<^ 3,9 , "3LO**. » ^& 
 
 The 
 Soviet 
 Merchant 
 Marine 
 
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 6 ^<SS=^ jj* 
 
 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
 Alexander B. Trowbridge, Secretary 
 
 MARITIME ADMINISTRATION 
 J. W. Gulick, Acting Administrator 
 
Prepared by Irwin M. Heine, Chief, and Muriel W. Coe, Foreign Shipping 
 Industry Analyst, Division of International Activities and Special Studies, 
 Office of Program Planning, Maritime Administration, U.S. Department of 
 Commerce. 
 
 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
 Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Price 35 cents 
 
FOREWORD 
 
 In less than a decade the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
 has become a major maritime power. Its ships incorporate many 
 of the latest engineering innovations, and advanced research 
 and development is being undertaken on a continuing basis 
 in all aspects of ship design and propulsion. 
 
 Modern, efficient merchant ships are entering the Soviet 
 merchant marine at the rate of about one million deadweight 
 tons a year. Soviet flag ships are to be found serving most of 
 the major ports of the world with few exceptions, notably those 
 of the United States. Apparently every effort is being made by 
 the U.S.S.R. shipping authorities not only to increase the size 
 of the merchant marine but the scope and extent of Soviet 
 shipping activities. Recently, some of their shipping lines, such 
 as the Baltic Steamship Line, have become members of shipping 
 conferences and participants in pooling agreements with non- 
 socialist countries' shipping lines. Soviet flag freighters and 
 passenger ships are even being offered on the time charter 
 market and others are actively seeking cargoes for interport 
 movement outside the sphere of the Soviet bloc. 
 
 It is understandable, therefore, that the tremendous upsurge 
 in Soviet ship construction and shipping activities has led to much 
 comment in international shipping circles as to the extent of 
 Soviet shipping capabilities in the foreseeable future and the 
 probable impact of Soviet competition upon the traditional sup- 
 pliers of merchant shipping. 
 
 While not minimizing the remarkable progress of the USSR 
 in acquiring a merchant shipping capability, this report places 
 the recent Soviet acquisition of ships in proper perspective as 
 related to the world fleet and world shipping capability. 
 
 J. W. Gulick 
 
 Acting Maritime Administrator 
 1967 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 
 in 2012 with funding from 
 
 LYRASIS Members and Sloan Foundation 
 
 
 http://archive.org/details/sovietmerchantmaOOunit 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 Page 
 
 Foreword % m 
 
 Introduction * 
 
 Growth of the Soviet Merchant Marine 9 
 
 Profile of the Soviet Merchant Marine 11 
 
 Passenger Ships 12 
 
 Freighters Including Refrigerator Ships 12 
 
 Bulk Carriers 13 
 
 Tankers 14 
 
 Ship Construction 15 
 
 Ships on Order and Under Construction 16 
 
 Combination Passenger/Cargo Ships 17 
 
 Freighters 17 
 
 Bulk Carriers 19 
 
 Tankers 19 
 
 U.S.S.R. Seaborne Domestic and Foreign Trade 21 
 
 Chartering Activities 22 
 
 Shipping Conferences and Pooling Agreements 24 
 
 International Organizations 26 
 
 Conclusions 28 
 
 Tables 1 through 8 29 
 
 Appendix 40 
 
 v 
 
TABLES 
 
 Table 1 Merchant Fleets — World, United States and Union of Soviet 
 Socialist Republics as of December 31, 1946, 1950, 1956, 
 1960, 1965 and 1970 (Est.) 29 
 
 Table 2 Oceangoing Merchant Type Ships of 1,000 Gross Tons and 
 Over Showing Average Age, Gross or Deadweight and 
 Speed, by Type of Ship and Country As of June 30, 1950 
 and December 31, 1956, 1960, and 1965 31 
 
 Table 3 Petroleum Exports of the U.S.S.R.: 1950, 1956, 1960-1965 .... 33 
 
 Table 4 Oceangoing Merchant Ships in the World, U.S.S.R. and 
 United States Fleets: 1965, Five Years Old and Under; 
 and Under 10 Years Old 34 
 
 Table 5 Country of Construction of Ships in the U.S.S.R. Merchant 
 
 Fleet As of December 31, 1965 35 
 
 Table 6 Number and Tonnage of Steam and Motor Vessels Under 
 Construction and/or On Order Arranged by Country of 
 Construction and Country of Intended Registration Ocean- 
 going Merchant Vessels of 1,000 Gross Tons and Over, 
 As of June 30, 1966 36 
 
 Table 7 International Seaborne Shipping — World Total and Selected 
 Countries — 1958-1965 Goods Loaded and Unloaded in 
 Foreign Trade 38 
 
 Table 8 Ship Deliveries From New Construction To the World Fleet, 
 U.S.S.R., United States, and all Other Fleets, 1950, 1956, 
 1960-1965 39 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 Classes of Cargo Ships and Tankers Acquired by the U.S.S.R. During 
 
 1959-66 With Their Principal Characteristics 40 
 
THE SOVIET MERCHANT MARINE 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 Soviet merchant sea power is an accomplished fact. Its 
 merchant marine ranks seventh on a deadweight tonnage basis 
 among maritime nations and consists of an increasing number 
 of well-designed, technically advanced, fast oceangoing freight- 
 ers, bulk carriers, tankers and passenger ships. It is a relative- 
 ly new fleet since 50 percent of its merchant type oceangoing 
 ships 1 is five years old or younger (Table 4), and it has been 
 expanding at an average annual net rate of almost one million 
 deadweight tons during the past five years. Based upon the 
 tonnage of ships on order and under construction, scrapping 
 rates, losses, and the goals established by the U.S.S.R. for the 
 next five years, the same rate of growth should be maintained 
 through 1970. 
 
 The U.S.S.R. regards its merchant marine as an essential 
 element of the national economy 2 and, according to the latest 
 edition of Jane's Fighting Ships, a vital factor in the national 
 defense. As a consequence, the nation has a strong merchant 
 marine policy and program that appear to be constantly updated. 
 
 The Soviet merchant marine is a planned fleet. Ships are 
 added to the fleet on the basis of the nation's planned needs 
 for freighters, bulk carriers, tankers and other types in keeping 
 with the goals established for increased national industrial, 
 agricultural and petroleum production, expansion of economic 
 and commercial ties with its Council for Economic Mutual 
 Assistance (Comecon) trading partners and the developing 
 nations as well as the industrially advanced nations of the 
 West. Its ships now carry all its seagoing domestic trade and 
 some 50 percent of the 92 million tons of oceanborne foreign 
 trade. 3 By 1970, the U.S.S.R. expects its ocean freight turnover 
 to increase by 1.8 times from 208.8 billion ton miles in 1965 to 
 
 1 Based on gross tonnage. Only oceangoing ships of 1,000 gross tons and 
 over are included in this study. Fishing vessels, fish factory ships, self- 
 propelled barges, tugs, icebreakers, cable ships, and military craft are not 
 considered to be merchant type ships in the context of this report. 
 
 2 V. G. Bakayev. Izvestiya, Moscow, October 10, 1965. 
 
 3 Tass international service, Moscow, March 25, 1965. 
 
380 billion ton miles, 4 and it is estimated that its ships will 
 carry a substantially higher share of Soviet foreign trade than 
 the present 50 percent. 
 
 From the point of view of national defense, the Soviet 
 merchant marine is readily adaptable as an important arm of 
 the Navy. It has a large number of timber carriers, for example, 
 that can readily be converted to missile carriers and its new 
 passenger ships are readily convertible to troop transports. 
 Although its large, modern fishing fleet is not considered as 
 part of the merchant marine in the context of this study, it 
 can serve as an important defense adjunct by becoming a fleet 
 of minesweepers, 5 and does serve as observation posts for the 
 U.S.S.R. just outside the territorial waters of many non-Com- 
 munist nations. 
 
 There can be no doubt that economic and political exigencies 
 are motivating factors in the expansion of Soviet maritime 
 interests with the Comecon countries and the rest of the world. 
 
 Coincident with the growth of Soviet shipping is the reali- 
 zation on the part of the U.S.S.R. that new ideas of manage- 
 ment and planning in the operation of its ships are essential 
 if Soviet shipping is to achieve economic progress and engage 
 competitively with the ships of the larger maritime nations. 
 If the tight hold of central planning for Soviet shipping has not 
 been entirely loosened, there seem to be at least the first tenta- 
 tive steps toward actual decentralization of fleets and the need 
 for certain "capitalistic" criteria in the individual operations 
 of the basin fleets. 6 
 
 For example, V.G. Bakayev, who directs Soviet shipping as 
 Minister of the Merchant Fleet and is a member of the power- 
 ful Council of Ministers, pointed out the necessity for following 
 basic management principles and what can only be termed the 
 
 4 Izvestiya, Moscow, April 20, 1906, reporting an interview with V. G. 
 Bakayev, Minister of the Merchant Fleet. 
 
 5 New York Herald Tribune, February 6, 1966. 
 
 6 The Soviet merchant marine is divided geographically among five 
 separate "maritime basins": The Arctic, Baltic, Black Sea (including the 
 Sea of Azov), Caspian and Far East. Individual shipping lines operate to 
 various ports of the world from each basin. In addition to the normal func- 
 tions of trasporting cargo, each steamship line has complete responsibility 
 in its area for the operation of repair yards, port facilities, including 
 loading and discharging and terminal operations, maintenance of tug and 
 lighter service, navigational aids, operations of international training 
 schools for seagoing and related personnel, and a varying degree of respon- 
 sibility for the housing and social activities of its workers. 
 
first steps of elementary principles of cost effectiveness when 
 he stated: 
 
 ". . . Our shipping is planned to obtain maximum possible income. 
 Our merchant marine has moved from inefficient planning of 
 international service in tons and ton miles to net profit planning. 7 
 Through calculations of net profits we establish plan tasks for our 
 
 vessels . . . 8 
 
 Much attention is also being given to improved techniques 
 in ship repairing and refitting which would speed up these opera- 
 tions and lengthen the periods between the repairs. 
 
 The fact that the Soviet fleet has increased tremendously 
 in size in a relatively short time has been a source of concern 
 to many of the major maritime nations. It is a huge state- 
 controlled enterprise, to which substantial allocations of national 
 resources are made not only for ship acquisitions, but for the 
 construction and improvement of ship repair facilities, ports, 
 research and development, and for maritime personnel train- 
 ing facilities. 9 For example, it is planned to increase operational 
 efficiency in shipping operations by 38 percent and in ship re- 
 pairing by 18 percent during the current five year plan. This 
 is to be done by introducing modern science and technology, 
 fleet specialization, port and shipyard development, and scienti- 
 fic labor organization; increasing incentives; and improving the 
 skills of the workers. 10 
 
 While the U.S.S.R. is still a "user" of shipping services, 
 although not to the same extent as the United States, it is 
 understandable why some of the "supplier" nations are uneasy 
 about the long-term trend of Soviet shipping. Certainly, factors 
 that give substance to the future competitive aspects of the 
 Soviet merchant marine are the recent development in charter- 
 ing some of its ships to Western countries and its advertised 
 intent to increase this operation, 11 especially during the winter 
 and spring seasons when some Soviet shipping lines are relative- 
 ly inactive; the related practice of using its ships on return 
 voyages to carry cargo between non-Communist ports (inter- 
 port cargo) at attractive rates so as to earn foreign exchange, 
 
 7 Emphasis supplied. 
 
 8 Red Star, Moscow, March 13, 1966. 
 
 9 Vodnyy Transport, Moscow, April 26, 1966. 
 
 10 Ibid. 
 
 11 Fairplay Shipping Journal, August 18, 1966 — Advertisement) of 
 "SovFracht," Soviet chartering organization, offering ships for various 
 kinds of charters. 
 
rather than sail in ballast; and the expectation that by 1970 
 the availability of Soviet ships for charter will be substantially 
 greater than at present. 
 
 On the other hand, consideration should be given to the 
 hard realities of Soviet merchant fleet capabilities, viz.: 
 
 1. Although the deadweight tonnage of the Soviet merchant 
 fleet increased from 4.9 million tons to 9.6 million tons or 96 
 percent between 1960 and 1965, it comprises only 4.4 percent 
 of the merchant fleets of the world. Even if the laid-up mer- 
 chant ship types in the United States national reserve fleets 
 amounting to 10.2 million deadweight tons are excluded, the 
 percentage is increased to only 4.6 percent. 
 
 2. The growth rates of the fleets of other maritime nations 
 cannot be overlooked. 12 In the same period, the Norwegian mer- 
 chant marine increased from 16.1 million deadweight tons to 
 23.5 million tons (46 percent). The Japanese fleet, which had 
 to start virtually from scratch after World War II, increased 
 from 9.4 to 16.5 million deadweight tons. (76 percent), and the 
 fleet registered under Greek flag rose from 7.3 to 10.4 million 
 deadweight tons (42 percent). Additionally, about 15.5 million 
 deadweight tons 13 of Greek owned or controlled shipping were 
 under Liberian, Panamanian, Lebanese, and other flags of 
 convenience. Of outstanding importance is the tremendous rise 
 in the tonnage of the Liberian fleet which gained 13.5 million 
 deadweight tons (78 percent) during the above period and totaled 
 31 million deadweight tons at the end of 1965. It is estimated 
 that of the companies which own or control ships registered 
 under Liberian flag 45 percent was controlled by American 
 interests, 35 percent by Greek interests and the remaining 20 
 percent was divided among French, Italian, Norwegian, 
 British and Hong Kong interests. 14 
 
 This is, however, only part of the over-all picture, for new 
 ships on order or under construction for the above nations, not 
 to mention such other maritime powers as Denmark, France, 
 West Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, and the United 
 
 12 For example, the Norwegian fleet comprises 11.5 percent of the world 
 fleet; the Japanese 8.1 percent; the Greek 5.1 percent; and the Liberian 15.1 
 percent. 
 
 13 Official government despatches, Athens, August 1965. 
 
 14 Office of the Liberian Deputy Commissioner for Maritime Affairs. 
 
Kingdom, must be taken into account. As of June 30, 1966, the 
 following countries had under construction or on order: 1 ' 
 
 Country of Registry Type of Ship 
 
 
 Passenger 
 
 GRT 
 
 No. (000) 
 
 Freighter 
 
 DWT 
 No. (000) 
 
 E 
 
 ulk 
 
 Tc 
 
 nker 
 
 
 No. 
 
 DWT 
 (000) 
 
 No. 
 
 DWT 
 (000) 
 
 Denmark 
 
 
 
 
 
 23 
 
 196 
 
 8 
 
 282 
 
 5 
 
 329 
 
 France 
 
 West Germany 
 
 Greece 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 
 23 
 5 
 
 
 15 
 84 
 15 
 
 157 
 569 
 210 
 
 14 
 13 
 25 
 
 508 
 515 
 985 
 
 16 
 
 11 
 
 1 
 
 1,529 
 926 
 
 74 
 
 Italy 
 Japan 
 Liberia 
 Netherlands 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 41 
 2 
 
 
 
 4 
 41 
 
 6 
 20 
 
 22 
 
 490 
 78 
 195 
 
 14 
 
 25 
 
 96 
 
 4 
 
 606 
 1,172 
 4,174 
 
 139 
 
 15 
 
 28 
 
 36 
 
 9 
 
 651 
 2,446 
 2,805 
 
 904 
 
 Norway 
 Sweden 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 27 
 
 
 51 
 27 
 
 357 
 
 241 
 
 120 
 19 
 
 4,911 
 895 
 
 70 
 6 
 
 5,401 
 502 
 
 United Kingdom 
 United States 
 
 1 
 
 
 58 
 
 
 54 
 45 
 
 584 
 642 
 
 37 
 
 
 1,554 
 
 
 23 
 1 
 
 1,095 
 36 
 
 Total 
 
 10 
 
 156 
 
 385 
 
 3,741 
 
 375 
 
 15,741 
 
 221 
 
 16,698 
 
 Additionally, the developing nations are particularly inter- 
 ested in acquiring their own merchant fleets, either with 
 second-hand tonnage or new ships, as a means of securing 
 better shipping rates for their exports of raw materials and 
 imports of finished products, and as a means of conserving 
 their limited foreign exchange resources. 10 
 
 3. At the U.S.S.R.'s projected rate of increase for its fleet, 
 estimates 17 indicate that the Soviet merchant marine by the end 
 of 1970 will comprise less than 6 percent of the world's ocean- 
 going merchant tonnage excluding the United States National 
 Reserve Fleet. In view of the 1966 to 1970 goals for the increased 
 movement of cargo tonnages in the U.S.S.R.'s domestic and for- 
 eign trades, with special attention to the trade of its Comecon 
 partners and the lesser developed nations, 18 it seems unrealistic, 
 at least during the next five years, to believe the Soviet fleet 
 
 15 U.S. Maritime Administration, Department of Commerce. Includes 
 only oceangoing merchant ships of 1,000 gross tons and over. 
 
 16 Shipping and Ocean Freight Rates. Regional Economic Cooperation in 
 Asia and the Far East. Published by the United Nations. New York, 1965. 
 
 17 By December 31, 1970, the authors of this study estimate the world's 
 oceangoing merchant ships, of 1,000 gross tons and over, will total 260.6 
 million deadweight tons and the Soviet fleet 13.9 million deadweight tons, 
 or 5.3 percent. 
 
 18 Long turnarounds are involved in servicing East and West African 
 nations, as well as those in the Middle and Far East and Cuba. 
 
will become a major competitive threat to the suppliers of in- 
 ternational shipping. For example: 
 
 a. The U.S.S.R. has required and will continue to need the 
 services of non-Communist flag ships during the 1966 to 1970 
 period. In 1964, foreign flag ships carried slightly less than 50 
 million tons of cargo or about half of the total in the U.S.S.R.'s 
 overseas trade. 19 
 
 b. Realistic economic and political expediency would seem 
 to dictate the continued use of foreign flag ships by the U.S.S.R. 
 if for no other reasons than for " . . business cooperation" 
 (with free world nations) and "for the development of foreign 
 
 commerce." 20 
 
 c. By 1970, the U.S.S.R. plans to increase the cargo tonnage 
 carried by its flag ships in domestic and foreign trades to .1.6 
 times that of 1965. During the same period, however, the 
 merchant fleet is expected to increase to 1.5 times. Relatively, 
 cargoes are thus expected to increase at a faster rate than ship 
 availabilities. 21 
 
 d. Plans for the expansion of the domestic economy during 
 the 1966 to 1970 period will necessitate increasing requirements 
 for Soviet ships not only in the foreign trade but in the domestic 
 trade as well. The economy and relative flexibility of using ships 
 in moving cargoes between areas in the U.S.S.R. as opposed to 
 other modes of transport, particularly for long hauls, may well 
 result in an additional utilization of the Soviet merchant 
 marine. 22 
 
 e. Numerous factors are at work that may cut down the 
 operating effectiveness of Soviet shipping, such as: 
 
 (1) Losses in operating time are believed to be high at a 
 number of U.S.S.R., satellite nations' and lesser developed 
 countries' ports which Soviet ships seek to serve, due to relative- 
 ly inefficient loading and discharging facilities; lack of, or in- 
 different, warehousing accommodations; and an inadequate 
 transport network (access roads, railroads, pipelines, tank stor- 
 age farms among others) for the movement of cargoes to and 
 from such ports. The bottlenecks that may occur could result 
 in stretched-out turnaround time and poor utilization of ships, 
 
 19 V. G. Bakayev, in Za Rubezhom (Life Abroad), reported in New 
 York Times, March 26, 1965. 
 
 20 Vodnyy Transport, Moscow, May 26, 1966. 
 
 21 Vodnyy Transport, Moscow, April 26, 1966. 
 
 22 Ibid. 
 
 6 
 
all of which would undoubtedly drain off shipping capability 
 for foreign trade service. The Ministry of the Merchant Fleet 
 is giving much attention to port construction and improvements 
 to facilitate cargo and ship movements. 23 
 
 (2) Ship productivity appears to be leveling off. 24 While im- 
 proved ship designs, technical advancements in propulsion and 
 automation, and increased size and speed of ships will undoubt- 
 edly help to raise productivity ratios, their impact will be 
 impaired unless improved coordination between ship arrivals, 
 availability of cargoes, and clearing piers leading to faster sh,ip 
 turnarounds, can be achieved. 
 
 f. Since the Soviet merchant marine is a state-owned enter- 
 prise, it can be used as a political instrument for economic 
 purposes and an economic instrument for political purposes. 
 The Soviet shipping authorities could institute lower freight 
 rates at any time and in any trade of their choosing for either 
 of the foregoing purposes.- 5 Such action, however, could be two- 
 edged. 
 
 Since the U.S.S.R. at present is required to charter large 
 tonnages of foreign flag shipping to meet its export and import 
 needs, 26 and, according to V.G. Bakayev, will continue to depend 
 upon foreign flag charters through at least 1970, 27 any reduction 
 in charter rates resulting from a general lowering of freight 
 rates initiated by the Soviets would be to their advantage; that 
 is, the amount of convertible exchange they would have to dis- 
 burse for foreign flag charters would be reduced. 
 
 The other edge concerns the acquisition of foreign exchange 
 by the U.S.S.R. from shipping services. In this context reference 
 is made to the numerous and continuing comments by Soviet 
 shipping authorities and commentators, on the need for the mer- 
 chant marine to earn convertible exchange to pay for the 
 foreign flag ship charters. 28 
 
 Soviet flag ships presently are carrying about half of the 
 U.S.S.R. 's foreign trade. 29 They would carry more if it were 
 
 23 Vodnyy Transport, Moscow, April 26, 1966. 
 
 24 Alfred Boyer, "Quelques Aspects de L'Exploitation de la Flotte de 
 Commerce Sovietique," Journal de la Marine Marchande, August 23, 1966. 
 
 25 Soviet Weekly, January 21, 1967. A Soviet publication distributed 
 in England. 
 
 26 Vodnyy Transport, Moscow, April 26, 1966. 
 
 27 Ibid. 
 
 28 Ibid. 
 
 29 Tass international service, Moscow, March 25, 1965. 
 
economically feasible, since this would result in a smaller outflow 
 of convertible currencies for chartered foreign flag ships. Under 
 the conditions of maximized utilization of Soviet flag shipping 
 in foreign trade, it is to the U.S.S.R. 's advantage to obtain the 
 most favorable freight rates that would yield the highest re- 
 turns of foreign exchange. Similarly, foreign exchange earnings 
 from the chartering of Soviet flag ships to foreign operators 30 
 would be greater if charter rates were not depressed as a result 
 of a freight rate war. The need for foreign exchange is a fact 
 and constantly stated, 31 for the U.S.S.R. has had to make and is 
 making large expenditures of gold and foreign exchange reserves 32 
 to: 
 
 (1) buy shipping services during recent years to make up 
 the tonnage that was diverted to supply Cuban and, to a lesser 
 extent, North Vietnamese economic and defense requirements; 33 
 
 (2) buy and transport huge quantities of grains for the 
 U.S.S.R. and dependent satellites due to poor harvests in the 
 U.S.S.R. during the past few years; 
 
 (3) build ships in the free world shipyards; 
 
 (4) charter on a continuing basis the large quantities of 
 free world shipping services to meet its own foreign trade 
 needs, about 50 to 60 percent of which can and probably will 
 be met by the Soviet merchant marine in the foreseeable future. 
 
 In this connection it should be noted that the Minister for 
 the Merchant Fleet, V. G. Bakayev, has stated that the Soviet 
 merchant marine has no intention of "hogging" shipping busi- 
 ness or of cutting internationally agreed tariffs. In fact, he points 
 out that the U.S.S.R. plays its full part in international maritime 
 conferences so as not to disturb "existing balances," and that it 
 adheres strictly to the tariff rates fixed by the large shipping 
 conferences. He goes on to state: 
 
 30 Vodnyy Transport, Moscow, April 26, 1966. 
 
 31 Ibid. 
 
 32 Soviet bloc countries which have the U.S.S.R. as their principal 
 trading partner are now demanding gold or transferable^ currencies for at 
 least part of their transactions with the U.S.S.R. Since settlements are 
 made in rubles, which are nontransferable, the bloc countries are tied to 
 inter-bloc trade and restricted from the development of Western purchases. 
 
 33 Free world ships trading with Cuba and North Vietnam are ineligible 
 to carry U.S. Government-financed cargoes from the United States. Since 
 the latter cargoes are considered more desirable over the long term than 
 those destined for Cuba and North Vietnam, the U.S.S.R. finds it necessary 
 to use a number of its own and satellite flag tankers and freighters to 
 supply the latter areas, at the expense of operating on more profitable 
 trade routes. 
 
"The Soviet Union could act independently in the field of sea trans- 
 port, but it does not wish to do so." 
 
 ". . . It adheres to a policy of cooperation, and would in particular, 
 like to see an international agreement or convention on the basic 
 problems of world shipping." 34 
 
 GROWTH OF THE SOVIET MERCHANT MARINE 
 
 One of the great national assets of the U.S.S.R. is its fleet 
 of 1,345 merchant ships totaling 9.6 million deadweight tons. 35 
 It is a relatively youthful, 36 balanced merchant marine of all 
 types of ships, which in the last decade has become one of the 
 major fleets of the world. It is the product of a consistent 
 maritime program corresponding with the national goals for 
 total economic progress, according to Nikolai Dyakonov, a Soviet 
 press commentator. 
 
 The rise of the Soviet fleet was rapid. In less than 20 years 
 its tonnage increased by 3.5 times, its average age decreased 
 from 22 years to 14 years, and the gain in speed of its major types 
 of ships was significant (Table 2). Its ships no longer operate 
 in rather restricted and somewhat parochial services but now 
 are to be seen in many of the major ports of the world. 37 
 
 Net additions to the fleet were relatively small between 
 1946 and 1955, averaging only 50,000 deadweight tons annual- 
 ly. -It was not until 1960 that the U.S.S.R. gave impetus to its 
 plans to build a strong, modern, and competitive merchant 
 marine. By 1960 the fleet had almost doubled in tonnage over 
 what it had been in 1946 (Table 1). It was still a merchant 
 marine of contrasts in that the average ages of some segments 
 of the fleet, such as bulk carriers and tankers, were 8 and 8.4 
 years, while those of freighters and passenger ships were 20.6 
 and 27.9 years respectively. Since the closing of the Suez Canal 
 in 1956 pointed up the need for bulk carriers and tankers, data 
 
 34 Soviet Weekly, January 21, 1967. A Soviet publication distributed 
 in Great Britain. 
 
 35 Maritime Administration, "Merchant Fleets of the World, December 
 31, 1965." Includes merchant type ships of 1,000 gross tons and over. Ex- 
 cluded are fishing vessels, tugs, icebreakers, cable ships, and other special 
 types. 
 
 36 54 percent of the fleet was 10 years old or less on December 31, 1965 
 as compared with 38 percent for the world fleet and 19 percent for the 
 U.S. privately owned merchant marine. 
 
 37 According to Agitator, Moscow, No. 13, 1966, Soviet flag ships called 
 at 800 ports in 85 countries during 1965. The number of ports visited varies 
 with different publications, but they are indicative of the expanding opera- 
 tions of the Soviet merchant marine. 
 
 9 
 
show that the construction of these two types was stepped up 
 (Table 1). 
 
 Additions to the freighter and passenger segments of the 
 merchant marine were relatively unimportant during the five- 
 year period prior to 1960. Ships and tonnages increased moder- 
 ately, but the effectiveness of new additions from construction 
 was diluted by the large majority of both types of ships which 
 were of pre-World War II vintage. By 1960 steps were being 
 taken to dispose of inefficient and ancient tonnage and to up- 
 grade the quality of the freighter group. 
 
 If the growth of the Soviet merchant marine had not been 
 precisely outstanding prior to 1960, the expansion during the 
 next five years was spectacular. The fleet practically doubled 
 in tonnage from 4.9 million deadweight tons in 1960 to 9.6 million 
 tons in 1965 (Table 1). 
 
 Between 1960 and 1965 freighters increased by a net of 
 321 ships and 2.3 million deadweight tons. There were 46 more 
 bulk carriers, adding 242,000 deadweight tons to the fleet, or 
 1.5 times the tonnage that was in existence in 1960. The in- 
 crease in the number and tonnage of tankers reflected the 
 rise in crude and refined oil production and the need for tanker 
 facilities to serve the widespread areas of the U.S.S.R. and 
 foreign markets (Table 3). Although the number of tankers 
 in 1965 was 1.7 times larger than the number in 1960, tonnage 
 rose by 2.5 times indicating tankers of greater carrying ca- 
 pacity had been added to the fleet. The increase in the tanker 
 fleet made it possible to increase shipments of oil products on 
 Soviet tankers from 2.8 million tons in 1955 to 27 million tons in 
 1965. 38 
 
 Passenger ships took on a somewhat new significance, 
 since a number of the new ships were built for the international 
 trades. A net of eight new passenger ships was added to the 
 fleet during the last 5 years among which the sisterships 
 Ivan Franko and the Alexandr Pushkin 39 are the showpieces 
 
 38 Vodnyy Transport, Moscow, April 26, 1966. 
 
 39 The Ivan Franko was built in 1964 ; the Alexandr Pushkin in 1965, 
 a third sistership, the Taras Shevechenko, was built in 1966. All three 
 were built in East Germany with passenger capacity of from 700 to 750 in 
 one class depending upon whether the ships are employed in scheduled 
 services or cruise trade. They have a gross of 19,900 tons and a speed of 
 20 knots. The Alexandr Pushkin is operated by the Baltic Steamship 
 Company and the Ivan Franko and the Taras Shevechenko by the Black 
 Sea Steamship Company. In April 1966 the Alexandr Pushkin inaugurated 
 a regular schedule between Leningrad and Montreal with calls at Helsinki, 
 Copenhagen, London and Quebec. The outbound and homeward voyages 
 take somewhat more than a month. 
 
 10 
 
of the Soviet merchant marine. They appear to be used in a very 
 flexible manner either in regularly scheduled services or for the 
 cruise trade as opportunity affords. During 1966, for example, 
 their newest passenger ships operated under charter to West 
 European operators for cruises from the U.S.S.R. and West 
 European ports to the Mediterranean and Caribbean areas. Data 
 are not available as to whether they are operating profitably. 
 However, on their scheduled sailings to and from Canada and 
 non-communist countries, and, when chartered to West Euro- 
 pean operators, they become earners of desired convertible 
 exchange. 
 
 PROFILE OF THE SOVIET MERCHANT MARINE 
 
 An analysis of the ships under U.S.S.R, flag indicates that 
 on an average basis, Soviet ships are smaller and slower than 
 ships in the merchant fleets of the major maritime nations 
 (Table 2). This may be due to several reasons: 
 
 1. Many of the U.S.S.R. ports and those of the Soviet's 
 Comecon partners are not too deep nor well equipped, thus ena- 
 bling a smaller size ship with its shallower draft to maneuver more 
 effectively when loading or discharging cargo. 
 
 2. The U.S.S.R. has very extensive coastlines and numerous 
 inland waterways and seas. Since one of the U.S.S.R.'s maritime 
 goals is the expansion of its coastal shipping 40 the flexibility of 
 the smaller ships with their lower draft can be used advantage- 
 ously in lieu of other transportation modes to operate in this 
 area. 
 
 3. Soviet naval architects and engineers indicate that ships 
 which have a tonnage displacement to power in the ratio of 
 2:1 are more effective for operation in Arctic waters, providing 
 their hulls are suitably strengthened. Since their northern waters 
 are used to tap the rich timber and mineral wealth of Siberia 
 with their shallow and, as yet, somewhat undeveloped ports, 
 the smaller ships, especially small bulk carriers and timber 
 ships, are more useful and productive than larger ships. 
 
 4. Large, fast ships are productive only if they can be 
 turned around quickly. They would serve little purpose if after 
 a quick crossing between ports they were forced to lie idle in 
 
 } Vodnyy Transport, Moscow, April 26, 1966. 
 
 11 
 
port awaiting berths for loading- or discharging cargoes be- 
 cause of inadequate facilities. 
 
 Passenger Ships 
 
 Of the 80 passenger ships totaling 433,000 gross tons under 
 U.S.S.R. flag, 55, or 69 percent of the total, are less than 5,000 
 gross tons, and 16, or 20 percent, fall in the range from 5,000 
 to 10,000 gross tons. The remaining ships vary in size from 
 10,000 to 22,000 gross tons. Among the latter are the largest 
 and oldest ship in the fleet, the Sovetsky Sojus, of 21,100 gross 
 tons which was built in Germany in 1923 and two of the U.S.S.R.'s 
 newest and fastest ships, the Ivan Franko and Alexandr Push- 
 kin. 41 
 
 Despite the fact that 29 ships totaling 200,000 gross tons 
 are less than 10 years old (Table 4), the remaining ships are 
 so old that the average age of the passenger fleet is raised to 
 24.4 years. Their average speed is estimated over-all at 14.6 
 knots. 
 
 Freighters Including Refrigerator Ships 
 
 This group is comprised of 892 ships whose deadweight 
 totals 5.2 million tons or 54 percent of the entire tonnage of the 
 Soviet merchant fleet. It is a diversified freighter fleet from the 
 standpoint of carrying capacity, although 494 ships of 1.5 million 
 deadweight tons or 55 percent of the ships and 29 percent of 
 the tonnage comprise freighters whose deadweight is less than 
 5,000 tons. If the 226 ships of 1.6 million deadweight tons in 
 the range from 5,000 to 10,000 deadweight tons are included 
 with the foregoing group, the percentages are increased to 81 
 percent of the ships and 60 percent of the tonnage. These 
 ratios show a great variance from the ratios of freighters in 
 similar size groupings making up the world fleet; 42 namely 61 
 percent of the number and 42 percent of the tonnage of freighters 
 less than 10,000 deadweight tons. 
 
 41 See Footnote 39. 
 
 42 In order to obtain a more valid comparison, freighters in the U.S. 
 National Defense Reserve Fleet and the U.S.S.R. merchant marine were sub- 
 tracted from the world total. In this way the world fleet was not influenced by 
 freighters tied up for long duration and by U.S.S.R. freighters with which 
 a comparison is being made. 
 
 12 
 
 

 A majority of the freighter segment of the U.S.S.R. mer- 
 chant fleet is relatively new. Of the 892 freighters, 346 total- 
 ing 2.4 million deadweight tons are five years old or younger 
 and their tonnage comprises 46 percent of the total for all 
 freighters. If those whose rge is less than 10 years are included, 
 the number is increased to 478 or 54 percent and their tonnage 
 to 3.1 million deadweight tons or 59 percent of all U.S.S.R. 
 freighters. When compared with the number and tonnage of 
 freighters in the world fleet in the latter age group, the dis- 
 parities are substantial since only 33 percent of the number 
 and 34 percent of the tonnage in the world are less than 10 years 
 old. 
 
 On the other hand, the average size (5,888 deadweight tons) 
 and speed (12.6 knots) for U.S.S.R. freighters are less than 
 those for freighters in the world fleet, viz.: 7,787 deadweight 
 tons and 13.1 knots. 
 
 Bulk Carriers 
 
 It was not until after the Suez crisis of 1956 that the 
 U.S.S.R. started a large bulk carrier program. In fact, as 
 recently as 1956 there were only 20 bulk carriers totaling 73,000 
 deadweight tons under U.S.S.R. flag. By the end of 1965, the 
 number had increased to 141 aggregating 714,000 deadweight 
 tons (Table 1). 
 
 It is significant, however, that these ships are of small 
 size ranging from a few thousand deadweight tons to less than 
 10,000 tons. About half of the bulk carriers are comprised of 
 ships of less than 5,000 deadweight tons. Although the Suez 
 crisis gave impetus to the worldwide construction of large bulk 
 carriers and tankers, it would seem that the U.S.S.R.'s evalua- 
 tion of its needs concluded that ships of small cargo carrying 
 capacities would best serve its national requirements. As a con- 
 sequence, the average size of bulk carriers under the U.S.S.R. 
 flag is only 5,238 deadweight tons, far less than the 16,000 
 deadweight ton average for this type of ship in the world fleet. 
 
 Since the first sizable number of bulk carriers did not come 
 into the U.S.S.R. merchant marine until 1956, the average age 
 of the bulk carrier segment is 10.5 years. When the number 
 which is less than 10 years old is analyzed, it is found that 
 they make up about 43 percent of the bulk carrier type ships 
 and 58 percent of the total bulk carrier tonnage. 
 
 13 
 
Tankers 
 
 Between 1960 and 1965 the tanker segment of the Soviet 
 merchant marine increased substantially, with a net gain of 
 98 tankers *(73 percent) and some 2.1 million deadweight tons 
 or two and one-half times the tonnage in 1960. It is sufficiently 
 large that the U.S.S.R. can carry approximately half of its 
 exports of crude oil and petroleum products in its own flag 
 tankers. 
 
 In an era when 100,000 deadweight ton tankers are common- 
 place, and contracts for tankers of 250,000 deadweight tons and 
 larger have been let, the small size of Soviet tankers is high- 
 lighted. Almost three-quarters of the tanker fleet is comprised 
 of vessels under 12,000 deadweight tons, although their tonnage 
 accounts for only one-third of the total deadweight tonnage. 
 Of the 232 tankers in the Soviet merchant marine, 75 are 
 vessels of under 5,000 deadweight tons; and the six largest do 
 not exceed 48,000 deadweight tons. The following tabulation 
 points up the narrow spread in size ranges of the Soviet tanker 
 fleet: 
 
 U.S.S.R. FLAG TANKERS BY SIZE GROUPS 
 As of December 31, 1965 
 
 Deadweight Number 
 
 Under 5,000 75 
 
 5,000— 9,999 20 
 
 10,000—10,999 3 
 
 11,000—11,999 66 
 
 12,000—16,999 3 
 
 17,000—17,999 
 
 18,000—19,999 6 
 
 20,000—25,999 10 
 
 26,000—34,999 16 
 
 35,000—35,999 12 
 
 36,000—38,999 
 
 39,000—44,999 3 
 
 45,000—45,999 12 
 
 46,000—47,999 
 
 48,000—48,999 
 
 232 
 
 Source: Maritime Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
 
 Soviet tankers are also slower, on the average, than tankers 
 in the world fleet. On the other hand, again based on averages, 
 
 14 
 
they are far younger, 43 and in many respects more modern and 
 flexible as to use. 
 
 Flexibility is a necessity for Soviet flag ships. They must be 
 adaptable for so many different types of services, 44 both in the 
 domestic and foreign trades. Although the U.S.S.R. may find it 
 desirable and may even be anxious to increase the sale and 
 transport of crude oil and petroleum products in foreign trade 
 as a means of entering markets largely dominated by western 
 producers, other considerations must be taken into account, 
 such as: 
 
 1. Domestic transport requirements to serve a growing 
 national economy. 45 
 
 2. Economic and political considerations requiring transport 
 services to serve the developing nations and to meet the needs 
 of Cuba, North Korea, ^nd North Vietnam for essential sup- 
 plies of crude oil and refined petroleum products. 
 
 From an economic point of view the U.S.S.R. finds it desira- 
 ble to increase the sale and transfer of crude oil and petroleum 
 products to western nations since these commodities and ship- 
 ping service are among the relatively few items it has for 
 export. The foreign exchange thus earned is needed to pay for 
 industrial, agricultural, and scientific equipment and supplies 
 which the Soviets are buying from the West. Of the U.S.S.R.'s 
 total exports of crude oil and petroleum products to the free 
 world, approximately 75% goes to Western Europe. On the 
 other hand the motivation for the export of the remaining 25 
 percent which goes to developing nations is primarily political, 
 although what the U.S.S.R. receives in return often has 
 economic value. 46 
 
 It is estimated that about 50 percent of total oil exports to 
 all areas is carried by Soviet tankers, and a high percentage 
 (perhaps as much as 75 to 80 percent) of the remaining 50 per- 
 cent is on ships under U.S.S.R. control on a charter basis. 
 
 SHIP CONSTRUCTION 
 
 The Soviet merchant marine is comprised of ships built 
 in 21 foreign countries. It is significant, however, that of the 
 
 43 Eight years versus 14 years. 
 
 44 For example, the coastal seaborne trades, the Arctic service and 
 inland seas and waterways to areas not readily accessible by other means 
 of transportation. 
 
 45 Vodnyy Transport, Moscow, April 26, 1966. 
 
 46 U.S. Department of Interior, Office of Oil and Gas. 
 
 15 
 
1,345 oceangoing merchant ships in the fleet on December 31, 
 1965, more than one-half or 713 ships were constructed in the 
 U.S.S.R. and Soviet bloc countries (Table 5). 47 This is the 
 important point to note. While utilizing the facilities of foreign 
 shipyards to acquire ships either on an oil-for-tankers deal as 
 with Italy, on a trade balance basis with Finland, or for trans- 
 ferable foreign exchange from Denmark and other western 
 countries to meet its increasing vessel requirements, the fact 
 should not be lost sight of that the U.S.S.R. and its satellites 
 can, and do, supply the majority of the various types of ships 
 for the Soviet fleet. 
 
 SHIPS ON ORDER AND UNDER CONSTRUCTION 
 
 On June 30, 1966, there were on order and under con- 
 struction for the Soviet merchant marine in the U.S.S.R., 
 satellite and all other countries a total of 552 oceangoing mer- 
 chant ships, or 28 percent of all ships on order and building 
 throughout the world (Table 6). 48 Of this number, 399 of all 
 types were contracted for in the U.S.S.R. and satellite countries, 
 as follows: 
 
 Country of 
 Construction 
 
 Combination 
 
 Pass/Cargo 
 
 No. GRT 
 
 (000) 
 
 Freighter* 
 No. DWT 
 (000) 
 
 Bulk Carrier 
 
 No. DWT 
 
 (000) 
 
 Tar 
 No. 
 
 iker 
 DWT 
 (000) 
 
 Grand Total 
 
 12 
 
 105 
 
 403 
 
 2191 
 
 7 
 
 158 
 
 130 
 
 1891 
 
 Soviet Bloc 
 
 12 
 
 105 
 
 300 
 
 1523 
 
 ~7 
 
 "158 
 
 ~80 
 
 1406 
 
 U.S.S.R. 
 
 ~9 
 
 ~~5i 
 
 ~83 
 
 699 
 
 ~0 
 
 
 
 ~55 
 
 1062 
 
 Bulgaria # 
 
 
 
 
 
 44 
 
 101 
 
 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 50 
 
 Czechoslovakia # 
 
 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 East Germany 
 
 3 
 
 54 
 
 48 
 
 215 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Hungary 
 
 
 
 
 
 37 
 
 56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Poland 
 
 
 
 
 
 46 
 
 331 
 
 7 
 
 158 
 
 15 
 
 294 
 
 Rumania # 
 
 
 
 
 
 32 
 
 103 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 All Other 
 
 
 
 
 
 103 
 
 668 
 
 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 485 
 
 Denmark 
 
 ~0 
 
 ~~0 
 
 ~2 
 
 5 
 
 "o 
 
 
 
 ~~ 
 
 
 
 Finland 
 
 
 
 
 
 68 
 
 343 
 
 
 
 
 
 34 
 
 152 
 
 Italy 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Netherlands 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Yugoslavia 
 
 
 
 
 
 24 
 
 288 
 
 
 
 
 
 16 
 
 333 
 
 * Includes refrigerator ships. 
 
 Source: Maritime Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
 
 # Available information indicates that the majority of these units will 
 be shallow draft, motor ships for coastal, river and lake services. 
 
 47 Bulgaria (17), East Germany (143), Hungary (104), Poland (195), 
 Rumania (7), and U.S.S.R. (247). Yugoslavia (13) is not included in the 
 above group because of its special relationships not only with the U.S.S.R., 
 but with the United States and other countries of the West. 
 
 48 Maritime Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
 
 16 
 
Combination Passenger/Cargo Ships 
 
 More passenger/cargo type ships are on order or under 
 construction for the U.S.S.R. than for any other maritime 
 nation. 49 One large passenger ship of 25,000 gross tons with a 
 proposed speed of 24 knots is on order in the U.S.S.R. for the 
 international trade. Present design specifications are for 1,200 
 passengers in two to six berth cabins. An unusual feature of 
 the ship will be the strengthening of the hull for navigation 
 where ice conditions are prevalent. 
 
 The three ships building in East Germany are sisterships 50 
 of the Ivan Franko, Alexandr Pushkin and Taras Sheve- 
 CHENKO and will augment substantially the international pas- 
 senger services of the Soviet merchant marine. 
 
 In keeping with U.S.S.R. 's requirements for specific 
 type ships that can operate effectively in shallow water ports 
 along its long coastline, the Soviet Ministry of the Merchant 
 Fleet is building at its Riga and Zhdanov shipyards, a series 
 of eight small passenger/cargo type ships, each of which will 
 have a gross of 3,200 tons, 15 knots speed and a draft of only 
 20 feet. 
 
 Freighters 
 
 If the other principal maritime nations are concentrating 
 their hew construction efforts on bulk carriers and tankers, 
 the Soviet Ministry of the Merchant Fleet is still endeavoring to 
 augment its freighter fleets. 51 As of June 30, 1966, almost 39 
 percent of the total number of freighters and more than 27 
 percent of the total deadweight tonnage of all freighters on 
 order or under construction throughout the world were for 
 U.S.S.R. account (Table 6). 
 
 If any type of ship exemplifies the U.S.S.R.'s propensity for 
 small, flexible, shallow draft ships, it is the freighter. The fol- 
 lowing table illustrates clearly the concentration on small special- 
 ized freighter types, built in series of large numbers, which tend 
 to reduce construction costs considerably. At the same time each 
 
 49 Upon delivery of the 12 passenger/cargo ships now on order and 
 under construction, the U.S.S.R. will rank third in passenger tonnage after 
 the United Kingdom and Italy. 
 
 50 See Footnote 39. 
 
 51 An analysis of the freighter fleets of the leading maritime nations 
 shows that their freighter tonnages during the past five years has, with 
 the exception of Liberia (much of which is comprised of second-hand ton- 
 nage), actually declined. 
 
 17 
 
series embodies certain ship characteristics that enable the 
 basin fleet to which they are assigned to operate them as 
 effectively as possible. 
 
 FREIGHTERS ON ORDER AND UNDER CONSTRUCTION FOR THE U.S.S.R. 
 
 BY COUNTRY OF CONSTRUCTION 
 
 As of June 30, 1966 
 
 Deadweight 
 
 Total 
 
 
 Tons (ea.) 
 
 No. 
 
 Country of Construction 
 
 1,500 
 
 74 
 
 Bulgaria and Hungary 
 
 1,600 
 
 5 
 
 Czechoslovakia 
 
 2,000 
 
 5 
 
 Czechoslovakia 
 
 2,500 
 
 12 
 
 Finland 
 
 2509-2550 
 
 2 
 
 Denmark 
 
 2,600 
 
 4 
 
 Netherlands 
 
 3,150 
 
 28 
 
 Rumania 
 
 3,400 
 
 38 
 
 Finland 
 
 3,500 
 
 7 
 
 U.S.S.R. 
 
 3,630 
 
 4 
 
 Rumania 
 
 4,000 
 
 6 
 
 U.S.S.R. 
 
 4,300 
 
 46 
 
 East Germany 
 
 4,400 
 
 5 
 
 Italy 
 
 4,500 
 
 17 
 
 U.S.S.R. 
 
 5,000 
 
 20 
 
 Bulgaria, Finland, East Germany 
 and U.S.S.R. 
 
 5,800 
 
 7 
 
 U.S.S.R. 
 
 5,950 
 
 24 
 
 Poland 
 
 6,000 
 
 2 
 
 U.S.S.R. 
 
 7,000 
 
 16 
 
 Poland 
 
 7,500 
 
 5 
 
 U.S.S.R. 
 
 8,600 
 
 3 
 
 U.S.S.R. 
 
 10,000 
 
 2 
 
 Bulgaria 
 
 11,600 
 
 6 
 
 U.S.S.R. 
 
 12,000 
 
 24 
 
 Yugoslavia 
 
 12,200 
 
 13 
 
 Finland 
 
 12,400 
 
 1 
 
 East Germany 
 
 12,700 
 
 5 
 
 Poland 
 
 13,000 
 
 6 
 
 Poland and U.S.S.R. 
 
 16,000 
 
 16 
 
 U.S.S.R. 
 
 Total 
 
 403 
 
 of 2,168,500 deadweight tons. 
 
 Source: Maritime 
 
 Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce; and 
 
 Sudotroyeniye No. 1, 
 
 , January 1966, Moscow. 
 
 Of interest also are the larger type freighters that are 
 under construction for the Soviet merchant fleet in the U.S.S.R., 
 Poland, Finland and Yugoslavia. They are relatively fast ships 
 of 17 knots with drafts of 29 and 29.5 feet, which points up the 
 attention the Soviet shipping authorities are giving not only to 
 vessel draft, but to the need for faster ships. 
 
 Eight ships, each of which will have a deadweight of 
 
 18 
 
16,000 tons, 17 knots speed and a draft of 29 feet, are being 
 built in a shipyard at Nikolayev on the Black Sea. An additional 
 eight freighters are on order for construction at the Kherson 
 Shipyard on the Black Sea. They are believed to be of the 
 Leninsky Komsomol class which has a deadweight of 16,040 
 tons and a speed of 18 knots. Also building at the Black Sea ship- 
 yard at Kherson are five freighters, each of 13,000 dead- 
 weight tons with a speed of 17 knots and a draft of 29' 6". 
 
 The five freighters on order at the Zhdanov shipyard at 
 Leningrad 52 each will have a deadweight of 7,500 tons, 16.4 knots 
 speed and will be ice-reinforced. They will probably be destined 
 for operation by one of the northern steamship lines. 
 
 Bulk Carriers 
 
 There is little concentration in the U.S.S.R. on the acquisi- 
 tion of bulk carriers. Although 490 of this type ship aggregating 
 18.8 million deadweight tons are on order and under construc- 
 tion throughout the world, building for the U.S.S.R. is limited 
 to only 7 of 158,000 deadweight tons. Poland is building all 
 seven, each of 22,500 tons and a speed of 15.5 knots. 
 
 According to Leningradskaya Pravda, dated November 10, 
 1966, the Baltic Shipyard at Leningrad is expected to begin the 
 construction of ore carriers "of 45,000 tons displacement" (ap- 
 proximately 34,000 deadweight tons). The hull is planned to be 
 heavier than usual in order to accommodate the high specific 
 weight of the ore. Additionally, the ships are planned to have 
 a second bottom and fore-and-aft bulkheads partitioning the 
 hold which will prevent the ore from shifting. 
 
 Tankers 
 
 The Soviet Ministry of the Merchant Fleet is adding 130 
 tankers of 1.9 million deadweight tons to the U.S.S.R. merchant 
 marine. It is, however, a small fraction of the 23.5 million 
 deadweight tons on order and under construction for world 
 merchant fleets, and falls far short of the tonnage building for 
 Norway (5.4 million deadweight tons), Liberia (2.8 million dead- 
 weight tons) and Japan (2.5 million deadweight tons). 
 
 52 These ships are of the Kaliningrad class and have the following 
 additional characteristics: Diesel 5400 HP, length over-all 426', beam 59', 
 large hatches, deck cranes and a cruising range of 12,000 miles. 
 
 19 
 
Of the 130 tankers, 71, or more than half, are in size 
 ranges of less than 10,000 deadweight tons. In all of the present 
 Soviet tanker fleet of 232 tankers, the largest size is 48,000 
 deadweight tons, of which there are only six. There are, however, 
 10 tankers of 47,000 deadweight tons building in the U.S.S.R. 
 at the Baltic Shipyard and at the Admiralty Shipyard, both 
 of which are located at Leningrad. They will have a speed of 
 19 knots and an estimated draft of 38 feet, which is large for 
 a Soviet flag ship. Also listed for construction at the above 
 shipyards are four tankers of 60,000 deadweight tons. 53 They 
 will have a proposed speed of 17 knots and a draft of 40 feet. 
 Tankers of this size will be able to operate from a limited 
 number of U.S.S.R. ports because of their large draft. 
 
 Although Soviet naval architects such as Dimitri Sokolov 
 have pointed out the need and desirability of larger size tankers 
 (75,000 to 80,000 deadweight tons) because of their greater 
 economy and operating efficiency, as far as is known, none 
 has appeared on the order books of U.S.S.R. or foreign ship- 
 yards. 
 
 The following table illustrates the various size groups of 
 tankers and the number in each series that are on order and 
 under construction in the U.S.S.R. and foreign shipyards: 
 
 TANKERS ON ORDER AND UNDER CONSTRUCTION FOR THE U.S.S.R. 
 
 BY COUNTRY OF CONSTRUCTION 
 
 As of June 30, 1966* 
 
 Deadweight 
 
 Total 
 
 
 Tons (ea.) 
 
 No. 
 
 Country in Which Building 
 
 2,000 
 
 4 
 
 U.S.S.R. 
 
 4,400 
 
 22 
 
 Finland 
 
 4,600 
 
 12 
 
 Finland 
 
 4,700 
 
 11 
 
 U.S.S.R. 
 
 5,000 
 
 12 
 
 U.S.S.R. and Bulgaria 
 
 7,500 
 
 10 
 
 U.S.S.R. 
 
 53 There is some doubt as to whether tankers of this deadweight ton- 
 nage are actually being built since tankers on order for the U.S.S.R. of 
 60,000 deadweight tons have been on the Maritime Administration lists for 
 several years and none has been delivered. This discrepancy could be 
 attributed- to variance in the manner of reporting ship tonnages. The 
 Sofiya class of tankers which has a deadweight of 47,000 tons has a dis- 
 placement of 62,000 tons and it may be that some confusion exists between 
 the two types of tonnages. Characteristics of the Sofiya class tankers 
 are: length 756' 3", beam 101' 9", draft 37' 9" (loaded), deadweight 47,000 
 tons, speed 17 knots, shaft horsepower 19,000. 
 
 20 
 
TANKERS ON ORDER AND UNDER CONSTRUCTION FOR THE U.S.S.R. 
 
 BY COUNTRY OF CONSTRUCTION - Continued 
 
 As of June 30, 1966* 
 
 Deadweight 
 
 Total 
 
 
 Tons (ea.) 
 
 No. 
 
 Country in Which Building 
 
 12,000 
 
 1 
 
 U.S.S.R. 
 
 15,000 
 
 13 
 
 U.S.S.R. 
 
 19,000 
 
 6 
 
 Poland 
 
 20,000 
 
 9 
 
 Poland 
 
 20,800 
 
 13 
 
 Yugoslavia 
 
 21,000 
 
 3 
 
 Yugoslavia 
 
 47,000 
 
 10 
 
 U.S.S.R. 
 
 60,000 54 
 
 4 
 
 U.S.S.R. 
 
 Total 
 
 130 of 1,891,000 d( 
 
 i adweight tons. 
 
 Source: Maritime Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
 *In September 1966 a tanker, the Vladivostok, was under construction at 
 the Baltiyskiy Yard in Leningrad inaugurating a new class of tankers 
 of 21,000 tons displacement (16,800 deadweight tons). The Vladivostok 
 type tanker is being built so that it can enter shallow ports and carry petro- 
 leum cargoes in "small portions." The Vladivostok is expected to enter 
 service in 1967. ( Leningradskaya Pravda, November 10, 1966) 
 
 U.S.S.R. SEABORNE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN TRADE 
 
 Although seaborne shipping plays, as yet, a somewhat mod- 
 est role in the total transportation economy of the U.S.S.R., 
 it has been expanding very rapidly in the past five years. 
 Emphasis on the economic development of the eastern and 
 northern regions of the U.S.S.R. and the growth of the Soviet's 
 foreign economic relations are major factors in promoting the 
 further development of the Soviet merchant marine. 
 
 Data differentiating domestic and foreign seaborne trade 
 are not always available, and U.S.S.R. statistics are not usually 
 stated on a comparable basis with those of other maritime na- 
 tions. Nonetheless, the information contained in the following 
 tables does illustrate the extent to which U.S.S.R. cargoes moving 
 by sea have increased in a relatively short period, and as a 
 rationale for the continuing growth of the Soviet merchant 
 fleet. 
 
 MOVEMENT OF U.S.S.R. FREIGHT BY SEA: 1950-1970 
 (In Billions of Ton-Miles) 
 
 Year Freight 
 
 1950 21.4 
 
 1956 44.5 
 
 1960 71.0 
 
 1962 93.6 
 
 1963 122.2 
 
 1964 160.7 
 
 54 See footnote 53. 
 
 21 
 
MOVEMENT OF U.S.S.R. FREIGHT BY SEA: 1950-1970 
 (In Billions of Ton-Miles) — Continued 
 
 Year Freight 
 
 1965 209.9 
 
 1970 380.0* 
 
 * Projection made by Viktor Bakayev, U.S. Transport, December 1, 1966, 
 page 4. 
 
 Source: 1950-1965 Narodnoye Khozyaystvo SSSR. For various years 1950- 
 1965. 
 
 U.S.S.R. SEABORNE FOREIGN TRADE: 1958-1965 
 (In Thousands of Metric Tons) 
 
 Year 
 
 Total 
 
 Exports 
 
 Imports 
 
 1958 
 
 26,566 
 
 22,372 
 
 4,194 
 
 1959 
 
 34,807 
 
 30,136 
 
 4,671 
 
 1960 
 
 44,690 
 
 38,765 
 
 5,925 
 
 1961 
 
 58,528 
 
 51,181 
 
 7,347 
 
 1962 
 
 66,963 
 
 60,045 
 
 6,918 
 
 1963 
 
 75,607 
 
 66,732 
 
 8,875 
 
 1964 
 
 83,674 
 
 71,450 
 
 12,224 
 
 1965 
 
 91,837 
 
 79,088 
 
 12,749 
 
 Source: Compendium of External Trade for the U.S.S.R. 
 
 CHARTERING ACTIVITIES 
 
 Foreign and domestic trade and shipping in the Soviet 
 Union are closely interrelated. Until 1962, chartering and for- 
 warding activities were controlled by the Ministry of Foreign 
 Trade through an organization known as SovFracht. In the 
 latter year, as a result of the growing importance of Soviet 
 shipping activities and the apparent need for closer coordination 
 in the utilization of Soviet owned and chartered ships, SovFracht 
 and its functions were transferred to the Ministry of the 
 Merchant Fleet. 55 
 
 The great expansion in Soviet foreign trade (Table 7) 
 during the past decade required the chartering of large numbers 
 of foreign flag ships and, as a consequence, SovFracht became 
 one of the most important agencies in Soviet shipping activities. 
 It was an influencing factor in world chartering markets and 
 because of the volume of shipping that is handled for the 
 Soviet Ministry of the Merchant Fleet, SovFracht was able to 
 obtain charters at reasonable rates that were contributing factors 
 to the substantial growth of Soviet foreign commerce. 
 
 55 Most of the forwarding functions of SovFracht were subsequently- 
 turned back to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and were included in an 
 organization known as "Soyuzvneshtrans." 
 
 22 
 
SovFracht's principal functions are: 
 
 1. Representing Soviet foreign trade organizations in ar- 
 ranging time and voyage charters of foreign flag ships. 
 
 2. Advising the Ministry of the Merchant Fleet and other 
 U.S.S.R. agencies interested in shipping matters, which might 
 be required to charter tonnage or quote prices including freight 
 rates on charter and liner rates. 
 
 3. Acting as agent on behalf of foreign charterers and 
 shipowners, as well as booking liner space on Soviet and foreign 
 flag ships to any destinations SovFracht had applied for member- 
 ship on the Baltic Exchange in London, one of the most im- 
 portant centers for chartering ships in the world, but as yet 
 membership has not been granted. Despite this setback 
 SovFracht's ability to charter ships at effective rates is not 
 diminished, because the U.S.S.R. 's expanding trade and shipping 
 requirements will, for some years to come, make SovFracht one 
 of the most influential organizations in the world's charter 
 markets. 
 
 According to Viktor Bakayev, Minister of the Merchant 
 Fleet, the planned freight turnover will increase in the next 5 
 years from 208.8 billion ton miles to 380 billion ton miles, an 
 82 percent increase, 56 but the tonnage of the U.S.S.R.'s ocean- 
 going merchant fleet is expected to increase by some 45 percent. 
 Granted that higher speeds, greater vessel productivity and the 
 fact that certain types of ships such as bulk carriers (including 
 ore and ore/oil carriers) and tankers have a greater carrying 
 capacity utilization per annum than ships in the deep sea liner 
 trades, 57 all of which would require the use of a smaller ratio 
 of ships to cargo — nonetheless, cargo export and import re- 
 quirements as envisaged by the U.S.S.R. Ministries of Foreign 
 Trade and the Merchant Fleet will require the use of large 
 tonnages of foreign shipping on a voyage or time charter basis, 
 
 56 Soviet Novosti Press Agency (APN) as reported in U.S. Transport 
 of December 1, 1966, page 4. 
 
 A revised estimate of 209.9 billion ton miles was published in the latter 
 part of 1966. The estimated increase between 1965 and 1970, therefore, 
 would be 81 percent. 
 
 57 It is estimated that freighters engaged in transocean liner services, 
 whose cargoes are general in nature for delivery at a number of ports on 
 a given trade route, carry about four times their cargo deadweight per 
 annum. On the other hand, estimates of the amount of cargo bulk carriers 
 and tankers carry range up to 10 times their cargo deadweight. This is 
 so because their operation is much simpler and their turnaround time at 
 loading and discharging ports about three times faster than general cargo 
 ships. 
 
particularly in those instances where the Soviet authorities desire 
 to control shipments and receipts of their cargoes. 
 
 SovFracht is also chiefly instrumental in arranging for 
 charters of Soviet flag ships to foreign operators. Soviet shipping 
 authorities are promoting the availability of their ships, parti- 
 cularly those of small and medium size, to foreign charterers 
 for trade in the Baltic, North Sea, and Mediterranean during 
 the spring and winter seasons. 58 Furthermore, Soviet ships which 
 operate in the Far East and Mediterranean services, for example, 
 may often return to Soviet ports in ballast, and such ships are 
 available for the movement of cargoes from one foreign port 
 to another at attractive rates. 59 
 
 The present five year plan (1966-1970) envisions an in- 
 crease of from two to two and one-half times in the chartering 
 operations of Soviet flag ships. It is expected that the income 
 from such operations will result in enough foreign exchange to 
 cover expenditures for Soviet chartered foreign flag tonnage 
 during the foregoing period.' 50 
 
 One of the newest Soviet passenger ships, the Alexandr 
 Pushkin, was chartered by a Swedish company for cruises 
 to the West Indies from Scandinavia for the period December 
 1966 to March 1967. Recently, Swedish companies have also 
 chartered Soviet flag timber carriers for operations between 
 Swedish and Mediterranean ports. 
 
 SHIPPING CONFERENCES AND POOLING AGREEMENTS 61 
 
 For many years Soviet shipping did not participate in ship- 
 ping conferences. One reason may have been that the bulk of 
 
 58 U.S. Government despatches and Fairplay Shipping Journal, August 
 18, 1966. 
 
 59 Ibid. 
 
 60 Vodnyy Transport, Moscow, April 26, 1906. 
 
 61 A steamship conference is composed of companies providing liner 
 service between the areas set forth in the agreement. A steamship con- 
 ference is essentially a rate-making body. The basic purpose of the confer- 
 ence is to reach common agreement among members with respect to trans- 
 portation rates and other conditions of carriage of goods or of passengers. 
 The conference agreement constitutes the written charter of the steamship 
 conference. It defines the scope of authority; provides the basis for violation 
 charges; and conditioned upon its approval by the Federal Maritime Com- 
 mission (where the United States is concerned) formally immunizes the 
 conference members from prosecution under the anti-trust laws of the 
 United States for acting pursuant to its provisions. A pooling agreement 
 is an arrangement between carriers for the division of revenues derived 
 from the operation of vessels in the particular trade covered, pursuant to a 
 formula set forth in the agreement which prescribes minimum sailing re- 
 quirements and the percentage of each carrier's participation in the total 
 revenue pool. 
 
 24 
 
the cargoes carried by ships in their major liner services were 
 moving on routes generally not subject to conference rates. 
 
 As Soviet shipping activities became world-wide in scope 
 and their authorities less parochial in their outlook, membership 
 in shipping conferences and participation in pooling agreements 
 appeared advantageous. Accordingly, membership was sought in 
 at least three of the major cargo and passenger conferences. 
 
 In November 1965, the Baltic Steamship Line of Leningrad, 
 whose fleet is believed to include about 111 ships of 627,000 
 gross tons, was accepted as a member-shipowner of the Baltic 
 and International Maritime Conference effective as of Jan- 
 uary 1, 1966. The Conference^ whose headquarters are in 
 Copenhagen, Denmark, is believed to have members from 66 
 countries whose ships total 45 million gross tons or about 30 
 percent of the world's merchant tonnage. It is really an ex- 
 clusive trade association with none of the functions of a ship- 
 ping conference. Rather, it serves its members by furnishing 
 them with information on current hydrographic data, port condi- 
 tions, objectionable clauses in bills of lading and charter parties, 
 and frequently serves as arbitrator in disputes involving charter 
 parties, bills of lading and labor agreements. It is not a maritime 
 exchange and no fixtures are made there. 
 
 With the advent of their new passenger ships into the 
 Atlantic service, the Baltic Steamship Line of Leningrad applied 
 for and was granted membership in the Trans- Atlantic Pas- 
 senger Conference, 62 outbound, from Canada and the United 
 States, with headquarters in New York. Membership was also 
 granted in the Atlantic Passenger Steamship Conference, 63 in- 
 bound to North America, with headquarters at Folkestone, Kent, 
 England. 
 
 The advantages to be gained by pooling arrangements over 
 some of the routes served by Soviet steamship lines are also 
 recognized by Soviet shipping authorities. Pooling agreements 
 between specific Soviet shipping lines and those of Belgian, 
 
 62 Area includes U.S. Atlantic, Gulf and Great Lakes ports; Canadian 
 Atlantic, St. Lawrence River and Newfoundland ports; European ports; 
 Asian and African ports bordering the Mediterranean Sea when tickets 
 are sold on the North American continent. The Conference has 22 member 
 lines from 16 countries and eight associate members from eight countries. 
 
 63 Area includes all ports in Europe, Mediterranean and Black Sea 
 countries; ports in Morocco, Spain and Azores; and North American 
 Eastern ports, including St. Lawrence River, Great Lakes and U.S. Gulf 
 ports. The Conference has 22 members from 14 countries and 10 associated 
 members from 7 countries. 
 
 25 
 
Bulgarian, French, East and West German, Indian, Japanese, 
 Netherlands, United Arab Republic, and British shipping- com- 
 panies are believed to be in force on a cargo sharing basis. 64 
 
 In addition to seeking membership in shipping conferences 
 and pooling arrangements, Soviet authorities have also con- 
 cluded bilateral agreements on shipping matters with a number 
 of countries, notably India and the United Arab Republic. A 
 recent statement by Viktor Bakayev 65 noted that: 
 
 ". . . Maritime countries engaged in considerable goods exchange 
 come up against many specific issues in the field of navigation 
 (shipping) , which have to be dealt with on a bilateral basis . . ." 
 ". . . Agreements among countries on mercantile navigation (ship- 
 ping) are the highest form of such relations. They may solve a 
 wide range of problems. Such an agreement between Great Britain 
 and the U.S.S.R. is known to have been agreed upon during Prime 
 Minister Harold Wilson's recent visit to Moscow. The maritime 
 organs of the U.S.S.R. intend to develop on large scale bilateral 
 relations on the basis of equality and mutual advantage." 
 
 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 The U.S.S.R. makes its voice heard on maritime matters 
 through its membership in a number of international organiza- 
 tions, among which the Intergovernmental Maritime Consulta- 
 tive Organization (IMCO), comprised of 63 member nations, 
 is probably one of the most important. The interests of the 
 Organization lie mainly in ships used in international services, 
 and its objectives are to facilitate cooperation among govern- 
 ments on technical matters affecting shipping, and with special 
 responsibility for the safety of life at sea. 
 
 Since the U.S.S.R. has one of the largest and most modern 
 fishing fleets in the world, it is especially interested in the 
 Working Group on the stability of fishing vessels in whose 
 activities its representatives participate. The U.S.S.R. delega- 
 tion plays an active role in IMCO deliberations and in its several 
 subsidiary bodies such as the Assembly, Council and Maritime 
 Safety Committee. 
 
 Some of the other organizations that are international in 
 scope and in which the U.S.S.R. holds memberships are: 
 
 The International Labor Organization (ILO), in collabor- 
 ation with IMCO through a joint committee, establishes programs 
 
 64 R. L. Guberman, et al, Organizatsiya Perevozok Eksportnykh i 
 Importnykh Gruzov SSSR, Moscow, 1962. 
 
 65 Soviet Novosti Press Agency (APN) as reported by U.S. Transport, 
 December 1, 1966, page 5. 
 
 26 
 
for training seafarers in the use of the latest safety devices 
 for ships as well as regulations for their use by member nations' 
 ships. 
 
 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
 (UNCTAD), Shipping Committee is a specialized agency within 
 the United Nations with a 55 nation Trade and Development 
 Board which carries out the continuing work of the Conference 
 between plenary sessions. The Shipping Committee is concerned, 
 among other matters, with the problems of international liner 
 freight rates and services as they affect trade between the 
 developing nations and the highly industrialized regions of the 
 world, the development of merchant fleets and port facilities 
 in the developing countries and other shipping problems of an 
 economic nature. The U.S.S.R.'s position in the Shipping Com- 
 mittee is expressed in the following statement by Viktor Bakayev: 66 
 
 ". . . The Shipping Committee under the UN Conference on Trade 
 and Development may become to be the foundation for dealing with 
 shipping problems. 
 
 "Until now, international maritime organizations focused their 
 attention on the legal and technical aspects of shipping, whereas 
 the statute of the new intergovernmental body permits to deal on 
 a much wider scale with the numerous problems of world sea ship- 
 ments, including the commercial relations between shipowners and 
 shippers. This may be considered to be the beginning of putting 
 the solution of all the problems of world shipping on an inter- 
 governmental footing. 
 
 "It is to be expected that in the future there will appear specialized 
 organizations either under the UN Shipping Committee or outside 
 it, which will deal with and solve a number of shipping problems 
 on an intergovernmental basis, among them the issues of unifying 
 port facilities, vessels, their servicing at ports, shipping documents, 
 tariffs, rates, dues, etc. 
 
 "The result, I think will be that the now existing numerous inter- 
 national conferences and shipping organizations, which developed 
 on the private enterprise basis, will gradually die-off or merge with 
 intergovernmental bodies . . ." 
 
 The Permanent International Association of Navigation Con- 
 gresses (PIANC) offers the U.S.S.R. a forum for discussion and 
 information on the technical and economic problems of ship- 
 ping and seaports — subjects of great and continuing interest to 
 Soviet shipping authorities. PIANC, whose headquarters are in 
 Brussels, Belgium, acts as an international clearing house of 
 information on maritime matters, particularly ports and harbor 
 developments. 
 
 The listing is by no means inclusive. The organizations are 
 
 66 Soviet Novosti Press Agency (APN) as reported by U.S. Transport, 
 December 1, 1966, page 5. 
 
 27 
 
noted cnly to give some idea of the U.S.S.R.'s participation in 
 international forums concerned with maritime matters. 
 
 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 1. The U.S.S.R. is one of the world's leading maritime powers. 
 The nation is actively engaged in the development of its mari- 
 time industries and, under the direction of the Ministries of the 
 Merchant Fleet and of the Shipbuilding Industry, continuing pro- 
 grams are being pursued in the areas of ship construction, 
 ship repair, port development, research and development, and 
 maritime personnel training facilities. 
 
 2. The Soviet merchant marine will probably increase at a 
 net annual rate of one million deadweight tons for the five year 
 period ending in 1970. 
 
 3. On the other hand, it is estimated that, after exclusion 
 of the U.S.S.R. tonnage from the world total, the net annual 
 growth for all other merchant fleets combined over the next five 
 years will be about eight million deadweight tons. 
 
 4. Although the Soviet merchant fleet has increased substan- 
 tially since 1960, the U.S.S.R. is dependent upon "supplier" na- 
 tions of the West for ships to move about 50 percent of its cargoes 
 in foreign trade. An analysis of the planned growth of U.S.S.R. 
 international commerce, its proposed shipping availabilities, and 
 statements of Soviet shipping authorities indicates that foreign 
 ship charters for the movement of a sizable portion of the 
 U.S.S.R. 's external trade will still be required by 1970. 
 
 5. It does not appear realistic to assume that the U.S.S.R. 
 will offer strong competition to the traditional "suppliers" of 
 shipping within the next five years — and probably not within 
 the next ten years for the following reasons: 
 
 a. Exclusive of Soviet merchant tonnage, the absolute net 
 growth in tonnage of the remaining maritime nations is esti- 
 mated at about eight times greater annually than the increase 
 in the Soviet fleet. 67 
 
 b. The U.S.S.R. has its own domestic shipping requirements 
 and those of the satellite nations with which to contend. 
 
 67 This relationship could be even greater since many of the ships on 
 order in the U.S.S.R. and satellite countries are on a planned basis and 
 may extend over a period of five years, whereas ships on order in non- 
 socialist countries are usually delivered within one or two years. 
 
 28 
 
c. The developing nations are particularly interested in ac- 
 quiring their own merchant fleets, either with second hand ton- 
 nage or from new construction, as a means of securing better 
 shipping rates for their exports of raw materials and imports 
 of finished products, and as a means of conserving their limited 
 foreign exchange resources. 
 
 d. The U.S.S.R. has, at best, 4.6 percent of the merchant 
 tonnage of the world. By 1970, it is estimated Soviet flag ships 
 will increase their relative position only slightly to less than 6 
 percent. 
 
 e. The U.S.S.R. has professed continued need for Western 
 shipping services in developing its own foreign trade. Moreover, 
 statements have been made by Soviet shipping authorities that 
 they have no desire to disturb "existing balances" in interna- 
 tional shipping and, in fact, have affirmed their strict adherence 
 to conference freight rates. 
 
 f. The U.S.S.R. has demonstrated the need to maximize its 
 acquisition of foreign exchange from its shipping services, which 
 is one of its significant exportable items, in order to pay for: 
 
 (1) present and future charters of foreign flag ships; 
 
 (2) essential food grains required for its own use and for 
 shipments to nations within its orbit and those it seeks to in- 
 fluence; 
 
 (3) the purchase of highly technical equipment which is 
 required for its own industrial development, and; 
 
 (4) ships built in foreign countries which are not acquired 
 on a bilateral trading basis. 
 
 g. A number of the satellite nations such as Poland, 
 Czechoslovakia and Rumania, for example, which are among the 
 U.S.S.R. 's principal trading partners, are now demanding gold 
 or transferable exchange, at least for part of their transactions 
 with the U.S.S.R. Since settlements are now made in rubles, 
 which are nontransferable, the bloc countries are tied to in- 
 terbloc trade and restricted in their purchases of desired goods 
 from Western nations. 
 
 29 
 
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