amendment. But whoever will advert to the use made repeatedly England of tho prerogative of the king, and the frequent attacks on the privileges of the people, notwithstanding many legislative acta to secure them, will see the necessity of excluding implication. Nations who have trusted to logical deduction have lost their liberty. The honorable gentleman last up, agrees that there are defects, and by and by, he says, there is no defect. Does not this amount -to a declaration that subsequent amendments are not necessary? His arguments, great as the gentleman’s abilities are, tend to prove that amendments cannot be obtained after adoption. Speaking of forty amendments, he calculated that it was something like imprao* iicability to obtain them. I appeal therefore to the candour of the honorable gentleman, and this committee, whether amendments be not absolutely unattainable, if we adopt. For he has told us, that if the other states will do like this they cannot be previously ob,» tained. Will the gentleman bring this home to himself? Thi 3 is a piece of information which I expected. The worthy member who proposed to ratify has also proposed that what amendments may be deemed necessary, should be recommended to congress, and that ft committee should be appointed to consider what amendments were necessary. But what does it all come to at last? That it is a vain project, and that it is indecent and improper. I will not argue un¬ fairly, but 1 will ask him if amendments are not unattainable? Will gentlemen then lay their hands on their hearts, and say that they can adopt it in this shape? When we demand this Security of our privileges, the language .of Virginia is not that of respect. Give me leave to deny. She only asks amendments previous to her aflop* T tion of the constitution. Was the honorable gentleman accurate, when he said that they ( *could exist better without us than we could without them? I will make no comparison. But I will say that the states which have adopted will not make a respectable appearance without us. Would he advise them to refuse them admission when we profess ourselves friends to the union, and only solicit them to secure our rights 7 We do not reject a connexion with them. We only declare that will adopt it, if they will but consent to the security of rights essera* *ial to the general happiness. 584 DEBATES. ffleN&r. He told you to confine yourselves to amendments which were in ¬ disputably true, as applying to several parts of the system proposed,. Did you hear any thing like the admission of the want of such amendments from any one else 1 ? I will not insist on any that does not stand on the broad basis of human rights. He says there are forty. I say there is but one half the number, for the bill of rights is but one amendment. He tells you of important blessings which he imagines will re¬ sult to us and mankind in general, from the adoption of this system, I see the awful immensity of the dangers with which it is pregnant. I see it. I feel it. I see beings of a higher order anxious concern¬ ing our decision. When I see beyond the horizon that binds human, eyes, and look at the final consummation of all human things, and see those intelligent beings which inhabit the aetherial mansions, re¬ viewing the political decisions and revolutions which in the pro¬ gress of time will happen in America, and the consequent happiness or misery of mankind, I am led to believe that much of the account on one side or the other, will depend on what we now decide. Our own happiness alone is not affected by the event. All nations are interested in the determination. We have it in ourpower to secure the happiness of one half of the human race. Its adoption may in¬ volve the misery of the other hemispheres. (Here a violent storm arose, -which put the house in such disor¬ der, that Mr. Henry was obliged to conclude. Mr NICHOLAS proposed that the question should bo put at nine- o’clock next day. He was opposed by Mr CLAY. Mr RONALD also opposed the motion, and wished amendments to be prepared by a committee, before the question should be put, Mr NICHOLAS contended that the language of the proposed ratification, would secure every thing which gentlemen desired, as it declared tl 4 at all powers vested in the constitution was derived from the people, and might be resumed by them whensoever they should be perverted to their injury and oppression; and that every power not granted thereby, remained at their will, no danger whatever could arise. For, says he, these expressions will become a part of the contract. The constitution cannot be binding on Virginia, but with these conditions, if thirteen individuals are about to make a contract, and one agrees to it, but.at the same time declares that he understands its meaning, signification, and intent, to be, what the words of the contract plainly and obviously denote, that it is not to be construed so as to impose any s npplementary condition upon him and that he is to be exonerated from it, whensoever any such impo¬ sition shall be attempted—I ask whether in this caso these eondi- VIRGINIA. 565 RtWALD.) ions on which he assented to, would not be binding on the other twelve] In like manner these conditions will be binding on con- _ o gress. They can exercise no power that is not expressly granted them. Mr RONALD.—Mr Chairman, I came hither with a determina¬ tion to give my vote so as to secure the liberty and privileges of my constituents. I thought that a great majority argued that amend¬ ments were necessary. Such is my opinion, but whether they ought to be previous or subsequent to our adoption, I leave to the wisdom of this committee to determine, I feel an earnest desire to know what amendments shall be proposed, before the question be put. One honorable gentleman has proposed several amendments. They are objected to by other gentlemen. I do not declare myself for or against those amendments; but unless I see such amendments, one way or the other, introduced, as will secure the happiness of the people and prevent their privileges from being endangered, I must though much against my inclination, vote against this constitution. Mr MADISON conceived that what defects might be in the con¬ stitution might be removed by the amendatory mode in itself. As to a solemn declaration of our essential rights, he thought it unne¬ cessary and dangerous.—Unnecessary, because it was evident that the general government had no power but what was given it, and that the delegation alone warranted the exercise of power.—Dan¬ gerous, because an enumeration which is not complete, is not safe. Such an enumeration could not be made within any compass of time, as would be equal to a general negation, such as his honorable friend (Mr Wythe) had proposed. He declared that such amend¬ ments as seemed in his judgment, to be without danger, he would readily admit, and that he would be the last to oppose any such amendment as would give satisfaction to any gentleman, unless it were dangerous. Wednesday the 25th of June, 1788. Mr NICHOLAS.—Mr Chairman, I do not mean to enter into any further debate. The friends of the constitution wish to take up more time, the matter being more fully discussed. They are convinced that further time will answer to no end but to serve the cause of those who wish to destroy the constitution. We wish it to be rati¬ fied, and such amendments as may be thought necessary, to be sub¬ sequently considered by a committee, in order to be recommended to congress, to be acted upon according to the amendatory mode pre¬ sented in itself. Gentlemen, in the opposition, have said that the friends of the constitution would depart after the adoption, without entering into any consideration of subsequent amendments. I wish to know their authority. I wish for subsequent amendments as a friend DEBATES. 555 [Habbibot. to the constitution—I trust its other friends wish so too—and I be¬ lieve no gentleman has any intention of departing. The amendments contained in this paper, are those vve wish. But we shall agree to any others which will not destroy the spirit of the constitution, or that will better secure liberty. He then moved that the clerk should read the resolution proposed: by Mr Wythe, in order that the question might be put upon it Which being done—Mr Tyler moved to read the amendments and bill of rights proposed by Mr Henry, for the same purpose. Mr HARRISON.—Mr Chairman, the little states refused to come into the union without extravagant concessions. It will be the same case on every other occasion. Can it be supposed that the little states whose interest and importance are greatly advanced by the constitution as it now stands, will ever agree to any alteration, which must infallibly diminish their political influence? On this occasion let us behave with that fortitude which animated us in our resistance to Great Britain. The situation and disposition of the states render subsequent amendments dangerous and impolitic, and previous amendments eligible. New Hampshire does not approve of the constitution as it stands. They have refused it so. In Massachusetts we are told that there was a decided majority in their convention who opposed the consti¬ tution as it stood, and were in fav or of previous amendments, but were afterwards, by the address and artifice of the federalists, pre¬ vailed upon to ratify it. Rhode Island is not worthy the attention of this house. She is of no weight or importance to influence any general subject of con¬ sequence. Connecticut adopted it, without proposing amendments. New York , we have every reason to believe, will reject the con¬ stitution, unless amendments be obtained. Hence it clearly appears that there are three states which wish for amendments. Jersey , Pennsylvania , and Delaware , have adopted in uncondi¬ tionally. In Maryland there is a considerable number who wish amend¬ ments to be had. Virginia is divided, let this question be determined which way it will. One half of the people, at least, wish amendments to be ob¬ tained. North Carolina is decidedly against it. South Carolina has pro¬ posed amendments. Under thi3 representation it appears that there are seven states who wish to get amendments. Can it be doubted, if the seven HaERK80».]1 VIRGINIA. m states insert amendments as the condition of their accession) that they would not be agreed to? Let us not then be persuaded into an opinion, that the union will be dissolved if we should reject it? I I have no such idea. As far as I am acquainted with history, there never existed a ©on- etitution where the liberty of the people was established this way; states have risen by gradual steps—let us follow their example. The line which we ought to pursue is equally bounded. How comes that paper on your table, to be now here discussed? The state of Virginia finding the power of the confederation insufficient for the happiness of the people, invited the other states to call a conven¬ tion, in order that the powers of congress might be enlarged. I was not in the assembly then, and if I had, I have no vanity to sup¬ pose I could have decided more cautiously. They were bound to do, what we ought to do now. I have no idea of danger to the union. A vast majority from every calculation are invincibly attached to it I see an earnest desire in gentlemen to bring this country to be great and powerful. Considering the very late period when this country was first settled, and the present state of population and wealth, this is impossible now. The attempt will bring ruin and destruc¬ tion upon us. These things must not be forced. They must come of course, like the course of rivers, gently going on. As to the in¬ conveniences to me from adoption, they are none at all. 1 am not prejudiced against New England or any part. They are held up to us as a people from whom protection will come. Will any pro¬ tection come from thence for many years? When we were invaded, did any gentlemen from the northern states come to relieve us? No, sir, we were left to be buffetted. General Washington, in the great¬ ness of his soul, came with the French auxiliaries and relieved us opportunely.—Were it not for this we should have been ruined. I call heaven to witness that I am a friend to the union. But I con¬ ceive the measure of adoption to be unwarrantable, precipitate, and dangerously impolitic—Should we rush into sudden perdition, I should resist with the fortitude of a man. A3 to the amendments proposed by gentlemen, Ido not object to them—they are inherent¬ ly good. But they are put in the wrong place—subsequent instead of previous. Mr Harrison added other observations which could not be heard. Mr MADISON.---Mr Chairman, I should not have risen at all, were it not for what the honorable gentleman said. If there be any suspicions, that if the ratification be made, the friends of the system will withdraw their concurrence, and much more, their persons, it shall never be with my approbation. Permit me to remark, that if he has given us a true state of the disposition of the several mem- m DEBATES. [Monuo&. bers of the union, there is no doubt they will agTee to the same amendments after adoption. If we propose the conditional amend¬ ments, I entreat gentlemen to consider the distance to which they throw the ultimate settlement, and the extreme risk of perpetual dis¬ union. They cannot but see how easy it will be to obtain subse¬ quent amendments. They can be proposed when the legislatures of two-thirds of the states shall make application for that purpose, and the legislatures of three-fourths of the states or conventions in the same, can fix the amendments so proposed. If there be an equal zeal in every state, can there be a doubt that they will concur in rea¬ sonable amendments? If, on the other hand, we call on the states to rescind what they have done, and confess that they have done wrong, and to consider the subject again, it will produce such un¬ necessary delays, and is pregnant with such infinite dangers, that I cannot contemplate it, without horror. There are uncertainty and confusion on the one hand, and order, tranquility, and certainty on the other. Let us not hesitate to elect the latter alternative. Let us join with cordiality in those alterations w T e think proper. There is no friend to the constitution, but who will concur in that mode. Mr MONROE, after an exordium which could not be heard, re¬ marking that the question now before the committee was, whether previous or subsequent amendments were the most prudent—strong¬ ly supported the former. He could not conceive that a conditional ratification would in the most remote degree endanger the union, for that it was as clearly the interest of the adopting states to be united with Virginia, as it could be her interest to be in union with them. He demanded if they would arm the states against one another and make themselves enemies of those who were respectable and powerful from their situation and numbers? He had no doubt that they would in preference to such a desperate and violent measure, come forward and make a proposition to the other states, so far as it would be consistent with the general interest.—Adopt it now, uncon¬ ditionally, says he, and it will never be amended, net even when ex¬ perience shall have proved its defects. An alteration will be a dimunition of their power, and there will be great exertions made to prevent it. I have no dread that they will immediately infringe the dearest rights of the people, but that the operation of the government will be oppressive, in process of time. Shall we not pursue the dic¬ tates of common sense and the example of all free and wise nations, and insist on amendments with manly fortitude? It is urged that there is an impossibility of getting previous amendments, and that a variety of circumstances concur to render it impracticable. This argument appears to me fallacious, and as a specious evasion. The same cause which has hitherto produced Innks.] VIRGINIA. 66$ a spirit of unanimity, and a predilection for the union, will hereafter prodace the some effects. How did the federal convention meet? From the beginning of time xn any age or county, did ever men meet under so loose, uncurbed a commission? There was nothing to restrain them but their cha¬ racters and reputation. They could not organize a system without defects. This cannot then be perfect. Is it not presumeable that by subsequent attempts we shall make it more complete and perfect? What are the great objections now made? Are they local? What are the amendments brought forth by my friends? Do they not con¬ template the great interests of the people, and of the union at large? I am satisfied from what we have seen of the disposition of the other states, that instead of disunion and national confusion, there will be harmony and perfect concord. Disunion is more to be apprehended from the adoption of a system reprobated by some, and allowed by all, to be defective. The arguments of gentlemen have no weight on ray mind. It is unnecessary to enter into the refutation of them. My honorable friends have done it highly to my satisfaction. Per¬ mit me only to observe, with respect to those amendments, that they -are harmless. Do they change a feature of the constitution? They secure our rights without altering a single feature. I trust there¬ fore that gentlemen will concur with them. Mr INNES.—Mr Chairman, I have hitherto been silent on this great and interesting question. But my silence has not proceeded from a neutrality of sentiments, or a supineness of disposition. The session of the court of Oyer and Terminer, at this time, has indispensably called my attention to the prosecutions for the com¬ monwealth. Had I taken an earlier part in the discussion, my ob¬ servations would have been desultory and perhaps not satisfactory, being not apprised of all the arguments which had been used by gentlemen. We are now brought to that great part of the system where it is necessary for me to take a decided part. This is one of the most important questions that ever agitated the councils of America. When I see in this house, divided in opinion, several of those brave officers, whom I have seen so gallantly fighting and bleeding for their country, the question is doubly interesting to me. ! thought it would be the last of human events, that I should be on a different side from them, on so awful an occasion. However painful and distressing to me, the recollection of this diversity of sentiments may be, 1 am consoled by this reflection—that difference of opinion has a happy consequence—it aids discussion, and is a friend to truth. We ought (and I hope we have the temper) to be regulated by candor and moderation, without which, in a delibera- *7t> DEBATES. [Inin*. tive body, every thing with respect to the public good evaporates into nothing. I came hither under a persuasion that the felicity of our country required that we should accede to this system; but I am free to de¬ clare, that 1 came in with my mind open to conviction, and a pre¬ determination to recede from my opinion, if I should find it to be erroneous. I have heard nothing hitherto that would warrant a change of one idea. The objections urged by the advocates of the opposition have been ably, and, in my conception, satisfactorily answered by the friends of the constitution. I wish, instead of reasoning from possible abuses, that the government had been con¬ sidered as an abstract position drawn from the history of all na¬ tions, and such theoretic opinions as experience has demonstrated to be right. I have waited to hear this mode of reasoning, but in vain. Instead of this, sir, horrors have been called up, chimeras suggested, and every terrific and melancholy idea adduced, to pre¬ vent what I think indispensably necessary for our national honor, happiness and safety—I mean the adoption of the system under consideration. How are we to decide this question! Shall we take the system by way of subsequent amendments, or propose amendments as the previous condition of our adoption! Let us consider this question coolly. In my humble opinion, it transcends the power of this con* vention to take it with previous amendments. If you take it so, I say, that you transcend and violate the commission of the people. For if it be taken with amendments, the opinions of the people at large ought to be consulted on them. Have they an opportunity of considering previous amendments! They have seen the constitu¬ tion, and sent us hither to adopt or reject it. Have we more latitude on this subject! If you propose previous amendments as the con¬ dition of your adoption, they may radically change the paper on the table, and the people will be bound by what they know not. Subsequent amendraents'Would not have that effect. They would not operate till the people had an opportunity of considering and altering them, if they thought proper. They could have it in their power to give contrary directions to their members of congress. But I observe with regret, that there is a general spirit of jealousy with respect to our northern brethren. Had we this political jealousy in 1775! If we had, it would have damped our ardor and intrepi¬ dity, and prevented that unanimous resistance which enabled us to triumph over our enemies. It was not a Virginian, Carolinian or Pennsylvanian, but the glorious name of an American, that extend¬ ed from one end of the continent to the other, that was then beloved and confided in. Did we then expect, that in case of success, wo Ijmss.] VIRGINIA. m should be armed against one another? I would have submitted> British tyranny rather than to northern tyranny, had what we have been told been true, that they had no part of that philanthropic spirit, which cherishes fraternal affection, unites friends, enable# them to achieve the most gallant exploits, and renders them formi¬ dable to other nations. Gentlemen say that the states have not similar interests, that what will accommodate their interests will be incompatible with ours, and that the northern oppression will fetter and manacle the hands of the southern people. Wherein does the dissimilarity coo sist? Does not our existence as a nation depend on our union? Is it to be supposed that their principles will be so constuprated, and that they will be so blind to their own (rue interests, as to alienate the affections ot the southern states, and adopt measures which will produce discontents and terminate in a dissolution of an union, aa necessary to their happiness as to ours? Will not brotherly affec¬ tion rather be cultivated? Will not the great principles of recipro cal friendship and mutual amity be constantly inculcated, so as to conciliate all parts of the union? This will be inevitably necessary from the unity of their interests with ours. To suppose that they would act contrary to these principles, would be to suppose them to be not only destitute of honor and probity, but void of reason— not only bad, but mad men. The honorable gentleman has warned us to guard against Euro¬ pean politics. Shall we not be more able to set their machination# at defiance, by uniting our councils and strength, than by splitting into factions and divisions? Our divisions and consequent debility are the objects most ardently wished for by the nations of Europe. What cause induced Great Britain and other European nations which had settlements in America, to keep their colonies in aR in¬ fantine condition? What cause leads them to exclude our vessels from the West Indies? The fear of our becoming important and powerful. Will not they be perpetually stimulated by this fear? Will not they incessantly endeavour to depress us by force or stra¬ tagems? Is there no danger to be apprehended from Spain, whose extensive and invaluable possessions are in our vicinity? Will that nation rejoice at an augmentation of our strength or wealth? But we are told that we need not be alraid of Great Britain Will that great, that warlike, that vindictive nation, loose the desire of revenging her losses and disgraces? Will she passively overlook flagrant violations of the treaty? Will she lose the desire of retrie¬ ving those laurels which are buried in America? Should I transfuse into the breast of a Briton, that amor patriae which so strongly pre- S7S DEBATES. [Innes, dominates in my own, he would say, While I have a guinea, I shall give it to recover lost America! But, says another gentleman, the maritime powers of Europe look with anxious and jeolous eyes on you. While you are help¬ less, they will let you alone, but if you attempt to become respect¬ able, they will crush you! Is this the language or consolation of an American? Must we acquiesce to continue in this situation? We should by this way of reasoning sacrifice our own honor, and inte¬ rests, to please those supercilious nations, and promote their inte¬ rests, and with every means of acquiring a powerful fleet, would never have a ship of the line. To promote their glory [we should bee ome wretched and contemptible. Our national glory, our honor, our interests, forbid this disgraceful conduct. It may be said that the ancients who deserved and acquired glory, have lost their liber¬ ty. Call to mind the many nations of Indians and Cannibals that have lost it likewise. And who would not rather be a Roman, than one of those who hardly deserve to be enumerated among the human species ? This question is as important as the Revolution which severed us from the British empire. It rests now to be determined wheth¬ er America has in reality gained by that chahge which has beea thought so glorious, and whether those hecatombs of American heroes, whose blood so freely shed at the shrine of liberty, fell in vain, or whether we shall establish such a government as shall ren¬ der America respectable and happy. I wish her not only to be internally possessed of political and civil liberty, but to be formi¬ dable, terrible and dignified in war, and not depend on the ambitious princes of Europe for tranquillity, security or safety. I ask if the most petty of those princes, even the Dey of Algiers, were to make war upon us if the other states of Europe should keep a neutrality* whether we should not be reduced to the greatest distress ? Is it not in the power of any maritime power to seize our vessels, and destroy our commerce with impunity ? But we are told that the New-Engianders mean to take our trade from us, and make us hewers of wood, and carriers of water; and the next moment that they will emancipate our slavess! But how inconsistent is this ? They tell you that the admission of the impor¬ tation of slaves for twenty years, shews that their policy is to keep us weak, and yet the next moment they tell you, that they intend to set them free ! If it be their object to corrupt and enervate us, will they emancipate our slaves ? Thus they complain and argu® against it on contradictory principles. The constitution is to turn the world topsyturvy, to make it answer their various purposes! Can it be said that liberty of conscience is in danger ? I observe a»«es.1 VIRGINIA. 573 on the side of the constitution, those who have been champions of religious liberty, an attack on which I would as soon resist, as one on civil liberty 1 Do they employ consistent arguments to shew that it is in danger * They inform you that Turks, Jews, Infidels, Christians, and all ether sects, may be presidents,and command the fleet and army, there being no test to be required. And yet the tyrannical and inquisitorial congress, will ask me as a private citi- 'Jen, what is my opinion on religion, and punish me if it does not conform to theirs. I cannot think the gentleman could be serious when he made these repugnant and incompatible objections. With respect to previous amendments, what will be the conse¬ quence? Virginia first discovered the defects of the existing confed¬ eracy. When the legislature was sitting, a few years ago, they sent an invitation to the other states to make amendments to it. After some preparatory steps, the late federal convention was called. To this were sent select deputies from all the states, except Rhodelsland. After five mouths spent in tedious and painful investigation, they with great difficulty devised the paper on the table, and it has been adopted by every state which has considered and discussed it. \ irginia is about dictating- again to the other states. Eight states have exercised their sovereignty in ratifying it. Yet with a great deal of humility we ask them to rescind, and make such alter¬ ations as the ancient dominion shall think proper. States are but an aggregate of individuals. Would not an individual spurn at such a requisition? They will say, It has been laid before you, and if you do not like it, consider the consequences. We are as free, sis¬ ter Virginia, and as independent as you are; we do not like to be dictated to by you. But say gentlemen, we can afterwards come into the union—we may come in at another time—that is, if they do not accede to our dictatorial mandate. They are not of such a yielding, pliant stuff, as to revoke a decision founded on their most solemn deliberations, to gratify our capricious wishes. After hearing the arguments on this subject, and finding such a variety of contradictory objections, I am the more averse to solicit another convention, from which I should expect great discord, and .ao good effect at all. Not doubting the sincerity of gentlemen’s protestations, I say, the mode pointed out in the constitution is much better. For, according to their mode, the union would never be com¬ plete, till the thirteen states had acceded to it, and eight states must rescind and revoke what they have done. By the paper before you. if two-thirds of the states are obliged to cull a which are to be submitted three-fourths- o i the states, think amendments necessary, congress convention to propose amendments, to the legislatures, cr conventions in the acquiescence of which will render 574 DEBATES. [Ihkks. them binding. Now is there not a greater probability of obtaining the one than the other! Will not nine states more probably agree to any amendments than thirteen! The doctrine of chances is favor of it. Unless we in vain look fora perfect constitution, we ought to take it. In vain you will seek from India to the pole, for a perfect con¬ stitution. Though it may have certain defects yet I doubt whether any system more perfect can be obtained at this time. Let us no longer pursue chimerical and ridiculous systems. Let us try it— experience ia the best te3t. It will bear equally on all the states from New-Hampshire to Georgia; and as it will operate equally on all, they will all call for amendments; and whatever the spirit of America calls for, must doubtless take place immediately. I consider congress as ourselves, as our fellow-citizens, and no more different from us than our delegates in the state legislature. I 4onsider them as having all a fellow-feeling for us, and that they will never forget that this government is that of the people. Under this impression, I conclude that they will never daie to go beyond the bounds prescribed in the constitution; and that as they are eligi¬ ble and removeable by ourselves, there is sufficient responsibility— for where the power of election frequently reverts to the people, and that reversion is unimpeded, there can be no danger. Upon the whole this is the question—shall it be adopted or rejected! With ■respect to previous amendments they are equal to rejection. They are abhorrent to my mind. I consider them as the greatest of evils. I think myself bound to vote againstevery measure which I conceive to be a total rejection, than which nothing in my conception, can be more imprudent, destructive and calamitous. Mr TYLER.—Mr Chairman, I should have been satisfied with giving my vote on the question to day, but as I wish to hand down to posterity my opposition to this system, I conceive it to be my du¬ ty to declare the principles on which I disapprove it, and the cause •of my opposition. I have seriously considered the subject in my mind, and when I consider the effects which may happen to this ■country from its adoption, I tremble at it. My opposition to it arose Jirst from general principles, independent of any local consideration. But when I find that the constitution is expressed in indefinite terms in terms, whieh the gentleman who composed it, do not all concnr in the meaning of, I say that when it is thus liable to objections and .different constructions, I find no rest in my mind. Those clauses which answer different constructions, will be used to serve particu¬ lar purposes. If the able members who composed it cannot agree ■on the construction of it, shall l be thought lash or wrong to pas# censure on its ambiguity! VIRGINIA. 57 6 Tmuuu] The worthy member last up has brought us to a degrading situa¬ tion, that we have no right to propose amendments, ’’ should haY® expected such language had we already adopted a constitution, which will preclude us from this advantage. If we propose to them to reconsider what they have done, and not rescind it, will it be dic¬ tating to them? I do not undertake to say that our amendments will bind other stated: I hope no gentleman will be so weak as to say so. But no gentleman on the other side will deny out right of pro¬ posing amendment. Wherefore is it called dictatorial? It is not my wish that they should rescind, but so much as will secure oar peace and liberty. W T e wish to propose such amendments to the sister states, as will reconcile all the states. Will gentlemen think this will dissolve the union? Among all the chimeras adduced on this occasion, we are intimi¬ dated with the fear of being attacked by the petty princes of Europe. The little predatory nation' of Europe are to cross the Atlantic and fall upon us, and to avoid this we must adopt this government with mil its defects. Are we to be frightened into its adoption? The gentleman has objected to previous amendments, because th® people did not know them. Hava they seen their subsequent amend¬ ments? [Here Mr Innes rose and explained the difference, that previous ■amendments would be binding on the people, though they had ne¬ ver seen them, and should have no opportunity of considering them before they should operate: but that subsequent amendments being only recommendatory in their nature,could be reviewed by the peo¬ ple before they would become a part of the system; and if they dis¬ approved of them, they might direct their delegates in congress to alter and modify them.] Mr TYLER then proceeded—I have seen their subsequent amendments, and although they hold out something like the thing we wish, yet they have not entered pointedly and substantially in¬ to it. What have they said about direct taxation? They have said nothing on this subject. Is there any limitation of, or restriction on the federal judicial power? I think not. So that gentleman hold out the idea of amendments which will not alter one dangerous part of it. It contains many dangerous articles. No gentleman here cn* give such a construction of it, as will give general satisfaction. Shall we be told that wo shall be attacked by the Algerines, and that disunion will take place, unless we adopt it? Such language as this I did not expect here. Little did I think that matters would come to this, when w c separated from the mother country. There, Sir, every man is amenable to punishment. There is far less^res¬ ponsibility in this government. British tyranny would have bee* more tolerable. By our present government every man is secure m $76 DEBATES. [Tyleh* his person, and the enjoyment of his property. There is no man who is not liable to be punished for misdeeds. I ask what is it that disturbs men whose liberty is in the highest zenith] Human nature will always be the same. Men never were, nor ever will, be satis¬ fied with their happiness. They tell you that one letter’s alteration will destroy it. I say that it is very far from being perfect. I ask if it were put in imme¬ diate operation, whether the people could bear it—whether two bodies can tax the same species of property? The idea of two om¬ nipotent powers is inconsistent. The natural tendency must be,either a revolt, or the destruction of the state governments, and a consoli¬ dation of them all into one general system. If we are to be consoli¬ dated, let it be on better grounds. So long as climate will have etiect on men, so long will the different climates of the United States render us different. Therefore a consolidation is contrary to our na¬ ture, and can only be supported by an arbitrary government. Previous and subsequejit amendments are now the only dispute , and when gentlemen say, that there is a greater probability of obtaining the one, than the other, they accompany their assertions with no kind of argument. What is the reason that amendments cannot be got after ratification? Because we have granted power. Because the amendments you propose will diminish their power, and undo some clauses in that paper. This argument proves to me, that they cannot be serious. It has been plainly proved to yon, that it is impracticable. Local advantages are given up as well as the regulation of trade. When it is the case, will the little states agree to an alteration? When gentlemen insist on this, without produ¬ cing any argument, they will find no credulity in me. Another convention ought to be had, whether the amendments be previous or subsequent. They say another convention is dangerous. How is this proved? It is only their assertion. Gentleman tell us we shall be ruined without adoption. Is this reasonable? It does not appear so to me. Much has been said on the subject of war by foreigners, and the Indians. But a great deal has been said in refutation of it. Giro me leave to say, that from the situation of the powers of Europe at this time, no danger is to be apprehended from thence. Will the French go to war with you, if you do not pay them w T hat you owe them? Will they thereby destroy that balance, to preserve which, they have taken such immense trouble? But Great Britain will go to war with you, unless you comply with the treaty. Great Britain, which, to my sorrow, has monopolised our trade, is to go to war with us unless the law of treaties be binding. Is this reasonable ? It is not the interest of Britain to quarrel with us. She will not VIRGINIA. 577 Tri.ER.] hazard any measure which may tend to take our trade out of her hands. It is not the interest of Holland to see us destroyed, or oppressed. It is the interest of every nation in Europe to keep up the balance of power, and therefore they will not suffer any nation to attack us, without immediately interfering. Hut much is said of the propriety of our becoming a great and powerful nation. There is a great difference between offensive and defensive war. If we can defend ourselves, it is sufficient. Shall we, sacrifice the peace and happiness of this country, to enable usto make wanton war"? My conduct throughout the revolution will justify me. I have invariably wished to oppose oppressions. It is true, that I have now a paltry office. I am willing to give it up—away with it! It lias no influence on my present conduct. 1 wish congress to have the regulation of trade. I was of opinion that a partial regulation alone would not suffice. 1 was among those members who, a fefv years ago, proposed that regulation. I have lamented that I havo put my hand to it, since this measure may have grown out of it. It was the hopes of our people to have their trade on a respectable footing, But it never entered into my head that we should quit liberty, and throw ourselves into the hands of an energetic govern¬ ment. Do you want men to be more free, or less free than they are? Gentlemen have been called upon to shew the causes of this measure. None have been shewn. Gentlemen say we shall be ruined unless we adopt it. We must give up onr opinions. We cannot judge lor ourselves. 1 hope gentlemen, before this, have been satisfied that such language is improper. All states which have heretofore been lavish in the concession of power, and relinquishment of priv¬ ileges, have lost their liberty. It has been often observed (and it cannot be too often observed) that liberty ought not to be given up without knowing the terms. The gentlemen themselves cannot agree in the constructio » of various clauses of it. And so long as this is the case, so long shall liberty be in danger. Gentlemen say we are jealous—I am not jealous of this house. 1 could trust my life with them. If tl>is constitution were safer, I should not be afraid. But its defects warrant my suspicions and fears. We are not passing laws now, but laying the foundation on which laws are to be made. We ought, therefore, to be cautious how we decide. When I consider the constitution in all its parts, I cannot but dread its operation. It contains a variety of powers too dangerous to be vested in any set of men whatsoever. Its power of direct taxation, the supremacy of the laws of the union, und of treaties, are exceedingly dangerous. I have never heard any manner of calling the president to account for his conduct, nor even vox.. 3 37 f73 DEBATES. [Stephen- the members of the democratic branch of the government. We may turn cut our ten members, but what can we do with the other fifty- five? The wisdom of Great Britain gave each state its own legisla¬ tive assembly, and judiciary, and a right to tax themselves. When they attempted to infringe that right, we declared wst. This sys¬ tem violates that right. In the year 1781 the assembly were obli¬ ged to pass a law, that forty members could pass laws. I have heard many members say that it was a great departure from the constitution, and that it would lead to aiistocracy. If we could not tiust forty, can we ttost ten? Those who lay a lax ought to be amenable to the payment of a proportionate share of it. I see no¬ thing iji their subsequent amendments going to this point—that we shall have a right to tax ourselves. But gentlemen say, that this would destroy the constitution. Of what avail then will their subsequent amendments be? Will gen¬ tlemen satisfy themselves that when they adopt this constitution, their country will be happy? Is not the country divided? Is it a happy government, which divides the people and sets brother in opposition to brother? This measuie has produced anarchy and confusion. We ought to have been unanimous, and gone side by side, as we went through the revolution. Instead of unanimity, it has produced a general diversity of opinions, which may terminate in the most unhappy consequences. Wc only wish to do away ambiguities, and establish our rights, on clear and explicit terms. If this be done, we shall all be like one man-—we shall unite and be happy. But if we adopt it in its present farm, unanimity or concord, can never take place. After adoption, we can never expect to see it amended ; because they will consider requests and solicitations for amendments as in a high degree dictatorial. They will say., you have signed and sealed, and you cannot now retract, When I review all these considerations, my heart is full, and can never be at peace, till I see these defects removed. Our only con¬ solation is the virtue of the present age. It i9 possible that when they see the country divided, these politicians will reconcile the minds of their countrymen, by introducing such alterations as shall bo deemed necessary. Were it not for this liopo, J should be in despair. I shall say no more; but that I wish my name to be seen in the yeas and nays, that it may be known that my opposition arose from a full persuasion and conviction of its being dangerous to the liberties of my country. Mr STEPHEN addressed the chairman, but in so low a voice that he could not be distinctly heard.—He described in a feeling •manner the unhappy situation of the country, and the absolute .necessity of preventing a dismemberment of the confederacy. J[ Tfi.er.] VIRGINIA. m was, said he, sent hither to adopt the constitution as it is, but sneh is my regard for my fellow citizens, that I would concur in amend*' raents. The gentlemen on the other side have adduced no reasons or proofs to convince us, that the amendments should become a part of the system,before ratification. What reason have we to suspect, that persons who are chosen from among ourselves, will not agree to the introduction of such amendments as will be desired by the people at large. In all safe and free governments, there ought to be a judicious mixture in the three different kinds of governments. This govern¬ ment is a compound of those different kinds. Rut the democratic hind preponderates, as it ought to do. The members of one branch are immediately chosen by the people: and the people also elect, in a secondary degree, the members of the other two. At present we have no confederate government. It exists but in.name. The honorable gentleman asked, where is the genius of America? What else but that genius has stimulated the people to reform that govern** menl, which woful experience has proved to he totally inefficient? Wiiathas produced the unison of sentiments in the states on this subject? I expected that filial duty, and affection would have impelled him to inquire for the genius of Virginia— that genius .which formerly resisted British tyranny, and, in the language of manly intrepidity and fortitude, said to that nation—Thus far, and no farther, shall you proceed! What has become of that genius which spo-ke that magnanimous language—that genius which produced the federal convention? Yonder she is, in mournful attire, her hair dishevelled, distressed with grief and sorrow, supplicating our assistance, against gorgons, .fiends and hydras, which are ready to devour her, and carry deso¬ lation throughout her country. She bewails the decay of trade and neglect of aorrieulture—her farmers discouraged, her ship carper)- tors, blacksmiths, and all other tradesmen, unemployed. Site casts •her eyes on these, and deplores her inability to relieve them. She sees and laments that the profit of her commerce goes to foreign .states. She further bewails, that all she can raise, by taxation, is inadequate to her necessities. &he sees religion die l>y her side, public faith prostituted, and private confidence lost between man and man. Aic the hearts of her citizens so deaf to .compassion that they will not go to her relief ! If they are so infatuated* the dire consequences may be easily foreseen. Expostulations must be made for the defection of Virginia, when congress meets. They will inquire where she.has lately,discovered so much political wis¬ dom—she that gave an immense tract of,country to re.lieve the gene¬ ral distresses? Wherqiiy consists her superiority to her friends of 5S0 DEBATES. [JOiftfSOKv South Carolina, and the respectable state of Massachusetts, who^ to prevent a dissolution of the union, adopted the constitution, and proposed such amendments as they thought necessary, placing con¬ fidence in the other states, that they would accede to them? After making several other remarks, lie concluded, by declaring, that* in his opinion, they were about to determine whether we should be one of the United States or not. Mr ZACHARIAH JOHNSON.—Mr Chairman, I am now Galled upon to decide the greatest of all questions—a question which may’ involve the felicity or misery of myself and posterity. I have hitherto listened attentively to the arguments adduced by both tides, and attended to hear the discussion of the most complicated parts of the system, by gentlemen of great abilities. Having now dome to the ultimate stage or the investigation, I thfnk it, my duty to declare my sentiments on the subject. "When I view the neces¬ sity of government among mankind, and its happy operation when judiciously constructed; and when I view the principles of this con¬ stitution, and the satisfactory and liberal manner in which they have been developed by the gentleman in the chair, and several other gentlemen; and when I view, on the other hand, the strained construction which has been put, by the gentlemen on the other side, on every word and syllable, in endeavouring to prove op" pressions which ean never possibly happen, my judgment is con¬ vinced of the safety and propriety of this system. This conviction has not arisen from a blind acquiescence or dependence on the as¬ sertions and opinions of others, but from a full persuasion cf its rectitude, after an attentive and mature consideration of the sub¬ ject; the arguments of other gentlemen having only confirmed the opinion which I had previously formed, and which I was deter¬ mined to abandon, should I find it to be ill founded. As to the principle cf representation, I find it attended to in this government in the fullest manner. It is founded on absolute equal¬ ity. When I see the power of electing the representatives—the principal branch—in the people at large—in the people at large—in those very person? who are the constituents cf the state legislatures; when 1 find that the other branch is chosen by the state legislature; that the executive is eligible in a secondary degree by the people likewise, and that the terms of elections are short, and proportionate to the difficulty and magnitude of the objects which they are to act upon; and when, in addition to this, I find that no person holding c ny office under the United States shall be a member of either branch,—I say, when I review all these things, that 1 plainly see a security of the liberties of this country, to which we may safely trust. Were this government defective in this fundamental princi- Johnson.] VIRGINIA. 5U ^plo of representation, it would be so radical, that it would admit oi no remedy. I shall, consider several other part3 which are much objected to. As to the regulation of the militia, 1 feel myself doubly interested. Having a numerous offspring, I am careful to prevent the establish¬ ment of any regulation that might entail oppression on them. When gentlemen of high abilities in this house, and whom I re¬ spect, tell us that the militia may be subjected to martial law in. time ot peace, and whensoever congress may please, lam much as¬ tonished. My judgment is astray and exceedingly undiscerning, if it can bear such a construction. Congress has only the power of arming and disciplining them. The states have the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia, according to the discipline prescribed by congress. When called into the actual service of the United States, they shall be subject to the marching orders of the United States. Then, and then only, it ought to be so. When we advert to the plain and obvious meaning of the words, without twisting and torturino* their natural signifies- tion, we must be satisfied that this objection is groundless. Had we adverted to the true meaning, and not gone farther, we should not be here to-day, but would have come to a decision long ago. We are also told, that religion is not secured, that religious tests are not required. You will find that the exclusion of tests will strongly tend to establish religious freedom. If tests were required, and if the church of England or any other were established, I might be excluded from any office under the government, because my con¬ science might not permit me to take the test required. The diver-. sity of opinions and variety of sects in the United States, havejustly been reckoned a great security with respect to religious liberty. The difficulty of establishing an uniformity of religion in this coun¬ try is immense. The extent of the country is very great. The multiplicity of sects is very great likewise. The people are not to be disarmed of their weapons. They are left in full possession of them. The government is administered by the representatives of the people, voluntarily and freely chosen. Under these circumstances, should any one attempt to establish their own system, in prejudice of the rest, they would be universal¬ ly detested and opposed, and easily frustrated. This is a principle which secures religious liberty most firmly. The government will eepend on the assistance of the people in the dW illiam Mason Daniel Fisher Andrew Won row Ralph Humphreys George Jackson John Prunty Isaac Vanmeter Abel Seymour Gov. Randolph John Marshall Nathaniel Burwell Robert Andrews Janies Johnson Robert Breckenridge Rice Bullock William Fleet Bui dot. Ashton William Thornton J. Gordon of Lancaster 1 lenry Tow lea Levin Powel \'i . Overtoil Oiihl$ S30 DEBATES. Ralph Wormley jun. Francis Corbin William MC’lerry Willis Riddick Solomon Shepherd William Clayton Burwell Bassett James Webb J. Taylor of Norfolk "Walker Tomlin Ebenezpr Zane Jacob Rinker James Madison John Williams James Gordon, Orange Benjamin Blunt William Ronald Samuel Kello Anthony Walke John Hartwell Cocke Thomas Walke John Allen Benjamin Wilson Cole Digges J. Wilson, Randolph H. Lee, Westmoreland John Stringer Littleton Evro * Walter Jones Thomas Gaskins Archibald Woods ■Edmund Custis John Pride Edmund Brooker William Cabell William Peachy, William M’Kee Andrew Moore Thomas Lewis Gabriel Jones Noes. Samuel Richardson Joseph (laden John Early I'homns Arthurs Samuel Jordan CabeliJohn Guerrant John Trigg William Sampson Charles Clay Isaac Coles Hen: Lee, of Bourbon George Carrington John Jones Binns Jones Charles Patteson ■David Bell Robert Alexander Edmund Winston Thomas Read John Tyler Stephen Pan key Jos'li Michaux Thomas H. Drew French Strother Joel Early Joseph Jones William Wa 1 kins Meriwether Sm-ith James Upshaw John Fowler Bushrod Washington John Blair George Wythe James Lines Thomas Matthews Alexander Robertso® John Evans W T a!fer Crocket Abraham Trigg, Matthew Walton John Steele Robert Williams J. WJIson, of Pittsyi Thomas Turpin Parker Good all John Carter Lit.tlepage Patrick Henry Thomas Cooper John Marr Thomas Roans Holt Richcson Benjamin Temple Stephens T. Mason William White . .Jona Patteson Robert Lawson Edmund Ruffin Theodorick Bland W 7 i 1 l i a m G ra y so n Cutlibert Bullitt Thomas ( irter Henry Dickerson James Monroe Christopher Robertson John Dawson .ogan John L Henry Pawling John Miller Green Clav Samuel Hopkins Richard Ken non Thomas Alien George M son Andiew Buchanan John Howell Briggs Thomas Edmunds Richard Cary Samuel Edmison James Montgomery ng then read a second time, a motion The second resolution Lei was made, and the question being put to amend the same by striking out the preamble thereto, it was resolved in the affirmative. And thqn the m in question being pat that the convention da agree with the committee in the second resolution so amended, it was resolved in th<* affirmative. On jnotron, Orth red. That a committee be appointed to prepare and report a form oi ratification pursuant to the first resolution ; ahd ‘that Governor Randolph, Mr Nicholas, Mr Madison, Mr Marshall, and Mr Corbin, compose the said committee. On motion. Ordered, J’hat a committee bo appointed to prepare And report such amendments as by them shall be deemed necessary.. VIRGINIA. 591 to be recommended, pursuant to the second resolution; and that the Hon George Wythe, Mr Harrison, Mr Mathews, Mr Henry, Go¬ vernor Randolph, Mr Georoe Morgan, Mr Nicholas. Mr txra ysoa. Mr MadisonVMr Tyler, Mr JohnJVlazshall, Mr Monroe, Mr Lfnnald, Mr Bland, Mr Merriwether Smith. Mr Paul Carrington, Mr Innes, Mr Hopkins, Mr John Blair, and Mr Simms, compose the said committee. His Excellency Governor RANDOLPH reported, from the com¬ mittee appointed, according to order, a form of ratification , which was read and agreed to by the convention, in the words followings VIRGINIA, to wit : We, the Delegates of the people of Virginia, duly elected in pur¬ suance of a recommendation from the general assembly, and now met in convention, having fully and freely investigated and discuss¬ ed the proceedings of the Federal Convention, and being prepared as well as the most mature deliberation hath enabled us, to decide thereon, iDo in the name, and in behalf of the people of Virginia, ■declare and make known, that, the powers granted under the Consti-, tution being derived from the people of LI.States he resumed by them whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury oroppression ; and that every power, not granted thereby, remains with them and at, their will: that therefore, no right of any denomination, can be can¬ celled, abridged, restrained or modified, by the congress, by the se¬ nate or house of representatives acting in any capacity, by the prf sident or any department, or i ffieer of the United States, except i those instances in which power is given by the constitution for those /purposes: and that among other essential rights,the liberty of con- icienceand of the press cannot he cancelled, nbridg Mr WYTHE reported, from the committee appointed,'such amend- meats to the proposed constitution of government for the United fStaies, as were by them deemed necessary to be recommended to (the consideration of the congress, which shall first assemble under the said constitution, to be acted upon according to the mode pre¬ scribed in the fifth article thereof; and he read the same in his place, and afterwards delivered them in at the clerk’s table, where the same were again read, and are as follows: That there be a declaration or bill of rights asserting and seen- c? o rinor from encroachment the essential and unalienable rights of the people in son®® such manner as the following: 1st. That these are certain natural rights, of which men when they form a social compact cannot deprive or divest their posterity, among' which are the enjoyment of life and liberty with the means of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety. 2d. That all power is naturally invested in arid consequently de¬ rived from, the people, that magistrates therefore are their trustees. and agents at. all times amenable to them. &d. That government ought to be instituted for the common ben- efit, protection and security of the people; and that the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression, is absurd, j slavish, and destructive to the good and happiness of mankind. 4th. That no man or set of men are entitled to separate or exclu¬ sive (Public emoluments or privileges from the community, but iu consideration of public services, which not being descendable, nei¬ ther ought the offices of magistrate, legislature, or judge, or any other public office to be hereditary. 5th. That the legislative, executive, and judicial powers cfgovern- ment should be separate and distinct, and that the members of the two first may be restrained from oppression by feeling and participa¬ ting the public burthens, they should at fixed peiiods be reduced to to a private station, return into the mass of the people, and the va¬ cancies be supplied by certain and regular elections, in which all or any part of the former members to be eligible or ineligible, as the rules of the constitution of government, and the laws shall direct. 6ih. That the elections of representatives in the legislature ought Vo be fiee and frequent, arid all men having sufficient evidence of VIRGINIA. 591 permanent coi>:mon interest with, and attachment to the community ought to have the right ot suffrage: and no aid, charge, tax or fee, can be set, rated, or levied upon the people without their own con¬ sent, or that ol their representatives, so, elected, nor can they be bound by any law, to which they have not in like manner assented for the public good. /th. that all power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws by any authority without the consent of the representatives of the people in the legislature, is injurious to their rights, and ought not be exercised. 8th. That in all criminal and capital prosecutions, a man hath aright to demand the cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses, to call for evidence, and be allowed counsel in favor, and to a fair and speedy trial by an impartial jury of his vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty (except in the government of the land and naval forces) nor can he be compelled to give evidence against himself. 9th. That no freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold liberties, privileges or franchises, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land. 10th. That every freeman restrained of his liberty is entitled to a remedy, to enquire into the lawfulness [thereof, and to remove the same, if unlawful, and that such remedy ought not to be denied nor delayed. 11th. That in controversies respecting property, and in suits be¬ tween man and man, the ancient trial by jury, is one of ^he greatest Securities to the rights of the people; and to remain sacred and in¬ violable. 12th. That every freeman ought to find a certain, remedy by re¬ course to the laws for all injuries and wrongs he may receive in his person, property, or character. He ought to obtain right and justice freely without sale, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, and that all establishments or regulations, contrave¬ ning these rights, are oppressive and unjust. 13th. That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, or cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 14th. That every freeman has a right to be secure from all unrea¬ sonable searches and seizures of his person, his papers, and pro¬ perty ; all warrants therefore to search suspected places, or seize any freeman, his papers or property, without information on oath (or affirmation of a person religiously scrupulous of taking an oath) of legal and sufficient cause, are grievous and oppressive, and all general warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend any suspected person without specially naming or describing the place or person, are dangerous and ought not to be granted. 15th. That the people have aright peaceably to assemble together, to consult for the common good, or to instruct their representatives; and that every freeman has a right to petition or apply teethe legisla¬ ture for redress of greviences. 16th. That the people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing and publishing their sentiments; that the freedom of the press is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty, and ought not to be violated, vol 3 38 DEBATES. 17th. That the people have a right to keep and bear arms. That /a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people trained to arms, is the proper, natural and safe defence of a free state. That standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, and there* fore ought to be avoided, as far as the-circumstances and protection of the community will admit; and that in all cases, the military should be under strict subordination to and governed by the civil power. 18th. That no soldier in time of peace ought to be quaitered in any house without the consent of the owner, and in time of war in such manner only as the law directs. 19th. That any person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be exempted, upon payment of an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his stead. 20th. That religion, oi the dulv which we owe to our creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and con* viction, not by force or violence, and therefore all men have an equal, natural and unalienable right to the free exercise of religion accord¬ ing to the dictates of conscience, and that no particular religious sect or society ought to be favored or established by law in preference to others. Amendments to the Constitution. 1st. That each state in the union shall respectively retain every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this constitution dele¬ gated to the congress of the United States, or to the departments of the federal government. 2d, That there shall be one representative for every thirty thou¬ sand, according to the enumeration cr census mtiniioned in the con* stitution, until the whole number ot representatives amounts to two hundred; after which that number shall be continued or encreased as congress shall direct, upon the.principles fixed in the constitution, by apportioning the representatives of each state to some greater num¬ ber of people from time to time as population encreases. 3d. When the congress shall lay direct taxes or excises: they shall immediately inform the executive power of each state, of the quota of such state according to the census herein directed, which is pro¬ posed to be thereby raised; and if the legislature of any state shall pass a law which shall be effectual for raising such quota, at the time required by congress, the taxes and excises laid by congress shall not be collected in such state. "4th. That the members of ihe senate nnd house of representatives shall be ineligible to, and incapable cf holding any civil office un¬ der the authority of the United States, during the time for whichf they shall respectively be elected. 51h. That the journals of the proceedings of the senate and house of representatives shall be published at least once in every year, except such parts thereof relating to treaties, alliances, or military operations, as in their judgt nent require secrecy. 6th. That a regular stateme; ’ and account of the receipts and ex¬ penditures of public money, shah I ■> published at least once a year. 7th. That no commercial treaty g.i. ! he ratified without the con¬ currence of two-thirds of the whole number of the members of the senate; and no treaty, ceding, contracting, restraining or suspending the territorial rights or claims of the United States, or any of them* Madison.] VIRGINIA. 59 & or their, or any of their rights or claims to fishing in the American seas, or navigating the American rivers, shall he made, but in cases of the most urgent and extreme necessity, nor shall any such treaty be ratified without the concurrence of three-fourths cf the whole number of the members of both houses respectively. 8th. That no navigation law, or law regulating commerce, shall be passed without the consent of two-thirds of the members present, in both houses. 9th. That no standing army or regular troops shall be raised, or kept up in time of peace, without the consent of two-thirds of the members present, in both houses. 10th. That no soicier shall be enlisted for any longer term than lour years, except in time of war, and then for no longer term than the continuance of the war. 11th. That each state respectively shall have the power to provide r or^anizt ng, arming, and disciplining its own militia, whensoever congress shall omit or neglect to provide for the same. That the militia shall not be subject to martial law, except when in actual service in time of war, invasion or rebellion, and when not in the actual service of the United States shall be subject only to such fines, penalties and punishments, as shall be directed or inflicted by the laws of its own state. 12th, That the exclusive power of legislation given to congress over the federal town and its adjacent distiict, and other places, pur¬ chased or to be purchased by congress of any of the states, shall extend only to such regulations as respect the police ami good go¬ vernment thereof. ^ 13th. That no person shall he ’capable of being president of the United States for more than oightypars in any term of sixteen years* 14th. That the judicial power of the United States shall be ves¬ ted in one supreme court, and in such courts of admiralty as con- giess may front time to time ordain and establish in any of the dif¬ ferent states. The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under treaties made, or which shall be made un¬ der the authority of the United States; to all cases affecting ambas¬ sadors, other foreign ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiral¬ ty and maritime jurisdiction ; to controversies to which the United States shall he a party; to controversies between two or more states, and between parties claiming lands under the grants of different states. In all cases affecting ambassadors, other foreign ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party, the su¬ preme court shall have criginal jurisdiction; in all other cases be¬ fore mentioned, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction, as to matters of law only; except in cases of equity and of admi¬ ralty and maritime jurisdiction, in which the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such ex¬ ceptions and under such regulations as the congress shall make: hut the judicial power of the United States shall extend to no case where the cause of action shall have originated before the ratifica¬ tion of the*constitution, except in disputes between states about their territory, disputes between persons claiming lands under the grants of different states, and suits for debts due to the United States. 15th. That in criminal prosecutions, no man shall be restrained in the exercise of the usual and accustomed right of challenging or excepting to the jury. DEBATES. $96 16th. That congress shall not alter, modify, or interfere in the times, places, or manner of holding elections for senators and repre¬ sentatives or either of them, except when the legislatures of any state shall neglect, refuse, or be disabled by invasion or rebellion to prescribe the same. 17th. That those clauses which declare that congress shall not exercise certain powers, be not interpreted in any manner whatso¬ ever, to extend the powers of congress; but that they be construed either as making exceptions to the specified powers where this shall be the case, or otherwise, as inserted merely for greater caution. 18th. That the laws ascertaining the compensation of senators, and representatives for their services, be postponed in their operation, until after the election of representatives immediately succeeding the passing thereof; that excepted, which shall fiTSt be passed on the subject. 19th. That some tribunal other than the senate be provided for trying impeachments of senators. 20th. That the salary of a judge shall not be increased or dimin¬ ished during his continuance in office, otherwise than by general regulations of salary, which may take place on a revision of the subject at stated periods of not less than seven years, to commence from the time such salaries shall be first ascertained by congress. And the convention do, in the name and behalf of the people of this commonwealth, enjoin it upon their representatives in congress to exert all their influence and use all reasonable and legal methods to obtain a ratification of the foregoing alterations and provisions in the manner provided by the fifth article of the said constitution; and in all congressional laws to be passed in the mean time, to conform to the spirit of these amendments as lar as the said constitution will admit. , And so much of the said amendments as is contained in the first twenty articles, constituting the bill of rights, being read again, Resolved , That this convention doth concur therein. The other amendments to the said proposed constitution, con¬ tained in twenty-one articles, being then again read, a motion was made, and the question being put, to amend the same by striking Out the third article, containing these words: “ When congress shall lay direct taxes or excises, they shall im¬ mediately inform the executive power of each state, or the quota of such state according to the census herein directed, which is pro¬ posed to be thereby raised, and if the legislature of any state shall pass a law which shall be effectual for raising such quota at the time required by congress, the taxes and excises laid by congress shall not be collected in such states.” It passed in the negative—Ayes 65.—Noes 85. On motion of Mr George Nicholas, seconded by Mr Benjamin Harrison, the Ayes and Noes on the said question were taken as followeth: Jlyes. Messrs George ParkerWilliam Dark Charles Simms George Nicholas Adam Stephen John Prunty Wilson Nicholas Martin M’Ferren Abel Seymour Zachariah Johnson J. Taylor, of Caroline Gov. Randolph Archibald Stuart David Stuart John Marshall Nathaniel Bur well Robert Andrews James Johnson Rice Bullock Burdet Ashton William Thornton Henry Towles Archibald Woods James Madison J. Gordon, of Orange William Ronald Thomas Walker Anthony Walker Benjamin Wilson John Wilson William Peachy Andrew Moore VIRGINIA, Thomas Lewis Humphrey Marshall Martin Picket Humphrey Brooke John S. Woodcock Alexander White Warner Lewis Thomas Smith John Stewart Daniel Fisher Alexander Woodrow George Jackson Levin Powell W'm. Overton Callis Ralph W'ormley, jun. Francis Corbin William M’Clerry Noes. Edmund Custis John Guerrant John Pride William Sampson William Cabell Isaac Coles Samuel Jordan CabellGeorge Carrington John Trigg Parke Goodall Charles Clay John Carter Littlepage William Fleming Thomas Cooper Henry Lee, Bourbon William Fleete John Jones Thomas Roane Bi nns Jon03 Holt Richeson Charles Patteson Benjamin Temple David Bell Jas. Gordon, Lancaster Robert Alexander Stephens T. Mason William White Jonathan Patteson 5$? James Webb James Taylor, Norfolk John Stringer Littleton Eyre Walter Jones Thomas Gaskins Gabriel Jones Jacob Rinker John Williams Benjamin Blunt Samuel Kello John Allen Cole Digges Bushrod Washington Hon. George W r ythe Mr Thomas Mathews E. Pendleton, Pres. William Clayton Burwell Basset Matthew Walton John Steele Robert Williams John Wilson Thomas Turpin Patrick Henry Edmund Ruffin Theodorick Bland. William Grayson Cuthbert Bullit Walter Tomlin William M’Keo Thomas Carter Henry Dickenson James Monroe John Dawson George Mason Andrew Buchanan John Hartwell Cocke John Howell Briggs Thomas Edmonds Richard Cary Samuel Edminson James Montgomery And then the maiiy question being put, that this convention doth concur with the committee in the said amendments, It was resolved in the affirmative. On motion , Ordered. That the foregoing amendments bo fairly engrossed upon parchment, signed by the president of this conven¬ tion, and by him transmitted, together with the ratification of the federal constitution to the United States in congress assembled. Edmund Winston Thomas Read Paul Carrington Benjamin Harrison John Tyler David Patteson John Logan Henry Pawling John Miller Green Clay Stephen Pankey, jun. Samuel Hopkins Joseph Michaux French Strother Joseph Jones Miles King Joseph Haden John Early Thomas Arthurs Richard Kennon Thomas Allen Alexander Robertson Walter Crocket Abraham Trigg Solomon Shepherd Debates. On motion, Ordered, That a fair engrossed copy of the ratification of the federal constitution, with the subsequent an endments this day agreed to, signed by the president, and attested by the secreta¬ ry of this convention, be transmitted by the president, in the name ot the convention, to the executive or legislature of each state in the union. Ordered , That the secretary do cause the journal of the proceed¬ ings of this convention to be faiily entered into a well bound book, and after being signed by the president, and attested by the secre¬ tary, that he deposite the same in the archives of the privy council or council of state. On motion, Ordered , That the printer to this convention do strike forthwith, fifty copies of the ratification and subsequent amendments of the federal Constitution, for the use of each county in the com¬ monwealth. On motion, Ordered , That the public auditor be requested to ad¬ just the accounts of the printer to the convention for his services, and of the workmen who made some temporary repairs and altera¬ tions in the new academy, for the accommodation of the convention, and tc grant his warrant on the treasurer, for the sum due the re¬ spective claimants. On motion, Retched unanimously , That ihe thanks of the conven¬ tion be presented to the president, for his able, upright, and impar¬ tial discharge of the duties of that office. Whereupon the president made his acknowledgement to the con¬ vention, for so distinguished a mark of its approbation. And then the convention adjourned, sine die .” Signed EDMUND PENDLETON, President, Attest, JOHN BECKLEY, Secretary. r